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EMPLOYING SYSTEMATICALLY SELECTED MEMBERS OF
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ELECTORATE.

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STYLE AND POSITION ISSUES: A FIELD EXPERIMENT
EMPLOYING SYSTEMATICALLY SELECTED
MEMBERS OF THE OAHU (CITY
AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU)
ELECTORATE

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE
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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
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PREFACE

This study was supported in part by a grant from the Graduate Research Committee, Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii. The writer wishes to express his indebtedness to five persevering interviewers--Sue Ann Higa, Lynne Norris, Sylvia Shimizu, Noreen Takara, and Rosemarie Zimmer--for their assistance in this research endeavor. Special thanks also go to Mrs. Pat Pila and her staff at Hawaiian Telephone, Jerry Hirokane at the University's Statistical and Computing Center, Richard Pratt and Charles Wall for computer assistance, Earl Babbie for helpful comments in the construction of the questionnaire, and Mrs. Betty Wilson for preparing the manuscript.
ABSTRACT

The intent of this study is to explain after systematic investigation voters' perceptions of political issues and issue appeals. Many past studies have attempted to show how any why persons vote for certain candidates and/or affiliate with specific parties. This particular research tries to go one step further by delineating voters' perceptual processes and by charting their underlined political belief or issue clusters. While only eight issues are employed and while only members of the Oahu electorate are utilized, the findings suggest that voters have definite attitudes on issues which predispose them to behave the way they do, at least under field experimental conditions. Further research is needed to substantiate these initial findings.
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CHAPTER I

STYLE AND POSITION ISSUES

A. Introduction

Since the publication of The People's Choice in 1944, political scientists increasingly have uncovered significant relationships between voters' attitudes and behavior. This study, an effort to add to that accumulating knowledge, focuses on the topic of political issues and utilizes a field experiment, a modified form of the sample survey.

Addressing itself specifically to political issues, this study incorporates social psychological literature on perception and political studies on partisanship and other key variables. It, in essence, attempts to bridge the gap between the two disciplines by investigating voters' perception of political issues.

The employment of the field experiment seemed efficacious for two primary reasons. On the one hand, its usage enabled the researcher to "experimentally" control the issues which the voters perceived. Four hundred and thirty-five systematically selected voters on the island of Oahu (City and County of Honolulu) stated: 1) which issues they perceived to be favored by the Republican party, the Democratic party, or by both parties; 2) which issues were relatively important and relatively unimportant to them, and 3) what types of hypothetical issue appeals, based on two different types of political issues, they preferred. This
research strategy, lacking the strict controls and scientific rigor of experiments and quasi-experiments, has been loosely termed a field experiment since some variables, issues in this case, are manipulated by the researcher.

On the other hand, employment of the field experiment enabled the researcher to transcend the research environment of the laboratory. Its emphasis is on the "field," rather than on the "experiment." No attempt, for example, is made to manipulate the 435 registered voters who participated in the study nor to measure perceptions of issues by voters in experimental and control groups. The perceptions, which the 435 voters had of two general types of political issues, were the foci of the field experiment.

Having grasped the general nature of the study, it is worthwhile briefly to introduce the participating subjects and the primary stimuli or variables in this field experiment, and then to present an overview of the chapters in this research report. A systematically selected sample of 435 registered voters participated in the field experiment which was conducted via two complementary telephone interviews of five and thirty minutes duration respectively. Each of the respondents stated how he perceived two different types of political issues, style and position issues. The former are emotionally charged, abstract, short-term, bipartisan (or nonpartisan) issues; the latter are historically conditioned, concrete, long-lasting, partisan
issues.

At the outset this researcher desires to warn the reader that he should not expect the issues in the study to be much more than experimental objects. They mainly are incorporated into the field experiment to measure how different voters perceive two different types of political issues. To many persons the style issues are mere campaign rhetoric; they are pleasing stimuli to many voters who need emotional assurances and psychological reinforcements—not issues in the strict sense of the term.

Similarly, the reader should not expect the position issues to be the foremost political controversies of the day. They instead are partisan issues which have been associated with the Republican or the Democratic party for a sustained period of time. They have experimental value since extensive pretests have shown that the position issues which were utilized in the field experiment divide Oahu voters along partisan lines.

To sum up, it is hypothesized that there are basic differences between style and position issues; that there are fundamental differences between members of the electorate; and that it is worthwhile to explore how different issues affect different voters or, conversely, how various types of voters perceive the two types of political issues.

What, the reader might justly ask, is the value of such research? First, by incorporating social psychological
and political science methodologies and hypotheses, this study examines voters' (partisan) perception of political issues from an eclectic perspective. It does not confine itself to one discipline of the behavioral sciences; it is an integrative study.

Second, by employing the field experiment it is possible to focus directly on voters' perception of political issues without the multiple political stimuli of an election campaign. Such diverse and competing stimuli, coupled with psychological forces such as cross-pressures, do not permit the researcher to observe, measure, and compare voters' perceptions of political issues with accuracy. Such intervening variables contaminate the relationships that the analyst is trying to isolate and to chart. Thus, there is a definite methodological rationale for the employment of the field experiment.

Third, by examining voters' perceptions of political issues and their attitudes toward specific ideological stances, such as those incorporated into the Survey Research Center's (Michigan) Domestic Social Welfare Scale of 1960, it is possible to glean some insights into the beliefs and attitudes which underlie partisan affiliation. While many studies have demonstrated that partisanship colors perceptions of issues, few studies have shown how the latter predispose voters to associate with a particular political party. Showing causality between such variables is beyond
the scope of this research. Nevertheless, the reader is alerted to the possibility that perception of issues may affect partisanship, as well as vice-versa.

Fourth, if perception of issues partially determines direction and intensity of party affiliation and if partisanship, in turn, influences perception, then we would expect to find substantial and significant differences among the perceptions of political issues by different types of voters. In fact, investigating the similarities and dissimilarities between partisans and independents who lean toward a particular political party is one of the major concerns of this study.

Last, another motivation for undertaking this research was its potential contribution to the evolution of behavioral science in general and political science in particular. Social sciences, like the natural sciences, evolve as experiments and studies are conducted to find new relationships--i.e., to enlarge upon past findings. This study is no exception. By measuring voters' perceptions of political issues and their political predispositions, it is possible to gain insights into their political behavior. Such knowledge promotes explanation and prediction which are valued by both the political scientist and the professional politician. Hopefully this research endeavor will provide some new information which will be helpful to each.
B. Overview of Chapters

The present research report begins with an attempt to define the term "political issue" and to differentiate between two major types of issues, style and position ones, in the latter portion of this chapter.

In the second chapter past studies concerning voters' perceptions of issues and parties will be examined. Three theses will be discussed. One relates issues to objective external stimuli that impinge upon a person's thinking and cause him to make decisions on the basis of those stimuli—in other words, a voter decides on the basis of political issues which party he will support. Another thesis, the antithesis of the first, states that external stimuli or issues have minimal effects on voters who rely on subjective attitudes and values, such as party allegiance, to guide them. They interpret political stimuli as they desire to interpret them—on the basis of subjective beliefs and preferences. The third thesis does not concern perception of issues per se; it rather hypothesizes that voters are conditioned by many factors—parental, socio-economic, political, ethnic—to align with one political party or the other. Issues may arouse such voters, but their main guidelines are the differences that they perceive between the two parties. Perceiving such differences, objectively and/or subjectively effects, in turn, their perception of political issues. Thus, the third thesis is a combination of the other two.
In order to make the findings more meaningful and useful, Chapter three describes the research site and the population from which the sample was drawn. Understanding voters and their specific political environment enhances comprehension of their attitudes toward political parties and facilitates explanation of their reactions to style and position issues.

Chapter four discusses the criteria which were employed to select the sample and the manner in which the respondents were interviewed. In addition, the nature of the questionnaire, which formed the backbone of the field experiment, is presented.

Chapter five, after critically reviewing past research concerning voters' perceptions of style and position issues, presents some of the major findings of this study. It demonstrates how different types of voters perceive different types of political issues. It juxtaposes style and position issues and measures voters' perceptions of each type of political issue. By simultaneously examining both style and position issues chapter five not only offers empirical evidence for various hypotheses but also promotes conceptual clarity by giving explicit meaning to both style and position issues and to the kinds of voters which seem to favor each type of political issue.

Chapter six continues our investigation of the two types of issues by measuring the relative importance of each
of the eight issues that were utilized in the field experiment for different types of partisans. Intra-party issue clusters are delineated by small space analysis. In addition, the effect of issues on voting behavior is explored by constructing different indices of issue importance and relating them to hypothetical candidate choices.

In chapter seven an attempt is made to relate issues and perceptions of them to larger concerns such as ideological orientations and socio-economic bifurcations. For example, attitudes on the Survey Research Center's Domestic Social Welfare Scale of 1960 are examined; and the relative importance of ethnicity and partisanship on Oahu is discussed.

Last, chapter eight will summarize in propositions the major findings of this research and will suggest areas for future research. In addition, it will offer arguments to establish the place of the field experiment and telephone interview in survey research.

C. Conceptualization of Style and Position Issues

What do we mean by political issues? Many political scientists probably would be unable to offer a suitable definition of political issues since the discipline has neglected to study issues in any comprehensive, thorough manner. During the last two decades, for example, political scientists mainly have conducted "voting studies," correlating personal traits and political predispositions with
votes,¹ have examined citizens' attitudes vis-a-vis political systems;² and have investigated the relationships between political participants and parties.³

This study concerns a topic which political scientists have not investigated systematically: political issues. While there have been numerous studies that have dealt with political issues in specific elections,⁴ with political issues in roll-call analyses,⁵ and with political issues as components of ideologies,⁶ there has been no study which has addressed itself completely to the study of political issues.

Consequently, political issues have remained a poorly defined concept and an elusive variable. What is a political issue? In 1947, White defined issue, supposedly political, as:

A question of public policy in which there are two or more alternatives upon which members of a legislative body may vote, or upon which the public may express its choice, either directly, as in a referendum, or indirectly, by electing representative officials pledged to carry out certain alternatives.⁷

What is wrong with White's definition? First, it equates issue with public policy which is an erroneous conception. Public policies are not necessarily issues, nor do issues necessarily correlate with policy outputs. Second, many issues, at least campaign ones, never come up for vote. In fact, many prime issues during an election campaign dissolve or fade away after that particular contest. Similarly, the
public, not the entire electorate by any means, often does not express itself on issues. In fact, many voters are not cognizant of major issues nor of party cues regarding those issues. Third, issues must be considered in relation to the historical evolution of the two parties and the socialization experiences of voters. Issues are not isolated entities devoid of subjective content.

Perhaps standard dictionary definitions of "political" and "issue" would be more beneficial than searching for piecemeal definitions in the literature of political science. The American College Dictionary, while providing no noteworthy assistance in defining "issue"—at least, in a political context—defines "political" as: 1) pertaining to or dealing with the science or art of politics; 2) pertaining to or connected with a political party or its principles, aims, and activities; 3) of or pertaining to the state or its government; 4) affecting or involving the state or government; and 5) of or pertaining to citizens.

Examining the various definitions of "political," the first appears tautological. Moreover, it escapes closure by introducing another question, "What is politics?", which is beyond the scope of this research. Definition three unfortunately has a specific orientation toward the political system which confines its usage with the word "issue" and which carries the implication that the state rather than the individual citizen is the main party to the issue. It is
too legalistic for the purposes of this study.

The other three definitions of "political" however, offer some guidelines. "Political" involves people, parties, and their government; each of which may be given prime emphasis at a particular time and/or under specific circumstances.

Defining "issue" is more problematic because it is such an abstract, eclectic term. Restricting a definition of issue, however, is necessary in order to promote conceptual clarification of the term, "political issue."

In this study, political issues will be defined as partisan matters upon which voters have different opinions and upon which their differences of opinion have varying degrees of intensity at different times. That definition is appropriate for this research, for it implies that voters' concern about political issues has both direction and intensity. In layman's terms, it suggests that voters associate issues with one or the other of the political parties and/or with themselves as partisans, and that they value certain issues in varying degrees depending on the nature of the issue and its importance to them.

Having defined "political issue" it is now appropriate and logical to inquire whether there are different types of political issues. Here the literature of political science offers some guidelines. In Voting, Berelson et al. define style and position issues; McClosky et al. examine party
leaders' and followers' attitudes toward various issues in a national survey; Froman discusses the two types of issues in *People and Politics*, and Froman and Skipper conduct empirical research which results in two monographs concerning style and position issues. And, while other writers discuss different types of issues, they all seem to fall within the general classification of either style or position issues.

To understand and utilize the classification style and position issues, they must be defined. Berelson et al. originally stated:

In general, one type of issue refers to the question "In whose style should the government be run?" whereas the other type refers to the question, "In whose interest should the government be run?" Position issues cannot be "created" by propaganda as can style issues; they are more likely to arise out of socio-economic conditions. And political parties can only take a stand in reference to them, whereas they more often "invent" the issues that are associated with style. Historically, position issues seem to have such strength because economic conditions call them forth with such cogency.

Berelson et al. also make the following distinctions:
Style Issues | Position Issues
---|---
2. Matters of style, taste, way of life. | 2. Matters of money and material power.  
3. Short-range, reference to present, topical | 3. Long-range, reference to past, historical  
4. Indirect, subjective, symbolic gratification for successful group. | 4. Direct, objective, tangible gains for successful group.  

After Berelson et al. Froman added conceptual clarity to the meaning of style and position issues. Borrowing heavily from Edelman's monograph "Symbols and Political Quiescence," and Himmelstrand's Social Pressures, Attitudes, and Democratic Processes, Froman writes:

Style issues are primarily useful in the distribution of symbolic rewards and punishments. By symbolic I mean advantages and disadvantages that have little impact on the lives of people. Position issues, on the other hand, are primarily useful in the distribution of material rewards and punishments. By "material" I mean advantages and disadvantages that tend to have relatively large, immediate consequences on the lives of a number of people.

Using the formulations of Berelson et al. and Froman as guidelines it now is possible to define style and position as they will be considered in the context of this study. Style issues are political appeals which carry no noteworthy historical nor partisan meaning; they are abstract electoral appeals which arouse emotional reactions from voters and which address themselves well to voters'
psychological needs. Style issues often are short-term ones, reaching a crescendo at election time. Style issues, it should be stated, do not include emotive symbols such as the Constitution or "Old Glory."

Position issues, on the other hand, are political appeals which carry noteworthy historical and partisan meaning; they are concrete electoral appeals which arouse cost-benefit, self-interest reactions from voters and which address themselves well to voters material needs. Position issues often are long-term ones, usually being salient to most voters.

D. Voters and Political Issues

To further grasp the nature of style and position issues it is worthwhile to examine what types of voters are attracted to each type of issue. Indeed, many of Berelson et al's and Froman's conceptualizations were borne after analyzing the people to whom each type of issue was appealing.

In this area Himmelstrand is most instructive; for he has conceptualized voters "inputs" and their desired "out-takes," to use Milbrath's terms, from the political system. Basically Himmelstrand's conceptualization divides voters into two types: those who have an "instrumental attitude toward politics" and those who have an "expressive concern for politics."

The person with an expressive concern for politics is
interested in political affairs for immediate gratifications. The type of gratifications vary from voting to telling friends good points about the political party with which he is affiliated. Usually the voter with expressive concerns, however, receives most of his gratifications through distant symbols or from people acting as symbol carriers.

The person who has an instrumental attitude towards politics, on the other hand, is interested in concrete political actions. He keeps himself relatively well informed about politics and participates in the political arena as a "gladiator" or "active spectator," to employ Milbrath's terms again. As Himmelstrand writes:

> The instrumentally oriented man in the street... is not seriously concerned with more or less attractive verbiage or with electoral campaigns and actual voting as occasions for ritualistic gratifications. He is gratified only at occasions when he observes that a political goal, set up by the party he has been voting for, actually is attained or seems close at hand.17

> It should be apparent that the person with an expressive concern for politics probably would be attracted by style issues, while a person with an instrumental attitude toward politics would be impressed by position issues.

Indeed, what Himmelstrand calls partisan symbol acts are very similar to perceptions of style issues by voters with strong party affiliations. As Himmelstrand succinctly writes, "Search for expression (issues which please a person from a psychological standpoint) rather than for information
and for instrumental performance (weighing position issues in terms of self-interest criteria) is the mark of such an (expressive) orientation.  

Himmelstrand's conceptualization of the process of amplification, similar to a heightened interest in politics in general and issues in particular at election time, also relates to the study of style and position issues and to investigations concerning which type of voter prefers each. He writes:

For the process of amplification to occur in a subject with an expressive concern for politics, this subject will be less dependent on the quantity and quality of the information on political parties imparted with the relevant social pressures than will a subject with an instrumental concern for politics. For the process of amplification to occur in a subject with an instrumental concern, this subject will be dependent on (a) the availability of sufficient quantities of unambiguous and relevant information concerning political parties, and (b) on the opportunity to consider, digest, and to organize this information so that it will establish and confirm the expectations of the subject that this or that particular party is worth voting for. To the subject with an instrumental concern, then, the process of amplification will not take place except as a consequence of cognitive confirmation. This may be contrasted again with the amplifying as displayed in a subject with an expressive concern. A minimum amount of rather diffuse or even somewhat contradictory information may be sufficient for this subject to project the motivational energies underlying his expressive concern into a definite partisanship.

Similarly, Himmelstrand's categorization of instrumental political participation as dynamic and continuous, and of expressive political participation as static and periodic (at election time) is highly reminiscent of the gladiator--
active spectator and passive-spectator--apathetic bifurcation.\textsuperscript{20}

As a means of integration at this point, it seems beneficial: 1) to construct a table based on the conceptualizations that have been discussed, and 2) to relate the work of other political scientists--such as Froman, Edelman, Pranger, McClosky--to those conceptualizations.

**TABLE I**

**A TYPOLOGY OF VOTERS AND ISSUES**

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<td>Voters with both expressive concern and instrumental attitude</td>
<td>Voters with instrumental attitude</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apathetics and Passive Spectators</td>
<td>Active Spectators</td>
<td>Gladiators</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inactive Partisans</td>
<td>Active Partisans who are not leaders</td>
<td>Party Leaders</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consumers, mass public</td>
<td>Interest-group members</td>
<td>Political-economic decision-makers</td>
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In *People and Politics*, Froman argues that followers, as opposed to party leaders, are more likely to be satisfied with symbolic gratifications. He writes:

> Followers have few beliefs connected with their attitudes about group (party) life, their values are less numerous and less intense, their attitudes are weaker. Also they are less knowledgeable and less able to see the relevance of group (party) activities and participate less in them. The kinds of issues that they are likely to get excited about are broad, general, moral questions--that is, style issues?\textsuperscript{21}
Concerning leaders, Froman argues they often try to cast issues in style form; for they know that the tensions, produced by style issues (ending war, averting depressions, abolishing corruption in government, stopping communism, keeping economy strong, making sure there is no "missile gap") tend to be reduced by symbolic and emotional gratifications. 22

Edelman, whose ideas Froman borrowed, further explains expressive political behavior. He states, "As the world can be neither understood nor influenced, attachment to reassuring abstract symbols (support of tension-reducing style issues?) rather than one's own effort becomes chronic." 23 Moreover, suggesting a reason why partisans tend to "pull" style issues to their own party, Edelman writes: "It is wholly in line with findings of experimental and empirical research on perception to conclude that in an ambiguous situation people may, as a result of their own anxieties, perceive a leader's acts (candidate's issue pronouncements?) to be what they want them to be (or perceptions that style issues, which they favor, are supported by their candidate and/or their political party?)." 24

Pranger in his book The Eclipse of Citizenship also addresses himself to symbolic or expressive political behavior. Pranger argues that the politics of participation--every voter having some type of "instrumental attitude" toward politics--has been subordinated to the politics of
power in which most voters clutch reassuring symbols offered by the power-holders. While Pranger's treatment of symbolic politics too closely associates style issues with Lasswell's and Kaplan's concepts of symbol and political myth, parts of his central argument are applicable to this study. For example, he argues that representation, often thought of as instrumental political behavior, can easily become expressive:

Under representative government the politics of participation metamorphoses into a variety of spectator politics with audiences and players; the imagery of a "watchful citizenry" applies here. As society grows more complicated, the typical pattern for modern development, representation seems to be the only governmental solution. But such complexity only isolates representatives still more from their constituents and finally destroys representation altogether.23

Needless to say, greater distance between representatives and their constituents, an implied breakdown of the responsible party model, means more reliance on style issues, or, perhaps more appropriately, less emphasis on position issues. Moreover, as Pranger and Edelman both amply document, when distances between leaders and followers become significant, the former become symbol-carriers or symbol-inventors and the latter anxious symbol-recipients.

Turning abruptly to those who engage in instrumental political behavior, Froman shows the relationship between Himmelstrand's formulation and political issues. He writes:

Bargaining is a relationship in which leaders interact with leaders. As such it is characterized by interaction among people who are highly issue-oriented, who are interested in position issues,
who have utilitarian attitudes and knowledge regarding those issues, who feel intensely about issues that affect them, and the people they represent, and who are interested in retaining their own position of leadership.26

Similarly, McClosky hypothesized that leaders of interest groups and other political leaders pay more attention to position issues, the "bread and butter" issues; for such issues have immediate and tangible consequences for them, as well as long-range effects on the political system and on the values of the polity.27

It should be remembered also that rank and file members of political parties or voters in general can have instrumental attitudes toward politics and can put more emphasis on position issues than on style issues. In fact, it is hypothesized that self-interest considerations make issues with tangible economic benefits quite salient and important to voters, depending on the specific nature of the issue and the socio-economic status of the voter.

E. Summary

It is readily seen that, although many political researchers have posited various hypotheses about style and position issues and about voters with expressive concerns and instrumental attitudes, there is a need for more systematic, empirical research. This study is a starting point. It defines style and position issues, pre-tests them, and operationalizes a research design which measures and maps how registered voters on the island of Oahu perceive
the two types of political issues. Moreover, it partially explains why voters perceive political issues the way they do and demonstrates the centrality of partisanship in their perception of such issues.

Criticisms of past studies and further examination of the relations between style and position issues and between "expressives" and "instrumentalists" will be dealt with in chapter five.

Discussion of the field experiment's internal and external validity, to use Campbell's terms, will be postponed until chapter eight. 28
A. Introduction

To date the research of political scientists and social psychologists on political issues has coalesced around two political-social psychological theses. One states that voters evaluate issues and party positions on them on the basis of objective criteria, such as knowledge of the issues and the party stances on them. Since voters make their decisions on the basis of incoming stimuli, this thesis is said to be stimulus-determined.¹

The other major thesis concerning voters' perception of political issues states that voters' evaluations of issues and parties are determined by subjective criteria which reside in the mind of the voter. Such perception is perceiver-determined and is not necessarily related to incoming stimuli.² A person, for example, who always believed that his party supported the issues he favored, without comparing his stand on those issues with his party's stand on them, would be an example of perceiver-determined perception.

The two theses, however, are inadequate and overly social psychological. Therefore the concluding section of this chapter will put forward a new thesis concerning the perception of political issues. It will be termed the syndrome thesis; for it posits that voters over a period of
time develop close-circuited, reinforced belief systems. Such belief systems, it is assumed, are perpetuated by objective stimuli or actual occurrences and by subjective attitudes. Thus a syndrome thesis is a synthesis of the two other theses of perception. The syndrome or perceiver-conditioned thesis, however, does not stress partisanship as the perceiver-determined thesis; it incorporates social, economic, and status considerations to a much greater extent than does the latter. And those considerations, not party affiliation, "color" stimuli.

The rest of this chapter will explain each of the three thesis of perception and will present relevant empirical findings.

B. Stimulus-Determined Thesis

The stimulus-determined thesis hypothesizes that incoming stimuli, issues in this case, become salient to a person who then makes a decision, such as determining which party gives more support to the issue(s) or for which candidate he wants to vote, on the basis of the undistorted meaning of those stimuli.

Berelson et al., describing the Elmira's electorate's evaluations of the importance of political stimuli or issues during the 1948 election year, lend indirect support to the stimulus-determined thesis. They write:
There is a general agreement before the campaign on what the important issues of the election are supposed to be. With a remarkable lack of difference—that may be attributed to the impact of common events and of common communication media—Republicans and Democrats named the same measures as most and least important to their vote decision.⁴

Miller, in his study, "Party Preference and Attitudes on Political Images 1948-1951," however, presents the first substantial evidence for the stimulus-determined thesis vis-a-vis political issues. He discovered that there was a rank-order correlation between candidate preferences and support scores for the Truman administration on both foreign and domestic issues. In other words, the higher the support score the more prone the person to "vote" Democratic and the lower the support score the more prone the person to "vote" Republican. "Votes" were preferences for nameless candidates of one or the other of the two major political parties. Moreover, he found the above relationships held for party changers as well as steadfast partisans. See Table II on the following page.

Miller's findings suggest that people vote for the party or candidate whose (perceived) position on issues, in this case conduct of America's foreign policy, is closer to their own position. In other words, voters evaluate incoming stimuli and then make a decision on the basis of information from those stimuli. They do not let purely partisan considerations distort their perception nor bias their decision.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1948 Vote</th>
<th>1951 Preference</th>
<th>Index of Support for Administration* No. of Pro Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>51</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>50</td>
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<td>R</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>43</td>
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<td>D</td>
<td>R</td>
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<td>I</td>
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<td>36</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No = New Voters and Non-voters  
I = Independents

*The Domestic Support Index was used in connection with the 1948 vote but not in connection with the 1951 preference. Since the latter seemed more applicable to the stimulus-determined thesis and since the 1951 preference was used only in conjunction with foreign issues, the above table was employed as an explanatory device, even though domestic issues, not foreign ones, were utilized in the field experiment.
Miller, himself however, was reluctant to hypothesize that voters behave so rationally in the light of accumulated evidence to the contrary. Thus, he concluded, that "under varying conditions and circumstances political attitudes and party identification may be of different importance to people" and that "different attitudinal areas (such as those involving domestic policies or those involving foreign policies) may, at different times, be of differential importance to people." Indeed, the elections of 1948 and 1952 supported the above conclusion. In 1948 partisan lines were drawn by the two presidential candidates; and those divisions crystallized as the campaign progressed. In 1952, on the other hand, such partisan cleavages were muted. Secondly, in 1948 domestic political attitudes were of prime importance whereas foreign policy concerns eclipsed those domestic attitudes four years later.

Key, in contrast to Miller, was not reluctant to state that the American electorate is rational. In his last book, *The Responsible Electorate*, Key presented the most convincing evidence for the stimulus-determined thesis. He found that both steadfast partisans or "standpatters" and party changers or "switchers" between 1936 and 1960 tended to perceive issues in a relatively unbiased manner and to vote on the basis of that perception.

Key, nevertheless, made a distinction, and an important one, between those who "acquire their policy attitudes more
or less deliberately" and "affiliate with (and vote for) the party whose policy emphasis appear to parallel their own" and those who, being "psychologically identified with a party, adopt those policy outlooks espoused by the most prominent spokesmen of their party."  

The former support the thesis well since they vote for whichever party takes the same issue stands as they do. The latter, which receive stimuli from party leaders, do not support the thesis as strongly; since their psychological affiliation with a particular party is so strong, they might vote for that party even when it did not espouse the same issue stands they do. Nonetheless, since the "acceptance of cues from party leadership" often results in the "alteration of attitudes of party followers," the latter also can be said to be supportive of the stimulus-determined thesis.

Moreover, Key specifically states that partisans who regularly support the party ticket "manifest fairly high agreement to the party positions as popularly conceived."  

Similarly, Key writes that people, in general, vote for the party which they "believe best equipped to handle the most important issues of a particular election," even when they voted for the other party's candidate in the preceding presidential election. These hypotheses, it is evident, are elaborations of more basic hypotheses that were posited by Miller in the early 1950's.

Key further points out, the switchers--constituting
one-fifth to one-eighth of the electorate, having similar educational backgrounds as standpatters, and being just as concerned about the issues as standpatters—resemble the standpatters of the party to which they switched on "major policy issues of wide concern in the population."\textsuperscript{10}

Thus, Key, supporting the stimulus-determined thesis of perception by stating that voters do not blindly follow party lines nor fall for Madison-Avenue gimmicks during campaigns, concludes his argument that voters evaluate political issues (stimuli) on the basis of objective criteria by writing:

This (similarity between switchers and standpatters of the party to which they switched) should be regarded as at least a modicum of evidence for the view that those who switch do so to support governmental policies or outlooks which they agree, not because of psychological or sociological peculiarities.\textsuperscript{11} (The American electorate is not one) straight-jacketed by social determinants or moved by subconscious urges triggered by devilishly skilled propagandists but moved by concern about central and relevant questions of public policy, governmental performance, and executive personality.\textsuperscript{12}

Last, Shapiro's field study of the Oahu electorate during the 1968 election campaign—the only study to date which has juxtaposed the two social-psychological theses of perception in an attempt to discover which one better explains perceptual processes in everyday politics—lends some support to the stimulus-determined thesis.

Shapiro hypothesized that evaluations of five presidential candidates (their distances from the respondents' attributes) would be systematically related to the partisanship of the
respondents if a perceiver-determined perceptual mechanism was operating. Strong partisans, for example, would perceive candidates of their party in a more favorable way than weak partisans who, in turn, would perceive them in more favorable terms than independents. The low correlations which Shapiro found between the partisanship ratings of the candidates and their ratings on personal quality, issue, and interpersonal attributes, demonstrated that partisanship did not account for the major part of the variance.\(^{13}\) And when Shapiro factor analyzed respondents' perceptions of the candidates, he extracted independent, uncorrelated factors which loaded highly on the four different types of attributes, thus further substantiating the thesis that voters did not distort their perceptions of the presidential candidates by "coloring" them subjectively in highly favorable and/or partisan manner.\(^{14}\)

Despite Shapiro's clear-cut findings more research needs to be done to determine the relative importance of stimulus-determined and perceiver-determined theses. In the first place, replication serves as a validity check and promotes conceptual clarity, not to mention higher level theorizing.

In the second place, the timing of Shapiro's study—when five candidates were vying for presidential nominations and when, by virtue of the number of candidates, perceiver-determined or perceptual balancing mechanisms would be less
functional--was inopportune in some respects. After the conventions, it is hypothesized, more perceiver-determined or purely partisan perceptions would exist.

Last, the peculiarities of the 1968 presidential election also may have biased his findings. As Converse writes, "pressing questions of foreign policy" and convergences on domestic matters can hide party differences. Nonetheless, the usefulness of Shapiro's sophisticated methodology and the cross-disciplinary value of his study--social-psychological models and political behavior rarely have been related in the past--should not be underestimated by political scientists nor by social psychologists.

C. The Perceiver--Determined Thesis

The perceiver-determined or perceptual balance thesis, in contrast to the stimulus-determined thesis, hypothesizes that voters simply perceive what they want to perceive. They distort stimuli to fit their own belief systems--which, in politics, means they perceive most stimuli with a partisan bias.

Voters, according to the perceiver-determined thesis, perceive their party to stand for the issues that they favor and for those which they think are important. They perceive the opposing party, on the other hand, to uphold those issues which are unfavorable and/or unimportant to them.

Under the perceiver-determined thesis a person becomes more and more partisanly and perceptually biased as his
political behavior as a member of a party is reinforced. Eventually his reaction to political stimuli becomes a learned partisan response. He becomes more and more conditioned to perceive political positions which he likes to be those of his own party and political stands which he dislikes to be those of the opposing party. As Campbell and his associates write:

If party identification deeply influences the partisan character of a field of psychological forces, it will have marked effects on the internal consistency of the field. Identification with a party raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favorable to his partisan orientation. The stronger the party bond, the more exaggerated the process of selection and perceptual distortion will be.

While social scientists have not ceased to discuss the validity of the concepts--selective exposure, perception, and retention--the general conclusion of the SRC group has been widely accepted.

But, after reaching the above conclusion, the Survey Research Center team--instead of studying the longitudinal effect of perceptual screening or constructing a theory of political attitude formation and change--turns its attention to psychological forces that impinge upon the individual voting act, though it continues to regard partisan affiliation as an "antecedent factor" that "colors" these pre-voting attitudes as they are formed.

This researcher, in general, agrees with Sullivan; the Survey Research Center group has over-emphasized short-term
psychological forces that precede the voting decision and has neglected long-term partisan forces that condition voters' perception and political behavior. Its decision to study "forces operating on the individual just prior to the act of voting" perhaps has lent a "peculiar static cast to theory development," as Sullivan suggests.21

Long-term partisan forces, which are instrumental to the perceiver-determined thesis of perception include: political socialization, partisan reinforcement over a sustained period of time, and learned partisan responses, such as straight-ticket voting.

Ideology, it should be pointed out, is not a long-term partisan force. Being more complex and more subject to change, an ideology can not serve as a perceptual-balancing mechanism as a party can. As Hyman writes, "No matter how well individuals were socialized into any particular ideological position in childhood, such a mode of preparation for adult politics would be inadequate."22 New issues, which ideologies can not subsume, continually emerge. Party, on the other hand, constitutes a suitable, all-encompassing organizing mechanism for such new issues.23

In short, it would not be inappropriate, at least in political affairs, to term the perceiver-determined thesis of perception the party-determined thesis, since partisanship literally determines political perception for many voters.
D. The Syndrome or Perceiver-Conditioned Thesis

The examination of what will be termed the syndrome or perceiver-conditioned thesis of perception will be divided into four parts: 1) the effects of past events on political perceptions as viewed by political scientists, 2) the implications of Centers' interest group theory of social classes for partisanship and political perception, 3) a recapitulation of Lind's findings about socio-economic status differentiation in Hawaii, and finally 4) the present development of social class and status consistency as relevant concepts in sociological literature. While this approach to the syndrome or perceiver-conditioned thesis of perception lacks coherence, it will help to incorporate past and present research into some theoretical structure before examining in the next chapter the functioning of syndrome-like political phenomena in Hawaii during the last century.

Political science lacks a developmental psychology of political attitudes. Berelson et al. have described the vote as a "moving average" of reactions to the political past.24 Campbell et al. in The Voter Decides write: "Every new event is perceived against a background of attitudes and predispositions of which the individual himself may be only dimly aware. Perceiving is a highly selective process influenced both by past experience and present needs."25 Similarly, Key states:
Engulfed by a campaign fallout composed chiefly of fluffy and foggy political stimuli, the voter tends to let himself be guided by underlying and durable identifications, group loyalties, and preferences rather than the meaningless and fuzzy buzz of the transient moment.

The fact remains, however, that political scientists need to know more about voters' "political pasts," their past "attitudes and predispositions," and their "underlying and durable identifications, group loyalties, and preferences." Longitudinal and/or panel studies have not been stressed; consequently, many political scientists have not been cognizant of the development and nourishment of political attitudes.

And despite the finding that most voters in response to open-ended questions seldom relate policy issues to party stands many perceive important differences between the two major parties. For example, Stokes et al., describing the 1952 presidential election, write:

Despite the appearance of new personalities and the Korean War, the experience of the Great Depression and the New Deal left three apparent marks on the attitudes of those in our sample of 1952. First of all, there was a strong residue of good feeling toward the Democratic Party and hostility toward the Republican Party on the basis of the groups each was thought to favor. The Democratic Party was widely perceived was the friend of lower status groups in the population; the Republican Party in opposite terms. The second imprint of the depression experience was the Republican Party as the party of depression. Great numbers of responses associated the Democrats with good times, and the Republicans with economic distress. The third legacy of the immediate past was a wide measure of approval for the domestic policies of the New Deal and the Fair Deal. Despite the
trouble most people have in giving particular answers to open-ended questions, large numbers in our sample in 1952 cited specific domestic policies as reasons for approving the Democratic Party. 29

In short, the syndrome thesis hypothesizes that social and economic considerations, such as status bifurcations and political divisions based on economic self-interest, still divide the electorate and influence voters' perceptions of political issues.

