GRAPHIC PROPAGANDA:
JAPAN'S CREATION OF CHINA IN THE PREWAR PERIOD, 1894-1937

A DISSERTATION TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI'I IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN

HISTORY

August 2005

By
Scott E. Mudd

Dissertation Committee:

Sharon A. Minichiello, Chairperson
Paul Varley
Jerry Bentley
James Kraft
Willa Tanabe
Dedicated to Akiko,
for her love, support, and putting up with me over the past four years of research and writing.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to the Japanese Ministry of Education and Crown Prince Akihito Scholarship Foundation for their generous financial support during my four years of research in Yokohama and Kyoto. My heartfelt thanks go out to Nagamine Shigetoshi, Professors Mitani Taichirō and Chin Zhao bin, at the University of Tokyo (Meiji Shinbun Zasshi Bunko) for their time and insights on my topic; Sekigawa Tōru for talking about the history of his family print business in Kyoto and for allowing me to photograph his Sino- and Russo-Japanese print collections; and Shoji Kakuko, for her invaluable assistance in deciphering the finer points of prewar bureaucratic Japanese. Of course, special thanks must go to my father, Donald E. Mudd, for the use of his extensive library of books and collection of war prints and war posters, and for his continued support in the form of reading drafts as well as continued input in the form of new information and comments. Finally, I am deeply indebted to Sharon A. Minichiello for the time and effort that she has put into guiding this project from its inception as a Masters thesis to its completion herein.
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1: Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Context</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Media Portrayal</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periodization</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Graphic Media</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media-Government Relations</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing/Publishing</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graphic Imaging</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects of Graphic Imagery</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Synopses</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2: Technology, Media, and Society</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal Service</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Booksellers, Commercial Book Lenders, and Libraries</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imaging</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing Technology</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photography: Smaller and Easier</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3: Moral Righteousness in Bright Colors and Style</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Boshin (1867-1868) and Seinan Wars (1877): Samurai Virtues on Exhibit</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Jingo (1882) and Kōshin Incidents (1884): The Degradation of the Other</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Images</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4: 1894-1904: Enlightenment versus Barbarism</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sino-Japanese War and Boxer Rebellion</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5: 1904-1931: Romanticizing the Past; Ignoring the Present</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Japanese and Chinese Image Characteristics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Sino-Japanese War Imagery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Chinese Imagery, 1904-1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Comparative Japanese Image Values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Chinese Imagery—Comparisons, 1904-1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>“No-Chinese” Images—Comparisons, 1904-1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Negative Chinese Image Breakdown, 1904-1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>“No-Chinese” Images—Percentage Comparisons, 1904-1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Japanese Image Comparative Values, 1894-1937</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**LIST OF FIGURES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Selling Japanese Involvement in Manchuria</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Commemorative Stamp of General Nogi Maresuke</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Tomioka Tessai’s “The Red Cliff”</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Caricature of a Chinese soldier</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Negative Image of Chinese Prisoners</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td><em>Heroic Pose</em> Example</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Example of an Altruistic Deed</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Neutral Depiction of a Chinese Classroom</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td><em>Total Dominance</em> Example</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td><em>Survival Against Nature</em> Example</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td><em>Courage and Discipline</em> Example</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td><em>Technological Superiority</em> Example</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td><em>Enlisted glory</em> Example</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td><em>Altruism</em> Example</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Image with Multiple Chinese Characteristics Portrayed</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td><em>Strange Cultures and Honor</em> Example</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Litter Bearers and Passenger</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Opening of Kyoto Station</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Japan’s Railways: 1906</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
22. Boy Pulling Book Wagon .............................................. 48
23. Zauri Style Bookstore, circa 1890 ..................................... 61
25. Furoku (insert) Woodblock Print ........................................ 65
27. Open-Air Stall at Night ....................................................... 68
28. “Library Hell” ................................................................. 69
29. Three Japanese Syllabaries and Furigana ............................... 71
30. Cover of The Press and Paper, 1891 .................................. 73
31. Shimooka Renjo and Photography Equipment ....................... 77
32. Replica of a Cherry Portable Camera ................................... 81
33a. 1925 Pearlette Camera ..................................................... 81
33b. 1935 Hansa Canon Camera ............................................... 81
34. Japanese Soldier Bayoneting Chinese Prisoner, 1938 ............... 82
35a. View of a Suspension Bridge at Mt. Gyōdō ............................ 86
35b. Naosuke Gombei Kills his Former Master ............................. 86
36. A Kabuki Nirami (crossed eyes) Mie .................................. 87
37. The Spider Monster ........................................................... 90
38. The Fall of Osaka Castle .................................................... 91
39. Children at Play ............................................................... 91
40. A Summer Night’s Insect Battle .......................................... 92
41. “The Fart Battle” ............................................................... 92
42. The Battle of Asahi Mountain .............................................. 93
43. Two Valiants in Combat ..................................................... 95
44. Saigō’s Battle to the Death ................................................................. 96
45. Example of a “Distant” Neutral Seinan War Image .......................... 97
46. Typical Neutral Seinan Print: Victorious Homecoming .................... 97
47. Negative Seinan Print ........................................................................ 98
48. “Scene of Southwestern Bandits Surrendering” .............................. 98
49. Modernity’s Superiority ..................................................................... 99
50. “Scene of the Big Fight with Korea” ............................................... 102
51. “The Fierce Battle at Uekiguchi in Kyushu” .................................... 103
52. “The Korean Mob” ........................................................................... 103
53. “News on Korea” ............................................................................ 104
54. Use of Electric Light during Night Attack ....................................... 106
55. Views of the Mitsui House ............................................................... 106
56. “Banzai for Japan!” ......................................................................... 110
57. “Advancing on the Ice to Attack Weihaiwei” ................................. 111
58. The Yamato Spirit ............................................................................ 111
59. “Picture of Our Second Army’s Assault on Port Arthur” .................. 111
60. Japanese in Western Clothing .......................................................... 112
61. Sino-Japanese War Technological Superiority ................................. 112
62. A Heroic Pose Example .................................................................... 113
63. Sino-Japanese War Enlisted Glory ................................................ 113
64. Sino-Japanese War Altruism ............................................................. 114
65. Sino-Japanese War Caricature ........................................................ 114
66. “Picture of Our Great Victory, the Fall of Asan” ............................. 115
67. Picture of a Steam Locomotive ....................................................... 117
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>68.</td>
<td>&quot;The Great Victory of Japanese Warships off Haiyang Island&quot;</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69.</td>
<td>An Early Depiction of Western Technology</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70a.</td>
<td>Photograph of the Battleship <em>Yashima's</em> Naval Gun</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70b.</td>
<td>“Japanese Warships Fire on the Enemy near Haiyantao”</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71.</td>
<td>Braving the Bitter Cold</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72.</td>
<td>“The Splendid Deed of the Brave Soldier Shirakami”</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73.</td>
<td>A Positive Chinese Depiction</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74.</td>
<td>A Negative Japanese Depiction</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75.</td>
<td>German Postcard Photograph of Peking Wall during the Boxer Rebellion</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76.</td>
<td>General Attack on Tientsin by the Alliance Army</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77.</td>
<td>On Equal Terms with Europeans</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78.</td>
<td>Japan Ignoring China</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79.</td>
<td>“Chinese Calvary Flee from Allied Forces in the Fierce Fight for Beicang”</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80.</td>
<td><em>Monthly Historical Photos</em></td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81.</td>
<td><em>Photographic Illustration</em></td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82.</td>
<td>Two “No-Chinese” Images</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83.</td>
<td>Neutral “No-Chinese” Image</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84.</td>
<td>Negative “No-Chinese” Image</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85.</td>
<td>A <em>Strange Cultures and Honor</em> Image</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86.</td>
<td>Chinese Barbarity against Chinese</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87.</td>
<td>A <em>Romantic Past</em> Caricature</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88.</td>
<td>Evidence of Growing Sino-Japanese Friction</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89.</td>
<td>Sightseeing in Korea, Manchuria, and Mongolia</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90.</td>
<td>Chinese in Western Clothing</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
91. Chinese Diplomatic Mission in Tokyo .................................................. 138
92. A Neutral "No-Chinese" Image Showing Japanese Troops .................. 139
93. Japanese playing baseball in Port Arthur ........................................... 139
94. Japanese Troops Guarding Defense Barrier ...................................... 140
95. A *Courage and Discipline* Image .................................................. 141
96. An Example of Japanese Technological Superiority .......................... 142
97. A *Survival Against Nature* Image .................................................. 142
98. Japanese Red Cross in Action in China ........................................... 142
99. Japanese Naval Technological Superiority ....................................... 143
100. Japanese Military Vehicles in Manchuria during the Winter .......... 144
101. Japanese Red Cross on Tour .......................................................... 144
102. Caricature Emphasizing Chinese Backwardness .............................. 145
103. Results of Chinese Violence against Japanese ................................. 146
104. China’s Romantic Past: Mountain Temple ..................................... 146
105. China’s Cultural Legacy: The Great Wall ...................................... 147
106. Anti-Japanese Imagery ................................................................. 147
107. Positive Depiction of Chinese ........................................................ 149
108. Captured Chinese Soldiers ............................................................ 158
109. Captured Chinese "Guerillas" .......................................................... 158
110. Japanese Marine Watches over Chinese Prisoner ............................. 159
111. War Booty ......................................................................................... 161
112. Shanghai Waterfront ...................................................................... 163
113. Manchu Mausoleum ....................................................................... 163
114. Emperor Puyi’s Throne .................................................................. 165
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>Manchukuo's Greatness</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>The Story of the Phonograph</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>The Kindness of the Catfish</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>Assassination of Zhang Zoulin</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119</td>
<td>Censored Photos: Mountain Ranges</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>Censored Photos: Vehicles</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121a</td>
<td>Censored Photos: Boat landings</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121b</td>
<td>Approved Boat landing Photograph</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>Censored Photos: Airfields</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>Censored Photos: Officers</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>Censored Photos: Injurious to the Military</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>Censored Photos: Military Technology</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>Censored Photos: Tokyo</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td>Japanese War Dead</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128</td>
<td>Japanese Troops Landing in Southern China</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
<td>Censor Extremes: Gun Barrels</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
<td>Censor Extremes: Nudity</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>Japanese Soldiers Wrestling Chinese Prisoners</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Thought is impossible without an image.
Aristotle

Japan's turbulent relationship with China during the first half of the twentieth century has continued to dominate studies in modern Japanese history. During the fifty-year period between 1894 and 1945, in which over half a million Japanese and more than nine million Chinese troops and civilians lost their lives in Sino-Japanese conflicts, relations between the two countries were guided at best by suspicion and condescension, and at worst, open violence and racial hatred. In trying to identify the primary causal factors in Sino-Japanese relations during these years, most writers have focused on the rise of Japanese militarism and geopolitical, economic or ideological circumstances. While many excellent studies have greatly increased our understanding of Sino-Japanese relations during the period, gaps in our knowledge remain.

One particular area that has received relatively little attention deals with the role that visual media played in the creation of Japanese popular attitudes towards China. Specifically, to what extent did graphic media created by Japanese affect Japanese attitudes toward Chinese from 1894 until 1937? Although this work focuses on imagery produced during and after the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), in order to understand better the evolution of Japan's graphic mass media, an examination of its immediate roots, starting from the Meiji Restoration in 1867, is included. For the purpose of this paper, graphic media refers to any material, printed or handmade, that relied primarily on visual images rather than the written word to transmit a message. Although I do discuss many forms of graphic media, my research relied primarily on commercial images that were produced as woodblock prints in the nineteenth century and
photographs published in magazines that targeted the mass consumer in the prewar period.\textsuperscript{1} During the period in question, economic and technological breakthroughs led to the dominance of photographs in graphic media by the second decade of the twentieth century. In an era that witnessed dramatic social and political change throughout the world, the ability to enhance the delivery of the news with what appeared to be accurate depictions of reality came to play an ever larger role in the formation of popular attitudes in societies around the world. The decades bracketed by the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and the beginning of undeclared war with China in 1937 are significant in Japanese history because much of the country’s present social, political, and economic character evolved during this time.

One of the integral parts of the “new” Japan that developed during this period was a modern mass media network. From its origins in the latter half of the seventeenth century, a sophisticated but largely urban-based woodblock publishing industry transformed itself from a cottage industry that served mostly the entertainment needs of the samurai and educated merchants into a media infrastructure that transmitted the news in timely fashion to most Japanese by the 1930s. Another important aspect of the post Meiji Restoration era was the evolution of Japanese attitudes towards China. The gradual reversal of Japan’s centuries-old student-teacher relationship with China and the West’s overwhelming deprecation of the same country during the latter half of the nineteenth century were bad omens for the future of Sino-Japanese relations. Overwhelming victory over its much larger neighbor during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 decisively set the negative tone of the relationship for

---

\textsuperscript{1} Until photographic journalism became firmly rooted in Japan at the beginning of the twentieth century, woodblocks prints in the form of nishikie, or brocade prints, dominated the visual aspect of reporting in Japan. For the photographic record after the woodblock era, I relied primarily on two magazines, Shashin tsushin (Photographic Illustration) and Rekishi shashin (Monthly Historical Photos). These two graphically oriented magazines, which in many respects resembled the American publication, TIME (incidentally founded in the same era in 1923), enjoyed long publishing runs and provide a valuable glimpse of how the image of China changed during the prewar period.
decades to come. In turn, these attitudes towards China played a large part in defining the character of modern Japan and its mass media. As a rationale for protection from the West as well as a duty to civilize its less fortunate neighbors, the exploitation of China and other East Asian countries became a fundamental policy in prewar Japan.

The mass media capitalized on a certain degree of Japanese indifference towards China to create images that appealed to the public thereby creating profits that enabled the publishing industry to grow and expand, especially during times of crisis between the two countries. Examining the media's role in the evolution of the prewar Japanese psyche as well as Sino-Japanese relations during this period will enhance our understanding of how Japanese attitudes towards China were formed and why interactions between these two countries degenerated to such a degree and for such a long time. While Japan's defeat in World War II marked the cessation of warfare between both countries, the effects of decades of attitudinal formation have lasted more than half a century later. The fact that the ambiguous-at-best attitudes held by successive postwar Japanese governments regarding the nation's past military aggression in Asia continue to create friction between the two countries further validates the ongoing need to understand better the historical roots of modern Sino-Japanese relations.²

² Ongoing controversies that continue to hinder positive Sino-Japanese relations include the euphemistic manner in which Japanese school textbooks portray Japan's "involvement" in East Asia during the war, and official visits to Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo by top government leaders. Other events, in spite of their more tenuous links to the war era, nevertheless often become focal points for anti-Japanese sentiment that recall Japan's past aggressions in China as well as other Asian nations. Note the agitated Chinese reaction expressed over the internet to the Japanese "sex" tour of approximately 400 men that visited the city of Zhuhai in September 2003. One chat room participant on Sina.com commented that, "Japanese people deep in their bones look down on Chinese people." See "Chinese Up in Arms over Japanese Tourists' Orgy at Southern China Hotel," Yahoo! News, Sunday, September 28, 2003; accessed 29 September, 2003; "Japan Orgy Trial Opens in China Amid Tight Security," Yahoo! News, Friday, December 12 2003; accessed 12 December 2003; and "Hard Questions Remain Between Japan, China, Despite Talks," Yahoo! News, Sunday, April 24, 2005; accessed 23 May 2005.
A different and useful way to do this is by looking at the evolution of the Chinese images as graphically portrayed by the Japanese media between 1894 and 1937. While non-graphic material will also be examined, this study's focus is on Japan's pictorial image of China and Chinese. I do this for two reasons: first, visual media, especially when presenting emotionally charged scenes such as those of war, creates lasting impressions on viewers. Furthermore, as technological breakthroughs occurred in the realms of printing and photography, the added ability to manipulate inherently potent graphic imagery, such as by editing, touching-up, and misrepresentation of context, made for an even more effective propaganda tool when attempting to influence social attitudes. This being the case, determining what role Japan's visual imaging of the other played in the development of Sino-Japanese relations during the period in question is historically relevant.

The second reason for conducting this study is that, to the author's knowledge, no similar study of its kind has been done to date. Although several scholars such as Carol Gluck, John Dower, Shumpei Okamoto, Konishi Shirō, and Elizabeth Swinton have dealt in various ways with the subject, none has focused specifically on graphic propaganda's effects on the Japanese general public's attitudes towards China, nor do their studies span the range of time covered in this present study.3

In examining the impact of Japan's visual imagery of China from 1894-1937, four questions guided my research. First, I wanted to see how the Japanese media graphically

portrayed China over the period. Did Chinese images improve or worsen with time, or was there little discernable change? Second, what motivating factors such as government pressure, profit, and cultural biases may have guided how the media chose to depict Chinese?

The role of technology in the Japanese imaging of China was the third major aspect that informed my research. Technological advances directly and indirectly related to publishing enabled the industry to deliver the news and related information farther and faster and with more realism in the form of photographs that portrayed the scenes with ever more accuracy. Without the technological breakthroughs of the period, a mass media would never have come about in Japan. The fourth, and most difficult question to answer, involved estimating the effectiveness of graphic propaganda in influencing the Japanese public’s views on China and Chinese. I approach this problem by examining the extent of the graphic imagery’s exposure to the Japanese public. While acknowledging that uncovering the sources of attitudinal change is highly problematical, my thesis is that more exposure to negative imagery would most likely increase the likelihood of one’s attitudes being influenced by such media.

The rest of this introduction gives a brief overview of the historical context of the period, outlines the four major divisions of this paper, gives a chapter synopsis and ends with an explanation of the methodology that guided my research.

**Historical Context**

When considered against the backdrop of the long historical relationship between the two cultures, on first examination the rapid deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations during the Meiji period appears startling. On further inspection, it becomes clear that, while the war of 1894-1895 was a major turning point, the rift between China and Japan had begun as much as two centuries earlier. By the middle of the eighteenth century, knowledge of recent Western advances in science and technology had begun to enter Japan through Chinese and Dutch
It eventually became apparent to Japanese intellectuals that Western empiricism yielded more practical and effective results than the Buddhist and Confucianist dominated worldview of China’s ruling elite; but it took time for Japan’s traditionally subordinate and respectful attitude towards its neighbor to deteriorate, for the relationship had been nurtured by over a thousand years of history.

Japan’s relationship with East Asia began in earnest as early as the sixth century, with the adoption of Buddhism from the mainland. Japanese elites were soon importing political, cultural and military knowledge from China as well as Korea. This mostly one-sided student-mentor relationship lasted until the middle of the Tokugawa period (1600-1868). While the Tokugawa Shogunate’s policy of seclusion (sakoku) greatly reduced Japanese contact with the outside world, it also paradoxically stimulated an incipient nativist intellectual movement. Tired of China’s dominating cultural and intellectual influence, thinkers such as Yamazaki Ansai (1618-1682) and Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801) sought to elevate native ideas over the realm’s imported cultural legacy. Ansai and Norinaga focused on rediscovering a Japanese “ancient way,” which they asserted had been contaminated by the foreign influences of Buddhism and Confucianism. This inward redirection of intellectual energy marked the beginning of the end of Japan’s less than critical admiration of Chinese culture.

In addition, the revival of Japanese interest in the outside world towards the end of the eighteenth century contributed to the further deterioration of the relationship. Stimulated by increasing uninvited contact with Western vessels, the Shogunate gradually eased prohibitions against Foreign or Dutch studies in order to keep abreast of rapidly changing developments. As early as 1715, Arai Hakuseki’s (1657-1725) Seiyō kibun (Notes on the West) revealed that Western science had much to offer Japan. By the end of the century,
translated works such as the *Tafel Anatomia* (*Kaitai shinsho*) made it clear to a growing number of Japanese intellectuals that Chinese scientific knowledge was sorely lacking. But what of the general population? What did the average Japanese commoner think or even know of the intellectuals' changing attitudes toward China?

In spite of the amount of cultural knowledge, skills, and beliefs imported from China, it is difficult to gauge what kind of impact these may have had on average Japanese commoners. We can assume at least a superficial influence; they saw Buddhist architecture in the forms of temples and monuments and marveled at the works of artisans—but did they fully comprehend the extent to which Japanese culture owed its neighbor China? Although the question may be a moot one, nearly impossible to resolve either way, a more revealing line of thought is to consider to what degree of understanding the premodern Japanese peasant had of the concept of China as the other, and for that matter, Japan as the self. The immediate and overwhelming concern for people of non-elite status was getting by in everyday life; for most people in this category, such as most farmers and laborers, the self incorporated their immediate household or kinship group while the other included everyone outside the former.

To a lesser extent, the question of Japan as an identifying concept is more easily applied to the Japanese ruling elite, for even after Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543-1616) brought relative peace to the land by uniting the warring Daimyo in 1615, the modern notion of a nation-state still remained a distant idea to most Japanese. Although the novel presence of Western foreigners in the islands during the Christian Century (1543-1650) had stimulated a wider view of the other in many Japanese, it was not until intellectuals such as Motoori

---

4 Donald Keene, *The Japanese Discovery of Europe, 1720-1830* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), 20-24. Published in 1774, Sugita Genpaku translated *Tafel Anatomia* (Amsterdam, 1734) as *Kaitai shinsho* (New book on dissection), and included illustrations by Odano Naotake, a painter who, like Genpaku, was also a student of Western learning (*Rangakusha*).
Norinaga developed the nativist or “national learning” school of thought (*Kokugaku*) that the concept of the nation-state began to spread in Japan during the latter half of the eighteenth century. The image of the modern state that Japanese elites eventually settled on during the Meiji period (1868-1912) was linked intrinsically to how they perceived their newfound definition of self. Although the Meiji Restoration, as exemplified by the Charter Oath (*Gokajō no goseimon*) issued in early 1868, signaled a dramatic change in the evolution of Japan as a concept for elites, it was not until the latter half of the Meiji era that the Japanese commoner began to visualize a similar concept of self. This realization of self resulted primarily from three factors.

First, before imposing the concept of a modern nation-state on the Japanese general public, the ruling elite had to create an image that was acceptable among themselves. The symbol for a modern Japan required over two decades of debate (at times violent), but finally resulted in the promulgation of the Meiji constitution in 1889. This document represented a consensus among the elite on how they wanted Japan to evolve as a nation. The Meiji Constitution fulfilled at least two important roles. Its primary purpose was to serve as a compromise between the country’s two groups of oligarchs, those running the government and those on the fringes of power. While the emperor became the centerpiece of the new regime, the inclusion of a two-house Diet allowed those who qualified to elect representatives.\(^5\) This aura of “popular” representation placated disgruntled Restoration leaders such as Itagaki Taisuke and Soejima Taneomi who previously had left the government and subsequently saw the broadening of the political franchise as a means of returning to power.

\(^5\) In 1890, approximately only 450,000 men (slightly over 1% of the 1890 population) qualified to vote by paying the fifteen-yen direct national tax. It is also interesting to note that the figure nearly matches the total membership of the former samurai class. Marius Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 2000), 415.
The Meiji constitution's second major role was in large part symbolic, and targeted the eagerly watching foreign audience. Aside from maintaining domestic stability, the guiding purpose that drove the Meiji oligarchs was the ending of the unequal treaties imposed upon the country by the United States and other Western nations in the 1850s. They surmised that Japan's adoption of a Western-style constitution, the most visible symbol of a civilized state, would go a long way towards accomplishing this goal. Only after proving to the West that Japan was a modern enlightened nation would the treaty powers remove the onerous extraterritoriality provisions that hobbled the nation's economic and political development. In spite of its dubious origins, the constitution also provided the framework from which Japanese leaders would later create a greater sense of nationality, thereby bringing fragmented factions of ex-samurai and former peasants together as one united nation.

A second important cause hastening the Japanese commoner's awakening of national identity was the country's rapidly deteriorating political relationship with China during the latter half of the nineteenth century. The Meiji Restoration, part of a more general aggressive reaction by Japanese elites against Western imperialist incursions in the Far East, provided a further point of departure for Sino-Japanese relations. While China's leadership was ineffectual at best in bearing the brunt of the West's nineteenth century encroachment into East Asia, Japan acted quickly and resolutely to industrialize and modernize its military (as epitomized by the slogan *fukoku-kyōhei*, meaning "enrich the nation and strengthen the military"). Japan's impressive success in modernizing bred a new feeling of national self-confidence as well as a growing sense of contempt for China.

By the turn of the century, the former student had largely displaced its mentor by resoundingly defeating China in the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). For many Japanese, regardless of class or status, their country's lopsided victory, as depicted graphically
by thousands of woodblock prints, played the decisive role in forming a definitive perception of self. In the eyes of most Japanese, as well as the rest of the world, overwhelming victory also vindicated the ruling elite's programs of economic austerity aimed at stabilizing the nation's financial system. It united the people in such a patriotic fervor that more than a few contemporary observers suggested that the war with China, not the Restoration of 1868, signaled the true birth of the Japanese nation. The noted journalist, Tokutomi Sohō (1863-1957), noted that before the war "... we did not know ourselves, and the world did not yet know us. But now that we have tested our strength, we know ourselves and we are known by the world."6 A mere ten years later, victory over Russia in 1905 earned the West's grudging respect and propelled Japan into a political as well as military leadership role in the Far East.

In contrast to Japan's successful modernization, as represented by its admittance into the club of "Great Powers," China's internal political turmoil continued to earn the open denigration of the West, now with Japan a part of the chorus as well. After the hostilities had ended, the American war correspondent, Trumbull White (1868-1941), described the defeated country as an "Invertebrate China, with scorn of western methods, and complacent rest in the belief that all but her own people are barbarians ... ."7 George N. Curzon (1859-1925), a prominent British politician considered an expert on Far Eastern affairs, noted that "Most travelers deplore the transition from Japan to China as one from sweetness to squalor, from beauty to ugliness, from civilization to barbarism ... ."8 The inability of China's leadership to address foreign criticism by implementing lasting social and political reforms during the

---

fifteen-year period after the war with Japan ultimately led to the regime’s downfall. The overthrow of the Ch’ing Empire (1644-1911) and its subsequent partitioning into modern-day fiefdoms by warlords created a situation reminiscent of China’s warring states period two-thousand years earlier.

The ineffectual young Republic of China’s international image continued to deteriorate through the end of the twenties, even as foreign powers seeking to protect their interests in China implicitly supported the chaotic status quo. In spite of the apparent hopelessness of the country’s situation at the time, the end of the 1920s also witnessed the gathering of momentum for China’s nationalist movement. Chiang Kai-shek’s revitalized Northern Advance by his Nationalist Party (Guomindang) in 1928 signaled a turning point—to the outside world, Chinese now appeared truly determined to put aside political differences and unite as a modern nation. From its base in Nanjing, the nationalist government increasingly demanded the remission of foreign privileges; and for the most part, the Western powers acceded. By 1928, Great Britain, France, and the United States had returned tariff control to China and talks with the United States regarding the ending of extraterritoriality clauses had begun.9

Japan, on the other hand, appeared unwilling to adapt to the changing times—only after increasing international pressure did it belatedly relinquish tariff control back to China in 1930. Thus, while Japan joined the West in disparaging China for its political effeteess in the two decades after the Sino-Japanese War, during the 1920s it broke ranks with the Great Powers as they gradually came to recognize that the era of unequal treaties in China was

---

9 Only in 1943, did the West give up all claims to extraterritoriality on Chinese soil. Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), 381, 474. My dissertation uses pinyin romanization throughout, with some exceptions for place names and personal names that many westerners might have difficulties in recognizing otherwise, such as Chiang Kai-shek and Peking.
ending. By the close of the twenties, Japan’s economic and military involvement on the 
continent had come to eclipse that of the Western powers combined and strengthened its 
resolve in maintaining the post-1895 status quo, with Japan playing the role of mentor to 
China as the backward student. The inability of Japan’s governing elites to adapt a more 
flexible attitude towards China’s attempts at unification came to be reflected in a Japanese 
mass media that by then had become fully developed.

The **third** key factor in the Japanese commoner’s awakening of national self was the 
technologically advanced media infrastructure that came to maturity in Japan by the end of the 
1920s. Victory in the first Sino-Japanese War alone could not define the new Japan—the 
image of a modern, industrious state had to be effectively conveyed to the masses. 
Consequently, scholars have noted that the same war also gave birth to the modern media in 
Japan.¹⁰ While the enormous increase in sales of newspapers (and later magazines), sparked 
by the war, awakened publishers to the potential profits to be had in selling current events, 
only the era’s rapid technological advances in the transportation infrastructure and publishing 
industries made it possible to develop an information-net capable of satisfying the public’s 
growing desire for news of the world. This new *mass* media performed the essential task of 
informing Japanese, as well as the rest of the world, of the nation’s recently acquired greatness. 
In the process, the media’s graphic imagery also played an intrinsic role in how Japanese 
developed the nation’s image of self—an image built on, in no small part, the concept of 
China as the other.¹¹

---

¹⁰ James L. Huffman, *Creating a Public: People and Press in Meiji Japan* (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1997).

¹¹ Benedict Anderson discusses "print capitalism" and its impact on the formation of national 
identity in *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* 
I next discuss the major themes of this paper and follow with a chapter synopsis that details the particular questions that are addressed within.

**Japanese Media Portrayal**

**Periodization**

Based on styles of visual presentation, Japanese modern graphic portrayal of the other from the early Meiji period until 1937 can be categorized roughly into four different stages. The first period, from 1867 until 1894, was defined by unsophisticated caricatures of the other as well as little attention to detail and realistic accuracy. At the dawn of the photographic era, brocade prints, or *nishikie*, were still the primary method of visually transmitting the news of the day. The various international crises that threatened the young nation's political stability, such as the Korean question (*Seikanron*, 1873), Taiwan incident (1874), the Jingo and Kōshin incidents (July 1882 and December 1884), as well as Japan's modern era civil war in 1877, the Satsuma Rebellion (*Seinan sensō*), were portrayed gaudily through hundreds of separate prints. In addition, reflecting the genre's evolution from the better-known ukiyoe creative tradition, classic elements of style, such as heroic poses defined by long-time artistic convention, prevailed over realistic portrayals in scenes from this period.

The start of the Sino-Japanese War in August of 1894 marked a turning point in the Japanese media's visual presentation of the other. Sino-Japanese War and Boxer Rebellion *nishikie* prints, influenced by a wider trend towards realism in the Japanese art world, began to depict accurately the physical reality of scenes more often than in the previous period. While gross caricatures, imaginative landscapes, and classical poses continued to exist, the attention to realistic detail predominated. In addition to contemporary artistic trends, Japan's introduction to photography in the late nineteenth century also aids in explaining how artists...
were able to portray accurately their subjects in spite of the fact that only a few ever visited the front. Although the rudimentary technological development of photography at the time prevented it from immediately displacing *nishikie* as the graphic news medium of choice, many photographs were used as templates for prints as well as publication during this period.

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, marked the transition point into a third phase of Japan's media presentation of China. The adoption of photography as the primary medium for presenting the news graphically characterized this period. In spite of photography's growing dominance of commercial media, other graphic sources, such as paintings and woodblock prints also continued to play a role in defining the image of China in Japan. Whether in photographs, paintings, or prints, a romantic vision of China came to dominate the graphic imagery. Contemporary images that depicted the chaos and turmoil of the era were rare. Instead, classical landscapes and vistas proliferated while Chinese were usually depicted as quaint and old fashioned.

This rather romantic trend continued into the mid-twenties, when the media's focus turned towards depicting the Sino-Japanese relationship as a familial one. Reflecting the Japanese government's increasing cultural exchange efforts aimed at curbing rising anti-Japanese sentiment, photographs emphasized the *dōbundōshu* (same culture, same race) connection between China and Japan. When photographs depicted Japanese and Chinese together, they symbolically portrayed the former as beneficent mentors and guides to the latter. The media rarely showed negative images; and when they did, the anti-foreign or criminal rather than Chinese aspect was highlighted, particularly in the months immediately following the Manchurian Incident.  

---

12 Prior to the Manchurian Incident *Monthly Historical Photos* editors often referred to Chinese troops according to their regional affiliation such as "Jinan army" (*Sainan-gun*) or "Mukden army" (*Hōten-gun*). In what might be interpreted as an attempt by the media to
1920s onward, realism, albeit one-sided, reemerged again to dominate the imagery of China during the 1930s.

The Manchurian Incident of September 1931 distinctly marked the final stage in the development of the media's imagery of Chinese prior to 1938. The apparently accurate depiction of current events on the continent highlighted this period. Photographs displayed the wide variety of activities in which Japanese were involved in China during the thirties. From working conditions to combat scenes, these images gave the reader back home an idea of what conditions in China were supposedly like. Of course, the media usually omitted or spun out of context the Chinese point of view. When shown, photographs portrayed Chinese in simplistic extremes as either part of the criminal element, such as misled foreigner-hating ideologues, or as a people grateful for the hard work and dedication that Japanese were investing into "bettering" their backward nation. Only rarely did any photograph or representation give the Japanese home audience a more balanced account of the situation by including scenes of Chinese suffering or resistance. Especially telling are the scenes (reminiscent of the United States' postwar occupation of Japan) of Japanese downplay the rapid escalation of events after September 1931, various metaphors for the Chinese enemy came into use. Captions used several variations of the kanji character for bandit, zoku, such as hizoku (outlaws) and heibi (rebel soldiers). The term benitai (guerilla unit) also came into use and appeared designed to illicit strong negative feelings in readers by emphasizing that regular troops (seihitsu) would actually dishonorably discard their uniforms and fight in plain clothes (ben). For examples, see Rekishi shashin (Monthly Historical Photos), 1 March 1932, number 226, passim.
soldiers befriending Chinese children by giving them candy and food (Figure 1). Judging by the bulk of post-1937 magazine photos, even after full-scale war with China broke out that summer, it appears that the Japanese media remained determined to continue propagating the illusion of fraternal relations with China.

**Commercial Graphic Media**

Although the above categorizations serve as a general guideline for most forms of graphic media during the period, variations occurred naturally from medium to medium. These variations in the graphic approach to China over the course of the period reflect the changing cultural differences as well as variations in media organizational structures and their relationships with the government. This study identifies three main areas of graphic imagery: commercial, artistic, and educational. While all three areas are touched upon, commercial graphic imagery is the central focus since, of the three media mentioned above, it enjoyed by far the widest exposure to the Japanese public—even though the subject has attracted the least attention by scholars. Although the commercial graphics examined here included war prints, newspaper and magazine photographs, postcards and stamps, war prints and magazine photographs have been highlighted. This was done since they were the primary method of graphically portraying the news during the period, and thus they dominated other various forms of commercial graphic media.  

**Art**

The rapid influx of foreign cultural influences during the Bakumatsu period stimulated wide Japanese interest in things Western. New artistic styles and techniques such as

---

13 The Japanese film industry remained at an early stage of commercial development until the late 1930s. Even with the number of tickets sold from 1,586 theaters increasing from 185 million to over 400 million sold from 2,363 theaters in 1940, films and newsreels still enjoyed far less exposure to most Japanese than the monthly and bimonthly graphic magazines with print runs into the millions. Peter High, *The Imperial Screen: Japanese Film Culture in the Fifteen Years’ War, 1931–1945* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 149.
as perspective and *chiaroscuro* revolutionized the concept of art and the way artists approached their craft in Japan. Western-style painting (*yōga*) became an organized movement soon after the Restoration when the government founded The Technical Art School (*Kōbu Bijutsu Gakkō*) in 1876. While Japanese-style painting (*Nihonga*) initially lost a degree of respect, it gained a new lease on life in the reactionary period against things Western during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. The result of this increasing interest and organization in both *yōga* and *Nihonga* was that painting in general became a respectable profession by the beginning of the twentieth century. By the start of the Taishō period (1912-1926), the existence of numerous exhibitions, associations, and fan magazines attested to the fact that painting in Japan had gained a legitimacy that it had lacked before the Restoration. In 1907, the Ministry of Education’s sponsorship of the country’s first *Bunten*, or national art exhibition, signaled the institutional direction that the discipline would follow up until the end of the war in 1945.14

In spite of its close relationship with the painting establishment, it appears that the government did not aggressively utilize artists in any concerted propaganda campaign against China during the period. Aside from woodblock prints of the 1894-1895 war, few works exhibited enthusiastic support for anti-Chinese propaganda. Even when the might of the Japanese military was extolled in oil, the scene usually consisted of the figure of an officer outlined dramatically against the background of a ship, military placement, or the sky and clearly lacked the racial meanness characteristic of most of the Sino-Japanese War graphic images. Even after full mobilization of Japanese troops on the continent in 1937, depictions of Chinese, particularly as victims, hardly figured in war-art. “The extent of cruel treatment

---

of the race and its civilization to which the Japanese were supposedly closest, from whom the Japanese had drawn many of their cultural forms and on whose behalf Imperial Japanese forces were supposed to be fighting to liberate them from Western imperialism was not shown in Japanese painting during the eight years of their slaughter.\textsuperscript{15} This lack of racially demeaning caricature images produced in cooperation with the establishment indicated a drastically different approach to the imaging of China by both the government and artists in each of the two Sino-Japanese conflicts.

