RELIGION AND STATE-BUILDING
IN POST-COLONIAL SOUTHEAST ASIA:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATE-BUILDING STRATEGIES
IN INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA

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By
Robert Ken Arakaki

Dissertation Committee:
Deane Neubauer, Chairperson
Belinda Aquino
Kate Zhou
Muthiah Alagappa
Elton Daniel
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ABSTRACT

The dissertation attempts to answer the following questions: Why has religion been a persistent and significant factor in Third World politics? How did Third World countries address the challenge of religious pluralism? How can development theory be reformulated so that religion can be treated as a significant variable? The competing nationalisms thesis argues that managing religious pluralism is an integral part of the post-colonial state-building project and that states seek to manage religious pluralism by imposing a particular metanarrative on society. The competing nationalisms thesis functions both as a typology of nationalism and as a model of the state-building project. As a typology it argues for three forms of nationalism: secular, theocratic, and semi-secular/ethnic. As a model it draws upon Ian Lustick's three stage model of state-building: incumbency stage, regime stage, and ideological hegemony. It also draws upon James Scott's argument that state-building consists of the imposition of standardization of practice on society. The research design consists of the macro-social comparative history approach applied to the two case studies: Indonesia and Malaysia. Indonesia's metanarrative was secular. Although the Pancasila -- Indonesia's official ideology -- professed belief in God, it committed the Indonesian state to no one particular religion; the result being a de facto secular state. Malaysia's metanarrative was semi-secular/ethnic. Malaysia's constitution designated Islam -- the religion of the core ethnic group (the Malays) -- the official religion. A comparative analysis of the two case studies resulted in several findings. One, confirmation of the availability of all three national trajectories for both countries. Two, both states achieved the incumbency stage
and the regime stage of state-building, but failed to reach the third stage, ideological hegemony. Three, in both case studies the attempt to impose the metanarrative on society, in conjunction with the disruptive effects of modernization, resulted in the emergence of Islamic nationalism as a rival narrative. The dissertation closes with (1) a discussion how the findings challenge the secular assumptions of major theories of nationalisms, e.g., Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson; and (2) a discussion how the findings can enrich and expand the Weberian understanding of the state.
To my parents

Takezo and Florence Arakaki
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

In many ways this dissertation had its beginning when I was a doctoral student at the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, California. Initially when I came to the GTU in 1993, my research focused on the politics of religious pluralism in Southeast Asia. GTU, especially Area VIII "Cultural and Historical Studies of Religion", provides a wonderful environment for students, such as me, whose research interests cross a number of disciplinary boundaries. While there, I was fortunate to have Clare Fischer as my advisor. I was also fortunate to serve as area assistant to Ronald Nakasone. In addition to its excellent theological resources, GTU provided me with access to UC Berkeley. I especially benefited from Robert Bellah's class on the sociology of religion and M. Steven Fish's class on comparative political analysis. Their influence can be seen in the way I approach religion, modernity, and the modern state in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. I am also indebted to Sylvia Tiwon. It was in her class that I wrote the paper that formulated the "Pancasila as firewall" argument which appears in Chapter 5.

Then in an unexpected turn of events, I went through an "identity crisis" in which I came to the realization that down deep inside I was really a political scientist. This realization prompted me to change my major from religious studies to political science. I would like to thank Takeshi Kohno of Ohio State University and Ken Miller of UC Berkeley for confirming to me that I really do belong in political science.

In 1996 I began my studies as a doctoral student in political science at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. For students whose focus is Southeast Asia, UH Mānoa has a number of excellent resources: Hamilton Library's Asian Collection, the Center for
Southeast Asian Studies, the Indo-Pacific Languages program, and the neighboring East-West Center. The University of Hawai‘i political science department has the advantage of giving students the latitude to pursue what can be unconventional or interdisciplinary research interests.

I would like to thank Deane Neubauer, my dissertation chair, who willingly took on the responsibility of supervising my dissertation despite his busy schedule and who pushed me to improve the content and style of the dissertation. I would also like to thank my other committee members: Belinda Aquino, Kate Xiao Zhou, Elton Daniel, and Muthiah Alagappa, who both encouraged me and challenged me with tough questions.

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

One of the significant political developments in the late twentieth century has been the emergence of Islam as a significant political force.¹ The Iranian Revolution of 1979, in which a Western oriented regime was replaced by an Islamic theocracy, took many political scientists by surprise and questioned their theories of revolution. The fierce civil war between Maronite Christians and Shi'a Muslims that destroyed Lebanon's pluralistic democracy in the 1970s, the 'ethnic cleansing' perpetrated by the Serbian Christians against the Bosnian Muslims in former Yugoslavia since the 1980s, and the communal violence between Muslims and Hindus during the Ayodha dispute in India in 1992 all point to the significant challenge that religious pluralism poses to the modern nation-state. The Algerian military's forcible overthrow of the democratically elected Muslim majority in 1992 and the French government's attempts to suppress the wearing of veils by Maghrebi/Muslim girls in schools point to the significant challenge that religious resurgence can pose to democratic theory as well as theories of modernization and political development.

After many years of disinterest, scholars in the West began to write articles and books treating Islam as a threat: Bernard Lewis' "The Roots of Muslim Rage" in the Atlantic Monthly (1990), Samuel P. Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations" in Foreign Affairs (1993), the May 1995 issue of Foreign Affairs subtitled "The Islamic Cauldron",

¹ This is not to imply that Islam is the only religion that became a significant political variable in the late twentieth century. Other examples include the Christian Right in the 1980s in the U.S., the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas; the Aum Shinrikyo in Japan. Furthermore, the Roman Catholic Church played a major role in the demise of communism in Poland and the downfall of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines.
and Benjamin R. Barber's *Jihad Vs. McWorld* (1995). Many of these articles failed to take seriously the complexity of Islam and the varieties of religious belief and practice existing within Islam. Although much attention has been given to the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia, little attention has been given to Southeast Asia where one of the greatest concentration of Muslims can be found and where Muslims live in peaceful coexistence with peoples of other faiths and embrace religious tolerance as a way of life.

Another significant political event of the twentieth century has been the demise of colonialism and the rise of a whole host of nation-states. This has given rise to political scientists prolifically generating literature on political modernization, democratization, and economic development. Under the influence of the ideological tensions of the Cold War and the heady optimism of the post-WW II economic boom, many social scientists have optimistically written about the preconditions that give rise to a modern, prosperous capitalist and democratic society available to the new nation-states. What is striking is the fact that many of these post-colonial states, contrary to theories of modernization, did not become stable democracies but reverted to some form of authoritarianism. Also, contrary to the expectation of many social scientists, many of the newly independent countries did not elect to become secular states but either openly recognized religious groups or explicitly legitimized themselves upon religious principles. Two such examples are Indonesia and Malaysia. Malaysia adopted Islam as its official religion and Indonesia adopted a vague monotheism that allowed for state rule of a religiously plural society.

The challenge of ethnic, linguistic and religious pluralism has been an especially significant one for the post-colonial state. Well over half of the "Third World" countries
have "high" or "very high" levels of pluralism (Migdal 1988:37). (It should be noted that "pluralism" is used here in a sense that differs from the widely used concept "organizational pluralism." A working definition of religious pluralism can be found in Chapter 3.) There exists a substantial body of literature on religious/ethnic conflicts and how states have sought to manage, contain or suppress these conflicts. But research is needed on how the managing of religious pluralism is linked to the state-building project. Why did post-colonial states "fail" to undergo secularization? Why did these new nation-states openly recognize religion even as they simultaneously took on modernization projects? How is the open recognition of religion linked to the structural imperatives of the post-colonial state-building project?

Political science's neglect of religion is partly due to the large body of literature on modernization generated during the 1960s. An underlying assumption in much of the literature from this period was that "modernization = secularization." Political science's secular bias, however, has roots deeper than the modernization theories of the 1960s. The neglect of religion goes back to the broad radical restructuring of higher education in the late 1800s that accompanied the rise of the modern research university. It was during the nineteenth century that sociology underwent a narrowing of focus that resulted in the neglect of religion (Mann 1986:31-32). This trend became so widely and firmly entrenched in the social sciences that: "The theory of secularization may be the only

3 See Marsden and Longfield's (eds.) The Secularization of the Academy (1992) and Conrad Cherry's Hurrying Toward Zion (1995).
4 See also Robert Bellah's insightful essay "Between Religion and Social Science" in Beyond Belief (1970).
theory which was able to attain a truly paradigmatic status within the modern social sciences (Casanova 1994:17)."

The secular assumptions of social theory have recently come under serious criticism. Jose Casanova in *Public Religions in the Modern World* (1994) engages in a theoretical and empirical critique of the secularization theory. He notes that what passes for secularization actually consists of three distinct forms of secularization (1994:19 ff.).\(^5\)

Furthermore, his comparative case studies show that secularization as decline of religious beliefs and practices holds true for Western Europe but not in other parts of the world (1994:218). Mark Juergensmeyer in "The New Religious State" *Comparative Politics* (1995) critiques the secular assumptions that underlie theories of nationalism and argues that nationalism and religion resemble each other much more closely than many suspect.

A significant shift in attitude can be seen in the recent Summer 2003 issue of *Daedalus* subtitled "secularism and religion." The increased scrutiny of what has been up to now a widely assumed paradigm points to a new opportunity in the social sciences.

An underlying assumption of this dissertation is that political science needs to problematize the concept of modernity if it is to be able to understand the relationship between religion and politics.\(^6\) While many political scientists reacted to the "return of religion" by treating it as a problem, the recent turn of events can also be used as an opportunity to question the dominant research paradigms in political science. Political modernization is very much a part of contemporary history, but our understanding of this

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\(^5\) He argues that secularization can take one of three forms: (1) the structural differentiation of society, (2) the decline of religion, and (3) the privatization of religion.

\(^6\) Professor Steven Fish of UC Berkeley once noted in a class lecture the need for political scientists to begin problematizing the notion of modernity.
historical project has been distorted by the antireligious bias of the European Enlightenment.

In recent decades the field of comparative politics has undergone significant changes. One such change has been the "return of the state." During the 1950s and 1960s the concept of the "state" fell into disfavor as a result of a reaction against earlier formalistic constitutional approaches to the state and the growing popularity of the pluralist and structural-functionalist model among political scientists. However, the situation began to change during the 1970s with Alfred Stepan's *State and Society* (1978) and Theda Skocpol's *States and Social Revolutions* (1979). This trend became especially clear with the publishing of Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol's *Bringing the State Back In* (1985).

I propose to complement the "return of the state" with a similar "return of religion" to political science, i.e., constructing a theoretical framework that allows us to treat religion as a significant political variable. This will be done by examining how Indonesia and Malaysia addressed the challenge of religious pluralism as part of their state-building strategies.

**The Research Question**

The basic question of this dissertation is: What is the significance of religion for the nation and state building strategies of Indonesia and Malaysia? Why did these two countries fail to undergo secularization? What are the implications of the two states' failure to undergo secularization for development theory? How did the two countries address the challenge of religious pluralism? How can political development theory be
reformulated so that we can take into account religion as a significant political variable in the post-colonial state?

I will be using the competing nationalisms thesis to explain the disparate ways states manage religious pluralism. Basically, this theory argues that states manage religious pluralism through the imposition of an official metanarrative on society. Furthermore, this theory argues that modernization is not unilinear as assumed in conventional theory but rather multilinear. Instead, states take different religious trajectories depending upon the type of nationalism (secular, religious/theocratic, semi-secular/ethnic) selected by the political elite at the time of independence. The type of nationalism selected is then inscribed upon the public sphere through the post-colonial state-building project. The three fold typology presented here is intended to go beyond the simplistic religion/secular dichotomy that underlie conventional development theory and to enable political scientists to take into account the complexity of state-religion relations in many Third World countries.

This leads to the question: Why do states seek to manage religious pluralism? The provisional answer is that it is an essential part of the state-building project. Because the modern nation-state requires ideological homogeneity among its subjects, it is imperative that religious pluralism be managed. Without this shared ideological framework coordinated action becomes problematic and political legitimacy becomes tenuous and unstable leading to a weak nation-state.

One of the ways the state appropriates religion for the state-building project is through the construction of a metanarrative that defines the structural and ideological
framework of the new nation-state. The metanarrative constitutes the ideological core of the modern nation-state. The metanarrative defines the relations of power, the structure of society, the role of the individual citizen, and provides the unifying symbols for the nation-state. National metanarratives draw upon religion not only for its tremendous mobilizational capacities but also for its intelligibility. In societies where modernization has only recently just begun, the effectiveness of Western secular ideologies is limited to those exposed to Western-styled education. Religion on the other hand is accessible to both the westernized urbanites and the more traditional rural populations.

Subsequent to the selection of the national metanarrative, the state then proceeds to impose it upon the public sphere, drawing upon the resources of the state apparatus to do so. The national constitution is one of the most significant ways that the national metanarrative is defined. Although the constitution articulates the official metanarrative for the nation-state, other counter-narratives often exist. This can give rise to opposition movements and even violent anti-state actions. I would contend that much of the recent emergence of Islamic "fundamentalism" are actually rival forms of nationalisms. This rivalry gives the post-colonial nation-state a conflictive quality often overlooked in theories of nationalism. By drawing attention to the contested nature of the post-colonial state the competing nationalisms thesis raises questions about the teleological assumptions implicit in development theory.

In order to impose the official metanarrative upon the public domain the state draws upon the various state capacities: distributive, extractive, regulative, responsive,

7 "Fundamentalism" has been italicized to indicate the problematic nature of the term. It is used in the introduction because of its widespread usage in popular media. A discussion of the complex phenomenon denoted by "Islamic fundamentalism" can be found in the third chapter.
and symbolic. The goal here is the creation of a universally accepted ideological framework within the borders of the newly established nation-state. It is here that the state-building project conjoins the nation-building project.

What I propose here is to replace the widely accepted "modernization = secularization" paradigm with the "modernization = standardization" paradigm. This paradigm is derived from James Scott's *Seeing Like a State* (1998) in which Scott describes how the modern state through the imposition of "legibility" and "simplification," extends state power into the public sphere. Using Scott's framework I will argue that the modern state can and will appropriate religion for the state-building project, especially for the ideological construction of the nation-state. The advantage of this paradigm is that it allows room for religion to play a significant role in the making of the modern state. In addition, Scott's approach allows us to problematize the nature of the modernity project and to overcome the antireligious prejudices that derive from the Enlightenment Project.

In this dissertation questions about state-building cannot be easily separated from questions about nation-building. This is especially true given the fact that religious/ethnic pluralism and ideological competition are closely related. Assuming that the state-building project is guided by the goal of not just administrative integration (state-building) but also social homogeneity (nation-building), I will be asking the following questions: Has the state-building project resulted in greater ideological/cultural homogeneity? Has the reality of religious pluralism forced the state to abandon or modify

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8 These five state-capacities were identified by Almond and Powell in their *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (1966).
this goal? Has the imposition of the metanarrative been a one-way, top-down process or a more complex state-society dialectic?

The Research Framework

When Malaysia and Indonesia acquired their political independence in the aftermath of World War II, both countries faced significant ethnic/religious cleavages. Interestingly, however, each state adopted quite different approaches to this problem. Where Malaysia adopted Islam as its official religion, Indonesia opted for a vague monotheism as its official ideology. With their disparate strategies, the two countries taken together lend themselves to comparative analysis due to their relative cultural similarities as well as differences in demographics and colonial history.

This raises a number of interesting questions: Why did Malaysia make Islam the official religion while Indonesia instead adopted the quasi-religious framework of the Pancasila? What were the most widely used administrative means for managing religious pluralism? Did the New Order regime of Indonesia manage religious pluralism largely through the Pancasila, the country's national ideology, or through the coercive power of the military? In the aftermath of the 1969 post-election riots did Malaysia rely heavily upon the Rukunegara, the national ideology, to restore interethnic harmony or did they rely upon the New Economic Policy which attempted to redistribute wealth between the Malays and the Chinese?

On a more theoretical level: How well does the competing nationalisms thesis explain the different approaches the two states took to managing religious pluralism? How effectively did the two states penetrate and integrate the public sphere? What were
the principal means of governance used for imposing the official metanarratives on society? Do the states' strategies for managing religious pluralism conform to the modernization = standardization paradigm? Despite their different strategies, can it be said that the state-building projects in Indonesia and Malaysia share common features?

The Plan of the Dissertation

Chapter 2 "Religious Pluralism and State-Building Theory" is a survey of the recent literature on state-building theory. This survey covers the return of the concept of the state in political science, the controversy between statist and non-statist approaches to political analysis, and competing definitions of the state. It also discusses the recent literature on state-building and religious pluralism. The chapter concludes with a working definition of state-building that will be used for this study.

Chapter 3 "Nation-Building and the Competing Nationalisms Thesis" will start with an overview of the recent literature of theories on nationalism. Drawing upon this recent research I will construct a threefold typology of nationalisms (secular, ethnic, religious) that attempts to explain the different trajectories states have taken with respect to religion in society. I will attempt to show how these variant nationalisms shaped the state-building project in post-colonial societies. Additionally, I will construct a diagram by which we can map out the complexities of state-religion relations and by which we can situate the post-colonial state-building project. In this chapter I will also be setting forth a set of propositions about the state-building project that will be tested against the two case studies of Indonesia and Malaysia.
Chapter 4 "Methodology and Approach" will describe the methodological approach taken in this dissertation. In this chapter I will discuss the dominant methodologies in the field of comparative politics and the advantages of the macro-social comparative analysis approach for this investigation. In addition I will discuss the utility of historical institutional analysis as a complementary approach.

Chapter 5 "Case Study I - Indonesia" will give a historical overview of the state-building project in Indonesia beginning with the selection of the Pancasila. Using the competing nationalisms thesis I will argue that Indonesia followed the secular nationalism paradigm. I will then describe the means used by the Indonesian state to impose the Pancasila upon Indonesian society. I will also be looking at rival metanarratives like the Jakarta Charter (religious nationalism) and how these rival metanarratives shaped religious opposition to the Indonesian state. The chapter will conclude with an assessment of the extent to which the state-building project was able to effectively structure Indonesian society, especially with respect to the religious domain.

Chapter 6 "Case Study II - Malaysia" will give a historical overview of the state-building project in Malaysia beginning with the formation of the consociational polity. Using the competing nationalisms thesis I will argue that Malaysia followed the ethnic nationalism paradigm, this despite the fact that Islam was recognized as the official religion of Malaysia. I will be making the argument that the long-standing rivalry between the two major parties, UMNO and PAS, stems from the ethnic nationalism vs. religious nationalisms rivalry. The chapter will conclude with an assessment of the extent
to which the state-building project was able to effectively structure Malaysian society, especially with respect to the religious domain.

Chapter 7 "A Comparative Analysis of State-Building Strategies" will compare the state-building strategies of Indonesia and Malaysia. It will assess the propositions presented in chapter 3. I will be looking for evidence that the states attempted to structure state-society relations along the lines of the official metanarrative. I will also be examining whether the two countries follow Lustick's three stage/two threshold model of state-building. I will be paying close attention to whether or not certain basic similarities can be found in the two countries' state-building strategies -- the attempt to structure state-religion relations through the official metanarrative. I will also be paying attention to the emergence of rival religious metanarratives in response to the official metanarrative. Additionally, I will examine the persistence of religion in the face of state sponsored development programs and the implications this has for political development theory.

Chapter 8 "Conclusion" will summarize the findings of this study with respect to the way the state-building project was framed, the usefulness of the competing nationalisms thesis for explaining various configurations in the state/religion relations, and the distinctive features of state-building in post-colonial societies.

**Anticipated Contribution to the Discipline**

Just as Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol argued for bringing the state back in, I will be arguing for bringing religion back in. With the recent increased resurgence of religion in contemporary politics it is imperative that political scientists understand how
religion functions as a political variable and how states have interacted with religious
groups. I hope to provide a theoretical framework by which political scientists can take
into account religion's role in a country's political development. I also hope to provide a
critique and an alternative to the modernization paradigm that has caused political science
to exclude religion from its purview.

Another anticipated contribution to the discipline of political science will be a
more focused understanding of state-building in post-colonial countries. In many of the
important works on modernization and state-building, the region of Southeast Asia has
been left out. Many works in comparative analysis are comparative in the sense that they
focus on countries in Western Europe and East Asia.

For the discipline of Southeast Asian studies I expect the dissertation will provide
a more nuanced understanding of the role Islam played in the nation-building project as
well as a clearer understanding of the relationships between religion and the post-colonial
state. It is also anticipated that the concept of the state-building project will give us a
more theoretically sophisticated understanding of politics in post-colonial Southeast Asia.
CHAPTER 2
STATE THEORY AND RELIGIOUS PLURALISM:
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

I. The Return of the State

As mentioned in the Introduction, a significant development in political science has been the "return of the state." During the 1950s and 1960s the concept of the "state" fell into disfavor as a result of a reaction against earlier formalistic constitutional approaches to the state.¹ Alfred Stepan notes that he could find only one major article dealing with state theory for this period (1978:3-4). This non-statist tendency was due to the widespread popularity of pluralist and structural-functionalist theories among political scientists. In these models the state is viewed as a passive instrument responding to the market mechanism or to the demands of competing interest groups.² The other rival approach in political science -- Marxist theory -- was likewise non-statist.³ The Marxist class model saw the state as an instrument of class rule rather than an autonomous actor.

However, the situation began to change in the 1970s with Alfred Stepan's State and Society (1978) and Theda Skocpol's States and Social Revolution (1979). Stepan attempted to counter the non-statist bias of pluralist structural-functionalism and Marxist

¹ This describes the situation in the U.S. In Germany state theory fell into disfavor as a result of its close association with militarist tradition (Mann 1984:186).
² Some go even further and vehemently deny the existence of the state. Marion Levy calls the concept of the state a "pathetic fallacy" insisting that the government does nothing to people, that it is people who do things to people (see 1966:4, no. 1). As a Parsonian, Levy shies away from referring to institutions per se, preferring to speak of patterns of social action.
³ This is a general description of Marxist theory. The situation in Marxist scholarship is more complex. Keith Faulks notes that Karl Marx held two conflicting views of the state. In the Communist Manifesto Marx described the state as instrument of the capitalist class but in The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte Marx described the state as independent of class rule (1999:33 ff.). This issue is given extensive treatment in Nicos Poulantzas' State, Power, Socialism (1978). Also Eric Nordlinger in "Taking the State Seriously" notes that the revival of neo-Marxism can be attributed to the prominence it gives to the state in capitalist societies (1987:356).
theory by drawing attention to the organic-statist tradition (1978:26). Skocpol's *States and Social Revolution* marked a major advance for state theory and for theories of revolution. Skocpol turned Marxist theory on its head by arguing that it is the Weberian state rather than the Marxist economic superstructures that explains the outcomes of social revolutions. This trend was further established with the publishing of Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol's *Bringing the State Back In* (1985). They countered the anti-statist bias by arguing for the autonomy of the state as a social actor. Since then state theory has become a burgeoning field of research. The fairly recent flourishing of state theory has resulted in a number of review articles: Stephen Krasner's in *Comparative Politics* (1984), Forrest Colburn's in *Comparative Politics* (1988). Of interest to Southeast Asianists is Caroline Hau's short review essay on state building literature focusing on the Philippines in the *Kyoto Review* (2002).

A review of the literature shows that state theory -- especially state-building theory -- has become a significant area of research in political science. Joel Migdal predicts that states will continue to be central to the study of comparative politics well into the 21st century (Migdal 1997:209). Mohammed Ayoob identifies "state making" as the principal political activity in the Third World in the second half of the 20th century. Furthermore, he asserts that "state-making" must form the centerpiece of any political theories concerning the Third World (1992:64). A search on the UMI's ProQuest shows that dissertation research pertaining to state-building shows a definite, if uneven, growth trend (see Table 2.1 at end of chapter). It is clear that state-building should be of significant concern to political scientists in comparative politics.
Out of the recent resurgence in state theory has come a number of significant advances. One development has been the tempering of the earlier assertion of the state's autonomy from society. Pushed too far, arguments for the state's autonomy can lead to a state isolated from society. Migdal, Kohli and Shue's in *State Power and Social Forces* argue vigorously for moving away from a strictly statist orientation to a frame of reference that puts the emphasis on the mutual interaction between state and society (1994:293).

Another significant development has been a focus on the causal mechanism underlying state-building. Charles Tilly's provocative essay "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime" (1985) makes the argument that national states originated as a result of organized means of violence used for the purpose of extracting revenues from the populace. Bluntly put, "War makes states." Tilly elaborated upon this argument in his *Coercion, Capital, and European States: AD 990-1992* (1992). In making this argument Tilly openly challenged the long-standing liberal notion that the state originates from the social contract (1985:169).

Thomas Ertman's *Birth of the Leviathan* (1997) refines Tilly's causal theory by showing how state-building in Europe took different trajectories depending on the timing of the onset of geopolitical competition and the strength of local government at the onset of state-building. Ertman makes brilliant use of macro-social comparative analysis not only to describe the state-building project, but also to explain regime variation.

Joel Migdal's *Strong Societies, Weak States* (1988) marked another advance in state theory. For comparativists, Migdal is worth taking note of because of the attention
he gives to post-colonial states. By focusing his attention on the state's ability to penetrate and impose its will on society he brought a more dynamic understanding to the state-building project. In his analysis of the "triangle of accommodation" Migdal identifies the concrete actors involved in the contentious process of policy implementation.

Gerald Easter's 1996 *World Politics* article on state-building in Soviet Russia highlights the significant role that personal networks can play in the state-building project. He draws upon the conceptual tools of network analysis in an attempt to correct the tendency to stress macro-level causes (1996:553).

Migdal, Kohli, and Shue's *State Power and Social Forces* made a number of other contributions to state theory. In this book various authors examine state-building in non-Western and post-colonial contexts. Atul Kohli's chapter on India discusses the puzzling tendency towards centralization and powerlessness in Indian politics. Catherine Boone's chapter on sub-Saharan Africa discusses the transformation of state structures from colonial structures that excluded post-colonial structures that sought to include the rural peasantry and the contradictions that this engendered.

Another interesting development has been the attempt to apply rational choice theory to state theory. Barbara Geddes' *Politician's Dilemma* (1994) used rational choice theory to demonstrate state autonomy and to explain variation in state capacity. By approaching policy implementation as a collective action problem Geddes showed the state's autonomy from society.
David Waldner's *State Building and Late Development* (1999) brings a rational choice approach to state-building theory. He used rational choice theory to explain how in some instances state-building facilitates economic development and in others impedes it. In addition, Waldner made a number of other significant contributions to state theory. Taking Chalmers Johnson's concept of the developmental state, Waldner refutes the popular neo-liberal paradigm which holds that the absence of market intervention by the state facilitates economic development. Another exciting aspect of Waldner's book is the way it shows the variability of the state's autonomy from society. Rather than assume the state's autonomy -- as some of the earlier works seem to do -- Waldner shows state autonomy to be variable, subject to social forces. When the political elite formed cross-class coalitions using side payments the state's autonomy was undermined and the ability of state apparatuses to effectively manage economic development was weakened (1999:202).

Another fruitful aspect of state theory has been the relationship between state-building and political regimes. David Collier's (ed.) *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (1979) provided a corrective to the overly optimistic assumption of modernization theory that modernization leads to democracy. It also gave political scientists a more nuanced understanding of the analytical differences between states and political regimes. The book is also noteworthy for its explanatory model for bureaucratic-authoritarianism (1979:28). In this model, industrialization gives rise to economic and political tensions that, in turn, threaten further economic growth which

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4 The model is not Collier's but a summary of Guillermo O'Donnell's argument about bureaucratic-authoritarianism.
precipitates military intervention. A similar concern can be found in Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (1992) in which they argue for the relationship between capitalism and democracy. Building upon Barrington Moore's classic *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1966) they show that the emergence of democratic regimes can be traced to political equality that arises as a result of contradictions within capitalism.

Two books edited by Muthiah Alagappa have brought a more focused analysis of certain aspects of Weber's state. *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia* (1995) focuses on a critical component of the Weberian state: political legitimacy. The book is noteworthy because until recently not much attention was given to political legitimacy in developing countries (1995:4). This lacuna is understandable given the prevailing non-statist bias of conventional political science research. The more recent *Coercion and Governance* (2001) addresses another lacuna in state theory: the state's coercive apparatus. In light of the prevalence of military regimes among Third World countries and given the fact that the military is the principal institution of the state's monopoly on coercion, it is somewhat surprising that political scientists paid little attention to the role of the military in political development (Alagappa 2001:xix, 42). One significant finding in *Coercion and Governance* is that reliance on coercion (military rule) reflects low political legitimacy and weak or contested national identity. In other words a military regime is really a weak state, not a strong one.
II. Unsettled Issues and Other Lacunae

The recent "return of the state" movement can be characterized as Weberian in spirit and orientation (see Kohli and Shue 1994:294 ff.). Much of contemporary theorizing on the state takes Weber and his classic definition of the state as its starting point (Mann 1986:37). What is remarkable is how well Weber's definition of the state has held up for almost a century since it was first articulated. State theory owes a significant debt to Max Weber.  

Even with the recent resurgence in state theory, the statist approach must contend with other non-statist approaches that dominate the discipline: liberal-pluralist, Marxist, post-modern. Also, the return of the state movement has encountered resistance and criticism. In 1990 Gabriel Almond -- a prominent structural-functionalist -- responded strongly to the "return to the state" literature. He pointed out that the statist's charges of reductionism against the pluralist model were unfounded, noting that structural-functionalists have acknowledged the role of the state in political process. He rebuts the neo-statists' claim to having made an improvement, noting that their approach is essentially the same as the structural-functionalists (1990:214-216). In short, the "return of the state" movement is really an intergenerational misunderstanding.

5 "... a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (1958:78, italics in original). This widely cited definition is found in Weber's speech "Politics as a Vocation." A more elaborate definition can be found in his magnum opus Economy and Society Vol. I (1978:56).

6 For example, Weber in his attempt to trace the emergence of the state to an evolutionary process anticipated the current debate in state-building theory (see 1978:904-905). Weber in Economy and Society makes the argument that state-building was the result of the containment of violence which in turn leads to social stability and economic stability (1978:907-909 anticipating Norbert Elias' civilizing argument (see Kuzmics in Keane 1988) and Charles Tilly's capital extraction argument. Weber also discussed the problematic nature of defining the nation (see 1978:921 ff.) and the nature of state capacity (1978:905).

7 "But at what cost! A generation of young scholars has been encouraged to reject much of its scholarly ancestry with little more than a paradigmatic farewell." (1990:216)
Another significant criticism came from Timothy Mitchell's 1991 *American Political Science Review* article "The Limits of the State." His critique is basically rooted in the post-modernist hostility to essentializing. Mitchell criticizes the attempt to "bring the state back in," arguing that the statist approach founders upon the elusive and shifting boundaries that the state shares with society. He argues that the state is not so much a structure, but rather a structural effect.

**Defining the State**

Despite the recent resurgence in state theory, social scientists still find the term "state" somewhat problematic. Michael Mann admits the state to be a "messy concept" (1984:187). Muthiah Alagappa finds the term "state" by itself to be too abstract and seldom the specific object of legitimation by power holders (1995:26). Anthony Giddens noted that the meaning of "state" remained ambiguous, referring either to a "state-based society" or "government institutions of a definite type within such a society" (1984:246).

This concern has led a number of state theorists to warn against the reification of the state. Roger Owen warns against imputing an unwarranted ontological status to the state, i.e., treating it as a concrete entity acting upon society (in Khoury and Kostiner 1990:6). Barbara Geddes sees a similar problem noting:

> For another, discussions of the state usually assume that states behave as unitary actors. In reality, they often do not. The problem is not that there is "no there there," but that there are too many theres there--each having different capacities, intentions, and preferences (1994:7).

Migdal, Kohli and Shue note that state power is not monolithic, suggest the need for political scientists to disaggregate the concept of the "state" (1994:294).
A number of theorists have taken this advice to heart. Rather than dismiss the concept of the "state" out of hand, they apply a more elaborate and differentiated definition to the vague "human community" in Weber's definition of the state. Alagappa, for example, employs the useful heuristic tactic of breaking down Weber's definition into three more narrow or concrete manifestations: (1) the nation-state -- the political community within a given territory, (2) regime -- the type of political system, and (3) government -- individuals or groups in control of state power. The three categories are meant to be understood as ideal-types. Alagappa is aware that these theoretical distinctions are not always found in concrete reality and that in many Third World countries the situation is such that the three manifestations of power are often conflated (Alagappa 1995:59).

A similar strategy can be found in Brian Job's *Insecurity Dilemma*. Like Alagappa, Job employs a threefold typology of state, regime, and nation. However, he defined the terms differently. What Alagappa refers to as "government" (the individuals or groups that employ the power of the state apparatus), Job subsumes under the "state" (the *set of institutions* that controls interactions among groups and individuals within a given territory) and "regime" (the *set of people* who hold the highest office and/or the elite that exercises effective control over the instruments of coercion) (1992:15). The "nation" is understood as the subject population's self-identification and its shared understanding of what constitutes legitimate political identity. Rich and Stubbs defined the state as a *series of interlocking institutions* (civil bureaucracy, the governing
executive, military, and police) and a governing elite that is constrained by the power brokers who represent the different sections of society (1997:2).

**State Building and State Capacities**

State-building is much more complex than the recent literature lets on. Many theorists tend to view state-society relations in terms of command-obedience. Skocpol understood the state primarily in terms of its administrative capacity (see 1979:293, 1985:16-17). Migdal approached state-society relations in terms of the state's ability to make and impose binding rules upon society.

Another dominant approach is to view state-society relations in terms of the state's capacity to extract revenue. Tilly in "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime" makes the provocative argument that the state is primarily structured for the purpose of extracting money from the subject population (1985:184). O'Donnell's bureaucratic-authoritarian state model emphasizes the state's role as the guarantor of domination within society in order to safeguard capitalist relations of production (1979:288).

The current emphasis on command-obedience or revenue extraction gives short shrift to the discursive dimension of state-formation. States cannot rely on coercion alone but require the willing consent of their subjects. This neglect leads to political scientists failing to give their attention to other critical aspects of the nation-building project, e.g., the forging of an ideologically united polity. It also leads to a neglect of how political legitimacy is achieved in developing countries (see Alagappa 1995:5)
There is a need for state-building theory to take into account the complexities of state-society relations. One way is to approach it in terms of the expansion or strengthening of state capacities. A useful breakdown of state capacities can be found in Almond and Powell's *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (1966). In it the "capabilities" of "political systems" are broken down into five categories: extractive, distributive, regulative, responsive, and symbolic (1966:190 ff.). Although their approach was non-statist, Almond and Powell's work provides us with a useful framework for distinguishing the various aspects of state-building. This is not to say that this is a complete listing of state capacities. There are other capacities that can be added to the five listed by Almond and Powell, for example, the state's ability to mobilize the subject population (Migdal 1988:21-22).

Distinguishing differences among state capacities can lead to a more sensitive understanding of the state-building project. One question that apparently has yet to be addressed is whether or not the state-building project is sequential in nature, that is, the expansion of one particular state capacity is needed before another can be strengthened. Something like this can be seen in a three stage model found in The World Bank's *World Development Report 1997*: Zone I - unfocused state capabilities, Zone II - focused state capabilities, and Zone III - effective state capabilities (1997:3).

**Religion and State-Building**

Another conspicuous omission in the recent theorizing on the state has been the role of religion. A survey of the recent literature shows very little work done on the role of religion in society, especially with respect to the way religion has influenced political
development in Third World societies. As noted in the Introduction there are many questions that have yet to be addressed by political scientists. Why did many newly independent states retain traditional religious symbolism as part of their symbolic repertoire? What accounts for the recent religious resurgence in Third World countries? Why is much of the religious activism political in nature and directed against the state?

Political science's failure to view religion as a political variable stems from a constricted understanding of power. What is needed is a broader theoretical framework that takes into account the various forms of power. There are several examples of this broader approach. Michael Mann in *The Sources of Social Power* (1986) identified four fundamental sources of power: (1) ideological, (2) economic, (3) military, and (4) political (1986:22 ff.). Similarly, Anthony Giddens identified four social institutions involved in the production of human interactions: (1) symbol systems or modes of discourse, (2) political institutions, (3) economic institutions, and (4) the law in conjunction with the sanctioned use of coercion (1987:19). Manuel Castells, in his three volume *The Information Age*, sees societies as being organized by three processes: (1) production, (2) experience, and (3) power (1996:14 ff.). Thus, although the state is unique in its monopoly on coercion, there are other institutions involved in the production of power relations. In light of this broader understanding of power, managing religious pluralism is not incidental to the state, but is integral to the "infrastructural power" of the modern state (Mann 1984:196, Smith 1986:236).

