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This dissertation argues that international terrorism can be understood from the perspective of changes within the international system, particularly since the end of the Cold War. The primary foundation of the inquiry rests on the “four waves of modern terrorism” theory put forth by David C. Rapoport, who argues that different types of terrorism come in various waves throughout history, and tend to reflect larger tensions within the international system. Rapoport asserts that contemporary terrorism, which is primarily religious in motivation, constitutes the fourth wave. This dissertation expands on Rapoport’s fourth wave description by asserting that there are three primary drivers of this particular wave of terrorism: 1) globalization and its attendant processes, 2) religious violence in the international system, and 3) the spread of CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) weapons to nonstate actors. The final chapter takes a prescriptive approach and explores ideas on how to mitigate the terrorism threat in the future.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

On 11 September 2001, the United States experienced the most deadly and destructive single terrorist attack conducted by nonstate actors in the country’s history. Nineteen young men, mostly citizens of Saudi Arabia, boarded four planes within the United States and drove three of them into the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon, in Washington, DC. A fourth crashed in a field in Pennsylvania when passengers attempted to regain control of the aircraft. The individuals who perpetrated this incident acted as part of, or on behalf of, a conservative and militant Islamic terrorist organization known as Al Qaeda, which at the time was based in Afghanistan.

From a tactical point of view, the 9-11 terrorist attacks were the product of elaborate planning, particularly by one individual, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who had devised the plan after a similar plot, known as Project Bojinka, which he directed, was disrupted in the Philippines in 1995. Following his arrest, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed revealed to US interrogators that the original 9-11 plot involved the hijacking of ten aircraft. Mohammed and his fellow planners envisaged “striking nuclear power plants, symbolic buildings on the west and east coasts of the U.S. and simultaneously exploding other planes over South-East Asia.”¹ However, eventually the plot was scaled back out of concern of logistical overreach.

¹ Rebecca Carr and George Edmonson, “Original Plan ‘to hijack 10 aircraft’”, The Age (Melbourne), June 18, 2004.
1.1 “Massive Intelligence Failure”

In the days, weeks, and months following the attack, many pundits, analysts, and scholars began to question how such an attack could have occurred; one U.S. Senator described the entire events surrounding 11 September 2001 as a “massive intelligence failure.” Moreover, others speculated that the world after 9-11 had fundamentally changed. In newspapers, many articles and columns revolved around a self-examining “why do they hate us” theme. In a speech to Congress shortly after the incident, President George W. Bush posed this self-examining question himself: “Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this chamber -- a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms -- our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.” In addition to discussions in the popular press, many political scientists began publishing articles questioning whether terrorism had fundamentally changed the international system, and whether terrorism posed a strategic threat to states.

Perhaps the most important question being asked during this period was why such an attack had not been predicted. A joint Congressional investigation, formed

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2 This specific phrase was uttered by US Senator Richard Shelby on the CBS News Show ‘Face the Nation’ on 16 September 2001 (file accessed through Lexis-Nexis).
subsequently to determine the nature and scale of intelligence lapses prior to the attack, noted that at certain key junctures government agencies had failed to understand the underlying threat facing them. Specifically, the inquiry revealed three critical junctures in which the 9-11 plot could have become compromised, and thus disrupted by the U.S. government. One of these involved in a meeting in January 2000 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, involving at least two of the original 19 hijackers. A second juncture occurred when Zacarias Moussaoui, reportedly a member of the original hijacking team, enrolled in a flight school in Minnesota under suspicious circumstances. A third occurred when a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent based in Phoenix, Arizona wrote a memorandum detailing "a pattern of suspicious activity involving numerous Middle Eastern men seeking training in area flight schools."\(^5\)

However, in many respects, these were tactical matters—a more strategic question posed during that inquiry, and later in the ‘9/11’ commission hearings,\(^6\) was why the United States had failed to recognize and appreciate the evolution of terrorism as represented by the 11 September attack. The world had decades of experience with terrorism, with the United States alone possessing one of the most sophisticated counter-terrorism infrastructures (intelligence, legal and military) in the world; yet for some reason, this collective national and global knowledge could not prepare the world’s most powerful country for the most devastating terrorist attack in its history.

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\(^6\) The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
1.2 Rise of the 'New' Terrorism

One possible explanation for the U.S. government’s failure or inability to “connect the dots” or otherwise predict September 11 was that the attack was probably viewed in isolation, and not as part of a longer-term strategy by Al Qaeda or similar groups. For instance, it took many months, and in some cases several years after September 11, for many Congressional leaders and others to understand that the 9-11 attack was a continuation (a second strike in effect) of an attack that was initiated against the World Trade Center in 1993. Moreover, a more macroscopic perspective would reveal that the type of terrorism practiced—featuring mass casualty designs, plans to use CBRN weapons, and deployment of suicide bombers—reflected what the terrorism literature was describing as the ‘new’ terrorism. An alternative name for this terrorism was postmodern terrorism. In 1996, Walter Laqueur published an article titled *Postmodern Terrorism* in the prestigious journal *Foreign Affairs* in which he detailed the emergence of this new type of terrorism that would feature absence of state sponsorship.

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9 CBRN=Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear weapons. The popular term for these weapons is “Weapons of Mass Destruction” (WMD); however, there are problems with vagueness regarding that term. Jerrold Post asserts that WD is a “semantically confusing term” since many conventional weapons—such as jet airplanes used in suicide bombings—can also cause “mass destruction.” The acronym CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear) is more precise and thus is used throughout this dissertation. See transcript of prepared statement of Jerrold Post, before the House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, *Federal News Service*, October 12, 2001.
(and hence constraints), presence of religious or millenarian ideologies, and inclination
to use CBRN weapons. Laqueur also wrote: “Society has also become vulnerable to a
new kind of terrorism, in which the destructive power of both the individual terrorist and
terrorism as a tactic are infinitely greater.”¹⁰

David Rapoport has assigned the ‘new’ terrorism another name: fourth wave
terrorism (hence the title of this dissertation). Fourth wave terrorism, according to
Rapoport, can also be described as the “religious wave” of terrorism and moreover,
“Islam is at the heart of the wave,” although fourth wave terrorism can be found in other
religions.¹¹ Scholars and analysts who subscribe to the ‘new’ terrorism or fourth wave
terrorism thesis often highlight the importance of radical religious ideologies. The 11
September 2001 attacks occurred in an era in which religious-based terrorist attacks
were becoming quite common. Only one year before 9-11, for instance, in Indonesia,
the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah, a militant neo-Salafist jihadi group, initiated a
bombing campaign across the country aimed at Christian churches and other targets
associated with globalization, such as the Jakarta Stock exchange. Two years later this
group would conduct its most devastating attack, to date, which involved two
simultaneous bombings of the Kuta resort district in Bali, Indonesia. Over 200 people,
mostly Australian tourists, were killed in this attack. In a non-Islamic context, the
religious terror group Aum Shinrikyo, a nominally Buddhist-mystic sect, launched a
chemical weapons attack on the Tokyo subway system in 1995, in one of the first major

¹¹ David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James
M. Ludes (eds), Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy (Washington DC: Georgetown
attempts to use CBRN weapons in terrorism, a trend that had long been predicted and is expected to continue.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

It is the underlying contention of this dissertation that international terrorism, far from being a mere nuisance that it has generally been viewed as in previous eras, currently represents a grave threat to the international system—economically, culturally, and militarily. Although terrorism has always existed in history, and has threatened societies or states in varying degrees in the past, this dissertation argues that the international community is on the cusp of a new and more devastating era in terrorism, an era in which terrorists may attain the same status—in terms of their power and influence on the international system—as states.

This dissertation also contends that terrorism needs to be understood in an international relations (IR) context, in terms of how it relates to larger strategic dimensions and, indeed, the international system itself. This is an important point because traditionally terrorism has often been viewed in isolation, of interest only to government intelligence agencies, 'think-tank' analysts, and a handful of academic specialists. According to a RAND corporation analyst: "Most contemporary analyses of terrorism focus on terrorist political violence as a stand-alone phenomenon, without
reference to its geopolitical and strategic context.”12 Moreover, this academic neglect of the subject, particularly among international relations specialists, has also resulted in a paucity of theoretical frameworks and analysis. As Martha Crenshaw notes:

“Within political science, scholars focusing on terrorism did not often work in the field of international relations. They were equally or more likely to be specialists in civil conflict. Multidisciplinarity made it hard to build a unifying set of theoretical assumptions that could coordinate different approaches to understanding the threat of terrorism or analyzing responses.”13

This dissertation adopts Rapoport’s ‘fourth wave’ label as a useful term that demarcates the current terrorism from terrorism in previous eras, although it is also acknowledged that many common threads link all forms of terrorism, such as the glorification of martyrdom, the need for publicity, and the extreme idealism embedded in many terrorism movements’ adherents and participants. Nevertheless, fourth wave terrorism is unique in that it is situated within the currents of globalization. Indeed, this dissertation asserts that there are three main ‘drivers’ of fourth wave terrorism: globalization, the rise of militant religious ideologies and the proliferation of CBRN weapons out of the state realm (these themes are covered separately in chapters 5, 6, and 7). These three drivers can be depicted in the following pyramid structure [see figure 1.1], which is designed to highlight the relationship between the three (for example, globalization facilitates the distribution of CBRN weapons; religious ideology makes the use of such weapons more likely, etc.).

13 Ibid., p. 78.
3 Drivers of Fourth Wave Terrorism

Figure 1.1: terrorism rests on the interplay of these three phenomena, or processes. Each of these issues within the context of terrorism is fueled by the existence of the other two.

1.4 Objectives of My Study and Contributions to the Field

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the concept of terrorism and to analyze current trends in terrorism, with a particular focus on fourth wave terrorism. The dissertation will also provide a theoretical foundation on which terrorism can be
analyzed, from an international system perspective. The attacks on 11 September 2001 act as a key referent event around which the chapters are organized, although other ‘fourth wave’ attacks—such as the Sarin gas attack of the Tokyo subway system—are also considered. In other words, the examination within this dissertation will be expansive, looking into the various factors that are contributing to the rise of fourth wave terrorism. Relying on original transcripts, court documents, interviews, and U.S. Congressional testimony, this dissertation will shed new light on the nature of fourth wave terrorism, its parameters and its likely future direction.

1.5 Structure of the Dissertation and How to Proceed

The dissertation is presented from the perspective of, and within the theoretical worldview of an international relations (IR) scholar and specialist. Although terrorism can be studied from various disciplines (law, criminology, sociology, psychology, etc.), it is the purpose of this dissertation to largely focus the inquiry using the language and analysis provided within the academic sub-discipline of international relations, within the larger discipline of political science. This is particularly true when questions involving terrorism’s systemic effects and impact are addressed.

In terms of the dissertation’s structure, first, I present in chapter two an overview of current and relevant theories that help explain the type of terrorism that occurred on 9-11 (and other instances); secondly, I present a macroscopic view of terrorism from the perspective of history and the international system; and thirdly, I begin three specific
inquiries into what I've termed the “three drivers” of fourth wave terrorism [see Figure 1.2 below], which were represented in the 11 September 2001 attack (Chapters five, six, and seven) as well as other attacks. As noted above, these mutually-supporting issues are globalization, the rise of religious ideology and violence in the international system, and the proliferation of CBRN technologies, particularly into the hands of nonstate actors.

The final chapter relates back to the chapter on the international system and the fundamental ‘root causes’ of terrorism. It looks at current efforts designed to address the political oxygen that fuels religious militancy and tries to assess current strategies to countering terrorism. More importantly, it proposes a strategy based on the notion of soft power, a concept proposed by Joseph Nye, which is explored in greater detail in chapter two.
The illustration below helps to visualize the major divisions of this dissertation:

Figure 1.2: General structure of the dissertation
CHAPTER 2: THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 Introduction

This dissertation analyzes transnational terrorism through the prism of International Relations (IR) and thus seeks to understand the means by which the international system—the core referent within the IR discipline—affects, propels or constrains terrorism, and perhaps just as importantly, how terrorism in turn affects the international system. The state has traditionally assumed a central position in analysis within the IR discipline, particularly among realists: "Realists and neorealists continue to concentrate on the nation-state as a central unit."¹ However, one of the key developments within terrorism during the past two decades has been the emergence of nonstate actors as primary drivers, a departure from previous trends of state-sponsored terrorism that was particularly prominent within the Cold War. Thus to understand contemporary international terrorism requires reliance on theories and frameworks that take into account the new environment in which terrorists currently operate. Fortunately, other schools within IR acknowledge the importance of other actors within the international system: "For at least three decades, pluralists who study nonstate actors and neoliberal theorists of economic interdependence have questioned the validity of the state-centric paradigm."² Many pluralists argue that "significant

² Ibid.
decisions are being increasingly taken outside the framework of nation-states—by international organizations (governmental and nongovernmental), by international regimes, or by MNCs [Multinational Corporations].”³

Recognizing these theoretical parameters, this dissertation seeks to draw upon theories that acknowledge a post Cold War international system in which globalization, nonstate actors, religious ideologies, and ‘soft power’ play a major role. This dissertation contends that these theories best explain the rise of the ‘new’ terrorism that many analysts have predicted. Xavier Raufer asserts that the ‘new’ terrorism—what will be termed fourth wave terrorism throughout this dissertation—is characterized by five key attributes: 1) its de-territorialization (or location in accessible areas); 2) the absence of state sponsorship (which makes this terrorism more unpredictable and uncontrollable); 3) its hybrid character (partly political and partly criminal); 4) its ability to change configuration rapidly and 5) its enormous killing power and mass casualty-intent.⁴ The new terrorism that Raufer describes is fostered by a transformed international system, one that state-centric analysis can no longer adequately explain. In contrast, the theories presented below provide a more nuanced and comprehensive explanation for contemporary terrorism, and the likely terrorism patterns that will eventually unfold within the next two decades.

³ Ibid., p. 33.
2.2 Systemic Theories on Terrorism

(a) Postmodern Terrorism Theory

The essence of this dissertation is that the attacks on 11 September 2001, as well as other similar attacks (such as the 1995 Tokyo subway attack and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing) are indicative of a fundamental transformation in terrorism and, moreover, reflect the emergence of what some have termed “postmodern terrorism.” The term postmodern terrorism was first developed by Walter Laqueur in an essay with that same title, which was published in *Foreign Affairs* in the fall of 1996.\(^5\) Laqueur argued that since 1990, terrorism (including its motivation, strategies and weapons employed) had “changed to some extent.”\(^6\) For example, the anarchists and left-wing terrorist groups of the 1970s—the Red Armies in Germany, Italy, and Japan for instance—had vanished, replaced by the proliferation of “dozens of aggressive movements espousing varieties of nationalism, religious fundamentalism, fascism, and apocalyptic millenarianism.”\(^7\)


\(^7\) Ibid.
In 1998, James K. Campbell, testifying before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, refined the theory of postmodern terrorism even further, by delineating its key characteristics:

(i) **Postmodern terrorists are driven by religious ideologies:**

Although Islamic groups have committed some of the most notorious attacks in the past decade, Islam is not the only motivating religion; almost all religions have a violent streak that can, at times, manifest as terrorism. However, the focus on Islam is considered justified because “Islamic groups have conducted the most significant, deadly, and profoundly international attacks.”

(ii) **Postmodern terrorists seek to conduct mass casualty attacks:**

The highest possible body count is desired. This is a departure from the goals of traditional terrorists. As terrorism analyst Brian Jenkins once stated regarding traditional terrorism: “terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead.” The postmodern terrorist differs from this model in that he or she wants both a) many people watching and b) as many people dead as possible. The postmodern terrorist pursues unconstrained violence as a legitimate goal in its own right. James Campbell asserts that “where modern or ‘secular-political’ terrorists typically operate within certain violence thresholds, such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army, those groups or individuals who embrace a radicalized, religious belief may not view

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themselves as subject to the same constraints as they conduct their violent acts to satisfy
(in their belief) a higher authority, God.”

(iii) Postmodern terrorists seek to develop and deploy nonconventional (WMD)—CBRN—weapons to achieve attacks: Campbell told the U.S. Senate that “a review of terrorist activities in the 20th century clearly reveals that terrorists can acquire and use lethal chemical, biological, and radiological agents…” More importantly, the desire for nonconventional weapons is consistent with the religious ideologies of these groups: “These groups may be attracted to the power ownership of WMD [Weapons of Mass Destruction] affords precisely because WMD use can result in mass casualties and mass disruption against an ‘enemy’ defined by their religious belief.”

(iv) Postmodern terrorists have political or religious demands (or goals) that cannot be accommodated by the international system: (Thus negotiation is futile). This is perhaps one of the most frustrating characteristics of postmodern terrorism, particularly for those analysts and scholars accustomed to traditional terrorists. Lee Harris argues that terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda are driven by a fantasy ideology, in which the very act of terrorism—and particularly suicide terrorism—is the goal, and simultaneously constitutes a nonnegotiable sacred act: “Seen

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12 CBRN Weapons—Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear.
through the distorting prism of radical Islam, the act of suicide is transformed into that of martyrdom — martyrdom in all its transcendent glory and accompanied by the panoply of magical powers that religious tradition has always assigned to martyrdom."14

(b) Rapoport’s Wave Theory of Terrorism

The theory of postmodern terrorism, proposed by Walter Laqueur and developed by James Campbell, runs parallel to a similar theory proposed by Professor David Rapoport, who has proposed a “wave” theory of terrorism. Rapoport argues that modern terrorism, which he dates from the 1870s, generally reflects larger tensions or shifts in the international system. As a result of these tensions, terrorism occurs in cyclical “waves”. Rapoport defines a wave as a “cycle of activity in a given time period.” He states that:

“A crucial feature [of a wave] is its international character; similar activities occur in several countries, driven by a common predominant energy that shapes the participating groups’ characteristic and mutual relationships.”15

Various waves have ebbed and flowed throughout the history of modern international terrorism and they tend to exhibit unique forms of “predominant energy”, which echoes larger tensions within the international system. Specifically, Rapoport

identifies four key waves since the beginning of modern terrorism. He argues that the first wave of modern non-state actor terrorism occurred in the late 19th century. During this period, the world witnessed a rise in revolutionary, anti-monarchist, anarchist sentiment, particularly in Czarist Russia, but also throughout Europe and, ultimately, the United States.

The second wave of terrorism generally followed a mood in the international system for “self-determination” and opposition to colonialism and empires. Rapoport argues that the Versailles Peace Treaty, which concluded World War I, established the principles around which terrorist movements within this wave would operate. He asserts that “the victors applied the principle of national self-determination to break up empires of the defeated states (mostly in Europe).”16 Anti-colonial movements and insurgencies, many of which used terrorism as a strategy, proceeded in India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, the Philippines, Ghana, Nigeria, among other places. The anti-colonial struggle also created new language to describe terrorism, which had too many negative connotations. Many insurgents, such as Menachem Begin, leader of the Jewish militant group, Irgun, began to refer to themselves as “freedom fighters”. This had important implications for terrorism’s support base: “...because the anticolonial struggle seemed more legitimate than the purposes served in the first wave, the ‘new’ language became attractive to potential political supporters

16Ibid., pp. 52-53.
as well.\textsuperscript{17} Again, this demonstrates how the international system has shaped terrorism and perceptions surrounding it.

The third wave of terrorism (roughly spanning the 1960s and 1970s) reflected an international system that was ensconced in the tensions of the Cold War, the capitalist-communist competition of ideas, as well as the 'New Left' movement. Rapoport asserts that the Vietnam War was the central political event that stimulated this wave of terrorism. In addition, within young populations in Western countries, there was great concern and sympathy for the plight of the Third World. "Many Western groups—such as American Weather Underground, the West German Red Army Faction (RAF), the Italian Red Brigades, the Japanese Red Army, and the French Action Directe—saw themselves as vanguards for the Third World masses."\textsuperscript{18}

The fourth wave of terrorism—which is the foundation for the title of this dissertation—begins in 1979 and is now in progress (estimated, according to Rapoport, to end in the year 2025). This is what Rapoport calls the "religious wave" and although examples of this wave can be found in all religions, Rapoport admits that "Islam is at the heart of the wave."\textsuperscript{19} There are two critical events in the international system that are currently shaping this wave of terrorism—the 1979 Iranian revolution and the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the former Soviet Union. Within this wave, the most devastating tactical innovation has been suicide terrorism, which Rapoport considers analogous to the bomb-throwing efforts (which were often suicidal) of the anarchists.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 61.
Rapoport argues that the various waves occupy discreet periods of time; "the first three waves lasted about a generation each—a suggestive time frame closest in duration to that of a human life cycle, in which dreams inspiring parents lose their attractiveness for children." Nevertheless, Rapoport captures the notion, prevalent in the terrorism literature, that terrorism—and particularly international terrorism—does not exist in isolation to the larger enabling environment. Rapoport argues that the wave analysis provides deeper perspective and militates against the common flaw in many terrorism studies—that is to focus excessively on contemporary trends without understanding the linkages to past events.

In summary, Rapoport’s wave theory is useful in that it captures the notion of the international system’s effects on terrorism. However, it cannot be considered a complete theory; for instance, what about groups that exhibit elements of all three movements (religious, nationalist, anti-capitalist, etc.)? Another sensitive complication is the issue of Islam. Although Rapoport is careful in describing the fourth wave as the "religious" wave, it is clear that most of his examples pertain to Islam, which suggests perhaps other trends that may be at work that are not explained within this theory. Another aspect of the theory is the notion of the “end stage”—Rapoport suggests that 2025 will be, more or less, the end point for this wave of terrorism. However, there is no good explanation as to why this date was chosen, other than it roughly parallels generational change.

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20 Ibid., p. 47.
2.3 **Nye's 3-Level Model Theory of the International System**

To give greater context to systemic theories of terrorism (described above), this dissertation also relies on the 3-level model theory of the international system proposed by Professor Joseph Nye, whose theory—and particularly its discussion of third level phenomena—provides an explanatory framework for the power of nonstate actor groups, such as Al Qaeda or Jemaah Islamiyah. Among other things, this particular theory describes how power is expressed and distributed within the international system, particularly within the context of the global information age. Nye argues that international relations (and the international system) in the post Cold War era can be explained from the perspective of a 3-dimensional chessboard. On the top of the chessboard is classic state-to-state relations where military power is largely structured in a (current) unipolar system. The United States represents the apex of this system because it “is the only country with both intercontinental nuclear weapons and large state-of-the-art, naval, and ground forces capable of global deployment.”

In the middle of the chessboard (the second layer) however, is economic power which is structured in a multipolar system. “[O]n the middle chessboard, economic power is multipolar, with the United States, Europe, and Japan representing two-thirds of world product and with China’s dramatic growth likely to make it the fourth big

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player. On this economic board, the United States is not a hegemon; it must often bargain as an equal with Europe...”  

The bottom of the chessboard is the “third level”, the realm of transnational relations that exist outside of government control. “The actors in this realm are as diverse as bankers electronically transferring large sums than most national budgets, terrorists transferring weapons, and hackers disrupting Internet operations.”  

In the third level, power is dispersed widely and thus it “makes no sense to speak of unipolarity, multipolarity or hegemony.” Thus power operates multi-dimensionally, depending on the level concerned. This complicated model is why, as Nye argues, “those who recommend a hegemonic American foreign policy based on traditional descriptions of American power are relying on a woefully inadequate paradigm.” He argues that focusing solely on the first level means that you ignore developments (and power) within the second and third levels. It also means that you miss the “vertical connections” between the various levels.

The third level’s importance and influence is accentuated by globalization and its various processes. For instance, the information and technological revolutions have given the third level far more influence than it might have had otherwise. It is within this milieu that non-state ideologies can germinate and flourish; it is also this milieu that is outside the total control of states: “The problem for Americans in the twenty-first century is that ultimately more and more things fall outside the control of even the most

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22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
powerful state.” The most significant characteristic of the third level is the diffusion of technology. Joseph Nye argues that the “dramatically decreased cost of communication, the rise of transnational domains that cut across borders, and the ‘democratization’ of technology that puts massive destructive power into the hands of groups and individuals” has created a new challenge for states, and a new power base for non-state actors.

Transnational relations and connections are a critical element of the third level. This level is also characterized by the existence of “transnational relations that cross borders outside the control of government, everything from the spread of infectious diseases to transnational terrorism.” Within the third level, groups as diverse as the Norte Del Valle to Al Qaeda can flourish and grow. This is why many argue that the security agenda cannot be limited to first realm issues—major interstate rivalry for instance—but must include such “transnational phenomena...as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, alien smuggling, and the smuggling of nuclear material” that flourishes within the third realm.

An important co-factor in the influence of the third-level is the rise of nonstate actors. In an influential 1997 essay in Foreign Affairs magazine, Jessica Mathews argued that the international system was experiencing a “power shift” away from state power, and toward nonstate actors. Power is diffusing, according to Mathews, from

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27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
strictly states to markets and civil society. States would not necessarily “lose” power, but rather “share” it with other nonstate actors from a variety of backgrounds, with myriad interests and motivations. Like Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Mathews attributed this transformation to the information revolution, and specifically computers and the telecommunications revolution. “The most powerful engine of change in the relative decline of state and the rise of non-state actors,” she argues, “is the computer and telecommunications revolution, whose deep political and social consequences have been almost completely ignored.”

The key role of the information revolution in the rise of nonstate actors is linked to the wide accessibility of information, which “has broken governments’ monopoly on the collection and management of large amounts of information…” Not only have governments lost their monopolies over information, but they are also losing their hierarchies. “…Information technologies disrupt hierarchies, spreading power among more people and groups,” Mathews argues. She also asserts that this information and technological transformation is paving the way for an alternative order—an order comprised of nonstate actors functioning through networks. In networks, people or groups link up for “joint action without building a physical or formal institutional presence.”

32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
Another way of viewing the phenomenon of non-state actors is to view them as what James Rosenau describes as "micro-actors." Micro-actors are distinguished from macro-actors in that the latter are comprised of states, large corporations and other large institutions. Within this particular paradigm, prominent among the realist and neorealist ideologies, micro-actors are treated as "constants [and as] citizens who comply with the directives and requirements of macro collectivities." Moreover, global order is viewed as "the order which international organizations, states, multinational corporations, and a host of other large and complex organizations evolve for managing their affairs." Rosenau argues that the relative decline of state power, social institutions (such as labor unions) and the concomitant increase in stature of "interdependency" agenda items—such as transnational issues (crime, disease, terrorism)—suggest that micro actors are playing a significant and increasingly important role in the new global order.

This new order is characterized by decentralization and informal governance from many directions, what Rosenau terms "polyarchy." Like Mathews, Rosenau finds particularly noteworthy the relative ascendancy of nonstate actor power contrasted with the traditional state. Rosenau notes that a "central tendency on the present world scene involves a diminution of state authority." Rosenau does not dismiss states or state power; he acknowledges that "states still predominate as their interests, conflicts, bargains, and institutions shape the course of events in the realms of political, military, 

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38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., p. 282.
and economic diplomacy. Nevertheless, power has indeed devolved to nonstate actors.

Another view of the rise of nonstate actors is presented by Martin Van Creveld who views the rise of nonstate actors as part of a natural and predictable process that is occurring alongside the relative decline of state authority. In essence, he argues that the state is declining, functionally and institutionally, in some cases because of its own voluntary choice. Van Creveld points to the growing privatization of functions that traditionally were carried out by the state, such as education, health care, welfare, security (law enforcement), and even the conduct of war. Private institutions or other nonstate actors will arise in place of the state. Moreover, because these nonstate actors do not enjoy the type of sovereignty traditionally granted to states, they will “be forced to share that control with other organizations.” Van Creveld later argues that “the organizations which, in the future, will carry out the functions of government will be more fragmented, more integrated with each other than those with which we have become familiar during the last 300 years or so.” Nonstate actors will fill the void created by the retreat, or in some cases outright decline, of the state. But their power will be diffused, chaotic, and malleable.

Within the context of terrorism, the rise of the nonstate actor paradigm has created confusion and misunderstanding among traditional terrorism scholars. For example, the traditional view is that nonstate actors (terrorists) could never achieve the

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40 Ibid., p. 282.  
42 Ibid.
type of damage or devastation that state actors (or state-sponsored terrorists) could achieve. A CIA analyst has attempted to counter this bias, in the context of terrorism, by asserting that the “dominance of the state-sponsor mind-set must be ended”\textsuperscript{43} and replaced by an acceptance that nonstate actors can pose a serious threat to US (and other countries’) security. Nonstate actors are challenging the monopoly of violence traditionally held by the state. As Anthony Lang notes: “The example of Al Qaeda suggests that some transnational movements may be challenging the state’s monopoly on violence, although legitimate uses of violence remain with the state.”\textsuperscript{44}

In summary, the Nye 3-level model of international relations provides the most comprehensive and useful framework to analyze contemporary terrorism. Many of the issues raised in this dissertation—globalization, the rise of religious ideologies, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc.—become salient within this framework. For example, the controversy over how and to what extent globalization affects the international system is clarified when one defines which level one is referring to. Globalization may influence the first level in a different way than it influences the third level, and perhaps the influence is more powerful on the third level. Similarly, religious ideologies may not influence state-to-state relations as potently as they influence the actions of nonstate actors.


\textsuperscript{44} Anthony F. Lang, Jr., “Evaluating Middle East Foreign Policy Since 9/11,” in “The Impact of 9/11 on the Middle East,” \textit{Middle East Policy}, n. 4, v. 9 (December 1, 2002), p. 75.
Moreover, the Nye model highlights "vertical connections"\textsuperscript{45} between the various levels; these three levels of the international system, after all, do not exist in a vacuum. When Pakistani nuclear scientists Sultan Bashiruddinn Mahmood and Chaudari Abdul Majeed traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan in August 2001 to meet with Al Qaeda leaders,\textsuperscript{46} they established a vertical connection between the first and third levels of Nye's 3-level model. One of the scientists, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, was known as "an Islamic extremist who had been in charge of Pakistan's production of weapons plutonium prior to his retirement."\textsuperscript{47} Osama bin Laden apparently wished to ask the scientists whether radiological materials that had been acquired by an affiliate group, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, could be used to construct a nuclear weapon. The scientists informed bin Laden that the radiological materials were not sufficient to create such a weapon. Once again, possession of such materials by Al Qaeda, likely stolen from former Soviet stocks, establishes a link between the first and third levels—between the state and nonstate realms.


\textsuperscript{46} David Albright, "Al-Qaeda's Quixotic Quest to go Nuclear", November 22, 2002, available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/DK22Ak01.html; last accessed on 27 February 2005.

2.4 Globalization Theories and Terrorism

Globalization lies at the heart of this dissertation’s analysis of the contemporary international system and its impact on terrorism. The phenomenon of globalization is not necessarily new—some writers have described the period between 1880 to the beginning of World War I as a previously robust era in globalization, which was followed by an era of “deglobalization” which lasted until the 1950s.48 Since the 1970s, however, globalization has remerged in a much more robust and powerful way than was seen in history. Jean-Marie Guehennno argues against simply viewing contemporary globalization as a re-casting of the pre-World War I variety: “The process of integration and disintegration at the end of the twentieth century goes much deeper than that of the pre-First World War period.”49

Having accepted that globalization is indeed a major force in the international system, the next question involves its impact on terrorism. It can be argued that globalization provides the enabling environment for terrorism today, just as the Cold War provided the enabling environment for the ‘new left’ terrorist movement of the 1960s and 1970s. As Audrey Kurth Cronin has argued: “The current wave of international terrorism, characterized by unpredictable and unprecedented threats from

nonstate actors, not only is a reaction to globalization but is facilitated by it."\textsuperscript{50} Thomas Homer-Dixon has argued that technological changes that are substantially related to globalization provide a logistical foundation for Al Qaeda and other nonstate actor terrorists:

"The steady increase in the destructive capacity of small groups and individuals is driven largely by three technological advances: more powerful weapons, the dramatic progress in communications and information processing, and more abundant opportunities to divert non-weapon technologies to destructive ends."\textsuperscript{51}

Globalization is a complex process, however, and it influences contemporary terrorism in multiple ways. In addition to analyzing the logistical enabling environment created by globalization, this dissertation also considers at least one theory of globalization (and its relationship to terrorism) that addresses the problem of incomplete globalization and, perhaps, the frustrations that are created by the processes of globalization. Professor Michael Mousseau argues that globalization fosters a clash between the liberal-democratic values associated with market democracies and the collective-autocratic values that are associated with clientalist economies.

Mousseau defines and describes clientalist economies as ones based on personal relationships, in which gift-giving is common so as to reinforce a sense of trust and obligation between parties. Because of its focus on relationships, clientalist economies

draw major distinctions between “in” groups versus “out” groups: “These linkages render in-groups more important than out-groups, making clientalist communities more inward looking than market communities in terms of identity, values and beliefs.”

Market economies, by contrast, function by use of contracts and other instruments of the rule of law. Thus, there are no additional unstated obligations between the parties, outside of the stipulated terms of the contract. Thus, in contrast with clientalist economies “in market economies, strangers and even enemies can cooperate in prescribed ways.” As a result of these exchanges, the “markets develop and the liberal values of individualism, universalism, tolerance, and equity emerge concurrently with the rule of common law and democratic governance.”

Mousseau argues that the clash—and hence the violence—occurs when developing countries must contend with a mix of market and clientalist values: “In this mixed economy, clientalist and market cultures can lead to illiberal and unstable democracy, military dictatorship, state failure, sectarian violence, or some combination thereof—and bitter anti-Americanism.” The flux created by transition from clientalist to market values generates anti-Western sentiment. This is because “for many individuals living in this rough-and-tumble Hobbesian world, the new zero-sum culture has a thoroughly Western or American character, as seen on television, in movies, and in other forms of popular culture exported from Europe and the United States.”

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53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
Economic and cultural insecurity thus breed resentment against the perceived power behind this flux and currently this means the United States.

2.5 Juergensmeyer's Religious Violence 4-Stage Theory

In the late 1980s, when the end of the Cold War became apparent, Francis Fukuyama wrote an influential essay, titled 'The End of History?' in which he argued that the end of the Cold War marked the "emergence of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government." According to Fukuyama, the 20th century had witnessed conflict between liberalism and "the remnants of absolutism, then bolshevism and fascism, and finally an updated Marxism that threatened to lead to the ultimate apocalypse of nuclear war." The decline of these secular ideologies or movements heralded the "unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism." Ironically, Fukuyama did not mention the stealth ascendance of religious ideology that was at least partially propelled by the Cold War, but after 11 September 2001 he wrote another essay in which he acknowledged the rise of "Islamo-fascism"—equated to Wahhabi ideology—which he described as a desperate backlash against modernity. In this post-9-11 essay, Fukuyama posed the question: "Why has this kind of radical Islamism...

58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Reference is made to the alliance of the United States with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in the 1980s to destabilize the Soviet Union following its invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The United States helped fuel the rise of the muhahideen movement in Afghanistan, and by extension, the larger Islamic (Salafist) movement around the world.
61 Wahabbi Islam, a conservative school of Sunni Islam emanating from Saudi Arabia, is named for its founder Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab who lived in Arabia during the 1700s and who aided Muhammad ibn Saud in consolidating power over the various tribes of Arabia.

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suddenly emerged?" He attributed some of the causes to the fact that “the Islamic world has seen large populations uprooted from traditional village or tribal life in the past generation.” He also pointed to the “root causes” rationale of poverty, economic stagnation and authoritarian politics.

What Fukuyama did not mention, however, is the fact that the rise of “Islamo-fascism”, which Mark Sageman more artfully describes as the Global Salafi Jihad, is not a recent phenomenon; rather, it has roots extending back hundreds of years. Moreover, its most recent manifestations are linked to events in the Middle East, such as the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt by Hasan al-Banna in 1928, the rise of Sayyid Qutb (and Qutbism ideology) in the mid-20th century, and the rise of such thinkers as Abdullah Azzam, who advocated an activist and militant version of jihad. These individuals not only believed in the power of religion, they believed that religion must be the predominant force or ideology in the world. Secularism—and secular societies—could not be tolerated; rather, they must be struggled against. Thus, Fukuyama was correct when he stated: “The Islamo-fascist sea within which the terrorists swim constitutes an ideological challenge that is in some ways more basic than the one posed by communism.” This sentence captures the totality of the struggle, particularly if it is viewed from the perspective of those engineering the conflict.

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63 Ibid., p. 32.
66 Francis Fukuyama, “History and September 11,” p. 34.
Mark Juergensmeyer argues that the rise of religious ideology can be found around the world and, in varying degrees, in most of the world's religions, not just Islam. In the early 1990s, Juergensmeyer made the following sweeping observation: "The new world order that is replacing the bipolar powers of the old Cold War is characterized not only by the rise of new economic forces, a crumbling of old empires, and the discrediting of communism, but also by the resurgence of parochial identities based on ethnic and religious allegiances." In other words, religion is rising and its ascendancy will almost inevitably lead to confrontation that will manifest in varying ways. One of these manifestations will be terrorism.

This dissertation devotes an entire chapter to religion and terrorism, largely because religion is viewed as a key tenet of fourth-wave terrorism. To specifically explore the connection between religion and terrorist violence, this dissertation relies on Mark Juergensmeyer's 4-prong stage theory regarding religious violence. Chapter 6 of this dissertation establishes the case that religion is becoming a major force in the international system. However, it is the turn to violence that is most relevant to this dissertation. Juergensmeyer proposes a 4-prong stage theory that identifies and characterizes this transition.

These stages consist of (1) A World Gone Awry. This stage is created by real-world problems, such as the Palestinian question, or the unsettled dispute in Kashmir. Juergensmeyer notes that "a few [individuals] take these situations with ultimate gravity

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and perceive them as symptoms of a world gone badly awry.\textsuperscript{68} Thus, the setting is created for the second stage: (2) \textit{The Foreclosure of Ordinary Options}. This stage results when individuals seeking to address problems identified in stage 1 find little success in their attempts at amelioration. They may join political campaigns or social movements, but ultimately become frustrated when their efforts yield very few results. For individuals ensconced within this state “their sense of frustration about the world around them is experienced as the potential for personal failure and a meaningless existence.”\textsuperscript{69} This leads to the third stage: (3) \textit{Satanization and Cosmic War}: at this stage, the conflict is no longer bound by the earth plane—religion provides an alternative venue for conflict known as “cosmic war” As Juergensmeyer explains:

“As opponents become satanized and regarded as ‘forces of evil’ or ‘black-coated bachelors from hell,’ the world begins to make sense. Those who felt oppressed now understand why they have been humiliated and who is behind their dismal situation. Perhaps most important, they feel the exhilaration of hope, that in a struggle with divine dimensions God will be with them and, despite all evidence to the contrary, somehow they can win.”\textsuperscript{70}

The fourth stage is comprised of (4) \textit{Symbolic Acts of Power}—at this stage, the cosmic war manifests as the “performance of acts that display symbolically the depth of the struggle and the power that those cultures of violence feel they possess.”\textsuperscript{71} Some of the more benign forms of this expression could include holding private rallies, demonstrations, flaunting weapons, or even “creating alternative governments with

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
courts and cabinet members and social services." The more extreme manifestation of this stage can occur with dramatic expressions of power—such as terrorism—either as an isolated event, or as a longer-term protracted struggle.

With the rise of Al Qaeda and other neo-Salafist groups, one can see this four stage theory in action. Many neo-Salafists were originally concerned about an actual political or social problem. Sayyid Qutb, for instance, was concerned about social and political corruption in his country. As it became clear that ordinary political processes and mechanisms would not bring about a solution, many neo-Salafists began the process of separation (stages 2 and 3). Kumar Ramakrishna describes the process in the context of the rise of radical Islam in Southeast Asia: "...it would nevertheless appear that the real roots of radical Islamism lie in the emergence, in both the Middle East and in Southeast Asia, of neo-Salafism, which blends the return-to-roots fundamentalism of traditional Salafism with the additional ideational thread of an Islam under siege from Christian, Zionist, and secular forces." In the context of Jemaah Islamiya, an affiliate of Al Qaeda, stages 2 and 3 probably lasted throughout the 1990s, until the year 2000 when the terrorism campaign in earnest began in Southeast Asia.

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72 Ibid.
2.6 CBRN Proliferation and Terrorism

Another major contention of this dissertation is that fourth wave terrorism features development, integration and deployment of weapons of mass destruction (CBRN\textsuperscript{74} weapons). A key argument here is that the incorporation of CBRN weapons by terrorists has fundamentally changed the nature of terrorism, and particularly how it is perceived within the wider international community. In his 3-level model, Joseph Nye argues that nonstate actors can assume characteristics of a state with a private agenda, and one of these might be the acquisition of CBRN. One theory that is helpful in understanding the acquisition of CBRN by nonstate actor terrorists is Nikos Passas' theory of criminogenic asymmetries, a theory that was devised to describe the rise of transnational crime in the post Cold War security environment. This theory was chosen because current evidence suggests that terrorists are most likely to gain access to CBRN weapons through illicit pathways (whether through crime, or corrupt actions of state officials, etc.) rather than from states directly.

This theory posits that the structure of the international system has evolved in such a way that almost any illicit need or desire on the part of states or nonstate actors can be satisfied, almost invariably by the conduct of criminal acts, through the processes of globalization and complicity or failure of states. The international system has created large incentives to acquire CBRN weapons, for a variety of defensive and offensive motives. The incentives exist among states and nonstate actors, including

\textsuperscript{74} Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN).
terrorist groups. As these groups seek out such weapons, and are willing to pay large
sums of money, they will, according to this theory, likely succeed. This theory is
consistent with the ideas of Chaim Braun and Christopher Chyba who recently argued
that the global nuclear nonproliferation regime is being challenged by dispersal of
nuclear technology—through illicit sales or theft—to nonnuclear states (or other actors)
who are seeking to clandestinely and illegally develop these weapons.75

Current evidence demonstrates that Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups (such as
Aum Shinrikyo, now known as Alef) have attempted to manufacture or acquire CBRN
weapons.76 Moreover, there is also strong evidence that some groups have attempted to
interface with either criminal elements in states with a surfeit of such weapons, or with
corrupt officials from those states. Al Qaeda has reportedly sought CBRN weapons
from the former Soviet Union, relying on criminal intermediaries. Passas argues that
such criminogenic asymmetries “are largely the work (direct or indirect) of agents of
nation states. In some cases the states are complicit; in other cases they are unable or
unwilling to take remedial action.”77 Thus, in the case of the former Soviet Union, the
failure to secure certain nuclear materials has helped foster a criminogenic asymmetry
that some nonstate actors, including Al Qaeda, have sought to exploit.

The shortcoming on this theory, however, is its lack of precision. It does not,
for instance, elucidate precisely how or where the asymmetry exists, nor does it provide

75 Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, “Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear
76 A good summary if provided by Matthew Bunn, “The Threat: The Demand for Black Market Fissile
Williams and Dimitri Vlassis (Eds), Transnational Organized Crime (Special Issue: Combating
guidance on how to alleviate the asymmetry. However, overall, the theory remains useful because it provides a systemic and structural explanation to transactions that tend to be illicit and beyond the purview of the international community. By recognizing the elements of an asymmetry (as currently exists between the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ of CBRN weapons), one can perhaps proactively devise an effective regime to monitor and perhaps stymie such transactions.

2.7 ‘Soft Power’ Theory and Prescriptive Approaches to Terrorism

Having relied on Joseph Nye’s 3-level model of the international system, this dissertation also relies on Nye’s theories on soft power, which are particularly relevant to 3rd level relationships and pathways of influence. Nye defines soft power as power that is attained by “the ability to shape the preferences of others.” Unlike hard power—commanded power in which an actor seeks to control another through coercion—soft power seeks to influence by appealing to shared values. “Soft power uses a different type of currency (not force, not money) to engender cooperation—an attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values.” According to Nye, soft power from a country derives from three major sources: 1) its culture; 2) its political values; and 3) its foreign policies.

79 Ibid., p. 7.
This dissertation will make the case in the final (prescriptive) chapter that the most powerful tool available to the United States and other countries as they attempt to thwart terrorism is soft power—the power of ideas, influence and ‘moral-suasion’. A “war on terrorism” can only be engaged in for a limited period of time; however, a campaign of “soft power” is likely to be more sustainable, and, moreover, likely to generate goodwill internationally in other arenas, such as investment and trade. This is not to suggest that military responses are unnecessary; in the event that a planned CBRN attack is discovered, for instance, a fast military response may be the only option. However, the chronic response to terrorism is likely to be more successful if it favors the strategy of soft power.

2.8 Methodology

This dissertation is the product of more than five years of research, teaching, and publishing in the field of terrorism and transnational violence. Specifically, this dissertation rests on four main pillars of inquiry:

1. Analysis of original documents, transcripts and speeches: To gain understanding of the nature and parameters of fourth wave terrorism, I have relied on original documents, including transcripts of speeches (by terrorists and counterterrorism officials), terrorist manifestos and training documents, and testimony by various experts in this field, and related fields. I have also relied on court documents and associated
transcripts. These original documents and transcripts pertain to terrorists, terrorist organizations, as well as government experts testifying before US Congressional hearings, and other forums. For instance, I have reviewed speeches by prominent terrorists, such as Osama bin Laden, in an effort to discern key themes, which are developed within this dissertation. I have also relied on official US government documents, such as studies by the US General Accounting Office (GAO) and Congressional Research Service (CRS), to integrate information that may be overlooked in the popular literature pertaining to terrorism.

2. **Interviews conducted in Hawaii and abroad**: Over 70 interviews were conducted with officials, analysts and scholars around the world as part of this inquiry. Approximately, 55 of these interviews were conducted in Australia, Thailand, India, Bhutan, Malaysia and Singapore over a four-year period (four separate trips). I have also participated as a U.S. delegate (in November 2002) at a meeting on regional terrorism held in Bangkok, Thailand where I presented a paper on the linkage between border security and transnational terrorism.

Regarding specific names of research institutes or government agencies visited, I can list the following: the University of Adelaide (Australia); National Defence College (Bangkok, Thailand), Royal Thai Army, Command and Staff College, Special Warfare Unit (Bangkok, Thailand), Institute of Police Administration (Bangkok, Thailand), Southeast Asian Regional Centre for Counterterrorism (SEARCCT, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia); Headquarters, Royal Malaysian Police (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia);
United States Embassy Malaysia; United States Embassy Singapore; Singapore SID
“Joint-Counterterrorism Center” (Singapore), Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
(IDSS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore; Centre for Policy Research
(CPR, New Delhi, India); Institute for Conflict Management (ICM, New Delhi, India),
United Service Institution of India (USI, New Delhi); Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Thimphu, Bhutan). Overall, I interviewed approximately 20 government officials, 15
researchers and scholars, and 20 police officials.

3. Review of the terrorism literature: This dissertation also benefits from a
thorough review of the literature on terrorism, and specifically scholarship conducted on
the phenomenon of fourth-wave terrorism. Specifically, I have relied on books and
journals that are considered the most scholarly and credible. This effort has been aided
by the fact that I teach courses in this field and thus I am constantly reviewing (and
assigning to students) various articles and books on this subject. In addition, this
dissertation relies on conference papers, academic and news articles acquired from the
Internet (and specialized websites, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development—OECD—site), and computer databases (Lexis-Nexis, EBSCO and
Proquest).

80 This term is rarely used, however, in the literature. It is more common to find terms such as the ‘new’
terrorism, or perhaps postmodern terrorism.
4. Teaching and publishing in the field: For approximately four years I have served as an Assistant Professor with the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies and my primary duties have been teaching courses and delivering lectures on the topics of terrorism and transnational violence. Within this context, I have informally gained information about my field from my students, who come from around the world (including Africa, Europe, Asia, Oceania and the Americas). I have published articles on terrorism,\(^1\) chapters in books on terrorism,\(^2\) and have recently edited a book on terrorism.\(^3\) These experiences have allowed me to acquire depth in terms of my understanding of contemporary terrorism trends.

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\(^3\) Paul J. Smith (ed.), *Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005).
3.1 Introduction

Terrorism is a phenomenon that has existed, in one form or another, throughout history. It is a complex subject that is often difficult to define and properly analyze. One analyst has lamented that “terrorism is an abstract phenomenon of which there can be no real essence which can be discovered and described.”\(^1\) Despite this, terrorism’s effects are far more concrete: more than 4000 people have died in terrorist violence since 2001, and many thousands have before that. In addition, it is generally accepted that terrorism is not an ideology or philosophy but rather a tool, which is used by nonstate actors. Terrorism is defined as a “systematic use of coercive intimidation, usually to service political ends.”\(^2\) The word terrorism itself was adopted from the French word *terreur*, which itself was derived from the Latin word *terrere* (to frighten). The word *terreur* began to be commonly used in France during the French Revolution during a period known as the Reign of Terror (1793-1794). The term terrorism is generally distinguished from ‘terror’ or ‘terror tactics’ which may be employed by a state. This is to distinguish the actions of nonstate actors from those of state actors. Thus, the word terrorism itself is


reserved for the actions of nonstate actors. The essence of the difference is described by R. Thackrah:

"Terror practiced by a government in office appears as law enforcement and is directed against the opposition, while terrorism on the other hand implies open defiance of the law and is the means whereby an opposition aims to demoralize government authority."\(^3\)

Moreover, another way of thinking about the difference between state terror and nonstate terror is to think of Grant Wardlaw’s bifurcation of enforcement terror versus agitational terror. Enforcement terror is used “by those in power who wish to suppress the challenges to their authority”\(^4\) and is most identifiable with terror conducted by states. Agitational terror is a phrase that “describes the terroristic activities of those who wish to disrupt the existing order and ascend to political power themselves.”\(^5\) In general, agitational terror would apply to nonstate actors. Thus, terrorism is an activity pursued—in general—by those without power who are seeking to alter the current status quo.\(^6\)

To recapitulate, states can sponsor terrorism (via a relationship with a nonstate actor, although it is the nonstate actor that actually performs the deed), or engage in acts of terror, but it is generally understood that terrorism itself is an activity conducted outside of the purview or agency of the state.