**Education**

Graphic imagery in educational textbooks was minimal during the period in question. This was due most probably to the prohibitive costs of inserting pictures and photographs into textbooks. In spite of the relative sparsity of visual representations in educational texts, I have touched upon how they depicted China because of the direct connection that existed between the production of textbook materials and the government, as well as for the obvious links that invariably exist between education and attitudinal formation in society. The Japanese government’s assignment of the direction of textbook publication to the Department of Education (Monbushō) from 1903 to 1945 demonstrated that it was well aware of this correlation. Since textbooks during this period reflected the government’s official perceptions of China, they provide an important basis of comparison with the images produced by commercial graphic media.

It is interesting to note that the textbook portrayal of China from 1903 onwards closely mirrored, although perhaps more conservatively, similar trends in the graphic imagery of China produced in Japan during the same period. Harry Wray’s tracing of the

developmental stages, according to published editions, in the evolution of textbook presentation of China is revealing. In the first government edition in 1903, "the attitude toward China was explicitly and implicitly the least favorable, hopeful, or balanced of any subsequent textbook edition. The 1903 textbooks clearly reflected an attitude of still seeking to emulate the West while dissociating the Japanese people from all other Asians, including the Chinese."\textsuperscript{16} Although the next edition, in 1910, continued to carry negative implications regarding China, textbook authors complemented them with the more positive message that Japan "should show a keener interest in their neighbor, help the Chinese people, and recognize China's relevance to the peace of East Asia."\textsuperscript{17} As with the graphic imagery of the time, the 1918-1923 textbooks presented the least patronizing and negative images of the whole period. The central theme of these texts was to stress the benefits of economic cooperation between both countries. Finally and again reflecting much of the graphic imagery of the same period, the last editions before World War II, published between 1933 and 1936, emphasized Japan's role as an independent and self-sufficient nation capable of leading China and the rest of East Asia to freedom from the West. The striking similarities between 	extit{Monbushō} textbook portrayals and commercially produced graphic images of China during the same period suggests that a certain amount of mutual understanding or agreement existed between the media and government.

\section*{Media-Government Relations}

The media's relationship with the government invariably affects the manner in which


\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 119.
the former disseminates information to the masses. Analyzing media systems that
governments overtly control poses far fewer problems than when the relationship is less
clearly defined, as was the case in Japan up until the late 1930s, when wartime controls began
methodically to muzzle the flow of information. Even though the balance between
government control and the freedom of the press varied up until the outbreak of open war, a
trend towards more coercive methods by censors is readily discernable. While the
government’s radicalization to the right during the 1930s played a large role in this trend, the
fact that Japan’s system of censorship drew its authority from administrative codes rather than
Diet-created laws led to an arbitrariness that usually favored the censors.

Reminiscent of censorship during the Edo period, most of the prewar period’s
administrative codes and laws were vaguely worded and often left publishers in the dark as to
their intent. Phrases such as “disruptive of public peace and order” or “injurious to public
morals” gave authorities broad powers of interpretation and left the publishing industry little
recourse in seeking redress from the judicial system. One major result of this
administrative-based tradition was that publishers, both in Edo Japan as well as in the prewar
period, became accustomed to self-censorship in order to avoid the costly repercussions of
producing “dangerous” material. The fact that self-censorship played a fundamental role
throughout the prewar period suggests that many if not most publishers and editors accepted
the need for at least some degree of media restraint. While those in the industry often
managed to resist the system in spite of the increasing pressures during the period, only a few
appear to have complained about censorship in general. Moreover, when publishers and
editors did protest, it usually was against the censor’s arbitrary interpretation of material rather
than the concept itself.
The Press Law of 1909 (*Shinbushi Ho*) ultimately became one of the cornerstones of Japan’s prewar censorship system, but nothing in the law specifically referred to graphic imagery. Although one would expect regulations such as these to address at least implicitly the graphic material in newspapers and magazines, the images examined in this study suggested little concerted effort at screening by censors prior to the Marco Polo Incident in the summer of 1937. Even after the military began taking an active role in censorship in late 1937, many instances of photographs managed to avoid the censors’ “not approved” (*fukyoka*) stamp through the late 1930s. This can be attributed largely to the relatively small number of censors who were charged with policing Japan’s massive publishing industry. As war on the continent spread and valuable resources became increasingly scarce to obtain, the government realized that its control of the materials needed to publish was the most effective way to enforce censorship; and from August 1938, rationing of materials such as paper began in earnest. Judging by the decreasing quality of photographs in the magazines examined, especially after 1940, the growing lack of the basic materials necessary to publish may have been the censors’ most effective weapon during the war years.

**Technology**

**Infrastructure**

Technological advances played a fundamental role in determining what kind of imagery was formed as well as who was affected by those images. Without the modern transportation and communications infrastructure produced by its rapid industrialization, Japan’s information network would never have become a mass media system. The introduction and rapid development of railroads and telegraphs soon after the Restoration enabled newspaper and booksellers to expand their customer base. Shortly after their
introduction into the country, fast and cost effective trains became the favored mode of transport for commercial distributors of the written media. The rail system linked the Japanese countryside to its urban centers; and by the end of the Meiji period, even the remotest villages were keeping abreast of current events soon after they happened, rather than weeks or months after the fact, as was the case prior to the Restoration.

The telegraph network (with wireless following soon after) went up alongside the laying of railroad tracks. Besides being an indispensable tool in maintaining the smooth and safe operations of the railways, the nearly instantaneous communications provided by the telegraph allowed reporters to cover domestic as well as global news quicker than ever before. The ability to transmit the news rapidly from China via telegraph relays on land and the Nagasaki-Shanghai marine cable during the first Sino-Japanese War played no small role in stimulating the subsequent newspaper and magazine publishing boom. As customer bases grew, more and more capital was generated, in turn creating a cycle of further investment and expansion. The major urban centers such as Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya continued to dominate the amount of sales generated by the publishing industry; but as technology improved both the speed of delivery and quality of transmission, the countryside became an increasingly vital component in the competition for market share and profits.

**Printing/Publishing**

Advances in print technology also played a large part in the development of Japan's mass media. Initially, the Japanese language, with its Chinese derived characters (kanji), presented a challenging obstacle to publishers' attempts at utilizing mass production methods. However, by the end of World War I, ingenuity, tenacity, innovative typeset techniques, imported technology, and advances in printing press technology combined to overcome obstacles and raise the Japanese publishing industry to a level on a par with its counterparts in
the West. Subscription statistics graphically illustrate the publishing industry's dramatic growth during the fifty-year period between the two Sino-Japanese Wars. While most newspapers were content to sell between 10,000 and 20,000 copies during the early 1890s, the post-war publication boom saw sales rise rapidly after 1895. Major dailies such as the Osaka Mainichi Shinbun and Osaka Asahi were selling over 200,000 copies a day in 1915; by the end of the Taishō era in 1926, the Osaka Mainichi had broken the one-million mark and several rivals were nearing it.18 The magazine industry also enjoyed steady growth during the same period. Publishers of mainstream magazines who were once happy to sell a few thousand copies before World War I were striving to sell over a million of each issue by the end of the 1920s.19 New print technology also increased the reach of graphic media. In addition to magazines and newspapers, postcards

18 Huffman, Creating a Public, 362-363, 386-387.
and stamps became another outlet for selling images, whether the images were of war heroes (Figure 2) or stereotypical scenes of China (Figure 3).

In addition to advances made in the printing industry, enterprising publishers such as Iwanami Shigeo (1881-1946) and Noma Seiji (1878-1938), blazed the innovative trail by creating two of Japan’s first modern publishing giants, Iwanami Shoten and Kodansha. These two companies introduced or popularized strategies that the publishing world accepts today as basic operating principles; by the end of the 1920s, practices such as the return of unsold magazines, aggressive advertising in newspapers and magazines, sponsored promotional events and responding to reader feedback, were a central part of the industry. In addition to expanding the information network, these innovations transformed an industry from one that had formerly served as soapboxes for special interest groups into one that increasingly came to reflect the attitudes of readers by providing them with what they wanted to see and read. By the 1920s, more than one contemporary publisher noted that capitalism had become the driving force in Japanese publishing. The aforementioned Tokutomi Sohō, the owner and publisher of the politically oriented Kokumin no tomo (Friend of the People), noted with sadness that “the businessmen who fingers the abacus” had become the driving force in newspaper publishing by the late 1920s.20

As the publishing industry evolved into big business, layout became a central component in the process. The skillful placement and design of a photograph within a magazine became critically important in attaining the desired effect. Although graphic design was in its nascent stages of development during the twenties and most of the thirties, the field had evolved significantly by the start of World War II. By then, Japanese

20 Quoted in Huffman, Creating a Public, 360.
photographers and editors had joined the vanguard in developing techniques such as photographic collage, touching up, and compositing.\footnote{21}

**Graphic Imaging**

Improvements in photographic technology went hand in hand with advances in the printing and publishing industries. The steady reduction in the size of cameras, improvements in lens quality, and the development of negative film improved photographers' capacity for taking more dramatic and realistic pictures. Instead of staged or controlled photo shoots, blurry images (from long exposure times), and drab landscapes, photographs came to capture the natural flows of action, albeit in snapshots, with crisp clarity and increasingly in color. Breakthroughs in chemical processes shortened developing times and made the process easier, quicker, and cheaper. As photography became cheaper and less complicated, it developed a large amateur following which in turn stimulated the birth of the fan club industry by the turn of the nineteenth century. By the end of the Meiji period in 1912, fan magazines were being published, exhibitions held, and cameras as well as developing supplies produced domestically. These trends continued up into the late 1930s, when increasingly stringent government regulation and co-option of vital resources for the war effort derailed the industry's expansion until its postwar recovery in the 1950s.

**Effects of Graphic Imagery**

Establishing a direct correlation between Japan's graphic presentation of China and its effects on Japanese societal attitudes towards Chinese is nearly impossible and is not the

\footnote{21 Regarding the prewar development of artistic and commercial photography in Japan, see Friends of Photography, *Modern Photography in Japan, 1915-1940* (San Francisco: Friends of Photography), 2001. For more on Japanese advances in commercial graphic design during the Pacific War, see Seiichi Tagawa, *Senso no gurafizumu: "Front" o tsukutta hitobito* (War imaging: The creators of the *Front*) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2000).}
goal of this study. It is clear, though, as numerous studies have demonstrated that the modern mass media does have the power to affect social attitudes on a large scale. In a similar vein, this work seeks to highlight the fact that Japan’s graphic media did play a central role in influencing how the Japanese public “saw” Chinese during the first half of the twentieth century. The lack of ample quality opportunities for Japanese to meet Chinese either in Japan or in China allowed the media to create the visual imagery that defined for most Japanese what it meant to be Chinese. Although many Japanese in the roles of soldier, trader, scholar, and tourist did visit China increasingly after 1895, their perspectives usually failed to portray a China that resembled the reality of the times. While the soldier and trader saw Chinese through a lens colored by economic and military imperialism, many Japanese scholars and tourists also failed to see past long-held preconceptions of China. These ideas, shaped by centuries of cultural borrowing from China, more often than not predisposed Japanese visitors to the mainland into seeing what they expected to see rather than a vision more in tune with the reality of the times. This lack of accurate information regarding China increased the media’s visual imagery impact, for without any positive alternative views or experiences to balance the negative, Japanese attitudes towards Chinese were destined to remain prejudiced. That anti-Chinese biases negatively affected Sino-Japanese relations


23 Neither the military nor the trading profession was conducive to positive Sino-Japanese relations. While the army indoctrinated soldiers into perceiving the Chinese enemy as sub-human, the typical Japanese merchant lived in their expatriate concessions, isolated from the general Chinese population. The Japanese expatriate lifestyle and colonial mentality left little room for positive cultural exchange based on respect and equality. For the Japanese trader’s experiences in China, see The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937, ed. Peter Duus, Ramone Myers, and Mark Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).

during the period was clearly demonstrated by the actions of Japanese both at home and overseas.

Following this introduction, Chapter 2 examines the creation of Japan’s modern transportation infrastructure, and then looks at the key technological inventions and innovations such as the camera that allowed the media industry to reap the commercial benefits derived from a nation united both in body as well as in spirit. The social results of Japan’s rapid industrialization became readily apparent during the Taishō period (1912-1926). By the beginning of the twentieth century, the expanding communications and transportation structure had stimulated an urbanization trend that continues to this day. From all areas of the country, rural youth came to the cities seeking work and the hope of improving their lives. By the end of World War I, this growing urban population and the ensuing birth of a middle class, centering on the newly created “salary man,” attained a critical mass that allowed media companies such as the Asahi Shinbun and Kodansha to grow from regional into national organizations. This development stimulated subsequent cycles of renewal and expansion and the acquisition of new equipment and technology allowed expanding companies to nurture new markets as well as increase market share. By the end of the 1920s, Japan had become a unified economic unit in which the national information grid had integrated even the remotest villages. While these improvements greatly facilitated the flow of information, they also allowed censors to more effectively control the system and therefore have greater influence over societal attitudes.

Chapters 3 through 6 take an in-depth look at the changing image of China as portrayed by the Japanese commercial media from the Meiji Restoration of 1868 until 1937. Following the categorization previously outlined above, the chapters present the evolution of
the imagery in four phases. Chapter 3, covering from 1868 to 1894, examines how woodblock prints depicted the important political events of the time. These prints, made to convey Japanese superiority and righteousness, were highly one-sided affairs that relied on artistic tradition and license to convey their messages. This chapter begins with an introduction to prints that depicted the domestic Boshin (1868-1869) and Seinan (1877) Wars because they offer insightful comparisons in the portrayal of fellow Japanese as the other. Besides demonstrating the bias of Japanese artists in portraying their fellow compatriots rather than foreign antagonists, these images also allow us to trace how artistic style and technique evolved over time. The chapter then focuses on the Jingo (1882) and Kōshin (1884) incidents since they were the precursors that led up to the war in 1894. Both events involved Korean infighting between local factions for and those against increased foreign intervention in the peninsula’s affairs. While Japan received reparations for loss of life and damage to property after both incidents, Chinese influence came to dominate palace politics in Seoul until the Sino-Japanese War.

The next stage in the evolution of the Japanese portrayal of China encompassed the Sino-Japanese War and the Boxer Rebellion. While many similarities with prints from the previous period are noticeable, an increasing attention to realistic detail is readily apparent. Although only a few woodblock artists ever visited the battle scenes, those who did used available vivid on-the-scene descriptions (from Japanese as well as European sources) and photographs as templates to create accurate images from the front. While photographs from the front began appearing in publications during the Sino-Japanese War, technology of

---

25 It is interesting to note that this trend towards realism more often than not ended when it came to portraying Chinese facial and physical expressions. Most prints, aside from the caricatured expressions and exaggerated bodily contortions of the depicted Chinese, were factually correct down to the smallest detail, such as uniform markings. Not surprisingly, although most Japanese figures were also caricatures, they were positive, portraying nobility, courage and sincerity.
Chapter 5 examines the third phase in modern Japan’s imaging of China, and covers the years between the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and the Manchurian Incident of 1931. The war with Russia introduced commercial photography on a large scale to the Japanese public. Although woodblock print publishers attempted to revive the declining industry’s fortunes by capitalizing on war fever and patriotism, the nature of the war as well as improving technology prepared the way for the new medium. In every conceivable format, photographs in magazines, booklets, posters, and postcards brought the reality of the battle zone home to an eagerly awaiting public. In spite of the still primitive quality of the dreary black and white photographs, they were popular; and during the next war to affect Japan, the First World War, they were the medium of choice in reporting on the latest developments in Europe. During this phase, Japanese imagery for the most part romanticized China. Rather than focusing on the contemporary problems that were plaguing the country and complicating Sino-Japanese relations, photographs and other media such as paintings and woodblock prints emphasized the rich classical lore of China (Figure 4). Famous landscapes and scenery dominated the
imagery; when Chinese were portrayed, it was either as anthropological subjects or as quaint and backwards people in need of friendly assistance from Japan.

The Manchurian incident and the subsequent creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo marked the final stage in the evolution of Chinese imagery up until Japan’s mobilization for all-out war in latter half of 1937. During the period, Chiang Kai-Shek’s increasingly aggressive nationalist movement along with Japan’s heavy economic investment in the mainland guaranteed China a continuing prominence in the Japanese media. Reflecting the Japanese government’s growing exasperation with Chinese actions and attitudes, a strong pedantic tendency dominated the graphic imagery. The media portrayed two basic types of Chinese—one who gratefully welcomed Japan’s “guidance,” and the other who needed to be convinced, more forcefully, of his misguided ways. In spite of the copious graphic coverage of Japanese military actions on the continent, the grotesque caricatured images that dominated the first Sino-Japanese War were conspicuously lacking. The reasons for this are dealt with in the following chapter.

Chapter 7 examines the human influences behind the production of Chinese imagery during the period. Of central interest is the relationship between the government and media. While scholars such as Jay Rubin and Richard Mitchell have dealt with censorship and the written word, there has been little said about the effects of suppression on graphic media. Did the same laws and methods used on the written word apply to graphic media? To what extent was graphic media a priority for censors? In The Imperial Screen, Peter High has shown that the authorities were indeed worried about the effects of motion pictures on society but did they also place the same kind of pressure and use similar tactics on the publishing industry to accomplish their goals? If so, how effective was graphic media censorship?
As mentioned above, generally there was a definite trend towards more, rather than less, print censorship from the early Meiji period up until the end of the Pacific War. As the period progressed, the increasing suppression of the word had a dampening effect on what authors chose to write and editors printed. Did the graphic imaging of China demonstrate a corresponding effect? At first glance, the visual evidence paints a different picture, since the most offensive images of China were produced early on during the period while the apparently innocuous ones dominated the news in the 1930s as the two countries fought each other. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that Japanese graphic propaganda regarding China (aside from the 1894-1895) never attained the fervid pitch that it did against the United States. Was this because of a government dictated policy, or for some other reason, such as the public’s differing attitudes towards Japan’s respective antagonists? These are some of the questions addressed in this chapter.

The final chapter evaluates the influence of the Japanese media’s graphic portrayal of China. To what extent did the visual depictions of China affect the public’s perception of China change over the fifty-year period?

I add here a word about my theoretical and methodological approaches. As stated above, the focus of this study is to examine the effects of visual media, particularly commercial graphic media, on the formation of Japanese attitudes towards China and Chinese. The commercial graphic media examined herein include nishikie prints produced from 1868 until 1905, and photographic journalism, primarily from magazines that targeted the Japanese public between 1895 and 1937. I defined the general public simply as the majority of Japanese population who played no direct role in the governing of the nation or in the formation of its intellectual elite. These people came from all occupations, both urban and
rural. They were farmers, factory workers and day laborers, as well as the rising new middle class of salary men who owed their origins to Japan’s remarkable industrialization. The Japanese media targeted these people since they made up the bulk of the population and provided the best potential for profits.

My theoretical approach to this topic was in large part guided by concepts and ideas from Benedict Anderson, James Huffman, and Oliver Thomson. Anderson’s concept of “print-capitalism” was useful in helping to explain the rapid rise of Japanese nationalism. Japan’s print-capitalism came about as the result of the rise of capitalism and the rapidly expanding publishing industry after the Meiji Restoration. The end creation of this union became the new “imagined” community of Japan. The Japanese printed language served as a unifying factor that emphasized national allegiance at the expense of local associations and loyalties. The power of print demonstrated itself dramatically when nearly the whole country enthusiastically rallied behind the war effort in 1894-1895. This unity of purpose and thought was even more remarkable considering that the country had experienced a civil war less than two decades before.

Huffman’s ideas on how public identity creates and is created by the mass media complements Anderson’s concept of print capitalism. In his *Creating a Public*, Huffman argues that once Japan’s print media had evolved from political gazettes into a fully developed capitalist system, with profit governing management strategies, it gained the power to influence social attitudes. However, this interaction between the public and the press went both ways; for even as the press had the ability to create a Japanese public identity, the need to profit allowed that same public to dictate to a certain extent what the press would print. If magazines and newspapers consistently failed to pique the public’s interest by publishing stories and news it wanted to hear, publishers invariably went out of business, as was
demonstrated by the many who failed to adapt successfully to the industry’s capitalization during the latter half of the Meiji period.26

Oliver Thomson’s *Mass Persuasion in History* provided a general framework for examining the effects of graphic imagery.27 As the title suggests, Thomson explains how graphic imagery, such as that found in art, on coins, and in architecture, can be (and usually is) used as propaganda, and how those effects can be measured in historical contexts. Thomson argues that by analyzing the straightforward physical (the amount of media evidence in question remaining today), psychological (the message as well as the receptiveness of a particular audience), and quantitative criteria (how extensive and persuasive a message could be transmitted with the given mass media infrastructure and logistical situation of the period), we can measure adequately a certain medium’s cultural impact. Once this has been done, we can gain a clearer understanding of the attitudinal trends that existed in past societies.

Using the theoretical concepts mentioned above, I approached the practical problem from various different angles. First, I looked at the graphic evidence. Images of China and Chinese in *nishikie*, graphic magazines, postcards, and paintings were inspected and rated. In categorizing the images, the following five general guidelines directed my analysis and added coherence to the material throughout the whole period: 1) the depiction of the other/Chinese; 2) the rendering of Japanese; 3) an image’s primary message as well as its lucidity; 4) an image’s relation to reality; and 5) an inference of the targeted audience’s identity. The actual classification of prints and photos involved my subjective grading of material into the three major categories of negative, positive, and neutral portrayals (Table 1).

26 Huffman notes the publishing industry’s volatile nature; while it produced an average of 622 new newspapers and magazines every year from 1906 to 1911, 581 folded annually during the same period. See Huffman, *Creating a Public*, 315.
Table 1: Japanese and Chinese Image Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JAPANESE IMAGES</th>
<th>CHARACTERISTICS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>total dominance of enemy</td>
<td>dead or dying Chinese; brutal physical violence; humiliating depictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>survival against nature</td>
<td>stoic endurance against inhospitable landscapes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>courage and discipline</td>
<td>depicting actions designed to elicit selflessness, loyalty, patriotism, as well as images of organization and endurance against hardships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>technological superiority</td>
<td>displays of technology such as ships, artillery, trains, search lights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enlisted glory</td>
<td>same as courage and discipline, but featuring enlisted soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>altruism</td>
<td>acts of kindness towards Chinese</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHINESE IMAGERY

| Caricatures | exaggerated depictions of Chinese in fear and horror of Japanese; barbarism/backwardness; banditry or anti-foreign displays; romantic past |
| Panic and cowardice | emphasis on acts of panic and cowardice, such as retreat |
| Strange cultures and honor | differences of the other emphasized, sometimes in honorable form |

A representation earned a negative designation if the portrayed subject was depicted in either a demeaning caricature or a humiliating situation. Images ranging from exaggerated caricatures of Chinese fighting in the Sino-Japanese War (Figure 5) to photographs of Chinese

prisoners serve as representative examples (Figure 6). Positive-rated depictions mirrored negatively classified portrayals by showing figures (nearly always Japanese) in heroic poses (Figure 7) or performing altruistic deeds (Figure 8). I used the neutral classification when it was difficult to determine, from either the image alone or an accompanying cartouche, whether the portrayal was negative or positive. In war prints from the Meiji period, this usually occurred simply because the Chinese enemy was too far in the distance to render an objective categorization (Figure 9). In photographs from the Taishō and Shōwa eras, images ostensibly about China

Figure 6: A negative image of Chinese prisoners captured in the attack on Jehol, a province in northern China. The headline in large type reads, “The general offensive on Jehol” (Nekka sōkōgeki), and the caption in the top-right reads, “The defeated remnants of Chengde’s [city name] enemy forces captured by our troops” (Waga gun ni towaretaru shōtoku no teki no sanpe). From issue #239 (August 1933) of Monthly Historical Photos.

Figure 7: Example of a heroic pose. This Sino-Japanese War woodblock print shows Admiral Kabayama Sukenori, chief of the Navy General Staff, bravely enduring the enemy’s attack aboard the Saikyō-maru, a merchantman converted into a war vessel. From Impressions of the Front, page 27.
In a scene often depicted from the Sino-Japanese War, Captain Higuchi is shown rescuing a lost Chinese infant while still managing to conduct an assault near Weihaiwei. The captain later had a Chinese prisoner return the baby to its mother. The potentially powerful impact on the emotions by such graphic images was demonstrated in a French correspondent, who after apparently observing Higuchi’s actions, remarked “From this episode alone, it is clear that Japan’s war against China is righteous.” From *Impressions of the Front*, page 42.

During the 1920s, when judging by the large number of photo-journalistic magazines in publication, Japanese interest in the rest of the world was at a prewar height, photographs depicting the everyday lives of different peoples from different nations in an inoffensive manner, including Chinese, were widespread. These types of photographs also tended to fall into the neutral classification if they omitted a stereotypical or hackneyed perspective (Figure 10).
Six themes dominated the negative, positive, and neutral categories into descriptive groupings that highlighted the fact that most images usually contained more than one message. Six themes dominated the graphic imaging of Japanese when depicted in opposition to Chinese throughout the period from 1868 through 1937. They were 1) total dominance of the enemy (Figure 11), 2) survival against nature (Figure 12), 3) courage and discipline (Figure 13), 4) technological superiority (Figure 14), 5) enlisted glory (Figure 15), and 6) altruism (Figure 16). Another reason for including these subcategories is that doing so
helped to illustrate the Japanese audience’s changing attitudes over time. For example, judging by contemporary media coverage, depicting the bravery of the enlisted man, or what I label as “enlisted glory,” was extremely popular during the Sino-Japanese War. Only ten years later, although the far fewer number of representative prints indicates a comparative
decrease in public demand for woodcuts, portraying the exploits of officers during the Russo-Japanese War apparently replaced images of the men in the ranks.

While the Japanese categories reflect the positive images of the self, as visualized by Japanese artists and photographers, the Chinese imagery fell into three types, all of which displayed Japanese attitudes of condescension towards China. They were 1) caricatures, 2) panic and cowardice (Figure 17), and 3) strange cultures and honor (Figure 18). I also left some subcategories, such as...
caricatures, intentionally broad in order to accommodate slight shifts in thematic focus over time. Doing so highlighted the fact that while Sino-Japanese War prints in this category emphasized the barbarous nature of Chinese, later images, mostly photographs, underscored the outlaw or backward characteristics of those portrayed in addition to barbarous aspects.

Although a subtle distinction, the former label targeted Chinese as a monolithic cultural unit while the latter implied that there were two main types of Chinese, the good and the bad. This kind of conceptual obfuscation provided Japanese authorities with the intellectual ammunition to justify their continued presence in China throughout the prewar period. The implied reasoning was that Japan was in China to help the good Chinese overcome the bad Chinese who were preventing the nation’s modernization. In similar fashion, I divided another category, courage and discipline, into two different groups for Sino-Japanese War prints. The additional classification, heroic pose, helped to spotlight the stylistic heritage of nishikie prints during the Meiji period. Once photographs displaced woodblock prints as the
preferred commercial graphic medium of choice, the realism of photography for the most part rendered the contrived style of the heroic pose obsolete.

After classifying the imagery, I then examined the relationship between the government and the publishing industry. To what extent did the government dictate how the media graphically portrayed Chinese? Using the period’s various press laws as a background, I searched for clues such as memos, diaries, and published statements by public officials that indicated a preference in the way the government wanted China and Chinese to be portrayed as well as how the bureaucracy meant to enforce such preferences.\(^{28}\) Thereafter, paying special attention to infrastructure and technological advancements, I traced the development of Japan’s commercial media. By focusing on the extent of the publishing industry’s infrastructure as well as the effects of technology on production and distribution, my goal was to estimate the scope of the public’s exposure to the graphic imagery in question. Having done this, I hoped to arrive at a realistic estimate of the impact that Japan’s commercial graphic media had on Japanese social attitudes during the prewar period.

Aside from the media's relationship with the government, the ability to disseminate information in an effective and timely manner depends heavily on the extent and quality of a country's existing transportation and communications infrastructure. The lack of either component hinders the efficient transfer of information and lessens the impact of a message, if not rendering it obsolete. The logistical difficulties in managing domestic disturbances that plagued much of the country during the 1870s, especially during the Seinan Rebellion, convinced the Government that an efficient communications and transportation system was vital to national security as well as for developing the nation's industrial strength. The Japanese public's ravenous appetite for news from the front during the Sino-Japanese War also made it clear to leaders in the news industry that information had become a valuable commercial commodity, and in order to maximize profits by expanding markets, investment in advanced technologies was required. Both of these factors combined to fuel the development of Japan's communications and transportation infrastructure as well stimulate technological progress in the printing and publishing industries. By the 1920s, these efforts resulted in the creation of a mature information-providing industry that could be described accurately as a true "mass medium."

In addition to outlining how images of China and the Chinese reached the Japanese public, this chapter examines the ways in which new technologies affected the actual presentation of those images from the beginning of the Meiji Restoration through 1937. In doing so, the following pages focus on the effects of the creation of a national transport and communications infrastructure, technological advances in the printing and publishing industries, and the evolution of graphic imagery during the period. First is an overview of
the development of the transport and communications system. As noted above, the Meiji government’s quest for domestic stability and economic prosperity led directly to the creation of a modern transportation and communications infrastructure. By the start of the war with China, most of the nation’s major railway hubs had been completed; and in areas where tracks had yet to be laid, other modes of transportation linked even the remotest villages to major urban centers. In turn, the printing and publishing industries utilized this growing network to expand their markets rapidly in ever-larger spirals emanating from centrally located metropolitan areas such as Tokyo and Osaka. By the end of the Meiji period, many of even the smaller, more isolated towns could boast of having their own local bookstores that offered the latest novels as well as most of the national newspapers and magazines—a reflection of the increasingly literate population and an improved transport infrastructure that led to lower costs in delivering printed media. While newspapers stimulated the commercialization of the Japanese media industry, the evolution of cheap and high quality photography led to a new form of information medium, the graphic magazine, which targeted the masses. Given the large role that photography came to play in the growth of popular magazines and media in general, this chapter ends by examining the development of photography and its evolution into a major form of presenting the news in Japan.

Transportation

During the Edo period, Tokugawa officials were well aware of the importance of timely information. Authorities strictly regulated the development of transportation networks as one method of controlling distant daimyo whose loyalties to the bakufu were questionable. For government-related business, the system of information transfer was relatively speedy; by express courier on foot, an official letter could cover the 300-mile
distance between Kyoto and Edo in about sixty hours. Commercial and private transport moved at a more leisurely pace, usually completing the journey in two weeks or more. The rugged terrain that comprises most of the Japanese archipelago prevented the extensive use of horses and wagons and played a major role in determining the speed of goods and travelers (Figure 19). In addition, administrative controls on transport networks such as barrier stations and limits on sea travel further hampered the creation of an efficient system. As scholars have pointed out, the system worked well enough since it served its purpose by limiting the efficient flow of information to those not in power.

After the Restoration, the new government's concerns over the liberalization of information transfer as well as the prohibitive cost of building a modern, efficient, and open transportation and communications infrastructure initially delayed its development. Foreign pressure to modernize as well as recognition of the benefits that such a system had to offer to the military and the nation-building process resolved the matter. In 1872, the country's first rail line opened for service between Yokohama and Shinbashi station in Tokyo. Trains made two stops along the way and covered the total distance of approximately 18 miles (29km) in 53 minutes (32.8 km/h). In spite of its modest beginnings, the railroad captured the imagination of the Japanese public and new station and line-opening ceremonies invariably

Figure 19: Litter Bearers and Passenger (collodion photograph, circa 1870). Litters were the favored method of long-distance transport for the upper classes during the Edo period. From Hyakunen mae no Nihon (Japan one hundred years ago), page 185.
drew large crowds of spectators eager to catch glimpses of the new technology (Figure 20). The Japanese fascination with trains and railroads, often imaginatively depicted owing to the lack of first-hand observation, provided a major staple for woodblock artists during the 1870s (see Figure 69 below).

![Figure 20: Opening of Kyoto Station. This 1877 print by Hiroshige III depicts the opening ceremonies of Kyoto Station, one terminus of the Kobe-Osaka-Kyoto railway, on February 5, 1877. A major step towards the completion of a national railroad network, the event was attended by the Meiji Emperor as well as many dignitaries. From Bakumatsu meiji rekishi, #7 pages 24-25.](image)

Commercial as well as public demand for faster and more efficient transport continued to stimulate the steady growth of Japan's railway network throughout the Meiji period and beyond. Passenger traffic steadily grew from 495,078 people in 1872, to 31,944,856 in 1900, and 411,562,353 by 1920. Freight loads also increased rapidly from the annual total of 46,000 tons of cargo delivered in 1872, to over 2,850,000 tons by 1900. The successful debut of the Tokyo-Yokohama line spurred the development of other lines in urban areas across the country. The commercially important Osaka-Kobe line began operations in 1874 and was extended to Kyoto in 1876 and the city of Ōtsu on Lake Biwa in 1880. In 1889, the foundation of Japan's transportation network, the Tokaido line, opened by linking
Kobe and Tokyo with service that took just over twenty hours to complete a one-way trip. By 1894, a new express train had reduced the time to under 18 hours and again less than 14 hours in 1906. The Tokaido line finally linked Shimonoseki on the western end of Honshu in 1907, therefore preparing the way for further economic development along the entire Inland Sea corridor. As track mileage increased in central Japan, other lines in Hokkaido and Kyushu also opened. Aside from slowdowns in periods of economic hardships during the 1880s and 1890s, Japan’s rail system expanded rapidly to the point where, by the end of the Meiji period in 1912, a national network of over 5,247 miles (8,395 km) of track linked most of the country (Figure 21). By 1936, more than a billion passengers were traveling over 10,950 miles (17,530 km) of tracks nationwide and trains were hauling more than one hundred million tons of freight annually.29

---

In addition to the expansion of railroads on land, Japanese shipping also experienced extensive growth during the same period. As with railroads, the initial development of the shipping industry started slowly and increased momentum only later, especially after the Sino-Japanese War. The economics of starting a shipping business was the main factor that held back the industry’s growth prior to the war with China. In light of the nearly insolvent national treasury and other pressing problems, Meiji leaders at first were unable to dislodge the foreign firms that had come to dominate the coastal sea trade after Commodore Perry’s forceful opening of the country in the 1850s. It was not until the 1874 punitive expedition to Formosa (Taiwan) that Japanese leaders fully realized how deeply national independence and the existence of a healthy merchant marine were intertwined. Initially, the expeditionary force planned to use foreign-chartered ships but the Western powers involved vetoed the Japanese request. The lack of alternate transportation forced the government to purchase the thirteen ships needed, then selling them for a nominal fee to the largest Japanese shipping company of the time, Mitsubishi Shōkai, which then successfully carried the troops and cargo to Formosa. Soon after, Mitsubishi again came to the government’s aid, this time by devoting all of its resources towards the vital transport of troops and weapons during the Seinan Rebellion of 1877.

After Saigō Takamori’s defeat, the government continued supporting the shipping industry through subsidies and encouraged domestic competition in order to weed out weak companies. By the 1880s, two companies dominated shipping in Japanese waters, the former Mitsubishi Shōkai (as of 1885 the Nippon Yūsen Kaisha, NYK) and the Osaka Shōsen Kaisha (OSK). With the benefit of government subsidies as well as the industry’s continuing rationalization through modernization and horizontal integration (buying out the competition), both companies continued to expand. Circumstances such as increasing world trade,
continuing emigration out of Japan, and both the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars stimulated further growth until by the beginning of World War I, Japanese shipping was dominating East Asian waters as well as competing with American and European lines in other regions of the world. By 1927, after World War I had provided another boost to industry growth, Japan’s merchant marine had become the third largest in the world, with 4,033,000 tons of capacity, behind the United States (13,645,000 tons) and Great Britain (21,877,000 tons).

While the use of the automobile and airplane slowly increased after the late 1920s, trains and ships continued to provide the bulk of the country’s transport until years after World War II. The high cost of air-transport limited its extensive use to the larger newspaper companies such as the *Asahi Shinbun*. Even so, the newspapers used airplanes only when the speedy delivery of unprocessed film was a priority, such as during the crisis started by the Manchurian Incident of 1931. Anticipating the public’s interest in Japan’s growing presence on the continent, the major dailies hoped to increase their readership by being the first to break the latest news from China as had the war print publishers during the Sino- and Russo-Japanese Wars.

In addition to airplanes, trucks also became a more common sight in Japan during the late 1920s. However, when compared to the costs of using bicycles and two-wheeled human-pulled wagons, trucks were a luxury that
few book and magazine vendors could afford before World War II (Figure 22). The military’s increasing monopolization of manufactured products such as trucks during the 1930s further exacerbated the situation for the media industry, and for the most part, the bicycle and hand-wagon remained the final link in the distribution chain between publisher and vendors in the more remote areas of Japan until the postwar period.