The neglect of religion in political science can be attributed to the uncritical acceptance of the "modernization = secularization" paradigm. In recent years, however,
this paradigm has come under serious criticism. Paul Marshall's article "Religion and
Global Affairs: Disregarding Religion" (1998) discusses the widespread tendency in the
West to disregard religion and the need for a corrective to this myopia.

We do not need a wholesale shift to religion as the new key, but we do
need to deal consistently with religion as an important independent factor.
Analyses which ignore religious dynamics should be inherently suspect

Probably the best critique is Jose Casanova's *Public Religions in the Modern World*.
Casanova points out that the "modernization = secularization" paradigm holds true
primarily for Europe (see Casanova 1994), but elsewhere religion continued to exert a
significant influence over society and politics. For comparativists, the Eurocentric bias of
this paradigm has created a significant blind spot in their research. It has resulted in their
being caught flat-footed in the face of the recent religious resurgence.

Two approaches can help us move beyond the current impasse. One is to focus on
the ideological construction of the state. The other is to replace the "modernization =
secularization" paradigm with the "modernization = standardization" paradigm.

**The Ideological Construction of the State**

One recent theoretical advance in political science has been the increased attention
given to the discursive aspects of power. Two influential theorists who have brought
greater attention to the relationship between discourse and power are Antonio Gramsci
and Michel Foucault. Gramsci influenced Marxist theory and Foucault's
post-structuralism would play a significant role in post-modern theory. Gramsci turned
Marxist theory on its head by insisting that it is ideology that is primary, not institutions
(see Bobbio 1988:88). Foucault's discussion of the "politics of truth" and the triangular
relationship among truth, right, and power, has brought to the attention of social scientists the discursive aspects of power (see 1980: 93 ff., 131 ff.). Also in line with mainstream social science is Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann's *The Social Construction of Reality* (1966). By expanding our definition of power, discursive analysis enables us to study forms of power that have tended to be neglected, e.g., religion and ideology.

Several examples of the discursive approach can be found in political science. Anthony Giddens' *Nation-State and Violence* (1987) is probably a good example of an attempt to bring a discursive approach to Weber's state. Giddens enlarges upon Weber's classic definition of the state, noting that in its reflexive monitoring of the reproduction of social systems under its purview, the state appropriates the various elements of the social system: signification, domination, and legitimation (1987:17 ff.). The notion of the ideological construction of the state expands upon Weber's definition of the state and facilitates the analysis of managing religious pluralism in the context of state-building.

The state has a number of means by which it imposes a metanarrative on the public sphere. Some of the obvious means are official speeches given at official events and later disseminated through the government controlled mass media, and the public education system (see Harootunian 1999). More subtle means include the census and museums (see Anderson 1983:163 ff.). The government census is a powerful means of defining social reality. What is counted becomes real and what is not becomes unreal or irrelevant. Museums are a powerful means by which the official version of history becomes visible to the public eye and corroborates the version received through the school texts. Orientalist discourse, the intertwining of academic and government

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8 The meaning of "metanarrative" will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
discourses, can suppress the complexities of intercommunal relations (van der Veer 1994:142 ff.).

In successful state-building the official metanarrative acquires hegemonic status. Ian Lustick’s article provides a useful illustration of how the Israeli government worked to give its borders a hegemonic status.

To cross the second threshold—to transform the nation’s cognitive and emotional maps in such a way that few Israelis are any longer willing or even able to imagine their country without the West Bank and Gaza—is a psychological task. It is a problem of political education. It is not the automatic result of laws, formal declarations, or number of settlers, though it is intimately related to these and other "created facts." (Lustick 1987:169).

Lustick’s article is of particular interest to us because it lays out how ideological hegemony is achieved through government actions. The state-building project is broken down into three stages and two thresholds that must be crossed in order for successful state-building to take place. In the early stages of state-building political conflict is basically intra-elite conflict. In the later stages of state-building certain institutional features of the state become part of the given everyday reality accepted by all.

**State-Building as Standardization**

The state-building project is an aspect of the vast project of modernity. However, state theory has been led astray by the uncritical acceptance of the "modernization = secularization" paradigm. What I propose here is to replace the widely accepted "modernization = secularization" paradigm with the "modernization = standardization" paradigm.

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9 Van der Veer notes that by bracketing Indian history into Muslim and Hindu periods, the India government was able to gloss over ambiguities such as patronage of Hindu shrines by Muslim rulers and Hindus and Muslims both using the mosque-temple side by side (van der Veer 1994:151-153).
This paradigm is derived from James Scott's *Seeing Like a State* (1998) in which Scott describes how the modern state, through the imposition of "legibility" and "simplification", extends state power into civil society. Scott's book is essentially an ethnographic description of the practices of the modern state: cadastral surveys, population census, surnames, tax maps, codification of legal codes, monocropping etc. all of which lead to a coordinated and centralized society easily controlled and manipulated by the modern state. Scott's list can be further augmented by Anderson's insightful analysis of "census, map, museum" (1983:163 ff.) and Caplan and Torpey's book on identity cards.\(^{10}\)

Scott did not invent the "modernization = standardization" paradigm. Similar arguments can be found elsewhere. Anthony Smith's *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (1986) describes the "triple Western revolution": (1) division of labor, (2) control of administration, and (3) cultural coordination, i.e., cultural standardization (1986:131 ff.). Similarly, Charles Tilly in *Coercion, Capital, and European States* shows how standardization of society facilitated the European states' ability to extract resources and mobilize its population.

In the period of movement from tribute to tax, from indirect to direct rule, from subordination to assimilation, states generally worked to *homogenize their populations* and break down their segmentation by imposing common languages, religions, currencies, and legal systems, as well as promoting the construction of connected systems of trade, transportation, and communication (1990:100, emphasis added).

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\(^{10}\)The identity card is something that only recently has come under critical scrutiny. *Documenting Individual Identity* (2001) touches upon how the imposition of precision and permanence on individual identity is rooted in the requirements of the modern nation-state. Benedict Anderson notes that the mandatory identity card in New Order Indonesia represents a kind of census with special markings that identify 'traitors' and 'subversives' (1991:185).
The modern state's ability to engage in more direct and drastic forms of intervention into society was due not just to more powerful technologies but also to the imposition of standardization of relations on society. Indeed, the modern nation-state with its industrialized economy requires a population that is "mobile, literate, culturally standardized, interchangeable" (Gellner 1983:46). It is this understanding of modernity that underlies the "modernization = standardization" paradigm.

On the surface the conventional "modernization = secularization" paradigm, seems to describe quite well the profound ideological shift that took place in Western Europe. The decline of religion in Europe can be traced to the church's caesaropapist embrace of absolutist rule, its resistance to the cognitive heresies of modernity, and its insistence on its right to define public knowledge. The growing influence of modern science combined with the Enlightenment critique of religion, resulted in educated publics -- and later whole societies -- indifferent or hostile to religion. But there were exceptions to this. In societies where the church accepted the modern process of functional differentiation or relinquished the medieval Aristotelian-Thomist synthesis, religion continued to thrive (Casanova 1994:29-31). This suggests that the "modernization = secularization" paradigm may not be as universally applicable as assumed by political scientists.  

This becomes especially apparent when we look at modernization outside Europe. As noted earlier many Third World countries did not undergo secularization but instead

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11 This understanding of modernization challenges Marion Levy's widely cited definition of modernity which is based upon the preponderance of inanimate sources of power in a society (1966:35 ff.)
12 Similarly, the uncritical acceptance of modernization led to people assuming the universality of certain theories. Hamza Alavi's article on the post-colonial state in Pakistan and Bangladesh shows how concrete situations diverged significantly from the categories set forth in the classical Marxist theory.
retained traditional religious symbol systems. Unlike modern Europe, which opted for modernity based upon the cognitive framework of the secular Enlightenment critique of religion, many Third World societies instead opted for modernity -- industrial capitalism, modern technology, legal-rational bureaucracies -- framed by ideological frameworks informed by traditional symbol systems. Thus, the widely accepted "modernization = secularization" paradigm needs to be replaced with another understanding of modernization. This is not because it is invalid but because its validity is of limited value when applied outside Western Europe. For this reason the "modernization = standardization" paradigm is being proposed as an alternative framework for understanding political development.

The "modernization = standardization" paradigm proposed here is not intended to serve as a causal model for modernization. It is intended to identify one of the distinguishing consequences of the modernity project -- the modern nation-state as a unified field of political discourse coextensive with the nation's territory. The "modernization = secularization" paradigm was right in highlighting the hegemonic status of the Enlightenment philosophy in Western European political discourse but only half right. Nation-building calls for some particular "ideology of order" to dominate public discourse but not necessarily one based upon the secular Enlightenment. This was the historical option chosen for Europe, but other options also exist. Political science's Euro-centric bias resulted in comparativists focusing on the one particular historical option, chosen to the neglect of the more important process of discursive formation and cognitive unification that underlie the making of the modern nation-state.
Modernity and the State-Building Project

State-building is but one aspect of the modernity project. Modern state-society relations came about as a result of wrenching changes being imposed on premodern societies.\(^{13}\) Understanding the structural characteristics of premodern societies will help us understand the distinctive features of the modern state and the state-building project. State-society relations in premodern cultures differ radically from modern societies; for that reason it is important that political scientists take into account the distinctive aspects of premodern cultures in shaping political structures in order to comprehend the distinctive aspects of modernity.

One characteristic of premodern societies was the limited capacity of the state. The limited technological capabilities of premodern states constricted the ruler's ability to impose his will on society. The ruler was able at best to effectively impose his will in the immediate area surrounding the capital city, but beyond the capital the ruler had to rely on the cooperation of local lords and chieftains.

Until the advent of the nation-state, the authority of a political center did not systematically and equally cover an entire population, so that what appeared to be a single homogenous polity was in fact a congeries of fiefdoms. The further one got from the center of power, the weaker the grip of centralized political influence, until at the periphery whole sections of a country might exist as a political no man's land (Juergensmeyer 1993:27).

\(^{13}\)Examples include: the closing off of the frontiers, the replacement of traditional subsistence economies with commercial agriculture, the introduction of a cash economy, improved cartographic and census taking techniques that enabled states to tax the subject population directly and recruit manpower needed for military (both of which are necessary for maintaining a standing army). See James Scott's chapter "The State as Claimant" in *The Moral Economy of the Peasant* (1976:91) and his more recent *Seeing Like a State* (1998); Sidney Tarrow's chapter "States and social movements" in *Power in Movement* (1994:62 ff.), and Charles Tilly's *Coercion, Capital, and European States AD 990-1992* (1992:67 ff.).
The result was a society decentralized and fragmented in terms of rule, culture, and language; something very much like Gellner's agro-literate society (1983:9 ff.).

Despite these limitations there were early attempts at state-building. Premodern societies consisted of state space -- areas under the direct rule of a monarch, and non-state space -- areas that were either sparsely populated or had a very rudimentary economy. The rulers engaged in state-building through the expansion of state space. This was often done through massive public work projects that brought together a subject population within easy reach of the ruler, e.g., Borobudur, Versailles. Other means included the capturing of slaves through war, forced settlements of subjects, or codifying of religions (Scott 1998:186).

Another distinctive aspect of premodern cultures is the preponderance of clans and tribes. Khoury and Kostiner in Tribes and State-Formation in the Middle East (1990) note that variation in tribal structures -- from simple camps to broad confederations -- affect the nature of political structures. Khoury and Kostiner's focus on tribal structures enables them to adopt a different approach to state-society relations. Rather than approach the state as a monolithic entity, the authors prefer to view the state as one of several "social formations" in society (1990:6).

In these and other new definitions of the state, state power, state legitimacy, and judicial sovereignty in a demarcated territory are implicitly regarded as aspirations. All states aspire to such features, but in reality the degree to which they are successful in acquiring them varies. Their legitimacy and territorial sovereignty can only be defined as partial (Khoury and Kostiner 1990:6).

In light of the above, Khoury and Kostiner note that stateness of the state, i.e., its strength or viability, varies across time and circumstance (1990:7). However, in light of the state
being a "social formation", it might be more appropriate to refer to the "stateness of society.""14

The modern state-building project reflects the Weberian state's attempt to penetrate society and impose administrative control over premodern tribal structures. In societies with low levels of stateness tribal groups and peripheral regions retain substantial autonomy with respect to their internal affairs and their economy. In these societies the state is present, but only indirectly. This suggests that Migdal's "strong societies" and "weak states" may actually reflect not the failure to modernize, but rather the ability of traditional structures to successfully withstand the efforts of the modern national state to subjugate them. Thus, the transition to modernity is characterized by the modern state's ability to become the preeminent social structure in society.

State-building entails not just the state's attempt to impose administrative control over society but also a uniform, coordinated administrative order based on a national language, codified legal code, unified bureaucratic hierarchy, universal educational system, and a shared political ideology that explains and justifies the state's presence in society. Under the modern state-building project the fragmented character of premodern society is replaced by the imposition of state space through its territory. In the post-colonial state-building project the state draws upon its various organizational capabilities -- administrative, coercive, and symbolic -- to make the official metanarrative coextensive with its administrative rule throughout its territory.

14This is similar to Ira Lapidus' "state-organized societies" which appears in his "Tribes and State Formation in Islamic History" (1990:38).
This is not surprising, for as Gellner and others have noted, the modern nation-state requires cognitive uniformity. For this reason the "modernization = standardization" paradigm works better for understanding political development in Third World countries than the more conventional "modernization = secularization" paradigm. Political discourse in the modern nation-state can be framed in a number of ways: the secular Enlightenment critique of religion as in Europe, a nationalist ideology that retains traditional religious symbol systems as in many Third World societies, or a religious nationalism that seeks to order the new nation on the basis of divine revelation.

Another consequence of political science's unproblematic acceptance of the modernity project has been its taking for granted colonialism's role in the political development of Third World nation-states. Colonialism's peculiar modernizing influence on Third World societies resulted in political development in the Third World possessing characteristics that differed from the West. The post-colonial state, in many ways, has been shaped decisively by the precedents set by the colonial powers: the demarcation of precise, often arbitrarily determined, geographic borders; modern educational curriculum, modern bureaucratic practices, and legal institutions alien to indigenous cultures. These precedents combined gave rise to the post-colonial nation-state.

However, because modernization has been initiated by foreigners, it is often seen as culturally alien and externally imposed. All this affected the westernized indigenous elites deeply, distancing them from the general population and from the traditional cultural framework that linked them to that population. A related consequence has been the estrangement between the traditional religious leadership and the modernizing
political elite creating, as it were, two rival worldviews and rival political movements. This is significant for our understanding of modernization in post-colonial societies. It points to the continued role of religion and to deep tensions between modernizing and traditional elites who resist the state's attempt to impose modernization and standardization on society. Furthermore, it implies a conflictual quality to the "modernization = standardization" paradigm. This aspect of Third World societies is important for understanding the competing nationalisms thesis which will be presented in the next chapter.

III. Summary

To summarize, state theory since the 1980s has come a long way. Not only has the concept of the "state" been brought back into the discipline, state theory has become quite sophisticated and nuanced. However, even with these advances, gaps still remain in the research. One of the biggest oversights has been the role of religion in the political development of Third World countries. Another gap has been the distinctive aspects of state-building in post-colonial societies and the relationship of state-building to the modernity project. It was argued that these gaps can be traced to the unquestioned acceptance of the "modernization = secularization" paradigm. The "modernization = standardization" paradigm was suggested as an alternative for understanding political development in Third World countries. The "modernization = standardization" paradigm basically argues that one distinguishing consequence of modernization is the state's attempt to impose a ideological uniformity and administrative rule coextensive with its territory.
I will be approaching the question of how states manage religious pluralism with two arguments: (1) that managing religious pluralism is not incidental but integral to the post-colonial state-building project, and (2) that the primary means by which states manage religious pluralism is through the imposition of the official metanarrative on society. This approach draws upon two significant research traditions, state theory and theories of nationalism. The literature review in this chapter forms one part of the theoretical basis for this dissertation and the review of theories of nationalism in the next chapter will form the other part. Following that, in Chapter 3 I will be describing in more detail the theoretical framework that explains how states manage religious pluralism in post-colonial Indonesia and Malaysia.

The question how states manage religious pluralism brings up the question about how the state will be defined in this dissertation. I will be using Weber's emphasis on the state's claim to the monopoly on legitimate coercion within a given territory. I will be complementing Weber's classic definition with Giddens' emphasis on the state's reflexive monitoring of social systems and Gramsci's giving priority to hegemony over coercion. The discursive approach has a number of advantages: (1) it reflects the fact that the modern state relies more on consent than coercion, (2) it takes into account the cognitive centralization of society as the basis for the nation-state, (3) it allows us to approach nation-building in terms of identity politics, and (4) it allows us to approach religion as "ideologies of order" capable of challenging the modern state. Using this approach I will be arguing that each newly independent state selects a particular ideological template or metanarrative, and then seeks to impose this template upon society as part of its attempt
to become the preeminent social institution -- the goal of the post-colonial state-building project.
Table 2.1 Number of Dissertations on "State-building" or "State-formation"

![Graph showing the number of dissertations on state-building and state-formation from 1990 to 2001.]

Source: UMI ProQuest
CHAPTER 3
THE COMPETING NATIONALISMS THESIS:
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

I. Theories of Nationalism


Many of the theories on nationalism contained a secular bias. Key to Gellner's argument is the presence of a homogenous culture which is understood to be secular, not religious. Anderson argues that nationalism emerged with the disappearance of two large cultural systems: religious community and the dynastic realm. The secular bias reflects the dependence of the modern nation-state and its discourse upon the Western discourse of modernity (van der Veer 1994:x).
For the most part theories of nationalism have tended to be non-statist. It is not so much that they deny the role of the state as they unconsciously assumed the presence of the state (see Smith 1986:231). For example Gellner saw nationalism as the result of industrialization, Anderson understood it to be a result of "print capitalism." Karl Deutsch in *Nationalism and Social Communication* (1966) attributed the rise of nationalism to the intensification of communication by modern technology. Peter van der Veer in *Religious Nationalism* (1994) explicitly avoids discussing nationalist discourse in terms of the state project (1994:201). It appears that no one has taken a statist approach, that is, arguing that nationalism is part of the state-building project.

Another flaw is the tendency to view nationalism primarily in terms of anti-colonial struggle and neglect the role it plays in post-colonial politics. John Breuilly's *Nationalism and the State* (1982), which takes an explicitly political approach to nationalism, sees nationalism primarily in terms of anti-colonial opposition, not in terms of post-colonial state-building. Chalmers Johnson's *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* (1962) shows how the emergence of Chinese peasant nationalism provided a mass base for the Maoists, but does not pay any attention to the post-revolution state-building project. Giddens' *Nation-State and Violence* (1987) does an excellent job in linking the nation-state to the Weberian state, but is limited by a static understanding of the state.

The assumption seems to be that once independence is achieved nationalism loses its integrative power and other movements: ethnic, linguistic, religious etc. dominate post-colonial politics (see Berger et al.1973:168). However, it appears that there is no
justification given as to why nationalism is to be viewed primarily in terms of an anti-colonial approach.

**Nationalism and Religion**


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1 It is not easy to define "secularism." Peter Berger notes that "secularism" can have the sense of: (1) the removal of territories from ecclesiastical rule, (2) the liberation of modern man from religion, and (3) Christianity's coming of age (1969: 106). See also Talal Asad's "Religion, Nation-State, Secularism" (1999). Secularism has long been the dominant paradigm of the modern world and of the social sciences. It is only recently that this paradigm has come under critical scrutiny. Casanova notes that the secularization paradigm is a complex concept that contains three quite different understandings of secularization. In his conclusion he notes that secularization as structural differentiation has proven to be one of the persistent traits of contemporary society, but secularization as the decline of religion has proven untenable. The challenge here is to find a definition of secularism that is empirically descriptive and does not get confused with normatively prescriptive definitions.
Religion is important to theories of nationalism for several reasons. One is the close resemblance between the two. Both manifest ideological sources of power (Mann), comprise symbol systems (Giddens), function as "ideologies of order" (Juergensmeyer), and organize society through the relationship of experience (Castells). Another similarity is their integrative function. As an ideological framework nationalism, like religion, enables people to make sense of the world they live in and provides a framework of meaning by which people can cope with existential questions. Modernization has resulted in rapid changes and social anomie which spur a powerful desire for reintegration and a nostalgia for the past. Religious resurgence and nationalism are two common responses to the crisis of modernity (Smith 1986: 174 ff.).

The public sphere can never be totally a-religious. A coherent discursive community requires a unifying center, a set of overarching values or "common currency" that facilitate the public exchange of ideas. This argument applies even to modern non-religious societies. The unifying ideological center for secular Europe came from the Enlightenment. In the case of communist regimes, the unifying ideological center came from the dogmas of Marxist-Leninism. This is basically a Durkheimian view of society. Far from being neutral -- as assumed in liberal theory, public space is an important medium for the ritual communication of identity. This can take quite different forms, e.g., the Good Friday observances (Christianity), the protection of cows (Hinduism), the veiling of women (Islam), the prohibition of girls wearing the veil in public schools (secular France), or pilgrimages to holy sites. The competition to assert ritual identity by

2 Bellah, in explaining why something as obvious as civil religion in American society has been ignored for so long, notes: "The Durkheimian notion that every group has a religious dimension, which would be seen as obvious in southern or eastern Asia, is foreign to us (1974: 41, note 1).
rival communities is often expressed in electoral competitions and sometimes even communal violence (see Tambiah 1996) and political terrorism (Juergensmeyer 2000). All this point to the need for a theory that takes into account the role of religion in the political development of Third World countries.

One question that needs to be asked about political development in Third World politics is why some countries took the path of secularism, while others chose paths of political development that retained traditional religious symbolism. Furthermore, political development theory needs to be reformulated in order to take into account the recent rise of "religious fundamentalism" that seeks to order all of society along religious lines. The usual opposing categories of secular and religious need to be supplemented with additional categories like "semi-secular" and "inclusive hegemonic" in order to take into account the complex nature of state-religion relations in Third World societies. It is clear that the secular understanding of political development needs to be replaced or at least reformulated.

II. The Competing Nationalisms Thesis

The competing nationalisms thesis argues for three forms of nationalism: secular, theocratic, and semi-secular/ethnic. Each of these nationalisms defines state-religion relationships in different ways. This has significant consequences for the way the public sphere is ordered. The trajectory of political development depends upon the type of nationalism selected by the political elite at the time of independence. The type of nationalism selected defines the basis for political legitimacy, the basis for citizenship, access to the state apparatus, and the basis for public discourse.

3 The use of quotation marks is to indicate the problematic nature of the word "fundamentalism."
The different trajectories in the competing nationalisms thesis reflect the different responses Third World societies have made to modernization. The secularist variant represents the wholehearted embracing of the Enlightenment Project of Western Europe. Secularism is embraced by a modernizing political elite usually after prolonged struggle with an entrenched religious leadership that opposes modernization, e.g., Turkey, Mexico, and France. Ethnic nationalism, like the secularist variant, represents the embracing of the Enlightenment but because no serious opposition came from the religious leadership, the political leadership is under no pressure to marginalize or suppress the religious sector. The ethnic variant of nationalism seeks to have the best of both worlds: the material benefits and prestige of the modern West and the comforting familiarity of traditional culture. Religious nationalism represents the rejection of the Western Enlightenment Project. This rejection may stem from the following reasons: (1) resentment against modernization as culturally alien (being imported from the West), (2) disappointment in the failure of modernization projects to produce the promised material and economic prosperity, and (3) anxiety and social anomie stemming from massive social dislocation arising from urbanization and ambitious modernization projects (see Hobsbawm 1990:150). Religious nationalism, even as a reaction against modernity, is not a reversion to a pre modern social order but another variant form of modernity.

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4 In its extreme forms this embracing of the Enlightenment takes on a certain dogmatic tinge that Ernest Gellner labeled "Enlightened Secular Fundamentalism" (1992:75 ff.).

5 Manuel Castells writes: "...Islamic fundamentalism is not a traditionalist movement. For all the efforts of exegesis to root Islamic identity in history and the holy texts, Islamists proceeded, for the sake of social resistance and political insurgency, with a reconstruction of cultural identity that is in fact hypermodern " (1997:16, italics added).
The three variants of nationalism listed below all assume the three basic features of the nation-state: a well defined territory, a common national culture, and a centralized bureaucratic state. The competing nationalism thesis also assumes that the post-colonial state is engaged in state-building in order to become the preeminent institution in society. Because religion constitutes a fundamental source of power, the state can either marginalize it, appropriate it to secure the assent of the dominant ethnie, or organize the nation as a religious community. In other words, underlying each of the national trajectories are the structural imperatives of the post-colonial state-building project. The competing nationalisms thesis assumes not just that the variety of trajectories available to a developing country will lead to fierce inter-elite competition at independence, but also that this competition underlies many of the persistent ideological conflicts that characterize Third World politics.

The categories used in the competing nationalisms thesis are not at all novel but bear some resemblance to earlier typologies, e.g., M.G. Smith's threefold categories of (1) an open and inclusive society, (2) a closed oligarchic society, and (3) a consociational polity, follow the conventional regime categories of political science and Casanova's categories of caesaropapism, theocracy, and separation (1994:48 ff.). An even closer resemblance can be seen in Esposito's *Islamic Politics* (1984) which sees three patterns of nation building in the Muslim world: secular, Islamic, and Muslim (1984:96). However, Esposito's typology suffers from an idealist understanding of nationalism. There is an

6 The nation-state is the preeminent "power-container" or model of rule of the modern era (see Giddens 1987:120). The concept of the nation-state is an ideal type; very few countries possess the uniform culture or ethnic group presupposed in the nation-state model.

7 The term "ethnie" is taken from Anthony Smith's *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (1986). Ethnie consists of groups of people having a sense of solidarity and share a common ancestry, history, or culture and are usually associated with a particular territory (1986:32 ff.).
over reliance on official statements and ideological writings and a neglect of concrete practices and political structures. A close resemblance can also be found in Castells' concept of identity-building: legitimating identity, resistance identity, and project identity (1997:6 ff.). Legitimating identity's rationalization of structures of domination describes well the post-colonial state-building project. Resistance identity and project identity describe well the differences between "apolitical" social movements like the Muslim Brotherhood and the more radical agenda of Islamists who seek to impose the shari'a upon all of society. The competing nationalisms thesis has been strongly influenced by the last two writers.

The advantage of the competing nationalisms thesis is that it enables us to break out of the unilinear understanding of political development dominant in comparative politics. The secularization paradigm has long had a stranglehold grip on comparative politics.8 The secular nation-state, however, is just one trajectory among others. Modernization takes a variety of forms; the theocratic nation-state is just as modern as its secular and semi-secular counterparts. Situating Islamic "fundamentalism" as a particular response to modernity helps political scientists avoid being misled by the anti-modern rhetoric of Islamic fundamentalism.

In addition to bringing a more nuanced approach to theories of nationalism, the competing nationalisms thesis also expands our understanding of political regimes. The various state-religion configurations described below are regime features. The competing nationalisms thesis enables political scientists to go beyond the more conventional regime

8 Jose Casanova writes: "The paradigm of secularization has been the main theoretical and analytical framework through which the social sciences have viewed the relationship between religion and modernity" (1994:211).
categories based upon command-obedience and take into account variation in political regimes based upon differences in discursive formations.

A. Secular Nationalism

In secular nationalism the nation -- the political community -- consists of a group united by a supra-ethnic high culture. While the nation may have historic roots in one particular ethnie, it has long since expanded its boundaries to include peoples from other ethnic, linguistic, religious, and racial backgrounds. In the secular nation-state traditional markers of social identity (e.g., ethnicity, race, religion, language) are rendered obsolete in the face of modernity. It is marked by a particular historical outlook: a rejection of the backward past and an optimistic anticipation of a future based upon modern science. It views religion as backward, parochial, and divisive.

The Western nation-state is based upon the discourse of individualism, equality, and secularism (van der Veer 1994:18). This particular discourse radically reorders social space. The primacy of tribal or communal identity is abolished and the individual is thrust into a segmented society -- the "pluralization of lifeworlds" (see Berger, Berger, and Kellner 1973:63 ff.). A sharp distinction is made between the public sphere and the religious sphere. Religion is relegated to the private sphere, and the public sphere comes to be dominated by the political discourse of liberalism and the economic imperatives of capitalism. For the most part, the Enlightenment ideology is not necessarily opposed to religion so long as it does not constrain political or economic behavior. The state does not penetrate the private sphere, rather it assumes that the introduction of universal
education will lead to the spread of scientific reason and the passing of religion in the private sphere.

The secular model of society originating with the European Enlightenment was later dispersed around the world via colonial rule and international capitalism. Colonial rule had a profound modernizing effect on non-Western societies, especially their elites. Local elites were exposed to modern bureaucratic practices and to the ideas of the European Enlightenment. Even those who led anti-colonial oppositions were affected, appropriating the political discourse of the West in their attempt to oust their colonial masters (see Plamenatz in Chatterjee 1986:1-2). The carriers of secular nationalism were for the most part members of the urban educated elite, or the modern military.

Secular nationalism is based upon a liberal understanding of the state as a "purely neutral legal mechanism without purpose or values" whose "sole function is to protect the rights of individuals" (Bellah 1975:175). The legitimacy of the secular state is based upon the will of the nation -- the political community whose identity has been delinked from any specific ethnic group or religion. Secularism by making religious identity irrelevant renders moot inter-religious conflict and paves the way for a common national identity. The same can also be said about ethnic and tribal loyalties.

B. Ethnic Nationalism

In ethnic nationalism, the state is fused with the dominant ethnie. The nation -- the political community -- consists of a core ethnic group that enjoys direct access to the state and dominates the state apparatus while other ethnic groups either have limited access to the state or are excluded from the state. Ethnic nationalism is considered
semi-secular, reflecting the fact that the state embraces the path of modernization while retaining traditional religious symbolism. The ethnic state employs the cultural symbols of the dominant ethnie. Being dependent upon that ethnie for its political base, it thus appropriates certain markers (e.g., ethnicity, race, religion, language) of the dominant ethnie to shore up its political legitimacy. The employment of religion depends on its salience as a marker distinguishing the dominant ethnie from the minority groups. Ethnic nationalism is driven by the need to frame the public discourse in terms of the culture of the dominant group. Public discourse can be framed either broadly (including and assimilating minority groups) or narrowly (excluding or disenfranchising minority groups). Thus, the public sphere under ethnic nationalism is characterized by multi-vocality, albeit a constrained one. Members of minority ethnic or religious groups have the freedom to practice their faith or maintain ethnic customs in private but not necessarily in public.

In this form of nationalism the relationship between the public sphere and the religious sphere is more tenuous and fluid. The state does not seek to transform the private sphere. Even if there is a discrepancy between private practice and religious precepts, the purpose of public religious symbolism/discourse is to reinforce the privileged standing of the dominant ethnie. At the same time that indigenous cultural identity of the core ethnie is being affirmed, the norms and institutions of Western science are utilized for the anticipated material benefits they will bring to the political elite and the dominant ethnie. The state allows public policy and economic development to proceed along the lines of the norms and standards set by the modern West even as it
affirms its indigenous non-Western identity. For example, in Egypt Nasser pursued the strategy of Egyptianizing along with modernizing, i.e., an Egypt that was culturally Muslim while politically secular (Juergensmeyer 1993:36).

C. Religious Nationalism

In religious nationalism the nation -- the political community -- is equated with the religious community. It is based upon the premise that "a nation should reflect the collective values of the moral community that constitutes it" (Juergensmeyer 1993:195). The function of the state is to protect the interests of the nation/religious community. In this form of nationalism no distinction is made between the public sphere and the religious sphere. Usually there is a close collaboration between the political and religious elites. The deployment of religious symbolism and practices goes beyond political legitimation to the transformation/conversion of society along religious lines. Here the state penetrates the private sphere and seeks to make it conform with religious precepts.

The theocratic society assumes a public sphere under state hegemony and is characterized by univocality. Another name for religious nationalism is what Casanova labeled "mobilizational religions" that take over the state and shape it along theocratic-totalitarian lines (1994:219 ff.). The rise of Islamic religious nationalism marks not a return to traditional Islamic polities, but a radically different kind of polity. Casanova notes that mobilizational state religions give rise to "totalitarian participatory publicness" that destroys the public/private distinction (1994:219).

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9 Casanova notes: "The traditional Islamic umma also had its own internal restricted public sphere. It is the transposition of the umma onto a modern mobilizational state that gives it its theocratic-totalitarian direction" (1994:299, note no. 8).
10 The Islamic fundamentalists' assertion that there is no sacred/secular distinction in Islam has not been borne out in history. The separation of political and religious institutions took place in Islamic societies as early as the Ummayad and 'Abassid dynasties (Ira Lapidus 1990:37; see also Lapidus 1975).
One of the fundamental features of religious nationalism is its rejection of the liberal assumption of the emancipated individual. In religious nationalism communal identity takes precedence over other forms of identity. Where in other forms of nationalism religion takes on the form of the "sect" -- the voluntary association, in religious nationalism religion takes on the form of the "church" -- a compulsory hierocratic organization coextensive with society and membership is compulsory (see Weber 1978:54, 1163-1164). The primacy of the "church" is consequential for the political regimes. Those outside the "church" are either regarded as heretics or second class citizens. The religious nation-state has two principal means of dealing with minority groups: (1) granting minority groups a separate civil status, or (2) accommodating these minority groups within the prevailing ideology (Juergensmeyer 1993:181). There is a third option not mentioned by Juergensmeyer: violent persecution.

Religious nationalism, in many instances, stemmed from the Third World nations' rejection of Soviet and American models of development. This rejection has its roots in the disappointing outcomes of development projects and economic setbacks in the 1970s and collapse of the Soviet empire in the 1980s (Juergensmeyer 1993:22, 194). Appropriating the symbols of Islam Arab nationalism became a new faith promising salvation in the form of a political system that would bring justice, security, and human fulfillment (Lapidus 1983:31).

The source of religious nationalism, however, is somewhat complicated. It does not represent the attempt by traditional elites to reclaim the centers of power. Many religious fundamentalists are graduates of modern universities who upon becoming
disenchanted with modernity turned to religion as a way of addressing the problems of modern society. However, they brought with them the habits of modernity, e.g., the close reading of religious texts independent of the traditional scholastic apparatus, modern organizational practices, and the attempt to translate religious precepts into a political program.

Identifying a theocratic nation-state through the national constitution is not as easy it may seem to be. The national constitution is not always the most reliable indication of a theocratic state. The pre-Khomeini Iranian constitution stipulated that five "devout doctors of Islamic law and jurisprudence" examine legislation and reject any that contravene the teachings of Islam (Markoff and Regan 1987:172-3). Similarly, many Muslim countries require that the head of state be a Muslim.

Ironically, Communism falls in the category of religious nationalism. Despite its explicit atheism, from a sociology of religion perspective, Communism functions in many ways like a religious system. Like the religious nation-state which assumes a congruence between the nation and state ideology/theology, Communism attempts to impose a similar congruence between Marxist-Leninist ideology and society. This led Gellner to label Communism a "secular Umma" based upon a doctrine of total salvation framed in naturalistic terms (1994:xi, 174).
The competing nationalisms thesis is laid out in the table below.

**Figure 3.1 Competing Nationalisms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Secular Nationalism</th>
<th>Religious Nationalism</th>
<th>Ethnic Nationalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>countries</strong></td>
<td>Turkey, India, France, pre-1979 Iran</td>
<td>Iran, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan under Taliban</td>
<td>Japan, Malaysia, West Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>nation</strong></td>
<td>modern society</td>
<td>religious community</td>
<td>ethnic group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>dominant ideology</strong></td>
<td>European Enlightenment</td>
<td>Hinduism, Islam</td>
<td>Malayness, Nihonjinron, Hindutva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>excluded minorities</strong></td>
<td>fundamentalists, Communists</td>
<td>heretics, infidels</td>
<td>kafirs, Chinese, burakumin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>political legitimation</strong></td>
<td>the state reflects the will of the majority</td>
<td>state conforms society to divine revelation</td>
<td>state protects the dominant ethnic group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>public sphere</strong></td>
<td>individualistic: open and competitive</td>
<td>religious group dominated: Umma, Christendom</td>
<td>ethnic group dominated: Japan, Bumiputra, Mother India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>citizenship</strong></td>
<td>open</td>
<td>restricted</td>
<td>restricted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Nationalism as Metanarrative**

Nationalism is more than a subjective sentiment or a group spirit, it also serves as a template for individual and collective identities and for organizing public space. It unifies the nation -- the political community -- by defining citizenship (membership in the nation/political community), by defining regime features (access to the state), and by organizing public discourse. It constructs national identity and public space through a series of oppositions: the nation vs. outsiders, the nation vs. traitors, the bright future vs. the dark past. It serves as a "map" that enables people to "identify their own position in the world in relation to others" (Breuilly 1982:381).

