AESTHETIC SPONTANEITY:
A THEORY OF ACTION BASED ON AFFECTIVE RESPONSIVENESS

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For my parents.
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is an attempt to analyze an indigenous concept of early Chinese Philosophy in its own context, interpreting it outside of a contemporary Western philosophical framework (to the extant that such an exercise is possible), then to comb the history of Western philosophy for related concepts, in order to finally enrich the contemporary philosophical landscape by incorporating this concept through a useful and familiar set of conceptual tools.

The concept in question is *ziran*, rendered spontaneity, a central notion of early Chinese philosophy but one that has not been philosophically elaborated to an adequate degree in sinological literature. Preliminary to addressing spontaneity, one must first address the outstanding metaphysical issue of intersubjective interaction in early Chinese philosophy, and such an investigation must center on the difficult notion of *qing*, rendered affectivity in a general sense meant to encompass not only emotion but all cognition. On the sensitivity-and-response model of Chinese interpenetrative interaction, affectivity is found to be a central component of such interaction.

Having laid the groundwork for an analysis of spontaneity, I examine the skill episodes of the early Chinese Daoist work *Zhuangzi*, abstracting out four defining features of spontaneous action. After elaborating on these features in context and in relation to each other, I turn to the Western philosophical tradition to see if any aspects of spontaneity or its underlying metaphysics can be discovered there. Although metaphysical differences are constantly an obstacle, I find significant parallels to
spontaneity in such figures as Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Schiller, James, and Dewey. Through extended examination of this wide variety of philosophical theories, a more nuanced and enriched understanding of spontaneity results.

Finally, I bring spontaneity to bear on aesthetic and moral action. Here I make a number of original contributions regarding how to conceptualize spontaneous action with regard to formality and syntax of actions in activities, regarding a division of the arts into somatic and non-somatic, regarding the relationship of spontaneity to improvisation, and regarding the possibility and challenge of cultivating spontaneity in art and in moral action.

Similar philosophical gains are prompted through the dissertation, such as the logical impossibility of judgment, the possibility and desirability of unnatural action, the distinction of numismatic terminology, and the usefulness of the inchoate.
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CHAPTER 1: AFFECTIVITY AS RESPONSIVENESS

What [the Yi Jing] is all about, is discovering the "essential dynamics" in the world of changes, the underlying realm of real dynamic characteristics that are essential factors in bringing about change. At this crucial point in the book, the keyword is qing 情.¹

The translation of the term qing in early China is controversial, because the term is perceived to suggest, on the one hand, objectivity, nature, and reality, and on the other, subjectivity, emotion, and desire.²

The purpose of this chapter is to clear up two long-standing issues regarding affectivity³ in early Chinese philosophy: first, the status of affectivity as it extends beyond personal boundaries, and second, the axiological status of affectivity. In the process of this discussion, a third long-standing issue must take priority, namely which terms were used to express affectivity in the early Chinese lexicon. The chapter falls naturally into two parts, both centering on Zhuangzi as a main source for these issues and drawing significantly from the recently excavated On Nature and Affectivity (Xingqing).

Zhuangzi was one of the subtlest thinkers of early China, and because his language often involves novel or paradoxical uses of terms and because he addresses philosophical issues indirectly, his claims can be obscure. Zhuangzi wrote at the height

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¹ Christoph Harbsmeier in Eifring, Love and Emotion in Traditional Chinese Literature, p. 39.
³ I use the term "affectivity" rather than "feeling," "emotion," or "passion" for several reasons. Etymologically, "affectivity" connotes more thoroughly both sides of a psychological causality than either "emotion" or "passion." Affectivity implies psychological interaction between two subjects or between a subject and the world, while "emotions" implies an inner "motive" power of a subject, and "passion" implies a "passive" subject at the mercy of inner forces. "Feeling" implies an interaction, but this is more in a proprioceptive sense. In addition, each of the other three terms are traditionally set in dualist opposition to reason. Affectivity can stand one step prior in the psychological process to this duality and encompass it, such that both thoughts and feelings can be affects.
of early Chinese philosophical activity, heir to works ascribed to Confucius and Mozi, and roughly contemporaneous with Mencius and the work Laozi Daodejing.

Philosophically, he is considered consistent with the latter and an opponent to the former three. Society was arranged in a way that nominally cohered with the thought of Confucius (i.e. Ruism), against which Zhuangzi rebelled in the name of a naturalistic freedom. And against the rigorous Mozi and his legions, Zhuangzi extended their logic to absurdist ends. Zhuangzi was a thorn in the side of both Ruists and Mohists, and while there is a distinct humor to his work, he was neither a jester nor a charlatan. On the contrary, and in the vein of Laozi, his work is a sobering challenge to the absolutism of politics and logic.

The relativistic and skeptical sides of Zhuangzi have been explored extensively. What has received less attention is his positive theory of the aesthetics of action. But before embarking on that topic, one must first take the preliminary steps of understanding his notion of affectivity. The three unresolved issues mentioned above are all evident in a single passage of Zhuangzi:

惠子謂莊子曰：「人故無情乎？」莊子曰：「然。」惠子曰：「人而無情，何以謂之人？」莊子曰：「道與之貌，天與之形，惡得不謂之人？」惠子曰：「既謂之人，惡得無情？」莊子曰：「是非吾所謂情也。吾所謂無情者，言人之不以好惡內傷其身，常因自然而不益生也。」惠子曰：「不益生，何以有其身？」莊子曰：「道與之貌，天與之形，無以好惡內傷其身。今子外乎子之神，勞乎子之精，倚樹而吟，據槁梧而瞑。天邁子之形，子以堅白鳴！」

Huizi said to Zhuangzi, "Can humans be without qing?" Zhuangzi said, "Yes." Huizi said, "If humans are without qing, how can they be called humans?" Zhuangzi said, "Dao gives them an appearance and nature (tian) gives them a form, so how can they not be called humans?" Huizi said, "If they can be called humans, how is it that they have no qing?" Zhuangzi said, "What I call qing is approbatory judgment. In my opinion, people who are without qing do not form preferences which thereby injure their persons. Instead, they respond spontaneously, without augmenting life." Huizi said, "How can people maintain their persons without augmenting life?" Zhuangzi said, "Dao gives them an appearance, nature gives them a form, and
they do not injure their persons by forming preferences. You exercise all of your energies externally, exhausting yourself completely. You lean against a tree, moaning, or sleep bent over your table. Nature selected your form, but your call has become 'logic, logic, logic'."

This passage depicts a typical exchange between Zhuangzi and Huizi, who was a polished practitioner of the method of closely argued disputation that was in vogue at the time. Huizi begins by pursuing the validity of an apparent claim that humans can be "without qing," taking the position that qing is a necessary condition for applying the label "human." Zhuangzi implicitly denies qing as a necessary condition, appealing to form as substance, apparently rejecting the notion of essentialism with regard to human beings. Huizi insists that humans must have qing, and Zhuangzi clarifies his point by defining qing as an act of approbatory judgment, explaining that forming preferences can do harm to one's person and that rather than acting positively to improve one's life based on the limiting preferences, one should react spontaneously. Hui Shi responds that if one does not improve one's life, one will not have much of a person, to which Zhuangzi suggests pointedly that Hui Shi damages his own self by forming preferences and squanders his energies in worthless external pursuits, namely narrow philosophical dialogue, rather than leading a life of balanced spontaneity that preserves an inner power.

The most philosophically important passage in this quotation is Zhuangzi's penultimate statement which bears isolating and repeating: "What I call qing is approbatory judgment. In my opinion, people who are without qing do not form preferences which thereby injure their persons. Instead, they respond spontaneously, without augmenting life." This is the earliest definition we have of qing. In order to get at the subtleties of this statement, I'll begin with several divergent translations:
'Judging "That's it, that's not" is what I mean by "the essentials of man". What I mean by being without the essentials is that the man does not inwardly wound his person by likes and dislikes, that he constantly goes by the spontaneous and does not add anything to the process of life.' (Graham)

"That is not what I mean by emotions," said Master Chuang. "What I mean by having no emotions is to say that a man should not inwardly harm his person with 'good' and 'bad,' but rather should accord with the spontaneous and not add to life." (Mair)

Chuang Tzu: "That's not what I mean by feelings. When I talk about having no feelings, I mean that a man doesn't allow likes or dislikes to et in and do him harm. He just lets things be the way they are and doesn't try to help life along." (Watson)

"You are misunderstanding what I mean by passions and desires. What I mean when I say that he is without these is, that this man does not by his likings and dislikings do any inward harm to his body;--he always pursues his course without effort, and does not (try to) increase his (store of) life." (Legge)

Graham's passage diverges from the other three in two respects: his interpretation of the first sentence and his translation of qing. I will argue that his is acceptable in the first respect and in need of revision in the second.

Each of the last three translations begins with the admission of a misunderstanding, namely that Huizi has indicated a meaning of qing with which Zhuangzi cannot agree. It is impossible on a syntactic or lexical level to adjudicate between Graham's interpretation and the other three. There is another way, however. The question arises from the ambiguity of the first two terms of Zhuangzi's quotation, shifei. Graham interprets them as a lexical unit common to Mohist style debate. The others interpret the first term as a pronoun and the second as a sentential negation. A legitimate way of resolving this type of interpretive impasse (though not entirely definitive) is to appeal to other uses in the same text. In the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi, the characters shi and fei appear together in this order 12 times outside of this instance, all unambiguously in the sense that Graham takes them to have here. In
addition, one appearance is just prior to our passage in question, in a passage that
happens to also discuss the problem of being without qing. This passage contains a
laudatory description of a sage:

有人之形，無人之情。有人之形，故群於人。無人之情，故是非不得於身。

He has the form of a human but not the qing. He has the form of a human, and so gathers
with other people. He is without qing, and so shi and fei do not enter his person.

Taking this passage into account, the interpretation of the passage following appears to be
an open and shut case. All four translations agree in translating this instance of shifei
along the lines of Graham's interpretation (though in the Mohist use), so how could the
instance of shifei in the very next passage, that also discusses being without qing, mean
something different, and contrary to every other use in the same text? For this reason,
then, I will take Graham to be correct in understanding the passage in question to be a
rudimentary definition of qing, which, again, is not important just in Zhuangzi, but also
for being the first definition of qing that we have in Chinese philosophy.4

Qing for Zhuangzi, taking our original passage into account, involves making
approbatory judgments and, going on to the next line, which appears to be an extension
of his clarification, qing entails not only judging but also forming preferences based on
those judgments, and those preferences influence one's inner person. Any philosopher
will immediately identify this as a definition of emotion, and it's odd that this in itself has
not been evidence enough to attribute an affective content to qing. Robert Solomon
defines emotions in this way:

4 In regard to the opinions of Chinese commentators on interpreting shifei, they appear to be split on this
issue, but none that I have found have taken into account other uses in the same text.
An emotion is a basic judgment about our Selves and our place in the world, the projection of the values and ideals, structures and mythologies, according to which we live and through which we experience our lives.\(^5\)

In her recent work, Martha Nussbaum, taking a neo-Stoic view, concurs:

> emotions are forms of evaluative\(^6\) judgment that ascribe to certain things and persons outside a person's own control great importance for the person's own flourishing.\(^7\)

These two philosophers are presently our major theorists on emotions and they agree not only that emotions are judgments but also that they are judgments that affect our inner world. This is one of Nussbaum's major theses—that emotions are not simply physiological reflexes but are reflections of a person's stance on issues that immediately impact the person's inner world.\(^8\) Could I be guilty of ascribing a Western definition of emotion to Zhuangzi and basing my interpretation of *qing* on that? Zhuangzi says unequivocally that *qing* essentially involves forming approbatory judgments and preferences (that can injure oneself). I don't see a reason not to consider such a statement a definition of affectivity.

Graham differs from the other three translators in another way, as well. He renders *qing* "the essential" to the others' affective terminology ("emotions," "passions and desires", "feelings"). On this issue, I must now side with the majority. There can be no question that *qing* has affective content. The question now is what kind of affectivity it is and why Zhuangzi appears set against it. While Zhuangzi appears to be in agreement with Nussbaum and Solomon on the definition of affectivity in a fundamental sense,

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\(^6\) Although "evaluative" and "approbatory" are essentially two ways of saying the same thing, I choose "approbatory" as my translation to prevent the misconstrual that I am drawing exact congruencies between divergent traditions.

\(^7\) Martha Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought*, p. 22.

\(^8\) Although Nussbaum remarks in a note that she distances herself from Solomon by going further than him on this point, she acknowledges that there is agreement in a fundamental sense.
Solomon and Nussbaum take affectivity as a necessary and inseparable part of cognition, while Zhuangzi appears to be advocating the elimination of it. In the following sections, I will adumbrate affectivity in *Zhuangzi* by finding evidence for interpreting it as responsiveness and then explore the role of responsiveness in Zhuangzi’s axiology.

**Part 1: Qing as Affectivity**

When reading the works of an important thinker, look first for the apparent absurdities in the text and ask yourself how a sensible person could have written them. When you find an answer, when those passages make sense, then you may find that more central passages, ones you previously understood, have changed their meaning.

Thomas Kuhn, *The Essential Tension*

The term *qing* 情, the meaning of which in Modern Standard Chinese is often translated "emotions", as in *ganqing* 感情 or *qingxu* 情緒, occurs four times in the *Mencius* none of which seem to obviously connote affectivity, and instead appear to mean something like "situation". Yet in the Inner Chapters of the *Zhuangzi*, roughly contemporaneous with the *Mencius,* *qing* is defined specifically as affectivity. This section shall explore how it is that the word *qing* could harbor two such different senses. I will begin by exploring the usage of *qing* in other early Chinese texts, with the prospect in mind of reconciling these two divergent meanings.

In the appendix to his article "The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature," A. C. Graham ventures several English equivalents for *qing*:
As a noun it means 'the facts'... as an adjective 'genuine'... as an adverb common in Mozi 'genuinely'.

Graham is explicit in stating that in pre-Han literature qing never means 'passions'," as it does, he says, in Neo-Confucianism, when it is contrasted with xing 性 nature. Only in the "ritualistic school of Confucianism", he says, does qing take on the meaning of emotions in even a roundabout way:

In Xunzi and the Liji... qing is the genuine and unassumed... In these texts, but nowhere else in pre-Han literature, the word refers only to the genuine in man which it is polite to disguise, and therefore to his feelings.

It is from this usage, Graham says, that qing as emotions developed.

The passage typically cited as the earliest definition of qing occurs in Xunzi, Chapter 22:

性之好惡喜怒哀樂謂之情

The emotions of xing are called qing.

Using synecdoche, Chinese often uses representative parts of wholes to stand for the wholes themselves. In modern Chinese, for instance, we still have "long/short" to mean "length." Even in English, we often say "pros and cons" rather than, say, "evaluative criteria". Similarly, in the classical language, it was common to refer to affectivity by using from as few as two (e.g. aile 喜怒) to as many as seven (e.g. haoexinuaileyu 好惡

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11 Graham chooses to render xing "nature", stating in the first passage of his article that it is one of the few Chinese philosophical terms that has a near equivalent in English. He goes on later in the article, however, to demonstrate that it means less what one is born with and more the direction in which one grows, referring to it in terms of "tendencies" and "inclinations" (e.g. p. 38).
specific emotions, there being no single distinct term for emotions in the sense that we use "emotions" today.

On my reading, however, when Xunzi says, "性之好惡喜怒哀樂謂之情 the self-nature's emotions (preferences, happiness, anger, grief, and joy) are called qing, he is not suggesting a new definition for qing such that the other 115 times he uses the word he means it specifically in this new technical sense. In fact, the statement occurs rather late in the book as we have it today. Looking at the other two occurrences of "xinualve" in Xunzi can afford a useful angle.

In Chapter 17, we find the following passage:

天職既立，天功既成，形具而神生，好惡喜怒哀樂哀焉，夫是之謂天情。

Nature's work having been set and it's achievements completed, forms having been solidified and spirits brought forth, emotions [lit.: preferences, happiness, anger, grief, and enjoyment] are stored within. This is what we call the natural qing.14

Here is another apparent definition of qing, and when we take a close look at the context surrounding this passage, we see that it is more than a bare proposition. The passage is embedded in a chapter that John Knoblock translates "Discourse on Nature,"15 which describes the coursing of the natural processes, from constellations to the sun and moon, to the four seasons, to the yin and yang, to the wind and rain. All aspects of the world must function in harmony, and human affectivity is part of this functioning. Qing, we see, is not a static entity, or a mere psychological state, but a collection of processes that harmonize with the outer world.

14 All translations are mine if not otherwise noted.
In Chapter 22, not many lines beyond the passage translated by Graham above, we find the following:

Forms, bodies, colors, and patterns are differentiated by the eye. Sounds, voices, clarity, muffledness, pitches, harmonies, and odd sounds are differentiated by the ear. Sweet, bitter, salty, bland, spicy, sour, and odd flavors are differentiated by the mouth. Fragrant, malodorous, sweet, pungent, ripe, putrid, and odd smells are differentiated by the nose. Pain, itching, cold, heat, smooth, rough, light, and heavy are differentiated by the body. Emotions [lit.: happiness\(^{16}\), anger, grief, enjoyment, love, hate, and desire] are differentiated by the heart\(^{17}\).

Here the larger context is an argument about naming and the differentiation that takes place prior to naming. The naturally endowed sense organs facilitate differentiation, each according to its own faculty. The heart plays a special role, as both a sense organ and an organ of intention. In order to be effective, the sense organs must come into contact with the outside world. Notice that their placement in the parallel structure shows the emotions to be sense impressions, impressed from the external world through one's experience of the external world. They are shareable and objectifiable in the same sense that two people experience the same pepper to taste spicy or the same peony to smell sweet. In this sense, affectivity is neither private nor subjective. It is a response to experience in the world.

\(^{16}\) The characters *shuogu* 說故 appear to be excremental and are therefore left untranslated.

\(^{17}\) The term *xin* 心 fundamentally means the organ of the heart. Because it is often used as the seat of thought, it is rendered by some translators as "mind". As it is also considered the seat of emotion, others seek a balance through a neologism such as "heartmind". Recognizing that colloquial English has the heart as the seat of emotions in contradistinction to the brain as the seat of mentation, the reader should be aware that references to the heart in Chinese assume no such physiological dichotomy and that all thinking and feeling are done through the heart.
It is now widely recognized that in the ancient Chinese cosmology there appears to be a presumed interconnectedness among things in the world\(^\text{18}\) that precludes the kind of reductionist analysis available in substantialist metaphysics. Thus, the concept of *qing* likely reaches beyond the "characteristic features of a class", as Kwong-loi Shun would put it.\(^\text{19}\) Shun, in attempting to differentiate *qing* from *xing* notes that:

> While *qing* emphasizes the fact that x's have certain characteristic tendencies, "*xing*" emphasizes the presence of such tendencies as part of the constitution of x's. Also, while *qing* emphasizes that the presence of the tendencies is something difficult to alter and reveals what x's are really like, "*xing*" emphasizes that the tendencies are something that is subject to all kinds of influences and can be nourished or harmed. In addition, "*xing*" is also different from *qing* in that, while "x zhi *qing*" can refer to characteristic features of x's as a class that are not also features of each individual x, "x zhi *xing*" cannot be so used.\(^\text{20}\)

Shun's analysis, itself, is not at issue. Rather, it is important to note that he refers to *qing* in terms of tendencies, rather than merely facts, as Graham often does, or as characteristic features, as Shun, himself, does elsewhere in his article. The term "tendency" connotes a certain dynamism in *qing* that it is important to retain for an accurate conception of it. Shun, however, concurs with Graham in the assumption that *qing* must mean either one thing or another, but not both, denying the term the polysemy so characteristic of Classical Chinese in general.

\(^{18}\) In an exhaustive account of the transition from Shang *sifang* 四方 (four quarters) cosmology, to late Zhou *wuxing* 五行 (five phases) cosmology, Wang Aihe (2000) finds that human influence on the natural/supernatural world extends all the way back to the Shang:

> In Shang theology, the high god *Di* and numerous natural forces and alien spirits were connected in the cosmological structure of *Sifang*. These forces and spirits were not randomly sent by the unpredictable will of the high god, but rather sent through the *Sifang* structure, ordered in time and space. . . The Shang king . . . could influence such forces through ritual action. (pp. 31-34)

\(^{19}\) Shun, "Mencius on *Hsing*".

In Xunzi we see that there is more to *qing* than just what is genuine and that there is more to the idea of affectivity than a simple psychological state. We can find similar notions in pre-Zhuangzi texts as well.

Section 1: *Qing* Prior to Zhuangzi

In this section, I examine the usage of *qing* in several early texts, identifying passages that lend a broader sense to the meaning of the term *qing*, a sense that allows for a natural transition to a connotation of affectivity.

When Sunzi says, "主不可以怒而興師，將不可以愠而致戰 A ruler must never deploy his commanders due to anger, and a general must never enter war due to irritation" (Chapter 12), he is referring to the specific emotions of anger and irritation. He never refers to emotions in a general abstract sense using synecdoche. He does use the word *qing*, however, and in each of the seven 21 times he uses it, it appears at first glance to be a perfect example of Graham's understanding of the term as "the facts". Of the seven occurrences, four different formulations appear:

索其情
兵之情
人情之理
敵之情

In the first, second, and fourth occurrences, a run-of-the-mill translation might render *qing* as "facts" or "situation":

seek the facts
the situation of the troops
the situation of the enemy

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21 Twice in Chapter 1, three times in Chapter 11, and twice in Chapter 13.
The third formulation defies this trend. Throughout pre-Han political theory, it was essential that a ruler comprehend the 人情 renqing "qing of people" or 民情 minqing "qing of the people". Yet there is no consensus on what exactly qing means in these terms. Does it refer to the general situation of people in terms of their welfare? Or perhaps the true situation of people, as opposed to what one is told about them? Or, in a more democratic vein, it may mean the sentiments of the people. Likely it is all three.

An overarching theme of the Sunzi Bingfa is the manipulation of people and events according to the constantly shifting conditions surrounding warfare and the possibility of warfare. In order to adjust in accord with events, one needs to have a grasp of the facts. These facts, of course, are not merely academic. The facts are very much what dictate how one reacts. Relationships between events are inescapable and, more importantly for Sunzi, manipulable. A general must understand his personnel, the terrain, supply lines, the enemy, the populace, the ruler, etc. To understand is to be able to react appropriately, to tip the balance one way or another, to capitalize on, as François Jullien would say, "the propensity of things." 22 Every situation is itself a process, changing as events come and go. Renqing, as "situation of people," means more than a static state of affairs. People react according to their circumstances. Going back to the notion of the heart as a sense organ, we remember that people have the tendency to react similarly under similar stimuli—not in a necessarily behavioral sense, but in a general sense of observed tendencies—in general people will savor a ripe persimmon and spit out a putrid loquat. So if a general understands the "patterns of people's situations", he will understand the

22 Jullien, The Propensity of Things.
patterns of their reactions. In other words he must understand what lies right between and mediates situations and people's reactions, he must understand their sentiments, their emotions, their affectivity.

Sunzi Bingfa stands as one of our earliest pre-Han texts. Probably the earliest use of *qing*, however, appears in the Zhoushu section of the Kanggao chapter of the *Shangshu*. Here, we find the following:

天畏教，民情大可見

Heaven is to be feared in that it assists the sincere; the *qing* of the people is entirely visible.

Already around the turn of the first millennium BCE, Chinese rulers were concerned about the *qing* of the people. The king is advising his son on the ways of the wise ruler, which involves more than simply issuing edicts. Nature reacts to a ruler's sentiments, and likewise, a ruler must understand the people. He must "make himself as broad as the sky, filling himself with *de*."26 In its early use, of course, *de* was a kind of beneficent power, an influence flowing out from a noble ruler to all his subjects, positively affecting all things. To act nobly, a ruler must understand his subjects--their *qing*, which is entirely visible. 見 *jian/xian* is one of those numismatic Chinese verbs that can mean two very

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23 In Chad Hansen's article, "Qing (Emotions) 情 in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought" (in Marks and Ames, *Emotions in Asian Thought*), he ventures a linguistic analysis of *qing*, concluding that an appropriate translation of the term would be "reality-reactions".

24 All dating in this paper is from Loewe, *Early Chinese Texts*. Beginning in the Song, scholars have questioned the traditional late-Chunqiu dating of the *Sunzi*. Samuel Griffith (1963) recounts the controversy and provides numerous historical arguments to support a date of 400-320 B.C. Ames (1993) takes the issue up again, concurring with Griffith. Gawlikowski and Loewe (in Loewe 1993) allow for the traditional dating. If the late-Chunqiu dating is correct, the only books to predate it would be the *Shijing*, *Chunqiu* and parts of the *Shangshu* and *Yijing*. If the Warring States dating holds, parts of the *Zuo zhuan*, *Guoyu*, *Lunyu*, and, perhaps, *Shangjunshu* would jump ahead. In such a case the Guodian and Shanghai Museum manuscripts would be approximately contemporaneous.

25 See note 18 of the Appendix for more on translating *tian* 天 as "Heaven".

26 *Shangshu*, Zhoushu section, Kanggao chapter.
different but related things depending on one's point of view. I say "numismatic" because, like a coin, two distinct but inseparable sides come together to form a unity of meaning for a unity of experience--as in 借 jie "borrow/lend" and 授 shou "give/receive". To be manifest xian, is to be visible ke jian.\(^{27}\) The implicit interactions that go with being a thing among things in a sentient world ensures this. There can be no isolation of ruler from people. The people are there and must be reckoned with. They will react according to their situations--their sentiments are visible and must be taken into account.

The single instance of qing in the Shi Jing is perhaps the only occurrence in a pre-Han text in which it seems to carry only emotional connotations. We find it in poem #136:

子之湯兮，宛丘之上兮；洵有情兮而無望兮。

How gay and dissipated you are,  
There on top of Wan Mound.  
You are full of kindly affection indeed  
But you have nothing to make you looked up to.\(^{28}\)

From the rest of the poem, we see that there is a kind of raucous celebration occurring on Wan Mound, where, according to the commentators, raucous celebrations too commonly occur. The gentleman being addressed seems to have succeeded in displaying the high spirits of revelry but still lacks the weightiness of a good reputation. He has qing, but it is not all that he needs, and it may conversely have a negative impact on his reputation. This passage appears to directly contradict Graham's thesis that qing never meant "emotions" in pre-Xunzi texts. I cannot find a single commentator or translator that takes the qing of this passage any other way than as love or emotion. This being an early

\(^{27}\) Xian 現 does not appear as a separate term meaning manifest until after the Han.  
occurrence of qing, the implications are profound. Unfortunately, Graham does not address this occurrence, but it provides us with growing confidence that qing carried a range of meaning, from mere facts on one end of a spectrum, to pure emotion on the other. Bernhard Karlgren, in Grammata Serica Recensa, gives five discrete meanings for qing: feelings (Zuozhuan), quality, proper nature (Mengzi), circumstances (Zuozhuan), true, real (Yijing), and love (Shijing). I would contend that these are not discrete meanings but are instances along a spectrum of polysemy. Notice that arranged chronologically, Karlgren's definitions would run: love; feelings/circumstances; quality, proper nature; circumstances—a trend the reverse of Graham's facts-to-feelings transition.

Qing occurs twice in the Lunyu, in 13:4 and 19:19. The first occurs in a phrase of unusual wording:

上好禮則民莫敢不敬
上好義則民莫敢不服
上好信則民莫敢不用情

If the superiors favor ritual propriety, none among the people will dare be disrespectful. If the superiors favor rightness, none among the people will dare not submit. If the superiors favor trustworthiness, none among the people will not dare to not utilize qing.

This passage again demonstrates the flow of arousal and response among rulers and people. In this case, the ruler's moral turpitude yields direct responses in the people, but not in a coercive way, for the end result, Confucius goes on to say, is that people will move to such a country in increasing numbers. But what does it mean to utilize qing? If "信 xin" in the same sentence means "standing by one's word", perhaps qing means "standing by one's sentiments", reacting (not just acting) sincerely to circumstances, without duplicity. Admittedly, there is not much context here to flesh out the meaning.
The phrase *yongqing* does occur in four other passages of the early corpus, and though they are, of course, later texts, examining them can shed some light.

In the *Dongguanhanji* (Chapter 1, seventh year), we find a phrase identical to that of the *Lunyu*, 專民莫敢不用情. Here, however, the context is explicit. A funeral of the eminent is taking place, and the people are moved to express emotion. *Yong* appears to mean a general sort of execution, reminiscent of its use in the idiom *yongcan* 用餐 (to commence eating).

This understanding is buttressed by a similar use in the *Kongzijiayu* (17.2). Here, the context is emotion in ritual. Confucius responds to a question of Zaiwo regarding ghosts and spirits by describing the importance of funeral ritual with respect to human passing. The people are taught to return to a deep love, and *shang xia yong qing* 上下用情 (superiors and subordinates [all] "execute" affectivity). The connotation is clearly an expression of interior feeling; in fact, Confucius goes on to say that with a feeling of great reverence, the person *fa qi qing* 發其情 (expresses his affectivity). This passage of the *Kongzijiayu* appears to be a paraphrase of a nearly identical passage of the *Liji* (25:29), minus the contextualizing dialogue.

In a telling passage from the *Zhouli*, the duties of an official are described, one of which is to judge the merits of lawsuits, interrogating by *yongqing*. When Graham speaks of *qing* meaning facts, or when Waley translates the *Lunyu* passage under examination as, "none will depart from the facts", they have this kind of litigation in mind. Indeed, this *Zhouli* passage goes on to say that the official *qiu min qing* 求民情
(seeks the *qing* of the people). But how one uses facts in an interrogation when an interrogation is actually supposed to yield up facts is not clear. In some minor way, such an interpretation is conceivable, but it hardly seems worth mentioning. What is worth saying is that the official interrogating seeks to understand the truth behind the sentiments of the people—why they are reacting the way they are—and that he uses his own affectivity to do so. This passage illustrates the resonance inherent in early Chinese notions of affectivity. First, we notice that the official does not prioritize reason over emotion as might be familiar in contemporary law courts. But this does not mean that he is to be emotional, as such, either, since it is commonplace in early texts for cultivated persons to restrain their emotions. This is why we must distinguish *qing* and emotions, as such, and why seeing *qing* in the examples of *yongqing* above as "utilizing emotion" is too simplistic. *Qing* is the entire affective relationship. The judge opens himself to understanding the facts of the situation that elicit sentiment in the people and the people's reactions based on this affective relationship. The judge feels as well as comprehends.

Another way to get at the issue of utilizing *qing* is to look at a nearly synonymous phrasing. *Jin* 盡 (as well as its synonym, *jie* 竭) means "to utilize to the extreme" or "to use up" or "to do to one's utmost", and the phrase *jingqing* 盡情 (and *jieqing* 竭情) appears numerous times in early literature. If *qing* in such a term is to be taken as "facts", then the term as a whole would mean something like "getting to the bottom of a case". But such an interpretation simply doesn't fit the contexts. From the *Zuozhuan* to the
Guanzi, from the Hanfeizi to the Zhuangzi, one sees this term meaning going to the limit of one's affectivity.

In the Hanfeizi 26, people are to be rewarded and punished according to their actions, and those who qingjin 情盡 (have exhausted their affectivity, i.e. have given their all) are to be honored with a prominent position. In Zhuangzi, Chapter 12, there is a description of chaos as the inchoate (which I pursue in detail in Chapter 4) of the unearthly person (shenren 神人), who ends his life in an ethereal glow, jinqing (exhausting his affectivity). In both of these passages there is a spiritual element to qing.

In Hanfeizi, it is a spiritedness, an enthusiasm reminiscent of the Greek thymos, and in Zhuangzi the affectivity does not entirely expire at death, but remains in the myriad things, wanwu fu qing 萬物復情.

In Guanzi 10.5, consistent regulations encourage the people to jieqing 竭情 (give their all). And in the Liji (10:22), we see how giving one's all is an affective experience:

君子之於禮也，有所竭情盡慎，致其敬而誠若

In performing ritual propriety, the exemplary person exhausts his affectivity and is gingerly to the utmost, while being eminently respectful and sincere.

It is apparent how this passage connects with the yongqing of Lunyu 13:2, which D. C. Lau translates, "none of the common people will dare be insincere."

There are many more examples of jinqing and jieqing in early literature. Those that I have singled out above are the earliest. Again, it may be anachronistic to resort to later texts to justify the understanding of an earlier one, but they did belong to the same interpretive tradition, and if one is to suggest that there is a divide between them, the onus
is on the person who postulates the divide to demonstrate when it occurs and to explain its origin. Graham says that qing suddenly comes to mean emotion around the time of Xunzi, but as Hansen points out, this would mean that the meaning of the term shifted from referring to something metaphysical and objective (reality, essence, or the facts) to referring to something subjective and psychological (passions) ... Postulating such a radical meaning change also violates the principle of humanity's call for explanation on analogy to us. Our words would hardly be intelligible if they arbitrarily changed meaning so radically while no one seemed to notice.29

My claim (in agreement with Hansen) is not that Graham is incorrect in relying on the objective sense prior to Xunzi but that, rather than there having been a semantic transformation, qing had both objective and subjective senses all along. This can be seen most clearly in the following.

For the second use of qing in the Lunyu (19:19), we return to the notion of judgment:

如得其情則哀矜而勿喜

In having uncovered the facts (affectivity) in cases, he should show compassion and not be pleased with himself.

The full context is that a newly appointed magistrate has asked Zengzi for advice. Zengzi replies that the people have been through great hardship, so in uncovering the truth of cases, the magistrate should show compassion and not be pleased with himself for his accomplishments. Again, we notice that the "facts" are not detached data available for reductive analysis. Rather, they entail a reaction, an affective reaction, and it is up to the magistrate to react appropriately. On the other end of the events continuum, Zengzi wants to make it clear that the facts are themselves pursuant to hardships suffered by the

29 Marks and Ames, Emotions in Asian Thought, p. 195.
people. In other words, the facts, the people's reactions, are just what one would expect of people under straightened circumstances. So the magistrate is not just uncovering facts but the entire affective circumstances surrounding the facts.

Another text that may, or parts of which may, predate the Zhuangzi is the Zuozhuan. We find no mention of *qing* in the Chunqiu (of which the Zuozhuan is a commentary), but 13 instances in the Zuozhuan. For the most part, they all fall decidedly on the external side of an internal/external semantic dichotomy. One curious occurrence, however, is in the commentary to year 28 of Duke Xi. According to the passage, the Marquis of Jin was too strong to defeat because, "民之情偽盡知矣 The people's *qing* and *wei* are fully known." At first glance, *qing* would appear to mean the same as it does in most other occurrences in this work, "the facts", "the true situation". But as we noted above, *minqing* also entails the reactions of the people via their affectivity. Further evidence of this lies in the inclusion here of the term *wei*, meaning the opposite of *qing*. Under Graham's interpretation, it would mean "disingenuous". I bring this up because I would like to point out that although being disingenuous appears in our own language to entail a sense of intention, that someone is disingenuous on purpose, and the Daoists would have us believe that this purposiveness is the root of our problems, *wei*, as opposite of *qing*, is not limited to the human realm. In the Yi Jing's Xici, we find the following passage (A12): "設卦以盡情偽"the hexagrams were established as a way of fully [comprehending] *qing* and *wei*." Going back to the process nature of the Chinese cosmology, which in the Xici is now being more fully delineated, *qing* can be interpreted
as (natural) tendencies and *wei* as "countertendencies to spuriousness". Wang Bi in his interpretation takes the creative dynamism of nature to be constituted by the dialectic of *qing* and *wei*. So in this sense, *wei* is an unintentional "getting on the wrong track" if you will, nature going slightly awry. If "*wei*" means "getting on the wrong track", then *qing* is being on the right track, following natural or appropriate tendencies, tendencies that are in tune with one's surroundings as mediated by the senses, one of which is the heart, which senses emotional flow.

**Section 2: Qing after Zhuangzi**

The commentaries to the *Yijing*, although not predating *Zhuangzi*, may still shed some light on the meaning of *qing* in the *Zhuangzi*. In the commentaries to the *Yijing*, *qing* occurs twice in the *Wenyuan* 文言, four times in the *Tuan* 水, and eight times in the *Xici*, all of these uses being consistent with the explicit notions of flowing cosmological processes. In the *Wenyuan* commentary to the first hexagram, *qian* 乾 (creativity), the activation of creativity is described in terms of mutually influencing forces using the term *tongqing* 通情 (interpenetrating affectivity). The forces extend to all affectivity, they are mysterious and powerful like the flowing dragon, and they are invisible but manipulable by an exemplary person.

Fully six of the occurrences are put in terms of the *qing* of natural processes, the *qing* of *tiandi* 天地 (the sky and earth), *wanwu* 萬物 (the myriad things), or *guishen* 鬼神 (spiritual forces). Hexagram 31 is *xian* 艮, which the commentaries inform us is a variant

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30 Lynn's wording, following Wang Bi, in Lynn, *The Classic of Changes*. 
of *gan* 感 (arousal/feeling). In the Tuan commentary, we find in the form of an echo from the *Shangshu* an explication of *qing* being visible.

天地感而萬物化生。聖人感人心而天下和平。觀其所感而天地萬物之情可見矣。

Nature arouses, and the myriad things come forth through transformation. The sage arouses the hearts of people, and the world achieves harmony and stability. Watch those things that are aroused, and the *qing* of nature and the myriad things will be visible.

The *qing* of things is visible in the mutual influence of the natural processes, "natural" in this case being inclusive of the human and spiritual realm. In the Tuan commentary to the subsequent hexagram, *heng* 恆 (constancy), we find further elaboration:

日月得天而能久照。四時變化而能久成。聖人久於其道而天下化成。觀其所恆而天地萬物之情可見矣。

The sun and the moon are able to continually shine by virtue of nature. The four seasons change and transform and are thus able to continually bring things to completion. When sages continue on the path, all in the world comes to completion through transformation. Watch that which is continuous, and the *qing* of nature and the myriad things will be visible.

At this point in the intellectual history of China, it is fully apparent that *qing* is closely associated with mutual arousal and response, the processes of transformation through interpenetration, and is not a merely static state of affairs or simple facts. The Xici concurs, in a fascinatingly ambiguous passage (B:1):

爻象動乎內。吉凶見乎外。功業見乎變。聖人之情見乎辭。

Shaughnessy translates:

Emulation and images move within, and auspiciousness and inauspiciousness are apparent without, achievement and enterprise are apparent in the alternations, and the real characteristics of the sage are apparent in the statements. 31

Lynn translates:

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As the lines and images move within the hexagrams, so do good fortune and misfortune appear outside them. Meritorious undertakings are revealed in change, and the innate tendencies of the sages are revealed in the attached phrases.\textsuperscript{32}

Wilhelm/Baynes translate:

The lines and images move within, and good fortune and misfortune reveal themselves without. The work and the field of action reveal themselves in the changes. The feelings of the holy sages reveal themselves in the judgments.\textsuperscript{33}

The three translations reveal the three aspects of \textit{qing}, "real characteristics" in Shaughnessy, "innate tendencies" in Lynn, and "feelings" in Wilhelm/Baynes. Are any of these renderings better or worse than the others, more or less correct? All appear to be correct and incomplete in and of themselves. Lynn perfectly captures the numismatic nature of 見 \textit{jian/xian} in rendering it "appear", meaning both to manifest and be visible. Unfortunately, we do not have an English word that can encompass the full sense of \textit{qing}.

In the course of explaining the early uses of \textit{xing} in his article on the Mencian theory of human nature, Graham appeals to the \textit{Zuozhuan} and its use of \textit{xing} in terms of the six 氣 \textit{qi} "vital energies". He says that "down to the 4th century BCE \textit{xing} is not a philosophical term; it belongs to the ordinary language of everyone who worries about his health and hopes to live out his natural life span.\textsuperscript{34} In other words, there is an implicit, though properly vague, shared cosmological psychology that precedes the philosophical disputations of the Warring States period. I submit that the affective side of \textit{qing}, prior to explicit elaboration by Xunzi and others, is part of this shared cosmological psychology.

\textsuperscript{32} Lynn, The Classic of Changes, p. 77.
\textsuperscript{33} Wilhelm, \textit{The I Ching}, p. 327.
\textsuperscript{34} Graham, Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature, p. 13.
In the Zuozhuan's commentary to year 25 of Duke Shao, we find an involved cosmological psychology explaining in part that the six emotions are generated from the six vital energies. Zichan, in an effort to explain ritual propriety, encompasses the entire cosmos, from the sky and earth, to enjoyment that prompts singing. Not only are the emotions produced from the six energies, so is the xing of the earth, the functioning of which process produces the five phases. Then come the five tastes, the five colors, and the five sounds, overindulgence in which causes disorder externally, and internally causes the people to lose their xing. The constant interplay of external and internal is such an integral part of the background assumptions of early Chinese thought that cosmology and psychology are themselves interpenetrating categories, external and internal overlapping. The goal is to achieve a properly balanced process of mutual influence, as opposed to suppressing natural reactions. The emotions are generated by the six vital energies.

"With grief there are tears, with enjoyment there is singing and dancing, with happiness there is generosity, with anger there is contention." It is important not to lose them: "By bringing them into harmony with the xing of nature, one can live a long life." The emotions must be well managed, for the sake of oneself and for the sake of social order.

Graham quotes a passage from the Liji:

何謂人情，喜怒哀懼愛惡欲，七者弗學而能。

Graham translates:

What is meant by "the genuine in man"? Pleasure, anger, sadness, fear, love, hate, desire, these seven we are capable of without having learned them.35

35 Graham, op. cit., p. 64.
Graham makes the point that *qing* are essential to humans, unlearned. As such, they are, according to him, what is genuine in a person, and so at this point, *qing* may still not mean "emotions", per se. If we move on to a subsequent passage in the *Liji*, however, which Graham does not mention, something else becomes clear.

Thus, this is how a sage manages the seven *qing* of people.

Is the sage managing the merely genuine in people, or is he managing the affectivity of people? The author of the *Liji* is saying something more than that the sage manages the seven genuine aspects of the people. The sage manages all by understanding and manipulating circumstances large and small, and in doing so, he is able to manage the way people act because their actions are actually reactions based on sentiments which mediate the circumstance the sage is manipulating. The mutual influencing never ends, and society's welfare as well as an individual's health depend on properly reacting to all circumstances. To interpret the seven emotions, and nothing else, as what is genuine in a person, simply does not cohere with the context.

Although the *Huangdi Neijing* dates relatively late, in the first century BCE, the notion of mutual influence can be seen in a very precise mapping. In Figure 1, I have drawn a schematic representation of the first chapter of the text to demonstrate the mutual influence of processes across scales and with no regard to boundaries of internal and external. In this schematic, we see that atmospheric phenomena can generate the terrestrial phases, which can generate the tastes, which can generate the visceral circles\(^3\).

\(^3\) Following the terminology of Manfred Porkert, *Chinese Medicine*. 
which can generate the body parts, which can generate the secondary visceral circles. Atmospheric phenomena can subdue atmospheric phenomena; tastes can subdue tastes, and psychic\textsuperscript{37} processes (including emotions) can subdue psychic processes. Also, visceral circles can control sense organs. Atmospheric phenomena can harm body parts; tastes can harm body parts, and the sense organs can harm visceral circles. I would like to emphasize that although this is a later text, the general notions, as we've just seen, go back at least as far as the \textit{Zuozhuan}, and are likely to go all the way back to the \textit{Yijing} and into the mists of Chinese pre-history. As Graham points out, concerns with health and welfare prompted the early Chinese to turn to the influences of the wider world.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{Mutual Responsiveness in the \textit{Huangdi Neijing}.}
\end{figure}

My point is not that the Chinese developed a correlative cosmology based on mutual influence. This is basic to any lower level instruction of Chinese thought. The point I'm trying to make is that we cannot confine this notion to discussions of "Chinese

\textsuperscript{37} Again following Porkert, \textit{ibid.}
metaphysics". Scholars often suggest that because there are no early expositions of Chinese metaphysics, we needn't begin discussing it until, at the earliest, the Yin Yang theorists, then confine further discussion to the Han cosmologists and finally the great metaphysical apotheosis in Song Neo-Confucianism. The Song Neo-Confucians felt that they were drawing their theories directly from the very earliest Chinese texts. Do we conclude that they were wrong in this simply because they misdated the commentaries to the *Yijing*? The suggestion I'm making is that when considering a term such as *qing*, it may help to broaden our perspective into a wider implicit Chinese cosmology.

Manfred Porkert, a philosophically-minded expositor of Chinese medical theory, offers the following background for those just stepping into the field of Chinese medicine:

> From the Chinese viewpoint—and this is a concept that is very deeply rooted in the Chinese consciousness—the location itself, the object, is given shape, substance, and structure in various ways by a constructive force, as differentiated from an active force. Thus every event is to be regarded as the interaction of an active and a constructive force, each of which has its own peculiar characteristics that determine the nature of the event. And in contrast to the sort of causal thinking that predominates in Western thought—which would contend that every event is the outcome of a cause that has already occurred at some time in the past—the Chinese would explain the same event as the instantaneous interaction of an active and a constructive force, the dynamic consummation of these two forces occurring at that very moment. The active component of every event is designated *yang* and the constructive component *yin*. And this is essentially why the Chinese regard the fundamental ordering of the universe as being based on the interplay of these two groups of opposite but complementary aspects of the principle of energy. Phenomena that would be described in Western terms as "things," or objects, would instead be regarded as the consummation of a whole series of *actions*, or effects, in the past—actions that have accumulated, so to speak, in the past and are only to be sought for in the past. All material things, including the bodies of human beings, are the outcomes and the visible expressions of quite specific actions that have accumulated in the past, so that a landscape or a building has acquired certain specific qualities as the result of forces interacting over a long period in the past.

The specific qualities to which Porkert refers, and felicitously italicizes, are exactly what an early Chinese might refer to as *qing*—not static facts but accumulated outcomes from

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innumerable processes of mutual influence. And what makes Chinese medicine potent is that the specific qualities occur in general patterns. This is why the Chinese doctor takes diagnostics (understanding a patient's 病情 bing qing "conditions of an illness") so seriously.

**Section 3: Qing in the Zhuangzi**

夫長國者唯知哀樂喜怒之節是以導民。

The only way leaders of a country can guide the people is by understanding the tempering of the expression of emotions.

In order to demonstrate definitively that qing bore affective overtones, the challenge that Graham puts forth in his article on the Mencian theory of xing must be met. He says:

There is a very striking example of qing at the end of the Te Ch'ung Fu 德充符 chapter of Chuang-tzu, where it is traditionally but surely mistakenly taken to mean the passions. (p. 61)

Graham then quotes the passage in full and offers four objections to interpreting qing as emotions. Again, it is not my intention to demonstrate that Graham is wrong is choosing the term "essence" over "emotions" but to show that "emotions" should not be counted out as a sense of the term qing compatible with Graham's "essence". To do this, I will have to confront Graham's objections in succession, either finding them faulty outright, or at least showing how a sense of affectivity may still be consistent with his reasoning.
Graham translates:

"Having received your food from heaven what do you need from Man? Have the shape of a man, be without the essence of man. Have the shape of man, and so flock with men; be without the essence of man, and so right and wrong will not be found in your person."

Huizi says: "May a man really be without his essence?"
"Yes."
"In that case, how can one call him a man?"
"The Way gives him the guise, Heaven gives him the shape, how can one not call him a man?"
"Granted that we do call him a man, how can he be without his essence?"
"Judging between right and wrong is what I mean by his essence. What I mean by being without his essence is that a man does not inwardly wound his person by likes and dislikes, constantly follows the spontaneous and does not add to what grows in him."39

Graham's first (of four) objection to translating qing as "passions" is as follows:

(1) Nowhere else in Zhuangzi is qing used in this sense. It is assumed throughout that the passions are undesirable disturbances but ch'ing [qing] (unless qualified as the ch'ing [qing] of something bad, as in this case that incurable rationalist and moralist, Man) is self-evidently good, the state of perfect genuineness which the sage recovers. Compare such phrases as 遠天佰情 "flee Heaven and turn one's back on ch'ing [qing]"; 遠其天, 離其性, 滅其情, 亡其神 "flee what they have from heaven, part from their nature, extinguish their ch'ing [qing], destroy their spirit."; 變其情, 易其性 "alter their ch'ing [qing], replace their nature." (Zhuangzi ch. 3, 25, 29).40

The quick response to this objection is that an unusual interpretation is called for in the case of a term's unusual usage. It is as if Graham were objecting to Zhuangzi, himself, rather than to a misguided translator. If Graham is arguing in a general sense that qing never means "emotions" in the Zhuangzi, then the uniqueness of its usage in this passage would argue against such a general claim. In fact, an unpersuaded translator may suggest that because this passage is unique in marking the qing of humans as undesirable, and because emotions are undesirable in Zhuangzi, all the more reason to render qing

40 Ibid.
uncommonly as "emotions". However, it is not certain that qing does have entirely negative connotations here or that emotions are viewed pejoratively throughout the Zhuangzi. In the section following this, I demonstrate that it is not emotions that are viewed pejoratively in Zhuangzi but rather an important dependence relation, and in Chapter 4, I make the case that wuqing (Graham: "without essence") in the above passage is actually an instance of what I call counternegation, a positive reformulation of an apparent negation.

Graham's second objection:

(2) Distinguishing right from wrong is hardly passion; but it is, in the Ch'î Wu chapter, what primarily differentiates man from things which follow Heaven.

Here Graham seems to be rather disingenuously playing on the word "passion", leaning toward the passionate, as opposed to emotions of all kinds. Zhuangzi explicitly links shifei with haowu, which, as we have seen, are referred to in the Zuozhuan specifically as among the other emotions. If preferences give rise to distinguishing right from wrong, then Zhuangzi has every reason to include them as what differentiates humans from things which follow nature. In addition, Mencius says in 2A:6 and 6A:6 that, along with other feelings such as shame and respect, all people have shifei zhi xin (feelings of right and wrong). Rather than being a counterexample to the theory of translating qing as "emotions", this passage would actually seem to support it.

Graham's third objection:

(3) The man without qing has only the "shape" and "guise" of a man (xing, mao, terms commonly contrasted with qing "the genuine").
This terse phrasing can be made more explicit: one should conclude that because elsewhere (outside the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi) when qing is opposed to the terms "xing" and "mao" it means "the genuine", here, where it is also opposed to those two terms, it should mean "essence" and not "emotions". The objection loses its force for two reasons. One, Graham has noted that this is a unique passage, so appeal to consistency with other passages seems moot. Two, affectivity is not ruled out because we may consider, as Graham suggests, that the essence of a human being may be the emotions, which are shown elsewhere to be undesirable for Zhuangzi. However, I would again caution against a facile interpretation of emotions as entirely negative in Zhuangzi.

Graham's final objection:

(4) It is no business of the sophist Hui Shih to express opinions such as that a man without passions would not be a man, which any of us could contribute to the discussion. His role is to point out the stunning self-contradiction in Zhuangzi's thought, and so involuntarily demonstrate the futility of all logic; and the way in which he worries at the point, three times pointing out the contradiction which always reappears in Zhuangzi's answers, shows that this is what he is doing.

This is an odd argument also, and it owes its oddness to Graham's confusion of the meanings of "genuineness" and "essence". This Aristotelian bent toward essentialism is, in my understanding, foreign not only to Zhuangzi but to all of Chinese thought, and it is uncharacteristic of Graham to allow the insinuation of such philosophical confusion.

I would like to reiterate that Graham is certainly correct that qing can and often does mean "genuine" or "facts" and that I am not suggesting that the term instead be translated "emotions". I am suggesting that the term is polysemic and includes a sense of affectivity. This particular passage that Graham points out seems, contrary to what

41 "Xinu" occurs five times in two passages of the Inner Chapters, both in Chapter 2. "Aile" occurs three times, twice in Chapter 2, and once in Chapter 6. All of these passages portray the emotions as undesirable perturbations that the sage is above.
Grahams says, to be just that type of early passage that should steer us in the direction of emphasizing its polysemy rather than reducing it to a phantom Russellian true denotation.

In much of this section I take issue with statements made by Graham in his 1967 article "The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature," using them as a foil to further my suggestion that qing has a side to it that draws on the shared, implicit early cosmology of spontaneous interrelations among things (humans included) in a way that imbues it with a sense of affectivity, thus explaining how a term could harbor the divergent meanings "circumstances" and "emotions". I would like to think that the section is convincing on its own merits but also cannot help thinking that in his later work Graham was heading in the same direction. In his article "What Was New in the Ch'eng-Chu Theory of Human Nature?", Graham says:

It is still assumed [in Zhu Xi] ... as in earlier philosophy, that the knower is already in spontaneous interaction with other things. The familiar passage we quoted from the Zhong Yong about the harmonious emission of the passions remains the classic account of the springs of human behavior and its adjustment to norms, and man's reactions to his circumstances are seen as belonging with physical interactions within the universal process of gan ying "stimulation [arousal] and response".

If he had turned his attention to qing with the same sensitivity that he shows in his examination of cosmological processes, Graham may have come to a similar conclusion.
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* appears as "ailexinu"

texts arranged roughly chronologically, according to dating provided in Loewe, *Early Chinese Texts*

Table 1: Occurrences of qing 情 in early texts.

### Part 2: Affectivity and Interdependence

In Chapter 5 of the *Zhuangzi* (13-24), a character by the name of Shun Tujia has lost a foot. He tells Zichan that sometimes when others laugh at him because of his disability, it makes him angry (怒 nu), but as soon as he gets to his master's place all that
goes away. Shen Tujia appears to be ashamed of his anger, and he says his master has to cleanse him of it. In the next chapter (lines 45-60), we find the story of a man named Ziyu, who suffers severe disfigurement and yet far from displaying a dislike (怒 e) for it, revels in it as a process of natural transformation. From the juxtaposition of these two passages, and many others like them in Zhuangzi's Inner Chapters⁴², the question arises as to why, if Ziyu can accept and express wonder at the transformations happening naturally to his body, Shun Tujia rejects and feels ashamed about the apparently natural transformations happening in his psyche.

In Chapter 2 (9-14), we find the mention of a number of emotions and a description of how they arise from "no-one-knows-where" and grow like fungus from vapors. And yet they are also, like Shen Tujia's anger, depicted in a negative light. If someone can revel in the transformations of severe bodily disfigurement, why is it not also favorable for a Daoist sage to revel in the natural transformations of emotions--for instance throwing a good fit when experiencing anger, or wailing for hours on end when experiencing grief?

Is there a contradiction in the Daoist approach to emotions? Why are emotions not considered just more natural transformations to be experienced with open-minded wonder? In this section, I will attempt to answer these questions. To do this, I will posit a hypothetical schematic of Daoist emotional psychology and employ it to analyze the Daoist approach to emotional life. In researching this topic, I have hit upon a number of

⁴² I'll limit myself to the Inner Chapters because the scholarly consensus seems to be that those were the chapters most likely to have been penned by a single hand, and any hope of finding a coherent philosophy lies most strongly with the work of a single author.
themes regarding emotions in the Inner Chapters and arrange my exposition using the themes as headings.

Section 1: Natural Interconnections

As discussed above, early Chinese cosmology was one of responsive interconnectedness. For Zhuangzi and other early Chinese, the human being was not considered in an individualistic sense as a separate voluntaristic entity with maximum decision power and minimum influence from external factors. Instead, the human being, like all things, was seen as a temporary concrescence of qi, organized to function in certain ways, and in constant mutual interaction with all other qi concrescences (all things, in other words). Obvious evidence of this interactive movement was the constant process of ganying 感應, arousal\(^43\) and response, among all things. The Huangdi Neijing was brought into evidence above as just one early work that identifies such interactions—among atmospheric processes, phases of the earth (or elements), internal organs, body parts, tastes, and other human senses. Also included in the description were psychic interactions, or emotions.

The notion of arousal and response can be found most explicitly in the Zhuangzi, in chapter two, in the passage about natural piping (tian lai 天簌) (1-9). In a meditative description, the wind is said to create all kinds of sounds in the hollows of the natural world. The way it accomplishes this is not by successively blowing through each hole but

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\(^{43}\) The attentive reader may have noticed that when this concept was first mentioned earlier in the chapter, I glossed "gan" as "arousal/feeling". Gan is another numismatic term, referring in this case to the experience of sensing arousal/feeling, and as such, it can refer to the arousal aspect or to the sensitivity/feeling aspect, or to both—making it rather difficult to translate at times because one does not always know to which subject it refers or if it refers to the entire intersubjective experience. This will become relevant again in Chapter 3.
by eliciting sound from them all at once. In line nine, we find the two phrases "使其自取，
使其自取, causing each to [sound] from itself, arousing each to draw out the other". The
first phrase, when taken in light of the entire passage, is enough to establish a sense of
arousal and response, but the second phrase adds to it significantly when interpreted
carefully. There are two significant interpretive issues. First is the term xian 咸. Xian is
most often taken to mean "all", but this does little for the interpretation of the passage and
ignores an apparent structural parallel between the phrases. Alternatively, we may, as
mentioned in regard to the Yijing above, take xian 咸 as a loan for gan 感44 (arouse),
which makes perfect sense of the line and the passage as a whole. Second, it's not clear
what the term qu 取, usually meaning to grab, connotes in a cosmological context such as
this. In the excavated Shanghai Museum text know as Xingqing 性情, qu is repeatedly
used in just this cosmological sense where it is best interpreted as "drawing out"45. These
two interpretive insights compound to reveal that in the resounding winds of nature,
emotions arise as interactive spontaneous internal responses to external arousal, not in a
causal sense but more in a harmonic sense.

