HAWAII'S JAPANESE COMMUNITY IN THE
POSTWAR DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT

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In summer 1994 I resumed doctoral study as a part-time long-distance graduate student while I had a full time teaching load at a college in Japan. I finished the comprehensive examinations in December 1997, and started the research for this dissertation. I never imagined that it would take over six years to complete it. Now that it is finally coming close to the end, I am very grateful to my committee members who understood my situation, and tried to help me. I am deeply indebted to Dr. Kiyoshi Ikeda, Dr. Eileen Tamura, Dr. Jonathan Okamura, Dr. David Swift, and especially to Dr. Patricia Steinhoff, my mentor and chair of the committee. I was about to give up my dream several times, but Dr. Steinhoff always tried to save me and pull me out from the “abyss” of piled up daily teaching demands. She always tried to show me the way that would lead to my goal. No words would express my present feeling of gratitude and respect to her.

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the social movements that changed the politics and social structure of Hawaii in the early 1950s from the perspective of its Japanese ethnic minority community. The landslide victory of the new Democrats in the 1954 election ended the 50-year Republican monopoly of Hawaii politics and came to be called the “Democratic Revolution” in Hawaii local history. The study uses the political process model and framing theory to analyze historical materials and data from a systematic content analysis of the Japanese language vernacular newspaper, *Hawaii Hochi*, in order to show how the Japanese speaking population of Hawaii, who were mostly first-generation (Issei) and elder second-generation (Nisei) took part in the social movements that led to this change.

First, the study demonstrates that the Japanese community had developed strong leadership and resources among the Issei early in the 20th century. The community had a long history of mobilizing community members to carry out labor strikes and other social movement campaigns aimed at obtaining equal status in American society, and viewed statehood for Hawaii and naturalization for Japanese as the prime vehicles for equality. Some elder Nisei won election to public office in the prewar period. Second, after World War II, the younger returning Nisei soldiers brought new momentum to these movements for equality, and the community managed to overcome the damage inflicted by the targeting of Japanese labor leaders in the Red Scare. Third, the study reveals the significant mobilization within the Japanese community in the early 1950s to support passage of new naturalization and immigration laws that would allow the Issei to become U.S. citizens, and then to promote their naturalization and voter registration. These
campaigns helped to turn many Issei into voters just in time to help elect the Nisei candidates, who won heavily in the 1954 election. And lastly, this dissertation suggests a new way to look at the "Democratic Revolution" as an alternation of leadership from the elder Nisei to younger Nisei.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements...........................................................................................................iv
Abstract..........................................................................................................................vi
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................x
List of Figures .................................................................................................................. xi

Chapter 1: Introduction ...................................................................................................1
   The Research Problem .................................................................................................1
   Content Analysis of Vernacular Newspaper: *Hawaii Hochi* .................................4
   Overview of the Political Process Model ...................................................................6
      Political Opportunities ............................................................................................7
      Mobilizing Structures ............................................................................................8
      Framing and Other Interpretive Processes .............................................................9
   Political Process Model and this Dissertation .........................................................10

Chapter 2: The Historical Basis for Postwar Social Movements in Hawaii’s Japanese Community .................................................................................................................13
   Social Structure of Hawaii: From Pre-Contact to Early Immigration .......................15
      The Social Structure of the Kingdom .....................................................................15
      Changes in the Status of Immigrant Workers under the Territory .........................17
      The Status of Japanese Workers in the Early Period ..............................................20
   Early Mobilization Period: 1900 through the 1920s .................................................21
      Mobilization of Internal Resources in the Japanese Community .........................23
      Social Movements and Events ..............................................................................28
      Development of Collective Identity and Resources .................................................40
   Emergence of the Nisei Generation: 1920s – 1945 ....................................................45
      Mobilization of Internal and External Resources ...................................................47
      Social Movements and Events ..............................................................................54
   Community Advancement and Wartime Setbacks .....................................................64
   Postwar Mobilization: 1945 – 1949 ..........................................................................66
      Mobilization of Community Resources ................................................................67
      Movements and Events .........................................................................................72
      New Political Opportunities After the War .............................................................80
   Meanings and Modes of Collective Action ................................................................81

Chapter 3: Red Scare and Strong Desire for Statehood ..................................................85
   The Red Scare Sets In ...............................................................................................88
   Statehood Drive: Japanese Community and Constitutional Convention ..................94
   HUAC (House Un-American Activities Committee) Hearings ..................................99
   Kageyama and Silva Affairs and the Constitutional Convention ..............................103
   McCarran’s Internal Security Act and the Reluctant 39 Trial ....................................106
   Completion of the Constitution and Statehood Bill Progress ....................................108
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1. Immigrant Arrivals in Hawaii, 1892-1899</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2. Party Membership of Territorial Legislators, 1901-1959</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3. List of Elected Politicians at Elections, 1950-1954</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4. Hawaii Politics and Nisei Politicians, 1950-1954</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1. Japanese Successful Candidates in Elections</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2. Circulation of <em>Hawaii Hochi</em> and <em>Nippu Jiji</em>, 1939-1960</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3. Communism and Statehood in <em>Hawaii Hochi</em></td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4. General Trend of Naturalization Related Articles</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5. Repatriation and Citizenship Recovery in <em>Hawaii Hochi</em></td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6. Naturalization and Immigration Act and War Bride Issues</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7. General Trend of Articles on Naturalization Promotion</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 8. Voting Class in <em>Hawaii Hochi</em></td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 9. Japanese Victories in Primary and General Elections</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 10. Election Related Articles in <em>Hawaii Hochi</em></td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 11. Advertisements for Candidates in <em>Hawaii Hochi</em></td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 12. Nisei Success Stories in <em>Hawaii Hochi</em></td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

"Some Coffee Drinkers Brewed a Revolution" was the headline for an article in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, a daily English newspaper, on February 25, 1975, about the achievement of a group of five "Coffee Drinkers" in the immediate postwar years. They were John A. Burns, Jack Kawano, Mitsuyuki Kido, Ernest Murai and Chuck Mau. According to the article, in early postwar Hawaii they had meetings on Saturday nights over coffee, and had long conversations about various political topics. Later in 1985 Roland Kotani wrote more minutely about the achievement of this group of "Coffee Drinkers" in his book, Japanese in Hawaii (130-131). The "revolution" these five are said to have started was the transfer of political power in Hawaii from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party, and the ensuing social transformations in the society. The landslide victory of the Democrats in the 1954 election marks the transfer point, after which the Democrats steadily strengthened their political control through statehood in 1959 and several decades thereafter.

The Research Problem

There have been many political analyses of the Democratic Revolution and many political biographies of its major actors (Aguiar 1996; Fuchs 1961; Hazama 1986; Kotani 1985; Phillips 1982; Ariyoshi 1997; Beechert and Beechert 2000; Boylan and Holmes 2000; Coffman 2003; Halloran 2002; Inouye 1967). All of the accounts make clear that Japanese Americans, particularly the Nisei generation of returning World War II veterans, played a major role in the social and political transformation of Hawaii. The Japanese
constituted one of the largest components of Hawaii's multiethnic population, and they rose to positions of prominence in politics, education, and other fields in the postwar period. This study takes a closer look at the role of the local Japanese community in the Democratic Revolution. Its aim is to deepen understanding of the social and political changes that took place by examining how the Japanese community participated in them, and how it understood them at the time they were happening. Unlike the political scientists and biographers who have studied this period, my study takes a different approach both theoretically and methodologically.

Theoretically, I approach the issue as a sociological problem of social change, in which members of the Japanese community participated as social actors who challenged their unequal status and eventually won political power and an equal place in the larger society. In order to see how those changes came about, I use the theoretical tools developed for the study of social movements. In particular, I use as a model Doug McAdam’s seminal study of the civil rights movement in the United States, through which he developed new ways of looking at how a minority can mobilize its internal resources and successfully challenge the dominant majority, which he called the Political Process model.

Methodologically, I use a form of data that is now quite commonly utilized for social movements research, the daily newspaper. Newspapers provide a contemporaneous record of what was happening in the society and how it was interpreted at the time. Although they are not by any means comprehensive, and they may have many factual errors, newspapers offer an unparalleled basis for systematic analysis of what actually happens in the course of a social movement. While some of the other studies of the
Democratic Revolution in Hawaii have made good use of the English language dailies as sources of general information, this study uses a Japanese language vernacular newspaper that served Hawaii's Japanese community for a systematic content analysis of the five years leading up to the election of November 1954 that marks the debut of the Democratic Revolution. In addition, I use a variety of other primary and secondary sources to broaden the findings of the content analysis and to see how earlier developments within the Japanese community prepared it to participate in a variety of social movement campaigns of the early 1950s that in turn led the way to the electoral victory of 1954.

Consequently, my study is pitched somewhere between the broad macro-historical and social factors of a general study of social change, and the micro-level study of individual political biographies. It focuses on the meso-level of social groups, organizations, and institutions that are created by individuals to carry out collective purposes -- tasks in which they may succeed or fail due to complex combinations of circumstances. I do not look at organizations to study them in their own right, but rather to see how they become the building blocks that mobilize resources for organized campaigns to achieve some social goal.

Because my primary data source is a Japanese language newspaper, my focus is on the first generation (Issei) members of the Japanese community, who produced the newspaper and constituted its readership. The study therefore looks at the Democratic Revolution and the social movement activities that led up to it through the eyes of the Issei, whereas most other studies focus on the Nisei who were its visible actors. There are many reasons that the Issei were not as visible, and perhaps in the conventional sense
not as politically important in the Big Story of the Democratic Revolution as the Nisei. I argue, however, that as the elders in the Japanese community they were very important behind the scenes, both in the decades-long run-up to 1954 and as the focus of a great deal of internal political and social activity within the Japanese community during the early 1950s.

In short, this study examines the involvement of Hawaii’s Japanese community, particularly its Issei generation, in various social movement campaigns and issues that eventually culminated in the Democratic Revolution with the election of 1954. It does so by using the theoretical tools of social movements research, with the vernacular Japanese daily newspaper *Hawaii Hoeki* as its primary data source.

**Content Analysis of Vernacular Newspaper, Hawaii Hoeki**

Content analysis of newspapers is a standard approach for the political process model in the study of social movements. McAdam used a content analysis of the New York Times (index only) for part of his study. In this study of social democratic movement in postwar Hawaii, articles in *Hawaii Hoeki* will provide the primary data. *Hawaii Hoeki* was established in 1912 so that it has a long history as a community newspaper. In the postwar era, it was a daily paper from Monday to Saturday. Each issue had six to eight pages in the Japanese language section and two to four pages in the English language section. The English section was not necessarily the translation of Japanese articles, and vice versa. As the number of pages shows, the Japanese section had more information than the English section. The subscribers of this newspaper were mostly Issei and some Nisei with good Japanese reading command. The articles included news stories, feature stories, editorials, letters, column of different sorts, notification of
upcoming social events, fund raising campaigns, and so forth. Each page had some space for advertisements of various sizes.

Since *Hawaii Hochi* is not indexed, I read a microfilm copy of the newspaper from 1950 through 1954 in order to find the relevant articles for this study. Articles were selected and coded appropriately if they were about labor unions, Red Scare, statehood, Naturalization and Immigration laws, naturalization promotion and voting movement, politics, and Nisei’s success. I also selected and coded all political advertisements. The total number of collected articles and advertisements was over 4,200.

I used the materials for both quantitative and qualitative analysis. For the quantitative part, I coded the articles and advertisements into an Access database, taking note of several variables. From this material I could examine the overall distribution of coverage on a particular topic over time, and find time-based patterns of relationship among the topics. Virtually all of the tables and charts in the dissertation were produced in Excel from the content analysis data. For the qualitative part, I read the groups of articles on each topic carefully, looking for patterns and themes, and for symbolic uses of language that attached specific meaning to particular actions or events. These are presented in the narrative, with quotations from specific articles as needed.

As the data for this study I relied on the content analysis of *Hawaii Hochi* articles as well as secondary sources and available oral histories of political actors. The oral histories were especially important in understanding how those people recalled the events and evaluated them retrospectively, just as the newspaper articles were important for understanding how events were understood and talked about at the time they happened.
Overview of the Political Process Model

The political process model, upon which this dissertation is based, developed from the resource mobilization theory advocated by John McCarthy, Mayer Zald and other American sociologists. The resource mobilization theory has some strong features. First, this theory describes social movements as collections of political actors dedicated to the advancement of their stated substantive goals. Second, in describing social movements as political phenomena, this theory has attributed rationality to movement participants. Third, this theory broadens the scope of the analysis to take account of the effect of external groups on the development of the movement. Fourth, this theory clarifies that social movements would be dependent on some combination of formal and informal groups for their persistence and success (McAdam 1999, 22-23).

However, the resource mobilization model has its own deficiencies. According to McAdam (1999, 25), first, this theory has some problem in describing the relationship of elite groups to social movements. Assuming that challenging groups were powerless, it focuses on outside elites as an important source behind their movements. Second, this theory does not pay full attention to the challenging capabilities of excluded groups. Third, this theory does not clearly define what resources are necessary for collective actions, and fourth, this theory does not acknowledge the enormous potential for variability in the subjective meanings people attach to their objective situations.

When McAdam studied the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, he realized the deficiencies of the resource mobilization theory above, and found a necessity to develop an alternative theoretical approach. It was the political process model, and this model has overcome the deficiencies of the resource mobilization. The good features
of resource mobilization become some strong points for the model. Over time, and with the contributions of other theorists, there is now a broad consensus on the main features of the model. They are expressed in three broad sets of factors for analyzing the emergence and development of social movements (McAdam et al. 1996, 2). They are: (1) political opportunities, (2) mobilizing structures, and (3) framing processes.

**Political Opportunities**

The structure of political opportunities and constraints confronting the movement is important in the analysis. Under ordinary circumstances, challengers face enormous obstacles in their efforts to advance group interests. Usually challengers do not have access to decision-making processes in a society. However, some changes in political or social environment would ease the challengers to start collective actions. McAdam explains:

> The point is that any broad social change process that significantly undermines the calculations and assumptions on which the political establishment is structured is very likely to cause a significant expansion in political opportunity for single or multiple challengers. Among the events and processes likely to disrupt the political status quo are wars, industrialization, international political realignments or concerted political pressure from international actors, economic crisis, and widespread demographic shifts (McAdam 1999, ix)

In studying the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 60s, McAdam looked into the generation process of the movement. He found that “social insurgency is shaped by broad social processes that usually operate over a longer period of time” (1999, 41). As a result, he found that the political opportunity structures confronting blacks gradually improved during the period from 1930 to 1954, “thus affording insurgents more leverage with which to press their demands” (1999, 230). It is a strong point of McAdam’s political process model to take this longer historical perspective, and I will adopt this idea
of political process as arising over a longer time period in my empirical study of social movements in postwar Hawaii.

**Mobilizing Structures**

McAdam defines "mobilizing structures" as those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action. Resource mobilization theorists focus on the meso-level groups, organizations, and informal networks as important factors. If the challengers cannot form organizations or networks, it is less likely the collective actions will occur. It is the organizational vehicles available to the group at the time the opportunity presents itself that condition its ability to exploit the new opening. In the absence of such vehicles, the group is apt to lack the capacity to act even when afforded the opportunity to do so (McAdam 1999, ix). For instance, in his empirical study on civil rights movement, McAdam found "the existent organizational strength was needed to mount and sustain a social movement" (1999, 231) as organizational vehicles.

In emphasizing the importance of existent networks or organizations, McAdam argued that "the significance of such organizations would appear to be largely a function of four crucial resources they afford insurgents" (1999, 44). They were: 1) members, 2) established structure of solidary incentives, 3) communication network, and 4) leaders. First, the members were recruited into the movement along established lines of interaction, by virtue of their involvement in organizations that serve as the associational network out of which a new movement emerges. Second, the established structure of solidary incentives is a resource available to the challengers through indigenous organizations. This means "the myriad interpersonal rewards that provide the motive
force for participation in these groups” (McAdam 1999, 45). The third resource, communication network, is the infrastructure for the movement, the strength and breadth of which largely determine the pattern, speed, and extent of movement expansion (McAdam 1999, 46). The last resource McAdam posits is leaders. Recognized leaders are important for the organizations. “In the context of political opportunity and widespread discontent there still remains a need for the centralized direction and coordination of a recognized leadership” (McAdam 1999, 47). With these elements in the indigenous organization being ready, the challengers can set out the collective action.

**Framing and other Interpretive Processes**

Having well-organized organizations and given a good environment to start movements, the challengers must share common purposes or an idea of oneness in order to actually start a collective action. The challengers can start an effective collective action when they share the common collective identity and have common understandings toward what they are going to accomplish. “Mediating between opportunity, organization and action are the shared meanings, and cultural understandings – including a shared collective identity – that people bring to an instance of incipient contention” (McAdam 1999, ix-x).

The challengers are discontent with something to begin with, but they must feel that they can redress the “something” that is causing their dissatisfaction. “The relevant mobilizing emotions are anger at the perceived injustice and hope that the injustice can be redressed through collective action. . . Conditioning the presence or absence of these perceptions is that complex of social psychological dynamics – collective attribution, social construction” (McAdam 1999, ix-x) which were referred as framing processes by
David Snow and other framing theorists. In the elaboration of framing processes set forth by Snow and his associates, the success of the social movement depends heavily on whether the group is able to impose meanings on the situation that will motivate people to act.

**Political Process Model and this Dissertation**

Thus, I would like to apply the three factors of the political process model as McAdam defines them to my research and analysis on the democratic movement in immediate postwar Hawaii. The dissertation is organized topically, as well as chronologically.

First in Chapter 2 on the political opportunities, I will cover a long time period preceding the actual postwar social movement within the Japanese community in Hawaii. In order to look at the development of internal community-based small and meso level social movement campaigns and drives within Hawaii’s Japanese community and also to see the connections with the larger movements such as Territory-wide campaigns and activities of national level organizations, the theory suggests that I should go back to the earlier time period. Thus I will see how the community developed the internal organizations and leadership that made it ready to take advantage of a change in the political situation. I will also cover the organizations and earlier social movements or campaigns and try to evaluate their outcomes, including how they received negative effect from some social control measures. For this chapter more secondary documents will be used to see the historical background.

In Chapter 3, I will cover the Red Scare, a major counter-movement that would become the most negative political opportunity upon the postwar social campaigns within
the Japanese community and upon larger-scale social movements on the Territory and national levels. In this chapter I also deal with the larger scale social movement campaign for statehood, in which Japanese community played a significant role as a supporting element and which had great significance for the community. The Red Scare and statehood campaign were both part of the national level context and were very much intertwined with each other.

In discussing the Red Scare as a constraint at the national level as well as the Territorial level statehood campaign, I will use the content analysis of *Hawaii Hochi* articles that covered these events. *Hochi* articles will offer the eyes of Japanese Issei within the community to look at the national and Territorial phenomenon as well as the people’s feelings toward and understandings about the movements and events. In the *Hochi* articles, I will look for the framing or meanings attached to the movements and campaigns as well as documenting actual social movement activities.

Chapter 4 discusses several small-scale movements within the Japanese community, including support campaigns for passage of new Naturalization and Immigration laws, a naturalization promotion campaign, and a voting campaign. Here the content analysis of *Hawaii Hochi* articles was utilized to find political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures and framing processes. As McAdam (1999) pointed out, the relations of mass base and leaders would be important on some occasions in the political process model, and Chapter 4 will discuss this issue. This chapter also shows clearly how the internal mobilization within the Japanese community engaged the Issei generation in Hawaii politics and prepared them to participate, either as voters or as enthusiastic observers, in the election campaigns of 1954.
Chapter 5 deals with the political and democratic movement focusing on the rise of Nisei into the political, government administrative and judiciary arenas. Using the articles of *Hawaii Hochi*, this chapter will shed a spotlight on this larger scale movement from the standpoint of the Japanese community. The content analysis of the *Hochi* articles will clarify the mobilizing structures and framing processes involved in generating and developing the movement within the Japanese community. This chapter will regard the events and movements discussed in the former chapters as part of the political opportunities for the larger scale political movement in the 1950s in Hawaii society.

Through these chapters, I will try to narrate the feelings, opinions, and understandings of the newspaper writers and readers that could never have been expressed in the language other than their own language, Japanese. I should be able to construct one aspect of the historical reality of social democratic movements in the Japanese community in postwar Hawaii through this analysis of materials written in their own language. By discussing the political opportunities, mobilization structures, and framing processes using the Japanese articles, the dynamics of the mobilization and development of these social movements will become clear. Accordingly, this dissertation will shed light on the particular aspect of the social movements that could only be seen from inside the Japanese community.
CHAPTER 2
THE HISTORICAL BASIS FOR POSTWAR SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN HAWAII'S JAPANESE COMMUNITY

In the political process model that this dissertation is based upon, it is very important to clarify the historical developments that give birth to social movements. Social movements “are held to arise as a result of the fortuitous confluence of external political opportunities, internal organization and framing processes” (McAdam 1999, x). McAdam emphasized the gradual development of resources within an oppressed or aggrieved community. This serves as the foundation for mounting a successful social movement when a favorable political opportunity arises.

In contrast to the resource mobilization theory that looked at the resources available once a movement had developed, McAdam’s approach emphasized a longer historical time frame during which a social group developed community institutions. During that time it may have tried to develop social movements with limited success. Close examination of those early movements reveals not only how adverse conditions of political opportunity limited their success, but also how the social group developed a collective identity and how community institutions were strengthened in the process. These institutions in turn provide the foundation for later social movements.

Thus I would like to look at the conditions that made it possible for aggrieved challengers who had been unsatisfied with certain situations in the society to create change through a social movement, by examining the development of the Japanese community over its history in Hawaii. In order to analyze the generating process of the
movement, the following factors will be studied: 1) the existent political power structure of the society; 2) the organizational networks the challengers developed; 3) whether the challengers had access to various kinds of resources within the society; and 4) how the community's collective identity developed and changed over time.

Accordingly, this chapter examines the social and power structures and political mechanisms in prewar and early postwar Hawaii society, to see how the postwar social changes were brought forth. It focuses on the dynamic changes in political power structure in the historical context as the political basis for the postwar social movements in Hawaii. It examines how the actors of the early social movements developed and used resources such as existing organizations and networks to mobilize the people in the society. Hence, this chapter draws a rough sketch of the main organizations that developed within the Japanese community and shows their role in various social movement campaigns. In the analysis I will also show how the collective identity of the Japanese community changed over time. I will try to capture these changes in collective identity by examining how the Japanese in Hawaii framed various issues in relation to their community.

The chapter is divided into several time periods so that these factors can be assessed within each era. I first look at the social structure of Hawaii and how it changed during the early immigration of Japanese contract laborers. I then look at the first three decades of the twentieth century as the period when Japanese developed a settled community in Hawaii with their own community organizational structure, and engaged in some early social movement campaigns. The third section examines the changes that arose from the 1930s to 1945, as the Nisei generation came of age. The final chronological section
covers changes in the first years after the war ended, which set the stage for the social movements of the early 1950s that contributed to the Democratic Revolution of 1954. Each of these sections has its own discussion section, with an additional overall analysis at the end of the chapter.

**Social Structure of Hawaii: From Pre-contact to Early Immigration**

**The Social Structure of the Kingdom**
Hawaii society has had a unique ethnic and class structure due to its historical experiences with various groups of immigrants. The postwar social movements in Hawaii were generated within this unique structure, so this section goes back to the time when Hawaii encountered the first group of immigrants and how it became a uniquely stratified society.

Even before encountering any newcomers, the traditional indigenous Hawaiian society was already a simple stratified society, made up of the *alii* ("chiefs") and *makaainana* ("workers"). The former distributed land, levied taxes, and settled disputes. The latter produced surpluses sufficient to support the chiefs and to trade (Okihiro 1991, 4). European and American traders who came to the Islands in the late 18th century introduced the market economy to Hawaiian society. When Captain James Cook first "discovered" the Islands, Hawaii was suffering from warfare among several strong chiefs. Kamehameha I, the great chief and warrior, finally succeeded in unifying the Islands. It became a constitutional monarchy in which Hawaiian kings reigned, but Kamehameha’s first cabinet already had some European and American advisors, who influenced the Kingdom’s politics. Hawaiians accepted the white settlers as equal partners, but the white
settlers regarded the Hawaiians as an inferior race. After the American Missionary Board came to Hawaii to introduce Christianity, the missionaries influenced the Hawaiian value system and culture in many ways. They provided Hawaiians not only with western technologies and knowledge, including a writing system for the Hawaiian language, but also with Christian values. Consequently, traditional Hawaiian values gradually gave way to Christian ethics even in the daily lives of Hawaiian commoners.

The power of Christian missionaries and their offspring grew in Hawaiian government. Although their numbers were small, they became literally the white elite class of the Hawaiian Kingdom. One of the crucial reformations that made the power of the white elite absolute was the land reform, which allowed the commoners and foreigners to own land on a fee-simple basis. It opened the way for the white elite to acquire land to produce the cash crop, sugar. Hawaii’s sugar industry boomed thanks to the increase in demand for sugar from the U.S. mainland. Sugar production required a lot of labor, which was made available by introducing immigrant laborers. The population of native Hawaiians had been decreasing due to the diseases introduced by the foreigners and food shortage caused by the destruction of the traditional staple food production system. In order to supply the labor for sugar production, the planters introduced the immigrants from various European and Asian countries.

In 1876, the reciprocity treaty removed trade barriers between the United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom. It also gave the United States permission to use Pearl Harbor as a military base. This treaty boosted Hawaii’s sugar industry, and the number of sugar plantations increased from twenty in 1875 to sixty-three by 1880 (Kent 1983, 47). More and more immigrant workers from various countries worked on the
plantations across the Islands. The immigration of Japanese laborers began at first as government contract immigration (*Kanyaku Imin*) between the Hawaiian Kingdom and Japanese governments in 1885, and lasted until 1908. From 1894 till 1900, a private immigration company took the initiative. In 1900, the immigrants began to come without a master contract, as free laborers. As Table 1 shows, by 1900 Japan had become the single largest source of immigrant laborers working in the sugar industry.

Gradually the white elite politicians and businessmen in the sugar business came to control the politics of the Kingdom. The Big Five, the five large companies in sugar production in Hawaii, were often referred to as the symbol of the strong power of the sugar industry owners. These five companies were: Castle & Cook Ltd., American Factors Ltd., Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd., and Theo. H. Davies & Company Ltd.

In 1893, the Hawaiian Kingdom was overthrown by a small group of white elites who had formed the Committee of Safety. Failing to fulfill their original purpose of immediate annexation of Hawaii to the United States, the leaders of the Committee of Safety proclaimed the Hawaiian Republic in 1894. When war broke out between the United States and Spain, the geopolitical advantage of Hawaii became more attractive to American politicians. In 1898, the dream of the annexationists of Hawaii was finally fulfilled when the U.S. Congress voted to annex Hawaii.

**Changes in the Status of Immigrant Workers under the Territory**

The overthrow of the Kingdom and the annexation of Hawaii to the United States seemed like something happening in a different world for many immigrant workers in the sugar industry who lived in the rural areas of Hawaii. However, the political status of immigrant laborers as well as native Hawaiians changed when the Organic Act went into effect in 1900 and Hawaii officially became a Territory of the United States.
For the last several years of the Kingdom and throughout the following short Republic years, the government had imposed property qualifications on elected Representatives. The 1887 constitution (called the Bayonet Constitution) also imposed property qualifications on voters. Moreover, this constitution enfranchised residents of American or European ancestry, but denied the vote to Asian residents. Under these restrictions, native Hawaiians of working class were unable to participate in politics, and almost none of the Asian immigrants participated in politics.

Hawaii’s Organic Act of 1900 was based on American democracy. The leaders of the new Territorial government in fact consisted mostly of the same people as the Republic’s government officials, who had placed the qualifications on voters and those to be elected. Now they had to accept the laws in the forms of American democracy. Regarding voting qualifications, the Organic Act had no property qualifications for either voting or holding office (Okihiro 1991, 13). Logically, since Hawaiians had a numerical majority at the polls from 1900 until 1924, there should have been a possibility for Hawaiians to control Hawaii politics. It was not so simple, however.

The Home Rule Party, which wanted to work for the interests of ordinary native Hawaiians, won control of the Territorial Legislature only once in the election of fall 1900. The Republican Party, the party of the white elite, succeeded in collecting Hawaiian votes by supporting popular Hawaiian candidates. For instance, Prince Jonah Kuhio Kalanianaole won the race for delegate to Congress with strong backing from the Republican Party. By supporting a few prominent Hawaiian politicians on their side and giving public service jobs to those ordinary Hawaiians who supported Republican politics, the Republican white elite was able to maintain control over the politics of Hawaii. As
Okihiro pointed out, “between 1910 and 1940, Republicans controlled more than 80 percent of the seats in the Territorial Legislature.” (See Table 2)

There was a contradiction even within the American Federal laws. Although the Federal laws declared democracy, they denied naturalization to Asian immigrants. Therefore, these Asians could never enjoy voting rights under the unequal laws of America, the country of freedom and equality. Okihiro quoted an observation of a Department of the Interior official at the time.

When the Organic Act was passed, it was accepted without question that Hawaii was to be governed by a ruling class of approximately 4,000 Americans and other Anglo Saxon peoples who were to have dominion over the remaining 145,000 residents of the Islands (quoted in Okihiro, *ibid.*).^1^

It was clear that racism in the minds of the white elite made them believe that they were naturally entitled to be the ruling class.

As to the legal status of immigrant laborers, there was a change in their status from the Kingdom - Republic era to the Territorial era. In the Kingdom and Republic years, the immigrant laborers working in the sugar industry were placed under the control of the Masters and Servants Act of 1850. This Act bound the masters and servants to labor contracts for as long as five years. The labor conditions were severe and there were punishments if the laborers neglected their required jobs. In order to enforce the contract, the Act stated that the laborers would face “imprisonment, fines, and extensions of the contract period” if they did not meet the requirements (Okihiro 1991, 15).

After annexation, the Organic Act clearly banned the contract labor system in the U.S. Territory of Hawaii. Therefore, the immigrant laborers were free from the severe working conditions enforced by the contracts. Moreover, they were even free to go to the U.S. mainland because Hawaii became a part of America. Finally the immigrant laborers became free labor and they were not bound to the workplaces to which they had been assigned.

The Status of Japanese Workers in the Early Period

The changing forms of governments from the Kingdom, then to the Republic, and finally to the U.S. Territorial government, worked both positively and negatively on early Japanese immigrants in Hawaii. Under the contract in the Hawaiian Kingdom and Republic days, the workers were bound to their assigned workplaces. But under the U.S. Territorial government, they became free to work in any place. Therefore many Japanese workers decided to move even to the mainland. On the other hand, regarding citizenship, living in the U.S. Territory worked negatively on Japanese residents. In the Kingdom and Republic days, if they earned enough money they could have had the right to participate in politics. However, under the U.S. naturalization law, Japanese became “aliens ineligible for citizenship,” which meant there was no possibility for Japanese to participate in politics under the prevailing Naturalization Law.

From the beginning, Japanese immigrant laborers were incorporated in the uniquely racialized society of Hawaii. Most of the Japanese immigrants came from farming backgrounds, although there were some exceptions. The sugar planters imported immigrant laborers from several European countries, Asian countries, and the Pacific Islands. They were placed under the divide and rule policy.
In this early period, Japanese immigrants thought of themselves as *dekasegi* workers, so they did not care much about how they lived in Hawaii. *Dekasegi* was a common labor system in Japan, under which laborers left their hometown for a while to work in order to return home with more money. They regarded the place of work as temporary and were still bound to the home communities to which they expected to return. Community organizations did not develop among the Japanese workers in Hawaii during this period because people did not feel the necessity. The Japanese consulate protected the human rights of Japanese immigrants in Hawaii when necessary. The immigrants themselves looked up to the consulate officials and asked them for help when they were in trouble. Thus, we could conclude that community organizations did not evolve yet because the political opportunities were not sufficiently developed, and the Japanese had not fostered appropriate collective identity to start challenging the exploited status in which they were placed. They relied on one resource, the Japanese government, to safeguard their interests. While the political structure around them changed, they remained uninvolved and simply subject to its changing requirements.

**Early Mobilization Period: 1900 through the 1920s**

Immigration of Japanese workers continued from the first governmental contract workers who arrived in Hawaii in 1885 until 1908. Until the 1920 dual union sugar strike, the majority of sugar plantation workers consisted of Japanese Issei. Even after the 1920 strike, many Japanese workers still worked on plantations with Filipinos. The population of Japanese residents grew rapidly, and as early as 1900, Japanese comprised about forty percent of the total population of Hawaii. By that time the Japanese community was
beginning to settle down in Hawaii. Japanese women arrived as arranged brides for male workers and these new Japanese families began to have Nisei children, who acquired American citizenship by virtue of their birth in an American territory.

With the freedom to leave their contract labor positions, some Japanese moved off the plantations and started to develop businesses, while those on remaining on the plantations began to view their working conditions in a new light. The collective identity of the community shifted from that of dekasegi workers who were only in Hawaii to work until they could return with some money to support a better life in Japan, to become a settler community that needed to develop a better life in Hawaii. The Japanese community began developing institutions to support its life in Hawaii, and the first attempts at political engagement emerged.

This section highlights the early mobilizing period of Hawaii’s Japanese community. First, I will introduce several key organizations that played various roles within the community. Some community organizations worked as mutual aid associations, whereas others emerged for specific purposes and tried to mobilize Japanese into social movements around various issues. The latter will be introduced within the context of these social movements. Both types of organizations provided the foundation for a new political engagement of the Japanese community within the host society of Hawaii.

Second, I will focus on several key events and social movements that arose during this period and engaged the Japanese community: the Great Sugar Strike of 1909, the dual union sugar strike of 1920, the language school controversy, the Educational Campaign, and the Campaign for Naturalization of Issei War Veterans. The analysis will focus on how new leaders within the Japanese community utilized available resources,
how they developed a new collective identity upon which to mobilize the community into these social movements, and how positive and negative political opportunities affected the movements.

**Mobilization of Internal Resources in the Japanese Community**

**General Community Organizations**

A number of Japanese community organizations emerged in the plantation camps and among the city dwellers during this period. The main purpose of these organizations was for self-help among the community members. Over time, they came to constitute the basic structure of the community and fostered its local leadership.

Kenjinkai and Other Locality-Based Groups

*Kenjinkai* literally means prefectural association. *Kenjinkai* were organized by those who came from the same prefecture in Japan “for mutual aid in time of illness or death, as well as for various kinds of misfortune” (Kimura 1988, 25). Such mutual aid networks were common in Japanese rural communities, and the immigrants transplanted a familiar form of community-based social organization into their new setting. As is well known, over eighty percent of Japanese immigrants were from Hiroshima, Yamaguchi, Kumamoto, Okinawa, and Fukuoka. It was not practical to organize *Kenjinkai* when they were a very large number of people from the same prefecture in one neighborhood, because these mutual aid groups operate as small, face-to-face organizations based on mutual trust. In that case, they organized *Sonjinkai* for those who were from the same home village (*son*). In the case of Okinawans, they had also *Azajinkai*, which were organized by those who came from the same *aza*, a smaller section.
These organizations helped orient newcomers to a familiar community of Japanese from the same local area. Although they defined membership and identity on the basis of one's place of origin in Japan, they became the basis for stabilizing collective identity and community membership in Hawaii. By reinforcing social ties among Japanese in Hawaii, they served as arenas for development of local leadership as well as recruiting pools for mobilizing the community to participate in local activities. As in Japan, a sense of obligation and loyalty to members of one's immediate community facilitated the mobilization of individuals through these established groups. Thus, although their aims were not overtly political, they played a role in mobilization for social movement activity.

Hongwanji and Other Buddhist Temples

Japanese immigrants organized various religious organizations from the very beginning of their residence in Hawaii. Since the majority of immigrants were from areas where people were affiliated with Honpa Hongwanji, the first Buddhist bishops that had come to Hawaii in the last 10 years of the 19th century were all from Honpa Hongwanji. The bishops were accepted in the community as leaders with intellectual and cultural capital. Especially after the 1910s when the majority of Japanese became determined to settle down in Hawaii, the Buddhist temples played very important social roles as ties to bind the immigrant families. Besides Honpa Hongwanji, other sects such as Higashi Hongwanji (Jodo Shin), Nichiren, Soto, Shingon, Kannon-kyo, and I built temples and started their own sect communities in Hawaii (Kimura 1988, 156). Most of these Buddhist temples ran Japanese language schools for children in their temple buildings. They served as Japanese cultural centers and functioned as day care centers for Nisei children who were born in Hawaii.
Japanese Christian Churches

The number of Christians among Japanese immigrants was very small in the beginning. Although Hawaii at that time already was a Christian society, some of Hawaii’s Japanese immigrants became Christianized under the influence of Japanese ministers from Japan, not of the American ministers in Hawaii. The very first Bible class started in the mid 1880s in Hawaii, and Christian churches run by Japanese ministers grew with some support from influential American businessmen, although the number of churches was quite small compared with that of Buddhist temples. These Christian ministers also were respected as prominent leaders of the Japanese community, along with the Buddhist bishops. However, Japanese immigrants were basically Buddhists so that the number of Japanese Christians did not grow fast. They took part in the Americanization movement and the public morals movement. Okumura Takie, a prominent Christian minister, started one of the very first Japanese language schools in the Islands. Christian ministers paid much attention to the well-being of the immigrant lives.

Nihonjin Shogyo Kaigisho (Japanese Chamber of Commerce)

The Honolulu Nihonjin Shonin Doshikai (Honolulu Japanese Merchants Association) was organized to help the victims of the Honolulu fire of 1900. It changed its name to the Honolulu Nihonjin Shogyo Kaigisho (Honolulu Japanese Chamber of Commerce) in 1912. The leaders of this organization were usually regarded as the notable leaders of the Japanese community. Occasionally their interests did not match with those of the plantation workers and small independent farmers.
Japanese Language Schools and Hawaii Kyōiku Kai (Japanese Educational Association of Hawaii)

The purpose of Japanese language schools was to bring up children to appreciate their Japanese language and culture. Because the children were expected to go back to Japan with their parents when the parents saved enough money to go home, they had to learn Japanese language and culture. In the early days when Issei immigrants thought of themselves as *dekasegi* workers who would return to Japan in a few years, the schools established and run by the Issei parents taught very similar classes as the schools in Japan did for bringing up patriotic Japanese children.

In the mid-1910s, more and more Issei parents decided to settle down in Hawaii as they realized that it would take much longer to earn enough to go home. Then Japanese language schools began to change the content of the classes to teach mainly two subjects, Japanese language and Japanese morals. In 1914 the united organization of the Japanese language schools, *Hawaii Kyōiku Kai* (Japanese Educational Association of Hawaii) was organized and unified the content of the classes by publishing their own textbooks suitable for Hawaii-born American citizens of Japanese ancestry. The textbooks emphasized becoming loyal Americans by respecting Japanese cultural virtues.

The language schools are significant not only because of their cultural leadership and close ties to Japanese families, but also because they became involved in litigation over their right to exist. That controversy in turn sparked a social movement that mobilized the Japanese community.
Community Newspapers

In prewar Hawaii the Japanese vernacular presses played a significant role in leading Japanese community opinion. There were about seven Japanese vernacular daily papers throughout the Islands in their prewar prime. The Japanese newspapers were born as the information source for Issei immigrants who were sugar industry workers and small shopkeepers. Some Japanese newspapers existed in Hawaii before 1900. These papers served as community resources to give information on social gatherings, or to convey notices from the Japanese consulate.

In the face of overt and covert discrimination from the host society, some educated Japanese as leaders mobilized their fellow Japanese workers by using the Japanese vernacular papers as a vehicle for spreading their ideas to strike against the sugar planters. The Japanese paper, Nippu Jiji\(^2\) played a significant role during the Japanese Great Strike of 1909. Nippu’s owner Soga Yasutaro was one of the four leaders of the 1909 strike who were arrested. Realizing the power of the pen, another 1909 strike leader Fred Makino Kinzaburo established a newspaper company of his own in 1912 with the motto, “Fuhen Futou Dokuritsu Fuki (Unbiased and Independent).” Later, Hawaii Hochi and its owner Makino played an important role in filing litigation to test the constitutionality of the Territorial control laws to control the foreign language schools.

The newspapers in the early years of the Japanese community not only maintained a role as media to convey information to their readers, but they tended to become opinion leaders either to mobilize the readers for social movements or to discourage them from

\(^2\) Nippu Jiji took over the former Yamato Shinbun, which had been founded as early as 1885.
doing so. This was possible because the newspaper owners and editors had enough education either in Japan or the U.S. mainland to write and propagate their own opinions.

Social Movements and Events

Utilizing the community organizations, newspapers, and available networks, Japanese community leaders initiated various social movements to change their living conditions. They exploited various political opportunities and mobilized the community for specific campaigns. Community organizations created to promote specific social movements gradually emerged in the early 1900s. Japanese immigrants were in the process of changing from viewing themselves as *dekasegi* workers to seeing themselves as settled members of the Japanese community in Hawaii after the 1908 Gentlemen’s Agreement, which was a U.S.-Japan Agreement to stop further immigration of Japanese to the United States. They started organizing groups to challenge the powerful ruling class in order to make their lives better in Hawaii.

The 1909 Great Japanese Strike

In the hierarchical society of Hawaii, the immigrants from Asian countries had to live with some discriminated social/economic/legal systems. Asian immigrants were generally dissatisfied with the lower wages and harsher working conditions in the sugar industry, compared with the conditions of European immigrant laborers doing the same kinds of jobs. Since the Gentlemen’s Agreements between U.S. and Japanese governments stopped the further immigration of immigrant workers from Japan to the U.S. (including Hawaii), and further migration of Hawaii’s Japanese to the U.S. mainland, Japanese had to decide whether they would settle down in Hawaii or go back to Japan for good. Many had to stay in Hawaii because they did not have enough money saved to
return to Japan, owing to the poor working conditions with low wages in the sugar industry.

Japanese laborers were the largest ethnic group among the sugar workers. Moreover, the wide subscription of Japanese vernacular newspapers became a useful information network for Japanese laborers. Labor leader Negoro Motoyuki, who had studied at a university in California before coming to Hawaii, advocated the right of laborers to strike. His ideas became known to many Japanese laborers through statements that were printed in *Nippu Jiji*. Soga Yasutaro was the owner and main editor of *Nippu Jiji*, and he had a capable editor Tasaka Yoshitami. Both of them were sympathetic to the sugar workers.

In December 1908 the *Zokyū Kisei Kai* (Higher Wage Association) was organized with four leaders, Ishii Yukichi, Fred Makino Kinzaburo, Negoro Motoyuki, and Yamashiro Matsutaro. As a result, *Zokyū Kisei Kai*’s Fred Makino Kinzaburo and Negoro Motoyuki on one side, *Nippu Jiji*’s Soga Yasutaro and Tasaka Yoshitami on the other side, decided to work together and became the leaders of the strike group (*Hawaii Hochi* 1987, 1). The newspaper *Nippu Jiji* led the strike group of laborers and mobilized them by using “Yamato Damashii” as a symbol. The term means traditional Japanese spirit, and invokes a sense of ethnic-national pride and an obligation to live up to one’s heritage by fighting valiantly. They disparaged the anti-strike group, including the editors of two other Japanese newspapers, *Hawaii Shinpo* and *Hawaiian-Japanese Daily Chronicle*, by calling them *inu* (dogs), *buta* (pigs), spies and what not (U.S. Department of Labor 1911, 85). The pro-strike leaders argued that

“If . . . the wages be increased, . . . they would become more devoted to their employers and more faithful for the work to which they are assigned. There will be a truly brotherly and neighborly feeling between the employer and the
employee, and Hawaii will enjoy perpetual peace and prosperity, with increased production of sugar and more contented. Hawaii will have, not in a very distant future, a thriving and contented middle class – the realization of the high ideal of Americanism.” (U.S. Department of Labor, 1911, p. 78)

What the representatives of Zokyu Kisei Kai demanded was the increase of wages and betterment of conditions, because at that time Japanese laborers were given lower wages and poor labor housing compared with European immigrant laborers. Frederick Makino Kinzaburo spelled out the reasons to ask for higher wages in his letter to the secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association, dated January 1909. He said

“that the efficiency of Japanese laborers is equal of any labor who are getting higher wages, and that therefore they are entitled to demand equal wages as the labor of other nationalities; and that therefore the demand for an increase to a sum above $22.50 a month is not unreasonable” (U.S. Department of Labor, 1911, p. 69).

This strike began with powerful leaders who had good knowledge of English. It should also be noted that the concept of striking was not anything new for the rank and file Japanese farm workers. In Japan, strikes or riots occurred from time to time when farmers were under too much exploitation and faced the situation in which they were hardly able to live. Thus both the action of striking for higher wages and better working conditions, and the framing of the strike as an expression of “Yamato damashii” were culturally familiar to the Japanese workers in Hawaii.

On the other hand, the anti-strike group consisted of Shiba Sometaro, editor of Hawaii Shinpo, a Japanese Christian group led by Okumura Takie, and the Honolulu Nihonjin Shonin Doshikai (Honolulu Japanese Merchants Association). The division of the community into two opposing factions was one of the reasons the strike itself failed.
The political opportunities for the pro-strike group to carry out the strike were not ripe enough. Many Japanese sugar workers wanted higher wages. They had strong information networks made possible by the newspaper networks. They had strong leaders with Americanized ideas and strategies to win the equality. The statistical number of Japanese laborers was advantageous to Japanese. However, the HSPA, or Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association, had an advantage of making use of the workers of other nationalities as strike breakers. The strikers could not exercise their utmost power because the planters filled the plantations with strike breakers.

Using “Yamato Damashii” as a symbol worked well to unify Japanese sugar workers across the Islands, but it opened a way for the white elite class, including the HSPA executives, to accuse the strikers of being Japan nationalists. Actually the victory of Japan in the wars with China in 1895 and Russia in 1905 worked to the detriment of the Japanese in Hawaii, who did not hide their joy at Japan’s successes. The way they celebrated the Japanese victory had a negative impact on the image of Japanese in the eyes of other residents of Hawaii. Some white Americans already had become suspicious of the intentions of Japanese immigrants, and Chinese and Korean immigrants in Hawaii felt uneasy about Japanese behavior. This further divided the immigrant workers on nationality lines.

The use of Yamato Damashii as a rallying cry also prevented the Japanese workers from cooperating with other workers of various ethnic backgrounds. Most of Hawaii’s Japanese in those days were Japanese nationals. They were born and raised in Japan at a time when Japan was catching up with the western super powers in industrialization, building up of armaments, and westernization in the ways of living. Convinced that
Japanese were not inferior to westerners, they resisted any discrimination by Americans. They were proud of being Japanese. This attitude, however, led to the labeling of the pro-strike group as Japan nationalists, which alienated Hawaii's ordinary non-Japanese residents.

Hawaii had become a racially stratified society, because it was advantageous for the sugar planters and the white elite. Racial divisions would hinder the workers of various ethnicities and nationalities from starting collective actions. Under these conditions, the fact that Japanese workers in 1909 strike had a strong leadership of organizers and the efficient rank and file Japanese workers, and that they developed the effective and powerful organization, the Zokyu Kisei Kai, should be evaluated highly. However, the framing process of rank and file Japanese workers reveals that using "Yamato Damashii" worked well for the solidarity of Japanese workers but hindered the inter-ethnic cooperation with other sugar workers of different nationalities.

The 1920 Dual Union Sugar Strike

In 1920 there was another large-scale strike on sugar plantations on Oahu. It became a dual union sugar strike, because Japanese workers struck a few days after Filipino laborers went into strike. This strike is remembered as the first inter-ethnic strike at the grassroots level, although the top executive level of the unions lacked mutual understanding and trust, which was one of the reasons for the final failure of the strike.

Political opportunities for the sugar plantation workers to ask for higher wages and better working conditions had been growing since the mid-1910s. Due to World War I, the selling price of sugar for the sugar companies went up, but the wages for sugar workers stayed the same. Consumer prices of daily necessities rose during the war, so the
workers faced a comparative loss of income. The increasing numbers of Filipino workers on sugar plantations were facing the same problems. As early as 1916, *Hawaii Hochi* already indicated the necessity to cooperate in claiming for wage increase (*Hawaii Hochi* 1987, 146). After World War I, *Hawaii Hochi* argued clearly that Japanese workers must organize a strong union and start demanding a pay raise with better working conditions. On the other hand, Hawaii’s English dailies wrote that there was no need for pay raises since the Japanese workers were satisfied with their pay (*Hawaii Hochi* 1987). Moreover, Japanese Christian leaders, the *Nippu Jiji* owner and editors, and *Nihonjin Shogyo Kaigisho* were against the idea of striking. In short, there were positive and negative political opportunities before they actually organized the union, *Nihonjin Rodo Renmei Kai* or *Roren* (Japanese Federation of Labor).

This union, *Roren*, was not strong enough to work through the end of the strike. In December 1919 it was organized with Japanese representatives from various regions and plantations across the islands. Filipino workers on various plantations on Oahu did not wait for Japanese unionization and went ahead into the strike one after another, starting on January 19 1920. *Roren* finally struck on February 1. Already, the Hawaii Sugar Planters’ Association planned to break the ties between Filipino and Japanese leaders. The Filipino leader, Pablo Manlapit, called off the strike on February 10 but soon told the workers to restart the strike, which caused confusion among the striking Filipino laborers (*Hawaii Hochi* 1987, Okahata 1964). Moreover, the HSPA with the English dailies, tried to label this strike as a “Japanese conspiracy” (*Hawaii Hochi* 1987; Duus 1991). At that time the Japanese empire was trying hard to catch up with the European and American super-powers, and had become the only super-power in the Asia Pacific countries.
Japanese in Hawaii had nothing to do with the Japanese government, but Japanese empire was suspected of aiming to invade Hawaii with some help from their patriotic nationals living in Hawaii. It was easy for the HSPA to utilize the false image and frame up the stories in order to prevent strikes.

The weak ties of Japanese union leaders with Filipino leaders, the negative labeling of this strike as a Japanese conspiracy, Japanese leaders’ inability to maintain high morale among the strikers, and the presence of an anti-strike group of prominent Japanese who were trying to stop the strike, all worked negatively for the strikers. For this strike, *Hawaii Hochi* sided with the rank and file strikers, but not with *Roren*, the leaders of which claimed that they represented Japanese workers. In the eyes of Makino and the *Hochi* editors, the *Roren* leaders were not trustworthy, based on rumors that they had been juggling the accounts of the support fund for the rank and file strikers (*Hawaii Hochi* 1987). One successful event at this five month-long strike was the parade of workers with their family members, holding up placards saying, for example, “My Papa 77¢ a day.” For the five months of the strike, the *Higyo Rodosha Koenkai* (The Supporting Association for Strikers) supported the workers who came to Honolulu after they were evicted from their plantation homes for striking. They took shelter in the buildings of Buddhist temples, language schools and so on. Unfortunately, about 20 percent of the evicted strikers living in these make-shift quarters contracted the flu. Before the epidemic ended, an estimated 1,056 Japanese and 1,440 Filipinos had been stricken by influenza (Kotani 1985, 51).

Finally *Roren* called off the strike without winning any pay raise for the workers. Later, the leaders of *Roren* were arrested and jailed, and some strikers had to go through
more hardship to get their jobs back on the plantations where they had worked prior to the strike (*Hawaii Hochi* 1987). Thus this strike ended in a miserable failure.