Communications

Whereas the early growth of a modern transportation infrastructure encountered difficulties caused by the fluctuating economic situation during the early Meiji period, the development of a communications network progressed more smoothly. While the government’s early recognition of the importance of timely communications was an important factor its rapid growth, the comparatively low startup costs of setting up an efficient network also played a large part its subsequent expansion. Telegraphy, invented in the 1830s by Samuel Morse, was the fastest method of communication of the time and therefore naturally formed the foundation of Japan’s modern infrastructure. Although Commodore Perry’s visit initially had introduced telegraphy to Japan, the period’s political turmoil prevented the Tokugawa government from taking any concrete action despite the Bakufu’s interest in going ahead with constructing a domestic telegraph network.

Japan’s first telegraph service linked Yokohama and Tokyo in 1869 soon after the Meiji Restoration had unified the nation. A combination of government, private, and international funding subsequently stimulated a flood of telegraph construction throughout the 1870s. Domestically, the Kobe-Osaka line opened in 1870; marine cable connected Kyushu

30 The following information on the evolution of telegraphy in Japan is derived in large part from Osaka Mainichi Shinbun and Tokyo Nichi-nichi Shinbunsha, *The Development of Postal Enterprise in Japan* (Osaka: Osaka Mainichi Shinbun, 1928), 32-34.
and Honshu in 1872; in 1873, service began between Tokyo and Nagasaki in the south and Aomori in the north; and by the end of 1874, marine cable linked Honshu and Hokkaido. In 1876, the network included all of Kyushu's major cities and by 1882, Japan's fourth main island of Shikoku had been incorporated into the system. The rush to set up lines was such that construction outpaced the supply of telegraph poles and engineers resorted to utilizing trees instead wherever possible. By 1878, the government had established 68 telegraph offices and erected 3800 miles of landline along with 50 miles of submarine cable.

Along with the creation of a domestic infrastructure, Meiji leaders also invested sufficient energy in developing Japan's regional communications capability. Its completion of the marine cable connecting Europe and Shanghai in 1870 greatly magnified Japan's presence in the Far East. In order to keep up with rapidly changing developments as well as to conserve scarce funds, the Japanese government signed an agreement that gave The Great Northern Telegraph Company, a Danish firm, an eventual thirty-year concession to the rights of any lines it built running through Japan. By the middle of 1871, the company had laid cables linking Nagasaki to Shanghai as well as Vladivostok. The Great Northern built additional lines to Shanghai and Vladivostok in 1892 and Japan obtained another connection to the mainland via Taiwan after defeating China in 1895. Demonstrating Japan's growing interest in Asia, more cables were laid connecting Dairen (Port Arthur) with Sasebo, in western Kyushu, during the war with Russia. In 1906, cables linked San Francisco and Tokyo via the Ogasawara islands and Guam, and by 1914, Japan had built a line between Nagasaki and Shanghai with government funds, thereby allowing for the first use of Japanese in transmitting messages.31

31 Having joined the International Telegraph Union in 1873 (the first international telegraph conference was held in 1865), Japan was obliged to follow the Union's rules and transmit in one of the five approved European languages when using lines subject to international
By the turn of the century, telegraph lines were a ubiquitous sight in Japan. Twenty thousand miles of line in 1893 had grown to 100,000 miles in 1919 and to 130,000 miles in 1924. Confirming the demand for wire services, the volume of telegraph traffic followed a reoccurring pattern in Japan where communications traffic increased drastically during times of war. The number of telegrams sent during World War I increased from 32,000,000 in 1913 to 75,000,000 in 1919. The telegraph continued to be the favored method of long-distance communications throughout the 1920s, in spite of growing competition from the wireless telegraph, radio, and the telephone.

The first successful practical test of the wireless telegraph was a message sent over the thirty-two mile distance across the Channel from England to France in 1899. That same year, its inventor, Guglielmo Marconi, also conducted a successful ship-to-ship trial relay. Marconi's experiments proved that the wireless had great potential for both humanitarian as well as military applications and stimulated further government-funded research throughout the world. In Japan, the imperial navy in particular took great interest in the new technology; in 1900, it already had installed a wireless transmitter on the Mikasa, one of its newest battleships ordered from Great Britain. Two years later, Japanese scientists had successfully sent messages over a distance of 80 miles. During the Russo-Japanese War, wireless saw its first combat use when Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō (1848-1934) sent a message from the Mikasa informing Japan of its stunning victory over the Russian fleet at the battle of the Tsushima Straits in 1905. By 1910, all Japanese ships had complied with international agreements requiring the installation of transmitters and were receiving weather reports via wireless. By the end of the 1920s, all of Japan and much of the world had become accessible by wireless technology.

conventions. Ibid., 33.
The previous two decades of intensive global research invested in the development of radio technology finally gave birth to the broadcasting industry in the 1920s.\textsuperscript{32} The world’s first commercial service began broadcasting out of Pittsburgh in the United States in 1921; within two years over three million Americans were listening and radio sales were reportedly making over a million dollars per day.\textsuperscript{33} Japan’s first commercial radio service began when the Tokyo Broadcasting Station started airing in early 1925. In spite of or perhaps because of its potential popularity with the Japanese public, radio failed to replace the written media as the prime source of information for most Japanese during the interwar period. Although economics played a part in limiting the industry’s growth throughout the 1930s, the Japanese government’s early desire to control strictly its content was the major reason that radio did not reach the level of popularity it enjoyed in the West.

Japanese radio initially began in the private sector but soon after the first stations started broadcasting, the government bureaucracy, recognizing the potential power to influence public attitudes, opted to nationalize the industry. By the end of 1926, the three existing stations in Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya had merged into the Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai (NHK). From the beginning of the broadcasting era, the Ministry of Communications aimed to protect the public from radio’s potentially harmful effects on morals by micro-managing programming content as well as airtime. Advertising was not permitted; this prevented listeners from contemplating lighthearted topics and assured NHK’s subservience to the bureaucracy since it became the corporation’s only major source of revenue. Target ratios limited the amount of airtime to be devoted to the various categories of content such as news

\textsuperscript{32} Although the wireless and radio are based on the same technology, I differentiate the two for clarity’s sake. For this piece, radio stands for the one-way broadcasting of electric waves while the wireless implies two-way communication.

or music, and effectively prevented anything considered frivolous, such as "entertainment," from dominating the programming schedule. Newspaper and magazine publishing laws guided censorship regulations, and pre-airing review of content was the norm. The mandatory installation of circuit breakers in all stations after 1927 ensured instantaneous content control by Ministry officials.

In spite of its strict management by the government, radio did manage to expand its market; by 1932, there were over 1.4 million subscribers and 19 stations in Japan. Even so, until after World War II, the new technology was clearly an urban phenomenon; in 1932 only 4.5% of the rural population owned radios, as opposed to 25.7% of those living in cities; only in 1940 did rural ownership pass the 25% mark. Even accounting for multiple numbers of people that most likely listened to each individual radio set, the 1.4 million subscribers in 1932 was a very small percentage of the approximate total Japanese population of 64-70 million during the 1930s. If subscription and sales figures for the broadcasting and newspaper/magazine industries are reliable indicators, it is clear that most Japanese, especially those living in rural areas, continued to depend more heavily on the written word for news of the world outside their own localities throughout most of the 1930s.

As with the wireless, the telephone was introduced to Japan soon after its invention in 1876. Japan's first experimental line was set up between Yokohama and the Imperial Household Office in 1877. Unlike the telegraph, initial acceptance of the telephone by both the public and government was slow to develop. High start-up costs and misunderstandings of how the phone actually functioned played a major role in its initial slow development.

---

34 Between 1925 and 1942, "entertainment" shows surpassed the 30% mark of total annual programming content only in six years of the seventeen-year period. From Kasza, State and the Mass Media in Japan, 96.
1893, the one-time subscription fee ranged from 35 yen in Kobe and Yokohama, to 50 yen in Osaka and Tokyo. This was a large sum when considering that the vast majority of non-government workers made substantially less per month in wages—and subscribers still had to pay for each individual call. Some Japanese, wary of the new technology, refused to use telephones because they believed contemporary rumors that phone lines could transmit cholera; only after the government’s concerted public education campaigns on the usefulness of the phone did it start to gain in popularity.36 Public service between Tokyo and Atami, a popular hot springs resort for people living in the capital, began in 1888 and expanded further west to Shizuoka city in 1889. Osaka-Kobe service started in 1893 and by 1899, phone lines had linked Kobe, Osaka, and Tokyo. After the Sino-Japanese War, phone services steadily increased. By 1925, there were 563,922 phones and 2,489,702 miles of line installed. In spite of this impressive growth, by 1926 Japan still only ranked thirteenth worldwide in the number of phones per capita, with less than five phones per 100 people.37

**Distribution**

This section outlines the distribution links that the publishing industry established as it reached maturity by the 1920s. At the foundation of this distribution network was the modern Japanese postal system. As the nation rapidly modernized during the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Post Office’s increasingly efficient service and the country’s expanding transportation network enabled the publishing industry to penetrate deeply into the Japanese countryside. Publishers continued to rely on traditional means as well as to develop innovative marketing methods in reaching their customers. Bookstores and book-lending

36 From *Postal Enterprise in Japan*, 40.
37 Americans owned over 60% of all phones produced in the world and nearly fifteen percent of its population owned phones in 1925. From Ibid., *Postal Enterprise in Japan*, 40.
shops, long a staple during the Edo period, in addition to the more recent used-magazine clubs and libraries, completed a network that effectively assured the growing influence of printed visual matter on the formation of Japanese social attitudes throughout the prewar period.

**Postal Service**

In the immediate aftermath of the Restoration, a government-operated postal service was not a pressing issue for Meiji leaders. The system left over from the Edo period appeared cost-efficient as well as sufficient for the needs of those in power. However, the collapse of the bakufu structure opened the interior of Japan to the rest of the world, and as foreigners began expanding their presence outside of treaty ports, their cries for modern amenities such as a Western-style postal service became increasingly vociferous. At the time, Westerners often pointed out that the standard of any country's culture could be judged accurately by the degree of development attained by its postal system. The consequences of failing to modernize along Western lines, as demonstrated by the example of China during the Opium Wars, convinced Meiji leaders that improvements were indeed necessary. Under the committed leadership of Maejima Hisoka (1835-1919), the postal service evolved into an efficient delivery system that came to be highly regarded by Japanese as well as foreigners by the end of the Meiji period.

The Japanese government introduced its modern postal system in 1871 and the first batch of mail took 75 hours to travel from Tokyo to Osaka. Under Maejima's guidance, services improved rapidly as well as expanded in nature. By 1877, the International Postal Union admitted Japan into membership and the last foreign post office in the country closed soon after in 1880—clear proof of the West's growing confidence in the local system.

---

38 During the late 1860s up until the widespread expansion of the new postal service in 1872, mail could take as long as ten days to travel the Osaka-Tokyo route and the cost varied greatly according to method of transport, route, and carrier. *Postal Enterprise in Japan*, 11.
Innovations such as fixed schedules and routes, standardized official post offices and mail boxes (1883), and fees based on weight rather than distance (1883) also strengthened domestic faith in the new postal service. In order to satisfy growing public demand, the government strove to make it as easy as possible for Japanese to send and receive mail. The number of post offices grew from 183 in 1871 to 5,527 a decade later. In 1912, there were 7,243 post offices with nearly two thousand more built by 1927. The number of items mailed increased from 563,000 in 1871 to nearly two billion in 1915. 39

The postal service also expanded overseas as the nation increased its presence in China, Korea, and Micronesia. The government established a post office in the Japanese enclave in Shanghai in 1876 and another in Seoul in 1884. By 1929, there were over 214 Japanese post offices in China’s major cities and Manchuria. 40 Delivering mail to areas where Japanese post offices existed, including its colonies, cost the same as Japanese domestic rates; additional costs were charged if means other than the Japanese system had to be utilized in order to complete delivery. While China’s admittance into the World Postal Union in 1914 forced Japan to close many of its mainland post offices, those in Manchuria remained in service under the Kwantung Army’s administration until the end of World War II.

In addition to expanding its physical presence domestically and overseas, the increasing number of services offered by post offices also played a large role in attracting the Japanese public’s patronage. 41 The introduction of pre-stamped postcards (1873), money orders (1874), postal savings (1875), standardization of mail classification into four categories (1883), parcel post (1892), military post service (1894), and the private mailbox in 1916

39 Ibid., 20.
40 Ibid., 31.
41 Statistics for this paragraph were taken from Postal Enterprise in Japan, pages 20-27 and D. Eleanor Westney, Imitation and Innovation, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University of Press, 1987), 134.
dramatically increased the postal service's presence in the everyday life of Japanese. Postcards became extremely popular with the public, especially after the advent of picture postcards towards the end of the century. In 1919 alone, domestic post offices delivered over two billion postcards—almost four times more than the number of letters sent that same year. The idea of establishing a free-letter quota for those in the military also stimulated use of the postal service. During the Sino-Japanese War alone, the postal service delivered over twelve million pieces of mail to and from the front.

The start of parcel post service and the categorization of mail into four classes continued to make the postal service much more attractive to commercial interests. The service specifically created its third-class rate to facilitate the bulk shipping of newspapers and magazines. Savings to publishers were substantial; in 1882, first-class mail (letters) cost 16 times more to send than mailing just over two pounds of newspaper or magazines. Furthermore, in 1889, the post office cut its third-class rates in half and then in 1900 raised the weight allowance by twenty percent, thereby increasing the savings over using first-class mail by thirty times. Between 1887 and 1925, the number of newspapers delivered by the postal service increased from 18 to over 318 million copies. The service's rapid expansion during the latter half of the Meiji period led to similar growth in Japan's publishing industry.

**Book Sellers, Commercial Book Lenders, and Libraries**

Throughout the development of Japan's transportation infrastructure and expansion of its postal service during the prewar period, the bookstore in some form or other remained the primary intermediary between publishers of print media and readers. Although the bookstore

---

42 From *Postal Enterprise in Japan*, 22.
43 It cost two sen to deliver a letter weighing less than .265 ounces (7.50 grams) in 1882. After 1889, the price of one letter weighing up to .530 ounces (15 grams) cost three sen. From 2.12 pounds (60 grams) of third-class material cost one sen until 1889 and half-a-sen afterwards. *Ibid.*, *Postal Enterprise in Japan*, 23-24.
has a long history in Japan it was not until the seventeenth century that selling books became a true commercial enterprise. Benefiting from the nationwide unification and peace imposed by Tokugawa Ieyasu, the nascent industry expanded its reach outward from the Kyoto-Osaka area into the new capital of Edo as well as the rest of the country’s regional castle towns that the bakufu established as domain capitals. Over the next two and half centuries bookstores, commercial book-lending libraries (kashihonya) and itinerant salesmen established the foundation of a distribution network that spread into rural areas from the country’s major urban centers. In spite of the book trade’s rapid growth during the Tokugawa period, the lack of an efficient nation-wide transportation infrastructure as well as the general population’s low level of literacy limited market growth. After the Restoration, solving these two problems became a major priority for Meiji leaders.

As discussed above, the development of the nation’s railways, roads, and an efficient nation-wide postal system was one of the major factors that stimulated the publishing industry into broadening its reach outside of Japan’s major urban markets. The other pivotal reason was the creation in 1872 of a national school system that incorporated universal compulsory education (kyōikurei) in 1879. In response to the growing demand for textbooks, enterprising Japanese from varied backgrounds began opening up bookstores in school districts throughout the country during the 1870s and 1880s. Once a bookstore had acquired the proper government licensing to either publish or sell prefectural textbooks (attaining both was more profitable), continued annual profits were practically assured. After obtaining the

45 The 1872 Education Law (gakuseihō) asserted the importance of education in developing a modern nation and that everyone had the right to such an education. Initially children were required to attend school only for sixteen months over a four-year period. Compulsory education increased to four years in 1886 and six years in 1907, where it remained until 1947. Compulsory education was made free in 1904. Hunter, Concise Dictionary of Modern Japanese History, 1984 ed., s.v. “Education.”
rights to make and sell textbooks, many booksellers expanded their earnings by also procuring exclusive business contracts with individual schools as well as with entire Prefectures.

The government’s stress on education had two immediate effects on the book industry. First, the profits from the textbook trade enabled dealers to expand their businesses geographically. Many stores opened branches in neighboring towns and villages while the more innovative owners expanded into regional as well as national markets. As volume sales increased, wholesaler specialists, foregoing the retail business, became more and more common in the latter half of the Meiji period. Utilizing increasingly efficient transport, communication, and postal services, these companies used textbook profits to expand their product diversity, often going into the musical instrument and office supply trade, both of which complemented their core businesses well. The second outcome of the government’s prioritization of education was the substantial increase in the number of people able to read. While measuring literacy rates during the Meiji period is very difficult, the fact that by 1905 nearly all Japanese youth were enrolled in primary education undoubtedly improved overall rates dramatically.46

In addition to greatly increasing the number of readers, the new education system also inculcated in Japanese students a growing curiosity in their rapidly changing world.

---

46 Although research by some scholars such as Ronald Dore and Richard Rubinger points to the existence of a strong educational foundation in Edo Japan other studies indicate otherwise. Dore estimated that by the end of the Tokugawa period 40% of all boys and 10% of all girls were receiving some form of education outside of the home. Children who pursued a primary education did so primarily at the local terakoya, or temple school—Richard Rubinger estimated that there were over 10,000 such schools in operation between 1830 and 1867. On the other hand, Theodore Cook found an 1892 survey showing that 27% of all new military conscripts were still illiterate and 34% were only marginally literate; and even by World War I, only 4% of all conscripts had reached beyond the middle school level of education. Ronald P. Dore, *Education in Tokugawa Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965); Richard Rubinger, *Private Academies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 5; and Theodore Cook, “Soldiers in Meiji Society and State: Japan Joins the World,” in *Nihon kin-gendai shi*, ed. Banno Junji (Tokyo, 1993), 14, quoted in Marius Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 190, 275-276, 404.
However, unlike the more immediate tangible effects of modernity such as railroads and telegraphs, the intellectual impact on the Meiji youth, as measured by reading and writing habits, took more time to materialize. The book trade reflected this lag in cultural evolution as the content of material sold during the first two decades of the Meiji period remained relatively unchanged from that of the late Tokugawa period. As late as the 1880s, Edo era bestsellers still dominated the domestic book market and the birth of new domestic reading material did not occur until a new generation of Japanese had been born and raised under Meiji rather than Edo cultural influences. The nationwide stress on education along with the rapidly changing physical and cultural landscape of late nineteenth century Japan set the stage for the introduction of new writing styles as well as reading habits. In turn, this cultural revolution led to the dramatic increase in the size as well as democratization of the reading population. Finally, by the turn of the century, these cultural factors combined with the aforementioned technological breakthroughs to create the conditions necessary for Japan’s book trade to evolve into an industry that became the foundation of a modern Japanese mass media centering on the sale of newspapers and popular magazines.

This modernization and popularization of print media dramatically affected how the public obtained their reading material. The bookstore, written media’s initial commercial outlet during the Meiji period, evolved with the changing times. By the end of the Taishō period, the media industry’s evolution had drastically altered the typical Japanese bookstore’s physical appearance as well as how book dealers conducted business. The increasing volume of trade created by the addition of millions of new readers to the market produced the need for roomier stores. Whereas Edo and Meiji era shops had been wide and shallow

47 See Kornicki, 2001, pg. 268.
structures with merchandise displayed on tatami mats (zauri), angled display shelves, and tables at the front of store in order to take advantage of natural lighting, Taishō era stores brought their merchandise indoors (Figure 23). The modern display style (chinrei-shiki), characterized by features such as bookshelves, magazine racks, and special-item exhibit areas seen in the typical bookstore today replaced the zauri method of selling (Figure 24). Electric lighting as well as glass windows and doors illuminated previously dark interiors, enabling stores to expand their square footage further inward and greatly increase exhibit space.

Other signs of modernity included the use of cash registers instead of the traditional abacus, the use of Western-style store uniforms, and the payment of salaries to workers. Prior to the end of the Meiji period, most bookstore employees worked for room and board in addition to a small monthly or even yearly allowance. Many booksellers encouraged an apprentice-like...
relationship with their staff; in return for years of service, the owner would assist the industrious worker start out on his own by setting up a branch store.\textsuperscript{48} Anticipating the need for cash in opening a new store (\textit{norenwake}), owners often loaned or gave apprentices a lump sum of cash when they were ready to set up shop for themselves after serving years as apprentices.\textsuperscript{49}

In addition to bookstores, other outlets such as commercial lending libraries (\textit{kashihonya}), itinerant salesmen, public reading rooms, commercial circulating libraries (\textit{kaidoku-kai}), outdoor vendors (\textit{roten-ya}), late-issue magazine sellers (\textit{tsuki-okure zasshi}), used bookstores (\textit{furu-honya}), and public libraries played important roles at certain stages of the media industry's development. Commercial lending libraries had become a fixture in Edo, Osaka and Kyoto by the end of the seventeenth century, and they operated by buying popular books and then lending them out to members for a fee. Members either could read on the premises or have the desired books delivered to their homes. Judging by the existence of approximately eight hundred establishments during the mid-nineteenth century in Edo alone, commercial circulating libraries apparently provided a cheaper alternative to buying books for the average reader.\textsuperscript{50} As with bookstores, change also greatly affected \textit{kashihonya}. From the early 1860s their numbers steadily decreased as their primary customers, the samurai class and their retainers began leaving Edo after the easing of \textit{sankinkōtai} provisions enabled them to return to and reside in their home regions year-round. This trend increased after 1868 when the Tokugawa clan and a large number of its retainers left the new capital for their

\textsuperscript{48} Women employees did not become common in the book trade until the end of the 1920s.
\textsuperscript{49} On turning thirty-years old and after ten years of service in the bookstore, one worker in Nagoya received the substantial sum of 3000 yen to open up his own shop in 1927. Ozaki Hotsuki and Munetake Asako, \textit{Nihon no shoten hyakunen} (One hundred years of the Japanese bookstore) (Tokyo: Seieisha, 1991) 292-293, 524.
ancestral holdings in Shizuoka prefecture. The final demise of the kashihonya came towards the end of the nineteenth century as printed books came to displace manuscripts and most stores failed to adapt to new technologies.

As well as hastening the demise of several traditional modes of business, technological advances also played a large part in creating a trend towards trade specialization in the media industry. Up until the widespread adoption of the printing press towards the end of the nineteenth century, most bookstores also doubled as small publishing firms. The costs of producing manuscripts through woodblock printing were low enough that most booksellers could increase their profits by publishing in-house materials that targeted local markets. Calendars, tourist guides, local histories, and maps were popular items that many bookstores in every region throughout Japan often produced and sold. This changed as newer and more expensive publishing and printing machinery was adopted (initially by the major newspapers), and it became increasingly difficult for individual bookstores to afford the latest equipment needed to stay competitive with the mass production capabilities of modern printing presses. By the end of the 1920s, printing, publishing, and bookselling had become distinct trades, and only a semblance of the former craft crossover that characterized the industry during the Meiji period remained.

This ongoing rationalization process in the bookselling, publishing, and printing trades along with the increasing demand for a greater variety of reading material by a growing literate population set the stage for the advent of popular books and magazines. Although more intellectual monthly general-interest magazines (sōgōzasshi) such as Taiyō (1895-1928) and Chūō Kōron (1899-) demonstrated to publishers in the 1890s that the magazine format could generate profits, it was not until the turn of the century that the forerunner of popular magazines (taishū zasshi) began appearing. Like Taiyō and the Chūō Kōron, this new type of
publication aimed at capturing a specific niche market; in contrast to its predecessors, it did so by providing light and easy reading that was informative as well as personally relevant to readers. In addition to serialized novellas and practical tips on how to be a modern woman, publications such as *Fujin Sekai* (Women's World, founded in 1906) and *Fujin no Tomo* (Women’s Friend, founded in 1908) firmly infused Japan’s nascent magazine industry with an unabashed capitalistic quality. This new brand of magazine first enticed readers with stories and advertisements that touted the newest fashions, household goods, and cosmetics, and then directed them to purchase any desired goods at one of late Meiji Japan’s newest symbols of consumer culture, the department store.51

The commercial success of early women’s magazines had such a considerable impact on the way the industry conducted business that Nōma Seiji, the founder of the populist publishing house Kōdansha, noted that “women’s magazines were the single greatest influence in the magazine industry’s evolution into a modern capitalistic mode of production.”52 Larger copy runs resulted in greater profits, which in turn spurred publishers into growing their readership in order to maintain or increase market shares. Aside from increasing advertising efforts through newspapers, magazine owners also resorted to sales tactics imported from their counterparts in the United States. In addition to the ubiquitous insert supplements (*furoku*), which soon became an industry standard, publisher-sponsored events such as beauty contests, mail-in essay competitions, and free item-giveaways such as cosmetic samples that often were worth more than the price of the magazine itself, ushered in the age of modern advertising in publishing (Figure 25).53

52 Ibid., page 28 (author’s translation).
53 In its June 1922 issue, the magazine *Toyō* offered a bath product worth two and a half to
Rationalization of the magazine trade also greatly affected distribution practices. In 1909, *Fujin sekai* introduced an industry-first by initiating the use of consignment sales. This helped increase circulation by providing distributors further incentives to order more rather than less magazines since they could then return unsold issues and recoup 80 to 90 percent of the full cover-price. This translated into considerable savings for retailers, especially when considering that Nagamine Shigetoshi, a scholar in the field of popular magazines, estimates that most magazine return-rates prior to the 1920s averaged between thirty and forty percent.\(^{54}\) The relatively high price of magazines during the Taishō era serves to reiterate further the impact that consignment sales had on retailers, especially smaller businesses. For example, the *Chūō kōron*’s cover price during the early 1920s was 80 sen; this would be equivalent to approximately 3,000 to 4,000 yen in 2001 prices.\(^{55}\)

---

*Fig 25: Furoku* by Kitagawa Utamaro (1753–1806). Magazines used these common supplements to attract and keep readers. Reproductions of ukiyo-e and *nishikie* by famous artists such as Utamaro were especially popular and magazines such as *Monthly Historical Photos* often inserted more than one print in each issue. From issue # 317 (December 1924) of *Monthly Historical Photos.*


\(^{55}\) This translates to roughly between twenty-seven and thirty-seven American dollars for one issue. Ibid., 79.
Expensive cover prices and the consequential glut of returned magazines produced from the consignment system played a large role in expanding the size of the nation’s magazine reading audience in two different ways. First, the result of exorbitant pricing gave birth to commercial reading circles (kaidokukai), which were reminiscent of earlier kashihonyas and dealt exclusively in magazines. Commercial reading circles became a Taishō fixture until most were forced out of business by a lawsuit won by The Tokyo Association of Magazine Sellers (Tokyo zasshi hanbaigō kumiai) in 1924 as well as by a general decrease in magazine prices at the start of the Shōwa era.56 Judging by the number of customers enrolled, commercial reading circles were extremely popular—in Tokyo alone, an estimated 300,000 to 400,000 members belonged to the twenty or so circles in operation.57

*Kaidokukai* operated by buying new magazines and then charging readers a monthly fee for borrowing rights. This monthly fee ranged from thirty sen to one yen from 1916 until 1921, and free home delivery was the preferred method of distribution.58 As a business model, both the *kaidokukai* as well as the reader benefited since the circles maximized the use of individual issues while customers could read up to ten magazines a month for approximately the same price as purchasing one new magazine. The actual cost of joining a circle to the individual was even cheaper in many cases. Community organizations, such as youth groups and factories, which often had their own libraries, frequently purchased a variety of monthly magazines for members and workers. After magazines became dated with the release of the newest issue, the circles profited further by selling their out-of-date stock for as much as half the cover price to *tsuki-okure* dealers, the topic of the following paragraph.

56 Judging by various newspaper ads, some *kaidokukai* lasted as late as 1932, Ibid., 90.
57 Nagamine also estimates that less than half of all magazine buyers in Taishō Tokyo bought magazines at full cover price. Ibid., 58.
58 Over 500 delivery boys were employed by the various *kaidokukai* in Tokyo and 1922 monthly salaries were 35 yen and up. Ibid., *Modan toshi*, 58.
The second major effect of high magazine prices and the consignment system was the birth of a completely new micro-industry revolving around the selling of *tsuki-okure zasshi*. *Tsuki-okure* translated literally means “a month late,” and referred to the unsold magazines (*zasshi*) that retailers returned to publishers under the consignment system. Even before the advent of consignment sales in 1907, an infrastructure for selling *tsuki-okure* magazines was firmly in place in Tokyo. By then, there were thirty-four businesses devoted to selling *tsuki-okure* and the vendor ads had begun appearing in the major dailies (Figure 26). Like commercial reading circles, the sale of *tsuki-okure* magazines provided a cheaper means of obtaining magazines for a large percentage of the population until prices came down in the late 1920s. While the customer base for commercial reading circles was undeniably large, *tsuki-okure* magazines played an equally important role in disseminating magazines to the public. In addition to mail-order service, hawkers sold *tsuki-okure* magazines for cut-rate prices on trains, in ships, railroad stations, and open-air stalls (Figure 27). By utilizing Japan’s modern postal and transport infrastructure, the *tsuki-okure* network was able to expand its geographical reach.

![Figure 26: Advertisement for *tsuki-okure* magazines in *Monthly Historical Photos* (under arrow). In similar fashion to present-day copy, the highlighted ad (top-left) stresses the convenience (delivery and payment through the post office) and economic benefits to be had in buying month-late magazines—in this case over 80% savings off the cover price. From issue #72 (April 1919) of *Monthly Historical Photos.*](image-url)
throughout the country, thereby eclipsing the physical range of commercial reading circles, which were limited to major urban centers by economic factors.

While the majority of Japanese in the Taishō era undoubtedly obtained their magazines through commercial reading circles and tsuki-okure dealers, the advent of public libraries provided yet another source for readers.59 While the basic concept of lending books was nothing new to Japanese familiar with kashihonyas, the notion of building a library that provided free membership with loan privileges was imported from the West by Japanese who had traveled and studied abroad. These men were impressed with the role that American and European libraries were playing in educating the citizenry of their respective countries during the latter part of the nineteenth century. The first Japanese public library opened in Hibiyatani, Tokyo in 1908 with a second following soon after in Shinagawa in 1909. By 1914, there were nineteen libraries in Tokyo and most remained open until nine in the evening in order to accommodate workers on their way home from their jobs. Judging by the public's reaction, libraries were very popular. Soon after their openings, over a thousand people were using the Hibiyatani, Hitsubashi, and Imperial public libraries daily. A 1928 newspaper article attested to the libraries' popularity with the public as well as their importance in the role of educating

---

59 My information on libraries derived heavily from Ibid., Modan toshi, 24-28.
the working class by noting that over 300 people were using the newspaper and magazine reading rooms at the Shinagawa branch every day. In 1926, another newspaper article commented on the term "library hell," referring to when libraries closed their doors to readers because of having reached their maximum capacity—the reporter portrayed this as a serious problem especially for students deprived of a quiet place to study (Figure 28). By 1930, most of the country’s major cities had built their own public libraries, thus marking the completion of Japan’s modern prewar distribution infrastructure.

Figure 28: "The Miseries of Library Hell" (3 March, 1926). This newspaper article with photographs depicts the crowded conditions both inside and outside the Hibiya Public Library in Tokyo. From Modan toshi, page 26.

**Imaging**

New technology affects human institutions and organizations both in a direct, revolutionary manner, and in more subtle, indirect ways. The birth of Japan’s printing industry falls into the former category since the manufacture of native-language typesets, the introduction of modern printing presses from the West, and the importation and evolution of the camera, created and redefined Japan’s modern printing industry virtually overnight in the

---

60 Most of the content of this paragraph is derived from Nagamine, Modan toshi, pages 25-27.
latter half of the Meiji period. Prior to the introduction and widespread adoption of Western printing technology in the late nineteenth century, printing through woodblocks was the primary process for publishing written and illustrated works in Japan. Human effort and ingenuity rather than mechanically driven machines played the central roles in creating a finished product that took much time to create. This contrasted greatly with the modern printing industry, which centered on automated printing presses that cheaply mass-produced hundreds of thousands of copies in the space of a few hours.

In light of the revolutionary effects the two technologies had on the publishing industry, the following section highlights the effects of modern print technology and the camera in prewar Japan.

**Printing Technology**

Although European Jesuits and Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537-1598) both introduced the printing press to Japan at the end of the sixteenth century, the new technology failed to displace the domestic woodblock method of production until the end of the nineteenth century. Political and economic factors along with the intricacies of the Japanese language were the primary causes for the three-hundred year delay in the adoption of a technological innovation that played such a key role in the intellectual advancement of Western culture. Tokugawa Japan lacked the cultural ingredients such as a monolithic organized religion or a bureaucratic examination system that helped to stimulate the mass production of reading materials in Europe and China respectively. Moreover, the Edo regime’s official neo-Confucian ideology as well as the Tokugawa government’s obsession with controlling the free-flow of information precluded it from welcoming the spread of the printing press in Japan. In addition to the political impediments, the complicated nature of the written Japanese language, with its multiple syllabaries such as kanji, *hiragana* and *katagana*, posed a serious technical challenge
to the development of a press that could efficiently print the native language (Figure 29).\textsuperscript{61} The political realities of Tokugawa Japan combined with linguistic barriers in making it prohibitively expensive to publish using printing presses. It was not until the middle of the Meiji period that the proper political, social, and economic conditions necessary for the widespread adaptation of the innovative technology would emerge in Japan.

Motoki Shōzō (1824-1875), often referred to as Japan’s Gutenberg, is credited as the first person to introduce the modern printing press to Japan.\textsuperscript{62} An official Dutch translator for the bakufu in Nagasaki, Motoki became enamored with the idea of starting a publishing business with the use of a printing press, and ordered one from Holland. After a seven-year wait, the press finally arrived only to be confiscated by the government as a “gift” for the Shogun. As domestic and foreign pressures for political change intensified during the 1850s

\textsuperscript{61} In addition to kanji, \textit{hiragana} and \textit{katakana}, printers also had to create typesets for \textit{kaeriten} (diacritic marks for reading \textit{kanbun}, or classic Japanese) as well as \textit{furigana}, the \textit{hiragana} scripts placed beside kanji in order to facilitate the reading of the Chinese characters. Given the total number of characters needed, a printer needed to make tens of thousands of typesets in order to produce one book in a cost-effective manner.

\textsuperscript{62} Much of the information on Motoki Shōzō was derived from an excellent online version of the journal, \textit{The Book & The Computer}, sponsored by Dai Nippon Printing Co., Ltd., at http://www.honco.net/japanese/index.html; internet; accessed 2004-2005.
and 1860s, the confiscation of the press was one sure sign that Tokugawa officials were slowly beginning to realize that it would be a valuable tool in disseminating the Western knowledge needed to prop up the floundering bakufu system. In light of his troubles in trying to set up a publishing operation, Motoki refocused his attentions toward developing an indigenous typeset.

With the aid of William Gamble, the chief technician of the American Presbyterian Mission Press in Shanghai, Motoki learned how to manufacture moveable typesets in 1869, and by 1871, he had founded the Kiyo Shinjuken Type Foundry in Nagasaki. The following year, one of Motoki’s students, Hirano Tomiji (1846-92), became the new president and moved the company to Tokyo in order to improve the business’s fortunes. Renamed the Tsukiji Type Foundry in 1872, the company provided the Japanese language type for most newspapers and magazines throughout the 1870s. In addition to manufacturing typesets, Tsukiji also provided a wide range of services including various methods of printing as well as typesetting. Although newer companies later eclipsed Tsukiji, it continued to play an important role in the industry through the 1930s.63

The advent of moveable Japanese typesets for mechanical presses allowed the publishing industry to begin a modernizing process that by 1920 would make Japan the second largest book-publishing nation in the world.64 Within five years of the founding of the Tsukiji Type Foundry, the high demand for Japanese print types and print services by the infant newspaper and magazine industries encouraged the entry of two more printing organizations into the market. The government opened its own printing office in 1872 in order to disseminate Western knowledge through translations as well as to produce textbooks

63 For more information on the Tsukiji Type Foundry and a sampling of its products, see http://baxleystamps.com/litho/tsukiji_type.shtml; internet; accessed 2004-2005.
and government informational gazettes and records. In 1876, Shueisha, Japan’s second modern private printing company, was founded in Tokyo, and by 1900, two more major companies had been established.\textsuperscript{65} In 1897, the owner of the Hakubukanakan Publishing Company, Ohashi Sahei (1836-1901) founded the Hakubukanakan Print Shop in order to print the large number of books and magazines by the publisher of the same name.\textsuperscript{66} Soon after, a group consisting mostly of former engineers from the Finance Ministry’s Printing Bureau established another company, the Toppan Printing Limited Partnership.\textsuperscript{67} Together these three companies came to dominate the industry throughout Japan’s imperial era and continue to do so in the twenty-first century.

By 1891, only two decades after Tsukiji’s establishment, the publication of the printing industry’s first trade magazine, \textit{Press and Paper}, provided another indicator of how quickly modern printing became established as a thriving profession during the Meiji period (Figure 30). The industry continued to emphasize technological innovation throughout the Meiji and Taishō periods and incorporated key technological advances such as electric and rotary printing.

\textsuperscript{65} Shueisha merged with the Nishhin Printing Company to become the Dai Nippon Printing Company in 1935.

\textsuperscript{66} The Hakubukanakan Print Shop later became the Kyodo Printing Company, Limited in 1925.