And now the question arises: if these emotions are spontaneous and in harmony
with nature, why should they be seen by Daoists, who value natural action above all, as
undesirable?

44 The Shuowen Jiezi also attests to the legitimacy of this loan.
45 See Appendices I and II for a Chinese recension and translation the Xingqing.
Section 2: Self-Estimation

At an obscure place (17) in the first section\(^{46}\) of Chapter 1, the term *zi shi* 自視\(^{47}\) is used to mean something like "self-estimation", "self-evaluation", or "self-appraisal". It is important for the Daoist that everything in the world function according to its natural propensities, within the confines of its individual circumstances. The small birds, in comparison to the great *peng*, were able to appraise their own selves and situations to conclude that they did not need to fly as high or far as the *peng* and could be happy in their own circumscribed world. Conversely, the praying mantis in Chapter 4 (59) overestimates himself and is crushed as a result.

The possibility of the loss of life, or the cutting short of one's years, is a persistent concern in the *Zhuangzi*, especially in Chapter 3, where nurturing and preserving oneself are of paramount concern. An implicit question throughout the chapter, and in later chapters, is: under what circumstances is one's life compromised? In the eleventh section of Chapter 2 (64-73), the ultimate person (*zhi ren* 至人) is safe because benefit and harm do not touch him. In the first section of Chapter 4 (1-34), seeking after fame and gain (*ming shi* 名實) can get you killed, as it did for Longpang and Bigan. What is important in these types of circumstances, is that one fulfills his or her destiny (*zhi ming* 至命),

\(^{46}\) Sectioning according to Mair, *Wandering on the Way*.

\(^{47}\) In early texts, *zishi* does not appear to have achieved a level of standard binomial use. In the pre-Han period, it occurs once each in only the *Lüshichunqiu*, the *Zhanguoce*, and the *Mencius*. In the first, it means something like "viewing a situation selfishly"; in the second, it means "to look into something for oneself"; and in the third, it means "to see oneself as", the sense most similar to that of the *Zhuangzi*. Since the term appears twice in the *Zhuangzi* (in adjacent paragraphs), it may have a heightened significance.
"destiny" being a pat translation for a term that includes connotations of self-estimation and nurturing life.

In Chapter 3 (2-12), the destiny of the cook is to cut up meat, but his virtuosity is viewed by an onlooker as a recipe for nurturing life. It is through his ability to understand himself and fulfil the promise of his abilities that the cook excels at nurturing life. And there is another important component—he relies on the patternings of nature (依乎天理). Through these three components—self-estimation, fulfilling one's destiny, and appropriate dependence relations—the Daoist lives up to the ideal natural lifestyle. In the sections that follow, I explain how emotions can interfere with this ideal and then how the Daoist can effectively regain balance.

Section 3: Negative Emotions

One of the great obstacles to personal fulfillment in the *Zhuangzi* is the negative emotion. We saw in Chapter 2, section 2 (9-14) that numerous emotional states constantly interacting and growing seemingly spontaneously, like music from holes or fungus from vapors, are afflictions common to most people. That section is an eloquent little piece warning of the dangers of being wrapped up in one's own petty (and not so petty) anxieties. In section 2 of Chapter 4 (34-53), the Duke of She is burning up due to anxiety. In section 4 of Chapter 2 (21-23), there is further elaboration on emotional states, this time into the formation of feelings (*cheng xin* 成心). And even before the feelings are formed, there is affirmation and denial (*shifei* 是非).
We may have a tendency to associate affirmation and denial with discursive thinking, especially since the terms are used heavily in the epistemological portions of Chapter 2. Zhuangzi discourages too much discursive thinking, however, using affirmation and denial as primary examples of confusion that can be caused by excessive analysis, as commonly practiced by logicians of the time. By saying that affirmation and denial precede the formation of feelings, he is suggesting that even affirmation and denial are fundamentally pre-theoretic. It is important to understand that Zhuangzi's epistemology has an emotional/psychological basis and that his purpose in bringing up the topic of epistemology is to dismiss discursive thinking as counterproductive. When the ultimate concern is the nurturance or preservation of life, the danger of excessive discursive thinking is the danger of emotional investiture--that it will distract one, dissipate one's energy, and lead one into danger. Zhuangzi's epistemology is not an academic exercise, just as Cook Ding's cutting up an ox is not just everyday butchery.

In the Cook Ding episode (3:2-12), the cook is careful not to take any credit for his high level of skill. Instead, he says that he "relies on the patternings of nature (依乎天理)". For the Daoist, emotions, as well, are reliant on external factors. In the arousal and response cosmology, emotions are one of many interrelations that bespeak interdependence. To say that one's emotions are aroused by an external factor is also to say that one is dependent on those external factors for arousal of emotions. If, from the scant evidence in the Zhuangzi, one may speak of a Daoist psychology of emotions, it would appear that emotions are, in keeping with the cosmology of responsive affectivity,
dependent on external factors, but those factors alone do not determine the emotion. There are also internal factors. A crude schematic of Zhuangzian emotion might look like this:

\[
\text{external factor} \leftrightarrow \text{self-concern} \rightarrow \text{internal factor} \rightarrow \text{emotion}
\]

An external factor arises, say, the death of one's mother. An internal factor resonates with that, say, love for one's mother. The arrow moving from self-concern to the external factor marks a dependence relation, indicating, for example, investment in society's hierarchy of power. Self-concern refers largely to desires and aspirations. The external dependence relation and self-concern both tend to magnify and exacerbate the incipience of an emotion. For instance, since one's mother has died, and considering that one accepts societal conventions that dictate one must express great sorrow, and considering that one desires to be regarded well in order to maintain a beneficial place in society, one not only feels sorrow but feels great sorrow and expresses it vividly so that everyone knows that one feels great sorrow. Zhuangzi never suggests that sorrow expressed in this manner is manufactured for show but he does demonstrate that because of the dependence relation and inflated self-concern, there is a distinct element of disingenuousness. A more genuine emotion would take a form something like this:

\[
\text{external factor} \leftrightarrow \text{internal factor} \rightarrow \text{emotion}
\]

Self-concern, involving desires and profit motivation, is now gone, but a dependence relation remains. Because of Zhuangzi's cosmology of interdependence, this relation can never realistically be broken. It's not that the person is no longer dependent on external factors but that the factors have changed from those stemming from inflated self-concern
to those that broaden the self to include all things through the process of natural transformation.

Section 4: Establishing Appropriate Dependence: Emptiness

Toward the end of the first section of chapter 1, Liezi is held up as an example of a free spirit, but even this example is placed in doubt because there is something Liezi is dependent on (有所待者). This notion of dependence comes up quite often in the Inner Chapters, usually in the form of dai 待, but also, as we saw above, in the form of yi 依. One has to notice from context whether it is used in a pejorative sense (dependence on societal mores) or a positive sense (dependence on the natural transformations). Here, it is used in a pejorative and metaphorical sense--Liezi is dependent on the wind, just as most people are dependent on, to whatever extent, fame and gain, stemming from an acquisitive or prideful self. One step beyond Liezi is the ultimate person (zhiren 至人), who has no self, then the unearthly person (shenren 神人), who has no accomplishments, and then the sage (聖人), who has no fame, or recognition. These latter three have managed to eliminate the self-center and thereby the negative dependence.

The term used to describe this state is emptiness (xu 虛). When emptiness is reached, however, another kind of dependence asserts itself. For instance, when Confucius is teaching Yan Hui about sitting in fasting in Chapter 4 (1-33), Confucius defines sitting in fasting as emptiness. He says that in this situation, one's qi empties and becomes "dependent on things (待物者)". "Things" here refers to the things in natural
transformation (萬物之化), as is made explicit at the end of the passage (33). When one is resigned to the transformations that are always underway, one has no psychic investiture in any external emotional factors, and minus the self-center, any subsequent emotion is likely to be comparatively shallow and fleeting. So in the seventh section of Chapter 6 (75-82), when Yan Hui sees the great mourner Mengsun cry tearlessly for his deceased mother and appear to feel no sorrow in his heart, he is appalled. Confucius (taking a Daoist position) explains that Mengsun had advanced beyond the forms of discursive understanding that underpin conventional mourning rites. Instead, he "transforms into things (化為物)", "depending on transformations he doesn't understand (待其所不知之化)". In section 2 of Chapter 6 (20-29), the bankruptcy of conventional dependencies is illustrated through the image of fish stranded on dry land and spitting on each other to stay alive. Better to lose oneself in the insecurity of the ocean of transformations, to "become one with the transformations on which the [myriad things] depend (一化【萬物】之所待)". Another passage that illustrates the inescapability of dependence is section 13 of Chapter 2 (93-94). Here, a shadow is explaining that it is dependent on something that is in turn dependent on something else, a dependence that is as natural as a snake's dependence on its scales or a cicada's dependence on its wings.

A positive, appropriate dependence relation is termed empty because the self-center is eliminated. The arousal and response factors flow uninhibited by selfish interference. When the self-center is not vacated, the negative dependence on societal convention is depicted as shackles (zhīgū 槊梏), as in section 3 of Chapter 5 (24-31), and the
prescription is that one should free (jie 解) oneself from them. The image shows that by depending on external factors emotionally, one ties oneself to them and so is at the mercy of the emotions that arise from such ties. To untie them is to free oneself of such debilitating emotions. In the fifth section of Chapter 3 (14-19), another funeral takes place, this time for Lao Dan. One of Lao Dan's friends attends, gives three wails, then leaves. One of the disciples, who is among those weeping as if they lost their own mother, objects to the friend's perfunctory display of emotion. The friend, in turn, objects to the overwrought sobbing of the disciples, suggesting that it is "fleeing from nature while turning one's back on affectivity (匿天倍情)". In contrast, the friend says, the master "finds comfort in timeliness and dwells in the flow of events (安時而處順)" even though these may mean death. As a result, "sorrow and joy do not enter (哀樂不能入)". This, he says, is what the ancients call the "untying of the ropes of the ancestors (引之縣解)".

In the fifth section of Chapter 6 (45-60), we find identical language describing the attitude of a man toward his own debilitating disfigurement. He also "finds comfort in timeliness and dwells in the flow of events", watching the transformations occur. As a result, again, "sorrow and joy do not enter". And this is what the ancients called "untying the ropes". It goes on to say that someone who cannot untie oneself (自解) is "tied to things (物有所解)". Rather than being tied to things, one wants to flow with them in interdependent relationships so that emotions may hit, but they will not enter. An appropriate dependence relation is constantly in flux with factors of influence arising and
dissipating constantly. The metaphors of ropes and shackles symbolize a state of being bound into a dependence relation with one persistent factor of influence, which will always have a negative impact.

To grasp the concept of "not entering", it may help to refer to the mirror metaphor which occurs in Chapter 5 (17ff) and 7 (32). A mirror, as is well-known from elaboration by later writers, reflects only on the surface, without anything actually entering. Thus, the person without a self-center is like a surface of glass, with external factors coming then glancing away. Without a self-center, there is nowhere for emotions to take root and feed back into desires and aspirations. They just skim along on the surface and dissipate as soon as they arise, like Lao Dan's friend's three wails.

Section 5: Equanimity

The effect of untying one's ropes is that one distances oneself from the affairs of the world. The Inner Chapters are replete with such accounts, and the one at this same place in Chapter 6 is representative. Yi'erzi becomes disfigured, and yet "his heart remains unaffected (其心間而無事). In chapter 1 (34), the question is raised rhetorically, "who wants to take things as important (孰肯以物為事)?" And in Chapter 2 (74), "the sage does not involve himself in worldly affairs (聖人不從事於務)."

Although powerful emotions are gone from the enlightened sage, a certain equanimity remains. The descriptions vary:

心。。如死灰 heart ... like inert ash(2:2)
吾喪我 I lost (died to) myself (2:3)
These states of equanimity are all achieved, not through debating the finer points of logic, nor through concerted effort at a program of self-cultivation, but through eliminating self-centeredness and selfish ties to things. To Daoists, humans have the dubious distinction among animals of being the only species that can get off the natural course. This occurs through unnatural external dependencies engendered by the mores of society, which also promotes the expansion of the self. These, in tum, generate the spectrum of emotions that so disturb the human heart. By returning to a natural vacuity, a sort of ataraxia ensues, and though emotions may still arise, they will do so innocently and disappear as quickly as the image of a migrating "goose across a wintry lake".

It has been my purpose here to examine the Daoist approach to emotions and explain why there is an apparent double standard in their approaches to transformations of the body (and all external things) on the one hand, and to transformations of the psyche, in terms of emotion, on the other. It turns out that there is no rejection of
emotions, per se. Rather, the emotions, when resulting from negative external ties and a self-center, do not count as natural transformations but are instead the result of artificial machinations arising from an inflated self-center. The emotions of equanimity, on the other hand, are welcomed, as they arise naturally, without selfish interference. So the standard of accepting natural transformation stands for both the external and internal realms, with a caution against encouraging a cancer of self-importance to develop inside and thereby throw affective interrelations out of balance.

Both goals of this chapter have now been accomplished. Affectivity as it extends beyond personal boundaries has been found to be a central concern in early Chinese philosophy in general and in Zhuangzi in particular. It is an integral process of the vast cosmology of arousal and response, important for knowing how people feel and predicting how they will react. It manifests as emotions that are exacerbated by a sense of self-importance but not to be devalued altogether. Affectivity is the root of human responsiveness in a responsive world.

These conclusions have been achieved with scant mention of a very important text. In 1993, a cache of documents was unearthed in China that contained texts never mentioned in transmitted literature. Several years later, the Shanghai Museum purchased a similar set on the Hong Kong antiquities market. One text occurring in both sets, and now known as the Xingqing (On Nature and Affectivity)\textsuperscript{48}, is an entire tract, dating

\textsuperscript{48} The Guodian version was untitled but commonly known as Xingzimingchu (Self-nature issues from destiny), lifted from a line of the text. The Shanghai version was also untitled but called by its
from the late 4th cent. BC (contemporaneous with the Inner Chapters of *Zhuangzi*), on the role of human affectivity in a responsive world. If there was every any doubt that *qing* had affective connotations, no one reading this text could persist in such skepticism.\(^{49}\) The *Xingqing* nicely pulls together the threads that I have been pursuing, and in the section that follows, I summarize the philosophical importance of the *Xingqing* as it bears on affective responsiveness in the person and in the cosmology.

**Part 3: Qing in the Xingqing**

In the late 4th Century B.C., lineages of thought had not separated into the categories that Sima Qian first identifies two centuries later. There appear to be distinct concerns that occupy authors of what we now identify as belonging to Ruist (Confucian) or Daoist lineages, respectively, but just as there were differences within a so-called lineage, there were also similarities across lineages. As I have been striving to establish, one of these similarities is an implicit *qi*-based cosmology of responsive interdependence. Of some significance also is the fact that Ruist texts and Daoist texts were found together in the Guodian tomb of an official thought to have been tutor to the crown prince of Chu, with the *Daodejing* at the top of the stack. The *Xingqing*, with its concomitant concern

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original transcriber, *Xingqinlun* 性情論 (On Self-Nature and Affectivity), more accurately reflecting the general content of the treatise. Li Ling, in his recension, calls it simply *Xingqing*, which I follow. As mentioned above, a complete translation and Chinese recension can be found in Appendices I and II. \(^{49}\) To get some idea of how central the notion of *qing* is in the *Xingqing*, we may simply note that it occurs 21 times in a mere 2,007-character text, for an occurrence rate of .011 or 1.1%. The texts that come closest to that are the *Xunzi* and the Inner Chapters of the *Zhuangzi*, both of which have occurrence rates of 0.1% for *qing*—lower by a factor of 10—and further on are *Sunzi* at 0.08%, *Yijing* and *Guanzi* both at 0.05%, and *Shangjunshu* at 0.04%.ag
for reverence, funeral rites, and the standard Ruist virtues is obviously a Ruist text, but an arousal and response cosmology is a key factor in these concerns.

Why the *Xingqing* was lost and how widely it was circulated in the ancient period, are impossible to say, but like many texts of the time it proffers advice for the active ruling class. Cosmology, philosophical anthropology, political philosophy, ethics, and even aesthetics all cross-fertilize in this rich treatise. Of primary concern is the notion of instruction, also referred to from the other side of the numismatic experience as learning. According to the *Xingqing*, instruction is integral to any aspiring official’s proper path, the proper path being derivative of affectivity (1:1). The first chapter lays out a derivative progression that runs:

\[
tian \rightarrow ming \rightarrow xing \rightarrow qing \rightarrow dao
\]

(affectivity) --&gt; dao (proper path)

Of this progression, the *Xingqing* focuses on self-nature and its dynamism in activation, on affectivity and its significance in cultivating the proper path, and on the path itself, as it plays out in education, emotion, and responsive interaction. Education (instruction (*jiao* + learning (*xue*)) distinguishes humans from the rest of nature and from each

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50 Because the texts originates on bamboo strips that are conveniently numbered, my numbering refers to the chapter number of the Chinese, then to the strip number. For instance “(1:1)” refers to the passage beginning at the start of Chapter 1 and running to ”(81)” at the end of the second line of the chapter’s second paragraph. I provide the strip numbers in the English translation, as well.

51 A similar progression begins the Zhongyong, but with the notable substitution of *jiao* (instruction) for *qing*. 
other (4)\textsuperscript{52}. Self-nature is the raw material that one has to work with, and it is generally the same in its potential from person to person, but it must be drawn out (1, 2).\textsuperscript{53} The beginning of education lies in drawing out one's nature, of which there are two essential factors.

The first factor in drawing out one's nature is the general cosmological factor of external things. *Xing* is a potential feature of a person as sound is a potential feature of a chime, both requiring a mechanism to draw them out (2). The second factor for drawing out self-nature is the apprehension of external things by the heart, which was noted above\textsuperscript{54} in *Zhuangzi* as playing a similar role--actually, a dual role. In *Zhuangzi*, the heart was viewed as equivalent to a sense organ in having its own modality for distinguishing things, the things being emotions. But it also was the seat of those emotions. In the *Xingqing*, the same dynamics appear to be present but are made more explicit. The heart is said to draw out one's nature in conjunction with the things of the external world, only now the things are defined much more broadly as "all the things that are manifest" (7:6). It is obvious that whereas the *Zhuangzi* described the process at the crucial point of emotional involvement, the *Xingqing* is reaching back to our anthropological beginnings. Everyone, according to the *Xingqing*, will have their natures drawn out to some extant; how that process unfolds, however, depends on personal efforts and environment (education (4)), for whereas one's nature is more or less set in its potential, the heart is more variable (1).

\textsuperscript{52} If the notation of my citation is a single number, it refers to a chapter number of the *Xingqing*.
\textsuperscript{53} Compare *Analects* 17:2: 性相近，習相遠 (people are close in nature but far apart in practice/habit).
\textsuperscript{54} P. 10.
Human affectivity, which is derivative of one's nature (1, 19) but finds its seat in the heart, is fundamentally emotional (11:18), and it is through emotions that cultivation of one's nature takes place, thereby developing one's character (de 德) (8:10), which sets one on the proper path. According to the Xingqing, education in human affectivity takes place through two vehicles, ritual propriety (li 禮) and music (yue 樂).

Exposure and practice in ritual propriety culminates in reverence (jing 敬) (8), the human attitude that the Neo-Confucians hit on as of great significance in early Ruist thought. All Ruist rituals were affective interactions that functioned as vehicles for the proper expression and arousal of emotions. As mentioned repeatedly in the Xingqing, it was essential that the emotions were genuine, that the rituals were not taken as rote movements but as genuine affairs that were conducted in an informed manner. Li, of course, did not refer only to ceremony but also to daily propriety, which was to be conducted with the same reverent expression and arousal of emotion.

In close conjunction with ritual propriety was music, which accompanied all ceremonies as well as being a highly valued pastime. The affective nature of music is explicated in great detail in Chapters 9 and 10, which provide a segue into an account of emoted and evoked human emotion. Chapter 9 begins with an affective description of music, with sound emanating from affectivity then entering the listener's heart and stirring it profoundly. Different kinds of sounds, whether laughter, folk songs, zither playing, or the ancient performances affect the person differently, but no less profoundly,

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55 When people weep, they are not only expressing emotion but evoking it in others--a numismatic aspect of affectivity in early China that must not be neglected.
and the changes that they prompt in a person build that person's character. Thus, the sounds one hears must be chosen carefully as they act as a powerful form of instruction, evoking emotion, molding character, and leading to responsive action. In order to function in society reverentially and with care, one's heart must be opened by the proper music and the process of arousal and response initiated (10).

Music augments emotions and gives rise to responsive vocalization. These shouts of joy and cries of grief feed back into the process of affectivity, further affecting the emotion. And yet, the heart is not all emotion without mentation. Reflection on one's emotional state contributes to the emotion, "compounding the heart's activity" (12:20). This profound affectivity, this vulnerability to things of the external world, is not to be lamented but accepted happily, valued, and cultivated (13). This give-and-take of responding to sounds emotionally and physically in ways that feedback into the affectivity builds until the body and heart effectively become one (14:29). This is the point of affective spontaneity, in which emotions are felt profoundly and expressed appropriately, in which actions arise without discursive interference, and the person interacts effortlessly in communal situations.

The Xingqing offers a valuable description of a responsive cosmology, including a mention of the role of qi in the faculties of hearing and seeing (20:36). And yet, affectivity is not simply a feature of the world but an imperative, and anyone who fails to cultivate it will be a failure in life (20:38)

Affective responsiveness is of equal importance in both Daoist- and Ruist-oriented tracts of the late 4th Cent. BC. For the Ruists, it is a conduit of profound emotions that
are expressed and evoked in a panoply of life's affairs, bonding with others, serving others, and reveling in aesthetic delight. For Daoists, the emotional aspect of affective spontaneity is downplayed in favor of an ataraxic equanimity. For both, the ultimate mode of action is affective spontaneity—which I will expound in detail in the coming chapters.

Summary

There are two key philosophical gains in this chapter:

1. Affectivity is often understood as a synonym for emotion, which in turn is often understood in the context of many traditional dichotomies, such as private/public, subjective/objective, inner/outer, cognitive/conative, intellectual/emotional, and essential/relational (contextual). Emotion occurs privately at first and becomes public only when revealed through expression or action. Emotion is a subjective experience, not an objective fact. An inner/outer boundary is maintained in explaining emotion as an inner reaction to external stimuli. Emotion is a cognitive judgment, after which one acts either deliberately or indeliberately. A human being who possesses emotion is viewed as a discrete voluntaristic entity with maximum decision power and minimum influence from external factors.

In this chapter, I demonstrate that these dichotomies fail in an account of environmental affectivity. Environmental affectivity is an understanding that all of nature, including human beings, is composed of, and only of, the same fundamental building blocks and that there is a constant, though not always visible, process by which the building blocks coalesce to produce identifiable objects and then disperse. In addition,
there is a constant, though also not always visible, process of interaction among things. Affectivity is the sensitivity and responsiveness in this interaction. One cannot say that sensitivity is private and responsiveness public or that sensitivity is an internal process aroused after an external stimulus. Just as one cannot say that the wind blows through points B and C on its way to point D from point A but instead is drawn through all points (in the direction of point D) simultaneously, so one cannot place discrete temporal or spatial boundaries on affectivity. People's reactions are affective responses that reveal the process of sensitivity and response and cannot be reduced to deliberate or indeliberate reaction to external stimuli. One could say that affectivity eludes the above dichotomies, but one could more profitably say that affectivity bridges them. Affectivity exposes the gaps that the dichotomies hide and opens new avenues for philosophical exploration.

2. One of these avenues is that of the fundamental act of axiological deliberation. When one chooses a path of action, that choice is based on a judgment that the path chosen is superior to alternative paths, which, in comparison, are judged adversely. We see in this chapter, however, that there is an undiscovered feature of choice that problematizes its theorization. It can be formulated in the following paradox, call it the Paradox of Naturalness:

1. One ought not judge a natural process adversely.

2. To judge adversely is a natural process.

3. Therefore, one ought not judge 'judging adversely' adversely.

The basis of Proposition 1 is that natural processes arise organically, and to protest a single natural process one would have to protest its entire organic development, which is
untenable (the only tenable adverse judgment of nature would be to judge the entire universe adversely). The basis of Proposition 2 is that judgments, as well, evolve organically out of a complex of processes. Proposition 3 follows necessarily from 1 and 2 and reveals the Paradox of Naturalness in that Proposition 1, which appears *prima facie* to be true, turns out to be self-refuting. Since under normal circumstances negative instructions are tantamount to adverse judgments, Proposition 1 ends up being a negative instruction to not only refrain from judging natural processes adversely but to refrain from any adverse judgment, such as saying, "one ought not". Hence, it is recommending against itself. What is significant about this paradox is that every judgment, being based on values that are inherently relative (otherwise they would be factual assessments rather than judgments), necessarily implies its opposite ("This food is too salty" necessarily implies that there is food that is less salty), making all judgments, whether adverse or not, logically untenable.

I do demonstrate in this chapter that emotions are not always natural processes, which means that in as much as emotions are judgments, judgments also are not always natural processes, meaning that Proposition 2 can be made false. But at what expense? Given my definition of unnatural, or contrived, emotions arising only in individuals with overdeveloped self-concern, it would mean that logically tenable judgments can be made only by the morally abject. Unless we are to concede that our justice system must logically rely on selfish persons as judges, we must admit that the very notion of a judgment is by this paradox made unintelligible. The significance of this problem can be seen best not in the field of jurisprudence but in the broader field of axiological
deliberation in general. Whenever we act on a good, it is presumed that the good is first judged such. But if judgment is not logically possible, the good cannot be determined, and the action cannot be taken. Is axiological deliberation therefore impossible? This dissertation is, in part, an answer to that question. Put simply, the answer lies in aesthetic spontaneity. One cannot maintain a separation between the agent and the circumstances such that the agent stands back in independent deliberation, formulates a propositional judgment, then acts on that judgment. Rather, there are integrated processes, each with its influence and responsiveness. Deliberation is part of that process, but it results in action without judgment. Another way of putting it is that judgment itself is the entire process of affective interaction, and that is why there are no discrete judgments, as such. When the counternegative claim "people are without affectivity" is made, it is meant to strip affectivity of the usual dichotomies and reveal that affectivity is an environmental, organic process not reducible to discrete elements.
CHAPTER 2: THE INTEGRATED SELF AND ITS CULTIVATION

In Chapter One, I began examining the early Chinese notion of responsive affectivity. An anthropological foundation for responsive affectivity is the concept of a mind that is a unity of reason and emotion. Such a unity, not relying solely on discursive reason but instead on all of one's faculties in reacting to circumstances, requires the cultivation of habituated action, as mentioned above at several points, particularly in regard to education. The overall goal of this dissertation is to delineate a notion of spontaneous action that is relevant to contemporary aesthetics and philosophy of action. To this end, I will be drawing on the richness of not only Chinese but also Western traditions.

If I am to develop aspects of responsive affectivity in the Western tradition, the first order of business will be to locate the philosophical basis for an integrated self, a self that relies neither on reason nor emotion alone. Then I will need to determine the basis for a method of cultivation that takes that integration into account, a habituated way of responding to circumstances and the emotions with flexibility, while preserving a space for creativity. I will look for a basis for the integrated self in Western philosophy in what may be an unexpected place, the philosophy of Plato. I choose Plato not because he has the most sophisticated philosophy of an integrated self but because he is often characterized as positing just the opposite—the prime example of the divided self. This Platonism is then said to be the basis of all of Western philosophical anthropology,
effectively throwing a damper over any effort outside of recent times to find an integrated self in Western thought. It is crucial to begin with Plato in order to disprove such an extreme view and its radical implications.

After developing a notion of the integrated self in Plato, I move on to Aristotle, where I find a sound basis for developing both a notion of habituated activity and cultivation of the emotions. These major lines of thought having been developed, I will have laid the groundwork for the following chapter on spontaneity in Chinese and Western thought and for the further exploration of cultivated spontaneity in Chapter 5.

**Part 1. Aesthetic Affectivity in Plato**

As a prelude to demonstrating an internal/external dichotomy in the prevailing history of Western philosophy, Charles Taylor, in his *Sources of the Self*, outlines Plato's ideal of the moral self. Paramount in his description is the soul's rational component, which by attaining hegemony over other aspects of the soul brings order to the person, or "self-mastery", as Taylor puts it. What is significant for Taylor is the introduction, and through later interpreters, the perpetuation, of a "spirit/matter, higher/lower, eternal/temporal, immutable/ changing" dualism. A person who seeks the good life gravitates toward a nonmaterial realm that subsists independently of, in fact, is the source of, the material realm, and which is the repository of the virtue and goodness that humankind seeks. To ascend to the immaterial realm, the person must rely on reason pacifying the appetites, reining in all desires, until a dispassionate soul guided by reason

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56 Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, p. 120.
may catch sight of the realm of glorious forms and thereby order earthly life in accordance with the forms.

Taylor's point is that the essential details of this two-world theory blossomed with Plato and informed the dominant strand of pre-modern Western thought. This is not a radical claim, to be sure, but if we inspect the few pages that Taylor devotes to his Platonic exegesis, we notice that all of his references are to Plato's *Republic*. This detail does not escape Taylor, himself, who includes a note to the effect that his 'Plato' refers solely to the author of the *Republic*, explicitly ignoring any conflicting arguments that may arise elsewhere in works also attributed to Plato. This at first seems to be a rather trivial caveat, since Taylor's goal is to "capture the tradition-setting doctrine laid down in the *Republic*," and so any arguments objecting to his exclusion of other of Plato's works that would allow a fairer reading of Plato should be directed at the tradition's deficiencies rather than at Taylor's. Before going after the tradition, however, one must first be certain of two things: 1) that Taylor has got the tradition right, and 2) that Taylor has got Plato right. I will not claim that Taylor has got either wrong, but I do claim that he has not got them exactly right. I will demonstrate that in regard to the transcendent vs. transient and reason vs. emotion dichotomy that he identifies with the tradition, he overstates his case. My re-evaluation of Plato's two-world cosmology will help bring to the fore an alternative Plato, one that stands in contrast to Taylor's exclusively transcendent dialectician and, ironically, closer to a modernist position of the complex interplay of the physical and the mental that Taylor later articulates. It may also help

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show how some of the conflicts that Taylor identifies in the modern identity may be resolved. Taylor need not be bothered by complex minutiae that may conflict with the arc of his story, but the following sections will magnify those minutiae, and the apparatus for magnification will be the concept of aesthetic affectivity.

Section 1: The Integrated Mind

Emotion in the history of the philosophy of art and art criticism goes back as far as Aristotle's purging of the emotions through katharsis and is touched on from time to time in relation to aesthetic experience. It has come to the fore of discussion in the last century through the works of such aestheticians as Clive Bell59 and Susanne Langer60.

Taylor stresses Plato's elevation of reason above emotion. Langer, in contrast, subsumes all psychical processes under the rubric "feelings". She offers an involved theory of mind centering on feelings not as hypostatized entities but as organismic actions, as phases of physiological process. "Feel" is a verb, she reminds us, "to feel something is to do something."61 Reaching into fields as diverse as biology and anthropology, Langer identifies the human being as an organism in constant interaction with the environment, always under the influence of the world around it and always affecting the immediate surroundings. Sensations are felt as impact, she says, while such psychic phenomena as envisagements, intentions, cogitations, insights, decisions, etc. are

59 See his seminal essay "Art as Significant Form" in his 1914 book Art.
60 Langer develops her theories throughout a number of books, beginning with Philosophy in a New Key and Feeling and Form, culminating finally in her trilogy Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling.
felt as "autogenic actions". The purpose of her book is summed up in the following passage:

Instead of accepting "mind" as a metaphysically ultimate reality, distinct from the physical reality which subsumes the brain, and asking how the two can "make liaison," one may hope to describe "mind" as a phenomenon in terms of the highest physiological processes, especially those which have psychical phases.

These highest physiological processes are what she calls feelings, including reason and emotion. I find this notion of feelings to coincide quite well with the early Chinese notion of affectivity that I outlined above in Chapter One. Thought and emotion are not something that arise out of nowhere. Rather, they are instances in the stream of interactions between people and the world, arising as reactions to factors of arousal and acting as factors of arousal down the line.

I bring up Langer's thesis because it is a succinct and cogent statement from an influential aesthetician on the nature of mind and because it coheres so well with early Chinese notions of the mind ("heart", as they put it). In the sections that follow, I will put Langer's notion of psychic unity based on feelings to work as a model of what I endeavor to recover in Plato, only I will substitute the term "affectivity" for "feeling", as I consider it a better description of the entire responsive process and lacking the limiting passive connotations that Langer strove to overcome.

This sort of psychic unity is not what Taylor means, however, when he remarks on Plato's privileging of a self-collected awareness requiring a conception of the mind as

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62 Ibid., p. 23.
63 Ibid., p. 29.
64 This thesis is also largely in agreement with theories of Whitehead (Langer's teacher) and Dewey (her colleague at Columbia), who could be invoked as well, though not as tidily.
a unitary space. When Taylor speaks of the Platonic mind as a unicity of locus, he refers to a single site of thought and feeling, where there is an understood incongruity between reason and other psychic processes, with reason necessarily being the ruler in the good life. Taylor calls this a privileged condition, distinguishing a privileged condition from "a special state" such as that induced by a muse's inspiration. He wants to make the point that the Western notion of mind is a unitary one but that this did not necessarily have to be the case. In the time of Homer, for example, different thoughts and feelings seem to be attributed to various parts of the body and are not unified in the psyche. With Plato, however, the soul suffers a conflict of evenly matched desires, emotions, thoughts, and so on. So Taylor's unity is not one of physiological processes differentiated by function but a unity of locale in which thoughts, desires, and emotions are still different species of being, only with the misfortune to be fenced in by the same body.

I take exception to this notion of unity as an appropriate depiction of Plato's psychology (now taking 'Plato' to include all of the works attributed to him and not just the Republic). The unity I will pursue instead follows the lines of Langer's psycho-physical unity. In regard to Plato, this is, of course, an uphill battle, since Plato, himself, repeatedly emphasizes the disjunction between the body and soul. There are, however, passages in Plato that call into question the steadfastness of this distinction, and I will exploit those passages in an attempt to re-integrate the Platonic body and mind.

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65 Taylor, op. cit., p. 119: "Plato's view, just because it privileges a condition of self-collected awareness and designates this as a state of maximum unity with oneself, requires some conception of mind as a unitary space."

66 Ibid., p. 119.
When Langer ties feeling into her concept of mind as physiological processes, her aim is to bring what are normally identified as aesthetic emotions to a more subtle level. Feeling in art, rather than being merely an expression of anger or angst or joy, may be of "vitality, energy or somnolence, or the sense of quietness, or of concentration, or any of the countless inward actions and conditions which are felt in the living fabric of mental life." By bringing the entire "living fabric of mental life" into play, Langer offers a springboard from which to approach aesthetic affectivity in Plato. In the following three sections, I will explore the psychic world of Plato in many of its neglected dimensions. I will cover some well-traveled ground, such as his conceptions of beauty and art, but I will integrate these with his conceptions of aesthetic affectivity. To do so, I will often rely on his later works, in which these areas are given elaboration that differ in the details from accounts in his Socratic dialogues and middle works (such as the Republic). One may speculate about whether their being later makes them more definitive.

Section 2: Affectivity in Plato

The most prominent emotion we encounter in Plato is love (eros), which holds a special place as the one emotion that can guide one toward the forms (eide). In the Symposium's tale of the nature of love, Diotima teaches Socrates that love is naturally attracted to beauty, desiring immortality. Love is first attracted to the beauty of other bodies, then passes through a number of stages of attraction until arriving at beauty in and of itself, the form of beauty that is beyond time and place and in which all other beautiful things share. Beauty, Diotima says, is in harmony with the divine, and one who achieves the ultimate beauty also achieves the love of the gods (theophiles). The love of the gods
is achieved, Diotima says, because by being in touch with true beauty, one gives birth to true virtue, which wins the love of the gods. And, as stated at the outset of Diotima's excursus, the supreme goal of happiness (eudaimonia) is what is finally achieved.

In this account of love and beauty, the ultimate attraction is toward the immaterial realm, toward the form of beauty. There are three things to note, however, that hint at a continued importance of the material realm. The first is that the ascension to true beauty is not possible without the stepladder of being attracted to a series of beauties in the material realm, thus making realization of the transcendent dependent on the transient. The text could have said that one is directly drawn to the forms without any physical intermediary, through pure intellect, as is said elsewhere. Instead, it introduces prerequisites making the physical realm necessary to realization of the transcendent. This is not, of course, to say that the physical is more important or a sufficient condition itself, merely that it is indispensable and significantly so. Second, reason, the direct route out of the material realm in the Republic, is given a lesser role, and not even explicitly mentioned. It is true that in the stage of knowledge (episteme) of various things, one "gives birth to many gloriously beautiful ideas and theories, in unstinting love of wisdom (philosophia)" (210d), which would seem to imply the utilization of reason, but this is

68 There are two statements of the progression of stages: 1) one beautiful body, all beautiful bodies, the beauty of activities and laws (as being of souls), various kinds of knowledge, and then the beauty of the forms (210a-210e); 2) (a restatement of the first) one body or two ("beautiful things"), all beautiful bodies, beautiful customs, learning beautiful things, and then learning of Beauty (211c).

69 A. N. Whitehead notices something similar: types of Platonic philosophy . . seek the forms in the facts. Each fact is more than its forms, and each form 'participates' throughout the world of facts. The definiteness of fact is due to its forms; but the individual fact is a creature, and creativity is the ultimate behind all forms, inexplicable by forms, and conditioned by its creatures. (Process and Reality, p. 30).

70 In the note directly above, there is no mention of reason (logos) in either list.
still just an intermediary step, and it is a knowledge (episteme) of beauty that vaults one

to the realm of forms; whereas such a vehicle in the Republic is fueled only by reason and
dialectic. Third, there is a curious passage about midway through Diotima's teaching,
which I'll quote:

There are those who are even more pregnant in their souls than in their bodies, and these
are pregnant with what is fitting for a soul to bear and bring to birth. What is fitting? Wisdom
(phronesis) and the rest of virtue (arete), which all poets (poietes) beget, as well as all the
craftsmen (demiourgos) who are said to be creative (heuetikos). (209a)

The inclusion here, or rather, the singling out, of poets and craftsmen as bearers of both
wisdom and virtue, two of Plato's highest goods, is quite stunning, and perplexing, given
that elsewhere both are relegated to much lower levels of achievement. Diotima makes it
clear in subsequent lines that there is a higher, more beautiful level of wisdom that is
achievable through the pursuit of beauty (not artistic beauty), but the mere mention here
of craftsmen and wisdom in the same line runs directly contrary to arguments in the
Republic, in which poets are tantamount to liars for peddling mere imitations, and
craftsmen are still one remove away from true reality.

The Ion is also one of the classic accounts of Platonic aesthetics. In this short
dialogue, Socrates convinces a talented rhapsode that his ability for reciting poetry is not
due to his own knowledge (gignosko) or mastery (techne) but due instead to the divine
power of a muse inspiring (entheos) him to poetic heights. Again, there is an absence of
the privileging of reason, but there is also no pursuit of beauty or achievement of
intimacy with forms. Neither, however, is the rhapsode (or poet) considered just a cheap
imitator or deceiver or destroyer of reason, as he is in the Republic (605b). Instead,
Socrates eagerly awaits Ion's performance of Homer and calls the poet, because of the phenomenon of divine inspiration, divine himself.

The *Symposium* and *Ion* are two examples from early dialogues that demonstrate the possibility of an alternative to the exclusive supremacy of reason in Plato as he is represented in Taylor's interpretation. According to Taylor, Plato established a strict transcendent vs. transient and rational vs. non-rational dichotomy that persisted through the ages as the dominant understanding of human beings and their place in the world but which has gradually been eroded.

... Plato's moral theory seems in some ways very familiar and understandable to us. This is so when we describe it as calling for a kind of self-mastery, which consists in reason ruling over desires, a self-control which contrasts to being dominated by one's appetites and passions. We instinctively feel we understand what this moral theory is about, whether we agree with it or not. We see it as one of our contemporary options.

But it begins to seem strange when we understand that the rule of reason is to be understood as rule by a rational vision of order—or better, since for Plato the logos was in reality as well as in us, we should speak of rule by a vision of rational order. The question of which element in us rules translates immediately into a question of what the soul as a whole attends to and loves: the eternal order of being, or else the changing play of sights and sounds and the bodily perishable. To be ruled by reason means to have one's life shaped by a pre-existent rational order which one knows and loves.71

Taylor makes a sharp distinction between reason on the one hand and desire and passion on the other, attributing this distinction to Plato, Augustine, and Descartes as the major representatives of the Western tradition. This distinction is accurate in general terms, but as I will demonstrate below, it is not as absolute as Taylor makes it out to be.

In the *Republic*, Plato's position regarding a hard-and-fast reason vs. emotion dichotomy is ambiguous. At one point, when he refers to the place of poets in society, the distinction is obviously there:

In the case of sex, anger, and all the desires, pleasures, and pain that we say accompany all our actions, poetic imitation has the very same effect on us. It nurtures and waters them and establishes them as rulers in us when they ought to wither and be ruled. (606d)

Here Plato lumps all non-rational motivations for action together without distinguishing among them, as if the rational part of the soul could rule alone. This is a popular understanding of both Plato and Descartes and one that Taylor reinforces. When Plato actually discusses the matter, however, his conclusion draws the line separating reason from non-reason much less sharply, in fact, he moves the line so that the distinction is not reason vs. non-reason but reason and emotion vs. desire. This is a critical point because it prevents a strict mind vs. body and therefore transcendent vs. transient distinction. When Plato discusses the division of the soul into parts, he identifies "rational (logistikos)", "spirited (thymos)", and "appetitive (epithymetikos)" parts. It is not clear at first where emotion falls in this distinction, but it clearly would not be the rational part, as the rational is by its nature elevated to the transcendent realm of the intellect. Emotion, not being intellectual is in some way related to the body and would belong to either the spirited or appetitive parts of the soul. Plato suggests at first that emotion would fall into the appetitive part but later concludes that because anger can be shown to oppose the appetite, it belongs to the spirited part. In fact, we see that in Plato's interpretation of human action, reason has no power of animation, and it is emotion that motivates us. The two major emotions that motivate are love and anger.

Philosophers have struggled throughout history to create a plausible theory of how the non-corporeal soul, as the seat of the intellect, can move the non-spiritual body.

72 Plato, Republic, 439d - 442b.
Plato posits parts of the soul that are non-intellectual as an answer but does not address how the non-spiritual body influences these parts of the soul, though they (the non-intellectual parts of the soul) do, indeed, represent for him all of the flaws of corporeality. So we are left with a deep ambiguity in Plato regarding the importance of the transcendent in relation to human action, and it revolves around the problem of emotions. Taylor asserts that there is no ambiguity, that there is a clear and indisputable reason vs. non-reason split, and that it coincides with a similarly clear and indisputable transcendent vs. transient split. He asserts that Plato is the font of these notions and that they are carried forward throughout the tradition. We see in Plato, however, that the divide is not as unambiguous as he makes it out to be, that there is an ambiguity that leaves room for more discussion of these dichotomies and their repercussions on theories of human action.

Section 3: The Integrated Mind in Plato

We saw above that it was important to Taylor that Plato's soul have a unity of locale, and I promised to challenge such a unity. In the Republic, Plato actually does not discuss the location of the soul in the physical body, although there is a strong hint of it. After establishing that there are three parts to the soul and that anger belongs to the spirited part, Plato depicts the following discussion:

... we can show [the spirited part of the soul] is different from the rational part, as we saw earlier it was from the appetitive one.

It isn't difficult to show that it is different. Even in small children, one can see that they are full of spirit right from birth, while as far as rational calculation is concerned, some never seem to get a share of it, while the majority do so quite late.
That's really well put. And in animals too one can see that what you say is true. Besides, our earlier quotation from Homer bears it out, where he says, "He struck his chest and spoke to his heart." For here Homer clearly represents the part that has calculated about better and worse as different from the part that is angry without calculation.  

Homer's quote goes on to say, "Endure, my heart, you've suffered more shameful things than this." The heart is where suffering takes place, and so Plato is suggesting that that is where the spirited part of the soul resides. In the Timaeus, the narrator is explicit, retaining the tripartite division and placing each part of the soul in a different part of the body. The narrator, an astronomer and philosopher named Timaeus, first notes a bifurcation into mortal and immortal parts. The immortal (divine) part was placed by the creator in the person's head, staining it as little as possible with corporeal afflictions. The mortal part was placed in the trunk and separated again, placing the spirited part in the chest and the appetitive part in the abdomen, near the liver. These parts of the soul were connected to each other by the marrow. This passage of communication between parts of the soul is what allows for a notion of unity, but not a unity of locale. Each part of the soul is identified with a vital human organ, suggesting that none is dispensable and all are necessary to the normal functioning of the whole person. Also, the communication depicted among the parts is not just the logistikos ruling it over the other two parts of the soul but a more complex communication that intimates a larger significance for corporeality. Other parts of the body even have roles necessary to the smooth functioning of the soul.

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73 Plato, op. cit., 441a - b.
74 Ibid., 390d.
75 It should not go unmentioned that although Taylor depicts the Republic as the fountainhead of the Western philosophical anthropological tradition, it was, in fact, the Timaeus that was virtually synonymous with Plato from late Antiquity through the Middle Ages.
76 Timaeus, 69c-70b.
This awareness of the person as a biological being also manifests in the area of sensory awareness. From the very beginning of life, the impinging interactions with the surrounding world produce sense perceptions (*aisthanomai*) in the person's soul. Next produced is love, mingled with pleasure and pain, and thereafter, fear and spiritedness.\(^{77}\)

Again, this emphasis on interaction with the external world and the importance of physiology reveals a slightly smaller role for the activities of pure reason. The mortal parts of the soul contain pleasure, pains, boldness, fear, anger, expectation, sense perception, and lust, all "dreadful but necessary disturbances".\(^{78}\)

We also see that when external stimuli impinge on the body, they travel like chain reactions through the body, accompanied by pains and pleasures, terminating in the "*phronimon*", literally, the place of *phronesis*. "*Phronesis*" appeared above in the passage from the *Symposium* in which *phronesis* was unexpectedly attributed to craftsmen and poets. The appearance here, where *phronesis* is essentially activated by sensory awareness, helps explain the link between practical wisdom and practical crafts on one hand and expressive poetry on the other.

The increased importance of the *kosmos aisthetos* in the *Timaeus* is echoed in two other late works, the *Philebus* and the *Laws*. In the *Philebus*, the importance of a happy (*eudaimonia*) life takes center stage, no longer viewed as an unimportant, inevitable, rather watered down concomitant of a just existence. The question addressed is whether practical wisdom (*phronesis*) or pleasure yields the happy life. Perhaps it is not surprising, since happiness rather than justice is the central concern, that both are found

\(^{77}\) *Ibid.*, 42a.
\(^{78}\) *Ibid.*, 69c.
wanting, and the ideal life would have a mixture of both phronesis and pleasure. Cold reason (logos) is markedly absent. Instead of a pull toward the immaterial realm, we are ensconced comfortably in a realm of constant interaction between the intellectual and the physiological, each dependent on the other. It is still clear that the intellectual is of a higher order, but it is not an order that is in any way disjoined, or strives to be disjoined, from the physical. Intellectual functions such as memory are shown to be tightly wound up with sense perception, and physiological functions, such as pleasure, are found to be absent without the soul making contact with the body. By the end of the dialogue, the mixture of pleasure and practical wisdom, if it is to be a good mixture, is seen to also require beauty (kalos), proportion (symmetos), and truth (arete), and so these are added to the evaluative possibilities, along with other properties of life, and a final ranking is made. The importance for us is not that measure (metros) and beauty are at the top and pleasure at the bottom, with intelligence (nous), practical wisdom (phronesis), the sciences (episteme), and the arts (techne) in between; the importance is that they are on a continuum, absent the sort of disjunction we find in the divided line of the Republic.

What might be troubling the reader at this point is the fact that a close inspection of the final rankings in the Philebus puts beauty, the arts, and pleasure (the only affective trait mentioned) all in different rankings, making it appear that any talk of so-called aesthetic affectivity is irrelevant. If we understand aesthetic affectivity in the sense of expressive emotion in art, then, of course, we will not find it in Plato. But if we take Langer's advice and broaden our understanding of affectivity to the interplay of all

79 Ibid., 34a.
80 Ibid., 35c.
cognitive and sensate faculties, then the mere continuum of beauty, art, and emotion, reveals an important aspect of Plato's later philosophy. Beauty is still associated with perfection, as we saw in the Symposium, but it is now a perfection of geometric objects immanent in the physical realm\textsuperscript{81} rather than belonging to, and sought after in, another plane of existence, and the measure from which it derives is of either the physical or the intellectual.\textsuperscript{82} This is very unlike the Symposium, and unlike the Republic and other earlier works. Intelligence and wisdom are not trained on a higher realm or striving to suppress emotions; all psychic processes--emotions, thought, sense-perception--are working in harmony to produce a happiness that is of this world. No single element is self-sufficient:

\begin{quote}
both intellect and pleasure . . . lost any claim that one or the other would be the good itself, since they were lacking in autonomy and in the power of self-sufficiency and perfection.\textsuperscript{83}
\end{quote}

Without the concept of aesthetic affectivity, this harmony appears to be just another division of Plato's when it can be interpreted as a practical synthesis.

A similar synthesis that presumes an aesthetic affectivity can be found in the Laws. In Book II, the intriguing question is raised as to whether drinking parties, if properly run, can actually safeguard correct education. We can see right away that the concept of aesthetic affectivity can be of help in understanding such an extraordinary claim.

I will not outline the entire argument, for in its details it extends well beyond the bounds of this discussion, but I will begin with the first postulate, namely that the earliest

\textsuperscript{81} Plato, Philebus, 51c.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 64e-65a.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 67a. Frede's translation has "reason" for nous, which I have changed to "intellect".
sensations a child feels in infancy are of pleasure and pain. This immediately places the topic in the sensate realm, and the reader is assured that this is not a red herring when later the admission is made that the best life is that which brings the most pleasure.  

Pleasure is not disinterested, of course; it is also the route by which virtue and vice first enter the soul. Virtue is taken to be not reason or measure or beauty alone but the "general concord of reason and emotion". Virtue and pleasure come together in the arts, of which both are a concern, but pleasure is actually taken to be the highest concern. It is not that virtue is sidelined, but rather that the judge of the arts will, himself, be a man of high moral caliber and adequate education and so will eschew any art of questionable taste. Goodness in the arts is when they please just this sort of man. But to what does he owe the cultivation of his good taste? None other than the faculty we have found so important above in bridging the gap between the ethereal and earthly realms, phronesis.

I am in no way suggesting that the Laws embraces hedonism. The intellectual and the moral still hold privileged positions. But in what we may consider a sort of sequel to, or revision of, the Republic, there is a marked shift in emphasis away from the immaterial to a synthesis of the intellectual and the sensate. We notice in the account above that the intellectual faculty of phronesis is employed not to suppress or transcend the sensate realm, but to harmonize, to choose the best pleasures to be found among the arts. And the intellectual, cultivated properly in virtue, never deviates from the moral. Thus,  

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84 Plato, Laws, 664b.  
85 Ibid, 653a.  
86 Ibid, 653b.  
87 Ibid, 658e.  
88 Ibid, 659a.
whereas the poets were hard-pressed to get through the city walls into the Athens of the *Republic*, in the *Laws* they are invited in to be enjoyed by discriminating connoisseurs and school-age children, so long as the poetic works are in accord with the educative principles of the city.

One of the reasons it is so difficult to talk about aesthetics in Plato is that we largely identify aesthetics with the philosophy of art, whereas Plato does not even distinguish art in the sense that we understand it. The lines that divide the definitions of the terms he uses for art and artist space (*techne*, *demiourgos*, *poietes*, etc.) cross so haphazardly into broad categories that we know as science, professions, craftsmen, inventors, and makers and doers of all kinds that even speaking of the arts in Plato is difficult, let alone philosophizing about them. Even a word as seemingly straightforward as "dance", which brings to mind images of elegance, refinement, flowing rhythms, and so on, is employed in the *Laws* as an essential part of gymnastic and military training, perhaps more akin to a martial art. And a word that may come closest to our understanding of high art, "*mouseios* (product of the muses)", is rarely used in ancient Greece.

This linguistic difficulty, however, should not prevent us from continuing to push the bounds of interpretation in regard to Plato's aesthetics; conversely, it should irrigate the seeds of creativity. Falling back on pat answers or the "received tradition" runs contrary to the Socratic spirit, after all. Aesthetic affectivity may not have been in Plato's vocabulary, but through it, with the help of some sophisticated analysis, we can achieve a more robust understanding of Plato's aesthetics and his philosophy as a whole. We do
not have to accept the pat two-world Plato that Taylor identifies as dominant in the tradition and can instead entertain a more interesting Plato who has more to say to our world.

Section 4: Impact of the Integrated Mind

Having established the relevance of aesthetic affectivity for the later Plato and its role synthesizing the intellectual and sensate realms, I will proceed to investigate its possible impact on the interpretation of the self in the Western tradition and its relevance to the understanding of the modern identity. A flaw in Taylor's work is that in isolating the tradition, although his sources are numerous and well-cited, he occasionally falls back on unsupported generalizations. An example of this sort of lapse that is pertinent to the issue of aesthetic affectivity is Taylor's characterization of the soul in Plato.

Taylor understands Plato's emphasis on self-mastery, or collectedness, to necessitate what he calls the soul's unicity of locale, as opposed to the soul being divided into distinctly functioning parts and located in different parts of the body, as depicted in Homer. Because Taylor's sole source for Plato is the Republic, the implication is that there is a discussion in the Republic of the location of the soul in the body. There is a discussion of the soul, of course, but in it the soul does not turn out to be as unified as Taylor makes it out to be. Taylor's claim turns out to be a logical one: "the soul must be one if we are to reach our highest in the self-collected understanding of reason."89 His reasoning is that in order for the rational part of the soul to dominate the other parts of the

89 Taylor, op. cit., p. 120.
soul, they must be in communication and therefore, apparently, adjacent to each other. It turns out, as we saw above, that when Plato does get around to specifying likely locations for the various parts of the soul in the Timaeus, they are not in the same part of the body at all. And although they are in communication, it is not the logistikos, but the thymos that suppresses the epithymetikos through its proximity. In addition, by drawing on the complexities in other dialogues, we see that the communication among parts of the soul does not guarantee that the notion of self-mastery, or collectedness, is quite as straightforward as Taylor makes it out to be.

We'll remember from the discussion of the Philebus and the Laws that in order to achieve the good life, pleasure and practical wisdom must be balanced. We also saw in the Symposium the importance of being carried along by the recognition of earthly beauty. And in the Timaeus, divination, which occurs when the understanding is bound up, is a gift from the gods and allows some grasp of the truth.\textsuperscript{90} In each of these cases, it is not true to say that the rational part of the mind must achieve undisputed hegemony or that self-mastery is necessarily the ultimate goal. We still have the notion of divine inspiration from the Ion, which also goes against this notion of collectedness. When the importance of poetry and other arts gains ground in the Laws, it also becomes implicit that the same power and ability to transport that Socrates finds so attractive in the Ion is also accepted as part of the search for intellectual and pleasurable balance. This would indicate that Taylor's thesis of self-mastery, or collectedness, beginning with Plato can also be called into question.

\textsuperscript{90} Plato, Timaeus, 71e.
The claim Taylor makes is that beginning with Plato a tradition developed in which reason was always elevated over nonrational psychic states. He traces this development through the Stoics, Augustine, Descartes, Locke, and into the modern concept of the self. The key components of this self, he says, are an internalization and a disengagement. There is no question that reason plays a paramount position in Plato and that his philosophy on the whole was influential, but I find Taylor's account of the tradition too tidy. After spending fifteen pages outlining Plato's philosophy as it appears in the *Republic* and noting rather bluntly that he doesn't care whether it represents the 'real' Plato or not, he moves on to Augustine, explaining how Augustine had drawn on Plato in developing his ideas of inwardness, but the Plato that Augustine was reading, Taylor himself tells us, was mostly the Plato of the *Timaeus*. Augustine was also influenced by Neo-Platonists such as Plotinus, who stressed the special state of nonrational draw toward the beauty of the divine. John Milbank even argues, explicitly against Taylor, that "Augustine's use of the vocabulary of 'inwardness' is not at all a deepening of Platonic interiority, but something much more like its subversion". 

"Plato's distinction," Taylor says, "stands at the head of a large family of views which see the good life as a mastery of self which consists in the dominance of reason over desire." Milbank, however, responds:

An examination of Augustine's texts (especially the *Confessions*) suggests, first, that inwardness for Augustine involves remaining within our *createdness* and not imagining that some psychic aspect of ourselves is really part of an eternal substance. . . . Second, and in consequence,

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92 Dodaro and Lawless, *Augustine and His Critics*, p. 91.
it means remaining within time and traveling to God by gathering ourselves again through memory, through a tearful shedding of ourselves and an expectation governed by right desire.\textsuperscript{94} If Milbank's interpretation is correct, then in the best of all circumstances for Augustine, reason is not dominant over desire.