Another complication of terrorism is that it is a word imbued with negative connotations. In some cases, ideological differences can result in charges of “terrorism”.

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\(^3\) Thackrah, “Terrorism: A Definitional Problem,” p. 38.


\(^5\) Ibid.

\(^6\) Ibid.
In early 2004, for instance, Education Secretary Rod Paige called the National Education Association, the largest teacher’s union in the United States, a “terrorist organization” due to various ideological differences he had with the organization. In another case in Canada, a legislator who opposed the behemoth American retailer Wal-Mart’s plan to close down a unionized store in Quebec, accused the retailer of engaging in “economic terrorism.” The term is clearly intended as a delegitimizing tactic: “Those who seek to delegitimate the tactics and strategies of their opponents often describe them as terrorist acts.” As Peter Chalk has noted: “The word terrorism is typically never used in a balanced, objective manner.” Martha Crenshaw echoes this by arguing that “the word [terrorism] has become a political label rather than an analytical concept, used to condemn one’s enemies rather than to specify what terrorism is and what it is not.” Governments tend to label anyone who opposes their policies as a “terrorist”, while anti-government extremists will claim that they are the victims of state terror: “Use of the term [terrorism] usually implies a moral judgment: it is what the bad guys do.”

12 Chalk, The Nature of Contemporary Terrorism.
3.2 The Challenge of Defining Terrorism

One of the great controversies in the study of terrorism is the issue of definition. It is a well-known fact that currently the international community does not subscribe to a single definition of terrorism, although many definitions currently exist that essentially and arguably speak to the same phenomenon. The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as the “unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”13 A second US executive branch definition was contained in an executive order on terrorist financing. That order contained the following definition of terrorism: “(d) the term ‘terrorism’ means an activity that (i) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, property or infrastructure; and (ii) appears to be intended (A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (B) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (C) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, kidnapping, or hostage-taking.”14 The United Nations has proposed a definition such that terrorism constitutes “criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public.”15 Peter Chalk of the Rand Corporation argues that terrorism is the “use or threat of illegitimate violence that is employed by sub-state actors as a means to

14 Executive Order on Terrorist Financing (Blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism) available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010924-1.html.
achieve specific political objectives.”\textsuperscript{16} Ayla Schbley offers up the following definition of terrorism: “Terrorism is any violent act upon symbolic civilians and their properties.”\textsuperscript{17} Christopher Harmon proposes the following succinct definition: “Terrorism is the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends.”\textsuperscript{18}

These varied definitions of terrorism have led to criticisms of the field of terrorism studies—if there is no internationally agreed-upon definition of terrorism, how can the subject be studied effectively? As Carl Thayer has written, “[t]he failure of the international community to define terrorism poses a difficult methodological problem for scholars who specialize in terrorism studies.”\textsuperscript{19} However, recent international treaties have provided greater guidance as to an internationally-accepted definition of terrorism. Specifically, the \textit{International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism} (1999) provides a reasonably robust definition in Article 2, subpoint 1 (a) and (b). Section (a) states that any offence that is listed in the annex of the treaty (which lists previous terrorism conventions) would fall under the purview of this treaty. More significantly, section b provides a working definition of terrorism as follows: “Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} Chalk, \textit{The Nature of Contemporary Terrorism}.
\end{itemize}
purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”20

In addition, terrorism can be delineated into domestic versus international.
International terrorism is defined as terrorism which involves the government, citizens or
territory of more than one state.21 Thomas Badey classifies international terrorism as the
“repeated use of politically motivated violence with coercive intent, by non-state actors,
that affects more than one state.”22 According to the U.S. General Accounting Office,
international terrorism simply is “terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more
than one country.”23 By contrast, domestic terrorism is generally confined to a single
country (origins of the perpetrators as well as the target of terrorism). In the context of
the United States, domestic terrorism is defined as “the unlawful use, or threatened use,
of force or violence by a terrorist group or individual based and operating entirely within
the United States or its territories without foreign direction.”24

Moreover, there is some division among scholars and analysts whether to consider
terrorism as a form of warfare, or as simply crime masquerading as political action.
Ambassador Ronald Spiers has proposed that terrorism be seen in Clausewitzian25 terms
and as a form of warfare. Just as states use war “as a method of carrying on politics by
other means” terrorists use terrorism as politics by other means by using violence “to

20 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999), United Nations,
21 Chalk, The Nature of Contemporary Terrorism.
22 William Maley, “The ‘War against Terrorism’ in South Asia,” Contemporary South Asia, v.12, n2 (June
2003), p. 205
23 Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Address the Overseas Threat
24 Ibid.
25 Referring to the Prussian military thinker Carl von Clausewitz, author of the influential book On War.
intimidate or instill fear for the purpose of advancing a political objective.” 26 However, there is one major difference between war and terrorism—apart from tactics and tools—which relates to the legitimacy of the use of that particular type of force. War is considered legitimate, while terrorism is considered illegitimate. Terrorists make a “deliberate decision to abandon those restraints [adopted by states concerning warfare] or to refuse to accept as binding the prevailing moral distinctions between belligerents and neutrals, combatants and non-combatants, appropriate and inappropriate targets, legitimate and illegitimate methods.” 27 Christopher Harmon singles out the killing of civilians as a key de-legitimizing (as well as de-legalizing) aspect of terrorism, and thus compares terrorism to the conduct of war crimes: “Many wars are legitimate but war crimes are never so; similarly, many forms of military violence may be justified, but not terrorism.” 28

3.3 Historical Survey and Rapoport's Waves

Terrorism has existed throughout history, and it is likely to persist far into the future. It could be described as an almost permanent feature of human civilization. This is because, as Ariel Merari asserts, “[t]errorism is a means, not goal. Because it is the

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simplest form of armed struggle, it appears whenever and wherever there is a conflict that is sufficiently acute to generate the will of some people to resort to violence."\textsuperscript{29}

In addition, terrorism tends to reflect the particular tensions within the age or era in which it manifests. As discussed in the previous chapter, David Rapoport has proposed a systemic theory of terrorism that posits the notion of "waves" within the evolution of terrorism movements. Rapoport argues that modern terrorism has occurred in four major waves (thus far). In the next sections, this dissertation will examine these four major waves of terrorism, simultaneously referencing and surveying the relevant literature. The purpose of this survey is to provide context to the ultimate topic of this dissertation, which is the fourth wave of terrorism.

However, because Rapoport's waves begin with the revolutionary/anarchist era (late 19\textsuperscript{th} century), this section will first examine two topics that have relevance to the general study of terrorism, but which are not covered by Rapoport's wave theory: 1) premodern terrorism and 2) state terror.

3.4 Premodern Terrorism and State Terror

Premodern Terrorism

Premodern terrorism tended to feature terrorism that was often driven by religious or ethnic motivations. As Bruce Hoffman and others have argued, the earliest terrorists

were most commonly religious terrorists. The three famous groups in the pre-modern era are the Zealots (also known as Sicarri), the Assassins and the Thugs.

The Zealots-Sicarri was a Jewish group that was prominent roughly in the first century CE. They gained prominence because of their habit of murdering individuals as part of their political campaign; later they engaged in open warfare. According to David Rapoport, the Sicarri...

"...did not limit themselves to assassinations. They engaged military forces openly, often slaughtering their prisoners. They took hostages to pressure the priests and terrorized wealthy Jewish landowners in the hopes of compelling a land redistribution according to Biblical traditions." 30

The Sicarri’s political objective was to revolt against the Greeks in Judea and the Romans (who ruled both the Greeks and Jews). 31 The Zealots-Sicarri existed for a very short time (25 years in the early 1st century), although their impact was far-reaching. They directed their violence against foreigners, but also Jewish leaders, with whom they did not agree. They also targeted Hellenized Jews. 32 Moreover, they preferred to conduct their attacks in the open because, like the Assassins (discussed below), they were inspired “by messianic hopes to seek maximum publicity.” 33 Their larger political objective was to incite mass insurrection, and in many cases they did.

Another famous premodern terrorist organization that emerged roughly a thousand years later were the Assassins, who are called hashishiyah in several texts, a name that is derived from the word hashish. The Assassins were an Islamic sect who operated in Persia and Syria between 1090 and 1275. Founded by Hassan Sabbah the Persian, they are described by Charles Nowell as “probably in their heyday, the fiercest of the fanatical sects that have terrorized the Islamic world.” Two branches eventually emerged in the organization, one Persian and the other Syrian, “though a connection still existed between them.”

Through acts of violence, they hoped to propagate a more purified form of Islam. The lowest ranking of the sect—known as fedayeen—were the actual attackers. “These [fedayeen] cared nothing for their own lives, and seemed to enjoy killing their victims in the most conspicuous places and under the most dramatic circumstances.” In other words, their attack methods were nearly suicidal in that they would stab their victims in broad daylight. As Bernard Lewis notes: “The Assassin went right up to his victim and normally made no attempt whatsoever to escape.” Some scholars see the techniques of the Assassins as an antecedent to contemporary suicide bombers. Like the Sicarri, the Assassins’ objectives were rooted in both religion and politics. Among other things, they killed political leaders whom they deemed as corrupt in order to pave the way for a more

35 Stem, The Ultimate Terrorists, p. 15.
37 Ibid.
pure and unblemished form of Islam. They also targeted the “rich and powerful”: “The Syrian Assassins followed the example of Hassan Sabbah and reserved their daggers for the rich and powerful, not stooping to attack the humble and poor.”\textsuperscript{40} Bernard Lewis argues that ultimately, the Assassins did little more than terrorize:

“The terrorism of the medieval Assassins lasted several centuries. It expressed the smoldering discontent and the continuing resentments of a society in which rapid changes were taking place. It made a tremendous impact. It terrorized a series of regimes. But it ended in total failure. The Assassins disappeared, having accomplished none of their purposes.”\textsuperscript{41}

A third prominent premodern terrorist group were the Thugs, who existed for more than 600 years, from the 13\textsuperscript{th} thru the 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries.\textsuperscript{42} They attacked their victims on remote roads by using specific strangling techniques, designed to avoid the spilling of human blood. It is estimated that the Thugs murdered more than 500,000 people, making them one of the most violent nonstate actor terrorists in history.\textsuperscript{43} Unlike many terrorist groups that seek to impress both an external and internal audience, it appears that the Thugs primarily focused on creating violence to impress their god, Kali. Publicity was eschewed by the Thugs; the widespread cultivation of fear was a by-product of their activities, not an objective.\textsuperscript{44} Moreover, there is some controversy whether they should be

\textsuperscript{40} Nowell, “The Old Man of the Mountain,” p. 507.
\textsuperscript{41} Lewis, “Islamic Terrorism?” p. 69.
\textsuperscript{42} Stem, The Ultimate Terrorists, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} Rapoport, “Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions,” p. 660.
labeled terrorists at all, since it appears that were driven less by political motives than by a cultish religion that relished human sacrifice.\textsuperscript{45}

\textit{State Terror}

In addition to surveying premodern nonstate actor terrorism, it is also useful to briefly examine state terror, particularly as the concept is often confused with classic terrorism, which normally is understood to involve nonstate actors exclusively. Jerrold Post defines state terrorism as follows:

"...\textit{[S]tate terrorism refers to the state turning its resources—police, judiciary, military, secret police, etc.—against its own citizenry to suppress dissent, as exemplified by the ‘dirty wars’ in Argentina. When Saddam Hussein used nerve gas against his own Kurdish citizens, this was an example of state CBW terrorism.}"

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A good historical example of state terror occurred in the context of the French revolution. During the period from September 5, 1793 until July 27, 1794, the French revolution experienced one of the most violent and bloody episodes of state terror—terrorism engineered by the state itself—in history. Maximilien Robespierre used the Revolutionary Committee of Public Safety to institute terror throughout France. The Committee pursued, investigated and arrested individuals who disagreed with its policies,

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., p. 658-677.
\textsuperscript{46} Jerrold Post (transcript)—prepared testimony before the House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, \textit{Federal News Service}, October 12, 2001.
or who even appeared less than enthusiastic.47 The result was that over 300,000 suspects were arrested on generally unsubstantiated political charges, and more than 17,000 were executed, many of them not having the benefit of a trial. The guillotine was commonly used as the execution method, in part because of the broad public spectacle that was generated.

Other instances of state terror can be found in other historic periods. For instance, in Russia, Vladimir Lenin, at the beginning of his career, was suspicious of using terror tactics to achieve political goals; however, after 1905, he “increasingly became an enthusiastic supporter of all types of terror” and moreover, his position hardened to such an extent that he came “to justify the most ruthless terrorist means,” an attitude that would persist once he had attained power and could then use the instruments of the state to mete out terror.48 Richard Drake writes that by 1917, Lenin had totally abandoned any reluctance to employ terrorist tactics: “The Bolshevik leader claimed that all resistance to the communist revolution would have to be met with maximum force...The terrorist potential in Lenin’s program was unmistakable, as his fellow Bolshevik, Trotsky, proudly acknowledged [in his book] Terrorism and Communism: a Reply (1918).”49

Joseph Stalin later took state terror to new heights, generating human carnage to such a level that some have described the former Soviet Union as a “country built on

The hundreds of thousands of bodies, the result of Soviet terror, have been "discovered in practically every Soviet city, including the center of Moscow."\textsuperscript{51}

Political pogroms and ethnic cleansing campaigns may also fall under the general heading of state terrorism. During the period from 1915 to 1918, Turkey sanctioned a pogrom against Armenians that resulted in the death of more than two million ethnic Armenians. Similarly in Germany, during the period leading up to World War II—in addition to the war years—state terrorism reached a new level of violence. Between 1933 and 1945, Nazi Germany pursued a policy of persecuting and executing Jews and others. What began as social persecution ultimately led to violence. The Nazi regime began a systematic campaign to exterminate Jewish people. Over six and a half million Jews and other 'asocials' (Gypsies, homosexuals, the handicapped, the mentally ill, and Soviet prisoners) were killed.\textsuperscript{52}

Across the world in Asia, Japan actively used terrorist methods as parts of its 'liberation’ of the Asian region from Western colonial powers. In the Nanjing Massacre, Japanese troops engaged in acts of gratuitous violence against women, children and elderly men. In their military camps, Japanese guards regularly engaged in sadistic acts of cruelty, including rape, torture and beheading. In one instance, in 1944, Japanese sailors sealed the hatches on a sinking US ship, thus condemning 1800 men to drown.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{50} Irina Paperno, "Exhuming the Bodies of Soviet Terror," \textit{Representations}, n. 75 (Summer 2001), p. 90.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., p. 107.
The colonial expansion of European powers over much of the world in the 19th century resulted in widespread terror, employed by the state or its instruments (i.e., military or police forces, etc.). Terror tactics were used in putting down resistance movements and thus tens of thousands died. In Natal, southern Africa, the British responded to a Zulu uprising with extreme force, resulting in the deaths of hundreds. When the Maji Maji rose up against the Germans during 1905-06 in what is now known as Tanzania, more than 100,000 people died. French forces killed between 60,000 and 100,000 in Madagascar following a revolt in 1947.

Clearly, the loss of life in the context of state terror in the modern era far overshadows the violence and death count attributable to nonstate actor terrorism, at least thus far in history. As Walter Laqueur notes: "No one denies that the number of victims and the amount of suffering caused by oppressive, tyrannical governments has been infinitely greater than that caused by small groups of rebels: a Hitler or a Stalin killed more people in one year than all terrorists throughout recorded history." This partly reflects the simple fact that states generally had more efficient means—and more powerful weapons—to conduct terrorist actions against their own populations, or those of neighboring states or outlying colonies. In the future, this "body count" asymmetry between state terror and nonstate actor terrorism may begin to equalize as nonstate actor

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55 Ibid.
terrorists employ more effective weapons, such as bioweapons, that have the capacity to kill mass quantities of individuals.

3.5 Rapoport's First Wave—Revolutionary/Anarchist Terror

In the context of modern terrorism, David Rapoport asserts that the first wave of modern terrorism—largely revolutionary and anarchist terrorism—had its genesis in Russia. Reinforcing this point, Norman Naimark asserts that “…nowhere did terrorism enjoy such widespread use and acceptance as a means of struggle as in late Imperial Russia. Between 1866, when a demented ex-student named Dmitrii Karakozov fired an errant shot at the Tsar Alexander II, and 1911, when Dmitrii Bogrov fatally wounded Prime Minister Petr Stolypin, Russia was absorbed by terrorism.”

As the industrial revolution progressed throughout Europe, terrorism began to reflect the broader tensions in international society at the time. The rise of universalist ideologies—such as Marxism and Communism—was also influencing the evolution of terrorism. “From this milieu a new era of terrorism emerged, in which the concept had gained many of the familiar revolutionary, anti-state connotations of today.” Carlo Piscane and his “propaganda by deed” is associated with this transformation. Piscane elaborated on his “propaganda by deed” ideology by arguing that “ideas result from deeds, not the latter from the former, and the people will not be free when they are educated, but educated when they are

free.”⁵⁹ The ideology is believed to be the foundation for a subsequent group founded in 1878, Narodnaya Volya (or People’s Will), which consisted of a small group of Russian constitutionalists who sought to end Czarist rule (explained in greater detail below).⁶⁰

The Naradonaya Volya can trace its intellectual foundations to Mikhail Bakunin, a Russian national “who up to his death in 1876 remained the center of the anarchist movement in Switzerland, France and Italy.”⁶¹ Born to an aristocratic family who was heavily influenced by the writings of G. W. F. Hegel and French anarchist Pierre J. Proudhon, Bakunin advocated a comprehensive anarchism. Bakunin basically believed that all idea systems or means of governance, whether monarchic or parliamentary, forced people to become slaves. He believed that the state, and its inherent power of coercion, was the source of all evil.⁶² To free the slaves of these systems (including states), he argued, “existing society had to be overturned.”⁶³ Bakunin urged his followers to engage in all-out revolt against the established ruling class:

“The present generation must in its turn produce an inexorable brute force and relentlessly tread the path of destruction. The healthy, uncorrupted mind of youth must grasp the fact that it is considerably more humane to stab and strangle dozens, nay hundreds, of hated beings than to join with them to share in systematic legal acts of murder, in the torture and martyrdom of millions of peasants.”⁶⁴

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⁵⁹ Ibid.
⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 18.
Mikhail Bakunin spent most of his political life outside of Russia; however, an associate named Sergei Nachayev set up the first organization that would eventually lead to Narodnaya Volya, which was known as the Narodnaya Rasprava.

A major reason terrorism flourished in Russia was that it offered the only real chance for political struggle. This point is emphasized by Zeev Ivaniski:

"The Russian revolutionary intelligentsia slid into terrorism because of its weakness, its isolation and its alienation from Russian reality. And the Jewish intelligentsia, which was even weaker and more isolated and alienated than the Russian, was swept up by the same wave for the same reasons. There was an additional factor too: the general motivation leading to the transition to terrorism lay in the fact that, in their feeling, it was the only channel for political struggle in the circumstances prevailing in Russia at the time."65

In his essay, 'Catechism of the Revolutionist', Segey Nechaev elucidated principles that would resonate with fourth wave religious and suicide terrorists. On the issue of death and martyrdom, Nechaev argued that "In cold blooded and tireless pursuit of this aim, [the revolutionary] must be prepared both to die himself and to destroy with his own hands everything that stands in the way of its achievement."66 In addition, Nechaev describes the "binary worldview" that would be common in many fourth wave terrorists, the notion that the revolutionary was part of one category of persons, while the object of its terror was on the other side. Nechaev argued that "[an individual] is not a

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revolutionary if he feels pity for anything in this world. If he is able to, he must face the
annihilation of a situation, of a relationship, or of any person who is part of this world—
everything and everyone must be equally odious to him.”

Nikolai Morozov urged that terrorists follow a methodology consisting of two
primary tenets: first, Russian terrorists must clarify and articulate a consistent theory of
terroristic struggle, and this propaganda must be disseminated to the people. “Only then
will the struggle receive an influx of fresh forces from the population, and these forces
are essential for a determined and long struggle.” Secondly, the terroristic party must
adopt a strategy of demoralizing and weakening the government. Terrorists must use “a
consistent, punishing system” which will make “government weak and incapable of
taking any measures for the oppression of freedom of thought…” Thus, it is not the
terrorists’ strength that brings about victory, but the constant erosion of the government’s
strength. Serge Stepniak-Kravchinski wrote that “in a struggle against an invisible,
impalpable, omnipresent enemy, the strong is vanquished, not by the arms of his
adversary, but by the continuous tension of his own strength, which exhausts him, at
least, more than he would be exhausted by defeats.”

As the organization, Narodnaya Rasprava (the People’s Reckoning) began to rise,
it was promptly suppressed by the government. Parts of this organization survived and

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67 Ibid., p. 73.
68 Nikolai Morozov, “The Terrorist Struggle,” in Walter Laqueur (Ed.), Voices of Terror: Manifestos,
Writings and Manuals of Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Other Terrorists From Around the World and Throughout
69 Ibid.
70 Serge Stepniak-Kravchinski, “Underground Russia,” in Walter Laqueur (Ed.), Voices of Terror:
Manifestos, Writings and Manuals of Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Other Terrorists From Around the World and
regenerated to become the mass movement known as “Back to the People”, which derived its name from Alexander Herzen’s pamphlet entitled *Narod* (To the People). Many of the leaders of this movement believed that the rural peasant, upon hearing the messages of these political movements, would rise up and overthrow their oppressors. However, despite this propaganda, the masses failed to rise up. This caused many of the activists to become disillusioned and many of them turned to terrorism. In 1879, some of these activists established the above-mentioned Narodnaya Volya (the People’s Will), a secret organization comprising 30 members. One description of the Narodnaya Volya (the People’s Will) is as follows:

“It was a secret organization which comprised 30 members; it was dedicated to fighting the Czarist regime using systematic terror in the hope of kindling the revolutionary energy of the peasants. On its founding, the executive committee of the organization passed a death sentence on Czar Alexander II. The assassination of the Czar was now the group’s prime objective.”

Narodnaya Volya claimed to speak ‘for the people’, but as the group progressed “the people had become an abstract concept with no equivalent in the real world.” Their primary motivation was to assassinate the Czar, a feat that they attempted three times with no success. Eventually, they succeeded in assassinating Czar Alexander II (in 1881), but the assassination would ultimately prove disappointing:

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71 Otto, “Russian Anarchist Terror,” p. 55.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
"...the assassination did not produce the desired political results: the peasantry did not rise; moderate urban public opinion was horrified; and the radical cause lost support. Anarchist terrorism, exemplified by the Populists, had run its course."  

What happened instead was a massive government round-up of Narodnaya Volya's members. Ultimately, all the original members of the group were eliminated and this led to various splinter or successor organizations that emerged to continue the struggle.  

From an international perspective, Narodnaya Volya's most important contribution to terrorism was the template it provided for the anarchist movement, although some scholars are adamant on separating Russian revolutionary terrorists from anarchist terrorists. Socialists believed that the actions of Narodnaya Volya meant that "Russia was on the eve of a revolution."  

Four months following Czar Alexander II's assassination, a group of radicals convened an "anarchist conference" in London. "In hopes of encouraging and coordinating worldwide anarchist activities, the conferees decided to establish an 'Anarchist International' (or 'Black International'). It was during this conference that the doctrine of "propaganda by the deed" was officially recognized. Although the anarchist conference had no real power, the participants were

75 Ibid.
76 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 19.
77 Vladimir Simkhovitch presents this case; he insists that Russian revolutionary terrorism was a very distinct phenomenon from anarchist terrorism. He states "...it seems utterly impossible to class even the Russian terrorists of a quarter of a century ago as anarchists." See Vladimir G. Simkhovitch, "Russia's Struggle with Autocracy," Political Science Quarterly, v. 20, n. 1 (March 1905), p. 120-121.
79 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 19.
able to "create a myth of global revolutionary pretensions and thereby stimulate fears and
suspicions disproportionate to its actual impact or political achievements."81

One of the main security problems for Western Europe was the problem of
Russian refugees, who brought with them their revolutionary, nihilistic and anarchist
doctrines and habits. Vladimir Simkhovitch writes that Russian refugees, with their
"propaganda by the deed" doctrines, infested Western and Southwestern Europe:

"The [Russian] refugees, hostile to the society from which they are obliged to
flee, have seldom a chance to get sound information about the social organization
of the country in which they seek refuge. In their new environments they are, as a
rule, taken up as heroes by native malcontent cranks and extremists of all sorts
and conditions, and they gain a most distorted conception of their new
surroundings. Add to this the passionate desire for political activity, which has
obligerd them to flee from their own country but which they have not abandoned
in their flight...Lastly, close upon the heels of the terroristic attempts in Russia,
followed the new political pest, the anarchistic 'propaganda of the deed', which
infested Western and Southwestern Europe. These murderers did not plead
insanity, they pleaded 'doctrines'..."

Anarchist terrorism could be considered a form of ideological terrorism. According to
Christopher Harmon:

"Anarchists perceive themselves as the 'purest' of terrorists, for their politics are
most outside all norms. They live for their overriding commitment to and
exultation in the destruction of the state's authority, and for the dream of complete
freedom."82

81 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 19.
82 Harmon, Terrorism Today, p. 1.
The anarchists reigned during the period encompassing the 1880s up to the first decade of the 20th century. The anarchists, which were a loose and largely independent group, were believed by many to be part of a huge international conspiracy. Among those killed by the anarchists were U.S. Presidents Garfield and McKinley. The assassination of McKinley sparked widespread fear in the United States that Leon Czolgosz, McKinley’s assassin, “was part of a widespread anarchist conspiracy” and that an “evil cabal with equally evil ideas imported from a morally corrupt Europe was behind the attack,” although Czolgosz claimed that he acted alone.

Earlier in the United States, the anarchist movement had combined with latent xenophobia and tensions over organized labor to create a pervasive climate of fear that led to, among other things, the Haymarket Affair in Chicago, in which eight anarchists were either hanged or imprisoned for the death of a Chicago policeman, despite very scant and questionable evidence. The Haymarket Affair marked a key turning point in how the public viewed anarchists and their rhetoric; what was once considered “loose and flamboyant talk” had transformed into a “terrifying ominousness in the eyes of the adversaries of labor.” Moreover, the “foreignness” of the anarchists intensified

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83 Regarding President Garfield, Jay Robert Nash uses the phrase “political malcontent” to describe Charles Julius Guiteau (Garfield’s assassin), so it remains unclear if this was a product of the anarchist movement. See Jay Robert Nash, *Terrorism in the 20th Century: a Narrative Encyclopedia from the Anarchists, through the Weathermen, to the Unabomber* (New York: M. Evans and Company, Inc., 1998), p. 4.
antipathy against them: "The fact that most of the anarchists were recent immigrants—Germans, Russian Jews and Italians—tended to intensify the prejudice against them."\(^{87}\)

In Europe, the anarchists killed French President Sadi Carnot in 1894, and Antonio Canovas, the Spanish Prime Minister, in 1897. Empress Elizabeth (Zita) of Austria and King Umberto of Italy were killed in 1898 and 1900, respectively. In addition, many leaders were the object of assassination attempts, including Bismarck and Emperor Wilhelm I of Germany. In addition, the anarchists killed many "secondary" leaders; consequently, "it should come as no surprise that a large public was fascinated and horrified by the mysterious character of these assassins and their motives."\(^{88}\)

Thus, overall the period of anarchist terrorism roughly spans from the 1880s to the early 1900s. Although the anarchists cultivated widespread fear, they did not engineer large-scale political movements designed to fight or undermine state power; their threat was more psychological in nature. There was no anarchist central command that was directing the campaign. In fact, the following description demonstrates how haphazard the international organization really was:

"The reality [of anarchist organization structure] was one of scattered small groups or isolated individuals who shared some measure of common ideology and in some cases shared readership of the same books or periodicals. International contacts between anarchists were made largely on an individual level when activists moved from one country to another, often as exiles."\(^{89}\)

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\(^{87}\) Ibid., p. 58.


Paul Berman echoes this point when he argues that the anarchists and the threats they posed were largely contained; they were not viewed as large socially-transforming threats: “[The] terrorists and their bombs and guns seemed, to most people in those years, a marginal affair—a problem of crime prevention, a philosophical problem, a mystery, but nothing larger.”

Ironically the anarchists may have gained a boost as a result of harsh state responses. Anarchist terrorists who were executed or sentenced to long terms in prisons effectively became “martyrs” and this helped encourage recruitment. In public trials, moreover, anarchists would take advantage of the public forum and publicity to air their views, which also attracted new recruits.

Anarchist terrorism peaked in France during the period from 1892 until 1894, when 11 significant bombings and other incidents took place. In one instance, a bomb was thrown into the Chamber of Deputies, and in another, an anarchist fired shots from his gun in the Paris stock exchange. These anarchists shared a common goal. They wanted to “destabilize bourgeois society, [avenge] the suffering of the oppressed and that of earlier, martyred terrorists.” Like their Russian revolutionary terrorist counterparts, they had hoped that their actions would serve as a spark to ignite a much larger revolution by the working masses. Some anarchists thought of their struggle as one of liberating mankind from the oppressive actions of an old order. Emma Goldman wrote in 1910 that “anarchism, more than any other social theory, values human life above things. All

92 Ibid., p. 57.
93 Ibid.
anarchists agree with Tolstoy in this fundamental truth: if the production of any commodity necessitates the sacrifice of human life, society should do without that commodity, but it cannot do without that life."\textsuperscript{94}

The anarchist wave was greatly facilitated by technological and communication changes that occurred in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century. David Rapoport notes that "the telegraph, daily mass newspapers, and railroads flourished during the last quarter of the nineteenth century."\textsuperscript{95} News traveled quickly—events that occurred in one location would be known in other countries in a matter of days. Terrorists could travel across borders; immigration patterns moreover created a 'diapora' phenomenon, which played a major role (in some cases as a source for financial support) in terrorism. Many leaders called for international laws or treaties to address this growing terrorism menace. However, an international conference on terrorism was stymied by, among other things, the refusal of the American government to send a delegation because "it feared that extensive involvement in European politics might be required, and it had no federal police force."\textsuperscript{96}

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., p. 52.
3.6 Rapoport’s Second Wave: Anti-Colonial/Nationalist Terror

The second wave of terrorism, according to David Rapoport, began with the Versailles Peace Treaty that concluded World War I. This wave featured anti-colonial struggle and a growing belief in the principle of self-determination. On April 24, 1916, Irish nationalists staged the Easter Rising, in which they took over key buildings in Dublin and declared an Irish Republic. However, the British retaliated by deploying troops in various operations that ended the uprising in roughly a week. The British, now in control, proceeded to execute 16 rebels for the insurrection that had killed more than 794 civilians and 521 soldiers. The failure of the Easter Rising prompted Irish nationalists to form the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which would specifically engage in a guerrilla war against the British. They also formed a political party known as Sinn Fein (Ourselves Alone).

The IRA experience has had a profound impact on the development of modern terrorism:

"The legacies of the IRA’s early struggles—the role of martyrs, symbols, spies, money, and smuggled arms; the blend of politics, terror, and propaganda; the appeal to legitimacy, the military techniques and tactics—have become hallmarks of modern terrorism worldwide."

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97 Ibid., p. 52-53.
99 Ibid., p. 67.
After World War I, anti-colonial terrorism spread throughout the world, reflecting pro-independence and anti-colonial struggles. For example, insurgency groups increasingly challenged British colonial rule in India, and occasionally they turned to terrorism tactics. Much of the terrorism occurred in Bengal, northeast India. The promoters of the insurgency wanted Indian self-government, known as swaraj. The insurgents established terrorist secret societies, or samitis. These groups engaged in terrorist tactics, such as beatings and killings. They also engaged in armed robberies as a way to buy arms and ammunition. At first the British did not respond aggressively, but by 1914 the Raj slowly began to see this insurgency as an attack on its entire rule in India and subsequently cracked down hard. By 1917, the British had established an effective intelligence network and introduced a policy of "preventive arrest." The insurgents that were still at large "were so demoralized and disorganized that their activity ceased almost entirely." The continued British crackdown against Bengali opposition ultimately led to widespread opposition throughout India to British rule. This led to calls for independence and the rise of the Indian National Congress. However, this did not end terrorism. In the 1920s and 1930s, India also witnessed other terrorism, including assassinations, murders and other acts of violence. In 1924, attacks against European administrators and police officers became particularly severe; as a result, the British introduced new emergency legislation in October 1925. In 1930, a group of 100

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101 Ibid., p. 166.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid., p. 167.
Bengal terrorists staged an attack on the Police and Auxiliary Force armories in Chittagong (in today's Bangladesh).\textsuperscript{104}

Rapoport argues that only after the end of World War II did the true successes of second wave terrorism begin to truly emerge. This era was characterized by a growing sense of optimism (including a reaction against the former Colonial system) and reordering of the international system:

"The collapse of the great colonial empires in the wake of World War II engendered a vast and rapid reordering of global relations, carried out under the pressures of burgeoning nationalism in former colonies and protectorates...For many, and particularly for the peoples of the Third World, the prevailing mood of the postwar era has been one of transition, or a new world order emerging."\textsuperscript{105}

One example of this reordering occurred in Palestine, where the Jewish group, the Irgun, began a terrorist campaign against Britain in order to secure a Jewish state. The Irgun was joined by a more radical group, the Stern Gang which attempted to secure from Germany and Italian military assistance in a campaign against the British. Eventually, the Irgun accomplished its most daring operation, the bombing of Jerusalem's King David Hotel in July 1946. On two floors of the hotel’s southern wing were located the "nerve center of British rule in Palestine: the government secretariat and headquarters of British military forces in Palestine and Transjordan."\textsuperscript{106} Eventually and as a result of this violent campaign, the state of Israel would be born.

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{106} Hoffman, \textit{Inside Terrorism}, p. 51.
In Algeria, the war for independence began in 1954. The insurgency underlying this conflict was waged by the National Liberation Front (FLN)\textsuperscript{107} against France during the period from 1954 and 1962. The FLN campaign had the help of sympathizers from neighboring countries. In fact, more than 20,000 FLN—or FLN sympathizer—fighters were assembled outside of Algeria, usually in adjacent territory.\textsuperscript{108} The French comprised a small—but powerful—minority in the population; by 1945, the population of Algerians of European descent exceeded ten percent.\textsuperscript{109} By the mid-1950s, the violence that was associated with the FLN anti-colonial movement became more intense. In 1955, the nationalists provoked an uprising in Philippeville, which included mass slaughter of Europeans, including children. French troops responded by slaughtering Muslims. In Algiers, the nationalist campaign was controlled by Saadi Yacef, who was famous for, among other things, regularly employing female bombers.

The French regularly used torture methods against FLN operatives, including “using electrical equipment and half drowning suspects.”\textsuperscript{110} Upon gaining the intelligence they were seeking, French authorities in some cases would throw the captives from helicopters into the sea. By October 1957, it appeared that France had regained control of the country. Eventually, French war hero Charles de Gaulle would become president in France and his strategic vision did not include Algeria as one of France’s provinces. As a result, Algeria ultimately gained its right to self-determination in September 1959.

\textsuperscript{107}Or in French: Front de la Liberation Nationale.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., p. 158.
In Kenya, another anti-colonial terrorist movement arose with the Mau Mau, a secret society that conducted a violent campaign against British rule in Kenya during the 1950s. The Mau Mau resented the fact that the British had generated prosperity for themselves at the expense of the country’s main tribe, the Kikuyu.\textsuperscript{111} From 1951 until 1952, the Mau Mau conducted sporadic attacks on rural white farmers, and their Kikuyu associates or sympathizers. These attacks became so frightening to the European settlers that the government declared a state of emergency in October 1952.\textsuperscript{112} Three months later, a British family (the Ruck family) was hacked to death in a nighttime raid. News of the massacre generated widespread panic within the British settler population. The British responded in 1954 by strengthening their counterinsurgency operations and improving intelligence operations. As part of this crackdown, the British launched Operation Anvil in April 1954, which involved rounding up and interrogating 30,000 members of the Kikuyu tribe in Nairobi. “Operation Anvil effectively broke the central committee and ended coordinated activity between the different groups of Mau Mau guerrillas.”\textsuperscript{113} However, eventually the British would decide to leave and Kenya would gain its independence.

Nationalist or anti-colonial terror has traditionally been viewed as the most ‘successful’ terrorism. For instance, the Irgun (in Palestine) and the FLN in Algeria are often seen as two groups that used terrorism successfully to achieve their ultimate

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
political goal, but, as Martha Crenshaw argues, “it is impossible to be precise about the role played by terrorism in bringing about independence in these contexts.”

3.7 Rapoport’s Third Wave—New Left Terror

The third wave of terrorism, according to Rapoport, is tied to the Vietnam War. Many “new left” terrorist groups, such as the Red Army Faction and the Italian Red Brigades, saw themselves as protectors of the working classes, as well as the Third World masses. Not only was the new terrorism heavily ideological, it was also international. Bruce Hoffman describes the date July 22, 1968 as marking the beginning of the day that “modern, international terrorism” emerged. This was the date that three armed Palestinian terrorists hijacked an Israeli El Al commercial flight en route from Rome to Tel Aviv.

The rise of international terrorism was in effect driven by the Palestinian cause. Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, proposed in 1967 that the Palestinians adopt terrorist tactics against Israeli unfortified civilian targets, instead of striking the Israeli Defense Force directly since it was overwhelmingly superior in force and training. Eventually, Palestinians would establish an infrastructure that would involve multiple countries. Several splinter organizations, such as the Abu Nidal group, which eventually set up offices in Iraq, had assets in the Middle East and Europe.

116 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 67.
Moreover, many of these Palestinian groups would link up with European counterparts. This occurred partly because there were so many PLO splinter groups, including Black September, Force 17, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Population Front of the Liberation of Palestine, General Command, and Abu Nidal Group, among others.  

Alongside Palestinian terrorism emerged a new variety of left-wing ideological terrorism within Europe in the late 1960s. This new terrorism had much of its origins in the student revolt of 1968, as well as general tensions within the Cold War. Examples of this type of terrorism included such groups as the German Red Army Faction (originally the Baader Meinhof group) and the Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades) in Italy. Many of these groups were comprised of middle class youths, who had idealistic visions of bringing down the capitalist order, although some members of these groups (such as the German Red Army Faction’s Andreas Baader) were more motivated by a cult of violence, instead of ideology. The presence of privileged and politically connected terrorists was especially apparent in the radical American group, the Weathermen, “[m]ade up mostly of college-educated white women and men, many...[of whom] had parents who were wealthy or [had political power].”

One characteristic that could be found in these groups was extreme idealism. One Italian Brigadist, Enrico Fenzi, wrote an autobiography detailing his rationale for

becoming a terrorist. Among other things, he wrote, capitalism was a “dying dinosaur” and thus the Red Brigadists “were clearing the way for the communist fulfillment of history.” Many of new left terrorist members attempted to downplay their privileged backgrounds. As one writer notes: “They tried to compensate for the absence of a proletarian background by the frequent use of four-letter words.” In Japan, the Japanese Red Army (Sekigunha) attracted “the bright sons and daughters of regional elites from all over Japan.” Had these young people not joined the Japanese Red Army, they would have likely “passed uneventfully into the elite bureaucracies of contemporary Japan.”

The Red Brigades in Italy were particularly destructive—in their first ten years of existence, they conducted roughly 14,000 terrorist attacks that nearly paralyzed the Italian judicial system. The German Red Army Faction, on the other hand, was notorious for its high-level kidnappings, including that of Dr. Hans-Martin Schleyer, a director of Mercedes Benz and President of the Germany employers’ federation, who was ultimately murdered.

The other factor that came into play with third wave terrorism was the rise of mass media, a trend that would continue well into today’s fourth wave terrorism.

“Modern communications have done more than anything else to promote terrorism as an

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124 Ibid., p. 726.
The rise of the media—and particularly television video images—transformed the way that terrorism operated. Even operations that would have been deemed tactical failures might be seen as strategic victories “provided that the operation is sufficiently dramatic to capture the media’s attention.” Based on this rationale, the Munich Olympic massacre—in which 11 Israeli athletes were murdered by members of the Palestinian group Black September—was thus successful, although the terrorists failed to achieve their ostensible objectives (gaining the freedom of 236 jailed Palestinians).

The impact of the European ‘new left’ groups was rather fleeting. Paul Wilkinson has compared these groups “to tiny gangs of bandits” rather than to “serious political movements.” Consequently, he argues that they posed much less danger to Western states and societies than the fear they created seemed to imply, although the fact that some groups were supported by the Soviet Union added a sinister geopolitical dimension to their operations. A major factor that probably accounts for their short, transitory existence is the absence of a strong, sustainable ideology. Wilkinson argues that these groups “created their own ‘transcendental’ rationality.” Specifically he notes:

128 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 73.
129 Ibid.
132 Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy, p. 27.
“The chiliastic utopianism of groups like the Baader-Meinhof gang, the Weathermen and the Japanese Red Army totally rejected the existing order as being vile and beyond redemption. There was no ground for negotiating any compromise between their ends and those of the rest of society.”

The other significant factor that underlies the rise of both Middle Eastern terrorism as well as Western European terrorist groups was the cross-over between the two. For instance, A.J. Jongman wrote in 1992 that “a great deal of international terrorist incidents in Western Europe [were] caused by a spill-over from the Middle East.” In fact, by 1985, Middle Eastern terrorism had spread to five West European countries, resulting—in total—in 109 deaths (most victims were of Middle Eastern origin) and 540 injuries. In some cases European terrorist groups would cooperate with their Middle Eastern counterparts, as was the case with the alliance between the Germany Red Army Faction (RAF) and the PLO Black September organization.

This cross-over between Palestinian groups and ‘new left’ groups also included the Japanese Red Army. Following a notorious hijacking in March 1970, George Habash of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) approached the Japanese Red Army (JRA) and an alliance was subsequently formed. Following this, many JRA members began training in PLO camps situated inside Lebanon. JRA operations also became more international; for instance, in 1972, the group boarded an Air France flight for Tel Aviv. Once they had retrieved their baggage, they “stood and opened fire

133 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
indiscriminately on the crowd before throwing several grenades.\textsuperscript{136} Over 26 people were murdered in this incident. Subsequent interrogations of one of the JRA survivors (two of the three had been killed in the incident) revealed clear operational links between the PFLP and the JRA.\textsuperscript{137}

3.8 Rapoport’s Fourth Wave: Religious Terrorism

The rise of fourth wave terrorism can be generally tied to the 1980s with the decline of the Cold War and the increasing importance of globalization. The fourth wave also has its roots in the Iranian revolution of 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and other key events—such as the rise of suicide bombings by Hezbollah in the early 1980s.\textsuperscript{138} In many respects, fourth wave terrorism is an analogue of pre-modern terrorism—both ideologies are rooted in religious identity and both are largely divorced from the state or its ideologies. Although the beginning of the fourth wave era is linked to key events in Islamic (or Muslim-majority) countries, the trend can be found all major religions. However, as David Rapoport notes, it is Islam that is at the heart of this religious wave: “Islamic groups have conducted the most significant, deadly, and profoundly international attacks.”\textsuperscript{139}

Fourth wave terrorism, which some analysts describe as the ‘new’ terrorism is distinguished from traditional (modern) terrorism by its emphasis on unconstrained

\textsuperscript{136} Davies, \textit{Terrorism: Inside a World Phenomenon}, p. 79.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{139} Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” p. 61.
violence. In other words, instead of being constrained by a lateral (support) community, the fourth wave terrorist is only constrained by his terrorist abilities. The traditional view that “terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead”\textsuperscript{140} has been replaced by an arguably more accurate adage: “terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people dead.”

However, fourth wave terrorism does share certain characteristics with its antecedents, notably revolutionary-anarchist terrorism and ‘new left’ terrorism. Like their anarchist or ‘new left’ counterparts, fourth wave terrorists such as Al Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo view the world in binary terms—the division between good and evil, the world of the pure versus impure, or in the case of Al Qaeda, the world of Islam vs. the world of infidels. Islamic militants are, in particular, motivated by the notion of Jihad, which literally means struggle. Jihad has a wide range of meaning—ranging from peaceful self-improvement to violence—that forms the backbone of the Islamist movement. One prominent intellectual tradition in Islam interprets Jihad as a complete and universal struggle. Ibn Tamiyyah, a prominent Islamic legal scholar who lived in the 13\textsuperscript{th} century, wrote that anyone who stands in the way of the word of Allah must be fought, particularly as “lawful warfare is essentially jihad and since its aim is that the religion is Allah’s entirely…”\textsuperscript{141} Women, children, monks, old people, the handicapped and the like may be spared death, but not if they “fight with words” or other supportive acts (such as spying).

\textsuperscript{140} Brian Michael Jenkins, \textit{Terrorism in the 1990s} (Text of an address to the 26\textsuperscript{th} Annual Seminar of the American Society for Industrial Security, Miami Beach, Florida, September 25, 1980), p. 5.

Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian member of the Muslim Brotherhood who died as a political prisoner in the 1960s, took the notion of Jihad a step further, arguing that it is the true nature of Islam that it be spread universally until all men are liberated. Specifically, he wrote that Jihad was essentially a struggle for "the freedom of man from servitude to other men, the establishment of the sovereignty of God and His Lordship throughout the world, the end of man's arrogance and selfishness, and the implementation of the rule of the Divine Shari'ah in human affairs."\textsuperscript{142} Moreover, this struggle can never cease.

"...This struggle is not a temporary phase but an eternal state—an eternal state, as truth and falsehood cannot co-exist on this earth."\textsuperscript{143}

Syed Abul ala Maududi expanded on the universal theme by writing "Islam does not intend to confine this revolution [against the rule of a non-Islamic system] to a single State or a few countries; the aim of Islam is to bring about a universal revolution."\textsuperscript{144} Maududi explained that it was first necessary that Islamic activists carry out the revolution within the state system "but their ultimate objective is no other than to effect a world revolution."\textsuperscript{145} Abdullah Azzam also wrote of this universal aim. According to a biographer, "the Sheikh's [Azzam's] life revolved around a single goal, namely the establishment of Allah's rule on earth, this being the clear responsibility of each and

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., p. 396.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.
Moreover, the struggle could not end until "the Khilafah is established so the light of Islam may shine on the whole world." Later, the manual used by Al Qaeda terrorists would recapitulate many of these themes, and expand on the martial nature of Islam’s spread. Specifically it states that "Islamic governments have never and will never be established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are established as they [always] have been: by pen and gun; by word and bullet; and by tongue and teeth."  

Thus, certain themes prominent among fourth wave religious terrorists can be found in anarchism and in the ‘new left’—such as the view of the world as fundamentally corrupt. Another common theme is the prevalence of oppression that must be fought so that human society may be liberated. The difference may be that the religious terrorists had a plan on who or what would replace the “human government” once it was overthrown—anarchists and the ‘new left’ were conspicuously vague about what would transpire following the destruction of the current order. Nevertheless, the themes that flow through these different eras of terrorism share remarkable commonalities, although their methods and ideologies have differed significantly.

In general, Rapoport and other scholars have concluded that the nature of fourth wave terrorism can be summed up by these characteristics:

(1) Increasingly Independent of States: Fourth wave terrorists are generally

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147 Ibid.
viewed as independent actors from states. This has implications toward structure as well as financial support. A recent US Congressional report summarized this trend as follows: “A modern trend in terrorism is toward loosely organized, self-financed, international networks of terrorists.”\textsuperscript{149} The loosely-organized aspect refers to network structures that span the globe and yet remain operationally coherent. The trend of self-financing typically refers to reliance on charitable contributions, criminal activities, or self-made (or inherited) wealth. This reflects the absence of state support, which was the hallmark of terrorism in the late 1970s to the mid 1990s.\textsuperscript{150} According to a US government report:

“Terrorists increasingly have been able to develop their own sources of financing, which range from NGOs and charities to illegal enterprises such as narcotics, extortion, and kidnapping. Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is said to make hundreds of millions annually from criminal activities, mostly from taxing or participating in the narcotics trade. Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda depends on a formidable array of fundraising operations including Muslim charities and wealthy well-wishers, legitimate-seeming businesses, and banking connections in the Persian Gulf, as well as various smuggling and fraud activities. Another source of support is bin Laden’s personal wealth, estimated by some at $280 to $300 million.”\textsuperscript{151}

(2) Increasingly Driven by Religious Ideology: As discussed above, fourth wave terrorists are generally driven by religious ideologies. These ideologies can range from militant Islamic, Jewish, Christian, Buddhist, or Hindu (or other religious) ideologies.\textsuperscript{152} One of the complications of studying militant ideologies is separating the

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., p. 5.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., p. 6.
\textsuperscript{152} Bruce Hoffman, “Responding to Terrorism Across the Technological Spectrum,” \textit{Terrorism and Political Violence}, v. 6, n. 3 (Autumn 1994), pp. 371-372.
“fundamentalist” from the violent. For instance, in Islam, Salafists and Wahabbis are known to be conservative and, according to popular perception, violent and predisposed toward terrorism. However, “as it is with other schools of thought, there is diversity within the Salafi and Wahabi, ranging from moderate to the extreme.”\textsuperscript{153} Thus the terms should not be necessarily viewed as synonymous with violence.

