Moving Grammars of the Political: Beyond Sovereign Thought and Action

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN

POLITICAL SCIENCE

DECEMBER 2004

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my entire committee for the generosity of offering their time to this project.
ABSTRACT

This dissertation challenges the failure of the contemporary political imagination. Effectively to do politics today is to say I oppose. With this failure in mind, the dissertation explores what it can mean to affirm new horizons of political possibility by being attentive to political grammars. I ask what it means to exceed the political grammar of sovereignty and, by moving grammars of the political, affirm different verbs in its wake. In the wake of sovereignty, I explore the following types of questions: 1) how can what exceeds accepted structures of intelligibility be appreciated. 2) How can difference be politicized without reducing it to the logic of the same? 3) How is it possible to think about a politics of time? How is language, grammatically and rhetorically, a set of limits that holds people to singular identities and calibrates political action to predetermined positions? With these questions in mind, the general question being asked is: how can different linguistic practices open up competing political grammars? To this end, the dissertation pushes Gilles Deleuze beyond his inherited political grammar. Specifically, I amplify Deleuze's philosophy, which celebrates creating concepts above all else, into a moving politics. The dissertation demonstrates that Deleuze's emphasis on the concept neglects the verb “to create” which is always indebted to sovereignty's intellectual patrimony. For Deleuze to become political, other verbs are needed that do not reproduce sovereignty's political grammar. To aid developing different verbs, I dedicate a chapter to re-writing the Pacific Rim as a temporal Event in order to affirm the verb to exceed. In a chapter dedicated to reading the genre of Science Fiction, the verb to encounter is affirmed. Finally, in a chapter dedicated to the problem of Music appreciation, the verb to amplify is affirmed. Such affirmations offer a contribution to political and philosophical discussions about the crisis of the political. They push celebrating movement and change towards developing linguistic practices that embody movement and change.
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Everywhere (the metaphysics of language) sees a doer and doing; it believes in will as the cause; it believes in the ego, in the ego as being, in the ego as substance, and it projects this faith in the ego-substance upon all things — only thereby does it first create the concept of “thing.” Everywhere being is projected by thought, pushed underneath, as the cause, the concept of being follows, and is a derivative of, the concept of ego. In the beginning there is that great calamity of an error that the will is something which is effective, that will is a capacity. Today we know that it is only a word.... *I am afraid we are not yet rid of God because we still have faith in grammar.*

-- Fredric Nietzsche

It is often forgotten that (dictionaries) are artificial repositories, put together well after the languages they define. The roots of language are irrational and of a magical nature.

-- Jorge Luis Borges

**PREFACE**

As the title suggests this dissertation is about shifting grammars of the political, pushing beyond sovereign thought and action, and implies celebrating the political event of thinking and acting. To say the least this is an inauspicious beginning, since, like any interesting project (another trembling statement), it is doomed to failure. It is doomed to failure because there are a number of impossible juxtapositions in the title, for instance, between thought and action and between thought and thinking and action and acting. Although they are productive, and worthy of inquiry, they are impossible because they only persist in and through the grammar that brings them into existence.

Grammar is more than the way in which words are organised and how they follow from each other in an acceptable fashion. Grammar is more than what Mr. Hayes, my ninth grade English teacher, attempted to teach (me); namely: the rules and exceptions of the English language. When is it proper
to use a comma? When is it correct to pluralize a subject? When is it acceptable to modify a noun? In this line of questioning grammar is a morality. It is a set of rules that must be obeyed or, returning to the case of Mr. Hayes, be subject to the pain of copying out a column of the Oxford English Dictionary. As a morality, grammar is an articulation of what is possible and of what can be said at any particular time. As Nietzsche's quote starting this preface suggests, grammar is a metaphysical statement about being, "I am afraid we are not yet rid of God because we still have faith in grammar (Nietzsche 1954: 483)." Through language, through grammar, a world exists. This world is properly ordered, rhythms are well punctuated and meanings are defined. It should be no surprise that the first chapters of Hobbes' Leviathan are about grammar, since, in modernity grammar is sovereignty and, in turn, sovereignty is the expression, condition and performance of being modern. To this end, Mr Hayes played his role in making an example out of me.

If grammar is about the constitution of a way of being together, of the meaning and possible expression of life, then all grammar is political. The dissertation is about grammar because it politicises the conditions of possibility for politics. I want to ask how it is possible to think and act beyond the political conditions of possibility of thought and action. In this sense, I am asking with Mr. Hayes when to pluralize a word and when to modify a noun, but instead of operating in the service of a governing morality, my aim, with Machiavelli as my teacher, is to celebrate the return of politics. To ask
such an impossible question of thinking and acting beyond sovereign thought and action requires moving grammar by pluralizing nouns and modifying verbs. In the dissertation's title, the first meaning of the word moving, therefore, is that of the verb to move.

The second meaning of the word moving however is its adjective usage. Because the etymological root of “adjective” is to throw or to place, moving grammars throws grammar into a condition of movement. This second meaning highlights, in contrast to moralising grammars, that grammar is always already in a condition of movement. Grammar's moving can be explained as a contemporary experience. It is increasingly common place to hear statements like our worlds have changed, our worlds are changing or our worlds will change. Or grammar's moving can be explained as a prior statement about life itself: “there is nothing permanent,” Heraclitus of Ephesus once said, “except change.” Grammar's moving can also be explained as an internal destabilising quality of language itself. Language itself is always deteriorating. The roots of language, Borges reminds us, are mystical and irrational. In all these affirmations, grammars are on the move. The grammar of being together and creating meaning in the world today is itself on the move.

Third, the effect of moving grammars and grammar's moving is, I think, moving. In other words, moving grammar, like poetry, is affective. It is emotional at a bodily level. Moving grammar changes the habitualized ways in which it is possible to experience, sense and appreciate being in the world.
Moving grammar gives access to words that are beyond the habit of comprehension, specification and quantification. "It is the silence, rather, that obliges the poet to listen, and gives the dream greater intimacy. We hardly know where to situate this silence, whether in the vast world or in the immense past. But we do know that it comes from beyond a wind that dies down or a rain that grows gentle (Bachelard 1994: 172)." Moving grammar alters the possible ways in which to become, identify, and recognise what it means to be alive today.

Obviously, there are political implications for acknowledging moving grammars. First, within the schooling thought that treats grammar as a morality, grammar should be used as an attempt to stop grammars from moving. Second, in the vital festivity of grammar, the movement of grammar should be celebrated and encouraged. Third, in the service of political life, to move grammars is to politicise the foundations that the illusion of non-movement presupposes. I argue it offers a taste of political freedom. Fourth, the question shifts from what is human to a more open ethical and political question about ways of living differently.

It is to moving grammars of the political, pushing beyond sovereign thought and action, and celebrating the political event of thinking and acting that I turn in this dissertation.
It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent that survives. It is the one that is the most adaptable to change.
-- Charles Darwin

I have something to prove, as long as I know there's something that needs improvement, and you know that everytime I move, I make a woman's movement.
-- Ani Difranco

CHAPTER 1
Moving from Crisis

This dissertation is an engagement with the contemporary stasis of the political imagination. Contemporary political stasis results from a poverty of verbs; all political verbs have come to mean the same thing "to oppose." The contemporary political imagination involves an endless list of demobilising oppositions like theory/practice, war/peace, damnation/redemption, boredom/restlessness, want/need, action/apathy, scarcity/affluence and fear/hope. These oppositions are demobilising because at the same time that the demand making a choice between sides, they also make it possible to occupy both sides of the opposition. The result is that there is no outside, only included/exclusion, only stasis. Because there is no outside to opposition, the unfortunate effect is a superficial politics; to be disgruntled, spun, flustered, outraged and opposed is to be political.

To enlarge the problem, the condition of being disgruntled emerges from being trapped between two opposing grammars: a politics of crisis and a crisis of the political. In a politics of crisis, politics attempts to occupy only one side of an opposition (a traditionally righteous political position). In the
crisis of the political, politics celebrates the hybridity, in-betweenness and fluidity of the condition of being on both sides of the opposition at the same time (a contemporary progressive political condition).

Together these grammars constitute the stasis of the contemporary political imagination. Ironically, to be in crisis, leads to stasis, and to be in stasis, leads to crisis. Being trapped in/between either condition of crisis quarantines the political imagination to endless practices of opposition. Through the verb to oppose, individuals perpetually reproduce what they abhor, or eternally condemn what they have become. Dilemmas about democratic participation, for example, often reflect the contemporary stasis of the political imagination. On the one hand, to choose the lesser of two or three evils negates the virtue of choice and as such reproduces a democratic political system that was responsible for such narrow choices in the first place. On the other hand, to reject the practice of voting itself, and become a democratic purist, results in an abdication to a capricious management of dissent that produced the problem of the lesser of evils in the first place. This condition of stasis is no small problem; it cuts to the heart of what it means to be a modern qualified political subject in the contemporary world.

The problem is this: when the quintessential institutions of modernity's triumph are implicated in global human enslavement, eradication and extinction, it appears that there is nothing left to do but condemn or redeem old political strategies. Furthermore, when the return to the virtues of civility, order and reason are implicated in the strewn bodies and shattered lives of
modernity, it is irresponsible to ignore that modern political strategies (to oppose) are implicated in abhorrent political problems. The question, as such, is how can the political be re-imagined?

In this dissertation, I have set the difficult, if not impossible, task of leaving behind the politics of crisis, aid in developing a more affirmative politics out of the crisis of the political and evade the stasis of the contemporary political imagination. To do so requires an affirmative political vocabulary that is organised around verbs instead of concepts and one that begins the process of exceeding the political imaginary that endlessly chains those interested in politics to the philosophical ground of modern sovereignty. To develop these verbs, this dissertation focuses on different practices, genres, stories and events that challenge the sovereign concept of the political and develop new political sensibilities and tools. Political options are too narrowly defined in the conventional grammar of sovereign state politics and therefore wholly occupy the locations worth searching for indicators of political change. José Saramago's novel Blindness (1998), by way of contrast, offers an exemplary map of the contemporary stasis of the political imagination. I turn to Saramago in particular because of his writing style. Saramago abandons the conventions of grammar and as such affirms the entanglements of life. I turn to Saramago to enact two political grammars, the politics of crisis and the crisis of the political, from which this chapter can introduce a third.

Like his other novels, All the Names and The Cave, Saramago situates Blindness in everyday western life, around an exceptionally normal character.
Blindness draws us into a spiralling drama that starts with the plight of one individual and ends up encompassing the whole contemporary world. As a Catholic humanist, for Saramago the quotidian is the exceptional. Sitting a stoplight, waiting for the light to change, a man goes blind for no explainable reason. This man is not a centre of attention, we are told nothing about him, no name, nationality or occupation; instead we are left to lose sight of him as the drama builds. He is simply the blind man. However, through him, in those first pages we witness an unexplainable epidemic of blindness, already sweeping a city, a country and all of humanity into a worsening outbreak. To solve the widening pandemic, his unknown nation-state begins quarantining its national-citizens and managing the national-problem with nothing but the most basic of state-enforced rules and boundaries (i.e. no leaving the hospital or you will be shot). Blindness follows the plight of some of the first victims of this condition, from here the story grows complicated.

The first level of complication emerges with the politics of crisis, the desire to secure a pure, safe and essential position in a problem (friend/enemy). This complication takes form through reading the novel according to two different faces of a politics of crisis: damnation or redemption.

When Saramago's novel is read as an updated Lord of the Flies, losing all norms and mores assumed in society, the contemporary condition becomes a testament to humanity's damnation and its fall back into a Hobbsian "state of nature." Becoming blind, each individual looses their
ability to navigate, function and know the world as they did before. As their qualification in contemporary society disappears before their eyes, so do their cherished societal protections. Occupying one half of the dichotomy of damnation/redemption, *Blindness* contributes to the disturbing, yet comforting, trend to read everything, all signs, events and texts, to indicate that chaos and Armageddon loom on the horizon. Saramago recognises the paradox that enlightenment and modernity coincides with the systematic erasure, enslavement and partitioning of peoples’ worlds. Whether talking about the darkness of genocide or the light of new medical therapies, with the privileging of science and rationality comes the effect of reducing all life to a question of calculability, probability and acceptable losses. In the face of this century’s horrors, failures and broken promises, how else should one read Saramago’s epidemic of blindness that sweeps a city, nation and world into the most bewildering forms of violence, derision and fear? When reading *Blindness* a sense of trepidation builds, “What if, just by reading on, I too become blind?”

Occupying the other half of the damnation/redemption opposition, the failure of the contemporary political imagination also arises from the equally comforting trend to read a novel like *Blindness* as a triumphant humanist story. As a redemption story, *Blindness* becomes about resisting the collapse of civilisation and fostering the resurrection of reason, justice and democracy. In the face of Armageddon, Saramago’s heroine (the doctor’s wife who can see) becomes a tribute to our humanity. As the saying goes, “in the country of
the blind, the one-eyed man is king (Saramago 1998: 98).” In this case, she becomes queen. The doctor’s wife, because of her sworn dedication to her marriage, becomes a beacon of caring, generosity and humility. In the twilight of humanity’s defilement, she enshrines hope through recalcitrance and reconciliation. Through her story, we learn the importance of taking ownership of our individual responsibilities, of caring for our community and protecting the essential human virtues of civility, order and reason. In the face of society’s collapse, Saramago inspires readers to redouble their efforts to be good citizens. While reading Blindness a sense of a hope builds, “what if by reading on, I again find my eyes?”

Although these two narratives about the human condition are both widely rehearsed, since they constitute the two dominant positions/narratives within the politics of crisis, they are not very politically interesting. Taking up one position only occurs through the negation of the other. Blindness is never essentially a story about falling out of civilisation and into chaos nor is it about saving humanity from the dangers of disorder and celebrating its potential for reason, justice and peace. Like contemporary life, the novel lends itself to a more complicated reading than such narrow a political imagination allows. When the characters are discussing their fate, for instance, an unknown voice declares “We were already blind the moment we turned blind (Saramago 1998: 129).” The problem that they face is not about choosing between uncorrupted truths, as if they were ever available, but about understanding and engaging in the shifting complexity of the day/era.
Therefore, in addition to a crisis of politics, Saramago is also signalling a crisis of the political. Celebrating the hybridity, in-betweenness and fluidity between closed oppositions reveals that there is a politics to the way that we define what is political. The crisis of the political shows that the result of modern definitions of politics is the erasure of other questions, voices and possibilities.

By presenting the crisis of the contemporary political imagination, Saramago challenges the tunnel vision associated with a politics of crisis. What is unique about the character's affliction in Blindness is that instead of the blind “seeing” black, nothing, they “see” all white. Seeing all white, however, does not mean taking up the opposite of blackness, but instead white signals that the world is washed in fields of colour that have been forgotten and dismissed. Overwhelming the senses, overwhelming how we are taught to see, results in the crisis of the political imagination. As we read on we are taken up into the whiteness of a “milky sea (Saramago 1998: 3).”

All white, always present, colour overwhelms the modern black and white politics of crisis. As modern political stories have been overcome, new ones must be encountered. Beyond modern fixations with black and white, Saramago's rhythmic writing style overwhelms the conventions of grammar. Saramago abandons periods, refuses capitalisation and treats grammar as if it were a sound track encouraging the novels paces. His aesthetic connections exceed empirical definitions and his poetic movements surpass the modern rational political imagination. The crisis of the political emphasises a political
awareness of the importance of movement, fluidity and change. Such an emphasis is mobilised towards a political imaginary that affirms how things are always already moving in the world and therefore undermining the desire to permanently fix a position.

Like Blindness, this dissertation stakes a political quest that confronts and challenges its reader's political imaginary. It offers an opening, a fluid horizon of possibility that builds from the crisis of the political. To challenge the dilemma that, although things keep getting worse our hope and faith in human potential gets stronger and vice versa, our political stories cannot remain limited to the modern spatial imagination inherited from early modern Europe. Although social contract theory and the Treaty of Westphalia dominates modern political science, if we continue to think that politics is what happens inside/between sovereign states (and institutions) and conducted by traditional political actors (states, politicians and activists), then political action will remain synonymous with the verb “I oppose.” While to oppose endures as the singular verb of modernity -- I oppose therefore I am -- the contemporary political imagination will to remain in stasis. Instead, an affirmative political imagination that exceeds both a politics of crisis and the crisis of the political needs to be developed. It is not sufficient to celebrate movement or attempt to contain it. Therefore, the political question being introduced in this introduction, and developed in this dissertation, reads: how is it possible to imagine the political in ways that do not reproduce the desire
to control movement and change, like a politics of crisis on the one hand, or simply celebrate a given condition like the crisis of the political on the other?

I suggest in this dissertation that, because it is not enough to celebrate change, movement and stasis, the political problem being faced is not whether to move, but how to move. Since, everything is always already moving, the dissertation develops a political sensibility that affirms how things move differently. If politics is about movement, then this dissertation asserts that there is a need to affirm new verbs of political movement.

This introduction develops in greater detail the political positions associated with the two grammars already introduced, a politics of crisis and the crisis of the political, while at the same time developing a third grammar, moving politics, that exceeds both. While the introduction remains within the genre of political thought to build the guiding argument of the dissertation, later chapters develop the argument from neglected political practices, genres, stories and events. The introduction, therefore, continues to employ the novel Blindness as a narrative guide developing the politics of crisis first, the crisis of the political second and moving politics last.

The Politics of Crisis

In Saramago's Blindness, the reader is confronted with individuals, one by one, becoming blind in what turns out to be an ever-widening epidemic. Facing the threat of their entire population becoming blind, the leaders of a "nation-state" create a quarantine in a local asylum. Inside the asylum,
Blindness unfolds as a social, economic and political caricature of contemporary politics. As the newly blind are forced into the asylum, exemplary of modernity’s quintessential strategy of organisation, the state, the normalised, routinised and accepted themes of contemporary politics are brought into focus. Here, politics is the fetish of boxes and boundaries, interests and identities, and distributions and injustices. Inside the asylum, a defiled environment, a forced confinement, and an artificial scarcity reifies temporary injustices in the name of the nation. National reification occurs in the following message that is read to all those interned in the asylum: “The government is fully aware of its responsibilities and hopes that those to who this message is directed will, as the upright citizens the doubtless are, also assume their responsibilities bearing in mind that their isolation in which they now find themselves will represent, above any personal considerations an act of solidarity with the rest of the nation’s community.”¹ Unequal capitalist relations between wards (stripping individuals of their personal wealth and dignity) compound this national reification. When faced with a food shortage in the asylum, one ward demands payment for food, first in terms of valuables, but then in the form of sexual services. Regardless of resistance and protest, patriarchal divisions of sexual labour (mass rape for food or love for security) further compound the boundaries of exploitation. For instance, husbands protest the injustice, only revealing their prior propitiatory claims to sexual servitude by their wives. As all these horrors occur, the threat of sovereign violence is used to maintain order outside the
asylum, by keeping the sick inside the asylum. Because much of Blindness occurs within the confines of the modern asylum, any attempt to challenge what is acceptable political practice is contained by the politics of crisis inside the asylum. To explain how this containment works we need to move beyond the initial introductory remarks about the crisis of the political and develop the phrase in the context of its political grammar.

At its most rudimentary, there are two different faces of a politics of crisis. On the one hand, modern democracy looks like dissent, resistance and disagreement. In this sense, politics is a contest of interests and truth statements in a public medium. Often represented by colourful, cheerful, chanting citizens, here politics is the antagonistic engine that drives society towards change, evolution and, in long run, stability. On the other hand, modern democracy often looks like an apparatus of discipline, dressed in black, the police/paramilitary enforce a constitutive order that mediates the immediate concerns of citizens. In this sense, politics is located in ordering, maintaining and securing the foundations for social life; order creates the conditions of possibility for dissent, resistance, justice, peace and democracy. This dilemma can be summarised in the following question: Does “resistance” or “resistances to the resistance” best represent democratic politics today?

The irony available in this dilemma of resistances is that all campaigns for change produce greater codification and governance, and all drives for security produce further opportunities to claim insecurity. The desire to emphasise order over change (or vice versa) is the recurring politics of crisis.
Should politics emphasise dissent or should it emphasise order? Is politics achieving balance between change and continuity? Should change happen in terms of content (i.e., party, laws and distributions) but never in terms of form (i.e., the security of the state is paramount)? Such questions constitute the constrained grammar of political possibility that forms the left-right spectrum of state-centric traditional politics. As such, the politics of crisis is not a departure, failure, or demise of traditional politics; on the contrary, crisis is exemplary of political health, it reproduces itself. While it is tempting to get excited and agitated about the defilement of an ancient and noble practice, perpetual political crisis is the historical continuity.

In other words, the politics of crisis reproduces the discursive limits of modern politics. The damnation-redemption and left-right consensus that politics is dirty, dishonest and insignificant constitute the laments that reproduce a status-quo politics. The picture of negative, power hungry, self-interested and superficial politics and politicians, for example, looms large in the mind of anti-political and critical-political thinkers alike. In Bernard Crick’s once popular book, In Defense of Politics (1972), the desire to get rid of dirty politicians simultaneously comes with Crick’s promise for good governance, citizen participation and a healthy civil society. Crick’s recuperation, like even the most sophisticated, inevitably passes through a contemporary, but ultimately liberal, definition that runs something like:

Politics arises in organized states, which recognize themselves to be aggregates of many members (not a single tribe, nation), represents at least some tolerance of differing truths, some recognition that government is possible, indeed best conducted, amid the open
canvassing of rival interests...Politics are the public actions of free men (Crick 1972: 18).

In such a formulation, politics is redeemed as the decisions that (re)create the preconditions for reason, citizenship, community, peace, justice and truth. In this light, the struggle for power and influence is again called the struggle for power and influence and politics can be redeemed as a truly human, connubial disposition, equivalent to that of love, which nurtures and reproduces the whole community (Crick 1972: 26). Crick, who was a beacon of critical politics, is trapped within a tautological view of politics: good political decisions create the conditions for good political communities in which good political decisions can be made.

In the face of its perpetual de-legitimisation, politics is exalted as the foundation for dissent, democracy and ultimately for being human. As the discursive limits necessitate, the best that can be hoped for, from Bernard Crick's position and from liberal/marxist political science, is a just balance between freedom, diversity, creativity, responsibility, individualism and justice, on the one hand, and equality, unity, security, rights, community and force, on the other. The political answer to the politics of crisis, therefore, is a society that allows for the maximum celebration and accommodation of difference in so far as the celebration and accommodation of difference does not jeopardise the society's capacity to reproduce its "core values" of order, unity and security. In the process, the politics of crisis captures the political imagination.
What should be striking, for example, is how often Crick's dilemma is reproduced, repackaged and restated election after election, event after event, and analysis after analysis. The result is a disturbing, irksome and tiresome set of conversations that dominate the airwaves, the print media and the day to day conversations of political junkies. The problem, as seen on TV, is an increasingly Americanized and hyped politics of backroom deals, sliding handshakes, silver smiles, perky youth initiatives and generalised irrelevance. The solution, as seen in liberal dreams, is an Europeanised and deliberative politics in a healthy civil society of concerned citizens, perky youth initiatives and generalised tediousness. A left/right consensus: the politics of crisis becomes a problem of “correct” participation and access to “creditable” information. In the drive to secure these, the politics of crisis represents the limits, the superficiality, of the political imagination.

The endless monody about the end of politics is not, however, what is most interesting here; the claim to recuperate politics, to dust it off and put it back on its pedestal is where the interesting political work is being done. Within this redemption, the fluid horizons and complexity of contemporary life, those lives and practice that cross boundaries, that occupy more than one side of an opposition, are forgotten in the name of rescuing politics from crisis. Redemption enacts the limits of the political discourse of modern politics in order to secure the politics of crisis.

The redemption of modern political life occurs through the question “what is politics.” The question has the effect of returning us to the traditional
formulation of politics that fortifies core political images that are themselves inherently unstable and insecure. Three core principals come to mind. *Territory*, previously assumed to be a natural reflection of human/animal actions (Sack 1986), and thereby making current territorializations of the globe, state-system, state, region, city, neighbourhood, home and individual apolitical, are now routinely seen to be highly contestable political practices (Agnew 1995; Magnusson 1990; Murphy 1996; Sack 1986). All Canadians are from Canada, but there are more Canadians in California than the largest Canadian City. Territorial politics proceed by rearranging the internal/external boundaries of a territorial unit, reducing the political to very important squabbles between propositions about allocation, distribution, circulation and scale and, in the process, removing the territorial fix from the political discussion. *Identity*, represented as the expression of an essential quality of self, community or being and thereby normalising nationalism and its racialized, gendered, classified and sexualised constituents, no longer has the cardinal standing it was once granted to recuperate the political (Campbell 1998b; Connolly 1989; Daiya 2003; Doty 1996; Krishna 2001; Said 1979; Soguk 1993; Walker 1990; Zalewski and Enloe 1996). Simply put, what the hell is a Canadian? Instead, identity is a discursive relation that is constructed, managed, reproduced and represented through the construction, management, reproduction and representation of others (Anderson 1991). *Security*, the foundational narrative that assures all territory and identity their construction, management, reproduction and representation, has been
shown to work through a perpetual securing of what is meant by security (Dillon 1996). The military will always be the definitive image of increasing citizen's security even though pollution, rape and violence increases when a military base is nearby (Enloe 1989; Seager 1993; Thomas 1995). Security has come to mean state security, and as the supreme justification of all actions, it comes at the cost of all other ways of being secure (i.e. forms of safety). Not only does an understanding of security change when a national unit to be secured is exchanged for human, environment, food or gender subjects of security (Dalby 1997; Falk 1995; Runge 2003; Tickner 1996; Weldes 1999a), but metaphysical relationships between order/change are also re-politicised (Constantinou 2000; Dillon 1996; Walker 1997). The practices of securing security, territory and identity therefore are expressions of being human. Together they erase the instability that is inherent in these three core principals.

Since hardened images of territory, identity and security are themselves expressions of modernity's dominant epistemological and ontological statement – sovereignty – modern politics remains sovereign politics. Modern sovereignty, in very dangerous ways, continues to have its most eloquent validation in Carl Schmitt's articulation of sovereignty as the decision on the exception (Schmitt 1985: 1). The sovereign norm functions in and through the exceptional move that constitutes the abnormal, the outside and the dangerous (Walker 1993b). The result of this modern discourse of politics is the tri-part distinction between sovereign individual, sovereign
state and sovereign world. Any answer to the question “what is politics” that differs from these three core principals becomes a dangerous threat to be defeated. For example, if politics becomes about taking the diversity of lived experience seriously in world affairs, the disciplinary gatekeepers of international relations will condemn you to irrelevance (Ashley and Walker 1990). As George Bush said, and the Dixie Chicks proved, either you are with us or against us. As a modern frame, the discipline of international relations is about the relations between sovereign states, and domestic politics is about the relations between the sovereign state and its constitutive parts. Therefore, it is expected that the state mediate the possible solution to global problem found at the local level, not individuals. Individuals are not global actors; they act through the avenues granted them by the state. The implication is any imaginative possibility outside this modern frame is dangerously criminal/terrorist because territory, identity and security each contribute a pillar to the auto-creation of sovereignty.

The logic of sovereignty, in fact the primary function of the concept, as is explored in detail in chapter 2, is to constitute itself as the presence against which all other modes of qualification are to be judged and disqualified. This is the trap of modernity, whereby the centre (sovereignty) functions by making the second term in an opposition dependent upon the first (Derrida 1970). For example in dualisms such as sovereignty/anarchy (or identity/difference, male/female, rich/poor, order/change, normal/abnormal) the first term is defined by not being the second, and
therefore the second term is always mobilised in the interest of stabilising the first (Ashley 1989). The implication is that the second term in the opposition can never stand on its own. "Modern discourse," Richard Ashley explains, "presupposes an unexamined metaphysical faith in its capacity to speak a sovereign voice of suprahistorical truth (Ashley 1989: 264)." The first term never has to explain itself. Paradoxically, as such, modern sovereignty is a constitution of modern sovereignty. Against the logic of sovereign presence is the constituted absence of war, anarchy and disorder in conventional politics, but also, more generally, the constituted absence of unintelligibility, nonsense and mystery. Sovereignty secures territory and identity as a policing grammar: what is politics? Sovereignty secures for itself a world of political possibility. The answer to any question of political possibility will always reproduce the exclusive sovereign claim to be the "one" able to answer that question.

As an epistemology, sovereignty expresses how some knowledge gets to have the functioning status of Truth and depreciates other kinds of knowledge as mystical and/or parochial. The modern sovereign moment does not occur in the spectacle of the looming Sovereign, but in the endless power/knowledge practices of individualisation, hierarchicalisation, opposition, organisation, negation, judgement and definition that occurs within modern governmentality (Foucault 1977a). For example, it is only with the need for universal taxation in Europe that individuals need a family name to replace the derivative genealogical naming practices (Scott 1998: 64-73).
Similarly, in the history of agricultural weights and measures the kilo and the bushels (or a certain size) have only recently been the sole standard and norm for trading grain (Scott 1998: 25-33). The state secures itself by defining what is normalcy and what counts as legitimate. What counts as the norm of knowledge, where before a local variant was acceptable, is both a sovereign prerogative and function.

As an ontological statement, sovereignty is an expression of the birth of modern humanism, where humanity is united and divided through a historically and geographically specific resolution of the universal and the particular (the state) while other forms of being in the world are targeted as barbaric threats to be eliminated or assimilated (Said 1979). Sovereignty is secured in the endless temporal practices that distinguish between modern national classifications of human/barbarian, human/human, human/animal and human/machine. These boundary practices define human progress. As both an epistemological and ontological nexus, sovereignty is performed in and through modern political disciplines (i.e., international relations, political science, sociology, economics, geography, anthropology and psychology) and everyday representations (i.e. state memorials and celebrations, resistance movements, sports events and pop culture). Together these epistemological and ontological performances of sovereignty de-politicised the boundaries of territory, identity and security that in turn normalises the modern individual in a world of sovereign states.
In other words, the modern discourse of sovereignty assumes the epistemological and ontological nexus of the modern individual, modern state and modern world. The result of this normalisation is a series of depoliticised problems, which take expression as individual, state and international boundaries in which sovereignty is mobilised as the capacity to decide-judge the exception, draw the boundary, create the balance (Schmitt 1996). Richard Ashley puts the modern horizon of political possibility succinctly, “the modern state” he argues “comes to be seen as a construct of boundaries by which transversal struggles are controlled and limited in space and time, ambiguities are interrupted, and a difference is marked between man and domestic society, on the one hand, and the dangerous domain of war and anarchy, on the other (Ashley 1989: 302).” Modern sovereign man, trembling at the edge of imposed darkness, is secured by the modern sovereign state, trembling at the edge of imposed darkness, that is secured by a modern sovereign world, trembling at the edge of imposed darkness, that is secured by modern sovereign man, trembling at the edge of imposed darkness. Modern sovereignty enacts the exception as the rule that decides/creates the possibility of the exception and the rule in the first place (Schmitt 1985).

When politics is assumed to occur inside sovereign states (and institutions) and conducted by traditional political actors (states, politicians and activists) any attempt to make seemingly stable personal, national, global concepts unstable, and therefore political, is faced with the threat of violence
that secures the logic of modern sovereignty. The politics of crisis is a false
debate, however, since how the political terrain is framed empowers the very
problems, actors and locations that are targeted for change. Judith Butler
argues that “to claim that politics requires a stable subject is to claim that
there can be no political opposition to that claim. ... The act which
unilaterally establishes the domain of the political functions, then, as an
authoritarian ruse by which political contest over the status of the subject is
summarily silenced (Butler 1992: 4).” A work of politics therefore becomes an
investigation of the conditions under which politics becomes possible, how
the subject of politics is “always and only a political prerogative (Butler
1992: 13 original emphasis).” The politics of crisis negates the tension
between resistance on the one hand and the resistance to resistance on the
other. Instead, this tension has always already been resolved in and through
the prior terrain of where politics takes place, who gets to participates and
what political grammar of action is acceptable. When the modern political
spectrum negates, disciplines and pacifies change, the contemporary political
imagination privileges the status quo (hardened identities, territories and
securities). The politics of crisis constitutes itself as the legitimate domain of
political action and inquiry because sovereignty is not a question; it is an
answer to the infinitely proliferating questions about how to be political in the
world. The crisis is the stage upon which to police what politics means;
consequently, as is pursued below, asking the question “can politics be
otherwise” becomes a very political act.
The Crisis of the Political

Returning to Saramago's *Blindness*, the humiliating and debasing events inside the medical asylum are so frustrating and disempowering for the reader because, first they reveal processes underway in contemporary society and second it appears that there is no way to change the limits imposed on political possibility. Like the characters, the reader is confined to a narrow range of available political action. Action is only available within the asylum; outside the asylum is terra nullius. These limits of political action make possible the horrors that the characters are trying to escape and the reader finds disempowering. Neglecting this paradox, and reproducing the politics of crisis, the characters treat each other as disposable enemies and objects. In the asylum, women become objects of sexual satisfaction for men, and men become challengers to other men's domains of control (over resources, food and women). Assuming the limits of political action, the characters eventually normalise and even desire the asylum's political configuration of territory, identity and security. To think that another world is possible seems oddly irresponsible in the immediate face of apartheid, starvation, mass rape and killing, yet this is the first taste of the political beyond the politics of crisis. It reveals a tension between politics and the political. Where politics is about operating within accepted limits, the political becomes about making hard boundaries and accepted images unstable.
On occasion, an event occurs, a new horizon arrives from the beyond, an accident, which opens the inside to what is outside the limits of political possibility. In *Blindness*, for example, a fire ignites in a battle between asylum wards and turns the inmates outside onto the front stairs where, according to the rules of the institution, they would be shot if they ventured. Accidentally trespassing the institutional limit, they find that the epidemic has swept away the border guards and the very boundary that they themselves have been so guardedly assuming/securing. At this moment *Blindness* becomes an investigation into ways of knowing and acting in the world. As a result it problematizes accepted societal institutions, relations and practices, and brings the reader into a fluid world of political crisis. On the edge of the modern asylum, our heroine, the doctor’s wife, is confronted by a crisis of the political. *Blindness* dares the reader to ask: what now?

Say to a blind man, you’re free, open the door that was separating him from the world. Go, you are free, we tell him once more, and he does not go, he has remained motionless there in the middle of the road, he and the others, they are terrified, they do not know where to go, the fact is that there is no comparison between living in a rational labyrinth, which is, by definition, a mental asylum and venturing forth, without a guiding hand or a dog-leash, into the demented labyrinth of the city, where memory will serve no purpose, for it will merely be able to recall the images or places but not the paths whereby we might get there (Saramago 1998: 217).

What is to be done once the quintessential institutions of modernity’s triumph are implicated in global human enslavement, eradication and extinction? Outside, the doctor’s wife faces an insecure, shifting and fluid world without the same modern limits of territory and identity. Because the characters must
accept movement as the norm, the doctor’s wife and her fellow travellers, must decide how they want to be in common in movement. Founding a community requires a different political sensibility than one that has already assumed an ordered space/time of existence. The problematization of sovereignty ushers in a crisis of the political that is closer to the contemporary problems faced in increasingly, fluid, dynamic and exceptional worlds.

The crisis of the political is an expression of the tension between politics and the political. Whereas politics is concerned with issues that accept and require the given modern sovereign political order, what Robert Cox calls “problem solving theory (1989),” and Rancière calls “policing (Ranciere 1999),” an emphasis on the political can attend to the very possibility of politics. As Fred Dallymayr explains, “whereas politics in the narrower sense revolves around day-to-day decision making and ideological partisanship.... ‘the political’ refers to the frame of reference within which actions, events and other phenomena acquire political status in the first place (Dallymayr quoted in Edkins 1999: 2).” Jenny Edkins pushes further by suggesting that “the political emerges when a new social and political order is founded, a moment that by definition takes place without the authority of any existing political system of community (Edkins 1999: 7).” The crisis of the political refuses the prior framing of the problem (in terms of the sovereign state) and instead questions the different political possibilities of being in the world. For this problematization to proceed, the sovereign terrain of the political cannot be assumed/perform ed.
Gaining immediate and unrelenting scorn from the conservative/fundamentalist wing of the first order politics of crisis (which would like to dictate the term of debate), a second order approach refuses to secure the political within a prior sovereign frame of territory and identity. Simply put, this second order approach accepts crisis, insecurity and uncertainty as facts of life. All attempts to expunge and secure them are, minimally, political and, furthermore, never eternal. As Machiavelli constantly reminds, no decision is ever final; a sure answer today might be the wrong answer tomorrow and therefore only with an appreciation of fortuna and virtu can good decisions be made for the here and now (Walker 1993a). Machiavelli does not teach what decisions to make but, in terms of the political, that those decisions must always be made. The crisis of the political operates on a similar (though not medieval) limit of the possible.

Two political positions operate around, but have different relationships to, this limit. Against a sovereign epistemology and ontology of being that secures territory and identity, the crisis of the political mobilises 1) a politics of discourse and/or 2) an onto-politics.

A focus on discourse emphasises the problem of epistemology. Discourse functions in and through the mechanisms that grant the status of Truth (qualified) to some knowledge and relegate other knowledges to a lesser status of myth or tradition (disqualified) (Foucault 1980). Such a focus asks how the core concepts of modernity emerged, how they function and, as such, the worlds they legitimate and disqualify. Instead of attempting to recuperate
(secure) the unit (identity or territory), a critical discursive approach to the political, as Karena Shaw nicely puts it, explores "the conditions under which, and the practices through which, authority is constituted and legitimated, and what these constitutions and legitimations enable and disable (Shaw 2002: 56)." A discursive politics maps how certain orders emerge and become dominant. The perpetual mapping of modernity's political discourse, while giving rise to judgements, responsibility and critical politics, also gives rise to a more blunt political position that seeks to affirming openness, change and movement against the recuperating practices of sovereign closure. This sense that a whole way of being human is at stake in modern politics has given rise to an onto-political turn (Campbell 1998a; Dillon 1996).

The onto-political turn arises from a radical critique of certainty and closure as the condition of all being. It operates by affirming the silent presence of other possibilities that haunts or traces the discursive focus emphasising that "it could always be otherwise (Foucault 1989)." The ontological turn, though working closely with the discursive focus, affirms the possibility of otherness, the outside or an alternative to a modern ontology of being human. In the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, for example, an ontological turn privileges fluidity and becoming over order and being (Deleuze and Guattari 1983). Creating critical spaces of openness, diversity and innovation, therefore, becomes a political practice in itself. It constitutes a "geography of resistance (Pile and Keith 1997)." The processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization becomes an over-arching
statement about the condition of life, itself an open horizon and what Badiou calls a “clamour of being (Badiou 2000).” The result of an onto-political turn is that all universal orders are explored as particular movements made to function as universals, in that they define anything but themselves as a movement against order (Deleuze and Guattari 1983). The ontological turn affirms the paradox of vitalism: everything changes since nothing is fundamental (Connolly 1995).