\textsuperscript{67} The partnership later incorporated as Toppan Printing Company, Ltd. in 1908.
presses as well as photogravure and offset printing. By the end of World War I, Japan’s printing industry was thriving and technologically on par with the West. In spite of this fact, growing labor movements as well as the increasing technical nature of the work made it difficult for printing companies to find skilled employees. In order to provide a steady pool of skilled workers, Hakubunkan opened the Seibidō, a school for training future printers, in 1925.\footnote{The Seibidō became the Nippon Printing Academy in 1978.} In addition to teaching the printing trade, the school also provided a middle-school curriculum comparable with the national education system. After graduation, students had the choice of signing up with Hakubunkan after passing a difficult exam or applying to other companies for employment.

Hakubunkan’s growth also reflected the industry’s commitment to research and development. It was the first printing company to establish its own laboratory and there Hakubunkan’s scientists were in the vanguard in the development of new advances and techniques such as deep-etching lithography and printing on fabrics and metals. By 1935, the organization had completed its state-of-the-art facilities and had come to be known as the largest printer in the Far East. By the beginning of the war with China in 1937, Dai Nippon Printing, Kyodo Printing, and Toppan Printing had laid the modern foundation of Japan’s printing industry.\footnote{All three printing organizations continue to dominate the industry in the twenty-first century.}

**Photography: Smaller and Easier**

While the history of the camera’s evolution in Japan attracted little serious scholarship prior to the 1970s, the subject has made large gains over the last three decades. Works such as *Nihon Shashin Shi, 1840-1945* (A History of Japanese Photography, 1840-1945) published in 1971, and *The History of Japanese Photography* (2003) have gone a
long way in helping us understand how the camera arrived in and afterwards developed in Japan. In order to avoid repetition of the many impressive works on the topic, the following section provides a brief summary of the camera’s evolution in the West, its introduction into Japan, and then highlights the impact of technology on the proliferation of photography in terms of both quality and quantity in Japan.

My reasons for doing so are twofold. First, the example of photography’s development highlights the speed with which Japan modernized. Japan was able to join the rank of modern nations in the space of only a few decades—a feat that still attracts the attention of scholars a century later. Second, the rapid increase in quality and ease of use of cameras changed the way Japanese and the rest of the world viewed reality. The new technology was a mixed blessing to authorities; while photographic realism created an apparent objectivity that easily could be used to manipulate the general masses, the proliferation of cameras also made it more difficult to control the public’s visual access to events around the globe. Pictures such as the one shown in Figure 34 below would have been very difficult to convey to a non-eyewitness without the aid of a compact, easy-to-use camera. These are important points to keep in mind when considering to what extent graphic imagery influenced Japanese attitudes towards Chinese during the prewar period.

The formal presentations of their parallel inventions in Paris and London by Louis Jacques Mandé Daguerre (1787-1851) and William Henry Fox Talbot (1800-1877) in 1839 traditionally marks the official introduction of photography to the world. The evolution of photography, defined by Webster’s as “the process or technique of rendering optical images on photosensitive surfaces,” was intricately connected to an era of rapid scientific and

---

technological advances that characterized the intellectual climate in the United States and Europe during the latter half of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries. Often referred to as the Second Industrial Revolution, this period’s emphasis on the search for the fundamental knowledge of science and our natural world inspired men such as Daguerre and Talbot to study how certain chemicals and elements react to light. Given the highly technical nature of the field during its first fifty years of existence, it is difficult to envision photography evolving as it did without the social and technological conditions that existed during the period.

Creating a daguerreotype image, a wonder for its time, was a highly technical and difficult process. It involved exposures of large glass plates sensitized by chemicals, which then were developed by using mercury vapor, “a dangerous process with health hazards not fully appreciated at the time.” While Daguerre’s method was a great improvement over previous experiments in reproducing light, the exposure times required to replicate an image properly still took between twenty and thirty minutes and the result produced a positive image, which precluded the possibility of making multiple copies. Moreover, creating a daguerreotype involved heavy and bulky gear that greatly limited the conditions in which a photographer could take pictures. Talbot’s invention, the calotype process, had several advantages as well as disadvantages in comparison to its French counterpart. Advantages included the use of less caustic chemicals than those used by the daguerreotype, shorter exposure times, and the creation of a negative image on paper. Although this allowed the photographer to reproduce images, calotypes were of a quality inferior to daguerreotypes.

---

Moreover, the need for ready access to large amounts of water as well as the fragile nature of its paper negatives also continued to pose considerable difficulties for photographers.

The collodion process, also known as the wet-plate process, was the next technical breakthrough in the evolution of photography. Invented in 1851 by Frederick Scott Archer (1813-1857), the wet-plate process quickly replaced other techniques in spite of inherent difficulties. While exposure times decreased drastically, from tens of minutes to as little as ten seconds, collodion glass plates had to be exposed while their light-sensitive emulsion was still wet, therefore allowing little time for error. This made the process equipment-intensive since the photographer had to prepare negatives and take the photograph in rapid succession (Figure 31). Although the wet-plate process was a major step in the evolution of photography, the next developmental step revolutionized cameras and firmly set the foundation for the growth of a modern global industry.
The dry-plate process made its commercial debut in Liverpool, England, in 1874. This technique utilized a gelatin rather than liquid emulsion to sensitive glass plates, thereby allowing the plates to dry while retaining their light sensitivity. This meant that photographers could prepare negative plates in advance of taking photographs, thereby greatly reducing the amount of the equipment needed to capture an image. Once a photographer took a picture with a pre-made negative, the plate could be stored for weeks at a time under the right conditions. The dry-plate process was the direct descendent of modern photography and its introduction had an immense impact on the growth of the industry in Japan as well as the rest of the world.

Photography was one of the earlier Western technologies introduced to Japan. As with several other new technologies of the time, Commodore Perry’s expedition of 1853-1854 offered many Japanese their first extensive exposure to photography. With the commencement of increased trade between Japan and the West in 1859, the treaty ports of Yokohama, Nagasaki, and Hakodate rapidly became centers of photography in Japan. Initially trained by foreigners, Japanese such as Ueno Hikoma (1838-1908) and Shimooka Renjo (1823-1914) built successful photography businesses and in turn then helped to spread photography’s popularity throughout the country. By the 1870s, photography was firmly entrenched in Japan and there were over one-hundred Japanese running successful businesses across the country.

---

74 Although the evidence is sketchy, John Dower notes that Japanese *rangakusha* clearly were acquainted with the concept of photography in the form of daguerreotype images and possibly a daguerreotype camera as well by early 1841, only two years after the invention had been presented to the French public. Dower, *A Century of Japanese Photography*, 3.
Photography quickly became popular in Japan primarily because of two reasons; one involved the efficient transfer of evolving technologies from overseas and the other related to the ability of the medium to cater to Japanese graphic tastes that the woodblock industry traditionally had served. First, the rapidly developing domestic and international transportation infrastructure as well as the presence of foreign traders in treaty ports enabled photographers to obtain the latest photographic equipment. This was a critical factor since domestic manufacturers could not produce many of the camera's vital components, such as lenses, until after World War I. Second, photography encountered a ready-made Japanese market in consumers that had previously relied on woodblock prints to fulfill a demand for graphic material. The desire for photographic prints of favorite actors and geisha, famous tourist sights, and even "death" portraits, insured the steady growth of the new industry throughout the Meiji period. By the end of the nineteenth century, the market both abroad as well as at home had created a thriving industry; in the peak years of 1897 and 1900, the number of exported photographs registered by the Japan Trade Bureau reached record amounts of 24,923 and 20,242 images respectively.

Although foreign demand initially sustained the market for photographs during the 1860s and 1870s, the decreasing costs of taking pictures and the increasing ease of usage spurred on by rapid technological advances stimulated the industry's continued domestic growth. The number of related publications reflected photography's growing popularity with Japanese, and as early as 1854, a manual in Japanese on the daguerreotype was published; in

---


77 From the 1860s until the end of the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877, many politically active samurai, expecting death in the near future, had their portraits taken for posterity's sake—an important consideration in a society that valued highly the memory of ancestors. Dower, *A Century of Japanese Photography*, 7-8.

1862 Ueno Hikoma put out a technical manual on photography, and by 1900 the first technical manual for amateur photographers was in bookstores.\(^{79}\) The number of magazines, journals, and associations also rapidly multiplied. The first journals on photography began appearing in the 1890s; by 1930, there were more than ten major monthly publications and nine clubs or organizations dealing with all aspects of the art of taking pictures.\(^ {80}\)

Photography’s popularity continued to grow throughout Japan but it was not until the end of World War I that the widespread adoption of photography’s next major advancement after the dry-plate process, rollfilm, took place. Originally introduced in the United States in 1894, the technology was prohibitively expensive in Japan until the 1920s. By then the photography industry had expanded enough to support the capital investment needed to first buy, and then later build, the machinery needed to produce film domestically. Japan’s relative isolation from Europe during World War I also stimulated the growth of other manufacturing capabilities of key camera components such as the lens element. Supported in part by government funding, several companies, such as Asahi Optics and Nihon Kogaku began producing the first optical lenses made in Japan by the early 1930s.\(^ {81}\)

The practical results of these technological advancements were enormous for the development of Japanese photography during the prewar period. Domestically built equipment lowered the costs of taking photographs and resulted in the proliferation of amateur photographers. From the advent in 1903 of the Cherry Portable, the first portable camera manufactured in Japan, the variety of both foreign and domestically made units proliferated

---


\(^{80}\) For an informative overview of the major Japanese photography clubs and associations as well as magazines and journals (along with photographs of their covers), see Anne Wilkes Tucker, et al., *The History of Japanese Photography*, with essays by Iizawa Kōtarō and Kinoshita Naoyuki (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 370-385.

By the end of the 1930s, although censors were largely successful in preventing images "injurious to Japanese morals" from previously possible (Figures 33a and b). Konishiroku-Konten’s Pearlette (1925) and Canon’s Hanson Camera (1935) enabled photographers to take a wider range of photographs in more varied conditions than previously possible (Figures 33a and b).

By the end of the 1930s, although censors were largely successful in preventing images "injurious to Japanese morals" from entering the public’s eye, the camera’s versatility had outstripped the Japanese authorities’ ability to prevent the creation of such images. As the photographs in the Osaka Mainichi Shinbun's collection mentioned in chapter 7 attest, the compact rapidly (Figure 32). Cameras such as Konishiroku-Konten’s Pearlette (1925) and Canon’s Hanson Camera (1935) enabled photographers to take a wider range of photographs in more varied conditions than previously possible (Figures 33a and b).

By the end of the 1930s, although censors were largely successful in preventing images "injurious to Japanese morals" from entering the public’s eye, the camera’s versatility had outstripped the Japanese authorities’ ability to prevent the creation of such images. As the photographs in the Osaka Mainichi Shinbun’s collection mentioned in chapter 7 attest, the compact rapidly (Figure 32). Cameras such as Konishiroku-Konten’s Pearlette (1925) and Canon’s Hanson Camera (1935) enabled photographers to take a wider range of photographs in more varied conditions than previously possible (Figures 33a and b).
size and versatility of cameras made during the prewar period enabled amateur as well as professional photographers to take the types of photographs that were assured of being censored for their content (Figure 34). While it had been a relatively simple task for authorities to keep track of the whereabouts of photographers and their bulky equipment during the Sino- and Russo-Japanese Wars, the development of the dry-plate process and film made it very difficult for censors to monitor what later photographers chose to take and develop. Whereas technological and economic factors had limited the number of practitioners during photography’s early evolutionary stages, by the 1920s, the number of Japanese who could afford the much-simplified camera had increased dramatically. As a result, amateurs such as soldiers nevertheless took many photographs that stood little chance

---

82 The value of photographic materials imported into Japan increased by eight times from 1916 to 1922. The proliferation of photography-related publications during the Taishō period was also indicative of photography’s popularity. Even short-lived magazines on photography, such as *Amachua* (Amateur), reportedly sold as many as 10,000 copies of each issue before its demise in the 1923 Kanto earthquake. Dower, *A Century of Japanese Photography*, 14.
of making it to publication, and images such as these serve as valuable "raw" perspectives that help us to estimate where the censor's reach ended and self-censorship began in prewar Japan. The next four chapters will address the topic further by examining how the Japanese media actually portrayed China during the period in question.
CHAPTER 3
1868-1894: Moral Righteousness in Bright Colors and Style

All words are prejudices.
Frederich Nietzsche

Chapters 3 through 6 highlight the Japanese media's graphic depiction of Chinese from the beginning of the Meiji era until 1937. Following the categorization outlined in the introduction, each chapter reflects the stylistic stages that portrayals of Chinese and China underwent during the entire time span. The first phase, from 1868 to 1894, examines the woodblock prints that depicted the major political news making events of the time. These often garish prints relied on artistic tradition and license to convey their messages of Japanese superiority and righteousness. During this first period, I focus on the Jingo (1882) and Kōshin (1884) incidents since they were foreign events that both made the headlines as well as foreshadowed Japan's increasing involvement in the domestic affairs of Korea and China.

Another reason for including these prints in this study was that, in spite of the prevalence of Koreans rather than Chinese in the role of other, the portrayed images highlighted the recurring theme of barbarian versus civilization, which played a central role in Sino-Japanese relations up until the end of World War II. The Meiji government's central preoccupation with the fate of Korea hinged on which country's sphere of influence it would come under, China's or Japan's. Publicly, advocates for decisive action on the peninsula rephrased the problem in terms of modernization. Would Korean leaders choose to emulate Japan's drive towards enlightenment or would they, under the vassalage of the stubborn and conservative Chinese, opt to remain bogged down in an uncivilized state of chaos and corruption? Given the situation at the time, Meiji leaders saw a politically unstable Korea as
Without the stability provided by a modernized independent nation-state, nothing would prevent Western imperialistic-minded nations from utilizing the peninsula to threaten Japanese interests at home as well as in the rest of the region.

While the situation in the Far East forced Japan's leaders to focus increasingly on foreign affairs from the 1880s onwards, eradicating domestic insurrections was their main priority during the first decade of the Meiji era. Prints depicting the domestic Boshin (1868-1869) and Seinan (1877) Wars were also included in this chapter since they offer insightful comparisons into how the media portrayed Japanese in the role of the other in contrast to similar renderings of Koreans or Chinese. An examination of Boshin and Seinan images alongside images of the Jingo and Köshin incidents reveals that while there was a continuity in artistic style, depictions of Japanese as the other in the earlier images lacked most if not all of the racial caricaturing prevalent in the later prints. In spite of the emotional nature of the domestic conflicts in which all combatants were Japanese, contemporary print artists more often than not rendered both winning as well as losing sides with a certain amount of dignity that was clearly lacking in later portrayals of foreign others.83

The prints that depicted the events in this phase of imagery development trace their roots to the second half of the eighteenth century. Suzuki Harunobu (1725-1770), widely regarded as the father of nishikie (brocade prints), introduced color to the predominantly black and white ukiyoe genre. Instead of the one or two woodblocks used in producing the primarily monochrome ukiyoe, he and other nishikie artists utilized multiple woodblocks, each representing a different color or shade. Initially, colors were derived from plant and mineral

83 This was clearly not the case with Boshin satire prints (fūshie), which were usually left unsigned. These images typically portrayed their subject matter, usually the samurai class, in highly irreverent form.
sources but by the middle of the nineteenth century, these had virtually disappeared, replaced by aniline pigments introduced into Japan from Holland in the 1820s. During the first half of the Meiji period, *nishikie* that depicted political events more often than not utilized bright blues and reds to create striking effects. These vivid, sometimes gaudy colors were well suited in depicting nature scenes as well as the common grotesque and fantastic news stories that were popular with the Japanese public during the second half of the nineteenth century (Figures 35a and b).

![Figure 35a (above): View of a suspension bridge at Mt. Gyōdō, a popular tourist sight in present-day Tochigi prefecture. By Katsumika Hokusai, ca. 1834. From *Masterpieces of Japanese Prints*, page 103.](image)

![Figure 35b (right): “Naosuke Gombei Kills His Former Master Shōzaburō.” Part of the 1866-1867 series “Twenty-eight Infamous Murders with Accompanying Verses” (Eimei Nijūhasshūki) by Tsukioka Yoshitoshi. Artists used new synthetic colors to create breathtaking as well as grotesque images that sold well during the middle of the nineteenth century. From Yoshitoshi, figure #7, page 36.](image)

Another characteristic commonly shared by these early political prints was their use of highly stylized form and ritualized poses when portraying central figures. This practice evolved from the depiction of Kabuki, one of the early mainstay themes for the ukiyoe genre. Originating in Kyoto at the beginning of the seventeenth century, Kabuki rapidly developed...
into a form of entertainment that targeted the urban masses.\textsuperscript{84} By the end of the eighteenth century, the art had matured and developed large popular followings in the major urban centers such as Edo, Osaka, and Kyoto. The ukiyoe industry benefited greatly from Kabuki’s widespread popularity by publishing thousands of copies of prints that depicted popular actors in favorite poses and scenes.\textsuperscript{85} These poses, or \textit{mie}, (Figure 36) became standardized techniques of expression by the end of the seventeenth century and were well known by a wide range of people, including commoner as well as samurai, thanks in large part to the great number of actor prints published during the Edo period. Transferring depictions of Kabuki \textit{mie} from actor prints to \textit{nishikiie} allowed artists to convey succinctly the mood of a print even when they were not familiar with the main aspects of a representation such as scenery details or the facial features of central characters. As most artists up until the

\textsuperscript{84} Kabuki also became extremely popular with the samurai class, much to the chagrin of bakufu officials, who fought a constant battle to isolate Tokugawa society from the debilitating effects on morality by the often lewd and boisterous performances. In spite of repeated bans throughout the period, many samurai often risked censure and fines to attend Kabuki plays in disguise. See Donald H. Shively, “Bakufu Versus Kabuki,” \textit{Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies}, vol. 18 no. 3/4 (December 1955): 326-356.

\textsuperscript{85} Print runs of extremely popular actors or subjects could run into the tens of thousands and sometimes even into the hundreds of thousands. For a rare look at ukiyoe prints in a commercial context, see \textit{The Commercial and Cultural Climate of Japanese Printmaking}, ed. Amy Reigle Newland (Amsterdam: Hotei Publishing, 2004), especially 11-22, 171-191.
Russo-Japanese War did not witness personally the events that they portrayed, these techniques made it easier for them to create news prints that their audiences could understand and relate to, even if consumers were largely unfamiliar with the actual people and places portrayed.

**The Boshin (1867-1868) and Seinan Wars (1877): Samurai Virtues on Exhibit**

Japan experienced two major civil wars during the modern period. Both conflicts were fought to determine which path the nation would take, a step forward towards modernity, as represented by Western culture and technology, or a step backward, as symbolized by a more traditional Japan. The Boshin War was the name given to the series of battles and short campaigns that marked the final downfall of the Tokugawa Shogunate. In late December 1867, samurai forces predominantly from the Choshu and Satsuma provinces declared the Shogunate defunct and instituted a “restoration” of political power to the emperor. While most of the fighting had ended by the spring of 1868, isolated pockets of bakufu resistance lasted through July 1869 in northeast Japan and Hokkaido. Over the next few years, the new government’s implementation of drastic political and social reforms rapidly eliminated the long-held traditional privileges of the samurai class, thus incurring the bitterness of large numbers of those who had the most to lose under the democratization process.

Between 1869 and 1877, this simmering discontent materialized into several isolated rebellions that finally came to a head in 1877 when a disaffected Saigō Takamori (1828-1877) led his Satsuma samurai in open revolt against the central government. The Seinan War (also known as the Satsuma Rebellion) was the last major domestic revolt faced by the Meiji administration; while the conflict lasted less than eight months, it was a bloody affair for both
sides and posed a serious challenge to the stability of the young government. Saigō Takamori’s rout marked the symbolic as well as actual defeat of conservative reactionary forces and allowed the new government to concentrate on modernization strategies aimed at releasing the country from the burden of unequal treaties and extraterritoriality clauses imposed on it by the West during the 1850s.

Boshin *nishikie* prints reflected continuity in both style and content from the Edo era to the Meiji period. Stylistically, the poses, facial expressions and dramatic scenes that characterize these images highlighted artists’ emphasis on theatrical and emotive aspects rather than on the accurate transmission of information. This stress on the melodramatic was only natural for artists who often produced prints to advertise Kabuki and promote leading actors, but it was also a legacy from the previous regime’s system of censorship. One of the Tokugawa bakufu’s primary efforts at curbing social disobedience involved preventing the dissemination of information regarding current affairs. In response, publishers and artists circumvented censorship regulations by thinly disguising contemporary events as past incidents. Usually this was done by creating a well-known historical scene with the names of characters and places portrayed in a manner that enabled most viewers to recognize the image’s true reference to a contemporary event (Figure 37).

Measures taken by artists to protect themselves during the Boshin War reflected the uncertainty of the times. However, the Meiji government’s first press regulation, the Publication Ordinance of 1869 (*Shuppan Jōrei*), offered a positive glimmer of hope for those in the publishing business. While the regulation warned against anti-government criticism, it

86 The government’s army of 65,000 men suffered over 6,200 deaths and 10,000 casualties. Eighteen-thousand rebels were either killed or wounded. See Jansen, *Modern Japan*, 368-69. In addition to the loss of life and damage to property, the government also nearly went bankrupt by spending approximately 80% of its annual budget in suppressing the rebellion. See Konishi Shirō, *Seinan sensō*, vol. 8 of *Nishikie Bakumatsu Meiji no rekishi* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1977), 135.
explicitly failed to ban the reporting of current events, as was the case during the Tokugawa period. This was in keeping with the ideals espoused in the previously released Five Charter Oath (Gokajō no seimon), of which one article proclaimed that "the spread of knowledge" would be one of the new regime's ideological foundations. In spite of this promising start to modern journalism in Japan, publishers' cautious approach to covering the news was reaffirmed when the more comprehensive Press Ordinance of 1875 (Shinbushi Jōrei) became law. Although this new regulation confirmed the right to disseminate the news, it created harsh penalties and fines for criticizing the government and imperial family in print. Given the unstable political conditions of the country up until the end of the Seinan War, it is not surprising that most artists, writers and publishers prudently chose to follow historical precedent by camouflaging the present with the past.

Figure 37: "The Spider Monster Creating Monsters in the Mansion of Minamoto no Yorimitsu," by Utagawa Kuniyoshi. The print ostensibly depicted Minamoto no Yorimitsu (948-1021), an eminent member of the celebrated samurai clan, Minamoto. Released in 1843, the rumor spread that the picture was meant to satirize the Tempō Reforms being implemented at the time. Neither Kuniyoshi or his publisher were punished since they were able to convince authorities otherwise. From Kuniyoshi, figure #30.

Of the less than 200 Boshin War nishiki created, only a relatively few were published as the portrayed events unfolded. In addition to logistical difficulties, it is reasonable to assume that publishers and artists failed to perceive the newsworthiness of reporting the war, thus contributing to the scarcity of portrayals—hardly surprising, since the staggering degree of the subsequent changes wrought over the next few years would have been very difficult for even astute contemporary observers to perceive. Furthermore, the outbreak of the Seinan War in 1877 was sensational news that all but eliminated the demand for accounts of the previous conflict. The nearly 500 Seinan prints published during the seven-month war attested to the fact that people at that time were interested more in dramatic current events than in tales of the past.

Figure 38: "The Fall of Osaka Castle," by Utagawa Yoshitora. Released in 1868 before the new government began creating publication legislation, Yoshitora followed Tokugawa era precedent on depicting current events and used the names of past samurai from a similar battle that occurred in 1615 between Toyotomi and Tokugawa forces to disguise the 1868 imperial capture of Osaka. From Bakumatsu Meiji rekishi, #4 page 18.

An examination of more than fifty Boshin prints revealed a few general patterns. First, nearly all of the prints published in 1868 either disguised events by transposing them into the past (Figure 38) or replaced battle venues with familiar images from daily life, such as sumo wrestlers grappling or children playing (Figure 39). Another common method of evading censorship regulations that traced its roots back to the Edo period was the use of imaginative nature scenes in disguising the present (Figure 40). As further insurance against punishment for censorship infractions, artists at times also left their works unsigned. They did this with when camouflage conventions used were so transparent

89 Of twenty-nine prints published in 1868 that were examined, only two depicted semi-realistic scenes—and both these were rated negatively. One showed a Tokugawa samurai being decapitated (see Figure 42 below) and the other showed Tokugawa Yoshinobu (1837-1913) and his retinue retreating from Osaka to Edo by ship. See Konishi Shirō, Isshin no nairan, vol. 4 of Nishikie Bakumatsu Meiji no rekishi (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1977), 70-71, 80-81.
that an image’s anti-establishment message had a high probability of attracting the censor’s unwanted attention or when both sides were portrayed in a less than positive light (Figure 41).

In categorizing Boshin prints, bakufu forces were designated as the enemy since the Emperor had officially proclaimed them as rebels. Aside from a few, usually unsigned, satirical depictions, bakufu forces fared rather well in Boshin prints. Of the fifty-four prints examined, thirty-three were positive (61%), twenty-eight neutral (51%), and three negative (.5%). At first glance, the overall lack of images portraying the bakufu side (3 of 54) in a negative light was surprising. Moreover, of the three negative depictions, two were relatively innocuous unsigned prints that thinly disguised a scene of a bakufu supporter losing to a Satsuma player at a game of **shōgi** (Japanese chess). The third negative image foreshadowed how later prints would come to portray the enemy in negative caricature (Figure 42).

**Figure 42:** “The Battle of Asahi Mountain.” This print by Yoshitaki is a rare negative depiction of the Tokugawa enemy. The scene shows imperial troops storming the castle at Nagaoka in north-central Japan in the middle of May. In the north, bakufu loyalists resisted fiercely, partially explaining the unrestrained graphic nature of the print, which was published in 1868. Note the head of a Tokugawa soldier flying out of the frame in the upper left-hand corner. From *Bakumatsu Meiji rekishi*, #4 pages 70-71.

Although still rather mild when compared to many of the caricatures in the Sino-Japanese War prints, images of bakufu samurai fleeing in terror and the dramatic depiction of one of their comrade’s heads flying through the air after his decapitation presaged
the future negative trends in the portrayal of the other. On the other hand, the relative lack of negative portrayals in Boshin prints can be attributed to the fact that both sides involved in the conflict were mutually Japanese as well as members of the same ruling class, the samurai.

The backgrounds of the artists creating the prints also helps to explain why there were so few negative portrayals during this period. Most print artists appear to have come either from the lower ranks of the samurai class or from relatively well-off merchant families. These connections to the higher echelons of Japanese society may have served to temper any latent desires by artists, especially of samurai lineage, to ridicule their social superiors. On the other hand, given the rigid social and economic controls imposed on them by the Tokugawa Shogunate, many merchant class artists probably relished the opportunity to ridicule the samurai bureaucracy for its discriminatory policies. While difficult to verify without signatures, the contents of satire prints (fūshiga) such as the one in Figure 47, which clearly depicted antagonistic feelings towards the samurai class, indicate merchant authorship.

An additional common feature shared by those later Boshin prints, published more than a year or so after the battles of 1868 and 1869, was that they tended towards portrayals that were more dramatic. Rather than focusing on factual accounts or the causes of events, artists instead emphasized the heroic or tragic qualities of characters from both sides. One obvious reason for this was that many bakufu supporters later became loyal imperial servants after the fighting had finished and the new government formed. Another, perhaps more important, reason was the customary habit for artists to graphically lionize historical figures (more often than not, military ones), even those former enemies of the state. In an established convention that traced its roots back to the rise in preeminence of the warrior class during Japan’s medieval period, artists extolled famous warriors or rebels such as Kusunoki Masashige (1294-1336) as paragons of loyalty and unshakable determination. The idealized
depicting of these virtues helped to create an ethos that became both an inherent part in defining the samurai class as well as a popular theme unto itself.

Nineteenth century nishikie artists continued to supply this demand for the warrior genre by producing long series of print sets. Works such as Utagawa Kuniyoshi’s (1797-1861) “108 Heroes from the Popular Suikoden Tales,” and Tsukioka Yoshitoshi’s (1839-1892) “New Tales of Honor,” in 1873 were representative of this genre (Figure 43). Series such as these underscored the recurring tendency to portray the samurai class artistically in terms of honor and loyalty. As the Meiji push towards modernization progressed and reforms quickly melded the former domains and social classes into a more unified nation and people, these traits came to define the essence of not only the former samurai class, but also the general population as well. Although many former samurai disdained sharing the political franchise with commoners, Meiji leaders such as

---

Okubo Toshimichi (1830-1878) realized that doing so to a certain degree was a prerequisite for successful modernization. Furthermore, the results of both the Boshin and Seinan Wars convinced most Japanese leaders that modern warfare dictated the necessity of mobilizing the general population if future battles were to be won. The Japanese military learned these lessons well. As the following chapter will show, woodblock prints would introduce Japan’s modern army to the world by depicting thousands of images of high-tech weapons as well as conscripted soldiers during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.

Seinan War prints continued the trend of highlighting the warrior’s traits of honor and loyalty. While nearly all of these prints rendered both government forces and rebels favorably in terms of loyalty and heroism, depictions of Saigō Takamori and his followers stand out for their overwhelmingly positive treatment, in spite of their status as rebels against the state. Nearly two-thirds of the approximately five hundred Seinan War prints published focused on Saigō and his close-knit group of comrades-in-war such as Kirino Toshiaki (1838-1877) and Murata Shinpachi (1836-1877). Of the ninety-four Seinan prints examined, seventy-two were positive (76.5%), eighteen neutral (19%) and four negative (4%) towards the rebels. The positive images conform to the customary pattern of depicting heroic figures and fierce warriors. Whether the rebels were battling against overwhelming odds or
preparing to die in honorable fashion, artists depicted Saigō’s followers with a great deal of respect (Figure 44). Neutral depictions also followed artistic precedent by either portraying the rebel samurai in a scene’s distant background or by not including images of the enemy at all (Figure 45). Most of the neutrally rated Seinan prints in this category illustrated government officer general staff meetings or homecoming celebrations welcoming troops and officers back to Tokyo soon after the war had ended (Figure 46).

The negative Seinan prints are interesting for their diverseness and can be interpreted as government condoned derision both of Saigō as an enemy of the State as well as of Saigō as a representative member of the former samurai class. One print depicted an imaginary scene where Saigō enjoys a lavish party, complete with geisha, music, and wine, while his commanders lead a fierce attack on Kumamoto castle. Konishi Shirō attributed this print’s origins to one of many negative rumors (probably government inspired) regarding the rebels that circulated during the seven-month war.91 Konishi Shirō is most likely correct since, based on abundant studies of the man and his life,

---

91 Shirō, Seinan sensō, 13.
such actions would have been completely out of character for Saigō. Another print is interesting for its critique of Saigō’s men not as insurgents, but as members of the samurai class. This print, in yet another imaginary scene, depicts the rebels as they valiantly attack government forces. In the process, they wield tatami floor mats as shields to ward off bullets (Figure 47). The implication is that the once politically and socially supreme samurai class has sunk to the lowest level of society by hiding behind common flooring for protection. Of the remaining negatively classified prints, only one hinted at the civilization/barbarian theme that would come to dominate later prints dealing with Korea and China (Figure 48).

This print of Saigō’s surviving men surrendering to government forces is remarkable for its similarities to nishikie images that would portray the Chinese surrendering to the Japanese at Heijō (present-day Pingyang) nearly twenty years later (Figure 49). The

---

Seinan print juxtaposed the disheveled rebels, kneeling on the ground, to the clean, well-groomed government officers and soldiers dressed in Western-style uniforms and sitting authoritatively in chairs or standing in orderly fashion. The contrast between Japan’s past and its future is explicit, with the path towards modernity lying clearly with the Meiji government.

Figure 49: A Sino-Japanese War print showing Chinese surrendering at Pingyang (heijō). Here, European-looking Japanese exemplified modernity’s superiority while the Chinese epitomized the archaic past. Private collection.

The Jingo (1882) and Kōshin Incidents (1884): The Degradation of the Other

The origin of Meiji Japan’s “Korean Problem” (Seikanron) traced its roots to Korea’s failing to recognize diplomatically the new restoration government. In 1873, the government’s decision not to use military force in punishing Korean “intransigence” and “insult” divided Japanese leaders and instigated a major split in the fragile government coalition. Although the treaty of Kanghwa (1876) subsequently resolved the immediate issues in Japan’s favor, Korean “stubbornness” to modernize, continuing Chinese political intrigue in peninsular affairs, and Japan’s domineering attitude towards its neighbor continued to cause friction between the two countries over the next twenty years. Korea’s drift

---

93 Saigō Takamori’s subsequent departure from government service was a major impetuous for start of the Seinan War.

94 In spite of Korea’s gaining nominal independence from China, Japan clearly benefited the most from the treaty. In addition to ending the feudal system of conducting foreign diplomacy through the Sō family, the former daimyo of Tsushima, an island in the middle of the Korean Straits, the treaty also granted Japan many of the extraterritoriality privileges that had been imposed on itself during the 1850s. For an in-depth examination of
towards China’s sphere of influence and its repeated failure to modernize along Japanese lines increasingly alarmed Meiji leaders, who feared that further Western imperialistic incursions into the peninsula would destabilize the region economically as well as politically.

The Jingo Incident (also known as the Imo Mutiny) was the first of two flare-ups in Korea during the volatile state of affairs of the 1880s. In reaction to the favored treatment given to a small core of Korean soldiers modernizing under Japanese guidance, regular Korean troops staged a general mutiny that quickly led to a palace coup, which in turn ousted the Japanese clique and installed a Chinese-backed conservative regime firmly into power. In the process, the mob killed six Japanese diplomats and military personnel, including Lieutenant Horimoto, the officer in charge of the modern-style Korean unit. 95 The Japanese legates, assuming the worst, set fire to their legation building that subsequently burned to the ground. Those who could, made their way to the nearby port of Inchon and escaped on an English ship, the Flying Fish. In September, Japan and Korea signed the Treaty of Chemulpo (Inchon) with mediation from China. The agreement promised to punish mutiny instigators as well as give Japan broader trading rights and freedom of movement in Korea.

In spite of the treaty, the proceeding eighteen months saw Chinese influence in Korean court politics increase while Japanese sway diminished. Then, in December 1884, with the support of Japanese military personnel assigned to protect the legation in Seoul, Korean reformers staged another coup. Chinese military intervention quickly restored the status quo but in the process, angry mobs killed forty Japanese officers and residents as well as set fire to the legation compound. Japanese minister Takezoe Shin’ichi (1841-1917),

---


95 Ibid., 53.
reminiscent of the Jingo Incident, once again fled by boat from Inchon. Sino-Japanese negotiations soon settled the crisis and Korea promised to punish the offenders as well as pay the equivalent at the time of $110,000 in reparations. A second treaty, signed in Tientsin in April 1885, required that both Japan and China discontinue active military involvement in the peninsula. It also allowed both nations to send peacekeeping troops to Korea in the future, as long as the dispatching party gave prior written notification to the other treaty signatory. While ineffective in preventing further Chinese machinations in Korean domestic politics, the Tientsin Treaty was important in that it provided Japan with the context for declaring war on China less than ten years later.

The Images

While forty-one prints depicting the Jingo Incident were located and examined, I found none that portrayed the latter Korean episode. Various factors most likely account for the lack of Kōshin prints. First, Japanese leaders had begun to distance themselves in exasperation from the complex Korean situation. Next, government orders directing Takezoe not to support any palace putsch attempt arrived in Seoul too late to prevent Japanese involvement. Finally, the worsening economic crisis in Japan during the 1880s forced the government into focusing more attention on domestic rather than foreign issues. Of the Jingo prints examined, there were no positive portrayals of the Korean or Chinese other, twenty-two negative, and nineteen neutral. In keeping with precedent set by Boshin and Satsuma prints, all neutral portrayals either failed to depict the enemy or did so only vaguely in a scene's distant background. The main impression one gets from these prints is that the

96 Ibid., 54-60.
97 There were three politically/economically motivated uprisings in the latter half of 1884 alone. They were the Gunma (May), Kabasan (September), and Chichibu (November) Incidents. Concise Dictionary of Modern Japanese History, 1984 ed., s.v. "Gunma Incident," "Kabasan Incident," and "Chichibu Incident."
Koreans were backward and uncivilized. In both the neutral as well as negative portrayals, the Japanese are poised under fire and are dealing with the desperate situation stoically in spite of overwhelmingly odds (Figure 50). It is also interesting to note that in the process of “civilizing” Japanese figures, artists were increasingly portraying Japanese as Western look-a-likes.

While this civilized versus barbaric premise was obviously one of the central themes of these prints, they represented a middle stage in its development. Although the Jingo portrayals of the enemy are much more debasing than parallel depictions of the Satsuma Rebellion, they are relatively subdued when compared to the large number of excessive caricatures depicted in Sino-Japanese War prints. This negative tendency was an invariable result of the Japanese government and media’s growing impatience with the volatile situation, especially after 1884, which both attributed to continued Chinese obstructionism on the peninsula. For the most part, Sino-Japanese War images of Chinese became much more demeaning while depicted Japanese would become clearly more Western in appearance.