**Language School Controversy**

By 1915 there were over 130 Japanese language schools in all the sugar plantation camps and towns in 1915 (Ozawa 1972). The increasing number of Japanese language schools seemed threatening to the other American residents in Hawaii society. When the strong Americanization movement swept across the United States in the latter half of 1910s, Japanese language schools became a target of the Americanizers in the Territorial government.

Noticing the impact of the Americanization movement, *Hawaii Kyōiku Kai* revised the content of textbooks in 1917 to make them more suitable to Nisei children. They eliminated Japanese nationalistic lessons and added some lessons to foster loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry who could also cherish their Japanese cultural heritage (Takagi 1987). However, the ordinary Americans in the host society did not see the efforts of *Kyōiku Kai*. Several bills were soon presented at the Territorial Legislature to control the foreign language schools, which led to the litigation movement among the parents of Nisei children studying at the Japanese language schools under *Kyōiku Kai*.

When Makino, the owner of *Hawaii Hochi*, and other *Hochi* editors publicized the strategy of litigation, only four schools actually stood up to file the test case in December 1922: Palama Independent School, Toyo Gakuen, Chuō Gakuin, and Kalihi Japanese Language School. *Shiso Kisei Kai* (Test Case Organization) was organized to carry out the litigation to test the constitutionality of the Territorial measures to control foreign
language schools. Delegates were chosen from the parents’ group of the four Japanese schools. The main job of the delegates was to increase the membership of the organization and raise enough funds to carry out the litigation. For them, filing litigation was the American way to protect the language schools.

On the other hand, many other language schools under *Hawaii Kyōiku Kai* were against the idea of taking the case to the Court, because they believed that the litigation would injure the feelings of white Americans in Hawaii. Accordingly, *Hawaii Kyōiku Kai* split into two factions, the litigation group supported by *Hawaii Hochi* editors, and the anti-litigation group supported by the *Nippu Jiji* and a Japanese Christian group headed by Okumura Takie.

Makino had a powerful network among the influential figures in Hawaii host society. He was able to form a group of legal advisors: Makino’s long-time friend, Joseph Lightfoot as general counsel; J. Poindexter, later governor of Hawaii; S.C. Huber, former U.S District Attorney; James Coke, later Territorial Supreme Court judge; Samuel Kemp, later Territorial attorney general; and the son of the general counsel, Bert Lightfoot, a former judge. They helped the litigation group as wonderful human resources to fight the effective legal fight.

In May 1923, the Clark bill requiring a dollar assessment per pupil of language schools was signed into law. Then, dramatic news reached Hawaii that the U.S. Supreme Court had declared that the state prohibition on teaching foreign languages in Nebraska, Ohio, Iowa and twenty-one other states was unconstitutional. The number of Japanese language schools joining the litigation in Hawaii jumped up to 87 schools. In the process, when Bishop Imamura decided to participate in the litigation group, all the *Honpa*
Hongwanji affiliated language schools came in, which sharply increased the amount of funds available for the litigation (Hawaii Hochi, 1937, 78).

Thus the political opportunity for the litigation group developed and the group was able to capitalize on it because they were already organized. In 1927, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that the Territorial measures to control foreign language schools were unconstitutional. At the assembly to celebrate the legal victory Makino delivered a speech.

The Americans feel it only proper that we took the action we did. The Americans are only too well cognizant of the fact that it is the right of the people living in free democracy to advocate their rights guaranteed under the Constitution and to seek legal clarification of doubtful points in the enforcement of laws. . . . Individuals and organizations alike must never forget to stand up for their rights and freedom. But we must not become selfish or irresponsible in our actions because of our victory. We ask that the Japanese school cooperate with the Territorial government officials to strive to raise good American citizens capable of understanding both the English and Japanese languages (Compilation Committee of Makino’s Biography 1965, 66).

Although the state of political opportunity was not advantageous for the Shiso Kisei Kai in the beginning, the gradual change of environments developed their opportunities. Moreover, their courage to take the risk to litigate came from their belief that it was the American way to protect their own rights.

Keihatsu Undo (Educational Campaign)

Reverend Okumura Takie, who was a minister at Makiki Christian Church, started the Keihatsu Undo (Educational Campaign) to Americanize Japanese in Hawaii. He also called this campaign, “Hainichi Yobo Undo (Preventive Campaign against Anti-Japanese Feelings).” It was a counter-movement against the Japanese collective action of the litigation campaign, which Okumura regarded as a mistake. Okumura thought that the
Japanese language school litigation and Japanese strikes both injured Americans' feelings toward Japanese in Hawaii. He believed that the collective action of Hawaii's Japanese challenging the host society would aggravate anti-Japanese sentiments in Hawaii.

In order to start his campaign, he gained the moral and monetary support from the white prominent businessmen in Hawaii, such as the Castles and the Cookes. He also received support from prominent politicians and businessmen in Japan, such as Viscount Shibusawa Eiichi, and the members of the Nichibei Kankei Iinkai (Japan-America Relations Committee). Keihatsu Undo (the Educational Campaign) consisted of two phases, the first from 1921 till 1925, and the second from 1926 to 1930. Instead of holding mass meetings, during the first phase Okumura Takie went from plantation to plantation with his son Umetaro, to meet Japanese workers there. Since they had endorsement from Viscount Shibusawa and other major politicians in Japan, the plantation workers agreed to cooperate with the Okumuras in their Americanization movement. Okumura's campaign promoted the full assimilation of Nisei into American society.

For his second campaign, Okumura emphasized the following three points. First, he encouraged Nisei to renounce their Japanese nationality. Second, he encouraged Nisei to exercise their voting rights. Third, he encouraged Nisei to become an integral part of agricultural business in Hawaii. The third point was unpopular among the Issei generation. The Issei criticized that Okumura was trying to make the Nisei farmers, just as the Issei were, rather than encouraging them to get ahead in American society. He countered in writing that he did not mean to make the Nisei the plantation workers but to make them independent self-employed farmers. However, his idea of keeping the Nisei
within the realm of agriculture shows Okumura's elitist standpoint, which was looking at
the Nisei from the top elite of the Japanese community. Okumura's ideas had an influence
on many Nisei in the 1920s, which can be seen in their later involvement in other social
movements.

**Prewar Naturalization Movement for Japanese Veterans**

European immigrants were incorporated into Hawaii society as naturalized American
citizens, whereas Asian immigrants were basically barred from citizenship. Consequently,
Asian immigrants were unable to participate in the political arena of Hawaii society.

After America declared war against Germany in World War I, all male residents older
than 21, with or without citizenship, were asked to register for military recruitment in
July 1917. Over 800 Issei and Nisei men joined the military from the U.S. mainland and
Hawaii. *Hawaii Hochi* insisted that Japanese servicemen should be entitled to citizenship.
Although there was pressure from the host society that Japanese nationals should not be
entitled to U.S. citizenship, Fred Makino Kinzaburo and his *Hawaii Hochi* editors
continued their claims about the citizenship issue. In 1919 *Hawaii Hochi* reported that
then Territorial Judge Joseph Lightfoot advised Japanese servicemen to apply for
citizenship before they were discharged. As mentioned before, Judge Lightfoot was a
good personal friend of Makino, and gave a helping hand whenever Makino asked. This
time, too, with his useful advice, the *Hawaii Hochi* group succeeded in helping many
Japanese veterans to become naturalized. Through this process, 454 Issei servicemen
acquired U.S. citizenship. Makino and the *Hochi* group contributed significantly to this
However, a legal case that reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 1922 shook the foothold of the naturalized citizenship of Japanese World War I veterans. Issei Ozawa Takao first attempted to become naturalized in Hawaii in 1914. He lost the legal fight because he was not of Caucasian or African background. He appealed to the higher Court, but finally in 1922, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the decision of U.S. District Court, and this terminated any possibility of Issei acquiring U.S. citizenship. In the same year, Congress went further and passed the Cable Act, mandating the loss of U.S. citizenship for women who married aliens ineligible for naturalization, legislation that clearly targeted the Japanese (Odo 2004, 36).3

After the Ozawa Case judgment, some Issei who had fought in World War I lost their acquired citizenship through the legal process, based on the premise that Japanese were “aliens ineligible for citizenship.” A Hawaii Hochi editorial strongly protested this decision, but in vain. The Issei Japanese regarded the discriminatory naturalization law as something that must be changed, because the Issei could not accept any social rules and laws that injured their ethnic pride. Some Issei even believed that the Japanese were a superior race, so they could not stand it when they were treated as if they were inferior. The 1924 Immigration Law that officially stopped any immigration from Japan further injured their pride. They chafed under the mounting evidence of legal ethnic and racial discrimination against them by the United States.

Development of Collective Identity and Resources
In the early mobilization period until the 1920s, various organizations evolved in the Japanese community. The state of political opportunity to start some movements was

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3 This Act was amended in 1931 and finally repealed in 1936 (Odo 2004, ibid.).
expanding for Japanese in this period, and they were sufficiently organized with indigenous leadership to take advantage of the political opportunities. The international climate began to affect the Japanese in Hawaii, as Japan gradually emerged as a super power in the Asia-Pacific area. Some Americans in Hawaii became suspicious of the real intention of Japanese empire, and believed the false idea that the Japanese empire was trying to invade Hawaii by using their loyal Japanese nationals in Hawaii. This led to other movements intent on demonstrating that the Japanese wanted to be loyal Americans. Although they tried to use standard American methods to demonstrate their loyalty, including enlisting for military service, seeking citizenship, and trying to resolve disputes through the courts, they were repeatedly rebuffed by exclusionary laws and court decisions. This environment limited their political opportunities even as they were able to take advantage of some openings to improve their situation.

The fact that Japanese plantation workers had been placed under racially discriminatory wage scales and harsh working conditions triggered them into collective action to ask for better treatment. Using collective power for striking under severely exploited situations was not an unfamiliar measure for Japanese farmers. They had that tradition back in Japan. The fact that the host society tried to place Japanese language schools under government control mobilized the Japanese into the legal fight in court for equality. Having strong leaders with knowledge and some newspapers on their side to publicize their opinions were good resources for them to form purpose-oriented community organizations, such as Zokyu Kisei Kai and Shiso Kisei Kai.

The 1909 and 1920 strikes were carried out by the special-purpose community organizations Zokyu Kisei Kai and Nihonjin Rodo Dantai Renmei Kai (Roren). The
former was organized at the time of the Japanese Great Strike in Oahu sugar plantations in 1909, and the latter was organized to represent Japanese for the dual union sugar strike in 1920. These were organizations formed to change the status of the laborers, with strong grassroots leadership in the Japanese community. For both strikes the organizations successfully mobilized the workers for walk-outs and strikes.

The leaders of the strikes belonged to the intellectual class of the Japanese community, who had the knowledge and leadership skills to mobilize and direct the rank and file workers. These were important internal resources for the community. However, other community leaders, who had strong ties with the Japanese Consulate and even with politicians in Japan, opposed the strategy of striking. Japanese vernacular newspapers were divided on whether workers should strike or not. At the time of the strikes that involved Japanese laborers, Japanese newspapers played a role of propagating different types of opinions among the community.

In the former case, the strike ended in failure, and the leaders of the Zokyu Kisei Kai and Nippu Jiji were arrested. But it gave one of the leaders, Makino, an incentive to start his own newspaper. It also helped the rank and file Japanese to know their potential to achieve results through a strike, since it did lead to the eventual increase of their wages. The 1920 strike accomplished inter-ethnic cooperation on the grassroots level, but lacked mutual cooperation among the leaders. The weakness of the leaders of Roren contributed to its miserable failure. On the contrary the litigation movement regarding control measures over Japanese language schools succeeded in the end. In the litigation, Shiso Kisei Kai finally won because they had a strong opinion leader, Makino, the Hawaii Hochi editors, and Makino’s group of capable legal advisors on their side. It was also
because they successfully connected the test case in Hawaii with legal cases on the national level regarding the right to teach foreign languages.

The way the leaders framed each issue in order to mobilize the community also reflects problems in the community’s sense of collective identity during this time period. The 1909 strike occurred at a time when the workers had started to shift their way of thinking toward settling down in Hawai rather than returning to Japan. They carried out the strike as proud Japanese under the banner of “Yamato Damashii,” which had a positive effect in raising the solidarity of striking Issei, but provided a way for the sugar companies to break the strike by using workers of other nationalities. In the 1920 strike, some grassroots workers began to develop cooperative relations with Filipino workers. But the leaders of Roren lacked the vision of cooperating with Filipinos, and let the strike fail.

In the midst of the Americanization movement across the nation, Hawaii Kyōiku Kai revised and Americanized the content of the Japanese language textbooks. The leaders of Kyōiku Kai had already shifted to the idea of settling down in Hawaii, so they wanted to have their Nisei children grow up as Americans who could still respect Japanese cultural values. When they stood up to challenge the Territorial measures, they believed that it was the best American way to deal with this problem.

In the two strikes and the litigation for Japanese language schools, there arose a division within the Japanese community. In the two strikes, the community more or less divided into pro-strike and anti-strike groups. This division weakened the strikers, and led to the failure. Then in the litigation on language schools issue, the community divided over the means of litigation. Although the Shiso Kisei Kai won the litigation,
which brought the flourishing days for language schools in the 1930s, the division left bitter feelings among the Japanese community leaders.

Resource mobilization theory views oppressed groups as unable to muster sufficient resources to mount an effective social movement unless external elites contribute their resources to assist them. McAdam (1999), on the other hand, looked farther back into the history of oppressed groups. He argued that they first developed their own internal community resources, which generated the social movements. It was only after those movements emerged that outside elites contributed their resources to help them. While the infusion of external resources from elites may have been critical to the ultimate success of social movements among oppressed groups, the longer political processes within the community were equally essential to the development and success of the movements.

Just as McAdam found that the U.S. civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s was built internally by the churches and higher educational institutions within the Black community well before liberal white elites noticed and supported it, the early social movements in Hawaii’s Japanese community were built on internal community organizations. The two labor strikes lacked substantial elite support, which certainly contributed to their failure. In the case of the successful litigation of the Japanese language schools, elite support was essential to the litigation, since the Japanese community lacked lawyers who could conduct such a legal fight. However, the initiative for the litigation came from the Japanese community and its own leadership, which raised the funds and enlisted the support of a powerful litigating team. Although it was technically a counter-movement, the Reverent Okumura’s Americanization movement
also followed the same pattern, with internal development followed by enlisting the support of external elites—in this case both in Hawaii and in Japan. Because his movement coincided with the values and aims of the white elite in Hawaii, he was able to gain their financial and moral support to promote Americanization within the Japanese community.

The Japanese community was internally divided about how to achieve improvements in its status during this period. Each of the five social movement campaigns profiled here framed its issue differently, and took a different approach. Each also faced internal opposition within the Japanese community, from people who thought the movement was following the wrong strategy and would damage the community instead of helping it. This sort of internal division is common within ethnic communities as well as within social movements, but it is not necessarily responsible for the success or failure of specific movement campaigns. A large body of evidence now indicates that success or failure is the result of a delicate, interactive combination of political opportunity, resource mobilization factors, and the movement’s framing of the issue. My analysis suggests the same holds true for the Hawaii Japanese community’s first efforts at mobilization through the 1920s.

**Emergence of the Nisei Generation: 1930s -- 1945**

The 1930s revealed considerable demographic changes in the Hawaii population. Although Hawaii was a multi-ethnic society, ethnic Japanese comprised 37.9 percent of Hawaii’s total population. The 1924 immigration law, which was called *Hai Nichi Imin Ho* (Japanese Exclusion Law) by the Japanese, stopped all subsequent immigration from Japan. Consequently, the momentum of increase in the Japanese population went down,
as the only source of increase was the birth of Nisei children. In 1930, the Nisei generation made up 65.3 percent of the total Japanese population of nearly 140,000 in Hawaii (Lind 1946, 14).

However, the white population increased from 1920 to 1930 by 46 percent, and from 1930 to 40 by 39 percent (calculated from, Nordyke 1989, Table 3-1). It shows that a large number of white Americans immigrated to Hawaii and stayed. These white newcomers formed the middle class of Hawaii society, the class that appeared to have different values from the top white elite class. Among these newcomers the seeds to change Hawaii society were hidden. For instance, the public school teachers from the mainland with progressive educational ideas planted the democratic ideas and egalitarianism in the mind of the Nisei and other minority children at public schools.

On the other hand, some migrated with prejudiced ideas, and they worked to establish English standard schools separate from ordinary public schools. The English standard schools were established for the students whose English level was above standard, whereas those who could not get in the standard schools were sent to the ordinary public schools. Accordingly, the English standard schools became schools for children of middle class white families.

In the 1930s the Nisei were growing up and coming of age in this changed environment. The Issei were also going through the Americanization process. Until the 1930s, the community repeated its pattern of split and integration. But finally in the 1930s, the united organization of Japanese started to emerge. However, the war between their country of residence, America, and their mother country, Japan, stopped the functioning of most of the Japanese leading organizations. The war accelerated the shift
of leadership from the Issei to Nisei generation, whether the Issei wanted it or not. This section highlights the new organizations and movements under these unexpected changes in the environment. I will put some emphasis on the new Nisei generation and their leadership in the new movements and organizations, but also I will focus on the changes within the general community organizations that were still led primarily by Issei leaders.

**Mobilization of Internal and External Resources**

In the 1930s and during the war years, various organizations emerged that were different from the earlier Japanese community organizations. Some of these new organizations in Hawaii or on the mainland came to play important roles in postwar social movements. These new groups included national (as opposed to local Hawaii) organizations, and organizations that extended beyond the ethnic boundaries of the Japanese community. Hawaii’s Issei and Nisei would become connected to these organizations later, and participate in their movements in various forms. In the 1930s, Hawaii’s Japanese ethnic community organizations were still active and most of them had their prime, but they had to shut down at the outbreak of the Pacific War. Some of these ethnic organizations reorganized after the war and functioned in the postwar movements. This section outlines the main organizational developments of the period, with special attention to wartime changes.

**Community Organizations**

Among general community organizations that operated in Hawaii during this period, *Hawaii Kyōiku kai* and *Nihonjin Rengo Kyokai* need some explanations, because both of them became symbols of the united Japanese organizations in the 1930s.
Reorganized Hawaii Kyōiku Kai and Japanese Language Schools

In the 1930s, Japanese language schools and their united organization, Hawaii Kyōiku Kai, flourished. After the victory over the Territorial Legislature in the language school litigation, Hawaii Kyōiku Kai was reorganized and again became a united organization of all Japanese language schools throughout the Territory. A small number of language schools in Honolulu had their own normal school for Japanese language instructors. Some Nisei finished the normal school and even went to study more in Japan, and came back as teachers of Japanese language. Thus, although the numbers were small, Nisei Japanese language teachers appeared.

Nihonjin Rengo Kyokai (United Japanese Society)

In 1932, with the initiative of then Consul General of Japan, the United Japanese Society (Honolulu Nihonjin Rengo Kyokai) was finally organized by combining the Honolulu Nihonjin Shogyo Kaigisho, Honolulu Nihonjin Doboku Kenchiku Ukeoigyo Kumiai (Japanese Building Contractors' Association), Honolulu Nihonjin Kyokai, and seventy-five large and small groups such as prefectural associations, village and town clubs, and others (Honolulu Japanese Chamber of Commerce 1970, 48). For about fifty years since the first government contract labor immigration had started in 1885, Japanese community did not have a united organization to represent all the Japanese residents in the Islands. 4 According to Kimura (1988, 178),

with this overall organization the Japanese community became more efficient in

4 In the early 1900s, several organizations were born in Japanese immigrant community. Rinji Nihonjinkai in 1900, Hawaii Nihonjinkai in 1901, and Chuo Nihonjinkai in 1902 were organized with varied purposes to represent different interests. None of them lasted long. In the mid-1910s there was a movement to establish one united Japanese organization, but the Japanese Issei leaders ended up with two such organizations, both of which existed for a short while.
undertaking various activities and service projects for the larger community, such as fund-raising for the Red Cross and the Community Chest and welcoming celebrities from the mainland and was also better able to sponsor activities within the Japanese community such as welcoming Japanese celebrities and naval training ships, establishing scholarships for Hawaii-born children, and collecting and sending relief material and money to Japan for disasters caused by earthquakes, floods, tidal waves, typhoons, and so on.

Later in 1939, under the Nihonjin Rengo Kyokai (United Japanese Society), Nihonjin Shogyo Kaigisho merged with the Nihonjin Shogyo Kumiai to become the Honolulu Nihonjin Shoko Kaigisho, Nisshoko (Honolulu Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry). Thus there emerged a tendency for the conflicting groups to work together as a part of one community.

**Community Newspapers**

In the 1930s, Japanese vernacular newspapers experienced their prime time. Due to the victory of language school litigation, Hawaii Hochi, the newspaper that had acted as a main mobilizer of the movement, increased its circulation. Hawaii Hochi published the 10th anniversary booklet for the litigation victory in 1937, and collected the voices of the main figures in the litigation regarding the activities of Shiso Kisei Kai.

When the war broke out between Japan and America, the Japanese newspapers faced the possibility of shutdown just as the other Japanese ethnic organization did. On the very day of the Pearl Harbor attack by the Japanese military, however, some of the Japanese presses still issued their papers. By the military Governor’s proclamation effective on December 12, 1941, “the publication, printing, or circulation of all newspapers, magazines, periodicals, the dissemination of news or information by means of any unauthorized printed matter, or by wireless, radio, or press association” (Chapin 1996, 173) were prohibited. Accordingly, Japanese presses were closed along with the
other presses. But the military government did not have any other choice but to reopen the Japanese newspapers, because they needed to communicate with Issei residents who were unable to read English. The government “ordered Nippu Jiji and Hawaii Hochi to reopen and operate under its directives, which they did on January 9” (Chapin 1996, 181). Soga Yasutaro, the owner of Nippu Jiji, and many other Nippu Jiji editors were interned, whereas Fred Makino was not. The Nippu continued issuing the newspaper even though about one fourth of its editors and staff were taken away (Hirai 1990, 158). In the fall of 1942, Hawaii Hochi renamed itself the Hawaii Herald, and Nippu Jiji the Hawaii Times in order to avoid Japanese words.

The censorship office sent a specialist to each office of Hochi and Nippu to check the contents of articles. The articles written in English were checked by the specialists and printed on English pages. But for the Japanese readers, the articles had to be translated into Japanese. Therefore, “the articles were translated into Japanese by staff members, then read by army or FBI language experts.” In this way both the English and Japanese versions of articles were checked. “These two papers’ assigned role was not just to provide essential information, but to exhort the Japanese community to American patriotism” (Chapin 1996, 182).

With the censorship of their articles in both languages, Hawaii’s Japanese papers had to stop their function as vehicles to spread ideas and strategies to fight against discrimination and injustice from the host society. They had to comply with the Territorial military government’s policy under the conditions of war against Japan. Thus Japanese vernacular newspapers could not help but lose their fighting spirit against injustice during the war. Although everyone acknowledged the significant roles the
Japanese press played in prewar years, the Japanese press in wartime years was often said to have a token role and to be losing its prewar glory.

**National Organizations Related to Japanese Community Issues**

Among the organizations that emerged in the 1930s and involved the Japanese community in Hawaii, JACL and Nisei troops could be categorized as national organizations, based on their functions. Both played important roles in the period of their emergence and again in the postwar period. They are presented here because they developed during the 1930s and early 1940s, although their greatest impact on social movements in Hawaii came after the war.

**JACL (Japanese American Citizens League)**

In 1929, Nisei on the West Coast organized the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), the united organization of American-born citizens of Japanese ancestry. They had the first united meeting in Seattle in 1930. From the beginning they were politically oriented, and had objectives such as to have the Issei World War I veterans acquire citizenship or to reform the Cable Act to change the discriminatory treatment toward Nisei women. They were discontent with the legal status of their parent generation, the Issei, under American law, and aimed to change the discriminatory laws based on race and nationality. They had a strong intention to develop the JACL as a national organization that would cover all Americans of Japanese ancestry, although the first meeting consisted only of Nisei from the major West Coast cities. Nisei in Hawaii were not included in the prewar and war years of the JACL. One of the founding father of the JACL, Kido Saburo, was from Hawaii, but he became a member of the JACL as a Nisei living on the mainland (Hosokawa 1984 [Japanese version], 14).
One of the JACL leaders and a future enthusiastic lobbyist, Mike Masaoka, joined the JACL in 1938. JACL leaders cooperated with the War Relocation Authority in the evacuation of all Japanese residents on the West Coast during World War II, because they believed that it was not wise to oppose the military order. Instead, by emphasizing the law-abiding character of Americans of Japanese ancestry, JACL executives tried to show their Americanism. It was true, however, that there were a group of Issei and Nisei who opposed this JACL policy even during the war. During the war, JACL members, such as Mike Masaoka volunteered to the military, where they met the Nisei soldiers from Hawaii (Masaoka 1987). It was the first mass encounter between two Nisei groups and the useful liaison was born there.

100th Infantry Battalion, 442nd Combat Team, and MIS (Military Intelligence Service)

The Nisei troops who served in the U.S. military can be considered an organization in the sense being used here, because they joined voluntarily and served in distinct, segregated units during the war. Moreover, after the war their membership in these organizational units and their related alumni organizations had a major impact on the community.

Before the Pacific War began, some Nisei in Hawaii were already inducted as soldiers in the U.S. military. Although Nisei were Americans, their loyalty was suspected because their Issei parents were categorized as enemy aliens. Those already enlisted did not have a chance to fight with the enemy right away. Moreover, all Americans of Japanese ancestry were placed in the category of 4-C for the enlistment, which meant a military draft status equivalent to non-draftable alien. In 1942, the Nisei troop was
finally sent to the mainland for training. The Nisei inducted soldiers did not have to be discharged because there were some military officers such as Lt. Colonel Farrant L. Turner, who did not suspect their loyalty, but were impressed by the determination and discipline of the Nisei soldiers (Kotani 1985, 108). The Nisei troop was given a new name, 100th Infantry Battalion, and finally they were given a chance to fight for their own country. In the battlefields in Europe, they showed their courage and capability as American soldiers, and many lost their lives.

A group of Nisei young men in Hawaii pleaded to the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department to give them the chance to fight for their own country and show their loyalty. Upon hearing the news that the Nisei soldiers could volunteer, over 9000 Japanese in Hawaii volunteered, and the authority increased the Hawaii’s quota from 1,500 to 2,900 (Kotani 1985, 106). The volunteering soldiers formed the 442nd combat team, and just like the 100th battalion soldiers, they fought for Americanism and proved their loyalty to America, although they suffered tremendous casualties. While the Nisei soldiers were fighting battles on the European warfront, some thousands of Nisei with comparatively good command of Japanese language were selected to join the Military Intelligence Service, MIS. They were trained in a special school and sent to the Pacific warfront, where they used their language skills in questioning Japanese prisoners of war and translating captured military documents from Japanese to English. After the war ended, the MIS soldiers contributed as translators in the occupational troops sent to Japan.

These Nisei troops served in racially segregated units under white American supervision, just as Black American troops and Filipino enlistees did. In this sense, the Nisei soldiers were discriminated against in the military. The Nisei soldiers utilized this
adverse situation and won the reputation as loyal American soldiers. Since they were kept together in segregated troops, they could develop their solidarity not only in terms of sharing the same fate but also in the ethnic sense.

Social Movements and Events
As has already been seen through the review of community organizations, the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941 splits this time period into the 1930s, when the Japanese community was enjoying increased visibility and dynamic social activity, and the wartime era, when Japanese community organizations were shut down and a very different mood prevailed. However, there is also considerable continuity of individuals and organizations, so it is appropriate to consider the social movements and events that arose within this period and see how the war affected them. This section will review five significant social movement campaigns and related political developments involving the Japanese community: the prewar statehood movement and Japanese reaction to it; The New Americans Conference; Nisei Participation in Local Politics; Labor Organizing through the ILWU; and the Wartime Shutdown and Internment of Issei and Kibei leaders. As in the previous section, I am looking for evidence of internal community organization and leadership, how the Japanese community mobilized its internal resources for specific campaigns, how changing political opportunities affected these activities; and how these campaigns were framed and their significance for collective identity in the Japanese community.
Prewar Statehood Movement and Japanese Reaction

Throughout prewar and war years, Asian immigrants were labeled as “unassimilable” people who could not be Americanized. Thus, anti-statehood proponents used the fact that Asian and Pacific Islanders constituted over 75 percent of the total population of the Territory as the prime reason that Hawaii should not join the union as a state.

In the mid-1930s, a movement to support statehood started in Hawaii. By 1935, statehood was the announced policy of the HSPA (Bell 1984, 62). In October 1935, a subcommittee of the House Committee on Territories came to Hawaii to conduct extensive hearings on statehood. Although 90 out of 105 witnesses testified in favor of statehood, the six-member subcommittee did not accept that Hawaii met the qualifications for statehood. “Most members of the committee rejected immediate statehood. . . because they believed ‘it would be wise to wait until another generation of American citizens of Oriental ancestry. . . had an opportunity to absorb American ideals and training’” (Bell 1984, 64). Despite the fact that Americans of Asian ancestry, many of whom at that time were Nisei, were born American citizens, the committee distrusted the loyalty of those Americans.

Reporting the result of the hearings, the Honolulu Advertiser wrote that they were anti-statehood because “the Oriental” in Hawaii would not adapt American standards and because the Japanese American citizens had a double loyalty problem caused by the language and culture lessons given at Japanese language schools. The Japanese community rejected this type of articles, which it felt was based on misunderstanding of its actual situation. Hawaii Kyōiku Kai, as a representative of Japanese language schools,
protested to the Advertiser that Japanese language schools were not teaching Nisei children (American citizens of Japanese ancestry) loyalty to the Japanese government.

It is significant that the Japanese community had the resources, power and networks to try to straighten out wrong information or misunderstandings made by the major media and the Legislators of Hawaii regarding Japanese people and culture. Regrettably, Japanese leaders were unable to remove the prejudice from the minds of mainstream leaders of the host society. But they never accepted the prejudiced situation easily, just as they did not accept any discriminatory laws and social practices toward Japanese. This would become one of the reasons why Hawaii’s Japanese became statehood proponents later. They interpreted statehood as other Americans’ acceptance of Hawaii’s Japanese residents as good and loyal Americans just like the residents of the rest of the states. In a word, statehood meant to Japanese to be accepted as equal Americans.

**Nikkei Shimin Kaigi (New Americans Conference)**

While he was working on the Educational Campaign, Okumura Takie realized that the Hawaii Japanese community needed good leaders among the Nisei generation. In order to train the Nisei leaders, he started the Nikkei Shimin Kaigi or New Americans Conference. Okumura wanted to give Nisei youngsters chances to meet prominent Americans in Hawaii, and wanted them to know that the prominent American businessmen and the Nisei youngsters were equal in terms of their status as citizens of American society. He had discovered that some Japanese in the countryside automatically believed that white Americans were great people who had higher status, because the only white Americans in the countryside were plantation managers, office clerks, or public school teachers, who were in the higher position in the community (Okumura 1937, 110).
Okumura held a conference once a year, for one week. Nisei delegates from across the Islands gathered in Honolulu, discussed current issues, and had luncheons and dinners with prominent business leaders in Hawaii. Okumura wanted Nisei to become responsible and good Americans of Japanese ancestry. Since there was some suspicion of the loyalty of Nisei within the larger community, Okumura wanted to prove that Nisei were fine and loyal Americans. Okumura’s conference program lasted from 1927 till 1941, and in fact many of the delegates later became important Nisei leaders in Hawaii.

One of the first to be elected County Supervisor, Miyake Noboru, was a participant in the very first New Americans Conference. These early Japanese politicians who were related to Okumura’s activities were all Republicans. This indicates that Okumura’s Conference gave them a chance to establish the liaison with powerful business and political figures in Hawaii, who were many times related to the Big Five sugar companies.

The New Americans Conference movement was a successful effort to build leadership among the Nisei generation, and to connect them to prominent figures in the white establishment of Hawaii, who in several cases became their sponsors. The Reverend Okamura’s status as a Christian minister, along with his political conservatism and strong Americanism, may have given him better access to white elites in the community, which he used to further the careers of promising young Nisei.

**Nisei Participating in Local Politics**

In the 1930s, more and more Nisei were coming of age. In 1910, only 0.4 percent of adult citizens of Hawaii were of Japanese origin, whereas twenty years later the number of adult citizens of Japanese origin, who were eligible to vote, rose to 12.0 percent (Lind
They were not only voting, but also beginning to run for election to local offices.

According to Figure 2-3, which is based on a compilation of all Japanese elected officials in Hawaii compiled by Hawaii Hochi, a Nisei ran for Territorial representative as the first American of Japanese ancestry as early as 1922, but he lost. He was a *Nippu Jiji* editor for the English language section. No Nisei ran in the 1924 election, and several Nisei candidates tried in the following elections in 1926 and 1928 without success. In 1930, finally, three Nisei were elected to political positions for the first time. They were two Territorial representatives and one County Supervisor. Throughout the 1930s until the outbreak of the war, the number of Nisei politicians gradually increased. In the 1940 election, thirteen Nisei were elected. They were one Territorial Senator, six Representatives, and six County Supervisors.

After the outbreak of the war in 1941, most Nisei refrained from running for political offices. Japanese language newspapers called this behavior “enryo”, which meant reserve or self-restraint. One Nisei politician, Democrat Sakai Sakuichi, did not conform to this tacit agreement. He served out his term throughout the war.

The involvement of Nisei in local politics during the 1930s indicates clearly that the Japanese community was achieving a certain amount of movement into the political mainstream at this early period, on the basis of the leadership and organizational structures the Issei had developed and the more privileged political status the Nisei had as U.S. citizens. These new Nisei political leaders also represented the first age cohort of Nisei to come of age, and they were a decade or more older than the larger cohort of Nisei who followed them. Although they were representing largely Japanese communities
with sufficient numbers of Nisei voters to elect them, they also had the sponsorship of the white elite and the Republican Party.

The war was clearly an overwhelmingly negative state of political opportunity for Nisei with political aspirations, but the fact that there had been this sort of political participation in the 1930s must be kept in mind in evaluating the political developments that happened subsequently in the 1950s. The characterization of the withdrawal of Nisei elected officials from the political scene during the war years as “enryo” suggests the same sort of political prudence that led the JACL on the mainland to cooperate with the internment. It carries the distinctive flavor of the Japanese cultural values of self-effacement, deference, and modesty that were taught in the Japanese language schools. It also contrasts rather sharply with the tenor of earlier social movement campaigns in the Japanese community, such as labor strikes and litigation. In that respect, it is a reminder of the internal diversity and range of political sentiment within the Japanese community.

**Labor Organizing**

The Great Depression in the 1930s had a strong impact on the American economy. At the same time, the union movement was developing across America, and Hawaii was no exception. In the 1930s, their consciousness as workers was growing gradually among the Hawaii-born workers. With the experiences of labor disputes on the U.S. mainland, some mainlanders came to Hawaii and started labor union activities, first among the dockworkers. Their union was a part of the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU), which had been organized by Harry Bridges in San Francisco in 1937.
With the help of white mainlanders, such as Jack Hall and Ed Berman as new leaders, the grassroots organizing by local labor activists went well. A Nisei dockworker named Jack Kawano did most of the grassroots organizing of the longshoremen. Kawano had been working in the sugar industry, first on plantations and later on the docks, since he was eleven. Local-born, non-white organizers like Kawano, Bert Nakano and Yoroku Fukuta became a substantial part of the union, whereas the white mainlanders were good strategists with useful knowledge. In the 1930s, they could not do an effective labor negotiation, because the unions were not strong enough.

After the Pacific front of World War II broke out in 1941, with the Japanese military attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii came under military control. The US government imposed martial law on Hawaii, and the military government denied workers the right to change jobs and froze their wages. Accordingly the Big Five companies did not allow wage increases, which caused dissatisfaction among the sugar industry workers, both on plantations and at the docks. Although they could not engage in ordinary labor negotiations during the war, the ILWU continued to organize workers and to prepare for a more labor-friendly future after the war ended.

The ILWU expanded its political opportunity by utilizing the Political Action Committee (PAC) of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), to which it belonged at the time. The Political Action Committee lobbied the Legislators and worked to have them pass labor-friendly bills. Jack Hall insisted that the ILWU would help the Democratic Party of Hawaii to grow bigger and have labor-friendly policies carried out
by the Territorial government by organizing the political base for the Democratic Party within the union.\(^5\)

In the 1944 elections, the Union succeeded in getting a substantial number of PAC-endorsed House and Senate candidates elected. Many of those elected were Democrats, and these Legislators contributed to passing the Hawaii Employee Relations Act (better known as the Little Wagner Act). The Act extended to all agricultural workers in Hawaii the same collective bargaining rights that had been granted to industrial workers nationally under Federal law. The efforts of labor union leaders to make use of the Political Action Committee opened up the way for sugar plantation workers to start a union movement legally. Kawano succeeded in organizing the plantation workers on the islands of Hawaii, Maui, Kauai, and Oahu. According to Kotani (1985, 116), the number of dues-paying ILWU members increased from 970 in January 1944 to 6,610 in January 1945.

The ILWU in Hawaii grew under effective strategists such as Jack Hall, and capable organizers such as Jack Kawano. They were able to utilize existing organizations such as the Political Action Committee to gain enough influence on the Territorial Legislators to pass labor-friendly laws. With the strict military control on labor, workers in Hawaii had complaints on frozen wages, fixed jobs, and so on. In this wartime environment and with all its resources, the union was ready for action at the end of war.

\(^5\) Later Jack Hall shifted toward the strategy of endorsing labor-friendly candidates regardless of party affiliations.
Wartime Shutdown and Internment of Issei and Kibei Leaders

When the Pacific front of World War II broke out with Japan’s Pearl Harbor attack, Hawaii society faced the imminent necessity to keep the society calm. Having a large population of Japanese Issei and Nisei in Hawaii, the authorities had been alert for whether any espionage would happen with the deterioration of U.S.-Japan relations. For a few days after the Pearl Harbor attack, there were some rootless rumors about sabotage by Japanese residents.

Shortly before the outbreak of war, “a group called the Police Contact Group was organized as a network of loyal Japanese-Americans who would report regularly to the Honolulu Police Department through police officer Jack (John A.) Burns” (Boylan and Holmes 2000, 33). The reports of this group helped to identify which local Japanese residents might pose a threat during wartime. The decision was made not to subject the entire Japanese population of Hawaii to internment, as was the case on the U.S. mainland. Instead, the whole Territory was put under martial law and had a military government, and only a relatively small number of Japanese were designated for internment. That number, however, included many of the prominent Issei and Kibei-Nisei leaders of the local Japanese community.

The Pacific War had a tremendous influence on the daily lives of Japanese residents in Hawaii. It was a war between America, where the Japanese residents lived, and Japan, the country they were from. The Issei, already being aliens ineligible for citizenship, became enemy aliens. Japanese residents were advised to get rid of Japanese things in their homes. They were advised not to speak in Japanese in public. It was very hard on Issei who were unable to speak English.
After the war began, in order to avoid race-related problems among the local population of Hawaii, a Morale Committee was created under the leadership of local prominent leaders Charles Loomis, Hung Wai Ching, and Shigeo Yoshida. Under the Morale Committee, each nationality or ethnic group organized a branch with local chapters to encourage their ethnic group members to refrain from acting on ethnic lines, and to mobilize them for American patriotism. The Emergency Service Committee (ESC) was a branch of the Morale Committee for the local Japanese population, led by loyal Nisei leaders appointed by the authorities. The members of the former Police Contact Group were included in the appointed ESC members. “Chapters of the ESC popped up in every Oahu neighborhood where the Japanese population was concentrated” (Boylan and Holmes 2000, 38). John A. Burns, as a police officer working with the FBI, worked closely with the ESC Nisei members.

Various Japanese organizations stopped their functions. Japanese language schools were shut down because they were not allowed to teach the language of the enemy, and because the principals and some teachers were interned. Shinto shrines were also closed down, because many Shinto priests were also interned. Nihonjin Shoko Kaigisho, or Nisshoko (Honolulu Japanese Chamber of Commerce) kept functioning for a while because it had Nisei leaders. When the Issei leaders of the organization were interned soon after the beginning of war, the last two leaders left with the organization were a Kibei Nisei, Oi Tetsuo, and a Nisei lawyer, Marumoto Masaji. As a Supervisor for the Nisshoko, Oi Tetsuo worked very hard to help the Issei understand the orders of the military government, since many Issei did not understand the English orders well. Oi was born in Hawaii and educated in Iwakuni, Yamaguchi, but later went to the mainland.
and graduated from Stanford University, so that he was truly bilingual. But even he was sent to internment after four months of service with the organization. Marumoto, as a legal adviser for the organization, legally suspended the activity of Nisshoko, since he believed that if they wanted to dissolve the organization, it should be dissolved with the majority consensus of the members. Since the main leaders of Nisshoko had been taken away to the internment camps, the Nisshoko could not dissolve with proper legal procedures. In this way, the Nisshoko stopped functioning for the duration of the war.

The older Nisei professionals took the leadership of the community because the Issei leaders were taken away. Especially, the Nisei ESC (Emergency Service Committee) members worked closely with the FBI and the military government of Hawaii. These Nisei professionals worked hard to help the Issei Americanize in the Japanese community. They took the initiative to liquidate the assets of Japanese language schools and Shinto shrines (Shimada 1998). The Nisei who were chosen as ESC members understood the significance of their roles in the society and did their best to cooperate with the morale committee leaders. It was true, however, that many ESC members had to take the hard experience of being called Inu (sell-out) by the Issei (Shiramizu 1998, Shimada 1998).

**Community Advancement and Wartime Setbacks**

The 1930s was the time Hawaii’s Japanese community finally had a united organization to unite various ethnic, cultural, religious, business organizations under one umbrella organization. After the turmoil of Japanese challenging the social control of the host society during the strong Americanization movement, the next decade was more stable. However, all the Hawaii residents had to live in the depression era, which began to affect the lives of all the working class people in Hawaii, as well as across America.
Outside of Hawaii’s Japanese community, various types of organizations were emerging. On the mainland, the JACL was organized by mainland Nisei, in order to challenge the injustice being done to the civil rights of Japanese. The JACL would become the future leaders of the Japanese community on the mainland, and Hawaii’s Japanese would work with them in the postwar era. In Hawaii, unionization of working class people regardless of their ethnic backgrounds was on its way, led by mainland union organizers from the ILWU. Nisei union organizers began to make active contributions to the labor movement, which would lead to drastic social change after World War II.

Since the Nisei were coming of age, Issei leader Okumura started the New Americans Conference to train good and loyal American leaders of Japanese ancestry. Okumura’s network with influential Americans in the business and political arenas of Hawaii gave these Nisei a great chance to be active in business and politics. One of the first Nisei elected to the office of County Supervisor was a participant in Okumura’s Conference. The number of Nisei politicians began to increase, reflecting their early success in prewar Hawaii.

The prime time of Issei leadership and burgeoning Nisei activities ended with the outbreak of the Pacific War. The war with Japan tremendously affected the Japanese community in Hawaii. In order to remove the suspicion that fell upon Japanese among ordinary Americans, and to prove their Americanism and loyalty, Nisei of the 100th and 442nd troops fought on the European warfront. Nisei in the Military Intelligence Service contributed to America with their knowledge of Japanese language and culture on the Pacific warfront.
The Pearl Harbor attack by the Japanese military had made non-Japanese residents of Hawaii uneasy, because of the comparatively large size of the local Japanese population. The military government felt the necessity to wipe out this uneasiness. Some leaders even thought about evacuating all Japanese to one island or someplace else, although it seemed impossible. However, there were a group of American leaders who understood Hawaii's unique racial and ethnic blend. And it was these people who created the inter-ethnic network to connect all the ethnic groups, the Morale Committee. These prominent leaders of Hawaii helped to organize the branch committees of the Morale Committee, and assisted the representatives of all the ethnic groups to share understandings of each other.

In Hawaii, the Nisei leaders were nominated by the military government to join the Japanese branch of the Morale Committee, the Emergency Service Committee, to help Americanize the Issei. Some Nisei ESC members developed a friendship with a police officer named John A. Burns. The birth of this Burns group later brought about major social changes in postwar Hawaii. All these organizations, networks, and leaderships generated by Nisei would pay off after the war, with a strong backstage support from the Issei, who would come back to the postwar Japanese community as still powerful leaders.

**Postwar Mobilization: 1945-1949**

When World War II ended with Japan's surrender to the Allied Forces in August 1945, Japanese in Hawaii had complicated feelings. The Issei in Hawaii were relieved that the war was over. But they were not as happy as the other Americans who enjoyed the V-J day, because they were Japanese nationals. Some were even afraid of going out to see the other Asian residents, since Japan was defeated, and those Asians from the
countries once colonized by Japan were pleased with the defeat of Japan. Also, they thought of their own families and relatives who had been in Japan during the war and wondered whether they were alive. No direct correspondence with those in Japan had been possible since the outbreak of the Pacific War. According to Hirai (1990, 168-169) right after the mail system resumed between America and Japan in September 1946, he wrote to his parents in Japan. He described how happy he was to receive a letter from his parents after a long interval.

Hawaii's Japanese did not have to refrain any more from speaking Japanese, singing Japanese songs, or demonstrating Japanese culture in public because all restrictions were lifted. For instance, the Club Nisei Orchestra came back in fall 1945, the Nihon Gengakudan performed in July 1946. Hawaii's prewar groups of Japanese entertainers came back one after another, and new groups were born. Hence the number of such entertainers became larger than it had been in the prewar years (Tasaka 1985, 50; Hirai 1990, 176-177). The Japanese martial arts, Japanese chess clubs, tea ceremony schools and Japanese dancing lessons also returned to the Japanese community.

In this early postwar context, the Japanese community also began rebuilding the organizations through which it would mobilize participants into social movement campaigns.

Mobilization of Community Resources
Some community organizations had been completely disbanded during the war, while others had operated quietly while waiting for political opportunities to open up at the war's end. The 1930s and early 1940s had seen the emergence of some ties between the local Hawaii Japanese community and some national or pan-ethnic organizations,
such as the ILWU and the JACL. In addition, local Nisei had joined the U.S. military and gone off to fight in the war. In the immediate postwar era these groups re-emerged, combined, and interacted in new ways. This section will examine the re-emergence of basic community organizations and institutions and the role of some new ones that would prove critical to the development of the Democratic Revolution in the early 1950s. We will also take a brief look at an odd group that emerged immediately after the war’s end and provided some awkward moments for the Japanese community.

Community Organizations

After the war, their former leaders reorganized the Japanese community organizations. Also the Nisei veterans who returned to the Islands formed community-oriented organizations.

Honolulu Nihonjin Shoko Kaigisho, or Nisshoko (Honolulu Japanese Chamber of Commerce)

The former Honolulu Japanese Chamber of Commerce (Nihonjin Shoko Kaigisho or Nisshoko), was reorganized in March 1947 under the new name of Honolulu Businessmen’s Association (Honolulu Jitsugyo Kyokai). The leaders who reorganized this Japanese organization were mostly Issei, such as Sumida Taizo, Peter Fukunaga Shuichi, and Iida Koichi, who had been prominent leaders and returned from internment. Miho Katsuro, a powerful Nisei lawyer, and Oi Tetsuo, a Kibei Nisei businessman who used to be a supervisor in prewar years and returned from internment, also supported the reorganization of Nisshoko.

However, there was a small group of people, mostly Nisei, who were against the idea of reorganizing the exclusively Japanese organization. The most powerful opponent was
the Nisei lawyer, Marumoto Masaji, the one who had suspended the activity of the prewar Nisshoko, and would later become a Justice of the Hawaii State Supreme Court. Although Marumoto insisted that the Nisshoko should merge with the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce of the host society, the majority of Issei businessmen felt “that Issei as a whole were still unable to participate fully in American organizations because of their inability to speak English freely” (Kimura 1988, 252). At the reorganization, however, they did not use the former name, because they considered the time and situation of the Japanese community and the feelings of other Americans toward the Japanese community.

Less than a year later, in January 1948, these revitalizers of the organization made a decision to resume their former name, the *Honolulu Nihonjin Shoko Kaigisho*, or *Nisshoko* (Honolulu Japanese Chamber of Commerce). The *Nisshoko*, resumed the leadership position among the Japanese Issei and Nisei businessmen, and began to support the JACL policies on the mainland for protecting the interests of the Issei and Nisei in Hawaii. In order to fight against the still existent discrimination toward Japanese in Hawaii, they needed an organization big enough to work for them instead of relying on the Japanese consul general’s offices. In fact, they did not have any official Japanese government protection until 1952, when the Japanese consulate officially resumed its function after the U.S. Japan peace treaty went into effect. The Nisshoko, as a united organization of Japanese residents in Hawaii, functioned as an institution to protect the interests of Japanese, and sometimes supported the activities of the JACL.

*Nisei Veterans Clubs*

Many of Nisei veterans took advantage of the G.I. Bill to pursue higher education at prominent universities on the U.S. mainland. In the prewar years, to study law or
medicine was something only the children of wealthy families were able to do. But the
G.I. Bill enabled these Nisei sons of agricultural workers and small shopkeepers to enter
the prominent universities on the mainland. They earned degrees in law, medicine, or
other fields. Many of them came back to Hawaii to start their new professional life there,
although they had a hard time achieving the social and economic status they deserved on
the basis of their academic achievements. They organized the 100th veterans club, the
442nd veterans club, and later the MIS veterans club. They had strong ties among the
members and soon these clubs worked for the social wellbeing of the people of Hawaii.

*Katta Gumi* (*"We Won the War" Group*)

When World War II ended with Japan's surrender, a group of Issei did not believe
that Japan had lost the war. They believed that Japan had won the war, and waited for the
Japanese Imperial Fleet to come to Pearl Harbor. They were confused by new
information, because they had long believed that the information provided by the
Japanese Imperial Headquarters was true. Various groups emerged as *Katta Gumi* or *"We
Won the War"* groups. The largest one was the *Hawaii Hissho Kai*, which was said to
have four thousand members in its prime. In addition, the *Katta Gumi* included *Tobu

Most of the members of these groups were Issei and elder Nisei. Some prominent
leaders of these groups collected membership dues, and were said to hold parties every
night using the money (Hirai 1990, 162). Since the Japanese fleet never came to Pearl
Harbor, the rank and file members began to suspect the words of the leaders. Gradually
the *Katta Gumi* came to realize the truth and shifted towards more social activities such
as supporting and visiting Japanese war captives held in Hawaii and sending relief to war victims in Japan.

**Community Newspapers**

After the war, censorship was lifted and two Japanese vernacular newspapers were allowed to write articles without censorship. However, with many editors and writers still off in the concentration camps it was not easy for both newspapers to return to their prewar conditions.

As Figure 2-1 shows, in 1940 *Nippu Jiji* had a circulation of over 14,000, whereas *Hawaii Hochi*'s circulation was about 12,500. However, the *Nippu Jiji* circulation in 1945 went down to 9,000, only two thirds of the 1940 figure. Similarly, the *Hawaii Hochi* circulation dropped to 7,900 in 1945. This drop suggests that the articles of both newspapers during the war were not so attractive for the readers. Some Nisei just stopped subscription because they did not have to read Japanese papers. However, after the war the circulation began to increase gradually to over 10,000 in 1949 for *Nippu Jiji*. The number also increased to about 9,500 in 1949 for *Hawaii Hochi*. Both papers showed small increases until 1960, although the circulation of both newspapers could not come back to the prewar level.