By ignoring the complexities in Plato's and Augustine's notions of reason and emotion, Taylor effectively projects the sharp reason vs. non-reason dichotomy of the Stoics on to Plato and Augustine. Then he moves to Descartes and does the same. Descartes is the other major figure often cited as positing a clear reason/emotion split, with reason given the paramount position, in an absolute sense. Taylor posits the same, but again, he overstates the case. Descartes does prioritize reason over emotion, but he also does not deny that emotion has a function in practical life. For Descartes, there is an acceptance that emotions (or passions), when in balance, are a necessary part of the good life:

\textit{The function of all the passions consists solely in this, that they dispose our soul to want the things which nature deems useful for us, and to persist in this volition.}\textsuperscript{95}

In Taylor's historical narrative, the sharp lines he draws around rational self-mastery are not intended to delineate just a simple reason vs. emotion dichotomy. He could have done this by beginning with the Stoics, but the Stoics do not have a strong enough conception of transcendence. Instead, Taylor links the inward turn to a vision of an external rational order, as seen in the \textit{Republic}. Order in the soul is achieved through a turning toward a greater cosmic order by reason's suppression of emotion. It turns out, however, that the real importance of Taylor's distinction is not a turning inward or a

\textsuperscript{94} Dodaro and Lawless, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 91.
\textsuperscript{95} Cottingham, \textit{The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Passions of the Soul}, § 372.
primacy of reason but rather a hierarchy of being and a sacredness to appeal to beyond
the profane.

Let me recapitulate the subtle transition that takes place in Taylor's reasoning.
Near the beginning of Section II ("Inwardness") of Sources of the Self, he develops the
time that considerations of the self in Western Philosophy take a significant turn inward,
beginning with Plato. For evidence, he turns to the Republic and its emphasis on the
primacy of reason as a means of self-collectedness. He traces this tradition of inwardness
from Plato through Augustine to Descartes, Locke, and Montaigne. Beginning with
Descartes, this inwardness becomes total, and disengaged reason along with
individualism begins to take precedence philosophically. This is the lead-up to Section
III ("The Affirmation of the Ordinary"), which begins with the Reformation's rejection of
a spiritual hierarchy (there being only God and humans) and of special patches of
sacredness of life, which, as it becomes obvious later in the work, Taylor himself finds
problematic. But why should a section on inwardness lead up to a section on the
problems with the affirmation of the ordinary life? It is because Taylor finds the fusion
of the "the ethic of ordinary life and the philosophy of disengaged freedom and
rationality"96 to be problematic. But now he has moved away from the importance of
Plato's Republic and Augustine altogether. By directing the reader's notice to the
historicity of the notion of inwardness, Taylor is suggesting that disengaged reason does
not represent the entire significance of the reflexivity. Rather, he is saying that when this
notion arose in the history of Western philosophy, it was concomitant with some other

96 Taylor, op. cit., p. 234.
important notions, such as a hierarchy of being and a broad sacredness in life, which the
Protestants of the Reformation managed to erase, while retaining the importance of
disengaged reason.

My claim is not that Taylor is entirely incorrect in asserting that the transcendent vs.
 transient and reason vs. non-reason dichotomies were a major force in the history of
Western philosophy. I am suggesting, however, that his case is overstated in a way that
prevents views more amenable to bridging these gaps from finding firm historical
foundations. Taylor's purpose for writing the book is to establish historical precedents
for returning the role of transcendence to meta-ethics\textsuperscript{97}, but by overstating his case, he
simultaneously elbows out those of us who would like to retrieve corporeality in Western
thought.

As I have demonstrated above, if one turns back to Plato, it becomes apparent that
his stress on rational self-mastery gets complicated in both the Republic, itself, and in
works outside the Republic, with such notions as the synthesizing of the rational and the
sensate, and it becomes much more difficult to maintain that the Reformation's jettisoning
of the hierarchy of being and of the sacral was entirely at odds with Plato. Protestants
believed that "humans are meant to enjoy the things which God has put before them,"\textsuperscript{98}--
a statement not entirely alien to the Laws.

What becomes clear now, and ironic, is that Taylor's critique of modernist
philosophies follows along the same lines as my critique of Taylor's understanding of

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., see pp. 517 - 521 for specific references to his agenda and note that he explicitly declines to justify
it.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., p. 222.
Plato. Taylor says that the problem with all the various philosophical anthropologies of modernism is that they are too narrow and do not take into account all of the implicit goods that contribute to the modern identity.99 Taylor emphasizes that the modern identity is much more complex and, in fact, is an amalgamation of, conflicting but not contradictory notions of the self. Taylor's view of Plato, I would argue, is similarly exclusionary and does not take into account the complex facets of Plato's thought that would actually make it more appealing to a contemporary understanding than that of his narrow interpretation of the Republic alone.

Taylor defines the modern identity in these terms

a sense of self defined by the powers of disengaged reason as well as of the creative imagination, in the characteristically modern understandings of freedom and dignity and rights, in the ideals of self-fulfillment and expression, and in the demands of universal benevolence and justice.100

Not all of these characteristics would apply to Plato's anthropology, particularly the notions of rights and expression, but for the most part it coheres with what I have recounted above from his later works. What is absent from the modernist identity, according to Taylor, is "the exploration of order through personal resonance". This vague phrasing appears to be a Taylor euphemism for spirituality, a term he dares use only reticently in the book and which does not even find its way into the index. In other words, the hierarchy of being and the sacredness that have disappeared from modernity were, in Taylor's view, unfortunately erased from Platonic reason's purview.

Taylor does not proffer a remedy for the inherent conflicts of the modernist identity, although he hints strongly that it must be in this direction of spirituality.

99 Ibid., pp. 502 - 503.
100 Ibid., p. 503.
Perhaps we could look back to Plato, the complete Plato (not just of the *Republic*), to find some inspiration for reconciliation. Of course, it would take a book to do justice to the subject, but, as a conclusion for this section, let me offer a general outline for such a venture.

We can begin with Plato's spirituality. I mention above that the likely reason that Taylor skirts Stoic spirituality in favor of the *Republic* is the Stoic bent toward turning the transcendent into the immanent. It may be for the same reason that Taylor opts for the *Republic* over the *Timaeus*. In the *Timaeus*, and in the *Laws*, the forms are in the background, and the soul takes center stage. The *Timaeus* story of creation begins with the crafting of the world soul, which imbues the entire universe with motion and life.  

We may construe this sort of hylozoism as a source of the sacred, although because the sacred can be found everywhere it differs significantly from Taylor's desire for sacred patches in life, such as the Catholic sacraments, tied to a transcendent realm. I find the potential for everything to be sacred more attractive, for the reason that to say that something is not sacred is to say that it is profane, which implies a license to treat it in a way not in keeping with the moral imperative stemming from the belief that all creation is good because it was created by a creator incapable of evil.  

I'm not now elucidating Plato, but reading in a possible implication. Sacredness can be recovered even in a life that affirms the ordinary, for if the ordinary partakes in the world soul then one is bound to view it as sacred. One can find parallels in Buddhism, Hinduism, and Shinto. It's true that mainstream philosophy shies away from such notions and even from the

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101 Plato, *Timaeus*, 30c-d. See also *Laws*, 896a-b and 899b.
contributions of these major religious philosophies, but by returning to Plato, fountaineer of Western philosophy, as we are doing, such notions may be established as worthy of consideration.

Continuing with the story in the *Timaeus*, after the world soul the various individual souls were created. When these were sown into the souls of human beings, "the first innate capacity they would of necessity come to have would be sense perception." The idea of sacredness above depends on one accepting certain of Plato's religious notions, but here, even though it is still in the language of the soul, we begin a psychological account that also brings us face to face with ordinary life. After perception comes love (*eros*), accompanied by pleasure and pain, and following these come the emotions of fear and spiritedness, and that is all. Reason does not make the list. Here we have the ingredients for an ordinary life filled with the beauty and pleasures of the arts as described in the *Philebus* and *Laws*. Taylor worries quite a bit about the reconciliation of utilitarian detached reason and Romantic notions of creative fulfillment and expressionism. He finds that the conflict often lies in the bivalent need for one of these conflicting notions to be dominant over the other. Of course, he traces the beginnings of such bivalence back to Plato, but as we have seen above, the demands of these two sides of the modern identity can be successfully accommodated in a harmonious way, even in Plato. Although Plato holds reason as paramount in ordinary states, he allows for special states, such as creative inspiration, divination, and the ecstatic pursuit of beauty. Taylor effectively denies these in Plato by confining himself to the *Republic*'s vision of reason as

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the sole mode of access to the transcendent, but they hold a significant place in Plato's reconciliation of unfeeling reason with the undeniable human need for aesthetic pleasure. Especially important for a concern with the modern identity would be the interesting notion in the *Ion* of the magnet of inspiration and how it presumes divine inspiration not only for the creative artist but also for the spectator. This is much more than requiring a suspension of disbelief during a drama, for there is a certain truth to how one is carried away by participation in an artwork. We may not have to believe in muses who are intermediaries between gods and humans, but the power of a piece of art to move us and the appearance of the power actually forming a creative link between the artist and the spectator or audience are undeniable.

Taylor's concern for a hierarchy of being appears to be subsumed under his notion of "personal resonance", which would also fall under our notion above of the sacred. It could also, in my opinion, fall under the notion here of magnetic inspiration in the arts. When we consider that all of creation is in a sense (a literal sense for Plato) fashioned and we view it with an attitude not too unlike the attitude of sacredness, we become connoisseurs of the art of ordinary life. There are heights to the ordinary life that Plato flirts with and which can be fleshed out to enrich a modern notion of identity.

Regardless of whether one calls the connection sacred or ordinary, the emotional connection established in the experience of art is an example of the notion of responsive affectivity bordering on that found in early Chinese affective experience. Thus we have moved from the aesthetic to responsive affectivity. This transition becomes even more pronounced in Aristotle.
In this part of the Chapter, I have demonstrated two main points: 1) that Charles Taylor in his presentation of Plato as a fountainhead of the notion of rational self-mastery in the West, commits the error of narrow circumscription, which robs him of a richer sense of the self in Plato, and 2) that this richer sense of the self has the power still to enrich our modern notion of identity, by providing us an integrated self, for which both emotion and reason can act as foundations for responsive action. I should reiterate that although the latter was my main objective, I had to first contend with the former because Taylor is such an imposing figure. Again, Taylor is generally correct in asserting the dominance of reason over emotion in the history of Western thought, but in the service of his agenda of establishing a transcendent basis for a modern meta-ethic, he overstates his case for the importance of reason in the tradition. Reason has not been quite as paramount and emotion as neglected as he makes them out to have been. Moving now to Aristotle, I will uncover a sophisticated notion of aesthetic emotion that can function as a rudimentary form of responsive affectivity and that can be cultivated as such.

Part 2: Aesthetic Affectivity in Aristotle

The now classic statement on aesthetic emotion comes from Clive Bell:

That there is a particular kind of emotion provoked by works of visual art, and that this emotion is provoked by every kind of visual art, by pictures, sculptures, buildings, pots, carvings, textiles, etc., etc., is not disputed, I think, by anyone capable of feeling it. This emotion is called the aesthetic emotion. 104

Because Bell endeavors to use the concept of aesthetic emotion and its concomitant, "significant form", to justify the aesthetic legitimacy of nonrepresentational art, it is not

104 Reprinted in Dickie, George, et. al, Aesthetics, p. 74.
in his scope of interest to delineate specific emotions evoked by art. That would run
counter to his enterprise, since particular emotions would tend to connote
representationalism in the art piece. Bell prefers the term "peculiar" (meaning specific)
when referring to what kind of an emotion aesthetic emotion is. The more vague the
better because ultimately he is also attempting to identify that one quality by virtue of
which all visual art pieces can be called art.

In another well-known exposition on art and emotion, Leo Tolstoy takes exactly
the opposite position. Attempting to ferret out legitimate art from nonsensical modernist
imposters, Tolstoy argues that the feelings transmitted by art are specific feelings felt by
the artist and transmitted to the viewer, though he allows for a generous range of feelings:

Art is a human activity consisting in this, that one man consciously, by means of certain
external signs, hands on to others feelings he has lived through, and that other people are infected
by these feelings and also experience them. 105

In Tolstoy's case, the general implication is that the more specific the emotion the better;
and "the stronger the infection, the better is the art as art." 106

Accounts of emotion can be found in many places in the history of Western
Philosophy, from Plato and Aristotle in rudimentary form to more sophisticated
expositions in Descartes and Spinoza. To approach a notion of responsive affectivity,
however, in which there is a discussion of resonant arousal and response, it helps to turn
to emotions as they are couched in aesthetic terms, particularly in Aristotle. "Aesthetic
affectivity" is not a term in Aristotle's technical vocabulary, but I will demonstrate below
that because his exposition on the nature and value of responsive emotion cultivated by

105 Reprinted in Ibid., p. 58.
106 Ibid., p.60.
the arts, the term is not without merit, and I will adopt it here for its appropriateness and convenience. The notion does not reach the broad cosmology of responsive affectivity found in early Chinese philosophy, instead relying on descriptions of specific emotions and their evocation, cleaving more closely to Tolstoy's than to Bell's account of aesthetic emotion. Nonetheless, the accounts of responsiveness and cultivation will provide a foundation for further development in later chapters.

Understanding aesthetic affectivity in the basic sense of emotions having to do with art, is itself problematic when we attempt to extend it back over two millennia to a very different philosophical milieu. In the following sections, I will first attempt to reconcile our notion of art with Aristotle's own conception, which is similar but still differs in significant aspects. Having ironed out this terminological ambiguity, I will approach the issue of emotions and art in Aristotle by distinguishing three areas of theoretic crossover between emotions and art: emotion evoked by art, emotion cultivated by art, and emotion ensuing from art. From these, it will become apparent that Aristotle does approach a notion of responsive affectivity in a broader sense than merely arts as expressing emotion, and that his sophisticated theory of cultivated character adds a rich dimension for further exploitation.

Section 1: Terminological Ambiguities

As mentioned above, one must be aware of the wide differences in meaning between the ancient Greek term that we translate "art" and our use of the term "art". Translations of Aristotle almost invariable translate the Greek term "techne" as "art".
The easy distinction to make is that "techne" is a broad term that includes not only our conception of art but also the menial crafts and all the professions. I would contend, however, that it does not include our conception of art at all and so can be a misleading term even for a reader experienced in this field. I won't try to define the current use of the term "art" except to say that when we use the term, we generally refer to what we call the creative arts. We often hear statements such as "politics is an art" or "basketball is an art", but in these cases, the purpose is to highlight a certain subtle adroitness and creativity that most people do not normally recognize in these endeavors, which are not in general understanding considered to be arts as such, otherwise the phrase itself would be nonsensically tautological. For example, one would never hear the claim that painting is an art or sculpture is an art. It goes without saying that they are arts because, in their highest forms, they require not only expert adroitness, but also a high level of creativity. I'm not suggesting that creativity is the only criterion of art, just that it is what most people nowadays would agree is one of the major defining characteristics of art, and it is also one that does not appear to have sprung to Aristotle's mind in his discussions of art. This is why I bring up the distinction.

For Aristotle, an art is a productive art. If we were to translate "creativity" backward into ancient Greek, a likely candidate would be "poietikos", a term that

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107 What one often hears now instead is that such and such a painting or sculpture is not art because of what it lacks.

108 I would even go so far as to say that it has unfortunately come to be the badge of recognition for much art that otherwise has little to recommend it. Perhaps creativity should be differentiated from novelty in this instance, but for now let novelty be a part of creativity.

109 Other candidates would be "euporos" and "epinola", which can both mean inventive, but the first refers more to resourcefulness and the second to clever thoughts, not usually associated with creativity in an artistic sense.
means capable of creating. "To create" in Aristotle's terminology, as in Plato's, means to bring into existence absent a necessary transformation resulting from efficient cause.

Whereas we would oppose creative production to mechanical production, for Aristotle, the opposition is between production and action, and all production is a science that proceeds, at its best, according to identifiable principles. So in this sense, not only does the Greek conception of art not include our contemporary conception, it is diametrically opposed to it, since art made solely according to systematic principles is anathema to currently accepted notions of creativity.

The following is an illustrative example from Aristotle:

\[\ldots\text{it is}\ldots\text{because of the same actions that every virtue comes into being or is destroyed, and similarly with every art; for it is by playing the lyre well or badly that men become good or bad lyre players, respectively. In the case of architects and all the rest, too, the situation is analogous.}\]^{10}

There is no indication in this passage that "art" does not mean "creative art" as we understand it; in fact, this sense recommends itself in the two examples of the lyre player and the architect. If we take a closer look at the word "architect (oikodomos)", however, we see that oikodomos is not a designer of houses, per se, but a builder of houses. This meaning becomes apparent in the subsequent line: "for men become good architects by building houses well." It is not immediately apparent how lyre-playing can be a productive and not a creative art, but for Aristotle, the productive arts are also the mimetic arts. This is made clear in regard to the lyre in the first and second chapters of the Poetics, but perhaps Aristotle's clearest statement is in the Politics:

\[\footnote{10} \text{Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1103b 5-10. All translations are from Apostle, Aristotle: Selected Works, unless otherwise noted. Line numbers will be given according to Bekker's standard edition and with as much specificity as the various translations allow.}\]
Rhythm and melody above all else provide imitations of anger and calm, of courage and temperance and their contraries, as well as of other spiritual affections, which come very near to the affections themselves.\footnote{Politics, 1340a. Translations of the Politics are from Aristotle, Politics and the Athenian Constitution.}

All the arts (in his sense of the term), were conducted according to principles, and by "principle", he meant "formal principle", which meant that the product of the art, whether it be poetry, music, drama, painting, etc., was created by imitating a pre-existing form, a universal schematic of sorts. So when we see the title of Aristotle's \textit{The Rhetoric}, we should think of it more as the Principles of Rhetoric than as the Creative Potential of Rhetoric. In the opening lines, he tells us that "the subject matter [of rhetoric] can be systematized, . . . and all men would agree that success [in rhetoric] is without doubt the work of art." The same goes for Aristotle's so-called \textit{Poetics}, which would be better translated \textit{"The Principles of Dramatic Narrative"}.

I have attempted to clarify Aristotle's notion of art because I shall be using the term "art" repeatedly here and do not want to conflate his notion with ours. It turns out that for the most part, the particular arts in Aristotle that I mention below just happen to also fall under our heading of "creative arts", and this is all the more reason that we must remind ourselves of the distinction.

\textbf{Section 2: Emotion Evoked by Art}

Affectivity is a hallmark of Chinese aesthetics, going all the back to the earliest texts. In Chapter One, I pointed out the importance of arousal and response in regard to sound in the \textit{Xingqing} and how sound is expanded to include music and song. The evocation of emotion produces responses in the listener, which in the short term feed
back into the affective scene, and in the long term cultivate similar affectively responsive habits by which upright character is built.

Subsection 1: Emotion and Habit

A similar concern for habit and character can be found in Aristotle. Whatever differences there may be between Aristotle's conceptions of emotions and ours (I'll be getting to more later), it is important that we understand Aristotle as allowing for rational emotions, emotions that can arise and change through reasoned deliberation. It is difficult at first to understand what Aristotle means in the *Nicomachean Ethics* when he says:

> Since virtue is concerned with feelings and actions, and since feelings and actions which are voluntary are praised or blamed, while those which are involuntary are pardoned and sometimes even pitied, it is likewise necessary for those who examine virtue to specify what is voluntary and what is involuntary. (1109b 30-35)

Although he goes on to describe voluntary and involuntary actions in some detail, he fails to provide the same treatment for the emotions. Still, the passage is easily comprehended if we understand emotions as having the possibility of being rational. A voluntary emotion, then, would be one that is reasonable and chosen. To understand this further, it is necessary to delve deeper into Aristotle's psychology.

It is best to begin by admitting that there is some ambiguity, if not outright contradiction, on Aristotle's part in regard to the emotions. There are times when he makes emotions out to be explicitly irrational, as when he says in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, "he who lives according to passion (pathos) would neither listen to argument

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112 "Feelings" is a translation of "pathe". I'll not make a distinction in this section among "emotions", "feelings", "passions", and "affective states" and will assume an interchangeability among them.
which dissuades him nor understand it" (1179b25-30), and even more generally, "passion seems to yield not to argument but to force" (1179b25-30). These statements would appear to directly contradict statements in the Eudemian Ethics, such as, "reasoning controls inclinations and the affections (pathema)" (1220a1-5).113

There are several places we can look in Aristotle to resolve this paradox. I shall begin where the paradox began, with the Nicomachean Ethics: "there are three things in the soul, and these are feelings (pathos), powers (dynamis), and habits (hexis), virtue (arete) would be one of these" (1105b20-25). Noticeably absent from this psychology is any mention of the intelligence. Aristotle is not as keen on dividing the soul into definitely identifiable parts as Plato was. He mentions the possibility of different parts but is always sure to couch his reasoning in a language of hesitancy and uncertainty, aware of the numerous difficulties that arise once we begin attributing discrete functions to parts of the soul. In On the Soul, he suggests several powers that the soul may have: nutrition, desire, sensation, locomotion, and thinking (414a30). Later, he tentatively identifies these powers with different parts of the soul but is clearly not satisfied with the patness of the scheme.

One problem for Aristotle is that part of the soul is immortal, while the other part is mortal. Aristotle works within an interesting dichotomy. He separates the world into the intelligible and the sensate and runs the faculties pertaining to these realms in parallel, with the intelligence thinking intelligible things and the sensitive part of the soul perceiving sensate things, each thinking or sensing the forms of their respective objects.

113 Aristotle (Michael Woods, trans.), Eudemian Ethics.
A problem that he runs into, however, is that for certain ontological reasons, the intelligence has to be completely detachable from the body and not affected by it (429b). But of course there has to be some interface between thought and sensation, so to take care of this, he posits a practical intelligence in contradistinction to the purely speculative intellect (433a). The result is not altogether satisfactory, but he does manage to account for the motive force within a person, allowing for thought to have some power over how we act, and thereby providing for interaction between the physical and the mental.

For his motive forces, he finally settles on desire and the imagining practical intellect, with desire having the upper hand (433a). We should not confuse this notion of motive force with the "powers" mentioned above. Motive force, or locomotion, is meant to account for why an animal (humans included) moves. Powers, on the other hand, belong to a complicated theory of potentiality and actuality that underpins much of Aristotle's metaphysics. The powers are capacities for acting, rather than forces as such. The five parts of the soul mentioned above are subsumed under this larger category called powers, and only one of these parts is the intellect, which is weaker as a motive force than another power, desire. With the powers and the emotions on equal footing as "things in the soul", we begin to see why there is some confusion over whether the emotions are subject to rationality or not.

We are assured near the end of On the Soul, that "the senses ... exist ... for the sake of living well" (434b), so we should not assume the kind of warring of parts of the soul that we find in Plato's Republic and Phaedrus. Nevertheless, near the beginning of the same work, we are given the following psychic inevitability: "whenever there is
sensation, there is also pleasure and pain, and whenever these exist, desire too must exist" (413b20-25). For Aristotle, desires are normal aspects of life, and it is only when they are overindulged that they are harmful. So we must not think that there is a necessary tension between emotion (desire also being one of the emotions (Nic. Eth. 1105b20)) and intelligence. This also helps explain the paradox above, namely, why emotion is both susceptible and immune to reason. Desire trumps reason but desire is not necessarily contrary to reason. Below I will show how it is that reason can sometimes trump desire.

I've yet to bring into discussion the third item in the soul, habit. In the Physics, when Aristotle is concerned with understanding where in the soul alteration occurs, he identifies habits of the soul as virtues and vices (246a10ff). He says that one should not understand virtues as qualities that people have but as perfections of actions—so a virtue is not something you have but something you do. By acting bravely, one is brave. It may help to understand virtue (arete) in this sense as a "good", for virtues are not one-size-fits-all. The more one acts bravely, the nearer one gets to being perfectly brave, and in the process, the more one acquires the habit of bravery. But bravery is also an emotion; after, all, one "feels" brave. In this chapter of the Physics, there is an interplay between actions, emotions, and virtues. Emotions (presumably desire has some part) engender actions, and actions engender virtues. But virtues, as habits, also dispose one to respond to emotions in a way proper to the virtue. Here, we have found another nonrational curb on excess emotions and also the foundation for a rational one.

In the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle attempts to resolve a long-standing problem from Plato, namely, why it is that the irrational parts of the soul would ever agree to
domination by the rational part. In his answer, Aristotle assumes two parts to the soul, both of which share in reason (1219bff). For Plato, the rational part of the soul would always be at a loss to convince the irrational parts, but Aristotle says that both parts are rational, only that one part prescribes according to reason and the other obeys according to reason. This established, he then divides virtue into a quasi-rational, obedient form and a rational intellectual form. He calls them "virtue of character" and "intellectual virtue". Virtues mediate between actions and emotions, and by positing virtues that "follow the principles of reason" in channeling the emotions, Aristotle is stacking the deck in favor of virtuous behavior. The logic behind this assertion appears to be that before virtues have been firmly established, we will already be acting, and at that time, we will choose the best actions and thereby build the best virtues. This, of course, begs the question, unless one can assume training as a child to establish the proper virtues. If this can be assumed, then we can easily see how emotion can be susceptible to reason: virtues, following the principles of reason, channel emotions into appropriate actions.

We can now also see how emotion can be immune to reason: if one does not receive proper training as a child, then the best virtues of character will not be established, and so reason will have little sway. This reasoning is supported by a passage at the very end of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, near where we found the original passage about emotions being immune to reason: "the nurture and pursuits of the young should be regulated by laws, for when they become habitual they are not painful." We should not think that Aristotle conceives of the human being as a kind of programmable automaton. Rather, he posits a cooperative relationship between good habits and reason. As he says, "virtue . . .
is a habit, disposed toward action by deliberate choice" (*Nic. Eth.* 1107a1-5). Deliberate choice is based on reason, and can help determine appropriate action, but without virtues as habits also guiding the emotions, excessive emotion, if there be such, may win out.

**Subsection 2: Affectivity in the Art of Rhetoric**

Like the Chinese, Aristotle also notices the evocative power of art, a clear exposition appearing in the *Rhetoric* which is also Aristotle's most sustained treatment of the emotions. First, however, we must agree that rhetoric is a form art. Certainly it is in Aristotle's sense, since he tells us so. If this chapter is to be relevant to aesthetic affectivity in a contemporary sense, however, we must also agree that rhetoric can be conceived of as an art in our contemporary sense of creative art. In some sense it can, of course, because it involves, at its best, a high level of skill and training and it is performed in public. On the other hand, if it is practiced as rhetoric at all in the current age, it appears in law courts and political arenas (as it did in Aristotle's day), and few people would pay to see it as a pure performing art, so it is hard to see how rhetoric would truly qualify as an art form for us. However, I would like to suggest that this impasse is more a cultural function than a function of the limitations of rhetoric itself. I could imagine a time in which stand-up speeches were viewed and appreciated much as performance art and drama are today. But we needn't really imagine such a time, if we simply remember that Aristotle's society was still a largely oral society, much different from ours; so we don't have to confine ourselves to rhetoric as a performing art. Where our culture would certainly accept notions of rhetoric as an art is in the art of composition.
In our day of exploding media, we tend to write rather than deliver our opinions orally, but even Aristotle, who did not have the benefit of publishing in the *New Yorker* or the *Atlantic Monthly*, spoke of written compositions as a kind of rhetoric.\(^{114}\) Creative Writing programs that teach the art of poetry and novel writing also teach the art of prose composition, and some even still refer to it as rhetoric. The more common term of art now is the art of the essay. There are the teleological essays of politics and news media (known nowadays as "spin"), which Aristotle would agree qualify as art, and there are essays written for no other purpose than as art pieces (e.g. those of an E. B. White), and there are those that are artfully written with a purpose—satisfying both camps.

Rhetoric having been established as an art in both ancient and contemporary senses, I can now approach the question of how Aristotle treats emotion within this art. It is important to keep in mind the complex, and not exactly intuitive, relationship between reason and emotion in Aristotle. Here we will be speaking of evoked emotions. After stating that treatises on the subject of rhetoric prior to his misguidedly concerned themselves solely with emotions, Aristotle goes on to expend considerable effort explaining how rhetoric can be used to evoke emotions. The purpose of doing so is to sway the listener's opinion, for, he says, the object of rhetoric is judgment (II.ii.1).\(^{115}\)

It's not exactly clear under Aristotle's conception of emotions (which are not understood as forms of judgment), how swaying emotions could alter the listener's judgment. Judgment, after all, should be related closely to reason. Such is the case, in Aristotle's opinion, for the best of men, but when a rhetorician is attempting to sway

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\(^{114}\) See *Rhetoric*, 1404a, 1407b, 1409b, and especially 1413b-1414a.

\(^{115}\) Aristotle (John Henry Reese, trans.), *The "Art" of Rhetoric*. 
opinions, he faces a majority of men who are not the best men and so will not be in full command of their rational endowments:

Justice should consist in fighting the case with the facts alone, so that everything else that is beside demonstration is superfluous; nevertheless, . . . [style] is of great importance owing to the corruption of the hearer." (III.i.5)

Aristotle believed that cultivating the highest virtues was both possible and desirable, but he was under no illusion about the moral state of most people. This is what he was getting at toward the end of the *Nicomachean Ethics* with his words against men who live by passion. Bad habits had eclipsed their ability to reason, leaving them with a diminished capacity for deliberation.

Since Aristotle understands thinking as an action, and since virtue and vice as habits can influence actions, emotions which are channeled by virtue and vice can obviously influence people's opinions. The purpose of rhetoric is not just academic or for mere entertainment. Rhetoric for Aristotle has a mission, and the speaker a duty, to correct wrong opinion, and this mission and duty have definite moral overtones. He was as opposed to the frivolous speeches of the sophists as Plato was, but he also understood that many important matters were decided by men on account of rhetorical speeches. For this reason, Aristotle viewed rhetoric as a synthesis of the moral purpose of sophistry and the rigorous arguments of dialectic. As a practical man, he understood that valid reasoning was not enough to change opinions.

A keen observer of human nature, Aristotle also understood that our emotional states can influence our reasoning ability and that elements of rhetoric can influence our emotional states:
Appropriate style also makes the facts appear more credible for the mind of the hearer imposed upon under the impression that the speaker is speaking the truth, because, in such circumstances, his feelings are the same, so that the thinks (even if it is not the case as the speaker puts it) that things are as he represents them; and the hearer always sympathizes with one who speaks emotionally, even though he really says nothing. (Rhetoric III.vii.4).

The ways of evoking emotion in the Rhetoric fall into two general categories: 1) evoking emotion through style and 2) evoking emotion by discursive appeal to specific conditions that stir particular emotions.

Rhetorical style refers largely to delivery. Aristotle notes that delivery was a newly discovered skill at that time and that actors were at the vanguard of its explorations. He tells us that the skill was comprised most of all through the use of the voice, particularly the mode used to express each emotion, the tones, and the rhythms. Each of these required expert attention, and when carried off well, a speaker with an outstanding delivery could always sway his audiences. Style in general also refers to tempo, arrangement, grammar, word choice, and effecting a "foreign" air. These and other characteristics of style could be combined to enhance and even supersede whatever rational arguments were also offered in a speech.

Emotional evocation through discursive means, or content, can be most easily explained through illustration. Aristotle provides detailed analyses of ten specific emotions or pairs of contrary emotions. They are anger, mildness, love and hate, fear, shame, benevolence, pity, indignation, envy, and emulation (unhealthy rivalry). Each of these emotions are the type directed at another person or group of persons, so we will first notice that one way of evoking these emotions is to illuminate the person at whom one targets the emotion. The speaker must also pay close attention to the disposition of
the mind that causes the emotion as well as the occasion which gives rise to the emotion. Lacking one of these three, the speaker, Aristotle says, will fail to arouse the intended emotion.

Let us take fear as an example. Aristotle defines fear as a painful or troubled feeling caused by the impression of an imminent evil that causes destruction or pain. Important to this definition are the notions of immanence and pain, for lacking either of those, one would not have sufficient reason to fear. Notice, now, that we are speaking of a reason to fear. The discursive method of evoking emotion, involves creating an intellectual ambience of that emotion, in this case fear. To create the ambience, the target of fear, the fearing person's frame of mind, and the occasion for fear will all have to be conjured up. Immanent pain is akin to danger, and examples of signs of danger in another person are enmity of those able and willing to injure us, an unjust man with the power to injure, or a man of outraged virtue (with many other examples). The person under the spell of fear must be one likely to suffer. Aristotle says:

Whenever it is preferable that the audience should feel afraid, it is necessary to make them think that they are likely to suffer, by reminding them that others greater than they have suffered, and showing that their equals are suffering or have suffered, and that at the hands of those from whom they did not expect it, in such a manner and at times when they did not think it likely. (II.v.15)

In evaluating these kinds of conditions, one's rational capabilities are inevitably employed. So again we see the complex relationship between emotion and reason.

Occasions of fear are when we have wronged an enemy, when we have committed a grave error that is impossible to fix, or when we are in danger and nobody can help. Aristotle sums up succinctly, and even humorously, saying that all things are to be feared that arouse compassion in others when they are about to happen to us. He goes
on to describe fear's opposite, confidence in an equally insightful way, but this should be enough to illustrate how Aristotle describes how the emotions can be evoked through discursive speech.

In addition to the content and style of a speech, a significant aspect of rhetoric is the speaker, who must embody his principles of rationality and moral uprightness while also calling on all of his artificial means to use emotion to sway the listeners' opinions. Although Aristotle does not advocate dishonesty, he does appear to feel some compunction at having to strain for artificiality, at having to resort to expedient means to win a case that should, ideally, be won through reasoned argument alone. But an artist must work with his material, and in a rhetorician's case that material is the "corrupted" minds of the listeners, which cannot be convinced by reason but must be emotionally manhandled by the methods of the rhetorician's art.

One does not find in Aristotle's account of rhetoric and emotion a full cycle of affective responsiveness, finding instead a simple linear stimulus-and-response model, but the addition of the notion of habit and character raises his already sophisticated ideas to a level beyond either Bell's or Tolstoy's notions of simple evocation. More can be said with regard to poetics in Aristotle.

**Subsection 3: Affectivity in the Art of Tragedy**

The art of the author of dramatic narratives also involves the arousal of emotion but for a different purpose. The rhetorician aims to move the listener with the purpose of persuasion. The poet aims merely to move the listener, or audience. Another distinction
is that in rhetoric, the speaker has all the emotions at his disposal, more than ten of which Aristotle analyzes in detail for their usefulness. In tragedy (the subject of the *Poetics*), only two emotions are of main concern, fear and pity (while compassion and pleasure are also mentioned).

Aristotle tells us that tragedy is an imitation of actions (1448a1) and that people attend tragedies for the enjoyment, or pleasure, that they provide (1448b10-15). This enjoyment appears to entail the experiencing of the emotions of fear and pity vicariously through the actors. The experiencing of emotion, it must be stressed, is not a side benefit of viewing a tragic performance but the "proper function" of it (1452b30-35). In the thirteenth chapter of the *Poetics*, Aristotle introduces the kind of character and the character's circumstances that best arouses pity and fear. First he dispenses with the wholly good man who goes from good fortune to misfortune because such a negative turn of events is simply distasteful and arouses neither pity nor fear. Next, he dispenses with the wholly evil man who goes from misfortune to good fortune, which is equally distasteful and doesn't even arouse compassion (which, presumably, the first example does), let alone pity or fear. Finally, he dispenses with the wholly evil man who goes from good fortune to misfortune, which, he says, may arouse compassion but certainly not fear or pity. Pity, he goes on to explain is aroused by the misfortune of one who does not deserve it (whereas the evil man, of course, would deserve it), and fear, he says, is aroused by the misfortune of someone who is like us, hinting, as we may guess from the more extensive explanation in the *Rhetoric*, that what can happen to a person like us can also happen to us.
What is left is the man who is neither wholly good nor wholly bad who goes from good fortune to misfortune through some failing of his own. It is important that the failing not be significant enough to deserve the tragic misfortune that befalls the victim, otherwise, we would not pity him. And since he is neither wholly good nor wholly bad, the average audience members can relate to him and therefore fear that what happens to him could just as well happen to them.

Because Aristotle takes the plot to be the most important component of a tragedy, and because the plot is engineered specifically to elicit emotion, it is not overstating the case to call a tragedy an artwork of emotion. Rhetoric is an artwork of emotion only in a secondary sense, because its purpose is still one step beyond emotion, with emotion just a handy tool. Tragedy is for the purpose of experiencing these emotions.

Beyond the plot's general flow of events, in the eleventh chapter, Aristotle identifies three characteristics of plot that play a part in the eliciting of emotions. The first is peripety, a sudden and unexpected reversal of circumstance. As an example, Aristotle mentions the scene in *Oedipus Rex* when the messenger comes to cheer Oedipus up but produces the contrary effect when he reveals who Oedipus really is. The effect is one of shock and surprise in the audience, which has the audience feeling pity for Oedipus. Aristotle does not mention the experiencing of shock or surprise explicitly, but I feel that they must play some part in Aristotle's notion of catharsis. He mentions this important concept only long enough to insert it into the definition of tragedy and say that through pity and fear one achieves a catharsis of these emotions (1449b30). We know that *katharsis* was a medical term at the time which referred to a kind of purification.
through purgation. So the implication would be that Aristotle is proposing a psychological remedy for two emotions that would commonly disturb us. Art as therapy is a far cry from the Republic's art as pathology.

The second plot characteristic that Aristotle identifies as emotionally relevant is recognition. This is when one suddenly recognizes that someone close should actually be held in contempt or someone held in contempt should actually be a close friend or even a relative. Aristotle says that under the best tragic circumstances, recognition and peripety should occur simultaneously, as in Oedipus Rex. Again, the notion of shock or surprise is implicit and appears to enhance the feelings of fear and pity and the cathartic effect as well.

A third characteristic that Aristotle identifies as emotionally relevant is suffering. This, of course, is when the protagonist undergoes intense hardship and/or pain. Aristotle does not elaborate on this, but we can readily see how the suffering of a character with whom we identify could arouse pity and fear. The suffering, though, is often absent the shock, unless it is a suffering such as Oedipus' gouging out his eyes. This suffering could be viewed as integral to the plot, but it could just as well be seen as a gratuitous spectacle, depending on the production. Aristotle does allow for the effects of spectacle in arousing fear and pity but prefers that such emotions be due purely to plot. He distinguishes the two by saying that if the emotions can be aroused simply by narrating the events, then they will be due to plot and not spectacle.

Aristotle identifies six parts of tragedy: plot, character, diction, thought, spectacle, and song. Plot, character, and spectacle we have covered already, and of the three
remaining, Aristotle mentions only thought as having emotional importance. The emotional importance is not in arousing the emotions of fear and pity but of expressing other emotions as they are appropriate to the plot. And rather than detailing these emotions, he refers the reader to the *Rhetoric*. There is one significant difference, though, between drama and rhetoric and that is that in a dramatic narrative, the author must always be careful not to tell that which can better be shown, otherwise it would be rhetoric and not drama.

Narrative drama, for Aristotle has a purpose quite distinct from that of Rhetoric. Whereas rhetoric attempts to sway a listener to form an opinion and thereby act on it, narrative drama exploits the aforementioned psychology of emotion and habit to achieve a change in the spectators themselves. Aristotle is not explicit about this, but it is certainly warranted to extrapolate that *karthasis* possesses more than entertainment value. Emotions mold the person, and by subjecting oneself to complex emotional experiences of cathartic power, one influences one's own character. Although Aristotle is not explicit on this topic in regard to theater, he is in regard to music, as demonstrated below.

**Section 3: Emotion Cultivated by Art**

In the final chapter of the *Politics*, Aristotle says that the future of any polity depends on its children, and so he trains his analytic skills on youth education. He identifies four essential branches of learning: 1) reading and writing, 2) physical training, 3) drawing, and 4) music (1337b).\(^{116}\) He expresses some ambivalence about including

\(^{116}\) Aristotle (John Warrington, ed. and trans.), *Politics and the Athenian Constitution.*
music, stating flatly that it is not a necessary inclusion (1338a); and yet he devotes nearly all of his material on youth education to just the subject of music.

Music, for Aristotle, is valuable for two main reasons. The first is that it affords pleasure and the second is that it facilitates cultivation of one's moral character. The first reason turns out to be more applicable to adults than to children, and I will reserve comment on it for the following section. The interest here is on music as educational, with the understanding that the emotions are integrally involved.

Corollary to the terminological clarifications made in the above sections, a distinction must also be made between music as Aristotle conceived of it and as we conceive of it today. To Aristotle, although music was a great pleasure, the musician was merely a mechanic, and a free man would never be caught playing a musical instrument unless he was drunk or joking around (1339b). Although consistent with much of Western history, it is in sharp contrast to the high status of musicians in our own society (and of the elevated position of zither playing in the East), especially that of classical musicians. This, again, has much to do with the notion of arts in general--that the artist (musicians included) was a producer, not a creator, in our sense of "creativity". Although making music was a special skill and could provide great pleasure for people, it was afforded no higher status than that of bricklaying.

Since traditionally the curriculum had included the learning of a musical instrument, Aristotle was faced with the question as to why not simply teach the children music appreciation instead of playing instruments, which they would abandon soon after mastering the rudimentary skills. He finally settles on two reasons. The first is that
instrument playing helps form musical judgment. This is likely related to the benefit, he
points out, of learning how to draw. Drawing, he says, helps to refine one's aesthetic
judgment (1338a-b). In other words, the direct practicing of an art form allows one to
better appreciate that art form and the aesthetic features of related art forms. For
propriety's sake however, a child must abandon the musical instrument once he has
grown. The second reason for learning a musical instrument is more cynical. Because
children are forever in motion, playing a musical instrument will keep them occupied:
"training in music is a rattle in the hands of older children" (1340b).

These are the reasons for playing music. The reasons for learning music
appreciation are more complex, and more interesting. Musicological theories of
Aristotle's time supposed that there was a certain affinity between the human soul and the
"music" of the universe, and Aristotle does allow for affinity between the soul and certain
musical modes and rhythms (1340b), but he doesn't make much of it. He was more
interested in the general advantages of musical study and the specific kinds of melodies
conducive to moral cultivation.

We see the link with emotions when Aristotle attempts to reconcile his idea of the
general advantages of musical study with what he calls the functions that philosophers
use to distinguish melodies. These latter number three: 1) those which express character,
2) those which rouse to action, and 3) those which produce inspiration. His general
advantages of musical study number four: a) education, b) release of emotion, c)
cultivation of the mind, and 4) recreation and relief from the pressure of work. He
associates (a) with (1) and appears to associate (b) with (2) and (3). To explain with
regard to emotion, he begins to speak in terms of the Poetics, saying that when performed before an audience, music can evoke emotion, such as religious inspiration and fear and pity. The two kinds of people experiencing these emotions through the music can feel them deeply and be brought to heights of experience that end in a cleansing and therapeutic catharsis. The parallels with the experience of viewing a tragedy are obvious. So music does have, for Aristotle, a function of emotional evocation. He makes it clear, however, that unlike tragedy, this is not the typical musical experience. More common are rowdy musical contests for the "common herd" that have no redeeming value. (1341b-1342a).

What about cultivation of the mind? Rhythm and melody, he says: "provide imitations of anger and calm, of courage and temperance and their contraries, as well as of other spiritual affections, which come very near to the affections themselves" (1340a). This distinction between spiritual affections and "affections themselves" is not one that we made earlier, and, indeed, it turns out to be a problematic translation of a vague Greek passage. Another translation reads: "...contain representations of anger and mildness, and also of courage and temperance and all their opposites and the other moral qualities, that most closely correspond to the true natures of these qualities." In one case, we have affections and in one case qualities. The Greek term in question, is "ethikos", and for this, I believe the desirable translation would be the second, moral qualities. So the music affords imitations of qualities, which are absorbed by the listener, presumably through the senses. In his psychology, Aristotle is careful to distinguish sensations from

117 Aristotle (H. Rackham, trans.). Politics.
emotions, and emotions from thought, but here we seem to find a residual connection between sensation and emotion. We may ask how these two are felt by the person. Sensations obviously register on the sensate part of the soul. And emotions? Where else but the sensate part of the soul? This would help explain why imitations of moral qualities when experienced through the sensation of sound can reverberate in the soul like the emotions themselves, which are mediated by moral qualities.

Why is this experiencing of emotion through music educative? We saw above the close relationship between emotions, powers and habits, with a species of habit being virtues, and virtues subdivided, not very helpfully, into intellectual virtues and virtues of character. We are told now that different musical modes and different musical rhythms effect a person in a consistent way according to the nature of each mode or rhythm. Some modes for example make us sad, some settle the mind, and some inspire enthusiasm. Likewise, some rhythms induce restfulness or excitement. Aristotle ends this theorizing with the curt statement that it is now evident that music can cultivate character, but it will take a couple more steps of reasoning to make it truly evident.

Music is a sensation but not mere titillation. Aristotle says:

Now the habit of feeling pleasure or pain at mere representations is not far removed from the same feeling about realities; for if someone looking at a statue derives pleasure from its beauty, he will necessarily experience the same emotion in presence of the original.

There are two things we should note in this passage. The first is the notion of habit. Given what we learned above, it appears odd to see emotion referred to as habitual, but we'll remember that in the context of building character, it is the virtue of character that mediates emotional response, and so "feeling" emotion is what character essentially does
and character is nothing but habituation. Second, there is a special relationship between emotion delivered on the strains of music and genuine emotion, such that the habit cultivated by the former applies directly to the latter. This is not self-evident. It must have something to do with both types of emotion being sensed by the same part of the soul, such that when they are mediated directly thereafter by the character, the character does not distinguish between the two, and so a moral response to one would habituate a moral response to the other. And this is how music is educative, and likely how theater is as well. In fact, it is interesting to note that music is not the only art able to cultivate the moral character. According to Aristotle, the visual arts, such as painting and culture, when they are imitative of moral qualities, can accomplish the same effect, only to much smaller degrees, since the visual sense does not strike the soul with as much force as the aural.

And so affective responsiveness is achieved in Aristotle through emotional interaction of the art piece and the spectator synchronically, and as a spectator exposes himself to worthy artworks over time, emotional habits are formed diachronically, finally manifesting a good character. Why Aristotle confines his exposition to childhood education is not clear, but it is clear that such emotional education plays a much smaller role in Aristotle than in early China. In early China, as is evident in the Xingqing, ritual propriety is of such immense importance and so pervasive in life that the benefits accumulating to one through synchronic affective responsiveness are palpable and ever-present. With music an integral part of ceremonies and highly valued as a pursuit in and
of itself, synchronic affective responsiveness is, indeed, inescapable in early China. It was educative but not in a narrow didactic sense, nor was it for Aristotle.

Section 4: Emotion Ensuing from Art

I didn't touch on it in Chapter One for lack of opportunity, but this would appear to be an appropriate place to speak of why, besides for educative purposes, one may pursue affective responsiveness. Character-building is not always reason enough to do something, and fortunately in the case of aesthetic pursuits there is a certain amount of pleasure to be gained. The Xingqing says frankly that "human affectivity is something to be pleased about" (13:21), and this is even outside of aesthetic activity, per se. On the aesthetic side, it says, "Ancient music opens one's heart, by fostering joy and by being amply suggestive" (10:17). That the Chinese term for music and joy is one and the same is itself amply suggestive.

When well-executed, affective responsiveness, according to the Xingqing, compounds emotion, as noted in Chapter One, and it moves the body to the point that a level of spontaneous action is achieved, with "the body becom[ing] the governing heart" (14:29). An evocative description is offered:

Delight leads to an upsurge; an upsurge to excitement; excitement to singing; singing to cavorting; and cavorting to dancing. Dancing is the culmination of delight. (10:21)

Contrary to the common caricature of the Confucian painfully following rote ritual against other competing inclinations, the Xingqing shows Ruist ritual propriety to be not only vital but pleasurable and inviting.
All aesthetic pursuits are fundamentally inviting. Aristotle notices this and captures it in his discussion of the emotion of pleasure. In Aristotle's works, the emotion of pleasure, like the emotion of desire, holds a special place in relation to the other emotions. As with desire, Aristotle holds that pleasure is not necessarily an evil and is in fact a natural good when enjoyed in moderation.

But pleasure still differs from desire in another, significant sense, as it does from all of the other emotions. Pleasure, according to Aristotle, while enjoyed, is not an affective state in exactly the same sense that the other emotions are. As quoted above, at the beginning of *On the Soul*, we find the following passage: "whenever there is sensation, there is also pleasure and pain, and whenever these exist, desire too must exist" (413b20-25). Pleasure is not something one can simply eschew or suppress. It is a fact of life that arises with every sensation. But it does not arise in the same way as sensation. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where we find a sustained discussion of pleasure, we are told that pleasure arises with activities (which are constant during waking life) and perfects the activities (1174b-1175a). "The most pleasant activity is the most perfect, and the most perfect is that of a [faculty or organ] which is excellently disposed towards the best object coming under it" (*ibid.*). We mustn't read this as an activity being perfect because it is pleasant. Pleasantness does not perfect something in the sense of completing it but in the sense of arising from its completion. In Aristotle's words, "pleasure perfects the activity not as a disposition which resides in the agent but as an end which supervenes like the bloom of manhood to those in their prime of life" (*ibid.*). Pleasure supervenes on activities, and the better the activity, the more pleasure supervening. In the famous words
of Victor Fankl, it is not pursued but rather ensues. This sense of ensuing, I believe, is just the sense that Aristotle wants to posit, only he would also say that pleasure certainly can be pursued. In fact, pleasure, for him, along with virtue, honor, and intellect, is one of the few things that can be pursued for their own sake (*Nic. Eth.* 1097b1-5).

Where Aristotle is going with this eventually, of course, is to the highest pleasure of all, which ensues from the virtuous activity in accordance with wisdom—philosophy (*Nic. Eth.* 1177a20-25). Since philosophy is not widely recognized as an aesthetic activity, I would like to backpedal to aesthetic activity in general and come to understand its relation to the emotion of pleasure.

Aristotle says that not only does pleasure ensue from an activity, but it continues for as long as the activity continues and even feeds back into the activity enhancing the qualities of the activity itself. This is a significant aesthetic notion. Aristotle says that in pursuing pleasure in the way that is natural to humans, we direct our activities to the things we like most. And when Aristotle is speaking of pleasure in this generic way, he does not mean just any pleasures. Instead, he is assuming these pleasures to be the ones "that appear to [a good man] to be pleasures" (1176a15-20). Since we are pursuing the notion of pleasures perfecting activities, we understand this notion of ensuing perfection rather like a continuum of pleasure that increases as the goodness of the activity increases. So any activity low on the scale of goodness will have pleasures in only "a secondary sense" (1176a25-30).

Returning to the things we like most, Aristotle says, "an activity is increased along with the pleasure that is proper to it" (1175a30-35). This means that whatever the
activity, whether it be music, geometry, philosophy, or house-building, the more one does it, the more one will enjoy it, and the more one enjoys it, the more one will pursue excellence in it, which will further serve to enhance that activity. This is an interesting notion when applied to the arts, for the arts, as we conceive them today, are just those activities that we pursue for the sake of (genuine, not secondary) pleasure, in both a performance sense and a spectator sense, both of which Aristotle allows and both of which can profit from the pleasure/enhancement feedback loop. Someone who enjoys listening to classical music will pursue his understanding of classical music, and this enhanced understanding will lead to a higher level of pleasure, and this new pleasure will prompt more learning, etc.

And these pleasures are in no way a trivialization of life, or a frittering way of time for Aristotle. If pleasure has any end at all besides itself, he says, that end is happiness, which is the ultimate end of all people's lives (1097b5). The only question that remains is how high on the continuum of goods do the creative arts lie. In Aristotle's case, we must confine ourselves to appreciation rather than performance, but we get some idea of the importance of the arts when he says that "music is one of the greatest pleasures" (Politics 1339b), and, of course, he feels the same about tragic drama.

Unlike Aristotle, who posits a linear pursuit of happiness with the exception of aesthetic emotions to be experience in art, the Xingqing notes that pleasure and tragedy occur in cyclic fashion throughout one's life. For this reason, pleasure is not the only pursuit in affective responsiveness. For the early Chinese, grief also must have its day and be part of the same compounding processes of aesthetic affective responsiveness, not
simply for cathartic purposes but because they are naturally necessary expressions of the human being. Nonetheless, Aristotle offers the important notion of the compounding of pleasure in a pleasurable activity, and having established it here, I will pursue it further in Chapter Five.

For all of his own creativity, Aristotle was a man of his culture and so did not have a notion of the creative arts in just the way we do. I think, however, that his understanding of aesthetic affectivity can still be instructive to us and can even be enhanced with modern notions, such as creativity.

**Summary**

The radical conclusion of Chapter 1 is that one cannot analyze cognition and action (i.e. mind and body) separately. Claims have been made by recent philosophers (notably Charles Taylor), however, that this separation forms the very basis of a dominant line of thought in conceptualizing the self, stemming from Plato. In this chapter, I plumb Plato's oeuvre to dispute this claim and thereby begin the process of providing tools from the Western tradition for confronting the challenges of Chapter 1, the first of which, from Plato, is the possibility of conceptualizing mind and body as fundamentally integrated rather than discrete. I continue in Aristotle, locating two further resources, namely the notion of habit as a non-deliberate trigger for human action and the possibility of the cultivation of habit, one important factor of which is the feedback mechanism of pleasure.

The unified body and mind will be an essential anthropological assumption in the next chapter's discussion of spontaneous action; the cultivation of habit will be further
developed in Chapters 4 and 5; and the feedback mechanism of pleasure will become relevant when discussing autotelic activities in Chapter 5.
CHAPTER 3: AFFECTIVE RESPONSIVENESS AND SPONTANEITY

I think I could turn and live with animals, they’re so placid and self-contain’d,
I stand and look at them long and long.

They do not sweat and whine about their condition,
They do not lie awake in the dark and weep for their sins,
They do not make me sick discussing their duty to God,
Not one is dissatisfied, not one is demented with the mania of owning things,
Not one kneels to another, nor to his kind that lived thousands of years ago,
Not one is respectable or unhappy over the whole earth.
- Walt Whitman ("Song of Myself," Leaves of Grass, § 32)

Love animals: God has given them the rudiments of thought and joy untroubled. Do not trouble their joy, don’t harass them, don’t deprive them of their happiness, don’t work against God’s intent. Man, do not pride yourself on superiority to the animals; they are without sin, and you, with your greatness, defile the earth by your appearance on it, and leave the traces of your foulness after you—alas, it is true of almost everyone of us!
- Father Zossima in Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, VI, 2g

In Chapter One, I delineated the notion of affective responsiveness in early Chinese thought, especially in the Zhuangzi and in the excavated text Xingqing. In Chapter Two, I turned to Plato and Aristotle to find the foundations of a similar notion in the West that may act as a basis for developing an understanding of affective responsiveness valuable to descriptions of action in the Philosophy of Action. To do so, I turned to the aesthetic notions of Plato and Aristotle, where I found a richness of descriptions that drew from emotions as they relate to art. In this chapter, I will continue the construction of a robust theory of action by transitioning to a description of spontaneity.

As I describe below, spontaneous action is action that is an attuned responsiveness, a thorough understanding of which presupposes the information and analyses I have
provided in the first two chapters. The human heart, according to the early Chinese, is an affective organ (using "affective" in the broad sense explained in the above chapters) and all actions are responses based on affective arousal under given conditions. As I transition to a description of spontaneous responsiveness, I refer less often to affectivity—not because it is no longer involved, but because, having made clear its role, it is safe to leave it in the background as a presumed component. Also, while the emotional dimension of affectivity is widely apparent in Ruist writings, it is downplayed in the Daoist writings from which I draw below.

I have noted above that the implicit qi cosmology of early China was shared by Daoists and Ruists alike. As this cosmology extends to theories of action, the same applies. Salient and approbatory descriptions of spontaneous action can be found in Ruist texts such as the Analects, the Zhongyong, and the Xingqing. Nevertheless, the theme of spontaneous action can be found most saliently in Daoist texts, particularly the Zhuangzi, and so I turn again to this seminal work for elucidation.

In Roger Ames and David Hall's philosophical translation of the Daodejing, they translate a key Daoist term, ziran, as "spontaneously so". They are not the first to do so, and it is hardly controversial on linguistic grounds. If we look to Western philosophical literature, however, we can find little explicit justification for it. It differs markedly from Rousseau's libertarian use of the term and Mill's clockwork use. It also differs from the Romans' sponte and from Aristotle's automaton, often rendered into the English as "spontaneity". If it differs so markedly from the prevailing philosophical uses of
"Spontaneity", why has it not been called into question? The prevailing philosophical uses of "spontaneity" often presuppose a metaphysical human/nonhuman dichotomy regarding the causes of action that reaches all the way back to the Greeks. 118 "Spontaneity", fundamentally meaning "self-active movement," translates in the nonhuman realm into natural teleology or determinism and in the human realm into voluntarism—a single term thus referring to contradictory philosophical notions—a contradiction that one may refer to as the Paradox of Spontaneity. Because Daoist philosophy does not presuppose a metaphysical human/nonhuman dichotomy, it stands to reason that "spontaneity" for a Daoist will refer to something quite different from what it may refer to in various branches of the Western tradition, and yet because it still describes self-active motion, it may count as another legitimate use of "spontaneity".