(3) Increasingly Predisposed to Mass Casualty/Mass Destruction Attacks: As earlier referenced, Brian Jenkins is famous for his quote that “terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead”\textsuperscript{154} Fourth wave terrorists, on the other hand, are less constrained, compared to their antecedents. For this reason, governments are fearful that fourth wave terrorists will resort to attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons. According to a US government report: “Looming over the entire issue of international terrorism is a trend toward proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).”\textsuperscript{155} CBRN weapons have the potential to create mass casualties: “This ability to inflict great numbers of casualties may cause terrorists to view chemical or biological weapons as a viable means for promoting an agenda of terror and destruction.”\textsuperscript{156}

Apart from mass casualties, one of the most destabilizing immediate effects of a CBRN attack would be mass panic. Loss of public confidence in government and violent

\textsuperscript{153} Moderation in Islam in the Context of Muslim Community in Singapore (Singapore: PERGAS, 2004), p. 131.
\textsuperscript{154} Jenkins, Terrorism in the 1990s, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{155} Perl, “Terrorism, the Future, and US Foreign Policy,” p. 1.
competition for medical treatment are also some of the likely consequences.\textsuperscript{157} Perhaps the most important aspect of a CBRN attack would be economic, something that recent Al Qaeda statements suggest is of key interest for terrorists. A nuclear detonation from a sea container, for instance, would likely result in a massive regulatory response (such as 100\% inspections), "thus bringing the global economy to its knees."\textsuperscript{158}

### 3.9 Controversies Associated with Fourth Wave Terrorism

The previous section has explored some basic characteristics of fourth wave terrorism. The purpose of this section is to examine some of the major controversies and debates within the literature regarding this particular wave or phase of terrorism. Based on a survey of the literature, the three most important controversies of fourth wave terrorism relate to its distinctiveness ('newness') from past terrorism, the question of CBRN weapons (and the likelihood of their use), and the role of suicide attacks. These issues will be explored in sequence:

**Is Fourth Wave Terrorism a Distinct and New Terrorism?**

One of the central controversies that exists within the terrorism literature concerns the question of whether a ‘new’ terrorism—what this dissertation refers to as ‘fourth

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., p. 7.

wave’ terrorism—actually exists. Writers such as Bruce Hoffman and others argue that there is indeed a clearly new terrorism, with significant discontinuities from past forms of terrorism. On the contrary, writers such as Isabelle Duyvesteyn argue that the “new” terrorism is not new after all.\(^{159}\) Claims to “newness”, according to Duyvesteyn, are based on the following features: (1) The perpetrators of terrorism act transnationally and operate in loosely organized networks; (2) They are inspired by religion and “are seen as religious fanatics”; (3) They seek weapons to attack as many people as possible, namely CBRN; (4) They engage in indiscriminate targeting.\(^{160}\) Duyvesteyn argues that if these four features are the characteristics of the “new” terrorism, then this “new” terrorism is not so new after all, given the fact that these features can be found among terrorist groups throughout history.

The primary thrust of this dissertation is that there is indeed a ‘new’ terrorism. Simply pointing out continuities, as in Duyvesteyn’s arguments, does not negate the qualitative differences inherent in fourth wave terrorism, compared with past forms of terrorism. For instance, the global communications revolution—and integral part of the information revolution—has significantly and qualitatively transformed the “transnational” aspect of terrorism. Scholars supporting the ‘new’ terrorism thesis include David Tucker, Oliver Richmond, and Bruce Hoffman. Tucker argues that the new in the ‘new’ terrorism is the fact that terrorists are more inclined to use CBRN


\(^{160}\) Ibid., p. 443.
weapons.  This view is also echoed by Andrew O'Neil who argues that "...the new terrorist groups are said to covet those weapons that can do the maximum damage to their target set: WMD." Richmond asserts that the 'new' terrorism is notable because it questions the entire system of states: "...[T]he new terrorism challenges value systems and legitimacy in a far more radical way than the older forms of terrorism that focused on recognition, and territorial and political control within the framework of the states-system."

Will Fourth Wave Terrorists resort to CBRN weapons?

Another key controversy in fourth wave terrorism is the question of whether terrorists will turn to CBRN weapons in order to bring about mass casualties. One school says that this is occurring, and is reflected in the writings of Bruce Hoffman, Andrew Loehmer, James Campbell and others. Andrew Loehmer asserts that the increased possibility of CBRN use by terrorists reflects fundamental changes in the international system: "the proliferation of civilian and military nuclear technology and the burgeoning of terrorism, both of which have reached unprecedented levels." James Campbell argues that CBRN weapons are attractive because of the unprecedented power they give

to terrorist groups: "Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons give terrorist organizations a strength that they could never hope to achieve through conventional means allowing them to seriously threaten the security of a national population with a single blow." 165

The alternative school suggests that the CBRN threat has been overblown, or is simply not credible. Representing this line of thinking, Ehud Sprinzak wrote that "despite all the lurid rhetoric, a massive terrorist attack with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons is hardly inevitable. It is not even likely." 166 He argues that most terrorists realize that such an attack would be extremely counterproductive: "Neither crazy nor stupid, most terrorists strive to gain sympathy from a large audience and wish to live after any terrorist act in order to benefit from it politically." 167 The primary argument here is that terrorists will rely on "tried and true" methods of terrorism, and will be far more likely to employ conventional weapons (and methods) in their attacks. Ariel Merari also supports this contention. He similarly argues that terrorists are conservative and not particularly innovative in terms of their choice of weaponry: "[A]t the end of the century [20th], terrorist still use the same weapons that they used in its beginning, namely: pistols, rifles and improvised explosive devices." 168 David Claridge agrees and argues that since terrorists tend to be conservative in their tactics (which have a proven history),

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165 Transcript of prepared testimony of James K. Campbell, United States Navy, Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Subject: "Chemical and Biological Weapons Threats to America: Are We Prepared?" reported in Federal News Service, April 22, 1998.


167 Ibid.

“there is not incentive to cross the line into the use of WMD [CBRN].” Andrew O’Neil offers an assessment that is commonly agreed to by many terrorism experts—that terrorists are more likely to deploy a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)—the “dirty bomb”—instead of a full-scale nuclear bomb; this is partly attributable to the difficulties in obtaining weapons grade fissile materials which he notes are “scarce internationally and very expensive to produce in sufficient quantities to manufacture even the crudest of nuclear devices.”

Is Suicide Terrorism a unique and significant characteristic of Fourth Wave terrorism?

A key characteristic of fourth wave terrorism is the large reliance on suicide attacks. David Rapoport argues that suicide terrorism “was the most deadly tactical innovation” of fourth wave terrorism. However, a reasonable argument could be made that fourth wave suicide terrorists—who invariably refer to themselves as martyrs—are not that different from martyrs in other terrorism waves. For instance, in 1907, a Russian conservatory student named Evstoliia Rogozinnikova, who was a member of a revolutionary terrorist group, walked into a prison administration building and shot its chief. Authorities later discovered that she had 13 pounds of nitro-glycerin, enough to have killed everyone in the building, strapped to her body. Presumably she was prepared

to kill herself (and others with her) either as part of her attack plan, or in the event her assassination attempt failed.\textsuperscript{172} In addition, the Russian revolutionary group, People's Will, used at least two suicide attackers to assassinate Czar Alexander II.\textsuperscript{173} In addition, other examples of suicide terror—or near suicide terror—exist in terrorism history. This has led some to speculate that the current era of suicide terrorism may not be particularly unique.

Despite historical instances of suicide terrorism, this dissertation sides with the argument that fourth wave terrorism has ushered in an era of qualitatively unique (and quantitatively unprecedented) suicide terrorism. Today, suicide terrorism occurs on an almost monthly, or even weekly basis throughout the world. “About 400 suicide attacks committed by over 30 terrorist groups have taken place since the early 1980s and the beginning of the contemporary wave with Hezbollah in Lebanon.”\textsuperscript{174} Analysts such as Lee Harris note that the suicide tactics appear to be an end unto themselves: “…[I]n the fantasy ideology of radical Islam, suicide is not a means to an end but an end in itself. Seen through the distorting prism of radical Islam, the act of suicide is transformed into that of martyrdom—martyrdom in all its transcendent glory…”\textsuperscript{175} Moreover, in some parts of the world, such as Palestine, a ‘cult’ of suicide bombing has emerged. Palestinian culture celebrates the death of a suicide bomber (called a ‘martyr’) as it would

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{172}] Noman M. Naimark, “Terrorism and the Fall of Imperial Russia,” \textit{Terrorism and Political Violence}, Winter 1990, v. 2, n. 4, p. 186.
\item[\textsuperscript{173}] Ibid.
\end{itemize}
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a wedding: "The death of a martyr is routinely announced in the Palestinian press not as an obituary but as a wedding."176

3.10 Conclusion

The earliest terrorists were nonstate actors—they were driven by religious and ethnic motives. With the rise of the state and state system, terror was practiced by both states and nonstate actors. Within the nonstate category, terrorism manifested generally as part of revolutionary or anarchist movements, anti-colonial movements, Marxist or ‘new left’ movements, and finally religious terrorism. As noted above, certain common themes can be found in at least three of the types—anarchist, ‘new left’ and religious. The one terrorism that stands out is ethno-nationalist (or anti-colonial). Paul Wilkinson has written that history demonstrates that it is this category of terrorist that has the greatest chance of success, in terms of achieving a reasonable political settlement. He specifically writes that “nationalist groups tend to be more capable of sustaining protracted campaigns and mobilizing substantial support than ideological groups.”177 Nevertheless, the more idealistic terrorist movements—the anarchists, the ‘new left’ and the religious-motivated—are potentially more dangerous.

Fourth wave terrorism specifically addresses the rise of religious-based terrorism and the emergence of a no-restraint ethos. Although it has many common links with pre-

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177 Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy, p. 25.
modern and modern terrorism, it is imbued with an ethic that favors unconstrained violence:

“Indeed, the terrorist who possesses radical, religious beliefs seems ‘primed’ to commit acts of unconstrained violence believing that such acts are not only sacred, but also necessary to guarantee him or her a blessed existence in the afterlife. Statistics suggest that terrorism motivated by religion oftentimes results in horrific acts of mass killings. Where modern or ‘secular-political’ terrorists typically operate within certain violence thresholds, such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army, those groups or individuals who a radicalized, religious belief may not view themselves as subject to the same constraints as they conduct their violent acts to satisfy (in their belief) a higher authority, God.”\textsuperscript{178}

As this chapter demonstrates there are numerous continuities in various terrorist movements in history, but there are also new twists and alignments. This is why terrorism analysts and scholars trained in one era can often be caught off-guard with the arrival of a new era. Patterns of terrorism, like history, do not repeat, but they do tend to rhyme.

CHAPTER 4: TERRORISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM:
CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES

4.1 Introduction

As a political phenomenon, international terrorism occurs within the context of larger trends and shifts in the international system. In the aftermath of the 11 September attacks in New York City and Washington DC, many US commentators, scholars and analysts claimed, in essence, that the devastating attacks had profoundly changed the world in fundamental ways, and by implication the international system. The US government, moreover, since 9-11 has grounded its foreign policy on the notion that it should conduct a global “war” on terrorism, a move that echoes, in some respects, Theodore Roosevelt’s reactions to the horrors perpetrated by the anarchist terrorists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. During that period, President Roosevelt called for an international campaign against anarchist terror. Specifically he stated that the “crimes [of the anarchist] should be made a crime against the law of nations…declared by treaties among all civilized powers.” Unfortunately for President Roosevelt, a lack of political will during that period within the international community prevented the establishment of a viable regime to confront terrorism effectively.

Terrorism is inherently a violent, dramatic and shocking phenomenon. The effects of terrorism will be felt among its targets, as well as those who directly or indirectly observe the attacks. If the terrorist attack is large enough, it can have international effects as well, such as was seen following the 11 September attacks. However, despite its horror, it is uncertain that terrorism has had a significant impact on international relations (and the international system) as many intuitively presume; some even argue that the impacts have been minimal.\(^2\) In the United States context, the irony is that as horrible as 9-11 was, few Americans have been victims of terrorism during the past two decades. From an actuarial point of view, in fact, Americans would be justified in having a greater fear of the effects of cigarette smoking, car driving, and recreational boating than terrorism. "Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 871 Americans died worldwide from terrorism, an average of about forty-four each year."\(^3\) In contrast, more than 43,000 Americans die yearly in automobile accidents, and another 98,000 die from medical errors in hospitals and other medical settings.

Notwithstanding these caveats, fear of terrorism pervades much of the world, particularly in the current historical era, and thus this fear will almost inevitably entail certain political consequences, including effects on the international system. Audrey Kurth Cronin has argued that terrorism cannot be completely understood through the prism of any one academic discipline—it often entails elements of political science, psychology, anthropology, law, history, theology, economics, forensic science, among

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others. What political science contributes—and particularly what the sub-field of international relations contributes—is a model through which terrorism can be analyzed. This model is often referred to as the international system. Cronin argues that this level of analysis (with regard to the study of terrorism) is the least understood and least developed in political science—perhaps, she suggests, because of its difficulty. Martha Crenshaw suggests more practical reasons why the international system has not generally been relied upon as a decipher mechanism for terrorism. One problem is that the emphasis of "realists" on states has tended to neglect or overlook the role of transnational nonstate actors:

"In such a [realist] framework, threats emanate from states, not non-states, and the most powerful states are the most important for American interests. Weak or failed states and shadowy underground conspiracies do not constitute challenges to the American position in the world. From this perspective, threats are simple to interpret. They stem from rival states that can challenge one’s power now or in the future."  

This chapter will proceed with an analysis of the international system with the 11 September 2001 attacks serving as the primary referent event for purposes of discussion. The chapter will explore traditional views regarding the role of terrorism in the international system and will go on to explain why those assumptions can no longer be accepted in a post 9-11 environment.

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4.2 The international system: its dynamics and actors

Analyzing the international system first requires defining it. Although there are some disagreements, reflecting whether one identifies oneself as a realist, liberal, constructivist, or post-modernist, most will agree that the international system can be broadly defined as the "patterns of interaction [in an international context] that exist among those actors that formulate and conduct a policy designed to further their foreign goals and interests." Another definition holds that the international system is "the authority structure of a system for making and enforcing rules, for allocating assets, and for conducting other authoritative tasks..." The international system is inherently anarchic; "it has no overarching authority to make rules, settle disputes, and provide protection." States must rely on self-help in order to survive and protect themselves. Thus the authority structure of the international system is mostly horizontal, as opposed to vertical.

Former Secretary of State George Shultz described the international system in this way: "We live in an international system of states, a system that originated more than 300 years ago. The idea of the state won out over other ideas about how to

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8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
organize political life because the state gave people a sense of identity, because it provided a framework for individual freedom and economic progress, and because states over time proved able to cooperate with each other for peace and mutual benefit.\textsuperscript{10} It is undeniable that the sovereign state system remains the lynchpin of the international system: "States have been, and continue to be, the most powerful political agents in international affairs."\textsuperscript{11} Among other things, states have at least one characteristic unique to them that is unavailable to other actors in the international system, the ability to act militarily and to engage in legitimate and legally-sanctioned violence.

According to John Rourke and Mark Boyer, the international system contains actors. They basically subdivide these actors into three broad categories:

\textit{States}: first there are national actors—states. States are considered the principal actors on the world stage. States are territorially based political organizations that possess sovereignty. Over a given piece of territory, a state commands a preponderance of economic and military power.

\textit{International Government Actors}: the second level of actors involves government actors that comprise international organizations. These actors are called intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). IGOs are international organizations that consist of states (or their agents) who act as members—a good example is the United Nations. IGOs have played an increasingly important role in the international system,


\textsuperscript{11} Anthony F. Lang, Jr., "Evaluating Middle East Foreign Policy Since 9/11," in "The Impact of 9/11 on the Middle East," \textit{Middle East Policy}, n. 4, n. 9 (December 1, 2002), p. 75.
evidenced by their increasing numbers. “In 1900 there were 30 IGOs. That number has
increased some 900 percent: there are now 272.”

**Transnational Nonstate Actors:** This is the third level of actors within the
international system, and this category is increasingly becoming important, particularly
in regard to terrorism. Nonstate actors include private actors that have economic,
political or criminal roles and objectives. Two good examples include non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), such as Amnesty International, and transnational
corporations such as British Petroleum. Terrorist groups and transnational crime groups
also fall within this category, although they have traditionally been assigned a marginal
status within the traditional view of the international system. Once again, like IGOs,
the prominence of transnational nonstate actors has increased dramatically during the
past century. “In 1900, there were 69 NGOs. Since then the number of NGOs has
expanded 70 fold to approximately 5,000.” Moreover, nonstate actors have assumed a
much greater prominence in the international system: According to Muhittin Ataman
“...[N]on-state actors have become essential instruments within the international
system. Today, it is difficult to analyze international politics and behaviors of nation-
states without attaching great importance to them.”

In addition to its constituent actors, the international system is also comprised of
a basic power structure. Typically structural analysis tends to highlight the
relationships between the major actors, and this has traditionally meant states. The

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13 Ibid., p. 51.
primary currency of international relations is power and power is always shifting within the international system, sometimes slowly and, at other times, more quickly.

"Powerful countries rise and fall in their relative power to one another."15 Rourke and Boyer argue that the first half of the 20th century witnessed the decline of a multipolar international system—with the end point in 1945, the end of World War II. A new bipolar era began in 1947 and lasted until 1985. The waning of the bipolar system occurred between 1987 and 1992, and its end-point was the conclusion of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. From 1993 onward, a new international system has been emerging, although the exact nature of this system is not yet understood. One could argue that the United States, with its unchallenged military dominance, has ushered in a unipolar world—but this assessment may be premature. What could be emerging is a new bipolar system, with the United States on one side, with the European Union on the other, or perhaps a tri-polar system with the US on one side, China on the other, and Europe on the third, or perhaps a multipolar system including other states, such as India and Brazil.

4.3 Terrorism and the International System

Terrorism’s relationship with the international system can be viewed from two general angles. First, there is the analysis of how terrorism has influenced or affected the international system. Terrorists are similar to states in that both entities seek power,

15 Rourke and Boyer, World Politics: International Politics on the World Stage, p. 56.
particularly if one views international relations through the lens of classical realism.\textsuperscript{16} Power, according to Joseph Nye, "is the ability to effect the outcomes you want and, if necessary, to change the behavior of others to make this happen."\textsuperscript{17} In the terrorism context, the desire for power can be viewed as a central thread running through all terrorist movements since the rise of the modern state system. "...Modern terrorism can best be seen as a power struggle: central power versus local power, big power versus small power, modern power versus traditional power."\textsuperscript{18} Even today's religious terrorists are, in Cronin's view, engaged in a "ongoing modern power struggle between those with power and those without it."\textsuperscript{19} Nevertheless, historical evidence suggests that, notwithstanding their power motives, terrorists have had—at least until recently—only a marginal impact on the international system. As Walter Laqueur has stated "[Terrorism] has been a tragedy for the victims, but seen in historical perspective it seldom has been more than a nuisance."\textsuperscript{20}

Moreover, most scholars will agree that, although terror attacks are horrific, they rarely have any sort of lasting impact or effect on the international system. John Lewis Gaddis argues that anarchists, assassins and saboteurs have operated throughout history; however, they have rarely destabilized states or societies and "the amount of physical

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 284.
damage they're caused have been relatively small."21 Alex Schmid confirms this view by contrasting terrorism with more conventional war and genocide: “Compared to the fatality of contemporary wars and genocide, the losses due to acts of terrorism, while tragic and traumatic on an individual scale, are modest.”22 This is not to suggest that terrorism has had a minimal impact in its local circumstances—in many cases, the impact was quite significant. Moreover, the terrorist attack, as in the case of the bombing of the King David Hotel in Palestine in 1946, can be seen as a “proximate cause” agent in a long series of effects that ultimately lead to a significant political transition (in that instance, the ultimate transition was the founding of the state of Israel).

One key exception to the argument just presented is the phenomenon of “geopolitical fault line” terrorism. This refers to the fact that when terrorism has occurred along a geopolitical fault line, it has had (or at least had the potential) to be far more consequential to the international system. Two prominent cases in recent history are the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. In the first case, a group of terrorists in 1914, led by Gavrilo Princip, assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir-apparent to the Austro-Hungarian throne. This assassination is viewed historically as a trigger event for World War I, although it is important to note that the assassination did not cause World War I; instead, it was the subsequent Austro-Hungarian government response

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that led down that perilous road. In a recent study, Paul Schroeder makes this point succinctly: “Though Princip deliberately tried to start a great war, his terrorist action, which succeeded only by luck, could not in itself produce that war. Only Austria-Hungary could do that by its response, and it did.”

Moreover, this case is complicated by evidence that the Serbian military intelligence apparatus had actually trained, supported and armed these terrorists. The Austro-Hungarian government apparently knew about Serbian government links to the terrorists and thus “it considered the assassination the final outrage in a series of Serbian provocations and attacks directed against the monarchy.” The Serbian government’s “hidden” role—as perceived by the Austro-Hungarian government—may have played the critical role in sparking the subsequent war. The Serbs apparently concluded “that Austria-Hungary’s existence as a great power required a direct attack [on Serbia] that would, as the phrase went, eliminate Serbia as a political factor in the Balkans.”

A second case points to how terrorism might have significantly altered the international system, had it not been for intervention by major powers—such as the United States—that urged restraint. On December 13, 2001, a five-man suicide squad stormed the Indian Parliament in New Delhi in one of the most daring attacks in India’s recent history. The assassins had intended to kill as many Parliamentarians as possible, including possibly India’s Prime Minister. However, they ultimately killed only six people, including several police officials. The attack sparked a major increase in

24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
tensions between India and Pakistan, with threats of nuclear attack against the other emanating from both sides.

The quick escalation of tensions stemmed from the fact that the Indian authorities quickly linked the terrorist group—Laskar-e-Taiba—to the Pakistani government, which has had a long history of supporting insurgency organizations as part of its proxy war against India in Kashmir. Pakistan’s government contended that it could not control the group. The eruption of major war was probably stymied by Pakistani insistence that, while it had supported Laskar-e-Taiba and other groups in the past, it could not control all of their actions. Thus, as can be seen from this example, it appears that the power of terrorism in the international system really depends on whether the terrorist groups are perceived as state-supported, or as pure nonstate actors. In the case of state-supported terrorist attacks, the impact on the international system—and on international relations between states in general—is likely to be much larger (even if war doesn’t result, it can lead to a serious ratcheting up of tensions that takes many years to attenuate).

History suggests that when states are directly tied to terrorism (through evidence of funding or other forms of logistical or ideological support), the political potency of the specific terrorist incident rises considerably. This partially reflects the state-centric bias that exists in the international system, as well as among international relations scholars. When the terrorist organization is viewed as a nonstate actor, it has traditionally not been considered as serious a security challenge. The terrorist group and its actions are viewed as a nuisance, but not necessarily a threat to state security.
This state-centric bias can be seen in the comments or writings of realists and neorealists, who place the state as the primary referent in the international system. For these analysts, practically all terrorism has a state sponsor, either through active support or acquiescence.

Henry Kissinger recently summed up this view in his testimony in 2002 before the US Senate Foreign Relations committee: “Global terrorism cannot flourish except with the support of states that either sympathize with it or acquiesce in its actions.”

States may not actually conduct overt acts to support the terrorists, but they can support terrorism by merely tolerating the presence or activities of terrorists within their territory. But this state-centric view in many ways ignores the potency and agility of network-based terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda. Moreover, the Kissinger view tends to dismiss or overlook the challenge of failed (or quasi) states that simply do not have the capacity to restrict activities on their territory—in other words, states with incomplete sovereignty—or failed states that do not, for all practical purposes, have a functioning government. This is one of the major challenges in fighting network-based transnational terrorism.

A second way of analyzing terrorism’s relationship with the international system is to view the problem of terrorism as an indicator—either lagging or leading—of larger trends and tensions in the international system. The international system is a web that reflects multiple competitions for power. Within this view, terrorists are no different than states or other nonstate actors that seek power, but are nevertheless constrained by

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forces within the international system. David Rapoport’s “wave” theory of international terrorism, described in detail in chapter 2, captures the basic notion that it is the larger tensions in the international system at any one time in history that gives rise to—or enables—terrorism.

Rapoport argues that modern terrorism is characterized by major waves—or epochs—each of which were fostered by particular tensions within the international system that dominated within a particular period of time. He argues that the first wave of modern nonstate actor terrorism, which was revolutionary and anarchist in nature, occurred in the late 19th century. The second wave of terrorism, in the early 20th century, generally followed a mood in the international system for “self-determination” and opposition to colonialism and empires. The third wave of terrorism (roughly spanning the 1960s and 1970s) reflected an international system that was ensconced in the tensions of the Cold War, the capitalist-communist competition of ideas, as well as the ‘New Left’ movement. Finally, the fourth wave of terrorism begins in 1979 and is now in progress (estimated, according to Rapoport, to end in the year 2025). This is what Rapoport calls the “religious wave” and although examples of this wave can be found in all religions, Rapoport admits that militant Islam forms the foundation of this wave.27

Thus, historic evidence tends to suggest that the international system has always played a major role in shaping trends in terrorism. In most cases, however, this effect has been unidirectional—the international system’s effect on terrorism. In general,

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terrorism itself (and specific terrorist incidents) has had less significant or long-lasting impacts on the international system. One argument among terrorism scholars that counters this thesis to some degree is the rise of international terrorism in the late 1960s. Some scholars believe that it this critical transition period—and particularly the year 1968—that marks the beginning of an era where terrorism truly became an international phenomenon. The year 1968 marked the beginning of the Palestinians’ air piracy campaign which was conducted “in part as an alternative strategy to the conventional battle which had brought disaster to the Arab coalition that in 1967 made war on Israel.”

The rise of international terrorism also coincided with the rise and proliferation of television, and particularly live television coverage. Hoffman argues that during this period, the nature and character of terrorism began to change:

“For the first time, terrorists began to travel regularly from one country to another to carry out attacks. In addition, they also began to target innocent civilians from other countries who often had little if anything to do with the terrorists’ cause or grievance, simply in order to endow their acts with the power to attract attention and publicity that attacks against their declared or avowed enemies often lacked. Their intent was to shock and, by shocking, to stimulate worldwide fear and alarm.”

This view is supported by other scholars as well who view the 1960s as the critical “pivot” point where terrorism became a force in the international system. Peter Chalk notes that “by the late 1960s and early 1970s, extremist political violence had

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become a truly prominent feature of the international system.”

Similarly, Aldo Borgu asserts that terrorism “has been a feature of international policies and security since at least the late 1960s.” This view is also shared by former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu:

“Terrorism began its rapid growth in the 1960s. It was sparked by the early successes of two groups of terrorists: the PLO, which introduced airline hijacking as an international weapon, and European radical factions which carried out increasingly bold bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations throughout the Continent. Terrorist groups, seemingly independent from one another, soon proliferated throughout Europe, Japan, North and South America, and the Middle East.”

4.4 9-11 and the International System: Continuity or Discontinuity?

The primary argument of this dissertation is that the 11 September 2001 attacks, and more importantly the “fourth wave terrorism” that it represents and heralds, marks a significant departure in the evolution of terrorism. Instead of merely being the product of trends in the international system, 9-11 brought about a situation in which terrorism significantly shaped the international system in a direct (not merely a proximate) manner. For years, American policymakers viewed terrorism as an important security issue, but clearly subordinate to classic state-on-state security

matters. The traditional view is that terrorism, while destructive, constitutes a minimal threat to national security. Even as late as 2000, US security analysts were asserting these themes, as with the following example: "Today’s terrorism does not constitute military power. Terrorism is assessed as posing only a small direct threat to our national survival, but its impact over time on U.S. foreign policy interests and U.S. national security may be far greater." The perspective that terrorism constitutes a nuisance to national security changed significantly after 11 September 2001, particularly among certain political leaders, analysts and scholars who began to view terrorism itself as a direct threat to not only American security, but also international security.

The first consideration is that in the post Cold War era, the international system has evolved in a way that convergence has occurred between various trends—communications, technology transfers, and networked societies—and these trends greatly aid terrorists. John Lewis Gaddis described the paradigm shift that distinguished 9-11 from previous attacks. As noted earlier, Gaddis has written that terrorism has traditionally had a minimal impact on the international system, but 9-11 was something qualitatively different because it "showed that terrorists can now inflict levels of destruction that only states wielding military power used to be able to accomplish." Thus 9-11 obscured the dichotomy between states and nonstate actors in terms of exerting power and influence within the international system. Consequently,

the world community now faces a terrorist threat that, unlike past terrorist trends, "has the potential to fundamentally threaten the international system."\textsuperscript{36}

The September 11 attacks in the United States occurred within a milieu of shifting social, economic and political alignments in the international system. The attack itself was deemed a "massive intelligence failure"\textsuperscript{37} by the United States, although in many respects it could be viewed as a massive paradigm failure in the sense that the dominant paradigm in international relations—realism—which posits the state as the primary referent actor, from which the most serious security threats emanate, simply could not explain or predict the dynamics of the 9-11 attack. The dominant realist paradigm could not account for the effects of globalization, the rise of religious militancy, nor the increasing threat of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons being developed, acquired and used by nonstate actors (these three themes are explored in chapter 6, 7, and 8 of this dissertation).

With respect to the Nye 3-level model theory (described in chapter 2), it is well documented that the third and second levels both influenced and were influenced by the 9-11 attacks. The third level empowered nonstate actors, networks and nonstate ideologies. The second level was involved because of the vast money involved—the money necessary for the attack, as well as the economic effects of the attacks. The


\textsuperscript{37} This phrase was uttered by US Senator Richard Shelby on the CBS News Show \textit{Face the Nation} on 16 September 2001 (file accessed through Lexis-Nexis).
estimated economic losses attributable to the 9-11 attack exceeded $100 billion.\textsuperscript{38}

Secondly, the 9/11 attack has arguably slowed down international commerce—certainly it has made it much more expensive. “Air travel has become more bothersome, and airfreight more expensive.”\textsuperscript{39}

However, what made 9-11 even more significant was its effect on the first level of Nye’s model—the relationship between states. To begin with, the attacks were aimed squarely at the world’s premier military and economic power at a time in history when a truly unipolar power system existed. “The early twenty-first century system is unipolar because the United States is the first nation in the history of world politics to hold preponderance across the spectrum of capabilities, including economic, military, political, geopolitical, and technological.”\textsuperscript{40} Many believe that this unipolar world system will see much less cataclysmic conflict, but will see an increase in conflict on the lower end of the conflict spectrum, “largely within states that are in the process of fragmenting as a result of ethnic and other national forces.”\textsuperscript{41}

The rise of a unipolar power system, with the U.S. at the apex, has created an environment in which terrorists are tempted or motivated to target the United States directly, as has been seen among Islamist groups, such as Al Qaeda. This is, as Randall


\textsuperscript{40} James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., \textit{Contending Theories of International Relations} (New York: Longman, 2001), p. 133.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
Woods suggests, a normal process when a country rises to world power status. Richard Betts argues that “American global primary is one of the causes of this war... To groups like Al Qaeda, the United States is the enemy because American military power dominates their world, supports corrupt governments in their countries, and backs Israelis against Muslims.” The overwhelming military superiority of the United States has created a situation where the only way an enemy can strike at the United States is to employ terrorism, or other “irregular” forms of warfare. This is what the U.S. Department of Defense has termed “asymmetric warfare”, or warfare between actors with significant disparities in capability. Asymmetric war results, for instance, when “radical Muslim zealots [determine that they] cannot expel American power with conventional military means, so they substitute clandestine means of delivery against military targets (such as the Khobar Towers barracks in Saudi Arabia) or high-profile political targets (embassies in Kenya and Tanzania).”

The world is witnessing the rise of what Michael Hudson describes as “Westphalian states vs. transnational networks” in which terrorism acts as the “equalizer weapon” because of its accessibility and low expense. In contrast to a country like the United States, Japan—which, ironically, many viewed as an economic threat in the early 1990s—is not considered a terrorist target because “Japan’s economic

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44 Ibid., p. 25.
power does not make it a political, military, and cultural behemoth that penetrates their societies." 46

A unipolar power system also generates anxiety and resentment on the first level of the Nye 3-level model. Robert Kagan argues that during this unipolar phase, in which the United States enjoys unrivalled power, both allies and enemies are nervous about the nature of this power. "...[T]he core of the problem [of international anxiety about American power] lies in the unique structural realities of the present international system." 47 Essentially, American dominance in the international system following the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union "has created suspicion and resentment even among America's allies." 48 Many states have begun to question whether they want to be constrained by American power, and have begun balancing against American power, as was seen in the broad coalition that blocked U.N. authorization of the Iraq War, a war that was justified—at least partially—by the United States and its allies on the basis of terrorist fears. This blocking action within the U.N. "denied the United States the legitimacy of international approval" and significantly raised the "economic and political costs of the war." 49 In many respects, 9-11 set into motion trends that were already in play, but which were not yet clear. However, it also allowed the unilateralist militarist wing of the Bush administration to gain the upper hand, at the expense of the "liberal realists" or multilateralists.

48 Ibid.
In one sense, the 9-11 attacks gave the United States government, under the leadership of President George Bush, the opportunity to assert American military primacy and thus solidify the American-dominated unipolar international system. The subsequent military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated, without doubt, the brute strength and unrivaled power of American military force. Moreover, some analysts feel that the true impact of 9-11 on the international system is that it has given license to those within the United States who reject the liberalist, rule-based international system that has been established since the end of World War II:

"The evolution of the international system has reached a critical intersection. Absent the liberal brand of U.S. internationalism around which the post-World War II order took shape, that order is currently at risk. The preservation of an Atlantic zone of stable peace—the establishment of which is perhaps the greatest achievement of the 20th century—is in question, with balance-of-power dynamics returning to relations between the United States and Europe. The institutional infrastructure central to managing the international system is eroding."\(^{50}\)

Amin Saikal offers an important alternative view. He argues that the 9-11 attacks had the potential to alter the international system in a major way—particularly if the United States had chosen not to respond in a military fashion: Saikal asserts that the attacks "were so massive, catastrophic and symbolic that if left un-answered would have substantially degraded America’s position at home and abroad, with a potential seriously to undermine America’s superpower status and global faith in capitalism and

\(^{50}\) Ibid.
Thus, aggressive or unilateral U.S. actions, however noble (whether in the context of the "war on terror" or otherwise), will be viewed with a jaundiced eye by those states predisposed to worrying about American power. One factor stimulating this worry may be concerns that the United States is seeking re-make the world, in a

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52 Ibid.
53 Ikenberry and Kupchan, "Liberal Realism: the Foundations of a Democratic Foreign Policy."
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
way that would make terrorism less likely. To confront a perceived dangerous world, the United States may wish to “re-order” the world, or as Richard Haass of the Department of State stated, “in the twenty-first century the principal aim of American foreign policy is to integrate other countries and organizations into arrangements that will sustain a world consistent with US interests and values, and thereby promote peace, prosperity and justice as widely as possible.”

Part of this process involves the doctrine of preemption, which is predicated on the notion that sovereignty is not complete, that “sovereignty does not grant governments a blank check to do whatever they like within their own borders.” Thus, states that allow—by commission or omission—the existence of transnational terrorist organizations to exist on their soil will be held accountable. This is the essence of the philosophy of the current administration and represents a sharpening, or acceleration, of unilateral inclinations that became apparent at the end of the Cold War. President Bush has justified this apparent policy shift in various statements, including the following: “The attacks of September the 11th, 2001, showed what the enemies of America did with four airplanes. We will not wait to see what terrorists or terrorist states could do with weapons of mass destruction.”

Thus, the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States have acted as the precipitating event that has led to changes within the international system, particularly on the “first level” of Nye’s 3-level model. Ironically, while 9-11 first appeared to

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57 Ibid.
strengthen multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations, subsequent actions, such as the American invasion of Iraq, have weakened the United Nations and have created a split between the United States and its traditional allies, most notably Germany and France. The complete effects of the 9-11 attacks are yet to be known, but it is likely that 9-11 will be viewed as a significant milestone with regard to the impact of terrorism on the international system. President Bush hinted at such a transformation in his 2002 National Security Strategy document, in which he stated as follows: “Today, the world’s great powers find ourselves on the same side—united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos. The United States will build on these common interests to promote global security.” Some leaders have discussed getting back to “business as usual” when terrorism was viewed as a nuisance. Yet the dramatic and cataclysmic nature of the 9-11 attack will almost certainly sear this event in the memories of several generations, particularly since, due to the information age, it can be viewed over and over in video format.

Overall, it is likely that terrorism will never again be viewed under the “nuisance” paradigm, as Walter Laqueur has proposed, and will instead be seen as a much larger systemic threat. US defense department officials regularly describe the terrorist threat as a threat against the sovereign state system, and not merely an attack against a specific nation. The fact that terrorism is now seen as a systemic attack on the state system reflects a fundamental change in how the issue of terrorism is viewed.

Audrey Kurth Cronin echoes this theme by arguing that “the use of terrorism implies an attempt to de-legitimize the concept of sovereignty, and even the structure of the state system itself.”\textsuperscript{61} She also compares it to what she terms as the two most serious systemic challenges of the twentieth century—the rise of fascism and communism. Cronin argues that these two powerful ideological movements “were fundamental challenges to the international state system, engaged in by what were, at least initially, pariah states, and requiring countervailing coalitions of highly industrialized status quo states to defeat them.”\textsuperscript{62}

4.5 The Second Level of the Nye Model—and Implications of Recent Al Qaeda Statements

One advantage of viewing the international system through the prism of the Nye 3-level model is that it instructs us that not only are classic state-to-state relations important (first level phenomena), but also relationships between other transnational actors (second and third level). Recent speeches and statements from Osama bin Laden suggest a strong interest in the second level—the realm of transnational economic relations (and the larger economic system within which these relations function). Moreover, these speeches reveal an understanding of how terrorism can strongly affect the international system, particularly by influencing the second level.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
In recent speeches, bin Laden has remarked about the economic effects of the 9-11 attacks. Moreover, close examination of his statements suggests a strategy of Al Qaeda to weaken the United States not by focusing on the first level (where raw military power is most effective), but on the second level. In an interview with the Internet-based *Jihad Online News Network*, Osama bin Laden described what he understood as the economic consequences of the 9-11 attacks:

"The daily US income is $20 billion. There was no business during the first week [following the 11 September attack] due to the psychological shock. And, no one has gone to work to this day due to the big shock. If you multiply $20 billion by seven days, the answer is $140 billion. But, it is actually more than that. You have to add it to the $640 billion. So what is the result? It is more than $800 billion. The loss of buildings is more than $30 billion. The number of employees dismissed by aviation companies to this day, or until two days ago, was over 170,000."\(^{63}\)

Moreover, in an interview, bin Laden reveals that the World Trade Center was chosen as a target not merely because of its symbolic value—its towering presence and representation of strength—but also because it clearly represented the American economy: "Those who were killed in the World Trade Center towers were an economic power, not a school for children or a house. Those who were in the [World Trade] center backed the biggest economic power in that world that sows corruption on

\(^{63}\) "Full text of interview held with Al-Qa'ida Leader Usama Bin Ladin, on 21 October 2001", *Jihad Online News Network*, 21 January 2003, translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS].
In another speech delivered by audio tape, bin Laden once again focuses on the economic consequences of 9-11:

"Their losses following the strike and its repercussions have reached more than a trillion dollars. They also witnessed a budget deficit for the third consecutive year. This year's deficit reached a record number estimated at $450 billion. Therefore, we thank God."

Moreover, in November 2004, Osama bin Laden mentioned a "policy" organized by his organization of economically damaging the United States: "So we are continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy."

The 11 September 2001 attacks may not have weakened American military power, but it did harm—at least temporarily—American economic power. There is little doubt that the 9-11 attacks resulted in substantial economic loss for the United States. An estimated 130,000 individuals lost their jobs in 462 mass layoffs attributable to the 9-11 attacks. According to the Comptroller of New York, the 9-11 attacks cost New York City $30.5 billion. The US airline industry posted losses of approximately $17 billion from 2001 to 2003, due to the effects of 9-11 (but also including the effects

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64 "Full Text of interview held by Al-Qa’ida Leader Usama bin Laden on 21 Oct 2001", Jihad Online News Network WWW-Text in Arabic, 21 Jan 03, translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
of the SARS epidemic, as well as the Iraq war). On the insurance front, the loss of life and property resulted in the largest property/casualty claim in history (an estimated $40 billion). In a report issued by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), it described the amount of destruction in similar terms:

“The 11 September attacks inflicted casualties and material damages on a far greater scale than any terrorist aggression in recent history. The destruction of physical assets was estimated in the national accounts to amount to $14 billion for private businesses, $1.5 billion for State and local government enterprises and $0.7 billion for Federal government.”

However, it could be argued—as some reports have stated—that the economic losses, while devastating, were largely temporary. America’s economy has rebounded and has absorbed these losses. But this more positive analysis fails to take into account permanent structural changes (and costs) that are related to 9-11. For example, around the world, governments have passed and implemented thousands of new laws, regulations, and rules designed to diminish the chance of another major terrorist attack. In the maritime realm, new regulations pertaining to new security staff and equipment are expected to cost 1.3 billion, with annual costs of 730 million after that. In the United States, the USA PATRIOT Act (Title 3) has expanded reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act for financial transactions to other “nontraditional” industries,

such as insurance companies, travel agencies, automobile dealerships, and jewelry shops, among others. The expansion of Bank Secrecy Act reporting requirements has created a structural change resulting in increased costs, which are now permanently embedded into the cost of doing business.\textsuperscript{73}

Moreover, the more permanent impact has been a re-orientation of money directed toward security, and away from more productive applications. As one recent U.S. Congressional research report stated:

"Resources that could have been used to enhance productive capacity of the country will now be used for security. Since it will take more labor and capital to produce a largely unchanged amount of goods and services, this will result in a slower rate of growth in national productivity, a price that will be borne by every American in the form of a slower rate of growth of per capita real income."\textsuperscript{74}

However, after reviewing bin Laden’s statements, and taking into account his organization’s interest in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons (explored in greater detail in chapter 7), there is growing concern that a major CBRN attack could bring about the economic harm that bin Laden envisages. According to a study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), an RDD—"dirty bomb"—packed into a container and loaded onto a ship, and then clandestinely transported to a particular port, could, upon detonation, cause damages amounting in the tens of billions of dollars.\textsuperscript{75} "The very things that have allowed...


\textsuperscript{74} Makinen, "The Economic Effects of 9/11: a Retrospective Assessment," p. 2.

\textsuperscript{75} "Open to Attack...", \textit{Lloyd's List}, July 23, 2003, p. 7.
maritime transport to contribute to economic prosperity also render it uniquely vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist groups,” according to the report.76

A nuclear attack would be even more devastating. Apart from the enormous loss of human life that can be expected, the long-lasting effect is likely to be in the economic realm. For instance, a nuclear device detonated in lower Manhattan would likely result in economic damage in excess of US$1 trillion.77 According to an OECD report that assessed the economic effects of the 9-11 attacks, “an attack against, for instance, New York City using a nuclear weapons could leave most of the metropolitan area uninhabitable for years. The direct impact would reduce the country’s production potential by about 3 per cent.”78 One could argue that these are short-term effects that, like the aftermath of 9-11, would be ameliorated in due course. However, the report points to more ominous structural changes that could weaken the United States permanently. The following assessment assumes a nuclear attack on New York City:

“Nationwide, both household and business confidence would be badly shaken, as well as the trust in the Government’s capacity to protect the country. The displacement of the surviving population to non-contaminated areas would create the need for new housing. As standard insurance policies exclude nuclear attacks, the cost of reconstruction would fall on the budget, and the fiscal outlook would deteriorate markedly. The recent shrinkage of coverage for terrorism-related risks…would also leave most businesses dangerously exposed. Over the long term, such an attack would sharply reduce the readiness of persons and businesses to agglomerate in metropolitan areas. The trend would

therefore be to disseminate in less populated areas, which may have a negative impact on innovation and productivity growth.”

The report concludes with this ominous note: “Overall, a second terrorist attack could have longer-lasting effects, especially one using weapons of mass destruction.” Such an attack would result in systemic changes in how societies (not just the United States) are ordered, how business is conducted, and how governance is conducted. Although the United States would likely rebound, or embark upon a military assault on the source country of the nuclear weapon, or its constituent materials, the longer term effects, geopolitically, would likely be profound. The structural shifts in the international system would be visible, structural and, most likely, permanent.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the relationship between terrorism and the international system. In general, it is accepted that terrorism is often shaped more by the international system, instead of the other way around. However, 9-11 arguably changed this relationship, or at least elevated the significance of terrorism in terms of its effects on the international system. The 9-11 attacks were the product of an unprecedented convergence in the international system between religious, social and technological trends.

79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
International terrorism did not suddenly emerge with 9-11—however, what 9-11 reflected was a shift in the international system. Al Qaeda was able to operate relatively freely in the third level of the Nye 3-level model. States did not take the threat of terrorism seriously, prior to 9-11, because traditionally only threats existing in or emanating from the first level—i.e. state-based threats—were seen as true security threats. In addition, Al Qaeda was the product of a key convergence in a number of functional and ideological trends, including globalization and its various processes, the rise of radical religious ideologies as a palliative against state failure and economic malaise, and finally the proliferation of CBRN weapons beyond the realm of states.

The end result is a transformation of the power structure of the international system. Commenting on the systemic-change aspect of the post 9-11 view of terrorism, Audrey Kurth Cronin argues that “the age of terrorism is a new era in international relations, where the traditional tools of power politics will be less important than in the past.”

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CHAPTER 5: GLOBALIZATION AND THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION—
THE FIRST DRIVER OF FOURTH WAVE TERRORISM

5.1 Introduction

In February 2000, an Egyptian merchant living in Guangzhou, China sought assistance from a local internet firm to set up an internet web site. After a fee was negotiated, the Egyptian, Sami Ali, set up his web site with the address "maalemaljihad.com". With technical assistance from militants in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United Kingdom, Mr. Ali’s website was open for business. The home page welcomed visitors to the site of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, a militant group closely associated with Al Qaeda. What was surprising about the website was not its content, but rather its location—hosted in a country with a centralized, nominally-Communist government—far from the Middle East where such militant ideologies are rooted.

Four years later, in another case, an Internet company in Malaysia, Acme Commerce, claimed that it had unwittingly hosted a web site that showed the May 2004 beheading of US national Nick Berg, who was killed by Islamic extremists in Iraq. Malaysian leaders were embarrassed by the revelation and later Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawai vowed not to “allow any kind of Web page or any company operating on behalf of terrorists.” Acme Commerce denied any linkages to or sympathies for Al

Qaeda or other similar groups. Later the company searched other sites that it hosted and discovered at least five more sites linked to Al Qaeda or other terrorist organizations, which were subsequently shut down.\(^3\) The incident followed recent embarrassing revelations that Malaysia had been linked to Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan’s nuclear network.

Although these cases may appear unusual, they should be viewed within the context of transnational terrorist groups’ increasing reliance on the Internet and other new communication technologies to plan and conduct their operations. Al Qaeda in particular has masterfully exploited the Internet to advance its particular political agenda. For example, after enduring an onslaught of criticism in the Middle East regarding its operations and ideology, Al Qaeda reportedly launched an Internet offensive, relying on websites, such as now defunct www.alneda.com, to promote its message and spread its propaganda. According to one analyst, “al-Qaeda attaches great importance to waging psychological warfare, and has used the Internet as its medium.”\(^4\)

Indeed, the information revolution has empowered militant Islamic groups in their campaign against the West. Information technology is used when planning attacks—information is passed via email or “chat rooms” to operatives in the field—and it is used when justifying or explaining attacks. The information revolution has created opportunities for nonstate actors, such as Al Qaeda, that simply were unavailable before. With minimal costs, nonstate actors can establish a presence on the international stage

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\(^3\)Ibid.

and transform their asymmetry into a symbolic symmetry, as Al Qaeda has done in its
titanic confrontation with the United States. These information revolution tools have, as
one writer notes, “led to enhanced efficiency in many terrorist-related activities,
including administrative tasks, coordination of operations, recruitment of potential
members, communication among adherents, and attraction of sympathizers.”

But the larger enabler is not only information technology and the information
revolution in which it is embedded, it is the process of globalization itself, of which the
information revolution is one part. Terrorism always occurs within a larger political
context. During the anti-colonial struggles and movements of the early 20th century, anti-
colonial or nationalist terrorism was prominent. During the Cold War, leftist or Marxist
terrorism was in ascendant. Today, the prominent and most powerful trend is
globalization and it is within this enabling environment that contemporary transnational
terrorism continues to thrive.