By maintaining historicity, movement and change, an attention to becoming has resituated political practice so that it operates as a contest between closed and open epistemological and ontological statements. In this sense, the second order approach is dedicated to an ethos of democratic politics that traditional recuperation of the political (including its most active dissidents) cannot and will not tolerate (Connolly 1995; Mouffe 1992). Such a democratic ethos does not seek transcendental resolution, consensus and justice but instead seeks to foster an epistemological and ontological condition of openness (Connolly 1995).

Jacque Rancière (1999) helps explain how crisis is at the heart of the political and constitutes the discursive limit of politics. He argues that the political operates around a wrong that can never be solved. Like crisis, wrong is constitutive of the political. The political simultaneously emerges as the management of the wrong and the expression of the wrong (Ranciere 1999: 19). Just as Michel Foucault argues that the problem of subjectivity emerges in the disjunction between an arithmetic order of resemblance and a
geometric order of representation (Foucault 1970), Rancière argues that the wrong specific to the political emerges from the disjuncture between an arithmetic distribution of goods for use and a geometric deduction of the good (Ranciere 1999: 19). Leading logically to the "puzzle of sovereignty (Walker 2002)," so conveniently answered by Carl Schmitt (1985), politics is the management of the wrong that constitutes sovereignty, and in turn, politics is the crisis made possible by the sovereign decision as to what is the exception, the wrong. In Schmitt's words, politics operates around the distinction between who is "friend" and who is "enemy (Schmitt 1996: 37)." Therefore, where the sovereign is the act of decision, by the one "who gets to decide the exception (Schmitt 1985: 1)," the political subject and the subject of the political are the management and maintenance of this exceptional sovereign line. Wrong, disjuncture and exception are limits of the political that must be sought after, but can never be erased, contained, or expelled. As such, as suggested above, crisis is the mainstay of political theory; if there were no crisis, the political would be absent. The problem is its logically necessary, if one does away with crisis, violence or force one does away with the political.

The political, as such, is indebted to an originary violence that cannot be expunged. An originary violence, Jacque Derrida explains, is the moment of self-founding, an arche-writing, the exceptional moment around which sovereign boundaries are founded (Derrida 1990). Since by definition, prior to sovereignty there can be no justice, an original moment of injustice is required to found the force of law and the very possibility of future
justice (Derrida 1990). Indebted to this founding moment of state violence, what Michael Taussig calls "the magic of the state (Taussig 1997)", the subject of the political performs rites and rituals that pay homage to the exceptional divisions that are constitutive of the sovereign order. The military, the police, the prison and the fire department, for instance, regularly pull out their hardware, to demonstrate their capacity to exert force in the name of promoting safety, civility, order and justice. The crucial practice of the political is to attend to the wound of an originary violence, remembering the cycles of forgetting and forgetting the cycles of remembering. The result is a political refusal to secure the instabilities inherent in political pillars like territory, identity and security.

Resisting the attempts to recuperate and secure the political and put an end to the crisis, discursive and onto-political conceptions of the political recognise, in William Connolly's words, the "essentially contested" constitution of politics (Connolly 1983). Politics is "simultaneously a medium in which unsettled dimensions of the common life find expression and a mode by which a temporary or permanent settlement is sometimes achieved (Connolly 1983: 227)." When the crisis of the political is embraced, therefore, it creates an agonistic democracy: a practice that embraces "the indispensability of identity to life, disturbs the dogmatism of identity, and folds care for the protean diversity of human life into the strife and interdependence of identity\difference (Connolly 1991: x). Instead of embracing either poles of order/change or fundamentalism/pluralism,
Connolly argues for a middle and open space that emphasises a politics of pluralization, a constant bubbling up of political contest and evaluation (Connolly 1995). Crisis must not be secured, erased or silenced through sovereign violence; instead, it must be celebrated. Although still a spatial, territorial and Americanist project at heart, Connolly’s project is “not to root a theory in transcendental grounds but to problematize the grounding any theory presupposes while it works out the implications of a particular set of themes (and) construct(s) alternative hierarchies that do not demand the same relation to truth to enter into the field of contestation (Connolly 1989: 336).” In Connolly’s project, in keeping with the crisis of the political, is to affirm the contingent foundations upon which claims to the political can be made. As such, uncertainty, fluidity, or openness, must be put the centre of the project, since to put it at the margins or edges, would be to invite securing it as a threat by the crisis of politics.

One such attempt to put uncertainty at the centre of a political project occurs with Rancière’s concept of “disagreement (1999)” and refines the above a distinction between politics and the political. Instead of politics, Rancière introduces the term policing “as the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the organisation of powers, the distribution of places and roles, the system for legitimising this distribution (1999: 28).” In contrast, the political is concerned specifically with what he calls disagreement and is organised around crisis. He explains that the political is "a series of actions that reconfigure the space where
parties, parts, or lack of parts have been defined (Ranciere 1999: 30).” Disagreement arises when one party announces themselves in a way that reconfigures the epistemological and ontological space/time of a community. Rancière explains “disagreement is not the conflict between one who says white and another who says black. It is a conflict between one who says white and another who also says white but does not understand the same thing by it or does not understand that the other is saying the same thing in the name of whiteness (Ranciere 1999: x).” The political occurs as the inoperable community (Nancy 1990). Community always functions in relation to a limit or beyond that it cannot expunge. In Chapter 3, for example, the ways that Science fiction encounters and uses “the beyond” demonstrates different horizons of political possibility. In Starship Troopers, for example, encountering the beyond is used to undermine the dominant security narratives of modern political international relations. The crisis of the political is therefore a confrontation of difference that disrupts a society’s policing practices by undermining the assumed distinction between theory and practice, thinking and thought and acting and action.

As a crucial part of the politics of crisis, introduced earlier, separating theory from practice remains the legacy of the logical positivist epoch in the social sciences (but also the default position of most of the globe’s schooled class). As Jim George explains, positivist social sciences are organised around the claim that there is a world “out there” that is prior to or divorced from human action and understanding (1994: chapter 2). Not debating the
likelihood that there is a world indifferent to human existence, the question that is resolved in and through the divorce between theory and practices is how might that world “out there” beyond ourselves be known by humans without recourse to human action and understanding. The pivotal theoretical action is the divorcing of theory from practice, value from fact and subject from object (George 1994). Once such a separation has occurred, as a grammar, a world of limited possibility has been created. As such thoughts and actions, including those in the service of the new, reproduce that very limited possible world. The very practice of thinking and acting therefore reinforces the political limits to thinking and acting because thinking and acting requires those very political limits for self-assertion/presence. Pushing away from the politics of crisis towards the crisis of the political requires reformulating the problem of thinking and acting differently, in the form of theory as practice.

Theory as practice is a return to a familiar form of inquiry called historical realism, but repackaged as a post-positivist turn, that recognises the depth to the problematic of theory and action. The historical/linguistic turn in the social science has emphasised recognising the limits that history, language and discourse impose on the possibility of both free thinking and free acting (George 1994: chapter 4). The very agent of free action and thought, it turns out, is caught up, in the very historical, linguistic and discursive events that it wishes to describe and/or change. As Richard Ashley suggests “upon exercising his (sic) powers of reason, sees plainly that he (sic)
is enmeshed in language and history, indeed, that he is an object of language and history. If man is the transcendental condition of the possibility of all knowledge, he (sic) also knows himself (sic) to be an empirical fact to be examined and conceptualized (Ashley 1989: 265).” A specific representation of the world, and a specific way of knowing the world, produces the individual as the centre of thinking and acting (capable of representing the world). Therefore, incapable of attaining an Archimedian point from which to describe/change the world, those championing theory as practice are left describing/altering the processes, trends and trajectories with which they themselves are always already enmeshed. Accepting what Foucault calls the “critical limit attitude (Foucault 1984c)” becomes the boundary expression of qualified human thought, action and being. Challenging the perpetual reproduction of this boundary requires positioning oneself in the breaks, ruptures and disjunctures of the dominant narratives of intelligibility. At best, by achieving a critical propinquity to a situation, a moment of freedom emerges, and thought and action become exercises in contingency the crisis of the political.

Celebrating a crisis of the political does not necessarily take as its objective the revitalisation of a critical democratic project. The crisis of the political, in post-Kantian fashion demands that the ways that constitutive institutions of modern life are secured be subject to critical inquiry, and therefore politicised. Although this may embody the spirit of what some call a democratic ethos, the commitment lies with showing how foundations are
always already political and how they are political needs critical attention. Unless, for instance, the nation-state is constituted as political discourse about movement, territory and identity, the migrant will always be represented as a threat (Soguk 1999). As such, immigration policy must be read as a statement about how some want to control movement, how forces of change should be managed, named and governed and how some forms of movement (the state) desire to have the privileged appearance of stability and being there first (Soguk and Whitehall 1999). Where this management takes place, however, is not limited to the official institutions of the state, or on the territorial edges of the state, on the contrary, these boundary performances take place wherever the re-representations the nation occurs. The nation needs the dangerous outside other to constitute itself as internally contiguous and ontologically coherent because a nation is always, what Anderson calls, an “imagined community (Anderson 1991).” A nation requires infinite practices, stories and events (like border patrols, foreign policy, and holidays) to be secured and naturalised (see contributions in Shapiro and Alker 1996). Therefore, to understand the production and securing of the nation requires an attentiveness to sites of cultural production like monuments, media, novels, movie and advertisements (Der Derian and Shapiro 1989; Shapiro 1997b; Shapiro and Alker 1996). It is in and through these narrative sites that the accepted limits of political life are secured and policed. Representing the nation is enacting the nation across prior mobile, fluid and antagonistic fields of possibility. In Chapter 5, for example, the national Canadian project is
shown to look different when explored through a political lens that does not seek to represent the nation, but instead open it up to contested political possibilities. As Foucault and Deleuze explain, “Representation no longer exists; there is only action— theoretical action and practical action which serve as relays and form networks... in this sense theory does not express, translate, or (sic) serve to apply practice: it is practice...a theory is exactly like a box of tools (Foucault and Deleuze 1977: 206).” How one narrates, how one creates, or founds, is precisely the political moment that the crisis of the political operates around. Therefore, wherever the representation of being in common takes place, a moment of political opportunity is available.

Moving Politics From Crisis

Again returning to Saramago’s Blindness, the doctor’s wife could no longer assume the limits of the asylum. Everything had changed. As such, she had to make decisions in the fluid milieux beyond the limits of the asylum. As such, she was required to be attentive to create community in the context of shifting and fluid worlds. To do so she was required to be attentive to different genres, events and practices of everyday life; she needed to revisit and rewrite old memories and create and recount new stories. She could not be blind to the importance of quotidian practices in creating new horizons of political possibility. Her responsibility for creating meaningful foundations in contingent times was emphasised by her need to hold together her band of travellers while having to search for food, clothing and shelter. Neglected
moments of closure, like the storage basement beyond the reach of the blind, become opportunities to exploit. Securing old boundaries and ways was not survival; instead, survival meant creatively founding new ones.

It would be a mistake, however, to treat movement and change as though they only exist or begin ‘outside” the asylum. Movement cannot be localised, periodised or contained without denying its movement. Instead, as Blindness demonstrates, everything changes, everything moves, and everything is contingent. Movement must be affirmed.

Affirming is an order of political existence that exceeds the logic of sovereignty’s practices of negation (to oppose). In a Nietzschian sense, following Deleuze’s reading, affirmation is a positive will that commits to itself the actualisation of what its will can do (Deleuze 1983). Affirmation is a creative force that is committed to bring negation into an affirmation of the new (see chapter 2). In this sense, affirmation exceeds negation. From affirmation, a third political imaginary emerges in Blindness.

Blindness is not only attentive to movement, but also to an economy of differing movements. The political does not end at celebrating fluidity and movement; to become political is to affirm how to move. The doctor’s wife, for example, does not have the political privilege of simply describing and encouraging “change” around her. Instead, she must become change and she must become movement or she and her companion travellers will die. Because movement cuts through and transforms the political possibilities available at any moment, the doctor’s wife can neither be the passive subject
of movement or the agent of order. Instead, she must affirm new ways of becoming political. To do so she must affirm new verbs since with new verbs come new political trajectories.

For example, in Blindness, when the violence in the asylum becomes too much, people are being raped and murdered, the doctor’s wife finds herself and her scissors transformed from tools of domestic servitude, defending the sanctity of her marriage to her husband, into weapons of political change. Instead of continuing to be a political agent that orders or opposes while inside the asylum, together with the scissors she becomes cutting. Ani Difranco reminds us that “anything is a weapon if you hold it right (Difranco quoted in Hardt and Negri 2000: v).” To be effective the doctor’s wife must become (a new) woman and to do so she must hold her scissors just right. She must affirm a new verb and become the cutting of her rapist’s neck.

The doctor’s wife acted as a new woman, one that exceeded the semiotic expectations of those she opposes and those who she supports. In the case of Algeria, for example, a new woman had to evade French racism and her male comrades’ cultural assumptions in order to come into existence. As Franz Fanon (1959) describes, sometimes a new individual must be born out of a movement. To do so, what was invisible needed to become visible so that which was visible could again become invisible. Fanon says of this new woman:

This woman who...would carry the grenades or the submachine-gun chargers, this woman who tomorrow would be outraged, violated,
tortured, could not put herself back into her former state of mind and relive behaviour of the past; this woman who was writing the heroic pages of Algerian history was, in so doing, bursting the bounds of the narrow world in which she had lived without responsibility, and was at the same time participating in the destruction of colonialism and in the birth of a new woman (Fanon 1959: 107).

By removing her veil, to the French she was had been pacified, and to her nationalist comrades she became desexualised and (re)empowered. Ultimately, she became explosive.

Like the doctor’s wife in Blindness, the new woman became politically explosive and reorganised the grammatical world of her contemporary travellers. Later, when the cutting is exhausted, and no longer political, the doctor’s wife encounters a dog, the dog of tears, and in the rain, on the curb in the streets, together they become healing. Again out of movement, a new verb emerges. By first acknowledging movements and openings, Saramago affirms new verbs that inspire the political imagination. Through becoming different, the doctor’s wife brings forth a new people, not based on looks, opposition, or hierarchy, but instead in and through love and affirmation. To this end, Saramago is asking how is it possible to move in ways that do not reproduce the sovereignty’s grammar that controls movement and change. Framed differently, and with the full weight of the contemporary condition in sight, how does one think and act politically beyond sovereignty’s political conditions of thought and action?

This dissertation participates in a growing literature that is attempting to push beyond the crisis of the political by affirming the available tendencies and possibilities immanent to this crisis. The need for this push arises
because the crisis of the political risks reproducing the first order politics of crisis. On the one hand, it mimics the oppositional strategy of sovereign politics. If the first order politics of crisis is organised around resistance and security, the second order crisis of the political is organised around openness and sovereignty. On the other hand, the crisis of the political also risks returning to a hermeneutic position that attempts to represent the world in a more refined, fluid and comprehensive way. In other words, there is a risk that being attentive to the many different genres of the nation, for example, forgets the political practices involve in representing, mapping, and narrating. The danger that a discursive and ontological turn always risks, is reproducing the very practices that are challenged. This occurs because the crisis of the political still worships the original violence of sovereignty - crisis. To be very bold, we need a post-hermeneutic politics. As Foucault suggests, “what we need...is a political philosophy that isn’t erected around the problem of sovereignty (Foucault quoted in Edkins 1999: 6).” Needed is an affirmation of moving grammars of the political, pushing beyond sovereign thought and action, and celebrating the political event of thinking and acting.

While situated within the fluidity created by the crisis of the political, the dissertation builds from attempts to develop a politics of movement. A rich literature already exists that deals with the political question of movement and speed. Critical social movements and migration studies, for example, have opened the political imagination because they look at politics, first, by being attentive to movement and change. The world becomes, as
Warren Magnusson puts it, a contest of different movements for the state, capitalism, urbanism (Magnusson 1996). When looked at this way, the state, for example, becomes one movement among many (like a mature Greenpeace), that instead of door to door canvassing to get out its message and fund its programs, just threatens to put you in jail if you do not pay (like a protection racket (Tilly 1985)). Or similarly, that migration becomes the constitutive feature, not the excluded exception, to social, cultural, economic and political life (Glissant 1997). Global life is constituted through different movements, or what Appadurai calls, scapes (i.e., infoscape, ethnoscape, financescape)(Appadurai 1996: Chapter 2). With an appreciation of movement, however also comes an attention to differentiating movements, what Deleuze and Guattari call nomadology (Deleuze and Guattari 1987) and Virilio calls dromology (Virilio 1986). Deleuze and Guattari are attentive to teeming connections and overlaps that constitute a changing and fluid expression of multiplying existences, that exceed the logic of state sovereignty. Deleuze and Guattari admit, however, affirming movement is only a political practice, not the political practice (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 25). It is not simply enough to affirm movement, but instead must be able to contextualise, historicise and mobilise differentiating movements. Affirming movement means affirming different verbs, not affirming the abstract concepts of movement and change.

Such differentiation has begun, in part, through a growing appreciation of speed. In this regard, Paul Virilio’s attention to the relationship between
speed and politics (Virilio 1986). Dromology as the study of speed recognises
that different speeds not only create different political implications, but also
create differing political horizons. In war, the different speeds between an
intercontinental ballistic missile and a horse, for example, constitute different
political horizons/implications (Derrida 1984; Virilio 1986). Through the
speed of instantaneous war, it is impossible to distinguish a battlefield, a
military target and a civilian in the shadow of nuclear war.

What is common to authors like Paul Virilio (1986; 1997) and Arthur
Kroker (2004), however, is that they tend to treat increased speed as a
contemporary condition that leads to nihilism. For them speed is the problem
to be solved, not affirmed. With things getting faster, the globe shrinking, and
all that is solid melting into thin air, their question is “how do we slow things
down?” When treated in this way the return to the politics of crisis (order and
manage of movement) and the crisis of the political (celebrate and privilege
movement) is already assumed in the question. Where Virilio and Kroker see
the future as a sped up collapse, others have developed an approach that,
while being equally cautious, find an attention to speed offering new political
openings (Connolly 2000, 2002). William Connolly, for instance,
contextualizes a generalized tendency to either reject or celebrate movement.
Instead, as Connolly suggests, the question is “not how to slow the world
down, but how to work with and against a world moving faster than
heretofore to promote and ethos of pluralism (Connolly 2002: 143).” Instead
of pluralism, which evokes the crisis of the political, bringing back Connolly’s
earlier vocabulary (1995) of pluralization, as a verb, helps diversify the ways in movement can be politicised. Instead of asking whether speed is good/bad or to be controlled/celebrated, the crucial politicising question is how might speed to be theorised in itself. What is required, in a world of differentiated speeds is an attention to the different ways in which it is possible to move. This requires new verbs.

If politics is about movement, then we must learn to affirm new verbs. In order to be able to deal with the contemporary failure of the political imagination requires an expanded vocabulary of political verbs beyond to oppose. Nathaniel Mackey (1992) offers an example of a first step in this process to affirm. He argues that when nouns, i.e. “the other,” are affirmed as verbs, i.e. “to other,” different social and artistic horizons emerge. He argues that social othering, for instance, “has to do with power, exclusion and privilege” whereas artistic othering ‘has to do with innovation, invention and change (Mackey 1992: 51).” In music, for instance, the social othering that occurs by record companies othering something jazz, disco or rap, as nouns, had the effect of containing, ghettoising black musicians within the music industry. Artistic othering, in contrast, what occurs through jazzing or swinging, is “the verb process, the doing, the coming into being, the at-the-time-of. Which is why we think there is a particular value to live music (Charlie Parker quoted in Mackey 1992: 59).” In this respect, to make nouns into verbs opens different forms of political communities, different sites of political contest, and different ways of appreciating life. The same occurs
when democracy returns to democratising, pluralism becomes pluralization, demonstration becomes demonstrating, liberty becomes liberating, justice becomes justing and, to end and the endless, empowerment becomes empowering.

The problem remains, however, that for every artistic othering there is a social othering waiting in the wings, the crisis of the political is intimately tied, to put it politely, by the crisis of politics. The move to fluidity is not enough to exceed the contemporary stasis of the political imagination that is caused by being trapped between a politics of crisis and the crisis of the political. Affirm movement, for example, and the politics of crisis is hailed for your security. Because movement is opposed, through included/exclusion, to order, moving politics is required. Moving politics exceeds the political verb to oppose, and instead opens a different political vocation.

Moving politics is developed in Chapter One. It develops a more affirmative politics through a political vocabulary that is organised around verbs instead of nouns and concepts and exceeds the political imaginary that endlessly chains those interested in politics to the ground of modern sovereignty. If politics is about movement then new verbs are required to become political, and to do this new verbs must be affirmed.

Specifically, Chapter One politically develops Deleuze and Guattari's assertion in *What is Philosophy?* that the task proper to philosophy is to create concepts. To show its force, this argument is unfolded by examining the structure of the concept in relationship to modern sovereignty. When
sovereignty is treated as a concept, and philosophy is treated as the creation of concepts, sovereignty ceases to function as the concept. As such, sovereignty becomes one concept among many, like, the Event. However, although the proper vocation of philosophy may be to create concepts, the problem that remains unanswered in What is Philosophy? is whether or not this is also the same vocation for politics? The chapter concludes that a political vocation does not create concepts because, first, the concept is specific to philosophy and, second, the verb “to create” is implicated in the very sovereignty that Deleuze and Guattari’s nomadic philosophy seeks to problematize.
What therefore is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which became poetically and rhetorically intensified, metamorphosed, adorned, and after long usage seem to a nation fixed, canon and binding; truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that they are illusions; worn-out metaphors which have become powerless to affect the senses; coins with their images effaced and now no longer of account as coins but merely as metal. – F. Nietzsche

“Knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting”
-- M. Foucault

CHAPTER 2
The Verbalising of the Political Grammar of Sovereignty

On February 15th 2003, millions of people around the world said “no” to a U.S. led war on Iraq and, turning conventional awareness on its head, unwittingly “yes” to the status-quo. Standing on the edge of political change, the world’s protesters demanded the balance of the same political futures. To point out this dilemma, however, is not to advocate war or to wade into the quagmire of Iraq, but instead to condemn contemporary peace. How could concerned citizens mobilise a global opposition to war, with millions in the streets singing words of peace, and still have nothing happen? Myriads of superficial condemnations are available as answers to why their dream of resistance achieved nothing; more interestingly, however, this failure of opposition provides an opportunity to problematize some of the traditionally held ideas about the contemporary political imagination. This chapter is a philosophical-political investigation into the restricting grammar of canonical political thought, arguing, through the work of Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari and Michel Foucault, that the Event of the political occurs with the encounter of new verbs, not with the demonstration of opposition, nor with the creation of new political concepts/futures. There may be “no future in war,” as a
placard at my local protest read, but for most of the world, for whom the status-quo is not a viable option, is there still a "future" in peace? A War/peace dichotomy, like the one mobilised on February 15th, sustains the status-quo by systematically organising and naturalising infinite (un)folding injustices. Foucault's riff on Clausewitz's famous dictum is helpful here: peace is the continuation of war by other means (Foucault 1980: 90). Peace is not, as it is traditionally assumed in western circles, the absence of coercive practice. On the contrary, peace is a global war waged against diverse ways of being in common, in the form of the national sovereign state (Foucault 1984b: 65).

Questioning the limited and restricted grammar of the contemporary geopolitical frame is not directed solely at the peace movement. The various movements inside the peace movement, like those in any other global movement, face the same problem: can a global social movement strive beyond a logic that presupposes a peace that manages all demands for change within a governing system of individual sovereign states? Nor is this criticism to be reserved for global movements, in particular, it is an indictment of all contemporary global, national, local and individual politics. The general problem is that, not only has peace been defined as the absence of war, politics has become the absence, better yet, the nullification and neutralisation of change. When change is a mechanism of the status-quo, as in the politics of crisis, resistance will continue to serve as an instrument of political (re)stabilisation. State politics will always police change and state
philosophy will always police thought. For example, resting the abuses and intrusions of police “surveillance” only invites the state to “look into it” further. When politics is the continuation of war by other means, war is being waged in all of our infinite daily practices that reproduce the dominant order.

The implication of this intrusiveness is that until how we are always already violent, in our own diverse and shifting ways, ceases to become invisible, peace remains a way of life that violently negates change, movement and, ironically, life. Peace is not the absence of violence; on the contrary, peace makes sure violence takes place far away and in other ways (for example, slaughterhouses, sweatshops, inner cities or Iraqi oilfields) and by or to someone else’s husband, wife and child. But at an even more insidious level, violence occurs in the linguistic and metaphysical grammars of contemporary political society and authority prior to these everyday violences (Benjamin 1978; Derrida 1976, 1990). To understand the ways in which peace functions, one must ask how is violence legitimated and delegitimated. The conversation that needs to be undertaken therefore, is how are we, again in our own shifting and divergent ways, always already violent and then begin to take ownership of these practices (see Grosz 1998). To do so the accepted concept of the political itself needs to be (re)politicalised and to do this the problem of sovereignty must be addressed.

Modern politics remains sovereign politics. Politics remains contained with the grammatical sovereignty of states’ subjects, identities, territories and institutions (Magnusson 1990; Walker 1990). To generate optimism about
global events like February 15th, the traditional, negative and restricting political ground that constitutes the ordering opposition between war/peace, change/security, and difference/self needs to be problematized. This political ground is sovereignty. The implication of not yet having, as Foucault puts it, “cut off the head of the king in political theory (Foucault 1984b),” is that all political solutions (war, peace, justice, education, legislation, regulation etc.) continue to be manifestations of the problem of sovereignty. The problem of sovereignty is not an insignificant or clear-cut problem. Sovereignty functions like a mobius strip, where the epistemological inside becomes the ontological outside, and vice versa. Bound together, as such, they make each other possible and necessary. The implication of this epistemological and ontological paradox is that all modern politics operate around ordering sovereign political oppositions and differentiations (i.e., Canada versus Argentina, the urban versus the rural, the elite versus the poor). R. B. J. Walker puts the problem provocatively: “sovereignty,” he says, “is not a reality as much as it is a limit to our modern political imagination (2002: 16).” Reformed this way, the status-quo, peace/war dichotomy, is a global war to maintain a uniform experience of the politics of truth and of being political. This implies that “there is a politics to how we define politics (in that)...how we have come to accept the way we have come to define politics is indeed the essence of politics (Walker 2002: 17).” Ultimately, the result is that global political movements are employed to reproduce what they seek to oppose.
To think and act beyond this political grammar, the limits reflected in
the peace/war dichotomy, requires a different treatment of the political than
what is available to us within the discourse of sovereignty. This chapter
begins a journey away from the status-quo peace/war dichotomy and builds
towards an affirmative politics beyond the illusion of sovereignty's totalising
logic. This requires an affirmation of the political that is capable of exceeding
oppositions made possible by sovereignty and in turn opening the ruptures,
breaks, mutations and transformations specific to the what Deleuze and
Guattari call the Event. The Event is more than a moment in an already given
terrain of possibility (like a birthday or a train wreck). It is an arrival of
forces/concept/personae that rearranges the horizon of political possibility
(the human genome, the printing press or Captain Cook). The Event requires
a different philosophical grammar and requires an approach to the concept
that is different in kind from empiricist projects of representation specific to
sovereignty and what Deleuze and Guattari call state philosophy. For Deleuze
and Guattari, the Event is the concept that exemplifies nomad philosophy.
Whereas, sovereignty is a concept that closes and solves, the Event is a
concept that problematizes (Deleuze 1990a: 54). To use language from the
introduction, the clash between sovereignty and nomad philosophy coincides
with the clash between a politics of crisis and the crisis of the political.

The guiding argument that needs further development in this chapter,
however, is that the Event, like the crisis of the political, is not sufficiently
*politicising*. Deleuze and Guattari's opening of sovereignty and state

philosophy by creating concepts is not a sufficient political vocation. Contributing to the crisis of the political, by affirming the openness of sovereignty by creating new concepts, in the end reifies the political logic of sovereignty. By showing how this reification occurs, and to avoid this fate, this chapter argues that the political resides in the verbs that occur before the concept of Sovereignty and the concept that Deleuze and Guattari call the Event. The Event is not rejected, but instead treated as an incomplete step, an opening, in actualising a nomadic politics or politics as movement. To politicise the verbs that occur before the concept, instead of reproducing them in the vocation of creating new concepts, politicising must operate through the Event so that new verbs can be affirmed.

To make this guiding argument, and offer the reader a map, this chapter starts with Deleuze and Guattari’s exceptional claim that the task of philosophy is to create concepts (like the ideal, the sovereign or the Event). Evaluating this claim, by mapping the concept, has the effect of opening a concept to political investigation. Any concept, they argue, can be mapped according to its five vectors: its parts, its whole, its singularity, its plane of immanence and its conceptual personae (Deleuze and Guattari 1994). Using this map, the first section of this chapter, creates a diagram of how a concept functions. The concept of sovereignty is used as an example, in part because Deleuze and Guattari’s treatment tends to be very abstract, but more importantly because treating sovereignty as a concept has the effect of politicising the stature it assumes in modern political discourses like...
international relations that maintain the peace/war dichotomy. In effect, treating sovereignty as a concept is to open its normalised status as a proposition or a thing and instead treat it within a different conceptual horizon: the Event. The result is that the micro-political practices of sovereignty are politicised instead of being assumed as “doing politics.”

However, there is more at stake in this chapter than throwing support behind another critique of international relations theory and, as shown in the introduction, shifting again between a politics of crisis towards the less restrictive, but still implicated, crisis of the political. The question remains once opened, then what? How does politics occur after sovereignty? Is politics, like philosophy, also about creating concepts and/or Events? Can an Event be created or must it simply arrive from elsewhere? To answer this line of questioning, the second section in this chapter evaluates the verbs of political sovereignty (now that its operating systems are available); in order to suggest that sovereignty historically implicates the verb “to create.” Ironically, to create operates in the service of the verb to oppose. The effect of this irony is not failure, but instead an affirmation of the future line of political argumentation taken in the final section of the chapter. Namely, although an affirmation of the event and the openness it provides is not politically sufficient, it is through the Event those new political verbs can be affirmed. Specifically, I argue that the Event of the political is to affirm new verbs like those explored in later chapters (e.g. to amplify, to overwhelm, to
affirm and to encounter). All in all, this chapter lays the theoretical groundwork for those later chapters.

**Concept of Sovereignty or Sovereign Concept?**

Deleuze and Guattari's *What is Philosophy* outlines a critical approach to the concept of sovereignty. When experimentation has been subsumed and lost to dogma, they argue there is but one courageous thing left to do. Create a concept. Creating a concept is the supreme task of philosophy (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 11). Deleuze explains that “to think is to create – there is no other creation – but to create is first of all to engender “thinking” in thought (Deleuze 1994: 147).” A brick, like a concept, can anchor a courthouse of judgement and reason, or be thrown through the window to let in some fresh air (Massumi 1992: 5). Because of the relationship between language and politics, changing, creating or altering the meaning of concepts is a politically dangerous activity.

To situate the role of concepts, however, requires an attention to the epistemological, ontological and cosmological functions of grammar. To begin, concepts and propositions should not be confused. A proposition is a statement that makes the claim that a thing is either true or false, take for example the proposition that “life was hard in the Palaeolithic age.” A concept, as we will see, sets the conditions for uttering a truth claim in the first place; its opposite is not false, but the horizon of other possibilities. So, for example, life is only deemed hard in the Palaeolithic age if, by creating the
concept of progress and as a result an economy of desire, your “wants” replace
the status originally assigned to your “needs” which could easily be met in the
Palaeolithic age (Sahlins 1997). Simply put, concepts are never given, they
must be created. Concepts are not found, they are not plucked from the
heavens, the sky or the world, since as Foucault warns “the world does not
turn us a legible face, leaving us merely to decipher it (Foucault 1972b: 229).”
The world is not our accomplice; it does not deliver to us concepts that have
one to one relationships with those things they seek to explain. Instead, a
concept creates relationships between things and propositions through a
politics of interpretation. Through interpretation a concept cuts out a whole
world of relationships not previously available.

The concept cannot be confused with a proposition because of the
special role that the concept plays in creating the actual interpretative terrain
of propositions and things (the heavens, the sky or the world). To appreciate
what is at stake in this grammatical arrangement, we can turn to International
relations which treats both the concept, in general, and the concept of
sovereignty, in particular, as propositions. When international relation
scholars treat sovereignty as a proposition, sovereignty acts to limit the range
of political options available at any particular time. As such, if treated as a
proposition and a thing, sovereignty, a world political community is created
that revolves around the claim, like the one made by Kenneth Waltz that “each
state, like every other state, is a sovereign political entity (Waltz 1986: 91)” or
that sovereignty is “the legitimate use of physical force as a means of
domination within a territory (Weber 1946: 83).” The mistake here would be to assume that the world has somehow provided the concept of sovereignty to explain itself; instead sovereignty is an active engagement and organisation of the world. The former Yugoslavia’s overlapping cultural, historical, economic and symbolic complexity, for example, does not have only one sovereign political solution. Nevertheless, the United Nations assumed that the only solution for Yugoslavia was its division into smaller sovereign states with homogeneous populations and uniform territories. Instead such solutions speak more to the sovereign mindset in international relations than to the complexity of available problems and solutions in “Yugoslavia” (Campbell 1998a). This collapse of interpretative possibility is created when concepts and propositions are confused. Whereas a proposition is defined by its reference to things and is made possible in and through a concept being created (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 22), a concept prepares a world (or what is explored later as a plane of immanence) for relationships between propositions and things to be made.

Because a concept is different in kind from a proposition and is never a thing, when the two are confused, concepts are condemned in international relations to what Robert Cox calls “problem solving theory (Cox 1989).” Problem solving restricts politics to conversations occurring within established political assumptions (that sovereignty is a proposition), instead of across them (making them concepts). Conversations concerned with problem solving revolve around what Henri Bergson calls “false problems (Deleuze
“All our false problems” Deleuze explains, “derive from the fact that we do not know how to go beyond experience towards the conditions of experience, towards the articulations of the real, and rediscover what differs in kind in the composites that are given to us and on which we live (Deleuze 1988a: 26).” All empirical statements require a measure of metaphysical faith since an experience cannot be explained without recourse to trans-experiential measures (i.e., language and method). Jens Bartelson explains “as soon as a field of knowledge is to be demarcated, conceptual oppositions are there to do the job by marking off what is present and foundational from what is supplementary and derivative; it is in this role that the concept of sovereignty becomes crucial both to the organisation of political reality and to the organisation of knowledge of this reality. (Bartelson 1995: 50).” When the concept is reduced to positivist propositions the task of thinking (as in international relations) falls to an “illusion of discourse (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 50).” International relations treats sovereignty as a given, and therefore assumes that the world is composed of sovereign states. Under such illusions, the peace movement will never be able to imagine a peace that is not simultaneously secured by the very concept that creates the conditions, the logical necessity, for war. The peace movement is forced to reproduce what it is critiquing and to assume what it is ideally transcending.

Sovereignty is not a proposition of things called modern states. Neither sovereignty nor modern states exist in and of themselves. Sovereignty and states are performed through people’s lives, stories and
actions. One might say that modern state philosophy (as representational thinking) restricts how people understand sovereignty, and forgetting this, offer it up only as a proposition (or even a thing). For example, when the United States handed sovereignty back to Iraq it was treated as a proposition and a thing. Pretending that Iraqi sovereignty was kept “safely” in a box makes sovereignty a proposition or a thing at the disposal of other things. Sovereignty can never be returned to Iraq because Iraq was never sovereign; instead, people performed Iraqi sovereignty. Both the modern state and sovereignty, as such, are performative fictions that come into play in and through state philosophy’s concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty may relate to current events but is not reducible to this state of affairs. Sovereignty is not important because of the way the world is “out there”; the world “out there” is an enactment of the concept of modern sovereignty. Sovereignty is not a thing, it is made and not given; it functions as a concept.

When sovereignty is understood as a concept, it ceases to belong to international relations. International relations, or what Deleuze and Guattari call state philosophy, reposes on a double identity (the modern subject and state) and organises around a discourse of self-resemblance that confuses concepts, propositions and things (Masumi 1987: xi). When it is treated as a concept, however, it is revealed to be the condition of possibility for both things and propositions (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 22). This is not a game of semantics; to treat sovereignty as a proposition is to miss the grammatical functions of a concept. The functions of a concept can be mapped by being
attentive to its five vectors: its parts, its whole, its singularity, its plane of immanence and its conceptual personae. As will be explored in turn, each function contributes to the exceptional grasp of a concept, like sovereignty. Once a concept comes into existence, it appears to have a life of its own, a gravitational pull, that is easily confused with a thing or a proposition (and in the case of Iraqi sovereignty supposedly worth killing and dying for).

First, the concept combines different parts. A concept is always made up of the components that it includes because it is always forged out of the act of solving particular problems (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 16). For example, modern sovereignty is a convincing resolution or capture of the particular medieval problem of the universal and particular (Walker 1993b). Modern sovereignty emerges in the slow and violent shifts from medieval Christianity, through the Reformation, towards a secularised and territorially divided early modern Europe (Kohn 1945). David Campbell explains "with the demise of Christendom, the rise of new forms of identity associated with the state equally need to be seen as embedded in the infrastructural relations of power of the order they were replacing (Campbell 1998b: 45)." Modern sovereignty takes up the epistemological and ontological slack resulting from the slipping ground of medieval Christian political constellations. By resolving the problem of universal and particular in a different way than medieval sovereignty, modern sovereignty gives rise to a different solution to the problem of being a qualified thinker and actor in the world. In this sense, as a concept, sovereignty is an act of thought which is attentive to the medieval
problems of creating a place for a newly emerging secular and individualised subject. Sovereignty emerges in a world slipping from the hands of Christendom but laying at the feet of the early modern subject. Sovereignty solves a particular problem; it is an act, a practice and, in other words, it does work. Sovereignty, as a concept, brings a modern world into existence.

Second, while a concept is a combination of parts, it also makes these internal components inseparable as a whole (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 19). A concept may be fragmentary, but it does not fall apart. A good example is nationalism. Nationalism functions through its parts, i.e. individuals, but individuals do not participate as individuals, they participate in national celebrations, for instance, as patriots. Because it is socially constructed, a national territory needs a population to come into existence, but in order to define which population is to count, a population needs to be defined by its national territory (Knight 1994). A concept's components cannot be separated, because the concept is responsible for calling them into being. A concept is absolute in terms of the resolution or capture it performs. It occupies the conditions that it constitutes for its problem (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 21). The concept forms a unity, a "zone of neighborhood" or a "threshold of indiscernibility (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 19)." The concept creates a space in which to move effortlessly. For example, in enlightenment concepts of sovereignty, the "will of all" becomes "the will of one" and vice versa. An individual is "forced to be free (Rousseau 1987: 150)," for example, because that freedom is always understood as operating within the whole or
good of the universal will of all (the state). One’s own freedom is tied up with the actualisation of universal freedom that is guaranteed by the state. In this sense, to commit a crime, Hegel explains, is an action against your own freedom, and your punishment reactivates your freedom (Hegel 1967: 66-74). As a whole, sovereignty enables the slide between questions about particular universal interests and particular universal claims. Sovereignty is the space where freedom can exist since it is the starting and ending point of the continuum of universal and particular. As a whole, the concept acts as a container or condition of possibility.