Nationalism can be understood both subjectively and objectively. The subjective approach can be seen in Anderson's "imagined community" and Ayoob's "psychological identification of the citizenry with the state" (1992:67). The objective approach can be
seen in Alagappa's understanding of the nation as a "political community" (1996:26). For this study I will be approaching the "nation" from the standpoint of a "political community", that is, as a group of "citizens" -- individuals who possess legal standing in the eyes of the state. Rogers Brubaker notes that the modern nation-state involves closure, the exclusion of "outsiders" (1992:75). This process of exclusion involves not just those who live outside its borders, but also those who reside within, e.g., Turkish migrant workers in Germany or Koreans in Japan. Thus, citizenship in the modern nation-state comprises a form of membership invested with rights and obligations. Marshall and Bottomore in *Citizenship and Social Class* (1992) note that citizenship consists of three elements: civil, political, and social (1992:8). These distinctions are useful for understanding the modern nation-state. Anderson's "imagined community" touches upon the social dimension that unifies the nation but does not highlight the unequal access to the state. Third World societies with ethnic/religious cleavages often lack the uniform social space assumed in the modern West. In these societies, the social dimension of citizenship is often underdeveloped due to ethnic/religious differences and the political dimension of citizenship is often unevenly distributed among its population. This means that states can define the citizenship -- access to the state -- inclusively or exclusively. In order to create an intersubjective sense of belonging and form a political community, post-colonial states rely on the official metanarrative.

I will be using the term "metanarrative" in reference to the "big story" that frames national identity or the official ideology that explains and justifies the identity or self-understanding of a nation-state.¹¹ There is a tendency in theories of nationalism to

¹¹The term "metanarrative" or "grand narratives" derives from Jacques Lyotard's term for narratives used to
overlook the content of national identity. Giddens notes this omission in Gellner and Deutsch (1987:214). A similar criticism can be made of Anderson's *Imagined Community*. The concept of the metanarrative is quite similar to Anthony Smith's mytho-moteur (1986:57-58) and Robert Bellah's "civil religion" (1975). Bellah in *Broken Covenant* describes the American myth of origin, its choseness, salvation and success in American life, nativism vs. pluralism, and the taboo on socialism. Locating the "big story" brings out the particular and concrete forms of nationalism. In this dissertation, I will be focusing on how the discourse of nationalism structures relations of power.

The metanarrative serves a number of political functions. One is to legitimize the present political regime. Another is to define a national identity and the symbols that link the ruling elite with the rest of society. Still another is to define the rules of the game for public discourse, i.e., who has access to the policy making process. The metanarrative is a key means by which the state attempts to organize and partition the public sphere. In other words, the metanarrative is a regime feature of the state. 

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12 It should be noted that Bellah who helped revolutionize sociology of religion with his 1967 article on civil religion, has disavowed any interest in the concept (see Jones and Richey 1974:4 ff.; and Bellah 1992:x).

13 Algeria's independence from France demonstrates how revising the national metanarrative can lead to a regime crisis. Algeria had become so much a part of the French national metanarrative that it became inconceivable to think of a France without Algeria. France's relinquishing of Algeria resulted in the destruction of the Fourth Republic in 1958 and several coup attempts in 1960 and 1961. Lustick observes
The type of nationalism chosen plays a key role in how the political legitimacy of a regime is framed. Legitimacy can be based either upon the principle of immanence or the principle of transcendence. The secular nation-state's legitimacy is based upon the principle of immanence -- the assumption that the state faithfully mirrors the will of the people. Legitimacy based upon transcendence is based upon some principle independent of the nation, e.g., the king's divine right to rule (traditional monarchy), the ineluctable force of history and economic forces (Communism), or the divine Revelation (the theocratic state). Legitimacy based upon transcendence is at odds with the ideals of democracy and the two principles often coexist in an uneasy détente.

The type of nationalism selected defines the notion of citizenship: who belongs to the nation -- the political community -- and who can make claims on the state. Rogers Brubaker's *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (1992) discusses how differences in notions of the nation led to differing basis of citizenship. France's emphasis on the territorial basis for French citizenry led to the *jus solis* basis for citizenship, Germany's emphasis on blood descent led to a *jus sanguinis* notion of citizenship. In Malaysia, being a Muslim is a necessary part of being a Malay -- a privileged form of citizenship. Religious nationalism has resulted in certain minority groups being outlawed on the basis of religion (being a heretical sect), e.g., the Bahais in Iran, and the Alevi in Turkey.

The national metanarrative also shapes the partitioning of the public sphere. William Hinton's *Fanshen* describes Communist China's draconian attempt to impose the
Marxist class categories on the rural villages of China. Deborah Stone's *The Disabled State* (1984) shows how even the modern welfare state partitions society on the basis of needs-based categories: old age, childhood, blindness etc. (1984:25). Lebanon's consociational democracy controlled access to the state along communal lines (see Lijphart). A similar consociational arrangement can be found in Malaysia's *Barisan Nasional* (see von Vorys 1975). France's metanarrative constructed a uniform secular space that was largely uncontested until immigrants from the Maghreb began to insist on their daughters wearing the veil in the classroom (see Blou 1996).

**III. Competing Nationalisms and the Post-Colonial State-Building Project**

The competing nationalisms thesis argues that the post-colonial state structures state-religion relations through the official metanarrative. The imposition of the official metanarrative forms an important part of the post-colonial state-building project. The state-building project consists of three phases: selection, imposition, and hegemony.

The first stage -- selection -- consists of the inter-elite struggle to frame the national metanarrative. The post-colonial state is situated in a unique, open-ended situation marked by the ending of one metanarrative (colonialism) and the struggle to construct a new metanarrative (nationalism). The often abrupt ending of colonial rule created situations in which several groups competed to assume control of the "commanding heights." Part of this struggle centers on the framing of the national constitution -- the most visible symbol of the new metanarrative. The post-colonial meta-narrative is not created *ex nihilo*; rather it is appropriated from already extant discourse: traditional indigenous (e.g., traditional culture, customs, and religion) and
modern alternatives (e.g., liberal capitalism vs. socialism). Thus, constitutional debates often bring to light ideological fault lines running through the nation-state. The dominant elite faction succeeds in imposing its ideological interests on the national constitution, while its rivals find themselves sidelined not just from the framing of the constitution, but also from the state apparatus.

In the second stage -- imposition -- the state seeks to impose the official metanarrative on society. The modern nation-state is based upon the assumption that the political elite will share the same high culture as the populace (see Gellner 1983:95; Smith 1986:221 ff.). The imposition of the official metanarrative begins with the political elite in the national capital and extends to the rest of society. This particular stage is critical to the argument of how states manage religious pluralism through the imposition of the official metanarrative. It is here that the argument that state-religion relations are structured through the imposition of a uniform discourse can be subjected to empirical scrutiny.

Beyond official speeches, laws, and public policies -- the most obvious means of dissemination -- the national metanarrative is expressed through other means as well. This is an area that has been subjected to intensive scrutiny. Visits by head of states to sacred sites on holy days present a powerful occasion of acting out the official metanarrative: the Yasukuni Shrine in Japan (see Harootunian 1999:144 ff.), the Sea Beggars festival in the Netherlands (see Groot 1999:161 ff.), the Pearl Harbor memorial (see Turnbull 1996:407 ff.), and the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier (Anderson 1983:9) are well-known examples. State owned or controlled mass media transmitting patriotic
symbols (the national flag) or cultural symbols (the Muslim call to prayer) are a powerful means of producing the unifying national discourse. Other means of inscribing the official metanarrative include currency and postage stamps which depict the national heroes and symbols of the nation-state (see Billig 1995).

Another means of imposing the metanarrative is through the various administrative practices discussed by James Scott in his *Seeing Like a State*: simplification, legibility, standardization. Scott's ethnographic analysis of modern state practices provides us with a powerful means of understanding how the modern state imposes standardization upon society. However, it should be noted that much of Scott's attention has been on concrete objects like urban landscapes, Soviet agricultural collectives, and compulsory villagization in Tanzania. He gives scant attention to the modern state's attempt to rearrange the mental habits of its subjects. His brief discussion (two pages) of the Bolshevik's attempt to promote atheism, suppress Christian rituals, and provide alternative secular rituals deserves at least a chapter in itself (see Scott 1998:195-196).

Another means of imposition is through the creation of brute facts that alter the rules of the game and push things beyond the point of no return. One example of this is the Likud Party's willingness to invest large sums of money to create a sizable Jewish presence in the West Bank. The numerical target of 100,000 Jewish settlers in the West Bank was considered the threshold at which annexation of the area was considered irreversible (Lustick 1987:159). Another means of imposing the Zionist metanarrative was through the differential distribution of Jewish and Arab population with the Jewish
settlement being concentrated in highly visible locations and the Arabs living in scattered "out of sight" rural villages. Another related goal was to induce fatigue and resignation among those opposed to the government's objectives.

How states impose the national metanarrative on society is an area that needs further research. Little is known about the principal administrative means used by the post-colonial state to structure state-religion relations. The two likely candidates are the ministry of religious affairs and the ministry of education. Public education is one of the principal means by which post-colonial states impose the metanarrative on society.

Gellner in a twist on Weber notes that in industrial society the state's *monopoly of legitimate education* became more crucial than its *monopoly of legitimate violence* (1983:34). He goes on to note that foundational to the power of the modern state is the *doctorat d'etat*. This is similar to Gramsci's argument in "The Intellectuals" (Gramsci 1971). However, other state agencies may play a key role in the imposition of the official metanarrative, e.g., the security apparatus.

In the third stage -- hegemony -- the post-colonial state successfully achieves ideological hegemony over society, public debate about certain contested issues ceases and is replaced by uncritical acceptance or by resignation (see Lustick 1987). One way of determining the degree of hegemony is by looking at the content of public debate. Successful hegemony extinguishes any public debate about the contents of the official metanarrative. A failed or incomplete hegemony is marked by the open questioning or rejection of the metanarrative. This rejection can range from intra-elite debate, to more widespread popular or regional repudiations. However, it should be noted that this
assumes a relatively open public sphere. Authoritarian rule, which constrains public
discourse, makes it more difficult to ascertain the extent of popular acceptance of the
official metanarrative.

Hegemony is a rare achievement among Third World nations. The reasons for
failure are numerous. One is Migdal's "triangle of accommodation" in which national
goals are deflected, subverted or defeated at the local level. Another reason is that while
nationalism is a form of homogenizing discourse, it also creates antagonistic forces at the
same time (van der Veer 1994:105; see also Comaroff 1994:301 ff.; and Keyes et al.

It should be clear that centralization and homogenization create their own
counterforces. There is an internal dynamic in these processes such that
what is at one point an antinational rebellion may become, at another, a
successful nationalist movement that results in the formation of a
nation-state. ... In other words, the centralizing force of nation building
itself sprouts centrifugal forces that crystallize around other dreams of
nationhood: nationalism creates other nationalism--religious, ethnic,
linguistic, secular--but not a common culture (van der Veer 1994:14-15).

This is helpful for understanding communal conflicts in pluralistic countries like India. It
can also shed light on the recent resurgence of religious fundamentalism as an alternative
discourse.

The resistance to the homogenizing tendencies of the nation-building project is
significant for theories of nationalism. It implies that nation-building will never quite
achieve completion, that it will continuously be contested. The exogenous nature of
modernity in the Third World combined with the presence of indigenous symbol systems
-- religious and cultural --gives the post-colonial nation-building project a dialectical and
contested character. This would account for the pervasive and powerful challenge that
the recent Islamic resurgence presents to the modernizing state. It also makes ideological hegemony -- the final stage of state-building -- a rather dubious possibility.

Thus, post-colonial nation-building is a highly contested process. This is one of the major arguments in the competing nationalism thesis, i.e., that post-colonialism nation-building is highly contested, from its beginning when the national metanarrative is selected, to the present day as the state continually attempts to impose the metanarrative on society.

The highly contested and dialectical character of post-colonial nation-building has significant implications for the three nation-building trajectories -- secular, semi-secular ethnic, and theocratic -- presented in the competing nationalisms thesis. It would seem that the three national metanarratives comprise mutually exclusive categories, like variables on a nominal scale. It is suggested here that while each of these metanarratives comprises a distinct variant of state-religion relations, under the stress of political competition and social conflict the parties involved may engage in tactical compromises in order to achieve their desired ends. These tactical compromises may result in minor shifts away from the ideal type presented in the competing nationalisms thesis.

Proposed Typology and Model for the Post-Colonial State-Building Project

The competing nationalisms thesis is both a typology of nation-building strategies and a model of post-colonial state-building. It is a typology in that it attempts to differentiate among the several trajectories possible for state-religion relations (secular, semi-secular, and theocratic) that a newly independent Third World state could take. It

14The competing nationalisms thesis is more like the "interaction of effects" typology that classifies things, it is not as theoretically powerful "combination of values" typology that reveals important properties that
is also a model in that it uses Lustick's three-stage model of state-building to predict a certain pattern of behavior, i.e., that the post-colonial state-building project will go through several distinct stages of development. In what follows below, I will be presenting a revised version Lustick's model of state-building and the competing nationalisms thesis diagrammatically.

Lustick's three-stage model is helpful for understanding the ideological aspects of the state-building project. The post-colonial state-building project can be understood to consist of three distinct stages: incumbency, regime, and hegemony. Each stage differs from others in terms of the degree of acceptance of certain key components of the state; in the case of Israel, the key issue is Israel's territorial claims, while in Indonesia and Malaysia the key issue is how to achieve national integration in the face of a religious/ethnic pluralistic society.

Lustick's model has been modified to make it more applicable to the Indonesian and Malaysian case studies. For Lustick, Israel's disengagement from its territory in the incumbency stage would not necessarily jeopardize the rules of the game. But in the regime stage -- when more people have accepted the state's territorial claims -- disengagement becomes much more disruptive. While this may have been the case with Israel, I would argue that the risks for newly independent Indonesia and Malaysia were quite different. The two countries differed from Israel in two ways: (1) they did not engage in territorial conquest but "inherited" their borders from their colonial

result from certain combination of values (see Stinchcombe 1968:43-47).

There are a number of disparate understandings of what constitutes a theoretical model among social scientists. Where King, Keohane and Verba (1994) understand "model" to refer to a simplification of the real world, Kaplan discusses the six different cognitive styles that influence modeling (n.d. pp. 258-262).
predecessors, and (2) the pluralistic nature of their societies made their respective polity brittle in comparison to Israel's. In the case of Indonesia, early victories by secessionist movements would likely have shattered the Jakarta-based regime's claim to rule over its territory. Israel, on the other hand, with its core ethnie, could more easily survive the loss of its territories. This is not so much a repudiation of Lustick's model as a critique of the way he frames his concepts. What is needed is to reframe Lustick's three-stage/two-threshold model of state-building to allow for comparative analysis in Third World countries.

Figure 3.2 (shown below) retains the three stages of Lustick's model, but defines the various stages around the state's attempt to impose the official metanarrative on society.

**Figure 3.2 Three Stage Model of State-Building**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STAGES OF STATE-BUILDING*</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INCUMBENCY STAGE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Selection of Metanarrative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Violent Opposition and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-Legal Challenges</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGIME STAGE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imposition of Metanarrative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Opposition Confined to</td>
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<tr>
<td>State Institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>IDEOLOGICAL HEGEMONY STAGE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ideological Hegemony</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cessation of Conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>over Official Metanarrative</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>REGIME THRESHOLD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYCHOLOGICAL THRESHOLD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Modified version of Lustick's chart (see Lustick 1987:164).
I will also propose a diagram outlining the various types of national metanarratives. The proposed diagram is needed in light of the complex nature of state-religion relations and the ambiguities and shifts that arise from the conflictual nature of post-colonial nation-building. The competing nationalism thesis posits three trajectories for nation-building: secular, semi-secular/ethnic, and theocratic, but other trajectories exist as well, for example, the Marxist-Leninist atheistic regime which bears striking resemblance to religious nationalism. This complex state of affairs means that a more complex typology is needed than the simple secular vs. religious continuum or the more elaborate secular/semi-secular/religious continuum.

State-religion relations can be charted along several dimensions: naturalistic this-worldly knowledge vs. transcendent other-worldly knowledge, uni-vocal vs. multi-vocal, and public vs. private.\textsuperscript{16} The complexity of this diagram stems from the close resemblance between Communism and religious nationalism from the sociology of knowledge perspective. Communism and theocratic rule resemble each other in that both are ideologically uni-vocal and both deny the public/private distinction; however, they diverge radically over the source of their ideology, divine revelation vs. scientific reason. The purpose of this diagram is not just to enable us to see the typological differences between the various political actors in post-colonial politics, but also to be able to plot tactical shifts in their positions.

\textsuperscript{16}For similar attempts at charting state-society relations see Subrata's "Desecularising the State in India" (1990) in which he uses categories like: hegemonic, theocratic, secular, and neutral (1991:758) and Dahl's attempt to chart democratization using terms like: closed hegemonies, inclusive hegemonies, competitive oligarchies, and polyarchies (1971:7).
Naturalistic this-worldly knowledge vs. Transcendent other-worldly knowledge.

The European Enlightenment, which rejected the theistic worldview of the Catholic Church, sought to create a worldview based upon this-worldly knowledge. It gave rise to secular societies of Western Europe and the Marxist-Leninist regimes that would dominate Eastern Europe and other parts of the world. Contrary to the expectations of many political scientists, development in the Third World did not result in the decline in religious beliefs and practices but in many instances resulted in modernizing states that sought to retain traditional religious symbol systems. Later in the 1970s, religious fundamentalist groups emerged that sought to order all of society on the basis of divine revelation. This complex set of outcomes means that uni-linear arrow model of development needs to be discarded in favor of a two dimensional spectrum model.

Uni-vocal vs. Multi-vocal. This typology describes the differences between societies where a plurality of views is allowed and societies where one particular ideology is dominant and all others are suppressed. For political regimes this describes the difference between polyarchy and hegemony (see Dahl 1971:6-8). For religious organizations this describes the difference between the "church" and the "sect" (see Weber 1978:54, 1163-1164). This continuum consists of three societies: (1) a pluralistic multi-vocal society that allows for open competition among the various groups, (2) an authoritarian regime where competition is constrained but the private-public distinction is maintained, and (3) a uni-vocal totalitarian regime where competition is repressed and the private-public distinction is obliterated.
The values in the second typology form a continuum, unlike the values in the first typology which tends to comprise two discrete and exclusive categories. When the two axes are combined, we have a continuum with two hegemonic extremes: atheistic communist regimes and theocratic regimes, and a contested middle. In the contested middle, we find interest group competition characteristic of open democratic societies as well as religious denominations competing against each other for adherents.

Figure 3.3 Secular/Religious Continuums

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Uni-Vocal</th>
<th>Multi-Vocal</th>
<th>Multi-Vocal</th>
<th>Uni-Vocal</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Religious</td>
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Public order vs. Private interests. In addition to these two typologies, a third one is proposed in order to differentiate between private religions and public religions. This constitutes a continuum which consists on one end of a small sect that meets in private away from public scrutiny, which then progresses to a religious group with a sizable following that seeks to influence the public sphere, and culminates in a theocratic regime in which the state is fused to a particular religion and where the public/private distinction is obliterated. In between these two extremes are the "state church" -- a religious institution that is linked to the state and enjoys a privileged standing over other religious groups, and the "holy nation" -- an ethnic group whose identity is closely linked with a particular religion. These two examples fall in the middle because they are situated in societies that retain the public/private distinction.
Figure 3.4 Competing Nationalisms: Cross-country Comparison*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>This-Worldly Knowledge</th>
<th>Contested Middle</th>
<th>Other-Worldly Knowledge</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uni-vocal</td>
<td>Multi-vocal</td>
<td>Multi-vocal</td>
<td>Uni-vocal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marxist-Leninist</td>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>Secular Regimes</td>
<td>Consociational</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regimes:</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Regimes</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Inclusion/</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communist China</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Caesaropapism</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Bargain</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Derby</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Denominations</td>
<td>State Church</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Church of England</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Holy Nation</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Malay Bangsa</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>State Church</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Church of England</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Ideal types in bold; National metanarratives underscored.
It is anticipated that Figure 3.4 will enable us to be more aware of the various ways state-society relations can be structured. In addition to recognizing official state metanarratives, Figure 3.4 will also enable us to compare one state's metanarrative with another state's as well as that of its internal opposition. This diagram maps out the various stance a state can take with respect to the role of religion in society. The word "stance" is used to indicate that the official metanarrative is not something fixed and immutable. Given the oppositional nature of the nation-state as posited by van der Veer (1994:105), we can expect that one of the ways states may respond to rival narratives is by making tactical concessions to the opposition or even co-opt them by imitating them. If this happens, then we can expect to see a certain amount of drift away from the original official metanarrative. Another possibility is that the state will defend the metanarrative through repression. A more elaborate version of Figure 3.4 will be presented in Chapter 7 in which the two countries' state-building strategies are compared.

IV. The Challenge of Religious Pluralism and The Post-Colonial State-Building Project

Raising the question about how states manage ethnic/religious pluralism addresses one of the most critical issues in political development theory. Colonial rule, with its habit of forcing conglomerations of tribes and ethnic groups to reside within arbitrarily determined geographic borders, resulted in a legacy that often made the task of

17Ethnic/religious pluralism here is different from "organizational pluralism" or "democratic pluralism." See Dahl (1982:4-5) for a definition of "organizational pluralism." For a discussion of ethnic, religious, or subcultural pluralism see Dahl (1971:105 ff., esp. 106 note 1), Lijphart (1977:3 ff.), Young (1976:47 ff.), and Horowitz (1990:115 ff.). Where "organizational pluralism" is characteristic of countries with well developed democratic political systems, "ethnic/religious pluralism" is quite common in the Third World. Horowitz notes that ethnicity in the West, unlike Third World societies in Asia and Africa, tends not to displace all other forms of identity (1985:19-21). The difference is that "organizational pluralism" takes place in a society where members share a common civic culture, "ethnic/religious pluralism" reflects a society with a poorly developed and deeply divided civil society.
nation-building a difficult and arduous one. Ethnic/religious pluralism often resulted in a severely divided society and a weak state unable to impose effective political rule.

For the central difficulty of 'nation-building' in much of Africa is the lack of any shared historical mythology and memory on which state elites can set about 'building' the nation. The 'nation' is not, as we see, built up only through the provision of 'infrastructures' and 'institutions', as 'nation-building' theories assumed; but from the central fund of cultures and symbolism and mythology provided by shared historical experiences (M.G. Smith 1986:258, italics added).

For this reason, nation-building -- the creation of a shared understanding and a shared political discourse -- is essential to the post-colonial state-building project.

The presence of ethnic/religious pluralism has significant implications for political development theory. It seems that ethnic pluralism is negatively correlated with democracy. Stepan notes that in the vast majority of non-democratic regimes a homogenous high culture is also absent (2001:186).

...if there are two or more culturally conscious demoi in the polity, nation building policies of and for the dominant nation would imply restricted citizenship, or at least unequal citizenship, for many of the long-standing minority residents in the state (Stepan 2001:189).

In the case of Malaysia, the result was unequal citizenship, and in Indonesia's case the result was authoritarian rule -- prospects not favorable to democracy. Thus, the challenge of religious pluralism should be of interest to political scientists concerned with political development, civil society, and democratization.

What is being proposed here is a statist approach to nation-building. Although oftentimes confused with one another, state-building and nation-building are not identical. This confusion is due to the fact that the form of the modern state is the
nation-state.\textsuperscript{18} This makes it risky to arbitrarily separate state-building from nation-building. Where nation-building is primarily concerned with the making of a common standardized 'national' culture, state-building is primarily concerned with the extension of the national state's ability to penetrate, organize, and mobilize the general population that makes up the nation. The two processes may seem quite distinct but they are integral to each other. As Scott points out, it is by means of the imposition of a standardized national culture and the suppression of local differences that the modern state is able to effectively impose its will upon society.

The competing nationalisms thesis offers several advantages for political science. First, it has the advantage of being able to account for the different roles that religion has taken in political development of Third World societies. Second, it has the advantage of being able to show how the state's attempts to manage religious pluralism are driven by the structural imperatives of the post-colonial state-building project. And third, by breaking away from the secular understanding of modernization, it allows political development theory to take into account religion as a significant political variable. Thus, the competing nationalisms thesis reflects two trends -- one well underway and one just emerging -- in comparative politics: (1) the return of the state, and (2) the return of religion.

\textsuperscript{18} The modern nation-state is the result of the fusion of the state with the nation. The three-fold configuration of (1) a centralized bureaucratic state, (2) a territory with well defined borders, and (3) a uniform culture, stands in contrast to older polities, e.g., the city state, dynastic empires, or segmented society.
V. Testing the Competing Nationalisms Thesis

The competing nationalisms thesis is basically a typology that attempts to describe the complexity of state-religion relations with respect to the post-colonial state-building project. It can also be considered a model of political development in so far as it argues that the post-colonial state-building project consists of three stages: the selection of the metanarrative, the imposition of the metanarrative, and the achieving of ideological hegemony. Its function is heuristic in nature and as such does not lend itself to formal modeling. To facilitate the testing of the competing nationalisms thesis three propositions are presented below. The propositions are intended to facilitate comparative analysis between the two case studies in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 with respect to how Third World countries have addressed the challenge of religious pluralism and the role that religion has played in the post-colonial state-building project.

Proposition 1: The competing nationalisms thesis argues that modernization in Third World countries is not uni-linear but multi-linear. The uni-linear understanding of modernization assumes that because "modernization = secularization" Third World elite will seek to leave behind the traditional/religious symbol systems as they embark on ambitious modernization programs. The competing nationalisms thesis suggests there are three ways that state-religion relations can be structured: (1) the state is autonomous of the religious sphere (secular nationalism); (2) the state is fused with the core ethnic group and relies on the core group's religious symbol system for political legitimacy (ethnic
nationalism); and (3) the state is fused with a particular religion and seeks to order society to conform with the moral and doctrinal precepts of that religion (religious nationalism).

Proposition 2: Where the newly independent state encounters a religiously plural society, the state will seek to manage religious pluralism through the official metanarrative. The official metanarrative functions as the template which define and structure state-religion relations in the post-colonial nation-state. Using Lustick's model of state-building it is expected that the post-colonial state-building project will undergo three stages: (1) the selection of the official metanarrative, (2) the imposition of the metanarrative on society, and (3) the achieving of ideological hegemony. Using Scott's model of state-building it is expected that the imposition of the official metanarrative will take place through the introduction of standardization and legibility on society.

Proposition 3: Using the competing nationalisms thesis it is expected that the official metanarrative will encounter numerous challenges from other narratives. This rivalry will be evident in the initial stage when the metanarrative is selection and will recur repeatedly even as the country undergoes modernization. This expectation is based upon van der Veer's argument that the homogenizing effects of the nation-building project will at the same generate resistance in the form of rival narratives, especially religious nationalism. This rivalry also stems from two unintended consequences of modernization: (1) people turning to religion in reaction to the destabilizing consequences of modernization and (2) the emergence of modern forms of religion that derive strength and vitality from the conditions of modernity, e.g., universal literacy and modern communications. The ironic consequences of modernization pose a serious challenge to
the unilinear understanding of modernization suggesting the need for a more elaborate
theory of modernization. Is proposed that the competing nationalisms thesis provides a
framework that enables political scientists to understand the "failure" of Third World
countries to undergo secularization and the recent emergence of religious movements that
challenge the post-colonial state-building project.
CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

The purpose of this chapter is threefold: (1) describe the methodology of the dissertation, (2) justify the methodology used, and (3) describe the dissertation's research design.

For this dissertation I will be using the macro-social comparative history approach. It is a method widely used in comparative politics. It has been used in "classics" of comparative politics: Barrington Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1966) and Theda Skocpol's *States and Social Revolutions* (1979). It has been the method used in path breaking works in state-building theory: Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens' *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (1992), Thomas Ertman's *Birth of the Leviathan* (1997), and David Waldner's *State Building and Late Development* (1999).

The comparative method has several advantages. Unlike the statistical method which requires a large number of cases, the comparative approach allows for a small number of cases. It allows the researcher to study phenomena that are difficult to quantify. Because it allows for limited control of variables, it enables the researcher to go beyond historical description to hypotheses testing (see Lijphart 1975:164). Skocpol and Somers write,

Macro-analytic comparative history has the considerable virtue of being the only way to attempt to validate (and invalidate) causal hypotheses about macro-phenomena of which there are intrinsically only limited numbers of cases (1980:193).
It is clear then that we are not referring to comparative analysis in the sense of the "traditional quotation/illustration methodology" (Galtung in Lijphart 1971:686), but in the sense of doing comparison with a concern for advancing theory (Ragin 1994:112).

Comparative political analysis constitutes not a single method but several somewhat similar approaches. Skocpol and Somers identify three major approaches or "logics-in-use" to comparative analysis: (1) comparative history as parallel demonstration of theory, (2) comparative history as contrast of contexts, and (3) comparative history as macro-causal analysis. Each approach has its own strengths and weaknesses, and thus complements the other. Skocpol and Somers note that the different approaches represent different stages in the ongoing research cycle. The contrast oriented approach is suitable for formulating inferences and hypotheses, the macro-causal analysis approach is best suited for testing of theory, and the parallel demonstration approach is best suited for the generalization of a theory.

I plan to use the contrast oriented approach to the two case studies of Indonesia and Malaysia. The contrast approach is suitable when research is still in the beginning phase as is the case with state-building in Southeast Asia. Contrast oriented comparative analysis takes a particular theme, question, or ideal type and applies them across disparate cases. The advantage of this approach is that it heightens the visibility of one structure by contrasting it with another (Reinhard Bendix in Skocpol 1980:180). This makes contrast oriented comparison well suited for verifying the presence of a distinct process -- the

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1 Skocpol and Somers' contrast oriented approach is somewhat similar to Przeworski and Teune's "most different" research design. The "most different" research design starts with a heterogeneous set of case studies, proceeds on the understanding that through these differences certain systemic variables can be ruled out, thus leaving experimental variables that account for the variation under consideration (1970:31 ff.).
post-colonial state-building project. In addition, this approach allows us to test whether the state-building project consists of a multistage process with identifiable thresholds similar to that described in Lustick's model. Because contrast oriented comparison sharpens our understanding of contexts, it strengthens our ability make generalizable causal inferences.

The Case Study Approach

The case study method constitutes one of the basic approaches in comparative politics. One advantage is that it allows for small-N research designs like this dissertation which consists of just two case studies. Although some social scientists may find small-N research designs wanting, there are certain advantages to the small-N approach. Small-N designs -- unlike large-N designs -- have the advantages of allowing the researcher to carefully assess the research data and make detailed historical comparisons not possible with a large-N research design. Unlike large-N designs which tend to be confined to the whole nation level, small-N designs routinely mix national factors with subnational factors (Coppedge 1999:474). Small-N designs are more likely to uncover aberrations that lead to revisions in theory that in turn advance theory in the field (Bradshaw and Wallace 1991:164).

The case study method is more complex than it first appears. Arend Lijphart identified six different types of case studies: (1) atheoretical descriptive case studies, (2) interpretive case studies, (3) hypothesis generating case studies, (4) theory-confirming

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2 Although the case study method is widely derided by theory driven political scientists who seek to pattern political science after the natural sciences, they overlook the fact that the case study method is widely used in the clinical studies of medicine and psychology (see Eckstein 1992:120).

3 See Eckstein 1992:124-125 for a discussion of constitutes a "case."
case studies, (5) theory-infirming case studies, and (6) deviant case studies (1971:691). Each approach differs with respect to the role of theory formation and theory testing. Lijphart points out that it is the latter four approaches that have the potential for making a lasting contribution to political science. A similar classification has been worked out by Harry Eckstein who identified five ways of doing case studies: configurative-idiographic studies, disciplined-configurative studies, heuristic-case studies, case studies as plausibility probes, and crucial-case studies (1992:134 ff.).

The approach used in the dissertation will be similar to Lijphart's theory confirming/theory infirming approach and Eckstein's plausibility probe approach. Because the dissertation's theoretical framework derives in part from Lustick's three stage/two threshold model of state-building -- a model which already been tested -- the method used follows Lijphart's theory confirming/theory infirming approach. On the other hand, because the dissertation will be testing a revised version of Lustick's model that focuses on state-religion relations -- a model of state-building that is untested and in light of the little work done on state-building in Southeast Asia -- the method used here closely resembles Lijphart's hypothesis testing or Eckstein's plausibility probes.

**Historical Institutionalism**

The macro-analytic comparative approach will be complemented with the historical institutionalist approach. The macro-analytic comparative approach is appropriate for the study of broad social phenomena like nations and societies, but it needs to be complemented by the historical institutional approach which is suited for understanding the specific means by which the state-building project has been carried out.
Historical institutionalism is a relatively new approach in comparative politics. Unlike earlier formalistic studies of political institutions, New Institutionalism is deeply concerned with theory building, a result of the behavioral revolution in the 1960s and 70s. New Institutionalism views institutions not as passive objects (as in the Marxist and liberal pluralist paradigms) but as significant actors that "constrain and refract politics" (Thelen and Steinmo 1992:3). Historical institutionalism is concerned with showing how political struggles "are mediated by the institutional setting in which [they] take place" (Thelen and Steinmo 1992:2). This is strikingly similar to Lustick's description of the key role institutions play in state-building. In conjunction with the historical institutional approach I will be utilizing James Scott's concepts of "legibility" and "standardization" as a way of understanding of how state policies have been used to extend state power into the religious domain and shape local religious discourse bringing it under the aegis of the nation-state.

The historical institutionalist approach addresses a certain lacuna in Southeast Asian studies. Many of the well known works in the field have been done on the level of micro-level analysis. But not many have been done on the institutional level. Among the

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4 A skeptical Nelson Polsby once remarked: "Political science is the study of institutions. So what's new about the New Institutionalism?" (Thelen and Steinmo 1992:3).
5 See Thelen and Steinmo 1992:3-7 for an overview of the history of political science and the internal trends that gave rise to New Institutionalism.
6 Lustick writes: "Institutions organize and stabilize expectations. They exist, as such, insofar as they establish certain parameters of political competitions as 'givens' that permit decision making, bargaining, and other forms of political activity to proceed 'normally'. But effectively ruling out many of the most fundamental questions that could, theoretically, be raised in any political context, institutions permit political actors to focus on particular issues, calculate the consequences of different outcomes, and make appropriate tradeoffs (1987:165)."
7 Southeast Asian studies is replete with macro-level analysis. Well known examples are the ethnographies like Clifford Geertz's *The Religion of Java* (1960) which focused on the village of Modjokuto in East Java, John Bowen's *Islam Observed* (1993) which focused on the Gayo Highlands on the island of Sumatra in Indonesia, Benedict Kerkvliet's *Everyday Politics in the Philippines* (1990) and Thomas McKenna's *Muslim Rulers and Rebels* (1998) which focuses on the Cotabato region of the Philippines. Other interesting
exceptions are Daniel Lev's *Islamic Courts in Indonesia* (1972) and Muthiah Alagappa's (ed.) *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia* (2001).

**Methodology in Political Science**

Methodology has been a contentious issue in political science. Modern political science has been strongly influenced by the behavioral revolution of the 1950s and 60s (see Easton 1967). This methodological turn stemmed from dissatisfaction with descriptive case study and the noncumulative nature of political research. The goal of the behavioral revolution has been the discovery of "scientific" laws, i.e., covering laws with high predictive powers for a wide range of cases (Almond 1990:40). This has resulted in political science and other disciplines being divided between the nomothetic and the idiographic approaches (see Eckstein 1992: 136, Ragin 1991:1-3, Przeworski and Teune 1970:5 ff.).