Since most Japanese residents of Hawaii had their families and relatives in Japan, the Japanese newspapers played an important role of providing them with any news from Japan especially during the immediate postwar years. The information about the lives of Japanese ordinary people in the devastated cities and towns in Japan attracted the readers who read only Japanese language. In the newspaper the news about Japan ranged from political and economic to social items. For example, the aftermath of Hiroshima became
the subject of many articles. After the restriction on visiting relatives in Japan was lifted for Japanese residents of Hawaii, their travel experiences became favorite articles for readers. At the same time, the local news about Hawaii’s politics, economics, and social aspects all filled their pages. The legal and political status of Issei and Nisei in Hawaii as well as in Japan attracted the readers’ attention. The notices of social gatherings, cultural classes, and religious gatherings were also favorite information for the Issei and Nisei. The notifications of new Japanese movies, Japanese music performance of local orchestra, and sports events played by Nisei became good news.

Thus, the postwar Japanese press kept their characteristic of being Japan-oriented and Japanese community-oriented. The news stories in *Hawaii Hochi* told the details and daily matters in Japanese community, some of which the English dailies never covered. However, those details would sometimes be telling the important aspect of the mobilization process for the social movements. Also the articles and editorials would show the writers’ values and attitudes toward certain events, although it would not be easy to assess how strongly the ordinary Japanese readers supported those opinions.

**Movements and Events**

After the war, the Hawaii Japanese community capitalized on newly opened political opportunities created by the end of military government and the restoration of civil authority in Hawaii, the flush of a victory carried out in the name of democracy and freedom, and the special status of returning Nisei veterans. Returning Issei and emerging Nisei leaders utilized the resources of their revived and reinvigorated community organizations to mount a series of social movement campaigns. This chapter concludes with a look at several of these early campaigns: war relief efforts for Japan, support for
the JACL's redress campaign, the multi-ethnic strike activities of the ILWU, and the Burns group's efforts to revitalize the Democratic Party with strong ILWU support. These early movement campaigns were important for reviving and focusing the community's internal resources and reinforcing new aspects of collective identity.

**War Relief Efforts for Japan**

Hearing that Japanese in the war-devastated cities were starving, Japanese residents in Hawaii organized *Nihon Nanmin Kyusai Iinkai* (Japanese Refugee Relief Committee) in 1946 and cooperated to send an enormous amount of relief to Japan via LARA (Licensed Agency for Relief of Asia) for about six years. The total amount of their relief added up to about $600,000 (Hirai 1990, 174-5). The Hiroshima *Kenjin Kai* independently raised funds and sent relief to the war victims of the city of Hiroshima, the city where America had dropped the first atomic bomb, because they or their parents were originally from Hiroshima prefecture. The various Nisei orchestra groups and entertainers performed for the fund-raising entertainment planned by the organizations such as *Kenjin Kai*. Even the *Katta Gumi* became involved in war relief efforts after they finally realized that Japan had lost the war (Hirai 1990, 164; Iino 2000, 143-5).

While these relief efforts linked the Japanese community in Hawaii back to its origins in Japan, they also reinforced the position of the Hawaii Japanese community as part of the American victors offering a helping hand to the Japanese whom they had defeated in the war. Hawaii's Japanese community was able to raise a very substantial amount of relief funds in the booming American postwar economy, which contrasted sharply with the situation in war-devastated Japan. Those who had left Japan decades
earlier as penniless contract laborers and their children were now in a position to give generously to those who had stayed in Japan.

**JACL Efforts for Resettlement and Redress**

On the U.S. mainland, the resettlement of Japanese evacuees required much time and hard work of the people. The JACL took the leadership and cooperated with the authorities in the resettlement process. It was very hard for the Issei who were in their sixties and seventies to start life over back on the West Coast. More Japanese on the mainland began to support the legal fights initiated by the JACL to redress the unequal treatment by America toward Japanese Issei and Nisei, in spite of the fact that there were always some Issei criticizing the JACL. In Hawaii, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce (Nisshoko) began to organize support for the JACL legal initiatives to redress the unequal treatment of the Japanese in the United States.

Although Hawaii’s Japanese community had been spared the massive uprooting of the internment, enough local Japanese leaders had been interned, and enough Japanese community assets such as language schools and Shinto shrines had been liquidated to create a strong shared bond with Japanese communities on the mainland. The local community leaders also recognized the leadership role the JACL was taking in the campaign for legislation to correct the unequal treatment of Issei and strongly supported the JACL efforts. By serving as the main channel for fundraising for these JACL activities, Nisshoko was aligning the Hawaii Japanese community with the national campaign, and reinforcing its own leadership role on behalf of the community.

This campaign also highlighted the emergence of Nisei leadership with the legal standing to challenge discriminatory laws and the strong desire to honor their parents by
doing so. In this early period the JACL initiated its campaign, but it would take several years to bring it to fruition. We will examine the campaign and its eventual success in greater detail in Chapter 4.

1946 Sugar Strike and 1949 Longshore Strike by the ILWU

The end of war offered new political opportunity for the ILWU in Hawaii. The sugar workers were unsatisfied with the pays and working conditions. Since the war was over, they were entitled to negotiate with the employers in terms of new contract. The union grew with the organizing efforts of Jack Kawano and other local-born union leaders. The union appeared to be tightly organized, without any problems. On the level of leadership, however, the ILWU had a problem. The local-born leaders gave way to the mainland white executive leadership. Moreover, since the Japanese were the biggest ethnic group among the dockworkers, in many cases Japanese of ability would have to stand back and let members of other races, chiefly Filipino, take over in the name of multiracial leadership (Zalburg 1979, 122).

In 1946, the time was ripe for a Territory-wide, inter-ethnic labor strike for the union on the sugar plantations. The ILWU had brought a sufficient number of signed-up Hawaii local laborers of various ethnic minority backgrounds to their side, and they had a capable union leadership having a strong tie with the ILWU headquarter in San Francisco. On September 1 the sugar workers struck. The ILWU leaders had stored enough food for the workers and prepared for the prolongation of the strike. While the striking workers manned the picket line and kept their morale high, the leaders worked hard at the bargaining table with the representatives of the sugar planters. The labor leaders did not give in. With the help of mediators sent by the Secretary of Labor the two sides finally
reached agreement and the strike ended on November 18. The workers gained a pay raise, and an end to the perquisite system. "For the first time in Hawaiian history the employers had been soundly and definitely thwarted" (Zalburg 1979, 155).

In the following year, however, the union lost the pineapple strike. The unionization of the pineapple industry was not complete yet. Therefore, the union could not fight a strong fight against the pineapple industry employers. And the timing was not good either, since the Red Scare was emerging by then.

In 1949, the ILWU started a longshoremen's strike in Hawaii. There was a 42-cent differential between the wages of ILWU longshoremen in Hawaii and those on the mainland. This differential caused the strike, which started on May 1 and lasted almost six months. The morale was high among the striking workers, but the employers used the Red Scare to accuse the union of being Communist. Agreement was finally reached between the union and the employers at the negotiating table. The settlement was for a wage increase of 21 cents an hour: 14 cents on return to work, and 7 cents payable on February 28, 1950. For the workers' side, it meant a 21-cent raise, although for the employers, it was presented as a 14-cent raise, and 7 cents extra. On October 23, 1949, the longshore strike ended officially, although the ending of the strike had become apparent around October 5.

This clear victory of the ILWU shocked the employers. As a result, it added fuel to the anti-Communist fire, since it was believed that hidden Communists were manipulating the union in Hawaii. The high profile successes of the ILWU in these two

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6 The union lost its bid for a 40 hour week so the 48 hour week system continued. Also the union allowed a continuance of the irrevocable check off system as a guarantee of union security, and it did not get a union shop (Zalburg 1979, 154).
early postwar strikes quickly led to a backlash by the still-powerful old white elite. Although the ILWU was very explicitly a multi-ethnic organization, Japanese figured heavily in its successes both as leaders and as rank and file union members. The backlash, in turn, would come down heavily on the Japanese community.

Emerging Burns Faction of Democrats
Through his extended personal network in the Police Contact Group and the ESC, John A. (Jack) Burns got together with Ernest Murai, Jack Kawano, Chuck Mau and Mitsuyuki Kido, and started meeting every Saturday night to discuss the future of Hawaii. They were later called the “Coffee Drinkers” (Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 2/25/75), because they discussed the future of Hawaii until late at night over cups of coffee.

John Burns was an Irish man who grew up poor with the other ethnic minority working class people in the neighborhood of Kalihi. Ernest Murai was a Nisei dentist, trained at a mainland university. Murai worked very hard for the ESC during the war. He learned how hard it was to overcome prejudice and prove that Japanese were loyal and trustworthy people willing to Americanize. At the same time, since he had told Japanese ethnic organizations to liquidate their estates and properties, some Japanese community members criticized him as “INU (sell-out).” Jack Kawano was a Nisei labor organizer for the ILWU, who had a wide network among the grassroots laborers. Kawano was invited to join the ESC because he was a labor organizer who had a strong influence over sugar and dockworkers, many of whom were of Japanese ancestry. Chuck Mau was a Chinese-American lawyer and politician, who had been elected several times to the Honolulu Board of Supervisors. Mau grew up poor and worked very hard to become an attorney in Hawaii. In the group, only Chuck Mau had political experience.
and had been an active Democrat. Mitsuyuki Kido was a Nisei schoolteacher, trained at the University of Hawaii.

The five "Coffee Drinkers" had one thing in common despite their ethnic differences. It was the fact that they knew very well what it was like to live in Hawaii as members of the working class, as underdogs. From this small meeting, the new Democratic Party emerged after having been moribund for a long time. Although small, this first group had a good start with the effective mobilizing activities of each member. Later, the Nisei war veterans with higher university degrees came back and joined the Burns faction.

Toward the end of World War II John A. Burns and his group of "Coffee Drinkers" began informal meetings outside of the ESC activities to discuss their great ambitions for postwar Hawaii (Kotani 1985, 130). During the war, Kido was receiving letters from Nisei soldiers who were once his students.

"What can we expect when we get back to Hawaii? Will the Americans of Japanese ancestry still be treated as second-class citizens? After our sacrifices as Uncle Sam's troops, can the veterans expect decent jobs in post-war Hawaii?" (Kotani 1985, 89)

The contents of the letters prompted him to think seriously about the necessity of changing Hawaii into a more democratic society. He was considering becoming a politician himself to change the society. He won the 1946 election, and became a Territorial Representative. The support of his former students and the ILWU members was indispensable in his victory.

From the end of war until the beginning of the HUAC hearings in April 1950, the Democratic Party of Hawaii was in the process of revitalization with Burns' Coffee Drinkers and the ILWU supporters. Among the Coffee Drinkers was Jack Kawano, an
ILWU grassroots organizer. With the increase of the ILWU membership, their potential influence in politics grew. Jack Hall, the ILWU leader in Hawaii, pushed the strategy to support the labor-friendly candidates. In 1947, Jack Hall told some grassroots organizers to bring in as many union members as possible with votes for the Democratic Party. “To a large degree, the ILWU helped create the modern Democratic Party of Hawaii. ILWU members (such as Kawano) or people paid by the ILWU (such as Wilfred Oka) played a big role” (Zalburg 1979, 223).

For instance, Wilfred Oka, who used to teach at the Nuuanu YWCA, talked to his former students about joining the Party. He said, “It’s time we became first-class citizens” (Zalburg 1979, 225). He was paid by the ILWU about fifteen or twenty dollars a week for doing this work, which John A. (Jack) Burns later admitted.

Oka did a lot of running around... Organizing precincts, putting those guys in, getting those guys, signing up those guys – in the ILWU, whom they could influence, and so forth. And that was the basic start [of the new Democratic Party] that we had until 1948 when we got the 442nd [the veterans] tacked in and I ran for office (Zalburg 1979, 224).

The ILWU members became strong enough to influence many precinct clubs to elect ILWU-supporting delegates to the Democratic Party Convention. The ILWU’s efforts made the Democratic Party grow bigger as well as more labor-oriented.

As with the ILWU’s successful early postwar strikes, the movement itself was pan-ethnic, but the Japanese community loomed large in both the leadership and the rank-and-file mobilization. Although the prewar Japanese forays into politics had been largely based on elite Republican patronage and sponsorship of older Nisei, the Japanese community base for the revitalization of the Democratic Party came from both the working class members of the ILWU and the highly educated younger Nisei war veterans.
And this time the Japanese were not entering politics through elite sponsorship, but rather because their own organizing and leadership skills had put them at the center of Party development.

**New Political Opportunities After the War**

After the war, the image of the Japanese as an "unassimilable race and sneaky enemy" gave way to the new image that they were "loyal Americans" who had even sacrificed their lives. This shift in attitudes began to influence the state of the Japanese community. The Issei and elder Nisei leaders reorganized their ethnic and cultural community organizations, and worked actively in order to protect the interests of the Japanese community. They kept their ethnic pride and mentality to redress the injustice and unequal treatment they had received throughout the prewar and war years.

The ILWU mobilized the working class people into large-scale movements after the war, and succeeded in two strikes, in the sugar plantations and on the dock. It was noteworthy that working class people with various jobs in Hawaii strengthened the union as part of the national organization of the ILWU. The efforts of local-born organizers, usually non-white, were indispensable for successful unionization. On the other hand, thanks to Kawano, their liaison person with the ILWU members, the Burns group gained power within the Democratic Party of Hawaii. It was significant that the Burns group chose to develop their influence within the existing Democratic Party by utilizing the support from the developing ILWU.

The ILWU increased their influence because the rank and file members could share the dream of the local-born leaders like Kawano, to make Hawaii a good place for working class people. The Burns group grew because they worked in order to create a
Hawaii where those who had been treated as second-class would be treated as first-class citizens. Sharing this aim mobilized other people into their movements. When the Nisei veterans with higher academic degrees came back to Hawaii and found their society was still second-class, they found the Burns group attractive. Many Nisei veterans cooperated with this group, and worked together to make Hawaii a society in which they would no longer be second-class. However, the Red Scare would soon tremendously influence all these activities of the ILWU, the Burns group in the Democratic Party of Hawaii, and the Japanese community organizations.

_Meanings and Modes of Collective Action_

This chapter has discussed the gradual development of political structures for the Japanese community organizations to mobilize the community people into social movement campaigns and political activity. In order to start a discussion of the development of various small scale movements leading to the overall democratic movement in the 1950s, I followed McAdam’s Political Process Model and went back and examined the changing social structures of Hawaii society, the ebb and flow of various organizations that mobilized Japanese people into movements, and the changing collective identity of those challengers involved in the movements.

In prewar Hawaii, the Japanese community was resourceful in generating various collective actions to redress the injustice in the racialized Hawaii society in which the Issei immigrants found themselves. They valued ethnic pride and believed they should be treated equally with European immigrants. They had knowledgeable leaders and organizations. Facing adverse economic situations, Japanese workers challenged the
employers by striking. Facing unequal social control on their language schools, they challenged it by filing a lawsuit. For Issei Japanese, equal treatment was what they really wanted in American society, which they believed was a democratic society.

As more of them were settling down in Hawaii, they tried to Americanize themselves, partly because their ethnic pride as Japanese could not allow the label of “unassimilable race.” Thus, on one hand, they assimilated themselves to American values especially of equality, justice and freedom, while on the other hand, they respected their ethnic cultural values and ethnic pride. By redressing the injustices in Hawaii, Issei wanted to make Hawaii a better place for their Nisei children. This way of respecting American democracy and preserving Japanese pride would become a part of the residual resources for Japanese residents to pass on. Therefore Nisei grew up with these two traditions, and they became loyal American citizens with a good understanding of Japanese values and morals. With their strong belief in democracy, some Nisei devoted themselves to the union movement with workers of different ethnicity who shared the same conditions.

The outbreak of war with Japan was very unfortunate for Hawaii’s Japanese community. Ordinary Issei residents lost their leaders, who were taken away to the internment. Their ethnic and community organizations shut down. It was unfortunate for Nisei too, since their loyalty was suspected and initially they were deprived of a way to fight for their own country. However, they created a chance to volunteer for their country in order to prove their loyalty. While some organizations remained in abeyance during the war, they were ready to rebound when the war ended.

In immediate postwar Hawaii, the Japanese community, Nisei as well as Issei, were ready to start new movements to redress the inequality that they had kept challenging
throughout the prewar years. The Issei Japanese had experiences of challenging the host society. Even though World War II interrupted their activities, they resumed their former community organizations. In addition, Nisei new leaders brought forth new organizations with other local born people of minority backgrounds. New movements to change the structure of Hawaii society were burgeoning by 1950.

This review has demonstrated that over nearly half a century, Hawaii’s Japanese community had developed good organizational resources and a strong collective identity that positioned it to capitalize on the new political opportunities of the postwar period. It was ready to engage in social movements that would change the society and its own position within it.

The early community organization-building and social movement activities that the Japanese community carried out over the first half of the twentieth century had already established some key meanings and modes of operation that would recur in the movements of the early 1950s. The Japanese community had already established its capacity and willingness to engage in collective actions such as strikes and to support litigation and legislation as means of redressing inequities. It had demonstrated a strong desire to participate in politics, even when that avenue was only open to the Nisei generation. It had already identified the achievement of statehood for Hawaii as an essential element of “first-class status” in the society, and linked it symbolically with erasing the Issei stigma of being “unassimilable aliens” who were unsuitable for American citizenship. At the same time, the Japanese community had demonstrated considerable internal variation and independence of opinion about the best way to achieve goals that were broadly shared.
I have also tried to show the central role of the Japanese vernacular press within the Japanese community and its relation to various social movements during the first half of the twentieth century. In the next four chapters I will be using content analysis of one newspaper, *Hawaii Hochi*, as the main data source for examining more closely the social movement campaigns that occupied the Japanese community in the early 1950s. As a Japanese language newspaper that also published some pages in English, its primary audience was the Japanese-reading Issei public. Although by 1950 the Issei generation comprised less than half of the adult Japanese community, they still held strong leadership positions and played a significant role in the community. They were also the proud parents of the Nisei generation, and the pages of *Hawaii Hochi* provide intriguing glimpses of inter-generational relations as they played out through these social movement campaigns.
CHAPTER 3
RED SCARE AND STRONG DESIRE FOR STATEHOOD

The national political context for early postwar Hawaii contained two dominant themes: the great desire for statehood, which was stalled by the Red Scare. The Red Scare that spread across America in the early postwar period was a political atmosphere in which Americans became alarmed about the danger of Communists hiding among them, and embarked on a crusade to identify, label, and banish them. The crusade was carried out through public legislative hearings in which cooperating informants confessed to having been members of the Communist Party and reported the names of other people they had met in that context. The people accused and labeled in this way were not only pressured to confess publicly and inform on others, but were often removed from their jobs and blacklisted so they could not find other work. These public pressures led to many false reports and damaged many lives, although some people who were called as witnesses steadfastly refused to inform on other people, citing their constitutional right to remain silent.

Phenomena such as the Red Scare have been variously called moral panics, witch-hunts, inquisitions, and public hysteria, and are thought to arise periodically under social conditions of uncertainty in which some group facing a challenge to its dominance attempts to regain control of the social order. They are a well-studied form of social movement. There had been earlier Red Scares in the United States and other countries from early in the twentieth century, in response to the perceived threat of communist revolution. The early postwar Red Scare in the United States arose in the context of
deteriorating U.S.-Soviet Union relations and was fueled by the willingness of certain politicians to capitalize on these fears for political gain.

The Red Scare was a national phenomenon, but especially in Hawaii it had a tremendous impact on the social movements that various grassroots organizations were trying to promote. Since the white elite oligarchy of Hawaii tactically utilized the Red Scare atmosphere to counteract and suppress these labor and political movements, it became a strong negative political opportunity for all the social movement campaigns happening at that time. *Hawaii Hochi* steadily reported about the Red Scare. The newspaper followed the HUAC hearings (April 1950), Reluctant 39 Trial (January 1951), arrest of the Hawaii Seven (August 1951), and Hawaii Seven Trial (mainly November 1952 – July 1953), which is reflected in the number of articles seen in Figure 3. Accordingly, the number of articles for April-June 1950 was as many as 96. The number for January-March 1951 was 22 reflecting the Reluctant 39 trial, that of July-September 1951 was 25 reflecting the arrest of Hawaii Seven, then the total number of articles in one year from October 1952 to September 1953 became 91, showing the coverage of *Hochi* on the Smith Act trial. *Hawaii Hochi* covered communism related issues well, with a total of 384 articles related to communism in Hawaii from 1950 to 1954.

On the other hand, there had been a desire for Hawaii statehood starting in the prewar years. The U.S. Congress must decide admission of a new state to the Union. However strongly Hawaii residents might have wanted statehood, unless the U.S. Congress voted for the statehood bill, their wish would not be fulfilled. For members of Congress, admission of a new state had much to do with how the Federal Representatives and Senators to be elected from a new state would affect the political status of the
congresspersons themselves. The partisan factors and political orientations of the politicians and residents of the new state figured heavily in the decision. Thus the admission of a new state was very much a national issue. In the case of the Hawaii statehood bill, U.S. Congress treated it as national issue, which tremendously affected Hawaii's strategy to get admitted as a state. One of the first steps in that strategy was to develop a constitution through a constitutional convention.

Japanese residents in Hawaii, including both generations of Issei and emerging Nisei, were passionate statehood proponents. For Japanese, statehood was one of their future dreams along with the legislation of a new Naturalization and Immigration Law, because it symbolized the attainment of equal status with other Americans. Throughout the prewar years, a group of Issei kept challenging what seemed to them to be legal inequalities and injustices. The statehood issue also was an issue of equality for them. Politicians used the characterization of the Japanese in Hawaii as aliens who could not be assimilated to American society and were unsuitable for citizenship as a reason for denying statehood. This meant not only that statehood itself became symbolic of equality, but that the Japanese community felt it had to prove that the label was wrong and that their large presence in the Hawaii population should not be an obstacle to statehood.

*Hawaii Hochi* editors followed the process of the constitutional convention and statehood campaigns in Hawaii and the move of statehood bills in the Congress very well. Figure 3 shows the shift of numbers of articles on the constitutional convention and statehood in *Hawaii Hochi*. As the Figure clearly shows, the articles about the constitutional convention were concentrated in the beginning of the 1950 when the convention took place, while the statehood issue in general covered the entire period.
because Hawaii did not obtain statehood until 1959. For the five years from 1950 to 1954, the total number of articles on statehood was 457, and that of articles related to the constitutional convention was 183.

As I explained in Chapter 1, this dissertation uses the *Hawaii Hochi* articles as its primary data source, and content analyzes the articles to see the features of social movements that involved the Japanese community. In this chapter I will use the *Hawaii Hochi* articles and secondary historical sources together to clarify how the Red Scare and statehood mattered to the Japanese community, and to show how the issues became intertwined. As the analysis will demonstrate, when the Red Scare focused on members of the Japanese community and their relatives, it reinforced the political view that they were an unassimilable alien element and an obstacle to the achievement of statehood. This in turn raised questions about their political involvement in activities related to the statehood campaign and the constitutional convention.

**The Red Scare Sets In**

With deteriorating US-Soviet Union relations, the state of cold war was developing in the world in the late 1940s. In the United States, anti-communism hysteria appeared, and some politicians instigated anti-red activities in Hawaii as well as on the mainland. In a democratic society, whether or not one could be accused for just thinking about the overthrow of the existing government was a very important and touchy issue. Earlier American Red Scares had resulted in passage of the Smith Act of 1940, which made it possible to prosecute people on the basis of such ideas, even if they were not put into action.
The Smith Act was a nickname for the Alien Registration Act, because Representative Howard W. Smith had authored its anti-sedition section. Since the Smith Act made it illegal for anyone to knowingly advocate or teach the duty, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the United States by force, or to organize or join any group teaching such a doctrine, in 1948 it was used to indict the eleven leaders of the Communist Party in New York. The Court found all of them guilty and “the door was open to go after the so-called second string communists” (Holmes 1994, 11). In the end, over 140 Communist Party leaders were indicted. Hawaii saw a part of the national anti-communist scenario appear in the form of hearings conducted in Hawaii by the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), and later when seven Hawaii residents (the Hawaii Seven) were indicted for “advocating the overthrow of the U.S. government.”

Ingram Stainback, who had been a right-wing Democrat Governor of the Territory from the war years, instigated the Hawaii version of the anti-communist crusade. In 1947 Stainback started warning Hawaii’s people about the dangers of communism on many occasions. Governor Stainback warned that there were communists in the Territorial government, and said that he would expose and dismiss any Territorial employees who were involved in communism. In an Armistice Day speech, Stainback quoted a part of a document called “What Must We Do?” and said a local resident wrote it. The author’s name was not released at that time, but actually Dr. John Reinecke wrote it in 1934.

Holmes reports that “less than a week after Governor Stainback’s Armistice Day speech, a sensational thirty-two-page pamphlet entitled The Truth about Communism in Hawaii was released to the public” (Holmes 1994, 53). In this pamphlet the author Ichiro
Izuka, of Japanese descent, confessed that he once was a communist, and exposed a list of forty-seven alleged members of the Communist Party. The pamphlets were distributed all over the islands, and had a tremendous impact on the island community, because this list of communists included the names of labor leaders, Democratic politicians, and two public school teachers. On November 25, 1947, these two school teachers, Dr. John E. Reinecke, a haole scholar from the US mainland, and his wife Aiko Reinecke, a local Nisei school teacher, were charged with being members of the Communist Party in Hawaii. The following month, both of them were suspended from their teaching positions.

In August 1948, the Reineckes' hearing before the Territorial Commission on Public Instruction began and lasted for 33 days (Zalburg 1979, p.221). The result of the hearing was harsh on the Reineckes. Both John and Aiko Reinecke had been properly dismissed, the Commission said. “The commission revoked John Reinecke’s teacher’s certificate and found that both Reineckes were ‘not possessed of the ideals of democracy’” (Zalburg, p. 222).

When the Reineckes’ case surfaced and Izuka’s pamphlet and testimony attracted public attention in 1947, Hawaii’s Japanese community felt uneasy. Looking at the list of people who were named communists by Izuka, one could not help finding names of

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7 Reinecke and others say the Izuka pamphlet had 31 pages, not 32. According to Zalburg, this Izuka pamphlet was actually written by Paul Beam, and polished by Arnold Willis (1979, 207). Reinecke also said the same. Reinecke said, “Today, its ghost writers, Paul Beam and A. L. Willis, probably take little pride in either its style, its contents, or the uses to which it has been put... Its 31 pages were one of the most descriptive bits of writing ever done in Hawaii, and certainly one of the most profitable financially. ‘Ichiro Izuka, American’ received $7,000 for telling ‘The Truth About Communism in Hawaii’ as he knew or imagined it” (Reinecke 1993, 48).
Japanese in the list. In 1948, Hawaii’s Governor Stainback made a speech in front of a Japanese audience at the Young Men’s Buddhist Association in Hilo and said that quite a few Japanese were communists. It shocked the Japanese community.

_Hawaii Hochi_ on Sept. 18, 1948 (p.4) printed a letter from a Japanese in Wailuku titled “Why Japanese citizens became communists.” This letter seemed to summarize the feeling of Issei Japanese residents in Hawaii at the time. The writer said, “If Izuka’s list tells the truth and if there are so many Japanese communists, it would trample the trust toward Japanese which had been earned by Nisei soldiers during World War II.” Calling it one of the most deplorable things for the Japanese community, the writer suggested that they should find out the reason Japanese Americans had gone over to communism and the remedies to convert them back. The writer of the letter assumed that Nisei Japanese went over to communism: 1) because they had been suppressed in Hawaii society, 2) because they did not know the truth of communism, 3) because they confused unionism with communism, 4) because they were disappointed with the existing society and political groups. The writer believed that it was not because they really had hoped to overthrow the existing government. Nisei grew up in a harsh atmosphere of suppression, so they took it as a great accomplishment to win in the strikes against the Big Five through the union movement. While enjoying the victory some of them went over to communism without contemplation, because communism seemed to do good for the working class people. Then the writer presented his belief that the Nisei communists could easily be converted back. Aside from whether what the writer wrote was right or wrong, this letter told the Issei’s sincere feelings and anxiety toward Nisei who, to the eyes of Issei, had made the mistake of becoming communists. However, this anxiety of Issei did not
become widely known outside the community, whereas the stigma that there were many communists in Hawaii's Japanese community did not disappear easily, even though Issei and other Japanese residents wanted to wipe it out.

Ordinary Japanese residents in Hawaii dreaded having fellow Japanese labeled communist, perhaps more strongly so than other ordinary Americans. Being labeled communist in the Red Scare atmosphere by itself meant ostracism. But Japanese residents also hated another meaning of communist, which was un-American. To Japanese residents in Hawaii, being criticized as un-American reminded them of Hawaii's prewar days when Japanese were regarded as un-American by ordinary Americans. The Nisei soldiers' loyal and heroic behavior during the war had contributed to making Americans accept Nisei as loyal American citizens. The negative image of Japanese as un-American finally began to disappear after the war, and the Japanese community did not want it to re-emerge. They did not want to be labeled communist and un-American again owing to only a handful of Nisei who actually had belonged to the Communist Party.

During the long dock strike of 1949, the Red Scare atmosphere worked negatively on the ILWU side, and labor activities were labeled as being communist-inspired. The Big Five employers' strategy was to call the union activists communists. One of the English dailies in Hawaii, the Honolulu Advertiser, ran a series of columns that started with "Dear Joe," and charged that "the Hawaii longshoremen were serving Stalin in a plot to destroy Hawaii's economy" (Zalburg 1979, 245).

In the beginning of October 1949, the Territorial Legislature passed a concurrent resolution requesting the United States House Committee on Un-American Activities
(HUAC) to come to Hawaii. Believing that the prolonged and damaging dock strike was part of a communist plot, the Legislature wanted HUAC to investigate and report on the threat of internal subversion in the Territory (Holmes 1994, 150). Hawaii’s legislators, many of whom had connections to the Big Five businessmen, felt the ILWU threatening and wanted to diminish the union’s power by charging that union leaders were red. In addition, on October 10, the Territorial House passed a bill to create a Territorial Subversive Activities Commission (Holmes 1994, 151). In December, Governor Stainback appointed seven members of the Commission. The chairman was Edward Sylva, and the members included William Borthwick and Marumoto Masaji, a prominent Nisei lawyer. The report of their investigation did not become public until after the HUAC hearings and Reluctant 39 trials had ended.

There were two related organizations in Hawaii dedicated to ridding the society of red elements. IMUA, or the Hawaii Residents’ Association, was formed in June 1949 to call attention to the creeping paralysis of communism in Hawaii (Holmes 1994, 145). It was an organization on the Big Five side, and it framed the Union strike as part of the intrigues of the communists to harm the U.S. government. By labeling the union leaders communists, the Big Five wanted to show that the strike was truly a communist plot. This negative frame and the fact that a number of Nisei workers were included in the union activities generated the image that there were many Japanese communists in Hawaii.

In order to wipe out the label of communist, Beikoku Shugi Koyo Kai (Americanism Promotion Association) was organized among the Japanese elites, such as the leaders of the Nisshoko, Honolulu Japanese Chamber of Commerce. The main objectives of
Beikoku Shugi Koyo Kai were 1) to promote Americanism, 2) to prevent the penetration of communism in the Islands, and 3) to obtain citizenship for the Issei generation (Hawaii Hochi, 3/7/50, p.2). It was a voluntary organization, but the leaders of this association were Fukunaga Shuichi, Matsui Toyotaro, Miho Katsuro, and Yamamoto Tsuneichi, all of whom were the then executive members of the Nisshoko, as reported in Hawaii Hochi in 1950 (3/27/50, p.5; 7/14/50, p.2). The Beikoku Shugi Koyo Kai sponsored a radio program promoting Americanism among Japanese residents for fifteen minutes every Sunday morning. A University of Hawaii assistant professor was in charge of this program on Americanism (Hawaii Hochi, 3/7/50, p.2). The group also actively supported the campaign for passage of the Walter-McCarran Immigration and Naturalization Act.

Thus very early in this period there were opposing social movement groups either trying to impose the label of communist on the Japanese community or trying to fight against that label on behalf of the Japanese community.

**Statehood Drive: Japanese Community and Constitutional Convention**

The statehood movement started in the prewar period, but did not achieve its aims. When the public hearings were conducted in Hawaii regarding statehood in 1937, the loyalty of Nisei, Americans of Japanese ancestry was questioned (Bell 1984, 65).

Statehood became a significant problem for the Japanese community, because the anti-statehood group was using the stereotype of Japanese as unassimilable, and even suspected Nisei’s loyalty even though the Nisei were born Americans. The war with Japan interrupted the statehood campaign, but soon after the war, the statehood issue was
revived in Hawaii. Thank to the heroic Nisei troops in the war, the suspicion about the loyalty of Nisei was gone.

In June 1947, a Hawaii statehood bill passed the U.S. House of Representatives. But the Red Scare issue emerged in Hawaii, and blocked its way. The U.S. Senate did not discuss the bill. Senator Hugh Butler, who was a very strong opponent of Hawaii statehood, but would become pro-statehood later, strongly opposed Hawaii statehood, based on his report, *Statehood for Hawaii: Communist Penetration of the Hawaiian Islands*. He conducted confidential interviews and accepted public testimony from more than 100 witnesses, and concluded that Hawaii had been strongly influenced by communists. Similar to the naturalization bill, the Hawaii statehood bill was very much vulnerable to the Red Scare situation after a Hawaii scenario of Red Scare became apparent in 1947 (Holmes 1994, 145-146).

In 1950 the discussion on statehood in Hawaii started with the election of the delegates for the constitutional convention. At that time there were 48 states in the United States, and the Territories of Alaska and Hawaii were trying to win the admission to the union as new states. "Fifteen of the twenty-nine former territories entered the Union by drafting and adopting state constitutions before Congress finally accepted them as states." (Bell 1984, 180) Although there had been a request for a constitutional convention before, it was delayed because of the anti-communism hysteria in Hawaii. Finally in July 1949 the Territorial Legislature approved a budget of $295,000 for the convention. Thus, in order to draft the constitution of future state Hawaii, the elections to elect the delegates to the convention were held.
Figure 3 shows a trend of number of the *Hawaii Hochi* articles on constitutional convention and statehood campaigns from 1950 to 1954. During the first three months of 1950 quite a good number of articles regarding the topic of constitutional convention were found in the *Hawaii Hochi*. However, the number of the articles regarding constitutional convention in 1950 gradually decreased as the time went on. The primary election for the constitutional convention took place on February 11, and the general election on March 21. Most of the articles in January were profiles of the candidates who ran for election as constitutional convention delegates. The total number of candidates for delegates turned out to be 243, out of which 46 were of Japanese ancestry (*Hawaii Hochi*, 2/10/50, p.2). It was a special Territorial election to elect the delegates to draft state constitution for Hawaii. The voters would decide not on party lines but on personality and opinions of each candidate. Starting in January until the primary election in February, the readers saw one or two articles giving the profiles of the candidates in almost every *Hochi* issue. More than half of the profile-type articles were about Nisei candidates, giving detailed information on them. Also *Hawaii Hochi* posted the political advertisements of the candidates, most of which were found in the English section (See Figure 6). *Hawaii Hochi* welcomed the fact that 46 Nisei ran for the convention delegates.

The *Hochi* editors tried to enlighten the readers about the significance of the constitutional convention for Hawaii’s future statehood in the paper. From January to March in 1950, the *Hawaii Hochi* editors wrote seven editorials on the topic of the constitutional convention. In January *Hochi* had two editorials. The first was "Do Not Fail to Register for the Election." (1/11/50, p.2). It urged the Japanese readers eligible to
vote to register, because the constitutional convention was one of the most important and necessary events for statehood. The second was "Necessity for Amateur Politicians" (1/23/50, p.2). This editorial gave an interesting point. About 20 candidates out of 243 were the incumbent Territorial Legislators. The occupations of the other candidates varied from businessmen to college students (Hawaii Hochi, 1/23/50, p.2). According to the editorial, some candidates labeled as professional politicians were giving the impression that they were the ones people could count on. The editor, however, thought that they would need the amateurs in politics for the convention. Even though they were amateurs in politics, they would be able to contribute to the drafting of the constitution from their own expertise such as medicine, business, or education.

The editorial on February 7, titled “Unprecedented Election Campaign”, told the Japanese readers the editor’s impression of the election campaigns for the 1950 constitutional convention. In the campaigns for this particular occasion, he saw a good sign he had never seen in the local elections before. At least for him, for the first time, the candidates spoke effectively about their own opinions rather than showing the audience enjoyable shows with good hula dancers and Hawaiian singers. The editor commented that in the general elections for the Territorial Legislators the candidates did not necessarily have to give their straight opinions, for all the important decisions in Hawaii’s local politics were made on the top anyway. In this sense it was the first chance for the voters to hear the candidates openly speak about their opinions and show their sincerity and knowledge in front of voters.

The editorial on the day before the primary election (Hawaii Hochi, 2/10/50, p.2) told the readers how important the editors thought the election and constitutional
convention were. "Whether or not Hawaii will be admitted to the union in the near future may depend on the quality of the constitution that the elected delegates will draft at the coming convention" (ibid). The editor emphasized the importance of the convention, and urged the voters to elect those fully qualified as constitutional convention delegates.

Knowing that Japanese tended to be criticized for their bloc-voting attitudes, the Hochi editors tried to tell the readers what the people should consider in voting and choosing the best candidates. The editorial (3/20/50, p.2) titled, “Vote Wisely” told what the voters were supposed to do on the general election day. The content can be summarized in the following four points.

1) Voting turnout rate has to be high in order to show the anti-statehood proponents that the majority of residents of Hawaii support the constitutional convention.
2) Choose and vote from all the candidates, because it is what civic-minded people are supposed to do. Bloc voting would cause the criticism that it is evidence of immaturity in political matters.
3) Do not vote on party lines. This election has nothing to do with party politics. Do not vote with race preferences. This election has nothing to do with race matters, either.
4) Vote for the candidate with intelligence, honesty and belief. Vote for the candidate who could calmly deal with difficulties. Vote for those who can consider the minority’s opinions.

It is clear from this editorial that the Hochi editor took it their mission to enlighten the readers and explain the importance of the coming election for the constitutional convention.

In reporting the results of the primary and general elections for the convention delegates, Hochi reported the details of how well the people of Japanese ancestry did in the election. The main difference of the Japanese press articles from the English dailies was that the former had much more detailed articles on the people of Japanese ancestry.
This tendency might have caused the anti-Japanese people’s suspicion that Japanese were bloc-voting. In the primary election, out of all 243 candidates, 18 won the delegate’s seats right away, and another 90 cleared the first hurdle and were allowed to move on to the general election on March 21. Among these 18 immediate winners, 8 were Nisei (44.4%). Among the 90 candidates who cleared the first hurdle, 22 were Nisei (24.4%) (3/20/50, p.2). Then, at the general election on March 21, 45 finally won the convention delegate seats. Among the 45, 11 or 24.4% were Nisei. Thus, out of the total 63 selected delegates, 19 or 30.1% were Nisei. Considering that Japanese constituted 36.9% of the total Hawaii population in 1950, in the constitutional convention Japanese were a little underrepresented. However, the population percentage included Issei who were not U.S. citizens and thus could not vote.

With these successful delegates, the constitutional convention had a grand opening ceremony at the Armory on April 4. Six days later, the HUAC hearings began at Iolani Palace. It could be interpreted that the opening of the HUAC hearings was intentionally set to coincide with the constitutional convention, since having the HUAC hearings in Hawaii was the idea of a group of anti-Statehood, strong anti-communist people such as Governor Stainback. The HUAC hearings were positioned to influence the statehood issue.

**HUAC (House Un-American Activities Committee) Hearings**

According to Figure 3, April-June of 1950 had over 90 articles, which shows how much interest Hochi paid to the hearing and also how much these articles attracted the readers, because the editors continuously wrote about the testimonies. Before the HUAC
hearing began, Japanese people had been very anxious about what would come out in the hearings and how the hearings would affect Japanese community, because they knew that at least several witnesses must be of Japanese ancestry. Most of Japanese were also concerned that the result of the HUAC hearings might affect negatively on the statehood bills being discussed in the Congress. Knowing the anxiety of ordinary Japanese reading residents, Hawaii Hochi had started reporting about HUAC even before the hearings actually began.

The arrival of the HUAC members was a sensational event for all the residents of Hawaii. Francis Walter, who chaired this committee, was already well known to most Japanese community members as the congressman who had proposed the revised naturalization bill. The committee had seven members besides Representative Walter, but only five members, including the chair, came to Hawaii. Much attention was paid to this event, and Japanese community members were anxious to find out how many of the witnesses would be of Japanese descent, and to what extent Japanese residents were connected to communist activities in Hawaii.

Hawaii Hochi reported about the process of the HUAC hearings in detail to their Japanese readers. Needless to say, all the English dailies were writing about the hearings, but Hawaii Hochi wrote more about the testimonies of Japanese witnesses. The news covered from the first hearing to the last hearing, from April 10 to 20, and most of the top news stories of Hochi during that time were HUAC-related. The Hochi editors were supporting Hawaii’s statehood, so Hochi articles showed their wish to remove the large obstacle for the statehood, which was the belief among some Americans that Hawaii was
controlled by the communists. The editorial of February 1 shows the pro-statehood editors’ feelings.

We do not believe that there is a “dangerous condition” in Hawaii, although a member of the HUAC was reported to believe that there is. We do not know any evidence his opinion was based on. We cannot believe that communism infiltrated our government. However, we cannot always be right. Thus we do want to know the truth. If we are wrong and if the situation is worse than we think, correct us. We do not protect any communists. We do not want the communists to be active in our government. This is why we welcome the HUAC investigations (Hawaii Hochi 2/1/50, p.2).

It was expected before the beginning of the hearings that many ILWU-related people would be subpoenaed for the hearings, and some Japanese names must be included.

Charles Fujimoto Kazuyuki and Eileen Fujimoto, Jack H. Kawano, Jack Hall, Ernest Arena, Robert McElrath, Ah Quon McElrath, Jack Denichi Kimoto, John Reinecke, Aiko Reinecke, and Ichiro Izuka were already reported as the people to be subpoenaed (Hawaii Hochi: 4/2/50, p.5, 4/5/50, p.1). But the appearance of the first witness shocked the people of Hawaii, especially the Japanese.

When the name of the first witness, Kageyama Masato, was called, it shocked all the audience. At 9:40, City and County Supervisor Kageyama took the witness stand with attorney Fukushima Yasutaka. Kageyama said that he signed the Communist Party card in February 1947, after having attended the discussion meeting at Dr. Reinecke’s for 9 weeks. This gave another shock to the audience. He had served in the military during World War II. . . Kageyama was a former student of Dr. Reinecke at Hilo High School. He had been a Communist Party member for 9 months. . . At the hearing he reported at whose houses the local meetings were held. He confessed that he had joined the party because he believed that the Communist Party would fight for the freedom of the citizens, and give a hand to the miserable people. Kageyama admitted that the Izuka pamphlet was true (Hawaii Hochi, 4/10/50, p, 1; p.2).

Richard Kageyama Masato was a Nisei politician, who had been popular among the local residents. He was a World War II veteran, and had been elected to the Board of Supervisors as the first American of Japanese ancestry in the 1946 election. He had also
won a delegate seat for the constitutional convention in March. The opening ceremony for the constitutional convention had been held a week earlier. Thus, the Hōchi editors reported about what would become of Kageyama as a City Supervisor and as a delegate to the constitutional convention.

Unlike Kageyama, Izuka Ichiro, the second witness for the hearings, was the one everybody had expected to appear, because Izuka was the author of the pamphlet, “The Truth about Communism in Hawaii” published in 1947, and he had showed up as a witness at the Reinecke’s hearings in 1948. His testimony lasted from the first day to the second day of the hearings. He named 23 people as having been communists, including 13 Japanese Americans. Izuka even said that Frank Silva, who had been elected as a delegate to the constitutional convention with Kageyama, was one of the former Communist Party members. Because Izuka named Silva as a Communist Party member at the testimony, Silva was unexpectedly subpoenaed on April 13, and refused to answer all the questions regarding communist activities in Hawaii at the hearing (4/14/50, p.2).

Ralph Tokunaga, a Nisei union worker, was the first witness to refuse to answer all the questions regarding communism at the HUAC hearings. His testimony was held on April 12, and the ILWU lawyers, Myer Symonds and Harriet Bouslog had advised their clients to refuse to answer all the questions regarding communism. Tokunaga took shelter behind the Fifth Amendment as his constitutional right. As a result, more witnesses followed this advice, which led the HUAC to counteract by charging these hostile witnesses with contempt of Congress. The number of the hostile witnesses became 39, and therefore they were called “Reluctant 39.”
Until the end of the hearings, *Hawaii Hochi* followed all of the testimonies, although the *Hochi* editors treated some testimonies very minutely, while did the others very briefly. On April 19 the HUAC hearings in Honolulu ended. According to the *Hochi* (4/20/50, p.4), the total number of witnesses subpoenaed was 77, which included 29 witnesses of Japanese descent. Among 38 friendly witnesses, 8 were of Japanese descent. Among 39 hostile witnesses who refused to testify, 21 were Japanese. These 39 witnesses were called Reluctant 39, from then on, and would face the charge by the HUAC committee with contempt of Congress. The reluctant 39 included Jack Hall, Wilfred Oka, Charles Fujimoto Kazuyuki, Frank Silva, Dwight James Freeman, Pearl Freeman, Edward Wong, Jack Kawano, John Reinecke, Jack Kimoto Denichi, and others.

**Kageyama and Silva Affairs and the Constitutional Convention**

The appearance of popular Nisei City Supervisor, Richard Kageyama as the witness for the HUAC hearings surprised the Japanese residents. This event had a negative effect on the course of the constitutional convention and eventual statehood (*Hawaii Hochi*, 4/10/50, p.1). For the anti-Statehood proponents, Kageyama’s confession became instrumental in delaying the statehood discussion. At the same time, the Old Guard Democrats praised Kageyama for his courage in admitting his former mistakes. The Kageyama confession was shocking news not only for Japanese residents but for all Hawaii residents regardless of race. But especially for Japanese it was something that could not be ignored, because City Supervisor Kageyama was regarded as a hero among Hawaii’s local Japanese.
The number of articles regarding the Kageyama affair is shown in Figure 3. It started as the top news for the Hochi on April 10, the very first day of the HUAC hearings. The Hochi wrote 13 articles in total regarding Kageyama in April. The Hochi readers’ concern concentrated on whether Kageyama would lose all his jobs and status. Kageyama voluntarily resigned as a constitutional convention delegate, because he thought it might harm the future of the statehood campaign.

Convention delegates accepted his resignation unanimously. But on a split vote they also agreed to a resolution which recognized that his cooperation with the HUAC in testifying before and otherwise assisting it in the exposure of Communists and Communist activities in Hawaii has been of distinct service to this country (Bell 1984, 183).

However, Kageyama kept his seat in the Honolulu Board of Supervisors. Rep. Francis Walter, the chair of the HUAC and a prominent Democrat, praised his brave confession as a true American, while Hawaii’s Democratic leaders criticized Kageyama and even tried to erase his name from the list of Party members. Japanese residents paid much attention to what would become of his status. From then on, the Hochi reported what possible penalties Kageyama might face (4/11/50). Although the other City Supervisors and Mayor Wilson advised Kageyama to resign, Kageyama did not accept the advice. According to the articles, he kept saying that he was considering it and kept attending the Board meetings. In the process, Kageyama got accused of perjury, for he had previously taken an oath as City Supervisor that he was not a communist. The Hochi followed the Kageyama case until the Supreme Court handed down the judgment and his case was dismissed, because no evidence was presented that he actually had made an oath that he was not a communist. Kageyama did not run for City Supervisor in the 1950 election, so his term ended at the end of that year. He ran for the 1952 election without
success, and came back to the position by winning the 1954 election. It reflects that more or less for many of Hawai‘i’s Japanese Kageyama stayed as a hero who became the first Nisei City Supervisor, and showed courage to admit his former mistake in public.

Compared with the number of reports on the Kageyama affair, the Hawaii Hochi was rather indifferent to the Frank Silva affair. Frank Silva, an ILWU business agent from Kauai and then also a delegate for the constitutional convention, was named a communist by HUAC witness Izuka Ichiro. Izuka was the second witness for the HUAC hearings on the first day. For Silva’s affair Hawaii Hochi had only five articles in April. It reported what he said at the HUAC hearings, and how his testimony affected his position in the constitutional convention.

Frank Silva’s case looked very similar to Kageyama’s. However, Silva’s reaction was different from Kageyama’s. When Silva was subpoenaed to the HUAC hearing on April 13, he took his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. However, not only Izuka but Lorenzo, another witness at the hearings, also testified that Silva was a communist. Silva was pressured to resign from the convention, but did not accept the advice (Hochi, 4/19/50). At the convention, an amendment to expel Frank Silva “by reason of his contumacious behavior . . . toward the Constitutional Convention” was voted, and passed by 53 to 7 (Zalberg, 298). As a result he was expelled from the convention, and the Governor nominated Nisei Arashiro Matsuki to the constitutional convention as Silva’s successor.

8 Although his pay as City Supervisor had been held at the City Treasurer’s office after the HUAC hearing, he finally got paid his salary in December 1950 when his term ended.
9 Arashiro was a Democrat, and elected for the Territorial Representative in the 1946 and 1948 elections.
From the end of April till the beginning of May 1950 a different type of hearings were held at the U.S. Senate in Washington D.C. The hearings were for Hawaii’s statehood. About one fourth of the convention delegates went to participate in the Washington D.C. hearings, but those who stayed in Hawaii continued the discussion to draft the constitution during the statehood hearings on the mainland. Due to these elements, however, the discussion went more slowly than was originally expected.

**McCarran’s Internal Security Act and the Reluctant 39 Trial**

While the news of the HUAC hearings was drawing the attention of Hawaii’s people, Senator McCarran’s Anti-Communist bill had been discussed in the US Congress. This was the bill to become the Internal Security Act, better known as the McCarran Act. On June 25 1950 North Korea invaded South Korea, and America sent their military force to South Korea as part of United Nations forces to fight against communists in North Korea. Under the influence of this international atmosphere, the McCarran bill became law when the Congress overrode President Truman’s veto on September 23. *Hawaii Hochi* reported about the legislation on the front page on September 23. On September 26, *Hochi* reported that the Hawaii Civil Liberties Committee (HCLC) raised an objection to the McCarran Act. The HCLC regarded the law as a by-product of war hysteria. But the HCLC itself had been labeled red. Even some neutral people regarded the Internal Security Act as dangerous. *Hawaii Hochi*, too, in its editorial predicted that Americans in the near future would regret the passage of McCarran’s Internal Security Act (9/28/50, p.2). Introducing the President’s reason for vetoing the bill, the *Hochi* editor expressed the anxiety that it would lead to the control of thoughts and opinions by the government,
and that America would come close to being a totalitarian society. The successful passage of the McCarran Act in spite of some people's feeling of its danger clearly showed the anti-communist atmosphere of the days.