The mention of several additional characteristics helps to clarify further the pictorial development of prints during this period. First, even though artists often depicted wounded Japanese, images of those killed during the fighting are noticeably missing in the Jingo prints. This contrasted with earlier scenes of the Boshin and Satsuma conflicts, where grisly images of both dead and wounded were readily available (Figure 51). This growing sensitivity
been another reason for casualties may have also been another reason for the lack of Kōshin prints. Although portrayal of Japanese war dead would later become one of the publishing industry’s central taboos during the 1920s and 1930s, there were still numerous examples of dead or dying Japanese in Sino-Japanese War prints. These types of images obviously served government propaganda purposes by appealing to Japanese viewers’ sense of duty, sacrifice, and patriotism. (More will be mentioned on the portrayal of war dead in the following chapter.)

Other conspicuous links with past prints that depicted previous domestic events included the use of cartouches that identified central characters and important geographical features (Figure 52). Moreover, a tendency, varying greatly with artist, towards more realistic depictions appeared more pronounced in Jingo prints (Figure 53). Western artistic influences and the gradual spread of photography
throughout Japan adequately explain this trend. Finally, the speed with which publishers put out prints during the Jingo Incident was a definite improvement over the Seinan War period. The time to market for news increasingly came to be measured in term of days and weeks, rather than in weeks and months. The expansion of a national railway system combined with both domestic as well as international telegraph trunk lines invariably shortened the time between the occurrence of an event and its reporting to the nation. The general Westernization in both style and portrayal of Japanese in conjunction with degradation of the Chinese image were trends that artists would develop fully in Japan’s first modern war on foreign soil, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.
Chapter 4
1894-1904: Enlightenment versus Barbarism

By the middle of the 1890s, the foundation of modern Japan was firmly in place. In less than three decades since the Restoration, Meiji Japan’s rapid progress towards industrialization accentuated the contrast with a China that appeared to be lagging further and further behind in the race towards modernization. Although many of China’s governing elite realized that modern weapons were necessary in order gain any substantial degree of independence from Western imperialist powers, measures to develop the infrastructure necessary to support such changes were repeatedly hindered by prevailing conservative social and political forces. The extent of the development gap between both countries became painfully clear with the outcome of the Sino-Japanese War. By resoundingly defeating an enemy that on paper was superior in both numbers and technology, Japan convinced the world that it had indeed become modern and thus civilized.

This theme of Japanese success and Chinese failure in copying Western civilization was the fundamental message that Japanese graphic media repeated in the thousands of prints published during the war. Graphic depictions of the front, predominantly by woodblock prints, easily sold to an audience that was eager to feel good about being Japanese. Although the woodblock industry had been fading quickly as a commercial medium during the 1880s, the overwhelmingly popular war stimulated a remarkable albeit short-lived revival. The mature state of the industry, photography’s economically prohibitive stage of development, and Western artistic influences on style and perspective combined to create the ideal situation in which woodblock prints came to dominate the graphic market’s representation of the war.

Sino-Japanese war prints exhibited links with both past and future trends in graphic media. Stylized poses, caricatures, and the use of bright aniline colors were reminiscent of
past war prints. In contrast, the increasing emphasis on realism in both content and perspective by artists such as Kobayashi Kiyochika (1847-1915) clearly reflected encroaching Western influences in Japanese art and culture (Figure 54). Furthermore, although photography did not become widespread in Japan until after the turn of the century, its impact on realism in prints was already being felt in the 1870s and 1880s, from which period it is easy to find many examples of woodblock images that closely mirrored photographs of the same scene (Figure 55). A quick comparison of early photographs and prints reveals why prints still were the media of choice for reporting the news during the war with China. While photographs reproduced the reality of a scene, it was invariably a drab and lifeless perspective. In contrast, artists could and did liven up the black and white pictures by applying color as well as

Figure 54: "Use of Electric Light during Night Attack on P'yong-yang," by Kobayashi Kiyochika. The artist was fascinated with the use of light and shadow in creating perspective, and often used Western techniques in depicting night scenes. New technologies such as the searchlight highlighted here were popular topics for Sino-Japanese War artists. From Kiyochika, page 82.

Figure 55: Views of the Mitsui House. An example of a woodblock print reflecting as well as touching-up reality. From Meiji Print, page 81.
using the illusion of motion in creating prints that were sufficiently faithful to reality and far more appealing to the eye.

After the war, the trend towards realism and technological advances in photography increasingly relegated prints to the realm of art rather than journalism. Struggling printmakers tried to use the Boxer Rebellion and later the Russo-Japanese War to stage another commercial comeback but failed. Instead, the prominent use of color photographs and even motion pictures in portraying the conflict with Russia foreshadowed the degree of importance that newer graphic media would soon attain in journalistic reporting. Although woodblock prints quickly faded from news landscape, they continued to play an important role in the Japanese art world in the innovative forms of sōsaku (creative prints) and shinhanga (new prints).  

The Sino-Japanese War and Boxer Rebellion

Frustrated with the way developments on the peninsula continued to unfold in the years after the Kōshin Incident, the Japanese government decided to take action in 1894. A domestic Korean rebellion, soon put down by Chinese troops, provided Japan with the immediate pretext. As allowed by the Treaty of Tientsin, Japan swiftly dispatched troops to Seoul in order to defend its citizens and property. Subsequent failure to reach a settlement on the future of Korea suitable to both China and Japan led to hostilities on July 23 and a declaration of war on August 1. By November 21, the key Chinese fortified base in Manchuria, Port Arthur, had fallen to Japanese forces. On February 18, 1895 Weihaiwei, a strategic naval base on the Shantung peninsula, also fell. Considered the staging ground for

any land attack on Peking, the port’s capture along with the destruction of the Chinese fleet signaled the practical conclusion of the war. By the end of March, an armistice was declared and both countries signed a formal treaty at Shimonoseki in western Japan on April 17, 1895.

In spite of the brevity of the eight-month war, publishers produced over two-thousand different nishikie designs.99 The ability to sell such a large number of prints underscored the war’s extreme popularity with the Japanese public. In a manner of speaking, the conflict was a coming out for Japan—repeated victories in the field announced to Japanese and a world which equated military might with civilization that the small island nation had become a modern civilized state worthy of the West’s respect. As one impassioned Japanese regional editorial put it, “Henceforth the West would call us as we call ourselves: Nippon, which has a meaning, the rising sun, and there will be no more ‘Japan’ or ‘Japs’ in the foreign press.”100

Aside from the economic and territorial gains to be achieved from military forays on the Asian continent, Japanese leaders hoped that the international respect earned through victory on the field would hasten the termination of the unequal treaties imposed on it by the West in the 1850s. The outcome of the war and particularly the way in which Japan conducted itself in the field had the desired effect—although complete tariff sovereignty was not restored until 1911, Western extraterritorial provisions were eliminated by 1899.101

---

99 The time span during which reportable events happened was actually much shorter since most of the fighting occurred at the beginning and end of the war. Relatively few prints were published during the months between the fall of Port Arthur and Weihaiwei when the severe Manchurian winter forced a nearly complete cessation to hostilities. Those prints that made it to publication during the period usually depicted Japanese soldiers stoically enduring the frigid Manchurian climate.

100 “Sekai ni okeru Nihon no kokumin,” Sekai no Nihon (25 Oct. 1896), quoted in Carol Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths, 89.

101 Japan signed treaties abolishing extraterritoriality with the Western powers in July 1894, but they did not come into effect until the summer of 1899. For many foreign observers of the war, Japan’s victory and the exemplary conduct of its troops (for the most part) confirmed Japan’s status as a “civilized” nation.
While victory in the Sino-Japanese War signaled the long-awaited end of foreign intervention in Japan, defeat for China was disastrous. Although the loss initially stimulated domestic political and economic reforms, further foreign incursions into a politically weakened China along with a conservative government resistant to change combined to inflame continuing anti-foreign sentiment. These factors, in addition to the weakened state of regional government in a Shantung province that had bore the brunt of the burden in fighting the war as well as a suffered a prolonged regional drought, led directly up to the Boxer Rebellion in the summer of 1900. From June to mid-August the Boxers, a loose organization of predominantly lower class Chinese that traced its origins to various traditional religious, local peacekeeping, vigilante, and banditry associations, laid siege to the foreign legations in Peking. It took 20,000 foreign soldiers, of which 8,000 were Japanese, over two weeks to battle their way to Peking eighty miles from the coast and put down the “rebellion.” Almost another full year was required for the mopping up operations conducted by the various foreign troops. Finally, on September 7, 1901, all parties involved signed a peace protocol, therefore officially ending the incident.  

The huge indemnity (the equivalent of 333 million U.S. dollars to be paid over a forty-year period) along with added political and territorial concessions made to the foreign powers further disgraced and weakened an already faltering Chinese government. As the world’s view of China was reaching a low point, Japan enjoyed high praises for the way its troops handled themselves in the previous war as well as during the rebellion.  

Japanese graphic depictions of the Boxer Rebellion, while relatively few in number when compared to

---


103 During the expedition to Peking, Japanese troops bore the brunt of the fighting. Moreover, after the relief and nearly complete destruction of Peking, Japanese soldiers refrained from the widespread looting and pillaging that other foreign troops, notably the Russians and Germans, took part in.
the Sino-Japanese War or even the Boshin War, were unanimous in reaffirming China's backwardness in contrast to Japan's attainment of civilization. In portraying the events of both conflicts, woodblock prints defined modern civilization in terms of morality, honor, courage, spirit, advanced weapons/technology, and superior organization.

While comparing Japan's attainment of civilization with China's lapse into barbarity was the central topic of Sino-Japanese imagery, the various sub-themes depicted in the war prints provide a wealth of information about what the term "civilization" actually meant to many Japanese during this period. In examining over 150 prints, several recurring themes became apparent. Consequently, in addition to the previously used positive, negative, and neutral classifications, I divided Sino-Japanese War images of Japanese heroic poses, enlisted glory, and altruism. As mentioned in the Introduction, heroic pose portrayals were separated from the courage and discipline category in order to note stylistic changes in nishiki prints. The goal in designating category labels in this manner was to highlight the nuances of the Japanese media's interpretation of civilization as well as its anti-Chinese bias during the war.

Prints that portrayed the utter and crushing defeat of enemy fell under the total dominance of the enemy rubric (Figure 56). Survival against nature images showed Japanese
soldiers stoically braving the extreme weather and temperatures of the frigid Manchurian winter (Figure 57). The courage and discipline category included displays of bravery or courage as well as discipline.

Scenes of daring reconnaissance missions behind enemy lines or soldiers attacking in the face of withering enemy fire regardless of the personal danger demonstrated to Japan and the rest of the world the true meaning of the indomitable Yamato spirit (Figure 58). Images of group discipline, the foundation of modern warfare, which in turn was seen as a key component

Figure 57: “Advancing on the Ice to Attack Weihaiwei” (iakai kōgeki hyōjō no shingun), by Kiyochika. Japanese soldiers initially were unprepared for the extreme cold in China during the Sino-Japanese War and many suffered from cold-related injuries. From In Battle’s Light, page 47.

Figure 58: Example of the Yamato spirit. In this print by Migita Toshihide (1863-1925), Colonel Satō, renowned for his exploits of bravery during the war with China, leads the attack on the fortress at Niuzhuang. From In Battle’s Light, page 69.

Figure 59: “Picture of Our Second Army's Assault on Port Arthur.” This Kiyochika print clearly contrasts the discipline and organization of the Japanese army to the panic-stricken Chinese who are depicted in caricature. From In Battle’s Light, page 44.
of Western modernity, proved to the world that Japan had indeed become a nation worthy of being called civilized (Figure 59). The desire to appeal to the West in this print category is clearly made evident by the many images of Japanese soldiers that appear more European than Asian (Figure 60).

Images of modern weaponry such as artillery or steam ships were classified under the technological superiority category (Figure 61). When a scene emphasized the poise, rather than the actions, of the central character, it was categorized as a heroic pose (Figure 62). Scenes that portrayed courageous acts performed by general rank and file soldiers were classified as enlisted glory (Figure 63). Given the popularity of the multiple depictions of several episodes of valor made famous by the media, it is clear that both the Japanese public as well as the military wanted the observer to interpret the war as a Japanese event for the Japanese everyman.\(^4\) This was in stark contrast to the

\(^4\) Apparently, the government was interested in propagating this image enough to cover up the true details of the story of Harada Jûkichi, one of the three famous enlisted heroes of the war. See Donald Keene, "The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and its Cultural Effects in
way in which artists had portrayed military heroics of the past as belonging to the samurai class. The final category, altruism, underscored the humane aspect of the civilized Japanese by portraying acts of kindness towards the Chinese enemy, in spite of their apparent barbarous ways (Figure 64).

Given the predominance of negative portrayals of Chinese in nearly all Sino-Japanese War prints, classifying their depictions using the same criteria for the Japanese only served to confirm the extreme extent of their bias against Chinese. For that reason, positive, negative, and neutral portrayals of Chinese were divided further into categories titled caricatures, panic and cowardice, and honor.

Figure 62: Example of a heroic pose: "The Great Battle of Ansong Ford. The Valor of Captain Matsuzaki," by Toshikata. Although Captain Matsuzaki lost his life in this early action of the war, his bugler, Shirakami Genjirō, gained the lion's share of the glory by continuing to sound the charge as he died, later on the same day as his Captain (see Figure 72 below). From In Battle's Light, page 74.

These caricatures (able suicide). These subcategories helped to clarify how the Japanese media sought to distinguish the barbarous from the civilized. Caricatures highlighted the most degrading level of Chinese portrayal in the prints. In these scenes, artists put aside reality and unabashedly depicted an other that had few redeeming qualities (Figure 65). While the panic and cowardice category often overlapped with caricatures, some of these prints were well composed, realistic scenes that emphasized the inevitability of defeat against the far superior Japanese forces, rather than the complete abjectness of the Chinese soldier, and therefore were classified differently.

Figure 64: Example of altruism, by Toshikata. Another print depicting Captain Higuchi's celebrated rescue of a Chinese baby during the Sino-Japanese War (also see Figure 8 above). From Japan at the Dawn of Modern Age, page 102.

Figure 65: Example of a Chinese caricature, by Kobayashi Toshimitsu (active 1877-1904). In addition to the exaggerated depictions of the enemy, Toshimitsu, reminiscent of his teacher, Kiyochika, also highlighted Japanese technology in the form of the searchlight and artillery piece. From Japan at the Dawn of Modern Age, page 73.
Given the overall bias of these war images, it is understandable that only a small number of prints fell under the Chinese classification of *honor*. The one print that did so shows a Chinese Admiral committing suicide after learning of the defeat of his forces.\(^{105}\) The Japanese media as well as audience apparently looked favorably on such scenes since they corresponded closely to an ethos that samurai culture and the Japanese media had been perpetuating for centuries.

Analysis of 159 Sino-Japanese War prints revealed an unequivocal message of Japanese superiority (Table 2). Of the prints examined, artists portrayed Chinese negatively ninety-nine times (62%), neutrally fifty-nine times (37%), and positively only once. The images exemplified Japanese superiority over Chinese primarily by using the three categories of *courage and discipline*, *total domination of the enemy*, and *heroic poses*. As

![Table 2: Sino-Japanese War Imagery](image)

105 See Figure 73 below.
Table 2 shows, acts of courage, discipline, and poses appeared 146 times and obviously were important ingredients in how those creating the images interpreted the meaning of “civilized.” This is predictable since those same qualities also played an important part in how the West was defining its vision of civilization in an age of militant nationalism and aggressive imperialism. Seventy-one scenes of Japanese soldiers totally dominating the Chinese enemy further reinforced the idea that modernity was indeed inherently better than the ways of the past.

Altruism, another theme that symbolized the higher qualities of civilization, also appeared in the Sino-Japanese War imagery. Although altruism would receive more exposure during the Taishō (1912-1926) and pre-war Shōwa periods, the theme appeared four times (2.5%) in war prints. The sources of these images were stories and rumors coming from the front that told of acts of Japanese kindness towards the Chinese enemy, in spite of their uncivilized state. Three of four of these prints refer to various reports of Japanese officers who came across and saved Chinese babies who had been abandoned in the battlefield. Although the finer aspects of Japanese civilization are showcased in these prints, they seem to call as much attention to the supposed degenerate state of the Chinese character by asking what kind of parents would abandon their own baby. The fourth print shows another Japanese officer expressing compassion for a Chinese prisoner who has attempted to commit suicide for allowing himself to be captured. These altruism images, especially those of the abandoned babies, served to accentuate the degree of difference between Japanese civilization and Chinese barbarism.

106 For a discussion on how the Japanese media adopted Western ideas of civilization in spinning the punitive expedition to Taiwan, see Robert Eskildsen, “Of Civilization and Savages: The Mimetic Imperialism of Japan’s 1874 Expedition to Taiwan,” American Historical Review, vol. 107 no. 2 (April 2002): 388-418.
In addition to the war prints' emphasis on the personal characteristics associated with modern man, the more tangible, physical attributes of civilization, as embodied by technology, also appear prominently in the imagery. Twenty-eight prints (17.6%) spotlighted the machines that helped Japan convincingly defeat an enemy that greatly outnumbered them. These Sino-Japanese War images, aside from three important exceptions, are reminiscent of the prints that depicted the rapid influx of things foreign into Yokohama during the 1860s and more of Japan during the 1870s (Figure 67).\footnote{More than five hundred different prints depicting Westerners and their culture were produced in Yokohama during the three-year period from 1859-1862 alone. Throughout the \textit{bunmei kaika} (civilization and enlightenment) period of the 1870s, artists focused more on Western civilization's technological trappings rather than cultural heritage. See Ann Yonemura, \textit{Yokohama: Prints from Nineteenth-Century Japan} (Washington, D.C.: Arthur M. Sackler Gallery and Smithsonian Institute Press); and Konishi Shirō, \textit{Bunmei kaika}, vol. 6 of \textit{Nishikie Bakumatsu Meiji no rekishi} (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1977).}

![Figure 67: "Picture of a Steam Locomotive along the Yokohama Waterfront," by Hiroshige III (1842-1894). Yokohama prints typically spotlighted Westerners and their machines during the 1860s. From \textit{Yokohama}, page 183.](image1)

![Figure 68: "The Great Victory of Japanese Warships off Haiyang Island," by Namura Shūkō (dates unknown). The Matsusima, the Imperial Navy's flagship, was highlighted for its technological superiority over its Chinese counterparts. From \textit{Japan at the Dawn of the Modern Age}, page 80.](image2)
the war with China explicitly highlighted the martial facets of technology by depicting military ships, torpedo boats, and big guns (Figure 68).

More striking than the predictable dichotomy between the depiction of technology in peace and wartime prints was the difference in how artists portrayed the interaction between man and machine. In the Yokohama prints, the machine invariably took center stage, almost as if it and not the man were in control. Furthermore, the men depicted operating the machines were more often than not Westerners rather than Japanese, therefore hinting at Japan's heavy reliance on foreign technical expertise during the first few years of its push towards industrialization. This contrasted greatly with the Sino-Japanese War prints, which showed Japanese soldiers utilizing new technologies smoothly and efficiently. These images of man's mastery over machine, the material manifestation of modernity, implied that Japan had become a civilized nation.

Figure 69: An early depiction of Western technology: "The Transit of an American Steam Locomotive," by Yoshikazu (active 1850-1870). Unfamiliar with the technology and working from Western illustrations, Yoshikazu unknowingly combined features from a steam locomotive and a steam-powered paddleboat. By the start of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, Japanese artists had become much more sophisticated in depicting new technologies (see detail of the Matsushima in figure 68 above. From Yokohama, page 162.
The final difference between Yokohama prints and Sino-Japanese War images worth noting is the depictions of the machines themselves. While the earlier images of technology such as trains were invariably technically inaccurate at best, the war prints were usually highly precise and realistic (Figure 69). Following past precedence and influenced by the contemporary trend towards realism in the Japanese art world, many prints artists often rendered images directly from photographs in order to achieve life-like perfection (Figures 70a and b). This increasing accuracy in depictions of machinery also reflected both a general rise in Japanese society’s level of knowledge and familiarity with technology as well as its growing fascination with realism in the graphic arts. As photography came to replace woodblock prints in graphic reporting after the turn of the nineteenth century, both these trends would continue throughout the prewar period.

Figure 70a (left): Photograph of the Battleship Yashima firing a six-inch naval gun at Port Arthur, circa 1904. From Japan’s Fight for Freedom, page 182.

Figure 70b (below): “Japanese Warships Fire on the Enemy near Haiyantao,” by Toshikata. From Impressions of the Front, page 26, figure 27).

While Chinese warships were equipped with larger caliber guns, the Japanese navy relied more on smaller yet newer rapid-fire guns, such as the ones shown in both images. These guns played a decisive role in Japan’s naval victory over China.
The two remaining war print themes involving the portrayal of Japanese also deserve mention. Thirteen prints (8%) portrayed the Japanese soldier’s *survival against nature* and twelve prints (7.5%) depicted scenes of *enlisted glory*. As mentioned above, all the *survival against nature* images depicted the Japanese soldier stoically withstanding the artic-like conditions of the Manchurian winter (Figure 71). The scenes of enlisted glory stressed the ordinary soldier’s bravery as well as his dedication to Emperor and nation (Figure 72). By highlighting the enlisted soldier’s spiritual and physical strength in addition to his loyalty to Japan, images from both these categories served to emphasize the egalitarian aspects of modern Japanese society.

In turn, Japan’s victory over China demonstrated to the world as well as its own citizens that it had transformed itself from a feudal, class-structured society into a nation built on traditional loyalties and modern democratic values.
While the portrayals of Japanese in war prints give us an idea of how many people visually perceived the traits of the civilized man, depictions of Chinese show the viewer what it meant at the time to be “barbarous.” Of the ninety-nine prints depicting negative portrayals of Chinese, seventy-one (71.7%) fell into the category total dominance, sixty-nine (69.6%) caricature, and fifteen (15%) panic and cowardice. Again, as with the images that highlighted characteristics of civilization, it is unsurprising that Japanese visualizations of barbarism coincided neatly with contemporary Western thought on the subject. The repeated negative caricature portrayal of Chinese in Sino-Japanese War prints clearly reiterated the statement that civilization and modernity would inevitably crush the barbarous ways of the past.

A final note on the one positive Chinese portrayal and one negative Japanese depiction is in order. First, the positive image depicts the Chinese admiral, Ting Ju-chang, committing suicide after hearing of the Peiyang fleet’s defeat at Weihaiwei on the Shantung peninsula in February 1895 (Figure 73). This action aroused sentimental feelings of the samurai spirit in many Japanese. The commander of the Japanese fleet, Admiral Itō Sukeyuki, lauded Admiral Ting’s defense of Weihaiwei and paid tribute to his honor and bravery by having the Japanese fleet fire a salute with flags at half-mast.109 It is interesting to note that Admiral Ting had been educated in the United States and that his Western military

---

109 Shumpei Okamoto, Impressions from the Front, 44.
advisors considered him an able commander. Although only one print, the imagery suggests that even the barbarous Chinese could hope to obtain salvation, if only they embraced modern civilization.

The one negative Japanese image shows the carnage of a ship's ammunition room after having been hit by enemy fire (Figure 74). Rather than intending to portray Japanese sailors in a negative light, the artist appeared to be trying to depict the horrors of war realistically and objectively, especially in the context of the modern mechanical era. Censors banned the print from publication for obvious political reasons that the artist must have been well aware of since he left his work unsigned. With the exception of this unpublished print, I found no other negative Japanese images from the Sino-Japanese War. Although this example does stress that censorship was indeed at work during the conflict, this kind of suppression was by far more the exception rather than the rule. The majority of the evidence from the period indicates that most Japanese appeared enthusiastic about supporting the war and its symbolic meanings for the nation's future. Repeated victories and negligible battle casualties created an outpouring of patriotism that

---

110 The print was included in an illustrated book written by a naval Captain, Kōkichi Kimura (1861-1940), that the authorities banned after its publication in 1896. Censors deemed the book's illustrations and text inappropriately graphic in describing the physical carnage caused by enemy fire. See Donald Keene, Anne Nishimura, and Frederic A. Sharf, *Japan at the Dawn of the Modern Age: Woodblock Prints from the Meiji Era, 1868-1912* (Boston: MFA Publications, a division of the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, 2001), 82, 136.

resulted in a union of thought between the Japanese government and people that greatly reduced the censors' workload during the conflict.

The years immediately following the Sino-Japanese War witnessed the end of the commercial popularity of the nishikie format. Technological advances in the graphic arts such as lithography and photography along with the increasing demand for realism in graphic media made it prohibitively expensive to continue reporting the news through woodblocks. 112 These factors help to explain the scarcity of Boxer Rebellion prints. Although many photographs depicting people and places related to the event exist, the technology was still such that cameras could not yet create effective shots of action at the time (Figure 75). While the numerous photos of the various allied soldiers posing, Chinese scenery, and the occasional Boxer rebel are valuable historical documents, they did not contribute any substantial information towards the topic of the Japanese media's presentation of China since most of the pictures taken by Japanese do not appear to have been published commercially in Japan.

Given this situation, I was able to find only six Japanese woodblock and twelve lithograph prints that portrayed the Boxer Rebellion. In addition to reiterating the themes portrayed in the Sino-Japanese War images, Boxer prints stressed the cooperation between Japanese and the Western powers during the allied punitive action (Figure 76). Although

---


123
Sino-Japanese War prints underscored the Westernization of Japanese troops (qualities invariably absorbed in the process of modernization, since at the time, the West defined the essence of civilization), the metaphor was less pronounced in images of the latter conflict with China. Instead, Boxer Rebellion images clearly showed Japanese troops fighting side by side with European troops on an equal basis and appearing naturally at ease in their newly found status as a regional power (Figure 77).

As with imagery from the Sino-Japanese War, the media portrayed Chinese as disorganized, wearing bright traditional clothing, and in various stages of losing


Figure 77: On Equal Terms with Europeans: “Major-General Fukushima’s detachment of soldiers advances with the allied troops towards Tientsin,” (artist unknown). Fukushima (1852-1919), one of Meiji Japan’s most celebrated military figures, rose to celebrity status after riding over 9,000 miles from Berlin to Vladivostock in 440 days in 1892-1893. This lithograph shows him (standing with binoculars) conferring with a British commander while other allied officers observe the field. From http://www.woodblockprint.com/os/itemhtml/ht529352.stm?529352, internet, accessed 17 March 2004.
battles. While every Boxer print examined depicted the Chinese in a negative light, the gross caricatures so prevalent in the imagery of the Sino-Japanese War were visibly lacking. While one reason for this is attributable to the aforementioned trend towards graphic realism, the results of the recent war may also have played an important role. Flush with confidence from the seemingly effortless victory over China, a growing sense of smug superiority gave birth to in many Japanese a condescending sense of pedantic charity towards Chinese (Figure 78). These feelings may have helped to tone down the harsher caricatures of the enemy during the Boxer Rebellion.

Whatever the reasons for the slight improvement in the portrayal of Chinese by Japanese artists, the viewer gets the
distinct impression that Boxer prints continued to highlight the modernity of the Japanese soldier. It is almost as if the enemy was not important—that drawing attention to them through caricatures detracted the viewer’s attention away from the Japanese. Even when the Chinese enemy became the central focus, as in one print, they were depicted skillfully and realistically, albeit fleeing from the inevitable advance of Western forces (Figure 79). In addition to the previously mentioned focus on Japanese soldiers working harmoniously with Western troops, the prints also reiterated the superiority of civilization over barbarianism. Moreover, the imagery unmistakably implied that Japan had become a central part of the modernity that was Western civilization. Both of these themes would reappear throughout the graphic media during the next period covering 1904-1931.
Chapter 5
1904-1931: Romanticizing the Past; Ignoring the Present

Victory over China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 imposed the mantle of regional leadership on Japan, and many Japanese as well as Western observers expected the newest addition to the club of modern nations to take an active role in civilizing Asia. As a result, interactions between the two countries steadily increased after the conflict had ended. Encompassing what Douglas Reynolds called a "golden decade" in Sino-Japanese relations, between 1896 and 1911, over 25,000 Chinese students traveled to Japan in order to learn the secrets of modernization from its recent victors. Reminiscent of Meiji Japan's earlier efforts to modernize, China's central and provincial governments sponsored overseas study as well as hired Japanese teachers to assist in the process. In addition to the promising outlook for relations between the two countries, Chinese embarked on the arduous task of replacing their withering imperial government during the same period. By the end of the 1920s, radical change had produced a China that was inherently different from what had existed at the turn of the century.

This chapter traces how the Japanese media, through graphic images published in magazines, presented the rapidly changing face of China to the Japanese public from 1904-1931. Deepening involvement between the two countries as well as Japanese interest in the ongoing process of political unification after the fall of the Qing dynasty manifested itself in increasing coverage of China, especially during the second decade of the twentieth century. Japan's entry into World War I on the side of the Allies provided the pretext for further political and economic gains on the mainland while improving technology enabled

photography to become the dominant means of graphically reporting the events as they occurred. While photography provided the Japanese media with the opportunity to portray the events of the times accurately, did it in fact do so? The following pages attempt to answer this basic question.

While signs of growing cultural exchange appeared promising for the development of improved relations between the two cultures, Japan’s increasing political and military presence in the region along with China’s own growing sentiments of nationalism dampened China’s enthusiasm for things Japanese. In the space of just over a decade, from 1905 to 1918, the presence of Japanese teachers in China and Chinese students in Japan diminished substantially. The number of Chinese students decreased from a high of 7,283 in 1906 to fewer than 3,000 in 1917. Moreover, by 1918, the number of Japanese teachers in China had dwindled to thirty-six from a peak of 1,000 in 1905.114 Japanese victory over the Russians in 1905, Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910, and its Twenty-one Demands made to a young Republic of China in 1915 only exasperated the growing suspicions of many Chinese that Japan had other than its expressed ulterior motives in mind in its dealings with the mainland. These feelings of ambivalence towards its neighbor help to explain why China increasingly turned directly to the West for guidance in modernizing after World War I.115

In spite of the growing signs of Chinese disappointment with its policies towards China, Japan continued to increase its political, economic, and cultural presence on the mainland. Its overreaching political goal was preventing any Western imperialist power from gaining a clear-cut military or economic dominance on the mainland; in doing so, many Japanese believed that providing the Far East with firm guidance would stabilize the region

115 Ibid., 16.
and thus provide a buffer from the West's aggressive overtures. An integral part of this plan included the development of economic possibilities in China's treaty ports and on the Korean peninsula. Well aware of the tenets of economic imperialism, Japanese leaders aggressively promoted mainland investments that would support Japan's rapidly industrializing economy. Indicators such as the value of assets, shipping tonnage, and expatriate population attest to the increase of the Japanese economic presence in Korea and especially China during the first three decades of the twentieth century.\footnote{Peter Duus et al., ed., \textit{The Japanese Informal Empire in China}, 3-9.}

In addition to China's hiring of teachers and advisors mentioned above, the Japanese government also took an active part in cultural exchange. By 1902, two cultural associations, the \textit{T"oa d"obunkai} (East Asia Common Culture Association) and the \textit{D"ojinkai} (Universal Benevolence Association) had formed in Japan.\footnote{For background on the \textit{T"oa d"obunkai} and its activities in Shanghai, see Douglas R. Reynolds, "Training Young China Hands: T"oa D"obun Shoin and its Precursors, 1886-1945" in Peter Duus et al., ed., \textit{Japan's Informal Empire in China}, 210-271. For more information on the \textit{D"ojinkai}, see Sophia Lee, "The Foreign Ministry's Cultural Agenda for China: The Boxer Indemnity," in \textit{Japan's Informal Empire in China}, 297-300; and Teow, \textit{Japanese Cultural Policy}, passim.} Both associations received state funding, had government bureaucrats on their boards of directors, and maintained close ties to the bureaucracy throughout their existences.\footnote{Although the \textit{T"oa d"obunkai} and its facilities in Shanghai lasted until 1945, its Tokyo school for Chinese students, the \textit{Tokyo D"obunshoin}, closed in 1922 owing to the lack of Chinese students. The \textit{D"ojinkai}'s four hospitals in China continued to function until they were closed and reorganized to support the war effort in 1937.} Aiming to promote the concept of pan-Asianism, the \textit{T"oa d"obunkai} strove to train Japanese students how to function economically and politically in China while the \textit{D"ojinkai} instructed Chinese students in public health and medicine. One of the more important legacies of these cultural associations was the volumes of information gathered on China. Part of the curriculum at the \textit{T"oa D"obunshoin}, \textit{T"oa d"obunkai}'s academy in Shanghai, involved student trips into the Chinese interior lasting from
one to three months. Over the years, these field trips resulted in voluminous amounts of data that covered all aspects of Chinese life. The association collated and published the students’ field reports, first for the Japanese government’s confidential reference, and then for public consumption starting in 1913.\footnote{Reynolds, “Training Young China Hands,” 241-247.}

News on conditions in contemporary China from various other sources was also making its way to Japan by the end of World War I. During that time, thirty-five Japanese-owned newspapers were being published in both Japanese and Chinese in sixteen cities across China.\footnote{Teow, \textit{Japan's Cultural Policy Toward China}, 14.} Like the cultural associations, these organizations also had government ties and many of them received direct as well as indirect funding from Japan.\footnote{For an examination of the Foreign Ministry’s efforts in “selling” itself and Japanese interests in China during the first two decades of the twentieth century, see Ōtani Tadashi, “Shinbun sōjū kara taigai senden e: Meiji, Taishōki no Gaimushō tai Chūgoku senden katsudō no henken,” \textit{Mediashikenkyū}, vol. 5 (1996): 71-97.} Another source of information on the contemporary situation in China was the growing amount of travel narratives written by Japanese writers, artists, businessmen, journalists, tourists, pilgrims, and scholars who visited the mainland during the prewar period. These personal recollections, numbering in the thousands, helped to create an image of China in the Japanese consciousness; that this emerging picture, for the most part, failed to reflect the political realities of a rapidly evolving prewar China is clearly supported by these travelogues. Instead of a picture of rising Chinese nationalist consciousness driven by anti-Japanese feelings (hai-nichi), two reflections came to dominate Japanese perceptions, one of an unchanging China of the past, steeped in the classics, and another, of a present-day China full of poverty, civil war, and generally lacking signs of modern civilization. As Joshua Fogel has noted, “... renewed contact, after centuries of relative isolation, led to manifold efforts to reintegrate ‘China’ into Japanese cultural life. Physical contact with the mainland not only
enabled this effort; it compelled it, for the unproblematic ‘China of the past’ that had lived so symbiotically within the body of ‘Japanese culture’ now had to be confronted by contemporary realities. And, reintegration never took place."122 This Japanese failure to "reintegrate" created a growing fracture between Japanese perceptions and the realities of modern-day China.

These disjointed views helped in shaping how the mass media graphically presented the concept of China to the Japanese public during the first three decades of the twentieth century. This visual message appeared to work on two premises. The first was that Japan and China had shared a long and harmonious relationship that the former had benefited from in many ways over the centuries. Pan-Asianists used this concept, as epitomized in the slogan dō bun dō shu (same race, same culture), to create the appearance of unity where little existed. Second, since Japan had modernized ahead of its neighbor by the beginning of the twentieth century, there was the implication that China should take it upon itself to accept the generous guidance offered by its former pupil. Doing so would allow China to arise out of a barbarous squalor imposed on it by Western imperialism. The corollary to this line of thought was that by realizing the elusive pan-Asiatic ideal, Japan and China together could rid Asia of the West’s oppression. In spite of the trend towards a deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations during the 1920s, the graphic images examined indicated that Japan’s commercial media continued to portray China in terms of a once great society that needed guidance from a now modern Japan. In doing so, the imagery created a picture of a benevolent, patient, and modern Japan in the process of doing what it could to assist its mainland neighbor. This

metaphor of Japanese "patience" would continue throughout the 1920s, finally giving way to a more critical view of China after the Manchurian incident of 1931.

The Imagery

As mentioned above, this as well as the following chapter focuses on magazine photographs in examining graphic images of China. Specifically, two monthly mass-consumption publications, Monthly Historical Photos (Rekishi shashin) and The Photographic Illustration (Shashin tsūshin) provided the bulk of the imagery examined. Monthly Historical Photos and The Photographic Illustration both fall into the category Japanese media historians refer to as taishū zasshi, or mass-consumer magazines. Targeting the lowest common denominator in Japanese society, publishers profited greatly from this type of publication by selling large quantities at low prices. Content offered a little of everything; photographs provided coverage of foreign and domestic political news, royal families around the world, sporting events, entertainment, disasters, technological breakthroughs, and views of different cultures.