If a concept is made up of its parts and functions as a whole, the concept also becomes a singularity when it folds back over its parts and its whole. Sovereignty is more than the sum of its parts. As a singularity, the concept overcomes the paradox of being both fragmentary and whole, finite and infinite or particular and universal. This paradox is naturalised as the concept’s essence, and as such the concept stands as an exception to the rules set up for its parts and its whole. The concept is a transcendent relation that simultaneously includes what it excludes. For the concept, the exception is the rule. In this way, the concept becomes “a” concept, like sovereignty. The sovereign is always more than its parts (citizens) and its whole (the state), instead it is an entity that has neither dimension nor existence, yet paradoxically, is everywhere and eternal. To emphasise its paradoxical function, sovereignty is a self-referential, self-positing unmoved movement of auto-creation. For sovereignty, there is no outside to sovereignty, yet
sovereignty itself arrives from the outside. It naturalises the paradox of its existence, resolving parts and wholes, by making its exceptional state a natural exception. The concept of sovereignty, as such, holds together its content and its form in the swirl of its own perpetual production. Like a moebius strip it holds together possibilities as it creates a condition of possibility for itself. As a concept, sovereignty cuts a whole existence, it is "the contour, the configuration, the constellation of an event to come (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 33)."

As a singularity, sovereignty is an Event, a self-positing arrival that exceeds the conditions of possibility given in a world made available by previous or different concepts. When the parts and the whole combine as a singularity, called sovereignty, state philosophy (and with it international relations) emerges. The Nietzschean quote that starts this chapter is apropos: "truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that they are illusions; worn-out metaphors (Nietzsche 1972)." Like truth, sovereignty is a solution to a particular problem, but through use, it is slowly confused with a proposition or a thing. When it is reified in this way, sovereignty becomes "the" answer to all particular questions instead of a particular answer to its particular problem. Ceasing to be a metaphor or concept, truth and sovereignty become false problems of the "actual."

As a singular Event, sovereignty looses its specificity and it becomes increasingly difficult to imagine thinking and acting outside the actual limits of sovereignty. To explain this epistemological and ontological amnesia
Deleuze and Guattari introduce what they call the plane of immanence (1994: 37). If the concept is an Event, then the plane of immanence is a horizon of Events. The plane of immanence is described as a moving desert that concepts come to populate without dividing (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 41). Africa, for example, is said to have a geography and a history, and that disparate events and experiences constitute the story of Africa and the African. However, the actual experiences of the continent and its peoples can always be narrated otherwise, in fact they have always already been narrated otherwise. That this lived diversity is “forgotten” illustrates the function of the plane of immanence. Its function is to scoop from chaos, from the possibility of being, a consistency and a concept, without losing chaos' infinity (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 42). The constitution of a planes of immanence is groping experimentation through which intensities of forces give rise to concepts that, once materialised, move upon a constituted surface at infinite speed (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 41). A concept requires a plane of immanence to become thought because a concept is not a logical puzzle, it is “an image of thought (1994).” Simply put, an image of thought gives to itself “what it means to think (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 37).” The cogito, for instance, gives for itself “thought” as a plane of immanence. Thought is what makes possible the statement “everyone knows what thinking means. Everyone can think; everyone wants the truth (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 61).”
Just as it is important not to confuse concepts with propositions or things, for Deleuze and Guattari it is important not to confuse the plane of immanence with the concept itself. The effect of this illusion would be to make a plane of immanence the single, universal plane of all concepts (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 35). In state philosophy, a concept, like sovereignty, functions as a universal plane of immanence (in other words, a universal plane of the concept). When this occurs, "thinking" is replaced by a dogmatic image of thought. Such confusion creates a concept of concepts, an univocality of being or a Great Chain of all Being. Concepts would then be confused with propositions and things, they would be found instead of created, and therefore they would always reproduce the prior, now over-coded concept (like sovereignty). Confusing experience and the conditions of experience leads to the "illusion of discourse" and arguing over "false problems." Deleuze and Guattari offer a simple guide: whenever immanence is interpreted as immanent to *something* the plane of immanence has been confused with a concept (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 44). When sovereignty is said to be immanent or necessary (to use Hegel's term) to the state system, to history or to thinking, for example, the plane of immanence has been confused with a concept and the illusion of discourse emerges.

In state philosophy, the plane of immanence is established as a geometrical bridge connecting what Deleuze and Guattari call three unique concepts: "space," "time" and "I think (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 32)." This bridge is exemplified in the writings of Thomas Hobbes who provides the
most convincing resolution of the problem of universal and particular, therefore grounding truth and society in a modern age beyond Christendom (Hobbes 1991). The implication of this “grounding” is that a specific conception of difference is made possible and, once possible, sovereignty logically follows. In the first thirteen chapters of the Leviathan, where Hobbes is attentive to the problems of language and meaning, difference is made comprehensible only once a prior grammar of sameness has been established (Hobbes 1991). The linguistic terrain of similarity demands that each “thing” must have only one meaning (no metaphors). Therefore, upon this singularity, all future differences are established. Each “thing” is to have one “essential” difference. Things are the same in how they differ. Through language Hobbes establishes a relationship between the one and the multiple and as such an image of thought or a plane of immanence upon which sovereignty makes sense is ushered in with the concept of sovereignty. In the Leviathan, as in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right or Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, sovereignty is both the beginning and the ending of the problem of establishing political order from political/linguistic disorder. Sovereignty needs this linguistic plane of immanence, since a concept “has meaning only in relation to an image of thought to which it refers (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 81).” Sovereignty is practised in the grammar of representation. It is a grammar that denotes what is and is not possible/acceptable.

In addition to a plane of immanence, and as a final touch to their diagram of the concept, a concept always has a conceptual persona and if one
is not yet available, there will be a “new people” on its way. A conceptual persona is not reducible to the philosopher or the author. Instead a conceptual persona — Plato’s friend, Nietzsche’s idiot and Kant’s judge — is a character in and around which a world is instantiated. For example, when someone says “I speak to you as your leader” her words are to be taken within a specific context, given certain authority, purpose and care. Her words, as such have a specific overtone or resonance that would not be otherwise present if said, for example, by your brother. “Conceptual personae” Deleuze and Guattari explain, “constitute points of view according to which planes of immanence are distinguished from one another and brought together (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 75).” A conceptual personae stands at the nexus of the plane of immanence, the concept and the chaos from which the plane is cut. For Hobbes all individuals are equal (since we are all similar in our needs) and are therefore thrown into a state of war of all against all. Only from such a state can individuals unite to form a contract of equals. Hobbes defines the outside according to his needs to establish the inside. Hobbes’ Levitation and Rousseau’s Legislator are their conceptual personae. However sovereignty’s plane of immanence does not circulate around the point of view of the Levitation or Legislator. Instead, the conceptual persona of sovereignty, more generally, is the modern citizen/subject or what is called the “human.” The concept of sovereignty develops its conceptual persona through the individualised reasoning citizen/subject (Ashley 1989) because the reasoning human is both free and equal to all others as well as responsible
to limits of sovereignty. In short, the conceptual persona of modern sovereignty is simply "human." Such an artificial persona as human is created at the same time as sovereignty; they are constitutive of each other (Foucault 1970, 1977a). Humanity is an expression of what Foucault calls the critical limit attitude of sovereignty (Foucault 1984c) or the "man-measure (Foucault 1977a)," beyond which there is only nature, animals, machines, disorder and a world of nonsense that can never be "known." With the creation of the concept of sovereignty comes the geometrically divisible plane of immanence, which forms around the conceptual personae of the epistemological and ontological character of the "human being rational in the world." Modern humanism, as such, is modern political sovereignty. In other words, the conceptual personae provides the dram through which the plane of immanence is enacted.

Together, with the concept (parts, whole and singularity) along with the plane of immanence and the conceptual personal, a picture of the modern age emerges. Ironically, to explain why "philosophy is the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 2)" is also simultaneously to articulate how the discipline of international relations is impoverished. International relations is an impoverished illusion of discourse or a false problem (and hence so convincing) when it forgets that sovereignty is a concept. The result is that philosophy is replaced with state philosophy. Philosophy is not communication, contemplation or reflection – these have never produced a single concept and are instead machines for producing
universals (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 6). “The first principle of philosophy (following Whitehead’s empiricism) is that Universals explain nothing but must themselves be explained (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 7).” State philosophy and international relations are failures of philosophy.

Verbalising Sovereignty’s Statements

In contrast to state philosophy, Deleuze and Guattari’s attention to the creation of concepts is specific to what they term nomad philosophy (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). “Philosophy,” Deleuze and Guattari clarify, “is not simply the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts, because concepts are not necessarily forms, discoveries or products. More rigorously, philosophy is the discipline that involves creating concepts (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 5 original emphasis).” This emphasis on creating animates philosophy; however, it can be lost in the specificity of state philosophy and is common to other practices like science and art. For example, philosophy and art are different in what they create. Art does not “think” less than philosophy. Philosophy creates concepts, whereas art creates sensations (affects and precepts) upon a plane of composition and around an aesthetic persona. Science, on the other hand, creates functions upon a plane of reference. Within nomad philosophy, philosophy, art and science are all connected to creating through the concept of the Event (Deleuze and Guattari 1994). It is the concept that is specific to philosophy, and when there was nothing left to do but create a concept, Deleuze and Guattari created the Event. The
question that we are exploring in this chapter is whether creating concepts, or participating in their actualisation, is a sufficiently political vocation.

Whereas sovereignty is the concept of state philosophy, the Event is the concept that exemplifies nomad philosophy. For Deleuze, the Event is the only philosophical concept capable of displacing sovereignty (Deleuze 1990a). In the sense that it participates in the crisis of the political, displacing sovereignty by creating the concept of the Event is political. Sovereignty is a closing concept whereas the Event is an opening concept. The Event problematizes, whereas sovereignty solves (Deleuze 1990a: 54). Even when sovereignty is free from the illusory of being a proposition, and treated as a concept, state philosophy remains a closed order of recognition, a dogmatic image of thought (see chapter 5). Nevertheless, treating sovereignty as a concept (instead of a proposition) puts sovereignty into political play. Sovereignty falls from the heights of false idols and returns to nomadic millieux of the Event.

When sovereignty is a concept it becomes an Event of nomadic thought. Rescued from the illusion of discourse, the false problem of international relations, sovereignty again becomes a particular concept and a specific problem: how do we live together in a meaningful way. The result is that the Event has displaced the play of sovereignty making it a singular, not universal, moment of closure. State sovereignty does not have a monopoly on the way in which to live together in a meaningful way. Community, for instance, does not need to be conceptualised as a bounded entity, with
homogeneous members, and an identical history or future. The concept of the Event, therefore, promises the possibility of thinking and acting beyond the image of thought and action that sovereignty qualifies because the Event claims the condition under which a concept, like sovereignty, is created. Sovereignty steals for itself the eternal illusion of permanence from a world of change. In contrast, the Event has all the qualities of a concept (parts, wholes, singularity, plane of immanence and conceptual personae), but instead of closing and securing possibilities, it opens towards the sublime, unknown, paradoxical beyond - crisis.

Such an opening, exceeding a sovereign epistemology and ontology, can only be called cosmological. Deleuze and Guattari return sovereignty to the play of cosmic forces that Sovereignty is to have solved in the shift from Christianity to the Modern era. The claim that the Event is the only concept capable of displacing sovereignty has its merits because it is possible to see how challenging the iron grip of a politics of crisis, by opening towards a crisis of the politics, is revelatory.

Nevertheless, while creating the concept of the Event, in relation to the concept of sovereignty is contextually political, the overarching question remains is creating concepts a sufficient political vocation? Since sovereignty is an organising concept of modernity, and is implicated in both the crisis of politics and the crisis of the political, should political philosophy not also be involved in creating alternative concepts to Sovereignty? Since the desire to escape is always great, it is tempting to answer “yes;” however, it is
not clear how one would create an alternative without, in the end, enlisting
the concept of sovereignty. Even further, if one did create such an alternative,
how one would judge if it was a judicious alternative and how one would
decide upon its functionality without mobilising the normalising province of
the concept of sovereignty. Precisely because of its historical patrimony,
Sovereignty is familiar with these questions. Sovereignty is equipped, if not
destined, to resolve such questions. Carl Schmitt once observed “All
significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized
theological concepts, not only because of their historical development...but
also because of their systematic structure (Schmitt quoted in Bartelson 1995:
88).” Ultimately the political problem that Deleuze and Guattari, and all of us
interested in contemporary politics face, is: creating (like ordering,
opposition, transcending or resolving) is not foreign to the grammar of
sovereignty.

Deleuze and Guattari struggle with their paradoxical problem. In
opposition to transcendent judgement Deleuze and Guattari choose
immanent creation and in opposition to immanent empirical decision Deleuze
and Guattari choose transcendent creation. Like all other modern thinkers,
Deleuze and Guattari are stuck within the pull of sovereignty’s gravity.
Although the Event is a useful concept, the question that Deleuze’s
transcendental empiricism is incapable of answering remains: can an Event
be created or must it arrive from the outside? Simply put, how does one
become political? How is it possible to think and act beyond state philosophy and its recuperating politics of crisis and the crisis of the political?

Although philosophy is always political, since it always operates within the domain of a given concept, philosophy always comes after politics. Substituting one concept for another only shifts the philosophical content and not the political form. The problem of political form plagues modern transcendental (Kantian) and dialectical (Hegelian) approaches to the political (Whitehall 1996). The proper subject of philosophy is the concept, but the political vocation of philosophy is creating. Marx got this thesis right (and then did the opposite by assuming the grammar of nationalism), the point of political philosophy is not to “interpret the world, in various ways, but to change it (Marx 1977: 158).” Creating and changing, however, both belong to the arsenal of State Philosophy’s political patrimony. Although Deleuze and Guattari’s re-valuation of creating concepts, especially in relation to the concept of the Event, seems refreshingly unique to modern ears, the Christian Medievalist plane of immanence of the Event is presumed as the prior ground of modern sovereignty’s recuperation of late-medieval sovereignty (Blumenberg 1983). Because of sovereignty’s “systematic structure,” or the epistemological, ontological and cosmological grammar, sovereignty retains a stranglehold on politics (and therefore on philosophy) because it retains a unique relationship with “the verb” (to create, to judge, to decide and to oppose). Before affirming the verb as a timely political intervention, exploring sovereignty’s political relationship to philosophy
requires that we employ the help of Michel Foucault, since his genealogical approach is attentive to the shifts in how sovereignty, as a historical concept, functions.

If sovereignty is not a proposition or a thing, and must first be understood as a concept that creates a world of im/possibility, then sovereignty must also be understood as a statement (Foucault 1972a: 28). Sovereignty is not a Thing; it is an episteme and a diagram. An episteme constitutes the infinite knowledge practices in a diagram of unfolding everyday qualified life. For our purposes, sovereignty is best understood as how some kinds of knowledge come to have the status of Truth and some kinds of Being(s) have the status of Qualified, while others are relegated to the status of, for example, traditional, mystical or emotional. In the shadow of a sovereign truth, other claims to truth or what Foucault calls “subjugated knowledges (Foucault 1980: 81),” are deemed abnormal, inadmissible, or simply wrong. Along the limits and discontinuities within the field of the totality of all effective statements comes mutations of discursive unites, discursive events or statements (Foucault 1972a: 27-30). Between the 18th and the 19th century, how sovereignty functions, as a concept, shifts between two statements: to create and to decide. If sovereignty were simply a concept, it could be replaced and as such creating its replacement would be political. However, if creating, as a statement, is implicated in the concept of sovereignty, then creating its alternative is less political than it is philosophical semantics.
Michel Foucault’s concept of power/knowledge is helpful in investing the supposed continuity of sovereignty with the political dimension of discontinuity and therefore illustrates the problem of philosophical semantics when “the head of the king has not yet been cut off (Foucault 1984b).” Foucault explains that how one knows the world simultaneously prepares the world for a specific way of knowing. In and through knowing, a world is organised and disciplined. In and through such organisation and discipline, things of that world are prepared as objects to be known. Immanuel Kant, for example, treated geography in a very special manner. Geography, for Kant, was a propaedeutic for knowledge; it prepares the world as a thing, and a container of things, to be known (though history, for instance) (May 1972: 67). Without geography, knowledge of the world becomes impossible because knowing, for Kant, is a kind of political management of things in space and time. Without a map of the world, one could not discuss the character of an “American,” and without an American population, it would be impossible to discuss America’s problematic crime rates. Preparing the world to be known and managed is political, Foucault explains because “there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations (1979: 27).” Power therefore is not a localised capacity that can be exercised but is instead a vehicle or relation that characterises how knowing happens (Foucault 1980: 98). Power and knowledge are two statements of the same concept: sovereignty. Knowing is political because it involves the
reproduction of the concept of sovereignty though the enactment of its logic of
government (Foucault 1991). The proper ordering of things in space is the
expression of sovereignty’s politics - governmentality. What is required is
politicising the functional grammar of sovereignty. How does sovereignty, as
concept, do work, how has it changed historically and geographically?

If sovereignty is understood in an active way, as the practice of making
some forms of knowledge have the status of Truth in and through preparing a
world of objects for a specific kind of knowing, then sovereignty has had
epistemic transmutations, disruptions and breaks. Foucault’s genealogies
demonstrate that the way in which statements function as Truth change.vi
These epistemes do not necessarily follow each other nor do they constitute a
“spirit of the age” or a “cultural totality,” but instead these statements become
dominant or more widely circulated as legitimate; they are discursive events
(Foucault 1972a: 15-16). Each statement, mode of sovereignty or
“epistemological-juridical formation (Foucault 1977a: 23)” enacts the concept
of sovereignty that in turn constitutes its world of im/possibility. Between the
18th and the 19th century, sovereignty, as a concept, functions shift between
discursive events: to create truth through the spectacle, to decide truth
through judgement. Modifying Carl Schmitt’s definition slightly to include
historical transience, the sovereign is composed in how one creates and
decides “the exception (Schmitt 1985: 1).” Illustrating the war-politics relation
that exists in sovereign politics that is evident in Schmitt’s definition,
Foucault confirms that “the right to punish is therefore an aspect of the
sovereign's right to make war on his enemies (Foucault 1977a: 48)." The criminal inside peace emerges as the same expression of the enemy outside in war: sovereignty. In order to explore the historical shifts in sovereignty’s statements, two discursive events are worth remembering from Foucault’s text, *Discipline and Punish*.

The first discursive event is the classic order of sovereignty. It functions in and through the creation of the spectacle. The spectacle is the cumulative moment in a series of knowledge claims that, in order for the order of resemblance to have the status of truth all the way down to the tiniest moments of the social body, needs a final sovereign spectacle. In classical sovereignty, the king exists in the spectacle and his truth is created in and through the practices at his disposal (torture, confession and execution). Throughout the court proceedings, with the aim towards creation of the spectacle of sovereign Truth, some forms of knowledge become ordained as truth while others are dismissed as inadmissible falsities. At the end of the process, the ultimate Truth of the crime is created through the spectacle of the criminal’s punishment. The spectacle of punishment is the demonstration of the singularity of sovereign truth. From the most minute intervention by the magistrate’s question, to the arithmetic constitution of proof attained, through torture and to the final moment when the executioner's blade removes the head of the prisoner on the scaffold, the spectacle enchants, confirms and creates the entire epistemological process (Foucault 1979). The purpose of the spectacle is, as Foucault explains, “not so much to re-establish
a balance as to bring into play, as its extreme point, the dissymmetry between
the subject who has dared to violate the law and the all powerful sovereign
who displays his strength (Foucault 1979: 48).” Here politics is the arithmetic
management of wrong. The spectacle is the cumulative excess of a whole
economy of power; “the public execution did not re-establish justice: it
reactivated power (Foucault 1979: 49).” The king is the embodiment of the
sovereign truth because, as the embodiment of God on earth, he alone is
created through the spectacle. The king, in this sense, is not special, but is
himself caught up in an economy of power/knowledge that, in order for it to
function, requires the king to be “spectacular.” Classical sovereignty, as such,
can exist only in grand demonstrations, performances and creations of
spectacles. Creating the spectacle of the Event of sovereignty requires
perpetual re-creation.

The second discursive event is the modern order of sovereignty. Modern sovereignty functions through decision and judgement, not through
creating spectacles. Whereas truth claims of the classic era revolved around
the epistemological problem “did the criminal do this crime,” in modernity, a
second order type question is added. In modernity the question is “what is
this crime? Who is this criminal? (Foucault 1979: 19)” Away from the classic
arithmetic order of resemblance (has this crime occurred) modern
sovereignty functions through geometric (exponential) judgement or decision
about the essence of the crime and the criminal (who is this criminal?). The
judge moves from being the one who punishes the criminal (in the name of
the sovereign) for what they have done and instead becomes a mechanism (in a series of mechanism) that decides the exception. A criminal is not normal. In and through this modern statement of sovereignty, the Subject is born as an Object of knowledge. As Foucault explains “the power of normalization imposes homogeneity; but it individualizes by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialities and to render differences useful by fitting them one to another (1979: 184).” In other words “it establishes over individuals a visibility through which one differentiates them and judges them (Foucault 1979: 184).” Such normalising judgement is not located in a single individual, a singular moment or in a particular location. As an architectural grammar it became democratized, decentralized and increasingly mobile: “the judges of normality are present everywhere (Foucault 1979: 304).” From god-king the creator to god-king the judge, “justice no longer takes public responsibility for the violence that is bound up with its practices (Foucault 1979: 9).” Violence instead constitutes the political environment, the decentralised relays of judgement, and the democratised moments of decision that have been normalised as contemporary Peace.

It is important to draw attention to geographic shifts in sovereignty since peace is not something produced at a national level, but instead we are dealing with a question of global peace. Sovereignty has never been a national concept; sovereignty has always been about ordering the world into individualised/nationalised units. Sovereignty outside the west takes expression as exploration and colonialism (Mignolo 1995). In this regard,
global peace, as sovereignty, occurs first through the shift in colonialism from direct to indirect rule. The similarities between Foucault's descriptions of classical sovereignty (with grand speculates of violence) and legitimate rule, and modern sovereignty (with internalised and decentralised juridical acts of violence) and indirect rule are important (Mamdani 1996). These shifts in colonialism are finalised as global sovereignty — marked by the birth of scientific International Relations Theory in the 60s — through decolonization and into a world of sovereign states. Decolonisation through Nationalism is itself a "derivative discourse (Chatterjee 1986)," offering only the same body of practices with a different veneer, but further Decolonisation through sovereignty is a recuperative move of sovereignty to incorporate the world into its mode of categorisation (different nations). This mode of categorisation is global peace. Modern global peace, therefore, is not achieved until the 1960s when the world is freed into manageable/self-managing units. Like the responsible individual created in and through the panoptic model, the responsible state, the nation-state, is created in and through the panoptic model (International Relations Discourse) of global peace. Global apartheid and global balkanisation the false idols of modern liberty, equality and progress, draw in the political imagination about how to be in the world. Other imaginaries, like pan-Africanism for instance (Cooper 2002), disappear in the light of the inter-nationalised-sovereignty of global peace.

Global peace, international relations and colonialism are not foreign to Foucault's talk about discipline, prisons, bodies, and punishment. On
contrary, Foucault warns, in all this talk about discipline must hear the “distant roar of battle (Foucault 1979: 308).” Underlying the constitution of the norm, the individual, is the guiding drive to “make discipline (inter)national (Foucault 1979: 169 my addition).” If the international is itself a disciplinary mechanism of judgement and decision, where difference, now defined by national, not individual, character is organised, managed and policed, then war is not the exception to peace but the ruling, the governing and the policing of peace. Peace is not the absence of war; it is the normalisation of war. In modernity, sovereignty is the rule, because it is how the exception is judged and decided. International relations is itself the disciplining of the world into “a world” of “properly” ordered units (the sovereign state) against the possibility of all other ways of being together.

Together these two discursive events, classical sovereignty (to create) and modern sovereignty (to judge), constitute the discursive boundaries of the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty functions as a relation of creating and judging. Creating and judging are not different in kind; they differ in only degree, because both function to reproduce the concept of sovereignty. In other words, while sovereignty, as a concept, remains, how it functions changes historically and geographically.

If we continue to be attentive to the discursive edges, breaks and limits of modern sovereignty, a new shift in sovereignty’s contemporary statement unfolds. A new prospective shift in sovereignty, Deleuze argues, functions through coding. Deleuze calls this shift to coding a shift from a disciplinary
society (to judge) to a society of control (Deleuze 1992). Instead of a presence/absence made possible by both sovereign judgement and decision, or its transcendental truth of the spectacle, in a society of control, truth is a function of codes. Codes channel movement through passwords and moulds. The function of a code or a mould is not to resist movement, or to stop it, but to organise it into a transportable grid (Deleuze 1992). Coding is neither an arithmetic nor a geometric expression but is increasingly becoming quantum. In other words, sovereignty is no longer a question of summing the parts, nor is it a question of singularity, but instead, it is increasingly functioning outside and before itself. In sleepy Victoria BC, a police car, for instance, will no longer arrive after or in response to a crime, but instead, will move to where a crime is statistically supposed to occur. The control is no longer decentralised in the petty officer, but is liquefied, through the computer module. Where is the judge, where is the police officer? Could they be located in the code itself (or is our new overlord the IT guy?) Sticking with code, code operates like space-time: "mass (information) tells space-time (code) how to curve and space-time (code) tells mass (information) how to move" (Wheeler quoted in Bartusiak 2000: 59 my additions). The potential status of knowledge to become truth depends on how well it moves, operates, connects and enables. Those who code, enable worlds.

If code operates in the constituting of an information environment, the contest of future sovereign community forms is likely to be between different operating systems (Windows, OS X and Linux, or Netscape, Google and
Ebay). The battle between open and closed source code has yet to be decided, yet the implications are greater than a cyber-punk vision of the future (network hacks, viruses and links) already imagine. Code is becoming the organising principle of contemporary society, making possible the ways in which we communicate, the ways in which we perceive justice, and the ways in which we determine the good (Lessig 1999). We are increasingly on the edge of a new biopolitical horizon, code is implicated in shifts in military technology, tactics and ambitions (information, swarms, shock and awe and full spectrum dominance) (Joint Cheifs of Staff 2002). Code is implicated in shifts towards a re-qualification of human life, away from rights and responsibility towards DNA, where human essence is not a discursive limit but a discursive pass-code (Haraway 1997). Is code post-human? Perhaps when sovereignty has become digital, if it has not already, the future of sovereignty will be robo-sapiens.

Such a sketch only illustrates: 1) that sovereignty as a concept is unlikely to sit idly by while the concept of Event is actualised and 2) more importantly, sovereignty functions and changes historically and geographically. These three genealogical turns, classical, modern and contemporary sovereignty, make available three discursive statements: to create, to judge-decide and to code. Creating, deciding-judging and coding are all ways of describing how sovereignty functions as a concept. Against the backdrop of the above diagram, we can ask anew, is creating concepts a sufficiently political vocation?
Unless politics is to be a wait and see endeavour, sovereignty and the political offered by Deleuze and Guattari must be politicised further. To create a concept ultimately reproduces sovereignty because it enacts the epistemological mechanism involved in such state philosophy’s politics (create, decide or code). The problem is twofold: On the one hand, Deleuze (from the outside) assumes sovereignty in the creation of an alternative concept to displace it (the Event) and ends up with coding (as Foucault (1977b) charges by saying that the next century will be known as Deleuzian). On the other hand, Foucault, (who Deleuze (1988b) described as the new cartographer) assumes sovereignty (from the inside) in discursively mapping it and ends up with coding. For Deleuze and Foucault the political problem is either: 1) how does one act politically within a new Event that has arrived from the outside; and/or 2) how does one create events that disrupt the discursive map of sovereignty? The contemporary horizon of political possibility flirts between these possibilities, and it is impossible to judge, decide, code or create what comes next. Nevertheless, the question remains, is this politically sufficient?

To answer the charge of sufficiency, the following problems have to be overcome: 1) the act of creating new concepts is implicated in the function of sovereignty; 2) Modern sovereignty’s notion of liberal agency implicates the desire to create new Events; and 3) Operating politically within new Events (that are created or arrive from elsewhere) de-politicises the crisis of the political to a politics of crisis. When we are again concerned with
policing/policying the Event; the Event has been captured by sovereignty. When the Event becomes a concept of sovereignty it links together the verb and the concept and itself becomes a proposition (and the Event becomes the plane of immanence for all concepts). In order to further politicise nomad philosophy the problem of the verb needs to be affirmed further.

**Affirming Moving Verbs**

For the sake of clarity, although the philosophical concept of the Event is promising, and philosophy is always political, since it always operates within the domain of a given concept, philosophy always comes after politics. As such, nomad philosophy (like science and art) is defined by what it creates: concepts. Yet, sovereign politics also creates. In this chapter's argument, politics always occurs through the verb (creating, opposing, judging, deciding, coding) not the concept. When the role of the verb in politics is ignored, the concept of sovereignty retains its hold on politics (and therefore on philosophy). In such a case, sovereignty retains a singular relationship with the verb. The result is that it is difficult (if not impossible) to decide whether an Event can be created or if it must arrive from the outside without returning to an agency enabled by modern sovereignty.

The political question demands thinking and acting beyond, philosophy, the politics of crisis and the crisis of the political. A political moment is available in the creation, judging, deciding and coding, not of concepts, but of Events. However, the creation of Events (like February 15th 2003 or September 11th 2001) will have little effect problematizing the
sovereign world in which they arrive (see Chapter 3). Whether created or arriving from the outside, although destabilising, such Events are well within the dominion of the concept of sovereignty. Such Events fail to politicise the verb; instead they offer another opportunity for sovereignty to recreate itself anew.

Instead, to create, to judge, to decide, to code and more specifically to be, are the proper targets of change for political inquiry, not the concept of sovereignty. The verb to be makes the verb to create. Creating is a statement of sovereignty. To create or to judge, is really, to be sovereign creation or to be sovereign judgement. Such a singular relationship between sovereignty and the verb must be politicised. To put it bluntly, to be political is to stop creating concepts that are to serve as our new transcendental or immanent masters (Sovereignty, the Event etc.) and instead politicise verbs and affirm new verbs that do not reproduced the lure of conceptual politics.

By way of introducing the verb, we can start with Deleuze’s use of the Stoic distinction between bodies, attributes, actions, passions and states of affairs, on the one hand, and incorporeal events and verbs, on the other (Deleuze 1990a: 4). Deleuze is still useful here because he is appreciative of a verb’s unique role in relationship to the concept and the Event. The Event is “a philosophical concept, the only one capable of displacing the verb to be and the attribute (Deleuze quoted in Rajchman 2000: 57).” Through the Event, nomad philosophy problematizes the accepted (sub-political) status given to verbs and, as will be shown below, opens towards to affirming verbs.
The verb to affirm asks “what does a will want, what does this or that one want (Deleuze 1983: 9)?” The categorical imperative of exceeding is “whatever you will, will it in such a way that also will its eternal return (Deleuze 1983: 68).” In spite of this imperative, the majoritarian “conceives of power as the object of a recognition, the content of a recognition, the stake in a competition, and therefore makes it depend, at the end of a fight, on a simple attribution of established values (Deleuze 1983: 10).” Opposition and negation are never active; they makes active forces join them and become reactive (Deleuze 1983: 57). Becoming reactive is separating forces from what they can do (Deleuze 1983: 57). Instead of capture, affirmation goes to the limit of what it can do and, instead of stopping (like the first move of the crisis of the political), becomes different (Deleuze 1983: 64). Submitting themselves to the test of the eternal return, affirming verbs exceeds the reactive forces in themselves (Deleuze 1983: 70). Affirmation is the only way verbs become active, since reactive verbs do not return.

Deleuze affirms verbs so that they become acting (instead of actions). For Deleuze, verbs are not actions and passions since they do not belong to the world of things (Chronos). Verbs are of the incorporeal realm of effects (Aion) and as such they are always acting. For example, when a scalpel cuts there is a new property that emerges between the flesh, the scalpel and the wound. The new incorporeal property, Deleuze notes, is the verb (Deleuze 1990a: 5). Cutting is not a being, but a way of being, a becoming. There is no place that cutting can be identified, we can point to the cut, or to the surface
to be cut, but the cutting can never be, it can only happen. The verb persists at the surface of events and is “neither active nor passive...it is purely and simply a result, or an effect which is not to be classified among beings (Quoting Emile Breheir in Deleuze 1990a: 5).” The grammar of sovereignty restricts how the verb is appreciated; instead of verbs, in their own right, we always have sovereignty.

Foucault explains that the verb currently owes its sub-political status to the beginning of the 18th century when the verb was subsumed within the mind of the sovereign speaker. With the general shift from classical commentary -- when “language represents thought as though it represents itself (Foucault 1970: 78)” -- to modern criticism -- “when language attempts to define its relation to what it represents (Foucault 1970: 81)” -- the verb disappears in its new-found sovereign universality. The verb disappears, ironically, because “the verb is the indispensable condition for all discourse; and wherever it does not exist, at least by implication, it is not possible to say that there is a language (Foucault 1970: 93).” Because it is indispensable, the verb has a unique relationship with language and discourse that is incorporeal, intangible and autonomous. Foucault explains,

the verb must therefore be treated as a composite entity, at the same time a word among other words, subjugated to the same rules of case and agreement as other words, and yet set apart from all other words, in a region which is not that of the spoken, but rather that from which one speaks. It is on the fringe of discourse, at the connection between what is said and what is saying itself, exactly at that point where signs are in the process of becoming language (Foucault 1970: 93 emphasis added).
The verb hovers on the edge, on the limit of the possible, on the edge of what Deleuze calls “pure difference and pure repetition (Deleuze 1994)” beyond the grammar of State philosophy’s obsession with representation. As Foucault explains, the verb is not there to signify tense, as Aristotle proposed, nor is it there to express action or passions as Scaliger did, nor to identify the verb with persons. Instead in modernity “the entire species of the verb may be reduced to the singular verb that signifies to be (Foucault 1970: 94).” Once the verb reached this level of generality it has disappeared. Foucault illustrates that, whereas concepts are the ideas, nouns the forms and adjectives the colours, “the verb is the canvas upon which all are made visible” and therefore qualified, existent and possible (Foucault 1970: 95). Forgetting, we say “I sing” but what we mean is “I am singing (Foucault 1970: 94).” Upon this verb to be all other verbs are subsumed into the concept of sovereignty and as such politics stands with an impoverished vocabulary of verbs (to create, to decide, to judge, to code). The political is reduced to a call to existence or a call to recognition: demonstrations and oppositions. Sovereign politics amounts to occasions to self-create (“I am demonstrating” or “I am opposing” or “I am becoming”) which in turn fulfils sovereignty’s creation, decision, judgement or coding. Sovereignty is an epistemological and ontological nexus of thinking and acting.

Although not to minimise the political dimension of Sovereignty, if one is interested in the political, and not just sovereign politics (creating, deciding, judging or coding), then a new political vocabulary is needed. It is through
the Event, as an opening to the beyond (that exceeds the exception), that it might be possible to affirm new verbs that do not reproduce sovereignty, but instead are again political. The proper vocation of the political is not to create concepts, nor to create events, but to "verb verbs." As a first step, since Deleuze offers many verbs (to encounter, to connect, and to deterritorialize) that operate within and in the service of the Event and since they do not operate in the service of the concept of Sovereignty they can offer some direction towards other such verbs. To connect, to encounter, to deterritorialize or to affirm all betray the verb to be, since they are not ontological claims to self-existence, self-creation and self-recognition. Instead of sovereign closures, they are openings towards the Event.

Connecting requires that "experimentation comes before ontology, (and) 'And' comes before the 'Is' (Rajchman 2000)." The tree of sovereign knowledge "imposes the verb "to be;" but the ... the conjunction, "and...and...and" ... carries enough force to shake and uproot the verb to be (Deleuze and Guattari 1987)." Instead of essential statements of existence, to connect requires that the one is open to the multiple possible ways of becoming different. In other words, "to connect is to work with other possibilities, not already given (Rajchman 2000: 6)." What is required to connect, therefore is an opening through the Event to what is beyond dogma, that disturbs dogma, and that allows the risk of transformation. As John Rajchman explains "to make connections one needs not knowledge, certainty or even ontology, but rather a trust that something may come out, though one
is never completely sure what (Rajchman 2000: 7).” In this way, to connect
draws on an ethos of affirmation that, instead of building in reaction or
opposition to some essence, builds from an affirmation of the unknown ways
in which the one may become connected to the multiple. Ultimately, “to
connect is to affirm and to affirm is to connect (Rajchman 2000: 13).” The
example that Deleuze offers is how in cinema two frames are connected
through an edit or splice resulting in an affirmation of one possible trajectory
of possibility (a time image) that arrives only because of that edit or splice
(Deleuze 1986b). A time image is a type of affirmative connection and the
result is that unrelated images become a narrative. A series of
“and...and...and....” cuts across the political terrain that strives for singular
meaning (sovereignty). As Jacques Derrida explains, “a conjunction such as
“and” dares to defy order, taxonomy, classificatory logic, no matter how it
works: by analogy, distinction or opposition (Derrida 1990: 919).” In this
sense, what is politically important is not the construction of a counter
narrative, or a new concept to organise things differently, but an opportunity
for different connections.

An example of a politics of connection can be found in Michael Moore’s
recent film “Fahrenheit 9/11.” It operates around a politics of connecting and
the result is that viewers are affirmed as political thinkers. Returning to the
introductory example of growing opposition to the War in Iraq, Fahrenheit
9/11 makes affirmative connections that push the audience towards multiple
meanings (letting the audience connectings do the work) instead of closing
them to narrow his own ideological objectives (that are unfortunately unpalatable to most Americans). Deleuze's attention to the time image (as opposed to the movement image) in cinema is helpful (Deleuze 1986a, b). In cinema, politics does not happen so much inside or outside the moving frame, cinematic politics occurs between frames, within a montage, assemblage or milieu of different frames (see Rodowick 1997; Shapiro 1999). Instead of offering a transcendental narrative that the audience is likely to reject, Moore locates the moment of politics in the cut, fade, or splice of a cinematic narrative. Moore, through most of the film, does not even have control of what happens inside the frame. Instead, for Moore it is about connecting different shots to have an unintended and unimagined effect. For instance, the juxtaposition of George W. Bush reading See Spot Run and the black screen of the Twin Towers collapse, is likely to conjure many different connections in audiences. An audience, as such, is directed towards their own connections, linkages and interfaces between things. They participate in their shared deterritorializations and reterritorializations, instead of the unified, essential truth of the things Moore represented. The audience, in the time affirmed by Moore, is empowered to make their own connections.