Under such a strong anti-communist atmosphere, what would become of the Reluctant 39 drew much attention of Hawaii's people. However, as some lawyers pointed out, it would be difficult to find any penalty for the Reluctant 39, since they had a right of refusing to reply when their answers might lead to criminal charges. Thus, no matter how strongly determined the chair of the HUAC, Francis Walter, was to indict the hostile witnesses at the hearings with the charge of contempt of Congress, it would be hard to find them guilty. At the plea in the indictment hearing on the morning of October 30, 1950, all of the 39 demanded that the indictment should be declared invalid, but the indictment went forward. The trial for the Reluctant 39 started in January 1951. Five test cases were selected to represent the charges against all the 39. The five were: Abe Yukio, Ester Bistow, Charles Fujimoto, Ralph Tokunaga and John Reinecke. Judge Metzger upheld the defendants' right of refusing to answer the questions at the HUAC hearings and acquitted the 5 defendants on January 16. Then, as expected, Judge Metzger also granted the remaining 34 defendants a joint verdict of acquittal on January 19. Although the trial did not clarify the whether the defendants were communists or not, the indicted 39 were all acquitted.

10 Thirty-eight of the Reluctant 39 were represented by the Bouslog-Symonds law firm whereas Jack Kawano employed Norman Chung as his lawyer.
**Completion of the Constitution and Statehood Bill Progress**

Going back to the issue of the constitutional convention and statehood, the delegates continued discussion regardless of some obstacles. The HUAC related incidents and the statehood hearings held in Washington D.C. both slowed down the discussion a little.

While the delegates were drafting the provision of the constitution, the Hawaii statehood bill was proceeding in the discussion in the U.S. Congress. Back in March 1950, the House had voted for the Hawaii statehood bill and passed it by 261 votes to 110 (Hawaii Hochi, 3/7/50), but the senators stalled the bill. In May 1950 the hearings were held at the Senate regarding the Hawaii statehood bill. Hochi covered the hearings in detail, since if they had good results from the hearings the bill would have a good chance to be approved. Hiram Fong, the Speaker of the Territorial House of Representatives, and Wilfred Tsukiyama, the President of the Territorial Senate, testified and gave moving testimonies. Tsukiyama emphasized Hawaii's residents of Japanese ancestry had all been loyal to America, and talked about the brave soldiers of the 442nd and 100th troops (Hawaii Hochi, 5/3/50, p.1). Spark Matsunaga Masayuki, a future politician but who was a Harvard University student at that time, testified, and stressed the fact that Nisei soldiers fought not only for America but in order to prove their fine loyalty and Americanism regardless of their racial backgrounds (Hawaii Hochi, 5/4/50, p.1).

The testimonies in Washington worked well and the outbreak of Korean War on June 25 became a fair wind for the statehood bill. To the joy of pro-statehood Japanese, the Hawaii statehood bill passed the Senate Committee on June 28. When the bill passed the House in March, Hawaii Hochi editors regarded it as "just like the baseball player who hit the ball and reached first base" (Hawaii Hochi, 3/16/50, p.2). Now that the bill had
passed the Senate Committee, the Hochi editor called it as “a batter reaching second base” (Hawaii Hochi, 7/12/50, p.2). The editor added in this editorial, “We have not won the game. The game is still on.” And this time they lost a game. The bill was buried, regardless of the strong hope of Japanese residents in Hawaii. As an indication of how strongly Japanese supported the bill, Nisei groups became active in the statehood campaign. In July 1950, the 100th and 442nd Veterans clubs each sent a petition to Washington, and urged that the bill be discussed on the floor. Their efforts did not bear fruit this time.

Even with many of the constitutional delegates in the capitol city attending the hearings, the rest of delegates back in Hawaii diligently worked on drafting of the constitution. They were expected to draft a constitution good enough for Hawaii to be accepted as a state. Entering June, the convention speeded up, but it was becoming clear that the convention would not finish drafting a new constitution within 60 days as originally planned. June 23 was the 60th day for the convention. Governor Stainback decided to ask the Territorial Legislature for another $15,000 budget. Samuel King as char urged the convention members to speed up the discussion (Hawaii Hochi, 7/7/50, p.2). As a result, the convention finally produced the constitution draft, and closed its sessions on July 15 (7/17/50, p.2). On July 22, a signing ceremony was held, and the delegates and the others gathered and honored their great work. Hawaii’s delegate to the Congress, Joseph Farrington, came back from Washington D.C. to attend the ceremony, while Governor Stainback did not attend.

Even before the Hawaii Territorial Legislature approved the new constitution, the Statehood Commission used it to urge the U.S. Senate to discuss the statehood bill. On
August 7, Hawaii Hochi reported that Samuel King (Statehood Commission chair, and former delegate to the U.S. Congress) went to Washington D.C. and handed the newly compiled Hawaii state constitution to the Secretary of the Interior, Oscar Chapman, who had been a strong supporter of Hawaii's statehood (8/7/50, p.1).

In September, a special session of the Territorial Legislature convened in order to approve the just completed state constitution. Governor Stainback was against the idea of holding the provisional legislature because the budget was short. For the pro-statehood politicians, however, it was necessary to see the ratification process completed by the time the U.S. Senators votes for Hawaii statehood bill. The vote had been put off till after November 27. The pro-statehood Representatives and Senators requested Governor Stainback to convene the Territorial Legislature because they needed to approve the constitution as soon as possible. After discussion in the both Houses for about 10 days, the constitution was approved. Then, in November, the constitution was submitted to the voters for ratification at the general election.

*Hawaii Hochi* strongly supported this constitution. The following two *Hochi* editorials show their pro-statehood opinion. They were "Vote to Approve the Constitution" (10/20/50, p.2), and "General Election to Vote for the Constitution" (11/4/50, p.2). In the first editorial, the Hochi welcomed the fact that every voter had a vote to decide whether the constitution was acceptable as it was or not. And the Hochi editor predicted that the constitution would be approved by a great margin. In the second editorial, the Hochi said, "even though the convention delegates all signed on the constitution, even though the Board of Regents of the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce advised the voters to approve the constitution, and even though the Hochi and other
newspapers were supporting the approval of the constitution, each voter must make his or her own decision.” The Hochi editor called it a historic decision. On November 8, the Hochi reported the result of the historic decision. Hawaii voters approved the new State Constitution by a margin of 3 to 1 (11/8/50, p.1).11

Kawano’s Sensational Statement in February 1951

About three weeks after the Reluctant 39 were acquitted of the contempt of Congress charges for refusing to testify at the HUAC hearings, Jack Kawano, one of the Reluctant 39, made a sensational statement. Hawaii Hochi ran the headline: “Red Party Exposed: Former Union Leader Kawano Quit Communist Party” (2/10/51, p.3). Jack Kawano, an ILWU organizer, confessed that he once was a communist but had already quit the Party. He explained in the statement why he had joined the Communist Party, and why he quit it. This statement was released to all the daily newspapers in Hawaii, and gave a big sensation to Hawaii’s residents.

Kawano “joined the Communist Party because some individual communists were willing to assist [him] in organizing the waterfront union” (Hawaii Hochi, 2/10/51, English Version, p.1). He also reported how communists influenced the organizing of the union. He later noticed that “primarily all of these decisions are made on the basis of what is good for the Communist Party and not what is good for the membership of the union” (ibid.). He was sure that to quit the Communist Party was right, considering the international situation in which American young people were dedicating their lives to

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11 According to Table 24.5 of Historical Statistics of Hawaii, those who approved the state constitution were 82,788 whereas those who opposed were 27,109 (Schmitt 1972, 602)
their country in the Korean War, which had broken out in June 1950. America was fighting against Communist Korea and China. He said, “I cannot help but believe that anyone who is a communist and is willing to assist Communist Korea, China or any other Communist nation today is dangerously flirting with treason against his own country” (ibid.). In this way, Kawano came out and exposed himself as having once belonged to the Communist Party. Kawano’s coming out was praised by a CIO organizer (Hawaii Hochi, 2/14/51, p.2). The CIO had expelled the ILWU in August because the latter was branded a communist-friendly union (Holmes 1994, 172). The CIO organizer said that the CIO would give a helping hand to those who were willing to expel the communist elements from the union” (Hawaii Hochi, 2/14/51, p.2.).

In July 1951, Jack Kawano was subpoenaed again by the HUAC committee to testify in Washington, D.C. According to Hawaii Hochi (7/5/51, p.2), the HUAC subpoenaed Kawano because the committee was confident that Kawano would testify this time. It was expected that Kawano would clarify the relations between the ILWU headed by Harry Bridges and the Communist Party. In the same article, Jack Hall was quoted, “It is not an unexpected thing. The HUAC is just an organization dedicated to anti-labor movement and anti-union movement.”

Kawano’s testimony was conducted in a closed committee hearing on July 5 in Washington, D.C. Although the details of the testimony were to be published later, the residents of Hawaii read in the daily papers that Kawano told about the relations between Harry Bridges and the communists and that Kawano gave a list of people in the union who actively worked for the Communist Party (Hawaii Hochi, 7/6/51, p.3). Lawyer (Judge) Chuck Mau went along Kawano to Washington, D.C. Since Mau just took a
leave and left the office without any explanation, many wondered where Judge Mau went at that time. An article headlined “Yukue Fumei No Mau Hanji? (Judge Mau Missing?)” appeared in Hochi on July 7, 1951. As Zalburg’s Spark is Struck! revealed later, after Kawano’s testimony Mau went over to see a deputy in the United States Attorney’s Office, and persuaded him to hold the next Smith Act trial in Hawaii. Actually Mau was personally in a very difficult position at that time. He was waiting for the approval of his nomination to a federal judgeship from the U.S. Senate. In spite of being in the capitol city, Mau did not work on his own interests to get his nomination as a judge approved by the Senate, but he paved the way for the U.S. Attorney to bring about the Smith Act trial in Hawaii. It led to the abrupt arrest of seven people labeled as communist leaders in Hawaii on the early morning of August 28, 1951.

**Arrest and Trial of the Hawaii Seven**

The FBI simultaneously arrested the seven people alleged to be communist leaders. They were: Jack Hall, regional director of the ILWU, Charles Fujimoto Kazuyuki, chairman of the Communist Party of Hawaii, Ariyoshi Koji, editor of the Honolulu Record, Dwight James Freeman, mechanic, Eileen Fujimoto Toshiko, wife of Charles Fujimoto and secretary at the ILWU Longshore Local 136, Jack Kimoto Denichi, an employee of the Honolulu Record, John E. Reinecke, former teacher at Farrington High School, and part-time employee of the Honolulu Record. These seven people came to be called “the Hawaii Seven” in both the English and Japanese media. Hawaii Hochi reported on the day after the arrest a comparatively detailed profile of each of the seven arrested. The article said that Jack Hall married Ogawa Yoshiko in 1942, whose parents
had come from Japan, and that John Reinecke married Tokimasa Aiko in Honolulu. Considering that Charles Fujimoto Kazuyuki, Ariyoshi Koji, Eileen Fujimoto Toshiko, and Jack Kimoto Denichi were all of Japanese ancestry, it turned out that out of the seven, six were either Japanese American themselves, or their spouses were of Japanese ancestry. Although *Hawaii Hochi* did not make comment on this fact, some readers must have felt that Japanese-related people were disproportionately represented in the Hawaii Seven.

Their bond was initially set at $750,000 each. However, after appeals from defense counsel Symonds, Judge Metzger reduced the amount of bond to a mere $5,000 each. All of them were bailed out. Then, Judge Metzger also allowed the postponement of the arraignment for 60 days upon request from the defense counsels. This drastic reduction of the amount of bail and the postponing of the arraignment raised controversy. It complicated and dragged out the procedure for the Hawaii Seven trial. It led to the confrontation between two Judges, Metzger and McLaughlin, and the solution was to replace the judge for the Hawaii Seven trial. Finally Judge Jon Wiig was chosen to preside over the Hawaii Seven trial.

After several twists and turns, the trial finally started on November 11, 1952. Many witnesses were called in to the courtroom, and the trial attracted considerable public attention. Many times the courtroom was packed. The highlight of the trial came with the witness Jack Kawano who showed up in February 1953. During the time of his cross-examination, the courtroom was packed everyday. After about a 6-month trial, on May 22 1953, the witnesses for the defense finally finished their testimony, and on June 17, the jury started its deliberation. The jury arrived at the conclusion after three days (over 19 hours) of deliberation.
The first page of *Hawaii Hochi* on June 19 1953 reported sensational news in the time of Red Scare. The top headline was “Mr. and Mrs. Rosenbergs’ Capitol Punishment to be Exercised Eight Tonight.” Mr. and Mrs. Rosenberg were charged with espionage for selling American high technologies to the Soviet Union. Their deed was regarded as treason and they were sentenced to capital punishment. It was one of the most shocking communist-scare incidents of the time. Right next to the Rosenberg’s big news, the next headline told, “All Guilty Verdict for Defendants of Hawaii Communist Trial” on the first page of *Hawaii Hochi* (6/19/53, p.1). The defendants of Hawaii Seven were found guilty of violating the Smith Act.

At 2:00 pm on July 3 1953, Judge Wiig solemnly delivered the sentence. The six men were sentenced to five years in prison and fined $5,000 each. Eileen Fujimoto was sentenced to three years in prison and fined $2,000 (Holmes 1994, 210). “At the request of the government, bail was raised to $15,000 while the appeal of the decision worked its way through the Courts. The ILWU Defense Fund was able to get Jack Hall released immediately, but the other six languished in jail for a week before bail could be raised” (Holmes 1994, 210-211; *Hawaii Hochi*, 7/6/53, p.4; 7/11/53, p.3). “Thus, the Red trial to try communist leaders in Hawaii revealed the red faces of seven defendants, and the trial ended for the moment. . .” as *Hawaii Hochi* aptly said on July 6 (p.4).

The public reaction toward the guilty sentence and verdict was varied. On July 10, *Hochi* (p.2) reported that somebody threw red paint at the office sign of Bouslog & Symonds Office and the outer wall of the ILWU building. The Hochi editor wrote the following editorial on July 7 (*Hawaii Hochi*, 7/7/53, p.2). Titling the editorial “What do you mean by Frame-up?” the editor was very critical about the behavior of the
sympathizers of the Hawaii Seven and the Rosenbergs, although the editor understood the sympathy some people showed to the Hawaii Seven and the Rosenbergs. The editor insisted that the sympathizers' careless behavior of calling the process and verdicts of trials “frame-ups” would contribute to the development of the communist party. According to the editor, the American legal system was the best system in the world for protecting the defendants’ rights. It was understandable that the communists would call the sentences “frame-ups”, but the editor insisted that non-communists must not be too emotional, because if they do so, they were helping the communists, although not intentionally. This editorial suggests that more or less dissatisfaction against the sentences filled the general atmosphere in those days.

From August 1953 through the end of 1954, there were few Hawaii Seven-related articles in *Hawaii Hochi*. Most of the topics of articles were the procedure for deciding bond to appeal to the higher Court, and the process of appealing to San Francisco Court of Appeals. As usual, the appeals trial was delayed several times. Although they were out on bail, the defendants were not free, and had to suffer from prejudice.

The Hawaii Seven trial was one of a series of trials that began with the indictment of the leaders of the Communist Party of the United States (Dennis v. US) in July 1948. The verdict in the 1948 trial of the national leadership tested only the constitutionality of the Smith Act of 1940 as it applied to the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. The Court tried to judge whether they advocated the overthrow of the United States government by force, but they did not examine the validity of the evidence against the defendants. The U.S. Supreme Court said, “It would evaluate the quality of the evidence and the conduct of the trial at a later time” (Reinecke 1993, xi). The Department of
Justice secured the conviction of some 150 people in a series of eight trials based on this decision. The credibility of government-side witnesses remained untested, although it was repeatedly challenged. On June 17, 1957, the U.S. Supreme Court made a decision on five California Communist Party leaders (Yates v. United States), which would lead to the reversal of the conviction of the Hawaii Seven.

The Court established a careful distinction between mere advocacy of doctrine and advocacy of action. Only the latter could be prosecuted under the Smith Act. Justice Harlan wrote that advocacy of doctrine "is too remote from concrete action to be regarded as the kind of indoctrination preparatory to action.... The essential distinction is that those to whom the advocacy is addressed must be urged to do something, now or in the future, rather than to merely believe in something" (Reinecke 1993, xii).

On January 20, 1958, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the convictions of the Hawaii Seven. Eight years and four months after their arrest, the seven defendants of the Hawaii communist leaders' case became legally free (Holmes 210-211, Reinecke, ibid.). It was 1.5 years before Hawaii became a state.

The Hawaii Statehood Bill in Congress

Since the result of HUAC hearings left a negative impression on some U.S. Senators' minds, and Hawaii statehood bill, together with the Alaska statehood bill, had become the weapon for the political game in the Congress, the statehood bill did not develop well at the U.S. Congress during 1951 and 1952. Hawaii Hochi editors reported the opinion of a HUAC member that the HUAC results would clear the way for Hawaii statehood as the results proved that there were only a handful of communists in Hawaii. These articles reflected the hope of the editors and the readers of Hawaii Hochi. But statehood did not materialize. And Hawaii Hochi editors and readers both became frustrated.
In the process, Hawaii’s Japanese, most of whom were pro-statehood, saw that the Hawaii statehood bill was used as a weapon of the Senators to win their own political games. For both Hawaii and Alaska, the fact that their statehood bills were presented about the same time was unfortunate for both states. At the Congress, whether Alaska-first or Hawaii-first was discussed, but for the Japanese residents in Hawaii, they just wanted the Congress to quickly discuss it and pass it. The filibustering of some politicians very much frustrated the Japanese in Hawaii.

In 1952, the statement made by a Senator from Texas aggravated Japanese in Hawaii. He said at the Senate meeting, “A majority of Hawaii’s residents are not Americans and they are inferior as citizens” (Hawaii Hochi, 3/5/52, p.3). This remark invoked strong protests from various groups in Hawaii, such as the Honolulu Board of Supervisors, Citizens’ Statehood Committee, and Honolulu Chamber of Commerce. The Hawaii Veterans Clubs dispatched their delegation to Washington D.C. to have the Senator revoke his racist comment. Although the Senator promised to revoke his statement he did not do it. Whenever this type of racial comments came out, Japanese residents in Hawaii reacted rather quickly and tried to straighten out the false image of Japanese.

In 1953, Samuel King became Hawaii’s new Governor, appointed by the Republican President Eisenhower. King had been a chair of the Hawaii Statehood Commission, and worked active for Statehood. The statehood bill had to start over again, but it started in a promising mood. In February the Hawaii statehood bill passed the House Committee of Interior affairs, and in March it passed the House. Again the statehood bill reached first base.
The most bothersome tactic used by the U.S. Congresspersons to delay the statehood was to combine the Hawaii statehood bill with the Alaska bill. When that happened, it became hopeless to realize Hawaii statehood. *Hawaii Hochi* said, it was because pro-Hawaii statehood Democrats were also pro-Alaska, but pro-Hawaii Republicans were against Alaska statehood. The Hawaii statehood proponents in Hawaii were again frustrated. Reflecting the feelings of Japanese, Nisei Territorial Representative, Sakakihara Tameichi, presented a motion. The resolution drafted and approved by both Houses of the Territorial Legislature was sent to the U.S. Senate Interior Affairs Committee. It strongly accused the Senate Committee of making use of the statehood bill for their partisan objectives. However, the bill was buried again.

The year 1954 was to become a dramatic year for Hawaii local politics. In fact in the beginning of the year, it seemed like the statehood bill would go a little further than before. The Japanese Issei and Nisei hoped that everything would go well. Therefore, the testimony of former Governor Stainback at the Senate hearings was troubling. He testified that Hawaii was not ripe enough for statehood yet. He said that Harry Bridge's leftist union had an influential power over Hawaii's politics and warned that they might use their power over electing the Senators of the new state of Hawaii (*Hawaii Hochi*, 1/8/54, p.1). *Hawaii Hochi* editors showed their dissatisfaction to his testimony in the corner called *Kabachi*. Then *Hawaii Hochi* wrote an editorial calling for immediate statehood. The editorial showed the strong desire of the editor, and also it reflected the pro-statehood Japanese opinions. The Hawaii bill was combined with Alaska bill and untied again. Finally the Hawaii statehood bill passed the Senate Committee. Again it reached second base, in the *Hawaii Hochi* editor's words.
The pro-statehood Governor King worked hard to push the bill. A big statehood campaign was planned and mobilized a great number of Hawaii residents. With Governor King, the Citizen's Statehood Committee planned to collect the citizens' signatures to ask for statehood (Hawaii Hochi, 2/8/54, p.3). They held rallies to collect signatures on a half-ton roll of newspaper paper, which came to be called Statehood Honor Rolls. They held the rallies at different places in the City of Honolulu, in Oahu County and on the outer islands (2/10/54, p.5). Governor and Mrs. King came to the rally and signed on the Roll. For the first day, the committee collected about 10,000 signatures across the islands. Later, with very organized help from the dairy workers, signing made great progress. The milk deliverers distributed signing sheets tied to milk bottles for the customers to sign. Later, the deliverers collected the bottles and signed sheets. The dairy workers volunteered to paste the sheets on the roll. Finally the committee collected 116,000 signatures, and the roll became one-mile long. A United Airlines plane took the Statehood Honor Roll to Washington D.C. in the late February, 1954.

This campaign tells the strong hope for statehood of the people who participated in signing. Hawaii Hochi gave good information about the dairy workers' voluntary work, so that the Issei living in the countryside could participate in the signing. This case reveals the instrumental role of Hawaii Hochi in the statehood campaign. A delegation of statehood campaign members went to Washington D.C. for lobbying. To their regret, the bill again became tied to Alaska bill and the discussion was delayed. All the work of pro-statehood Hawaii residents did not succeed.

When Hawaii Hochi found out one U.S. Senator's comment on TV, the editors reacted quickly. The Senator said, "The residents in Alaska and Hawaii should move to
the mainland if they really wanted to become U.S. citizens.” *Hawaii Hochi* printed every
word of this Senator’s comment in a bigger font size, and underlined it (3/15/54, p.1).
This article appeared on the first page, and revealed the fury of the pro-statehood *Hochi*
members. In the Congress, there was a proposal to allow Hawaii the status of
commonwealth instead of state (3/26/54, p.2; 3/29/54, p.5). *Hawaii Hochi* editors
strongly opposed to this idea. According to the *Hochi* editor, Hawaii originally became a
Territory of the United States under the condition that it would join the Union as a state in
the future. To make Hawaii a commonwealth meant to Hawaii residents something like
degradation. *Hawaii Hochi* editors stressed that the United States government should
keep their words to accept Hawaii as a state. They emphasized this because for the
Japanese community, to be equal was most important. To them the commonwealth bill
was insulting.

In May 1954, Hawaii again sent a delegation to the U.S. House, in order to lobby the
statehood bill through the House. Since the Hawaii bill was combined with Alaska bill it
seemed very difficult for the bill to pass. A delegation from Alaska also came and
lobbied. It is noteworthy that Republican Governor King sent the delegation against the
wishes of quite a few Hawaii residents at this time. The Democrats were against the idea.
The two major English dailies were against the idea. It was because the Legislature was
spending tax money for a campaign that would not work. They argued that the
Legislators should stay in Hawaii to discuss more substantial things for the residents of
Hawaii. In the meantime, *Hawaii Hochi* wrote articles about the backstage story for this
delegation. A florist run by a Japanese couple thought their delegation should give leis to
U.S. Representatives. They began to send leis, and more volunteers participating in this
sending lei campaign. The Lei Flower Union donated carnations, and about 100 leis in total were sent to the U.S. Representatives.

Although Hawaii Hochi did not send their own editor to report about the lobbying of the delegation to the capitol city, the articles covered their activities in detail. And the result was, again, it failed. The Governor made tremendous efforts for the statehood campaign and lobbying in the Congress, but his efforts did not achieve a good outcome. This ruined the reputation of Republican legislators, which was one of the causes of their miserable defeat in the coming election in the fall 1954.

Following the Democratic Revolution of 1954, the majority of Hawaii’s legislators were Democrats. However, at the national level, General Eisenhower, a Republican, had been the President since 1953. This meant that Hawaii’s Republican Governor appointed by President Eisenhower would not be replaced even though Hawaii’s local politics became democratic-oriented. Republican Governor King, chosen by Eisenhower, had to fight against the democratic-oriented legislature, and so he vetoed almost all of the democratic bills submitted to him. Gradually Hawaii local residents became aware that in order to realize the really democratic politics in Hawaii they had to win statehood and have the right to elect their own Governor.

At the general election of 1956, Eisenhower was reelected President, but the Republicans could not hold the majority seats of both U.S. Senate and House at the national level. At this election in Hawaii, John A. Burns, who had been the leader of the young Democrats, was finally elected as Hawaii’s delegate to Congress. The Democratic delegate started working for Hawaii’s statehood in Washington D.C. In 1957, President Eisenhower appointed a Republican, William Quinn, as the new Governor for Hawaii.
He was a Republican, but was different from the old guards. With these new elements in local government, Hawaii set out with a new strategy to win statehood at the national level. With the compromise of Southern State Representatives who had been a core of massive resistance against any kind of civil rights measures and also against the statehood of Hawaii and Alaska, a civil rights bill introduced by Eisenhower finally became law in 1957. The political climate changed, and a door was opened for discussion of statehood for Hawaii and Alaska, though there was still a long way to go. For instance, there was a problem regarding which Territory of Hawaii or Alaska would become a state first. Hawaii’s delegate John A. Burns worked tactically, and Alaska statehood bill was accepted first, and Hawaii bill was voted for next. Finally within 1959 both of Alaska and Hawaii were admitted as the new states of the Union, as the 49th and 50th state respectively.

**The Meaning of Statehood and the Red Scare**

For Japanese in Hawaii, realizing Hawaii’s statehood was very important. It meant to become equal with other Americans. It meant they would have right to select their own Governor, and participate in the Presidential elections. They would become the first-class citizens. The Japanese residents cooperated with statehood campaigns earnestly and tried to make every effort for this purpose.

Around 1947, one of the biggest obstacles to block the way for Hawaii statehood bill turned out to be the Red Scare problem. Therefore, the Japanese community showed high interest in what would become of the HUAC hearings in Honolulu in 1950. For Hawaii’s Japanese, if there were a big percentage of Japanese residents found among the
communists, or if Hawaii had a significant number of communists within its society, it would be a big concern to delay or even stop the Hawaii statehood bill and also the revision of the Naturalization and Immigration bills. Japanese were very much concerned because they were once regarded as non-American factor of Hawaii society who would not be able to become loyal Americans in prewar years. In order to know what facts regarding communism in Hawaii the HUAC would reveal, Japanese readers paid much attention to the news, which the Hawaii Hochi editors tried to provide. Therefore, the ways the editors wrote about the contents of testimonies and about the witnesses showed their willingness to report what was going on to the readers.

Hawaii Hochi articles about the HUAC hearings showed the editors’ concern about the extent to which Japanese were actually linked to communist red activities. By reporting faithfully how many Nisei were included in those who were subpoenaed for the hearings, both the friendly witnesses and the hostile witnesses, the Hochi editors wanted to have the readers know about the situation. It was obvious that Nisei were overrepresented in the Reluctant 39, because 53.8 percent of them were Nisei. Six of the Hawaii Seven had something to do with Japanese Americans. Hawaii Hochi never wrote about this Nisei overrepresentation. The fact that Hawaii Hochi disregarded the overrepresentation of Nisei reveals the editors’ stand in the Red Scare era.

Compared with what the Advertiser, one of the Honolulu English dailies, said about the union members, Hochi’s position would become clear. The Advertiser ran a series of columns, “Dear Joe letters,” which accused Stalin of trying to influence Hawaii’s laborers. It reflects that the Red Scare was used as a social control measure by the white elite to suppress the organized labor unions. The Advertiser’s editor took a stand to charge the
laborers as communists. *Hawaii Hochi* never did this kind of name calling, although they did not defend the Reluctant 39, or Hawaii Seven.

*Hawaii Hochi* stories on the HUAC hearings, Reluctant 39 trials, and Smith Act trials were all written in a rather neutral tone. It was true that the editors used the words such as “red” and “communists” in the articles in bigger characters. For instance, they often called the Smith Act trial “*Aka Saiban* (Red trial)” which had a strong meaning. But they were not very ultra-anticommunist, or anti-union, either. Their stories were fact-oriented, because they had no necessity to accuse the labor union members as red, which the white oligarchy did as a means to suppress the union movements. In reporting these issues in terms of the influence of Red Scare, *Hawaii Hochi* editors showed their unique understanding and standpoints on these issues, and tried to share these opinions with their readers.

Japanese community members were strong statehood proponents as well as strong supporters of the legislation of equal Naturalization and Immigration bills. For statehood, the Japanese pro-statehood group cooperated with Territory level statehood drives and campaigns. For the legislation of the Naturalization and Immigration laws, Hawaii’s Japanese cooperated with the lobbying movement started by the Nisei on the mainland. These movements would meet strong negative impact of the Red Scare, because in Hawaii the Red Scare was used as social control by the existing power structure to prevent and deter these mobilizations. The mobilizers and challengers asking for equality and justice had to confront this strong social control power. Therefore, the Red Scare cast a shadow over all the social movement campaigns of the early 1950s in which the Japanese community was involved.
This chapter illustrates the strong dynamic of social movements that challenge the dominant order of the society and face counter-movements launched by those with power. In social movement terms, the drive for Hawaii statehood can be seen as a social movement by many groups within the Territory to achieve equal status with the rest of the United States. It was fundamentally a national political issue, because success depended upon decisions made by the U.S. Congress. While the issue itself was much broader than the Japanese community, they were intimately involved in it because one of the earliest and most common tools for opposing statehood was to point to the Japanese population as an unassimilable alien element. The role of Nisei soldiers in World War II undercut that argument when the statehood debates resumed after the end of the war.

In the early postwar period, the Red Scare became a potent new weapon. The Red Scare was quite patently a national counter-movement that spread widely throughout the United States, aided both by the HUAC hearings and by the use of the Smith Act to prosecute leaders of the Communist Party in the U.S. At the local level in Hawaii the Red Scare became a powerful, multi-pronged weapon that disproportionately targeted the Japanese community. First, the elite Big Five employers used the Red Scare to label the emerging labor movement as a communist plot, in an attempt to smear the ILWU and counter the gains it had made in the sugar and dock strikes. Secondly, the anti-statehood forces used the same Red Scare tactics to argue that Hawaii was not ready for statehood. Because of the focus on communists with ties in the Japanese community, this resonated with the earlier claim that the Japanese were un-American and untrustworthy. A third element in this broad campaign, which was raised in the previous chapter, was the relationship between the ILWU and the efforts to build the Democratic Party in Hawaii.
The targeting of union leaders and Democratic Party activists in the Red Scare can also be seen as a movement by the Republican elite to discredit their rising political opponents.

In this context, the *Hawaii Hochi* coverage reflects both the deep interest of the Japanese community in the political events that were unfolding both in Hawaii and in Washington D.C. and the very uncomfortable position in which the Japanese community was placed by the targeting of Japanese in the Red Scare. *Hochi* was treading a very fine line between wanting to support both the statehood cause and the young leaders in the Japanese community who were involved in the labor movement and in politics, on the one hand, and trying to distance the Japanese community from the devastating new charges of communist influence, on the other. While they could wholeheartedly support the statehood campaigns and the Americanism efforts of *Beikoku Shugi Koyo Kai*, sponsored by the Japanese Chamber of Commerce leadership as a counter to the white elite's IMUA, which was a local promoter of the Red Scare, they could not openly support those members of the community who had been revealed as communists, for fear of further damaging the community's reputation.

This uncomfortable position is revealed by the *Hochi's* heavy coverage of the political events, with special emphasis on the Japanese who were involved, while trying to remain studiously neutral and downplaying the role of communist influence in the community. It is sometimes difficult in a content analysis to see what is not there, and to interpret its significance. In this case, the significance comes out in the contrast between the heavily factual content of *Hochi* with its concentration on following the fate of people linked to the Japanese community, as opposed to the blatant red-baiting of the English language *Advertiser's* coverage of the same issues from the perspective of the white Big
Five elite. In cultural terms, *Hochi's* approach to this awkward situation can also be seen as a kind of "enryo" or deferential restraint, much like the Japanese politicians who refrained from running for election during the war. To view it *enryo* also implies that the Japanese readers of *Hochi* would understand what was left unsaid.
CHAPTER 4

OBTAINING EQUALITY THROUGH NATURALIZATION RIGHTS

This chapter highlights a series of campaigns that were related to the naturalization and citizenship of Japanese residents in Hawaii. As shown in chapter 2, quite a few factors influenced the dynamics of campaigns and movements in the Japanese community in the first half of the twentieth century: the social status in which Japanese Issei were placed in the hierarchy of Hawaii society; the internal splits within the Japanese community; two world wars and their effects on the Hawaii economy including increase of consumer prices; a strong Americanization movement especially targeted at Japanese; and anti-Japanese legal measures imposed by the host society in response to Japan’s coming close to being a super power in the Asian Pacific area.

Within this context the Japanese community developed local leadership and community organizations and used them to mobilize support for various social movement campaigns. Nisei began participating in local politics. However, the Japanese community was often stymied by barriers that can be characterized as absent or negative political opportunities. During this time the Japanese community came to see itself as a settled part of Hawaii society whose members wanted to be treated as good and loyal Americans, on an equal footing with all other Americans. In that vein, they strongly supported Hawaii’s desire to become a state equal to all other states, rather than a Territory without full voting rights and self-government rights. An even more immediate issue of political participation was the legal barrier to U.S. citizenship for the Issei. Already in the prewar period they had mobilized in support of early efforts to win
naturalization for veterans and to prevent the loss of U.S. citizenship for women who married non-citizens. Thus the issue of naturalization was already very much on the agenda when new political opportunities to pursue social and political change arose in the postwar period.

Chapter 3 showed us the dual national level context that affected political opportunities for change in Hawaii in the immediate postwar period. Efforts to achieve statehood for Hawaii comprised a central aspect of the Territory’s political agenda, but statehood was opposed both by part of the local white elite and by some politicians in Washington, both of whom viewed it as a potential loss of political power. The Red Scare operated as a counter-movement hindering both statehood and other grassroots campaigns such as labor union movements. The statehood campaigns in Hawaii and the development of the Statehood bill in U.S. Congress received a very negative impact from the Red Scare. Hawaii’s Japanese community was deeply involved both in the statehood campaign itself, and in the impact of the Red Scare on it. To the Japanese community, statehood symbolized equality with other Americans. It was intimately tied to charges that the very existence of the Japanese community was a barrier to statehood for Hawaii.

While in the early postwar period the opposition strategy was to use the Red Scare to target members of the Japanese community as un-American communists, the older charge was that the Issei were aliens unsuitable for U.S. citizenship. Even the valiant service of Nisei soldiers in World War II could not erase the suspicions raised over the presence of a large number of Issei in the Japanese community who were ineligible for U.S. citizenship. Consequently, the revision of the Naturalization and Immigration Law and fully protected rights of citizenship also symbolized equality very powerfully for Japanese residents.
Like statehood, Immigration Law was a national issue that could only be decided in the U.S. Congress. Yet to a much greater degree than the statehood campaigns, the campaigns for citizenship and naturalization engaged the Japanese community at a very local level.

After World War II, among various legal discriminations against Asians (mainly Japanese), Naturalization and Immigration laws had substantial negative effects on the lives of Japanese Issei and Nisei. The Japanese community in Hawaii wanted to change the laws, and also they wanted to help those who were suffering discrimination caused by these racially biased laws. The pages of *Hawaii Hochi* reveal the involvement of Hawaii's Japanese in various kinds of campaigns related to immigration, naturalization, and the rights of citizenship. In some cases they provided strong support for national campaigns initiated elsewhere, and in other cases they instigated their own grassroots campaigns locally.

This chapter will discuss four major types of social movement campaigns related to naturalization and citizenship rights. The first type is campaigns concerning nationality and citizenship issues for Japanese that were caused by residence and movement barriers during the war. Hawaii's Japanese community began to pay attention to these issues partly because JACL, the Japanese Americans Citizens League, also promoted them as major activities. They included stopping the repatriation of Japanese sojourners who had stayed in America during the war, and helping the Nisei who were stranded in Japan during the war and lost their U.S. citizenship during their stay. Hawaii's Japanese paid much attention to these issues because sometimes their relatives, children, or somebody they knew, were involved. As Figure 4 shows, the articles that cover repatriation of
Japanese sojourners and restoration of citizenship were visible throughout the five years from 1950 to 1954, which means the Hawaii Hochi editors and their readers were following these issues closely.

The second type includes campaigns to support the immigration of war brides and passage of a new naturalization law. Figure 4 shows that Hawaii Hochi carried articles on the war brides issue from 1950 to the first half of 1952, although the number was not large. Similarly the articles regarding new Naturalization and Immigration Act were visible throughout 1950, 1951, and the first half of 1952. Both of these types of articles ended with the successful passage of the desired legislation. Hochi covered all the legislative activity related to Japanese war brides and revisions to Immigration and Naturalization Law, but in addition reported on various social movement campaigns in support of the legislation. JACL had mounted a national movement to lobby for the bill to revise the existent racially discriminatory Naturalization Law, and also supported movements to facilitate the immigration of Asian war brides. Accordingly, Hawaii’s Japanese community responded to these initiatives, and mobilized the community into support campaigns.

The third type is the naturalization promotion campaign, which encouraged people to undergo naturalization and become American citizens. The revision of the Immigration and Naturalization laws went through Congress with much difficulty, and it took longer to reach the goal of passage of a non-discriminatory law than most members of the Japanese community had expected. As seen in Figure 4, the articles on naturalization promotion appeared as early as mid-1950, even two years prior to the actual passage of the legislation, but the bulk of the articles follow passage of the new law that permitted
Issei to become citizens. This was essentially an internal campaign within Hawaii’s Japanese community, in which *Hawaii Hochi* served as information provider as well as advocate. The large number of *Hochi* articles regarding this campaign shows how enthusiastically the *Hochi* editors wrote and supported it.

The last type is the voting campaign. Once the Issei became new naturalized citizens, they were expected to become responsible American citizens by participating in elections. Hawaii’s Japanese community encouraged the new Issei citizens to register to vote, by offering voting classes and helping them with the English requirements. Figure 4 shows that the articles on voting classes appeared in 1954 when the newly naturalized citizens first participated in the election.

This chapter covers these four kinds of campaigns. I will use the content analysis of *Hawaii Hochi* articles from 1950 to 1954 as the main data to analyze these campaigns. Also I will use the secondary material to narrate the shift from the immediate postwar days through the 1950s regarding these campaigns.

**War-Related Repatriation and Citizenship Issues**

Right after the war Hawaii’s Japanese had two concerns. First, they were concerned about the Japanese nationals in Hawaii who had entered the U.S. with business or student visas before the outbreak of Pacific War and had remained in Hawaii during the war. After the war ended, they received repatriation orders from the U.S. Department of Immigration since they were now in America without valid visas, but in some cases people wanted to make it possible for them to remain in the U.S. Second, they were concerned about the Nisei who had been stranded in Japan during the war. They thought
these Nisei would come back to Hawaii since the war was over, but things were not so simple. In some cases, the U.S. government determined that some action they had taken while they were living in Japan was grounds for stripping them of their U.S. citizenship. The JACL on the mainland started their support for these types of people as one of the main projects for the organization. Hawaii’s Japanese community supported their project partly because Japanese in Hawaii knew the people facing critical situations. In the beginning the support by Hawaii’s Japanese was more like a mental support, but they paid attention to what would become of the stranded people on both sides of the Pacific.

After the war, American host society gradually changed the attitudes toward Japanese, owing to the heroic contributions by Nisei in the military troops and MIS (Military Intelligence Service), although not 180 degrees. In the western states, however, there was still anti-Japanese sentiment and some Japanese who had returned from internment were deprived of the land they used to own there. JACL, the Nisei organization on the mainland, had cooperated with the War Relocation Authority (WRA) to comply with the executive order of mass relocation at the outbreak of the war. Since Nisei in the JACL worked closely with the WRA, quite a few interned Issei felt that these Nisei children had interned the Issei. There was a rumor that the JACL had received money from the authorities for throwing Issei into the internment camps (Takeshita and Saruya 1983, 85). After the war, JACL helped the resettlement of the interned Japanese. When problems arose, JACL quickly acted and started the fund-raising to protect Japanese civil rights. The main activities for the postwar JACL included stopping the repatriation of Japanese nationals, along with asking for compensation for the economic
losses suffered by the Japanese who had been uprooted and interned in the concentration
camps, and supporting new Naturalization and Immigration laws.

First the JACL started the campaign to protect those Japanese nationals who had lived the war as Japanese residents in the United States and then faced the repatriation. Since there was no Japanese diplomatic representation in the United States during the Occupation, the JACL executives decided to act as a protecting organization to ask the U.S. Government to consider these victims of the war. About 2,000 Japanese nationals were facing repatriation, since they had entered the U.S. before the war on business, as students, or as temporary sojourners, and had stayed until 1945 (Takeshita and Saruya 1983, 115; *Hawaii Hochi*, 6/17/50, p.2). When the U.S.-Japan Commercial Treaty became void due to the Pacific War, their visas became void. Many of these Japanese chose to stay in America and had contributed to the war effort for America as Japanese language instructors at military language schools, or translators for the military. Some of them married American citizens and had children (Chuman [Japanese version] 1978, 470). Nevertheless, after the war, those Japanese faced repatriation to Japan, because the fact they were in the U.S. without valid visas was illegal. Moreover, as Japanese they were “aliens ineligible for citizenship,” which meant they were not able to nationalize either.

Mike Masaoka and JACL-ADC (Anti-Discrimination Committee of the JACL) appealed to the Congress to discuss their status and save them from repatriation as early as 1946. Masaoka drew up a bill and lobbied members of Congress in 1946. In 1948 the bill to cancel the repatriation of these Japanese finally passed. From then on, the U.S. Attorney General was given the power to cancel the repatriation orders. *Hawaii Hochi* occasionally reported about decisions made by the Justice Department to cancel the
repatriation of Japanese sojourners, such as an article on September 1, 1951, headlined “Nikkeijin 22 mei ni Sokanteishian Saitaku: Join Homu Iinkai nite (Bill to stop repatriation of 22 Japanese passed: Senate Judiciary Committee). *Hawaii Hoichi*, 9/1/51, p. 6). Figure 5 shows that the articles concerning the cancellation of repatriation and gaining permanent residency appeared steadily from 1950 through 1954.

On the other hand, the Japanese community in America also wanted to help the Nisei who had spent the war years living in Japan and had lost their U.S. citizenship in the process. Many of these Nisei had no choice other than cooperating with the Japanese military government during the war years. *Hawaii Hoichi* from 1950 till 1954 had a total of 74 articles on the issue of Nisei’s loss of citizenship (Figure 5).

There were various reasons behind the loss of citizenship by Hawaii Nisei. Some Nisei who had been students in Japan had served in the Japanese military and lost their U.S. citizenship because they fought against America. Others had become Japanese nationals in order to live safely with better jobs during the war. They felt they were obliged to rescind their U.S. citizenship. Quite a few Nisei who had voted in the Japanese general election after the war lost their citizenship. Many of them felt a covert threat that they would lose their food rations unless they went to vote. On the mainland, among the internees there were some Nisei who had rescinded their U.S. citizenship, because they could not accept the discriminatory treatment they received from U.S. government. Arrangements were made for those Nisei who had lost citizenship to come back to America with special permission in order to recover their citizenship through legal procedures.
Hawaii Hochi covered those who filed suit to recover their citizenship at the Federal Court in Hawaii. On a personal level, many got involved in the cases in Hawaii's Japanese community.

The JACL on the mainland started the campaigns to support the Issei facing repatriation and also worked to help the stranded Nisei in Japan recover their American citizenship. Hawaii did not have a Nisei organization equivalent to the JACL on the mainland. In Hawaii, Japanese community organizations, whose leaders were both Issei and Nisei in the postwar years, took the initiative for movements like these when needed. No visible "campaign" arose in Hawaii to deal with either of these issues. However, the community members were very interested in the circumstances of these people who had been stranded on both sides of the Pacific during the war, and shared their experiences through the Hochi articles. The Hochi coverage also reveals that some capable Nisei attorneys were helping these war victims in Hawaii.

Supporting New Naturalization and Immigration Legislation
Throughout the prewar years, Issei Japanese residents in America regarded their legal status of "aliens ineligible for citizenship" as a symbol of unfairness. Many Issei had been making efforts to achieve equity with ordinary Americans in various ways. The Nisei were born Americans, but they felt uncomfortable when their parents were branded as aliens barred from naturalization. Issei in Hawaii were trying to adjust to American culture and to keep their pride of being Japanese at the same time, but the label of "unassimilable Japanese" always shook and injured their pride. Therefore, both Issei and Nisei regarded the passage of the new Naturalization and Immigration laws as a key goal.
It would wipe out the most unequal treatment that was injuring their pride, and would make their dream of being equal with Americans come true.

In order to discuss the exciting climax years of the revision process of Naturalization and Immigration laws from 1950 by using Hawaii Hochi articles, I will first look back at the immediate postwar days. I will put the spotlight first on a new group of Japanese flowing into America, women who were called war brides (Senso Hanayome, or Gunjin Hanayome in the Japanese community). JACL initiated a lobbying campaign for passage of new Naturalization and Immigration laws, by forming two sub-groups. The Anti-Discrimination Committee (JACL-ADC, Hansa linkai) concentrated on legal fights, and the Kikaken Kakutoku Kisei Domei (The Committee to Aid in Obtaining the Right of Naturalization for the Japanese in the U.S.) was formed as the fundraising arm to financially support the activities of JACL-ADC. For the JACL-ADC, the war bride admission issue was part of their activities to push for the revision of the Naturalization and Immigration laws. The admission of war bride and revision of Immigration Law were very much related, because the admission of war brides had to become a separate bill while it was taking long to revise the existing Immigration Law. Japanese war brides were the people who immediately needed the rule revised for them to enter the U.S., so Mike Masaoka and JACL-ADC wrote a separate bill for their admission.

Mike Masaoka was a Nisei who had joined the JACL in 1938. He was instrumental in the JACL complying with the WRA (War Relocation Authority) at the beginning of the war. When the chance came for the Nisei to volunteer to the U.S. military, he was among the first to volunteer. His brothers also went to war and fought for America. Once back in the U.S. after the war, Mike Masaoka soon found himself working in
Washington D.C. as an integral figure for the JACL-ADC, with his wife Etsu a secretary, Thomas Takeshita Koichiro (Issei) as a correspondent specializing in Japanese language, and Gladys Shimasaki, as a typist. When he starting lobbying, Masaoka did not receive good treatment from the members of Congress. What kept him going were the words he remembered from his friends who died on the battlefields, “Save my parents from anti-Japanese treatment with my life.” (Takeshita and Saruya 1983, 109).

War brides were foreign women who married American G.I.s and veterans while American troops were stationed abroad. The legal treatment of war brides in Immigration Law drew much attention from Japanese community members. The soldiers who had married Japanese or Korean women found that the 1924 Immigration Act barred their future spouses from entering their home country. Thus the U.S. Government finally began to pay attention to the necessity of revising the Immigration Act’s discriminatory treatment of Japanese and Koreans owing to the appeal from the G.I.s and their fiancees and wives. First the Congress passed a law in 1945 that would allow the G.I spouses to enter the U.S. above quota (Public Law 271). As the 1924 Immigration Act gave a small quota to each of the Eastern and Southern European countries, war brides from these countries needed to be permitted to enter above the quotas for their native countries. Then in order to admit the spouses from the countries that were not allotted any quota, such as Japan, in the following year the 1946 War Bride Act (Public Law 471) was enacted. The war brides issue made the unfairness of the 1924

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12 Chinese were allowed to immigrate to the US in 1943, because China was one of the allied countries for the U.S. during World War II. However, the quota China was given was just a minimal token quota.
Immigration Law clear to everybody, and it was an achievement that the Congress allowed special treatment for the immigration of Asian war brides.

According to a Nippu Jiji (Hawaii Times)\textsuperscript{13} editor Hirai Ryuzo, the war brides from Japan started arriving in the Hawaiian Islands around the end of September 1947. Hawaii’s Japanese accepted it as good news. They brightened Hawaii’s Japanese community that had been in low spirits since Japan’s defeat in the war. However, these Japanese women did not become integrated in the Japanese community easily. In the beginning the community could not afford to reach out to these newcomers, partly because the Japanese war brides were not usually married to Japanese-American men. Those women married to non-Japanese veterans many times had to live in the marginal zone between the Japanese community and the outer large society. Later, a group of Japanese war brides called the Hibiscus Club was organized under the auspice of Nishi Tokue, a YWCA worker. Nishi helped these Japanese women to learn American ways of living (Hirai 1990, 180-183; Hawaii Hochi, 12/7/50, p.6).

The war bride act was extended until the end of 1948. Especially around the end of 1948 many war brides rushed into the U.S. because President Truman’s executive order, issued in fall 1948, made it impossible for the war brides to enter the U.S. without military permission after 1948. From January 1949 till August 1950, the war brides from Japan and Korea had to personally file a special petition to ask for permission to enter.

\textsuperscript{13} The Hawaii Times was former Nippu Jiji. It changed name after the war started as we have seen in the previous chapter. Hirai Ryuzo was already an editor for Nippu in the prewar period. He was sent to internment, and came back and resumed his former position after the war.
Discussion on the revision of Immigration and Naturalization bills started in 1947, so it overlapped with the discussion on the separate war bride bill. Representative Walter Judd (Minn.) introduced the revised Immigration and Naturalization bill in 1947, reflecting the effective lobbying of JACL-ADC lobbyist, Mike Masaoka on Representative Judd. The bill was revised three times before it was presented as HR 5004 in the hearings of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization in mid-April of 1948. Although the Judd bill was approved by the Judiciary Committee, it was set aside untouched for as long as a year after that. In March 1949, the Judd bill finally got to be included as HR199 in the agenda for floor discussion in the House, and the bill gained the majority vote of the House after the heated discussion. Although Senate Committee hearings on the Judd bill were held in mid-July 1949, the bill was never discussed on the floor of the Senate itself. In order to get the bill discussed on the floor, the JACL-ADC lobbyist Mike Masaoka urged Representative Francis Walter to present a separate bill exclusively on naturalization in the House. This Walter bill became an alternative to the Judd bill. It proposed that all aliens with permanent residency be permitted to become naturalized citizens. However, this alternative bill was also halted in the Senate in fall, 1949. Thus, at the beginning of 1950, Hawaii's Japanese showed a great interest in both the war bride bill and the Naturalization and Immigration bill.

Figure 6 shows the changing number of articles found in the Hawaii Hochi on war bride issues and the new Naturalization and Immigration bills. It shows relatively small numbers for the war bride issue from 1950 to 1954. Figure 6 also shows that Hawaii Hochi had over 20 articles on the Naturalization and Immigration bill in the time period of April-June of 1950 when the revised Walter bill passed the Senate. In 1951, Figure 6
shows that the number of Hochi articles on Naturalization and Immigration bills was bigger in the first half than in the latter half of the year. And for January-March to April-June of 1952, Hawaii Hochi had a large number of articles on the legislation. April-June 1952 marked the highest level at 28 and it corresponded to the final passage of the McCarran and Walter Immigration and Naturalization Act.

The year 1950 started with the discussion on the two Naturalization bills having been presented by Representative Judd and Representative Walter in the previous year. In April, Senator Pat McCarran presented the new revised Immigration and Naturalization bill to the Senate. It was the product of the Senate Special Committee on Naturalization and Immigration, chaired by Senator McCarran himself. In June, the Senate finally discussed the Walter bill and revised it to limit those capable of naturalization only to Japanese who had legally immigrated to America, including Hawaii, prior to July 1, 1924. Then on June 8, 1950, this revised Walter bill passed the Senate.