Centers, perhaps more than any other social scientist, laid the foundation for such a thesis. In The Psychology of Social Classes he describes his interest-group theory that is nearly synonymous with the syndrome or perceiver-conditioned thesis. He writes:

This theory implies that a person's status and role with respect to the economic processes of society impose upon him certain attitudes, values, and interests relating to his role and status in the political and economic sphere. It holds, further, that the status and role of the individual in relation to the means of production and the exchange of goods and services gives rise in him to a consciousness of membership in some social class which shares those attitudes, values, and interests.

. . . Class, as distinguished from stratum, can well be regarded as a psychological phenomenon in the fullest sense of the term. That is, a man's class is a part of his ego, a feeling on his part of belongingness to something; an identification with something larger than himself. 30

Moreover, Centers found substantial and statistically reliable differences between the political predispositions and attitudes of the middle class and those of the working class. 31 This further led him to believe that there was a
definite psychological-economic-political bifurcation in the 
American public.

in Hawaii*, suggests that there may be a solid relationship 
between Centers' formulations and Hawaii's social-political-
economic development. If the economic development of the 
islands and the resultant socio-economic status differentia-
tion of the different ethnic groups is examined chrono-
logically, it is discovered that something similar to 
Centers' interest-group theory of social classes aptly 
describes political attitudes in Hawaii.

During the last decades of the nineteenth century and 
the first decades of the twentieth century, for instance, 
there was a definite socio-economic status cleavage between 
the different ethnic groups, not to mention other undeniable 
differences between the immigrant ethnic groups and the 
haole* minority, in Hawaii. In an obscure monograph, 
"Occupation Attitudes of Orientals in Hawaii," Lind writes:

> It is felt that the plantation employment at common 
labor is a sign of inferiority, personal and social. To accept it as a permanent thing would be to admit 
inferiority, and for a race group to become 
permanently identified with the cane field would 
be, in the minds of many, to accept the permanent 
status of inferiority for a race. . . Contact with 
the realities of plantation labor, the only line 
of endeavor open to most of the immigrants, had at 
first the effect of transforming the occupational 
attitudes from one of acquiescence, expectancy, or 
approach to one of mere toleration, then to dis-
content and revulsion, and eventually to with-
drawal.34
Moreover, it is probable that everyone was acutely aware of their status during the pre-World War Two period. Most immigrant families, for example, strongly encouraged their children to achieve higher statuses via occupational advancement so that they, in turn, could raise the status of the family.

Another facet of island life that made status so salient was the limitation which the controlling haole elite put on occupational mobility. It did not take long for second-generation Hawaiians of Asian ancestry to discover that there were man-made limits to advancement.

Describing occupational opportunities on the sugar and later pineapple plantations, Lind notes that vested interests, plantation psychology, and other cultural factors frequently determined economic mobility. "In most plantation areas," he writes, "the common laborer may rise some distance occupationally, but it is usually assumed that this maximum advancement is to the class of skilled labor." 35

Indeed, throughout the pre-war period haoles resented the competition for jobs that resulted when persons of other ethnic groups, dissatisfied with their jobs on the plantations, sought employment in non-plantation pursuits. Lind quotes an excerpt from the Third Report of the Commissioner of Labor in Hawaii in 1905. While the excerpt overstates

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*Haole refers to caucasians of North European extraction, most of whom came to Hawaii from continental United States.*
the case, it adequately exposes one predominant haole attitude which existed at the time and throughout the four succeeding decades. It stated:

Embarrassing as it has become in many ways for the planters, the Orientalization of the Islands is reacting still more disastrously on the white and native (Hawaiian and part-Hawaiian) wage-earners, merchants, and even farmers, than it is on the planters... The first effect of the incoming of the Asiatics was the taking over of unskilled labor of every sort, but the competition has now extended until it has become active in nearly every line of trade and in nearly all the skilled occupations. Most of the competition in the skilled trades comes from the Japanese, and it is insisted everywhere throughout the Islands that this competition is growing rapidly.36

On the other hand, many Japanese and Filipinos, finding the Hawaiian economy to be less viable and themselves less economically mobile in the 1920's and experiencing the repercussions of the depression more than the other major ethnic groups, undoubtedly had many ill feelings toward the haoles and perhaps toward Hawaiians, part-Hawaiians, Chinese, and the Portuguese who were higher on the social status ladder, as Table III demonstrates.

While the table underestimates the wealth of many Chinese and Japanese, who regularly sent money to relatives in China and Japan, it does provide a glimpse into the economic stratification of the Islands. Undoubtedly socio-economic statuses were quite visible to the various ethnic groups.

To sum up, it is hypothesized in accordance with the syndrome thesis that the early socio-economic and status
TABLE III

PER CAPITA ASSESSED VALUES ON PERSONAL PROPERTY AND REAL ESTATE FOR DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS IN TERRITORY OF HAWAII

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Groups</th>
<th>Personal Property</th>
<th>Real Estate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian and Part-Hawaiian</td>
<td>$ 34</td>
<td>$ 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haole</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bifurcation that existed in Hawaii prior to Pearl Harbor determined and still determines partisan alignments. Moreover, it is assumed that the differing partisan alignments by the different socio-economic and ethnic groups, in turn, effect the political perceptions of each group. Those voters who compose a majority of the members of the working class, namely Filipinos and Japanese, will have a perceptual bias in favor of the Democratic Party; while those who constitute a majority of the people in the middle and upper-middle classes, mainly haoles and Chinese, will have a perceptual bias toward the Republican Party and its positions. *

But before examining socio-economic, ethnic, partisan, and status cleavages in the Islands, it is worthwhile to

*Many Japanese also can be found in the latter socio-economic class...
survey briefly recent sociological findings to give theoretical import to the syndrome thesis of perception and to better understand the partisan alignments of the different ethnic and socio-economic groups in Hawaii.

Lenski, realizing like Centers that subjective phenomena rather than objective ones such as class may have a greater effect on attitudes and behavior, developed a concept called status consistency, congruence between achieved and ascribed statuses. He hypothesized, furthermore, that low status consistency was associated with a tendency to vote Democratic and to have liberal ideas toward economic matters. Kenkel replicated Lenski's study and obtained contradictory findings, though he employed a different methodological approach and another definition of status consistency.

Recently Kelly and Chambliss have re-examined the concept of status consistency in relation to political attitudes. Two of their findings are germane to this study. They discovered: 1) that social class and ethnicity are "far more important determinants of political attitudes than the degree to which persons are status consistent or status inconsistent;" and 2) that, while higher status groups are more liberal on civil rights, civil liberties, and internationalism scales, lower status groups are more liberal on welfare issues. The latter were employed as position issues in this study and will be discussed in depth in
chapter seven.

Segal and Knoke, two other sociologists, also posit hypotheses that put partisan divisions and attitudes in Hawaii into a more clear theoretical framework. After comparing mean Republican support scores for people who are upwardly mobile (31 percent) and downwardly mobile (21 percent) with those for people in the middle class (51 percent) and in the working class (25 percent) for the two succeeding generations, they write:

Inconsistency between an achieved and ascribed status is more likely to lead to Democratic party preference than is inconsistency between two achieved statuses. . . Because members of the present generation are more likely to attain their occupations through achievement than were their fathers, intergenerational mobility in many cases leads to achievement-ascriptive inconsistency. Our data show that both the upwardly mobile and the downwardly mobile are likely to support the Democratic party, thus helping to explain part of the partisan realignment in the United States favoring that party.41

Last, using Heider's rather crude balance model--P is person, O is status which others in social system ascribe to P, and X is the person's achieved status--Segal further hypothesizes that a state of imbalance often exists--a state from which the person can not escape since he remains a member of the social system. Therefore, to restore "balance" the person seeks to change the system that ascribes lower status to him by supporting the political party--i.e., the Democratic party--that promises to change the system or the status quo.42 This hypothesis readily applies to
Hawaii's political culture since until the 1950's Hawaii was a one-party state--the Republicans holding political power and the Democrats seeking it.

E. **Summary**

By simultaneously examining the three major theses of political perception--stimulus-determined, perceiver-determined, and perceiver-conditioned (syndrome)--and relevant empirical studies, a step has been taken to bridge the chasm that separates political science and social psychology. Each thesis has empirical verification; thus, much more research is needed to determine the relative importance of each one.

Chapters five and six, dealing with voters' perceptions of style and position issues and their preferences for different types of political appeals, juxtapose the stimulus- and perceiver-determined theses.

Unfortunately the syndrome or perceiver-conditioned thesis is too complicated to be tested in this particular field experiment. Nevertheless, chapter three offers some indirect evidence for its relevance to social-psychological models concerning the perception of political issues; and chapter seven presents some evidence of its relation to perceptual processes of Oahu voters.
CHAPTER III

POLITICAL LIFE ON OAHU*

A. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter concerning political life on Oahu during the twentieth century is threefold: 1) to integrate the theoretical structure of the preceding chapter, namely the syndrome thesis, and the actual political structure of Island politics, 2) to expose the underlying causes for the Republican-Democratic bifurcation on Oahu, and 3) to provide a contextual basis from which to evaluate the findings of the field experiment. While both the class-ethnic group considerations and partisan concerns are inseparable in many respects, the former undoubtedly deserves chronological and causal priority.

Thus, the socio-economic statuses of each major ethnic group--haoles, Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos--and their assimilation in Hawaii will be discussed in the first part of this chapter. Stress will be given to the haole economic oligarchy and the general haole fear of the Japanese; to the quick assimilation and rapid economic advancement of the Chinese; to the numerical dominance and difficult social and economic conditions of the Japanese; and to the frustrating, immobile economic existence of Filipino men on the sugar plantations.

*This researcher desires to state his indebtedness to Norman Meller for pointing out an embarrassingly large number of inadequacies in an earlier draft of this chapter.
The second half of the chapter will examine the haole-Hawaiian political alliance in the pre-war period; the political participation of the various ethnic groups; and finally the emergence of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU) and the Democratic party as the prime political forces in Hawaii, replacing the haole-Hawaiian alliance.

B. Class-Ethnic Group Bifurcation

1. Haole

The term haole originally was a Hawaiian word which meant foreigner. With the passage of time and the influx of influential immigrants of North European ethnic extraction, the term eventually became synonymous with caucasians. Two distinctions, however, are necessary. Haole mainly applies to caucasian immigrants who came to Hawaii first as missionaries, educators, businessmen and later as military personnel and skilled workers, especially during World War II. The word haole usually does not apply to imported caucasian plantation laborers nor foremen, such as the Portuguese. In addition to occupational status, length of residence also differentiates haoles. Those who have lived on the islands for some time are known as "kamaaina"; more recent caucasian arrivals, "malahini."

a. Economic Czars and Political Fathers

Haoles, both missionaries and merchants, early accumulated political-economic power in the Islands by becoming advisors
to Hawaii's regal rulers. In fact, approximately three-fourths of the cabinet-level appointments during the Monarchy went to haoles; and they rapidly consolidated their nascent political power. And by 1848 they were able to persuade Kamehameha III to permit haoles to purchase land as private citizens under the Great Mahele. Having their appetites for land and its accompanying economic potential whetted by previous grants from Hawaii's proud monarchs, the haoles rapidly accumulated more land, often obtaining it from naive Hawaiians who were not imbued with the capitalist spirit.

Moreover, the sugar industry provided the means by which haoles accelerated their land acquisitions and ultimately gained control of the Islands' economy. By importing cheap immigrant laborers from the Orient under the Masters and Servants Act of 1850, and by obtaining trade concessions which drastically increased the export of sugar to the mainland, the haole elite gradually enlarged its power base. Toward the end of the nineteenth century the haole minority was so powerful that it usurped the rightful powers of the monarchy and established a provisional government in its place.

In short, as the haole octopus in Hawaii increased its political-economic grip in the islands, it simultaneously extended its tentacles to such distant spots as Washington, D.C. where arguments advocating the eventual annexation of the islands, proposals concerning Pearl Harbor's potential as
a strategic outpost, and pleas for help for real and conceived problems in the islands did not fall on deaf ears. In fact, during the early twentieth century members of the Big Five, the sugar magnates which later became diversified interlocking holding companies, and influential entrepreneurs such as Walter Dillingham had so much political leverage in the nation's Capitol concerning the affairs of Hawaii that they made the territorial delegate's power appear nominal in comparison. The "haole-fication" of the islands was in progress.

Simultaneously enlarging its land holdings; importing more cheap labor from Asia and, to a much less extent, Europe; and further cementing political-economic ties with the mainland; the haole elite steadily made the islands its private estate. Daws, for example, writes:

The Big Five controlled 75 percent of the sugar crop in 1911 and 96 percent by 1933. By an inevitable extension they came to control as well every business associated with sugar: banking, insurance, utilities, wholesale and retail merchandizing, railroad transportation in the islands and shipping between the islands and between the islands and California. The haole elite, in essence, was a tight interlocking directorate.

Having gained such all-encompassing economic and political control of the islands, the haole elite virtually had no new frontiers left to conquer. Consequently, its main preoccupation became the preservation of the status quo and the integration of other ethnic groups under an
undeniable haole paternalism. As Fuchs writes:

The oligarchy (the haole elite during the 1920's and 1930's) had spun a web of control over every major aspect of Island life. To dominate, in its view, was not a lustful greedy ambition. The goal was not just power, not was it wealth or prestige. It was the achievement of a way of life in which the haole ruling elite, through its ingenuity, dedication, and charity had made (in its opinion) Hawaii a veritable paradise on earth. 2

Making Hawaii a "veritable paradise," however, was no easy undertaking. First, the haoles were a definite minority. 3 Nonetheless, contrary to popular opinion, the haoles were not against the importation of foreign labor, since such labor was vital to the very existence of their plantations. On the whole haole leaders wanted a relaxation of the exclusion policy, though of course they did not want any foreign group to usurp, or threaten to usurp, their own power. Despite their hopes, such an ethnic group appeared. In fact, as Daws writes, the "oriental problem (became) . . . largely a Japanese problem, not because the Chinese problem had disappeared but because the size of the Japanese problem put it in a different perspective." 4

b. Fear of "Japanization" rather than "Haole-fication" of the Islands

Since statistics and information concerning the major non-haole groups will be treated in other parts of this chapter, it is appropriate to concentrate on the haole-Japanese confrontation here; for that was the haole elite's chief concern during the pre-World War II period. Moreover,
repercussions from that confrontation, it is hypothesized, were the determining factors in post-World War II political developments.

As the population of Japanese in Hawaii skyrocketed from 20.5 percent in 1896 to 41.5 percent in 1910, the haole elite intensified its effort to control the Japanese—demographically, economically, and politically.

With the immigration acts of 1917 and 1924 Filipinos, the only Orientals who were subjects of the United States, became the main source of plantation laborers. They, however, could not offset the Japanese dominance since the latter rapidly increased in number during the 1890's and 1900's before Filipino immigration and since the Filipinos, being mostly male immigrants who planned to return to the Philippines, could not alter the demography of the Islands. In fact, considering that Japanese women constituted 44.5 percent of Hawaii's female population in 1920, the Filipino immigration, which was 10% women, was hardly more than a "stop-gap" measure to check further population growth by the Japanese. On the other hand, that immigration was necessary since the plantations needed more laborers; many Japanese plantation workers had followed their Chinese predecessors to the cities.

In addition to the fear that were created by the number of Hawaiians of Japanese extraction, the life-styles of the latter group also alarmed or at least perturbed, the haoles.
The Japanese language schools, in particular, were an anathema to haoles; for they immeasurably impaired "haole-fication" efforts. Consequently, the haole elite initiated a series of controls:

Beginning in 1921 the (Japanese language) schools were licensed by the Territorial Department of Public Instruction. Teachers had to demonstrate a grasp of the English language, American history, and the ideals of democracy, and had to pledge themselves to teach their students loyalty to the United States. Moreover, "The Americanizers regarded this victory as only the opening shot in a long campaign." In fact, haole efforts to stamp out the schools were not stymied until a United States' Supreme Court decision in 1927 declared that the language schools were constitutional and, therefore, had certain undeniable rights.

The paternalistic, condescending attitude of the haoles during the decades prior to Pearl Harbor was unmistakable. One quote provides a glimpse into the philosophy of the haoles. Propagating the haole ethnic, Edwin Irwin remarked in the 1930's, "We are fond of saying that the children of America, of whatever parentage, are entitled to all the education we can give them. They're not, of course: they're entitled to only such an amount as we think is best for them." But perhaps the most pressing aspect of the Japanese problem and the one most distasteful to the haole elite was not that ethnic group's size, not its cultural introvertism
but its economic clashes with "the establishment." The labor strikes of 1909 and 1920 cost the owners of the sugar plantations nearly twenty million dollars. In addition, such strikes undoubtedly imbued other plantation workers, such as the Filipinos, with a keen desire and a dogged determination to better their own working conditions and standard of living. Last, there was always the possibility that the Japanese eventually would develop into an ethnic voting bloc which, in turn, could radically disrupt the elite's management of island politics, and could doom efforts concerning "haole-fication," the attainment of a particular haole-conceived way of life for the islands.

An excerpt from the Honolulu Star Bulletin, a mouthpiece for the elite, supports that conclusion:

Never lose sight of the rule issue (in the 1920 sugar strike): Is Hawaii to remain American or become Japanese? A compromise of any nature or any degree with the alien agitators would be a victory for them and an indirect but nonetheless deadly invasion of American sovereignty in Hawaii. The American citizen who advocates anything less than resistance to the bitter end against the arrogant ambition of the Japanese agitators (who were striking for same pay as Portuguese and Puerto Ricans got!) is a traitor to his own people.

Later, military men, believing that the value of the islands was mainly strategic and that all non-haoles were potential subversives, carried the banner of the elite. An oft-quoted remark by Admiral Stirling, an unabashful intervenor in island affairs, aptly summarized the attitude of some military leaders who believed that only a commission
form of government could preserve the Islands' status quo--i.e., negate the efforts of the progressive factions of the kamaaina haole elite.

The present system of self-government tends to increase the number of votes and consequently of politicians and political office holders from among racial mixtures...At present government control should be by men primarily of the Caucasian race, by men who are not imbued too deeply with the peculiar atmosphere of the islands or with predominance of inter-family connections, by men without preconceived ideas of the value and success of the melting pot.11 (such as those kamaaina's with liberal ideas)

In summary, some members of the haole elite feared the Japanese who drastically outnumbered other ethnic groups and who resisted attempts of "haole-fication." Their large population, especially when coupled with the extremely favorable sex ratio, ethnic seclusion, and labor strikes provoked deep resentment on the part of the haoles. But perhaps the most frustrating response of the Japanese to haole paternalism was their ungratefulness. In fact, it is hypothesized that some similar type of bipolar psychological phenomenon was the catalyst of post World War II political developments, namely the gradual orientation of most Japanese and members of other "immigrant group," with the exception of the Chinese, to the Democratic Party and the steadfast adherence of the haole elite to the Republican Party.

2. Chinese

Throughout Hawaii's history imported laborers--Chinese,
Japanese, Portuguese, and Filipino—with the exception of the latter group, advanced rapidly in socio-economic status. Of these groups the Chinese undoubtedly have shown the most mobility. Parenthetically it should be remarked that advancement has varied directly with time of arrival with one atypical group. The Hawaiians were here first, but their present status is perhaps lower than that of any other ethnic group.

a. Immigrant Laborers

During the 1860's, '70's, and '80's Chinese laborers were imported to work on Hawaii's sugar plantations. By 1884 their number had grown to 17,939--17,068 men and 871 women—and they constituted 22.2 percent of the islands' population. Only the pure Hawaiian group, composing 49.6 percent of the population in 1884, outnumbered the Chinese who outnumbered the third largest ethnic group, the Portuguese, by almost a 2:1 ratio.

The period in which the Chinese composed the bulk of the plantation labor force, however, was a rather transient one. In 1882, for example, they constituted 50 percent of the employees on the sugar plantations; in 1902, less than 10 percent of the Chinese were field hands. In short, they migrated to urban areas, mostly in Honolulu. Cheng, a University of Hawaii sociologist, reports:

By 1889 the Chinese were rather well entrenched in trades ranging from draying, horse-driving, and butchering to retail and wholesale
merchandizing. In that year, they were holders of 23.5 percent of the licenses issued for wholesale merchants; of 62 percent of the licenses issued for retail merchants and of 84.7 percent of the licenses issued to restauranteurs.13

Most of the Chinese, more so than the Japanese, did not plan to return to their homeland; they early decided to become permanent residents and wasted no time in establishing themselves as an integral part of the Islands' social and economic systems.

b. Evaporation of Chinese Ethnic Orientations (identifications with one's own ethnic group in some concrete, measurable manner)

As noted above the Chinese were the largest immigrant ethnic group in the 1880's. Nonetheless, the enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 and its implementation in 1900 when Hawaii became a United States' Territory, eliminated the possibility that the Chinese would ever become a formidable political bloc in Hawaiian politics. That one act, by stopping the inflow of Chinese immigrants and encouraging out-marriages--mainly Chinese men marrying Hawaiian and part-Hawaiian women--changed the ethnic composition of Chinese in Hawaii.* By 1950 Cheng, though he probably overstated his case, forecast: "Unless the Chinese group is greatly affected by migratory movements full-blooded

*Many Chinese in Hawaii had two wives--A Hawaiian one in the Island and a Chinese one at "home." Moreover, they often returned to die in their original homeland.
Chinese will follow Hawaiians to ultimate racial extinction and their blood will amalgamate with that of other ethnic groups in the bloodstream of a new Hawaiian race." 14

While Cheng apparently over-estimated miscegenation among Chinese, the central thrust of his argument retains its validity. The Chinese as an ethnic group continue to decline in number. 15

The recognition that their number inevitably would decline, unless the immigrant laws were lifted, and their desire to reside permanently in Hawaii affected, it is hypothesized, many of their attitudes. Fuchs offers some insight when he describes Chinese attitudes toward the Japanese.

For the most part, the Chinese failed to share the rising hostility of Hawaiians, haoles, and Portuguese for the Japanese. Chinese affability in part derived from the fact that the Japanese increasingly patronized Chinese businesses and professions and were a factor in the growing success of Chinese politicians. Probably the major reason for Chinese acceptance of the Japanese was the former's acceptance of Hawaii as it was. The huge Japanese population, no less than the kamaaina haoles (those who resided in Hawaii for some time), seemed a permanent feature in the Island social system. The Chinese were determined to succeed within that system. Hostility against others filled no psychological, economic, or political need for them. 16

The Chinese acceptance of the haoles, and the haoles, more or less, positive attitude toward the Chinese tended to reinforce each other. Constituting a small minority and residing in the city, the Chinese never confronted the
haole elite as did the Japanese and Filipino laborers on the plantations and the Japanese themselves through their newspapers, schools, and sheer number. And since the haoles, constituting approximately one-fifth of the population, had no time nor reason to fear the Chinese, the latter busied themselves by improving their socio-economic status.

3. Japanese

The Japanese, probably because they came later, did not migrate to the cities as early nor did they prosper as much as the Chinese. They, however, were by no means an economically immobile group. Haole limitations, coupled with the Depression, prevented the Japanese from economic advancement and complete political participation in the pre-World War II period. After the war the Japanese rose rapidly in socio-economic status and accumulated political power, both of which had been denied them in the earlier period.

a. Immigrant Laborers

During 1880's the Big Five of the sugar industry decided to import large numbers of Japanese field hands as a result of their reluctance to let any ethnic group become potentially powerful as a political and economic, through striking, force on the islands. They also needed laborers badly: and some importers, in fact, believed there were definite similarities between the Japanese and the native Hawaiians.

In 1884 there were 116 plantation workers of Japanese
extraction; twelve years later in 1896 there were 22,329 Japanese laborers. At that time or shortly thereafter one would surmise that the plantation elite would restrict Japanese immigration. Experimenting with immigrant labor from Europe and attempting to persuade Congressmen in Washington to pass legislation enabling Hawaii to import more Chinese laborers despite the Exclusion Act, the sugar managers did not limit Japanese immigration until the gentleman's agreement of 1907. In the meantime, Japanese immigration skyrocketed. By 1910 the Japanese numbered 79,675 and constituted 41.5 percent of the population.

Coupled with the size of the Japanese population—which in 1920 overshadowed the haole, Hawaii, and Chinese by 5:1, 4:1, and 3:1 ratios respectively—was the extremely significant Japanese sex ratio. In 1890 there were 4.4 Japanese men for every Japanese woman; but in the three succeeding decades that ratio steadily decreased from 3.5:1 to 2.2:1 to 1.2:1. It was not incidental that the period of greatest discrimination against the Japanese was the time during which the childbearing potential of Japanese women was most salient to the haole elite and its supporters.17

b. Emergence and Development of Ethnic Orientations

(Identifications with one's own ethnic group in some concrete, measurable manner)

Speculating on the thoughts that Japanese in Hawaii had
during the pre-World War II era is not within the scope of this research. A few hypotheses and accompanying examples, however, are appropriate; for they provide insights into Japanese-haole relations and, in turn, help in understanding politics in Hawaii. Three things--Japanese marriage patterns, language schools, and labor conditions--will be examined briefly.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to estimate how much effect the favorable male:female ratio had on the life-patterns of Japanese in Hawaii. It is not inconceivable that the better balanced sex ratio enabled Japanese immigrants to resist artificial assimilation attempts which the caucasian elite tried to impose upon them. With a favorable sex ratio Japanese were able to marry within their own ethnic group. And, as Fuchs states:

The (Japanese) attitude toward intermarriage was slowly modified as second- and third-generation Japanese became integrated in Hawaii's interracial society, but even in recent decades, Japanese have revealed less inclination than other groups to marry outsiders.18

Another undeniable reason for the durability of Japanese mores in Hawaii was the support which their families gave to the language schools. In short, the inculcation of traditional values was believed to be so important the schools flourished even when all hopes of returning to Japan had vanished. As late as 1937, more than eighty percent of the eligible Japanese children were enrolled in language schools.19
Third, no researcher can overlook the fact that definite Japanese-haole hostility was generated as a result of discrimination against the Japanese on the plantations and as a byproduct of the costly labor strikes. If a man works as hard as a fellow worker who does the same work, he naturally expects to be paid the same wage. Such was not the case for Japanese field hands. During and after World War I Japanese on the plantation were paid $18 per month for their labor while Portuguese and Puerto Ricans received $22 and $23. Undoubtedly that pay differential was a major cause of ethnic friction. 20

Other causes of much bitterness were the labor strikes of 1909 and 1920. These were basically Japanese strikes, and they fostered ethnic orientations as well as resentment for their haole employers. Both strikes were futile as the sugar-plantation elite successfully employed strike-breakers of nearly all other ethnic groups to work in the sugar fields. Daws describes the aftermath of the 1920 strike:

At the end the Japanese surrendered. They talked about the "magnanimity" of the planters and the "sincerity" of the laborers, and about the "unreserved understanding" between the two parties. What this meant was that the laborers went back to work on the same old terms, hoping that the planters would make improvements in wages and conditions. 21

4. Filipinos

The Filipino ethnic group experienced many frustrations that neither the Chinese nor the Japanese group did. Being imported as single, male laborers--often strikebreakers--and
anxious to return to the barrio, Filipinos in Hawaii during the 1920's and 1930's were beset with one obstacle, and accompanying frustrations, after another.

First, in 1930 nine of ten Filipinos were male which meant that this ethnic group had an incredible 9:1 sex ratio as compared, for example, with the 1.2:1 Japanese ratio. And, although 40 percent of the Filipino men were married, nearly three-fourths of them had to leave their wives in the Philippines. And there were no "picture brides" for the Filipinos as there had been for the Japanese. (Parents and relatives, who lived in Japan, often found brides for their sons and nephews, who worked as laborers in Hawaii. Pictures of prospective bride and groom were exchanged. If both agreed, they would meet for the first time at a Honolulu pier as husband and wife.)

Second, Filipinos had a hard life in Hawaii. In 1930, for instance, 90% of the gainfully employed Filipinos were field hands. They did not experience the socio-economic mobility nor benefit from educational opportunities as did the Chinese and Japanese before them. In 1930 three out of every ten Filipinos were illiterate and five out of ten could not speak English. And to make matters even worse, the Depression displaced many Filipinos from their jobs.

It was not until after World War II that the Filipinos started to feel as if they were an integral part of Hawaii's populace. Receiving higher wages after the successful 1946
sugar strike in which they as members of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU) participated and experiencing the gradual emergence of a balanced sex ratio, life was more enjoyable for Filipinos. With decent jobs and families, they could begin to lead normal lives.

5. Hawaiians, Part-Hawaiians, and the Portuguese*

Hawaiians had an uneasy union with the haole Republicans during the early part of the twentieth century. They were mainly concerned with the restoration of their lost rights, possessions (especially land), and dignity. Unfortunately their socio-economic status and number steadily declined before World War II and continued to decline thereafter.

The Part-Hawaiians--usually offspring of Chinese, Japanese, and haoles who married Hawaiians--had a much higher educational level and socio-economic status than the Hawaiians during the decades which preceded World War II. The group has not been studied systematically, but it occupied the middle strata of Hawaii's social and economic systems during the pre-War years and tended to support the haole-Hawaiian voting bloc.

The Portuguese, the only European immigrant group of noteworthy size, originally were imported as field hands on the plantations. Gradually, however, they too migrated to

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*Many will regret the researcher's failure to distinguish more clearly between Hawaiians and Part-Hawaiians. The latter, however, hastens to reply that this is a political field experiment--not a sociological treatise.
the cities. Those who remained on the plantation eventually were elevated to lunas (foremen) since the haole elite trusted them more than they trusted Asian immigrant laborers.

Having surveyed the assimilation and socio-economic status of haoles, Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos, it is seen that each ethnic group had identifiable attitudes which in many respects resembled loosely-knit syndromes. Each group, more or less, knew its status vis-a-vis the other groups. Whether such syndrome-like attitudes and status considerations were the major causes of post World War II political and economic developments remains to be proved. Nonetheless, the rest of the chapter, describing those developments, strongly suggests that some type of relationship existed between pre-war attitudes and post-war actions.

C. Party Bifurcation

1. Haole Political Base

The haole political base during the early twentieth century was maintained by various means, most of which were dysfunctional in the post World War II era.

Initially, the haoles allied with the Hawaiians and Portuguese who were Republicans. Orientals had no vote during the first part of the twentieth century, and thus can be discounted as a political force in Island politics during the first decades after Hawaii became a U.S. territory. Divisions of Hawaiians, Portuguese, and haoles among contending parties gave substance to Island political life. The haole-Hawaiian political alliance under the banner of
the Republican Party worked well. In 1927 for example, a political scientist at the University of Hawaii discovered that Hawaiians held 46 percent of the appointive executive positions, 55 percent of the clerical and other jobs of the Territory, and over half of the judgeships. Moreover, certain governmental bodies, such as the local police, were staffed entirely by Hawaiians though ultimate control of that group undoubtedly remained in the hands of the haole elite.

Table IV vividly documents how well the haole-Hawaiian coalition worked in elective, as well as appointive, positions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Hawn.</th>
<th>Haole*</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This includes 1 Portuguese in both 1917 and 1927 totals. After 1927 there was no separation of haoles and Portuguese.
TABLE IV. (continued) REPRESENTATION IN TERRITORIAL SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BY ETHNIC GROUPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Hawn.*</th>
<th>Haole**</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The effect of the Home Rule is evident here.

**This includes 3, 5, and 6 Portuguese in the years up to 1927 respectively.

Similarly, the haole-Hawaiian coalition determined who would be the recipients of their political patronage—namely other haoles and Hawaiians.

In short, before World War II eight out of every ten members in the Territorial legislature were Republicans; and they did not hesitate to enlarge their political base through patronage. As Daws writes: "At the islands there was a place for everybody, and everybody was in his place—and the place of the Big Five (the sugar plantation elite) was at the center of affairs."26

They controlled not only the legislature and the Territorial bureaucracy but also the islands' labor
force.* To put it bluntly, as Lind states, plantation laborers simply could not "bite the hand that fed them." Moreover, the haole elite employed various means to make sure that the field hands stayed in their "place"; many, for example, were told how to vote during the pre-war period.

Another means, besides political patronage and surveillance of voting, which the haole elite employed to maintain its political dominance was restriction of voting rights. Rigid citizenship requirements, namely a federal law and local voting requirements such as being fluent in English or Hawaiian, excluded many from voting. Lind, who as a University of Hawaii sociologist followed patterns of political participation in the islands during the 1920's and 1930's more closely than any other observer, writes:

Because the population of Oriental ancestry has constituted somewhat more than half of the persons resident in Hawaii throughout the period since Annexation (1898), reaching a peak of 64 percent in 1930 . . . it has commonly been supposed that they must have wielded a corresponding degree of political influence. Nothing, of course, could be further from the truth . . . As recently as 1930, when the combined population of Oriental ancestry made up nearly two-thirds of the entire population of the Territory, they constituted only 26 percent of the total adult citizens.

* Meller has pointed out that there was Democratic Party strength in other levels of Hawaiian government at this time--namely Democrats in city and county positions. Surprisingly those Democrats too were haoles and Hawaiians.
Last, the haoles and their Hawaiian cohorts simply voted as a supreme, though a poorly integrated, voting bloc to maintain their dominance of Island politics. In 1938 Robinson, another University of Hawaii sociologist, found that Japanese and Chinese in his interviews, although charging that each other voted along ethnic lines, agreed on one point: that the greatest amount of bloc voting was done by the haoles. Until World War II the haoles were able to dominate Hawaiian politics and to deny full citizenship to all islanders of Asian ancestry.

After Pearl Harbor military government, more or less, eclipsed the haole-Hawaiian bloc.* And after the war democratization and unionization enabled many persons of Asian extraction to participate for the first time in Hawaiian politics. Moreover, the haoles, focusing all their attention on the formidable political forces that were emerging in the Democratic Party and in the labor unions, such as the AFL-CIO and ILWU, had little time to form a new political alliance with the Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians who were declining in number and even defecting to the "other side."

Nevertheless, new partisan lines were drawn as the Chinese, steadily gaining in socio-economic status, tended

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*Military leaders on the islands, it should be pointed out, often were distrustful of the kamaaina haole leaders, many of whom became quite progressive in their thinking during the 1930's and 1940's.
to align themselves with the haoles in the Republican Party while the Japanese and Filipinos, despite past ethnic enmity, gathered under the political umbrella of the Democratic Party. Indeed, it would have been unthinkable for the latter, spearheading and supporting the labor movement, to side with "management" in the Republican Party.

2. Japanese Political Base

Three forces will be considered as instrumental ones in the creation and maintenance of what will be called the "Japanese political base," for lack of a better term. They are: 1) societal forces such as the desire to participate in politics and to receive political patronage; 2) the emergence of the powerful ILWU; and 3) Japanese identification with and support of the Democratic Party.

First, no one should underestimate the fact that many Asian immigrants and their descendants prepared themselves for political participation long before they were given the right to vote and to hold office. Table V for example, demonstrates the high educational level of Chinese and Japanese in Hawaii in 1920 and similarity between Hawaiians and mainlanders in perhaps the best criterion for competent political participation, namely education.
TABLE V

PERCENTAGE OF CHILDREN IN SCHOOL IN HAWAII AND IN THE UNITED STATES, 1920

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ages</th>
<th>All Races (Hawaii)</th>
<th>All Races (U.S.)</th>
<th>Native White (Hawaii)</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14-15 year olds</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-17 year olds</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-20 year olds</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lind, who always was optimistic about the quality of political participation on the plantations, writes:

The critical and liberalizing forces of political democracy have probably extended further into the plantation area of Hawaii than in most comparable regions of the world.* The newspapers and public schools as symbols of the free city enter even the most remote and isolated plantation. But most significant of all--the plantation laborer is becoming a voter and an active participant in the democratic process of the commonwealth in which both plantation city are incorporated. The proportion of citizens of laborers on the sugar plantations of Hawaii is not as yet very large, but it is growing.32

On the other hand, the various immigrant groups, especially the Japanese, had no intentions of flexing their "political muscles" in the 1920's and 1930's and certainly not in the late 1930's and early 1940's when the idea of a military commission form of government was being discussed by certain groups in the islands, namely military leaders

*Here is further evidence of progressive elements within the kamaaina haole elite.
and members of the haole elite. Moreover, since no
immigrant ethnic group was very large, at least not in terms
of registered voters, it would have been politically
futile, if not disastrous, for any such group to foster
ethnic bloc voting. Lind, in a series of investigations
between 1928 and 1938, found that experienced ethnic
politicians tried to shun their "ethnic label" in efforts
to garner votes. Only "younger, unexperienced, and relative­
ly colorless candidates," he reports, tried to reap "ethnic
votes" which, it should be stated, often were the result
of familiarity with names on the ballot (Chinese more
readily recognizing the word Chun, Japanese Sato, Portuguese
Silva, and Filipinoses Santiago) rather than the result of
intentional ethnic voting in the traditional sense of the
term. 33

Emergent class and partisan lines also were developing
in the two decades prior to World War II. Some kind of
"ideology by proxy," a finding of The American Voter, in
which a person perceives some correlations between group
successes and the emergence of concrete benefits and puts
his faith in "any leadership that has shown enough interest
in his group to figure out what must be done to maintain
its welfare existed. 34 Lind, in fact, describes a latent
"ideology by proxy."