Taking a politics of connection as exemplary, global politics becomes concerned with the overlapping edits, splices, flows and migrations of people (s), concepts and images that affirm the arrival of new horizons of being together. It is important to remember, however, that even the hardest opposition (black/white) is a connection that, at best, expresses a middle
(grey), however what we are striving for is the infinite colour that exceeds the Grey world of political possibility. What seems to be central for Deleuze, when he focuses on verbs, is that in and through the Event verbs open towards the possibility of becoming different. To exceed therefore is a type of connection, not simply any connection, and similarly to exceed is a kind of encounter, not just any encounter. Yet, they must take place in relationship to the Event.

Through the concept of the Event, the next chapter explores the context for the emergence of a different means of political solidarity. Chapter 4 explores the historically situated emergence of the Pacific Rim Project. Whereas, the Pacific Rim is traditionally seen within a spatial logic (the Rim) and therefore reproducing the sovereign terrain of oppositional politics (between states), the Pacific Rim project is open to being theorised as an Event. When theorised through the Event and what is unique about the Pacific Rim is the Ocean’s refusal to be closed and captured. When the ocean is affirmed, it liquefies the hard boundaries of the spatial imagination. The discourse of the Pacific Rim has never been able to erase the trace of the fluid Ocean. As such, the Ocean becomes the condition of movement that must be used to theorise political action. To this end, the chapter focuses on First nations strategies in the 2001 BC referendum on First Nation’s Treaty negotiations. What is interesting in the strategies used is that they politically liquefy the boundaries of Canadian citizenship. Political action, as such, has
more to do with the verb to exceed. It involves exceeding available options rather than fulfilling the habit of becoming Canadian.
The cadastral map is an instrument of control which both reflects and consolidates the power of those who commission it...the cadastral map is partisan: where knowledge is power, it provides comprehensive information to be used to the advantage of some and the detriment of others...the cadastral map is active: in portraying one reality, as in the settlement of the new world or in India, it helps obliterates the old.
-- Roger J. P. Kain and Elizabeth Baigent

The future of a movement is conditioned by the fanaticism, yes, the intolerance, with which its adherents uphold it as the sole correct movement, and push it past other formations of a similar sort.
-- Adolf Hitler

Man cannot discover new oceans unless he has the courage to lose sight of the shore.
-- Andre Gide

Highest good is like water. Because water excels in benefiting the myriad creatures without contending with them and settles where none would like to be, it comes closest to the way.
-- Lao Tzu

CHAPTER 3
Politics after the Event: Exceeding Fluid Horizons in a Time of Terror

The turn of events “after,” or more appropriately, “through,” September 11th will preoccupy the political imagination for some time, since it marks the most recent instance of the politics of crisis (where securing the grounds of politics comes at the cost of more fluid politicisations). The adjective “through” is more appropriate than “after” because the enduring features of the war on terror, the war of terrors or a “time of terror,” are only extreme instances of processes that were already underway before September 11th. International terrorist/crime legislation, biometric surveillance, data-conglomeration and micro-militarisation of everyday spaces that are now used as examples of Post-9/11 American Empire were already in the legislative corridors well before September 11th (Germain 2003; Sheptycki 1998; Smith 1996). Similarly, corporate mega-merges, public privatisation,
global subcontracting, government de/re-regulation, branding or bio-genetic research that are examples of globalisation were further heightened through September 11th and exceed the logic of any particular nation (though still disproportionately benefiting some). In and through September 11th, two competing narratives, one territorializing and the other deterritorializing, have been united into a new political delirium, how to become political in an age defined, not by stopping, but by controlling movement.

In the introduction I called this new political delirium the contemporary stasis of the political imagination, but September 11th territorialized a number of historic global gambles wagered through Bretton Woods 1944, Nuremberg 1945, Fort Knox 1971 and Uruguay 1994 that were undermining the territorializing narratives of the nation-state. On September 10th, the future of the sovereign nations state seemed bleak; whereas, the future of global governance through international organisations, hegemonic empires and/or multinational corporations, although contested, was bright (Barber 1995; Commission on Global Governance. 1995; Guehenno 1995; Held 1995; Hirst and Thompson 1995; Omae 1995). Yet, after the smirk of George Bush, does anyone remember Vancouver 1997, Seattle 1999, Washington 2000, Genoa 2000 or Quebec 2000 (assuming, as some (Shah 2003) do that most will not remember India 1992, Mexico 1994, Ecuador 1995)? Bush’s smirk has had the same effect as Ronald Reagan’s smile, offering a silver glint to dangerous decisions, and a darkening contempt for any politically contested grounds (Baudrillard 1988). September 11th, if
anything, fed the sweet tooth of what James Der Derian calls the “military-industrial-media-entertainment network (2001).” It provided an opportunity to repackage the complexity of past technological, cultural, and economic developments into a smooth, simplistic and entertainingly territorial story of “us versus them.” Again, the politics of crisis has the effect of policing the discursive range of political opportunities into choosing one side of a pre-constructed dichotomy. Because of the good versus evil framing, post-9/11 politics is, in part, a return to pre-WWII discursive closure of the political imagination. A nationalised community is rescued from the fluidity of the narratives of globalisation, global governance and universal humanism and the nation-state (not only the United States) is returned as the central agent responsible for individual security, peace and prosperity in dangerous times.

However, post-9/11 politics is also, in part, a commitment to global deterritorializing narratives. Heidegger’s “age of the world picture” described the world becoming the metaphysical horizon of ontological possibility, and the world becoming an epistemological object for human consumption (through technology) (Heidegger 1977), has been renewed as an “time of terror.” Where a post-WWII imagination was organised around a global world driven towards a temporal horizon of liberal progress, a post-9/11 imagination is a global world organised around a temporal horizon of national terror. Simply put, a world of progress is replaced with a time for terror. A territorializing national narrative, characteristic of a politics of crisis, rescues globalisation. This rescue occurs because the territorializing narrative of a
post-9/11 imaginary is not sufficiently stable, or desirable, for the US administration to reject the world community. A complete rejection of the world community is not possible or desirable, because the locus of national legitimacy has shifted towards a global web of mediated, technological, governmental, cosmopolitan interactions. Narratives about globalisation share a similar fate; they are incapable of abandoning the hegemonic pivot of the United States, in particular, and the question of sovereignty, in general. Although the function of sovereignty remains, what is different in the run up to 9/11 is that the link between globalisation, progress and the United States was beginning to fracture (Bello 2001). With the leading conservative publication The Economist and Joe Stiglitz, former Chief Economist of the World Bank, both pointing to the failure of the promise of progress, proponents of globalisation and the imperial ambitions of American neo-cons needed a new narrative of manifest immanence. Terrorism provides this narrative for the politics of crisis.

Today opposing narratives (deterritorializing globalisation and territorializing Empire) remain united in a strange death dance – both simultaneously undermine and support each other. For example, biometrics, bio-genetics, nano-technology, database integration, on the one hand, are fully integrated with global corporate mega-mergers, deregulation, and corporate militarisation, on the other. Within the pursuit of terror as the legitimating narrative, both are once again working within the same narrative, since both are stories about American national security interests. In other
words, processes that on September 10th were undermining the national territorial imagination have been claimed to secure the sovereignty of the state in the fight against America's newest greatest enemy, terrorism. To emphasise the convergence, just after September 11th, U.S. President George W. Bush declared "the terrorists attacked the world trade centre, and we will defeat them by expanding and encouraging world trade (Bush quoted by Finnegan 2003)." Whereas in the past the nationalist ambitions of American imperialism were narrated in a global claim of universal progress; now, the global imperial ambitions are nationalised through a terrorist narrative of national security. Regardless if you ever believed them, the World Bank and the IMF are only two blocks from the White House, the story has changed.

The clashes between globalisation and empire provide the starting context for this chapter. Starting with this context does not signal that the narrative of the sovereignty has disappeared. On the contrary, challenging the dominance of the nation-state, as globalisation and Empire do, makes the concept of sovereignty all the more politically relevant. The core dynamic of globalisation and empire is the recuperation of the concept of sovereignty. Recuperation is not new, sovereignty, when understood as a concept, is always shifting. Sovereignty shifts because it is always being enacted and modified to solve particular problems like September 11th or February 15th. Whether globalisation/empire is a minor or major shift is unknowable, what can be identified is the process. In recuperation, sovereignty, as a concept, remains the same, but how it functions in each formulation (to create and to
decide/judge and to code) differs. The third (a fundamental or an incremental?) formulation, coding (a temporal instead of spatial mode of capture), is how sovereignty is said to be functioning in globalisation/empire (Hardt and Negri 2000).

With Deleuze, many argue that the locus of resolving truth claims in a disciplinary society is in the process of being recuperated into a society of control (Deleuze 1992). In a society of control, sovereignty no longer functions by stopping movement and change; instead, it operates by controlling the directions of movement and change. Paul Virilio warns that whoever controls the streets controls the state (Virilio 1986). The future trend of globalisation/empire is speeding up so that, relatively speaking, the rest of the world slows down and can be easily managed. The subtle change towards controlling movement has the enormous effect of making governance more "stable." Armed with a new controlling problem solving zeal, the global-spatial fetish of globalisation and empire is reflective of the hermeneutic desire to mould everything so that it is secured. In the politics of crisis, where there is resistance, there is a problem to be smoothed through judging, deciding or coding, and therefore, provides a moment for sovereignty, as a concept, to be (re)actualised.

For those interested in resistance, when the target of political action is represented as Globalisation, Empire, US Hegemony or Modernity, the effect is likely to harden, and therefore stultify, the political imagination. The narrative of David versus Goliath, for instance, has not only been overdone,
but also presents those interested in politics with diminishing odds of success. In an effort to loosen this political imagination, it is useful to keep both propositions (globalisation and empire) alive. As a context, it is likely that the immediate future will first pass through the globalisation of emergent regional empires (NAFTA, APEC, ASSEAN, EU and AU). Moreover, this context allows for the future of global political struggles to be explored beyond the nationalist frame. Within this context, the problem being developed here is where and how are the loci of sovereign performances shifting and, in that light, how is it possible to appreciate different political verbs? The purpose of this chapter is to develop the relationship between the Event and the verb, in general, and to affirm a novel instance of political solidarity, in particular. Within the Event, political solidarity will have to become transformative. Alliances of opposition towards globalisation/empire and demands for national re-democratisation are not sufficient. They play upon the oppositional terrain that sovereignty's verbs already command. Therefore, instead of assuming with globalisation/empire a global world in need of geographic (re)ordering, this chapter recasts the trends of territorialization and deterritorializations as moments of a shifting concept of Sovereignty.

Specifically, in an age of the globalisation of empires, this chapter treats one emerging trajectory, the Pacific Rim Project, within the context of sovereignty shifting towards a society of control. The Pacific Rim Project marks the arrival of forces/concept/personae that rearrange the horizon of political possibility. In the chapter we look at how the Pacific Rim Project
unfolds, occupies and naturalises a geography of the “Pacific Rim.” The Pacific Rim is a spatial imaginary that is particular to a modern grammar of politics. Therefore its qualification of political life occupies a unique transitional space within the clash of globalisation and empire. The underlying aim of the Pacific Rim, through organisations like Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), is to create a uniform space (of control) where all difference, resistance, and politics (whether in regards to the ocean, the pacific islands, pacific Islanders or indigenous peoples) becomes “pacific.” Instead of accepting this geography as normal, this chapter opens this cartographic imagination by treating the Pacific Rim as an Event, and then moving from crisis, into a politics that exceeds sovereignty’s boundary practices. First we simultaneously map the Pacific Rim and diagram it as an Event.

The Event of the Pacific Rim Project

In 1976, Endel-Jakob Kolde of the Pacific Rim Project produced a report called “The Pacific Quest” at the University of Washington. Although now quite dated, “The Pacific Quest” reads as a simple, and yet monumental, survey. “The Pacific Quest” sought to document the economic, political and cultural changes that were emerging in the Post W.W.II world and how they were important to the pacific region. As such, the survey accounted for national populations, economies, treaties, resources and other variables (like religion, culture and languages) that are traditional characteristics of “area
studies" today. This task was monumental because the Pacific Rim was represented as the future of the west – the Pacific Century (Lower 1975; MacKay 1986; United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 1990; Weiss 1989). It was/is a "quest." Huge in scope, the document's purpose was to record the chaotic flows of Japan's economic miracle, the USSR's geo-political climb (and fall), the USA's financial and cultural hegemonic rise (and fall), the (post)cold-war tensions/strategies, 20+ countries' formal decolonisation, NGOs, INGOs and MNCs' increasing clout, 1500+ bilateral treaties being signed and the (social) scientific shift towards appreciating the ocean's cultures, resources, geophysics and ecosystems (Kolde 1976b). Although dizzying in magnitude, the "Pacific Quest" appears simply to describe what was happening in the world. The quest was in keeping with the purpose of international relations, as declared by Hans J. Morgenthau: "to bring order and meaning to a mass of phenomenon which without it would remain disconnected and unintelligible (Morgenthau 1967: 3)." Similarly, "the Pacific Quest" sought to organise an age of disorder. What appears to be a simple description, and organisation of facts into a realistic picture of the world out there, however, is actually an important philosophical and political practice – creating a concept.

The Pacific Rim is not simply an act of description, although it is performed through this empirical imaginary; it is an Event that frames the practical problems of post-WWII economic, political, cultural and
technological flows. It is an Event because the Pacific Rim does not exist prior to its discursive organisation. Kolde's "Pacific Quest," ironically, documents and participates in this Event: the birth of the Pacific Rim concept. His enthusiasm is evident when he states that "an epoch has ended. For a third of a millennium the Pacific served as an extraneous mass to a Eurocentric world...all that has ended (Kolde 1976b: 15)." The Rim can no longer be the Pacific other to the European self, the sea monster lying at the edge of the civilised world. Instead, as Kolde dramatises, the Pacific Rim is a character, in search of itself, its home in the world. He reflects

The Pacific Rim is a concept still in search of a definition. Traders and diplomats seem to have started using the term as a form of verbal shorthand to describe markets bordering the Pacific Ocean. Instead of individually enumerating and identifying all the nations and territories, they could conveniently be grouped under the label of "Pacific Rim." What mattered was not the potential or performance of individual countries, small and relatively insignificant as some of these were when taken separately, but the aggregate of many countries adjacent to one another. In a proverbial analogy, their strategists needed a name for the forest to distinguish it from the trees. The term Pacific Rim answered that need (Kolde 1976b: 25).

For Kolde the Pacific Rim would no longer be a void, a res nullius, in the Anglo-American social scientific World. Like other "discovered territories," it could now find a place within a modern, classified and ordered world. In other words, the Pacific Rim becomes a conceptual unity that fits within a modern matrix of intelligibility. Suddenly, its dimensions can be studied, its characteristics chronicled, and its essence probed, labelled and dissected. A unified field of study unfolds geographically (the Pacific Rim) and historically (the Pacific Century). In turn, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) geopolitically secures this unified field through its individual member states. These four moments (geography, history, geopolitics and member states)
constitute the political diagram of the Pacific Rim Event. Each will be explained in turn.

The Pacific Rim Project begins by satisfying the modern desire to survey complex and overlapping flows into a universal geography. To say that something is answered geographically implies a naturalisation of a representation. Geography is always what Edward Said calls an “imaginative geography (1979: 21).” In this sense, struggles over geography are ‘complex and interesting because (they are) not only about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings (Said 1994: 7).”

As Roger J. P. Kain and Elizabeth Baigent suggest, “the map is active... it helps obliterate the old (Kain and Baigent 1992).” Kolde does not understand this complexity. For him the region simply “encompasses the entire Pacific Ocean and all the lands – both continental and insular – that border on its shores (Kolde 1976b: 3).” He states “it is no longer unusual to hear convention speakers at business conferences using Pacific Rim in the same breath as Europe, Africa and Latin America (Kolde 1976b: 29).” In this sense, the Pacific Rim achieves the status of what Kolde calls a “household word (1976b: 29);” or explained in chapter 2, it has become an order-word or singularity that is granted the ontological status of a continent. The continental Rim is the composite of everything (lands, waters, peoples, boundaries, cultures, diplomatic treaties and corporate relations) within this demarcated space of continents. What, at one moment never existed, suddenly is a bounded, solid continent.
However, as hinted above, continents are themselves not natural entities they are created in and through social relations. The construction of the world via terrestrial blocks is a deeply contentious, highly unstable practice that hides the social processes and imperial drives (Lewis and Wigen 1997: 10). Politics and philosophy are implicit in the construction of continental "beings." Martin W. Lewis and Karen Wigen help demystify the natural grounding of continents; they argue

The debate over how to conceptualize the Pacific community goes to the heart of the challenge before us - first it conveys a sense of the immense difficulties entailed in rightly grasping - and naming - the elusive spatial structures of contemporary life. All geographic divisions share with these neo-categories the quality of being artificial simplifications, more or less convenient devices for advancing analysis rather than reflections, wholly knowable spatial structures (Lewis and Wigen 1997: 205). Naming cuts through other possible (non-western) stories and submerges complex histories, cosmologies and routes of encounters. In Arlif Dirlik's words, "to define, as to Name, is to conquer (1998b: 5)." Granting the Pacific Rim the status of a continent ignores diversity of alternative ways that peoples have moved and lived in the pacific. Once the Pacific Rim is grounded within a traditional geographic imaginary and named a continent, it can be studied, probed and managed. An imaginative geography, like the Pacific Rim, emerges in and through writing, knowing, authorising and ultimately dominating a region (Said 1979: 54). There is a "tendency to view the region as a geographical given, a physically delineated stage, as it were, upon which human beings play out their various activities (Dirlik 1998a: 17)." In the place of its previous complexity, convenient anchor-statements, like "The Pacific Rim is the most dynamic region in the world today (Nemetz 1990: 1)," begin
academic papers, newsmagazines, and business forecasts without adequate qualification. The region, as social and political production, is treated as empirical fact, a simple backdrop for anthropological, political, economic or regional studies (Murphy 1991: 24). The proper name functions as the Grammatical referent for all past and future developments.

As a singular named region, it becomes possible to write a history for Pacific Rim. The Pacific Century emerges as the Rim’s plane of immanence. The Pacific Rim attains an imagined history, the Pacific Century, that organises its condition of possible futures. For some, the Rim is accepted as having simply arrived from nowhere and yet oddly having created its own history in the process. Dennis Flynn and Arturo Giraldez, for instance, declare that the “Rim does not seem to possess a common chronology prior to the Second World War (Flynn and Giraldez 1998: 16).” Over its temporal lacuna, the Pacific century erases other histories and other futures. The Pacific Century stands as a historical memorial to its own creation.

An example of a historical memorial is Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor stands as an essential marker in the imaginary Pacific Century. It marks an imposed future and an erased past. Phyllis Turnbull argues the telling of American History in Hawaii, for example, is an act of remembering through a strategic forgetting of other possible histories (1996). On the one hand, Pearl Harbor will always be remembered as American’s monument documenting the sneak attack that woke a sleepy giant and forced it to enter WWII. It stands as a moral and political marker that changed the social, economic, and
cultural characteristics of the Pacific Rim. On the other hand, Pearl Harbor is also a Hawaiian monument of the US occupation of Hawaii that, to flip the emphasis, changed the social, economic, and cultural characteristics of the "Pacific Rim" forever. One mode of being in Hawaii (as an American settler) replaces the multiple other ways of being in Hawaii (as a Hawaiian) (Trask 1993). The same can be said of Kaho'olawe, which, for some is a empty island ideal for testing military weapons of destruction, and for others is a site of spiritual significance and is itself a spiritual expression (Wood 1999: chapter 7). The difference between the two remembrances is the history of the Pacific Rim; it is the Rim's plane of immanence. Within the Pacific Century, Pearl Harbor becomes a signpost around which a specific historical narrative replaces the diversity of complex webs of historical relations.

The Pacific Century, as a plane of immanence, also limits other future possibilities within its imagined temporal trajectory that Toshiya Ueno calls techno-orientalism. Ueno argues that the west fanaticises about its own future by projecting, claiming and owning a techno-imaginary of Japan (Ueno N.D.). Japan, in particular, but the Pacific, in general, becomes the next logical step of the west's manifest destiny. The pacific become the extension of the western frontier, simultaneously a zone of erasure and creation, whereby populations are re-written in the service of America's territorial ambition(Palumbo-Liu 1999). David Morley and Kevin Robins statement, quoted by Ueno, is exemplary of this logic. They argue "if the future is technological, and if technology has become 'Japanised,' then the syllogism

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would suggest that the future is now Japanese too. The postmodern era will be the Pacific Era. Japan is the future, and it is the future that seems to be transcending and displacing modern society (quoted in Ueno N.D.).” Science fiction is a good example of how Japan becomes a mirror upon which the America writes itself (see chapter 4). Like the assumed spatial cohesion of the Pacific Rim, Blade Runner, Star Wars and the Matrix, to name a few, create an “assumed future history (Wendland 1985: 35)” in the name of the Pacific Century and the image of America.

The Pacific Quest, therefore, answers the desire for an epistemological and ontological unity by creating geographic and historical conceptual entity – the Pacific Rim. The Name, once authorised, is constitutive of what can and cannot be said about the history, cultures, politics, and economics. Self-referentially the future of the Pacific Rim is organised around the discursive singularity of the Pacific Rim. Amazing, the Event is literally grounded in a geographic and historical imaginary so that it ceases to be appreciated as an Event. The Rim is simply a continent, a region and a Name.

A Name, however, is insufficient to fully capture the diversity of everyday practices that Kolde imagines at work. A Name cannot police the diverse flows into the concept of the Pacific Rim. Instead the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) fulfils this role of policing. Specifically, APEC solves the problem of keeping together, not only flows of people and economic transactions, but also, the very meaning of the Pacific Rim. This is not unusual of a governing structure, and APEC does not fail to trumpet its
capacity to resolve the conflicts in the "region." ix At the beginning of all it official documents it boasts

APEC has 21 members - referred to as "Member Economies" - which account for more than a third of the world's population (2.6 billion people), approximately 60% of world GDP (US$19,254 billion) and about 47% of world trade. It also proudly represents the most economically dynamic region in the world having generated nearly 70% of global economic growth in its first 10 years (APEC 2004).

APEC was established in 1989 in response to the growing interdependence among Asia-Pacific economies. Begun as an informal dialogue group, APEC has since become the primary regional vehicle for promoting open trade and practical economic cooperation. Its goal is to advance Asia-Pacific economic dynamism and sense of community (see for instance IPEG 2002).

Like Kolde's "Pacific Quest," APEC answers the call to fill the organisational void. APEC not only takes ownership of all the region's people, economic wealth, activity and growth, but come to assert itself as the guarantor of this very dynamism and a sense of community. However, like most imperial projects, APEC also imagines that there was nothing there before, at worst, and at best that, through decolonisation, all ways of being, all peoples, all economic futures and all cultural trends are represented in nation-states (Kolde 1976a: 21). By standing in and re-presenting all that occurs within the region, APEC takes ownership of it all. This is difficult to imagine because we are in the habit of imagining national political horizons. The logo for APEC provides a good visual example of how APEC comes to stand in for the region's complexity, by taking up the image of transcending an empty void.
What is interesting about this logo is that APEC, as a sign, has come to represent the space in-between the Rim. APEC not only acts as the bridge between landmasses, but, semiotically, APEC acts as the bridge between signifier and the signified. APEC comes to replace the very diversity it claims to represent. In representing the cultural, social, economic, historical and political complexity (represented by the ocean, for example) APEC annuls that diversity. In exchange for complexity, APEC creates a void, an absence, which only APEC can fill. It fills the cultural, social, economic, historical and political absence within the newly naturalised absence at the heart of the Pacific Rim. Through its member states, APEC becomes the geopolitical referent around which all possible articulations of development and dissonance are directed.

However, in as much as dissonance flows through member states to APEC, APEC itself also emerges as the geopolitical guarantee that the sovereign state will be the central political actor of the Pacific Rim. In APEC's official history, the sovereign state emerges from the background, into the centre of the organisation. APEC started with the buried ambitions to form a Pacific Free Trade Area emerging in the late 1960s. The name APEC emerged
in conjunction with the Pacific Trade and Development conference, the Pacific Basin Economic Council and the Pacific Economic Co-operation Council in 1989. As such, it was not until 1993 that APEC, as an institution, emerged with its respective heads of states (now numbering 21) and APEC would have to wait until 1995 to have functioning voluntary agenda of "open regionalism" and timetable for implementation (Bhalla and Bhalla 1997: Chapter 5).

Explaining "Why APEC matters to Americans," the US Embassy in Jakarta posted this fact sheet,

The United States, recognizing the value of top-level meetings to advance the work of creating a Pacific community, invited member economies' leaders to Blake Island, Washington, to meet informally to discuss major issues in the APEC region. This gathering of economic leaders has become the single most important institution in the Asia Pacific region. It brings top level attention to APEC's vision of free trade and investment as well as providing a forum for Leaders to meet on a regular basis both as a group and bilaterally to discuss current issues and resolve disputes (U.S. State Department 2001).

By APEC representing sovereign national governments as 21 the key units of the Pacific Rim other possible, other legitimate, stories, histories, politics and cultures are erased again. Standing in for local, regional and national complexity APEC simply appears to be a collection of heads of states, ready to sit down across the abyss of international anarchy and hammer out international agreements. It is further assumed that these agreements will benefit their national communities.

Sergio Marchi's, Canada's Minister of Trade at the time (currently the Chair of the General Council at the WTO), is an exemplary of imagining national priorities. At the 1997 APEC conference in Vancouver, for example, he said that he is "confident some of Canada's priorities (trade barriers will be
eliminated for 15 economic sectors such as fish, wood products, energy and oilseeds) will make it to the top of the agenda (CBC 1997a).” The magic of Marchi’s “Canada’s Priorities” are things that only national leaders and their cadre can conjure. Marchi’s priorities perform a smooth transition between “national interest” and the “good” for all people (s) living within the territorial boundaries of Canada. However, individuals in member states do not partake equally in the pursuit of national interest; in fact, the good of Canada’s trade interests is not necessarily good for Canadian workers, forests or health (nor our friends throughout the pacific). Increased exports of unprocessed raw logs from British Columbia, for instance, has little positive effect on the sustainability of Canada’s economic, social and environmental future. Anne-Marie Sleeman, the executive director of BC Environmentally Network, for instance countered the magic of Canada’s priorities at the People’s Summit in Vancouver. She said

We fundamentally oppose the current proposal to designate forest products for "Early Voluntary Sector Liberalization" (EVSL) within the APEC process. This proposal has been developed in an undemocratic manner without input from local communities. (EVSL) for forest products will drive additional demand and consumption, creating further pressures to log forests at unsustainable rates....This "fast track" proposal will lead to increased forest destruction in the Asia-Pacific Region and undermine community-based efforts to protect and sustainably manage forest ecosystems (Sleeman 1997).

After the global protests about logging in Clayoquot Sound, the days when what was good for forest industry was automatically assumed to be good for Canada are long over (Berman 1994; Magnusson and Shaw 2003).
Superseding its sovereign member states, however, APEC has become the central relay around which ecological, political, economic and social challenges throughout the Pacific Rim are funnelled. Having APEC at the centre of the Pacific Rim allows for extra-territorial issues (i.e., gender, poverty, environment and justice) to be policed back within its geopolitical frame for easier political consumption. For example, parallel conferences that deal specifically with APEC, like the People's Summit, began to emerge in 1993 in Seattle. These summits have grown to include a successful alliance of participants from environmental, solidarity, feminist, indigenous and labour organisations. As these people's summits become more successful, however, APEC becomes legitimated as the universal space where particular claims are heard if not recognised. Whether in praise or in anger (around trade issues, sustainable development, women's issues, cultural appropriation or even the make up of APEC itself), communications are directed to APEC. APEC is no longer limited to strict economics (trade, tariffs and liberalisation)(APEC 1997). It has developed an ear for soft trade issues (tourism, intellectual property rights and standards)(APEC 1997). It has grown a heart for social issues (environment, sustainable development and women's issues)(APEC 2000, 2003). It has even gained a voice through “official forums” that made possible statements about “hot topics” (human rights, terrorism and the future of the children)(APEC 2001, 2002a, b). States in these arrangements do not disappear; they change to fulfil the organisation's imaginary of which they are part (Cox 1987: 259). For many states, outside Canada, Japan, USA,
New Zealand and Australia, APEC is the governing organisation, to which they must conform or be disqualified.

APEC, in other words, becomes a node of governance in the shifting tides of globalisation/empire. APEC resolves the tensions, questions, and problems that arise in these shifts by incorporating (or ignoring) these "issues" in its agendas. It now claims to solve the very problems that it is responsible for creating. Any contemporary engagement with APEC itself — though reform, regulation, or protest — will further the discursive "authority" of APEC. The net result, instead of questioning the Pacific Rim, the concept that makes APEC possible, we question APEC. APEC wins. The very success of APEC, as we will see below, comes at the cost of some of the most fundamental narratives of national identification (Ericson and Doyle 1999).

At the 1997 APEC conference that Sergio Marchi pronounced the miracles of Canada's priorities, for example, the edges of nation, globe and empire collided. The result was a clash between protesters and police that would set the standard for globalisation protests in the future. Both the police and the protestors would look to Vancouver as a global model.

That November, however, the world descended on Vancouver. With 18 state leaders, 60 dignitaries recognised as internationally protected persons and approximately 10 000 visitors destined for APEC functions, everyone knew that there were going to be protests. Once the sovereign state becomes part of the geopolitical project to order the Pacific Rim, instead of treating
APEC as a threat to its national narrative, the state must in turn police its citizens.

The city of Vancouver and the Canadian Government revealed the most overt form of policing. For example, centralised organisational structures ironed out the cleavages between 500 local, 2500 national and 1000 solders from the Canadian Army to create one unified Canadian police/force (CBC 1997b). The conference was supposed to have an air of an international resort, free from local controversies surrounding APEC. The conference was supposed to be as an extra-territorial space, since like the Pacific Rim, it is neither inside nor outside the interstate system.

With the objective of tranquillity in mind, the point was made very clear to organisers; protesters were to be kept out of sight and earshot of APEC "at all costs" on direct orders from the Prime Minister's office (CBC 1997b). As such, when the demonstrators trespassed the boundaries that had been carefully established, patrolled and secured, the police took decisive action. The officer in charge, RCMP Staff Sargent Hugh Stewart (nicknamed "Sargent Pepper") gave less than 10 seconds to the protesters to move and then pepper sprayed everyone in sight (The Vancouver Sun 1998c). Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien stated later that "rather than talking a baseball bat or something (?) there're (police) trying to use civilised measures (pepper spray) (The Vancouver Sun 1998b my question mark)."

The extent to which Canada was more interested in protecting the APEC's order, as opposed to Canadians' interests, are revealed in the micro-
political disciplinary procedures that are used in the daily practice of security discourse.

On behalf of APEC, Canada kept its population under control. The right to free speech and peaceful assembly was abandoned. This is not legal in Canada. It violates the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Supreme Court decision (Ramsden v. Peterborough (City), (1993) 2 S.C.R. 1084). However, because the RCMP's policing was done in the service of APEC, under the protection of international recognised persons, it was considered within Canada's purview to violate the same Canadian rights that its police are "supposed" to be protecting (Ericson and Doyle 1999).

For instance, a central revelation at the APEC inquiry was the degree to which the state, through its international (CCIS), national (RCMP), regional (B.C.) and local (Vancouver) enforcement agencies was "legitimately" involved in the "private" affairs of its citizens (CISIS 2000). The RCMP had infiltrated the demonstrator's meetings to track their intentions (The Globe and Mail 1999), swapped files between police jurisdictions (Toronto Sun 1999) and spied on its own population (something prohibited by the mandate of CSIS) (The Globe and Mail 1998; The Province 1998; The Vancouver Sun 1998a).

Simply put, the question of excessive force used against Canadians was less important than the dignity of APEC. The purpose of the local, regional and national police turned from "upholding" the rights of its citizens (depending on who you are), and instead, became maintaining the dignity of
leaders with questionable human rights records and an organisation that only narrowly defines national interest. At the inquiry looking into the excessive use of violence, the magic story of Canada’s priorities unravelled with each testimony revealing a shifting mode of sovereignty that is increasingly servicing APEC’s imaginary instead of, for example, Canadians’.

Of course, these incidents are not unique to Canada. On the contrary, what happened in Canada was incredibly tame compared to what other clashes around the world exemplified. It is more likely that we hear about what happened in places like Canada because of the nature of the global media, but clashes between police and protests are now regular global events (Moore 2003). The protests/policing also became the model for Seattle 1999, Washington 2000, Genoa 2000 or Quebec 2000 and Honolulu 2000 marking the trend towards criminalization of dissent and the securitization of protest (Weldes and Laffery 2003). Instead of seeing what happened in Vancouver as unique, it is more useful to see APEC as a particular instance of a larger set of global trends that are reorganising the ways in which lives are being moulded. In and through the clashes of globalisation and empire, national frames shift and the shape of policing changes. Through the merging of the Pacific, European and American centuries, the clash of globalisation and empire is actualised. The question remains, if the Pacific Rim stands as a concept around which other possible ways of thinking, acting and being are actively policed and erased, then how can political resistance be imagined that
does not contribute to the further expansionary problem solving zeal of globalisation/empire?

**Oceans, Flows and Currents**

The “Pacific Quest” unfolds a geographic region in which geopolitical organisations, like APEC, seek to resolve the contemporary problems arising from divisions between self/other, universal/particular and east/west. The politics of crisis attempts to resolve an opposition in favour of one half of the dichotomy, however, with the clash between globalisation/empire it is also becoming more frequent to see both sides of the opposition being celebrated at the same time. Globalisation/empire are unfolding as new ways of resolving old problems become available. The degree to which they succeed will also create a smooth and pacified Pacific Rim.

However, at the heart of the Rim is the Pacific Ocean that won’t be pacified. The ocean does not conform to the spatial, territorial, controlled and geopolitical narratives of APEC, the Pacific Century or the Pacific Rim (Stienberg 2001). The language required to appreciate the ocean confounds such narratives. For example, take M.F. Murray (1859) who is one of the original western referents for a oceanic discourse, who describes the gulf stream in the following way:

*There is a river in the Ocean. In the severest droughts it never fails, and in the mightiest floods it never overflows. Its banks and its bottoms are of cold water, while its current is of warm. The Gulf of Mexico is its fountain and its mouth is in the Arctic Sea...its waters, as far out from the Gulf as the Carolina coasts, are of an indigo blue* (Maury 1859: 1).

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Instead of spatial lines, the ocean is composed of temperature gradients, fluid zones, and distant horizons and instead of empty, abstract or mapped space, the ocean is a constantly teeming, churning, flowing movement. Refusing to be resolved, the Ocean evades the sovereign desire to map, name and govern. The ocean’s flows and currents evade every desire for closure by the “Pacific Quest”. For Kolde this is a problem, he worries:

conceived from this perspective, the Pacific Rim has so far been a strictly terrestrial concept: the land ringing the ocean. Such a view is now obsolete. Maritime research and technology are unlocking accesses to heretofore unknown treasures of the seas on which the economic welfare of society will increasingly depend. Any definition of the Pacific Rim oriented toward the future must therefore integrate the land with the sea of the region. ... Incorporating the ocean into the definition introduces a linguistic complication. Is the word rim appropriate to describe the ocean itself as well as the lands on its shores? (Kolde 1976b: 3 original underline, emphasis added)

In other words, the ocean is an enigma in Kolde’s quest for unity, closure and erasure. In an attempt to salvage his quest, Kolde introduces a semantic solution to deal with his problem of metaphysical grammar. As a last ditch attempt to neatly rescue his quest he suggests that instead of the word “Rim” the substitute “Basin” should be used (Kolde 1976b: 3). The word basin, he implies, can capture oceanic flows better than the Rim and can therefore give the ocean a place with modern space (see Stienberg 2001). In the Pacific Rim/APEC discourse, at worst, the ocean completely disappears and, at best, the ocean contains floating resources to be extracted by its nation state members. But for those interested in other political horizons, the ocean must be affirmed as much more.

Contrary to Kolde’s scientific imaginary, the ocean is more than its resources. The ocean is already inhabited, not only by its “resources,” but also
by its peoples and by diverse ways of being in the world, those that might even
defy human understanding. The ocean cannot be reduced to the rim or a
basin because, like sovereignty, the Ocean is a concept. Within the enactment
of sovereignty, like within the Pacific Rim discourse, treating the ocean as a
concept, instead of a thing, is difficult to understand. Having had the
opportunity to debate the deputy ambassador to France when nuclear testing
was about resume in the South Pacific in 1996, the following point was made
clear to me: there is nothing to fear since Vancouver is thousands of miles
from nowhere (i.e. the Murora Atol where the tests were to take place). The
presumption being made was that the Pacific is empty. Communities that are
organised around and within the ocean have either been invisible on the
dominant terrestrial world maps or been erased in the process of creating new
representations of those regions (Gilroy 1993; Hau'ofa 1995; Stienberg 2001;
Wilson and Dirlik 1995a). However, the ocean does not need a home in the
Pacific Rim or Basin; it is already home.

There are at least two ways in which to appreciate flows and currents. One way in which to appreciate these movements is as a fluid ontology. Here
a flow is a movement of clashing currents and waves. As such, the ocean is a
fluid “space” of overlapping currents. For instance, Rob Wilson and Arlif
Dirlik (1995b) move towards representing, acknowledging, and celebrating
the ocean’s diversity and openness. The term Asia/pacific appreciates and
reclaims the fluidity at the core of the Pacific Rim. The slash is an open
disjunctive, “linkage yet difference (Wilson and Dirlik 1995b: 6),” in the desire
to close, know and map the rim. Asia/pacific affirms the complex and interwoven network of flows, relations and zones of becoming (Wilson 2001: 470). Wilson and Dirlik suggest that “the fluid, furious, and dislocational “transnationalization” of public space and local culture that is under way in all areas of life, from material to cultural production, would appear to be fundamental to the changes we observe and call forth responses in critical thinking (or rethinking) of the Asia-pacific region as cultural political location (Wilson and Dirlik 1995b: 12).” Instead of the Pacific Rim, therefore, Asia/Pacific is re-presented as a “space of cultural production (Wilson and Dirlik 1995b).” Asia/pacific respects how, quoting Chris Connery, “resistance writes its own geography (Connery quoted in Wilson and Dirlik 1995b: 6).” Shifting the organising language of the pacific discourse to a creative and contested language of Asia/pacific gives standing, recognition and acknowledgement to local enclaves that have previously been excluded, erased and ignored.