Hawaii since April 1950 had experienced rather stormy days owing to the HUAC hearings in Honolulu. Japanese community leaders were trying to wipe out the un-American label that had been placed on them after several incidents such as the Reinecke affairs of 1947 and the HUAC hearings in April 1950. The Beikoku Shugi Koyo Kai (Americanism Promotion Committee) organized in 1950 by the Nisshoko (Japanese Chamber of Commerce) executive members showed their Americanism by promoting Americanization among Issei. They were afraid that this communist scare and un-American labeling would block the way for the Naturalization bill to its goal. Thus, any news of the development of the new naturalization and immigration legislation was good news.
Toward the end of the HUAC hearings in Honolulu, the Japanese groups planned a reception to welcome and show their gratitude to Representative Francis Walter, the chair of the HUAC committee, who was known as the presenter of the revised Naturalization bill. The aim was to show how much Japanese in Hawaii thanked Representative Walter for introducing the bill and how strongly they wanted the revision of Naturalization and Immigration laws. *Honolulu Nihonjin Shoko Kaigisho (Nisshoko), Beikoku Shugi Koyo Kai,* 100th Club and 442nd Club co-hosted a reception on behalf of Representative Walter and other HUAC members on the night of April 18. Governor Stainback, Hawaii’s delegate to the Congress Joseph Farrington, and other prominent people of the Territory were invited and the total attendees numbered about 75. A picture of Delegate Farrington, Representative Walter, Governor Stainback, Senate President Tsukiyama, and former Captain of the 100th Battalion, Lt. Colonel Turner, all wearing Japanese summer *kimono (yukata)* of the same design, accompanied the article (*Hawaii Hochi, 4/19/50*, p.2). This event reveals enthusiasm that Japanese Issei and Nisei leaders together had for supporting the revision of laws, but it is ironic that the reception took place because Rep. Walter was in Honolulu for the HUAC hearings, which had targeted members of the Japanese community.

In June 1950, when the Naturalization bill finally passed the Senate, *Hawaii Hochi* revealed the happy feelings among Japanese residents in Hawaii.

The Naturalization legislation campaign all Japanese have worked on has just come to an end. The Naturalization Law having racially discriminated against Japanese will be finally revised to be the one that will give Japanese freedom

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14 The executives of *Beikoku Shugi Koyo Kai* and *Nisshoko* were mostly the same people. The executives of the Nisshoko organized the former, and all the key persons belonged to the latter as integral members.
and equality (Hawaii Hochi, 6/9/50, p. 2).

However, this bill that had just passed the Senate was not the original bill the JACL and Masaoka had been earnestly working on. This was revised from the original one at the Senate and it would give only Japanese immigrants the naturalization right and denied citizenship to Koreans and Pacific Islanders.

For a while Japanese in Hawaii did not care very much about those who were denied naturalization rights in the revised bill. Hearing the news of the passage of the bill at the Senate, some impatient Japanese community leaders started preparing for the day when they could naturalize. For example, on June 9 Hawaii Hochi’s headline was “Japanese Chamber of Commerce will Support Application for Naturalization: The Forms in Japanese Ready (Nihonjin Shoko Kaigisho Kika Shinsei wo Enjo, Nihonji de Kakikomu Yoshi ari)”. It tells that the Nihonjin Shoko Kaigisho (Nisshoko) will assist the Japanese to fill out the application. “The applicants will just go to the Nisshoko, where they can get the attendants help them fill out the application written in Japanese.” In the article, the spokesperson of Nisshoko said:

The Nisshoko had been strongly supporting the JACL. We started the Kikaken Kakutoku Undo Koenkai last year, and worked on the fund raising from island to island. We raised over $40,000 to donate to the JACL. We continued our support for legislation of Naturalization bills. When Representative (Francis) Walter visited Hawaii as a committee chairman for the HUAC hearings, we hosted the welcome banquet. We are very happy to know the passage of the Walter bill” (Hawaii Hochi, 6/9/50, p. 2).

Opposite to the optimistic and happy mood of Hawaii’s Japanese, Koreans in Hawaii showed a strong dissatisfaction. Hearing that the Walter bill was revised to give naturalization rights only to Japanese, Hawaii’s Koreans sent a strong appeal to the Congress (Hawaii Hochi, 6/14/50, p. 2). The JACL-ADC lobbyist Mike Masaoka had
been disappointed that the original Walter bill had been altered. Although the revised Walter bill was on its way to being approved at both Houses, he said,

It was regrettable the original Walter bill which guaranteed people of all races equal rights in naturalization, had to be changed” (Hawaii Hochi, 6/13/50, p. 2).

Mike Masaoka and JACL-ADC members advocated an ideal new Naturalization Law that would open door to all immigrants regardless of races. At the time of the passage of the revised bill, Masaoka said that he wanted at all costs to let the revised bill pass the Congress in this session since this comment was made exclusively for the Japanese press. But he actually wanted to have the original bill back on the stage, because the revised one was not what he wanted. The strong appeal from the Koreans was quite understandable for Masaoka. Hawaii’s delegate to U.S. Congress Joseph Farrington and Representative Walter shared his feeling and the three of them lobbied together to revive the original Walter bill permitting all the “aliens ineligible for citizenship” to naturalize. They finally succeeded in holding a Joint Committee meeting on this matter in August.

On August 14 1950, the original Walter bill finally passed both Houses and it was sent to the President on the 28th. When the news about the passage of the original Walter bill reached Hawaii, a Hawaii Hochi editorial explained its significance on August 16.

The passage of the Walter bill has finally corrected the long-lasting injustice and contradiction. . . . Finally thousands of people who chose America as their home would be able to become American citizens of their own will. . . . Some immigrants had been denied the right to acquire citizenship. . . . It might have been because the Asians looked very different from the Europeans so that the former were regarded as unassimilable. . . . What more strongly hurt the pride and self-esteem of these who had been denied citizenship, was the fact that they were also denied the right of immigration. . . . The fact that they denied their naturalization right and that America made this discriminatory Immigration Law was against the principles of founding fathers of American nation. Although
America had been a champion of fair play spirit, people from Asian and Pacific countries were unfairly denied citizenship. But these aliens ineligible for citizenship chose to stay and live in the country that labeled them as such, and they sent their American born children to the war to fight for America. It is important that the bill passed to remove the discriminatory provisions from the law (Hawaii Hochi, 8/16/50, p. 2).

As we could understand from this editorial, the passage of the bill was viewed as the correction of the long-lasting injustice. Also, the editorial clarifies that the denial of Asians' naturalization right and further immigration from Asia-Pacific area by America was seen as injuring their pride and self-esteem. Many Japanese in Hawaii shared this understanding of the naturalization rights. Thus, passage of the Naturalization Law was regarded as their dream come true. The community leaders felt that they should start preparing for the naturalization examinations even before knowing the President's decision.

Hawaii Hochi editors did not lose any time in starting the article series on "Kika Shiken Mondai no Shiori: Shitsumon Outo no Youryo (Pamphlet for Naturalization Examinations: Useful Tips for Good Answers" in early September. As Figure 7 shows, the Japanese community started several Kika Junbi (Naturalization Preparation) Classes while waiting for the President's signature. The opening of the classes in Kaneohe was reported on August 24, and the extension class on naturalization at Kaimuki High School was written up on September 16. The starting of the Kika Junbi Classes even before the President's signature shows that many ordinary Issei could not wait to start studying for the naturalization examinations.

On September 9, the President vetoed the bill, to much disappointment of Japanese. Hawaii Hochi on the same day reported about the veto as the top news. The President
vetoed the bill because its regulations regarding national safety and security had some problems. After the President sent the bill back to the House, Hochi editor wrote that there was some hope left that the bill would gain over two-thirds approval in order to override the President's veto. On September 24, the House voted for the vetoed bill, 307 vs. 14, and the bill was sent to the Senate (Hawaii Hochi, 9/24/50, p.1). Thus, the hope of Japanese leaders for the revision rose again. However, the Senate did not even discuss the bill, and on the very last day of the session, Senator McCarran said that it would not be necessary to override the President's veto of the Walter bill, because the bill had some defects.

The national security provisions attached to the Walter bill were the same as those in the National Security bill introduced by Senator McCarran, which had become law on the previous day, September 23, by overriding President Truman's veto. The Red Scare had deeply influenced the legislation process of Immigration and Naturalization bills. Many ordinary Americans feared that new immigrants would enter with communist ideas to destroy American democratic society. McCarran was the very man who had added the national security provisions to the Immigration bill. However, the passage of McCarran's National Security bill eliminated the need for the same provisions to be included in the Immigration and National Security legislation. McCarran then said the naturalization issue was totally different from national security, and he promised to present a genuine naturalization proposal in the coming session in November.

When Senator McCarran announced that he would not fight the President's veto, Japanese were very disappointed. However, their feeling was not expressed in the headline of the article on that day, which was: "We Should Have Hope for Senator
McCarran’s New Naturalization Bill: It Will Become Law in the Next Session in November” (Hawaii Hochi, 9/27/50, p.2). As a headline for what McCarran had done, this was too optimistic, even though McCarran promised to reinstate a better naturalization bill in the next session. Two days later, the Hochi editor expressed more honest feelings toward what Senator McCarran had done, with the headline: “We Feel Sorry about Senator McCarran’s Attitude: Re Walter Bill” (9/29/50, p.2).

Although the legislation movement could not accomplish its goal, the campaign leaders maintained close contact with the JACL leaders on the mainland. In fact, three delegates from Hawaii attended the national meeting of JACL in Chicago (Hawaii Hochi, 9/22/50, p.2). There was a meeting of the national-level Kikaken Kakutoku Kisei Domei, the fundraising arm for the naturalization legislation, at the same time.

After the President’s veto on the Walter bill, the discussion on this issue in the Japanese press calmed down. When the special session of the Congress drew near, however, the number of the articles on this issue increased to over 15 in the period of October-December of 1950. In November a new Walter bill on naturalization was introduced and in December the discussion started in Congress. The Japanese community revived its passion for the legislation again as Figure 6 shows. On December 7, 1950, the bill gained the majority vote in the House and was immediately sent to the Judiciary Committee of the Senate (Hawaii Hochi, 12/11/50, p.1). The date of its passage in the House was exactly nine years after the Pearl Harbor attack. Mike Masaoka commented that the fact the bill had passed the House of Representatives on Pearl Harbor Day really showed that the atmosphere had changed in nine years.
But the bill had to go through a very bumpy road in the Senate as usual. The JACL lobbyist's efforts seemed to bear fruit when they heard that the Senate Judiciary Committee had voted for the Walter bill on December 14 and it was sent to the floor of the Senate. The headline of the Hochi (12/15/50) said, “Walter Naturalization Bill passed the Senate Committee: Legislation Soon.” However, on December 26, the Hochi reported that on December 15 Senator Russell had opposed the bill on the grounds that international merchants might have leeway to naturalize under the bill. The Hochi article sounded pessimistic for the future of the bill.

Failure to pass the Naturalization Law in 1950 affected the lives of different types of people. First, all the alien permanent residents including Issei Japanese were now required to go through the troublesome alien registration procedure every year, as a result of the McCarran Act (Internal Security Act) of 1950. Therefore, this registration would become a time-consuming matter for most Issei in the beginning of 1951. Second, a group of Japanese women marrying American G.I.s, and waiting for the new Naturalization Law, were disappointed to hear the failure of legislation. The war brides (including fiancées) especially needed a law in order to immigrate. Mike Masaoka had asked U.S. Senator Pat McCarran in March 1950 to quickly discuss in the Senate the issue of giving entry permission to the war brides from Asia. Thus the new war bride bill passed in August 1950 while the Walter bill had been discussed. Although the Walter bill failed, the entering women in this category were no longer required to file personal petitions for a short period, which ended in March 1951. They began to hope that the new Immigration Law would pass soon, before the time limit of March 1951.
Although the legislation failed in 1950, in the beginning of 1951, Hawaii Hochi did a feature article on naturalization in the New Year's Day special. This feature article included comments made by influential Issei. Ozawa Gijo, a prominent Issei educator for Japanese language, spelled out his feelings toward naturalization in the article titled “Make efforts toward Naturalization.” He said the reason why the naturalization issue surfaced lay in the fact that all the people in the world as well as all Americans came to know about the great contributions made by Nisei soldiers in the European and Pacific fronts at World War II. So Ozawa believed they should make efforts to enjoy the equal rights once the Government gave them. Ozawa, however, showed a little uneasiness that there might be a rather small number of Issei who actually would become naturalized citizens. Some might feel sad to renounce Japanese nationality. Others might think they were too poor in English. Others might say they were too old. In the end, he regarded the legislation of Naturalization Law as the best thing in the century, so that they should try to become Americans.

Another prominent Issei who contributed an article was Furuya Suikei (Kumaji), a powerful Japanese businessman. In the article titled “It is not late,” Furuya also made a comment that most Issei were in their old age and thought, “there is no need to become American now.” Furuya also insisted that participating in American society should be a service (hoko) to America where they had lived for a long time and an obligation to their descendants, Nisei and Sansei. He added that they should start studying for naturalization examination by accepting it as punishment (bachi) for not having made a firm resolution to settle down sooner. These articles reveal that some Issei were rather reluctant in taking naturalization examinations for themselves since they were not
confident of their English ability. Therefore, the prominent Issei leaders encouraged in
the articles that they should participate in the American society by naturalizing. Most of
the Issei were cooperative in fund-raising by Kikaken Kakutoku Undo Koenkai, because
they were generous in supporting any activities led by the Nisshoko, although some of
them were reluctant about actual naturalization. The articles also framed becoming
naturalized in traditional Japanese terms of obligation, both to the host society that was
granting this new right, and to their descendants.

From January to April of 1951, Hawaii Hochi had more articles on Naturalization
bills than during the rest of the year, as Figure 6 shows. In Washington D.C., Several
Naturalization and Immigration bills were presented in January and February in the year
1951. Hawaii Hochi on January 23 reported about comments by the JACL-ADC lobbyist
Masaoka on the submission of the various bills. In it Masaoka said they were afraid that
the legislation would need more time and money. But he also said that they would
continue the work as long as the Japanese Issei and Nisei both on the U.S. mainland and
in Hawaii did not lose their hope and passion for this legislation movement (Hawaii
Hochi, 1/23/51, p. 6).

On February 24 Hawaii Hochi printed a statement from JACL-ADC. Among the
various Naturalization and Immigration bills, the ones presented by Senator McCarran
and Representative Walter looked most promising. After explaining the similarities and
differences between the McCarran and Walter bills, the statement explained that the bills
would allow those immigrants over 50 years old of age and had lived in the U.S. for 25
years or more to be exempt from taking examinations in English. This would be
particularly advantageous for Issei Japanese.

151
In March, the Senate and the House held a subcommittee joint-hearing session to discuss the Naturalization and Immigration bills including McCarran and Walter bills. The future of the bills looked promising and it spurred the fund-raising campaign in Hawaii. *Hawaii Hochi* reported that the joint Senate and House subcommittee hearings would start on March 6 (*Hawaii Hochi*, 3/3/51, p.6). It reported the names of the witnesses to testify on the first and second days of the hearings. On March 9, *Hawaii Hochi* printed the summary of Mike Masaoka’s testimony, which was to be delivered on March 7, the second day of hearings. *Hawaii Hochi* reported that powerful interest groups such as the American Veterans’ Club all supported the revised Immigration and Naturalization proposals (*Hawaii Hochi*, 3/10/51). *Hawaii Hochi* on March 12 reported Masaoka’s testimony in detail, and the testimonies by Representative Judd and Hawaii’s delegate to the congress, Joseph Farrington. On April 14 *Hochi* reported the ending of the hearings, and two days later, *Hawaii Hochi* notified the readers that the *Kikaken Kakutoku Undo Koenkai* (Association for Supporting Naturalization Legislation) would resume its fund-raising drive across Oahu to support the lobbying of the JACL-ADC for the Naturalization bill.

*Kikaken Kakutoku Undo Koenkai* was originally organized in 1949 with the leadership of the *Nisshoko* (Japanese Chamber of Commerce) in order to raise funds to support the lobbying activities being carried out by the JACL-ADC. This was a purpose-oriented organization exclusively for fund-raising, which existed within the united organization of *Nisshoko*. The executive members of the *Nisshoko* filled all the executive positions of the *Kikaken Kakutoku Undo Koenkai*. As early as February 1947, JACL organized the *Hokka Kikaken Kakutoku Kisei Domei* (Committee to Aid in the Obtaining
the Right of Naturalization for the Japanese in the North California), and this
organization expanded and reached out to the other Japanese communities to cooperate
for the same purpose. Hawaii’s Kikaken Kakutoku Undo Koenkai was within Hawaii’s
Nisshoko, but it was also a part of the large-scale national organization of JACL.

Hawaii Hochi played a significant role as an information source for the various fund-
raising activities planned in different regional organizations belonging to the Kikaken
Kakutoku Undo Koenkai such as the movie nights planned for May 19 in Kaneohe
(Hawaii Hochi, 5/14/51, p.4; 5/16/51, p.3), on May 30 in Kakaako (Hawaii Hochi,
5/29/51, p.4), and on June 9 in Ewa (Hawaii Hochi, 6/8/51, p.2). For this kind of
activities, a vernacular paper like Hochi did indispensable work to draw the attention of
the readers, and actually helped bring the audience to the fundraising event. For example,
Hawaii Hochi publicized the information like this.

Movie in Kaneohe: Fund-raising for Naturalization Legislation Movement
The JACL is working in order to fight against any discrimination against the
Japanese, to acquire equity, and protect their rights. Mike Masaoka is playing
the central role. To support their activities, all Japanese residing in Hawaii,
including all groups and voluntary leaders, are working on fund-raising. In
Kaneohe, the volunteers planned the movie night on May 19, Saturday. The
movie, “Tsuki ga deta deta” will be shown at 7:30 pm at the Kaneohe Higashi
Hongwanji Hall. Please come to support the activity (Hawaii Hochi, 5/14/50,
p.4).

The fund-raising drive lasted about two months and had its peak when the lobbyist
Mike Masaoka visited Hawaii in June. Where Mike Masaoka visited and what he said
attracted the readers, so his every move from his arrival till his departure became news in
the Hochi (Hawaii Hochi 6/14/50, p.4; 6/19/51, p.2, p.4). On June 22, Kikaken Kakutoku
Undo Koenkai printed a large article for fund-raising (Hawaii Hochi, 6/22/51, p. 2). It
first explained to the readers how effectively the JACL had worked for the movements to
redress the injustice and inequality, and how grateful the Japanese in America were. The article explained the background of Hawaii’s Kikaken Kakutoku Undo Koenkai, and its steady support for the legislation of new Immigration and Naturalization laws. It said:

Now that not only Caucasians, but Africans, Chinese, Filipinos, Indians and others were all entitled to naturalize, the fact that only Japanese were excluded from this right is a disgrace (Chijoku) for Americans of Japanese ancestry. Naturalization right has a significant meaning whether you actually naturalize or not. The naturalization right will abolish the racial discrimination, give you equal rights with the other racial groups, and remove the stigma of “aliens ineligible for citizenship.” This stigma even brands the Americans of Japanese ancestry as children of “aliens ineligible for citizenship” and tells that they just happened to be citizens because they were born in Hawaii. They were regarded as the second-class citizens.

In the last paragraph of this long article, the Kikaken Kakutoku Undo Koenkai finally said:

*Kikaken Kakutoku Undo Koenkai* was organized by the voluntary regional groups and individuals in Hawaii’s Japanese community. We would like to ask for your understanding and kind donations.

This statement made by Kikaken Kakutoku Undo Koenkai shows the Issei’s honest feelings. They had been challenging the unequal treatment by American host society for years. What annoyed the Issei most was the label of aliens ineligible for citizenship. Branded as such, the Issei felt it as a stigma. It injured their pride as Japanese and made some of them feel inferior. Acquiring naturalization right was very important for them. It became even more important when they found that their Nisei children, whom the Issei were proud of, were branded as second-class American citizens because they were children of aliens ineligible for citizenship. This strong feeling was what kept the Issei challenging the racially discriminatory label. Framing the issue in this way produced a

\[15\] However, this was not true. Actually the Koreans and those from the Pacific Islands were also still “aliens ineligible for citizenship.”
powerful incentive to contribute donations to the cause, and thus was an effective way of mobilizing community resources.

Although the fund-raising was actively going on in Hawaii, the likelihood that the bill would become law within 1951 became dim. The year 1952 would become a memorable year when the McCarran-Walter Immigration and Naturalization Law finally passed. As Figure 6 shows, there were 28 articles on the Immigration and Naturalization bill in the April-June 1952 quarter, which corresponds to the climax of the bill becoming law. On May 23, the bill passed the Senate (Hawaii Hochi, 5/23/52, p.1). Hawaii Hochi reported the joyful comments of Hawaii's Japanese just as it had done in 1950. The President of Nisshoko, Awamura Tokuyoshi,\(^{16}\) said to the reporter:

> As a Japanese, I have never experienced the happier event than this. When this bill receives the signature of the President, I will apply for naturalization. It is natural for the parents of the American citizens and with long time living experience in the U.S. to make use of the right (Hawaii Hochi, 5/23/52, p.3).

June 1952 had 13 articles on this topic, which reported the dramatic days that the Naturalization and Immigration bill went through. When the Hawaii Hochi reported about the process, the articles had some hopeful tone as usual that the bill would surely become law, reflecting the desire of the editors as well as most of the Japanese community members. For example, on June 10, the Hochi headline was “Both Houses Will Pass the Bill Soon: President Will Surely Sign.” The headline on June 12 was, “President’s Signature on the Naturalization and Immigration Bill is Desired: President is

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\(^{16}\) At this time, Awamura Tokuyoshi was well-known as one of the prominent Issei in the Hawaii Japanese community. Later, he was more often recognized as the father of Senator Daniel Inouye’s wife, Margaret.
Undecided” (Hawaii Hochi, 6/12/52, p.1). Thus, the news about the President’s veto on the bill was reported as the top news (6/24/52, p.1).

On the day after the veto, the Hochi said again with a hopeful tone that both Houses would override the President’s veto (6/26/52, p.1). The article explained that it would be easily overridden in the House of Representatives. Finally on June 27, the McCarran-Walter Immigration and Naturalization bill was voted affirmatively in the House, 278 vs. 113, and in the Senate 57 vs. 26. In the Senate, the pros gained only one vote more than they needed to override the veto (Hawaii Hochi, 6/27/52, p.1). Finally the long waited dream had come true.

The Hochi again quoted the happy comments of well-known Issei. Awamura Tokuyoshi appeared again as the President of the Nisshoko, and said, “I am as happy as ever, and feel like jumping up high! I am going to apply for naturalization right away. I recommend my fellow Issei to do the same because America finally opened its door to us” (ibid.).

Thus, the passage of the McCarran-Walter bill was the successful outcome of a campaign by the JACL, Kikaken Kakutoku Undo Koenkai and Nisshoko. To support effective lobbying to revise Naturalization and Immigration laws, Hawaii’s Japanese community cooperated with fund-raising activities being carried out by the JACL groups. The JACL used an internal sub-organization, the ADC (Anti Discrimination Committee) as the lobbying group, and Kikaken Kakutoku Kisei Domei, as a fund raising group. In Hawaii in order to work with the latter group, Kikaken Kakutoku Undo Koenkai was organized within the Nisshoko, Japanese Chamber of Commerce. The Kikake Kakutoku Undo Koenkai worked exclusively on fund-raising, and the Nisshoko was always
instrumental in supporting the legislation in any forms. *Nisshoko* represented the elite leadership within the Japanese community. At least in the *Hochi* coverage, there is little indication that white elites in Hawaii did anything in particular to support this legislation, although as its meaning was constructed within the Japanese community, it was an essential pre-condition for statehood.

The Americanism of the Japanese was still suspected, as the HUAC hearings had revealed that there were some communists among the Americans of Japanese ancestry. The *Nisshoko* had organized the anti-communist group *Beikoku Shugi Koyo Kai* within its own organization to counter the labeling of the Japanese community as communists and to promote Americanization among the Issei. One of the aims of this organization was to make the Issei ready for naturalization.

The reason why the Issei and rather elder Nisei leaders of the *Nisshoko* were wholly involved in supporting the legislation campaign was that it was to change the laws that had stigmatized the Japanese as aliens ineligible for citizenship. This painful label injured their pride. In the prewar era the Japanese had challenged this label many times. And under the changing international situation, after their Nisei children had contributed to America as loyal and heroic American soldiers, Hawaii’s Issei joined the legislation campaign in postwar years. When the Red Scare blocked the way for the legislation, as seen in the failure of Walter bill in 1950, Japanese community tried their best to show how anti-communist and American they were through the activities of the *Beikoku Shugi Koyo Kai*. For their self-esteem and pride, Hawaii’s Japanese continued to support the ceaseless efforts of lobbyist, Mike Masaoka, and kept their hope for the passage of the Immigration and Naturalization bills in the U.S. Congress. The fact that articles related
to the Naturalization and Immigration laws and fund-raising campaign for the legislation filled the pages of Hawaii Hochi shows how much interest Hochi editors and Japanese community members paid to these issues. Once the law had passed, Japanese community leaders started to encourage the Issei to naturalize.

**Naturalization Promotion Campaigns**

There were four different types of Naturalization Promotion Campaigns. All of them were Japanese community-oriented, and not only the Issei prominent leaders but also community volunteers cooperated in the campaigns. First, there was a supporting drive for Issei to register annually as alien residents, although it may seem contradictory to call it as part of the naturalization promotion campaign. The requirement arose in the context of the failure of the passage of the Naturalization and Immigration Law in 1950. Second, there were various gatherings to promote and encourage the Issei to naturalize. Third, there were many Kika Junbi Classes (Naturalization prep classes) where the Issei prospective citizens would prepare for naturalization examinations. Fourth, there were several series of articles on “tips for naturalization examinations” in Hawaii Hochi. All of these small-scale campaigns began as initiatives of organizations and individuals within the Japanese community. The Japanese vernacular papers, such as Hawaii Hochi, played a significant role in these campaigns, as an information provider as well as a promoter.

First, regarding the Alien Registration, Figure 7 shows that the articles on this topic appeared in the time period between year-end and beginning of the following year every year from 1950 to 1954. The annual registration became required as a result of the
McCarran Act (Internal Security Act) that passed the Congress in 1950. Since the Issei were not allowed the naturalization in 1950, all Issei as aliens had to go through the process of registration for 1951, 1952, and 1953. For 1954, only those Japanese who chose not to become naturalized U.S. citizens still had to register. Japanese organizations such as Nisshoko, the 442nd Club, the International Division of YWCA, and even some private stores voluntarily helped the Issei go through the registration procedure.

The registration for the year 1951 was the first one after the McCarran Act (Internal Security Act) was enacted, and Hawaii Hochi published several articles to call the attention of the readers not to fail to register. Hawaii Hochi's editorial on January 2 on "Alien Registration" said as follows:

28,000 Japanese who have lived in Hawaii over several decades must register between January 2 and 10. Also 29,000 Filipinos, 2,000 Chinese and 2,000 Koreans have to do the same... The procedure is simple, but time-consuming. We do not think this registration meaningless, but we would like to appeal that most of the aliens who have to register this time are the aliens with this duty only because they are not allowed to naturalize to the country they have long lived in and dedicated their loyalty to (1/2/51, p.2).

While conforming to this duty, many Issei strongly wished that the day to entitle them to naturalize would come as soon as possible in the year 1951.

For the 1952 registration, Hawaii Hochi again warned the readers not to fail to register. The registration was between January 1 and 11, and for the 1952 occasion, more organizations supported the Issei to help them register. Among the newly participating assisting organizations, Japanese Inns, Buddhist temples like Higashi Hongwanji, Japanese language schools, and regional Japanese clubs volunteered to help. It would become something that the Issei could skip if they become naturalized citizens. However, to become naturalized came to have some different meanings than the Issei had expected
before it was actually available. *Hawaii Hochi* also reported supporting drives for Issei to go through alien registrations in 1953 and 1954, from late December to early January. More voluntary organizations assisted the Issei to fill out the forms. The number of alien residents in the Japanese community began to decrease in 1953 due to the naturalization of the Issei and natural decrease. However, there were Issei who preferred to stay as Japanese nationals, so these people had to register every year.

Second, even before the passage of the Naturalization and Immigration bill, some campaigns to promote naturalization began in the Japanese community. As I pointed out in the previous section, about the time the first Walter Naturalization bill passed both Houses of Congress in August 1950 and was waiting for the President to sign, these small movements appeared. *Hawaii Hochi* started their series of on-paper prep-classes called “*Kika Shiken Mondai no Shiori: Shitsumon Outo no Youryo* (Pamphlet for Naturalization Examinations: Useful Tips for Good Answers).” Figure 7 shows the increase in number of articles on tips for naturalization in the July-September period. Also, two *Kika Junbi* Classes (naturalization prep classes) started in the year of 1950 without waiting for the legislation.

After the passage of the Naturalization and Immigration bill, the articles in *Hawaii Hochi* treated preparation for the naturalization examinations in more detail. As Figure 7 shows, the number of *Hochi* articles on the topic of naturalization promotion skyrocketed to 37 in the time period of July-September, 1952. Although the number decreased to 14 in the October-December slot, it went up to 27 in January-March 1953. Apparently, people started paying more attention to the naturalization examinations as a real event after the passage of the bill in June. On July 2, 1952, the *Hochi* reported as its top news
the beginning of the applications for naturalization. “The new Naturalization Law will be activated on January 1, 1953, so the Department of Immigration has already started accepting the applications." This article explained in detail about what applicants were supposed to write on the application form.

Expecting that more Issei were interested in preparing for the naturalization examinations, a series of articles on prep-classes for naturalization examinations was planned in *Hawaii Hochi* in October 1952. The McCarran-Walter Act would become effective about two months later, so the series called, "Kika Juken Junbi Amerika Koza (Preparation for Naturalization Examination: Course on America)” started (*Hawaii Hochi*, 10/27/52, p.4). *Hawaii Hochi*, as a vernacular newspaper, not only played a role to let the readers know about the naturalization classes offered at various locations, but also ran a school in the newspapers for the readers.

This newspaper series consisted of 31 installments, which ran from October 27 through December 3 of 1952. One portion was made up of four to five sets of questions and answers regarding America, written in Japanese and English. This series was well received by the community, according to the *Hochi* editor. For the Issei, reading the series of articles of prep-classes was a handy and inexpensive way to start preparing. This series not only gave useful knowledge to the prospective applicants, but also helped the Issei to get an idea of what the examination would be like. The series was so useful that *Hawaii Hochi* repeated it the following year.

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17 In fact the new Immigration and Naturalization Law was activated on December 24, 1952.
After the successful passage of the Naturalization and Immigration Act, the leaders of the Japanese community actively encouraged the Issei to naturalize. The Nisshoko, or Honolulu Nihonjin Shoko Kaigisho (Honolulu Japanese Chamber of Commerce) committed itself to informing the ordinary Issei of the naturalization procedure. Gradually the group of people who specialized in the naturalization campaign emerged. Among them Oi Tetsuo and Toyama Tetsuo were the most active. At the events planned by these leaders, the significance of the Naturalization Act and the importance of the new Immigration Act were explained. The new Naturalization Law had a provision that those who were over 50 years old and had lived in the U.S. for 25 years would be exempt from taking examinations in English. The leaders explained the law and the advantages for the elders, and encouraged their fellow Issei to naturalize.

Oi Tetsuo, who served as administrator of the Nisshoko, delivered lectures at various locations across the Islands to explain the benefits and importance of the new law for the Japanese. Oi came back from the JACL annual meeting held in June 1952 in San Francisco,¹⁸ and conveyed the hot information he had collected there. In Honolulu his lecture was held at Bussei Kaikan (Young Men’s Buddhist Association Hall) on July 18 (Hawaii Hochi, 7/16/52, p.1), and on the Big Island, at Hilo Honganji Bussei Hall on July 19. The summary of Oi’s lecture was printed in the Hochi in a three-day series (Hawaii Hochi, 7/19/52, 7/21/52, 7/22/52), demonstrating that the Nisshoko leaders wanted more fellow Issei to become interested in this issue. At the beginning of the lecture, Oi

¹⁸ The news of the successful legislation of the Walter-McCarran Act came in the middle of this annual meeting of the JACL in San Francisco around noon on June 27. On the previous night, the JACL delegates sent the telegrams to encourage the Senators to vote for the bill.
explained the great contribution the JACL had made for the legislation. Oi spelled out the reasons the JACL had made such a great effort:

1. because their parents were not treated equally with the other racial groups,
2. because they believed that the Issei should be entitled to the citizenship for their hard work in developing the Sacramento Valley, and Imperial Valley, etc.,
3. because they wanted to show their “koko (filial piety)” to the Issei parents who had given them American education,
4. because they wanted to achieve justice by getting rid of racial discrimination according to Americanism (Hawaii Hochi, 7/19/52, p.2).

This speech offers an opportunity to examine the meaning of the naturalization law in social movement terms. Snow and his associates (Snow and Benford 1988; Snow et al. 1986) developed a theory of framing to analyze how the presentation of an issue can affect the prospects of a social movement. They identified three types of framing: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational. Diagnostic framing explains a problem in a particular way, and prognostic framing tell what one should do about it, based on the diagnosis. Motivational framing presents why individuals should actively engage in the movement rather than sitting back passively and leaving it to others to do. Oi’s speech links the just-completed successful campaign to achieve a new, non-discriminatory naturalization and citizenship law to the longstanding concerns of the Japanese community about their unequal status, and their efforts to contribute to American society.

Based on this diagnosis, it argues (the prognostic frame) that the Nisei worked through JACL to create a new law that would bring justice by getting rid of racial discrimination, and invokes such justice as a core American value.
These reasons frame the meaning of the law in familiar terms related to the long efforts of the Japanese community to achieve dignity and equality in American society. Striking in this list of reasons is the inclusion of filial piety, the traditional Japanese Confucian value of children honoring their elders. As a way of framing the achievement of getting the new naturalization law passed, this concept presented the law as a gift from the Nisei children to their Issei parents. The strong implication of this framing is not only that the parents should be pleased by the good behavior of their children, but that they must in turn respect and honor the gift by utilizing it. Thus this motivational framing set up an obligation for the Issei to naturalize as American citizens, to show that they appreciated the gift their Nisei children had given them.

Since the new Immigration and Naturalization Law was to be in effect soon, the Japanese in Hawaii were eager to know what kind of benefits they could expect, who would be able to immigrate to the U.S. under the new law, and what they should know in order to naturalize to be American. At the end of Oi’s lecture, Awamura, the President of Nisshoko, said in his closing remark that they had decided to raise a fund of up to $10,000 as a token of gratitude to Mike Masaoka from Hawaii’s Japanese community as a whole. Set in the context of Oi’s framing of the achievement in terms of filial piety, this was powerful motivational framing to contribute to the appreciation fund. It also offered a way for Issei who were reluctant to go through the naturalization process to express their gratitude for the gift their children had given them in a tangible yet symbolic way.

A few days before Oi’s lecture series, a new organization specializing in the naturalization promotion for Issei was emerging: Toyama Tetsuo’s Kika Kenkyukai (Naturalization Study Group). Its activities contributed to the increase in the number of
Hochi articles on naturalization promotion. Many of the articles in the time period of July-September 1952 were related to Toyama Tetsuo's activities. Actually at the very end of Oi's lecture in Honolulu, Toyama gave a short speech in appreciation for Oi's service. Wherever naturalization-related events were held, Toyama would be there. On July 10, the Hochi reported about a meeting of the Kika Kenkyukai (naturalization study group) held by a group of Japanese graduates from Kawananakoa adult classes. More than 20 people gathered, and the main figure was Toyama Tetsuo. Toyama and others such as educators, doctors, and religious ministers who had attended the classes, invited Nishi Tokue, who worked at the International Division of the YWCA, as a speaker for the meeting to explain the naturalization procedure. Toyama finished the adult extension class for naturalization examination at Kawananakoa, and organized his own group with the other attendants of the classes. Toyama would become the key naturalization person in the newspaper.

Toyama Tetsuo played a significant role in the naturalization campaign and even started to publish a journal called “Citizen (Shimin)” in 1954. In the prewar period he had contributed to the Japanese community as publisher of the journal “Jitsugyo no Hawaii.” He went through difficulties in doing business in the local Japanese community as an Okinawan, but he gradually became successful. During the war he was interned on the mainland, where he became a Christian. On his return to Hawaii, he tried to resume his printing business, which was not easy. In the meanwhile he helped organize the Hawaii Keizai Kenkyu Club (Hawaii Economy Study Club), Kika Sokushin Renrakubu

Mrs. Nishi was an Issei who helped the war brides to organize the Hibiscus Club and give them necessary information for American way of life.
(Naturalization Encouragement Association), and Friends of the Children of Okinawa. He played an instrumental role in Americanization of Issei.

If the Nisshoko-affiliated groups could be called top-down organizations within the Japanese community, Toyama’s activities should be called a grassroots type. Since Toyama had been in the publishing business for a long time, he knew the well-known people in and out of Japanese community, which would work as a good network in planning and carrying out various activities. In July, Toyama arranged a public meeting with Territorial Senate President, Wilfred Tsukiyama, and editors of both Japanese presses, Hawaii Hochi and Nippu Jiji, and other volunteers, in order to discuss naturalization matters (Hawaii Hochi, 7/21/52. p.2). The headline of the Hawaii Hochi article, “Decide to Naturalize After Considering Where You Want to Die: Opinion of President Tsukiyama,” describes the tone of the lectures. According to the article, Senator Tsukiyama, a Nisei, thought it natural that the Japanese should naturalize if they had children and grandchildren with them, had lived in Hawaii for a long time and regarded Hawaii as the place where they would like to live for the rest of their lives.

If the Issei become American citizens, they would enjoy equal rights as Americans. It is very important that they could get rid of inferiority complex that they had to feel under the discrimination. For the Nisei and Sansei generations, it was sad that their parents’ generation could not become American citizens and could not enjoy the rights of full-fledged American citizens. The Nisei generation did their best in this matter from their sincere hearts and filial piety. The Territorial Legislators did their best because they wanted to show their gratitude for the contribution of Japanese in Hawaii (ibid.).

The way Tsukiyama, a Nisei, emphasized “filial piety” is meaningful. Filial piety was the value that Issei parents wanted Nisei children to learn most. The Nisei grew up in two cultures, American and Japanese. At home their parents spoke to them in Japanese
and taught them Japanese cultural values. They wanted their children to succeed in American society so that the parents tried to give them as much education as they could. The parents sent the children to local public schools and Japanese language schools. At American schools, Nisei learned the meaning of democracy, equality and freedom. At Japanese language schools, they learned Japanese values such as filial piety and respect for elders. Tsukiyama as a prominent politician and attorney told the Issei that the Nisei did their best in supporting the legislation of new Naturalization Law, because they felt they must do so to show their filial piety. This message had very strong cultural meanings, especially to the Issei parents. The Issei, who received the filial piety gift from children, felt that they must pay back something to them in return, which should be to naturalize and to become American citizens. Tsukiyama’s lecture was in this sense very significant, offering the same motivational framing as Oi’s lecture.

Toyama Tetsuo soon arranged another meeting with a guest speaker for a naturalization meeting (Hawaii Hochi, 7/26/52, p.5). The main guest of this meeting was H. L. Darnstead, an instructor who taught naturalization night classes at high schools. Over 80 percent of his students had passed naturalization examination. He advised that Japanese applicants should not be afraid of the English examination. He urged the Issei to go to the night classes at high schools for preparation.

*Hawaii Hochi* not only wrote about the activities of Issei and Nisei leaders of the naturalization campaign, but *Hochi* editors actually collected more information themselves, and wrote special articles for the readers. There was an article “*Hochi* editor visited the Immigration Department Office to inquire about the process of naturalization: over 100 Japanese have already applied for citizenship” in the *Hochi* (7/22/1952, p.2).
The *Hochi* editor met with John J. Kelleher on July 18, and interviewed him about the Japanese reaction toward the new Immigration Law. According to the official, Japanese groups and individuals made about 200 to 300 inquiries regarding naturalization. The articles gave good information on the procedure of naturalization, and the address and phone number of the immigration office. Thus, we can see that *Hawaii Hochi* itself was a strong and active supporter of the naturalization campaign, and also a mobilizer to involve more Issei into the activities.

The main event planned in the month of August was the *Kika Mondai Ippan Koenkai* (Public Lectures on Naturalization Issues), which was planned by volunteers such as Toyama, the naturalization person. The article on August 1 (*Hawaii Hochi*, 8/1/52, p.4) announced that a mass meeting would be held to give various lectures on naturalization because it was understood as necessary to study the naturalization issues from all different angles. The meeting would take place at Kawanakaoa School Auditorium and admission would be free of charge. Over 30 groups were reported to support the meeting, including the 442nd and 100th clubs, the *Nisshoko*, and various Japanese religious groups from Christians to Buddhists. The number of groups supporting the mass meeting increased with each report in Hochi. More and more people became involved in the plan, as *Hochi* reported that the number of the supporting groups increased to as many as 50. Another article on this mass meeting appeared on August 18. It reported the names and titles of the twelve lecturers.

The names and titles of speakers showed that the well-known people representing their organizations made speeches. And these organizations more or less worked as mobilizing resources for this naturalization campaign. The titles of speeches reflected
what the organizers of the lecture meeting wanted the ordinary community members to get interested in. Matsui Toyotaro’s speech title “Oyome san Iyoiyo Nyuseki” reflects that he compared the naturalization of the Issei to the marriage registration of new bride in the husband’s family. Issei often compared Japanese immigrant in America as a bride in the husband’s family. It is a traditional way of thinking, but the Issei who had traditional Japanese values wanted to believe that the bride or wife must follow the ways of living in the husband’s family. Accordingly, a Japanese immigrant must follow the ways of America. It promoted their assimilation to American culture.

One day before the mass meeting at the Kawananakoa Auditorium, Hochi (8/20/52) announced the meeting again. This article reported that even the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii and the delegate to the Congress would attend the mass meeting and make congratulatory addresses. The editorial of August 21, titled "Over 70 Supporting Voluntary Groups," emphasized the significance of voluntary motivation of more than 70 groups' supporting the lecture meeting. The editor labeled this as an unprecedented situation and said the naturalization and citizenship issue was so important for Japanese that even the conflicting groups gathered and cooperated together. According to the writer of this editorial, the passage of the new Immigration and Naturalization Law was accomplished because of three factors: (1) the international situation changed after the war, (2) people wanted to reward the Nisei’s contribution to World War II, and (3) people wanted to reward the law-abiding attitudes of Japanese Issei during the war. Therefore, Issei must have sincerity and strong interest in this matter. “Once this type of lecture meeting was held, many must attend,” the writer urged the readers.
On the day after the big meeting, the *Hochi* reported the summary of every lecture (*Hawaii Hochi*, 8/22/52, p.3). The *Hochi* said that about 700 people gathered at KawanakaoA Auditorium to hear the lectures. It started at 7:40 p.m., and Toyama Tetsuo chaired the meeting. Fourteen speakers made a speech one after another, including congratulatory addresses by Secretary of Territory Serrao and Hawaii's Delegate to the Congress Farrington, and finally it ended at 11:30. The meeting was a great success. On August 30, the *Hochi* reported that the group called *Kika Sokushin Renrakubu* (Naturalization Encouragement Association) was organized in order to promote the naturalization of Issei. This organization was particularly going to be a liaison organization to connect all the organizations that had supported the special event and to accomplish their special purpose.

In sum, since the Issei leaders of the campaign provided good meaning to the participation in the public lecture meeting, a great number of people actually took part in the meeting as participants or fund-supporters with enthusiasm. However, this success of the lecture gathering could not directly lead to the Issei’s actual naturalization. To be given the naturalization right legally did not mean one would actually make use of the right. Therefore, the naturalization leaders tried to mobilize people to start preparing for applying for citizenship and taking the examinations.

As early as the end of August of 1952 the *Hawaii Hochi* started writing to enlighten the Issei and urge them to attend the night adult classes of naturalization preparation offered at public high schools in Honolulu. On August 27 the *Hochi* said that three high schools, Kaimuki, McKinley and Farrington in Honolulu, would offer 10-week naturalization education classes in the fall (*Hawaii Hochi*, 8/27/52, p.2). The article
explained that Japanese, Koreans, Samoans and other Pacific Islanders would be able to naturalize under the new Naturalization Act that would take effect on December 24. The organizations to assist filling the naturalization application forms were: Nisshoko, Nihonjin Seinen Shoko Kaigisho (Japanese Junior Chamber of Commerce), YWCA, 442nd Club, Young Men’s Buddhist Association, Samoan Citizenship Association and so on (ibid). Clearly, the Japanese media played an important part in giving information on naturalization education to Issei readers.

September 1952 had nine Hochi articles about naturalization prep classes. The articles not only told the facts but also had a tone to urge the readers to attend the classes. For example the article on September 18 was composed of two parts with three pictures. The first part, “More and More People Eager to Learn English Everyday: Adult School is Very Popular,” explained the necessity of studying English for Issei Japanese (Hawaii Hochi, 9/18/52, p.3). This part introduced the words of the officer of Adult Education Section of Territorial Department of Education. He said that those who were over 50 years old were able to naturalize in their mother language, but they also would need to know some English for instance to go to vote. He added that the adult night classes would be taught by teachers who had some knowledge of Japanese language and would teach American ways of life, too (ibid). The second part of this article had a smaller headline, “Japanese Adults Study English Hard: Joining Night Classes,” and introduced the adult night classes at Farrington High School. This part quoted the words of a Japanese man who was 66 years old. “I have seven grandchildren and they speak only English, which made me study English. I intend to naturalize to become an American citizen. I am entitled to take a naturalization exam in Japanese. Even so, since I am going
to become American, I want to be a fluent English speaker. There is a saying in Japanese ‘Rokuju no Tenarai (starting to learn a new thing at the age of 60),’ I am just like it. I am studying hard.” These types of testimonials of night school attendants were used to encourage Issei readers to join the classes. It again shows that newspapers were also mobilizers of the naturalization drive.

According to the article of September 19, Toyama Tetsuo of *Kika Sokushin Renrakubu* (Naturalization Encouragement Association) played a role in giving the detailed information about adult night classes offered at public high schools. Fifty to sixty people had already inquired about the courses. The article gave Toyama’s phone number to contact. Toyama even visited the Territorial Department of Education office and opened the way for new naturalization classes that would be taught in English with a thorough Japanese explanation. Teaching classes in a language other than English was against the rules, but using both languages was permissible. Accordingly, this new type of naturalization class would be offered at McKinley High School first, starting the 7th of October, gradually followed by Kawananakoa, Farrington, and Kaimuki Schools.

The high popularity of Japanese language naturalization classes was also written in the article on October 8. It reported how busy the day of registration for the Japanese class was at McKinley High. Toyama and other volunteers from the *Kika Sokushin Renrakubu* (Naturalization Encouragement Association) were literally sweating to assist the registration. The class started on the seventh, but they were starting a second class because the original class was already filled (*Hawaii Hochi*, 10/8/52, p.2).

On November 14 (p.3), an article with a picture reported the graduation ceremony for three naturalization classes of Farrington High School. There were more than 70
graduates, of whom Japanese were in the majority. The three teachers received leis and Toyama Tetsuo gave congratulatory words. On December 19 (p.2), there was an article about the graduation ceremony of three naturalization night classes at McKinley High. This article was also accompanied by a group picture of graduates and teachers, and even with a list of names of graduates. According to the article, two Japanese-English naturalization classes and one English language naturalization class enjoyed the graduation together.

As the articles show, with the passage of the new Naturalization Law, the number of Issei attending the naturalization classes, either English classes or Japanese classes, increased dramatically. More classes were organized with the initiative of the leaders of Kika Sokushin Renrakubu, such as Toyama Tetsuo. Facing the starting of the real examinations in 1953, the leaders expected a good result as the effect of the successful naturalization drive.

In addition to the actual naturalization campaign, Hawaii’s Japanese were enthusiastic about showing their thankfulness toward Mike Masaoka’s hard work in lobbying. His name became known among all Japanese residents in Hawaii as the person who had realized the legislation of the new Naturalization and Immigration Law. Toyama Tetsuo even wrote a poem to admire Mike Masaoka for his passion, efforts and hard work (Toyama 1971, 219). In September 1952, Hawaii’s Japanese community invited Mike and Etsu Masaoka to Hawaii in order to show their sincere gratitude to both of them for the lobbying activities to make Japanese community’s dream come true. Japanese presses such as Hawaii Hochi reported about them very earnestly, so Masaoka stories filled the papers during their stay in Hawaii. Their every move in Hawaii was reported
by the *Hochi* and other Japanese presses, indicating that their visit was of great interest to
the readers of the Japanese press.

Separate from inviting Mike and Etsu Masaoka to Hawaii, Hawaii’s Japanese
community had already started the fund-raising campaign to raise some amount of money
in gratitude for the Masaokas’ contribution. This fund-raising was started by the JACL-
affiliates in the mainland Japanese communities. Hawaii’s local committee, the *Masaoka
Sharei Inkai* (Masaoka Gift Committee) was organized by central members of the
*Nisshoko*. *Hawaii Hochi* carried an article describing the Ewa Japanese Club’s activity in
cooperation with the Masaoka Gift Committee. The *Hawaii Hochi* of September 19 (p. 4)
announced that the Ewa Japanese Club was planning the movie night on September 20.
They would show two Japanese movies and ask for many to attend. Other than this
movie-night type of fund-raising campaign, the Japanese community leaders worked hard
on raising funds by asking for individual donations directly to the Masaoka Gift
Committee through Japanese media.

For some Issei in Hawaii, donating some money to show gratitude to the Masaokas
had a more significant meaning than actually becoming naturalized Americans. To
donate money seemed more direct and important than going through rather difficult
examinations. For Japanese, feeling “on (obligation)” to someone who had made
tremendous efforts for them and showing gratitude to that person was most important.
Therefore, to hold a banquet in order to show gratitude to all who had supported the
lobbying activities for passage of the new law had a very important meaning, too.

December was the month when the Naturalization Act went into the effect on the 24th.
Thus, December 1952 had more articles about naturalization promotion campaigns to
report some special activities of celebration carried out in the Japanese community. On December 1, the Hawaii Hochi reported about a party held on the previous night, in appreciation of the service of Hawaii’s delegate to Congress, Joseph Farrington, for the legislation. As the delegate, Farrington worked hard to support the Immigration and Naturalization bill in the Congress, and the Nisshoko (Japanese Chamber of Commerce) appreciated his service, so they hosted a party for Mr. and Mrs. Farrington. On December 2, the Hochi announced the plan for a large-scale banquet celebrating the enactment of new Immigration and Naturalization Act. The banquet would be held on December 28, the first Sunday after the law went into effect, at Queen Surf Hotel in Waikiki. The newspapers reported that the Governor and Secretary of the Territory, Mayor of Honolulu, the delegate to the Congress, and others were to be invited as honored guests, so the news informing of the development of the plan made the readers eager to support the plan for the banquet and contribute to its success. The delegates of all private and local groups felt that they must not be left out from the list of supporting organizations. The article gave information on how to purchase tickets (ibid.).