Both these magazines enjoyed long publication runs, starting in the early Taishō period and lasting into the Shōwa era; in the case of Monthly Historical Photos, at least 359 issues over a twenty-nine year period were published—an impressive run for a monthly magazine, even by today's standards. While I also examined other sources of imagery


124 Photographic Illustration was founded in 1914 (Taishō 3) and I was able to verify that it lasted through at least issue 165, published in November 1927. Monthly Historical Photos also started publication in 1914 but enjoyed a much longer run, lasting until at least March 1943 (Shōwa 17). As I had very little success in finding copies of either of these magazines in Japanese libraries I used online library (NACSIS) and used-bookstore (www.kosho.or.jp) databases to estimate their print runs.
such as paintings, postcards, and textbook illustrations, they were mentioned for comparative purposes only. I did so since I worked under the premise that the Japanese commoner was exposed to images of China mostly via these *taishū zasshi*. Judging by distribution data published in the magazines themselves, this is a reasonable assumption since they sold in Japan’s outer territories and possessions (*gaichi*) as well as in most towns across the country.

For this chapter covering the 1904 to 1931 period, I examined 106 issues of *Monthly Historical Photos* (Figure 80) dating from July 1915 (issue 28) to July 1931 (issue 218), and twenty-six issues of *The Photographic Illustration* (Figure 81) dating from September 1914 (issue 5) to November 1927 (issue 165). Analyzing the images involved counting and categorizing each depiction of China or Chinese that appeared in the two magazines. “China” for this period included Manchuria in the northeast as well as Inner Mongolia.
(Naimōko) and Eastern Mongolia (Tōmōko). In addition to the classification criteria previously used in Chapters 3 and 4 (see Table 1), a column noting the number of neutral images that lacked depictions of Chinese people was also included since there was a proportionally large quantity of such photos. This “no-Chinese” category consisted primarily of scenes that showed Chinese or Japanese architecture in China (Figure 82) as well as images of Japanese and other foreigners on Chinese territory (Figure 83). I also noted the number of negative images that lacked depictions of Chinese in similar fashion (Figure 84).
Analysis reveals that *Monthly Historical Photos* and *Photographic Illustration*’s portrayals of China and Chinese from 1904 to 1931 displayed four distinctive characteristics. They were 1) an apparent lack of negative imagery combined with an overwhelming number of neutral portrayals, 2) a lack of Chinese people in depictions, 3) the common portrayal of Chinese as barbarous or backwards, and 4) the depiction of China in terms of a past grandeur.

First, the relative lack of negative representations immediately stood out upon examination of magazine content. Of 368 images rated, only fifty-nine (16%) earned a negative evaluation (Table 3). Further analysis revealed that nearly a third of all negative images also lacked depictions of Chinese, thus reducing the percentage of critical portrayals of actual Chinese people to less than 11%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3: Chinese Imagery, 1904-1931</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 83: Example of a neutral "no-Chinese" image. Captions in both English and Japanese explain that Japanese soldiers are arriving in the city of Tsinanfu. From issue #5 (May 1914) of *Photographic Illustration*.

Figure 84: Example of a negative "no-Chinese" image showing views of sacred buildings in Peking. From issue #53 (August 1917) of *Monthly Historical Photos*. 
The negative sampling consisted almost entirely of images classified as *caricatures*, with only one depiction falling under the *strange cultures and honor* designation (Figure 85).

Of the *caricatures*, twenty-three each highlighted the *barbarous/backwards* (Figure 86) and *romantic past* features (Figure 87) of the Chinese subjects. The remaining twelve images focused on the banditry/anti-foreign aspect in the visualization of China (Figure 88). In spite of classifying these fifty-eight *caricatures* as negative, numerous images could just as well have been categorized as neutral since the content of many were not overtly critical of China or Chinese (Figure 89). The reasoning for not rating them as such was the fact that as *caricatures*, they presented exaggerated or stereotypical views and failed to present a visual account that accurately represented the reality of China at the time.
Figure 88: Evidence of growing Sino-Japanese friction in the 1920s. The poster, which reads "tainichi keisai sekkai," calls for a break in economic relations with Japan. From issue #189 (February 1929) of Monthly Historical Photos.

Figure 87: Example of a romantic past caricature. While "A View of the Eastern Mongolia" is captioned in both Japanese and English, the Japanese continues with a pedantic explanation on the vast land's potential to both Chinese and Japanese in their aspirations for peaceful development. From issue #189 (February 1929) of Monthly Historical Photos.

Figure 89: Example of a romantic past image not overly-critical of Chinese. Monthly Historical Photos ran a graphic series during the 1920s and 1930s called "Mansenmōko yūran" (Sightseeing in Korea, Manchuria, and Mongolia). This photo titled "daughters on the way to a festival" was typical of the genre that emphasized an idyllic image of country life on the continent. From issue #192 (May 1929) of Monthly Historical Photos.

Figure 90: Chinese in Western clothing. When magazines graphically presented Chinese in non-critical terms, they often did so in situations and clothes that most Japanese could identify with readily. Pictured here are Chinese female athletes attending the preliminary rounds of the Far Eastern Track and Field Meet. From issue #206 (July 1930) of Monthly Historical Photos.
Even without categorizing many negative images as neutral, the large number of neutrally rated representations further accentuated the lack of imagery critical of Chinese. As Table 3 shows, 293 of 368 images (79.6%) were neutral. The typical photograph in this category showed Chinese dressed in a manner and in situations that most Japanese viewers could relate to from their everyday lives (Figure 90). Portraits or photographs of Chinese military leaders and politicians, usually of those who enjoyed at least some amount of political or financial backing from Japanese sources, also were prevalent among depictions classified as neutral (Figure 91). While many neutral images were just that, attempts to depict China or Chinese in an apparently objective manner, the high percentage of such portrayals was deceiving since over 56% (165 of 293) of them lacked any actual depictions of Chinese.

This second characteristic of the period’s imaging of China, the paucity of Chinese subjects in purported timely views of China, is startling; yet, as the viewer scans through issue after issue of *Monthly Historical Photos* and *Photographic Illustration*, it is surprisingly easy to overlook the fact that China is the topic of such imagery. The photographs leave the reader with the

---

124 Even if the visual aspects of such depictions were ambiguous in highlighting the main topic, the accompanying headlines invariably focused the reader's attention. Often used titles included "Shina no bōdō" (China Disturbance/Violence), "Shina dōran" (China
strong image that Chinese were not an integral part of what the country was experiencing during the period. Instead, the impression is that of a land dominated by foreigners from various nations, and Japan in particular. Of the 165 neutral “no-Chinese” images, over 45% (75 of 165) were of Japanese soldiers or politicians. Typical photographs included depictions of troops landing on the mainland to quell disturbances or protect Japanese citizens (Figure 92) as well as scenes of Japanese expatriates enjoying a traditional Japanese lifestyle overseas (Figure 93).

While publishers and editors may have intended to portray China in this distorted fashion for hidden ulterior reasons, the evidence from these two magazines suggests otherwise. In the sampling of images, enough objective photographs depicted the reality of the times and allowed the Japanese viewer, if willing, to construct a relatively accurate picture of the contemporary situation on the continent (Figure 94). This fact, along with the relatively unrestricted nature of Japanese Disturbance), and “Shina senrari” (China fighting/upheavals). See Monthly Historical Photos, 1 August 1925, 145; 1 June 1928, 180; and 1 September 1930, 208.
censorship during the first half of the 1920s, points to a matter-of-fact attitude towards picturing the news by those in charge of graphically presenting China to Japan. Reporting the reality of the situation rather than creating propaganda appears to have been the goal for at least those managing *Monthly Historical Photos* and *Photographic Illustration*. If replies to readers' comments were indicative of editorial policies, then it was apparent that accurate reporting was a magazine goal. One reader stated that “Aren’t there too many pictures of the military and politically related issues?” He continues by asking, “... Could you [*Monthly Historical Photos*] decrease or omit the [current events] type of photos printed in the newspapers?” The editor replied decisively. “We do not believe that we print too many photographs of military and political issues. While newspapers and *Monthly Historical Photos* both print photographs of important current events, we differ in that our publication takes the longer, more permanent view, rather than the near-sighted perspective of the newspapers.”

125 Until at least the Manchurian incident of 1931, *Monthly Historical Photos’* graphic content appears to have supported this statement.

---

125 Editor's reply in, “Okujō tei” (Roof-top garden), *Monthly Historical Photos*, 1 July 1925,
Classifying the Japanese "no-Chinese" depictions gave further credence to the editor’s statements quoted above. Of the seventy-five images portraying Japanese, forty-one (54.6%) were categorized as courage and discipline (Figure 95), twenty-seven (36%) as technological superiority (Figure 96), six (8%) as survival against nature (Figure 97), and five (6.6%) as altruism (Figure 98). Besides emphasizing martial aspects of the Japanese character, the imagery also revealed a remarkable consistency in graphic presentation of Japanese over time. When compared to the woodblock prints from the Sino-Japanese War, images from the 1920s breakdown in a similar fashion (Table 4).

**Table 4: Comparative Japanese Image Values (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1904-1931 Images</th>
<th>Sino-Japanese War prints</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Courage and discipline</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological superiority</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survival against nature</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altruism</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 95: Example of a courage and discipline image. The photograph shows the arrival ceremony of Japanese troops in Peking. From issue #169 (July 1927) of *Monthly Historical Photos*.

As with previous Japanese image classifications, some portrayals, particularly those that depicted courage and discipline as well as technological superiority, fell under multiple categories.

number 144.
In both periods, 58.5% of the war prints and 54.6% of the later period photographs fell under the *courage and discipline* category. Although prints categorized as *total dominance* and *heroic poise* images were numerous during the Sino-Japanese War, it is predictable that they would not appear in the latter period when Japan was at peace with China. There was a noticeable percentage increase, from 17.6% to 36%, in the number of *technological superiority* images during the 1904-1931 period. Again, this is to be expected owing to the increasing mechanization of Japan’s military during the inter-war period. In spite of the growing presence of machines in the imagery, it is interesting to note that the symbols of technological advancement such as field artillery and warships generally remained the same in both periods (Figure 99).

The *survival against nature* category equaled 8% of the total for both periods. As with the *technological superiority* category,
images from both periods were alike, with the Manchurian winter depicted as the Japanese soldier’s antagonist (Figure 100). In many of these latter photographs, symbols of technology such as trucks or ships dominate the visual space, giving the impression that man and technology are united together against the elements. Finally, the number of altruism depictions also increased from less than one percent to 6.6% during the latter period. Altruism images, of all the just-mentioned categories, underwent the greatest visual change between the two periods. While war prints depicted scenes of charity towards the Chinese enemy by Japanese soldiers (see Figure 16 in Chapter 1), photographs in the following period highlighted the activities of the Japanese Red Cross instead. Moreover, rather than depicting its nurses and doctors in action tending to patients, pictures usually showed them posing in group photographs as they toured in Japan and overseas (Figure 101).

This type of presentation strongly suggests a concerted effort to portray Japanese in a certain positive light. While the method of portrayal was different, this was also the case with the altruism prints from the

---

127 In the sampling, there were an additional seventeen photographs of the Japanese Red Cross making the rounds in countries other than China. It is easy to infer that promoting the organization in European countries, where the other photographs were taken, was considered more important than doing so in China.
Sino-Japanese War, where they played a role in convincing the West that Japan, as a civilized nation, naturally treated its defeated enemy humanely.

When one takes into account the differences between war and peacetime depictions of Japanese as well as the growing influence of technology in both the imaging process and...
Japanese mastery of technology played a central role in the imaging of China. However, as the long-running serial of articles on technological advances in *Monthly Historical Photos* demonstrates, China was not a necessarily an essential component in portraying Japanese greatness in relation to its mastery of technology.128 This appears less true when dealing with other less tangible qualities of modern civilization such as courage and discipline, which the Japanese media invariably juxtaposed to the following two characteristics used graphically to define China from 1904 to 1931.

The third notable attribute of the imagery presented by *Monthly Historical Photos* and *Photographic Illustration* during this period was the portrayal of Chinese as a backwards people. As mentioned previously, over 38% (23 of 59) of all negative images fell under the *barbarism/backwardness* subcategory of the *caricatures* classification. In contrast to the Sino-Japanese War prints, the latter period's imagery highlighted the backwardness rather than the barbarous aspect of Chinese (Figure 102). Although a subtle distinction, I argue that the term *backwardness* is less derogatory than *barbarism*, since the latter strongly implies connotations of irrational violence.

---

128 These articles, lasting over nearly the entire run of the magazine, covered an incredibly eclectic range of technological topics such as the history and development of the telephone, pencil, automobile, factory assemblies, metal production, and silk processing. See *Monthly Historical Photos*, passim.
which was and still is one of the purported antitheses of civilized society. Even in the few cases when shown, images highlighted the results of rather than the propagation of violence, such as the destruction of Japanese property (Figure 103). In this sense, the Japanese imaging of Chinese improved slightly during the first three decades of the twentieth century.

A retrospective view of China also played a role in this softening of its graphic imaging during the period. This fourth and final characteristic of Chinese imagery, classified under the romantic past category, also contained twenty-three images, or nearly forty percent of all negative depictions. Most romantic past photographs portrayed China in terms of its impressive historical cultural or vast natural legacy. Typical of the genre were stunning nature scenes and dramatic views of the Great Wall or Peking’s Forbidden Palace (Figure 104).

The latter type of image was more prevalent and seemingly attempted to impress on the viewer that China was a land with a rich cultural legacy (Figure 105).
That nearly all of these cultural-relic images were devoid of human figures also has given this viewer the impression that the image-makers were making a concerted effort at relegating Chinese greatness to the past; the previously mentioned imagery of Japanese technological superiority especially supports this notion by clearly pointing to Japan as the path leading towards future Asian glory.

Although they did not occupy a central place in the overall imagery of China, it is worth mentioning that twelve of the fifty-nine negative images (20.3%) fell into the bandits/anti-foreign category of the caricature classification. Most of these photographs focused on the anti-foreign aspect of the category and, in keeping with the lack of depictions of active violence mentioned above, they focused on the immediate after-effects of such actions (Figure 106). Although these images further support the idea that editors at least attempted to cover the news in an

Figure 105: Example of a romantic past image that highlights China's cultural legacy. The caption's title reads "The magnificent view of the Great Wall." A brief explanation of the wall's size and history follows. From issue #173 (November 1927) of Monthly Historical Photos.

Figure 106: Example of anti-Japanese imagery. The caption reads "Bombing incident at the Japanese consulate in Shanghai." In spite of the in-depth description of the actions of a Chinese national, the writer offers no possible reasons for the failed bombing attempt. Fragments of the bomb and unidentified Japanese examining the scene are pictured. From issue #160 (November 1926) of Monthly Historical Photos.
unbiased journalistic fashion, they also seldom, if ever, delved into the reasons for Chinese displays of antipathy towards Japanese. Moreover, the conspicuous absence of perpetrators in the imagery also accentuated the previously mentioned tendency to omit Chinese figures in depictions. Again, this probably reflected the situation of the times rather than a concerted propaganda campaign. Joshua Fogel makes the convincing point that civil as well as cultural reasons accounted for this phenomenon. He notes that as the Japanese presence on the mainland increased in particular areas, their visiting compatriots from home tended to increasingly focus their attention on those same areas, such as southern Manchuria. Although the endemic disturbances that plagued China failed, for the most part, to deter these travelers from coming, their recollections reflected an overwhelming interest in the self, rather than the other.129 As the political situation in China worsened throughout the 1930s, the ability as well as the desire to interact with Chinese other also continued to decline.130

Table 5: Comparative Chinese-Korean Image Values (%), 1904-1931

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Korean Images (83 total)</th>
<th>Chinese Images (368 total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>negative</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neutral</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>positive</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neutral no human</td>
<td>14.45</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>negative no human</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While not within the parameters of this study, it is interesting to note how Monthly Historical Photos and Photographic Illustration portrayed Korea and Koreans during the same period. Comparisons between the Korean and Chinese images reveals that both patterns of neutrally portraying as well as omitting Chinese figures was actually greater when

129 Fogel, Literature of Travel, 276-277.
130 Ibid., 277.
applied to the graphic depiction of Koreans (Table 5). In particular, the percentage of neutrally rated Korean images surpassed those of Chinese by over ten percentage points. Furthermore, there was a higher percentage of Korean images lacking Korean figures (56.6%) than with depictions of China (44.5%). This suggests that magazine editors were applying the same process used in visualizing China to portray Korea, but to a more extreme degree.

This comes as no surprise considering the contemporary state of affairs on the peninsula, particularly after the annexation of Korea in 1910 and the brutal suppression of the March First movement of 1919.

A final note concerning positive depictions of Chinese helps to increase our insight into the way Monthly Historical Photos and Photographic Illustration visually presented China to its primarily Japanese readership. There were only sixteen positive depictions of Chinese equaling just over 4% of the total number of images examined. The typical example showed various Chinese military leaders in either portrait form or Chinese troops parading for

---

131 As has been often noted with woodblock prints published during the Meiji era, I surmised that the inclusion of English captions alongside photographs in both magazines indicated intent to target a foreign audience. Monthly Historical Photos stopped regularly using English captions sometime between August 1919 (issue 76) and December 1924 (issue 137), and Photographic Illustration did so with issue 140 in October 1925.
Chinese and Japanese officials (Figure 107). The fact that most, if not all, positive representations portrayed Chinese who in someway were enjoying Japanese political and financial assistance at the time supports the general tendency of magazine editors to avoid miring its readership too deeply in the truth. The quantity and quality of positive Chinese depictions, added to the overwhelming number of neutral portrayals, belied the reality of increasing tensions in Sino-Japanese relations during the period, especially towards its end as the 1920s came to a close.
Chapter 6
1931-1937: The Misguided Chinese

This chapter continues tracing Monthly Historical Photos' graphic imaging of China and Chinese from 1931 to the outbreak of open war in 1937. As the 1920s ended, rising Chinese nationalistic feelings coupled with escalating anti-Japanese sentiment created an increasingly volatile political situation in both China as well as Japan. Although the Guomindang made considerable territorial gains by incorporating much of China's prosperous southern and eastern coastal regions during the Northern Expedition, its hold on power was precarious. While its falling out with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1928 and continuing pressures from various regional warlords prevented Chiang Kai-shek from committing Guomindang forces to aggressive military confrontation with Japan, ever-widening economic boycotts on Japanese goods created havoc with Japanese business interests in China.

In reaction, the Japanese military, especially elements of the Kwantung Army stationed in Manchuria, progressively became more frustrated with the worsening state of affairs and their calls for action became louder. In June 1928, the assassination of the powerful northern Chinese warlord, Zhang Zuolin (1875-1928), by a group of Kwantung Army officers failed to provoke open hostilities that would have provided Japan with a justifiable pretext to increase and consolidate control on the continent. Furthermore, although initially expected to serve as a Japanese puppet warlord, Zhang's son and successor, Zhang Xueliang (1898-2001), unexpectedly proved to be a formidable enemy by successfully consolidating his southern Manchurian power base and pledging allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek in the fall of 1930. This alliance between the two men allowed the Nationalists to focus their efforts on disrupting Japanese objectives in China by instigating economic
boycotts, agitating anti-Japanese demonstrations, and being intransigent in most matters when dealing with the Japanese at the negotiating table. In addition to the ongoing turmoil in China, the perceived acquiescence of Japanese diplomats in accepting lower than expected ratios for auxiliary naval craft at the London Naval Conference in the spring of 1930 further exasperated the Japanese military establishment.132

These circumstances culminated in the Manchurian Incident (Manshū jihen) of September 18, 1931.133 Although the incident, which involved the bombing of railroad tracks north of the Manchurian city of Mukden, was not a major event in itself, it provided the catalyst for the subsequent Japanese takeover of Manchuria and other Chinese territories.134 By December, the Kwantung army had taken over much of southern Manchuria and controlled the capitals of all three Manchurian provinces. The Kwantung army’s continuing actions independent of the civilian authority in Tokyo, the League of Nations’ initial sanctioning of the suppression of “bandits” and other “lawless elements” (while at the same time advocating restraint), and the militarization of the Japanese government as demonstrated by the collapse of successive civilian cabinets, led to the increasing scope of Japanese territorial gains. By

132 Hamaguchi Osachi’s cabinet accepted a compromise that limited the Imperial Japanese Navy to a 10:10:6 ratio in eight-inch-gun cruisers but gave it the desired 70% ratio for other cruisers and destroyers as well as parity in submarines. Given the global situation of the times, hardliners in the Navy generally accepted that attaining parity across the board was unrealistic but this did not prevent them from portraying the arms agreement as a serious insult to Japan’s honor.

133 Information on the Manchurian Incident and its immediate aftermath was collated from Jansen, Modern Japan, 576-590; Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990), 388-396; Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 95-106; and Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, 1980 ed., s.v. “Manchurian Incident” and “Manchukuo.”

134 A group of Kwantung army officers, with the tacit approval of staff officers in Tokyo, concocted and carried out the plot to bomb a part of the vital north-south railway. The Kwantung army leadership blamed the attack on Chinese troops and used it as an excuse to “stabilize” the situation, which resulted in only minor damage.
the end of 1932, all of Manchuria was in Japanese control and the Kwantung army had created the new nation of Manchukuo out of the conquered territory.

In May of 1933, Chinese forces sued for peace and were granted a humiliating truce in which the region surrounding Peking became a demilitarized zone that came under the de facto control of Japanese forces. Over the next four years, an unstable peace existed between Japanese and Chinese forces as Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists and Chinese communists fought each other. The civil war was extremely costly in both human lives and resources, and atrocities by both sides became more common as the fighting continued over the years. By 1936, many Chinese leaders were beginning to lose hope of ever seeing the country unite under one banner in order to oust Japanese troops from China. These feelings came to head on December 9, 1936 when Zhang Xueliang dramatically kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek.

Far from the typical palace coup, Zhang Xueliang and his supporters aimed to convince Chang Kai-shek that his vendetta against the Chinese communists was severely damaging the nation—that the Guomindang and CCP should put aside their differences in order to join forces and fight the Japanese together. Following intense negotiations, Zhang Xueliang released Chiang Kai-shek from custody on December 25 after the Nationalist’s leader issued a verbal agreement that he would reevaluate the situation. Although no lasting alliances were forged as a result of this episode, Chang was given notice that many Chinese leaders now expected concerted action against Japanese rather than against each other. Over the next few months, an unsteady truce came into being that allowed both Guomindang and communist forces to regroup.

As events unfolded in 1937, the Japanese government, now deeply infiltrated by the military establishment, hotly debated Japan’s China policy. Should the status quo on the continent be maintained or should, as many officers argued, an expansion of territory be
undertaken in order to gain more precious natural resources as well as protect Manchukuo and other Japanese possessions from potential Soviet and Chinese aggression? Moreover, as these general developments were occurring in both countries, particular tensions continued to build within the demilitarized zone around Peking. Although technically demilitarized, the Tangü Truce of 1933 allowed the Chinese to garrison the region with peacekeeping units while the Boxer Protocol of 1901 stipulated that Japanese troops could conduct training maneuvers in the area. Given the atmosphere of antipathy that existed between the two peoples at the time, the close proximity of Japanese and Chinese soldiers was bound to provoke trouble. The spark that ignited the Second Sino-Japanese War (Nitchū sensō) occurred on July 7, 1937 when Chinese and Japanese troops clashed several times at the Marco Polo Bridge, ten miles west of Peking. Like the previous Manchurian Incident, the incidents at the bridge were minor in themselves but they unleashed a string of events that escalated into open war between China and Japan.

These beginnings of what rapidly expanded to full-scale hostilities between China and Japan, although undeclared, mark the limits of this chapter and study's inquiry as well. Once war becomes an openly recognized fact of life, as it did for the Japanese public after the Marco Polo Incident, the way the media gathers and presents information invariably alters. Peacetime standards of objectivity are bent or discarded for the sake of security and the state invariably becomes involved in propagandizing its cause and objectives. As impartiality becomes less of a goal for the media, it invariably attempts to rationalize war to an audience who in turn usually seeks reassurance that its government is doing the right thing. The creation of the good-other/bad-other and the liberation of the former is one of the oldest justifications for war, and Japanese graphic depictions of China reflected this trend from the late 1920s onward.
Until my research reached the point when open hostilities commenced in 1937, I worked under the assumption that peacetime balances had been in place to prevent the broad misrepresentation of what actually was happening in China during the period. This ability to examine how the Japanese media portrayed China more openly and with fewer of the constraints associated with wartime controls, thus providing a more accurate picture of how Japanese actually saw Chinese, was the primary reason that I used the Marco Polo Incident as the cut-off point for this study.

The Imagery

Since Photographic Illustration ceased publication during the middle 1920s, the bulk of this chapter’s sampling came from Monthly Historical Photos, which continued publishing until the early 1940s. Thirty-two issues of Monthly Historical Photos ranging from number 220 (September 1931) to 291 (August 1937) were examined. Although this chapter covered fewer magazine issues (32 versus 120) over a much shorter time period than the previous chapter, the number of images dealing with China from 1931-1937 increased nearly 24% (from 368 to 456). This reflected the Japanese public and media’s intense interest in events as they unfolded in China once the fighting had started. Only hours after the event, the nation’s leading newspapers began reporting the incident early and often; the Osaka Asahi Shinbun’s September 19 front-page headline read, “Japanese and Chinese forces collide at Kitadaiei, north of Mukden—violent fighting reported.”135 By the end of the year the Asahi had sent at least thirty-three special correspondents and another major paper, the Mainichi Shinbun, had dispatched fifty reporters to the scene.136

136 For a summary of the comprehensive nature of the Japanese media’s coverage of the
Aside from the increased graphic coverage of events in China, the accompanying outflow of jingoist support for the Kwantung Army’s actions by most Japanese seemed to have little of the expected influence on how *Monthly Historical Photos* portrayed Chinese. Compared to the previous period’s images, the magazine demonstrated a remarkable consistency as well as some interesting differences in its presentation of China and Chinese from 1931 to 1937 (Table 6). The number of neutral depictions from both periods remained the same at 80%. This implies that editors were still interested in portraying Chinese in a non-polemic and objective manner. In contrast, the decrease in negative depictions from 16% to 9.5% combined with the increase of positive images from 4% to 10.5% suggests that publishers were making a concerted effort, through graphic euphemisms, to avoid reporting accurately the violent turn of events on the continent. This differed greatly from the post-September 19 trend towards verbal deprecations of China noted by Louise Young in popular magazines such as *Kingu*, *Shōnen Kurabu* (Young boys’ club), and *Kōdan kurabu* (Storytelling club).\(^{137}\)

---

\(^{137}\) Ibid., 98-100.
Reminiscent of the first Sino-Japanese War, these print magazines often focused on the apparent Chinese soldier’s ability to vanish from the battlefield with alacrity. Although the repetitive use of verbs such as “bolting,” “escaping,” “running off,” and “hiding” to describe the enemy action must have been monotonous to the reader at times, magazines occasionally demonstrated a literary flair for turning phrases. The expression, “fleeing pell-mell like scattering spider babies” (kumo no ko o chirasu yō ni nigemadotte imasu), an apparent favorite of Shōnen Kurabu, a print-oriented magazine targeting schoolboys, used a wry sense of humor to further dehumanize the Chinese. In addition to the sudden increase in printed censure of Chinese in terms of cowardice and venality, these magazines readily utilized the good Chinese/bad Chinese paradigm in order to justify Japanese actions overseas. One Shōnen Kurabu article emphasized the unambiguous nature of Japan’s mission (later to elevated a “righteous” level) by quoting a Japanese schoolboy’s explanation of the situation in China. “Japan isn’t fighting all of China. Just the evil soldiers.”

While Monthly Historical Photos occasionally used print magazine terms such as ryōmin to describe the “good people” in photograph captions, the tendency to focus on “bad” Chinese, especially during the first few months after the incident occured, was more prevalent. Photograph captions descriptively utilized multiple combinations of the word “zoku,” meaning burglar or bandit, such as bazoku (mounted bandits), hizoku (outlaw), and zokugun (rebel army/rebels) to reiterate the lawlessness of those Chinese who chose to oppose Japan. Characteristically, copy read, “Chinese army regulars put on civilian clothes and dare to

138 Japanese reports usually failed to mention Chiang Kai-shek’s widely publicized policy of nonresistance as well as his ordering of Zhang Xueliang to move his forces south of the Great Wall in order to avoid further confrontations with Japanese forces.

139 Young, 96-97.

140 Ibid., 99.
commit acts of violence—photograph of one such guerilla [ben-i-tai] captured by our soldiers (Figure 108).” Examination of the published images shows that editors chose to interpret Chinese use of guerilla warfare as cowardly and “unsportsmanlike”—and avoided indicating the actual extent of anti-Japanese sentiment (hainichi). Although this consistent construction of a negative Chinese image invariably underscored various positive aspects of the Japanese soldier’s character, on the rare occasion photographs did depict the troops in an ambiguous light.

But, during the height of the media-inspired war fever, graphic presentations were usually those images that emphasized the Japanese military’s complete dominance, in terms of physical as well as moral force, over the rebels (Figure 109). In the photograph, two Chinese “guerillas” are kneeling with hands tied behind their backs and are wearing ammunition cartridge belts—as if to prove conclusively to the viewer that these men are indeed vile specimens.

The view of a uniformed Japanese soldier kneeling next to the captives

---

141 Monthly Historical Photos, 1 March 1932, number 226.
142 Young, 97.
with an intense expression on his face suggests deep contempt for the Chinese prisoners.
The ammunition belts and hardened look of defiance by at least one of the prisoners probably
made it difficult for the Japanese viewer to sympathize greatly with the Chinese captives.

An example of the latter type of depiction shows a Japanese soldier in a situation
compromising the civilized image that the Japanese government and media had labored so
long to project since the beginning of the Meiji period (Figure 110). Here, a soldier, with bayoneted rifle
 leveled, stands watch over a Chinese army regular
 squatting in apparent uneasiness on a sidewalk in
 Shanghai. The caption explains that the “insolent
and reprehensible” (furachina) Chinese soldier, who
has murdered (satsugai) three Japanese soldiers, is
about to be executed. The expressed words’
matter-of-fact attitude towards what appears to be an
impending summary execution suggests a natural
reaction towards the sequence of events—if a Chinese
soldier murders a Japanese soldier, then he will die.
The editor’s choice of the word satsugai also is
interesting since it carries stronger ethical
connotations of illegality than the generic verb, korosu,
which means to kill. The implication that resistance to Japanese aggression was futile as
well as illegal provides the viewer with a rare look into the mindset of those Japanese who

143 Monthly Historical Photos, 1 March 1932, number 226. The photograph’s full caption
read, “Waga hei sanmei o satsugai shitaru furashi na shins no seikihei ga, wagagun no te ni
toraware yūsatsu seraruru chokuzen no shashin de aru.”
later came to see the war in China as a righteous crusade. After open hostilities with China began in 1937, this kind of rationale became much more entrenched; but it is surprising to see such powerful imagery in early 1932, since at the time many Japanese political leaders still valued maintaining a positive national image with the West, and Japan had just recently signed the Geneva Peace Convention of 1927.

In spite of these signs of growing hostility towards Chinese, Monthly Historical Photos' previous tendency to portray China and Chinese in a non-negative manner actually increased between 1931 and 1937. As table six shows, the combined total of neutral and positive depictions grew by nearly 7% (84% versus 90.5%). In addition to the significant decrease of negative images (over 40%), the type of negative depictions also reinforced both previously mentioned styles of print and graphic portrayals of Chinese. Even as captions were becoming more caustic, photographs continued to omit Chinese from scenes supposedly about Chinese (Table 7). I applied the term "no-Chinese" to these types of images that depicted scenes of China but failed to portray any actual Chinese human figures in them. The number of "no-Chinese" images increased over 33% (from 184 to 278) in the 1931 to 1937 period. Given this trend, it was predictable that the negative "no-Chinese" and neutral "no-Chinese" categories also experienced increases (2.7% and 7.5% respectively); but the
positive “no-Chinese” classification unexpectedly saw the most dramatic change, increasing from zero images in the earlier period to thirty-one (62.5% of all positive depictions) in the latter period.

While the negative “no-Chinese” depictions of both periods fell into the same two classifications, romantic past and banditry/anti-Japanese, the ratio of images in each category changed drastically over time. Prior to the Manchurian Incident, fifteen out of nineteen (78.9%) of these images focused on China’s storied past or impressive scenery while only four (21.1%) depicted the effects of anti-Japanese violence. After the Manchurian Incident, editors of Monthly Historical Photos chose to highlight the destructive effects of “rebels” and “bandits” by showing scenes of damaged buildings and bridges. Sixty-six percent of the fifteen images examined depicted such scenes while only 33% classified as romantic past images. Furthermore, photographs displaying the captured weapons, regalia, and supplies of the Chinese rebels added a new dimension to the banditry/anti-Japanese category that largely was missing during the 1904-1931 period (Figure 111). Therefore, while the decrease in percentage as well as real number of negative “no-Chinese” images suggests an improvement in the portrayal of China during the latter period, actual imagery content implies otherwise.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁴ As a percentage of total images, negative “no Chinese” depictions decreased from 5.16% in
Analysis of all negative images from the period confirms that there was a changing focus on what editors perceived to be wrong with the Chinese (Table 8). As with the negative “no-Chinese” images mentioned above, the transformation from barbarian to bandit was the most pronounced transformation in the negative Chinese category. Comparing figures from the two periods shows that images classified as barbarian decreased from 39% to 7%, while banditry/anti-Japanese depictions increased from 20% to over 60%. While there were undoubtedly many causes for this gradual “evolution” in the Japanese imaging of China during the 1930s, two reasons come to the forefront. First, the growth of modern industries in cities such as Shanghai and other treaty ports dotting the country’s coastline made it more difficult to argue convincingly that China was still uncivilized. Moreover, most Japanese could clearly observe this dynamic industrial growth from afar since magazines such as Monthly Historical Photos often graphically lauded this economic expansion—again, a predictable reaction considering the large amount of Japanese investments entering China during the first three decades of the twentieth century (Figure 112). Second, Japan’s growing interests in China, particularly with Manchukuo after 1932, also created the need to

---

Table 8: Negative Chinese Image Breakdown, 1904-1937

![Bar chart showing image breakdown]

---

1904-1931 to 3.28% in the 1931-1937 period.

foster an image of friendly cooperation between the two countries; given the rising anti-Japanese feeling during the 1910s and 1920s, the media’s recourse to the good-Chinese/bad-Chinese metaphor provided a rational explanation that helped to justify Japan’s aggressive military actions on the continent.

The remaining negative images fell under the romantic past and strange cultures categories. The decrease of romantic past depictions from 40% to 30% indicated a slight editorial shift from a historical focus to a contemporary one in China. This comes as little surprise in light of Japan’s growing presence in China as well as increasing tensions in Sino-Japanese relations; given the volatile situation after the Manchurian Incident, most Japanese wanted to hear about what was going on in present-day China. A subtle change in the content of romantic past depictions also reflected this heightened Japanese interest in the contemporary state of affairs. The transformation of photographs that had previously depicted scenes of generic Chinese panoramas and ruins into images of notable historic...
Manchu sites in Manchukuo after 1931 is revealing since it further suggested a conscious effort by editors to rally support for a "Japanese China" (Figure 113). These kinds of images also reinforced the fact that Japan supported the "good" Chinese—in this case, those from Manchukuo; they also implied that Japan was justified in helping rid China of "bad" Chinese.

In addition to the content of negative Chinese depictions, the change in the neutral "no-Chinese" category also supports the existence of a subtle deterioration in the Chinese image during the 1930s. While the increase in percentage as well as actual number of neutral depictions implies a slight positive trend in portraying China, the noticeable rise in neutral "no Chinese" images shows that in spite of the additional coverage, *Monthly Historical Photos* was portraying actual Chinese less often than the magazine did in the 1910s and 1920s (Table 9). During the 1931-1937 period, over 63% of all neutral depictions lacked images of Chinese; when measured against the absolute number of all images (456), the figure still exceeded 50%. Moreover, the large number of neutral images that focused on Japanese rather than Chinese vividly reiterated the point that the editors of *Monthly Historical Photos* were more interested in depicting Japanese in China than showing the actual conditions of Chinese in their own land. The percentage of neutral "no-Chinese" depictions featuring

*Table 9: "No Chinese" Images—Percentage Comparisons, 1904-1937*
Japanese in place of Chinese increased from 45.5% during 1904-1937, to 90% in the 1930s. Even when calculated as a part of the total number of depictions examined, the trend towards non-representation of Chinese was still high; while 20% of the 368 images classified in the former period featured Japanese, by the 1930s over 45% of the 456 images examined omitted Chinese.

In addition to negative and neutral “no-Chinese” depictions, positive “no-Chinese” images increased from none in the earlier period to thirty-one during 1931-1937. While the large increase in this type of portrayal is worthy of note, it is the content that once again catches the viewer’s attention. Of the forty-eight positive images, thirty-one fell into the “no-Chinese” category; of these images, thirty (96.7%) dealt with either the newly created country of Manchukuo or the accouterments of its royal head of state, Henry Puyi (Figure 114). The positive depictions (both with and without Chinese) that Monthly Historical Photos chose to publish were very much in harmony with the Japanese media blitz that followed the creation of Manchukuo. In efforts to validate the tenuous legality of its creation as well as to encourage emigration, Japan’s publishing and film industry inundated the public with photographs, articles, books, movies, and news reels aimed at convincing the world that Manchukuo and its citizens were

---

146 Henry Puyi (1906-1967), also known as the “Last Emperor” of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), was installed as Emperor of Manchukuo by the Kwantung Army in March 1934.
This was the impression that *Monthly Historical Photos* clearly attempted to portray with its selection of positive photographs that actually depicted Chinese during this period (Figure 115).