Therefore, instead of presenting the ocean as a problem to be solved, a flow to be contained, it can be also presented in terms its ontological fluidity. At the heart of the Euro-American quest in the Pacific, are erased histories and possible futures. Epeli Hau’ofa (1995) makes a fundamental shift in thinking from the Pacific Rim and its scattered Pacific Islands towards the Pacific Ocean. The ocean is not a vast empty space in the midst of a solid rim of land. Nor are pacific islands, small isolated and scattered. The ocean is a “sea of islands with their inhabitants(Hau’ofa 1995: 92)” The flows and
relations between islands and island peoples constitute the ocean. Whereas, islands appear small and isolated from a land centric view, in the embrace of the ocean, islands are nodes between different flows, migrations and negotiations. Hau’ofa affirms that order, containment and smallness are the axiological aims of a western tradition but they are not the singular encompassing condition of all being. The ocean, here, is treated as an ontological juxtaposition to the Rim. For Hau’ofa, “Oceania is vast, Oceania is expanding, Oceania is hospitable and generous, Oceania is Humanity rising from the depths of brine and regions of fire deeper still, Oceania is Us. We are the sea, we are the ocean, we must wake up to this ancient truth and together use it to overturn all hegemonic views that aim ultimately to confine us again....(Hau’ofa 1995: 98)” Hau’ofa’s ontological statement implies the ocean does not separate; it flows.

Hau’ofa’s inference that the ocean flows however, tends to develop into a counter-ontological statement. Such a development should be troubling for those interested in flows. It enters into the perpetual game of substituting one foundation, concept or ontology for another. Furthermore, simply celebrating errant flows or juxtaposing flows against order has the effect reproducing a modern geopolitical grammar or inviting the desire to (re)impose one. The tension between the politics of crisis and the crisis of the political is not evaded by simply affirming movement. Instead there need to be an attention to how movement happens,
The dominant story about immigration is an instance of fluid foundations solidifying into apparently secure national foundations. It is always tempting to forget how flows themselves can be read to found solid spaces, identities and functions. For example, central to Canada's contemporary national story (after the Canada Citizens Act) is the repeated image of successive flows of global immigrants coming together to create a multicultural Canadian landscape. This story, at one moment, stands as a progressive move when set against the puritanical versions of Canada as a nation of two linguistic solitudes. At another moment, the story of immigration and multiculturalism forgets its roots as a story of settlement, occupation and/or displacement (See Fujikane and Okamura 2000; King 2003; Mitchell 1996; Trask 1993). Katharyne Mitchell, for instance, explores the class bias that occurs within Canadian immigration patterns, in order to re-read settlement in Vancouver within the movements of trans-national capital (Mitchell 1996). People may always move, but one cannot fully separate the people from the various overlapping forces that move people or constitute their movement.

Forgetting the impact of movement is the core feature of the document designed to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the "Canadian Citizen Act." The document begins with the memorialisation of Canada's fluid claim to truth. It reads,

Immigration, the entrance of a people into a country for the purpose of settling there, has always played a central role in Canada's history. It was as much a feature of ancient times, when the ancestors of Canada's Native peoples migrated from Asia by land via Beringia or by sea via the Japanese current, as it is of the present day, when
immigrants from around the world come to this country in the thousands (Knowles and Canada. Citizenship and Immigration Canada. 2000: 1).

The Canadian narrative of successive waves of immigration is a discourse that manages movement and erases prior foundational claims. Canada’s essential fluidity is rehearsed as a natural continuation of “ancient” immigration. Contemporary flows replace ancient flows and therefore a national community is said to be founded from indigenous foundations. A narrative of immigration, and its reproduction in multiculturalism, replaces the narrative of settlement and occupation. “Canada’s Aboriginal people” we are told in a footnote “commonly believe that they have lived on Canadian Soil from the beginning of time and that various myths of theirs support this position (Knowles and Canada. Citizenship and Immigration Canada. 2000: 1).” By presenting it this way, enacting sovereignty’s function of deciding between truth and belief, the fluid narrative of Canadian emergence acts to displace other flows and therefore creates the illusion of Canada being a stable entity. The result is that in solidifying Canada’s national origin story, at the cost of indigenous stories, Canadian soil “magically” precedes white contact. Further, Canadian immigration, settlement and colonisation are simply presented as stories of late indigenous arrivals. As such, immigration brokers do not see the overlapping irony of making statements like: “Immigration has helped to make Canada one of the world’s richest countries, and the country is largely free of racial tension. Many recent newcomers hail from Asia. Canada’s indigenous peoples make up less than two per cent of the population.
The diversity of indigenous claims, practices and migrations, therefore, are negated repackaged and erased within singular historical immigration that feeds the open, flowing mosaic of Canadian multiculturalism. Canada prospers through Canadian naturalisation while others in Canada do not. The lesson: although "movements, speeds and slowness, are sometimes enough to reconstruct a smooth space... never believe that a smooth space will suffice to save us (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 500)."

Instead of only treating oceanic flows and currents as a counter ontological space they should also be treated as ontological temporalities. To treat a flow temporally, and in an affirmation of the Event, puts "experimentation before ontology (Rajchman 2000: 6)." When experimentation comes before ontology, it is impossible to assume a fixed way of being in the world (like a national citizen or a body without organs) and instead those conceptual foundations become contingent. When ontology is contingent, being could always become something different, ontology is opened to the unknown. Hau'ofa's allusion that the ocean flows, is a beckoning to an open horizon, it need not ground opposition, but instead can opens futures. Flows, like concepts, are not found; they are made. A flow or current, in this sense, affirms that there is something, someone, someself or someworld, yet to arrive upon the migrating horizon.

When we start with the stories and histories of migration, the very ground beneath our feet beings to move (Soguk and Whitehall 1999).
Movement does not only happen in relation to stable horizons, but horizons themselves migrate. The search for solid ground is illusory. Movement never starts; it changes. Like the ocean, migration demands that we recognise how we have always already been moving (Diaz 2003). The result is that the most stable continental foundations begin to shift, not towards a new ontology, or an onto-political posture, but towards an affirmation of openings.

The Mid-West, for example, is an unlikely a place to find the Pacific Ocean. Nevertheless, the Pacific liquefies the desert. The salt flats around Salt Lake City, for instance, are a reminder of a time long ago forgotten, and a present time often ignored. The salt deposits view in retrospect the flows that cut through rock and created Grand Canyons. Everywhere in the very dry desert there are the signs of a very wet, oceanic physical and cultural geography. The desert is flooded with an ocean of edges, histories and stories. All that is solid is flooded with the ocean and melts. The Hula Hoop, Island Boogie, the Aloha Shirt and Slack Key Guitar, Blue Hawaii, for example, remind how the attempt to occupy and claim the Pacific, in turn changed America (Stillman and Mundt 2002). Furthermore, after Hawaii, Utah, of all places, has the next highest concentration of pacific Islanders in the United States (Grieco 2001). Such a present is often ignored; it demonstrates the Mormon reach into to the Pacific Quest and the breadth of the Pacific diaspora. Ironically, in the American Heartland beats a Pacific heart. The Mid-West, in particular, and continental North America, in general, is and always has been a moving island in the Pacific archipelago (Diaz 2003).
To affirm flows through the concept of the Ocean does not conspire to constitute a counter or oppositional world. Instead, using Foucault's words, the Ocean reminds us to always "remain attentive to the unknown knocking at the door (Foucault quoted in Rajchman 2000: 7)." An oceanic current flows with what one cannot yet understand, know, or acknowledge. A current is not indebted to making the world accessible to knowledge; currents always start from the middle. Currents start from the inside and as such, they open the already known terrains of the self, nation and world to the unknowable horizon beyond. To every current, there is a horizon; to every horizon, there is a moving beyond (a subject explored in chapter 4).

The horizon is ephemeral, it is a movement that cannot ground or be grounded. The horizon opens modernity's desire to contain space. Its sublime edge, displaces the sure grounds of modern ways of knowing and replaces them with its own (Turnbull 1994). The relationship of Chuukese with the horizon, for example, expresses this appreciation of openings. Joakim Peter explains that "Ppaileng is the space we (Chuukese) refer to today as the horizon, that is where the sea and the sky meet, beyond which is a world of foreign things, peoples, spirits – navigators and travellers are specialists in this realm... (Peter 2000: 256)." With an appreciation of the horizon, Joakim Peter explains, there is a refusal to claim and narrate space.

The same space that colonialism attempts to subdue and reorient has already been inhabited by others, namely island travellers. Islanders are ocean people. On many levels and in many forms, travelling is a major part of how islanders deal with, appropriate, and understand space. Space is not just physical. It is fluid and mobile, so that navigation is just one way of conceptualizing these seemingly unruly forces. Travelling is about casting and expanding one's own boundaries, thus demanding an
attempt made here to define the terms of both travellers and the nature of travelling (Peter 2000: 256).

Against the dominance of narration’s grammar of space and of the desire to Name the ocean the Pacific Rim, Peter reminds the reader that navigation is about negotiating boundaries, dealing with the edge of one’s experience, self and expectations. The horizon pushes the limits of what you “are” supposed “to be.” The horizon, of the ocean and self, demands becoming different and “the world becomes that of moving oceans of islands (Peter 2000: 256).” In pacific navigation, the ocean canoe sits still and the Islands begin to move (DeLisle and Diaz 1997). The horizon is not spatial, the end of the world, with the monster that awaits on old maps of the Pacific (like Kolde might imagine), but instead, the horizon is an opening, a new earth, a new self, that is always already moving in the practice of navigation.

Attending to the horizon, and to the current that is yet to come, emphasises the continual engagement with the practices of community, self and world. The meaning of modernity’s supports (like territory, identity and security) change since refusing to move makes them unobtainable. Using modernity’s definition of security, for example, has the effect of making a community less secure because it negates the fertile horizon available through navigation. Sailors, surfers and fishers alike will caution those interested in survival: never turn your backs on the ocean. The ocean is full of surprises. Uncertainty, not categorical unity, exemplifies the Ocean. In uncertain waters, perhaps only in uncertain water, the problem of the political again arises.
When the Ocean is affirmed in excess of the Pacific Quest’s attempt to erase, contain and map difference fails, new political processes of becoming-other and exceeding one’s limits, stand out as important political moments. In the clash of globalisation/empire, when the boundaries of sovereignty are shifting, those moments of local transformation become crucial. An appreciation of how movement occurs in and through localised horizons becomes especially germane. Although generally seen as a problem to be solved, instead of a future to be affirmed, such transformations are crucial political moments in global affairs. A recent referendum in the Pacific north-west offers oceanic eddies through which to imagine such local horizons of global political solidarity.

**Exceeding Politics after the Event**

Politics in the Pacific Rim is about taking sides. Politics therefore, occurs, inside and between state’s territories, identities and populations. However, if the political is appreciated through the concept of the Ocean, instead of through a sovereign imaginary, the political emerges in the fluid eddies that subduct, transform and overwhelm secured boundaries. Oceanic politics are not political because they overwhelm old boundaries, they are political because of how, through different verbs, openings and horizons are affirmed. By bringing the solidifying Canada’s Pacific North West (as described above) into the fluid horizon of the ocean, political contests stream over terrestrial limits.
In the continuing clash of Canada's arrival in the Pacific North West, where the diversity of indigenous claims, practices and migrations are repackaged within a solidifying narrative of frontiers and/or multiculturalism (see King 2003; Perry 1996: Chapter 5), the latest provincial government of the occupied territories was again "democratically" decided. To do so the British Columbia Liberals, with the left vote split between the New Democratic Party (NDP) and the Greens, solidified the right vote by promising the right wing B.C. Reform Party to hold a binding referendum on the future of Treaty Negotiations with First Nations. The push for such a referendum emerged in the context of fourteen original treaties signed at the time of B.C. confederation, one hundred and twenty-two years of B.C.'s refusal to negotiate more treaties, ten years of stalled negotiations and one recent financially and territorially endowed Nisga Treaty. The referendum emerged out of increasing anxiety by settler populations about the future of Aboriginal Rights and Title to the rest of the Pacific North-West.

The 2002 referendum offers a unique political problem. How does one act in solidarity with a position that does not fall within, or is in fact immiscible with, the unfolding of available avenues of political action? As a cautionary note, the stakes of this encounter are more interesting for those interested in the future of politics, in general, than they are for those who are interested in the specifics of indigenous or Aboriginal relations with Canada, in particular. It targets the sense that the language of the political is impoverished by empty gestures of oppositional alliances that reproduce what
is challenged. The increasing need to expand the political-literary repertoire is developed through ephemeral moments of becoming-other and into political moments that select openness over opposition. Establishing the constitutional context and exploring the traditional alliances around the referendum opens a horizon that encourages the affirmation of political solidarity.

Offering the unknown a place with the sovereign domain of the known and the different a place within the logic of the same, the referendum unfolded across the province. The referendum was to take place under the *B.C. Referendum Act*, whereby 50% on any question (regardless of overall participation) secures the answer as legally binding. It was conducted by mail out ballot, where approximately 2.1 million Ballots were sent to all residents who have lived in B.C. for at least 6 months. The referendum contained eight questions. The guiding mission statement on the ballot read “the Government of British Columbia is committed to negotiating, workable, affordable treaty settlements that will provide certainty, finality and equality.” Although only a “yes” vote was considered binding, Geoff Plant, BC Attorney General, suggested to the CBC that “for too long the people of BC have been shut out of the treaty process... The referendum is going to give the people of British Columbia a direct vote in the principles that should guide the province’s treaty negotiations (Plant quoted in Bowman 2002).”

As pollyannaish as this proclamation might sound, the referendum was subject to dense legal and public debate. As outlined by Louis Mandell (2002),
the political legitimacy of the provincial referendum floundered around the following considerations: First, Section 35 of the Constitution prohibits the unilateral extinction of aboriginal title without compensation and treaties must be negotiated in "good faith." Second, Section 91(24) establishes clear limits for provincial jurisdiction and prioritises the federal fiduciary and treaty making relationship with First Nations over those of provincial interest. Effectively, First Nations have a nation-to-nation relationship with Canada, not the province of British Columbia whom is only invited to sit at the treaty table. In the sense that these are nation-nation relations, third, First Nations can never be a "minority" interest in Canada (as are provinces and other interest groups). The interest is located the domain of global politics which is uniquely enshrined in the Canadian Constitution. Section 25 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms recognises the unique rights of Aboriginal peoples. They are unique rights in Canada because they pre-exist the assertion of Canadian Sovereignty. In this sense, to treat "all Canadians" as if they have the same rights is anti-Canadian. Ironically, equality only happens after conquest. The final stumbling block for the political legitimacy of the provincial referendum is that decisions from both the Supreme Court of Canada and the Supreme Court of BC have already answered many of the B.C. Liberal's questions. Prejudicing affordability, finality and certainty does not reflect good faith negotiations at the treaty table. Consequently, it is doubtful, if not impossible, that it could unilaterally implement any of the referendum results (Mandell 2002).
Leaving the legal controversy aside, a court injunction was sought on the political grounds that the referendum would inflame native and non-native relations (CBC 2002a). Could the referendum be interpreted as a hate crime? Although the injunction failed, as it is the government’s democratic prerogative to hold a referendum, it raised the important question: What was the referendum’s rhetorical purpose? Was its purpose to polarise, antagonise or harmonise? This question drew political engagement away from the question of constitutional validity, and instead opened it towards the question of political solidarity.

Immediately the referendum drew scathing public criticisms. Canada’s most seasoned pollster, Angus Reid, described the referendum as “one of the most amateurish, one-sided attempts to gauge the public will that I (Reid) have seen in my professional career (quoted in Bowman 2002).” Implying that the referendum was an attempt to by-pass the courts and recycle failed legal arguments in domain of civil society to garner political legitimacy, Archbishop Douglas Hambridge of the Anglican Church quipped “We believe stupid questions deserve stupid answers (quoted in CBC 2002b).” Both on the ballot and in civil society, the government set the political table in terms of binary oppositions, effectively asking: who's side are you on?

Among those groups that endorsed the BC government’s position there were some interesting alliances. BC White Pride, for instance, argued “First Nations people get preferential treatment (and) the mail-in ballot will promote unity among white people (CHBC 2002).” On the other front, social
justice groups announced their intentions to side with First Nations' interests and against the what they say as an ideologically driven provincial referendum. Such alliances, no doubt, represent the progressive edge of Canadian politics. Nevertheless, an alliance is an organisation of interests that, while siding with positions across boundaries of privilege, maintain the practices and benefits that constitutes that privilege in the first place. In this context, allied groups were concerned that “the minority rights” of First Nations people would be determined by “the majority” population through poorly established and unclearly worded questions. Should someone who moved to BC from elsewhere, six months ago decide the heredity and inalienable rights of First Nations (in what is now known as BC)? If yes, by dint of all being Canadian, should not all Canada (i.e., outside of B.C.) participate in the referendum? More to the point, should the universal rights of a unique interest be defined by the particular and immediate interest of a (selected) majority/minority? Or further still, bordering on the possibility of an interesting question, should an individual (from BC) be invited to negotiate the terms of righting a national historical wrong for which the sovereignty of the Canadian project is indebted? Groups argued that protecting Aboriginal claims coincide with the constitutional federalist spirit of Canadian Democracy. An alliance emerged, the liberal position gleefully celebrated, to be Canadian is to have Aboriginal interests at heart.

Polls showed that B.C. residents were fairly split over the referendum. Of those expressing an opinion, 55% of those surveyed were opposed, while
45% were in favour to the referendum (accurate to within +/- 4.4%) (CGT Research International 2002). When asked “whose side are you on,” Mennonite, Anglican, Presbyterian and United churches counselled their congregations, Jewish and Muslim Federations likewise offered voting guidance, and Environmental, labour and social justice groups offered their commitment to the First Nations. Various groups counselled their members to either vote “no” on all the questions, vote no on Question 6 or spoil the ballot by marking it void.

Of the 2.1 million ballots that were sent out only 760,000 were returned. Of the votes on average 9% voted “no” with question 1 and 6 gaining the highest “no” vote of 15.48% and 12.75% respectively. Of the total votes sent in, approximately 60,000 were spoiled. Although the BC government secured 89% of the votes, the total 760,000 ballots returned account for only 35% of eligible voters (CGT Research International 2002). The low voter turn out indicates voter apathy that can, in turn, be interpreted as either tacit consent or tacit dissent for democratic governance itself. Minimally, low participation undercut the government’s desired clarifying mandate (regardless of the Referendum Act).

In excess of these traditional forms of alliance, in the heart of the democratic process itself, a truly novel political problem presented itself. If a political verb is sought, it is important to exceed the available options (state and alliance). The domain of available democratic and egalitarian options is inimical with such a position of solidarity. Solidarity requires transformation
and therefore some other verb is needed. Amidst the emerging controversy about even holding such a referendum, Gordon Campbell said on the April 9th edition of the National Post, “I’ve never heard people say ‘it’s time that the government stopped asking people what they should do. It’s time they forget about the public.’” When framed in terms of democracy, people backed off. Any challenge to the assumed legitimacy of the referendum invited the charge of being anti-democratic. Similarly, since the referendum appealed to the equality all BC residents, both in terms of the referendum questions and those who could vote, questioning the legitimacy of the referendum process would again invite the charge of being anti-egalitarian. Such is the bind of grammatical politics.

Increasingly contemporary problems, whether it is the war on Iraq, voting for your conscience, combating terrorism, forces the scenario of choosing between a lesser of two evils, and if you question the very process, you invite total negation. The contemporary stasis of the political imagination, being caught between the politics of crisis and the crisis of the political, offers no political possibility beyond reproducing the problem that should be politicised in the first place.

Therefore the political problem goes even further than choosing between lesser evils and being called names. The problem is, regardless of how one votes, or even if one spoils their ballot, the referendum prevails. Ultimately, to participate in the referendum is to recognise the sovereignty of the Canadian quest (claimed in the 1763 Peace of Paris) and to participate in
an encounter that erases (or attempts to) the hereditary (prior) sovereignty of First Nations. Referendums, like elections, taxes, rent and the census, constitute an “apparatus of capture (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 424-73).”

An “apparatus of capture” is like a knot. A knot is a rope that is made to work against itself; struggling against a knot only makes it tighter. In capture, doing what is expected (submitting or struggling against capture through opposition) makes the grip of capture tighter. As such, the captured is always obliged to act in the service of the capture. Capture, like assimilation, is a moment that simultaneously includes and excludes. James Clifford documents how the courts enter into the practice of assimilation when they attempt to define who is Mashpee, for instance, and the conflicts that arises when the courts use terms like “tribe,” “group,” “bands” etc... (Clifford 1988: Chapter 12). Sometimes a mode of differentiation is also a practice of inclusion. Juridical definition is such a binary machine, “the mechanism of capture contributes from the outset to the constitution of the aggregate upon which the capture is effectuated (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 446).” Included/exclusion functions by containing the “outside” within the logic of the inside and then giving it limited circulation (called freedom, purpose, meaning or choice).

As an apparatus of capture, therefore, the referendum does not solicit different viewpoints. It is not designed recognise the opinions of British Colombians. Instead, the referendum secures Canadian sovereignty through capture. Participation in the referendum is limited, as sovereign prerogative
would have it, to choosing between pre-established options that reproduce a sovereign order of qualification or disqualification. Qualification or disqualification always precedes the questions; they constitute the terrain of available avenues and acceptable options. Qualification means citizenship and disqualification means further assimilation, ironically, presented as a mode of re-qualification. Any demand/offer to be included/excluded strengthens the sovereign right to “include and/or exclude.” The politics of crisis, as such, always already happens within a captured sovereign space and the crisis of the political always laments that capture. The result is that all differences and political possibilities are always already captured within the sovereign limit of the same. In the referendum process, like the treaty process,\textsuperscript{xv} Canadian sovereignty is always already being reproduced.

When it came time to evaluate Indigenous/Canadian relations, the fundamental question was not on the ballot; it was the ballot. Therefore, the novel political question that was faced in the referendum was: how does one resist, or more generally how does one do politics at all, when the terrain of politics is itself suspect, if not wholly occupied, and assigned a normalising function? In order to undermine the discursive authority of the government to EVEN ask these questions, the democratic ideal of participation was not only abandoned but also exceeded. Alexander the Great once taught\textsuperscript{xi} that sometimes the only answer for a knot is \textit{to cut}.

The solidarity sought by some First Nations’ Chiefs, led by Judith Sayers of the Hupacasath First Nation in Port Alberni, required that that non-
native B.C. residents exceed their available options by surrendering their right to vote. Unlike alliance, solidarity requires that something be sacrificed. To exceed available options it is imperative to move against your habituated and naturalised inclination. Therefore, instead of voting “no” in the referendum, mailing in a spoilt ballot or not participating at all, a further option was proposed. It required sending your ballot to a collection site run by First Nations where ballots would be counted and then ceremonially destroyed. Here one would participate by not participating, not through opposition and negation, but through affirmation and exceeding the available options.

It is interesting to note the paternalistic and possessive responses that emerged in response to Chief Judith Sayers’ call to action. Such responses took expression in statements like “but that is ineffective, it’s my right to vote and I want my vote to count.”xvii “The Majority in government presupposes the right to vote...the majority in the universe assumes as pregiven the right and power of man (the norm) (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 291).” What was requested was not that non-natives use their privilege to vote on behalf or in concert with First Nations, but on the contrary that they give up their right to vote to someone else, surrendering the quintessential modern privilege and exceeding their entitlement to the norm.

Exceeding has much in common with what Deleuze and Guattari call becoming-other. Becoming-other can be understood as a relationship between a Majoritarian (Canadian) and a minoritarian (native) possibility
Majoritarian here means something like a norm, standard or centre, which retains its qualification by dint of practices that aid in normalising and reproducing itself. Minoritarian, therefore, is that which the Majoritarian builds itself from and against through capture. Capture is opposed to becoming, but becoming differs from capture (Deleuze 1983: 188). Capture is never active, it makes active forces join them and become reactive (Deleuze 1983: 57). Becoming reactive is *separating forces from what they can do* (Deleuze 1983: 57). Becoming minoritarian, in contrast, cannot be about winning the majority (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 292). All politics is becoming-minoritarian or sovereignty’s reproduction through reactive capture. It is impossible, therefore, to become-majoritarian. Both becoming-man and becoming-sovereign, for instance, are impossible processes because sovereignty and man are created through capture. A boy does not become a Man; he takes it from the world still designed to give it to him. Becoming is indifferent to these practices. The result, however, is that for Deleuze and Guattari all political movements are either located on the infinite horizon of becoming-minoritarian or reproducing sovereignty through capture.

Exceeding moves slightly differently than becoming. To exceed requires to transgress the very capture enacted by sovereignty and cannot be the same thing as acting in an alliance. Exceeding risks the assumed privileges of Canadian practices of capture (like citizenship). Exceeding, like becoming requires a kind of metamorphosis (Patton 2000: 110). A metamorphosis does not build on what was already there, nor does it
constitute a swapping of positions, "becoming produces nothing other than itself (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 238)." Exceeding makes what it already is available, operate in a different manner. Exceeding is therefore untimely. It requires that that the realm of the same is not reproduced. Acting in an untimely fashion is "acting counter to our time and thereby acting on our time, and let us hope, for the benefit of a time to come (Deleuze 1994: xxi)." Exceeding requires that the assumed categories and qualifications of existence, like being-Canadian, are put at risk, surrendered, so as to open to different fluid horizons.

What was being proposed did not amount to a call for non-natives to become Native. That is impossible. In this context, it meant to give up a privileged self, to operate before, against and beyond one's privileged qualification. Warning against the potential for misunderstanding Deleuze and Guattari clarify that "becoming is certainly not imitating, or identifying with something; neither is it regressing-progressing; neither is it corresponding, establishing corresponding relations; neither is it producing, producing a filiation or producing through filiation. Exceeding is a verb with a consistency all its own; it does not reduce to, or lead back to, "appearing," "being," "equallling" or "producing (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 239)."" This does not amount to being native at heart. To exceed requires that non-natives become-other than what they are entitled by dint of being Majoritarian. Instead of responding to the government's call "what side are you on?" the call of political solidarity is "exceed the sides you're on."
The implications for exceeding available positions are greater than one might assume. Since, exceeding goes beyond the qualification of identity, which is always already a Majoritarian position, solidarity requires that all involved are implicated in the process of exceeding available options. To exceed requires two simultaneous movements: first where the subject withdraws from the majority and second where the minoritarian medium rises up (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 291). Regeneration, healing, and affirmation are the political moments of exceeding the available options.

The problem of exceeding emerges in Deleuze's reading of the Nietzschean relationship between affirmation and the eternal return (see Chapter 2). Indifferent to negation and opposition, affirmation is "the power of becoming active (Deleuze 1983: 54)." This culminates in the eternal return. Against the dialectic and against transcendent capture, the eternal return, is not the return of the same, but the return of that which is different (Deleuze 1983: 48). The result is a position of affirmation, where it is possible to exceed the options made politically available.

A statement stapled to telephone poles during the referendum summarises the above. Someone stapled to Victoria telephone poles "if you want to "help" us, fuck off, if your liberation is wrapped up in my liberation, then we have work to do." In this encounter, the survival of the horizon is not re-captured because in that opening, the majority recognises their own process of solidarity and exceeds the options available. Ashis Nandy articulates the position well, "as a state of mind, colonialism is an indigenous
process released by external forces. Its sources lie deep in the minds of the rulers and the ruled. Perhaps that which begins in the minds of men must also end in the mind of men (Nandy 1998: 3)." Solidarity is framed in this way so that non-native privilege becomes something political and exceeds its reactive habits. Chief Judith Sayers offered this option in an impressive moment of political acumen and opened the political horizons of possibility in a moment of sovereign capture that most opposed.

Conclusion:

The hard question to be asked at this point is how is it possible to exceed in the clash of globalisation and empire in a time of terror? How, in other words, is it possible to exceed the available options when the nexus of globalisation/empire is so encompassing? For example, John Weeks, the Canadian Permanent representative at the WTO once tautologically said: "Globalisation is reality...the well being of ordinary people (is) much more dependent on events outside national borders...and therefore the world needs predictable international rules and strong institutions to enforce them (quoted in Ó Tuathail, Herod, and Roberts 1998: 9)." The lure of such "thinking," what is called a dogmatic image of thought (see chapter 5), is that the problem already assumes (and necessitates) its answer. Since, politics is likely to occur along those edges of actualisation, if the nature and location of those edges are already assumed, then political resistance will always enact the dominant mode of solving political problems. What is important in the
clash of globalisation/empire is the ways in which pasts, presents and futures are being articulated and how and where those pasts, presents and futures are being actualised. To exceed the available options, these loci of recuperation, capture, and decision need to be politicised. To get an oblique view of the articulation and actualisation of political “realities” one such project, the Event unfolding of the Pacific Rim proves useful (though it could have been the EU, FTA, WTO or AU). Treating the Pacific Rim as an event makes it possible to imagine other events, concepts possibilities.

This process is invisible when the Pacific Rim or the Ocean are treated as things instead of Events and Concepts. Reframing the Pacific Rim and the Ocean through the Event reveals a different world emerges and different verbs of the political. Instead of a geopolitical world of sovereign states, like that represented by APEC, it is possible to imagine an ocean of flows, currents and horizons. Old boundaries open to an uncertain political future. When such a sensibility is brought to a contemporary struggle, those sites and strategies that are usually discounted become more important. They politicise moving within movement. These movements are not more important because they are capable of undermining modernity, US hegemony, Globalisation or Empire, they are important because they re-activate the political.

To politicise these edges, as political verbs, this chapter has affirmed that there is always change. Sometimes change is small, sometimes big and sometime unknown. For example, it has been reported recently that rogue waves are more comment than previously imagined. A rogue wave is an
oceanic Event, *where from nowhere*, a wave, sometimes 100ft high, appears in an ocean of smaller waves and then disappears. One report by Captain Anderson Chase (1986), on the SS Spray (ex-Gulf Spray) in the Gulf Stream, off of Charleston, tells the story like this:

It was actually a nice day with light breezes and no significant sea. *(The only)* very long swell *(was)* about 15 feet high and probably 600 to 1000 feet long. This one *(rogue wave)* hit us at the change of the watch at about noon. The photographer was an engineer (name forgotten), and this was the last photo on his roll of film. We were on the wing of the bridge, with a height of eye of 56 feet, and this wave broke over our heads. This shot was taken as we were diving down off the face of the second of a set of three waves, so the ship just kept falling into the trough, which just kept opening up under us. It bent the foremast (shown) back about 20 degrees, tore the foreword firefighting station (also shown) off the deck (rails, monitor, platform and all) and threw it against the face of the house. It also bent all the catwalks back severely *(Chase 1986 my bold added)*.

On Dec. 1, 1986 it looked like this:

![Figure 2: Rogue Wave](image-url)
One hypothesis to explain such a wave is that rogue waves emerges as a fractal might; it is the amplification of minor waves into an event that exceeds the available physics (Improper winds, geography, breaks, energy, earthquakes). Kahlil Gibran once said, "In one drop of water are found all the secrets of all the oceans." Might a politics of the Event be similar? Can Events be created or must we simply wait?

While have nothing but hope for such a wave, it is more important and effective, to always already enact the waves that can be otherwise imagined. There is no guarantee how exceeding available options might affect the world, your world or your/their worlds. Gandhi said it well, “Be the change that you want to see in the world.” Deleuze and Guattari might say if differently: “become the changes your/worlds are always already becoming.” Nevertheless, to affirm of open horizons is to encounter new political verbs that exceed the available horizons of political action. Galileo Galilei said it better, “The Sun, with all the planets revolving around it, and depending on it, can still ripen a bunch of grapes as though it had nothing else in the Universe to do."

Through the Event, new verbs can be affirmed, when new verbs are affirmed, it again becomes possible exceed a politics of crisis or the crisis of the political. In order to exceed sovereignty’s verbs—to oppose, to decide, to judge, to code and to capture -- the next chapter turns to the verb to encounter.
To explore the verb to encounter, the next chapter focuses on how the beyond has been used points to different ethical-political verbs. The beyond functions in political theory in order to legitimate an assumed world. The other and the outside are used to legitimate the self and the inside. In order to get critical distance from this dominant framing, I turn to a genre of the beyond, namely science fiction, to offer a richer encounter with the beyond. I provide three examples of encounter in an attempt to pull the verb encounter away from the gravity of sovereignty. The first reproduces the discursive limits of international relations by being attentive to the spatial temporal framing that occurs in Star Trek. The second explores how in re-reading Starship Troopers the beyond can be mobilised in order to problematize the dominant discursive frame. To conclude, I argue that these both reproduce the spatial framing that they seek to evade. As an example of exceeding the logic of sovereignty, I argue that, as an Event, The Martian Chronicles introduces the encounter as an affirmation of the other. The Martian Chronicles affirms the verb to encounter.
We were walking barefoot on the beach, with music in the air, ocean breeze washing over us, stars in the sky, full moon rising-and the most you can say is stimulating?

--Star Trek: The Next Generation - All Good Things

And the moon was so beautiful, that the ocean held up a mirror.

--Ani DiFranco

A single and same voice for the whole thousand-voiced multiple, a single and same Ocean for all the drops, a single clamour of Being for all beings: on condition that each being, each drop, and each voice has reached the state of excess

--Gilles Deleuze

CHAPTER 4
The Problem of the “World and Beyond”: Encountering “the Other” in Science Fiction

This chapter flows from the assertion that the enabling foundational myths of modern world politics have been exceeded, and that an adequate conception of the political, one that is capable of dealing with this profound, yet cliché, condition of indeterminacy, contingency, and change, has yet to be generated in globalisation/empire. What was called the stasis of the contemporary political imagination in the introduction to this dissertation is being refined as “The problem of the world and beyond” in this chapter. “The problem of the world and beyond” represents an epistemological and ontological crisis whereby contemporary events are exceeding the conventional grammar of modern politics. Instead of further denying “the problem of the world and beyond” and offering its eternal reification, simulation, and the violence that follows, this chapter explores alternative
ways of dealing with the condition of being (or becoming) beyond the limits of modern thought and action. My highest concern is that political responses to “the problem of the world and beyond” are nothing short of fanatic attempts to contain movement, deny change, and ignore anything that is different. In asking how a politics of crisis and crisis of the political reproduces itself as the contemporary stasis of the political imagination, the beyond emerges as a problem.

The beyond can be introduced as an affirmation of those aspects of contemporary late-modern, high-capitalist life that exceed modern national forms. Jean Baudrillard's (1988) survey of America, for example, presents a radically different account of “the nation” than Tocqueville's conducted in 1831 and Sartre's compiled in 1945. Where Tocqueville and Sartre sought America in tangible institutions, and in attitudes, characteristics, and deep mores, Baudrillard presents America as an affirmation of spaces of pure circulation, wrapped in “the exhilaration of obscenity, the obscenity of obviousness, the obviousness of power and the power of simulation (1988: 27).” America has overcome the traditional classifications, qualifications, quantifications, and essentializations of national political life. Similarly, a world where meaning can be determined, mapped, and shelved, a world that makes sense and can itself be sensed, has also been exceeded, overtaken, by (virtual) world(s) of change and movement. Contemporary life is deemed one of speed, not order, where speed “creates pure objects. It is itself a pure object, since it cancels out the ground and territorial reference-points, since it
runs ahead of time to annul time itself, since it moves (more) quickly than its own cause and obliterates that cause by outstripping it (Baudrillard 1988: 6).” A condition of speed generates the problem of exceeding one’s condition of possibility. Developing this problem, Jean-Luc Nancy suggests that “there is no longer any world: no longer a mundus, a cosmos, a composed and complete order (from) within which one might find a place, a dwelling and the elements of an orientation (Nancy 1997: 4).” Instead, he suggests, “the world of sense is cumulating in the unclear and in nonsense (Nancy 1997: 9).” This non-sense is not an absence of meaning but an excess, what Paul Virilio (1997), referring to the grey matter in the brain, calls “grey pollution.” This grey pollution, this glut of meaning and information that overwhelms the senses, constitutes “the problem of the world and beyond” and the crisis of the day. If non-sense, speed, and excess have overwhelmed an ordered world, as the beyond, then how does one make sense of the world? In this sense the beyond is everywhere.

This contemporary thesis—that the world of sense has been overtaken by a condition of non-sense and thus created the epistemological and ontological crisis of modern politics—relies on a historically and geographically contingent idea: that for every world there is a simultaneous beyond. Immanuel Kant offers an interesting way to explore this grammar because of the mutual dependency implied between his system of philosophy and politics. Kant links the modern measures of qualified thinking and acting to his mapping of the “world” (Franke 2001). The question emerges: How
does one begin to think and act when Kant's world has become overwhelmed by this beyond?

In terms of philosophy, the beyond emerges from Kant's distinction between phenomena and noumena. This distinction implies that there are two aspects of any "thing:" what is knowable (phenomena) and what is not (noumena). Kant calls that aspect of the thing that is knowable an *appearance* and that which is unknowable the *thing in itself*. Together they constitute a matrix of intelligibility: the world is the sum of all appearances. This matrix of intelligibility implies that the noumena, a thing in itself, cannot be understood as being of this world; it exceeds our structures of apprehension.

To every world there is a beyond that cannot be known. The relationship manifests itself in Kant's concept of geography and is enforced through his politics. For Kant, geography is a *propaedeutic* (a preparation) for knowledge. Geography prepares "things," as appearances, making them ready to be experienced or knowable (May 1970: 67). It prepares a world that is the sum of all appearances and it excludes all that which is unknowable (noumena). Once prepared, this world (of things) can then be known via the *a priori intuitions* of space and time. The world cannot be known in itself; instead, it is a presentation of empirical objects and appearances, mapped to serve reason's required unity. The phenomenal world corresponds to a geographic preparation of phenomenal things.

This relationship between the phenomenal thing and the phenomenal world is concisely summarised in Nancy's statement that "the world is not
merely the correlative of sense, it is structured as sense, and reciprocally sense is structured as world” (1997: 6). A tautological relationship emerges: reason affirms for itself that beyond the experienced world there is nothing that can be an object of reason (Franke 2001: 173). The resulting image of the world is “geographically pictured as an island . . . surrounded by the dark, inhuman and unknowable void of the deep waters (McGrane quoted in Shapiro 1999: 88)”. Outside Kant’s island of reason, the beyond becomes constituted as a realm (the sublime) that is unknowable and excluded from Kant’s structure of apprehension and modern matrix of intelligibility (the world). “The problem of the world and beyond” is the idea that for every world there is always a simultaneous beyond that exceeds human sense and human sensibility.

It is in this sense that the question of how to maintain a coherent, secure, and endurable boundary between world and beyond emerges as a key modern political problem. The modern distinction between the world and the unknowable beyond, which manifests itself in Kant’s concept of geography, is enforced through his politics. The question most important for International Relations theory and modern explorations of the political is how the boundary between the world and the beyond, between what is sensible and non-sense, and between what can be known and unknown is to be managed, secured, and disciplined. As contemporary issues concerning global justice, diaspora, migration, finance, trade, tourism, terrorism, entertainment, governance, activism, and urbanism increasingly exceed the explanatory and administrative capacities of disciplines of political studies, the political
engagement with “the problem of the world and beyond” becomes more urgent. If this “world” has been exceeded by those noumenal qualities of the beyond, as is suggested, then how does one now make sense of world politics?