Al Qaeda, as one example of this trend, is the quintessential product of
globalization—with its extensive transnational linkages, reliance on modern
communications technology and deft manipulation of international financial pathways.
Al Qaeda thus represents the “new” terrorism (or fourth wave terrorism), a terrorism
rooted in the various—and often contradictory—processes of globalization. Regarding
21st century terrorism and its relationship to globalization, Audrey Kurth Cronin has

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argued that "globalization and terrorism are intricately intertwined forces characterizing international security in the twenty-first century." \(^6\)

5.2 Defining Globalization

Before examining the globalization-terrorism nexus, it might be useful to review just what is meant by the term "globalization" itself. Globalization has become the catchphrase used by many scholars to describe the vast network of international interdependence—transnational cultural, economic and military flows—that characterizes global society today. One definition posits that globalization represents "the growth of worldwide networks of interdependence." \(^7\) R.J. Barry Jones asserts that globalization can be seen as an enhanced stage of internationalization: "Globalization can be understood as a higher stage of internationalization, which itself may be interpreted as an increase in the inter-societal flows of finance, trade, social patterns and human mobility." \(^8\)

Joseph Nye argues that there is nothing particularly new about globalization, but what is new is that the "networks are thicker and more complex, involving people from more regions and social classes." \(^9\) To the extent that globalization represents increased interdependence, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye have identified three key elements that

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\(^{6}\)Ibid.  
\(^{9}\) Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*.  

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facilitate this process. First, globalization is characterized by density of networks, which refers to the fact that as interdependence has grown, international networks have become thicker and more important. Second, globalization can be measured via institutional velocity, which refers to speed and magnitude of information exchange; it is within this element that the information revolution plays such an important role. The third element is transnational participation and complex interdependence. This refers to the multiple channels between societies—not just at the elite level, but at the common level as well. Complex interdependence also implies the absence of a hierarchy of issues; all issues are important, depending on the particular network.

Keohane and Nye also propose slightly different language to analyze the processes of globalization. First, they draw a distinction between interdependence and globalization. “Globalization” is, in many respects, an analogue of the 1970s phrase “interdependence”. Both of these phrases, according to Keohane and Nye, “express a poorly understood but widespread feeling that the very nature of world politics is changing.” However, interdependence “refers to a condition, a state of affairs.” Interdependence can increase as it has done since the end of World War II, or it can decrease, as it did during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Globalization, on the other hand, “implies that something is increasing: there is more of it.” Globalization is the process of expanding “globalism”—the opposite would be “deglobalization” which would refer to the idea that globalism is decreasing.

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11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
Globalism is described as “a state of the world involving networks of interdependence at multicontinental distances.” These linkages can occur in terms of information flows, capital flows, international migration, or any other transnational flows (including diseases or environmental phenomena, such as acid rain.) Interdependence is far less dynamic than globalization; interdependence simply refers to single transaction linkages. Globalism is a type of interdependence, except that it features two characteristics: multi-nodal networks (not simply single linkages) and multicontinental distances (not simply regional networks or linkages). Keohane and Nye provide an example (regarding the spread of Islam versus Hinduism) to illustrate the basic differences between the concepts: “Islam’s rapid diffusion from Arabia across Asia to what is now Indonesia was a clear instance of globalization, but the initial movement of Hinduism across the Indian subcontinent was not.”

Stanley Hoffman approaches globalization slightly differently by breaking the concept into three key parts: economic globalization, cultural globalization and political globalization. Economic globalization, according to Hoffman, affects countries and societies directly because it encompasses international trade, foreign investment flows and transnational technology transfers. Cultural globalization, on the other hand, refers to the “flow of cultural goods” that travel across borders, and can include artwork, movies, and other media that collectively transmit ideas. Political globalization is a product of both the economic and cultural varieties; it is characterized by the “preponderance of the
United States and its political institutions and by a vast array of international and regional organizations and transgovernmental networks..."\(^{16}\)

As a predominant trend within the international system, globalization colors all forms of transactions, but one of its most important effects is that it elevates the importance of nonstate actors—a point that is particularly relevant to terrorism. In his 2002 annual report to Congress regarding global threats to the United States, Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), argued that traditional approaches to security have almost always focused on the "state-oriented threat model"—however, this state-centric model is no longer adequate, especially as nonstate actors have become empowered by the forces of globalization. He stated specifically that "non-state adversaries are not likely to be deterred by our overwhelming military superiority, and will often present challenges that do not lend themselves to a predominantly military solution."\(^{17}\)

Theodore Cohn makes four critical observations about globalization if it is to be properly understood. First, he argues that globalization is not a uniform process that is affecting the entire world in the same way; clearly it is more evident in certain places more than others. Cohn asserts that "the effects of globalization are far more evident...in urban areas than they are in rural areas, on remote islands, and in extremely underdeveloped areas of the Third World."\(^{18}\) Secondly, Cohn argues that globalization is

not causing the state to wither away (although it must accommodate the rising power of nonstate actors). He argues that the state remains resilient, even against the forces of globalization. In fact, Cohn notes that "the state is... adopting some new and more complex functions to deal with a highly interdependent world."19

Thirdly, according to Cohn, globalization is not creating a world society or world government—in other words, it is not necessarily stimulating a massive and unifying homogenizing effect. He argues that globalization can lead to fragmentation and conflict, just as it can stimulate cooperation and unity. Fourth, globalization should be viewed in historical context. It is not necessarily new or unique—transnational influences have existed throughout history. Cohn notes that before World War I, "there was a high degree of interdependence in trade, foreign investment, and other areas."20 However, Cohn does concede that globalization has become "fashionable" because it is "more encompassing today than it was at any time in the past."21 Today, advances in technology, communication and transportation are causing the activities of states to be internationalized on a scale not seen in previous historical instances.

Among international relations specialists, there is a debate regarding whether globalization is a fundamental paradigm shift, or merely a fad, or something in-between. James Mittelman creatively describes those who are "stead fast about maintaining the prevailing paradigms" as para-keepers; they are contrasted with the para-makers who are keen to "bring into question what they regard as outmoded categories and claim to have

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19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
shifted to an innovatory paradigm."\textsuperscript{22} Many international relations specialists can be characterized as para-keepers: they see globalization as a current, temporary "fashion", or perhaps a repetition of a previous pattern—such as transnational interdependence of the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} century. However, despite such views, the preponderance of evidence suggests that globalization is a much more persistent trend that is embedded within the international system. Moreover, it is playing a significant role as an "enabler"—as will be addressed below—for global terrorism trends.

5.3 Globalization: the Terrorism Enabler

Al Qaeda is viewed as a product of globalization by many terrorism analysts. In many respects, it is globalization that provides the technical foundations for Al Qaeda and similar groups. Thomas Homer-Dixon argues that it is the technological and network characteristics of globalization that facilitate the organization and sustenance of contemporary terrorist groups. "Meanwhile, new communications technologies—from satellite phones to the Internet—allow violent groups to marshal resources and coordinate activities around the planet."\textsuperscript{23} Globalization and all of its economic, social and cultural processes have created a vast global "enabling environment" in which terrorism can thrive. Moreover, globalization has helped societies develop network structures that are more vulnerable to terrorist-type attacks. Globalization and its attendant communications


revolution have provided an environment in which small groups can link up and share knowledge. In the case of Al Qaeda and similar Islamist (or Salafist) groups, many of these network relationships among top leaders were forged in schools and universities. Satellite television, the Internet, and text messaging technologies have facilitated the ability of militant Islamist groups to stay in touch and maintain their network relationships.

As noted earlier, and particularly in Chapter 4, a persistent question that arises within the context of globalization revolves around the role of the state, and more specifically, whether the state suffers a diminution of power status (particularly vis-à-vis nonstate actors), or perhaps enjoys a strengthened position as a result of globalization. Currently there are reasoned perspectives on both sides of this question. For instance, Mark Lagon argues that despite globalization and the apparent erosion of state power, the state remains a central actor within the sweeping changes brought about by globalization, even if it is caught off guard during certain historical periods.24 Other perspectives, however, tend to emphasize the relative decline of state power. Chritoph Knill and Dirk Lehmkuhl tend to believe that as a power exogenous to the state, globalization tends to undermine states’ power. Among other things, they assert that “both the internationalization of markets and the emergence of transnational information and communication networks challenge the autonomy and effectiveness of national

governments in defining and providing public goods—a function classically associated with the nation-state.”

Sylvia Ostry is another proponent of the relative state decline thesis. She argues that globalization acts as an “exogenous” atmospheric force that overlays nation-states—a sort of hyper-actor in the international system. The rise of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), she asserts, represents an intrusion into the nation-state. Moreover, the power of globalization—and perhaps more importantly its “perceived” power—acts as an overhanging sword over the neck of the state. She argues that globalization causes people to “perceive the decline in national authority” and moreover it erodes the credibility of governments and “feeds the erosion of social cohesion.” Unless they reinvent themselves, governments will have to play a reactive or perhaps subordinate role to multinational corporations or a large slew of international NGOs and IGOs.

Some analysts believe that globalization is vastly changing or perhaps undermining our traditional concepts of sovereignty, the lynchpin of the traditional Westphalian state. Economic globalization contains two key transforming elements: an increase in economic relations between countries (increased economic complex interdependence) and the “gradual replacement of national economies by a global economic system based on a consolidated global marketplace for production, distribution

and consumption.” \(^{27}\) However, globalization also involves political and economic splintering. Paul Lubeck asserts that world civilization resulting from globalization includes the “emergence of a myriad of localized spaces of socio-cultural, economic and political activity that are bound together by the wider networks of information and communications technology.” \(^{28}\) Thus, different worlds exist side-by-side, but do not necessarily interact—moreover, these spheres are sustained by localized and discreet communication nodes. This network/nodal model of interaction is precisely the means by which Al Qaeda was able to gain power.

### 5.4 Information Revolution Dimension of Globalization and its Impact on Terrorism

Just weeks after the 9-11 attacks in the United States, Al Qaeda released a video depicting Osama bin Laden triumphantly declaring victory over the United States. He stated: “There is America, hit by God in one of its softest spots. Its greatest buildings were destroyed, thank God for that.” \(^{29}\) He then continued with a phrase that many Americans would remember because it captured much of the anxiety and paranoia being felt across the nation: “There is America, full of fear from its north to its south, from its

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\(^{28}\) “Globalization played a role in mobilizing Islamic movements,” *New Straits Times*, November 25, 2000. [Interview of Professor Paul M. Lubeck, Center for Global, International and Regional Studies, University of California, Santa Cruz].

\(^{29}\) “I bear witness that there is no...” *Washington Post*, October 28, 2001.

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west to its east. Thank God for that." The words penetrated homes, businesses and transportation terminals across the country.

Like an Arab Wizard of Oz, bin Laden masterfully catapulted himself onto the visual media stage and gleefully celebrated his actions. But his real achievement was skillfully exploiting the fruits and tools of globalization to achieve his particular political objectives. At almost every level, Al Qaeda has thrived on and exploited globalization and the fruits of the information revolution and all that they have to offer. The organization regularly communicates via the Internet; bin Laden himself has been known to use satellite telephones. Members of Al Qaeda commonly conduct cross-border financial wire transfers and engage in all varieties of international business transactions.

Today television, including 24-hour news channels such as CNN, and satellite television, plays a critical role for terrorism. “Television in particular is no longer a medium which simply responds to terrorist events, it is an integral part of them.” Because television allows for huge, transnational audiences, “terrorists have learned to stage-manage their spectaculars for maximum audience impact.” Live television is crucial for terrorism because it quickly distributes the oxygen of terrorism, which is publicity. Publicity is the very essence of terrorism: “Terrorists strive for attention, for recognition, and for respectability and legitimacy in their various target publics.”

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30 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
result, the rise of ubiquitous live television and other instruments of the information revolution unwittingly feed terrorism, and in some respects, perhaps spawn terrorism.

This is a major departure from terrorism prior to the 1960s, a period that is considered the demarcation point for live, instantaneous transnational communication. Prior to that period, terrorists could reach comparatively fewer numbers of people, and often there was a significant time lapse between the actual terrorist attack and the point at which it was noticed or recognized. This technological limitation could be seen with the assassination of President John F. Kennedy; although the President’s assassination was filmed, only a few people beyond the United States saw the footage because so few owned television sets.34 Similarly, in September 1970, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked four New York-bound airliners and flew them to Jordan. The passengers were held for over three weeks. However, due to limitations in television broadcast technology, the terrorists did not receive the publicity that they had hoped for: “The communication technology at the time did not allow live transmissions from remote locations. Satellite transmissions were in their early stages and were very expensive. For the PFLP, the multiple hijacking episode ended in disappointment.”35

In contrast, future years would see advances in television broadcast technology that would result in more dramatic terrorist events with correspondingly far-reaching effects. At the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, Germany, for instance, the Palestinian group “Black September” attacked and killed members of the Israeli Olympics team and over eight hundred million people around the world watched the tragedy unfold in front

34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
of their eyes.\textsuperscript{36} Perhaps because of this vast televised publicity, the Munich Olympics attack was considered a symbolic victory for the Palestinians. As Bruce Hoffman notes: “In terms of the publicity and exposure accorded to the Palestinian cause, Munich was an unequivocal success—a point conceded by even the most senior PLO officials.”\textsuperscript{37} Similarly, the 11 September 2001 attacks in New York City and Washington DC attracted even greater numbers of viewers—estimated at over 2 billion (either live or delayed video) around the world, with corresponding increases in publicity impact.

The significance of “television terrorism” lies in the fact that the violent terrorist images become seared onto the minds of millions as they watch ubiquitous video images aired in 24-hour news formats, hour after hour. Perceptions are thus created—often raw, unfiltered and devoid of government interpretation—and these perceptions are distributed throughout vast viewer networks (whether via cable television, satellite television, the Internet, or other outlets). The tendency for contemporary terrorists to want to have their actions seen by vast television audiences is one reason that scholars such as Jean Baudrillard have stated that it is best to avoid places with intense media coverage or capacity because that is where terrorists are most likely to strike. Indeed, television accentuates and perhaps even creates the “theatrical” nature of specific terrorist actions. Mark Juergensmeyer refers to these acts as constructed events. “At center stage are the acts themselves—stunning, abnormal, and outrageous murders carried out in grand scenarios of conflict and proclamation.”\textsuperscript{38} Video depiction only magnifies this effect, and

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
creates a historical record so that the image can be viewed over and over again.

According to Brigitte Nacos television shapes terrorism by emphasizing its spectacular qualities:

"In the past, terrorism has often been compared to theatre because political violence is staged to get the attention of the audience. Although the theatre metaphor remains instructive, it has given way to that of terrorism as a global television spectacular, as breaking news that is watched by international audiences and transcends by far the boundaries of theatrical events."

More significantly, R.D. Crelinsten argues that terrorists normally have an asymmetric relationship with a state with which they have an adversarial relationship. However, television has helped break down this typically imbalanced, asymmetric relationship in favor of a more symmetric relationship between the two parties and, hence, has helped terrorist groups attain power symmetry with states. This is particularly true given the recent proliferation of private television networks, such as al-Jazeera. Crelinsten describes this as an "upset" in the normal imbalance of power that exists between the terrorists and the state.

Another way of considering this phenomenon is the term "symbolic parity."

Essentially, symbolic parity refers to the idea that on the international stage, terrorists can appear as parity actors—alongside states—thus the relationship becomes less vertical, and more horizontal. Contrast this with private communication. For example, if Al Qaeda engaged the United States (or any other adversarial country) in private discussions or clandestine communications, the relationship would likely be vertical, with the United

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States, as the more powerful actor (in military or "hard power"\textsuperscript{40} terms) in the
commanding position. However, as long as Al Qaeda maintains its dialogue via private
television networks, Internet video uplinks, and other new communication technologies,
it maintains its status as a symbolic parity actor.\textsuperscript{41} As Crelinsten has asserted, "Access to
the communication structure is intimately related to power."\textsuperscript{42} As the communication
structure becomes more diffused and more democratic, as a result of globalization and its
attendant processes, then access to this structure becomes much easier in both technical
and financial terms.

An example of this "symbolic parity" between states and terrorist nonstate actors
occurred in the days prior to the 2004 U.S. Presidential election. During this period,
Osama bin Laden suddenly appeared on American network television, as if he—not
Ralph Nader—was the third-party spoiler candidate. Bin Laden no doubt hoped that his
pronouncements and warnings would sway the American electorate in a certain direction.
But more importantly, the video imagery—and the distribution through private satellite
cable companies such as the Middle Eastern-based \textit{al Jazeera}—allowed bin Laden to
achieve symbolic parity with the United States. The video image anchored bin Laden's
image inside the U.S. political process, transforming him into a major player, as
significant as any statesman from a "regular" state.

\textsuperscript{41} Shyam Tekwani, "Media, Information Revolution, and Terrorism in Southeast Asia," in Paul J. Smith (ed.), \textit{Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability}
\textsuperscript{42} R.D. Crelinsten, "Terrorism as Political Communication: The Relationship between the Controller and the Controlled," in Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair M. Steward (Eds), \textit{Contemporary Research on Terrorism}
The information revolution creates an enabling environment for Al Qaeda and other Islamist organizations. These groups rely on a vast, globally-connected array of websites and other private outlets to publish or air their particular views, which often go unchallenged. The result is a grand international narrative—a story of conflict between the United States and other Western countries and the world of Islam, not merely a conflict involving particular terrorist organizations. In one tape, Osama bin Laden describes the jihad against the Americans in Iraq as “a war of destiny between infidelity and Islam.”\(^{43}\) Moreover, according to this grand narrative, all Muslims “should view themselves as a single nation and unite to resist anti-Islamic aggression on the basis of obligatory defensive jihad.”\(^{44}\) Other aspects of the grand narrative, which are distributed to private Internet sites around the world, include assertions that the United States has committed crimes against Islam and that these crimes were part of a “Zionist-Crusader” plot intended to annihilate Muslims around the world.\(^{45}\) Such crimes justify Al Qaeda’s declaration of war against the United States.\(^{46}\)

Chris Jasparro argues that the “grand narrative” is not only distributed through the new tools of the information revolution, but is crafted in such a manner as to attract and organize Muslims from around the world, who often come from dramatically different cultural backgrounds:

\(^{44}\) Ibid., p. 8.
\(^{46}\) Ibid.
Throughout Bin Laden’s statements there is consistent use of religious and historical allegory and reference, which is very effective for communicating to Muslims around the world (many of whom do not speak Arabic and who come from a wide array of ethnic and cultural backgrounds). This provides common reference points (as classical allusions and references once did in the West) and taps into ‘imagined’ histories, grievances, and communal identities shared by Muslims worldwide, thus providing a transnational discourse by which the underlying ideology of the wider jihadi struggle can be transmitted, articulated and understood across geographic scale, language, and culture.”

By taking advantage of this networked, communications infrastructure, Al Qaeda and its affiliates have created the terms of the conflict. Moreover, by targeting specific messages to specific media outlets—the proliferation of which is a hallmark of globalization—Al Qaeda is able to tailor its message to specific audiences. For example, messages intended for European or American audiences tend to be much more moderate, and portray Osama bin Laden and other leaders in a more statesman-like manner.

In the November 2004 address referenced above, Osama bin Laden directly referenced assertions put forth by the Bush administration regarding the nature of terrorism. For instance, Bin Laden directly addressed the assertion that terrorists “hate freedom”—Bin Laden stated that “…I say to you that security is an indispensable pillar of human life and that free men do not forfeit their security, contrary to Bush’s claim that we hate freedom. If so, then let him explain to us why we don’t strike for example—Sweden?.” In this address, he also criticized the USA Patriot Act in language that almost resembled many US domestic critics of this anti-terrorism law: “So he [Senior

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47 Dr. Chris Jasparro, in conversation with the author held on February 22, 2005.
President Bush took dictatorship and suppression of freedoms to his son and they named it the Patriot Act, under the pretense of fighting terrorism.\textsuperscript{50}

Shyam Tekwani argues that the Internet and its attendant communications technologies are key foundations for current terrorist organizations, including Al Qaeda. Not only do such media allow for the dissemination of propaganda, they also allow planning of operations:

"The information revolution...has clearly contributed to the ability of terrorist groups in the region to network with others of their ilk to form transnational networks that cooperate in disseminating propaganda and fund-raising and recruitment. It has also greatly enhanced the ability of terrorists to plan and execute operations across international borders with greater ease."\textsuperscript{51}

Computer savvy is thus a hallmark of the contemporary terrorist. Tekwani notes that in the Southeast Asian context, "authorities...routinely find computers and diskettes on raids on terrorist hideouts across Asia, from Ramzi Yousef's Manila lair to LTTE hideouts and JI cells in Singapore."\textsuperscript{52}

5.5 The Global Information Infrastructure as Terrorism Enablers

As can be seen from the Al Qaeda example, the information revolution—to include television, the Internet, and other new communication technologies—has

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
arguably helped create and sustain the current wave of terrorism and does not simply report it. Grant Wardlaw argues that changes in communication, including the transmission of information, are the key distinguishing features of contemporary terrorism when contrasted with past forms of terrorism: "A very plausible case can be made that the most important differences between past and present terrorism may be traced to the modern, transnational flow of information." Among other things, the information revolution is allowing international *jihadi* groups, such as Al Qaeda, by virtue of access to the Internet and other modern communication technologies, to create what David Martin Jones describes as an international "cyber-caliphate." Jones argues that the modern Islamist seeks "...a globalization of Islam’s pre-modern scriptural injunctions that can leap over the bureaucratically-centralizing post-colonial arrangements into the transnational network of the cyberehaliphate." The advantage of such an Internet-based caliphate is that the ideas are divorced from the constraints and restrictions of the local community—the caliphate is, in a sense, dislodged from reality whereby the "fantasy ideology" can grow and prosper. These Internet-based associations become "abstract communities" in which "more extreme examples of neo-orthodoxy among those deracinated from communities and tradition..."

The Internet—and associated technologies—also provides a forum for militants around the world seeking information on weaponry, tactics or other related topics. In one case, the discovery of Al Qaeda computers in Afghanistan revealed that the

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55 Ibid.
organization’s decision to launch a chemical and biological weapons program was at least partly driven by the organization’s access to communications—televised discussions, newspaper articles and other open information—in the United States regarding fears about the use of such weapons.  

Overall, it could be argued that the information revolution (and all of its attendant technologies) has had a powerful “leveling” effect within the international system. In testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 2000, George Tenet, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, reported that “terrorists...are embracing the opportunities offered by recent leaps in information technology: To a greater and greater degree, terrorist groups, including Hizballah, HAMAS, the Abu Nidal organization, and Bin Laden’s al Qa’ida organization are using computerized files, e-mail, and encryption to support their operations.”

Joseph Nye argues that information has historically been viewed as a source for power and, moreover, in light of the current information revolution, this power is being diffused beyond the realm of the state. Moreover, what sets apart contemporary circumstances from the past is the fact that the cost of transmitting information has diminished significantly. In the past, the cost barrier acted as a stumbling block preventing “masses” from having ready access to information. This diffusion of power has thus allowed nonstate actors—such as corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and even terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda—to gain power that they would not

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have otherwise. Nye further argues that governments around the world “will find their control slipping during the twenty-first century as information technology gradually spreads to the large majority of the world that still lacks phones, computers, and electricity.”

The Al Qaeda organization exemplifies the enabling power of globalization, and its constituent processes, and its ability to create notions of symbolic parity between nonstate actors and states. It is rarely understood that despite successful US military operations in Afghanistan and other locations, Al Qaeda leaders, and particularly Osama Bin Laden, remain convinced that they are winning the long term battle against the United States. Evidence from Osama Bin Laden’s speeches, for instance, reveals a keen monitoring of political debates and controversies within the United States, an understanding that is facilitated by technologies associated with the global information revolution. For instance, Bin Laden once made reference to the US budget deficit: “They [the United States] witnessed a budget deficit for the third consecutive year. This year’s deficit reached a record number estimated at $450 billion. Therefore, we thank God.”

He also made reference to the speech by President George W. Bush regarding the cessation of major military operations in Iraq: “You recall Bush’s words, when he said ‘the major operations are over’ just a few weeks after the beginning of the war. They think that the people in front of them are sheep and that the whole thing is a picnic in

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Later in the same speech he referenced the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, as well as the "axis of evil" speech delivered by President Bush:

"Did not Bush say that Iraq is one of the states of the axis of evil? To the Christians, this description means that we are infidels and useless. This explains the atrocities that their soldiers committed in Abu-Ghurayb prison, Guantanamo, and elsewhere against our brother prisoners; atrocities which moved the whole of mankind."\textsuperscript{61}

5.6 International Migration and the New Diaspora Order

Another aspect of globalization relevant to terrorism is the role of international migration and the resulting transnational networks that are thus spawned. In early 2001, Al Qaeda activated a suicide cell based in Western Europe with the intent to assassinate the leader of Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance, Ahmad Shah Massoud. The team, primarily consisting of Tunisians, traveled to the United Kingdom, then to Pakistan, and then to Afghanistan where, posing as foreign journalists, they managed to arrange a fake interview with Massoud. The two 'journalists' and Massoud assembled in a room where the interview began. Shortly afterwards, a bomb exploded in their camera. Massoud and one of the journalists were fatally wounded, while the second journalist was shot by nearby guards.

\textsuperscript{60} Transcript of Osama Bin Laden speech, reported by Al-Jazirah Television on 27 December 2004, translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 31 January 2005.  
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
The fact that Al Qaeda could engineer this operation, relying on operatives from another continent, reflects both the power of globalization and the influences of one of its sub-processes: international migration. Today, the world has more than 150 million people around the world who are classified as international migrants. International migrant populations exist in countries across the globe and with modern technology and resultant contact with the homeland, such communities can remain—at least within first or second generation migrants—culturally ‘intact.’ This transnational milieu provides the foundation for the third level of Joseph Nye’s 3-level model of international relations: “Diasporic affiliations and mobile, media-linked communities of migrants are redrawing the relationships of location and affiliation. Sri Lankan Tamils, Kurds, Chinese emigrants, Indian techno-coolies, each in their own way, owe their allegiance to multiple forms of citizenship. Their mental geography is no longer Westphalian.”

In the context of terrorism, global migrant and transnational religious populations have provided critical logistical support, a supply of recruits and other forms of assistance to international terrorist movements. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), for instance, relies on monetary contributions from overseas Tamil populations living in North America, Europe, Africa and elsewhere. Moreover, overseas migrant and diaspora societies provide a potential garden within which transnational militant ideologies can grow and flourish. In Europe, radical Islamic ideologies have grown and have become more entrenched, a trend that partly reflects the disorientation and alienation felt among many Muslim migrants who have not been embraced by nor culturally integrated into

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their host countries. More than 15 million Muslims live in Western Europe; they are the products of waves of immigration during the last half century, but most have arrived more recently. The largest recent wave occurred from the 1950s to the early 1970s. Approximately 5 million Muslims live in France, and 2.5 million each live in Germany and the United Kingdom. Overall, Muslims constitute approximately 4 percent of the European Union’s population.

However, the integration of these migrants into larger Western European society has been incomplete. Many young Muslim migrants who experience discrimination or exclusion in such places as Germany or France look to fundamentalist or militant ideologies as a way of overcoming their sense of alienation. In addition, they discover such ideologies as a consequence of their own search for religious identity. Thus, it should come as no surprise that Western Europe unwittingly acted as a base for many of the terrorists involved in the 9-11 attacks.

There are several factors driving this phenomenon. According to Olivier Roy, “Radicalization is a peripheral result of the Westernization of Muslims born and living in Europe. It is linked with a generation gap and a depressed social status, and it perpetuates a pre-existent tradition of leftist, anti-imperialist protest in those communities.”

More recently, in the wake of the US campaign in Iraq, intelligence officials in Europe are detecting rising militancy among Muslim immigrant communities.

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Intelligence officials report that “on working-class streets of old industrial towns like Crawley, Luton, Birmingham and Manchester, and in the Arab enclaves of Germany, France, Switzerland and other parts of Europe” militant ideologies are growing and, moreover, their proponents are becoming more open and aggressive in their advocacy.65

Muslims living in Europe often bear the brunt of economic problems. The unemployment rate among Muslims is often double that of non-Muslims. As a result, many Muslims, and particularly young Muslims, are embracing Islam as a ‘badge of identity’ in response to perceived discrimination in employment, housing, education and other sectors. As many European Muslims search for their religious identity, many also discover more activist radical sub-ideologies within Islam. European counterterrorism officials estimate that roughly 1 or 2 percent of the continents Muslims—somewhere between 250,000 and 500,000 individuals—are involved in some sort of extremist activity. In Germany, it is estimated that of the roughly 400,000 Muslim individuals living in the country, approximately 40,000 are involved with radical Islam and are actively seeking the establishment of an Islamic state. Many experts attribute this to a culture shock phenomenon, which occurs among Muslim immigrants, who then become “born again Islamists.” According to Timothy Savage:

“Not accepted as an integral part of European society and at the same time repulsed by its secularism and materialism, a few individuals with a Muslim background, especially when confronted with a significant personal crisis,

apparently find solidarity, meaning, and direction in radical Islamist groups that are actively looking for such recruits.\textsuperscript{66}

Rising Islamic militancy in Europe also reflects strong allegiances to transnational ideologies, instead of to a state. Combined with the diaspora/overseas migrant phenomenon, globalization and the information revolution have allowed transnational ideologies—such as militant Islam—to grow and spread. Moreover, these ideologies are typically rooted in a transnational interpretation of religion and, moreover, they are often divorced from states, or modern secularism. These ideologies allow an individual, faced with discrimination or hopelessness, to aspire to a status far and beyond what his local circumstances will allow. In the Al Qaeda context, Afghanistan (and the anti-Soviet campaign of the 1980s) provided the international bonding experience among disparate individuals from around the world who sought a common cause in a shared religious tradition. The Afghanistan experience—and its resulting ‘Afghan Alumni’—has helped facilitate the growth of this transnational ideology that, ironically, can be found quite prominently in the immigrant communities of North America and Western Europe.

For many Western countries, multiculturalism and liberalism present a dilemma. Western governments provide greater freedom and individual rights, but at the same time, by allowing immigrants to practice their own religion or to be attracted to radical ideologies, they endanger themselves, or unwittingly become bases for transnational violence elsewhere. Many Muslim migrants in Western Europe have fled more repressive regimes in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or Singapore, countries that exert more

control over potential Islamist activities. Thus, an ironic situation develops with European states that advocate strong counter-terrorism policies abroad, and yet tolerate the same militant ideologies at home. David Martin Jones has observed that “the British Home Office permits self-styled sheikhs Abu Hamza and Omar Bhakri Mohamed to recruit for Al-Qaeda from their state-subsidized mosque in Finsbury Park, North London, within half a dozen tube stops of Westminster.”

In addition he describes leading figures in the Saudi Arabia-funded Islamic Council of Britain who advocate the establishment of a united Islamic world that would include as a member state the Islamic Republic of the United Kingdom. Many of the 9-11 pilots became radicalized in Western Europe—partly as a response to the freedoms they found around them, but also because of the general liberal climate and lack of government scrutiny.

Jones argues that secularism, tolerance and liberal values found in Western countries that harbor large Islamic migrant minorities actually encourage the spread of radical ideologies. Sayyid Qutb perceived Western “tolerance” as a form of weakness. “To Islamists, Western tolerance is weakness, and secularism a form of spiritual death requiring Islamic salvation.” Sayyid Qutb described the time when he lived in the United States as a continual confrontation with *Jahiliyyah* (roughly defined as corruption, falsehood and ignorance). In Chapter 10 of *Milestones*, Qutb asserts that he “took the position of attacking the Western Jahiliyyah, its shaky religious beliefs, its social and economic modes, and its immoralities.” He was also appalled by American “individual

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68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
freedom, devoid of sympathy and responsibility for relatives except under the force of law; at this materialistic attitude which deadens the spirit." From Qutb’s point of view, living within the state of Jahiliyyah and being a good Muslim are simply incompatible. Qutb argues that “Islam cannot accept any mixing with Jahiliyyah...Either Islam will remain, or Jahiliyyah: Islam cannot accept or agree to a situation which is half-Islam and half-Jahiliyyah.” From this perspective, migrants living in nominally non-Muslim countries could conceivably adopt the position of struggle against the host country, ultimately leading to its religious conversion. At the very least, the struggle will lead to violence until conversion finally occurs, or the migrants themselves (or their ideologies) are eliminated or suppressed. Thus, the diaspora phenomenon itself becomes the ultimate enabler for violence.

Another aspect of the relationship between international migration and terrorism is more logistical in nature, and concerns border security (and the resultant range of operability such borders provide to international terrorists). Since the end of the Cold War, border security, particularly in the former Soviet Union, has declined significantly. Among other things, the loosening of border controls in the former Soviet Bloc has greatly enhanced the ability of terrorist organizations to organize themselves, recruit new members, and travel clandestinely to conduct new attacks. In the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the decline of border security controls has “enhanced the organizational and operational opportunities for foreign terrorist groups.” A clandestine

71 Ibid.
72 Ibid., p. 130.
industry of forged passports facilitates the movement of illicit non-state actors, such as terrorists and criminals. The assassins of Ahmad Shah Massoud, former leader of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, relied on forged Belgian passports. Similarly, Ahmed Ressam, the key perpetrator of the “Millennium plot” to blow up Los Angeles Airport in 1999, obtained a Canadian passport using fraudulent precursor documents (among them a fake baptismal certificate), in a process known as breeder-document fraud. The decline of border security, both a product of the end of the Cold War and the rise of globalization, is a boon for international terrorism.

5.7 Globalization as Cultural Invasion

When Indonesia prosecuted one of the main perpetrators of the October 2002 Bali, Indonesia terrorist attack, which killed more than 200 people, it revealed just how globalization is perceived. When asked how he felt about the impact of the Bali attack, Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, a key operator in the plot who supplied the chemicals to make the bomb, told the court: “There’s some pride in my heart. For the white people, it serves them right.” He said foreigners introduced moral decadence to Indonesia through television and Western lifestyles. “They know how to destroy religions using the most subtle ways through bars, gambling dens. And you must realize the debauchery of their television,” he told the court.

76 Ibid.
Although it may be tempting to dismiss or downplay Amrozi’s comments as the fulminations of a discredited militant, it should be recognized that these sentiments—the idea that globalization represents an invasion of unwanted social values—can be found throughout the developing world. In many developing countries, globalization is viewed as a threat, or as a type of insidious cultural invasion. “Modern-day globalization, the opening of borders to the greater movement of ideas, people and money, has stirred familiar anxieties about ill-defined ‘outside forces.’”\(^\text{77}\) Globalization, and particularly ‘cultural globalization,’ is perceived as bringing in decadent values, such as television with sexual images, widespread alcohol use, and violent music, that have the potential to undermine local, and typically conservative, social values. Thus, it can be reasonably posited that terrorism is at least partially a response to globalization, and particularly cultural globalization. In many parts of the world, globalization is perceived as a new form of imperialism—an absolutist ideology that the West seeks to foist upon the world.

Roger Scruton echoes this “invasion by globalization” theme by arguing that globalization lends an “in your face” quality to Western values and mores, particularly as they are thrust into Muslim-majority countries. “In the days when East was East and West was West, it was possible for Muslims to devote their lives to pious observances and to ignore the evil that prevailed in the dar al-harb. But when that evil spreads around the globe, cheerfully offering freedoms and permissions in place of the austere

requirements of a religious code, so that the *dar al-Islam* is invaded by it, old antagonisms are awakened, and with them the old need for allies against the infidel."\(^{78}\)

The fear of cultural globalization, and in particular the influx of Western permissive values into traditionalist societies, can even be seen in some militant organizations' foundational documents. For instance, Article 17 of the Covenant of Hamas addresses the influx of Western standards and attitudes towards women, and reflects anxieties regarding the undermining of traditional values in this regard. Specifically the document states:

"The Moslem woman has a role no less important than that of the Moslem man in the battle of liberation... The enemies have realized the importance of her role. They consider that if they are able to direct and bring her up the way they wish, far from Islam, they would have won the battle. That is why you find them giving these attempts constant attention through information campaigns, films, and the school curriculum, using for that purpose their lackeys who are infiltrated through Zionist organizations under various names and shapes, such as Freemasons, Rotary Clubs, espionage groups and others, which are all nothing more than cells of subversion and saboteurs."\(^{79}\)

Moreover, not only is globalization associated with permissive, immoral or decadent values, it is almost invariably linked with Westernization, and in many eyes this means Americanization. Equating globalization with increased American influence, the *New York Times* columnist Thomas Friedman has argued that American power became so dominant in the 1990s that no country could remain immune from its cultural or social

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influences. "The net effect was that U.S. power, culture and economic ideas about how society should be organized became so dominant (a dominance magnified through globalization) that America began to touch people's lives around the planet." Like an elephant walking nonchalantly across a grassy field, unaware of the insects being crushed under its weight, the United States, its citizens, corporations, and culture travel around the world, often not realizing the consequences of its vast and raw power. This power often translates into an altering of local values. Audrey Kurth Cronin asserts that "globalization, in forms including Westernization, secularization, democratization, consumerism, and the growth of market capitalism, represents an onslaught to less privileged people in conservative cultures" who are then forced to contend with the dismantling of their traditional societies and value systems.

Globalization is also viewed as an encroachment on sovereignty. In the Middle East, according to Mark Strauss, "Islamists and secular nationalists alike portray globalization as the latest in a series of US-Zionist plots to subjugate the Arab world under Western economic control and erase its cultural borders." Within this perspective, globalization is viewed not just as cultural menace, but a threat to the very soul of the host state. Sonja Hegasy argues that "a majority of Arab intellectuals have depicted globalization as pure cultural and economic imperialism, and their position has trickled down into daily newspapers and public opinion." Daniel Benjamin and Steven

Simon argue that the United States is resented in the Islamic world because "its cultural reach threatens traditional values, including the organization of societies that privilege males and religious authority." 84 In addition, American culture "offers temptation, blurs social, ethical, and behavioral boundaries, and presages moral disorder." 85

As a force, globalization is viewed as both inclusive and exclusive in character. In the Arab world, exclusion refers to two major concerns related to globalization—that it is a force that has largely bypassed their societies (and thus has resulted in poverty) and at the same time, it is a force that results in the "withering away of one's own voice." 86 Hegasy argues that the anti-globalization feeling, which she describes as anti-globalism, among many Arab intellectuals is predicated on three basic tenets: 1) Anti-globalism sentiment reflects a severe identity crisis in the Arab world, which therefore requires a clear demarcation line; 2) Anti-globalism has emerged as a new type of nationalism because it allows one to define oneself as a victim of a massive external onslaught; 3) Anti-globalism "paradoxically combines refusal of Western cultural products with the desire to share in them." 87

The notion of 'invasion' embedded within conceptualizations of globalization—and the need to repel the invasion—strikes a deep chord among many Islamic militants. Ibn Taymiyya, considered an intellectual father to contemporary Islamic militant ideology, grew up within the milieu of the collapse of the central caliphate to the Mongol invasion from the East in the 13th century. "His painful experience as a refugee colored

85 Ibid.
86 Hegasy, “The Impact of 9/11 on the Middle East,” Middle East Policy, p. 75.
87 Ibid.
his attitude toward the conqueror Mongols throughout his life." Hassan-al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, spent his early days in the shadows of British colonialism. Similarly, Sayyid Qutb, considered an intellectual guide to Osama bin Laden and author of the influential book *Milestones*, also grew up under the shadow of growing Western cultural influence over the modernizing Egyptian state. Many of these early thinkers, whose ideas have directly or indirectly influenced Al Qaeda and other similar groups, have wrestled with the problem of confronting or managing an influx of powerful exogenous social or economic forces beyond their control.

Al Qaeda has been described as an anti-globalization movement, but in many ways, it is a pro-globalization movement, except that it is an alternative globalization different from that envisaged by the West: According to Yoel Sano, "[Al Qaeda]...represents an alternative globalism; one aimed ultimately at creating a unified Islamist state from Morocco in the west to Mindanao in the Philippines in the east." Moreover, as described in earlier sections, Al Qaeda has deftly exploited the technologies of globalization and the information revolution. It has relied on the Internet to make up for its own geographic and financial limits. Its Internet-based propaganda can be accessed by anyone, anywhere. Thus, Al Qaeda embraces the various technological fruits of globalization; however, its ultimate vision for globalization greatly contrasts with those of the United States and other Western countries.

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90 Ibid.
In 1997, an economic crisis swept through Southeast Asia, beginning in Thailand but soon spreading elsewhere in the region. One country in particular, Indonesia, endured particularly harsh consequences and later near political collapse. The 1997 economic crisis demonstrated the power of what some economists term as 'contagion'—the phenomenon in which ideas and panic can spread throughout an information-wired global community and thus create profound and sometimes disastrous financial and social consequences. The effects of this contagion in Southeast Asia were devastating on the state level as well as the individual level. Thousands of people endured layoffs or massive cuts in wages. The social and economic carnage eventually spread to South Korea, Russia and other countries.

In an era of globalization, both positive and negative influences can race around the world with unprecedented speed. Countries connected by extensive communication networks become susceptible to sudden changes or disruptions caused by unexpected events. Thomas Homer-Dixon argues that this vulnerability is particularly acute in modern countries that rely “on intricate networks and [concentrate] vital assets in small geographic clusters.”\(^91\) The economic, social and cultural forces of globalization can be compared to a wildfire and just as a wildfire leaves charred remains and trails of destruction, so can the forces of globalization. Financial dislocation caused by contagion—or mass panics such as the 1997 economic crisis—creates deep resentment.

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within populations. Moreover, such dislocations and the poverty that results can create an enabling environment for nonstate actor-driven terrorism. Ironically, it was during this period of state weakness in Southeast Asia—particularly weakness in Indonesia—that Jemaah Islamiyah began to strengthen and plan bold strikes, including the October 2002 attack in Bali.92

The 1997 economic crisis demonstrated how powerful and unconstrained transnational economic forces could actually be. The crisis also revealed the degree of marginalization experienced by much of the world’s population, despite the promises of open trade and economic liberalization. In many parts of the world, globalization has not only led to economic marginalization, but also social and cultural marginalization. Weakened states and corrupt governance, often the product of (or exacerbated by) economic crisis, contagion, or abrupt transitions from centrally-planned to market-driven systems, leave millions stranded in a milieu of chaos and, in some cases, outright anarchy. Dislodged from social or economic certainties, some people are then tempted to turn to (or attracted to) religious, fundamentalist ideas that offer clear guidance and comfort. Michael Mousseau argues that globalization encourages terrorism indirectly because of the social anarchy that it causes. He argues that millions today turn to “ethnofacism,” sectarian murder, and fundamentalist religions as a way of attaining “psychic comfort in the face of volatile social anarchy.”93

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Economic globalization is a powerful force, but ironically it has bypassed much of the world, where unemployment problems continue to grow. Theodore Cohn has argued that globalization has largely been confined to the world’s developed economies: Western Europe, North America and Japan/East Asia.\(^{94}\) In terms of foreign direct investment (FDI), it is within this triad that most activity is occurring: “In 1995, for example, the developed market economies accounted for 92.1 percent of the outward stocks of FDI and for 72.1 percent of the inward stocks of FDI.”\(^{95}\) Additionally, most of the world’s trade flows only really affects this triad—“In 1993, North America, Western Europe, and Asia accounted for 84.2 percent of global merchandise exports and for 90.2 percent of world exports of manufactures.”\(^{96}\)

Less developed countries have increased their share of FDI, but in general this is still relatively limited to certain countries, such as Singapore, Brazil, Mexico, Malaysia, Thailand, etc. The world’s least developed countries, located mainly in sub-Saharan Africa, received only 1.5 percent of FDI inflows during the 1980-84 period.\(^ {97}\) Poorer countries have generally not benefited from increased world trade either: “The least developed countries, with about 10 percent of the world’s people, accounted for only 0.3 percent of world trade in 1997—which was about half of their share two decades earlier.”\(^ {98}\) Thus globalization’s effects—most notably its positive effects of encouraging

\(^{95}\) Ibid.
\(^{96}\) Ibid.
\(^{97}\) Ibid.
\(^{98}\) Ibid.
economic growth—have been much less apparent in the less developed regions of the world.

Arguing the positive side of economic globalization, Clair Apodaca makes the case that economic globalization has probably done more to actually improve people’s lives than any other factor, including international aid. In particular, the author is most enthusiastic about foreign direct investment (FDI). “FDI is the only globalization variable,” she asserts, “that promotes every aspect of human and economic development in Asia. Contrary to what many theorists and several well-publicized cases suggest, FDI benefits not only the state and elites but also the poor and underprivileged.”99 This is why she is more inclined to advocate a “trade not aid” policy. She concludes with the following statement: “trade for aid ought to be given greater consideration among human rights scholars, activists, and politicians, as it is clearly a means of encouraging human welfare and economic growth.”100

5.9 Conclusion

When Al Qaeda members launched the 9-11 attacks in the United States, they were, in many respects, lashing out at globalization, and the values that they associated with the phenomenon. Many of Al Qaeda’s members were marginalized from their native societies, or at least they perceived that their values and way of life were being

100 Ibid.
overwhelmed by vast and powerful external forces that they could not control. Ironically, however, by conducting that attack, Al Qaeda transformed itself into a major player on the global stage. It became a global actor that owed its newfound fame and power to elements of globalization—and particularly the information revolution—that it so despised.

The 9-11 attacks also confirmed to governments worldwide the power of globalization. The spread of technology via the globalization process had acted as an enabler of terrorism; it had allowed terrorists to acquire even more disproportionate power than they would have had otherwise. Transforming civilian airliners into suicide missiles is just one example. New technologies flowing into the hands of nonstate actors are allowing destructive scenarios—such as a nuclear attack on a major city—to become a possible reality in the future. Globalization did not solely create the current wave of terrorists; it did, however, enable it.

Terrorism throughout history always occurs within the context of broader tensions in the international system. Globalization has indeed become that new tension in the international system. Whether globalization is good or bad depends largely on where one stands. For a developing country, globalization may present opportunities for participation and economic ascendency, or it might foster the decimation of precious cultural values. If globalization is the current reality of the world, then it must be understood in a comprehensive sense. Moreover, the manner in which the processes of globalization facilitate terrorism—and particularly mass casualty terrorism—must be
grasped as well. The passions generated by anti-globalization must be managed, lest they result in a continuation in the vicious cycle of terrorism and political violence.
CHAPTER 6: RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY AND MILITANCY—THE SECOND DRIVER OF FOURTH WAVE TERRORISM

6.1. Introduction

Within weeks of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, Osama bin Laden appeared on a videotape, which was aired throughout the United States on most major network channels, in which he directly referenced the 9-11 attacks on American soil. He used the occasion to praise those involved in the attack as well as to list some of his grievances that underpinned the attacks. But most importantly, he linked the attacks to religion by essentially describing them as actions sanctioned by God. Many have doubted bin Laden’s religious motives, arguing that he cloaked his political and strategic objectives cynically within a concocted and distorted religious narrative. But evidence from a variety of bin Laden’s statements—both prior to and following the 9-11 attacks—suggests that religion was indeed a core and genuine motivation. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon have argued that religion was the very essence of the 9-11 attack:

"The motivation for the attack was neither political calculation, strategic advantage, nor wanton bloodlust. It was to humiliate and slaughter those who defied the hegemony of God; it was to please Him by reasserting His primacy. It was an act of cosmic war. What appears to be senseless violence actually
made a great deal of sense to the terrorists and their sympathizers, for whom this mass killing was an act of redemption.”

Such an assessment is validated by Osama bin Laden himself, whose words were recorded onto a video tape that was smuggled to the West and subsequently translated. Referencing the 9-11 attacks, bin Laden praises the young hijackers for the actions that, according to his perception, have promoted the spread of Islam:

[Bin Laden]: “Those young men (...inaudible...) said in deeds, in New York and Washington, speeches that overshadowed all other speeches made everywhere else in the world. The speeches are understood by both Arabs and non-Arabs—even by Chinese. It is above all the media said. Some of them said that in Holland, at one of the centers, the number of people who accepted Islam during the days that followed the operations were more than the people who accepted Islam in the last eleven years. I heard someone on Islamic radio who owns a school in America say: ‘We don’t have time to keep up with the demands of those who are asking about Islamic books to learn about Islam.’ This event made people think (about true Islam) which benefited Islam greatly.”

The 9-11 attacks were the culmination of an on-going campaign by the Al Qaeda organization to bring about what it perceived as God’s will in the way that it believed was appropriate—and this was by attacking and ultimately destroying the United States. Religion, moreover, provided the foundation for Al Qaeda’s philosophy, its goals, and also its tactics. Western governments have taken great pains to distance their counter-terrorism measures from Islam in general. Some Muslims have

complained that the “war on terror” is essentially a war against Islam. In response, the United States government has attempted to portray a more benign motivation by distinguishing militant Islam and Al Qaeda from the larger belief system that is mainstream Islam. However, it could be argued that the conflict between the United States and Al Qaeda is much more fundamental and profound than the immediate objectives or campaigns by either of these two parties. It is arguably a conflict between modern secularism—and particularly the modern Western manifestation of this secularism that permeates the world in the form of capitalism and globalization—and religion (and the traditional communitarian values retained within).

