"LOOSENING THE SEAMS"

MINORITARIAN POLITICS IN THE AGE OF NEOLIBERALISM

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Last, the dissertation is dedicated to the memory of my friend, Jorge Fernandes. His fingerprints pervade throughout this project. If there is anything interesting, provocative, or particularly well-argued within these pages, it is because of Jorge. Likewise, those portions that are clumsy or in Jorge’s words, “theoretically impoverished,” are simply sections that he never got a chance to read. Jorge, I miss you everyday.
This dissertation is organized around a single research question: how is it possible to engage in immigrant, racial, and indigenous issues in an age where neoliberal politics has appropriated the progressive discourse of “fairness,” “justice,” and “racial equality?”

The origins of this question emerged from my experiences in the Department of Ethnic Studies at Colorado State University. Like most Ethnic Studies departments, it was built around three components: 1) Civil Rights, 2) identity politics, and 3) recovering histories. Of these three components, it was an identity-based approach and more generally, a politics of recognition, which was promoted as the organizing principle behind contemporary racial politics in the United States.

While this tradition has rendered the notions of “fairness,” “justice,” and “racial equality” as the fundamental validations of progressive social movements, I increasingly began to confront the limitations of identity-based movements. One experience from my undergraduate days in particular underscores this point. At the encouragement of a Latino Studies professor, I decided to attend one of the meetings of the university’s Chicano student organization. Because the university was 87% “white,” I felt that it could be a productive moment of coalition building. Nevertheless, before the meeting commenced, one of the leaders took me aside and said, “It’s cool that you’re here and all...but how do we know you’re not a spy?” While I was initially shocked, the essence of his statement resonated with a growing tension from my own experiences within Asian American Studies; namely, that my emergence as an “Asian American male” came at the expense of other possible identities. This awareness came in no small part from my Jewish mother’s nagging to never forget that “you’re more than just Asian.” These
experiences brought to the fore the limits of identity politics—that identity can only be produced through the either/or process of disjunctive difference: in my case Asian American, NOT Jewish.

Feeling confined by the strategic essentialisms of identity politics, I came to the University of Hawai‘i with the intention of exploring a hybrid or hapa identity. In my preliminary research, however, it became clear that the literature on mixed race or multiracial identity was scarce and what did exist was theoretically impoverished. Time and again, these treatments of mulatto, mestizo, hapa, or mixblood identities, sought to naturalize hybridity it as its own distinct category. If anything, these literatures worked to substantiate, rather than threaten the mutual-exclusivity of categories produced through identity/difference.

By the time I began piecing together my dissertation proposal, the debates surrounding the US 2000 Census and the possibility of adding a “multiracial” category had moved to the fore of the American discourse on race. Led predominately by a group of multiracial UC Berkeley students and the concerned parents of biracial children, the so-called “multiracial movement” gave racial mixing unprecedented media attention. I became alarmed, however, when no one other than Newt Gingrich, then Speaker of the House, emerged as one of the most fervent proponents of the “multiracial” category. Gingrich declared that such a move could “begin to phase out the outmoded, divisive, and rigid classification of Americans as ‘blacks’ or ‘whites’ or other single races.” “Ultimately,” he argued, “our goal is to have one classification—American.” It was at that moment that I became clued into the conservative appropriation of “equality”; that after the experiencing a number of set backs during the Civil Rights era, conservative
forces had commandeered identity politics in a manner that disabled the political claims made by native, immigrant, and minority activists. When placing these Census debates in relation to the concurrent Rice v. Cayetano Supreme Court Case (2000), I became increasingly uneasy about the implications surrounding these contending employments of "justice," "fairness," and "racial equality." To put it simply, conservative forces seemed to be out-maneuvering progressives on their own terrain of identity politics.

The issue, however, was not that simple; the preexisting language of Democrat vs. Republican or Liberal vs. Conservative did not coincide with what appeared to be an overall trend towards an antiracial, ahistorical recoding of national bodies: like Gingrich said, the goal was to erase or obscure intra-national differences to the point that the nation was comprise of only undifferentiated Americans. With these socio-economic distinctions eradicated, one's successes or failures could be explained only through the discourse of "merit." The renovation of this Darwinian "survival of the fittest" ethic is emblematic of the tenets of neoliberalism, which individuates and atomizes society in order to justify privatization and absolve the state of its responsibilities and commitments to social welfare.

Because neoliberalism rides upon the notion of an undifferentiated society (antiracial and ahistorical), it seemed as though an effective way to mount a political response would be to take up the issues of identity, difference, and the logic of categorization. The neoliberal commandeering of identity meant that a return to identity politics would be insufficient. Fortunately, as I prepared for my comprehensive exams, I was introduced to a range of literatures related to this problematic but as of yet, untapped by the domain of Ethnic Studies. In particular, feminist and postcolonial theorists, with
their problematizations of binaries (i.e., man/woman or colonizer/colonized) provided me with the intellectual space needed to, in the words of Gerald Vizenor, “loosen the seams in the shrouds of identities.” My interest in these fields lay not in pushing feminist or postcolonial theory in new directions, but instead, to reinvigorate Ethnic Studies by infusing it with new questions, explorations, and possibilities.

The first step necessitated a critical engagement with the concept of difference. Drawing from Joan Scott, Gilles Deleuze, and Edouard Glissant, I worked to displace the NOT-opposition that undergirds disjunctive difference with a more connective and relational AND. I hoped that this shift to a more relational and affirmative engagement with difference could work to undermine the neoliberal agenda. Thus, it was a combination of these issues: 1) reinvigorating Ethnic Studies, 2) loosening identity politics, and 3) mounting a productive response to the neoliberal appropriation of progressive ideals, which provoked the research of this dissertation. The dissertation opens with a reading of H.G. Wells’s Island of Dr. Moreau in order to establish the theoretical and historical terrain of my project. The remainder of the dissertation, however, was provoked-by and organized-around three moments: Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Rice v. Cayetano, Newt Gingrich’s endorsement of the multiracial census category, and Hiroshi Komai’s reaction to Japan’s so-called “immigration problem.”

I begin the Hawaii chapter with Rice v. Cayetano in order to stage two contending notions of equality. Whereas native Hawaiian activists argued for an equality based upon the righting of historical wrongs (“a leveling of the playing field”), Rice’s neoliberal litigants sought a distributive form of “racial equality” where all Americans are treated
equally before the law. I argue that as long as native Hawaiian advocates pursue equality within the framework of American Constitutional law, they will be more than likely to fail, since what is lost in the objectivity of law are the social and historical specificities that differentiate the Rice Case from other constitutional inquiries into racial discrimination. I therefore work to destabilize the neoliberal argument by racializing and historicizing native Hawaiians; the question became not, “Who are native Hawaiians?” but instead, “How were Hawaiians produced as a racial—and not a political—group?” To answer this question, I point to the intellectual apparatus of Territorial Hawaii, a body of research led by the famed-sociologist Robert Park. I argue that this research fetishized interracial marriage, and as a result, crystallized the fluidity of the Islands’ population into a rigid and peculiar racial taxonomy. This ordering of space and bodies plotted Hawaii along a teleological trajectory that was destined to be Americanized.

The US chapter explores recent attempts to answer the question, “Who Are We?” Through an examination of current events—the Trent Lott controversy, Huntington’s latest polemic, and the US 2000 Census—I foreground a neoliberal attempt to domesticate the complexity of America’s racial makeup through the impositions of an antiracial, ahistorical we-ness. I begin with Senator Lott’s faux pas, in which he intimated that racial segregation was an acceptable “solution” to America’s social “problems.” This in itself was not particularly noteworthy. What was significant, however, was the outpouring of condemnation from both sides of the ideological spectrum. Such a reaction evinced a new trend in American politics, one that exceeded the language of Democrats and Republicans and gestured toward a neoliberal management of difference. Now, Huntington’s Who Are We? is exemplary of this for the
fact that his argument simultaneously conceals and reinforces the nation’s internal
frontiers. After insisting that he is not racist and that in fact, there are no longer racial
“Americans,” Huntington concludes by stating that “Americans can be
Black/Hispanic/Asian/Native/Other as long as they work, speak, and act like white
Anglo-Saxon Protestants.” This is not indicative of the end of American racism. On the
contrary, beneath the superficial erasure of overt discrimination, Huntington evinces a
mere recoding of intra-national differences.

And, the last of the core chapters situates my critique of neoliberalism in an
examination of Japan’s so-called “immigration problem.” With the dissertation
organized so centrally around the production, containment, and denial of intra-national
differences, the turn to Japan—a paradigm for homogeneity—may seem peculiar.
However, a stagnating economy, a fragmenting social structure, and an increased demand
for foreign labor have recently thrown the assumption of ethno-cultural unity into
question. I begin by detailing Japan’s latest education reforms in order to chart a trend
towards an individuated society that is consolidated around the recapturing of a lost
Japanese essence. In order to illustrate the simultaneous concealment and exposure of
these intra-national differences, I examine the disruptive position of the Latin American-
born nikkeijin who have “returned” to live and work in Japan. I argue that the
incommensurability of the nikkeijin (neither “resolutely foreign” nor “essentially native”)
can be used to loosen Japan’s biopolitical boundaries to encourage a more responsible
accommodation of intra-national difference.

Taken together, these chapters show how hybridity has been used as a statist
“solution” to the “problems” of intra-national difference. My critiques of Tocqueville,
Wells, Park, and the discourse of *nihonjinron* indicate how hybridity can be employed to recuperate racial/spatial orders through the denial of difference. For example, my examination of Brazil’s “racial democracy” demonstrates the dangers of such employments—that the disavowal of racial difference (“we are not African, European, or Indian...we are all Brazilians”) can be used to effectively disable claims of discrimination. Alarmingly, this same line of thought is being employed today and can be found in Hawai‘i’s notion of a “racial paradise.” It can also be found in the discourse of the “New Multiracial Face of America.” And, in Japan, recent consolidations of a unified “Japaneseness” obscure national diversities, thereby concealing the ineffably miscegenated character of its national origins.

All of this work attests to the political immediacy to my project. First of all, the ascendancy of neoliberalism has rendered prior conceptual frames (Democrat/Republican; Progressive/Conservative) increasingly ill-equipped to understand the complexities of present-day politics. Until immigrant, racial, and indigenous activists come to grips with the fluidities of the contemporary era, it will remain difficult to escape the sterilized flatness of neoliberalism while maintaining commitments to the progressive ideals of “fairness,” “justice,” and “racial equality.” Second, there is an immediacy to each one of my sites. First, in Hawai‘i, the *Rice* decision ruled that “Hawaiian ancestry” is, in fact, a proxy for race and therefore in violation of the 15th Amendment. As a result, neoliberal litigants are now positioned to challenge the future of all Hawaiian entitlements. Second, in the United States, the ascendancy of neoliberalism, with its privileging of “merit,” has made claims of racial discrimination increasingly difficult to prove. This has created the image of a colorblind
society where the determinates of success and failure are now reduced to the Civil Rights emphasis on “merit,” “initiative,” or simply the “content of one’s character.” The result is that no one really knows how to talk about race in present-day America. The recent controversies involving Kobe Bryant, Michael Jackson, Ty Willingham, and Dave Chappelle testify to the fact that no one knows how to talk about race...and this signals the dangers that lie ahead. And finally, with UN projections indicating that Japan must accept 17 million immigrants by 2050, the nation’s ethno-spatial boundaries will undoubtedly change. This means that the difference between a future characterized by exclusive violence and one that holds a more accommodating form of pluralization rests entirely upon the country’s engagement with intra-national difference.

What the dissertation makes obvious is that future struggles against neoliberalism will be fought along the lines of difference. I have signaled “hybridity” as an important site for engaging the concept of difference because it is from this ground that the possibilities for more connective relations can be built. It is a different kind of hybridity, however, not one governed by the either/or negation of disjunction, but one that affirms difference through a conjunctive AND. I therefore conclude that it is only through political movements that affirm, combine, and multiply differences will it be possible to shape a more just Hawai‘i, US, and Japan.
CHAPTER ONE

"PROGRESSIVE" POLITICS IN THE AGE OF NEOLIBERALISM

1. Three Moments

On February 23, 2000, the US Supreme Court ruled that the Office of Hawaiian Affairs' (OHA) Board of Trustees elections were unconstitutional. The Court, insisting that ancestry can function as a proxy for race, concluded that OHA had violated the 15th Amendment by restricting voter eligibility to the "descendents of the peoples inhabiting the Islands before 1778" (Rice v. Cayetano 2000: 1). Justice Kennedy, in the majority opinion for Rice v. Cayetano, would ultimately characterize OHA's voting scheme as an affront to the egalitarian spirit of America:

Distinctions between citizens solely because of ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality (Ibid).

In a 1997 response to a Clinton speech on race relations, then-Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, presented a ten-point plan to promote "racial healing." Point number six, Breakdown Rigid Classifications, suggested that by adding a "multiracial" category to the official list of racial identities, the United States could...

...begin to phase out the outmoded, divisive, and rigid classification of Americans as "blacks" or "whites" or other single races. Ultimately, our goal is to have one classification—American (Gingrich 1997).

And in July 2003, Hiroshi Komai, a Japanese population expert, denounced a United Nations' study that claimed the only solution to Japan's rapidly declining workforce

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1 "The Amendment's purpose and command are set forth in explicit and comprehensive language. The National Government and the States may not deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race. The Amendment reaffirms the equality of races at the most basic level of the democratic process, the exercise of the voting franchise. It protects all persons, not just members of a particular race" (Rice v. Cayetano 2000: 1; n. a).
is a large-scale importation of foreign workers. The report stated that in order to
preserve the nation’s infrastructure, “[Japan] would need 17 million net
immigrants…or an average of 381,000 immigrants per year between 2005 and 2050”
(UNPD 2000: 49). After first dismissing the U.N.’s figures as being “simply
unimaginable for Japan” (French 2003: A1), Komai offered his own vision of the
nation’s future:

Societies have always risen and faded, and Japan will likely disappear and
something else will take its place, but that’s not such a problem. Greece and
Rome disappeared too (Ibid).

*****

While the words of Justice Kennedy, Newt Gingrich, and Hiroshi Komai emerge
from distinct social contexts, they are linked by what this study will identify as a
neoliberal response to the pressures of pluralization. All three articulate a desire to
“solve” the “problems” produced by intra-national difference—embodied in this
project as indigenous, “minority,” and immigrant Others—by summoning forth
utopian futures where the messy details of pluralization have somehow already been
resolved.

Justice Kennedy’s evocation of equality, for instance, couches indigenous
legal claims within the ahistorical flatness of “blind justice.” By eradicating the
historical distinctions that differentiate “Hawaiians” and “Americans,” the Rice ruling
projects Hawai’i into a future where the United States has been absolved of its
commitments to “rehabilitate” native Hawaiians. Similarly, Gingrich’s antiracial

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2 For reasons explained on the bottom of page 11, my use “minority” comes with a great deal of
apprehension. Nevertheless, I am momentarily forsaking this point and have thrown “minority” in
quotations as a reminder of this unease.

3 “Rehabilitation” is drawn from a quote in J. Kehaulani Kauanui’s PhD dissertation (2000).
vision of a populace identified simply as “American,” anticipates the actualization of a “colorblind” society. His plan suggests that once the “divisive” claims of racial discrimination and oppression have been rendered unintelligible, a “healed” nation will be able to thrive. And, while Komai’s fatalistic forecast would appear to be at odds with the outwardly democratic solutions presented by Kennedy and Gingrich, it too invests in the promises of utopianism, which foregrounds a critical tension within the concept of “utopia.”

Commonly understood as “good place,” utopia also signifies “no place,” an abstract quantity stripped of the historical and material effects that are produced by political ideologies, social structures, and economic forces (Giroux 2001: 235). This “no place,” evident in Kennedy’s ahistoricism and Gingrich’s antiracialism, is equally present in Komai’s framing of Japanese society, which he characterizes as being sealed-off and purged of the currents and countercurrents that animate human history.4 By disavowing alterity, Komai re-stabilizes the nation as a homogenous space of citizenship. Thus, in lieu of actively engaging in the processes of pluralization, policymakers are permitted to wait idly for Komai’s “something else,” wherein somehow, for better or worse, Japan’s population and immigration “problems” have disappeared.

Provoked by the implications surrounding these three moments, this project seeks to intervene in a recent and alarming shift in production of racial-spatial orders.

2. Pathologizing Difference

Historically, racial-spatial orders were organized around overt assertions of racial superiority. Under this regime of racism, the monopolization of privilege was

predicated upon the sanctity of internal boundaries: colonizer/colonized, white/black, native/foreigner. What emerged, then, was a politics of exclusion—a hierarchical organization of citizens and subjects that required the incessant management of disjunctive identities.

To preserve these racial hierarchies, the regulation of sexual relations became imperative. “Transgressions” in the forms of sexual activity, marriage, and miscegenation, threatened the exclusivity of racial privilege and thereby undermined the foundation of authoritarian control. Colonial policies, such as the prohibition of interracial marriage and the delimiting of inheritance to only “legitimate” offspring, evince the degree to which the sexual proclivities of individuals were tied to the security of the colonial order (Stoler 1997: 349). The tenuousness of colonial control resulted in a proliferation of administrative measures that were designed to protect against the tainting, dilution, and degeneration of blood, and by extension, privilege (Stoler 1997; Marx 2002; Dominguez 1997). These colonial anxieties have resonated throughout much of the modern era, animating a wide array of state-sanctioned violence: slavery, eugenics, genocide, apartheid, blood quanta, anti-miscegenation legislation, and insular attitudes towards immigration.

The three moments that opened this chapter, however, signal a shift in the statist approach to nation-building, from a politics of institutionalized exclusion to a politics of measured inclusion. Masquerading under the guise of egalitarianism, this latest form of racism operates by smoothing-over the threatening contours of intra-

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5 As I will develop later in the project, this form of institutionalized pluralism is not entirely new. Throughout modern history, there have been countless examples of state-sponsored inclusiveness (i.e. *mestizaje* throughout Latin America, racial democracy in Brazil, and *nihonjinron* in Japan). What is unique in the present case is the way that inclusion has been coded by neoliberalism in order to facilitate the upward distribution of wealth, resources, and opportunity.
national difference. Instead of the boundary policing and outright discrimination that characterized previous racial orders, this form of racism apprehends heterogeneity as a malignancy—something in need of healing, solving, and fixing.

Couched within celebratory pronouncements of diversity, hybridity, and even globalization, this pathologization of difference modifies the discourse of 1980’s Multiculturalism, “we are all different, so we are the same,” to say “your distinctiveness is preventing you from joining us.” The sooner “we” can “overcome race” and “free ourselves from what happened in the past,” the sooner the nation will be able to achieve unity and reap the rewards of modernity. Thus, the realization of the nation-state as a “civi-territorial complex” is perched just on the horizon (Connolly 1995: 168-169). This is a seductive and effective nation-building strategy since “[o]nce civilization is coded onto a contiguous territory—so that its occupants are occupied by the same culture—it is possible to strengthen both together” (Ibid.).

It must be restated, however, that this consolidation of “the people” is only made possible through the removal of historical and racial distinctions, an erasure that is de-moralized by the religiosity of “civilization” and “progress” (Ibid., 172). The smoothing of intra-national difference, therefore, in spite of its inclination towards equality, should be understood as nothing less than an enactment of force (see Chapter 4). It retools the surfaces of citizen-subjects by glossing over the asymmetrical relations of power, as if material history provided no source of resistance or counter-pressure (Bogard 2000: 269; Palumbo-Liu 1995: 59). Once atomized and instrumentalized, questions of the political are effectively removed

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6 The concept of “smoothing” was drawn from Bogard 2000.
7 This move was inspired by Giroux 1993: 102.
from broader considerations of justice, compassion, and ethical commitments to building a better society (Giroux 2001: 233). Neoliberalism, in this sense, compels society to adhere to the laws of the market, placing emphasis on the importance of struggle while ignoring any of the ethical implications that might be involved (Ibid., 233-234). As a result, economic ambition is elevated as the central feature of social exchange while the assumed neutrality of a “commonsense” meritocracy converts public responsibility into opportunities for private gain—a phenomenon evinced in the recent push to privatize healthcare, education, and social security.

Throughout this transformation of society, neoliberalism has been able to deflect conventional modes of social critique by re-coding economic policies as innocent matters of technical expertise. This deflection, according to Lisa Duggan, has stood as “the most successful ruse of neoliberal dominance” (Duggan 2003: xiv). Freed from political accountability and shielded from cultural critique, neoliberalism has been able to malign opposition to material disparity as “class warfare,” while simultaneously dismissing issues of racial, gender, and sexual inequalities as purely cultural or private matters (Ibid). “Once economics is understood as primarily a technical realm,” notes Duggan…

...the trickle-upward effects of neoliberal policies can be framed as due to performance rather than design, reflecting greater merit of those reaping larger rewards (Ibid).

Commenting upon this revival of social Darwinism, Henry Giroux draws attention to the pedagogical force broadcast through the recent proliferation of reality-based television (i.e. The Apprentice, Big Brother, Amazing Race, and Survivor):

Not only do such spectacles celebrate a survival of the fittest ethic, reinforced by monetary prizes to the lone “survivors,” they also relieve viewers of the
assumption that they should assume any responsibility for the “weak”—that is, the impoverished and the powerless (Giroux 2001: 229).

Within the context of this project, I will argue that the neoliberal atomization of politics works to launder the state’s relationship to racism and relieves the public from its commitments to indigenous, “minority,” and immigrant concerns. In other words, the pathologization of difference re-centers the burdens of pluralization upon those populations most exposed to the vagaries of institutional power. Since a more thorough critique of neoliberalism will be presented in Chapter Two, I want to return once again to the three moments that opened this chapter, focusing specifically on Newt Gingrich’s appeal for “racial healing.”

3. “Healing” and the Ecology of Institutional Supports

Gingrich’s evocation of a corporeal metaphor—a wound—suggests an injured body politic; a nation that exists but is not yet complete (Lloyd and Thomas 1998). This imagery draws upon a state-centered, territorial conception of the nation, one founded upon the idea of a homogeneous national culture. Within this framing, national unity is presented as an irrefutable commonsense goal, one that could easily be attained if the “divisive” identity-based groups would simply cease to reopen old wounds; that “We” (upstanding Americans) would all be better served if “we” (natives, “minorities,” and immigrants) would just allow past injuries to heal.

This neoliberal appeal for unity has been received by many as evidence of “progress.” Nevertheless, while Gingrich’s embrace of “all Americans” is more palatable than the overt exclusions generated by regimes of racial superiority, his

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8 The concept of “laundering” is drawn from Lubiano 1992: 353.
9 The phrase, “left exposed to the vagaries of power,” was drawn from Agamben 1998: 8.
10 This move was inspired by Nelson’s work on Guatemala’s racial politics (1999).
“progressive” call for healing must be met with a degree of skepticism. And, once under scrutiny, the promise of Gingrich’s inclusiveness is undermined by its re-centering of America’s problems on the agitation of old wounds—namely, the unwillingness of “minority” groups to forget the injuries produced by conquest, slavery, and discrimination. Healing, in this sense, is exposed as a desire to silence claims of injustice. By eradicating the racial and historical distinctions that anthropomorphize intra-national difference, Gingrich’s healing aims to synthesize disaggregating multiplicities into a single representation of “the people” (Agamben 1998: 177; Shapiro 2001: 13). This smoothing-over of difference facilitates an upward distribution of wealth, resources, and opportunity by rendering the categories that sustain “progressive” policies and programs (i.e. Equal Opportunity Employment and Affirmative Action) unintelligible.

Herein lays the critical disjunction between Gingrich’s neoliberal call for racial equality and the similar-sounding appeals that were initiated during the Civil Rights Movement. The politics of the Civil Rights Movement fought (though in diverse and uneven ways) to dismantle the gender, racial, and sexual divisions that facilitated the upward distribution of resources and the monopolization of privilege. These struggles, propelled by the emergence of identity-based politics (i.e. Black Nationalism, the American Indian Movement, Chicano pride, the Hawaiian Renaissance, and the formation of an Asian American identity), forced the nation to not only acknowledge but also address past and continued oppression. What followed, at least until the Reagan’s presidency, was the establishment of federal policies and programs that encouraged a downward re-distribution of wealth,
resources, and opportunity (Duggan 2003: 9). It can be said, then, that the politicization of racial identities during the Civil Rights Movement resulted in the establishment of a limited welfare state, a reduction in corporate profits, and an imperilment of America’s white patriarchy (Ibid., xi).

Gingrich’s critique, though founded upon similar ideals of egalitarianism, is qualitatively different. The politics of Gingrich’s equality is part of a pro-enterprise counter-movement that has, since the 1970s, fought to systematically dismantle the gains made by the Civil Rights Movement (Ibid., ix). With the goal of enhancing corporate profits, this counter-movement has seized the primary institutions of the state, rerouting federal funds away from “social issues” and towards private interests (Ibid., xi). In Lisa Duggan’s compelling critique of neoliberalism, she argues that this ecology of institutional supports has been facilitated by three factors: 1) the presentation of neoliberal policies as neutral, commonsense precepts for efficient business and government; 2) a narrow reading of American politics as a contest between conservatives/liberals or Republicans/Democrats, which has left the overarching salience of neoliberalism largely ignored; and 3) the fluidity with which the neoliberal agenda has circulated both within and across national boundaries (Ibid., xiii). While Duggan’s analysis serves as an invaluable foundation, the present study will focus primarily on a fourth factor: neoliberalism’s appropriation of the once-progressive commitments of “justice,” “fairness,” and “racial equality.”

4. From “Progressive” to Minoritarian Politics

The title of this chapter, “‘Progressive’ Politics in the Age of Neoliberalism,” is designed to cast suspicion on what it means to be “progressive.” On one hand, it
initiates the project’s central critique against the neoliberal appropriation of egalitarianism. On the other, it foregrounds the modernist yearnings that are embedded within liberal notions of “progress”; that a politics of “social advancement” (i.e. the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People), if not built upon a language of difference, can be readily consumed by the same homogenizing aspirations that typify the fundamentalist opposition. In other words, the egalitarianism that is embraced by progressives and the fundamentalism employed by conservatives are cut from the same cloth since both privilege equality over difference and both posit homogeneity as a prerequisite for achieving a “true” democracy.

The problem is that both sides subscribe to a devitalized conception of democracy, one that negates or denies the fugitivity of movement, contingency, and difference. Opting instead to couch heterogeneity within a settled pluralism, this narrow form of democracy permits the political to “dance lightly on the surface of life only because everything fundamental is fixed below it” (Connolly 1995: 169). Subjectivity and political agency are thus over-determined: “[t]he ‘this and that’ that everything is, tend to be the same ‘this’ and the same ‘that’, over and over again, like a broken record” (Massumi 1992: 79). As a result, there is very little opportunity for social change.

Those working to breathe new life into politics must do more than merely trace the (in)equality of distribution amongst officially-recognized actors. They must envisage a broader conception of democracy, one that is open to contingency and
flexible enough to extend political qualification to a heterogeneous citizenry. Such a conception could challenge the modern limits of subjectivity by understanding democracy as the...

...institution of politics itself, the system of forms of subjectification through which any order of distribution of bodies into functions corresponding to their “nature” and places corresponding to their functions is undermined, thrown back on its contingency (Ranciere 1999: 101; Shapiro 2000: 30).

The political, in this sense, functions as a mode of interruption; it pries open new spaces for contestatory speech and action, which in turn ventilates the over-determined framework of authoritarian control (Shapiro 2000: 30).

Informed by this disruptive conception of democracy, this project is organized around a series of interventions that respond to the neoliberal containment of indigenous, “minority,” and immigrant activism. The chapters that follow strive to formulate a more dynamic response to neoliberal dominance by interrupting settled practices, loosening that which has been sewn shut, and rendering-as-produced that which has been portrayed as naturally-emergent. This revolutionary trajectory, however, is not to suggest a devaluation of macropolitical responses to inequality, typified by judicial and legislative campaigns. However, neoliberalism’s commandeering of the seemingly-irrefutable ideals of egalitarianism combined with modernity’s indelible bearing upon notions of “progress” has made the “advancement of minorities” an increasingly less viable means of enacting change.

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, in their outlining of a minoritarian approach, provide a dynamic alternative to “progressive” politics. Drawing

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11 The critique of distributive conceptions of justice was drawn from Iris Marion Young’s Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990).
inspiration from Franz Kafka's anti-representational form of writing, Deleuze and Guattari articulate a mode of critique that affirms difference by rendering the over-determination of dualisms and subjectivities untenable. Just as the deterritorializing effects of Kafka's writings work to contaminate the "dialectic" or "structural" correspondence between content and expression, a minoritarian politics strives to disrupt the commonsense structures of subjectification (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: xvii). Unlike a majoritarian order, which naturalizes the dualism between a constant, homogenous "majority" and a subsystem of "minorities" who struggle to achieve political qualification, a minoritarian position suggests that marginalized peoples can function as collectivities of a different order—as presences that threaten the cohesiveness and stability of all unities, majority or otherwise (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 105f.; Patton 2000: 48).

The nebulous quality of dualisms and unities is a theme that figures prominently throughout Kafka's writings. In *The Castle* (1926), for example, he stages the ambiguity that exists within the dualistic spatial ordering of inside/outside. Kafka's protagonist finds the Castle, upon closer inspection, to be merely...

...a rambling pile consisting of innumerable small buildings closely packed together....I don't fit in with the peasants, nor, I imagine, with the Castle. "There is no difference between the peasantry and the Castle," said the teacher (quoted in Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 8).

For Deleuze and Guattari, there is nothing symbolic about the indistinction that Kafka produces between the Castle and the masses, between inside and outside. Nor do they read Gregor's *becoming-beetle* in Kafka's *The Metamorphosis* (1915) to be metaphoric. Instead, the minoritarian position provides an escape from the superficial oscillation between distinct and opposing poles (i.e., Castle/masses; man/animal). A
minoritarian approach to politics, therefore, operates by breaking apart false dualisms (i.e. inside/outside, us/them, majority/minority) while simultaneously encouraging new kinds of sproutings that necessarily produce a “rupture in the order of things” (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 28). Within the core chapters of this project, these disruptive sproutings are embodied by the transboundary movements of interracial marriage in Hawai‘i (Chapter 3), the proliferation of multiracial childbirths in the United States (Chapter 4), and the “re-migration” of Latin American *nikkeijin*\(^{13}\) to Japan (Chapter 5).

For those engaging in indigenous, “minority,” and immigrant issues, minoritarian politics reformulates the questions of equality/difference and liberty/submission by clearing a path that escapes the confines of subjectivity: “it is no longer a question of breaking through the roof, but of intensely going *head over heels and away*, no matter where, even without moving” (Ibid., 6). It is precisely this non-directional fugitivity that enables minoritarianism to elude the kinds of over-determinations that restrict modernist notions of “progress”; it gestures towards “a line of escape or, rather, of a simple *way out*, ‘right, left or in any direction’, as long as it is as little signifying as possible” (Ibid.). While the potential of the minoritarian position will be explored more extensively in Chapter Four, I want to build upon its unsettling disposition by relating it to the final core component of my project: namely, the fluctuating positions of “hybrid”\(^{14}\) subjects.

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\(^{13}\) Throughout this project, I will use “*nikkeijin*,” “*nikkei*,” and “日系人” interchangeably to refer to foreign-born persons of Japanese descent.

\(^{14}\) Like the apprehension that surrounds my use of “minority,” I use “hybrid,” “hybridity,” and “mixed-race” aware that they naturalize “whole” or “pure” races as majoritarian facts. Chapters 2 and 4 will further develop this critique. For now, I will make “hybridity” stammer by placing it within quotations.
5. The Promise of “Mingling”

Newt Gingrich’s endorsement of a multiracial addition to the official grid of racial classifications was part of a millennial shift in American racial politics. In the years leading up to the 2000 Census, a “Multiracial Movement,” composed predominantly of multiracial university students and the concerned parents of biracial children, fought for federal recognition and in the process pushed racial “hybridity” to the forefront of American culture.

The popular media quickly took up the cause and announced in countless articles the arrival of “The New Face of America,” “The New Multiracial Mainstream,” and “The New Face of Race.” Indeed, in the years between 1997 and 2000, it appeared as if mixed-raced individuals were sprouting-up everywhere, and everywhere they were new. In a testament to the times, Danzy Senna commented that it was “[s]trange to wake up and realize you’re in style”:

That’s what happened to me just the other morning. It was the first day of the new millennium and I woke to find that mulattos had taken over. They were everywhere. Playing golf, running the airwaves, opening their own restaurants, modeling clothes, starring in musicals with names like *Show Me the Miscegenation!* The radio played a steady stream of Lenny Kravitz, Sade, and Mariah Carey. I thought I’d died and gone to Berkeley. But then I realized. According to the racial zodiac, 2000 is the official Year of the Mulatto (Senna 1998: 12).

Much of the zeal that accompanied the Multiracial Movement was generated by celebratory framings that heralded “hybridity” as a potential, or more precisely, *imminent* solution to America’s racial problems. Drawing upon statistics that signaled an “unprecedented boom” in interracial marriage and multiracial childbirths, sources from every segment of society proclaimed it was just a matter of time before

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15 *Time* (Fall 1993); *Newsweek* (May 8, 2000); and *Newsweek* (September 18, 2000).
extensive mixing rendered all racial distinctions meaningless. The “good place” utopianism that animates this projection was presented colorfully in Warren Beatty’s portrayal of a maverick, “nothing-to-lose” politician in the 1998 film, Bulworth (Twentieth Century Fox). The specific scene of note stages a nationally-televised interview where the California Senator proposes his solution to Los Angeles’ racial tensions:

BULWORTH: White people got more in common with colored people than they do with rich people...We just got to eliminate them.

INTERVIEWER: Eliminate?

BULWORTH: Eliminate.

INTERVIEWER: Who, rich people?

BULWORTH: White people! Black people too. Brown people, yellow people, get rid of them all. All we need is a voluntary, free-spirited, open-ended process of procreative racial deconstruction...Everybody just gotta keep fucking everybody ‘til they’re all the same color (Bulworth 1998).

What is missing in this “good place” championing of mixing, however, is a consideration of the historical and racial effect smoothings inscribed by “no place” utopianism. In fact, a sharper examination would disclose “hybridity’s” long, integral, and even disturbing role throughout the history of the United States; that America’s aversion to hybridity resulted in a “[eugenics] movement that authorized the forced sterilization of over 20,000 Americans by the mid-1930s, the exclusion and deportation of countless Asians, and the proliferation of anti-miscegenation laws” (Palumbo-Liu 1995: 59). A broader historical perspective, therefore, would work to disrupt the novelty of these “New Face” solutions to America’s oldest racial problems.
While W.E.B. Du Bois’s *The Souls of Black Folks* stands as perhaps the most prominent problematization of race—“the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color line” (Du Bois 1903: 1)—it was Alexis de Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America* (1889) that first articulated the “problem” of the insurmountably of racial difference in the United States. In Chapter 18, “The Present and Probable Future Condition of the Three Races that Inhabit the Territory of the United States,” Tocqueville begins by characterizing Europeans, Indians, and Negroes as being “naturally distinct” and separated by “insurmountable barriers” that have been created by “education and law, as well as by their origin and outward characteristics” (Tocqueville). “[A]lthough they are mixed,” he continues, “they do not amalgamate, and each race fulfills its destiny apart” (Ibid.).

However, in spite of this initial assertion of absolute distinctions, Tocqueville continues by becoming the first to allude to interracial mixing as a practical, future-oriented solution to America’s race problems. He begins tentatively by introducing sexual “mingling” as a possible, if not yet feasible, means of amalgamating the three races. “The Negro,” writes Tocqueville, “who earnestly desires to mingle his race with that of the European, cannot do so; while the Indian, who might succeed to a certain extent, disdains to make the attempt” (Ibid). And, although he blames the impossibility of miscegenation on European prejudice and the unwillingness of Indians to relinquish their “primitive lifestyles,” Tocqueville’s attitude towards “mingling” is nonetheless provocative. Unlike the racial metaphysics of Arthur de Gobineau’s *The Inequality of Human Races* (1853-1855), which claimed interracial mixings threatened to dilute European blood, Tocqueville’s consideration of
“mingling” posits miscegenation as a potential source of national strength—specifically, the “whitening-up” of Indians and Negroses.16 His engagement with “mingling” is extended through his subsequent observations of European-Indian “half-bloods” who, according to Tocqueville, formed a natural “link between civilization and barbarism” (Ibid.). Tocqueville therefore attests to the “civilizing” or assimilative qualities of interracial mixing by stating that whenever these two races have mingled, the “savage state has become modified” and more attuned to “European habits” (Ibid.).

The promise Tocqueville locates within the amalgamation of Indians and Europeans is nevertheless foreclosed to what he deems as “the destiny of the Negroses”: either permanent enslavement or “open strife” (Ibid.). He notes that although Europeans and Negroes are bound together by the history of slavery, they are incapable of “mingling” due to their “insurmountable” racial distinctions: “[The Negro’s] physiognomy is to our eyes hideous, his understanding weak, his tastes low; and we are almost inclined to look upon him as a being intermediate between man and the brutes” (Ibid.). Given the enormity of these differences, Tocqueville deduces that “[t]hose who hope that the Europeans will ever be amalgamated with the Negroses appear to me to delude themselves” (Ibid.).

Nevertheless, in spite of this skepticism, Tocqueville is reluctant to abandon the promise of interracial mingling. The conclusions that he draws at the end of his examination of America’s three races are worth quoting at length:

I have previously observed that the mixed race is the true bond of union between the Europeans and the Indians; just so, the mulattoes are the true means of transition between the white and the Negro; so that wherever

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16 Language on “whitening” was drawn from Marx’s treatment of Brazil’s racial democracy (1999: 67).
mulattoes abound, the intermixture of the two races is not impossible. In
some parts of America the European and the Negro races are so crossed with
one another that it is rare to meet with a man who is entirely black or entirely
white; when they have arrived at this point, the two races may really be said to
be combined, or, rather, to have been absorbed in a third race, which is
connected with both without being identical with either (Ibid.).

This process of “absorption,” he concludes, will ultimately dispense with the
problems presented by race since all Americans will be drawn “nearer and nearer to
the common type” (Ibid). And, although Tocqueville drew these observations during
the 1830s, there is a remarkable resonance with the millennial celebrations of
America’s “new face of race”: both identify racial distinctions as “problems” to be
resolved, both subscribe to the ideal of a homogenous national culture, and both
invest in a “no place” utopianism that exalts interracial “mingling” as a means of
solving the problems of race.

By locating “hybridity” within this broader historical context, it is possible to
loosen the novelty of the recent utopian smoothings of intra-national difference.
Furthermore, such a treatment works to simultaneously signal the integral role that
“hybrid” subjects have played in the formation of racial-spatial orders: at certain
moments they have been problematized as “disaggregating threats,” while at others
heralded as “unifying solutions.” The dynamics of this fluctuation—something that
will be explored in detail by Chapter Four’s treatment of South Africa’s Cape
Coloureds—brings to the fore the limits of nation-building projects.

Every national construction contains a “fundamental biopolitical fracture”
(Agamben 1998: 178). The “nation” instantiates a moment of inclusion, as it refers to
the “total state of integrated and sovereign citizens” (Ibid., 177). However, this
consolidation and naturalization of “the people” enacts a simultaneous process of
exclusion since citizens are constituted through their opposition to alien-others (i.e. inside/outside, majority/minority, domestic/foreign). Giorgio Agamben notes that “it is as if what we call ‘people’, were in reality not a unitary subject but a dialectical oscillation between two opposite poles: one the one hand, the set of the People as a whole political body, and on the other, an exclusion that is clearly hopeless” (Ibid.). Agamben continues by suggesting that much of the shape of national political discourse has stemmed from an attempt to finesse this fracture through a resettling of intra-national boundaries (Agamben 1998; Shapiro 2001: 13).

Historically, this form of national anxiety has manifested itself in a variety of statist strategies that strive to re-stabilize or domesticate the threats produced by the transboundary movements of “hybrid” subjects (i.e. Apartheid in South Africa and the Jim Crow legislation in the United States). However, to use the words of Bruno Latour, there are now “so many hybrids that no one knows any longer how to lodge them in the old promised land of modernity” (Latour 1993: 131). While neoliberalism is actively working to redeem prior forms of exclusionary violence through its commandeering of once-progressive rhetoric, the project that follows will use the threatening position of “hybrid” subjects as a means of exploring other ways of accommodating intra-national difference that escape the limitations produced by disjunctive difference.

6. Roadmap

The ascendancy and proficiency of neoliberalism has made it necessary to rethink traditional approaches to “progressive” politics. Responding to this need, the project that follows asks: How can one engage in indigenous, “minority,” and immigrant
politics in an era when the opposition has appropriated the once-progressive language of “fairness,” “justice,” and “racial equality?” By running this question through three sites—indigenous politics in Hawai‘i, racial politics on the US mainland, and immigration politics in Japan—the project strives to formulate a critical response to the disabling strategies of neoliberalism.

Chapter Two functions as a sort of literature review and raises questions regarding the ways in which political philosophy and popular fiction of H.G. Wells are enmeshed with two of the twentieth century’s most formidable ideologies: Liberalism and Darwinism or Empire and Progress. Wells’s outlook, the chapter will argue, contributed to the rise of social Darwinism, neoliberalism’s investment in a meritocracy, and most importantly, a racialization of “progress.” Drawing heavily from one of Wells’s earliest novels, The Island of Dr. Moreau (1896), the chapter will use Wells’s work to elaborate the project’s broader themes of evolution, degeneration, and the “promise of hybridity.”

Chapter Three builds off of a comparison between Moreau’s laboratory in the Pacific and Robert Park’s designation of Hawai‘i as a “racial laboratory.” The chapter focuses largely on the Park-led research on interracial marriage and the ways that this body of work contributed to the institutionalization of Hawai‘i’s peculiar racial taxonomy. This body of work is significant because its institutionalization of native Hawaiians as a “race” has facilitated the recent neoliberal attack against native Hawaiian entitlements. With eligibility for native Hawaiian programs seemingly been drawn along racial lines, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that some of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs’ policies were unconstitutional. This ruling is critical
since the neoliberal litigants are hoping that it will set a precedent for a systematic removal of native Hawaiian entitlements.

Chapter Four focuses on recent constructions of “we-ness” in the United States. Drawing from a wide range of examples—the controversy surrounding Senator Trent Lott, Huntington’s *Who Are We?* (2004), and the US 2000 Census—it aims to illustrate how statist employments of hybridity have been used to conceal potentially disaggregating threat of intra-national difference.

And, Chapter Five examines how the recent “return migration” of South American-born *nikkeijin* has threatened the Japanese boundary between *uchinohito* (“*uchinohito*” or “insiders”) and *sotonohito* (“*sotonohito*” or “outsiders”). This engagement with “Japan’s newest minority” supports conventional responses to injustice while simultaneously challenging the politics that make such majority/minority binaries meaningful.
CHAPTER TWO

LIBERALISM, DARWINISM, AND H.G. WELLS’S ISLAND OF DR. MOREAU

I was convinced now, absolutely assured, that Moreau had been vivisecting a human being. All the time since I had heard his name I had been trying to link in my mind in some way the grotesque animalism of the islanders with his abominations; and now I thought I saw it all. The memory of his works in the transfusion of blood recurred to me. These creatures I had seen were the victims of some hideous experiment!

—The Island of Dr. Moreau (1896)

1. “Buggering” Wellsian Studies

Since his death in 1946, little consideration has been given to the impression that H.G. Wells left upon modern politics. Yet, in the years between 1901 and 1946, his ideas had an influence on nearly every aspect of internationalist thinking (Partington 2003: 2). His fiction, journalism, radio broadcasts, and lectures, combined with his direct relations with Theodore Roosevelt, V.I. Lenin, Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, made Wells one of the most influential political commentators of his time (Ibid.). This chapter is not, however, designed to validate Wells’s political significance. Such a project would be better left to the self-proclaimed Wellsian scholars who, to this point, have seemed more interested in exchanging jabs over the “definitive” meaning of Wells’s work. Divided over conflicting interpretations of his tone in key passages—either “clearly sarcastic” or “plain-speaking”—one side has valorized Wells as a compassionate visionary of an inclusive, yet regulated,

1 Prendick, the ship-wrecked narrator of Wells’s The Island of Dr. Moreau, at the moment he realizes the nature of Dr. Moreau’s island laboratory (Wells 2002: 69).

liberalism (i.e. Hammond, Parrinder, Smith, and Partington), while the other has indicted the man as a callous proponent of an anti-humanistic, technocratic totalitarianism (i.e. Carey, Coren, Kemp, and Stoler). This “good Wells”/“bad Wells” interpretive frame, when extrapolated to epitomize Wellsian studies (an admitted oversimplification, but valid nonetheless), evinces a hermeneutic project that approaches Wells’s work as a “box with something inside” (Deleuze 1995: 7); this “something,” for the Wellsians, is of course the true Wells.

Uninspired by the reductiveness of their interpretive frame, this chapter turns to Gilles Deleuze to acquire a more dynamic means of engaging with Wells’s work. The allure of Deleuze lies in the way in which he opens-up texts by relating them “directly to what is Outside” (Ibid., 8). In other words, he treats each text as “a little cog in a much more complicated external machinery” (Ibid.). Unlike hermeneutics, which strives to winnow signifiers down to their rightful signifieds, Deleuze re-conceptualizes the practice of reading as a relational encounter, one that treats each text as “a flow meeting other flows” (Ibid., 9). A Deleuzian approach, therefore, displaces the hermeneutic question, “Is it true?” by asking instead, “Does it work? How does it work? And, what new thoughts does it make possible to think?” (Massumi 1992: 8). Such an encounter is productive precisely because it works to tear apart texts, placing their parts in-relations to the broader mechanics of an “Outside” (Deleuze 1995: 9).

Invigorated by Deleuze’s dynamic and relational approach to reading, this chapter aims to inter-articulate the cogs of Wells’s writings with the historical and theoretical cogs that animate the overall project. This entails treating the historical
production of knowledge—in this instance, the "ways of knowing" expressed in Wells's writings—as an enactment of power, one that privileges certain subjects and locations at the expense of possible others (Foucault 1972; quoted in Shapiro 2004: xv). The signifying practice of Wells's work, in this sense, exceeds both the innocence of storytelling and the objectivity of science. As Michel Foucault suggests, it is utopian to believe in "a state of communication that would allow games of truth to circulate freely, without any constraints or coercive effects" (Foucault 1994: 289). He argues that because power relations are a constitutive element of all societies, it would be more productive to engage in a mode of critique that raises critical questions regarding "power and eventualization" (Shapiro 2004: xvi).

Therefore, in lieu of a formal literature review, this chapter will raise questions regarding the ways in which Wells's writings are enmeshed with two of the twentieth century's most formidable ideologies: Liberalism and Darwinism, Empire and Progress. The turn to Deleuze endows such a project with an "undisciplined" kind of flexibility, which is critical since it liberates the project from the constraints of Wellsian scholarship. For instance, the chapter will draw heavily from one of Wells's earliest novels, *The Island of Dr. Moreau* (1896). *Moreau* is significant because it stands as Wells's most elaborate engagement with the themes of evolution, degeneration, and the "promise of hybridity." "Good Wells" apologists, however, actively discredit and dismiss any critical assessment of Wells's early work. They argue that those who accentuate the racist and pro-eugenic sentiments that proliferate throughout his early writings unfairly distort Wells's legacy since they fail to account
for the ultimate dilution and even retraction of these ideals. While Wells did indeed reformulate his position on a number of controversial issues, the counter-attack deployed by the guardians of Wells's legacy is troubling since it aims to repress any form of analysis that does not honor the oeuvre in its entirety. To this end, their strategy mirrors that which Deleuze identifies as the repressive history of philosophy, one that claims: “You can’t seriously consider saying what you yourself think until you’ve read this and that, and that on this” (Deleuze 1995: 6). Deleuze himself eluded these disciplinary constraints by performing what he refers to as a “sort of buggery”:

I saw myself as taking an author from behind and giving him a child that would be his own offspring, yet monstrous. It was really important for it to be his own child, because the author had to actually say all I had him saying. But the child was bound to be monstrous too, because it resulted from all sorts of shifting, slipping, dislocations, and hidden emissions that I really enjoyed (ibid).

Following Deleuze’s lead, this chapter seeks to evade the specter of Wells’s legacy by approaching his work “from behind” and producing a “monstrous” reading of Moreau. It engages with the novel as a political moment, one related to—but unconstrained by—the entirety of Wells’s work.

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Opening with a historical account of Anglo-American Liberalism, the remaining sections will use Wells’s philosophy (in general) and The Island of Dr. Moreau (in

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3 For example, in “The Death of the Static: H.G. Wells and the Kinetic Utopia” and “H.G. Wells’s Eugenic Thinking of the 1930s and 1940s,” Partington warns of fixing understandings of Wells’s ideals to his early pro-eugenic essay, “Anticipations of the Reaction of Mechanical and Scientific Progress upon Human Life and Thought” (1902). Partington goes to great pains to map the continuous renovation of Wells’s stance on eugenics, noting that “Wells, as an old man of 78, did not want to pass away with the taint of Galtonian eugenics upon him. The Second World War, and the eugenic experiments being revealed by the liberation of the concentration camps and death camps of Central Europe, had poisoned the reputation of eugenics and apparently forced Wells, the erstwhile half-baked eugenicist, to reject it out of hand” (79).
particular) to explore three themes. It will first signal a convergence between Wells’s philosophical foundation and the dissertation’s key concepts: Liberalism, Darwinism, and the so-called “promise of hybridity.” Second, it will examine how Wells anthropomorphized these concepts within the racial politics of Moreau. When read in this manner, the novel enacts a racialization of the “survival of the fittest” ethos, which was used to provide Anglo-American imperialism with a bioethical justification. The doctrine of Moreau, therefore, will be read as an evolutionary rationalization of socio-economic exploitation, a key move for the project’s broader critique of neoliberalism. And third, because Moreau was the first literary work to stage the Pacific as a “racial frontier,” the chapter will transition into Chapter Three by foregrounding a curious resonance that exists between Moreau’s grotesque Pacific Island laboratory and Robert E. Park’s designation of Hawai‘i as a “unique racial laboratory” where “outstanding race studies” could be performed (Park 1926). However, in order to contextualize Wells’s writings within the neoliberal critique initiated in Chapter One, it is necessary to begin by mapping the emergence of neoliberalism.

2. The Emergence of Neoliberalism

As suggested in Chapter One, neoliberalism surfaced as a late-twentieth century response to the faltering primacy of Western institutions. Frequently associated with the Washington Consensus, neoliberalism has been characterized as a set of policy initiatives that were implemented throughout the 1980s and 1990s in hopes of prefiguring the post-Cold War geopolitical order in the favor of fiscal austerity, privatization, market liberalization, and governmental stabilization (Duggan 2003: 26.
The Washington Consensus—sometimes portrayed as the backroom dealings that integrated the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, U.S. Treasury, and the World Trade Organization—institutionalized a particular form of political, economic, and cultural governance that rationalizes free market capitalism through its insistence that the outcomes are universally inevitable and, in the long term, beneficial for all (Ibid., xiii).

The various defenders of neoliberalism have fortified this rationalization by arguing that the latest stage of capitalist democracy (i.e. neoliberalism) represents the ultimate expression of “good place” utopianism (Giroux 2001: 228; as explained in Chapter 1). Exemplified by the works of Francis Fukuyama, neoliberalism’s defenders posit democratic capitalism as an irrefutable end-point in the evolutionary development of all societies. In his *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992), Fukuyama declares that there is no form of governance beyond democratic capitalism; that a pursuit of anything else is pointless because, quite simply, nothing better exists. While he admits that previous societies also believed they had attained the final stage of development, Fukuyama maintains that democratic capitalists “arrive at this conclusion exhausted, as it were, from the pursuit of alternatives we felt had to be better than liberal democracy” (Fukuyama 1992: 46).

Fukuyama’s satisfaction, however, is shortsighted. His enthrallment with liberal democracy overlooks the deep-seated contractions that haunt this latest stage of capitalism—that in spite of, or more precisely, because of this consolidation of power, wealth, and commercialism, the violence of exploitation, misery, and ecological devastation has continued to escalate (Giroux 2001: 228). Furthermore, by
aligning the principles of democracy with the market-based logic of neoliberalism, Fukuyama's “end of history” naturalizes an individuation of social responsibility. As a result, grand social and collective hopes are displaced by the increasingly narrow convictions of an entrepreneurial self. This atomization of society works to render unintelligible the notions of social responsibility and public accountability. As such, prior social commitments (even in their most limited forms) to the marginal and disempowered segments of society have been converted into commercial opportunities for private gain. “All of this adds up to” according to Lisa Duggan, “a corporate culture managed by a minimal state, achieved by the neoliberal privatization of affective as well as economic and public life” (Ibid., 66).

The consequence of neoliberalism’s ascendancy, in short, has been the popular denouncement of all provisions that fail to correspond to the laws of the market. As neoliberal ideologues implore citizens to surrender their understandings of the public domain as a terrain of empowerment, a mantra of “individual responsibility,” “privacy,” and “personal initiative” has been used to justify a “cutting of losses” and the curbing of state involvement (Aronson 1999: 480). It is this ecology of entrepreneurial supports that reinstates the ideological force of social Darwinism, and as a result, replaces the ethos of social obligation with a privileging of “merit.”4 Under attack is the social contract with its emphasis on enlarging the public good and expanding social provisions, which is designed to provide not only a safety net but also the set of conditions upon which democracy can be experienced and critical citizenship encouraged (Giroux 2005: 4). Even more damaging, however, are the ways in which this return to social Darwinism represents the nation as an

4 The term “ecology of entrepreneurial supports” was drawn from Michael J. Shapiro.
undifferentiated space of citizenship (Shapiro 2000). Under this framework, one person’s successes and another’s failures are coded as “fair” since they are rationalized as discrepancies in effort, merit, and what Robert Putnam has deemed, “cultural capital” (Putnam 1995).