Despite behavioralism's dominance there has been widespread resistance. A number of strong criticisms have been raised concerning this approach. Andrew Mack's "Numbers Are Not Enough" (1975) in *Comparative Politics* finds the behavioral tradition flawed in terms of its data, methods, and theoretical and epistemological assumptions. Almond and Genco in "Clouds, Clocks & the Study of Politics" point out that epistemological as well as ontological differences exist between natural sciences and political science that make the attempt to make political science into a "science" quite

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approaches to micro-level analysis are James Siegel's *Solo in the New Order* (1986) which is a post-modern analysis of the city of Solo in Central Java, and Alfred McCoy's (ed.) *An Anarchy of Families* (1993) which explores the role of elite families in Filipino politics.
problematic. They point out that the behavioralists' understanding of "science" tended to be in terms of physics and overlooked other scientific disciplines like biology and medicine which are more indeterminate in their findings. Large-N quantitative research also suffers from "bait and switch" tactics (i.e., the reliance on narrowly defined indicators like per capita energy consumption to measure broad phenomenon like economic development) that affect the validity of the research findings (Coppedge 1999:469).

Another criticism of the behavioral revolution has been its failure to make good on its promise: covering laws. Mack notes that quantitative research and correlation analysis have yielded meager findings. Despite the goal of producing law-like scientific findings stripped of particularities like a country's name, idiographic tendencies persist. Lijphart notes that Dahl's high respected Polyarchy has been unable to avoid idiographic analysis. Almond and Genco note that voting behavior, the closest thing to scientific theory in the discipline, has been plagued with new findings that show regularities shifting over time (1990:37). It can be argued that the behavioralists' quest to imitate the natural sciences has been misguided.

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8 Almond and Genco's clock vs. clouds model is quite moderate in comparison with Courtney Brown's Serpents in the Sand (1995) which argues against the linear understanding of social reality.

9 As an example of the attempt to do comparative analysis with the countries' particularities stripped away see Almond's "Introduction" to The Politics of the Developing Areas (1960), especially page 25.

10 In the appendix Dahl notes that a rigorous scaling of polyarchies resulted in France being unexpectedly low on the scalogram. In the face of this "anomaly" Dahl "arbitrarily" reassigned it a higher ranking (Dahl 1971:243-245; see Lijphart 1975:170). This reassignment was not so much arbitrary as it reflected Dahl's familiarity with the historical complexity of French politics. Thus, in the end idiographic descriptors like the name "France" prevailed over the nomothetic approach.

11 In a scathing aside Almond and Genco mock political science's quest for scientific legitimacy: "Our longing for full scientific status has led us to create a kind of 'cargo cult,' fashioning cardboard imitations of the tools and products of the hard sciences in the hope that our incantations would make them real" (1990:45).
Although political science has been a "discipline divided" (see Almond 1990), there have been attempts to reconcile the different approaches. Lijphart in his 1971 article sketches a tree diagram of the scientific method showing the similarities that the experimental method shares with non-experimental methods (statistical, comparative, and case study). King, Keohane, and Verba in *Designing Social Inquiry* (1994) argue that the differences between quantitative research and qualitative research are really stylistic and that both traditions share "a unified logic of inference" (1994:3). Michael Coppedge in "Thickening Thin Concepts and Theories" (1999) calls for the combining of the large-N and small-N approaches in light of their respective strengths and weaknesses.

Behavioralists' criticisms of the deficiencies of the comparative method gave rise to more sophisticated approaches to comparative analysis (see Collier 1993). Attempts have been made to show how the comparative method incorporates theory formation and takes into account causal relations between dependent and independent variables (see Przeworski and Teune (1970); Lijphart (1971, 1975); Skocpol and Somers (1980)). The growing sophistication of comparative analysis also gave rise to a more nuanced discussion of problems in selection (Geddes 1990), "conceptual stretching" (Collier and Mahon 1993), generalizability vs. the idiographic nature of reality (Verba 1967:117), and the use of counterfactuals in hypothesis testing (Fearon 1991).

Even within the sub field of comparative politics, methodology has been a highly contested issue. Lichbach and Zuckerman in *Comparative Politics* (1997) note that there are three major research communities in the field of comparative politics: rationalist, culturalist, and structuralist. The rationalists represent the widely popular rational choice
school which focuses on seeking law like explanations for political behavior based upon the "rational" interests of individual actors. Between the culturalists, who are hostile to generalizing across cases, and the rationalists, who seek to construct general laws, are the structuralists. While they look for patterns in comparative histories (something the culturalists are averse to), structuralists are cautious about extending the generalizability of their findings. Structuralists prefer to focus on the historical dynamics of structures rather than the individualistic interest-maximizing actors of the rationalist school.

The opening remarks in the beginning of this chapter make it quite apparent where this dissertation stands in relation to the discipline. The comparative approach lies somewhere between quantitative statistical analysis and qualitative analysis. The combination of macro-social comparative analysis with historical institutionalism situates this dissertation with the structuralists. This in turn indicates that the dissertation's stance with respect to the behavioral revolution is a critical one. The same goes for the rational choice school.

In addition to the three research communities mentioned by Lichbach and Zuckerman, another significant research community is the post-modernist school. Post-modernism is more than another rival research paradigm. It is a broad cultural movement that challenges the basic premises upon which modern social science was founded. Pauline Rosenau in Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences (1992) writes: "Post-modernists rearrange the whole social science enterprise. .... They offer

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12 Although widely popular, rational choice theory has come under severe criticism. Gabriel Almond notes that rational choice is not so much based upon observed regularities but on regularities postulated a priori (Almond 1990:49). See also Green and Shapiro's Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory (1994) and Myra Marx Ferree's "The Political Context of Rationality" (1992).

It is quite apparent then, that post-modernism's hostility to representation and its insistence on intertextuality are at odds with the comparative method chosen for this dissertation. However, it is not that easy to set this dissertation in opposition to post-modernism. Although its methodology is derived from the mainstream of comparative politics, its concern with religion as a political variable and state-building as discursive formation puts this dissertation somewhat at odds with the dominant secular and positivist paradigms in political science. Furthermore, without the attempts by post-modernists to break down rigid disciplinary boundaries, it would probably have been much harder to raise the research questions underlying this dissertation.¹³

The Research Design

The basic framework of this dissertation consists of two case studies: Indonesia and Malaysia, set up to facilitate the making of comparisons. The comparative analysis will be structured along the lines of the contrast-oriented approach. This particular form of comparative analysis has several advantages. It allows us to (1) test for state-building

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¹³ This dissertation stands in tension with the three ideological options described by Ernest Gellner in his Postmodernism, Reason and Religion (1992). In it Gellner describes the three major ideological options at the close of the twentieth century: religious fundamentalism, postmodernism, and Enlightenment Secular Fundamentalism. Modern social science is based upon the third option as is evidenced by its strong secular bias. The postmodernists represent a major challenge from within the academy as it seeks to revise the dominant research paradigms and the religious fundamentalists represent a major challenge from without the academy as it seeks to overthrow political institutions based upon Western ideals. Although modernist in its epistemology, this dissertation breaks with the dominant secular bias in political science and it incorporates some of the boundary crossing questions raised by postmodernists.
as a distinctive political project, (2) test for the various stages of the state-building project, and (3) test for the success/failure of the post-colonial state-building project, i.e., ideological hegemony.

Comparative analysis is based upon similarities and differences. The post-colonial state-building project constitutes the fundamental similarity between the two case studies. It is also assumed that state-building in the two case studies will undergo similar stages of development -- selection, imposition, and hegemony. The differences consist of (1) the strategies selected for managing religious pluralism (ethnic nationalism by Malaysia, secular nationalism by Indonesia), and (2) the success/failure by the state to achieve ideological hegemony.

To bring a more tightly focused analysis I will be looking at how the state frames religious discourse, especially Islamic discourse. By "framing" is meant how Islam's role in society is defined by the state. The competing nationalisms thesis depicts the roles that Islam can play with respect to the public sphere: marginal (secular), supportive (ethnic), or determinative (religious).

Each of the case studies consists of a historical narrative that traces the respective state's attempts to impose the official metanarrative on society. The historical narrative for the case studies will be delimited as follows: for Indonesia it will be from 1945, when the Pancasila was formulated and Indonesia's independence declared, to 1998, when Suharto stepped down; for Malaysia it will be from the mid 1940s, when the British authorities presented the Malayan Union proposal as a political framework for

14 Looking at state/religion relations in general would make the research design too unwieldy, especially in the case of Indonesia which grants official standing to five religions.
post-colonial Malaya, to 1990 when an inter religious coalition protested the Malaysian
government's pro-Islamic drift. The historical narrative of the post-colonial state-building
project is framed using a modified version of Ian Lustick's three-stage/two-threshold
model. In the selection stage I look at the role assigned to Islam in the political debate
surrounding the formulation of the national constitution. In the imposition stage I look at
the ways the state employs its institutional resources to enforce this particular role
assigned to Islam in the public sphere. Hegemony is defined in terms of the cessation of
public debate on key aspects of the official metanarrative and it becoming part of the
unquestioned commonsensical reality (see Lustick 1987:166 ff.).

Much of the data for this dissertation is drawn from library research. This
approach is characteristic of comparative research in political science, but at odds with
Southeast Asian studies where much of the research has been based upon new data
uncovered through field research. Skocpol defends the library research approach noting
that even with the reliance on secondary sources, comparative analysis can make
substantial contributions to the discipline.

The comparative historian's task -- and potential distinctive scholarly
contribution -- lies not in revealing new data about particular aspects of the
large time periods and diverse places surveyed in the comparative study,
but rather in establishing the interest and prima facie validity of an overall
argument about causal regularities across the historical cases (1979:xiv).

To attempt macro-social comparative analysis independently of prior research is too labor
intensive and in the long run unproductive.
The Research Question

The title of the dissertation points to the fundamental research question: What has been the relationship between religion and state-building? How does the post-colonial state deal with the challenge of religious pluralism? Thus, the scope of this dissertation is quite modest. The research question of the dissertation is not so much "Why?" -- causal relations between independent/dependent variables -- but "How?" -- the distinctive structures and policies used by the state to shape public discourse.

The subtitle of the dissertation "a comparative analysis of state-building strategies" points to the dissertation's goal: a critically informed understanding of state-building that goes beyond mere description and interpretation. The research design has been constructed to facilitate comparisons and test a number of propositions concerning the state-building project. It is hoped that in the concluding chapter a comparative analysis of the two case studies will yield the following: (1) confirmation of the usefulness of the competing nationalisms thesis typology for understanding state-religion relations, (2) confirmation of the three-stage model of state-building, and (3) a more nuanced understanding of why religion has continued to be a significant political variable and even thrived as Third World countries underwent modernization, trends that challenge conventional secular models of development.
CHAPTER 5
COMPETING NATIONALISMS AND STATE-BUILDING
IN POST-COLONIAL INDONESIA

As a case study, this chapter consists of three parts: (1) the historical narrative of Indonesia's political development, (2) applying the competing nationalisms thesis to Indonesia, and (3) the findings and implications derived from this case study. For this case study, attention will be given to the way the official metanarrative structured state-society relations in post-colonial Indonesia and guided the state-building project.

I. HISTORICAL NARRATIVE

Selecting the Official Metanarrative

The selection of the Pancasila as the official metanarrative was made by the BPKI (The Investigative Body for the Preparatory Matters for Indonesian Independence). Created by the Japanese military during the waning days of World War II, the BPKI was far from a representative body. Its members were largely from Java, well educated and politically moderate. The Muslims, on the other hand, were poorly represented (out of the 62 members, only 7 were Muslims). The committee's moderate and conservative bent reflected the Japanese authorities' desire to avoid extremist elements who could instigate armed uprising against Japanese military rule.

1 "Indonesia" is the name of the country that declared its independence of Dutch rule in 1945. Indonesia's predecessor the "Dutch East Indies" was the result of Dutch colonial rule (circa 1680 to 1940) being imposed on the vast archipelago "Nusantara." Variations in the spelling of Indonesian words reflect differences between the old system and the new system -- Ejaan Bahasa Indonesia yang disempurnakan -- introduced in 1972, e.g., pantjasila vs. pancasila, prijaji vs. priyayi (see van Dijk 1981:vii). With the exceptions of quotations, I will follow the new spelling system.

2 Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, also spelled BPUPKI.

3 The Muslims' under representation is not all that surprising given their minimal presence in the Volksraad during the Dutch era and the Chuo Sangi In during the Japanese Occupation.

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One of the committee's tasks was to define the *dasar negara* (the basic principles) for the new nation. The task was a daunting one, given the country's religious pluralism combined with regional and ethnic differences. The committee resolved the problem of religious pluralism by adopting the Pancasila as the nation's foundational principles. It was largely because of Sukarno's leadership that the committee was able to complete its task (Reid 1974:19). The Pancasila addressed the question of Indonesia's religious pluralism by proposing an inclusive integralistic state that was religious but not confessional.

The Pancasila means 'Five Principles': (1) belief in God, (2) nationalism, (3) humanitarianism, (4) social justice, and (5) democracy. There are several significant aspects of the Pancasila's first principle *ketuhanan yang maha esa* (belief in God). First, it was phrased in *bahasa Indonesia*, the proposed national language. Second, it did not use the name "Allah" -- a move that would have implied an Islamic state. Third, it was not phrased in Javanese -- a move that would have privileged the Javanese over other ethnic groups. And fourth, rather than use the more commonly used word "tuhan" for God, it used the more abstract *ke-an* form which can be translated "divinity" or "God".

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4 A detailed discussion of the ideological sources of the Pancasila can be found in Saifuddin Anshari's *The Jakarta Charter of June 1945* (1979). Anshari also points out that a few days earlier Muhammad Yamin articulated the Five Principles quite similar to Sukarno's (1979:13).

5 The notion of an integralistic state -- a state united with society and which transcends all groups -- is rooted in traditional Javanese culture (see Supomo's address to the PPKI on May 31, 1945). See also Richard Robison's discussion of the notion of integralistic state (1993:42-43) and how the Pancasila supports integralistic concerns of the New Order (1993:44-45).

6 The Pancasila was first articulated on June 1, 1945, by Sukarno in the well known *Lahirnya Pancasila* (Birth of the Pancasila) speech (See Feith and Castles 1970:40; Sukarno 1963). In the original version "belief in God" was listed last, then in later versions it was made the first principle (Ramage 1995:14).

7 Back in 1928 at the height of the first wave of nationalism the Youth Congress committed itself to Bahasa Indonesia as the unifying language for the new nation. It was at this historic Youth Congress that people saw themselves for the first time as Indonesian first and Javanese or Sumatran second (see Ricklefs 1981:186).
"Godhead" -- a semantic move that made the Pancasila transcendent over the various rival religions.  

The Pancasila was well received by the Christians from the outer islands, the priyayis (the Javanese upper class), and the secular nationalists. On the other hand, the Islamic leaders who wanted an Islamic state were unhappy with the lack of an explicit reference to Islam in the Pancasila. As a concession to their demands, the Jakarta Charter "Piagam Jakarta" was appended to the first article. The first principle was amended to read that the Indonesian state was based upon "belief in God with the obligations for the adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law." However, when the Constitution was officially promulgated, the Jakarta Charter was dropped out of consideration for the Christian provinces which would otherwise have refused to join in declaring independence (Reid 1974:30; Ricklefs 1981:213; Lev 1972:43). If the Islamists had their way in the PPKI, Indonesia's Constitution at the time of independence would have emerged strikingly similar to Malaysia's. Islam would be the state religion and the head of state would be a Muslim (Emmerson 1976:57).

Competing Nationalisms

The contentiousness surrounding the selection of the Pancasila as the national metanarrative has its roots in the early 1900s when a host of political and nationalist parties emerged seeking to challenge Dutch colonial rule. It is in this time period that we

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8 See Nieuwenhuijze's extensive discussion of ketuhanan as an expression of "deconfessionalized" Islam that facilitated Indonesia's national integration (1958:208 ff.).
9 Even then the phrase was ambiguous and could be read three different ways: (1) that the Muslims should follow the Islamic law, (2) that the Indonesian state should ensure that Muslims kept the law, or (3) that the Indonesian state should execute Islamic law on behalf of the Muslims (Emmerson 1976:57).
10 The original wording was: "ke-Tuhanan, dengan kewajiban menjalankan syari'at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya" (Anshari 1981:143).

see the emergence of the three forms of nationalism. The main expressions for the anti-colonial struggle were either secular or religious. The least influential metanarrative was ethnic nationalism.

Secular nationalism can be seen in the *Indische Partij* (Indian Party), a radical socialist party founded in 1911 that called for independence from Dutch rule. At around this time the *Indische Social-Democratische Vereeniging* (Indian Social-Democratic Association) -- the precursor of the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (Indonesian Communist Party, PKI) -- was founded. The most successful of the secular nationalist parties was Sukarno's *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian National Party, PNI). After the PNI was dissolved by the Dutch, it was succeeded by other parties like *Partai Indonesia* (Indonesian Party), *Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian National Education), and *Partai Indonesia Raya* (Glorious Indonesia Party) (Noer 1973:318). Secular nationalism was secular in the sense that the national unity sought would not be based upon a single religion, e.g., Islam. Unlike the secular European Enlightenment, it did not so much seek to exclude religion from the public sphere as it sought to prevent Islamic nationalists from seizing the reins of power.

Ethnic nationalism can be seen in the *Sarekat Adat Alam Minangkabau* (Adat Union of the Minangkabau World), *Sarekat Ambon* (Ambonese Union), *Sumatren Bond, Jong Minahasa, Timorsch Verbond* (Timorese Alliance), and the *Comité voor het Javaansch Nationalisme* (Committee for Javanese Nationalism) (see Ricklefs 1981:167 ff.). Ethnic nationalism did not emerge as a viable option for a number of reasons. First, Indonesia's largest ethnic group, the Javanese -- who comprised sixty percent of Indonesia's
population -- was divided along class lines (priyayi vs. non-priyayi) and religion (abangan vs. santri). Second was the fact that the Javanese shared the island of Java with the Sundanese (Leifer 2000:159). A third reason was the decisive repudiation of ethnicity as the basis for nationalism at the 1928 Youth Congress (Leifer 2000:159).

The earliest sign of religious nationalism was the founding of Muhammadiyah in 1912 for the purpose of reforming Islam and resisting the influence of Western missionaries. In 1923 Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union) was founded for the purpose of purifying Islam of superstition and opposing nationalism. However, the emergence of religious nationalism was complicated by the internal tensions within Indonesian Islam.  

Not all Muslim groups were founded for the purpose of establishing an Islamic state. Sarekat Islam was founded for the purpose of defending the economic interests of the indigenous traders against the Dutch and the Chinese (Emmerson 1976:144; Noer 1973:102 ff.). In 1924 the Nahdatul Ulama (the Rise of the Righteous Scholars) was founded by Orthodox Muslims who rejected the Modernists' quest for an Islamic state.

The internal complexity of Indonesian Islam has its roots in the Islamization of the region. Islam entered and spread throughout the Nusantara archipelago through a gradual process of syncretistic adaptation (see Nagata 1986:38 ff.). Orthodox Islam represents

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11 This internal complexity is described in Geertz's classic *Religion of Java* in which he described the differences among the aristocratic priyayis, the syncretistic abangan, and the puritanical santri. Ramage provides a nice thumbnail sketch of the differences, "Santri refers to devout adherents of Islam, closely attuned to daily spiritual and social behavior based on diligent reading of the Qur'an. Abangan are nominal Muslims, primarily rural Javanese, for whom Islam is the latest, symbolic overlay on preexisting Hindu, Buddhist, and Javanese religious beliefs. In terms of political affiliation, santri tended to follow either of the leading Muslim political parties, Masyumi or Nahdlatul Ulama, while abangan generally identified with the Nationalist Party (PNI) or the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) (1995:16)." See Saleh 2001:37 no. 53 for a discussion of the debates surrounding Geertz's categories. Geertz's categories do not apply to Malaysia. This is largely because Islam in Malaysia -- unlike its counterpart in Java -- became deeply integrated with Malay identity (Saleh 2001:37).

12 Also spelled Nahdlatul Ulama.
syncretistic Islam, which adapted itself to the diverse "local knowledge" of the archipelago. Then, in the early twentieth century Modernist Islam emerged that would challenge traditionalist Islam.\(^\text{13}\) The Modernists' quest for a pure Islam led them to seek to impose standardization and legibility upon traditionalist or Orthodox Islam. It also led them to seek to impose their version of Islam on the public domain in the form of an Islamic state. In reaction to pressure from the Modernists, many traditionalist abangan and priyayi Muslims joined NU or PNI. This led to Indonesian Muslims being divided over their understanding of Islam and how it relates to Indonesian politics (see Von der Mehden 1986:15; Noer 1973:275 ff.).

Thus, despite its numerical majority, Islam in Indonesia never succeeded in attaining religious and political hegemony (Lev 1972:244). This resulted in Indonesian Muslims having what W.F. Wertheim describes as a "majority with a minority mentality." Islamic nationalism stemmed more from a defensive stance concerned with self-preservation. The religious nationalists saw the Jakarta Charter more as a means of protecting the Muslim *umma* from *abangan* laxity and from secular and Christian schooling (Emmerson 1976:99).

\(^{13}\) For all their "conservatism" Modernist Islam does not mark a return to the original Islam of Muhammed's time but an Islam that utilizes modern organizational practices, e.g., boy scouts, orphanages, women's auxiliary, and relies on modern literary techniques, e.g. seeking direct access to the Qur'an independently of the scholastic commentaries.
Figure 5.1 Early Twentieth Century Indonesian Nationalist Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secular Nationalist Groups</th>
<th>Ethnic Nationalist Groups</th>
<th>Islamic Nationalist Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indische Partij</td>
<td>Sarekat Adat Alam</td>
<td>Muhammadiyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indische</td>
<td>Minangkabau</td>
<td>Persatuan Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-Democratische</td>
<td>Sarekat Ambon</td>
<td>Sarekat Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vereeniging</td>
<td>Sumatren Bond</td>
<td>Nahdatul Ulama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Nasional Indonesia</td>
<td>Jong Minahasa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partai Indonesia</td>
<td>Timorsch Verbond</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pendidikan Nasional</td>
<td>Comité voor het Javaansch</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Nationalisme</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Partai Indonesia Raya</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The Pancasila as Secular Nationalism

With the selection of the Pancasila as its metanarrative, post-colonial Indonesia marks a radical departure from its two predecessor regimes: the Dutch colonialists and the Japanese military occupation. Unlike its two predecessors, Indonesia was intended to be a nation-state in which the rulers of the political unit belonged to the nation of the majority and in which both shared a common high culture (see Gellner 1983:1). As the official metanarrative, the Pancasila carried out a number of important functions for the new nation-state: (1) it defined the unifying basis for the political community, (2) it defined the parameters of public discourse, and (3) it protected the interests of the political elite. Most importantly, the Pancasila structured Indonesia as a secular nation-state.

Although the Pancasila is explicitly religious, it is secular in the way it structures state-society relations. The Indonesian state recognizes the five religions, but is beholden
to none.\textsuperscript{14} It is a "religious" state that transcends the five religions. But its transcendence is such that no particular religious group can lay claim to the state, especially Islam. This results in a de facto state-religion separation.

As the official metanarrative, the Pancasila protected the interests of the secular political elite -- Sukarno and the secular nationalists, and the interests of abangan Javanese -- Indonesia's "core ethnie." It protected them from being dominated by the santri Muslims from Java and outside Java. Being rooted in the values of Javanese culture, the Pancasila also protected the interests of the Javanese.\textsuperscript{15}

The Pancasila also served to protect the economic interests of Indonesia's political elite (and later that of the military). This is the Pancasila as firewall argument.\textsuperscript{16} In this argument, the Pancasila, by shielding the Indonesian state from Islamic radicals (who deny the distinction between religion and politics) safeguards the country's economic development. This argument is based upon the assumption that industrial capitalism requires the secularization of society (see Berger 1967:132).

Although dropped from the 1945 Constitution, the Jakarta Charter persisted as a contested issue. It would be brought up repeatedly by Islamic nationalists in their quest for an Islamic state in Indonesia. The Jakarta Charter provides a useful means of tracking

\textsuperscript{14}The Pancasila's overt religious language served to maintain the Indonesian state's legitimacy among the traditional groups and their leaders.

\textsuperscript{15}The Pancasila's strategy of inclusion was consistent with the way power was displayed in traditional Javanese culture. In the traditional Javanese polity there were three means of defeating one's enemies: absorption, dispersal, or destruction. The preferred means was absorption which was viewed as \textit{halus} (smooth, cultured) while the other two means were regarded as \textit{kasar} (coarse) (see Anderson 1990:4). The Pancasila's for the most part followed the \textit{halus} path of inclusion (the major deviation from this can be seen in the New Order's brutal suppression of its political opponents).

\textsuperscript{16}This argument was made earlier in a conference paper "Religious Pluralism and Nation-State Formation: The Pancasila as Managed Religious Pluralism" presented at the 1994 SEASSI Student Conference at University of Wisconsin - Madison.
the history of Islamic nationalism in Indonesia. The history of post-colonial politics in Indonesia has been in large part the struggle between the secularized political elite who sought to contain religious nationalism while adhering to the Western model of development and the religious nationalists who sought an Islamic state and an Islamic society.

**Independence**

Although August 17, 1945, marks the day Indonesia declared its Independence, it took another four more years of fierce fighting before the Dutch relinquished their claim on Indonesia. The first four years of independence were chaotic, stemming not just from the Japanese occupation but also from the Dutch attempt to retake Indonesia. This chaos was further compounded by the decentralized nature of the Indonesian revolution. Indonesia's revolution, unlike others, was not led by a single disciplined party. Its revolution was so decentralized that the national leadership had difficulty controlling excesses (Anderson 1998:278-279). This state of affairs laid the basis for the military's independence from civilian rule.

The chaos became so widespread that the 1945 constitution was suspended in practice and all state power was vested in Sukarno (Ricklefs 1981:218). Political rule under Sukarno rested on Sukarno's oratory, displayed either at mass rallies or by radio broadcasts, and on the Pancasila as an inclusive umbrella embracing the various segments of Indonesian society. This resulted in a highly centralized, but ineffectual national state.

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17 As an example of the persuasiveness of Sukarno's oratory, shortly after Independence was declared a huge crowd of some 200,000 people gathered in Medan Merdeka in Jakarta in defiance of the Japanese tanks and guns. Sukarno was able to persuade the huge crowd to disperse peacefully thereby avoiding any
The period from 1945 to the early 1950s was a relatively quiet one as far as open debate about the Pancasila. Feith in *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* wrote about this period:

...the Moslems accepted the formulation without much active protest. Many of them asserted that they were accepting it only temporarily, until an elected Constituent Assembly began the work of fashioning a new constitution. But public criticism of the Pancasila by Moslem spokesmen was rare. For the most part it was accepted, along with the constitution, as a shared cluster of symbols of state to which all parties could give assent (Feith 1962:284).

In the early 1950s Sukarno continued to affirm the Pancasila's inclusiveness. Furthermore, Sukarno openly warned against an Islamic state.

The state we want is a national state consisting of all Indonesia. If we establish a state based on Islam, many areas whose population is not Islamic such as the Moluccas, Bali, Flores, Timor, the Kai Islands, and Sulawesi, will secede. And West Irian, which has not yet become part of the territory of Indonesia, will not want to be part of the Republic" (in Feith 1962:281).

It was not until the 1955 elections and the Constituent Assembly that the Jakarta Charter resurfaced in a repeat of the fierce debates of the BPKI. The constitutional convention would be deadlocked on this issue over the next three years, forcing Sukarno to disband it and impose authoritarian rule under the guise of Guided Democracy.

**Secessionist Movements and Political Consolidation**

The challenge of religious pluralism posed a very real threat to the new nation-state. These breakaway movements were not necessarily attempts to set up an alternative state as attempts to set up an alternative government (see Ricklefs 1981:256; Harvey 1977:152).

18 These breakaway movements were not necessarily attempts to set up an alternative state as attempts to set up an alternative government (see Ricklefs 1981:256; Harvey 1977:152).

19 The organization's formal name was *Negara Islam Indonesia* (Indonesian Islamic State), *Darul Islam* outbreak of violence (Reid 1974:33).
Persatuan Ulama-Ulama Seluruh Aceh (All Aceh Ulama Association) in Aceh (1950); RMS Republik Maluku Selatan (Republic of South Maluku) in Eastern Indonesia (1949); Permesta Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam (Universal Struggle Charter) in Eastern Indonesia\(^{20}\) (1957); and PRRI Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic) in Sumatra (1958). Some of these rebellions were religiously motivated, others stemmed from more worldly concerns.

Darul Islam, with its aim to create an Islamic state, clearly represents the aims of religious nationalism, a theocratic society.\(^{21}\) Under the charismatic leadership of Kartosuwirjo\(^{22}\), the Darul Islam government was based upon Islamic law and administered by the kyais (see van Dijk 1981:93 ff.). At its height Darul Islam enjoyed ties with other secessionist movements in Aceh, West Java, and South Sulawesi, posing a major threat to the Jakarta-based government. However, the movement soon degenerated into banditry and extortion (See Nieuwenhuijze 1958: 165). It remained a significant threat in West Java until 1962, when Kartosuwirjo was captured by the military and executed. One lasting consequence of the Darul Islam uprising is that it confirmed for secular nationalists their fears of the "Islamic threat" (Ramage 1995:17).

Another Islamic rebellion broke out in Aceh in September 1953, when the All-Aceh Union of Ulamas (PUSA, Persatuan Ulama-Ulama Seluruh Aceh) under the

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\(^{20}\) I.e., Bali, Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi and Maluku.

\(^{21}\) See the "Manifesto of the Atjeh Rebels" in Feith and Castles (1970:211 ff.). See also Nieuwenhuijze (1958:171 ff.) for a description of the political structure for Darul Islam.

\(^{22}\) Kartosuwirjo, a Javanese mystic, founded a training academy for Muslim militants in West Java until it was shut down by the Japanese (see van Dijk 1981:20 ff.; Ricklefs 1981:227; and Nieuwenhuijze 1958:167 ff.).
leadership of Daud Beureu'eh\textsuperscript{23} declared that there would be no more Pancasila government in Aceh. This uprising stemmed from dissatisfaction with the Jakarta government for religious reasons as well as from Aceh's loss of autonomy arising from its recent amalgamation with North Sumatra (Ricklefs 1981:247). In 1959, the government defused Islamic sentiments by granting Aceh special autonomous status and allowed Daud Beureu'eh to retire with a pension (Ricklefs 1981:265-66).

In addition to the religious breakaway movements, the Jakarta government also had to contend with other breakaway movements. The RMS in East Indonesia represents the refusal of westernized Ambonese to accept their integration into the new Indonesian state (Chauvel 1999:21 ff.). The Ambonese Christians were pro-Dutch and looked upon Indonesia as a state dominated by Javanese, Muslims, and Leftists (Ricklefs 1981:233). The RMS's brief independence was suppressed by a series of tough military campaigns. The PRRI in Sumatra was basically a military rebellion.\textsuperscript{24} It was not religious in nature but rather consisted of army officers disgruntled with Sukarno and local civilians who wanted more economic independence from Jakarta (Ricklefs 1981:254). Like the RMS, the PRRI represented factions of the military disaffected with Sukarno's closeness to the Communist PKI.\textsuperscript{25} The military acted decisively, bombing PRRI installations and landing crack Siliwangi troops in Sumatra. In a short time, PRRI was reduced to a guerrilla operation. Its final collapse did not come until 1961.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Daud Beureu'eh was Aceh's strongman (see Ricklefs 1981:247).
\item It must be noted that Permesta received outside support from the US government alarmed at Sukarno's ties with the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party).
\item Although originally two separate movements, PRRI and RMS joined forces soon after PRRI announced its break from Jakarta. Identifying their nationalist orientation is clouded in light of clandestine support they received from the US (see Ricklefs 1981:262).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
The various uprisings came to an end by the early 1960s. Despite Sukarno's reliance on inclusive ideology and oratory, it was the military's forcible suppression of these movements that effectively unified Indonesia. In the process of suppressing the various breakaway movements in the 1950s, the Indonesian military established an effective presence across the vast archipelago. It became the most cohesive, disciplined and powerful group in Indonesia (Mackie and MacIntyre 1994:23). By the early 1960s the Indonesian military was poised to seize power in the wake of the Communist "coup" of 1965.

Islam and the Constituent Assembly Deadlock

The 1955 elections marked a major turning point in Indonesia's political development. Being a free election, it created an opportunity for mobilization of political support. Many of the political parties resorted to broad ideological appeals or religious loyalties in their quest for votes. The abangan in Central and East Java flocked to PKI while the santris joined the NU (Ricklefs 1981:249). Islamic party leaders called for a state based upon Islamic law, while the 'secular' parties PNI and PKI invoked the Pancasila as a means of resisting Islamization. In this election, the Pancasila was turned from Sukarno's version, a broad inclusive ideological umbrella, into an anti-Islamic slogan (Ricklefs 1981:246). The 1955 election was also a moment of revelation. It shattered the illusion of Islam's political superiority. The Islamic Masjumi party won only 22.2 percent of the votes -- the same percentage as the secular PNI -- falling far short of the 80 percent that some had so confidently predicted (Wertheim 1986:21; Feith 1962:275). The election results showed that the Muslim nationalists grossly
overestimated the salience between Islam as a religion and Islam as political ideology. The mixed results of the elections laid the foundation for the deadlocked Constituent Assembly.

Following the 1955 elections, the Constituent Assembly began the difficult task of formulating a more permanent constitution. The contentious issue of the Jakarta Charter surfaced once again. Some wanted the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter while others vehemently opposed this (see Saifuddin Anshari 1979:54). So intractable were the differences that Sukarno was forced to disband the Constituent Assembly in June 1959 and reintroduce the 1945 Constitution by presidential decree.

Guided Democracy represented the end of Indonesia's flirtation with democracy and its reversion to authoritarian rule. To call Guided Democracy a political system is misleading. The ideological framework for Guided Democracy Manipol-USDEK was so amorphous and ambiguous that it meant different things to different people. Later Sukarno introduced the concept of NASAKOM\textsuperscript{26} hoping to secure the support of three major parties: PNI (the nationalists), NU (the religious), and PKI (the communist). But as Sukarno allied himself more closely with the Communists, he alienated the Army and the Muslims. Despite all Sukarno's attempts to bring order and stability, his inattention to economic policy led to economic and social chaos. The whole house of cards came down in the September 1965 PKI "coup".

Beneath Guided Democracy's authoritarianism lay a weak state. Sukarno's lack of organizational power and his reliance on public oratory made him more like the

\textsuperscript{26} NASAKOM = Nationalisme, Agama (religion), Komunisme.
premodern Javanese kings and their theater states than modern presidents (see Geertz 1968:84-87). Ricklefs commenting on Sukarno notes:

He represented a centre of legitimacy which others needed. Conspicuous display was the outward expression of legitimacy, stadiums, statues and great public occasions were perhaps similar in function to the court ceremonial and buildings of an older age. Sukarno had little organizational power of his own and was obliged to manipulate, threaten and cajole other powerful men (1981:257).

Throughout Sukarno's rule the Pancasila, with its stress on inclusiveness and tolerance of religious differences, remained the defining framework for the Indonesian nation-state. Yet two striking facts stand out about the Sukarno era. One was the fact that it was the military's forcible suppression of secession movements that effectively united the Indonesian archipelago. The other was the fact that the Pancasila never effectively reconciled the conflict between the secular and Islamic nationalists.

**Gestapu 1965 and the New Order**

In September/October 1965 Indonesia was rocked by the Communist "coup" and the subsequent brutal anti-PKI pogrom. Sukarno was deposed and replaced by the New Order military government headed by General Suharto. One interesting aspect of the New Order was the retention of the Pancasila, Sukarno's personal invention. Sukarno's previous ideological statements, however, were annulled by the MPRS -- the official parliamentary body.

September 1965 marked a turning point in the military/state relationship. Essentially, the military captured the Indonesian state. The military's involvement in

27 On the evening of September 30th, 1965, six generals were killed in a coup attempt (allegedly by the PKI) hence the term Gestapu = Gerakan September Tiga Puluh "The September 30th Movement."
28 MPRS = Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara, "Provisional Peoples' Consultative Assembly."
29 The military is allocated 20 percent of the seats in the parliament. At the local level 21 of the 27
political affairs became part of the "normal" state of affairs under the doctrine of *dwi fungsi*. The Indonesian army supported the Pancasila, seeing itself to be the protector of the Pancasila state: a non-Communist, non-Islamic, unitary state (Ramage 1995:22).