For most practical purposes...local issues such
as patronage, improvement, education, taxation,
and all the questions which immediately affect
the lives of the citizenry determine party lines and party support. The democratic party, generally in the minority, has always attracted the poorer classes of the city but with the national landslide of 1932, its position throughout the territory was greatly strengthened. 55

While Lind gives the wrong impression that the New Deal, part and parcel, came to Hawaii and altered the distribution of political power--actually a few prominent haole Republican leaders kept many of the New Deal programs out of Hawaii, which was still a distant territory--there is no doubt that President Roosevelt via his policy regarding Nisei or second-generation Japanese during the war was an inspiration to Japanese in Hawaii. 36

Moreover, something similar to "ideology by proxy" existed in both the ILWU and the Democratic Party as they came to represent, ideologically and materially, the interests of the immigrant groups, especially the Japanese and the Filipinos. First the emergence of the ILWU will be discussed; then the rise of the Democratic Party in Hawaii will be examined.

a. Emergence of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union

The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 did not bear the fruit in Hawaii until members of west coast maritime unions, veterans of union battles on San Francisco docks, decided to reside permanently--or at least, spend substantial time--in Hawaii. To these experienced, enthusiastic labor organizers
Hawaii's ethnic group-based unions were an anachronism.\textsuperscript{37} They, realizing that the Big Five formerly had played one ethnic group off against another, hammered away at a new theme for labor in Hawaii, "Know your class, and be loyal to it."\textsuperscript{38}

Skilled laborers, rather than plantation field hands, were the first ones to become well-organized. Under the separate banners of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), craft and industrial unions were formed. Their membership, which was primarily haole, totalled 8,000 in 1940. At that time the I.L.W.U., an affiliate union of C.I.O., had only 2,500 members.

Having experienced an abortive attempt to form an all-inclusive Hawaiian Islands' Federation of Labor, which would have brought together all organized workers regardless of occupation or ethnic group, both unions, the AFL and the ILWU, generally made only small gains for organized labor during the war, though their membership rolls drastically increased during the immediate post-war period.

Through door-to-door campaigning, a political action committee, and other coordinated efforts labor organizations in Hawaii were able to elect labor-oriented members to the 1945 legislature. Those new legislators, along with progressive Republicans, passed the Hawaii Employment Relations Act, often termed the "Little Wagner Act." Under
the new act organized labor was able to incorporate agricultural workers in the sugar and pineapple fields into its membership. While the AFL unions remained, more or less, ethnically and occupationally exclusive, the ILWU, still an affiliate union of the CIO, strengthened its relationship with its west-coast affiliate unions, firmed up its organization of the waterfront, and proceeded to organize nearly all agricultural workers in Hawaii. Stressing the slogan "know your class and be loyal to it" and experiencing the benefits of "ideology by proxy" after the successful 1946 sugar strike, its membership leaped from a mere 900 in 1944 to an estimated 30,000 in 1947.

Undoubtedly the ILWU benefited from many factors. The successful 1946 strike, however, was the real turning point. For 79 days 21,000 workers on 33 plantations left their jobs. In fact, the 6,000 imported Filipino strikebreakers sided with the union after arrival in Hawaii. As Daws writes, "The age of the immigrant laborer was over." Union members realized that their strength lay in class loyalty, and they were unwilling to let management play one ethnic group off against another as it had so often in the past.

Indeed, there was a clear delineation of "we" and "they." Men like Jack Hall became charismatic labor leaders with whom workers identified, and Big Five organizations such as the Hawaii Employers Council, a team of professional labor negotiators which the Big Five brought from the mainland to
confront the rising power of organized labor, became convenient scapegoats.

In 1949, three years after the first successful major strike, the greatest battle between labor and management in Hawaii occurred. Working jointly with their west-coast counterparts, who refused to load cargoes for and to unload cargoes from Hawaii, the ILWU showed that 2,000 striking longshoremen, over a six-month period, could cripple an economy. "The expense to the Territory at large," Daws writes, "Could only be estimated in vague and appalling terms, at something like one hundred million dollars."40

At the same time the 1949 strike had a "boomerang effect," because it alienated many people who suffered economic setbacks. Moreover, the strike helped to fan the early charge that there were communists in the labor unions and, thus, impaired the working relationship between the ILWU and the Democratic Party. Leaders within the Democratic party, after the 1949 strike and resultant charges of communist infiltration in the labor union, realized that they had to prove to the public that they, not ILWU bosses, "called the shots."41

During the 1940's and 1960's labor in Hawaii increasingly became more prosperous; class warfare ceased. And past wounds, which were opened by the four-month sugar strike in 1958, healed quickly. The days of militant labor were over.

Moreover, reliance on tourism, rather than agriculture,
promoted a new spirit of cooperation between labor and management. For their mutual benefit they needed to cooperate with each other. Labor, in short, not only has succeeded in Hawaii but has become part of the "establishment."

Having examined the emergence of organized labor, partisan divisions, which now will be discussed, are much more easily understood. Indeed, if there is a syndrome underlying Hawaii political attitudes the Democratic Party, as well as the ILWU, plays a central role.

b. There are many possible explanations why the Japanese and, in lesser numbers though greater proportions, the Filipinos flocked to the Democratic Party in the post World War II era. It is not surprising, for instance, that they supported the party whose policy was to reverse the haole-Republican policy of protecting the vested interests of an Island minority.

In addition, it is undeniable that a symbiotic relationship existed between the Democratic Party and the labor unions, especially the ILWU; after all, having allegiance to each simultaneously was a very common phenomenon.

Another explanation for the rise of the Democratic party, one which appears in every discussion of Island politics, was a group of talented, youthful, energetic Japanese war veterans. One Japanese soldier aptly summarized the general sentiment of this group and its supporters in
the immediate post-war year:

The highest aspiration of our boys in uniform is to return to Hawaii where a citizen irrespective of ancestry will share and share equally in the rights as well as the responsibilities of citizenship. We have helped win the war on the battlefield but we have not yet won the war on the homefront. 42

Success on the homefront, however, was near. In 1946 the Democrats elected half the members of the Territorial House of Representatives; in 1954 they controlled both houses of that legislature. Hawaii no longer was a one-party state.

The findings of two Island-wide surveys by a professional polling organization document the Democratic Party's strength in the decades after the war. In 1948, responding to the question, "How do you generally think of yourself--as a Democrat, a Republican, or an Independent?, 27 percent classified themselves as Democrats, 19 percent as Republicans, and 48 percent as Independents. By 1955 the percentages were 29, 14, and 48 respectively. It is seen that by 1955 there were twice as many Democrats as Republicans and, equally important if not more so, the Independents preferred the Democratic Party by a 2:1 ratio. 43

The 1955 survey also revealed that the Republican-Democratic split was clearly along class lines. Four times as many skilled and manual laborers preferred the Democratic to the Republican Party; in fact, union members favored the former by nearly a 6:1 ratio. In the high-income group five out of nine businessmen and professional men sided with the
Republican party. In addition, the survey demonstrated that ethnicity is a prime political variable in Hawaii. Almost five times as many Filipinos, more than twice as many Japanese, and nearly twice as many Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians thought of themselves as Democrats than as Republicans. Only the Chinese and the haoles supported the Republican Party, though Japanese voters in high income groups also leaned toward the GOP. The haole-Hawaiian political bloc had disintegrated, and a multi-ethnic bloc now was the dominant force in Island politics.

During the 1960's the Democratic Party dominated Hawaiian politics. Part of that domination can be explained by the enthusiasm of many immigrants and descendants of immigrants to participate fully in Island politics. Part of it can be explained by effective labor organization. And a significant part of it domination can be understood as the ability of groups with similar socio-economic backgrounds and similar experiences as individual ethnic groups to unite under the banner of a political party.

D. Summary

In retrospect, it readily is seen that some phenomenon similar to a partisan-class-ethnic group syndrome has played and, for that matter, still plays a dominant role in Hawaiian politics. It, however, is difficult to separate class from ethnicity and ethnicity from party. The main
question of whether partisanship affects ethnicity, or ethnicity affects partisanship, or both (and to what degree) remains unanswered.

Only a few relationships appear to be definite. Class and ethnicity together seem to show noteworthy durability over the years, as predictors of party affiliation in Hawaii. The same island-wide survey, which was discussed earlier, found that Hawaiians of Asian extraction, though experiencing rising socio-economic status, were not shifting to the Republican Party to any noteworthy degree. It seems party affiliation, acquired during a time of sharp partisan cleavage and reinforced by other variables such as ethnicity and occupational status or class, is not readily subject to change. Here we have additional evidence for the existence of party-class-ethnic group syndromes which effect partisan alignment and, in turn, perception of political issues.

Other re-inforcing phenomena also have had and are having their effect on Hawaiian politics today. Dinnell writes:

Hawaii today is undergoing a process of development and integration which is substantially changing its economic profile and control structure. The shape of many of these changes is the product of the earlier unionization and democratization phenomena, which taken together, opened up society in Hawaii. Present voting pattern, which generally produce heavy democratic majorities, continue to reflect the impact of these phenomena including the past instrumental use of the Democratic party to achieve democratization.

To sum up, it is probable that party-class-ethnic group syndromes will remain major variables in Hawaii's political
life. In fact, some type of we-they, haole-nonhaole bifurcation—being historically conditioned—may be functional in Hawaiian politics in the future as it has been so often in the past, especially if the Democrats remain the party in power and the Republicans continue as a weak opposition party.

Having provided a contextual basis for the present study, the field experiment now will be discussed; then the findings will be presented.
CHAPTER 4

FIELD EXPERIMENT: RATIONALE FOR ITS EMPLOYMENT
DESCRIPTION OF SUBJECTS, TELEPHONE INTERVIEW,
PRETEST AND QUESTIONNAIRE

A. Rationale for Field Experiment

Charles Merriam, the founder of the "Chicago school" of political scientists in the 1920's and 1930's, was the first political scientist to advocate in specific terms the employment of the "scientific method in the observation, measurement, and comparison of political relations."\(^1\)

Despite Merriam's urgings, a science of political behavior did not emerge until after World War II. In fact, Easton's 1953 plea-argument for more theoretical clarity and organization as well as accompanying methodologies in The Political System shows that the behavioral approach to politics is a recent development, at least vis-a-vis the mainstream of political-science research.\(^2\)

Moreover, since there was early confusion between behavioralism or the study of behavior per se and the behavioral approach or the scientific study of (political) behavior, it was not until the 1960's that political scientists began to grasp the true meaning and implications of Merriam's earlier challenge to utilize the "scientific method in the observation, measurement, and comparison of political relations."

Finally, accepting the behavioral approach, political scientists have begun to outline its mode of application
with greater precision. Eulau, makes major headway, when he writes:

A science of politics which deserves its name must build from the bottom up by asking simple questions that can, in principle, be answered; it cannot be built from the top down by asking questions that, one has reason to suspect, cannot be answered at all, at least not by the methods of science. An empirical discipline is built by the slow, modest, and piecemeal cumulation of relevant theories and data.\(^3\)

This study of political issues, following the behavioral approach, "builds from the bottom up." Dealing with political phenomena which have been poorly researched in the past, it defines political issues, observes, measures, and compares them. By so doing it contributes to "the slow, modest, and piecemeal cumulation of relative theories and data" concerning the topic of political issues.

In addition, this study, as other research which employs the behavioral approach, borrows from various disciplines that study human behavior. Specifically, the field experiment incorporates the laboratory experiment of psychology and the sample survey of sociology and political science.

This research strategy, employment of a field experiment to study political issues, not only integrates the experimental and survey methodologies but also enables the analyst to reap the benefits of each. By transcending the narrowness of the laboratory the researcher is not confined to an artificial environment. On the other hand, by incorporating experimental techniques, as well as those of survey research,
the investigator can control for intervening variables and, hence, make some progress in establishing causal relations—something that often is not possible in research that focuses on sample surveys in the "field."

Unfortunately social psychologists and political scientists, specializing in experimental studies and sample surveys respectively, have been slow to grasp the potentiality of field experiments, especially in research dealing with political attitudes and political perceptions. Social psychologists generally have been unwilling to study problems of serious concern to political scientists. To date, few prominent social psychologists have become involved in what political scientists sometimes call "political psychology." Social psychologists for the past two decades have been concerned mainly with models of attitude change and theories of cognitive consistency. They have not subjected their sophisticated theoretical formulations nor their experimentally derived hypotheses to empirical verification in the everyday realm of political behavior. Indeed, experiments that are conducted in the artificial environment of the laboratory with unrepresentative samples, mainly college students, do not produce generalizations that can be applied with confidence to political phenomena and processes.

On the other hand, political scientists have only dabbled in the intricacies of social-psychological models and theories. For example, in 1954 Berelson et al. wrote:
How does the political campaign affect the voters? The query is not, "Does it affect them?" but "How?" It is easy to acknowledge that campaign issues and arguments have some effect, but it is not easy to understand and measure them. Present methods of social science are better adapted to the study of end products than of intervening processes.

So far, in most respects, that early challenge has not been met. Since political scientists have not integrated social psychology's methodological approaches into their research designs, they know relatively little about perceptual processes in general and about the perception of political stimuli, such as campaign issues, in particular.

Consequently, this researcher decided to utilize a field experiment, which incorporates facets of both psychological experiments and political surveys, and which enables an integration of social psychology and political science. Kerlinger defines this methodological strategy; he writes:

A field experiment is a research study in a realistic situation in which one or more independent variables are manipulated by the experimenter under as carefully controlled conditions as the situation will permit. The manipulation of independent variables and the possibility of randomization are the most important characteristics of the field experiment. Theoretically, the criteria of control can be satisfied, and if this criteria (sic) is satisfied, the problem of establishing causal relations is that much closer to solution.

In the field experiment style and position issues, coupled with one-paragraph political appeals that were composed of either style or position issues, were the
"manipulated" independent variables--manipulated in the sense that they composed all of the political stimuli that were given to the experimental subjects and in the sense that different political appeals were given to the 435 respondents depending on their party affiliation or preference for one political party over the other even though nonpartisan by self-classification.

Randomization was approximated by selecting persons from the lists of registered voters by the skip-interval method and then by contacting those that had listed telephone numbers. The telephone company's latest unpublished listings were used to update and cross-check the latter.

The major control, outside of the issues and appeals that were presented, was that which held direction and intensity of party affiliation constant, when the data was analyzed. This control, it should be noted, is the prime one in measuring people's perceptions of political issues.

Furthermore, by controlling or holding constant the direction and intensity of party affiliation, it is possible to measure differences between strong and weak partisans and between partisans and independents, as well as to prevent party affiliation from contaminating other relationships. Gauging differences between such voters is as important as measuring differences between Republicans and Democrats in general.

Last, the two telephone interviews (see Appendix A)
were highly structured, by necessity; and the second and
main one was well integrated. It dealt exclusively with
political issues which concerned domestic affairs and, more
specifically, the extent of the federal government's
involvement in such affairs. As Rossi writes:

Voting behavior research (in fact, political
research in general) is fast reaching the point
where limited purpose designs may be most
profitably employed. To crowd into a represen­
tative sample adequate measures of everything
of interest, and at the same time enlarge the
sample size to obtain sufficient case bases for
the desired crucial subgroup comparisons, may
lead to a cumbersome, expensive, and inefficient
study. 8

B. The Subjects

The Oahu electorate constituted the population of
211,853 registered voters from which the final sample was
drawn. 9 Having access to the newly published voter lists
as of November 5, 1968, the researcher extracted 668 three-
voter sets by employing the skip-interval method. 10

Since the Lieutenant Governor's Office systematically
purges the voter registration lists in an attempt to provide
accurate records for Oahu's highly mobile electorate, only
those people who voted in the primary and/or general election
of 1966, who voted in the 1968 primary, or who registered to
vote within ten days after the 1968 primary were included.

Three factors prompted the selection of the sample at
hand. First, cost naturally was a prime consideration.
Balancing financial resources and tolerable levels of
sampling error, the researcher decided to use an initial
sample of 668 which would have four percent relative error at the .95 confidence level. 11

Coupled with cost were the size and representativeness of the sample. While methodologists usually separate these two criteria for selection— for example, a sample size of 50 may be representative with the homogeneous group of state governors while a sample size of 500 may be unrepresentative in a biased public opinion survey—the two factors are inseparable from a practical point of view when studying the Oahu electorate. Each is a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for the other. If the sample size is too small, estimates about the population can not be made with reasonable precision. And if accurate estimates of the population can not be made from the sample, the latter is unrepresentative of the former and hence an inadequate basis for generalization.

Furthermore, moving cautiously when studying a multi-ethnic electorate, the analyst hypothesized that the representativeness of the sample could be enhanced by taking three potential voters or a set, instead of one, when he selected the sample. Previous telephone research had demonstrated that voters with no phones and non-published telephone numbers pose a problem for survey research via telephone interviews on Oahu. 12 Moreover, the 1960 employment ratio (percentage of people over 21 employed in the labor force) suggested that many people in the lower
socio-economic classes would be bypassed unless a corrective device, such as sampling by sets, was utilized. In short, it was assumed that the representativeness of the sample would be augmented by taking the next person listed alphabetically in a particular district, assuming the first could not be reached, than deleting a voter of that electoral district from the sample.

The above-mentioned procedure proved to be a sage sampling technique, for 68 sets did not have a voter with listed telephone numbers. In fact, 139 sets had only one voter with a telephone; and 215 sets had two persons with a phone. Thus, this procedure, it is hypothesized, helped to hold down the bias which resulted from interviewing only those voters who had telephones. 13

Perhaps the most accurate indicator of the sample's representativeness is the simple male-female ratio since that particular figure is not subject to interviewee nor interviewer bias. The following table presents actual and "obtained" statistics:
TABLE VI

PERCENTAGE OF MALE-FEMALE VOTERS ON OAHU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Official 1966 statistics from the Lieutenant Governor's Office*</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
<td>49.3%</td>
<td>193,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preliminary telephone survey (November, 1968)</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main telephone survey (July-August, 1969)</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This was the last year in which the Lieutenant Governor's Office compiled statistics on the sex of Oahu voters.

While sex is not one of the major independent variables in this study, it is significant that the telephone interviews, by virtue of repeated call-backs, enabled the researcher to obtain a nearly equal number of men and women in the sample. Often samples have a sex bias since women usually are at home more often than men and, thus, more prone to be interviewed, especially in interviews of households--talking to the person that answers the doorbell. In fact, one such household interview on the island of Oahu in 1955 produced an incredible number of female interviewees (70%) even though it was conducted by a professional polling company. In short, the stable sex ratio, which parallels that of the population, supports well the contention that representative samples can be preserved through telephone interviews just as easily, if not more so, than they can be
by personal face-to-face interviews.

Another indicator of the sample's representativeness is its ethnic composition. While these figures are more difficult to interpret since classification schemes vary, it provides some insights into the quality of the sample.

TABLE VII

PERCENTAGES FOR ETHNIC GROUPS ON OAHU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health Surveillance Study 1964-67*</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>100.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 Census</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>100.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 Estimate**</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preliminary survey</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main survey</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Department of Health, State of Hawaii
**Department of Planning and Economic Development, State of Hawaii

Since four different classification schemes were utilized, the patterns of the distributions are more important than the individual statistics. Percentages for those in the preliminary and main surveys, who were classified by name of head of household, do not differ significantly from the percentages of those in the other surveys if the patterns of the distributions are employed as means of comparison. Moreover, the differences between the percentages
in the preliminary and main surveys, while showing a slight Japanese bias in the latter, are within range of relative error.

Still another indicator of the sample's representativeness (and appropriate size) was the correlation between official election statistics and survey findings for the respondents' voting patterns. Hawaii's voting percentages for the three presidential candidates in 1968 were: Humphrey 59.8%; Nixon 38.8%; and Wallace 1.4%. Excluding the seventy respondents who refused to state if and/or for whom they voted, the percentages were: Humphrey 56.3%; Nixon 43.0%; and Wallace 0.8%. Each of those statistics is well within the tolerable range of relative error. Moreover, post-election surveys regularly find that voters identify with the winning candidate and report that they voted for him when, in fact, they either did not vote or voted for another presidential candidate.

The above statistical comparisons show the merits of employing the telephone interview in survey research. While the sample was slightly biased by using only those registered voters who had telephones and by recalling those who participated in the first interview, since substantial amounts of data had been collected for that sample, instead of obtaining a new sample, this researcher believes it is more representative of its population than the majority of other similar surveys that are conducted by political
scientists. The sample definitely is superior to those that usually are utilized in social psychological experiments and surveys. And, indeed, an 85 percent response rate is phenomenal for any type of survey research that, despite having limited financial resources, contacts over 400 respondents in the "field."

C. Interview Method

1. Telephone Interviewing

Social scientists continually state in journals and in private conversation that the telephone interview is too impersonal, too susceptible to considerable interviewee bias, and generally inferior to the personal face-to-face interview. Most of these critics, however, never subject their "conclusions" to empirical tests nor compare the telephone interview with other data-gathering techniques, such as the mailed questionnaire. A typical premonition is found in Backstrom's and Hursh's handbook entitled Survey Research: "Never interview by telephone. It is impossible to convey the subtleties of questions intended for a personal interview. Too, respondents find it easier to hang up than to refuse the interviewer at the door."16

While partial refutation of those two typical "conclusions" and presentation of empirical findings which research will not be mentioned here (see Appendix B), some specific prefatory remarks, pertaining to the Oahu sample, are appropriate at this time.
First, with the exception of sparsely populated rural areas Oahu is, more or less, a metropolitan area in which the city of Honolulu (pop. 294,194--1960 Census) is located. It is hypothesized that voters who live in a crowded, anxiety-ridden metropolitan area, such as Oahu, resent encroachments on their privacy and, equally important, are willing to take steps to prevent such encroachments. Many women in Hawaii simply refuse to talk with interviewers whom they do not know no matter what the latters' credentials. In fact, this researcher's past experience in person-to-person interviews on the island prompted the employment of the telephone interview.

Two other factors, in addition to a desire for privacy and a reluctance to talk with strangers, are central concerns to survey researchers on the island. Oahu's population is highly transient; military personnel and other mobile groups, such as young school teachers and students, arrive and leave the island constantly. An acute housing shortage also makes voters on Oahu more transient than their mainland counterparts as island residents scramble for more suitable and cheaper housing accommodations. Frequently only the telephone company's latest unpublished listings enable the survey researcher to get in touch with his prospective interviewees without spending unwarranted time and money to track them down.

Last, people on Oahu, mainly as a result of the high cost
of living in Hawaii, have an abnormally high percentage of the adult population in the labor force. These wage earners often can not be reached for personal interviewing at their homes since many of them work at irregular hours and/or have more than one job. Furthermore, after working for eight to twelve hours at the Dole cannery, for example, people simply are exhausted. And when they go home, they usually are busy or want to relax. Consequently, they prefer to have the interviewer call them at a time which is convenient for them, rather than to have him appear at their doorstep unexpectedly.

The fact that 61 percent of the sample preferred the telephone interview over the personal face-to-face interview (12 percent) clearly demonstrates the respondents' preference for telephone interviewing. Additionally it should be stated that many people, who were not at home or busy when they were called, often had to be called numerous times--some as many as ten which was the maximum number of callbacks authorized. To have reached those respondents in person would have been physically, as well as financially, impossible.

Moreover, since this researcher personally interviewed nearly 30 percent of the 435 interviewees, he was able to gain a few insights as a result of conversations with such a large number of people. The telephone seems to condition people to be friendly, at least in comparison to "doorstep
conversations" though salesmen and polling companies slowly but surely are eroding many people's good will toward callers. And, as was stated earlier, the caller requesting that you answer a few questions is not nearly as imposing as the doorbell ringer who awaits your invitation to be invited into the house--it is difficult to conduct a 20-minute plus interview while standing at the door. Last, pre-interview mailings to explain the forthcoming interview and well coached, polite interviewers--preferably girls or women--also seem to condition people to be friendly and cordial.

2. Procedures Prior to Telephone Interview

Perhaps the foremost procedure that was employed to establish interviewer-interviewee rapport was a pre-interview mailing (see Appendix C) which informed the potential respondents of the nature of the study and requested their cooperation in it. That mailing on formal stationary from the Department of Political Science gave the study legitimacy. The value of such legitimacy should not be underestimated, especially for survey research in an urban area which is saturated with telephone interviews by business firms and professional political pollsters.

A second interview procedure, one that was utilized only in the longer, main interview, was matching interviewers with interviewees of the same ethnic group (for Caucasians, Japanese, Chinese, and Filipinos only). While
no controls were administered and no direct measurements computed, it is probable that this interview strategy increased the response rate. Moreover, it was necessary for a few elderly voters to be interviewed in their native language.

A final factor that promoted the quality and determined, to some extent, the quantity of the data, as well as contributed to the response rate, was the preliminary interview in which initial rapport was established and in which questions concerning political participation and socio-economic status were asked.

Selecting another sample--than the one which was utilized in the preliminary survey during November, 1968--seemed unwise. Much data already had been collected on 563 registered voters; moreover, while the resulting sample was slightly biased, including only those who cooperated in the initial interview, it is assumed that another sample would have been similarly biased. In other words, attrition of an initial sample is inevitable. Some voters, for various and often-times understandable reasons, do not desire to be interviewed for 20 minutes or more--at least not when they receive no monetary compensation for the inconvenience.

In summary, the study was enhanced by formal pre-interview mailings, by matching interviewer and interviewee on an ethnic basis, and by the preliminary interview. But
perhaps the greatest boon to the response rate and the quality of the interviewing was the fact that the interviewers were well paid and simply had fun doing the interviews. In addition, the interviewers worked as a team by doing interviews for each other at times, by sharing with each other the humorous and not-so-humorous incidents that occur when one interviews people over the phone, and by steadfastly completing the interviews within the short three-week interview period.

D. Pretest and Questionnaire

Before presenting the findings, it is appropriate to discuss briefly the pretests and the final questionnaire that was employed in the field experiment.

The main telephone questionnaire can be divided into main parts. The first part resembles Froman's and Skipper's study though different hypotheses as well as different style and position issues were employed. Froman's and Skipper's style issues—decreasing chances of war, preventing a depression, and ending corruption in government—seemed too diverse to be incorporated into political appeals, as well as too peripheral as political issues. Consequently, the style issues—a strong economy, fair taxes, better relations between labor and management, and programs that help all of the people—were substituted for them. Similarly, the position issues that Froman and Skipper utilized—public ownership of natural resources, farm price supports, and
federal aid to education--were inapplicable to this study; they were "dated," irrelevant, and barely salient as partisan issues to members of the Oahu electorate. The position issues, selected after pretests involving 75-100 people throughout the City and County of Honolulu (Oahu), which were incorporated into the study were: creating more programs to help poor people, devoting more attention to the working man, spending less money to make the value of the dollar more stable, and allocating less money for poverty programs.

Finding position issues that Oahu voters tended to associate with one or the other major political parties was, to put it bluntly, no small task. Issues such as government control of big businesses and federal aid to education simply were not partisan ones to members of the Oahu voting public. Other issues, such as "having more labor legislation," were unsuitable, since they were "colored" too much by past labor legislation in Hawaii. Democrats, as well as Republicans, did not favor more labor legislation. Thus, since so many intervening variables affected perception of that position issue, it was not incorporated into the questionnaire.

The second part of the telephone interview dealt with issue appeals, based on the eight style and position issues that were employed, and candidate preferences. Hypothetical candidates--A, B, C, and D--served as "vehicles" for the various issue appeals.*
Each respondent in the second part was queried whether he would "vote" for: 1) the candidate of his own political party who stressed position issues of his party or the candidate of the other party who espoused style issues; and 2) the candidate of his own party who emphasized position issues of the other party or the candidate of the other party who discussed style issues. These hypothetical decisions tapped the relative importance of partisanship, type of issues, and level of congruence--incongruence between party label and partisan (position) issues for different types of voters. Moreover, they operationalized hypotheses like those that Froman had presented in an earlier article on campaign strategies and tactics involving the two types of issues.¹⁹

Last, in the third part of the telephone questionnaire an attempt was made to measure political attitudes on the SRC's Domestic Social Welfare Scale of 1960 and to relate those attitudes to other variables such as class, ethnicity, and partisan affiliation. One question, dealing with minimum wages, was appended to that five-item scale.

To serve as indirect validity checks, as well as independent variables, questions involving occupational status, liberalism-conservatism, attitude toward involvement of the federal government in domestic affairs also were incorporated into the questionnaire. The findings of the third part of the interview are presented in chapter seven.
E. Summary

To sum up, the field experiment, with its highly structured telephone interview, enabled the experimenter to control political stimuli, which definitely would not have been possible during election campaigns, and thus to "observe, measure, and compare" voters' perceptions of style and position issues more accurately than would have been possible under normal circumstances.

Response categories in the first part of the questionnaire--"Republican," "Democrat," "No Difference," "Don't Know"--and in the other two parts--usually the respondent had four possible responses--did not put premature closure on the interviewee's answers to the various questions.

Also, the questionnaire had a lively progression, as well as considerable variety. It is doubtful whether response sets were a major problem. Since rapport between interviewer and interviewee was established through a number of means--preliminary survey, pre-interview mailings, and good telephone manners--and since each respondent was told that his answers would remain confidential, it is assumed that the interviewees were relatively honest and straightforward.

*The second set of hypothetical candidates did not produce data which merited inclusion in the reporting of the findings; consequently, such data will not be incorporated into this paper.
CHAPTER V
PERCEPTION OF STYLE AND POSITION ISSUES

A. Introduction

In this and the two succeeding chapters, the findings of the two telephone surveys will be presented; and various hypotheses will be examined. Chapter five specifically concerns style and position issues, mainly how different types of partisans—strong Republicans, weak Republicans, independents who lean toward the Republican Party, independents who lean toward the Democratic Party, weak Democrats, and strong Democrats—perceive the eight issues that were employed in this study and how different types of voters tend to perceive style and position issues in general.*

Chapter six then employs various measures to discover if there are significant differences among voters concerning the issues that they perceive to be "most important," "important," and "least important." Chi square computations, rank-order correlations, and small space analyses are employed. In the second half of chapter six, differences between those who "voted" for the candidate of their own party with a position-issue appeal and those who voted for the candidate of the opposing party with a style-issue appeal are investigated. Such voters, it is hypothesized, place different values on the eight style and position

*In most of the computations, the 32 independents who stated they did not lean toward either political party were excluded. At a later time they may be examined in greater detail.
issues. In addition, two indices, issue-party congruence and issue-type preference, are related to voter's preferences for the two above-mentioned hypothetical candidates.

Chapter seven concludes the analytical chapters by integrating several major findings that do not warrant being presented in separate individual chapters. Utilizing two key dependent variables, Guttman scale scores of respondents on four questions that were extracted from the SRC's Domestic Social Welfare Scale of 1960 and votes in the 1968 presidential election, chapter seven elucidates and elaborates on the findings in the two previous chapters. It is hypothesized that the Guttman scale scores measure the prime determinant of partisan cleavage—namely, the "proper role" of the Federal government in domestic affairs—and that the votes cast in the last presidential election constitute the best way to measure a person's political behavior, when ethnicity, party affiliation, and socio-economic status are employed as independent variables. With this overview in mind it is appropriate to begin our discussion of style and position issues.

B. Delineation of the Research Topic: Political Issues

While Berelson et al. in Voting defined the two general types of issues, style and position, and offered many hypotheses regarding each type, they did not grapple with the topic of political issues in depth. They, on the contrary, mainly were interested in charting general differences
between Republicans and Democrats in their perception of issues and in the saliency of specific issues for the Elmira electorate in the 1948 presidential campaign. Thus, although they defined style and position issues quite well, they bypassed many of the fundamental questions which must be answered in any comprehensive study of political issues. For example, do different types of partisans perceive different types of issues differently? And, if so, why?

First, political issues must be defined. In this study, it will be recalled, issues are partisan matters of concern on which different voters have different opinions of varying intensity at different times. It is seen our definition incorporates the three conditions, as posited by Campbell et al. in The American Voter, that must exist if issues are to have electoral significance—i.e., to affect a person's voting decision.

Initially an issue must be cognized in some form. This rather basic assumption is far from simplistic. In fact, a major rationale for the employment of a field experiment is its ability to bring issues to voters' attention.

Second, an issue must arouse some minimal intensity of feeling if it is to have an effect on a person's political behavior. While the highly structured telephone interview, as well as the need for comparable responses, precluded the possibility of using open-ended responses, each interviewee was given an opportunity to state which issues he considered
to be "most important," "important," and "least important."

Last, if an issue is to influence a person's voting decision, it must be accompanied by some perception that one party represents the person's own position better than the other party or parties. In short, an issue must be a partisan matter as well as a political matter if it is going to have electoral relevance.

After discussing the three above-mentioned conditions which an issue must fulfill to effect a voter's behavior, Campbell et al. make an erroneous assumption. They hypothesize appear to that a person must perceive what a particular party's official stance is on an issue before such an issue influences his political behavior. For example, they write:

If a person goes on record in favor of leaving electric power production to private industry but has no idea what the Administration is doing about the question, we may deduce that his opinion is not based on substantial familiarity with the subject. (YES) He has an opinion but knows so little about the topic as to deprive his opinion of significance for his subsequent political behavior. (NOT NECESSARILY)²

Their conclusion is rather tenuous; since people without political information or with inadequate information tend to perceive congruence between their own position on an issue and their party's perceived position on the same issue. Thus, it appears that the SRC's research orientation puts premature closure on the topic of political issues by over-emphasizing specific position issues at the expense of more general position and style issues.
A quote from *The American Voter* seems to best demonstrate the above-mentioned bias. Campbell et al. write:

> Our typology reflects at least two dimensions of difference between political actors. First, it depends on the appearance of certain types of content, which the individual is not likely to master unless he pays continuing attention to the flow of political developments over a period of time. Second, whatever the depth of a person's political involvement, there are other basic limitations on cognitive capacities which are likely to make certain of the most sophisticated types of content remain inaccessible to the poorly endowed observer.

This researcher, in contrast, believes that even if persons only perceive political issues in terms of the "goodness or badness of the times," their perceptions are as important as those of other people who are much more cognizant of issues and party stands on them, if predicting voters' political behavior is our primary concern.

The closure which the SRC puts on the topic of political issues is seen best in the specificity of the issues it utilizes and investigates in its questionnaires. By focusing on complicated, changing issues the SRC researchers seem to err. Indeed, they bias their interpretation of position issues if the latter are defined as determinants of partisan alignment, as Berelson et al. and McClosky et al. conceive them.

By differentiating between "matters of specific public polity" and "global party images" and by isolating the two from each other the SRC diminishes the real partisan nature of political issues. As McClosky et al. write, issues which
concern both interests (matters of specific public policy) and ideologies (global party images) are the most important to voters.