6.2 Rising Importance of Religion in the International System

Western social science scholars have tended to ignore or downplay the role of religion in the international system. Robert Jervis attributes this discomfort about religion as one reason for the dearth of comprehensive analysis of religious-based terrorism: “Terrorism grounded in religion poses special problems for modern social science, which has paid little attention to religion, perhaps because most social scientists find this subject uninteresting if not embarrassing.” Nevertheless, it is clear from recent events—the Iranian revolution of 1979, the rise of Al Qaeda and the rise of religious fundamentalism in many parts of the world—that religion can no longer be dismissed as an unimportant factor in international relations. Indeed, if current trends

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persist, religion may ultimately emerge as the dominant factor in the international system in the next two to three decades.

Religion is defined in many ways. In his analysis of different scholars’ interpretation of religion, Mark Juergensmeyer argues that a common thread in religions is the emphasis on “a certain kind of experience that people share with others in particular communities.”4 Any discussion of religion, therefore, implies “communities that have a tradition of sharing a particular religious point of view, a world view in which there is an essential conflict between appearance and deeper reality.”5 Jonathan Fox argues that religion has four basic functions: “To provide a value-laden worldview; to supply rules and standards of behavior based on that worldview; to organize adherents through institutions; and to legitimate actors, actions and institutions.”6

In addition, religion addresses the sense of disorder that many people perceive in their lives: “in providing its adherents with a sense of conceptual order, religion often deals with the fundamental problem of disorder.”7 More importantly, perhaps, from a social point of view is the element of individual empowerment and comfort that religion brings to individuals: “Religious faith and spirituality are a great source of personal

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5 Ibid.
empowerment and psychological sustenance. Humans have long derived personal strength from their religious practices and beliefs.\textsuperscript{8}

The resurgence of religion and religious identity partly reflects profound changes since the end of the Cold War. Societies around the world are contending with disruptive change, economic dislocation, and moral questioning. The post Cold War world has witnessed an increase in religious, ethnic and communal sentiments and movements. This trend partly reflects the failure in the eyes of many people of secular ideologies, and the state systems that have been built upon such ideologies:

"Inconclusive modernization efforts and the failure of much of the non-western world to end its dependence on the West have added to the grievances of religious movements."\textsuperscript{9} In addition, the overall sense that values, traditions and "the family" have broken down has generated growing alienation, dislocation and various other anxieties.

In the United States, for instance, the rise of right-wing religious movements reflects public distrust of government and feeds "on the public’s perception of the immorality of government."\textsuperscript{10} In the militant Christian context, the rise of the Christian Identity movement parallels, in some regards, the ideology of militant Islam. The Christian Identity movement was established in the United States after World War II by network of preachers and writers who feared racial mixing and a grand conspiracy engineered by Jews. The central concern of Christian Identity adherents are Jews who


\textsuperscript{9} Fox, "The Effects of Religion on Domestic Conflicts," pp. 51-52.

\textsuperscript{10} Mark Juergensmeyer, "Terror Mandated by God," \textit{Terrorism and Political Violence}, v. 9, n. 2 (Summer 1997), pp. 16-23.
are seen as "the literal biological offspring of Satan, the descendants of Satan's sexual seduction of Eve in the Garden of Eden."\textsuperscript{11}

Magnus Ranstorp attributes rising religious consciousness to the surrounding disruptive processes associated with globalization:

"The accelerated dissolution of traditional links of social and cultural cohesion within and between societies with the current globalization process, combined with the historical legacy and current conditions of political repression, economic inequality and social upheaval common among disparate religious extremist movements, has all led to an increased sense of fragility, instability and unpredictability for the present and the future."\textsuperscript{12}

Around the world, the Western model of secular governance appears to be on the defensive, if not outright decline. In the Middle East, Islam has become the new salve to address the pain of declining states and hollow Arab nationalism. Arab nationalism once competed with Islamic fundamentalism as a rallying ideology to counter Western encroachment and colonization in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century. The difference between the two ideologies can be summed up in this way: "Arab nationalists and Islam fundamentalists are both opposed to Westernization, but Arab nationalists are committed to Arab modernization through secularization that would also facilitate Pan-Arab unity."\textsuperscript{13} Thus Arab nationalism embraced modernization and secularism,

\textsuperscript{13} Henry C.K. Liu, "Geopolitical Weeds in the Cradle of Civilization," \textit{Asia Times} [www.atimes.com], 2 September 2004.
although not Westernization. The anti-Western theme is a common foundation to both ideologies.

Nevertheless, current evidence finds religion in ascendance. As Michael Hudson observes "...[The] slogan 'Islam is the solution' resonates deeply with individuals mired in the tensions and contradictions of contemporary Arab societies."\(^{14}\) Emmanuel Sivan makes the argument that radical Islam's greatest feat over the past half century is its ability to survive, particularly in light of ferocious state pressure and repression. By the 1970s, radical Islam had emerged as an alternative to pan-Arab nationalism and Marxism. Today, radical Islam has "influenced gender roles, relations with local Christians...consumption habits and public mores."\(^{15}\) It is a force to be reckoned with and governments have increasingly succumbed to its pressure by censoring books, plays and other media in order to satisfy religious constituents.

In addition, Sivan makes the point that "young militants engage in grassroots vigilantism against alcohol, pornography and TV satellite dishes, impose Islamic dress codes and monitor the behavior of non-Islamic tourists."\(^{16}\) These campaigns by radical Islam supporters flourish among an audience eager for its message, primarily due to the failures of the state. Sivan argues that the radicals' message "falls on ready ears, because the failure of states in Muslim countries is clear. The state failure to provide has been exacerbated by the decline in oil and gas prices, which has impoverished some

\(^{16}\) Ibid.
The state failure nexus to radical Islam can also be seen in the growing trend whereby radical groups offer social services—such as free schools and hospitals—in lieu of those services customarily provided by a state, in light of the latter’s incapacity or unwillingness to provide such services.

Since the early 1980s, Islamic radicalism has grown and festered not only throughout the Middle East, but also in South Asia, Southeast Asia and North America, although many governments in these regions ignored it, or minimized its importance. Many scholars and politicians have talked about the struggle within Islam between radical and moderate forces. Some U.S. leaders have called for moderate leaders to quash the power of the radicals. But the reality is far more complicated. Emmanuel Sivan has examined the clash within Islam between moderates and radicals and has concluded that it is clearly the latter who have the upper hand. Throughout the Muslim world (with the exception of Indonesia), the “regimes [within Muslim-majority states] have a unitary—populist, if not plainly tyrannical outlook; the religious tradition is not pluralistic; and liberals lack communicating and organizing skills.”

According to Steven Emerson, governments around the world largely overlooked the rise and extent of Islamic radicalism because of a number of factors, including “cloak of religiosity, intimidation, the power of Saudi Arabia and other oil producers, and a tendency by many in the West to dismiss radical statements as nothing more than rhetorical posturing.”

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17 Ibid., p. 28.
18 Ibid., p. 43.
19 Steven Emerson, Testimony before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, reported in Federal News Service, July 9, 2003.
Throughout the Middle East, one can witness a trend against secular
government, in favor of political systems with heavy religious and even radical
influences. In the case of Kuwait, for instance, one scholar has suggested that Islamist
influence has grown over the past 25 years and liberal influence has eroded, and
moreover, "...the Islamists have succeeded in sinking roots into Kuwaiti society
through social organizations and business networks."\(^{20}\) In Iraq, growing religious
fervor is also emerging, and has roots predating the fall of Saddam Hussein. Iraq was
once viewed as one of the most secular states of the Middle East, but in recent years,
religion—and particularly militant Islam—has become much more important.

Nir Rosen argues that this transition within Iraq began in the early 1990s when
Saddam, who had not been particularly religious up to that point, began invoking
Islamic symbols to cultivate nationalism and unity. In the first Gulf War, Saddam
portrayed himself as "an Islamic warrior battling the infidels and heretics led by the
Americans."\(^{21}\) In 1993, Saddam reversed the country's secular policy and began the
cultural Islamization of Iraq through a policy known as *hamlah al-imaniya* (or 'faith
campaign').\(^{22}\) Religious study was emphasized and mosques were built. Thus, in many
respects, the trend toward religious orthodoxy, currently apparent in Iraq, had its roots
in policies that existed well before the American-led invasion of 2003.

Iraq's move from a secular to a more religiously-grounded system can be seen in
the quiet movement to revert the country's legal system to traditional Islamic law. On

East Policy*, n. 4, v. 9 (December 1, 2002), p. 75.

\(^{21}\) Nir Rosen, "Iraq's Religious Tide Cannot be Turned Back," *Asia Times*, May 26, 2004; accessed on

\(^{22}\) Ibid.
December 29, 2003, following a closed-door session, the 25-member Iraqi Governing Council, backed by the United States, passed a law that would place all family laws under the control of conservative Islamic law, known as Sharia. The move would undermine more than four decades of women's rights in Iraq, prompted by secular values, which made women in Iraq some of the most protected in the Middle East. Within the 25-member council, the law overturning the secular family law was reportedly sponsored by conservative Shiite members.

A similar trend can be seen in Indonesia, as radical Islamist ideology slowly infiltrates into the political mainstream. Zachary Abuza notes that under the former President Suharto, Islam was prevented from becoming an independent political force. Now, however, "it is not only a political force but is moving to the center of politics."^23 This is partly attributed to the fact that Islamists in Indonesia have linked Islam to nationalism and have consequently broadened their appeal. According to Anthony Smith: "It is evident that in the last few decades there has been an emerging orthodoxy in Islamic practice [in Indonesia]. Many commentators have noted the 'Arabization' of Indonesian Islam in recent decades..."^24 Smith links this trend partially to increased funding from Saudi Arabian charities, but also to cultural and political factors.

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6.3 How Religion Shapes Terrorism

As noted above, religion brings comfort and a sense of cosmic meaning to individuals and societies, but it also features a darker, violent side. “Religion, ordinarily a wellspring of hope, life, and virtue, stirs such deep passions that it also sometimes leads to violent action, to war, and even to terrorism.” Religious militants—including terrorists—often view their actions as a part of a defensive effort to protect their faith, or tradition. “Islam’s jihad, for example, is essentially a defensive doctrine, religiously sanctioned by leading theologians, and fought against perceived aggressors, tyrants and ‘wayward Muslims.” Magnus Ranstorp argues that religious ideology justifies ever greater levels of violence because the struggle “is one purely defined in dialectic and cosmic terms as believers against unbelievers, order against chaos, and justice against injustice.”

The religion-centric paradigm places a premium on the role of religion as an independent factor that instigates violence, or encourages terrorism. The power of religion is so seductive that even young, upwardly-mobile, and intelligent men or women are drawn in by its power. Nevertheless, religion’s relationship to violence is complex and not well understood. Mark Juergensmeyer has proposed that violence in religion is part of the ‘cosmic struggle’ that is played out, often in militaristic terms: “If

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26 Ranstorp, “Terrorism in the Name of Religion,” p. 52.
27 Ibid.
28 In Singapore, authorities were surprised by the profile of Jemaah Islamiyah members, who were generally intelligent and “held normal, respectable jobs.” See White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism, Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, January 7, 2003, p. 15.
the war between good and evil, order and chaos, is conceived as taking place in historical time, in a real geographical location, and among actual social contestants, it is more likely that those who are prone to violent acts will associate religion with their struggles."29

Another basis for violence is the perception of siege from the outside. Religious communities are particularly prone to defensiveness. As Jonathan Fox has argued, "...anything that a religious believer perceives to be a challenge to the religious framework underlying his behavior constitutes an existential threat for the whole constituency."30 Paul Pillar argues that the notion of a cosmic struggle is particularly powerful within militant Islamic groups. Islamists believe that they are engaged in a cosmic struggle with the non-Islamic world, a worldview that is fostered by the Islamic division of the world into *Dar al-Islam* (Realm of Islam) and the *Dar al-Harb* (Realm of War).31 As a result, in a cosmic war the parameters of battle are widened; in other words, everything and everyone are fair game. "It is a common trait of all extremists that they deem the lives of individuals who may die in the course of battle a cosmic enemy (including ones who die in terrorist attacks) to be of little importance."32

The siege mentality among many religious extremists is partly rooted in a need for separation from the outside world. As Kumar Ramakrishna has explained, the neo-Salafist ideology (the ideology that underpins such Islamist groups as Jemaah Islamiyah) creates a binary worldview—the clean versus the unclean, "us" versus

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30 Fox, "The Effects of Religion on Domestic Conflicts," pp. 44-45.
32 Ibid.
This separation provides some convenience to terrorists; it allows them to justify “elimination” of the “other” because of their unworthiness or other imperfection. This sense of total struggle found in religious terrorism is rooted in “dialectic and cosmic terms as believers against nonbelievers, order against chaos, and justice against injustice, which is mirrored in the totality and uncompromising nature of their cause...” This binary worldview provides the enabling foundation for a total war, or an “all-out war against their enemies.” This perspective provides the justification for unlimited or unconstrained violence.

One example of the siege mentality is an interview of Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, the nominal spokesman for Al Qaeda, conducted in June 2002, in which he expresses his fears regarding Islam:

“The Muslim lands are occupied and the Muslims are taken prisoner in the jails of the Kuffar [infidels]. So it is incumbent on every Muslim who really believes in Allah and the Day of Judgment to rise up to defend his religion and to support the oppressed Muslims in this world. And I advise the Muslims not to listen to these disingenuous scholars that work for kufr [infidel] regimes and only issue fabricated fatwas.”

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35 Ibid.

Another example can be found in Singapore, when government officials interviewed Ibrahim Maidin regarding his motivations for joining Jemaah Islamiyah. He stated that as long as the United States was “doing things against Muslims” the JI would continue to attack the United States. The sense of siege also describes statements and beliefs of Islamic leaders in the United States and other countries. Matthew Epstein argues that among Islamic radicals, two themes constantly appear: (1) that Muslims in the world are the victims of a conspiracy designed to persecute them and (2) Western countries, led by the United States, seek to destroy Islamic culture.

Such sentiments have consistently been expressed by Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, who partly ground their campaign against the United States on the basis of alleged American affronts against Islam. In 1998, Al Qaeda and affiliated groups issued a statement describing this sense of siege and their resulting grievances:

“First, for over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples.”

The siege mentality is also closely related to the separation mentality. In the recruiting process of the Southeast Asian terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah, new

37 The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism (Singapore Government White Paper), Presented to Parliament by Command of the President of the Republic of Singapore. Ordered by Parliament to lie upon the Table: 7 January 2003, p. 17.
recruits would find themselves drawn into meeting after meeting where the bonds of commitment would slowly emerge; those who left the group at this stage were considered infidels (or non-believers). Those who stayed “enjoyed a sense of exclusivity and commitment in being in the in-group of a clandestine organization.”

The “in-group” would develop its own language: “Esoteric JI language or ‘JI-speak’ was used as part of the indoctrination process. Code names for instance resulted in a strong sense of ‘in group’ superiority…” Singapore officials also noted that after the induction of new Jemaah Islamiyah members, these new members tended to isolate themselves from mainstream religious communities or activities: “Keeping together as a closely-knit group reinforced the ideological purity of the group and kept them loyal to the teachings of their foreign teachers.”

In addition, the need to separate from the outside world extended to choice of marriage partners. According to a report from the International Crisis Group, “The JI organization and the wider network is also held together by a complicated web of marriage alliances that at times makes JI seem like one large extended family.”

The separation mentality is also closely related to the second stage of Mark Juergensmeyer’s four-stage theory of religious violence. Perceiving as futile the more conventional means of addressing a world gone awry (due to immorality or other offenses), the believers begin to withdraw. They essentially foreclose the ordinary options for dealing with their grievances. In the United States, this can be seen in some

40 The Jemaah Islamiya Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism, p. 15.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., p. 22.
Christian anti-abortion militants. The following quote, taken from the Army of God Manual (2002), describes this transformation, which provides the foundation for violence:

"After praying, fasting, and making continual supplication to God for your pagan, heathen, infidel souls, we then peacefully, passively presented our bodies in front of your death camps, begging you to stop the mass murder of infants. Yet you hardened your already blackened, jaded hearts. We quietly accepted the resulting imprisonment and suffering of our passive-resistance. Yet you mocked God and continued the holocaust. No longer! All of the options have expired. Our Most Dread Sovereign Lord God requires that whosoever sheds man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed. Not out of hatred for you, but out of love for the persons you exterminate, we are forced to take arms against you. Our life for yours—a simple equation. Dreadful. Sad. Reality, nonetheless. You shall not be tortured by our hands. Vengeance belongs to God only. However, execution is rarely gentle."  

Reflecting the binary worldview (and its derivatives, including the need for separation) held by many religious militants, Sayyid Qutb, who is considered the intellectual father of Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders, argued that in an Islamic context, there can be no compromise between Islam and Jahiliyyah, which he defines as a state of ignorance or corruption. He states specifically: "Islam cannot accept any mixing with Jahiliyyah, either in its concept or in the modes of living which are derived from this concept. Either Islam will remain, or Jahiliyyah: Islam cannot accept or agree to a situation which is half-Islam and half-Jahiliyyah. In this respect Islam’s stand is very clear. It says that the truth is one and cannot be divided; if it is not the truth, then it must be falsehood. The mixing and co-existence of the truth and

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falsehood is impossible.” This uncompromising stance suggests that militant groups that follow the Qutb ideology (such as Al Qaeda) will persist in their violence until either they, or their targets, are destroyed.

Another reason that religion is inclined toward violence is the concept of millennialism, which is deeply entrenched within many religious traditions. Millennialism can be described as the “belief that human suffering will soon be eliminated in an imminent apocalyptic scenario, ensuring that the collective salvation of humanity is accomplished.” Cults and various religious movements have emphasized that at certain dates, their visions or certain prophecies will be fulfilled. Many of these groups believe that a final apocalyptic act will usher in a new era. This is why millennialism and terrorism fit together so conveniently. Terrorists motivated by religious millennialist ideologies may seek to bring about this event—in other words, to force the apocalypse. Millennialism is often associated with messianism, which is defined as “the belief that a cosmic figure will shortly appear to reestablish order and restore justice.” In addition, messianism stems from messianic beliefs, which are characterized as those beliefs that visualize “a day in which history or life on this earth will be transformed totally and irreversibly from a condition of perpetual strife which we have all experienced to one of perfect harmony that many dream about…”

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In the Islamic context, Max Taylor and John Horgan argue that Sayyid Qutb's beliefs and ideologies, which form the foundation of contemporary Islamic fundamentalist or Salafist thinking, reflect millennialist tendencies; for example. Sayyid Qutb, in his analysis of contemporary Islam, focused on the "catastrophic nature of contemporary life." Qutb shaped the views of the assassins of Anwar Sadat who was killed in 1981. The plotters apparently believed that by assassinating Sadat, it would trigger the establishment of an Islamic state. "They adopted a frankly millenarian outlook where it was argued that Sadat represented the apostate, the representative of Jahiliyyah." In the assassins' eyes, the death of Sadat itself would trigger God's intervention, which partly explains why they made little preparation for a takeover of the Egyptian state.

Violence in religion is also rooted in the capacity for religion to demand total loyalty among its adherents. In the pre-modern era of terrorism (such as the era of the Zealots or the Assassins), religion played the role of the key motivator. David Rapoport argues that religion has the capacity to inspire "total loyalties or commitments." In fact he argues that such commitment probably surpasses any that a particular state can muster from its particular subjects. In the case of Southeast Asia-based Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Singapore authorities recognized a similar theme in the way that Arab JI leaders recruited local members. They reported that "foreign Muslim

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50 Ibid., p. 47.
51 Ibid.
terrorists...exploited the deeply-felt sense of Islamic brotherhood among Muslims...which often transcends ethnicity and national boundaries..."52

Religious terrorists also believe in creating an "ideal" reality on the Earth. One prime example of this tendency is the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth) group founded by Shoko Asahara in 1987. As Asahara developed his organization, he increasingly sought to create an ideal society to replace the corrupt one that he perceived around him. He intended to build the kingdom of Shambhala, an "ideal society consisting of people who have achieve psychic power."53 In 1989, Asahara gained religious corporation status, a designation that led to significant tax concessions from the Japanese government. The designation also led to "de facto immunity from official oversight and prosecution", a development that significantly aided Asahara in his criminal ventures.54 The religious orientation of Aum Shinrikyo (and its successor organization, Aleph) is grounded in Buddhism "but with a strong mixture of assorted Eastern and Western mystic beliefs including the works of the 16th Century French astronomer, Nostradamus."55 Aum leaders taught that human beings can reach a number of levels of consciousness and enlightenment. In addition, the group was fascinated with the Hindu god Shiva—"This was significant since Shiva is the 'god of

52 The Jemaah Islamiya Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism, p. 22.
55 Ibid.
destruction’ thereby explaining in part the violent nature of the cult and its particular emphasis on ‘Armageddon’.56

By the late 1980s, Asahara became extremely fascinated with the notion that the world would soon be destroyed. He published a major religious treatise titled *The Destruction of the World*. In a subsequent book, Asahara claimed that

“from now until the year 2000, a series of violent phenomena filled with fear that are too difficult to describe will occur. Japan will turn into a wasteland as a result of a nuclear weapons’ attack. This will occur from 1996 through January 1998. An alliance centering on the United States will attack Japan. In large cities in Japan, only one-tenth of the population will be able to survive. Nine out of ten people will die.”57

According to Aum’s construction of the world, this destruction, like labor in childbirth, was necessary to bring about a more ideal world.

Similarly, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)’s ideal vision was to create a *Daulah Islamiyah* (Islamic State) that would be comprised of present-day Indonesia, Malaysia, the Southern Philippines, Singapore and Brunei.58 However, for new recruits into the JI organization, the true “ideal world” was the path that JI laid out toward “true Islam” that would lead to salvation. According to a Singapore government report,

“They [new recruits into the JI organization] wanted to be convinced that in JI they had found ‘true Islam’ and free themselves from endless searching as they found it stressful to be critical, evaluative and rational. They believed they could not go wrong, as the JI leaders had quoted from holy texts.”59

56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 *The Jemaah Islamiya Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism*, p. 6.
59 Ibid., p. 17.
Religious violence can also stem from particular religions’ claims to represent the absolute reality, and thus is anathema to any competitor. In this vein, Islam and Christianity are on a head-on collision course because they both make universal claims. Some argue that Western Christianity has been eclipsed by various secular ideologies, such as human rights, democracy, free markets and free trade. By contrast, in Islam, as noted earlier, there are two spheres of the world, the dar al Islam (the house of Islam) and the dar al harb (the house of war).60

6.4 Implications for terrorism and states

Many experts feel that the rise of fourth-wave terrorism is essentially the convergence of religiously-motivated terrorism and new, more destructive technologies. Religious terrorists, it is believed, are not constrained in the way their secular counterparts supposedly are. They see the enemy as something to be annihilated, not compromised with. “That terrorists motivated by a religious imperative can contemplate such massive acts of death and destruction is a reflection of their belief that violence is a sacramental act or a divine duty.”61 Thus, terrorism, to the religious terrorist, takes on transcendental qualities and assumes what Juergensmeyer deems as “cosmic war” status. David Rapoport associates such absence of restraint to messianic believers who

believe they must participate in a struggle to ‘force the end’: “When the stakes of any struggle are perceived as being great, the conventional restraints on violence diminish accordingly.”62 Peter Chalk echoes these themes with the observation that “the main objective [of religious terrorism] is to inflict as much pain and suffering as possible, with the enemy typically denigrated as fundamentally evil and beyond all redemption.”63

Another aspect of religious terrorism is that it poses a fundamental threat to the state system. Samir Kumar Das has argued that religious terrorism represents a systemic threat to states, unlike secular terrorism (or even pre-modern religious terrorism) of the past. Religious terrorism seeks a systemic change in the system of governance; it questions the very foundation or rationale for the state. Religious radicalism—the foundation of religious terrorism—“does not propose to replace one nation-state by another. Rather, it proposes to do away with the very structure of nation-states.”64 The United States, as the world’s premier and most powerful state, represents the vanguard of globalization, modernization and secularism. Al Qaeda has challenged that position; however, to focus on Al Qaeda is short-sighted. Al Qaeda represents a

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much larger movement—what Marc Sagemen refers to as the global Salafi jihad—that will sustain once Al Qaeda is either destroyed or merged into a related movement.

Another important by-product of religious terrorism is suicide terrorism. Such a phenomenon can be found among the Assassins and the Sicarri (within the Zealots) in the pre-modern era of terrorism. In addition, suicide terrorism is intertwined with the notion of "martyrdom" which is a consistent theme throughout many historic terrorist movements (both religious and non-religious). Writing about the underground terrorist movement in Russia, Serge Stepniak-Kravchinski wrote that "From the day when he swears in the depths of his heart to free the people and the country, [the terrorist] knows he is consecrated to death. He faces it at every step of his stormy life. He goes forth to meet it fearlessly, when necessary, and can die without flinching. ..." However, one characteristic that may distinguish fourth-wave suicide terrorism compared to earlier suicidal or martyr acts or campaigns is the degree of group or organization management. According to Ariel Merari, "[Contemporary] terrorist suicide is an organizational rather than personal phenomenon, in sense that it is planned and prepared by an organization rather than by the person who commits the suicide."

December 1981 marks the beginning of the modern era of suicide terrorism. In that month, suicide terrorists bombed the Iraqi embassy in Beirut, in an operation

67 Transcript of prepared testimony of Ariel Merari, PhD, Senior Fellow, Harvard University, and Director, Political Violence Research Unit, Tel Aviv University, before the House Committee on Armed Services, Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism, Federal News Service, July 13, 2000.
believed to have been orchestrated by Iran. In 1983, Hezbollah (Party of God) in Lebanon launched a major campaign of suicide attacks against U.S. and French soldiers in Beirut in a series of truck bombings. Both the United States and France subsequently withdrew their forces from the area. Suicide terror has been employed by Shi’ites—the underlying religious ideology of Hezbollah—with great effect: “As a result of suicide missions, the Shi’ite terrorist has acquired the image of a heroic warrior, utterly fearless, able to inflict punishment against which there is no defense.”

Shi’ite suicide attacks have two key features: (1) they use huge quantities of explosives and thus vehicular bombs tend to be the weapons of choice (as was seen in the attack on the US Marine headquarters in 1983, and the attack on the US Embassy in Beirut in 1983 and 1984); and (2) the sophistication and quantity of the explosives may indicate some degree of state involvement.

In the early 1990s, the increasingly popular tactic of suicide bombings made its way from Lebanon to Palestine, and played a major role in the Palestinian Intifada during two key periods: 1994-1996 and the period after November 2000. By 1995, suicide terrorism was becoming commonplace in Israel, at which time “Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad used suicide attacks to derail the 1995 Oslo Interim Agreement” that was proposed to establish peace between Palestinians and Israelis. Moreover, suicide terrorism has attained a cultural value—a high status activity. Public opinion in

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69 Ibid., p. 68.
70 Scott Atran, “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism,” Washington Quarterly, v. 27, n. 3 (Summer 2004), p. 68.
favor of suicide terrorism appears to mirror the frequency of its use. “Violence has become the source of all honor among Palestinians.”

Al Qaeda also employs suicide tactics, as can clearly be seen in operations during the past five years, and the organization views such tactics as extremely effective against American military power. In an audio recording, obtained by a Pakistani newspaper, Osama Bin Laden had this to say about suicide operations and their effectiveness against the United States:

“There is no reason to feel frightened by US power. US tanks and troops are only cosmetic symbols of power. If you launch suicide attacks, I assure you, the US citizens all over the world will be frightened. The United States will retreat in the face of your suicide missions…”

In a separate address delivered in December 2004, Bin Laden once again emphasized the importance of suicide operations:

“You should become diligent in carrying out martyrdom operations; these operations, praise be to God, have become a great source of terror for the enemy. They have perturbed its movement, frustrated its plans, and challenged its weapons and soldiers. These are the most important operations.”

Although suicide terrorism has occurred in both religious and non-religious terrorism, the religious variety has been particularly powerful. “...In the fantasy

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ideology of radical Islam, suicide is not a means to an end but an end in itself.”\textsuperscript{74} Normally, Islam and Islamic doctrines are opposed to suicide, but Islamic militants have avoided this problem by constructing an alternative rationale, as Sudha Ramachandran describes:

"Islam frowns on suicide. Yet Islamic extremists have gotten around this problem by describing suicide attacks as acts of martyrdom. They have been justified as attacks on ‘infidels’ and therefore a part of jihad. A suicide mission in which the bomber is able to take the lives of Westerners and Indians is thus not un-Islamic. Members of a rival sect, too, are regarded as infidels and therefore their killing through a suicide attack is not un-Islamic."\textsuperscript{75}

Thus, religious militants have carved out a “martyrdom exception” to the general rule within Islam, and many other religious traditions, that suicide is clearly unacceptable.

From a tactical standpoint, suicide terrorism is extremely effective. From 1980 to 2001, for instance, suicide attacks comprised only 3 percent of all terrorist attacks, but were responsible for over half of all deaths attributed to terrorism.\textsuperscript{76} From 2000 until 2003, more than 300 suicide attacks resulted in the deaths of over 5,300 people in 17 countries throughout the world.\textsuperscript{77} In the past, suicide bombers were typically young men, but this is no longer true. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have

\textsuperscript{75} Sudha Ramachandran, “Killers Turn to Suicide,” \textit{Asia Times} [Internet Edition], October 15, 2004.
\textsuperscript{76} Debra D. Zedalis, \textit{Female Suicide Bombers} (June 2004), Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monograph, available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/Pubs/pubResult.cfm/hurl/PubID=408/FEMALE_SUICIDE_BOMBERS.cfm
\textsuperscript{77} Atran, “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism,” pp. 68-69.
used the greatest number of suicide bombers. Moreover, of the more than 200 suicide attacks, the LTTE used women in roughly 30 or 40% of their attacks.78

In the Islamic context, reliance on women as suicide bombers was traditionally viewed as less desirable due to the clash with some religious leaders' fundamentalist beliefs; however, this psychological barrier has broken down, probably because women exhibit certain key tactical advantages when they are used for suicide operations. For instance, they can achieve a greater degree of stealth and surprise, partly attributed to hesitancy among authorities in conservative countries to conduct body searches on women, or the general perception that women are not particularly violent. But some terrorist groups view women as ideal suicide bombers because they allow the terrorist organizations to field a greater number of combatants. In addition, women suicide bombers garner substantial publicity (which enables more recruiting), and thus they achieve a profound psychological effect.79

Clearly, suicide terrorism has increased as a result of its reinterpretation as an act of martyrdom, hence the importance of the religious narrative that colors the phenomenon. In the Islamic context, “devout Muslims believe that, in death, every martyr, male or female, is welcomed by a minimum of 70 apparitions (houri-el-ein) of unnatural beauty who wipe away the martyrs’ sins, open the gates of heaven, and provide them with all the pleasures that God has given to mankind.”80 As this religious narrative has proliferated, partly as a result of the Internet and other modern

78 Zedalis, Female Suicide Bombers.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
communication technologies, it has begun to shape the manner in which terrorist operations are conducted. In Russia, for instance, the rise of Wahabbi (Saudi Arabian Islamic sect)-influenced ideology in Chechnya is fueling more instances of suicide terrorism, suggesting a strong correlation between fundamentalism—or radical neo-Salafism—and suicide terrorism.

In recent years, Chechen rebels have resorted to suicide terrorism with an intent to conduct mass casualties. On December 27, 2002, for instance, suicide bombers used a truck bomb to blow up the headquarters of Chechnya’s Moscow-backed government. On May 12, 2003, a suicide truck-bomber attacked and killed at least 60 people in northern Chechnya. On May 14, 2003, a woman suicide bomber blew herself up, killing 18 people in an apparent attack on the life of Akhmad Kadyrov, the then Moscow-backed president. In another dramatic attack on December 5th, 2003, a suicide bomber attacked a commuter train in southern Russia which killed 44 people. Overall, at least 8 major suicide bombing attacks perpetrated by Chechens occurred in 2003.81 In the following year, prominent suicide attacks included a simultaneous bombing of two airliners, which killed a total of 90 people. On August 31st, a suicide bomber blew up a car outside of a Moscow subway stop, which killed nine people. On September 1, 2004, more than 12 attackers, wearing suicide-bomb belts, seized a Russian school in Beslan, North Ossetia, taking hundreds of hostages (including

roughly 200 children). A subsequent botched Russian counterterrorism assault on the school resulted in more than 1000 deaths.

In Pakistan, incidents of suicide terrorism have grown dramatically in the past two years, particularly in attacks between various sects within Islam. In the past sectarian disputes between Sunnis and Shias would be settled with guns and bombs, but now suicide attacks have become the norm. The group that is attributed with bringing suicide terrorism to Pakistan in 2000 is Jaish-e-Mohammed. It conducted its first major suicide operation against India on December 25, 2000, when a 24-year-old man named Bilal rammed an explosives-laden car into the Indian army headquarters in Srinagar. In July 2003, one particularly gruesome attack involving suicide terrorism occurred within a Shi’ite mosque in Quetta, which killed approximately 50 people and injured another 60.

The trend can also be seen in Southeast Asia, a region that was once believed to be ‘immune’ from suicide terrorism. On October 12, 2002, a suicide bomber detonated a van full of explosives near a nightclub in the Kuta resort district of Bali, an attack that killed over 300 people, mostly Western tourists. Nearly a year later, another suicide attacker bombed the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta, and then a year after that a suicide terrorist bombed the Australian Embassy. These attacks suggest that suicide terrorism is spreading in Southeast Asia.

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82 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
6.5 The Origins of Al Qaeda Ideology: The Emergence of Religious Militancy

On 11 September 2001, 19 hijackers associated with the transnational Al Qaeda organization commandeered four American airplanes and crashed three of them into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The attack was the result of years of planning, and also the product of an ideological shift in the Al Qaeda organization that occurred in 1998. In that year, Osama bin Laden expanded the Al Qaeda network by inviting numerous other militant or terrorist groups to sign onto the newly established Al Jabbah al Islamiyah al Alamiyyah li Qital al Yahud wal Salibiyyin, or the International Islamic Front for Fighting the Jews and Crusaders. Once the organization was formed, it issued a statement that, among other things, urged Muslims to kill Americans anywhere or everywhere. Moreover, the statement invoked God and pleaded for God's help: "We—with God's help—call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it."86

As this statement indicates, the United States was clearly defined as the evil 'other', consistent with the binary worldview within militant religious ideology that requires a demarcation between good from bad, clean from unclean, and saved from unsaved. By identifying the United States and American citizens so clearly, Al Qaeda had focused its resolve. Although anti-American rhetoric can be found in statements

prior to the creation of the International Islamic Front, the 1998 statement left no doubt who the evil party was. In a sense, Al Qaeda declared a ‘cosmic war’ against the United States in 1998; it was not merely a physical war that would take place on the earth plane. It would also entail the canvassing of cosmic forces against what Al Qaeda viewed as evil American power.

Al Qaeda and the International Islamic Front, which it helped to establish, were products of both historic and more contemporary trends that had shaped militant Islamic ideology. In the more contemporary context, Al Qaeda was the beneficiary of two key events that both occurred in 1979. The first was the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, and the second was the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979. In the first case, a corrupt and tyrannical Shah, supported by the United States, was deposed by a revolution that saw the creation of an Islamic state and the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini. The strategic implications of the Iranian revolution are summed up by Paul Berman:

"The Iranian revolution reaffirmed the undeniable reality that immense revolutions could, in fact, be carried out in the Muslim countries, not just in the name of Baath Socialism or some other version of nationalist radicalism but in the name of the purest Islam. The influence of the United States and of liberal civilization could be cast overboard, and men with beards and turbans could resume their positions of patriarchal power, exactly as in the glorious days of the Islamic past."87

In the second case, following the invasion of Afghanistan by the former Soviet Union, the United States joined forces with Pakistan and a number of Arab countries to fund a

guerilla resistance to the Soviet invasion. The cost of this funding was approximately $1.2 billion per year, approximately half of which came from Arab countries and the other half from US taxpayers. Richard Clark, a former terrorism advisor to several U.S. presidents, argues the Iranian revolution and the Afghanistan invasion by the Soviet army dramatically increased the power and influence of militant ideologies. "Both events rekindled the radical movement in Islam and both drew America further into the realm of Islam."

However, to understand Al Qaeda, it is necessary to reach further back into history. The ideologies underpinning Al Qaeda and similar organizations reach back to the earliest days of the founding of Islam itself. The first movement of what might be termed ‘Salafism’ (referring to purist, fundamentalist tendencies) can be attributed to the Kharijites, who appeared shortly after the birth of Islam in the 7th century. In subsequent centuries, various scholars propelled the movement, such as Ibn Taymiyya in the 13th century. Scholars consider Ibn Taymiyya to be a “great Islamic thinker who, though he died in the early fourteenth century, laid the intellectual foundations for Islamic extremism in the twentieth.” In 1268, Ibn Taymiyya fled his home country, Iraq, and sought refuge in Syria in order to escape the invasion of the Mongols. The Mongol threat played a major role in the evolution of Ibn Taymiyya’s thinking—and has established a broad theme that is used by Islamic militants today: “The role that the

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Mongols played as the threat to Islamic civilization in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries is, in the view of Al Qaeda and likeminded extremists, currently played by Western civilization. In Ibn Taymiyya's view, the Mongols, some of whom converted to Islam, represented a false, or pseudo-Islam. In particular, Taymiyya reserved most of his disdain for the reigning Mongol Ilkhan, Ghazan, who had invaded Syria in 1300. Ghazan had converted to Islam in 1295, but this conversion did not convince Taymiyya:

"[Taymiyya] argued that, although Ghazan sported the appearance of being a Muslim, his policies as a ruler proved that he remained loyal to traditional Mongol law and belief. By having converted to Islam but then having failed to raise up Islamic law in his realm, Ghazan demonstrated that his conversion was a sham. On this basis, Ibn Taymiyya pronounced him an apostate."

In Islam, apostasy (abandoning the true faith) is considered a grave sin. When Ibn Taymiyya criticized Ghazan, he "thus established a boundary between the truly Islamic society and its pseudo-Muslim enemies, who in his view posed a grave threat not just to the Muslims of Syria but to religion itself." The notion of apostasy also plays a major role in the contemporary narrative of Al Qaeda; for example, Al Qaeda pronouncements often highlight the organization’s disdain with fellow Muslims whom it considers apostate. In 2003, Osama bin Laden issued a videotaped message to Iraqis, in which he criticized Arab regimes or individuals that assisted the United States by declaring them apostate:

91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., p. 179.
93 Ibid.
“We also point out that whoever supported the United States, including the hypocrites of Iraq or the rulers of Arab countries, those who approved their actions and followed them in this Crusade war by fighting with them or providing bases and administrative support, or any form of support, even by words, to kill the Muslims in Iraq, should know that they are apostates and outside the community of Muslims. It is permissible to spill their blood and take their property.”94

In a separate statement, issued in October 2003, Bin Laden once again echoes the apostate theme by urging Muslims to reject any Arab regimes or individuals who cooperate with the United States:

“Those who cooperate with the United States or its off-shoots, regardless of names and titles, are infidels and so are those who support infidel parties such as the Arab Socialist Ba’th Party, and the democratic Kurdish parties and their like. It is not a secret that any government formed by the United States is a traitor and collaborator government just like all governments in the region, including the governments of Karzai [Afghanistan] and Mahmud Abbas [Palestine], which were set up to terminate jihad.”95

In another speech, delivered in December 2004, Bin Laden makes a similar distinction between proper Muslims and those who have departed from the Muslim faith (and thus have become apostate):

“Supporting America or Allawi’s renegade government, or Karzai’s government, or Mahmud Abbas’ government, or any other renegade governments in their right against the Muslims is tantamount to infidelity and a

94 Transcript of Usama bin Laden’s Message to Iraq (Urges Muslims to Overthrow Regimes), Doha Al-Jazirah Satellite Channel Television in Arabic 2001 GMT 11 FEB 03 [translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service].
cause for departure from the [Islamic] nation. Included among those are also the owners of companies and the workers who transport fuel, ammunition, food supplies, and any other needs. Everyone who aides and supports them in any kind of way has defected from religion and must be fought.  

Several centuries later, another major influence on Salafism occurred with the rise of a radical Arabian cleric named Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Al-Wahhab was a close friend of Mohammed ibn Saud, founder of the House of Saud, the forerunner of the current state of Saudi Arabia. Al-Wahhab developed a form of Islam that would be later referred to as Wahabbism, which many consider simply the Saudi form of Salafiyya. In the 1800s, House of Saud leaders would join their Wahhabi allies and conduct joint raids throughout Arabia. In the contemporary era, the leaders of the House of Saud have essentially continued their cooperation with the Wahabbists by entering into a compact that allows the Wahhabi religious leaders to rule Saudi Arabia in a way that favors their particular creed. Not surprisingly, Wahabbi ideology permeates a wide range of Saudi domestic and foreign policy. The central tenet of Wahhabism, which is practiced by about 2 percent of all Muslims worldwide, is that “traditional Islamic virtues and beliefs have been corrupted” and thus the religion needs to “return to the ostensibly pure Islam of the time of the Prophet and his companions…” Most importantly, Saudi Arabia plays a role in exporting Wahabbi

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99 Ibid.
ideology throughout the world through a vast network of charities and other financial disbursements.¹⁰⁰

The next major influence on Salafism was the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded in 1928 in Egypt. The Brotherhood "was the first Islamic organization with global reach" according to Mamoun Fandy.¹⁰¹ Ironically, the organization has its headquarters in Qatar, next to the American CENTCOM military command.¹⁰² Fandy argues that the Muslim Brotherhood must be seen as the ideological fulcrum for Al Qaeda and similar organizations. "A constant stand on the Muslim Brotherhood and all movements that provide support for Al Qaeda-like activities is key to developing an effective way of addressing the rise of terrorism in the Muslim world," according to Fandy.¹⁰³

To understand the Muslim Brotherhood requires an examination into its founder, Hassan-Al-Banna. Al-Banna is considered a critically important thinker in the evolution of radical Islamic ideology. Born during a period in which Egypt was ruled by Britain as a colony, he witnessed the withdrawal of the British and the granting of independence to Egypt. Originally, Al-Banna sought to bring about peaceful social and political change in Egypt by developing the Brotherhood as a grassroots organization. It originally had charitable aims: "The Muslim Brotherhood's focus has always been on education and good works: In fact, it was founded in 1928 as the Islamic answer to

¹⁰¹ Testimony of Mamoun Fandy, Senior Fellow, United States Institute of Peace," before Panel 1 of a Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States" reported in Federal News Service, July 9, 2003.
¹⁰² Ibid.
¹⁰³ Ibid.
However, relations between the Brotherhood and the government of Gama Abdul Nasser deteriorated and the Brotherhood became more violent. Currently there are schizophrenic perceptions of the Muslim Brotherhood—on one hand, it has a reputation for engaging in violence and seeking to return to a purist form of Islam. On the other hand, in more modern contexts, the Brotherhood has continued to pursue peaceful political objectives and maintain its charitable missions.

The next major figure in the Muslim Brotherhood, and the man considered to be the ideological father of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri was Sayyid Qutb. Qutb played a major role in the Muslim Brotherhood by resurrecting some of the ideas of Ibn Taymiyya. Sayyid Qutb was very much against modernity, and modern society, which he termed “Jahili”—which derived from the word “Jahiliyya” which describes the period of ignorance and depravity that characterized the Arab world prior to the period when Muhammad began preaching Islam. Sayyid Qutb argued that the modern world was the realm of “Jahiliyya.” In this worldview, Western-driven modernity is itself the threat. Qutb’s focus on Jahiliyyah reflects a common concern among Islamic militants and fundamentalists regarding the problem of reconciling modernity with the tenets of Salafist Islam.

In addition to referring to the period prior to Islam’s founding, the term Jahiliyyah also translates roughly as “the state of ignorance of the guidance from God.” It can also refer to corruption, hedonism, and licentiousness. The separation

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105 Doran, “The Pragmatic Fanaticism of Al Qaeda,” p. 177.
of a true Muslim from Jahiliyyah, or used as an adjective, Jahili concepts, Jahili traditions, etc. is a key aspect of a pious Muslim. The philosophy thus militates against compromise. In fact, the true Muslim must seek to undermine the society in which the Jahili tradition flourishes: “Our aim is to change the Jahili system at its very roots—this system which is fundamentally at variance with Islam and which, with the hold of force and oppression, is keeping us from living the sort of life which is demanded by our Creator.”

Not only did Sayyid Qutb accuse the West of being Jahili, he also condemned secular Muslim states and regimes. Qutb believed in the most expansive and activist definition of ‘jihad’—he believed that it should not only be an inner struggle against bad habits or temptations; it must also be used to defend Islam: “He felt jihad must be used to establish the reign of God and eliminate the reign of man.” Qutb viewed Western modernity in a similar manner that Taymiyya viewed Mongols invaders—as displacing Islam from its proper moorings. Qutb argued that the Western modern concept of “public” vs. “private” space (in which religion was contained within the latter) was anathema to Islam.

Both Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb are products of powerful historical transformations that occurred in Egypt and much of the Middle East in the early 20th century. As Paul Berman has argued, the rise of radical Islamic ideologies corresponded with anti-colonial movements in the 1920s, which also saw the rise of

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107 Ibid., p. 21.

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Pan-Arabism. Pan-Arabists and Islamists appeared to have a similar agenda, at least in their early years. "Both movements dreamed of rescuing the Arab world from the legacies of European imperialism."\textsuperscript{109} Perhaps more importantly, both movements aspired "in some fashion to the glories of the Arab past."\textsuperscript{110} Pan-Arabism, however, focused on secular ideologies; Islamists focused on theocratic principles. Islamists also wanted to resurrect the caliphate, in which Shariah law would be strictly enforced. Berman argues that both the Pan-Arabists and the Islamists could be compared to Mussolini's Italy or Hitler's Germany, in that the latter sought to create an idealized current version of an ancient and glorious past. Indeed, the link with fascism is well-documented. "The most radical Pan-Arabists openly admired the Nazis and pictured their proposed new caliphate as a racial victory of the Arabs over other ethnic groups."\textsuperscript{111}

However, the fissures between the two groups had reached a critical level by the 1950s. In 1952, Gamal Abdel Nasser, who symbolized the rise of nationalist army officers in Egypt, visited Sayyid Qutb in his home in order to elicit his support. Many speculated that Qutb might be appointed to a high post in the new government, but such hopes vanished as it became clear, following Nasser's establishment of a new government, that the Muslim Brotherhood would be a target—not an ally—of the new regime. Many of the Muslim Brotherhood's members fled into exile. In 1954, Nasser placed Qutb in jail, then released him briefly, then jailed him again for ten more years.

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.
During this period, Qutb was regularly tortured. Nevertheless, he continued his writing—facilitated by smuggling papers in and out of jail—until he was finally hanged in 1966.\footnote{Ibid.}

Sayyid Qutb stressed his beliefs about the failures of the West and Christianity. “...Europeans, under Christianity’s influence, began to picture God on one side and science on the other. Religion over here; intellectual inquiry over there.”\footnote{Ibid.} Qutb totally rejected this dichotomy which he believed was the central flaw of modernity. Sayyid Qutb’s ideas could easily be viewed as revolutionary—he does not view the current “system” under which Muslims live, whether domestic or international—as being compatible with true Islam. As he states in *Milestones*, “Islam is a declaration of the freedom of man from servitude to other men.”\footnote{Qutb, *Milestones*, p. 61.} In the next sentence, he states: “Thus it strives from the beginning to abolish all those systems and governments which are based on the rule of man over men and the servitude of one human being to another.”\footnote{Ibid.} Qutb also asserts that the struggle for the supremacy of God’s rule on the earth, in the form of Islam, is not a temporary struggle, but rather is an eternal one:

> “Thus, this struggle is not a temporary phase but an eternal state—an eternal state, as truth and falsehood cannot co-exist on this earth.”\footnote{Ibid.}
Moreover, he warns that the movement will be opposed by the "usurpers of God's authority":

"Whenever Islam stood up with the universal declaration that God's lordship should be established over the entire earth and that men should become free from servitude to other men, the usurpers of God's authority on earth have struck out against it fiercely and have never tolerated it." 117

Qutb characterizes the struggle between Islam and the "usurpers of God's authority" as one of liberation. Islam is portrayed as a liberating force that will ultimately release men from servitude:

"It became incumbent upon Islam to strike back and release man throughout the earth from the grip of these usurpers. The eternal struggle for the freedom of man will continue until the religion is purified for God." 118

Within this context, many of Osama bin Laden's statements and proclamations begin to take on a clearer meaning.

6.6 Abdullah Azzam, Maktab-al-Khidmat and the rise of Al Qaeda

Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda was actually the successor to another organization known as the Maktab-al-Khidmat, run by Abdullah Azzam, a man who had a significant influence on the formation of bin Laden's ideology. Abdullah Azzam was a Palestinian

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117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.

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born scholar who played a major role in developing the concept of jihad. Azzam was essentially “responsible for internationalizing the Islamist struggle against secularism, socialism, and materialism.”¹¹⁹ He is viewed by many as the “intellectual architect” of the jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.¹²⁰ Like many Islamists during the period of the Afghan-Soviet war, he traveled to Afghanistan and created the agency—the Maktab al-Khidmat (MaK)—that would ultimately evolve into the present-day organization known as Al Qaeda. Azzam’s worldview was shaped by Israeli incursions into Palestinian living areas, where he lived as a child. He eventually went to study at Egypt’s Al-Azhar University. While in Egypt, Azzam became close to the family of Sayyid Qutb, whose ideology played a major role in the development of Azzam’s philosophy.