The New Order brought with it a realignment in international relations. In a break with Sukarno's non-aligned stance, the New Order embraced the laissez faire capitalism of the West. This was made clear with the installation of Western trained technocrats -- the so called Berkeley Mafia -- in the Ministry of Finance. As Indonesia severed ties with China, substantial amounts of aid money began flowing from Japan, IMF, and the US, bolstering the new regime's ability to undertake political consolidation.

At the outset the New Order wasn't authoritarian. The period from 1966 to 1974 was one of political ferment and free expression of ideas (see Hatley 1994:222). This state of affairs did not so much reflect the government's openness as its weakness. As the government's ability to dispense patronage grew following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the New Order became increasingly patrimonial and exclusive in character (Mackie and MacIntyre 1994:12-14).

**The Pancasila Under the New Order**

In the aftermath of the 1965 mass killings the New Order introduced a number of changes to the Pancasila. Rather than reject the Pancasila, it turned it into a tool for
authoritarian rule instituting a new principle, "Pancasila Orthodoxy." Under Pancasila Orthodoxy atheism was no longer tolerated. Anyone who claimed to be an atheist was suspected of being a Communist and treated as an enemy of the state. This was enforced by means of identity cards that every Indonesian had to carry. Indonesia became a police state where people's movements were tightly controlled and where certain classes of people were subjected to harsh treatment.

The New Order's harsh authoritarian rule was combined with a heavy handed reliance on the Pancasila. This can be seen in the infamous P4 courses designed to indoctrinate the entire Indonesian population in the regime's understanding of the national ideology. The P4 indoctrination program was launched in 1978 in response to growing unrest and dissent in society. In the convoluted reasoning of Pancasila orthodoxy, differences of opinion were allowed but not the sharpening of opinion leading to dissension (Elson 2002:184). In reality Pancasila Orthodoxy was designed to curb critical thinking through the heavy handed imposition of bland axioms.

The imposition of Pancasila Orthodoxy on Indonesian society took another step with the asas tunggal (basic principal) promulgated in 1982. Under this law it became mandatory for all political organizations to adapt the Pancasila as their sole principle. The law provoked strong protests, especially from Muslim organizations (see Ramage

32 Pedoman, Penghayatan dan Pengalaman Pancasila, (Guide to the Full Comprehension and Practice of Pancasila).
33 There was an earlier precedent in the Guided Democracy era when Sukarno attempted to impose the Manipol/USDEK doctrine on Indonesian society. It was introduced to all levels of education and government (Ricklefs 1981:267). The press was obligated to propagate it as well. Some pro-Masyumi and pro-PSI papers refused to endorse it and were banned.
34 For example: "Pancasila is the source of all our ideas concerning what we think of as the right kind of society, which guarantees the tranquility of us all, which is able to bring material and spiritual prosperity to us all" (Elson 2002:185). Other similar statements by Suharto on the Pancasila can be found in Elson 2002:186 ff.
In 1985 it became mandatory for all organizations -- political, religious, or social -- to have the Pancasila as their ideological basis. The underlying motivation here was the curbing of any independence on the part of Muslim groups, especially NU.

Under the New Order, interparty competition also came under severe restrictions. Rather than resorting to an outright banning of political activity, the Suharto government hollowed out the political process by forcing the consolidation of political parties. In 1973 the various Islamic political parties: NU, Parmusi, PSII, and Perti, were merged into the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party) (see Emmerson 1976:236). Although PPP and PDI represented the Islamic and Christian groups respectively, all references to religion were dropped from their new names. Political activity at the village level was banned under the "floating mass" concept under which "floating" voters would be allowed to express their preferences every five years and in between would be apolitical, channeling their energies into economic development (see Crouch 1978:271-2). The exception to this was Golkar, the government's political party comprised mostly of civil servants.

Under the New Order's authoritarianism the state exerted a stifling influence on public discourse and political participation. During the 1970s, the Indonesian press popularized the acronym SARA: suku, agama, ras, antargolongan (ethnicity, religion, race, intergroup competition), as a means of describing social conflicts (see Emmerson 1976:224 ff.). However, it was later banned by the government. Schulte Nordholt notes that the outlawing of the concepts of ethnicity, religion, race, and class resulted in religion
and ethnicity turning into "discourses of violence" (Schulte Nordholt 2002:50; see Emmerson 1976:252).

Islam became a safe alternative to the heavily circumscribed political structure. With all other avenues of public expression cut off Islam became one of the few remaining ways of resisting the New Order's oppressive rule (Schwarz 1994:164). Muslims effectively protested a national sports lottery and government regulations on marriage. They were also able to muster government support for Islamic banking and *halal* (ritually pure) food labeling. In addition to being a safe means of expressing opposition to the government's authoritarianism, the few occasions of success fueled Muslims' awareness of their ability as a group to impose their social vision on the state.

In a complex society like Indonesia's, such a heavy-handed approach rather than reconciling differences forces them "under the carpet," where they fester. When the iron fist of authoritarian rule falters, these differences will return to the public space and be expressed violently. It also resulted in people becoming cynical and feeling *jenuh* (fed up) about the Pancasila (Ramage 1995:48).

**Religious Pluralism During the New Order**

Following the 1965 "coup" the religious situation in Indonesia became quite volatile. The anti-PKI pogrom emboldened many Muslims in their faith, but at the same time the Muslims' brutality resulted in a backlash among many of the Javanese. Under the Pancasila Orthodoxy of the New Order everyone now had to belong one of the five religions. Under government pressure to formally affiliate with a religion many nominal Muslims in East and Central Java converted to Christianity, 35 a smaller number chose

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35 An estimated 2.5 million Muslims converted to Christianity during the years 1965-1968 (Oey p. 192).
Hinduism\textsuperscript{36} or Buddhism, a fact that angered the Modernist Muslims (Ricklefs 1981:293; see Oey p. 186). Many also turned to \textit{kebatinan} ("inwardness", a name for the indigenous Javanese mysticism). Similar conversions took place among the Chinese, many of whom chose Christianity over Islam. These trends away from Islam seemed to have embittered many Muslims.\textsuperscript{37}

Interreligious conflicts broke out in 1967. Anti-Christian riots occurred in Aceh, Ujungpandang, Sumatra, and Java (Ricklefs 1981:294; Oey p. 197 ff.). The conflicts reflected a shift in the nature of Indonesia's religious pluralism: from religious communities living in different areas or ethnic groups to adherents of different religions living next to each other in cities or coexisting within similar ethnic groups or even families (Ricklefs 1981:294). It also stemmed from Muslim resentment at proselytizing activities and humanitarian aid programs by Christians.

The government responded by convening interreligious dialogue between Christian, Hindu, and Muslim leaders. In November 1967, an Inter-Religious Consultation was held in Jakarta chaired by the Minister of Religion, K.H.M. Dachlan. During the discussions the Muslims complained that the Christians were intent on wiping out Islam in Indonesia. The consultation did not resolve interreligious tensions and ended with Christians and Muslims unwilling to compromise (Boland 1982:234 ff.; Oey p. 203).

\textsuperscript{36} An estimated half a million people converted to Hinduism in 1966-1967 boosting the number of Hindus to 3 million (Oey p. 195).

\textsuperscript{37} Despite the Muslims' active support and participation in the anti-PKI pogrom, they found themselves marginalized. Assuming that as the majority theirs was the right to rule, the Muslims found themselves still on the sidelines.
Then in 1978 the Minister of Religion, General Alamsyah, issued two decisions in favor of Muslims. The first decision banned proselytization of those already having a religion and the second required government approval for receiving outside religious aid (see Oey p. 205). The decision was welcomed by Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist leaders and opposed by Catholics and Protestants. The government's decisions favoring the Muslims apparently stemmed from a number of factors: (1) Suharto's being unsettled by the Malari riots of 1974, (2) the unreliability of the "secular" factions within the government, and (3) the potential gains from placating the Muslim factions (see Oey p. 213-214).

However, the Ministry of Religion's decision did not necessarily signify a change in Suharto's heart. At the same time an ambitious national development program was being formulated within the CSIS (Centre for Strategic and International Studies) under the leadership of General Ali Murtopo. The alternative plan would have taken Indonesia into an even more radical form of secularism. The plan was based upon the assumption that Islamic values were impeding Indonesia's economic development and called for the purging of ABRI (the Indonesian military) of Islamic elements, the incorporation of the Ministry of Religion into the Ministry of Social Affairs, and the replacement of religious education with budi pekerti (character building) (see Oey p. 215 ff.).

**Suharto's Islamic Turn**

In the 1980s, Suharto made a shift towards Islam. After excluding Muslim groups for many years, Suharto began actively courting their support (Hefner 1993:1). Although Suharto's courting of the Muslims may have stemmed from a turn towards spirituality in
his old age, it was also a response to elite competition. Over the years, Suharto and the military had parted ways and his courting of Muslims enabled him to expand his power base beyond the military (Hefner 1999:49).38

In the late 1980s and early 1990s the Indonesian government founded an Islamic bank, expanded the authority of the religious courts, lifted the prohibition on the hijab (Islamic veil) in public schools, abolished the state-run sports lottery, increased the amount of Muslim programming on television, and increased funding for Muslim schools and mosques (Hefner 1999:50; Ramage 1995:86). In 1990 Suharto made the haj (pilgrimage) to Mecca sending a powerful message to the Muslim community in Indonesia. That same year he founded ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association) and banned the popular tabloid Monitor after it provoked a public outcry among Muslims (Ramage 1995:87 ff.).

Despite the many concessions made to Islamic activists the fact remains that Sukarno appointed B.J. Habibie, a trusted aide and technocrat, to head ICMI and not some independent Muslim leader.39 Moreover, Muslims who called for a more formalized link between the state and Islam were still excluded from the cabinet and from the parliament. The fact remains that even with Suharto's currying the support of Islamicists, the secular metanarrative remained intact. While ostensibly Islamic, the Indonesian state continued to exclude the Islamic nationalists from key positions.

38 Originally Suharto's power was rooted in the military. But over time Suharto's power based changed as close ties developed between business conglomerates and his circle of friends and family, and he became less dependent on the Army. The distance between Suharto and military grew as a younger generation of officers rose through ranks who were not as closely bound up with Suharto. Growing tensions between the two can be seen in the struggle over the office of the Vice President. The military succeeded in imposing General Try Sutrisno on Suharto in 1988 but in 1993 Suharto was successful in having B.J. Habibie, a civilian technocrat, nominated Vice President.

39 For example, Dawam Rahardjo or Emil Salim (Hefner 1999:51).
The Collapse of the New Order

The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 proved to be the deathblow to Suharto's New Order. The devaluation of the Rupiah to catastrophic levels -- from Rp 2,500 to the US$ to as low as Rp 17,000 to US$ -- forced the government to halt cooking oil and gasoline subsidies. With Suharto's normative legitimacy already in tatters from public anger at the rampant corruption among his family and friends, the brutality suffered under thirty plus years of military rule, and the lack of meaningful reforms, the government was vulnerable to any severe downturn in the economy. The Asian Financial Crisis brought to a screeching halt the New Order's performance legitimacy. Suharto was unable to maintain public order as crime and lynchings became rampant, anti-Chinese riots broke out across the nation, and widespread looting followed in the aftermath of the riots. Suharto's ouster was facilitated from without by massive student protests, calls for his resignation by the popular Islamic leader Amien Rais, as well as from within by military leaders fearful of losing everything from a popular uprising.

The New Order came to a close when Suharto announced his resignation on May 21, 1998 (see Saleh and Rocamora 2000:167 ff.; Liddle 1999:16 ff.). Despite Suharto's ouster Orde Reformasi (Reformation Order) does not mark a regime change for the Indonesian state. While political authority has undergone decentralization and fragmentation, two of the principal means for centralized rule remained intact: the Army and GOLKAR, the government party (see Mietzner 2001:33 ff.; Bourchier 2001:119 ff.; Shiraishi 1999:85). The overthrow of a dictatorship is usually accompanied by the
dismantling of the surveillance apparatus. This has not happened in Orde Reformasi.
Kopassus, the Indonesian army's Gestapo-like unit, remains intact (Liong 2002:204).

Although the New Order made heavy use of the Pancasila, its legitimacy was
basically a "performance legitimacy" resting primarily upon its economic development
programs and the promise of improved living standards (See Ricklefs 1981:284; Guinness
Donald Emmerson described this in the formula "organizational superiority + economic
growth = regime survival" (in Weatherbee 1985). So long as people's income kept rising,
the government subsidies kept flowing and conflicts kept to a minimum, the New Order
rule was intact.

The nature of the New Order's legitimacy made it vulnerable to fluctuations in the
international economy. In the early 1970s the jump in oil price enabled the New Order to
secure political support in the form of patronage and suppress the opposition. This also
meant that the New Order would be vulnerable to downturns in the international
economy. In 1984, the shortfall in oil revenues led to the devaluation of the Rupiah and
the imposition of an austerity budget. Later that year serious rioting involving hundreds
of Indonesians broke out in Jakarta's old port area, Tanjung Priok, resulting in the loss of
This time, however, the severity of the crisis was such that the New Order was unable to
survive.

40 The huge jump in the price oil in 1973 resulted in a huge increase in oil revenues. Where oil revenues
made up 30 percent of Indonesia's export income by 1974 it grew to 74 percent (Ricklefs 1981:300).
41 Although the Tanjung Priok riots stemmed from acute poverty, the preachers used Islamic rhetoric for
protesting the dire economic conditions (see Weatherbee 1985).
The New Order's legacy has been a mixed one. Economic development was accompanied by persistent economic poverty and rampant corruption. Political stability and inter communal peace were obtained in large part through coercion and brute force. The Pancasila with its high ideals became a despised propaganda tool used for suppressing open political discourse. A similar assessment has been made by William Liddle:

Thirty years of New Order development programs have made matters worse. They have undoubtedly brought greater prosperity to many, perhaps most, inhabitants. But they have also sharpened local ethnic, religious, and class cleavages, and created new antagonisms toward outsiders, without providing effective institutions through which aggrieved groups can press their claims (Liddle 1999:34).

Following the collapse of the New Order rule Indonesian society was wracked by communal violence and the breakdown of social order across the archipelago: anti-Christian violence in East Indonesia, anti-Chinese violence in West Java, vigilante justice and lynching of criminals, and the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement) anti-government insurgency.\(^{42}\)

One of the unfortunate consequences of the New Order's heavy reliance on the Pancasila as an instrument of repression has been the Pancasila being reduced to empty rhetoric.\(^{43}\) If true, then post-Suharto Indonesia suffers from "the loss of binding address."\(^{44}\) In this current situation the religious nationalists have the advantage in public discourse and those who oppose them lack a credible alternative. This lack of a clear

\(^{42}\)See Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.) *Roots of Violence in Indonesia: Contemporary Violence in Historical Perspective* (2002).

\(^{43}\)This was confirmed by Goenawan Mohammed in a Q & A session at the Korean Studies Center, University of Hawaii, April 9, 2003. Jennifer Leith recounts an incident in North Halmahera in which the notion of the banyan tree as the symbol of national unity was disregarded by the villager (Leith 1999:70).

\(^{44}\)This phrase was used by James Davidson Hunter in his *Evangelicalism: The Coming Generation* (1987).
alternative does not necessarily entail the collapse of the Indonesian government. The Pancasila remains the official metanarrative, and in all probability the Indonesian government will drift along and muddle through from day to day. But this makes the Indonesian government much more vulnerable to another crisis.

II. THEORY TESTING

How Indonesia Managed Religious Pluralism

The challenge of religious pluralism was a very real one for the Indonesian state. Indonesia addressed the challenge of religious pluralism by adopting the quasi-religious Pancasila with its secular metanarrative. With the Pancasila as the formal ideological framework, the Indonesian state was set up as an integralistic state that transcended religious and ethnic differences. The Indonesian state responded to these challenges through three principal means: (1) the Army's coercive powers, (2) the centralized national bureaucracy, and (3) the inclusive ideology of the Pancasila.

As much as Indonesia may have proclaimed the Pancasila's ideology of inclusive tolerance as the basis for its unity, it has been the Army and its coercive powers that have been the principal means for state-building. During the 1950s Indonesia faced a serious challenge across the vast archipelago from the various secessionist movements, Islamic and non-religious. The Army effectively unified the archipelago by brute force, quashing any attempts at secession. During the early 1960s Indonesia came close to anarchy as the Communists, the Muslims, and the Army fought for control of the Indonesian state. Despite Sukarno's echoing the Pancasila's inclusiveness in his peculiar doctrine of Nasakom, it was the Army that ended this political crisis in 1965 when it imposed
military rule and instituted the brutal anti-PKI pogrom. The military's takeover marked the culmination of a long-term trend that began at the time of Independence.

Under the New Order's military regime the Indonesian state-building project received new impetus. Indonesian society underwent an unprecedented degree of penetration by the state apparatus. One means was the Army's unique "territorial structure" that extended the military's presence down to the village level (Liong 2002:222; Robinson 2001:227). In 1979 the government passed a law (Undang-undang No. 5, 1979; Village Law of 1979) that organized all village administrative systems throughout Indonesia in accordance with the Javanese desa (village) system. The national government's presence was further enhanced through the expansion of transportation facilities, the communications satellite Palapa and the distribution of television sets to villagers.

The prominence of coercion in Indonesia's state-building project resulted in Indonesia's long-term trend towards authoritarian rule. Indonesia began as an open democracy which was then replaced with the semi-authoritarianism of Guided Democracy, and later the brutal military rule of the New Order. This had significant consequences for the competing nationalisms and Indonesian state-building project. The New Order's authoritarianism resulted in the suppression of open dissent and the instigation of a propaganda campaign. This resulted in the Pancasila becoming a discredited propaganda tool and impeded its achieving ideological hegemony. The suppression of open dissent meant that with normal political channels closed off dissent and opposition would be expressed through extralegal and violent means.
Religion and the Centralized State Apparatus

The principal means by which the Indonesian government sought to control the religious sphere has been through the centralized bureaucratic apparatus. It is here that we see Scott's approach to state-building as standardization and legibility being worked out in practice.

In the wake of the exclusion of the Jakarta Charter, the Ministry of Religion was established in order to secure Muslim support for the new state (Saifuddin Anshari 1979:36; Nieuwenhuijze 1958:236 ff.). The Ministry of Religion was ostensibly interreligious with its four sections: Muslim, Christian, Hindu, Buddhist. In reality, the Ministry was created for Muslims. Muslim dominance was ensured by the Minister being a Muslim. It was staffed primarily by non-aristocratic santri which made for some awkwardness within the priyayi dominated central government. The other religions for the most part ignored it and participated mostly to ensure that their interests were not threatened by the Muslims (Lev 1972:47 note 29).

As the Ministry of Religion grew in size and expanded its scope of influence, standardization and legibility were imposed on Islamic institutions. The imposition of uniformity came through the establishment of local Offices of Religious Affairs (Kantor Urusan Agama, or KUA). The traditional semi-hereditary office of the village naib (mosque official) was abolished and incorporated into the rational-legal bureaucracy of

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45 For an overview of the organizational structure of the Ministry of Religion see Geertz's The Religion of Java (1960:200 ff.), Deliar Noer's Administration of Islam in Indonesia (1978:8-23), and Nieuwenhuijze's Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia (1958:217 ff.).

46 The Ministry of Religion was the fourth largest nonmilitary department in the Indonesian government following the departments of Education, Police, and Interior (Lev 1972:52). The Ministry grew from nearly 17,000 in 1958 to more than 34,000 in 1963, and 100,000 in 1967 (Lev 1972:52; Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistik Indonesia 1964-1967 pp. 28-29). For a brief period of time in the early 1970s the Ministry of Religion was the largest government ministry (Hefner 1987:544).
the Ministry (Geertz 1960:207). This move deprived local families of their control of local religious offices paving the way for the standardization of religious practices (see Hefner 1987).

Standardization and legibility were also imposed on the Islamic courts. Local diversity in inheritance practices, under the influence of customary adat laws and Islamic schools, resulted in inheritance problems being solved in a "crazy quilt fashion" (Lev 1972:191). However, it should be noted that as the administration of Islamic law was strengthened with respect to marriage and inheritance laws, it was restricted to these two domains. In short, while significant gains were made through the Ministry of Religion, they fell short of the religious nationalists' goal of an Islamic state.

John Bowen's description of the New Order's centralization of Muslim worship in the Gayo Highlands provides another example of standardization. Where previously there were five mosques in the general area, by the 1980s two remained as mosques and the other three were downgraded to prayer houses without the right to hold Friday services. The new town mosque enjoyed the advantages of being located near the government offices and being run by a government-appointed committee. Furthermore, in an attempt to keep a lid on antigovernment rhetoric no sermons were allowed except at the new government mosque.

A similar pattern can be seen in the state's attempt to impose standardization and legibility in Hinduism in Bali. In addition to the formalization of religious dogma and liturgy, the government also founded the Parisada Hindu Dharma to register the priests
The Parisada Hindu Dharma later became a part of Golkar which gave further impetus to the government's penetration into the religious sphere of Bali.

In the early 1970s the New Order regime attempted to bring uniformity to Indonesia's marriage laws. The law would allow Muslim women to marry non-Muslims and allow for civil marriages (Mackie and MacIntyre 1994:31). The 1973 marriage reform law represents one of the most explicit attempts to impose a Western style secular metanarrative on Indonesian society. The proposal provoked strong Muslim opposition and a revised marriage law was passed that satisfied Muslims. In addition, marriage was confined to the five recognized religions. The outcome was the standardization of Indonesia's de facto secular metanarrative.

Another key aspect of the state-building project was the imposition of standardization and legibility through educational and language policies. Under the New Order, education became much more accessible. Mass education resulted in basic literacy skyrocketing from 40 percent to 90 percent (Hefner 1999:42). By the 1990s, 30 percent of Indonesia's population had obtained a high school education. Bahasa Indonesia became the de facto national language.

Standardization was imposed on Muslim religious education which was until then localized and uncoordinated. Hefner notes: "By the early 1970s, all elementary students were receiving the same mandatory religious instruction from state-certified teachers using state-published textbooks" (Hefner 1999:42). This standardization of religious

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47 In 1996 a couple in Surabaya married in accordance with Confucianism, but the government refused to recognize their marriage as valid. A similar instance took place in Jakarta where a Sundanese couple married in accordance with Sundanese customs and had their marriage rejected by the Civil Registration Office (Suryadinata no. 16 1998:18).
education had several consequences for the Muslim community. One, it displaced the traditional pesantren as the primary source of Islamic knowledge. Two, it disrupted the more personalized teacher-student relations that underlay traditional Islam. Three, the standardized curriculum enabled Muslims from various parts of the country to converse with each other. This in turn facilitated collective action among religious activists on an unprecedented scale contributing to the ongoing vitality of Islamic nationalism in Indonesia.

Although quite successful in its attempts to impose standardization and legibility in the religious sphere, Indonesia's state-building project had unintended consequences. The Ministry of Religion, by providing an administrative umbrella for Islam, forestalled the atrophying of Islamic religious administrative institutions (Lev 1972:45). The creation of a parallel Islamic court system marked a divergence from the general trend in other Muslim countries that sought to constrict the Islamic courts in favor of the secular courts (Lev 1972:58). Ironically or paradoxically, this proved contrary to the modern state-building project as it created an autonomous sphere for the Islamists to operate independently of the secularists in the central government. The standardization of the Islamic curriculum strengthened the mobilizational ability of the Islamic nationalists, enabling them to challenge the official metanarrative.

**Indonesia's State-Building Project**

Using a revised version of Lustick's three stage/two threshold model (incumbency, regime, ideological hegemony) we can trace the historical development and the effectiveness of Indonesia's state-building project. In the first stage, incumbency,
political conflict centers on defining the "rules of the game", e.g., the national metanarrative. Conflict in this stage is marked by violent opposition and extralegal challenges to the authority of state institutions; stakes are high and the regime's survival on the line. In the second stage, the regime-stage, conflict takes place within the accepted "rules of the game", i.e., within institutional contexts. In the third stage, ideological hegemony, open debate about the official metanarrative ceases. It has become part of the unquestioned, taken for granted reality.

The primary feature of the incumbency stage -- conflicts over the "rules of the game" -- can be seen in the heated debates in BPKI over the selection of the Pancasila as the national metanarrative. After Merdeka (Independence), Indonesia faced a number of serious challenges to the authority of state institutions: (1) the numerous secessionist movements that broke out across the archipelago during the 1950s and (2) the general breakdown in social order in the early 1960s. Indonesia's inability to cross the first threshold can be seen in the deadlocked Constituante debates which foundered on the intractable differences between the secular nationalists and the Islamic nationalists. Thus, under Sukarno's oratorical leadership the Indonesian state-building project remained stalled in the incumbency stage. It was not until coercion was applied on a massive scale that the Pancasila's standing as the national metanarrative was secured.

Indonesia crossed the first threshold to the regime stage in September 1965. The brutality of the New Order's anti-PKI pogrom resulted in a national trauma that extinguished political life in Indonesia. In Lustick's model this is the "point of no return", i.e., the creation of a new and irreversible political reality accepted by all, even the
opposition. Political life under the New Order ostensibly fits Lustick's regime stage, i.e., political conflict takes place within the accepted "rules of the game" and within established institutional contexts. However, it should be noted that the institutionalization of political conflict in the New Order was largely shaped by the New Order's corporatist approach to associational life and its heavy reliance on the Pancasila as a propaganda tool.

The third stage, ideological hegemony, is marked by the cessation of public debate about the official metanarrative and its becoming part of the unquestioned, taken for granted reality. On the surface it appears that the New Order did achieve ideological hegemony. Islamic nationalism became dormant in the 1970s during the height of New Order rule. There was a popular revival of Islamic piety in the 1980s, but that was mostly apolitical in nature (see Hefner 1993:8 ff.). However, ascertaining ideological hegemony is problematic for authoritarian states like Indonesia where the cessation of public debate may instead reflect the effectiveness of the state's surveillance apparatus in suppressing political dissent.

There are indications that the New Order's heavy handed attempts to impose the Pancasila on Indonesian society has backfired. While many Indonesians have been exposed to the Pancasila as a result of the government's relentless educational programs, they saw it as a propaganda tool of an authoritarian state.48 People have also complained about being "fed up" (jenuh) with the Pancasila. Another indicator of Indonesia's failure to achieve ideological hegemony during Suharto's tenure can be seen in the absence of a

48 The Pancasila has been mentioned so frequently by the government -- Pancasila press, Pancasila democracy, Pancasila economy etc. -- that jokes have been about there being "Pancasila football" (Ramage 1995:48).
vibrant civic culture. This can be seen in Patrick Guiness' description of public life in New Order Indonesia:

The state has not reached any kind of cultural hegemony despite the widespread recognition of Pancasila and Independence Day. Instead, countless expressions of local adat reaffirm the importance of ethnic identity and of the specific formulations of moral worth. These can be interpreted as resistance, a culture of opposition to the hegemony the state is attempting to impose (Guiness 1994:303).

The New Order's failure to achieve ideological hegemony can be seen in the Pancasila's inability to constrain popular violence once the New Order regime's coercive rule disappeared.

The failure of the Indonesian state-building project to achieve ideological hegemony can be seen in the persistence of Islamic nationalism. The Jakarta Charter has surfaced repeatedly, challenging the Pancasila's secular metanarrative. It surfaced during the Preparatory Committee's deliberations just prior to Independence, during the Constituent Assembly debates in the 1950s, during the 1980s directly under the guise of Islamizing society, and more directly in 2001. The November 2001 issue of Tempo magazine was titled "Siapa Mau Syariat Islam?" (Who Wants Shariah Islam?) and on the front cover was a picture of people carrying a banner "Berlakukan Piagam Jakarta" (Put in Effect the Jakarta Charter). The repeated attempts by the Islamists to reinstate the Jakarta Charter is a strong indication of Indonesia's failure to cross the second threshold to the third stage of ideological hegemony.

Despite the critical assessment of Indonesia's state-building project, it must be noted that the Pancasila has functioned quite well as Indonesia's national metanarrative. The Pancasila's effectiveness can be seen in the fact that for over fifty years Indonesia has
been organized as a secular nation-state. Islamic activists have been excluded from key positions throughout the Sukarno and Suharto regimes, and the Jakarta Charter excluded from the Indonesian constitution. In addition to its longevity (over fifty years), the Pancasila's effectiveness can be seen in its being accepted by a succession of presidents who succeeded Suharto.\footnote{The same can also be said about the presidents following Suharto: Habibie (a technocrat and ally of Suharto), Abdurrahman Wahid (head of NU), and Megawati Sukarnoputri (daughter of Sukarno).} Even after the Pancasila fell into disrepute, there has yet to emerge an alternative metanarrative for post-Suharto Indonesia.\footnote{Unlike the whole scale repudiation of the Communist metanarrative that followed the collapse of the Soviet regime, no similar renunciation of the Pancasila took place in post-Suharto Indonesia.} While Islamicists asserted their demands for the Jakarta Charter, many Indonesians are unequivocal in their rejection of Islamic nationalism. Despite the widespread cynicism towards the Pancasila, many Indonesians are unable to conceive of another alternative. In that sense then, the Pancasila has achieved the status of ideological hegemony by default.

In conclusion, the Indonesian state-building project never quite crossed the second threshold to ideological hegemony. The continuing rivalry between secular and Islamic nationalists -- from 1945 till now -- points to a major political fault line running through post-colonial Indonesia. What is striking about the Indonesian state-building project is the prominent role of coercion. Indonesia made the transition from the incumbency stage to the regime stage of state-building primarily through the military's suppression of the opposition. Yet this reliance on coercion also prevents Indonesia from crossing the second threshold to achieve ideological hegemony. Although much attention has been given to the Pancasila's stress on tolerance and pluralism, the Pancasila's actual function probably lay with its providing an ideological cover for an integralistic state that sought to
penetrate and dominate Indonesian society. The outbreaks of interreligious and interethnic violence accompanying the collapse of the New Order regime point to the incomplete nature of the state-building project and Indonesia as a weak state.

**Assessing the Competing Nationalisms Thesis**

Indonesia both confirms and challenges the competing nationalisms thesis. It confirms it in that Indonesian politics has been shaped by the rivalry among various nationalisms. The rivalry between the Pancasila's secular nationalism and Islamic nationalism began during the closing days of the Japanese Occupation shortly before Indonesia declared its independence and would recur repeatedly over the next five decades. Indonesia also confirms the competing nationalisms thesis with its attempts to impose standardization and legibility. In fifty years time, the Indonesian state successfully quashed numerous secessionist movements, imposed a centralized administrative structure that penetrated down to the village level, made bahasa Indonesia the de facto national language, vastly expanded Indonesia's educational system, and indoctrinated large numbers of Indonesians in the tenets of Pancasila Orthodoxy.

The persistence of religious nationalism in Indonesia is significant for theories of political development. Conventional models would predict that Islamic nationalism would diminish under the impact of the New Order's ambitious development programs. But this has not been the case. Instead of a uniform political culture, what we find in the case of Indonesia is a fractured polity. The recurring demands for the Jakarta Charter from Merdeka till now, the resurgence of popular Islamic piety in the 1980s, and Suharto's Islamic turn taken together present a serious challenge to the secularization
thesis. It also challenges the secular bias underlying Gellner and Anderson's theories of
the nationalism.

Anderson's secular bias arises from his argument that with the rise of print
capitalism the great sacral cultures and their sacred texts were superseded by the modern
nation and vernacular texts. Anderson was right in his observation that the
"unselfconscious coherence" of religiously imagined communities (1983:16) declined
after the Middle Ages but what he did not anticipate was the rise of self-conscious
religiously imagined communities. Moreover, Anderson failed to anticipate the
revitalizing influence of modernity on religion. In premodern societies sacred languages
were confined to elite groups of literate scholars (1983:15). However, the rise of
Modernist Islam and the promulgation public education has made possible widespread
religious literacy where previously not possible. Sacred texts are no longer confined to a
religious caste bound by traditional scholarly apparatus but are now open to educated laity
who use these texts as ideological basis for modern collective action. Thus, print
capitalism played a major role in spurring religious nationalism in modernizing Third
World nations.

Gellner's secular bias arises from his argument that nationalism involves the
passing of agro-literate societies and the emergence of the universalized high culture of
the modern nation-state. The passing of stratified agro-literate societies requires that the
"wells of truth" be transferred from the clerical caste into "public, neutral control"
However, there are a number of problematic aspects to Gellner's model. One is historical; Gellner overlooked the role played by the modern university and the Enlightenment Project in the secularization of Western society. Secularization was not so much the result of the diffusion of religious knowledge into the public domain as its displacement by a new clergy, the modern university and the secular professoriat. The initial transition to modernity required the presence of a secular high culture but it is not necessarily the case after the initial transition has been achieved. The fact that large numbers of Third World societies have achieved economic development in the absence of a secular high culture refutes this particular aspect of Gellner's theory.

Another problem is Gellner's failure to give adequate attention to the fact that the modern nation-state requires "cognitive centralization" just as much as the agro-literate society (1983:8). Modern nations' need for "cognitive centralization" underlie the critical role of the metanarrative for the state-building project. Gellner perceptively touches upon the state's "monopoly on legitimate education." However, he focuses on modern education's role in creating a fungible labor population for the modern economy overlooking its importance for the modern state (see 1983:34-35). Also Gellner overlooked the fact that attempts by modern states to bring about cognitive centralization often met with stiff resistance from religious nationalists who insisted that the basis for cognitive centralization be indigenous/religious cultural traditions rather than exogenous/Western ones.

51 See Conrad Cherry's Hurrying Toward Zion (1995:130) for a description of how the American religious clergy underwent marginalization in the face of the country's rush to modernize.
Indonesia's fractured polity implies a state vulnerable to legitimation crises, which in turn implies a state much more reliant on coercion and performance legitimacy. Coercion is needed by the Indonesian state not only to maintain its right to rule but also to safeguard the economic performance that underlies its rule. While the social unrest and attempts at secession arising from competing nationalisms may hinder the pace of Indonesia's economic development, they do not necessarily jeopardize this process. So long as the Pancasila remains in place as a regime feature, we can expect Indonesia to remain part of the global capitalist economy and Western capital to flow into Indonesia's economy.

Indonesia's competing nationalisms also challenge Scott's model of modernization as standardization. While the New Order's development programs did succeed in imposing standardization and legibility on Indonesian society, they also had the unintended consequence of strengthening Islamic nationalism. Through its educational program and centralized religious bureaucracy, the New Order regime provided Islamic nationalists with resources for coordinated action. It also made for the emergence of more legible and uniform expressions of Islamic nationalism -- enhancing its capacity to serve as a rival metanarrative. In other words, while standardization and legibility advanced state-building in Indonesia, it also created conditions that undermined state rule.

The secular bias underlying theories of nationalism stems from a unilinear understanding of modernization that overlooks the dialectical aspects of nation-building. The competing nationalisms thesis takes this into account by appropriating van der Veer's argument that the homogenizing process of nation-building generates at the same time
counter forces, i.e., rival nationalisms (Van der Veer 1994:105). Religious nationalism does not necessarily stand apart from the high culture of modernity, but may even feed off it and as it does so, it contests the claims of the secular state. Religious nationalism has persisted in Indonesian politics because it is not so much a throwback to the premodern past as an alternative form of modernity.

Bassam Tibi notes that in the post World War II era it was the institutional structures of modernity that were globalized, however "cultural modernity" remained distinctly European and confined to its European heartland (1998:65). This suggests that while Indonesia's state-building project had some success in imposing the institutional structures of modernity on Indonesian society, it was less successful in imposing the cultural modernity of the West. Moreover, it is doubtful that its political elite ever intended to do so. The Pancasila is rooted in Javanese cultural values. Cultural modernity -- with its secular outlook -- remained alien and exotic to many Indonesians.

Indonesia's competing nationalisms can be seen as a continuation of Geertz's three fold aliran, especially between the abangan and santri. The fractured nature of Indonesia's modern polity has deep roots in the complexity and diversity underlying the vast sprawling archipelago. It also reflects the region's long history of partial-assimilation and syncretism in the face of waves of external influences of which Western cultural modernity represents just the latest wave.

For comparativists the scarcity of a uniform political culture among Third World countries suggests limits on the universality of the nation-state model. For comparativists this points to the Eurocentric bias underlying theories of nationalism and the need to
construct theories of development more appropriate to Third World societies. At the same time it should be noted that the notion "Third World" reflects a particular time period -- the post World War II Cold War politics -- and may constrain comparativists from taking into account the more recent phenomenon of globalization. The limits of the nation-state model are becoming increasingly evident in the face of recent trends like global capitalism, the globalization of crime, and the rise of international terror networks (see Castells 1997:244 ff.). Additionally, there is the emergence of political Islam as a transregional identity that rivals the nation-based identity project.