Nonetheless, the SRC group had definite reasons for employing its particular research design. In fact, the Michigan researchers were exceptionally frank in stating possible biases that might occur as a result of the research design which they selected. They write:

(It) seems that the specificity with which the issue is formulated does play some role in responses, and this fact provides some warning about the relative nature of the results, as well as a substantive indication of the sorts of objects toward which the public can respond most freely.6

In passing, it should be stated that McClosky et al., as well as Froman and Skipper, conducted research in which undue specificity of issues limited the value of their research, at least if perception of political issues and the partisan nature of such issues were major concerns. McClosky et al., for example, found practically no difference between rank and file partisan attitudes on issues in their study, when respondents were queried whether the national government should increase, decrease, or neither increase nor decrease its involvement in such specific, complicated, and barely salient issues as tax credits and tariffs.7

Similarly, Froman and Skipper, employing three of McClosky et al.'s position issues--government ownership of natural resources, level of farm price supports, and federal aid to education--may have jeopardized the value of their
research by selecting specific issues rather than general ones, or a combination of the two.

To sum up, it should be remembered that for an issue to be relevant to a person's voting decision it must be cognized, perceived with some feeling of intensity, and thought to be promoted better by one or the other of the political parties. It (is hypothesized such an issue) should not be so specific that only the politically sophisticated and informed segment of the electorate can comprehend it. In fact, it seems much more appropriate to investigate the perception of issues by the 80 percent of the electorate which is not well informed (rather than on the 20 percent which is well informed), since it constitutes the bulk of the voting public.

C. Selection of Domestic Issue for Study

At this point it should be stated why domestic issues, rather than foreign issues or a combination of the two, were chosen for study. First, central domestic issues, being byproducts of the New Deal and Fair Deal (and perhaps Great Society), simply are more salient and important to voters than foreign issues--at least, over a period of time. As McClosky et al. write:

Party cleavage in America was no doubt intensified by the advent of the New Deal, and by its immense electoral and intellectual success. Not only did it weld into a firm alliance the diverse forces that were to be crucial to all subsequent Democratic majorities, but it also made explicit the doctrines of "the welfare state" with which the party was henceforth to be inseparably identified. 8
Second, foreign policy issues do not generate partisan differences, as McClosky et al. discovered in their research.\textsuperscript{9} Moreover, attitudes toward and opinions on foreign issues usually correlate poorly with those on domestic issues.\textsuperscript{10}

Third, domestic issues were chosen since they reflect predictable, continuing concerns that are not easily subject to change, such as Center's collectivism-individualism dimension. Such issues can much more easily be related to self-interest and ideological concerns than can foreign issues.

Last, in relation to this study domestic issues, for all of the above reasons, can more readily be incorporated into style- and position-issue appeals and can be related more easily to reliable scales, specifically the SRC's Domestic Social Welfare Scale of 1960. Consequently, these eight issues, each selected after extensive pretests in the "field," were utilized.

\begin{tabular}{ll}
\textbf{Position Issues} & \textbf{Style Issues} \\
\hline
1. Devoting more attention to the problems of the working man (DEM) & 1. Having Government programs that help all of the people \\
2. Creating more programs to help poor people (DEM) & 2. Having taxes that are fair for everyone \\
3. Spending less money (by the government in Washington) to make the value of the dollar more stable (REP) & 3. Having better relations between labor and management \\
4. Using less government money for poverty programs (REP) & 4. Having a strong economy \\
\end{tabular}
Most respondents, it should be stated, seemed to evaluate
the above eight issues in terms of political developments in
the 1960's. Some union members and elderly voters, however,
also appeared to recall pre-1960 political happenings, such
as the New Deal, the rise of the International Longshoremen's
and Warehousemen's Union, and the legislation that the
Democratic Party in Hawaii enacted during the 1950's.

D. Relevant Past Studies

Only two past studies, with the exception of The
American Voter, are directly germane to this particular
research. Since McClosky et al.'s study mainly concerned
attitudes of party leaders and followers on five ideological
scales, devoting only one specific page to discussion of
style and position issues, it primarily will be examined in
chapter seven.

Briefly, it should be remembered that McClosky et al.
examined twenty-four specific issues.11 Their research
design, it appears, tended to measure voters' knowledge of
issues and interest in them--rather than their perception
of issues. Thus, it differed noticeably from this study.

For example, a respondent in McClosky et al.'s study
may have known virtually nothing about federal aid to educa-
tion and/or may have been so subject to cross-pressures that
he would reply "I don't know" or "about the same." But the
same respondent, in this study dealing with voters' percep-
tions of political issues, probably would have associated
federal aid to education with his own party if he favored such aid or with the opposing party if he did not favor such assistance.

Consequently, McClosky et al.'s finding that there are insignificant differences between rank and file members of the two major parties and this study's finding that there are significant differences between the two groups of partisan voters reflect methodological and theoretical differences more than substantive ones.

Turning to the second study which offers insights and research perspectives for this one, Froman and Skipper's research on style and position issues deserves much closer and more critical attention since it constitutes the first systematic study of the two main types of political issues. While Berelson et al. discovered that people usually perceive their candidate and party as taking the same issue stands as they do, and while they correlated accuracy of perception with mass media consumption, education, political interest, and other variables, they did not systematically examine position and style issues nor did they chart voters' perceptions of them with any scientific rigor--at least, not in their published work. Froman and Skipper, however, did. They write:

Basically, we are interested in answers to two broad questions: 1) Does misperception (pulling favored issues to one's own party) vary with the type of issue involved? and 2) What factors are related to misperceiving party stands on issues?12
Constructing measures of misperception for both style and position issues, Froman and Skipper generated and substantiated four major hypotheses:

1. Style issues will be misperceived more than position issues.

2. The higher the level of education, the less the misperception of both style and position issues.

3. The stronger the partisanship the more the misperception of style issues and the less the misperception of position issues (when level of education is controlled).

4. The greater the issue orientation (how important a set of issues is perceived to be) the more the misperception of style issues and the less the misperception of position issues (when level of education is controlled).

Briefly examining the accompanying rationale for each hypothesis, style issues, being ambiguous and abstract, as well as more attractive to most voters, tend to be "pulled" more than position issues which are less ambiguous, concrete, and perhaps less attractive. (Note: Throughout the rest of this writing the terms "pull" or "partisan pull" will be used rather than "misperceive" and "misperception," since the former are more specific terms. They show that misperception has direction, or rather must have predicted partisan direction if it is to be termed partisan pull.) Numerous social-psychological studies and a few political ones have offered evidence for such an abstract-ambiguous vs. concrete
unambiguous perceptual phenomenon to the degree that it is now widely accepted.\textsuperscript{13}

Second, partisan pull varies inversely with education. People who have more political knowledge and understanding of the American political process don't indiscriminately pull issues to their own political party as much as those with less knowledge and less empathy for the other party.

Third, strong partisans tend to think that their party is better (or they would be members of the other political party) and simply associate attractive style issues, often moral or emotional ones, with their own party. On the other hand, strong partisans have more knowledge about politics and thus perceive position issues much more accurately than weak partisans and independents.

Last, people with high issue orientation pull style issues to their own party more since they tend to value issues in general, and since they believe that their party is instrumental in promoting such issues. At the same time such people, thinking issues are important, tend to know which party supports particular issues; hence, they perceive position issues more accurately than those who do not have high issue orientation.

E. Critique of Past Studies

Needless to say it is unprofitable to engage in "nit-picking," criticizing others' research on secondary, peripheral points. On the other hand, it is unwise to incorporate others'
concepts and "conclusions" without critical examination of their validity. To do less would be quite unscientific.

Furthermore, since political issues constitute a poorly researched area of political science, it is mandatory to scrutinize the research of the most relevant studies to date in order to find the "essence of the matter," so to speak, and to prevent the incorporation of irrelevant, and perhaps incorrect, findings into one's own research endeavors.

Since McClosky et al. treated style and position issues as a secondary concern, only two criticisms seem warranted. First, they did not define what they meant by style, position, and "mixed" issues; and they put some issues into those three categories in a rather arbitrary fashion. Second, the issues that McClosky et al. employed, as stated earlier, simply were too complicated for voters to comprehend. To chart people's responses to such issues is to demonstrate public ignorance, but not to probe into the intricacies of style and position issues nor into voters' perceptions of them.

Turning to Froman and Skipper's research, the main difficulties—in addition to utilizing an unrepresentative sample of "voters" which was three-fourths students—center around their interpretation of their findings. In one monograph they present evidence and explanations why style issues are more important as determinants of partisan affiliation than position issues. Yet the findings and the accompanying rationale seem weak. The discovery that a
person pulls style issues more than position issues and "votes" for candidates of the other party more often when they stress style issues with which he agrees (more often than when the opposing party's candidates espouse position issues which he agrees) does not prove that style issues are more important determinants of partisan alignments than position issues. The attractiveness of the issues under study is a major intervening variable. Moreover, in most cases voters simply pull issues they favor to their own political party. Additionally, much evidence has been accumulated to contest Froman and Skipper's conclusion that style issues are more important as underlying causes of partisanship than position issues. 14

Similarly, in an earlier monograph Froman and Skipper seem to generalize their findings on the basis of insufficient evidence. Table VIII reveals two of their analytical problems: significance and multi-collinearity.
TABLE VIII

RELATION OF STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND ISSUE ORIENTATION TO DEGREE OF Misperception on Position Issues, Controlling for Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Strong Rep-Dem</th>
<th>Other Partisans</th>
<th>High Issue Orientation</th>
<th>Low Issue Orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>high school</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>3.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>early college</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>2.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>late college</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>1.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adult</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>2.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>2.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While some inferences may be appropriate, it appears that Froman and Skipper tend to overstate the case, since they did not compute significance levels for the above relationships. It is easily seen, moreover, that there is significant intercorrelation between the two independent variables. Strong partisans tend to have high issue orientation; weak partisans low issue orientation.

Last, other weaknesses of the Froman-Skipper study—perhaps unavoidable ones—are the misperception indices they employ and the comparability between such indices. Nonetheless, such difficulties often arise when indices are constructed.

In passing it should be stated that Froman and Skipper were exploring a delicate area of research, political issues.
They had few theoretical and few empirical guideposts in an unmapped research terrain; thus, the value of their pioneering work with style and position issues should not be underestimated.

F. Indices and Issues Employed in This Study

In this particular study, after considering the above-mentioned factors, the index for position issues simply was based on accuracy or correctness of perception. A score of "1" was given to a correct perception, a score of "2" for a "no difference" reply, and a score of "3" for an incorrect perception. "Don't know" responses, which were spread evenly throughout the six different types of partisans, were deleted.

As far as the style-issue index was concerned, if a person pulled an issue toward his own party he was given a score of "3," if he said there was "no difference" between the parties as far as one of them favoring the issue more than the other he received a score of "2," and if he "pushed" a style issue toward the other party he was given a partisan pull score of "1." (For small space analysis this index was inverted since the new index facilitated explanation of various relationships.) Again, "don't know" replies--which never constituted more than 16% of the responses for any of the eight issues--were omitted.

Before examining the results of this study it should be stated that the responses to the eight issues were dichotomized
systematically to increase variance and to control for the partisan nature of the issues, as well as to increase cell frequencies for chi square and other computations. Each of the four position issues was dichotomized between "no difference" and the correct response. For example, it was hypothesized that a Republican who says there is "no difference" between the Republican and Democratic Parties as far as favoring the working man (giving more attention to his problems) actually is pulling that issue toward his own political party, since the issue definitely is a Democratic one.

The need for such dichotomization becomes more noticeable when perceptions of style issues are measured. Programs that help all of the people and better relations between labor and management had distinct Democratic orientations, while a strong economy had a Republican coloration. Fair taxes, when considering the predominance of Democrats in the sample, also was assumed to have a Republican bias. Each of the style issues, in short, was dichotomized to maximize variance and to minimize the partisan nature of each issue.

To sum up, since the respondents formed a continuum from "Republican," "no difference," to "Democrat" and since "don't know" replies were proportionately distributed throughout the sample, it is hypothesized that such dichotomization did not alter the nature of the responses unduly. In fact, such dichotomization assisted the researcher
in finding numerous relationships which would not have been uncovered or would have been of dubious statistical value if more than two categories had been used for the dependent variable--perception of political issues.

G. Analysis of Data: General Findings Regarding Style and Position Issues

In analyzing the data it will be presented as percentages first, how the 435 respondents perceived each issue. Then, after briefly discussing the differences in perception of each of the six partisan groups, tau beta, a proportional-reduction-of-error measures (p-r-e measure), will be discussed. Next, general indices of accuracy of position-issue perception and partisan pull of style-issue perception will be related to other variables as well as to party. Last, a graphic representation of the major independent variables and the two dependent variables, perception of position issues and partisan pull of style issues, will be presented. The print-out of the Guttman Lingoes program for small space analysis (SSA) will neatly integrate all of the hypotheses, shed new light on the relationships that Froman and Skipper found, and demonstrate the characteristics of voters with an instrumental attitude toward politics and those with an expressive concern for politics.

Members of the Oahu (City and County of Honolulu) electorate tended to perceive position issues correctly, when the latter were not as specific nor as abstract as they
have been in earlier studies. Table IX presents the findings. Similar percentages, again not controlling for direction nor intensity of party affiliation, for style issues are listed in Table X (see next page).

**TABLE IX**

**OAHU VOTERS' PERCEPTION OF THE FOUR POSITION ISSUES**

(in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Working Man</th>
<th>Programs Poor</th>
<th>Stable Dollar</th>
<th>Less $ Poverty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>57.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No difference</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percent*</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* All differences in these percentages can be attributed to errors in rounding.
TABLE X

OAHU VOTERS' PERCEPTION OF THE FOUR STYLE ISSUES
(in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Programs All</th>
<th>Relations: Labor-Management</th>
<th>Strong Economy</th>
<th>Fair Taxes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No difference</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total percent* 100.0 100.1 100.0 99.9
Total N 435 435 435 435

* All differences in these percentages can be attributed to errors in rounding.

Turning now to the dichotomized responses--partisan in the sense that responses for the six groups of partisans (strong Republicans and Democrats, weak Republicans and Democrats, and independents who lean toward the two parties, respectively) were evaluated separately, as well as jointly--interesting findings emerge. All chi-square values were significant at the .001 level except better relations between labor and management which was significant at the .05 level and spending less government money on poverty programs which was not significant. Republicans "pushed" the latter issue toward the Democrats; Democrats "pushed" it toward the Republicans. It was an atypical issue, both groups of partisans advocating continued support for poverty programs
though in different degrees of intensity; neither group of partisans pulled the issue--spending less government money on poverty programs--to their own political party as they did the other seven issues. Consequently, that issue was not incorporated into the index which measured correct perception of position issues.

Controlling for party, the following percentages were obtained:

TABLE XI

REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS PULLING POSITION ISSUES TO THEIR OWN PARTY
(in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working Man</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>.381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programs Poor</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Dollar</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>.377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less $ Poverty</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table reveals much information. First, it is readily seen that strong partisans pull position issues--at least, favorable ones--to their own party much more than weak partisans and independents who identify with the same political party. For example, 74 percent of the strong Republicans thought that the Republican Party (more than the Democrat Party) was more inclined to help the working man in contrast to weak Republicans (41 percent) and independents
who identified with the Republican Party (48 percent). Similarly, 98 percent of the strong Democrats thought that the Democrat Party favored helping the working man (more than the Republican Party), while 83 percent of the weak Democrats and 79 percent of the independent Democrats had the same opinion.

Second, it is discovered that independents who state they tend to support one political party more than the other do not differ significantly in their perception of position issues from self-classified weak partisans of the same party.* That finding raises doubt whether such independents, who constituted over 42 percent of the total sample, should be so classified. Weak or latent partisans may be more appropriate appellations for that sizable group of voters.

Last, comparing the atu chi values** for the two most attractive position issues--giving more attention to the

---

*This finding may be an artifact of the field experiment, since voters on Oahu did not have to state their party preference, when voting in primary elections, until 1964. Indeed, replication with other samples is needed before that finding can be accepted with confidence.

**Tau chi is a measure of association for ordinal data with a large number of ties. It is comparable to Spearman's rank-order coefficient (rho) and Kendall's tau for ordinal data with no or few ties. Tau chi incidentally, is not a proportional-reduction-of-error measure, nor is tau beta, a similar measure of association for ordinal data which (unlike tau chi) discounts ties. Tau beta for ordinal data, however, should not be confused with tau beta for nominal or dichotomous data--a proportional-reduction-of-error measures which will be explained shortly.
problems of the working man (.381) and spending less govern­
ment money to make the value of the dollar more stable (.377)--
with those for the four style issues (see Table XII), it is
seen that the favorable position issues divide the partisans--
Republicans and Democrats--nearly as well as the attractive
style issues if the tau chi values are employed as the means
of comparison. The greater the tau chi values, the more
partisans, depending on direction and intensity of their
party affiliation, tend to pull issues to their own political
party.

Focusing now on style-issue perception for the same six
partisan groups, Table XII presents the findings:

| TABLE XII |
| REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS PULLING STYLE ISSUES |
| TO THEIR OWN PARTY | |
| (in percentages) |
| | Strong→Weak→Inde. | Inde.→Weak→Strong |
| Programs All | 78 | 79 | 75 | 57 | 67 | 78 | .438 |
| Labor-Management Relations | 83 | 78 | 64 | 64 | 64 | 80 | .406 |
| Strong Economy | 74 | 66 | 60 | 75 | 75 | 81 | .406 |
| Fair Taxes | 60 | 50 | 43 | 86 | 87 | 95 | .376 |
| Total N | | | | | | | |

First, it is seen, as Froman and Skipper hypothesized
earlier, that strong partisans pull style issues more than
weak partisans.

Again, we find great similarity between weak partisans and independents who identify with the same political party. Furthermore, after comparing the differences between independents who lean toward the Republican Party and those who lean toward the Democrat Party, we realize that the term "independent" is a misnomer--at least for those in this sample who so classified themselves.

Another significant finding is the consistently high tau chi value for each style issue. It appears that the four style issues are uniformly attractive though they definitely are different in content. Thus, the form of the issue, rather than its content, may be a crucial variable in the perception of political issues.

H. Analysis of Data: Measuring Improved Predictability of Dependent Variable (Perception of Issue) When Independent Variable (Nature of Party Affiliation) Is Known*

When the chi-square values for the four major partisan groups were calculated, it was found that issues which dealt with New Deal and Fair Deal legislation continue to be prime determinants of political differences for Republican partisans, Republican independents, Democrat independents, and Democrat partisans on the island of Oahu. But the chi square values and levels of significance are difficult to interpret. Thus, the researcher decided to utilize a proportional-reduction-of-error measure that has contextual meaning, to

* See also Appendix D
adopt Goodman and Kruskal's criterion for selecting the appropriate statistic.\textsuperscript{16} Tau beta, a p-r-e measure for nominal and dichotomized data with a large number of ties, proved to be the most appropriate, contextual statistic for this study.\textsuperscript{17}

In essence, tau beta for nominal and dichotomous data measures the proportional reduction of error in predicting the dependent variable when the independent variable is known.\textsuperscript{18} Algebraically, it is:

\[
\text{taub} = \frac{\text{number of errors not knowing independent variable}}{\text{number of errors not knowing independent variable}}
\]

In this particular section the independent variable is party affiliation and the dependent variable is perception of political issues, the latter dichotomized to produce "Republican" and "Democrat" scores. Tau beta, varying between -1.0 and +1.0, tells how much better the dependent variable can be predicted when the independent variable is known.

First, it is worthwhile to dichotomize the above-mentioned six partisan groups into "Republicans" and "Democrats," and to chart how much better we can predict their perceptions of the eight issues as a result of knowing with which party they identify.
TABLE XIII

TAU BETA FOR BOTH "REPUBLICANS" AND "DEMOCRATS"
ON ALL EIGHT ISSUES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position Issues</th>
<th>Style Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working Man</td>
<td>Programs All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programs Poor</td>
<td>Relations between</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labor-Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Dollar</td>
<td>Strong Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Dollars for</td>
<td>Fair Taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Programs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.372</td>
<td>.384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.213</td>
<td>.371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.334</td>
<td>.404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-.109</td>
<td>.410</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is readily seen that for each of the style issues, knowing with which political party a person is affiliated enables us to reduce the number of errors we would make in predicting his perception of a political issues, believing that it was favored more by one or the other of the parties, by nearly 40 percent.

And, while the tau beta values for position issues are not as high as those for style issues, they are significant, especially when it is remembered that voters pull style issues more than they pull position issues. In fact, it is seen that the tau beta scores for the two most attractive position issues are nearly as high as those of the four style issues. That finding constitutes partial refutation of the Froman-Skipper hypothesis that style issues, not position ones, are the major determinants underlying party affiliation.

This researcher should remind the reader that though the above-mentioned tau beta scores for dichotomized data resemble
earlier tau chi scores for ordinal data there is no direct relationship between them. The former, in short, have significant theoretical value while the latter mainly have descriptive value. They should not be considered comparable statistics, even though their numerical values are strikingly similar.

Turning again to tau beta comparisons, it is hypothesized that more significant relationships will appear if we separate the six partisan groups into strong, weak, and independent party identifiers. In fact, it is hypothesized that tau beta scores will vary proportionately, as far as perception of political issues is concerned, with the intensity of partisanship. Table XIV lists the tau beta values for strong Republicans and strong Democrats.

**TABLE XIV**

TAU BETA SCORES FOR STRONG PARTISANS ON BOTH TYPES OF ISSUES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position Issues</th>
<th>Style Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working Man</td>
<td>Programs All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programs Poor</td>
<td>Relations between Labor-Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Dollar</td>
<td>Strong Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Dollars for Poverty Programs</td>
<td>Fair Taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.697</td>
<td>0.543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.561</td>
<td>0.611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.419</td>
<td>0.613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.230</td>
<td>0.551</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table XIV is interesting since it demonstrates that the dependent variable, perception of political issues, can be predicted much better when it is known if a person is a strong partisan. Moreover, the tau beta scores can serve as indices of the relative importance of each issue for strong partisans, hypothesizing that such voters will pull the issues which they consider more important to their own political party.

It is seen that tau beta, as a p-r-e measures, enables the researcher to grasp the relative differences between the eight issues more clearly and easily than do chi square values and other traditional measures of association for nominal and dichotomous data such as the contingency coefficient. Unfortunately, tau beta like the chi square measures is affected by the size of the marginals, a problem for which no remedy appears.

Descriptively, the tau beta scores in Table XIV show that one position issue--giving more attention to the problems of the working man--divides strong partisans much more than others, a finding not unexpected in Hawaii where organized labor is a formidable voting bloc. In fact, it divides them more than any of the four style issues. And another issue with New Deal connotations, creating more programs to help poor people, has a comparably high tau beta value. Thus, we have found further evidence to cast doubt on the Froman-Skipper hypothesis that style issues divide
partisans or determine party alignments more than position issues.

Last, it is observed that strong partisans tend to be less willing to pull an unattractive issue--using less money for poverty programs--than weak partisans and independents. Hence, we have further data to support the perceptual balance thesis of perception.

What, it is appropriate to ask, would be the respective tau beta scores for weak partisans and independents who lean toward a particular political party? Tables XV and XVI are instructive.

**TABLE XV**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position Issues</th>
<th>Style Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working Man</td>
<td>Programs All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programs Poor</td>
<td>Relations between</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Dollar</td>
<td>Strong Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Dollars for Poverty Programs</td>
<td>Fair Taxes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here it is observed that the tau beta values for the perception of both position and style issues drop noticeably from those of strong partisans. And the tau beta scores for position issues drop more than those for style issue. Thus, two hypotheses can be offered:
1) position issues divide strong and weak partisans of the same political party much more than do style issues, and 
2) weak partisans are not inclined to pull political issues to their own party nearly as much as strong partisans even though they do not hesitate to classify themselves as "Republicans" or "Democrats." Similarly, in light of the above findings, it can be hypothesized that weak partisans more closely resembles independent partisans, at least as far as the perception of style and position issues is concerned. Table XVI tends to substantiate that hypothesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position Issues</th>
<th>Style Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working Man</td>
<td>Programs All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programs Poor</td>
<td>Relations between</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Dollar</td>
<td>Labor-Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Dollars for</td>
<td>Strong Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Programs</td>
<td>Fair Taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.284</td>
<td>.299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.236</td>
<td>.324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.212</td>
<td>.264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-.097</td>
<td>.334</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A comparison of the two preceding tables reveals another difference in the perception of political issues by different partisan groups. Weak partisans tend to pull style issues to their own party slightly more than independent partisans; the means for the tau beta scores for style issues are .392 and .307 respectively. This constitutes additional evidence for the perceptual balance thesis.
Desiring to see if there are significant intra-party as well as inter-party differences in the perception of issues, two calculations were made in an effort to see if knowing how strongly a person identifies with one political party helps us to predict his perception of issues vis-a-vis other identifiers of the same political party.

For Republican partisans and independents only one of the eight issues, having better relations between labor and management, produced a chi square value that was significant at the .15 level. The tau beta score for that one issue was .184. All other tau beta scores were less than .120 when "Republicans" were bifurcated into partisans and independents.

For Democrats a similar finding appeared. Knowing whether a voter self-classified himself as a partisan or an independent did not enable prediction of his perception of political issues, association of them with one or the other of the two major parties, with a significant reduction of error. In fact, only two issues produced chi square values that were significant at the .15 level for the two groups of Democrats: giving more attention to the problems of the working man (p<.15) and programs that help all of the people (p<.05). The tau beta scores for those two issues were .094 and .143 respectively--not very significant when compared with inter-party ones.

Noticing the similarity between weak and independent partisans of the same party, this researcher decided to
compare issues perceptions of those two groups with those of strong partisans, again generating an intra-party statistic. It was found that strong partisans tend to differ slightly from weak partisans and independent partisans in both parties; such differences, however, were by no means substantial. In fact, of the tau beta scores only those for two issues and both for Republicans were noteworthy: giving more attention to the problems of the working man (.268) and having government programs that help all of the people (.193). Thus, in only two instances did knowing whether a person was a strong partisan or not make much difference in our ability to predict his perception of political issues.

To sum up, there are substantial differences between Republicans and Democrats in their perception of both style and position issues. Differences in perception vary proportionately with strength of party affiliation, the more partisan pulling both types of issues more toward their own party. Our finding, which contrasts with the finding of Froman and Skipper that strong partisans will misperceive (pull) position issues less than weak partisans, may be a result of the particular issues that were chosen for study.

The second major finding was that independents who lean toward one political party resemble weak partisans of that party so closely that the name independents is a misnomer; they are partisans. And, it was found that weak partisans are much closer to independents who identify with the same
political party than they are to strong partisans, at least on Oahu.

Last, it was discovered that intra-party differences in the perception of political issues, admittedly rather basic ones, are insignificant. Strong, weak, and independent partisans tend to perceive both style and position issues with the same partisan bias. Thus, we have substantial evidence to support the perceptual balance thesis of perception.

I. Analysis of Data: The Relation of Key Political Variables to the Perception of Position and Style Issues

Having closely examined issue perceptions in detail for the six groups of partisan voters, the chief independent variable of this study, it now is appropriate to see if other independent variables also have an effect on the perception of position and style issues.

When not controlling for party and when investigating the accuracy of voters' perceptions of position issues--using an index of perception employing all of the position issues (except using less dollars on poverty programs) as the dependent variable--the following hypotheses were supported by chi-square values at the significance levels as indicated in parentheses:

The greater the interest in politics, the more accurate the perception of position issues (p<.01)
The higher the occupational status of the voter, the more accurate his perception of position issues (p<.05)

The higher the education level of the voter, the more accurate his perception of position issues (p<.05)

The greater the mass media consumption (a four-item scale), the more accurate the perception of position issues (p<.005)

The higher the level of political information (a five-item scale), the more accurate the perception of position issues (p<.01)

On the other hand, party affiliation, intensity of partisanship, age, interest in issues at election time, and belief that there (are are not) important differences between the two major political parties did not produce significant chi square values.

When controlling for party--strong-weak Republicans, independent Republicans, independent Democrats, strong-weak Democrats--the chi square value for interest in politics, when cross-tabulated with accuracy of position-issue perception, remained significant at the .10 level for all groups except strong-weak Democrats.

Perhaps more important, mass media consumption was significant at the .05 level for strong-weak Republicans and at the .01 level for strong-weak Democrats but was not
significant for independent partisans. Thus, it appears that there are greater differences among partisans, as a result of exposure to political news via the mass media, than there are among independents. Similarly, level of political information was significant for the Republicans, but not for the Democrats. The former findings, and to some extent the latter, have been hypothesized by Converse and others in the past.

To sum up, only two of the original hypotheses for position-issue perception remained significant when direction and intensity of party affiliation were controlled: 1) the greater the interest in politics (with one exception), the more accurate the perception of position issues when direction and intensity of party affiliation are controlled, and 2) the greater the mass media consumption, the more accurate the perception of position issues for partisans but not for independents. Small space analysis, as well shall see shortly, further elucidates the above-mentioned relationships.

Examining the partisan pull of style issues--a four-issue index being the dependent variable--while not holding party constant the following hypotheses were supported by the data:

The greater the interest in politics, the more the partisan pull of style issues (p<.10)

The greater the intensity of partisanship, the more the partisan pull of style issues (p<.01)
The greater the tendency to vote a straight ticket, the more the partisan pull of style issues (p<.005)

The greater the perception of important differences between the two major parties, the more the partisan pull of style issues (p<.10)

But when party was controlled, both interest in politics and perception of important differences between the two major parties no longer were significant vis-a-vis perception of style issues.

Thus, it is seen that partisan pull of style issues, associating them with the party with which one is affiliated, centers around a partisan dimension while perception of position issues (accurately) centers around a political knowledge-sophistication dimension. Such dimensions, especially after employing small space analysis, will recall Himmelstrand's distinction between voters with an expressive concern for politics and those with an instrumental interest in politics respectively.

J. Analysis of Data: Delineation of Key Variable Clusters Via Small Space Analysis

Briefly it should be stated that small space analysis or smallest space analysis (hereafter referred to as SSA) is a form of factor analysis for non-metric data; its only assumption is monotonicity. While SSA does not have the theoretical rigor nor the mathematical richness of the factor analytic model, it does provide an easily
interpretable, graphic display of the relevant variables and the relationships among them, a display which promotes conceptual clarity and fosters theoretical insights.

SSA, in essence, forces a set of variables into the smallest space possible--one dimension, two dimensions, three dimensions, etc. The preciseness with which a particular number of dimensions or coordinates represent the data is measured by the coefficient of alienation which is a "function of the differences between the distances as calculated from the coordinate system and the same distances permuted to maintain the rank order of the original coefficients."\(^{22}\)

The smaller the coefficient, the better the "fit."

Although no definite rules have been established for the coefficient of alienation by the proponents and practitioners of SSA, there seem to be two prime considerations: 1) the value of the coefficient of alienation for \(n\) dimensions as compared with the coefficients for \(n-1\) and \(n+1\) dimensions, and 2) the purpose for which the researcher uses SSA. Bloombaum, for example, suggests that it is best to obtain the coefficients of alienation for four dimensions, to compare them, and then to select the one which significantly improves the "fit."\(^{23}\) If, for instance, the coefficients of alienation were .65, .20, .13, .05 for one, two, three, and four dimensions, the two dimensional representation of the data would be chosen.

On the other hand, the researcher, depending on the
purpose of his research, may determine what coefficient of alienation and, naturally, what n dimensional display of his data is most appropriate. To represent the key variables and their inter-relations a two-dimensional representation of the data with a coefficient of .18 may be sufficient, while to delineate multi-variable clusters with preciseness a three-dimensional display of the same data with a coefficient of .006 may be more suitable.

Additionally, it should be remembered that it is nearly impossible to visualize variables and their relationships in more than three dimensions. Consequently, two or three dimensions usually are chosen to represent the data, depending on the two above-mentioned considerations.

Another facet of SSA which merits discussion is the criteria which the analyst employs as he associates variables with each other or delineates clusters of variables. Two criteria appear to be the central ones; in fact, they constitute necessary and sufficient conditions for interpretation of the output of SSA. First, the primary criterion is proximity of the variables; since the distance between them varies inversely with their correlation. The higher the correlation between two variables the closer they are to each other in a graphic representation of the variables.

Second, an additional criterion is the theoretical value of drawing certain clusters, provided the variables in such clusters satisfy the criterion of proximity. It is
possible, for instance, for one variable to be "outside" a specific cluster but to be closer to that cluster and more highly correlated with it than with any of the other clusters. If such is the case and if inclusion of that variable into the cluster is theoretically efficacious, then the boundaries of the initial cluster can be expanded. In such a case, it appears best to use a solid line to delineate the primary cluster and a broken line to outline the second, more inclusive cluster.

Having had a brief introduction to SSA, it is possible to examine a graphic illustration of the variables that correlate with accuracy of position-issue perception and partisan pull of style-issue perception. Figure 1 is instructive.

A comparison of the coefficient of alienation for one, two, three, and four dimensional representations of the data (.330, .159, .098, .064), as well as the facility in presenting the two dimensional display, prompted the usage of the latter.

As far as the delineation of clusters is concerned, both criteria were used; in fact, both have to be used in small space analysis. Employing the first criterion, proximity, the two independent variables that were closest to the two dependent variables, accuracy of position-issue perception, were level of political information and intensity of partisanship respectively. Since all the
FIGURE ONE

KEY VARIABLES IN PERCEPTION OF ISSUES AS REPRESENTED BY SMALL SPACE ANALYSIS

Coefficient of alienation = .159
variables included in the SSA were coded so that they would correlate in a predictable manner, a step which facilitates interpretation, two hypotheses can be stated: 1) the higher the level of political information the more accurate the perception of position issues, and 2) the greater the intensity of partisanship the more the partisan pull of style issues.*

Relating those two basic findings to Froman and Skipper's earlier hypotheses, it is seen, as far as the data in this particular study is concerned, that party by far is the key variable in the pull of style issues. Moreover, another of the Froman-Skipper hypotheses is supported: the higher the level of education the less the partisan pull of style issues. Since closeness indicates positive correlation in SSA, it is readily observed that education correlates poorly with partisan pull of style issues. To use Froman and Skipper's terms, those with more education tend to mis-perceive (pull) style issues less than those with less education. (r = -.10)

*Though the mass-media index correlated more highly with accuracy of position-issue perception than level of political information, it was efficacious to use the components of that index, rather than the index itself, in this particular SSA. Additionally, it is possible that the correlation coefficients utilized in SSA are more representative of actual relationships than chi square values. In passing, it should be remembered that the assumptions underlying Pearson's product-moment correlation do not have to be made in SSA.
Turning to the perception of position issues, it is discovered that political information level is more closely correlated with correctness of position-issue perception than any other of the independent variables—including intensity of party affiliation and level of education, two variables which Froman and Skipper found to correlate with accuracy of perception of position issues. At the same time it is seen, perhaps because the position issues in this study were rather basic ones, that no variable correlates as closely with position-issue perception as intensity of partisanship does with style-issue perception.

If the second criterion for cluster, the theoretical value of particular groupings, is employed, it is most profitable from an analytical point of view to delete three variables which correlate with both dependent variables before we enlarge our initial two variable clusters. Consequently, belief that there are important differences between the two major parties, usage of newspaper to obtain political news, and interest in politics were eliminated as components of our final clusters. (If the reader deplores the elimination of the variable—belief that there are important differences between the two parties—he is reminded that it can easily and justifiably from a theoretical standpoint be included in the cluster revolving around the partisan pull of style issues. Similarly, it certainly would be permissible to include interest in politics with
the cluster II since it was significant when cross-tabulated with accuracy of position-issues perception, while holding party constant.

Television as a source of news about politics did not correlate highly with either dependent variable. But, since it correlated nearly twice as strongly with style-issue perception or partisan pull of such issues than with accuracy of position-issue perception, and since it had theoretical relevance in cluster I, it was put in the latter group of variables.*

Recalling Himmelstrand's bifurcation of voters into two groups--those with an expressive concern for politics and those with an instrumental attitude toward politics--and remembering that it was hypothesized the former would be more inclined to favor style issues (i.e., pull them) and the latter position issues, Figure 1 becomes more meaningful. In fact, certain relationships are particularly interesting.