The aim of this chapter is to provide a definition of Daoist spontaneity that may carry over to contemporary philosophical discourse and eventually aid in conceptualizing a cognitive-aesthetic understanding applicable to philosophical research in metaphysical, psychological, cognitive scientific, and aesthetic aspects of action. The field of the philosophy of action has analyzed numerous dimensions of human action but has only skirted the edges of fluency in action. With the help of a clarified notion of "spontaneity", a new dimension may be added to aesthetics and the philosophy of action.

118 Aristotle and the Stoics were less insistent on such a metaphysical dichotomy, which as we shall see, makes them worthwhile subjects for studying spontaneity.
Part 1: Daoist Spontaneity

It is not the case that Daoist spontaneity has never been exploited for the purposes of contemporary philosophy. A. C. Graham wrote a book-length tract\(^{119}\) on spontaneity as a solution to the problem of fact and value. In this work, Graham offers spontaneity in opposition to "rational deliberation", defining "spontaneity" as "all activity which is not the result of a considered choice"\(^{120}\). He offers the imperative, "be aware" as the basis for all action, subsuming rational deliberation (as time permits) into the process that leads to spontaneous action.

Graham's main concern is ethical: that choices of ends are most successfully made in the spontaneous way that he describes. My account can be seen as, in a sense, preliminary to his in that I focus on the narrower issue of spontaneity of means. There are no obvious contradictions between Graham's analysis and mine, but I believe my exposition would allow him to hone his. Graham's analysis offers many valuable insights into the issues of spontaneity vs. action based on considered choice and often couches his discussion in terms of the uniqueness of particularities, responsiveness, and the collective pull of circumstances. All of these will be evident in my discussion below about Daoist spontaneity. While he takes all non-rational impulses as spontaneous, however, I endeavor to outline a specific definition of spontaneity based largely on the skill episodes in *Zhuangzi*. Graham takes the spontaneity of skill\(^{121}\) as a subset of all spontaneity. It is

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\(^{119}\) A. C. Graham. *Reason and Spontaneity.*


\(^{121}\) In Chapters 4 and 5, I extend the discussion into virtuosic action, but for now I restrict discussion to skill only, the distinction being that highly accomplished actions of skill do not necessarily have an aesthetic component necessary to elevate them to the level of virtuosity.
indeed not the case that Daoist spontaneity must be confined to skilled action, but its most thorough descriptions involve skilled action, and so it is most profitable to begin with skilled action as the basis for analysis. Any extrapolation to other kinds of action must derive from this. The opposition of reason and spontaneity does not get at the heart of what makes spontaneous action spontaneous. As Graham himself notes, reason can play a role in spontaneity. The spontaneity of nature that is extolled by Daoists is a spontaneity of regularity, not of randomness or of awareness, and skill (or habituation) as we shall see is how humans replicate this regularity. In addition, Graham does not adequately account for the failure of spontaneity, attributing it either to over intellectualization or to limited scope of awareness, rather than what I demonstrate in Chapter 1 to be an overdevelopment of self-concern.

The only other scholar to attempt a definition of spontaneity in early Chinese thought is the American philosopher Joel Kupperman who has noticed that although spontaneity is a much vaunted ideal in discussions of Chinese thought, no one has ever attempted a thorough examination of it. He offers the following definition:

Spontaneity, in the sense that everyone has it, is the occurrence of a thought or an action, or the formation of a preference, in a descriptive and explanatory context in which it is anomalous (I use

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122 Graham identifies Zhuangzi as an anti-rationalist. Chad Hansen, in an illuminating article on reason in Chinese philosophy challenges this, identifying Zhuangzi instead as a skeptic and incapable of being an anti-rationalist, since the Chinese did not possess a concept of reason approaching the Platonic/Euclidean concept that rationalism as we know it is based on. The upshot of such a conclusion is that if Zhuangzi (the font of a theory of spontaneity) does not oppose spontaneity to rationality, how much of a basis is there for such an opposition in contemporary theory? See his article, "Should the Ancient Masters Value Reason?" in Rosemont, 1991.


the word "anomalous" in the sense it has in Donald Davidson's "anomalous monism" [see Davidson 1970].

Notice that both Kupperman and Graham identify spontaneity as a pervasive condition of action. To Zhuangzi, however, spontaneity is an achieved ideal. Rather than a reversion to impulsiveness or a disregard for norms, Spontaneity is disciplined, skilled action executed in a familiar context.

Section 1: The Zi of Ziran

In defining Daoist spontaneity, I shall examine the two major early Daoist texts and rely on context to flesh out a satisfactory meaning. Beginning with 自 zi, the first character of the binomial term ziran 自然 (self-so), in both the Daodejing (terminus ad quem, 4th cent. B.C.) and the Zhuangzi (late 4th. Cent. B.C.), zi can be found to carry three discrete meanings. The first and most obvious meaning is the coverb "from", as in, zi jin zhi gu 自今及古 (from the present reaching back to the past) (Daodejing 21). The second meaning is also readily apparent, the reflexive pronominal adverb "to do, oneself" or "to do to oneself", as in, zisheng 自勝 (to conquer oneself, or, more properly, to self-conquer) (Daodejing 33). The coverbial meaning is philosophically neutral while the pronominal is presented in both approbatory and disapprobatory tone, most often the latter, such that one gets the distinct impression that actions centered on the self should be generally eschewed.

A third, less obvious, meaning is the reflexive adverbial "spontaneously", as in the above-mentioned ziran (Daodejing 17), or in such terms as zihua (to spontaneously transform oneself), zizheng (to spontaneously correct oneself), and zilai (to spontaneously come) (all found in the Daodejing). Although zi in these examples is reflexive, something more is going on than in definition two. This 'something more' is evident in, for example, Chapter 57 of the Daodejing, where the phrase min zizheng, rather than being rendered "the people correct themselves," is translated by both Wing-tsit Chan and D. C. Lau as "the people of themselves become correct/are rectified" (my italics). There appear to be two purposes in adding the function word "of": 1) the "of" emphasizes the causation over the action, it makes clear that the central focus of attention in the sentence is not that the people become correct, as such, but that they accomplish it themselves, without external impetus; 2) the "of" softens the causation away from single-impetus deliberateness to a more vague, multi-valent causation. It is very different, after all, to say that the universe moves itself, as opposed to saying that the universe moves of itself. In the first, there appears to be an ascribed intention, a single path of causation, and a single initial cause. When saying that the universe moves of itself, however, we are simply removing the possibility of an external cause, making no claim to paths or origins of causation, which could be multiple, subtle, even indiscernible. The "of", then, indicates a spontaneity of self-causation without distinct claims of either self or causation. I suggest that we may heighten the clarity of translation by following Ames & Hall and others in making the predicate of the modality
explicit, employing the adverb "spontaneously", as in "the people spontaneously correct themselves," with the stipulation that we interpret "spontaneously" as we have just interpreted the "of", however vague it may appear to be at the moment.

Thus we have a conception of "spontaneity" that minimally means self-causation but without delineating either "self" or "causation" in detail. Rather than risk the accidental imputation of Aristotelian essentialist anthropology and efficient cause to early Daoist philosophy, I must endeavor to provide some contours to Daoist self-causation.

Section 2: Daoist Self-Causation

Since the basic energy/stuff known as qi comprises everything in a Chinese cosmology, people being no exception, it can be said that human beings persist as temporary concentrations, or concrescences, of flowing qi. Although there is mention of spiritual or divine entities, uncritically translated as "souls", "spirits", etc., that imbue people and that inhabit super-normal spheres, these also are understood as temporary concrescences of flowing qi, just in a more rarefied form. There is, in other words, no metaphysical break between human and animal or human and spiritual. Teleologies exist only in as much as each particular item in the universe tends to act as one of its kind, drawing on particular resources at hand and responding to particular circumstances as accumulating to each unique self. Human beings have the distinction of being able to work against this natural, cooperative teleology, an effect typically brought on by excessive desire. By returning to the unassuming simplicity of one's natural state, a person can recapture the impulses that maintain harmony and equilibrium.
The human being receives information about the external world not only through the five senses but also through perception of the flowing of qi, which carries information (to varying degrees depending on the subject, the object, and the circumstances) concerning the fluctuating interior conditions of a thing, a person, a place, a group, or a situation in general. Knowledge in both of these modalities refers to an understanding of circumstances that reaches from general tendencies on the scale of populations or entire systems to minute or subtle tendencies of an individual or specific situation. There being no ontological difference among a stone, a person, or a circumstance, information is derived from each in the same way. Where more sentience is involved, affectivity plays a larger role in shaping circumstances and conveying and receiving information. The xin 心 (heart), the human organ system\textsuperscript{126} responsible for thought and affectivity, both senses and processes this information.

Causation in a Daoist world, then, is akin to reaction and is centered on understanding circumstances through all the information that one can garner and reacting in a way that maintains or enhances overall quiescence, stability, and harmony. The reaction, whether it be of a flower, a squirrel, a human being, a forest, or a state, comes in a pattern that follows apprehension. In mechanics, causality is a notion of pushing, of collision and ricochet--the vector, mass, and material of two billiard balls cause, or determine, their vectors after collision. Affectivity and response in Daoist thought, rather than a 'push mechanics', is more of a pulling or a drawing forward by circumstances, as a

\textsuperscript{126} Following Porkert (1979), reference to a human organ in Chinese medicine is actually reference to an entire organ system, what he calls an orb.
river draws forward its contents, channeling detritus and attracting rivulets.

Speaking of this process in terms of causation is misleading because our tradition prompts us to conceive of causality as efficient causality, of change caused exteriorly and discretely. In Daoist terms, however, a change, rather than being caused, is, in a sense, drawn out, attracted, elicited, allowed. So self-cause, as I have been calling it up to now, is not, after all, an impelling force and certainly not one exerted by an essentialized being. Self-cause is the flowing with circumstances according to one's own particular make-up and conditions. The river metaphor must not be understood as an inexorable flow that is either acquiesced to or resisted but more as the drawing of wind currents, with each particular pattern of qi following the directions most suitable to interior and exterior conditions. The difference that goes along the scale of sentience from stone to animal to human is one of sensitivity to the information that is carried by the flowing qi and the accommodating response. Humans are more sensitive and have more variables at play, accounting for a more complex decision-making process. Which conditions carry the most weight? Which course is more attractive? Which aspects of the overall situation should be given precedence? These are the types of questions that are often answered beneath conscious awareness, with proper answers cultivated ahead through engendering simplicity, reducing desires, and habituating specific skills. No one would suggest that these questions cannot be asked explicitly, or that deliberation plays no part in spontaneity. Spontaneity as self-cause lies between the extremes of automaticity and strain. It is a causation in which not enough self (in the sense referred to above as
awareness and understanding of systems and characteristics of circumstances) leads to automaticity, and too much self leads to strain.

Section 3: Spontaneity in Zhuangzi

Moving from nature in general to humanity in particular, we can turn to episodes in the Zhuangzi to distill out several notions of spontaneous action. There is perhaps no book in any philosophical tradition that speaks of spontaneous action more vividly than the Zhuangzi. Using the work of Angus Graham, who has elaborated this topic more than anyone else, I have identified sixteen core episodes related to spontaneity and analyzed them for discrete concepts, of which I count 24 that are directly germane to the notion of spontaneous action; those that can be found in four or more episodes number ten. Working with a Daoist text is much like defining terms related by Wittgensteinian family resemblance--there are no essentials to speak of, merely notions that indicate and overlap.

All of the characteristics of spontaneous action can be classified under the two general categories of *wholeness* and *fluency*. Any attempt to equate these two categories with such dichotomies as mental and physical or attitude and movement is doomed to failure. Wholeness and fluency speak to nothing more than the "self" and "causation" of the sort of Chinese self-causation described above, that, in strictly Western terms, is not really self-causation at all. From now on, then, I will change my locution from "self-causation" as a description of spontaneous action to "holistic fluency", understanding that not only do these terms carry very little information at the moment, there is the added risk

\[127\] If one must choose dichotomous aspects of spontaneous action under which to subsume these two categories, one would be best to speak of *ti* 體 (substructure) and *yong* 用 (function), an indigenous Chinese dichotomy, albeit of later date.
of appearing unrigorous for choosing traditionally non-technical terms. We must accept, I believe, and the sooner the better, that we cannot stuff Chinese notions into Western boxes and expect a perfect fit. Instead, we must choose, from our full vocabulary, terms, whether possessing traditional philosophical cachet or not, that best fit the notion in question. Each of the sixteen episodes of Zhuangzi under analysis speaks to both wholeness and fluency.

Subsection 3.1: Wholeness

Daoist wholeness, according to my analysis of the material, can be subdivided into collection and shedding. Collection is the bringing together all of the energies\textsuperscript{128} of a person who first achieves a state of calm and then who focuses on a particular activity. Collection is calm focus within broad awareness, involving a comprehensive view of the whole situation in addition to a particular focus, the latter of which involves caution in approaching the activity. "Shedding" refers to the elimination of everything that can act as an obstacle to the endeavor, such as distractions, consideration of rewards, discursive knowledge, selfishness, the external form of an object, even perception (paradoxically), even skill, itself. They are both abandoned and transcended. This process of collection and shedding can be viewed as a balancing and purification of the self, bringing the self to a state often compared to a calm pool of water that mirrors the surroundings.

\textsuperscript{128} I risk the vagueness of this term because the Daoists, in addition to referring to the obvious notions of attention and awareness, employ terms such as shen 神 (spiritual/unearthly) and qi, which in this context can be covered by the English "energy" in its subjective sense, e.g. "I have a lot of energy today."
Subsection 3.2: Fluency

In addition to the obvious, such as accuracy and reliance on methods and skill, fluency involves two main notions: *ease* (or *effortlessness*) and *responsiveness*. Of the sixteen episodes, fully eight explicitly mention the effortlessness of the agent\(^{129}\). Since it is difficult to see at first how ease is anything but supervenient to the action itself, we will begin with responsiveness, perhaps the most important of all the notions of spontaneous action.

Subsection 3.2.1: Responsiveness

In Chapter Two of the *Zhuangzi*, we find an illustration of the *ganying* process, the sensitivity-and-response\(^{130}\) process, of the natural world. In a meditative description, the wind is said to create all kinds of sounds in the hollows of the natural world. The way it accomplishes this is not by successively blowing through each hole but by eliciting sound from them all at once. This "eliciting" is recognizable as a

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\(^{129}\) One must stop and wonder what a proper term should be for the acting individual. "Agent", with its voluntarist connotations, appears at first an awkward choice; "actor", perhaps, but that sounds more like it requires affectation; "follower" gives the connotation of flowing, and "courser" allows for slightly more agency, but as neologisms in this context, they would engender confusion. Ames and Hall choose "co-creator", and even though they redefine "create" within strict limits, the term still seems to imply not only agency but wide-open agency. "Responder" may be the best term, since action for a Daoist is always a reaction, but it is another confusing neologism. Therefore, I will stick with the familiar "agent", with the understanding that it is an agency of responsive flowing, not of unilateral action.

\(^{130}\) A proper translation of this term is ripe for discussion. The second character can uncontroversially be rendered "response." The first, as I mention in Chapter 1, is more elusive. Post-Skinner, our first impulse regarding the *arousal* side of the term would be to pair up the term "stimulus" with "response", but this is obviously misguided, as this is not a Skinnerian world. *Gan* means to feel within oneself as much as it means to arouse in others. *Ganying* refers to how one responds to a situation based on one's feeling as derived from the situation itself. There is an openness, a resonance. "Resonance" itself, comes close to expressing the full meaning, but resonance, as commonly understood, occurs in insentient things, such as the cavities of musical instruments. There is an obvious sentence, or better, affectivity, involved in *ganying*, as evidenced by the occurrence of the heart radical in each of the Chinese characters *gan* and *ying*. In the sense that one is aroused to feeling, "sensitivity-and-response" is acceptable; "arousal-and-response" works as well; as would "affective resonance."
corollary of the "drawing forth" notion of causation mentioned above and, by the way, an accurate description of the actual physics involved in such a situation, in that wind is drawn between pressure or temperature differentials rather than actual "blowing", as we put it in common parlance. The difference between ganying and straightforward efficient causality is that ganying involves also an arousal in an agent. In this sense, wind is not only drawn, nor is it merely pushed, rather, the holes respond to the drawing of the wind by helping the flow along. Must we posit a hylozoism or panpsychism for the Chinese world to explain this apparent awareness of the otherwise inanimate world? No, but we may, following Daniel Dennett, who attributes intention to the lowly thermostat, attribute a kind of responsiveness. When a lightening bolt strikes the ground, it is as much attracted by the ground as it is thrown by the cloud. Conceiving of spontaneous action involves more than thinking of an agent acting autonomously. We must think systematically, of attraction, channels or conduits, and responsiveness. Of course, the cloud cannot refuse to send down the thunderbolt, but that does not discredit the analogy. Human action as Daoist spontaneous action is modeled on natural systems in the sense that when we act spontaneously, we do so by following an appropriate course determined at just that moment but unpredictable, unique, and nonreductive to components alone. Spontaneous action emerges from situations rather than being an effect of this or that cause or being an isolated volition of this or that autonomous agent. In Zhuangzi's famous episode of the cook carving up a side of beef in virtuosic manner, the cook explains that through years of practice, he no longer sees the carcass itself but depends on the patternings of nature. This dependence relation between the agent and the
circumstances is the responsiveness of fluent action. In Chapter 6, after listening to Confucius describe how a pair of Daoists are beyond the pale in regard to social customs, Yan Hui asks Confucius on what he depends for acting, the expected answer being *li*, ritual propriety. Confucius (speaking as a Daoist) explains, however, that the ideal state for human beings is existing in such comfortable dependence on the natural order of things that one forgets it, just as fish forget that they are in, and dependent on, water, slicing through it without obstruction.

Bringing responsiveness back down to a level of a specific activity, in *Zhuangzi* Chapter 21, a fisherman is described as being in such perfect harmony with his activity that he appears to not be fishing as such and that he appears to have always been doing it. Likewise, a king in the same episode, who discovered the fisherman and offered his crown to him on the basis of his obviously high accomplishment, is himself analogized to the fisherman in that he is praised as "adapting himself to the moment (以循斯須)". Spontaneous action in a Daoist sense is neither impulsive nor is it isolated, nor is it necessarily routine. It arises in response to situations and can be unprecedented—meaning that novel circumstances do not result in scripted responses.

The main organ of responsiveness is the heart, which for the Chinese, as mentioned above, is the center of all cognitive and emotional functions. In the story of the wheelwright, for instance, illustrating the limitations of the discursive transmission of knowledge, he says that in carving a wagon wheel out of wood, he feels it in his hand and responds from his heart and that it is something he cannot put into words beyond that.

131 See above Sections 3 and 4 of Chapter 1 for further explanation.
The heart is depicted elsewhere in early literature as a sense organ, picking up and responding to the affectivity of situations, and at this point in the early literature, as detailed in Chapter 1, there was a curious conflation of affectivity and the circumstances that give rise to it. In Section 2 of that chapter, I quote a passage from the Tuan Commentary to Hexagram 31 of the *Yijing* that referred to the arousal and response patterns in nature and mentioned in a footnote that the numismatic term *gan* can be interpreted as "to feel" or "be sensitive to" as well as "to arouse". Originally translated:

> 天地感而萬物化生，聖人感人心而天下和平，觀其所感而天地萬物之情可見矣。

Nature arouses [gan 感], and the myriad things come forth through transformation. The sage arouses the hearts of people, and the world achieves harmony and stability. Watch those things that are aroused, and the *qing* of nature and the myriad things will be visible.

It could just as easily be rendered:

> Nature feels [gan 感], and the myriad things come forth through transformation. The sage feels the hearts of people, and the world achieves harmony and stability. Observe that which one feels, and the affective circumstances of nature and the myriad things will be visible.

What we see in the world can originally be felt, and it is through this sensitivity that we respond spontaneously. But the "heart (xin 心)" in early Chinese thought does not refer merely to the organ, nor simply to cognitive faculties. It is the seat of responsiveness itself.

In the episode describing the wind above, the wind is analogized to a Chinese musical instrument called a *sheng* 笙 which is the original mouth organ, similar in acoustic principles, in fact a precursor to, the harmonica and the accordion. It is not clear, actually, whether the analogy is being drawn from the mouth organ to nature, or from
nature to the mouth organ. Nevertheless, both are illustrations of arousal and response causality. Just as a person blows through a mouth organ, the wind blows in nature. This image of blowing and resultant music does not differ from typical efficient causality, but the picture being drawn is much larger. It begins with an unspecified sensitivity and the resultant response of a musician. The response of the musician is the blowing into the mouth organ. The mouth organ responds with sound that acts as arousal to the sensitive listener, and the network of sensitivity and response spreads. In nature, the blowing of the wind is itself a response, and the response of the hollows in nature is an arousal, in a similar branching network that continues without end. As noted above, we should not shy away from attributing a level of responsiveness to nature. Again, rather than inert matter, all things in an early Chinese world were involved on a physical level in the grand processes of self-organization. Like Aristotle, the early Chinese took into account the seemingly intentional movements of nature, even according nature a heart. In the Tuan commentary to Hexagram 24 of the Yijing, it says, "Is fu (cyclic return)\(^{132}\) not the heart of nature?", "heart" meaning the organ system that senses and responds to affective circumstances, a theme that runs through the passage.

When speaking in such terms, of nature being animate or of taking on characteristics that we normally associate with consciousness, one's first instinct may be to characterize it as a mysterious, vitalist, prescientific hylozoism. But by doing so, one would betray a reliance on a matter/spirit dichotomy that attributes the cause of life to an

\(^{132}\) Fu means to return or to recommence. In the Yijing main text it is described as \(shops\) heng (to move or flow without obstruction), and it is interpreted in the Tuan commentary to mean "having gone forth smoothly and now returning." Together the commentaries highlight the spontaneous cyclic flow of nature.
immaterial realm. If we are willing to forsake a notion of a soul or of any immaterial source of life, then life is nothing but a complex instance of matter self-organized. It is thus not the case that matter is fundamentally inanimate or that there is a radical divide between the animate and the inanimate. It was only in contradistinction to the soul or spirit as animating principle that matter was viewed as lifeless. If we dispense with soul and spirit, as contemporary science does, we are left with matter that is able to organize itself into a bewildering array of processes and forms with which science, after decades and centuries of neglect, is now only beginning to cope.\textsuperscript{133}

Animism is the belief that there are nature spirits; panpsychism that nature is conscious; hylozoism that matter at the most fundamental level is itself alive; vitalism that a living organism is of a different order from lifeless matter; and materialism that all life can be reduced to lifeless building blocks. Which of these did the early Chinese subscribe to? Certainly the early Chinese were not all of one mind in regard to this question. There were obviously folk religions, even a state religion, that presupposed an afterlife. We must be honest that there are conflicting views regarding what the early Chinese believed, as they themselves did not discuss the topic very often or in much detail. There are in the early literature discussions of ghosts, spirits, souls\textsuperscript{134}, and \textit{qi}, and in these discussions, there was often uncertainty as to how to fit them together.\textsuperscript{135} Since the details of the physics/metaphysics of the early Chinese is beyond us because it was

\textsuperscript{133} In a penetrating account of human action from the perspective of complex systems dynamics and information theory, Alicia Juarrero (1999) pulls together major trends in these fields to provide an account of human action that is materialist without being reductive.

\textsuperscript{134} "Ghosts," "spirits," and "souls" are poor approximations of the original Chinese terms \textit{gui}, \textit{shen}, and \textit{ling} (or \textit{hun}).

\textsuperscript{135} For a detailed analysis of these early discussions, see Qian Mu's \textit{Linghun yu Xin}.
apparently beyond them, we must leave it vague, but we may still ascend one step above
the fundamentals to a functioning world characterized by the causation of sensitivity and
response. Although we cannot accurately apply the terms "hylozoism" or "vitalism". to
early Chinese physics/metaphysics, we can apply the term "qi-cosmology" since we do
know that going all the way back to Confucius, qi was current in the vocabulary and in
one way or another it was integral to their basic ontology. In the Han and pre-Han corpus,
the term qi occurs a whopping 10,071 times. Although absent in the very earliest texts, it
takes on a meaning of animation as early as the Analects.

**Subsection 3.2.2: Ease from Wholeness**

Effortlessness is apparent in the fluency of responsiveness. Craftsman are
repeatedly described in the Zhuangzi as completing difficult or complex tasks with great
ease. Ease in this sense contrasts with strain rather than difficulty; there is an
effortlessness despite difficulties involved, and, indeed, in response to the difficulties.
The ease refers to the flow of responsive interaction between the agent and the
environment. Although it may appear to be supervenient to the responsiveness, or a trait
of it, it is actually more closely related with another notion, that of shedding, mentioned
above. It is wholeness that allows for fluency.

Several passages relate the dependence of fluency on wholeness. In the account
of the maker of bell stands, the artisan relates that he first calms his heart, then he sheds
all thought of reward, honor, skill, and even of his own body. As these distractions melt
away, his dexterity concentrates, his aptitude attains its peak, and he gets a complete
vision of the bell stand growing in the wood of the trees themselves. Only at this point
does he dare to move a muscle, and the resulting bell stand dazzles viewers as unearthly. It is ironic that the bell stand is called "unearthly (shen 神)" because it is exactly with the nature of the trees that the bell stand maker is working. The purpose of calming is to be able to sense that nature and respond to it. If he cannot attain this level, he says, he gives the whole thing up.

Likewise, the carpenter who can create perfect circles and right angles by hand without any tool or calculation achieves a single-minded concentration and mental comfort such that he is steadfast in regard to both internal and external distractions. The swimmer who swims in a roiling river with unearthly ease does so by shedding a strong sense of self and following the currents of the water. The hunchbacked catcher of cicadas who picks them off of trees with a long pole as if off the ground with his hand first settles himself to a stillness resembling tree roots and sheds distractions to the point at which only the wings of the cicada exist. And the so-called ultimate person, who is at ease underwater, high above the ground, or even on fire, responds to the transformation of things through an inner wholeness that is described as a unity of self-nature (xing 性), a tending and purification of energies, and a containing of his charismatic power (de 德).

Ease is thus a result of wholeness and becomes apparent in fluent responsiveness.

There is still more to Daoist notions of spontaneity, but this will suffice as a summary. To recapitulate, Daoist spontaneity of action is a holistic fluency that can be analyzed generally as a collection of mental powers, a shedding of distractions, ease, and responsiveness to constantly changing circumstances. This notion will be explored
further in Chapter 4. For now, we turn to Spontaneity in the West to seek similar resources.

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Table 2: Skill Episodes in Zhuangzi

**Part 2: Spontaneity in the West**

In the Western tradition, there is no lack in philosophical discourse regarding the topics of mentation and causation, but the emphases are significantly different from the Daoist tradition. When surveying the Western tradition for examples of spontaneity, the metaphysics is consistently at odds with the Chinese *qi* cosmology, and this conflict will work against any kind of reconciliation before it can be achieved. And yet we are accorded with some fascinating glimpses along the way. I begin with the Ancient period, and with the added observation that because of the seminal contributions of Ancient philosophy, conclusions drawn in regard to it can often be extended to later periods.
Section 1: Aristotle

In Aristotle, there are three candidates for approximations to Daoist spontaneity:

1) Automaton: This term is often translated "spontaneity" (e.g. by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gayle) because in early Greek it means very close to what we mean today by "spontaneity" and is the term that the Romans translated into the Latin *sponte*. But Aristotle specifically redefined it for his own use, referring to something that happens contrary to the usual. As an aberration, it runs counter to a Daoist notion of spontaneity, which describes the usual order of things, at least in regard to the non-human realm. Automaton for Aristotle refers to something that happens unexpectedly and rarely, such as a rock hitting a person on the head. In fact, automaton refers to the contrary of nature:

The difference between spontaneity [automaton] and what results by chance [tyche] is greatest in things that come to be by nature [physis]; for when anything comes to be contrary to nature, we do not say that it came to be by chance, but by spontaneity. (Hardie and Gayle, 197b34-36)

A better translation of automaton here may be Hippocrates Apostle's "chance" (in which case, tyche is translated as "luck").

2) Physis: This term, translated as "nature", appears to come quite close to a Daoist notion of spontaneity as we have discussed it above.\(^{136}\) For Aristotle, nature is the shape (morphē) or form (eidos) of something that moves or changes. Something that exists by nature is a substance (ousia), the essence (ti en enai) of which exists in virtue of the shape

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\(^{136}\) It should be reiterated that the similarities that I identify between Daoist spontaneous action and Western theories of action are most often on a functional level. Their ontologies, as stated above, remain separate: a relational, qi-based cosmology on the one hand, and a substantialist cosmology on the other. This difference, although pervasive, does not, however, discredit the functional similarities or diminish the interest to be found in them. Rather, the similarities represent a latent countercurrent in Western thought that resonates with Daoist thought, and, significantly, assist in highlighting internal conflicts in Western theories themselves, as in Aristotle's *Physics* VIII and Rousseau's axiology below.
or form. The form of a living thing is its soul (*psyche*) which directs movement, and as such, it is self-moving. As moved mover, which is what concerns us here, the self-moving of the animate object (i.e. humans and other animals) involves the impelling forces of desire and imagination. We'll speak more about animate objects below, but for now, our interest will turn toward inanimate objects that are moved by nature.

Inanimate objects are moved in two ways according to Aristotle, by their nature or by force. The defining difference between these is not, as one might assume, that between external and internal causes, for both are conceived to be caused externally. Inanimate objects move by nature when they move from their natural potentiality to actuality, as when fire moves up or earth moves down. If fire moves down or something made of earth moves up, this movement is caused by force.

Aristotle is careful to clarify that inanimate objects, such as fire, that appear to move up by their own accord are not in actuality self-moving, for to be self-moving they would also have the ability to direct themselves to stop or to move in the opposite direction. Instead, objects are imbued by nature with potentiality that when activated externally results in movement of a certain kind.

Aristotle gives several examples of what he calls the principle of motion of being acted upon, namely the natural movement from potentiality to actuality. This is the normal motion of all things unless otherwise obstructed. The examples are fire that moves upward, things made of earth that move downward, the student who becomes a scientist and begins investigating immediately upon becoming so, heavy things that move down, and light things (such as water becoming air) that move up. Each of these things
moves from one place to its opposite place, the movement of which is potential before happening and actual after happening. In other words, all the activity of the natural world moves in natural transformations directed by the natures of the objects themselves, but caused externally. "Whenever that which can act and that which can be acted upon are together, then the potential always comes to be in actuality" (Apostle, 255a34). In the complex movements of natural objects, objects are constantly moving this way and that under the influences of each other, moving either according to their natures or contrary to them.

This is an interesting parallel with Daoist spontaneous movement in that movement occurs based on natural tendencies in accord with external forces conducive to those tendencies. Aristotle is careful to clarify, however, that it is not self-caused movement. The overt reason is stated above, but a more subtle reason lies in Aristotle's conception of the self. For Aristotle, the self is fundamentally a discrete substance disconnected from other discrete substances. Therefore, the only way for inanimate objects to move is by the pushing of one object externally against another, rather than, for instance, the flowing of qi objects in confluence (qi being ubiquitous), without clear internal and external boundaries.

Something intriguing occurs in Aristotle's explanation of natural movement. In explaining the natural actions of insentient objects in regard to potential and actual action, Aristotle offers the example of the learner who is potentially a scientist. Now a learner is hardly insentient, and yet the example is used again when Aristotle says, "an object with a quality changes so as to be in activity, for a man who has just become a scientist
immediately begins investigating, unless something prevents him." Contrary to his previous claim that there is a radical difference between the cause of movement in animate and inanimate objects, here a person is characterized as an object in the natural world, acting not sentiently/deliberately, but with a certain automaticity according to nature (physis). Elsewhere, Aristotle says that humans act according to desire, with important contributions from the imagination and intellect. Here, he is offering a very different scenario, one that prompts Daniel Graham in his volume dedicated to Physics VIII, where this passage originates, to declare it an aberration incompatible with other depictions of human action in Aristotle. This conclusion is likely accurate, but it leaves us wondering if Aristotle had not been on to something that, if developed, could have provided some interesting insights. It would appear as if Aristotle had stripped his learner of imagination, desire, and intellect, but it doesn't have to be this way. We could instead conceive of the learner, having reduced desires, as coordinating his imagination and intellect with his tendency to learn or investigate (arising from accumulating conditions and culminating at this point), and spontaneously going off to investigate at the appropriate time. We could even go so far as to suggest that this example is evidence in Aristotle that there does not have to be a radical divide between the animate and inanimate or the internal and the external

137 Aristotle Physics Book VIII. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999. David Furley (Gill and Lennox, 1994) addressed this issue in his essay, "Aristotle on Self-Motion," but didn't see a contradiction. He wrote that perception, desire, imagination, and intellect were all implied in the passage. It turns out that this issue has fascinated a number of Aristotle scholars, and solutions run the gamut. Gill and Lennox's Self-Motion (1994) is a collection of such papers.
3) Hexis: Ontologically, Aristotle does not posit a radical divide separating humans from other animals, but ethically he does. He would never turn to nature as a model for human conduct. Movement qua movement may be natural to humans inasmuch as humans are animals, but the similarity ends there. Unlike animals, humans are capable of virtue and vice, of pursuing happiness and pursuing (bad) pleasures. Habits are not off the table for animals but are only worth talking about in regard to humans, who turn to habit as an avenue to achieving happiness through virtuous actions.

Because Aristotle entertains the notion of habit only as it pertains to virtue as habit, it is difficult to draw precise conclusions of habitual action apart from virtuous action, but we may try as follows. Any action performed by an individual disposes that individual to performing that action again under similar circumstances. This is most clear, for example, in the case of certain arts, such as musical performance, in which by repetition we dispose our limbs to producing a specific action or set of actions without exerting mental effort. Although Aristotle's psychology is quite complex, fundamentally speaking, the role of habits for Aristotle is to work as a pretheoretic foil to other pretheoretic forces in the soul, namely emotions, especially desire. By cultivating from childhood a character disposed toward acting virtuously under psychic counterforces to do the opposite, one predisposes oneself to do so again and again. Reason also plays a key role as a guide in deliberate choice, but reason does not have the motive force of either habit or desire and so it relies on habit as the initiator of action.

We do not have from Aristotle an account of habit with regard to the crafts, but we can compare what we have said so far with the Daoist perspective. The first thing we
must acknowledge is that Aristotle has an essential moral element in his psychology and metaphysics that the Daoists either do not have at all or have in a very different sense. The subjectivity that Aristotle requires for the accurate ascription of moral responsibility eventuates in an expansion of the self and a dichotomous relationship with others that Daoists contrarily seek to diminish. Habit, for all of its forcefulness in Aristotle, cannot play the final role in moral action, for then blame would ultimately go to the creator of the habit, namely one's parents or teachers. Aristotle takes this up specifically (1135a16ff) and says that the ascription of blame requires that the perpetrator act voluntarily with deliberate forethought. Thus, regardless of the power of habit, rational deliberation is still the final appeal in guiding actions of habit. One may be ready to act in a certain way, but it takes the proper reasoning to decide what actions are appropriate to specific situations. A moral action for Aristotle requires a rational calculation, the kind of discursiveness that runs contrary to Daoist spontaneity. It bears repeating that Aristotle distinguishes between actions of bare skill and moral action, which requires higher mental faculties, and he allows for guidance of moral action by intuition (1143b), but he still holds that reason is what separates the moral agent from children and brutes (1144b) and that intuition does not gain its highest value until it is discursively demonstrable.

There is nothing in Aristotle's account of habit and virtue that explicitly contradicts the Daoist notion of spontaneity. It is the first Western account we have of the role of habit in the automaticity of action. The differences lie in the elevation of habit to a "human" level, separating us from nature. With this separation, the person stands
alone in a world of sensory apprehension and efficient cause, intuition a mysterious faculty acknowledged but not refined and emotion an inner disturbance to be combated through the cultivated automaticity of habit. Habit is a feature of much activity that may fall under the category of Daoist spontaneity, but the two are separate. Neither does spontaneity require habituated action nor does habit necessarily imply spontaneity—in the Daoist sense. The Daoist accounts often feature actions or activities that one would recognize as habituated skills, such as swimming, carving, and catching cicadas with a pole, but not all of them do, such as the fighting cock who wins by its bearing alone; the innkeeper's concubine who attracts through selflessness; and the ultimate person, who achieves by tending toward the inchoate. In the episodes involving skill, either skill is paradoxically denied outright or is downplayed in favor of the elements just mentioned. Whereas in Aristotle there is a desideratum of higher definition and more clarity whenever possible, the Daoists understand excessive definition and rationalization as impeding the spontaneous flow, which requires attuned responsiveness from participatory members. Theoretical isolation is the antithesis of attuned responsiveness, leading toward disassociation and effort, even with the aid of cultivated habit, rather than wholeness and ease. The shedding associated with wholeness tends toward the vague, rather than the distinct, giving rise to inchoate potential rather than distinct teleologies. Aristotle emphasizes the importance of particularity when applying general notions to specific circumstances, but he does not adequately explain how to do so in the absence of law-like associations. Rather than habit as virtue inhibiting inner disturbances, the Daoists shed the desires that give rise to such disturbances, falling back into indefiniteness; rather than
applying practical wisdom from universal principles to particular circumstances, the Daoists allow themselves to be drawn into the force of circumstances. Whereas an Aristotelian is fighting an inner battle against extremes on two fronts and an outer battle against ignorance and objects of desire, the Daoist is emptying himself inwardly, attuning himself outwardly, modulating relations that may contribute to disturbances.

Another way of looking at Aristotle's theory of action has come to be known as the practical syllogism, which he develops in *Nicomachean Ethics* and *On the Motion of Animals*. I have mentioned the process in vague terms above but will now make it explicit. Like a logical syllogism, the practical syllogism consists of a major premise (a general rule), a minor premise (a specific instance regarding the rule), and a conclusion that necessarily follows. The difference is that for the practical syllogism, the conclusion is not a proposition but an action. In a practical syllogism, the major premise consists of a general good, or end, and the minor premise of a specific means. Aristotle puts it in these terms: "the premises of action are of two kinds: of the good and of the possible." An interesting point to note in Aristotle's description is that although he likens the action of children and animals to mechanical toys, he still refers to them as actions rather than motions, or movements—because they are voluntary (*ekousios*).

Action for Aristotle depends on the broad categories of intellect and desire. Intellect allows one to formulate the major and minor premises, and desire provides the impetus to turn thought into action. For a child or animal, the cognitive faculty that governs the formulation of the major premise is what Aristotle calls natural virtue, and

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138 *On the Motion of Animals*, Chapter 7.
the cognitive faculty that governs the minor premise is shrewdness (*deinotes*) (*NE* VI:13).

The actions of children and animals, though necessarily following the steps of the syllogism, are voluntary in the sense that they involve cognition. Nevertheless, there is an automaticity to the actions of children and animals that corresponds to a Daoist notion of spontaneity. Aristotle, describing the interior mechanics of an action puts it in these terms:

> ... straightaway one [part] acts and the other responds. And on this account thinking that one ought to go and going are virtually simultaneous, unless there be something else to hinder action. ... The simultaneity and speed are due to the natural correspondence of the active and the passive.139

This is a bare description of what may be referred to as natural spontaneity, or *physis* as mentioned above. Aristotle even likens this notion of spontaneity to the spontaneous orderliness of a polity:

> And the animal organism must be conceived after the similitude of a well-governed commonwealth. When order is once established in it there is no more need of a separate monarch to preside over each several task. The individuals each play their assigned part as it is ordered, and one thing follows another in its accustomed order140.

There is a surface similarity to a Daoist polity becoming ordered *of itself*, but that is not what is actually being described. The guiding metaphor is still a mechanism that is started in motion and then continues to move on its own, with the separate parts acting in thoroughly predictable ways. Aristotle's understanding of orderliness, described here and elsewhere, is linear and mechanistic, with discrete parts directly causing movement of immediately adjacent parts, with wholes completely reducible to their parts.

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139 *On the Motion of Animals*, Chapter 8.
Notice in the quotation above that Aristotle is not suggesting that a polity be modeled on nature but rather that the mechanical orderliness of natural causality within an animal can be likened to what one finds in the orderliness of a state. As I have pointed out, nature is not a model for human behavior in Aristotle's view because of his emphasis on moral action. In an adult human the correlates to a child's or animal's natural virtue and shrewdness are virtue (arete) and prudence (phronesis) (111b), both of which guide action with an eye to the good, which is determined by reason. The mystery that remained to be resolved in Aristotle was the final, distinguishing characteristic of humans, namely intention (proairesis), also translated as deliberate choice. Voluntary (ekousios) actions, involving intellect and desire, are ascribed to children and animals, but deliberate choice is reserved for adult human beings alone. Does this mean that humans have the ability to escape the necessity of natural causality? Or is deliberate action just a more complicated case of simple voluntary actions that occur according to the laws of necessity? Or is there a middle ground? These are the questions that have defined the philosophy of action since Aristotle and that await a response in Aristotle's heirs.

Section 2: Aristotle's Heirs

After Aristotle, for many centuries to come, any consideration of spontaneity in action must be understood in the free will vs. determinism debate, which effectively began about the time of Aristotle, with the same theme of ascribing responsibility to actions that in a determined universe would appear to be unascribable. The contention of many Atomists was that the psyche was continuous with the rest of the universe in
obeying the laws of atomic interaction and that human behavior was therefore determined rather than free. Aristotle's younger contemporary Epicurus attempted an explanation to save morality from atomic determinism, an explanation that Lucretius later adopted employing the term *libera voluntas*. Epicurus attributed the possibility of non-determined human choice to so-called "atomic swerve", an unlinking of atomic motion from determinism in the human *psyche* such that, according to the secondary sources, either allows directly for non-determined (i.e. spontaneous) choices (Giusanni, Bailey) or for inborn traits to be freed up for modification through learning (Furley). In either case, a discontinuity is introduced between nature and humans, and spontaneity becomes a characteristic intrinsic only to humans, in violation, or as an exception to, all other natural laws.

Chrysippus and his Stoic school come on the heels of Epicurus, denying, again, any ontological discontinuity, returning to an Aristotelian account of deliberate action but without the deliberation. In the place of rational deliberation, the Stoics posit simple assent, which is determined by the person's upbringing and inborn character. The assent itself is rather like Daoist responsiveness in that it does not involve much effort. The need for effort arises in not giving assent to attractive forces and instead thwarting them. This is possible, according to Chrysippus, because of characteristics of each individual, such as a good education and proper upbringing, that allow one to resist temptation. In this way, Chrysippus preserves determinism while allowing for blame to be ascribed to individuals on account of distinct dispositions to act. While one may claim, "Fate made me do it", fate in this sense is the accumulation of one's inner dispositions, and so while
one may not be responsible on the grounds of free choice, the action itself is still
ascrivable to the person, and a different person under similar circumstances may well
have acted differently. Because it preserves human/nature continuity and discounts the
exceptional influence of discursive reason, Chrysippus' account is not incompatible with
Daoist theory. The account does, however, place humans on a pedestal above animals by
stating that while humans can perform moral actions by denying assent, animals cannot.
This is understandable, since it is a moral theory, after all. Daoists would be hesitant to
entertain such moral considerations, as such things tend to engender distractions.
Nevertheless, a Stoic spontaneity would appear to include major elements of Aristotle's
*physis* and *hexis*, contributing further to a full and intriguing notion of Western
spontaneity.

We can see the inception of the Paradox of Spontaneity in the interpretations that
Epicurus and Chrysippus give to natural human action. The Aristotelian internal
teleology of natural objects, including humans, according to Chrysippus, allows us to say
that all movement is *spontaneous*, that is, that there is no unmoved mover outside the
natural order. For Epicurus, however, humans must remove themselves from the
determinacy of nature and choose freely, thus *spontaneously*. This paradox—that
movement is spontaneous as determined and spontaneous as undetermined—persists even
into present everyday speech (e.g. we may say that grass grows spontaneously, or that so­
and-so spontaneously broke into song). Although "spontaneity" was not a term of art for
the Greeks, they clearly wrestled with this tension and were the foundation of all later
thought on the subject. Because of the ambiguity of the term "spontaneity" in Western
philosophy, we cannot accurately refer to spontaneity, as such. Instead, we must distinguish between Chrysippus' understanding, which we may call "determined spontaneity" and Epicurus', which may accurately be termed "voluntary spontaneity."

Voluntary spontaneity is understood as action that is decoupled from nature's spontaneity, initiating an entirely different order of action. It is spiritual, or at least mystical, and presupposes a radical mind/body dichotomy. Voluntary spontaneity becomes the preferred position in Western philosophy, and for those who later want to erase the mind/body dichotomy and posit a compatibilist position, the goal becomes how to demonstrate that human spontaneity is nothing more than determined spontaneity, a gargantuan task.

For the Daoists (and other Chinese, as well), who never presupposed a mind/body split to begin with, they do not have to face this problem. Terms such as "determined spontaneity" and "voluntary spontaneity" are non-sequiturs in a Chinese context, where there is only natural spontaneity (including human spontaneity) and where deliberate choice is more of a hindrance than an advance up the ladder of being. I will discuss the nature and cultivation of choiceless spontaneity in Chapter 5. For now, I will continue to investigate spontaneity in the Western tradition by looking briefly at how the Paradox of Spontaneity persisted through the Enlightenment and into the Romantic period.
Section 3: Spontaneity after Descartes

When looking to the Modern period for notions of spontaneity relevant to a Daoist spontaneity, a target philosophy would first involve a human being conceived as a unified mind and body and second a human being conceived on an ontological continuum with animals and the rest of nature—in other words, a thorough materialism. This is not difficult to find, beginning with Hobbes, but the model to be found, going back to Descartes, is 'man a machine,' as Julien Offray de La Mettrie so succinctly put it in his work of that name. La Mettrie's conception of the human machine dispenses with all notions of spirituality while positing a complex and subtle notion of a human being as deeply influenced by the immediate environment.

Julien Offray de La Mettrie

No questions are raised by La Mettrie about whether there is a determined or voluntary spontaneity. His use of the word "spontaneous (spontanés)" takes a straight vernacular "self-active" meaning, as in "spontaneous sounds" and "spontaneous dictates" of animals. Given his physicalism and his faith in science, it may be safe to assume a determined and linear efficient causality to La Mettrie, who uses analogies such as, "the body is but a watch." However, in a display of intellectual courage and scientific rigor, he does not attempt to account for everything, presenting the human being as a sophisticated, complex organism, the full mechanisms of which have not yet been (and may never be) discovered:

141 All La Mettrie references can be found at: La Mettrie, Man a Machine, http://cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/LaMettrie/Machine/, Feb. 5, 2004 and the original French version at http://www.pianotype.net/eBook/xhtml/Thomme-machine.HTML.
... matter is self-moved, not only when organized, as in a whole heart, for example, but even when this organization has been destroyed, ...

As to the development of feeling and motion, it is absurd to waste time seeking for its mechanism. The nature of motion is as unknown to us as that of matter. How can we discover how it is produced unless, like the author of The History of the Soul, we resuscitate the old and unintelligible doctrine of substantial forms? I am then quite as content not to know how inert and simple matter becomes active and highly organized, as not to be able to look at the sun without red glasses; and I am as little disquieted concerning the other incomprehensible wonders of nature, the production of feeling and of thought in a being which earlier appeared to our limited eyes as a mere clod of clay.

The more one reads La Mettrie, the more contemporary he begins to appear.

Writing at the time of Hume, Voltaire, and Rousseau, La Mettrie, like Hume, succeeds in divorcing himself from the zeitgeist of the time—from the scientism that had to explain everything, and from the dualist spiritualism that set human beings apart from the natural world. Most characteristic of his work is his notion of a unified mind ("soul" is his term) and body, apparent in lines such as:

... how many excellent philosophers have shown that thought is but a faculty of feeling, and that the reasonable soul is but the feeling soul engaged in contemplating its ideas and in reasoning! This would be proved by the fact alone that when feeling is stifled, thought also is checked, for instance in apoplexy, in lethargy, in catalepsis, etc. For it is ridiculous to suggest that, during these stupors, the soul keeps on thinking, even though it does not remember the ideas that it has had.

Three and a half centuries before neuroscientist Antonio Damasio claimed to demonstrate it scientifically, La Mettrie had already shown the biological

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142 Antonio Damasio, *Descartes' Error.*

But now I had before my eyes the coolest, least emotional, intelligent human being one might imagine, and yet his practical reason was so impaired that it produced, in the wanderings of daily life, a succession of mistakes, a perpetual violation of what would be considered socially appropriate and personally advantageous. He had had an entirely healthy mind until a neurological disease ravaged a specific sector of his brain and, from one day to the next, caused this profound defect in decision making. The instruments usually considered necessary and sufficient for rational behavior were intact in him. He had the requisite knowledge, attention, and memory; his language was flawless; he could perform calculations; he could tackle the logic of an abstract problem. There was only one significant accompaniment to his decision-making failure: a marked alteration of the ability to experience feelings. Flawed reason and impaired feelings stood out together as the consequences of a specific brain lesion, and this correlation suggested to me that feeling was an integral component of the machinery of reason. Two decades of clinical and experimental work with a large number of neurological patients have allowed me to replicate this observation many times, and to turn a clue into a testable hypothesis. (pp. xi-xii)
interconnections between thought and feeling, and further identified the position as not rare, as we are often led to believe, but common.

La Mettrie's model provides us with a rich model of the unified body and mind interacting with the environment and on an ontological continuum with the rest of nature.

To find a rich description of spontaneous action, however, we must turn toward an avowed Deist, Jean-Jacques Rousseau. On one hand, Rousseau takes the familiar Cartesian position of the preeminence of humans due to their reason and free will, while on the other, he initiates several contrary lines of thought that if developed could lead him to a notion of spontaneity that, rather than standing in opposition to determinism, could stand parallel with and even profit from it.

**Jean-Jacques Rousseau**

In Rousseau's *Emile*, he borrows the voice of his Savoyard Priest to express his own opinion in regard to the then current debate on human determinism and free will. His "creed" delineates the following three fundamental and clear beliefs: 1) There is no real action without will; 2) that matter is in motion according to fixed laws implies intelligence; and 3) humans are animated by an immaterial substance. He makes it clear that these are beliefs rather than firm empirical fact because of his necessary reliance on introspection and intuitive understanding. Nevertheless, he confidently asserts that there are two kinds of motion in the world—that which is caused ("acquired") and that which is "spontaneous (spontanéité) or voluntary". With this equivalence explicitly drawn

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between spontaneity and free will, there is no room to doubt where Rousseau stands in regard to the Paradox of Spontaneity. In fact, he later goes on to offer an argument purportedly proving that humans have free will. This argument is worth outlining briefly, because it encapsulates the issues in his overall position.

He begins with a disjunction, on one side of which is a conditional: if there are any original impulses, they do not have antecedent causes. This is simply a rewording of his definition for spontaneity, introducing the notion of original impulse which refers to the initial boost that is needed to set matter in motion, whether at the beginning of time or from moment to moment in human consciousness. The second disjunct of the opening proposition is that there is no original impulse. In other words, he says that either there is spontaneity in the universe or there is not. We know already that he assumes from the start that because matter is in motion there must have been an original impulse, and therefore the second disjunct is false, making the first true, namely that there is spontaneity in the world. From this, he concludes that humans do have free will and therefore are animated by an immaterial substance. Of course, logic was never Rousseau’s strong suit, but the validity of the reasoning is not what gives this argument its importance for us. We are interested rather in his definition of spontaneity as an event without antecedent cause and his concern for human freedom. These figure prominently in the ambiguity that we find in Rousseau regarding spontaneity in human action.

Rousseau posits a radical discontinuity between humans and animals, and yet implications at several points in his essay point toward his recurring theme of the noble savage and the contiguity of all nature, including humans. Rousseau uses the notion of
causeless spontaneity to set humans off from nature, to set us outside of the mechanistic
order of the inanimate universe. Presupposing a Cartesian soul that has a connection to
divinity, Rousseau places humans on a plane with God, declaring the natural capacity for
free moral action to be the defining quality of humans that sets us off from animals. He
calls the conscience, "divine instinct" and says that without it, "I find nothing in myself to
raise me above the beasts." Like Father Zossima's critique of the burden of free will
(quoted at the beginning of this chapter), Rousseau finds that spontaneity has the
potential to elevate humans but in practice often leads the other direction. Rousseau's
critique cuts even deeper, however, for two other distinctively human
traits—understanding and reason—are what lead humans astray. Here is where Rousseau
begins to construct a bridge from human to animal behavior, despite his conflicting
feelings.

From Rousseau's interpretation of free will, it would seem obvious that animals, for
him, would lack souls. And yet we find the Savoyard priest saying, "You ask me if the
movements of animals are spontaneous; my answer is, 'I cannot tell,' but analogy points
that way." Rousseau's conflict between the superiority of humans to animals and human
continuity with animals runs deep. I would even suggest that were it not for his Cartesian
ontological presuppositions, he would reject inherent superiority and opt for continuity,
sans divinity in animals. Rousseau wants to be Christian, however, and with a flawlessly
benevolent God at the helm of an otherwise mechanistic world, he requires free will to
account for wickedness, and this leads him to say such things as that the sensual body,
with its unsatisfiable temptations, is the source of all evil for a free soul that is otherwise
untainted. But if we set aside the overweening Christianity of Rousseau's thesis, we find in *Emile* a doctrine reminiscent of the natural man in his "Discourse on Inequality".¹⁴⁴

Let us differentiate now a third kind of spontaneity: 'natural spontaneity'. Natural spontaneity is the non-deliberate, self-active spontaneity of nature, considered outside of the ontological determined/voluntary dichotomy. In that it is considered outside of this dichotomy, it is a naive notion descriptive of the appearance of motions and actions and free of speculation regarding proximal causation. Daoist spontaneity is a kind of natural spontaneity that is developed into what I will later describe as aesthetic spontaneity.

Natural spontaneity has at its core the ideals we find in the common folk populating Walt Whitman's poetry, as quoted at the head of this chapter. The challenge that Whitman and Fyodor Dostoyevsky pose to philosophy is whether there is something that distinguishes humans from animals in favor of the animals. Though animals are lacking in degree of the defining human characteristics, have they in some sense fared better for it psychologically--could it be that humans have traded off something significant for gains elsewhere?

One answer comes from the long Christian tradition and is given voice by Dostoyevsky's Father Zossima. His is the position that animals, like children, are to be valued for their innocence, their lack of culpability, their freedom from sin. What

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¹⁴⁴ 1) As [the human] becomes sociable and [inevitably] a slave, he becomes weak, timid, and servile; his soft and effeminate manner of living completely exhausts both his [innate] strength and courage" (p. 14).
2) "Bereft of understanding and liberty, [animals] cannot recognize [natural] law, but since they share to some extant in our nature by virtue of the sensibility with which they are endowed, it will be thought that they must also participate in natural right, and that man is bound by some kind of duty towards them" (p. 7).

"Every animal has ideas because he has senses; it even combines its ideas up to a certain point, and, in this regard, man differs from beasts only in degree" (p. 15).

All quotations from Ritter and Conaway Bondanella's *Rousseau's Political Writings*. 
humans have lost, going back to the Garden of Eden, is their capacity for joy based in
naiveté, in exchange for an advance in psychic freedom that more often than not entails
dilemmas, frustration, suffering, and sin. But the human advance is not bemoaned for its
disadvantages, rather for the failure on the part of the many who fall short of employing
their God-given freedom benevolently, following the example of Jesus. The innocence of
animals in this instance is still a deficiency, one that is irretrievable and indicative of an
underdeveloped state.

Whitman’s appreciation of animals, though acknowledging shortcomings of
humans reminiscent of the Christian critique, appears to find something in animals
beyond a deficiency of the burden concomitant with free will. It is true that Whitman’s
poetry is thoroughly humanistic and finds themes in the simple lives of common people,
but what he finds ennobling in people is contiguous with what he finds ennobling in
animals. He finds a seamlessness of life, an effortless zest, uncontrived motives that
imbue experience with the radiance of simple joy. These people, in full possession of
their wits, work tirelessly and in such a way that work is not labor. They put their
imaginations into their activities. They make choices that conjoin the disparate events in
their lives. They feel emotions that flow from lived experience. Within the confines of
their individual circumstances, they live freely, without second thoughts for tradition or
forced virtue. To put it in deceptively straightforward terms, they live like animals. This
is not to say that they don’t have hard choices to make, that they are automatons, that
they lack emotional or intellectual depth, or that they are free from making wrong
decisions. Their lives are as full of thorns as any life of existential angst or guilt-driven
despondency. But the thorns are somehow less obtrusive, less harmful, more given to transform into the fragrance of the flower. These people (idealized though they be) and animals have something that other people don't, and it is something I want to call natural spontaneity. This natural spontaneity is akin to the spontaneity that Daoists identify as a defining characteristic of the natural world and mark it as worthy of emulation. It is a naturalness of action, free from egotism, intention, and cleverness.

If Rousseau is advocating natural spontaneity while simultaneously advocating voluntary spontaneity, which he appears to be doing by appealing to the "noble savage", he puts himself in a precarious position. Voluntary spontaneity is an unhinging of humans from nature, presupposing the positive qualities of rational deliberation and moral responsibility that combine to produce ethical conduct. Natural spontaneity is the presupposition of a human/nature continuum, a recognition of the limits of rational deliberation, and a skeptical attitude toward moral conventions. We can save Rousseau's position, however, by understanding ontological voluntary spontaneity as a naturalized feeling of freedom.