In place of rendering Chinese in photographs concerning China, *Monthly Historical Photos* consistently chose to depict Japanese. As shown above in Table 7, over 60% of all 1931-1937 examined images were "no-Chinese" depictions. Of these 278 photographs, over 75% portrayed Japanese—a nearly 30% increase from the 1904-1931 period. Even when taken from the total amount of photographs analyzed, the number of images that highlighted Japanese rather than Chinese still surpassed 45%. This contrasted to 20% of all depictions prior to 1931. These numbers show that the trend to omit Chinese by the Japanese media increased as tensions between the two countries deepened over time. Including in the comparison images from the Sino-Japanese War and Boxer Rebellion, where over 95% of all depictions portrayed Japanese, suggests that the publishing industry often saw the rendering of Chinese in scenes of China as a means of highlighting and validating the Japanese character, especially when at war with the country.

---

147 For more on the selling of Manchukuo, see Young, *Japan's Total Empire*; and High, *The Imperial Screen*, passim.
During the 1931-1937 period, *Monthly Historical Photos* chose to highlight *courage and discipline, technological superiority, total dominance, and survival against nature* as representative of the Japanese character (Table 10). While there was variation between periods, the data in Table 10 shows the Japanese media was remarkably consistent in portraying Japanese as courageous or disciplined. *Courage and discipline* depictions comprised over 50% of all images from 1894-1937, and while there was a slight decrease during the 1904-1931 period, the number returned to Sino-Japanese War levels during the 1930s. This tendency to portray Japanese in terms of bravery, selflessness, loyalty, and patriotism corresponded well with culture’s long samurai legacy; the message’s durability and longevity during the prewar period attests to the success of the government and media’s efforts to create a national identity by inculcating such values in the general population.

Another category that deserves mention is the *technological superiority* classification. While the percentages of technologically related images for the first and third periods were similar at 15% and 17.6% respectively, there was a sharp increase to 36% during 1904-1931. The Meiji founding fathers’ perceptions of technology as one of the central attributes of modernity helps to explain its overall emphasis throughout the period in question, but what of
the sudden prominence given to the subject from 1904-1931? One explanation is that during
the first three decades of the twentieth century, Japan witnessed an incredible amount of
mechanical and technological advances in all areas of society—inventions or advances such as
the telephone, typewriter, improved electrical systems, and gasoline had a great impact on
how people moved, worked, and lived during their everyday lives. *Monthly Historical
Photos* reflected Japanese society’s fascination with technology by publishing its *hanashi*
talk) and *kenkyū* (research) series that ran for most of the period. These two-to-three-page
articles, illustrated by numerous photographs, offered a wealth of information on the latest
scientific and technological advances and were included in nearly every issue during the
1910s and 1920s (Figure 116).

In addition to
dovetailing with the current
events of the times, the lack
of open hostilities between
Japan and China from
1904-1931 also probably had
an effect on the high number
of technological superior
images used. The four
percent decrease in *courage
and discipline* depictions in
the same period supports this hypothesis; while the characteristics denoted by the category
*courage and discipline* are more conducive to depiction during times of war, the classification
*technological superiority* lends itself equally to both peace as well as war. In spite of its

Figure 116: *The Story of the Phonograph* (*chikuonki*). Articles such as this one, explaining the development of the phonograph, often appeared in *Monthly Historical Photos* and attested to the curiosity that many Japanese had in new technologies during the prewar period. From issue #57 (December 1917) of *Monthly Historical Photos*. 
utility for propaganda purposes, during times of war, *technological superiority* has its limits; in war, images that magnify human qualities such as loyalty and self-sacrifice usually take center position in publications friendly to the belligerents. This appears to have been the case with the images published by *Monthly Historical Photos*.

A final look at Japanese images of 1931-1937 reveals that *survival against nature* depictions remained relatively consistent in both numbers as well as content. Given the unchanged venue and the harshness of the Manchurian winter, this was not an unexpected discovery. The decline from the previous period in *altruism* photographs (from 6.6% to 1.4%) is interesting for it suggests both a growing coldness towards the situation on the continent as well as a decreasing concern in projecting an image of Japanese kindness and charity to the world. The following chapter will focus on the way the publishing industry dealt with government censorship and how that association affected the graphic portrayal of Japan and China during the period from 1894-1937.
Chapter 7
Image Makers: Government-Media Relations

The images examined in the preceding chapters have shown that a trend towards the inaccurate portrayal of the situation in China existed throughout the period in question. The absence of actual Chinese in many images and a misleading, overly positive view of Sino-Japanese relations characterized this tendency. While government censorship was active during the prewar period, to what extent did it guide the media in its graphic depiction of China? How did Japanese popular magazines such as *Monthly Historical Photos* react to censorship? Using these questions and an outline of censorship laws and regulations during the period as an entry point, this chapter compares the graphic results of censorship in the publishing industry’s imaging of China before and after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937.

Commercial publishing in Japan traces its roots to the middle of the seventeenth century. By then, the effects of the peace and “one domain, one castle” policy established by the first Tokugawa shogun, Ieyasu (1543-1616), had begun to bear fruit. Removing the samurai from the land and relocating them to one of the over 200 castle-towns across the country created nascent urban centers that proceeded to grow around the need to provide for the requirements of the ruling class. The migration of large numbers of people from all backgrounds seeking economic opportunity and escape from the hardships of living in the country to cities such as Edo, the capital of Tokugawa Japan, epitomized this urban trend. By 1720, the once-small fishing village had become a thriving city of over one million people.

As the non-samurai population increased in castle towns across the country, the desire for entertainment and exchange of information among this new class of urbanite, the *chōnin* (townsman), stimulated the development of a commercial publishing industry. Works such
as illustrated stories of popular fiction (*kusazōshi*) and guidebooks proliferated during the Genroku period (1688-1704) and reflected the flowering of urban culture after nearly a hundred years of peace. Even as the industry began to flourish, the Tokugawa government started taking an active interest in what townsmen were reading. Against a backdrop of Neo-Confucian morality that envisioned a frugal, highly structured hierarchical society and the growing economic plight of a samurai class that increasingly was becoming financially dependent on the theoretically socially inferior merchants led to the government’s enactment of the Kyōhō Reforms in the early 1720s.

Designed as a sweeping program aimed at curbing political subversion, ostentatious displays of wealth, and immoral conduct, the reforms also laid the foundation for publishing censorship for the remainder of the Tokugawa period. The basic provisions required the names of the author or artist and publisher on printed works, and banned the publication of erotic and immoral material as well as any mention of the Tokugawa family or high-ranking government officials. In addition to the above provisions, previous edicts such as those issued in 1684, 1691, 1703, and 1713, had already set a precedent for the prohibition of publishing current events. The bakufu did this since news, especially of disasters and famines, of which there were many during the period, could foment civil disorder by possibly implying that the shogunate lacked control of worldly matters, thereby contradicting the long-held notion, imported from China, that an uneventful reign was a virtuous one.148

The Kyōhō Reforms were also important because they resulted in the creation of a system of pre-publication self-censorship by booksellers in major cities such as Kyoto, Osaka, and Edō. Since the Tokugawa government had neither the manpower nor the financial

---

means to enforce strictly most of its edicts, it put the onus on the publishers themselves by making members of existing booksellers' guilds become censors on a rotating basis. Although this self-censorship arrangement may have appeared inherently flawed owing to obvious potential conflicts of interest, "it is clear that the process was taken seriously [by booksellers], presumably to protect the monopolistic privileges enjoyed by the guilds." Instead of openly ignoring censorship edicts, publishers resorted to disguising both their identities as well as book content in order to make a profit (Figure 117). In light of the banned materials such as stories of love-suicides that continued to circulate, it is evident that the system was far from foolproof. The shogunate realized this and, rather than attempt comprehensive enforcement, it relied on the punishment of popular authors, artists, and publishers to set examples that would deter others in the industry.

Although Peter Kornicki accurately describes Tokugawa censorship as "haphazard and unsystematic" in terms of legislation and enforcement, its effects were insidious to the future of Japanese publishing since the vagueness of most edicts created an atmosphere of paranoia, which in turn encouraged

---

150 For examples, see Thompson and Harootunian, *Undercurrents*, 39, 62, 72.
self-pre-publication censorship in order to avoid the punitive as well as economic costs of being punished. In this manner, those in the industry became accustomed, and for the most part, came to accept censorship as part of the cost of doing business. With the exception of the years between 1841 and 1851, when the Tokugawa government banned booksellers’ guilds and appointed city magistrates to oversee censorship, self-censorship and general compliance to authority continued in Japan until the late 1930s when the military government began to take a much more active role in regulating all aspects of society.

The next major reforms to affect the publishing industry during the Tokugawa period were the Kansei and the Tempo Reforms. Enacted during the Kansei Era (1779-1801), the former edicts primarily reiterated the previous Kyōhō Reforms but authorities also added an important stipulation regarding commercial publications. From 1790, all prints would require a censor’s seal of approval before being allowed to publish. While not an insurmountable obstacle to overcome, it did make publishers more wary of what they published. As with previous attempts, the Tempo Reforms, initiated in the years 1841-1843, “sought to reimpose order and authority on urban society” against a backdrop of widespread government corruption and natural disasters. In addition to the continuing suppression of news on current events and stories of the samurai class, authorities also banned material that portrayed the immoral side of Tokugawa society, such as prints of actors, courtesans, and geisha. Although the reporting of most kinds of news would become legal after the bakufu’s fall from power, the shogunate’s persistent focus on preserving the moral stability of society would continue to dominate censorship regulations into the Meiji period and beyond.

152 Ibid., The Book in Japan, 343.
Observations of the Western press both abroad and domestically in treaty ports such as Yokohama made Meiji leaders well aware of its power to influence society. They alluded to this insight in the fifth article of the Meiji Charter Oath that stated, “Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world so as to strengthen the foundation of Imperial Rule.”

Although the new government realized that the flow of information was vital in building a strong and educated society, its leaders also took note of the possible detrimental effects associated with “knowledge of the world.” Soon after Imperial forces entered Edō, the Dajōkan (Council of State) issued its first edict regarding media censorship in July 1868. All newspapers were required to suspend business and obtain government licenses before reopening. Of the papers in existence in early 1868, only two pro-government operations resumed publication after being shut down.

The following year, the government issued its Publication Ordinance of 1869 (Shuppan Jōrei), which stipulated that anyone “who promulgates his views, accuses others falsely, publishes political secrets, or makes statements which lead others into lewd practices, shall be punished.” The ordinance’s vagueness and tone traced its roots to the Tokugawa period and set the direction of censorship codes in the decades to come. Soon after, in response to the growing popular rights movement initiated by disgruntled anti-government factions of mostly former samurai, the government issued the Press Ordinance (Shinbushi Jōrei) and Libel Law (Zambōritsu) of 1875. In addition to requiring the “occasional” submission of book manuscripts before publication, censorship control was moved from the

---

Ministry of Education to the newly created Home Ministry, where it would stay until the military took over the management of government censorship in 1940.

Building on the foundation of the Press Ordinance of 1875, the Meiji bureaucracy continued to strengthen censorship regulations throughout the period. In 1876, the Home Ministry gained the power to prohibit and suspend publications considered disruptive to the public peace; from 1883, papers and magazines of political content were required to pay registration bonds ranging from 350 to 1000 yen, and publishers, editors, writers, and printers were held accountable for content from 1887. The 1893 Publication Law (Shuppan Hō) and Press Law of 1909 (Shinbushin Hō) consolidated the contents of the various regulations as well as fine-tuned details such as adding provisions against the reporting of the details of court trials while they were in session. By the end of the Meiji Era, the prewar system of censorship was firmly established and it underwent little fundamental change until the late 1930s. Basic tenets included the prohibition against and punishment for publishing material "disruptive of public peace and injurious to public morals" (annei chitsujo o bunshi matawa fūzoku o gai suru) as well as government and military secrets, maintained the Home Ministry’s right to post-publication (but not predistribution) censorship, gave the Home Ministry the power to deny appeals by accused offenders, and provided provisions for fining and jailing offenders.

The Peace Preservation Law of 1925 and its 1928 amendment were the final major revisions to censorship regulation until the beginning of the war with China in 1937. A conservative reaction to increasing social strains caused by rapid urbanization, population growth, and bureaucratic ineptness in dealing with such problems, the drafters of the Peace Preservation Law designed it to "protect" society from anarchists and communists, the governments’s major scapegoats for society’s ills during much of the prewar period. Two
characteristics of the law stand out, the first of which was the lengthening of penal time for offenders. Prison term limits increased from six months to ten years in 1925, and life-terms as well as the death sentence were added in the 1928 amendment. The second characteristic was the inherent vagueness of key articles of the law. Reminiscent of previous phrases such as "injurious to public morals," Article 1 stated that "anyone who has formed an association with the objective of altering the kokutai (national polity or essence) or system of private property, and anyone who has joined such an association with full knowledge of its object, shall be liable to imprisonment with or without hard labor for a term not exceeding ten years."155 While the Japanese emperor was clearly the focal point of Japan's kokutai, the term defied any standard definition.156 As with past censorship regulations, this ambiguity effectively increased the law's authority since its interpretation usually was left to bureaucrats to define as they saw fit.

While the repeated creation of ordinances and laws may have given the Japanese government's approach towards censorship a rational appearance, ambiguous phrases such as the one above regarding public peace and morals or the kokutai, and inconsistency in enforcement continued to dominate the process throughout most of the prewar period.157 Attempts to clarify standards were made but rejected by the Diet as being too restrictive. While censorship authorities did have operating guidelines, they were kept secret and not

156 For commentary on the difficulty of defining the concept of kokutai, see footnote number 3, in Mitchell, Thought Control in Prewar Japan, 20.
157 The creation of modern laws and codes was one of the ways in which the Meiji government sought to convince the West that Japan was worthy of being called a civilized nation, and therefore worthy of treatment as an equal. One contributor to the 1911 edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica was apparently impressed with Japan's censorship system and remarked "... nothing now remains of the former arbitrary system except that any periodical having a political complexion is required to deposit security varying from 175 to 1000 yen." From Encyclopedia Britannica, 1911 ed., s.v. "Japan."
committed to writing apparently until the late 1920s—and even then, reports remained the secret property of the Home Ministry. As the Japanese publishing industry matured during the first two decades of the twentieth century, most of those in the business focused their energies on finding ways to comply with rather than fight the system.

To this end, extra-legal methods of dealing with an arbitrary system, such as the private inspection (naisetsu) and embargo system (kiji sashi-tome meirei) became prominent during the Taishō period (1912-1926). The naisetsu system of informal consultation allowed publishers and writers in the graces of censorship authorities to benefit from officials of the Police Bureau (part of the Home Ministry) reviewing galley proofs and advising on changes needed in order pass the censors. When authorities ended the naisetu conferences because of the lack of manpower necessary to keep up with a rapidly expanding industry in 1927, publishers complained but to no avail. In addition, by 1920, an embargo system had evolved whereby publishers and writers on the Home Ministry’s approved list would receive pre-distribution (but post-publication) advice on how to avoid the censor’s stamp. “By the late 1920s it was considered a mark of prestige to be among the companies favored by the Home Ministry with these secret warnings that enabled them to avoid a ban.” This system continued into the 1930s and was elevated to legal status by the National General Mobilization Act of April 1938.

In addition to the ambiguity of Japan’s prewar censorship codes and the publishing industry’s inability to appeal through legal channels the decisions made by censors, Articles 8 and 14 of the Meiji Constitution also gave authorities broad powers (in the name of the

---

158 Rubin, Injurious to Public Morals, 22.
Emperor) to create harsher censorship standards during times of emergency such as natural
disasters or wars.\footnote{For an informative and annotated version of the Meiji Constitution in
Japanese, see “Dai nihon teikoku kenpō” (Japan's Imperial Constitution), http://www.cc.matsuyama-u.ac.jp/–tamura/tiannijihou.htm; internet; accessed 3 February 2005.} Article 14, in particular, was a powerful tool for censors since it allowed
the military to administer affected areas under martial law (kaigen). The government
invoked these articles during the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars, the turbulent
months after the end of the war with Russia, the Rice Riots of 1919, and increasingly more
often in the 1920s and 1930s, in conjunction with repeated political and economic crises both
in China as well as at home.\footnote{In the Japan Center for Asian Historical Records' (JACAR) database, a keyword search of
“kaigeri” during the years 1894–1940, resulted in 373 hits. Keyword search in JACAR,
Throughout the prewar period, censors mainly targeted two
crises in times of emergency. In the case of military-related contingencies, authorities
primarily aimed at preventing the spread of information that could damage army (and
increasingly civilian) morale or expose tactical secrets such as troop movements and battle
locations. During natural disasters such as the 1923 Tokyo earthquake, the government
(usually through the Privy Council) invoked Article 8 in order to “preserve the peace” (anzen
o hoji).

One common theme that connected invocations of emergency powers throughout the
prewar period was the ambiguity of their wording. The typical kaigen document was
concise and to the point, stating only that “emergency powers were (or no longer) required
and were being implemented (kaigen o jikō suru) with the full authority of the Emperor and
Privy Council.”\footnote{“Regarding the adoption of emergency powers needed in a certain geographical area” (Uttei
no chikì ni kaigen meichū hitsuyo no kitei o tekiyō sure ken) appeared to be a set phrase and
used in many of the kaigen imperial edicts. An example of an exception was an edict
regarding the use of telegraph cables via Nagasaki during the Russo-Japanese War of
1904–1905. For examples of emergency power edicts, see JACAR, document reference}
area affected by the restrictions, they usually failed to mention the actual reasons for a particular emergency. Once authorities deemed an emergency to be over, they released an edict proclaiming the "ending of martial law" (kaigen o kaishi suru). The fact that very few, if any, "dangerous" prints or photographs made it to publication during times of emergency suggests that censors were for the most part successful in applying the increased powers accorded to them when kaigen edicts were in force.  

In spite of the apparent effectiveness of censors in times when the government invoked its emergency powers prerogative, it appears that graphic imagery (aside from film) experienced much less censorship than the written word in the years prior to the outbreak of Japan's second war with China in 1937. While various factors offer possible explanations for why graphically oriented mass-market magazines such as Monthly Historical Photos experienced less restrictions than books and newspapers, social conditions during the period, magazine content, and the Home Ministry's inability to keep up with the publishing industry's explosive growth, especially after 1923, were three main reasons. First, the cultural stresses of Japan's rapid industrialization and resultant urbanization had worried Japanese leaders since the early Meiji period, and the importation of various Western ideas such as anarchism and socialism were seen as dangers to society. In reaction, from the beginning of the twentieth century, authorities focused their censorship efforts on suppressing notions that threatened the sanctity of the Emperor and his image as a father-figure to an undivided nation.


163 Having learned valuable lessons during the Sino-Japanese War, the army organized and strictly regulated reporters during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Many Western reporters returned to their respective countries in frustration after months of being wined and dined but not being allowed to get near the action. The Army issued regulations regarding Japanese reporters attached to military units two days after Japan declared war with Russia on February 12. For more on reporters and the two wars, see Huffman, Creating a Public, pages 199-223, 271-309.
Incidents such as the High Treason Affair in 1910, the March 15 Incident in 1928, and the authorities’ pursuit of Professor Minobe Tatsukichi in the 1930s clearly demonstrated the government’s hardening stance regarding affronts to the Emperor or kokutai.\(^\text{164}\)

Content was the second important factor that saved popular graphic-oriented magazines from the censors’ undue attention. By their very nature, these types of magazines avoided the difficult political material that invariably attracted the attention of the Special Higher Police (tokkō). Instead, news on sports, entertainment, and watered-down domestic and world current events dominated their pages. The closest Monthly Historic Photos ever got to “dangerous” topics was coverage of emotionally-charged domestic criminal cases or politically sensitive stories such as the assassination of the Chinese warlord, Zhang Zoulin, in 1928 (Figure 118). Even when these types of stories did manage to make it to print, facts that could incriminate the Japanese government were usually omitted. Despite the dramatic increase in coverage of events in China after the Manchurian Incident of 1931, the business of bringing a sanitized visual image

\(^{164}\) Kotoku Shusui and eleven others were executed for plotting to assassinate the Emperor (covered in article 73 of the criminal code) in 1911. In 1928, authorities arrested approximately 1600 people suspected of being communists. This event signaled the effective end of the communist party in prewar Japan. In 1935, the government attempted to charge Professor Minobe (1873-1948) with lese majesty for expounding the emperor-as-organ theory, which suggested that that august self was merely a figurehead and not the core of the imperial political system. For overviews on each topic, see Jansen, Modern Japan, 491-492 and 504-506; 566-568: 542, 546-547, and 597; Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, 1983 ed., s.v. “High Treason Incident of 1910,” “Minobe Tatsukichi,” and “March 15 Incident.”
of the world to the Japanese public appeared to continue as usual.\textsuperscript{165} As late as the summer of 1936, the Olympic Games (including all the accompanying fanfare highlighting the games’ glossy message promoting international friendship through athletic competition) garnered multipage coverage over several issues.\textsuperscript{166} Finally, the fact that these magazines were published monthly tended to remove the edge from any potentially explosive news. The once-a-month format also gave editors at least a few weeks of foresight to create “safe” stories that augmented initial newspaper coverage as well as overcame the dailies’ economic advantage of first reportage.\textsuperscript{167}

A third reason why the monthlies were able to avoid much of the censors’ scrutiny was the result of an acute manpower shortage in the Home Ministry’s censorship division. Although the publishing industry had been experiencing rapid growth since the end of the Meiji era, new technologies and marketing techniques, such as the creation of the \textit{enbon} or one-yen books, created a publishing boom in the mid-twenties. The number of registered periodical publications (newspapers and magazines) increased from 2,127 in 1912 to 6,899 in 1925, and 11,915 in 1934. Compounding the problem for authorities, the number of nonperiodical publications (books) submitted for inspection increased over 250\% from 47,529 in 1924 to 126,733 in 1934.\textsuperscript{168} Moreover, the industry’s dynamic growth in the midst of an economic depression gripping the nation during the late 1920s made it harder for the Home

\textsuperscript{165} In reading through 1920s and pre-1937 issues of \textit{Monthly Historic Photos}, one notices a definite decrease in photos covering social news of the United States and Great Britain. In contrast, as if to cultivate a sense of growing tension in the Japanese public, graphic coverage of the two nations’ militaries (very popular during the 1920s) remained relatively constant. See \textit{Monthly Historical Photos, 1920-1937} issues, passim.

\textsuperscript{166} \textit{Monthly Historic Photos}, 1 September and October 1932, numbers 280-281.

\textsuperscript{167} A good example is the coverage of the Manchurian Incident of September 1931. While major newspapers such as the \textit{Osaka Asahi Shinbun} reported the incident the next day, on September 19, \textit{Monthly Historical Photos} did not cover the story until December or January.

Ministry to secure funds for its censorship operations. Even after obtaining a special allocation from the Diet that enabled the Special Higher Police to double their staff between 1927 and 1929, their numbers still totalled less than fifty.169

The political parties’ waning power and consequent rise of right-wing militarists in government during the late 1920s and early 1930s further stimulated a wider application of censorship in efforts to suppress material offensive to the Emperor and kokutai. In response to the growing logistical challenges posed by the increasing policing needs and the rapidly expanding publishing industry, the government established the Cabinet Information Committee (Naikaku jōhō inkai) in July 1936. The creation of the committee reflected an effort by authorities to streamline the censorship system and marked an escalation of the military’s gradual encroachment on the Home Ministry’s control of censorship. Its rapid rise within the bureaucratic hierarchy also reflected the military’s growing control of the civilian government. After the Marco Polo Incident of 1937, the committee was upgraded to a division, and by the end of 1940, it had become a bureau (kyoku).

Although the Cabinet Information Committee ostensibly was created to coordinate the censorship activities of various government departments such as the Justice, Home, and Army Ministries, the army and navy effectively took control once it became a Division in 1937. From that year onwards, the army, following its own conventions, instituted “informal get-togethers” (kondankai) and redirected the emphasis of government censorship from a “negative” (torishimari) to a more positive “guidance” (shidō) tone. Reminiscent of the aforementioned embargo system, the mandatory once- or twice-monthly kondankai meetings brought publishers and editors together with censors from the various government bureaus to discuss material content. Positive guidance involved censors offering “suggestions” on what

publishers and editors needed to do in order to avoid warnings or bans. This contrasted with the traditional negative method of censorship, which merely pointed out the offensive material responsible for infractions. By the time the organization was upgraded to Bureau status in 1940, the army and navy had gained nearly complete dominance over it by monopolizing key posts with active-duty officers. In the process, censorship control was wrested from the Home Ministry leaving the Cabinet Information Bureau as the ultimate authority (now with over six hundred employees) of censorship as well as propaganda during the war. 170

-----------------------------

The previous section briefly outlined the history of Japanese censorship and discussed its effectiveness against monthly graphic news magazines such as *Monthly Historical Photos* prior to 1937. This next section first explains why I chose 1937 as a key turning point in Japan’s prewar censorship system, and then follows by graphically comparing censors’ effectiveness before and after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937.

**Clarifying Censorship Guidelines**

Soon after the July 7 incident at the Marco Polo Bridge, the army created the document that defined clearly the path Japanese censorship would take during the war years. These guidelines, titled “Evaluative Guidelines Regarding the Approval and Rejection of Items Published in Newspapers” (*Evaluative Guidelines*), were released to the appropriate government offices on August 9, 1937. 171 In stark contrast to prior censorship codes and regulations, what was allowed and disallowed in print was more clearly spelled out in detail in


two sections, one pertaining to the army and the other to the navy (see Appendix B). Moreover, the points in each section explicitly described what kind of graphic content was approved or banned. While the inherent intent of the *Evaluative Guidelines* differed little from past regulations centering around military secrets and materials "injurious to public morals," the relative clarification of standards made it easier for censors to do their jobs more efficiently.

![Figure 119: Censored Photos: Mountain Ranges](image)

In order to preserve military secrets, the army targeted any information (with heavy emphasis on the graphic type) that could aid the enemy in locating Japanese troops, stealing technology, or discerning military tactics. This broad category of banned material included photographs that showed the tops of mountain ranges (Figure 119), the insides of armored vehicles (Figure 120), and certain camera angles of troops in action (Figures 121a and b). Prohibited images

![Figure 120: Censored Photos: Vehicles](image)
revealed the locations of airfields" (Figure 122), specifically noted in Evaluative Guidelines included those that revealed the locations of “plane crashes and airfields” (Figure 122),

the identities of “brigade commanders or officers of lieutenant rank or above” (Figure 123), “military or unit flags,” “water-supply vehicles,” and the names of “mechanized units.” In place of the term “injurious to public morals,” Evaluative Guidelines used phrases such as “articles or photographs that portray our army in an unfavorable light.” Images “injurious” to the army usually meant depictions that hinted at or portrayed the Japanese interrogation or torture of prisoners (Figure 124).
In similar fashion, the navy also banned information that could expose military secrets. This category included articles and images that depicted naval installations, indicated troop numbers and their destinations, and detailed the structural designs of vital war machinery such as propellers and large caliber guns (Figure 125). As with the army articles of *Evaluative Guidelines*, anything that portrayed the navy in a negative light also was prohibited. Aside from banning depictions of “cruelty” (how or to whom not specified), other points in this section reiterated the need to preserve military secrets and mentioned several banned topics such as the photographing of warships from certain angles. In a flash of foresight,
uncommon in other areas of the Japanese military at the time, the drafters of *Evaluative Guidelines* ended both sections in the document with the note that "Amendments will be made or removed to these points as the necessity arises" (*Hon yōryō wa hitsuyō ni ōshi kajo teisei su*). This phrase assured that future revisions to *Evaluative Guidelines*, of which there were many, would be expedited since it enabled the Cabinet Information Bureau to do so under its own auspices with little outside interference.  

While the creation of a consolidated censorship organ within the government and clearly delineated guidelines enabled authorities to enforce standards more efficiently, neither aided the publishing industry in its efforts to make profits while avoiding the censor's wrath. Following established tradition, authorities failed to notify publishers, editors, reporters, and photographers exactly of what they could or could not publish. Although past precedent to some extent had revealed what subjects were taboo to publish, the period after the Marco Polo Incident was a period of renewed learning for the industry.  

For those who lacked access to newspapers (which, given their daily publication, offered an

---

172 Revisions to the *Evaluative Guidelines* occurred over the next four months after its release on August 9, and again in June 1940. Revisions ranged from minor to major additions and deletions. Examples of the former type included adding individual phrases such as "article" (*ki*), or changing "article headline" (*ki* no *bō*), to "photograph caption." Major changes included the addition of new points such as prohibiting depictions of firefighting equipment. See JACAR, document reference numbers A03023927200 and C010047894300, [http://www.jacar.go.jp](http://www.jacar.go.jp); internet; accessed 15 February 2005.
accurate up-to-date reflection of media-oriented censorship standards) it was difficult to
discern what the censors would ban. One photographer, attached to a military unit to cover
the war in China noted that, "While in China we [combat photographers] had no idea what
was prohibited since we did not have access to newspapers. All we were told was that
photographs of corpses, Japanese as well as Chinese, would be censored. Of course we
assumed we had to be careful when taking photos of tanks and such, but even then, we
thought that those types of shots might have a chance of being approved if we adjusted the
camera angle appropriately."173

The above comment suggests two characteristics about Japan's censorship system
that the photographic record of the 1920s and 1930s confirms. First, in spite of the fact that
Evaluative Guidelines clarified policing standards for censors, the document did little to help
the publishing industry. Instead, the increased restrictions added to the editing process and
cost more money, both in materials as well as the postage required in sending galley proofs
back and forth to censors. The second characteristic that both the prewar and wartime
censorship shared was its apparent arbitrariness. Out of necessity, editors and photographers
were quick to learn that what got censored or approved depended in large part on who did the
actual censoring. Possible infractions could be missed by censors for either personal
preferences, inadequate knowledge of a photograph’s content, or simple oversight. As the
above-mentioned photographer Satō Shinju commented, “Subtle nuances determined the fate
of every photograph since each censor differed in thought and temperament."174 Insufficient
knowledge of the object of a photograph was one aspect of the censors’ “subtle nuances” of

173 Comments by Satō Shinju, a former Mainichi Shinbun photographer attached to the
Army's 101st division in China for approximately six months in 1937-1938. In Nishii,
Fukyoka shashin 1, 204.
174 In Makino Kikuo, ed., Ich'i-oku nin no shōwa rekishi 10: Fukyoka shashin shi (Tokyo:
Mainichi Shinbun Sha, 1977), 243.
One photo editor for the *Osaka Mainichi Shinbun* recalled an incident where the censor mistakenly approved a photograph captioned "American airplane." In reality, it was one of Japan's newest planes and therefore subject to strict censorship under the longstanding caveat protecting military secrets; understandably, neither the editor nor the censor had prior knowledge of the plane's existence.  

Another example illustrates the relative ease with which prohibited material could be published, even as late as the mid-1930s. Satō was nearly arrested in 1935 after a picture published in the *Osaka Mainichi Shinbun* caught the attention of the military police (*kenpeitai*). He intended the photograph in question to be an artistic shot, taken from the rooftop of the *Mainichi* building, of Tokyo's downtown Ginza district set against the background of Tokyo Bay and lowlying mountains on the other side of the water (Figure 126). Both Satō and the paper's graphic editors, assuming that the photo was "safe," failed to submit it to the censors. Only after noticing the image in the newspaper did the military police initiate an investigation. In the end, Satō and the *Osaka Mainichi Shinbun*

---

175 Comments by Tsujiguchi Fumizō, in Nishii, *Fukyoka shashin 1*, 205.
were let off with a stern warning after the paper's chief photo editor wrote a letter of explanation and an apology to the authorities.\textsuperscript{176}

**Images**

Comparing the photographs in *Monthly Historic Photos* that made it past the censors before and after the Marco Polo Incident provides a vivid opportunity to examine the extent to which the effectiveness of government censorship increased over time. In doing so, I divided the photographs into two categories, those relating to military secrets, and images that could be construed as “injurious” to the Japanese army or navy.

A survey of images prior to 1937 reveals that aside from times of war, particularly during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, censors were relatively lenient. In fact, as was the case during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the large amount of military technology and information published suggests that the industry had the government’s blessing in its “selling” of an image of Japanese military superiority.

As we have seen throughout the prewar period, *Monthly Historic Photos* repeatedly published photographs that depicted military vehicles, ships, airplanes, and weapons. Potentially

\textsuperscript{176} Satō also attributed the military police’s leniency in letting the newspaper off to the fact that the *Mainichi* was a major national daily and therefore had a degree of political influence, particularly prior to 1937. From Makino, *Fukyoka shashin shi*, 243-244.
negative depictions of the military, such as inappropriate photographs of prisoners or even Japanese corpses also appeared, although in less abundance than those in the military secrets category (Figure 127). While this openness reflects periods of relative political moderation in Japan, especially during the 1920s, it seems that the heightened crisis atmosphere of the early 1930s had little effect on the magazines’ editorial policies regarding military-related images.

In spite of Japan’s increasing involvement on the continent and the nation’s growing estrangement with Western powers between 1931 and 1937, photographs that depicted military secrets and images that could be interpreted as negative towards the military (see Figure 110 above) made it to print on a regular basis during the period. Moreover, even after the Marco Polo Incident, Monthly Historic Photos still continued to publish these types of images (Figure 128). While it is evident that there was a tendency towards stricter adherence to censorship guidelines after 1937, it appears that Evaluative Guidelines was not effectively enforced until the end of the 1930s, when we find significantly fewer censor "misses"; but once the publishing industry and authorities had gained a few years’ experience with the heightened "crisis conditions" of the war years (1937-1945), the breadth and scope of the censors’ reach expanded rapidly. This

Figure 128: Japanese Troops Landing in Southern China. Many post-1937 issues of Monthly Historical Photos contained an unexpected number of images that censors apparently overlooked. This photograph should have been censored because, according to Evaluative Guidelines, it portrayed a Japanese amphibious landing (therefore displaying Japanese military tactics) and risked exposing its location by including the ridge of the mountain range in the distance. From issue #307 (December 1938) of Monthly Historical Photos.
Figure 129: Censor Extremes: Gun Barrels. The cover of this *Shina jihen gabo* (China incident pictorial), with the Japanese tank’s barrel airbrushed out, was a typical example of the extremes censors would go to protect the military’s image and its secrets. From *Hizo: Fukyoka shashin*, pages 209.

was made clear by the *Osaka Mainichi Shinbun*’s voluminous collection of censored photos that managed to escape the mass destruction of documents that occurred after Japan’s surrender but before Occupation forces took control of the country in 1945.\(^{177}\)

As the war progressed, the lengths to which censors went in order to protect the military’s secrets and honor (and in extension, the nation’s) bordered on the ludicrous. While photographs of tanks without gun barrels (Figure 129) were being published, depictions of Japanese soldiers in *fundoshi*, or loincloths were banned (Figure 130). Moreover, images showing the lighter side of the

Figure 130: Censored Extremes: Nudity. This photograph, taken on May 10, 1941, was most likely censored for depicting the soldiers in various states of nudity as they bathed on board a ship. Although originally relaxed on the topic of public nudity, Japanese authorities absorbed conservative Victorian values on nudity in order to conform to Western standards of civilization during the Meiji period. Nudity continued to be a controversial subject in both art and photography throughout the prewar period. From *Ichi-oku Shōwa shi: Fukyoka shashin*, page 161.

177 All of the war photographs taken by *Osaka Mainichi Shinbun*’s photographers passed through the newspaper’s Osaka headquarters for development and processing. Once multiple prints of each negative were made, one copy was filed in binders for company records and another sent to Tokyo for inspection by government censors. The censor status (passed, failed, pending), comments on censor status, and captions for each photograph were recorded alongside every picture by newspaper staff. Although the original negatives have been lost, two large bookshelves of these binders containing thousands of photographs that span the 1937-1945 period made it through the war. This collection offers a rare visual glimpse of how Japan’s military as well as news media operated during the Greater Pacific War. See Nishii, *Fukyoka shashin I*, 196-197, 205.
times were also prohibited because authorities thought they detracted from the seriousness of spirit needed to support a successful war effort (Figure 131). In spite of the Cabinet Information Bureau’s censorship efforts, prohibited material continued to slip through its inspections. Rather than a reflection of Japan’s publishing industry rebelling against the establishment’s suffocating restrictions, continuing instances of non-compliance with censorship codes more likely indicated a difference of opinions in what constituted “injurious” to the military, and consequently, the Japanese public.
CONCLUSIONS

Nothing can be so deceiving as a photograph.
Franz Kafka

The goal of this work was twofold. First, I wanted to measure how the Japanese media’s graphic portrayal of China from 1894-1937 changed. Doing so helps to clarify why Sino-Japanese relations during the prewar period deteriorated to such a dismal state. Second, I attempted to estimate the extent to which Japan’s imaging of China affected Japanese attitudes towards its traditional other. For centuries, Japan looked up to China as its intellectual and technological superior, but this relationship changed in late Tokugawa and the three decades after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. In order to convince the West as well as its own citizens of Japan’s newly found modernity, the Meiji founding fathers found it necessary to juxtapose the image of a powerful, unified nation to a backward, fragmented China. Understanding the role that graphic media played in this transformation adds to our knowledge of modern Japan as well as how mass media can affect the formation of national identities in general.