This homogenization of the national body under the ideology of “merit” is dangerous since it obscures the fact that socio-economic successes and failures exist in a relationship. Because of the uneven distribution of wealth and resources under global capitalism, a phenomenon that has been exacerbated by the rise of neoliberalism, some people are rich and succeed because others are poor and fail.\(^5\) Attentiveness to this relationship fosters an appreciation for the notion that bodies as historically-situated “sites of the investment of power” (Shapiro 2000). Such a shift works to foreground that ways that socio-political spaces have been organized in a manner that has enfranchised some while simultaneously disenfranchising others (Ibid.). “The raising [of] corporate profits,” notes Lisa Duggan, “has never been pursued separately from the rearticulation of hierarchies of race, gender, and sexuality in the United States and around the globe” (Duggan 2003: 14). Neoliberalism, however, uses the ideals of merit and survival to conceal these relationships. Thus, the effectiveness of neoliberalism’s recoding of society can be attributed to the ways it structures political life in terms of race, gender, sexuality, and class while simultaneously disavowing their significance.

Chapter Four will elaborate this point in a critique of Samuel Huntington’s latest book, _Who Are We?: The Challenges to America’s National Identity_ (2004). But, it is worth mentioning here that Huntington’s argument suggests that America’s

\(^5\) This is a reformulation of a similar move in Shapiro 2004: 9.
(presumably cohesive) national identity is under attack; that the latest wave of
immigration poses a threat to the "American creed" since these immigrants, unlike
their predecessors, are less likely to complete the Americanization process.
Huntington ironically precedes his assault on Hispanic immigrants by declaring that
the United States has already witnessed an "elimination of the racial and ethnic
components of its national identity" (Ibid., 19). He plainly states that "racial and
ethnic Americans are no more" (2004: 12). Yet, in the same breath he warns of the
disaggregating effects produced by the recent immigrants from "Mexico and
elsewhere in Latin America" (Ibid., 14). While Huntington’s retreat to the notion of
"creed" is designed to uphold his anti-racial/post-ethnic vision of the nation, his
strategy is tenuous if not untenable since he proceeds by defining "creed" as an
assemblage of Anglo-Protestant values, the English language, and a European cultural
heritage (Ibid., 20). Huntington’s America, therefore, is a nation that claims: "You
can be Black/Hispanic/Asian/Native/Other as long as you work, speak, and act like a
white Anglo-Saxon Protestant." Huntington’s America is one that applauds Colin
Powell for being "well-spoken," refers to Oprah as a "sensible Black," and dismisses
criticism of Justice Clarence Thomas as "hypocritical partisanship." These
statements, like Huntington’s claims of antiracialism, are not indicative of the end of
American racism. On the contrary, beneath the superficial erasure of overt
discrimination, these statements evince a recoding and amplification of intra-national
distinctions. Thus, Huntington’s Who Are We?—in spite of (or perhaps, because of)
its contradictions, historical elisions, and thinly-veiled xenophobia—is instructive for
they ways it instantiates the most successful ruse of neoliberalism: a reliance upon, yet disavowal of, intra-national distinctions.

In order to expand upon the social implications produced by neoliberalism's use of merit necessitates a broader historical understanding of Liberalism. Specifically, attention must be paid to the modulations of Liberalism, in both Britain and the United States, and the ways in which these fluctuations have influenced normative understandings of the "proper" relationship between the state, the economy, and the family.

3. The Historical Fluctuations of Anglo-American "Liberalism"

The ideas, values, and categories of Liberalism emerged out of capitalism's slow and uneven advance across Anglo-Europe (Duggan 2003: 4). This economic transformation produced a dislocating and often violent array of consequences as the benefits and costs of these new modes of production and exchange were, by design, unequally distributed (Ibid).

By the seventeenth century, the disparate strands of Liberalism had begun to cohere into a formal political theory, one that ultimately emerged as a means of comprehending the administration of capitalist economies within nation-states. Liberalism's foundational metaphors were established by theorists such as John Locke and Adam Smith, whose writings worked to define the "proper" relations between the state, the economy, and the population (Ibid.). And, while the contours of Liberalism have fluctuated over time, its master binary (i.e. public/private) and the operative categories (i.e. the state, the economy, civil society, and the family) have remained relatively constant (Ibid). The "state" has stood as the durable site of
collective public life, while the "family" has represented the most private. The "economy" and "civil society" have appeared as mixed sites of voluntary, cooperative rational action as they are comprised of both public and private functions (Ibid). A majority of Liberalism's analytical force, therefore, lies in ways in which it differentiates "the state" from "the economy" and its regulation of the "proper" levels state influence within economic, civic, and family life (Ibid., 5).

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Britain experienced a profound increase in trade which incited a fierce debate over the degree to which the state ought to be involved in the private sector (Partington 2003: 32). State sponsorship of enterprises such as the Hudson's Bay and East Indian trading companies, as well as the enactment of anti-competitive Corn Laws, were diminished as a result of a popular shift towards "individual initiative" and the free, unregulated movement of goods and services throughout the world (Ibid.). Within the domain of social policy, the paternalism that had typified feudal aristocracies was replaced by notions of individual responsibility and competitive employment. A significant outcome of this transformation was a newly-industrialized and urbanized populace, but one that was sharply divided between the very rich and very poor (Ibid.).

Advocates of Adam Smith's policies, however, called for a complete liberalization of economic life, with state functions limited to maintaining law and order, providing defense from external attack, and motivating the poor to pursue "thrifty self-advancement" (Ibid.). In the public domain, the Established Church retained its sovereignty, which obstructed education in the areas of family planning and sexual hygiene (Ibid.). As a result, the unchecked fecundity of the segments of society least
able to afford large families produced a cycle of poverty that threatened the stability of the social structure and raised the issue of public welfare (Ibid).

The 1840s witnessed the passing of both public health and labor laws, which re-introduced a degree of state regulation upon the manufacturing, mining, and building industries. A gradual incorporation of secular influences into the education system brought about even more comprehensive changes. Influenced by the popularization of Darwin's theory of evolution, these reforms facilitated a more scientific approach to the teaching of science (Ibid.). In the wake of the "New Unionism" movement of the 1880s, even the most conservative proponents of laissez-faire economics conceded to the increasing need for a more robust state. However, a growing tension emerged over conflicting understandings of the "proper" role of the state, which divided Britain's Liberal Party with traditionalist Whigs on one side and the radical reforming "New Liberals" on the other (Ibid.). It is from within this contentious milieu that H.G. Wells cultivated his political consciousness. However, before examining Wells's educational influences, it would be instructive to also map the emergence of Liberalism within the United States.

In contrast to the Anglo-European model of Liberalism, which focused more heavily on issues of class, the American version accentuated gender and racial differences as it was forced to accommodate the socio-economic complexities produced by the institution of slavery. With the Union's removal of property qualifications as a criterion for voter eligibility, the requirements for full citizenship changed from a complex nexus of economic, racial, gender, religious, and genealogical characteristics to the reductive identity markers, "white" and "male"
While this transformation has often been portrayed as an expansion of democracy since it *enfranchised* property-less white men, the enactment of white suffrage produced a simultaneous constriction of democracy since it *disenfranchised* two previously legitimized groups: propertied women and free blacks (Ibid).

More significantly, "the removal of property considerations from voting requirements allowed for a more complete, rhetorical separation of the economy, which was understood as primarily private, from the public, democratically accountable (to white men, in theory) state" (Ibid.). The "white" identity marker removed America's indigenous populations, freed blacks, as well as non-Anglo-European immigrants from citizenship. It simultaneously coded the institution of slavery as a "private" economy, which incorporeally transformed African slaves into property rather than active participants in public life (Ibid., 6). Similarly, the "male" identity marker worked to cordon off the family as the private sphere of women and children who, like the enslaved Africans, were defined as belonging to the private worlds of individual "white" men (Ibid). While the social realities would never truly adhere to the conceptual framework outlined by Liberalism, its legacy left an indelible mark on American society.

As early as the nineteenth century, the terms "liberal" and "conservative" constituted the two poles of America's socio-political continuum. The meanings of these two positions, however, have been continuously renovated, influenced by competing notions and evaluations of "public" and "private" institutions and "family values" (Ibid., 7). In the early twentieth century, Progressive era "liberals"—
contrast to "free market liberals"—fought to expand the power of the state to allow for the regulation of the economic relations that were considered to be, at least in part, "public" (i.e. working conditions and hourly regulations of labor), while "conservatives" considered this kind of involvement to be an improper interference of the state in the matters of private property and contract rights (Ibid.). In the years following World War II, the contemporary versions of "liberal" and "conservative" emerged within debates over the Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal (Ibid.). The self-described "conservatives" declared the New Deal’s strengthening of the "public" sector—an encroachment into what had previously been the "private" domain of economic power—as "liberal" (Ibid., 8). Even though the types of welfare provided by the New Deal and the Civil Rights movement were composed of disparate and oftentimes contending factions, once both were labeled as being "liberal," they were lumped together and fiercely attacked by "conservatives" who saw them as efforts to diminish the freedoms of they deemed to be "private" economic, associational, and family life (Ibid.).

American "conservatives," therefore, argued for a re-privatization of as much of everyday life as possible. However, in what would become a defining move, conservatives sought to simultaneously deny the protections of privacy against state interference in both the domestic and sexual lives of all but the procreative, intra-racially married (Ibid.). In other words, while "conservatives" advocated for more privacy within the economic and social domains, they argued for less privacy in regards to familial, intimate, and sexual affairs (Ibid.). Thus, when fighting to protect their economic and collective activities, "conservatives" portrayed the state as a "bad,
coercive, intrusive force against freedom” (Ibid.). New Deal and Keynesian “liberals,” on the other hand, in their efforts to guarantee a distributive form of equality, called upon a democratically-accountable and “public” state interest (Ibid.). However, and this is a key move, when engaged in issues related to personal, sexual, and domestic life, “conservatives” would extend privacy only to an officially-recognized figuration of family values, advocating for state intervention in regards to all forms of aberrant intimate relations (Ibid.).

In the 1970s and 1980s, the “liberalism” of the 1950s and 1960s became “old liberalism,” “tax and spend liberalism,” or “welfare state liberalism.” Yet, in between “old liberalism” and “conservativism” arose a new entity, “neo-conservativism.” Neo-conservatives were composed of former self-identified liberals who felt alienated by the Civil Rights movement, black radicalism, the expanding welfare state, the countercultures of the 1960s, post-1968 feminism and gay liberation, the New Left, and even the Democratic Party, from which many had abandoned by 1980 (Ibid., 9). Traditional conservatives, however, did not easily embrace the “neocons,” who had too recently been tainted by their involvement with “liberals.” But, by the time of Reagan’s presidency, the merging of traditional conservatives and neo-conservatives had pushed the perceived “center” of American politics decidedly towards the right (Ibid., 9).

The politics of the 1990s brought about yet another renovation. Defined against the New Deal and Civil Rights liberals, championed by the Democratic Party, and led by the charismatic Bill Clinton, a new form of liberalism was organized around a “third way” politics. This “new liberalism” was characterized by the way it
incorporated pro-business, pro-market, and “free trade” policies with impoverished remnants of democratic social justice programs. Neoliberals argued for smaller, more efficient governments, appealing to notions of a “civil society” while placing the burdens of public welfare on the safety net of “the family” (Ibid., 10).

The purpose of this extended treatment of American Liberalism is to chart a trend on both sides of political spectrum towards neoliberalism:

If Ronald Reagan was a conservative president, with substantial support from the religious right, and Bill Clinton was a liberal president excoriated by conservatives and the right, then why do their policy initiatives look so much alike? It was Bill Clinton who pushed the North American Free Trade Agreement through against organized labor’s opposition, and who presided over “the end of welfare, as we know it” (Ibid., xv).

This phenomenon involved more than the becoming-conservative of liberals. During the 1990s, many within the ranks of the conservative party slowly and unevenly began to distance themselves from their “culture wars” allies: the religious moralists, white supremacists, ultra-nationalists, and other anti-liberal forces (Ibid., xix).

Although many retained their party affiliation, they joined forces with the Clinton-led New Democrats, holding commitments to civil rights as long as their equality politics could be couched within a framework that avoided a downward redistribution of resources (Ibid.).

During this political transformation, progressive/Left activists and intellectuals were drawn into increasingly unproductive battles, hindered by a stark either/or framing that separated economic from cultural politics, identity-based from Universalist rhetoric, and theoretical critiques from grass-roots political action (Ibid., 75). These divisions have not only distorted the complexities of the neoliberal politics, they have also rendered “progressive” politics largely unproductive.
4. Intervention

This impasse has been produced by the progressive/Left’s failure to grasp the transversal relationships that have facilitated the neoliberals’ success (Ibid., xvi).

Neoliberalism is a complex and contradictory phenomenon—an economic, cultural, and political project, supported by a wide-range of institutions, with an agenda that seeks to reshape every aspect of life in the favor of contemporary global capitalism (Ibid., 70). Therefore, to create an effective political response to this non-unitary system, “analyses of its recent history and hopefully future demise must be diverse, contingent, flexibly attuned to historical change, and open to constant debate and revision” (Ibid.). Unfortunately, there has been a general blindness to the multifarious ways that neoliberalism intertwines the domains of economics, politics, and culture. In other words, the continuities of neoliberal policy promotion, as traced from Reagan through Bush I, Clinton to Bush II, have been rendered relatively invisible by the dominant political system (i.e. Democrats vs. Republicans, Left vs. Right) and language (i.e. “liberal” vs. “conservative”) (Ibid., xv). This invisibility has allowed neoliberals to form and reform their constituencies and craft issues and rhetoric that entwine their entrepreneurial goals with popular culture and mainstream politics. Conversely, this invisibility, coupled with the progressive/Left’s adherence to the dominant political system, has lured activists and intellectuals into increasingly unproductive battles (Ibid., xvi).

The source of “progressive” impotence is located in a split that is most often associated with the post-1968 fragmentation of the “Radical Left,” a division that arose between class and identity. This split has placed identity-based and cultural
politics on one side with contemporary forms of "progressive" universalism, economism, and populism on the other (Ibid., 71). However, Duggan warns, "The more that identity and cultural politics are represented as the irresponsible, trivial, divisive 'other' of serious left analysis and organizing, the more constituencies seeking equality may be alienated from the left and abandoned to claim redress through liberal reform alone" (Ibid.). The alienation produced by this class/identity divide stands to potentially drain the progressive-left, not only statistically but in terms of creativity and vitality as well. Thus, Duggan concludes, "as long as the progressive-left represents and reproduces itself as divided into economic vs. cultural, universal vs. identity-based, distribution vs. recognition-oriented, local or national vs. global branches, it will defeat itself" (Ibid., xx). If identity-based and cultural politics remain at odds with broader critiques of global capitalism, it seems unlikely that "progressive" politics will be about to foster the kinds of transversal connections needed to create a "social movement strong and ambitious enough to take on inequalities that single-issue politics only ever ameliorate, but never reverse" (Ibid.).

A transformative politics, therefore, one that moves beyond the limitations of the class/identity split, must be able to advocate for individual and group autonomy (i.e. identity-based/cultural movements) while simultaneously demanding an expansive democratic publicness (i.e. universal economic justice movements). Notions of equality, freedom, justice, and democracy must be re-inflected in a manner that exceeds the shallowness of neoliberalism's domestication of these meanings (Ibid., 87). The will-to-privatization must be exposed as something that multiplies, rather than "solves," the severity of socio-economic inequalities. And, the mantra of
“personal responsibility” must not be allowed to function as an abdication of public and collective care taking.

To encourage such a renovation of “progressive” politics, this project will begin by problematizing neoliberalism’s “survival of the fittest” ethic. The professed innocence of “merit,” its “color-blindness,” and its homogenization of national bodies but all be denaturalized. It is at this point where Wells’s work becomes so critical.

As a university student, Wells struggled to navigate his way through the contending ideologies of late-Victorianism. Wells would ultimately forge his own political ideology, one that combined late-Victorian notions of socialism with Thomas Henry Huxley’s principle of “ethical evolution” (Partington 2003: 34). The result was an amalgamation of Liberalism, Darwinism, and the so-called “promise of hybridity.”

Wells explored these themes in a series of socio-scientific essays (as discussed in section 6). However, his 1896 novel, *The Island of Dr. Moreau*, would stand as his most elaborate exposition on evolution and the nature of Man. The novel would enact a racialization of the “survival of the fittest” ethos, which provided a bioethical justification for Anglo-American imperialism. This ethos, however, has found its ultimate expression as a rationalization of neoliberalism. To cut to the core of Wells’s work, one needs to examine the philosophical foundation that undergirds all of his writings: Thomas Henry Huxley’s “ethical evolution.”

5. T.H. Huxley and “Ethical Evolution”

H.G. Wells enrolled in the Normal School of Science in South Kensington in 1884. Studying under T.H. Huxley, Wells showed early promise in the fields of biology, zoology, and mathematics (Partington 2003: 27). Although his last two years at the
Normal School were less-than-spectacular, Wells left with a mediocre degree, the beginnings of a literary career, and a deep admiration for Huxley, claiming later that the "year I spent in Huxley's class was, beyond all question, the most educational year of my life" (Wells 1946: 161, quoted in Partington 2003: 27).

Huxley's concept of "ethical evolution," a reformulation of the Darwinian relationship between Man and Nature, would come to stand as the unifying principle of Wells's career as a political thinker and writer. First introduced in Huxley's 1893 Romanes Lecture, "Evolution and Ethics," an "ethical" evolution sought to address the Malthusian problems of over-population by altering Darwin's "survival of the fittest" to a "fitting of as many as possible to survive" (Huxley 1947: 81-82, quoted in Partington 2003: 3).

Huxley's lecture, in effect, was a response to the appropriation of Darwinism as a rationalization for exploitative social relations. In Darwin's Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex (1896), he refers to and (seemingly approves of) the process of "natural selection," claiming that "civilized nations are everywhere supplanting barbarous nations" (Darwin 1896: 618; quoted in McCarthy 42). Darwin also makes it clear that he disapproves of the ways that asylums, poor laws, and improved medical care interfered with the "process of elimination," allowing "the weaker members of civilised societies [to] propagate their kind" (Ibid.). While Darwin does note that withholding assistance from the weak and needy would result in a "deterioration [of] the noblest part of our nature" (Ibid), it was only be Huxley who crafted a means of population control that operated on an "ethical" basis (Partington 2000: 2). Huxley suggested that although society is inextricably "a part
of nature,” it “differs from nature in having a definite moral system” (quoted in McCarthy 42). “Social progress,” Huxley argued, “means a checking of the cosmic process at every step and the substitution for it of another, which may be called the ethical process; the end of which is not the survival of those who may happen to be the fittest […] but of those who are ethically the best” (Huxley 1947: 81; quoted in Partington 2000: 2). By “cosmic process,” he is referring to the laws of the animal and plant kingdoms, which are governed by an unalterable struggle for survival. Humankind, on the contrary, while not liberated from the struggle for survival, is able to direct its own evolution based upon reason and logic. Huxley’s objection to Darwinism, therefore, stemmed from its tolerance of the “pain of progress”; an arbitrary, non-directional evolutionary process that was animated by chance variation and resulted in a preponderance of unfit and ill-adapted variations that were destined for extinction (Haynes 1980: 28).

Huxley suggested that the harsher elements of the struggle for existence could be avoided if humanity would simply apply itself to the problem. In this sense, he perceived human struggle as a cooperative enterprise, one that “repudiates the gladiatorial theory of existence” by directing influence “not so much to the survival of the fittest, as to the fitting of as many as possible to survive” (Huxley 1947: 82; quoted in Partington 2000: 2). “In place of ruthless self-assertion,” he argued, an ethical approach “demands self-restraint; in place of thrusting aside, or treading down, all competitors, it requires that the individual shall not merely respect, but shall help his fellows” (Huxley 1947: 82; quoted in McCarthy 43). He continues by condemning the “fanatical individualism of our time” as “a misapplication of the
stoical injunction to follow nature” (Ibid.). Instead of submitting to the demands of mankind’s lower natures, intelligence and will should be used to modify the conditions of existence, thereby “curbing the instincts of savagery in civilized men” (Huxley 1947 82, 85; quoted in McCarthy 43).

To illustrate the possibilities of Man’s influence over Nature, Huxley turned to the metaphor of an English garden, arguing that a gardener’s interference in the usual process of natural selection demonstrated the “apparent paradox that ethical nature, while born of cosmic necessity, is necessarily at enmity with its parent” (Huxley, quoted in Wilkerson 1973: 75). A gardener’s cultivation, Huxley argued, suspends the state of nature, privileging instead the state of art, with artificial selection working to mitigate the struggle and suffering that characterized Darwin’s haphazard struggle for survival. Applying this metaphor to modern society, Huxley contended that an ethical evolution depends “not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it” (Huxley 1893: 82-83; Partington 2003: 28-29). Arguing that the “organized and highly developed sciences and arts of the present day have endowed man with a command over the course of non-human nature greater than that once attributed to the magicians,” Huxley saw “no limit to the extent to which intelligence and will, guided by sound principles of investigation, and organized in common effort, may modify the conditions of existence, for a period longer than now covered by history” (Huxley 1893: 83-84; Partington 2003: 29).

The promise of an “ethical” form of evolution, Huxley maintained, was not limited to Man’s manipulation of Nature. “[M]uch may be done,” he insisted, “to change the nature of man himself” (Huxley 1893: 84). And, herein lays its racist
underpinnings. In an effort to lessen the "pain of progress" experienced by the "unfit" and "ill-adapted," British advocates of ethical evolution would establish a teleological order whereby the "primitives" of the colonial encounter could be ushered to the glories of a "civilized" modernity. Huxley made the first move himself by comparing the British colonization of Tasmania to the "tending" of his own English garden—Wells would later dramatize this encounter in his famed *War of the Worlds* (1898). Claiming that in Tasmania, a "shipload of British colonists" had discovered a "true garden of Eden," Huxley warned that this Eden’s "serpent" was a regression to the "old state of nature" (Huxley, quoted in Wilkerson 1973: 75). In order to prevent such an outcome, Huxley argued for the establishment of an administrative authority that was "far superior in power and intelligence to men, as men are to their cattle" (Ibid.). The supernatural qualities of this colonial administration would therefore "assure the victory of the settlement over the antagonistic influences of the state of nature" since the ethical process of humanity, governed by the discourse of British civility, could "[tend] to the suppression of the qualities best fitted for success in that struggle" (Ibid.).

Throughout "Ethics and Evolution," Huxley builds upon this notion of "tending," stating at various times that the ethical process can be used to "interfere," "command," "modify," and "change" natural selection (Partington 2003: 29). When brought into the colonial encounter, the "tending" metaphor would come to animate a civilizing discourse.

...there is good evidence that discourse of race did not have to await mid-nineteenth-century science for their verification. Distinctions of color joined with those of religion and culture to distinguish the rulers from the ruled, invoked in varied measures in the governing strategies of colonial states. In
the nineteenth century, on the other hand, race becomes the organizing grammar of an imperial order in which modernity, the civilizing mission and the "measure of man" were framed. And with it, "culture" was harnessed to do more specific political work; not only to mark difference, but to rationalize the hierarchies of privilege and profit, to consolidate the labor regimes of expanding capitalism, to provide the psychological scaffolding for the exploitative structures of colonial rule (Stoler 1995: 27).

Yet, Huxley understood himself first and foremost as a biologist and therefore sought to maintain a sense of scientific neutrality (Partington 2003: 29). As a result, Huxley left his ethical evolution thesis as a "vague principle, based on his biological wisdom, to be adapted to human needs and conditions by those more able to do so" (Ibid.). Wells would be the one to take up the cause, with his journalism and novels broadcasting Huxley's ideas to a global audience.

6. Wells's Socio-Scientific Journalism

This section will examine Wells's philosophical engagement with Huxley's ethical evolution by reviewing three of his earlier socio-scientific works: Anticipations of the Reaction of Mechanical and Scientific Progress upon Human Life and Thought (1896), Mankind in the Making (1903), and A Modern Utopia (1905). This mapping works to disclose Wells's reactions to Darwinism and Liberalism as well as foreground those moments where his work either advocated or sanctioned racist, colonial, and eugenic policies. While the majority of his philosophical struggles with these themes took place the publication of The Island of Dr. Moreau, these tensions gesture towards the broader mechanics of Wells's Outside. In other words, his engagement with Huxley's ethical evolution would need to, in some manner, address the British ideals of Empire and Progress. Furthermore, his socio-scientific writings
are significant because, unlike Huxley, Wells's intention was to translate the ideals of ethical evolution into concrete public policy.

In reading the early works of Wells's scientific journalism, it is apparent that he endorsed Huxley's ethical evolution in its entirety (Partington 2000: 2). In his 1896 essay, “Human Evolution, An Artificial Process,” Wells wrote: “There is an idea abroad that the average man is improving by virtue of the same impetus that raised him above the apes” (1996: 226-227; quoted in Partington 2000: 2). He continues by claiming “[i]t is, however, possible that Natural Selection is not the agent at work here” (Ibid.). For Wells, the “agent at work” was the “Artificial Process,” which he defined a year earlier in “The Limits of Human Plasticity” (1895) as the “possibility of replacing old inherent instincts by new suggestions, grafting upon or replacing inherited fixed ideas” (Wells 1996: 223-224). Here Wells echoes Huxley in suggesting that humankind, though not without instinct, has been given the ability to reason, which enables man to infinitely transform that instinct through “moral education.” Thus, Wells concludes, “[t]he only considerable evolution that occurred since [the Stone Age], so far as man is concerned, has been [...] an evolution of suggestions and ideas” (Wells 1996: 227; Partington 2003: 29). “Natural selection is not the agent at work here,” he argues, but rather mankind is a “highly plastic creature of tradition, suggestion, and reasoned thought” (Ibid). Wells’s post-Palaeolithic “artificial man,” through the exercise of morality, enjoys the “comforts and securities of civilization” (Ibid.). This move resonates with Huxley’s view of “social progress” as a “means of checking of the cosmic process at every step and the substitution for it of another, which may be called the ethical process,” the purpose of
which for Wells is to serve as a “padding of suggested emotional habits necessary to keep the round Paleolithic savage in the square hole of the civilized state” (Wells 1996: 108; Partington 2003: 29).

Both Huxley and Wells sought to displace the Darwin’s animalistic natural selection with “an artificial perversion of instinct” (Wells 1996: 224); that for Wells, the battle was no longer humanity versus nature but rather a moral battle of adapting the “artificial process” to the “natural process”6 (Partington 2000: 2). In his 1897 essay, “Morals and Civilization, Wells concluded that this kind of adaptation will contribute to the construction of a “rational code of morality to meet the complex requirements of modern life” (Wells 1996: 262).

Wells’s Anticipations of the Reaction of Mechanical and Scientific Progress upon Human Life and Thought (1902) marks a slight diversion from Huxley’s ethics. Swept up in the discourse of “national efficiency”—a move provoked by “the poor quality of working-class recruits for the Boer War and the relative decline of British industrial efficiency in the face of German and American competition”—Wells understood the issue as one of faltering human stock and sought to develop a top-down policy solution (Partington 2000: 3). Evincing the influence of Galtonian eugenics—and foreshadowing the neoliberal rationalization of socio-economic disparity—Wells argued that those in occupations requiring mental exertion were there due to an innate quality that distinguished them from those below, who were socially inadaptable and lived parasitically on the rest of society (Ibid.). Thus, within Anticipations, Wells’s callous disposition towards the “People of the Abyss,” his term

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6 The slippage between Huxley and Wells exists only in terminology. Where Wells counterposes “artificial” and “natural”, Huxley uses “ethical” and “cosmic.”
for the poor and uneducated, took on the form of severe and even murderous policy recommendations. Believing that it is the responsibility of the “civilized” man to shape human progress, his recommendations were two-pronged: on one hand he advocated for the state to support the so-called “efficients” who were destined to become the ruling class of the twentieth century; on the other, he supported the withdrawal of all support to the poor and ill-educated, the “abyss” who were ill-fit for modern life, unteachable, and therefore prone to die out (Partington 2003: 51). His recommendations did not end here. Because the “abyss” stood as a potential moral contaminant to the rest of society, Wells advocated for a vicious solution. He wrote:

...the nation that most resolutely picks over, educates, sterilizes, exports or poisons its People of the Abyss [...] will certainly be the ascendant or dominant nation before the year 2000 (1902: 212; quoted in Partington 2000: 4).

Although this quote evokes a sense of national rivalry, the policy recommendations in Anticipations are global in scale.

When Wells implicates “large sections of the world’s population in the crime of ‘polluting’ the ‘efficient’ peoples,” he is arguing for the improved efficiency of humanity as a whole (Partington 2000: 4). It is within this moment that Wells begins to combine notions of efficiency with the discourse of race, which serves to racialize the ideals of human evolution and progress. He writes:

...whole masses of the world’s population are, as a whole, inferior in their claim upon the future, to other masses, [...] that their characteristic weaknesses are contagious and detrimental in the civilizing fabric, and that their range of incapacity tempts and demoralizes the strong (1902: 289; quoted in Partington 2000: 4).

These inferior peoples, according to Wells’s policy recommendations, should be tolerated “out of pity and patience, and on the understanding that they do not
propagate” (1902: 300; quoted in Partington 2000: 4). This tolerance, he recommends, should be at times suspended by the ruling elites, who ought to be authorized to “kill when that sufferance is abused” (Ibid.). To be clear, in *Anticipations*, Wells authorizes the killing of those “inefficients” who have the audacity to propagate since their intrinsic weaknesses threaten to pollute or contaminate the “efficient.”

The “good Wells” apologists adamantly insist that Wells’s policies were not racially determined. They often turn to a 1907 article, “Race Prejudice,” where Wells declares that “if any one wants a credible dragon to write against, talk against, study against, subscribe against, work against, I am convinced they can find no better one—that is to say, no worse one—than Race Prejudice” (Wells 1907: 382; quoted in Partington 2000: 4). Nevertheless, Wells’s words in *Anticipations* speak for themselves. In identifying the societal “inefficients,” Wells refers to “those swarms of black, and brown, and dirty white, and yellow people” (Wells 1902: 317; quoted in Partington 2000: 4). He continues by declaring:

So far as they fail to develop sane, vigorous, and distinctive personalities for the great world of the future, it is their portion to die out and disappear (Wells 1902: 317; quoted in Partington 2000: 4).

In the face of this passage, John Partington, the most critical of the Wells apologists, fights to maintain Wells’s innocence by claiming that Wells’s “test of global citizenship is efficiency, not race” (Partington 2000: 4). “This point is important,” Partington continues, “because, although he revises his views on public policy, Wells is constant throughout his life in his anti-racism, a point often ignored or distorted by his critics” (Ibid.). However, within Partington’s defense, one encounters the
seductiveness and salience of Wells’s racialization of the “survival of the fittest” ethic. His retreat to a universal standard of efficiency is intended to launder the racist underpinnings from Wells’s authorization of racial superiority as well as his eugenic solution to the problem of intra-national difference. In other words, conquest and exploitation—even eugenics extermination—are justified on the grounds that it is necessary to suppress the brutish, “inefficient” instincts in man and the “savage customs” that those instincts produce (McCarthy 45).

To illustrate the harmful legacy of Wells’s “efficiency-based” eugenics, one that has rationalized a wide-array of colonial violence, one need only look at Walter Kolarz’s 1955 analysis of Hawai’i race relations. In an article entitled, “The Melting Pot of the Pacific,” Kolarz first details Hawaii’s “dual process”—the “dying of the Hawaiian nation and the birth of a new one” (Kolarz 1955: 23)—and then unabashedly proclaims:

It is therefore most fortunate that this new mixed race of Hawaii is acquiring a common cultural background. And here we come to a point which is crucial for a proper understanding of the Hawaiian race situation, namely the great service done by the dying Hawaiian aboriginal people to all the other races that are inhabiting the islands (Ibid., 25).

What is striking about Kolarz’s remarks is that the dying of the Hawaiian people is completely justified, even welcomed, because the aboriginal “inefficients” are giving way to a more civilized, more capable, and more modern society. To make this claim, Kolarz drew from a rich colonial discourse that portrayed native Hawaiians as “inherently licentious, idle, and intellectually incapable” (Merry 2000: 249). This discourse endowed the colonizers of Hawai’i with a “new rhetoric about the ‘nature’ of Hawaiian people and their innate habits” (Ibid). The power and authority of the
missionaries, therefore, was legitimated through a conflation of moral (i.e. the civilizing project of the church) and biological grounds (i.e. the “survival of the fittest” ethos). This deadly combination extended to a bioethical coding of bodies: “[the colonizers] took on a uniformity of identity, extending even to the body, as they all came to be ‘strong and virile’, or ‘tall of stature’” (Ibid.). Furthermore, it transformed the brutal violence of colonization into exactly the kind of discipline needed to “tend” to the depraved character of the colonial subjects (Ibid., 139). It was this racialized paternalism, one that rendered the indigenous population morally and biologically incapable, “paved the way for the eventual takeover of the islands in a highly illegal act by the representatives of the U.S. government in 1893” (Ibid., 257).

The evolutionary themes evoked by Wells, Kolarz, and the Hawai‘i missionaries evince the dangers of transferring evolutionary principles to the domain of politics and economics. Surprisingly, Wells issues this very warning his *The War of the Worlds*, a novel that can be read as an allegory of the “conquest of a primitive society by technologically sophisticated colonists with no respect for native values or culture” (Hughes 1977: 61; McCarthy 47). In *War of the Worlds*, Wells depicts Mars as an older world with dwindling resources, which he himself compares to the “war of extermination waged by European immigrants” against Tasmania (Wells 1934: 266). Wells, however, justifies the Martian invasion in terms of the cosmic “struggle for existence” and ultimately reinscribes the “survival of the fittest” ethic, since the Martians defeated by their vulnerability to microbes of which the English are immune. In this respect, the Martian invasion of Britain is not a simple allegory for colonial expansion. True, the violent removal of humans to make room for the Martian
invaders—through extermination and eradication—reflects the nature of the turn-of-the-century European-American territorial wars, which swept away with genocidal force the native inhabitant of Africa and the Americas (Kydd 2002). However, *War of the Worlds* does more than this; the racialized “survival of the fittest” ethos, as dramatized in the death-through-disease of the seemingly invincible Martians serves to further legitimate Anglo-European political, economic, and cultural dominance.

The two socio-scientific publications that followed *Anticipations, Mankind in the Making* and *A Modern Utopia*, were markedly different in tone. This shift was brought about by the barrage of negative criticism that was directed towards *Anticipations*. For instance, an unsigned review in *The Spectator* charged: “What we miss in Mr. Wells’s view of the future of humanity is any allowance for humanity itself” (quoted in Partington 2000: 4). Another review in *The Daily Telegraph* pointed out that “carrying his theories to their logical conclusion, he advocates such extreme doctrines as the lethal chamber for the criminal and the lunatic […], praises the suicide of the melancholic, diseased, or helpless persons […] and suggests the possibility of ‘good scientifically caused pain’ as a method of deterrent punishment” (Ibid.). Joseph Conrad, a respected contemporary of Wells, wrote in a personal letter that *Anticipations* “seems to presuppose—or even to establish—a sort of select circle to which you address yourself, leaving the rest of the world outside the pale. It seems as if they had to come in into a rigid system” (quoted in Partington 2000: 5). Conrad would recommend that Wells “go forth, […] casting a wide and generous net, where there would be room for everybody” (Ibid.). And, F.W. Headley’s academic response in the scientific journal, *Nature*, declared that “we cannot help regretting that Mr.
Wells did not study and reflect a little longer before writing. [H]e does not show a very thorough grip of the principles of evolution. [...] For the strata do not keep up their number, and society has been truly described as an organism that is perpetually renewing itself from its base. But Mr. Wells knows only of the abyss into which tumble all the failures of modern life” (Ibid.).

The reviews Wells received from both popular and scientific critics compelled him renovate the position he took in Anticipations and, in the years between 1903 and 1905, he worked to craft a social policy that would truly place ethical evolution at its core (Partington 2000: 5). Wells’s intention in Mankind in the Making, therefore, was to “deal with social and political questions in a new way and from a new starting point” (Wells 1903: v). Whereas Anticipations was written from the standpoint of a “top-down” state, advocating a culling of those who could not contribute to its overall efficiency, Mankind in the Making (1903), shifted to a “bottom-up” approach, arguing that the well-being of the individual was coterminous with the well-being of the state. As a result, the work is notable for the emphasis Wells places on the state’s responsibility to create healthy, educated individuals (Partington 2000: 7).

Wells did not, however, completely abandon the eugenic sentiments he introduced in Anticipations. In Mankind in the Making, Wells warns against “specific diseases, which I am told are dangerous and disastrous and inevitably transmitted to the offspring of the person suffering from these diseases” (Wells 1903: 63; quoted in Partington 2000: 7). While Wells stops short of advocating forced sterilization, he is

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7 It is significant to note, if only to tease a later point, the intense criticism, both popular and professional, that was generated by Wells’s celebration of the “efficients.” In the age of neoliberalism, however, one which champions the very ideals that vilified Wells at the dawn of the twentieth century (i.e. efficiency and merit) remain unchecked as innocent markers of social progress.
determined to prevent these diseased births from occurring and contaminating society. While he believes that "any clear statement and instruction [the diseased] received from the medical profession, as a whole, in these matters, would be faithfully observed," in the event of a transgression, Wells advocated for the imprisonment of the parents and the use of euthanasia against the diseased offspring (Wells 1903: 64; quoted in Partington 2000: 7). But, to shield himself from the same critiques that plagued Anticipations, Wells justifies his position from the perspective of the diseased; he believed that a diseased child would only experience a life of misery and pain and the termination of its life at birth would be more just. But again, what persists is an authorization of the "survival of the fittest" ethic; that the diseased are less fit and therefore less entitled to a sovereign, politically-qualified life.

In the 1905 publication, A Modern Utopia, Wells strove to translate Huxley's biological theories into practical social policy. While Wells retains the principles of ethical evolution, he renovated the terminology; what had previously been called an "ethical" or "artificial" process came to be known as "kinetic." He begins his argument by claiming that pre-Darwinian utopias no longer provide a plausible basis for modern life since they are "all perfect and static States, a balance of happiness won for ever against the forces of unrest and disorder that inhere in things" (Wells 1994: 5). Partington notes that while this move can be read as a critique of texts such as Plato's Republic and Thomas More's Utopia, it should more likely be taken as Wells's effort to distance himself from Francis Galton's notorious theories on eugenics (Partington 2000: 2). Partington writes that "Wells distrusted Galton's notion of creating an ideal type through selective breeding. Not only was it
impossible to determine what characteristics to breed for in humankind, but the principle of creating an ideal contradicted the Huxleyan view that human evolution must be based on a degree of struggle between unique individuals” (Ibid.). Whereas Galton strove to achieve human perfection by damming back human change and development, Wells clearly stated that “[i]n a modern Utopia there will, indeed, be no perfection; in Utopia there must also be friction, conflicts and waste, but the waste will be enormously less than in our world” (Wells, 1994: 155). He argued that in an evolving universe, no one species can remain static—a concept Wells dramatizes in *The Time Machine* (1895), where he asserts that a stable, static balance would be doomed to degeneration and, ultimately, extinction (Partington 2000: 2). Wells’s alternative was a kinetic utopia where struggle and biological selection would continue, though under premise that mankind could “tend” to what direction the struggle would take. Wells declares that “[n]o longer will it be that failures must suffer and perish lest their breed increase” (Wells 1994: 81). Yet, apparently unable to abandon his racial and eugenic beliefs, Wells concludes by proclaiming that “the breed of failure must not increase, lest they suffer and perish, and the race with them” (Ibid.).

*A Modern Utopia* contains other instances where Wells returns to the problematic positions of *Anticipations*. Despite stating early in his thesis that “the cardinal expression of freedom in the human life is surely [the] choice of a mate” (Wells 1903: 297), Wells suggests that those who violate the regulations he outlines as the minimum requirements for procreation (i.e. housing, wages, education, etc.) should be punished through fines and imprisonment. For those who failed to comply
with these regulations, Wells wrote that the state would “take over the innocent victim of your passions, but we shall insist that you are under a debt […] that has in the last resort your liberty as a security” (Wells 1905, 108). And, in the case of multiple infractions, “we will take an absolutely effectual guarantee that neither you nor your partner offend again in this matter” (Ibid). While Wells insists that this would involve “no killing, no lethal chambers,” he does advocate to remove the transgressor from society, suggesting that the place of incarceration should be “islands lying apart from the highways of the sea” (Ibid., 85). He insists that these islands should be used, first and foremost, to relieve criminals from the “bleak terrors, the solitudes and ignominies of the modern prison” (Ibid., 86). Thus, these islands would permit prisoners a degree of liberty and, once removed from society they would be free to do as they pleased, even establish their own economy and law and order (Partington 2000: 8). *A Modern Utopia* proposes the establishment of a “system of island monasteries and island nunneries,” which would guarantee the eventual extermination of inferior stock (Wells 1905: 85).

Wells’s shift to socio-economic criteria as a requirement for procreation evinces another subtle shift in what remains a biologically-determined argument. Wells pre-supposes that a highly-educated, home owning, workforce is in some way biologically predisposed to birthing worthy contributions to society; that by encouraging these members of society to procreate and by prohibiting the societal “inefficients” from bearing children, Wells forecasts an overall improvement of society. While Partington notes that “Wells surely warrants credit for understanding the potential role of the state as a guarantor of basic housing, education, and a
minimum wage in order to enable the poor and uneducated to raise themselves out of the mire of poverty and ignorance” (Partington 2000: 9), what he fails to note is that those members of society unable to pull themselves up by their state-issued bootstraps would be doomed to extinction since they could not legally procreate and if they did, their child would be “removed,” and the parents would be extricated from the efficient, productive society. They would be sentenced to live out the rest of their lives on a distant island where they, along with their inferior stock, would be gradually eliminated from society.

Nowhere in Wells’s work, however, does he explore the meaning and implications of evolution, survival, eugenics, and the nature of Man more fully than in his 1896 novel, *The Island of Dr. Moreau*, which, according to Haynes, “discusses, either directly or by implication, almost all the critical issues which have since been raised by neo-Darwinism” (Haynes 1980: 27).

**7. Wells’s *The Island of Dr. Moreau***

Morality is the padding of suggested emotional habits necessary to keep the round Palaeolithic savage in the square hole of the civilized state. And Sin is the conflict of the two factors—as I have tried to convey in my *Island of Dr. Moreau*.

—H.G. Wells

At the beginning of his career, Wells wrote a number of full-length science-romances that are distinguished by their domestication of fantastic hypotheses: extraterrestrial invasion, lunar flight, time travel, and invisibility (Bowen, 318). Commenting upon the magnetism of this genre, Wells claimed that “the living interest lies in their non-fantastical elements and not in the invention itself” (Wells 1934: vii). As such, the majority of his early novels infuse the fantastic within the everyday: *The Time Machine* (1895) is narrated within the dancing firelight of a late-Victorian smoking
room; the *Invisible Man* (1897) is staged within the suburbs of Kent; *The First Men in the Moon* (1901) commences in another bucolic British setting; and in *The War of the Worlds* (1898), the Martian invasion brings death and mayhem to the familiarity of a southern English landscape.

Wellsian commentators, however, note that it is only *The Island of Dr. Moreau* (1896) that stands apart. In *Moreau*, they claim Wells makes almost no attempt to domesticate the fantastic, offering his readers with none of the familiarities that typify his other novels.⁸ Outside of the novel’s brief introduction, where the protagonist’s nephew establishes the tale as being drawn from his uncle’s papers, and the final chapter, which details Prendick’s bittersweet return to civilization, the narrative takes form as the “reliving of a nightmare, to what could be called a prolonged hallucination, set on a distant *terra incognita* in the Pacific Ocean” (Bowen 319). In writing about the inspiration for *Moreau*’s setting, Wells wrote:

> An old edition of Captain Cook’s “Travels,” fascinating middle-eighteenth century Atlas with abounding Terrae Incognitae, are vivid among the writer’s memories…. And the pictures in a Wood’s “Natural History”…gave him an inkling of evolution and a nightmare terror of gorillas (Wells 1924: xii-xiii).

The exotic alienation produced by *Moreau*’s Pacific Island setting, one that supposedly exists outside the “known lands and the traffic of men” (Bowen 319), will be problematized in the last section of this chapter. However, it is worth noting here that this colonial ordering is disrupted by Wells’s own inclusion of “six kanakas” (Wells 2002: 102). These men give presence to what Antonia Benitez-Rojo calls a meta-archipelago (Benitez-Rojo 1996: 16); between Britain and the Pacific exists a “flow of marine foam that connects two civilizations ‘in another way’, from within

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⁸ This observation was pulled from Bowen (318-319).
the turbulence of chaos” (Ibid.). But for now, it would be appropriate to begin with a focused reconstruction of Moreau’s plot.

The narrative begins in the Pacific Ocean, inside a lifeboat that holds three survivors of the sinking Lady Vain. Adrift for several days, Edward Prendick, the narrator, concedes to his companions’ scheme to sacrifice one member for sustenance so that the remaining two may survive. The three draw lots to determine the victim but a fight ensues and the other men fall overboard and perish. Drifting, alone, and on the brink of death, Prendick is rescued by the trading ship Ipecacuanha. The ship is carrying a cargo of caged animals, which it is to deliver to an undisclosed islet prior to reaching its final destination, Hawai‘i. Montgomery, the passenger in charge of the live cargo, nurses Prendick back to health by feeding him “scarlet stuff, iced,” which “tastes like blood.” The ship’s captain, however, treats Prendick as an unwelcome burden and abandons him once the vessel reaches Montgomery’s island destination.

Once on the island, Prendick is coolly greeted by Dr. Moreau, who after some initial reluctance, permits Prendick to remain on the island until the next schooner arrives. In a guarded explanation, Moreau explains that he and Montgomery are “biologists” and that the island is “a biological station—of a sort” (Wells 2002: 36). The details of Moreau’s experiments are initially hidden from Prendick who, after hearing the pain-filled screams of animals, begins to suspect the work is some form of vivisection. After a series of horrifying events, Prendick discovers that Moreau is working to close the gap between men and beasts through the creation of hybrid “Beast Men.” While Moreau refers to his work as a “humanizing process,” Prendick describes the hybrids as “grotesque caricatures of humanity” (Ibid., 91).
Moreau is ultimately killed by one of his own creations and, in the wake of his death, the moral order he had imposed upon the island rapidly reverts to animalistic habit. Montgomery returns to the alcoholic destructiveness that had forced him to escape London ten years earlier while the Beast People lose all traces of civilization. The use of speech is the first trait to disappear, followed by their regression from bipeds to quadrupeds, smooth skins to an abundance of hair, constructed dwellings to natural protections, clothing to nudity, monogamy to promiscuity, and so on, culminating in a spasmodic, degenerating war (Bowen 332).

Amidst this chaos, Prendick is rescued and while the island’s physicality disappears in the distant horizon, its metaphysical reality is unshakable. Prendick returns to London, plagued by nightmares and a heightened awareness of the tenuousness of civilization: “I could not persuade myself the that men and women I met were not also another, still passably human Beast People, animals half-wrought into the outward image of human souls, and that they would presently begin to revert.” Prendick himself begins to display traces of degeneration: “I am told that even now my eyes have a strange brightness, a swift alertness of movement.” Thus, Prendick’s return to civilization is only partial, only spatial, since he can no longer escape the dramatic revelations of human nature. As he moves about the peoples of London, he remarks: “I feel as though the animal was surging up through them; that presently the degradation of the Islanders will be played over again on a larger scale” (Wells 2002: 183).

The next section will focus on Moreau’s “humanizing” experiments to develop the project’s theme of hybridity. It will argue that the “promise of
hybridity,” when situated with the colonial context, functions as an enabler of Empire and Progress.

8. The “Promise of Hybridity”

Written just three years after Huxley’s “Evolution and Ethics,” *The Island of Dr. Moreau* is remarkable in the sense that it contains a literary equivalent of nearly all of Huxley’s major points. Most significant for the purpose of this section is that Wells chose to dramatize Huxley’s rationalization of British colonialism; that in “Evolution and Ethics,” Huxley cited the extinction of Tasmanian aborigines at the hands of British colonists as a “tragedy of evolution.” While Huxley declared that this instance of genocide was tragic, it was a tragedy that he believed to be legitimized by the laws of evolution. Although his ethical evolution argued that “the individual shall not merely respect, but shall help his fellows” (Huxley 1947: 82; quoted in McCarthy 43), it is crucial to recall that Huxley’s notion of “helping” authorized those with greater intelligence and rationality to “modify the conditions of existence” in a manner that curbed the “instincts of savagery” (Ibid.). Superior cultures, like a gardener, must “tend” to the suppression of the primitive, the savage, and the anachronistic for the greater good of Mankind. When combined with Wells’s own beliefs regarding the “Peoples of the Abyss”—those who were ill-fit for modern life, unteachable, and therefore prone to die out—one can begin to read these works as an authorization of colonial violence. In other words, within the discourse of survival, those colonized subjects who could not assimilate to a civilized modern lifestyle would naturally and rightly (for the greater good of the “efficient”) become extinct.
The problem for Wells remained how to complete the ethical transition from Darwin’s “survival of the fittest” to Huxley’s “fitting of as many as possible to survive?” Wells found an answer in the so-called “promise of hybridity.” To be certain, Wells believed that large numbers of colonized peoples were helplessly ill suited for modernity and these natives would need to die out as the cost of progress. But, Wells also recognized the notion of Racial unity; that “individual men are to the species—otherwise called Man, Mankind, Racial Man, and so forth—as cells are to an organism” (Reed 91). And, just as individual men recapitulate the evolution of the Race in their biological development, advancing from infancy to maturity, so does Racial Man (Ibid.). Put differently, Wells believed that all humans were of the same (human) “Race.” Some “races” just happened to be more developed than others.

Wells’s belief in an evolving Racial unity was accompanied by an equally strong conviction towards the necessity of progress, which he defined as the successful adaptation to changing circumstances (Ibid., 95). To simply wait idly for millions of years for the evolutionary process to “abolish the chasm which divides man from brute” was unacceptable (Bergonzi 111). Wells maintained throughout his career that under the proper guidance, Man could plan and create a more promising future. In The Island of Dr. Moreau, this intervention is represented by Moreau’s experiments, which can be read as Wells’s effort to condense evolution “to produce human beings, or their like, from their remote ancestors without all the lengthy intermediate stops” (Ibid.). The promise of hybridity, therefore, is the closing of the gap—a “whitening up” of those less developed races.
Moreau’s use of blood and vivisection, therefore, can be read as a “physical amalgamation” of racial difference. During his first days on the island, Prendick is struck by the appearance of a number of the inhabitants. Something inscrutable about Moreau’s helpers generates an anxiety within Prendick, but the reasons are not immediately clear. Referring to one who would later be revealed as a Beast Man, Prendick comments:

“He’s unnatural,” I said. “There’s something about him....Don’t think me fanciful, but it gives me a nasty little sensations, a tightening of my muscles, when he comes near me. It’s a touch....of the diabolical, in fact” (Wells 2002: 48).

Clearly troubled by this uncertainty, Prendick elicits Montgomery’s help: “‘Your men on the beach’, said I; ‘what race are they?’” (Ibid.) and again, after being attacked in the jungle: “Montgomery,” said I, “what was that thing that came after me. Was it a beast, or was it a man?” (Ibid., 65). However, Montgomery is of no help. For reasons Prendick explains later, Montgomery had been amongst the “brutes” for so long that...

...he had come to regard them as almost normal human beings. His London days seemed a glorious, impossible past to him. Only once in a year or so did he go to Africa to deal with Moreau’s agent, a trader in animals there. He hardly met the finest type of mankind in that seafaring village of Spanish mongrels.

In this passage, one finds the emergence of a colonial/racial ordering; that in Prendick’s mind, because Montgomery has been so far removed from the civilized men of Europe with only an occasional encountering of the lesser “Spanish mongrels,” the Beast Men appear “normal.” As days pass, Prendick continues to puzzle over the nature of the islanders until he recalls hearing the name “Moreau” while still a student back in London. He slowly remembers that Moreau was a
"prominent and masterful physiologist" respected throughout Europe for his work on "morbid growths" and "the transfusion of blood." But, after a number of "unfortunate accidents," Moreau had been chased out of Europe and had disappeared altogether. Putting the pieces together, Prendick realizes that Moreau had escaped to this isolated Pacific Island where he has been free to continue his research. At the moment of revelation, he says: "I had been trying to link in my mind in some way the grotesque animalism of the islanders with his [Moreau's] abominations; and now I thought I saw it all. The memory of his works in the transfusion of blood recurred to me. These creatures I had seen were the victims of some hideous experiment" (Wells 2002: 69).

PRENDICK: "Monsters manufactured!" said I. "Then you mean to tell me—"

MOREAU: "Yes. These creatures you have seen are animals carven and wrought into new shapes. To that—to the study of the plasticity of living forms—my life has been devoted.

As the horror of Moreau's experiments fades, Prendick realizes: "The creatures I had seen were not men, had never been men," Prendick realizes, "They were animals—humanized animals—triumphs of vivisection" (Ibid., 96). "Mastering difficulty after difficulty," Moreau explains to Prendick, "I made my first man. All the week, night and day, I molded him. With him it was chiefly the brain that needed molding; much had to be added, much changed" (Ibid., 103). Moreau continues, again evincing a racial/colonial order, by surmising, "I thought him a fair specimen of the negroid type when I had done him" (Ibid.).

Moreau, in this sense, forces a sort of progress upon his island yet he creates an evolutionary situation that confuses genetic with behavioral evolution: "It is not
simply the outward form of an animal I can change. The physiology, the chemical rhythm of the creature, may also be made to undergo an enduring modification.” The promise of hybridity, therefore, is stated plainly by Moreau: “the possibilities of vivisection do not stop at a mere physical metamorphosis. A pig may be educated. The mental structure is even less determinate than the bodily” (Ibid., 99).