Rousseau's priest posits voluntary spontaneity based on a phenomenological fact:

You ask me again, how do I know that there are spontaneous movements; I tell you, "I know it because I feel them."

We needn't agree with the ontological conclusion that we do have free will, but we must agree with Rousseau that at the very least, we all have the feeling that our actions have something of the character that they could have been otherwise had we merely so chosen. Natural spontaneity, neither presupposes free will nor denies it. One may appreciate natural spontaneity while also acknowledging the feeling of voluntary choice and
ascribing that feeling to humans and animals alike. Thus, when the priest ascribes
(voluntary) spontaneity to animals in contradiction to his belief that animals lack souls
and therefore free will, we can save his position by removing the necessity in the link that
connects voluntary and natural spontaneity. This is an adjustment of categories. We
move from speculative ontology to descriptive naturalism. Without denying the feeling
of freedom, we claim that the philosophical notion of voluntary spontaneity is of a
different order entirely from natural spontaneity. If there are those who object on the
basis that humans require voluntary spontaneity for moral responsibility, the feeling of
freedom should suffice; if it does not, we must leave them the task of reconciling
ontology and ethics, both of which for the Daoists are a matter of a single-world cosmos.
Rousseau is not a Daoist, of course, and has his own solution.

For Rousseau, the two major shortcomings of human beings are passions that are
overdeveloped, or developed in wrong directions, and reason misused. Both of these
conditions are symptomatic of a corrupt civilization that has misdirected what were
originally beneficent faculties. He tells us that feelings (sentiment) and passions precede
intelligence and understanding in human development and that in their natural state they
are most reliable. They provide us with compassion and therefore the rudiments of
morality, and they lead us to sociability, but only to the extent necessary for a functional,
simple society. Rousseau is responding to Locke's notion of the blank slate of
consciousness, pointing out that human beings have a self-evident contingent of instincts,
that, as in animals, channel our behavior in trustworthy directions. Feelings and passions,
for Rousseau, are not a matter of deliberation but are involuntary (sentiment involontaire).
This last term (*involontaire*) leads us in a new direction for understanding natural spontaneity.

For Rousseau, conscience is a feeling and as such is fundamentally free of interference by any so-called higher faculties, such as reason. His return to the natural state in regard to his elevation of the notion of instinct is another instance of the continuity he finds between humans and animals, even though the "divine instinct" is what sets off humans as belonging to a moral realm that animal consciousness never broaches. Still, morality is only one dimension of the human life, and it would follow that the feelings that guide other aspects of life would also be classified as instinctual. But how is this sort of automaticity compatible with free will? How can conscience be both instinctual and a guide to free action? How can it be both voluntary and involuntary? Rousseau gives us the answer when he says that all the concretions of civilization serve only to block the instincts. Hence, by peeling away the affectations and contrivances of civilization, one may return to pure feeling, which is always, for Rousseau, an appropriate guide. Is it voluntary? In the sense that the final choice, or power of veto, always lies open, the answer is yes. Is it involuntary? In the sense that the options provided by feeling arise without effort, according to the matrix of feelings within one and their response to external stimuli, the answer is also yes. This is Rousseau's way of reconciling natural and voluntary spontaneity. But it is not his final word on the topic, for he has one more insight to provide regarding natural spontaneity.

Rousseau gives his most incisive discussion of spontaneous action in reference to God's intelligence, which "does not need to reason".
Man is intelligent when he reasons, but the Supreme intelligence does not need to reason; there is neither premise nor conclusion for him there is not even a proposition. The Supreme Intelligence is wholly intuitive, it sees what is and what shall be, all truths are one for it, as all places are but one point and all time but one moment. Man's power makes use of means, the divine power is self-active.  

Here is the pinnacle of right action, where consciousness expands from the self-limiting and self-involved perspective of the individual to encompass a wider and wider circle, until all space and all time lose their distinctions, when actions flow intuitively on without appeal to reason and without the hesitancy of deliberation and the self dissolves into selflessness. Rousseau, himself has moved from voluntary spontaneity to natural spontaneity, the definition of which is that action that is self-active and in which the meaning of "self" is all-encompassing.

Rousseau is not, unfortunately, explicit in describing how such a natural, self-active spontaneity may be cultivated in humans. Nevertheless, he tells us that a good world requires on the part of humans feeling and intelligence, but he is careful to note that intelligence is distinct from reason. He does not give us a clear indication of what intelligence consists of, but it appears to be akin to common sense gleaned from experience. It works seamlessly with the promptings of feeling to yield actions that are in harmony with society. This is achieved by expanding one's perspective from the self, with which reason is naturally preoccupied, to the common good.

The good man orders his life with regard to all men, the wicked orders it for self alone. The latter centres all things round himself; the other measures his radius and remains on the

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145 Page 12.
146 This notion of an all-encompassing self should not be viewed as contrastive of or contradictory to the focusing of energies in Doaist holism described above, where "collection" was defined as a calm focus within a broad awareness.
Natural spontaneity, as it becomes idealized, entails an expanding awareness that provides the stimulus for feelings that initiate actions automatically mediated by common sense intelligence, which is itself constructed through a constant awareness of the environment and the self. With this definition, let us turn to William James for further elucidation.

**William James**

William James possesses the same conflicts in regard to the question of determinism and free will that we find in Rousseau. The difference is that James is explicit about confirming both, albeit at different times. In his *Principles of Psychology*, he dons his scientist hat, taking a deterministic view of all phenomena and leaving the question of free will for other venues (although not without giving a spirited defense of the feeling of free will). One of those other venues is his "The Dilemma of Determinism", in which he argues vociferously for the existence of a free will.148 Ironically, for his most incisive arguments and observations related to our topic, we must turn to his least explicitly philosophical work, *The Principles of Psychology*, where we

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147 Though Daoists show little explicit concern for the ethical side of spontaneity, Confucians did, and the Neo-Confucians posited a position strikingly similar to that of Rousseau. For a description of the Neo-Confucian position, see my "Emotion, Desire, and Numismatic Experience in René Descartes, Zhu Xi, and Wang Yangming."

148 This argument relies on the claim that determinism is simply too unappealing to be the only option and involves a confusion between what it means for future events to be determined and what it means for future determined events to be actually known.
will look for two things: the conditions that allow for spontaneous experience and specific notions that will help develop an understanding of spontaneity.

James devotes an entire chapter to the will, in which he undertakes an examination of the composition of voluntary action. He offers as his contribution to the long history of this topic the proposition that voluntary action, i.e. action resulting from free will (if, he says, it is indeed free), consists in marked effort.

James first distinguishes between primary and secondary functions of the human body, identifying "reflex, instinctive, and emotional movements [as] primary performances." He says that voluntary movements are secondary and then goes on to identify two kinds of voluntary action: ideo-motor action and action after deliberation. Ideo-motor action is essentially habituated action: "Wherever movement follows unhesitatingly and immediately the notion of it in the mind, we have ideo-motor action." The person has a thought that a certain action will achieve a certain end, and instantly it happens, without any additional effort or fiat. These "quasi-automatic" actions include walking, talking, eating, and playing piano. All actions would be this way, James says, absent any "conflicting notion in the mind." When a conflicting notion does arise, it requires deliberation.

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149 In my depictions of James' empirical descriptions, "spontaneity" refers to natural spontaneity rather than voluntary or determined.
150 Principles of Psychology, p. 1099.
151 Ibid., p. 1130.
152 Ibid, p. 1131.
153 Ibid., p. 1132.
James goes on to describe deliberation minimally as the "feeling of effort"\textsuperscript{154}. Up to this point, James' description of action has been reminiscent of Aristotle's practical syllogism. He now embarks on a theory reminiscent of Chrysippus' notion of assent, for which James choose the term "consent"\textsuperscript{155}. What brings James even more in line with Aristotle and the Stoics, and further away from Daoism, is his contention that the obstruction of ordinary impulses is inevitably caused by "rarer and more ideal"\textsuperscript{156} impulses. In other words, and explicitly contra Rousseau, he equates volitional action with morally principled action. James does not mention the ontological position of humans vis-a-vis animals, but he appears to resemble Rousseau in his physicalist position of continuity and his volitional position of discontinuity. How he handles the notion of effort will be the deciding factor.

The effort involved in deliberation, the effort that defines volition, is an effort of attention, the difficulty of "getting the idea of the wise action to stay before our mind at all."\textsuperscript{157} One may notice the use of the word "wise" and that James goes on to characterize attention to an idea as reasoned deliberation such that he confirms the age-old dichotomy of reason and will vs. irrational impulse--the mind and body, despite his empirical practices, turn out to be separate realms:

\begin{quote}
thinking exists as a special kind of immaterial process alongside of the material processes of the world. It is certain . . . that only by postulating such thinking do we make things currently intelligible.\textsuperscript{158}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{154} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 1141.
\textsuperscript{155} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 1172.
\textsuperscript{156} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 1154.
\textsuperscript{157} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 1167.
\textsuperscript{158} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 1174.
The justification for the claim of a mental/physical dichotomy is pragmatic, but like Rousseau, James wants human beings to be special, a step above other creatures, a step closer to the divine.

When it comes to connecting the mental to the physical, James professes ignorance. He says that in addition to the effort of attention, one further thing is required, consent: 
"express consent to the reality of what is attended to is often an additional and quite distinct phenomenon involved."\(^{159}\) Strangely, this directly contradicts earlier statements that identify attention with consent:

> The idea to be consented to must be kept from flickering and going out. It must be held steadily before the mind until it fills the mind. Such filling of the mind by an idea, with its congruous associates, is consent to the idea and the fact that it represents.\(^{160}\)

On one hand, James identifies volition with reasoned deliberation and on the other he identifies it with mere attention, suggesting that rational deliberation is nothing more than attention. In contrast to the rest of the book, where examples from the scientific literature abound, his only example here is of the alcoholic who stymies the impulse to drink by holding his attention on the disadvantages of drinking. This is an anemic notion of reason and James' failure, or reluctance, to elaborate indicates a persistent conflict, alluded to above—humans as moral vs. humans as something less.

James picks out attention as the proper candidate for volition because he notices that attention to an idea is the most salient instance of our decoupling from nature. The pause between impulse and action is the space for reason, the effort of thought, the

\(^{159}\) Ibid., p. 1172.
\(^{160}\) Ibid., p. 1169.
opening for moral consideration. It is what separates the human being from the animal and mechanical.

James' most valuable insight on the issue of volitional action is his focus on attention, as in the following passage:

Though the spontaneous drift of thought is all the other way, the attention must be kept strained on that one object until at last it grows, so as to maintain itself before the mind with ease.¹⁶¹

In this passage, we have two senses of spontaneity. The first is the mechanistic flow of the thought process that is the converse of free will, it is what free will chooses from or in spite of. The second sense of spontaneity comes at the end of the passage. What does it mean for a thought to be at first strained for and then maintained before the mind with ease? As suggested above, when James speaks of free will, he presupposes a distinct ethical element. With this notion of ease, however, James introduces an aesthetic side, and this is the side that is most congenial to the notion of natural spontaneity, a notion for which we can find supporting elements earlier in the book, where he is less conflicted in his treatment of the subject.

The flow of movement that James mentions, the spontaneous drift of thoughts, is characteristic of consciousness, he says. Rather than proceeding from rational inference to rational inference, which is the way we like to think that our brains work in everyday life, James points out that our minds are a constant jumble of thoughts and feelings, none identical to the previous and only rarely following another in anything like a purely rational way. This stream of consciousness is a reaction to external sensations and the continual linking of relations internal to the mind. We experience the world viscerally,
and the world shapes us. Many of our thought processes are feelings rather than
discursive thoughts. James never denies the importance of rationality, but, like La
Mettrie now, he does not underestimate the role of non-rational cognizing that happens of
its own accord. Feelings for James are epistemic, they are a way of knowing the relations
of the world.

James does not, however, link the value of spontaneous feelings with the overt
effort of free will (except in the above passage about ease). Again, the effort of free will
is ethical at bottom and is working against the non-ethical stream of consciousness and
against the flow of habitual actions. Spontaneity in the sense I am using it, however,
works with the stream of consciousness and the flow of habitual actions (some of them
anyway).

This aesthetic/ethical tension in James is, as might be expected, most apparent in
his chapter on habit. In this chapter, James notes that all creatures are "bundles of
habits". Not only are our actions habitual, our thoughts and feelings are as well. Our
nervous systems seem to be grooved out by repetitive use. The result is that "habit
simplifies the movements required to achieve a given result, makes them more accurate
and diminishes fatigue". Habit from this perspective, James notes, is indispensable to
normal human activity. Most of our thoughts, feelings, and actions are habitual. James

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162 Page 228
163 Page 238.
164 James identifies a proto-spontaneity and uses it to characterize habituated actions in general. When
characterizing actions from an ethical viewpoint, he resorts to the free will to account for actions. These
two ways of accounting for actions, the aesthetic characterized by spontaneity (in a broad sense) and the
ethical characterized by ascription of responsibility, is a tension not only in James but through the Western
tradition.
165 Page 109.
166 Page 117.
characterizes nature as movement according to habit\textsuperscript{167} and then suggests that what is occurring in animals and humans is essentially the same, but with more variability in humans.

In examples of juggling and piano playing, James discusses the enormous range and complexity of movements that cultivated habit can achieve (through much effort) and then maintain with very little effort. This is where we must pose an aesthetic question, however, that James does not consider. What is the difference between a piano player who plays a piece mechanically, though with technical virtuosity, and one who plays it with supelatively in every way? If the same notes are being played, what accounts for the difference in aesthetic experience? Anticipating Chapter 5, my answer is that the second plays with a spontaneity that the first lacks. When James speaks of the ease of habit, he emphasizes the mechanistic side, failing to recognize that habituated activities that are to maintain a high level of artistry must also be executed with a certain effort of consciousness, with sustained attention. Put simply, which should suffice for now, aesthetic spontaneity is the sustained unselfconscious attention to habituated activity. So when James, as we saw above, draws a line between mechanical activity on the one hand and voluntary activity on the other, he leaves aesthetic spontaneity completely out of the picture. In his passage on the strain and ease of attention quoted above, he seems to be saying that the straining of attention is the process of habituation, and the ease is the functioning of the fully formed habit. This brings him to the threshold of spontaneity, but

\textsuperscript{167} Page 109.
we still do not see that although habitual activities require comparatively less strain, to perform one well still requires sustained attention.

We shouldn't think that James does not develop a notion of attention. On the contrary, he devotes a long chapter to it. He identifies six different kinds of attention, which I represent with the following schematic:

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To objects
of sense

To represented
objects

Immediate   Derived   Immediate   Derived

1 Passive   2 Passive   3 Active   4 Passive   5 Passive   6 Active
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Attention to objects of sense is called "sensorial attention" by James. Represented objects are mental objects, and attention to these, James calls "intellectual attention". The first and fourth are instinctive attentions and are to be distinguished from the second and fifth respectively as instinct is distinct from habit. Derived attention is created through all the various experiences of enculturation. It is not that we are attentive to certain instincts and habits, but that our attention is diverted to interests that we take either through instinct or through habit. James is also proposing that sometimes our attention is diverted purely through effort on our part, and this would be the third and sixth kinds of
attention. But James says that in reality attention cannot be held for more than a second at a time and that attention sustained is really attention renewed.

With this in mind, James embarks on a brief analysis of sustained attention, and it is interesting to note that, here, James does not speak separately of sensorial and intellectual attention but considers them simultaneously. Attention is sustained in an object when it is taken up for consideration and then considered again and again from different aspects and in different regards, thoughts and feelings branching out to various related objects and coming back again. The notion of sustained attention is where we can see James flirting with the idea of unifying the aesthetic and the ethical. He speaks of both the genius and the moralist as cultivating and relying on sustained attention. He says:

The longer one does attend to a topic the more mastery of it one has. And the faculty of voluntarily bringing back a wandering attention, over and over again, is the very root of judgment, character, and will.\textsuperscript{168}

Here we have both the aesthetic (mastery) and the ethical. The question now is whether the sustaining of attention can itself be habituated. If we can do something by effort many times, then presumably it carves out grooves in our nervous system and allows us to continue doing it with relative ease. So sustaining attention in a particular activity many times can allow us to cultivate the ability to sustain attention with little effort in the future, in the activity in question and possibly even in other activities. It is here that effort becomes ease and will turns into spontaneity. A child acts with impulsiveness, but

\textsuperscript{168} Page 401.
a cultivated artist acts with spontaneity, attending to both the big picture of an activity and to the details with stamina and ease.

In James' chapter on reasoning, he highlights the vast chasm between the rational powers separating humans and animals. Unfortunately, he does not consider the differences in light of attention. In the relatively circumscribed world of animals, we can see that although they cannot cultivate activities as we can, in one sense they do not need to. The reason we must cultivate sustained attention is that our minds are constantly jumping from one topic to another. James calls animals slaves to routine, but one may ask whether that is another way of saying that they live their lives in grooves of sustained attention, never being misled by greed, pride, or envy.

In James' chapter on the consciousness of self, we begin to see a move from superiority to humility, not in regard to animals, but in regard to other human beings. First, James mentions that all accretions in life tend to bolster the ego and thereby burden oneself with the need for protection and self-defense. By ridding oneself of accretions, he says one frees oneself from worry. Then, like Rousseau, James notes that the narrow, selfish, egoistic person is that one who sustains this inveterate self, who is concerned with the narrow interests of the self, while sympathetic people expand outward, such that "the outline of their self often gets uncertain enough, but for this the spread of its content more than atones."169 James is conceiving of this outward expansion of the self in ethical terms, but there is room in his psychology to subsume this ethical characterization under a broader aesthetic category such that it could occur within the domain of spontaneity.

169 Page 298.
James does not attempt such a subsumption, however, and so for a spontaneity that explicitly encompasses ethics, we must turn to Schiller.

**Friedrich Schiller**

Now that I have broached the topic of the aesthetic spontaneity, I will move back a century to Friedrich Schiller, who offers what I find to be the most complete description we have of aesthetic spontaneity in the West. Schiller wrote several tracts on aesthetics, but he tackles the topic of the aesthetics of action specifically, and trenchantly, in an extended essay called "On Grace and Dignity (Ueber Anmuth und Würde)."

Like Rousseau, whom Schiller admired greatly, Schiller accepts the Cartesian paradigm and struggles with human/animal contiguity, a theme that goes all the way back from his philosophical writings of the 1790s to an essay written in 1780 that got him expelled from medical school--"On the Connection Between the Animal and the Spiritual in Man." In this early work, Schiller draws a clear distinction between humans and other animals on spiritual grounds--namely that humans alone have souls, providing them with reason and morality--while also detailing the inherent sensate nature of humans that is not only coincident between humans and other animals but a necessary foundation for our higher powers: "all of [one's] spiritual capacities grow out of motive powers of sense."\(^{170}\) This necessity of the corporeal is reminiscent of Plato's stepladder of beauty-recognition in the *Symposium*, and Schiller's characterization of the mutual interaction of the "animal" and "mental" hearkens back to La Mettrie:

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\(^{170}\) Schiller, Essays: Aesthetical and Philosophical, p. 411.
Hence arises a fundamental law of mixed natures, which, being reduced to its primary divisions, runs thus: the activities of the body correspond to the activities of the mind. Schiller's full acceptance of the biological nature of human beings distinguishes his later works as well. The unity of body and mind allows Schiller to entertain action not only as a result of the will but as an event in the world. This leads him to explore the notion of grace in action.

At the time Schiller writes his "On Grace and Dignity", Kant's third Critique was only a few years old, and Schiller is not only impressed with Kant's entire architectonic, but accepts it almost entirely. One item he does not accept is Kant's devaluation of the sensate with regard to moral action. Whereas Kant's understanding of moral action is limited to the intellectual, Schiller attempts to introduce the sensate realm as well. And as pointed out above, Schiller fully accepts the notion of a soul, on which Kant (in his Critiques) was consistently chary. In Schiller, then, we have an interesting mix of La Mettrie, Rousseau, and Kant, which yields a subtlety of description in regard to action unprecedented in Western theory.

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171 Ibid., p. 418.
172 In On the Aesthetic Education of Man, he says:
Beauty is, admittedly, the work of free contemplation, and with it we do indeed enter upon the world of ideas--but, it should be emphasized, without therefore leaving behind the world of sense. . . . [I]t would be a vain undertaking to try to clear our perception of beauty of these connexions with feeling--which is why it will not do to think of the one as the effect of the other, but is imperative to consider each as being, at the same time and reciprocally, both effect and cause.
173 He adopts a similar strategy in regard to beauty, in his "On the Beautiful" (Ellis, Schiller's Kalliasbriefe and the Study of His Aesthetic Theory).
174 It is interesting to note that in Kant's pre-critical period, his position was closer to Schiller's, accepting the soul and acknowledging an "embodied cognition" (Carpenter, Kant's Earliest Solution to the Mind/Body Problem).
At the beginning of the essay, he defines grace as beauty of movement that is "outside nature in the domain of freedom," evidencing immediately his establishment of a necessary/contingent dichotomy, with nature being the source and model of everything that is necessary. We can conceive of nature in this sense as akin to determined spontaneity as discussed above. On the contingent side is the will, akin to voluntary spontaneity. Within this far-ranging dichotomy, he begins to explain human action. On the side of necessity, fall breathing, beauty of frame, and the sensate. On the side of contingency, fall singing, beauty of movement, human morality, and grace. Grace, he says is restricted to the human realm because it is closely associated with the moral.

Having established this dichotomy, which he will exploit throughout, Schiller says two kinds of human action also fall within this dichotomy, willful (or deliberate) action and sympathetic (stemming from emotion) action. A notion of mind/body unity which we have been seeking is rather obviously not present at this point, but Schiller begins to establish such a unity by bringing grace away from the contingent to the necessary, submitting that one must distinguish two kinds of sympathetic actions. On one hand are actions obviously beyond our control, instinctive actions, and on the other are actions that arise from emotion, which belongs to the realm of necessity but is not entirely separate from the realm of freedom. When an action is executed willfully, one does not willfully

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175 Schiller, Friedrich Schiller, p. 339. There is not an entirely adequate translation of "Ueber Anmuth und Würde." I work from this anonymous translation and from the Lodge, Eastwick, Morrison translation, with quotations coming from the anonymous translation. An example of my handling of the material in this way can be seen in my treatment of the German zufall, which the anonymous translation renders as the fortuitous, and the Lodge translation as the accidental. This is the term of the dichotomy opposed to the necessary. On philosophical and historical grounds, "accident" is, of course, the preferred translation, but it is now archaic, so I dispense with both translations and choose the more accurate and current "contingent."
control every muscular movement, rather the willfulness is merely an initiating, the action is actually carried out sympathetically, and how it is executed depends on one's entire person, one's moral character.

Schiller adopts Kant's understanding of dignity as the quality ascribed to one who makes the difficult moral choice through sheer force of the will. In opposition to this, Schiller posits his notion of grace, which is the modality of the moral action as determined by one's moral character, which is beyond the scope of the will. "Grace" he says, "must be nature, i.e. involuntary (or at least seem so)." And again:

although grace must be, or appear to be, something unwilled, yet we seek it only among movements which, more or less, depend upon the will.

This is the paradoxical side of grace, that it is the involuntary part of the voluntary. How is one to make sense of the valorization of the involuntary? Schiller uses a political analogy that closely resembles the Daoist ruler near the beginning of this chapter:

If a monarchic state be so administered, that, although everything happens according to one single will, yet the individual citizen can convince himself, that he lives according to his own inclination, then we call this a liberal government. But, one would have considerable reservations, either if the regent asserted his will against the inclination of the citizen, or if the citizen asserted his inclination against the will of the regent; for in the first case, the government were not liberal, in the second, it were no government at all.

In this analogy, the people are essentially becoming correct of themselves, in a fashion reminiscent of Daoist spontaneity. This may be difficult to see through the language of willfulness, but Schiller is saying that the actions of the people spontaneously dovetail with what the ruler would have them do. Applying this to graceful action in individuals, one's sympathetic actions stemming from sentiment spontaneously dovetail with actions

176 Ibid., p. 353.
177 Ibid. Schiller allows for the appearance of grace in cases such as the theater, while at the same time frowning on moral artifice.
178 Ibid. p. 360.
that would be executed voluntarily. What makes graceful action possible, then, is not anything that a person overtly performs but rather what the will allows (rather than commands). In dignified action, according to Schiller, the will forces itself against all inclination. In graceful action, the will abdicates in favor of one's personal constitution, allowing freedom to the moral sentiments that flow from it. In this way, will and inclination are unified in what we may call aesthetic spontaneity, for this, according to Schiller, is the manifestation of true beauty.

Graceful action, according to Schiller, is neither automatic in a mechanical sense, nor does it require overt effort. In other words, it is characterized by a middle ground that above I identified as ease:

Already the general opinion of mankind makes ease the chief characteristic of grace, and whatever requires effort can never manifest ease. It is equally evident, on the other hand, that nature must not conduct itself as a force against the mind, if a beautiful moral expression is to occur, for where mere nature rules, humanity must vanish.179

According to my Daoist schematic above, ease is one prong of fluency, the other being responsiveness. Since sentiment is the driving power behind sympathetic action, it is not difficult to see how responsiveness could be attributed to Schiller's notion of graceful action, even though he does not bring it up explicitly. And on the wholeness side of the schematic, the abdication of the forcefulness of the will is obviously a kind of shedding. So of my four characteristics of Daoist spontaneity described above, Schiller appears to include three of them in his theory of graceful action. The missing characteristic is collection, which is in no way precluded in his theory but lacks explicit articulation.

179 Ibid., p. 361.
Having divided human nature into the sensate and the voluntary, Schiller unites it in graceful action. He says that there are three possibilities in accounting for action, only two of which are normally considered, namely, reason taking priority over the sensate, and the sensate taking priority over reason. In the third option, that embodied in graceful action, "the impulses of natural necessity place themselves in harmony with the laws of reason, and the person is at one with himself."\(^{180}\) This unity appears at first as if reason and impulse are on even ground for Schiller, but Schiller reveals repeatedly a more Rousseauean bent—that appeal to reason in cases of moral ambiguity is a sundering of the unity of the person, that this unity consists in the will's letting nature take priority.

the mere inquiry of reason is already an encroachment on nature, who is a competent judge in her own affairs and will not see her verdicts subordinated to a new and alien jurisdiction. Each act of the will, which brings the affairs of the faculty of desire before the court of morality, is therefore, in reality, contrary to nature. . . .\(^{181}\)

When willed action is unnecessary, when reason and impulse are already in accord, that is the highest state. Such a person "may abandon the guidance of the will to emotions, and never run danger of being in contradiction with its own decisions."\(^{182}\) This passage, and others around it, bears a remarkable similarity to Confucian spontaneity as expressed in *Analects* 2:4, "At 70, I was able to follow whatever my heart desired without transgressing." Equally remarkable is the priority that Schiller gives to emotion and the superlative rank that he gives to the beauty of graceful action. We plumbed Plato and Aristotle by way of aesthetic emotion, and here in Schiller, we find its apotheosis, with

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\(^{180}\) *Ibid.*
none other than an Aristotelian notion of character playing a singularly prominent role.

Properly moral sentiment springs from one's character.

I mentioned the possibility of equating Schiller's notion of sentiment with a Daoist notion of responsiveness. This could be done if Schiller's understanding of emotion coincides in some way with the Daoist notion of sensitivity and response, but this does not appear to be immediately plausible. The pre- eminent emotion for Schiller, as for all Christians, is love, which he identifies as the only "free emotion."183 So toward the end of the essay, emotion, which appeared at first to fall in the mundane realm of necessity is elevated to the realm of freedom, which finds its source in the divine. Just as Rousseau finally resolved his determined/voluntary conflict in divine spontaneity, so does Schiller appeal to the superhuman:

Love . . . flows from the seat of freedom, from our divine nature . . . it is the absolutely grand itself, . . . the Legislator himself, the God in us, who plays with his own image in the world of sense.184

Rousseau's and Schiller's final appeal to God as the source of spontaneity is not surprising. When one begins with a determined/voluntary ontological dichotomy there are no ontological resources to account for action that appears both voluntary and involuntary. Still, Rousseau touches on it, and Schiller does a remarkable job accounting for it with the resources available. In Chapter 5, I will investigate how Schiller proposes that one cultivate aesthetic spontaneity.

In conclusion, I have attempted in this chapter to delineate a clear notion of Daoist spontaneity and then explore the Western tradition for resources that may be exploited in

183 Ibid., p. 381.
184 Ibid., p. 381-382.
incorporating such a notion into a contemporary theory of action. Even though the
metaphysics of the two divergent traditions have consistently clashed in this attempt, we
have managed to see some interesting parallels in the West with Daoist spontaneity. At
the very least, we have clarified the term "spontaneity" as it is used in the West. On the
ontological level, there is determined spontaneity and voluntary spontaneity. On a
descriptive level, we have distinguished a simple, naive natural spontaneity, and a more
cultivated aesthetic spontaneity. These final two are the two that crossover between
Daoism and the West, the former lauded by philosophers of a romantic persuasion
beginning with Rousseau, and the later developed only by Schiller with his notion of
grace. We also found many more partial parallels in the tradition, from physis and the
practical syllogism of Aristotle to the examination of attention in James. In the following
chapters, I will draw on these resources in developing a theory of the cultivation of
aesthetic spontaneity.

Summary

In this chapter, I continue the search for philosophical resources regarding
spontaneity in the Western tradition but begin by clarifying a definition of "spontaneity." "Spontaneity" is defined as holistic fluency. "Holism" is defined as the processes of
collection and shedding in an integrated mind and body. "Fluency" is defined as
responsiveness and ease in an integrated mind and body. "Collection," "shedding",
"responsiveness," and "ease" are all defined and illustrated. The first two involve a
reduction of self-concern and a heightening of attention. The second pair involve the
processes of affectivity. Spontaneous action requires attentiveness, relinquishment of self-concern, and responsiveness to the environment, and is executed with an apparent effortlessness. In examining this topic while searching for resources in the Western tradition, I identify four kinds of spontaneity. The spontaneity I describe above can be more narrowly referred to as natural spontaneity. It and the three other kinds of spontaneity are briefly defined as follows:

- **determined spontaneity**: discrete action/motion that results from causes in a linear process
- **voluntary spontaneity**: discrete action that results from intervention in linear causality
- **natural spontaneity**: organic action/motion that arises through affective processes
- **aesthetic spontaneity**: cultivated natural spontaneity

In plumbing the Western tradition for conceptual resources, I continue with Aristotle all the way through Friedrich Schiller, finding the following useful tools:

- a notion of natural motion and human action as arising organically
- a material basis of all reality, including human beings
- a notion of spontaneous action derived from a curtailment of self-concern and a broadening of concern outward
- a notion of attention as integral to sustained action
- ease in action
Two impediments that continually arise from the tradition are a metaphysical separation of human and nature and the Paradox of Spontaneity, in which the term "spontaneity" is understood as denoting both determined action and voluntary action.

CHAPTER 4: CHAOS, EXPERIENCE, HABIT, AND ATTENTION

Having outlined a notion of aesthetic spontaneity in early China and having found some intriguing equivalent notions in Western philosophy, I will now attempt first to engender a deeper understanding of aesthetic spontaneity by returning to the Daoist tradition. As part of my analysis of Daoist spontaneity in Chapter 3, I identified the two major identifying characteristics as holism and fluency, noting that fluency can arise only as a result of holism. Holism, in turn, can be subdivided into the characteristics of collection and shedding. If they were the same items being collected and shed, this would be a contradiction in terms. Shedding, as noted, refers to eliminating all of the characteristics that contribute to an inflated notion of the self. Collection, on the other hand, refers to a narrow focus within a broad awareness. There is an aspect of Daoist spontaneity that seems to refer to both shedding and collection but which almost eludes description. It appears at first to be one of those vague notions, part description, part fancy, that gives Daoism the appearance of being excessively opaque and therefore philosophically unreliable. This aspect of Daoism is best translated into English as inchoateness, or the inchoate.
It is said that Michelangelo could look at a piece of uncut stone and see a form inchoate within it. In the folk psychology of daily life, one doesn't normally take notice of this kind of inchoateness, although it is assumed to be there. Chaotic inchoateness for the Daoists is a cultivated psychological state in which one succeeds in clearing away psychological characteristics that bolster a strong sense of self, such as desire and pride, and in which what remains acts as an undifferentiated field of creative potential ready to be drawn upon. This "field" is difficult to explain in precise terms, so I will turn directly to the texts for descriptions and attempt to use them as a springboard for clarifying the notion of psychological chaotic inchoateness as it relates to spontaneous action.

**Part 1: Daoist Chaos as the Inchoate**

Can we conceive of disorder in a positive sense? We organize our desks, we clean up our houses, we cultivate good habits, we discipline our children, we govern our polities—all with the aim of reducing disorder, of temporarily reversing the entropy that inevitably asserts itself in our lives. Going all the way back to Hesiod, we see chaos as a cosmogonic state of utter confusion inevitably reined in by laws of regularity, in a transition from fearful unpredictability to calm stability. Even in modern Chaos Theory, what appears to be random is ultimately reducible to algorithmic constancy. There does not seem to be a place in normal Western, or Westernized, life for chaos.

Likewise in early China, disorder (*luan*) was the antithesis of everything civilized.\(^{185}\) States without rulers and minds without cohesion were *luan*. Familial

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[185] There is an exception in which "*luan*" paradoxically means order, but this is rare.
relationships were defined, honored, and codified in the rites, and extended metaphorically to the loyal bonds of the state. But against this overt imposition of order, a Rousseauian-type counter-current arose in the background. Though not exclusively Daoist, this revolutionary way of thinking was best articulated by two philosophers we now know as the progenitors of Daoism, Laozi and Zhuangzi. In the very first chapter of the Mawangdui Daodejing, we find the entire system of imposed order turned on its head:

When dao is lost, there comes character. When character is lost, there comes ren. When ren is lost, there comes appropriateness; when appropriateness is lost, there comes ritual propriety. Ritual propriety exemplifies the wearing thin of conscientiousness and trustworthiness and is the commencement of chaotic disorder (luan).

Human imposition, according to Daoists, leads to the creation of chaotic disorder rather than its rectification. In contrast, the Daoists posit a type of chaos that is replete with creative potential and through spontaneous action yields orderly processes that proceed from the concretion of things to their dissolution and back, in a complex web of relations. It is as if the early Daoists had an inkling of not only the second law of the thermodynamics that has all things tending to disorder and rest but also of our recent theories of emergent order, or self-organization. For Daoists, nature is a matter of diverse processes, not necessarily tending toward disorder but each in a unique place on a continuum running between concretion and dissolution and back again in a different form.

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186 In 1973, two complete versions of the Daodejing were found in a tomb dating to the Second Century BCE in Mawangdui, China, predating our earliest received version by some nine centuries. The internal chapter order of these two excavated versions differs slightly from the received versions, with the received Chapter 38 appearing first.

187 This is the central vocabulary of Chinese moral philosophy, with the implication that it is the virtues themselves that cause disorder rather than engendering it, as commonly thought.

188 My translation. All other translations will be from Legge, unless otherwise noted. The version used is an electronic version of Legge, Texts of Taoism found at Shuhai Wenyuan (www.shuhai.hawaii.edu).
This processional activity, although taken in one sense as cosmogonic akin to Hesiod's, in a more important sense, is immanent at every moment of activity. Our task as humans is to find the place on the continuum in all of our activities and work within the bounds of circumstance by responding creatively with appropriate means, emulating the spontaneity of nature. First I will attempt to explain how early Daoists understood spontaneity as a potent creativity inchoate in undifferentiated form. After this survey, I will move on to an analysis of spontaneous action in aesthetic order.

The predominant contemporary meaning of "chaos" as disorder, as in "with the collapse of the economy, the country fell into chaos" derives from an earlier meaning of a primal disorder of constructive matter that awaits ordering. This sense is hardly in use anymore, but we are fortunate to have translations of the Chinese classics by the hand of a sinologist who lived in a time when Greek was still a language of the literate and who therefore understood "chaos" in a way relevant to this study. In the middle to late 19th century, the Scottish missionary James Legge undertook the monumental and pioneering endeavor of translating many of the Chinese classics into English. If we scan his work for use of the terms "chaos" or "chaotic", we find one use in his translation of the Daodejing (Tao Teh King) and eight uses in five passages of the Zhuangzi (Kwang-tsze/Chuang Tzu). Analyzing each of these passages will bring us to a

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It may appear random or haphazard to approach chaos in China through the serendipity of translations from over a century ago, but I do so as a convenient heuristic that allows easy access to the heart of the matter. I will consider closely the Chinese terms rendered "chaos" and other instances of the same terms when not so translated.
better understanding of "chaos" in a Chinese sense and to a familiarity with related terms in its semantic field.

**Daodejing, 20**

I reproduce Legge's rendition of Daodejing, Chapter 20, in its entirety:

> When we renounce learning we have no troubles.
> The (ready) 'yes, 'and (flattering) 'yea,'
> -- Small is the difference they display.

But mark their issues,
good and ill;
--What space the gulf between shall fill?
What all men fear is indeed to be feared;
but how wide and without end
is the range of questions (asking to be discussed)!
The multitude of men look satisfied and pleased;
as if enjoying a full banquet,
as if mounted on a tower in spring.
I alone seem listless and still,
my desires having as yet given no indication of
their presence.
I am like an infant which has not yet smiled.
I look dejected and forlorn,
as if I had no home to go to.
The multitude of men all have enough and to spare.
I alone seem to have lost everything.
My mind is that of a stupid man;
I am in a state of chaos.

Ordinary men look bright and intelligent,
while I alone seem to be benighted.
They look full of discrimination,
while I alone am dull and confused.
I seem to be carried about as on the sea,
drifting as if I had nowhere to rest.
All men have their spheres of action,
While I alone seem dull and incapable,
like a rude borderer.
(Thus) I alone am different from other men,
but I value the nursing-mother (the Tao).

The "state of chaos" line at the end of the first stanza seems jarring until we realize that this is a primal chaos, an inchoate state akin to the functioning of *dao* before differentiated manifestation. In the text from which Legge was working, the Chinese
term is *dun dun* 浊浊, the fundamental meaning of which is to be stopped up. In a *qi* cosmology, the notion of flow or process is of primary ontological importance, and the halting of that flow indicates either an infirmity (as in traditional medical theory) or, as I propose here, a nascent state of disorganization that will eventuate in a recommencement of differentiation and dynamic flow. The translation by Legge of *dun dun* is fortuitous (others translate it as "blank" (Lau190) or "muddled and confused" (Henricks191)) and acute because the entire puzzling passage is one of Laozi's most succinct descriptions of the psychological state of chaos as the inchoate.192

This passage has long given interpreters pause. Daoism is supposed to provide an ideal for the good life, but Laozi, the godfather of all Daoism, presents himself in depressingly negative terms, the only positive note being the final line about obtaining nourishment from the mother. But this is to misread the passage. We can condense the passage to only the self-referential statements and strip them of their relative negativity:

> I seem still,  
> my desires having as yet given no indication of their presence.  
> I am like an infant which has not yet smiled.  
> as if I had no home to go to.  
> I [possess nothing].

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190 *Tao Te Ching* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1989).
192 Paul J. Lin, in his translation of *Daodejing (A Translation of Lao Tzu's Tao Te Ching and Wang Pi's Commentary, MMCS 30*) (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Center for Chinese Studies, 1977), pp. 35-36), following the commentary of China's most influential interpreter Wang Bi, translates *dun dun*, "How chaotic! Chaotic!" He records Wang Bi's commentary on this term: "Undifferentiated or unrecognized, it cannot be named".

Chang Chung-yuan (*Tao: A New Way of Thinking* (New York: Perennial Library, 1977), p. 52) notes that C. G. Jung refers to this passage in his *Integration of the Personality*, "identifying the 'lavishing mother' with the region of darkness into which one falls when one follows the process of *wu-wei*, or not-doing, expounded by Lao Tzu. This region of darkness is not empty but is the place where all potentialities are stored".
My mind is [blank];
I am in a state of chaos.

I have no special knowledge.
I am [plain].
I [have no permanent home].
I [have no profitable skill],
I value the nursing-mother (the Tao).

From this perspective, we find a person who has managed to go through a process of shedding and to reduce his desires to the most minimal level, resembling the utter simplicity of an infant. Having no sense of possession of anything material or conceptual, his mind is untroubled by desire, ambition, or habitual patterns of cognition and is therefore in a state of nascent creativity, ready to respond spontaneously to any circumstance.

There are two important considerations to note in regard to this passage as it relates to chaos as the inchoate. First, the negativity here is portrayed as dark, in contrast to the brightness of other people. This dark/bright contrast is one of the distinguishing characteristics separating Daoism and Confucianism, even though we can find important references to the inchoate in early Confucianism as well. The inchoate as an ideal of spontaneity and a source of creativity is not unique to Daoism, only that it is articulated in negative terms that set off the less purposive action of Daoists from the striving ambition of the Confucians.

Second, the negativity of Daoism does not involve total negation but instead negates only the contrivance and purposiveness of what is negated and so is in this sense

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193 In Zhuangzi, Chapter 2, there is a preoccupation with ming (clarity/illumination/acuity), but rather than promoting analytic discrimination the author is borrowing the term to criticize such means to clarity and suggesting instead a widening of scope.
194 The Zhong Yong, for instance, expounds on wei (minute/inchoate).
a positive reformulation. Hall and Ames isolate this trope in Daoism, when specifically using the negative "wu 無," and identify it as the wu-form. The examples they offer are wu zhi 無知, wu wei 無為, and wu yu 無欲, literally, no-knowledge, no-action, and no-desire, respectively. Interpreting these terms in context, Hall and Ames state:

"unprincipled knowing, nonassertive action, and objectless desire have this in common: To the extent they are successful, they enrich the world by allowing the process to unfold spontaneously on its own terms, while at the same time, contributing themselves fully to it. (p. 57)

Although Hall and Ames refer to this unique use of negativity exclusively in terms of the wu-form, I find that it also occurs without the use of wu and still holds its particular connotation of uncontrived engagement. Henceforth, I will refer to it as counternegation, that negativity that strips its positive opposite of any kind of strident connotations, yielding an engagement with the world in which experience is pared down to its most inchoate form and therefore maximizes the possibility of spontaneous interaction.

Zhuangzi, 7

In Legge's translation of the Zhuangzi, the term "chaos" (or "chaotic") occurs eight times in five passages. The first is the locus classicus for the famous myth of Chaos (渾沌 hundun):

The Ruler of the Southern Ocean was Shu, the Ruler of the Northern Ocean was Hu, and the Ruler of the Centre was Chaos.

195 See Thinking from the Han, pp. 45 ff.
196 Negation in this sense runs counter to normal negation, positing a reformed sense of the action, rather than negating it entirely.
Shu and Hu were continually meeting in the land of Chaos, who treated them very well. They consulted together how they might repay his kindness, and said, 'Men all have seven orifices for the purpose of seeing, hearing, eating, and breathing, while this (poor) Ruler alone has not one. Let us try and make them for him.' Accordingly they dug one orifice in him every day; and at the end of seven days Chaos died.

Unlike "dundun" in the Daodejing, Legge is not alone in his rendering of "hundun" as "Chaos". Watson\textsuperscript{197} and Palmer\textsuperscript{198} both follow him, and Feng & English\textsuperscript{199} use "Primal Chaos". Most others echo the primal inchoateness: "Primitivity" (Fung Yu-lan\textsuperscript{200}), "No-Form" (Merton\textsuperscript{201}), and "PrimalDark" (Hinton\textsuperscript{202}).\textsuperscript{203} It is often suggested that "hundun" is a reduplicative term, such as the English "hodgepodge", "roly-poly", or "Humpty-Dumpty". The "dun" of both "dundun" and "hundun" is the same and provides the basic meaning. "Hun" means whole or turbid, and together "hundun" means undifferentiated or obstructed. With the notion of undifferentiation, we can see how Legge can justify the use of "Chaos", and as I propose above, in a qi cosmology, an obstruction indicates a nascent state of disorganization that will eventuate in a recommencement of differentiation and dynamic flow. Chaos in this story is the inchoate state of nascent creativity that is inevitably destroyed by good-intentioned meddling. The fact that Chaos has no sense organs is again an indication of the undesirability of excessive differentiation, another hint at the dark/bright metaphor separating Daoism and

\textsuperscript{197} The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu.
\textsuperscript{198} The Book of Chuang Tzu.
\textsuperscript{199} Chuang Tzu: Inner Chapters.
\textsuperscript{200} Chuang Tzu: A New Selected Translation with an Exposition of the Philosophy of Kuo Hsiang.
\textsuperscript{201} The Way of Chuang Tzu.
\textsuperscript{202} Chuang Tzu: Inner Chapters.
\textsuperscript{203} In a bit of whimsy, Mair (Wandering on the Way: Early Taoist Tales and Parables of Chuang Tzu) transliterates "hundun" in the more familiar Cantonese "Wonton". Hamill & Seaton (The Essential Teachings of Chuang Tzu) manage to find an English term, "muddle", that straddles the meanings of "dun" as both mixture and mental confusion. Graham (Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters) transliterates, "Hun-tun".
Confucianism. The do-gooders want Chaos to share in their sensate world, but Chaos, who is doing just fine in his own inchoateness, perishes at the sight. Of course, in this metaphor it is not a creature that dies but replete potentiality that passes away once determinative choices have been made.

The story of Chaos/Hundun in Zhuangzi appears to be a metaphorical case of Daoist counternegation. As portrayed in other early sources, Chaos/Hundun is a rather hideous looking creature and viewed as vile or barbarous.\(^{204}\) The term \textit{hun} also has a history of association with barbaric tribes.\(^{205}\) In Zhuangzi's hands, however, this featureless beast is potent for what it lacks. Using the negative as positive, Zhuangzi employs that strange and fearsome god/creature as a symbol for nascent creativity, showing that the repleteness of dark inchoateness will function until we force our orderly constructions upon it.

Throughout the \textit{Daodejing}, we find the theme of the creative potential of the formless and the potent nature of darkness, in what are, again, instances of rhetorical counternegation. Chapter 4, for instance, reads:

\begin{quote}
The way is empty, yet when used there is something that does not make it full. Deep, it is like the ancestor of the myriad creatures. Blunt the sharpness; Untangle the knots; Soften the glare; Follow along old wheel tracks. Darkly visible, it only seems as if it were there.\(^{206}\)
\end{quote}

The suggestion is that there is an indistinct dynamo of creativity that can be harnessed but not coerced. The way to do so is by removing complications rather than adding them, by

\(^{205}\) Girardot, \textit{Myth and Meaning in Early Taoism: The Theme of Chaos (hun-tun)}, p. 122.
\(^{206}\) Lau, p. 271.
flowing with natural movement rather than trying to do something overtly. "Old wheel tracks" can be interpreted as a reference to cultivated habit, which, once cultivated, guides one's actions along appropriate paths. Yet vagueness is to be valued, all this creative potential remains dark and inchoate, exploitable, but just out of sight.

Chapters 56 and 52 reiterate this sentiment:

Block the openings,
Shut the doors,

At the heart of creative spontaneity, interaction with one's environment is primary, but it requires an intuitive attunement to the process rather than prior calculation. Perhaps the Asian martial arts are the best example of this kind of spontaneity that is energetic and immediate, accurate and appropriate, yielding and unforced. Chapter 56 calls the process the "dark identity (xuan tong 玄同)," a sure echo of Chapter 15's xuan tong 玄通207 (mysteriously comprehending), where we find a more descriptive account of the inchoate life:

Of old he [the sage] was well versed in the way
Was minutely (wei) subtle (miao), mysteriously (xuan) comprehending, and too profound to be known.

It is because he could not be known
That he can only be given a makeshift description:
  Tentative, as if wading through water in winter,
  Hesitant, as if in fear of his neighbors;
  Formal like a guest;
  Falling apart like thawing ice;
  Thick like the uncarved block;
  Murky like muddy (hun) water,
  Immense like a valley

207 Here following the received version. The Mawangdui version has xuan da 玄達, which is nearly identical in meaning.
Not exactly the description of a confident, graceful martial artist, this negativity now reveals itself as counternegation, akin to Chapter 20 noted above, as the passage continues:

The muddy, being stilled, slowly becomes limpid,
The settled, being stirred, slowly comes to life.
He who treasure this way
Desires not to be full.
It is because he desires not to be full
That he is able to be worn and incomplete.

There is a constellation of terms here and above that appear repeatedly in the Daodejing and that adumbrate the notion of the inchoate: xuan 玄 (dark, mysterious), miao 妙 (subtle/profound), wei 微 (minute/inchoate), xiao 小 (small/minute), pu 植 (uncarved block), wu 無 (nothingness), kong 空 (emptiness). Although these terms are concentrated in Daoist texts, some appear elsewhere also in the sense of inchoate creativity. In Sunzi's Art of War, as pointed out by Francois Jullien\(^{208}\), the notion of shi 勢 (propensity of things) is brought into relief through some of these terms and shown to be vital to a full description of spontaneous action. As mentioned above, in the Zhong Yong, the term wei (minute/inchoate) figures prominently, and Hall and Ames in their recent translation\(^{209}\) boldly translate cheng 誠 (conventionally rendered "sincerity") as "creativity". A salient difference, however, is that the Zhong Yong, like other Confucian texts, exhorts the reader to open the senses to discernment, to seek clarity and bring the dark to light.

\(^{208}\) The Propensity of Things: Toward a History of Efficacy in China.
\(^{209}\) Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong.
Zhuangzi, 11

In Zhuangzi, Chapter 11, we find several interesting themes and terms surrounding Legge's next occurrences of "chaos". One of the two terms rendered "chaos" is "xingming 冒眼," a reference to the formlessness and boundlessness of a cosmic inchoate potentiality; and the second is "hunhun dundun" a reduplication of "hundun" above, referring here not to a personage or to a cosmic state but to a psychological state. In the passage, an already highly achieved Daoist inquires of an even greater master regarding how to act in order to "blend together the essential qualities of [the] six [elemental] influences in order to nourish all living things". The master, Hong Meng (Vast Obscurity), replies:

Wandering listlessly about, I know not what I seek; carried on by a wild impulse, I know not where I am going.
I wander about in the strange manner (which you have seen), and see that nothing proceeds without method and order;-- what more should I know? [...] What disturbs [luan] the regular method of Heaven, comes into collision with the nature of things, prevents the accomplishment of the mysterious (operation of) Heaven, scatters the herds of animals, makes the birds all sing at night, is calamitous to vegetation, and disastrous to all insects;-- all this is owing, I conceive, to the error of governing men[...]
You will only injure them! [...] Your mind (needs to be) nourished.
Do you only take the position of doing nothing [wu wei], and things will of themselves become transformed [zi hua]. Neglect your body; cast out from you your power of hearing and sight; forget what you have in common with things; cultivate a grand similarity with the chaos of the plastic ether [xingming]; unloose your mind; set your spirit free; be still as if you had no soul. Of all the multitude of things every one returns to its root. Every one returns to its root, and does not know (that it is doing so). They all are as in the state of chaos [hunhun dundun], and during all their existence they do not leave it. If they knew (that they were returning to their root), they would be (consciously) leaving it. They do not ask its name; they do not seek to spy out their nature; and thus it is that things come to life of themselves [zi sheng].

Here we have an echo of Daodejing 20, in which humans are causing disorder (luan) by their very attempts to bring order. Hong Meng advocates instead a return to a personal
state of inchoateness that will in turn allow one to meld into a cosmic state of inchoateness. Just like the legendary Hundun, one must eliminate one's discriminatory sense of hearing and sight in order to blend with inchoate chaos. In the Daodejing, terms of the inchoate, such as pu and wei occur consistently with the exhortation to reduce or eliminate desires. For the Daoists, one of the defining characteristics of human beings is that we have the unfortunate capacity to engender a supervenient self made up of strident emotions and, most disastrously, desires. In this sense, elimination of desires is equivalent to elimination of the ego self and allows for a return to a natural, spontaneous state, described as a liberating melding with the cosmos, just as all things naturally do. The specific terms of spontaneity here are "zihua" and "zisheng", terms referring to the natural processes of transformation and generation that are hidden and mysterious but still achievable for the individual. Similar to contemporary notions of self-organization in which conditions accumulate to spontaneously produce order, things coalesce and dissolve of their own accord, of themselves, in constantly developing processes that interact in complex webs across scales of causality, with things possessing only transient intrinsicality.

Zhuangzi, 12

Legge's next occurrence of "chaos" (this time "chaotic"), occurs in another description of ultimate achievement. Three types of person are described-- men of sheng 聖 (sageliness), de 德 (virtue/potency/character), and shen 神 (spirit/supernatural/daemon). The first, which happens to be the highest level on the Confucian ladder of
achievement, forms a government of fair delegation, patient consideration, and appropriate and effective spontaneous action. The second moves beyond the human world to all within the Four Seas. He has transcended conventional dichotomies such as right/wrong and beautiful/ugly, and recalling Daodejing 20, he gives the appearance of being timid and hesitant. The third, supernatural, person goes a step further:

Men of the highest spirit-like qualities mount up on the light, and (the limitations of) the body vanish.
This we call being bright and ethereal.
They carry out to the utmost the powers with which they are endowed, and have not a single attribute unexhausted.
Their joy is that of heaven and earth, and all embarrassments of affairs melt away and disappear; all things return to their proper nature;-- and this is what is called (the state of) chaotic obscurity (humning).

Chaos is the highest human achievement by which one paradoxically becomes inhuman by transcending all human limitations and coalescing with the natural realm in indistinct repletion. Spontaneity prevails in a self that has disappeared. This type of transcorporeal liberation appears more than once in the Zhuangzi and indicates a level of achieved inchoate spontaneity on a personal level to match cosmic inchoate spontaneity on a grand scale.

One may notice the references to light and brightness here and wonder why this passage contradicts my earlier statement regarding a Daoist preference for the dark. The spontaneity of inchoateness can be represented as both bright and dark--bright in the sense of insubstantial evanescence and dark in the sense of mysterious and subtle. In contrast with Confucian clarity, the darkness or ethereality refers to a subtlety beyond sensate discrimination aimed at utilitarian manipulation.

210 Following Mair (p. 113) here rather than Legge, who renders the difficult Chinese terms "grief" and "perplexity", as opposed to Mair's "timidity" and "apprehensiveness".
When everything has returned to its proper nature, the state is one of *hunming* 混冥, chaotic obscurity. The "*hun*" of "*hunming*" is written differently as a Chinese character, but is cognate with the "*hun*" of "*hundun*" both phonetically and semantically. Karlgnren\(^1\) gives them identical pronunciations and glosses them both as "chaos", one in reference to the *Daodejing* and one to the *Zhuangzi*. The "*ming*" of "*hunming*" is effectively identical to the "*ming*" of "*xingming*" above, meaning dark or obscure. Both the "*hun*" and "*ming*" of "*hunming*" hearken back to the *Daodejing*. In *Daodejing* Chapter 14, "*hun*" appears with "*wei* (subtle/minute)", "*wuwu* 無物 (no things)", and "*bujian* 不觀 (not see)" to describe the inchoateness of the potent *dao*.

With these three qualities [Equable [bujian], Inaudible, Subtle [wei]], it cannot be made the subject of description;
and hence we blend them together and obtain The One.

Its upper part is not bright,
and its lower part is not obscure.

Ceaseless in its action,
it yet cannot be named,
and then it again returns and becomes nothing [*wuwu*].
This is called the Form of the Formless,
and the Semblance of the Invisible;
this is called the Fleeting [*hu*] and Indeterminable.

In Chapter 15, quoted above, we find "*hun*" occurring with "*wei*," "*miao*," and "*xuan*," in a description of the inchoate life. In the passage, "*hun*" describes the muddy condition of water. In Chapter 25, it is used as follows:

There was something undefined [*hun*]\(^1\) and complete,
coming into existence before Heaven and Earth.
How still it was and formless,
standing alone,
and undergoing no change,

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\(^1\) *Grammata Serica Recens.*

\(^2\) Henricks translates this as "chaos" (p. 236).
reaching everywhere and in no danger (of being exhausted)!
It may be regarded as the Mother of all things.

Here it occurs in a passage that goes on to describe the cyclic concrescence and dissolution of things due to their own spontaneity (ziran 自然). In all of these cases, "hun" describes an inchoate spontaneity that possesses enormous creative power. But this power is not forceful. It unfolds in successive stages according to the cumulative circumstances that are so subtle as to give the appearance of an inner energy that is the source of impulsion. We find just such a description in the occurrence of the ming of hunming in Daodejing 21:

The grandest forms of active force
From Tao come,
their only source.

Who can of Tao the nature tell?
Our sight it flies,
our touch as well.

Eluding sight,
eluding touch,
The forms of things all in it crouch;
Eluding touch,
eluding sight,
There are their semblances,
all right.

Profound (hu) it is,
dark and obscure [ming];
Things' essences all there endure.

It is not uncommon for the reader unfamiliar with Daoist thought to read the Daodejing and conclude that the dao is an external force controlling the natural transformations.