This chapter is an attempt to explore how the concept of the beyond can be used to give world politics, in general, and the political, in particular, specific grammars. Developing these different uses opens up the political “problem of the world and beyond,” makes unfamiliar the reification of this problem as modern state-centric politics, and offers a new possible range of political verbs.

Science Fiction as a Genre of the Beyond

Science fiction can help us think about how the beyond can be used to re-imagine the performances of world politics and the limits of the political. This genre has appeal because the modern political imaginary is so deeply committed to a singular reified world political performance. This performance endlessly secures and manages change, movement, and the beyond within the problematic of sovereignty. It is fair to say that science fiction does not necessarily deal substantively with the complexities of world politics; in fact, its themes are often restricted to sterile liberal constructions (i.e., democracy vs. dictatorship, freedom vs. equality, and exploitation vs. self-determination) that this chapter seeks to displace. This may be a blessing in disguise. Although provocative, we cannot rely on science fiction only as a meditation on contemporary political problems. For the purposes of this chapter, science
fiction will be treated as a *genre of the beyond*. On this view, the political appears in the different usages of the beyond and not in the specific details of a story's narrative dilemmas. What is said is less interesting than how the beyond is used.

As a genre of the beyond, science fiction is best introduced, as Carl Freedman (2000: 16) does, through Darko Suvin's distinction between estrangement and cognition (Suvin 1988). Science fiction is a literary genre that champions the tension between the beyond and the known by offering up imaginative alien worlds to scientific laws and cultural norms and mores (Freedman 2000: 16). At its most basic level, science fiction cannot assume a world; instead, as Albert Wendland suggests, it must convince the reader to *encounter*, become, or take part in a created reality (Wendland 1985: 21). The nature of this created reality of estrangement and cognition can be understood through classifying science fiction, as Wendland does, as either conventional or experimental. Whereas conventional science fiction follows a narrow range of plots and devices that reproduce the basic assumptions specific to the genre, author, or society, experimental science fiction attempts to place the genre, author, or society into a condition of estrangement. In this sense, experimental science fiction is a speculative philosophy that constructs thought experiments in the space between *science* and *fiction*. Experimental science fiction, therefore, is portrayed as a creative and progressive classification of literature that explores the (future) limits of humanity (Wendland 1985: Chapter 2-3). Science fiction is a genre of the beyond
precisely because, as a whole, it seems to value experimental variants of its
genre over those that might be considered conventional. International
Relations literature, by way of contrast, would celebrate the opposite, offering
rarefactions of conventional approaches while isolating dissident and
experimental ones (Ashley and Walker 1990).

While the difference is important, distinguishing between conventional
and experimental types of science fiction runs the risk of oversimplifying and
reifying the modern resolution of “the problem of the world and the beyond.”
A modern (Kantian) representational structure is not adequately
problematized and treated politically if framed in terms of experimental and
conventional worlds. A shift from categorising types of science fiction, to
emphasising different uses, productions, and practices of language avoids
these reifying tendencies. Instead of categorising genres into different
language types (i.e., conventional vs. experimental), I follow Gilles Deleuze
and Felix Guattari in exploring the major and minor uses of language (1986;
1987).

The major use of language produces a literature that reifies its own
authorisation by assuming a constant that serves as a standard measure to
evaluate its own authority and domination (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 105).
It is a literature of sovereignty, capable of resolving tensions between
universals and particulars by capturing them in a logic of representation. As a
major literature, therefore, it imposes a national language of territory,
community, identity, subjectivity, and history onto the unbounded
construction of the beyond. It uses a geo-political imaginary to capture the beyond and reify the political and philosophical matrix of intelligibility—the world. For example, when Star Trek, a major geo-political literature, represents a planet as a home world with a unified territory, identity, and history, a national language is used to manage the beyond within a prepared geo-political logic of national categories.

Minor uses of language in science fiction encounter the beyond differently. Instead of capturing the beyond in order to secure it, the beyond is mobilised to make major uses of language unfamiliar. A minor literature uses language “as seeds, crystals of becoming whose value is to trigger uncontrollable movements and deterritorializations of the mean or majority” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 106). Breaks, stutters, and openings are mobilised to challenge the ability of major literatures to capture meaning within the limits of its own authorisation. For example, in the film Starship Troopers (1996), a slaughter of an alien species might re-inflect the dominant images of American foreign policy (i.e., the protectors of peace, justice, and democracy), making these images unfamiliar, contingent, and parochial. The beyond, in this minor use of language, is mobilised to create a critical distance from the dominant stories it seeks to problematize.

In addition, this distinction between major/minor literatures must itself be opened. How to use the beyond, other than as a space of difference to be captured, secured, and mobilised, requires that the beyond in itself be affirmed through verb to encounter. By developing a politics of encounter in
advance or excess of these distinctions, the beyond is used differently than in either minor or major literatures. Instead of using language to negate difference by politically securing or mobilising the beyond, it uses language to encounter difference in itself through the Event. *The Martian Chronicles* (1950), for example, affirms different uses of the beyond and collapses the distinction between world and beyond. The political becomes an Event that precedes and exceeds the spatial limits of the world.

**Replicating a Grammar of Representation: Star Trek Managing the Beyond**

Exploring the galaxy and negotiating with alien cultures makes *Star Trek* interesting and politically rich in itself (Inayatullah 2003; Neumann 2003; Weldes 1999b). Here, however, *Star Trek* is read as a meta-theoretical project to secure modernity from the conditions under which modernity has itself been exceeded. The possibility of modern existence must be managed if the world, as the condition under which both knowing and being human are possible, has been exceeded. *Star Trek* represents the dominant political management of the epistemological and ontological “problem of the world and beyond.” It captures the beyond in a modern spatial-temporal matrix of intelligibility (the galaxy). *Star Trek* replicates modern disciplining of modern politics: where the world transcends and grounds all horizons of difference.

As explained above, Kant’s politico-philosophical matrix resulted in a division between world and beyond, between phenomena and noumena. Geography prepares a world of sense that can be understood, reasoned, and
grounded. Though he played with the idea of alien life (Kant 1991), it exists, allegorically, as a realm of danger that excites speaking non-sense and rouses mere opinion. The voyages of the Starship Enterprise have a cartographic mission that, by its very nature, are dedicated to trespassing Kant’s epistemological territory of danger: “to boldly go where no one has gone before.” Star Trek must breach Kant’s terrestrial propaedeutic and venture outside the geographic matrix of intelligibility and move into a bewildering expanse of uncertainty and danger.

Although Star Trek sheds Kant’s terrestrial limit, the Enterprise does not “senselessly” wander in space; on the contrary, the operational imperative of Star Trek’s journey preserves Kant’s “will to truth” as a galactic “will to map.” With long-range sensors and a stellar cartography, its continuing mission is “to explore strange new worlds, to seek out new life and civilisations.” The truth is out there. Immanent to this will to map is the drive to actualise humanity. Humanity, the inner space, is as important a territory to be explored (Inayatullah 2003). Kant’s securing of reason implies and requires that humanity itself be secured. Beyond the world, the question of humanity’s worth, character, and essence is urgent and always on trial. The question is always on the lips of Captain Picard (the Shakespearean-Earl Grey Tea ambassador of humanity), Data (the android who desires to be human), and Q (the omnipotent being with a perverse curiosity about human development). Star Trek’s mission, the search for answers to the essence of humanity, is directly connected to the realisation/enactment of Kant’s
reasonable world. It takes the form of Star Trek's galaxy. Star Trek seeks the realisation of a reasoned and represented galaxy like Kant sought the realisation of a knowable world. The project to know the galaxy acts as the space for humanity's universal realisation. Star Trek manages the human condition in a reasonable galaxy.

The problem of humanity, however, requires more for its actualisation than missions, excursions, and episodes. If Star Trek is to entertain the problem of humanity by creating knowledge beyond the world, the beyond must be geopolitically captured, transformed, and prepared as the world. It is through the political management of the beyond, that it is possible to be human beyond the world. Star Trek must reproduce how Kant made philosophy and politics mutually constitutive in order to make the will to map and actualisation of humanity possible. What makes Star Trek itself possible, as a metaphysical resolution of "the problem of the world and beyond," is the perpetual managing, policing, and reifying of the grammatical line between the world/beyond. The distinction between a sensible subject and the subject of non-sense (self and alien) is politically managed in two ways: through a galaxy of sovereign planets and an "assumed future history (Wendland 1985: 35)" of humanity.

The possibility for knowledge collection, securing meaning and actualising humanity within Star Trek's missions requires the simultaneous political securing of a galaxy of sovereign planets. Although the United Federation of Planets seeks to spread perpetual peace, negotiate difference,
and promote security throughout the galaxy, violence is never eliminated from the galaxy. On the contrary, it is simply managed, relocated, renamed, and represented. The result is emphasised in Michael Shapiro's statement that "the world in which (Kant) imagines the possibility of hospitality and peace is predicated on various forms of radical non-peace (Shapiro 1999: 88)." The Federation (like the discipline of International Relations), creates both places of peace, justice, and reason inside and zones of violence and uncertainty outside (Walker 1993b; Wight 1977). Hence, although every contact on the frontier has the possibility of becoming dangerous, a prior matrix of sovereign relations between M-class planets secures a galaxy for the missionary search for knowledge and peace. True, *Star Trek* is always involved in negotiating differences and dangers; yet, these dangerous differences have always already been resolved and pacified in and through the spatial galaxy represented by the Federation.

Whereas this pacification of danger takes place via sovereignty in modern politics, *Star Trek* uses the Prime Directive. The Prime Directive produces an assumed galactic frame of reference for the *Enterprise* to pursue its missionary quest (its foreign policy) as if it was epistemologically and ontologically secure. The Prime Directive spatially reifies planets in the same way that state sovereignty reifies nation-states. Every culture/race is defined by some essential quality and spatially contained in a home planet, and, in effect, produces unitary alien planets/cultures. In this way, the galaxy has always already been secured. Against a heterogeneous beyond, *Star Trek*
reproduces an a priori galaxy that negates the possibility of alien complexity, diversity, and encounters (Romulans are from Romulus as earthlings are from Earth). The galaxy is divided between hermetically sealed planets. The beyond, the excess, and the different meanwhile are compressed into the performance of the line between world/beyond. Management occurs in this perpetual encounter between “Humanity” and “Alien”: Star Trek has therefore always already limited the available political possibilities available to the Enterprise (i.e., declarations of enmity [die in war] or friendship [become like us]).

In addition to the Prime Directive’s spatial order, the beyond is also temporally managed within an anthropological development of human progress. The Federation is also the political embodiment of Kant’s cosmopolitan purpose. This teleological horizon of human development simultaneously founds and transcends the cultural divisions between reified planets. Star Trek founds a representational hierarchy of time between cultures called the Richter Scale of Culture and secures any temporal uncertainty. The Richter Scale classifies the evolutionary status of each species world. Each alien world is judged against its ability to attain warp speed technology. Thus all species are set in relation to a universal grammar of being—galactic humanity. One community dons the normalised title “human,” others are left to develop in a shadowy dusk of underdevelopment’s galactic dustbin—alien. The result is an “assumed future history” for all life forms (Wendland 1985: 35). The West has used time to construct a singular
direction to history into forms of progress, development, and modernity while negating other directions as stagnation, underdevelopment, and tradition (Fabian 1983). An “assumed future history” presents itself as a natural and inevitable path of socio-political (and biological) development. *Star Trek* plots the past-present and future-present of a united singular and unproblematic culture called “humanity.” A (Western) version of humanity stands as the measure of humanity, and all others. Through its search for the truth, its will to map the galaxy, humanity will become like “Q” (or are “Q” already humanity in the future?) and emerge as master of the galaxy. The beyond, in terms of unknown but possible futures, is therefore secured in a linear and teleological development toward human potential.

As in the disciplines of International Relations and International Development, in *Star Trek* any encounter with the beyond is always already managed within a prior geo-political system of spatial and temporal representation. The Prime Directive and the Richter Scale secure a Kantian galaxy for *Star Trek’s* missionary will to map and know humanity. The galaxy transcends and grounds all horizons of alien difference. *Star Trek* never comes face to face with an alien. It only encounters itself as alien. It effaces the beyond and as such the beyond is faced with humanity's self-image. This is the modern eternal resolution of “the problem of the world and beyond.” *Star Trek* erases different voices, different ways of being and different political possibilities. *Star Trek* violates the beyond so as to manage difference and reproduce the normalcy of its own categorical world. However,
the beyond need not be used this way. *Starship Troopers* mobilises the beyond that is erased, silenced, managed in *Star Trek* and puts this humanist project into crisis. *Starship Troopers* subverts what *Star Trek* replicates.

**Ironic Grammars: Starship Troopers Mobilises the Beyond**

*Starship Troopers* appears to be conventional science fiction and mimics *Star Trek*’s resolution of “the problem of the world and beyond.” Read in the manner of a major literature, *Starship Troopers*’ dominant narrative, following Kant, secures a spatialized inter-planetary political galaxy that it then temporally drives, through conflict, toward a horizon of philosophical resolution--knowing the Other. Its political galaxy mirrors the dominant cold war narrative that casts an alien species (the Arachnids from the distant planet Klendathu) as a force that threatens the future of human civilisation (as represented by the United Citizen Federation) in “the ultimate showdown between the species.” To this end, and in order to secure a galaxy of reason and human progress, the movie casts a group of youth in terms reminiscent of military recruitment narratives (Shapiro 1997a). Fresh out of high school, in search of themselves through love, sex, and excitement, they join the Federal Service to fight the enemy, become true citizens, and “save the world.” “Saving the world” results in an epic ontological battle between good and evil in which ultimate violence and power is used to defeat the mindless alien tyranny in the name of human salvation, truth, and freedom.
Notwithstanding the dominance of this reading, *Starship Troopers* can also be re-read as a minor literature deeply invested in examining the politics of security in modernity and displacing the major literature it exemplifies. Instead of managing the beyond to justify a geo-political framework (i.e., a world united or divided), the film mobilises the beyond as a creative literary space to disrupt the normalised practice of reading and writing world politics. Whereas *Star Trek* secures a specific representation of world politics, *Starship Troopers* uses the beyond to open world politics to political interpretation. *Starship Troopers*, as a minor literature, recognises the impossibility of securing humanity’s universal realisation in the ways that major literatures like Kant and *Star Trek* desire. *Starship Troopers* examines what the political securing of an ontological and epistemological world politics conceals. The beyond can be used as a space through which it is possible critically to re-read and re-write “the problem of the world and beyond.” It produces a play of insecurities. Against the over-determined narrative about securing the possibility of reason, humanity, and the world from the wrath of the Arachnids, *Starship Troopers* mobilises an ironic interpretative strategy that makes unfamiliar modern political readings of security.

Through irony, *Starship Troopers* seeks to unsettle and contest the normalised practices of world politics. As a critical device, irony develops a different epistemological and ontological relationship to the beyond than does Kant’s representational world. Instead of managing a philosophical and political grammar of intelligibility, irony puts such productions into question.
Because ironic grammars target the dominant structures of intelligibility, often any use of irony is cast as an anti-political, anti-social, and anti-public strategy (Conway and Seery 1992: 2). The typical reaction to *Starship Troopers* said it lacked authenticity and realism. Ironic strategies always run the risk of being branded relativistic and solipsistic because irony operates on the limits of assumed political, social, and public sensibilities. Obviously, this is only a condemnation if the meaning associated with the political, the social, and the public are assumed themselves to be apolitical, asocial, and assumed by public consensus. If, however, these concepts are themselves to be opened to political, social, and public challenge, then irony can be championed as a device that works against the political, social, and public domination of one epistemological and ontological practice over all others.

A politics that uses irony to challenge this domination can take the form of what William Connolly calls a practice of projectional interpretation. As a critical use of the beyond, projectional interpretation (irony) operates “first, by affirming the contestable character of its own projections, second, by offering readings of particular features of contemporary life that compete with detailed accounts offered by others, and, third, by moving back and forth between these two levels as it introduces alternative interpretations onto the established field of discourse (Connolly 1992: 145).” As a practice, projectional interpretations instil the beyond into spaces of closure. It therefore offers a critical propinquity to the subject being challenged. Grabbed from the
unknown, from the space that exceeds Kantian sensibilities, irony forces the beyond into the ritualised grammar that over-determines modern politics. It opens the naturalised secured world to a plurality of alternative interpretations.

The film's use of irony is most apparent in the United Citizen Federation's service announcements. The announcements are placed at crucial (and fearful) shifts in the development of the plot (i.e., when going to war). These projectional interpretations, in effect, remove the viewer from the thick of the plot and, in effect, create moments of rupture in the master narratives of modern politics. In the service announcement "A World that Works," for example, the world political cliche of "good us" against "bad them" is targeted. Specifically, the representation of humanity as an ordered, just, and rational civilisation, produced against a swarm of ugly, fearless, and mindless Arachnid warriors, is placed in ironic distance to itself. Playing on the relationship between security and insecurity, soldiers are shown "making a better tomorrow" by teaching children to shoot automatic weapons, laughing at violent behaviour, and supplying live ammunition with which children can play. A society obsessed with the illusion of securing external threats in the name of peace is shown steeped in the glorification of deadly weapons, trained killers, and ritualistic violence. The production, containment, and enactment of barbarism are revealed to be central to a system that claims to produce a just and civilised society. Titled "Doing their part," another service announcement's voice-over affirms the need for
vigilance at home. Human peace, reason, and justice must be secured against the external Arachnid threat. “Doing their part,” the viewer watches kids tenaciously squish neighbourhood insects on the pavement, their mothers cheering psychotically behind them. Just as the mothers’ psychosis reveals that in a rational state lunacy prevails, the service announcement uses irony to open the closed performances of socio-political life to reveal that the politics of security is founded upon the production of insecurity (Dillon 1996).

Since the service announcements arrive at critical shifts in the film’s narrative, irony is used to make the dominant cold war narrative of securing representation in world politics a political problem. This use of the beyond creates a different conception of world politics. Irony is used to implicate Starship Troopers’ apparently conventional narrative within a politics of critical interpretation. A Kantian world, in which humanity and knowledge are deemed apolitical, becomes the target of critique instead of the model to be reproduced. Where Star Trek reproduced a modern world politics, Starship Troopers uses the beyond to displace reified world political performances by revealing their contingency. Through the radical phenomenological stance, a pluralist world politics is opened. The meaning of world politics shifts from the conventional reproduction of politics taking place in the world toward a critical engagement with the political productions of worlds.

This radical phenomenological world politics is best introduced through Martin Heidegger’s notion of “being in the world.” In his essay “Age
of the World Picture," Heidegger charts a critical reversal (against Kant's world and the courage to use his own understanding) where the world's structure of involvement becomes that which is targeted for exploration. Heidegger states that

Metaphysics grounds an age, in that through a specific interpretation of what is and through a specific comprehension of truth it gives to that age the basis upon which it is essentially formed (i.e., the world). This basis holds complete dominion over all the phenomena that distinguish the age. Conversely, in order that there may be an adequate reflection upon these phenomena themselves, the metaphysical basis for them must itself be apprehended in them. Reflection is the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that must deserve to be called in question (1977: 115-116).

By examining how humanity secures the truth of itself in modernity, a Kantian world of representation, that which holds complete dominion over all "things," is first put into question. Heidegger (1968) unpacks Kant's question: What is a thing? Heidegger shows how the question "What is a thing?" corresponds to a specific conception of "Who is human?" (i.e., rational-sensible beings). He argues that Kant's correspondence between a world of things and the human world ignores the political securing of being human in the world. Being human in the world is shown to be a process of "worlding," wherein a specific conception of humanity is made to correspond to a specific conception of the world. In other words, "how humans are" makes possible "how things are" (i.e., appearances). By asking the question "how are we human," instead of Kant's "what is a thing," being human in the world is re-made a political problem. The beyond is infused into the world instead of produced as an outer space to be secured through inter-stellar adventure.
Whereas the question "What is a thing?" merely requires *Star Trek*'s implementation of an inter-stellar *order of things* (i.e., humans, planets, and aliens) the question "How are we human?" requires *Starship Troopers* to reflect upon the presuppositions that ground an age (i.e., being human). Although reflecting on societal values often seems more familiar to critical philosophy than science fiction, aspects of both have the potential to take "nothing less than the totality of the human world or social field for its object...that things are not what they seem to be and that things need not eternally be as they are (Freedman 2000: 8)." With such discursive breadth, *Starship Troopers* seeks to reveal how the knowledge of things (the enemy, the self, and the world) is secured.

*Starship Troopers* illuminates the political practices of being human in modernity and hence stresses the political limits associated with the qualifications of political citizenship. As such, *Starship Troopers* draws the viewer, and ultimately the practitioners of modern politics, into a self-critique of the project of being human in the modern world. At one level, as a critique of what it means to be human under modernity, *Starship Troopers* hinges on the successful production of a distant "them," as a threat, and to the production of the close at hand "us," as that which is ordered and good. *Starship Troopers* uses stark contrasts to reveal the production of threats. Presenting humanity with a civilised, intelligent, attractive, caring, and fearful identity, the films use bugs, horrible disgusting bugs, to solidify sovereignty’s ontological difference between friend and enemy (Schmitt 1996).
On a second level, however, the film’s use of irony makes clear that securing “us” is not simply a defensive reaction against pre-existing threats. Instead, security is shown to be intimately involved in the active production of threatening narratives that explain, as David Campbell argues, “by virtue of telling us what to fear, we have been able to fix who “we” are (Campbell 1998b: 170).” Against, yet within, its clichéd ontological galaxy, Starship Troopers mobilises the beyond to critique this dominant us/them narrative. It seeks to reveal how identity/difference, a relation of fear, founds a political galaxy. Campbell argues that fear is the order word of a security discourse. Historically, a discourse of fear bridged what it meant to be human in the world under Christendom (seeking salvation) and the emergence of modernity (seeking security) as the dominant trope of political life in the sovereign state (Campbell 1998b: Chapter 3-4). The church relied on a discourse of fear to “establish its authority, discipline its followers and ward off its enemies,” in effect creating a Christian world politics. Under modern world politics, similarly, the sovereign state relies on the creation of an external threat to author its foreign policy and establish the lofty category of citizenship as the only form of modern human qualification. The “subject of security (policing modern citizenship in the project to secure society from external threats) is the subject of security (Walker 1997: 68)”

Starship Troopers thus highlights sites where fear is created and conquered as crucial loci of qualified citizenship. The film defines the citizen as someone having “the courage to make the safety of the human race their
personal responsibility . . ..” In showing individual fear harnessed in boot camp, war, life, and death, the film produces civic heroes of humanity. By identifying fear as citizenship’s locus of enunciation, *Starship Troopers* challenges the epistemological and ontological privileges given to citizenship’s political status. By re-writing fear as a discursive production and not essential to human qualification, the dominant narrative of security is jeopardised.

The film also destabilises the assumed understanding of what it means to be human under modernity. Simply put, the assumed grammatical distance between human and bug is collapsed. The Arachnid threat, once thought to be fearless and senseless, is revealed (in the castration, capture, feminisation, and probing of the “Brain Bug”) to be afraid and intelligent, just like our heroic human citizens. Finding out that the “Brain Bug” is afraid does not mean that humanity is winning the war. On the contrary, it symbolises a progressive realisation that “they” are just like “us.” The problem is, although the human viewer has been cheering for humanity’s conquest over the bugs through violence and science, the modern discourse of security secures for itself the inevitable destruction of both protagonists. At one level, for the film to be successful the audience must accept that, if humanity is to be saved, some bugs must die; however, at another level, the movie makes clear that the reverse is also true. Human life is just as expendable as Arachnid life. Within a discourse of security the only possible response to a threat is the further securing of security. A security discourse is constructed as a mutually
constituting system of fear for which the ultimate logical end is the total annihilation of being itself.

By mobilising the beyond in the space between bug and human, and making it a space of critical irony, the dualism between hyper-reified identities begins to collapse. For example, a recruitment officer at the beginning of the film states that our heroes are simply “fresh meat for the grinder” and, by the end of the film, friends churn friends into “special” forces to be sacrificed on the front lines. “We’re in it for the species, boys and girls, its simple numbers” is sufficient to defend the decision of one friend to send another on a mission with a “low survival probability.” Humanity is no different than what it despises. Xander, right before his fearful and intelligent brains are sucked out, accurately articulates the logic of a security discourses’ genocidal ambition: “one day someone like me is going to kill you and your whole fucking race.” No doubt the bugs will be just as articulate when they are dissected. Both humans and bugs fuel a politics of security by producing threats that are to be feared. Viewing the bugs in disgust, humanity fails to recognise its own monstrosity. The movie dashes any hope of ending a cycle of destruction. The film ends with the line “they’ll keep fighting and they’ll win.” The viewer is left without knowing who and what “they” means. The politics of security leads to the ultimate insecurity of being in the world/galaxy.

By mobilising this play of insecurities, other possible readings/writings of world politics are not only possible but also understood as radical phenomenological practices of writing world politics. For example, the film
writes the will to truth as a dominant narrative of modernity. In the overall search for the Brain Bug, so humanity can “probe its secrets,” the service announcements repeat the modern scientific mantra “Do you want to know more?” The viewer is always admonished that “once we understand the bug we will defeat the bug.” The film also writes important social relations into the mix of high politics. The co-ed shower scene, the inter-changeable gender roles of the heroes, and the emasculation and feminisation of the Arachnids, interrogate the dominant gender relations in a secured society. The playing of “Dixie” by a Black soldier and the dominance of confederate memorabilia throughout the camp highlights the feeling that our Aryan youth from Argentina, in Nazi S.S. Trooper uniforms, are acknowledging the historical role of racism and anti-Semitism in the creation of secured empires and geopolitical strategies. Furthermore, the film writes in class conflict and homoeroticism to round out a montage of pluralistic possibilities of world politics. In other words, by dislodging the dominance of a security discourse, alternative narratives emerge and intertwine to form a pluralistic practice of writing modern politics.

All in all, Starship Troopers mobilises the beyond to unsettle the dominant use of the world/beyond in modern politics. Starship Troopers reveals modern productions of truth and humanity in the world. It reveals a structure of involvement that programs like Star Trek assume/promote. However, Starship Troopers’ ironic use of the beyond also has its limitations: What is beyond critique? The politics of critique uses the beyond as if it were a
lack, a negative. For example, by bringing the beyond back into the space of the world, humanity is revealed to be lacking its original meaning. The beyond is used to give a critical distance from what it is meant to displace. As a result of this contemporary spatial fetish, Starship Troopers also reifies the world/beyond distinction. The beyond remains the negative of the world; it is the external realm of untruth that does not have standing in the modern age. It depends upon prior maps and narratives to demonstrate what is excluded and Other. The world/beyond distinction remains; both seek viable maps of the world. The world is opened only for it to be read more accurately, and then closed. Starship Troopers and Star Trek use the beyond as a negative space in relation to the positive world to be secured/saved, conquered/liberated, and known/advocated. However, this does not mean that the beyond cannot be used still differently. The Martian Chronicles imagines world politics as a temporal practice of encounter, not as a spatial project of displacement, and moves toward a politics of encounter.

Encountering Grammars: Martian Chronicles and the Affirmation of the Beyond

Written in 1950, Ray Bradbury's The Martian Chronicles is obviously not a response to Star Trek or Starship Troopers. Nevertheless, where both Star Trek and Starship Troopers use Kant's boundary between the world and the beyond, The Martian Chronicles affirms the beyond in itself and, as a result, undermines the perpetual negation in "the problem of the world and
beyond." Although a possible geo-political reading of *The Martian Chronicles* holds that it is a novel (as is stated on the back cover) about the conquest and colonisation of Mars (or the New World), a different reading (while not denying others) seeks the political, not in a major or a minor literature, but in the virtual *meanwhile*. *The Martian Chronicles* does not manage or mobilise "the problem of the world and beyond" to produce a world or foster critique; instead, it is a temporal framework (a chronicle) that offers "time to encounter" the excessive, non-sensible and contingent beyond. Its temporal narrative structure evades the spatial dominance in *Star Trek* and *Starship Troopers*.

Sensitive to time, the structure of *The Martian Chronicles* demands that the beyond in itself be encountered in a way unfamiliar to geo-politics. Bradbury's temporal narrative denies the prior ontological fraternity (e.g., a world of things or state of affairs) and offers change, indeterminacy, and heterogeneity as a privileged sensibility instead. It is composed of twenty-six vignettes, each with a date starting in January 1999 and ending with October 2026. Each date is understood as an encounter. The encounter for Bradbury is not the meeting of two worlds; it is different from geo-political encounters. He does not depend on a spatialized here/there. Nor does the encounter depend on a linear time, since each encounter can be read on its own or in any order. The location of the encounter is as inconsequential as the year. The encounter needs to be introduced first within the Event.
Bradbury introduces the Event in his first vignette, “January 1999: Rocket Summer.” Whereas, an event (un-capitalized) is an attribute of the material realm defined as a state of affairs, order of things, or world, an Event (capitalised) is expressed by means of language, perhaps about things, but belonging to the incorporeal realm (Deleuze 1990b: 4). That January in Ohio, “the warm desert air changing the frost patterns on the windows, erasing the art work. The skis and sleds suddenly useless . . . . The Rocket stood in the cold winter morning, making summer with every breath of its mighty exhausts. The Rocket made climates, and summer lay for brief moment on the land . . . . (Bradbury 1950: 1).” The Event is irreducible to a state of affairs. The Event is not a distribution of “things” in Kant’s phenomenal “world;” it is different in kind from Kant’s “world.” The Event is of another order. It belongs to the temporal order of verbs and becomings. Winter becomes summer, snow becomes hot rain, and snowy fields become green lawns. The Event is the becoming of a “summer day” in an “Ohio winter”--a paradox. As such, the Event exceeds or precedes the Kantian world/beyond because the Event is the “part which eludes its own actualisation in everything that happens (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 157).” The Event does not take place “within” The Martian Chronicles, since this would only be an event within a novel; The Martian Chronicles “is” the Event itself. This is not a novel about Earth meeting Mars or about Humans meeting Martians (although they do). To assume these kinds of encounters, with such clear names, identities, and signs, is to assume

an a priori world/galaxy in which encounters take place and emerge as appearances. The Marian Chronicles chronicle the Event of these encounters.

Using the stoic distinction in kinds of being, the Event is different in kind from the present, past, or future time (Chronos) within which events take place; it is the time of the Event (Aion) (Deleuze 1990b: 61). Aion is always both infinite past and infinite future. The Event is infinitely divided into past and future possibilities; it is nothing more than a mathematical point, a meanwhile. Deleuze and Guattari explain:

the event “doesn’t care where it is, and moreover it doesn’t care how long it’s being going,” . . . It is no longer time that exists between two instants; it is the event that is a meanwhile [un entre-temps]: the meanwhile is not a part of the eternal, but neither is it part of time—it belongs to becoming. The meanwhile, the event, is always dead time; it is there where nothing takes place, an infinite awaiting that is already infinitely past, awaiting and reserve (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 158).

This meanwhile, this becoming of the Event is not a ground or a foundation—though it is ontological. Time must not disappear to the dominance of space. The whole is not given; it is an open totality (Deleuze 1988a: 105). The Event is repeated through its different encounters. Molar individuals meet molar individuals (Star Trek), molar individuals meet molecular individuals (Starship Troopers) and molecular individuals meet molecular individuals. Worlds collide and expectations get “selves” destroyed or killed. Life worlds re-code, over-write, and re-new other life worlds. Whole worlds (both Earth and Mars) are destroyed and created. Worlds are critiqued, examined, held at a distance, and displaced. Each vignette, each encounter, is not a piece of a larger puzzle. They are lines of flight. They do
not add up a guiding set of rules, a moral theme, a framework of intelligibility or a structure of intimacy. In other words, *The Martian Chronicles* is a meditation on the beyond in itself. Instead of managing or mobilising the beyond, *The Martian Chronicles*, as an Event, uses the beyond to affirm a politics of encounters.

The politics of encounter is not about boldly going where no one has gone before, nor is it solely about making old worlds new. Instead, it is about multiplying new worlds that, for a moment, become actual, have existence, and then slip back into the Event. “August 2002: Night Meeting” provides a meditation on encounters. In that chronicle, Tomás Gomez is joined on his way to a party in the blue hills on Mars. While on the road, to pass the time, Tomás reflects on time itself. In his reflection he makes time stand out from space, he demonstrates how to read the world in terms of time, not space. That night Aionic time, the time of the Event, both infinite future and infinite past, is given tangible sense. Tomás says,

There was a smell of Time in the air tonight. He smiled and turned the fancy in his mind. There was a thought. What did Time smell like? Like dust and clocks and people. And if you wondered what Time sounded like it sounded like water running in a dark cave and voices crying and dirt dropping down on hollow box lids, and rain. And, going further, what did time look like? Time looked like snow dropping silently into a black room or it looked like a silent film in an ancient theatre, one hundred billion faces falling like those New York balloons, down and down into nothing. That was how Time smelled and looked and sounded. And tonight . . . tonight you could almost touch Time.(Bradbury 1950: 80)

Tomás’ attention to the complexity of time leads to an appreciation of the Event. He recognises time as something that exceeds the modern matrix of
intelligibility, the spatial strategies of resolving “the problem of the world and beyond” so as to enable/found modern political practice. Fortuitously, as he explains how this night makes the impossible possible, an encounter emanates from beyond the horizon. The encounter emerges from the Event. Deleuze and Guattari explain such an encounter in the following terms: “There is, at some moment, a calm and restful world. Suddenly a frightened face looms up that looks at something out of the field. The other person appears here as neither subject nor object but as something that is very different: a possible world, the possibility of a frightening world (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 17).” Tomás had stopped his car to pour himself a cup of coffee and take in the night air. A strange object—jade coloured, with red jewels, green diamonds, six legs, and making the sound of sparse rain—passed, carrying a Martian with bright gold eyes. Tomás, out of habit (minus his gun), said “hello.” Affirming the Event, instead of containing it by mapping it or by forcing it in-between reified worlds, enables possible worlds to flourish and different worlds to be encountered. The Martian responded, “hello,” but their different languages prohibited understanding. When the Martian, always a quick study, learns English, both are embarrassed at the nakedness of their newfound connection and hence their awkward silence. When passing coffee, a token of Kantian hospitality, “their hands met and--like mist--fell through each other.” Cold and frightened they stood face to face. They each proclaimed that the other must be dead, a ghost—they both assured the other that they
were real, alive, and could feel their own presence. How could they not connect? Again Deleuze and Guattari,

This possible world is not real, or not yet, but it exists nonetheless: it is an expressed that exists only in its expression--the face, or an equivalent of the face. To begin with, the other person is this existence of a possible world. And this possible world also has a specific reality in itself, as possible . . . . The other is a possible world as it exists in a face that expresses it and takes shape in a language that gives it a reality (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 17)

Accepting the linguistic encounter, the Martian asks where Tomás is from. Not knowing what Earth is, it becomes sufficient to ask when. Resorting to the Event, Tomás explains that the Martians are almost extinct now that humans have arrived two years ago. In disbelief, the Martian proclaims “I’m alive!” When confronted with similar statements by the Martian, Tomás proclaims the same: “I’m alive!” Words failing, they each point to their respective cities, which are full of life and beauty in their own eyes; but each sees the other’s city as not there or in ruins. Faced with the question of truth, the Martian proposes that they retreat back to their limited encounter:

Let us agree to disagree . . . . What does it matter who is past or future, if we are both alive, for what follows will follow, tomorrow or in ten thousand years. How do you know that those temples are not the temples of your own civilization one hundred centuries from now, tumbled and broken? You do not know. Then don’t ask. But the night is very short. There go the festival fires in the sky, and the birds (Bradbury 1950: 85)

They wish each other well, each driving off to their respective parties, wondering how such a strange encounter could have happened. With both their material and linguistic proofs proving insufficient, all that was left was the beyond, they only had the Event. As Deleuze and Guattari explain, the
Event “is a concept with three inseparable components: possible world, existing face, and real language or speech (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 17).” Attributing it to a dream or a vision, as a test of the possible worlds, existing faces, and real languages, this encounter has its limits, but the Event re-emerges so Human and Martian become different.

Within the context of the Event, “October 2026: The Million Year Picnic” offers the political possibility of becoming Other. Humanity is becoming meaningless, of the beyond, but because of Bradbury’s politics of encounter, it is an affirmative, not a negative, change. Humanity’s loss is humanity’s gain. “The Million Year Picnic” takes an affirmative approach to what is a dreadful scenario: the Martian Holocaust is coupled with Earth’s nuclear destruction. Only two human families are left and they have escaped to Mars. When the second rocket is spotted, the father of the first becomes the future of humanity. Timothy, the son, looks on as the father says,

“Now we are alone. We and a handful of others who’ll land in a few days. Enough to start over. Enough to turn away from all that back on Earth and strike out a new line—“ The fire leapt up to emphasize his talking. And then all the papers were gone except one. All the laws and beliefs of Earth were burnt into small hot ashes which soon would be carried off in the wind. Timothy looked at the last thing that Dad tossed in the fire. It was a map of the World, and it wrinkled and distorted itself hotly and went--flimphf--and was gone like a warm, black butterfly (Bradbury 1950: 180).

Massumi suggests that the possibility of becoming other does not involve re-defining, exaggerating, or inventing new identities and categories (Massumi 1992: 88). Instead, it involves exceeding a grid of representation, a cartographic imaginary, the map, and “the problem of the world and beyond.”
The laws, the beliefs, the geo-graph are carried off in the wind, an imaginary that Tomás Gomez might refer to as time itself. Becoming-Other does not proceed analogically; it proceeds by potential (Massumi 1992: 97-98). This is different from rejecting direction (Massumi 1992: 103). Direction can only be understood in reactionary terms since it implies a bearing and a true north. A potential is a gathering of encounters from the Event and actualising a change. It is a line of flight. The family heads to the canal near the ruins so that Michael can see the Martians that he so desperately wants to meet. The last lines of *The Martian Chronicles* read,

They reached the Canal. It was long and straight and cool and wet and reflective in the night. “I’ve always wanted to see a Martian” said Michael “where are they, Dad? You promised.” “There they are,” said Dad, and he shifted Michael on his shoulder and pointed straight down. The Martians were there. Timothy began to shiver. The Martians were there--in the canal--reflected in the water. Timothy and Michael and Robert and Mom and Dad. The Martians stared back at them for a long, long silent time from the rippling water... (Bradbury 1950: 222).