Moreau expects that his grafting techniques will produce a durable transformation, endowing the Beast Men with a civilized morality. The process, however, is savagely brutal. Moreau justifies the brutality of his experiments by professing: “Each time I dip a living creature into the bath of pain, I say, ‘This time I will burn out all the animal this time I will make a rational creature of my own’.” Moreau’s “bath of pain,” the process through which the beasts must pass to be made more human, carries the overtones of a baptismal ceremony, the washing away of original sin and savagery. Moreau, in this sense, combines Christian morality with modern scientific rationality to legitimate pain in the name of Progress. He strives, with his “bath of burning pain,” to consume all the “cravings, instincts, desires” that make his victims creatures of feeling. Progress is therefore presented as an effort to advance civilization by extricating the animal nature from mankind. “Scientific reason is the agent of progress,” notes Wilkerson, and “primitive emotion is the enemy of society, which reason must subdue” (Wilkerson 82).

Moreau, when read in this manner, presents a world in which lesser-developed “brutes” can achieve the rewards of modernity under the power of a quasi-divine scientist. Yet, despite the promise of hybridity, Wells maintains a
colonial/racial order by placing a limit on the degree to which the “brutes” can
progress. AsPrendick observes:

Before they had been beasts, their instincts fitly adapted to their surroundings,
and happy as living things may be. Now they stumbled in the shackles of
humanity, lived in a fear that never died, fretted by a law they could not
understand; their mock-human existence began in an agony, was one long
internal struggle, one long dread of Moreau—and for what? It was the
wantonness that stirred me.

While Wellsian apologists would contest such a reading of Moreau, maintaining that
Wells was explicitly anti-racist, when read through the lens of hybridity, the novel
can be read as a reification of the colonial/racial ordering as well as a legitimization
of Empire and Progress.

To be fair, Wells was not alone in gesturing towards the “promise of
hybridity.” In fact, many of the earliest and most violent employing of hybridity in
a post-colonial setting were deployed throughout Latin America in the forms of
Cuba’s “transculturation” (Ortiz 1995) and Mexico’s “cosmic mestizaje”
(Vasconcellos 1997). These two concepts were institutionalized as statist ideological
practices and formed “powerful nation-building myths that were to help link dark-
skinned castas, Euro-Americans, and Indians into one nation-state” (Klor de Alva
1995: 11). The critical success of these hybrid conceptualizations had everything to
do with the fact that the national-populist state formation was dominant in Latin
American from the 1930s until the 1980s (Moreiras 1999: 375). “Heterogeneity,”
however, a notion introduced by Antonio Cornejo Polar in the ruins of Latin
America’s national integration projects, with its double relationship of antagonism
and supplementarity to these myths, brought about a critique that exposed the
insidious underbelly of these national-populist ideologics. In the words of Alberto
Moreiras, heterogeneity “signaled the fact that, from the point of view of what was heterogeneous to the dominant social articulation, for instance, indigenous ethnicities in Peru, transculturation was a powerfully threatening instrument of social subordination, not of redemption” (Ibid.). Similarly, Klor de Alva has thrown Mexico’s myth of cosmic mestizaje into question, noting that it has been effectively used to “salve the national conscious or promote collective amnesia in what concerns the dismal past and the still colonized condition of most native peoples in Latin America” (Klor de Alva 1995: 11). “It has failed,” he continues, “to bring national unity and it has continued to be used to avoid addressing the hard fact that ethnic differences are primarily the effects of power and therefore usually serve the interests of the powerful” (Ibid.). And, in relation to Brazil’s nation-building myth of a “racial democracy” and its attendant racist ideology of “whitening,” Michael Hanchard has observed that the “premise of racial equality and the attendant denial of contemporary, on-going racist practices in society influences not only how people perceive race relations, but their very definition of democracy at a time when the crisis of Brazilian civil society also constitutes a crisis of the meaning of the word citizen; who gets to be considered citizen, and who does not” (Hanchard 1994: 8).

9. Problematizing Hybridity

What becomes apparent in these various employments is that as a concept, hybridity has not simply been used to create phenomenological descriptions of cultural and racial integrations. It has also served as a brutal biopolitical tool of integration. Chapter Three will examine the ways in which notions of hybridity, in the form of interracial marriage studies, have been used in Hawai‘i to enact a similar type of
biopolitical laundering. Yet, in the present-day, within the context of neoliberalism, critical attention must be paid to the ideological force of hybridity since “just as for the concept of transculturation a distinction could always be made between its constative and performative aspects, hybridity might in the present come close to becoming, on its performative side, a sort of ideological cover for capitalist reterritorialization—and even a key conceptual instrument for the very process of naturalization of subaltern exclusion (Moreiras 1999: 377).

This project, therefore, will begin to search for a corrective counter-concept to the modern formations of hybridity in the hopes of setting in motion what Cornejo Polar’s heterogeneity did to the ideologies of transculturation and cosmic mestizaje. In this sense, the larger project (which will not be exhausted in the dissertation form) will seek to envisage a conception of hybridity that confounds its modern limits and summons forth “a new earth and a people that does not yet exist” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 108).

This theme will run through the entire project but for now it would be instructive to briefly introduce the ways in which hybridity has emerged within the domain of post-colonial theory. Utilizing a Bergson-Deleuzian critique of the dialectical unity of “the One” and “the Multiple” to problematize the primacy of the State (citizen-subjectivity) in the formation of society, this section will interject the concept of “the Many” as an indeterminate multiplicity, one that could possibly sustain a sense of the political that lies beyond the unity of identity. Therefore, the analysis that follows aims to flesh-out this diagram by distinguishing between those hybridities that reify the bounds of the unified subject, those who challenge such
limitations via alternatives and those whose notion of the political exceed the confines of subjectivity.

Homi Bhabha’s analysis of mimicry illustrates the ways in which statist hybridities work to forge the unity of the subject by integrating the Many into the One. Others, like Dipesh Chakrabarty’s “other temporalities,” Paul Gilroy’s “tactics of sound,” and Bhabha’s more recent work on “time-lag,” use hybrid notions to concretely embody the Multiple by presenting alternative forms of worlding. Few, however, have pushed hybridity beyond unity into the Many. Alberto Moreiras’ extension of Bhabha’s “savage hybridity” stands as one attempt to gesture towards such a beyond.

Unified Hybridity

Despite claims professing the transgressive force of hybridity, conventional treatments have overwhelmingly constructed a form of conceptual reification. In other words, hybridity-as-Other, while encountered as a challenge to the modern matrix of intelligibility, moves through the power/knowledge machine of the socius and is apprehended (or “comprehended” to use Glissant’s language\(^9\)) by a Cartesian form of closure. This representational-calculative world-view domesticates the hybrid within the conceptual closure of subjectivity, thereby extinguishing the possibility of politics beyond the subject. In the Deleuzian language of Brian Massumi:

> When supermolecularity succeeds, the forces of molarity must accommodate or kill it. Accommodating a supermolecule means adapting the grid of molar identities to it. A new category is added to the recognized list, and procedures

are established to ensure that the integration of the new kind of body into the shared environment does not upset the general equilibrium. A life-space opens, but it is no sooner surveyed than institutionalized, or captured: molarity is an apparatus of capture of energies that escape it (Massumi 1992: 101).

In “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse,” Homi Bhabha suggests that the over-production of stereotypes and pseudoscientific theories within the British colonial discourse attempted to normalize the ambivalence that emerged from the “tension between the synchronic panoptical vision of domination—the demand for identity, stasis—and the counter-pressure of the diachrony of history—change, difference” (Bhabha 1985: 126). Under these pressures, the colonial discourse was torn between that which was already in place, known, or apprehended and that which must anxiously be repeated. In the words of Gyan Prakash,

If, on the one hand, the colonial discourse asserted that the colonizers and the colonized were fixed, unchanging identities, the repetition of this assertion, on the other hand, meant that this discourse was forced constantly to reconstitute and refigure this fixity; consequently, the discourse was split between proclaiming the unchangability of colonial subjects and acknowledging their changing character by having to re-form and reconstitute subjects (Prakash 1995: 96).

Drawing upon this tension, Bhabha claims that within the forging of this colonizer-colonized binary were other, more incommensurable figures and processes that the colonial discourse could not easily accommodate—namely the stereotype of the mimicman as applied to English-speaking Indians. Bhabha claims that productions and normalizations of mimicmen were employed as a “strategy of reform, regulation, and discipline, which ‘appropriates’ the Other,” thereby producing a difference that is almost the same, but not quite (Bhabha 1985: 126). In other words, the Anglicization of Indians, produced by the dual colonial projects of assimilation and reformation,
created “brown Englishmen, at best—‘not white/not quite’.” Bhabha focuses on these dual projects, exploring their inherent racism in order to expose colonial anxieties. Embedded within this over-production of mocking stereotypes of those who were “Indian in blood and colour but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect” lies, in Bhabha’s opinion, a crisis within the English sense of Self that subsequently threatened British colonial authority.

For Bhabha, it is within these moments of crisis, anxiety and indeterminacy where criticism can intervene by rereading historical works to renegotiate the terms of the colonial discourse. These kinds of renegotiations, then, produce heterogeneity or “hybrid moments” in which the colonized produce not a copy of the original but instead a misappropriation that reformulates the master text, exposes its ambivalences and thereby denies colonial authority. As Prakash writes,

From this point of view, categories of racial, class, ethnic, gender, and national difference arise not as the result of a well-intentioned liberal gesture but as social identifications formed at the point of colonialism’s conflictual and contingent mode of functioning (Prakash 1995: 97).

This was indeed groundbreaking work at its time of production. However, in relation to the overarching project, Bhabha’s renegotiations resemble what Bergson calls a “retrograde movement of the true” (Deleuze 1988: 18). In other words, within Bhabha’s renegotiations there is an attempt to apprehend and thereby deny that which is incommensurable. It is an interrupting of worlding which itself attempts to world (or re-world). In other words his counter-concepts of heterogeneity and “hybrid moments” threaten the regime of molarity only to molarized hybridity themselves. Thus, to calcify hybridity as a strategic identitarian political project is to reify the
delimitation of political life to the terrain of subjective agency—the conflation of the Many with the One.

**Multiple Hybridities**

Hybrid categories, such as Bhabha’s “hybrid moments,” once apprehended in a strategic political project, circumscribe the political to mere subjective agency. However, subjective agency alone does not exhaust the political. Ultimately, these postulations of subjective agency as the political limit remain enmeshed within the Cartesian game of calculation and counter-calculation which, by its very conditions of operation, is unable to break beyond the internalization of hegemony. What is needed, then, is an appeal towards a position of exteriority in order to reinstate the possibility of what Etienne Balibar calls the introduction of “the unconditional into the realm of politics” (Balibar 1995: 65). This notion of the “unconditional” is a repercussion of what Balibar calls “ideal universality,” meaning the perpetual presence within any particularism of “some open or latent insurrection” as expressed in the form of an absolute or infinite claim “against the limits of any institution” (Ibid., 64). This is not a call for a voluntaristic project of world revolution. Rather, it is a call to open up alternative avenues of worlding, similar to the “outside” of the time of capital introduced by Dipesh Chakrabarty:

> I think of it as...something that straddles a border-land of temporality, something that conforms to the temporal code within which 'capital' comes into being while violating it at the same time, something we are able to see only because we can think/theorize capital, but something that also reminds us that other temporalities, other forms of worlding, co-exist and are possible (Chakrabarty 1996: 62).

Along similar lines, the dynamic cultural practices and alternative musical institutions articulated by Paul Gilroy in *The Black Atlantic*, embody a “tactics of sound” that
world an “alternative public sphere” thereby establishing “an integral component of insubordinate racial countercultures” (Gilroy 1993: 201; 200). Edouard Glissant elaborates:

The telling and retelling of these stories plays a special role, organising the consciousness of the ‘racial’ group socially and striking the important balance between inside and outside activity—the different practices, cognitive, habitual and performative, that are required to invent, maintain and renew identity. These have constituted the black Atlantic as a non-traditional tradition, an irreducibly modern, ex-centric, unstable, and asymmetrical cultural ensemble that cannot be apprehended through the Manichean logic of binary coding (Glissant 1997).

To this point, Bhabha’s work has been used to evince the hypostasity of hybridity. However, in a later work Bhabha retooled his conceptualization of hybridity to attend to the very sort of alternative worlding demonstrated by Chakrabarty and Gilroy. In this sense, he (and Chakrabarty and Gilroy) confronted the limits of subjective agency and began toeing the waters of the beyond, working to incorporate a temporal element, or in his words, “the geopolitics of the historical present” (Bhabha 1994b: 210).

What emerges out of this shift is an attempt to presence temporal alternatives to the master narratives of modernization through tactical interruptions from the point of view of a counter-modernity or, more specifically, a post-colonial agency. This agency is manifested spatio-temporally through Bhabha’s concept of “time-lag.” This “post-colonial time-space” is temporal in the sense that it involves the hybridization of time, which means, to paraphrase Chakrabarty, that it “fractures the time of modernity” from within (Bhabha 1994a: 174, 252; Kraniauskas 2001: 239; Moreiras 2000: 399). In other words, the time-lag works to repeat the violences of colonial pasts in order to interrupt the present. It is spatial in so far as the echoes of colonial pasts travel or migrate and are experienced mainly within the metropolis.
Such a haunting, in Bhabha’s view, enables “a narrative strategy for the emergence and negotiation of those agencies of the marginal, minority, subaltern, or diasporic that incite us to think through—and beyond—theory” (Bhabha 1994a: 181). These repetitions operate as enunciative acts, the re-articulation of discourses in the present such that it stammers, stumbles or, to use Bhabha’s term, lags. He writes:

...disjunctive temporality is of the utmost importance for the politics of difference. It creates a signifying time for the description of cultural incommensurability where differences cannot be sublated or totalized (Bhabha 1994a: 177).

In this sense, the time-lag is a “temporal break in representation,” the sign of temporal hybridity that, in Walter Benjamin’s words, “blast[s] open the continuum of history (in the forms of historicism and progress) bringing it to a standstill” (Benjamin 1979: 257, quoted in Kraniauskas 2001: 243). “The time-lag of postcolonial modernity,” writes Bhabha, “moves forward, erasing that compliant past tethered to the myth of progress, ordered in the binarisms of its cultural logic: past/present, inside/outside” (Bhabha 1994a: 253). Such a move is innovative in the sense that Bhabha’s conceptualization of hybrid temporality privileges alternative forms of worlding, yet it itself evades the reification of Cartesian worlding.

Turning to Nestor García Canclini’s Hybrid Cultures, what become clear is that the demands he places upon the concept of hybridity are substantial, for it is set to operate along multiple levels. García Canclini’s form of hybrid transdisciplinarity, for instance, does not simply mean the sampling of concepts derived from a variety of disciplines but, rather, a process by which a mutual transformation is performed, a radical transmutation of all concepts. Taken together, these references to culture,
society and history testify to the apparent need to lift the idea of hybridity from the realm of empirical description, via conceptual transdisciplinarity, into a totalizing domain of theory. Only then can one begin to take up the task of studying the complexities of those “hybrid cultures that constitute modernity and give it its specific Latin American profile” (García Canclini 1989: 15). García Canclini’s version of the hybridization of time claims that the dynamic of cultural hybridity results from the fact that modernization has failed to rectify or reform the traditional. In fact, claims García Canclini, processes of modernization have tended to reproduce and rearticulate “tradition” (as in the case of the production of handicrafts) so that what has been conventionally defined socially, culturally or politically as “traditional” and “past” are still active in the present (Kraniauskas 2001: 247). García Canclini goes on to suggest a modernizing politics of his own that (similar to Bhabha’s time-lag) attempts to overcome the stringent distinctions between modernization and those “traditions that persist” (García Canclini 1989: 331).

Perhaps the central theme of cultural politics today is how to build societies on the basis of democratic projects that are shared by all without equilising them, where disaggregation becomes diversity, and where inequalities (between classes, ethnic or social groups) are transformed into difference (Ibid., 333).

While employing notions of “diversity” and “difference” can be read as a move towards the Many, García Canclini fails to exceed the confines of dialectical unity because of his insistence that one can neither enter nor leave modernity. He claims, “it is a condition that contains us, in cities and in the countryside, in the metropoli and the underdeveloped counties” and suggests the only answer is “[t]o radicalise the project of modernity...to renovate...to create new possibilities so that modernity can
be something else and something more” (Ibid.). In this sense, for García Canclini, a
decentered, multidetermined politics could be new and emerge from the
contemporary cultural organization of power. However, within this assertion of the
Multiple exists a reification of the One. To elaborate it would be instructive to
introduce, just for a moment, the distinction Édouard Glissant draws between
"Thought of the Other” and what he deems the “Other of Thought”:

Thought of the Other cannot escape its own dualism until the time when
differences become acknowledged. From that point on thought of the Other
"comprehends” multiplicity, but mechanically and still taking the subtle
hierarchies of a generalizing universal as its basis. Acknowledging
differences does not compel one to be involved in the dialectics of their
totality. One cold get away with: “I can acknowledge your difference and
continue to think it is harmful to you. I can think that my strength lies in the
Voyage (I am making history) and that your difference is motionless and
silent” (Glissant 1997: 17).

The treatments examined within this section—Chakrabarty, Gilroy, Bhabha and
García Canclini—while challenging the limits of the political, continue to work
towards “comprehending” hybrid multiplicities via Thought of the Other. Alberto
Moreiras’s radicalization of Bhabha’s “savage hybridity” can be used to extend
Glissant’s call for an Other of Thought.

**Savage Hybridity: Moving to the Beyond**

Molar (hybrid) subjectivities are incapable of supporting any sort of discursive
position that attends to either identity or difference because of its own structural
ambivalence. As articulated by Prakash:

Recent Postcolonial criticism...seeks to undo the Eurocentrism produced by
the institution of the West’s trajectory, its appropriation of the other as History.
It does so, however, with the acute realization that postcoloniality exists as an
aftermath, as an after—after being worked over by colonialism. Criticism
formed in this process of the enunciation of discourses of domination occupies
a space that is neither inside nor outside the history of Western domination but
as a tangential relation to it. This is what Homi Bhabha calls an in-between, hybrid position of practice and negotiation or what Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak terms catachresis: "reversing, displacing, and seizing the apparatus of value-coding" (Prakash 1997: 491).

In this sense, Moreiras claims that "hybrid subjectivity, at its limit, does not sometimes allow for identity and sometimes for difference, but rather simultaneously undermines both identitarian and differential positions, which are driven into aporia" (Moreiras 1999: 396). In this sense, as a site for ambivalence, hybridity can operate as a diasporic ground or an "abyssal foundation" for subjective constitution. It would be the non-site or ambivalence itself. Thus, rather than playing upon the "transgressive-reticence" pull employed in traditional post-colonial constitutions, Moreiras's savage or nomadic hybridity opens the conditions of possibility for the constitution of socio-political subjects while simultaneously signaling its impossibility. Savage hybridity, therefore, differs from previous conceptions in that it does not ground the subject in an antagonistic relation to the state or capital domination, but rather it is precisely that which "ungrounds it, or the very principle of its ungrounding vis-à-vis any conceivable operation of State or social regime constitution" (Ibid., 396). In other words, this conceptualization of hybridity is beyond all difference and all identity and at the same time the condition of (im)possibility for both. It marks the site of an "abyssal exclusion, beyond any principle of reason, and it marks the (im)possible locus of enunciation of the subaltern perspective, beyond the subject" (Ibid., 397). This is not to say that savage hybridity is a locus of enunciation for the subaltern. However, as the "other side" of the hegemonic relationship, what it makes possible, or what it preserves, is the site of the subaltern. In this sense it is not as much a locus of enunciation as it is a beyond, a
place for the destabilization of all ontologies, for a critique of totality AND a place for the possibility of other histories.

It is precisely the incommensurability of the hybrid, its ability to evade representational-calculative closures deposited by the power/knowledge machine of the socius that marks the possibilities of the hybrid as a critical concept. As such, Moreiras powerfully concludes that “the absolute condition for a politics of transfiguration is the preservation of a mnemonic trace pointing to the possibility of a savage outside: an exteriority without positivity, a tranhistorical remainder whose force is the appeal to an ‘otherwise’ understood as the negation of what hegemony negates. This is the affirmative site of subaltern politics, which thus appears as a site beyond hegemony: the non-site that, by making possible the historical subjectification, affirms the radical ambivalence of historical subjectification and drives any politics of fulfillment against their own limit” (Moreiras 1999: 403).

The overall project will seek to further develop the concepts and critiques presented here in order to explore how Moreiras’s savage hybridity can contribute to a more productive response to neoliberalism. However, I would like to use the last section of this chapter to examine Moreau’s staging of the Pacific as a racial frontier.

10. The Pacific as a Racial Frontier

More than any other of Wells’s novels, Moreau places the theme of evolution at the heart of its narrative. Whereas The Time Machine presents only glimpses of possible evolutionary developments in a distant future, Moreau spells out the incontrovertible essence of Man, cutting across the barriers of past and future (Bowen 319). “There is no need to travel in time to find the appalling truth of man’s condition” observes
Bowen, “a journey in space, and in the present, is enough” (Ibid., 319-320). Thus, the conventional impulse of utopian/dystopian fiction—a displacement in time and space—is only partially met. Wells’s emphasis on the spatial, instead of the usual spatio-temporal separation, becomes the novel’s peculiar strength with the primal terrors associated with the origins of Man and the specter of devolution are neatly staged on a small, uninhabited, Pacific islet (Ibid., 320).

In *The Island of Dr. Moreau* Wells skillfully mines the resources of myth, adapts them for a new age, and above all, rediscovers the perfect topographical emblem for human isolation, the island, to show just how unspeakable life’s adventure may well be. The “island with no name” is at once the world’s beginning and the world’s end (Bowen 333).

The geography of *Moreau* is perhaps the novel’s most significant feature. *Moreau*’s literary antecedents include Rudyard Kipling’s *Jungle Book*, Edgar Allen Poe’s *The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym*, Swift for the elements of travel fantasy, Stevenson’s *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* for the physicality of human duality, Shakespeare’s *The Tempest* offers a practitioner of the black arts who presides over a “mysterious island, and it was Shelly’s creation tale that made the translation from “spell” to “surgery,” from magician to doctor with Defoe providing the archetype of a solitary castaway and island isolation. However, it is only *Moreau* that combines these elements and locates them in the middle of the Pacific—the limn of modern civilization.

To stage this Pacific Island microcosm, Wells cross-fertilized scientific and mythological resources in order to create the ultimate arena for struggle and survival. On Darwin’s the first sighting of the Galapagos Islands, he wrote: “The country was compared to what we might imagine the cultivated parts of the Infernal regions to be”

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10 Drawn from Bowen 320.
(Eiseley 1961: 107; quoted in Bowen 320). Melville, who sailed among these islands in 1841 aboard the *Acushnet*, described the Galapagos as “Plutonian,” declaring, “in no world but a fallen one could such lands exist,” as “caught in the air of spellbound desertness,” and inhabited by creatures that display a “dateless, indefinite endurance” that suggests the powerful hand of a “penal, malignant, or perhaps downright diabolical enchanter” (Melville 1970: 133; quoted in Bowen 320). Melville’s remaining sketches of the Islands’ human history is one of murder, piracy, insanity, and enslavement—the entirety of the archipelago, for Melville, serves as a microcosm of Man’s darker nature (Bowen 323).

In a *Saturday Review* article entitled, “The Influence of Islands on Variation” (1895), Wells displays a keen awareness of the unique patterns of variation found in island environments as well as being well-versed in Alfred Russel Wallace’s *Island Life: or the Phenomena and Causes of Insular Faunas and Floras including a Revision and Attempted Solution of the Problem of Geological Climates* (1880). In the essay, Wells’s key point claims “that the isolation on islands has played a larger part in the evolution of the animals and plant than is usually attributed to it” (Wells, 1895: 204-5; quoted in Bowen 323). He continues by identifying the “law of variation... [as] a prince consort of the reigning law of inheritance,” claiming that there are two cases where the “abeyance of usual conditions of environment results in great variation” (Ibid.). The first, he suggests, is the domesticated environment provided for domesticated animals; the second, island life. Using Wallace’s classifications, Wells differentiates between three types of islands: the “recent
continental” (i.e. Britain); the “ancient continental” (i.e. Madagascar—significant in that is the connection between colonialism and science); and finally:

...there are oceanic islands, isolated peaks rising from the beds of deep oceans, with no particular connection, geological or zoological, with any mainland (Ibid.).

This third, “oceanic” type provided Wells with the savagery and isolation needed to stage the grotesque of Moreau. Wells argues that the isolation of islands provides the conditions needed to encourage an accelerated form of modification, variation, and the creation of a new species. Therefore, Wells, drawing from Darwin and Wallace, places emphasis on the importance of island life in an understanding of the basic principles of evolution, that “mystery of mysteries” (Bowen 324). Sherwin Car1quist’s Island Life: A Natural History of the Islands of the World (1965) amplifies this exoticized understanding of island ecosystems by writing:

Isolation, ecological opportunity, and to a lesser extent climatic moderation have, over long periods of time, created remarkable designs. Untrammeled by the constant crosscurrents of migration, predation and competition, the smaller number of groups present on islands reveal patterns of evolution as in a laboratory. Islands are at the same time the experiment stations and the archives of evolution (Carlquist 1965: 5; emphases added).

The drama enacted on Moreau’s “biological station” is informed by these scientific postulations. He stages his Pacific Island as a simultaneous vision of an ancient past and a projected future. “[W]ith this dramatic juxtaposition of ‘archive’ and ‘laboratory’ at the core of the narrative,” notes Bowen, “Wells adds the mythic elements of Circe and Prometheus and infuses his entire fable with images of metamorphosis, creation, and degeneration” (Bowen 325).

The island’s geography is described as volcanic and, given Prendick’s frequent observations of fumaroles, hot springs, a thin spire of smoke that is a
permanent fixture of the landscape, and the occasional quiver of seismic activity, appears to be young and still evolving: "It was low and covered with thick vegetation, chiefly a kind of palm that was new to me. From one point a thin white thread of vapor rose slanting to an immense height, and then frayed out like a down feather" (Wells 2002: 34). The island’s still-forming geography resonates with the island’s biological development: raw and in an active process of development. Thus, the island’s isolation, its exoticness, the visible traces of its on-going development all mark Moreau’s biological station as primeval—“it is the past but it is also the present, and it could be the future” (Bowen 329). Moreau finds in this rawness a laboratory waiting to be used. He explained to Prendick: “It is nearly eleven years since we came here, I and Montgomery and six Kanakas. I remember the green stillness of the island and the empty ocean about us as though it was yesterday. The place seemed waiting for me” (Wells 2002: 102). In this regard, Moreau’s island is apprehended by the same colonial gaze that had held the islands of Hawai‘i; that for a long time Hawai‘i has been consumed as a “porno-tropics” (McClintock 1995: 22). As well-mapped in Kathy Ferguson and Phyllis Turnbull’s Oh Say Can You See?: The Semiotics of the Military in Hawai‘i (1999), one of the constants throughout the many phases of intrusion has been the inscription of Hawai‘i as a warm, “welcoming feminine place, waiting with open arms to embrace those who come to penetrate, protect, mold, and develop” (Ferguson and Turnbull 1999: 38). And, as the next chapter will illustrate, social scientist would also intrude upon the Islands, treating Hawai‘i as their very own racial laboratory. Led by Robert Park, the father of American sociology, these researchers were, like Dr. Moreau, intrigued by the
“formidable quality of Hawaii as a melting pot,” (Ibid., 132) finding the Islands
“particularly congenial as an exotic and colorful collection of races” (Matthews 1976: 174). As the westernmost point of America, Hawai‘i was taken as the extreme
frontier, the future of the United States (Yu 2001: 81). Park and his students would come to believe that if they could prove the “races were getting along in Hawai‘i,” that they would have proof of hope for the rest of the United States. Thus, Hawai‘i-as-racial frontier symbolized the unfolding of America through time—the further west one traveled, the more one delved into the future stages of American development (Ibid.). “It is significant,” observes David Palumbo-Liu, “that the
Pacific was a particular site for such assimilationist experimentation...Park’s students, most notably Romanzo Adams, traveled to Hawai‘i to plumb what he called a ‘racial laboratory’, wherein the limits of hybridity and the parameters for an engagement with Asia would be tested” (Palumbo-Liu 1999: 20).

While Chapter Three will examine and critique this sociological consumption of Hawai‘i, I would like to conclude this chapter by noting that Epeli Hau‘ofa contests “the idea that the countries of Polynesia and Micronesia are too small, too poor, and too isolated to develop a meaningful degree of autonomy” (Hau‘ofa 1993: 6-7). By privileging the “myths, legends, and oral traditions and cosmologies of the peoples of the Pacific,” knowledges systematically overlooked by the West, Hau‘ofa presents a world conceived of as quite large compared with those of nation-states (Shapiro 2004: xiii). It is a world “comprised not only of land surfaces, but the surrounding ocean as far as they could traverse and exploit its underworld with its fire-controlling, earth-shaking denizens, and the heavens above with their hierarchies
of powerful gods and named stars and constellations that people could count on to
guide their ways across the seas” (Hau‘ofa 1993: 7). Hau‘ofa, in this sense, poses a
challenge to the Anglo-American perspective in which the Pacific contains “islands in
a far sea.” Instead, he asserts, the Pacific is a very large “sea of islands,” a turn of
phase that overturns the view that has “confined ocean people to tiny spaces. Antonio
Benítez-Rojo supplies an equally critical intervention. Calling attention to the
distinctiveness of the Caribbean, he states that “[t]he culture of the archipelagos is not
terrestrial,” but instead, “fluvial and marine” (1996: ??). Referring to the Antilles as a
“meta-archipelago,” he privileges an understand that treats the islands as a bridge that
connects North and South America; they are a “discontinuous conjunction of […]
empty spaces, unstrung voices, ligaments, sutures, voyages of signification,” a place
that “has the virtue of having neither a boundary nor a center” (1996: ??)
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CHAPTER THREE

INSTITUTIONALIZING “RACIAL EQUALITY” IN HAWAI‘I

Research has the existent at its disposal if it can either calculate it in advance, in its future course, or calculate it afterwards as past. Nature and history become the object of expository representation...This objectification of the existent takes place in the re-presentation which aims at presenting whatever exists to itself in such a way that the calculating person can be secure, that is, certain of the existent.

—Heidegger, “The Age of the World View”

1. Introduction

The political landscape of present-day Hawai‘i is embroiled in a number of lawsuits that call into question the constitutionality of the state’s “Hawaiian only” administrative policies. Buttressed by the Supreme Court’s Rice v. Cayetano decision (2000) and a seemingly progressive demand for “racial equality,” this cascade of
litigation is poised to dismantle the federally-funded programs that were established
to “rehabilitate” native Hawaiians following the 1893 overthrow of the Hawaiian
monarchy. With the merit of these lawsuits hinging upon the designation of native
Hawaiians as a “racial” rather than a “political” group, it has become increasingly
necessary to examine how Hawaii’s unique racial taxonomy emerged as a normative
reality.¹

Responding to this need, Chapter Three draws attention to the politics of
Territorial Hawai‘i (1898-1959), focusing specifically on the legal, bureaucratic, and
intellectual apparatuses that animated the Territorial Administration’s statistical
panopticon. Before embarking on this archival investigation, an analysis of the recent
neo-liberal challenge to native Hawaiian entitlements will foreground the present-day
salience of Territorial conceptions of race. What follows, then, will be a genealogical
treatment of the emergence of race in Hawai‘i. The employment of a genealogical
approach has proved valuable for two reasons. First, while prior studies have
provided convincing structural explanations for the emergence of racism in
Hawai‘i—colonization, the plantation oligarchy, an exploitative tourist economy
(Kehaulani 2002; Kent 1993; Okamura 2000)—a genealogical investigation enables
the pursuit of an under-theorized component of Hawaii’s colonial legacy: namely,
how the modernist “promise of hybridity” rendered the Americanization of the

¹ The U.S. Office of Management and Budget’s Directive 15 defines the five racial categories
that are to be used by all federal agencies as: “American Indian or Alaskan Native,” “Asian
or Pacific Islander,” “Black,” “White,” and “Hispanic.” The State of Hawai‘i, however, uses
racial categories that are markedly different: “White,” “Black or Negro,” “Japanese,”
“Chinese,” “Filipino,” “Korean,” “Vietnamese,” “Indian (Amer.),” “Asian Indian,”
“Hawaiian,” “Guamanian,” “Samoan,” “Eskimo,” “Aleut,” and “Other.”
Islands as a natural and forgone conclusion.\(^2\) Second, an interrogation of Hawaii’s racial taxonomy could provide new tools to contest the neoliberal appropriation of “racial equality.”

My central argument contends that a fetishization of race—one that was maintained by a steadfast adherence to admittedly ill-equipped racial categories—transformed Hawaii’s heterogeneous masses into “proper” subjects. By fetishism, the chapter refers to the “mistakes and denials” whereby fixed things (in this case, interracial marriage and mixed race children) stand in for processes of change, contingency, or the reiteration associated with actions and relations of power-differentiated beings (Haraway 2000). In this sense, the interracial marriage studies canonized by the University of Hawaii’s sociological journal, Social Process in Hawaii, institutionalized the trope of Hawai‘i as “racial paradise” in a manner that turned complex political processes between power-differentiated beings into an apolitical thing to be taken as fact.

Thus, by focusing specifically on the proliferation of interracial marriage studies, this chapter will argue these enumerative practices endowed the Territorial Administration with a sensation of authoritarian control; that with a total knowledge of their subjects’ positions and relations, authorities believed they could plot a teleological order where the colonial past and an inevitable American future were fixed along a single, uncontested trajectory. And, while statistics were used to disambiguate Hawaii’s intricate social hierarchy—complex mixtures were reduced to distinct, measurable units—this form of control would have been far less durable.

\(^2\) This move was inspired by Cornell West’s, “The Genealogy of Modern Racism,” 90.
were it not for the attendant meta-narrative of “racial equality.” Popularly broadcast as an “ethnic rainbow” or “racial paradise,” this inscription of Hawai‘i as an egalitarian space has proven to be particularly injurious as it has delimited the legal possibilities for native Hawaiians while simultaneously laundering the violence of colonization from Hawai‘i’s settler experience.

The contours of this argument are not entirely novel since the chapter draws from two bodies of work that have gestured towards related conclusions. The first group (Merry 2000; Kauanui 2000, Dominguez 1998) has shown how early bureaucratic and legal employments of race hastened the “Americanization” of Hawai‘i’s socio-political structures. The second (Palumbo-Liu 1999; Yu 2001; Okamura 2000) has drawn attention to the early 20th century Hawaii-based social scientific research, noting how these studies conditioned American understandings of race relations. By bring these two bodies of work together, this chapter intends to accentuate a previously undertheorized component of Hawai‘i’s colonial legacy: namely, the means by which race came to conceal the raw expressions of state power. Framed in this manner, race provides a productive point of entry for exploring how Hawaii’s social relations were conceived, how its institutions were organized, and how collective identities were established. To begin, however, the chapter will introduce the recent battle over “racial justice” in order to reveal how prior formations of race continue to reverberate within the politics of present-day Hawai‘i.

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3 My use of “settler” is intended to delineate between the “descendants of the 1778 inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands” and subsequent waves of immigrants.
2. “Racial Justice” in Present-day Hawai‘i

On the morning of September 7, 2003, the “dream paradise” that typically shrouds Waikiki’s tourist district was disrupted by a mile-long wave of over 5,000 demonstrators. Staged on the eve of the pivotal Arakaki v. Lingle U.S. District Court ruling, the ‘Ilio‘ulaokalani Coalition’s “Ku I Ka Pono: A March for Justice for the Hawaiian People” amassed both native and non-native groups to demonstrate a widespread commitment to the “protection of Hawaiian rights, the preservation of ali‘i trusts, and of all the services, agencies, and programs that contribute to the capability and well-being of native Hawaiians” (Ku I Ka Pono, www.ilio.org/ilioonline/issues/kuikapono/kuikapono.html, viewed 9/8/2003).

Figure 1: Kalakaua Avenue, September 7, 2003 (Ishiwata)

Commencing at the mouth of Waikiki’s Kalakaua Avenue, the event began as speakers rallied participants with stories of the on-going attacks upon native

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4 See Elizabeth Buck’s Paradise Remade and Jane Desmond’s Staging Tourism.
5 The details of this case, in which 16 non-native Hawai‘i residents challenged the constitutionality of federally-funded “Hawaiian-only” entitlements, will be discussed below.
6 The ali‘i trusts refer to those lands and resources that were solely dedicated to servicing the needs of the Hawaiian people following the United States’ 1893 overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i.
Hawaiian people, land, and culture. Emphasizing the urgency for action, Victoria Holt Takamine, the event's organizer, proclaimed: "This [demonstration] is about social justice. This is about economic justice. This is about ensuring that the basic needs, health, education, [and] welfare of our Hawaiian people are being met" (Ku I Ka Pono 2003). Evoking similar notions of "justice," Linda Lingle, the current Hawai'i State Governor, also a participant in the march, later commented that the event's diverse turnout clearly indicated that a "majority of the community does support justice for Hawaiians" (Nakaso and Viotti 2003).

Events like the 'Ilio'ulaokalani Coalition's "March for Justice," which have been held in response to the escalating neo-liberal opposition to native Hawaiian entitlements, have been staged across the Islands with increasing frequency. And, like the September 7th march, these demonstrations have been principally organized around ideals of justice. However the latest neoliberal strategy—one which has appropriated the once-progressive language of "racial equality"—has forced the U.S. federal courts to deliberate over two divergent articulations of justice: justice for the historically-wronged Hawaiians versus justice for "all." In the aforementioned Arakaki v. Lingle District Court case, the plaintiffs—sixteen non-native Hawai'i residents—arguing on the grounds of the 14th Amendment,7 pursued their vision of justice by challenging the constitutionality of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA)8

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7 The U.S. Constitution's 14th Amendment states: "[XXX]."
8 The Office of Hawaiian Affairs was created by the State of Hawai'i in 1978. Its purpose is to advocate for native rights, cultural preservation, economic development, education, environment and natural resources, nationhood, social services, land and housing, and health care. Prior to Rice v. Cayetano, only native Hawaiians could vote for its all-Native Board of Trustees.
and the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (HHCA). A ruling in their favor, the plaintiffs argued, would endow the State as a whole, rather than just one racially-determined group, with over $100 million annually, a calculation drawn from the thousands of acres of land and millions of dollars of funding that are presently used to support native Hawaiian health, education, and welfare programs (Sing 2003).

The egalitarianism evoked by the plaintiffs’ claim is significant because it defines justice as the proper distribution of benefits and burdens amongst all the members of a given society (Young 1990: 15). In light of the vast differences that exist within the State of Hawai‘i in terms of access to material goods and services, such a formulation would appear to be well-principled. Nevertheless, it is important to note that this distributive framing of justice conditions the dispute over native Hawaiian entitlements in the favor of the conservative litigants. While native Hawaiian advocates have continued to emphasize the historical, legal, and socio-economic injustices incurred by the group in order to legitimate their claims to the ali‘i trusts, Hawaii’s conservative groups have responded by evoking the egalitarianism of distributive justice, asserting that need is not—and should not—be determined solely by race. Thus constituted, the legal battle is composed of two divergent claims of material need: the particularity of the native Hawaiian people versus the universality of a “color-blind” society. And, given the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent position on racial issues—a steadfast belief that racial classifications

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9 By the early 1900s, after disease, the Great Mahele, and the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom, the numbers of native Hawaiians had declined at an alarming rate. Of those who survived, many were living in poverty. To address this problem, in 1921 the U.S. Congress passed the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (HHCA) to designate a portion of the ceded lands as homesteads for persons of 50% or more Hawaiian blood.
never exist benignly (Katz 2000)—it would appear that native Hawaiian advocates are, if not prefigured to fail, poised to confront not only their conservative opponents, but the reigning mindset of the U.S. Supreme Court as well.

In the instance of *Arakaki v. Lingle*, Judge Susan Oki Mollway ultimately ruled in favor of the State and the plaintiffs have (that the time of this writing) yet to declare their intent to appeal. Nevertheless, the dispute over the constitutionality of native Hawaiian entitlements is far from over since *Arakaki* was just one of three federal lawsuits filed by neoliberal groups in 2003. The two other cases, both filed against the Kamehameha Schools, similarly argue that the schools’ “Hawaiian-only” admissions policy is racially discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional.

While several articles have examined the legal basis that has either enabled (Katz 2000) or should rightly disable (Kauanui 2002) the litigation against native Hawaiian entitlements, the argument advanced by this chapter moves in a different direction. By examining how race has and continues to mask expressions of state power, the chapter seeks to intervene in the ways in which politics is understood and performed in Hawai‘i. The point of departure, then, requires a complication of “justice,” one that destabilizes the reigning distributive figuration and opens the possibility for the more relational concept of “social justice” (Young 1990). By drawing upon Iris Marion Young’s concept, native Hawaiian advocates may be

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11 The *ali‘i* trusts refer to the lands and resources that have been solely dedicated to servicing the needs of the Hawaiian people following the United States’ 1893 illegal overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i.
better-positioned to address the forms of institutional oppression and exclusion that continue to plague Hawaii's modern history.

3. From Distributive to Social Justice

While distributive conceptions of justice may be well-suited to preside over the materiality of land, wealth, and resources, they are significantly less able to address the immaterial domain of power, opportunity, and self-respect. And, despite some claims that distributive models can be applied beyond the domain of material goods (Runciman 1978: 37; Ackerman 1980: 25; Galston 1980: 112), metaphorical extensions of distribution invariably replace complex social relations with the ahistorical flatness of static representations (Young 1990: 16). And this is precisely the problem (or promise depending upon one's intentions): distributive justice implicitly assumes a "social atomism" where individuals exist as fixed and distinct nodes within a social field (Ibid). Within this social field, individuals are assigned either larger or smaller portions of material and social goods and accordingly, members are related to one another only in respect to the goods they possess. As a result, social relations are reduced to quantitative comparisons regarding the amount of goods and social capital that each unit possesses (Ibid 18). Distributive models of justice, therefore, can be characterized by their inability to articulate the interrelations that exist amongst social members. While this may be attractive to those working to advance a neoliberal agenda—as the impartiality of statistics can be used to launder one's implication and indebtedness to others—Young's conception of "social justice"

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12 From Young 1990: 16-17.
finds this social atomism problematic because it obscures these forms of injustice that are endorsed by social structures and institutions (Young 1990: 15, 20, 21).

Seeking to disrupt neoliberal assertions of “racial equality,” the chapter will foreground the ways in which domination and oppression have been institutionalized and presented as normative facts. By foregrounding the institutionalization of Hawaii’s biopolitical narratives (i.e., “ethnic rainbow” and “racial paradise”)—narratives on cultural and racial amalgamation that govern the institutions of state, family, and workplace—the argument presented here will abandon those approaches that trace the in/equality of distribution in favor of a more fluid and relational concept of social justice. “The concept of social justice,” writes Young, “includes all aspects of institutional rules and relations insofar as they are subject to potential collective decision. The concepts of domination and oppression, rather than the concept of distribution, should be the starting point for a conception of social justice” (1990: 16).

An analysis of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rice v. Cayetano will illustrate how these divergent engagements with difference intersect with the institutionalization of race in Hawai‘i.

4. Rice v. Cayetano

In 1996, a non-native resident of Hawai‘i, Harold “Freddy” Rice, sued the State of Hawai‘i on the grounds that the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA)—the agency that administers programs designed to benefit peoples of Hawaiian descent—employed

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13 Language from Young 1990: 15, 21.
14 This is comprised of two subclasses: “native Hawaiians” and “Hawaiians.” “Native Hawaiians” refer to those descendants who are “not less than one-half part of the races inhabiting the Islands before 1778,” while “Hawaiians” represent a larger group (including
voting restrictions that were “race-based” and therefore in violation of the U.S. Constitution’s 15th Amendment.\(^\text{15}\) Despite early dismissals from Hawaii’s District Court and the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 2000 (7-2) that the restriction of OHA’s electorate to the “descendants of the 1778 inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands,” used ancestry as a “proxy for race” and therefore effectively “fenc[ed] out whole classes of...citizens from decision-making in critical state affairs” (120 S. Ct. at 1059).

The Justices’ decision was largely informed by the 1960 ruling of *Gomillion v. Lightfoot*, which eradicated a racial gerrymander erected to exclude the African-American residents from the political affairs of Tuskegee, Alabama (*Gomillion* 1960, 364 US: 339).\(^\text{16}\) In *Gomillion*’s majority opinion, Justice Frankfurter states that the redrawing of Tuskegee’s boundaries “from a square to an uncouth ... strangely irregular twenty-eight sided figure” (Ibid. 340, 341), removed nearly all African-American residents from the city’s limits. And, because this redrawing did not displace a single white voter, the Court found the State of Alabama to be “solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their preexisting municipal vote” (Ibid. 341). Such an action, the Court concluded, denied a racially-delineated segment of Tuskegee’s population the right to vote and thereby violated the U.S. Constitution’s 15th amendment.

\(^\text{15}\) The U.S. Constitution, amendment XV, section 1 states: “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”

\(^\text{16}\) From Katz 2000.
Amendment (Ibid. 347-348). Thus, the rationale behind the *Gomillion* Court's ruling was to eliminate institutional discrimination in the form of racial segregation.

The *Rice* ruling, drawing upon *Gomillion*, held that the State of Hawai‘i, like the Alabama State legislature before it, employed racial classifications to segregate voters. The fact that Hawaii's social context differed from Alabama's bore little significance. Whereas in Tuskegee, an empowered white majority singled out a "readily isolated segment of a racial minority for special discriminatory treatment," in Hawai‘i it was the non-native majority, through an amendment ratified by the State's 1978 Constitution, that voluntarily opted to fence themselves out of the electorate for the newly-formed OHA. Nevertheless, once it was determined that the State of Hawai‘i defined OHA's electorate in terms of race (through the proxy of "ancestry"), the Court, convinced that racial classifications never exist benignly (Katz 2000), found the absence of invidious intentions to be immaterial to *Rice's* Constitutional inquiry. In the words of Justice Kennedy: "Distinctions between citizens solely because of ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality" (*Rice* 2000:10).

In Kennedy's statement, two things become evident. First, he is evoking a universal and normative conception of justice that is self-standing and ahistorical.

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17 Justice Stevens's dissent in *Rice* makes this point when he argues that Hawaii acted without invidious intent. See *Rice*, 120 S. Ct. at 1063 (Stevens, J., dissenting): "[T]here is simply no invidious discrimination present in this effort to see that indigenous peoples are compensated for past wrongs, and to preserve a distinct and vibrant culture that is as much a part of the Nation's heritage as any" (Katz 2000: n11).

Second, the lynchpin for the *Rice* decision (as well as the subsequent suits founded upon its precedent) is the legal designation of native Hawaiians as a “race.” In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy accepted, at least partially, the State’s claims that: 1) the native people who compose OHA’s electorate hold a position similar to Native American Indian tribes, 2) OHA itself resembles a “special-purpose district” and not a general governmental body, and 3) OHA’s electorate held a distinct property interest in OHA’s electoral affairs (120 S. Ct. at 1058-61). Because these factors endowed OHA’s voting scheme with a non-suspect, political classification (as opposed to a forbidden racial one), the State of Hawai‘i argued that *Rice* ought to be placed beyond the ambit of the 15th Amendment. And, given the Court’s acceptance of these premises, it seems as though the State should have prevailed (Katz 2000). However, despite the Court’s disinclination to reject the State’s defense outright, the majority opinion maintained that the State’s premises failed to remove OHA from the protections provided by the 15th Amendment. The Justices conceded that native Hawaiians may, on occasion, qualify for the “tribal” designation presently afforded to Native Americans. This granting of tribal status would render OHA at least provisionally eligible for a non-racial/non-suspect status. Yet, the Court found that when “Hawaiian” was used as a classification to constitute an exclusive electorate for a federally-funded public agency, it evolved into a forbidden racial classification (120 S. Ct. at 1058-59). Further, the opinion held that even if the scope of OHA was limited to a “special-purpose district,” the use of racial classifications to delimit the eligibility of voters transforms the voting process from an ordinary administrative act into one implicated in the Constitutional protection of voting rights. Lastly, the *Rice*
decision held that while OHA’s electorate may indeed share a common property interest that might have legitimated its delimitation of voter participation, the use of a racial classification to define that interest “fatally corrupt[ed] any legitimate basis for the voting regime” (120 S. Ct. at 1060). The Court determined that when used in the administrative practices of state and federal programs, the “Hawaiian-only” designation demeaned the “dignity and worth” of the persons it judged because it privileged ancestry over individual “merit and essential qualities” (Rice 2000: 9).

Justice Kennedy’s opinion states that OHA’s criterion of ancestral lines “is not consistent with respect based on the unique personality each of us possesses, a respect the Constitution itself secures in its concern for persons and citizens” (Ibid).

These statements, in conjunction with Court’s aforementioned judgment that “[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality” (Rice 2000:10), are indicative of the egalitarianism and social atomism that characterize distributive conceptions of justice. “Equality,” however, whether evoked by marginalized groups, neoliberal conservatives, or Supreme Court Justices, entails the “ignoring of differences between individuals for a particular purpose or in a particular context” (Scott 1990: 44). And thus, in the metaphorical extension of distribution to the areas of “respect” and “dignity,” the differences that exist amongst Hawaii’s peoples are institutionally negated and replaced by the equality undifferentiated citizenry. In this sense, the institutionalization of “native Hawaiian” as a racial classification discursively elides questions of aboriginal claims to land and

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19 From Katz 2000.
resources by overcoding the active processes of domination and exclusion with an unsituated, anti-racial flatness. As the rhetoric of “racial equality” elevates the ideal of merit-based distribution as the archetype of impartiality (i.e. Kennedy’s use of “merit and essential qualities”), there has been in general a move towards a meritocracy that assumes an objective measurement of qualifications and performance, independent of cultural and normative attributes. However, because social competency cannot be separated from hegemonic values and norms, the “objectivity” attributed to such measures fails to exist. In other words, Kennedy’s majority opinion moves Hawai‘i towards a universal ideal that cannot exist independent of the exclusionary social structures that produce them. In this discursive shift to the “egalitarianism” of a meritocracy, the Rice decision effectively launders the United States’ relationship to the political, social, and economic abuses of the Hawaiian people. To use the words of Patricia Williams, “[t]he law thus becomes a shield behind which to avoid responsibility for the human repercussions of both governmental and publicly harmful private activity” (Williams 1987: 134). This inscription of Sameness—the e pluribus Unum of Hawaii’s peoples—has, since Robert Park’s influential period of Hawaii-based race studies, been promoted as the “solution” to Hawaii’s incommensurable biopolitical “problems.”

The Rice example illustrates how the egalitarianism of distributive justice foregoes the specificities of socio-political contexts. This administration of “justice” has assumed an impartial viewpoint, one that was positioned outside the actual circumstances from which the case arose. This “critical distance” endows the Court

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with a justice that is self-standing, universal, and beyond the influence of socially specific prejudices or self-interested claims of power (Young 1990: 2). Yet, by transporting the particularities of Hawaii’s history to the “level playing field” of American justice, the Court has denied the free play of difference and contingency by recasting the given (i.e., that racial discrimination is wrong) as both necessary and universally applicable.

The problem, however, is that this desire for impartiality is predicated upon the ideal that every moral situation ought to be governed by the same rules. In this sense, claims of impartiality can “feed cultural imperialism by allowing the particular experience and perspective of privileged groups to parade as universal” (Young 1990: 10). In Rice, for example, the desire for impartiality resulted in a removal of the particularities of Hawaii’s socio-historical context from Court deliberations. As a result, the majority opinion was unable to recognize that the circumstances of Gomillion’s Tuskegee were radically different from the politics of present-day Hawai‘i. By conflating Rice’s neoliberal litigants with the embattled African Americans of a pre-Civil Rights Alabama, the Court preserved the universal ideal of racial equality, one that has contributed to the continued oppression of native Hawaiian peoples.

In light of Rice’s authorization of native Hawaiians as a “racial” group, future indigenous political actions will be forced (to some degree) to confront in the politics of race. And, because race too often circulates throughout Hawai‘i as an innocent and durable cultural artifact, it has become increasingly necessary to understand how Hawaii’s unique racial categories emerged as a normative reality. By exploring how
the Territorial Administration employed racial classifications, it may be possible to forge more productive responses to the arguments presented by the neoliberal opposition.

5. Focused Genealogy

In a 1926 Survey Graphic article, famed University of Chicago sociologist Robert Park signaled the then-Territory of Hawai‘i as America’s “racial frontier” (Park 1926: 192-196). In the years that followed, Park and his students treated the Islands as their own “racial laboratory” and, operating out of the University of Hawaii’s Sociology Department, published a collection of studies which ultimately conditioned American notions of race, acculturation, and assimilation.

While a number of studies have detailed how these Hawai‘i-based “frontier studies” influenced the development of America’s racial discourse (Matthews 1976; Raushenbush 1979; Palumbo-Liu 1999; Yu 2001; Rosa 2001), little attention has been paid to the lasting impressions that this scholarship has left within the Islands themselves. In particular, what has remained unmarked are the ways in which this prolific era of sociological research contributed to the crystallization of Hawaii’s racial classifications. And, in light of the neoliberal attack against native Hawaiian entitlements and the Rice decision’s designation of Hawaiians as a “racial” group, it has become increasingly necessary to examine not only how Hawaii’s unique racial

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21 The University of Hawaii’s Department of Sociology was founded in 1919 by Romanzo Colfax Adams, one of Park’s students while at the University of Chicago.