The Indonesian case study also challenges the competing nationalisms thesis. The competing nationalisms thesis predicts that nation-formation would take place in the context of the state-building project. That is what has happened. But surprisingly, much of Indonesia's unity was achieved through coercion, rather than through the Pancasila's ideology of inclusive tolerance. To put it another way, the command-obedience dimension of the Indonesian state-building project was much more prominent than the discursive dimension. This finding challenges recent works that have sought to give the Pancasila a key role in Indonesian politics (see Ramage 1995:184 ff.; Morfit 1986). In the long term, Indonesian politics will continue to be influenced by competing nationalisms. 53 Unless there is a radical break in the historical pattern, we can expect that it will be the Indonesian state's coercive powers, not discursive formation, that will continue to unify Indonesia as a nation-state.

53 See Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk's *Indonesia's transformation and the stability of Southeast Asia* (2001) for a discussion of the secessionist and regional movements currently challenging the Jakarta based national government.
We can also expect that Indonesian politics will continue to be framed by the Pancasila. This reflects the fact that the Pancasila is a fundamental regime feature of post-colonial Indonesia. While the overthrow of the Pancasila by the Islamic metanarrative is possible, it is highly unlikely. For this to happen, the Indonesian state would have to encounter a catastrophe of such magnitude that cripples its ability to maintain order. Tsarist Russia faced this kind of a crisis at the end of World War I (see Skocpol 1979:110). Or, the modernizing state may attack popular culture, undermining its claim to legitimacy; for example, the Pahlavi Shah's attempt to replace the traditional Islamic calendar (see Castells 1997:17 ff.).

In conclusion, the competing nationalisms thesis and the Indonesian case study have much to offer -- theoretically and substantively -- to the discipline of comparative politics. The competing nationalisms thesis by taking seriously religion as a political variable expands the research agenda for comparative politics. In addition, the competing nationalisms thesis strengthens state theory by highlighting the discursive aspects of state-building. Lastly, in light of the growing prominence of political Islam Indonesia cannot be ignored. This is partly due to its being the largest Muslim country in the world and also because its Southeast Asian variant of Islam offers a useful contrast to the Middle Eastern heartland.
CHAPTER 6
COMPETING NATIONALISMS AND STATE-BUILDING
IN POST-COLONIAL MALAYSIA

As a case study, this chapter has three parts: (1) a historical narrative of Malaysia's political development, (2) testing the competing nationalisms thesis, and (3) the findings and implications derived from this case study. The post-colonial state-building project will be used as the primary framework for describing Malaysian politics. For this case study attention will be given to the way the official metanarrative guided Malaysian politics and structured state-society in post-colonial Malaysia.

I. HISTORICAL NARRATIVE

The Selection of the Official Metanarrative

One legacy of British colonialism -- a society divided by ethnic, linguistic, and religious differences -- has left a deep imprint on Malaysian society and posed a major challenge to the Malaysian state-building project. Malaysia has responded to this challenge by selecting the ethnic metanarrative as the principal means of defining and

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1 The term "Malaysia" refers primarily to peninsular or Western Malaysia. Much of the literature on Malaysian politics focuses attention on peninsular Malaysia. This reflects the dominant role that peninsular Malaysia plays with respect to politics, demographics, and economic affairs in comparison to East Malaysia, i.e., the provinces of Sarawak and Sabah on the island of Borneo. Additionally, the term "Malaya" refers to the former British colony, and "Malaysia" to present day nation-state. In light of the above the focus of this chapter will be mostly on peninsular Malaysia.

2 British rule in Malaya led to a social and economic bifurcation of Malaya (see Charles Hirschman's article "The Making of Race in Colonial Malaya" (1986)). Under the Pangkor Engagement the British instituted a form of indirect rule which kept intact traditional Malay political institutions. Industrial capitalism was established in the tin mines and rubber plantations, and foreign laborers imported from China and India to work there. Thus, much of Malaysia's ethnic/religious pluralism has its roots in British colonialism.

The Malays' isolation was in part due to British policy. Besides protecting the interests of the Malay elite, the Malay Reservation Enactment of 1913 which prohibited the sale of certain kinds of land to non-Malay, also discouraged Malay peasants from migrating to the cities. This in turn kept urbanization to a minimum among Malays (Verma 2002:48, note 30). This resulted in an urban, diverse, and cosmopolitan Malaya exposed to modern capitalism and populated by non-Malays, and in a more provincial rural Malaya sheltered from the influence of modern capitalism.
organizing the post-colonial polity. The history of post-colonial Malaysia shows the tensions among the three competing nationalisms: ethnic, religious, and secular.

The selection of Malaysia's official metanarrative, i.e., its constitution, was an especially contentious affair. The controversy stemmed from two competing metanarratives, secular vs. ethnic. The British sought to impose the secular metanarrative through the Malayan Union, which called for a unitary state with citizenship made available to all ethnic groups. To the surprise of the British authorities, the normally quiescent Malays rose up in massive protests against the proposal (see Andaya and Andaya 1982:254 ff.). In the face of Malay protests the British were forced to revoke the Malayan Union.

Malays felt threatened by the Malayan Union proposal to grant equal citizenship status to the Chinese and Indians (Stockwell vol. I 1995:200). They were already at a disadvantage economically with the Chinese. With their slim demographic majority, Malays feared that giving the franchise to non-Malays would result in their being dominated by non-Malays in the political arena as well (Stockwell vol. III 1995:350 ff.).

In the second effort to produce a constitution, Malays were well represented on the Working Committee (Von Vorys 1975:72). They succeeded in negotiating the

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3 Malaysia, unlike nearby Indonesia, did not go through a violent anticolonial struggle to gain independence. The peaceful handover meant that the British colonial authorities had a bigger say as to the nature and shape of the successor regime. The Colonial Office Secretary, Lytton, warned that Malaya would not be granted independence until the various races showed they could live and work together in harmony (Funston 1980:138).

4 The Malay opposition was further bolstered by the opposition of former colonial administrators who sided with their former colleagues.

5 The Committee was comprised of 11 members: 5 British officials and 6 Malays representing UMNO and the Sultans. The Chinese and the Indian communities were for the most part uninvolved due to their interests lying elsewhere. The Indians were preoccupied with the independence struggle in India, while the Chinese were preoccupied by internal conflicts and the Communist insurgency that broke out in 1946. The fact that the Malayan Communist Party was predominantly Chinese resulted in a reversal in their relations with the British. Now the Malays were favored by the British and the Chinese viewed with suspicion.

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Merdeka (Freedom) Constitution with ethnic (Malay) nationalism as the official metanarrative. The Committee produced a document that called for: (1) a strong central government, (2) citizenship available to Malays and non-Malays tempered by restrictive naturalization requirements, (3) Islam as the religion of the state, and (4) preferential treatment for Malays in the political system. The civil administration would be predominantly Malay and eighteen of the thirty-four seats in the Legislative Council would be held by Malays (see Stockwell vol. III 1995:307 ff.; see Von Vorys 1975:77 ff.). In addition, the proposed constitution defined a Malay as one who habitually spoke the Malay language, professed the Muslim religion, and conformed to Malay customs.6

Religious nationalism was not a major factor in the selection of the official metanarrative. During the 1940s, a number of militant Muslim cults (Sufi tarekats) became so influential that they began to pose a serious threat to the traditional Malay leadership (see Stockwell 1979:146 ff.). However, in the face of the threat posed by the Malayan Union -- and later the Communist insurgency -- religious leaders joined forces with UMNO, heading off a potential schism within the Malay community (see Ackerman and Lee 1988:36 ff.; Stockwell 1979:160).

The Legislative Assembly of the Federation of Malaya overwhelmingly approved the recommendations of the Constitution Commission (revised by the Alliance dominated

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6 One consequence of the Malays reaction to the Malayan Union proposal was the construction of a unified and homogenized entity known as the "Malays." Although Malaysia's Constitution officially defines who the Malays are, Malay identity is far from a simple matter. A certain amount of ambiguity surrounds Malay identity. The Malay bangsa (race) contains a number of related subgroups: Javanese, Boyanese, Minangkabau, Bugis, and Rawanese (see Nagata 1984:193; see also Hirschman 1987). Another issue is the fact that the term bumiputra "sons of the soil" which applies to the Malays in West Malaysia is also applied to non-Muslim indigenous groups in East Malaysia: Iban, Murut, Kadazan, Melanau, Bajau etc.
London agreed to the changes and the Federation of Malaya received its independence on August 31, 1957.

**Malaysia's Official Metanarrative**

Malaysia's Federal Constitution's ethnic metanarrative can be seen in two crucial traits: (1) the privileging of a core ethnie -- the Malays -- over others and (2) the privileging of the religion of the core ethnie in the public sphere. Article 3 describes Islam as the religion of the Federation and Article 153 talks about the "special position of the Malays and natives of any of the other States of Sabah and Sarawak" being safeguarded. Another indication of the ethnic metanarrative can be found in Article 152, which describes the Malay language to be the national language. The two indicators of the ethnic metanarrative -- Islam as the state religion and the special position of Malays -- can also be found in the constitutions of the respective states (See the *Constitutions of the States of Malaysia* (1991) for respective states' constitution). The ethnic metanarrative is further reinforced by Article 159, which requires the consent of the Conference of Rulers

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7 Sheridan and Groves in *The Malaysian Constitution* (1979) note that the protective discrimination in Article 153 was patterned after the Indian constitution. (1979:385). Unlike India's constitution which was designed to protect minority groups, Malaysia's was designed to protect the largest group, the Malays.

8 Islam as the "Religion of the State" and the provision of religious freedom for non-Muslims can be found in Johore (Part I Article 57), Kedah (Part I Article 33A), Kelantan (Article 5), Negeri Sembilan (Part I Chapter 2), Pahang (Part I Article 23), Perak (Part I Article 5), Sabah (Part I Article 5A), Selangor (Part II Article 47), and Trengganu (Part I Article 3). Exceptions are Malacca (Part I Chapter 2), Penang (Part I Article 5), and Sarawak (Part I Article 4A) which only states that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall be the Head of the Muslim religion. Perlis' Constitution makes no provision for Islam as the official religion. The closest language that can be found is the requirement that the Menteri Besar (Prime Minister) be a Malay and a Muslim (Part III Article 35(2).

The "Special Status" reserved for Malays can be found in Johore (Part III Article 1), Kelantan (Part I Article 27B), Negeri Sembilan (Part II Article 75), Pahang (Part II Article 47), Perak (Part I Article 27B), Perlis (Part III Article 70), Selangor (Part II Article 91), and Trengganu (Part I Article 25B). Exceptions are Negeri Sembilan, Penang, Sabah, which lacks these specific provisions for the Malays. Sarawak's Constitution (Part V Article 39) makes reservation for the Natives of that state.
for constitutional amendments affecting Malays. This, in effect, shields the Constitution from revision by a non-Malay majority.9

Because of the British influence, Malaysia's Constitution contains both ethnic and secular metanarratives. Part II "Fundamental Liberties" and Part III "Citizenship" by themselves describe a liberal political regime where individual liberties are guaranteed by the state. However, the actual result was the ethnic metanarrative being superimposed on the secular metanarrative.

While Islam is the state religion, the Malaysian constitution also upholds the right of any citizens -- Malay and non-Malay -- to practice their religion. However, it also has the proviso -- Article 11(4) -- that prohibits the proselytizing of Muslims, i.e., Malays.10 Although non-Muslims are at a disadvantage, the underlying intent of the legal system is defensive. It is designed to protect the 'unique' status of the Malays, rather than to impose the Islamic shariah (Divine Law) on Malaysian public sphere.

Despite its open recognition of Islam, Malaysia is not a theocracy. This conclusion is based upon the following facts: (1) the Muslim ulama (religious authorities) do not control the policy making process, (2) Malaysia has two legal systems, Muslim and Western, and (3) the freedom of non-Malays to practice their religion is safeguarded by the Constitution. This is also clear from Tunku Abdul Rahman's (Malaysia's first Prime Minister) statement:

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9 Y.A.M. Raja Azlan Shah wrote that this was due to the Malays' fears of a non-Malay majority taking over the Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives) (1986:88).

10 Article 11:4: Any person, whether or not he professes the Muslim religion, who propagates any religious doctrine or belief, other than the religious doctrine or belief of the Muslim religion among persons professing the Muslim religion shall be guilty of an offence cognizable by a civil court and punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or fine exceeding $3000 sections 15(2) (see Awang 1998:158).
I would like to make it clear that this country is not an Islamic State as it is generally understood; we merely provide that Islam shall be the official religion of the State (in Hussin 1990:35).

Malaysia's ethnic metanarrative can also be seen in its omissions. One is the absence of any definition of an Islamic state. Another is Malaysia's Constitution being the Supreme law of the land without reference to Islamic law (Ahmad 1978:65).

From a comparative standpoint, Malaysia's making Islam the religion of the state is not at all unusual -- fifteen other countries at the time had similar provisions in their constitutions. The intent behind this is primarily ceremonial, i.e., official occasions would be celebrated in an Islamic fashion (Awang 1998:157; Sheridan and Groves 1979:37; Ahmad 1978:49).

**Imposing the Official Metanarrative on Society**

In the 1960s, the ethnic metanarrative was imposed through two principal means: (1) consociational democracy and the Alliance, and (2) the incorporation of Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak.

Malaysia's distinctive consociational democracy was the result of the two metanarratives embedded in its constitution. The multi-party Alliance combined liberal democracy with communal politics through the collaboration of three communal parties: UMNO (United Malays National Organization), the MCA (Malayan Chinese Alliance), and the MIC (Malayan Indian Congress), representing the three major ethnic groups.

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11 This observation was made by Justice Abdul Hamid (from Pakistan) during the time he served on the Reid Commission -- formed in 1953 for the purpose of framing a constitution for independent Malaya (in Ahmad 1978:48-49). More recently, Robert J. Barro notes that of the thirty-four countries outside sub-Saharan Africa with high Muslim populations (greater than 70%) two of them (Turkey and Syria) have no state religion.

12 Also known as "elite accommodation system" (Means 1991:2). A fair amount literature exists on consociationalism (see Means 1991:16 note 2; see also Lijphart 1977; Horowitz 1985:569 ff.).
UMNO's leading role in the multiracial alliance proved to be key to the implementing of the official metanarrative.\textsuperscript{13}

Malaysia's consociational democracy worked on two levels: vertical mobilization within the respective ethnic communities, and horizontal solidarity among the leaders of the respective ethnic communities (Von Vorys 1975:143 ff.). The Alliance depended on its members not only supporting their respective ethnic parties, but also supporting candidates belonging to other Alliance parties to ensure the Alliance's majority in the Parliament. It also rested upon an informal, behind-closed-doors partnership among the leaders of the various parties (Von Vorys 1975:164, 252), including certain informal understandings such as UMNO's willingness to concede 29 percent of the seats in the parliament to the MCA.

With the formation of the Alliance, a political vehicle emerged in which the various communal groups could present their demands and negotiate compromises and concessions. By 1959, UMNO yielded to MCA's demand for Malaysian citizenship based upon the principle of \textit{jus soli} in return for MCA's agreement to a common educational curriculum and \textit{bahasa Melayu} (the Malaysian language) as the required language of instruction (Andaya and Andaya 1982:269). Other important concessions were made in the areas of the state apparatus and government regulation of the economic sector. MCA and MIC also accepted as the status quo the existing four-to-one ratio of Malays to non-Malays in the Malayan Civil Service. In return for these concessions,\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{13}The Alliance has been described as a "freak of history" (Vasil 1971:10). It originated not out of a deliberate strategy but rather as a result of an improvised tactic on the local level. The UMNO and MCA's local branches in the Kuala Lumpur banded together in an effort to defeat the noncommunal Independence of Malaya Party.
UMNO assured the other two parties of its commitment to liberal economic policies that would allow non-Malays to pursue economic activities without fear of government confiscation or discriminatory taxation (Andaya and Andaya 1982:269).

At the outset, the Alliance functioned well but weaknesses soon became evident. The Alliance's two-fold mobilization structure contained some built-in contradictions. The most problematic was the fact that MCA's solidarity with UMNO (horizontal solidarity) often led to its rank and file members being disappointed (undermining vertical mobilization) (see Milne and Mauzy 1999:93). This structural flaw would become manifest in the 1969 elections.

The second means by which Malaysia sought to implement the official metanarrative was through expansion. In September 1963, the Federation of Malaya expanded -- incorporating Sabah and Sarawak in Borneo and the city-state of Singapore -- becoming the Federation of Malaysia. The underlying advantage of the expansion was demographic. The inclusion of the heavily non-Chinese Sabah and Sarawak augmented the electoral strength of the Malays. Singapore, with its economic vitality providing an expanded revenue base, proved to be a plus for the federation. The threat of its predominantly Chinese population was offset by its representation in the Parliament being limited to fifteen seats (Von Vorys 1975:153).

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14See Milne and Ratnam's *Malaysia -- New States in a New Nation: Political Development of Sarawak and Sabah in Malaysia* (1974) for a detailed discussion of the incorporation of East Malaysia.

15Where peninsular Malaysia population comprised ten million in 1967, Sarawak had 900,000 and Sabah 600,000. Sarawak's pluralism consisted of Malay 18%, Melanau 6%, Iban (Sea Dayak) 29%, Land Dayak 8%, Chinese 33%. Sabah's pluralism consisted of Kadazans (Dusun) 30%, Muruts 4%, Bajaus 12%, Chinese 22%, Other Indigenous 18%, and Others 14% (Milne and Ratnam 1974:5). Although the inhabitants of the two provinces were not Muslims, they were racially Malay and for that reason counted as Malays regardless of the religious requirement in the Malaysian constitution.
The incorporation of the three provinces was complicated by Malaysia's ethnic metanarrative. Extensive negotiations yielded concessions that allowed a certain amount of autonomy in the areas of economics, education, and religion. Singapore would be granted autonomy with respect to education and labor policies. The two Borneo states of Sarawak and Sabah were given significant concessions: (1) control over immigration from the other states, (2) the continuation of English as the medium of instruction and as the official language for the state governments, (3) special privileges similar to those enjoyed by the Malays granted to the indigenous peoples, and (4) the freedom to propagate other religions (Andaya and Andaya 1982:272).

Once inside Malaysia, Singapore along with the Singapore-based PAP (People's Action Party led by Lee Kuan Yew) found itself chafing under Malaysia's ethnic metanarrative and the consociational arrangement. During the 1964 election the PAP used the theme of a "Malaysian Malaysia" to challenge the UMNO-dominated Alliance. This led to Singapore's secession from Malaysia later that year (Andaya and Andaya 1964:276).

The official metanarrative was imposed in East Malaysia through two approaches: (1) making Islam the paramount religion and (2) maintaining the dominance of the Barisan Nasional (National Front) in the state legislature. Despite earlier agreements, the process was not always a smooth one. In 1973, the national government revoked an earlier agreement and made Islam Sabah's official religion (Means 1991:155). It also

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16 However, in the mid 1990s the national government made Islam the official religion for Sabah (Suhaini Anzam 1995:54-55; Means 1991:155).

17 Eventually the two states of Sabah and Sarawak did accept bahasa Melayu as the sole official language: Sabah in 1973 and Sarawak in 1980.
curtailed the efforts of Catholic missionaries and supported the efforts of Muslim missionaries, creating resentments among the Catholic Kadazans. In the 1985 elections Berjaya (Bersatu Rakyat Jelata Sabah, Sabah United People's Party) lost to PBS, the multiracial Parti Bersatu Sabah (Sabah United Party) which was dominated by Christian Kadazans. Rather than accept the new situation, the political elite used a number of means to recapture the state legislature: threatening to withhold money for development projects, wooing Chinese supporters of PBS, boosting the Muslim population through the importation of Indonesians and Filipinos, raising the specter of Christian violence against Muslims by evoking the interethnic strife in former Yugoslavia, heavy handed measures like detaining PBS leaders under the auspices of the Internal Security Act, and even the manipulation of the stock market (see Means 1991:153 ff.; Gomez and Jomo 1997:130 ff.; Suhaini Aznam 1995:54-55). Although the PBS narrowly won the 1994 elections, that victory was short-lived when a number of supporters defected to the Barisan Nasional. Sabah was instructive as an example of the extent to which Malaysia's political elite would go to maintain the official metanarrative, even in the outlying provinces.

In nearby Sarawak the Barisan Nasional was able to maintain its hold on the state legislature despite Dayak resentments against the government's interior land policies and its distribution of timber concessions. Sarawak's political environment was much like Sabah, but differences in political alignments enabled the Barisan Nasional parties to

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18 Muslims in East Malaysia did not have a demographic advantage like that on peninsular Malaysia. Sabah's population was 40% Muslims with a nearly equal percentage being indigenous Christians, and 20% being Chinese (Gomez and Jomo 1997:130).
19 The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange was often used for raising capital among the bumiputras and for raising capital to fund electoral campaigns (Gomez and Jomo 1997:134).
maintain their hold on power despite the presence of economic resentment and attempts by opposition parties to mobilize ethnic and religious differences.

The 1969 Election Riots

The results of the May 1969 Elections shook the foundations of consociationalism in Malaysia, precipitating a regime crisis. In the face of competition from the more radical Malay and Chinese parties, the Alliance lost many votes and ended up with a much reduced majority in the Parliament\(^{20}\) (see Means 1991:4 ff.). The election results cheered some Chinese and alarmed Malays, heightening interethnic tensions between the two groups. Riots broke out between Malays and Chinese resulting in heavy losses of life and property, especially among Chinese.\(^{21}\)

The May 1969 election riots mark the first major political crisis for Malaysia. This was not the first occasion of intercommunal violence.\(^{22}\) However, the riots destroyed the facade of intercommunal harmony that formed the basis for post-colonial Malaysia and posed the threat of intercommunal warfare that would rip apart the fragile tapestry of Malaysia's plural society and disrupt its economy. Martial law was declared and parliamentary proceedings suspended. The government came under the Malay dominated National Operations Council. Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman resigned and was replaced by his more militant deputy, Tun Abdul Razak.

\(^{20}\)Although the Alliance still held the majority in the Parliament, it no longer possessed the two-thirds majority needed for amending the national constitution.

\(^{21}\)As many as eight hundred lives were lost and six thousand homes destroyed. Official estimates are one hundred ninety six killed and four hundred thirty nine wounded (Funston 1980:208).

\(^{22}\)Following the Japanese surrender the predominantly Chinese MPAJA (Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army) carried out reprisals against Malay police and other collaborators (see von Vorys 1975:61 ff.). In an eight month period six hundred people were killed and thousands made homeless. In 1967 a group of Chinese in Penang protested currency exchange measures that the government considered to be routine as discriminatory. This protest triggered three days of bloody violence between Chinese and Malays (Esman 1994:31).
State Response to Regime Crisis

The May 1969 crisis brought to an end the consociational arrangement that framed Malaysia's plural society. Non-Malays lost their status as equal partners with the Malays. MCA and the MIC leaders continued to represent their respective groups and hold office, but they were no longer allowed to hold senior ministerial portfolios. Where previously Malaysia's government maintained a neutral stance towards the three major communal groups, after 1970 it became a "monoethnic state" which closely identified with the Malays (Verma 2002:208).

Following the 1969 riots, the Alliance was replaced with the Barisan Nasional in 1974. Under this new arrangement the Alliance's three party coalition was broadened to include opposition parties like the multi-ethnic but predominantly Chinese DAP (Democratic Action Party), the noncommunal Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People's Movement), the Perak based Chinese/Indian PPP (People's Progressive Party), and the Islamic PAS (Pan-Malayan Islamic Party). They joined the Barisan, yielding to Razak's argument that they needed to put aside "politicking" in favor of the national interest. The political elite was enlarged while strengthening UMNO's paramountcy. However, UMNO's refusal to allow PAS to increase its number of seats led to PAS leaving the Barisan Nasional in 1977 and resuming its former oppositional role.

In addition to the imposition of martial law (coercion), the Malaysian government resorted to three additional responses: the formulation of the "Rukunegara" as the official ideology (ideological), the New Economic Policy (distributive), and the reinforcing the Malay metanarrative in the public sphere.

Rukunegara

The Department of National Unity was founded for the purpose of formulating a national ideology. Within a year's time, the Rukunegara ("pillar of the nation") was promulgated. The Rukunegara bears a striking resemblance to Indonesia's Pancasila.24 Like Indonesia's Pancasila, the Rukunegara consisted of bland inclusive statements. One notable feature of the Rukunegara was the lack of any mention of the ethnic metanarrative.25 However, it appears that not much use was made of the Rukunegara. No concerted effort was made to indoctrinate Malaysians in a manner similar to Indonesia's New Order regime's imposition of Pancasila Orthodoxy.

The New Economic Policy

The New Economic Policy (NEP) was the more significant government response to the May 1969 crisis. Basically it was an attempt to restructure Malaysia's plural society by forcibly redistributing economic resources between the Chinese and the Malays. Through the NEP planning documents, targets and percentages were spelled out in explicit terms that would bring about the redistribution of economic resources between ethnic groups.26 The government used these targets to promote economic partnerships

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24 "We, her people, pledge our united efforts to attain those ends guided by these principles:
Belief in God
Loyalty to King and Country
Upholding the Constitution
Rule of Law
Good Behaviour and Morality."

25 Note for example the lack of any indication of the ethnic metanarrative in the Preamble:
Our nation, Malaysia, being dedicated to achieving a greater unity of all her peoples; to maintaining a democratic way of life; to creating a just society in which the wealth of the nation shall be equitably shared; to ensuring a liberal approach to her rich and diverse cultural traditions; to building a progressive society which shall be oriented to modern science and technology....

26 For specific targets and goals see paragraph 237 in the Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan
between Malays and Chinese entrepreneurs. The government also sought to improve the Malays' economic standing through preferential treatment for *bumiputra* enterprises. Another aspect of the NEP was the increased university admissions for Malay students at the expense of Chinese students.27

The NEP has been a qualified success. Poverty levels among all ethnic groups in Malaysia were reduced from nearly 50 percent to 15 percent in the period from 1970 to 1992 (Gomez and Jomo 1997:166-167; see Table 6.1). On the one hand, by the early 1990s a large Malay middle class had come into existence along with a growing entrepreneurial class, and on the other hand, Malay interests owned twenty percent of the national wealth, which fell short of the targeted thirty percent. At the same time, however, interethnic tension still persisted (Gomez and Jomo 1997:168). The NEP also resulted in an increase in corruption and rent-seeking behavior by Malaysia's political elite, especially members of UMNO's hierarchy (see Gomez and Jomo 1997:5 ff.).

By 1989, the NEP was succeeded by the New Development Policy (NDP) which essentially continued the NEP policies but without quantitative targets and specific time frames. In 1991, Prime Minister Mahathir introduced the "Vision 2020" plan which

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27Between 1970 and 1988 the number of *bumiputras* studying at Malaysian universities increased tenfold from 3,000 to 30,000 while another 14,000 were studying at overseas universities (Crouch 1996(a): 125-126). This transformed the student body of Malaysian universities from 30 percent Malay in the mid 1960s to 75 percent Malay in 1977 (Crouch 1996(a):131).
aimed at Malaysia becoming a "fully developed country" by the year 2020. What is striking about "Vision 2020" is the move away from the redistributive emphasis of the NEP. Also, the emphasis here is no longer exclusively on the Malays, but rather on Malaysia as a whole.

Reshaping Public Space

The government also responded to the May 1969 crisis by: (1) entrenching the Malays' special position in public space and (2) by restricting public discourse.

The government's attempt to give greater prominence to Malay and Islamic symbols in public space while at the same curtailing the non-Malay presence marks a significant departure, especially for urban spaces in Malaysia. During the British colonial era most Malays lived in rural areas, while the towns were dominated by non-Malays (Crouch 1996:165). Laws were passed that required that Malay letters on signboards be larger than non-Malay languages. Streets were given Malay names exclusively (see Crouch 1996:167). After 1970, non-Muslims found it harder to obtain land to build churches or temples on prime land and were often forced to resort to worshiping in homes or store-front facilities (Lee 1988:410).28

In addition, it became a punishable offense to question in public or in Parliament: (1) the special status of the Malays, (2) the status of the Malay language, (3) the sovereignty of the sultans, or (4) the citizenship rights of non-Malays. Furthermore, any call for a "Malaysian Malaysia" would be regarded as subversive and subject to legal

28 In Penang -- a heavily Chinese island -- the Chinese were prevented from erecting a statue to Kwan Yin "the goddess of mercy. The concern was that it would be taller than the State mosque (Nagata 1980:432). Similarly, local governments in Klang and Petaling Jaya sought to curb the indiscriminate erection of curbside shrines, some of which were dedicated to Malay deities and had Quranic verses inscribed on them (Lee 1988:411). Part of the difficulty may also have stemmed from the scarcity of land in the face of intensive urban development (Ackerman and Lee 1988:58).
sanctions. This last restriction marks the outright suppression of the liberal secular metanarrative and a reinforcing of the ethnic metanarrative.

The internal contradictions of Malaysia's consociational democracy -- Malay paramountcy vs. liberal egalitarian democracy -- gave rise to a regime crisis, the government responded by reinforcing the ethnic metanarrative. Egalitarian democracy was sacrificed for Malay paramountcy. Esman writes,

The government was transformed into a hegemonic Malay regime in which non-Malay parties that agree to accept the new dispensation may participate, but in a clearly subordinate status (1994:70).

Although still democratic, Malaysia began its gradual slide into authoritarian rule.

The Islamic Revival

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Malaysia saw the emergence of a grassroots Islamic revival also known as the *dakwah* movement. The Islamic resurgence in Malaysia was a broad complex social phenomena which ranged from informal student prayer groups to organized groups like: *Parti al-Islammiyah Se-Malaysia* (PAS), *Angkatan Belia Islammiyyah Malaysia* (Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement), *Darul Arqam* (House of Arqam), and the *Jemaat Tabligh*. Although the dakwah movements varied in the degree in which they were political in nature, they each challenged the official metanarrative either directly or indirectly.

\[29\] It should be noted that "dakwah" literally means "to witness" and was originally understood to refer to the conversion of non-Muslims. Malaysia's dakwah movement for the most part was directed at Muslim (Nagata 1980:414, note 17). In this dissertation the term "Islamic revival" is also used to refer to the "dakwah movement."

\[30\] The fluid, informal and diverse nature of Malaysia's *dakwah* movements leads Nagata to suggest that the Indonesian term *aliran* might be a more apt way of characterizing this significant social phenomenon (1980:412). For a general overview and description of these Islamic organizations see Jomo and Cheek's "The Politics of Malaysia's Islamic resurgence" (1988); Hussin Mutalib's *Islam and Ethnicity in Malay Politics* (1990), chapter 3.
As UMNO's chief political rival, PAS was the most explicitly political expression of the dakwah phenomenon. Although PAS antedates the dakwah movement, it became one of the principal vehicles through which the Islamic revival found expression. PAS constitutes the biggest challenge to UMNO's ethnic metanarrative. The party was founded in 1951 by a group of ulama who broke off from UMNO because of differences with UMNO's more accommodating stance towards non-Malays. Where UMNO was leading the fight to protect the Malays' special position, PAS was calling for a theocratic Malaysia.31 They sought an Islamic state which would be based upon the Qur'an and Hadith. They sought to remove Islam from the sultans' purview and place it under a pan-Malayan religious council (Milner 1986:56).

Although a minor party on the national level, PAS was much more successful in imposing the Islamic metanarrative on the state level (Lee 1988:404 note 13; Esposito and Voll 1996:140). This can be seen in Kelantan and Terengganu, the two states where PAS dominated (Hussin Mutalib 1990:106). Legal reforms there include the imposition of the kharaj (a special Islamic tax) on non-Muslims, a dress code for Muslim women in the public sphere, the banning of rock concerts and fashion shows in hotels, and the implementation of hudud, the traditional form of punishment (Camroux 1996:860; Verma 2002:114).32

31For a more nuanced understanding see Alias Mohamed's PAS' Platform: Development and Change 1951-1986 (1994). PAS's ideological stance was not always straightforwardly theocratic. In light of its being UMNO's political rival and its role as a bolt hole for UMNO dissidents PAS's membership was quite fluid and complex. But Alias did take note of PAS moving in a distinctly theocratic direction in the 1980s (1994:204 ff.).
32However, the enforceability of these laws depend upon the consent of the federal government (see Berita Malaysia).
ABIM was the most popular of dakwah organizations claiming a membership of 35,000 and many more sympathizers (Nagata 1980:423). The significance of ABIM lies in its heavily urban university-educated membership. ABIM expressed dissatisfaction with Islam's status in the national constitution, believing that the Constitution should more explicitly declare Malaysia an Islamic state with laws based upon the shariah (Jomo and Cheek 1988:846). In addition, ABIM criticized UMNO for basing its strategy upon ethnicity, i.e., the Malay race, than upon religion, i.e., Islam.33

Jemaat Tabligh was much smaller, claiming 5,000 members of which only a thousand were fully committed. Unlike other groups, it was exclusively male in its membership, much more secretive, and placed a heavier emphasis on rituals. Because Jemaat Tabligh was concerned primarily with personal piety, it did not pose a serious threat to the state and was largely ignored.

Darul Arqam was critical of the government's limited focus on Islamic education and attempted to redress this by forming model Islamic communities. Its significance lay in its 48 self-supporting communes and estimated RM 300 million of assets.

**Government Response to the Islamic Revival**

The government responded to the Islamic revival in a number of ways: accommodation, cooptation, imitation, and coercion (see Barraclough 1983; Lee 1988; Camroux 1996).

*Accommodation.* Recognizing UMNO's vulnerability to PAS's flanking maneuver, Mahathir incorporated elements of PAS's into his administration. The

33Employing the Islamic precept of assabiyah -- the wrongfulness of racial chauvinism, ABIM held that Malaysia's pluralistic society would fare better under an Islamic state than an ethnic chauvinistic state (Jomo and Cheek 1988:853).
government's Islamization program in the early 1980s included the establishment of an Islamic consultative body that would advise the government on religious matters, the International Islamic University, the expansion of facilities for Islamic education on the tertiary level, the Islamic Bank, and the upgrading of the status of Islamic courts (see Hussin 1990:138-139, Table p. 134). It also undertook symbolic measures like building more mosques, undertaking daily broadcasts of the *azan* (the Muslim call to prayer), televising the annual Qur'an recitation competition, and giving UMNO leaders a high profile at Islamic celebrations like the Prophet Muhammed's birthday.

*Cooptation.* The government responded to ABIM's success through a strategy of cooptation. In 1981, Mohamad Mahathir became prime minister. In 1982, in a surprise move, he invited Anwar Ibrahim to join UMNO, and to the surprise of many, Anwar accepted. 34 Under Anwar's influence, the UMNO-led government began to implement Islamization policies. 35

*Coercion.* The government banned the reclusive Darul Arqam in 1994 for illegal activities and labeled it a deviationist cult. Ashaari Muhammad, the group's founder, was extradited from Thailand and detained under Malaysia's Internal Security Act, and later forced to make a public confession on national television. This draconian action contrasts sharply with the government earlier accommodating approach to the Islamic revival. It is not clear why the government dealt with Darul Arqam so harshly, but it may have something to do with the fact that the group's self-supporting communes created an

34 The government's response also contained an element of coercion. In 1974 Anwar Ibrahaim was arrested and detained for a year.
35 The government's cooptation of Anwar also had an opposite effect. In reaction to Anwar's defection a number of ABIM leaders joined PAS and under their influence PAS became increasingly confrontative in its stance.
autonomous social sphere that challenged the government's welfare programs aimed at the Malays\textsuperscript{36} and bypassed the government's control over public discourse (see Camroux 1996:864-865). Another factor may have been the highly contested UMNO elections in late 1993.\textsuperscript{37} It seemed that the government left the Jemaat Tabligh alone because the group's stress on personal piety did not pose any threat to the government's state-building project.