Of course, the family wanders on human beliefs; they are still a nuclear family. Burning laws and maps does not erase the life world from which they emerge. However, it is a turn away from the limits and direction of humanity and the world toward the limitlessness of the beyond. Instead of managing or mobilising the beyond to reproduce a sensible world, they are willing to affirm that they exceed the category “human” and embrace its meaningless as the virtual condition under which new possibilities are encountered. *The Martian Chronicles* is engaged encountering a new “earth.”
Encountering Beyond World Politics

Recent affairs in world politics suggest that a commitment to anything but the eternal reification and simulation of "the problem of the world and the beyond" is still difficult, if not unimaginable. The war on terrorism or the American missile defence program (among other examples) are representative of the severity of the crisis of thinking beyond the containment and securing of "the problem of the world and beyond." They are fanatical attempts to manage the beyond. Such a management would entomb the United States (and later "the world" via the Star Wars program) in an invisible, unaccountable, unintelligible, and unimaginable shield against potential threats from invisible, unaccountable, unintelligible, and unimaginable enemies. The Bush administration is protecting the American imagination from the epistemological and ontological slippage into contemporary indeterminacy. As a major literature, the containment of the beyond must produce a world of states, rogue states, and anti-state actors. If any other beyond is mobilised (like that of environmental collapse, global economic disparity, or a generalized malaise in modernity), the strategy of American isolation via missile shields, or a united front, ceases even to register on the scales of efficacy.

Furthermore, wiping traditional threats, terrorists, or even world summit protests off the map and wrapping cartographic security blankets around International Relations' injured tropes only stalls and intensifies impending crisis. Under these conditions, managing and mobilising
conventional maps of the world fail to produce the desired results of creating effective political decisions and affirming alternative political horizons. Instead, strategies of management and mobilisation perpetuate universal insecurity and injustice. Negating the Event, they fundamentally miss the opportunity of exceeding “the problem of the world and beyond” in itself. The conditions that make these events possible are ignored, reproduced, reanimated, and reified.

Encountering the beyond, as that which exceeds a resolution of “the problem of the world and beyond,” first, acknowledges how maps of meaning are perpetually produced, imagined, and insufficient, and, second, affirms possible futures and pasts that evade current structures of intelligibility. To encounter the beyond, therefore, is to activate the political on a temporal horizon of exceeding. Instead of assuming a world politics, it makes the world political. An adequate conception of the political, one capable of dealing with this profound, yet cliché, condition of indeterminacy, contingency, and change, must be created instead of further denying and reifying sovereignty’s grammar. It is ironic that one must venture “way out” into the realm of science fiction in order to examine how the beyond is used in everyday life. Only when appreciated in these quotidian ways, in the radical multiplicity of actual encounters, can the practice of world politics be wrestled from the modern political imagination.

Encountering politics affirms a sensibility attentive to the beyond. Chapter 5 explores the contemporary problem of thought by being attentive to
the problem of music appreciation. Specifically, by reading the film *Dancer in the Dark*, and Bjork's musical accompaniment, the chapter explores how difference can be affirmed in a world that is hostile to existing otherwise. The chapter starts with the importance of spatial and visual in constructing a dogmatic image of thought. Such a dogmatic image of thought is concerned narrowly with deciding between good and bad and judging the truth of such decisions. The effect, however, is that a dogmatic image of thought reduces difference to the same in order to preserve its capacity to decide and judge. Decision and judgement comes at the cost to difference. In contrast, by exploring music as a mode of thought, a way of appreciating difference in itself is explored. It is argued that music operates through connections instead of oppositions and, as such, offers it a unique relationship to the beyond. The chapter asks whether music, or more precisely sound, can be affirmed in itself to constitute a politics to sound. By showcasing the work of John Cage, sound can be heard to express a different form of political action than negation, opposition and becoming. By focusing on composing and listening, a new amplifying sound of thought can be affirmed in excess of the dogmatic image of thought.
Any musical innovation is full of danger to the whole State and ought to be prohibited...
-- Plato

Visibility is a trap...He is seen, but he does not see; he is the object of information, never a subject of communication
-- Michel Foucault

Music, like drugs, is intuition, a path to knowledge. A path? No – a battlefield.
-- Jacque Attali

It is the silence, rather, that obliges the poet to listen, and gives the dream greater intimacy. We hardly know where to situate this silence, whether in the vast world or in the immense past. But we do know that it comes from beyond a wind that dies down or a rain that grow gentle.
-- Gaston Bachelard

Listening transforms the monologue into a dialogue
-- Hannah Arendt

CHAPTER 5
Musical Movements of Political Thought

This chapter is about the political difficulties of affirming and creating life when modernity’s grammar of qualification is obliged to create uniformity/difference. Lars Von Trier's film Dancer in the Dark, which is about a Siren caught in a world inimical to her musical existence, introduces this political dilemma. Like his other cinematic works (Elements of a Crime, Breaking the Waves and Kingdom), Dancer in the Dark is organised around the clash between outside and inside worlds. On the one hand, the outside undermines the pomposity of the dominant idealist order inside by showing its immanent corruption and, on the other, the dominant inside order drives to erase the outside in the name of its own self-presence and continuity. In the end, Von Trier's viewer is left without an inside/outside split, asking instead: how can difference be affirmed in a world hostile to becoming otherwise?
In Dancer in the Dark, as in Jose Saramago's novel Blindness or Arthur Miller's novel Focus, the main characters' blindness is less about actually going blind than it is about becoming differently aware. Inspired by these artistic insights, the chapter is concerned with thinking beyond the traditionally accepted grammar of thought. In particular I focus on how Dancer in the Dark situates the knowing subject differently and creates a vantagepoint through which the dominant world becomes unfamiliar to those who live their subjectivity unreflectively. In both the film and this chapter, the visual/spatial qualifications of modernity, as such, become limitations and problems to overcome. In this chapter, this dilemma becomes a new musical horizon of political possibility.

In Dancer in the Dark, Selma, a young quirky mother (played by Björk), is slowly going blind and because her illness is genetic, her son, Gene (played by Vladic Kostic), faces the same fate. The film's narrative unfolds around Selma's attempts to earn enough money to get Gene an operation and offer him the possibility of life different from hers. Selma feels guilty for having brought Gene into the world because, even though she knew he would be condemned to blindness, she wanted to hold a baby in her arms. Participating in normal American life is a means for her to ameliorate this original guilt and give Gene own life trajectory.

Under the threat of her own condition worsening, Selma passes as a slightly odd citizen in typical, mundane, small town, factory life and earns enough money by making minimal wages in a sink factory and doing piece
work (organising boxes of bobby pins into neat rows). To survive the daily task of living in a world dominated by the need for sight, Selma enchants her darkening world by defiantly immersing herself in a world of music. As Selma approaches the sum needed for her son's operation, and her condition worsens, the film reveals its underlying conflict. Two horizons of becoming are colliding in and through Selma: one of visual qualification and one of acoustic vitalism.

Selma participates in society's visual qualification, being "that" kind of mother, the interested neighbour and the docile worker, by hiding her impending disqualification. Since an ocularcentric world is a spatial world, the series of minor everyday obstacles that Selma must overcome turn out to be conditions of possibilities for her being qualified/disqualified in modern society. Navigating the quotidian existence of factory life in late-capitalism, reproducing sink after sink, replicating rows and rows of bobby-pins and coping the copy of normal relationships, reveals itself to be a social political map of qualification and surveillance.

Because failing to navigate the boundaries of qualification means discipline and disqualification, Selma must pass below the visual-political matrix of qualification. Because of her fugitive existence, few actually know about Selma’s impending blindness or about the money for her son's operation. To keep her job, Selma keeps up the appearance of being sighted by memorizing the optometrist’s eye chart (a map of optical competence), maintaining normalised patterns of life (eligibility for work, family and
community) and either awkwardly accepting the hospitality of some (Kathy or Bill) or refusing the help/love of those who would make her dependent (Jeff). These passing tactics allow her to operate in the world of sight and appear normal while at the same time physically shifting into another world of acoustic qualification; however, ultimately these tactics also come to betray her and result in compounding the ire of a visual-spatial world.

Bit by bit, as Selma fails to maintain her appearance of visual competency, her vulnerability and dependence increase and the weight of an ocularcentric world reigns in her feigned freedom. At the tipping point, having confided in Bill (played by David Mores) about her impending blindness, Selma becomes physically, morally and emotionally cornered. In return for Selma's trust, Bill (her friend, neighbour, landlord and a police officer) confesses about his own financial exigency but asks Selma to keep his failure a secret to maintain the illusion of society's and his "movie star" wife's expectations of him. When the ideal citizen/husband/friend corrupts before our eyes and steals the $2 056.10 that Selma has saved for her son's operation, Selma's overt political capture becomes suddenly apparent to all. Selma finds herself positioned opposite, yet indebted, to the interests of Bill. Selma is trapped, what in chapter 4 was called "captured," because she must both get her money back and maintain her promise to keep Bill's secret. Trapped in this way, Selma's fugitive trajectory becomes exposed and the subject of erasure.
Selma resists, but has no choice. Upon confronting Bill, refusing to give up her son's future, Bill begs Selma to kill him instead of revealing his inadequacies. Killing him will fulfil his martial obligations (giving his wife his life insurance policy to keep up her Hollywood lifestyle), protect his image of the upstanding citizen as a police officer, all the while uphold her promise to his secrecy and recover the money he has stolen. Selma resists, but has no real choice; so as a line from the soundtrack asserts, "she did what she has to do." Events have been set in motion, and her impending capture and Gene's future blindness, loom on the horizon. Selma must choose life over continued qualification and, ironically, this means both Bill and Selma will die. Having switched his impending disqualification for hers, Selma finds herself in the sights of the majority world and on trial for an act beyond social comprehension.

Not generally seen as an act of compassion, killing a police officer immediately disqualifies Selma from society and leads towards her juridical capture. In this optical reversal Selma's tactics for passing suddenly become the state's strategies for her capture and negation in court. Her tactics for passing become interpreted as the essential characteristics of a selfish, jealous, lying, communist adulterer who is charged with killing Bill, the upstanding officer, citizen and husband who rebuked her advances. Ultimately, Selma is re-written from quirky citizen into criminal pariah.

However, finding herself caught in the sights of the world, Selma refuses any re-qualification (breaking her silence, accepting a retrial, being
hooded in the gallows) because instead of going blind, and being fully disqualified, Selma was always already becoming acoustic. Granted Selma is placed in the sights of political capture but at the same time Selma enacts a musical politics. Selma is participating in enacting a politics that exceeds the options being made available by the dominant sighted world. A musical politics is an opening beyond the politics of crisis and the crisis of the political. Selma’s problem has never been about going blind. She states she can “do her job with her eyes closed;” her difficulty is that she cannot pay attention to what is “serious” in the world around her because she hears music. Selma is not responsible to the sighted world; in her world, Selma is outside the world. Selma registers the ressentiment, the unrequited potential for happiness, joy and music, in the people and worlds around her. As such, however compelling the narrative of capture, Selma’s last song, her silence and her death rips through the veil of modernity’s drive to qualification/disqualification and inclusion/exclusion. Though her musical attachments and her acoustic vitalism, the film offers the possibility of a counter political reading engaged in a declaration of life, not qualification.

Heard in the register of musical politics, the film is a retelling of an epic clash between Apollo, the sun God who comes to represent light, seeing, consciousness and knowledge, and Dionysius, the God of life, who comes to embody sensual festivals of sex, drink, dancing and music. As the film progresses, the battle is increasingly staged upon the body of Selma’s musical being. Selma’s affirmation of joy, life, and abundance through music is
dangerous for the established prudent, qualified, political order. Heed the basis of Plato's warning in the Republic "Any musical innovation is full of danger to the whole State and ought to be prohibited..." because clear "forms and rhythms are never changed without producing changes in the most important political forms and ways (Plato 1966: Book IV p.72)." Music offers the possibility of affirming life where modernity's modes of qualification are obliged to create uniformity and capture difference. Music is therefore politically dangerous.

The music moments spliced into Dancer in the Dark indicate that there is more operating in this film than a distressing story about blindness, betrayal and capture. Selma's song is also about musical affirmation of a beyond that exceeds modernity's visual-spatial matrix of qualification. In the face of modernity's sighted/spatial practices that lead to her capture and death, Selma affirms joy and life through music. Musical worlds evade, mystify and exceed the epistemological and ontological unity of biopolitical capture. In each instance when capture arrives, Selma becomes acoustic. Exceeding the regularised and restricted refrain of factory life at a machine, comes joy; further than the condemned cycle of a skipping record, comes an opening for forgiveness; and beyond the repetitive meter of a train's progress, comes resistance to modernity's linear path. For Selma, when the music starts "everything turns out alright," since in the world of musicals "there is always someone there to catch you, when you fall."
With Selma's musical evasions as our guide, we can push beyond thought and action into a musical politic and the event of thinking and acting. My concern is to develop a distinct musical mode of political thought by, first, distinguishing music from sight's dogmatic image of thought (judgement) and then building towards a new sound of thought (appreciation). Instead of a modern-politics obsessed with opposition, moving towards a musico-politics opens up different political spaces, times and modes of being together, and ultimately can help develop an acoustic politics that emphasises amplification. This later direction occurs by refusing the dominant question "what is music" and instead develops the political question "what can music do?" Ultimately, change the music and you shift how things move, shift how things move and you've changed politics.

Track 1: Thinking as a Dogmatic Image of Thought

Music stands in its own way in excess of what Gilles Deleuze calls a dogmatic image of thought. Deleuze argues that an image of thought like "I think therefore I am" works "because everybody naturally thinks that everybody is supposed to know implicitly what it means to think (Deleuze 1994: 131)." People think that they know what it means to think, just because they think they think. *I think therefore I am* acts as a way to link together the epistemological problem of thinking with the ontological problem of being. Thinking and being are united in the modern subject. Following Descartes in *Optics*, the modern conception of the subject privileges the visual as a means
to knowing. Together they constitute an image of thought. Around the subject, this image of thought provides the epistemological ground and generalized Being within which the events of differences and repetition can be captured.

Deleuze explains that this capture of difference occurs through the medium of representation and under the image of the Same (Deleuze 1994: 29). A dogmatic image of thought provides an univocal or equivocal ontology. Like a great chain of being, this ontology provides the ground in which things that are different are said to have a common denominator. Aristotle's statement in Metaphysics III "that which is different is different from some particular thing in some particular respect. So there must be something identical whereby they differ (Aristotle Quoted in Olkowski 1999: 18)" is exemplary of this ontological grounding. Aristotle uses this image of thought to unify and ground philosophy, however the result is that Aristotle has no concept of difference in itself (i.e., difference is reduced to as a predicate of the concept of Being) (Deleuze 1994: 18). Deleuze argues that this failure to appreciate difference limits the act of thinking making it a mode of thought that is exemplified by mere recognition. Using Henri Bergson's distinction, instead of thinking difference as radically different in kind, differences for Aristotle are understood as different in degrees (Deleuze 1988a: 21). For Deleuze this is a type of enslavement or containment of difference. This enslavement occurs, Deleuze explains, since “difference becomes an object of representation always in relation to a conceived identity, a judged analogy, an
imagined opposition or a perceived similitude (Deleuze 1994: 138)." All things, as such, are presumed to be similar before they are different.xxi As such, in the modern context, thinking always happens within the prior domain or limits of the same. Such thinking simply affirms for itself the possibility of thinking: I think therefore I am becomes I think therefore I think (Deleuze 1984).

With the loss of difference also comes the loss of a useful conception of the temporal. Time becomes a means to the reproduction the same. The opposition or similitude that occurs in the dogmatic image of thought's treatment of difference has the effect of bracketing change, time and movement. "Opposition is not a maximum of difference but a minimum of repetition (Deleuze 1994: 13)." The reign of the same is reproduced because of the dogmatic image of thought's negation of repetition. The dogmatic image of thought has no capacity to affirm change; since change only occurs, in Nietzschian terms, as the eternal return of the Same. Instead, for Deleuze, repetition is the creative engine of thinking difference. Against the problem of negation and resentment, when put to the test of the eternal return, only that which affirms difference returns (Deleuze 1983). As such, repetition becomes an affirmation of difference in kind. What has happened, Deleuze suggests, is that an order of reproduction has replaced an openness of repetition. Under an ontology of reproduction the promise of repetition in itself is restricted. Repetition "is grasped only by means of recognition, distribution, reproduction and resemblance in so far as they alienate the prefix RE in
simple generalities of representation (Deleuze 1994: 139).” Where for Deleuze “to repeat is to behave in a certain manner, but in relation to something unique or singular which has no equal or equivalent (Deleuze 1994: 1).” “Repetition is not generality,” he explains, “...repetition is a necessary and justified conduct in relation to that which cannot be replaced (Deleuze 1994: 1).” Representation, by way of contrast, is the perpetual re-presenting of the Same in such a way that the new, different and singular is captured and denied existence. The dogmatic image of thought, as such, denies difference and repetition in order to secure a world that is hostile to existing otherwise.

Like Deleuze, Michel Foucault is attentive to the ontological capture of difference and repetition that occurs in representation, this dogmatic image of thought and the limits to the practice of thinking. In The Order of Things (1970), for example, Michel Foucault locates an occurrence of the apparatus of capture and representation within the classical epistemology of the 16th century that corresponds to the emergence of modernity’s disciplinary society. The classical age was an epistemological order of similitude and resemblance and was manifest a visual table of representations (Foucault 1970: 75). Here, representations were presented within a generalized order of knowledge. Natural history was exemplary of the classical episteme. Natural history was the “nomination of the visual (Foucault 1970: 132);” it was made possible by a table of representation in which observations locate the proper place for a thing within the order of knowledge. Natural history played a special role since it sought to reduce the distance between things and language. It aspired
to bring language as close the act of observation and to bring those things observed as class to their sign as possible (Foucault 1970: 132). Natural history brought together the verb and noun to delimit all possible articulations of being; it became the survey of all structures on the earth (Foucault 1970: 160). There was no historicity and no emergence – just the capture, collection and classification of things. Where time was internal to language, the world was a visual order of things and names. As such, observation was restricted to that which was perceptible. While only that which was visible carried the status of proof. Although not all that was visible was qualified as valuable (like colour), an order of visibility required that all other senses were excluded (Foucault 1970: 133). What was left were four variables with which to systematise elements in the visual: form, quantity, relational distribution in space, and relative magnitude (Foucault 1970: 134).

Although this visual table of representation aids in visualising the dogmatic image of thought, this epistemic world was radically disrupted by the event of the modern episteme in the 19th century. Foucault argues that instead of locating things within a visual table, the observing gaze shifted to the search for the essences of things. The technology of viewing shifted from placing things in a table to probing things in space. In what Foucault calls an "epistemological thaw," a table of things, defined by their similitude, was disrupted by a spatial order of things' internal relations. Time shifts from language into the essential function of a thing. Humans, for example, think. "The threshold between Classicism and modernity" Foucault states "had been
definitely crossed when words ceased to intersect with representations and to provide a spontaneous grid for the knowledge of things (Foucault 1970: 304).” Instead of visual table of resemblance what emerged was metaphysics of oppositions (visible/invisible, identity/difference, use/exchange) (Foucault 1970: 268). Most importantly is the distinction between subject and object. In this distinction, the thinking subject (human) becomes the embodiment of time (via thinking) in a spatial world of represented objects (non-thinking animals, machines, things, women and barbarians). The gaze of god is replaced with the gaze of the modern subject in a society of modern subjects. As a result of this vertical and then horizontal shift in epistemology, the thinking subject also become an object of knowledge, something to be known, controlled, and policed by a society organised around the epistemological principals of representation know as normalising judgement.

In Discipline and Punish Foucault demonstrates the political implications of a Normalising Judgement. Under the epistemological threat of qualification/disqualification, this hierarchy of knowledge/existence assigns each thing an essence that can be ordered, ranked and policed (Foucault 1979: 170-194). Governance shifts from being an art towards the proper ordering of things in space (Foucault 1991: 94-95). The factory, the school, the prison, the hospital are designed to produce normal, efficient, healthy, responsible and effective thinking subjects/citizens – the modern individual (Foucault 1979). Thinking itself to be sovereign, in a world of policed difference, this individual emerges as a useful, but docile body, with accepted purpose, destiny and
agency. It induces in the subject "a state of consciousness (responsibility) and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power (Foucault 1979: 201)." It thinks therefore It is: in this thinking It is responsible (read free) and in this thinking It exists (read normal citizen). Like other bodies (whether chickens, forests or children), the product is a resource to be captured, consumed, and classified in the service of an image of thought -- the human will to truth.

Whereas in the classical episteme representations are represented, and this are is understood as the table of knowledge, in the modern episteme this are is the cogito, the I think. The meeting point between representation and being, between representations and representation itself, is the divided modern subject (Foucault 1979: 310). This transcendental double of "man," the I think therefore I am, provides the condition of (im)possibility for thought and action. Foucault calls this the critical limit attitude (Foucault 1984c). This curious entity "man," both subject and object, mind and body, emerges as the estranged sovereign, the subjected subject and the observed observer of modernity (Foucault 1979: 312). Things are doubled in such a way so that their opposite is invested as both the thing's condition and its limitation. Seeking to overcome this distance, the observing gaze probes the indeterminacy, between the surface of signs and the hidden architecture of essences. The modern episteme therefore emerges via the transcendental double of "man" as an ocular epistemology (I think = I see) enabled and disabled by a spatial metaphysic of Being (I am = I am seen). Not only does
seeing the world through the dogmatic image of thought limit the possibility of thinking, but in the service of the same, it polices what it means to be human (qualified) and the multiplicity of ways in which to encounter others (politics of difference).

Remix: Music as a Terrain of Thought

It is not fair to say that Selma is becoming disqualified because she is losing her sight. Societal forces in the film are more than willing to tolerate her differences. The problem that Selma faces is that she is slowly being marked, ranked and disqualified by an epistemological system of surveillance and boundaries; this is liberal toleration. The disqualified are qualified as disqualified. As Selma is becoming acoustic she faces the problems that many others (perhaps most) in modernity face, she just cannot pay attention, she daydreams and she is undisciplined. Out of the loop, Selma has different ontological commitments than those required by capitalism, liberalism and modernity. Selma’s different concerns and needs can be accommodated, but not affirmed. At one level, modern liberal capitalist society is more than willing to assimilate Selma’s difference (they offer her a job that doesn’t require seeing and retrial on compassionate grounds), but the effect of these gestures would be Selma’s ultimate ontological/cosmological erasure. Although Bill recognises Selma’s problem, he takes advantage of her social, physical and emotional isolation. Selma does not want to be incorporated into puritan American Society, she is not from that world; Selma wants her son’s operation because, mistakenly, he has been born into it. To this end,
and for Selma’s musical horizon to survive, Selma must accept her death by rejecting her assimilation and instead affirming life for Gene.

Although one might rightly be concerned with perpetual death of the maiden in the story of national construction (Molloy 1999; Wolff 1993), for Selma rejection of assimilation is not tragic, since, as she explains in her song to Jeff, “she has seen it all...there is no more to see.” She rejects the blackmail modernity’s symbolic icons (Niagara Falls: I have seen water, its water that’s all or the Great Wall of China: all walls are great if the roof doesn’t fall). Minimising the greatness of marriage, nation, empire and technology, she says: “I have seen it all, I have seen the dark, I have seen the brightness in one little spark, I have seen what I choose, I have seen what I need...I have seen what I was, and I know what I’ll be, I’ve seen it all, there is no more to see.” What is important for Selma is a different musical register, her ultimate rejection of Jeff’s (played by Joel Grey) love (and control) happens after he states: “I don’t understand musicals, I never just break out in song” to which she vocalises, “No Jeff, you don’t.” What is important is in the same moment of rejection (which happens at work, in court, in prison and in death) Selma is also vocalising her appreciation of real musical worlds outside modernity’s mode of representation/qualification. Selma accesses the world musically and through Selma, as viewers of the film, we see different worlds. When the music starts the world around Selma changes, from bleak American labour landscape to the utopianism of Russian Realism, from dull factory life to colourful musical festival. For example, the panning shot of a train moving
across the American landscape is transformed into a shot within a musical lens that employs one hundred cameras to capture the effects of Selma singing and dancing.

In contrast to her treatment of Jeff, Selma tolerates Kathy's (played by Catherine Deneuve) seriousness because her joy and happiness needs only a little help to come out, and when the music plays, she dances. The overhead shot of Selma and Kathy as cogs within the factory machines is transformed into a moving flow of shots that spiral through worker's singing and dancing towards ecstasy (i.e., to be beside oneself). Teaching the viewer how to look at the world differently, in her song “The Musical” Selma explains a world “where there is always someone there to catch me...when you fall.” Selma is not a modern subject; she “sees” thought music, she perceives worlds and human relations though their musical horizons.

In other words, Music stands in contrast to the dogmatic image of thought because sound has a unique relationship with perception and existence. The difficulty of affirming sound in itself is articulated by Jeremy Turner’s question: “how to think sound itself, when the epistemological focus of our thinking and our concepts is located in the seeing subject (Turner: 3).” Sound registers knowledge corporally; it is affective and somatic. Whereas for Descartes the optical is like a direct linear connection to the mind (Descartes 1988), sound, as John Shepherd and Peter Wicke explain, “brings the world into people from all directions, simultaneously and dynamically (Shepherd and Wicke 1997: 126).” Typically, perception of sound is thought
to be restricted to the ears, the inner chambers of the ear and the brain (Jourdain 1997). This makes for a unique interiority between sound and the mind that makes a special relationship between sound/music emotional ecstasy (Jourdain 1997). When it has not been reduced to words and meaning, music, with modernity’s romantic turn, is said to express the soul, the true self and the inner essence of humanity. However, sound affects the whole body, and without this base relation, sound does not exist in perception. Sound does not simply affect auditory organs, in order for sound to exist, as sound, it requires the interior chambers of a body to resonate and amplify. Furthermore, sound is sensed both across the entire surface of the body. Sound’s materiality, vibrating in and through the body’s interior and exterior surfaces, takes hold of a body (Gilbert and Pearson 1999: 45-46). Therefore, at the same time as sound is an interiority, sound also cocoons the body and externally affirms an ambient sonic environment (Shepherd and Wicke 1997: 126). Ultimately, all beings experience music, just differently. A bird song marking territory or eagerness to mate becomes similar to a world of national anthems and love ballads. Music constitutes an affective geography.

Music lifts off the surface of all things, interior and exterior, creating a sonic landscape and modes of being together. Though neglected by the dominance of knowing through sight, it is possible to map these sonic landscapes. Susan Smith argues that it is because geography is “almost exclusively a visual affair (Smith 1997: 503)” that the world of music, lamentably so, has been ignored. A map tells us more about the geographer’s
way of knowing and being than it does about the "world" that is described (Barnes and Duncan 1992; Crampton 2001). In contrast, Smith suggests that since "sound penetrates forbidden spaces, expresses the unspeakable and offers a style of communication quite different from the written or spoken word, it might be a useful – even indispensable – route into an appreciation of the geographies of (for example) racism, resistance and ethnic identification (Smith 1997: 515)." Music becomes a unique and valuable way to open up the world or understand it in ways that are ignored by dogmatic ways of knowing (Smith 1994). As Deleuze and Guattari remark, "sound invades us, impels us, drags us, transpierces us.... its force of deterritorialization is the strongest, (and) it also effects the most massive of reterritorializations, the most numbing, the most redundant...flags can do nothing without trumpets (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 348)."

Starting from Jacque Attali's statement that "all music, any organisation of sound, is ... a tool for the creation and consolidation of community (Attali quoted in Shapiro 2001)," Michael Shapiro maps the potential political diversity of "musico-literary genres of nationhood (Shapiro 2001)." A nation does not exist prior to its performance (Anderson 1991). Therefore, on the one hand, Irving Berlin and the American musical represent an assimilationalist musico-literary nationalism and hence maps a desire to become a good American (Shapiro 2001). On the other, John Coltrane, Hip Hop and Hawaiian resistance music re-maps diverse national horizons, where the wrongs of America's assimilationalist nationalism are stated, processed
and transformed (Shapiro 2001). To use music to map neglected worlds, Smith offers the emergence of the brass band as an important moment in the emergence of contemporary socio-economic conditions (Smith 1997). Being attentive to brass bands, she argues, enables a more complex mapping of social life during the shift towards mass production and the resulting rising wages, leisure time, class conflict and economic expansion. The brass band, therefore, becomes an important acoustic landmark in an emerging world where “local people become virtuosos (Smith 1997: 513),” and workers become citizens. Similarly, Sara Cohen looks to music as an action that reproduces the social relations specific to a community (Cohen 1995). Looking at the production of Jewish community in the UK, she argues that a sense of place is produced, maintained and remembered through music. Turning to another form of community production, Gill Valentine maps the production of a transgressive place (s) for queer women in and through the music of kd lang (Valentine 1995). Either in the concert hall or in the acknowledging and mutual glance of another listener, a transgressive place of identification and community is identified. All in all, instead of sight, music is used to map out spaces of community that would not otherwise be recognised. How music is expressed, affirms different ways of being together than the assumed national category of modern philosophy.

It should not be surprising, then, to find that music and philosophy have had a difficult balancing relationship, with philosophy always preferring the realm of meanings, ideals, words and sight over the affective, fluid and
possible worlds of music. The difference between meaning and affect proves important here. Philosophy "privileges modes of thought and experience which occur in the medium of verbal language, which thereby have clearly identifiable and analysable meanings (Gilbert and Pearson 1999: 57)."

Because music privileges modes of though and experience that have an affect and celebrate creative connections, production and openings, philosophy has tended to treat music's affective quality as dangerous and needing order. In their book Discographies (1999), Jeremy Gillbert and Ewan Pearson argue that a common musicological thread runs from Plato through Rousseau. "Unless (music) is tied down by words, given a fixed and ordered meaning by language, music is viewed as an inherently dangerous, destabilizing force (Gilbert and Pearson 1999: 40)." Music's affective quality is dangerous because it leads to physical pleasures that can distract from the clarity, unity and order of mind and State. Music undermines the basic qualities of the docile body, habit, and instead amplifies it as a nexus of affective forces. Music is dangerous to order. As such, Socrates stands as philosophy's musicological touchstone "we shall then adapt the beat and tune to the appropriate words, and not the words to the beat and the tune (Gilbert and Pearson 1999: 40)." For Philosophy, music must be constrained within the ethico-political-linguistic grammar of the dogmatic image of thought.

Within the German influence in philosophy, from Kant through Schopenhauer and Liebniz, however, music is embraced as the highest artistic expression of pure interiority. To do so, the prerequisite for words dropped
and abstraction, mathematics and purity are emphasised. Swapping danger for similitude, music became the ultimate expression of the pure essence, emotion and ideal interiority of human expression. Because of modernity’s focus on internal essence (out thinking humanness), music in romanticism comes to stand as the embodiment of human expression. However, with essential interiority comes a further depreciation of affective timbre, rhythm and physicality, and a valorisation of the purity of tone, composition and meaningful narrative harmony. The result is an approach to music that embodies a “double gesture of acknowledging music’s sensuality, its physicality and exteriority, while at the same time seeking to denigrate these characteristics and to valorize an ideal music experienced as pure interiority... (Gilbert and Pearson 1999: 58).” This understanding of ideal music is hostile to affective music’s base characteristic (sound) and what it can do (like make us dance, appreciate the world through out bodies and desire more than qualification) (Gilbert and Pearson 1999). As Gilbert and Pearson conclude, when music’s “primary purpose is to move our bodies via the materiality of the bass (sound), which do not offer linguistic meaning, (it) would seem to epitomize everything that (this) philosophical tradition dislikes and distrusts about music (Gilbert and Pearson 1999: 47).”

Indebted to philosophy’s approach to music, contemporary musicology and cultural studies tend to treat music as if it is either completely autonomous or thoroughly socially determined. On the one hand, if music is an autonomous, then its essential ethereal meaning is either immanent to
music/sound and/or completely meaningless for society. On the other hand, if music is socially determined, then music becomes nothing but a cipher for social relations and therefore meaningless in itself (Shepherd and Wicke 1997: 15). In all cases, music is being appreciated upon the epistemological and ontological terrain established by, and in service of, philosophy's desired unity. The perpetual reproduction to the dogmatic image of thought secures philosophy as the singular place and proper practice of thinking against music's horizon of epistemological and ontological possibility. The result is the same: music and its appreciation of difference are negated. Up and beyond music being used to explain, map and know the social, musical's sociality needs to be emphasised in a musical way.

Cut: Music as a Distinct Terrain of Social Thought

Selma embodies the tension between seeing the world through music and appreciating the world musically. With Selma's rejection of the sighted world also comes amplifying acoustic worlds that have always already been at her disposal. Music for Selma is not another tool through which the world can accurately be described for disabled modern ocularcentric subjects. Her ambition is not to fulfil modernity's will to truth; on the contrary, music for Selma builds, writes, and enables the worlds in which she moves. Her musical worlds act as a medium that helps compose her resistances to the ethical, political and disciplinary practices of the modern world. The world becomes visibly different in Dancer in the Dark when the music starts and in
this way (with Von Trier) music adds to the film; however, we must also begin to appreciate the film musically (with Björk). Von Trier is pushed to the edge of the visual, using one hundred cameras to try and reveal the blindness of the viewer and to capture Selma's musical movements. However, Von Trier had to turn over the film to Björk and Vincent Paterson (the choreographer) to allow for the musico-political accompaniment to emerge fruitfully. The collaboration provides the rich undertones in the film’s cinematic juxtapositions. For instance, in the song Cvalda, the music builds out of the working of the factory's machine tools. Selma builds a Marxist resistance to the monotony of daily factory life from the acoustic world that is always at her disposal. Her capacity to pass in the world is enabled by the beat, the movements and interactions with the machine. Similarly, in her song “I have seen it all” the film’s colours and the actors movements shift into that of Russian realism, an ideological medium in which someone is always there to catch you fall. How music sets the stage or medium for worlds to clash constitutes the first step in understanding Selma’s political agency.

In their book Music and Cultural Theory (1997), John Shepherd and Peter Wilke point to the problem of appreciating music in a way that affirms music's social conditions but does so musically. They argue that “music's social condition is intrinsically musical and not reducible to other forms of sociality (Shepherd and Wicke 1997: 95).” How, in other words, does one think about music “when the epistemological focus of our thinking and our concepts is located in the seeing subject (Turner: 3)?” Music must be understood in its
own terms (sonically not visually) yet affirmed as immanent to the social condition. The central problem Shepherd and Wilke face in determining the musicality of music's sociability is discerning and disentangling the relations between sound, music and language.

The difference between the use of sound in music and sound in language is that, in music, sound is non-denotative (Shepherd and Wicke 1997: 20). A note in music is not presumed to relate to a thing. Whereas language can with some success maintain the appearance of efficacy in this regard, the assumed one-to-one relationship between signifier and signified is wholly absent in music (Shepherd and Wicke 1997: 91). A b-flat doesn’t “mean” anything. Although there may be notes and notations, and can be reproduced, music does not have the status of a language. Put differently, since music does not capture sound, and imprison it and shackle it to the dirty work of knowledge production, music escapes “the tyranny of language (Shepherd and Wicke 1997).” In its disqualification comes its political potential. Shepherd and Wilke do not go so far as Luce Irigary and Julia Kristeva, who treats music as a semiosis and therefore before language, instead Shepherd and Wilke argue that language and music use sound differently. In Shepherd and Wilke’s use music constitutes a social medium. Music has a different use for sound (affirmation) than does language (capture).

Difference is constructed within language through opposition and capture. With obvious overtones to the dogmatic image of thought, “a sound
recognized within language is recognized as meaningful within a language ... because of its difference from all other sounds, a difference based on opposition (Shepherd and Wicke 1997: 137).” Language functions, in other words, via a grammar of difference that is constitutive of language itself. Verbal language uses sound to create the self presence of things, concepts and words (Derrida 1976). A presence is opposed the presence of others within the prior acceptance of prior ground of language. “Language therefore serves to structure the world through relations of difference, but a difference based on opposition if not repulsion (Shepherd and Wicke 1997: 137).” Language disengages from the world and becomes abstract to the material conditions of its emergence (sound). In this way, language ceases to be musical or language captured from music.

Music does not produce linguistic meaning that is defined and ordered. Music is not prior to language but uses sound in the service of sonic events. Music builds relations of difference that are based on attraction (Shepherd and Wicke 1997: 138). Instead of representation (presence/absence, here/there, either/or), therefore, a musical understanding cuts across established boundaries, producing affective open and transgressive “meaning” or “sensibility.” It builds towards moments that defy explanation but demand appreciation.

Music is unique because of its drive to develop connections between sounds. Instead of opposition and capture, all music is organised around affirmation and attraction that “has the potential to become infinitely
complex (Shepherd and Wicke 1997: 162 emphasis added).” In order to explain the connective aspect of music’s use of sound, Shepherd and Wilke turn to the musical theorist Victor Zuckerkandl. Zuckerkandl refers to the drive to develop connections as the sonic saddle (Shepherd and Wicke 1997: 159). The sonic saddle “present in musical experience is not a dividing point that eternally separates past and future; it is the stage upon which, for every ear, the drama of time is played (Shepherd and Wicke 1997: 134).” The sonic saddle is the unfolding of the musical present. In a 2/2 meter, for instance, a beat proceeds not as “one-two-three,” or “one-one-one,” but instead as “one-two-one (Shepherd and Wicke 1997: 131).” Music is created around the use of difference to construct relationships other than opposition or linear development. Zuckerkandl clarifies further that “it is not so much further as back that the beat carries us – and back to the starting point. To be able to come back, on must first have gone away...The entire process is therefore an “away from-back to” a flux, a cycle, a constantly repeated cycle (Zuckerkandl quoted in Shepherd and Wicke 1997: 131).” Zuckerkandl’s use of the term cycle here is more akin to a process of opening to the new, than it is about the eternal return of the same. The cycle “contains within it a past that is not remembered and a future that is not foreknown (Shepherd and Wicke 1997: 133).” The cycle, therefore, is the “ceaseless storing of itself and anticipating itself which is never repeated, which is every instant new (Shepherd and Wicke 1997: 134).” In the Sonic Saddle time is combined with space to
constitute a spatial-temporal medium in the service of creating sonic events or music.

Instead of asking the question what is music which, as shown by Shepherd and Wilke, leads to a complex interplay between structure and agency that respects music's singularity, but understands it term of its social discursivity, it is useful to begin to affirm Shepherd and Wilke’s attention to how music works from their drive to explain how music is used.

Shepherd and Wilke use Zuckerkandl’s sonic saddle in order to introduce music as a medium in sound, the social medium in which meaning is generated and negotiated. Introducing music as a medium in sound allows Shepherd and Wilke to fulfil their purpose of appreciating music's social condition in musical terms. A medium is “an agent or a material substance in which physical or chemical process takes place but which remain unaffected by the process (Shepherd and Wicke 1997: 116).” Whereas language attempts to differentiate a sound to related it to a single thing and secure meaning, a musical medium, as a distinct terrain of social thought, treats sound in an affirmative way, relating one sound to another in order to create affective meaning. This meaning, however is not outside of social production, sound is discursively understood and experienced. Musical meaning is produced through a social nexus, a sound medium, in which competing forces come to combine sound with societal understanding. The sound medium is what makes sound meaningful, expressive, affective (Shepherd and Wicke 1997: 116). The medium calls forth “from people elements of signification in a
manner in which sounds as signifiers do not (Shepherd and Wicke 1997: 117).” Sounds do not determine meaning, but similarly, meaning does not determine sound (Shepherd and Wicke 1997: 115); instead, in and through the medium, sound acquires a negotiated affective existence. Music begins to do work. It calls forth agents and entices them to move.