Abdullah Azzam believed in a universal and internal Islamic jihad, rather than a narrow and local version. Azzam’s long term goal was the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate. He believed that jihad is the ‘safest path’ to establishment of the universal leadership of the Caliphate. Azzam also believed in the concept of tawhid (the oneness of God). Moreover, like Sayyid Qutb, he believed that Muslims were engaged in a global struggle against Jahiliyyah. In 1979, Azzam decided to put his thoughts into action and move to Pakistan with his family, where he would be active in the conflict in Afghanistan. In 1984, he established the MaK (Services Center) which “served as a means of channeling donations from Islamic charities and wealthy individuals in the

Gulf States to support the mujahidin.\textsuperscript{121} MaK emerged as a significant political force, interfacing between the Afghan fighters and the governments of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan. In addition, MaK worked closely with the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) bureau in facilitating the resistance against the Soviet Union.

Azzam believed fervently in the notion of an activist jihad and, moreover, for him jihad meant to fight. He dismissed the notion, common among many Sufi orders, that jihad was bifurcated into a ‘greater jihad’ (struggle against evil within oneself) and the ‘lesser jihad’ (physical fight against injustice). For Azzam, jihad meant actual and physical struggle or fighting. In addition, the ‘fight’ was not intended to be a metaphor: “It does not mean to fight with the pen or to write books or articles in the press or to fight by holding lectures.”\textsuperscript{122} Eventually, in November 1989, Azzam and his two sons were assassinated as they rode in their car along a road they normally took to the mosque on Fridays. No one has claimed responsibility for this act, although there are many suspects including the CIA, the ISI (Pakistani intelligence services), the KGB, Osama bin Laden himself, and several others.\textsuperscript{123}

With Azzam now deceased, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri took over the MaK in 1989 and slowly re-oriented its objectives toward more narrow (less internationalist) objectives. Osama bin Laden was the chief financier of the organization in the early 1980s and was thus “considered the deputy to Azzam, the leader of

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., p. 105.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.
This allowed bin Laden to assume the leadership role in Al Qaeda, the successor organization. Osama bin Laden structured Al Qaeda to resemble a classic hierarchical organization, with the emir-general at the top, and below him the Shura majlis, a consultative council. Below the majlis were four committees (military, religious-political, finance and media) that report to the majlis.

For Al Qaeda, Afghanistan provided the key bonding experience that would form the core of the network. It allowed Al Qaeda to establish strong linkages to like-minded Islamist organizations such as Harakat ul Mujahideen and Hamas in the Occupied Territories. In addition, it helped to facilitate the critical merging between Al Qaeda and the Egyptian organizations. Most of Al Qaeda’s membership was drawn from the Islamic Group of Egypt (Gamaya al Islamiya) and Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Al Gamaya Al Islamiya). The Egyptian influence on Al Qaeda, particularly after the early 1990s, cannot be overstated. In the early 1990s, after suffering a series of terrorist attacks, Egypt cracked down hard on groups such as Islamic Jihad. That organization’s leader, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, sought out an alliance with Al Qaeda. In the early 1990s, al-Zawahiri “decided to shift the groups sights from its ‘near enemy’—the secular rulers of Egypt—to the ‘far enemy’, namely the United States and other Western countries.” During the Afghanistan war, the Egyptians played a major role in influencing Osama Bin Laden. “They wooed him away from his mentor, a radicalphilosopher...”

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125 Ibid.
126 Jessica Stern, “The Protean Enemy,” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2003, p. 27.
Jordanian-born Palestinian scholar named Abdullah Azzam, who became the guiding light of the ‘Arab Afghan’ movement...”

Since the mid 1990s, Al Qaeda adopted a form of “total war” against its enemies. This was demonstrated most recently by a document issued by Al Qaeda on April 24, 2002 which justifies the killing of civilians, and particularly the American people. It argues that in democratic countries, the general population—due to their ability to exercise their vote—has a derivative responsibility for the actions of their government. For example, the document states: “If the successive Crusader-Zionist governments had not received support from their people, their war against Islam and Muslims would not have taken such an obvious and conspicuous form.”

The assumption that the government’s policies—in this case US policies toward Muslims countries—reflects the popular will is contained in this sentence: “It [government policy] is something that would not attain legitimacy except by voices of the people.”

Thus, within this logic, all members of the country are fair game.

Some scholars suggest that this Manichean worldview exhibited by Al Qaeda is similar to that of the GIA (Groupe Islamique Armee) in Algeria which did not draw a distinction between combatants and noncombatants. Ironically, it is America’s democratic status that creates risk for all citizens: “The notion that civilians become legitimate targets because of ‘deed, word, mind or any other form of assistance’...is so

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129 Ibid.

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broad that it encompasses virtually every American."\textsuperscript{130} It also justifies almost any method of warfare, including—at least theoretically—weapons of mass destruction. According to Michael Doran:

"In some respects, Al Qaeda resembles a doomsday cult: it divides the world into absolute categories of good and evil; it has a paranoid siege mentality; it sees in extreme violence a means of cleansing the world; and it believes that all humanity stands on the brink of an unspeakable disaster."\textsuperscript{131}

Richard Clark, a former White House terrorism adviser, argues that in addition to separating the world into good and evil, Al Qaeda seeks to drive a global campaign of global domination:

"[This ideology] does not seek terror for its own sake; that international movement's goal is the creation of a network of governments, imposing on their citizens a minority interpretation of Islam. Some in the movement call for the scope of their campaign to be global domination. The "Caliphate" they seek to create would be a severe and repressive fourteenth-century literalist theocracy. They pursue its creation with gruesome violence and fear."\textsuperscript{132}

Given the rich historical and cultural background that forms the foundation of Al Qaeda, the American-led campaign against Al Qaeda arguably has a major flaw, an unwillingness to acknowledge that the problem is not so much the organization as it is the "ideological enabling environment" that allows this organization to grow. Alex

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{131} Doran, "The Pragmatic Fanaticism of Al Qaeda," p. 177.
Alexiev elaborated on this point in testimony to the United States Senate. In that instance, he declared that:

"it is worth reminding ourselves here, that Al Qaeda is not the cause, but rather the symptom of the malignancy called Islamic extremism and that even if we are able to defeat Al Qaeda totally, somebody else will almost certain continue in its footsteps, as long as the underlying malignancy lives on."\(^{133}\)

Al Qaeda can be viewed as part of what might be described as a "jihad international"—a movement that is housed within multiple Islamic militant organizations. The bulk of terrorist attacks following 9-11 have not been carried out by Al Qaeda, but rather "by its associated groups with origins in the Middle East, East Africa, Asia, and the Caucuses, such as the Al Zarkawi group, Al Ansar Al Islami, Al Ansar Mujahidin, Jemmah Islamiyah, Salafi Jehadiya, the Salafi Group for Call and Combat, and the Abu Sayyaf Group."\(^{134}\) This is consistent with the original vision for Al Qaeda proposed by its founding charter member Abdullah Azzam. Azzam proposed that "Al Qaeda was to play the role of a pioneering vanguard of the Islamic movements."\(^{135}\) Thus, the movement that Al Qaeda spearheads will not disappear with the elimination of Al Qaeda. Rohan Gunaratna argues that "Today, the terrorist threat has moved beyond the individual and the group to an ideology. Even if bin Laden and

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\(^{135}\) Ibid., p. 92.
his principal strategist Ayman al-Zawahiri are killed or captured, the terrorist threat will not diminish.”136

Paul Pillar, former head of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, echoes this theme as well. He argues that “even with Al Qaeda waning, the larger terrorist threat from radical Islamists is not.”137 Thus he cautions against the American government’s fixation on capturing Osama bin Laden, as if accomplishing this goal will significantly reduce terrorism. Even if bin Laden is captured (as of this writing, he has not been), “fragments of the organization are likely to spread, subdivide, and inject themselves into other parts of the worldwide Islamist network, like a metastasizing cancer that lives on with sometimes lethal effects even after the original tumor has been excised.”138 Gunaratna argues that the only way to counter this movement is to strike its ideological heart. He argues that it is critical for governments (both in the West and the Muslim world) to send a clear message that “Al Qaeda and its associated groups are not Koranic organizations and that they are presenting a corrupt version of Islam…”139

Al Qaeda as an organization has morphed into an ideology, rather than an organization. Similarly-oriented groups are adapting its ideology and reshaping their own agendas to match Al Qaeda. This is particularly true in Chechnya, where a movement that was largely nationalist and secular has morphed into one that “is now

136 Ibid., p. 99.
138 Ibid., p. 111.
soaked in the rhetoric and blood of global jihad.” The term ‘Al Qaedism’ describes the phenomenon in which local nationalist or separatist struggles, many of which were only marginally (if at all) ensconced in religion, are now repackaged into a larger globalist Islamist ideology. As one Wall Street Journal article recently noted, “Radical Islam has mutated into something akin to communism of the past—a convenient, off-the-shelf ideology that can clothe complex local conflicts that few would care about otherwise.”

These local conflicts include struggles in Aceh, Kashmir, Chechnya and elsewhere—essentially they are re-cast in terms of a global Islamist struggle. By “donning Islamist garb” these leaders of local conflicts can tap into foreign funding (particularly from wealthy Gulf States) and also gain manpower “from a pool of footloose militants looking for work.” Chechen rebel leader Shamil Basayev has consummated this merger with the larger global jihadi struggle by taking on an Arab name, Abdullah Shamil Abu Idris and renamed his group the Gardens for the Righteous Islamic Brigade of Martyrs. He is described as largely pragmatic and cynical, and not particularly religious: “The image of fighter for his faith is just a mask.” As the Chechnyan struggle has taken on a global militant ideology, the myth of the Chechnyan rebellion has changed as well—Islamic militants now view it (and the myriad Russian defeats) as analogous to the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

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141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid.
In many respects, Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah and other similar groups reflect the binary worldview that is predominant in neo-Salafist ideology. Thus, Al Qaeda is really the tip of an iceberg that can be found throughout the world. As Steven Emerson notes “Within the framework of militant Islamic fundamentalism, a culture of violent jihad has become a common denominator sanctioning violence, terrorism against moderate and secular Muslims, Americans, westerners, Christians, Jews and other infidels.” Emerson argues that such militancy can be found in other religions—such as Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism—but “no other religious-inspired violence matches the scope and transnational breadth of militant Islamic fundamentalism.” Moreover, this ‘religion within a religion’ is accepted only by a small proportion of Muslims and yet, “the undeniable fact is that Islamic militants dominate or exercise disproportionate influence over the religious, academic and media institutions in the Muslim world...”

6.7 Conclusion

Throughout history, religion has played an important role in orienting human beings toward peace and peaceful co-existence. Religion has also provided comfort, and an explanatory scheme in which individuals can attempt to understand their place in the larger cosmos. But religion also has had a dark side. The tendency toward

146 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
universalist claims and absolute adherence has spawned a sinister alter-ideology that is predisposed toward violence.

To understand trends in terrorism, one must understand religion's relationship with terrorism. More importantly, the conditions within various religious narratives that justify or even celebrate extreme violence must also be recognized, and to the extent possible, managed or suppressed. Although religious terrorism is not new, combined with new technology (such as chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons), its ultimate impact is likely to be far different than that of its historic analogues.
7.1 Introduction

In early 2003, officials with the newly-created Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a warning to residents of Washington D.C., in which they suggested that terrorists may be attempting to stage another attack in the area. American officials were cryptic in their comments, refusing to publicize the exact nature of the threat. They did, however, issue guidance on how residents could prepare for the attack. Officials urged families to create a “family emergency plan” which would involve selecting specific places to meet in the event of a disaster, as well as preparing a disaster kit, consisting of various emergency supplies.\footnote{“What Steps to Take Before, After Attack,” The Washington Post, February 16, 2003, p. A14.} Residents were also urged to install plastic sheeting over windows and to cover ventilation ducts with tape in order to maintain air purity. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) urged families to maintain a food and water supply that would last at least three days.

The fear emanating from these official warnings was palpable throughout the D.C. area; government leaders suggested that parents remain calm in front of their children in light of this threat. The unprecedented security precautions were a response to intelligence information that Al Qaeda was seeking to deploy nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical weapons in a terrorist attack. Officials were most concerned
about a radiological dispersal device (RDD), the so-called “dirty bomb” (which is a conventional bomb laced with radiological material). The deployment of an RDD was viewed by officials as not only feasible, but quite possible in light of intelligence discoveries and interrogations of Al Qaeda operatives. This Washington D.C. public warning incident, which turned out to be a false alarm, was followed by another nearly a year later. On January 1, 2004, officials in New York City issued similar warnings after intelligence suggested that Al Qaeda might conduct an RDD attack on the city during the New Year celebrations. However no incident occurred.

These warnings reflected a growing perception among U.S. officials that, in a post 9-11 world, terrorists would use any means to conduct a mass casualty attack and, moreover, would be quite willing to use Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) weapons or materials to conduct such an attack. The horrific and catastrophic scale of Al Qaeda’s attack on 11 September 2001 has led people to believe that in today’s era of terrorism, there are no limits, no constraints—nothing that is, so to speak, “off the table.” Moreover, these fears have been strengthened by discoveries made by U.S. troops in Afghanistan who have discovered physical evidence and documents displaying an active effort on the part of Al Qaeda to develop a CBRN capacity. Essentially these discoveries and other observations have resulted in a sea change in how states think about terrorism; what was once inconceivable is now possible, and perhaps inevitable. Technology that was once comfortably believed to be safely within the “state realm” (behind lock and key, in well-guarded buildings operated by reasonable and responsible states) is now seeping into the “non-state realm”, into the
hands of non-state actors such as Al Qaeda. Globalization provides the enabling environment underpinning the diffusion of CBRN technologies: "Today’s global community is the result of several developments, including the diffusion of and increased reliance on technology; increased access to information, technology, and materials; ease of communication and transportation; and the openness of more societies."\(^2\) Terrorism has changed and thus, the way that societies think about terrorism has begun to change as well.

7.2 The CBRN Element in Terrorism

Terrorism involving chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons (CBRN) has emerged as one of the key security concerns of the 21\(^{st}\) century. This dissertation contends that this factor acts as the third driver of fourth wave terrorism. In the wake of the 9-11 attacks in the United States, officials in many countries concede that a threat that was once theoretical—and the subject of popular fiction or movies—has now become quite possible, and perhaps inevitable. Post 9-11 revelations to support such concerns have included evidence that Al Qaeda has actively pursued a CBRN capability in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Other CBRN, such as chemical and biological weapons, are also on the radar screens or “shopping lists” of terrorists. As noted above, globalization, and its attendant network linkages, is “at the heart of the

danger of potential use of chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological weapons.\(^3\) In addition, the decline of the Soviet Union after the Cold War has unleashed massive amounts of CBRN technology and materiel within the former Soviet Union and, as current evidence suggests, also onto the global stage. Such dispersion is partially the result of government corruption, state breakdown or the convergence of state technologies with organized crime. This underpins one of the tenets of Nickos Passas’ criminogenic theory, discussed in chapter 2. Passas argues that states are at the root of CBRN phenomena:

“Asymmetries are largely the work (direct or indirect) of agents of nation states. In some cases the states are complicit; in other cases they are unable or unwilling to take remedial action. Systemic sources fueling the demand for illicit goods and services are thus traced back to nation states.”\(^4\)

The notion that a lone rogue individual, or non-state actor, would engage in acts of mass destruction has existed for over a century, and was popularized in such stories as *The Enemy of the World* by Jack London and H.G. Wells’ *Invisible Man*. As Walter Laqueur describes: “Throughout history world destruction has usually been imagined as taking the form of say, an all-consuming fire or global inundation.” After World War II, following the actual deployment of such weapons against Japan, nuclear weapons emerged as the great concern; but most fears about nuclear weapons concerned those

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that were possessed by states. Indeed, much of the Cold War security structure rested on the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD), which was rooted in the deployment of nuclear weapons by the United States, the Soviet Union and their respective allies.

Since the 1970s, fears regarding nuclear weapons in the hands of non-state actors have become more common, as the likelihood of such scenarios becomes more possible and urgent. As Andrew O’Neil describes, policymakers and scientists, beginning in the 1970s, began to worry that terrorists might possibly gain access to nuclear weapons or other CBRN materials. “The specter of terrorist attacks involving WMD [CBRN] has preoccupied security analysts both within and outside official government circles since at least the early 1970s.”\(^5\) In the late 1970s, Louis Rene Beres warned that nuclear conflict was no longer confined to the risk of war between the United States and the Soviet Union; “Today, with more than fifty major terrorist groups operating in the world, the most likely scenario of nuclear destruction has become one involving terrorist activity.”\(^6\)

The end of the Cold War greatly magnified these fears for various reasons, including worries about the collapse of the USSR and the potential security of CBRN materials and technology. What worries experts is that traditional notions of nuclear power, where major states maintained control and crises could be contained, are evolving into an alternative situation where nonstate actors may have access to such

materials. Alex Schmid has summarized it this way: “The post Cold War situation
where weapons of mass destruction become within reach of non-territorial actors who
cannot be deterred in the way that territorial actors can, creates an instability we have
yet to learn to cope with.”

There is a growing sense of inevitability among security analysts and terrorism
professionals regarding the role of CBRN in terrorism. In the Israeli-Palestinian
context, two analysts recently assessed whether CBRN is likely to be used in terrorism
in that setting. They generally concluded that the possibility was still small, although “at
the very least, Israeli civilians and security planners should factor in the possibility that
these weapons may eventually be used in their conflict with the Palestinians.”

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dr. Amy Sands of the
Center for Nonproliferation Studies recently asserted that “it is clear that we are living
in a new security era in which the possibility that terrorists could acquire and use WMD
[CBRN], including chemical and biological weapons, must be seen as real.”

These fears notwithstanding, to date there has been no terrorist-directed nuclear
attack. Other CBRN—such as chemical or biological weapons—have been deployed,
but their results have been rather limited, especially when compared to more
devastating attacks involving traditional conventional bombs. This has led some to

8 Gary L. Ackerman and Laura Snyder, “Would they if they could? If the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
continues, terrorist groups could be drawn to far deadlier weapons,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
9 Testimony of Amy Sands, PhD, before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Deconstructing
the Chem-Bio Threat,” reported in Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, March
19, 2002.
argue that the CBRN threat has been overblown. John Parachini argues that the emphasis on nonconventional terrorist attacks—i.e. use of CBRN—is diverting attention away from more conventional (and more likely) modes of attack, such as deployment of high explosives and suicide terrorists. Parachini points to only three terrorist mass casualty attacks involving unconventional weapons materiel. The first involved the case of the Rajneeshee religious cult that attempted to influence a local election by poisoning local residents with *Salmonella typhimurium*. The second example involved the use of chlorine gas by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) against Sri Lankan Armed Forces, which injured approximately 60 government soldiers. And the third involved the use of sarin gas by the Aum Shinrikyo group against passengers in a Tokyo subway in 1995.10

This small number of CBRN terrorist attacks reflects what Parachini and others call terrorists' natural inclination to employ "tried and true" methods, rather than venturing into the unknown. For policymakers, Parachini argues that they should "guard against inordinate attention to unconventional weapons so as not to hamper attention to a clear and present danger: terrorist attacks with conventional explosives."11 He argues moreover that conventional explosives have caused far more damage and destruction than deployment of unconventional weapons.12 This line of reasoning is consistent with another view of terrorism that has been commonly accepted—that terrorists, in the words of Brian Jenkins, "want a lot of people watching, not a lot of

11 Ibid., p. 403.
12 Ibid., p. 400-401.
people dead.” In other words, the traditional view of terrorism was that terrorists did not want to go too far: “Real terrorists—that is to say, those pursuing political aims—are more interested in publicity than in a great number of victims.”13 Moreover, the difficulty in actually conducting a successful CBRN attack would act as a natural constraint. According to Juliette Kayyem, former Commissioner of the National Commission on Terrorism, “What we need to remember, however, is that despite popular portrayals, a WMD [CBRN] attack by a terrorist group is very difficult. Today, we know that terrorist groups in the Middle East are seeking the ability to use such agents, but their ability to do so is much less easy than their desire.”14

Nevertheless, this view has begun to change significantly, particularly in the wake of the 9-11 attacks. This is because the 9-11 attacks revived a current of thinking that gained prominence in the late 1990s in the United States and which was reflected in a wave of literature during that period that began to seriously contemplate the possibility of CBRN weapons being used outside the context of normal inter-state warfare. In 1998, Richard Betts wrote an essay for Foreign Affairs in which he argued that CBRN weapons, once considered “the technological frontier of warfare” and also key weapons for strong states, would now become “weapons of the weak—states or groups that militarily are at best second class.”15 In other words, these weapons, which have been traditionally associated with strength, are now instruments that foster

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vulnerability and weakness. "...[T]hey [CBRN weapons] have become the only hope for so-called rogue states or terrorists who want to contest American power."\textsuperscript{16} As a result, for the United States and other developed countries, the real strategic worry had to do more with civil defense, rather than military utility. Confronting the specter of a massive terrorist attack involving CBRN weapons would now have to become the priority for powerful states in the international system. Betts argued that "the response that should now be the highest priority is one long ignored, opposed, or ridiculed: a serious civil defense program to blunt the effects of WMD [CBRN] if they are unleashed within the United States."\textsuperscript{17} In addition, Betts has called for a reduced U.S. role in foreign conflicts: "American activism to guarantee international stability is, paradoxically, the prime source of American vulnerability."\textsuperscript{18}

7.3 **Terrorism and the Nuclear Threat**

Of all the CBRN weapons, nuclear is undoubtedly the element that provokes most fear. Since the 1970s (and earlier), U.S. officials have worried about the possibility that terrorists may gain access to a nuclear weapon. Analyzing the potential for nuclear weapons to fall into the hands of terrorists requires a breakdown analysis into specific portals. Stanley Jacobs proposes four key ways that terrorists may use

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
nuclear weapons. First, they may steal an intact nuclear weapon. Second, they could attempt to construct a nuclear device based on information gained from unclassified sources. Jacobs concedes that although this is a theoretical possibility, “the conversion of that information into a functioning device is a task of a far different magnitude.” Third, they may seek to construct a radiological dispersal device (RDD), the so-called “dirty bomb.” Lastly, they could simply attack a nuclear reactor. This last scenario is considered particularly serious because, as one US government report stated, “operating nuclear reactors contain large amounts of radioactive fission products which, if dispersed, could pose a direct radiation hazard, contaminate soil and vegetation and be ingested by humans and animals.”

However, there are practical barriers to each of these various access pathways. Regarding nuclear weapons slipping into the hands of terrorists, Thomas Badey argues that if terrorists intend to use nuclear weapons in a terrorist attack, they must overcome certain barriers which have generally been viewed as difficult. First, the easiest way to deploy a nuclear device is to actually gain access to a functional, intact weapon. But Badey and others have argued that “the successful theft or acquisition of a finished nuclear device by non-state actors is unlikely.” Countries often invest tens of millions of dollars to develop nuclear weapons—as can be seen in the recent examples of Libya,

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20 Ibid., pp. 149-163.
21 Ibid., p. 155.
Iran and North Korea—and they would almost never, assuming logical reasoning, simply hand an intact nuclear device over to a nonstate actor, particularly given the long-term political and military ramifications (particularly as such nuclear devices would likely contain a ‘signature’ allowing tracing back to the source country).

This analysis, however, does not consider unaccounted for (i.e. lost or misplaced) nuclear weapons. Currently, there are fears that some nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union have disappeared, or are simply unaccounted for. In 1997, former Russian Security Council Secretary Alexander Lebed disclosed that the Russian government was unable to account for roughly 80 atomic demolition munitions—popularly known as “nuclear suitcase bombs.” The devices weigh between 30 and 45 kilograms and can fit into a backpack.

Another barrier to the deployment of nuclear devices by terrorists involves the difficulty in accessing weapons grade uranium or plutonium. Groups such as Aum Shinrikyo (now known as Aleph) have attempted to acquire these materials, but there is little evidence that this nonstate actor, or any other, has succeeded thus far. Moreover, the ability to acquire such materials on the black market or otherwise would require substantial financial resources, more than most nonstate actors would be able to accumulate or maintain (with the obvious exceptions of Aleph and Al Qaeda). As Andrew O’Neil observes: “Despite some claims to the contrary, the core ingredients of weapons grade fissile material—highly enriched uranium and plutonium—are scarce

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internationally and very expensive to produce in sufficient quantities to manufacture even the crudest of nuclear devices.”

Still another barrier to using nuclear devices in a terrorist attack involves the clandestine transportation of fissile materials across international boundaries. Thomas Badey argues that since the assembly and detonation or launch of a weapon “is not likely to take place in the country in which the material originated, would-be nuclear terrorists require access to clandestine transport capabilities, preferably their own...”

A report by the CIA once warned that the clandestine shipment of a nuclear device into the United States would likely be the primary pathway by which such a weapon would be used. In the United States, seaports are considered particularly vulnerable. A recent US government study suggested that an attractive possibility for terrorists would be the smuggling of a nuclear device aboard a ship container. Since many seaports are located near major population cities, the resulting detonation would likely kill up to a million people and inflict several billion dollars worth of economic damage. The report named two cities, New York and Philadelphia, as being particularly vulnerable due to the close proximity of civilian populations. One barrier to the smuggling/detonation scenario in the post September 11 environment is that many states have significantly enhanced their radioactive (and other CBRN) detection

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29 Ibid., p. 6.
capabilities inside their ports. However, it is the pre-inspection phase (the time that a
ship enters a port, or an airplane flies over target airspace, prior to inspection) that
remains a critical vulnerability.\textsuperscript{30}

Regarding the second pathway described by Jacobs concerning the construction
of a nuclear weapon, many experts are divided on the likelihood of this scenario.
However, more recent analysis suggests that this is more plausible, particular if
terrorists construct one type of nuclear weapon called a “gun-type” weapon. In this
type of weapon, “a mass of uranium highly enriched in the fissile isotope 235 (highly
enriched uranium, or HEU) is shot down a tube (resembling an artillery tube) into
another HEU mass, creating a supercritical mass and a nuclear explosion.”\textsuperscript{31} This
model of a nuclear weapon was used in the Hiroshima Japan bombing in 1945.
According to an official European government report, based on the May 2004 exercise
\textit{Black Dawn}, which simulated a nuclear detonation in a European city, the “gun-type”
weapons could be constructed relatively easily:

“There is broad consensus among nuclear weapons experts that widely available
plans could be used to build a “gun type” nuclear device, similar in design to the
Hiroshima bomb, which was detonated without previous testing. This device
could be built with readily available machining tools. A simple gun-type
improvised nuclear device using 40-60 kg of 90% HEU could produce the
explosive equivalent of 10 kilotons or 10,000 tons of TNT.”\textsuperscript{32}

In addition, according to the US government report, simple improvements in the

\textsuperscript{30} Jonathan Medalia, “Nuclear Terrorism: a Brief Review of Threats and Responses,” \textit{Congressional
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., p. 2.
\textsuperscript{32} Black Dawn final report, accessed at
design of a "gun-type" weapon could make it very versatile and mobile: "In short, a [gun-type] weapon could fit in a car, boat, or small airplane, and would occupy a small corner of a shipping container." Moreover, the only true barrier to creating an effective gun-type nuclear device is to acquire a suitable quantity of HEU, the stockpiles of which are believed to be substantially unguarded in many parts of the world. The second type of weapon, an implosion weapon, is considered more complicated, and would most likely require assistance from a state. The second type relies on weapons-grade plutonium (WGPU, composed mainly of the isotope 239). In this case, "a shell of WGPU is surrounded by chemical explosives arrayed to produce a symmetrical inward-moving (implosion) shock wave that compresses the plutonium enough to be supercritical." This particular nuclear weapon model was used in the explosion in Nagasaki Japan in 1945.

Given the difficulties that nonstate actors would likely encounter in their attempt to deploy and detonate a nuclear device in a terrorist attack, experts tend to agree that the most likely scenario is for a radiological dispersal device (RDD)—a so-called "dirty bomb"—to be used in a terrorist act. Such a bomb is considered technically much simpler, compared to the alternatives and it is more likely that a terrorist could gain access to fissionable material. Many experts believe that unguarded nuclear waste facilities could become a source for materials to be used in a radiological bomb. Such

34 Ibid., p. 9.
36 Ibid.
38 Jacobs, "The Nuclear Threat as a Terrorist Option," pp. 149-163.
waste could come from nuclear-medicine technology waste, dismantled tactical or strategic nuclear weapons, or expended nuclear power fuel rods. The growing use of nuclear technology in medical and civilians sectors and the rise of the nuclear industry in general are increasing the possibility that radioactive materials will fall into the hands of terrorists. Consequently, an RDD is viewed as the most likely radiological event. A recent U.S. study completed by the National Defense University recently stated that a successful “dirty bomb” attack on an American city could “expose hundreds of people to potentially lethal amounts of radiation.” The Federation of American Scientists determined that if a small amount of cesium-137 (an amount that could be found in a medical gauge) was detonated in an RDD at the National Gallery of Art in Washington DC, the resulting radiation would cover 40 city blocks and exceed Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) contamination limits.

A dirty bomb attack would not likely cause immediate mass casualties—except for those individuals caught within the radius of the conventional blast—but could potentially kill hundreds or thousands because of exposure to radiation. Moreover, the economic consequences would likely be even more dramatic. According to the National Defense University study, even a small or moderately-sized device could contaminate a large area—such as the central district of a large city—and require years

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of cleanup effort.\textsuperscript{43} The study’s publication coincided with revelations that the US government had conducted a secret “dirty bomb” test near the Washington Monument on 11 September 2003, two years after the infamous 9-11 attacks. The “bomb”, which was fake, was placed at the Monument grounds by the Interior Department’s Office of Inspector General. The fake bomb test was designed to test whether local authorities were adept at spotting the potential bomb. The police failed to spot the device—one police officer, who was in sight of the fake bomb, apparently fell asleep in his patrol car.\textsuperscript{44}

7.4 Post Cold War Paradigm Shift

Although the theoretical possibility of terrorist groups obtaining a nuclear weapon has always existed, it is not known to have happened to date. And moreover, terrorists tend to be conservative in terms of their deployment of weapons; they tend to use methods—such as conventional bombing—that have been tested before. Thus, in theory, the current trend (preference for conventional explosives over unconventional explosives) would likely continue, except for two major factors, both of which were identified prior to the 9-11 attacks in the United States. James Campbell has asserted

that we must look at both the supply and demand changes that are occurring within the context of terrorism and nuclear weapons. 45

Supply Changes

A few weeks following the 9/11 attacks in the United States, reports surfaced that Russian organized crime syndicates were potentially cooperating with Al Qaeda and other groups to facilitate the illicit transfer of nuclear materials to these nonstate actors. The reports generated alarm throughout the world, especially as they occurred within a context in which Russia and other former Soviet states had, according to numerous reports, become a sieve for nuclear materials because of failures in internal control mechanisms. Since 9-11, there have been numerous but scattered reports of Al Qaeda cooperation (or attempts at cooperation) with Russian criminals or corrupt officials to acquire a nuclear device. A former US FBI agent has claimed that Al Qaeda purchased 20 “suitcase” bombs from former KGB agents in 1998. 46 Another report suggested that Al Qaeda had entered into a deal with Russian organized crime representatives to purchase nuclear materials, but later Al Qaeda negotiators discovered they had been cheated. 47 Another report states that “al-Qaeda itself has long had links with Russian mafia middlemen who purchased weapons in Ukraine and then exported

47 Ibid.
them to terrorist groups in the Middle East and as well as to the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{48}

The end of the Cold War has ushered in an era in which worries about “loose nukes” around the world have grown. The Soviet Union, which had developed one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals, faced severe economic challenges—and many of its nuclear devices were now unaccounted for. As Russian criminal syndicates became unleashed, and as they proliferated throughout the world, many experts feared that Russian organized crime groups might seek to sell these weapons to the highest bidder. Most experts agree that post Cold War Russia remains a key vulnerability whereby nuclear materials may leak from the state realm into the realm of nonstate actors:

“Russia inherited a vast nuclear complex where hundreds of tones of ‘fissile material’ (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) exist under inadequate and even non-existent security measures.”\textsuperscript{49}

In Russia, huge stockpiles of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium presumably still exist, despite the end of the Cold War. According to Dr. Rose Gottemoeller “…approximately 1500 metric tones of highly enriched uranium were produced for the Soviet Weapons program and approximately 150 metric tons of plutonium…That’s why we worry about the Russian Federation.”\textsuperscript{50} The role of Russia as a potential “seepage” point is especially critical in the sense that access to fissile materials has been considered the greatest barrier for any potential nuclear terrorist.

\textsuperscript{48} “Russia, the CIS and Terrorism,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest, January 10, 2003.
\textsuperscript{50} Dr. Rose Gottemoeller, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Federal News Service, September 24, 2002.
However, this barrier is largely nonexistent with regard to Russia which has the world’s largest supply of unirradiated HEU, estimated at between 1,000 to 1,500 tons. This is enough HEU to create thousands of bombs, and would facilitate nuclear terrorism:

“If they could obtain HEU, terrorists would face few obstacles to building a crude nuclear device capable of delivering a multiple-kiloton yield; a sophisticated implosion design would be unnecessary. Depending on the degree of enrichment and the design of the device, tens of kilograms of weapons-grade uranium are sufficient for one nuclear warhead.”

In addition, there have been periodic incidents of nuclear materials being stolen from Russian nuclear sites. One such case occurred in 1998 in the Chelyabinsk administrative region. In that case, Russian officials reported that “quite sufficient material to produce an atomic bomb” was stolen in this particular instance. Russian nuclear materials are particularly vulnerable to theft in two specific situations. First, loose constituent nuclear materials outside of the nuclear weapons are vulnerable to theft due to inadequate protection measures in storage facilities. Second, nuclear materials are also vulnerable to theft during the warhead manufacture process. In a recent case, agents with the Russian Federal Security Service broke up a plot by inside employees of a Russian nuclear weapons facility in Chelyabinsk to steal 18.5 kg (40.7 lbs) of highly-enriched uranium (HEU).

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52 Ibid.
54 Ibid., p. 76-77.
In addition to theft, the smuggling of nuclear materials through the former Soviet Union has become a major threat since the early 1990s. In Moldova, for instance, much of the country is viewed as a “gunrunner’s haven” where large numbers of “rocket mounted ‘dirty bombs’” (or warheads, designed to distribute deadly radiation) are now considered missing. In Eastern and Southeastern Europe, the smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials is well documented. For example, in Turkey, police have identified at least two main routes that were used between 1993 and 1999: a maritime route to Turkey that passed through Romania and Bulgaria, and a northern route that crossed into northern Iraq. Authorities have listed Russia, Georgia, Iran and Azerbaijan as starting points for the nuclear trafficking. Most of the seized material in Turkey has been natural uranium, low enriched, or depleted uranium, although many seizures revealed fraudulent attempts by traffickers to pass off non-nuclear materials as nuclear.

The nuclear seepage problem from Russia is so serious that some have observed that the threat of nuclear attack is greater now than during the Cold War: “The implicit threat to the United States from Russia’s nuclear edifice is more acute than it was during the Cold War,” according to John Newhouse, a former senior policy advisor with the US State Department.

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57 Lale Sabrihomuglu, “Turkey Detects Nuclear Material Trafficking,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 1, 2002.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
majority leader Howard Baker and White House counsel Lloyd Cutler “The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation-states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home.”

Alongside worries that Al Qaeda and Russian criminal syndicates may be cooperating on nuclear matters, reports have emerged in the past few years from Pakistan about possible collusion between Pakistani scientists and Al Qaeda leaders. Pakistan is considered one of three states outside of Russia with significant quantities of possibly unsecured HEU (the other two being Iran and North Korea). With regard to Pakistan’s relationship with Al Qaeda, press reports have indicated that nuclear scientists were seeking to assist Al Qaeda in the latter’s quest to develop an arsenal consisting various CBRN weapons. These concerns and allegations would later provide the backdrop for a shocking revelation that occurred on February 4, 2004 when Pakistani’s top nuclear weapons scientist and founder, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, appeared on Pakistani national television and admitted that he had shared Pakistani nuclear technology with other countries around the world. The public admission capped years of investigation by intelligence agencies who believed that Dr. Khan had operated—with official Pakistani complicity and perhaps assistance—a one-man nuclear proliferation operation. Evidence uncovered by internal investigations in Pakistan revealed that Dr. Khan had specifically delivered nuclear technology to Libya,

61 Ibid., p. 21.
Iran and North Korea. Moreover, there is strong evidence that he did this with the blessing of the Pakistani military establishment—ostensibly an ally of the United States in the latter’s “global war against terrorism.”

Dr. Khan has argued that he was partly motivated by a desire to spread nuclear technology to the Islamic world in an attempt to shield the “umma” (the Islamic community) from Western pressure. 63 He reportedly implanted the idea of an “Islamic bomb” in the mind of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. 64 Moreover, it is not clear that the distribution of nuclear technology was limited to states. As noted earlier, prior to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, two nuclear scientists, under direction of Dr. Khan, traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan to meet with Taliban leaders. This meeting emboldened Mullah Omar to declare that the United States would suffer a terrible event. When the United States sought to interview the two scientists, Suleiman Asad and Muhammad Ali Muktar, they were suddenly declared “unavailable” by the Pakistani government because of an urgent project in Burma. The scientists were described as “very motivated” in their desire to assist Al Qaeda and its leadership in the field of CBRN weapons, although there is little evidence that this resulted in any tangible acquisition of CBRN materials or technology for Al Qaeda. 65

The linkage between Pakistan’s nuclear establishment and Al Qaeda was allegedly engineered by the Pakistani intelligence service, the so-called Inter-Services Intelligence Bureau (ISI). In particular, the Pakistani scientists, with the blessing of the

ISI, are believed to have instructed Al Qaeda operatives on techniques of building a radiological dispersal device (RDD, or “dirty bomb”). The events surrounding Dr. Khan’s revelations reveal just how likely it is that nuclear technology—believed to be safely stored within the realm of responsible states—has seeped into the hands of ‘rogue’ states and nonstate actors seeking to obtain a nuclear capability. Experts on nuclear weapons and terrorism have generally assured themselves that such seepage was not likely and, moreover, that no state would be willing to take responsibility for such actions.

Nevertheless, the Abdul Qadeer Khan affair has revived fears that nuclear experts have harbored for decades, that somehow a ‘rogue’ state or individual might seek to sell a nuclear device to a terrorist or a state known to sponsor terrorism. There is also some evidence that Dr. A.Q. Khan sought to stimulate Iraq’s nuclear weapon program. In the mid-1990s, Dr. Khan, relying on a middleman named ‘Malik’, reportedly approached the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and offered to sell a nuclear bomb design and centrifuge parts for $US 5 million.66 The Iraqis reportedly declined the deal because they suspected it was either a criminal scam or trap set up by a foreign intelligence agency.67 Dr. Khan also approached other countries, including Iran, which according to recent reports, received significant technical assistance from the A.Q. Khan network.68

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67 Ibid.
More significantly perhaps was the vast network of middlemen who traded in dual-use technology that could be used to build centrifuges for the purpose of enriching uranium. The A. Q. Khan affair highlights what many security analysts believe to be a potential conduit for nuclear weapons flowing from states to nonstate actors—the problem of failing or 'quasi' states. Mohan Malik has argued that "...the breakup of states creates the danger of WMD [CBRN weapons] falling into the hands of separatists and religious fanatics."69 Specifically in the context of Pakistan, there is substantial worry that the country could splinter "with one piece becoming a radical Muslim state in possession of a nuclear weapon..."70

Iran poses another danger for seepage (independent of the A.Q. Khan affair) from the state realm to the non-state realm, particularly because it remains one of the key countries in the world with an active and overt relationship with terrorist organizations. In April 2001, for instance, Iran held an international meeting in Tehran, known as the International Conference on the Palestinian Intifada, in which it invited leaders from Hamas, Hizbollah, and Islamic Jihad "presumably to encourage greater cooperation between these groups in their campaigns against Israel."71 Iranian leaders reportedly used this meeting to urge total eradication of the Israeli state. Such an ambitious plan might presume reliance, at some future date, on CBRN weapons. It is now known that Iran is actively developing a nuclear capacity. At least in theory, and

70 Ibid.
based on its past agency relationship with nonstate actors, Iran could play a vital role in acting as a portal through which CBRN technology could exit the state realm into the hands of nonstate actors.

Contributing to the appeal of using nuclear weapons is the extreme vulnerability of key states, such as the United States, which often fixate on ballistic missiles as the most likely means by which they will suffer a nuclear attack. Ironically, however, more realistic analysis has tended to focus on more prosaic means of attack, such as smuggling a nuclear device across borders. "Terrorists would not find it very difficult to sneak a nuclear device or nuclear fissile material into the United States via shipping containers, trucks, ships or aircraft."72 The magnitude of cross-border traffic confirms this statement; every year, roughly 500 million individuals, 11 million trucks and 2 million rail cars cross US borders and the inspection rate is believed to be roughly 10 percent.73 The United States has over 300 sea, land, and air ports of entry, any one of which could be used to smuggle in a nuclear weapon.74 However, if the borders surrounding the United States can be viewed as porous, the borders around Russia are arguably even more porous, particularly in those areas that are not actively monitored by border police. Visa-free arrangements between Russia and several close neighbors "creates additional opportunities for weapons smugglers and terrorists."75

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72 Allison and Kokoshin, "The New Containment: An Alliance Against Nuclear Terrorism."
73 Ibid.
75 Allison and Kokoshin, "The New Containment: An Alliance Against Nuclear Terrorism."
Demand Changes

In addition to changes on the supply side, there are also important shifts on the demand side of the equation that must be considered. Much of this chapter has focused on the technological aspects of CBRN weaponry. But a critical part of the larger analysis requires an examination of motivations to use such weaponry. Indeed, for decades conventional wisdom has always presumed that terrorists would not use CBRN. There were generally three planks to this reasoning: first, terrorists did not need a large number of casualties to convey a symbolic message as part of their political objective; second, terrorists would be unable to overcome the technical and resource difficulties inherent in deploying CBRN weapons; and third, that “mass-casualty attacks could result in the loss of the much-sought after approval and support of the wider group that the terrorists claimed to represent.”

Terrorism in a religious context—what David Rapoport refers to as “fourth wave terrorism”—has undermined many of these assumptions, however. James Foxell is among a group of scholars and analysts who argue that the world is witnessing the rise of a new type of terrorism that views mass casualty attacks in a different light. For example, he argues “we are currently witnessing a paradigm shift in terrorism in which total annihilation of opposing cultural and economic systems has become the straight-—

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76 Combing Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries are Organized to Combat Terrorism (Washington DC: U.S. General Accounting Office), report number GAO/NSIAD-00-85, April 2000, p. 11.
77 Gary L. Ackerman and Laura Snyder, “Would they if they could? If the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues, terrorist groups could be drawn to far deadlier weapons,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, n. 3, v. 58 (May 1, 2002), p. 41.

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out ambition of a new breed of terrorists.” 

Similarly, James Campbell argued before the U.S. Congress that this terrorism evolution reflects the decline of the so-called “constrained terrorist.” He argues that “the change in the characterization of terrorism may be indicative of a new era, one in which the traditional ‘constrained’ terrorist of the twentieth century is supplanted by the ultraviolent ‘postmodern terrorist’ of the twenty-first century.” Campbell further argues that this change can be explained by two factors: the rise of religious ideologies within terrorism—“religion has played a part in legitimizing ultraviolent acts throughout history”—and the removal of the bipolar constraints imposed by the Cold War-era international system.

Today there is little doubt that certain terrorist groups would use CBRN weapons if they could effectively acquire and deploy them. Indeed, Al Qaeda has expressed great interest in acquiring and deploying a nuclear device in a terrorist attack. According to a report issued as part of the *Black Dawn* Nuclear Scenario-Based Exercise (referenced earlier in this chapter) conducted in Brussels, Belgium in May 2004:

“Acquisition of weapons of mass destruction has been a priority since the earliest days of Al Qaeda. There is ample evidence of the group’s sustained interest in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. Osama bin Laden has asserted a ‘religious duty’ for Al Qaeda to seek nuclear weapons. His position has been confirmed by others, including the Saudi radical cleric Naser

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80 Ibid.
bin Hamad al-Fahd, who issued a fatwa in 2003 endorsing the use of weapons of mass destruction.”

One of his famous interviews disclosing this intent occurred in 1998. In that interview, Osama bin Laden responded to a question regarding his intent to purchase nuclear weapons. He evaded mentioning nuclear weapons specifically, and instead responded that “to seek to possess the weapons that could counter those of the infidels is a religious duty.” He further stated—in a manner that made no admission—that “if I indeed acquired these weapons, then this is an obligation I carried out and I thank God for enabling us to do that.” Two years later, in a separate interview with a Pakistani newspaper, Osama bin Laden was asked by the interviewer if there was any truth to Western allegations that Al Qaeda was seeking to obtain chemical or nuclear weapons. Bin Laden replied: “I wish to declare that if America used chemical or nuclear weapons against us, then we may retort with chemical and nuclear weapons. We have the weapons as deterrent.”

When pressed about the origins of these weapons, bin Laden subsequently refused to answer the question. According to Matthew Bunn, “The extensive downloaded materials on nuclear weapons (and crude bomb design drawings) found in Al Qaida camps in Afghanistan make it clear the group’s continuing desire for a nuclear

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83 Ibid.

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capability. More ominous, as Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon have noted, is the fact that Al Qaeda is among the first terrorist groups that has actively sought a nuclear weapon for the purpose of destroying its enemy—in this case the United States—rather than simply using the device (or its constituent materials) for blackmail. Osama bin Laden told *Time* magazine that it was a religious duty for Muslims to acquire or develop a nuclear device; specifically, “it is the religious duty of all Muslims to acquire nuclear, biological and chemical weapons to terrorize the enemies of God.” In fact, he noted, “it would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that could prevent infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims.”

Another incentive for use of CBRN weapons—and particularly nuclear or biological weapons—is the functional likelihood that such weapons could achieve “kill parity.” Examining statements by Al Qaeda and its affiliates reveals a keen mathematical sense of justice. For instance, Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, nominal spokesman for Al Qaeda, wrote in an article in 2002 that the number of killed in the 9-11 attack in New York and Washington DD “were no more than fair exchange for the ones killed in the al-Amiriya shelter in Iraq, and are but a tiny part of the exchange for those killed in Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, the Philippines, Bosnia, Kashmir, Chechnya and

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In the same article, he continued with this chilling assessment: "We have not reached parity with them. We have the right to kill four million Americans—two million of them children—and to exile twice as many and wound and cripple hundreds of thousands." In the next sentence, Abu Ghaith specifically mentions use of biological and chemical weapons, which would most likely be necessary in order to reach the four million body count mark: "Furthermore," he continues, "it is our right to fight them with chemical and biological weapons, so as to afflict them with the fatal maladies that have afflicted the Muslims because of the [Americans'] chemical and biological weapons."

In October 2003, Osama bin Laden once again made reference to the notion of mathematical parity: "You should know that we count our killed ones, may God have mercy on their souls, particularly those killed in Palestine at the hands of your allies, the Jews. So, we will punish you for them, God willing, just as what happened during the New York day." Al Qaeda may believe that only a CBRN attack could achieve that level of numbers necessary to achieve some degree of "kill parity."

One of the big structural changes within terrorism that may portend CBRN is that many of today’s terrorists are extremely educated; a great proportion have advanced degrees—including doctorates—in chemistry, engineering and physics. In the case of Hamas, "...members tend to be well-educated, and many senior members have

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89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
graduate degrees in engineering, chemistry, physics and medicine."92 Globalization creates an enabling environment that makes CBRN attacks more likely. According to a US Congressional Research Service study, “...the rising level of education worldwide means that more people have the requisite training in chemical engineering, and the Internet has simplified communications, training, and cooperation within geographically dispersed groups.”93

**Convergence and its Implications**

As the constraints against the use of nuclear weapons in terrorist attacks are lifted—as evidenced by changes in both the supply and demand dimension—states are confronting a potentially new type of terrorism that will be orders of magnitude more deadly than anything ever experienced in the history of modern terrorism. In the United States, this is more than a fear—many experts believe now that it is only a matter of time before the United States (or other major Western power) suffers a devastating nuclear attack perpetrated by a terrorist organization. Similarly in Russia, a very real threat in light of the recent Chechen attack in September 2004 on a school in Beslan, in North Ossetia, is a nuclear terrorist attack conducted with surplus nuclear materials from the old Soviet Union. “Chechen terrorist groups...have demonstrated little if any restraint on their willingness to kill civilians and may be tempted to strike a definitive

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92 Ackerman and Snyder, “Would they if they could?” p. 41.
blow to assert independence from Russia." This represents a major transformation of terrorism as it has been traditionally understood.

7.5 Chemical and Biological Terrorism

In addition to nuclear and radiological weapons, there is also the threat of chemical and biological weapons being deployed in terrorist incidents. According to a CIA report issued in 1995, the transition by terrorists to chemical and biological weapons is an expected development. Dr. Gordon C. Oehler, testifying before a US Senate Committee, asserted that "terrorist interest in chemical and biological weapons is not surprising, given the relative ease with which some of these weapons can be produced in simple laboratories, the large number of casualties they can cause, and the residual disruption of infrastructure." He argues that "population fiction and national attention" have given undue emphasis to nuclear weapons, whereas "chemical and biological weapons are more likely choices for such groups."