Visualizing China: 1894-1937

I began research on this project with two preconceptions spreading across a spectrum of possibilities. On one hand, given the increasing confrontational nature of the relationship between China and Japan after the latter’s victory over Russia in 1905, I assumed the period’s graphic portrayal of China, reflecting the social and political trends of the time, would also noticeably deteriorate. If that scenario failed to emerge, I assumed instead that the media, under the guidance of the Japanese government, would have painted a more positive picture of Sino-Japanese relations. This development would have indicated a concerted propaganda
campaign aimed at fostering the image of a benevolent Japan trying to lead China out from an uncivilized squalor imposed on it by Western imperialist powers. The graphic evidence indicated a condition somewhere in between my preconceptions.

The hundreds of woodblock *nishikie* prints and photographs from the mass-consumer magazines *Photographic Illustration* and *Monthly Historical Photos* provided the bulk of the sampling of Japan's graphic media treatment of both Chinese and Japanese from 1894 to 1937. The first readily noticeable characteristic of these depictions, purportedly about Chinese, was that they invariably contrasted the perceived flaws of Chinese character and culture to the positive virtues assumed inherent in the Japanese spirit. While portraying the other in terms of its relation to one's self is a common phenomenon, especially in cultures such as Meiji Japan, recently coming out of relative isolation from the world, the consistency over time of the Japanese depictions of itself and China were notable. The initial portrayals of China were highly negative and focused on depicting a backward, barbaric people as the antithesis to a modern, civilized Japan. Given the relative socio-political conditions in both countries, where Japan was successfully modernizing even as conservative forces in China hindered progress and allowed the Western powers to partition the country, it is of little surprise that Japanese artists depicted the war in this fashion. For the Meiji government, projecting an image of modernity and civilization during the war with China, which was assumed by many to be Japan's superior in both technology and culture, served to impress on Japanese as well as the West that the recently fragmented country had become a modern and united nation. By attaining this condition of "modernity," Meiji leaders also hoped that victory over China would reaffirm in the eyes of the West that Japan was deserving of the "civilized" status granted to it by the signing of the 1894 treaties that ended extraterritoriality in the summer of 1899.
Representations of the Chinese soldier during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 were the first images of China to reach modern Japan on a large scale. As demonstrated by the prints examined in Chapter 3, these early impressions of Chinese were overwhelmingly negative (62%), while Japanese were depicted positively 99% of the time. These war prints highlighted Japan's modernity in terms of courage, discipline, total dominance over the enemy, and survival against nature while Japanese artists portrayed the Chinese soldier as backward, barbaric, and cowardly. After the conflict ended and for the rest of the subsequent prewar period, the image of Japanese in a Chinese context changed very little. Courage, discipline, and endurance against the elements continued to typify the Japanese character. In accordance with the relative peaceful state of relations between China and Japan prior to 1931, blatant scenes of martial Japanese dominance gave way to the more restrained images of technological superiority.

While Japanese interpretations of themselves changed very little throughout the period, the imagery of Chinese underwent a subtle metamorphosis. The transparent visualization of superiority and contempt displayed in the Sino-Japanese War prints gave way to a seemingly more positive outlook on China in the 1920s and 1930s. In spite of appearances, this trend actually masked a gradual near-erasure of Chinese from Japanese depictions of China. From 1904 to 1937, neutral depictions epitomized the portrayal of China and progressively ignored the actual existence of Chinese in their own land. During this period, 80% of all depictions of China examined earned a neutral rating, and over 56% percent failed to depict Chinese at all. Furthermore, negative images decreased from 16% to
fewer than 10% while positive images increased from 4% to over 10% of all depictions. As mentioned in Chapter 6, the increase in positive portrayals was misleading since over 60% of them were designed to sell Manchukuo to the Japanese public. Magazines such as *Monthly Historical Photos* did this by focusing on Puyi's imperial heritage as well as the new nation's architectural splendor (much of which was built under Japanese guidance). Thus, the Japanese media's memorialization of an imaginary Chinese culture actually served to marginalize further an accurate image of contemporary China in the visual conscience of the Japanese public.

Whenever Chinese did appear in images during the 1930s, magazine editors increasingly labeled them as either “good” or “bad” Chinese, as seen by the growing use of words such as *ryōmin* (good people) and *hizoku* (outlaw) or *bazoku* (mounted bandits) in the 1930s. After the Manchurian Incident, such sophistry, directed by both the Japanese media and army, resolved the difficulties of justifying continued military actions against an enemy that for the most part, refused to fight back.¹⁷⁹ The resultant simplification in the portrayal of both Chinese and Japanese resulted in images that depicted “bad” Chinese as backwards, “good” Chinese as looking to Japan for salvation, and Japanese as paragons of courage, discipline, endurance, and loyalty. Even after the commencement of open warfare in 1937, these trends continued to dominate the graphic imaging of Sino-Japanese relations, but failed to degenerate to the same extent that the Japanese visualization of the American enemy did during World War II.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁹ Young, 143.

197
Modern Mass Media versus Inefficient Censorship

Addressing the extent to which Japan’s graphic media depictions of Chinese from 1894 to 1937 influenced Japanese attitudes towards China was much more difficult than tracing the evolution of the same imagery. Realizing that trying to attribute direct attitudinal formation to prints and photographs in a historical setting is highly problematic, I approached the problem indirectly. As mentioned previously, I started first by examining the development of Japan’s communications and transportation infrastructure. Two rationales guided my research. The first was that unless Japan’s media industry had matured enough by creating extensive and efficient marketing and distribution networks, it would not have been capable of influencing a large percentage of the population to any substantial extent. By the 1920s, this condition had been met; annually, thousands of newspapers and magazines were being printed and delivered by modern high-speed presses, and a comprehensive transportation system linking the farthest reaches of Japan had connected most Japanese into a rapid and an efficient information network.

As important as technological advances were in the creation of Japan’s modern mass media infrastructure, they were even more revolutionary in changing how the publishing industry presented graphic media to the public. The evolution of the camera, from its incipient bulky and difficult-to-use form into a small, portable instrument capable of accurately reproducing reality, changed how humans viewed the world. Advances such as film, color, high-speed shutters, and more versatile lenses enabled photographers to capture a wider range of reality. Early photography had been limited to the controlled environment of the studio and long exposure times that required stiff poses; but by the time of the Manchurian Incident, action shots of soldiers fighting on the front were bringing the war home vividly to
Japan. New printing technologies made it possible to present these “realities” accurately and rapidly to readers on a mass scale. Given an extensive distribution network that included mail-order subscriptions, book clubs, libraries, old-book shops, and newspaper stands, avoiding exposure to the news in graphic form became nearly impossible. By the 1920s, photographic images of distant people and places, for most Japanese in a still predominantly rural country, had become an integral part of their window on the world outside.

Having determined that Japan’s publishing industry was capable of inundating the public with its graphic message, I then investigated the relationship that existed between the media and censorship apparatus in Japan during the period. Using censorship regulations and codes such as the *Evaluative Guidelines* as points of reference, I examined how the media reacted to government-imposed censorship. As shown in Chapter 7, censorship in prewar Japan never attained the level of sophistication achieved by other nations such as Nazi Germany in World War II or Great Britain in World War I. Prior to 1937, logistical difficulties (such as not enough censors) and bureaucratic inefficiencies weakened the government’s attempts at controlling the media. However, in spite of the consolidation of censorship organs in the form of the Cabinet Information Bureau after the Marco Polo Incident, the publication of prohibited images such as those pertaining to military technology continued, even after the start of the Pacific War in 1941. These repeated lapses demonstrate that the government encountered persistent problems in enforcing censorship regulations.

The inefficient state of Japan’s prewar censorship structure indicates that the publishing industry had substantial leeway in deciding what to print or not print. Although notable instances of heavy-handed punishment, such as the case of Professor Minobe Tatsukichi, do stand out in the history of Japanese censorship, these were more the exception
than the rule, especially when dealing with graphic material. As scholars such as Donald Keene and Jay Rubin have shown, inherent objections to limitations of free speech were largely lacking in the Japanese publishing industry. Instead, writers, editors, and photographers fought over inconsistent censorship enforcement, which created widespread frustration with censors when they failed to comprehend the artist's personalized expression of support for the war. Moreover, judging from the examination of hundreds of censored photographs collated from the Osaka Mainichi Shinbun collection, it is easy to conclude that censorship actually served to restrain magazines such as Monthly Historical Photos from presenting a more jingoist visual presentation of the Japanese occupation of China.

As the rapid proliferation in the number of books and magazines dedicated to the graphic coverage of events in China after the Manchurian Incident attests, it is clear that China was a very popular topic in Japan during the 1930s. As with Japan's previous wars with China and Russia had proved, media-inspired war fever sold copy. However, judging by the frequency of China-related photographs in Monthly Historical Photos and Photographic Illustration, the topic of China also attracted a sizeable readership during the more peaceful

---

181 In 1935, Professor Minobe (1873-1948) was forced to resign all public posts, including his seat in the House of Peers, and all of his books dealing with the Emperor-as-an-organ theory were banned. He narrowly avoided going on trial for lese majesty and nearly lost his life in an assassination attempt by a right-wing extremist. Ryusaka Tsunoda, Wm. Theodore Dary, and Donald Keene, comps., Sources of Japanese Tradition, Volume II (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), 239-240.


183 For photographers' and graphic editors' comments regarding censors' haphazardness in banning photographs during the war with China, see Nishii, Fukyoka shashin 1, 202-205.

184 One Japanese war correspondent stationed in Burma during the Pacific War noted that reporters competed intensely, not in reporting the news skillfully and accurately, but "... over how most effectively to rouse the public." Haruko Taya Cook and Theodore F. Cook, Japan at War: An Oral History (New York City: The New Press, 1992), 212.

185 For descriptions of the extent to which the Japanese media whipped up jingoistic fervor in the public during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and after the Manchurian Incident of 1931, see Lone, Japan's first Modern War, 78-122; and Young, Japan's Total Empire, 55-114.
1920s. In spite of the publishing industry's inability to utilize a hawkish perspective to sell magazines in calmer times, my research showed a remarkably consistent graphic visualization of both Chinese and Japanese throughout the prewar period. This consistency of graphic message, added to the relative ineffectiveness of government censorship during most of the period in question, suggests that Japan's publishing industry had a substantial amount of control over its editorial policies. Magazine publishers and editors created images designed, on the surface, to inform Japanese of the world, but in reality served to promote the greatness of the Japanese spirit—and for the most part, this message agreed with the government's views on the matter. Moreover, this message sold copy because the Japanese public also wanted to hear what magazines such as *Monthly Historical Photos* had to say.

Having determined that Japan's prewar print media portrayed China in a manner capable of breeding Japanese contempt for Chinese, and that the graphic message was capable of reaching most Japanese, the question of to what extent the graphic images affected Japanese attitudes remains to be answered. It is clear that Japan's prewar educational system, army indoctrination program for conscripts, and mass media all played essential roles in influencing Japanese attitudes towards Chinese. Which, however, of these sources exerted the most influence on the Japanese public? All three sources were integral components of the cultural milieu that collectively created Japanese attitudes towards China; but analyzing each one out of context helps to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of each system in order to determine which may have most affected the Japanese public. Towards that end, I argue that of the three, Japan's graphic media had the most widespread influence on Japanese over the longest period.

---

186 My examination of China-related images from both magazines noted 368 images from the 1904-1931 period and 456 images from the 1931-1937 period. See issues of *Monthly Historical Photos* and *Photographic Illustration*, passim.
Using the same reasoning that guided the research for this project, I rated the educational system as having the least impact of the three institutions. In spite of its ability to reach over 90% of the population through free universal education after 1904, the moderate treatment of China and relative lack of graphic images diluted any negative influences that government textbooks might have projected. Moreover, compulsory education throughout the prewar period lasted only six years, while the publishing industry’s influence, in the form of popular magazines that targeted most age groups, lasted throughout the life spans of most Japanese. I rated army indoctrination as slightly more influential than education because of the intensity of the experiences that most recruits underwent in getting through basic training. One officer described the training regimen typical for recruits stationed in China in 1941: “A new conscript became a full-fledged soldier in three months in the battle area. We planned exercises for these men. As the last stage of their training, we made them bayonet a living human.”¹⁸⁷ Of course, that living human was invariably a Chinese person. While the combination of this kind of indoctrination and living through the horrors of the battlefield surely made a lasting impact on many soldiers, only a relatively small proportion of Japan’s total population were exposed to such experiences and for only short periods of time prior to 1937.¹⁸⁸

As I have shown in the preceding chapters, the media’s graphic message regarding China and Chinese was negative, reached most of the Japanese population, and remained remarkably consistent over a long period of time. Although the negativity of the message vividly surfaced during times of open conflict with China, the media usually presented it in

¹⁸⁷ Cook and Cook, Japan at War, 43
¹⁸⁸ Until 1937, Japan’s peacetime army never exceeded 300,000, and only 12% to 16% of conscript-age men (about 100,000) were actually drafted each year for the required two-year stints. Richard J. Smethurst, A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism: The Army and Rural Community (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 6, quoted in Young, Japan’s Total Empire, 132.
terms subtle enough to preclude most Japanese from wantonly disregarding it as propaganda motivated by jingoistic or economic reasons. Judging by the generally negative prewar as well as postwar Japanese attitudes towards Chinese, many Japanese must have bought into the media’s skillfully presented yet understated message that implied that Chinese were inferior to Japanese. In spite of having highlighted the impact of the media’s visual message, it is essential to emphasize once more that graphic images worked within a cultural context.

Without the appropriate words to illustrate depictions, additional reinforcing sources of information such as the army and government textbooks, and political and social events that can be utilized by governments or mass media to confirm a given message, the influence of media tools such as Monthly Historical Photos are usually temporary and negligible. As time progresses in media-driven industrialized societies, new influences tend to bury the old, and attitudes change from generation to generation. In the case of Japan, I surmise that postwar events such as the rebuilding of the nation and the American-imposed isolation from Communist China served to preserve rather than erase negative prewar attitudes towards China. The fact that Japan and China did not conclude a peace treaty until 1978, suggests that the negative attitudes were slow to dissipate even decades after the fighting between the two countries had ended.189

As is usually the case in conducting this kind of project, time and economics have been limiting factors in determining how far to pursue the various avenues of research presented above. My first plan for continuing investigations into the effects of graphic media on Japanese attitudinal formation is to examine further the extent to which popular magazines

such as *Monthly Historical Photos* existed during prewar Japan. This will include assembling a complete run of *Monthly Historical Photos*, examining more thoroughly the publication data of it and other similar magazines (such as editor backgrounds, funding, distribution patterns, etc.), and cataloging graphic content. Uncovering information such as subscription rates and the number of magazines similar to *Monthly Historical Photos* that existed during the period will help in determining the extent of their influence more clearly. Moreover, in spite of the severe shortage of paper and other printing materials crippling the nation during the Pacific War, over two-thousand different magazines still existed in Japan as late as 1943; many of them were graphically oriented, and many, such as *Monthly Historical Photos*, have failed to attract serious attention by scholars, Japanese and non-Japanese alike.\(^{190}\) A most likely reason for the relatively low academic profile of this source of material is that much of it is not stored in libraries or archives. I obtained nearly all of the over two-hundred magazines used for this project from bookstores across Japan, and these sources will continue to provide an abundance of material for the foreseeable future.

Another area of study that needs further pursuit is the examination of the backgrounds and views of the photographers who were actually in positions to observe for themselves the realities of the Chinese front. To what extent were they influenced by Japanese actions and to what extent were they accomplices in propagating the image of Chinese that emerged during the period? While sources such as the *Osaka Mainichi Shinbun* collection, Makino's *Fukyoka shashin shi*, and the Cooks' *Japan at War* are valuable in shedding light on the subject, more evidence remains to be uncovered. As the Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (JACAR) continues to increase the amount of documentation

---

\(^{190}\) Private conversation with Nagamine Shigetoshi, November 2003.
available online every year, this kind of information will become more readily available in the future.

Finally, extending this study into the war and postwar periods in order to see how long the effects of graphic media can linger in society will help us to understand better its role in the formation of modern Japan as well as other nations. This is particularly pertinent in society today, where a highly developed global mass media system more often than not serves as a proxy for international relations because of its ability to create realities that, while appearing accurate, fail to represent the truth faithfully. Moreover, in spite of modern technology’s power to bring people and cultures closer together through modern communications and transportation, it also has made it easier to overlook much of the world by allowing us to bypass what we choose not to see. Instead, we rely increasingly on graphic media to tell us what we want to hear about the world in short sound bites that ignore the important subtleties of the issues at stake. This kind of superficial interaction with mass media distorts perceptions of our selves as well as our others, as was shown by the global coverage of events following the terrorist attack on New York City on 11 September, 2001.

In the aftermath of the attack that brought down the World Trade Center’s twin towers, the world has experienced vividly the potential extent of the mass media’s influence when working in concert with the government concerned. On one hand, the Western media has played a large role in creating an extremely negative image of the Muslims; on the other hand, Islamic media organizations, such as Aljazeera, have marginalized the West in the eyes of the Islamic world. Although the socio-political problems in the Middle East are far more complicated than usually portrayed, with roots deep in past, the mass media tends to report on events in the area superficially. This incomplete coverage by the media is in large part
responsible for the dramatic polarization in relations that has occurred between the United States and Islamic cultures around the world during the twentieth century.

In conclusion, it must be reiterated that mass media does not work in a vacuum. Other influences on attitude formation, such as education, personal experiences, and belief systems always work together with media to produce one's individual viewpoint of the world. In the final analysis, this worldview strongly influences how we act and react. However, without the proper tools such as an objective mass media, which informs on multiple aspects of an issue, and personal inquisitiveness, which drives us to seek answers as to why things are the way they appear, formulating a balanced and relatively accurate picture of ourselves and others becomes an extremely challenging task.
APPENDIX A

MAP OF CHINA AND JAPAN (CIRCA 1930)

191 Taken from Chinese abroad, ca. 1930 A.D., at http://map.huai.net/84.jpg; internet; accessed 24 April 2005.
APPENDIX B

EVALUATIVE GUIDELINES REGARDING THE APPROVAL AND REJECTION OF ITEMS
PUBLISHED IN NEWSPAPERS
(September 9, 1937: Ministry of Army News Censorship Chief)

ARMY

i) These evaluative guidelines replace the evaluative guidelines created on July 28 1937 (additions made on August 1); however guidelines concerning air defense shall follow the evaluative guidelines regarding the approval and rejection of air-defense related items published in newspapers, as noted in the Defense of the Nation [act/document] of September 6, 1937.

ii) Announcements made by the Army Ministry and the head of the Department of Troop Deployment (including QO news bureau for the duration) must be approved.

iii) The following items may be published (bold lettering added)

1) As long as the past, present, and future movements of troops are not revealed in articles and photographs, the following items described below can be shown (bold lettering added), but only however, as long as weaponry capabilities are not revealed
   a) the activities of regular infantry, cavalry, field artillery, mountain artillery, engineers, and military transport units
   b) the activity of heavy field artillery (smaller than 150 mm)
   c) the actions of high-powered artillery (as long as sights are not shown) and related support machinery
   d) actions of armored cars
   e) bridge-building (excluding specialized heavy tanks and the like used for crossing bridges), and the activities of wireless and railroad army engineers

192 In translating this document, I attempted to convey the idiosyncratic nature of the original Japanese text. While the double negatives, extensive use of etc. (nado), mid-level generalizations, and inconsistent transcription of diacritic symbols used to signify the negative form made translating the document a challenge, I am confident that it also posed difficulties for contemporary Japanese trying to comply with or enforce censorship guidelines. The document's Japanese title is "Shinbun keisai jikō kyōhi hantei yōryō," and was taken from Nishii Kazuo, ed. Hizō no fukyoka shashin 1, (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1998), 223.
f) actions of military vehicles

g) regular tank activity, however excluding clear views of tank components; the type of tank is not to be revealed—all tanks and tank units shall be labeled uniformly as “tanks” and “tank units.”

h) photographs of planes in flight or articles pertaining to combat missions; however, the type of plane shall not be identified but uniformly referred to as “airplanes.”

2) Pertaining to brigade units and larger, unit commanders' family names, regardless of length, must be spelled out as “so and so unit” and “so and so unit leader.”

Pertaining to leaders of regiment size and smaller units, leaders' names shall be referred to as “so and so’s unit” or “so and so unit leader.”

For cases above the regiment level, the command structure must be shown as “so and so’s unit” of “so and so unit.”

3) Photographs of unit leaders of colonel or lower rank, as long as epaulets are not shown.

4) In stories that are clearly inspirational, permission to publish is allowed as long as unit number, location, and mustering date as well as age, rank, and type of soldier are not revealed—however, there is no harm in using explanatory phrases such as the gathering, mustering, and dispatching of troops.

5) For inspirational stories from the homefront [Japan], follow the above guidelines.

6) When interviewing troops called up for duty, for information regarding departures, send-offs, etc., refer to Article 5.

7) Regarding the departures, transit, and sending-off of units: unit designation, departure, transit, place and time of send-off, and unit destination are allowed only in abstract terms; however, for troops transported by ship, articles and photographs that reveal information related to their departures, transit, and sending-off are not allowed.

8) Regarding any units related to the above activities, refer to the above guidelines.

iv) The following articles are not allowed (bold lettering added)

1) Regarding articles and photographs on airfields and airplane accidents:
while there is no harm in reporting the death in battle of those aboard, using phrases such as “died in action over so and so area” is prohibited.

2) photographs of unit leaders (major-generals) and above rank
3) photographs of units flying military flags or articles about military flags
4) photographs of large gatherings of staff officers
5) photographs or articles that identify operation commands or headquarters
6) photographs or articles that identify or are about armored-tracked vehicles
7) photographs or articles that identify or are about mechanized units or troops
8) photographs or articles that are about water-supply vehicles or other related equipment
9) any photographs or articles about the facts of the movement, relief, transit, or advance, etc., of units that threaten to expose future military plans
10) photographs or articles that identify or are about amphibious vehicles
11) aside from the above [guidelines], photographs or articles of special forces
12) photographs or articles unfavorable to our army
13) photographs or articles of Chinese soldiers or prisoners being interrogated that suggest [Japanese] maltreatment
14) photographs of [Japanese] cruelty; however, there is no harm in articles pertaining to the cruelty of Chinese or Chinese soldiers

v) Movies shall be censored according to these guidelines

vi) These guidelines will be amended as needed.

NAVY

EVALUATIVE GUIDELINES REGARDING THE APPROVAL AND REJECTION OF ITEMS PUBLISHED IN NEWSPAPERS (and magazines)
(revised September 1937 by the Navy Ministry)

Pertaining to the recent incident, the treatment of articles or photos related to the Navy will be based upon the [document], “items banned from publication in newspapers,” issued by the Navy Ministry in July 1937; nothing may conflict with said [document] and it goes without saying that the articles listed below must be adhered to.

Articles
1) Announcements made by the Navy Ministry, naval stations, department of strategic 
ports, and naval headquarters may be published, but must be inspected by censors anyway.

2) Regarding ships engaging in convoy duty, caution is to be taken in order not to 
divulge information such as the names of ships, ports of departure, destinations, type of troops 
being transported, troop strength, equipment, and fleet formation.

3) After being inspected by [naval] headquarters, naval stations, department of 
strategic ports, or authorities from the Navy Ministry, articles (including photographs) on ship 
manufacture, naval maneuvers, and naval strategy or similar topics must pass through Naval 
Command to undergo censoring.

4) There is no harm in publishing the names of cruisers, destroyers, torpedo boats, and 
gunboats anchoring inside the mouth of the Kō inlet; (caution) Goshō-oki is not the Kō inlet.

5) Permission to print the type of weapons in use along the Shanghai front lines on land 
is granted by the Army Ministry. However, anything that may expose ordinance classified as 
"special weapons" in use by the Navy or reveal conditions in allied territory must be inspected 
by the authorities.

6) Describing units in terms of Yamada's unit or Suzuki's unit is possible [allowable]; 
but when using apppellations such as Suzuki's Platoon, Yamada's Company, or Takahashi's 
Battalion, caution must be taken not to reveal the battle strength of troop units.

7) All our forces' rendezvous points must be represented by 00 (two) when published.

8) While there is no harm in photographs of airplanes in flight and articles concerning 
air battles, publishing information on topics such as reconnaissance missions, air battles, and 
the type and number of fighters is prohibited.

9) Aside from announcements made at the Navy Ministry, the outside publication of 
statistical numbers pertaining to damaged warships and airplanes as well as the number of 
war casualties is prohibited.

10) Articles that may possibly allow the inference of planned future movements of naval 
ships and troop units or the like must be handled with extreme caution; however, there is no
harm in the use of circles (two) as in the following cases:

Examples
the naval ship “OO” is departing for “OO” destination
“OO” unit is heading for “OO” destination
battle group “OO” is passing through “OO” location

There is no harm in detailing the actions of the Third Battle Group in the Shanghai area.

Examples
Third Battle Group Headquarters
The Third Battle Group’s flagship, Izumo
Announcement from Third Battle Group’s communications unit
The Third Battle Group’s “OO” destroyer group

These are the ways the Third Battle Group should be used.

11) Articles and photos injurious to our military are not to be published.

12) Photos of cruelty [by Japanese soldiers] are not to be published.

13) Taking photos of warships and military cargo [is allowed] as long as they do not violate the following censorship guidelines: however, specialist-oriented [technical] publications must conform to extensive specifications and follow the authorities’ guidelines 

(general principles of prohibited items are listed as follows) (bold lettering added)

a) photographs showing the full frontal, back, and sideways views of warships
b) photographing structural components of weaponry, as well as clearly identifying the effectiveness and power of weapons
c) large photographs that may reveal structural components of warships
d) anything that injures the dignified appearance of warships
e) photographing special military weaponry (publication may be possible when negative slides have been appropriately corrected)
f) photographing naval vessels from a birds-eye view (depending on the angle)
g) naval vessels showing formation identifications (there is no harm in publication if negative slides have been appropriately corrected; however photographs of maneuvers are not allowed)

14) There is no harm in publishing moving stories of groups of soldiers (such as warships and combat land units) as long as the location of their units is not revealed.

(remarks)
These guidelines will be amended as the need arises.
APPENDIX C

陸軍
新聞掲載事項許可判定要領
(昭和一二、九、九陸軍省報道検問係)

一、昭和一二年七月二十八日作製（八月一日附増刷シタルモノヲアリ）ノ判定要領ニ代ウルノ本要領ヲ似テス
但シ防空ニ関スル事項ハ昭和一二年九月六日作製ノ国士防衛中防空ニ関スル新聞掲載許可判定要領ニヨル

二、陸軍省及出征軍最高司令部（当分ノ間オー報道ヲ含ム）ノ発表ハ更メテ許可ヲ受クルヲ要セル

三、左ニ列記スル事項ハ掲載ヲ許可ス
(1) 軍隊ノ過去ノ行動中現在及将来ノ企図ヲ暴露スレ慮ナキ局外部ノ記事及写真ヲ掲載シ示ス様ノ如キモノ
但シ兵器ヲ型ハリ性能ヲ窺知シ得サルモノヲ除クル
イ、通常ノ社え歩兵、騎兵、野砲兵、山砲兵、工兵及び機重兵ノ活動
ロ、野戦重砲（十五箇以下）ノ活動
ハ、高射砲（照準具ヲ示スサルモノヲ除ク）高射機関銃ノ活動
ニ、装甲列車ノ活動
ホ、架橋（戦車自動車等ノ重車両渡橋用モノ特種モノヲ除ク）無線、電磁等ノ工兵部隊ノ活動
ヘ、軍用自動車ノ活動
ト、通常ノ戦車ノ活動但シ各部分ノ明瞭ナルモノヲ除ク戦車ノ種類ヲ示スコトナク一律ニ戦車、戦車隊トス
チ、飛行中ノ飛行機ノ写真及飛行機ノ戦闘ニ関スル記事
但シ一律ニ飛行機ナル名称ヲ用ヒ機種ヲ示スコトヲ得ス
(2) 旅団以上ノ部隊＝関シテハ部隊長ノ姓ノ長短＝拘ラス「OO 部隊」「OO 部隊長」トシタルモノ
連隊以下ノ部隊＝関シテハ其指揮官ノ姓冠シ「某部隊」「某部隊長」トシタルモノ
以上ノ場合「OO 部隊」「某部隊」等指揮系統ヲ示スコトヲ得ス
(3) 部隊長（大佐）以下ノ写真但シ連隊長ノ写真ハ肩章ノ明瞭なナルサルモノヲ除クル
(4) 明朗ナル召集美談
部隊号、部隊所在地、召集ヲ召否ノ日時、召集ノ種類且ノ種年齢ヲ記載セサル
モノニ限ル
但シ召集、応召、出征等ノ字句ヲ用フルハ差支ナシ
(5) 銀後ノ美談
右ニ準ス
(6) 応召者ノ面会、出発、見送等ノ情況
(5) 二準ス
(7) 部隊ノ出発、通過、見送等ノ情況
部隊号、出発、通過、見送ノ場所及び日時、部隊ノ行先等ヲ示サレル抽象
的ノモノニ限ル
但シ艦船ニヨリ輸送スル部隊ノ出発通過見送ノ情況ニ関スル記事ヲ書ク
(8) 右ニ関連スル各種団体ノ活動
右ニ準ス
四、左ニ列記スルモノハ掲載ヲ許可セス
(1) 飛行場及飛行機事故ニ関スル記事ヲ書ク
搭乗者戦死ノ場合単ニ戦死トシテ掲載スルハ差支ナキモ「某地上空ニ於
テ」等ノ記事ヲ准ス
(2) 旅団長(少将)以上ノ写真
(3) 軍旗ヲ有スル部隊ノ写真及軍旗ニ関スル記事
(4) 多数幕僚ヲ集合シアル写真
(5) 司令部、本部ノ名称ヲ記載セル記事ヲ書ク
(6) 装甲軌道車ノ名称及之ニ関スル記事ヲ書ク
(7) 機械化兵団、機械化部隊ノ名称及之ニ関スル記事ヲ書ク
(8) 給水自動車ヲ并び給水機材ニ関スル記事ヲ書ク
(9) 部隊ノ移動、交代、通過、進出等事実ニシテヲ後ヲ企図ヲ暴露スル虞ア
ル記事ヲ書ク
(10) 水陸両用戦車ノ名称及之ニ関スル記事ヲ書ク
(11) 以上ノ外特殊部隊ニ関スル記事ヲ書ク
(12) 我軍ニ不利ヲ記載ヲ書ク
(13) 支那兵ヲハ支那人逮捕及捕間等ノ記事ヲ書ク中虐待ノ感受ヲ与スル虞ヲアルモノ
(14) 慘虐ナル写真但シ支那兵ヲハ支那人ノ惨虐性ニ関スル記事ヲ差支ナシ
五、映画ハ本要領ニ準ス検閲スルモノトス
六、本要領ハ必要ニ応シ加除訂正ス

海軍
新聞(雑誌)掲載事項許否判定要領(昭和十二年九月改定海軍省)

214
今次事変ニ関連シ海軍ニ関スル記事若ハ写真ヲ取扱フ場合ハ昭和十二年七月海軍省発布ノ新聞掲載禁止事項ノ標準ニ準拠シ之ヲレニ抵触セザル事ヲ必要トスルハ勿論ナルモ左記諸号ヲ留意スルヲ要ス

記
一、海軍省、鎮守府、要港部ハハ艦隊司令部ハハ其ノ艦隻ヲ放ハ其ノ艦載記載差支ナシ然ラザルモノノハ呑検閲ヲ受クル必要アリ
二、護送任務ニ従事シノ艦船ハ其ノ艦船ノ名ヲ、発進地、到着地、輸送兵種、兵力、物
件、航行陣形等ヲ察知セラレザル様注意スルコト
三、艦船ニ便乗中作製シタル当該艦ノ行動記載若ハハ海上部隊ハ作戦記事（写
真ヲ含む）ノ如キハハ呑検閲ヲ、鎮守府、要港部、或ハ海軍省ニ当居ハハ查閲ヲ受
ケタル後海軍省ニヨル検閲機関ヲ経由スル必要アリ
四、黃浦口内ニ在泊行動スル巡洋艦、駆逐艦、水雷艇、砲艦ニ限り艦船ノ記載差支ナシ（註）号洪沖ハ黄浦ロニ非ズ
五、上海陸上戦線ニ於テ使用シツヲナル兵器類ハ陸軍省許可範囲ニ準ズ
但シ海軍ニ於テ使用スル特殊兵器ト認メルモノヲ及ビ味方陣地ノ内状ヲ暴露ス
ルヲ如キハハ當居ハハ查閲ヲ受クル必要アリ
六、山田部隊、鈴木部隊等呼称スルハ可ナルモ、鈴木小隊、山田中隊、高橋大隊
等ト記載シ兵力可察知ノ資料ヲ與ヘサル様注意スルコト
七、我兵力集結地点ヲ記述スル場合凡テ OO（二個）ヲ使用ス
八、飛行中ノ飛行機写真並ニ飛行機戦闘ニ関スル記載ハ差支ナキモ、偵察、戦闘、
攻撃機等ノ機種並ニ機数ヲ記載セザルコト
九、艦船、航空機ノ被害状況、戦病死者、負傷者ノ統計的数字ハ海軍省ニテ公表ス
ルモノヲ除ク外掲載ヲ禁止ス
一〇、艦船、部隊移動ノ記事ハ将来ト企図ヲ推知セラル虞アル似テ取扱慎重ヲ要ス但シ OO（二個）ヲ用ヒ左例程度ノモノヲ差支ナシ
（例） 「OO」艦隊ハ「OO」ヲ向ケ出港セリ
「OO」部隊ハ「OO」ヲ移動ス
「OO」戦隊ハ「OO」ヲ通過セリ
尚上海方面ニ行動スル第三艦隊名ヲ明記ス差支ナシ
（例） 第三艦隊司令長官
第三艦隊倉本関
第三艦隊報道班発表
第三艦隊 OO 駆逐隊
等ヲ使用スル第三艦隊名
一一、我軍ニ不利ナル記事、写真ハ掲載セザルコト
一二、惨虐ナル写真ハ掲載セザルコト

215
一三、軍艦並に搭載兵器類ノ写真撮影ハ左記禁止事項ニ抵触セザルモノニ限ル
　但シ専門的見地ヲリスル発表ノ可否ハ広汎ニ渡り列挙スルコト能ハザルヲ似て
　当局ノ指示ヲ受クル必要アリ
　(一般的禁止事項原則左ノ如シ)
　(イ) 軍艦ノ真正面、真後向、真横写真
　(ロ) 兵器類ノ機構部分ヲ撮影シタルモノ、又其ノ能力、威力ヲ明
　　瞭ニ示スモノ
　(ハ) 艦ノ構造ヲ観知シ得ヲルガ如キ大写シ写真
　(ニ) 艦ノ威容ヲ損スルガ如キモノ
　(ホ) 特種兵器ノ撮影ヲセシムモノ (原版ヲ修正ヲ行ヒ消去セバ発
　　表可能ノ場合アリ)
　(ヘ) 航空機より俯瞰セル艦船写真 (程度ニヨル)
　(ト) 隊番号記載ノ艦船 (原版ヲ修正ヲ行ヒ消去セバ発表可能ノ場
　　合アリ尚活動写真ノ場合ハ差支ナシとス)
一四、応召者美談等ハ配属部隊 (軍艦、陸戦隊ノ如キ) 派遣先等ヲ明示セザルモノ
　ニ限り掲載差支ナシ
　(備考) 本要領ハ必要ニ応フ加除訂正スルコトアリ
SOURCES CONSULTED

Japanese Primary Sources


Kokusai shashin jōhō (The international graphic). January, February, May 1938; October 1939.

Kokusai shashin shinbun (The International News Photo). July 1937; March 1938.


Shashin tsūshin (The photographic illustration). September 1914-November 1927.


English Primary Sources


Japanese Secondary Sources


Bijutsu Shuppansha (Fine arts publishing). “Tokushū bakumatsu hanga ni miru jūnen no zōkei” (Special edition: The creation of pathos as seen in woodblock prints from the end of the Edo period). Mizue, no. 4 (Mizue: A monthly review of the fine Arts, no 4) (September 1968).


Takizawa Hiro, ed. “Sensō 100 nen no kiroku: eikō no kengun kara taiheiyo sensō no shūketsu made” (100 years of War: From the glorious founding of the army to the end of the Pacific War). Bessatsu shukan Yomiuri (Weekly Yomiuri supplement) (January 1970).


**English Secondary Sources**


Internet