22 Jonathan Okamura’s “???” in Amerasia Journal 26: 2 stands as an exception.
taxonomy emerged as a normative reality, but to also consider what this emergence reveals about the implementation of institutional power.\textsuperscript{23}

The inscription of Sameness has, since the era of Hawaii-based race studies, been promoted as the "solution" to Hawaii's incommensurable biopolitical problems. At its peak, the Park-influenced race studies produced several unreflexively savage writings. However, before delving into the archives of the University of Hawaii's race studies, it is critical to emphasize that Hawaii's racial classifications did not naturally sprout out of the land.\textsuperscript{24} Instead, their rise to a normative reality is indebted to a multiplicity of often minor processes, of different origins and scattered locations, which overlapped, repeated, or imitated one another, supported one another, distinguished themselves from one another according to their domain of application, converge, and gradually produced the blueprint of a general method (Foucault 1979: 138). It is for this reason that the present study is concerned with the interstitial forces that contributed to the governing of Territorial Hawai'i. What becomes apparent, however, is that these enumerative apparatuses of control were less a coordinated, deliberate strategy than a reactionary, fragmented, serendipitous effort to maintain control and promote Hawaii's teleological trajectory towards Americanization. This is not to say that these apparatuses became less significant after Hawai'i attained statehood in 1959, but it is critical to note how these processes contributed not only to the Islands' socio-political transformation, but also as well as the laundering of colonial violence from the settler experience. With this in mind, the following section presents a focused genealogy that stages those legal and

\textsuperscript{23} Language drawn from Scott 35, 43.
\textsuperscript{24} Language from Foucault's \textit{Discipline and Punish} (1979: 138).
bureaucratic forces that incorporeally transformed Hawaii’s peoples into distinct races.

In *Colonizing Hawai‘i: The Cultural Power of Law* (2000), Sally Merry notes that within the classic histories of Kuykendall (1938; 1953; 1967), Daws (1968), and Fuchs (1961), Hawaii’s transformation from an independent Kingdom to a conquered U.S. Territory is typically told as one of gradualism and invitation, as predictable as it was inevitable (Merry 2000: 25, 7). Her studied discovered, however, that when closely examining Hawaii’s legal archives, what emerges is a colonial process characterized by both uncertainty and ambiguity (Ibid., 7). “Reexamining these decisions in hindsight,” writes Merry, “with far greater knowledge of their consequences, it is difficult to appreciate the very different conditions under which these decisions were made in the first place” (Ibid). And, while an exploration of these processes does not offer anything along the lines of a causal explanation, it does foreground the juridical, bureaucratic, and institutional overlappings that, however serendipitously, conditioned the ideas of race in Hawai‘i.

6. Early Conceptions of Race in Hawai‘i

The American form of colonialism introduced to Hawai‘i was strikingly different from its British counterpart because of the New England missionaries’ willingness to welcome all peoples who were willing to transform their cultural selves in accordance with the principles of Christian civilization (Ibid., 23). Over time, however, the growing significance of race came to undermine the missionaries’ eagerness to incorporate Native Hawaiians into their civilizing project. The 18th and early-19th century framings of other cultures and religions as “evil” and “immoral” gradually
came to be replaced by late-19th and 20th-century views that it was individuals themselves who needed to reform (Ibid., 20-21). The missionaries' transformative desire shifted from the culture that needed to advance to individuals who needed to be taught sexual self-discipline, punctuality, enterprise, and saving (Ibid). At the same time, there was a transformation in the understandings of difference between Europeans and the peoples of Asia, Africa, and the Pacific. Prior cultural and religious explanations were abandoned in favor of concrete biological distinctions such as skin shade, hair contour, eyelid configuration—all of worked can to represent innate character differences. In other words, there was an epistemic shift from the missionaries’ concern for the soul to the colonial administration’s focus on the body as the marker of difference. Whereas the 17th and 18th century perspectives believed difference could be effaced through the learning of language, manners, and religion, by the 19th and 20th century, these physical markers came to represent a permanent and immutable bodily-inscribed disfigurement.

Part of this transformation was provoked by the missionaries’ failure to transform the “bodily deportment” and “self-discipline” of the Hawaiian people (Ibid., 249). In justifying their failures to potential New England donors, the missionaries portrayed Hawaiians as “inherently licentious, idle, and intellectually incapable” (Ibid). This characterization contrasted sharply with those of the “noble warriors” that proliferated during Cook’s time as well as statements about their industry and intellectual capacity during the missionaries’ remarkably successful conversion of Hawaii’s ruling chiefs (Ibid). What emerged, then, was a “new rhetoric about the
‘nature’ of Hawaiian people and their innate habits,” one that naturalized fixed differences and rationalize their resistance to the “civilizing project” (Ibid).

Thus, by the time of the U.S. annexation of Hawai‘i in 1898, the primacy of race and the belief in immutability of difference had become so strong that one of the reasons some Americans resisted the takeover of Hawai‘i was due to its diverse racial composition. “Beliefs in the inferiority of barbarian societies,” writes Merry, as well as “the alleged innate incapacity of nonwhite ‘races’ rendered the incorporation of the islands deeply questionable” (Ibid.). This sentiment is critical to the present study because it articulates the anxieties created by the threat of heterogeneity. It is here where intra-national difference becomes a “problem” in need of a “solution.” The primary reason for introducing Merry’s work, however, is her examination of sixty years worth of records from the Hilo District Court effectively demonstrates the emergence of Hawaii’s racial categories.

7. Legal Apparatus

Hormann, one of the Park-influenced contributors to Social Process in Hawaii, noted: “[w]hat is called a race in Hawaii may be referred to on the Mainland as race, nationality, minority group, ethnic group, cultural group, and ancestry group” (Hormann SPHI2: 28). In spite of this historical slippage between Hawai‘i and the continental U.S., the 2000 Rice ruling maintained that ancestry stood as a proxy for race and thereby institutionalized a direct, one-to-one correlation. It is possible, however, that if the Supreme Court had been more sensitive to the historical contours of Hawaii’s racial discourse, the applicability of Gomillion in Rice may have been
deemed unsuitable. Therefore, it is instructive to examine Merry’s treatment of race’s emergence as a legal category throughout the colonial and Territorial administrations.

Merry notes that court records, particularly during the latter part of the 19th century, are quite explicit about ethnicity (Merry 2000: 138). “Of a total set of 5,628 district and circuit court cases,” she notes, “half (51 percent) mentioned the ethnic identity of the defendants” (Ibid). And, while ethnicity was mentioned in about half the cases that occurred between 1860 and 1880, the percentage grew in the 1890s and 1900s when “ethnic identity was mentioned in more than three-fourths of all cases” (Ibid). Merry’s attention to “ethnicity” and “ethnic identity” becomes complicated, however, by the courts’ concurrent attention to “nationality.” She notes that of the 2,510 Circuit Court cases held between 1852 and 1892, “62 percent mentioned the defendant’s nationality, and in the District Court of the same period, 54 percent identified nationality, reaching a high of 89 percent in 1893” (Ibid.). This variation is indicative of the Courts’ almost exclusive identification of Puerto Ricans and Japanese by nationality. National identifications of Hawaiian were rare (20 percent of the cases), with haoles (whites) occurring even less often (12 percent). Moreover, the “[n]ineteenth-century District Court case records frequently refer to witness and defendants as “the Chinaman” or “Jap” rather than by name, but haoles and generally identified by name” (Ibid.). In this respect, the Courts’ system of identification contributed to the homogenization and essentialization of the variegated identities of immigrant and settled populations of nineteenth- and early-twentieth century Hawai’i (2000: 143). Japanese immigrants were consolidated into a single identity, regardless of their prefectural, religious, and class differences. The same was the case for
Hawaii’s Chinese and Filipino populations, in spite of the vast regional differences that exist within both groups. Native Hawaiians, despite significant differences in social status, similarly became a singular identity. The categories utilized by the court records represented what Merry calls a “crystallization of complex local and regional identities within the Hawaiian context” (Ibid.). “Indeed,” she continues, “it was processes of marking and recording these identities in official documents such as court records that helped to create the regime of essentialized national identities that came to dominate Hawaiian social life in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century” (Ibid.).

This essentialization of colonial and Territorial subjects within the court records resonated with the concurrent ordering of Hawaii’s plantation labor force. By ordering laborers in terms of nationality, this system of discipline fortified the social hierarchy of racial and gendered identities that Hawaii’s planter paternalism relied upon (Ibid., 143; 140). The discourse of nationality informed not only court records, but other structures of governmentality as well. Official communications, planters’ journals, police arrest statistics, and (as will be demonstrated later through Virginia Dominguez’s work on Hawaii’s censuses) Territorial censuses were all, at least until the 1940s, structured by nationality.

This system of disciplinary classification, however, was bidirectional as it homogenized not only Hawaii’s subordinates but also the haole elites who, according to Merry, “took on a uniformity of identity, extending even to the body, as they all came to be ‘strong and virile’, or ‘tall of stature’” (Ibid.). The haole elites’ power drew added strength from the reformist element of Hawaii’s missionary society, one
coded violence as the kind of discipline needed to improve the character of its subjects (Ibid., 139). This paternalism, according to Merry, “paved the way for the eventual takeover of the islands in a highly illegal act by the representatives of the U.S. government in 1893” (Ibid., 257).

By tracing the emergence of Hawaii’s ethno-national categories through colonial and Territorial legal records, Merry’s work describes the production of a social knowledge about a “truth of bodies” (2000: 263). It illustrates how a modernist epistemology of numbers and types of bodies emerged out of the colonial law through the “forms filled out, boxes checked, tables rendered” and in time enabled a form of governance (Ibid). As bodies were being enumerated, classified and fixed, “peoples” were being regrouped and reconfigured according to somatic, cultural, and psychological criteria that made administrative control both necessary and credible.25 In this sense, the notions of “population” and “people” were crafted though vast documentation projects that bolstered colonial control, with both conceptions representing “state-building and nation-building projects in which a racial grammar tying certain physical attributes to specific hidden dispositions played a crucial role” (Stoler 1995: 39).

8. Bureaucratic Apparatus

While Merry’s work illustrates the classificatory logic of colonial regimes, equal attention must also be paid to the ways in which these categories were quantified in censuses, surveys, racial studies, and various other productions of the colonial archive (Appadurai 1997: 315). In this sense, Hawaii’s Territorial censuses can be read not as

25 Language from Stoler 39.
passive instruments of data-gathering, but as a bureaucratic institutionalization of
categorical identities (Ibid., 317). This statistical panopticon was an increasingly
important part of the illusion of bureaucratic power where “countable abstractions” of
both people and resources produced an image of Hawai‘i as a domesticated society. 26

“For the mature colonial state,” writes Appadurai, “numbers were part of a complex
imaginaire in which the utilitarian needs of fiscal militarism in the world-system, the
classificatory logics of orientalist ethnology, the shadow presence of western
democratic ideas of numerical representation, and the general shift from a
classificatory to a numerical bio-politics create[d] an evolving logic that reached a
critical conjunctural point in the last three decades of the nineteenth century and the
first two decades of the twentieth” (Ibid., 333).

The Territorial census’s official enforcement of labeling activities brought
together the exoticizing vision of Orientalism with the familiarizing discourse of
statistics, coding Hawaii’s subjects in a “soft exoticism,” simultaneously strange and
docile. 27 Thus, these colonial body counts created not only distinct types and
classes—they also couched subjects within a settled form of unity since statistics, by
their very nature, flatten idiosyncrasies and create boundaries around homogenous
bodies, performatively limiting their extent (Ibid). Thus, the language of numbers
recovered the incommensurability of Hawaii’s diversity through a statistical
domestication of heterogeneity, which both counted and accounted for the “humdrum
projects of taxation, sanitation, education, warfare, and loyalty” (Ibid). Virginia
Dominguez’s “Exporting U.S. Concepts of Race” (1998) is significant because it

26 Language from Appadurai 333; 317.
27 Language from Appadurai 333 and “soft exoticism” comes from Desmond.
maps the institutionalization of racial categories throughout each incarnation of Hawaii's official census categories.

As established earlier, “race” as an official form of classification, is a relatively recent phenomenon in Hawai‘i. Only after the U.S. annexation of the Islands in 1898 did Hawaiʻi censuses to require racial classifications. This is not to suggest that the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi was an egalitarian state prior to annexation, but rather “its terms of distinction and modes of differentiation had very little overlap with Anglo-American racial ones” (Dominguez 1998). Indeed, Hawaiian society was ordered through a rigid system of social ranking, governed by a bilineal genealogical reckoning (Kamakau 1991). Yet, Dominguez asserts that this alone is not evidence of “racial thinking.” She maintains that prior to American occupation, there were no institutional practices (i.e. prohibitions on marriage, citizenship, etc.) that promoted social, reproductive, or civic exclusivity based upon racial terms (Dominguez 1998). In fact, there is little evidence of the existence of racialized distinctions in Hawaiian society prior to Cook’s arrival at the end of the 18th century. While there are references to phenotypic traits such as “reddish hair” and “red-eyed outcasts,” Dominguez notes that with the exception of references to the “height at which each ali‘i stood,” there exists no systematic invocation or reference to the body or skin color in any of the key documents written by nineteenth-century Hawaiian historians (Ibid.). And, while it is evident that by the 1850s, Hawaiian society became aware of the Anglo-American use of race through reports on slavery, it

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appears that race held very little purchase either institutionally or conceptually throughout much of the 19th century.

Dominguez’s study found that by the mid- to late-19th century, Hawai‘i did adopt a taxonomy to classify its subjects, but it was one based upon nationality rather than race; that by the end of the 19th century, the concepts of “nation” and “nationality” had a growing presence in governmental practices and public discussions. Specifically, the 1872 and 1884 Hawaiian censuses classified people by age, sex, and “nationality,” with the categories under “nationality” being: Natives, Half-castes, Hawaiian-born foreigners, Americans, British, Germans, French, Portuguese, Norwegians, Chinese, Japanese, Polynesians, and Other Nationalities (Ibid.). These categories, according to Dominguez, imply an “openness to, rather than a blanket rejection of, foreign taxonomies” (Ibid.). However, she continues, “what we know for sure is that ‘race’ and ‘color’ remained elusive as principles of classification and modes of reference at least into the 1880s” (Ibid). Everything would change after American annexation as the Territory’s first census in 1900 blatantly classified Islands’ population by “color” (Ibid.). While “nationality” remained a consideration, the population was also accounted for in terms of “Total White,” “Native White,” “Native White of native parentage,” “Native White of foreign parentage,” “Foreign White,” “Chinese,” “Japanese,” and “Negro.” Within these categories, as with the legal classifications disclosed by Merry, one can witness a haphazard conflation of color, racial, and national origins.

This transformation exposes the prior absence of “race” in Hawai‘i as much as it exhibits America’s dependence on “race.” Whatever hesitancy existed on the part
of Hawaii’s monarchy to implement European notions of race proved to be insignificant for the U.S. Territorial bureaucracy. While some difficulties arose for the American administrators, rather than rejecting the use of a racial taxonomy, they were determined to force its application. “From the vantage point of the Bureau of the Census and other administrative offices in both Washington and Honolulu,” writes Dominguez, “Hawai’i was just one more place to adapt, recategorized, and incorporate within the [American] racial taxonomy” (1998.).

In the years immediately following annexation, Territorial officials were forced to employ a terminological duality and simultaneity in order to mitigate the tension between its dogged adherence to racial thinking and the incommensurability of Islands’ population with the white-black duality of the continental U.S. The 1910 Hawai’i census categorized “race” as: “Hawaiians, Part-Hawaiians, Portuguese, Spanish, Porto [sic] Ricans, Other Caucasians, Chinese, Japanese, and All Others.” A 1920 report for the “Superintendent of Public Instruction” included a table titled “Nationality of Pupils,” yet the heading of the table’s column read, “Races”: Hawaiian (3,293); Part-Hawaiian (4,100); Anglo-Saxon (1,033); Scandinavian (34); Portuguese (5,304); Filipinos (941); Spanish (379); Chinese (3,721); Japanese (17,541); Porto Rican (1,068); Korean (508); Other Foreigners (373). This biopolitical sculpting did more than prepare the Islands’ heterogeneous citizenry for incorporation into the American racial-spatial order. It also worked to establish the conditions needed for Hawaii’s economic transformation: Dominguez comments on the conspicuous absence of “Negro,” “Black,” or “colored” in these lists, stating that during this period “Hawai’i was being romanticized through postcards, music, dance,
and a burgeoning tourist industry intent on selling Hawai‘i as both foreign and safe for (white) Americans, that is, as a place not constituted by racial tension, without a history of slavery and, hence, without negroes” (1998: ??). This evinces another integral component to the function of race in Hawai‘i. For if the Islands were to take root in the American imaginary—both as a state in the union and as a viable tourist destination—there needed to be a reduction in not only physical distance, but also a closing of socio-cultural distance. Technological advancements would reduce the time between the West Coast and Honolulu. Mass media would create a desire for the tropical dream paradise. However, it would be the Territorial Administration’s intellectual apparatus, specifically its fetishization of interracial marriage and miscegenation, that would produce the “soft exoticism” of Hawai‘i—exotically different yet unquestionably American.

9. Intellectual Apparatus

The 1920s witnessed a significant rise in popular and academic concern regarding the American “problem” of race relations (Matthews 1976: 157). On the U.S. mainland, political conversations regarding the assimilation and restriction of European immigrants, the rights and “place” of Negroes, and Oriental exclusion were of absorbing importance. The then-budding social sciences naturally turned their attention toward these problems (Matthews 1976: 157). In the spirit of Huxley and Wells, these social scientific interventions sought to replace the savagery of Darwinism with the more “ethical” form of existential egalitarianism. Sociology provided the perspective that seemed best equipped to understand the social relationships between the particular and the universal. And, if sociologists could
understand a particular group's position relative to the rest of mankind, then that
group could presumably be embraced within an ever-growing universal
consciousness. Sociology, therefore, as a universal and unifying perspective on all
peoples, stood as the encapsulation of modernity (Yu 2001: 87) and progressive
social scientists from the Chicago School came to define America as the prototypical
modern nation through their research on the primitive Others against which it was
differentiated (Ibid., 86). Thus, the melting pot civilization of America, the end goal
of a culturally assimilated United States, came to stand in for modernity itself (Ibid.,
88).

Perhaps the era's most famous social scientist was the University of
Wisconsin's E.A. Ross, a prominent Progressive Party intellectual who advocated for
the social sciences to become an instrumental tool in guiding the progress of society
(Ibid., 27.). Ross and his contemporaries would pioneer a vision of the social
sciences that shared a tenet with the mission of Protestant ministries—the planning
and implementation of social reform by highly educated elites (Ibid.). While some
historians have distanced Robert Park from Ross's progressive agenda, claiming that
"[Park] did not consider it his job to advocate for social reform," and that his view of
sociology "was not the improvement of society but the description of society and how
it work[ed]" (Ibid., 28), Park's research undeniably sought to provide reasonable
"solutions" to both the "Negro" and "Oriental problems." In this sense, the centrality
of Robert Park's theories in the shaping of America's popular and political
understandings of ethnicity is unquestionable (Ibid., 8). In particular, his interaction
cycle (also called the "assimilation cycle" and "race relations cycle") and theories

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about "race prejudice" and "marginality" left an indelible mark on American social thought (Ibid.).

In the years between 1929 and 1934, Park traveled and studied in Japan, China, India, Africa, and Brazil (Matthews 1976: 174). On September 12, 1931, Park sailed from Vancouver to Hawai‘i where he spent a year as a resident professor at the University of Hawai‘i (Raushenbush 1979: 131). Park was intrigued by the "formidable quality of Hawaii as a melting pot," (Ibid., 132) finding the Islands "particularly congenial as an exotic and colorful collection of races" (Matthews 1976: 174). As the westernmost point of America, Hawai‘i was taken as the extreme frontier, the future of the United States (Yu 2001: 81). Park and his students would come to believe that if they could prove the "races were getting along in Hawai‘i," that they would have proof of hope for the rest of the United States. Thus, Hawai‘i-as-racial frontier symbolized the unfolding of America through time—the further west one traveled, the more one delved into the future stages of American development (Ibid.). “It is significant,” observes David Palumbo-Liu, “that the Pacific was a particular site for such assimilationist experimentation...Park’s students, most notably Romanzo Adams, traveled to Hawai‘i to plumb what he called a ‘racial laboratory’, wherein the limits of hybridity and the parameters for an engagement with Asia would be tested” (Palumbo-Liu 1999: 20). As such, Park and his students from the Chicago School of Sociology viewed Hawai‘i as their own laboratory where "outstanding race studies” were to be performed (Rosa 2001: 51). The Chicago sociologists would come to Hawai‘i as if it was a pilgrimage site (Yu 2001: 82). Beginning with Romanzo Adams, who founded the University of Hawaii’s Sociology
Department in 1919, and continuing until the 1970s, sociology in Hawai‘i was dominated by Chicago graduates (Ibid.). Even after the famed Survey of Race Relations had concluded its studies on the West Coast, research continued in Honolulu as Chicago sociologists such as Park, William Smith, Andrew Lind, and Edward Byron Reuters migrated to Hawai‘i to carry out their race studies (Ibid.).

In these studies, the Chicago sociologists created a new outlook on race and culture in American social thought (Ibid., 45). They forged modern understandings of Hawaii’s racial identities by mapping the divergences between group consciousnesses. If a group of people shared a similar way of understanding the world, then they shared a culture; therefore, if a group shared a similar consciousness of place in the world because they were conscious of their physical difference from others, then they shared a racial culture (Ibid.). Race consciousness, in this sense, was equated with cultural difference as they believed the physicality of race would eventually give way to cultural consciousness (Ibid.).

Park’s best known and most influential contribution was his proposal for a coherent theory of social processes called the “interaction cycle.” According to Park, American racial and ethnic relations could only be understood in the context of this universal interaction cycle that was set in motion whenever diverse ethnic groups were brought into long-term contact (Matthews 1976: 164). This unidirectional cycle sought to organize the progression of ethnic encounters into four stages: competition, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation. The intermediary stages, “conflict” and “accommodation,” were characterized by greater instability than those at either end of the cycle. And, in the final stage, assimilation, differences amongst individuals and
groups were believed to be eroded and reduced to triviality by the "mutual introjection of alien values" (Matthews 1976: 161). Assimilation, then, was presented as a more stable stage than accommodation since it did not require a rational compromise of conflicting and distinctive elements. Rather, assimilation gradually homogenized foreign traits, which led to easier relations until once-disparate elements blended into a looser, imperfect yet viable new community, characterized not by complete uniformity but by easy intercourse and agreement on values sufficient to ensure stable relationships (Ibid.). When dealing with contacts between races, Park called this process the "race relations cycle," when dealing with the adjustments of immigrants to the United States, he called it the "assimilation" or "Americanization" cycle (Yu 2001: 40). And, evincing his modernist agenda, Park asserted that his race relations cycle was "apparently progressive and irreversible" (Park 1926: 192).

The Chicago-trained sociologists were heavily invested in connecting the study of America's European immigrants with studies on racial conflict (Yu 2001: 41). The trends revealed in the Americanization of European immigrants suggested that assimilation was an inevitable process. The enduring conflicts between "Negroes" and "whites" and "Orientals" and "whites," on the other hand, seemed interminable. Noting that the "Japanese, Chinese, and Negroes" remained segregated from other Americans, Park feared that they would continue to stand as exceptions to his interaction cycle. Thus, in order to substantiate the universal applicability of his interaction cycle, all three situations—European immigration, the Negro Problem and the Oriental Problem—would need to be resolved with the same result: the increased social contacts and the eventual sharing of memories that would bring all Americans
together in a common consciousness (Ibid.). As such, by intertwining American
definitions of race and culture with international immigration and modernity, the
Chicago sociologists built the foundation for a nationally defined study of race
relations and immigration (Ibid.). This study, however, was undergirded by an
intellectual pursuit that “emphasized and valued exoticism, even as it demanded its
ultimate erasure” (Ibid.). “The end result,” writes Henry Yu, “has been a structure for
the production of knowledge of the exotic that has endured, founded on the
tremendous privilege that white American academics held in this project of
enlightenment” (Ibid.).

With their focus on migrancy and assimilation, the Chicago sociologists’
research came to build a strong connection between notions of cultural consciousness
and the physicality of space. Their concept of “social distance” reinforced their
rejection of the belief that the physical body as the origin of mental differences yet
still providing a tangible way of measuring the practices of racial segregation (Ibid.).
Measurement of social distance, therefore, equipped the Chicago sociologists with a
simple way of quantifying racial prejudice through spatial metaphors: living in the
same country, city, neighborhood, home, or bed (Ibid.). “The idea was simple and
elegant,” writes Henry Yu:

People were asked in questionnaires to rank on a scale from 1 to 5 how they
felt about another racial group. If they wanted them driven from the country,
their answer would be 5. Allowing them into your home as friends would be a
2, and actually marrying someone and living with them was a 1 or even a
zero” (Ibid.).

Thus, through these quantifications of social distance, intermarriage and
miscegenation would come to stand as the “ground zero” and thereby emerged as the
perfect site for investigating the erasure of physical distances between two
races/cultures. As Yu suggests—and the rest of this chapter will demonstrate—the
"strangest result was that in objectifying racial prejudice as a quasi-physical quantity
that could be measured, the categories of race became fixed (Yu 2001: 52).

10. Social Distance and Interracial Marriage

At the beginning of the twentieth-century, mass migrations from the Asia to West
Coast of the United States were met by a comparable increase social distance. Park,
however, believed that the lessening of physical space could only result in a decline
in social distance. As a result, despite a lack of any supporting evidence, Park argued
that the “rising tides of color and Oriental exclusion laws” were merely “incidental
evidences” of diminishing social distance (Ibid.). Intermarriage, therefore, stood as
the crossing point along the boundaries between social groups. Sexual relations and
reproduction came to represent the most intimate of social relations, equated with the
shortest measurable distance (both physical and social) between two races or cultures.
Racial intermarriage was thus the truly successful end, the “ultimate proof” of a
complete American assimilation.

Park was interested in intermarriage for two reasons: 1) as the focal point of
inter-cultural contact and 2) as a relationship that produced racially mixed offspring
(Ibid., 61). Intermarriage would be extrapolated as a synecdoche for all race
relations—the distillation of two different racial groups coming into intimate contact.
Thus, the relationships between a man and a woman from two different races became
the perfect site for discovering how different races and cultures could co-exist. In this
respect, intermarriage could stand as a potential “solution” to both the “Negro” and
“Oriental” Problems. If physical markers, such as skin color, lead to an awareness of racial difference, then the process of “physical amalgamation” could eventually remove such markers. While Yu asserts that Park’s faith in intermarriage as a biological homogenizer was purely theoretical, that Park never advocated it as a solution, the work of his Hawai‘i-based protégés prove otherwise. But, before examining the archive of Social Process in Hawaii, it is necessary to examine the logic that sustains Park’s interaction cycle by revisiting the theoretical engagement with difference.

11. Dissonance between Simmel’s “Stranger” & Park’s “Marginal Man”

Park’s theories on race relations were predominantly influenced by Georg Simmel. While attending Simmel’s graduate seminars at the University of Berlin, Park was seduced by Simmel’s concept of the “stranger” (Rodgers 1994: 62). Simmel’s understanding of society was such that, “[t]he groups with which the individual is affiliated constitute a system of coordinates, as it were, such that each new group with which he becomes affiliated circumscribes him more exactly and less ambiguously” (Simmel 1922: 140). In this sense, social networks work to limit the possibilities of individuals. Simmel’s concept of the “stranger,” as the wanderer who comes today and stays tomorrow (Simmel 1950: 402), is relatively free from such networks and thus can more easily deviate from the norms of the system (Rodgers 1994: 61). Simmel’s “stranger,” therefore, is one who lives in intimate association with the world about him but never to a point has inhibits a certain critical detachment.

Park served as the main conduit through which Simmel’s theories were imported to the United States (Rodgers 1994: 63). He would apply Simmel’s concept
to an American context, modifying it slightly—but critically—to become a staple of
the Park-influenced body of race research: the “marginal man.” In his work prior to
arriving at his “racial laboratory” of Hawai‘i, Park wrote of the newly-arrived Jewish
immigrants in the United States: “The emancipated Jew was, and is, historically and
typically the marginal man, the first cosmopolite and citizen of the world. He is, par
excellence, the “stranger,” whom Simmel, himself a Jew, has described with such
profound insight and understanding in his Sociologie” (Park 1928: 205). Park
continues by asserting: “The autobiographies of Jewish immigrants, of which a great
number have been published in America in recent years are all different versions of
the same story—the story of the marginal men; the men who, emerging from the
ghetto in which he lived in Europe, is seeking to find a place in the freer, more
complex and cosmopolitan life of an American city” (Park 1928: 205). Thus, Park
culminates by stating that it is within the minds of the “marginal men” that one can
find the “changes and fusions of culture” and study the “processes of civilization and
of progress” (Park 1928: 206). Within this lies traces of the modernist project that
informed the Hawai‘i-based race studies.

But, it must be noted that Park’s conflation of his “marginal man” with
Simmel’s “stranger” is critically flawed. While Park’s “marginal man” is
characterized as a racial and/or cultural hybrid that aspires to, but is excluded from,
full membership in society, Simmel’s conceptualization of the “stranger” is one who
never desires to become assimilated. Simmel’s “stranger,” therefore, is the perpetual
wanderer, one who “does not conform completely to the norms of the system” and
refuses to surrender the freedom of coming and going (Rodgers 1994: 61; Levine
1985: 75). Thus, whereas the dejected “marginal man” of Park’s studies was depicted
as suffering from spiritual instability, one exacerbated by self-consciousness,
restlessness, and malaise, Simmel’s “stranger” occupied an indeterminate position in
relation to the larger group. This tension can be understood as a dissonance in their
engagements with difference: with Park’s desire for assimilation, the “marginal man”
moves towards the negation of difference whereas Simmel’s “stranger” affirms
difference through the recognition of incommensurable positions. These are two
markedly different engagements with difference. The limitations of Park’s “marginal
man,” however, would become institutionalized and later glorified as the
“amalgamation” produced by interracial marriage.

12. Stonequist’s *Marginal Man in Hawaii*

One of Park’s students, Everett Stonequist, would extend the concept of the “marginal
man” by applying it to hybrid societies throughout the world. “With Professor Park’s
encouragement,” Stonequist writes in the introduction of his *The Marginal Man*
(1937), “I undertook to analyze further the validity of [the marginal man] hypothesis,
presenting the preliminary results of this study in 1930. Since then, I have pursued
the subject by travel in Europe, in Hawaii, and the Caribbean” (Stonequist 1937: vii).

Believing that the “vast expansion of Europe during the last 400 years has
brought about changes more devastating than in any earlier in period in the world’s
history,” Stonequist wrote that there existed “everywhere an interpenetration of
peoples and a fusion of cultures” (Stonequist 1937: xiv). He argued that out of this
process a certain “personality type” emerged, one that “if not wholly new is at any
rate peculiarly characteristic of the modern world: the marginal man” (Stonequist
1937: xiv). “The marginal man,” writes Stonequist, “is one whom fate has
condemned to live in two societies and in two, not merely different but antagonistic,
cultures (Stonequist 1937: xv). A “marginal man,” he continues, is an “individual
who through migration, education, marriage or some other influence leaves one social
group or culture without making a satisfactory adjustment to another” and therefore
finds oneself “on the margin of each but a member of neither” (Stonequist 1937: 2).

After first detailing a number of hybrid configurations, Stonequist ultimately
settles upon the focus of his study: “The most obvious type of marginal man is the
person of mixed racial ancestry” (Ibid., 10). Claiming that mixed race individuals
generally possess distinctive physical, behavioral, and cultural traits that are derived
from both lines of their ancestry, Stonequist asserts that “these peculiarities of mixed
blood presents a special problem for the community: what is to be [the mixed blood’s]
place in the social organization” (Ibid.)? In answering this question, Stonequist’s
study introduces the principle theme of his research—the assimilative potential of
racial amalgamation. He claims that the “problem” of mixed race children is that
they are of “incomplete social assimilation as well as of incomplete biological
amalgamation” (Ibid: 11). However, he continues by claiming that as the processes
of amalgamation and assimilation proceed, the status of the mixed bloods will
improve as they gradually become the preponderant or “normal” type (Ibid.).
Exhibiting traces of Park, Stonequist claims that at the end of this process, mixed race
individuals will no longer be “considered hybrids but a new ‘race’” (Ibid). Thus, the
end result is that “complete racial intermixture in any given region solves the problem
which arises from partial intermixture” (Ibid.).
Until the problem of the mixed blood's marginality is solved, Stonequist declares, their role in society should be to function as intermediaries between two societies. "Mixed bloods are logically suited for this part," he writes, "since in physical and social make-up they are attached to each of the parent races" (Stonequist 1937: 175). However, in this assertion, one can see how Stonequist's treatment of racial mixture in fact reinforces racial boundaries. That, despite the ambiguity or transgression produced by miscegenation, Stonequist fortifies Hawaii's racial categories by naturalizing the cohesiveness of the so-called parent races. It is critical to note that Stonequist's Hawai'i studies employed the "racial" categories produced by the Territory's legal and bureaucratic apparatuses: an indiscriminate collection of nationalities, ethnicities, races, and skin colors. This is evinced later as Stonequist writes, citing Stanley Porteus's notorious "Human Studies in Hawaii," that the "Chinese-Caucasian-Hawaiian mixture (where the Caucasians are northwest European in origin) has been found to rank higher in psychological tests than other Hawaiian mixtures, or most pure 'races' in Hawaii" (1937: 43 fn 50). He writes that a "possible explanation for their superiority may be found in the fact that a three-way mixture necessarily involves at least two generations of racial amalgamation, with corresponding opportunities for the breakup of old culture patterns and the assimilation of new ones" (Ibid). Because Stonequist suggests that this process results in a "relatively greater Americanization," one can assume that the breaking up of old cultural patterns refers more to the Chinese and Hawaiian than the "northwest European" part of the subject's ancestry (Ibid). Furthermore, in commenting upon mixtures between native Hawaiians and the haole planter oligarchy, Stonequist enact
a similar type of reification. "Since the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom and the rise of a more stable Haole society," he writes, it became more increasingly important to have "stronger connections with the United States" and as a result, "the ratio of Haole intermarriage with Hawaiians has declined" (Ibid., 39). "In fact," he continues, "among the upper-class Haoles it now involves a definite loss of social status" (Ibid.). Not only does this passage fortify the racial boundaries between Hawaiians and haoles, it simultaneously produces the Islands' socio-economic hierarchy, which demonstrates how race was implicated in the larger project of Americanizing Hawai'i.

One of the greatest challenges for Stonequist's Hawai'i-based studies involved his application of "racial" categories. He writes, "In the following pages I have tried to use [race] to refer to those inherited physical differences which characterize groups of men (such as hair color, hair structure, head form, stature, etc.) even when there is much variability of traits within a given social group" (Ibid., 7 fn 5). While inclined to follow a "scientific" approach, Stonequist observed that "in common speech and in less scientific writing the term is also employed to include cultural groups, especially nationalities" (Ibid., 7). And, because he believed social use influenced the shaping of social and political relations, he wrote that "it is the duty of the sociologist to take into account popular conceptions of race, even as one rejects them from the standpoint of physical science" (Ibid). He concludes by stating that while "most Japanese can be distinguished physically from most Englishmen," there is no "Japanese" race and when the "wider meaning is given to the term in this volume, it is hoped that the context will make the meaning clear to the reader" (Ibid.). And to be sure, Stonequist was fairly diligent his use of quotation marks around
“race.” For example: “The census of 1930 listed the following ‘racial’ or nationality groups: Hawaiian; Chinese Hawaiian; Asiatic Hawaiian; Porto Rican; Portuguese; Spanish; Other Caucasian; Chinese; Japanese; Korean; Filipino” (1937: 37 fn 45) and “…together with the growing strength of invading ‘races’, particularly of American and British origin” (1937: 38). Nevertheless, subsequent Hawai‘i-based racial studies would lack Stonequist’s guarded employments of “race.” As a result, the odd assemblage of ethnic, national, race, and skin color would soon become institutionalized as normative realities.

In his study’s focus of the racial situation in Hawai‘i, Stonequist noted that the “mixed bloods of Hawaii are not in the doubly outcast position of the Anglo-Indians, nor are they socially as isolated as the South African Cape Colored” (Stonequist 1937: 43). Thus, after considering several economic, social and political conditions, Stonequist concluded that Hawai‘i, especially given the extent to which intermarriage has taken place, is most closely aligned with Brazil. In exploring the reasons for the extent to which intermarriage has taken place in Hawai‘i, Stonequist introduces the notion of “racial equality.” While noting that a variety of factors (i.e. early trade relationships, survival of the Hawaiian monarchy, an absence of Anglo-American women, and America’s 1898 annexation), Stonequist ultimately concedes that the “fact that no race is in a majority position compels each to conciliate and cooperate with the others” and it is this factor that “serve[d] to create a pattern of racial equality in Hawaii” (Ibid., 37). Yet, unlike some of the later Chicago-trained researchers, Stonequist did not overtly celebrate Hawai‘i as a “racial paradise.” For example, he explicitly noted that despite his heralding of the Islands’ “racial equality,” there was
also the simultaneous existence of patterns of inequality. "The weakening Hawaiian people," he writes, "through population decline and cultural disorganization, together with the growing strength of invading 'races', particularly of Americans and British origin, caused actual power to shift away from the Hawaiians" (Ibid., 38).

Stonequist also stood apart from subsequent Hawai‘i-based researchers in that he was aware of the dissonance between Park’s “marginal man” and Simmel’s “stranger.” He made an explicit delineation when he noted that the stranger’s ambivalence towards full incorporation enables an “attitude of objectivity, a freedom from local prejudices and values and so renders his social relations more abstract and generalized” (Ibid., 177-178). Thus, Stonequist clarifies by noting the “stranger’s” “relative detachment frees him from the self-consciousness, the concern for status and the divided loyalties of the marginal man” (Ibid., 178). The “stranger” only “evolves into the marginal position” when one seeks to identify “integrally within the group into which he has moved, but is held at arms length” (Ibid.). Stonequist would further clarify this discrepancy by noting that the distinctive properties of the stranger, as identified by Simmel, were lost in the individual moves into the position of marginality (Levine 1985: 76). Yet, as Levine illustrates, in spite of Stonequist’s delineation, the tendency to conflate the “stranger” with the “marginal man” would persist. More than a decade after the publication of Stonequist’s manuscript, Hughes would repeat Park’s view that Simmel’s conceptualization of the “stranger” referred to the phenomenon of the “marginal man” (Levine 1986: 76). Boskoff would similarly misrepresent Simmel’s “stranger” as being “vulnerable to internal
uncertainties” (Boskoff 1969: 282). More critically, Levine notes, was Peter Rose’s attempt to “reexamine the ubiquitous concept of ‘marginal man’” (Levine 1986: 76). By using ex-urban Jews living in upstate New York to examine “how the ‘stranger’ in the midst of alien territory adapts to community life,” Rose concluded that their position “could be described more aptly as one of duality than as one of marginality; for they felt ‘we have the best of both’” (Levine 1986: 76). In this, Rose believed that his findings refuted the views of “Stonequist, Park, and others who have characterized the Jew as a disturbed marginal man, an eternal stranger unable to reconcile the traditions of his people with the counterforces of the majority world” (Rose 1967: 472). In making this point, notes Levine, “Rose, like Hughes and Boskoff, was misreading Simmel through Park’s distorting lens” (Levine 1986: 76). In fact, Rose’s research found that his interviewees could not be adequately be encapsulated by Park’s concept of marginality, but they might be characterized in terms of Simmel’s conception of the “stranger.”

Stonequist’s most damaging passages, however, occur when he tries to recuperate the modernist impulse of Park’s interaction cycle with Hawaii’s colonial violences. For example, one can witness his ties to Park when he writes: “Typically, race relations develop in terms of a cycle or sequence of processes” (Stonequist 1937: 220). He continues by noting that the “relations between two or more races or nationalities who are living in a common territory under a single political and economic system assume a predominately symbiotic or economic character” (Ibid). With the advance of time, he suggests, more intimate social relations develop such as

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30 Quoted from Levine 76.
the “mixing of blood and the transfer of culture” and “[o]ut of this process emerge the marginal men, whether as racial hybrids or cultural hybrids” (Ibid). And, it is in this incorporation of Park’s “marginal man” concept, with its modernist impulse towards assimilation via the erasure of difference, where the true violence of Stonequist’s works emerges. He writes: “If sufficient time elapses a new racial stock and a new culture arise out of this contact and interaction, and the particular cycle of race relations comes to an end” (Stonequist 1937: 220). While this is little more than a reiteration of Park’s interaction cycle, its incorporation by Stonequist into Hawaii’s colonial situation held serious implications. As subsequent studies were published in the University of Hawaii’s sociological journal, Social Process in Hawaii, this line of thought would be pushed further, each time becoming increasingly modernist, and consequently, increasingly incapable of affirming the differences and relations that exist amongst Hawaii’s populations.

13. Romanzo Adams’s *Interracial Marriage in Hawaii*

Robert Park’s introduction to Romanzo Adam’s *Interracial Marriage in Hawaii* (1937), evokes the same themes of the “interaction” or “race relations cycle,” “marginality,” and the inevitable process of modernity. The “sort of race relations with which we are concerned in this volume,” writes Park, “can best be interpreted if what they seem to be at any time and place is regarded merely as a phase in a cycle of change which, once initiated, inevitably continues until it terminates in some predestined racial configuration, and one consistent with an established social order of which it is part” (Adams 1937: xiv). And, in a tone reminiscent of Wells’s Dr. Moreau, Park claims that race relations in Hawai‘i have neared the terminus of his
cycle: "in this study of intermarriage in Hawaii, we seem to be brought, so to speak, into the very presence of the historical process, where we may observe civilization as it evolves under something like laboratory conditions, this is due, in part at least, to the advantages of islands for the purpose of sociological investigation" (Ibid., xi).

The advantages of Hawai‘i as a “racial laboratory” is expounded upon by Adams himself. He writes that in the years following Western contact, relations were mainly economic in character. However, during the first century of what Adams deems “interracial contacts” (1778-1878), the practical conditions were such that “foreign men, mainly white and Chinese, desired Hawaiian wives” (Ibid., 204). It is important to note that Adams codes this encounter in terms of a racial discourse that had not yet entered Hawai‘i. Moreover, the “races” are again, an assemblage of skin color and nationality (if one conceives of Hawai‘i as a nation). To connect back to the Rice v. Cayetano ruling, one can seem how the Territory’s intellectual apparatus worked to institutionalize a random assemblage of categories into an American racial discourse. Thus, Adams continues, “gradually and without observation” social relations of an increasingly intimate character developed and with the emergence of a “considerable body of descendants of mixed racial ancestry” the creation of a special pattern of race relations hardened into a code based on the “assumption of racial equality” (Ibid., 204). With this, Adams forecasts that “with immigration at an end, the further process of acculturation and amalgamation can be the better foreseen” (Ibid., 10) and at this “beginning of a new era in Hawaiian history,” the Islands’ peoples are becoming one: “one in blood relationship, one in culture, one in loyalty” (Ibid., v). That Adams includes “loyalty” evinces the Territorial administration’s
anxiety that a heterogeneous population may lead to disaggregation and possibly a rejection of American authority. Yet, as if to quell these fears and pave the way for Hawaii's 1959 Statehood—the Islands' full incorporation into the United States—Adams professes to his American audience: "There is in Hawaii a considerable development of [American] sentiment and, under favoring conditions, it may be expected to become more general among the citizens and also stronger" (Ibid., 324).

Adams continues by unreflexively claiming that "[w]ith some exceptions, the conditions that have existed since the annexation of Hawaii in 1898 have been favoring conditions" (Ibid). Among the favorable conditions noted by Adams, he lists "trade relations and the intellectual contacts between the Territory and the United States," "educational policies in Hawaii march with those of the more progressive communities on the mainland," that "American books and periodicals are widely read," and foreshadowing the Islands' economic transformation from agriculture to tourism, he adds that, "[w]hen the people of Hawaii travel they go, mainly, to the mainland and thousands of mainland people visit Hawaii each year" (Ibid., 324).

Working to lessen the social distance between the United States and the Territory of Hawaii, Adams attests that if, in the future, there is a "failure in the development of national sentiment in Hawaii it will not be on account of the persistence of the ancient loyalties" but rather due to the unfavorable changes in Washington's policies" (Ibid., 325). Thus, it would appear that Adams' study is more than an innocuous treatment of interracial marriage. It is also a testimony to the United States that verifies the Territory of Hawaii is becoming stable and, in no uncertain words, "Americanized." He in fact concludes his manuscript on interracial marriage by proclaiming: "If it is
granted that local sentiment will continue to be the most important factor in the
situation, one may look forward to the amalgamation of all the races of Hawaii and to
their complete assimilation. There will be common interests, common memories, and
common loyalties. The peoples of Hawaii will become one people” (1937: 326).

A key factor for the incorporation of Hawai‘i into the Union, it would seem,
was a domestication of foreign attachments in the forms of culture, blood, and
loyalties. It is for this reason that Adams focused on interracial marriage. “The rising
mixed-blood group,” he writes, “is the symbol of the more advanced acculturation as
well as of the progressive amalgamation” (1937: 199). It is for this reason that
Adams claims that “information relative to the growing mixed-blood groups is of the
utmost importance” in forecasting Hawaii’s future societal and demographic trends
(1937: 199). Yet, within the pages of Interracial Marriage in Hawaii, Adams
unwittingly naturalized a number of institutional violences. Of particular note, his
rendering of Hawaii’s history not only obscures the processes of genocide,
colonization and deterritorialization (Kauanui 2000: 52-53), it simultaneously
launders haole guilt and responsibility. Adams writes—in spite of the fact that by
1898, foreign-born subjects had apprehended three-quarters of all arable land,
uprooted a vibrant culture, and illegally overthrown the Hawaiian Monarchy—that
“the Islands have enjoyed a measure of isolation so that outside influences have not
been overwhelming” and that “at every stage of development the outcome has been
determined largely by local interests and local traditions” (1937: vi). And, while he
does briefly gesture to the “leading causes of the depopulation of the native people,”
mentioning tribal warfare, the introduction of diseases, and a “decadence of the old
moral order,” the predominant reason Adams offers throughout his manuscript is a Wellsian evocation of the “survival of the fittest” ethic; in his own words, Hawaiians were a “primitive people [that] was unable to meet the requirements of a new situation promptly” (1937: 7). For example, Adams contends that the “decay of the Hawaiian” progressed so rapidly because of an “unfitness of the traditions of a primitive moral order in a world of modern industry” (1937: 103). And it is within these statements that one can witness how notions of “race” and “competency” or “fitness” mingle within the Chicago-trained sociologists’ modernist assimilation studies. That, despite their efforts to privilege the amalgamating potential of Hawaii’s so-called “mixing process,” their work institutionalized racial categories and ironically fortified the Islands’ racial-spatial hierarchy through notions of progress, competency, and suitability. As Henry Yu indicates: “The sociologists’ emphasis on intermarriage as an interesting phenomenon theoretically reinforced rather than erased the boundary between Oriental and white” (2001: 63). “Without accepting the validity of this boundary as actually marking meaningful difference” Yu continues, “(in contrast to the idea, for instance, that such a boundary is arbitrary and that the people on either side are much more similar than different), any interest in interracial or intercultural contact would be pointless and devoid of meaning” (2001: 63-64).

Adams was either oblivious to or unwilling to account for this irony. He states quite clearly that his work “represents an attempt to measure the mixture that has taken place in Hawaii by regarding each immigrant people as a pure group and by segregating those descendants whose ancestry is not wholly within the group” (Ibid., 14). “Even the obviously mixed Porto [sic] Ricans,” he continues, “are here treated
as if they constituted a pure racial stock, and such related groups as Portuguese and
Spanish are treated as if they were of different racial stocks” (Ibid., 14). As such,
what Adams intends for the table below “to show is the amount of mixture that has
taken place in Hawaii” (Ibid.).

**TABLE LX**

*A Racial Classification of Brides and Grooms*

*Four Years, 1924-1928*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Races of Brides</th>
<th>Hawaiian</th>
<th>Caucasian-Hawaiian</th>
<th>Pacific Islander</th>
<th>Portuguese</th>
<th>Euro-Brazilian</th>
<th>Spanish</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>Other Caucasian</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Korean</th>
<th>Filipino</th>
<th>All Other</th>
<th>Intermarriage in Hawaii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian-Hawaiian</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asiatic-Hawaiian</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porto Rican</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Caucasian</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1,071</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>2,022</td>
<td>603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>806</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3,099</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,030</td>
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<tr>
<td>All other</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,155</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>1,374</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>1,193</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>3,227</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>10,729</td>
<td>^134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is ironic that a work so intent on demonstrating amalgamation—the erasure of
“race”—could so thoroughly reify the epistemological significance of racial
categorizations. For example, Adams writes: “In the story of the amalgamation of
races in Hawaii the immigrant peoples, especially the white and the Chinese, appear
to have played the more active part, while the role of the Hawaiian has been of a more
passive character” (Ibid., 69). Moreover, he notes that native Hawaiians, “as a pure
racial group,” are “destined to disappear at a comparatively early date in consequence
of intermarriage with part-Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians” (Ibid., 25). And, while the
above statement is significant because in a single utterance Adams manages to
simultaneously confirm and conjure away the significance of “race,” his most
frequent manner of resettling Hawaii’s racial categories and hierarchy was through the exploration of which races produced the most suitable, and therefore most desirable, husbands. He asks: “Why have the Hawaiian women been so ready to marry white men and Chinese men? Do they believe them to be superior? If so, superior in what ways? Do they regard their own people as representatives of an inferior race?” (Ibid., 62). And, while Adams superficially disavows notions of racial superiority, his work simply recodes such differentiation in the language of individuality and meritocracy (i.e. the neoliberals in present-day Hawaii’s litigations). Thus, Adams’ fetishization of interracial marriage mystifies a process that represented not the eradication, but an “ethical” reconfiguration of earlier forms of domination. 31 This domination was extended in Adam’s Interracial Marriage in Hawaii through his feminization and infantilization of native Hawaiian men. 32 This is evident in statements such as: “All this does not appear to have involved any idea of race superiority. The white men were personally superior in knowledge and skill; that is, they were possessors of a superior culture” (Ibid., 63). Further, he proclaims that the “white people of Hawaii are, for the most part, superior to the Hawaiians in certain ways” (Ibid., 235). He justifies this claim by couching his judgment within the language of modernity. Hawaii’s white people, he writes, “are able to make adjustments to the requirements of a modern commercial society more promptly and more satisfactorily than the Hawaiians” (Ibid.). These kinds of declarations worked to fortify the status-quo of Hawaii’s racial-spatial hierarchies. Elsewhere, Adams

31 Language from Dirlik 503.
32 Language from Merry 2000.
bluntly declares that "the white people are superior to the Caucasian-Hawaiian mixed bloods who, in turn are superior to the Hawaiian" (Ibid., 235).

In another attempt at denying the persistence of race in Hawai'i, Adams works to emphasize the notion of a meritocracy by stating that when "individual Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians have superior personal abilities they can put such abilities to use" (1937: 68). Maintaining that educational opportunities and other "avenues of distinction" are open to all Hawaiians, Adams claims that "for the time being, most of them are inferior to the white men" (1937: 68). Yet, he notes that Hawaiians are "not bound to treat a white man as superior when he is in fact inferior," asserting that "[i]t is just this distinction that makes the difference between the trend toward a caste system and the trend toward a social system characterized by opportunity to pass from one class to another according to ability and character, a society of open classes, to use Cooley's term" (1937: 68).

Nevertheless, Adams' did more than consolidate native Hawaiians into a single racial group. His positioning of "the Chinese" in opposition to native Hawaiians similarly reaffirmed the reigning racist ideology through the construction of a mono-cultural, mono-ethnic group. He writes that in his interviews, "there is the constant recognition of the business superiority of the Chinese" and that "Chinese men are 'industrious', 'thrifty', 'shrewd', the Hawaiians are not" (1937: 91). What was for Adams the best way of facilitating his measurement of Hawaii's mixing process became an institutionalized grid of racial identities. This transformation can be witnessed in statements such as: "Doubtless the Portuguese and the Spanish are about alike in racial traits as well as in old-country culture traits. Possibly one might
classify the Chinese, the Japanese, and the Koreans as belonging to one race.

Nevertheless each of the various peoples specified has in Hawaii a separate identity. They are culture groups and social groups as well as statistical groups (1937: 82).


If Park, Stonequist, and Adams can be credited for initiating the interracial marriage studies in Hawai‘i, the University of Hawaii’s Sociology Department, with its annual journal Social Process in Hawaii, deserves the credit for canonizing their research. These reports would increasingly herald Hawaii’s “amalgamating process” as an index of modernization. Whereas studies on the harmful impacts that modernization was having on the native Hawaiian population were non-existence, there was an over-abundance of celebrations of the “promise of hybridity.

Hormann’s “Racial Statistics in Hawaii” (Social Process in Hawaii 12), for example, proclaimed that “in another fifty years, 50% of Hawaii’s population will be mixed-blood” (Ibid., 28). “At that time,” he continues, “the Old World cultural traits will be all but eliminated” and the time will come where “Hawaii’s experience will collaborate the statement in Acts, ‘And he made of one every nation of men to dwell on all the face of the earth’” (Ibid., 26). Hormann, anticipating the antiracialism that surrounded the US 2000 Census, proclaimed that it was just a matter of time before “all racial and ancestral forms of classification will be obsolete (Ibid., 35).