Those, for example, who have more knowledge of politics (five-item scale), high occupational status, more education, and who get news about politics from magazines such as Time and Newsweek as well as from other sources tend to perceive

*Chi square calculations showed the greater the consumption of political news via television broadcasts, the greater the partisan pull of style issues. (p. .20) Better measurement, it is hypothesized, would have made that relationship more significant.
position issues more accurately.* Indeed, such voters resemble those with an instrumental attitude toward politics. They tend to ask what particular relevance and value a certain issue and/or candidate has for them. In fact, if the position issues which were chosen for study had been more specific and more valued by those in cluster II, it is hypothesized that "accuracy of position-issue perception" would have been closer to the center of the cluster and that the cluster itself would have been more cohesive.

Turning to cluster I, other if not more significant relationships are discovered. First, it is seen that the intensity of partisanship does not correlate highly with other variables such as education and occupation—at least not for those in this sample who strongly pull style issues to their own political party. Moreover, by considering the other variables in cluster II, it can be assumed that the voters in cluster I are less politically knowledgeable and sophisticated than those in cluster II.

That assumption seems to be supported if we observe where voters in each cluster tend to obtain their information about political happenings. Those in cluster I rely on

*This relationship was not significant. But the high correlation of consumption of political news via magazines and other key variables, such as education and political information level, merits its inclusion into cluster II. Interviewee bias, over-stating usage of magazines as source of political information, seems to have been a problem.
the evening news broadcasts on television as a major source of political information. This is a way they express their concern about politics, and "keep up" with the news. In fact, such viewing may even be a form of entertainment for them.

On the other hand, those in cluster II seem to seek more precise political information, if reading periodicals such as Time and Newsweek is an indication of a desire to be well informed. Moreover, television is relatively unimportant to them vis-a-vis voters in the other cluster.

Parenthetically it should be stated that deleting newspapers as a source of political news should not be considered a serious omission since the telephone questionnaire did not probe from which part of the paper respondents usually got their information. To scan over the headlines and pictures on the first page is not comparable to carefully reading the arguments for and against certain issues on the editorial page.

To sum up, it is seen that SSA not only integrated the previously discussed hypotheses which were supported by the data in this field experiment but also fostered conceptual clarity, not to mention its panoramic display of the key variables under consideration. To use an analogy, if a picture if worth a thousand words, then a representation of major, related variables, both independent and dependent, by SSA may well be worth a thousand untested hypotheses.
Figure 1, in fact, may express the differences between voters with an expressionist concern for politics and those with an instrumental attitude toward politics—at least from an empirical standpoint—more clearly than those differences have ever been stated in the past. Similarly, Figure 1 sheds new light on political issues in general and on the perception of style and position issues in particular.
CHAPTER VI

THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF ISSUES AND ISSUE CLUSTERS

A. Introduction

Recalling the three conditions which the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan (hereafter often referred to as SRC) hypothesized must exist if an issue is to have an effect on a person's voting behavior, it is seen that we already have discussed conditions one and three--cognition of issues and association of them with one or the other of the two major parties or both.

Now it is appropriate to consider the second condition: arousal of a minimum degree of feeling toward an issue or what will be termed the relative importance of issues and issue clusters in this chapter. It is not exceedingly significant to know that a person cognizes an issue and associates it with a particular political party unless we also know that issue's importance to the voter and its relative importance vis-a-vis other issues that the voter also cognizes and associates with one or both of the parties. Thus, to measure that importance is the intent of this chapter.

Parenthetically it should be stated that, since each respondent was asked to state which two of the eight issues were most important to him and which two were least important, a valence was obtained for each issue--the other four issues simply were assumed to be important to the voter. "Most important" issues were coded "1," "important" issues "2,"
and "least important" issues "3." A few voters stated that all of the eight issues were important, and a few refused to answer. In such cases a score of "2" was given to each issue.

In this study the importance of an issue or issues to voters will be measured in six different ways, not counting the presentation of the frequency distributions of voters who consider each issue "most important," "important," or "least important." First, chi square calculations will be made to determine which issues divide those, including independents, who identify with the Republican and Democratic parties respectively. Inter- and intra-party computations will be presented.

Second, to show the degree of inter-party incongruence and intra-party congruence, Spearman's rank-order correlation (rho) will be calculated. Such measures are akin to those utilized by McClosky et al. in their study of party leaders and followers.

Third, small space analyses will show what issues the entire sample and Republican- and Democrat-oriented sub-samples tend to value the same. Additionally, SSA will enable us to visualize intra-party similarities and inter-party differences more clearly.

Since the graphic distances in SSA vary with the correlation between variables (issues)--for example, a correlation of +1.0 between two variables would mean that they vary directly with each other (they would have the same valence)
and thus would be superimposed upon each other or represented by the same point in SSA. On the other hand, a correlation of -1.0 between two variables would mean that they vary inversely with each other (e.g., in this case if one had a valence of 1 the other would have a valence of 3 and vice versa) and they would be a noticeable distance apart in SSA. As a hypothetical case, let us assume that two variables which vary inversely would be six inches apart in SSA. Similarly, if the same two variables were perfectly uncorrelated with each other or statistically independent, then in this hypothetical case they would be three inches apart.

Determining whether a cluster indicates a group of variables which are perceived to be important or unimportant for a particular group is easily done by checking the frequency distributions--"most important," "important," and "least important"--of the issues in that particular cluster. It should be noted, when checking the relative importance of position issues, that the number in the "important" and "least important" groups becomes significant. In short, since style issues are perceived to be "most important" quite often, the reader should not expect the less attractive position issues to be exactly comparable. More important, the relative importance of each of the issues not only is seen by looking at the distributions of valences for one group of partisans, but also by comparing the distributions of valences for that one group with the corresponding distributions for the other groups of partisans. (See Appendix E for the relative
importance of each of the eight issues for the six partisan
groups.)

Three additional measures of issue importance seemed
beneficial, recognizing the need to measure differences be­
tween those who "voted" for the candidate of their own party
who stressed position issues (of their party) and those who
"voted" for the candidate of the opposing party who espoused
style issues. The fourth measure to be examined will be
termed issue-party congruence. It measures how closely the
interviewee associates (pulls) those two issues which he
believes are "most important" to his own political party. It
is hypothesized that those who pull such issues will "vote"
for the candidate of their own party, whether he stresses
those two issues or not.

A fifth measure, issue-type preference, charts whether
the issues which the respondent considers to be the "most
important" are both style issues or are two issues of which
at least one is a position issue. Here it is hypothesized
that the voter who perceives the two "most important" issues
to be style issues will vote for the candidate of the oppos­
ing party who espouses such issues rather than for the candi­
date of his own party who espouses only position issues. It
is seen that the issue-party congruence measure offers an
indirect means to test the perceiver-determined or perceptual
balance thesis of perception while the issue-type preference
index offers a similar means to test the stimulus-determined
thesis.
The last measure to be utilized in this chapter simply calculates the differences in the values attributed to the eight issues for those who "vote" for each type of hypothetical candidate, when controlling for direction and intensity of party affiliation. It is hypothesized that the persons who favor candidates with substantially different issue appeals, composed of either three position or three style issues, will value the issues incorporated in such appeal differently. If a weak Democrat "votes" for the hypothetical Republican candidate who stresses the need to maintain a strong economy, for example, we would expect him to value the maintenance of a strong economy more than the weak Democrat who does not vote for that candidate. He, thus, would state that the issue "having a strong economy" was more important to him.

B. Perceived Important of Issues for Oahu Voters

Having provided a brief overview of this chapter, it is appropriate to proceed in examining the findings. Table XVII presents the relative importance of the different issues for the entire sample (N = 435).
### TABLE XVII

**RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF STYLE AND POSITION ISSUES TO OAHU SAMPLE**

(in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Most Impt.</th>
<th>Impt.</th>
<th>Least Impt.</th>
<th>No Response</th>
<th>Total*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Fair Taxes(S)</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Strong Economy (S)</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Programs for All People(S)</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>100.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Less Spending-Stable Dollar (P)</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Creation of More Programs for Poor(P)</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>100.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Better Relations: Labor &amp; Management(S)</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>100.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. More Attention to Problems of Working Man(P)</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Using Less Money on Poverty Programs(P)</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Differences are due to errors in rounding

P = position issue  
S = style issue
It is discovered that style issues, perhaps as a result of the relative attractiveness of those selected for this study vis-a-vis the attractiveness of position issues chosen, tend to be perceived as more important than position issues.

Grasping the general importance of each of the eight issues for the Oahu sample, it now is appropriate to see which issues divide those who tend to identify with each political party--i.e., strong, weak, and independent Republicans and their Democratic counterparts.

Since the frequency distributions of the responses for most issues were rather skewed, the researcher decided to dichotomize all responses for each issue before calculating the chi square values. When that was done, four issues produced significant inter-party differences: 1) creating more government programs to help poor people \((p < .001)\), 2) giving more attention to the problems of the working man \((p < .001)\), 3) spending less government money to make the value of the dollar more stable \((p < .01)\), and 4) having government programs that help all of the people \((p < .05)\). With the exception of the third issue, which Republicans supported, Democrats--strong, weak, and independent--favored each issue consistently and uniformly more than their Republican counterparts. Thus, it is seen that the significant differences between Republicans and Democrats in Hawaii focus on issues which have divided the two major parties since the 1930's. And while Hawaii may have experienced a belated "New Deal,"
the above findings bolster our hypothesis that attitudes on the conduct of domestic affairs constitute the prime determinants of party cleavages.

Equally significant, when chi square values were computed for Republicans and Democrats separately, only one issue was significant at the .20 level. Having better relations between labor and management divided the three Republican identifiers \( (p < .05) \) with nearly 60% of the independent Republicans believing their party favored such cooperation while only slightly over 20% of the self-classified Republicans, strong and weak ones, possessing a similar attitude. Thus, it is seen that as far as the relative importance of issues is concerned, there are significant inter-party differences but no noteworthy (with one exception) intra-party differences.

The same findings emerged when the perception of issues was examined; major inter-party differences but only minor intra-party ones.

Those two findings have major theoretical significance as well as empirical relevance. First, they support the perceiver-determined or perceptual balance thesis of perception; they offer little support for the stimulus-determined thesis. Second, they tend to refute the Froman-Skipper hypothesis, at least in the confines of this particular study, that style issues are the major determinants of partisan cleavages. On the contrary, position issues that focus on New Deal-Fair Deal partisan bifurcation and on fiscal
management of the economy seem to be the prime causes of Republican-Democrat differences, at least in domestic affairs.

To provide a more comprehensive measure of intra-party similarities and inter-party differences, Spearman's rank-order correlation (rho) was computed for the various groups of voters. The findings are recorded in Table XVIII.

**TABLE XVIII**

**DEGREE OF ISSUE CONGRUENCE BASED ON THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF STYLE AND POSITIONS ISSUES (RHO)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SR</th>
<th>WR</th>
<th>IR</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>WD</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SR</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WR</td>
<td>.970</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>.881</td>
<td>.881</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>.744</td>
<td>.810</td>
<td>.690</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>.732</td>
<td>.768</td>
<td>.768</td>
<td>.564</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WD</td>
<td>.565</td>
<td>.619</td>
<td>.524</td>
<td>.571</td>
<td>.911</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>.530</td>
<td>.655</td>
<td>.488</td>
<td>.548</td>
<td>.798</td>
<td>.917</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using the "most important" response category to rank-order issues for the respective groups, it is seen that agreement concerning the relative importance of issues varies directly with partisanship. The first column and the last row demonstrate that relationship.
Moreover, intra-party congruence and inter-party incongruence is highly visible, as shown by the underlined correlations. In passing it should be stated the lower correlation between independents who leaned toward neither party and Democratic party identifiers mainly was the result of substantial disagreement on one issue, spending less government money to make the value of the dollar more stable. Deleting that issue "pure independents" would have been more equidistant from both partisan poles.

Another means of measuring the importance of different issues for voters is SSA. Initially the entire sample will be analyzed; then those who tend to identify with the Republican and Democratic parties respectively will be investigated; finally specific groups of partisans within each general grouping will be subjected to further analysis. Figure 2 is instructive.

It is seen that the two clusters appear to be partisan ones.* The more cohesive Democrat-oriented cluster includes: better relations between labor and management, giving more attention to the problems of the working man, and creating more government programs to help poor people. The other discernible cluster, a Republican-oriented one, encompasses: spending less government money to make the value of the dollar

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*Cohesiveness does not equal importance; it simply shows correlation of specific variables for a particular group; importance is determined by actual frequency distributions of that group for specific issues in the clusters.
FIGURE 2

ISSUE CLUSTERS FOR OAHU ELECTORATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster Description</th>
<th>Graph Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Better Relations bet. Labor &amp; Management</td>
<td>Top Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention to Working Man</td>
<td>Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programs for Poor</td>
<td>Bottom Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using Less Money on Poverty Programs</td>
<td>Bottom Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Spending and Stable Dollar</td>
<td>Bottom Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programs for All</td>
<td>Bottom Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Economy</td>
<td>Bottom Center</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

coefficient of alienation = .160
more stable and using less government money in poverty programs. Democrats tend to support the former cluster of issues and de-emphasize the importance of the latter; Republicans tend to reverse the stresses.

Another interesting facet of Figure 2 is the fact that only one style issue is included in a specific issue cluster. The others, being bipartisanly popular are not closely associated with position issues—at least, when party is not held constant.

Hypothesizing that Figure 2 probably hid underlying issue clusters for Republicans (strong, weak, and independent) and Democrats respectively, two other SSAs were done. Figure 3 exposes the issue orientations of the Republican group. (see next page).

In Figure 3 it is seen that one specific cluster—programs that help all of the people, using less money on poverty programs, spending less government money to make the value of the dollar more stable—is the most cohesive Republican issue orientation. It includes issues which stronger Republicans tend to consider important.

Two secondary clusters also appear: 1) giving more attention to the problems of the working man, having fair taxes, and having better relations between labor and management and 2) maintaining a strong economy and having better relations between labor and management. The latter clusters include issues which weaker Republicans, especially independents who lean toward that party, tend to regard as important.
FIGURE 3

ISSUE CLUSTERS FOR OAHU REPUBLICANS

coefficient of alienation = .226

*Here it should be noted that the coefficient of alienation (.226) is high indicating a poor fit between the actual correlations and the graphic distances between the variables. Whenever the coefficient of alienation noticeably exceeds .150, the researcher should be extremely cautious in interpreting his results. This particular representation of variables is no exception.
Turning to Democrat issue orientations, Figure 4 is interesting.

**FIGURE 4**

**ISSUE CLUSTERS FOR OAHU DEMOCRATS**

\[
\text{Coefficient of alienation} = 1.66
\]
It is seen that our initial labor-management relations—working man—programs poor cluster has disintegrated, though it is not impossible that giving more attention to the problems of the working man and having taxes that are fair for everyone are highly correlated for Oahu Democrats.

From the above diagram it is possible to extract three clusters - I, II and III - two of which have a labor-orientation. The components of cluster I—more fair taxes, better relations between labor and management, and more government programs to help poor people—are the issues for which organized labor mobilizes its supporters.

At the same time cluster II also has a labor bias. Many Democrat Party identifiers on the island of Oahu seem to believe that there is a strong correlation between maintenance of a strong economy and betterment of the worker's standard of living, as indeed there is.

It should be pointed out that using less government money for poverty programs is not highly correlated with either clusters II or III, which include the issues Oahu "Democrats" tend to consider the "most important." There is a definite distinction in Hawaii between a working man and a poor man. Many Hawaiians of Asian extraction, who have advanced from plantation labor to other jobs, or who shortly hope to make such an advance, do not favor federal subsidies to the poor. They have a self-help attitude, one conditioned by their own experiences in the labor market.
Figure 4 also presents an interesting non-correlation; less spending by the government in Washington to make the value of the dollar more stable is not a primary concern of Oahu Democrats. Having been supportive of New Deal-Fair Deal legislation and recent Democratic administrations and legislatures in the State of Hawaii which have not been reluctant to spend large sums of money on social welfare measures, it appears that Oahu Democrats have grown accustomed to large governmental expenditures.

Seeing the value of SSA in generating general issue clusters, groups of issues which different groups of voters tend to value similarly, it seemed worthwhile to do small space analyses for each group of partisans: strong Republicans, weak Republicans, independent Republicans, independent Democrats, weak Democrats, and strong Democrats. While the issue clusters are quite general—being extracted from two dimensional SSAs in which the variables often were not tightly clustered and having valences (+ or -) which, though determined from frequency distributions, were assigned rather arbitrarily to key variables—they give us a concise interpretation of intra-party similarities and inter-party differences.
## TABLE XIX

### INTRA-PARTY ISSUE CONGRUENCE AND INTER-PARTY ISSUE INCONGRUENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weak Republicans</th>
<th>Strong Republicans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N = 38</td>
<td>N = 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Economy</td>
<td>Less Money for Poverty(+)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Labor and Management
|                   |
|                   |                     |
| Strong Economy   | Less Money for Poverty(+) |
| Programs for All  |
|                   |
|                   |                     |
| Strong Economy   | Less Money for Poverty(+) |
| Programs for All  |
|                   |
|                   |                     |
| Strong Economy   | Less Money for Poverty(+) |
| Programs for All  |
|                   |
|                   |                     |
| Strong Economy   | Less Money for Poverty(+) |
| Programs for All  |
|                   |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Republicans</th>
<th>Independent Democrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N = 63</td>
<td>N = 120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Economy</td>
<td>Fair Taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair Taxes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Money for Poverty</td>
<td>Strong Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Dollar(+)</td>
<td>Less Money for Poverty(+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(less spending)</td>
<td>Programs for All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Economy</td>
<td>Fair Taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair Taxes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Money for Poverty</td>
<td>Strong Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Dollar(+)</td>
<td>Less Money for Poverty(+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(more spending)</td>
<td>Programs for All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Economy</td>
<td>Fair Taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair Taxes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Money for Poverty</td>
<td>Strong Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Dollar(+)</td>
<td>Less Money for Poverty(+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(more spending)</td>
<td>Programs for All</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ tends to strongly support and to consider important
- tends to weakly support and to consider unimportant
□ denotes most cohesive cluster
To sum up, it has been shown that SSA is an effective research instrument especially when used in conjunction with other statistical tools. In this particular study we discovered that it was beneficial to calculate chi square levels of significance; those calculations clearly demonstrated that the major differences between Republicans and Democrats on Oahu revolve around domestic matters which appear to be by-products of the New Deal, Fair Deal, and Great Society as well as the evolution of state politics in Hawaii. Moreover, Spearman's rank-order correlation enabled us to visualize the degree of intra-party agreement inter-party disagreement on the relative importance of the eight style and position issues.

On the other hand, chi square values gave us no grasp of the importance and cohesiveness of the eight variables vis-a-vis each other. Similarly, while Spearman's rank order correlation and tau chi for grouped data give us meaningful statistics, they are summarizing measures. They, like the chi square calculations, are incapable of representing the specific relationships of a large number of variables simultaneously.

C. Correlation between "Most Important" Issues and Candidate Choice

Having identified issue clusters and having shown the intra-party similarities and inter-party differences, it now is appropriate to focus on those issues which the respondents
stated were "most important" to them. The issue-party congruence measure seems to be more closely related to previous findings, and hence it will be discussed first. It is hypothesized that those voters who associate the two issues they consider to be the "most important" with their own political party will "vote" for the hypothetical candidate of their own political party who espouses position issues of their party more than they will "vote" for the candidate of the opposing party who stresses style issues. If Froman's hypothesis that it is nearly impossible to appeal to identifiers of one political party with style issues (since they already believe that their party better fosters such issues and since they have issue-party congruence) is correct, and if the related hypothesis—that those who pull the issues they deem "most important" to their own party tend to support candidates of their party—also is correct, then we would expect to find a definite bifurcation between those who pull the issues they consider "most important" to their own party and those who do not exhibit such a partisan bias, as far as their preferences for hypothetical candidates are concerned. The data is supportive as Table XX indicates.
TABLE XX
ISSUE-PARTY CONGRUENCE AND CANDIDATE CHOICE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue-Party Congruence</th>
<th>Candidate of Own Party Espousing Position Issues</th>
<th>Candidate of Other Party Espousing Style Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>56 (193)</td>
<td>104 (200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(N = 393)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 22.651, \text{ df } = 2, p < .001 \]

Over 62 percent (77) of those voters who believe the party with which they identify supports the two issues they consider to be the most important (of the eight) "vote" for the candidate of their own party. Similarly, 55 percent (60) of those who think that their party favors one of the issues they rate most important and that both parties support the other, tend to "vote" for the candidate of their own party. On the other hand, in all other cases in which there is no such issue-party congruence only 35 percent (56) of the voters express an intention of "voting" for the candidate of their own party. Thus, it is seen that voters' perceptions of their party's stand on the issues which they consider to be the most important influence their voting behavior, at least under field experimental conditions. The more their party is perceived to support such issues, the more inclined
they are to support its candidates.

Additionally, when controlling for intensity of partisanship the above relationships remained significant strong partisans \( (p < .02) \), weak partisans \( (p < .05) \) and independents who lean toward a particular political party \( (p < .10) \). Thus, it is seen that, at least under field experimental conditions, issue-party congruence tends to have a substantial effect on candidate choice. And, while such a measure is rather crude, it represents an attempt to identify factors which influence political behavior rather than simply to measure that resultant political behavior or correlate it with socio-economic status and/or political participation and interest variables, as is the all-too-familiar characteristic of voting studies.

Another measure, issue-type preference, is of interest to us; since we are desirous of discovering how issue considerations affect candidate choice. It is hypothesized that those who believe that style issues are the "most important", in contrast to those who think that style issues are less important, will tend to vote for the candidate of the opposing party who stresses style issues rather than for the candidate of their own political party who emphasizes position issues.

Previously Froman and Skipper have discovered that style issues are more important to voters than position issues and that voters will cross party lines to "vote" for candidates
who espoused political issues which they supported (stated were "most important" to them) rather than "vote" for the candidate of their own party who espouses issues which they do not support.\textsuperscript{3} Thus, knowing what type of issue a voter tends to value should help us to predict his political behavior, especially when the candidates he evaluates stress different types of political issues. Table XXI offers support for the above hypotheses.

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{ISSUE-TYPE PREFERENCE AND CANDIDATE CHOICE}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Issue Type} & \textbf{Preferred Position-Issue} & \textbf{Position-Issue Appeal} & \textbf{Candidate of Own Party} \\
\hline
\textbf{Candidate of Other Party} & \textbf{Position-Issue Appeal} & \textbf{Issue Type} & \textbf{Preferred} & \textbf{Style*} \\
\hline
Candidate of Other Party & 114 & 82 & 196 & \\
\hline
Style & 75 & 115 & 190 & \\
\hline
\textit{N=386} & 189 & 197 & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\[X^2 = 13.486, \text{ df} = 1, p < .001\]

*Since there were very few who chose two position issues as the "most important" (33) and since it is understandable for a person to be attracted by at least one of the magnetic style issues without having an attraction to style issues in general, this classification was employed.

When intensity of partisanship is held constant, the same relationship holds for the three groups of party identifiers: strong partisans (\(p < .02; \tau \beta .270\)), weak partisans (\(p < .01, \tau \beta .241\)), independent-partisans (\(p < .05,\))
tau beta .151). Though the relationship becomes weaker, as evidenced by the declining tau beta values (proportional reduction in error in predicting dependent variable if independent variable is known), it remains significant at the .05 level or better for all three types of partisans.

Thus, the issue-type preference index, when cross-tabulated with hypothetical candidate choice, tends to confirm Froman's and Skipper's hypothesis that: "Political choices will be made on the basis of certain salient beliefs which the voter feels distinguish between the two parties or the candidates of the two parties."  

This research design, it should be stated, did not pose two directly conflicting issue choices to the respondents as Froman and Skipper's did. It presented more realistic, multiple-issue political appeals. Thus, it is hypothesized that it was less affected by questionnaire bias, not to mention interview bias (respondents naturally would want to appear consistent in their answers, to do less would refute the basic premises of cognitive consistency theory) than Froman and Skipper's research design.

To sum up, the latter two indices of the relative importance of issues to voters, while not nearly as sophisticated nor as comprehensive as the former two indices, suggest strongly that voters are rational. Those who associate issues that they consider to be "most important" with their own political party tend to vote for the candidate of their own political party whether he stresses those particular issues
or not. And those who believe that the two most important issues are both style issue, showing a proclivity toward that type of political issues, tend to vote for the candidate who espouses them. Additionally, the above findings seems to further elucidate our earlier distinction between voters with an instrumental attitude toward politics (high issue-party congruence) and those with an expressive concern for politics (high style-issue preference).

Both of those findings, it is seen, resemble hypotheses and findings of social psychologists. In fact, Rosenberg specifically hypothesizes that people's attitudes toward an attitude object (candidate) depend on the value placed upon various objects of affective significance (issues) and the perceived instrumental relations between those objects (issues) and the attitude object (candidate or party).6

In addition, the latter two indices--issue party congruence and issue-type preference--are grounded on assumptions that are akin to those Rokeach uses in his belief-congruence theory--namely, centrality and importance.7 The more central the belief (or the greater the issue-party congruence), the less subject it is to change. And, similarly, the more important a particular type of issue is, the less inclined a voter is to vote for candidates, even of his own political party, who do not espouse that particular type of issue. It is seen that the concepts of centrality and importance regarding beliefs can be applied equally well, if not moreso, to issue clusters which undoubtedly are more stable and enduring.
than most beliefs.

The last measure, correlating issues which are perceived as important with candidate choice, perhaps is the most meaningful one.* Controlling for direction and intensity of party affiliation, it measures whether Republican partisans, Republican independents, Democratic independents, and Democratic partisans who "vote" for the hypothetical candidate of their own party with a position-issue appeal value issues differently than their counterparts who "vote" for the hypothetical candidate of the opposing party with a style-issue appeal.

It is hypothesized that those who "vote" for the candidate espousing position issues will consider them be more important than those who do not "vote" for that candidate and, similarly, that those who "vote" for the candidate espousing style issues will perceive them to be more important than those who do not "vote" for that candidate.

Initially it should be stated that in a majority of the cases there was no significant difference in the perceived importance of particular issues. Republican independents, for example, who "voted" for their own party's candidate with a position-issue appeal did not differ significantly in the issues they valued from Republican independents who voted

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*In this measure the three response categories—"most important," "important," and "least important" were dichotomized. Since some distributions of responses were skewed, that dichotomization was necessary to maintain sufficiently large cell frequencies for valid chi square calculations.
for the opposing party's candidate with a style-issue appeal. Nevertheless, certain differences were discovered; and they constitute partial explanations why voters behave as they do. Controlling for party and knowing what issues were valued and which candidate was preferred, it was possible to relate position issues directly and style issues indirectly to candidate choice in the field experiment. Parenthetically, it should be stated that direct comparisons between style issues and candidate choices can not be made—at least, not with these particular chi-square calculations—since two style-issue appeals were alternated to avoid questionnaire bias, and since dividing respondents according to those two appeals would adversely affect the size of the cell frequencies.

The findings will be presented in sets, depending on the partisanship of the respondents. The following relationships were found; all, with two exceptions, were in the predicted direction:

1) **Weak and strong Republicans** who consider programs for all (p < .25) and relations between labor and management (p < .10) to be relatively important and who consider less government expenditures to make the value of the

---

*It should be noted that the converse of each of these findings—reversing perceived importance of issue and candidate choice—also is true. For example, if a chi-square calculation shows that voters who perceived a style issue to be relatively important preferred the candidate with a style-issue appeal, it also shows that voters who perceived that particular style issue to be relatively unimportant favored the candidate with a position-issue appeal.*
dollar more stable \((p < .05)\) to be relatively unimportant tend to "vote" for the candidate of the opposing party who espouses style issues. When controlling for strong and weak Republicans separately, relations between labor and management was significant \((p < .05)\) only for weak Republicans.

2) **Independent Republicans** who consider programs for all \((p < .15)\) to be relatively important and who consider usage of less government money for poverty programs \((p < .20)\) to be relatively unimportant tend to "vote" for the candidate of the opposing party who espouses style issues.

3) **Independent Democrats** who consider fair taxes \((p < .05)\) to be relatively important and who consider programs for poor people \((p < .10)\) and aid for the working man \((p < .12)\) to be relatively unimportant tend to "vote" for the candidate of the opposing party who espouses style issues.

4) **Weak and strong Democrats** who consider maintenance of a strong economy \((p < .001)\) to be relatively important and who consider programs for poor people \((p < .01)\) and aid for the working man \((p < .10)\) to be relatively unimportant tend to "vote" for the candidate of the opposing party who espouses style issue. When controlling for weak and strong Democrats separately, aid for the working man was significant \((p < .10)\) only for weak Democrats.
The only two exceptions to the predicted relationships, those "voting" for candidate with position-issue appeal considering position issues to be relatively more important and similarly for those "voting" for candidate with style-issue appeal considering style issues to be relatively more important, involved attitudes of Democrat identifiers toward programs that help all of the people. Independent Democrats (p < .10) and strong-weak Democrats (p < .20) who believed programs for all to be relatively unimportant tended to "vote" for the candidate of the opposing party who espoused that issue. Those exceptions, however, can be explained by the partisan nature of that particular style issue. It appears those who conceived programs for all to be a relatively important issue were supporters of the Democratic party who associated that issue with their party and who, in turn, "voted" for the candidate of the Democratic party who stressed Democratic position issues rather than for the candidate of the Republican party who stressed style issues, including programs for all. Thus, those who considered it relatively unimportant would be more inclined to "vote" for the candidate with a style-issue appeal.

Grouping together those issues which divided those who identify with the Republican party and also those who identify with the Democratic party, it is seen that differences in the perceived importance of programs for all, relations between labor and management, less money for poverty, and less government expenditures to make the value of the dollar more stable
tend to divide those who support Republican party. On the other hand, differences in the perceived importance of fair taxes, maintenance of a strong economy, programs for all, programs for poor people, and aid to the working man tend to divide those who support the Democratic party.

It should be noted that the perceived importances of both position and style issues seemed to have effects on candidate choices under field experimental conditions.

D. Summary

Since propositions provide an efficient way to summarize findings, this chapter will be concluded by re-stating the major relationships which were discovered.

1. Style issues are more important to voters than position issues.

2. There is great intra-party agreement and substantial inter-party disagreement on the importance of different issues. (agreement = cluster)

3. The higher the level of identification with a particular political party, the higher the correlation (rho) for the rank-ordering of issues by perceived importance of each.

4. Those voters who associate issues that they consider to be "most important" with their own political party, regardless of whether those issues are style or position ones, tend to vote for the candidate of their own party who espouses position issues rather than for the candidate of the other party who supports style issues.
(Here is evidence for the perceiver-determined or perceptual balance thesis of perception.)

5. Those who consider style issues to be "most important" rather than position issues or a combination of position and style issues tend to vote for the candidate of the opposing party with a style-issue appeal rather than for the candidate of their own party with a position-issue appeal. (Here is strong evidence for the stimulus-determined thesis of perception.)

6. Controlling for direction and intensity of partisanship, those voters who tend to vote for the candidate of their own party who espouses position issues tend to perceive position issues (of their own party) to be relatively important and style issues to be relatively unimportant.

7. Controlling for direction and intensity of partisanship, those voters who tend to vote for the candidate of the opposing party who espouses style issues tend to perceive style issues to be relatively important and position issues (of their own party) to be relatively unimportant.

Two other relationships, propositions eight and nine, were substantiated partially by a series of small space analyses. Though the two relationships and the accompanying issue clusters did not merit incorporation into chapter six, they warrant inclusion in this summary.

8. Those voters who identify with one political party and vote for the candidate of that party who emphasizes position issues tend to have underlying issue cohesion.
(This seems to be indicative of an instrumental attitude toward politics.)

9. Those voters who identify with one political party and vote for the candidate of the opposing party who champions style issues tend to have fragmented issue concerns. (This appears to be indicative of an expressive concern for politics.)

10. Though this finding will not be discussed in detail, it should be stated that voters tend to "compartmentalize" their attitudes on issues. It was not uncommon, for example, for Republican identifiers to favor creating more government programs to help poor people and at the same time to believe that the federal government should spend less money on poverty programs. Neither was it uncommon for the Democrats to do the same. Thus, it is seen that two issues, one often being a moral one and the other an economic self-interest one, can be logically incompatible yet empirically related--that is, supported simultaneously by the same person.

The findings of this chapter should not be underestimated. It has been shown that voters under field experimental conditions not only value or perceive certain issues to be important, depending on their party affiliation, but also that, when controlling for party affiliation, the perceived importance of specific issues appears to have an effect on hypothetical candidate choices.
Thus, a major step has been taken to "attain some grasp of the level at which issue concerns affect mass participation in politics." Attitudes toward issues, contrary to the implications and conclusions of many past studies, seem to have a definite effect on the way voters behave. Verification of that hypothesis, however, must be done by experiments and studies much more comprehensive and sophisticated than this isolated field experiment.
A. Introduction

Chapter seven may well be the most interesting chapter to the reader, since it examines "why" voters behave as they do. Specifically, it presents findings that help to explain why voters identify with a particular political party which, in turn, assists in explaining why voters have distinct partisan issue clusters or orientations. Additionally chapter seven presents evidence that gives meaning to the syndrome or perceiver-conditioned thesis of perception and to the nature of Hawaiian politics in general.

The chapter will be divided into three sections: 1) a critical examination of past hypotheses and data concerning why voters behave as they do, 2) an investigation of voters' attitudes toward the perceived role of the national government in domestic affairs, as measured by their responses on the Survey Research Center's (Michigan) Domestic Social Welfare Scale of 1960, which is representative of the prime determinant of partisan cleavage (especially for the Oahu electorate), and 3) evaluation of various hypotheses and theses why partisan cleavage persists even though ethnic, economic, class, and ideological distinctions fade. Moreover, data will be presented to explain the relative importance of ethnicity and party affiliation, perhaps the two chief determinants of political behavior on Oahu.
B. Why Voters Behave As They Do

It is hypothesized that voters' behavior corresponds with or reflects underlying beliefs which voters possess and consider important. Realizing the need to study such beliefs, Froman and Skipper write:

Our central hypothesis is that beliefs, no matter how unsophisticated, about how the parties stand on certain issues are important factors underlying a person's party identification. Usually a voter's beliefs about which party will promote the values he feels strongest about and the voter's party identification will be congruent. This congruency of beliefs and party identification, however, tends to mask the importance of these beliefs to the voter.

Relating that hypothesis to the findings of the SRC and the research design of this study, it is seen that attitudes toward the role of the national government in domestic affairs may be an important, if not the most important, "factor underlying a person's party identification."

Campbell et al., for example, write:

Persons who favored social welfare activity by the federal government were likely to be identifiers with the Democratic Party. They perceived the Democratic Party to be closer than the Republican Party to their own issue positions on other issues, and their voluntary references to domestic issues, within the system of proximal attitudes, were highly favorable to the Democratic cause and critical of the Republican.

After finding that relationship between partisanship and attitudes toward the role of the national government in domestic affairs, the SRC relates voters' scalar responses on the Domestic Social Welfare Scale (1960) to their comparable scores on McClosky's Conservativism Scale (1958) in
an effort to tap deeper, more comprehensive ideological dimensions.

Discovering a weak relationships between attitudes toward governmental social welfare activity and liberalism-conservatism, the SRC concludes: "In sum . . . the pattern of responses to our domestic issues is best understood if we discard our notions of ideology and think rather in terms of self-interest."^3

Having found a higher correlation between economic self-interest or socio-economic status and attitudes toward the role of the national government in domestic social welfare affairs than between the latter and partisanship, the SRC does not further investigate the relation between party affiliation and attitudes toward the role of the federal government in domestic matters.

It appears that the SRC had some difficulty in scaling responses on the Domestic Social Welfare Scale. Robinson et al., for example, write: "The number of pre-election respondents was 1929; of these only 1286 gave answers that could reasonably be scaled."^4

Another possible reason why the SRC did not devote a larger part of its analysis to the relation between the above scale and partisanship seems to be the employment of open-ended questions throughout its questionnaire. Desiring not to over-structure their questions and believing that such informal queries constitute the best way to tap underlying
beliefs and attitudes, Campbell et al. turn their attention to other relationships than the one between partisanship and attitudes on domestic policies.