As with nuclear weapons, there are significant changes in both the "supply" and "demand" dimensions of this phenomenon that are influencing current trends. The first section will examine chemical weapons.

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94 Allison and Kokoshin, "The New Containment: An Alliance Against Nuclear Terrorism."
96 Ibid.
Chemical Weapons

On April 20, 2004, a Jordanian special counterterrorism unit thwarted a terrorist plot, engineered by Al Qaeda and affiliated individuals, to bomb the Prime Minister’s Office, the U.S. Embassy and the General Intelligence Department in Amman. The attack plan, which would involve suicide terrorists, envisaged a convoy of vehicles that would enter the compound (where all three targets were located). The first vehicle, a conventional sedan, would attack the guard post and destroy it. The trucks in the back of the convoy would proceed into the compound and position themselves near their targets, and then detonate. In addition to conventional explosives, the plot involved use of toxic chemicals that would enhance the effects of the explosives and to create “a cloud of toxins that would disperse around the GID compound and out in the city, inducing mass casualties.” Overall, police uncovered more than 80 tons of chemicals and explosives; the bombers had hoped to kill up to 80,000 people with a toxic cloud composed of nitric acid, acetone and other chemicals. The plot is viewed as part of a larger trend within Al Qaeda and similar groups to accentuate conventional IED (improvised explosives devices) operations with chemical weapons in order to bring about collateral mass casualties. In April 2004, the British security services, MI5, foiled

99 Gorka and Sullivan, “Jordanian counterterrorist unit thwarts chemical bomb attack.”
a plot by terrorists in Britain that would have resulted in the release of the highly toxic chemical osmium tetroxide in a major public transportation or shopping venue.\textsuperscript{100}

For years, authorities have worried that ‘rogue’ states or nonstate actors may actively develop and deploy chemical weapons. In 1989, the Iraqi government deployed chemical weapons in what is considered the first modern instance of chemical terrorism, when it released sarin gas on the Kurdish inhabitants of the village of Halabja, which killed thousands of people in a matter of minutes.\textsuperscript{101} Roughly five years after that incident, the Japanese terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo deployed sarin gas on the Tokyo subway system. The first Aum Shinrikyo attacks occurred in June 1994, in Matsumoto, Japan. This attack killed seven people and injured 500; this was followed by the attack on the subway in Tokyo that killed 12 individuals and injured 5,500. Although the Matsumoto and Tokyo attacks signal a growing interest in chemical weapons terrorism, they are not the only indicators. In another case, Tajik opposition members laced champagne with cyanide at a New Year’s celebration in 1995, which killed six Russian soldiers and injured several others. In Turkey, reports have emerged that the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) poisoned Turkish water supplies with cyanide.\textsuperscript{102}

Chemical weapons are generally classified into four general categories, in accordance with the symptoms they produce: nerve agents, blister or mustard agents,

\textsuperscript{100} Donna Watson, “MI5 Foil Fanatics Poison Gas Plot,” \textit{Daily Record}, April 7, 2004.
\textsuperscript{101} Bryant Furlow, “Biological, Chemical and Radiological Terrorism,” \textit{Radiologic Technology}, v. 75, n. 2 (November 1, 2003), p. 91.
chocking agents and asphyxiants. They have been deployed extensively by states, such as Germany and Japan during World War II. It is well-known that at least two recent terrorist organizations have had an active chemical weapons program: Al Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo. According to one Italian report, Al Qaeda “purchased three chemical and biological agent production facilities in the former Yugoslavia in early May 1998.” In addition, Al Qaeda operated several chemical weapons facilities in Afghanistan, one of them located in the small village of Derunta, near the city of Jalalabad. Al Qaeda also operated a fertilizer plant in Mazar-e-Sharif which was “also suspected of playing a role in possible chemical weapons production.” In addition, Aum Shinrikyo aggressively pursued a chemical weapons capacity. The group owned a variety of facilities, including medical clinics and trading companies that were used for research and import/export of lethal substances. The group purchased some materials from Russia and the United States and in Australia, the group tested nerve agents on a remote area of the country.

Biological Weapons

In a separate case in early January 2003, authorities in Britain discovered vials of ricin—a deadly toxin—in an apartment above a pharmacy in London. Four men

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105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
were later charged under Britain's Chemical Weapons Act and Terrorism Act. Police believed the men had trained in the Pankisi gorge, which links Georgia and Chechnya, and had learned techniques for developing ricin and other chemical and biological weapons. The arrests in the United Kingdom came a month after similar discoveries occurred in France. In December 2002, French authorities had arrested four suspected Islamic militants who had in their possession chemicals and anti-contamination suits. The arrests in France followed a much longer-term pattern of Arab men engaged in production of ricin (which is a plant toxin produced from castor beans) and other chemicals that could be used as weapons. Ricin is considered a potentially effective bioweapon. It was used in 1978 by Bulgarian agents to kill dissident Georgi Markov in London, with the use of a novel umbrella-based weapon that injected a pellet of ricin into the victim. Ingestion of ricin "causes nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, gastric hemorrhaging and shock." Moreover, injection produces internal bleeding, tissue death and collapse of entire major organ systems. With a high enough dose, death will occur within three to five days.

Ricin is just one of many possible bio-weapons that terrorists may employ in future CBRN attacks. Biological weapons are defined as "viral or bacterial pathogens, or toxins that have been developed to cause disease in humans, animals, or plants or

110 Ibid., p. 2.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
lead to the destruction of materials." 113 The U.S. considers such weapons to be
"weapons of mass destruction", alongside nuclear, chemical and radiological weapons.

In the weeks following the 9-11 attacks, the United States experienced several weeks of
panic as letters full of anthrax spores were distributed, first to Florida, and then to sites
around the country, including U.S. Senate offices. Following the opening of one of the
anthrax letters in the Hart Senate Office Building, over 30 congressional employees
tested positive for anthrax exposure. 114 Subsequent investigations into the origins of the
anthrax revealed that it probably originated from a U.S. government laboratory. This
reinforced the view held by many scientists that biological weapons have been secretly
propelled by state-sponsored research programs and have, as Gregory Koblentz has
argued, "become one of the key security issues of the twenty-first century." 115 One of
the reasons is that access to biological agents is relatively easy. As one Department of
Defense analyst noted in 1998: "Access to biological agents never appears to have been
a limiting factor in the misuse of pathogens and toxins, because acquiring biological
agents is relatively easy." 116 Moreover, biological agents are often the byproduct of
state-run programs, such as that in the former Soviet Union, as well as the

113 General Accounting Office, Biological Weapons: Effort to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers
Benefits, Poses New Risks—Report GAO/NSIAD-00-138 (Washington DC: General Accounting Office,
114 General Accounting Office, Capitol Hill Anthrax Incident: EPA’s Cleanup Was Successful;
Opportunities Exist to Enhance Contract Oversight—Report GAO-03-686 (Washington, DC, June 2003),
p. 1.
115 Gregory Koblentz, "Pathogens as Weapons: the International Security Implications of Biological
116 Transcript of prepared statement of W. Seth Carus, Visiting Fellow at the National Defense
University, Before the Senate Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information, Federal News Service, March 30,
1998.
biotechnology revolution, which many fear may be exploited for biological weapons objectives.

As noted above, one of the main worries is the existence of state-run biological weapons programs that have now been shut down, or significantly down-sized. The former Soviet Union started a major, well-funded program during the Cold War. The program, begun after the Soviet Union ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1972, was known as Biopreparat. The program was "a civilian pharmaceutical and biotechnology enterprise, which also served as the civilian focal point of the Soviet biological weapons program."\(^{117}\) The program produced a range of bioweapons involving smallpox, anthrax, plague, and other pathogens. In 1992, President Boris Yeltsin acknowledged the program (the United States had already halted its biological weapons program in 1969)\(^{118}\) and began the process of phasing it out, including shutting down facilities in Stepnogorsk, Obolensk, and Vektor. However, a US Government Accounting Office report noted in 2000 that "[t]he former Soviet Union’s biological weapons institutes continue to threaten U.S. national security because they have key assets that are both dangerous and vulnerable to misuse..."\(^{119}\) Moreover, in the process of these downsizings by the former Soviet Union, "hundreds, perhaps thousands, of scientists, engineers, and technicians were fired or had their


\(^{118}\) Ibid.

\(^{119}\) Ibid., p. 5.
wages cut.”\textsuperscript{120} Many fear that these scientists would offer their services to the highest bidder—whether a state or nonstate actor. Iran, for instance, has attempted to recruit these scientists by offering salaries in excess of US$6,000 per month.\textsuperscript{121} In addition, claims by one former KGB official, Alexander Kouzminov, who was a senior member of the KGB unit responsible for biological espionage, casts doubts on the notion that the Russian security establishment has actually completely shut down the country’s bioweapons program.\textsuperscript{122}

Other states with active CBW programs have included South Africa and the former Yugoslavia. In South Africa, the government funded Project Coast, which “became a highly secretive program that engaged in offensive research.”\textsuperscript{123} Project Coast had a relatively small staff, 200 individuals, and an annual budget of US$ 10 million. In 1993, the project was shut down and this “left a number of weapons scientists and technicians suddenly out of work”,\textsuperscript{124} a fact that left open the possibility that they might go to work for foreign governments or non-state actors.\textsuperscript{125} In Yugoslavia prior to 1991, the Yugoslav National Army had four facilities dedicated to its chemical weapons program; three were located in Serbia and one in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{120} Testimony of Amy Sands, PhD, before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Deconstructing the Chem-Bio Threat,” reported in \textit{Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony}, March 19, 2002.

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{123} Testimony of Amy Sands, “Deconstructing the Chem-Bio Threat.”

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
Deploying biological agents as weapons requires sophisticated planning and execution. In an ideal scenario, biological weapons “are designed to disseminate pathogens or toxins in an aerosol cloud of microscopic particles that can be readily inhaled and retained in the lungs of the exposed population.” Acquiring biological weapons is also made simple because of the “dual use” factor. This means that certain materials, equipment or facilities that are used for peaceful activities can also be exploited for terrorist ends. Many of these resources are available on the open market. Moreover, nonstate actors can acquire these materials through a multitude of clandestine means, particularly given the weakness of current arms control and disarmament regimes: “Preventing the acquisition of biological weapons through arms control and disarmament is extremely difficult.”

As with chemical and nuclear weapons, biological weapons are most likely to appeal to frustrated states or nonstate actors in the international system. In particular, the terrorists that are most likely to be interested in these weapons are the “radical religious philosophy [adherents] or apocalyptic worldview [adherents] that could justify the use of these weapons.” This is because such extremist religious groups are interested in highly lethal (or mass casualty) attacks. Such groups may also be interested in the potential of biological weapons to spark “catalytic wars”—wars between two states begun secretly by the action of a third party.

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128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
7.6 'Overt Acts'—Additional Evidence Supporting Aum Shinrikyo and Al Qaeda Efforts to Acquire CBRN Weapons

As demonstrated in previous sections of this chapter, the question of whether terrorist groups would seek to develop and deploy CBRN weapons has largely been answered. Current evidence suggests that many fourth wave terrorists have already embarked on such a course. The purpose of this section is to provide additional evidence regarding past and current efforts (as well as future aspirations) pertaining to two groups, Aum Shinrikyo and Al Qaeda.

_Aum Shinrikyo_

Extensive evidence collected over 10 years has revealed an unprecedented effort by Aum Shinrikyo, a nonstate actor, to research, develop and ultimately deploy CBRN weapons. First, according research conducted on behalf of the United States Senate, it was revealed that Aum had “actively recruited scientists and technical experts in Japan, Russia and elsewhere in order to develop weapons of mass destruction.”\(^{130}\) The cult had over US$1 billion in assets, and thus had no financial constraints with regard to this effort. Overall, according to the Senate assessment, the “Aum cult was aggressively involved in chemical and biological weapons production...the Staff found evidence that

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they successfully produced nerve agents such as Sarin, Tabun, Soman and VX, biological agents such as botulism and anthrax and controlled substances such as LSD.\footnote{Ibid.}

The cult conducted the following overt acts in furtherance of its goal of generating mass and catastrophic destruction in Japan: (1) In June 1994, Aum Shinrikyo conducted a gas attack in Matsumoto, Japan; (2) On March 20, 1995, it conducted its sarin-gas attack on the Tokyo subway system (this is the single incident that is most well-known throughout the world); (3) On May 5, 1995, Aum Shinrikyo attacked Shinjuku Station (part of the Tokyo subway system). In this attack, the group relied on sodium cyanide, which was placed in a public restroom. According to the U.S. Senate report, “the chemical device was a rather simple binary weapon consisting of two plastic bags, one containing 2 liters of powdered sodium cyanide and the other containing about 1.5 liters of diluted sulfuric acid.”\footnote{Ibid.} When the bags were discovered, they were on fire; however, the bags had not yet broken open. If they had, the result would have been hydrogen cyanide gas, which could have killed between 10,000 and 20,000 people. (4) On July 4, 1995, Japanese authorities thwarted another attempted chemical attack by Aum Shinrikyo. In this case, the bags (two separate bags containing sulfuric acid and sodium cyanide) were discovered at the Kayaba-cho, Tokyo and Ginza subway stations, as well as the Japanese Railway suburban Shinjuku station.\footnote{Ibid.}
In addition to chemical attacks, Aum Shinrikyo also attempted to engage in biological terrorism, although most attacks were less sophisticated than the chemical attacks: (1) In April 1990, Aum Shinrikyo attempted to disperse botulinum toxin in the Tokyo subway, using a specially-equipped automobile;\textsuperscript{134} (2) In early June 1993, the organization attempted a similar attack in downtown Tokyo;\textsuperscript{135} (3) In June 1993 the cult attempted to disseminate anthrax spores throughout Tokyo by "using a sprayer system on the roof of an Aum-owned building in east Tokyo."\textsuperscript{136}

Finally, Aum Shinrikyo was also interested in developing a nuclear capacity, although this effort was the least advanced, compared to its chemical and biological weapons capacity. However, evidence later revealed that the organization had attempted to purchase equipment that could ultimately have applications in nuclear weapons. In 1987, for instance, Aum Shinrikyo opened an office in New York City under the name of Aum USA company. Among the objectives of having a presence in the United States was the ability to acquire U.S. technology that could be used, directly or indirectly, in the development of CBRN weaponry. In August 1993, for instance, the organization sought to acquire a Mark Ivxp Interforometer from the Zygo Corporation in Middlefield, Connecticut. This technology is used for a variety of civilian and military purposes, including the measuring of plutonium. In addition, Aum requested a

\textsuperscript{134} Transcript of testimony of prepared statement of W. Seth Carus, before the Senate Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information, \textit{Federal News Service}, March 30, 1998.
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid.
"vibration isolation table which with modest reconfiguration can be used to measure spherical surfaces including plutonium used in nuclear weapons."

**Al Qaeda**

As described earlier in this chapter, based on public pronouncements of the organization and other evidence, Al Qaeda has demonstrated intent to develop and acquire a CBRN weaponry program. According to Ben Venzke and Aimee Ibrahim, Al Qaeda’s desire to acquire nuclear weapons, for instance, should be taken seriously:

"It is clear that al-Qaeda intends to obtain a nuclear weapon. While it would be difficult for the group to build one from scratch, the possibility of one being obtained through theft and utilized shortly thereafter before its disappearance is widely appreciated cannot be discounted. Key targets, if the group feels confident of its ability to smuggle the device into the U.S., will be Washington, DC and New York City. Other major metropolitan areas along the coasts also may be targeted."  

In interviews, individuals affiliated with Al Qaeda have articulated their desire to bring about mass casualties by using chemical and biological weapons. Osama bin Laden claims that he possesses CBRN weapons. When confronted with reports from the Western media claiming that Al Qaeda was seeking chemical and nuclear weapons, bin Laden stated:

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“I heard the speech of the American President Bush yesterday [7 October 2001]. He was scaring the European countries that Osama wanted to attack with weapons of mass destruction. I wish to declare that if America used chemical or nuclear weapons against us, then we may retort with chemical and nuclear weapons. We have the weapons as deterrent.”

However, despite this rhetoric, evidence of Al Qaeda’s attempt to construct and deploy CBRN weaponry is inconsistent. Regarding nuclear weapons, the evidence comes primarily from secondary sources. For instance, one scholar cites a “leaked Israeli intelligence report” describing Bin Laden’s payment of over 2 million British pounds to a middleman in Kazakhstan, who promised to deliver a ‘suitcase’ nuclear bomb within two years. In addition, it was also reported that Pakistani nuclear scientists visited Al Qaeda facilities with the purpose of discussing the construction of nuclear weapons.

Regarding chemical and biological weapons, the evidence is more dependable, but not concrete. For example, it is well known that Al Qaeda has trained operatives in the use of chemical weapons in its urban warfare training. One favored technique was to use cyanide and apply it into air intake vents of US (or other) government buildings in order to kill the maximum number of people possible. In trial testimony, for his role in a plot to blow up the Los Angeles airport, Ahmed Ressam reported that he had been trained in this manner:

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Question: The reason you were trained in the use of cyanide at the camps in Afghanistan was because you were going to use cyanide in your urban warfare, correct?
[Ressam]: We don’t know. Possibly if I needed it, I would use it. Yes, because it is very difficult to use gases in the field.

Question: You were trained to use cyanide by placing the cyanide near the air intake of a building, correct?
[Ressam]: They gave us some examples, but we did not try them out actually.

Question: The reason one of the examples was to put the cyanide right near the air intake of a building such as a government building, correct?
[Ressam]: Yes, that’s right.

Question: And the reason that you would put the cyanide, you were trained, near the air intake would be to kill the most amount of people without endangering yourself and without being detected, correct?
[Ressam]: Yes, that’s how gas is used in killing.”

In addition, according to Ressam’s testimony, it is clear that Al Qaeda experimented with other chemicals, including ones that could easily penetrate the epidermis of a human hand. The following is taken from trial testimony:

Question: One of the things you learned at the Deronta camp was how to mix poisons with other substances, put them together and smear them on doorknobs; do you remember that?
[Ressam]: Yes, I did say that.

Question: Any person who would touch that doorknob would soon have poison running through their bloodstream, correct?
[Ressam]: Yes, that’s true; the poison will infiltrate his body.

Question: And kill him or her, correct?
[Ressam]: Yes.

Question: That procedure was designed to be used against intelligence officers and other VIPs, correct?
[Ressam]: Yes, yes.142

142 Ibid., p. 626 of transcript.
7.7 How CBRN Weapons have Changed Terrorism

On a warm morning in West Point, New York, President George W. Bush delivered a speech in which he extensively referenced the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. He asserted that “the gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology.” Then he referenced the ideas underlying catastrophic terrorism: “When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons...occurs...even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations.” Given this new threat, the President declared that deterrence, which he described as “the promise of massive retaliation against nations”—can no longer be applied effectively against “shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend.” Outlining what would later be described as his doctrine of preemption, the President urged that “we must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge.” The President argued that “the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act.”

President Bush’s speech revealed several transformations related to terrorism and CBRN weapons. First, the speech reflected the growing realization that CBRN was a reality that could be no longer ignored or denied. In other words, the question of

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143 Remarks by President George W. Bush at the 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy, June 1, 2002.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
CBRN (WMD) weapons being used by terrorists was now seen as an inevitability. As Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson has argued:

"Some 25 countries now possess or are actively pursuing WMD [CBRN] or missiles. Meanwhile, a variety of non-state actors, including Al Qaeda, have an increasing interest. New alliances have formed, providing pooled resources for developing these capabilities, while technological advances and global economic conditions have made it easier to transfer materiel and expertise. Most of the technology is readily available, and most raw materials are common. The basic production sciences are generally understood, although the engineering and component integration necessary for ballistic missile production are not so easily achieved. All told, the global WMD [CBRN] and missile threat to US and allied territory, interests, forces, and facilities will increase." \(^{147}\)

One impact of the rise of terrorism—and particularly catastrophic terrorism—is the undermining of doctrines that have persisted since the end of World War II. The rise of CBRN terrorism challenges the traditional paradigm of deterrence, which President Bush referenced in his speech, and which was a mainstay of the Cold War era. Under the deterrence principle, states would be deterred from using nuclear weapons by the threat of retaliation. This deterrence structure has played a major role in fostering stability since the advent of nuclear weapons.

However, deterrence as a working principle has been decimated by the rise of nonstate actors such as Al Qaeda. Mohan Malik argues that "nuclear weapons were never meant to deter transnational terrorists. Religious zealots bent on martyrdom have turned on its head a nuclear doctrine that was based on the deterrent value of mutually

\(^{147}\) Prepared Testimony of Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee; Subject—Global Threats and Challenges, reported in *Federal News Service*, March 19, 2002.
assured destruction.”

Deterrence seemed to work best when it was applied against territorially-based adversaries. However, a “non-state actor such as Al Qaeda has no population or territory held in thrall, and its cult of martyrdom sees death as unimportant.”

Echoing these sentiments, Amy Sands, testifying before Congress, offered her critique regarding U.S. policy assumptions related to weapons of mass destruction: “The US appears to be approaching the problem of mass-casualty transnational terrorism, and the possibility of terrorist use of WMD [CBRN], in a manner consistent with deeply entrenched Cold War assumptions about warfare and deterrence.”

In addition to undermining the doctrine of deterrence, the virtual certainty and inevitability of CBRN weapons in the hands of terrorists has changed post Cold War geopolitical calculations about terrorists themselves—and their likely range of activities—as well as states that might be supportive of such organizations. According to Richard Ewing, a Nixon Center research fellow, the administration of George W. Bush couched its Iraq operations in the context of larger historic calculations. The administration had already accepted that CBRN weapons will spread to states in the Persian Gulf, as well as to nonstate actors: “In 1950, only the U.S. and the Soviet Union had atomic bombs. By 2000, poverty-stricken Pakistan and autarkic North Korea had


150 Sands, “Deconstructing the Chem-Bio Threat.”
acquired nuclear capabilities. With the threshold clearly dropping, what’s to stop Micronesia or Sudan from getting the bomb in 2050?\textsuperscript{151}

Globalization has provided the framework in which the diffusion of CBRN technologies has proceeded in the Middle East, and elsewhere. Thus, the reasoning goes, there is no practical way to stop the spread of these weapons, certainly not in the long term. Moreover, well-intentioned international treaties have clearly failed. Ewing argues that the administration reasoned that since the Middle East region “is going nuclear down the road, it must be as benign as possible,”\textsuperscript{152} which, in the eyes of this administration, means a democratic system of governance. Thus, the Iraq campaign was not simply conducted because of fears of an imminent CBRN attack; rather, it was part of a much larger transformative campaign stemming from a recognition of the reality of CBRN diffusion. In other words, the emphasis was on changing—in a strategic sense—the system in which the diffusion would likely take place.

The irony is that this reasoning is not necessarily related to the events of 11 September 2001. Throughout the 1990s, a growing chorus of writers have warned of the inevitability of CBRN terrorism. In 1998, Ashton Carter, John Deutch and Philip Zelikow published an influential essay in \textit{Foreign Affairs} warning of a rise in catastrophic terrorism.\textsuperscript{153} They argued that although the United States government was geared to address conventional terrorism, as represented by the twin bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that year, it should instead focus on the new

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.
threat of catastrophic terrorism, which would involve CBRN weapons. They specifically reasoned that if the device that exploded in 1993 under the World Trade Center had been nuclear, or had dispersed a deadly biological weapon, "the resulting horror and chaos would have exceeded our ability to describe it."154 They describe a scenario in which civil liberties would be scaled back, "allowing wider surveillance of citizens, detention of suspects, and use of deadly force."155 They also argued that "the danger of weapons of mass destruction being used against America and its allies is greater now than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962."156

The most important lesson of these trends is that CBRN terrorism has transformed perceptions about terrorism in a fundamental sense. Among many states, terrorism has graduated up the scale of security threats, posing a far more dire threat to the survivability of states. Thus, as deterrence can no longer be an accepted norm in the international system, states must turn to more proactive means to address CBRN terrorism.

7.8 Conclusion

Traditionally and historically, terrorists have been a nuisance in the international system and, at times, have played a pivotal role in sparking or accelerating a conflict that had already been brewing. Nevertheless, terrorism usually did not result in state

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154 Ibid.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
destruction and, moreover, in the modern era "individual acts of 'modern' terrorism do not generally constitute a serious threat to national survival."\(^{157}\) However, terrorism embedded with CBRN weaponry presents an entirely different scenario.

Within the security establishments of many countries, the notion that terrorists will not only acquire, but also deploy CBRN in their attacks is increasingly seen as inevitable. The CBRN element has thus changed the way that certain states—particularly in the West, which have direct knowledge and experience with CBRN—view terrorism. Terrorists now have the ability to change the power structure of the international system, or at least generate massive destruction in attempts to do the same. Nonstate actors, with perhaps little stake in the international system, are now in a position to potentially blackmail states in ways they could only have imagined in eras past. Clearly, the nature and threat of terrorism have changed permanently.

\(^{157}\) Prepared Testimony of CDR James K. Campbell, United States Navy, Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Subject—"Chemical and Biological Weapons Threats to America: Are we Prepared?" reported in *Federal News Service*, April 22, 1998.
CHAPTER 8: THE WAY FORWARD—ADDRESSING THE ROOT CAUSES AND OTHER FACTORS UNDERLYING FOURTH WAVE TERRORISM

8.1 Introduction

Terrorism has existed throughout history and, in some cases, it has succeeded in bringing about the desired change envisaged by the terrorists; thus, to the extent that terrorism is viewed by non-state actors as an effective tool, it is not likely to abate anytime soon. However, given the increasing destructive capacities of terrorist groups—namely the possible use of CBRN weaponry—it is necessary for states and the world community to devise effective ways to minimize the attractiveness of terrorism and to neutralize, to the extent possible, organizations that are committed to unfettered destruction.

One of the key challenges to deterring or countering terrorism is the fact that the phenomenon itself is so complex and multifaceted:

“Terrorism...involves many groups, many instruments, and, often, no central command. Terrorists are not a single foe, and no simple theory of deterrence can possibly apply to the spectrum that ranges from anti-U.S. or anti-Israeli ‘martyrs’ to members of American right wing militias.”

Thus, any single policy on terrorism is likely to overlook or ignore the local, or ethnic variations inherent in each terrorist organization. Nevertheless, this should not be

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1 Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: a Component in the War on Al Qaeda (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), p. 7.
an excuse for inaction on the part of the international community. Terrorism can longer be viewed as merely a nuisance. On that point, former U.S. Presidential candidate John Kerry was quoted in an article in the *New York Times* magazine (just weeks before the November 2, 2004 election) as saying "we have to get back to the place we were, where terrorists are not the focus of our lives, but they’re a nuisance." President Bush subsequently criticized Senator Kerry’s remark by stating that it reflected a fundamental misunderstanding of the terrorist threat the United States was now facing. Directly referencing Senator Kerry’s “nuisance” standard, President Bush was quoted as saying “Our goal is not to reduce terror to some acceptable level of nuisance. Our goal is to defeat terror by staying on the offensive, destroying terrorists, and spreading freedom and liberty around the world.”

Despite the political rhetoric associated with discussion of the “nuisance” standard, one can find validity on both sides of the argument. In Senator Kerry’s defense, the “nuisance” standard was presented as an alternative to perpetual war that is implied by an open-ended campaign designated the “global war on terrorism” (or GWOT, as it is known within government circles). Senator Kerry stated that terrorism, like prostitution, could never be eliminated, but it could, with the appropriate measures, be managed so that it does not disrupt society or exact too heavy a price in terms of its destructive capacity. However, President Bush was also correct in asserting, in essence, that terrorism could no longer be viewed through the lens that it had been understood in

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previous eras, such as during the Cold War, or earlier periods, when terrorism was indeed seen as a nuisance. The convergence of CBRN technology and unrestrained desires on the part of fourth wave terrorists to bring about catastrophic destruction meant that terrorism could never again be viewed through the nuisance paradigm.

If the international community is going to effectively counter terrorism, then it must devise policies or countermeasures that will be effective. This chapter will address the basic questions as to what factors are most important in spurring terrorism and, more importantly, what measures or tools are best for countering terrorism.

8.2 Identifying Root Causes of Terrorism and the ‘Enabling Environment’

Today it is generally accepted that most states find terrorism to be both morally abhorrent and a threat to their national security. However, to properly counter terrorism, it is necessary to understand what is driving it. Unless states can identity the causes, any long-term solution is likely to fail. This reality was reflected in the testimony of Philip Wilcox, former Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the U.S. Department of State:

“...[W]e must recognize that terrorism, like other forms of political violence, is often an extreme symptom of conflict caused by political, ethnic, economic or other factors. Effective counterterrorism cannot be a stand-alone policy that is limited only to diplomacy, law enforcement, intelligence and other programs of counterterrorism per se. The programs are vital, but they are not enough unless we also address the root causes of terrorism.”

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4 Transcript of prepared testimony of Philip C. Wilcox, Jr. before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, Federal News Service, January 26, 2000.
One of the challenges of addressing the root causes of terrorism is the lack of clarity. The question—what causes terrorism?—would seem simple enough to invite a straightforward answer. Unfortunately, there is no simple or concise answer. Audrey Kurth Cronin and others have argued that to understand terrorism, one should employ a level of analysis approach. She states that the field of political science, and particularly the sub-field of international relations, has the most "ownership" over the fourth level—the systemic causes of terrorism. Other levels of analysis perhaps venture into the realm of other academic disciplines, including psychology, medicine, law, anthropology, sociology and others. Before turning to the fourth level of analysis, it might be useful to review the other three:

(1) Individual Level: Analysis on the individual level focuses on the various motivations or pathologies of the terrorists themselves. Many policymakers subscribe to the individual level analysis model, although many may not realize it. For instance, if one views terrorism as an individual level analysis question, then one might subscribe to the "argument that if the West can neutralize delusional individuals—either leaders or followers—then the most important sources of contemporary transnational terrorism will diminish sharply."\(^5\) Policymakers who subscribe to this view tend to focus on leaders, as the United States government has done in its pursuit of Al Qaeda’s leadership. The assumption underlying this policy is that if the leaders can be eliminated (killed or arrested, for instance), then the source of the terrorism will be diminished.

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(2) *Group Analysis Level*: analysis of terrorism on this level focuses on the terrorist group or organization and its internal dynamics. “Much of the research conducted in the past several decades has led to the conclusion that terrorism is fundamentally a group activity that cannot be understood without reference to concepts such as shared ideological commitment and group identity.” Martha Crenshaw confirms this when she argues “[m]any people are recruited into terrorist organizations because of their need to belong to a community of like-minded individuals as much as to achieve political purposes.” This has interesting practical implications. For instance, such an approach may direct us to focus on the means by which the terrorist group conducts recruitment, or solidifies group loyalty. In Palestinian controlled areas, many suicide bombing organizations recruit new members by sealing their loyalty in front of a video-recorder. This video recording acts as a ‘safety-stop’ in case the member seeks to leave the organization—his or her intent has already been recorded on tape. If he or she tries to back out of an operation, his or her video recorded statements of loyalty will be circulated around the community, bringing shame to the bomber and his or her family. The organization may also threaten to distribute the videotapes to local police.

(3) *State Level Analysis*: this level of analysis, popular within political science circles because of its emphasis on state behavior, tends to focus on the role of states in perpetrating international terrorism. “The general assumption is that whether it is immediately apparent or not, the support of a sponsoring state usually is essential to the

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6 *ibid.*, p. 27.

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execution of major and devastating international terrorist attacks.”  Those who focus on this level of analysis would argue that the most effective means to stymie international terrorism is “to target states that are proven to have sponsored international terrorism in the past…” This level of analysis might explain the almost immediate focus on the part of the administration of President George W. Bush on Iraq following the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. Iraq was viewed as a sponsor of terrorism—for instance, the regime of Saddam Hussein had links to Hamas suicide terrorism campaigns and also hosted the notorious Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal—and, moreover, the Iraqi government was also viewed as an aspirant in seeking CBRN weaponry. Indeed, Audrey Kurth Cronin argues that state sponsorship of terrorism accelerated significantly in the 20th century when both the Soviet Union and Iran (particularly after the 1979 revolution) used terrorist organizations as agents of their foreign policies. More recent evidence suggests that state-sponsored terrorism has declined significantly. The state-level analysis of terrorism is also perhaps most comfortable for ‘realists’ who view states as the primary actors in the international system.

(4) **International System Level:** Analyzing terrorism from an international system angle is the fourth (and highest) level of analysis. Ideologies, such as neo-Salafism, examined from this perspective “reach beyond the nation-state and are better understood as an international ideological movement like twentieth-century Communism.”

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9 Ibid.
11 Cronin, “Sources of Contemporary Terrorism,” p. 35.
Studying terrorism from an international system perspective also suggests underlying tensions that relate to "broader organizing principles of humankind, including both the evolution and devolution of modern secular states, not to mention the attractions of alternative models of governance."  

Having established the background and objective of the fourth level of analysis, we can now turn to the "root causes" question. From an international systems point of view, what causes terrorism? And by extension, what factors should be addressed by the international community to mitigate terrorism, or diminish it as a viable option by sub-state actor (nonstate actor) groups? Perhaps the first issue that arises within this context is that of global poverty, which could perhaps be more effectively characterized as asymmetrical wealth distribution and economic development. Many terrorism analysts accept the notion that poverty and mass unemployment in poorer countries tend to support terrorism. Samuel M. Makinda argues for the poverty as "root cause" thesis and proposes economic development as an antidote. "Development has the potential to reduce the chances of terrorism by eliminating or modifying the conditions that produce discontent." Paul Pillar, former head of the CIA’s counterterrorism center, for instance argues that: "The majority of terrorists worldwide are young adult males, unemployed or underemployed (except by terrorist groups), with weak social and familial support, and with poor prospects for economic improvement or advancement through legitimate

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12 Ibid., p. 37.
13 Interview with senior intelligence counterterrorism official, government of the Philippines, February 23, 2004.
work.\textsuperscript{15} Jonathan Fox echoes this theme when he argues that in the long term "the best way to deal with fundamentalism is probably to mitigate the socio-economic dislocations and political-cultural disruptions caused by modernization."\textsuperscript{16}

Complicating this analysis, however, is the fact that there is no direct link between poverty or unemployment, and the person who becomes a terrorist; otherwise solving or mitigating terrorism might be a more direct and straightforward matter: "It is not nearly as simple a matter as giving disgruntled people votes or a higher income."\textsuperscript{17}

Moreover, many of the world's more wealthy Muslim-majority countries have paradoxically produced more terrorists than poor Muslim-majority countries. In addition, fifteen of the 19 hijackers in the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States came from one of the most affluent Muslim countries in the world.\textsuperscript{18} Similarly, the 20 Jemaah Islamiyah operatives in Singapore who were part of a planned attack against the US and other targets in December 2001 lived in one of the most prosperous countries in Asia. Many of the young men, moreover, had good jobs and strong educational credentials.\textsuperscript{19}

This suggests, at least, that the poverty-terrorism linkage is less than direct, although


\textsuperscript{17} Pillar, "The Dimensions of Terrorism and Counterterrorism," p. 37.


\textsuperscript{19} \textit{The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism} (Singapore Government Whitepaper), Presented to Parliament by Command of the President of the Republic of Singapore, 7 January 2003, p. 15.
evidence appears to indicate that the link is stronger in certain parts of the world than others.\textsuperscript{20}

In the Middle East, stagnant economies and rising unemployment are creating an enabling environment for terrorism. The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States noted that since the 1990s, high birthrates and declining infant mortality had produced a situation where there was "a large, steadily increasing population of young men without any reasonable expectation of suitable or steady employment."\textsuperscript{21} Many of these men, frustrated by poor job prospects and lack of opportunities, were thus easy targets for radicalization, which is a precursor step to terrorism. Thus, there are many complexities and contradictions regarding linkages between poverty and terrorism. An alternative phrase that captures the 'root causes' issue, or the antecedents, is 'enabling environment.' Terrorism appears to be most persistent within areas that have economic or political pressures that cannot be solved under normal circumstances or pathways.\textsuperscript{22}

The complicated—and perhaps questionable—link between poverty and terrorism can be seen within the Al Qaeda organization itself. According to some studies, nearly two-thirds of Al Qaeda's membership come from middle or upper-middle class

\textsuperscript{20} Based on author interviews with counterterrorism officials, conducted in Southeast Asia, from 30 November to 9 December 2004.
Yet the lack of poverty in wealth does not negate what Thomas Friedman has described as the poverty of dignity that exists throughout the Middle East. Friedman explained the concept of ‘poverty of dignity’ in the following way:

"What radicalized the Sept. 11 terrorists was not that they suffered from a poverty of food, it was that they suffered from a poverty of dignity. Frustrated by the low standing of Muslim countries in the world, compared with Europe or the United States, and the low standing in which they were personally held where they were living, they were easy pickings for militant preachers who knew how to direct their rage."\(^{24}\)

Dennis Ross, a former Ambassador with extensive experience in the Middle East, also describes this region as one that is “characterized by a sense of indignity.” Part of this, Ross asserts, is related to a sense of loss over a glorious history. Another factor is the sense of betrayal regarding promises that were made after World War I. Ross notes that Osama Bin Laden released a videotape following the 11 September attacks in the United States in which he referred to 80 years of humiliation in the Middle East, particularly after World War I when many Arabs were promised independence. “...[N]ot only did they not get the independence,” Ross asserts, “but their image of having one Arab state, which was going to be the key to reestablishing their glory, was also frustrated.”\(^{25}\)

Ambassador Ross thus believes that it is the poverty of dignity—the widespread sense of humiliation—that is the ultimate cause of terrorism in the Middle East.

Widespread anger is directed at both regional governments and the United States. The presence of despair and sense of grievance (both actual and perceived) are also factors behind the rise of suicide terrorism, according to some scholars.\textsuperscript{26}

Another underlying cause of terrorism, at least for the United States, is the perceived inconsistencies or lack of fairness in American foreign policy. The role of superpower places the United States in a position of high visibility. When the United States exhibits double standards (or perceived double standards) regarding a particular issue, such actions are noted around the world. As the Pakistani scholar Egbal Ahmad asserts regarding US foreign policy and terror: "Don’t condone Israeli terror, Pakistani terror, Nicaraguan terror, El Salvadoran terror, on the one hand, and then complain about Afghan terror or Palestinian terror. It doesn’t work."\textsuperscript{27} Because terrorism is a political problem, it requires political solutions—or at least reasonable attempts—particularly if the political issue in question relates to the current international system (a grievance or dispute that can be ameliorated in some fashion). Such approach would probably be less effective with Aum Shinrikyo, or similar groups engaged in an absolute "cosmic" struggle.

One of the challenges of confronting terrorism in the long-term is dealing with the "political oxygen" that fuels terrorism.\textsuperscript{28} American unilateral foreign policy is resented,

\textsuperscript{26} Scott Atran, "Mishandling Suicide Terrorism," \textit{The Washington Quarterly}, v. 27, n. 3 (Summer 2004), p. 85.


\textsuperscript{28} The term is attributed to Kumar Ramakrishna. See Kumar Ramakrishna, "Countering Radical Islam in Southeast Asia: The Need to Confront the Functional and Ideological 'Enabling Environment,'" in Paul J.
according to polls and surveys taken since the 9-11 attack. Experts on terrorism, political science and other disciplines offer an array of prescriptions to address the "root causes" of terrorism. Stephen Zunes proposes that "the most important thing the United States can do to prevent future terrorism is to change its policies towards the Middle East." In his view, this does not necessarily mean withdrawing support for Israel; rather, the United States should pursue "a Middle East policy based more on human rights, international law, and sustainable development, and less on arms transfers, air strikes, and punitive sanctions..."30

One of those controversial measures by the United States and its allies was the invasion of Iraq, done at least partly to confront terrorism, including the terrorism associated with the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States. Prior to the Iraq invasion, Vice President Dick Cheney drew direct linkages between Al Qaeda and Iraq. In one speech, he accused the Iraqi regime of aiding and protecting Al Qaeda: "His [Saddam Hussein's] regime aids and protects terrorists, including members of Al Qaeda." In a subsequent speech, he discussed Iraq's hosting of an Al Qaeda camp in its northeastern area: "Al Qaeda had a base of operation there up in Northeastern Iraq where they ran a large poisons factory for attacks against Europeans and U.S. forces." Some scholars and government officials have suggested, however, that the more robust

30 Ibid.
32 Transcript of remarks by Vice President Cheney at a Bush-Cheney 2004 Reception, Wakonda Club, Des Moines, Iowa, reported in PR Newswire, October 4, 2003.
relationship between Iraq and terrorism has occurred after the American-led invasion.

Some have suggested that Iraq may emerge as the “new Afghanistan”—a new epicenter for terrorism. Barry Desker and Arabinda Acharya argue that:

“Iraq has now emerged as the new epicenter of transnational terrorism, in much the same way as Afghanistan following the Soviet occupation in 1979. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 25 December 1979 led to a well-organized resistance supported by the US and its allies...Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iraq has attracted several hundred foreign militants supplementing the ranks of domestic resistance fighters engaged in a growing insurgency targeted against the American-led coalition.”

Such assessment was recently confirmed by Porter Goss, Director of Central Intelligence, who stated:

“In Islamic extremists are exploiting the Iraqi conflict to recruit new anti-US jihadists...These jihadists who survive will leave Iraq experienced in and focused on acts of urban terrorism. They represent a potential pool of contacts to build transnational terrorist cells, groups, and networks in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other countries.”

Not only has the Iraq operation generated a new army of Islamic militants, it has diminished the standing of the United States, according to opinion polls conducted throughout the world. According to one analyst, “Never has the US (according to international public opinion polls) been so resented, if not loathed, by so many people around the world. And this is exactly the kind of environment in which al-Qaeda...

terrorists - who represent a real and ongoing threat to the US and others - thrive.\textsuperscript{35}

According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, anti-American sentiment has risen dramatically since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. In Muslim-majority countries, such as Turkey, Pakistan, Jordan and Morocco, unfavorable views of the United States have held fairly consistently since 2002, although the downward descent appears to have stabilized between 2003 and 2004.

Moreover, in Muslim countries’ surveys, substantial numbers of people “believe suicide attacks against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq are justifiable.”\textsuperscript{36}

Muslim-majority countries have a low opinion of the US-led “war on terrorism”: in March 2004, only 28% percent of those surveyed in Morocco, 12% surveyed in Jordan and 16% surveyed in Pakistan actually favored the US-led war on terrorism.\textsuperscript{37} Ironically, Osama bin Laden received a favorable rating in Pakistan (65%), Jordan (55%) and Morocco (45%).\textsuperscript{38} Additionally, according to the survey, a substantial number of Muslims surveyed believe that the war on Iraq has not helped mitigate terrorism. A majority of respondents in Turkey, Pakistan and Morocco, for instance, believe that the Iraq war has had a negative impact on the fight against terrorism.\textsuperscript{39}

Not only is the United States held in low regard in Muslim-majority countries, it is also disdained in many countries thought to be traditional allies, countries that will be necessary for any sustained campaign against terrorism. In Britain, France and Germany,

\textsuperscript{35} Frank Smyth, “Left, right, the US out of Step in Iraq,” \textit{Asia Times}, September 24, 2004.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 3.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., p. 1.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
for instance, there is rising support for an independent European foreign policy that
would be decoupled from the United States.\(^{40}\) One of the barriers to reducing the “root
causes” of terrorism is the fact that Anti-American sentiment is such a robust commodity
in the Middle East. Osama bin Laden portrays himself as an Islamic scholar, yet what he
thrives on is widespread antipathy for the United States. As Stephen Zunes argues:

“[Osama bin Laden] is a businessman who—like any good businessman—knows
how to take a popular fear or desire and use it to sell a product in this case anti-
American terrorism. The grievances expressed in his manifestos—the ongoing
US military presence in the Gulf, the humanitarian consequences of the U.S.-led
sanctions against Iraq, US support for the Israeli government, and U.S. support for
autocratic Arab regimes—have widespread appeal in that part of the world.”\(^{41}\)

Another systemic analysis of terrorism urges an examination into the type of
political system, rather than poverty per se. A number of analysts assert that oppressive
political systems lead to the birth and expansion of militant ideologies that ultimately
spawn terrorism. The top two leaders of Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-
Zawahiri come from countries, Saudi Arabia and Egypt respectively, that are largely
authoritarian and which provide only scant public space—if any at all—for dissenting
political views. Paul Pillar argues that political repression (including a general
frustration with one’s rulers, or system of government) is one of the most important
factors that may generate terrorism: “People who are angry over such issues are more

\(^{40}\) Ibid.
likely to resort to extreme measures, including terrorism and other forms of violence, than ones who are not." 42

A recent Harvard University study supports the notion that the type of political system within a particular country is more predictive of terrorist activity compared to poverty per se. The study recognizes that within the "root causes" controversy, "the widespread view that poverty creates terrorism has dominated this debate." 43 However, the study suggests that it is the type of political system and degree of political freedom that determines whether a country is prone to terrorism. The study concludes that "countries with intermediate levels of political freedom are shown to be more prone to terrorism than countries with high levels of political freedom or countries with highly authoritarian regimes." 44 As countries transition from authoritarian regimes to more liberal regimes, this phase "may be accompanied by temporary increases in terrorism." 45

This may explain why, as will be discussed below, the problem of "quasi-states" is more problematic than failed states. Quasi-states, defined as states with semi-functional but incomplete governance, tend to lie in the intermediate range, between authoritarianism and high levels of political freedom. 46

One major shortcoming of the oppressive political systems or lack of democracy thesis is that many of the adherents of Al Qaeda's—and similar Salafists'—ideology have

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42 Pillar, "The Dimensions of Terrorism and Counterterrorism," p. 36.
44 Ibid., p. 3.
45 Ibid.
been based in Western Europe, where democratic and free expression are regularly allowed and encouraged. As Gerard Alexander asserts, "...authoritarianism is not a sufficient condition for extremism...Al-Qaeda-type beliefs have found support among at least some Muslims in democratic Turkey and Western Europe."47 This is important because a key component of President Bush's counter-terror strategy—and one of the key arguments put forth to justify the invasion of Iraq—is the desire to counter or undermine tyrannous regimes that breed "despair and anger."48 A key component of the U.S.-led "war on terrorism" has been the belief that non-democratic regimes "incubate anti-Western extremism, making their aggrieved populations vulnerable to recruitment by terrorist groups..."49 However, terrorism scholar Walter Laqueur has suggested the uncomfortable proposition that democratic systems of governance may be the most hospitable to terrorism and that "terrorism has never had a chance in an effective dictatorship..."50 Scanning the historical record of terrorism, Laqueur argues as follows:

"The historical record shows that while, in the nineteenth century, terrorism frequently developed in response to repression, the correlation between grievance and terrorism in our day and age is far less obvious. The historical record shows that the more severe the repression, the less terrorism tends to occur. This is an uncomfortable shocking fact, and has, therefore, encountered must resistance. But it is still true that terrorism in Spain gathered strength only after Franco died, that the terrorist upsurge in West Germany, France, and Turkey took place under social democratic or left-of-center governments, that the same is true with regard to Peru and Colombia, and that more such examples could easily be adduced."51

48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
As can be seen from this section, there are multiple theories and beliefs about what constitutes the “root causes” of terrorism. Unfortunately, there is no definitive answer; however, the truth probably lies somewhere within the intersection of these various theories. For example, poverty may provide an enabling environment for a specific type of political system, which in turn could stimulate terrorism. One interesting point, noted within Abadie’s study (referenced above) is the distinction between domestic and international terrorism. Abadie notes that in transnational (or international) terrorism, it appears that the asymmetric economic structure of the international system appears to play a more significant role in stimulating terrorism, compared to domestic terrorism: “Much of modern-day transnational terrorism seems to generate from grievances against rich countries.”

Presumably at least some of these grievances relate directly or indirectly to the current economic divide that characterizes this world, especially between the extremely rich and the extremely poor.

One of the problems with addressing terrorism is that no matter how well designed counter-terrorism measures might be, they will never completely eliminate terrorism. Just as humans must contend with infectious diseases, they may also have to contend with terrorism as part of the human condition. Aldo Borgu summarizes this view succinctly:

“At best terrorism can only be contained to the point where it is considered manageable. Spreading democracy worldwide, eradicating poverty, improving the delivery of basic services in Iraq or solving the Israel-Palestine issue will not

52 Abadie, Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism, p. 2.
eliminate the threat of terrorism. Attacking the so-called root causes of terrorism is important to deny the terrorists the chance of wider strategic success but it will not eliminate the threat of terrorist attacks themselves.\textsuperscript{53}

8.3 The Range of State Responses in Countering Terrorism

Although measures to address "root causes" are clearly important from a strategic standpoint, many states often must react to terrorist in a more immediate sense. States have a number of tools at their disposal, but one of the questions that shapes this response is whether the problem is viewed as essentially political or criminal (and thus within the purview of the legal system).

If terrorism is viewed as a political (and hence military threat), states can apply hard power—military power—as well as soft power. In the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks, the United States chose to apply hard power in Afghanistan by launching a major military invasion. In addition, other smaller military assaults occurred throughout the world, including in the southern Philippines.