\textbf{Reconfiguration of Pluralism}

By the 1990s, pluralism in Malaysia had been established in its basic forms, but it was clear that the overall politics of the state would require continued change and adaptation in the basic pluralist structure. Previously Malaysia's pluralism was structured along the lines of ethnicity -- Malay vs. non-Malay; under the impact of the dakwah movement Malaysia's pluralism has been defined along the lines of religion -- Muslim vs. non-Muslim.\textsuperscript{38} The Islamic revival resulted in greater numbers of Malays wearing "Islamic" attire, attending religious services during work hours, adhering to the segregation of men from women, abstaining from alcoholic drinks, and adhering more strictly to the Muslim food code.\textsuperscript{39} This has resulted in tensions between moderate

\textsuperscript{36}These programs formed the basis for the patronage essential to securing the Malays' loyalty to UMNO.
\textsuperscript{37}In the November 1993 Anwar Ibrahim (representing the new generation of Malay leaders) and Ghafar Baba (representing the old-style rural-based Malay constituency and reputed to have ties with Darul Arqam) vied for the position of deputy president of UMNO and by virtue of that position deputy Prime Minister (Camroux 1996:864).
\textsuperscript{38}David Camroux, on the other hand, sees a different shift of emphases, from the government being preoccupied with securing positions for bumiputras through quotas to an emphasis on Malaysia's being a multiracial society during the "Visit Malaysia Year" (1996:855). Vidhu Verma sees the emergence of a multi-voiced Islam that will offset the univocalism of Islamic fundamentalism. She notes that even as Islam increasingly becomes the locus of Malay identity, alternative forces are emerging -- modernists, traditionalists, nationalists, feminists, communitarians -- that are contesting the Malay community's understanding of Islam (2002:209).
\textsuperscript{39}In Islam the \textit{halal} code prohibits Muslim against eating pork or food prepared in utensils that were previously used to cook pork.
Malays and their dakwah counterparts, as well as reduced social interaction between Malays and non-Malays.

The Islamic revival also resulted in the government's Islamizing public space. However, this caused many non-Malays to feel threatened. In 1990, the Malaysian Consultative Council on Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and Sikhism led a campaign to gather a million signatures protesting the imposition of shariah law (Camroux 1996:861). The petition drive forced Prime Minister Mahathir -- who had avoided meeting them for three years -- to meet with them and affirm that the government had no intention of imposing the shariah on non-Muslims (AsiaWeek 5/4/90).

This shift in Malaysia's pluralism is far from inconsequential. This alienation of the non-Malays has the potential to undermine Malaysia's consociational democracy (Verma 2002:157; Lee 1988:405). Although the government's symbolic concessions to the Muslim nationalists can be passed off as "window dressing" -- in that legal reform has been minimal -- a shift away from the long-standing ethnic metanarrative to the Islamic metanarrative seems to be underway.

II. THEORY TESTING

Malaysia and the Competing Nationalisms Thesis

As proposed in Chapter 3, the competing nationalisms thesis attempts to explain the following: (1) how the modern state deals with the challenge of a plural society, (2) the persistent and significant role of religion in modernizing societies, and (3) how discursive formation plays a critical role in the post-colonial state-building project. It does so by arguing that a country's political development proceeds along one of three
trajectories: secular, ethnic, or religious nationalism. One is selected to be the official metanarrative and is then imposed upon society as part of the state-building project. The centralizing tendencies of the state-building project also give rise to rival national metanarratives; hence, the concept 

competing nationalisms. Examining the events presented in this chapter allows us to establish the degree of fit between the facts of Malaysia's political development and this thesis.

Much of modern Malaysian politics can be explained by the rivalry among the various groups to establish one of these metanarratives as national policy. British authorities sought to establish the secular metanarrative of the Malayan Union proposal as a discourse convenient to their purposes and which held the greatest promise of preserving British influence. However, it was rejected by Malays and in its place the ethnic metanarrative was used to frame Malaysia's constitution. Since then, the secular metanarrative has had a marginal role in Malaysian politics. 40

The ethnic metanarrative exercised a decisive influence on the Malaysian state. It functions as a defensive form of nationalism that safeguards the Malays' paramountcy in Malaysia's plural society. The Malaysian government exists primarily for Malays; it functions to safeguard and advance the interests of Malays. Policies are designed to ensure that jobs and grants are available in order to promote Malay economic

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40 Probably the most significant proponent of the secular metanarrative since independence has been the mostly Chinese DAP (Democratic Action Party) which called for a "Malaysian Malaysia, and official status for Mandarin, Tamil, and English (Von Vorys 1975:270 ff.). For the MCA -- UMNO's coalition partner -- the DAP has been its most serious political rival. Other instances of the secular metanarrative include the All-Malayan Council of Joint Action (AMCJA) which was formed in 1946 for the purpose of unifying the various ethnic communities. In 1950 Dato Onn broke with UMNO to form the noncommunal Independence of Malaya Party (IMP). In addition to these was the Socialist Front which saw the differences in society lying along class lines rather than ethnicity (Von Vorys 1975:148).
development. The state bureaucracy, as well as the military, is heavily Malay. For Malays it is their government; so long as the government upholds their interests, its rule is legitimate. For non-Malays -- especially the descendants of the immigrants -- Malaysia may be the only homeland they know, but the government now exists to recognize their delegated interests, rather than those derived from the citizenship of birth. The legal code, in a constant state of refinement, continues to extend these principles and differences. The result has been the partitioning of Malaysia's political sphere between Malays and non-Malays.

Over the years, the official metanarrative encountered a number of serious challenges. The 1969 election riots precipitated a regime crisis disproving the myth of intercommunal harmony and bringing into question the viability of the "Bargain" underlying Malaysia's consociational democracy. The metanarrative suffered another challenge when the Islamic revival gave rise to groups that questioned the legitimacy of the UMNO dominated government. Religious nationalists found in the Islamic revival a vehicle for the Islamic metanarrative. Through the revival, they sought to challenge UMNO's leadership and replace the ethnic state with a theocratic state. While not having accomplished that end, the Islamic revival has been extremely influential, altering UMNO policies and redefining relations between Malays and non-Malays. These two challenges point to the tenuous hold that the ethnic metanarrative has had on Malaysian society both among Malays and non-Malays. Malay nationalism remains the official metanarrative but is far from achieving ideological hegemony. The overall pattern of post-colonial Malaysia

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41 The combat services are heavily Malay in composition and the premiere unit -- the Royal Malay Regiment -- is entirely Malay (Milne 1999:3). During the early 1980s the Malaysian military's officer corps was seventy four per cent Malay and the rest of its ranks eighty four per cent were Malay (Crouch 1996:135).
politics has been consistent with the competing nationalisms thesis. We can see here each of the three forms of nationalisms vying to be the defining framework for the emerging nation-state.

**How Malaysia Managed Religious Pluralism**

Malaysia imposed the ethnic metanarrative through the following state capacities: (1) the responsive capacity (the Alliance), (2) the distributive capacity (the NEP), and (3) the symbolic capacity (government support for Malay and Islamic symbolism). An analysis of the various responses deployed points to the incremental nature of Malaysia's state-building project. The state deployed its various capacities in response to crises that arose from the internal contradictions embedded in the official metanarrative. A common thread underlying the varied state responses was the imperative to safeguard UMNO's paramount position. It was this particular imperative that constituted the core of Malaysia's state-building project. UMNO safeguarded its paramount position by maintaining the Malay paramountcy and the Alliance/Barisan Nasional's dominance in the elections.

The Alliance imposed the ethnic metanarrative on Malaysia's political sphere by ordering political competition along communal lines. Noncommunal parties are allowed to compete, but have been unable to win significant numbers of votes. Strikingly, while the Alliance was an informal arrangement -- not anticipated by the Constitution -- it played a pivotal *de facto* role in the shaping of post-colonial Malaysian politics.

Malaysia's official metanarrative was based upon UMNO's dominant position within the Alliance. UMNO's dominance stemmed from its ability to function
simultaneously as a governing party for the country and as a political machine that links Malay villages into a nationwide political network (see Rogers 1975:223). In light of that, it would not be mistaken to characterize Malaysia as a one-party state. This implies that the core of Malaysia's state-building project resides not so much in the national government but rather within UMNO.

The 1969 election riots exposed the internal contradictions of Malaysia's consociational system. In response to this regime crisis, the government created the NEP which imposed the ethnic metanarrative on Malaysia's economy by means of economic policies designed to redistribute wealth between Chinese and Malays. In addition to shoring up the state's legitimacy, the NEP also enhanced UMNO's ability to dispense political patronage among its Malay constituency.

The government's imposition of Malay and Islamic symbols on public space and the curtailing of public expressions of non-Malay cultures was largely a response to the Islamic resurgence in the 1970s and 1980s. This was done to protect UMNO's standing among Malays in the face of stiff competition from the rival PAS, even at the cost of alienating non-Malays.

An examination of the Malaysian state reveals some interesting structural features. Unlike Indonesia, Malaysia has no national Ministry of Religion (Nagata 1984:63). This reflects the differences in the two countries' transition to independence. Where Indonesia was faced with the Islamists vs. the secularists conflict, Malaysia faced the Malay vs. non-Malays conflict. As part of the strategy for upholding Malay paramountcy, Malaysia

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42 Dan Slater has made a similar observation referring to Malaysia as a "single party regime" (2003:89, 99 note 10). Harold Crouch notes, "It is often said, only half jokingly, that Malaysia's real election is not the national election but the triennial election of UMNO's leadership (1996(a):133).
relied on the traditional institution of the sultanate for managing Islamic affairs. The legislating of Islamic law rested with the State Legislatures.

Although the Malaysian government had available a wide range of coercive powers, its decentralized approach to managing religious affairs constrained the government's ability to respond to the Islamic revival (Ackerman and Lee 1988:44). When the Islamic revival became a concern to the government, its officials found that the government suffered from the lack of centralized surveillance over the religious sphere (see Barraclough 1983:969). Instead of controlling religious affairs directly, the government created several agencies concerned with religious education and the prevention of "false teachings" (Nagata 1984:64). Within the Prime Minister's office, two specialized units were formed: the Islamic Research Centre and the Islamic Training and Dakwah Institute. Pusat Islam (Islamic Center) was formed to keep an eye on dakwah activities both in Malaysia and abroad. Religious officers were sent abroad for the purpose of discouraging Malay students from joining the overseas dakwah groups (Shamsul 1994:107).

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43 Although the sultans are the Head of the Muslim religion of their respective states, there is no Head of the Muslim religion for the entire Federation. The Yang di-Pertuan Agong is the Head for his own state just like the other sultans. See also Y.A.M. Raja Azlan Shah's article "The Role of the Constitutional Rulers in Malaysia" (1986:76-77).

44 The Federal Parliament can make Islamic laws for the Federal Territory which have no sultans of their own.

45 For example, the Internal Security Act which gave it wide-ranging detention power, the Sedition Act which enabled it to proscribe public discussion of "sensitive" issues, and the Societies Act which gave it the power to deregister political parties (see Barraclough 1985:808 ff.).

46 What is interesting about Pusat Islam is that the national government saw fit to establish this agency despite the presence of already existing Departments of Religious Affairs in each of Malaysia's states.
The Islamic Revival and Development Theory

Malaysia's Islamic revival challenges conventional models of political development. The fact that the quite successful NEP should give rise to the Islamic revival and that it was the urbanized highly educated Malay youths who joined the dakwah movements challenges some of our fundamental understandings of modernization, e.g., that modernization would result in the passing of traditional beliefs and the secularization of society. When one also brings into consideration the growing economic disparity among Malays the unilinear assumption of conventional development theories becomes especially problematic. The assumed linkage between economic success and beneficial social outcomes (interethnic harmony and distributed affluence) that underlay conventional models has not been supported by the Malaysian case study. (Another unanticipated outcome of the NEP has been the huge capital flight (US $12 billion) by Malaysian Chinese reluctant to invest locally.)

The Islamic revival's reconfiguring of Malaysia's pluralism in the 1990s -- from Malay vs. non-Malays to Muslim vs. non-Muslim -- presents another challenge to development theory. The shift to the Muslim vs. non-Muslim difference reflects Malays' resistance to the results of the government's successful development programs. Under the

47Vasil in his Politics in a Plural Society: A Study of Non-Communal Political Parties in West Malaysia (1971) expressed the hope that with the emergence of a strong Malay middle class noncommunal parties would experience a comeback and turn the tide of communal politics (1971:298).
48Gomez and Jomo note that the Industrial Coordination Act resulted in many Chinese businesses becoming reluctant to invest in Malaysia and their redirecting significant amounts of capital overseas (US $12 billion) (1997:44). Also in the mid 1980s in an attempt to attract foreign capital the government lifted the cap on foreign ownership resulting in foreign share holding manufacturing projects exceeding 50% for the years 1988-1990 (see Table 3.6 in Gomez and Jomo 1997:43). Both these trends resulted in the hastening of Malaysia's integration into the global economy.

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government's ambitious development programs, economic disparity ceased to mark the
differences between Malays and non-Malays.\(^49\) Nagata writes:

...the progressive erosion of linguistic, occupational and many customary
boundaries of "Malayness" have forced Malays into a new defensive
position, where Islam has become the last bulwark of distinctiveness
(1980:435).\(^50\)

The Malays' desire to maintain the Malay/non-Malay differences runs contrary to
conventional theories that predict that modernization will lead to greater homogeneity and
a decrease in ethnicity and religious identity. This unexpected turn, on the other hand,
confirms Peter van der Veer's hypothesis that the homogenizing tendencies of
nation-building give rise to alternative forms of nationalism (1994:14 ff.).

A number of different, and sometimes competing, explanations have been
advanced to explain this unexpected development: a response to the spiritual alienation
engendered by modernization (Chandra Muzaffar), a response to the social anomie arising
from urbanization (Shamsul) or university education (Hussin Mutalib 1990:62), a way of
defending the bumiputra standing (Raymond Lee), or a response to gender roles imposed
by modern capitalism (Aihwa Ong 1987). Each of these explanations runs against the
grain of the secularization model of development, together they combine to form a
powerful critique of conventional understandings of modernization. They also point to
alternative understandings of development that can result in models of development that
are more accurate and relevant to the Third World.

\(^49\) One indicator is the sharp reduction in poverty levels among Malays. Where nearly two-thirds of the
Malays -- 64.8 percent -- lived under the poverty line in 1970, the percentage dropped to 20.8 percent by
1990. Economic disparity among ethnic groups also declined. Official figures for 1990 show a 15 percent
incidence rate of poverty for all ethnic groups and a 20.8 percent incidence rate among Malays (Gomez and
Jomo 1997:167, Table 6.1; see also Syed 2003).

The competing nationalisms thesis has several advantages in this respect: (1) it helps us to avoid taking a unilinear approach to modernization, (2) it allows us to approach modernization in terms of identity,51 and (3) it invites us to question the often touted homogenizing dynamic of nation-building. Van der Veer writes: "...the centralizing force of nation building itself sprouts centrifugal forces that crystallize around other dreams of nationhood: nationalism creates other nationalisms--religious, ethnic, linguistic, secular--but not a common culture" (1996:14-15). The competing nationalisms thesis allows us to approach religion as a form of modernity and in doing so enables us to take modern religion as a political variable rather than as an unwanted or irrelevant irritation to be swept under the rug. It also enables us to elaborate upon previous models of development. A revised model of development would show: (1) that political development is multilinear, (2) that instead of withering away, ethnicity and religion play a significant role in political development, and (3) that political development is intrinsically dialectical and conflictual -- in most instances, the outcome will not be a stable homogenous polity as expected in earlier models.

Furthermore, by viewing it as a modern variable we are encouraged to see religion as a social phenomenon continually changing, developing new forms of social engagement, especially those associated with the technologies of mobilization and articulation. Indeed, as our observations of the role of Islam in other national contexts make clear (e.g., Iran, Iraq and Egypt to choose three quite dissimilar examples), the intense use of the tools of mass communication provide Islam with direct roots of appeal

51 I am using Castells' approach: "I understand by identity the process by which a social actor recognizes itself and constructs meaning primarily on the basis of a given cultural attribute or set of attributes, to the exclusion of a broader reference to other social structures" (1996:22).
and identity articulation that either extend the state past its parallel secular boundaries (Iran), or propel it rapidly beyond the capacity of the state to effectively control (Egypt and perhaps as I write, Iraq).

**Malaysia and Theories of Nationalism**

Malaysia's ethnic nationalism challenges the major theories of nationalism. Most models assume a congruence between state, nation, and territory. What we find in the case of Malaysia is a polity that conforms to and deviates from these models. While Malaysia conforms to the congruence between state and territory, it violates the conventional models of the nation-state in two respects: (1) the *state* is fused to the core ethnie (the Malays), but not the general population, and (2) the *nation* (the political community) is organized along the lines of a compartmentalized pluralistic society, not a homogenized polity.

Fundamental to Gellner's model is his insistence that nationalism is a principle of political legitimacy -- the "state" being congruent with the "nation" (1983:1). Malaysia's ethnic metanarrative bears out Gellner's argument of nationalism as a political principle. Malaysia consists of a state congruent with the core ethnie (to the exclusion of nearly half the population) and it derives its legitimacy from the core ethnie. Malaysia challenges the assumption in Gellner's model that under the impact of modernization, primordial ethnic identities will give way to a homogenized high culture (1983:116-117). This clearly has not been the case with Malaysia where ethnic differences not only persist, but have recently been reinforced by religious differences.
One of Anderson's brilliant insights has been the nation as an *imagined* community. This has certainly been the case with Malaysia's core *ethnie* 52. Malays imagine themselves to be connected to other Malays whom they may never have met, but estranged from non-Malays they do see. From this flows the logic that sovereignty resides with Malays (to the exclusion of non-Malays). 53 However, Anderson's argument that the forces of modernity, e.g., print capitalism, administrative pilgrimages etc., would give rise to a population with a shared self-understanding does not account for the rise of Malay nationalism in the face of the Malayan Union controversy and its defensive posture vis-a-vis the non-Malays. Furthermore, Anderson's model did not anticipate nationalism as a reaction against the homogenization effect of modernization.

The Malays' defensive ethnic nationalism has roots in the pluralization of Malaya under colonial rule and Malays' anxiety over the homogenizing effects of modernization in post-colonial Malaysia, i.e., their living in a society dominated by non-Malay values and symbols. In his discussion of the emergence of nationalism, Anderson overlooked the diasporic flows and the subsequent pluralization of societies brought about by the demands of modern capitalism and colonial rule. 54 I would argue that the pluralization of societies did as much to stimulate the emergence of imagined identities as print capitalism. Furthermore, I would assert that this pluralization of societies underlies much of the contested nature of nationalism that has troubled post-colonial states. This approach to identity formation based on difference is supported by Dru Gladney's concept

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52 An "ethnie" is an ethnic community with a strong sense of belonging (Anthony Smith 1986:30).
53 See Anderson's discussion of "sovereignty" as one of the key facets of an imagined community (1983:7).
54 For a discussion how diasporic flows has contributed to the making of the modern world see my essay "Theorizing on the Okinawan Diaspora" (2002:29 ff.).
of relational alterity, Fredrik Barth's argument concerning the critical role played by a
group's boundary in the making of ethnic identity, and Norman Buchignani's interactionist
model of identity formation (see Arakaki 2002:32 ff.).

Malaysia's Islamic revival in the 1980s contradicts Anderson's secular assumption,
i.e., the passing of the sacred script with the rise of the print vernacular (see 1983:12 ff.,
36). The Islamic revival owes much to the growth of literacy in the sacred scripts in
modernist Islam as well as to the widespread use of the vernacular language in the
dakwah movements. Likewise, it challenges Gellner's belief that industrial capitalism
will give rise to a modern secular nation-state (see 1983:141-142). What is especially
significant is the way Malaysia's Islamic revival challenges Gellner's argument
concerning the key role played by modern education in the rise of the modern nation-state
and modern education's homogenizing effects (see Gellner 1983:34).

These criticisms do not so much invalidate Gellner and Anderson's models as they
highlight their modernistic assumptions: (1) the unilinear understanding of modernization
which leads them to overlook the divergent outcomes of the modernity project, (2) the
homogenizing influence of modernization, and (3) the secularist understanding of
modernity that leads them to overlook the powerful influence of religion on other social
forces shaping the nation-building project. The competing nationalisms thesis expands
the conceptual categories of the nation-state, enabling us to take into account the role of
religion and pluralism in modernizing societies.
Malaysia and State-Building Theory

The competing nationalisms thesis is based upon the post-colonial state's active attempts to impose the official metanarrative on society. The Malaysian case study shows an active attempt by the state to maintain the official metanarrative on the electoral process, the economy, and public space.

The Malaysian state-building project, for the most part, confirms James Scott's understanding of state-building as standardization (1998:4 ff.). Over the past several decades the Malaysian state consistently sought to uphold the Malays' paramountcy in post-colonial Malaysia, the key assumption of the official metanarrative. But, for Malaysia the imposition of the ethnic metanarrative results not in the imposition of uniformity on society (as predicted by Scott's model), but the imposition of differences (Malay vs. non-Malay). Where secular nationalism and religious nationalism fit Scott's distinction between "metis" (local and particular) and "techne" (universal), ethnic nationalism does not. Also the tension between "metis" and "techne" does not really account for the Islamic revival, which restated and reinforced the Malay vs. non-Malay differences.

Ian Lustick's three stage/two threshold model (incumbency, regime, ideological hegemony) has been useful for understanding the historical dynamic of Malaysia's state-building project. Conflict in the incumbency stage takes place over what the rules of the game are. This is what happened when the Malays vociferously opposed the Malayan Union with its secular metanarrative and succeeded in having the ethnic metanarrative written into the Merdeka Constitution. The first threshold was crossed, not
so much with the passing of the Merdeka Constitution, but when the Bargain was made among UMNO, MCA, and MIC. The Alliance's consociationalism provided the rules of the game that would effectively define political competition in post-colonial Malaysia. Conflict in the regime stage are meant to take place within the accepted "rules of the game", i.e., within institutional contexts. However, there were at least two instances in which Malaysia's official metanarrative was challenged. The communal conflicts that broke out following the 1969 elections marked the breakdown of Malaysia's consociational system. As far as communal conflicts go, the 1969 crisis was relatively minor in scale; its severity lay in the threat it posed to the "rules of the games" that underlay the regime stage of state-building.

The Islamic revival was another significant challenge to the ethnic metanarrative. It not only posed an alternative to UMNO's ethnic metanarrative, but the popularity of the dakwah groups threatened UMNO's ability to retain the loyalty of the Malays. Although the Malaysian government still adheres to the ethnic metanarrative, the Islamic revival has exerted a powerful influence on the public sphere: reconfiguring Malaysia's pluralism along religious lines. Other than that, extralegal communal violence has been infrequent, a fact that shows that Malaysia remains in the regime stage of state-building. It is significant that an important degree of political competition took place outside the

55 Since the 1969 riots intercommunal violence has for the most part been infrequent. The 1978 the Kerling Incident strained Hindu-Muslim relations. In this incident five Muslim extremists desecrated twenty eight Hindu temples in various locations before being ambushed at Kerling where four of them were killed and a fifth seriously injured (Barracough 1983:960; Shamsul 1998:71). In 1980 the Batu Pahat incident took place in Johore in which members of a Muslim sect attacked a police station. In 1985 two clashes took place, one in Kedah between UMNO and PAS members, and another between the military and Muslim dissidents in Memali which resulted in 18 dead (Crouch 1996:175; Lee 1988:402; Milner 1986; Suhaini Aznam in FEER 12/5/1985).
institutional context of the Alliance and the Barisan Nasional which is what we would have expected from Lustick's model.

Lustick's model shows that while Malaysia crossed over the first threshold from the incumbency stage to the regime stage, it has yet to reach the second threshold to the ideological hegemony stage. This is not likely to happen for two reasons: (1) Malaysia's official metanarrative will always be suspect to non-Malays, and (2) the official metanarrative has been shown to be especially vulnerable to Islamic nationalism. Malaysia's state-building project is a partially completed project and likely to remain incomplete for a long time to come.

Assessing the Competing Nationalisms Thesis

One of the advantages of the competing nationalisms framework is that it allows us to critically understand the nature of the Malaysian state and its relationship to Islam. The Malaysian government has been frequently characterized as "secular" (e.g., Ackerman and Lee 1988:56; Funston 1980:293). However, those who make these claims rarely precisely define "secular." Furthermore, these claims have not been substantiated. They make sense if "secular" means "not theocratic", but make little sense in light of a constitution that declares Islam to be the state's religion and a government that spends a lot of money and actively promotes Islamic symbolism.

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56 The tight links between the Malay identity and Islam has made it impossible for UMNO to back away from the "race for Islamization" with PAS. Much of the popular dissatisfaction with UMNO is not so much ideological but stems from disgust with the widespread corruption and nepotism within UMNO's leadership (see Noor 2000:61).

57 An exception is Raymond Lee's 1990 article in which he defined secularism in terms of "an increasing trend towards materialistic accumulation influenced by a this-worldly orientation" (1996:496).

58 For example, the government built 1,800 mosques (M$27.6 million), 1,669 suraus (prayer houses) (M$5.7 million), 742 religious schools ($M7.8 million), and 644 temples and churches (M$7.4 million) (Von Vorys 1975:232).
With its distinction between ethnic and religious nationalism, the competing nationalisms thesis enables analysts to make sense of a "secular" state that relies on Islamic symbolism as an instrument of rule. It does so by differentiating between religion as an ethnic marker and religion as political ideology. Building mosques and funding religious schools are not necessarily indicative of a theocratic state; they can also be seen as patronage delivered by an ethnic state. A more significant indicator of a theocratic state lies in its reliance on divine revelation as the source for legislation and public policy or key political positions monopolized by clerics sharing the same religious-political ideology. An awareness of this distinction will sensitize us to the differential basis for political legitimacy and enable us to avoid misconstruing the ways political elite act to legitimate their rule.

The competing nationalisms thesis offers a different approach to the question of how the Malaysian state managed religious pluralism. Earlier analyses have framed the Islamic revival in terms of interest group competition (Barraclough 1983; Camroux 1996) or in terms of status group competition (Lee 1990). The state's response to the revival has been approached in terms of command-obedience (Barraclough 1983; see also Camroux 1996). The competing nationalisms thesis differs from them by emphasizing the discursive aspects of the state-building project and the close resemblance between religious identity and national identity.

Similarly, the competing nationalisms thesis offers an alternative approach to Malaysian politics. Much of the literature on Malaysian politics has tended to focus on

59 UMNO in its political campaigns boasted it could deliver these more of these goods more promptly than PAS (Funston 1980:146).
political structures (democracy vs. authoritarianism) or economic issues (capital accumulation vs. underdevelopment). This has led to a neglect of the role of identity politics in relation to modernization. Identity politics enables us to approach Malay nationalism and the Islamic revival not just as mere interest group rivalry, but in terms of "identity projects" genuinely grounded in religious concerns or ethnic identity. This is because it is based on nonmaterial rewards like communal pride, group status, and sense of belonging.

There appears to be an emerging interest in identity politics within Malaysia. Charles Hirschman's 1986 article on the construction of race and identity highlights the structural and ideological means by which British colonialism "managed" Malaya's plural society (1986:356). A.B. Shamsul's more recent "Religion and Ethnic Politics in Malaysia" discusses the Islamic revival as being rooted in the crises of tradition stemming form secularization and Islam as an "identity marker" (1994:112). Vidhu Verma's recent Malaysia: State and Civil Society in Transition (2002) marks a significant advance in the study of identity politics in Malaysia. She discusses the impact of the dakwah movement on Malay "cultural identity" and the implications for the emergence of a civil society in Malaysia (2002:209 ff.). This dissertation builds upon these works with its attempt to frame the construction of Malay/Muslim identity within the context of the post-colonial state-building project.

60For example Milton Esman's Administration and Development in Malaysia (1972) focuses on the tensions between two government functions: participative and authoritative (1972:6 ff.; 294 ff.). Harold Crouch in his Government and Society in Malaysia (1996) frames his analysis in terms of political regime: authoritarian vs. democratic (1996:244 ff.). This is orientation is quite explicit in Crouch's chapter "Malaysia: Neither authoritarian nor democratic" (1993).

61Manuel Castells in The Rise of the Network Society (1996) notes that there are three ways a society can be organized: production, experience, and power (1996:14 ff.). From the category of "experience" Castells constructed the concept of "identity projects" (see his The Power of Identity (1997:6 ff)).
The competing nationalisms thesis sheds new light on Malaysian nationalism with its focus on nationalism in post-colonial Malaysia. The tendency has been for scholars to focus on early nationalist developments prior to World War II (e.g., Roff 1994; Milner 1994). Not much attention has been given to the formative event of the Malayan Union controversy and the powerful and pervasive influence that this event has exercised on post-colonial Malaysian politics. Roff discussed the role of British colonial rule, the rise of Modernist Islam, and the role the British educational system; and Milner analyzed the ideological conflict in colonial Malaya, but neither of these analyses is able to account for Malay/non-Malay opposition that underlies modern Malay nationalism and the post-colonial state-building project.

The competing nationalisms thesis also enables political scientists to study religion as a political variable without succumbing to reductionism, i.e., as a mask for hidden class or economic interests. Much of the analysis of the Islamic revival has been framed in terms of interest group liberalism. This has resulted in attention being focused on the groups and their attempts to influence the state. This level of analysis falls short in addressing the fundamental challenge that Islamic nationalism poses to the modern nation-state. Islamic nationalism, with its radically different metanarrative, poses a major challenge to the Malaysian nation-state and its state-building project.

The competing nationalisms thesis anticipates radical changes for Malaysia if Islamic nationalists were to succeed in making Islamic nationalism the official

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van der Veer writes, "...we should take religious discourse and practice as constitutive of changing social identities, rather than treating them as ideological smoke screens that hide the real clash of material interests and social classes" (1994:ix).
metanarrative. However, such radical changes are unlikely. What is more likely is that Malaysia's fractured polity makes it vulnerable to disruption. This stems from the understanding that the modern state-building project gives rise to rival nationalisms and that this dialectic underlies the conflictual nature of modern nation-states. Malaysia is especially vulnerable to disruption from within the Malay community (moderate Malays vs. Islamic nationalists) or from the general population (Malays vs. non-Malays). Such disruptions pose a threat to the flow of global capital; the resulting economic downturn would in turn exacerbate social tensions. What can be expected is that given Malaysia's vulnerabilities the government will become increasingly authoritarian and repressive as it responds to the contradictions embedded in Malaysia's plural society in order to ensure the stability of Malaysia's economy and safeguard the interests of Malaysia's political elite. A corollary phenomenon will be the rise in rent seeking behavior as a means of securing the loyalty of the political elite. Both trends -- coercion and corruption -- point to a weak state and a failed state-building project. This bleak scenario arises from the fact that the ethnic metanarrative (by restricting the nation to a core ethnie) generates inbuilt contradictions that undermines the post-colonial state-building project.

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63See Hussin Mutalib's Islam in Malaysia: From Revivalism to Islamic State (1993) for a sympathetic treatment of the possibility of an Islamic state in Malaysia. Although Hussin sees many factors making it difficult for an Islamic state to be established in Malaysia, he nonetheless describes four scenarios in which this might happen (1993:81 ff.)
CHAPTER 7
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATE-BUILDING STRATEGIES

In this chapter, a comparative analysis of the two countries' state-building project will be carried out using the competing nationalisms thesis as a framework for comparison. Three propositions were presented in Chapter 3 for testing the competing nationalisms thesis: (1) that modernization in Third World countries is not uni-linear but multi-linear, (2) that the state will attempt to manage religious pluralism through one of three national metanarratives, and (3) that the homogenizing tendencies of the nation-building project will generate rival narratives. Using the two case studies, I will assess the usefulness of the competing nationalisms thesis as a typology for understanding state-religion relations in Third World societies and as a model for state-building. I will close this chapter with a discussion of the advantages that the competing nationalisms thesis has over conventional development theories.

Proposition #1
Modernization as a Multi-linear Process

The competing nationalisms thesis proposes that there are three ways state-religion relations can be structured: secular, semi-secular/ethnic, or theocratic. This proposition has been confirmed in three ways: (1) the different metanarratives the two countries adopted for managing religious pluralism, (2) the rival options both countries faced during the selection of the metanarrative, and (3) the presence of all three metanarratives during both countries' preindependence anticolonial struggles.

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At the time of its independence, Indonesia selected the secular form of nationalism. Although the Pancasila is based upon faith in God, it commits the Indonesian state to no one particular religion. This stance results in a de facto secular state. The Pancasila was a compromise that enabled the new nation-state to include non-Muslims while avoiding massive rejection by strict Muslims.

Malaysia, on the other hand, selected the semi-secular/ethnic form of nationalism. For Malaysia, designating Islam as the official religion was an essential part of safeguarding the unique status of the core ethnic group, the Malays. Although many of the leaders of UMNO were not personally devout, they sought this proviso as it was UMNO's raison d'être to safeguard the Malays' unique status in the face of a non-Muslim majority.

The competing nationalisms thesis three fold typology finds further support in the ideological rivalry that surrounded the selection of the official metanarrative. The two countries' official metanarratives cover only two of the three options, but when the two case studies are combined, all three variants can be seen in the struggle to define the national metanarrative. At the time of Indonesia's independence, there were two major ideological options: secular nationalism -- the inclusivist secular Pancasila proposed by Sukarno, and religious nationalism -- the Islamic Jakarta Charter proposed by the Islamic nationalists. At the time of Malaysia's independence there were likewise two major ideological options: secular nationalism -- the ill-fated Malayan Union, and semi-secular/ethnic nationalism -- the Malay dominated consociational democracy.
One interesting finding is that in both countries the selection of metanarrative was essentially a two way contest, not a three way contest as might be expected by the three categories proposed in the competing nationalisms thesis. At the time of Indonesia's independence there was a two way rivalry between religious nationalism and secular nationalism. Ethnic nationalism fell by the wayside in the early 1920s and by the end of World War II ceased to play an influential role in politics. At the time of Malaysia's independence there was a rivalry between secular nationalism and ethnic (Malay) nationalism. Islamic nationalism, which at one time might have become a potent rival to ethnic nationalism, joined forces with the traditional Malay leadership in the face of external threats, e.g., the Japanese occupation and later heavily Chinese MCP communist insurgency.

It appears that although Third World societies do contain the potential for all three metanarratives, the three options did not emerge simultaneously, but at different times with the result that by the time of independence one of the three options had fallen by the wayside, leaving only two rival options, a state of affairs that would form the basis for ideological rivalries that would challenge the official metanarrative. This suggests that two way rivalry among nationalist movements might be more common in Third World countries than the three way rivalry. This is a matter that calls for further investigation and has possible significant implications for political development theory.

**Proposition #2**

**The Three Stage Model of State-Building**

The competing nationalisms thesis proposes that the post-colonial state-building project consists of three stages: the incumbency stage, the regime stage, and the
hegemony stage. This argument can be tested by the presence or absence of certain historical patterns: (1) in the first stage of state-building, whether or not the selection of the official metanarrative was a conflictual process; (2) in the second stage of state-building, whether or not ideological conflict was carried out within established institutional contexts; and (3) in the third stage of state-building, whether or not ideological challenges to the official metanarrative diminish in frequency and intensity as the metanarrative attains ideological hegemony.

In the Indonesian case study, as anticipated in the three stage model, the selection of the official metanarrative was marked by interelite rivalry. What was not anticipated was that the first stage of state-building -- the incumbency stage -- would last nearly twenty years. The prolonging of the incumbency stage can be seen in the following: (1) the numerous breakaway movements that emerged soon after independence was declared; (2) the contentious debates over the Pancasila and the Jakarta Charter during the Constituent Assembly in the late 1950s; and (3) the fierce three way fighting between the Army, the PKI, and Muhhamdiyah during Sukarno's Guided Democracy in the early 1960s. So long as the Indonesian state faced armed resistance to its claims and open challenge to its metanarrative, it remained in the incumbency stage.

It was not until 1965 when the New Order regime imposed authoritarian rule that Indonesia entered into the second stage of state-building, the regime stage. The New Order's brutal suppression of the PKI created what Lustick called the "point of no return," i.e., the creation of a new and irreversible political reality accepted by all, even the
opposition. Under New Order rule, both open ideological challenges and armed resistance were vigorously suppressed.

During this stage Suharto made extensive use of Pancasila Orthodoxy for the legitimation of New Order rule. The New Order regime suppressed ideological debate by banning "sensitive" topics from public discussion, e.g., SARA, as well as by forcing the consolidation of various political parties into three umbrella parties. Ideological conformity was also imposed on Indonesian society through ideological education under the guise of the P4 program and the Asas Tunggal law that required all organizations to have the Pancasila as their sole ideological basis. Thus, authoritarian rule, with its suppression of open debate accompanied by ideological conformity, played a key role in the second stage of Indonesia's state-building project.