McDermott, in describing what he deemed the paradox of Hawaii’s pidgin culture—“so tolerant... yet at the same time so provincial”—would ultimately decided that “in any event, it was an important means by which the people of Hawaii moved toward become one people” (228). Romanzo Adam’s protége, Andrew Lind,
developed his entire career around the themes of race relations, interracial marriage, and the processes by which “the many peoples of Hawaii were becoming one people” (Lind 1980: ix). But, it was Walter Kolarz’s “The Melting Pot of the Pacific” (1955) that most nakedly exposed the disturbing conclusion of the Park-influenced era of Hawai‘i-based racial experimentation. Kolarz begins his essay by noting that he is greatly interested in Hawaii’s “dual process,” namely the dying of an old nation and the birth of a new one (Kolarz 1955: 23). “The nation that is dying are the Hawaiians, the Polynesian aboriginal inhabitants of the Territory” writes Kolarz, “and the nation that is emerges is the neo-Hawaiian nation formed out of the remnants of the Hawaiian people and various immigrant groups” (Ibid.). After providing several anecdotal examples that attest to Hawaii’s so-called “mixing process,” Kolarz deduces that it is therefore “most fortunate that this new mixed race of Hawaii is acquiring a common cultural background” (Ibid., 25). And with this, he unreflexively launches the following claim, the watermark for the institutional violence produced through the University of Hawaii’s Sociology Department:

And here we come to a point which is crucial for a proper understanding of the Hawaiian race situation, namely the great service done by the “dying” Hawaiian aboriginal people to all the other races that are inhabiting the islands (1955: 25).

Underscoring his insensitivity, while simultaneously indicating that his views were not exceptional, Kolarz concludes his piece by writing:

One might be tempted to say that the racial situation in Hawaii is almost too good to be true…[t]his was exactly the reaction of quite a number of participants at the recent Race Relations Conference in Honolulu (Ibid.).

Yet, in spite of these glorifications of the “melting pot of the Pacific,” the State of Hawai‘i never surrendered its efforts to statistically apprehend its
heterogeneous populace. Take for example Eleanor Nordyke’s discussion of “ethnicity” in her recommendations to the State of Hawaii’s Department of Health.

In cooperation with the National Center for Health Statistics, Nordyke developed a coding system for handling Hawaii’s “mixtures”:

a. If a mixture is of Hawaiian and any other race, code as Part Hawaiian.

b. If a mixture is of White races (White, Caucasian, Puerto Rican, Portuguese, Cuban, or Mexican), code to the first race listed.

c. If a mixture is of White (White, Caucasian, Puerto Rican, Portuguese, Cuban, or Mexican) and any other race, code to the non-White race.

d. If a mixture is of non-White races (except Hawaiian and Part Hawaiian), code to the first race listed.

In addition, she added:

The State Health Department determines a child’s race from the parents' ethnic group following [the] 1978 procedures:

a. If both parents are of the same race, child's race is parents' race.

b. If either parent is of unknown race, child's race is that of the parent with the known race.

c. If either parent is Hawaiian or Part Hawaiian, child's race is Part Hawaiian.

d. If either parent is Black, child's race is Black (except Hawaiian and Part Hawaiian).

e. If parents' races are White but not the same, (Caucasian, Puerto Rican, Portuguese, Cuban, or Mexican), the child's race is that of the father's race.

f. If one parent is White and the other parent is non-White, child's race is that of the non-White parent.

g. If both parents are non-white but not the same race, child's race is that of the father (Nordyke 1989: 106-7).
Like her predecessors, Nordyke quoted these contemporary categories with the intention of demonstrating the complexity of Hawaii's demographics (Ibid., 104). However, even more poignantly, her efforts evince the degree to which the State's accounting procedures are entrenched in racial thinking.

Throughout the Territorial era—and well into Statehood—the legal, bureaucratic, and intellectual apparatuses worked tirelessly to racialize the people of Hawai‘i. The result has been the elevation of race as a “meaning constituting system,” a system “through which meaning is constructed and cultural practices organized and by which, accordingly, people represent and understand their world, including who they are and how they relate to others” (Scott 1988: 34). This chapter, therefore, has sought to illustrate how the knowledge produced by sociologists generated the authoritative “facts” that constituted Territorial Hawai‘i within a conceptual template that would be progressively fixed, factualized, and taken as convention for official wisdom. Thus, this return to Park, Stonequist, Adams and Social Process in Hawai‘i demonstrates the veracity of statements about “race” has never been the issue as much as their epistemological authority, their power to organize understandings of the world. Specifically, the discourse of race in Hawai‘i has plotted out a teleological trajectory with the “promise of hybridity” serving to usher native Hawaiians into an indisputable American modernity.

33 Language from Ludden 259.
34 Language from Ludden 250.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE "NEW FACE" OF RACE IN AMERICA

1. Introduction

On December 5, 2002, Senator Trent Lott (R-Mississippi) took the podium at Strom Thurmond’s (R-South Carolina) 100th birthday and retirement party. As C-SPAN cameras broadcast the event live, the then-Senate majority leader announced:

I want to say this about my state. When Strom Thurmond ran for President, we voted for him. We’re proud of it. And if the rest of the country had followed our lead, we wouldn’t have had all these problems over all these years, either” (www.cnn.com; verbatim_lott_1; emphases added).

Delivered in a style Lott would later clumsily describe as “too much into the moment” (www.cnn.com; verbatim_lott_2.), his toast ignited a media sensation. It was sensational for the fact that Strom Thurmond’s 1948 presidential campaign was run on a Dixiecrat ticket, one founded upon his promise to uphold racial segregation.1

As a result, even in a room full of people celebrating Thurmond’s life and career, Lott’s remarks were met with audible gasps.

In the two-week controversy that ensued, the Senator from Mississippi vehemently defended himself. In fact, Lott issued three different statements

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1 In his 1948 campaign, Thurmond declared: “All the laws of Washington and all the bayonets of the Army cannot force the Negroes into our homes, our schools, our churches.” Similarly, the Dixiecrat Party Platform stated: “We stand for the segregation of the races and the racial integrity of each race.” Demonstrating the kind of “lead” Lott wished the “rest of the country had followed,” the 1948 sample ballot from Lott’s state of Mississippi reads: “A vote for Truman electors is a direct order to our Congressmen and Senators from Mississippi to vote for passage of Truman’s so-called civil rights program in the next Congress. This means the vicious…anti-poll tax, anti-lynching and anti-segregation proposals will become the law of the land and our way of life in the South would be gone forever” (excerpted from: George, Robert. “Vacant Lott: The GOP and the Ghosts of Mississippi” NRO December 10, 2002 and Edsall, Thomas B. “Poor Choice of Words,’ Lott Says: Senator Apologizes for Recent Remarks About Thurmond” The Washington Post 12/10/02: A13).
pertaining to the guffaw before he finally incorporated the word "apology" (Kurtz: 2002). Four days after the party, Lott issued a written apology. The phrasing of his statement, however, would only serve to add fuel to the controversy. He wrote:

A poor choice of words conveyed to some the impression that I embrace the discarded policies of the past. Nothing could be further from the truth and I apologize to anyone who was offended by my statement (Ibid.)

It is remarkable how such a short explanation could be so riddled with problems. To begin, Lott’s vague reference to “discarded policies” never specifically identifies what it is he seeks to amend. Furthermore, if one assumes that Lott is indeed referring to racial segregation, is there not a substantial difference between calling the policies “discarded” and condemning them as unjust, inexcusable, or immoral? And last, by issuing his apology to “anyone who was offended” instead of “everyone who was offended,” he seems to be leaving room for the possibility that perhaps no one took exception. Lott’s choice of words gives the impression that he is hesitant to take a stand against institutional racism.

Figure 1: Strom Thurmond’s 100th Birthday and Retirement Party (Lott is standing behind Thurmond)
Lott’s initial defense sought to skirt the issue of race. In a radio interview with conservative talk show host Sean Hannity, Lott insisted that the remarks alluded not to Thurmond’s stance on segregation but instead to his support for “a strong national defense and economic development and balanced budgets and opportunity.” Perhaps. But, during the two-week media frenzy that followed, reporters from across the country uncovered a long string of his public displays of racism, making Lott’s December 5th toast seem anything but an isolated “slip up.”

The media scrutinized Lott’s shaky legislative record on civil rights and uncovered previous instances where Lott supported Thurmond’s 1948 bid. On December 11, 2002, Jackson, Mississippi’s The Clarion Ledger reported that Lott had made near-verbatim remarks in 1980 (Kurtz 2002a). Again referring to Thurmond, Lott announced: “You know, if we had elected this man 30 years ago, we wouldn’t be in the mess we are today” (Kurtz 2002b). On December 17, 2002, a videotape surfaced showing Lott at a 2000 Capitol Hill ceremony, again praising Thurmond as “someone who should have been president” (Edsall and Balz 2002). Furthermore, there were several documented accounts of Lott delivering speeches to openly racist institutions. In 1984, for instance, he gave a talk to the Sons of Confederate Veterans in Biloxi, Mississippi, and gleefully proclaimed: “The spirit of Jefferson Davis lives in the 1984 Republican platform” (Krugman 2002); adding later that “[s]ometimes I feel closer to Jefferson Davis than any other man in America” (Conason 2002). It

2 The Lott controversy was the media event that turned “blogging” to the mainstream. Wired Magazine wrote: “It’s safe to assume that, before he flushed his reputation down the toilet, Trent Lott had absolutely no idea what a blog was. He may have a clue now. Internet opinion pages like Instapundit, run by University of Tennessee law professor, Glenn Reynolds, and Talking Points Memo, from leftie political columnist Josh Marshall—were among the first to latch on to ABCNews.com’s brief item on Lott’s racist comments during Strom Thurmond’s 100th birthday bash. And they kept focusing on Lott’s hateful past—until the national press corps finally had to take notice” (Shachtman 2002: 1).
was also revealed that Lott was a due-paying member of the Council of Conservative Citizens (CCC), a neo-white supremacist organization. While some could argue that membership alone should not be used to condemn the man, Lott addressed the CCC, proclaiming they "stand for the right principles and the right philosophy" (www.bostonphenoix.com/medialog/index.asp).

Placing these troubling details aside, two questions remain. First, what was Lott referring to by "all these problems?" And second, who exactly is embodied in his use of "we?" If the promise of Thurmond's presidential bid is understood as the institutionalization of Jim Crow's draconian organization of space and bodies, it would appear that Senator Lott's "problems" refer less to integration *per se* than to the subsequent unsettling of white male privilege. It refers to the disruption of the nation's classic biopolitical distinctions (i.e., inside/outside, us/them, white/black), one induced by post-World War II immigration patterns, the Civil Rights movement, persistent miscegenation, and a diminished confidence in racial categories. In the years since Thurmond's presidential bid, these phenomena have combined to challenge the exclusivity, and therefore legitimacy, of Lott's privileged we-group. His nostalgia for Jim Crow segregation, in this respect, evinces a desire for the reinstatement of the discernible delineation of privilege and a consolidation of power, wealth, and resources. If, as Lott suggested, the rest of the country *had* followed Mississippi's lead, the complex anxieties produced by pluralization would have continued to be disciplined by America's binary logic of racial segregation (i.e., "white"/"colored"). As this chapter builds upon the Lott controversy, it will examine two trajectories: first, the pathologization of intra-national difference in the United
States and second, discursive and policy attempts at “solving” the “problems” produced by pluralization.

One way to stage this inquiry is to begin by asking “who is incorporated by Lott’s ‘we’?” To be sure, his “we” does not stand for all Americans. His “we” cannot even stand for all of his constituents since it is unlikely that Mississippi’s African American and other non-White populations share Lott’s nostalgia for the good ‘ole days of Jim Crow. The Senator’s fraternal “we,” in this sense, presents a crucial moment where America’s interior frontiers are plainly disclosed. To restate points made in earlier chapters, the dual movement of 1980s multiculturalism and the emergence of “compassionate/neo-conservatives” in 1990s worked to temporarily conceal America’s “interior frontiers” through a disavowal of racial distinctions. Lott’s remarks, however, brought to the fore the persistence of America’s internal frontiers and it was a disclosure that well-exceeded the December 5th toast. In one of the earlier press releases following the party, Lott declared:

In the days and months to come, I will dedicate myself to undo the hurt I have caused and will do all that I can to contribute to a society where every American has an opportunity to succeed (www.cnn.com; emphasis added).

While intended as an apology, this compassionate conservative/neoliberal gesture is betrayed by an organizational grammar that differentiates between the “we” evoked in Lott’s December 5th toast and a broader “every American,” which seems to include those he would not naturally include within his we-group. In this sense, the broadened “every American” evinces the same exclusionary principles that have historically modulated racial, class, and sexual categories in a manner that secures intra-national hierarchies (Ibid., 11). The fourth section of this chapter will use
Samuel P. Huntington’s *Who Are We?* (2004) to explore how “we” categories have mutated over time, shielding socio-economic privilege from surreptitious invaders—those transgressive bodies that jeopardize the sanctity of bio-political orders. The Lott controversy, however, is instructive because it presents a theater where modernity’s pressing anxieties (i.e., categorical disruptions) emerge.

### 2. A Surfacing of America’s Interior Frontiers

On the heels of the Republicans’ much-celebrated 2002 electoral victories,\(^3\) Lott’s foregrounding of racial boundaries provided Liberals and Democrats, who had been silenced by the post-9/11 doctrine of “nonpartisanship,” with an opportunity to once again demonize the GOP as fundamentally discriminatory. NAACP President Kweisi Mfume denounced Lott’s toast, deeming it “the kind of callous, calculated, hateful bigotry that has no place in the halls of Congress” (*USA Today* 2002). On CNN’s *Inside Politics*, former Vice President Al Gore proclaimed: “Trent Lott made a statement that I think is a racist statement, yes. That’s why I think he should withdraw those comments or I think the United States Senate should undertake a censure of those comments” (Edsall 2002: A13). Senator John Kerry (D-Massachusetts), then a likely 2004 presidential candidate, challenged Lott’s future role in Congress: “The question is whether someone who has made the statements Trent has made should be or can now effectively be the majority leader of the United States Senate” (Edsall and Balz 2002: A1).

Even more noteworthy than these condemning remarks, however, were those criticisms launched by Lott’s own GOP. Senator Don Nickles (R-Oklahoma) told

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\(^3\) In the November 2002 elections, the GOP regained control of the Senate and strengthened their majority in the House.
ABC’s *This Week*: “I am concerned that Senator Lott has been weakened to the point that may jeopardize his ability to enact our agenda and speak to all Americans” (www.cnn.com). In strikingly similar language, Senator Christopher Bond (R-Missouri) stated: “I have concluded that the current controversy has completely overshadowed our efforts to expand the American dream to all Americans” (www.cnn.com).

The GOP’s surprising—yet evidently orchestrated—condemnation of its own congressional leader exposes their deep concern over the political effects of Lott’s remarks. “Lott’s comments could single-handedly set the party back a decade,” declared one GOP strategist. “All the efforts of outreach and inclusion and reaching out to nontraditional voters could be out the door, down the drain” (Edsall and Balz 2002: A1). Lott’s gaffe threatened to undermine not only the agenda of the Republican Party, but that of the White House as well. Both Republicans and Democrats agreed that Lott’s comments would make it more difficult for Republicans to attract black and other minority voters, one of George W. Bush’s primary goals (www.nytimes.com/2002/12/12/politics/CND-LOTT.html). Consequently, at a Philadelphia rally, Mr. Bush sharply rebuked: “Recent comments by Senator Lott do not reflect the spirit of our country. He has apologized and rightly so. Every day that our nation was segregated was a day our nation was unfaithful to our founding ideals.”

On December 20th, under constant pressure from every angle, Trent Lott finally announced that he would surrender his leadership position but retain his seat in Senate: “In the interest of pursuing the best possible agenda for the future of our
country, I will not seek to remain as majority leader of the United States Senate for the 108th Congress, effective January 6, 2003” (www.cnn.com). After Lott’s announcement, Republicans came out in droves to commend his move. Lamar Alexander (R-Tennessee) stated: “I want to say of Trent Lott that he’s a good man, he’s an honorable man, and he will gain distinction to his career by showing that he understands that he can make a decision bigger than he is. I commend him for his leadership and for his willingness to put the Republican Party’s future and his country’s future ahead of him” (emphasis added). Senator Sam Brownback (R-Kansas) said: “Trent’s an honorable man and this is the right thing to do” (emphasis added). And, in a statement read by the White House press secretary, Mr. Bush announced: “I respect the very difficult decision Trent has made on behalf of the American people...I am pleased he will continue to serve our nation in the Senate and I look forward to working with him on our agenda to make America safer, stronger and better.”

In the midst of these “honorable” tributes and tropes of sacrifice, one would think that Lott had died in the line of duty. And in a way he had. By abandoning Lott as a scapegoat, the GOP was able to maintain its celebration of “diversity.” The Lott controversy, in this sense, discloses the relationship between scapegoats and the maintenance of political orders. Scapegoats, William Connolly notes, “serve as objects upon whose lives comes to rest responsibility for the deceits, revenge, and violence built into escalating rivalries of desire” (Ibid., 53). Lott’s decision to step down, therefore, served a unifying function. By admitting his wrongdoing, Lott was able to restore the “compassionate” image of the GOP—a party recoded to seem as
tolerant as it is just. The GOP support Lott received after resigning can be read as a testimony to their indebtedness to his sacrifice. Connolly notes that:

...[the] sacralization of an originary scapegoat conceals the arbitrary violence upon which the moral order rests while memorializing the scapegoat as a hero to whom they are in debt. The community forgets its punishment of the scapegoat to conceal the element of violence in the moral code that unifies it (Ibid., 53).

To this end, one can read the distancing that occurred between the “compassionate conservatives” and Lott as an effort to smooth-over the interior frontiers that surfaced in his December 5th toast. As the National Review’s Jonah Goldberg wrote:

White people, believe it or not, don’t like to think of themselves as racists. This was the logic behind the 2000 GOP convention’s cavalcade of inclusiveness. All of those blacks and Hispanics were on stage not so much to get the votes of blacks and Hispanics (though that was certainly part of it). They were up there to demonstrate to moderate whites that it’s okay to vote for the GOP again.

Lott himself tried to patch things up. On CNN”s Larry King Live, he said: “We’re way beyond those policies of the past, Larry. They were bad at the time. We’ve made huge progress since then. My state has more African American elected officials than any other state. We need to come together; we need to be uniters, not dividers.”

It is clear from this statement that in order to create and maintain a “united” America, one must first abandon divisive racial and historical distinctions. While this point will be elaborated fully in section four’s treatment of Huntington, it is worthwhile to begin by exploring the corporeal metaphor of the nation.

3. A Finger in the Wound

As established in Chapter Two, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, American politics on both sides of the spectrum began to lean towards the ideals of

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neoliberalism. "Compassionate conservatives" and "fiscally-responsible liberals" alike professed their commitments to social causes, as long as these causes did not impede the upward distribution of wealth and resources (Duggan 2003). In this sense, the GOP's efforts to erase or deny racial exclusions from their "we-group" were animated not by the belief that discrimination no longer exists, but rather because they feared that the reopening of old wounds would stir up scarred-over conflicts.

Lott made this explicit when he declared: "I apologize for reopening old wounds and hurting so many Americans" (www.cnn.com; verbatim_lot_2). The bodily metaphor Lott offers—a wound—is useful in describing the biopolitical component of nation-building (Nelson 1999: 1-2). Lott's corporeal metaphor suggests that his words injured the body politic, a nation that exists but is not yet whole or complete (Ibid.). The surfacings of America's racist legacies, then, represent painful proddings and irritating interventions—a dangerous political game that works against the forging of national unity (Ibid.).

The imagery of bodies, wounds, and healings, is organized around a state-centered, territorial conception of the nation, one founded upon the idea of a homogeneous national culture. Within this framing, national unity is presented as an irrefutable commonsense goal that could easily be attained if the "divisive" identity-based groups would cease to reopen old wounds; that "We" (upstanding Americans) would all be better served if "we" (natives, "minorities," and immigrants) would just allow past injuries to heal. In this formulation, one can witness the statist impulse to
smooth-over intra-national differences in order to “solve” the “problems” of pluralization.

Because the geopolitical system has been founded upon building blocks of homogenous, unified and functioning modern nations, so-called “deficiencies” are blamed on the disaggregating effects of pluralization. Tradition, ethnicity, race, and difference in general are found guilty of holding nations back, impeding the attainment of the benefits of modernization. Thus, statist practices seek to discipline and structure these anxieties through a fixing (both “to stabilize” and “to repair”) of the national body. Efforts to promote national healing however are continuously thwarted by those surreptitious invaders that threaten to contaminate the body politic. An example of a recent mobilization of national anxieties can be found in Samuel Huntington’s latest offering, *Who Are We?* (2004).

4. Huntington’s *Who Are We?*

In *Who Are We?*, Huntington seeks to answer the questions of American national identity given the monumental changes that have taken place over the past fifty years: the end of state-sanctioned racial segregation, the gains of the Civil Rights movement, and the growth and acceptance of a more multicultural, multiracial nation. In reaction to these various forms of pluralization, Huntington argues that recent developments have produced a disaggregated America, one that is divided along cultural, linguistic, and religious lines. He contends that these trends represent an ominous movement towards national disunity, if not disintegration.

Huntington provides three core explanations for the erosion of America’s national identity: 1) American intellectual and corporate elites value multiculturalism,
cosmopolitism, and the profits of transnationalism more than national unity; 2) recent waves of immigrants are failing to follow the patterns of assimilation established by their predecessors; and 3) Latin American—specifically Mexican—immigrants are forming bilingual, bicultural, and potentially separatist regions within the United States (Huntington 2004: 138; 247). Marking a departure from an argument he presented in earlier *American Politics: the Promise of Disharmony* (1981), Huntington no longer has confidence in a purely creedal conception of American nationality (i.e., belief in liberty, democracy, civil rights, nondiscrimination, and the rule of law); that a national ideology that revolves around ideologies cannot withstand what he calls “deconstructionist” forces (Ibid., 338). According to Huntington, being American goes beyond one’s belief system. He argues that people can only become American if: 1) they migrate to the United States, 2) participate in American social life, 3) learn English, U.S. history and customs, 4) absorb the nation’s Anglo-Protestant culture, and 5) identify primarily with the United States (Ibid., 338-339).

Putting all of this together, it becomes clear that Huntington longs for a prior American identity that prevailed when northern Europeans dominated and other immigrants worked to assimilate seamlessly into American culture (Johnson and Hing 2005: 1378). Huntington wants this version of America to survive and believes the only way to ensure its longevity is to renew the nation’s commitment to the Anglo-Protestant culture of the settlers who founded America. It is important to note his privileging of “culture,” since he is adamant that his outlook rides upon “cultural” rather than “racial” or “ancestral” definitions of American identity (Ibid., 31).

Nevertheless, in spite of these frequent disclaimers, Roger Smith argues:
...it is politically, if not philosophically, impossible to disentangle a call for “Anglo-Protestant” values from invidious ethnic and religious senses of national identity. Those words have old, familiar meanings far more resonant than Huntington’s redefinitions, and they do not resonate first with what has been best in America” (Smith 2004: 522).

And, while Johnson and Hing approach Huntington in a somewhat more sympathetic manner, they too raise a similar critique:

Professor Huntington grounds his concerns with the changes caused by Mexican immigrants to the nation’s culture, with a particular emphasis on language (Spanish rather than English) and religion (Catholic rather than Protestant). Although we fear and suspect that language, national origin, and religion in certain circumstances serve as convenient proxies for race, we take Professor Huntington at his word that race is not the core basis of his concern with Mexican immigrants (Johnson and Hing 2005: 1351; emphasis added).

Johnson (the Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and a Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o Studies at the University of California at Davis) and Hing (Director for Asian American Studies Program and a Professor of Law and Asian American Studies also at UC Davis), seem hesitant to classify Huntington’s argument as explicitly racist. They do, however, call attention to two of the book’s more questionable aspects: first, Huntington’s unequivocal charge that immigration from Mexico is a specific—and most dangerous—threat to the national identity and unity (Huntington 2004: 221-56); and second, Huntington’s attack against multiculturalism.

Johnson and Hing are not alone in raising the first issue. In fact, a large part of the critical attention directed towards Who Are We? has revolved around Huntington’s fear of a possible Hispanic “reconquista.” He warns that “[i]n the late twentieth century, developments occurred that, if continued, could change America into a culturally bifurcated Anglo-Hispanic society with two national languages” (Huntington 2004: 221). He continues by arguing that all of America’s immigration
“problems” would miraculously disappear if the government would simply enact policies that dramatically reduced the flow of immigration from Mexico (Ibid. 243). Huntington claims that with such reductions, the debates concerning undocumented immigration, bilingual education, and assimilation would all presumably simmer down. However, implicit within his assumption, Johnson and Hing note, “is that this ‘silver bullet’ is a realistic possibility when, from all appearances, migration appears to be a fact of life in the modern world and migration from Mexico to the United States has deep and enduring roots in both nations” (Johnson and Hing 2005: 1366).

They continue by observing that Huntington offers a cost-benefit analysis of immigration but he cites only the costs. While this is a vibrant and worthy line of critique, one that has been addressed by the majority of the Latina/o and Chicana/o scholars in the United States, this project’s investment in Who Are We? is more interested in a second critique: Huntington’s privileging of assimilation and antagonism towards multiculturalism. To be clear, Huntington distains multiculturalism as an attack against European civilization (Huntington 2004: 171-173). A large portion of his hostility can be attributed to the challenges that multiculturalism has presented to the premise that America is a white, English-speaking, Western/Christian nation. Multiculturalism, in fact, has sought to destabilize the historical amnesia that founds Huntington’s argument by diversifying the master narrative of American history. Johnson and Hing note that multiculturalism reminds the United States that “not only did Native American tribes long pre-date the arrival of white Christians, but the early European settlers spoke Spanish, German, Dutch, French, and Polish in addition to English” (Johnson and
Furthermore, they continue, before the United States established the Chinese exclusion laws, approximately 300,000 Chinese entered the country; that as early as 1565, Filipinos had established a community in Louisiana; that 9.5 million Africans were transported to the Western hemisphere as slaves; that in the mid-1600s, Spanish-Portuguese Jews had settled in the New World; and more significantly, given the contours of Huntington’s argument, they remind Americans that “Mexicans have long migrated to the United States, in no small part due to the fact that much of the Southwest was once part of Mexico” (Ibid.). In short, the two suggest:

...the heritage of the United States does not derive solely from people who are white, English-speaking, Christian, and European. Nonwhite peoples have a long history in America. The genocide of Native Americans, brutal enslavement of African Americans, and exploitation and oppression of Asian and Latina/o Americans, are harsh reminders of the nation’s racial past (Johnson and Hing 2005: 1379-1380).

And this point exposes the crux of the issue. Regardless if one’s inclination to label Huntington’s argument as racist, his consolidation of “we-ness,” like Senator Lott before him, is one that is produced and maintained by a pathologization of intra-national difference. Their general antagonism towards heterogeneity, however, is misdirected since, as William Connolly warns, “the stronger the drive to the unified nation, the integrated community, and/or the normal individual, the more powerful becomes the drive to convert differences into modes of otherness. And the more implacable the cultural drive to convert differences into otherness the less feasible it becomes to build majority assemblages of democratic governance that can actually govern a diverse populace” (Connolly 1995: xxi). Connolly argues that the threats of fragmentation, violence, and anarchy are not produced from political engagements...
with difference but instead, from those doctrines and movements that strive to suppress difference (Ibid.). Specifically, he continues, the threat of fragmentation emerges from “totalistic identities engaged in implacable struggles against those differences that threaten their hegemony or exclusivity. Such culture wars do not reflect too much diversity, difference, or variety; they express contending demands to control the exclusive form the nation, state, or community must assume” (Ibid.).

Nevertheless, Huntington’s “answer” for the proliferation of intra-national difference is an outright rejection of multiculturalism and the promotion of assimilation. His condemnation of multiculturalism is in fact a cover for a more general critique against identity politics. The goal for Huntington is to disable all notions of racial and ethnic consciousness that detract from a nationalistic American identity. This position resonates with Huntington’s colleague at Harvard, Arthur Schlesinger, whose *The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society* (1992), similarly suggests that multiculturalism is tearing the nation apart. For Huntington, multiculturalism is a “finger in the wound,” a destructive agenda imposed upon the nation by “deconstructionists [who have] promoted programs to enhance the status and influence of subnational racial, ethnic, and cultural groups” (Huntington 2004: 142).

The anxieties displayed by Huntington are instructive in that they stage a critical tension between assimilation and multiculturalism. Endorsing assimilation in its entirety, Huntington suggests that the future of America depends upon a universal adoption of the “dominant culture,” a rejection of racial or ethnic consciousness, and a repudiation of the notion that all cultures are of equal value (Johnson and Hing

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5 Pulled from Johnson and Hing 2005: 1355.
Assimilation, therefore, is an obligation to be imposed upon all immigrants, with the expectation that they assimilate as smoothly as European immigrants did in the past. In this sense, Huntington presents assimilation as a wholly positive experience, paying no attention to the human costs of past assimilation campaigns (Ibid: 1361). As Johnson and Hing note: “Human costs simply are not as important to Huntington as maintaining national unity and the United States as we know it” (Ibid., 1386).

Huntington, therefore, appears firmly committed to the notion that a unified national identity did indeed once exist in the past and can exist again in America’s future. His “no-place” utopian (see Chapter One) retreat to an idyllic past is understandable since it is far easier to maintain a unified national identity in a society that actively disavows its diversity. Multiculturalism and multiracialism, in this sense, do complicate the processes of nation-building.

Yet, Huntington’s argument fails to address the difficult questions he poses regarding the forging of national identities in heterogeneous nations such as the United States. His only recommendation is to return to a purer, simpler period of American history. And while the United States may have possessed a more coherent national identity when minorities and immigrants were subordinated under Jim Crow and other draconian assimilations measures, the problem lies in Huntington’s (like Lott) unabashed longing to return to those days. Moreover, he neglects the fact that the subordination of racial minorities facilitated the cohesiveness of his desired national unity. In this respect, he glosses over the violence that permeates the history of American assimilation:
Early in this nation’s history, for example, the claim was that German and Irish immigrants — later replaced by Chinese, Japanese, southern and eastern European, and later Mexican immigrants — were racially inferior and refused to assimilate into mainstream U.S. society. These claims were buttressed by the assertion that the current cohort of immigrants differed from the last group. Despite those claims, the assimilation process has in most respects been successful, and most observers see the past efforts to limit the immigration of “unassimilable” persons as unfortunate mistakes that mar, not elevate, the nation's proud history (Ibid., 1352-1353).

In fact, Huntington stops just short of praising immigration restrictions as a means of limiting racial diversity since he presents the national origins quota system of 1924 as a positive aspect of American history (Huntington 2004: 57-58).

In spite of these obvious limitations, Who Are We? does raise some provocative questions: how can a nation form a cohesive identity in a post-Civil Rights era that is committed to recognizing and respecting differences within its citizenry? Does a multicultural, multiracial nation necessarily result in a more diffuse national identity? The “answer” for the United States has seemed to be a smoothing-over of intra-national distinctions. This process will be explored more fully through an exploration of the debates surrounding the U.S. 2000 Census. However, before examining the effects of the so-called “multiracial movement,” it would be productive to turn to the biopolitics of Brazil and its attendant ideology of a “racial democracy.”

5. Brazil’s Racial Democracy

“What distinguishes Brazil from any other plural society in the New World,” writes Michael Hanchard, “is that no other nation has had such an elaborate ‘solution’ to the ‘problem’ of racial and cultural pluralism” (Hanchard 1994: 8). This solution—the Brazilian ideology of racial democracy—was designed to conceal the nation’s interior
frontiers and fix the national body (both stabilize and repair\textsuperscript{6}) through a harmonious trope of mixing. As expressed in a statement by João Pacheco de Oliveira:

\begin{quote}
...the tenderness of the Indian and the sensuality of black people compensate for the dryness and rationality of the colonizers, eventually integrating themselves in the specific character of the Brazilian Mestiço (de Oliveira 2000: 194).
\end{quote}

In attributing each of Brazil’s three “races”—Portuguese settlers, African slaves, and the indigenous populations—as equal founders of the modern state, the myth of racial democracy alleges that extensive miscegenation has rendered prejudice nonexistent, thereby creating a field of seemingly undifferentiated citizenship.

While the future work of this project will elaborate the ideological force of mestizaje by engaging with the sexual, racial, and colonial entanglements of Oliveira’s statement, for the purposes of the present chapter, it would be useful to proceed here by raising a set of questions raised in William Connolly’s Ethos of Pluralization (1995): “what about the larger contexts within which the pattern of diversity is set? How plural or monistic are they? To what extent does a cultural presumption of the normal individual or the preexisting subject precede and confine pluralism? What conceptions of identity (and difference) are taken for granted in pluralist celebrations of ‘diversity’? How are subjects territorialized by operational codes of conventional pluralism?” (Connolly 1995). These questions enable the present investigation to signal how statist celebrations of racial and cultural blending obscure the complex and often violent relations endemic to biopolitical processes.

For example, Brazil’s institutionalization of racial democracy (coupled with its attendant ideology of “whitening”) emerged not out of a move towards

\textsuperscript{6} Nelson, Diane M. A Finger in the Wound: Body Politics in Quincentennial Guatemala (Berkeley: University of California, 1999), 6.
egalitarianism, but rather as an attempt to recuperate hierarchies unsettled by the loosening of race-based privilege (Hanchard 1994: 8). The discursive force of Brazil's racial democracy upholds racial inequalities while simultaneously denying their very existence. By inscribing Brazil as a "race-less society," this mystifying effect has secured privileged positions through the disabling of race-based mobilizations, an accomplishment owing primarily to "the general inability of Brazilians to identify patterns of violence and discrimination that are racially specific" (Ibid., 8).

This Brazilian vignette is intended to show how the disavowal of difference (i.e. the compassionate conservatives' commitment to equality; Huntington's proscription for national unity, etc.) can domesticate the anxieties posed by categorical transgressions. By fixing the degrees of difference found within national boundaries, statist "solutions" to the "problems" of categorical transgressions (i.e. a pluralization of difference) contain disaggregating threats to national orders within a sterile context of Sameness. In this sense, conventional forms of pluralism preserve a state-centered ideal: "outside the warm, protected spaces of the normal individual and the territorial state, conventional pluralists project a lot of abnormality, anarchy, and cruelty in need of exclusion or regulation" (Connolly., xiii-xiv).

In the Brazilian example, racial democracy elides of the "problems" posed by racial and cultural pluralization by supplanting histories of resistance and domination with an ahistorical and anti-racial flatness. The smoothing of intra-national differences, however, has a broad and deep-seated history throughout all of Latin America. *La Raza Cosmica* or *mestizaje*, a myth similar to Brazil's racial democracy,
was employed to “help link dark-skinned *castas*, Euro-Americans, and Indians into one nation-state” (Klor de Alva 199?: 11). However, in the words of Jorge Klor de Alva, the promise of *mestizaje* has “failed to bring national unity and it has continued to be used to avoid addressing the hard fact that ethnic differences are primarily the effects of power and therefore usually serve the interests of the powerful” (Ibid.).

These appeals to mixing as a means of obscuring racial/spatial hierarchies and the effects of state power are not isolated to Latin America. As demonstrated in Chapter Three’s exploration of Hawai‘i, the salience of a hybridized “local culture” has masked the far more complex colonial, political, and economic processes that are involved in the politics of the Islands (Okamura 1994: 246). And as will be addressed in Chapter Five, in Japan—the country heralded as the paradigmatic nation-state—the naturalization of a constructed Japanese unity through myth of “ethnic homogeneity” silences those claims of indigenous (the Ainu), colonial (Okinawan), and migrant (Koreans, Chinese, and most recently, Latin American *nikkeijin*) Others.

The Fall 1993 Special Issue of *Time Magazine*, however, provides an interesting text for inquiring how appeals to racial mixing are presently working to transform America’s racial ideology.

6. *Time*’s “New Face of America”

On the cover of the Special Issue—notably entitled, “The New Face of America: How Immigrants Are Shaping the World’s First Multicultural Society”—is the now famous computer-morphed image of “Eve,” a face promoted by *Time*’s editors as a dramatization of the impact of interracial mixing: the so-called “symbol of our future.”
In commenting on the birthing process of this “remarkable preview,” the editors assert that “(t)he woman on the cover of this special issue of *Time* does not exist, except metaphysically.” They elaborate:

The highlight of this exercise in cybergensis was the creation of the woman on our cover, selected as a symbol of the future, multiethnic face of America.... As on-lookers watched the image of our new Eve begin to appear on the computer screen, several staff members promptly fell in love. Said one: “It breaks my heart that she doesn’t exist.” We sympathize with our lovelorn colleagues, but even technology has its limits. This is a love that must forever remain unrequited (*Time* 1993).
Eve is remarkable in the sense that she promises a future where federative differences have morphed together, rendering “trivial” things (i.e. the legacies of racism, discriminatory exclusion policies, and indigenous entitlements) utterly meaningless. She has been cast as an imaginary solution to the problems of immigration, multiculturalism, sexuality, gender, and (trans)national identity (Berlant 1997: 176).

“Soon, we will all be the Same,” she proclaims, “the Promised Land is just around the corner. Soon the Many will be the One and everything will finally run smoothly.”

But, beneath the sanguinity of Eve’s promises lays a politics that necessitates a complicated understanding of smoothness, a conceptualization that moves beyond the innocent processes of blending and melting, or in this case, morphing. To start, the process of smoothing cannot be separated from processes of inscription. What is smoothing, William Bogard asks, if not the enactment of friction? Moreover, what is friction but the performance of a force, a marking comprised of microscopic cuts, tears and wounds? It can therefore be said that things must be “worked-over” before they can fit into their place. Things must become-smooth. Just as carpenters sand down surface irregularities to create the smooth interface of a tongue-and-groove joint, states must inscribe, or rather “machine” the surfaces of their citizen-subjects to insure that differences do not exceed the limits of national cohesion. Cast in this light, we can begin to treat the socius as an assemblage of “smoothing machines,” as syncopated energies working to code-smooth the social relations of power (Bogard 2000: 269).

7 In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari stage a number of soft oppositions between smooth and striated spaces. However, they are most interested in those instances where the smooth and the striated flowed through one another. They seek to map out how “the forces at work within space continually striate it, and how in the course of its striation it develops other forces and emits new smooth spaces” (p. 500).
With this understanding set in motion, it is easier to read the promise of “Eve” as a nation-building strategy. She is intended to assure America that, “Everything is smoothing out. Things are coming under ‘our’ control. ‘Our’ problems will soon be solved.” However, Lauren Berlant understands the “New Face of America” to be a “Frankenstein monster composed from other “ethnic” human images, through a process of morphing. The new face of America involves a melding of different faces with the sutures erased and the proportions made perfect; she is a national fantasy from the present representing the posthistorical—that is, postwhite—future” (Berlant 1997: 201). In this sense, the morphing of America works to discursively elide the “problems” of race and immigration by supplanting histories of resistance and domination with an unsituated anti-racial flatness. This is represented in the Time cover, as in Eve’s background lies a field of immigrant faces that are obscured to the cusp of invisibility. As Berlant observes, “the matrix of blurry faces, barely intelligible dots, is the dominant image of mass immigrant life in this Time, which is dedicated to disaggregating, categorizing, and managing the circulation and value of the contemporary immigrant population” (Ibid., 202). “The dots,” she continues:

...declare the immigrant a weak or faded sign, real only as an abstract racial type rather than as persons distinguished by movement through concrete and abstract spaces of any sort. As they recede behind the face of the future that is also called the “new face of America” in a kind of whirl of temporalizing, the immigrant dots are also already being forgotten (Ibid.).

Time’s image asserts that the “problems” of immigration and racism, therefore, will be “solved” through the assimilative/Americanizing force of interracial breeding.

“For all the talk of cultural separatism,” argues Time, “the races that make the U.S. are now crossbreeding at unprecedented rates” such that the “huddled masses have
now already given way to the muddled masses" (*Time* 1993: 64-65). The article continues by quoting Karen Stephenson, a UCLA anthropologist, who anticipates Huntington's *Who Are We* argument through a channeling of the Robert Park-influenced interracial marriage researchers: “Marriage is the main assimilator,” asserts Stephenson. “If you really want to effect change, it’s through marriage and child rearing...Those who intermarry have perhaps the strongest sense of what it will take to return America to an unhyphenated whole” (Ibid., 65). As such, the promise of hybridity—the becoming-beige of America—has been broadcast as the “final solution” to America’s incommensurable racial problems. Berlant states it plainly when she writes that the “defensive racialization of national culture in [*Time*] is genocidal. It sacrifices the centrality of African American history to American culture by predicting its demise; it sacrifices attention to the concrete lives of exploited immigrant and native people of color by fantasizing the future as what will happen when white people intermarry, thus linking racial mixing to the continued, but masked hegemony of whiteness... (Berlant 1997: 207).

Unfortunately for the state, social realities are far messier than the sterilized world of *Time’s* computer-generated morphing. Smoothing machines, Bogard warns, “transgress nothing—they deterritorialize, and reterritorialize, that is all” (Bogard 2000: 283). Therefore, while the promise of “Eve” might enable the creation of a new American myth—one which extracts bodies from the histories and politics of race and deposits them into the smoothed space of undifferentiated beige-ness—it can never solve the “problem” of intra-national difference.
The task at hand, therefore, is not to prescribe solutions to so-called “problems.” Instead, it would be more worthwhile to ascertain within historical moments the nature of hybrid subjectivities, how it they are embedded within the complex matrix of race, ethnicity, and nation, focusing on what it can disclose about the present historical situation. The controversy surrounding the whether or not to add a multiracial category to the US 2000 Census provides such a moment.

7. Transformation of America’s Racial Discourse

The main provocation for this chapter was the debate surrounding the US 2000 Census. In particular, my attention was drawn to Newt Gingrich’s unlikely endorsement of a “multiracial” addition to the list of official racial categories. Responding to a 1997 Clinton speech on race relations, Gingrich offered a 10-point program to promote “racial healing.” Point number six, titled “Breakdown Rigid Classifications,” suggested the addition of a “multiracial” category on the census and other government forms could “begin to phase out the outmoded, divisive, and rigid classification of Americans as ‘blacks’ or ‘whites’ or other single races. Ultimately, our goal is to have one classification—American” (Gingrich 1997).

Like Lott, Gingrich evokes a corporeal metaphor, suggesting an injured or wounded body politic. And when read in this manner, it becomes clear that Gingrich was not at all interested in a politics of recognition. Instead, he found within the so-called “multiracial movement,” an opportunity to gloss over American histories of oppression and discrimination with a neoliberal, antiracial sheen. And, while this embrace of “all Americans” is more palatable than the overt exclusions generated by regimes of racial superiority or even Huntington’s call for the consolidation of an
American national identity at the expense of Latin American immigrants, Gingrich’s “progressive” call for healing must be met with a degree of skepticism. And, once under scrutiny, the promise of Gingrich’s inclusiveness is undermined by its re-centering of America’s problems on the agitation of old wounds—namely, the unwillingness of “minority” groups to forget the injuries produced by conquest, slavery, and discrimination. Healing, like Eve’s smoothing, is exposed as a desire to silence claims of injustice. By eradicating the racial and historical distinctions that anthropomorphize intra-national difference, Gingrich’s healing aims to synthesize disaggregating multiplicities into a single representation of “the people” (Agamben 1998: 177; Shapiro 2001: 13).

As this chapter has tried to demonstrate, some hybridities, (i.e. Brazil’s racial democracy, Latin America’s cosmic mestizaje, Hawaii’s “ethnic paradise,” and the United States’ “new face of America”) have worked to strengthen national cohesion by erasing intra-national distinctions. This project, however, does not intend to force historical cases to explain present inequalities (an overcoding of sameness) nor to stress the emergence of unique and distinctive hybrid identities (an overcoding of difference). Instead, this engagement with hybridity seeks to ask a question similar to Foucault’s: “how might the polyvalent discourses on race and their effects be better viewed as complex processes of rupture and recuperation?” (Foucault, quoted in Stoler 1995: 60). In other words, Foucault’s investigations do not simply search for the discontinuities of history; he engages in a much more challenging analytic concern regarding the tension between rupture and reinscription, between break and recuperation in discursive formations (Ibid.). To this end, what concerned Foucault
was not modern racism’s break with earlier forms, but instead the “discursive 
bricolage whereby an older discourse of race is ‘recovered’, ‘modified’, ‘encased’,
and ‘encrusted’ in new forms” (Ibid.). The emergence of the so-called “multiracial 
movement” discloses such a fluctuation.

“The New Face of America.” “Counting a ‘New’ Type of American.” “The 
New Multiracial Mainstream.” “The New Face of Race.”8 As one surveys the ways 
in which race was being written (or more precisely, inscribed) in the years preceeding 
the 2000 census, it would appear that mixed-raced individuals are popping-up 
everywhere, and everywhere they seem to be new. Paul Gilroy deems this 
transformation as a crisis in raciology. “Prompted by the impact of genomics,” 
Gilroy suggests, “‘race’, as it has been defined in the past, has become vulnerable to 
the claims of a much more elaborate, less deterministic biology” (Gilroy 2000: 29). 
The emergence of this crisis of raciology has effectively diminished the race’s 
common-sense credibility, stripped away its moral and intellectual integrity, and 
made visible the elaborate cultural and ideological networks that sustain it (Ibid., 28-
29).

Gilroy argues that this crisis presents an opportunity to free ourselves from the 
bonds of raciology and therefore, we “must try to take possession of that profound 
transformation and somehow set it to work against the tainted logic that produced it” 
(Ibid., 15). However, before falling into the same celebratory trap that caught 
Oliveira’s celebration of Brazil’s heterogeneity, Gilroy warns that the anxiety 
produced by this crisis have caused racial regimes to become “more unpredictable as

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8Selected titles from Time (Fall 1993); World Report (July 14, 1997); Newsweek (May 8, 2000); and 
Newsweek (September 18, 2000) respectively, emphases added by author.
the quality of their claims upon the world have become more desperate” (Ibid., 14). An instance of this desperation was disclosed in the renovation of the 2000 Census categories. In order to appreciate the ways in which the state fought to maintain control over an increasingly diverse populace, it is necessary to frame census-taking as a form of state control, if not an enactment of force.

Deleuze and Guttari suggest that the state machine has built itself upon a history of “legitimate” violences both of dispossession and containment, in order to striate the space and populations over which it has reigned (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 385). This use of violence can appear strange for those unaccustomed to recognizing non-physical violence. However, as Deleuze and Guattari write, “Violence is found everywhere, but under different regimes and economies...All things considered, the violence of the war machine might appear softer and more supple than that of the State apparatus because it does not yet have war as its ‘object’, because it eludes both poles of the State...It is true that war kills, and hideously mutilates. But it is especially true after the State has appropriated the war machine. Above all, the State apparatus makes the mutilation, and even death, come first. It needs them preaccomplished, for people to be born that way, crippled and zombielike. The myth of the zombie, the living dead, is a work myth and not a war myth. Mutilation is a consequence of war, but it is a necessary condition, a presupposition of the State apparatus and the organization of work” (Ibid., 425).

8. Multiracial Americans and the US 2000 Census

In July 1997, after four years of intense debates, the Interagency Committee for the Review of the Racial and Ethnic Standards ruled against the addition of a sixth,
multiracial response for the US 2000 Census's race question. Citing a fear that an additional multiracial category would amplify racial tensions and exacerbate national fragmentation, the Committee decided instead to recommend a retooling of OMB Directive 15 in order to allow multiracial Americans to "mark one or more" of the five existing official categories (America Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, Black, White, and Hispanic). While much has already been written on the history, significance, and effects of the Multiracial Movement and the 1997 amendment of Directive 15 (Nobles 2000), what has remained largely unmarked are the ways in which the debates surrounding the multiracial category produced a theater of national crisis, anxiety, and indeterminacy. Thus, in the final section of this chapter, focus will be placed on the OMB's pathologization of multiracial difference, which invites, in a very direct way, a further questioning of the bounded and territorialized conceptions of culture, society, and community.9

The census can be understood as a form of accounting that not only enumerates, but like Huntington's *Who Are We?*, seeks to define the nation. In what may seem to be a bureaucratic routine, the state orders its subjects into clearly defined categories in terms of nativity, citizenship status, age, household income, marital status, and race and ethnicity. Of these categories, none have been more contested than race and ethnicity. As more recent censuses have been forced to confront the demise of biological notions of race, census categories are now seen as an important force in the generation and reproduction of political and collective identities.

9 Language pulled from Malkki 1995: 2; "Working in social settings of displacement invites in a very direct way the further questioning of the anthropological concepts of culture, society, and community as bounded, territorialized units."
The US government began collecting racial data in the eighteenth century. From its inception, the categories were implemented in order to establish a basic differentiation between whites and nonwhites. Until the passage of Civil Rights legislation in the 1960s, the function of the census categories was to facilitate prohibitions on naturalization rights, the maintenance of quotas for the 1924 National Origins Immigration Act, and to strategically circumscribe the political, economic and social rights of particular groups (Anderson 1988).

Since the gains of the Civil Rights movement, however, the US Census has increasingly become the site of competing political claims. What is at stake is not only official recognition, but also the political ramifications that are created by these definitions. Since the 1964 passing of Civil Rights legislation, new record keeping practices have been implemented in order to monitor discriminatory trends and enforce equal opportunity mandates. At the time of the 1960 Census, biologically-based racial classifications had already become discredited and would have been eliminated from the 1970 Census. But, with the passage of Civil Rights and Equal Opportunity legislation, it became necessary for the state to continue to collect racial statistics (Kaplan 1979: 4). These “comprehensive” statistics were used to demonstrate patterns of discrimination practiced by businesses, schools, and political institutions. In this function, the census became an essential tool in the enforcement of civil rights. To restate this key point, the passage of Civil Rights legislation marked a significant shift in the use of racial and ethnic data. No longer used as a tool to identify those populations who should be excluded from citizenship, census data became a way of ensuring the equal protection of all (Lott 1998: 31).
In 1977, the Office of Management and Budget issued the first incarnation of Directive 15. Defining the federal standards for racial and ethnic classification, Directive 15 provided a standardized classifications system for the collection, analysis, and presentation of national statistics on race and ethnicity. Originally issued to provide manageable data for state agencies, OMB Directive 15 has in fact come to shape the very discourse of race in the United States as the categories have become the de facto standard for state and local agencies, the private and non-profit sectors, as well as social scientists and policy makers. Also, from a civil rights perspective, Directive 15 is critical in that it institutionalized the representation of presumably compatible, non-duplicated, exchangeable ethnic and racial statistics.

Despite the hopes of statisticians and demographers, the ethnic and racial categories provided by Directive 15 have not proven to be exclusive and exhaustive. Rather, America’s racial categories have proven to be fundamentally unstable. In the last ten US Censuses, the nation’s official racial categories have changed nine times. Some writers have claimed that when Directive 15 was implemented in the 1970’s, “racial and ethnic minorities were a stable and small proportion of the American population.” At the time, the only “sizable” minority group (as tallied by rigid federal statistics) was African Americans who composed 90% of the non-white population (Payson 1996, 1257). Since that time, however, there has been a substantial increase in the numbers of immigrants from Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The other notable demographic change has been an increase in the recognition of mixed race citizens, the “new generation of multiracial families and children.”
Beginning in the 1980s, multiracial advocacy groups began challenging Directive 15’s “single race check off” policy. In the 1980s and 1990s, activist organizations such as the Association of Multiethnic Americans (AMEA) and Project RACE (Reclassify All Children Equally) began lobbying for federal validation of what was being promoted as a burgeoning “multiracial” group identity. With the 2000 US Census looming on the horizon, the main political goal of the “Multiracial Movement” was to secure a census category they could call their own. The activism of the movement, coupled with an increasing disenfranchisement of the utility of Directive 15, forced the American government to re-evaluate its racial and ethnic categories. In June 1993, AMEA testified before the US House of Representative’s Census Subcommittee and proposed that a “multiracial” category be added to the 2000 Census. Motivations for this change ranged from improving self-esteem to increased recognition for the fluidity and ambiguity of ethnic and racial identities to a more accurate tabulation of statistics on the nation’s population.

In the debate over how to enumerate multiracials in the 2000 Census, the already established identity-based Civil Rights interest groups clashed with the multiracial movement. Slighted by the state’s history of classifying multiracials into a single rigid category, the multiracial advocacy groups and their supporters lobbied for an additional mixed-race category. However, the majority of civil rights groups worked against this amendment claiming it would drastically impact the demographics for minority groups and therefore result in the loss of hard-won gains.

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10 In the 1990 Census, nearly 10 million persons marked the “Other” race category, making it one of the fastest growing racial categories. Although the bulk of the growth came from a shift in racial identity among Hispanics, the growth can also be explained in part by the increase in the number of multiracials who used the “Other” category to write in “multiracial,” “biracial,” “mixed-race” or other alternatives to the monoracial categories (McKenney and Cresce 1992).
in civil rights, education, and the electoral arena (Nash 1997: 23). The identity-based
groups decided that “adding a multiracial category would undermine the effectiveness
of civil rights enforcement agencies because of the inconsistent counts and the
uncertainties it introduces in being able to analyze trends” (House Committee
Hearings 1997: 418). In an opposing statement, the National Coalition for an
Accurate Count of Asians and Pacific Islanders asked, “What can be stated about
common experiences shared by biracial or multiracial persons?...biracial or
multiracial persons have the burden to document what distinct experiences or
disadvantagement, in contrast to persons of protected single race backgrounds, they
have had because of their biraciality or multiraciality before the decision to establish
a multiracial or biracial category would be appropriate” (Hearings 1997, 96).

Opponents to the addition of a multiracial category denied the appropriateness
of multiple affiliations in favor of safeguarding themselves against the possible loss
of political clout and the economic benefits that are attached to their demographics.
Thus, by May 1997, the Asian and Pacific Islander Census Advisory Committee,
along with the Census Advisory Committees on the African American, American
Indian, and Alaska Native, and Hispanic populations, jointly recommended that the
“Census Bureau does not add a multiracial category in Census 2000 form, and that no
separate instructions be added for multiple responses in the race question” (Census
Advisory Committees 1997).

After four years (1993-1997) and three rounds of congressional hearings, the
federal interagency on what came to be known as the “Tiger Woods Bill” made two
recommendations. First, it suggested that the 2000 US Census should allow for
multiple responses to the race question. And second, the committee believed that “multiracial” should not be added to the five existing racial categories (Nobles 2000: 143).