Quite the opposite. Dao is nothing but a name given to the mysterious and spontaneous process of natural self-organization that people at their best may emulate.
Zhuangzi, 16

In Zhuangzi 16, Legge uses "chaotic" for the term "hunmang 混茫". "Hun" is the same term as just above, and "mang" means expansive or muddled. The passage begins as follows:

The men of old, while the chaotic condition was yet undeveloped [hunmang213], shared the placid tranquility which belonged to the whole world. At that time the Yin and Yang were harmonious and still; their resting and movement proceeded without any disturbance; the four seasons had their definite times; not a single thing received any injury, and no living being came to a premature end. Men might be possessed of (the faculty of) knowledge, but they had no occasion for its use. This was what is called the state of Perfect Unity. At this time, there was no action on the part of any one, but a constant manifestation of spontaneity [ziran].

What if everyone were to attain the highest possible state of spontaneous creativity? According to this passage, that was the original condition, and rather than all things being cast in the bold relief of profit and loss or good and bad, the world seemed in a still inchoate state of chaos, a "Perfect Unity" in a complete diversity. Spontaneity was a way of life. This passage is sandwiched between two passages that describe the descent of the world into the current state of striving and contrivance, a world that requires the Confucian virtues. In both cases, the result, as in Daodejing 38, is luan, the rank chaos of disorder. The contrast is delightful--chaos in both realms, but while one devolves to entropic disorganization, the other proceeds in harmonious cycles, from rest to movement and back, the creative power inexhaustible.

213 The Chinese for "while ... undeveloped" is: 在混茫之中.
Zhuangzi, 18

Legge's final use of "chaos" in translating Zhuangzi is in Chapter 18, the famous story of Zhuangzi celebrating after his wife's death. Asked to explain, Zhuangzi replies that after an initial pause, he realized that his wife's passing was just another stage in the natural processes which are worth celebrating. We have in this passage a clear indication of chaos' utility on the individual rather than the cosmic level:

I reflected on the commencement of her being.
She had not yet been born to life; not only had she no life, but she had no bodily form; not only had she no bodily form, but she had no breath [qi]. During the intermingling of the waste and dark chaos [manghu], there ensued a change, and there was breath [qi]; another change, and there was the bodily form; another change, and there came birth and life.

While Chapter 16 may appear confusing in that we seem to have gone back to a time of primal chaos but where human life is already in full form, here we see clearly a Daoist chaos that refers to an unceasing immanence of creative potentiality. The moment of the concrescence of qi is not a return to grand cosmic primality but a momentary example of the process of self-organization that occurs repeatedly.

I believe the word "breath" above would be better left untranslated as "qi". It is hard to see, after all, how breath could precede corporeal form unless it were a Greek-like pneuma, which it clearly is not. What precedes bodily form is the inchoate qi, which coalesces as the body, only to someday disperse again. This is the process that Zhuangzi celebrates. The Chinese term for "chaos" here is "manghu芒荅". The "mang", we saw just above. "Hu" is a loan for one of two similarly written characters also pronounced hu 忽 or hu 恒, both of which belong to the large set of terms meaning muddled or mixed up. We saw these two used above in Daodejing 14 as the "fleeting" and 21 as the "profound".
The semantic range for all of these "chaos" terms (dun, hun, hun, ming, mang, and hu) is like the meanings of the terms themselves, immense, obscure, and with fuzzy boundaries. What we have found from our survey of Legge's translating them as "chaos", however, is that they can all possess the sense of a powerful creative spontaneity, like that of nature, that can be exploited by a human being, not through overt means but through a reduction of the self to a fundamentally natural level. In part 3 of this chapter, I will entertain a Confucian notion of spontaneity that will take into account much of what I have covered until now. I have gone into some detail regarding the notion of inchoateness for two reasons. First, it is integral to a full understanding of spontaneity, as we have seen. Second, the notion of reducing the self is at first counterintuitive and so deserves this kind of extended elaboration. In Part 3 of this chapter, I will again broach the topic of the reduction of the self. The context will be Confucian this time, but the overall notion will not differ significantly. Before getting to that, however, I wish first to address the topic of affective experience.

In Chapter 1, I downplayed the differences between Daoism and Confucianism, with the exception of how each treated the topic of emotions. In the above section, I have opened up the divide in regard to how the inchoate is treated. It is important to understand that there was much in regard to a theory of action that the early Daoists and early Confucians shared. According to my presentation so far, there were two major differences between the two lineages of thought: 1) Daoists, as seen in Chapter 1, were less trustful of the vagaries of common emotional experience, and 2) the Confucians preferred the discursive and readily apparent to the Daoists' vague and non-discursive.
Rather than radical differences, these two distinctions are really different levels of comfort. Both lineages show a history of being wary of the trouble that can be caused by desire and emotion, but the Daoists, who preferred to distance themselves from ritual propriety, which is nothing more than the channeling of emotion in appropriate ways, also thereby distanced themselves from common emotions— but not from all emotions. Both lineages were concerned with lessening the negative effects of self-concern, and the different ways they did largely account for divergent paths that each took. The Daoists concluded that the reduction of self-concern would ultimately lead one to transcend the emotional bonds of ordinary life, whereas the Confucians the same reduction could be accomplished while remaining within these bonds, and would actually strengthen them.214

In Section 3 below, I will address Confucian spontaneity and self-reduction with reference to John Dewey's notion of experience. Before doing so, however, I will first review Dewey's notion of emotional experience with the already familiar position of Zhuangzi.

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214 The practice of drawing congruencies between Confucianism and Daoism can be disconcerting to those who were schooled in the belief that the two lineages were, first, entirely distinct and, second, mutually combative. As in any hierarchical society, there were historical tensions between the enfranchised Ruists (Confucians) and others not as close to power, but philosophical disagreements were much more complex. As A. C. Graham has shown (Disputers of the Tao), philosophical disagreements were often more trenchant between Confucians and Mohists and between Daoists and Mohists than between Confucians and Daoists (speaking of a Daoist lineage in the Warring States, however, is problematic from the start, as there was no such distinction at the time). Evidence from recently excavated texts supports the view of Ruists-Daoist compatibility. Rather than perpetuating the view of mutual combativeness, recent scholars, such as Edward Slingerland in his Effortless Action, have begun tracing philosophical beliefs that transcend distinctions of so-called schools of thought. And finding subtle differences among simulators is much more interesting, and difficult, than drawing stark lines and staking out boundaries.
Part 2: Emotional Experience

Spontaneity problematizes a notion of discrete agency and therefore any philosophy based on such a notion. Without a discrete agent as a basis for conceptualizing a philosophical theory, it is difficult to begin to approach issues that spontaneity might raise. As seen in our survey of Western notions of spontaneity, our options are often restricted to autonomy and automaticity, human or robot. Spontaneity in the Daoist sense, however, is choiceless and therefore, although implying a philosophy of action, appears to fall more under our aesthetic categories than our metaphysical or ethical categories. Around the turn of the 20th Century, a few philosophers, such as Whitehead, Heidegger, and Dewey, began to question underlying dichotomies that limit our conceptual options. Heidegger and Dewey were both led ultimately to aesthetics, and it was Dewey who posited an intriguingly anthropological account of human experience as fundamentally aesthetic.

Dewey's notion of aesthetic experience is paradigmatic of his notion of experience in general. Dewey speaks of experience in terms of particularized experience, of interaction of a live being with its environment, of a beginning and an ending, of organized processes, or conflict and resolution, of culmination and fulfillment. An experience, he says, is an intensified interaction of the person with the environment. And by "environment," he means every aspect of our lives from moment to moment, whether it be trees, ideas, or the person two seats away. Life involves a fluctuating adaptation to the environment, now in step with it, now falling behind. In an experience there is a spontaneous organization of perception and intention that involves reworking the material
of the environment until a particular goal is achieved and equilibrium is restored. I don't believe Dewey ever explicitly uses the term "spontaneous" to describe the process of action, but it seems implicit in his descriptions in works such as *Art as Experience*,\textsuperscript{215} from which I will be drawing below. In other books and essays, Dewey dispenses with free will altogether in favor of habit, for instance:

\[\ldots\] all habits are affections, that all have projectile power, and that \[\ldots\] a predisposition formed by a number of specific acts is an immensely more intimate and fundamental part of ourselves than are vague, general, conscious choices. All habits are demands for certain kinds of activity; and they constitute the self. In any intelligible sense of the word will, they are will.\textsuperscript{216}

The conscious reworking of the material of the environment is, for Dewey, the germ of artistic experience. Dewey notes that in English terminology we divide our experience into artistic (the artist's viewpoint) and aesthetic (the connoisseur's viewpoint) but that conceptually they are a unity. The artist reworks the materials of the environment in a meaningful way based on interpretations and feelings that guide him from all past involvements. The perceiver, likewise, recreates the work of art in the act of perceiving, interpreting it based on the psychological contributions of total personal history and predilections. The artist must take the position of aesthetic perceiver in the process of creating an art work, and the perceiver is an artist in the re-creation of the meaning of the work. An experience is the re-creation of unity, the restoration of balance, and when it is moved by its own urge to fulfillment, when it is expressed only as experience, without being dominantly practical or intellectual, it is aesthetic.

\textsuperscript{215} *Art As Experience.*
Dewey tells us that emotion, which for him is emotional thinking, is what brings unity to an experience, what orders it, what brings the things of consciousness into consciousness and filters out the rest, what integrates things of consciousness into a whole. It is not that there are separate emotions in experience but that experience is emotional. All experience, according to Dewey, as an integrated movement toward a culmination, can bring the person into unity with the environment.

While emotion drives experience during an experience, according to Dewey the final culmination of experience results in a kind of inner harmony, or serenity, a moment when tension has subsided, when conflict has been resolved, and intense involvement gives way to a feeling of communion with the developed order. It is a feeling of the restoration of unity, a feeling we call happiness or delight. Dewey says that it is "a fulfillment that reaches the depth of our being--one that is an adjustment of our whole being with the conditions of existence." It is interesting to note that this feeling of inner harmony is not the final cause of an experience for Dewey. Each experience has an inherent telos, is driven forward by forces, energies, desire, and needs peculiar to it. This is the spontaneity; I believe. Experiences are self-active. Aesthetic experience is controlled by a heightened sensitivity to the ordering of the relations of qualities, and it is the bringing to consummation of the ordering that is the end in view of experience. We should note the difference, in Dewey's philosophy of experience, between the supervenient feeling of inner harmony that ensues from experience and the intense feeling of interpenetration of self with world at the height of experience. The former is a

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slackening of vitality, an emotion felt deeply but not intensely, a feeling of well-being in restored order but not of immediate union. In his aesthetics, Dewey emphasizes the tension, the interaction, and the heightened vitality that give rise to artistic expression and that imbue aesthetic experience. The pause for reflection and quiet enjoyment afterward is significant but not primary.

Zhuangzi also has a philosophy of creature/environment interaction, one that lends itself to being interpreted aesthetically, one that finds importance in personal union with the environment, and one that recognizes emotion as crucial to experience. For Zhuangzi, however, rather than a heightened vitality being paramount philosophically, it is inner harmony that is most important.

Given Zhuangzi's understanding of the human being as a temporary concrescence of \textit{qi}, functionally organized and in constant mutual interaction with all other \textit{qi} concrescences, that is, the entire environment, the processes of this interaction are, as stated above, understood in terms of "sensitivity and response \textit{(ganying)}". Recall the episode in \textit{Zhuangzi}, Chapter 2, of the piping of nature and how sound was elicited from all cavities at once. In the natural state all things are in accord with each other as the natural processes proceed in successive transformations. There is no human being in an individualistic sense, as a separate voluntaristic entity with maximum decision power and minimum influence from external forces. As in Dewey, the person is an entity in process, constantly shaping and being shaped by the environment. For Zhuangzi, however, intentional, calculative interaction with the environment, marks a straying from the ideally natural ways of acting. There is a subtle but significant difference between
Dewey and Zhuangzi on this point and it speaks to their overall axiologies. Although Dewey writes as if in purely descriptive terms of experience, his terminology (e.g. "heightened vitality," "fulfillment," "recovering unison", etc.), reveals a tipping of the scales toward a valuing of the emotions of active participation as opposed to the more distant emotions of inner harmony. The height of experience for Dewey, which would also be the height of the emotion ordering experience, is a complete interpenetration of self and the world of objects and events. Although Zhuangzi stresses a similar interpenetration, the emotions are muted, there is a psychological distance. This distinction would indicate that although there are distinct resonances between Zhuangzi and Dewey, there may be even more between Dewey and the Confucians.

Zhuangzi stresses not only a notion of interaction among things but of dependence relations among things, as demonstrated above in Chapter 1. The dependence relations, connote a sense of dependence or reliance in regard to the ability to act. In the human realm, dependence relations are positive or negative depending on whether the particular relation is natural or contrived. In Zhuangzi, Chapter 1, for instance, Liezi is elevated as a free spirit who can roam where he will, but his clay feet are revealed in the fact that there is still something on which he is reliant, namely, the wind. In contrast, Cook...

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218 The interpersonal emotions that are so integral to relational experience are downplayed in Zhuangzi. There is often a sense of wonder and buoyancy depicted that seems concomitant with a level of cultivated accomplishment, which in turn appears to distance oneself further from the cares and relationships of everyday life.

219 The contrivance here is not explicit, since the wind, after all, is natural. Liezi brought attention to himself by roaming freely, roaming as if to be noticed, rather than roaming as a natural event. Hence the contrivance. Compare the worthies that Confucius praises in Section 6 (section numbering according to Mair, Wandering on the Way) of Chapter 6, who do not "watch for the inquisitive eyes and ears of groups of people (以觀眾人之耳目 yi guan zhongren zhi er mu)."
Ding, who carves up an ox with such consummate skill that his actions are taken by a viewer as the secret of nurturing life. When asked about his secret, the cook replies that he merely relies on the patternings of nature (依乎天理 yi hu tian li).

The union of person and environment is achieved, in Zhuangzi, by moving away from contrivances and re-entering the stream of natural processes, attaining a natural spontaneity. A concomitant movement is one away from common emotions of joy, anger, grief, etc., to a distant equanimity, a sort of ataraxia. From one perspective, the height of (aesthetic) experience can be seen in both Dewey and Zhuangzi as the resolution of the self with the environment, of merging with the chaos of the inchoate and taking advantage of potent and creative spontaneity therein. There is a significant difference, however, in the extent of emotional investment as postulated by Dewey on the one hand and Zhuangzi on the other. For Dewey, complete investment of the self is complete emotional investment, emotion being integral, and integrating, to the experience. For Zhuangzi, however, powerful, disturbing emotions are the result of contrived dependencies arising from unnecessary personal and psychic investments in activity. Whereas Dewey turns to society, we see in the ideal characters depicted in Zhuangzi's Inner Chapters sages and worthies who move beyond the dusty world.

For Zhuangzi, those who can free themselves of the shackles of contrived dependencies also free themselves from the disturbances of emotions. In "loosing the bonds", sadness and joy cannot find a way in (Zhuangzi, Chap. 3). In Chapter 1 above, I offer a list of statements of equanimity in Zhuangzi that demonstrate an ideal in which the self is dissolved and with it the transient emotions. The emotion that remains is a kind of
equanimity, a calm delight in the constant processes of nature. This equanimity does not preclude interaction. On one hand, practically speaking it does reduce it, since so much human interaction is contrived; on the other, however, it optimizes action that coheres with the spontaneous transformations of nature.

The aesthetic of spontaneity relies on a notion of experience that arises out of complex interaction with our environment that is conceptualized by Daoists as the chaos of the inchoate, a primal disorder that is the seat of potent creativity. Emotions play a role in the larger affective interaction, but as my Dewey-Zhuangzi comparison shows, common emotions are more integral to Dewey's theory. It turns out that Dewey is closer to the Confucians on this score than to Zhuangzi. In the following section, I will pursue this affinity in more detail, pursuing some of the key factors in Confucian spontaneity.

Part 3: Habit and Spontaneity

In order to slip the more easily into the process of drawing the bow and loosing the shot, the archer, kneeling to one side and beginning to concentrate, rises to his feet, ceremoniously steps up to the target and, with a deep obeisance, offers the bow and arrow like consecrated gifts, then nocks the arrow, raises the bow, draws it and waits in an attitude of supreme spiritual alertness. After the lightning release of the arrow and the tension, the archer remains in the posture adopted immediately following the shot until, after slowly expelling his breath, he is forced to draw air again. Then only does he let his arms sink, bows to the target and, if he has no more shots to discharge, steps quietly into the background.

Archery thus becomes a ceremony.

This quotation is taken from Eugen Herrigel's *Zen and the Art of Archery*, in which Herrigel, a German philosopher, uses archery, among other Japanese arts, to elucidate Zen spirituality, a key component of which is aesthetic spontaneity. It is

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220 p. 39.
revealing to see how it is so closely tied to the strict bounds of ceremony. Many central aspects of Chinese culture were transmitted to Japan during the second half of the 1st millennium AD., but the ceremony of archery had already declined in China by then and Japanese had already attained a distinctive level of achievement in archery. But what of the spontaneity? Is it possible that the spontaneity of Zen archery was transmitted to Japan either through a remaining vestige of the ceremony of archery or through other cultural institutions, having had its inception in China as early as the time of Confucius when the ceremony of Chinese archery was at its height?221 When we read the Confucian canon, we find very little mention of the various aspects of Daoist spontaneity noted in the previous chapter. In fact, most scholars trace such notions in Zen to the influence of Daoism. Must we credit Daoists, then, with co-opting the practice of archery and taking it to higher levels? When reading about Daoist accounts of cultivated skills, whether it be archery, swordsmanship, charioteering, or wood carving, we find clear evidence of similarities with Zen spontaneity but no mention of ceremony.

It is certainly clear that archery was commonplace in China quite early, at least by the time of Confucius, when it was considered one of the "six arts,"222 and so there must have been quite a number of different approaches to it as a technique. Is it fair to say, then, that there was a Confucian form of archery that depended on ceremony and a Daoist form that prized aesthetic spontaneity? That would make it easy to say that Japanese Zen

221 In his Armed Martial Arts of Japan: Swordsmanship and Archery, Cameron Hurst states, "[The] Chinese view strongly affected Japanese archery throughout its history. The emphasis upon posture, ritual, mental concentration and character development is part of this early legacy, long predating any influence of Zen on Japanese archery" (p. 109).
222 I will address the issue of a definition of art in early China in Chapter 5.
Buddhists combined the elements of both to arrive at the art as we know it today in Japan. But if it can be shown that aesthetic spontaneity is an integral aspect of Confucian ceremony, then it would not be unreasonable to infer that we can look to archery as a model of the mutual expression of Confucian ceremony and Confucian aesthetic spontaneity.

In David Hall and Roger Ames' 1987 work *Thinking Through Confucius*, the authors note their indebtedness to American pragmatism in their interpretation of Confucius' philosophy. In this section, I will endeavor to uncover the Confucian link that connects the spontaneity of Confucius with the spontaneity of Japanese Zen archery. In so doing, I will follow Hall and Ames into American pragmatism, most notably John Dewey's conception of habit, draw further distinctions of my own in regard to habit, offer an explanation of spontaneity in terms of these distinctions, outline Hall and Ames' interpretation of Confucian yi (義 appropriateness, rightness), and demonstrate how the newly delineated conception of spontaneity fits Confucian yi and thereby forms a possible bridge between Confucian ceremony and Zen archery.

As elaborated in the preceding section, an integral component of spontaneity is opening oneself to the possibilities of creativity inherent in any situation. In searching for creativity in Confucianism, it can be helpful to turn first to education and experience in John Dewey, who sought to liberate American education from the bonds of outmoded structures of pedagogy. He found the instructional tradition of spoon-feeding facts to students to be a gross distortion of the student's natural abilities to learn. When subjects are taught as "ready-made,"
activity is divided, and two separate worlds are built up, occupying activity at divided periods. No transmutation takes place; ordinary experience is not enlarged in meaning by getting its connections; what is studied is not animated and made real by entering into immediate activity. Ordinary experience is not even left as it was, narrow but vital. Rather, it loses something of its mobility and sensitiveness to suggestions. . . . Mere amassing of information apart from the direct interests of life makes mind wooden; elasticity disappears.223

In contrast to this sterile, inflexible form of education, Dewey offered his own technical definition of a proper education:

It is that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience.224

Few words carry more weight in Dewey's philosophy than "experience," and he felt that education was more a matter of experience than of what it is normally taken to be, namely knowledge and the transmission of knowledge. As mentioned above, experience for Dewey is an interaction with one's environment, and by "environment," he means every aspect of our lives from moment to moment, whether it be trees, ideas, or the person two seats away. And unlike the process of absorbing facts on a page, experience is transformational, transforming the persona and the environment, again, from moment to moment. Education, then, should guide this transformation, exploiting the curiosity and interests of the student by establishing common, achievable aims and allowing the student to achieve those aims experientially. The significance of this method does not lie in the facile observation that lived experience impresses more indelibly on the memory than book-learning. The significance is revealed in the moniker that Dewey gives his method: education as reconstruction.225 The reconstruction of experience is turning it from passive to active. In experiential learning, the process of learning suddenly

223 Democracy and Education, p. 209.
224 op. cit., p. 76.
225 op. cit., pp. 76ff.
becomes multi-dimensional, and meaning is ramified across all dimensions. Rather than learning a fact, a student becomes his or her experience, and the fact becomes a part of life, with a past, with a reason, with connections to facets of the experience, and most importantly to future experience. With the fact embedded in the student, the student has not only increased a store of information but has accumulated power in his or her ability to anticipate and prepare for the future. It becomes an instrument exploitable in future experience.

In 1925, Dewey wrote an introduction to American pragmatism in which he outlined the advances that pragmatism offered to philosophy in general. Of major significance was the notion that pragmatism tied thought irrevocably to experience. No longer could a philosopher sit comfortably in a chair, pipe in hand, reasoning out the meaning of life, because concepts have their meanings only in so far as they are lived. If no philosophical truth can be vouchedsafed until it can be verified by experience, we stand eternally and vicariously on the precipice of uncertainty, for we never know when yesterday's truth will be overturned by tomorrow's experience. And so pragmatism turns us toward the future, to the consequences not only of our actions but of our concepts, our beliefs, and our values, which can be verified only through interaction with our environment.

The unknown of the future necessitates a person's need for creativity. If we cannot rely on established patterns of thought to meet future events, then we require some mode of creativity. Dewey notes that James tied creativity to reason, "or thought, in its more
general sense." With this understanding of creativity in experience, we can return to Confucianism. Hall and Ames find a relationship between creativity and tradition.

If one simply learns without reflecting critically upon what one is learning, one will fail to act "properly," that is, to personalize what is learned in such a manner as to make it appropriate and meaningful in one's own unique circumstances. . . .

The interplay between "learning" and "reflecting"-- between appropriating widely from the cultural tradition and elaborating on it through an investment of one's own creativity-- is a recurring theme in the Analects. 227

Like Dewey, Hall and Ames say that Confucius eschewed, or rather never made, the distinction between theory and praxis, and that "thinking is a process that engages the whole person." 228 Dewey's philosophy appears to fit very well with Hall and Ames' interpretation of Confucius' thought. How far can we walk this path into Confucius' philosophy? Is pragmatism enough to resolve the riddle of the origin of spontaneity in the ceremony of Zen archery?

When Dewey began elaborating William James' and Charles Peirce's pragmatism, he called his version "instrumentalism." He said that thought allows us to reason with the world, so to speak, to avail ourselves of regularities that are noticed in the course of experience and to adjust as needed. Further, we are also able to avail ourselves more readily with our own mental conceptions of the world-- they become instruments for our exploitation:

Instrumentalism is an attempt to establish a precise logical theory of concepts, of judgments and inferences in their various forms, by considering primarily how thought functions in the experimental determinations of future consequences. That is to say, it attempts to establish universally recognized distinctions and rules of logic by deriving them from the reconstructive or meditative function ascribed to reason. 229

227 Thinking Through Confucius, p. 48.
228 op. cit., p. 49.
Worded this way, instrumentalism leads Dewey into a kind of modifiable architectonic axiology that does not seem too far removed from the immovable architectonics he has attempted to demolish. In this sense, instrumentalism seems too overtly discursive for Confucius' approach to thought and action.

But there is a side to Dewey that is worth pursuing: A better tack for solving the riddle of spontaneity is to follow Dewey into his philosophy of habit, derived ultimately from Aristotle, where above we saw some affinity with our notion of Daoist spontaneity. Dewey brings up the topic briefly, and lucidly, in the fourth chapter of *Democracy and Education*, "Education as Growth." He provides a more complete elucidation in a chapter from his 1922 *Human Nature and Conduct*, entitled, "The Place of Habit in Conduct."

When contrasted with behaviorist reflex or with the pre-philosophical view of habits as undesirable, or with a view that ascribes intentional action largely to deliberation, Dewey's view of habits is revolutionary and deserves to be explained in depth. To this end, I will summarize the three sections of the article that are most relevant to this discussion.

In the first section, Habits as Social Functions, Dewey expands the scope of habit to include any action that can be accomplished in any way involuntarily, from breathing and digesting to stone working and even to the making of moral decisions. Like an experience, a habit is not merely *in* the person. All habits, he says, are "things done by the environment by means of organic structures or acquired dispositions."230 This is a rather counterintuitive claim, and it means that habit is not just a matter of individual

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action; the environment contributes to the formation of a habit just as much as a person's
habit modifies the environment. There is a constant give and take between the person
and the environment, and this fact cannot be neglected in a complete theory of habit.
Likened to an art, a habit requires not just bare skill and technique, but skill and
technique in manipulating the materials of the art. They demand adjustments to
surroundings, perhaps the reconfiguration of surroundings; they are performed in time;
they involve perception; they require order. So when we misconceive moral action as
arising solely within the self, it is like saying that one knows how to play the violin (or do
archery) without ever having picked up a bow. According to Dewey, all of our moral
traits are habits, "they are working adaptations of personal capacities with environing
forces."231

The dissolution of habit into environment does not preclude the personal element.
It is one's response to the environment that initiates action that leads to the cultivation of
habit, and responses are obviously particularized to each individual, according to taste,
desire, interest, aversion, etc.--and, of course, prior experience. The keys points to be
taken away from this section are the wide definition of habit and its fusion of person,
experience, and environment (which includes the social).

This explicit mention of the personal factor in a habit as opposed to the environmental turns out to be a provisional distinction--the personal itself is habituated,
"we are the habits."232 The implications of this claim are monumental. Consider a bad
habit, such as cracking one's knuckles. This is not just a repetitive action, it is a

231 op. cit., p. 25.
232 op. cit., p. 27.
predilection to doing it again. A habit exerts control over our future, steering us in certain directions, and only habits have this power, "they constitute the self. In any intelligible sense of the word will, they are the will." If that's the case, then where does all-powerful reason come in, which we identified above as indispensable to creative action? So far, we can at least say that thoughts are secondary to actions in the sense that one must have acquired a thought as habit before one can generate the thought--thoughts do not arise from nothing: "Reason pure of all influence from prior habit is a fiction." The priority of habits of conduct over habits of thought means that no matter how good one's intentions, bad habits will still lead away from those intentions.

This demonstrates the importance of cultivating good conduct as a means to achieve ends. If thought cannot be completely relied on to direct our actions, then it is imperative that we cultivate good habits of conduct. It is important to remember, however, that habits are not predispositions to specific acts, but to ways or modes of activity.

Dewey proceeds to reflect on the relationship of custom and habit, suggesting that custom forms a background. In one sense, customs are formed by individual habits of a people, and in another sense they are the package in which habits are passed on from generation to generation. Education, then, becomes the winnowing of custom, separating the wheat from the chaff and encouraging good habits in our children through the perpetuation of good customs.

\(^{233}\) op. cit., p. 28.
\(^{234}\) op. cit., p. 29.
Going back to the role of reason in creative action, Dewey eschews the dichotomy of custom as conservative and thought as progressive. It is not as simple as one may have presupposed. As Dewey says, if we try to act on a thought without the means through habit to execute it, we are spinning our wheels. Rather, habit allows for a certain amount of mechanization of action, "psychologically engrained, which operates 'spontaneously'."²³⁵

We appear now to have found an opening for discussing the spontaneity of Confucian ceremony, but it would also appear that Dewey has gotten himself into somewhat of a dilemma. On the one hand, he appears to understand spontaneity as determined spontaneity. On the other hand, his further elaboration indicates that he also understands spontaneity in the idealized sense of aesthetic spontaneity and yet is unable to reconcile the two contrastive senses. What is the difference between a virtuoso violinist and one who plays the same score but only mechanically? Dewey is forced to distinguish two types of habit—routine and intelligent (or artistic). Of intelligent habit, he says, "A flexible, sensitive habit grows more varied, more adaptable by practice and use."²³⁶ How is it that a habit is characterized as sensitive and flexible? Only through evaluating it after its execution. It is not the habit itself that is sensible and flexible but the way that it is executed. But how can one cultivate a way of doing something? Is it to be cultivated as a habit? Then we would have not only habits of thought and habits of conduct, but also habits of method (modal habits?).

²³⁵ op. cit., p. 42.
²³⁶ op. cit., p. 43.
This is as far as we can come with Dewey, for he concedes his limitations of understanding regarding further distinctions: "we do not yet fully understand the physiological factors concerned in mechanical routine on the one hand and artistic skill on the other." Notice, however, that in sensitivity and flexibility, Dewey has isolated two critical aspects of the fluency component of aesthetic spontaneity, both falling under the rubric in the previous chapter of responsiveness. Since he has isolated responsiveness but still finds his theory lacking in accounting for aesthetic responsiveness, the missing piece must lie outside of responsiveness. We saw in Chapter 3 that fluency, rather than being an independent characteristic of aesthetic spontaneity is actually dependent on wholeness, so we must look in this direction for a supplement to Dewey's understanding of spontaneous action and for an answer to the question of the origin of spontaneity in Confucian ceremony.

The relationship of custom and thought is not lost on Hall and Ames: "Thinking per se always involves a grounding in tradition and may never be modeled after the direct investigation of "nature" or undisciplined, imaginative constructions." Further: "Confucius . . . posits the received cultural tradition as the authority sine qua non for all knowledge and conduct." Hall and Ames see a vital and vibrant philosophy in the Analects, and despite the lived tradition in China and the Western scholarship that regularly ignores or condemns Confucian ritual action as wooden, they embrace li (ritual action, ceremony) as fundamental to a Confucian idea of spontaneous action.

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237 op. cit., p. 43.
238 Thinking Through Confucius, p. 67.
239 op. cit., p. 67.
By way of elaborating, they shift their emphasis from Dewey to the fourth great American pragmatist, George Herbert Mead. Playing off of Mead's conceptions of self and society, they restate Confucius' notions of *li* and *yi*. The community is seen as the "generalized other." This would be the customs, traditions, propositions, opinions, etc. of the community, carried from the past into the present, all taken together as a single unit of stimulus. The self internalizes these attitudes of the generalized other and, in fact, becomes them. This conceptualization does not appear too entirely different from Dewey's concept of internalizing habits arising from one's environment. The difference appears to arise in Mead's formulation of a person's response to the generalized other, in which the self is distinguished into the "me" and the "I". To quote a passage from Mead that Hall and Ames find relevant:

> The "me" represents a definite organization of the community there in our own attitudes, and calling for a response. . . . The "I" . . . is something that is, so to speak, responding to a social situation which is within the experience of the individual. It is the answer which the individual makes to the attitude which others take toward him when he assumes an attitude toward them . . . . The attitudes he is taking toward them are present in his own experience, but his response to them will contain a novel element. The "I" gives the sense of freedom, of initiative. 240

Hall and Ames explain that "the dialectical process that goes on between the "I" and the "me," therefore, is not only creative of the developed self; it is also the means whereby novelty is introduced into the human world." 241 Here is the key to creativity in Mead. As for Confucius, Hall and Ames take off of Mead and suggest that the Chinese word "*yi*", translated as "signification," is a close cognate of the word "*wo* 我", a first person

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240 *op. cit.*, p. 81.
241 *op. cit.*, p. 81.
personal pronoun. Through a series of convincing arguments, they conclude that in articulating the self, a person exploits \textit{li} through appropriate signification.

The person-in-context understands "self" as a dynamic and changing focus of existence characteristically expanding and contracting over some aspect of the process of becoming, the interpretation of which is grounded in and involves reference to the environing whole.\textsuperscript{242}

It does not serve the purpose of this section to go into too much detail about Confucius' and Mead's conceptions of selfhood and self-making. Suffice it to say that they do offer an attractive account of freedom and novelty in a Confucian world, but can they help us resolve Dewey's riddle of spontaneity in regard to routine and intelligent/artistic habit? Not immediately. Yes, novelty arises out of each individuals' distinct expression of the \textit{li}, but in any one circumstance, what is it that distinguishes someone who is doing so in a virtuosic manner and someone who is just going through the motions? This is not a question of "how can we tell?" but of "how is it that?" How is it that when Confucius performs a ceremony, he exudes reverence, whereas a similarly practiced \textit{shi} (± scholar-official) may appear stiff and insincere?

Hall and Ames confront a tension between a judgment that they want to identify as necessary in choosing the appropriate \textit{yi-ized li} and a reluctance to ascribe willfulness to \textit{yi} actions. They say, for instance:

this realizing person cannot surrender to some set of determining principles, but must rather exercise his own judgment creatively in response to the uniqueness of his situation.\textsuperscript{243}

They emphasize that this judgment is not due to an individual's calculating agency. They say that it "arises" and account for the "arising" in terms of negotiation and deference:

\textsuperscript{242} op. cit., p. 94.
\textsuperscript{243} op. cit., p. 95.
This "arising" is not random or chaotic. Rather, there is an appropriate direction which the particular pursues, negotiated between its own agency and the flux of its context. The particular is a compositor, always composing its world. Its direction is appropriate to the extent that it enriches the particularity of the constituent elements of its context. This interplay is that of deference to recognized excellence. The coherence and regularity observable in one's world emerges as a vector negotiated out of the interplay between oneself and the elements of one's context. The influence of the arising particular is dependent upon the range and quality of its self-construal. Any particular can become coextensive with other particulars insofar as they defer to it. This can involve the inclusion of an increasingly broader field of "arising" within the sphere of one's own particularity. 244

This is an insightful and plausible account. Hall and Ames never had the intention of accounting for aesthetic spontaneity as I have defined it, so one would not expect such. Rather, their account of freedom in ceremonial action, of willfulness in cosmology that lacks a notion of a will acts as a foundation for the investigation here. In what follows, I would like to offer a description of habit and spontaneity as an augmentation of Hall and Ames' overall view of the Confucian notion of action.

**Part 4: Attention and Spontaneous Action**

In order to do so, I will make an attempt at some finer distinctions in regard to the concept of activity, harking back to James' understanding of attention but also going back to Dewey. I mentioned above the momentousness of Dewey's claim that "we are the habits". This claim, in the concept of spontaneous holism outlined in Chapter 3, and in conjunction with James' distinctions in regard to attention will yield up and understanding of Confucian spontaneity that will not only answer our questions from Dewey and in regard to Zen, but will also advance our general understanding of aesthetic spontaneity, itself. But first some distinctions.

244 *Thinking from the Han*, p. 39.
An activity is to be distinguished from an action. Swinging a bat is an action, while playing baseball is an activity. We may categorize activities based on two types of actions, formal and informal, imagining a continuum with completely formal activities (i.e. those composed of formal actions), such as a choreographed dance, martial arts forms, or acrobatics on one end and completely informal, or open-ended, activities (those with informal actions), such as a walk in the woods or eating a grape, on the other. Of course, we will find that many activities will have both formal and informal components, but we should be able to place them somewhere on the continuum relative to others. Entertaining guests, for instance, would appear toward the informal end, while driving might appear somewhere in the middle.

We may also categorize activities according to another continuum, namely whether or not actions are conducted according to rules, whether or not they are syntactic. Those with more rules, whether constitutive or regulative, I will call more syntactic activities, and those with fewer rules I’ll call less syntactic activities. Now, we may take these two continua as axes of a grid, formality being the vertical axis and syntax being the horizontal axis. Fully formal and highly syntactic activities, such as a symphony performance or a Confucian ceremony, will fall at the top right, while informal nonsyntactic activities, such as eating a grape, will fall at the bottom left. Elsewhere on the grid, we will find driving (middle right—lots of syntax, less formality), martial arts (top middle—lots of formality, less syntax), chess and other games (bottom right—lots of syntax, very little formality), painting, sculpture, and other arts (middle left—some formal techniques but little syntax), and baseball and other sports (center—some formal
actions and some rules). We may call those activities marked more by formal actions than by syntax “formal”, and those marked more by syntax than formal action “syntactic”. What I call stylized activities have both formal actions and elaborate syntax, while open-ended activities have neither.

Figure 3: Graph of Activities, Formal and Syntactic
Formal actions are those actions learned and executed in somatically practiced patterns. In other words, they are habitual in a narrow sense of the term. When speaking of habits, Dewey broadened the scope of habits to include all actions, even thoughts, but when bringing up the issue of spontaneity, he found formal actions to be most problematic (although he did not put in such terms).245

Formal actions are a type of mechanization, allowing a person to execute a whole string of movements without paying close attention. As we saw in James, the relationship between attention and habit is of utmost importance. The standard psychoanalytic view of conscious and unconscious motivations does not fit a conception of a self that is a composition of competing habits. Because of the mechanization involved, habits can be within or outside of attention, and attention can be directed to them voluntarily. It may be best to dispose of the very clear boundary dividing the conscious and the unconscious and view instead a continuum of what we might call "attentionality". Habits that can be brought into attention more easily would be more attentional, and those less easily brought into attention would be less attentional. If we conjure up again the notion of a continuum, we can find two continua, one spanning the range from attentional to nonattentional and the other spanning the range from modifiable to unmodifiable.246 For some habits (such as a short temper or a moral compunction), a

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245 At one point, Dewey says that "all habit involves mechanization" (p. 42). But elsewhere he characterizes habits as "standing predilections and aversions, rather than bare recurrence of specific acts" (p. 33). It appears that Dewey would characterize predilections as a form of mechanization, but in the context of passages in which he actually speaks of mechanization, he seems to be speaking of bare actions, of techniques (such as walking and artistic technique). Because of this ambiguity, I have chosen to rephrase Dewey's actions characterized by mechanization of technique as "formal actions."

246 There may also be a continuum of controllability, closely related but not identical to modifiability. For instance, in the case of a golf or tennis swing, it is easy to stop or start the habitual mode, but the actual...
person may have to do a sort of archaeology of habit to bring the entire mechanism to
attention. Some habits (such as alcoholism), are easily brought to attention but less easily
modified or controlled (contrary to what James might say about sustained attention being
equivalent to willed action).

I draw these distinctions so that we may see the complexity behind attentionality
and to choose a clear test case, with the hope that it will apply to other activities as well.
The most refined of all the activities mentioned above are those that require both formal
actions and syntactic actions—the stylized activities. These activities require by far the
most practice, the most cultivation, the most sustained attention.

If, as James says, that which requires effort can gradually, through practice, be
achieved with ease, then we can understand how a dancer or symphony musician can
perform their activities in a way that appears to the non-specialist completely effortless.
But as we noted above, the effortlessness of a truly superlative performance is still
performed with great care and close attention.

On initial consideration, it may appear accurate to differentiate boorishly
mechanical formal action from virtuosic formal action by the amount of attention and
control the performer maintains. A superlative violinist is fully absorbed and in full
control of the playing of the violin. We notice, however, that in the Zen tradition, the
practitioner is constantly encouraged not to think, not to bring attention to bear on the
activity, not to exert control. Likewise, it is not uncommon for a Western musician to be
said to "lose oneself" in the music such that the music seems to play itself. The answer to

modification of the formal action itself (as from poor technique reinforced over years of playing) turns out
to be much more challenging.
the riddle of spontaneity may lie, then, in an exploration of virtuosic attention, attention as it relates to highly cultivated formal action.

The Daoist *Liezi* 列子 is a text that appears well after the Qin unification, and therefore at least several hundred years after Confucius. It contains a number of (fantastic) accounts of practical training in formal actions. For instance, the story of Ji Chang in Chapter 5 recounts how in his attempt to become the greatest archer in the land, Ji Chang, on his teacher's suggestion, lay beneath his wife's loom, staring at the foot pedal as it rose and fell just inches from his face. After two years of training this way, he was able to do so without blinking. Then, again on his teacher's suggestion, he strung a mite from a window and stared at it continuously. It appeared to grow larger and larger, and after three years, it appeared to be as large as a cart wheel.

Ji Chang offers us an example of what we might call the progressive shedding of habits, which I would characterize as the gradual clearing away of other habits that are competing for attention. Any beginning practitioner of meditation or any other skill will understand how a person's focus of attention is constantly shifting, and in keeping with James' and Dewey's psychology, one could explain the shifts in attention by virtue of various habits that are constantly in play. The practitioner of a formal action attempts not only to condition somatic responses but also to progressively shed habits that compete for attention, so that attention can be brought fully to bear on the formal action. This progressive shedding of habits in the cultivation of formal action is usually not an actual focus of the practice. Rather, it is the constant attention to and practice of the activity
that allows for the gradual and, we might say, automatic dropping away of the predilections stemming from competing habits.

If, as Dewey contends, the self is composed of so many enculturated habits, what the practitioner of a formal activity is accomplishing through the progressive shedding of competing habits is the effective relinquishment of the self, until nothing remains but the activity itself. And when the performer is fully engrossed in the activity, when the remaining habit that now defines the performer is itself the activity, we can see how a performer can claim to become the activity or become one with the surroundings.

Under normal conditions, attention exists only insofar as there are competing demands for attention. We wouldn't have to attempt to focus on something if there were no other habits predisposing us to turn our attention to other things. When all competing habits have been progressively shed, where has attention gone? The state of complete absorption in activity is the paradoxical state of attentionless attention. We can non-contradictorily say that the virtuosic performer is both in a state of highest attention and also in a state of no attention whatsoever, a state in which the self is completely dissolved into the activity. Once competing habits are progressively shed, highest attention becomes no attention. This is the spontaneity for which we have been searching, a state in which the habit no longer controls the self in regard to interacting with the environs but brings the self into union with the environs such that all actions within the activity arise spontaneously and with perfect appropriateness. The terms of aesthetic spontaneity from Chapter 3, this simultaneous collecting and shedding engenders a holism that allows for the virtuosic fluency of action.
Notice that in an attempt to explain Zen spontaneity, I have resorted to the Daoism of Liezi. Perhaps if we now reconsider Hall and Ames' interpretation of \( yi \), we can apply this notion of attention and the progressive shedding of habits to the Confucian worldview and discover a spontaneity within Confucianism that could account for a type of spontaneity applicable to Zen archery. Our first stumbling block, as we saw above, is that there is no good account in Confucius of the cultivation of formal action. We do have the famous line of 2:4, in which Confucius says that at 70 he was able to follow his heart's desires without overstepping boundaries, but this is not necessarily in the context of formal activities, it could instead refer to syntactic activities. With his great emphasis on \( li \), however, it is clear that Confucius did incorporate formal activities, and formal actions, into his philosophy.

Trying to get a handle on what exactly is meant by the word "\( li \)" is a difficult issue. It obviously included the formal actions carried out in official ceremonies, but as we see in 3:15, a passage in which Confucius identifies \( li \) as including even the asking of questions about ceremony, Confucius considered an expanded scope of meaning for \( li \). The word, in fact, becomes too vague to pin down precisely. Turning to Hall and Ames for a strict characterization is of no help, either, because they, like other commentators, assume that the reader understands the word intuitively.

Hall and Ames identify \( li \) as a formal action or activity, "a formal apparatus for achieving and displaying one's \( yi \)."\(^{247}\) \( Li \) actions are a historical repository of model actions from which a person may draw in appropriate circumstances, and in so doing, a

\(^{247}\) Thinking Through Confucius, p. 100.
person infuses them with meaning derived from the particular circumstances giving rise to the action. Yi is the appropriation of li, and a person acting yi-ly would seem to bear a resemblance to a martial artist who chooses the appropriate movement from a repertoire of movements in attack or defense.

Above, I telescoped a formal activity into a formal action and saw how competing habits can achieve a dissolution of the self in an absorption of attention which we recognized as being characterized by aesthetic spontaneity. Hall and Ames find a dissolution of the self through yi activity:

The process of becoming an exemplary person in Confucian thought entails both the dissolution of a delimiting and retarding distinction between self and other, and the active integration of this liberated self into the social field through the disclosure of yi... The process of dissolving the barrier between the self and its social environment involves disciplining the ego-self and becoming a person-in-context. This process can alternatively be described as the objectification of self in that it recognizes the correlative and coextensive relationship between person making and community making, and ultimately, world making.\footnote{248 op. cit., pp. 93-94.}

If we now take our formal action, in the form of yi-ized li, and reevaluate it within the category of syntactic activity (where we earlier located martial arts), we will find a reversal of process that broadens the scope of virtuosic habit to include yi activity and thereby the whole of Confucian life.

I noted above that through the practice of a single formal action, competing habits are progressively shed. If a person is able to execute all of one's movements such that they are so many formal actions, interspersed with informal actions, strung together in a coherent syntax, such that all competing extraneous habits are progressively shed, a spontaneity can be achieved that will infuse all of one's life. In this way, formal actions will achieve a virtuosic vitality in conjunction with informal actions. In other words, the
notion of yi allows for the virtuosic spontaneity of li to be available even in activities with less formality and less syntax. Appropriateness is the outcome in any action characterized by aesthetic spontaneity. The obvious place to observe appropriate actions derived from aesthetic spontaneity is in stylized activities, and this is enough to answer our question of the origin of spontaneity in Zen ceremony, but the key to action in Confucianism lies in expanding the scope of aesthetic spontaneity from stylized activities to every day activities, and this is the promise of Confucian self-cultivation.

So we were justified in suspecting that Japanese ceremonial archery is a direct descendant of the spontaneity arising in Confucian yi-ized li action. We have also discovered that the fulcrum in cultivating spontaneity is not the practice of technique, itself, but the practice of sustaining attention in any activity, the achievement of wholeness through simultaneous collection and shedding. It is the consistent focus on one activity that reduces the self and allows for a simultaneous expansion of that activity to encompass all of one's immediate world. In a paradoxical way, the contraction of the self is also an expansion of the self. This is why I refer to holism as such. Selflessness, if one may call it that, is characteristic of spontaneity, but as the self-as-habits contracts, the activity-as-attention expands to produce a state in which there is no sense of fragmentation of the self, but on the contrary, a feeling of completeness, of perfection in virtuosic fluency.

James noticed an ethical dimension to the "selflessness" of spontaneity that is directly relevant to the Confucian sphere, and actually elaborated explicitly in the neo-Confucians. The sympathetic person (in James' terms) has a leg up on the young
practitioner of morality for the reason that the sympathetic expansion into selflessness is equivalent to the habituated reduction of the self. As long as the self is diffused, spontaneity can reign.

The realm of spontaneity is that realm which Whitman idealizes. He finds it in both animals and in humans. For both kinds of creatures, one can view it as a spontaneity achieved by way of a reduced ego. Animals are in this sense fortunate for not being burdened with all of the second thoughts that we have in regard to the accoutrements of our egos. The common folk in Whitman's poems are admittedly idealized, but as such, they stand for the ideal human beings that one can strive to be. But there is a difference between natural spontaneity and aesthetic spontaneity. In a sense, aesthetic spontaneity is a recovery of natural spontaneity through training, but how is that accomplished? This will be the subject of Chapter 5.

Summary

As demonstrated in Chapter 1, judgment is an organic affective process, and deliberation is not a detached, discretely rational, calculative undertaking. Rational, calculative deliberation and the action purported to result from it presuppose that one is able to gather enough information relevant to the action such that one may make a correct decision and predict its outcome with everything open to view. In contrast, in this chapter I demonstrate that judgment as an organic affective process presupposes that important factors of incipience may not be immediately open to view for prior deliberation and instead arise in the affective processes. Further, if one is open to this
possibility and attentive to the affective processes, one may capitalize on this inchoateness in the course of action.

Searching for further resources, I explore habit in experience, concluding that, with a rich enough understanding of habit, it is plausible that one can conceive of the self as a congeries of competing habits. With this conception, shedding is not just a shedding of self-concern but also of habits that disturb one's attention and vie for precedence in action.

Considerations of the spontaneous execution of habituated actions lead me to differentiate two categories of activity based on whether actions in the activity are formal or not and how complex the syntax of consecutive actions in the activity is. I define "formal action" as any action that requires attentive practice to execute properly. "Syntax" refers to the rules or implicit guidelines in executing the actions of an activity. Activities that contain maximum formality and syntax of actions I call stylized activities. Those with minimal formality and syntax of actions are termed open-ended activities. Activities with a preponderance of formality are called formal activities, and those with a preponderance of syntax are called syntactic activities. I lay out the formal and syntactic continuua as axes of a graph and plot various activities on the graph. This graph ends up being a powerful tool for analyzing spontaneous action. The activities that are most relevant to spontaneous action fall under the categories of stylized activities (those with predominantly aesthetic considerations) and open-ended activities (including those with predominantly moral considerations).
CHAPTER 5: SPONTANEITY, ART, AND SELF-CULTIVATION

The art of calligraphy is unique among the arts of the world in that the process of creation in all its consecutive phases is visible in the object. A proper viewer follows with his eyes the brush movements through each of the characters and the sequence of the lines. He thus re-creates for himself the moments of the actual creation.

Lothar Ledderose, *Mi Fu and the Classical Tradition of Chinese Calligraphy*, p. 29

In Chapter 2, I addressed the issue of modern notions of art versus ancient Greek notions of art, distinguishing the two and demonstrating that standard contemporary notions of the fine arts do not easily extend backward to ancient Greek culture. What about early Chinese culture? Did the early Chinese harbor a notion of fine arts in any way similar to ours? If not, then identifying principles of early Chinese art and applying them to art today would be fruitless. If, however, significant similarities can be found, then a comparison might reveal something significant about how we understand art in general. In Part I of this chapter, I establish the importance of spontaneity as a central feature of early Chinese art. In Part 2, I distinguish two general categories of art, the distinguishing factor of which is spontaneity. I then explain by classifying various arts into the two categories, focusing in particular on Chinese calligraphy and dance, which provides a rich cross-cultural comparison. In Part 3, I extend the notion of spontaneity further into the philosophy of art by entertaining a recent discussion regarding the role of improvisation in the arts. Through the concept of spontaneity, I distinguish several
different kinds of improvisation, articulate their definitions, and explain the heretofore murky role of spontaneity in improvisation. In Part 4, I seek an answer to the inevitable question of how one may cultivate spontaneity.

**Part 1: The Concept of Art in Early China**

Analyses of early Chinese art inevitably begin with cultural artifacts such as jades and bronzes, entirely ignoring what the early Chinese themselves said about high art. This is a an easy mistake to make, for high art in early China left behind no art works to admire.\(^{249}\) The term of Classical Chinese that would be the likeliest candidate to correspond to the English "fine art" is \(\text{yi} \) \(\text{汯}\). This term occurs very early in the literature, as far back as the early Zhou dynasty where it has two distinct meanings: 1) to cultivate plants; and 2) a skill or talent. Both of these meanings occur in chapters\(^{250}\) of the *Shujing* that date to the end of the 2nd millennium B.C. According to Karlgren, the etymological origin of the character is an image of a kneeling person holding a seedling for planting: \(\text{嬚}\).\(^{251}\) Obviously, these two meanings are related, and a skill, or talent, is understood very early on in Chinese culture as something that is to be cultivated. This cannot be overstated.

The strictly horticultural meaning of \(\text{yi}\) was not the most common way of referring to plant cultivation, and by the middle of the 1st millennium B.C., a third meaning had

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\(^{249}\) It is suspicious to make negative citations, but a widely used history of Asian art textbook written by Sherman Lee (1994), refers only to artifacts when describing early Chinese art and makes no mention of the "six arts," (to be described presently). He does identify spontaneity in painting, but in the common sense of expressionism rather than as affective responsiveness.

\(^{250}\) Chapter 34, *Jinteng*, and Chapter 38, *Jiugao*.

\(^{251}\) *Grammata Serica Recens*, no. 330.
evolved, a meaning that can only be translated as art, in the sense of an activity requiring a cultivated skill which is cultivated and appreciated not just for its practical consequences or material products but for the aesthetic mastery of the skill. A term nearly synonymous with the skill connotation of yi was gong 亜, which referred to all of the productive skills. What appears to have differentiated the two is an aesthetic element. Whereas yi came to refer to arts of the sophisticated class, gong remained a term for the crafts and even came to refer to any labor at all, skilled or not. A similar evolution in connotation took place in English and the Romance languages in which works of the artisan (only later to become "artist") and craftsman came to be valued in different ways. A significant difference, however, is that after the initial class distinction, what distinguished arts from crafts in the English speaking world were a level of creativity and a supererogatory significance, whereas in China the distinguishing factor was the level of spontaneity involved. I'll return to this below.

In the Analects, the earliest of our extant, explicitly philosophical texts, the term yi occurs four times, twice meaning a general level of personal cultivation, presumably in the standard arts of the time,\textsuperscript{252} and the other two times it appears to be a general term for the arts. In 9:7\textsuperscript{253}, Confucius says that he ended up becoming highly cultivated in the arts because he had been so seldom appointed to public office. His definitive statement, however, is 7:6, in which he says, "Set your aspirations on dao, depend on de, rely on ren, and take leisure in the arts." Rather than idle pastimes, even leisure plays a significant

\textsuperscript{252} Analects 6:8 and 14:12.
\textsuperscript{253} End of 9:6 in some editions.
role in Confucius' understanding of a full life. We saw above in Aristotle the role that music can play in self-cultivation. In the Xingqing, we saw an even larger role for music in a mutually responsive world. This latter is the world of Confucius, a world in which a skill is not only cultivated action in a circumscribed and familiar context but also entails feedback from and response to situations as they occur over time. The aim of the arts for Confucius is refinement of the self from both one's own performance of an art and from witnessing someone else performing.

Does this sense of art resonate with our sense of fine art? It is safe to say that there were no cultural institutions in Confucius' day dedicated to providing venues for the patrons to appreciate the works of artists. Today the arts are commercialized and secularized in the same way that all aspects of modernity are compartmentalized. Still, people discuss the intrinsic redeeming value, the educative worth, the uplifting dimensions of the arts--in fact, these are the selling points for contemporary fund-raising campaigns. In Confucius' day, the arts were more integral to life, forming the backbone of rituals, the training for battle, and the common language of leisure among cultured friends. The major differences between the arts in Confucius' time and the fine arts today is not in the arts themselves (of which there are, of course differences but also overlap), or in their cultural value, but in 1) their level of pervasiveness and 2) the significance of action in executing the art. Today, one can easily, if one were so inclined, live the life of the educated class without ever exposing oneself in a significant way to any of the fine arts except literature, which is a required course in school. In Confucius' day, practical divorce from the arts for an educated person would be inconceivable. In addition, the
fine arts today include arts such as painting and sculpture, in which one may focus largely on the art work and its historical context without bringing the actions of the artist into imagination. This also was impossible in Confucius' time when the performance of actions was integral to the appreciation of an art, and there was no art work separate from the actions that created it.

So can the Chinese yi-arts be considered fine arts in our contemporary sense? If the criteria for inclusion as a fine art is that it involves creativity and supererogatory significance, then the answer would seem to be no. But there is another aspect of the fine arts that is often overlooked and to which I would like to draw the reader's attention. I discussed in Chapter 4 how spontaneity is a key determinant in evaluating the aesthetic success of both ritual propriety and archery, suggesting that what unifies them is this very notion of spontaneity. I now suggest that this is true for all of the aesthetic yi-arts of early China and for several Western fine arts. Spontaneity, I further suggest, is the hallmark of any art for which activity is a primary aesthetic consideration.

**Part 2: Somatic and Non-Somatic Arts**

If the Chinese yi-arts are to fall under the category of fine arts, one must first recognize that contemporary fine arts can be distinguished into two distinct categories: somatic arts and non-somatic arts. Simply put, somatic arts are those arts in which the actions of the artist are integral to the aesthetic success of the work; and non-somatic arts are those in which the actions of the artist are not. The latter case is easy enough to
understand. Take a musical composer, for instance. Composers write music on paper or
using a computer. Whichever way they choose is irrelevant because when a piece is
finally performed, no member of the audience will consider how the symbols were put
down when judging the aesthetic merits of the piece. The same goes for a
choreographer. Thus, musical composition and dance choreography are not somatic
arts. Musical and dance performance, on the other hand, most decidedly are.

Chiang Yee, a twentieth century artist in the traditional Chinese vein and an
influential transmitter of Chinese art and aesthetics to the West, touches on the key to
somatic arts in speaking of the art of Chinese calligraphy. He says:

An identical series of characters can be written by two hands, and though the lines described are
precisely the same, with no difference at all between the curves and the structures, the work of the
one hand will be an object of joyful contemplation while the work of the other appears so common
that the untutored onlooker feels he could do as well himself.

This is the question I asked in Chapter 4 about one piece of music played by both a
virtuoso and by a very competent but aesthetically less accomplished musician. What
accounts for the difference aesthetically? Yee says it involves nature and movement.