Indonesia never crossed the second threshold to the third stage of state-building, ideological hegemony. Although widely accepted by Indonesians, the Pancasila never became part of the taken for granted background knowledge. The failure of the Pancasila to achieve ideological hegemony can be seen in (1) the Islamic revival in the 1980s and Suharto's "Islamic turn," (2) the outbreak of interethnic and interreligious violence in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, and (3) the widespread sentiment expressed by many Indonesians that they were "fed up" with the Pancasila.

In conclusion, Lustick's three stage model has proven useful for tracing the different stages of Indonesia's state-building project. Indonesia successfully entered into the first two stages of state-building, however, it failed to enter into the third stage, which implies an incomplete or a failed state-building project.
The three stage model has also been helpful for understanding state-building in Malaysia. As anticipated by the competing nationalisms thesis, the selection of the official metanarrative was surrounded by controversy. In comparison to Indonesia, however, Malaysia crossed the first threshold relatively quickly. The Malayan Union controversy took place in the mid 1940s and the formation of the consociational Alliance took place in the early 1950s. In other words, by the time Malaysia received its independence in 1957 it was already in the regime stage of state-building. Another contributing factor, the imposition of military rule during the Emergency -- also prior to independence -- did much to facilitate Malaysia's political consolidation, laying the basis for a stable post-colonial state. Unlike Indonesia, Malaysia did not have to struggle with suppressing breakaway movements so soon after independence.

Malaysia's semi-secular/ethnic metanarrative was based upon the premise of Malay paramountcy in a plural society. The second stage in Malaysia's state-building project consisted principally in the incremental expansion of the application of this premise on Malaysia's society: (1) the consociational Alliance that safeguarded Malay paramountcy in the political sphere, (2) the NEP which extended Malay paramountcy to the economic sector, and (3) the expansion of Islamic symbols in public space in the 1980s.

Malaysia never quite achieved the third stage of state-building. This was not so much a reflection of its failure to achieve hegemony as the internal contradictions embedded within its metanarrative. Malaysia's strategy of ethnic nationalism was based upon the government securing of the undivided loyalty of the core ethnic group -- the
Malays, while at the same time excluding the non-Malays. In other words, intrinsic to Malaysia's metanarrative was the alienation of the non-Malays. For non-Malays the Malaysian government would never really be theirs. Ironically, internal contradictions were present even within the Malay community. Because of the close ties between Islam and Malay identity, UMNO's ethnic nationalism was vulnerable to challenge from its rivals' Islamic nationalism.

In conclusion, the three stage model has proven quite helpful for analyzing the two case studies. When we consider the complexities of post-colonial politics, it becomes apparent that the competing nationalisms thesis has been useful in enabling us to go beyond the historical narrative to an informed understanding of state-building as a series of distinctive political processes. The three stage model also enables us to compare the two states' progress in state-building, the different means used for state-building, and the degree of success in state-building.

**State-Building as Standardization**

Key to the competing nationalisms thesis is the argument that the state will attempt to manage religious pluralism through its attempts to impose standardization and legibility on society.

The imposition of standardization on Indonesian society can be seen in the nationwide indoctrination campaign, P4, the Asas Tunggal law, and the attempt to saturate public discourse with Pancasila themes, e.g., "Pancasila democracy." Standardization can also be seen in the transformation of the Ministry of Religion into a vast national bureaucratic hierarchy that linked Muslim communities across the vast
archipelago, the standardization of Islamic education which gave rise to a shared religio-political discourse, and the consolidation of Islamic places for worship.

In the case of Malaysia, standardization was carried out in the newly incorporated states of Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore through two means: (1) establishing the Alliance's preeminence in the political domain, and (2) establishing Islam's preeminence in the religious domain. The state-building as standardization argument also finds confirmation in Singapore's expulsion in 1964. Malaysia, being unable to contain Singapore and the Singapore-based PAP party which insisted on a "Malaysian Malaysia," expelled Singapore from the federation rather than risk a regime crisis. Another example of standardization has been the Islamization of public space in the 1980s, especially in urban areas, along with the curtailment of non-Muslim and non-Malay symbols in public space. The expansion of Malay/Islamic space can also be seen the government's support for Islamic education, Islamic institutions, the construction of mosques, and allowing the daily prayers requisite for all Muslims.

Proposition #3

Nation-Building and Rival Narratives

The competing nationalisms thesis argues that the state's attempt to impose the official metanarrative will, in turn, give rise to rival narratives that challenge the official metanarrative. Furthermore, it argues that modernization rather than secularizing society, gives rise to religious nationalism that challenges the dominant official narrative. In both case studies Islamic nationalism has proven to be a significant and persistent challenge to the state-building project especially as the countries underwent modernization.
At the time of Indonesia's independence, the Preparatory Committee was faced with two rival metanarratives: the secular Pancasila and the Islamic Jakarta Charter. Although excluded from Indonesia's constitution, the Islamic Jakarta Charter resurfaced repeatedly in Indonesian politics challenging the state's official metanarrative. Influential in the 1950s, Islamic nationalism became quiescent during the 1970s, during the height of New Order rule, then enjoyed a popular revival in the 1980s. The persistent challenge from Islamic nationalism does not represent a failure in the Pancasila to function as Indonesia's metanarrative, as it demonstrates Islam's capacity to function as an "ideology of order."

After achieving independence, Malaysia's ethnic metanarrative faced a number of ideological challenges. Although the Malayan Union's secular metanarrative was soundly defeated, the secular metanarrative surfaced later in the Chinese DAP and Singapore's PAP party's which called for a "Malaysian Malaysia." An even more significant challenge to the ethnic metanarrative came from the religious nationalism of UMNO's main rival PAS. A longtime rival to UMNO, PAS did not pose a serious threat until the emergence of the popular dakwah movement in the 1980s enabled it to expand its political base.

Thus, the two case studies confirm the third proposition that state-building generates rival narratives that challenge the official metanarrative. As its name suggests, the competing nationalisms thesis sees the state-building project as inherently conflictual. This implies that ideological competition is a normal part of political development in Third World countries and that modernization does not result in the cessation of
ideological rivalry as anticipated in conventional development theories, but provides the conditions that intensifies this rivalry.

**Shifts in the Metanarrative**

One significant finding arising from the testing of Proposition 3 is evidence pointing to shifts being made in the metanarrative in response to pressure from rival narratives or major political crises. These shifts point to the mutability of the official metanarrative, in addition to its durability. Both countries encountered a major regime crisis shortly after independence; and later in the 1980s both faced a significant political challenge from the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. These challenges affected the way the two states made use of the metanarrative.

Figure 7.1 "Competing Nationalisms: Indonesia -- Shifts in Metanarratives" and Figure 7.2 "Competing Nationalisms: Malaysia -- Shifts in Metanarratives" (both can be found at the end of this chapter) are based upon the elaboration of Figure 3.4 "Competing Nationalisms: Cross-Country Comparison" which attempts to map out the various ideological options available to the post-colonial state. Figure 7.1 attempts to diagram the shifts in Indonesia's metanarrative and Figure 7.2 attempts to diagram the shifts in Malaysia's metanarrative. These diagrams are intended to help us map ideological shifts in the official metanarrative and also to map out the ideological differences between the official metanarrative and narratives of opposition groups.

Indonesia's 1965 Gestapu "coup" arose in part from the fierce rivalries between the military (Western oriented secularists), the Muhammadiyah (modernist Muslims), and the PKI (communists). The New Order dealt with the regime crisis through two principal
means: (1) repression, turning Indonesia into a police state; and (2) propaganda, turning
the Pancasila into an instrument of authoritarian rule. Under the guise of "Pancasila
Orthodoxy," the original metanarrative was reinterpreted to make it a suitable instrument
for authoritarian rule. Where under Sukarno, the Pancasila's multi-vocal stance allowed
for open political competition and ideological diversity, under Suharto the Pancasila
became increasingly univocal and political competition severely constrained. This was
done through the process of deconfessionalization. Under deconfessionalization,
differences of opinion were allowed in public discourse so long as they did not cause
controversy or dissension, the end result being the curtailing of critical reasoning. This
was not so much a radical break as a reversion to a form of ideological control exercised
under Dutch rule. Thus, under New Order rule the Pancasila's multi-vocality was retained
but redefined to facilitate inclusive hegemony by bringing diverse groupings under the
New Order umbrella and restraining ideological competition. This shift from the
Pancasila's original multi-vocal stance to the uni-vocal stance of early New Order
Pancasila Orthodoxy can be seen in the shift from Position #1 to Position #2 in Figure
7.1.

Indonesia's metanarrative underwent another shift in the 1980s in response to
Suharto's "Islamic turn." In the early days of New Order rule, Suharto's close ties with the
Indonesian Army allowed him to enjoy considerable autonomy from Indonesian society.
By the 1980s, however, Suharto's power base began to erode as the relationship between
him and the Army became distant. In response to the erosion of his power base, Suharto
began reaching out to the Islamic activists by making symbolic concessions like ICMI. A
comparison of the early New Order with the late New Order shows interesting similarities
and differences. Where the early New Order regime comprised an inclusive hegemony
that exercised considerable autonomy from the Muslim sector, the late New Order regime
was an inclusive hegemony that favored the Muslim sector. This shifting of internal
political alliances resulted in Indonesia's metanarrative shifting from secular
authoritarianism to something like caesaropapism, an authoritarian regime that draws
upon the religion of the majority to solidify its rule. This second shift in the
metanarrative can be seen in the shift from Position #2 to Position #3 in Figure 7.1.

Malaysia's 1969 regime crisis arose out of the internal contradictions of
consociational democracy -- Malay paramountcy vs. liberal egalitarian democracy.
Liberal egalitarian democracy was multi-vocal, which enabled the new state to include
both Malays and non-Malays. At the same time, however, Malays feeling threatened by
the possibility of living under the rule of a non-Malay majority, insisted on constitutional
guarantees that safeguarded the Malays' "unique status." The consociational arrangement
sufficed until the communal violence that broke out following the 1969 elections.

In the aftermath of the 1969 regime crisis, the Malaysian state moved away from
the multi-vocality of consociational democracy to a more uni-vocal, pro-Malay stance,
i.e., to a form of inclusive hegemony. The Alliance's successor, the Barisan Nasional,
still included the three major communal parties: UMNO, MCA, and MIC but non-Malays
were no longer allowed to hold ministerial portfolios. In addition, the NEP was
promulgated which affirmed Malay paramountcy through economic policies intended to
redress economic inequality between Malay and Chinese. Public space in post-1969
Malaysia became increasingly uni-vocal as the result of policies that penalized the questioning of the Malays' unique status or the articulating of a "Malaysian Malaysia." As Verma puts it, the Malaysian state became a "monoethnic state" closely identified with one particular ethnic group, the Malays (2002:208). This shift in metanarrative can be seen in the shift from Position #1 to Position #2 in Figure 7.2.

In the 1980s, Malaysia's ethnic metanarrative faced another challenge, this time from within the Malay community. The resurgence of Islamic piety among Malay youth and the emergence of numerous reform movements gave new impetus to Islamic nationalism. In response to pressure from the dakwah movements, UMNO made a number symbolic concessions. Public space became increasingly uni-vocal in urban areas with the construction of mosques, the broadcasting of Muslim calls to prayers on government mass media, and the restrictions imposed on the construction of non-Muslim places of worship.

This marked a subtle, but significant, shift for state-religion relations in Malaysia. In the original metanarrative, Islam functioned as a symbol of the Malays' paramount status in a consociational polity. In the 1980s, Islam still retained its original function as a symbolic marker, however, the Malaysian government imposed the Islamic symbol system more aggressively upon public places to the growing unease of non-Muslims. This marked a subtle, but significant, shift in Malaysia's official metanarrative. Where at the time of independence Malaysia's ethnic metanarrative formed the basis for an inclusive consociational democracy, by the early 1990s it evolved into a form of caesaropapism -- an authoritarian government drawing upon the support of the majority,
or in this case, the religion of the core ethnic group, to strengthen its rule. Malaysia's polity continued to consist of an inclusive hegemony but with religious differences overshadowing ethnic differences it had taken a small, but significant, step towards theocratic rule. This particular shift can be seen in the "minor" shift from Position #2 to Position #3 in Figure 7.2.

Conclusion
The Advantages of the Competing Nationalisms Thesis

The comparative analysis of the two case studies supports the three propositions concerning the competing nationalisms thesis. From these findings, it can be argued that the competing nationalisms thesis has several advantages over conventional political development theory: (1) it is able to take into account religion as a significant variable in the political development of Third World nations; (2) it enables political scientists to investigate how Third World states dealt with the challenge of religious pluralism; (3) it enables political scientists to approach state-building in terms of discursive formation; and (4) it enables political scientists to carry out a comparative analysis of state-building projects.

Conventional theories have failed to anticipate the significance of religion as a political variable and are unable to recognize the complexities of state-religion relationships due to their secular assumptions. The competing nationalisms thesis is able to avoid this oversight because its multi-linear understanding of modernization allows for state-religion relations in which religion plays a key role in the legitimation of newly independent Third World states. Another advantage of the competing nationalisms thesis
is that its dialectical understanding of nation-building enables it to take into account the emergence of religious fundamentalism as a rival metanarrative.

Another advantage of the competing nationalisms thesis is its discursive approach to state-building. The discursive analysis of power enables us to go beyond the usual understanding of power as command-obedience or in terms of control of economic resources to take into account the relationship between ideology and political structures. It also enables us to take into account how religion impacts national "imagined communities" and informs identity projects that emerge in response to the disruptive consequences of modernization.

The usefulness of the competing nationalisms thesis can be seen in it enabling us to see the distinct stages of state-building that Indonesia and Malaysia went through, the differences in their progression through the various stages, and differences in the means used to carry out their respective state-building strategies. It offers political scientists a number of advantages not found in conventional models of development. With its three stage model of state-building, the competing nationalisms thesis builds upon the earlier attempts "to bring the state back in" and with its three fold typology of nationalisms that allows room for religion as a political variable, the competing nationalisms thesis contributes to development theory with its attempt "to bring religion back in." Therefore, with its typology of nationalisms and its model of state-building, the competing nationalisms thesis has much to offer to the field of comparative politics with respect to relationship among development theory, modernization, and state-building.
Figure 7.1 Competing Nationalisms: Indonesia -- Shifts in Metanarrative*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>This-Worldly Knowledge</th>
<th>Contested Middle</th>
<th>Other-Worldly Knowledge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uni-vocal</td>
<td>Multi-vocal</td>
<td>Uni-vocal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marxist-Leninist</td>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>Hegemonic</td>
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<td>Regimes</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Inclusion/</td>
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<td>PKI</td>
<td>Regimes</td>
<td>Caesaropapism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(early New Order)</td>
<td>(late New Order)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Pancasila</td>
<td>Suharto's Islamic</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Orthodoxy</td>
<td>Turn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Counter-Narrative</td>
<td>Position #2</td>
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<tr>
<td>(shift #2)</td>
<td>Position #1</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Position #3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Party</td>
<td>Islamic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denominations</td>
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* Ideal types in bold; National metanarratives underscored.
Figure 7.2 Competing Nationalisms: Malaysia -- Shifts in Metanarrative*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>This-Worldly Knowledge</th>
<th>Contested Middle</th>
<th>Other-Worldly Knowledge</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uni-vocal</td>
<td>Hegemonic</td>
<td>Multi-vocal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marxist-Leninist Regimes</td>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>Consociational</td>
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<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Pluralism</td>
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<td>Regimes</td>
<td>The &quot;Bargain&quot;</td>
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<td>Pre-1969 Alliance</td>
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<td>Post- 1969</td>
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<td>Barisan Nasional,</td>
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<td>NEP</td>
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<td>Position #1</td>
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<td>Counter-Narrative</td>
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<td>Position #3</td>
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<td>Muslim dominance</td>
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<td>in the public sphere</td>
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<td>Darul Arqam</td>
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<td>Jemaat Tabligh</td>
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<td>Religious Reform</td>
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<td>Religious Commune</td>
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<td>Private</td>
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* Ideal types in bold; National metanarratives underscored.
CHAPTER 8
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

Bringing the State Back In

This dissertation is part of a recent trend among political scientists to "bring the state back in," i.e., to treat the state as an autonomous actor in political development. It attempts to build upon this trend by attempting to understand the relationship between the state and religious pluralism.

In the Introduction, the research question for this dissertation was posed: How do states manage religious pluralism? The two case studies -- Indonesia and Malaysia -- confirmed the provisional answer, i.e., post-colonial states manage religious pluralism through the selection and imposition of a nationalist metanarrative as part of the state-building project.

This leaves the other research question: Why do states seek to manage religious pluralism? The provisional answer offered was that managing religious pluralism is an integral part of the post-colonial state-building project. Unlike its colonial predecessors, the post-colonial state is intended to be a modern nation-state in which the rulers of the political unit belong to the nation of the majority (see Gellner 1983:1). The modern nation-state constitutes a singular field of discourse that allows for elite coordination and mass mobilization (see Breuilly 1982:382 ff.). Religious pluralism must be managed because of its potential for disrupting the state's discursive formation and its capacity for generating communal conflict. Without this shared ideological framework, coordinated
action becomes problematic and political legitimacy becomes tenuous and unstable, leading to a weak nation-state.

The official metanarrative functions to unify the political elite (the state) with the political community (the nation). The imposition of the official metanarrative is key to the modern state's power. Migdal notes that what makes the modern state modern lies not just in the sheer magnitude of claims that the state makes on individuals as its ability to lay claim above all others to the collective consciousness, i.e., its ability to define the identity of the nation (1997:230). Unlike the premodern state, with its weak center and fragmented crazy quilt polity, the modern state consists of a strong administrative center effectively ruling over a unified and integrated polity. The standardization and legibility imposed upon society through the state-building project enhances the modern state's administrative capabilities, which in turn allows for the mobilization of resources not possible with earlier states.

The competing nationalisms thesis has certain advantages for state theory. The competing nationalisms thesis builds upon state theory by allowing political scientists to study religion as a political variable, especially in the Third World. By emphasizing the discursive aspects of state-building, it enables us to address more directly the question of religious pluralism. By approaching religion as "ideologies of order," it enables us to approach religion as a political variable rather than as private ritual. This approach enables us to take note of the tensions between what Habermas called "steering problems" and "problems of mutual understanding" embedded in modern society (1987:363). It allows us to expand upon the Weberian notion of the state by: (1) situating the state in a
more historically dynamic and evolutionary model of state-building, (2) making more explicit state-society relations, and (3) taking into account the discursive dimension of state power.

Many Third World countries have held on to religious symbolism even as they undertook ambitious modernization projects. The prominence of religion in Third World societies stems from a historical trajectory that differs from the West. In traditional societies, religious symbolism has been the primary idiom by which power is expressed and legitimated. The European Enlightenment gave rise to an alternative symbol system for expressing and legitimating political action. The secular symbol system of the modern West can function effectively as the metanarrative providing that the "nation" -- the general population -- has embraced the symbol system of the modern West. This has not been the case in many Third World countries, where modernization is viewed as an alien import and where the European Enlightenment has influenced only a part of the tiny elite. For the modernizing elite to jettison the traditional symbol system still adhered to by the populace and replace it with the secular ideologies of the West is to run the risk of alienating themselves from the "nation" and jeopardizing the new state's legitimacy. This has resulted in numerous political elites retaining traditional symbol systems for expressing and legitimizing political power.

The competing nationalisms thesis contains some interesting implications for Weber's definition of the state. In his "Politics as a Vocation," Weber was vague about the "human community" claiming the monopoly on legitimate violence. The competing nationalisms thesis suggests that this community is defined by its particular
metanarrative. This political core could be clerical -- as in the case of a theocratic state, or university educated or part of the modern bureaucracy -- as in the case of a secular state, or part of the traditional elite -- as in the case of an ethnic state. Also in his essay, Weber insisted that the state could not be defined in terms of its ends. But the competing nationalisms thesis suggests that it is the nationalist metanarrative that guides the state in its exercise of power. The modern state exists not just for the purpose of concentrating power, but also for the purpose of inscribing the metanarrative on society. Where coercion provides the content for the power of the modern state, the metanarrative provides the form. The goal of the post-colonial state-building project is the creation of a nation-state, an entity in which both the state (the political elite) and the nation (the political community) are united on the basis of a shared metanarrative.

Globalization and Going Beyond the Nation-State

Although this dissertation's research was carried out primarily within the framework of the nation-state, it should be noted that Southeast Asian politics and Islam cannot be understood solely within the context of the nation-state.

The collapse of the colonial system in Southeast Asia came about, not as a result of internal forces, but through the Japanese military conquest. The Japanese laid the basis for the post-colonial state by shattering the myth of European superiority and by introducing modern organizational practices and structures.

The British attempt to impose the Malayan Union on Malaysia reflected the pressures stemming from international politics. The liberal premises of the Malayan Union can be traced to the Atlantic Charter which was formulated by Roosevelt and
Churchill in 1941, in an attempt to set up the post-WW II global order. One of the stated principles of the Atlantic Charter was the right of all peoples to choose their government (Stockwell 1979:19). Also the British saw interracial harmony as necessary for protecting the West's security in the face of the Communist threat and for protecting British economic investments in Malaysia.

In the case of Indonesia the relinquishing of their claims to Indonesia by the Dutch was the result of American diplomatic pressures. During the 1950s, Cold War politics and Sukarno's friendly stance towards the Communists led to American intervention in Indonesia's internal politics. The U.S. supported the PRRI rebels in East Indonesia (Ricklefs 1981:263). Close ties between ABRI and the American military enhanced the Indonesian Army's organizational clout, paving the way for the New Order regime. The collapse of Suharto's New Order regime can be attributed to the Asian Financial Crisis and to Indonesia's integration into the Southeast Asian regional economy during the 1970s and 1980s.

In recent years, a new field of study has emerged: globalization. Globalization began to attract the attention of social scientists in the early 1990s and as of this writing has yet to reach its peak. This has significant implications for how research is done by political scientists in the subfield of comparative politics. The long standing division of labor within political science between the subfields of comparative politics and international relations has become problematic in recent years.

In the years to come it will become increasingly imperative for comparativists to take into account the emerging global context and to extend their theorizing beyond the
conceptual framework of the nation-state. They will need to take into account transnational phenomena that are shaping political reality, e.g., multinational corporations outsourcing the production process, diasporic flows that result in significant shifts in population across national borders, and transnational religious movements that seek to coordinate manpower across national borders. Castells in *The Power of Identity* (1997) notes that globalization is causing the erosion of the nation-state's basis for power (see Chapter 5). Deane Neubauer in "The Incredible Shrinking State" (1997) suggests that the forces of globalization are undermining the basis of the current positive state and in time will give rise to a radically different type of state. However, Anthony Smith in *Nationalism and Modernism* (1998) suggests that it may premature for critics of nationalism to predict the demise of the nation-state (1998:213-216).

**Islam and Globalization**

The nature and character of Islam are changing rapidly, especially in the face of modernization and, more recently, globalization. Globalization has brought about the acceleration and intensification of transnational cultural flows. This in turn has given rise to transnational Islamic identities. The Islamic *umma* has acquired a new kind of reality in recent years. With the emergence of *al-Jazeera*, an international media station

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1 Neubauer also advances an intriguing evolutionary model for state-building. Arguing that states develop attributes consistent with the political economy of the time, he posits five state types: (1) the minimalist state, (2) the regulatory state, (3) the welfare state, (4) the positive state, and (5) the impending model that result from the globalization of political relations. This is taken from a presentation given at the Peace Institute, University of Hawaii at Manoa in 1997.

2 This is not a brand new development. Islam has long had a transnational character. For centuries the Islamic *umma* has been unified through the yearly *haj* to Mecca. The European colonial system with its transportation and communications systems facilitated travel and the exchange of ideas among Muslims under its rule. It is also somewhat ironic that it was in those areas where the British exercised direct rule, e.g., Singapore, that Islamic activists were able to propagate their ideas and be influenced by Islamic thinkers in other parts of the world, e.g., Pakistan and Egypt (Milner 1986:56). The *dakwah* movement which has been so influential among Muslim fundamentalists is by nature a transnational movement (Piscatori 1986:144).
indigenous to the Muslim world, communication among Muslims is no longer confined to newspapers and magazines, media that for the most part conform to national borders. The horrific terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent American response have given rise to intensified Islamic identities and contributed to the recent Islamic resurgence (Verma 2002:90 ff. and 207 ff.).

Islamic fundamentalism is a powerful expression of modernity. Its significance can be seen in how it marks a break from earlier forms of Islam (Tibi 1998:xi). Religious syncretism is multi-vocal. When a world religion like Islam expands, crossing regional and cultural boundaries, it adapts itself to local situations (see Bowen 1993; Saleh 2001:22 ff.). The diversity of local expressions of religious practices corresponds to Scott's *metis*. Religious fundamentalism, on the other hand, is characterized by uni-vocality. It decries syncretistic adaptations as adulterations of the "pure" faith and calls for the return to the pristine purity of the original faith community. Religious fundamentalism's uni-vocality is what makes it significant for the modern nation-state. Its uni-vocality parallels one of the fundamental axioms of the modern nation-state, i.e., the quest for uniform political culture. This accounts for why Islamic fundamentalists vigorously resist the official metanarrative and seek to seize control of the state in order to impose their own metanarrative.

Islam's stress on *this worldly* salvation makes it even more potent as a political force in nation-building politics. Lapidus describes Islam's potential for political action:

...it provides the symbols of loyalty, the rhetoric of identification, the justification of leadership, the rationale, the legitimation and the

3 Despite criticisms of the term "fundamentalism," social scientists continue to regard the term to be a useful one (see Almond, Appleby, and Sivan 2003:90 ff.; Tibi 1998:ix ff.).
motivation for action. Islam as a religion, as set of beliefs, [and as a political ideology] supplies the vocabulary and the images that Muslim peoples use to cope with mundane political, economic, and institutional problems. . . . Islamic beliefs constitute the vocabulary of political action, the elements of which may be combined and recombined in innumerable ways depending upon situational needs (in Lapidus 1983:49; see also Lapidus 1990).

Just as the recent Islamic revival has been a response to the modern nation-building project, we can expect that it will also provide a powerful, and possibly even disruptive, response to the emerging phenomenon of globalization. Paul Lubeck's "Islamist Responses to Globalization" (1998) discusses the interplay of post-Fordist production, state developmental capacity, and the historical legacy of Islamic institutions of countries like Malaysia.

**Bringing Religion Back In**

The two case studies challenge the "modernization = secularization" paradigm on several different levels. Religion played a significant role in the way the national constitution was framed: Indonesia was to have a supra-religious unitary state, while Malaysia's government would comprise a democratic state designed to protect the special status of the Malays and Islam, the distinctive religion of the Malays. Religion also played an important role shaping patron-client relations. Patronage often took the form of monies for mosque construction and scholarships for religious education (Rogers 1975:222). Both states embarked on ambitious development programs that despite their success failed spectacularly to secularize society. Also significant was the fact that political opposition frequently appropriated Islamic discourse as a means of challenging the legitimacy of the state.
Conventional development theories posited two outcomes of modernization: (1) the decline of religion and (2) the decline of primordial ethnic identities. Neither of these has occurred in either Indonesia or Malaysia. In her survey of the various *dakwah* groups in Malaysia, Judith Nagata notes that the preponderance of their members came, not from traditional Malay villages, but from recently urbanized, university educated Malay youths (1986:43; Jomo and Cheek 1988:843; Husin 1990:62 ff.). Thus, modern education, contrary to the expectations of many modernization theories, has given rise to the Islamic resurgence. The secularization thesis is further weakened by the fact that a religious resurgence was even taking place among non-Malays (see Nagata 1984:204 ff.; Muzaffar (1987); Ackerman and Lee (1988)). In the case of Indonesia, Suharto's Islamic turn and ICMI's widespread popularity point to the persistence of religion even after the New Order's ambitious development programs attained many of its goals.

Jean Comaroff, noting that religion and ritual play an important role in the life of "modern" Asian societies, suggests that it is time for social scientists to question Weber's disenchantment of the world thesis (1994:301). What Weber failed to anticipate was the extent to which non-Westerners would resist the disenchantment of their lifeworld. This does not mean that the *withering away of religion* thesis was altogether wrong. Ackerman and Lee note that while modernization has contributed to the decline of traditional ascriptive religious structures, it has also spurred the emergence of religious innovation and entrepreneurialism. But what it means is that there is a need to rethink how we understand modernization and its impact on religion.

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4 Weber's disenchantment thesis holds up for Western Europe but not for non-European societies (see Casanova 1994:27-29).
If the secularization paradigm is seriously flawed, this has serious implications for policy makers. There is a need for policy makers to become aware of the fact modernization is not unilinear but multilinear, and that they are part of a particular historical trajectory, i.e., the European rationalist Enlightenment and its secular values.\(^5\) It is only by becoming critically aware of the particularity of their \textit{weltanschauung} that they can enter into dialogue with those from outside the modern Western conceptual framework.\(^6\) Failure to comprehend the complexities of modernization can lead to a cavalier dismissal of religious concerns as being made by irrational troublemakers and to increasingly draconian and authoritarian state actions.

These implications are especially pertinent for those involved in making educational policies, both in the West and in developing societies. Instead of taking public education for granted, these policy makers need to be aware of public education's crucial role in modern nation-building. Gellner wrote:

\begin{quote}
At the base of the modern social order stands not the executioner but the professor. Not the guillotine, but the (aptly named) \textit{doctorat d'etat} is the main tool and symbol of state power. The monopoly of legitimate education is now more important, more central than is the monopoly of legitimate violence (1983:34).
\end{quote}

A good example of this is the secular French government's recent attempts to forbid Muslim girls from wearing head scarves in the schools. This is not a minor issue given France's sizable Muslim population that has been augmented by recent diasporic flows from other Muslim countries. It is possible that the French government's struggle to

\(^5\) See Ernest Gellner's pithy description of the European rationalist Enlightenment as a cultural package (1992:80 ff.)

\(^6\) See David Little's article on the how U.S. foreign policy makers can respond to the growing prominence of religion in international affairs (1998).
impose the secular metanarrative on Muslims could presage the breakdown of the French nation-building project.

In the Introduction, it was noted that political science has, for the most part, neglected the relationship between religion and politics. For too long the secularization paradigm has dominated the social sciences and constrained research in the social sciences. Madsen et al. in their introduction to *Meaning and Modernity* (2002) write:

There is a painful contradiction between what modernity promises and what it delivers. It promises--indeed demands--intellectual, moral, and political emancipation. Yet it delivers an iron cage. Modern persons aspire to express themselves as autonomous individuals, even as their choices are firmly channeled into paths laid down by the modern market economy and bureaucratic state. The social sciences embody these contradictions. .... Morality, religion, and the whole normative dimension of social life get either pushed out of sight or explained away as resultants of more important, or more real, factors. What goes typically unnoticed and unremarked is how this apparently straightforward approach locks its adherents into a closed universe of diminished meaning and possibility (2002:ix).

However, social scientists are attempting to break out of the strictures imposed by this paradigm. The "return of religion" in political science was facilitated by similar developments in other fields: restoration of "power" in sociology of religion (see Beckford), the "cultural turn" in sociology in general (see Robertson 1992), and Robert Bellah's "symbolic realism" (see Madsen et al. 2002:xii ff.). In his essay "Between Religion and Social Science," Bellah notes that social science's neglect of religion has its roots in the antagonistic relationship between modern science and religion, and that social science now has the conceptual tools needed to go beyond this impasse (1971:244).

In closing, I would like to note that this dissertation represents an attempt to problematize the concept of modernity. I have attempted to demonstrate that
modernization is not unilinear but multilinear and dialectical. I have also attempted to take into account that people are not only situated in social structures, but rather inhabit a symbolic universe. Modern social science has long been constrained by the secularization paradigm. It is finally waking up to the fact it is in an "iron cage" and only now is slowly making its way out.
GLOSSARY

Chapter 5 - Indonesian Terms

abangan  
A nominal Muslim

ABRI  
_Angkatan Bersenjata Republic Indonesia_ - Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia

adat  
Custom, tradition

bahasa Indonesia  
Indonesian language

BPKI  
_Badan Penyelidik Kemerdekaan Indonesia_ (founded in May 1945; succeeded by PPKI)

BPUPKI  
_Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia_ - The Investigative Body for the Preparatory Matters for Indonesian Independence

Constituante  
Constituent Assembly (tasked with drafting a permanent constitution to replace the 1945 Constitution)

Golkar  
_Golongan Karyawan_ - "functional groups", the government political party

IAIN  
_Institut Agama Indonesia Negeri_ - Government Institute for Islamic Studies

ICMI  
_Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia_ - Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association

Masyumi  
_Majelis Syruro Muslimin Indonesia_

Modernist  
An understanding of Islam that stresses the purification of Islam from any foreign element, has a well defined boundary between the secular and the sacred, and emphasizes an activist approach to life (see Geertz 1960:149 ff.).

Muhammadiyah  
A Modernist Islamic organization

naib  
A mosque official or deputy of local religious affairs

NU  
_Nahdatul Ulama_ - the Rise of the Righteous Scholars

Kantor Urusan Agama  
Religious Affairs Office

Parmusi  
_Partai Muslimin Indonesia_ - Indonesian Muslim Party

penghulu  
Village chief, Muslim leader

pesantren  
A school for Qur'anic studies, usually a boarding school for children and youths
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition/Explanation</th>
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<td>P4</td>
<td><em>Pedoman, Penghayatan dan Pengalaman Pancasila</em> - Guide to the Full Comprehension and Practice of Pancasila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
<td><em>Partai Komunis Indonesia</em> - Indonesian Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPKI</td>
<td><em>Panitia Persiapan Kemderdekaan Indonesia</em> - Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>priyayi</td>
<td>A member of the Javanese upper class</td>
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<tr>
<td>PUSA</td>
<td><em>Persatuan Ulama- Ulama Seluruh Aceh</em> &quot;All Aceh Ulama Association&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>santri</td>
<td>A strict Muslim, a student of the <em>pesantren</em> (Muslim school)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARA</td>
<td><em>Suku Agama Ras Antargolongan</em> - ethnicity, religion, race and inter-group competition</td>
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**Chapter 6 - Malaysian Terms**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition/Explanation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ABIM</td>
<td>Angkatan Belia Islamiyyah Malaysia</td>
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<tr>
<td>asabiyah</td>
<td>Communal (ethnic) parochialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bahasa Melayu</td>
<td>Malayan language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bangsa</td>
<td>nation, people, race</td>
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<tr>
<td>the Bargain</td>
<td>The informal power sharing agreement made among the leaders of UMNO, MCA, and MIC that formed the basis for consociationalism.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barisan Nasional</td>
<td>National Front, successor organization to the Alliance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Berjaya</td>
<td><em>Bersatu Rakyat Jelata Sabah</em> (Sabah United People's Party), aligned with the Nasional Barisan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>bumi putra</td>
<td>Literally, &quot;son of the earth&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>dakwah</td>
<td>Traditionally any Muslim missionary activity, but more recently understood to mean Islamic revivalist groups.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAP</td>
<td>Democratic Action Party (the main rival to the Chinese MCA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>'Emergency'</td>
<td>The period from 1948 to 1960 in which the British government fought against the Malayan Communist Party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>Federated Malay States: Negeri Sembilan, Pahang, Perak, and Selangor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISA</td>
<td>Internal Securities Act - legal measures that gave the government sweeping authoritarian powers, especially to detain people without charges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>kampung</td>
<td>Traditional Malay village</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCA</td>
<td>Malaysian (earlier Malayan) Chinese Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentri Besar</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merdeka</td>
<td>Independence</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIC</td>
<td>Malaysian (earlier Malayan) Indian Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPAJA</td>
<td>Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>New Development Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEP</td>
<td>New Economic Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOC</td>
<td>National Operations Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of Islamic Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAS</td>
<td>Partai Al-Islamin Se-Malaysia - Pan-Malayan Islamic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBS</td>
<td>Parti Bersatu Sabah, not aligned with the Barisan Nasional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERKIM</td>
<td>Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam SeMalaysia - Islamic Welfare Association of Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMIP</td>
<td>Pan Malaya Islamic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shariah</td>
<td>Divine law based upon the Qur'an and the Sunnah (tradition), also spelled shari'a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tun/Tunku</td>
<td>Title for nobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ulama</td>
<td>Islamic scholars or authorities, also the body of learned persons competent to rule on religious matters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMNO</td>
<td>United Malay National Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMS</td>
<td>Unfederated Malay States: Johore, Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Dipertuan Agung</td>
<td>Literally, He who is made Lord</td>
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