The defeat of the multiracial category initiative exposed an underlying ideological rift within the multiracial movement. While AMEA was satisfied with the multiple response recommendation, claiming it to be “the best compromise at this time,” Project RACE read the multiple origins proposal as “at best a partial victory and at worst a perpetuation of ‘multiracial’ as a sub- and/or incoherent identity” (Ibid., 143-144). Even within this divergence, it is apparent that the discourse of the “Multiracial Movement” is invested within a politics of recognition and therefore, inclusion.

Several works have examined US 2000 census to highlight the fluidity of racial categories. This project, however, is more interested in using the multiracial category debate to expose an anxiety that arises from the nation’s fundamental inability to manage its internal frontiers of racial difference. “It is from within this anxious setting,” remarks Gilroy, “that new hatreds are created not by the ruthless enforcements of stable categories but from a disturbing inability to maintain them” (Gilroy 2000: 22). The debates leading up to the US 2000 Census, therefore, expose a significant emergence of the threat posed by hybridity. This sprouting, if its fugitivity is preserved, echoes Gilroy’s call for a further disruption of race-thinking.
The fortitude of racial regimes however, requires that those seeking to loosen the seams within its shroud of power do so in “other” ways and “other” spaces. Conventional (i.e. reactionary) movements that operate solely against these already existing orders will ultimately be self-defeating (molarized into the Same) unless they are used to ignite a breaking away. Movements that break away—as opposed to those that merely break into—evoke a state of “permanent revolution,” which is a move to incessantly deterritorialize the stabilize “legitimacies” of existing orders (Patton 2000: 120).

Rather than simply breaking-into (the inclusion of a “multiracial” category or “check all that apply), the destabilization of national identities enables a breaking-away from the dangerous and destructive patterns that are authorized by raciology—Gilroy’s terminology for the period where “the rational absurdity of ‘race’ was elevated into an essential concept and endowed with a unique power to both determine history and explain its selective unfolding” (Ibid.). The modern order of race and identity (and specifically in this sense its employment of hybridity) cannot not just simply be re-signified or de-signified. In the words of Gilroy: “to imagine that its dangerous meaning can be easily re-articulated into benign, democratic forms would be to exaggerate the power of critical and oppositional interests” (Gilroy 2000: 12).

9. Conclusion

This chapter has foregrounded some of the recent political, discursive, and legal efforts that have fought to rearticulate America’s interior frontiers in a manner that differentiate between “us”/“them” or “white”/“colored” while simultaneously
smoothing away the significance and even the existence of such categories. This constant redrawing of racial boundaries—as evinced in Lott’s “we,” Time’s Eve, and the OMB’s renovation of Directive 15—exposes both the porous and fluid nature of citizen-subjectivity as well as the tenuous achievement that is state control. The chapter has also shown that by fixing the degrees of difference found within national boundaries, statist “solutions” to the “problems” of intra-national difference strive to contain those disaggregating threats to national orders within a sterile context of Sameness (Lott’s “every American,” Huntington’s appeal to a unified national identity, and the antiracial flatness produced by the census categories).

Nevertheless, the transgressions of “boxed identities” are constantly compromised by the modern logic of exclusive disjunction, “a distinction buttressed by a belief system deeply ingrained in the American imaginary which insists on the essential difference of racialized peoples.”

Thus, hybridity must be understood as a multiplicity in the style of Deleuze and Guattari. They explain: “It was created precisely in order to escape the abstract opposition between the multiple and the one, to escape dialectics, to succeed in conceiving the multiple in the pure state, to cease treating it as a numerical fragment of a lost Unity or Totality or as the organic element of a Unity or Totality yet to come, and instead distinguish between different types of multiplicity.”

In Who Are We?, Huntington’s complaints suggest that there needs to a new way of defining what it means to be “American.” Certainly, the concept of

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11 DPL 3: Nevertheless, this crossing over is constantly compromised by the essential, racial separation of Asians from “Americans,” a distinction buttressed by a belief system deeply ingrained in the American imaginary which insists on the essential difference of racialized peoples.
12 D&G 1987: 32.
“becoming an American” represents differing things to different people. A recognition of these differences, however, can facilitate the accommodation intra-national differences and set the groundwork for a more hospitable multicultural and multiracial society. Such groundwork encourages an active contestation of the nation’s master binaries (i.e., inside/outside, us/them, white/colored) as well as establishes the kinds of conditions needed to respect a new vision of pluralism.
RECEIVED
AS
FOLLOWS
CHAPTER FIVE

RE-MADE IN JAPAN:
NIKKEIJIN DISRUPTIONS OF JAPAN'S ETHNO-CULTURAL UNITY

1. “The Strength to Live” in a Neoliberal Japan

The chapters thus far have focused on neoliberal “solutions” to the “problems” of intra-national difference. They have worked to illustrate how rhetorical commitments to “fairness,” “justice,” and “racial equality” have enabled a restructuring of political life: one that relies upon—while simultaneously denying—racial, gender, sexual, and class distinctions. As noted throughout, the dangers of this neoliberal restructuring stem from its individuation of socio-economic successes and failures. This has not only obscured more relational understandings of society (i.e. that the enfranchisement of some is a result of a disenfranchisement of others), it has worked to absolve the State from notions of social responsibility and public accountability.

With the project organized so centrally around the production, containment, and denial of intra-national differences, this chapter’s focus on Japan—the paradigm for national homogeneity—may seem peculiar. The myth of Japan’s ethno-cultural unity and the invisibility of its intra-national diversity, however, are simply testaments to the potency of Western Orientalism and Japanese nationalism. In recent years, however, the nation’s stagnating economy and fragmenting social structure have thrown these assumptions into question. As a result, Japanese policymakers have been provoked to seek out “solutions” to a wide-array of “problems.” And, as Andrea Arai’s analysis of Japan’s recent education reforms demonstrates, the latest trend has policymakers turning to the tenets of neoliberalism for viable “solutions.”
In 2002, at the peak of a decade-long recession, the Japanese government announced its plans to overhaul the national education system. Responding to a barrage of media reports on “collapsing classrooms,” “deteriorating homes,” and “strange youth,” these reforms seemed designed to suggest a new, positive role for the Japanese government in local affairs (Arai 200?: 1). The reforms’ promises of relaxed requirements and a commitment to individualized learning were fortified by two slogans: “the strength to live” (ikiru chikara) and “the frontier is within Japan” (furonteia wa nihon no naka ni aru). These promises, Arai observes:

...did foreshadow a new relationship between the individual and the State, but a relationship replete with new responsibilities and less security—a relationship driven by the globalization of markets and efforts on the part of the Japanese State to bring about the final structural and ideological overhaul of the postwar ideas of “homogeneity” and “democracy” (Ibid.).

In her examination of these educational reforms, Arai discloses a “trajectory of problematizations” whereby the government has reinterpreted the past—the relatively secure path from education to the workforce—in the name of the present economic and political exigencies (Ibid., 4). The result, she argues, has been a recommitment to the discourse of “patriotic education.”

For example, in the spring of 2001, Teruwaki Ken, the chief spokesman on educational reforms for the Ministry of Education, was featured in a ten-part television series devoted to the nation’s “school problems” (kyouiku mondai) (Ibid., 7). In these programs, Teruwaki introduced his national audience to the new official position on Japan’s education past; that in retrospect, the top-down education system produced a nation of docile adults and, in this respect, was to be blamed for recent difficulties. More significant, Teruwaki suggested, the traditional education system
has done little to prepare Japanese citizens for today’s global realities. The goal of
the Ministry’s new system, therefore, is to create “individual[s] that would not wish
to foist responsibility off on others, or wait for the schools, or government to care for
them” (Ibid.). Teruwaki elaborated:

These reforms mean a turn to the public (minnasan). The local population will
from now on assume responsibility. When there are education problems from
now on, you won’t have to turn to the Ministry, but rather solve them on your
own, by developing the strength that is now lacking (Ibid., 8).

In a moment that revealed broader economic anxieties, Teruwaki emphasized that
throughout Japan’s history, there has never been a time where education was more
important than the present:

Terrible times have befallen Japan (Nihon wa taihen no koto ni nate
shimaimasu). What we need to get at the roots of these problems is to focus
on the inner mind or heart (kokoro) of these children. We need to raise
children with energy (seiryoku), that will be able to go anywhere in the world
and solve problems (Ibid., 10).

Embedded within his statement is the image of the moral decline of the 1980s
generation, characterized as a general malaise for school, the nation, and life itself.
The faltering economy and increase in social problems of the late 1990s provoked the
government to reintroduce the notion of ikiru chikara (“strength to live” or “zest for
living”), which rapidly emerged as one of the nation’s most circulated buzzwords
(Ibid., 16). The notion of “recapturing the spirit that made Japan great” was broadcast
in countless venues (i.e. the MIJ advertising campaign discussed below), not the least
of which being Miyazaki Hayao’s 2001 film, Spirited Away (Sen to Chihiro no
Kamikakushi).

The narrative of Spirited Away takes place within the recessionary period of
the 1990s when the Japanese stock market crashed, property values were cut in half,
and the nation’s banking system was on the verge of collapse due to years of bad
loans and speculative ventures—all of which is represented in the film’s opening
scenes as the protagonist, ten-year old Chihiro, and her parents stumble across a
deserted theme park. As the family strolls through the abandoned park, a decadent
past mysteriously materializes before them, with previously-dilapidated concession
stands somehow becoming full of delicacies. Chihiro’s parents do not pause to
question the source of this feast and dive in, gorging themselves on the “seemingly
intransigent luxuries of the ‘economic miracle’” (Ibid., 12). As a result, however, the
parents fall under the spells of the park’s spirits, they are transformed into enormous
swine, and Chihiro is the only one who can save them.

Figure 1: Spirited Away

The parents’ rescue entails Chihiro’s personal journey, a reconnection with the gods,
symbols, and settings of an earlier, more mystical Japan, within which lies the path to
a “native source” of energy. By the film’s end, however, this source is revealed as
being not an actual physical space but rather a revitalization of the Japanese ethic; that through Chihiro’s labor as a bathhouse maid, “taking on and flawlessly executing the menial and dirty chores rejected for some time now by the youth of Japan, Chihiro is transformed from the subject of lack to the subject of potential, demonstrating as she does how individual responsibility is linked to national” (Ibid., 12).

The premise of *ikiru chikara*, therefore, is that Japan’s future rest upon the *senzaitenkina chikara* ("latent strength") of its children and, in order to draw upon this withering resource, Japan needs to create a new kind of relationship between the State and its citizens, between authority and the individual (Ibid.19). Under this framework, the sources of societal “problems” are removed from the economic domain—the “bursting of the bubble” and everything associated with it—to the notion that “political and social systems, the value system (*kachitaikei*) and moral sense (*rinrikan*) have been infested (*mushibande shimatta*) from within” (Kawai quoted in Arai 200?: 21). The lesson being that while the organization and morality of Japan has not yet collapsed (Chihiro’s parents do return to their natural state), it is dire need of strengthening.

Kawai Hayao, the Japanese Minister of Culture, has suggested that it has become clear that Japan’s previously-successful model of “catch up and surpass” no longer meets the challenges of the present era. However, hope is not lost since Kawai reminds the Japanese citizenry that the solution literally lies within: “within Japan lies a superior nature” (*sugureta shitsu*). This latent strength, he continues, has been lying dormant (*nemutta mama*) and in order to save Japan, we must “reclaim this enormous
frontier (kyōdaina furonteia wo kaitaku shinakereba naranai), by drawing out this latent strength.

How are we going to go about this (dono yō ni jitsugen suru noka)? We are going to change the way that the people and the State relate to each other. We are going to develop a vital and supple individual (takamashiku, shinayakana kojin)” (Kawai quoted in Arai 200?: 22).

As Kawai continues to call for a more individuated Japanese society, he declares:

“We are compelled to follow the world tide of revolutionary change in which people, things, money, and information cross borders at a new rate, and change to fit the new world standard of a highly competitive era, by upping the power (kojin no pāwa appu) of the individual.” (Ibid.). Just as the traditional household-centered life gave way to one structured around the company (kaisha), Kawai declares that it is time for a new transformation to take place: “there is a need for an individual that is independent (jiritsu) and self-acting, that can take on risk, be intentional, assume responsibility, and not be tied to a place (ba)—a vital and supple individual” (Kawai in Arai 200?: 25). If the twentieth century could be characterized as the century of organization, the twenty-first must be, according to Kawai, the century of the individual (Ibid., 23).

With the implementation of this new individual-centered educational system, Kawai believes that it will be easier to cultivate the “Japanese spirit.” Presently, however, the Japanese educational system holds two responsibilities. First, it is in charge of the obligatory, enforced education (gimu toshite kyōsei suru kyōiku) that provides the minimum standard. The second, a service education (saabisu toshite no kyōiku), is designed to train those who are able to meet the demands of the marketplace. While these two kinds of education are currently intertwined, in future,
Kawai argues, "they will need to be separate. Along with this, we will need to reevaluate the role of the home, as one of the major bodies responsible for education, which isn't fulfilling its role at present" (Kawai, quoted in Arai 200?: 26). In this, one can witness a significant bifurcation that prepares the "efficients" (recall Wells) for the professional workforce with those less skilled channeled into manual labor. It is Kawai's evocation of the "role of the home" that is significant. With the individuation of society, the discrepancies between "enforced" and "service" education becomes a matter of each families' social capital and therefore no longer a concern of the state. Those homes with a stronger social capital will just naturally produce stronger students.

Thus, the new discourse of the education reforms as outlined by Teruwaki and Kawai, aims to replace the top-down education system by reducing making reductions in curriculum and allowing students "the freedom" to choose their own way while also requiring individual decision-makers to accept responsibility their own choices. Simultaneously forward and backward looking, the *ikiru chikara* ideology, therefore, is leading Japan towards the creation of a new "bipolar" society where status inequality and a new underclass of workers stand as the "solutions" for a full economic recovery (ibid., 32). Those who can, as Kawai says, will meet the demands of the marketplace and the others will make up the new reserve army of unskilled and semi-skilled labor.

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It is from within this milieu that this chapter want to situate Japan's so-called "immigration problem." The nation's rededication to a nativist identity (through the
strengthening of the “Japanese spirit”) has presented an even greater challenge to those working to create a more tolerant and pluralistic Japan. With the prospect of increased immigration to Japan rapidly becoming a social reality, this chapter seeks to intervene in the current culture of intolerance by tracing the cultural construction of ethno-spatial boundaries within present-day Japan. In keeping with the general theme of the overall project, the chapter works to identify the underlying structural continuities and cultural reciprocities that mediate ideological schisms between inside/outside, domestic/foreign, and identity/difference. Using a genealogical approach, the chapter will examine the symbolic forms, material practices, and narrative strategies that animate the construction, maintenance, and transgression of Japan’s nativist order: inside/outside (uchi/soto), insider/outsider (uchinohito/sotonohito), Japanese/foreigner (nihonjin/gaikokujin).

2. Imin Mondai: Japan’s “Immigration Problem”

In July 2003, the New York Times ran a three-part series titled, “Can Japan Change?” In the second installment, “Japan Needs, but Resists, Immigration,” columnist Howard W. French stages Japan’s so-called “immigration problem” by drawing upon the country’s oft-noted population decline: “Japan is at the leading edge of a phenomenon that is beginning to strike many advanced countries: rapidly aging populations and dwindling fertility” (French 2003: A1). As a result, the size of Japan’s work force, which peaked in 1998, has entered a decline that experts predict will continue to accelerate. The potential consequences of this decline, writes French, include “not only a scarcity of workers and falling demand, but also a collapse of the pension system as the tax base shrinks and the elderly population booms” (2003: A1).
After first noting that a more thorough integration of women into the workplace could provide temporary relief, French asserts that Japan's "only hope" is to accept a massive influx of foreign labor. Citing a March 2000 United Nations study (???), the columnist argues that in order to "stave off disaster," Japan will need to admit seventeen million new immigrants by the year 2050—an eighteen percent increase in a country whose current immigrant population constitutes a mere one percent.

An influx of this magnitude would have a dramatic impact on any nation. But Japan, as French dutifully notes, remains the "most tenaciously insular of all the world's top industrial countries" and "deeply conservative notions about ethnic purity make it hard for [Japanese] experts to envision large-scale immigration" (2003: A1). One such expert, Komai Hiroshi of Tsukuba University, responding to forecasts similar to the United Nations', has argued that "[t]he kind of figures the demographers talk about are [sic] unimaginable for Japan." Furthermore, when pressed to envision Japan's future in light of a growing tension between the nation's historical resistance to immigration and demands for foreign labor from the industrial and service sectors, Komai declared:

Societies have always risen and faded, and Japan will likely disappear and something else will take its place, but that's not such a problem. Greece and Rome disappeared too (French 2003: A1).

While Komai's fatalism is arresting, it concisely replicates the convergence of social science thinking and popular opinion in regards to the nation's immigration "problem.""1 "From its inception," comments Yoko Selleck, "the issue of foreign

1 The language of this critique was influenced by Allen Feldman's Formations of Violence (1991: 18).
migrant workers has assumed the existence of an absolute distinction between
Japanese and foreigner” (Selleck 1997: 202). Thus, because Komai’s statement
concisely instantiates both Japan’s current national anxieties and the normative belief
in a homogenous space of citizenship, it is possible to use his utterance to launch a
larger critique.

Komai’s outlook rests upon a belief in watertight unities and
incommensurable differences, a position that resonates with the sentiments expressed
by Samuel P. Huntington in his controversial essay, “The Clash of Civilizations?”
(1993). One of Huntington’s central argument asserts, “cultural characteristics and
differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than
political or economic ones” (Huntington 1993: 27). In this sense, Komai’s “societies”
are homologous to Huntington’s “civilizations,” since both are presented as “shut-
down, sealed-off entities that have been purged of the myriad currents and
countercurrents that animate human history” (Said 2001: 1). This historical purging
is evident in Komai’s descriptions of Greece and Rome as “faded” and “disappeared.”
Such declarations are founded upon a static conception of culture, one that conjures
away the dynamic attributes of trans-boundary encounters. As a result, the possibility
for a hospitable integration of foreign workers in Japan is rendered simply
“unimaginable.”

When read in this manner, Komai’s remark can be read as an ingenuous
“solution” to Japan’s immigration “problem.” By attempting to consolidate a cultural
singularity in the face of an impending multiplicity, it appears that the
“disappearance” of Japan is a more viable option than a genuine engagement with
pluralization. The desire to leap forward to Komai’s “something else,” wherein somehow, for better or worse, Japan’s immigration “problem” has already been worked out, enacts a discursive closure that not only conceals national anxieties, but more importantly, obscures the multiple forms of discrimination currently inflicted upon the thousands of immigrants already living in Japan.

Rather than contributing to French’s sensationalism or Komai’s intolerance, Chapter Five seeks to reformulate Japan’s immigration “problem.” Specifically, it is designed to pursue the ways of envisaging a more hospitable Japan, one that can responsibly accommodate intra-national difference through acts of tolerance, plurality, and non-violence. Those working to bring fairness to Japan’s marginalized populations have struggled with this question for years. However, as Japan’s recent free trade (FTA) negotiations with other East Asian countries continue to involve discussions on the bilateral movement of labor, the need for this sort of critical engagements has become even more pressing. Responding to this urgency, this argument that follows seeks to move beyond the barriers typically encountered by conventional approaches to Japan’s minority issues. By examining the scripting of Nikkeijin identities in Japan, this chapter aims to loosen the ubiquitous uchi/soto (“inside/outside”) distinction in a manner that affords new ways of thinking about and

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2 This question was influenced by Sankaran Krishna’s work on Indian-Sri Lankan relations in his Postcolonial Insecurities (1999: xxix).
3 At the time of this writing, Japan is entering a fourth round of FTA negotiations with the Philippines. As a condition of this agreement, it seems likely that Japan will extend “residential status” to those Filipino nurses who obtain Japanese qualifications. Similarly, the Japan-Thai Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA) is nearing completion. A key point of contention, however, is the discrepancy between Japan’s preference for an exchange of “qualified personnel” versus Thailand’s wish to also include service workers (Miyagawa Makio, Director of the Regional Policy Division, Asian and Oceania Division in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interviewed July 20, 2004).
4 In this chapter, I will use “Nikkeijin” and “Nikkei” interchangeably to refer to foreign-born people of Japanese descent.
interceding in the so-called immigration “problem.” Insofar as this chapter proceeds by engaging with texts from a variety of genres—SMAP’s 2003 “MIJ” advertising campaign, Akira Kurosawa’s 1991 film *Rhapsody in August*, and NHK’s 2002 *asadora* ("morning serialized drama") *Sakura*—its analysis will explore the ways in which popular fictions participate in the dramaticization of Japan’s ethno-spatial boundaries. But first, it is necessary to include a brief account of the Nikkeijin “re-migration” phenomenon.

3. Japan’s Nikkeijin “Re-migration” Phenomenon

The economic boom of the 1980s depleted Japan’s domestic source of unskilled and semi-skilled labor as the younger generation, having been raised in the relative comfort of a vast middle class, became averse to the low wages and lower prestige of factory work (Lie 2001: 10; Linger 2001: 22). Having already recruited the maximum number of *dekasegi* (“seasonal migrants”) from Japan’s less affluent provinces, second- and third-tier employers began hiring undocumented workers from Pakistan, Iran, Bangladesh, and a number of other Asian countries (Linger 2001: 22). As the number of foreign laborers grew, some within Japan’s business and political sectors expressed concerns about a perceived threat to the nation’s cultural and ethnic “harmony.” Pressured by several factions, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed restructuring of the nation’s immigration regulations such that Nikkeijin would be allowed to enter as unskilled laborers. An oft-quoted article from the Liberal Democratic Party’s monthly magazine, states:

Admitting Nikkeijin legally will greatly help to ameliorate the present acute labor shortage. People who oppose the admission of the unskilled are afraid of racial discrimination against foreigners. Indeed, if Japan admitted many Asians with different cultures and customs than those of Japanese, Japan’s
homogenous ethnic composition could collapse. However, if Nikkeijin were admitted, this would not be a problem... Nikkeijin, as relatives of the Japanese, would be able to assimilate into Japanese society regardless of nationality and language. (Nojima 1989: 98-99 quoted in Linger 2001: 23)

The logic of this proposal evolved into the 1990 Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act. And, under the premise of preserving “Japan’s homogenous ethnic composition” while simultaneously addressing the industrial demands for cheap labor, a new legal category was created, the “long-term resident.” This residency status was made available to second- and third-generation Nikkeijin as well as their spouses, regardless of ancestry (Selleck 1997: 188-189). Additionally, under this revision, relatives within a “sixth degree of consanguinity,” such as the grandnephews and grandnieces of an applicant’s great-grandparent could also apply for a “certificate of eligibility” from Japanese Immigration Offices. With no restrictions placed upon these virtually guaranteed entry visas, they provided Nikkeijin with de facto working visas (Selleck 1997: 189).

This transformation of Japan’s immigration policies coincided with the bleakness of Brazil’s “lost decade,” a period characterized by a faltering economy, hyperinflation, and high unemployment (Tsuchida 1998). Capitalizing upon their newly-acquired preferred entrance category, many Brazilian Nikkei, frustrated by their country’s economic malaise and governmental mismanagement, “re-migrated” to Japan in hopes of earning better wages (Linger 2001: 24). As a result, the number of Nikkeijin living and working in Japan increased from approximately 2,000 in 1986 to almost 155,000 by 1993 (Cornelius 1994; Kajita 1998). Despite a prolonged Japanese recession, the numbers continued to increase steadily and today the domestic Nikkeijin population (predominantly, but not exclusively from Brazil)
exceeds 300,000, thereby constituting Japan’s second-largest “foreign” group (Tsuda 2003: 123).

4. Institutionalizing Japan’s “Newest Ethnic Minority”

A number of recent works have examined Japan’s Nikkei dekasegi phenomenon (Lie 2001; Linger 2001; Yamashita 2001; Brody 2002; Mori 2002; Roth 2002; Tsuda 2003; Douglass and Roberts 2003). While these studies employ a variety of approaches, they appear to be undergirded by one fundamental question: namely, “to what degree are the Nikkei, Nihonjin?" This is not surprising given that contemporary studies of diasporic communities derive from prior anthropological inquiries on the retention and transformation of culture (Kelley 2002: 127). However, more than simple “social scientific” observations, these ethnographic studies have focused heavily upon the daily struggles of dekasegi life and in this sense appear to be invested in institutionalizing the Nikkei as Japan’s “newest ethnic minority.”

For example, Michael Weiner, in the introduction to his edited volume, Japan’s Minorities, states that he included a discussion on the Nikkeijin because they have recently emerged “as a distinct minority population” (1997: xiii, emphasis added). In the same volume, Yoko Selleck notes that the purpose of her chapter is to “detail the current state of the Nikkeijin and discuss the possibility of them becoming a new minority group in Japanese society” (1997: 179, emphasis added). More recently, Tsuda Takeyuki, writing on the social isolation experienced by Nikkei dekasegi, claims that because second- and third-generation Nikkei are culturally

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5 “Nihonjin,” referring to Japanese people, is a contentious category, particularly within the context of this chapter (see also Lie 2001: 144-148). From this point on, I will delineate “Japanese” and “Nihonjin” in order to accentuate the differences between the language/culture/citizenship associated with “Japanese” and the seemingly immutable, ethnonational, and almost “racial” connotation of “Nihonjin.”
Brazilian, "they are ethnically rejected and treated as foreigners in Japan despite their Japanese descent, and thus have become the country's newest ethnic minority" (Tsuda 2003: 123, emphasis added). And, in a similar tone, Yamanaka Keiko, in describing the consequences of Brazilian labor migration to Japan, contends that despite the promise of "privileged access to economic opportunities and cultural integration," the Nikkeijin have found themselves "relegated [...] to the position of a disadvantaged 'ethnic' minority" (Yamanaka 2003: 192, emphasis added).

To be sure, the life of a Nikkei dekasegi is difficult. Beyond the long hours spent performing alienating san-k jobs (Tsuda 2003), and beyond the everyday struggles associated with living in a foreign country, they are confronted with the reality that "most Japanese citizens regard them as behaviorally strange and culturally inferior as a result of their Nikkeijin ethnicity and their third-world nationality" (Yamanaka 2003: 192). Nevertheless, the argument advanced here seeks to move in a different direction. That is, while many of the aforementioned treatments have demonstrated how the preference for Nikkeijin over other migrant workers has reified Japanese beliefs in jus sanguinis (the "law of blood") and racial homogeneity, the chapter will suggest that the institutionalization of Nikkeijin-as-minority enacts a strikingly similar kind of reification. In other words, by establishing Nikkeijin as "Japan's newest minority," these works discipline the indistinctiveness of Nikkei subject positions (i.e. neither resolutely "foreign" nor essentially "Nihonjin") in a

\[6\] San-k refers to the "three k's" of Japanese migrant labor: kitanai (dirty), kitsui (difficult), and kiken (dangerous).
manner that naturalizes the “Nihonjin” group identity as a majoritarian fact (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 105).  

By revisiting the core question, “to what degree are the Nikkei Nihonjin?,” it becomes evident that Nihonjin-as-majority operates as the constant against which the Nikkeijin are to be evaluated. Yet, when framed in this manner, political responses to discrimination are reduced to advocating for a minority’s right to be included within the majority—in this case, an extension of the legal protections afforded to Nihonjin. While this brand of politics strives for equality, it is an equality in its most anemic form, as subjects are simply overcoded in “sameness” through a recalibration of the self/other disjunction (Patton 2000: 47). Such a modification not only fortifies the majority/minority binary, it also, as a result, accepts exclusionary practices as an inevitable matter-of-course (Scott 1988: 47).  

Without denying the importance of conventional responses to inequality (i.e. judicial and legislative reforms), working solely for the incorporation of minorities into the majority is not sufficient. Rather, projects must simultaneously work to distinguish between the “majoritarian” as a constant and homogenous system, “minorities” as subsystems, and the “minoritarian” as a potentially creative position of becoming (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 105-106). By interjecting the “minoritarian” into the majority/minority dialectic, Deleuze and Guattari offer those involved with minority struggles another trajectory. Whereas traditionally, minorities have been problematized as outcasts who may strive to be included within the legal protection of the majority, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that marginalized peoples

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7 This move draws from Michael Shapiro’s treatment of Deleuze and Guattari’s “becoming-minoritarian” in “Radicalizing Democratic Theory: Social Space in Connolly, Deleuze, and Ranciere” (2003).
can function as collectivities of a different kind, ones whose very presence threaten
the cohesiveness and stability of all unities, majority or otherwise (Patton 2000: 48).
At the core of this concept is the claim that representations of the “majority” are
untenable since there exists no coherent horizon or durable essence behind any
collective identity (Nancy 1997: 93). Therefore, rather than subsuming to Komai’s
logic of immutable and mutually-exclusive differences through discussions about
who is/not “Nihonjin,” the remainder of this chapter seeks to employ a minoritarian
tack, one that can affirm intra-national differences in ways that confound, disrupt, and
render ambiguous the myth of Japan as a homogenous majority. What is enabled
then, is a more complicated engagement with difference, one that disrupts the
oscillation between minority demands for equality (i.e. “We want to be treated
equally”) and affirmations of their differences (i.e. “We want our uniqueness to be
respected”), and therefore fosters the conditions of possibility for a more pluralistic
Japan.

It is for this reason that the somewhat flexible position of Nikkeijin in Japan is
so productive. Being neither resolutely “foreign” nor essentially “Nihonjin,” the
Nikkeijin embody a “zone of indistinction” that can potentially render the dynamics
of exclusion untenable (Agamben 1998: 9). In other words, the indistinctiveness of
Japan’s Nikkeijin population has the potential to loosen the Nihonjin/gaikokujin
(“Japanese/foreigner”) binary. The remaining sections, therefore, will focus less
upon indexing the discrepancies between uchinohito (“insiders”) and sotonohito
(“outsiders”) and more upon the construction, maintenance, and transgression of the
thresholds that define and differentiate the two. To begin, it is critical to examine the contours of Japan's bio-political order.

5. Japan's Nativist Ordering

All national constructions contain a fundamental biopolitical fracture (Agamben 1998: 178). On the one hand, the "nation" instantiates a moment of inclusion, as it refers to the "total state of integrated and sovereign citizens" (Agamben 1998: 177). However, this consolidation and naturalization of "the people" enacts a simultaneous process of exclusion as citizens are constituted through their opposition to alien-others (i.e. inside/outside, us/them, domestic/foreign). As Agamben notes, much of the shape of national political discourse stems from an attempt to finesse this fracture as disaggregating multiplicities are synthesized into a single representation of national unity (Agamben 1998; Shapiro 2001: 13). Yet, because the quest for unity utilizes the same exclusionary practices that produce national insecurities (Dillon 1997), boundary-producing process is forced to operate in a perpetual state of reproduction.

It is this continuous adjustment, the ceaseless recalibration of who "we" are, that animates and redeems exclusionary forms of violence. As Sankaran Krishna writes:

...majoritarian nationalism and ethnic cleansing are two points along the same continuum. Both are based on an exclusionary vision of national space; both regard national identity and membership as an ineradicable and unchanging matter of blood and belonging; and both would attempt to carry the fiction of homogeneity to its logical conclusion: the permanent effacement of minorities either through genocide or by according them an eternal second-class state as "guests" (1999: 222).

Thus, the nascent violence and discrimination embedded within national boundary-producing practices underscores the need to create other, more ethical ways of engaging with intra-national difference.
In the case of Japan, the nation’s biopolitical fracture moves along a ubiquitous inside/outside binary: Nihonjin/gaikokujin ("Japanese/foreigners") or uchi no hito/ soto no hito ("insiders/outsiders") (Nakano 1983; Lie 2001). This nativist ordering grants those included within the “politically qualified” uchi no hito category the privileges of legal protection, whereas the sotonohito, those designated as politically ineligible, are left exposed to the vagaries of power (Agamben 1998: 7). Despite the normative strength of Japan’s uchi no hito category, its salience remains contingent upon its ability to contain the unruly exceptions that are increasingly posed by the trans-boundary flows of globalization. Thus, when threats to the sanctity of the uchi/soto order arises—such as the Nikkeijin—the master-narrative of national unity works to curtail possibility of disaggregation, thereby reestablishing the boundaries between inside and outside. As a result, “Nihonjin” as a homogenous category once again comes to represent a unified nation. In its pursuit of “immaculate conceptions, pure belongings, and unambiguated identity” (Krishna 1999: 228), these nation-building efforts merely privilege one out of a variety of possible unities (Balibar 1991: 49).

The remainder of this chapter, then, treats Japan’s uchi/soto binary not as a given fact but as a tenuous achievement that must be continually remade in order to suppress those narratives that contest the nation’s ethno-spatial order. Mass media, because it is one of the main transmitters of the nation-building process’s regulatory ideals, stands as a provocative site for investigating the ways in which the nation is presented, contested, and re-presented. “MADE IN JAPAN” (MIJ), a promotional

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8 While a majority of Japanese relationships are framed within uchi/soto terms, thereby making the categories situational, there also exists a prevailing conception of Japan-as-uchi, which sits in contrast to all that is soto, or beyond Japan (Creighton 1997: 212).
campaign designed for the June 2003 release of *SMAP*’s latest album and concert tour, offers a revealing site for this kind of analysis.

6. "The slogan is – MADE IN JAPAN = [MIJ]"

I encountered the first installation of the MIJ campaign in May 2003. In Tokyo’s Harajuku ward, along Omotesandō-dori, directly across the street from one of the world’s largest Louis Vuitton showrooms, stood a wall-length billboard (Figure 1). Its text, written (in English) in red on a white background, read:

We all know the Japanese star called the fantasista, who is one of the most exciting in Serie A. This year, he was joined by another Japanese. Now we have two fantasistas. In Major League baseball this year, there is the Japanese pitcher who achieved the 100th win of his career. Right now, the most valuable first batter in the Majors is Japanese. There is the Japanese rookie who could become the first Japanese home run king in the Majors. On the movie front, a Japanese won the Oscar for the best animated feature film. One of the world’s top fashion brands has worked in a tie up with a Japanese artist. In classical music, we have the Japanese conductor who has won world wide praise. This was the first time that Nobel prizes were won by Japanese in two separate fields in one year. Has there been any other period where so many Japanese have played such active roles in the world at one time? Nowadays, Japan is experiencing tough times. People seem to have lost their energy. However, this is a truly amazing time for Japanese culture. Don’t you feel good to be living as a Japanese in such [sic] a wonderful age? We should be encouraged by their achievements and feel a little proud of ourselves. We hope that someday, with you, we will be able to walk tall and play a positive role too. So come along with us! The slogan is—MADE IN JAPAN = [MIJ]

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*SMAP* is the name of Japan’s most popular boy-band.
Upon viewing, I became instantly intrigued by its political implications. After speculating for days about the possibility of politically-motivated artists setting up installations throughout Tokyo, challenging brand-obsessed consumption, I encountered several other installations in Harajuku and Shibuya (Figures 2, 3, and 4), these with the notable addition of “6.25 SMAP” in the lower right corner. It was only then that I came to understand the MIJ campaign to be a promotion for the latest SMAP release.

While this development was initially disappointing, it does not take much effort to speculate upon the political implications of MIJ. Because the impact of the
installments far exceeds the hyper-commercialization of the J-pop music industry, it is necessary to respond to and extend MIJ's message. This entails treating it not just as an advertisement, but also as a moment of social disruption designed for a particular place and time (Morris 1992). In order to heighten the kind of sensibility that I want to imbue in MIJ, it is helpful to examine the politics of Shepard Fairey's OBEY GIANT project.

The OBEY GIANT project began 1989 with the creation of Fairey's first sticker modeled upon the face of American wrestling star, Andre the Giant (Figure 5).

![OBEY](image)

Figure 6: Fairey's “Obey the Giant”

Since its inception, the sticker, which Fairey himself describes as “nonsensical,” has popped-up in the urban landscapes of nearly every major U.S. city, as well as London, Tokyo, Melbourne, and Hong Kong (Fairey 2002: 55).

While the image itself may have no inherent meaning, it is the placement of these stickers that drives Fairey’s politics. He writes: “Because people are not used to seeing advertisements or propaganda for which their product or motive is not obvious, frequent and novel encounters with the sticker provoke thought and possible frustration, nevertheless revitalizing the viewer’s perception and attention to detail” (Fairey 2002: 4). In other words, for Fairey, context is crucial. He claims that his works must be installed in public spaces in ways that compete with other forms of
signage and corporate advertising (Figure 6). "The fact that the images are placed in public without permission," writes Fairey, "brings the control of the public space into question" (2002: 4). Thus, by integrating his art into the fabric of urban landscapes, Fairey forces viewers to become "curious about the images and how they relate to their surroundings, therefore bringing the surroundings into question as well" (2002: 4).

![Figure 7: Fairey’s Obey Giant](image)

By bringing the politics of OBEY GIANT into MIJ’s Omotesandō milieu, it is possible to reread the installment it in a style similar to Fairey’s, as both create novel encounters that provoke thought and illicit a questioning of public space. In order to convey the disruptive force of MIJ, it is necessary to first describe the “signage” of Omotesandō. Fodor’s guidebook to Tokyo describes Omotesandō-dori as the “Champs Elysées of Tokyo,” a “wide, tree-lined avenue that runs from Aoyama-dori to Meiji Jingū [Shrine] and is lined with expensive cafés and designer boutiques” (Fodor 2002: 154). It was along this street that, opposite the Louis Vitton showroom, Omotesandō’s MIJ installment was flanked on the right by a women’s boutique named “Morgan de Toi,” a United Colors of Benetton, a boutique named “Marcella,”
and a McDonald’s. Across the street from McDonald’s, moving down Omotesando-dori towards Louis Vuitton is the American-owned Citibank, La Maison du Chocolat, a De Jour flower shop, the cosmetic line Shu Uemura, Kawai Music Plaza, Max & Co., a bar named “Seoul to Soul,” Emporio Armani, and the Tokyo Unity Church. On the opposite side of Louis Vuitton stand Missoni, Paul Stuart New York, and beach-themed boutique named “Santa Monica.” The mere presence of MIJ, then, as an emblem of Japanese pride, not only disrupted the international milieu created by the intrusion of American and European retailers, but also reterritorialized Omotesando as unquestionably Japanese.

This kind of attentiveness to MIJ’s signifiers heightens both its articulation of national anxiety (“Nowadays, Japan is experiencing tough times. People seem to have lost their energy”), as well as its simultaneous effort to shore-up group membership through a re-stabilization of the nativist order (“Don’t you feel good to be living as a Japanese in such [sic] a wonderful age? We should be encouraged by their achievements and feel a little proud of ourselves. We hope that someday, with you, we will be able to walk tall and play a positive role too. So come along with us!” [emphasis added]). While MIJ’s employment of “we” and “ourselves” recuperates Japanese “energy,” it also resettles Japan’s ethno-spatial boundaries as viewers are interpolated into exclusionary practices that populate the either-or categories of “us”/“them,” uchi/soto, and Nihonjin/gaikokujin. As such, the installation, standing as national banner, stakes a nativist claim in both Omotesando’s designer boutiques and Japan as a whole.
Resonating with Komai’s nihilistic outlook on immigration, the reactionary politics of representation evinced in MIJ can be read as an effort to re-stabilize the dominant fiction of a homogeneous nation. In its effort to “recuperate” ethno-spatial homogeneity, the narrative of MIJ silences the irresolvable forms of otherness that are necessary for the very construction of an *uchi no hito* category. Thus, by couching the heterogeneity of Omotesandō within the either-or rigidity of Japanese nationality—one defined by culture, descent, and the ideologically-charged metaphor of “one large household” (Kashiwazaki 2000: 16)—MIJ’s reanimation of the myth of national unity effectively inhibits the affirmation of Japan’s unruly exceptions, those unrecognized identities that have, at other times, exceeded the current limits of nationhood. Therefore, in order to activate a minoritarian approach, one would need to first disrupt this historical amnesia by giving presence to those narratives that refute this latest investment in ethno-spatial homogeneity.

7. Refiguring the “Family State”

Drawing from a number of recent works that have detailed the historic fluidity and contingency of Japan’s biopolitical order, one could demonstrate how, during Japan’s period of colonial expansion, the nation’s multiethnic origins were not only recognized but celebrated (Oguma 1998; Tanaka 1995; Young 1999; Kashiwazaki 2000). Additionally, the scholarship that has traced how the Meiji Restoration’s state-sponsored nationalism imbued all strata of Japanese society with a sense of homogeneity (Gluck 1987; Fujitani 1993; Oguma 1995; Vlastos 1998) is equally beneficial as it illustrates the ways in which the notion of *Yamato minzoku* (“distinct Japanese race”) was enabled by a dual process that mobilized powerful cultural
generalities while simultaneously suppressing and redefining regional particularities (Weiner 1997: 1, 8). These two moves could be further supplemented by an examination of the nihonjinron ("Japanese cultural uniqueness") discourse. Because the resiliency of nihonjinron has effectively buried in antiquity all evidence attesting to Japan's heterogeneous past (Yun 1993: 27; Weiner 1997: 8), such a treatment would reveal how race and nation came to be institutionalized as naturally occurring phenomena. Thus, the canonization of nihonjinron, coupled with the notions of the Yamato minzoku has, through their "powerful images of the enduring purity and homogeneity of the nation, the family, and Japanese way of life" (Weiner 1997: 2), established the nation as a kazoku kokka ("family state"). It is precisely this familial conception of the state that has veiled the means by which Japan's contradictions and contingencies have been constructed, consented to, displaced, and replaced by the naturalization of a homogenous culture and identity. ¹⁰

Because this reigning ideology obscures the counter-memories that attest to the "household's" ethnic and cultural diversity, a minoritarian approach must both loosen the uchi/soto binary and foreground those zones of indistinction that refute the concept of the kazoku kokka. For this reason, the remaining sections will focus more sharply on the ways in which popular fictions participate in the production of Japan's ethno-spatial boundaries. Through an examination of two sites—Akira Kurosawa's 1991 film, Rhapsody in August and NHK's 2002 asadora ("morning serialized drama"), Sakura—the analysis will center on how Nikkeijin characters disrupt the stability and cohesiveness of Japan's "Nihonjin" majority. Since both Rhapsody and

¹⁰ This move was inspired by similar arguments posed by Lauren Berlant her The Queen of American Goes to Washington City: Essays on Sex and Citizenship (1997: 57).
Sakura can be read domestic allegories, they intersect with the themes of this chapter through their explicit engagement with Nikkeijin intrusions into Japan’s familial-as-national space (i.e. kazoku kokka). While it is true that both storylines ultimately domesticate the threats posed by their Nikkeijin characters, scripting them as “essentially Nihonjin,” they remain instructive precisely because they depict Japan’s ethno-spatial order as a complex process rather than an inevitable matter-of-course.

8. Incorporeal Transformations in Rhapsody in August

Rhapsody in August (Hachigatsu no kyoshikyoku), one of Kurosawa’s last films, explores the effects of the Nagasaki atomic blast by interlacing four storylines in a leitmotif of remembrance. The first storyline revolves around Kane, played by Sachiko Murase, a woman who survived the August 9, 1945 bombing, but whose husband was killed. The film opens inside Kane’s traditional farmhouse, set in a rural village just outside of Nagasaki. Maintaining a self-sufficient life, one devoid of modern appliances, Kane is seemingly at peace with her memories; she has forgiven, or perhaps forgotten, the traumas of the war. But, when she receives a letter from Suzujiro, a man claiming to be an elder brother who migrated to Hawai‘i in 1920, the film’s narrative and Kane’s memories are set into motion. Written from Suzujiro’s deathbed, the letter asks Kane come to Hawai‘i so he can see his only remaining sibling before he dies. Kane, however, is reluctant to leave her home for two reasons. First, because she had more than ten older siblings and has difficulty remembering a brother named Suzujiro, Kane questions the integrity of the “stranger’s” claim. Second, and more significantly, despite the gravity of Suzujiro’s condition, a visit at
this particular moment would force Kane to miss her husband’s annual memorial service.

The second storyline is told through the eyes of four adolescent grandchildren who are staying with Kane because their parents—Kane’s son Tadao and daughter Yoshie—have already left for Hawai’i to meet the ailing Suzujiro. The grandchildren, clad in American baseball and university t-shirts throughout the film, are aware that their grandfather was killed by the blast, but it is a vacated memory since they know little more than what was presented in their history lessons. This changes, however, when they encounter a memorial at the elementary school where their grandfather taught and was presumably killed. In the school’s playground stands the twisted wreckage of a steel jungle gym, melted from the heat of the blast and its resulting fires. Standing in front of this enduring marker of destruction, the children finally confront the loss of their grandfather. After a solemn moment of contemplation, one says, “Even though no one ever found Grandpa, he’s here...I’m sure.” Upon experiencing this emotional awakening, the children deduce that their grandmother’s reluctance to visit Hawai’i is due to resentment over their grandfather’s death. “Grandma does not like America and it is only natural,” one explains, “After all, Grandpa was killed by the bomb.” However, upon overhearing this comment, Kane protests stating: “I do not particularly like or dislike America. War is to blame.” From this moment forward, the children’s relationship with their grandmother deepens as petty complaints about her stubbornness and cooking are replaced by feelings of compassion and respect.
The third storyline emerges as Tadao and Yoshie return from Hawai‘i and rejoin their spouses and children in Kane’s home. Impressed by the wealth that Suzujiro’s family has amassed through their multinational pineapple enterprise, the middle-aged parents begin to fantasize about the potential benefits to be drawn from their newly discovered relatives. But, upon learning that Kane sent a telegram stating that she will postpone her visit until after her husband’s August 9th memorial, the parents become outraged. The daughter, Yoshie, surmises that Kane’s letter will bring an end to the budding relationship because, in her words, “Americans resent being reminded of the atom bomb.” When they discover that the purpose of a surprise visit from Suzujiro’s son Clark is not to officially sever the relationship but to apologize for his family’s insensitivity regarding Kane’s loss, Tadao and Yoshie are visibly embarrassed. Yet, unlike their impressionable children, their embarrassment fails to result in an increased sensitivity to their mother’s travails.

For the purposes of this chapter’s argument, the fourth storyline, Clark’s visit to Nagasaki, demands the most attention. After receiving the telegram explaining why Kane must postpone her visit to Hawai‘i, Suzujiro sends his hapa-nisei son to offer the family’s apology. And, while Clark seems to thoroughly enjoy his time with the family, he receives word of his father’s death and is forced to return to Hawai‘i. His presence in Kane’s home, however, triggers a series of events that suggest Kane has begun to re-live past traumas. After witnessing one such relapse, one of Kane’s

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11 Native Hawaiian language for “part,” hapa is commonly used in Hawai‘i to refer to people with multiethnic backgrounds. Nisei, meaning “second generation,” refers to the Nikkeijin children of this original immigrants or issei (“first generation). In this case, Clark is second-generation Nikkei and half-Japanese, half Caucasian.
grandchildren deduces that “[t]he clock in Grandma’s head is running in reverse so now she is slipping back to the time of Grandpa.”

Previous readings of Kurosawa’s *Rhapsody* have claimed that the representations of Suzujiro and Clark distort Nikkeijin realities (Bernstein and Ravina 1993; BLS 2001); that the film fails to represent Nikkei “as they really are” or “should be.” This hermeneutic approach, however, assumes that a more psychologically rounded portrayal of Nikkeijin would expose the “true complexities” of their experiences. Rather than contributing to the deepening of this interpretive frame, it would be more interesting to employ a genealogical sensibility, one in which interpretation becomes the subject matter rather than a strategy of epistemic closure (Shapiro 2001: 6). In this sense, *Rhapsody* can be analyzed as a domestic allegory, one that stages broader national anxieties. Instead of demonstrating how such genres (in)validate fundamental Nikkeijin characteristics, it seems a more vital treatment would explore how popular fictions operate as sites of conflict and negotiation, mediating Nihonjin reactions to the pluralization of Japanese space, culture, and identity.

It is appropriate, then, to note that in *Rhapsody* that there is but one passing reference to Nikkeijin. For the remainder of the film’s ninety-seven minutes, the characters are reduced to being either “Nihonjin,” characterized by Kane, her family, and her neighbors, or “American,” represented by Suzujiro, Clark, and abstractly, “those who dropped the bomb.” Nevertheless, while Nikkeijin identity is not stated explicitly, a subtext regarding the familiar question, “to what degree are the Nikkei Nihonjin?” plays heavily throughout the film. In the opening scene, for example, the
domestic tranquility of Kane’s countryside home, representing the uchi as the primary locus of belonging for the family and by extension Japan, is disrupted by the arrival of Suzujiro’s letter, an embodiment of the soto. Kane and her grandchildren gather at the threshold of the house to read the letter aloud. And, while Suzujiro’s offer to pay for all to come to Hawai‘i thrills her grandchildren, Kane remains hesitant.

Scrutinizing each word and the enclosed photos, struggling to make sense of the situation, the bewildered Kane proclaims:

This is all so strange. It could be some kind of mistake... Haruno Suzujiro? Surely, my maiden name is Haruno but I cannot remember the name Suzujiro. After all, I was born in a poor family that was blessed only with children. I had more than ten brothers and sisters... Besides, this man is an American, isn’t he? How could he be my big brother?

In this sense, the Nikkei position of Suzujiro emerges as a zone of indistinction that threatens the ontological security of the film’s ethno-spatial boundaries (i.e. Japan/U.S., uchi/soto). In this particular scene, Kane (similar to Komai and MIJ) re-establishes the uchi/soto binary by ascribing Suzujiro an unambiguous sotonohito identity: “...this man is an American...How could he be my big brother?”
The challenge to and resettling of Japan's ethno-spatial order is underscored by the way in which Kurosawa frames the scene. When the letter arrives, Kane and the grandchildren, some of whom were busy with tasks deep inside the house, convene at the threshold to read the letter at the physical boundary between *uchi* (inside/family/domestic) and *soto* (outside/stranger/foreign). Furthermore, the camera's point of view is established from within the house gazing out, as if the interior of Japan is scrutinizing, along with Kane, whether or not to accept the American-outsider into her family-kazoku kokka.

The Nikkeijin of *Rhapsody* are relegated as American-outsiders until Clark’s arrival in Nagasaki. Tadao and Yoshie, who had pre-arranged for Clark to stay at a hotel, greet him at the airport. Clark, however, rejects the hotel accommodations and in a rough handling of Japanese (so perhaps less assertive than what appears on the page), states: “I do not need a hotel. I am staying at Auntie’s place.” But, before reaching Kane’s home, Clark asks a dismayed Tadao and Yoshie to take him to the site where his uncle (Kane’s husband) died.

At the elementary school, they encounter a number of scarred survivors who have come to tend to the memorial. Despite Yoshie’s assumption that “Americans resent being reminded of the atom bomb,” Clark is visibly moved. In a gesture that echoes the grandchildren’s prior encounter with the memorial, Clark claims, “Seeing these people, I can understand well what happened that day.” Tadao and Yoshie’s reactions to Clark’s compassion evince neither a refiguring of their conceptions of American-outsiders nor the establishment of a hybridized subjectivity. Instead, Clark is incorporeally transformed as an “essentially” Japanese-insider.
This transformation is made complete in the following scene: the film's first exchange between Clark and Kane. Echoing the reading of Suzujiro's letters, their encounter takes place at the threshold of Kane's home. And, while the shot is established outside the house looking in, *uchi no hito* are given presence by Tadao, Yoshie, and the youngest grandchild who are positioned in the background, eavesdropping from within the house. As Clark and Kane sit together staring at the moon, Clark offers an apology. It is worth noting that contrary to the initial reactions from American film critics (Yoshimoto 2000: 365-368), Clark's apology is not for the American bombing of Nagasaki. Instead, he expresses deep regret for not understanding that Suzujiro's request was asking Kane to forego her husband's memorial service. In this sense, Clark is speaking to Kane as an insider, a family member: "My father said to me, 'Clark, go and do whatever you can for your aunt'.” Moved to tears, Kane accepts Clark's apology. The camera acknowledges this by once again establish a point a view from within the house in order to capture Kane embrace Clark, her welcoming him inside her home. Kane's gesture, paired with Kurosawa's framing, establishes Clark as a family member (*uchi no hito/Nihonjin*) and permits him to enter the deepest and most sacred room of house, that of Kane's late-husband. Lined with family portraits, now Clark's family portraits, the room has been decorated by the very grandchildren who initially shunned Clark as resolutely sotonohito. Next to a makeshift bed are flowers and a sign that reads, "Welcome.” With this, the threats of Clark's American foreignness and Nikkei indistinctiveness have been domesticated as his newly acquired *uchi no hito* status affords him access to the sanctity of Kane's family and by extension, Japan's kazoku kokka.
The last scene worth discussion is one of Rhapsody's final moments, one that takes place just after Clark leaves to attend his father's funeral. When Tadao, Yoshie, and the grandchildren return from the airport, they find Kane shut within her house, crying into a picture of Suzujiro: "Big brother, I am so sorry, I wish I had come to see you sooner." With Kane's finally accepting Suzujiro as her brother, not at the threshold but within the enclosed space of her home, she re-establishes the uchi/soto boundary, as Suzujiro's indistinctive Nikkei identity has been effectively re-made.

While "families" have historically been contingent forms of association with unstable boundaries and varying structures (Shapiro 2001: 2), as objects of appropriation within Japan's kazoku kokka ideology, they are represented as the non-contingent result of cohesive and unambiguous unities. The homogeneity of Kane's own family, however, is only made possible through the misrecognition of the incoherence and otherness that always already exists with all collectivities. While obscured when set in relation to the abject alterity of the film's American-outsiders, Rhapsody does portray a wide array of intra-familial conflicts. There are vast generational gaps between Kane and her children, Kane and the grandchildren, and between the grandchildren and their parents. There is the indication of class differences between Yoshie's husband, a clerk, and Tadao who is perhaps middle management. But most significantly, there is an overwhelming disparity between the traditional existence of Kane's bucolic Nagasaki village and the modern, urban lifestyles of which her Tokyo-born grandchildren are accustomed. But, similar to the logic of Komai and MIJ, the energy the film spends dissimulating Nikkeijin indistinctiveness as either American-outsider or Nihonjin-insider, conceals these
intra-familial/intra-national differences and enables the master-narrative of Japan as a homogenous and cohesive society to remain intact.