Plans for the banquet were reported several times in the Hochi pages. On December 10, an article (p.5) said that more than 60 groups would sponsor the party, and the main sponsor would be the Nikkei Kika Sokushin Renrakubu (Japanese Naturalization Encouragement Association). The article showed the names of some of the supporting groups. Hochi (12/24/52) printed a name list of those who would play a significant role in the banquet, and a name list of leaders of all the supporting groups. The list documents that leaders from various groups were all supporting this historic event. In addition, on December 27, the Hochi (p.2) reported the names of the speakers. Among
them were Governor Long, Mayor Wilson, the Section Head of Adult Education from the Department of Education, and the Section Head of Naturalization from the Immigration Office. On the day before the party, the *Hochi* reported that 500 people had already purchased tickets. The article urged people to purchase tickets right away if they intended to go, and also asked the leaders in the counties to report the number of attendants as soon as possible, if they had not already done so. This enthusiastic reporting about the banquet, indicates how strongly the Japanese people wanted to celebrate the historic event and show their gratitude to those who had made great efforts to get the bill passed.

On December 29, the *Hochi* (p.2) reported details about the party. As many as 600 people gathered at Queen Surf Hotel for a sumptuous banquet. The article reported who had attended the party among Hawaii's socially and politically prominent people. It also printed summaries of the speeches they made. Among the attendees, there were a small number of Samoans, Koreans, Chinese and Filipinos. Since they were also entitled to enjoy the new Immigration and Naturalization Law they were included in this historic banquet although most of the attendees were Japanese.

In a real sense, the direct way to show the delight over entitlement of citizenship was to actually apply for citizenship and pass the naturalization examination. However many Issei and Nisei also were released from their sense of inferiority by the passage of the new Naturalization and Immigration Law itself. Therefore, they became very eager to hold a banquet to celebrate the legislation and show their gratitude to the contributors,

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20 Chinese and Filipinos had already been given a quota for immigration and access to citizenship since their mother countries fought on the side of the U.S.
and it seemed as if all of the Japanese community elites were involved in the celebration banquet in December. However, the leaders of the Kika Sokushin Renrakubu remained focused on mobilizing the ordinary Issei to study and apply for citizenship. Thus, many naturalization classes were held across the Islands.

The Hawaii Hochi New Year’s Day special of January 1 1953 had more than 100 opinions regarding naturalization, in response to “Give us your view to the acquisition of naturalization right.” Many said they were happy that the racially unequal law was finally revised to give them the same naturalization right as European immigrants had. Some said they finally could feel proud (Katami ga hiroi). Those who said that they were willing to naturalize often added that the naturalization right was given thanks to the efforts of Nisei on the war front at World War II, the lobbying of Mike Masaoka, and supporting activities of Issei leaders. Some shared the opinion that once you had decided to live in Hawaii for the rest of your life you would like to naturalize. One person expressed this opinion the other way round, that if you decided to naturalize, you meant to die here. Also there were quite a few opinions that they would like to participate in the politics by voting. When they naturalized they would like to become good American citizens.

The comments showed that most Issei felt happy about the passage of the Naturalization Act. It was interpreted as a breakthrough because the cause of their injured pride had finally disappeared. Many thanked the Nisei’s contributions to the country, Mike Masaoka’s efforts, and JACL. Although the Issei leaders were urging fellow Issei to join the naturalization campaign, this New Year’s Day special reveals that there were quite a few Issei who were happy about the legislation but were not seriously
thinking about naturalizing themselves. Some thought the legislation had been realized too late so they became too old for naturalization, while others felt they could not renounce Japanese nationality very easily. Thus, these statements of Issei tell that to attend the parties and donate money for showing their sincere gratitude was one thing, and to become an American citizen was another.

Since the naturalization classes became very popular, the Hawaii Hochi received some requests from the readers to repeat the series of articles on how to prepare for naturalization examinations, which had appeared in Hawaii Hochi from late October to mid-December of 1952 (Hawaii Hochi, 1/13/53, p.2). The Hochi asked Dr. Kondo Kikujiro to compile a series of “common sense for an American citizen,” and print it as a daily series. According to the article, “Dr. Kondo Kikujiro himself passed the naturalization examination last Friday, and he will write the series based on his own actual experiences and those of others” (ibid.). The popular series started as “Kika Juken Junbi Amerika Koza (Preparation for Naturalization: Study on America),” on January 13, and ran for 5 months, with 52 installments.

The year 1953 was the year when the Japanese Issei finally became able to take naturalization examinations. The headline for the first news for the year about the naturalization was as follows (Hawaii Hochi, 1/3/53, p. 3): “Naturalization Examinations Will Start on Jan. 5: About 18 Applicants a Day in the Beginning” Finally the naturalization examinations started accepting Japanese applicants in January. The Hochi on January 5 reported about the first naturalization examination for Japanese.

Toyama, the naturalization person, and Nishi, an active promoter working in the YWCA, were successfully naturalized. There were more and more articles on the
naturalization examinations and ceremonies for oath of allegiance throughout the year 1953. *Hawaii Hochi* continued its role as mobilizer to urge the Issei to consider applying for citizenship. To encourage them attend the naturalization classes was the part the presses played in the naturalization campaign. Since the news on the people who actually passed the naturalization examinations and became American citizens increased, the notification articles of the time, place and contents of naturalization night and day classes began to look like information about something other readers could do. The articles on the graduation ceremonies and parties made the readers feel like joining the fun part.

For example, an editorial "*Kika Yagakko e* (To the Naturalization Night Class)" of *Hawaii Hochi* worked to enlighten the Issei to go to the naturalization night school. It said that most naturalization examination takers were actually asked at the interview for the examination whether they had attended the naturalization classes or not. "The officer seemed happy to hear that I went to the naturalization class." This editorial also explained the importance of attending the naturalization classes.

First, the classes would give you the common sense as American citizens. Second, the classes would make the Issei younger. Even if you did not have a time for study since you had to support the family in your younger days, now you can do almost anything. It would be a good experience, too (*Hawaii Hochi*, 1/15/53, p.2).

By giving some new meanings to participation in naturalization classes, the naturalization campaign leaders and *Hawaii Hochi* editor tried to influence Issei who were dubious about the effect of classes. In fact, getting an advantage at the naturalization interview would be a good incentive to go to naturalization classes. Moreover, staying young by going to classes would become a good reason to go, too.
Whether to take the naturalization examinations in Japanese language or not was one of the most important issues for Issei Japanese applicants for citizenship. In spite of giving lessons in Japanese language at adult extension schools in preparation for naturalization examinations, it seems it was still uncertain in the beginning of 1953 whether the Issei would be able to take the exams in Japanese. *Hochi* reported every new bit of information on this topic. An article on March 4, 1953 told how much help the Issei whose English command was not good needed in order to apply for citizenship. The article said that a Nisei volunteer would hold a meeting with those Issei prospective applicants to teach them what to write in the application form. This type of meeting seems to have been held at different places several times. The article (3/13/53, p.6) was based on the information from the JACL and said that naturalization examinations given in Japanese language might be delayed because the immigration office was short of budget to hire translators.

The article on March 21, 1953 gave the headline “Can we naturalize only in Japanese language?: *Kika Senseishiki* (The oath of allegiance ceremony) on the 26th.” The article said that those who took naturalization exams in Japanese language would attend the oath of allegiance ceremony on the 26th, and whether Judge McLaughlin would admit them to citizenship or not was attracting attention. The article even said that if they were not allowed to become American citizens those applicants would file a test case in order to naturalize. On March 24, the *Hochi* printed the official statement of Immigration Chief Official, Mr. Kelleher.

Those applicants who have lived in the United States over 20 years, and who were already over 50 years old on December 24, 1952, are able to take naturalization examinations with a translator in their mother tongue, other than
English. There might be some misunderstanding because we had no applicants that made use of this provision. A Filipino person asked for this provision and he passed the examination with a translator in his own language. He will attend the ceremony and make an oath of allegiance in his language. Therefore please be advised that the Japanese can make use of this provision (Hawaii Hochi, 3/24/53, p.).

On March 26, the second ceremony for oath of allegiance for the year was held. The Hochi reported on this event rather minutely (3/26/53, p.3). A total of 78 people were naturalized on this day, and 48 among them were Japanese. The Hochi reported about a Filipino man who had taken an examination in his own language Visayan. He was admitted as an American citizen at this ceremony. This article also reported about two Japanese women as the first naturalized war brides. It also reported that the two local-born women, who had lost their American citizenship by marrying Japanese nationals, had regained their American citizenship again. They were exempt from examinations and recovered their citizenship just by making an oath (3/26/53).

On the next day, there was an article about a Japanese translator at the Immigration Office, Mr. James Tanaka Zenzo. “He started as a translator in February and he would be an official translator at the Immigration Office after successful screening” (3/27/53, p.3). In Hawaii the first naturalization examination conducted in Japanese with translator Tanaka was held on April 24 in Honolulu. Hochi reported about this examination in great detail. The oath of allegiance ceremony was also held and they became Americans successfully. Hochi wrote articles on the oaths of allegiance conducted in Japanese language (c.f. 5/29/53, p.2). Judging from the Hochi articles, the number of the applicants for naturalization in Japanese was much smaller than that of those who tried in English.
Hochi produced many articles to let the Issei readers know the various experiences of those who actually passed the examinations. This type of articles had a tone to make the readers feel, “I can do it if so and so could do it.” For example, there was a meeting of the naturalized citizens and prospective examination applicants at the YWCA on March 14, 1953. Hochi announced the meeting two times beforehand (3/9/53, p.6; 3/13/53, p.3), and reported the meeting on March 15 (p.3). Kika Sokushin Renrakubu (Naturalization Encouragement Association) sponsored the meeting. Toyama Tetsuo, as usual, served as chair, and nine brand-new American citizens made speeches on their experiences. The article did not say exactly how many gathered, but it said “they did not have enough seats in the originally-reserved room, so they changed the meeting place to the bigger room, and brought more chairs in” (Hawaii Hochi, 3/15/53, p.3).

There were more articles on the personal naturalization experiences throughout the year 1953. These articles regarding the real personal experiences of naturalization examinations were favorite ones for those prospective Issei applicants. An interesting one, for example, was the article about an Issei lady who had studied for naturalization only in katakana, and passed the examination successfully (Hawaii Hochi, 8/6/53, p.3). This type of article was meant to encourage the Issei elders who were not good at English but also were only semi-literate in Japanese.

Those Issei who attended naturalization classes usually had a luncheon party after a series of classes ended. Besides these rather small-size parties, larger-scale banquets were held once or twice a year after the naturalization act came into effect. Expecting the first anniversary of the new Immigration and Naturalization Act coming in December 1953, the Kika Sokushin Kai (Renrakubu) started planning the banquet to celebrate it as
early as September. The most outstanding ceremony for oath of allegiance by the newly-naturalized citizens was held on Citizens’ Day, September 17. It was planned as a part of the Citizens’ Day’s special event and a total of 215 people took the oath of allegiance at this ceremony. Among the 215, 140 were Japanese, or 65% (Hawaii Hochi, 9/18/53, p.1). An interesting ceremony for oath of allegiance was the one held on October 9 (Hawaii Hochi, 10/9/53, p.2). The main speaker for the ceremony was then Vice President Richard Nixon. U.S. Vice President and Mrs. Nixon, Senator and Mrs. Russell Long, and Governor and Mrs. Samuel King attended the ceremony. At that ceremony a total of 116 newly-naturalized citizens made their oaths. Among them 61 were Japanese.

On November 2, the Hochi announced (p. 2) that the first anniversary banquet for new law would be held on December 3 at Lau Yee Chai in Waikiki. The committee chose the date and place, and decided to cooperate not only with Japanese community groups but also with Filipino, Samoan, and other ethnic community groups. They organized a new committee to prepare for the banquet, with 24 committee members. The tickets would be $2.50 each, and the Kika Sokushin Kai (Renrakubu) expected from 700 to 1,000 would attend. On November 6, eight delegates from the preparation committee came to the Hawaii Hochi office and reported about the program of the ceremonial banquet (Hawaii Hochi, 11/7/53, p.3). Hochi reported several times how many would attend the banquet, on November 23 (p.2), November 28 (p.2), December 1 (p.5), and December 2 (p.5). Day by day, the expected attending number increased, from 700, to 800, to finally 850.

An article about the anniversary ceremonial banquet appeared in Hochi the day after the event (12/4/53, p.3). The ceremony consisted of two parts, the first part being the
banquet. The second part was the ceremony itself, filled with many congratulatory addresses by honorary guests. The total number of attendants was more than 850. The article reported that a special gift was presented to Toyama Tetsuo, who had been running around and working so hard for the naturalization campaign. The gift turned out to be a pair of shoes since he wore out his pair of shoes by “running around.”

In 1954, more Issei went through the naturalization procedure and became American citizens. Once in a while a group of people held parties to celebrate their success in naturalization. Thus, also in 1954, articles of announcement of registration for naturalization classes, and graduation ceremonies, sometimes even with banquets, and of night naturalization classes filled the *Hawaii Hochi* pages.

In January 1954, there was an article to advertise the publication of Kondo’s book, *Questions and Answers: Preparation for Naturalization Examinations*, published by the *Hawaii Hochi* Publishing Company (*Hawaii Hochi, 1/16/54*). “This book is as handy as 6.5” x 3.5” and 106 pages. It is portable and covers all the questions most likely to be asked at the examination. It costs 60 cents, and postage is extra.” It seems that the *Hochi* made a good business out of the naturalization series. There were articles telling of the good popularity of Kondo’s publication. On January 30, Mr. Miura in Honokaa strongly recommended the book. Miura was a man who was teaching naturalization lessons on the Big Island. After speaking highly of the contents, the article said that those who lived in Honokaa area should contact Miura for purchase (p. 8). The same kind of article was found on February 2 (p. 2). The article in May explained, “Dr. Kondo’s *Questions and Answers: Preparation for Naturalization Examinations*, published by the *Hochi*, was
selling well. They made reprints, and are receiving many orders.” The article said there was an order from Japanese on the mainland.

In 1954 there were more kinds of naturalization classes available for people with different mother languages. In February, *Kika Sokushin Renrakubu* initiated a new campaign to make all the naturalization classes free of charge (*Hawaii Hochi*, 2/15/54, p.3). The Hochi reported ceremonies for oath of allegiance many times. For instance, in April about 100 became citizens (*Hawaii Hochi*, 4/29/54, 2). In May 109 people attended the ceremony to become citizens (*Hawaii Hochi*, 5/25/54, p.3; 5/27/54, p.7).

Throughout 1954, Toyama’s two organizations, *Kika Sokushin Renrakubu* and *Kika Shimin Kenkyu Club*, and the *Nisshoko*, all played indispensable roles in various occasions related to naturalization promotions. As early as July 26, *Hawaii Hochi* announced that a banquet was planned at Wisteria on August 29, sponsored by *Kika Shimin Club* (Naturalized Citizen’s Club). *Kika Shimin Club* was the name for the group voluntarily organized by the naturalized Issei interested in the naturalization campaign. Then, according to *Hawaii Hochi*, Judge McLaughlin officially named this Issei club *Kika Shimin Kenkyu Club* (8/17/54, p.4). These Issei leaders were passionate supporters of the naturalization promotion campaign and worked very hard for the banquet in August, which was attended by several hundred people, including Judge McLaughlin.

Hearing the news of sudden death of Senator Pat McCarran on September 29, *Kika Sokushin Renrakubu* and *Kika Shimin Kenkyu Club*, both led by Toyama, sent a telegram of condolence (p. 5). On October 1, Toyama worked hard to hold a memorial to commemorate the late Pat McCarran (*Hawaii Hochi*, 10/1/54, p.2). In the article he was recognized as a *Kikaho no Onjin* “a benefactor for Naturalization Law.”
On November 11, there was a large ceremony for 629 people of over 20 nationalities to take their oaths together. It was the first Veterans' Day to celebrate (*Hawaii Hochi*, 11/11/54). Therefore, over 48,000 people took oaths on this day nationwide. *Hawaii Hochi* on the following day emphasized that the naturalization right was a gift from the Nisei to the Issei. The Nisei earned the gift by their blood, the article said (*Hawaii Hochi*, 11/12/54, p.2). Besides, on December 1, they held another banquet at Wisteria. It was a social gathering for *Kika Sokushin Kai (Renrakubu)* but also a farewell party for the head of the department of immigration. Soon after that, Mike and Etsu Masaoka, great contributors for legislation of new Immigration and Naturalization law, visited Hawaii on their way to Japan. Figure 7 shows the number of *Hochi* articles in the category of Mike Masaoka increased to nine in December 1954. Again *Hochi* reported about the Masaokas' activities in Hawaii, including a luncheon party for Mr. and Mrs. Masaoka sponsored by *Kika Sokushin Kai* (12/2/54, p.2: 12/9/54, p.5).

In December 1954, *Kika Shimin Kenkyu Club* changed its name again, and became *Shimin Kenkyu Club*, in order to accept the ordinary American citizens (12/13/54, p.5). Thus, *Kika Sokushin Kai* played an important role not only in enlightening and supporting the Issei to prepare for naturalization procedures and examinations, but in planning and holding various luncheons and banquets to celebrate official occasions, such as anniversaries of legislation of Immigration Law. Also, *Kika Shimin Kenkyu Club* played a role of Americanizer for the Issei. Toyama Tetsuo, the naturalization person, not only led these grassroots organizations, but also issued the journal "Citizen" in order to convey his Americanizing ideas to the readers. He continued these activities for a long time.
In sum, the passage of the McCarran-Walter Immigration and Naturalization Law itself was a dream-come-true for the Issei Japanese. It finally wiped out their stigma and enabled them to feel proud about their status in American society. Even during the long process of getting the new laws passed, some impatient Issei opened the naturalization prep schools. It shows that some Issei were eagerly waiting for the day when they could really naturalize.

Therefore, when the bill finally passed the Congress, these Issei naturalization leaders started preparing for the naturalization exams. The naturalization prep classes started in Japanese schools, and in the extension classes of public schools. *Hawaii Hochi* did not miss the timing to start its own prep classes on the paper. They became very popular, which was good for their business. In this movement, Toyama emerged as a grassroots leader and started the naturalization-related events. With his own network of people and help from the *Nisshoko* and other organizations, he had great success in the public lectures on naturalization. He became an important figure in the *Kika Sokushin Renrakubu*, which was the network organization to connect many various ethnic, religious and community organizations to support the naturalization promotion.

The reason why Toyama and his fellow groups needed big promotion campaigns was seen in the views to the acquisition of naturalization rights in the New Year’s issue of *Hawaii Hochi* 1953. There was some reluctance among the Issei to actually take the naturalization examinations to get citizenship. Many Issei thought it was a personal decision whether you would naturalize or not. In order to encourage these rather reluctant Issei, the Toyama group and newspapers like *Hawaii Hochi* played a special role of promoters.
Voting Campaign

This campaign was born out of the necessity for the new naturalized citizens to know how to fill out the registration forms to participate in the elections. The key members of Kika Sokushin Renrakubu and Kika Kenkyu kai played a role in starting voting schools for the new citizens. Japanese language newspapers like Hawaii Hochi played a role to let the readers know about the necessity of voting schools, and provided information about them. This was a community-oriented campaign, which mobilized the new Issei citizens to exercise their voting rights.

The articles in this category of voting classes first appeared in 1954. In the Hawaii Hochi New Year’s Day special of 1954, Toyama Tetsuo of the Kika Sokushin Renrakubu was interviewed (Hawaii Hochi, 1/1/54, p.8). The Hochi editor wrote an introduction to the article as follows:

This year is an election year, and by fall the number of the naturalized citizens in Hawaii will reach 3500 to 4000. Among them 1500 will be Japanese. With those new American citizens exercising their voting rights for the first time, Hawaii’s politics will be influenced by a new wind. Let us hear Mr. Toyama’s opinion on this matter.

To the question of what made him work very hard for the naturalization movement, Toyama replied.

There are five reasons. First, the citizenship was a gift from our Nisei generation as “blood tax” so I feel sorry if we do not make good use of it soon. The second reason is that the Issei and the following generations will share the same fate if Issei become Americans. Third, it is for our mother country. Fourth, it is to strengthen the U.S.-Japan ties. Fifth, it is to contribute to American culture by using our Asian culture.
Asked if he would go to vote, he answered. “Of course, I will vote. I will be as happy as ever. This will be my first experience to vote in my 71-year-life. If I do not go to vote even with U.S. citizenship, I will ruin my treasure.”

Asked whether they will need a voting school to teach the new citizens how to vote, Toyama answered.

Yes, we will definitely need one. The Kika Sokushin Renrakubu will do its best to support voting classes as well as naturalization promotion. I hope they will have workshops on how to vote at the Young Men’s and Women’s Associations, community associations, public schools, and other ethnic community associations.

For the New Year special pages for New Year’s Day 1954, Hawaii Hochi again compiled more than 100 answers to the question, “how do you make use of your citizenship?” A majority of those who had gained citizenship or who were preparing for naturalization answered that they would like to vote. Some said they would like to use the citizenship for better relations between Japan and the U.S.

The Toyama article and the 100 answers in the New Year’s special indicate several interesting points. Toyama made it apparent that citizenship meant a gift from the Nisei generation as blood tax. Toyama used the word blood tax because many Nisei soldiers lost their lives in World War II to prove their loyalty as Americans. Toyama as an Issei wanted to accept the gift from the Nisei, who paid for it as blood tax. When the Issei accepted the gift, they must return something to show their appreciation. For Toyama, this meant to get citizenship and make use of it by voting. He also called this gift a treasure. The Issei must not ruin the treasure they received from the Nisei generation. Showing gratitude was very important for the Issei, whose cultural values were very traditionally Japanese. In this context, voting started to bear a significant meaning.
The editorial on March 12 “Kika Shimin to Tohyo (Naturalized Citizens and Voting)” had a very similar content with Toyama’s interview. This editorial appealed to the new citizens to attend a workshop in order to learn how to vote (Hawaii Hochi, 3/12/54, p.2). Thus, from the beginning of the year 1954, the need for the voting school was apparent.

According to Figure 8, the time period of April-June 1954 had 22 and that of July-September had 10 articles regarding the voting schools in Hawaii Hochi. The numbers of Hawaii Hochi articles suggest that there was considerable interest in the voting school and its importance. The very crucial point for new citizens to get ready for voting was found in April. The article on April 8 said, “It turns out that those who became naturalized are not able to practice the voting right if they cannot understand English or Hawaiian.” This matter became a big issue all of a sudden. There were four more articles on this issue in April. According to the articles, since the Organic Act of Territory of Hawaii regulated that those who had no good command of Hawaiian or English could not vote, there was no way to go against it. The article on April 16 said, “this fact discouraged the newly nationalized Issei from voting. Some even asked whether the citizenship endowed by the new Naturalization Act was second-rate” (Hawaii Hochi, 4/16/54, p.3). In the article Miyamoto, a politician, tried to straight out the misunderstandings. “Even if you were born in Hawaii you do not have a voting right if you do not know how to read and write. So, it is not discriminating against Japanese.” Miyamoto encouraged the Issei to study English before going to register. Thus, there arose some concern about whether they could go through the proper procedure of registration for voting and actual casting of votes at the poll box. The necessity for the voting classes for the new citizens increased.

190
In April there was an announcement of starting the *Tohyo Gakko* (voting school) for new citizens (*Hawaii Hochi*, 4/16/54, p.3). The instructor would be Dr. Kaneshiro Zensuke, and it would be free of charge. The classes were to be held on Mondays (3:00-4:00), and Wednesdays (7:00-8:00), and would start in the beginning of May. The classes would be held in the building next to the Kyodo Printing Company, which was owned by Toyama Tetsuo, the naturalization man. From this article we can tell that the naturalization person Toyama again was the main supporter of this plan. Soon another voting school was planned. It would be at Kaimuki High School, and the instructor will be Lawyer, Russell Kawano. It would be also free of charge, like the *Kaneshiro Tohyo Gakko*, and a Japanese only class for the first try. Classes would be on Tuesdays (7:00-9:00). The Voting School at Kaimuki High was enabled by three naturalization supporters: Dr. Homer, the principal of adult extension of Kaimuki High School, Mr. Nishimura, an earnest supporter, and Toyama.

Another editorial, titled "*Kikasha to Tohyo Gakko* (Naturalized Citizens and Voting Schools," explains the importance of the voting. Emphasizing the importance of exercising voting rights, the editor drew the readers' attention to the issue of English literacy and voting schools.

> When you register, your English will be checked by the city and county clerks. How do they check your English level? They will assume your level by observing how you read and fill out the registration form. The new citizens will surely need the voting classes. Even if your English is good enough for daily conversation, the instruction on the registration form is hard to read. You can easily make mistakes. We hope that new citizens do not fail to prepare for registration (5/5/54, p.2).

The effect of the voting school was demonstrated by many of the new citizens. According to the article of May 13, "only two days at a voting school made new citizens
get through the voting registration.” Matsumoto and Kozeki, who finished the registration successfully, gave a talk at Kaneshiro Tohyo Gakko (Hawaii Hochi, 5/13/54, p.5). The article said that more and more students were coming to the voting school day by day. The voting schools were being planned outside of Honolulu, such as in the counties and on the outer islands, it said. The article on May 14 reported that the voting preparation workshops were to be held at the places that offered naturalization preparation classes on Kauai, as decided at the meeting of Kika Shimin Club (Naturalized Citizens’ Club). On May 29, the Hochi reported that a dinner party would be held in order to thank Dr. Kaneshiro for his service at Voting School. Thus we can tell that the voting schools were popular and many new citizens actually went to the voting classes. There were more articles on voting schools held at different places in April-June, 1954. The articles explained about the effective results of the voting classes, and about the features of voting schools at different places.

In July, the new citizens had a chance to vote for the first time. July had five articles related to this topic, but the most conspicuous one was about the special election for Hawaii’s delegate to the Congress. On July 30, there was an article about the special election. The headline said, “The First Voting Experience for 3,50021 Japanese New Citizens: Special Election for Delegate Tomorrow” (7/30/54, p.1).

The characteristic of this special election is that about 6000 new naturalized citizens under the new Naturalization Law will have a chance to vote... Be careful not to go to polling stations of other districts.

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21 This number does not correspond to the statement six months earlier in Hochi that “by fall the number of the naturalized citizens will reach 3500 to 4000. Among them 1500 will be Japanese” (Hawaii Hochi, 1/1/54, p.8). Apparently the naturalization and voting campaigns were more successful than originally anticipated.
On the front page, there were pictures of new citizens voting for the first time in their life (*Hawaii Hochi*, 7/31/54, p.1). The new citizens who were interviewed on this occasion were those well-known ones such as Awamura Tokuyoshi, Matsui Toyotaro, and Dr. Kondo Kikujiro. On August 2, the new citizens' comments after voting were published in the *Hochi* (p.3).

After the special election the voting schools started again on August 17 (8/4/54, p.3; 8/16/54, p.5) in preparation for the general election in the fall. Mr. Yamaguchi became an instructor for this time. The first Tuesday in October was the primary election, and some new citizens voted for the first time. After that, the voting school resumed classes (9/30/54, p. 2). In October and November there were many articles regarding the elections, although there were not many articles particularly on voting schools. The 1954 election was the historic election in which the Democrats overthrew the Republican monopoly. Especially for the new citizens, their first voting election turned out to be the one that changed the history of Hawaii.

In 1954 Toyama Tetsuo started another naturalization-related business, which was to publish the monthly journal called "Citizen (Shimin)". The first issue came out in June, and the journal covered the naturalization prep classes, voting classes, and local politics. Each issue has articles contributed by prominent people. For instance the first issue had greetings and articles from Vice President Nixon, Hawaii's delegate to the Congress, Joseph Farrington, Judge Wiig, Representative Francis Walter, Judge McLaughlin, and so forth. In the second issue, Toyama declared the mission of the Citizen:

> Our mission is to promote the citizens to elect the candidates who would fight for freedom of American citizens, not based on the party lines, but on personal character.
Toyama finally had his own journal as a means to publicize his views on citizenship, naturalization, voting rights, and politics.

In sum, using his network of *Kika Sokushin Renrakubu* and *Kika Shimin Kenkyu Club*, Toyama with his fellow friends started voting schools to get new citizens prepare for registration. It was a community-type grassroots campaign. For Toyama and other grassroots leaders, the voting right was not just right that automatically came with their citizenship. The voting right was one of the most important rights which new citizens must make use of as useful American citizens. Toyama interpreted the citizenship as a gift from the Nisei, and his treasure. He must not ruin the treasure. He wanted the other Issei to think as he did, and the *Hawaii Hochi* New Year special of 1954 reveals that quite a few Issei shared his feelings. One said, “I will call Hawaii my graveyard and I would like to repay my ‘On (obligation)’ to my homeland”. It would be a return gift toward the Nisei who gave the Issei a gift of citizenship by their blood tax. And these new citizens wholeheartedly supported the Nisei politicians and government officials who were making a success in the larger society.

**The Meaning of Naturalization and Voting Rights**

The political opportunities for the revising the unequal Naturalization and Immigration laws were increasing after World War II. While the JACL-ADC was engaged in the legislation movement on the mainland, in Hawaii, the *Nisshoko*, Honolulu Japanese Chamber of Commerce, the organization whose leadership used to be in the hands of Issei leaders, took the initiative of the campaign to support the legislation movement. With some Nisei leaders who had a good command of Japanese, Issei leaders
of Nisshoko organized a purpose-oriented organization called Kikaken Kakutoku Undo Koenkai, and began fund-raising for the lobbying activities of the JACL-ADC. Although the Red Scare affected and delayed the discussion of revision of Immigration and Naturalization laws, the labeling of Japanese, especially Issei generation, as “unassimilable race” had been changed to that of “the parent generation of loyal American soldiers,” which gave a fair wind to their side at the discussion in the Congress. The theme that mobilized the ordinary Issei and Nisei residents of Hawaii into the campaign to support the legislation was their perception that the unequal law that had hurt the pride and self-esteem of those who were denied citizenship would finally be revised. The idea that the revision of the law would finally give them freedom and equality mobilized them to participate in the supporting campaign.

However, to support the legislation and to naturalize themselves were different for most Issei. The legislation itself was meaningful, and all the Issei thanked those who had realized the legislation from the bottom of their heart. To become American citizens, however, was a personal matter for most Issei. The grassroots organizations, Kika Sokushin Renrakubu and Kika Shimin Kenkyu Club were organized with the leadership of Toyama Tetsuo. The active leaders and members of these organizations gave new meanings to becoming naturalized citizens and making use of the right of American citizens. To naturalize meant to become a “full-fledged American,” and to exercise the voting rights meant to make good use of the gift from the Nisei who had paid with their blood tax. Those who shared the feelings with the active leaders participated in the naturalization promotion campaign.
Conversely, there were quite a few Issei who believed that they were too old to naturalize, or that it was too late to start studying such elementary things. To deal with this type of Issei, the campaign leaders and media such as Hawaii Hochi publicized the new ways of thinking, for instance, "Rokuju no Tenarai (starting to learn a new thing at the age of 60)," or "the retired people have much time to study in order to make use of the rights the Nisei gave them." To help the Issei pass the examinations and participate in the elections, the naturalization classes in both languages and the voting schools were organized. These schools became popular, which shows that going to these schools with other Issei became in fashion in those days. The efforts of the naturalization campaign leaders like Toyama succeeded in mobilizing the ordinary Issei and Nisei to some extent. Moreover, this campaign gave the Issei a chance not only to participate in the elections, but also to support the candidates of their choice. Since the end of war, the Nisei politicians were gradually emerging and seeking elected positions. The Issei, with or without voting rights, supported some of these brand-new political candidates, many of whom turned out to be Nisei candidates.

In social movement terms, this chapter has shown how the local Japanese community in Hawaii went beyond simply mobilizing support and fund-raising campaigns for national issues, but began their own grassroots campaigns once the national goal of new naturalization and immigration legislation had been achieved. In addition to showing how these campaigns mobilized resources within the community and call upon both internal and external elites for support, I have emphasized how the framing of the campaigns resonated with values the Issei held and motivated them to participate.
The meanings attributed to the new naturalization law, to the act of becoming a naturalized American citizen, and to exercising citizenship rights through voting were a blend of American ideals and traditional Japanese cultural concepts. As articulated in newspaper articles and editorials and in speeches at public meetings as part of the campaign, American and Japanese ideas fused into a persuasive emotional logic to encourage these previously ineligible Issei to seek American citizenship and then to exercise their new rights through voting. These were major steps to take, and the elderly Issei would not have been able to achieve them without the strong, creative support of the community and its leaders who organized the necessary support.

While it was the second generation Nisei who had to take the lead in getting the legislation passed, the leadership for the grassroots campaigns to prepare people for naturalization and voting registration came primarily from the Issei themselves, with strong promotional assistance from the Hawaii Hochi. They saw what kinds of support they needed, and set about to organize it in ways that not only would meet their objective needs, but would also be socially and culturally acceptable. The community leaders and Hawaii Hochi did not simply note that the public schools offered naturalization classes; they promoted them heavily, supplemented them with extensive article series in Japanese in the vernacular newspaper, and even arranged for special naturalization classes with Japanese explanations. They turned studying for naturalization into an attractive social activity, with parties for the graduates and new opportunities for them to promote the campaign more widely, which the vernacular newspaper in turn publicized heavily. They did not simply acknowledge that the law permitted certain older Nisei to take the naturalization exam in their native language; they ran interference and made sure that
arrangements were in place to facilitate it, which in turn were also publicized heavily in *Hochi*.

When it became clear that the newly naturalized citizens would need additional help in order to vote, the same grassroots leaders developed voting schools to teach them how to register and campaigned once again to encourage voting despite the English language barrier. Once again, *Hawaii Hochi* was an active promoter of the campaign, going well beyond simple news reporting to encourage voter registration and actual voting through editorials and features that reinforced the symbolic meanings of these acts. Although the methods and circumstances were different, these social movement campaigns within the Hawaii Japanese community offer an intriguing parallel to the larger-scale and more famous voting rights campaigns of the American civil rights movement, as documented by McAdam and many others. As these scholars have pointed out, it is not simply legal provisions but organized social movement campaigns with powerful frames of meaning that turn excluded minorities into active political participants.

I have also shown that not all Issei were motivated by these campaigns to become citizens and voters. Yet the content analysis of Hawaii Hochi demonstrates clearly that even those who did not choose to take advantage of the new Naturalization and Immigration Law to become citizens attached deep personal meaning to the passage of the law itself. It represented equality for all Japanese within American society, and wiped out the stigma for the Issei of being unassimilable aliens who were ineligible for citizenship and an obstacle to statehood for Hawaii. The whole community expressed its gratitude to the people who had worked so hard to bring about the new legislation, with organized gestures of appreciation sponsored by the main organizations in the community.
Both the large community appreciation banquets and the monetary gift and sponsored appreciation tour for the Masaokas were heavily imbued with symbolic meanings that were constructed in the course of the long campaigns. The same framing that motivated others to naturalize could also motivate Issei who chose not to do so to donate generously and participate in the celebrations. They, too, could return the Nisei's gift of blood with their generosity and displays of gratitude.

This chapter has shown how a series of such social movement campaigns within the Japanese community delivered a substantial new group of Issei voters to Hawaii politics and made all Issei feel that they were now equal in the eyes of American society. In the next chapter I will explore the broader context of the Japanese community's political participation in elective and appointive politics leading up to the 1954 election, which represented the beginning of the Democratic Revolution in Hawaii.
CHAPTER 5
RISE OF NISEI POLITICIANS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS:
ROLE OF THE JAPANESE COMMUNITY IN NEW POLITICS

This chapter focuses on the rise and achievements of Nisei in politics and government administration, and the roles the Issei and their Japanese ethnic community in Hawaii played in supporting the activities of the Nisei to get ahead in the larger Hawaii society. Within the political context of twentieth century Hawaii, I argue that the Democratic Revolution of 1954, and the role of the Japanese community with it, can be fruitfully viewed as the culmination of a series of social movements that brought underdog challengers to political power and changed the social and political structure of Hawaii. Using the political process approach to the study of social movements, I have taken a long historical view to show how the structures for mobilizing resources and the collective identity of the Japanese community were developed over a long period of time, through a series of social movement campaigns, so that the community was poised to take advantage of new political opportunities in the postwar era. In this chapter we see the culmination of those efforts.

A group of Nisei Democratic politicians who won election in 1954 seem to have become the winning symbols of the new Hawaii. However, as I discussed in Chapter 2, the process of Nisei entering politics and integrating themselves into the society as politicians had already started in the 1930s. Then World War II affected the situation of the Japanese community both positively and negatively. The early postwar period offered new political opportunities in which new social movement campaigns developed, but also
the constraints of the Red Scare as a counter-movement, which affected the Japanese community directly. Against the backdrop of union organizing, unsuccessful statehood campaigns, successful campaigns for new Naturalization and Immigration laws and local campaigns to maximize their benefits, Nisei again became deeply engaged in politics. By 1954, they had also made it possible for their Issei parents to embrace politics as well.

In this study I treat the vernacular newspaper *Hawaii Hoehi* both as a primary source of systematic data about these processes of social movement development, and also as an actor in some of the social movement campaigns. In this chapter I analyze *Hawaii Hoehi* coverage of politics in the time period of 1950 – 1954, which focused heavily on the political activities of Nisei and other key political figures. Special attention will be paid to the effects of the Red Scare on local politics and the rise of the Democratic Party; how *Hoehi* presented the election campaigns of the candidates and the election results through news and feature stories, columns and editorials, and advertisements; and the *Hoehi*'s emphasis on Nisei successes. Through quotations and statements in the newspaper it is also sometimes possible to characterize the views of the Issei readers. First, however, I will briefly review the political structure of Hawaii in the early postwar period, bringing together some elements that were touched upon in earlier chapters, but this time emphasizing the development of a revitalized Democratic Party as the vehicle for social and political change, and the role of Nisei in that development.

**Hawaii’s Political Structure in the Immediate Postwar Period**

During the period of this study Hawaii was a U.S. Territory, where the residents were only allowed to elect their own Territorial Legislators (15 Senators for four year terms
and 30 Representatives for two year terms), and City and County elective officials, including the Mayor of Honolulu (two year terms). The residents of the Territory were not allowed to elect their own Governor, or to elect their Representatives and Senators to the Federal House and Senate. The only delegate they could send to Washington D.C. was a delegate to the Congress (two year term) who had the right to originate bills and to debate, but could not vote. Moreover, the residents of the Territory could not participate in the election for the President of the United States. The Governor of the Territory was appointed by the President of the United States, with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States. The Secretary of the Territory, who was equivalent to Lieutenant Governor of the State, was also appointed by the President with the consent of the United States Senate (Mann 1949).

As Chapter 4 showed, Issei had to live with the discriminatory status of “aliens ineligible for citizenship” until December 1952, when the McCarran-Walter Immigration and Naturalization Act was enacted and finally entitled them the right of naturalization. Until then, except for the small number of Issei World War I veterans who had naturalized and kept their citizenship, only qualified and registered Nisei and Sansei could vote. However, by the 1950s these Japanese-Americans who were U.S. citizens by birth represented a growing proportion of both the population and the electorate in Hawaii.

Figure 9 shows the shift in numbers of successful Nisei candidates in each election from 1922 to 1954. It shows a growing number of Nisei elected through 1940, a sharp drop during the war, and then a resurgence beginning in 1948 and leading to the 1954 transfer of political control to the Democrats. This chart was produced based on the data
in a column in *Hawaii Hochi* called “Doyo Jihyo” "Nikkei Senkyo 32 nen: Hatsubutai Karano Tosensha Ichiranhyo (32 year history of Japanese in Elections: Name List of Successful Japanese Candidates since their Debut)”\(^{22}\) which looked back at the Nisei’s accomplishment in Hawaii local politics from the beginning (*Hawaii Hochi*, 11/6/54, p.2).

Throughout the prewar years, as presented in Chapter 2, the Republicans dominated Hawaii’s Territorial Legislature. When Nisei were emerging as new politicians in the 1930s, a good percentage of the winning Nisei were Republicans. From 1930 through 1940 Nisei won election 45 times, with 35 winning as Republicans, 9 as Democrats, and one whose Party affiliation was not determined.\(^{23}\) However, the outbreak of the Pacific War stopped the rise of Nisei in the political arena. According to the “Doyo Jihyo” of *Hawaii Hochi* on November 6, 1954, “for the 1942 and 1944 elections there were none (Nisei successful candidates) due to the war.” However, in fact, there was one Nisei politician who ran for the Hawaii County Supervisor position in 1942 and 1944 and won the seat for both elections. He was Sakai Sakuichi, a Democrat, who had served as Hawaii County Supervisor continuously for six previous years. After the war started the Nisei politicians withdrew from the politics, because their ancestral country Japan became an enemy country for America. *Hawaii Hochi* took the side of those Nisei politicians who voluntarily withdrew from running for elective office. The open

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\(^{22}\) This column “Doyo Jihyo” provided only the names of successful candidates, but no party affiliations. So for party affiliation for each candidate I checked the other Hawaii Hochi articles in the time of elections. However, sometimes, Hawaii Hochi did not provide party affiliations even in reporting the result of the elections.

\(^{23}\) Candidates are counted for each election they won, although sometime the same person was re-elected.
disregard of the winner Sakai in the elections of 1942 and 1944 by Hawaii Hochi’s “Doyo Jihyo” (1954) shows where Hochi stood on this matter.

Until the 1944 election, the Republicans dominated the Hawaii Territorial Legislature, except that one or two times in the Senate the number of Democrats came close to that of the Republicans. The Republicans were affiliated with some of the Big Five sugar company executives, and had influential power in political, economic and even social arenas. On the other hand, the Democratic Party of Hawaii existed all the way through the prewar years, but it was a moribund organization. Some of the influential Democrats served as Territorial Legislators, but those Old Guard Democrats were very conservative. In this imbalanced power structure between the powerful Republicans and the moribund Democrats, young politicians like Chuck Mau started their political careers. And with him, the “Coffee Drinkers” of John A. (Jack) Burns, Mitsuyuki Kido, Ernest Murai, and Jack Kawano gathered together toward the end of war to start drawing the blueprint for the future Democratic Hawaii. For the five “Coffee Drinkers,” to build a democratic Hawaii included forming a strong Democratic Party that would carry out more democratic policies to help the working people, and to realize Hawaii’s statehood.24

The rejuvenation of the Democratic Party of Hawaii actually came about as a result of two elements: one was the participation of Nisei veterans such as 442nd Veterans Club, and another was the contribution of ILWU members. In fact, the ILWU’s influence on the Democratic Party became visible as early as 1944. As a member of the Burns “Coffee

24 In 1948 Chuck Mau was a delegate for Democratic National Convention, and succeeded in getting a plank calling for “immediate” statehood for Hawaii for the first time.
Drinkers,” Jack Kawano played a powerful role in organizing the Democratic Party and building a strong base for the re-born Party. As I discussed in Chapter 2, the ILWU exercised political influence through its Political Action Committee, or PAC in the 1944 election. By sending the PAC endorsed politicians to the Legislature, the ILWU succeeded in enacting the “Little Wagner Act” to give the union the legal means to bring thousands of unorganized plantation field workers into the ILWU.

The first election after the war was held in 1946, and the Democrats won an even number of Representative seats with the Republicans. In the Senate, the Democrats had only one seat less than the Republicans after the election. This shift reflected the influence of the ILWU members in supporting the ILWU-endorsed candidates in the election, with 20 of 34 ILWU candidates for territorial offices winning election. Not all ILWU-endorsed candidates were Democrats, however. Nisei won nine political offices. Among the successful Nisei candidates there were four Nisei Republicans and five Nisei Democrats. The best news for the Japanese community was that Wilfred Tsukiyama Chomatsu (Republican) became a Territorial Senator and Richard Kageyama Masato (Democrat) joined the Honolulu City Board of Supervisors. Kageyama would suffer severely from the Red Scare in the 1950 HUAC hearings. In this election, Kido Mitsuyuki, one of the Burns “Coffee Drinkers” group members, won a Territorial Representative seat.

For the election of 1948, the ILWU tried to gain more power in the Democratic Party. Jack Hall used the local labor leaders with strong ties to rank and file workers such as Jack Kawano and Wilfred Oka and had them sign up many new Democrats in batches (Zalburg 1979, 224-225). Although the ILWU made a great effort, the Territorial
Legislature became again under strong Republican control (nine to six in the Senate; twenty to ten in the House). In the 1948 election the number of Nisei winning political positions more than doubled to 23, surpassing the largest number of elective positions they had ever won in the prewar period. In this election, almost an even number of Nisei Democrats and Republicans won. This time, Ansai Toshio (Republican) won a Senate seat, and the number of Nisei Representatives rose to ten. John A. (Jack) Burns stood as a candidate for delegate to Congress to challenge the incumbent Republican delegate, Joseph Farrington because “he could not allow the Democratic Party to let the position go to the Republicans by default” (Boylan and Holmes 2000, 81).

This was also when a former member of 442nd Regimental Combat Team, Daniel K. Inouye, appeared on the scene. He gave a phone call to Burns, and offered his help in the election. The 442nd Veterans Club members at that time were “more interested in their education, jobs, and families than politics” (Boylan and Holmes 2000, 82). The members liked Farrington as a delegate, so they did not support Burns. However, Daniel Inouye, as a member of the Board of Directors of the 442nd Veterans Club, managed “to get Burns on an upcoming program to which Farrington had been invited.” Then, Farrington and Burns both were invited to a forum to address the members for three minutes each, but they were not to talk about politics. According to Inouye, “the real result was to show the world that the 442nd Veterans Club took a Democratic candidate for high office seriously” (Inouye 1967, 216.).

The 442nd Veterans Club was growing to be a powerful organization that had strong networks among the members and their friends. “The Military structure which had helped the men of the 442nd survive in time of war remained in place in time of peace. . .
Unlike similar organizations on the mainland, the veterans of the 442nd did not scatter themselves throughout the United States. They were concentrated on six small islands in the middle of the Pacific Ocean and they possessed enormous organizational power” (Boylan and Holmes 2000, 82). Therefore, later on Nisei veterans signed up with the Democratic Party, because they saw that “the Democratic Party welcomed and cared about the returning G.I.s” (Inouye 1967, 216), a factor which was starting to appear with this campaign for Burns in 1948.

Although Jack Hall contributed to rebuilding the foundation of the new Democratic Party, he felt that to play a political game between the two political parties would give more benefit to the union. In November 1949, Jack Hall resigned from the Democratic Party, and the Party used this to say that they were not dominated by the ILWU. However, having been labeled as sympathetic to communists by its opponents, the Democratic Party faced deep problems in the Red Scare atmosphere in 1950. We will return to this issue after first examining the overall picture of political coverage in *Hawaii Hochi* from 1950-1954.

**General Trend of Hawaii Hochi Coverage of Local Politics from 1950-1954**

For the five years from 1950 to 1954, *Hawaii Hochi* reported diligently about local electoral politics. The total number of articles related to the elections, candidates’ campaigns and political parties was about 750 for the five-year period. Figure 10 shows the trend of changing numbers of articles over the five years from 1950 to 1954. The top line shows the total coverage of elections, and it is clear that the coverage of the sub-categories of Japanese candidates’ campaign, candidates’ service to Japanese voters, and
political party and elections follows the same general pattern, which corresponds to election periods. The key features are as follows: 1) There is a broader peak in numbers of articles in 1950, 2) Compared with the election years of 1950, 1952 and 1954, the years 1951 and 1953 show relatively little activity, 3) In all the election years, the three months from September to November are the peak in the number of articles, as one would expect, 4) The year 1954 had nearly three times as many articles on politics, compared with the previous election years.

The year 1950 had a very broad peak because of the HUAC hearings in April, and the regular elections in the fall. The bars superimposed on the chart shows articles regarding politics related to communism, and makes clear that the HUAC hearings had major impact on Hawaii local politics. As Chapter 3 revealed, as a result of the HUAC hearings, two constitutional convention delegates who also were members of the Democratic Party became the focus of Hochi articles. The year 1952 was also an election year, but compared with the other two election years, no great enthusiasm was seen.

The year 1954 looks very different from the other two election years. First it was because they had a special election to elect a delegate to the U.S. Congress in July, and second, it was also because Hawaii’s Japanese community became more interested in local politics. After the McCarran-Walter Act went into effect in December 1952, the Issei started to naturalize and became new American citizens to cast votes. The 1954 elections including the special election for Hawaii’s delegate were the first ones for new naturalized citizens. And there was the biggest number of Nisei candidates ever running for elective offices. Therefore that year’s elections drew the attention of the Issei. We
will analyze the Hochi coverage in detail to see what elements increased or changed in 1954.

Appendix 1 [Table 5-1] lists all the persons elected to public office in Hawaii in the elections of 1950, 1952 and 1954. The information is summarized in Table 4, which illustrates the increase in the number of Nisei candidates who succeeded, and the general trend of changing majority parties in local politics. It shows the gradual increase of Japanese politicians from 1950 to 1952, and a rather sharp increase with the major change in political structure in the 1954 election. Hawaii Hochi followed the campaigns and election results of Nisei candidates rather thoroughly. For the Issei residents in Hawaii, party affiliation of the Japanese candidates was not very important especially in the early years. To send Nisei, Americans of Japanese ancestry, to the local political offices was very meaningful in itself. However, for those Nisei politicians running for the offices, political parties were important. Among the Nisei politicians, gradually more Democrats were gaining recognition and winning the offices, although elder Nisei politicians were among the prominent Republicans who had been active politicians even in prewar years.

As a result of the 1950 election, 51 Republican candidates won their political races, whereas 32 Democrats did as Table 4 shows. For the delegate to Congress, the incumbent Republican candidate Joseph Farrington won, and for the Mayor of Honolulu, the incumbent Democrat candidate, Johnny Wilson kept his position. For the Territorial Senators, 4 Republicans and 3 Democrats won the elective positions, and the total division of the Senate became 9 Republicans vs. 6 Democrats. For the Territorial House of Representatives, it became 21 Republicans vs. 9 Democrats. These numbers show that
Hawaii’s politics in the 1950 election was dominated by the Republicans just as before. It is certain that the results of theHUAC hearings negatively influenced the Democrats in the elections of 1950 (*Hawaii Hochi*, 11/8/50, p.1; 11/9/50, p.1).

Then, two years later, in the 1952 election on the Federal level, Republican Eisenhower won the presidency and ended the 20-year Democratic control of U.S. government. As Table 4 shows, in Hawaii, the Republicans won 27 Territorial Legislators’ seats while the Democrats won 18. Since the Republican President Eisenhower would be in office in 1953, Democrat Governor Oren Long would resign. President Eisenhower was expected to appoint a Republican Governor to the Territory of Hawaii. Those Territorial officials appointed by Democratic Governor Long were to resign their positions.

In 1954, in addition to the regular two-step election, there was a special election for a delegate to the U.S. Congress in July to fill the seat having been held for a long time by Joseph Farrington, who passed away in June. This also contributed to the larger number of articles about politics in *Hawaii Hochi*, as shown in Figure 10. In 1954 the total number of election-related articles in *Hawaii Hochi* was nearly 350. This large number of *Hochi* articles reflects the enthusiasm and interest of *Hochi* editors and readers.

The year 1954 started as the ordinary election year. In June, very shocking news of Joseph Farrington’s sudden death came to Hawaii and saddened everyone. A special election was called to select a replacement. Elizabeth Farrington won the special election, and left for Washington in August. Soon after, Elizabeth Farrington declared her candidacy for the coming general election for the same office, and John A. Burns filed his candidacy for delegate at the last minute. For this election, the Democratic Party had
quite a few Nisei faces new to politics running for various offices. According to “A List of all the candidates of Democrats and Republicans” on September 3, 1954, a total of 214 candidates, 101 Republicans (47%) and 113 Democrats (53%), were running for the Territorial Legislature and City and county elective positions. The list showed that the Democratic Party had become strong enough to support an even larger number of candidates than the Republicans.