In fact, it is hypothesized that their interest in open-ended questions, coupled with an attempt to find underlying ideological rather than partisan dimensions, drew them away from relationships concerning party affiliation and domestic attitudes.

Kessel, for example, utilized similar open-ended questions in his study, "Cognitive Dimensions and Political Activity;" and found that the strongest relationships were between cognitive dimensions and issue-oriented political behavior. He discovered no relationship between cognitive dimensions and direction (strong Republican to strong Democrat) or strength (strong partisan, weak partisan, independent) of partisanship.

It appears that answers to such open-ended questions as Kessel and Campbell et al. used correlate highly with degree of political involvement, level of political knowledge, and type of issue orientation but that they do not correlate highly with party affiliation and, hence, give no information about underlying partisan beliefs, attitudes, and dimensions.

Thus, it seems it would be advantageous to relate specific scales--i.e., highly structured questions--to party affiliation if a person desired to explain the latter and the behavior that results from such partisanship.
McClosky et al., as well as the Michigan team of researchers, give us some indication that such a scale may revolve around attitudes toward the perceived role of the national government in domestic affairs. They uncovered significant relationships between direction of partisanship and attitudes on the Egalitarian and Humanitarian Welfare issues which they incorporated into their study. The latter issues are reminiscent of the SRC's Domestic Social Welfare Scale. McClosky et al. write:

On four (of the six Egalitarian and Humanitarian Welfare issues)--federal aid to education, slum clearance and public housing, social security, and minimum wages--the leaders of the two parties are widely separated. . . The percentages showing the proportion who favor increased support for these issues are even more striking. In every instance the Democratic percentages are considerably higher: 66 vs. 22 percent (education); 78 vs. 40 percent (slum clearance and housing); 60 vs. 23 percent (social security); and 50 vs. 16 percent (minimum wages).7

And, while McClosky et al. did not find similar divergences between Republican and Democratic followers, it is hypothesized that their failure to find significant variance was a result of the specificity of the issues which they employed.

Additionally it is hypothesized that New-Frontier and Great-Society legislation have catalyzed greater partisan differences in domestic affairs since the late 1950's when McClosky et al. collected the data for their study and in the mid-1950's when Campbell et al. did their research for The American Voter.
Parenthetically, it should be stated that Hawaii, perhaps better than any other state, presents the Democrat-Republican scenario as far as attitudes toward the intervention of the national government in domestic affairs are concerned. Oahu, where more than three out of every Hawaiian voter reside, has its "New Deal and Fair Deal Democrats" and its "Taft Republicans." Equally important, each group has a sizable number of active supporters who sustain partisan and ideological cleavages on the island.

Realizing our indebtedness to Campbell et al. and McClosky et al., it now is appropriate to examine a major relationship in this study, the correlation between party affiliation and attitudes on domestic policies.

C. The Relationship between Party Affiliation and Attitudes toward the Role of the National Government in Domestic Affairs

Hypothesizing that voters' attitudes toward the perceived role of the national government in domestic affairs is the prime determinant of partisan cleavage and, in turn, an indirect cause of partisan behavior in general, this researcher utilized questions that were extracted from the Survey Research Center's Domestic Social Welfare Scale of 1960. The final four that were incorporated into a scale included: 1) The government in Washington ought to see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job; 2) The government in Washington ought to help people get doctors and hospital care
at low cost; 3) If cities and towns around the country need help to build more schools, the government in Washington ought to give them the money they need, and 4) The government in Washington should leave things like electric power and housing for private business to handle.*

When the four items were dichotomized—response categories being "strongly agree," "agree," "disagree," "strongly disagree"—to obtain varying frequency distributions in the response categories, a fundamental criterion of scalogram analysis, the above scale produced a coefficient of reproducibility of .968 and a coefficient of scalability of .832. (Thirty-five respondents, it should be remarked, did not reply to all of the above questions and were excluded before the above computations were made. They, nonetheless, were distributed fairly well throughout the seven partisan groups.)

The exceptionally high coefficient of scalability is quite significant, for it shows that Oahu voters' attitudes toward the role of the national government in domestic affairs.*

*In the questionnaire six items were utilized, two of which were phrased in a negative manner to avoid acquiescence or response sets. One of the six items, dealing with minimum wages, was deleted after factor analysis; its loading was hopelessly low. Still another was deleted since it provoked moralistic responses rather than genuine attitudes toward the role of the federal government in domestic affairs—or, at least, seemed to provoke such responses.
affairs, as measured by the SRC Domestic Social Welfare Scale, are unidimensional. Indeed, that coefficient is unusually high; often the coefficient of scalability, a much more precise measure than Guttman's coefficient of reproducibility, is considered indicative of a unidimensional attitude if it is between .60 and .70. For example, a similar scale which also measured peoples' attitudes toward the role of the national government in domestic affairs had a coefficient of reproducibility of .90 and a coefficient of scalability of .69.

In passing it should be noted that Menzel's coefficient also is a proportional-reduction-of-error measure; it denotes the ratio of the actual improvement in scalability to that amount of improvement which would constitute perfect scalability. Moreover, varying from 0 to 1, Menzel's measure makes it possible to speak meaningfully of degrees of scalability.

Turning to the correlation of the above four-item scale and party affiliation, we find a correlation of .70. Thus, if it is assumed that the measurements of party affiliation and the Guttman scale scores constitute interval data, an assumption akin to many employed with similar measurements, then it is seen that nearly half (49%) of the variance of party affiliation can be accounted for by attitude toward the role of the national government in domestic affairs. The latter, it is assumed, is the prime ideological and partisan
dimension on Oahu; it influences political behavior more than any other one.

Adding other variables that have been conceived by political scientists to be relevant to both party affiliation and attitude toward involvement of the national government in domestic affairs, the following SSA representation of six key variables was obtained.

**FIGURE 5**

**CORRELATION OF KEY VARIABLES WITH ATTITUDE TOWARD ROLE OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS AS MEASURED BY SRC SOCIAL WELFARE SCALE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lib-Con</th>
<th>Belief: more-less govt. help for people</th>
<th>SRC Index</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Occupational Status</th>
<th>Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

coefficient of alienation = .002

The above diagram is an accurate illustration of several key relationships as evidenced by the unusually low coefficient of alienation. First, in addition to graphically representing the correlation of party affiliation (strong Republican to strong Democrat) with the SRC scale (less involvement to more
involvement by the national government in domestic affairs), Figure 5 shows that occupational status and belief that the government (should-should not) do more things to help people than it has during the past few years are related to the SRC scale while class and liberalism-conservatism are not. It, thus, is readily seen—if this representation of variables has any generalizability to a national population—why the SRC could find no correlation between its Domestic Social Welfare Scale and McClosky's Conservatism Scale.

At this point it seems beneficial to list specific hypotheses and significance levels:
1. The more Democratic a voter's partisanship the more supportive he will be of greater involvement by the national government in domestic affairs (p<.001).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE XXII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

PERCENTAGES OF PARTISAN GROUPS FAVORING GREATER INVOLVEMENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN DOMESTIC SOCIAL WELFARE (SRC SCALE OF 1960)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Involvement</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Inde.</th>
<th>Inde.</th>
<th>Strong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>¥ Weak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>¥ Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reps.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Percent</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. The lower the occupational status of the voter, the more inclined he is to favor greater involvement by the national government in domestic affairs ($p < .02$). When controlling for party affiliation, this relationship remained significant only for independents: independent Republicans ($p < .10$) and independent Democrats ($p < .15$).

3. Belief that the national government should do more things for people than it has during the past few years varies proportionately with belief that the national government should assume a larger role in domestic social welfare affairs, even when controlling for party affiliation. Significance levels were: weak and strong Republicans, $p < .01$; independent Republicans, $p < .22$; independent Democrats, $p < .02$; and strong and weak Democrats, $p < .001$.

4. Education was highly intercorrelated with occupational status; the latter being of more theoretical value and thus being used in SSA. Nonetheless, it should be stated, the higher a person's educational level, the more inclined he is to favor less involvement by the national government in domestic affairs, even when controlling for party (with one exception): strong and weak Republicans, $p < .12$; independent Republicans, $p < .05$; independent Democrats, $p < .05$; strong and weak Democrats, $p < .35$. 
Equally significant, when conservativism-liberalism, class, and age were correlated with the Guttman scores for the SRC scale, they did not produce significant relationships. Surprisingly, none of those three variables were significant when party affiliation was not controlled.

It is possible that the SRC's Domestic Social Welfare Scale has assumed a slightly different meaning to voters as a result of New Frontier and Great Society legislation. On Oahu, for instance, it does not appear to correlate closely with self-interest nor occupation but to tap attitudes toward the nature of governmental intervention in domestic affairs. The latter became apparent more so when the belief that the government in Washington should do (more, less) to help people than it has during the past few years, correlated much higher with the SRC scale than occupational status, especially when controlling for party affiliation.

Desiring to get a better understanding of the key variables, this researcher did another SSA on a new set of variables.
In addition to providing greater conceptual clarity, two significant findings appear in Figure 6. It is seen, as expected, that attitudes on the variable we hypothesize to be the prime determinant of partisan behavior correlate highly with perhaps the most significant form of political behavior by the rank and file partisans--i.e., voting. Second, it is observed that ethnicity is a key factor in political behavior and underlying attitudes on Oahu*. Moreover, it fits well

*Ethnicity was coded, as far as SRC index was concerned, to correspond with general Republican-Democrat continuum. Since Japanese, Chinese, and Filipinos in this particular sample all equally supported a greater role for the Federal government in domestic affairs, it is assumed that coding differences did not introduce significant error. Moreover, in proportional reduction of error measures, all of latter groups were collapsed together, to obtain a more accurate correlation of the relation between ethnicity and attitude toward role of government in domestic affairs.
into the main cluster which has been hypothesized to be the prime determinant of partisan differences, both attitudinal and behavioral.

Knowing that ethnicity and party affiliation are inter-correlated on Oahu, it is appropriate at this part of the analysis to employ proportional-reduction-of-error measures to determine which one is more influential. That determination was made by grouping all Islanders of Caucasian extraction and all of non-Caucasian extraction together, employing the Guttman scores as the independent variable, and by controlling for ethnicity and party affiliation respectively. Since the proportional-reduction-of-error measures for nominal or dichotomous data necessitate the usage of 2 x 2 tables all voters who identified with one party--strong, weak, and independent identifiers--were grouped together. Additionally since the Caucasian and Japanese ethnic groups dominate Oahu politics, separate calculations were made for them. Table XXV lists the findings.
TABLE XXIII

USAGE OF PROPORTIONAL REDUCTION OF ERROR MEASURES TO CHART IMPORTANCE OF ETHNICITY AND PARTISANSHIP IN ATTITUDES TOWARD INVOLVEMENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

For All Ethnic Groups on Oahu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>ETHNICITY</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ethnicity: Cau.</td>
<td>.582</td>
<td>p&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ethnicity: non-Cau.</td>
<td>.350</td>
<td>p&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For Caucasian and Japanese on Oahu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>ETHNICITY</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ethnicity: Cau.</td>
<td>.582</td>
<td>p&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ethnicity: Jap.</td>
<td>.266</td>
<td>p&lt;.005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What do the above tau beta values tell us? First, the finding that party affiliation is much more important as a determinant of political attitudes than ethnicity is evident, at least on Oahu.

Second, examining the tau beta values, it is seen that ethnicity has much more effect on attitudes toward the role of the national government in domestic affairs when Republican Party affiliation is held constant than when Democratic Party affiliation is held constant. This can be interpreted to mean that there is more homogeneity of attitudes on the SRC scale for different ethnic groups in the Democratic Party...
than in the Republican Party. In both cases, holding Democratic Party affiliation constant eliminates all significant variance. The same is not true, however, when Republican Party affiliation is held constant. Knowing whether a voter is a Caucasian or non-Caucasian helps us to reduce our error in predicting the dependent variable, his attitude toward role of federal government in domestic affairs, by over 16 percent. And that percentage rises significantly when only those of Caucasian and Japanese ancestry are juxtaposed (tau beta = .255).

Third, if the tau beta values for all Islanders of non-Caucasian extraction and Islanders of Japanese extraction are compared, it is seen that the latter has a stronger ethnic orientation—ethnicity, in short, accounts for more variance in attitudes toward governmental intervention in domestic affairs. Examining the respective frequency distributions for Islanders of Japanese extraction and other Islanders of non-Caucasian extraction, it is discovered that one in five of the former favor greater involvement by the national government in domestic affairs while only one in fifteen of the latter have the same attitude, when Republican Party affiliation is controlled. Thus, being of Japanese ethnic extraction seems to have a significant effect on a person's attitude toward the dependent variable; Islanders of Japanese ancestry favoring a larger role for the national government in domestic affairs.
Computing tau beta scores and significance levels for the same independent variables when related to 1968 presidential voting patterns, more pronounced results were obtained. The primacy of party affiliation over ethnicity is substantiated again.

**TABLE XXIV**

EMPLOYMENT OF PROPORTIONAL REDUCTION OF ERROR MEASURES TO CHART IMPORTANCE OF ETHNICITY AND PARTISANSHIP IN ATTITUDES TOWARD PRESIDENTIAL VOTING PATTERNS FOR 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For All Ethnic Groups on Oahu</th>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>ETHNICITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>controlling for ethnicity: non-Cau.</td>
<td>.639</td>
<td>.100**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For Caucasian and Japanese on Oahu</th>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>ETHNICITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>controlling for ethnicity: Jap.</td>
<td>.672</td>
<td>.169**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**These two statistics indicate that, while there is greater homogeneity among ethnic groups in the Democratic Party as far as attitudes toward the role of the federal government in domestic affairs is concerned, there is more homogeneity among the same groups in the Republican Party as far as 1968 presidential voting parties are concerned. In short, it is seen that a greater homogeneity of the prime**
What specifically does Table XXVI suggest in the light of past hypotheses? Coupled with the findings of the two previous chapters, strong evidence is presented to suggest that party, rather than any other variable, is the backbone of our syndrome thesis, though the finding that Japanese tend to favor intervention by the government in domestic affairs more than other ethnic groups, when controlling for party affiliation, implies that other variables also are operative.

Additionally, having charted the primacy of party affiliation, it now is possible to see why the perceptual balance or perceiver-determined thesis of perception is much more powerful as an explanatory and predictive tool than the stimulus-determined thesis.

D. Persistence of Partisan Affiliation and Behavior Despite the Disappearance of Other Re-inforcing Phenomena

While this researcher is not prepared to probe deeply into the above topic, some hypotheses merit our attention. First, the data of this study suggest that partisan affiliation on Oahu still is based on the revolutionary effect of the New Deal and Fair Deal. While Hawaii experienced its own belated "New Deal" with the outpouring of laws by its political attitude under consideration does not lead to proportional homogeneity in the prime type of political behavior under examination. In other words, specific attitudes do not necessarily predict behavior, as social psychologists have discovered repeatedly in the past.
Democratic legislature in the 1950's and early 1960's, it is interesting how unchanging early partisan cleavages have been.

Second, the basic partisan cleavage in Hawaii has been sustained despite some economic "leveling," the absence of liberal-conservative attitudinal differences, and the blurring of class distinctions.

What can explain that phenomenon? The data seem to support Converse's thesis: that partisan affiliation, born in a time of polarization such as the first half of the twentieth century in Hawaii, preserves status (and I add partisan) relationships after those status differences have faded.11

Third, it seems that political scientists have neglected the study of psychological and other forces that bolster partisan cleavage. Alford, for example, discovered there was no evidence of a decline in class voting in the United States between 1936 and 1960. More important, he hypothesized:

The lack of any consistent decline of class voting does not necessarily mean that class loyalties and consciousness have remained strong. Workers might continue to vote Democratic and businessmen Republican but the sense of identification of this behavior with class interests might be becoming obscure and weak. Such a change could occur within both parties and social classes... An important line of research is implied by these possible changes: what changes of political values and attitudes can take place without a substantial shift in the actual political alignment of a social group.12
More research definitely needs to be done in the area of psychological-political attitudes.

Last, it is possible that something similar to the syndrome or perceiver-conditioned thesis affects political behavior. Indeed, it is difficult to explain the persistence of partisan cleavage and ethnic-class voting, though not class consciousness, in Hawaii on the basis of New Deal-Fair Deal developments alone. Whether the relevant variables are social, psychological, economic, political, or a combination of them has not been ascertained. This chapter, coupled with the issue clusters which were described earlier, however, strongly suggests that voters' attitudes toward the role of the national government in domestic affairs is a major if not the prime sustainer of such partisan attitudes. Such an attitude easily evolves as the two political parties take opposing positions on the matter.

To sum up, it appears that the prime cause of partisan cleavage (at least, on Oahu) and, hence, partisan attitudes and behavior is something akin to an attitude toward the role of the national government in domestic affairs. But, since the SRC Domestic Social Welfare Scale was the only one utilized in this study, it would be unwarranted to make the above statement without many reservations. Indeed, new populations have to be sampled, new issues utilized, and new scales employed.
CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

There is a story told about a man who was seen at night circling around a street lamp, searching for something on the ground. A second man came by and asked him what he was looking for. "My watch," was the answer. The second man joined him in the search. After a while he asked: "Where exactly did you drop that little thing?"--"Oh," the other man said and pointed at some trees standing at a distance, "it was over there,"--"Heavens, why don't you look under those trees, then, mister?" the second man exclaimed. The other man smiled. "Don't you see that there's much more light here?"¹

A. Theoretical Value of This Study

Himmelstrand prefaces his book Social Pressures, Attitudes, and Democratic Processes by comparing survey and experimental researchers to the man who went to look for his watch where he thought he had lost it—not near the street lamp—and warns of the many pitfalls along the way.

In this study we have not stood in the bright "light" of past voting studies nor have we stood in the dimmer "light" of other studies on political issues, though we have oftentimes glanced at both "lights" in an effort to grasp where we were and where our "watch" probably might be.

By overcoming the problem of issue specificity, stating issues so abstractly and precisely that only the politically articulate can perceive partisan differences, and by structuring our research environment with the employment of a field experiment, it has been shown that identifiers with the Republican and Democratic parties perceive and support (consider to be important) issues in accordance with their
partisan predispositions. While other studies such as Campbell et al.'s and McClosky et al.'s have found little partisan difference between rank-and-file members of the two major political parties, this study discovered substantial partisan differences in such voters' perception of and effect toward various political issues. In fact, significant differences appeared when the least partisan rank-and-file voters were examined--independs who tend to support either the Republican or the Democratic party.

Thus, this study has put issues and partisanship in a new perspective. Define issue orientations predispose a person to align himself with a political party or, perhaps more accurately, alignment with a political party tends to produce specific attitudes or issue clusters which correspond with that particular party identification. Indeed, a substantial amount of interaction and reinforcement exists between the two. Specifically this study has demonstrated that partisanship "colors" perception of political issues and that party acts as a perceptual balancing mechanism which causes voters to "pull" issues they like.

On the other hand, the Oahu sample at the same time was quite rational.* They tended to perceive partisan differences on position issues fairly accurately.

*Rationality here means perceiving partisan differences when they occur, not indiscriminately "pulling" all issues that one favors towards one's own party.
And it is impossible to dispute the fact that voters' attitudes toward the role of the national government in domestic affairs, as measured by the SRC Domestic Social Welfare Scale of 1960, correlated highly ($r = .70$) with their party preferences. On that key dimension Oahu voters were quite rational, if rationality is defined as congruence between political attitudes and partisan identification.

Additionally, it should be re-stated that the issues on which Republican and Democratic party identifiers experienced most disagreement, as far as perceived importance of issues was concerned, were "New Deal issues": 1) giving more attention to the problems of the working man ($p<.001$), 2) creating more government programs to help poor people ($p<.001$), 3) spending less government money to make the value of the dollar more stable ($p<.01$), and 4) having government programs that help all of the people ($p<.05$). Those findings, plus the high correlation between partisanship and Guttman scores on the Domestic Social Welfare Scale, suggest that voters are rational. They align themselves with the party whose ideology corresponds with their own political attitudes.

Having found that most voters tend to be partisan, rational, or both, we would expect to find different types of voters among the ranks of partisans. Himmelstrand's bifurcation between voters with an expressive concern for politics, often a "spectator role," and those with an instrumental attitude toward politics, usually a "participant
role," proved to be a beneficial theoretical guidepost. The inclination of the former to support style issues and the latter to favor position issues, moreover, increased the relevancy of Himmelstrand's earlier theorizing to this study. Needless to say, Himmelstrand's hypotheses were in need of empirical verification. In 1965 Milbrath, for example, wrote:

Despite these intriguing speculations about the relation of expressives and instrumentalists to the political process, there is little reliable statistical evidence to back them up. We don't know the likelihood of each type taking political action, and we don't know the environmental conditions which encourage or facilitate action by each type. As improved tools for measurement are developed and statistical data gathered, the sharpening of concepts and the security of findings should improve. Until then, we must be content with intriguing speculations.  

It is seen that this study has offered sufficient data to substantiate a number of Himmelstrand's earlier "intriguing speculations" as well as some new hypotheses. Delineating "expressives" and "instrumentalists" and the way they tend to perceive the two major types of political issues, then, is another theoretical contribution of this study.

Having presented the major theoretical thrust of this research, it is worthwhile to outline the remaining part of this chapter. First, some of the major hypotheses suggested by this study will be stated. As Eulau writes: "An empirical discipline is built by the slow, modest, piecemeal cumulation of relevant theories and data." 3 Then, after listing some specific hypotheses concerning political issues and voters' perceptions of them, the practical relevance of those findings
will be discussed. What do such findings mean for those who must address themselves to issues at election time? What do they tell political scientists about people's political behavior? Some future avenues of research also will be suggested. Then the comparability of the Oahu electorate with other electorates, especially the national one, will be discussed. Last, the utility of employing the field experiment and the telephone interview in survey research will be briefly examined.

B. Integration of Major Findings via Propositions

The first set of propositions which will be presented deal specifically with the perception of issues by partisans; party overshadowed all other variables in effecting both accuracy of position-issue perception and partisan pull of style-issue perception. Controlling for direction and intensity of party, no other variables correlated significantly with the perception of style issues. When party was controlled for the perception of position issues, only interest in politics, mass media consumption, and political information level remained significant though none were significant for all partisan groups: weak and strong Republicans, independents who lean toward Republican party, independents who lean toward Democratic party, and weak and strong Democrats. It is readily seen that party is the key variable in the perception of political issues. Therefore, it will be discussed first.
1. Style issues are perceived to be more important by voters who tend to support one political party than position issues.

2. (But) Position issues constitute the major source of partisan cleavage, if having voters state which issues are "most important," "important," and "least important" to them is an adequate means of tapping underlying partisan differences. (This contrasts with Froman and Skipper's hypothesis that style issues are the main determinants of partisan affiliation.)

3. There is substantial intra-party similarity and significant inter-party difference in the perception and perceived importance of style and position issues.

4. As intensity of party affiliation increases, the partisan pull of style issues increases.

5. As intensity of party affiliation increases, the accuracy of position-issue perception, in general, does not increase nor decrease. Stronger partisans appear to "pull" such issues and weaker partisans tend to either "pull" them or to be ignorant of which party supports them. (This finding is similar to Kessel's discovery of no significant correlation between intensity of partisanship and various cognitive dimensions.)

6. As intensity of affiliation with a particular political party increases, the degree of agreement concerning the rank-ordering of issues by relative importance increases.
7. Independents who lean toward one political party resemble weak partisans of that party so closely in both perception of issues and attribution of importance to such issues that the name "independents" is a misnomer; they are "partisans."

8. Weak partisans resemble independents who lean toward the same political party in perception of issues and attribution of importance to such issues more than they resemble strong partisans though both of the latter self-classified themselves as "Republican" or "Democrat."

(Actual 1968 presidential voting percentages of the three groups of partisans--strong, weak, and independent--in both parties supported propositions seven and eight.)

9. Controlling for direction and intensity of party affiliation, voters who tend to "vote" for the hypothetical candidate of their own party who espouses position issues tend to perceive those issues to be more important than their partisan counterparts who tend to "vote" for the hypothetical candidate of the opposing party who espouses style issues.

10. Controlling for direction and intensity of party affiliation, voters who tend to "vote" for the candidate of the opposing party who espouses style issues tend to perceive style issues to be more important than their partisan counterparts who tend to "vote" for the hypothetical candidate of their own party who espouses position issues.
11. In general, voters who prefer a particular hypothetical candidate tend to believe that the issues which he espouses are more important than the voters who prefer the other hypothetical candidate. This, thus, constitutes indirect evidence that voters are rational in their political behavior.

Turning to Himmelstrand's model of voters with an expressive concern for politics and those with an instrumental attitude toward politics, some interesting findings and hypotheses appear. The following propositions apply to the voter with an expressive concern for politics.

12. If a person has an expressive concern for politics, he tends to perceive style issues more favorably and partisanly and to perceive position issues less accurately. He probably pulls the latter.

13. A voter who has an expressive concern for politics tends to have fragmented issue clusters, indicating no underlying issue cohesion nor orientation, and to vote for the candidate of the opposing party if he espouses style issues while the candidate of his own party espouses position issues. (This finding was supported by a series of small space analyses. The relationships, however, were not strong enough to merit inclusion in the body of the research report.)

14. If a voter (expressive concern) perceives the two most important issues both to be style issues, he tends to
vote for the candidate of the opposing party with style issue appeals rather than for the candidate of his own political party with a position-issue appeal. He appears to be activating a perceptual balancing mechanism such as Rosenberg-Abelson affective-cognitive phenomenon. He perceives to see what attracts him. He, for example, would "read" many things into the style issue, "programs that help all of the people." Affect, it is hypothesized, predominates and alters his cognition of the candidate.

15. If a person has an expressive concern for politics, the intensity of his partisanship is the major factor in his political behavior, and the evening news broadcast on television tends to be a prime source of political information for him.

16. If a voter has an expressive concern for politics, his perception of political issues (not candidates) is better explained by the perceptual balance thesis of perception. On the other hand, the voter with an instrumental attitude toward politics possesses different attitudes and displays different political behavior.

17. A person who has an instrumental attitude toward politics tends to perceive position issues more correctly and to pull style issues less toward his own political party. He appears to have more empathy with the two-party system and to be influenced by other considerations as well as by intensity of partisanship in his perception of
political issues.

18. If a voter has an instrumental attitude toward politics, he tends to have cohesive issue clusters, showing noteworthy issue cohesion and orientation, and to vote for the candidate of his own party if the latter supports his stands on issues. (This finding also was supported by a series of small space analyses, but it did not merit incorporation in the analytical chapters.)

19. If a voter (instrumental attitude) perceives the two most important issues to be either position or style or both, he tends to vote for the candidate who more closely stands for the issues he likes (affect). Here, it is hypothesized, cognition predominates; such a voter supports the candidate whose actual stands on issues impress him.

20. If a voter has an instrumental attitude toward politics, perceived self-interest is the major factor in his political behavior and a news-oriented magazine, such as Time or Newsweek, tends to be a prime source of political information.

Parenthetically, it should be stated that the above-mentioned propositions concerning expressives' and instrumentalists' perception of political issues are suggested by the data in this study. "Suggested" should not be interpreted to mean "strongly supported."
C. Relevance of Findings to Study of Political Behavior

What is the relevance of these findings? First, if we accept the assumption that issues are underlying determinants of partisan cleavage, then voters' perceptions of issues and the importance they attribute to such issues provide insights into their behavior. The best way, for example, to identify voters in an election campaign may well be the issues which they support or do not support.

Similarly, if it is known what underlying issue clusters or orientations voters have, then it should be possible to determine to what types of political stimuli they will respond. Style issues may activate some voters but repulse others. Conversely, position issues may influence some voters yet have no electoral appeal to others.

Third, it seems clear that a political candidate should devote a substantial amount of his time to style issues as Froman suggests. Of those who stated for which of the hypothetical candidates they would probably "vote," the following percentages intended to vote for the candidate of the opposite party with a style-issue appeal: strong Republicans, 26.7% (8); weak Republicans, 51.4% (19); independent Republicans, 58.1% (36); independent Democrats, 58.0% (69); weak Democrats, 51.0% (50), and strong Democrats, 38.3% (18). Again the similarity between weak partisans and independents who tend to identify with the same political party is seen.
Of the entire sample--exclusive of 32 independents who did not lean toward either political party and 10 who did not voice a preference for one hypothetical candidate or the other--49.1 percent (193) of those identified with one party said they would "vote" for the candidate of their own party with a position-issue appeal while 50.9 percent (200) stated they would "vote" for the candidate of the opposing party with a style-issue appeal. Experimentally, that finding contrasted with Froman's hypothesis that it is impossible to appeal to voters of the opposite party using style issue, at least if the opposing candidate fails to employ them.5

At the same time it should be remembered that some specific position issues attracted voters. Those who tended to "vote" for the hypothetical candidate of their own party who espoused position issues considered such issues more important than their partisan counterparts who supported the hypothetical candidate with a style-issue appeal. Specific position issues seemed to have an integral effect on such voters' political behavior under experimental conditions. Thus, we can offer an appendage to Froman's belief that the candidate benefits most if he uses style issues when appealing to members of his own party: for some "same-party" voters position-issue appeals or a combination of position-style issue appeal is most efficacious.6 That type of voters appear to have an instrumental concern for politics. He does not respond to the electoral verbiage incorporated into
style-issue appeals; he responds to issues that activate his self-interest and which re-affirm his partisanship. Nevertheless, since that findings was not directly substantiated by this research, it can only be considered an appendage to Froman's more general hypothesis.

Fourth, this study strongly suggested that the main determinant of partisan cleavage is an attitude toward the role of the national government in domestic affairs. Further measurement and explication of that attitude may prove helpful to both candidates and political scientists as they try to predict voters' behavior, especially on Oahu. In addition, further research may show that such an attitude dimension has cross-cultural validity.

Last, this study has value for political scientists since it raises many questions about political issues. To such new areas of research we now will turn.

D. New Areas of Research for Political Issues

Perhaps three of the most urgent areas for research on political issues correspond with the major emphases of this study: 1) the effect of issues as determinants of partisanship, 2) the effect of partisanship on the perception of political issues, and 3) the perception of political issues by voters with an expressive concern for politics and those with an instrumental attitude toward politics. Neither the first nor the third topics have been investigated systematically.
Another area of research which merits investigation is the nature of leader and follower attitudes toward political issues. Do they correspond or are they hopelessly discordant? Are there specific areas of agreement or disagreement? Recently only Luttbeg and Kingdon have published findings in this crucial area of research.  

Similarly, studies should be conducted with actual campaign issues. Do issues effect political behavior at election time? If they do, how important are issues in comparison with candidates' personalities and their party labels? And under what conditions do issues become more important or less important as causes of political behavior?

In addition, longitudinal studies are needed. Do issues, such as those in the New Deal and Fair Deal, continue to be influential? What type of issue remains a lasting concern to voters? What type of issue is transitory?

Furthermore, the relationship between the mass media, presentation and consumption of news, and political issues should be researched more thoroughly. As the mass media command more and more of the voters' attention, it is important that political scientists measure the effect of those media on political attitudes. Do mass media shape attitudes or merely re-inforce them? Do they present objective information to voters or merely give them a panorama of interesting events?

Last, what effect do issues have in different electoral
settings? Are they of differential importance at the local, state, and national levels. Is their importance (or unimportance) altered by the number of the political parties? Are issues substantially more important in electorates which have sharp partisan cleavages, such as Michigan and Honolulu, than in those which have muted partisan differences, such as Wisconsin and New York City? Do issues assume different importance in different national political cultures and, if so, why? Indeed, there are many more unanswered questions than answered ones in the area of political issues.

E. Comparability of Oahu Electorate: Implications for Future Studies

Before concluding this chapter with a note on methodology it is worthwhile to put this study, specifically its sample, in some type of perspective for the reader. Initially it will be shown that Hawaii has an inclination to be an issue-oriented political culture. Then, independent voters will be discussed vis-a-vis the Oahu electorate. They constituted nearly 50 percent of the sample; consequently, it is incumbent on the researcher to explain the reasons for such an large group of nonpartisans. Last, various comparisons will be made between the Oahu electorate and the national electorate. While Oahu definitely is atypical, we will see that more similarities exist than most popularly conceive.

1. Oahu: an Issue-Oriented Political Culture

In chapter three developments in Oahu politics for the
first half of the twentieth century were discussed. In this chapter political occurrences which happened during the last two decades will be examined to give us further insights on the sample under study.

Three phenomena specifically will be considered: 1) solidification of party lines, 2) focus on issues which, in turn, has augmented partisan cleavages on Oahu, and 3) a comparison between Hawaii in the 1950's and 1960's and the mainland during the 1930's and 1940's.

Recalling the political developments that were emphasized in chapter three--namely the rise of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU) and the Democratic Party, demise of the tight oligarchical control of the Islands' political-economic life by the haole elite, greater participation of Islanders of Oriental ancestry in Oahu politics, and an injection of new youthful leadership into the Democratic Party--it is not hard to conceive of Hawaii, as early as 1950 as a potential two-party electorate. Such a realization, in fact, became a reality after the 1954 elections.

Needless to say, the above factors were instrumental in providing the soil in which issue-oriented politics could grow. Meller, in 1964, writes:

In Hawaii, the Democratic Party in the past has tended to attract the support of the poorer classes; in contrast, the relationships between the Republican Party and the dominant economic interests in the Islands imparted an aura of respectability to the latter party and until
recently, also assured it the monetary wherewithal to carry on expensive campaigns. It has been a widely held belief in the Islands that the leadership of the Republican Party was merely another manifestation in different guise of the same group which enjoyed economic and social dominance in the community. 8

The sparks of that belief were fanned by the new leaders in the Democratic Party during the early 1950's as they tried to mold a coalition which could dismantle the political-economic-social status quo that the Republican-oriented haoles tried to maintain.

Describing the 1954 campaign, Tuttle writes:

The successful Democratic campaign of 1954 featured teams of new political faces who aggressively pursued what they termed "a campaign of issues"... By way of illustration, the 1954 Democratic platform promised a thorough-going revision of territorial tax laws, land reform which would expand the less than 10 percent of Hawaii's land devoted to fee-simple home sites, expansion of educational opportunity through increased teachers' salaries, state labor laws to equal federal standards, county home rule, and various other social welfare proposals. 9

Later, in 1965 the Democrats redefined the major plans of their party platform in a 4,000 word program entitled "The New Hawaii." That document placed heavy emphasis upon education, economic development, social welfare, and government finance. And, while that proposed Democratic program did not produce widespread public approval or disapproval--probably since its proposals had been reflected in earlier Democrat Party pronouncements and since the issues incorporated in it were ones which enjoyed bipartisan support--it did provoke a
series of formal Republican position papers, thus helped to sustain the salience of key issues on Oahu.

To sum up, it can be hypothesized, as Goldstein does, that Hawaiian politics is approximately one generation behind the mainland--i.e., that a Roosevelt-like coalition has been dominant in Hawaiian politics for the last few decades.

Goldstein's analogy is cogent:

The closed agricultural society was terminated then by the unions, by outside capital and management (which dismantled the economic oligarchy of the original factoring companies though the latter today remain economically powerful), and by the politicized oriental. Just as the factoring companies had used the Republican Party as their political vehicle, the new forces turned to the Democratic Party. As Schattschneider has demonstrated, political organizations which open the system to participation of new elements enjoy the support of the new elements, and often long after they have come to represent interests opposed to the new elements... The national Democratic Party of the depression days under Roosevelt also brought in power unions, new western capital as opposed to old eastern capital, and ethnic minorities.

Thus, Oahu politics can be conceived as a partial recasting of American politics in the 1930's and 1940's. In short, it has a highly partisan, issue-oriented political culture.