According to Yee, "the fundamental inspiration of calligraphy, as of all the arts in
China, is nature." I have discussed above how the ultimate model for spontaneity of
action for the early Chinese was the spontaneity of nature. When we think of nature in a
contemporary sense, it encompasses a wide range of connotations, from pristine
landscapes to endangered species. For the early Chinese, and right up to the present, the

\[254\] And for writers and, for the most part, for sculptors and painters.
\[255\] Rather than mutually exclusive categories, it may be more helpful to think of a continuum from somatic
to non-somatic.
\[256\] Chinese Calligraphy, p. 110.
\[257\] Ibid., p. 111.
word *ziran* that I am suggesting one translate as "to arise spontaneously," was such a common description of the transformations of nature that it came eventually to be the word for "nature," thus indicating unequivocally that the conception of nature for the Chinese is the very idea of spontaneous action. So when Yee goes on to suggest that there are many associations between calligraphic strokes and natural forms, one must understand that the forms to which he refers are not merely static shapes but dynamic formations. Yee emphasizes that it is not the static form of the natural thing that is important but the energy of it, hearkening back to our prior discussion of the *qi*-cosmology in which even rocks are imbued with the energy of life--actually, because rocks are seen as dense concentrations of *qi*, one should say that especially rocks are imbued with the energy of life. And when Yee describes the seven fundamental calligraphic strokes in natural terms, there is either a latent or explicit concern with motion in each, for instance:

A horizontal line or *Heng* (橫), so written as to seem like a formation of cloud stretching from a thousand miles away and abruptly terminating.

A dot or *Tien* (點), giving the impression of a rock falling with all its force from a high cliff.

A *Na* (捺) or downward stroke, made from left to right ... like a wave suddenly rolling up or a flying cloud emitting growls of thunder!\textsuperscript{258}

As Yee moves on to depict the quintessence of nature as its vitality, his description culminates in an extended account of calligraphy as movement. "The beauty of Chinese calligraphy," he says, "is essentially the beauty of plastic movement, not of designed and motionless shape. ... something like the coordinated movements of a skillfully

\textsuperscript{258} *Chinese Calligraphy*, p. 112-113.
composed dance. Thus, calligraphy is an ideal example of a somatic art, an art for which the movements of the artist in executing the art are integral to the aesthetic valuation of the art.

Although calligraphy had not yet reached the level of sophistication during the period when the yi-arts were prominent, everything that is said about the aesthetic standards of calligraphy as movement applies to the aesthetic yi-arts--ritual propriety, music, archery and charioteering. The example of spontaneity and archery has been touched on in the previous chapter. This and the others are prime examples of the priority of process over outcome. The success of the artists was not judged merely on whether an arrow struck the target or whether a string was plucked correctly, but on how artists, themselves, were revealed through the spontaneity of their actions.

In the West, spontaneity has always been a criterion of judgment in somatic arts such as musical performance and acting, and it has more recently become a factor in painting and performance art. It has not often been identified as such, and when the term "spontaneity" has been used, it has not had the full meaning that I have developed here. I would like to suggest that by appreciating a fuller meaning of aesthetic spontaneity, these arts (and others, such as archery) can be evaluated on a level that affords more conceptual richness and range of nuance than is the current case. For instance, aesthetics as a discipline rarely analyzes the preparation required of an artist to produce a work of art. Inasmuch as the somatic arts require aesthetic spontaneity, preparation, as illustrated in Chapter 3, becomes conceptually important. What goes into the processes of collection

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259 Ibid., p. 117.
and shedding? Does one take priority over the other? How is a spontaneity affected when one or the other is lacking? Are they more important for some arts than others? Are there easier ways to accomplish them than others, etc. And how does the aesthetic concept spill over to other kinds of action, such as moral action, that require spontaneity. Ritual propriety was not just an art in China, it was the basis of morality. How much of our morality likewise requires aesthetic spontaneity? I will tend to a few of these questions in what follows, but there are also many more questions that can be asked once the notion of aesthetic spontaneity has been identified and delineated as I have done.

**Part 3: Spontaneity, Improvisation, and the Somatic Arts**

In the year 2000, *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* published a special issue on improvisation in the arts. In ten articles by specialists in philosophy, painting, dance, classical music, and jazz music, the authors discuss a variety of aspects in which improvisation influences the creation of works of art. In order to illustrate how aesthetic spontaneity understood as a mode of action and how a distinguishing of the arts into somatic and non-somatic can assist in clarifying issues in the field of aesthetics and beyond, I will apply these notions to controversies and confusions that arise in this set of articles.

**Section 1: The Ambiguity of Improvisation**

These ten articles contain no fewer than seven distinct understandings of "improvisation". The term most often associated with "improvisation" was "creativity,"

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260 Garry Hagberg, guest editor. Volume 58, Number 2, Spring 2000.

R. Keith Sawyer understands improvisation as a public, ephemeral, collective performance. James O. Young and Carl Matheson restrict the notion of improvisation to an indeterminacy of what they call structural properties in an art. In separate articles, Richard Cochrane and the team of Carol S. Gould and Kenneth Keaton identify improvisation as any variation in a musical performance. These differences are obviously irreconcilable. If the notion of improvisation is to do its job in allowing us to converse about a specific aspect of the arts, we must consider it in all its various dimensions. If it is applicable across all the arts, then we must come up with a common understanding (if possible) that will allow for cross-genre comparisons. If it is to be restricted to only some arts, then there must be clear criteria that place it here and not there.

There are three terms that appear repeatedly in these articles that crossover so haphazardly in meaning that it is nearly impossible to distinguish them among articles and even within a single article. They are: "improvisatory," "extemporaneous," and "spontaneous." Before continuing, I'll reduce the possibility of confusion by distinguishing meanings and stipulating best choices. "Spontaneity" is used in three ways among the articles, most commonly referring to the impromptu character of an activity,
but also meaning unscripted. Two authors use "spontaneity" (unintentionally, it appears) in a sense that approaches the aesthetic spontaneity that I have distinguished above. No article attempts to define the term explicitly or to distinguish it from apparent synonyms. To distinguish, I will refer to spontaneously-as-impromptu only with the term "impromptu." For the unscripted character of an activity, I will use "improvised."

"Improvisatory" and "extemporaneous" are synonyms that are indistinguishable in use except that the grammatical form of one is often preferred over the same grammatical form of the other ("extemporaneous" over "improvisatory" and "improvise" over "extemporize"). To avoid confusion, I will banish henceforth from this chapter all forms of "extemporize" in favor of "improvise", since the latter is the topic, after all, of the journal issue.

What distinguishes an impromptu activity from an improvised activity? In some of these articles, the impromptu characteristic of jazz improvisation is understood as a necessary, even sufficient, condition for its being identified as improvisation, "impromptu" meaning that it is executed on the spur of the moment, unprepared, unrehearsed. William Day says, "improvised music is best understood as a species of ordinary, unrehearsed activity" (p. 100). For Lee B. Brown, jazz improvisation "is carved out as it is being played" (p. 121). Actually, an impromptu character is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for improvisation. Gould and Keaton show that

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261 By "impromptu," I mean that an activity is characterized as being executed on the spur of the moment, without rehearsal. By "unscripted," I mean that an activity is executed without some constitutive instructions or constraints.
improvisation is "conceptually independent" of an impromptu character (p. 145). They offer the following example:

Consider, for instance, Lynn Harrell's recent performance of the Hayden cello concerto in D with the Florida Philharmonic. In the second movement he inserted a series of decorative notes. When another cellist asked him after the concert why he had added these notes, Harrell allegedly responded that it sounded better this way... and that he was tired of playing those same simple notes every time he plays the concerto... While this is undeniably a case of improvisation, it is (in all probability) not a case of spontaneity—he most likely worked out the sequence before the performance with the orchestra, just as he probably did his cadenzas. (p. 146)

In regard to musical performance, then, we can distinguish two features of improvisation: impromptu and rehearsed.

Beyond this distinction, I have noticed six distinct kinds of improvisation that are distinguished either explicitly or through use in these articles. We may refer to them as composition, interpretation, invention, completion, elaboration, and substitution. The second, fourth, fifth, and sixth relate to a performer's handling of an existing score.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sawyer</th>
<th>public, ephemeral, collective performance; Picasso as improviser--compositional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Young &amp; Matheson</td>
<td>indeterminacy of structural properties--substitutive, elaborative, completive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochrane</td>
<td>any variation in a musical performance--derivative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gould &amp; Keaton</td>
<td>any variation in a musical performance; conceptually independent of impromptu performance; all musical performance requires improvisation--derivative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day</td>
<td>ordinary, unrehearsed activity--impromptu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown</td>
<td>carved out as it is being played; situation, forced, no script--impromptu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilmour</td>
<td>improvisation in painting--inventive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carter</td>
<td>produces new paradigms--as inventive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sterritt</td>
<td>authenticity, spontaneity, individuality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Key Views of Improvisation
Section 2: Five Kinds of Improvisation

a. Interpretive Improvisation

Gould and Keaton make another important distinction. They claim that all musical performance requires improvisation, meaning that it is executed in some way outside a set of instructions. This, they say, is because not all of a musical performance, not even classical music, can be encoded in a score:

While a musical score contains information on pitch, relative duration, and often some indication of relative dynamics, articulation, and an outline of phrase structure, it cannot express innumerable details of a musical realization. These details include precise tempi, subtle fluctuations of tempo, expressive rubato, tone quality, precise dynamics, and the combination of all elements to form a cogent, balanced structure that conveys the emotional insight of both composer and performer. (p. 146-147)

Conversely, Young and Matheson stipulate that an improvised performance is one in which the "structural properties" are not completely determined.262 By structural properties, they mean those properties that are symbolized in the score. In contrast to these, they postulate expressive properties that are part of the score. In other words, Young and Matheson distinguish improvisation from interpretation, which Gould and Keaton can do only by suggesting that interpretation be understood as a more subtle form of improvisation. Let us do just that and identify the first kind of improvisation as interpretive improvisation.

b. Inventive Improvisation

Both collaborative teams of Young and Matheson on the one hand and Gould and Keaton on the other are working in the genre of music, which Nelson Goodman (1976)

262 They add "prior to the performance" to this characterization, demonstrating that they disagree with Gould and Keaton on both points.
categorizes as allographic, meaning that it depends on a set of instructions that will be carried out after the fact. By Young and Matheson's definition, the autographic arts would have no place for improvisation, nor would allographic arts that lacked a precise way of symbolizing structural properties. Young and Matheson define structural properties as those that are recorded in the instructions, so if an art does not require a set of instruction or lacks a complete symbolic system, improvisation is impossible. Can a painter, sculptor, or dancer, lacking a complete score, improvise?

From what I understand of the uses of "improvisation" in general speech, improvisation is not just acting or creating outside of given structural properties. A better definition would be acting or creating outside of the usual constraints. In this way, a painter such as Cézanne, choreographers such as Balanchine and Graham, and an interpreting performer can all be improvising. John C. Gilmour, in discussing Cézanne's method of color use in relation to his understanding of impressions, says that what amounts to improvisation in Cézanne's late landscapes is his use of color to alter the idea of a naturalized image. In other words, Cézanne is using color rather than the usual method of geometric shapes in composition to depict depth. This straying from convention is what I refer to as invention, a form of improvisation on the received methods of painting. Curtis L. Carter, speaking on dance, puts it this way:

\[\ldots\text{improvisation produces new paradigms, while at the same time undermining the notion of a normative paradigm against which to evaluate possible solutions. In the framework provided by improvisation, choices are not determined by evaluative procedures already existing in the history of a practice. Through experimenting with improvisational art practices, artists discover "fresh and significant relationships" that "in some measure remake our world" and make "a genuine contribution to knowledge." [quoting Goodman (1976) on invention]}\]
This comment could act as a precise summary of Gilmour's description of Cézanne's improvisation:

... he so alters the idea of the naturalized image that his contemporaries tended to be confused about how to read these paintings. This is especially true of his handling of color, which alters received ideas about the role that color plays both in nature and in landscape painting.

So beyond the mere jazz riff, improvisation can play a much more substantial role in the evolution of an art form, or any cultural institution. Now let us turn to the jazz riff.

c. Completion, Elaboration, and Substitution

Of the five types of improvisation, I have covered interpretative and inventive above. The final three are related to the structural properties of the score, as Young and Matheson would put it. Some sets of instructions have gaps, as where a cadenza is called for in a musical score or as in choreographed dance, such as Giselle, that is preserved on paper only incompletely. Improvisation that fills such gaps can be called completive improvisation, or simply completion. Jazz musicians are well-known for adding riffs and solos to completed scores, and this may be referred to as elaborative improvisation, or elaboration. Finally, it is not unusual for a musician, especially in the jazz idiom, to dispense with parts of a score altogether in favor of the performer's own creation. This may be referred to as substitutive improvisation, or substitution. Improvisation is best understood, then, as any activity executed outside of the usual constraints, "constraints" often referring to instructions but also to any other conventions.
Section 4: Two Classes of Improvisation: Compositional and Derivative

I would like to return briefly to the distinction made above between impromptu and improvised. The claim was made and defended that these two modifiers are conceptually independent, that there is not a necessary impromptu-character to improvisation. But consider this wonderful description by Sawyer of Picasso at work:

In his studio, Picasso is painting free-form, without preconceived image or composition; he is experimenting with colors, forms, and moods. He starts with a figure of a reclining nude--but then loses interest, and the curve of the woman's leg reminds him of a matador's leg as he flies through the air after being gored by a bull--so he paints over the nude and creates an image of a bull and matador. But this leads him to yet another idea; he paints over the bullfight image and begins work on a Mediterranean harbor--with water-skier, bathers in bikinis, and a picturesque hilltop village. (p. 149)

This activity, composition (or creation) on the fly, seems intuitively to be what we would call improvisation, but it does not fit any of our descriptions above--it is not interpretive, not necessarily stylistically inventive, nor a form of completion, elaboration, or substitution. When I distinguished impromptu from improvised, it was demonstrated that someone engaged in substitution or alteration didn't necessarily do so impromptu, and therefore an impromptu character was not necessary for a definition of improvisation. If Picasso is composing impromptu and we discard the "impromptu," we are left with Picasso simply composing. But this could be accomplished in any number of ways, such as the traditional antecedent sketch followed by a faithful painting. In Picasso's situation above, it appears that the impromptu character *is* a necessary feature, as it is in free jazz (jazz played without reference to a score) and improvisational theater.

The only way out of this paradox—that an impromptu character both is and is not a necessary feature of improvisation—is to distinguish two classes of improvisation. One class of improvisation goes back to its Romance language roots in *improvisatore*, which
(like *extempore*) originally meant, and still means, to simultaneously compose and perform. Let us call this class of improvisation compositional improvisation, for it involves wholesale composition, not just substitution, completion, or elaboration. The central member of this class will be called simply, compositional improvisation, or composition. The other class of improvisation can be referred to as derivative improvisation. Derivative kinds of improvisation may or may not have an impromptu character, while compositional improvisation must have an impromptu character.²⁶³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Compositional</th>
<th>Derivative</th>
<th>Impromptu</th>
<th>Situated</th>
<th>Unscripted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Composition</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interpretation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Invention</strong></td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Substitution</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Completion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elaboration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Y = Yes  P = Possible

Table 4: *Classes, Kinds, and Features of Improvisation*

²⁶³ James Joyce writing *Finnegan's Wake*, for instance, was engaging in inventive composition, not compositional improvisation.
Section 5: Graphing Improvisation

Figure 3 in Chapter 4, the graph with axes of formality and syntax of actions, is a convenient tool for visualizing the gradients of improvisation. Stylized activities are those with more instructions, and as one proceeds horizontally on a line toward the left, the instructions decline and more opportunity for improvisation arises. For stylized activities, there are opportunities only for interpretive improvisation, but as one proceeds from right to left, opportunities arise for elaborative, then completive, then substitutive, and finally, at the far left, for compositional improvisation. The different kinds of jazz performance would fall somewhere in a square among the formal activities, with swing style closer to the right, moving horizontally through be-bop to the left and finally to free jazz on the far left. There may also be a slight vertical drop, but not to the point of the arts at the middle left.

It is not necessary to limit ourselves to a horizontal progression of improvisational opportunities. To be able to isolate such a direction of improvisation demonstrates that there is another way to categorize improvisation. Proceeding horizontally from fewer opportunities for improvisation to more reveals a category we may call syntactic improvisation. To proceed only on this axis, however, neglects inventive improvisation (we may also call it formal improvisation), which proceeds in increasing opportunity vertically, from top to bottom in the revision of the formality of actions.

Considering the entire graph through the evolution of one activity, we could look at classical ballet as an example. A fully scored, fully traditional classical ballet would fall under stylized activities, where there is room only for interpretive improvisation. If one
were to begin considering less completely scored ballets, one would begin to see more opportunities arise for improvisation moving horizontally across the top of the graph. If one were to consider ballet's transition to modern dance, one would move vertically down the right side of the graph. And if one were to consider both together, moving in the direction of dance in improvisational theater, one would move diagonally from top right to bottom left.

This graph is a good visual aid for the properties of improvisation, but we should not pretend that it captures every dimension of improvisation. There are interesting complications, such as a choreographer who in composing a piece on a practice stage alters a traditional step. This would be a movement from top to bottom on the graph, but is it also an activity, as such? It is improvisation, of the inventive variety, but inventive improvisation is most often not impromptu but deliberative. So perhaps inventive improvisation requires us to consider another dimension—graphing a progression from impromptu to deliberative. Most, but not all, inventive improvisation would fall on the deliberative side, but this example of choreographic composition reveals that there is not necessarily a clean split between deliberative and impromptu, as if an impromptu character precluded cognition, and deliberation precluded actions.

There is another dimension to consider, as well. In Lee Brown's article, he defines jazz performance using three parameters: situation, forced choice, and no script. For him, the no script parameter encompasses the three kinds of improvisation identified above as elaborative, substitutive, and completive (of course, I would say it applies to all improvisation). We have not considered situation or forced choice in improvisation. In
jazz performance, as in any performance, once a note is played (or a word spoken or a step danced), it cannot be revised; the performance is irreversible, and, according to Brown, this irreversibility is a condition of the performance occurring in a situation ("situation" meaning in real-time and among other people). It is the situatedness that accounts for the forced choice, and it is irreversibility that he emphasizes by the situatedness. So one should say that jazz improvisation is characterized by situatedness, which entails both irreversibility and forced choice. Because there is no continuum of situatedness, an activity (Brown is distinguishing between deliberative and impromptu composition) is either situated or not. This notion of situatedness helps clarify the distinction made between impromptu and deliberative. We have taken "impromptu" to mean without preparation, on the spur of the moment, and the notion of situatedness works as a reminder that we should emphasize the "moment" aspect of impromptu. Impromptu implies not only a lack of preparation but also a situatedness. One can take a written test, for example, without preparation, but one would not refer to it as impromptu. The notion of impromptu would seem to encompass the notion of situatedness, but not vice-versa. So a performance, while necessarily situated, is not necessarily impromptu (several articles point out that jazz improvisation, while partially impromptu, also relies on preparation and stock phrases). The graph, it turns out, has no schematic way to represent situatedness. And this tells us that while some activities are situated and some are not, situatedness has no necessary relation to aesthetic spontaneity, which can be a part of any activity--they are conceptually independent.
Brown's claim that situatedness is an essential parameter of jazz improvisation turns out to be fairly mundane. Since all performance is situated, jazz improvisation is not unique in this respect. In regard to compositional improvisation, it does not necessarily have to occur in a situation, as we saw with Picasso. What distinguishes jazz improvisation is that it is, along with improvisational theater, one of the few current forms of *improvisatore*, performed improvisation with compositional content, that is, if not compositional outright, containing at least elaborative, substitutive, or completive improvisation—all partial forms of composition.

**Section 6: Spontaneity and Authenticity**

There is one feature of improvisation that we have only touched on tangentially but which all of the above considerations help bring to the center, namely that improvisation that moves along the syntactic axis of the graph is somatic, in the sense that I was distinguishing somatic arts form non-somatic. In other words, the level of aesthetic spontaneity achieved in these cases of improvisation relates directly to the success of the activities. Any kind of inventive improvisation, that is to say formal invention, moving along the formality axis, is only trivially somatic so that any aesthetic spontaneity that may go into this kind of improvisation is invisible to an audience. This distinction brings to mind the interesting case of Jack Kerouac, which takes us to the heart of aesthetic spontaneity.

Jack Kerouac and James Joyce wrote in what is called the "stream of consciousness" style. Generally speaking, stream of consciousness is a literary
technique in which the concatenation of thoughts of a literary character are displayed in words through run-on-sentences, loose associations and unexpected transitions. William James originally coined the term\textsuperscript{264} as a way of emphasizing several aspects characteristic of the thought process. One of these aspects was that rather than being rational, orderly, and clearly punctuated, as prose on a page, the thought process is constantly changing, jumping from one association to another without pause and very difficult to maintain in one direction for any length of time. The stream of consciousness technique depicts this aspect of thought. There is another aspect, however, to which James refers and which Kerouac attempts to harness for his own uses.

For James, thought is not a detached process but experience, itself; thought is not the perception of the environment but interaction with the environment. He says,

\begin{quote}
Every thought we have of a given fact is, strictly speaking, unique, and only bears a resemblance of kind with our other thoughts of the same fact. When the identical fact recurs, we \textit{must} think of it in a fresh manner, see it under a somewhat different angle, apprehend it in different relations from those in which it last appeared. And the thought by which we cognize it is the thought of it-in-those-relations, a thought suffused with the consciousness of all that dim context. . . . Experience is remolding us every moment, and our mental reaction on every given thing is really a resultant of our experience of the whole world up to that date.\textsuperscript{265}
\end{quote}

The significance of stream of consciousness for James is not just that there is a continuous concatenation of loosely related thoughts but also that the loose relations are relations nonetheless and that these relations make up a context that becomes not only our view of the world but our very selves. And so his emphasis is not merely on the transience of thought but also on the history of our thought process that creates us and remains with us. And further, the thoughts that shape us do not come in isolation but are

\textsuperscript{264} James refers to it most often as "stream of thought." See \textit{Principles of Psychology}, chapter entitled "Stream of Thought," especially p. 233.

\textsuperscript{265} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 227 - 228.
representative of the constitutive relations of our experience. Under James' paradigm, the
sensitivity-and-response model of causality that I outlined in Chapters 1 and 3, describes
more than causal relations but also contributes to our personal make-up. Our affective
relations with the world shape who we are and contribute to the directions of future
actions. We can see from the discussion of Dewey's notion of habit in Chapter 4 that this
is exactly what Dewey had in mind. Our current and continuous perception of the world
molds us and guides our future actions.

We come now to a culminating point of this dissertation. In Chapter 1, I introduced
a notion of affectivity within a cosmology of sensitivity-and-response. This notion of
affectivity is not emotion in a narrow sense but emotional-cognitive interaction with the
environment, similar to that described by James immediately above. In Chapter 2, I
employed the terminology of affective emotion to go in two directions. In one direction,
I attempted to conceive of a unified mind and body in Plato's influential oeuvre, which is
often heralded as postulating just the opposite, because only with a unified mind and
body can there be the sort of affectivity outlined in Chapter 1. By finding it, or rather,
not excluding it, in Plato, I was able to provide a base for further theorizing along these
lines in the Western tradition. In the other direction, using Aristotle's aesthetics, I
highlighted the important roles that affectivity can play in aesthetics, particularly in self-
cultivation, thus providing another base for theorizing on this topic in the Western
tradition. In Chapter 3, I defined aesthetic spontaneity in detail (noting that the
affectivity of Chapters 1 and 2 is implicit in the term) and located approximate
equivalents in the Western tradition. In Chapter 4, I examined aesthetic spontaneity in
even closer detail, demonstrating a vague reservoir of creative potential at its edges, offering a visual layout for understanding activity in regard to aesthetic spontaneity, and bringing notice to the central characteristic of attention. So far in this chapter, I have distinguished the aspects of somatic arts in which aesthetic spontaneity plays a role and am now in the process of clarifying the relationship of spontaneity and improvisation. This latter is a culmination of the dissertation because improvisation, as so many of the journal authors point out, has never explicitly been viewed as a significant element of the arts in the West, and in describing improvisation, author after author describes it in terms of spontaneity.

I have until now maintained that the meaning of spontaneity as used by the authors can be construed as merely impromptu or unscripted. The way the authors use the term, however, there is a minor connotation that gets left out when it is reduced to impromptu or unscripted. Take a passage by Gould and Keaton, for instance:

> In arguing against dualism in musical performance, we are proposing that the difference between classical and jazz performance is one of degree rather than kind: the difference is one of degree of preexisting compositional material rather than the particular kind of spontaneity of expression in performance. (p. 147)

In a preceding passage, Gould and Keaton refer to Lynn Harrell's elaboration of the score as "improvisation, but not necessarily spontaneous" (p. 146), which I interpreted as impromptu and used in my own argument regarding inventive improvisation. Both of these instances of "spontaneity" can be understood as synonymous with "impromptu" except that when a person refers to spontaneity of expression, something further is assumed. This something further comes out most noticeably in David Sterritt's references to Kerouac.
Sterritt takes promoters of three improvisatory arts to task for claims that the spontaneity of creation accounts for the special "aura" (in Benjamin's sense) of improvisation. Although Sterritt essentially sets out to demonstrate that compositional improvisation is far less common than elaborative, substitutive, and completive improvisation and that therefore spontaneity plays a lesser role than commonly presumed, his accomplishment is actually, and unintentionally, in the direction of providing a third understanding of "spontaneity," in addition to impromptu and unscripted.

Sterritt claims that "allegedly inherent traits of improvisation--authenticity, spontaneity, individuality--are often exaggerated or misrepresented by its advocates" (p. 166). His first of three extended arguments considers the case of jazz improvisation. This section consists of an informative catalog of evidence supporting the position that jazz improvisation is not limited to compositional improvisation. It is not relevant to my discussion here that Sterritt fails to cite "advocates" for the opposition and is therefore arguing against no one (and that the laundry list of partisans to his side is actually an argument against him). What matters is that by fleshing out the notion of spontaneity beyond the borders of impromptu, he is leading us in the direction of aesthetic spontaneity. At the beginning of his argument and as it progresses, he refers to spontaneity in association with authenticity and individuality, as if the three are intricately related and in a way that impromptu is not related to the other two. Then at the end of his argument, he says, "it becomes clear that jazz improvisation in general is firmly imbricated with practices based less on rigorously spontaneous invention than on the inspired elaboration of preexisting music material" (p. 167). With the mention only
of spontaneity in this concluding sentence, he demonstrates an implicit understanding (which is apparent in the writing of others, as well) that this single attribute of jazz improvisation is enough to encompass both authenticity and individuality.

In the succeeding section, Sterritt takes up the case of Jack Kerouac, famous for his style of spontaneous writing. According to Sterritt, Kerouac contends that spontaneity in his writing allowed him to "achieve levels of '100 percent personal honesty both psychic and social etc" (p. 167). Thus we see from the start that the idea of spontaneity is imbued by Kerouac with a notion of authenticity. I noted at the very beginning of this dissertation that aesthetic spontaneity should be distinguished from the spontaneity of the Beat writers, of whom Kerouac was a major figure. I stand by that distinction, as will be made clear, but at the same time I am striving to demonstrate here that it is not a radical disjunction between the two, and in fact, Kerouac's construal can add another dimension to the understanding of aesthetic spontaneity achieved so far. William James' and John Dewey's account of conscious experience combine to illuminate action by bringing us to understand that every action, by virtue of its being informed and guided by previous experience that essentially shapes who we are, is revelatory of the accumulation of experience and therefore of the person. Kerouac believed something related but slightly different.

For Kerouac and others of his generation, spontaneity is an avenue of self-expression, a way to tap a vein of authenticity in a person that cannot be achieved through contrivance, and this authenticity is revealed in the work. The valorization of

\[266 \text{ Sterritt's citation: "Quoted in The Beat Journey: Volume 8, The Unspeakable Visions of the Individual, ed. Arthur knight and Kit Knight (1978); cited by Clark, Jack Kerouac: A Biography, p. 102."} \]
improvisation as a writing technique is what separated Kerouac from earlier stream of consciousness writers. For Kerouac, writing became a somatic art, an art for which the aesthetic spontaneity of the actions that contribute to the creation of the art work account in part for the aesthetic success of the work. Kerouac characterizes spontaneous writing in the following terms:

undisturbed flow from the mind of personal secret idea-words, blowing (as per jazz musician) on subject of image

following free deviation (association) of mind into limitless blow-on-subject seas of thought, swimming in sea of English with no discipline other than rhythms of rhetorical exhalation and expostulated statement, like a fist coming down on a table with each complete utterance, bang! (the space dash)-Blow as deep as you want-write as deeply, fish as far down as you want, satisfy yourself first, then reader cannot fail to receive telepathic shock and meaning-excitement by same laws operating in his own human mind.

No pause to think of proper word but the infantile pileup of scatological buildup words till satisfaction is gained, which will turn out to be a great appending rhythm to a thought and be in accordance with Great Law of timing.

Nothing is muddy that runs in time and to laws of time-Shakespearian stress of dramatic need to speak now in own unalterable way or forever hold tongue-no revisions

write outwards swimming in sea of language to peripheral release and exhaustion-Do not afterthink except for poetic or P. S. reasons. Never afterthink to "improve" or defray impressions, as, the best writing is always the most painful personal wrung-out tossed from cradle warm protective mind-tap from yourself the song of yourself, blow!-now!-your way is your only way-"good"-or "bad"-always honest ("ludicrous"), spontaneous, "confessionals' interesting, because not "crafted."

If possible write "without consciousness" in semi-trance (as Yeats' later "trance writing") allowing subconscious to admit in own uninhibited interesting necessary and so "modern" language what conscious art would censor, and write excitedly, swiftly, with writing-or-typing-cramps, in accordance (as from center to periphery) with laws of orgasm, Reich's "beclouding of consciousness." Come from within, out-to relaxed and said.

The flow of ideas for Kerouac did not come ex nihilo but from his accumulated experience, and it flowed out through his fingers in the frenetic act of writing. He repeatedly emphasizes the irreversibility and forced choices of the process. No revising

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267 This and the immediately following quotations are from Kerouac, "Essentials of Spontaneous Prose."
is allowed, and every pause affects the product. Where Kerouac begins to part company
with the account of aesthetic spontaneity provided above is in the final paragraph.

Nothing in my account of aesthetic spontaneity touches on the advantage of being
without consciousness or being in a trancelike state. Instead, I have emphasized the need
for intense focus, for a level of attention not achieved in any other circumstances. How
to construe this difference? Is there a genuine difference of opinion, or is a single kind of
experience described in divergent terms? I have no wish to make Kerouac's notion of
spontaneity cohere with mine, in fact, I would prefer that the two be significantly
different, but in the spirit of charity, one must give him a fair reading.

There is a certain feeling one gets when engaging in an activity that is wholly
enthralling. As the action progresses and one interacts with sustained intensity,
consciousness of time and of subsidiary concerns falls by the wayside. Mihaly
Csikszentmihalyi, a research psychologist, has isolated a psychological condition that he
refers to variously as psychic negentropy, optimal experience, autotelic experience, and
flow. In a series of articles and books, he presents studies, experiments, and anecdotal
accounts that detail the constitutive aspects of this special kind of experience. He
describes it succinctly as follows:

> When goals are clear, above-average challenges are matched to skills, and when accurate feedback
> is forthcoming, a person becomes involved in the activity. At this point, concentration focuses on
> what needs to be done.\footnote{Csikszentmihalyi, \textit{Optimal Experience: Psychological Studies of Flow in Consciousness}, p. 34.}

And in a more detailed account, he says:

> Another common feature of flow experiences is a "distorted" sense of time. When consciousness
> is fully active and ordered, hours seem to pass by in minutes, and occasionally a few seconds

\footnote{Csikszentmihalyi, \textit{Optimal Experience: Psychological Studies of Flow in Consciousness}, p. 34.}
stretch out into what seems to be an infinity. The clock no longer serves as a good analog of the temporal quality of experience.\footnote{Ibid., p. 33.}

This loss of a sense of time is reported widely from subjects questioned about autotelic experience. Another commonly reported feature is a dampening of conscious concern for affairs outside of one's immediately engaged activity. I submit that writing for Kerouac (and Yeats) is an autotelic experience and that these two features of autotelic experience account for their describing it as trance-like and as being outside of consciousness. In a serendipitous coincidence, Csikszentmihalyi refers to the same theory of Mead that I, on the coattails of Hall and Ames, refer to in Chapter 4:

> in the terms that George Herbert Mead introduced . . . , the "me" disappears during flow, and the "I" takes over . . . . In flow the self is fully functioning, but not aware of itself doing it, and it can use all the attention for the task at hand. At the most challenging levels, people actually report experiencing a \textit{transcendence} of the self.\footnote{Ibid., p. 33.}

I believe that Kerouac misconstrues this aspect of experience and that the dropping away of distractions to the attention contributes to his feeling of an absence of consciousness. If this theory can be accepted, then Kerouac's understanding of spontaneity is looking more and more like aesthetic spontaneity.

Sterritt is off the mark when he attempts to demonstrate that spontaneity is not what accounts for the aura of improvisation. It is exactly what accounts for it, whether that improvisation is completely compositional as in free jazz or whether it is restricted to strict forms and tight syntax of interpretation in classical music performance. He is correct, however, in bringing to our attention that these arts do not rely on spontaneity as an intrinsic attribute. Instead, they rely on it as a mark of excellence. A flat jazz
performance can be entirely improvisational, even technically virtuosic, without having a hint of aesthetic spontaneity\textsuperscript{271}. The authenticity that is vaunted by Kerouac is what gets sacrificed in such a performance. Thus the revelation of authenticity subtly connoted by the colloquial "spontaneity" is also an aspect of aesthetic spontaneity.

It is not a coincidence that the Beat artists were coming to prominence at the same time that Existentialism was gaining popularity in America. The Beats found the source for artistic authenticity in their notion of spontaneity. This is not unlike the Chinese, who believed that a person's true character was revealed through their calligraphy (the notion even persists in contemporary graphologists). Notice, however, that the Beats refer to it in terms of self-expression, whereas the Chinese refer to it in terms of self-revelation\textsuperscript{272}.

The distinction is important. Expression is a pervasive concept in modern art, and it is the imperative of every aspiring artist to express the true self, to purposefully depict one's inner being through one's art. This kind of truth cannot be pushed out but can only be let out.\textsuperscript{273} The somatic arts allow for such revelation by virtue of the actions in the process of sensitivity and response.

In the superficial kind of aesthetic spontaneity that occurs in Czikszentmihalyi's autotelic experience, the condition of flow is not difficult to attain. As long as all the objective criteria are met and one has an intrinsic interest, then flow will naturally occur.

\textsuperscript{271} I once witnessed a gamelan recital performed by non-Indonesians that was, to my amateur ears, technically flawless, and yet to me and others present that I spoke with, it still lacked a critical element.
\textsuperscript{272} This can be seen throughout On Nature and Affectivity, especially the first two chapters, where one's self-nature is described as being "drawn-out." One's nature being manifested through emotions was shown to be most effective in the medium of music in early China, and later the literary arts took precedence: e.g. "the sage's affectivity is manifested in his literary skills" (Wen Xin Diao Long, chap. 2).
\textsuperscript{273} Marvin Shaw repeatedly refers to this phenomenon of ensuing in his Paradox of Intention: Reaching the Goal by Giving up the Attempt to Reach It.
Csikszentmihalyi and his fellow researchers do not need to seek a method for cultivating it, for it can be manufactured fairly easily. Aesthetic spontaneity, which I view as a deeper and more robust form of autotelic experience, is more elusive. One cannot merely create the conditions for an aesthetically spontaneous performance and watch it come off without a hitch. Whereas for the agent of simple autotelic experience the key is interest, in high art all four main characteristics of aesthetic spontaneity must be met: collection, shedding, ease, and responsiveness. Ease is not reducible to high level of skill, nor is responsiveness reducible to action and feedback. They have a much closer, and largely dependent, relationship to cognitive wholeness.

Part 4: Aesthetic Spontaneity and Self-Cultivation

In William Day's article on improvisation, he postulates that improvisation can be an avenue to self-cultivation. He cites Emerson on the existential benefit of extempore in the arts and suggests that one of the benefits that accrues is an opportunity for self-reflection. In fully rehearsed and scripted activities, he says, one proceeds through from beginning to end without thought or insight. In improvisational activities, on the other hand, one has an opportunity to turn back on one's actions and through reflection consider the possible ramifications of those actions. This kind of reflection, Day maintains, can encourage moral knowledge in the agent. But how to cultivate the requisite aesthetic spontaneity of improvisation? This complex but essential attribute of the music doesn't just happen, but can it be purposely cultivated?
One can practice calligraphy day and night and never become a master calligrapher. One can practice the cello without cease and never become a virtuoso cellist. Surely innate talent decides as much as anything whether someone will succeed in a somatic art. But if practice regimens and talent level are equal, is there anything else that can account for aesthetic brilliance in an art? The claim has been made and defended that the missing ingredient is aesthetic spontaneity. Is aesthetic spontaneity something that just happens, or can it be groomed and cultivated? Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi does suggest that aside from intrinsic interest alone there may be another factor involved in the ability of a person to achieve flow. He says,

Many techniques of meditation or spiritual discipline attempt to develop control over consciousness. For instance, the various yoga traditions train the ability to concentrate attention, to control memory, and to limit awareness to specific goals. When a person learns such skills, it becomes much easier to achieve the necessary balancing of challenges and skills.

Csikszentmihalyi hits the nail on the head, but he does not elaborate, nor do any of the researchers whose articles he has collected in his anthology. Autotelic experience for them is something to be valued for its psychological benefits, and encouragement to meet the minimal criteria are typically enough to achieve the desired results. But what of the highest levels of autotelic achievement?

Section 1: Assessing the Difficulty of Cultivation

Going back again to the chart of somatic activities in Chapter 4, we can ask whether it offers us a clue about where on the chart it would be most fruitful to begin a program of self-cultivation in a quest for aesthetic spontaneity. Is it possible that aesthetic spontaneity is more easily achieved at one point on the chart and can then be
maintained and cultivated in a specific direction of formality or syntax? My discussion of the features of aesthetic spontaneity began back in Chapter 3 with the relatively informal and non-syntactic skills of butchery, carpentry, and cicada-catching, and then I went on to pursue the question of aesthetic spontaneity in the most formal and most syntactic activities, what I called stylized activities. From here, I wondered whether the aesthetic cultivation of stylized activities was relevant to more open-ended activities, as when Confucius remarked that he could act in any circumstance with unimpeachable fluidity, finding that a less restrictive syntax and fewer overt forms were not necessarily barriers to the achievement of aesthetic spontaneity.

Although I did not state it explicitly, I gave the appearance of presuming that aesthetic spontaneity is easiest to achieve in the fairly uncomplicated skills that Csikszentmihalyi uses as examples, if not butchery and carpentry, then rock-climbing, tennis, etc. These activities fall, with many sports, right about at the center of the chart, with a moderate amount of syntax and a moderate amount of formality of action. If there were a third axis to represent the ease of attainment of aesthetic spontaneity, it would reach its apex in the center, and considering that Csikszentmihalyi refers to flow as optimal experience because it is where people find the most psychic reward, it is not surprising, given the wide popularity of sports, that this is where we find it most easily achieved. Here, a balance of difficulty is achieved with regard to both formality and syntax so that there is enough challenge and enough feedback to maintain attention and attain a feeling of reward.
Moving diagonally to the top left and to the bottom right, where formality and syntax increase and decrease in reverse proportion, essentially the same situation persists but with a slightly higher degree of difficulty. Whereas the ratio of formality to syntax may remain the same, the balance is disrupted, adding difficulty in one area that is not mitigated by the opposite trend in the other area. Still, it is easiest to achieve and maintain a level of aesthetic spontaneity in the two square regions marked "formal activities" and "syntactic activities," and where the squares intersect is where the easiest activities are concentrated. It is moving in the directions of the top right and bottom left, where both formal and syntactic levels either simultaneously increase or decrease, that aesthetic spontaneity becomes most difficult to achieve. If the level of skill and the complexity of syntax are too demanding, aesthetic spontaneity will be impossible to attain. And if they are absent entirely, there is nothing to draw in or maintain the attention, again preventing the achievement of aesthetic spontaneity.

As it turns out, this dissertation is not concerned with either of the large intersecting squares. It is instead concerned with the squares at bottom left and top right, the former being the realm of morality, and the latter the realm of highest aesthetic achievement in the somatic arts. This is not to say that eating a grape is a moral act, rather that morality is an issue in the realm of open-ended activities. There are no formal actions to practice and no easy rulebook to follow, and it is precisely this lack of habituation or instruction that makes morality so difficult to achieve. When one is drawn in various directions by desires, fear, anxiety, altruism, etc., how is one to choose the appropriate action? Simply knowing what to choose is not enough. And when it is chosen once under one set of
circumstances, how is this concentration on performing the moral act maintained when new circumstances arise with new demands?

It is easy to conceive of rules of etiquette, ceremony, and moral laws and prohibitions having arisen in society as an extension of moral impulses that all socialized animals have\textsuperscript{274} and as an effective method for achieving social harmony. Another way to conceive of them is as aids in the accomplishment of aesthetic spontaneity with regard to moral action, as scaffolding for the performance of moral improvisation, training wheels for the novice moral agent. If one has the impulse to be a thoroughly moral person, one can focus one's energies on practicing and executing the fine points of etiquette, paying close attention to their appropriate uses. One may study a set of instructions or historical models, attempting to apply or interpret them in the circumstances of everyday life. This process brings moral activity out of the field of open activities and into the field of formal and syntactic activities thereby allowing for an easier attainment of the aesthetic spontaneity required to perform the actions with ease and responsiveness. Again, the realm of formal and syntactic activities is an arena that through autotelic experience makes activity intrinsically rewarding. One finds purpose and dignity where in the realm of open-ended activities there was only confusion and dissoluteness.

And yet as one practices in the formal/syntactic realm, one's facility at maintaining attention increases. One becomes more adept at collecting oneself in concentration and at shedding the impulses that draw one in dissolute directions. As the cognitive wholeness

\textsuperscript{274} See Franz de Waal, \textit{Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Animals}. 
increases it allows for penetration into the realm of open-ended activities. An unselfconscious single-mindedness begins to parse the syntax of everyday reality, seeing manageable moral challenges in the most mundane activities. Increasingly, previously pedestrian relationships provide constant feedback for adjusting one's responses. One becomes sensitive to the slightest expressions in others, reacting with consummate understanding.

Viewed in one light, Confucius was the promoter and maintainer of a Byzantine system of ceremonial actions and etiquette, fastidious in his adherence to propriety and intolerant of the transgressions of others. In another light, he was a trainer of moral virtuosos and a maestro of the art of etiquette. The object of all the moral accoutrements associated with ritual property was not merely to observe the rules and execute the forms but to train oneself in an aesthetic spontaneity that could be extended to less transparent, less regulated situations. Perhaps the Daodejing was correct in suggesting that moral principles arose as a result of a decline in spontaneity (following dao). If Stone Age human beings possessed a natural spontaneity akin to that of the animals and gradually suffered the loss of it through an increase in self-consciousness, the institutionalization of morality can be conceived as an avenue back to spontaneity, where aesthetic spontaneity is understood as a cultivated form of an equivalent natural mode of action, the actions executed under more complex circumstances.

Moral action characterized by aesthetic spontaneity is similar to improvisational performance. There is a forced choice, actions are irreversible, and instructions can guide one only so far—then one must rely on a cultivated holism and fluency to take the
appropriate action under the appropriate circumstances. Jean-Paul Sartre makes a relevant association between moral and aesthetic actions:

Man finds himself in an organized situation in which he is himself involved: ... and he cannot avoid choosing. ... Let us say that the moral choice is comparable to the construction of a work of art. ... Does anyone reproach an artist, when he paints a picture, for not following rules established a priori. Does one ever ask what is the picture that he ought to paint? As everyone knows, there is no pre-defined picture for him to make; the artist applies himself to the composition of a picture, and the picture that ought to be made is precisely that which he will have made. ... No one can tell what the painting of tomorrow will be like; one cannot judge a painting until it is done. What has that to do with morality? We are in the same creative situation. We never speak of a work of art as irresponsible; when we are discussing a canvas by Picasso, we understand very well that the composition became what it is at the time when he was painting it, and that his works are part and parcel of his entire life. It is the same upon the plane of morality. There is this in common between art and morality, that in both we have to do with creation and invention.275

Sartre does not broach the topic of a mode of moral action, neither does he consider possible strategies for achieving appropriateness in choices, and yet the similarities with aesthetic spontaneity in morality and art as discussed above are obvious. And now that we have seen that achieving aesthetic spontaneity is both difficult yet desirable, the question arises as to whether there is a method to cultivate.

Section 2: Theories of Cultivation

The reader may have noticed from my description that Csikszentmihalyi bases optimal performance of flow experience on the fulcrum of attention. Most typically, he describes focused attention as emerging from the flow experience and then constant challenges and feedback contribute to its persistence. When attention flags, flow is broken. I have suggested something similar above—that fluency depends on wholeness. We have even seen examples of how that wholeness can be cultivated: the cicada catcher

275 Jean-Paul Sartre, "Existentialism is a Humanism."
who settles himself to resemble tree roots and sheds distractions; the bell stand carpenter
who calms his heart and then sheds all concern for honor, reward, etc.; and the aspiring
archer Ji Chang who lies under the treadle of his wife's loom and stares at a mite in an
effort to hone his skills of concentration.

The reader may also have noticed that when Csikszentmihalyi summons examples
of attention cultivation, he turns directly to the East, to the "various yoga traditions" as he
calls them. In Chapters 3 and 4 above, we managed to find some rough Western
equivalents of aesthetic spontaneity as conceived by the early Chinese, which now
prompts one to begin to wonder if there are any vestiges in Western philosophy of self-
cultivation that can act as a resource in this direction. As alluded to in regard to Sartre,
for some time now philosophy has been preoccupied largely with theoretical activity.276
A philosopher speculates about what constitutes moral action but does not offer advice
about how to act, let alone about how to train oneself in moral action. A philosopher
speculates about the criteria that allow one to identify art as art but does not offer steps
for creating good art or for cultivating an aesthetic sensibility. Of course, such a bias
toward the theoretical has not always been characteristic of Western philosophy, as can
be realized by simply looking back to Socrates, who was constantly exhorting his
interlocutors to think better so that they might act better.

276 There have been, and continue to be, attempts at so-called applied philosophy, especially in the field of
ethics, but any kind of regimen for cultivation of the person remains rare outside of religion--and barely
touched on even there.
There are a diverse group of Western philosophers who have made recommendations for regimens of self-education, or self-cultivation. Schiller\textsuperscript{277}, Nietzsche\textsuperscript{278}, Dewey\textsuperscript{279}, and most recently, Richard Shusterman\textsuperscript{280} have all given extended consideration to cultivation of the person and, significantly, aesthetic sensibility plays a central role in each theory. Only in Schiller is importance given to modes of action and to the curtailment of discursive thought.\textsuperscript{281} But long before Schiller, there were others.

\textbf{a. The Stoics}

In his \textit{Spiritual Exercises}, Ignatius of Loyola provided the major regimen of self-cultivation since Classical times. Although this work is thoroughly Christian, according to Pierre Hadot, the exercises therein "are nothing but a Christian version of a Greco-Roman tradition."\textsuperscript{282} The reader will recall from Chapter 3 that the view of nature for the Hellenist and Roman heirs of Aristotle was adopted from Aristotle's understanding of

\begin{itemize}
  \item Schiller, \textit{On the Aesthetic Education of Man}.
  \item Friedrich Nietzsche, \textit{Human, All to Human} and \textit{Untimely Meditations}.
  \item John Dewey, \textit{Art as Experience} and \textit{The School and Society}.
  \item Richard Shusterman, \textit{Practicing Philosophy, Pragmatist Aesthetics}, and \textit{Performing Live}.
  \item Although Nietzsche, in \textit{Human, All Too Human}, offers a tantalizing hint in both directions:
    The born aristocrats of the spirit are not overly zealous: their creations appear and fall from the tree on a quiet autumn evening, without being precipitately desired, promoted, and pushed aside by something new. The desire to create unremittingly is vulgar and betrays jealousy, envy, and ambition. If one is something, one really doesn't need to do anything--and yet nevertheless does a great deal.

Citation from Graham Parkes' \textit{Composing the Soul}, who notices the parallel with Daoist "unforced activity" (p. 195).

Dewey recognizes three kinds of attention in children. Spontaneous attention is the attention of the pre-schooler that in spite of being occasionally intense and productive is completely beyond conscious control. Voluntary attention is that cultivated by disciplinarians who force the now older child to "pay attention" to school subject matter. Reflective attention involves the child consciously attending to a matter of interest (\textit{The School and Society}, pp. 139-149). This latter is potentially the attention of aesthetic spontaneity, and although not explicitly developed by Dewey in that direction, given his somatic emphasis in learning, it would not be difficult to do, as demonstrated in Chapter 4 above.

\item Pierre Hadot, \textit{Philosophy as a Way of Life}, p. 82.
\end{itemize}
physis and their philosophy of action from Aristotle's understanding of hexis. Hadot has researched the scant material on the once abundant tracts regarding self-cultivation regimens of the time, classifying and summarizing their content.

Hadot identifies attention as "the fundamental Stoic spiritual attitude." The attention that the Stoics posit is the attention of activity that we have examined in such detail. The concern is not with extended deliberation in order to come to a rational decision regarding a moral dilemma. Rather, the concern is to be able to focus on each and every moment of life in order to react appropriately to each unique situation as it arises. This sounds familiar. In fact, reviewing the Stoic and Epicurean exercises and their purposes, one finds exercises intended to cultivate all major aspects of the holistic fluency of aesthetic spontaneity.

It is true that the Stoics presumed a determined universe, but one will recall that it is organismic as much as it is determined. And the explicit valorization of reason turns out to be more important in preparing exercises of self-cultivation than in executing deliberate action. This valorization of reason and its actual function reminds us of the dangers of taking a philosopher's words at face value and of the importance of coming to a coherent interpretation before drawing conclusions. For example, in addition to reason, of course, the Stoics placed great emphasis on the importance of acting from the will. For the Stoics, reason and will stood in opposition to the passions, which were understood as being involuntary and responsible for leading a person in undesirable directions. The metaphysical assumption was that reason was an inherent feature of the

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283 Ibid., p. 84. Hadot understands "spiritual" in a broad sense to mean thought taking itself as subject matter and thereby modifying itself.
natural world and so to act out of reason was the ultimate way to act naturally. Because of this opposition of reason and emotion, it would appear that any mention of aesthetic spontaneity would be moot in such a context. But if one can get past the terms, themselves, we see that the Stoics, like the Daoists, made it a priority to shed the impulses that distract one from the present activity. Everything outside of the present activity was viewed as a distraction because the present was understood as a meaningful and fruitful consummation of all the organic forces of the universe. Collecting oneself in the present and shedding all distractions, drives, and diversions, one was able to act in harmony with the cosmos.

Likewise, if the Stoics were so concerned with reason, one would think that they would have produced involved analytic treatises not unlike those of Aristotle or contemporary academics. Instead, they had a penchant for aphorisms. Rather than a matter of popular literary style, ideas were recorded as aphorisms so that they could be easily remembered and thus assimilated into one's character and then put to use on the spur of the moment. As Hadot says,

*Attention (prosoche) allows us to respond immediately to events, as if they were questions asked of us all of a sudden. In order for this to be possible, we must always have the fundamental principles "at hand" (procheiron). We are to steep ourselves in the rule of life (kanon), by mentally applying it to all life's possible different situations, just as we assimilate a grammatical or mathematical rule through practice, by applying it to individual cases. (Ibid., p. 85)*

In addition to an overall guiding rule of life, the numerous aphorisms and other preparatory visualizations (as we would put it in popular parlance today) were designed to prepare oneself for any situation. With such preparation, one could act effortlessly and appropriately under a variety of circumstances. In a very clear sense, we have here
syntactic practice exercises undertaken for the purpose of perfecting the open-ended activities of everyday life. One must visualize possibilities and how to react, one must assimilate rules for action, one must shed competing habits, one must employ a manageable set of tools in preparation for the conceptually unmanageable—just like practicing a set of grammar rules so that one can apply them in a variety of situations on the spur of the moment. Unlike possible circumstances for applying rules of grammar, the multiplicity of possible situations demanding appropriate action demands that attention be maintained constantly.

It is not clear in Hadot's account whether a robust sensitivity-and-response characteristic is cultivated. With the emphasis on reason and application of rules, it would appear not. Hadot does, however, emphasize that in order for this process to work properly, one's understanding and practice cannot be merely intellectual. Instead, they must be visceral, "affective" even, because the stakes are so high and the difficulties involved so profound. Nonetheless, there is no cultivation of affective sensitivity akin to that seen in early China, where knowledge was understood to be a matter of correctly perceiving the affective states of others rather than attaining an intellectual grasp of reason in the universe. Still, the Stoics give us one of the most tantalizing pictures of the cultivation of aesthetic spontaneity in the Western tradition. The other comes from Friedrich Schiller.

284 Ibid., p. 84.
b. Schiller

Schiller, who gave us the most elaborate account of aesthetic spontaneity in his well-developed theory of grace, also put a considerable amount of effort into a theory of aesthetic education. Schiller's commentators, Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby, summarize the hint of a program in his theory:

This conviction—that self-consciousness which is characteristic of human beings carries within it the possibility of transforming even our most highly reflective activities into a new kind of spontaneity—this conviction was the driving-force behind Schiller's major aesthetic essays. It was also responsible for the cultural theory which informs them: the theory that man's true destiny takes him from a first phase of unselfconsciousness, through a second phase of highly cerebral lucidity, on to a third phase which combines the virtues of both in what looks like a return but is in reality a progress.  

Unlike the Stoics and Epicureans, and even unlike Aristotle, Schiller does not offer a regimen for practice or an account of what exercises may influence the character in which ways. Instead, he maintains a strictly theoretical description of how art contributes to a flourishing life.

In a long essay entitled *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*, Schiller maintains the metaphysical dichotomies that we have rehearsed in Chapter 3. Building on these, he postulates three phases in the life of human beings—in a historical evolutionary sense for the species as a whole and in a developmental sense for individuals. He makes it clear that the separation and distinction of these phases are merely a heuristic device and that they are always simultaneously in play at any one time. In keeping with his pre-established dichotomy, he identifies the first two stages as sensate and intellectual, respectively, and the stage that unifies these contrary impulses is the aesthetic stage. In *On Grace and Dignity*, it was grace that unified these two metaphysical realms, and the

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only difference here is that the aesthetic field is expanded to beauty in general, or, as he also refers to it, the aesthetic.

For Schiller, beauty is not merely a property of an object. Instead it is both a state of being and an activity that is performed, and this bifurcation can conveniently be matched to the major categories of aesthetic spontaneity—wholeness and fluency. The basic understanding of beauty is in the apprehension of an object as a form. Ascending out of the primary sensate stage in which the individual is undifferentiated from the multifarious objects of sense which stimulate one's impulses to unselfconscious action, contemplation of objects as objects initiates a sense of subjectivity. This is the beginning of the stage of idea in which the individual is wrenched away from matter in its particularity to universal abstractions. While a productive distance is generated away from the commands of the passions, the resultant intellectualism remains aloof from the sensate and yet tied to matter and selfish in isolation, pursuing personal well-being above all. The contemplation of beauty as a form manages to bring the intellect back to the sensate but while maintaining a productive distance. This contemplation results in a cognitive unity that is the precursor to any possibility of fluent action. Without this kind of collection, the individual is either a slave to passion or a domineering will. The particulars of life which used to draw one in all directions are abstracted away to a safe distance and feelings that are engendered by the sustained contact with the sensate via contemplation of beautiful form impinges on the legislation of the will. This is the moment that makes all future aesthetic considerations possible. And when both the sensate realm and the intellectual realm have been equally transcended through a
harmonious unity, the drives and distractions that were constantly impelling the individual away from the center have been shed, allowing for calm and mellifluous interaction of the individual with the environment.

When this kind of wholeness has been achieved, the "aesthetic mode of psyche" gives rise to freedom, and in this freedom, one's senses open to the world with a sensitivity previously lacking. "A complete sensitivity in his whole way of feeling" occurs, prompting responses in both cognition and action. The fluency notions of ease and responsiveness can both be found in Schiller's understanding of play as the second primary feature of beauty. In a resonant dichotomy, Schiller distinguishes two central attributes of beauty--semblance and play. Semblance is the formal nature of art that simultaneously frees us from the constraints of reality while also bringing us face to face with reality. Unlike the disengaged beauty experienced by the connoisseur, Schiller's conception of beauty is activating. With the very beginning of contemplation, there arises the impulse to recreate nature in patterns that cohere with forms that arise from the imagination. The individual first begins embellishing in a crude way but is soon fashioning forms entirely distinct from the particulars of reality. This activity, Schiller says, is a kind of play. Like the frolicking of animals and the dancing of sunbeams, in aesthetic play there is a "superabundance of life [which] is its own incentive to action."288

286 Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, p. 191.
287 Ibid., p. 205.
288 Ibid, p. 207.
This "free activity"\textsuperscript{289} should not be confused with wantonness, randomness, or bohemianism. It is, rather, the inception of cultural forms. Aesthetic education is thus a progression of awareness and resultant transformation that engenders increasing levels of sensitivity and responsiveness:

The form of his judgments has thus undergone an astonishing change: he seeks [objects of beauty], not because they give him something to enjoy passively, but because they provide an incentive to respond actively. They please him, not because they meet a need, but because they satisfy a law which speaks . . . in his breast.\textsuperscript{290}

And semblance, as well, must be characterized by the two properties of honesty and autonomy. If lacking either of these, then in its bias either toward claims on reality (dishonesty) or towards becoming subject to reality (heteronomy) all aesthetic appeal is lost. In both play and semblance, aesthetics is shown to be fundamentally moral. As aesthetic sensitivity (or taste) increases, it inculcates the forms of social behavior—"not . . . some soulless imitation of the manners and morals of others, but . . . the aesthetic nature we have made our own."\textsuperscript{291} This is the characteristic of grace that was detailed above.