Since the Hochi coverage of the climactic 1954 general election was so different from its previous election coverage, we will treat it in a separate section, after first examining all the political developments that led up to it.

**Red Scare Influence on Local Politics**

In chapter 3, the Red Scare was analyzed as a counter-movement, both nationally and in Hawaii, which aimed to suppress the rising political activism of workers and minorities. It touched Hawaii’s Japanese community when the HUAC hearings in Hawaii identified several well-known Nisei as current or former communists. As Figure 10 shows, the Hawaii Hochi political articles concerning communism peaked in April-June of 1950, because of the HUAC hearings. The HUAC hearings directly influenced Hawaii local politics, especially the emerging Democratic Party. Although the ultra-conservative Democratic Governor Stainback arranged to hold the HUAC hearings in Hawaii, the result was very unfavorable to the Democratic Party itself. Fourteen of the Reluctant 39 who refused to testify before HUAC were delegates to the Democratic convention and another two were alternates (Zalburg 1979, 300). The Democratic Party had to deal with the problems caused by the Reluctant 39 at its Territorial Convention on
April 30. As was expected, at the convention Hawaii’s Democratic Party clearly split and the 91 right wing members walked out of the convention. From then on, the right wing that had left the convention was called the walkouters, whereas those who stayed in the convention were called the standpatters.

Among the standpatters, who had been labeled left-wingers, some young Democrats including Daniel Inouye showed their desire to “make it the representative party of all working people.” To get rid of the label of left they started a house cleaning, or purge, of the party and decided to leave the way for the walkouters to come back to the party. In order to show that the standpatter’s Democratic Party was anticommunist, they decided on May 9 that “the fifteen delegates whose seats had been contested would be required to sign the . . . affidavit” declaring they were not communist (Holmes 1994, 167; Hawaii Hochi, 5/11/50, p.1). On the Oahu county central committee, one of the Reluctant 39, Wilfred Oka, was replaced with Daniel Inouye as secretary of the central committee. The Hochi editor interpreted this as a part of the standpatters’ reconciliation with the walkouters. It became an article in Hochi partly because both of the people concerned were of Japanese ancestry. The Hochi quoted what John A. Burns said at this party election; “two candidates are fine Democrats and my best friends. But we must elect the party officials by considering the present situation and future of the party” (Hawaii Hochi, 5/12/50, p.2.). About this time, Burns and his Nisei friends acquired supporters and began to make their mark as the moderates within the Democratic Party.

Wilfred Oka was one of the most effective Democratic Party workers. He had a college degree; he knew hundreds of people whom he had taught at the Nuuanu YMCA; and he signed up new Democrats in batches (Zalburg 1979, 224).
Hawaii Hochi covered the turmoil within the Democratic Party in an unusual way.

The editors wrote very interesting editorials on May 5 and May 19 of 1950 regarding the issue of the split in the Democratic Party. The first editorial was titled “The Surfacing of the Split of Democrats,” and explained the split of the party by using a family example.

The content of the editorial was as follows:

The mother Democrat criticized the father Democrat for having a relationship with a red haired girl with a Russian accent. On the other hand, the father criticized the mother for going out with the Big Five. He even called her “dirty Republican.” On Sunday they decided to separate. The mother Democrat insisted that the children who did not answer Uncle Sam’s questions should leave home, and the father defended the children saying that they were not proved to be guilty. The mother insisted that the children had been adopted two years before and they did not belong to the family. Since the children were defiant and did not move, the mother left the house angrily. Both parents were claiming for the family. The father said that the mother did away with her right when she left the house, and the mother said that the father abandoned his right when he started going out with the red-haired girl. Which side could take the party head office might be decided by the judges of public opinion.

The editorial on May 19 was titled “Who are Democrats?” This editorial was written in the form of Q’s and A’s between father and his child. Below is the content of this editorial.

The father answers the questions of his child regarding the Democrats in general. Father tries to explain that some Democrats are not behaving on the party line. The child asks how things are going with left-wing and right-wing Democrats. The father answers: The right-wing Democrats are very close to the Republicans. The left-wing Democrats are trying to entertain the labor union members. Some members of the union and some of the central committee members of the Democratic Party refused to testify at the HUAC hearings . . . The confrontation of the two factions has to be resolved soon. Otherwise, at the election in the fall, the Republicans will easily win. Hearing that, the child asks again, why can’t the two factions get along well with each other? The father says, “I cannot answer that. Ask your mother, or Mayor Wilson.”

The first editorial shows that the editor did not side with either faction of the Democratic Party. The Hochi editor criticized both sides, thinking that nobody could
help them make up together. The second editorial was also neutral, but it said that the Republicans would take advantage of this situation and would win the coming election if the Democratic Party did not solve the problem. *Hochi* often used this type of allegory to explain complicated things in a simple way.

Thus, the Democratic Party received a strong negative impact from the HUAC hearings. As a result, the party had to cope with the inner cleavage and had to reorganize the party. Since the Democratic Party of Hawaii had been rejuvenated with the support from the ILWU members and Nisei war veterans, and was gradually gaining power in Hawaii political scene, it looked like a retreat for the Democratic Party. However, later it turned out to be a significant operation of cutting-off of an unnecessary part of the Party, which provided new political opportunities for moderate Nisei to rise to leadership positions.

On May 5 1952 *Hochi* reported that finally the two wings of Democrats had become unified. On May 6, *Hawaii Hochi* posted the headline, “Finally Democratic Party Accomplished the Unity: Victory of Right Wing and Moderates,” and explained the unifying process. Two years after the cleavage, the two parts were unified. The moderate faction of the Burns group including Nisei war veterans, and the more conservative Democrats, finally merged together into one Democratic Party. But the Red Scare influence continued to hang over the Democrats.

During the process of Red Scare impact and unification of Democrats, two key persons of Burns’ Coffee Drinkers disappeared from the scene. One was Jack Kawano, who testified at the HUAC in Washington, D.C. and created the cause for the arrest of the Hawaii Seven. Later he had to cope with ostracism and left Hawaii. Another was Chuck
Mau, who was left off the slate of delegates to the National Democratic Convention in 1952. He wanted the position badly, so the embittered Mau decided to refuse the chairmanship of the Territorial Central Committee, and left completely from the political game of the Democrats (JBOHP, Mau, 1975; Philips 1982, 27-28). Another person who received a heavy political blow from the Red Scare was Richard Kageyama. He resigned as delegate to the constitutional convention, and finally served out his term as City Supervisor. In 1950 he did not run for reelection, and in 1952 he ran but failed. He had to wait another two years to come back to his former office.

As Figure 10 shows, from 1951 till 1954 there were very few *Hawaii Hochi* articles regarding politics and communism. But whenever they did appear they told the readers about some spillover from the Red Scare. At the elections in 1950, 1952 and even 1954, Republicans always asserted that the opponent's party was under the control of the ILWU. For instance, the Hochi on October 18, 1952 reported a statement issued by the Democratic Party leaders in order to counter the Republican strategy of charging that the Democrats were dominated by the ILWU. This article shows that the election in 1952 was still under the influence of the specter of Red Scare.

In the 1954 election, the Republican Party still clung to the old tactics of charging the Democrats with being controlled by the ILWU. The Republican Party again sharply attacked the relationship between the Democratic Party and the ILWU. *Hawaii Hochi* called this strategy “aka taiji (wiping reds out),” and still regarded the Democrat-ILWU relation as a vulnerable point for the Democrats (9/13/54, p.2). At the Republican Party's

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26 It was because Chuck Mau was the one who succeeded in getting a plank for the immediate statehood for Hawaii at the 1948 Democratic Convention. He believed that he deserved the position more than anybody else.
Kick-Off Party on Sunday, September 12 1954 in Honolulu, the Republican Governor King accused the ILWU regional director, Jack Hall, and the ILWU itself, of being political blackmailers. Republican Senator Ben Dillingham even said that getting support from traitors like Jack Hall was political corruption. Against these accusations, Democratic Mayor Wilson said that the red issue and the election should be treated separately. He wanted to make it clear that what the opposing Party was trying to do was mixing up two different issues (9/17/54, p.3). On October 16, the chair of Hawaii’s Republican Party, Samuel P King, attacked the Democrats, saying that the stage for the communists was in the Democratic Party (Hawaii Hochi, 10/26/54, p.5). The Democrats counterattacked by saying they had rattled the wrong cage. These articles show that the 1954 election was still under the influence of Red Scare.

Interestingly, in the 1954 election, there emerged a strong anti-red advocate from among the Democrats. It was Frank Fasi, a young Democrat who was running for the Mayor’s office. According to Hawaii Hochi (9/4/54, p.2), the primary election to decide one Democratic candidate for Mayor between old incumbent Wilson and young candidate Fasi became a center of public attention. On the night of September 16, Fasi’s supporters held a banquet (Hawaii Hochi, 9/17/54, p.5). Fasi made a speech criticizing Jack Hall and his group. He said, “If I win the primary, the votes of the ILWU and UPW members will go to Mr. Blaisdell at the general.” Then, Blaisdell made a comment that he would do business with the ILWU and UPW. It shows that Fasi was not supported by many of his own Party members some of whom were more union friendly, although he declared that he was a Democrat. Hawaii Hochi on September 22 ran a headline, “Battle of Words between Wilson and Fasi Intensified: Most Remarkable Match in Election on Oahu.”
In sum, communist-related articles peaked in *Hawaii Hochi* in the year 1950, when the influence of the Red Scare on the political scene was tremendous. The Democratic Party of Hawaii became split, and lost its momentum for a while. The Republicans used the situation and kept attacking the Democrats as the ILWU sympathizers. Some Japanese politicians in the Democratic Party and union organizers received a strong blow from the Red Scare. On the other hand, young Democrats like Daniel Inouye came into the political scene about the same time and actually got important positions in the Democratic Party because the Party needed to amputate the ultra-left, and to invite in war veterans like Daniel Inouye, who had a good image as a loyal American. While the Republicans clung to the old tactic of accusing the Democrats of being red, the Democrats made a success of rebuilding their party as a moderate-conservative coalition party.

**Election Campaigns and Japanese Voters**

Analysis of the political coverage in *Hawaii Hochi* from 1950 to 1954 sheds considerable light on the forces that converged to produce the Democratic Revolution in the 1954 election. While the spotlight was generally on the Nisei who were running for election, the analysis also demonstrates the special role played by the new Issei voters in the 1954 election. Regardless of what their actual voting impact may have been, it is clear that both *Hawaii Hochi* and the candidates paid particular attention to these new Japanese voters in three specific ways. First, the election coverage in *Hochi* expanded dramatically with new formats aimed at educating the Issei about local politics for their first election. Second, analysis of political advertisements in *Hawaii Hochi* shows how they became
increasingly aimed at these new voters. And third, Hochi reporting reveals various campaign tactics that non-Japanese candidates used to appeal to Japanese voters.

**Changes in Political Coverage in Hawaii Hochi**

For the 1950 election, Hawaii Hochi treated both parties equally. The editors provided the information about rally schedules, the contents of rallies, and the platform for each party in the pages of Hochi (9/9/50, p.2; 9/11/50, p.3; 9/12/50, p.1; 9/15/50, p.2; 9/21/50, p.7; 9/21/50, p.5; 9/22/50, p.2; 9/23/50, p.3). On the day of the general election, the Hochi editors explained some of the interesting election races, such as Wilson (Dem) vs. Gilliland (Rep) for Mayor, and Cobb (Dem) vs. Farrington (Rep) for delegate to the Congress (Hawaii Hochi, 11/7/50, p.2).

For the 1952 election, however, Hawaii Hochi editors showed a little preference for the Democrats. At the 1952 Territorial Convention, the Democrats accomplished the drafting of a strong party platform, which actually outlined the basic program the Democratic Party would pursue throughout the 1950s and into John A. Burns’ first term as Governor (Boylan and Holmes; 2000, 117-118). The platform consisted of six planks that included the following as the first plank: “We believe that the people of Hawaii want and are entitled to the full privileges of citizenship which only immediate statehood for Hawaii can bestow.” The Platform showed the Democrats’ sincerity and concern for the working class people in Hawaii. Hochi focused on this platform and printed every word of the six planks in Japanese (5/3/52, p.3). The Hochi editors appeared to be placing their hopes in the Democratic Party to improve local politics.

There were some patterns in Hawaii Hochi’s way of reporting about the elections. Hawaii Hochi readers were mainly Issei who would count on Japanese vernacular
newspapers for information. There were also some Nisei who were reading the papers because they were bilingual or more fluent in Japanese. Therefore, *Hawaii Hochi* editors wrote more about Japanese candidates and their election results. The headlines always applauded the good results of Nisei, such as “Nikkei Kohosha no Mezamashii Shinshutsu (Outstanding Progress of Japanese Candidates)” (10/9/50, p.1).

*Hawaii Hochi* always made a list of successful Nisei elected at the general election. For instance, “Starting Thirty Years Ago: Japanese Entering Politics” appeared on November 18, 1950. These articles did not tell about the party affiliation of candidates in the past. Apparently the most important information for Japanese readers was not which party those candidates belonged to, but who the candidates were and how they had fought. The articles just told the readers the names of Nisei who challenged in which election and who succeeded. The article provided each candidate’s name in Chinese characters. The same type of lists appeared for the 1952 election and 1954 election. It reflects how much interest *Hawaii Hochi* editors paid to the rise of Nisei in the political arena and what they thought their readers were most interested in.

The most striking change in Hochi’s election coverage in 1954 was the addition of three new political series, which were introduced for the 1954 primary election season. These were called “Seikai Ura Omote (Politics Inside Out)” and “Hawai Shima no Seisen (Political Battle on Island of Hawaii)” and “Doyo Jihyo (Saturday Column),” and ran in addition to more ordinary articles about the Nisei candidates. The first one appeared on the front page on almost every weekday. The second started on September 22 and

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27 Sometimes the editor just printed most common Chinese characters for the names. There is a high possibility that wrong Chinese charters were used.
continued seven times, appearing almost every day; the last one appeared only on Saturdays. These types of editorials never appeared in the *Hawaii Hochi* for the 1950 and 1952 elections.

“Politics Inside Out” basically treated one topic in each article. Most of the articles of this series were inside stories, similar to a collection of gossip and rumors. The first column appeared on September 22, and the topic was on the election race for Hawaii’s delegate to the Congress. The next topic for “Politics Inside Out”, which appeared on September 23, was the mayoral race (9/23/54, p.1). The article said that the primary of the mayoral race for the year 1954 was a thrilling game like the general election.

“However, the candidates were the same as in the 1952 mayoral race. The Republican candidate, Blaisdell, insisted on running for mayor even though a group of Republicans had recommended that he run for Senator. There was a rumor that he might go back to an executive position at Hawaiian Pineapple Co., if he lost the election. As to the Democratic candidate, Fasi, some armchair politicians felt it was strange that Fasi held his dinner party at Kewalo Inn, which was owned by Republicans Joe Itagaki and Mary Newman. It seemed that Republicans secretly supported Fasi. Another Democratic candidate, the incumbent mayor Johnny Wilson, went to a number of meetings and tried to wipe out the impression that Wilson was old. He was proud of the City budget being in surplus in spite of the Territory being financially in the red.

In this way until October 4, they ran “Politics Inside Out” almost every day with topics concerning the primary election. The topics were the Territorial Senatorial race, the City Supervisors’ race, the newly naturalized citizens and candidates strategies (9/27), the Territorial Representative race in Oahu 4th district (9/28), and so forth. The last article
was based on the results of the primary election held on October 3. In the series of articles, Hochi editors made some predictions of the results of the primary.

The “Saturday Column”s also treated hot political issues, and sometimes the editor looked at them from the underside.

In the other serial articles called “Political Battles on the Island of Hawaii,” the writer treated the hot topics about the election in the Island of Hawaii. There were seven articles in the series. The topics were: (1) Senatorial election, (2) county attorney’s race, (3) county chairman’s race, (4) county auditor’s race, (5) Representative race in East Hawaii, (6) Representative race in West Hawaii, (7) Supervisors’ race in East Hawaii. Hawaii Hochi was a newspaper for the people on Oahu so many of the articles were about news happening on the island of Oahu. However, in 1954, there were quite a few Nisei candidates running for several offices also on the outer islands, so that Hochi ran this special series.

For instance, the County Attorney’s position was being fought between two Nisei candidates, the Republican candidate Richard Miyamoto Isamu and the Democratic candidate Tanaka Yoshito (9/23/54, p.5). It was particularly interesting for Hawaii’s Japanese at that time. In the article, one voter said, “I would like both to win if it was possible. I will vote for one, and shall I have my wife vote for the other?” There were only a few articles about election races on Kauai, and Maui, but there were two detailed articles that reported about the interesting races in the Kauai and Maui districts (9/28/54, p.5; 9/28/54, p.4).

On October 27, Hochi started the series “Politics Inside Out” again. Until November 4, there were eight articles in the series and the topics were: the mayoral race, the
Senatorial race, the Representative race, the City Supervisors’ race and the expected result of the general at the time when the article was written. Each article talked about multiple topics this time. *Hawaii Hochi* editors made various predictions not only on the popular matches, but also on the races in which Nisei candidates were involved. Their predictions covered the mayoral race, the race for delegate, races for Senators and Representatives. They also covered some City and County elective offices, although not all. And this time, Nisei were running for most offices.

Although *Hawaii Hochi* worked hard to educate their Japanese reading subscribers to be good and knowledgeable citizens, in reality some voters were very simple as in this episode, which *Hochi* wrote in a joking way.

No matter what they studied about voting and elections, there were some new citizens asking questions like this: I would like to vote for such and such. Where on the ballot can you find his name? How many names down from the top?

This implies that there were some naturalized American citizens who had successfully registered to vote, but could not read English on the ballot sheet.

These new series started in the 1954 election because *Hawaii Hochi* editors knew these series would attract the Issei readers, some of whom were actually casting votes for the elections. Before, *Hochi* reported the results very enthusiastically but not the process or rumors and the inside stories, which the voters would like to consider when voting. The *Hochi* editors created new types of articles in order to provide enough information to the new Issei voters. Using these series, *Hochi* editors explained a variety of local political issues, not necessarily concerning Japanese candidates.
Changes in Political Advertisements in *Hawaii Hochi*

*Hawaii Hochi* not only reported about local politics, but also printed many advertisements of the candidates for political offices. For the daily newspapers, selling advertising spaces was part of their business. The English dailies like *Advertiser* and *Star-Bulletin* posted more advertisements. For the candidates, to print his or her advertisement in daily newspapers was one of the methods to publicize their candidacy. Since the *Hawaii Hochi* was a Japanese newspaper, and it was expected to have Japanese reading readers, the candidates published their advertisements in the newspaper to attract Japanese voters. After the election, most of the successful candidates who had advertised in *Hochi* then posted thank you notes in the *Hochi*. A few candidates published the thank you notes even though they lost the election.

Figure 5-3 shows how many advertisements were printed on the pages of *Hawaii Hochi* for the elections in 1950, 1952 and 1954. As a reference, I also counted the advertisements for the constitutional convention delegate candidates in 1950. *Hawaii Hochi* had separate English and Japanese sections. Usually the *Hochi* had two to three pages in English and seven to eight pages in Japanese. The English section had some space for advertisements, though the number of pages was small, whereas the Japanese section had a bigger space for advertisements of various kinds. In the Japanese section, a typical political advertisement had a picture of the candidate with his or her name, the position pursued, and many times with the names of sponsors who posted the advertisement. It had a rectangular shape and advertisement format.

Besides these advertisements, there were articles that were about the candidates and profiled their accomplishments and political opinions. Since the latter had an article
format, they were categorized as articles. Therefore even though these articles may also be construed as actually advertisements in content, I counted only advertisements that were written in advertisement format for this analysis.

Figure 5-3 shows the changes in numbers of advertisements for primary and general elections for the 1950 constitutional convention election, and 1950, 1952 and 1954 regular elections. I counted the English language advertisements and Japanese language advertisements separately for each election. I also recorded whether the candidates were Japanese or non-Japanese, so the chart shows the breakdown of the advertisements by whether the candidates were Japanese or non-Japanese, and by the language used for the advertisements.

In 1950 more candidates used English advertisements than Japanese ones both in the constitutional convention election and the regular elections. Among the candidates who posted English advertisements, a smaller number of Japanese candidates used English advertisements than non-Japanese candidates did, for the constitutional convention delegate election. In the fall elections, an even smaller number of Japanese candidates used English advertisements, although the number of Japanese candidates using English advertisements doubled from the primary to the general election.

On the other hand, among those using Japanese advertisements, more Japanese candidates used Japanese advertisements in the primary and general elections than for the constitutional convention delegate election, even though the total number of the candidates using Japanese advertisements was small. In the fall elections in 1950, a few Japanese and non-Japanese candidates used Japanese advertisements. This suggests that
not many candidates seriously thought the Japanese advertisements would collect votes, because most Japanese speaking people did not have voting rights.

To sum up, in the elections in 1950, only a few candidates made use of the Japanese media to advertise themselves and collect votes. Among those, more candidates used English advertisements rather than Japanese ones, even though the subscribers of Japanese newspapers were considered Japanese-speaking. Needless to say, these candidates expected that the younger ones in the subscribing family with voting rights might read the English pages and find the advertisements.

In the 1952 election, there emerged a clearly different tendency. As the chart shows, the total number of advertisements increased from 1950 to 1952. For the primary, total political advertisements increased from 37 in 1950 to 50 in 1952 (59% increase). For the general, the total number doubled from 41 to 82 (100% increase). For the 1950 regular election English advertisements were 72 percent of the total for the primary election, and 75 percent of the total for the general. In the 1952 election, English advertisements were 60 percent of the total for the primary and 68 percent of the total advertisements for the general election. In 1952, more non-Japanese candidates printed English advertisements whereas more Japanese candidates printed Japanese advertisements in Hawaii Hochi.

The number of candidates who used the Japanese newspaper for political advertisements increased, although most of them used English advertisements. More Japanese candidates challenged the election, so they wanted to let their fellow Japanese residents know they were candidates. Also, the passage of McCarran-Walter Act may have had something to do with the increase of advertisements in Japanese papers. As shown in Chapter 3 on the naturalization campaign, the new Naturalization and
Immigration Act became law by overriding the President’s veto in June 1952. It was activated in December of that year, so Hawaii’s residents were well aware of the existence of Japanese Issei who would soon become American citizens and would soon be able to exercise voting rights, even though they could not vote in the 1952 election. By printing their names in Japanese in the Japanese vernacular newspapers, the candidates wanted the Issei readers to see their names and talk with their Nisei children about who the candidates were.

In the 1954 election, a big change was seen in the advertisements of candidates in *Hawaii Hochi*. For the primary election, the 1952 election had 50 advertisements and the 1954 had 57. For the general election, the 1952 election had 82 whereas the 1954 had 85 advertisements. Hence there was little change in the overall volume of political advertising in *Hochi*. However, the language used for the advertisements was different. Figure 5-3 clearly shows that both for the primary and the general, the 1952 elections had more English advertisements, while the 1954 elections had more Japanese advertisements. For the primary, the number of English advertisements for the 1954 election dropped by a quarter and was 74 percent of that of the 1952 election. For the general election, the number of English advertisements for the 1954 election dropped by half, to 51 percent of that of the 1952 election. On the other hand, for the primary election the number of Japanese advertisements for 1954 was 1.27 times more than the number in 1952. And the number of Japanese advertisements for the 1954 general represented a 2.5 times increase from the 1952 general. Hence advertising in Japanese language suddenly became very popular in 1954.
Moreover, the breakdown of Japanese and non-Japanese candidates in the advertisements in both languages shows very interesting characteristics. The number of English advertisements by non-Japanese candidates sharply decreased from 21 in the 1952 primary to 12 in the 1954 primary. For the general election, the number decreased from 33 in the 1952 to 13 in the 1954. On the other hand, English advertisements by Japanese candidates did not decrease as much as was the case for non-Japanese candidates. Interestingly, for the primary election, the number of Japanese advertisements by non-Japanese candidates increased from three in the 1952 to eight in 1954, but the total was still small. However, for the general election, the number increased from five in the 1952 election to the 26 in 1954. This was a 2.67 times increase for the primary and a 5.2 times increase for the general. Comparing it with the situation of Japanese advertisements by Japanese candidates, it is clear that the direct reason for the increase in the number of Japanese advertisements in the 1954 general was the change of advertising policies of non-Japanese candidates.

Another interesting feature, although it was not shown in Figure 5-3, is that advertisements for the political party were only seen in the Japanese language section for the 1954 general election. Moreover, all of these political party advertisements in Japanese were posted by the Republicans. Considering that the number of advertisements for the political party itself was very small and only seen in English language for the 1950 and 1952 regular two-step elections, it suggests that the Republican Party felt at the primary that they might lose the 1954 election, and posted more advertisements as a party and tried to attract the Japanese votes. However, it did not work well for the Republicans in the end.
Summing up, the increase in the number of political advertisements in Japanese newspapers from 1950 to 1954 shows that more politicians in Hawaii appreciated the importance of drawing the attention of Japanese voters in Hawaii. The number of English advertisements increased for the 1952 general because more candidates knew that several Nisei voters lived in the house where Issei or older Japanese-speaking Nisei subscribed the Japanese newspaper. Passage of the Walter-McCarran Act in June 1952 made more politicians notice the existence of prospective supporters in the Japanese community. The 1954 election was the first regular election for the naturalized new citizens. The politicians, knowing that many of the new citizens felt more at home in the Japanese language, posted the advertisements in Japanese language in the Japanese newspapers to attract them. Moreover, after fighting a hard fight with the young Democratic candidates in the primary, the Republicans posted many advertisements in Japanese language to collect as many votes as possible at that time. Thus, posting Japanese advertisements in Japanese newspapers became popular in the 1954 election.

This would endorse the following opinion in the column called Kabachi in Hawaii Hochi on November 1: “This election might be the first time for Japanese radio and Japanese language newspapers to be so popular. Many candidates have been using the television, too” (Hawaii Hochi, 11/1/54, p.7).

Usually the advertisements in Hochi carried the name and picture of the candidate, with his or her short profile, the elective office pursued, and also the sponsors’ names. In the case of George Ariyoshi Ryoichi, future Governor of the State of Hawaii, who ran for the Territorial Representative office in the 1954 election, the sponsors were his parents, Ariyoshi Ryozo and Mitsue. Above his father’s name it said, Hachiman Yama, which
was his ring name as a Sumo Wrestler. He would have been known in the community as Hachiman Yama.

Many more of the advertisements in Hochi for the 1954 elections carried the party affiliation, the candidate's military experiences if any, and their contributions to the community. There were many new Democrats using the advertisements this way, and this gave a new impression of the Democratic Party that they were the party for the young Nisei veterans and community contributors.

The Japanese supporters for John A. Burns posted a big advertisement in Japanese language for the 1954 election. "Mr. Burns supported the Legislation of Naturalization Bill" was the caption. It explained how much he had supported the Naturalization bill, how enthusiastically he worked for opening up of the Japanese vernacular newspapers during the war, and so forth (Hawaii Hochi, 10/27/54, p.4). Burns' supporters posted another advertisement on November 1, which emphasized his contribution to the wellbeing of the Japanese community. In the case of the advertisement for Vincent Esposito, the caption said, "Friend of Japanese, Mr. Esposito. Contributed to Japan-America Friendship" (11/1/54, p.4). The content of these advertisements reveals that non-Japanese candidates who had strong Japanese speaking supporters posted advertisements in Hawaii Hochi for the 1954 election.

On occasion, advertisements were used for political warfare. There were two kinds of advertisements in Hawaii Hochi for the controversial mayoral candidate Frank Fasi, one was pro-Fasi, and the other was anti-Fasi. The Pro-Fasi advertisement recommended Fasi for Mayor. This advertisement introduced the episode that he had challenged a Federal Senator who had said the word "Jap" and Fasi made him apologize in public.
The advertisement labeled him as one who was ready to support the rights of Hawaii’s people regardless of their race, religion or creed. On the other hand, the advertisement, “Can you believe the liar Fasi?” tried to reveal that the candidate Fasi did not deserve to become Mayor (9/29/54, p.3). Thus, the supporters of their political opponents sometimes used the newspaper advertisements to reduce votes for some candidates.

Campaign Tactics Aimed at Japanese Voters
In addition to the advertisements in the newspapers, the candidates as well as political parties invented new tactics for their campaigns, many of which were designed to win votes in the Japanese community for non-Japanese candidates. Figure 10 shows that Hochi had some articles about certain services or special campaigns aimed at Japanese voters. It included unique events that only Hawaii Hochi would cover. For instance, Attorney Marumoto Masaji made a campaign speech on the radio in the 1950 election for the Republican candidate for Hawaii’s delegate to the Congress, Joseph Farrington. Ralph Honda, a prominent Nisei businessman, sponsored a ball in the 1950 election for the Democratic candidate for Hawaii’s delegate to the Congress, William Cobb. Non-Japanese candidates wanted to collect Nisei votes, so they had their Nisei friends publicize their political views and good points. It shows that Japanese residents were not acting on ethnic lines, but they did political activities more based on trust and friendship. In the 1950s a significant number of voters were already of Japanese ancestry. Therefore, for non-Japanese candidates it was becoming advantageous to have supporters in the Japanese community. And for the Nisei voters it worked well, too, because not all
of them were very much interested in and knowledgeable about local politics even though they had voting rights.

In the 1952 election campaign, the Democratic Party was reported to be starting a new plan to increase Democratic supporters. On August 16, the Democrats on Oahu planned to educate the people who would become new American citizens under the McCarran-Walter Immigration and Naturalization Act (*Hawaii Hochi*, 8/16/52, p.2). According to the plan the Democrats would get them to understand their rights as citizens and help them naturalize. It is interesting that in this early time the Democratic Party decided to reach out to the group of people who would gain voting rights soon under the new law. This party strategy also coincided with the efforts within the Japanese community to promote naturalization and exercise of voting rights.

For the 1954 election, some new strategies emerged to attract voters. Since the 1954 election was the first one in which many newly naturalized American citizens could cast votes, some Nisei candidates offered special services to the naturalized citizens of Japanese descent. *Hawaii Hochi* on September 24 reported about the upcoming political lectures with free admission. The headline of the article was: “Political Lectures by Seven Japanese in Japanese Language: To be Held on the 26th at Kawananakoa Auditorium.” This program resembles the activities previously developed to prepare Japanese Issei for naturalization and then for voter registration, which were discussed in Chapter 4.

According to the article, seven Nisei lecturers, all lawyers, would talk about several topics such as, 1) differences between the Democrats and Republicans, 2) whether Hawaii’s income tax law was fair, 3) whether Hawaii was treated equally with the other
American states by the Federal government, 4) whether there were too many Nisei candidates, and so forth. The article encouraged the readers to come to the lectures.

_Hawaii Hochi_ on September 27 reported the contents of the lectures held on the previous day. The headline was, “Seven Nisei Lecturers Gave Impassioned Lectures in Japanese.” Each lecturer made an impressive speech to over 100 people. In addition to the seven Nisei lecturers, a candidate for Mayor, Johnny Wilson, and a candidate for delegate to Congress, John A. Burns, both of whom were Democrats, came to the lectures and made short speeches. Moreover, other Democratic candidates, Lemke and Ariyoshi, joined and made speeches (_Hawaii Hochi, 9/27/54, p.3_). The contents of the lectures were helpful to the new American citizens who would vote for the first time. Moreover, the fact that the Democrats took advantage of this gathering was clear to the readers of the article.

Non-Japanese Republican candidates tried to reach out for the voters of Asian ancestry, too. Blaisdell, the Republican candidate for Mayor, invited Japanese media representatives and his Japanese supporters to a cocktail party at his home (_Hawaii Hochi, 10/12/54, p.5_). His Chinese supporters also set up a campaign office for Mr. Blaisdell in Chinatown. They celebrated the opening of the office with firecrackers in the Chinese way. Mr. Blaisdell made a speech to ask for strong support for all Republican candidates, and the candidates Hiram Fong, Walter McGuire and Fukushima Yasutaka made speeches there (_Hawaii Hochi, 10/16/54, p.3_).

On the other hand, the Democratic candidates also carried out something new in terms of the campaign office in 1954. The six Democratic candidates in the Oahu 4th

28 Johnny Wilson even spoke in Pidgin with some Japanese words to entertain the Japanese audience.
district who had won the primary set up the joint office in the place where Mr. Wilson’s office\textsuperscript{29} for the primary used to be. They were Spark Matsunaga Masayuki, Kono Katsuhiro, Dan Inouye Ken, Anna Kahanamoku, Doi Masato and Clarence Crozier.

It was a usual thing that the supporters came to the \textit{Hochi} office and asked the editors to post publicity for the candidates. For instance, Murakami Kaname’s article was on October 19 “Candidate for City and County Auditor, Murakami Kaname’s Supporters came to \textit{Hochi Office}” (\textit{Hawaii Hochi}, 10/19/54, p.2). The supporters’ leader, Yonemoto Yoshimasa, spoke to the \textit{Hochi} editor about why they supported Murakami for Auditor. Sometimes, the candidates themselves showed up and asked for publicity.

In case of a non-Japanese candidate having a Japanese spouse, the spouse paid a visit to the \textit{Hochi} office to ask for support. On October 23, \textit{Hochi} ran the article about Mrs. Fasi: “Mrs. Fasi visited \textit{Hochi} Asking Support for her Husband” (\textit{Hawaii Hochi}, 10/23/54, p.2). “Florence Asako Fasi, the wife of Frank Fasi who is the Democratic candidate for Honolulu Mayor, visited the \textit{Hochi} Office, with Mr. and Mrs. Yokooji Tamotsu, the supporters.”

\textbf{Ethnic Politics and the Japanese Community}

As indicated throughout this chapter, \textit{Hawaii Hochi} paid particular attention to Nisei electoral candidates and their success, but also provided information and commentary about non-Japanese candidates. As a primary source of information for Japanese-speaking Issei voters and an active participant in many social movement campaigns during the early 1950s, \textit{Hawaii Hochi}’s political coverage can also be

\textsuperscript{29} Since Johnny Wilson lost the primary against Fasi, he did not need the office for the general.
examined for its framing of ethnic politics. Three issues deserve special attention: how *Hawaii Hoichi* presented the meaning of Nisei electoral success; how *Hoichi* handled touchy issues of race and ethnicity; and how *Hoichi* presented key non-Japanese candidates to its readers.

**Celebration of Nisei Electoral Success**

*Hawaii Hoichi* always covered Nisei accomplishment in each election. In the 1950 election a total of 36 Nisei candidates challenged the primary election (See Figure 9). A *Hawaii Hoichi* article provided all the names of Nisei candidates. On October 9, the *Hoichi* reported how Japanese candidates did in the primary. The *Hoichi* paid special attention to the fact that Wilfred Tsukiyama gained over 25,000 votes and was in the first place for the Senate race in Oahu district (10/9/50, p.2). For the general election on November 6, the article “General Election to Decide the Fate of 130 Candidates: 30 Japanese Candidates” appeared in the *Hoichi* (11/6/50, p.4).

The article on November 11 reported the results for Japanese Nisei in the general election, in which 23 Nisei won. Since Ansai Toshio who had won the Senate seat in the 1948 election would hold the position for another two years, there would be three Nisei Senators in total. The *Hoichi* article sounded very happy about this result. As to their party affiliation, among 23 successful Nisei politicians, 12 were Democrats and 11 were Republicans. In the Territorial Legislature, they had four newly elected Nisei Democratic Legislators, while they had seven Nisei Republican Legislators. Among the City and County positions (except for the Mayor’s position) there were 8 Nisei Democrats vs. 4 Nisei Republicans. Though the successful candidates were totally dominated by
Republicans, among Japanese successful candidates, there were more Democrats than Republicans by a margin of one.

Regarding the election results of Japanese candidates in 1952, *Hawaii Hochi* ran unique headlines, “30 Japanese Won: Six Entered Senate, and Politics in Kauai under Japanese Control”. According to the article, Kauai had a tradition that Japanese held control. As a result of this election, the tendency became more apparent, and the Kauai Board of Supervisors had four Japanese, one Chinese, one Portuguese, and no Caucasians (11/5/52, p.7). On the other hand, among newly elected Senators, four were Japanese, one Democrat and three Republicans. Ansai Toshio was reelected to the Senate, and Joe Itagaki Ryozo and Miyake Noboru, who had served as Representatives before, became Senators for the first time. The Territorial Representatives included six Nisei Republicans and four Nisei Democrats. Kido Mitsuyuki (a member of Burns’ Group of Coffee Drinkers), who had served as a Territorial Representative for three terms, and Takabuki Matsuo, a 442nd veteran and Democrat, joined the Honolulu City Board of Supervisors.

For the 1954 primary election, *Hochi* as usual made a separate list of Japanese candidates. The headline was: “A List of all the candidates of Democrats and Republicans: 67 Japanese candidates” (9/3/54, p.3). According to the article, for Territorial Senate, there were 14 candidates (six Republicans and eight Democrats) for seven seats. Among the 14 candidates, five were Japanese (two Republicans and three Democrats). For the 30 Territorial Representative seats, a total of 88 people had declared

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30 A few days later, the number of total Japanese candidates running for the election was corrected from 67 to 66.
to run. There were 42 Republican and 46 Democratic candidates. Among 88, there were 23 Japanese candidates (9 Republicans and 14 Democrats). All the Japanese candidates of both parties for all the County positions were also listed.

The editorial on September 8 1954, called “The Election and Japanese Candidates,” compared the number of candidates with that of 1952 election candidates, and predicted that they would have from 30 to 40 successful candidates out of 66. “Japanese comprise 40 percent of Hawaii’s total population, so it is natural to have 30 to 40 successful candidates among us”. On September 25, Hawaii Hochi ran a special article on how Japanese candidates had done at the past primaries since their first participation in elections 32 years ago. Among these candidates there were old timer Nisei: Wilfred Tsukiyama Chomatsu (Rep), Fukushima Yasutaka (Rep), Shimamura Yoshinori (Rep), Murakami Kaname (Dem), Arashiro Matsuki (Dem), Steer Noda Gikaku (Dem). On the other hand, there were new Nisei candidates: For the Territorial Representatives, Daniel Inouye Ken (Dem), George Ariyoshi Ryoichi (Dem), Doi Masato (Dem), Nakashima Sumio (Dem), Stanley Hara Ikuo (Dem) and Sparky Matsunaga Masayuki (Dem) declared their candidacy. There were all veterans except one. Takahashi Sakae (Dem), a former City Supervisor and also former Territorial Treasurer, became a candidate for Senator this time. He had been in politics for four years, but was also young and a war veteran.

The result of the primary showed a great victory for the Democrats. The very good news for the Japanese community was the number of Japanese winning the primary (10/4/54, p.1). In the primary election two years before, 44 Japanese candidates out of 48 had won. In 1954, out of 66 candidates, 55 won the primary, which was great news for
the Japanese community. It again broke the record for Japanese in the political arena. The article explained who won, and the profiles of the winners, especially of the new faces.

**Block Voting and Racial Considerations**

In “Densha Nisshi” on September 3, the editor made an important comment regarding what they should not say about the election (*Hawaii Hochi*, 9/3/54, p.8). The editor Honda Ryokusen strongly discouraged the readers from saying, “he did not contribute to the Japanese community for Japanese, so please vote for this other person this time.” According to him, the politicians should work for the interest of general public of Hawaii, not only for Japanese. “If we keep saying this type of Japanese oriented views, Japanese will be criticized for being racially prejudiced. Please refrain from saying such words,” the editor advised his readers. From the content of this column we could see that some Japanese still had a tendency to vote for Japanese because they would do good for Japanese residents. In a sense this sentiment to vote for the candidates doing good for Japanese seems natural, but it was regarded as a prejudice that could hurt their cause in the long run.

A similar racial issue appeared in the election for Territorial Representatives in the 4th Oahu district. “Politics Inside Out” and “Saturday Column” both treated this issue. According to the “Politics Inside Out” on September 28, the 4th Oahu district had been called the white Republican citadel. A Nisei, Ralph “Munroe” Matsumura, ran for the Representative seat as the only Nisei Republican among the white Republicans. Some commentators on politics believed that it was the Republican strategy to push Matsumura into this district and remove the allegation of it being a “haole (white) district.”
Democratic candidate for Representative in the same district charged that it was shameful that the Republicans believed they could get rid of the label of “haole district” by having one Nisei Republican as a candidate. He emphasized that the other candidates were all white American, no Chinese, no Japanese, and no Portuguese among the Republican candidates (Hawaii Hochi, 9/28/54, p.1).

The “Saturday Column” also dealt with this issue. The editor explained what was happening in the Oahu 4th district, or haole district, where in his words, some very liberal movements were happening. One was the Democratic Party’s strategy to help hopeful Democratic candidates run in this district. It was their challenge to have the young 100th and 442nd veterans as Democratic candidates. Moreover, on the Republican side, there was a new move to racially balance out the Republican representation in the 4th district. An English daily accused them of this move, and called it un-American, not suitable for an ideal cosmopolitan society. The Hochi editor regarded this strategy of racially balancing as a remedy. He asserted that it was not causing the racial problems, but curing it. Calling it undemocratic is a far-fetched argument, according to the editor (Hawaii Hochi, 10/2/54, p.2).

The racial element was a touchy issue, but nobody could ignore it. It seems that for the first time the Republicans came to understand that the existence of a “haole district” was not ideal. Finding out that several young brand-new Democrats were running for the office in “their district” the Republicans chose one Nisei Republican to compete with them. The fact that Hawaii Hochi called this “a cure” was noteworthy.

Then as now, the subject of ethnicity was an open aspect of political calculations. In its evaluation of another hotly contested race for the Territorial Senate, the ethnicity of
the candidates and the voters figured heavily in assessing how the race would play out. A very interesting “Saturday Column” appeared in the issue of September 18. The title was “What will become of the Tsukiyama vs. Takahashi match?” and the article explained about this match over the Senators for the Oahu district. Actually this match was not a two-man fight. Six candidates (three Democrats and three Republicans) were fighting over three Senatorial offices in this district, and it would most likely become a match among three strong candidates fighting over two slots, because Ernest Heen would surely win election. The three left to fight over the two slots were Lovell, Tsukiyama, and Takahashi. According to the Hochi editor, the Caucasian voters were believed to naturally choose Lovell, a Caucasian, so that Tsukiyama and Takahashi should depend on the non-white voters. Labeling Tsukiyama a political bigwig having the power to collect even Caucasian votes, and calling Takahashi a young political figure having the power over the young G.I.s, the editor regarded the match as one between an older Yokozuna vs. a young Ozeki, just like a sumo (Japanese wrestling) match (Hawaii Hochi, 9/18/54, p.2). The editors discussed the political issue with some racial elements as a natural factor, suggesting that Hawaii’s people in the 1950s believed that white voters would naturally vote for white candidates.

This same race was discussed again before the general election. The “Politics Inside Out” on October 29 (p.1) predicted that Takahashi Sakae would win the third slot in the Senatorial race on Oahu, beating Lovell (Rep) and others. The writer, Santaro, reasoned that Takahashi and Lovell both used to belong to the 100th Battalion, with Major Lovell

31 At the time, Hawaii had multi-member districts in which voters could cast as many ballots as there were seats available.
having been the commanding officer. In the first half of the election race, Lovell and Takahashi were said to work together. But Takahashi’s supporters noticed that by working together Lovell would get Japanese votes whereas Takahashi, the Asian candidate, would not gain white votes. Then Takahashi started working with Democratic candidates Burns and Takabuki. This would strengthen Takahashi as a candidate, so he would win in the third place, next to Heen (a Democrat) and Tsukiyama (a Republican). That is indeed what happened.

Ethnic and cultural claims were also made in advertisements. The supporters for Richard Kageyama Masato, a candidate for City Supervisor, posted a large advertisement about Kageyama’s reputation in town. Starting with the sentence, “He is popular among all the people except Caucasians,” it continues with comments by various people on Kageyama.

A Waipahu plantation worker said, “I will vote for him because he works for the poor. . . . Talking about the last mistake (his confession of being once a communist), human beings make mistakes, and it does not matter because he is not (communist) now. I do not hear any opposition to him among plantation workers in Honolulu.”

A leader of the Democratic Party said, “Kageyama is popular. The Republicans accused him before the primary, but now the bad reputation was blown away because of his high popularity.”

A Buddhist bishop said, “… I do not have a voting right, but I hope he would be elected in this election.”

A tax driver said, “… When the bill was presented to exclude the Asians from Aina Haina, he was the strong opponent to bury the bill. In case of any racist bills presented, he will be the one to act as a watchdog.”

In addition, the advertisement introduced “Kageyama Ouen Ka” (Kageyama support song) to be sung with the melody of Tanko Bushi, one of the best-known Bon Dance tunes. The words were full of admiration and compliments for Kageyama.
Presentation of Non-Japanese Candidates

Within its voluminous coverage of Hawaii politics, Hawaii Hochi's reporting of two incidents stands out for their presentation of particular non-Japanese politicians as friends of the Japanese community who were worthy of support. The first is an incident through which the Issei view of John Burns was re-evaluated, and the second involved promotion of Elizabeth Farrington as Territorial delegate. Ironically, the two ended up running against each other for Territorial Delegate to Congress in the 1954 general election.

In 1952, an issue arose that would attract Japanese attention to the Territorial Legislature. It was about a plea for the government to return the buildings and assets of some Japanese language schools and Shinto shrines. The properties of many Japanese language schools as well as the Shinto shrines had been given to the government or some non-profit American organizations during the war, while most of the language schools principals and Shinto priests were interned in the camps. The Nisei ESC members worked behind the scenes to have the Issei who had been left in Hawaii dissolve these organizations and give away their assets to American organizations. At that time Japan was the enemy country and the Issei did not have any other choice but to give away the properties.

After the war, Hawaii Hochi started publicizing the necessity to file the lawsuit to get the properties back, considering the whole process of giving the property away as an unfortunate incident of the war. Hawaii Hochi believed the Japanese had a right to get the properties back, and urged them to fight in Court. For some cases, the Court referred the case to the Legislature to decide. The hearings were held at the Legislature in 1952,
and those who were concerned with what happened in the war years testified. Seeing the movement, Japanese Legislators regardless of their party affiliations generally supported the plan to give the buildings back to the former owners. At the public hearings, a Democratic politician, John A. Burns testified, and became well known in the Japanese community as a nice person supporting the Japanese side. He appeared several times as a witness to testify about the Japanese people under the war situation.

Especially among the Issei, John A. Burns was not very popular during the war and immediate postwar years because he worked with the FBI during the war. Some Issei thought that he was responsible for arresting all the Issei leaders and sending them to the internment. Even after the war, some Issei did not like him because of this rumor and also, according to Hirai Ryozo, a *Hawaii Times* editor, because Burns had a stone face (Hirai 1990). Later, several Japanese language schools and shrines won the case and got their properties back. Since *Hawaii Hochi* covered the news on this matter, the Issei *Hochi* readers came to see Burns in a more favorable light.

The second incident involved the special election held in the summer of 1954 to elect a new Territorial Delegate to Congress, after the longstanding delegate, Joseph Farrington, died suddenly. There was an immediate groundswell of support for simply appointing his widow to the post, but instead a special election was called. *Hochi* followed closely the machinations that led to the decision to hold the special election, and enthusiastically supported the candidacy of Elizabeth Farrington, despite the fact that she was a Republican running against two Democrats. Even from the very beginning of the delegate race, *Hawaii Hochi* showed its support for Mrs. Farrington. With the caption “Mrs. Farrington is Most Appropriate,” the article explained the reason:
Mrs. Farrington has worked side by side with Mr. Farrington for the Statehood Bill. She chaired the National Republican Party Women’s Club for several terms. She was once nominated as one of the ten most politically powerful women in Washington DC” *(Hawaii Hochi, 7/3/54, p.6).*

On July 7, *Hochi* showed the editor’s strong desire to elect Mrs. Farrington as a delegate. It appeared in the column called *Densha Nisshi*, which was a serial column written by the editor, Honda Ryokusen. The Column had a small caption, “we would like to send a woman delegate.” In it, Honda said:

> It might be an Asian way of thinking, but we would like to take Mrs. Farrington’s feelings into consideration. Her husband, Mr. Farrington, did his very best as a delegate to the Congress for Hawaii’s statehood campaign and passed away in the middle of the way to reach his dream. It was a laudable decision that she would succeed to her late husband’s cause and work for it *(Hawaii Hochi, 7/7/54, p.8).*

It is interesting that *Hawaii Hochi* editors brought in the notion of a Japanese way of thinking to elect the delegate of Hawaii to the U.S. Congress. One of the leaders of the naturalization promotion campaign, Toyama Tetsuo, made a comment on this occasion in his journal “Citizen.” He said, “Let Mrs. Farrington achieve her late husband’s will.” In any occasion, Toyama did not hide his strong support for Mrs. Farrington. Considering Joseph Farrington’s contribution not only to the statehood issue but also to the passage of the Naturalization and Immigration Law, Japanese felt very much “on” (gratitude and obligation) to the Farringtons.

Mrs. Farrington campaigned passionately and the Hawaii Japanese community’s support for her was apparent. The Japanese Women’s Society invited Mrs. Farrington for a tea party. She made a one-hour speech and enjoyed a question and answer session over tea with Japanese women (7/28/54, p.5). With attorney Marumoto Masaji she paid a courtesy visit to *Hawaii Hochi*’s office (7/30/54, p.3). The election was held on July 31,
and the result was Mrs. Farrington's sweeping victory by a margin of over two to one
(Hawaii Hochi, 8/2/54, p.2). This was the first election for Issei new citizens to actually
cast votes.

1954: Democratic Victory

With the Red Scare largely irrelevant, the Democratic Party seemed poised for
victory in the general election of 1954. Our analysis of the Hawaii Hochi political
coverage has shown that there were significant changes during the 1954 campaign, aimed
at attracting Japanese voters including the newly enfranchised Issei. These included more
elaborate political coverage in Hochi to educate and inform the new Issei voters, a shift to
Japanese language advertising, and a variety of campaign tactics aimed at the Japanese
electorate. While Hochi celebrated Nisei success, it also presented non-Japanese
candidates as particular friends of the Japanese community. At the same time, Hochi both
cautionsed voters against ethnic block voting and casually made election predictions based
on ethnic assumptions. Hochi clearly served as both an information source and an
opinion leader for its Issei readers, and its electoral sentiments were both pro-Nisei and
pro-Democratic Party as the 1954 general election approached.

Both political parties published the campaign schedules for the general election to be
held on November 2. According to Hochi on October 12 (p.2), the Oahu Republicans
would kick off the campaign on October 22 and continue campaigning and rallying every
night at several places. Broadcasting every candidate's political view on TV was
something new. The Republican political views were scheduled for broadcast from
McKinley High School via KGMB on November 1, the last night before the election. On
the other hand, the Oahu Democrats also made their schedule public (10/15/54, p.3). They would start the general election campaign on Sunday the 17th with a dinner party at Queen’s Surf. They would have campaign rallies almost every day at several places, although they did not have a TV campaign scheduled\(^{32}\) (10/15/54, p.3).