2. Oahu: a Politicized Electorate

While the above discussion tends to characterize Oahu politics, some other qualifications have to be made. Now we will investigate the relations between Republicans, Democrats, and Independents on the island of Oahu and the reasons why the Oahu electorate is composed of such a large number of Independents.
To grasp why there are so many self-classified Independents in this study--47 percent in the preliminary and 49 percent in the main survey--it is necessary to consider two major aspects of Oahu's political culture: 1) forces which tend to weaken party affiliation and 2) attitudes toward recent changes in voter registration laws in Hawaii.

Initially it should be stated that "personality politics" is evident on Oahu. Voters often appear to identify with specific candidates rather than to affiliate steadfastly with a political party. In 1959, for example, Tuttle wrote:

With as many as 60 percent of the electorate viewing themselves as "independents," party organization and program are difficult to maintain, even by the Republicans who appear to retain more elaborate organizational structure than their competitors. The preponderance of uncommitted voters continues to delay substantial implementation of the Democratic programs as individual office-holders feel more secure in individual independence than in strict adherence to program pronouncements. Similar independence is also apparent in the Republican Party.11

And, although both parties have firmed up their organizational efforts since statehood (1959), "personality politics" still remains salient on Oahu. A prime, visible example is the present Democratic split between John A. Burns, the incumbent governor, and Thomas P. Gill, the incumbent lieutenant governor. A supporter of the governor often is referred to as a "Burns man"; his counterpart, a "Gill man."

Second, Hawaii has been a mobile society for most residents during the last twenty years. Various preoccupations
such as union membership, \( ^{12} \) "generalized ethnic cohesion,\(^{13} \) (as opposed to unmitigated ethnic bloc voting), and socio-economic aspirations have had a tendency to diminish the importance of partisan affiliation and politics in general for many registered voters on Oahu.\(^{14} \)

Last, not to be overlooked as forces which have slowed down and/or adversely affected the development of major partisan cleavage and resultant partisan affiliation are the mass media. The Honolulu Advertiser and The Honolulu Star-Bulletin jointly have a combined circulation of nearly 175,000 and, more important, both officially list themselves as "independent" in their editorial policy. Likewise, the three largest television stations give Hawaii a balanced presentation of the news. Thus, today there is no Republican controlled mass media as there was in Roosevelt's time and in the period before statehood.

To sum up, "personality politics," preoccupation with one's socio-economic status, and a rather balanced presentation of Republican and Democratic positions and policies in the mass media on Oahu all have contributed to the existence of an abnormally large number of independents on the island.

Another factor, especially when the timing of this study is considered, also merits discussion as a phenomenon which tended to produce voters who sided with the ranks of uncommitted voters. Beginning in 1970 Hawaii will have a closed party system. To implement that system voters in 1968
had to register for one party or the other. Voter resentment against the requirement of having to specifically state their party preference seemed to augment the ranks of independents.

On the other hand, it is possible that self-classified independents in the sample were voters who were moving out of one political party, usually the major one, but who were not yet ready to commit themselves to another political party. They, nevertheless, seem to have underlying or latent issue-oriented tendencies to side with one particular political party, as was evidenced by the data that was presented earlier in this study.

A brief glance at independents in the sample, especially independents who stated that they did not lean toward either political party, will enable us to make some comparisons between independents on Oahu and those in other areas.

At first it should be stated that the pure independents in the Oahu sample exhibited some of the characteristics which often have been associated with independents. They, for example, tend to have less interest in politics, to try less to persuade their friends to accept their own political views, to be less active in political campaigns, to misperceive position issues, and to vote less if an abnormally high non-response rate on the question tapping 1968 presidential voting choices is indicative of such a political phenomenon.

From a socio-economic standpoint, the "pure" independents in this study were inclined to be slightly more similar to the
Democrats than to the Republicans. At the same time, however, their attitudes toward how well Hawaiian politicians in Washington D.C. represent the people of Hawaii and their 1968 presidential voting patterns were neither Republican- nor Democrat-oriented. Thus, it can be concluded that the "pure" independents in the Oahu sample were less sophisticated and politically involved than other voters; that they tended to resemble Democratic Party identifiers; but that their behavior was relatively nonpartisan.

As far as other independents, those who leaned toward a particular political party, are concerned, they tended to resemble the partisans of the party with which they identified, a findings we have stated repeatedly. On some variables, however, differences between self-classified independents and strong-partisans were quite salient. Independents tended to differ from strong partisans, though not weak ones, on interest in politics (p<.001), political persuasion (p<.001), campaign activity (p<.001), and presidential voting patterns (p<.02). Thus, we have additional evidence to substantiate our earlier findings that independents on Oahu tend to be partisans; or conversely, that partisans (weak ones, at least) tend to resemble independents.

3. Comparison of the Oahu Electorate and the National Electorate

Being the only Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
in the United States which has a caucasian minority, it would be absurd to think that Oahu as representative of the mainland. On the other hand, the writer believes it quite beneficial to point out to the reader that some similarities do exist and that differences are not extreme in other instances.

Initially it appears efficacious to compare our sample of the Oahu electorate (N = 435) with samples of the national electorate on two key variables: party affiliation and education.

**TABLE XXV**

**COMPARISON OF OAHU AND NATIONAL SAMPLES ON NATURE OF PARTY AFFILIATION**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong Republican</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Republican</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inde. Republican</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inde. Democrat</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Democrat</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>55.8%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Democrat</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Inter-University Research Consortium, 1962 Election Study
**Inter-University Research Consortium, 1966 Election Study
TABLE XXVI

COMPARISON OF OAHU AND NATIONAL SAMPLES
ON LEVEL OF EDUCATION (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>U.S.+ Sample</th>
<th>Oahu Sample</th>
<th>Oahu++ 1960 Census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grade School Only</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some High School</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Grad.</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Grad.</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.2</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+Inter-University Research Consortium, 1962 Election Study
++U.S. Census, 1960. This group includes all residents 25 years of age or older

It is readily seen that our sample has less strong party identifiers than the national electorate and that it is weighted in favor of the Democrats. Nonetheless, the general partisan distribution is not too dissimilar. In fact, Oahu sample, seems to approximate the national electorate better than other similar studies, such as the Erie County, Elmira, and Boston (Levin, T. Alienated Voter), (Lazarsfeld et al., The People's Choice), (Berelson et al., Voting).

As far as education is concerned, it appears that there was substantial interviewee bias, though the Census statistics suggest that the Oahu electorate has comparable levels of educational attainment with the national electorate. The
proper distribution of voters on Oahu in each educational group undoubtedly is somewhere between the sample's and the Census' statistics. The former is too high; the latter too low. Thus, it is seen that Oahu, as well as this particular sample, has a slightly higher educational mean than the nation.

Having made two general but key comparisons, it seems beneficial to make three secondary ones to give the reader a better grasp of the comparability of the Oahu sample with other samples.

Initially it should be stated that Oahu sample appears to be much more knowledgeable of congressional candidates than national samples. Only 43 percent of a national sample knew the name of the Representative from their district in Congress. In contrast, nearly 77 percent of the Oahu sample knew the names of both of Hawaii's Representatives in Congress.

While there are many possible explanations for such relative political sophistication and knowledge, mainly the unrepresentativeness or upper socio-economic class bias of the Oahu sample, it is interesting to see where voters in each sample tend to obtain most of their political information. The survey questions, incidentally, as those in the three previous questions, are directly comparable.*

*The SRC question was: "We're interested in finding out how people got information about the election campaign this
year. Would you say you got most of your information from newspapers, radio, television, or magazines?" The question which was utilized in interviewing the Oahu sample was: "From where do you get most of your information about candidates during political campaigns: 1) radio, 2) television, 3) newspapers, 4) magazines, and 5) political pamphlets that the candidates pass out. To promote greater comparability those (8 percent) who stated that they got most of their information from political pamphlets and their counterparts in the national survey were deleted. Moreover, whenever a person in either sample gave two responses or more, his answer was coded as "newspaper" if it was one of those listed was "newspapers" or "television" if the latter was listed but "newspaper" was not. Otherwise multiple responses were divided evenly among the categories which were involved. In short, we can put confidence in the relative comparability of the two questions.

TABLE XXVII

COMPARISON OF OAHU AND NATIONAL SAMPLES
ON MOST IMPORTANT SOURCE OF POLITICAL INFORMATION
(in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
<td>41.1%</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
<td>45.1%</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazines</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Inter-University Research Consortium, 1964 Election Study (presidential and congressional elections)

**Inter-University Research Consortium, 1966 Election Study (only congressional elections)
Realizing the differences between media consumption (and media expenditures) for presidential and congressional election years as well as the differences in time, it nonetheless if evident that the Oahu sample tends to rely substantially more on newspapers and less on television than voters in general throughout the United States. That finding, in addition to the sample itself, may be due to the relative importance of newspapers on the island. While enterprising television stations rapidly are establishing themselves in Hawaii, the two newspaper, the *Star-Bulletin* and the *Advertiser*, continue to be the key sources of political information. This, in turn, helps to explain why our sample tends to be issue-oriented. And, indirectly, it suggests that voters who have an expressive concern for politics and who value style issues and candidates with style-issue appeals are more prevalent in the national electorate than they are in our limited sample.

One further comparison appears worthwhile. Not only do the voters in the Oahu sample rely on newspapers more for political information than they mainland counterparts, but also they tend to read newspapers more regularly.
TABLE XXVIII

COMPARISON OF OAHU AND NATIONAL SAMPLES ON USAGE OF NEWSPAPER AS SOURCE OF POLITICAL INFORMATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reading Habits</th>
<th>U.S.*</th>
<th>Oahu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Every day</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost every day</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A few times a week</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than that (catch-all category)</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Inter-University Research Consortium, 1964 Election Study

The SRC question read: "We're interested in this interview in finding out whether people paid much attention to the election campaign this year. Take newspapers for instance—did you read about the campaign in any newspapers? (if yes) How much did you read newspaper articles about the election—regularly, often, from time to time, or just once in a great while?" The query which was utilized in the field experiment was: "Here are a group of questions about information that you get. How often do you read newspaper articles about public affairs and politics: 1) every day, 2) almost every day, 3) a few times a week, 4) less than that?"

To sum up, we initially found that this sample, and presumably the Oahu electorate, is an issue-oriented group of voters. Thus, we hypothesize, it is somewhat atypical. Second, we discovered that Oahu's political culture and environment tend to foster the emergence of large numbers of independent voters. This was documented by comparing the distribution of the Oahu sample with that of a national sample in regards to direction and intensity of party affiliation. Here again we find Oahu to be atypical, though the number of self-classified independents seems to be increasing on the
mainland as well. Last, using various indices it was discovered that this sample is akin to national samples in many ways, while being more politically sophisticated and knowledgeable as well as more oriented toward the Democratic Party than the latter.

Hence, we are lead to caution the reader about all our comparisons. The sample is atypical in a number of respects. At the same time we hypothesize that the Oahu sample is not drastically dissimilar to representative national samples and, by inference, to the national electorate. While, we certainly do not mean to imply that the Oahu sample is representative of the national electorate, we do suggest that it is comparable--indeed, a footnote of optimism.

F. A Note on Methodology: Usage of Field Experiment and Telephone Interview in Survey Research

1. Field Experiment

Initially it should be stated that the field experiment which was utilized in this research project was field- rather than experiment-oriented. Some methodologists, for example, may desire to classify this research strategy as a modified sample survey; still other more demanding methodologists may flatly refuse to term the telephone interview an experiment. Indeed, this study's field experiment is not unrelated to an exploratory field study which, to Kerlinger, has three purposes: "to discover significant variables in the field situation, to discover relations among variables, and to lay the groundwork for later, more systematic and rigorous tests
of hypotheses."\textsuperscript{16}

Another possible reason for classifying this study as a modified sample survey or a field study is its inability to satisfy the criteria of scientific experiments as popularly conceived. Campbell, for example, would categorize this field experiment as a "single-shot" study in which a single group was studied in detail only once and in which the observation (measurement of the differences in perceptions and candidate choices) was attributed to some prior situation (type of issues and issue-appeals that were presented to the voters). Describing such a crude research strategy, Campbell writes:

\begin{quote}
This design does not merit the title of experiment... The very minimum of useful scientific information involves at least one formal comparison and therefore at least two careful observations.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

Here a major weakness of this study is exposed. Since there were no control groups or since the stimuli were manipulated for all groups of voters (not specifically for those in an experimental group), no comparisons can be made between voters who received a stimuli (manipulated variables) and those who did not. In another research design such differences in the perception of political issues may be a fundamental concern. Indeed, some voters cognize issues, and others do not.

Campbell's post-test only control group experimental design seems to be the valid experiment which most closely resembles the field experiment of this study. Taking two
representative samples, which statistically are "identical," the experimenter subjects one group to the experimental variable and then measures the effect of that variable on the experimental group; changes in the control group, not catalyzed by the introduction of the experimental stimuli, aid in charting more precisely the effect of the manipulated experimental variable on those in the experimental group. Changes in the latter group suggest that certain intravening or extraneous variables are operative. Incidentally, though Campbell believes that the post-test only experimental design offers the greatest potential for social science research, it unfortunately has been sorely neglected.

Parenthetically, it should be stated that this researcher originally planned to conduct an experiment which more closely resembled Campbell's post test only design. Such an experiment was not conducted for two primary reasons: 1) the more experimental controls a person puts on such an experiment, the less it resembles political reality (this researcher was unwilling to make such sacrifices) and 2) the more stress is put on the variance that is generated by a specific experimental variables, the more valid and reliable the measurement must become. Measuring the effect of introductory stimuli on the behavior and experimental group is no small problem. In fact, the two above-mentioned difficulties help to explain why only a few political scientists have conducted post-test only experimental designs--the simplest of Campbell's
"real experiments"—not quasi experiments. The last field experiment, which adhered to Campbell's criteria for such an experiment, was conducted in 1935: The value of this field experiment, then, is not that it epitomizes internal validity, delineating the exact effect of the manipulated variable on the experimental group, nor that it exudes external validity, being representative of its population, but that it partially combines both of the two ideals. Indeed, the major research obstacles in the past as far as the perception of political objects is concerned, has been social psychologists' obsession with internal validity (laboratory experiments with tight controls) and political scientists' (surveys with inadequate experimental controls) over-emphasis of external validity, at the expense of the former.

Having seen the general value of the field experiment, it is worthwhile to explore some of its specific aspects. First, the field experiment helps the researcher to isolate his research problem. By structuring the experiment the investigator slowly eliminates irrelevant material and inter-relates his major variables. At the same time, however, the researcher is prevented from becoming too engrossed in his experiment, an apparent fallacy of many social psychologists. He knows he must go into the "field" and structures his research design accordingly.

In addition, the field experiment can be efficiently utilized as a method of comparing variables, such as
perception of style and position issues. It enhances comparability by being highly structured and relatively unaffected by intervening variables.

Also, the field experiment appears to be most applicable in research where the investigator clearly knows what his independent variables will be. If the researcher plans to employ certain groups as his independent variables, for example, he must be sure that those groups are sufficiently large for meaningful statistical calculations. Since many variables usually are controlled in field experiments, it is logical for the researcher to utilize a large sample.

Last, the field experiment appears to be most advantageous in political-psychological studies which concern individuals. The variables in such studies usually are more adaptable to experimental manipulation than other types of political variables. In addition, the processes involved are more amenable to "before-after" measurements than other political phenomena.

2. Telephone Interview

Since the telephone interview served as the backbone of the field experiment, it is appropriate to evaluate briefly its potential as a tool of survey research. Initially it should be stated that survey researchers' attitudes toward the value of the telephone interview frequently are contradictory. Moreover, very few studies have been conducted to evaluate the quality of the data from telephone
interviews, mailed questionnaires, and face-to-face interviews simultaneously.

Some comparisons, however, are possible. If the cost and the representativeness of the sample of a study are major considerations, then the telephone interview is preferable to the face-to-face interview for the former reason and to the mailed questionnaire for the latter reason. In this study the four-five minute preliminary interview and the twenty-thirty minute main interview cost $.30 and $1.60 respectively. The cost, at the least, would have been quadruple that for face-to-face interviews. That cost, incidentally, would curtail the size of the sample selected if the same research expenditures were made.

Additionally, in this study the main telephone interview produced an 85.6% response rate. Considering the length of the questionnaire, it seems probable that a 35-50% response rate would have been likely if mailed questionnaires had been used. Moreover, it is probable that a significant number of the returned questionnaires would have been unuseable. Thus, those general comparisons seem to suggest that the telephone interview has utility in survey research.

But, obviously, high response rates mean virtually nothing if the quality of the data is poor. Initially, it should be stated that respondents were willing to state rather confidential information over the telephone. For example, of the 563 respondents in the preliminary survey
only 9, 6, and 2 refused to tell the interviewer their occupation, amount of education, and party preference or non-preference. And while 12 percent refused to state for which Presidential candidate they voted, it appears that hesitancy to reveal such political information in a community which is interviewed regularly by university and professional pollsters and reluctance to admit non-voting, rather than the type of the interview, were the primary factors which provoked such refusals.

In addition, in the main questionnaire only a few voters refused to respond to the more difficult section, though some had trouble picking the two issues which were "least important" to them. Less than 10 voters indirectly refused to consider the questions carefully--i.e., indiscriminately selecting, before he had time to consider the issues, "about the same" or "I don't know" replies.

Reading the four one-paragraph issue appeals also provided no major problems. Many respondents in fact waited for the interviewer to read those paragraphs for them. Moreover, when such issues appeals had to be read over the phone--if the respondent misplaced the pre-interview mailing or threw out the letter--careful statistical comparisons showed no differences in the response rates. Those who had pre-interviewing materials with them at the telephone did not answer the questions regarding candidate choice any more willingly than those who had such issue appeals read to them
over the phone. The former, it should be stated, remembered, receiving the pre-interview mailing and supposedly were favorably affected by it.

Moreover, the telephone interview has many advantages that often are not appreciated. First, a refusal at the doorstep tends to discourage call-backs; a refusal over the telephone does not eliminate the possibility of the researcher, not his interviewers, directly establishing rapport with the potential respondents by making a second call. In fact, this researcher was able to persuade nearly 50% of the first-time refusals that they should participate in the study.

And to be practical, in addition to "not at homes," the telephone has the ability to eradicate the problem of dogs and extremely inclement weather. Additionally, and this subtle point is by no means insignificant, the data-collecting operation can be centralized, the interviewers more closely supervised; and the time schedule more easily adhered to when the telephone interview is employed.

Last, if survey research is going to be acceptable to both interviewee and interviewer in the future, then it appears that the latter should have more respect for the preferences of the former. In this study we obtain a rather clear-cut finding.

When the 435 respondents were asked if they preferred "to be interviewed at your home or to be interviewed over the telephone," 12.6% preferred the former, and 61.4%
preferred the latter. Of the remaining 26%, 19.3 percent stated that it did not matter; 4.1% remarked that they would prefer to be interviewed in another place such as their office; and 2.6% refused to express an opinion. Omitting the "other" responses, it is seen that voters on Oahu prefer the telephone interview by nearly a 5:1 ratio.

Thus, it appears that both the field experiment and the telephone interview are extremely useful tools in survey research. In fact, it can be argued that they are complementary research instruments. And all the studies which Campbell lists under the post-test only experimental design--the one he believes has the greatest potential in social science research--are amenable to telephone interviewing.

It is seen, this study is a research endeavor to augment voting studies and to probe the topic of political issues. While we may not have found the "watch," we can easily say that we are much closer to finding it than those who are still searching around the "street lamp."
NOTES

CHAPTER I

1. The most notable studies include: Paul F. Lazarsfeld et al., The People's Choice (New York, 1944); Bernard Berelson et al., Voting (Chicago, 1954); and Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York, 1960).


4. See: Berelson et al., Voting; Campbell et al., The American Voter; and Angus Campbell et al., The Voter Decides (Evanston, 1954).

5. Basic studies concerning roll-call analysis include: Duncan MacRae, Dimensions of Congressional Voting: a Statistical Study of the House of Representatives in the Eighty-first Congress (Berkeley, 1958) and Lee Anderson et al., Legislative Roll-Call Analysis (Evanston, 1966).


12. Cf: Donald E. Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," Elections and the Political Order, ed. Campbell et al., pp. 170-171. Stokes discusses "valence issues" which merely involve linking of parties with some condition that is positively or negatively valued by the electorate and "position issues" which involve the advocacy of governmental actions from a set of alternatives over which a distribution of voter preference is defined. Also cf: Herbert M. Baus and William Ross, Politics Battle Plan (New York, 1968), pp. 123-124. The two California political consultants describe "heart," "belly," and "power" issues—the former being more or less synonymous with style issues and the latter two with position issues.


18. Ibid., p. 266.

19. Ibid., p. 270.


22. Ibid., p. 47.

24. Ibid., p. 84.


NOTES

CHAPTER II


6. Ibid., pp. 154-155.


8. Ibid., p. 53. Key writes: "The Facts seem to be that, on the average, the standpatters do not have to behave as mugwumps to keep their consciences clear; they are already where they ought to be in the light of their policy attitudes."

9. Ibid., pp. 132-133.

10. Ibid., pp. 17, 101-102, 144.

11. Ibid., p. 104.

12. Ibid., p. 7-8.


16. Berelson et al., Voting, p. 231. They write: "The overall effect of political perception is to increase the amount of political consensus within the parties and to increase the amount of political cleavage between the parties--once again homogeneity within and polarization between."

17. For example, see: Milbrath, Political Participation, p. 31.


24. Ibid., p. 316.

25. Campbell et al., The Voter Decides, p. 84.


31. Ibid., pp. 127-128.


35. Ibid., p. 253.

36. Ibid., pp. 270-271.


NOTES

CHAPTER III


3. In 1930, for example, haoles--exclusive of the Portuguese who were always treated as a separate category in Territorial statistics--constituted a mere 18.3 percent of the Territorial electorate.


5. Ibid., p. 309.

6. Ibid., p. 309.

7. Ibid., p. 316.


9. Ibid., pp. 32-34.


12. Romanzo C. Adams, The Japanese in Hawaii (New York, 1924), p. 13. Adams writes: "... (R)epresentatives of all nationalities tend to leave the plantation almost constantly, thus creating a need for constant new importations. For example, from 1800 to 1890 about 33 percent of the Chinese were plantation laborers, and now only about 6 percent. In 1901, nearly 45 percent of the Japanese were plantation laborers, now only about 13 percent. The Filipinos, who were brought first in 1908, constituted 5 percent of all sugar plantation laborers in 1910, 30 percent in 1920, and 47 percent in 1923. Counting men only, the Filipinos are beginning to come to the towns and cities, and about a thousand went to California last year. The total number of laborers employed on sugar plantations is about the same as it was twenty years ago."


17. Romanzo C. Adams, The Japanese in Hawaii, pp. 10-16. Adams outlined a number of reasons stating why the percentage of Japanese women would decline, explicitly stating that: "The age distribution of Japanese women is at present unusually favorable to a high birth rate--more favorable than it will ever be again." In 1920 44.5 percent of the Islands' female population was Japanese; approximately one-half of them were in their childhood or adolescence. It is doubtful, however, that Adams' statistical arguments made much sense to haoles who constantly read remarks to the contrary in the newspapers.

18. Fuchs, Hawaii Pono, p. 110.


20. Ibid., p. 304. Cf: Fuchs, Hawaii Pono, p. 116. He writes: "The average monthly salary of haole lunas (foremen on plantations) in the field went from $87.54 in 1902 to $96.03 in 1910, while the pay of the Japanese lunas remained essentially the same changing only from $31.52 to $31.95. For the same work, the Chinese received $5 more and the Portuguese $10 more than their Japanese counterparts."


22. Fuchs, Hawaii Pono, pp.146-147.


Yamamoto discusses the number in oppponitive as well as in elective positions.


28. Fuchs, *Hawaii Pono*, p. 179. He reports: "The most popular method of checking what went on inside the voting booth was to hang a pencil from the railing directly over the Republican side of the ballot. If the loop around the railing shifted, instructions were being disobeyed."

29. Andrew W. Lind, "Racial Bloc Voting in Hawaii," *Social Process in Hawaii*, XXI (1957), 16. The percentage distribution of the territorial electorate by ethnic groups in 1930 (N = 43,521) was: Hawaiians 30.5, Part-Hawaiians 8.3, haoles 18.3, Portuguese 16.0, Japanese 13.8, Chinese 8.5, and Others 4.6. In 1930 it is seen that the Japanese, while constituting 41.5 percent of the islands' population, comprised only 13.8 percent of the electorate.


32. Lind, "Voting in Hawaii," p. 3.


36. Daniel K. Inouye, *Journey to Washington* pp. 146-147. Inouye writes: "Our (442nd Regiment's) biggest single advance came on the day word reached us that President Roosevelt had died. Men just got up out of their holes and began fighting their way up. "Where the hell are they going?" the brass hollered at regimental headquarters, and of course no one in the S-3 section knew. But down on the line, we knew. Every Nisei (second generation Japanese) who had been invested with first-class citizenship by virtue of the uniform he wore knew. We were moving up for FDR. He had given us our chance and we had a lot of aloha for that man."
37. Previously the Japanese laborers in the sugar strikes of 1909 and 1920 had struck as a protesting ethnic group. Filipinos had similar strikes and even formed their own labor union, Vibora Luvimindo, which had some limited success in the 1930's.


39. Ibid., p. 364.

40. Ibid., p. 370.

41. It is interesting that, when leaders in the Democratic Party dissociated their party from ILWU leadership, the political alliance of the party and the labor union remained in tact. Similarly, the party-class-ethnic group syndrome, assuming it exists, was able to subsume past Japanese-Filipino enmity.

42. Daws, Shoal of Time, p. 351.


44. Ibid., p. B-5.

45. Ibid., p. B-5.


NOTES

CHAPTER IV


4. Campbell et al., The Voter Decides, x. They write: "By the accident of the academic division of labor, social psychologists early acquired an understanding of the mysteries of sampling. They quickly applied the techniques to political studies (most studies in the 1950's by social psychologists dealt with political communications and resultant attitude change). These forays produced results of genuine significance; yet social psychologists at times, or so it seemed to political scientists, were as aliens moving on strange terrain, and failed to examine questions that students of politics would have given priority." At the present time social psychologists, a group of psychologists more closely associated with each other than any comparable group of political scientists, continue to publish widely yet usually for a rather select group of researchers. They still are not doing research on "the questions which students of politics would give priority."


6. The only field experiment, that the researcher found in the literature of social psychology and political science, which integrated the two disciplines was conducted in 1935. See: George W. Hartman, "A Field Experiment on the Comparative Effectiveness of 'Emotional' and 'Rational' Political Leaflets in Determining Election Results," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XXXI (1936-1937), 99-114.
7. Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research (New York, 1967), p. 382. Cf: Berelson's and Steiner's definition of experiment closely parallels Kerlinger's. They write: "By experiment is meant any investigation that includes two elements: manipulation or control of some variable by the investigator and systematic observation or measurement of the result. In short, it means active intervention of the phenomenon of interest (political issues in this case) to see what, if any, effects are produced by the intervention." Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner, Human Behavior: an Inventory of Scientific Findings (New York, 1964), p. 19.


9. Oahu voters comprise approximately 77 percent of the Hawaiian electorate.

10. If all of the three voters lived in the same residence and used the same phone, the first succeeding person who did not reside at that address was added to the list of potential interviewees, in case none of the three living together could be reached.


12. This researcher benefited from conversations with John White and Richard Pratt who have done extensive survey research for various legislative candidates on the island of Oahu.

13. The nature of the study did not merit interviewing those without telephones. They were scattered throughout the island; and interview costs, even for a sub-sample of them, would have been prohibitive. Moreover, this analyst has been more interested in the relationships among the variables than inferences about the population. Appendix B reveals the scope of this sampling bias.


17. In 1960 the city of Honolulu had a population of 294,194 of which 72.7 percent were non-caucasians. Comparable statistics for Oahu (city and county of Honolulu) were 500,409 and 64.3 percent. Since many people who live outside of Honolulu work in that city or regularly commute, or both, the island of Oahu has been classified a standard metropolitan statistical area. *1960 Population-Housing Census PHC-1, Census Tracts*, p. 14.

18. In 1960 83.1 percent of the males over 14 were employed and 40.5 percent of the females in the same age group had full-time jobs. *1960 Population-Housing Census PHC-1, Census Tracts*, p. 44. Hawaii has a larger percentage of women in the labor force than any other state. Cf: *Census of Population: Detailed Characteristics, PC-1*, I3D.

NOTES

CHAPTER V


2. Ibid., p. 173.

3. Ibid., p. 255.


5. Campbell et al., The American Voter, p. 181 n.

6. Ibid., p. 175.


8. Ibid., p. 420.


10. Campbell et al., the American Voter, p. 197. See also: John P. Robinson et al., Measures of Political Attitudes (Ann Arbor, 1968). They write (p. 37): "But though there may be this tendency among the five percent of the most intellectually aware people, for liberals in domestic economic welfare policy to be liberals on foreign policy, or for conservatives on domestic policy to be conservatives in foreign policy, such a correlation has hardly been apparent in the majority of the citizenry."

11. Each issue in their study was followed by three possible responses: 1) "increase" (e.g., government regulation of business), 2) "same" or no code, and 3) "decrease." The three responses then were given numerical values of 1.0, 0.5, and 0.0 respectively to place the respondents' attitudes toward the various issues on a 0.0 to 1.0 continuum for comparative purposes.


15. See: Berelson et al., Voting, pp. 184-185; McClosky et al., "Issue Conflict and Consensus among Party Leaders and Followers"; and Campbell et al., The American Voter, pp. 156-159.


17. Ibid., p. 272.

18. Leo A. Goodman and William H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross Classifications," Journal of the American Statistical Association, XLIX (Dec., 1954), pp. 734-735. They write: "The basic theme of this paper is that even though a single precise goal for an investigation cannot be specified, it is still possible and desirable to choose a measure of association which has contextual meaning, instead of using as a matter of course one of the traditional measures."

19. Herbert L. Costner, "Criteria for Measures of Association," American Sociological Review, XXX, 3 (June, 1965), 351-352. He writes: "The estimation rules for this measure (tau beta for nominal or dichotomous data) require that units be assigned to classes of the dependent variable so as to reconstruct the actual frequency distribution. Without knowledge of the independent variable, this means that the 'marginal' distribution of the dependent variable is reconstructed by random assignment; the probability of error then is the probability that a given unit fails to fall in its correct class. Estimation with knowledge of the independent variable consists in reconstructing by random assignment the conditional distributions of the dependent variable for each category of the independent variable." Costner also states: "Some sampling theory work for these measures has already been accomplished and although it is not complete, these measures are not severely handicapped because of the unavailability of tests of significance."


21. See: Louis Guttman, "A General Nonmetric Technique for Finding the Smallest Coordinate Space for a Configuration of Points," Psychometrika, XXXIII, 4 (Dec., 1968), 469-506. For an excellent empirical presentation of small space analysis as used in actual research, see:


23. Ibid., p. 6.


25. Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago, 1965), chapters one and two.

NOTES

CHAPTER VI

1. Campbell et al., The American Voter, pp. 169-170. They write: "We may specify at least three conditions to be fulfilled if an issue is to bear upon a person's vote decision. 1. An issue must be cognized in some form. 2. It must arouse a minimum intensity of feeling. 3. It must be accompanied by some perception that one party represents the person's own position better than do the other parties."

2. Froman and Skipper, "An Approach to the Learning of Party Identification," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXVII, 3 (fall, 1963), 477. Froman and Skipper state: "Our second hypothesis (the first being that perceived agreement on issues underlies party choice) was that style issues (broad, general, moral questions) are more important than position issues as factors underlying party identification."

3. Ibid., pp. 477-480.

4. Ibid., p. 476.

5. Ibid., pp. 477-478. They write: "A sample choice from our questionnaire was as follows: In this section assume you are a voter in a Presidential election. For each pair of Presidential candidates, please check the one (either A. or B.) for whom you would more likely vote. 1. A. A Democrat who favors increasing public ownership of natural resources. vs. B. A Republican who does not favor increased public ownership of natural resources. 7. A. A Republican who favors increased public ownership of natural resources. vs. B. A Democrat who does not favor increasing public ownership of natural resources. By comparing the choice of question one with the choice of question seven we can ascertain whether the respondent 'voted' on the basis of party or issue." To this researcher the probability that such questions would generate significant questionnaire bias seem quite high. Indeed, no one likes to contradict himself.


8. Campbell et al., The American Voter, p. 187. It is interesting that Campbell et al. write: "It may well be argued that we have imposed a view of issues in the public images of the parties that is unrealistically specific. The public may well have broader perceptions of the policy roles that the parties are prepared to play, and articulation between issue concerns and partisanship may be clear at this level."
NOTES

CHAPTER VII


2. Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter, p. 201.

3. Ibid., p. 205.


6. Ibid., pp. 385-386.


9. Dennis K. Kelly and William J. Chambliss, "Status Consistency and Political Attitudes," American Sociological Review, XXXI, 3 (June, 1966), p. 40. They employed a Welfare Scale whose four items included: 1) Federal aid to education is desirable if we are going to adequately meet present and future educational needs in the U.S.; 2) If unemployment is high, the government should spend to create jobs; 3) A government-administered health program is necessary to insure that everyone receives adequate medical care, and 4) Economic security for every man, woman, and child is a goal worth striving for even if it means socialism.


13. For some interesting empirical findings involving party, ethnicity, and class (using the data of the preliminary telephone survey) see: Marshall N. Goldstein, "The 1968 Election in Hawaii," Western Political Quarterly, XXII, 3 (Sept., 1969), 482-487. Goldstein, moreover, offers some theoretical insights concerning the inter-relationships among those three key variables.
NOTES

CHAPTER VIII


5. Ibid., p. 8.

6. Ibid.


13. Ibid., p. 96.


18. Cf: Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research (New York, 1967), p. 397. He writes: "Telephone surveys have little to recommend them beyond speed and low cost. Especially when the interviewer is unknown to the respondent they are limited by possible non-response, uncooperativeness, and by reluctance to answer more than simple, superficial questions. Yet telephoning can sometimes be useful in obtaining information essential to a study. Its principle defect, obviously, is the inability to obtain detailed information." Lolagene Coombs and Ronald Freedman, "Use of Telephone Interviews in a Longitudinal Fertility Study," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXVIII, 1 (spring, 1964), 117. They write: "The quality of the data cannot be evaluated until later in the analysis process, but it is clear that it is possible to obtain apparently reasonable responses from substantially all respondents on all the questions. . . Apparently it is possible to obtain sensitive information through telephone interviews."

19. Cf: A.N. Oppenheim, Questionnaire Design and Attitude Measurement (New York, 1966), pp. 35-34. He writes: "By far the largest disadvantage of mail questionnaires is the fact that they usually produce very poor response rates. For respondents who have no special interest in the subject matter of the questionnaire, figures of 40 percent to 60 percent are typical; even in studies of interested groups, 80 percent is seldom exceeded. The important point about these poor response rates is not the reduced size of the sample, which could easily be overcome by sending out more questionnaires, but the possibility of bias."
APPENDIX A

Hawaii's Voters' Study

Introduction to telephone questionnaire: My name is ____________. As you may remember, John Staples, a graduate student at the University of Hawaii, conducted a telephone survey after the elections last year. Your name had been selected from the voter registration lists by a special statistical method, and you helped us by answering a few questions. Today(tonight) we are completing the second and final part of that telephone survey. Did you receive a letter about the study from the Political Science Department yesterday or today? Do you still have that letter? (if both "yes," proceed; if either "no," conclude conversation with these statements: We will be glad to send you another one. Since you helped us to complete the first part of the survey, only you can help us with the second part. What would be the best time for me to call you after you receive the letter from us? Okay, then I will call you on __________., July ___ at ___ o'clock. If you are busy or not at home when I call, I will be happy to call you at another time. Thank you for your cooperation.) Would you please get that letter. Would you take the green sheet of paper from the envelope.* Please look at the directions at the top of the page while I read

*The directions, issues, and response categories ("Republican," "No Difference," "Democratic," and "Don't Know") were typed on the green sheet that was sent to the respondent in the pre-interview mailing.
them to you. BELOW ARE SOME STATEMENTS ABOUT POLITICAL MATTERS. PLEASE TELL ME WHETHER YOU THINK THE REPUBLICAN OR THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, ON THE WHOLE, IS MORE IN FAVOR OF EACH STATEMENT. THINK ABOUT WHAT THE PARTIES USUALLY STAND FOR ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL. DO NOT THINK ABOUT THE PARTIES HERE IN HAWAII.