9. There’s No Place like “Home” in NHK’s *Sakura*

While considerably less stylized than Kurosawa’s *Rhapsody*, NHK’s *Sakura* nevertheless offers another insightful staging of Nikkeijin intrusions and disruptions of Japan’s ethno-spatial order. And, when contextualized within the cultural authority of NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation), the primary site where Japanese citizens form images and gain knowledge about their state (Krauss 2000: 19), the influence of *Sakura*’s nation-centered narratives become even more significant.

NHK’s *asadora* (“morning serialized drama”), *Sakura*, was broadcast in fifteen-minute episodes, six days a week, from April to October 2002. The drama’s storyline follows the adventures of a Hawaii-born Nikkei- *yonsei*\(^{12}\) who moves to Japan to teach English at an intermediate school in the prefecture of Gifu. Staying true to its genre, *Sakura* is a conservative family drama that emphasizes the dynamics of social interaction by focusing on the emotional overtones of interpersonal relationships (Leung 2002: 68). Because NHK has been established “to conduct its domestic broadcasting with rich and good broadcast programs for the public welfare” (Krauss 2000: 97), its programming is concerned less with engaging in controversial social issues than with providing its viewers with a “prescriptive dose of programming for what it considers to be the personal and national good” (Yano 2004: 3).

\(^{12}\) *Yonsei* refers to the “forth-generation” of Nikkeijin immigrants, the great-grandchildren of the original immigrants.
Throughout the series, the central character, Sakura, confronts a new challenge involving her family, friends, co-workers, or love interests, and in every situation she works against all odds until her goals are met and love prevails. As the story unfolds, Sakura heals a rift between her mother and mother’s father, reunites her paternal grandmother with a lost love, repairs the marriage of her homestay “older sister,” and improves the relationships amongst the students and teachers at her school—all the while learning about and rubbing against Japanese norms and culture. By the series’ end, Sakura decides to reject both her Anglo-American fiancé and a research position at the University of Hawai‘i in order to return to Japan, resume her teaching job in Gifu, and most importantly, pursue her love for Katsuragi, a Nihonjin co-worker. In one of the series’ final scenes, Sakura returns to Gifu to find Katsuragi standing alone at their romantic meeting place. After a moment of awkwardness, Sakura stares into Katsuragi’s eyes and utters the single line, “I’ve returned home.”

While some critical attention has been paid to Sakura’s stereotypes and “glaring mistakes” (Connell 2002; Yano 2004: 11), to maintain a genealogical perspective would allow for an examination of how the asadora participates in the construction of Japan’s ethno-spatial boundaries. In this sense, the inquiry shifts from “are the representations of Nikkei ‘realistic’?” to “what are the political implications of this particular Nikkeijin identity that has emerged and retained significance in this specific time and place?” Sakura can thus be read as a nation-centered narrative that seeks to re-establish familial and national coherence by bringing Nikkeijin “home” to Japan.
The drama’s storyline begins with a point of stasis as Sakura’s Honolulu home and nuclear family mark her formal space of departure. This stasis, however, is disrupted by her decision to teach in Japan, a move that initiates the story’s central thematic: namely, a determination of Sakura’s identity. The problematization of Nikkeiijn identity is established in the series’ first episode when, on the eve of Sakura’s departure for Japan, her father delivers an emotional speech:

Although our nationality is American, our faces, our blood are Japanese. I myself have pondered this situation, “What am I?” If you go, you too will probably have these feelings. So as long as you are going, I want you to find the answer.

With the familiar core question (“to what degree are the Nikkei Nihonjin?”) established, the remainder of the story follows Sakura’s incorporeal transformation from an ambiguous, and therefore threatening, Nikkeiijn to the recuperative category of “essentially Nihonjin.”

Once in Japan, the narrative maps Sakura’s journey, oscillating between the cultural competencies of uchi no hito and the awkwardness of sotonohito. As she settles into her new point of stasis, the domestic space of her homestay family’s traditional house, the indistinctiveness of Sakura’s Nikkeiijn position gradually achieves the stability of Nihonjin. Similar to *Rhapsody in August*, the traditional style home is propped up as the interior of Japan writ large and in this sense, Sakura is not only disruptive—as evinced when upon her first moving in with the homestay family, her “mother” declares, “From now on, things will become difficult”—but also *transgressive*, as Sakura literally crosses the threshold between uchi and soto.

Sakura’s metaphorical transgression is demonstrated by countless instances throughout the series where Nihonjin characters, commenting on Sakura’s appearance
and behavior conclude, “She is just like a Nihonjin.” For example, after delivering a formal self-introduction at the Gifu middle school, the camera moves amongst her coworkers who variously comment on her seemingly Nihonjin characteristics: “Her Japanese is perfect”; “She looks just like a Japanese high school student.” The ease of this transformation is rationalized by Sakura herself in an exchange with her more “Americanized” younger sister, Momo. When Momo questions Sakura’s strong attachment to Japan, Sakura replies, “It is just that I love Japan and I want to preserve the Japanese culture.” But, while Momo maintains an indistinct or at least hybridized position by asserting, “We are Americans too, aren’t we?,” Sakura settles the debate, and in turn the uchi/soto binary, by providing a prototypical nihonjinron response: “But, we have Japanese blood running through our veins.”

The drama contains other narratives that overcode Nikkeijin as “essentially Nihonjin.” On a visit to Japan, Sakura’s father delivers a guest lecture at her school whereby he educates the students, and subsequently NHK’s audience, about the history of Hawaii’s Nikkeijin. However, his lesson, rather than emphasizing the processes of blending and acculturation commonly heralded in Hawaii works to affirm Nikkeijin allegiance to Japan:

Some people say the first generation forsook Japan, but I think this is wrong. Soon Obon will come and Hawaii’s Nikkei still enjoy Bon dancing. At the sea, they release lanterns towards the direction of Japan. This is called “seirei nagashi,” which means to let their spirits return to their hometown. I think they want to send the issei’s spirits back to Japan.

By closing the cultural and emotional distance between Hawaii’s Nikkei and their Japanese “homes,” the father’s parable works to elide the social distance between Nikkeijin and Nihonjin. In a similar fashion, at the end of the drama, when Sakura
decides to leave Hawai‘i and return to Japan, her father reads a letter she left behind explaining that she has gone to “follow her heart”:

I am going back to Japan. I cannot excuse what I doing. I am going to hurt Dad and the people around me. But, no matter how much people blame me, denying my feelings is a crime I don’t want to commit. While I know that hurting Dad is unforgivable, my life will become much happier and I promise to make a bridge between Japan and Hawai‘i. That is going to my life’s task.

In this promise to become a bridge (“kakehashi”) between Hawai‘i and Japan, Sakura’s body becomes the conduit through which Nikkeijin “spirits” can cross over from the abject difference of American-outsiders to the interiority of Nihonjin-insiders. This crossing over is completed for Sakura the moment she tells her Nihonjin boyfriend that she has “returned home.” However, the narrative’s quest for transcendence—the overcoming of Nikkei indistinctiveness—contained within the supposedly emancipatory inclusion of Nikkeijin as “essentially Japanese,” stands as just one more instance in an endless series of efforts to maintain Japan’s imaginary unity.13

10. Conclusion

Japan’s engagement with Nikkeijin subjectivities can be taken as an indication of the degree to which the nation is prepared to meet the challenges of its so-called immigration “problem.” In order to foster the conditions of possibility for a more hospitable Japan, one that can responsibly accommodate intra-national differences through acts of tolerance, plurality, and non-violence, efforts must be made to move beyond the nation-centered narratives that seek to recover a “pure originary state of being where territory and identity coincide” (Krishna 1999: xxxviii).

13 Draws from Krishna 1999: 246.
With this project in mind, the analysis above has combined political theory with applied treatments of popular genres in hopes of loosening the certainties of Japan’s *uchi/soto* binary. In treating SMAP’s MIJ campaign, Kurosawa’s *Rhapsody in August*, and NHK’s *Sakura* as enunciative spaces that mediate Nihonjin encounters with alterity, this chapter has worked to foreground the fragility of Japan’s ethno-spatial order as well as the anxieties that are produced by trans-boundary movements. Furthermore, *Rhapsody in August* and *Sakura* demonstrate how domestications of Nikkeijin indistinctiveness, regardless of their form (i.e. Japan’s “newest ethnic minority,” resolutely “foreign,” or “essentially Japanese”), recuperate the myth of a homogeneous society.

In order to resist this sort of recuperation, it is preferable to enact a decentering of those narratives that obscure the ineffably miscegenated character of national origins; not only in the theoretical sense of the debt that identity owes to otherness, but also in the historical sense that every linguistic, religious, nationalist, and ethnic category is always already bastardized and adulterated from the outset (Krishna 1997: xx). Yet, within popular debates regarding the accommodation of intra-national difference—whether held in official forums on Japan’s immigration “problem” or in the cultural domain of advertisements, films, and serialized dramas—there remains little room for the recognition of heterogeneity as assertions of an immutable Nihonjin culture and identity inhibit affirmations of hyphenated spaces and identities. By encouraging a continuous deterritorialization of Japan’s national myths, one can begin to foster a normative commitment to the creation and maintenance of a pluralistic ethos, one that respects alterity and refuses to banalize
differences into a homogenous space of citizenship where subjects are ordered along a normalized hierarchy of authenticity and sovereignty is attributed as either-or (Krishna 1999: 228).
CHAPTER FIVE

RE-MADE IN JAPAN:
NIKKEIJIN DISRUPTIONS OF JAPAN’S ETHNO-CULTURAL UNITY

1. “The Strength to Live” in a Neoliberal Japan

The chapters thus far have focused on neoliberal “solutions” to the “problems” of intra-national difference. They have worked to illustrate how rhetorical commitments to “fairness,” “justice,” and “racial equality” have enabled a restructuring of political life: one that relies upon—while simultaneously denying—racial, gender, sexual, and class distinctions. As noted throughout, the dangers of this neoliberal restructuring stem from its individuation of socio-economic successes and failures. This has not only obscured more relational understandings of society (i.e. that the enfranchisement of some is a result of a disenfranchisement of others), it has worked to absolve the State from notions of social responsibility and public accountability.

With the project organized so centrally around the production, containment, and denial of intra-national differences, this chapter’s focus on Japan—the paradigm for national homogeneity—may seem peculiar. The myth of Japan’s ethno-cultural unity and the invisibility of its intra-national diversity, however, are simply testaments to the potency of Western Orientalism and Japanese nationalism. In recent years, however, the nation’s stagnating economy and fragmenting social structure have thrown these assumptions into question. As a result, Japanese policymakers have been provoked to seek out “solutions” to a wide-array of “problems.” And, as Andrea Arai’s analysis of Japan’s recent education reforms demonstrates, the latest trend has policymakers turning to the tenets of neoliberalism for viable “‘solutions.”
RECEIVED
AS
FOLLOWS
In 2002, at the peak of a decade-long recession, the Japanese government announced its plans to overhaul the national education system. Responding to a barrage of media reports on “collapsing classrooms,” “deteriorating homes,” and “strange youth,” these reforms seemed designed to suggest a new, positive role for the Japanese government in local affairs (Arai 200?: 1). The reforms’ promises of relaxed requirements and a commitment to individualized learning were fortified by two slogans: “the strength to live” (ikiru chikara) and “the frontier is within Japan” (furonteia wa nihon no naka ni aru). These promises, Arai observes:

...did foreshadow a new relationship between the individual and the State, but a relationship replete with new responsibilities and less security—a relationship driven by the globalization of markets and efforts on the part of the Japanese State to bring about the final structural and ideological overhaul of the postwar ideas of “homogeneity” and “democracy” (Ibid.).

In her examination of these educational reforms, Arai discloses a “trajectory of problematizations” whereby the government has reinterpreted the past—the relatively secure path from education to the workforce—in the name of the present economic and political exigencies (Ibid., 4). The result, she argues, has been a recommitment to the discourse of “patriotic education.”

For example, in the spring of 2001, Teruwaki Ken, the chief spokesman on educational reforms for the Ministry of Education, was featured in a ten-part television series devoted to the nation’s “school problems” (kyouiku mondai) (Ibid., 7). In these programs, Teruwaki introduced his national audience to the new official position on Japan’s education past; that in retrospect, the top-down education system produced a nation of docile adults and, in this respect, was to be blamed for recent difficulties. More significant, Teruwaki suggested, the traditional education system
has done little to prepare Japanese citizens for today’s global realities. The goal of the Ministry’s new system, therefore, is to create “individual[s] that would not wish to foist responsibility off on others, or wait for the schools, or government to care for them” (Ibid.). Teruwaki elaborated:

These reforms mean a turn to the public (minnasan). The local population will from now on assume responsibility. When there are education problems from now on, you won’t have to turn to the Ministry, but rather solve them on your own, by developing the strength that is now lacking (Ibid., 8).

In a moment that revealed broader economic anxieties, Teruwaki emphasized that throughout Japan’s history, there has never been a time where education was more important than the present:

Terrible times have befallen Japan (Nihon wa taihen no koto ni nate shimaimasu). What we need to get at the roots of these problems is to focus on the inner mind or heart (kokoro) of these children. We need to raise children with energy (seiryoku), that will be able to go anywhere in the world and solve problems (Ibid., 10).

Embedded within his statement is the image of the moral decline of the 1980s generation, characterized as a general malaise for school, the nation, and life itself. The faltering economy and increase in social problems of the late 1990s provoked the government to reintroduce the notion of ikiru chikara (“strength to live” or “zest for living”), which rapidly emerged as one of the nation’s most circulated buzzwords (Ibid., 16). The notion of “recapturing the spirit that made Japan great” was broadcast in countless venues (i.e. the MIJ advertising campaign discussed below), not the least of which being Miyazaki Hayao’s 2001 film, Spirited Away (Sen to Chihiro no Kamikakushi).

The narrative of Spirited Away takes place within the recessionary period of the 1990s when the Japanese stock market crashed, property values were cut in half,
and the nation’s banking system was on the verge of collapse due to years of bad
loans and speculative ventures—all of which is represented in the film’s opening
scenes as the protagonist, ten-year old Chihiro, and her parents stumble across a
deserted theme park. As the family strolls through the abandoned park, a decadent
past mysteriously materializes before them, with previously-dilapidated concession
stands somehow becoming full of delicacies. Chihiro’s parents do not pause to
question the source of this feast and dive in, gorging themselves on the “seemingly
intransigent luxuries of the ‘economic miracle’” (Ibid., 12). As a result, however, the
parents fall under the spells of the park’s spirits, they are transformed into enormous
swine, and Chihiro is the only one who can save them.

Figure 1: Spirited Away

The parents’ rescue entails Chihiro’s personal journey, a reconnection with the gods,
symbols, and settings of an earlier, more mystical Japan, within which lies the path to
a “native source” of energy. By the film’s end, however, this source is revealed as
being not an actual physical space but rather a revitalization of the Japanese ethic; that through Chihiro’s labor as a bathhouse maid, “taking on and flawlessly executing the menial and dirty chores rejected for some time now by the youth of Japan, Chihiro is transformed from the subject of lack to the subject of potential, demonstrating as she does how individual responsibility is linked to national” (Ibid., 12).

The premise of *ikiru chikara*, therefore, is that Japan’s future rest upon the *senzaitenkina chikara* (“latent strength”) of its children and, in order to draw upon this withering resource, Japan needs to create a new kind of relationship between the State and its citizens, between authority and the individual (Ibid.19). Under this framework, the sources of societal “problems” are removed from the economic domain—the “bursting of the bubble” and everything associated with it—to the notion that “political and social systems, the value system (*kachitaikei*) and moral sense (*rinrikan*) have been infested (*mushibande shimatta*) from within” (Kawai quoted in Arai 200?: 21). The lesson being that while the organization and morality of Japan has not yet collapsed (Chihiro’s parents do return to their natural state), it is dire need of strengthening.

Kawai Hayao, the Japanese Minister of Culture, has suggested that it has become clear that Japan’s previously-successful model of “catch up and surpass” no longer meets the challenges of the present era. However, hope is not lost since Kawai reminds the Japanese citizenry that the solution literally lies within: “within Japan lies a superior nature” (*sugureta shitsu*). This latent strength, he continues, has been lying dormant (*nemutta mama*) and in order to save Japan, we must “reclaim this enormous
frontier (kyōdaina furontei wo kaitaku shinakereba naranai), by drawing out this latent strength.

How are we going to go about this (dono yō ni jitsugen suru noka)? We are going to change the way that the people and the State relate to each other. We are going to develop a vital and supple individual (takamashiku, shinayakana kojin)” (Kawai quoted in Arai 200?: 22).

As Kawai continues to call for a more individuated Japanese society, he declares:

“We are compelled to follow the world tide of revolutionary change in which people, things, money, and information cross borders at a new rate, and change to fit the new world standard of a highly competitive era, by upping the power (kojin no pawa appu) of the individual.” (Ibid.). Just as the traditional household-centered life gave way to one structured around the company (kaisha), Kawai declares that it is time for a new transformation to take place: “there is a need for an individual that is independent (jiritsu) and self-acting, that can take on risk, be intentional, assume responsibility, and not be tied to a place (ba)—a vital and supple individual” (Kawai in Arai 200?: 25). If the twentieth century could be characterized as the century of organization, the twenty-first must be, according to Kawai, the century of the individual (Ibid., 23).

With the implementation of this new individual-centered educational system, Kawai believes that it will be easier to cultivate the “Japanese spirit.” Presently, however, the Japanese educational system holds two responsibilities. First, it is in charge of the obligatory, enforced education (gimu toshite kyōsei suru kyōiku) that provides the minimum standard. The second, a service education (saabisu toshite no kyōiku), is designed to train those who are able to meet the demands of the marketplace. While these two kinds of education are currently intertwined, in future,
Kawai argues, "they will need to be separate. Along with this, we will need to reevaluate the role of the home, as one of the major bodies responsible for education, which isn’t fulfilling its role at present" (Kawai, quoted in Arai 200?: 26). In this, one can witness a significant bifurcation that prepares the "efficients" (recall Wells) for the professional work force with those less skilled channeled into manual labor. It is Kawai’s evocation of the "role of the home" that is significant. With the individuation of society, the discrepancies between "enforced" and "service" education is becomes a matter of each families’ social capital and therefore no longer a concern of the state. Those homes with a stronger social capital will just naturally produce stronger students.

Thus, the new discourse of the education reforms as outlined by Teruwaki and Kawai, aims to replace the top-down education system by reducing making reductions in curriculum and allowing students “the freedom” to choose their own way while also requiring individual decision-makers to accept responsibility their own choices. Simultaneously forward and backward looking, the ikiru chikara ideology, therefore, is leading Japan towards the creation of a new “bipolar” society where status inequality and a new underclass of workers stand as the “solutions” for a full economic recovery (ibid., 32). Those who can, as Kawai says, will meet the demands of the marketplace and the others will make up the new reserve army of unskilled and semi-skilled labor.

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It is from within this milieu that this chapter want to situate Japan’s so-called “immigration problem.” The nation’s rededication to a nativist identity (through the
strengthening of the “Japanese spirit”) has presented an even greater challenge to those working to create a more tolerant and pluralistic Japan. With the prospect of increased immigration to Japan rapidly becoming a social reality, this chapter seeks to intervene in the current culture of intolerance by tracing the cultural construction of ethno-spatial boundaries within present-day Japan. In keeping with the general theme of the overall project, the chapter works to identify the underlying structural continuities and cultural reciprocities that mediate ideological schisms between inside/outside, domestic/foreign, and identity/difference. Using a genealogical approach, the chapter will examine the symbolic forms, material practices, and narrative strategies that animate the construction, maintenance, and transgression of Japan’s nativist order: inside/outside (uchi/soto), insider/outsider (uchinohito/sotonohito), Japanese/foreigner (nihonjin/gaikokujin).

2. Imin Mondai: Japan’s “Immigration Problem”

In July 2003, the New York Times ran a three-part series titled, “Can Japan Change?” In the second installment, “Japan Needs, but Resists, Immigration,” columnist Howard W. French stages Japan’s so-called “immigration problem” by drawing upon the country’s oft-noted population decline: “Japan is at the leading edge of a phenomenon that is beginning to strike many advanced countries: rapidly aging populations and dwindling fertility” (French 2003: A1). As a result, the size of Japan’s work force, which peaked in 1998, has entered a decline that experts predict will continue to accelerate. The potential consequences of this decline, writes French, include “not only a scarcity of workers and falling demand, but also a collapse of the pension system as the tax base shrinks and the elderly population booms” (2003: A1).
After first noting that a more thorough integration of women into the workplace could provide temporary relief, French asserts that Japan’s “only hope” is to accept a massive influx of foreign labor. Citing a March 2000 United Nations study (???), the columnist argues that in order to “stave off disaster,” Japan will need to admit seventeen million new immigrants by the year 2050—an eighteen percent increase in a country whose current immigrant population constitutes a mere one percent.

An influx of this magnitude would have a dramatic impact on any nation. But Japan, as French dutifully notes, remains the “most tenaciously insular of all the world’s top industrial countries” and “deeply conservative notions about ethnic purity make it hard for [Japanese] experts to envision large-scale immigration” (2003: A1). One such expert, Komai Hiroshi of Tsukuba University, responding to forecasts similar to the United Nations’, has argued that “[t]he kind of figures the demographers talk about are [sic] unimaginable for Japan.” Furthermore, when pressed to envision Japan’s future in light of a growing tension between the nation’s historical resistance to immigration and demands for foreign labor from the industrial and service sectors, Komai declared:

Societies have always risen and faded, and Japan will likely disappear and something else will take its place, but that’s not such a problem. Greece and Rome disappeared too (French 2003: A1).

While Komai’s fatalism is arresting, it concisely replicates the convergence of social science thinking and popular opinion in regards to the nation’s immigration “problem.”

“From its inception,” comments Yoko Selleck, “the issue of foreign

1 The language of this critique was influenced by Allen Feldman’s *Formation’s of Violence* (1991: 18).
migrant workers has assumed the existence of an absolute distinction between
Japanese and foreigner” (Selleck 1997: 202). Thus, because Komai’s statement
concisely instantiates both Japan’s current national anxieties and the normative belief
in a homogenous space of citizenship, it is possible to use his utterance to launch a
larger critique.

Komai’s outlook rests upon a belief in watertight unities and
incommensurable differences, a position that resonates with the sentiments expressed
by Samuel P. Huntington in his controversial essay, “The Clash of Civilizations?”
(1993). One of Huntington’s central argument asserts, “cultural characteristics and
differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than
political or economic ones” (Huntington 1993: 27). In this sense, Komai’s “societies”
are homologous to Huntington’s “civilizations,” since both are presented as “shut-
down, sealed-off entities that have been purged of the myriad currents and
countercurrents that animate human history” (Said 2001: 1). This historical purging
is evident in Komai’s descriptions of Greece and Rome as “faded” and “disappeared.”
Such declarations are founded upon a static conception of culture, one that conjures
away the dynamic attributes of trans-boundary encounters. As a result, the possibility
for a hospitable integration of foreign workers in Japan is rendered simply
“unimaginable.”

When read in this manner, Komai’s remark can be read as an ingenuous
“solution” to Japan’s immigration “problem.” By attempting to consolidate a cultural
singularity in the face of an impending multiplicity, it appears that the
“disappearance” of Japan is a more viable option than a genuine engagement with
pluralization. The desire to leap forward to Komai’s “something else,” wherein somehow, for better or worse, Japan’s immigration “problem” has already been worked out, enacts a discursive closure that not only conceals national anxieties, but more importantly, obscures the multiple forms of discrimination currently inflicted upon the thousands of immigrants already living in Japan.

Rather than contributing to French’s sensationalism or Komai’s intolerance, Chapter Five seeks to reformulate Japan’s immigration “problem.” Specifically, it is designed to pursue the ways of envisaging a more hospitable Japan, one that can responsibly accommodate intra-national difference through acts of tolerance, plurality, and non-violence. Those working to bring fairness to Japan’s marginalized populations have struggled with this question for years. However, as Japan’s recent free trade (FTA) negotiations with other East Asian countries continue to involve discussions on the bilateral movement of labor, the need for this sort of critical engagements has become even more pressing. Responding to this urgency, this argument that follows seeks to move beyond the barriers typically encountered by conventional approaches to Japan’s minority issues. By examining the scripting of Nikkeijin identities in Japan, this chapter aims to loosen the ubiquitous uchi/soto (“inside/outside”) distinction in a manner that affords new ways of thinking about and

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2 This question was influenced by Sankaran Krishna’s work on Indian-Sri Lankan relations in his *Postcolonial Insecurities* (1999: xxix).

3 At the time of this writing, Japan is entering a fourth round of FTA negotiations with the Philippines. As a condition of this agreement, it seemly likely that Japan will extend “residential status” to those Filipino nurses who obtain Japanese qualifications. Similarly, the Japan-Thai Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA) is nearing completion. A key point of contention, however, is the discrepancy between Japan’s preference for an exchange of “qualified personnel” versus Thailand’s wish to also include service workers (Miyagawa Makio, Director of the Regional Policy Division, Asian and Oceania Division in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interviewed July 20, 2004).

4 In this chapter, I will use “Nikkeijin” and “Nikkei” interchangeably to refer to foreign-born people of Japanese descent.
interceding in the so-called immigration “problem.” Insofar as this chapter proceeds by engaging with texts from a variety of genres—SMAP’s 2003 “MIJ” advertising campaign, Akira Kurosawa’s 1991 film Rhapsody in August, and NHK’s 2002 asadora (“morning serialized drama”) Sakura—its analysis will explore the ways in which popular fictions participate in the dramaticization of Japan’s ethno-spatial boundaries. But first, it is necessary to include a brief account of the Nikkeijin “re-migration” phenomenon.

3. Japan’s Nikkeijin “Re-migration” Phenomenon

The economic boom of the 1980s depleted Japan’s domestic source of unskilled and semi-skilled labor as the younger generation, having been raised in the relative comfort of a vast middle class, became averse to the low wages and lower prestige of factory work (Lie 2001: 10; Linger 2001: 22). Having already recruited the maximum number of dekasegi (“seasonal migrants”) from Japan’s less affluent provinces, second- and third-tier employers began hiring undocumented workers from Pakistan, Iran, Bangladesh, and a number of other Asian countries (Linger 2001: 22). As the number of foreign laborers grew, some within Japan’s business and political sectors expressed concerns about a perceived threat to the nation’s cultural and ethnic “harmony.” Pressured by several factions, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed restructuring of the nation’s immigration regulations such that Nikkeijin would be allowed to enter as unskilled laborers. An oft-quoted article from the Liberal Democratic Party’s monthly magazine, states:

Admitting Nikkeijin legally will greatly help to ameliorate the present acute labor shortage. People who oppose the admission of the unskilled are afraid of racial discrimination against foreigners. Indeed, if Japan admitted many Asians with different cultures and customs than those of Japanese, Japan’s
homogenous ethnic composition could collapse. However, if Nikkeijin were admitted, this would not be a problem...Nikkeijin, as relatives of the Japanese, would be able to assimilate into Japanese society regardless of nationality and language. (Nojima 1989: 98-99 quoted in Linger 2001: 23)

The logic of this proposal evolved into the 1990 Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act. And, under the premise of preserving “Japan’s homogenous ethnic composition” while simultaneously addressing the industrial demands for cheap labor, a new legal category was created, the “long-term resident.” This residency status was made available to second- and third-generation Nikkeijin as well as their spouses, regardless of ancestry (Selleck 1997: 188-189). Additionally, under this revision, relatives within a “sixth degree of consanguinity,” such as the grandnephews and grandnieces of an applicant’s great-grandparent could also apply for a “certificate of eligibility” from Japanese Immigration Offices. With no restrictions placed upon these virtually guaranteed entry visas, they provided Nikkeijin with de facto working visas (Selleck 1997: 189).

This transformation of Japan’s immigration policies coincided with the bleakness of Brazil’s “lost decade,” a period characterized by a faltering economy, hyperinflation, and high unemployment (Tsuchida 1998). Capitalizing upon their newly-acquired preferred entrance category, many Brazilian Nikkei, frustrated by their country’s economic malaise and governmental mismanagement, “re-migrated” to Japan in hopes of earning better wages (Linger 2001: 24). As a result, the number of Nikkeijin living and working in Japan increased from approximately 2,000 in 1986 to almost 155,000 by 1993 (Cornelius 1994; Kajita 1998). Despite a prolonged Japanese recession, the numbers continued to increase steadily and today the domestic Nikkeijin population (predominantly, but not exclusively from Brazil)
exceeds 300,000, thereby constituting Japan’s second-largest “foreign” group (Tsuda 2003: 123).

4. Institutionalizing Japan’s “Newest Ethnic Minority”

A number of recent works have examined Japan’s Nikkei dekasegi phenomenon (Lie 2001; Linger 2001; Yamashita 2001; Brody 2002; Mori 2002; Roth 2002; Tsuda 2003; Douglass and Roberts 2003). While these studies employ a variety of approaches, they appear to be undergirded by one fundamental question: namely, “to what degree are the Nikkei, Nihonjin?” This is not surprising given that contemporary studies of diasporic communities derive from prior anthropological inquiries on the retention and transformation of culture (Kelley 2002: 127). However, more than simple “social scientific” observations, these ethnographic studies have focused heavily upon the daily struggles of dekasegi life and in this sense appear to be invested in institutionalizing the Nikkei as Japan’s “newest ethnic minority.”

For example, Michael Weiner, in the introduction to his edited volume, Japan’s Minorities, states that he included a discussion on the Nikkeijin because they have recently emerged “as a distinct minority population” (1997: xiii, emphasis added). In the same volume, Yoko Selleck notes that the purpose of her chapter is to “detail the current state of the Nikkeijin and discuss the possibility of them becoming a new minority group in Japanese society” (1997: 179, emphasis added). More recently, Tsuda Takeyuki, writing on the social isolation experienced by Nikkei dekasegi, claims that because second- and third-generation Nikkei are culturally

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5 “Nihonjin,” referring to Japanese people, is a contentious category, particularly within the context of this chapter (see also Lie 2001: 144-148). From this point on, I will delineate “Japanese” and “Nihonjin” in order to accentuate the differences between the language/culture/citizenship associated with “Japanese” and the seemingly immutable, ethnonational, and almost “racial” connotation of “Nihonjin.”

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Brazilian, “they are ethnically rejected and treated as foreigners in Japan despite their 
Japanese descent, and thus have become the *country's newest ethnic minority*” 
(Tsuda 2003: 123, emphasis added). And, in a similar tone, Yamanaka Keiko, in 
describing the consequences of Brazilian labor migration to Japan, contends that 
despite the promise of “privileged access to economic opportunities and cultural 
integration,” the Nikkeijin have found themselves “relegated [...] to the position of a 
*disadvantaged ‘ethnic’ minority*” (Yamanaka 2003: 192, emphasis added).

To be sure, the life of a Nikkei *dekasegi* is difficult. Beyond the long hours 
spent performing alienating san-k⁶ jobs (Tsuda 2003), and beyond the everyday 
struggles associated with living in a foreign country, they are confronted with the 
reality that “most Japanese citizens regard them as behaviorally strange and culturally 
inferior as a result of their Nikkeijin ethnicity and their third-world nationality” 
(Yamanaka 2003: 192). Nevertheless, the argument advanced here seeks to move in 
a different direction. That is, while many of the aforementioned treatments have 
demonstrated how the preference for Nikkeijin over other migrant workers has reified 
Japanese beliefs in *jus sanguinis* (the “law of blood”) and racial homogeneity, the 
chapter will suggest that the institutionalization of Nikkeijin-as-minority enacts a 
strikingly similar kind of reification. In other words, by establishing Nikkeijin as 
“Japan’s newest minority,” these works discipline the indistinctiveness of Nikkei 
subject positions (i.e. neither resolutely “foreign” nor essentially “Nihonjin”) in a

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⁶ San-k refers to the “three k’s” of Japanese migrant labor: kitanai (dirty), kitsui (difficult), and kiken (dangerous).
manner that naturalizes the “Nihonjin” group identity as a majoritarian fact (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 105).  

By revisiting the core question, “to what degree are the Nikkei Nihonjin?,” it becomes evident that Nihonjin-as-majority operates as the constant against which the Nikkeijin are to be evaluated. Yet, when framed in this manner, political responses to discrimination are reduced to advocating for a minority’s right to be included within the majority—in this case, an extension of the legal protections afforded to Nihonjin. While this brand of politics strives for equality, it is an equality in its most anemic form, as subjects are simply overcoded in “sameness” through a recalibration of the self/other disjunction (Patton 2000: 47). Such a modification not only fortifies the majority/minority binary, it also, as a result, accepts exclusionary practices as an inevitable matter-of-course (Scott 1988: 47).

Without denying the importance of conventional responses to inequality (i.e. judicial and legislative reforms), working solely for the incorporation of minorities into the majority is not sufficient. Rather, projects must simultaneously work to distinguish between the “majoritarian” as a constant and homogenous system, “minorities” as subsystems, and the “minoritarian” as a potentially creative position of becoming (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 105-106). By interjecting the “minoritarian” into the majority/minority dialectic, Deleuze and Guattari offer those involved with minority struggles another trajectory. Whereas traditionally, minorities have been problematized as outcasts who may strive to be included within the legal protection of the majority, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that marginalized peoples

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7 This move draws from Michael Shapiro’s treatment of Deleuze and Guattari’s “becoming-minoritarian” in “Radicalizing Democratic Theory: Social Space in Connolly, Deleuze, and Ranciere” (2003).
can function as collectivities of a different kind, ones whose very presence threaten the cohesiveness and stability of all unities, majority or otherwise (Patton 2000: 48). At the core of this concept is the claim that representations of the “majority” are untenable since there exists no coherent horizon or durable essence behind any collective identity (Nancy 1997: 93). Therefore, rather than subsuming to Komai’s logic of immutable and mutually-exclusive differences through discussions about who is/not “Nihonjin,” the remainder of this chapter seeks to employ a minoritarian tack, one that can affirm intra-national differences in ways that confound, disrupt, and render ambiguous the myth of Japan as a homogenous majority. What is enabled then, is a more complicated engagement with difference, one that disrupts the oscillation between minority demands for equality (i.e. “We want to be treated equally”) and affirmations of their differences (i.e. “We want our uniqueness to be respected”), and therefore fosters the conditions of possibility for a more pluralistic Japan.

It is for this reason that the somewhat flexible position of Nikkeijin in Japan is so productive. Being neither resolutely “foreign” nor essentially “Nihonjin,” the Nikkeijin embody a “zone of indistinction” that can potentially render the dynamics of exclusion untenable (Agamben 1998: 9). In other words, the indistinctiveness of Japan’s Nikkeijin population has the potential to loosen the Nihonjin/gaikokujin (“Japanese/foreigner”) binary. The remaining sections, therefore, will focus less upon indexing the discrepancies between uchinohito (“insiders”) and sotonohito (“outsiders”) and more upon the construction, maintenance, and transgression of the
thresholds that define and differentiate the two. To begin, it is critical to examine the contours of Japan's bio-political order.

5. Japan's Nativist Ordering

All national constructions contain a fundamental biopolitical fracture (Agamben 1998: 178). On the one hand, the "nation" instantiates a moment of inclusion, as it refers to the "total state of integrated and sovereign citizens" (Agamben 1998: 177). However, this consolidation and naturalization of "the people" enacts a simultaneous process of exclusion as citizens are constituted through their opposition to alien-others (i.e. inside/outside, us/them, domestic/foreign). As Agamben notes, much of the shape of national political discourse stems from an attempt to finesse this fracture as disaggregating multiplicities are synthesized into a single representation of national unity (Agamben 1998; Shapiro 2001: 13). Yet, because the quest for unity utilizes the same exclusionary practices that produce national insecurities (Dillon 1997), boundary-producing process is forced to operate in a perpetual state of reproduction. It is this continuous adjustment, the ceaseless recalibration of who "we" are, that animates and redeems exclusionary forms of violence. As Sankaran Krishna writes:

...majoritarian nationalism and ethnic cleansing are two points along the same continuum. Both are based on an exclusionary vision of national space; both regard national identity and membership as an ineradicable and unchanging matter of blood and belonging; and both would attempt to carry the fiction of homogeneity to its logical conclusion: the permanent effacement of minorities either through genocide or by according them an eternal second-class state as "guests" (1999: 222).

Thus, the nascent violence and discrimination embedded within national boundary-producing practices underscores the need to create other, more ethical ways of engaging with intra-national difference.
In the case of Japan, the nation’s biopolitical fracture moves along a ubiquitous inside/outside binary: Nihonjin/gaikokujin (“Japanese/foreigners”) or uchi no hito/soto no hito8 (“insiders/outsiders”) (Nakano 1983; Lie 2001). This nativist ordering grants those included within the “politically qualified” uchi no hito category the privileges of legal protection, whereas the sotonohito, those designated as politically ineligible, are left exposed to the vagaries of power (Agamben 1998: 7). Despite the normative strength of Japan’s uchi no hito category, its salience remains contingent upon its ability to contain the unruly exceptions that are increasingly posed by the trans-boundary flows of globalization. Thus, when threats to the sanctity of the uchi/soto order arises—such as the Nikkeijin—the master-narrative of national unity works to curtail possibility of disaggregation, thereby reestablishing the boundaries between inside and outside. As a result, “Nihonjin” as a homogenous category once again comes to represent a unified nation. In its pursuit of “immaculate conceptions, pure belongings, and unambiguated identity” (Krishna 1999: 228), these nation-building efforts merely privilege one out of a variety of possible unities (Balibar 1991: 49).

The remainder of this chapter, then, treats Japan’s uchi/soto binary not as a given fact but as a tenuous achievement that must be continually remade in order to suppress those narratives that contest the nation’s ethno-spatial order. Mass media, because it is one of the main transmitters of the nation-building process’s regulatory ideals, stands as a provocative site for investigating the ways in which the nation is presented, contested, and re-presented. “MADE IN JAPAN” (MIJ), a promotional

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8 While a majority of Japanese relationships are framed within uchi/soto terms, thereby making the categories situational, there also exists a prevailing conception of Japan-as-uchi, which sits in contrast to all that is soto, or beyond Japan (Creighton 1997: 212).
campaign designed for the June 2003 release of SMAP's latest album and concert tour, offers a revealing site for this kind of analysis.

6. "The slogan is – MADE IN JAPAN = [MIJ]"

I encountered the first installation of the MIJ campaign in May 2003. In Tokyo's Harajuku ward, along Omotesandō-dori, directly across the street from one of the world's largest Louis Vuitton showrooms, stood a wall-length billboard (Figure 1). Its text, written (in English) in red on a white background, read:

We all know the Japanese star called the fantasista, who is one of the most exciting in Serie A. This year, he was joined by another Japanese. Now we have two fantasistas. In Major League baseball this year, there is the Japanese pitcher who achieved the 100th win of his career. Right now, the most valuable first batter in the Majors is Japanese. There is the Japanese rookie who could become the first Japanese home run king in the Majors. On the movie front, a Japanese won the Oscar for the best animated feature film. One of the world's top fashion brands has worked in a tie up with a Japanese artist. In classical music, we have the Japanese conductor who has won world wide praise. This was the first time that Nobel prizes were won by Japanese in two separate fields in one year. Has there been any other period where so many Japanese have played such active roles in the world at one time? Nowadays, Japan is experiencing tough times. People seem to have lost their energy. However, this is a truly amazing time for Japanese culture. Don't you feel good to be living as a Japanese in such a wonderful age? We should be encouraged by their achievements and feel a little proud of ourselves. We hope that someday, with you, we will be able to walk tall and play a positive role too. So come along with us! The slogan is—MADE IN JAPAN = [MIJ]

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9 SMAP is the name of Japan's most popular boy-band.
Upon viewing, I became instantly intrigued by its political implications. After speculating for days about the possibility of politically-motivated artists setting up installations throughout Tokyo, challenging brand-obsessed consumption, I encountered several other installations in Harajuku and Shibuya (Figures 2, 3, and 4), these with the notable addition of “6.25 SMAP” in the lower right corner. It was only then that I came to understand the MIJ campaign to be a promotion for the latest \textit{SMAP} release.

While this development was initially disappointing, it does not take much effort to speculate upon the political implications of MIJ. Because the impact of the
installments far exceeds the hyper-commercialization of the J-pop music industry, it is necessary to respond to and extend MIJ’s message. This entails treating it not just as an advertisement, but also as a moment of social disruption designed for a particular place and time (Morris 1992). In order to heighten the kind of sensibility that I want to imbue in MIJ, it is helpful to examine the politics of Shepard Fairey’s OBEY GIANT project.

The OBEY GIANT project began 1989 with the creation of Fairey’s first sticker modeled upon the face of American wrestling star, Andre the Giant (Figure 5).

![OBEY](image)

Since its inception, the sticker, which Fairey himself describes as “nonsensical,” has popped-up in the urban landscapes of nearly every major U.S. city, as well as London, Tokyo, Melbourne, and Hong Kong (Fairey 2002: 55).

While the image itself may have no inherent meaning, it is the placement of these stickers that drives Fairey’s politics. He writes: “Because people are not used to seeing advertisements or propaganda for which their product or motive is not obvious, frequent and novel encounters with the sticker provoke thought and possible frustration, nevertheless revitalizing the viewer’s perception and attention to detail” (Fairey 2002: 4). In other words, for Fairey, context is crucial. He claims that his works must be installed in public spaces in ways that compete with other forms of
signage and corporate advertising (Figure 6). "The fact that the images are placed in public without permission," writes Fairey, "brings the control of the public space into question" (2002: 4). Thus, by integrating his art into the fabric of urban landscapes, Fairey forces viewers to become "curious about the images and how they relate to their surroundings, therefore bringing the surroundings into question as well" (2002: 4).

By bringing the politics of OBEY GIANT into MIJ’s Omotesandō milieu, it is possible to reread the installment it in a style similar to Fairey’s, as both create novel encounters that provoke thought and illicit a questioning of public space. In order to convey the disruptive force of MIJ, it is necessary to first describe the "signage" of Omotesandō. Fodor’s guidebook to Tokyo describes Omotesandō-dori as the "Champs Elysées of Tokyo," a "wide, tree-lined avenue that runs from Aoyama-dori to Meiji Jingū [Shrine] and is lined with expensive cafés and designer boutiques" (Fodor 2002: 154). It was along this street that, opposite the Louis Vitton showroom, Omotesandō’s MIJ installment was flanked on the right by a women’s boutique named "Morgan de Toi," a United Colors of Benetton, a boutique named "Marcella,"
and a McDonald’s. Across the street from McDonald’s, moving down Omotesandō-dori towards Louis Vitton is the American-owned Citibank, La Maison du Chocolat, a De Jour flower shop, the cosmetic line Shu Uemura, Kawai Music Plaza, Max & Co., a bar named “Seoul to Soul,” Emporio Armani, and the Tokyo Unity Church. On the opposite side of Louis Vitton stand Missoni, Paul Stuart New York, and beach-themed boutique named “Santa Monica.” The mere presence of MU, then, as an emblem of Japanese pride, not only disrupted the international milieu created by the intrusion of American and European retailers, but also reterritorialized Omotesandō as unquestionably Japanese.

This kind of attentiveness to MU’s signifiers heightens both its articulation of national anxiety (“Nowadays, Japan is experiencing tough times. People seem to have lost their energy”), as well as its simultaneous effort to shore-up group membership through a re-stabilization of the nativist order (“Don’t you feel good to be living as a Japanese insuch [sic] a wonderful age? We should be encouraged by their achievements and feel a little proud of ourselves. We hope that someday, with you, we will be able to walk tall and play a positive role too. So come along with us!” [emphasis added]). While MU’s employment of “we” and “ourselves” recuperates Japanese “energy,” it also resettles Japan’s ethno-spatial boundaries as viewers are interpolated into exclusionary practices that populate the either-or categories of “us”/“them,” uchi/soto, and Nihonjin/gaikokujin. As such, the installation, standing as national banner, stakes a nativist claim in both Omotesandō’s designer boutiques and Japan as a whole.
Resonating with Komai’s nihilistic outlook on immigration, the reactionary politics of representation evinced in MIJ can be read as an effort to re-stabilize the dominant fiction of a homogeneous nation. In its effort to “recuperate” ethno-spatial homogeneity, the narrative of MIJ silences the irresolvable forms of otherness that are necessary for the very construction of an *uchi no hito* category. Thus, by couching the heterogeneity of Omotesandō within the either-or rigidity of Japanese nationality—one defined by culture, descent, and the ideologically-charged metaphor of “one large household” (Kashiwazaki 2000: 16)—MIJ’s reanimation of the myth of national unity effectively inhibits the affirmation of Japan’s unruly exceptions, those unrecognized identities that have, at other times, exceeded the current limits of nationhood. Therefore, in order to activate a minoritarian approach, one would need to first disrupt this historical amnesia by giving presence to those narratives that refute this latest investment in ethno-spatial homogeneity.

7. *Refiguring the “Family State”*

Drawing from a number of recent works that have detailed the historic fluidity and contingency of Japan’s biopolitical order, one could demonstrate how, during Japan’s period of colonial expansion, the nation’s multiethnic origins were not only recognized but celebrated (Oguma 1998; Tanaka 1995; Young 1999; Kashiwazaki 2000). Additionally, the scholarship that has traced how the Meiji Restoration’s state-sponsored nationalism imbued all strata of Japanese society with a sense of homogeneity (Gluck 1987; Fujitani 1993; Oguma 1995; Vlastos 1998) is equally beneficial as it illustrates the ways in which the notion of *Yamato minzoku* (“distinct Japanese race”) was enabled by a dual process that mobilized powerful cultural
generalities while simultaneously suppressing and redefining regional particularities (Weiner 1997: 1, 8). These two moves could be further supplemented by an examination of the nihonjinron ("Japanese cultural uniqueness") discourse. Because the resiliency of nihonjinron has effectively buried in antiquity all evidence attesting to Japan's heterogeneous past (Yun 1993: 27; Weiner 1997: 8), such a treatment would reveal how race and nation came to be institutionalized as naturally occurring phenomena. Thus, the canonization of nihonjinron, coupled with the notions of the Yamato minzoku has, through their “powerful images of the enduring purity and homogeneity of the nation, the family, and Japanese way of life” (Weiner 1997: 2), established the nation as a kazoku kokka ("family state"). It is precisely this familial conception of the state that has veiled the means by which Japan’s contradictions and contingencies have been constructed, consented to, displaced, and replaced by the naturalization of a homogenous culture and identity.\(^{10}\)

Because this reigning ideology obscures the counter-memories that attest to the "household’s" ethnic and cultural diversity, a minoritarian approach must both loosen the uchi/soto binary and foreground those zones of indistinction that refute the concept of the kazoku kokka. For this reason, the remaining sections will focus more sharply on the ways in which popular fictions participate in the production of Japan’s ethno-spatial boundaries. Through an examination of two sites—Akira Kurosawa's 1991 film, Rhapsody in August and NHK’s 2002 asadora ("morning serialized drama"), Sakura—the analysis will center on how Nikkeijin characters disrupt the stability and cohesiveness of Japan’s “Nihonjin” majority. Since both Rhapsody and

\(^{10}\) This move was inspired by similar arguments posed by Lauren Berlant her The Queen of American Goes to Washington City: Essays on Sex and Citizenship (1997: 57).
Sakura can be read domestic allegories, they intersect with the themes of this chapter through their explicit engagement with Nikkeijin intrusions into Japan’s familial-as-national space (i.e. kazoku kokka). While it is true that both storylines ultimately domesticate the threats posed by their Nikkeijin characters, scripting them as “essentially Nihonjin,” they remain instructive precisely because they depict Japan’s ethno-spatial order as a complex process rather than an inevitable matter-of-course.

8. Incorporeal Transformations in Rhapsody in August

Rhapsody in August (Hachigatsu no kyoshikyoku), one of Kurosawa’s last films, explores the effects of the Nagasaki atomic blast by interlacing four storylines in a leitmotif of remembrance. The first storyline revolves around Kane, played by Sachiko Murase, a woman who survived the August 9, 1945 bombing, but whose husband was killed. The film opens inside Kane’s traditional farmhouse, set in a rural village just outside of Nagasaki. Maintaining a self-sufficient life, one devoid of modern appliances, Kane is seemingly at peace with her memories; she has forgiven, or perhaps forgotten, the traumas of the war. But, when she receives a letter from Suzujiro, a man claiming to be an elder brother who migrated to Hawai‘i in 1920, the film’s narrative and Kane’s memories are set into motion. Written from Suzujiro’s deathbed, the letter asks Kane come to Hawai‘i so he can see his only remaining sibling before he dies. Kane, however, is reluctant to leave her home for two reasons. First, because she had more than ten older siblings and has difficulty remembering a brother named Suzujiro, Kane questions the integrity of the “stranger’s” claim. Second, and more significantly, despite the gravity of Suzujiro’s condition, a visit at
this particular moment would force Kane to miss her husband’s annual memorial service.

The second storyline is told through the eyes of four adolescent grandchildren who are staying with Kane because their parents—Kane’s son Tadao and daughter Yoshie—have already left for Hawai‘i to meet the ailing Suzujiro. The grandchildren, clad in American baseball and university t-shirts throughout the film, are aware that their grandfather was killed by the blast, but it is a vacated memory since they know little more than what was presented in their history lessons. This changes, however, when they encounter a memorial at the elementary school where their grandfather taught and was presumably killed. In the school’s playground stands the twisted wreckage of a steel jungle gym, melted from the heat of the blast and its resulting fires. Standing in front of this enduring marker of destruction, the children finally confront the loss of their grandfather. After a solemn moment of contemplation, one says, “Even though no one ever found Grandpa, he’s here...I’m sure.” Upon experiencing this emotional awakening, the children deduce that their grandmother’s reluctance to visit Hawai‘i is due to resentment over their grandfather’s death. “Grandma does not like America and it is only natural,” one explains, “After all, Grandpa was killed by the bomb.” However, upon overhearing this comment, Kane protests stating: “I do not particularly like or dislike America. War is to blame.” From this moment forward, the children’s relationship with their grandmother deepens as petty complaints about her stubbornness and cooking are replaced by feelings of compassion and respect.
The third storyline emerges as Tadao and Yoshie return from Hawai‘i and rejoin their spouses and children in Kane’s home. Impressed by the wealth that Suzujiro’s family has amassed through their multinational pineapple enterprise, the middle-aged parents begin to fantasize about the potential benefits to be drawn from their newly discovered relatives. But, upon learning that Kane sent a telegram stating that she will postpone her visit until after her husband’s August 9th memorial, the parents become outraged. The daughter, Yoshie, surmises that Kane’s letter will bring an end to the budding relationship because, in her words, “Americans resent being reminded of the atom bomb.” When they discover that the purpose of a surprise visit from Suzujiro’s son Clark is not to officially sever the relationship but to apologize for his family’s insensitivity regarding Kane’s loss, Tadao and Yoshie are visibly embarrassed. Yet, unlike their impressionable children, their embarrassment fails to result in an increased sensitivity to their mother’s travails.

For the purposes of this chapter’s argument, the fourth storyline, Clark’s visit to Nagasaki, demands the most attention. After receiving the telegram explaining why Kane must postpone her visit to Hawai‘i, Suzujiro sends his hapa-nisei11 son to offer the family’s apology. And, while Clark seems to thoroughly enjoy his time with the family, he receives word of his father’s death and is forced to return to Hawai‘i. His presence in Kane’s home, however, triggers a series of events that suggest Kane has begun to re-live past traumas. After witnessing one such relapse, one of Kane’s

11 Native Hawaiian language for “part,” hapa is commonly used in Hawai‘i to refer to people with multiethnic backgrounds. Nisei, meaning “second generation,” refers to the Nikkeijin children of this original immigrants or issei (“first generation). In this case, Clark is second-generation Nikkei and half-Japanese, half Caucasian.
grandchildren deduces that “[t]he clock in Grandma’s head is running in reverse so
now she is slipping back to the time of Grandpa.”

Previous readings of Kurosawa’s Rhapsody have claimed that the
representations of Suzujiro and Clark distort Nikkeijin realities (Bernstein and Ravina
1993; BLS 2001); that the film fails to represent Nikkei “as they really are” or
“should be.” This hermeneutic approach, however, assumes that a more
psychologically rounded portrayal of Nikkeijin would expose the “true complexities”
of their experiences. Rather than contributing to the deepening of this interpretive
frame, it would be more interesting to employ a genealogical sensibility, one in which
interpretation becomes the subject matter rather than a strategy of epistemic closure
(Shapiro 2001: 6). In this sense, Rhapsody can be analyzed as a domestic allegory,
one that stages broader national anxieties. Instead of demonstrating how such genres
(in)validate fundamental Nikkeijin characteristics, it seems a more vital treatment
would explore how popular fictions operate as sites of conflict and negotiation,
mediating Nihonjin reactions to the pluralization of Japanese space, culture, and
identity.