**Drop: Towards a Dissident Image of Thought**

When Selma's musical appreciation goes too far, the film records a political event: the machine stops her music and her music breaks the machine. For Selma, the result is that she is fired and brought closer to her ultimate capture; however, for music, Selma turns the machine into something other than what it was intended, and the political potential of music is revealed. When Selma breaks the factory machine and the meter and the tempo end, the music does not stop. It begins. Although Selma is interested in Music, and participates in a musical medium, it is not immediately clear how music is interested in Selma. Only modernity offers the illusion that individuals are gods, creators of their worlds, and capable of total knowledge. In contrast, music takes up Selma, Kathy and the other workers and moves them beyond the ethico-political medium of a sighted world. Similarly, starting with a shot of the skipping of a record, music takes Selma, Bill and his wife beyond the base brutality of his death, and into a different register of musical forgiveness and the scratch of a pencil brings the geometry of courtroom into choreography of dance. Selma's agency is not
located in her ability to decide between worlds and create musical mediums. On the contrary, Selma's agency occurs when she is taken up with and how she is aligned through a musical rhythm. Agency is a question of neither linear timing nor liberal will. Although Selma has modern obligations to fulfil (guilt), Music is not interested in saving Selma from dying. Selma is ripped from the disciplinary bonds governing her modern life and return to her musical world in death. Music is dangerous. Passing is no longer an option, as such, Selma follows her heart and moves beyond. In excess of music as a medium or refrain, Selma is opened to a musical outside.

Instead of a medium, Deleuze and Guattari refer to the refrain. More inclusive than its conventional meaning as a break or mark of reproduction, here the refrain constitutes “a prism, a crystal of space-time (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 348).” Like a medium, the refrain has a “catalytic function: not only to increase the speed of exchanges and reactions in that which surrounds it, but also to assure indirect interactions between elements devoid of so called natural affinity and thereby form organised masses (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 348).” The refrain is a territorial assemblage, which like a medium, organises and is organised in a self movement that passes as music’s different tempos and meters (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 349). However, where Shepherd and Wilke see music as building dialectically within the medium towards infinity, Deleuze and Guattari add a third dimension to the medium that radically opens an alternative way to conceptualise music and
therefore the relationship between music, politics and the dogmatic image of thought.

For Deleuze and Guattari the refrain has three components: a point which serves as a fragile centre in the midst of chaos, a circle of a stable movement and a line of flight which breaks away from the point and circle (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 312). Instead of focusing on tempos and meters or reifying the refrain as the space of music, Deleuze and Guattari deviate from a musicological project by focusing on the third component of the refrain: the line of flight that breaks away. In this break away, music builds its political dimension.

For Deleuze and Guattari a refrain does not simply exist, a refrain “is an act of rhythm that has become expressive or a milieu of components that have become qualitative (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 315).” A refrain is not a static container that has no history, nor force and now pull. On the contrary, a refrain emerges from rhythms and milieus that are expressive because, in turn, they have been territorialized as a refrain (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 317). Instead of treating the refrain as a prior medium where music dialectically emerges and proceeds, as Shepherd and Wilke are want to do, the refrain emerges from milieu and rhythm which are in turn emerging from the virtual. Deleuze and Guattari are more interested in musical events than they are in a musical medium’s dialectical developments.

The following point must be made clear: music and the refrain are not synonymous. For Deleuze and Guattari the refrain is not a friend of music,
"the refrain is rather a means of preventing music, warding it off, or forgoing it (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 300)." A refrain is a mode of capture. The refrain, like language, takes what is musical and harnesses it for its own preservation, harmony and reproduction. Music, as such, becomes socially harnessed and treated as a noun instead of a verb (Mackey 1992).

The relationship between music and the refrain is not so much an expression of music as it is of capture. Most of what passes as music is sound captured in the service of the dogmatic image of thought. Instead of conflating music, medium and refrain, Deleuze and Guattari treat music as the deterritorialization of the refrain (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 350). Music emerges from deterritorializing relations between the refrain, milieu, rhythm and the virtual.

To appreciate music as the deterritorialization of the refrain the special relationship with time must be understood. Music is always connected to an event. For Deleuze and Guattari, music is first about "returning" to rhythm and the milieu. Escape, flight and deterritorialization are present in the event of what is being considered music. The emphasis is temporal, not spatial (linear development). Music emerges from a different sense of temporality than the chrono-time that occurs within the refrain. Whereas the time that occurs within the refrain is meter, time that proceeds the refrain is appreciated through rhythms and milieux. However, these temporal processes are not so much outside the refrain as they are preceding it because they are connected to what Deleuze and Guattari call the virtual. A virtual
sense of temporality is indebted to Deleuze's work on Stoic conceptions of Aionic time (Deleuze 1990b). Aionic time is not linear, and as such the present is not a point in a temporal arrow. Aion-time is not immanent to space. Instead all time is both inflate past and infinite future. A line might be drawn, but it is never real, it is only a possibility that can be actualised. The virtual is all lines. The virtual, in contrasts, is always in excess of the refrain, it a milieu of differences and repetitions.

Deleuze and Guattari treat music as a process moving from the refrain to the virtual and, in order to do so, music arises from the tensions between milieus and rhythms. Milieus and rhythms emerge from the virtual beyond. On the one hand, milieus are vibrating codes in perpetual states of transcoding or transduction (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 313). Although Deleuze does not refer to them as such, it is useful to think of a milieu as a sound itself. Sounds are the first moment of territorialization that escapes from the virtual and the cutting edge of deterritorialization (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 348). Rhythm, on the other hand, is the milieus' answer to the virtual (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 313). A milieu makes itself the content of a rhythm and a rhythm connects together different milieus (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 313). Rhythm connects milieus by cascading into the new. It is important to note that a rhythm is not opposed to the virtual since a rhythm is not a refrain. Rhythm is critical, it does not bind, hold or capture a milieu; its function is to connect. Rhythm and the virtual therefore have a special relationship. Whereas milieus are born from the virtual, both the virtual and
a rhythm are in-between milieux. They therefore have an affinity with each other, since both are always already everywhere available, but each has its own relationship to a milieu.

In other words, for Deleuze and Guattari, music is a virtual-milieu-rhythm-refrain relation. Whereas “the refrain is essentially territorial, territorializing and reterritorializing, music makes it (the refrain) a deterritorialized content for a deterritorializing form of expression (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 300).” For example, when Glenn Gould “speeds up the performance of a piece, he is not just displaying virtuosity, he is transforming the musical points into lines, he is making the whole piece proliferate (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 8).” Music is a constant breakaway from refrain and drives towards the virtual, to what is beyond the refrain and the dogmatic image of thought. Kant’s opening to the sublime, for example, is uniquely positioned to overturn the dogmatic image of thought since it opens to “a discordant harmony, the relation between imagination and thought which occurs in the sublime (Deleuze 1994: 146).” However, what Deleuze and Guattari call a “new image of thought (Deleuze 1994)” still remains elusive to their music understanding. Deleuze and Guattari remain wedded to the image of music, as a relationship between the refrain and the virtual, and as such are incapable of affirming difference and repetition, as they desire. At best they return to a unity of chance, “a single and same voice for the whole thousand-voiced multiple, a single and same Ocean for all the drops, a single clamour of Being for all beings: on condition that each being, each drop, and
each voice has reached the state of excess (Deleuze 1994: 304).” The clamour of being is therefore musical, a discordant harmony, a cacophony of sound, from which the refrain is temporarily born, and musically destroyed. Its a new image of thought; it affirms music. It allows the individual to become musical; however, the new image of thought does not “music.”

Music must be understood as a verb, never a noun (Fikentscher 2000: 57). To think of music as a noun offers sound up to the dogmatic image of thought that Deleuze and Guattari seek to evade. Exceeding this, to treat music as a verb brings out its affective, dynamic, deterritorializing and affirmative qualities; it treats music in terms of “what it can do,” instead of “what it is.” This amplifies a new sound of thought, which is capable of affirming difference and repetition in themselves.

Redux: Towards a Dissident Sound of Thought

When does the musical work begin in Dancer in the Dark? Music is not restricted to the action, meaning in the film, nor to musical agents in traditional musicals, on the contrary, for Selma music is coming from elsewhere. Selma has learnt how to appreciate music actively. As a result, music is always happening for Selma. Dancer in the Dark asks what the viewer is prepared to hear? Selma’s silence about Bill’s secret, her son’s operation and her impending blindness, are musical affirmations of life that exceeds recognition and qualification in the grammar of a sighted world. Selma’s silence is not the same silence that is imposed upon her by the state in
prison. In prison, silence stands as the physical absence of life, total visible capture. As a musical Being, Selma is almost dead before the execution, against the backdrop of the state's silencing gaze, leading to the state's sovereign violence, Selma's musical world screams. In the final instance, the snap of her neck on the scaffold, cuts all sounds from the film. In an acoustic reversal, equal to that of Bill's earlier optical reversal, Selma's silence rips through modernity.

However, music is not opposed to modernity and it is not opposed to sight in the same way that sight is organised to be opposed to sound. Sound exceeds and overwhelms the dogmatic image of thought. When Selma is silent she participates in a different musical beyond. Selma's silence is her way of listening to and appreciating other ways of being beyond the world. Although Selma's musical world is background noise to the viewer, Selma's appreciation of sound is always an invitation to listen to the infinite in our finite visible worlds. For Selma, affirmations of sound in themselves are affirmations of life. Music builds out of our immediate material world: from a machine's clang, rattle and thump, a skipping record's pop, crackle and snap, a pencil's scratching, sliding and rubbing and a guard's marching and stomping. Selma is appreciative of the sonic beyond and she finds it in everyone and everything around her. From this everyday resistance to a dogmatic organisation of thought and action, she is amplified and lives. What is needed is another guide, beyond Deleuze and Guattari, that pushes an appreciation of music beyond escaping the grasp of the refrain and the
dogmatic image of thought, and instead begins to appreciate music in its own terms.

Developing the potential of music to exceed the available options of musical understanding, image of thought, terrain of thought, dissident mode of thought, is aided by the work of John Cage. Cage refuses musicology’s attempt to define music by being attentive to harmonic relationships between sounds and instead starts with the affirmation of sound in itself. Cage is best known for exceeding musicology’s two central dualisms: noise/music and silence/sound. Noise/music is a false problem for Cage because both noise and music are composed of sounds. The boundary between music and noise is arbitrary. Disharmony and noise are simply musical expressions to which you are unaccustomed or taught not to like (Cage 1961: 12). In a conversation with Peter Gena, Cage laments the arrest at the nineteenth century that takes place in the study and reproduction of musical habit (Cage and Gena 1982). “Musical Habits include scales, modes, theories of counterpoint and harmony, and the study of the timbres, singly and in combination of a limited number of sound producing mechanisms (Cage 1961: 9).” As one might expect most listening occurs in a very narrow range, hearing only what has been heard before and liking only what fits in a prior structure of intelligibility. In a similar manner that philosophy excludes but mobilises music through opposition, musicology excludes but mobilises noise in order to perform its disciplinary coherence. What occurs under the banner of musical
appreciation is really philosophical judgement or the ordering of music. Cage
was not threatened by the collapse of the music/noise distinction:

wherever we are, what we hear is mostly noise. When we ignore it, it
disturbs us. When we listen to it, we find it fascinating. The sound of a
truck at fifty miles per hour. Static between the stations. Rain. We
want to capture and control these sounds, to use them not as sound
effects but as musical instruments (Cage 1961: 3).

Instead of the term music, Cage preferred the phrase “organisation of sound
(Cage 1961: 3)” to characterise music in general in his serialist days. Thom
Holmes explains that whereas “the serialist game was aimed at a total
democratization of tones, replacing the composer’s instincts for making pretty
music by an elaborate set of rules for choosing which notes and dynamics
could come next in a series,” though similar in intent, “Cage did not restrict
his sound palette to a certain number of tones, but instead opened his ears to
any and all possible sounds, pitched and unpitched (Holmes 1985: 113).” If
creating music is understood as “the organisation of sounds,” then what is
meant by organised is "organising whatever happens to happen (Perloff and
Junkerman 1994: 9)." Music’s appreciation and affirmation are ways of
encountering worlds without returning to the dogmatic image of thought’s
judgement and creation.

Cage’s compositions (like Imaginary Landscape no.1 and 4’33”), his
concerts (like the musicircus), and his readings and writings (like Silence and
Empty Words) were appreciations and affirmations of sounds in themselves.
Silence/Sound is a false problem for Cage because silence, as the absence of
all sound, does not exist. If silence is the negation of any action or

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movement, then what action would produce no action? Cage explains that “there is no such thing as an empty space or an empty time. There is always something to see, something to hear. In fact, try as we might to make silence, we cannot (Cage 1961: 8).” Cage offers an example of a time when he visited an anechoic chamber designed to create Silence. He remembered, “I entered one in Harvard University several years ago and heard two sounds, one high and one low. When I described them to the engineer in charge, he informed me that the high one was my nervous system in operation, the low one my blood in circulation. Until I die there will be sounds. And they will continue following my death. One need not fear the future of music (Cage 1961: 8).” Silence, like nothingness and whiteness, is not empty, but exceedingly full of difference. Cage affirms the beyond, and the outside, as the real. Silence and sound share duration and envelope; what most think of silence is in fact white, blue or pink noise. Thom Holmes argues that “because all sounds are composed of the same primary components and because all music is sound, then it follows that all sounds can be defined as music (Holmes 1985: 15).” Silence is a type of sound; the universe is not complicit with the puritan demand for quite.

The result of the explosion of these basic dualisms is that Cage is primarily interested in the affirmation of sound in itself. If the dualisms above are created in the service of musicology, a sort of tyranny over sound, the affirmation of sounds requires letting, echoing Christian Wolff, “sound come into its own (Wolff quoted in Cage 1961: 68).” Cage explains “One may
give up the desire to control sound, clear his (sic) mind of music, and set about discovering means to let sounds be themselves rather than vehicles for man-made theories or expressions of human sentiments (Cage 1961: 10).

Cage is interested in letting sound come into its own because of the special relationship that sound has with the outside or the beyond. In order to compose music that affirms sound in itself, to affirm that which is beyond the dogmatic image of thought and the dominant musical refrain, Cage used chance operations that are 'indeterminate in its performance (Cage quoted in Holmes 1985: 113)." When asked how he makes music, Cage responded "by not giving it a thought (Cage 1961: 17)." What underlies this rather cheeky statement is the "absence of intentions (Cage quoted in Holmes 1985: 131)." Instead of harnessing sound for a predefined purpose, to fit a grammar of intelligibility, sound is affirmed in itself. This intentionally embodies a contradiction. Composition and organisation without intention? Cage's piece Music of Changes is created "by introducing the action of method into the body of the structure, and these two opposed in terms of order and freedom, that structure became indeterminate (Cage 1961: 20)." There is an affinity here between Nietzsche's Dionysian "dice throw" and Cage's use of chance operations from the I Ching: the book of changes. A chance operation expresses two contradictory moments - chance and necessity. It constitutes a paradox: where chance exceeds our designs and operation is putting the excess into effect (Perloff and Junkerman 1994: 9). When asked what he means by chance operations Cage explains "it is simply an action the outcome
of which is not foreseen. It is therefore very useful if one has decided that sounds are to come into their own, rather than being exploited to express sentiments or ideas of order (Cage 1961: 69).” Take a second example, Cage’s piece Imaginary Landscape for 12 radios is created by tuning 12 radios according to a pre-established composition, derived from chance operations, and then letting what happens happen. So in addition to a structure derived by chance, sounds emerge from the radio’s without purpose, and therefore on their own right. He explains that the piece was created, not “for the purpose of shock or a joke but rather to increase the unpredictability (Cage 1961: 162)” When he played 4’33” for an audience, in which the player of the piano is instructed to lift and close the piano lid at three pre-established times to create three blocks of silence, Cage is in effect composing from an entire virtual field of possibility. The indeterminate restlessness of the audience, the coughs, the stern looks, the shifting in the seats, constitutes a composed silence that reveals its indeterminate sounds.

For Cage affirmations of sound in themselves are affirmations of life. Cage exclaimed that western art and philosophy inaccurately see their purpose as "to bring order out of chaos" instead of contributing to "affirmation of life...a way of waking up to the very life we are living (Cage 1961: 12)." Cage is not interested in creating. He argues when we separate music from life what we get is Art (a compendium of Masterpieces). With Contemporary Music, when it is actually contemporary music, we have no time to make that separation (which protects us from living), and so contemporary music is not so much art as it is life that any one making it no sooner finishes one of it than he
(sic) begins making another just as people keep on washing dishes, brushing their teeth, getting sleepy, and so on (Cage 1961: 44).

Silence and noise, and therefore sounds, are expressions of the teeming multiplicity of the everyday life, and more generally, the real. Sounds are not restricted to pretty noises; a sound is an endlessly opening and decomposing events in an infinite field of possibility (Cage 1961: 28). “In this new music nothing takes place but sounds: those that are noted and those that are not. Those that are not notable appear in the written music as silences, opening the doors of music to the sounds that happen in the environment (Cage 1961: 7-8).” Instead of only finding difference in groups of two or more, difference is sought starting with one. For Cage, one isn’t the loneliest number. The result is that “the composer (organiser of sound) will be faced not only with the entire field of sound but also with the entire field of time (Cage 1961: 5).” No longer restricted to habit, organising in and through the multiple becomes political.

Musical appreciation becomes political because it affirms the infinite potential in the everyday ways of changing and moving. Remember Plato’s warning in the Book IV of the Republic: “Forms and rhythms are never changed without producing changes in the most important political forms and ways (Plato 1966: 72).” There is much more at stake in sound than simply musical understanding, pretty lyrics and sweet melodies. Music, as we have worked it away from the dogmatic image of thought, is the affirmation of difference and repetition in a world that is hostile to existing otherwise. Focusing on John Cage’s affirmation of sound in itself, though listening,
reveals a politics of amplification that builds from an affirmation of difference and repetition. What is important for Cage is not the form, character, quality or relationships of sound, instead he asks the question: what does this sound do. In each sound, a world opens, a sound is always already multiple terrain, infinitely opening onto itself. Where Cage becomes most explicit about how he is affirming sound in itself, is in his increasing attention the role of listening, the act of amplifying sound. A musical subject amplifies sound through listening.

Cage concerns himself with a deceptively simple political lesson: teaching listeners what it means to listen. Since all noise is music, then the drive to create more music becomes secondary to learning how to hear or amplify what is already everywhere. Cage explains “what has happened is that I have become a listener and the music has become something to hear (Cage 1961: 7).” Listening to music is different from making music. The role of the listener is not to understand what a composer is trying to do, to predict what is to come next, to remember how a song goes and sing, hum and tap along, instead it requires affirming sound. Listening is about stripping the mind of “its right to control(Cage 1961: 22)” and entering “into the act of listening, hearing each sound, just as it is, not as a phenomenon more or less approximating a preconception (Cage 1961: 23).” Listening is “not about recognizing relationships - which are the product of attempts to know - but about being of situations where one could not foresee relationships (Junkerman 1994: 57). When music is not bound to habit, listening to sound
means appreciating more than the music that has been made presentable/qualified.

In listening, Cage is concerned with affirming the "coexistence of dissimilars (Cage 1961: 12)." He explains, "one takes as a spring board the first sound that comes along; the first something springs us into nothing and out of that nothing arises the next something; etc. like an alternating current. Not one sound fears the silence that extinguishes it. But if you avoid it, that's a pity, because it resembles life very closely...(Cage 1961: 173)." Listening, like forgetting, becomes a positive practice (Deleuze 1994: 7). Such listening requires affirming life, difference, and experimentation instead of the habit of classifying, opposing and controlling sounds. Listening to music is about refusing habit and memory and giving oneself over to sound, experience and experiment.

In listening, a new sound of thought cascades into practices that amplify whereas the dogmatic image of thought holds to opposition. To amplify one must start from appreciation and affirmation, since in negation amplification has already been captured through opposition. Giving oneself over to sound is not abandonment or death; instead what is affirmed is the practice of amplification of life. Although amplification typically refers to amplitude, the character of sound concerned with loudness, amplification here is being used more generally to refer to the modulation of any aspect of sound (timbre, pitch, amplitude, frequency, and envelope). Amplification takes from the beyond and makes into something a new. Amplification takes
what is already present and, by affirming a certain difference, force, frequency, amplitude, attack, duration, timbre, encounter or rhythm, transforms that singularity into something new, another difference, an excessive encounter. Amplification, in excess of opposition, becomes the political verb of music and opens onto difference and repetition instead of order, reproduction and capture. What is crucial about amplification in music is how the everyday is engaged and reworked. It takes dead ends, defunct possibilities, exhausted horizons and spent vectors and makes them more than they could have been. All become new in the face their extinction, capture and disqualification because they are always already different.

To amplify Dancer in the Dark: Selma is not going blind she is listening to music. Selma is the dancer in the dark – Selma embodies music and lets it move her differently. Since dancing is the ultimate form of listening and it is listening with the whole body, Selma embodies the musical horizon. Selma becomes acoustic because she is the virtual-milieu-rhythm-refrain relation that escapes modernity’s capture of music, and she does so in and through amplifying sounds from the everyday material around her. The factory machines, the record skipping, the train tracks, the 107 steps to her death are simultaneously captured horizons and amplified worlds. Selma dies visually and Selma lives acoustically. In silence the film ends: “They say it is the last song, they don’t know us you see, it only the last song if we let it be.” At this point in the film, with Selma hanging from a rope, and the state closing the
curtain on her body to make it invisible, the camera focuses beyond, into the musical darkness of Selma’s always “second to last song.”
CHAPTER 6
Concluding in the Middle

This dissertation is about the grammar of habit. It is about moving grammars of the political, beyond sovereign thought and action, towards the Event of politicising thinking and acting. To understand how this dissertation is about habit (for instance, I tend to fill in what I want to hear, see and experience) one must start from the middle. Living in Hawaii teaches you to start from the middle. It is where the cutting starts. So, everything starts from the middle, and that is where I conclude to begin with.

Understandably, sometimes, as a reader, you can never know something until it arrives. And when it arrives, it is like an Event, an intangible that unfolds and reorganises all that has gone before and all that is yet to come. It changes the very content of what was, because, seconds ago, as you needed it, it became gone, and now it is to come.

The chapter entitled Politics after the Event: Exceeding Fluid Horizons in a Time of Terror, ironically a chapter that almost ruined me, is, in addition to being about the future of glocal politics, a biographical piece about my father. My father, you could not see, is present in each of the chapter’s themes APEC, the OCEAN and the Politics of Exceeding. He is there, but you could never see him, read him, or touch him, until he arrives “here,” in conclusion. An Event.

My father, Ivan Whitehall Q.C., is an immigrant to Canada. The last name, you see, Whitehall, as a beacon of the British Empire, hides more than it reveals. He could have come from England, but he didn’t. No one in
England would call themselves Whitehall. Like the Pacific Rim, a Name like Whitehall buries other histories, it over-codes the past-present's painful secretes and violent paths.

My father fled from Hungary in 1957 because of the worsening Soviet repression in Budapest. I have walked down the street towards where he has described Soviet tanks rolling upon students, pushing the spirit of democracy and dissent to the edges of order, and folding them under. He ran home, but the unfolding of this crisis of politics directed my father and my Grandmother, Magda, to flee Hungary. It took them a year to get everything together; everyone else had already gone. First they left legally, but they returned, then they left illegally. Both times they left with and without my grandfather, Shandar. Killed in the Holocaust, they left him in Dachau, but surely he never left them. Officially, Shandar joined them in Vancouver when they could afford to add his name to the Holocaust memorial. But back 1957, with and without Shandar, they fled to Israel. From Israel, they moved to Canada.

My grandmother had hated her time in Israel. Perhaps it was too confining there. It was a year after the war, perhaps there was no difference; it has never ended. Having a sister, Elizabeth, in Canada, they packed up and left. With freedom things might flow smoothly now...

Having arrived in 1956, Elizabeth was living with her son George. Both had left to live with George's sister. All three have now passed away. Regrettably I only had the chance to really know and love George, and only in the last years of his life. Well this isn't fully true, I am forgetting Magda and
perhaps the Whitehalls were always forgetting Magda, who only appeared every 5-6 years when we were kids. A rift in the family, you see. In addition, regardless of never having met George’s sister, or knowing anything about her until George died, I now love her dearly. George’s sister has a special place in my heart because she was a world traveller and a dancer. George’s sister danced her way, in whatever way, to the shame of some, around the world. Perhaps because of this dancing, this dirty dancing and moving around, no one in my family much talked about her. Like much of the Whitehall’s past, it is buried and forgotten. George’s sister was later murdered by her boyfriend, buried, the only way to put an end to a moving spirit. That is not to say that the eyes of George and my father did not light up when we spoke about her a few years ago. I now sense that George’s sister enchanted us all. Like her we wander.

Aside aside, when my father and my grandmother arrived in Canada they did not have an easy go of things. As an immigrant, who came after largest refugee wave to ever hit Canada in 1956, my father was expected to become a manual labourer. Expectations of hopes and dreams had been diminished, I suppose. Nevertheless, he would overcome these narrowing odds; he refused the remedial “dead end” courses at high school, and proved himself by completing all his math requirements in one year. An astonishing feat, one that was memorialised around the dinner table on numerous occasions, and, perhaps more importantly, though not to a kid with pride in his eyes, it was a stand, a defence, that would make him a future-lawyer. He
would become acceptable in Canada, in his mother’s eyes, in his own eyes, finally taking on the mantle of a qualified dream title like Doctor, Lawyer, Accountant, and Ph.D.

Like I am here today, Whitehall, he would change his name from Weisz when he married my mother, in Vancouver, a Henderson, to avoid anti-Semitism in Canada and start new. No doubt the name change, but also finding love and support from my mother while he finished his Bar exams, would protect him from the pause after saying that his name was Weisz. But there is more, I suspect. Weisz, meaning white in German, a trace from the days when Jews had to buy their last names, the colours (i.e., gold, silver and white) indicating status and wealth, was to become more British than British and, abandoning the Citadel overlooking Budapest, Whitehall was our new trajectory. In the way that my father speaks with a British accent, in formal moments, or the very strict performance of upper-class manners, becoming British was becoming invisible, it was a defence of sorts, a moment to emerge from the past and become new.

There are dangers in the Ocean, and the ocean’s movement participates in tearing up the old. Other stories, other lives, other ways of being are lost in the process. My father lost his past, his culture, his religion and so did we. I don’t mind so much. How could I; a new direction was found. The lost is not always immediate, but sometimes takes a life-time, or generations’ lives, for the loss to become normal and the wound to solidify. The cost of transformation and habituation is not always your own, agency is not
restricted to your own limits, but instead comes in the absence of a subject, to change your directions. Sometimes things arrive from the middle and change all that has gone before and all that is yet to come. This is the hope and curse of a refugee, I think, you know.

Canada is a movement of immigrants, it writes itself as a stable place, a sanctuary in the world, much like Israel does, and because of this autobiography, its founding violence can rarely or easily be appreciated by those who arrive late. Erasures, boundaries, agreements, and treaties are everywhere transforming a line of flight into a settled pattern, a habit of becoming Canadian, a habit of becoming Pacific and BC becoming occupied territories.

The OCEAN is not pacific; it runs through like rivers within rivers, waves within waves and flows within flows. Like George’s sister, it never stops. It dissolves the boundaries of continents, nations and selves, which are so guarded, reactive and reserved. The Pacific Rim when it is treated as a movement, itself, is an Event. As an Event it becomes a set of practices that attempt to stabilise, securitise, containerise the same forces that my father witnessed in Budapest, with people in the streets, demanding, shouting, playing, dancing and rejoicing. Simply put, APEC manages change by pretending not to move. Such attempts to stabilise and pacify, clear out other possibilities, past and future; they are designed to channel flows, to convert their directions to its purpose: order.
After having become a lawyer my father quickly became a star. Always present, always loved, but removed from our lives. He moved up the ladder, became the chain of command, and sat atop a career to look over his world. That career, not unfamiliar to other families, is what we lived. It is the air we breathed and the food that we tasted. Dinner conversations and dinner guests gave us children our pedigree, manners, talents and tastes. Charmed and Canadian, my sisters and I, with our individual difficulties, excelled. It’s an immigrant’s story some times, but the immigrant’s dream most times.

Sitting like a star for our family and in his career, my father had climbed the narrative performance of the habit of becoming Canadian. My mother says he’s changed. He changed, not only for himself, nor for his children, but living for the others that he defended and those that he fought to protect in the courtroom. As Chief General Council for the Government of Canada, in the end, my father had a history of successfully defeating indigenous attacks on the national story and defending Canada’s national interests, the good life for some, and always the underlying Immigrant dream of the habit of becoming Canadian. Land settlement after land settlement, treaty negotiation after treaty negotiation, nickel and diming along the way, my father defended Canada’s interests, like a good immigrant, against a future yet to be articulated, and a justice as of yet to be tasted.

At Stony Creek Reserve, on beautiful rolling lands, in now-Alberta, at a conference, I watched my father at work, like I had, since I was a child. Back then, a special day with my father was going to see him argue in front of the
Supreme Court of Canada and then getting taken out for lunch. We'd go to "Shadows," appropriately where the other lawyers would hang out. I'd have chicken wings. In the opening ceremonies of the Stony Creek Conference, after years of working with "these people," my father was handed a cigarette, only to have him give it back. One of his life achievements, you have to understand, was kicking a habit. It's a very tough achievement. He didn't smoke anymore. So (not knowing?) he handed back the symbol of hospitality, in defence of the health of his-self. Giving it back, he reproduced the habit of becoming Canadian. Later that day when talk turned to resistance, "real resistance," my father and I now spectators, he clamped up, imagining the streets of Budapest, I suppose, some words slipped his lips "don't be insane, who has the guns?" Were these words of fear or threat, and for whom? Dreams of resistance, at the edges of order, defended by the failed dreams of resistance. A friend once said, don't bet on the replay.

On the edges of order, the Pacific Ocean flows, and with its currents, eddies of resistance cut to the heart of the habit of becoming Canadian. Dreams of resisting becoming Canadian, Pacific and, in general, the habit of being swirl with world historical importance. Sometimes waves in the ocean come from no(w)here; they build from the transformation of movements into movements that exceed the logic of their imperial sights. Recently the world was told "rogue waves are more common that we've previously thought." They build like fractals and exceed the available options.
Sometimes, mostimes, nowadays, waves crash against the break walls in Vancouver (and elsewhere). Who knows what the future of the protests against APEC 1997 potentially were, probably nothing, they were small, really only a handful of protesters in the sea of potential reserves. It was nothing like what my father witnessed in Budapest in 1956, except that in some ways, the response of the Soviets was the same as the response of the Canadians, not in severity, but in the service of empire. The spirit of democracy was too great, as weak as it was, conformist to the point of reproducing the available options of political life, and so dissent was symbolically crushed. The stakes of globalisation are now too great for nationalist populist, grassroots rhetoric. With pepper spray tears in their eyes, they complained to the government, they set up an inquiry into the violence at APEC Vancouver 1997. “Was the Prime Minister,” they asked, “working against the interests of Canadians and instead protecting a different dream of globalisation and empire?”

This time, instead of watching the events unfold as a scared boy, and fleeing for a different future elsewhere, my father was the break wall, the hired guns, like a tank, that met that wave of dissent. His job, publicised to my chagrin, was to defend the Prime Minster’s Office, no doubt, “at all costs.” Student’s lungs burning with the taste of contemporary democracy, luckily I hadn’t made it over from Victoria as planned. If I had, then, like the Canadian national project, my father, if he had proceeded, would have been defending himself against my working against the habit of becoming Canadian. Don’t bet on the replay
This dissertation is about habit. Sometimes, as a reader, you can never know something until it arrives. And when it arrives, it is like an Event that unfolds and reorganises all that has gone before and all that is yet to come. It changes the very content of what was, because, seconds ago, as you needed it, it becomes gone, and now it is new.

The dissertation works against the habit of policing movement and change into the accepted containers of being sovereign. It is a dissertation about politics, about becoming political in excess of the habit of being, but even more, in excess the habit of becoming something that separates you from what you can become. It is an affirmation of the verbalisations that are life, the very verbs that take up the challenge of habit of going with the flow and establishing order over change, movement and politics.

Of course the other chapters are working on the same familiar issues, how could it be otherwise: perhaps this is what we all wonder, how could it become otherwise, the opening of the political. Each chapter deals with a specific aspect of affirming the political by being attentive to the verbs that come to constitute our habits, our movements. It is cliché to say there is nothing as constant as change. Nevertheless, the constants of change can be limiting, since they imprison us, make us reserved, and reactive. Or the constants of change can impel us towards the opening horizon. They can push us through the Event, towards the beginning of practices that refuse but regenerate, that affirm, exceed, amplify encounter and listen to the possibilities that wait beyond the habits of becoming, in my instance, the son.
of a father who is only in the habit of becoming Canadian. And instead, taking up the challenge of becoming, with or without my father, his choice (I suppose), different. This dissertation contributes to exceeding the politics of sovereignty's verbs and affirming open horizons and new verbs in its wake.

I stand at the end of a long dissertation process. A dissertation does not start from the day you sit down to write it, or if it does then you are one of the lucky ones. Instead, a dissertation begins from the middle, from all the emotional, historical and performative practices that have kept you together as being. Writing a dissertation is writing against the grain of your-self, against the grammar of your-self. It's tough: to write a dissertation is to have the courage to stand in from of the mirror at 2am (tonight 08/03/04 it is 4:45am) and ask whether or not you are or ever will be happy. No doubt the answer you give will determine the speed that you finish that dissertation, if at all, and the futures that lie ahead. If only the world conspired with your intentions, but instead we stumble on.

I apologise for being indulgent, I end and begin here, but I thought you ought to know what your are participating in. This dissertation is about the grammar of habit, me on the edge of habit, wondering what to do next.
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ENDNOTES

1 After this statement the following orders were given: the lights will be kept on at all times, any attempt to tamper with the lights will be useless, they don’t work, second, leaving the building without authorization will mean instant death, ...fifth, it is recommended that ward representatives should be elected, this is a recommendation rather than an order, the internees must organize themselves as they see fit, provided they comply with the aforesaid rules and those we are about to announce...tenth, in the event of a fire getting out of control, whether accidentally or on purpose, the firemen will not intervene, eleventh, equally internees cannot count on any outside intervention should there be any outbreaks of illness, nor in the even of any disorder or aggression...the government and nation expect every man and woman to do their duty. Good night.”

2 See also not the shift in Discipline and Punish where Foucault looks how the arithmetic order of establishing the truth of a crime become a exponential establishment of criminality.

3 It could be argued that this is what Deleuze and Guattari are doing. In this way, the Event becomes the plane of immanence for all concepts.

4 This is the potential problem that remains for Deleuze and Guattari because they tend to be read as saying that the Event is immanent to history, thinking etc..... instead of saying that the Event is one political possibility among many. What is being argued here is that accepting the opening horizon of the Event, new verbs can be encountered, that then need to displace the potential immanence of the Event.

5 Hans Bloomenberg, for example, in The Legitimacy of the Modern Age suggest that the shift from the Christian Era to the modern era occurs through recuperating the principle of sovereignty. In contrast to secularizing, which would be to leave sovereignty the same, but call it something else, recuperation rescues a concept through its contextual and functional alteration.

6 The later geographical dimension is obviously lacking in Foucault’s work as was pointed out by Edward Said, but, working on the shoulders of Said’s mapping of modernity’s epistemological spread, was taken up by post-colonial anthropologists concerned with the question of epistemology. See, for instance, Asante. Molefi Kete. The Afrocentric Idea (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987)

7 For example, the funding for the “Pacific Quest” came in part from the “International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation.” Such an odd sponsor of an academic project indicates that a complex set of economic, political, intellectual, technological and cultural stakeholders are interested in the creation of the Pacific Rim as a conceptual being. A telephone company needs to have a comprehensive understanding of the region and its particular geological, political, cultural and economic character in order to operate effectively.

8 Though not mapped as fully here, as a concept, the Pacific Rim has its parts (resources, populations and relationships), its whole (the Rim), its singularity (the Pacific Rim), plane of immanence (the Pacific Century) and conceptual personae (Heads of State).

9 When this paragraph, produced for the year 2000, was subjected to a Google search it produces 2090 hits. Every year a similar statement (with updated figures – thought the percentages remain the same) is produced an begins that years flood of documents.

“10 APEC’s 21 Member Economies are Australia; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Chile; People's Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Peru; The Republic of the Philippines; The Russian Federation; Singapore; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; United States of America; Viet Nam.”

11 As Ericson and Doyle report: “Following the convention: an ‘internationally protected person’ is defined in section 2 (a) of the Criminal code of Canada as ‘a Head of State, including any member of a collegial body that performs the functions of a head of state under the constitution of the state concerned, a head of state of a government or a minister of foreign affairs, whenever that person is in a state other than the state in which he holds that position or office... Article 2 of the convention makes it clear that a signatory state must specify criminal offences to deal with attacks, threats and attempts against internationally protected persons, and establish other security measures to prevent attacks not only on their person but on their ‘freedom’ and ‘dignity'(1999 602-3).”

12 Thanks to Jenny Garmendia for this insight.

xiii The Questions read:
1- Private property should not be expropriated for treaty settlements. (yes/no)
2- The terms and conditions of leases and license should be respected; fair compensation for unavoidable disruption of commercial interests should be ensured. (yes/no)
3- Hunting, fishing and recreational opportunities on crown land should be ensured for all British Columbians. (yes/no)
4- Parks and protected areas should be maintained for the use and benefit for all British Columbians. (yes/no)
5- Province-wide standards of resource management and environment protection should continue to apply. (yes/no)
6- Aboriginal self-government should have the characteristics of local government, with powers delegated from Canada and British Columbia. (yes/no)
7- Treaties should include mechanisms for harmonizing land use planning between Aboriginal governments and neighbouring local governments. (yes/no)
8- The Existing tax exemptions for Aboriginal Peoples should be phased out. (yes/no)

xiv Where a “Yes” vote means the government will be bound to adopt the principle in treaty negotiations and a “no” vote means the government will not be bound to adopt the principle to guide its participation in treaty negotiations. The later leaves the government position open, perhaps even to take the position that was voted against.

xv A good example of inclusion that binds is the some 220 million dollars loaned to First Nations, and spent on Lawyers, to negotiate equally with the whole government apparatus at the Treaty table. Stepping away from the Treaty process means that the money must be repaid, signing a treaty, however, may only secure enough to repay the cost of the lawyers. Every act of inclusion is a simultaneous act of exclusion. See Alfred T. “Peace Power and Righteousness an indigenous manifesto” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) especially “Modern Treaties: A path to Assimilation?” p.119-128

xv Thanks to Nevzat Soguk for this Old World insight.

xvii It is easy to compare apples and oranges when you accept both are fruit. Why else would anyone use this opposition?