Aesthetic education for Schiller, then, consists in expanding awareness of objects of beauty and decreasing competing drives. As a result, one is able to function "with undismayed simplicity and tranquil innocence, through even the most involved and complex situations, free . . . of the compulsion to infringe the freedom of others in order to assert [one's] own."\textsuperscript{292} Like the Stoics, Schiller strives for achieving aesthetic spontaneity in the realm of open-ended activities, in the multifarious realm of the moral actions of everyday life.

\textsuperscript{289} Ibid., p. 209.
\textsuperscript{290} Ibid., p. 211.
\textsuperscript{291} Ibid., p. 219.
\textsuperscript{292} Op., cit.
Summary

Drawing from the resources gained in previous chapters and on the notion of high art in early China, in this chapter I make a new distinction in the categorization of the arts. Arts that fall under the new category of somatic arts are those in which the artist's actions as executed are integral to the aesthetic success of the work. This distinction allows us to see that there is an entire category of arts for which aesthetic spontaneity is a predominant feature.

Spontaneity in Western aesthetics most often associated with improvisation, so I examine in depth the meaning of improvisation, finally distinguishing 6 distinct kinds and differentiating them from aesthetic spontaneity. The graph from Chapter 4 proves instrumental in this distinction.

With spontaneity identified as a desirable quality in action, the obvious question that arises is whether or not there is a way to cultivate it. Drawing on insights from experimental psychology and from the same graph, I demonstrate that spontaneity is easiest to cultivate in the activities located at the center of the graph. The spontaneity of open-ended activities and of stylized activities is most difficult. This simple arrangement of activities shows why moral training must begin with forms and syntax if an open-ended morality is to succeed.

Although I have not developed a single line of argument throughout this work, I hope that I have succeeded in bringing to light a significant concept from early Chinese philosophy, demonstrated that it is latent in Western theories, and shown how it can
enrich philosophical speculation today. The advances that I've proposed do not by any means exhaust the subject and instead open a number of doors for further research.
APPENDIX A: ON SELF-NATURE AND AFFECTIVITY - TRANSLATION

On Nature and Affectivity

1.

Although people have natures, the heart has no set direction.

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This translation is based on Li Ling’s transcription of the Shanghai Museum manuscript (Li Ling, 2002) but with additions from his Guodian manuscript. The basis is the Shanghai manuscript rather than the Guodian because Li Ling’s examining both texts together has resulted in emendations that are available only in this edition. The Chinese accompanying this translation is thus a recension of the combined texts (I have modified Li Ling’s punctuation and added paragraph breaks).

The Guodian version of this text is most often referred to as Xing Zi Ming Chu. Li Ling entitles his Shanghai recension, but with a note that he would prefer to call it simply xing if only that term didn’t have such strong sexual connotations in Modern Chinese. Although English does not present the same difficulty, I prefer to remain with the already established custom of including qing in the title to emphasize the large role that affectivity plays in this text, which is unique in this way among early texts.

Regarding which of the two versions of the text is earlier or whether they come from two lines of transmission of the same ur-text, the criteria for such speculation rely on accounting for large discrepancies between the two manuscripts. If there is more of one text than another, was it an addition or a deletion? It is commonly accepted that early texts tended to accumulate. If this is so, then the Guodian, with slightly more lines of text would be the later version. If it is the later version, should we consider the interpolated lines a corruption of the original? Would the Shanghai version then be the authentic version? Such questions are worth exploring, but for purposes of this translation, I take both manuscripts to be authentic and of equal worth.

Each numbered section here begins in Chinese with the term fan (generally). As it seems as much about marking a change of topic as about indicating generality, and since in English, merely making a statement in the present tense indicates generality, I do not translate it explicitly when it heads a chapter.

The Shanghai manuscript has sheng 生 instead of xing 性 but later uses xing, consistently matching the Guodian. Ma Chengyuan (2001) notes that 生 was occasionally used for 性 even in transmitted texts. The actual character interpreted as xing 性 is written sheng 崣 in Chu Script, a form never, until now, identified with the word now signified by 性. That 生 is common to all three forms indicates that the phonetic it marks was the basic identifying feature used by the scribes. The phonetic use of characters is a salient feature of Chu Script texts, resulting in the use of a number of characters that differ in details from standard characters. From here forward, I’ll confine my comments to the standard forms of characters as transcribed, unless there is a compelling reason to refer to the Chu Script.

As for the meaning of the word in question, in the context of Pre-Han works, "nature" refers to a persons', creature's, or thing's characteristics and to tendencies toward affectivity and action. These characteristics and tendencies are viewed as at first being innate, but, as made explicit later in this text (e.g. Chapter 5), one's nature is malleable and should not be conceived of as connoting a Hellenic ineluctability. Among other sources, see Scarpelli 2003 for more on dynamic and static aspects of inborn nature in pre-Han philosophy. Compare Shang Shu, Tai Jia, "茲乃不義，習與性成 (this is not right, and [yet] by habit it becomes [second] nature)". To distinguish from nature in the larger sense, I translate "self-nature", when appropriate.
It activates only after contact with the external world.

It acts only when pleased to do so.

It becomes set (in direction) only through habit.

Self-nature is a matter of emotional qi,

and when manifested outwardly, the external world has drawn it out. (S1)

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296 Depending on context, one could accurately translate xin as "mind", "heart", or "heartmind". As the context here stresses affective faculties, the natural choice would be "heart", but that should not be taken to indicate affectivity at the expense of reason, as both are always implied.

297 Throughout, interpreting wang as wu.

298 Shanghai has zheng here instead of ding, but later uses ding, consistent with Guodian.

299 Although "activate" is most commonly a transitive verb, drawing on its intransitive sense is the best rendering of zuo.

300 Wu in this document connotes objects of perception, but not in a passive sense. Rather than an active-subject/passive-object dichotomy, subject and object are both active, or activating, and therefore mutually entailed.

301 Notice that the form of what we might call 'will' here is affective, yue (pleased) fundamentally meaning a feeling of cheerful contentment.

302 Habit is a tendency to act in a certain way, cultivated through repetition of that action, which in early China was believed to be able to alter one's nature. See Shang Shu quotation in note 3 above.

303 The Chinese has "xi mu ai bei", an example of the common synecdochic reference to emotions, as distinguished from qing.

304 Qi is a term that defies translation, and because it has entered the English language (cf. Random House Unabridged Dictionary (New York: Random House, 1993), "chi ... the vital life force in the body," p. 356), it is best to leave it in modern transliteration. One should note, however, that (in contrast to a generic material/energetic building block of matter) the term is used in a variety of specific senses in early literature, this being one of them.

305 As mentioned in Chapter 1, jian 見 is a numismatic term meaning both to be manifest and to see (what is manifest), depending on one's perspective.

306 Wan wu can best be understood as "things" in the broadest sense, to include people, creatures, material objects, and incidents, with an emphasis on their being of the external world. In a qi cosmology, the border between internal and external is not as distinct as in a substantive, individuated cosmology. Qing and qi, for instance, are both internal and external. Xing and xin, however, would appear to be only internal, while wan wu would appear to be only external.

307 Most commonly understood as to grab, to grasp, to select, qu here means to draw out, elicit. For a similar use, see Huangdineijing, e.g. to draw blood/qi.

308 Parenthetic "S" followed by a numeral refers to consecutive bamboo strips of the Shanghai manuscript, signifying that the end of the strip occurs in the line so marked.
Self-nature issues from destiny\footnote{Like self-nature, a person's destiny is also viewed as malleable. In an early Chinese context, one must be sure to divorce both inborn nature and destiny from any notion of ineluctable fate. "Destiny" refers to the circumstances in which one is born, including one's own capacities, and refers also to what one has to work with in making one's way.},

and destiny descends from the heavens\footnote{Translating  
\textit{tian} is problematic, as it simultaneously bears senses of nature, sky, and divinity but the latter in a very different sense from that of the modern Abrahamic religions with which we are so familiar. An early Chinese heaven did include a notion of supernatural power and there was a limited anthropomorphism to it; it was even understood at times, in a narrow sense as a supernatural abode. However, it was not understood exclusively as the abode of an omnipotent god or as a salvific abode for the afterlife of pious human souls. Nevertheless, there is obviously the sense here of communication coming down from a supernatural realm located above the human realm. It can be translated Heaven, heavens, or nature, depending on context, but with the understanding that the overlap those terms as traditionally used in English is far from complete. Roger Ames opts for the most conservative way, which is to simply transliterate. Although transliteration is a valid option, as in the case of \textit{qi}, there seems to be enough semantic overlap in the case of \textit{tian} to allow translation, although one must heed Ames' warnings against importing Abrahamic theologies into a Chinese cosmology.}

One's path\footnote{Here, it is apparent that \textit{dao} is not a metaphysical, cosmogonic source, but an individual path. It should be kept in mind when interpreting this term that whether it is nominalized or in verbal form (as in "making one's way") is often pregnantly ambiguous. In addition, whether it is a following or a making is similarly ambiguous, with the following being one not of rule following but of flowing with. Notice that the Guodian character further echoes the active implications of the traditional graph. The traditional graph is the graph \textit{shou} (head) plus the graph \textit{chuo} (run), indicating a person moving in some direction. The Guodian graph has the character "\textit{ren} (person)" in the middle of the character "\textit{xing} (walk/act)" (similar to a Chunqiu bronze inscription that has "\textit{shou}" inside "\textit{xing}" (He, 1998, p. 194.).) The very active sense of this term, and its obviously active use in this text, calls into question interpretations of the first line of the \textit{Laozi} that would interpret its second instance there as "speak". A way is apparently walked, made, followed (flowed with), etc.} begins in affectivity\footnote{Translating \textit{qing} as affectivity, with the understanding that it is both internal and external, psychological and causal.},

and affectivity arises from one's nature\footnote{Tang Yijie (2003) paraphrases the second through fourth lines of this paragraph as follows: the human \textit{dao} (the norms of personal and social conduct) exists from the start on account of shared emotions (\textit{qinggan} 情感) among people. The \textit{qing} of emotions (\textit{xi, nu, ai, le} 喜怒哀樂) emerges out of human \textit{xing}, and human \textit{xing} is conferred by \textit{tian} (human \textit{xing} are obtained from \textit{ming}, which \textit{tian} confers). \textit{Tian ming} is the inevitability and the teleology made manifest by \textit{tian}.}

In the beginning, one is closest to affectivity,

and in the end, one is closest to rightness.

One who understands\footnote{Translating \textit{ming} as destinies, with the understanding that it is both the inevitability and the teleology made manifest by \textit{tian}.} affectivity can convey\footnote{\textit{Tian ming} is the inevitability and the teleology made manifest by \textit{tian}.} it,
and one who understands rightness can internalize it.

One's preferences are a matter of self-nature, (S2)
but what one prefers are the things of the external world.

Whether one is good or not is a matter of self-nature,
but what one takes as good or not is a matter of propensity.

2.
Whenever self-nature is in control, things have drawn it out.

Metal and stone sound only when they are rapped; (S3)
even though {humans} have natures, those find expression only when the heart draws them out.  

Knowledge in an early Chinese sense must always be interpreted as assimilation for practical ends, hence, understanding.

Most often meaning "to go out", chu here means "to send out", and by extension, "to get across", hence, "to convey".

A ru B, typically means "A enters B", but here it would seem to mean A internalizes B. Both Qiu Xigui (for the Guodian (Qiu, 1998)) and Ma Chengyuan transcribe this character as nei 內 (internal), which Qiu interprets as na 内 (to bring in).

Metal and stone refers to important ceremonial musical instruments, namely bronze bells and stone chimes. See So 2000 for more on early musical instruments.

It is worth noting that the character sheng 聲 (sound) occurs eleven times in this text. Nine of the times, it is best interpreted as sheng 聲 (sound), once as ting 听 (listen), and only once as "sage".

Curled brackets indicate Li Ling's (unless otherwise noted) interpolations of passages that are missing or illegible in both the Guodian and Shanghai manuscripts.

Li Ling places a comma after xin 心 (heart) instead of after xing 性 (nature), in which case, the translation would be, "even though {humans} have natures and hearts, those find expression only when drawn out". Qiu Xigui has no comma. This passage does not appear in the Shanghai manuscript. There is a crucial distinction that depends on the placement of this comma. If Li Ling is correct, then the self-nature and the heart differ little in their function and relationship to the external world. If the comma follows xing, however, then the heart can play a mediating role between self-nature and the external world, which I take to be a major theme of this work (see especially Chapter 4).
3.

Whenever the heart has direction,
it does not {happen} without there being something in which to participate\textsuperscript{321}.

{The inability of people} to act alone
is like the inability of the mouth to converse alone.

After birth, cattle grow;
and geese stretch.

{This is due to} their inborn natures;
{humans}, however, have the potential to develop through learning.

4.

In [using] things of the external world, there is typically no difference [among people]:
of a hard tree, [everyone] takes advantage of the hardness;
of a pliant rope, [everyone] takes advantage of the pliancy.

[Likewise,] self-nature is the same everywhere,
but in using the mind, each person is different,

\textsuperscript{321} In Li Ling 2003, Li renders the character in question "\textit{ju} 興 (to hold up)", which must be a mistake, since in Li Ling 1999, he renders it "\textit{yu} 興 (to participate)", as do Qiu Xigui and Ma Chengyuan. Li makes no note here. Different characters appear in Guodian and Shanghai, but for each occurrence (Guodian slips 6, 22, 46, 48; Shanghai slips 13, 38, 39), Li consistently renders them 興, except for the occurrence here, where in fact, there is no character at all in the Shanghai, that part of the slip having been broken off. The character \textit{ju} 興 occurs three other times in Li's transcription, but represented by markedly different, and consistently different (except for one simplification), slip originals. The He and Teng dictionaries corroborate that this character should be \textit{yu} 興 (although Teng does mention a 趙孔布, in which \textit{yu} 興 appears to be a variant of \textit{Ju} 興, but this is an exception based on \textit{ju} 興 being a homophone of \textit{ju} 居, part of a place name).
and it is instruction that allows for the difference.

5.
Self-nature can be moved, accepted,\(^{322}\)
polished,\(^{322}\)
externalized\(^{322}\), (S4)\(^{324}\)
nurtured,
and extended.

6.
What moves self-nature are the things of the external world;
what accepts it is one's being pleased;
what interacts with it are affairs;
what polishes it is rightness\(^{325}\);

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\(^{322}\) The term \(ni\) (resist) here is problematic. *Shuowen Jiezi* actually glosses it as *ying* (meet), and it can also mean "accept/receive". Although *nixing* occurs nowhere in early texts, *niming* does, and it can mean both to disobey an order and to obey (accept) an order. In addition, it is not certain that the character in question is \(ni\). In his Guodian recension, Qiu Xigui renders it 迍, but with a question mark. I wonder if it could be \(da\) (arrive/achieve). *Daxing* occurs in *Jiazixiu* and *Wenzi*, both in relation to following or accepting one's *qing* (affectivity).

\(^{323}\) Here and in the next chapter, Li Ling renders this character *chu* (to stitch), while both Qiu Xigui and Ma Chengyuan render it *chu* (out).

\(^{324}\) The passage from "Even though humans" in Chapter 2 through "it is the pliancy that draws out one's nature and heart" in Chapter 4, does not occur in the Shanghai manuscript and is introduced from Guodian. Li Ling notes that the number of missing characters exactly equals those on two bamboo strips, speculating that two strips have gone missing from the original Shanghai manuscript.
what externalizes it is propensity; (S5)
what nurtures it is habit;
what extends it is one's path.

7.
The things of the external world are all the things that are manifest.
To be pleased with something is to be animated by it.
Propensity is the propulsion behind a thing of the external world.
An affair is something involving human action. (S6)
Rightness is any good positioning.
Habit involves the habituation of one's nature.
A path is the path that any external thing follows.

8.
For a path, one's mood\textsuperscript{326} is primary. (S7)

\textsuperscript{325} The excavated manuscripts bring to relief the problem of interpreting the term traditionally written 義 (yi). In these manuscripts, we not only find this character in its traditional form, we also find it written 宜 (yi), with nothing obvious accounting for the change. To complicate things, we also find the character 宜 (appropriate) sometimes carrying its traditional meaning apart from yi 義 (right). In short, it appears that there are two distinct words and two distinct characters, that one character can designate both words while the other character can only designate one, and that an interpreter must make the distinction based on context alone. Despite this confusion, we can conclude that the common interpretation of yi 義 as duty is too stringent (see Rickett, Guanzi, vol. 2, pp. 5-6). Yi 宜 means appropriate, and its doubling for yi 義 demonstrates that yi 義 is more concerned with comporting one's actions to circumstances than to moral imperatives. There has not been much scholarship done in English on what we can learn from the excavated manuscripts in regard to early thought, but this point is certainly a significant lesson.

\textsuperscript{326} An important contribution of the Guodian and Shanghai texts to contemporary sinology is their ability to reintroduce us to the tradition of the Liji, a text that although having been compiled into its present form in the Han dynasty and containing some material from that period, also contains important pre-Han
philosophical material. Jeffrey Riegel warns against too hastily "assuming that parts of the Liji originated in pre-Han texts" (Loewe, 1993, pp. 295-296), but the similarity in content and language of excavated texts to parts of the Liji may be cause to reconsider this warning. The mention of xinshu 心術 is an example. This term, through its prominence as chapter titles in the Guanzi is often associated with Daoist esoteric practices. It may, indeed, have a history as such, considering its use in Guiguzi, where it is used in an unequivocally mystical sense. However, if we survey the early literature for this term, we find that apart from Guiguzi, xinshu appears in contexts that have little to do with mysticism or with "patterns of mental behavior" as Rickett (1998, p. 22) renders it in his translation of Guanzi. He translates the chapter titles there "Art of the Mind". One problem with Rickett's rendering is interpreting xin as an organ of mentation. In Western thinking, this immediately divorces it from emotion, which, I argue, has the more call to prominence. A second problem is understanding shu as an art or a pattern, or a skill (as Graham says, in his Chuang-foo, 1989, p. 261). If shu is to be understood as method or technique, another way of articulating the term in Classical Chinese would be xin zhi shu 心之術, with zhishu modifying xin, but this never occurs in early texts (we do see zhishu modifying yongxin 用心 and zhiqiyangxin 治氣養心). This could be a happenstance of rules of syntax or it may be that xinshu is a single term rather than a noun phrase. Nevertheless, in Xunzi we could be speaking of two terms, xin and shu even though they may appear in concatenation. This may go as well for Guanzi and Guiguzi. But in Huainanzi, Hanshiwaizhuan, Liji, Mozi, Wenz, and Zhuangzei, the other early texts where xinshu appears (it also appears in Qianhan and Shuoyuan, but they are repetitions of lines form Liji, perhaps reflecting the wide influence of the passages; it also occurs once in Heguanzi, where it is ambiguous), the term appears to be an indivisible unit of vocabulary, often with clear affective content. In the Huainanzi (Chapter 7), Hanshiwaizuan (Chapter 2), and Wenz (Chapters 3 and 4), the term appears in the same expression, in parallel with other affective terms in admonition of psychic control, very similar to this chapter of On Nature and Affectivity. It is Further explicated as "not recklessly following emotions". In Zhuangzei (Chapter 13), the five branches extending from a sage's root are de 德 (character), jiao 教 (instruction), zhi 政 (governing), le 業 (joy/enjoyment/entertainment/music), and ai 哀 (grief), which all require xinshu. Even if one takes the xinshu as xin zhi shu, there is still an obvious affective content. In the "Yueji (Record of Music)" chapter of the Liji, affectivity seems to take over completely, but in a sense distinct from the standard emotions. Section 11, says that when a person is undisturbed by the standard emotions (xì, nu, ai, le) and motion is activated by resonant contact with external things, xinshu xin yan 心術形焉 (xinshu take form). It goes on to illustrate that if the external things are distinct kinds of music, the xinshu that take form are anxious contemplation, robust joy, firm determination, solemn reverence, compassionate caring, and base confusion. The next section elaborates on how, through self-control, ritual propriety, and the practice of rightness, one may temper emotions in a harmonious way. If these xinshu are affective but not emotional, per se, what may we call them? Perhaps "states of mind", or, to emphasize the affective content, "moods". Robert Solomon, in what is a standard distinction, distinguishes moods as, "generalized emotions" (Solomon, 1976, p. 133), meaning that they have no object. Martha Nussbaum accepts this distinction, with the clarification in an extended discussion of music (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 272) that music elicits emotions and not moods. Because she accepts that the line demarcating the two is often vague, however, and because I find her distinction overwrought, I would follow the Chinese and maintain that music can elicit both emotions and moods.

Note that this section is summed up just prior to the end with reference to the mood of reverence.
A path can be a matter of four methods\textsuperscript{327}, and of them, only the [highest] human path can be followed.

The other three methods lead and that is all.\textsuperscript{328}

The initial expressions of poetry, writing, and ritual and music all arise in the human being. (S8)

\textsuperscript{327} There are three mentions of si shu 四術 in early literature. The Sizi mentions "four methods" of governing (zhong ai 忠愛 (conscientiousness and care), wu si 無私 (selflessness), 用賢 (employing worthies), and du liang 度量 (using measure)). The Jiayixinshu mentions four methods of speech (chaoting 朝廷(court), jisi 祭祀 (sacrificial), junzu 軍旅 (military), and sangjifū 哀紀 (mourning). In the Liji, the "four methods" appear in association with the "four instructions", and the four instructions are identified as the classic titles Shijing, Shuojing, Liji, and Yuejing (now lost). No explanation is given of the four methods, and they are not equated with the four instructions. Incidentally, san shu 三術 in the next line, appears in nine early texts in a variety of contexts, from three ways to cultivate conscientiousness to three ways to destroy a state. Also incidentally, sijiao 四教 occurs in three other texts besides the Liji, two of which (Lunyu and Yizhoushu) specify the four instructions, each set different from the other.

\textsuperscript{328} These three lines are difficult to interpret--from shu 術 in the first line to four shu in the second, and then from dao 道 in the second line to "the other three" shu in the third line, and then another dao. Ma Chengyuan takes the "four methods" as poetry, writing, propriety, and music, citing textual evidence of the four as si jiao 四教 the four instructions and their textual association with si shu 四術. But Ma does not venture to explain how this problematizes "the other three methods" in the third line. Perhaps the best way to interpret these lines is to follow Li Ling and take xin shu as one of the four methods (still, in my understanding, taking it as "moods" but allowing the play on words), the other three being, poetry, writing, and propriety and music (propriety and music as one). The key is to understand moods as the human path in line two. The moods, being in control, lead one (ke dao 可道) in interactions with things, setting the tone for our actions and reactions. Poetry, writing, and propriety and music, on the other hand, merely guide by being forms of instruction. The subtle difference, I believe, between ke dao (can be followed) and dao zhi (to lead/guide) is that the former is internal and the latter external. All four methods are essential to effective conduct, but moods, which are interior and which arise through inner responses to inner feelings and external stimuli (such as music) shape our responses to the world. The other three methods are all external stimuli that shape our character and our moods. It appears, then, that the internal (xinshu) shaping (our view of) the external is more primary than the external (the other three) shaping the internal, but there is an interesting hermeneutic circle in which none is dispensable. Even under this interpretation, the question still arises as to why moods are considered the "human dao ren dao 人道" and the other three are not. Are the other three somehow not human? It could be that the use of ren 人 marks a superlative distinction, in the sense that through self-cultivation one becomes the best kind of person. This person's path is the highest path and a prominent feature of it is xinshu. This is not to say that poetry, writing, and propriety and music are not human but that they, despite their being essential, are in some sense of secondary consideration by dint of their being external. Note that the final line of Chapter 19 is nearly identical to the second line of Chapter 8, and Chapter 19 also focuses on the importance of affectivity in instruction.
Poetry is the semblance of deeds;
writing is the narration of deeds;
propriety and music are the elevation\textsuperscript{329} of deeds.
Sages bring all of these various kinds\textsuperscript{330} [of deeds] in for discussion.
They observe their beginnings and ends, and then flow or not with them [accordingly];
(S9)
they intuit their rightness, and temper or refine\textsuperscript{331} them [as necessary];
they comprehend the affectivity involved, expressing or internalizing it [as appropriate];\textsuperscript{332}
And so [in this way], they turn them into instruction.
This is how instruction arises inside one as character.

Propriety activates in affectivity\textsuperscript{333} and furthers it. (S10)

\textsuperscript{329} Elevation as models.
\textsuperscript{330} Citing textual evidence from  \textit{Mengzi} and \textit{Liji}, Ma Chengyuan notes that \textit{lei} 類 (kind) may best be interpreted as "affairs", tangentially supporting the interpretation, "kinds [of deeds]".
\textsuperscript{331} There is disagreement regarding the transcription of the character that Li transcribes as \textit{wen} 文. Qiu chooses \textit{du} 度, and Ma renders it \textit{qu} 取. Looking at the Teng and He dictionaries, the slip character does not closely resemble any recorded form of these characters, coming closest to \textit{qu} 取 (although still significantly different from the obvious occurrences of \textit{qu} 取 in other places of this text). Li actually takes the character as \textit{min} 敏, a homophone of \textit{wen} 文. From the parallelism of theses three lines, it would appear that the term must be contrastive to \textit{jie} 節, which would immediately discount both \textit{du} 度 and \textit{qu} 取, while working in favor of \textit{wen}--the contrast being to suppress (jie) versus to express (wen). Looking to literature of the same period, we find 29 mentions of jiewen 節文 in the Han and Pre-Han corpus, especially in the \textit{Guanzi}, \textit{Liji}, and \textit{Xunzi}, virtually all of which describe how to manage the emotions (mentioned several times with the term \textit{qing} 情) with reference to propriety and rightness. Jiedu occurs 23 times in the same corpus but mostly in later texts (esp. \textit{Lunheng}, \textit{Qianhanji}, and \textit{Taipingjing}) and with reference to the regulation of natural rhythms. The only exception is a single reference in the \textit{Guoyu}, explicatd in the following terms, 節則節度. This occurs in a description of the Confucian virtues and their results, but, significantly, no mention is made of emotions.
\textsuperscript{332} Each of these three lines describes how sages use the three methods as guides, observing and understanding deeds of the past in order to act appropriately in similar circumstances in their own lives.
When affairs are in accord with prevailing norms and institutionalized as such, when their sequence is ordered, then they are appropriate to a path.

And when this order is further tempered, there is refinement. (S11)

Tempering is the use of refinement in one's visage and bearing.

Exemplary persons bring aesthetic considerations to their affectivity, discipline their rightness, improve their tempering, beautify their facial expressions, take joy in their paths, and take pleasure in their instruction; in this way, there is reverence in [one's every movement].

In paying respect, refinement is how {one accomplishes reverence};\(^{334}\) (S12) in regard to valuables [used in paying respect], they are symbols of how one fulfills faithfulness;

and the display of each of these is done appropriate to one's path.

Laughter is a shallow expression of delight;
music\(^{335}\) is a profound expression of it. (S13)

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\(^{333}\) In the Guodian Yucong 2, there is a similar phrase, "li sheng yu qing 禮生於情 (propriety arises in affectivity).

\(^{334}\) Three characters of this line are impossible to make out in both manuscripts. The third to last is clear but indecipherable. Wen 文 takes the same form as above, but here, while Ma sticks with qu 取, Qiu leaves it undeciphered, and Li opts for min 敏, but without explanation of why he chooses that over wen 文. I see no reason not to be consistent and stay with wen 文. Considering context and an assumed loose parallelism with the succeeding line, I take the missing characters to be something like wei jing ye 為敬為.
Sound that emanates from affectivity is faithful to it,
And when it subsequently enters and stirs one's heart, it is profound.
When one hears the sound of laughter, one feels the buoyancy, as if delighted, oneself.
When one hears a folk song, one feels the upsurge, as if emotional, oneself. (S 14)
When one listens to zithers, one feels agitated, as if lamenting, oneself.
When one witnesses the Lai and Wu performances, one feels angry, as if [enough] to go into action, oneself.
When one witness the Shao and Xia performances, one feels motivated, as if enough to turn over a new leaf. (S 15)

335 Joy/enjoyment/entertainment/music.
336 Li renders the final character of this line gou 狗, noting that it likely means duo 多 (much). In his Guodian version, he had followed Qiu Xigui, who renders it hou 厚 (substantial/sincere), which is also how Ma Chengyuan interprets it (though Ma transcribes it gou 狗 (to hit)). If, as Li claims, the term is indeed gou 狗, it would be the first occurrence in Chinese literature and would predate the next occurrence by several hundred years, when it appears in the Wen Xuan. For this reason, I follow Qiu and Ma.
337 The character is sheng 聲 (sage), interpreted as ting 聽 (listen). Ting and wen appear to map fairly directly to English "listen" and "hear", but it is not clear why a folk song is merely heard, while a zither is listened to. Perhaps the distinction marks an implicit valuation of the each medium with regard to its cultural significance. While I can find several mentions of listening to zithers in early literature, I cannot find any of listening to folk songs. Another small point: that ting (listen) and sheng (sound) are both represented by 聽, demonstrates the numismatic use of this graph--given the event of a sound being heard, there are objective and subjective perspectives. 聽 refers to the event and is interpreted as ting or sheng according to perspective. A sage is one who excels at listening and communicating (for an etymological examination of sage as master communicator, see Hall and Ames (1987), pp. 257ff).
338 The Chinese is nan 難 (difficulty) in the Shanghai manuscript and nan 懇 (respectful) in the Guodian. Throughout the Guodian manuscript, both 難 and 懇 are used distinctly, the first as "difficulty" and the second as a loan for tan 嘆 (sigh/lament). In the Shanghai manuscript, only 懇 is used. Ma Chengyuan occasionally takes 懇 in the Shanghai manuscript as nan 懇 (respectful). However, this cannot work consistently (see the fourth to last line of Chapter 12, for example, which, incidentally does not appear in the Shanghai edition), so where 懇 appears in Guodian, I follow Li Ling and take it as a loan for tan 嘆.
339 These four performances are of obscure origin but appear to have been eponymous.
Reflecting long [on these] moves one's heart, as if to sigh.

And dwelling long on them,

one reverts to goodness and returns to a beginning with [renewed] awareness.

When [the process of] stimulus and expression flows smoothly, it is the beginnings of

one's character.

One may disapprove of the [the lewd] music of Zheng and Wei, but [on hearing it] one

will follow it nonetheless. (S16)

10.

Ancient music\textsuperscript{340} opens\textsuperscript{341} one's heart

by fostering joy and by being amply suggestive,

and in these ways it acts as instruction to people.

The \textit{Lai, Wu, Shao} and \textit{Xia} performances elicit affectivity [to this end].\textsuperscript{342}

11.

The extreme of joy is inevitably tragic (S17)

\begin{footnotesize}

\begin{itemize}
\item ritual dances to very ancient songs. The \textit{Lai} song is said to commemorate the enfeoffments of King Wu's (c. 1049-1043 BCE) vassals immediately following his conquest of the Shang and is still preserved in the \textit{Shijing} (#295). The \textit{Wu} song (or grouping of songs) is said to have commemorated the conquest itself. The \textit{Shao} and \textit{Xia} songs are said to have been written by the legendary virtuous sage kings Shun and Yu.
\item The character \textit{le(yao)/yue} 樂 (joy/music) appears here and five more times in the next nine lines. Here, it obviously means music, and in the final occurrence, it obviously means joy, but where exactly the transition occurs, and whether or not one meaning excludes the other, is open to question. The most problematic passage is at the end of this chapter.
\item Li transcribes this character \textit{long} 長 (mound) and wonders whether it is a loan for \textit{nong} 畜.
\item The fourth line of the Chinese appears to have an implied object for the verb \textit{qu} 取, and the fifth line appears to have an implied verb for the noun \textit{qing} 情, suggesting that the two lines can be combined, each complementing the other.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
as is that of lamentation
because they take affectivity to the extreme.
Grief and joy are very close in nature,
[even if] the causes in the heart are far apart.
When lamentation moves the heart, there is a [roiling] of extremes,
as ardent as desperate longing, (S18)
ending in pensiveness.
When joy moves the heart, there is a profound upsurge,
and at its most ardent\(^{343}\), it is as tumultuous as sorrow,
trailing off into reflection.

12.
Anxious reflection precedes tragedy; (S19)
joyful reflection precedes overexcitement.
Reflection is the compounding of the heart's activity,
and it is an aspect of reflection to give voice to it.

As the sound [of one's affective expression] changes, the heart follows;
as the heart changes, sound follows again in turn. (S20)

\(^{343}\) The character that Ma Chengyuan transcribes as \textit{ba} 拔 (to pluck), appears here, in slip 30, and,
according to Ma, also in slip 14 (probably also at the beginning of slip 19, where it is illegible). Li renders
it \textit{bo} 撥 in slip 14 and \textit{lie} 烈 elsewhere. In the Guodian manuscript, the character appears to be
substantially the same, and Qiu Xigui and Li agree that there are two different characters, except that rather
than \textit{lie}, they transcribe the second as \textit{yang} 失 with a \textit{dao} 刃 radical (which Li, in the Shanghai edition,
says should be corrected to \textit{lie}).
Moans follow sorrow,
and [gleeful] shouts follow joy;
Anguish\textsuperscript{344} [can] follow vocalization,
and outbursts follow [the affectivity of] the heart.

Delight then upsurge,\textsuperscript{345}
upsurge then excitement,
excitement then singing,
singing then cavorting,
cavorting then dancing;
dancing is the culmination of delight.

Indignation then anxiety,
anxiety then melancholy,
melancholy then sighing,
sighing then pacing,
pacing then frenzy;
frenzy is the culmination of indignation.\textsuperscript{346}

\textsuperscript{344} Ma suggests that this and the following line refer back to the fifth and sixth lines of this chapter. This sounds reasonable, but the connection remains obscure. The term in question here is transcribed as 秋 with a 言 radical (a character without precedent) then interpreted by Li and Ma as 嘆. In keeping with context, interpreting it as chou 慥 would seem to make more sense, suggesting an example of emotion arising from sound.

\textsuperscript{345} The lines from xi si tao 喜则陶 (delight then upsurge), to yong wen zhi zong ye 馳，恤之終也 (Frenzy is the culmination of indignation), are absent from the Shanghai manuscript.
13.

Human affectivity is something to be pleased about.

If an affective stimulation is worth responding to, even if excessive it is not to be reviled.

If an affective situation is not worth responding to, even if a great feat it is not to prized.

(S21)

Those who [achieve a level of] implicit faithfulness [in the eyes of others] are [able to do so by] bringing aesthetic considerations to their affectivity.

Those who bring the people to constancy without instruction have good self-natures.

Those who encourage the people without [using] rewards yearn for good fortune [all around]. (S22)

Those who strike awe into the people without [using] punishment have awesome hearts.

Those who are lowly and yet prized by the people have character.

Those who are poor and yet whom the people gather around have a path.

Those who are joyful living in solitude have an inner motivation. (S23)

Those who can be detested but not denied have achieved rightness.

Those who can be denied but not detested have become replete with ren.

Those who act without transgression have come to understand their paths. (S24)

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346 There is a black mark on the bamboo slip at this point. In other Chu texts, these marks represent major divisions in a text. In this text, however, they can appear not only at the end of a section, as here, but at the end of a line within a section and even within a line. Because it is not clear what the mark signifies, it is best to ignore it until it can be deciphered.

347 The character for this term is obscure, and even more so in the Guodian manuscript.
Of those who fail to understand themselves but also do not complain of others, 
even though stimulated to affectivity, 
and despite having not yet acted on it-- 
people still trust them.\textsuperscript{348} 
trust them implicitly\textsuperscript{349}. 

Those who on learning of a proper path apply it to their superiors [excel at] interacting 
with superiors. 
Those who on learning of a proper path apply it to their subordinates [excel at] interacting 
with subordinates. 
Those who on learning of a proper path apply it to themselves [excel at] self-cultivation. 
Those who [excel at] interacting with superiors can [begin to] approach [the idea of] 
serving their sovereign; 
Those who [excel at] interacting with subordinates can achieve [the hearts of] the masses 
and thereby [begin to] approach [the idea of] taking up the reigns of government; 
Those who [excel at] self-cultivation can [begin to] approach [the idea of] achieving 
utmost ren\textsuperscript{350}.

\textsuperscript{348} The Chinese corresponding to the lines from "even though stimulated to affectivity (茲有其情)" through 
"people still trust them (斯人信之矣)" appear in the Guodian manuscript after what corresponds to the 
third line of this chapter. 
\textsuperscript{349} The Chinese corresponding to this line (未言而信) (a repetition of the first phrase of line 4 of this 
chapter) does not appear in the Guodian manuscript. 
\textsuperscript{350} There is an obvious visual pun in the Chinese, with the character for ren (in its Chu script rendering as 
\textit{shen} 身 (person) over \textit{xin} 心 (heart)) playing off the character \textit{shen} 身 (person). This pun hints that there 
may be some significance to the Chu script etymology of ren.
Those who share the same aspirations are brought together by their paths. (S25)

Those who have different aspirations are brought together by happenstance.

Those who share the same satisfactions are brought together by their characters.

Those who have differing satisfactions are brought together by [prior] planning.

For order inside the household, one desires that it be [accomplished with] leniency; (S26)

for order outside, one desires that it be [accomplished with] stringency. 352

14.

Desire serenity in one's person, and do not envy [others]. 355

Desire character in exerting one's heart, and do not be false.

Desire depth in one's contemplations, and do not stop short. 356

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351 Tongfang 同方 (same methods) often appears in early literature together with hezhi 合志 (unified aspirations), e.g. Liji, 42:11, suggesting that tongfang refers to those who go about achieving similar (worthy) aspirations in the same way.

352 These two lines echo lines from Dadailiji, Kongzijiayu, and Liji, all of which contain the phrase men nei wai zhi zhi 門內 / 外之治. In each of them nei inside the household is contrasted to yi 託 outside.

Li Ling replaces zhe 折 (sever) with zhi 制 (severity), only because, he says, he can't make sense of zhe in context. Ma Chengyuan notes that the Dadailiji contains the line 勝內之治承義，門外之治義斷義, and suggests that zhe echoes duan (it may even be that the duan is an explication of zhe, since the Dadailiji is likely the later text). Nevertheless, the sentiment contrasts sharply with the depiction above of the official who governs effectively through leniency.

353 Li Ling has wu 勿, apparently a copying error of wu 毋.

354 The final character of this line is markedly different in the Guodian and Shanghai manuscripts but is cryptic either way. Li renders both the Guodian and Shanghai characters xian 犧 (envy), noting that it should be interpreted as qian 遣 (drive away). Qiu renders the Guodian character yin (言+欠) (cry). Ma renders the Shanghai version 託+童, tentatively interpreting it as dong 動 (action). No instance of wu xian 吾犧 appears in early texts. Wu xian 吾犧 appears once in early texts as 節之勿犧, in reference to the abode and food of a reformed duke (Yanzi Chunqiu).

355 A very similar series of lines appears in both the Guodian and Shanghai manuscripts but with significant differences. There are twelve lines in the Guodian that move through the following progression of topics: person, thoughts, actions, appearance, emotions, and behavior inside and outside the court. There are seven in the Shanghai series, excluding the emotions, and adding speech and behavior at home. I have retained them all.
Desire bravery in one's actions and be sure to go all the way.

Desire gravity in one's appearance and do not rebuke [others].

Desire gentleness and respectfulness in one's visage but not stolidness.

Desire wisdom in delight without being flighty.

Desire mildness in pleasure while keeping one's eye on the target.

Desire self-control in anxiety and do not blind oneself.

Desire fullness in anger do not let it be compromised.

Desire to be followed inside court, and do not be [too] clever.

Desire seriousness outside of court, and do not take things too lightly. (S27)

Desire straight talk, and do not prattle.

Desire ease where one lives, and do not be frivolous.

In all these things, desire even measure and do not be false.

Exemplary persons hold fast to aspirations and inevitably have broad hearts; they inevitably speak with a faithfulness based on fine discrimination; (S28)

their propriety toward dignitaries and guests is inevitably marked by a respectful visage;

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356 In the Guodian version, the final character here is wei 魏. In the Shanghai manuscript, the previous line, which does not appear in the Guodian version, ends in wei, and this line ends in a character that Ma unequivocally interprets as yi 義, which Li says is a mistake, taking it instead to be "related" to xi 息 but not offering a definitive transcription.

357 This line actually begins with yu 欲 and does not contain a word for visage at all. Ling speculates that a character has been lost and guesses from context that it is xin 心 (heart). I guess from context, taking into account that mao 貌 is often paired with rong 容, and with the benefit of knowing that xin occurs already in a different line (2) of the Shanghai text.

358 The Shanghai manuscript has zhuzhu 柱柱, but Li Ling suspects that it is a mistake and that the Guodian text, which makes more sense, is correct. Whereas zhuzhu appears nowhere else, guangguang 廣 appears in Zhuangzi and Xunzi, the former in reference to dao and the latter in reference to one's appearance. In terms of the importance of appearance, the Xunzi passage is worth comparing to this one.
their propriety in sacrificial ceremonies is inevitably viscerally reverential;
And in keeping the mourning period, their grief is inevitably full of longing.
For exemplary persons, the body becomes the governing heart.\(^{359}\)

15.
To please others, don't be reticent. (S29)
One must follow them in action and keep up with them in speech,
Then one [may] elevate them into the limelight without being false.

16.
When interacting, do not be strident\(^{360}\),
for inevitably there will be repercussions.

17.
In regard to a path or road\(^{361}\), if one does not reflect [too much],

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\(^{359}\) Taking the syntax in the most straightforward way possible. There are other possible interpretations of this line, but the word order would have to be rearranged to accommodate them. I propose that the purpose of this line is to explain that in spontaneous activity that flows from genuine affectivity, the separation between mind and body dissolves. This line does not appear in the Shanghai manuscript.

\(^{360}\) Translated ardent above.

\(^{361}\) The character dao 道 does not appear in the Guodian version, and the Guodian Chu Script character for lu 路 appears to have baffled scholars, Li Ling noting that only after seeing the Shanghai manuscript was it clear that the character represents lu. Li Ling says that the wei 思 of his Guodian recension now appears more likely to be si 思. It is worth noting, then, that had the character been dao in Guodian rather than lu or daolu, a translator might be tempted to render it "the Dao", but clearly the wording here prevents such a rendering and therefore reminds us that while the notion of a path may be abstract, it does not necessarily (perhaps ever) warrant extension to the metaphysical. As early as the Shijing, and throughout classical literature, daolu 道路 was a binomial referring to roads, in the concrete not abstract sense. Here, however, it is difficult to think of how it could be anything but abstract.
does not speak selfishly or dwell on oneself,
then one may practice that which brings joy to one's elders and seniors. (S30)
If one does no damage and bends [the rules] only rarely,
then one will get on fine with others at court.
That done, there will be no need to ever repeat oneself.

18. 362
For an anxious or troublesome affair, desire that one may shoulder it;
for a joyful affair, desire that one may prolong it.

19. 363
With regard to instruction364, seeking [the pupil's] heart is difficult365. (S31)
And although one may have gotten close by following his behavior,
it is not as fast as using enjoyment366.
One may be able to accomplish his affairs,
But if one cannot achieve his heart, one will not to be prized.

362 The content of this chapter appears at the beginning of Guodian Chapter 21.
363 With some discrepancies, this is chapter 13 of the Guodian manuscript.
364 Guodian has xue 学 (study), the substitution of which would make a significant difference in how to
interpret this passage. With jiao 教 (instruction), one may interpret the line as instruction to a ruler or a
prince of the ruling class
365 There is a strong indication of a scribal error here. Lines two through five are missing from Shanghai,
and lines 1 and 6 contain the identical phrase 求其心. It appears likely that the scribe of the Shanghai
manuscript may have skipped from the 求其心 of the first line to 求其心 of the sixth without noticing the
intervening material.
366 The Chinese is 楽. It is natural to feel forced to choose between interpreting it as le (joy) or as yue
(music), but perhaps this is an ideal place to understand it in the original meaning expressing the
connotations of both enjoyment and entertainment. This term may therefore be best understood in a
numismatic sense, enjoyment from one side, entertainment from the other, both inseparable.
And if one seeks his heart falsely, it most certainly will not be achieved.

It is obvious that people cannot act on pretense.

There are ten notions\footnote{See end of next note.} with regard to how not to commit this kind of transgression, and the heart must dwell on them.

Looking into their manifestations, how can affectivity be discounted? (S32)

\{Faithfulness\}\footnote{The Chinese of the Guodian goes undeciphered by both Qiu and Li, and the character is illegible in the Shanghai manuscript, although one thing certain is that the Guodian character carries the component yan 言 (speech). Because \textit{xin} 信 (faithfulness), which also carries that component, is often associated with \textit{qing} 情 of the line above and because it would bring the series that follows full circle, it seems a reasonable choice. Ma identifies the character, apparently based on the Guodian photos as \textit{qu} 阻 (to stop), and it does somewhat resemble the graph transcribed in Chapter 20 as such, but it does not seem to fit the context here. One argument against using \textit{xin}, however, is that with it, there are only nine notions: \textit{xing} 性 (self-nature), \textit{qing} 情 (affectivity), \textit{xin} 信 (faithfulness), \textit{zhong} 忠 (conscientiousness), \textit{ren} 仁, \textit{du} 禮 (honesty), \textit{wu zhijie} 物之節 (tempering [one's interaction with] external things), \textit{jing} 敬 (reverence), and \textit{yi} 義 (rightness).} is an important aspect of rightness.

Rightness is an important aspect of reverence.

Reverence is the tempering of [one's interaction with] external things.

Honesty is an important aspect of \textit{ren}.

\textit{Ren} is an important aspect of self-nature, and self-nature may well give rise to it.

Conscientiousness is an important aspect of faithfulness. (S33)

Faithfulness is an important aspect of affectivity, and affectivity emerges from self-nature.

Of the seven kinds of caring, it is the caring of one's nature that is closest to \textit{ren}.

Of the five kinds of wisdom, it is the path of rightness that is closest to conscientiousness.
Of the three kinds of detesting, it is the detesting of [behavior] contrary to ren that is closest to rightness. (S34)

Of the four ways of path-making, only the [highest] human path can be followed. 369

20.

For efforts of the heart undertaken in haste370, reflection must be of utmost consideration.

For efforts of intellect undertaken in urgency, disaster must be of utmost consideration.

For efforts at connecting on an affective level, elicited emotion must be of utmost consideration. (S35)

For efforts of the body undertaken in haste, satisfaction must be of utmost consideration.

For efforts of strength undertaken to the limit, advantage must be of utmost consideration.

That the eyes like colors
And the ears enjoy sounds
Are due to the stopping and undulating of qi,
And it is not difficult to meet one's demise on account of them. (S36)

369 The second line of Chapter 8 is nearly identical to this line.
370 Li Ling has bian 亟, interpreted as bianji 亟亻. Since bianji 亻亻 is a problematic term (see Zhang Qiyun's entries under 亻亻 and 亻亻 (Zhang 1990, pp. 2109 and 5207), and He Zhihua's Xunzi, p. 38), I correct to bian 亻, anciently written 卒, which is how Ma, though identifying the character here mysteriously as zao 亻亻, identifies the character three lines down, both interpretations based essentially on the same component original. Li chooses 亻 for both, which I modify to 亻. In Guodian, zao 亻亻 is the unanimous choice for the first, while Qiu Xigui chooses 亻 for the second. So regardless of the character, there is general agreement that the meaning of the term in both instances is "hurriedly", hence my choosing the unequivocal bian 亻.
If one conducts oneself with self-control but without a discriminating heart, then one is but putting on appearances.

If one conducts oneself with discrimination but without an aspiration to abiding joy, then one is being frivolous.

One who is clever and persuasive in speech (S37) but who lacks the [sensitivity of] heart to stop becomes effusive.

Someone who can with satisfaction rest easily in harmony and yet whose affectivity is not energetically activated is a disgrace.

For someone who is intelligent in behavior, it is not permissible to not guide others.

For someone who is careful in behavior, (S38) it is not sufficient to not assist others.

21.

Falsity is to be despised.

Falsity then reticence,

reticence then worry,

worry then the impossibility of cooperation.

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371 Shanghai manuscript has (a heretofore unknown graph) instead of jiejie 節節 (self-control).
372 The character here is undeciphered, but may be a loan for yue 悅 (pleased).
373 Guodian has kuai 快, and Li renders it such here. Ma, however, notes that Mawangdui Laozi A has kuai for hui 慧 in Chapter 18, demonstrating that kuai is a loan for hui (but not vice versa). The original Shanghai graph is obviously closer to 慧 than to 快.
374 The character here is obscure. Li makes no note. Ma notes the phonological resemblance to yuan 頭, and points out that Shuowen glosses yuan as jin 頭 (cautious).
Caution is an important aspect of worry\textsuperscript{375},
and its excess is not to be despised.

Calculation\textsuperscript{376} is an important aspect of planning,
and [yet] its excess is to be faulted.

If one is not cautious, one can count on a subsequent transgression. (S39, S40)

\textsuperscript{375} The Guodian manuscript has ren 仁 (in Chu script form) in place of lū 慮 (worry).
\textsuperscript{376} The manuscript character is su 速 (alacrity). I follow Ma Chengyuan in taking it as a loan for shu 數 (calculation), for which Ma provides textual evidence.
APPENDIX B: ON SELF-NATURE AND AFFECTIVITY - CHINESE RECENSION

性情

1.

凡人雖有性，
心亡定志。
待物而後作。
待悦而後行。
待習而後 G1 定。

喜怒哀悲之氣，性也，
及其見於外，則物取之 S1。

性自命出，
命 G2 自天降。
道始於情，
情生於性。
始者近情，
終者近義。
知情者能出 G3 之，
知情者能入之。

好 S2 悪，性也，
所好所惡，物也。
善不善，性也 G4，
所善所不善，勢也。

2.
凡性為主，物取之也。
金石之有聲也，弗扣不 G5 鳴 S3：
【人之】雖有性，心弗取不出。

3.
凡心有志也，
亡與不 G6【可。
人之不可】獨行，
猶口之不可獨言也。
牛生而長，

雁生而伸。

其性 G7【使然；

人】而學或使之也。

4.

凡物亡不異也者：

剛之樹也，剛取之也；
柔之 G8 約，柔取之也。

四海之內其性一也，

其用心各異，

教使然也。

5.

凡性 G9 或勳之，

或逆之，

或交之，

或屬之，

或出之 S4，
或養之，
或長之。

6.
凡動性 G10 者，物也：
逆性者，悅也：
交性者，故也：
屬性者，義也：
出性者，勢也：S5
養性 G11 者，習也：
長性者，道也。

7.
凡見者之謂物。
快於己者之謂悅。
物 G12 之行者之謂勢。
有為也 S6 者之謂故。
義也者，群善之類也。
習也 G13 者，有以習其性也。
道者，群物之道也。

8.

凡道，心術 S7 為主。

道四術也，唯 G14 人道為可道也。

其三術者，道之而已。

詩書禮樂，其始出也，皆生 G15 於 S8 人。

詩，有為為之也；

書，有為言之也；

禮樂，有為舉之也。

聖人比其 G16 顴而論會之。

觀其先後而 S9 逆順之：

體其義而節文之；

理 G17 其情而出入之；

然後復以教。

教所以生德於中者也。

禮 S10 作於情，G18 或興之也。
當事因方而制之，
其先後之序則宜道也。
或序為 G19 之節，則文也。S11
致容貌所以文，節也。
君子美其情，
責其義 G20，
善其節，
好其容，
樂其道，
悅其教；
是以敬焉。
拜，S12 所以【為敬焉】G21 其文也：
幣帛，所以為信與徵也；
其辭宜道也。

笑，喜之淺澤也 G22；
樂，喜之 S13 深澤也。
凡聲，其出於情也信，

然後其入發人之心也厚 G23。

聞笑聲，則勝如也斯喜。

聞歌謡，S14 則陶如也斯喜。

聽琴瑟之聲 G24，則悸如也斯歎。

觀《喪》、《武》，則愴如也斯作。

觀《韶》、《夏》，則勉 S15 如也 G25 斯敘。

永思而動心，喟如也。

其居次也久，

其反善復始也 G26 慎。

其出人也順，始其德也。

鄭衛 S16 之樂，非其聲而從之也 G27。

10.

凡樂隆心，

益樂隆指，

皆教其人者也。

《喪》、《武》樂取，
《韶》、《夏》樂情 G28。

11.
凡 S17 至樂必悲，
哭亦悲，
皆至其情也。
哀、樂，其性相近也，
是故其心 G29 不遠。
哭之動心也， questi，
其 S18 烈戀戀如也，
戚然以終。
樂之動心也 G30，瀟瀟鬱陶，
其烈流如也以悲，
悠然以思。

12.
凡憂思而後悲 G31/S19；
凡樂思而後忻。
凡思之用心為甚，
歎，思之方也。

其聲變，則心從之矣。G32：

其心變，則其聲亦然。S20

凡吟，遊哀也，

噪，遊樂也；

愁，遊聲也，

嘆，遊心也。G33。

喜斯陶，

陶斯奮，

奮斯詠，

詠斯猶，

猶斯舞；

舞，喜之終也。

愴斯憂，

憂斯感，

感 G34 斯歎，
敷斯辟，

辟斯歸：

歸，損之終也。[G35]

13.
凡人情為可悦也。
若以其情，雖惡不惡。
不以 S21 其情，雖難不貴 G50。

未言而信，有美情者也。
未教 G51 而民恒，性善者也。
未貧而民勸，貪福者也。S22
未刑而民畏，有 G52 心畏者也。
賤而民貴之，有德者也。
貧而民聚焉，有道者也 G53。
獨居而樂，有內動 S23 者也。
惡之而不可非者，達於義者也。
非之 G54 而不可惡者，篤於仁者也。
行之而不過，知道者 S24 也。
不知己者不怨人，

苟有其情，

雖未之為，

斯人信之矣，

未言而信也。

聞道反上，上交者也 G55。

聞道反下，下交者也。

聞道反己，修身者也。

上交近事君；

下交得 G56 畜近從政；

修身近至仁。

同方而 S25 交，以道者也。

不同方而 G57 交，以故也。

同悦而交，以德者也。

不同悦而交，以貨者也。

門內之治，欲其 G58 引也：S26

門外之治，欲其折也。
14.

凡身欲靜而毋羡。
用心欲德而毋偽。
慮欲治而毋與 G62。
行欲勇而必至。
貌欲莊而毋伐。
容欲柔齊而泊。
喜欲智而無末 G63。
樂欲愜而有志。
憂欲斂而毋昏。
怒欲盈而毋希。
進欲隨而毋巧 G64。
退欲肅而毋輕 S27。
言欲直而毋流。
居處欲逸易而毋慢。
欲呪度而毋偽。

君子執志必有夫廣廣之心；
出言必有 G65 夫東東 S28 之信；
賓客之禮必有夫齊齊之容；
祭祀之禮必有夫膴膴之敬 G66；
居喪必有夫懸懸之哀。君子身以為主心。G67

15.
凡悅人勿吝 S29 也。
身必從之，言及，
則 G59 明舉之而勿偽。

16.
凡交毋烈，
必使有末。

17.
凡於道路毋思，
毋獨言獨 G60 居，
則習 S30 父兄之所樂。
苟毋害少枉，
入之可也。
已則勿復言也。G61

18.
凡憂患之事欲任，
樂事欲後 G62。 ■

19.
凡教者求其 S31 心為難。
從其所為，近得之矣，
不如以樂之速也。G36
雖能其事，
不能其心，不貴。
求其心有偽也，弗得之矣。
人之不能以偽也 G37，可知也。

不過十舉，其心必在焉。
察其見者，情焉失哉？S32
【信】，義之方也 G38。

義，敬之方也。

敬，物之節也。

篤，仁之方也。

仁，性之方也，性或生之。

忠，信 G39 之方也 S33。

信，情之方也，情出於性。

愛親七，唯性愛為近仁。

智親五，唯 G40 義道為近忠。

惡親三，唯惡不仁為近義。S34

為道者四，唯人道 G41 為可道也。

20.

凡用心之卞者，思為甚。

用智之疾者，患為甚。

用情之 G42 至 S35 者，哀樂為甚。

用身之卞者，悦為甚。

用力之盡者，利為甚。
目之好 G43 色，
耳之樂聲，
鬱陶之氣也，
不 S36 難為之死。

有其為人之節節如也 G44，
不有夫東東之心則采。
有其為人之東東如也，
不有夫恆恆之志則慢。
人之 S37 巧 G45 言利辯者，
不有夫詭詭之心則流。
人之悅然可與和安者，
不有夫奮 G46 作之情則侮。
有其為人之慧如也，
弗牧不可。
有其為人之 S38 菜如也 G47，
弗輔不足。
21.

凡人偽為可惡也。

偽斯吝矣，

吝斯慮矣，

慮斯莫與之 G48 結。■

慎，慮之方也，

然而其過不惡。

數 4，謀之方也，

有過則咎。

人不慎 S39，斯有過，信矣 G49/S40。
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