However, despite its immediate effectiveness, hard (military) power is actually quite limited in the context of countering terrorism. When terrorists exist in small cells, linked transnationally via the Internet, or in other types of network structures, for example, such targets are extremely difficult to counter with military action. And when military action is conducted, it will often cause substantial collateral damage. In addition,\textsuperscript{53}

there are sovereignty and diplomatic restraints. Terrorists may operate in areas unreacha
ble by military force (for geographic or political reasons). In addition, the resort to military force can arouse profound opposition among other states, or in the realm of international public opinion, as the United States discovered when it chose to invade both Afghanistan and Iraq.

One major alternative to hard power is what Joseph Nye terms as “soft power.” Nye argues that soft power is the “ability to get what we want by attracting others rather than by threatening or paying them.”  

Soft power, according to Nye, is rooted in a country’s culture, its political ideals and also its foreign policies. Soft power does not necessarily replace “hard power” (military power); rather, they can both be used together. Nye has argued that soft power is particularly relevant in addressing terrorism:

“America’s success in coping with the new transnational threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction will depend on a deeper understanding of the role of soft power and developing a better balance of hard and soft power in foreign policy.”

Indeed, to the extent that the United States faces a possible confluence of terrorism and CBRN proliferation, it will need to rely on soft power to cultivate cooperation with other governments to prevent any disastrous scenario. Referencing his three-level model of the international system, Nye argues that soft power is particularly relevant to addressing third-level phenomena such as transnational threats:

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"...many of the transnational issues, such as climate change, the spread of-infectious diseases, international crime, and terrorism, cannot be resolved by military force alone. Representing the dark side of globalization, these issues are inherently multilateral and require cooperation for their solution. Soft power is particularly important in dealing with the issues that arise from the bottom chessboard [the third level] of transnational relations."

Audrey Kurth Cronin makes the point that fighting terrorism more resembles jujitsu, rather than a classic American cowboy fistfight. Terrorists rely on a sea of supporters; they seek to claim the moral high ground and use their weakness as their strength. For this reason, it is likely that “soft power” will be the most effective means to counter terrorists’ strength. Soft power may be more effective within the third realm of the Nye 3-level model of the international system, compared with the first and second levels. Excessive reliance on hard power, such as a powerful and visible military response, could potentially backfire. Cronin argues that “…the military campaign that the United States seems temperamentally and bureaucratically compelled to carry out is likely to enhance and perpetuate the anti-Western, anti-secular anti-materialist hatred that the al-Qaeda network is disseminating.”

Soft power may also be effective against the rising incidence of suicide terrorism. Scott Atran argues that soft power, rather than hard (military) power, would be more effective in diminishing suicide terrorism: “Rather than focusing on hard power as a last defense, the first line of defense should be convincing Muslim communities to stop supporting religious schools and charities that feed terrorist networks.”

57 Ibid., p. 263.
59 Atran, “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism,” p. 84.
measures Atran recommends is a dialogue between the United States, its allies and Muslim religious and community leaders that would be designed to reconcile Islamic legal customs with international legal standards in the area of criminal law, human rights and other matters.  

Soft power may also be more effective in winning the “battle of ideas” and inevitably this will require direct examination and refutation of militant religious ideologies. Shmuel Bar makes the point that religion underlies the current international terrorist threat and thus to ignore religion—and its conflict—will doom all counterterrorism efforts to failure. He argues specifically, “Attempts to deal with the terrorist threat as if it were divorced from its intellectual, cultural, and religious fountainheads are doomed to failure.” He argues that the West must take on Islamic radical ideology head on, and not merely attempt to democratize the Middle East as a sort of panacea. The strategy of the West “must include a religious-ideological dimension: active pressure for religious reform in the Muslim world and pressure on the orthodox Islamic establishment in the West and the Middle East not only to disengage itself clearly from any justification of violence, but also to pit itself against the radical camp in a clear demarcation of boundaries.” Specifically, Bar calls for rulings that undermine certain key ideals that the radicals hold dear, such as the persistent idea that a state of conflict exists between Islam and the rest of the world. He argues that such acts as suicide bombing should be condemned as *haram* (forbidden).

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60 Ibid., p. 85.
62 Ibid.
The alternative to the political and military approach to terrorism is the criminal-law enforcement paradigm. Normally terrorism is distinguished from basic, everyday crime in that it is criminal activity conducted for some political purpose. Brien Hallett, however, rejects this notion and argues that all terrorism should be viewed simply as crime; he also rejects the idea that terrorists are waging “war”. For example, when terrorists murder their victims, Hallett describes this simply as “theatrical murder”:

“Thus, the true genus for [terrorists’] activities is ‘crime’ which, in turn, needs to be broken down into the species of ‘arson’, ‘kidnapping,’ ‘murder’ and the like, before identifying the subspecies of ‘theatrical arson’, ‘theatrical kidnapping’, ‘theatrical murder’, and the like, should one so desire this further division of the phenomenon.”

Although terrorists may claim to be acting with a political purpose, Hallett rejects this because the “‘political purpose’ is based upon a claim made by the terrorists themselves, [and thus] its validity is suspect.” The “terrorism as crime” paradigm would likely be useful for states employing counter-terrorism strategies because it avoids political controversies normally associated with terrorist ideologies (such as sensitive questions involving religious interpretations, etc.). Recent evidence suggests, moreover, that states are aggressively using classic law enforcement and prosecutorial tools in their campaign against terrorism, particularly after the 11 September 2001 attacks. In the United States, the U.S. Department of Justice has waged a largely quiet and stealthy

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64 Ibid., p. 57.
prosecutorial campaign against terrorist organizations or their supporters who have ties within the United States.

On September 16, 2004, for instance, a grand jury in Miami Florida indicted Adham Amin Hassoun and Mohamed Hesham Youssef for providing material support to terrorists (and conspiracy to do the same). The indictment included eight additional counts against Hassoun, including allegations that he made false statements to government investigators, unlawfully possessed a firearm, committed perjury, and obstructed the proceedings of an immigration court. The indictment also alleges that Hassoun provided material support to terrorists engaged in “fighting jihad” outside the United States. Hassoun and Youssef are accused of conspiring to recruit members—including U.S. residents—to participate in “violent jihad” which would “involve armed confrontations and committing acts of murder, kidnapping and maiming.”

Two other recent cases have targeted U.S.-based support for the Palestinian group Hamas, which has been designated a terrorist organization by the United States government. These cases stem from a criminal investigation launched in the mid-1990s. On August 20, 2004, a grand jury in Illinois returned an indictment against Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook, Muhammad Hamid Khalil Salah and Abdelhaleem Hasan Abdelraqiz Ashqar for providing material support to the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). All three individuals were charged with taking part in a 15-year racketeering

65 United States v. Adham Amin Hassoun and Mohamed Hesham Youssef, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, Second Superseding Indictment, Case Number: 04-60001-CR-Cooke(s)(s).
66 Ibid.
conspiracy to provide money, weapons and other support to Hamas operatives. The indictment alleges numerous instances of money laundering, passport fraud, and kidnappings. 68

In a related case, a grand jury in Texas returned an indictment on July 26, 2004 against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (in addition to seven individuals) for its support of Hamas. The indictment states that in or around 1988, three of the defendants, Shukri Abu-Baker, Mohammad El-Mezain and Ghassan Elashi created Holy Land Foundation (HLF) for the purpose of providing financial aid to Hamas. 69 The indictment details a number of financial transactions between HLF and Hamas, including one in 1988, involving a US$100,000 transfer to Hamas, and another in 1989 involving a transfer of US$725,000 to Hamas. The indictment further alleges that “the HLF was deeply involved with a network of Muslim Brotherhood organizations dedicated to furthering the Islamic fundamentalist agenda espoused by Hamas.” 70

These prosecutions—and the police work that underlies them—are not dramatic compared to military action in Afghanistan, or predator assassinations of known terrorists; however, in fact, they are probably more devastating to terrorist organizations in the long-term, particularly those organizations that have international structures.

A significant thread linking all of these prosecutions is monetary support for terrorism. Naturally prosecutors are relying on laws that address the substantive offense of engaging in terrorism, facilitating terrorism, or aiding others in conducting terrorism.

68 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
However, in virtually every case, it was the transmission of money that provided a clear ‘overt act’ that helped support the larger substantive case. As money assumes greater importance in terrorism cases, the government is relying on money laundering statutes in aggressive and creative ways. In many cases, defendants may not have thought of their activities as classic money laundering. This is because the offense of money laundering is evolving—traditionally, it was thought of as dirty money being converted (or ‘cleaned’) so that it appears legitimate. In terrorism finance cases, there is an emerging doctrine of ‘reverse money laundering’—the process of transferring clean money to nefarious purposes.

The monetary support base of terrorism is particularly vulnerable under the “terrorism as crime” paradigm. Money is the key support of terrorism. Under U.S. Presidential Executive Order 13224, the United States has proscribed numerous organizations known to be supportive of terrorism throughout the world, including the Saudi Arabian charity Al-Haramain, which has been linked to funding of both Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah activities. 71 Partly as a result of the pressure exerted by Executive Order 13224, the Saudi Arabian government announced in June 2004 that it was dissolving the operations of Al Haramain and reorganizing the charity under the oversight of a national commission. 72 The United States campaign against terrorism financing is encapsulated within Title III of the USA Patriot Act, which is known as the International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act. Within this legal

framework, the doctrine of 'reverse money laundering' is being applied to anyone (or any organization) that provides monetary support to known terrorist organizations.

8.4 Failed States, Quasi States and the International System

As noted in chapter 3, the international system’s primary and most powerful actors are states. However, some analysts and scholars have identified failed or failing states as a major root cause of terrorism, particularly after the Al Qaeda assault on the United States on 11 September 2001. Al Qaeda planned, executed and directed its operation from Afghanistan, a failed state within the international system. For this reason, some political scientists have pointed to failed states as a critical challenge in developing effective international responses against terrorism. Steven Walt, for example, argues that 9-11 has demonstrated that failed states are a key security concern for the international system, and not merely a humanitarian issue as they have been traditionally viewed: "...the challenge of ‘failed states’ such as Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Rwanda, and Afghanistan has usually been seen as a humanitarian issue...The attacks on September demonstrate that failed states are more than a humanitarian tragedy; they can also be a major national security problem."73

Testifying before the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, George Tenet, then director of the Central Intelligence Agency, stated that "places that combine desperate social and economic circumstances with a failure of government to

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police its own territory can often provide nurturing environments for terrorists groups, and for insurgents and criminals. 74 He further stated that his agency counts approximately 50 countries that have such “stateless zones,” over half of which have active terrorist activity. Failed states have also figured prominently in the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. In the year 2003 edition, the document states that “weak states and failed ones are a source of international instability. Often, these states may become a sanctuary for terrorism.” 75 As a result, the document urges that U.S. policy seeks “the rebuilding of a state that can look after its own people—their welfare, health, prosperity, and freedom—and control its borders.” 76

However, the problem of “failed states” often defies understanding among Western policymakers. States have deteriorated in the Arab world, a trend that began in the 1980s. As Michael Hudson observes, “the Global and regional terrain began to shift in the 1980s. States that seemed dominant over their societies began to falter, unable to continue to deliver on the socioeconomic promises that tacitly fostered political passivity. Decades of considerable economic growth came to an end with the collapse of oil prices in the mid 1980s.” 77

Another challenge is that American officials often speak of a degree of complicity between the state and non-state actor terrorist groups, as if such complicity invariably

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76 Ibid.
exists. Testifying before a House International Relations Committee meeting on terrorism, Representative Brad Sherman of California stated that “September 11 taught us what terrorist organizations can do if they have a home base, a friendly or at least acquiescent state in which to plan, train and conduct their often complex financial transactions.”\(^\text{78}\) This rationale was also a central foundation of President George Bush’s doctrine of preemption. He held states accountable for actions occurring within their borders. However, the flaw in these arguments and assumptions is the notion that states always have the capacity to act. In the case of Afghanistan, evidence clearly suggests that the state—controlled by the Taleban regime—permitted Al Qaeda to engage in its activities. But in other cases—such as Somalia—it is not clear that a government either 1) exists or 2) has the capacity to counter international terrorism.

Weak or ungoverned states often present another problem—the presence of criminal syndicates that offer a form of ‘alternative governance’. Indeed, transnational crime is increasingly viewed as an enabler of global terrorism. Terrorism in Chechnya, for instance, is virtually sustained by organized crime. “Commonly referred to as a haven for organized crime, Chechnya has given terrorists the opportunity to profit from the illegal sale of oil, trafficking in illicit narcotics and weapons, and kidnapping.”\(^\text{79}\)

Transnational crime provides the stateless milieu in which terrorism can focus without

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worries of strong state intervention. In the wake of declining state support for terrorism, transnational crime provides a critical alternative platform.

The rise of networks means that failed states become critical elements of this new form of organization. According to Jorg Rabb and Brinton Milward, "there is increasing evidence of a close connection between Al Qaeda and the failed states of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Burkina Faso in West Africa." They argue that terrorism, arms trafficking, commodities smuggling (diamonds in particular in West Africa) and failed states provide the basis for transnational violence.

The term "failed states" often does not capture the reality of what is happening—it is too final a pronouncement. Most states do not completely fail—they muddle through. Phil Williams has argued it this way: "In many states...there has been a reduction in both internal cohesion and the capacity to govern." One alternative way of describing this phenomenon is governance decline. In some cases, this state weakness is associated with political transition—such as that from formerly Communist states to democracies. However, the most important factor is the decline in quality of governance—whether or political, social, or economic reasons—does cultivate an association with transnational crime, terrorism and other forms of violence. "A state in transition is particularly vulnerable to both indigenous and transnational criminal organizations because it is characterized by the collapse of state structures." Williams

82 Ibid., p. 99.
argues, furthermore, that weak states evince certain common characteristics that are favorable for the growth of crime or terrorism. He argues that these traits include "...a low level of state legitimacy, weak border controls, ineffective rules and laws, little economic or social provision for the citizenry, lack of regulation and protection for business, and the absence of social control through a fair and efficient criminal justice system." According to recent court documents, Kyrgyzstan is emerging as a terrorist haven because of "loose border controls and widespread corruption," factors associated with weak or failing states.

An alternative way of describing weak states is the term "quasi-state." Quasi states are states that are weak, ineffectual, and perhaps corrupt. However, unlike failed states, quasi states have reasonably functional governance and social infrastructure and thus are, according to Ken Menkhaus, preferred by transnational terrorist organizations:

"...[I]n general, terrorist networks have instead found safety in weak, corrupted, quasi-states—Pakistan, Yemen, Kenya, the Philippines, Guinea, Indonesia. Terrorist networks, like mafias, appear to flourish where states are governed badly rather than not at all."

Terrorists prefer "quasi-states" because of three major reasons. First, quasi-states offer some protection to terrorists. "Governments, however weak, enjoy and fiercely guard juridical sovereignty, forcing the US and key anti-terrorist coalition allies into awkward and not entirely satisfactory partnerships with those governments in pursuit of

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83 Ibid., p. 100.
terrorists.\textsuperscript{86} Secondly, "quasi-states" often host a large foreign community, which gives terrorists cover, and thus the ability to move around without arousing too much suspicion. Thirdly, terrorists prefer "quasi-states" because these states often feature corrupt security and law enforcement officials: "Bribes to police, border guards, and airport officials allow terrorists to circumvent the law even while they enjoy a certain level of protection from it."\textsuperscript{87}

8.5 Weak States and Quasi-States: Pakistan and the Al Qaeda Connection

Pakistan exemplifies the problem of "quasi-states" described above, particularly in its relationship with terrorist organizations. Pakistan's terrorism connection can be viewed from two basic angles. First, state weakness has allowed a sectarian terrorism to grow and flourish. Secondly, "the staff of agencies of the state, most notably the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate of the Pakistan Armed Forces, have played a role in nurturing terrorist groups committed to advancing Pakistan's geopolitical interests..."\textsuperscript{88} Pakistan has long engaged in support of terrorism as an extension of its foreign policy, particularly with regard to Kashmir. Despite President Pervez Musharraf's disavowal of such policies, it is clear that Pakistan's links to Islamist terrorist organizations are not likely to disappear. This position was bolstered in August 2004 when a 17-year-old Pakistani national, Muhammad Sohail, reported to US officials that "Pakistan was

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., p. 14.  
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., p. 15.  
\textsuperscript{88} William Maley, "The 'War against Terrorism' in South Asia," \textit{Contemporary South Asia}, v.12, n2 (June 2003), p. 206.
allowing militant groups to train and organize insurgents to fight in Afghanistan” despite pledges to the contrary.89 This was not a surprise to US officials who have understood that Pakistan has continued to support groups active in Kashmir. However, the overall impact of the militant threat in Pakistan could cause the country to “become a new epicenter of instability, terrorism and state breakdown in the extended South-west Asian region.”90

In the case of Al Qaeda, the organization’s two state backers have traditionally been Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, two states that the United States has considerable—albeit often opaque—ability to influence. In light of the fact that many Al Qaeda leaders have been based in Pakistan, it would seem that the US might have some leverage if it were to focus on that country. The challenge in the long-term is keeping pressure, while undercutting the ‘jihadi’ element within the Pakistani military. This is a major challenge because Pakistan has long cultivated ties with jihadi elements both in Afghanistan and within its own borders. In the late 1990s an estimated 8,000 Pakistani nationals served within the ranks of the Taliban.91

Pakistan’s model for low-intensity conflict with India over Kashmir is clearly rooted in the Afghanistan experience. In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in an effort to install a government favorable to Moscow. Over the next few years, Islamic fighters and jihadi leaders—funded by Saudi Arabia, the United States and other countries—resisted this invasion by engaging in guerilla warfare tactics that put the

91 Anthony Davis, “Asia: Pakistan’s ‘war by proxy’ in Afghanistan Loses its Deniability,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, October 1, 1999.
Soviet military on the defensive. Their fight was largely supported by Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), with conduit funding coming from the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Because the CIA had given so much power to the ISI (for instance, the Pakistani intelligence service was able to choose which faction in the Afghani resistance would receive international funding), Pakistan had a major role in choosing the ultimate leadership of the Afghan resistance and subsequent governments. Not surprisingly, Pakistan favored the southern Pashtun tribes, against the northern Tajik tribes that were largely supported by Iran and Russia.

The “Afghanistan model” was deemed a success by many Pakistani strategists. Its relevance to Kashmir would soon become clear. In the early 1990s, Pakistan claimed that it was merely giving diplomatic, political, and moral support to the Kashmiri separatist movement. However, the evidence supported a far more sinister conclusion—that the Pakistani army, through the ISI, was providing weapons, intelligence and refuge to militants engaged in this insurgency, just as it had done in Afghanistan. Moreover, many of the militants—arguably most—were “imported” from Afghanistan and were part of the notorious “Afghan alumni.” They were hardened soldiers possessing years of valuable guerrilla warfare experience.

Despite U.S. pressure, Pakistan has apparently been unable or unwilling to root out these militants from its own society. The apparent ease in which Al Qaeda units

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92 This refers to the tens of thousands of fighters from around the Islamic world who came to Afghanistan to fight the Soviet army. It also refers to thousands more who were trained in Afghan camps following the withdrawal of the Soviets.
operate in Pakistan has led some to speculate that the groups are receiving aid and succor from Pakistan’s ISI, which has cultivated links with Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the past. In Kashmir, the two militant groups that have benefited most from Al Qaeda’s influx into Pakistan from Afghanistan include Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba. These groups have had long and established historical links with Al Qaeda. Moreover, Al Qaeda provided training camps in Afghanistan devoted exclusively to training suicide bombers for operations in Kashmir. Ahmed Rashid, a prominent Pakistani analyst, has argued that the Pakistani government has attempted to draw false distinctions between the various groups that are broadly labeled as “terrorists.” First, there is Al Qaeda and the Taliban, then there are the sectarian extremists inside Pakistan itself (who are responsible for the killing of thousands of innocent Pakistanis) and finally there are the “freedom fighters” in Kashmir. Currently, according to Rashid, these distinctions are no longer relevant; most of the groups are inter-mingled. Many Kashmiri “freedom fighters” are directly linked to Al Qaeda. This Al-Qaeda-ISI linkage, which dates back to the era of the Afghan resistance against the Soviet invasion, is also the gateway through which nuclear arms will likely end up in the hands of Islamic terrorists.

The most disturbing aspect of the Pakistan-terror nexus is the intimate role of the military and security establishment in promoting and cultivating *jihadi* (neo-Salafist) culture. It was of course Pakistan’s military and intelligence sector that pursued these policies. Even Al Qaeda received significant patronage and support from the Pakistani

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security establishment. According to one writer, “the al-Qaeda network, created in Pakistan in 1989, was nurtured by Islamists in the Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) and the military.”

General Pervez Musharraf rests on the apex of this military-intelligence superstructure and yet, as one prominent analyst has noted, it is now openly acknowledged “that the general is a target for Pakistan’s numerous Islamic extremists, who have been trained by and are now closely linked to Al Qaeda.”

General Musharraf is apparently so concerned about his life that he no longer travels to Karachi where many anti-Western terrorist attacks have recently occurred, and only travels with an entourage comprised of 200-300 security specialists. Why would Pakistan’s general, who was once in charge of cultivating links with terrorist organizations, be so afraid of the terrorists that have received patronage from the Pakistani state? The main reason is that they have been co-opted and taken over by exogenous terrorist groups, most notably Al Qaeda. Militancy in Kashmir and throughout Pakistan is “now closely linked with Al-Qa’ida [Al Qaeda] and a new philosophy of global jihad.” Consequently, the local agendas that once characterized local militant/terrorist groups are now reflecting Al Qaeda’s global philosophy. As far as Pakistan is concerned, these groups have a combined objective of transforming Pakistan into “the next base for Islamic extremism.” In other words, they want to transform Pakistan into what Afghanistan used to be.

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99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
For Washington, Pakistan presents a sensitive strategic problem. On one hand the Americans understand that they must support Musharraf, although it is well known that he is in reality far from his ‘moderate’ image as the Western media supposes. In 2003, Pakistan was awarded ‘major non-NATO ally’ status, despite concerns about the regime’s militant sympathies and terror-support machinations. The U.S. government’s rationale was based on the notion that it was better to support Musharraf’s regime, rather than to face the probable alternative of extremists rising to power, a scenario that was gravely described in a RAND corporation report:

“If Pakistan should fall to Islamist extremists (the most likely alternative to Musharraf), this might very well change regional perceptions of who is winning, restore credibility to causes such as that of Al Qaeda, and reverse some of the gains made by Operation Enduring Freedom.”

Ironically, American economic support of Pakistan is likely to maintain or bolster that country’s “quasi-state” status, and thus allow it to remain a key—although perhaps unwitting—base for transnational jihadist organizations, such as Al Qaeda. Nevertheless, compared with the alternative, state collapse, it is clear that the United States has chosen a path of engagement, notwithstanding the “quasi-state” implications. As long as this engagement is accompanied by benign nudging, toward an open political system, it may result in a reasonable outcome for the United States.

101 Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on Al Qaeda (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002), p. 52.
8.6 Stopping the Tools of Armageddon

As examined earlier in chapter 7, one of the distinguishing features of fourth wave terrorism is the increased linkage between terrorism and CBRN weapons. In the past three years, a number of terrorist plots, involving CBRN, have been disrupted. In addition, a Saudi Arabian cleric, Sheik Nasir bin Hamid al Fahd, issued a fatwah (or legal decree) on May 21, 2003 granting permission to Al Qaeda to use a CBRN weapon against the United States. Clearly, there is a growing willingness and eagerness to use CBRN materials in terrorist attacks.

One of the key challenges in the international system is containing these weapons within the realm of responsible states. Unfortunately, many of these materials have seeped out into the realm of nonstate actors. Additionally, many scientists who were once employed by state-sponsored research programs are now unemployed, and are tempted by high salaries offered by “rogue states” or terrorist organizations.

In addition to availability, such CBRN weapons might be attractive to terrorists because they would possibly be able to achieve “escalation dominance,” which refers to the fact that a terrorist could use CBRN weapons against a country, such as the United States, but the United States would be unable to retaliate since it normally does not use CBRN weapons and, in addition, terrorists do not make good targets because of their diffused and networked structures. Thus, within this reality, CBRN weapons paradoxically exploit a vulnerability within powerful states.
There are two types of responses that are needed. First, there needs to be a more vigilant effort to contain these weapons, particularly nuclear weapons and their constituent materials. To prevent nuclear terrorism, many experts believe it is crucial to eliminate the sources of such weapons. Morten Bremer Maerli and Lars van Dassen have argued that:

"The best way to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism is to deny potential terrorists or proliferators access to fissile materials—plutonium and highly enriched uranium. And the best way to do this is to eliminate as much HEU as possible, as quickly as possible, through a new partnership between Russia and Europe."103

In this regard, the United States must continue its efforts to secure Russia’s loose fissile materials, such as highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is seen by many experts as the most likely (and technically feasible) material that Al Qaeda would use to construct a crude nuclear device.104 In the years shortly after the end of the Cold War, there were initiatives designed to “buy up” excess or surplus CBRN materials in the former Soviet Union; these measures need to be maintained, and even strengthened. In 1992, the U.S. Congress established the US Department of Defense’ Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program “to reduce the WMD [CBRN] threat posed to the United States from weapons remaining in the FSU."105 Although the program is generally successful, a 2005

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General Accounting Report (GAO) found that multiple US government agencies are failing to fully coordinate their efforts, or to link their efforts to global trends:

“DOD and DOE prepare their own individual strategies to implement their respective threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, but there is no government-wide strategy that integrates them with one another or with those of other agencies that implement threat reduction and nonproliferation programs.”

Second, given the increasing likelihood that these weapons will be used in terror attacks, states must prepare themselves—their citizenry and infrastructure—for such attacks involving CBRN weapons. Ideally, these weapons can be intercepted, or plots disrupted; however, realistically, given the large amount of material and knowledge that has already ‘seeped out’, it is almost inevitable terrorism will increasingly feature CBRN weapons. Because any threatened use of CBRN by a terrorist cannot be deterred, at least not in the traditional sense that deterrence worked between states, the international community must develop alternatives to deterrence, including better intelligence operations, special covert response initiatives, and, when all else fails, military preemption. Although President George W. Bush has been criticized for his views on preemption, he stated quite clearly in a speech delivered at West Point the rationale for such a policy. Specifically he stated:

“Homeland defense and missile defense are part of stronger security, and they’re essential priorities for America. Yet the war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront

106 Ibid., p. 7.
the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path
to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act.\footnote{107}{Speech by President George W. Bush to the Graduating class at West Point, released on June 1, 2002, obtained on the internet at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/print/20020601-3.html.}

8.7 A Fifth Wave? Reexamining Rapoport’s Wave Theory in the Context of International System Analysis

As noted earlier in chapters two and three, David Rapoport proposes a theory of terrorism “waves” to analyze terrorism trends. The wave theory provides a systemic lens through which terrorism can be viewed; it focuses on a “predominant energy”—what Audrey Kurth Cronin has described as a basic tension in the international system.\footnote{108}{Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism,” \textit{International Security}, 2002/2003 Winter, p. 30 [Lexis-Nexis edition].} Rapoport asserts that a wave is a “cycle of activity in a given time period.”\footnote{109}{David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (ed), \textit{Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy} (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), p. 47.} This cycle undergoes both expansion and contraction phases. Moreover, the wave has an international character: “similar activities occur in several countries, driven by a common predominant energy that shapes the participating groups’ characteristics and mutual relationships.”\footnote{110}{Ibid.} Most importantly, the “predominant energy” of each wave tends to be different from that of other wave, according to Rapoport.

In this section, we will analyze the different energies within each wave proposed by Rapoport. The section will provide analysis on different factors of each wave and will speculate, based on previous wave patterns, what a fifth wave might look like. First, a
table (Table 1) is provided that looks at the various terrorism waves, and the associated "energies" and larger tensions within the international system during those specific eras [see next page]:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crystallizing Factors or Causes</th>
<th>Ultimate Goal</th>
<th>Extent &amp; Effect of Globalization</th>
<th>Key Technological Innovations or Tactics</th>
<th>Application of Violence</th>
<th>Causes Of Decline or Disappearance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Wave</td>
<td>Declining legitimacy of Monarchies; rise of universalist ideologies (Communism Marxism)</td>
<td>Revolution; eliminate Oppression by Killing Heads of Governments</td>
<td>Very high; new communications innovations; strong influence of diaspora populations; migration of operatives throughout Europe and N. America</td>
<td>Invention of dynamite and incendiary devices</td>
<td>Constrained (careful avoidance of collateral damage or mass casualties)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Wave</td>
<td>End of World War I-Versailles Peace Treaty (applied principle of self determination)</td>
<td>To create secular states; or liberate states from colonial powers; or create new states within incumbent states or other territories</td>
<td>High; Significant diaspora support; Rise of the UN system (and culture) affected 2nd wave movements; many groups sought to interest UN to gain sympathy</td>
<td>Use of guerrilla-like hit and run tactics; emphasis on striking military targets</td>
<td>Generally measured; careful application of violence (although beyond rules of war); warnings to civilian populations (i.e. Irgun)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Wave</td>
<td>Vietnam war and consequent rise of student activism; European groups saw themselves as vanguard of Third World Masses; state sponsorship (Cold War tensions)</td>
<td>To 'bring down' the capitalist system</td>
<td>High; extensive mobility by operatives; training outside of target countries</td>
<td>Emphasis on striking symbolic targets (rather than military targets); hijacking of aircraft; kidnappings and negotiations</td>
<td>Generally constrained; kidnappings focused on elites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Wave</td>
<td>Rise of globalization; decline of Cold War; Iran revolution (rise of theocracy); Soviet invasion of Afghanistan</td>
<td>To create universalist religious system of governance; global Islamic Caliphate.</td>
<td>Very high—both functionally and ideationally; extensive reliance on tools of information, modern transportation.</td>
<td>Suicide bombings; use of aircraft for suicide bombing (an offshoot of hijacking tactics of the third wave); nascent CBRN use</td>
<td>Unconstrained; large body count desired; disregard for collateral damage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Crystallizing factors or causes:** All four waves of modern terrorism unfolded within the context of larger shifts or tensions within the international community. The first wave occurred within the context of a growing trend toward representative government. The second wave reflected the disintegration of empires and the rise of new, independent states. The third wave occurred within the context of broader tensions in the international system, namely the Cold War. Fourth wave terrorism occurred within the context of rising religious values and certain precipitating events, such as the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution.

**Ultimate Goal:** Analyzing the various objectives of each wave reveals certain interesting and persistent trends. The first and third waves appear similar in the sense that each had rather vague goals of undermining the extant system (including system of governance within a particular country, or globally). Anarchists saw human government as a cause of human oppression; “In order for the masses to be free, the rulers must be killed.” Third wave terrorists saw the capitalist-driven Western system as oppressive, particularly against Third World populations. Second wave terrorists were perhaps the most practical—they had defined (politically and geographically) nationalist goals. However, second wave terrorism did not exist in a vacuum. It was aided by the fact that “[b]oth colonialism and imperialism were no longer poplar causes: jingoism had long since given way to guilt-ridden disillusion with any overseas military adventures.” In addition, the colonizers (such as Britain and France) were themselves financially strapped

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(after having undergone two world wars) and thus were not enthusiastic to maintain their overseas possessions.

Fourth wave terrorists are a hybrid between third and second wave terrorists. Some fourth wave terrorists seek to take over key states, as part of a larger anti-systemic ideological struggle, which is why some analysts have described the larger Salafist movement as a global insurgency. Jemaah Islamiyah, an Al Qaeda affiliate, sought to conduct multiple insurgencies in Southeast Asia to create a Daulah Islamiyah (Islamic state). Simultaneously, some of the goals of fourth wave terrorists have bordered on fantasy, or operate on a cosmic level. Lee Harris argues that Al Qaeda is driven by a fantasy ideology and this has major implications for American counterterrorism efforts.

"...We are fighting an enemy who has no strategic purpose in anything he does—whose actions have significance only in terms of his own fantasy ideology...It matters not how much stronger or more powerful we are than they—what matters is that God will bring them victory." If Al Qaeda is pursuing vague political goals, then we must heed the warning issued by Walter Laqueur in 1977: "The less clear the political purpose in terrorism, the greater appeal to unbalanced persons."

**Extent and effect of globalization:** Globalization has been defined as the "gradually expanding process of international interpenetration in the economic, political, social, and security realms, uncontrolled by (or apart from) traditional notions of state

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113 Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism (White Paper), Presented to Parliament by Command of the President of the Republic of Singapore, 7 January 2003.
115 Laqueur, Terrorism, p. 128.
sovereignty.” From the perspective of globalization and Rapoport’s waves, it appears that first and fourth wave terrorism share common globalization characteristics. Both movements were comprised of disparate, nationally-distinct movements that coalesced around the tools and tactics of globalization. The anarchists were scattered throughout Western Europe, North America and, to a lesser degree, elsewhere. They subscribed to a similar view; they published newsletters that were circulated widely. Similarly, the Salafist organizations, such as Al Qaeda, are spread throughout the world, and communicate widely via the Internet and other sources. Interestingly, one difference between first and fourth wave terrorism in the context of globalization is that first wave terrorism appears to have been facilitated by globalization (particularly its functional attributes in the form of communication and transportation developments), whereas fourth wave terrorism was both facilitated by functional globalization, but also was a reaction against globalization (particularly its attendant social and cultural forces).

Moreover, first and fourth wave terrorism occurred during periods of major power transitions within the international system; during the time of the anarchists, the United States was a rising power and was tilting the international system toward a transatlantic multi-polar structure. Similarly, fourth wave terrorists have emerged during a transition period from a bipolar system to a post Cold War alternative system—either a unipolar system, or, what may ultimately be determined to be a global multi-polar system (possibly involving three or more major poles). Underlying each of these transitions in

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117 Ibid.
both first and fourth wave contexts were new developments in technology, transportation and communication.

Globalization also played an important role in second and third wave terrorism, although arguably much less in degree when compared to the first and fourth waves. In first and fourth wave terrorism, nonstate actors attained new power and influence and their range of geographic operability expanded as their “third level” within the international system expanded (referring to Joseph Nye’s three-level model—see chapter 2). Moreover, first and fourth wave terrorists benefited from new technologies. Second and third wave terrorism occurred within the context of strengthening state power, and the rise of the United Nations system. The Cold War bipolar international system both facilitated and constrained third wave terrorists. Yet the communications revolution—and particularly the advent of television—that occurred in the third wave transformed terrorism forever. However, its full potential would not be realized until the fourth wave, especially with the combination of video and the Internet (and associated low costs, which contrasted with high costs and high barrier entry of televised communications during the third wave).

**Key technological innovations or tactics:** First wave terrorism benefited from the invention of dynamite and incendiary bombs. Second wave terrorists developed new tactics, such as guerilla-like hit and run operations against government troops as well as assassination policies against police: “Second-wave strategy sought to eliminate the police—a government’s eyes and ears—first, through systematic assassinations of
officers and/or their families."\footnote{118} In third wave terrorism, the rise of civil aviation provided new opportunities for terrorism: "... the development of international civil aviation... created new vulnerabilities and lucrative targets for the terrorist to exploit."\footnote{119} Hijacking became a prominent tool, in addition to the invention and application of barometric pressure bombs on aircraft.\footnote{120} Similarly, advances in telecommunications also made their impact with third wave terrorists; thus hijackings would lead to negotiations with governments, which could in turn be aired on live television, which created the necessary "high drama" to advance a particular terrorist cause.

This use of communication tools becomes even more important in fourth wave terrorism, particularly with the rise of the Internet, video uplink technology, and computer-assisted manipulation of video and still images. Fourth wave terrorism has also seen increased application of CBRN\footnote{121} weapons, although some writers argue that the most likely scenario involves chemical and biological weapons, rather than nuclear. Chris Quillen argues that changes in human lifestyles—notably increased urbanization and the clustering of large populations into confined buildings—provides an invitation to the use of chemical or biological weapons.\footnote{122}

\textit{Application of violence:} In this category there are stark differences between the various waves. Wave one is distinguished by its insistence of targeting elites. Most

anarchists, although presumably not all, attempted to avoid collateral damage and were correspondingly averse to mass casualty attacks. Prominent anarchist Emma Goldman stated that “Anarchism, more than any other social theory, values human life above things...if the production of any commodity necessitates the sacrifice of human life, society should do without that commodity, but it cannot do without that life.”

Wave two featured directed and targeted violence—in other words, enough to get the job done, but generally not excessive. For second wave terrorists, this “constraint” ethos was driven by practical political considerations: “Nationalists have to concern themselves to a considerable extent with building up their own bases of domestic support and with winning over foreign governments and international opinion to their cause. This inevitably imposes certain restraints on the use of terrorism.” Even in those instances in which anti-colonial (nationalist) terrorists conducted a major attack that resulted in mass casualties, they made attempts to distance themselves from or apologize for the ultimate consequences. For instance, Irgun distanced itself from the bombing of the King David Hotel in 1946 (which killed 91 people) by arguing that it had issued a warning to evacuate which had been ignored by the British. Similarly, the Real IRA was forced to apologize for a major attack (the Omagh bombing) after a public backlash. In the case of strictly anti-colonial groups, such as the Kenyan-based Mau

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126 Ibid.
Mau, much of the terrorist violence was directed against non-Mau Mau tribesman (several thousand deaths), rather than the British colonizers.\textsuperscript{127}

However, for third wave terrorists, violence appeared to be a goal itself, although it was also constrained. Paul Wilkinson argues that “acts of violence became ends in themselves” for third wave terrorists.\textsuperscript{128} Chris Quillen observes that third wave terrorists—particularly the ETA in Spain, the Red Brigades in Italy, the Red Army Faction in Germany, and the Japanese Red Army (JRA)—are notable in that they rarely conducted a mass casualty attack. In the case of the ETA, for instance, “[o]ver the lifetime of the organization, the ETA is responsible for over a thousand deaths; but its single deadliest bomb attack remains the 21 people killed in a car bombing of a Barcelona parking garage in 1987.”\textsuperscript{129}

Wave four is unprecedented in that it features an unconstrained ethos directed not only against governments, but also civilians. This is particularly dangerous when combined with available weapons that have the capability of killing millions. Religious justifications of violence are the primary drivers. “Because religion can engender such intense feelings, a religious justification offered for a cause which might otherwise be justified in political or economic terms seriously influences the intensity of the violence used.”\textsuperscript{130} Moreover, fourth wave terrorists’ propensity to use suicide attacks greatly accentuates their violent potential. Suicide terrorists are told that their act of martyrdom

\textsuperscript{128} Wilkinson, \textit{Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response}, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{129} Quillen, “A Historical Analysis of Mass Casualty Bombers,” p. 284.
will be rewarded in heaven—thus, it is an act that becomes an end unto itself, and also one that overshadows any achievement that can be enjoyed in this world.

*Causes of decline or disappearance:* First wave terrorism declined because of generational change and changing political moods, not to mention the onset of two major world wars. Second wave terrorism declined because of the success of the terrorist movements: "it is indisputable that, at the very least, the tactical 'successes' and political victories won through violence by groups like the Irgun, EOKA[^131] and the FLN[^132] clearly demonstrated that—notwithstanding the repeated denials of the governments they confront—terrorism does 'work'."[^133] Third wave terrorism declined because of generational change—the ideology could not sustain beyond the first generation—and because of the decline of the Cold War. Moreover, the ideology underpinning third wave terrorism appeared rather ephemeral: "These movements [of the third wave], are more analogous to tiny gangs of bandits than to serious political movements."[^134] Rapoport argues that fourth wave terrorism is scheduled to end in 2025; however, given the fact that religion and religious-identity underpin fourth wave terrorism, the choice of this date is questionable. Religious terrorism could in fact lead to a double wave—a 'super wave'—that could span 100 years or so. Waves one, two and three were essentially secular waves. One could argue that terrorism infused with religious ideology has much greater sustainability.

[^131]: Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston, or National Organization of Cypriot Fighters.
[^132]: Front de Liberation Nationale, or National Liberation Front (Algeria).
Reviewing Rapoport’s theoretical model on terrorism waves reveals certain interesting trends: One of these is that the evolution of tactics that are developed for one wave—hijacking or aircraft, for instance—later become the foundation for the next wave in logical progression. For example, third wave terrorists—notably Palestinian organizations—effectively employed hijacking as a tool for negotiating with states to gain release of prisoners, or to press other demands. The hijacking method laid the groundwork for the fourth wave terrorists’ use of airplanes as suicide vehicles (effectively combining an established third wave tactic with an innovation—suicide bombings—associated with the fourth wave).

Another theme that emerges in this analysis is the remarkable continuity of key themes and trends within various terrorist movements (although perhaps expressed differently in different waves, just as genetic characteristics in human beings or animals are expressed differently in separate generations). For example, all four waves agitated against the extent power structure as they saw it—a power structure that the various groups deemed inherently unfair and unjust. Moreover, each wave took advantage of the larger “enabling environment” that surrounded it—as new technologies were developed and became widely disseminated, the terrorist organizations would duly incorporate these into their toolbox.

Another issue related to continuity that emerges in this analysis is the fact that ‘waves’ do not necessarily end. Rapoport acknowledges this: “Occasionally an organization survives its original wave.” However, Rapoport simply accepts the

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anomaly without explaining its implications, or the possibility that it might suggest an alternative model for understanding the rise and decline of modern terrorism movements. For example, the Palestinian organizations, while classified as third wave movements, are arguably better understood in the context of second wave terrorism. After all, like their second wave counterparts, the Palestinians were attempting to create a homeland within territory occupied by an incumbent—enemy—power. Similarly, the ETA, which is active to this day, is often classified as a third wave movement, although arguably it belongs within the second wave. The organization seeks to create an independent country “in northern Iberia with a quasi-socialist economy, that would protect and promote indigenous Basque folkways.” It is quite distinguished from the student-radical dominated groups such as the German Red Army Faction or the French Action Direct, with which it is often grouped.

Another shortcoming of the Rapoport theory involves its classification of terrorism in terms of time phases, rather than basic types. In general, nonstate actor terrorism falls into the category of either 1) ideological or 2) ethnic/nationalist. Jerrold Post argues that sub-state terrorism (nonstate actor terrorism) can be divided into five categories (a. social revolutionary—left; b. right wing terrorism; c. nationalist/separatist terrorism, d. religious extremist terrorism; and e. single issue terrorism). Four of these five categories identified by Post are essentially ideological, whereas nationalist/

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136 Rapoport includes it in his discussion of third wave terrorism.
separatist tends to be distinct (i.e. it is limited to a particular ethnic group). Among other things, ethno-nationalist terrorists tend to be ethnically-defined (ethnic Tamils populate the LTTE; ethnic Irish populate the IRA, etc.) and territorially-bound, in the sense that they seek to achieve a political goal that is tangible, with defined limits (typically a new homeland, or perhaps control of a state). Ideological terrorists, on the other hand, tend to have more broadly-defined "anti-systemic goals" (i.e. the anarchists sought to attack the system of governance, 'new left' groups in the 1960s sought to attack the Western-led capitalist system, Al-Qaeda seeks to attack the system of Western-led globalization).

Rapoport's wave theory tends to downplay these two different sub-types and moreover fails to acknowledge that the two categories have co-existed, in various degrees, throughout history. Transnational ideological anarchists (first wave) terrorists existed alongside more nationalist-based anarchists, such as those based in Serbia and elsewhere that had largely local nationalist goals. Similarly, the 'new left' groups existed contemporaneously alongside such territorial groups as the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Irish Republican Army. In terms of fourth wave terrorism, Al Qaeda has forged both a transnational movement, as well as encouraged local Islamist movements that have very specific ethno-nationalist territorial goals (MILF in the southern Philippines, for instance, that simply seeks broad autonomy within Mindanao).

However, Rapoport's theory and its reliance on the notion of "predominant energy" do provide a useful map, particularly in explaining the rise of second wave terrorism (anti-colonial) and fourth wave terrorism (religious). Perhaps it could be

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139 Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
strengthened by adding a 'dual track convergence' sub-theory to complement the waves. Such dual-track convergence theory would acknowledge the two basic sub-types of nonstate actor terrorism (ideological and ethno/nationalist). This theory would posit that during times of intense globalization and international systemic flux (such as a weakening of hegemonic relations between major powers), a convergence between the two 'houses of terrorism' takes place.

For example, the anarchist (first) wave and the religious (fourth) wave are characterized by intense globalization. Joseph Nye has asserted that to understand such periods, one must view the international system as a three-layer model, with the third layer being the realm of nonstate actors. Although Nye presumably intended that his model apply to the post Cold War era, it might also be applicable in explaining the international system during the anarchist wave. In other words, globalization facilitates the rise and power of nonstate actors; it allows an ideational convergence between various terrorist groups. Thus, a local nationalist group may be attracted to a global ideological movement and attempt to "combine forces" or, at the very least, cooperate (sharing equipment, intelligence, etc.). This can be seen in the current fourth wave as Al Qaeda attempts to forge alliances with local nominally Islamist movements that combine religion with nationalism, but which have more practical secessionist goals.

Globalization also deemphasizes the importance of borders. Both first and fourth wave terrorism exist within an ideological milieu which does not value the sanctity of secular borders between nation-states (in contrast with second wave terrorists who were very keen to assert their control of territory within borders). "...Islamic
radicalism...does not recognize the boundaries of the secular national states, and
certainly not those between the various Islamic countries. Thus, in both first and
fourth wave terrorism, globalization and the information revolution have allowed the two
'houses of terrorism' to forge common goals, although it is not certain how long (or
robust) such convergence will actually be.

8.8 Toward a fifth wave?

If one accepts the notion of four major waves in modern terrorism, as Rapoport
has proposed, then one is invariably left speculating as to what a fifth wave might look
like. As suggested by Rapoport’s theory, terrorism waves reflect broad and massive
shifts in the international system. “Terrorism is a by-product of broader historical shifts in
the international distribution of power in all of its forms—political, economic, military,
ideological, and cultural.” Thus, it is likely that a major event—perhaps once yet
unseen—could create the conditions that would facilitate the rise of a new wave.

One scenario suggests a continuation of current trends. The new fifth wave would
likely feature certain continuities from previous waves—for example, certain core themes
that were developed in earlier waves (religious identity, response to disparity between
rich and poor, etc.). If globalization continues at its current fervent pace, fifth wave
terrorism is likely to reflect the growing power of nonstate actors. According to Joseph

140 Gabriel Ben-Dor and Ami Pedahzur, “The Uniqueness of Islamic Fundamentalism and the Fourth Wave
141 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Behind the Curve; Globalization and International Terrorism,” International

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Nye's 3-level model of the international system, third level actors (nonstate actors such as individuals, corporations or non-governmental organizations, etc.) are likely to be primary actors in the continuation of fourth wave terrorism, as well as in fifth wave terrorism.

As nonstate actor terrorists grow in importance, they may see themselves as 'parity actors' alongside states and this self-perception might influence their choice of attack modus or type of weaponry to be employed (conventional or CBRN, for instance). Thus, the question of whether a terrorist is likely to use CBRN may hinge on the terrorist's perception about his position within a state-dominated international system.

Nonstate actor terrorists “seeking to disrupt, intimidate, or otherwise interrupt the regular functioning of a state...may be tempted to employ chemical and biological-type weapons.” In other words, it is during times of nonstate actor power ascendance, within the third layer of Nye’s model, that terrorists may seek weapons designed to undermine its power competitors, namely states; and thus, this would call for CBRN. Thus, much of the literature published during the fourth wave terrorism era that warned of the growing likelihood of CBRN use by terrorists may in fact be more predictive of (and relevant to) the fifth wave of terrorism. Moreover, new innovations in weaponry—such as lasers, nanotechnology, genetically-engineered viruses and others—would likely be a feature in fifth wave terrorism, just as dramatic and intrusive state responses will also be (i.e., increased surveillance of populations, human genome-based efforts to uncover a ‘terrorist gene’, tracking of all financial transactions, etc.).

Alternatively, the fifth wave may arise in response to a cataclysmic event in the international system—a major war, a disease pandemic, environmental change (massive climate change) or perhaps a threat or major discovery emanating from outer space. A major nuclear war would likely undermine globalization, and thus diminish the 'space' of the third-level of Nye’s model. As state power grows, facilitated by warfare or imperial adventures, terrorists would be on the defensive, at least temporarily. Ironically, this new state-on-state violence would be generally inhospitable to terrorists, although such a war would likely cause much greater carnage than what the terrorists would likely have brought about. Overall, it is clear that regardless of which scenario actually unfolds, terrorism is not likely to disappear; it is simply too convenient and effective a tool for nonstate actors seeking to expand their power and influence within an international system that they perceive to be unfair, unjust, or simply inadequate.

8.9 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the various challenges involved in both identifying ‘root causes’ of terrorism, and determining the proper (or most efficacious) strategies that should be implemented to mitigate terrorism. Clearly there is no easy answer, particularly as there is no single threat of terrorism, but rather a myriad of groups that are motivated and driven by various agendas.

Terrorism is not likely to ever disappear; however, with appropriate policies and cooperation between states and other nonstate actors, the threat can at least be managed
or contained. Greater reliance on 'soft power' rather than hard power will likely generate a more long-term, sustainable environment that is inhospitable to terrorism. In addition, wealthy, developed states must understand that one key to mitigating terrorism lies in the elimination of the enabling environment, and one way that this can be done is the cultivation of a more equitable and fair international system.
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