It is appropriate, then, to note that in Rhapsody that there is but one passing
reference to Nikkeijin. For the remainder of the film’s ninety-seven minutes, the
characters are reduced to being either “Nihonjin,” characterized by Kane, her family,
and her neighbors, or “American,” represented by Suzujiro, Clark, and abstractly,
“those who dropped the bomb.” Nevertheless, while Nikkeijin identity is not stated
explicitly, a subtext regarding the familiar question, “to what degree are the Nikkei
Nihonjin?” plays heavily throughout the film. In the opening scene, for example, the
domestic tranquility of Kane’s countryside home, representing the *uchi* as the primary locus of belonging for the family and by extension Japan, is disrupted by the arrival of Suzujiro’s letter, an embodiment of the *soto*. Kane and her grandchildren gather at the threshold of the house to read the letter aloud. And, while Suzujiro’s offer to pay for all to come to Hawai‘i thrills her grandchildren, Kane remains hesitant. Scrutinizing each word and the enclosed photos, struggling to make sense of the situation, the bewildered Kane proclaims:

*This is all so strange. It could be some kind of mistake...* Haruno Suzujiro? Surely, my maiden name is Haruno but I cannot remember the name Suzujiro. After all, I was born in a poor family that was blessed only with children. I had more than ten brothers and sisters... Besides, this man is an American, isn’t he? How could he be my big brother?*

In this sense, the Nikkei position of Suzujiro emerges as a zone of indistinction that threatens the ontological security of the film’s ethno-spatial boundaries (i.e. Japan/U.S., *uchi/soto*). In this particular scene, Kane (similar to Komai and MIJ) re-establishes the *uchi/soto* binary by ascribing Suzujiro an unambiguous *sotonohito* identity: “...this man is an American...How could he be my big brother?”
The challenge to and resettling of Japan’s ethno-spatial order is underscored by the way in which Kurosawa frames the scene. When the letter arrives, Kane and the grandchildren, some of whom were busy with tasks deep inside the house, convene at the threshold to read the letter at the physical boundary between *uchi* (inside/family/domestic) and *soto* (outside/stranger/foreign). Furthermore, the camera’s point of view is established from within the house gazing out, as if the interior of Japan is scrutinizing, along with Kane, whether or not to accept the American-outsider into her family-kazoku kokka.

The Nikkeijin of *Rhapsody* are relegated as American-outsiders until Clark’s arrival in Nagasaki. Tadao and Yoshie, who had pre-arranged for Clark to stay at a hotel, greet him at the airport. Clark, however, rejects the hotel accommodations and in a rough handling of Japanese (so perhaps less assertive than what appears on the page), states: “I do not need a hotel. I am staying at Auntie’s place.” But, before reaching Kane’s home, Clark asks a dismayed Tadao and Yoshie to take him to the site where his uncle (Kane’s husband) died.

At the elementary school, they encounter a number of scarred survivors who have come to tend to the memorial. Despite Yoshie’s assumption that “Americans resent being reminded of the atom bomb,” Clark is visibly moved. In a gesture that echoes the grandchildren’s prior encounter with the memorial, Clark claims, “Seeing these people, I can understand well what happened that day.” Tadao and Yoshie’s reactions to Clark’s compassion evince neither a refiguring of their conceptions of American-outsiders nor the establishment of a hybridized subjectivity. Instead, Clark is incorporeally transformed as an “essentially” Japanese-insider.
This transformation is made complete in the following scene: the film’s first exchange between Clark and Kane. Echoing the reading of Suzujiro’s letters, their encounter takes place at the threshold of Kane’s home. And, while the shot is established outside the house looking in, *uchi no hito* are given presence by Tadao, Yoshie, and the youngest grandchild who are positioned in the background, eavesdropping from within the house. As Clark and Kane sit together staring at the moon, Clark offers an apology. It is worth noting that contrary to the initial reactions from American film critics (Yoshimoto 2000: 365-368), Clark’s apology is not for the American bombing of Nagasaki. Instead, he expresses deep regret for not understanding that Suzujiro’s request was asking Kane to forego her husband’s memorial service. In this sense, Clark is speaking to Kane as an insider, a family member: “My father said to me, ‘Clark, go and do whatever you can for your aunt’.” Moved to tears, Kane accepts Clark’s apology. The camera acknowledges this by once again establish a point a view from within the house in order to capture Kane embrace Clark, her welcoming him inside her home. Kane’s gesture, paired with Kurosawa’s framing, establishes Clark as a family member (*uchi no hito/Nihonjin*) and permits him to enter the deepest and most sacred room of house, that of Kane’s late-husband. Lined with family portraits, now Clark’s family portraits, the room has been decorated by the very grandchildren who initially shunned Clark as resolutely sotonohito. Next to a makeshift bed are flowers and a sign that reads, “Welcome.” With this, the threats of Clark’s American foreignness and Nikkei indistinctiveness have been domesticated as his newly acquired *uchi no hito* status affords him access to the sanctity of Kane’s family and by extension, Japan’s kazoku kokka.
The last scene worth discussion is one of *Rhapsody*’s final moments, one that takes place just after Clark leaves to attend his father’s funeral. When Tadao, Yoshie, and the grandchildren return from the airport, they find Kane shut within her house, crying into a picture of Suzujiro: “Big brother, I am so sorry, I wish I had come to see you sooner.” With Kane’s finally accepting Suzujiro as her brother, not at the threshold but within the enclosed space of her home, she re-establishes the *uchi/soto* boundary, as Suzujiro’s indistinctive Nikkei identity has been effectively re-made.

While “families” have historically been contingent forms of association with unstable boundaries and varying structures (Shapiro 2001: 2), as objects of appropriation within Japan’s kazoku kokka ideology, they are represented as the non-contingent result of cohesive and unambiguous unities. The homogeneity of Kane’s own family, however, is only made possible through the misrecognition of the incoherence and otherness that always already exists with all collectivities. While obscured when set in relation to the abject alterity of the film’s American-outsiders, *Rhapsody* does portray a wide array of intra-familial conflicts. There are vast generational gaps between Kane and her children, Kane and the grandchildren, and between the grandchildren and their parents. There is the indication of class differences between Yoshie’s husband, a clerk, and Tadao who is perhaps middle management. But most significantly, there is an overwhelming disparity between the traditional existence of Kane’s bucolic Nagasaki village and the modern, urban lifestyles of which her Tokyo-born grandchildren are accustomed. But, similar to the logic of Komai and MIJ, the energy the film spends dissimulating Nikkeijin indistinctiveness as either American-outsider or Nihonjin-insider, conceals these
intra-familial/intra-national differences and enables the master-narrative of Japan as a homogenous and cohesive society to remain intact.

9. There’s No Place like “Home” in NHK’s *Sakura*

While considerably less stylized than Kurosawa’s *Rhapsody*, NHK’s *Sakura* nevertheless offers another insightful staging of Nikkeijin intrusions and disruptions of Japan’s ethno-spatial order. And, when contextualized within the cultural authority of NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation), the primary site where Japanese citizens form images and gain knowledge about their state (Krauss 2000: 19), the influence of *Sakura*’s nation-centered narratives become even more significant.

NHK’s *asadora* (“morning serialized drama”), *Sakura*, was broadcast in fifteen-minute episodes, six days a week, from April to October 2002. The drama’s storyline follows the adventures of a Hawaii-born Nikkei-yonsei who moves to Japan to teach English at an intermediate school in the prefecture of Gifu. Staying true to its genre, *Sakura* is a conservative family drama that emphasizes the dynamics of social interaction by focusing on the emotional overtones of interpersonal relationships (Leung 2002: 68). Because NHK has been established “to conduct its domestic broadcasting with rich and good broadcast programs for the public welfare” (Krauss 2000: 97), its programming is concerned less with engaging in controversial social issues than with providing its viewers with a “prescriptive dose of programming for what it considers to be the personal and national good” (Yano 2004: 3).

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12 *Yonsei* refers to the “forth-generation” of Nikkeijin immigrants, the great-grandchildren of the original immigrants.
Throughout the series, the central character, Sakura, confronts a new challenge involving her family, friends, co-workers, or love interests, and in every situation she works against all odds until her goals are met and love prevails. As the story unfolds, Sakura heals a rift between her mother and mother’s father, reunites her paternal grandmother with a lost love, repairs the marriage of her homestay “older sister,” and improves the relationships amongst the students and teachers at her school—all the while learning about and rubbing against Japanese norms and culture.

By the series’ end, Sakura decides to reject both her Anglo-American fiancé and a research position at the University of Hawai‘i in order to return to Japan, resume her teaching job in Gifu, and most importantly, pursue her love for Katsuragi, a Nihonjin co-worker. In one of the series’ final scenes, Sakura returns to Gifu to find Katsuragi standing alone at their romantic meeting place. After a moment of awkwardness, Sakura stares into Katsuragi’s eyes and utters the single line, “I’ve returned home.”

While some critical attention has been paid to Sakura’s stereotypes and “glaring mistakes” (Connell 2002; Yano 2004: 11), to maintain a genealogical perspective would allow for an examination of how the asadora participates in the construction of Japan’s ethno-spatial boundaries. In this sense, the inquiry shifts from “are the representations of Nikkei ‘realistic’?” to “what are the political implications of this particular Nikkeijin identity that has emerged and retained significance in this specific time and place?” Sakura can thus be read as a nation-centered narrative that seeks to re-establish familial and national coherence by bringing Nikkeijin “home” to Japan.

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The drama's storyline begins with a point of stasis as Sakura's Honolulu home and nuclear family mark her formal space of departure. This stasis, however, is disrupted by her decision to teach in Japan, a move that initiates the story's central thematic: namely, a determination of Sakura's identity. The problematization of Nikkeijin identity is established in the series' first episode when, on the eve of Sakura's departure for Japan, her father delivers an emotional speech:

> Although our nationality is American, our faces, our blood are Japanese. I myself have pondered this situation, "What am I?" If you go, you too will probably have these feelings. So as long as you are going, I want you to find the answer.

With the familiar core question ("to what degree are the Nikkei Nihonjin?") established, the remainder of the story follows Sakura's incorporeal transformation from an ambiguous, and therefore threatening, Nikkeijin to the recuperative category of "essentially Nihonjin."

Once in Japan, the narrative maps Sakura's journey, oscillating between the cultural competencies of *uchi no hito* and the awkwardness of *sotonohito*. As she settles into her new point of stasis, the domestic space of her homestay family's traditional house, the indistinctiveness of Sakura's Nikkeijin position gradually achieves the stability of Nihonjin. Similar to *Rhapsody in August*, the traditional style home is propped up as the interior of Japan writ large and in this sense, Sakura is not only disruptive—as evinced when upon her first moving in with the homestay family, her "mother" declares, "From now on, things will become difficult"—but also *transgressive*, as Sakura literally crosses the threshold between *uchi* and *soto*.

Sakura's metaphorical transgression is demonstrated by countless instances throughout the series where Nihonjin characters, commenting on Sakura's appearance
and behavior conclude, “She is just like a Nihonjin.” For example, after delivering a formal self-introduction at the Gifu middle school, the camera moves amongst her coworkers who variously comment on her seemingly Nihonjin characteristics: “Her Japanese is perfect”; “She looks just like a Japanese high school student.” The ease of this transformation is rationalized by Sakura herself in an exchange with her more “Americanized” younger sister, Momo. When Momo questions Sakura’s strong attachment to Japan, Sakura replies, “It is just that I love Japan and I want to preserve the Japanese culture.” But, while Momo maintains an indistinct or at least hybridized position by asserting, “We are Americans too, aren’t we?,” Sakura settles the debate, and in turn the _uchi/soto_ binary, by providing a prototypical _nihonjinron_ response: “But, we have Japanese blood running through our veins.”

The drama contains other narratives that overcode Nikkeijin as “essentially Nihonjin.” On a visit to Japan, Sakura’s father delivers a guest lecture at her school whereby he educates the students, and subsequently NHK’s audience, about the history of Hawaii’s Nikkeijin. However, his lesson, rather than emphasizing the processes of blending and acculturation commonly heralded in Hawaii works to affirm Nikkeijin allegiance to Japan:

> Some people say the first generation forsook Japan, but I think this is wrong. Soon Obon will come and Hawaii’s Nikkei still enjoy Bon dancing. At the sea, they release lanterns towards the direction of Japan. This is called “seirei nagashi,” which means to let their spirits return to their hometown. I think they want to send the issei’s spirits back to Japan.

By closing the cultural and emotional distance between Hawaii’s Nikkei and their Japanese “homes,” the father’s parable works to elide the social distance between Nikkeijin and Nihonjin. In a similar fashion, at the end of the drama, when Sakura
decides to leave Hawai‘i and return to Japan, her father reads a letter she left behind explaining that she has gone to “follow her heart”:

I am going back to Japan. I cannot excuse what I am doing. I am going to hurt Dad and the people around me. But, no matter how much people blame me, denying my feelings is a crime I don’t want to commit. While I know that hurting Dad is unforgivable, my life will become much happier and I promise to make a bridge between Japan and Hawai‘i. That is going to my life’s task.

In this promise to become a bridge (“kakehashi”) between Hawai‘i and Japan, Sakura’s body becomes the conduit through which Nikkeijin “spirits” can cross over from the abject difference of American-outsiders to the interiority of Nihonjin-insiders. This crossing over is completed for Sakura the moment she tells her Nihonjin boyfriend that she has “returned home.” However, the narrative’s quest for transcendence—the overcoming of Nikkei indistinctiveness—contained within the supposedly emancipatory inclusion of Nikkeijin as “essentially Japanese,” stands as just one more instance in an endless series of efforts to maintain Japan’s imaginary unity.13

10. Conclusion

Japan’s engagement with Nikkeijin subjectivities can be taken as an indication of the degree to which the nation is prepared to meet the challenges of its so-called immigration “problem.” In order to foster the conditions of possibility for a more hospitable Japan, one that can responsibly accommodate intra-national differences through acts of tolerance, plurality, and non-violence, efforts must be made to move beyond the nation-centered narratives that seek to recover a “pure originary state of being where territory and identity coincide” (Krishna 1999: xxxviii).

13 Draws from Krishna 1999: 246.
With this project in mind, the analysis above has combined political theory with applied treatments of popular genres in hopes of loosening the certainties of Japan’s *uchi/soto* binary. In treating SMAP’s MIJ campaign, Kurosawa’s *Rhapsody in August*, and NHK’s *Sakura* as enunciative spaces that mediate Nihonjin encounters with alterity, this chapter has worked to foreground the fragility of Japan’s ethno-spatial order as well as the anxieties that are produced by trans-boundary movements. Furthermore, *Rhapsody in August* and *Sakura* demonstrate how domesticaions of Nikkeijin indistinctiveness, regardless of their form (i.e. Japan’s “newest ethnic minority,” resolutely “foreign,” or “essentially Japanese”), recuperate the myth of a homogeneous society.

In order to resist this sort of recuperation, it is preferable to enact a decentering of those narratives that obscure the ineffably miscegenated character of national origins; not only in the theoretical sense of the debt that identity owes to otherness, but also in the historical sense that every linguistic, religious, nationalist, and ethnic category is always already bastardized and adulterated from the outset (Krishna 1997: xx). Yet, within popular debates regarding the accommodation of intra-national difference—whether held in official forums on Japan’s immigration “problem” or in the cultural domain of advertisements, films, and serialized dramas—there remains little room for the recognition of heterogeneity as assertions of an immutable Nihonjin culture and identity inhibit affirmations of hyphenated spaces and identities. By encouraging a continuous deterritorialization of Japan’s national myths, one can begin to foster a normative commitment to the creation and maintenance of a pluralistic ethos, one that respects alterity and refuses to banalize
differences into a homogenous space of citizenship where subjects are ordered along a normalized hierarchy of authenticity and sovereignty is attributed as either-or (Krishna 1999: 228).
CHAPTER SIX

LOCAL MOTIONS:
SURFING AND THE POLITICS OF WAVE SLIDING

"It’s all surfing,” as barefoot inventor Tom Morey told SURFER in 1994. “Everything! Surfing in the ocean just happens to be the perfect form of surfing.”

—Sam George, “The Perfect Day"

1. Introduction

Lisa Duggan, in her critique of neoliberalism, argues that the “Achilles’ heel in progressive-left politics since the 1980s, especially, has been a general blindness to the connections and interrelations of the economic, political, and cultural, and a failure to grasp the shifting dimensions of the alliance politics underlying neoliberal success” (Duggan 2003: xvi). “As neoliberals have formed and reformed their constituencies,” she continues, connecting their economic goals with politics and culture in politically effective ways, “progressives and leftists have tended more and more to fall into opposing camps that caricature each other while failing to clearly perceive the chameleon that eludes them” (Ibid). As long as the progressive/Left represents and reproduces itself as divided between “economic vs. cultural, universal vs. identity-based, distribution vs. recognition-oriented, local or national vs. global branches, it will defeat itself” (Ibid). If identity-based and cultural politics remain at odds with broader critiques of global capitalism, it seems unlikely that “progressive” politics will be about to foster the kinds of transversal connections needed to create a “social movement strong and ambitious enough to take on inequalities that single-issue politics only ever ameliorate, but never reverse” (Ibid.). This chapter, therefore, aims to explore the possibilities of what a critical, fluid and multifaceted response to neoliberalism might look like.
In May 2001, the state of Hawai‘i and its city of Honolulu played host to the 34th annual meeting of the Asian Development Bank. Anticipating a potential replay of Seattle’s WTO mayhem, the state devoted between $5 and 7 million on anti-demonstration preparations. These preparations, largely funded by Hawaii’s tourism industry, included the mobilization of the National Guard and a bolstering of the Honolulu Police Department’s crowd control capabilities (Brannon 2001; Daws 2001; Rees 2001). Not since 1893, when a handful of American businessmen employed U.S. troops to illegally overthrow the Hawaiian government, has the Islands witnessed such an overt coordination of state and private interests.

This latest consolidation of power in Hawai‘i has worked to nakedly expose, in ways previously concealed, the insidious interplay of the state’s three ruling orders. These three orders—the touristic, the macropolitical and the militaristic—have evolved since the close of the eighteenth century into an elaborate State machine, one which has functioned to capture flows of populations, commodities and monies for the benefit of the capitalist system as well as to secure its own ends (Deleuze and Guattari 1977: 233). In and of itself, this State machine has built itself upon a long history of “legitimate” violences (Merry 2000; Trask 1999), both of dispossession and containment, in order to striate the space and populations over which it has reigned (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 385). And, judging from the aftermath of the ADB, it would appear that the State machine has successfully forged Hawai‘i into a Control Society, par excellence.

The fortitude of this State machine’s most recent assemblage demands that those seeking to loosen the seams within its shroud of power do so in “other” ways and “other” spaces. Conventional (i.e. reactionary) movements that operate solely against these
already existing orders will ultimately be self-defeating (molarized into the Same) unless they are used to ignite a breaking-away. Movements that break-away—as opposed to ones that merely break-into—evoke a state of “permanent revolution,” which is a move to incessantly deterritorialize the stabilized “legitimacies” of existing orders (Patton 2000: 120). It is along these threatening deterritorializations that this paper seeks to use the politics of surfing not only as a fluvial site of micropolitical transmutation, but also as an opening for an “other” brand of politics that surfs across the limits of State control.

Surfing (originally he’e nalu—literally “wave sliding”), has always been much more than a leisurely or sporting activity. Originally woven tightly into the highly organized fabric of traditional Hawaiian society and then defiantly sustained despite condemnation by the colonizing New England missionaries, surfing in its present form continues to be one of the Islands’ most heavily politicized arenas. By tapping into the rhythms of surfing and appreciating the ways by which surfers slide across the force of waves, this paper embodies a “set” of waves that seek to erode the territorial constraints of the State machine by reintroducing the infinite into Hawaii’s political here-and-now (Alliez 1997: 87).

2. Setting Out: He’e Nalu as a Source of Iniquity

The potential for surfing to become a site of micropolitical transformation was actualized the instant New England missionaries declared it “the source of much iniquity” (Lyman [1832]; cited in Merry 2000: 237). However, when contextualized historically, this condemnation is indicative of a much larger colonial process that continues to work to “rid the land of pesky Natives who threaten the colonizer’s way of conducting business in Hawai‘i” (Kamahele 2000: 41). Inextricably linked with modes of capitalism and
domination, this colonial process has sought to remake Hawai‘i by purging Native Hawaiians of all un-Christian, or “iniquitous,” practices. As a result, traditional pastimes such as sports, gambling, kapa-making, ritual dancing and canoe building, were all pushed to the brink of extinction (Finney 1966: 58).

Remarkably, despite this violent and systematic dismantling of traditional Hawaiian society—effectuated by a nearly comprehensive erasure of Hawaiian sovereignty, language, culture, and not the least of which, Hawaiian people—he‘e nalu (“wave sliding”) has continued to endure (Ibid., 66-81). Nonetheless, it is imperative that critical conceptualizations implicate modern surfing within the past and present injuries inflicted upon Hawaiian people and culture. Along this vein, it would be instructive to regard present-day acts of surfing, as a type of scar (1996: 129).

Indissociable from wounds of the flesh, scars stand in as physical traces of past injuries suffered by the body, thereby embodying a site of the in-between: between past and present, history and continuity, destruction and healing. Consequently, surfing can be conceptualized as a “tenuous suture,” one that forces the recognition and remembrance of the painful injustices of the past while simultaneously founding a site for the possibility of a different future. For this reason, any value to be had within a “politics of surfing” it is lost precisely when an individual or collective looks past the numerous scars, and pretends as if there had never been so much as a wound (Ibid).

3. Wave One: The Politics of Surfing in Hawai‘i

The impulse of this first wave deviates from previous, more rigorous efforts that have sought to either assemble a comprehensive history of surfing or provide a hermeneutic analysis on the significance of “the local” in Hawai‘i. These heavily-tread paths have, in
my mind, been covered well enough already. Instead, the purpose of this initial wave is to push forward an “untimely” mode of thinking whose ultimate aim is not to simply recognize that which already exists, but rather create “other” possibilities for politics, what Deleuze and Guattari have called summoning forth “a new earth, a new people” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 99). That said it is perhaps best to paddle out into the lineups and become immersed within the politics of surfing.

Surfing protocol, simply put, dictates that the first surfer to stand up closest to the peak of a breaking wave has the right of way. However, the orderliness of this guideline is complicated by the phenomenon of localism. Irrespective of positioning, localism dictates that “locals,” through an implicit claim of place and belonging, possess a priority to waves over other surfers. This assertion of priority, one that has been notoriously sustained through intimidation and violence, establishes an in-the-water hierarchy that positions local surfers at the top with traveling surfers and resident military grunts at the bottom. In its utopian form, this hierarchy guarantees that the best waves go to the most invested (i.e. most local) surfers. If a non-local surfer intentionally “drops-in” on a local (an act analogous to cutting someone off in traffic) or disrespects the hierarchy in any other manner, the offender will be “escorted” out of the lineup or beaten or both.  

1 See Ben Finney for a historical treatment of surfing and Lind, Okamura, Ogawa and Grant, Rosa, Fujikane, Wilson and the literature from Bamboo Ridge for the local.
2 This usage of “Local” is a highly problematic. In my usage I am evoking the sense of belonging that certain populations of surfers have in the water. However, the distinction between Native Hawaiian and Local must be made as they have differing claims of belonging—that of “homeland” and “home.” This is a critical distinction that has been best explored in the Amerasia Journal’s issue entitled “Who’s Vision.” While the latter half of my paper will take up these issues directly, it is also important to note that by-and-large, such distinctions are not made in the surfbreaks. The most important in-the-water distinction is whether one is “local” or not.
3 Every surfbreak has its own set of “Locals” and its own level of intensity. In this regard, it is not a forgone conclusion that all violators will be assaulted. The surfers who are in the water wholly determine the intensity of the lineup. However, these sorts of hostile regulations are considered the rule instead of the exception.
Since locality determines a surfer's entitlement to both respect and waves, one possible way of articulating the politics of surfing would be to examine the manner in which locality is/not inscribed upon surfer bodies. Given the non-verbal nature of surfing—outside of heated arguments and cool pleasantries, lineups are silent spaces—identities are performed and observed primarily through "extra-visual leaps" (Reynolds 1998: 131). Thus, one might (as I have in the past) attempt to conduct a semiotic reading of the local "maps of meaning" whereby we-images and they-images are translated into markers of distinction (Featherstone 1993: 176).

A study such as this would be immediately drawn to the tattoos that emblazon the chests, necks, backs and shoulders of local surfers. Sometimes depicting the popular image of the Hawaiian Island chain, more often than not these markers inscribe a sense a place by way of thick gothic letterings: ‘Hawaiian’; ‘Kānaka’; ‘Hawaiian Born’; ‘Moloka‘i No Ka Oi’; ‘Nanakuli’; ‘Kaua‘i Boyz’; ‘Kekei O Ke Kai’. Unlike other "softer" signifiers of place and belonging that tend to get swept up in the postmodern flux of intertextuality, tattoos such as these are set apart by their pronouncement of permanence and authenticity.4

Surfers' automobiles could provide another significant locus of a local enunciation. For starters, new model sedans and convertibles (notably Cavaliers, Corsicas and Metros) coated in brilliant red or teal paints are considered rentals. Unlike the vehicles of most local surfers, these rentals have been sanitized of all marks of

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4 Regardless of how enamored non-locals might be with the islands, none of these signify Hawai‘i. As Shapiro writes that "because meanings exceed what speakers may want to do with statements, persuasion is as much a function of who is speaking under what circumstances as it is of whatever personally motivated markers may exist," visiting surfers know that there are varying degrees of risk attached to the appropriation of local markers (Shapiro 1992: 38). Whereas puka shell necklaces and aloha print boardshorts carry a small amount of risk, the meanings of local tattoos exceed the holding capacity of visiting bodies and, while poseurs in every-day setting may be discredited and ridiculed, those who "fake belonging" in Oahu's surfbreaks are shamed by violence to body and property.
duration and individualization. Local surf vehicles, on the other hand—anything from oversized F-150 Supercrews to bombed-out Toyota Corollas—possess patina along the lines of dented doors, rusted roofs and collages of place-making bumper stickers that read: 'Bruddah IZ'; ‘Radio Free Hawai‘i’; ‘Go BOWS’; ‘Save Sunset Beach’; ‘No Hawaiians, No Aloha’; ‘Keep Country, Country’; ‘Da Hui O He ‘e Nalu’; and ‘PUINSAI’.

To this point, the local/non-local distinction appears relatively seamless. However, once an approach along these lines attempts to impose an over-arching coherence on a local/global opposition, it will be consistently frustrated by what Arjun Appadurai deems the “fluidities of transnational flows” (Appadurai 1996: 44). The excess of meanings expressed in surfers’ phenotypes, hairstyles, surfboards and apparel, unfailingly spill across the over-determined boundaries of “we”/“they.” In the words of Michael Ho, a local professional surfer:

Surfing’s changed drastically over the past 10 years on the North Shore... It’s so much more open. You got 20 million Brazilians, Japanese and all the rest of them in the water. You don’t know what’s local anymore (in Slater 1999: 113).

This sort of race-based, phenotypic delineation of the local—a salient extrapolation of the over-coding narrative produced by Hawaii’s 1931 Massie Case—have become frustrated both by the increasingly heterogeneous “look” of Hawaii’s local population and, more interestingly, by the recent international nature of visiting surfers. As recently as 1980s, when traveling surfers predominately came from either California or Australia, the local/global distinction could “neatly” be drawn between racialized hues of brown and white. However, the recent globalization of surfing has made such a binary impossible. For example, this past winter the world-famous waves of Oahu’s North Shore filled the
lineups with significant numbers of surfers not only from the U.S. Continent and Australia, but also Japan, Brazil, Puerto Rico, Indonesia, South Africa, Tahiti, France, and, or Ho put it, “all the rest of them in the water.”

Along a similar vein, the globalization of the surf industry has also worked to confound displays of locality. Because surfboards continue to be individually hand-shaped, one of the most telling markers of place comes from the boards surfers ride. Since sales are largely based upon a reputation for making quality surfboards, the craftsmen who produce boards, called “shapers,” make names for themselves by shaping for the top professionals (which the best form of advertising as the shaper’s logo will then be widely circulated throughout the transnational surf media) and by putting out boards to a local clientele. Because shaping is by-and-large a cottage industry, shapers are always producing boards from a specific place (i.e. Sunset Beach, Makaha, Haleiwa, or more generally, Hawai‘i) and thus, the board’s logos become distinctive markers of locality. However, one a shaper establishes a solid reputation, they can be “taken-in” by the large surf companies (i.e. Rusty, Town & Country, Channel Islands), the outcome being a wider exposure in the surf media as well as a global distribution.

Hawai‘i has its own set of superstar shapers. Eric Arakawa and Kerry Tokoro shape for Hawaiian Island Creations. Andrus, Pat Rawson and Wade Tokoro shape for Local Motion. Glenn Minami and Mike Woo shape for Blue Hawai‘i. Glen and Dennis Pang, Jeff Johnson, Jason Kashiwai, and Cino Magaelles shape for Town & Country. However, because these “local” superstar shapers now have a global distribution, ownership of a surfboard made in Hawai‘i is no longer an automatic determinant of

5 Amongst some surfboard shapers there is a growing popularity with using CAD shaping machines. However, these machines can still only provide a rough cut, and require the fine-tuned nuances to be hand-sanded by the shaper.
locality. Not only can anyone go to Ala Moana Shopping Center and dish out five hundred and sixty dollars for a HIC Arakawa, but a similar Arakawa can also be bought in Japan, California, Mexico, and France.

Because of this recent development, markers of local identity have come to lie in how “underground” your shaper is. Since these “underground” boards are ordered, designed, and sold in tucked-away workshops (as opposed to Waikiki’s neon-lit mega-stores), to ride one of these boards is to display that you are well connected to the local surfing scene. This phenomenon supports a rather large contingent of shapers, both in Town and on the North Shore, who subsist solely off custom shaping boards for a select group of local clientele. These shapers include Carl Shaper, Petey Meredith, Ken Bradshaw, Mike Woo, Jeff Bushman, Greg Shiu, Matt Kinoshita, Steve Walker, Ben and Akila Aipa, and Gordon Quigg. But, even these markers of locality become diluted as struggling shapers are enticed into sending a shipment off to Japan where surfboards sell for double and even triple their local value.

Likewise, the locality of surf apparel companies, once a strong marker of place, is also constantly in flux. For example, Town & Country (T&C) started in 1971 inside a small shed in Pearl City, Oahu. Throughout the years, this once extremely local company has grown consistently larger, with its current market multinational in scale. On their website (www.tcsurf.com), T&C notes that they now have factories located in Hawai‘i, Southern California, and Florida, also adding that “New Zealand, Australia, France, Portugal, United Kingdom, Indonesia, Brazil are just a few countries that support the motive to serve the best quality surf gear internationally.” As the absolute number of people able to purchase T&C or similar transnational surf companies such as Local

9 www.tcsurf.com
Motion, Da Kine and Hawaiian Island Creations increases, the distinctive power of these cultural possessions naturally declines (Bourdieu 228). It is in response to this flooding that Souljah, a small local clothing company, boasts on its radio advertisements that their products are still “the hardest to find on the Island.”

Beyond its ethnographic allure, “wave one” is instructive in that it delivers us to the limits of representation, identity and politics in Hawai‘i. With its commitment to a narrow form of identity politics, it struggles to organize, stabilize and neutralize multiplicities along territorial axes of significance and subjectification (Shapiro 1999: 8). Ultimately, this sort of positivist tracing has less to do with representation than it does with intervention, calcification and incarceration. And, emblematic of many conventional treatments of Hawai‘i politics, it succeeds in domesticating the political by believing it is producing something new when in fact it fights to merely reproduce the Same. “That is why tracing is so dangerous,” write Deleuze and Guattari. “It injects redundancies and propagates them” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 13).

4. Wave Two: Confronting the Macro-political Limits

In terms of Hawaii’s broader political terrain, the process of calcification-via-representation mapped in “wave one” is largely responsible for the political paralysis that sustains the control of Hawaii’s State machine. The over-coding involved in exclusive identity politics generates a propagation of the Same that regrettably acts as “a sleight of hand that makes us forget about movement” (Deleuze 1995: 65). As Brian Massumi writes, within this dominant constellation of identities, there is no “impingement of chance”:
It is highly determined—over determined. The “this and that” that everything is
tend to be the same “this” and the same “that,” over and over again, like a broken
record. It’s a trap. The whole thing is an optical illusion produced by overcoding

But, if there is anything to be taken from “wave one,” it is that there is always movement
and movement works to “loosen the seams in the shrouds of identities” (Vizenor 1999:
23). Herein lays the reintroduction of the infinite, which founds the possibilities for
creative transmutations. In this sense, “wave two” is interested in foregrounding
movement in order to reestablish a fluvial and dynamic sense of political organization.

For the past fifty years, Hawai‘i has been dominated by a delineation of three
“macropolitical”\(^7\) actors, broadly: the Indigenous (Native Hawaiians), the Local (Asian
immigrant settlers whose routes run through Hawaii’s plantation era), and the Global
(everything that poses a threat to the land, peoples and cultures of the Islands).\(^8\) The
dynamics between these three actors has been such that the liberal political discourse has
sought to form coalitions between Locals and Native Hawaiians in order to protect
Hawai‘i from colonial incursions led by Global investors seeking to “develop” the islands
(Fujikane 1994: 2). However, as nakedly exposed in the smear campaign against Mililani
Trask—triggered by her criticism of Senator Daniel Inouye’s interference in the U.S.

\(^7\) My use of this term runs through Deleuze Guattari’s distinction between the “molar” and the “molecular,”
“macropolitics” and “micropolitics.” As Patton explains, “This is not simply a difference in scale but a
difference in kind. On the one hand, politics is played out in conflicts between molar social entities such as
social classes, sexes and nations. On the other hand, it is simultaneously played out at the molecular level
in terms of social affinities, sexual orientations and varieties of communal belonging” (Patton 2000: 43).

\(^8\) Because of time and space constraints I have set up this overtly crude cosmological grid. However, it
must be understood that the brevity of this treatment enacts tremendous violences to the people, lands and
histories of Hawai‘i. For an in depth analysis of the socio-historical processes of Hawai‘i please refer to
Trask, Kent, Okamura, Yamamoto and Fujikane.
Federal reconciliation hearings for Hawaiians⁹—this liberal discourse has proven to be as problematic as it is unjust.

This stringent delineation of Hawaii's three macropolitical actors—the Indigenous, the Local, and the Global—has effectively paralyzed processes of the political, in that it reduces and restricts subjects to their lowest level of virtuality (Massumi 1992: 76). “Native issues” have been quarantined to the domain of the Indigenous. Local issues (“Locals are good because they are Democrats, not Republicans”) take the tone of “locals only” and scapegoat the Global as a purely external threat in order to masks the reigning power structure and make themselves “at home” in Hawaii. As Ida Yoshinaga and Eiko Kosasa, leaders of Local Japanese Women for Justice, write:

Why are non-Hawaiians—that is, Inouye, the JACL, and the media—compelled to control the direction and processes of the Hawaiian sovereignty movement? In their own homeland, Hawaiians do not control their national lands, resources, and political processes—these are dominated by settlers from Asia, Europe, and the U.S. Continent, who run the colonial state structure and economy. Settlers benefit everyday from this unequal, unjust situation and constantly discredit Hawaiian nationalist who try to overturn it (Yoshinaga and Kosasa 2000: 144).

Therefore, the continued imposition of this macropolitical matrix of Indigenous/Local versus the Global not only works to limit Hawai'i politics, but it is also a constitutive element of the very colonial process in that enables elision of historical differences and entitlements between Native and Asian settler groups. Despite the “much-touted support in resolutions, articles, and personal statements,” writes Haunani-Kay Trask, “these alleged (Local) Japanese supporters always come down on the side of the reigning

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Democratic party since they are direct beneficiaries of its continuing power” (Trask 2000: 11).

To break free of the boundedness of this dominant constellation of identities is to recognize and support Native Hawaiian claims for justice, which is inevitably some form of Hawaiian self-determination. But, to support and enable Hawaiian self-determination, an active deterritorialization of Hawai‘i politics must first occur. By deterritorialization, I am implying a contrast between “‘āina” or “earth” and “territory.” I am calling for an unsettling of modern territoriality with its violent mechanisms of security and containment. To call for a deterritorialization then, is not to eliminate attachments to earth, but rather to talk about different relationships between earth and people (Patton 2000: 117).

The aforementioned limits of identity politics are precisely why this wave seeks to depart from concatenated tracings of identities and head towards a more fluid mapping that is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; one that is detachable, reversible, and susceptible to constant modification. The previous semiotic reading enables a conceptualization of identity as a tenuous and momentary achievement; one that is constantly contested, disrupted, and re-coded by what Jameson has deemed this “latest” stage of capitalism (Jameson 1997: 248-9). In its moments of excess there lies a new possibility for politics, ones that escape the imposition of “already recognized social identities” and introduces new voices that are at once expressive and disruptive (Shapiro 2001: 20). It moves us towards an artful or creative conceptualization of the political. As Deleuze writes, it is...

...no longer a matter of determinate forms, as with knowledge, or of constraining rules, as with power: it’s a matter of optional rules that make existence a work of
art, rules at once ethical and aesthetic that constitute ways of existing or styles of life (Deleuze 1995: 98).

In this sense, we can imagine movements both in and of the waves as a “distant terrain” (Shapiro 1992: 53) that erodes the “natural” distributions of determinate forms, thereby creating the conditions of possibility for politics-as-events rather than as a repetition of over-determined policy administrations (Shapiro 1992: 53; Shapiro 2001: 25). The waves can therefore be used to evoke for new kinds of political movements, one’s that make submarine connections. So for the remainder of this paper, I want to abandon hermeneutic questions of “Who or what?” and “Is this True?” in order to focus on questions of “Could/Does this work? What new thoughts does this enable us to think” (Massumi 1992: 8). Thusly, the question becomes: How can the movements in and of the waves be used to tear, reverse, adapt and refigure the ways in which we approach politics in Hawai‘i? Or, to put it bluntly: How can fluvial politics wash up onshore and breathe new life into Hawaii’s contemporary political order?

5. Wave Three: Hawaii’s Heterotopia

It is easier to describe how our subjects are circumscribed by the power of ruling orders than it is to imagine lines of flight that escape the grasp of a Control Society. However, in Hawaii, one of the State machine’s most powerful orders, the touristic order, is mercilessly overturned every single day. To understand how this is done, we need to reread the politics of surfing, enter into its rhythms, and shift our sensibilities from identity politics towards a politics-as-surfing.

Many high-quality treatments have described how Hawaii’s touristic order works to mediate all local-tourist encounters through the rigorous inscription of a commodified
For the sake of this third wave, I want to just quickly convey that Hawai‘i has, for a long time, been consumed as a “porno-tropics” (McClintock 1995: 22). As well-mapped in Kathy Ferguson and Phyllis Turnbull’s _Oh Say Can You See?: The Semiotics of the Military in Hawai‘i_ (1999), one of the constants throughout the many phases of intrusion has been the inscription of Hawai‘i as a warm, “welcoming feminine place, waiting with open arms to embrace those who come to penetrate, protect, mold, and develop” (Ferguson and Turnbull 1999: 38).

In this latest phase of the touristic order, the feminine fantasy has been refined through a hyper-sexualization of women as “wanting and waiting hula girls” as well as a domestication of men (Trask 145). As noted by Ferguson and Turnbull:

> Under the impetus of the new accommodating (to tourist) order, the Hawaiians fishing with throw nets and outrigger canoes disappeared as indigenous users of the beach and ocean. They came to be replaced by the domesticated gentle male Hawaiians of “splendid physiques” and “dignity of bearing” who began to make the ocean safe for tourists (Schnack, quoted in Herman 1995: 271; Ferguson and Turnbull 1999: 38).

This reconfiguration was not just limited to Native Hawaiian men. Immigrant plantation workers became service providers—gardeners, drivers, cooks, maids, waiters, parking attendants, and janitors—within this international political economy of tourism (Ibid., 39). Thus, the feminization of Hawaiian men, the desexualization of Asian immigrants, and the exotic/eroticisation of women as waiting-and-wanting hula girls, reconfigured the entirety of Hawai‘i into servants to the touristic order (Ibid., 40). The outcome of this touristic order is that every resident, in varying degrees, is implicated within the service sector of the tourism industry.

10 Please see Kent, Trask, Buck, McClintock, and Ferguson and Turnbull.
However, with the exception of *Canoes* and *Pops*, the surfbreaks just off of Waikiki Beach, the ocean is no longer a place “made safe” for tourists. If anything, offshore interactions between local and visiting surfers can be described as being anti-*aloha*, with broken surfboards and black eyes becoming increasingly more common. It is along these lines that the primarily concern of this third wave is to treat the surfbreaks of Hawai’i not simply as a place where locals carving out micro-resistances (see *la perruque* in de Certeau 1984: 149), but instead as space where locals actually reclaim and overturn the touristic order. To activate Foucault’s concept of the “heterotopia,” these surfbreaks have the curious property of being in relation with the over-coded space of Waikiki, but only in such a way as to “suspect, neutralize or invert the set of relations” that strive to regulate local-tourist encounters (Foucault 1998: 238). These offshore counter-sites, with their incessant undulations and impossibility of closure, create an open and infinite space that erodes and reorganizes the fixedness of onshore identities and spatial arrangements.

Michel de Certeau’s notion of the art of diversion can begin to articulate the specific ways surfers refuse to concede to the established normative codes of accommodating to tourists through a commodified *aloha*. Utilizing the “popular practice” of *la perruque*, de Certeau describes the personal projects employees work on during “company time.”

In the very place where the machine he must serve reigns supreme, (the worker) cunningly takes pleasure in finding a way to create gratuitous products whose sole purpose is to signify his own capabilities through his work and to confirm his solidarity with other workers or his family through *spending* his time in this way (de Certeau 1984: 149).

By establishing a degree of plurality within the workplace, the employee succeeds in “putting one over” on the established order, on its home ground (Ibid.).
In Hawai‘i, the established order is mass tourism and the product is the simulation of a “Hawaiian dream paradise.” “Company time” is around the clock, anytime tourist-local encounters take place. Any resistance to the normative codes of commodified aloha, whether as insignificant as purposely giving tourists inaccurate directions or as violent as punching a visiting surfer in the face, is an assertion of agency for a largely powerless local population. These tactics, however trivial, nonetheless work to alter the conditions and power relations of everyday life. In the arena of surfing, this inversion of the touristic order takes the form of an anti-aloha, hyper-territoriality that is policed through performances of hyper-masculinity.

Most local surfers in Oahu’s overcrowded surfbreaks are intense, puffed-up, and paddle around the lineup as if they are constantly on the verge of erupting. This emergence is enabled by the aforementioned identity pressures provoked by technologies and changes in the “ethnoscape” of Hawaii’s lineups that have made it increasingly difficult for local surfers to affirm their value and sense of place. These hyper-masculine local surfers are flexing their agency not only against the foreign intruders of their surfbreaks, but also against Hawaii’s state government and the tourism industry which, individually and in tandem, are interpreted by locals as threatening, corrupt, inept, and self-serving. The irony of these pumped-up hyper-masculine surfers, however, is that it is entirely possible that a local who punches or chases a visiting surfer out of the water will, later in the day, have to park that very tourist’s car or serve him his dinner.

By focusing on the project of re-constituting masculinity, I seek to show that beyond these expressions of anger and anxiety lays the more crucial project of identity

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32 A recent manifestation of this sentiment has formed around the state government’s handling of the filming of Baywatch Hawaii.
negotiation. To appreciate the rage and anxiety that is being performed by these “amping” surfers, it is necessary to first understand the energy that goes into identity maintenance. As Michael J. Shapiro writes:

What is encouraged is not a hospitality towards being, that is, towards particular kinds of subjects, but towards becoming, towards the open possibilities for persons to resist being wholly quarantined within institutional and authoritative models of identification (Shapiro 1999: 92).

This privileging of creative “becoming” over a static “being” then opens the door for an “other” form of politics, one that does not simply react to a set of constraints but instead develops an “other” sensitivity to them, one which is, “subtle enough to convert them into opportunities—and to translate the body into an autonomous zone effectively enveloping infinite degrees of freedom” (Massumi 1992: 102).

6. Wave Four: He‘e Nalu as Political Movement

This fourth wave seeks to refine the privileging of movement and explore the possibilities of he‘e nalu or wave sliding. The purpose of this sort of conceptualization is to move away from the idea that surfers are “catching” waves. It is incorrect to think of waves as walls of water traveling through the sea since there is very little horizontal displacement of water molecules. Rather, waves are actually bands of energy that move through water in orbital movements.

All this is to say that it is misleading to believe surfers are “harnessing the power of the ocean.” They are not even redirecting its energy. Rather, surfers enter into the force of an existing wave and, along with the water molecules, momentarily get caught up in its force. As Timothy Leary told SURFER Magazine, “One of the great lessons you learn in the ocean is that while you are totally insignificant to the total mass, you can
survive in it by being part of it (Leary, in George 2001: 84). In this sense, surfers are not channeling, manipulating or harnessing power but rather, negotiating the force of the waves and sliding, joining its orbits momentarily in order to move in a slightly different direction.

And when we think about it, everything is made of waves. “Historical waves, cultural waves,” Timothy Leary continues, Things come packaged in sequential, cyclical, moving, ever-changing forms” (Ibid.). Therefore, this concept of he’e nalu can easily be exported to movements amongst political waves. As Deleuze writes, “The key thing is how to get taken up in the motion of a big wave...to ‘get into something’ instead of being the origin of an effort” (Deleuze 1995: 122). In this sense, political movements need not expend energy trying to originate a movement against the State machine; it would be next to impossible. Instead these movements need to locate critical points of intervention or insertion into the frameworks of already-existing orders.

In this sense, a politics-as-surfing is concerned with the movement of forces. “Force,” in this case, must not be conflated or confused with “power.” As noted by Brian Massumi, “Power is the domestication of force” (Massumi 1992: 6). Whereas power works to build walls, force arrives in its wild state from outside to break open constraints and found new vistas. Therefore, it is not the control of State power that is of primary interest to this wave, but rather what can occur amongst the slidings along “wild states of force?” What forms of social change can take place underneath and across State power? And, how can these “iniquitous” moments be used to threaten and transform the political institutions themselves?
To return then to the politics of present-day Hawai‘i, the tragedy of the over-determination of subjectivities lies within the inability to sustain these moments of *sliding* or moments of “transversality” (Glissant 1989: 66). The transversal, as applied by Soguk and Whitehall, is:

…an ontological condition that is shaped in flows and networks, in submarine roots and errant politics, in border-crossings and borderisations, and in shared deterritorializations (Soguk and Whitehall 1999: 675).

Rather than simply accepting politics as the administration of policies enunciated from within a fixed territorial terrain (Shapiro 2001: 25), transversality opens up possibilities for a politics that *slides* and organizes across official surfaces. In this sense, a more transversal politics can be used to escape the limits of Hawaii’s over-determined macro-political actors, thereby cultivating new freedoms of possibility, freedoms that Michael Dillon has claimed “can only be enjoyed within *mutably* habitable, rather than viciously and unsustainably circumscribed, limits” (Dillon 1997: 7). It therefore becomes possible to reposition the institutional question of the political in such a way that it enables politics to engage with identity as an endless string of becomings.¹² In this sense, becoming opens a space within the institutional grid of identities, thereby allowing for the invention of “new trajectories, new circuits of response, unheard-of futures and possible bodies,” the likes of which we have never seen before (Massumi 1992: 101).

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¹² It is essential to clarify that this movement towards a transversal approach to politics is nothing like a wholesale invalidation peoples’ individual or collective identities. Movements of deterritorialization within the notion of transversality are capable of sustaining the distinction between Native Hawaiian claims to *homeland* and local claims to *home* (for an extended treatment of this distinction, see Fujikane 1996) because it is always linked to movements of reterritorialization. Deterritorialization, in this sense, does not imply a severing of Native ties to the land but instead, it is a deterritorialization of the statist forms of legal capture (from the Great Mahele onwards) and a reterritorialization of a new hybrid, or rather *hapa* form of politics that acknowledges and accounts for the becoming-Global of indigenous epistemologies and the becoming-Global of “native issues” (for a similar treatment of “native land titles” in Australia, New Zealand and Canada, see Patton 2000: 125-131).
This is not to say that resistances along macropolitical lines are useless. They are just cannot be seen as ends unto themselves. We need to engage the political on both the macropolitical front as well as the micropolitical. As stated by Moria Gaitens,

We need to address both the plane which organizes our possibilities into molar political realities and experiment with micropolitical possibilities that may be created on the plane of immanence (Gatens 2000: 143).

In this sense, the macro- and micropolitical are two sides of the same coin and need to be practiced in a style that integrates rather than mutually excludes one another (Massumi 1992: 104). Their combined goal should be a state of “permanent revolution” an incessant refiguring of the conditions of existence laid down by the State machine. Whereas for the State machine, a journey is simply a trajectory between two points, for sliders and surfers, it is the journey or ride that matters (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 380). Therefore, as Deleuze and Guattari claim, a line of becoming “has neither beginning nor end, departure nor arrival, origin nor destination” (Ibid., 293). It is all about the ride.

As such, it makes no sense to regard sliding as a necessary stage in a broader process of abolition of molar subjectivity or human liberation. However, politics-as-surfing does speak of new kinds of events, ones that cannot necessarily be explained by the situations that give rise to them, or to which they lead. These events “appear for a moment, and it’s that moment that matters, it’s the chance we must seize” (Deleuze 1995: 176). In this sense, we need to start surfing. We need to become wave-hungry, the way Town begins to buzz when a swell is running or the electricity of the North Shore when the winter swells begin to arrive. And when the waves come no one knows how long it will last so you have to surf ditch school and work and slide until exhaustion.
7. Wave Five: Sidewalk Surfing

These sorts of fluvial transformations have recently begun to wash up onshore. On February 25, 1997, a wave crashed upon the Hawai‘i State Capital that, in an unconventionally powerful way, threatened and effectively unsettled the State machine’s legislative function as well as the economic interests and plans of developers, wealthy landowners, and business interests. As powerfully described in Momiala Kamahele’s article on the contestation of Senate Bill 8, a bill that was poised to “terminate traditional and customary practices” through a regulation of gathering rights which is essential to the practice of hula and sustenance of Native Hawaiian culture. As Senate Bill 8 is of a long string of legislative efforts to remove Native entitlements, Kamahele writes,

> These bills are intended to destroy indigenous national cultures in a purposeful and methodical way. Although the attack on traditional and customary rights to gather resources of the land is generally made in terms of the sanctity of private property which will ensure economic progress and a better business climate, there is something much less grand and more vicious taking place: an attempt to rid the land of pesky Natives who threaten the colonizer’s way of conducting business in Hawai‘i (Kamahele 2000: 41).

However, in an unprecedented becoming-political of an ancient cultural form, “Kumu hula” throughout the Hawaiian Islands mobilized hundreds of their hula students in an extraordinary feat of grace and power never seen in modern colonial times” (Ibid., 52). Kumu hula had entered the political arena to defend Native Hawaiian traditional and customary rights to gather resources that ensure the practice of hula and sustain their culture. As describe by Kamahele,

> We organized in three days, determined to kill Senate Bill 8. The contested culture burst on the political scene asserting that things Hawaiian held extreme importance in Hawai‘i. A protest demonstration at the State Capitol for a twenty-four hour period became the outward expression of that assertion (Ibid., 52).
What had been an essentially conservative element of the Native Hawaiian community had slid into a becoming, the becoming-political of hula. Thus, in the very act of organizing to defend hula, a union of culture and politics was born. In the words of Kamahele,“Politicization of a cultural art form came alive that day” (Ibid., 55). And while Kamahele modestly proclaims “(w)e were political innocents treading on new political ground that felt like quicksand, ever shifting, ever partial” (Ibid., 59). These “unlikely” champions undeniably transformed Hawaii’s political terrain with a force beyond the means and imaginations of any other actors.

As for as the anticipated ADB protest that opened this paper, less than 500 demonstrators by most media estimates, participated in the protest march. The fact that the State machine spent over $10,000 per demonstrator is not the most significant (Rees 2001: 4). What was most significant was the broad band of surfers who came to surf the wave of the ADB demonstration. Marching through the streets of Waikiki were “supporters of kānaka maoli independence, members of the local Teamsters and ILWU unions, parent with children, environmental activists, church groups and others…” (Daws 2001: 13). What was most important was that the majority of these demonstrators had not much more than a crude understanding of the ADB, (before busting into song, the leader of the band Big Island Conspiracy proclaimed to the crowd, “Ho, I don’t know much about this A-D-B but, we Hawaiians been getting fucked by the U-S-A for years, brah”) yet they had entered the wave, become part of its orbits, and for a few moments, transformed the political order of Hawai‘i.
8. "One Last Wave"

The point of this set of waves is not to claim that surfing alone is the answer to the State machines or Control Societies. Deleuze and Guattari make it explicit that smooth space will never be sufficient enough to save us (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 500). Why is this? It is because slidings and becomings are directional, but never directed. Orbits can be negotiated, but there is never a predestinated end point to a wave. The details of these movements can never be exhaustively mapped out. As Massumi writes, “If it could, it would already be what it is becoming, in which case it wouldn’t be becomings at all, being instead the same” (Massumi 1992: 103). The best we can hope for is to develop sensitivities toward strategies that will serve as buoys for future waves. These sensitivities found a power of imagining things to be otherwise by having a creative power to decompose and recompose the social field, as Moria Gatens suggests, “bit by bit, molecule by molecule” (Gaitens 2000: 143).

Everything is made of waves, and in the words of Tom Morey: “It’s all surfing. Everything! Surfing in the ocean just happens to be the perfect form of surfing” (George 2001: 4). Sure this is an overly utopian view. But, as noted by Éric Alliez,

...critical and immanent view(s) of utopia, as ‘presentation of the infinite in the here-and-now’, has to be distinguished from the authoritarian utopias (or utopias of transcendence) to which the official political philosophy reduces every project of emancipation regarding the administrative practice of the state-of-affairs (Alliez 1997: 87).

Surfing lends itself handily towards this sort of anticipatory optimism. It bespeaks a fantasy that no society has to be organized in the way it is, that there is always another way, and then the choice is not purely one of fate or historical circumstance, but can always be activated by thinking differently” (Alliez 1997: 87). As fantastic as it may be,
to someone who surfs it makes perfect sense because surfing is by its very nature is an anticipatory and optimistic endeavor: the next swell, the next wave, the next ride. There is never “one last wave” because the next just might be the best one ever.
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