In the meanwhile, the increasing number of registered voters attracted the media’s attention. In an editorial on October 25, Hochi reported that Oahu by itself had some 110,000 voters, an increase of 10,000 voters compared with the number at the primary. They had about 161,000 voters across the Islands. At the previous election in 1952 there had been 148,000 voters. According to the editorial, the number of the unregistered persons decreased. However, the voting rate in Hawaii was not high. At the primary the turn out was 57 percent. The editorial said the increase of registered voters meant the high interest of Hawaii’s people in politics.

On November 1, Hawaii Hochi’s editorial discussed the possibility of Democratic dominance. For over 50 years the Republicans had dominated Hawaii’s politics. With new winds blowing in the 4th district of Oahu, where several Nisei veterans were running, and with a national tendency of Democratic power getting stronger, something new might happen in Hawaii, the editor said. And it turned out to be the case. The result of the general election was the landslide victory for the Democrats.

The top news of Hawaii Hochi on November 3 regarding the election result was as follows:

For the first time in the 54 year history of Hawaii’s politics since the establishment of the Territorial Legislature, the Democrats seized the dominant

\(^{32}\) It is often said that the Democrats were short of election funds, compared with the Republicans who had quite a few wealthy supporters.
position in the two Houses of the Territory. This big upset actually happened in the general election yesterday. Democrats filled all the County Boards of Supervisors except one, on the island of Hawaii.

For the Delegate race and mayoral race, Hochi’s prediction was correct. The incumbent delegate, Elizabeth Farrington, won over the Democratic Burns, but the margin was slim. Hawaii Hochi called this race a good fight (11/3/54, p.2). For Honolulu Mayor, Neal Blaisdell won over Fasi by the margin of 42,413 to 39,973 (Hawaii Hochi, 11/3/54, p.1). Although the two Democrats lost the election themselves, they made comments that they were satisfied with the overall election result. Fasi commented that a social revolution had taken place in Hawaii, and Burns regarded the cause of revolution as “the fact that Hawaii’s people were tired of Republican government that had taken care of only the privileged class” (ibid.).

The detailed results of the election appeared in Hochi on November 3. On the front page, all the pictures of the successful Japanese candidates who won the City Supervisors, Territorial Senators and Territorial Representatives were posted. On the second page, almost all the pictures of the Japanese who won the County office seats were posted.33

As to the result of Japanese candidates’ electoral races, Hochi said, “36 Japanese Won the Race: Bewildering Rise of New Faces” (11/3/54, p.2). In this article the editor praised the great success of Japanese candidates, especially that of young new people in the Hawaii political arena. Out of 55 successful Nisei candidates in the primary in October, 36 candidates, or 65 percent, won political seats in the general election. There were 31 Democrats and only 5 Republicans. Out of all 85 political seats, Japanese

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33 A picture of Hokama Goro, a Lanai County Supervisor-elect, was not included because his picture was not available for the Hochi office at that time (Hawaii Hochi, 11/3/54, p.2).
politicians held 41 percent. The article named all the 14 successful new faces. By contrast, the article also named the defeated candidates who had been political masters until then. Sakakihara Tameichi, who served as Representative for three terms, Shimamura Yoshinori, who served as Representative for two terms, and Okino Tomekichi who served in the Senate for one term, all lost their seats at this general election. For the Representative race in the Oahu 5th district, the election loss of Hiram Fong, the former Speaker of the House, was fairly unexpected.

In the editorial on November 5 (p.2), Hochi analyzed the causes behind the landslide victory of the Democrats. The editor said this big change happened because the Republicans had been doing the same thing for 54 years, and that the Republican dominance had been against the balanced politics, which was the principle of the American system. Hochi said that gradual small changes had started decades ago, and with the appearance of young, new Democratic candidates this year who attacked the political failures of the Republican regime, the final result must have come out. As such causes, Hochi listed the Republican politicians’ waste of public money on sending a statehood delegation to Washington DC, the payment issue of civil servants, and ILWU issues and so on.

Every aspect of the general election was discussed in the article, “Tracing the Race: Landslide Victory of Democratic Party: Accomplishment of their Dream after 54 years.” Hochi pointed out some interesting characteristics. Regarding Japanese candidates, Hochi especially spoke highly of Takahashi Sakae’s winning the Senate seat with the second biggest number of votes, even exceeding “Old Man” Tsukiyama’s. It is interesting that Hochi pointed out the unexpected defeat of Sakakihara Tameichi, Hiram
Fong and Shimamura Yoshinori, instead of pointing out the victory of young Democratic Japanese Representatives-elect, such as Ariyoshi, Inouye, Matsunaga and so forth. It reveals that right after the 1954 general election, these people were still totally unknown even to Japanese media. Even though Hochi predicted the victory of the Democrats, they did not expect most of these brand-new candidates to win. If the media had expected this result, they could have written more details about those young Japanese winners. Hochi wrote very few articles, and one was about Dan Inouye.

The headline for his article was “A War Wounded Hero’s Record-Breaking Victory: Mr. Dan Inouye Ken.” According to the article, having five Democratic winners from the Republican-controlled Oahu 4th district was record-breaking. Moreover, they had four Japanese winning among these five Representatives-elect. Even more record-breaking was the fact that Dan Inouye obtained the largest number of votes among the candidates in that district. Awamura Tokuyoshi, Inouye’s father-in-law, had made every effort to get support for him, and said to the reporter. “I am very relieved. He owes a lot to the support from all of you. I am very grateful” (Hawaii Hochi, 11/3/54, p.5). Mr. Awamura was one of the powerful Issei businessmen in the Japanese community, who had served as President of Nisshoko, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce. His comments had been in the pages of Hochi during the campaign for passage of the McCarran-Walter Act. He was instrumental in the naturalization campaign, and he was one of the newly naturalized citizens himself. Hochi clearly showed that the young novice Inouye had the strong support of his powerful father-in-law and his Issei friends backing him.

For Hawaii Hochi editors and the Issei readers, the great victory of the Democrats was a welcome outcome. They felt sorry to see the old timers disappear from the
political arena in the 1954 election, but they were as enthusiastic about the new faces coming in to the politics as they were about the old timers’ success. For the Issei, as the old timers brought honor to Japanese community, so were the new young Democrats giving tremendous honor. The new patriotic image of Nisei democrats seemed favorable. The fact that they were Democrats meant very much to the Nisei generation of the Japanese community, but not so much to the Issei generation. The Issei still had the power to support the Nisei candidates from the back stage, which was seen in the cases of Dan Inouye and George Ariyoshi. Behind the big wave of Democratic movement, the Issei supporting movement, whose scale was small, was still present.

The Democrats started discussing who would hold the positions of President of the Senate and Speaker of the House among the Democratic Party members for the first time (11/4/54, p.1). For the President of the Senate, William Heen was deemed powerful, and for the Speaker of the House, Charles Kauhane was the strongest candidate (11/4/54, p.1; 11/6/54, p.3; 11/10/54, p.3). Most of the important positions would be decided at the meeting to be held on Maui from November 19 for three days, according to the Hochi on November 10. What is noticeable here is that the important positions of the Territorial Legislature went to the Old Guard Democrats instead of Burns moderate faction members for the 1954 session. This staff assignment is very much understandable because the positions of House Speaker and Senate President, for instance, were too important for the newly elected politicians to hold. However, the newly-elected Legislator, Daniel Inouye, became the Floor Leader (majority leader) for the House, because, according to Hochi (11/18/54, p.3), he won the seat with the biggest number of votes from the Oahu 4th district where all the Representative seats had been held by white Republicans until then.
For the chairman of the Senate finance committee, which had been understood as the most important position at the practical level, it had been rumored that Takahashi Sakae or William Nobriga would get it. As a result of the Maui meeting, Nobriga was chosen to hold the position of finance committee chair.

Moreover, the Democrats had the majority of the Honolulu City Board of Supervisors, so that they were in the advantageous position to fill the vacant positions in the City government such as City and County Attorney. It was predicted in *Hochi* that the Republican City Mayor Blaisdell was in the difficult position to fight against the majority Democratic Supervisors with only one Republican Supervisor on the Board. Blaisdell would have to discuss the staff assignment issue with the Democratic Supervisors (*Hawaii Hochi*, 11/17/54, p.2).

Thus, the Democrats took a new step forward in Hawaii’s political history. Right after the election, nobody knew whether or not the Democrats would be able to keep the power of government for a long time after that. In the pages of *Hawaii Hochi*, however, we can see the people’s hopeful feelings in those days. Thus, young Nisei Democrats finally succeeded in strengthening the Democratic Party and even winning over the Old Guard Republicans and seizing tremendous power. The fact that the Democratic sweep of County Supervisor positions meant that the Democrats would also begin to have some control over appointive positions points to another feature of Nisei success in the early 1950s that requires further exploration. The electoral success of the Nisei was also built on the basis of a much broader visibility of the Nisei generation in public life in Hawaii.
Appointment of Nisei to Judiciary and Government Administration

After the war, many Nisei veterans with higher degrees came back and entered the job market in Hawaii. They were the people who had fought for America as loyal Americans, and who did not want to come back to the second-class society of Hawaii. Many Nisei lawyers passed the bar examination and started working in Hawaii. Nisei medical doctors started practice. More Nisei began to work for the City, Territorial or Federal governments. In a sense there was a momentum for Nisei to go into professional jobs in the early 1950s. But it was not very easy for Nisei to be treated equally.

Actually for the Nisei returning from the mainland, it was not very easy for them to just start working in the larger society. As Matsy Takabuki Matsuo wrote in his memoir, when he passed the bar exam in October 1949, no job was available for people like him without any political connections. “There were no positions available in the large haole law firms for local-born law school graduates from major mainland universities. These elite firms were importing Caucasian law graduates from major mainland universities” (Takabuki 1998, 52-53). Takabuki opened his own law office with Ben Takayesu in 1952. According to him, about that time the other Nisei law graduates were returning and beginning their careers. They were feeling the economic limitations Hawaii had. He wrote, “The Big Five represented by the Merchant Street haole law firms were still basically in control of the economy and judiciary. While little cracks of opportunity were appearing in business and government, we realized more and more that the only realistic opportunity for our generation to change socioeconomic environment was through elective politics. . .” (Takabuki 1998, 52-53).
Thus, many Nisei veterans with law degrees went into politics, just as Takabuki said. The years in the early 1950s were their starting time. However, it is also very true that many Nisei with college or higher degrees came back to Hawaii and tried to open the cracks of opportunity in business and government arenas. *Hawaii Hochi* always tried to report to their Japanese readers about how well Nisei were doing in the larger society of Hawaii. The Issei generation, especially, regarded it as an honor to have as many Nisei politicians, government clerks, and lawyers as possible. Such middle-class, white collar jobs demonstrated the whole community's movement into the middle class.

Figure 5-4 shows that *Hawaii Hochi* wrote quite a few articles on Nisei success stories. They included the news stories about Nisei who were appointed to the positions of Federal or Territorial Judiciary, or to the appointive administrative positions of the Territorial, City or County governments. The stories also included those about Nisei who passed the bar examinations and opened the law offices, as well as those who had achieved elective office and then went even farther to hold leadership positions connected with their offices.

*Hochi* editors showed their joy to report about splendid achievement of Territorial Representative Sakakihara and Territorial Senator Okino. They declared the opening of the both Houses of Legislature in the 1952 Legislature. The headline was: "The 26th Legislature Opened This Morning: Japanese Acting Chairmen Declared the Opening for Both Houses" (2/20/51, p. 2). *Hochi* reported that Sakakihara Tameichi (Rep), the acting chair for the House, called the meeting to order at 10:15, and Okino Tamekichi (Dem), the acting chair for the Senate, also declared the opening for the Senate.
It was the first time in Hawaii’s history that Legislators of Japanese ancestry declared the opening of both Houses. This fact, plus the fact that we have three Senators and nine Representatives of Japanese ancestry, tells eloquently the remarkable progress of Japanese in the political arena (2/21/51, p.1).

The Nisei who was most spotlighted by Hochi from the end of 1951 to 1952 was the City Supervisor Takahashi Sakae. When he won the office of City Supervisor, he was admired for accomplishment at his young age. On January 9, Governor Oren Long officially appointed him as Territorial Treasurer. With the headline “Mr. Takahashi Climbing up Rapidly: Also a Prominent Soldier,” Hawaii Hochi provided an explanation of his background (1/10/52, p.2). In the special editorial called “Today’s Issue,” Hochi wrote about Takahashi Sakae, admiring his accomplishment to become a Territorial Treasurer at the age of only 32 (1/11/52, p.1). Writing in the style of addressing Takahashi as “you,” from the standpoint of an Issei parent speaking to his son, the writer praised Takahashi’s accomplishment. The writer did not forget to add, however, that he must do a better job by listening to many elders and workers with more experiences in the Territorial Treasurer’s department since the position was very important.

You’re the first Nisei administrative member of the Territorial government. You are in the position of heavy responsibility. We wish you to achieve even bigger success and become an even more reliable Treasurer for the general public. The reason I said this is out of my concern for you as Issei ((1/11/52, p.1).

The editorial reveals how happy the Issei were to know this news about Takahashi’s success, and how much the Issei were concerned about him as a “parent (Oya)”. Here the Issei readers did not care about party affiliation, or his political standing. The readers cared about Takahashi, because he was a young, prominent Nisei who had a good
background as a 100th club veteran, and was getting ahead in the political regime very fast. They cheered him and wished his best luck. Takahashi became a Territorial Treasurer and resigned from the City Board of Supervisors. The news of appointment of Amano Sakae by Mayor Wilson to fill the City Supervisor office also pleased the Issei.

Kido Mitsuyuki, one of the Burns’ group of Coffee Drinkers, and Okino Tomekichi were also the ones who attracted much focus of Hawaii Hochi writers. When their names were found in the list of the prospective candidates for the Territorial Secretary of Hawaii (which was an appointive office, but equivalent to Lieutenant Governor today) to work with Governor Long, the Japanese community was happy (Hawaii Hochi, 6/12/51, p.2).

In the Today’s Issue, the editor wrote:

> The Territorial Secretary plays the role of wife (nyobo yaku) of the Governor. The Territorial Secretary will sit on the top of the Territorial government in the absence of the Governor. It is a special occasion that we have two Japanese candidates for such an important position. We have regarded having a Japanese Governor as a dream, but now it looks like it is becoming a reality (Hawaii Hochi, 6/13/51, p.1).

This article shows the happiness of the Issei generation to see the Nisei’s progress to the point that they had never dreamed of reaching 40 years before. To their regret, however, neither Kido nor Okino was appointed in the end. But for Hawaii Hochi editors, this news was good enough. The next paragraph of the same editorial explains how the Issei felt about the achievement of Nisei.

> Wherever we go, we see Japanese government officials. This means significant progress for Japanese in Hawaii. This was a result not only of Japanese efforts and accomplishments thus far, but also of American spirit and generosity (Hawaii Hochi, 6/13/51, p.1).

Hawaii Hochi also reported about some Nisei successes in the judiciary arena. For instance, Murakami Kiyoichi was appointed to the first Circuit Court bench and became
the first attorney of Japanese ancestry to be appointed to the high position of the Court (Hawaii Hochi, 6/6/52, p.3). On August 30, Spark Matsunaga Masayuki was reported to become a deputy prosecutor. The article included Matsunaga's profile.

When new Governor Samuel King took his office in 1953, he appointed various people to the Territorial positions and there were some Nisei among them. On May 20 1953, Hochi reported that many Japanese were appointed to the major committee of the Territorial government under new Governor King. Especially regarding the appointment of Harry Kawakami, he was the first Japanese naturalized U.S. citizen to be appointed to an important position in Territorial government. Moreover, the Hochi editor called it unexpected to have a Japanese on the Board of Regents of the University of Hawaii. As to Territorial judicial positions, George Chinen Jitsuzo was appointed to Territorial deputy attorney (Hawaii Hochi, 4/2/53, p.3). Tanaka Susumu, George Nakamura Takeshi, Fukuda Kiyoshi and Ernest Yamane Hiroyoshi were all appointed as Territorial deputy attorneys general (Hawaii Hochi; 3/19/53, p.2; 4/2/53, p.3; 6/16/53, p.3; 11/23/53, p.3). In all, the category of Nisei success stories had about 20 articles in 1953. It is evident that about this time Hawaii's Nisei made big strides toward success in their lives.

Compared with the number of articles regarding Nisei's political success, the number of articles about the nomination of Nisei to the judicial and governmental positions was quite small in the year 1954. However, diverse stories about Nisei making success in the real world were seen in the Hochi pages. For instance, the number of articles about Nisei starting a new law office increased (cf. 3/7/54, p.5; 6/26/54, p.3). A Nisei becoming a medical doctor was treated as news in Hochi (6/26/54, p.2). In the military service some Nisei were recommended to become officers (7/28/54, p.5). A Sansei was admitted to
Annapolis naval academy for the first time in Hawaii’s Japanese history (7/17/54, p.2).

Seven lawyers from Hawaii, including three of Japanese ancestry, received permission to practice before the U.S. Supreme Court (5/19/54, p.3). After the general election, important positions on various committees in the Territorial Legislature were going to the Democrats. Since there were many Japanese young newcomers in Democrats, some Japanese became chairs of the committees. The most impressive nomination was that of Daniel Inouye Ken, a young Democrat, becoming a floor leader of the House of Representatives. Since the Democrats dominated the Territorial Legislature, the government personnel should be changed. However, the big changes did not occur within the year of 1954.

Thus, *Hawaii Hochi* reported very much of the detailed reports about how Nisei were getting appointed to the higher positions in the judiciary and government administrations, as well as how the Nisei were doing in the political arena as candidates for the elections. The ways *Hawaii Hochi* editors wrote about the Nisei accomplishment shows the Issei’s pride and support for the Nisei as “parents of Nisei.” The Issei wanted to see the Nisei working side by side with the other Americans in the larger society of Hawaii. They interpreted it as evidence of equal treatment, which the political Issei in prewar years had worked in so many ways to achieve.

*The Meaning of the Democratic Movement in the 1950s.*

The HUAC hearings in the beginning of 1950 had a heavy impact on both political parties in Hawaii. For Democrats, the Red Scare gave a very negative effect. Having some reluctant witnesses within their party gave the general public the impression that the Democratic Party of Hawaii was vulnerable to communism. The fact that the ILWU
had been supporting the Democrats also gave a negative effect because the ILWU was labeled as having communist leadership. Since the party leadership became split right after the hearings, the Democrats in Hawaii had to go through a hard time to unite and rebuild the party enough to fight against the Republicans, which took a while. The young Democrats came into the Party, and some of them were instrumental in the cutting off of the left, and others came in later and rebuilt the party.

On the other hand, the HUAC hearings gave a boost to the Republican Party of Hawaii. By calling the opponent party red, the Republicans even increased the number of Legislators on their side in the Territorial as well as City and County levels in 1950 and 1952. But the Old Guard Republicans just continued the same tactics, while Democrats was making success in repainting their party with a new image. Many of the new Democratic Nisei candidates for the 1954 election clearly wrote their party affiliation and military experiences in their advertisements and fliers. It was because they wanted to have their backgrounds give a much better image to the party, as the party of the young Nisei veterans.

The number of Nisei winning election increased from 9 in 1946 to 23 in 1948, and stayed the same in 1950. Then it increased from 23 in 1950 to 30 in 1952 and finally 36 in 1954. When we put the party affiliation into consideration an interesting feature appears. In the elections of 1950 and 1952, on the whole the Republicans won the majority of elective offices. However, in the case of Japanese politicians in the 1950 election, 12 Democrats and 11 Republicans won, which meant they had more Democrats by one margin. In 1952, the Japanese Democrats and the Republicans won an even number of offices. From my study, the Nisei Democrats were more popular and getting
more seats than the Nisei Republicans well before the "1954 Revolution." Then the 1954, 31 Japanese Democrats won whereas 5 Republicans did.

Regarding the Nisei success in the City, County and Territorial administration, more and more Nisei government officials were appointed to the higher positions. Also in the judiciary, more and more Nisei passed the bar examination of the Territory and became lawyers. Among them some were appointed to higher positions in the Territory Courts. It was upon these achievements of successful Nisei that the drastic change in 1954 came about.

How did the Japanese residents who actually lived through the change interpret the tremendous political change of "Democratic Revolution"? When the landslide victory of the Democratic Party became clear to everybody in November 1954, how did the ordinary Issei residents in Japanese community accept this fact? What meanings did the Democratic victory have for the Democrats of young Japanese or other ethnic minorities as well as to the Old Guard Democrats? Moreover, how did the Republicans, especially some elder Nisei Republicans who had enjoyed winning political offices until then, accept the reality?

First of all, I would like to focus on the Issei generation. *Hawaii Hochi* subscribers were Japanese reading people, most of whom were Issei. *Hawaii Hochi* for the ten years after the end of World War II kept reporting to Hawaii's Japanese speaking readers about the information the *Hawaii Hochi* editors thought their readers wanted to know most. The success stories of Nisei ranked among the top topics for the Issei readers. For both the senders and receivers of the information, the fact that Nisei were getting ahead in the political, judicial, and governmental arenas was most important. The community
accepted the news with joy, whichever political party the person might have belonged to.
For newspaper editors and readers, it was more than clear that the monopoly of political,
economic, and social power by the white elite was wrong. It was unequal, undemocratic
and un-American. They were happy to see the young Nisei trying hard to open little
cracks of opportunity in business and government arenas and force them wide open for
everybody.

For the ordinary Issei, the specific changes of certain discriminatory laws were more
important than the abstract discussion of differences between the two parties. *Hawaii
Hoehi* welcomed the landslide victory of the Democrats, because many of those who had
won the political seats were young Nisei Democrats and war heroes. At the same time,
*Hawaii Hoehi* felt sorry that those older Nisei, having worked for Territory, City or
County for a long time, lost the election. It was true that the Democrats took over the
office from the Republicans in the 1954 election, but for the ordinary Issei, it was only an
alternation of power from the older Nisei to younger Nisei leaders. Needless to say,
having more and more young, capable Nisei politicians was regarded as an honor for the
Japanese community.

Then, what did the success of the Democratic Party in the 1954 election mean to the
young Democrats such as Takahashi, Matsunaga, Takabuki, Inouye, Ariyoshi, and others?
The central figures who started this drastic change were John A. Burns and his “Coffee
Drinkers.” Gradually the group became bigger with the younger war veterans with
higher academic degrees from the prestigious mainland universities. At the same time
several original people left the central group one after another.\textsuperscript{34} The aim of the original Coffee Drinkers was to change Hawaii from a second-class society to the first-class democratic society. The Democratic victory over the long reign of Republicans in 1954 meant a big stride ahead for Hawaii’s society toward a more democratic direction.

One of the reasons the young Nisei Democrats were trying to make Hawaii democratic was because most of them had fought in the European or Pacific War front during World War II for the country of America to prove their loyalty to the country. Having lost the precious lives of their close soldier friends, they felt they were indebted to their late friends to make Hawaii the first-class society. Therefore, many young Nisei Democrats could not help getting angry about being called communist sympathizers selling out the country in the anti-communism era.

The older Nisei politicians who had served for the Territorial, City or County offices, such as Sakakihara Tameichi, Shimamura Yoshinori both of whom lost the election, and Wilfred Tsukiyama Chomatsu, who was barely voted in, fared poorly in the 1954 revolution. They were some years, or even a generation, older than the young Democrats. In their day, to work as Republicans was the right way to do politics. Moreover, they were praised within Hawaii’s Japanese community, because they were respected as achievers in politics. Within the Japanese community, the accomplishment of Burn’s group of young Nisei meant the appearance of a new generation of Nisei politicians, instead of the defeat of Old Guard Republicans against the Democrats.

\textsuperscript{34} Ernest Murai, Chuck Mau, even Mitsuyuki Kido gradually left the central circle of the Democratic Party of Hawaii. Also Jack Kawano had to leave Hawaii because he was labeled a betrayer for revealing the relationship of Jack Hall’s ILWU and the Communism.
Within Hawaii's Japanese community, the Democratic victory was the appearance of a new generation of young Nisei politicians. I see it as a part of the transfer of generations from the Issei to the Nisei, and from the elder Nisei to the younger Nisei. The Issei leaders, unable to participate in politics, wanted to remove the discriminatory treatment of Asians under American law. Their dream began to be achieved by the elder Nisei who started working in the government administration, legislature and judiciary. Upon the base made by the elder Nisei, the younger Nisei with war experience and highest education got together in the Democratic Party with the other ethnic minorities. The leadership was handed from the elder Nisei to the younger Nisei, which corresponded to the time of transfer of the political power from the Old Guard Republicans to the young Democrats. Their tough challenging spirit was also handed down, first from the Issei who fought against discrimination with pride, to the elder Nisei who began to work as the first Nisei in many fields in the larger society, and then to the younger Nisei, who finally changed the political structure of Hawaii, by overthrowing the Republican reign.
CHAPTER 6
THE ROLE OF THE JAPANESE COMMUNITY

This dissertation has focused on the social movements in postwar Hawaii, and looked at the dynamics of various small and medium-level social campaigns and drives within the large scale democratic movements. Japanese residents in Hawaii, both Issei and Nisei, were very much involved in the postwar small and medium-level social movement campaigns whose ultimate purpose was to make Hawaii a more democratic society. The political process model was employed as a sociological analytical tool to discuss the process of mobilization of these campaigns and movements, using the systematic content analysis of articles in the Japanese vernacular press, Hawaii Hochi as primary data.

Application of the Political Process Model
As the political process model of social movement theory elaborated by McAdam shows, there are three important factors in discussing the emergence of movements. They are: 1) political opportunities, 2) mobilizing structures and 3) framing processes. In this study, the challengers were Hawaii’s Japanese residents, and they challenged the existent social and political power structure in order to change their status within the racialized society in which the challengers were embedded. The political process model emphasized the importance of discussing the emerging movements in a long time span. Although this dissertation was mainly a study of postwar democratic movements, in Chapter 2, I started my discussion from the time the Hawaiian Islands began to accept the first immigrant groups. As a result of the contact and merging of the white Americans
with Indigenous Hawaiians and also with the various immigrant groups from Europe and Asia, Hawaiian society in the late 18th to 19th centuries gradually became a uniquely racially stratified society. Chapter 2 discussed the political opportunities for Japanese residents who had been placed in this unique society to engage in some movements to change their exploited status.

For the challengers, there were quite a few events and conditions that disrupted their mobilization as negative political opportunities. The racialized hierarchy on the plantations, and divide and rule policy were among those constraints of mobilization for Japanese workers. The international situations such as Japan’s rising status in the Asian and Pacific region and the Japanese Empire’s aggressive image cast a negative shadow over Japanese residents in Hawaii. The most significantly negative effect was given by the outbreak of the Pacific War with Japan. On the other hand, the fact that Japanese constituted the biggest ethnic group among the plantation workers created advantageous political opportunities for them to start mobilizing.

As McAdam’s model says, for the movements to occur, not only the political opportunities but also the mobilizing structures should be ready. For the Japanese residents in the early 20th century, various community organizations worked as important organizations and networks to enable the purpose-oriented smaller scale organizations to emerge. These organizations functioned as indispensable “collective vehicles” (McAdam 1999, ix) for ordinary Japanese community members (mass base) to engage in collective actions.

The Japanese community consisted of a small group of intellectual leaders and a mass base of working class people who were the majority of the community members.
The greater part of the mass base was composed of plantation workers. The mass base also included some sugar factory workers, independent farmers, small shop owners, and shop clerks. For the plantation workers, having a small group of some intellectual Japanese leaders on their side to organize them under their own labor union was very helpful. Also in the case of the language school dispute, having intellectual leaders such as newspaper editors and prestigious attorneys from the host society as legal counselors on their side of litigation group led to legal victory. Having strong organizations and leaders was their strength.

In order for the challengers to start the collective actions, sharing collective identity and common objectives for action was important. For instance, when the Japanese workers struck in 1909, they shared the collective identity of Japanese who possessed *Yamato Damashii* or Japanese traditional spirit. But their collective identity changed over time. When the Japanese litigation group filed a lawsuit to test the constitutionality of territorial measures to control the foreign language schools, they chose this strategy of filing the suit because they regarded themselves as ones who settled down as permanent residents in American society. They shared the idea that doing things the American way was best. The lawsuit was the most suitable American way, in their opinion. Thus, in both cases of strikes and language school litigation, shared collective identity and common aims strengthened their solidarity as the challenging group.

Yet as I have shown, in both campaigns the Japanese community as a whole was divided. Some groups were opposed to the strike, and not all of the language schools participated in the litigation. No social movement gets 100% participation from its
potential constituency. In these two cases, the divisions within the Japanese community over strategy and tactics did weaken the movements.

What Chapter 2 clarified regarding political opportunity structures for postwar democratic movements is that Japanese community developed various community organizations, movement organizations and community newspapers, which were all instrumental for mobilization. Also Japanese residents shared the feeling that they were equal to other Americans, and they framed certain issues as important because they would help achieve that equality. Therefore they tried to revise the existent Naturalization and Immigration laws, which treated Japanese as “aliens ineligible for citizenship.” The goal of becoming equal also included realizing Hawaii’s statehood. Since the issues included in their purposes were not fulfilled in the prewar years, they became issues to be resolved after the war. The prewar experiences of Japanese residents to challenge the power structure in some forms of campaigns and movements by organizing various purpose-oriented organizations became a part of the political opportunities and mobilizing structures for the postwar movements to fulfill their long-dreamed purposes. Their framing of these central issues remained the same after the war.

The end of war with Japan changed the political opportunity structures for Japanese movements to realize their dreams of being equal with the other Americans. The biggest factor was the changing image of Japanese Americans from “unassimilable race” to “heroic and loyal Americans.” The unprecedented heroic contributions of Nisei soldiers to the American military during the war functioned as a fair wind for these movements for statehood and naturalization issues. However, there emerged a strong head wind to deter these movements, in the form of the Red Scare.
Chapter 3 treated the Red Scare, which affected Japanese residents as a negative political opportunity when they tried to start social movements and campaigns in the immediate postwar years. The white elite of Hawaii utilized this national phenomenon of the Red Scare as a counter-movement to suppress the bottom-up labor and political movements. Also this chapter discussed the statehood campaigns. For Japanese, statehood itself had a strong meaning of becoming equal with other Americans, so statehood had long been a strong desire for the Japanese residents. However, the statehood campaign itself had to be pursued by Territory-wide campaigns in the national political context. Japanese residents actively participated in the campaigns. *Hawaii Hochi* reported about the statehood bills in the U.S. Congress and the statehood campaigns in Hawaii in great detail. Hence, the Japanese readers even without good English command could follow the situation and participate in the campaigns. However, the Red Scare blocked the way of statehood. Hawaii was given a red image of having communists infiltrated in their society by the controlling class of Hawaii itself. As a result, Hawaii’s red issue backfired during the statehood discussion in the U.S. Congress.

The red image also affected the national level discussion in the Congress regarding the revision of Naturalization and Immigration laws. Chapter 4 discussed the mobilization process of Hawaii’s Japanese starting effective campaigns to support the passage of new Naturalization and Immigration laws, and naturalization promotion drives among Japanese community people. Unlike the statehood issue, the naturalization and immigration matter directly involved Japanese residents in Hawaii. The fact that the Issei were not entitled to naturalization rights had long been framed as a stigma that injured Japanese pride and self-esteem. Sharing this ethnic pride strengthened the collective
identity of Hawaii’s Japanese community and mobilized them for effective campaigns.

Since it was a political issue involving and affecting all the Japanese residents in America, Hawaii’s Japanese organized the campaign organizations within the existent organization, Nisshoko or Japanese Chamber of Commerce, and cooperated with the larger-scale organization of political oriented Nisei on the mainland, the JACL. The JACL took the initiative of effective lobbying and fund-raising for this matter, while Hawaii’s Japanese were engaged in the passionate campaigns and succeeded in raising a large amount of money for lobbying by Mike Masaoka and the ADC members. *Hawaii Hochi* articles revealed all these activities of small-scale purpose-oriented organizations such as Kikaken Kakutoku Undo Koenkai and their relations with the JACL and the lobbyist Masaoka.

Once the new naturalization law passed, in order to urge more Issei to become American citizens, Hawaii’s Issei and Nisei leaders started a naturalization campaign, which included naturalization prep classes and lecture meetings to educate the ordinary Issei about the importance of naturalization. In Hawaii the community leaders such as the established leaders of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce were not the only ones that acted as naturalization promoters. Interestingly, however, more bottom-up type organizations exclusively for naturalization promotion emerged and started active campaigns, led by a group of grassroots leaders. They were engaged in promoting naturalization prep classes and Americanizing the Issei generation. They did their best to help the Issei who were already in their old age and not very good at learning English as well as complicated information for naturalization examinations. Particularly the voting schools started by these naturalization promoters were unique and effective. The grassroots leaders framed naturalization as becoming responsible American citizens who
should actually participate in politics by casting votes. At the voting schools, instructors taught what the new citizens should do in order to register to vote. These promoters urged the Issei new citizens to participate in elections. Hawaii Hochi covered these community-oriented activities heavily.

Especially for the campaigns for supporting legislation of naturalization and immigration laws, naturalization promotion campaign and voting campaign, the cultural meanings attached to these matters by the leaders worked effectively. Nisei leaders framed their tireless efforts of lobbying for the legislation as showing their filial piety and "on (obligation)" to their Issei parents. The word filial piety and obligation had a strong cultural meaning so that the Issei, the parents of Nisei, felt obliged to return something to the Nisei. They must naturalize to show their appreciation. The grassroots leader, Toyama Tetsuo, aptly framed the voting rights as "blood tax" paid by brave Nisei solders who fought in the war, got wounded and even lost their lives to prove their loyalty. Thanks to these Nisei, the Issei were finally entitled to naturalize. Toyama did not hesitate to declare that the Issei must make good use of citizenship and exercise the voting rights, otherwise they would ruin their treasure given by the Nisei. In reality, a limited number of Issei went through the naturalization process and exercised their voting rights.

For some Issei, they had waited too long and become too old to go through the troublesome procedures. Therefore, some people framed naturalization as personal matter, and did not naturalize due to personal reasons. However, whether they actually naturalized or not, the majority of Issei felt grateful to those people who actually worked very hard to realize their dream come true of legislation of naturalization and
immigration laws. Hence, a great many people participated in the banquets and fund raising to show their gratitude to those who had worked hard for the legislation. These sentiments of the Issei and Nisei were reported very well in the Hochi pages.

Although the naturalization right and citizenship were finally endowed to the Issei by McCarran-Walter Act, Nisei were born Americans and had a right to participate in American politics. Having more Nisei obtaining important positions as politicians, government administrators, attorneys and judges was a great honor for the Issei and the Japanese community. Chapter 5 discussed the Nisei’s rise in the political and government administrative arenas, and looked at the crucial democratic movements from 1950 to 1954 from the Issei and Japanese community standpoint. Hawaii Hochi clarified that rise of the Nisei in politics had already started well before the Democratic Revolution of 1954. Moreover, the Democrats were already gaining an even or greater power than the Republicans among Nisei politicians before the Democratic Revolution. The study of Hawaii Hochi articles revealed as real time reports that the elder Nisei politicians, who were not necessarily Republicans but many of whom were, lost the 1954 election and the younger Nisei Democrats won the election instead. Hawaii Hochi editors congratulated the success of young Nisei politicians, but regretted the defeat of elder Nisei politicians who had contributed to Hawaii local politics for a considerable time.

What Hawaii Hochi reported was that the alternation of power among the Nisei politicians had just happened in the 1954 election. Behind this dramatic change, various factors worked as political opportunities. The biggest negative factor was the Red Scare. All the other events and campaigns were more or less intertwined and affected each other
as factors of political opportunities. The passage of Naturalization and Immigration laws and discussion of statehood bills functioned as political opportunity for each other.

**Comparisons with McAdam’s Study of the Civil Rights Movement**

The movements for equality among Hawaii’s Japanese community in some ways parallel what McAdam found in his study of the civil rights movement in the United States, but also differs in some respects. Both studies found that the peak movement period could only be understood by seeing how resources were built up within the community over time. Although the particular historical details of the two cases are of course different, the process was quite similar. Like black communities in the American South, Hawaii’s Japanese community developed strong social institutions around education and religion, and developed its own leadership. In McAdam’s case the leadership developed more out of the churches, while in Hawaii’s Japanese community, although there were religious leaders, the secular leaders had a more central role. In both cases, an educated younger generation played a significant role—black college students in the civil rights movement, and returning Nisei veterans educated on the GI Bill in the Hawaii case.

In both cases, local elites in the white community mounted strong campaigns to keep the challenging group from succeeding. In the South there was violence perpetrated by local authorities against civil rights demonstrators; in Hawaii, the Red Scare was used to label the Japanese community, although these are not really comparable. On the other hand, in both cases the challengers benefited from legislation and court decisions at the national level, which supported their claims for equality. Again, the details are different, but in very broad terms the processes look similar.
What seems most different is the nature of the social movement campaigns themselves. The social movements in which Hawaii’s Japanese community was involved in the postwar period were extremely mild, legal efforts to support change. There was no high-risk activism, and even the people who were caught in the Red Scare got out of jail very quickly and were eventually acquitted. Much of the activity was simply fundraising to support political lobbying efforts at the national level. The campaigns that were more complex and creative were aimed internally at the Issei themselves, and thus were not at all confrontational in the larger society. Yet I am convinced that those little internal campaigns to promote naturalization and voter registration did make some difference in the outcome of the 1954 election, just as the much more contentious and dangerous black voter registration drives in the American South helped to change politics there as well.

Framing Processes and Content Analysis

In his original study, McAdam did not pay much attention to framing processes, and framing theory was not developed fully until later. He referred to “cognitive liberation” as making it possible for people to become active in social movements, but he did not really develop the idea into an effective theoretical tool. Yet framing processes have now been fully included in the revised political process model that McAdam and many other social movement scholars use. Those later development in framing theory were significant for this study, and in that sense helped me go beyond the original model McAdam provided.

Through the concept of framing processes I could see not only how the collective identity of the Japanese community changed over time, but also how particular issues were presented, or framed, in ways that had strong emotional power for the Issei. Ethnic pride was part of their basic collective identity and made them hate the stigma of being
aliens ineligible for citizenship. Yet it was the framing of statehood for Hawaii and naturalization rights for themselves as ways to wipe away that stigma that helped to mobilize them into social movement campaigns to change those laws in the U.S. Congress. As a counter-movement by those who stood to lose power if the challengers succeeded, the Red Scare tried to label or frame the Japanese community as tainted by communism and not suitable to participate in American society. The way the Japanese community dealt with that problem reflected their discomfort over trying to demonstrate that they were good and loyal Americans while not abandoning members of their community who were in trouble. The Red Scare gave them further motivation to achieve equality through naturalization for the Issei and statehood for Hawaii.

When the social movement campaigns became completely local, as in the promotion of naturalization and voting registration, the way these issues were framed to appeal to the Issei became very clear in the newspaper accounts. It came out in the particular Japanese phrases they used to convey meanings that had powerful emotional impact because they linked the actions to important cultural values such as filial piety and the obligation to return gifts and favors. I also used the concept of framing to understand that the Issei regarded the results of the momentous election of 1954 as a generational transfer from older to younger Nisei, rather than as a sharp change in political parties. I think one reason McAdam did not do more with his concept of “cognitive liberation” and turn it into a more complete concept of framing is that he was much farther removed from the kinds of primary materials I used. While he did do a systematic content analysis in order to see the trend of civil rights activities, he used only the index of the New York Times for his analysis.
What enabled this dissertation to stand on the Issei standpoint to look at the postwar social movements in Hawaii was the close content analysis of *Hawaii Hochi*, a Japanese vernacular newspaper. Through studying the total number of more than 4,200 articles between 1950 and 1954 in *Hochi*, I came to understand the editors’ feelings and opinions. I could also see what the readers were interested in reading in the vernacular newspapers. The role of *Hawaii Hochi* as a community newspaper was quite clear. The vernacular newspaper *Hawaii Hochi* played a role not only of information provider but also as a promoter of the community oriented campaigns, or sometimes as a promoter to involve Japanese community members as an integral part in the Territory-wide statehood campaign.

*Hawaii Hochi* has offered insight into the democratic movements that caused the major structural changes in the larger society of Hawaii. These were collective movements that also included interacting small and meso-level campaigns and drives within the Japanese community. Only the close reading of articles written in the mother language of the writers and readers of the *Hawaii Hochi* could show the real sentiments and understandings of those people toward particular events. Articles and letters in the vernacular community newspaper were especially helpful in studying the framing process. For a study using the political process model on small and meso-level social movements within a particular ethnic community of the larger society, analyzing vernacular community newspapers proved to be a powerful tool. How much the Japanese Issei and Nisei expressed values such as ethnic pride and self-esteem, and democratic values of equality and freedom was more than clear in the *Hochi* pages. Also strong Japanese values such as filial piety or gift of blood tax, permeated the *Hochi*.
New Insights into the Democratic Revolution in Hawaii

This dissertation on democratic and social movements in postwar Hawaii has shed a new spotlight on the postwar structural changes, and clarified some aspects of the movements that the existing analyses of Democratic Revolution had never included (Aguiar 1996; Fuchs 1961; Hazama 1986; Kotani 1985; Phillips 1982; Ariyoshi 1997; Beechert and Beechert 2000; Boylan and Holmes 2000; Coffman 2003; Inouye 1967). The new spotlight was only available through systematic content analysis of articles of the vernacular community newspaper, Hawaii Hochi.

First, this dissertation clarified the relations between various small and meso-level social campaigns within the Japanese community for the acquisition of equality, on the one hand, and the larger scale social and democratic movements that affected the social structure of the whole society of Hawaii, on the other hand. Within the Japanese community, there were active campaigns supporting the Naturalization and Immigration legislation, followed by a unique naturalization promotion campaign and voting promotion campaign. The discussion of passage of the Naturalization and Immigration legislation was included in the history of contributions of the JACL, which were written from the standpoint of the JACL, the JACL-ADC, and sometimes Mike Masaoka, the lobbyist. However, these campaigns were never treated as relevant social movements within the study of Hawaii's postwar Japanese community or of Hawaii as a whole. In short, these local campaigns were hardly written about in detail in the existent literature either on postwar social movements in Hawaii or on the Japanese community in Hawaii. In this sense, this dissertation has added new aspects to the study of postwar social movements in Hawaii.
Second, this dissertation has clarified the Red Scare influences in Hawaii’s Japanese community through the primary source of *Hawaii Hochi* articles. Various social campaigns and movements by the Japanese community people for the purpose of becoming equal to the other Americans were strongly affected by the Red Scare atmosphere in the society of Hawaii. At the same time, the Japanese community was supporting the new generation of younger Nisei political figures in getting ahead in Hawaii’s larger society. The Red Scare also cast somewhat of a dark shadow on some of these new Nisei politicians, and people in the Japanese community showed their sincere concerns. The study of this aspect of the Red Scare on the Japanese community breaks new ground as it clarifies how the impact of the Red Scare became linked to their aspirations for equality.

Third, this dissertation offered a new interpretation of the Democratic Revolution of 1954 as the alternation of the leadership from the elder Nisei to the younger Nisei. The existing literature on the Democratic Revolution has placed too much emphasis on the revolutionary aspect of the landslide victory of the Democrats in the 1954 election. The active Democratic politicians who contributed enormously to Hawaii’s eventual statehood, democratization of Hawaii society including land and tax reforms, and so forth after the Revolution turned out to be the ones who had been strongly connected to the 1954 victory of the Democratic Party. This might be one of the reasons the names of elder Nisei politicians who had contributed to Hawaii local politics prior to 1954 have become underestimated. Focusing so heavily on Burns and his Nisei Democratic group made one overlook the great contributions of elder Nisei politicians, some of whom even started their careers in prewar years. *Hawaii Hochi* articles suggested that their
contribution should be more fully studied in the modern Hawaii political history. With their prewar contributions to open the cracks in the wall of powerful white Americans in the political arena, young Nisei Democratic candidates more easily went into this arena as novice politicians after the war. Tom Coffman (2003) was right in pointing out the importance of success of Republican Nisei politicians prior to the Democratic Revolution. He said, “This drama of the Democratic story, combined with errors in written history, have obscured this trend of increasing AJA success within the Republican party prior to 1954” (Coffman 2003, 152).35

I would like to point out here again that among the Nisei politicians, the number of Democrats winning the elections was increasing prior to the 1954 revolution. If we just look at those elected to the Territorial Legislature, even among the Nisei politicians the number of the winning Republicans was still larger in the 1950 and 1952 elections, though Democrats were increasing. However, if we include the elective offices of City and County levels, the number of winning Nisei Democrats was already even with that of Republican Nisei in the 1950 and 1952 elections. At the City and County levels, the Democrats had already become strong among Japanese politicians. And in the 1954 election, the Democrats increased the number of winning candidates especially at the Territorial level, which contributed to the sharp increase of the number of winning Democrats in total.

I would also repeat that in the 1954 election, at all the levels of Territorial, City and County government, more incumbent and elder Nisei politicians lost and the young

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35 As an example of errors in written history, Coffman provided the evidence as below. “For example, Burns’ biography, describing the oppressive atmosphere for AJA in 1941, says, ‘None served in the territorial legislature’” (Coffman 2003, 152).
novice Nisei came in. Judging from the contents of *Hawaii Hochi* articles, the Democrats won partly because the strategy of the Democrats to reach out to the Issei new citizens worked well, as my analysis of the advertisements in the *Hochi* showed. From the eyes of the Issei and elder Nisei residents, what happened in the 1954 election was the alternation of the power from the elder Nisei politicians to the younger Nisei politicians, and most of the latter were Democrats.

And again I would like to emphasize that behind the outstanding contributions and activities of these elder and younger Nisei politicians, the old Issei were there, supporting their Nisei children wholeheartedly. The Issei generation was not fading away so soon in the postwar period. After the war, Japanese community organizations revived and played their own roles with some former Issei leaders and new Nisei leaders with good command of Japanese. The Issei were still active in supporting the activities of their Nisei children, of whom they were very proud. The Issei were still powerful in the Japanese community at least until the mid-1950s even though not as much as in prewar years. And they were still deeply respected as elders by their Nisei children.

What enabled the successful social movements in Hawaii’s Japanese community as well as in the whole Hawaii society in the immediate postwar years was the challenging spirit passed on from the political Issei mobilizers, to the elder Nisei politicians and labor organizers, and then in turn to the young Nisei politicians and challengers. They all shared the goal that they must realize the democratic Hawaii where all people were treated equally.
# Table 1. Immigrant Arrivals in Hawaii, 1852-1899

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>56,700</td>
<td>1852-1897</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>68,279</td>
<td>1885-1899</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td>1878-1886</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Island</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>1878-1885</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1882-1885</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>146,279</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Party Membership of Territorial Legislators, 1901-1959

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislative Session</th>
<th>Representatives</th>
<th></th>
<th>Senators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Elected Politicians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>Johnny Wilson, Leon Sterling, Sr., Noble Kaushare, Abe Kasohisa, Dr. Shigemitsu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>John M Asling, Richard Lyman, County Chairman, J. Pim Cookett, James Burgess</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. List of Elected Politicians at Elections, 1950–1954

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1954</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Johnny Wilson</td>
<td>Joseph Farnsworth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Noble Kashame, Kido Mitsuoyuki, Taahboli Matau</td>
<td>Duke Kahamamoku, Milton Beamer, Nicholas Teves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Edwin De Silva, Salah Sabluohl</td>
<td>Richard Lyman, Ota Shiroishi, Robert Hida, Yoshide Yoshibu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>County Chairman, County Clerk</td>
<td>County Chairman, County Clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>County Chairman, County Treasurer</td>
<td>County Auditor, County Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John Bulge, Edmund Tanimoto, John Taga</td>
<td>Frances S. Kang, Foster Robinson, Sam Aia, Sr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>County Chairman, County Attorney</td>
<td>County Clerk, County Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arashiro Matau, Marita Matau, Okura Tanotao, Raymond Souza, Watanabe Katata</td>
<td>Frances Ching, 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senators: Herbert Lee, Abe Kazuhisa, William Hoag, John Duerin</td>
<td>Ben Dillingham, Sagaki Ryozo, Anaal Toaklu, Miyoza Naboru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Carl Kaohi, Leon Stirling, Sr.</td>
<td>Duke Kahamamoku, Milton Beamer, Nicholas Teves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Edwin De Silva, Salah Sabluohl</td>
<td>Richard Lyman, Ota Shiroishi, Robert Hida, Yoshide Yoshibu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>County Chairman, County Clerk</td>
<td>County Chairman, County Clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>County Chairman, County Treasurer</td>
<td>County Auditor, County Treasurer</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John Bulge, Edmund Tanimoto, John Taga</td>
<td>Frances S. Kang, Foster Robinson, Sam Aia, Sr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>County Chairman, County Attorney</td>
<td>County Clerk, County Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arashiro Matau, Marita Matau, Okura Tanotao, Raymond Souza, Watanabe Katata</td>
<td>Frances Ching, 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senators: Herbert Lee, Abe Kazuhisa, William Hoag, John Duerin</td>
<td>Ben Dillingham, Sagaki Ryozo, Anaal Toaklu, Miyoza Naboru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Oahu</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Mayor of Honolulu</td>
<td>City and County Chairmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>City and County Clerk</td>
<td>City and County Clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>City and County Clerk</td>
<td>City and County Clerk</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>City and County Clerk</td>
<td>City and County Clerk</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>City and County Clerk</td>
<td>City and County Clerk</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4. Hawaii Politics and Nisei Politicians, 1950-1954

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1950 (election yr)</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1952 (P. election yr)</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1954 (election yr)</th>
<th>1955</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US President</td>
<td>Truman (D)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Eisenhower (R)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor HI</td>
<td>Stainback (D)</td>
<td>Long (D)</td>
<td></td>
<td>King (R)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI Delegate to Congress</td>
<td>Joseph Farrington</td>
<td></td>
<td>Joseph Farrington (R)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Betty Farrington</td>
<td>Betty Farrington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(D)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(R)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(R)</td>
<td>(R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hi Terr. Senate</td>
<td>Democrat (6)</td>
<td>Democrat (6)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Democrat (7)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dem. (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republican (9)</td>
<td>Republican (9)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Republican (8)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rep. (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hi Terr. House</td>
<td>Democrat (10)</td>
<td>Democrat (9)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Democrat (11)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dem. (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republican (20)</td>
<td>Republican (21)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Republican (19)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rep. (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nisei in HI local politics</td>
<td>Democrat (11)</td>
<td>Democrat (12)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Democrat (15+1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Democrat (31+1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Territory, City, County)</td>
<td>Republican (12+1)*</td>
<td>Republican (11+1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Republican (15+1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Republican (5+3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* (12+1) means that 12 won the seat at the election and 1 stayed as Senator since Senators were on 4 year terms.
Figure 1. Japanese Successful Candidates in Elections

- Victory at General
Figure 4: General Trend of Naturalization Related Articles
Figure 5. Repatriation and Citizenship Recovery in Hawai‘i. Hōdō
Figure 6. Naturalization & Immigration Act and War Bride Series

Number of arrivals over time.
Figure 8: Votng Class in Hawktocit
Figure 9. Japanese Victories in Primary and General Elections

- JP declared candidacy
- Victory at Primary
- Victory at General
Figure 10. Election-related articles in newspapers.
Figure 11. Advertisements for Candidates in Hawaii Hochi

- English Ads JP candidates
- English Ads non-JP candidates
- Japanese Ads JP candidates
- Japanese Ads non-JP candidates

Legend:
- English Ads JP candidates
- English Ads non-JP candidates
- Japanese Ads JP candidates
- Japanese Ads non-JP candidates
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303