Do you think the Republican or the Democratic is more in favor of: (this statement was repeated by the interviewer before each question)

1. Giving more attention to the problems of the working man
2. Having government programs that help all of the people
3. Reducing the size of the national budget in order to make the value of the dollar more stable
4. Having taxes that are fair for everyone
5. Creating more government programs to help poor people
6. Having more cooperation between labor and management
7. Spending less government money on poverty programs
8. Having a strong economy
9-16 NOW LOOK AT THE BACK SIDE OF THE GREEN SHEET OF PAPER. PLEASE TELL ME WHICH 2 ISSUES ARE MOST IMPORTANT TO YOU. . . NOW, WHICH 2 ISSUES ARE LEAST IMPORTANT TO YOU? (space for checking the interviewee's replies was provided for on the interviewer's questionnaire)

NOW I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU SOME OTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT POLITICS. GENERALLY SPEAKING, DO YOU USUALLY THINK OF YOURSELF AS A REPUBLICAN, A DEMOCRAT, AN INDEPENDENT,
OR WHAT?

17 (if R or D) WOULD YOU CONSIDER YOURSELF A STRONG (R,D) OR NOT A VERY STRONG (R,D)?

(if Independent) DO YOU THINK THAT YOU ARE CLOSER TO THE REPUBLICAN OR TO THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY?

Note to interviewer: If the respondent will not give you an answer to the above question, re-phrase the question by stating: "WELL IF YOU HAD TO PICK ONE PARTY, WHICH ONE WOULD YOU SAY THAT YOU LIKE A LITTLE MORE THAN THE OTHER ONE?"

18 WHEN YOU VOTE, WHAT DO YOU DO: 1) ALWAYS VOTE FOR (R,D) CANDIDATES; 2) USUALLY VOTE FOR (R,D) CANDIDATES; OR 3) SPLIT YOUR VOTE UP PRETTY MUCH BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES?

19 REGARDLESS OF WHETHER YOU ARE A REPUBLICAN, A DEMOCRAT, OR AN INDEPENDENT, WOULD YOU SAY THAT YOU ARE LIBERAL OR CONSERVATIVE IN YOUR POLITICAL VIEWS?

20-21 NOW I WOULD LIKE TO GET YOUR REACTIONS TO SOME STATEMENTS MADE BY VARIOUS POLITICAL CANDIDATES. WOULD YOU TAKE THE _______ (pink for Republicans and Independents who lean toward the Republican Party, blue for their Democrat counterparts and for Independents who do not lean toward either political party) SHEET OF PAPER FROM THE ENVELOPE AND READ WHAT CANDIDATES A AND
B HAVE TO SAY. . . IF AN ELECTION WAS HELD TODAY, WOULD YOU PROBABLY VOTE FOR CANDIDATE A OR FOR CANDIDATE B IF THIS WAS ALL THE INFORMATION THAT YOU HAD ABOUT THEM? . . . NOW TURN TO THE BACK SIDE OF THE ___ SHEET OF PAPER AND READ WHAT CANDIDATES C AND D HAVE TO SAY. . . IF AN ELECTION WAS HELD TODAY, WOULD YOU PROBABLY VOTE FOR CANDIDATE C OR FOR CANDIDATE D IF THIS WAS ALL THE INFORMATION THAT YOU HAD ABOUT THEM?

Note to Interviewer: If the interviewee says he would not vote for candidates A and B and/or C or D, ask him this question: EVEN THOUGH YOU WOULD NOT VOTE FOR CANDIDATES ___ OR ___, WHICH ONE WOULD YOU SAY YOU LIKE A LITTLE BETTER THAN THE OTHER ONE?

A sample of the candidate choices (for Republicans and Independents who lean toward the Republican Party) is presented on the next page. For their Democrat counterparts the party labels as well as the position-issues appeals (A and D) would have been reversed. The two style issue appeals were alternated for even- and odd-numbered respondents to minimize questionnaire bias. The findings showed both style-issue appeals to be equally attractive to voters.
A

I am the REPUBLICAN candidate for the United States' House of Representatives in Washington. If I am elected your Congressman, I will work hard to reduce the size of the national budget in order to make the value of the dollar more stable. The government in Washington has spent too much money to help people. I, for example, think that the government should spend less money on poverty problems. Last, I will see to it that the government in Washington considers the interest of the taxpayer in the middle class.

B

I am the DEMOCRAT candidate for the United States' House of Representatives in Washington. If I am elected as your Congressman, I will support legislation that keeps our economy strong. One good way to help all Americans is to maintain a strong economy. I will promote more cooperation between different groups, such as employers and employees. Last, I will work hard to make sure that no group is taxed more than it should be.
C

I am the DEMOCRAT candidate for the United States' House of Representatives in Washington. If I am elected as your Congressman, I will work hard to make sure that taxes are fair for everyone. I will promote better relations between labor and management. Trouble between the two groups usually hurts everyone in the end. Last, I will support government programs that help all of the people.

D

I am the REPUBLICAN candidate for the United States' House of Representatives in Washington. If I am elected as your Congressman, I will support a larger national budget so that the government in Washington can help people as it has in the past. I, for instance, believe that the government should use more money to help poor people. Last, I will make sure that the government in Washington remembers the problems of the man in the working class.

Note: The interaction effect, an adverse one, between A and D was minimal. The differences in wording disguised the similarities of the two position-issue appeals. Respondents, in short, were so busy comparing A and B on one side and C and D on the other side that they did not seem to compare A and D directly.
HERE ARE SOME GENERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT POLITICS. SOME
PEOPLE THINK THAT ISSUES ARE VERY IMPORTANT IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS. OTHER PEOPLE DON'T THINK THAT ISSUES ARE IMPORTANT AT ALL IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS. ON THE AVERAGE, HOW IMPORTANT ARE ISSUES FOR YOU WHEN YOU DECIDE FOR WHICH CANDIDATE YOU WILL VOTE: 1) VERY IMPORTANT, 2) IMPORTANT, 3) NOT VERY IMPORTANT, 4) NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL?

DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THIS STATEMENT? A PERSON CAN NOT TRUST ANYTHING THAT POLITICAL CANDIDATES SAY AT ELECTION TIME.

DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THIS STATEMENT? THERE ARE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC PARTIES. WOULD YOU SAY THAT YOU STRONGLY (AGREE, DISAGREE) OR JUST (AGREE, DISAGREE) THAT THERE ARE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PARTIES?

IN GENERAL, DO YOU THINK THAT THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD DO MORE THINGS FOR PEOPLE, THAN IT HAS DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS?

DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THIS STATEMENT? THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON OUGHT TO HELP PEOPLE GET DOCTORS AND HOSPITAL CARE AT LOW COST. WOULD YOU SAY THAT YOU STRONGLY ____ OR JUST ____.

DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THIS STATEMENT? THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD NOT SET A MINIMUM WAGE LAW. STRONGLY ____ OR JUST ____.

AGREE OR DISAGREE. IF TOWN AND CITIES AROUND THE COUNTRY NEED HELP TO BUILD MORE SCHOOLS, THE
GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON OUGHT TO GIVE THEM THE MONEY THEY NEED. ETC.

29 AGREE OR DISAGREE? THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON OUGHT TO SEE TO IT THAT EVERYBODY WHO WANTS TO WORK CAN FIND A JOB. ETC.

30 AGREE OR DISAGREE? THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD NOT LEAVE THINGS LIKE ELECTRIC POWER AND HOUSING FOR PRIVATE BUSINESSMEN TO HANDLE. ETC.

31 AGREE OR DISAGREE? IF PEOPLE DO NOT GET FAIR TREATMENT IN JOBS AND HOUSING THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT THEY DO. ETC.

Note: Two statements were phrased in negative manner to offset interviewee bias or what is commonly termed a response set. Interviewers often had to repeat or explain those two questions to respondents since latter had a hard time grasping them. Nevertheless, it is hypothesized that it is better to have both negative and positive statements (both Republican-oriented and Democratic-oriented ones or ones that represent two different positions or attitudes) despite the difficulty in administering the former.

32 HERE IS A GROUP OF QUESTIONS ABOUT INFORMATION THAT YOU GET. HOW OFTEN DO YOU READ NEWSPAPER ARTICLES ABOUT PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND POLITICS: 1) EVERY DAY, 2) ALMOST EVERY DAY, 3) A FEW TIMES A WEEK, 4) LESS THAN
THAT?

33 HOW OFTEN DO YOU WATCH THE EVENING NEWS BROADCASTS ON TELEVISION: (same response categories as previous question)?

34 DO YOU EVER READ ABOUT PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND POLITICS IN ANY MAGAZINES SUCH AS TIME OR NEWSWEEK?

35 FROM WHERE DO YOU GET MOST OF YOUR INFORMATION ABOUT CANDIDATES DURING POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS: 1) RADIO, 2) TELEVISION, 3) NEWSPAPERS, 4) MAGAZINES, 5) POLITICAL PAMPHLETS?

THIS IS THE LAST GROUP OF QUESTIONS. JUST TELL ME WHETHER YOU THINK EACH STATEMENT IS TRUE OR FALSE. DON'T WORRY ABOUT GETTING RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS.

Note to interviewer: After each statement, ask, "true or false?"

36 a. EACH UNITED STATES' SENATOR IS ELECTED FOR A TERM OF 4 YEARS.

37 b. EACH STATE HAS 2 SENATORS IN WASHINGTON.

38 c. RIGHT NOW THERE ARE MORE REPUBLICANS THAN DEMOCRATS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN WASHINGTON.

39 d. MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN WASHINGTON ARE ELECTED EVERY 2 YEARS.

40 DO YOU HAPPEN TO KNOW WHO ARE THE REPRESENTATIVES FROM HAWAII IN THE UNITED STATES' HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
IN WASHINGTON. (if respondent gave more than two, the first two were coded as his answer)

41 HERE ARE THE LAST 2 QUESTIONS. THERE IS QUITE A BIT OF TALK THESE DAYS ABOUT DIFFERENT SOCIAL CLASSES. MOST PEOPLE SAY THEY BELONG TO THE MIDDLE CLASS OR TO THE WORKING CLASS. DO YOU EVER THINK OF YOURSELF AS BEING IN ONE OF THESE CLASSES?

(if "yes") WHICH ONE?

(if "no") WELL, IF YOU HAD TO MAKE A CHOICE, WOULD YOU CALL YOURSELF A MEMBER OF THE MIDDLE CLASS OR A MEMBER OF THE WORKING CLASS?

42 THIS IS THE LAST QUESTION. WOULD YOU PREFER TO BE INTERVIEWED AT YOUR HOME, OR TO BE INTERVIEWED OVER THE TELEPHONE?

THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION.
Percentages for Responses to All Question on
Main Telephone Questionnaire (N = 435) *

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Working man</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>63%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Programs all</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>44</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Less budget, stable dollar</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Fair taxes</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>5. Programs for poor</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>69</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Relations labor-management</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>45</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Spending less on poverty</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Strong economy</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>23</td>
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* Some totals do not add up to 100% as a result of rounding.
** Includes a few "no response".

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<th>MI</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>LI***</th>
<th>NR</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9. Working man</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>21%</td>
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<tr>
<td>+10. Programs all</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>11. Less budget, stable dollar</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>52</td>
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<td>+12. Fair taxes</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>43</td>
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<td>13. Programs for poor</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>+14. Relations labor-management</td>
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<td>15. Spending less on poverty</td>
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<td>+16. Strong economy</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>54</td>
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*** MI = Most Important
I = Important
LI = Least Important

If a person could not put issues into categories "most important" and "least important" or thought they were all equally important, he was given a score of "2" on the issue(s).

+ Denotes style issue
17. Strong Republican 7.4% (32)
   Weak Republican 8.7 (38)
   Independent-Republican 14.5 (63)
   "Pure Independent" 7.4 (32)

   Strong Democrat 11.0% (48)
   Weak Democrat 23.4 (102)
   Independent-Democrat 27.6 (120)

18. Always vote Republican 3.9%
    Usually vote Republican 7.8
    Split bet. Republican & Democrat 50.6
    Usually vote Democrat 24.8
    Always vote Democrat 5.5

   "Pure Independent" (7.4%) were not asked this question.

19. Liberal in Political Views 34.3%
    "Middle of Road" 5.7
    Conservative in Political Views 51.5
    Don't Know & No Response 8.5

20. 45.7% Candidate A (own party, espousing position issues
     of own party)
     50.6% Candidate B (other party, espousing style issues)
     3.7% No Response

21. 59.5% Candidate C (other party, espousing style issues)
     35.9% Candidate D (own party, espousing position issues
     of other party)
22. Importance of issues in voting decision

Very important 35.9%
Important 49.0
Not very important 10.3
Not important at all 3.2
No Response 1.6

23. Trust in what candidates say at election time

Yes 60.7%
No 36.8
No Response 2.5

24. Important differences between two parties

Strongly agree 15.9%
Agree 41.4
Disagree 36.8
Strongly disagree 3.9
No Response 2.1

25. Government in Washington should do more things for people?

More 63.7%
About same 6.4
Less 25.5
No Response 4.4
26. Doctors-hospital care  41%  35%  16%  7%  2%  
27. Minimum wage  37  38  15  9  2  
28. Aid to education  37  42  12  8  3  
29. Jobs for all  43  29  18  9  1  
30. Govt. ownership  10  24  35  25  5  
31. Jobs and housing  32  39  19  7  2  

32. Newspaper articles on public affairs and politics

   Every day  38%  
   Almost every day  25  
   A few times a week  24  
   Less than that  13  
   No Response  .5  

33. Television broadcasts (evening news)

   Every day  49%  
   Almost every day  22  
   A few times a week  18  
   Less than that  11  
   No Response  .5  

34. Magazines

   Yes (at least every 2-3 weeks)  57%  
   No (incl. "once in a while")  43  
   No Response  1
35. Main source of information about candidates

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<th>Source</th>
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<td>Radio</td>
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<td>Television</td>
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<td>Newspapers</td>
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<td>Magazines</td>
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<td>Political pamphlets</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>No response</td>
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36. Senator's six-year term

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Correct</th>
<th>Incorrect</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
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<td></td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>62%</td>
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37. Ea. state with 2 senators

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<td>68</td>
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38. More Reps. than Dems. in Congress now

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<td>77</td>
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39. Representative's two-year term

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40. Representatives from Hawaii in U.S. House of Representatives

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<td>Both correct</td>
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<td>One correct</td>
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<td>Neither correct</td>
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<td>No response</td>
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41. Yes, middle class

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<td>37.2%</td>
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No, middle class

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No, working class,

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Yes, working class

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No response

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<td>4.8</td>
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42. Type of interview preferred

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tr>
<td>At home</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Over telephone</td>
<td>61.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Doesn't matter</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other place (office)</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
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<td>No response</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
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Preliminary Questionnaire

My name is ______ ______. The University of Hawaii is conducting a survey to find out people's attitude toward politics. Your name was selected from the voter registration lists to participate in this survey. I have only a few short questions to ask you (start first question immediately).

1 Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? Would you consider yourself a strong____ or a not very strong____? (George Wallace's party is American Independent Party)

2 Which of these statements best describes you? 1) I always vote; 2) I vote most of the time; 3) I sometimes vote; 4) I never vote.

3 How interested are you in politics? 1) very interested, 2) interested, 3) not very interested, 4) not interested at all.

4 Do you ever try to persuade your friends to vote for the political candidates that you like? (if "yes") How often do you try to persuade them? 1) frequently, 2) occasionally, 3) seldom.

5 Did you actively participate in the election campaign of any candidate this year? 1) yes, 2) no. (if "yes") What did you do?
6 Here are two questions about politicians in general. How well do Hawaii's politicians in Washington D. C. represent the people of Hawaii? 1) very well, 2) well, 3) not very well, 4) not well at all.

7 How well do local politicians here in Honolulu represent the people of Honolulu? 1) very well, 2) well, 3) not very well, 4) not well at all.

8 If you had a son, would you like for him to become a politician? 1) yes, 2) no.

9 Did you happen to vote in last Tuesday's election or was it impossible for you to vote this year? 1) voted, 2) impossible to vote.

10 For which presidential candidate did you vote this year? 1) Humphrey, 2) Nixon, 3) Wallace. (note: interviewer specifically stated the three possible responses; this seemed to facilitate getting the respondent to divulge the rather confidential information of for whom he voted.)

11 Three short questions and we are finished. In which of these age groups would you place yourself: "I'm in my 20's, 30's, 40's, 50's, 60's, 70's, 80's."

12 What is your occupation? (exact name of job, not where he or she works)

13 How much education have you had? 1) grade school or less, 2) some high school, 3) high school graduate, 4) some college, 5) college graduate.
Good night. Thank you for your cooperation in answering these questions.

Percentages for responses to respective questions (N=563)

1. Strong Republicans 9.2% (52)
   Weak Republicans 8.9 (50)
   Weak Democrats 22.2 (125)
   Strong Democrats 12.6 (71)
   Independents 46.7% (263)
   Weak 21.0 (118)
   Strong 25.7 (145)

2. Always vote 79%
   Most of time 16
   Sometimes 3
   Never 1
   No response 1

3. Very interested 27%
   Interested 53
   Not very interested 19
   Not interested at all 1

4. Yes, frequently 17%
   Yes, occasionally 22
   Yes, seldom 4
   No 57
5. Campaign participation

- No campaign participation: 77%
- Federal employee, can't participate: 5%

6. Hawaii's politicians in Washington

- Represent people very well: 45%
- Represent people well: 43%
- Do not represent people well: 8%
- Do not represent people at all: 1%
- No response: 3%

7. Local politicians in Honolulu

- Very well: 10%
- Well: 50%
- Not very well: 30%
- Not well at all: 4%
- No response: 6%

8. Son in politics?

- Yes: 24%
- Doesn't matter: 22%
- No: 53%
- No response: 1%

9. Voted/did not vote in presidential election of 1968

- Voted: 94%
- Did not vote: 6%
- No response: 1%
10. Presidential vote:

- Humphrey: 49.2%
- Nixon: 37.7
- Wallace: 0.7
- No response: 12.4

11. Age:
- 20's: 17%
- 30's: 22
- 40's: 28
- 50's: 22
- 60 and over: 11

12. Occupation

- Business (including selling): 17%
- Professional (including teaching): 10
- Administrative and Clerical: 36
- Skilled Labor: 16
- Unskilled Labor: 17
- Students: 3
- No response: 2

13. Education

- No high school: 13%
- Some high school: 13
- High school graduate: 27
- Some college: 26
College graduate  20%
No response   1

Note: Since the final research design was not formulated at the time of the preliminary survey, the latter appears rather diverse and disjointed.
Appendix B

To present the nature of the telephone interview in greater depth the number of people in the original 668 three-voter sets who did not have phone numbers, without phones or with unlisted telephone numbers; the high socio-economic bias of the study; and the type of respondents who could not be interviewed--refusals and "not at homes"--will be discussed.

Among the 2,004 potential respondents (668 x 3) there were 228 Caucasians, 158 Japanese, 83 Chinese, 59 Filipinos, and 53 "others" who did not have telephones." Corresponding figures for those with unlisted phone numbers were: 31, 21, 13, 10, and 13. When those two statistics were combined for respondents of each ethnic group and were divided by the total number of possible respondents in each group, an undeniable sampling bias was found. Fifty-four percent of the Filipinos (69), 40% of the Chinese (96), 35% of the Caucasians (259), 28% of the Japanese (179), and 25% of the "others" (66) did not have telephone numbers.

To view the sampling bias from another perspective 68 of the 668 three-voter sets did not have one person with a telephone; 139 sets had one person with a listed phone number; 215 set had two voters with telephones; and 246 sets had three voters with telephones.

* The caucasian total was slightly inflated since many Portuguese without phones were included. Moreover, wives of military personnel, if they live alone or with other women, sometimes purposely do not have telephones installed. Still others have unlisted numbers or have only their initials published beside their numbers in the directory.
To many social scientists those statistics would "prove" the unreliableness and/or inapplicability of the telephone interview for survey research. Others, it is assumed, would remain tight-lipped and publish their findings, if such were the conditions under which their research had been conducted, with few (if any) professional scruples.

A closer examination of the potential respondents from each ethnic group in the total sample (668 x 3 = 2004) and the respondents from such groups in the two telephone samples dispels that initial apprehensiveness toward the telephone interview.

Percentages for Respondents of Major Ethnic Groups on Island of Oahu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Total Sample</th>
<th>Preliminary Sample</th>
<th>Final Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When Backstrom and Hursh remind us that 95 cases out of a 100 statistically fall within the tolerable ranges of error of 4 percent and 5 percent for sample sizes of 600 and 384 respectively, we are not dismayed at all by the above percentages. In fact, of the four major ethnic groups only the
Japanese in the final sample are outside those tolerable ranges of error. Using Japanese interviewers, it appears, provoked an abnormally high response rate for that ethnic group.

The above statistics prove the utility of selecting voters by sets or, alternatively, choosing a very large sample size. Since the lists of registered voters, moreover, were alphabetized and since ethnic groups tend to cluster in certain areas of Oahu, ethnic names tended to coalesce on the lists of registered voters (e.g., Ching, Choy, Chun or Takara, Taketa, Takeuchi). This, in turn, seemed to offset the original sampling bias; for often-times only one or two voters in the three-person sets would have listed telephone numbers. In those without telephone numbers did not affect the final sampling distribution in the same proportion that they affected the original sampling distribution.

In addition, there appears to be some occupational homogeneity within the smaller ethnic groups on Oahu; Filipinos and "others" being low status or blue-collar and Chinese being high status or white-collar. Thus, if persons in the smaller ethnic groups were by-passed since they did not have listed telephone numbers, the resultant sample—or rather sub-sample—for that ethnic group did not necessarily misrepresent its population. On the other hand, the Japanese and the Caucasians, being significantly larger groups, did not need occupational homogeneity as much as the smaller groups in order to combat sampling bias.
Nonetheless, the entire sample had a high socio-economic bias; since only those with telephones were interviewed. And, since survey researchers should be able to explain the sampling bias of their samples, it is appropriate that this researcher "measure" his sample's high socio-economic bias.

Initially, it is worthwhile to see if those with no phones and non-published phone numbers are scattered throughout the original sample or if they are clustered in specific residential areas of Oahu. By taking respondents from the voter registration lists systematically by number of Senatorial district and by number of precinct within each such district, and by dividing the potential respondents (668 sets) into seven arbitrary groups, it is possible to see if those who could not be reached by telephone were concentrated in specific areas or were distributed fairly evenly on Oahu. The statistics below are instructive.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No Phone</th>
<th>Unlisted Phone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1-100</strong></td>
<td>30 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>101-200</strong></td>
<td>45 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>201-300</strong></td>
<td>25 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>301-400</strong></td>
<td>35 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>401-500</strong></td>
<td>32 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>501-600</strong></td>
<td>28 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>601-700</strong></td>
<td>15 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is seen that the "first persons" without listed phone numbers, though undoubtedly of lower status than most of the sample, were dispersed throughout the island; they were not concentrated in any one or two geographic area of Oahu.
More important, those sets without any phone numbers were distributed fairly well among the different ethnic groups. Thus, the above findings, coupled with the fact that usually at least one person in the 668 three-voter sets had a phone, help to explain why the percentages of respondents who were interviewed in each ethnic group were relatively close to the actual distributions of each group in the Oahu electorate.

Another means of determining the extent of the final sample's high socio-economic bias is to see if significant differences emerge between those who participated in the short 4-5 minute preliminary interview and those who participated in the long 20-35 minute final interview. It is hypothesized that those with low socio-economic status will not consent to be interviewed as readily as those in the high socio-economic status group. The figures below document the high status bias, though it should be pointed out that that bias is not a severe one.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Persons from 600 Sets that had at Least one Voter in the Preliminary and Final Telephone Interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1- 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preliminary Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final One</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. Missed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Occupational Status*  
1-100  Middle  
101-200  Low  
201-300  Low  
301-400  Middle  
401-500  High  
501-600  High

* The occupational status index was calculated by summing the scores of each member of the labor force in each of the 6 groups and then by dividing that total sum by the number of people employed in each group. Occupation of high status were given a score of "1", those of low status "3", and all others "2".

Using the rather crude occupational index, it is seen that willingness to participate in the final telephone interview varied with occupational status, though many intervening variables, such as residential mobility in specific areas of Oahu, probably augmented that relationship. Thus, the higher the occupational status of the respondent or his family, the greater his tendency to complete the 20-35 minute telephone interview which served as the backbone of this study.

What are the major underlying reasons for that finding? Two factors seem to be of central, over-riding importance. First, lower status people simply have to work harder and longer than higher status people. Working more and usually being responsible for larger families, blue-collar workers and their spouses often are too busy with household jobs when they get home, as the mother who must prepare the evening meal after working at the pineapple factory, and/or are too tired physically to be interviewed. Second, those who refused to participate in the survey, either directly or indirectly by repeated postponements of the planned interview,
seemed to have less interest in and knowledge of political affairs and to be less willing to discuss political matters than those who consented to be interviewed. They, in short, tended to be either apolitical or unwilling to expose their ignorance of politics. One man, representative of man, stated: "I'm just a working man...don't like Republicans or Democrats...no use to vote for either...I have no opinion at all." Another bluntly replied, "I have nothing to say."

Striking similarities exist, moreover, between those who refused to be interviewed and those who were not at home.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Status</th>
<th>Not At Home</th>
<th>Refusal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laborers (factory workers, warehousemen, etc.)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks (including a few waitresses)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled laborers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business-Professional people</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8*</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Of the 11, eight were very wrapped up in their jobs. A lady who worked diligently managing her own small advertising company, an energetic realtor, and a harried traveling salesman were typical members of the business-professional group.

Thus, it is seen that there is a genuine similarity between the two groups. Moreover, it should be stated that here is a high status bias that simply cannot be corrected by normal methods.
On the other hand, it is interesting to note the fact that virtually no one in the middle and upper-middle income groups refused to participate or was not at home.

As far as the nature of the "not at home" and "refusal" groups, careful analysis has revealed that they were representative of the underlying ethnic distributions in the original sample, though Chinese, "others" and especially Filipino men were slightly more difficult to contact.

In all, only 15 men and 15 women refused to participate in the main interview even though the latter lasted over 20 minutes. Another 23 men and 20 women could not be contacted after repeated calls. Thus, of those who had telephone numbers as of July, 1969 91.5% of them were contacted; and 85.6% completed the relatively long telephone interview.* Fifty-five respondents, who originally participated in the preliminary telephone interview, did not have listed telephone numbers at the time of the second and final interview. The sample experienced nearly a 10% attrition rate in the 9-month interval between the two interviews.

In passing, it should be stated that a high number of "first persons" in the original 668 three-voter sets also were contacted in the preliminary interview. If the 35% did not have telephones are deleted, then 88% of the "first persons"

*Some 18 respondents were not on Oahu at the time of the second interview. They were sent mailed questionnaires and detailed instructions for each section. Eight questionnaires were returned; all were of good quality; none were unusable.
listed telephone numbers in the original sample were contacted—in other words, they were interviewed or specifically refused to be interviewed.

To sum up, the telephone interview proved to be an efficient tool for survey research. In fact, since the above results were achieved in a difficult research setting—a multi-ethnic, highly transient, overly interviewed population—it is hypothesized that even better results will be obtained with samples in other areas. But only IF social scientists test the adequacy of the telephone interview and, more important, present all of their findings both good and bad, with a new, unprecedented openness and frankness will they be able to fairly evaluate the neglected telephone interview as a tool of survey research.
Dear (Mr., Mrs., Miss) __________,

First, let me thank you for participating in the telephone survey conducted after the elections last year. As you may remember, your name had been obtained from the lists of registered voters that are on file at the City Clerk's Office by a special statistical method. With your help I was able to start my Ph.D. dissertation. In addition, part of the information from that first survey of 563 voters was used in an article entitled "The 1968 Election in Hawaii" by Professor Marshall Goldstein. That article will appear in the summer issue of The Western Political Quarterly, a political science journal. Please mark the enclosed postcard and return it to me if you would like to have a copy of that article and/or a summary of the results of this telephone survey when they become available sometime in August.

Second, I ask your cooperation in completing the second part of the telephone survey. The second part deals with information that I need in order to finish my dissertation. As in the first part, only group statistics, such as 43% voted for Nixon, will be used. Your name will remain confidential; your opinions will never be revealed. Furthermore, this information will never be given to any political party nor to any political candidate.

PLEASE KEEP THIS ENVELOPE AND THE MATERIALS THAT ARE ENCLOSED IN IT. Today or tomorrow a girl or I will call you on the telephone and ask you some questions. If you are busy or if you are not at home, we will be glad to call you at another time. Since you helped us with the first part, only you can help us with the second part of the telephone survey.

I deeply appreciate your cooperation. In fact, without your cooperation it would be impossible for me to complete my dissertation.

Sincerely yours,

John H. Staples
Dear Fellow Voter,

Mr. John Staples is conducting the second and last part of his telephone survey this month. He is doing his research and writing his Ph.D. dissertation under my direction. I believe that what he is doing will help us to understand more about our political behavior in Hawaii and will add to the knowledge that political scientists already have.

Mr. Staples is a fine student and a public spirited citizen who will go on active duty in the United States Navy as soon as his research is done this summer. I hope that you will spend a few minutes of your time answering his questions.

Sincerely yours,

Dr. Yasumasa Kuroda
Associate Professor
Dept. of Political Science
University of Hawaii
APPENDIX D

Since proportional-reduction-of-error or p-r-e- measures recently have acquired new prominence and respectability in statistical journals and behavioral studies, a short review of the principles behind this type of statistical measures and the relevance of such measures to this particular study merits inclusion in the appendix.

The basic rationale for p-r-e measures is that their employment permits greater clarity, sophistication, and comparability of statistical findings. As Costner, a prime proponent of such measures, writes, "The interpretation of the measures utilized would be more straightforward and clear than currently, and it would have a certain uniformity regardless of the nature of the scales. . .utilized."

Statistically, the benefit of p-r-e measures is their ability to gauge the predictive ability of independent variables or, in other words, to explain the amount of unexplained variance or error. The most popular such measure, of course, is $R^2$. As far as p-r-e measures for ordinal scales are concerned, gamma is the counterpart of Pearson's product-moment correlation; it, needless to say, does not have the latter's strict mathematical properties. For example, knowing gamma only enables an analyst to state that "as $x$ increases, $y$ increases." Using nominal or dichotomous data, p-r-e measures permit a crude comparison between the number of positive (predicted) pairs to the number of negative
(unpredicted) pairs. Nevertheless, such measures are much more clear, sophisticated, and comparable than traditional measures such as chi square and its derivatives which have little meaning in addition to their own specific interpretations. Indeed, the latter lack any clear interpretation at all for values other than 0, 1, or the maximum possible given for the marginals.

At the same time it should be pointed out there have been some noteworthy problems with p-r-e measures, especially those for ordinal and nominal-scale data. Costner, for example, found that only gamma was an appropriate p-r-e measure for ordinal data and, equally significant, that gamma and other measures of association for ordinal data are unusable as p-r-e measures when there are a large number of ties, a phenomenon that appears not infrequently in social science research. Concerning the popular tau measures, for instance, Costner simply writes: "I have been unable to designate any rules and definitions for any of Kendall's tau measures that would allow a p-r-e interpretation when ties are present."

It appears that ties in ordinal data have stymied statisticians as far as p-r-e measures are concerned. In the future, however, they may be able to relate them; for example, G or the maximum likelihood estimation of gamma for ties and tau chi, which also handles ties, seem to be potential p-r-e measures.

At present, though, if a researcher finds a significantly large number of ties in his ordinal data, as was the case
in this study, he simply must dichotomize those ordinal scores and treat them as nominal or dichotomous data.

Since this investigator was interested in the actual frequency distribution of the dependent variables, usually how many people perceived an issue or candidate to be associated with one of the parties or to be favored by the respondent, rather than the modal class of the dependent variable as the estimates for all units, tau beta rather than lambda beta was utilized. The former of the two p-r-e measures, which Costner recommends for such data, is easier to interpret. Moreover, it has more theoretical and contextual relevance for this particular study than does lambda beta.

To sum up, p-r-e measures for ordinal- and nominal-scale data steadily are receiving more and more attention in the literature of the social and behavioral sciences. They have clear conceptual and contextual meanings. As more and more social scientists employ p-r-e measures, the appropriateness of each one for different kinds of data and for different types of analysis will be ascertained much more clearly than it is at the present time. Indeed the nature of behavioral research will progress methodologically as well as theoretically as p-r-e measures become more widely used.
References


APPENDIX E

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS FOR DIFFERENT GROUPS
CONCERNING ISSUE IMPORTANCE*
(in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strong Republicans (N = 32)</th>
<th>Weak Republicans (N = 38)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Strong Economy</td>
<td>53.1%</td>
<td>46.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Fair Taxes</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Less Spending-Stable Dollar</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Programs All</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Better Relations: Labor-Management</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Less Money for Poverty</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>71.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Programs Poor</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Working Man</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>53.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The rank-orderings vary depending on the criteria and cut-off points used to determine importance.*
### Weak Republicans (Cont'd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Most Impt.</th>
<th>Impt.</th>
<th>Least Impt.</th>
<th>No Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6. Working Man</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Programs Poor</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Less Money for Poverty</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Independent Republicans (N = 63)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Most Impt.</th>
<th>Impt.</th>
<th>Least Impt.</th>
<th>No Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Fair Taxes</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Strong Economy</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Less Spending: Stable Dollar</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Programs All</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Better Relations: Labor-Management</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Less Money for Poverty</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Programs Poor</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Working Man</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Independent Democrats (N = 120)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Most Impt.</th>
<th>Impt.</th>
<th>Least Impt.</th>
<th>No Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Fair Taxes</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Programs All</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Strong Economy</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Less Spending: Stable Dollar</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Programs Poor</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Better Relations: Labor-Management</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Independent Democrats (Cont'd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Most Impt.</th>
<th>Impt.</th>
<th>Least Impt.</th>
<th>No Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7. Working Man</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Less Money for Poverty</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Strong Democrats (N = 48)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Most Impt.</th>
<th>Impt.</th>
<th>Least Impt.</th>
<th>No Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Fair Taxes</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Strong Economy</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Programs All</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Working Man</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Programs Poor</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Better Relations: Labor-Management</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Less Spending-Stable Dollar</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Less Money for Poverty</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Weak Democrats (N = 102)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Most Impt.</th>
<th>Impt.</th>
<th>Least Impt.</th>
<th>No Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Fair Taxes</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Programs All</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Strong Economy</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Programs Poor</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Working Man</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
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</table>

*Here it is seen that different criteria and cut-off points could have given this particular issue a much higher rank.*
### Weak Democrats (Cont'd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Most Impt.</th>
<th>Impt.</th>
<th>Least Impt.</th>
<th>No Response</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6. Less Spending-Stable Dollar</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Better Relations: Labor-Management</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Less Money for Poverty</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>41.2</td>
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</table>

### Independents (N = 32)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>Impt.</th>
<th>Least Impt.</th>
<th>No Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Fair Taxes</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>15.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Strong Economy</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Less Spending: Stable Dollar</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Working Man</td>
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<td>59.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Better Relations: Labor Management</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Programs Poor</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Programs All</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>18.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Less Money for Poverty</td>
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<td>68.8</td>
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<td>12.5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
GENERAL


VOTING STUDIES


POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY (Social Psychology)


Shapiro, Michael J. "Rational Political Man: a Synthesis of Economic and Social-Psychological Perspectives," Paper delivered at annual meeting of Western Political Science Association, Honolulu, Hawaii, April 5, 1969.

POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY


HAWAIIAN POLITICS


THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH


METHODOLOGY


MISCELLANEOUS


Goldstein, Marshall N. Personal Communication with writers.
See also: