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THE JINGJU-WAYANG ENCOUNTER: CHINA AND INDONESIA DURING THE
CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE GESTAPU COUP AND COUNTERCOUP

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This work is dedicated to all those Chinese and Indonesian people who lost their lives in, and also to all those who have suffered the hardships of, the Chinese Cultural Revolution and the Indonesian Gestapu Coup and Countercoup.
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I have been the beneficiary of extensive assistance and support from many individuals as the process for this dissertation unfolded. Stephen Uhalley, Jr., my dissertation advisor, has been unfailing in his support and guidance; his instruction, advice and constructive comments have been vital to the completion of this work. Leonard Andaya, Timothy Naftali, and Robert Van Niel have been the very best of instructors; true teachers in the best sense of the word. Alice Dewey has gone the extra mile suffering my unending explanations of my themes and ideas; access to her deep knowledge of Indonesia is a rare opportunity for any student. Along with Muthiah Alagappa, Alvin So, and T. Y. Tao I must say that all of these faculty members have enriched my existence as well as my fund of knowledge.

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I wish to thank the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, the Center for Chinese Studies, the History Department, the University ROTC program, and the University Veteran’s Affairs
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gracious wife invited me to their apartment for our interview, a rare treat for a visiting foreigner because the general custom in China is to do business and socialize in public meeting places. Professor Zhang Xizheng and his gracious wife Ji also invited me into their home, and I felt quite honored. Guo Hongxing deserves special thanks for his support in all things such as special access to the dissertation vault at Beida, entry to the National Library stacks, trip arrangements to Zhoukoudian, and all the other arrangements he made for me. Penn Zhou eased my way greatly for research opportunities in Shanghai and Nanjing.

While they and others will be credited in the thesis, I must thank Pak Raden and Ibu Meriam Sukardi, James T. Collins, Abdul Dahana, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Lan Hiang Char, and Yati Barnard for their assistance with the Indonesian language, sources, access, and information. Others in Indonesia will go unnamed for reasons of political sensitivities, but I have endeavored to express my gratitude to them, and I will continue to do so.

The University of Hawai'i at Mānoa Hamilton Library staff deserves really special thanks, not only for their professional expertise, but especially for the superb manner in which they have responded to the October, 2004 flood which devastated the library and even threatened some lives. After more than four decades of operation, no one could have predicted nature's vii
wrath. Ted Kwok and many other staff members were exceptionally innovative in devising ways for me to attain sources needed to finish my dissertation; they were magnificent! The Richardson School of Law Library was most supportive in my time of need.

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This dissertation is a study of the breakdown in relations between China and Indonesia, between October 1965 and October 1967, the early years of the Cultural Revolution and the Gestapu coup and countercoup. During that most tumultuous period in each Republic's short history, China and Indonesia each lost relations with only one major diplomatic partner: the other. Foreign Ministers Chen Yi and Dr. H. Subandrio, along with their ministries, came under repeated, violent, domestic attack. They were toppled and their foreign affairs systems thrown into severe disarray through radical, politically motivated, attacks and purges. Activist student groups in each country attacked the other nation's resident diplomatic facilities and personnel.

Despite China's severely strained relations around the world the PRC managed to hold on to its ties with its other major partners. Indonesia, with an increasingly broad anti-communist national program characterized by the Suharto New Order regime's decimation of the Indonesian Communist Party, the PKI, continued its relations with all of its other communist diplomatic partners.

This study uses Indonesian and Chinese internal government materials, as well as other Chinese and Indonesian language sources, to explore the cataclysmic domestic situations which played themselves out in their foreign relations.
Taking a different approach than earlier accounts, this dissertation views the breakdown in relations from both sides through their own words, but also with the use of U. S. and British declassified documents, and other reference materials, to provide depth from third party perspectives. The use of memoirs of recently released political prisoners, and other first-hand accounts, combined with my translations of the contents of diplomatic notes between the two nations, all serve to challenge conventionally held views of the break in relations: that the split was inevitable, that China and the PKI were mainly responsible, that the Indonesian student attacks were spontaneous, that the Indonesian Chinese brought about the breakup, and other popularly held impressions. Simultaneous disorder in both the domestic and foreign affairs scenes played the predominant role in the final freeze, or suspension, in relations in October 1967 which would last for nearly a quarter of a century.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This dissertation examines the various factors in the breakdown of diplomatic relations between China and Indonesia between October, 1965, the time of the Indonesian Gestapu Coup and beginning of the countercoup, and the early evolvement of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and October 1967, when relations between China and Indonesia were suspended (zhongduan in Chinese), or frozen (dibekukan in Bahasa Indonesia). The result was a rupture in relations which lasted for nearly a quarter of a century, to 1990, when relations were reestablished. During this two year period both China and Indonesia suffered the most chaotic domestic conditions experienced in each republic's short history; the People's

1 The term Gestapu is used as a label for the coup attempt in Jakarta which began on the night of September 30, 1965, in which six Army generals and one lower ranking officer were kidnapped from their homes during the early morning hours of October 1, and subsequently found to have all been murdered. The term comes from the Suharto government label for the date of the beginning of the failed coup Gerakan September Tiga Puluh, the September 30th Movement. The term was coined intentionally to cast a sinister, and forbidden, aura on the coup by framing it in terms of the malevolent Nazi Gestapo, Hitler's infamous Geheimes Staatspolizei-Secret State Police, B. Dahm, Indonesien: Geschichte Eines Entwicklungslandes (1945-1971) [Indonesia: History of a Developing Nation (1945-1971)], (Leiden/Koln: E. J. Brill, 1978), 158. The term countercoup describes the period beginning on October 1, 1965, when General Suharto and the Indonesian Army began their move to power, and lasting until March 27, 1968 when Suharto was sworn in as President, formally replacing President Sukarno.
Republic of China, founded in 1949, and the Republic of Indonesia, formally established in 1950. The domestic chaos in each country, during the same two years, played a predominant role in the interruption of diplomatic relations between them.

The political operatics and *sturm und drang* of China's Cultural Revolution and Indonesia's Gestapu coup and countercoup have parallels in the famed Beijing Opera (*Jingju*) and the popular Indonesian shadow play (*Wayang Kulit*). Both of these national movements were intensely inward looking, but had a shattering effect on relations between these two societies so steeped in their own ancient cultural legacies.

The use of the terms in the title emanated from the realization, as this study progressed, that deeper understanding of the meaning of the events of the Cultural Revolution and the Gestapu coup and countercoup could be got from framing one's understanding in terms of the *Wayang* and the *Jingju*; as explained in the chapters that follow. Though not a specialist on either art form, I have spent long hours, even days (and nights, in the case of village festivals), in the countryside, as well as in formal, official presentational settings, in both Indonesia (*Wayang*) and China (especially in the countryside in Taiwan) in attendance at *Jingju* performances (more accurately termed *jingxi*, *xiju*, or *wuxi*, when not strictly in the form of the Beijing Opera). Both populations incorporate the themes from their particular art form, to the extent of, sometimes,
seemingly unaware that they are playing out those themes, and character traits, in their daily lives.

More detail will follow, but a few illustrative examples are the search for the dalang (the title for the puppet master in the Wayang) of Gestapu, and the complete transformation of the Jingju by Chairman Mao’s wife Jiang Qing during the course of the Cultural Revolution. Suharto’s invention of the term Supersemar (from the term Surat Perintah Seblas Maret-Letter of Authorization of Eleven March) refers to the letter of authorization forced from President Sukarno which gave full power and authority over Indonesia to Lieutenant General Suharto in 1966. Semar is one of the most eminent and powerful characters in the Wayang; the God-clown, beloved of Wayang audiences everywhere. The addition of the modern word super connoted even greater powers than those possessed by the Wayang character, powers placed in the hands of General Suharto.2

In China it was an opera, after all, Wu Han’s "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office" which became the cause celebre to launch the Cultural Revolution.3 As one follows the unfolding of the

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3 Chen Mingxian and Zhang Heng, Xin Zhongguo sishi nian yanjiu [A Study of New China’s Forty Years], (Beijing: Beijing ligong daxue chubanshe, 1989), 346-347, relates that the famous Beijing Opera luminary, Ma Lianliang honored Wu Han by
high drama of events of the Cultural Revolution, the huge parades (or spectacles, really) by Red Guards in Tiananmen square, the dramatic confrontations during the February Adverse Current affair and its aftermath, the high tension of the struggle sessions and public self-criticisms by even the highest officials, the interplay of inhabitants of Chairman Mao's inner circle as related by Mao's personal physician, Dr. Li Zhisui and others, the themes from the Jingju spring, unbidden, to mind. 4 One would not wish to make too much of this line of inquiry, only to employ the concepts, the themes, to personally asking him to write an adaptation of "Hai Rui" for performance by the Beijing Opera as early as 1959. Wu Han had written the story prior to the Lushan Conference in September, 1959, where Mao had engineered the dismissal of Marshall Peng Dehuai; the piece wasn't adapted for opera until 1960. Nonetheless "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office" became the main object of attack by the Cultural Revolution left-radical group accusing Wu Han of likening the dismissal of Peng Dehuai to the dismissal of the upright Minister Hai Rui, and thereby comparing Chairman Mao to the Ming Dynasty evil emperor, Jia Jing, who had dismissed Hai Rui. Also see D. W. Y. Kwok, "Wu Han: The Case of the Mulberries and the Ashes," Asian Studies at Hawai'i 7 (1972): 3-27. I thank Professor Kwok for helping me to understand more clearly the importance of the issues involved in the Hai Rui case. More will be revealed in the following chapters.

4 Li Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao, translated by Tai Hung-Chao, edited by Anne F. Thurston, (New York: Random House, 1994). One is placed in mind of the tales of the Chinese Imperial court as one reads the events related in Dr. Li's book, which is commended by the esteemed Roderick MacFarquhar that "there is only one source providing testimony to the Chairman's innermost feelings about his principal deputy [the felled Liu Shaoqi]: the memoirs of Dr. Li Zhisui"; Roderick MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 1961-1966, Part III of The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), multivolume, 416.
assist in a deeper comprehension of the nature of the cataclysmic, tragic, events of the Great Cultural Revolution (wenhua da geming) in China, and the Gestapu coup and countercoup in Indonesia, especially for the period, October, 1965 to October, 1967. A clear picture of the nature of these two gigantic mass movements facilitates a comprehensive description of their roles in the rupture of relations between the two nations.

As will be described, the government of China, in the throes of the most virulent phase of the Cultural Revolution, lost control of its domestic governing power during 1966-67. China's foreign minister, Marshall Chen Yi, his ministry, and China's foreign affairs sector, including its overseas operations, were all severely disabled by repeated Cultural Revolution group attacks. During the summer of 1967, control of China's foreign affairs fell out of the hands of Premier Zhou Enlai and Chairman Mao Zedong, as will be documented herein.

During that same two year period, the struggle for power between General Suharto, the Indonesian army, and affiliates, and President Sukarno and his allies saw repeated attacks on Sukarno's Foreign Minister Dr. H. Subandrio and his ministry which resulted in his arrest, trial and death sentence. The ranks of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry underwent a purge in 1966-67 at the same time that China was losing control of its foreign ministry and foreign affairs. As will be demonstrated,
the turbulent removal of each foreign minister along with the breakdown in each country's foreign ministry operations, accompanied by the extreme upset in each country's foreign affairs between October 1965 and October 1967 all can be seen as the major contributing factors in the rupture of relations between China and Indonesia in October, 1967.

Other factors played a role in the break in relations, and they will be touched on as the text goes along. Some of these other factors were: the competition between opposing sides in the cold war, which played itself out in East Asia, and especially in Southeast Asia; the heating up of America's war in Vietnam; the Confrontation (Konfrontasi) between Indonesia, and Malaysia and Great Britain; internal and external tension in the Non-aligned movement; Indonesia's earlier withdrawal from the United Nations; competition between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC); the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); the many currents in Southeast Asian national politics (Maphilindo, the Indochina alignment with Soviet, Chinese, and Vietnamese communism, Burmese neutrality based on its own brand of socialism, Thai and Philippine alliance with the U. S., and so forth). All of these conditions and more were at play in this

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critical two-year period in the mid-1960s, but the results of

this study show China’s and Indonesia’s chaotic domestic situations’ effects on their foreign affairs infrastructures. These effects emerge as the, or at least one of the, primary factor(s) in the breakdown in relations.

The approach taken in this study is to examine the view of the breakdown in relations from the standpoint of each of the two nations involved; to do a thorough inspection of both Chinese and Indonesian language sources. In this way one will discover just how it was that relations between China and Indonesia went from amicable to non-existent in the short period between October 1965 and October 1967. China and Indonesia had consummated 25 diplomatic protocols, agreements, exchange of notes, and communiqués between 1950 and 1965. Just in 1965 alone the two nations amicably agreed on the following:

Jan 12: Agreement on cooperation in the field of tourism
28: Agreement on economic and technical cooperation
Agreement on Chinese loan
Mar 16: Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation
31: Protocol on economic and technical cooperation
Apr 6: Protocol on economic and technical cooperation relating to the construction of paper mill
Jul 24: Agreement on maritime transport
Aug 2(?) Agreement on cooperation in insurance
Sep 30: Trade agreement
Trade protocol
Payments agreement

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Agreement on economic and technical cooperation
Protocol on economic and technical cooperation?

As will be pointed out, those English language sources which do address the rupture in relations generally study the question from one side or the other, but not from the view of both Beijing and Jakarta. There is a tendency for those who

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7 Bartke, Agreements, 86-87. Agreements came to an end after September 30, 1965, the date of the Gestapu coup.


address the split to look at it from their own base of expertise and study, as either Sinologists or Indonesianists. Frankly, it would have been personally risky for a Suharto-era Indonesian sinologist to have examined the issues in the break in relations because the subject was fraught with political overtones that challenged the very legitimacy for governance of Suharto’s New Order (Orde Baru, or Orba, or OB as some Indonesian sources refer to it). One such example would have been Lieutenant Colonel W. D. Sukisman

. . . seorang Sinoloog dari Angkatan Darat yang mengetuai suatu Team/Froyek Cina dari KOTI G. V, yang para anggautanya terdiri dari beberapa orang Sinoloog dari Departemen P&K, DEPLU, Fakultas Sastra U. I. dll. nya, yang semuanya, termasuk juga Lie Tek Tjeng, pernah bersama-sama belajar di fakultas Sastra


U. I. jurusan Sinologi [a Sinologist from the Army who was the director of a Team/Project on China from KOTI G. V [Army Special Command Section, General Staff V], whose members were made up of Sinologists from the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Fakultas Sastra-University of Indonesia, all of whom, including Lie Tek Tjeng, studied together in the Department of Chinese Studies at the University of Indonesia]. 10

Even today, in the early 2000s, Chinese in the PRC who work with the subject must be cautious not to cross the Chinese Communist Party’s established line on the causes and factors

10 Departemen Luar Negeri [Indonesia Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Laporan Research-Ikhtisar Kejadian-Kejadian Dalam Hubungan: R.I.-R.R.C. Setelah Peristiwa Percobaan Kudeta G.30.S/PKI 1 Oktober 1965 Sampai Pembekuan Hubungan Diplomatik Akhir Oktober 1967 [Research Report- A Recapitulation of Events in Relations between R.I. (Republic of Indonesia)-R.R.C. (P.R.C.-People’s Republic of China) after the Attempted Coup d’état G.30.S./PKI [Gestapu] 1 October, 1965 to the freeze in Diplomatic Relations in late October, 1967], (Jakarta: Direktorat Research, 1972), Serial No.:007/STR/23/XII/72, mimeograph copy on legal-size paper, 19, hereafter cited as Laporan Research. Neither Lieutenant Colonel Sukisman, nor other members of his team, with the exception of Lie Tek Tjeng, went on to produce works dealing, in a major way, with China such as Lie Tektjeng [sic], An Indonesian View: The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, (Djakarta: Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, 1970), and Lie Tektjeng [sic], Some Indonesian Remarks on Modern China Studies: The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution as seen from Djakarta, (Djakarta: Lembaga Research Kebudajaan Nasional, 1971). Dr. Lie, who became the Director of LIPI (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia-the Indonesian Academy of Sciences) under the Suharto regime, had State authorization to publish on subjects dealing with China, some of which are referred to later. Another example is Dr. Abdul Dahana, with a Ph.D. in history, 1986, with a major concentration in the history of China, from the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, who chose to do his dissertation on relations between China and Malaysia, although he later played a major role in Indonesia’s reestablishment of relations with China after the official decision was made to do so in the late 1980s. Dr. Dahana is thanked for information and materials he provided me over the years.
which led to the rupture in relations with Indonesia; neither side covered itself with glory during that tumultuous two year period, especially when it came to dealing with each other versus other diplomatic partners. The rupture in relations has received surprisingly scarce attention, as will become clear in the chapters that follow. That is surprising because of the importance of the breakdown in relations between two of the major participants in East Asian affairs, and also because during this, the most tumultuous period in the two republics' short histories each only lost relations with one major diplomatic partner, the other. China managed to hang on to relations with its major diplomatic partners, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, India, Burma (today's Myanmar), Cambodia, and others with whom relations were strained to (at times beyond) the breaking point, especially during 1966-67, but lost relations only with Indonesia.11

11 China suffered on-again off-again diplomatic relations with some of the emerging nations of Africa, Sheng Bingjie, Chief Compiler, Guoji shishi cidian [Dictionary of International Current Events], (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan chuban, 1984), 678-90, for a full listing of China's diplomatic partners; Wolfgang Bartke, The Diplomatic Service of the People's Republic of China (as of June 1973), (Hamburg: Des Institutes fur Asienkunde, 1973), No. 53, see alphabetic entries for: Ghana, Congo, Burundi, Tunisia, Central Africa, and Dahomay, and the chart at the end of the text; for a more complete volume, to include names of Chinese diplomats, in Chinese, and biographical information, see the original German edition Wolfgang Bartke, Der Diplomatische Dienst der Volksrepublik China nach der Kulturrevolution [The Diplomatic Service of the People's Republic of China since the Cultural Revolution], (Hamburg: Des Instituts fur Asienkunde, 1972), No. 46, and the
In a like manner, Indonesia only lost relations with one diplomatic partner during those two years, China. Despite the Suharto New Order government's elimination of the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia) and other anti-communist policies, Indonesia retained relations with other communist diplomatic partners: the Soviet Union, the various Eastern European Communist countries, North Vietnam, North Korea, and even Cuba, which, along with the PRC, refused to fly its national flag at half-mast in honor of the generals massacred in the Gestapu coup. One aim here is to explain how it came about that Indonesia and China only lost relations with each other, and not with other major diplomatic

fold-out chart at the end of the text. Difficulties between China and these African nations can be seen to have been a mix of instability in those African countries and, during the Cultural Revolution, during the dates shown in these charts, Red Guard activism and internal interference in those nations' affairs, Philip Snow, "China and Africa: Consensus and Camouflage" in Thomas W. Robinson and David L. Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1994), 304-307 and Barbara Barnouin and Changgen Yu, Chinese Foreign Policy During the Cultural Revolution, (New York: Kegan Paul International, 1998), 75-78.

partners, during that most troubled period between October 1965 and October 1967.

The search for the factors which played key roles in the breakdown in relations takes place within the larger historical framework of China’s Cultural Revolution and Indonesia’s Gestapu coup and countercoup. As made clear in the chapters that follow, this work does not engage in explaining either the Cultural Revolution or Gestapu and its aftermath; those two periods in each nation’s history have been extensively written on, and documented. The focus here is on the effects of those

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13 One thorough rendering of the period leading up to Gestapu, the time of the attempted coup, and the resultant effects of the coup, is found in Zhang Xizhen, Dangdai dongnanya zhengzhi [Political Affairs of Contemporary Southeast Asia], (Nanning: Guangxi renmin chubanshe, 1995), 179-194. I thank Professor Zhang Xizhen, International Political Department, for all the help, direction, insight, and, especially, time, he provided me during my fellowship at Peking University (Beida) in 1996. His guided trips through the Waiwen, and the Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe publishing houses, the Beijing Tushu Faxingbu distributor, a host of bookstores and bookshops in downtown Beijing and in the Haidian district, and to the Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao (Central Party Institute) and the Waijiaobu (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) publishing outlets, all resulted in access to a rich pool of Chinese language contemporary history sources. Special thanks to Professor Zhang and his gracious wife, Ji, for inviting me into their home, as well as for the many bike rides and walks through the streets and alleys of Beijing.

14 See various sources in the Bibliography for information on the Chinese Cultural Revolution and the Indonesian Gestapu coup and countercoup. While the Cultural Revolution is quite widely known, the Gestapu coup, and its aftermath, the counter-coup -- the struggle by General Suharto and his followers to wrest power away from President Sukarno and his supporters, between October 1, 1965 and March 27, 1968, when Suharto was
cataclysmic affairs upon the relations between the two nations.

The major factor, as will be explained, for the rupture in relations was the most apparent (which may be why most observers neglect to address it): the very simultaneity of the domestic disarray in each country wrought by the most virulent years of China's Cultural Revolution (1966-1968) and the devastating national struggle for power between the Suharto group and the Sukarno government (1965-1968).

For the purposes of this disquisition, the actual start of the Cultural Revolution is preferred to be seen as the date of Yao Wenyuan's critique of Wu Han's play, "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office", as Wen-shun Chi writes

This is the article which is regarded as having commenced the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. It originally appeared in the Shanghai newspaper Wen-hui pao on November 10, 1965. The author, Yao Wenyuan, was almost unknown. Overnight he became an important figure, and in April 1969 the Ninth Party Congress raised him to the pinnacle of Politburo membership.15

appointed president in the place of Sukarno -- are generally not as widely known and understood.

15 Wen-shun Chi, Readings in The Chinese Communist Cultural Revolution: A Manual for Students of the Chinese Language, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 1. Wu Han was, in November 1965, the Deputy Mayor of Beijing, as well as an historian of note on the period of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), he also taught courses in history at Peking University (Beida). He was a valuable subordinate, and ally, to the Mayor of Beijing, Peng Zhen, who was also a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Secretariat, first secretary of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee, and (at the time) head of the Five Person Cultural Small Group, as it was known. More will be explained in the chapters which follow. Wen-shun Chi's book contains Yao Wenyuan's entire article, in Chinese, taken
More will be addressed in the chapters which follow, but as Wen-shun Chi translates from the politico-military journal, Hong Qi (Red Flag)

The proletarian revolutionaries in Shanghai resolutely implemented Chairman Mao's instruction. Under the direct guidance of Comrade Chiang Ching (sic), Comrade Yao Wen-yuan wrote "On the New Historical Drama Hai Jui Dismissed From Office," and the publication of this article began in the ideological sphere the criticism and repudiation of Wu Han and other anti-Party, anti-socialist representatives of the bourgeoisie, thus ushering in the stage of preparing public opinion for the mass movement of the great proletarian cultural revolution in China. 16

The setting of the time of the commencement of the Cultural Revolution as November 10, 1965 is important because it can be seen that Party and government personnel began to be distracted from their primary job requirements from that point on as more and more time and energy had to be devoted to grappling with the political implications growing around the Hai Rui issue; nothing less than political, career, and even physical survival was at stake. Also, the establishment of November 10, 1965 as the commencement of the Cultural Revolution better frames the beginning of the time period for the present

from Wenhui Bao, along with Wen-shun Chi's translation of terms into English and explanatory notes, 3-37. Wen-shun Chi's translation of terms, along with his notes, are most important because so many of the terms refer to people, places, events, and classical Chinese (wenyan) allusions taken from Chinese history.

16 Wen-shun Chi, 1; Chi is quoting from the editorial in Hong Qi, 27 May 1967.
study to more nearly coincide with the October 1, 1965 Gestapu coup. From those two dates, October 1, and November 10, 1965, both China and Indonesia embarked on mass movements which would bring pervasive destabilization to each nation, both domestically and in their foreign affairs, especially in their relations with each other.17

In the course of those unprecedented domestic cataclysms, each country attacked its own foreign affairs system, violently deposed Foreign Minister Subandrio and Foreign Minister Chen Yi, physically attacked and shattered their individual Foreign Service personnel structures, ransacked Foreign Ministry offices, and destroyed or stole Foreign Ministry files. Such

disruption of any nation's foreign affairs system would render it difficult to conduct diplomatic relations under any circumstances. What befell their relations was that both China and Indonesia's foreign affairs infrastructure went through such extreme disruption during that same two year period, ending in a rupture of those relations.

As these various chapters make clear, Chinese and Indonesian diplomatic personnel and embassies (along with other diplomatic facilities) were attacked by local student groups and rioting mobs over the course of 1966-67. Each country's embassy was invaded, ransacked and set aflame. While destruction of an embassy would certainly be a factor in the eventual breakdown of relations, history shows that diplomatic relations can survive destruction of an embassy if both parties are capable of enacting even a minimum level of diplomatic representational integrity. The British embassies in both Jakarta (1963) and Beijing (1967) were attacked and burned down, but England retained relations with both nations. The U. S. Embassy in Islamabad was attacked and set afire by rampaging Muslim Pakistani mobs in November 1979, but the two nations were able to salvage their relations with each other, even in a time of extreme tension between America and the Muslim world. What is

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\^ The U. S. Army Assistant Attaché in Islamabad, Lieutenant Colonel George Wood, in a conversation, later, in October, 1984, told me that as he rounded up the remnant group of embassy personnel and herded them to the embassy roof in the
new in this dissertation is a detailed incident-by-incident
description of Indonesian, army-backed, student group attacks on
Chinese diplomatic personnel and facilities between October 1965
and October 1967 (see Appendix B). Along with Red Guard
attacks, ransacking, and burning of Indonesia's embassy in
Beijing, in August, 1967, the interactive effects of attacks on
each country's diplomatic personnel and facilities are made
clear herein (see Appendix C).

Other factors in the breakdown of relations between China
and Indonesia are addressed within the different chapters.

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elevator (stairs were blocked at that point) he burned his hand
as he brushed against the side of the elevator. On an official
U. S. government trip to Islamabad in April, 1974, I was
conducted on an orientation tour of the newly completed embassy
which was touted as safely mob-proof with state-of-the-art
design fixtures such as exceptionally narrow (attack resistant)
window openings and brick walls which would prevent fires from
being set by attacking mobs. After the attack and capture of
the U. S. Embassy in Teheran on November 4, 1979, followed by
the attack in Islamabad, Tripoli, and on U. S. Embassies in
other Muslim states, the U. S. Government evacuated non-
essential personnel and families from virtually all of those
Muslim countries which had U. S. diplomatic facilities. As the
U. S. Defense and Army Attaché to Bangladesh (formerly East
Pakistan) at the time, I witnessed vast mobs surrounding the
U. S. Embassy, located on the upper floors of the Adamjee Court
Building in downtown Dacca (today called Dhaka), however, the
Bangladeshi Army, and the Dacca police successfully prevented
demonstrators from damaging or entering the U. S. Embassy
proper. The effectiveness of the host nation is essential to
the integrity of the sanctity of guest diplomatic facilities.
In the case of Indonesia from 1965 to 1967 (as will be shown),
the host government sanctioned student-led, army-backed attacks
on Chinese diplomatic facilities. In Beijing's case the attacks
on the Indonesian embassy from 5-10 August, 1967, were more a
matter of China's Cultural Revolution, and especially China's
foreign affairs sector, having gone beyond the control of
Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai, as will be explained.
Chapters two, three and four examine the dynamics and some events of the Cultural Revolution as they directly, in some cases indirectly, affected China’s foreign relations, especially with Indonesia. Besides a general explanation of the bases of what was one of the largest, if not the largest, mass movements in history, specific factors such as the recall of China’s ambassadors from all but one country, the implantation of the Cultural Revolutionary ideologies acted out in China’s overseas missions, and the details of Red Guard and affiliated groups’ attacks on Foreign Minister Chen Yi and his foreign ministry will all be covered. The February Adverse Current episode, a series of high-level meetings chaired by Premier Zhou and highly critical of the radical activist group led by Jiang Qing, Chen Boda and supporters of Chairman Mao and the way they carried out the Cultural Revolution up to that point in February 1967, as well as the radicals’ backlash, all are key factors influencing the breakdown in China’s foreign affairs, relations with other nations, and especially diplomatic relations with Indonesia, as explained in chapters three and four. The left-radical retribution, authorized and backed by Mao himself, targeted, among others, Foreign Minister Chen Yi and his ministry to the point where Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou admittedly lost control of China’s foreign affairs by the summer of 1967, a few months before the loss of China’s relations with Indonesia. The present study brings to the case a close examination of Chinese
language materials, both classified, declassified, and unclassified, together with interviews and consultations, especially with Indonesian-Chinese, who had fled Indonesia for their very lives, and who have had significant influence inside China.

The thrust of the exploration of the subject has been to concentrate heavily on Chinese and Indonesian language materials, both official (government), and non-official, classified, declassified, and unclassified, to explain in each country’s words the tortuous path to the breakdown in relations as it played out. Multiple Indonesian language sources appear in the chapters dealing mainly with China (chapters two, three, four and six) just as numerous references to Chinese language sources are found in chapters mainly focused on Indonesia (chapters five, seven and eight). The approach has been to explain events and trends in each country partly through the voice of the other country, at least insofar as sources would practically permit. China and Indonesia were quite interrelated at the time of the outbreak of the Gestapu coup in 1965. The PKI had close relations with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). President Sukarno was leaning heavily, politically, toward China, though neither he nor his Foreign Minister and First Deputy Premier, Dr. H. Subandrio subscribed to communism. The PKI was the largest legitimate party in Indonesia by 1965. Its influence was growing, and party members were legitimately
filling positions in government. PRC diplomatic presence was found on the major islands of Indonesia, and Indonesian-Chinese, both indigenous and expatriate, held amicable relations with Chinese diplomatic and media personnel, as will be shown herein.

Chapter five examines the role of the Indonesian-Chinese in the breakdown of relations between Indonesia and China, and portions of chapters six, seven and eight also amplify the plight of the Indonesian-Chinese, as well as the actions of their compatriots who acted on behalf of General Suharto to eventually wrest power from President Sukarno. Indonesian-Chinese influence in the student movements, KAMI, KAPPI, KASI and others are described in chapter eight.

Important to remember is that the roles of the various groups (the Chinese Central Cultural Revolution Group; the Red Guards; the lau tongzhimen-old party comrades-who enacted the February Adverse Current; foreign service personnel from both nations; both the PKI and the CCP; the Indonesian military; the Indonesian student groups; the Indonesian-Chinese; the Suharto group; the Sukarno group; and others) are all woven through the fabric of each chapter, just as they were interwoven in the events through this time in history. Quotes from Official Indonesian Foreign Ministry sources appear in chapters which address China's domestic events. Chinese official government sources appear in chapters dealing with Indonesian domestic trends. The search in pursuit of this dissertation's hypothesis
carried the analyses into the internal workings of both nations in order to isolate and define the various factors present in each nation which played a role in the process of the rupture of relations between October 1965 and October 1967.

THE PLIGHT OF THOSE TOUCHED BY THE TWO MASS MOVEMENTS

Unexpectedly, the writing of this study turned increasingly on the very human plight of the individuals involved. One comes away with a deep feeling of sadness after one fully realizes what happened to the persons involved in the various events. Regardless of one’s own political stance, or how one’s own worldview is framed, empathy and compassion must emerge for the individual participants in the great drama of China’s Cultural Revolution and in the sturm und drang of Indonesia’s Gestapu coup and countercoup. Yes, uncounted lives in the hundreds of thousands, possibly millions, were lost, and millions of lives were despoiled, some ruined forever, both in China and in Indonesia during the monstrous mass movements in each country during the two year period between 1965 and 1967. That ruination serves as a backdrop to the drama which was played out leading to the collapse of the relationship between Indonesia and China.
Even more than the incomprehensibly vast damage and suffering wrought on a mass basis, the process of discovery for this thesis framed sharply the personal life tragedies of key participants; only some will be named here, the others are found in the body of the work. Indonesian foreign Minister Dr. H. Subandrio was an accomplished and internationally respected statesman and diplomat whose story, written in his memoir, after he was finally released from over three decades of harsh imprisonment, is riveting in its tragic overtones for his life and the plight of those close to him.\textsuperscript{19} China's Foreign Minister, Marshall Chen Yi, movingly expresses his travail during the bitterest part of the Cultural Revolution, in an elegantly written poem "Red Leaves" equally elegantly translated into English by Professor D. W. Y. Kwok.\textsuperscript{20} Regardless of

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{19} Dr. H. Soebandrio, Kesaksianku Tentang G-30-S [My Testimony Relating to G-30-S], (Jakarta: n.p., 2000); which R. E. Elson describes as "this unpublished manuscript, due to be published by Gramedia in late 2000, was suddenly withdrawn from publication", Elson, 372.

\textsuperscript{20} Yan Jiaqi and Gao Gao, Turbulent Decade: A History of the Cultural Revolution, translated and edited by D. W. Y. Kwok, (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1996), 225. Though not to be done here, this poem deserves special study by anyone interested in the subject of Chen Yi, China's Foreign Minister; representing the more moderate high-ranking party and government officials, and reaction to the excesses and damage of the Cultural Revolution. The \textit{Western Hills} compose that hill mass including \textit{Xiangshan} [Fragrant Mountain] west of Beijing where Chinese people traditionally go to view the variegated red foliage in autumn as they cross \textit{Qinglongqiao} [Green Dragon Bridge] and pass \textit{Yuquanshan} [Jade Spring Hill] enroute. The area was (and still is) the site of rest facilities and other important installations for leading officials. Chen Yi alludes
whether or not one likes or dislikes one or the other of the particular players, one cannot help but be moved, even to tears, by the destinies which they, and theirs, individually endured.

What of Rachmawati Soekarno’s Bapakku, Ibuku [My Father, My Mother], and the gloom which settled over President Sukarno and those around him? How about the life story of one of the most prominent Indonesian-Chinese citizens, Ang Jan Goan (Hong Yuanyuan in Chinese Putonghua) who was forced to flee the Indonesia of his life and of his love in order to save his very life, and whose story will never be published in English in accordance with his last will and testament?

21 Rachmawati Soekarno, Bapakku, Ibuku: Dua Manusia Yang Kuginta dan Kukagumi [My Father, My Mother: Two Whom I Loved and Admired], (Jakarta: Garuda Metropolitan Press, 1984); her book was translated and published in the Chinese language as: Lamawati [Rachmawati], Duligong nei-wai: Sujialuo nuer huiyilu [Inside and Outside the Independence Palace: Sukarno’s Daughter’s Memoir], translated by Chen Han, (Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe, 1988).

22 Ang Jan Goan, Ang Jan Goan Zizhuan [Ang Jan Goan, An Autobiography], (Beijing: Zhongguo huaqiao chuban gongs, 1989). As will be more fully explained in a later chapter, Professor Liang Yingming, the translator of Ang Jan Goan’s autobiography, told me, in 1996, at Beijing University, that the conditions for allowing Mr. Ang’s memoirs to be translated and published in China were that the memoirs would never be allowed to appear in the English language. Mr. Ang’s motives were not made clear. Subsequent inquiry reveals that he may not have wished to create unnecessary trouble between China and Indonesia during the
Let us reflect deeply on the outrageous deeds perpetrated on the Englishwoman who had married Bud Budiardjo, and who, herself, became an Indonesian citizen, Carmel Budiardjo. And there are so many other individuals whose personal fates, during just these two years between 1965-1967, cannot but leave one emotionally transfixed: Deng Xiaoping, D. N. Aidit, Liu Shaoqi and his faithful, talented wife Wang Guangmei, Colonel A. Latief, Lieutenant Colonel Untung and the tragedy of his execution, Ade Irma Suryani Nasution, Peng Zhen and Wu Han, Marshall Luo Ruiqing who was hauled in to a public criticism meeting in a wheelbarrow, because he had broken his leg in a suicide attempt prompted by abuse from Red Guards. Over the decades I have been personally acquainted with a number of people, both Chinese and Indonesian, who lived through the Cultural Revolution, Gestapu, and their aftermaths. Their varied experiences form part of the quest which led to the present study.

Suharto years. Also it seems likely that he did not want to bring trouble to those he left behind in Indonesia. I also learned that in exchange for permission to translate and publish his autobiography, in Chinese, the PRC authorized Mr. Ang’s remains to be transported from Canada to China and buried there.

DEFINING AND UNDERSTANDING THE INDONESIAN-CHINESE PEOPLE

For the purposes of this inquiry it is necessary to clearly delineate the differences in categories between various Chinese people in Indonesia. The frequently employed term Overseas Chinese (huaqiao in Putonghua, huakiao in Bahasa Indonesia) falls short of the mark by lacking precision of meaning, and by failing to include some groups of Chinese in Indonesia. Also, other categorizations create difficulties in understanding, especially as they were employed in the 1960s, and will be addressed in detail as they occur in the following chapters.

My term indigenous-Chinese applies to those Chinese who were born in and, for the most part, grew up in Indonesia. For the purposes of this discourse, it did not matter whether the indigenous-Chinese were citizens of Indonesia (Warga Negara Indonesia-WNI) or not citizens of Indonesia (Warga Negara Asing-WNA). The important distinction is that their roots were in Indonesia. That distinguished them from other Indonesian-Chinese whose roots were somewhere else besides Indonesia, and therefore categorized herein as expatriate Indonesian-Chinese. Naturally, the term expatriate also includes Chinese temporarily residing in Indonesia, but without intention to reside permanently; some were Indonesian-Chinese, the essential
difference is in the term expatriate. Again, for the purpose of
the present study, a third important group of Chinese in
Indonesia at the time were Chinese diplomats and staff filling
positions at the PRC Embassy, Consulates, New China News Agency
(NCNA), and other Chinese official mission facilities in
Indonesia. To sum up, my exploration deals with the Chinese in
Indonesia in three general groupings: indigenous-Chinese,
expatriate-Chinese, and Chinese diplomatic personnel.

That said, the subject demands further explication.

During this two year period, Indonesia engaged in the issue of
changing the Bahasa Indonesia term for China (Tiongkok) to Cina
(old spelling Tjina); thus the term for Indonesian-Chinese would
change tionghoa to orang Cina (or orang Tjina).24 The issue of
whether or not the Indonesian Government (also mandated to the
public) should decide, in early 1967, to continue to use the
term Tiongkok and Tionghoa, or to begin to use the term Cina and
orang Cina, was an issue fraught with high emotion. Usage of

24 Laporan Research, 17-21. I am indebted to Dr. Dewi
Fortuna Anwar, Centre for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), Jakarta (at the time, March, 2001, serving as Associate
Director for Foreign Affairs, Habibie Center, Jakarta), for
bringing me to understand the depth of importance and the true
complexity of this issue of Tiongkok/Tionghoa versus Cina in the
political milieu of an Indonesia in transition from the Sukarno
Old Order to the Suharto New Order; especially the importance of
the role played by Dr. Lie Tek Tjeng, as noted in Laporan
Research, 17, which will be further addressed later.
the term Cina, in those days (and currently), carried a derogatory meaning

_Cina_ (us. Derog.) China, Chinese._-gundul (Derog.) a cheat, s.o. who takes advantage of a peasant. spt [seperti] - karam noisy, boisterous. - kuncir (Derog.) pigtailed Chinese. - mindering itinerant Ch vendor. men- become Chinese. Pe-n Chinatown. per-an Chinese affairs. . . _chinafikasi_ (Derog.) sinicization.25

As the passages in _Laporan Research_ show, heavy debate raged over the term to be used; eventually, the new style, Cina, won out. However, other terms relating to China and Chinese will appear throughout the present work as quoted from other sources. _Keturun Cina_ (or _Tjina_ ) describes people of Chinese descent. _Masyarakat etnis_ (or _etnik_ ) _Cina_ refers to those of Chinese ethnicity. Indonesians of the time (1960s) thought of the _Tionghoa_ (Chinese people) as divided into two categories: _peranakan_, Chinese of mixed Indonesian descent; and _totok_,

25 John M. Echols and Hassan Shadily, _An Indonesian-English Dictionary_ 3rd ed., edited by John U. Wolff and James T. Collins, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). Professor Collins merits my deep thanks for helping me (with his great patience in his graduate courses) to adequately gain a deeper understanding of Bahasa Indonesia, especially the lexical importance of Indonesian terms and their conveyance of meaning. His revised third edition is indispensable in translation from Bahasa Indonesia to English. I must also thank my Indonesian language instructors at the U. S. Department of Defense (DOD) Defense Language Institute (DLI), Presidio of Monterey, Pak Raden Sukardi, and Ibu Meriam Sukardi for their hard work and patience. My thanks also, for various continuing language classes at the American Embassy Club in Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta, sponsored by the American Women’s Association of Indonesia between 1986 and 1988, as well as to the Indonesian Defense Language Institute (Lembaga Bahasa Hankam), Jakarta, for special tutoring sessions in 1987 and 1988.
Chinese with no Indonesian ancestral background.\textsuperscript{26} Hoakiau, Hoakiauw, or Huakiau were all alternative terms used to designate overseas Chinese; a term which, in itself, came from the Chinese designation of themselves as huaqiao, a Chinese person (huaren, hua) who had crossed the bridge (qiao), or just crossed over, i.e., left China to go overseas. One interpretation for that Chinese language term, which will be seen in sources used here, the Indonesian equivalent of huaqiao, is orang-orang perantauan or perantau Tionghoa (from the extended Indonesian language meaning: abroad, foreign country; derived from the root word-rantau, shoreline, reaches of a river). Now, in the early years of the twenty-first Century, the term more commonly confronted, especially in Southeast Asia is huaren, simply a Chinese person, or people.

The confusion is, of course, that people inside China may also be called huaren; so where is the distinction that the person, or people, being referred to are in an expatriate status-out of their country? Thus the choice of terms for the present study: indigenous-Chinese (indigenous to Indonesia), and

expatriate Chinese (which includes both long-term Chinese residents as well as shorter term residing Chinese people); all collectively termed Indonesian-Chinese.

The estimated demographic count for Chinese in Indonesia by 1965 was between two and three percent of the Indonesian population, equivalent to about three million people.27 As Harold Munthe-Kaas, an observer in Indonesia in 1967 explained

Nobody seems to know exactly how many people of Chinese origin there are in Indonesia. One official estimate says there are 1.2 million Chinese with Indonesian citizenship (Indonesian Chinese), another 1.2 million stateless Chinese; and 250,000 Chinese with Peking passports (Chinese nationals). Other estimates say there are 1.4 million Indonesian Chinese and 1.1 million stateless. The total number is then somewhere around 2.54 million to 2.75 million people of Chinese origin living in Indonesia. The classification "Stateless Chinese" seems to be something quite new and may apply to those Chinese who have Chinese citizenship but not the relevant documents. Though legally, it may be questionable to argue that people who cannot produce documents are stateless, nevertheless it seems to be the easiest way of keeping the door open for this group eventually to become Indonesian citizens. Indonesian officials realize that the large bulk of Indonesia's Overseas Chinese are there to stay and that the only realistic policy is to try to integrate them, even if this takes time.28

Wang Gongwu, Leo Suryadinata, Lynn Pan, J. A. C. Mackie, Charles Coppel among others, have written quite extensively,

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relatively recently, on the subject of the Chinese in Indonesia; some works have already been mentioned or will be addressed shortly.29

THE APPLICATION OF THE VARIOUS USES AND SPELLING FORMS OF THE CHINESE AND INDONESIAN LANGUAGES

The Putonghua (more conventionally, Mandarin, standard language) form of the Chinese language, and Pinyin, the official Chinese alphabetic system, are used for transliteration and translation of Chinese language sources into the English language.30 Western Scholars who wrote around the time covered


30 It is noted that "The [Chinese] Foreign Ministry addressed a note to all diplomatic missions in China, informing them of its decision to adopt the Chinese Phonetic Scheme as the standard in Romanizing names of Chinese persons and places for the translation of the Chinese Government's diplomatic documents from January 1, 1979," New China News Agency (NCNA), China's
herein normally used the Wade-Giles system of transliteration and that system will be encountered frequently in the following chapters. The differences can be significant to anyone who is not familiar with both systems-Mao Zedong in pinyin is Mao T’se-tung in Wade-Giles, Chen Yi is Ch’en-i, wenhua da geming (the Great Cultural Revolution) is wenhua ta keming in the Wade-Giles system. Traditional forms of earlier Chinese usage are retained in this study—both Peking and Beijing, Hong Kong and Xianggang, Chiang Kai-shek and Jiang Jieshi. Beijing University continues to use its original English language name, Peking University, rendered upon its transition in 1898 from "the former Jing Shi Da Xue Tang (the Metropolitan University) of the Qing Dynasty."31 In some cases Wade-Giles usage is repeated in the pinyin form, especially as found in official Indonesian government documents—Yao Teng Shan to Yao Dengshan, Shih Hsin Jen to Shi Xinren, and Hsu Jen to Xu Ren.

The transliteration of Indonesian-Chinese names must take into account the rather random Indonesian spelling of Chinese


names derived from different Chinese dialects. As Lynn Pan points out in her Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas "such transliterations are rarely standardized and they often reflect the way the names were pronounced or spelt by the particular colonial authority, whether British, Dutch, French or Spanish under which they were initially adopted." 32 One key resource for the decipherment of those particularly challenging names (e.g., Ang Jan Goan which is rendered as Hong Yuanyuan in Putonghua), the Shijie Huaqiao Huaren Cidian [World Dictionary of Overseas Chinese], has been an extremely useful tool. 33

The Indonesian language form used herein is the official Bahasa Indonesia. Both the older form of spelling (Djakarta, Soekarno, Soeharto, Tjirebon, masjarakat) as well as the newer form (Jakarta, Sukarno, Suharto, Cirebon, masyarakat) are to be found, depending on the time of writing; works produced during

32 ECO, 8.

33 Zhou Nanjing, ed., Shijie huaqiao huaren cidian [World Dictionary of Overseas Chinese], (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1993), Beijing daxue xiaonei [Peking University internally produced], hereafter cited as WDOC. Two of the key authors, Professor Zhou Nanjing and Professor Liang Yingming, both Indonesian-Chinese, are thanked for their invaluable assistance during my University of Hawai'i Exchange Fellowship to Peking University (Beijing Daxue) in 1996, not only for turning me to this valuable resource, but also for all the opportunities they made available for me to expand my search and understanding of the relationship between China and Indonesia during the years of the Cultural Revolution and the Gestapu coup and countercoup period.
the time period addressed herein employed the old form of spelling. The new form of spelling is used wherever possible in order to minimize confusion.

AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION ABOUT INDONESIA AND CHINA DURING THE MID-1960S

As Indonesia moves, unevenly, further into the Reformasi (the reform movement) which really can be seen to have begun with President Suharto's handpicked successor, Dr. B. J. Habibie, and to have also continued sporadically with the follow-on President Abdurrahman Wahid, and then with one of President Sukarno's other daughters-President Megawati Sukarnoputri, more information on the topic of this dissertation emerges in the early years of the 21st Century.34 We now have the two key works by former Foreign Minister and First Deputy Premier Dr. H. Subandrio and by Colonel Latief, penned after

34 Sidarta Gautama, Megawati Soekarnoputri: Harapan & Tantangan Di Kursi Wapres R. I. [Megawati Soekarnoputri: Hopes and Challenges as Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia], (Jakarta: PT Rineka Cipta, 2000). President Megawati Soekarnoputri lost the presidency to General Bambang Susilo Yudhoyono in the fall of 2004, therefore, the degree to which Reformasi will continue to be implemented remains to be seen.
their release from more than three decades of prison. As will be explained in detail there have been such encouraging signs as the permitting of former PKI members to participate in the political election process after a thirty-eight year ban. Indonesian-Chinese have been granted freedom to practice their cultural traditions and to participate in politics in the wake of President Wahid’s revocation of a 1967 ban on such activities. The famous writer-intellectual Ananta Pramudya Tur (Toer) was recently allowed to travel abroad for the first time in decades. It is hoped that more information relating to the Gestapu coup and countercoup will emerge to shed further light on the topics addressed herein.

As discussed in the following chapters there has been a very satisfactory increase in the appearance of heretofore


36 *Tempo: Majalah Berita Mingguan* [Tempo Weekly Magazine], “Pramoedya ke Luar Negeri” [Pramoedya Goes Abroad], 4 no. 27 (30 Maret-5 April, 1999): 17.

37 *Suara Pembaruan* [newspaper], “Palajaran Sejarah Soal G30S Timbulkan Keragu-an” [Studies of the History of the G30S Problem Raise Doubts], Jakarta: P. T. Median interaksi utama, 30 Sept. 2000: 3. This article discusses problems history instructors encounter when teaching the history of Gestapu to younger students who question the Suharto New Order government’s version of the attempted coup. This article also examines the effects of the popular film “Shadow Play” which presents a different version of Gestapu than the conventional description propounded by the Suharto regime.
hidden information relating to political events in the 1960s in China. Still, the trend has been variable, with periodic clampdowns, interspersed with surges of publication of, especially, neibu, or restricted distribution, documents. The hopes are that the PRC will continue to allow release of information relevant to the topics raised in this treatise; there are challenges, especially if the release involves sensitive party or government mistakes or vulnerabilities.

China’s low profile on its role in the rupture of relations with Indonesia presents a rather mysterious puzzle; what prevents a more pervasive examination of the subject? Some answers are to be found in the chapters that follow. Certainly the Jingju-Wayang encounter plays a role. The two nations remain wary of each other even after a decade of reestablished relations.

In summary, the thrust of the pursuit of the research for this dissertation has been to discover, inasmuch as possible at this time, the various factors, from both the Chinese and the Indonesian side of the picture, that played roles in the breakdown in relations during those two politically stormy years in each country. One result from this search is a new view of the topic when seen from both Beijing and Jakarta, rather than from just one side or the other. That new view is necessarily based on an equally rigorous examination of Chinese language and Indonesian language sources, interviews and conversations with
Chinese people, Indonesians, and, especially, with Indonesian-Chinese who had fled for their very lives to the PRC. More recent availability of formerly classified English language sources, from both the U. S. and the British governments allows for an even more rounded out view when combined with unclassified government, or civilian, sources, as is demonstrated in the following chapters.

Much more remains to be uncovered as we draw further away in time from the events of the Cultural Revolution and the Gestapu coup and countercoup; as the Chinese government allows for continuing more openness in publishing; the reforming post-Suharto administrations divulge more information about Gestapu and its aftermath which led to General Suharto's assumption of power; and the U. S. government lifts its remaining excision and redaction of classified materials.

But the unexpected discovery from my quest has been that the very simultaneity of the domestic chaos of the Cultural Revolution and of the Gestapu coup and countercoup -- the Jingju-Wayang encounter -- between October, 1965 and October, 1967, played the key role in the breakdown of relations between them. Both nations were intensely focused within in massive struggles involving each country's entire population with hundreds of thousands of lives lost, and millions of lives despoiled; major loss of civic order; revolutionary disruption of government institutions -- not the least of which were each
nation's foreign affairs establishments. Disorder, purges, continuing attacks from within (Chinese Cultural Revolutionary Red Guards, Indonesian student groups backed by the army) and on each other's diplomatic personnel and facilities, all added up to the two governments having not been able to salvage the worsening relationship between them. Things fell apart. The details are laid out in the chapters that follow.
CHAPTER 2

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION’S EFFECTS ON CHINA’S FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SYSTEM AND RELATIONS WITH OTHER NATIONS INCLUDING INDONESIA

CHINA’S LOSS OF CONTROL OVER ITS FOREIGN AFFAIRS

China was in an exceptional state of upset in the spring and summer of 1967, to such an extent that it had lost control over its foreign affairs. As one Chinese-language source put it

1967 was the most chaotic (hunluan) year since the Communist Party took power. Even though the entire country had experienced turmoil from 1959 to 1961 [the Great Leap Forward], and the people’s lives thrown into disorder, eventually the society was able to stabilize somewhat. [But] in the spring and summer of 1967 the entire country fell into an unprecedented state of turmoil.¹

Zhou Enlai gave a clear and detailed explanation of China’s foreign affairs troubles wrought by the early years of the Cultural Revolution when he met, later, in 1971, with Burma’s (Myanmar) leader, Ne Win during his state visit to China. China had encountered very serious foreign relations problems with Burma, both at home and in Rangoon (Yongong) during the most virulent period of the Cultural Revolution -- 1966-1968. As the China Quarterly of that time put it

During the April-June quarter [1967] China was at loggerheads with two countries with which she had previously been on the best of terms-Burma and Nepal.

Chinese diplomatic or other representatives were expelled from Kenya, India, Indonesia and Mongolia; a Chinese official was stabbed to death in the embassy in Rangoon, and four diplomats killed in a car crash in Eastern Germany. There were anti-Chinese riots in India, Indonesia, Burma and Nepal and demonstrations nearly every week in Peking outside some foreign embassy. China openly incited "revolutionaries" in countries throughout the world, especially in Southeast Asia, to follow the path of armed struggle outlined by Mao and overthrow their governments by force.²

The following passage records Premier Zhou’s explanation of those difficulties as China tried to repair some of the damage done to its relations with Burma, as well as with other countries. Zhou’s explanation to the Burmese visiting head-of-state is quoted in full here because of his importance as the architect of China’s recovery from the damage done to China’s foreign affairs, and because of the striking parallels to the difficulties between China and Indonesia.

This morning Chairman Mao, in a cabinet meeting referred to affairs in 1967, things were just as described, it certainly was a time of great peril. The [China-Burma] border problems didn’t have much to do with the cause of our upset . . . you know, it was in 1967 that we were in the midst of carrying out “the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” there was a flood of extremist leftist thinking, . . . the real cause of the incident [in Burma] in 1967 was that overseas Chinese (huaqiao) were waving around figures of Chairman Mao, causing divisiveness, and later descended upon our Embassy in Burma, bringing about the deaths of many tens of people as well as the arrest of Overseas Chinese. This was the period of the high tide of the Cultural Revolution movement,

thousands of people continually, for days, gathered in front of your Embassy [in Beijing]. We were quite concerned to learn that the same kinds of activities were being fervently carried out in front of our Embassy in Rangoon. The Embassy was broken into, people were injured. I [Zhou Enlai] phoned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Beijing Security District to control that situation. Fortunately my call had effect at that time, your Embassy was secured, no such situation occurred as had taken place at our Embassy in Rangoon. Then, another time, in early August [1967], a large gathering was organized under the auspices of some evildoers (huaiiren) who manipulated the masses who had been heavily influenced by the rising tide of left-extremist thought. They burst into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the same time they penetrated the Burmese Embassy [in Beijing]. I also put a stop to this.

It was at that stage that the left-extremist tide gained its influence in our Foreign Affairs Department . . . . Just as relations between China and Burma had developed to the degree they had, because of that situation, they would not continue to develop any further. Our relations with England grew even more distant, the time factor was a little longer, and the damage was even greater.\(^\text{3}\)

As the authoritative A Diplomatic History of China [Zhongguo Waijiaooshi] makes clear, there was a continuing degradation of control over foreign affairs during the early years of the Cultural Revolution leading to a loss of control in 1967, at the time that China's relations with Indonesia became seriously endangered.

It should be especially pointed out that Lin Biao, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng and others grasped

control of foreign Affairs right after the Cultural Revolution began. During July and August, 1967 decisive power over China’s foreign affairs fell into their hands.\(^4\)

This important source puts forth the official Chinese view of the path to a breakdown in diplomatic relations between China and Indonesia:

Indonesia presented a special aspect: an excessively fervent opposition to and rejection of the Chinese and China (fanhua paihua). On September 30, 1965, there took place in Indonesia a movement which purportedly was designed to protect President Sukarno from an Army overthrow, and that incident was called September 30th [the attempted coup, labeled by the Suharto regime as GESTAPU-Gerakan September Tiga Puluh-the September 30th Movement]. Suharto, who commanded the Army Strategic Forces, put down the “September 30th movement” and then carried out a bloody purge of the Indonesian Communist Party. At the same time Suharto and his Army supporters, struggling to gain power, announced that the “September 30th incident” was directly connected with China and that the Chinese Communist Party had instigated the coup attempt. Subsequently anti-Chinese incidents increased enormously throughout Indonesia. Even though China continually protested and carried out opposing struggle, on October 9 and 23, 1967, Indonesian authorities suddenly announced closure of the Indonesian Embassy in China, and asked China to close its consulates in Indonesia. On October 28, 1967, China, while protesting, announced a suspension (tingzhi) in the diplomatic relations between the two countries.\(^5\)

The official Indonesian version of the reasons for the break in relations differs quite widely from this official


\(^5\) Xie Yixian, ed., 389.
Chinese version. Indonesia enumerates a number of reasons for the breakdown in relations, reasons quite at variance with those cited above. An official Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs research report, done in 1972, and presented here in abbreviated form lays out the Indonesian reasons for the break in relations with China.  

A. The treasonous (penghianatan) event of G-30-S/PKI, 1 October 1965, is recorded as the point (titik) of the beginning of the worsening (memburuknya) of relations between Indonesia and China [emphasis added].

B. Relevant facts

I. The failure of the PRC Embassy to fly its national flag at half-mast in honor of the slain Indonesian Army Generals, as requested by the Government of Indonesia (pp. 1-2).

II. Disagreements between Indonesia and the PRC relating to attacks on PRC diplomatic facilities in Indonesia (p. 2).

III. The series, and objectionable nature, of protest notes from the PRC to the Government of Indonesia (pp. 2-12).

IV. The series of protest notes, and their contents from the Government of Indonesia to the PRC (pp. 12-15).

V. Political Actions of the PRC (pp. 15-16).

a). The PRC provided shelter (perlindungan) to certain participants of the G-30-S/PKI (such as A.M. Hanafi, Djawato, Tahsin, Soekrisno, J. Adjitorop who is now [1972] the PKI Delegation Chief in Beijing, and others).

b). China’s anti-Indonesia campaign.

6 Laporan Research, 1-22. This Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs document is merely summarized here, in my translation from the Indonesian, but will be covered in more detail in later chapters and the Appendices B and C relating to the Gestapu coup and countercoup effects on Indonesia’s relations with China.
VI. Actions by the Government of Indonesia (pp. 16-22).

1. The formal move by the Government of Indonesia to change the Indonesian language form of The People's Republic of China (from the traditional Tiongkok/Tionghoa to Cina).

2. Indonesia was driven to declare offending Chinese diplomats as persona non grata: Naval Attache Shih Hsin-Jen (Chinese pinyin spelling: Shi Xinren), January 24, 1967, Chargé d'Affaires (Kuasa Usaha a. i.) Yao Teng Shan (Yao Dengshan), and Consul General Hsu Jen (Xu Ren), April 24, 1967; all were ordered to depart Indonesia within four, or five, days of notification. On September 14, 1967, Indonesia declared Chargé d'Affaires Li Tzu Po (Li Zebo) and Second Secretaty Su Sheng (Su Sheng) Persona non Grata. All declarations of PNG were, in turn, reciprocated by the PRC (p. 22).

3. Relations between RI and PRC became frozen (menjadi beku—pp. 22-23). Beginning Saturday August 5, 1967 the Indonesian Embassy in Beijing was continuously subjected to five days of demonstrations, damage, burning, and finally destruction carried out by hooligans (kaum perusuh) organized by the Government of the PRC. The PRC failed to assure the safety of Indonesian Embassy personnel, and to provide substitute working and living facilities for Indonesian diplomats, despite repeated requests by the Government of Indonesia. The PRC did not issue exit permits for Indonesian diplomats as requested by Indonesia (Indonesian Diplomatic Note No. D.069/67/11, August 24, 1967). After continuing relationship problems the PRC, on October 27, 1967, announced closure.
of its representational facilities [perwakilanya-the Embassy and Consulate General in Jakarta and the Consulates in Medan, Banjarmasin, and Makassar] in Indonesia, and that all PRC matters of importance in Indonesia would be handled by the Rumanian Embassy in Jakarta.

With the final departure of all diplomatic personnel back to their own countries, the diplomatic relations between Indonesia and China became frozen (pembekuan) in what the PRC termed “temporary severance of representation in Indonesia” (pemutusan sementara perwakilan-perwakilannya di Indonesia), and which the Indonesian side characterized as “closure of the Embassy in Beijing until such time as it is feasible for the Indonesian Embassy in Beijing to resume representational duties” (menutup Kantor Kedutaan Besar RI di Peking sampai keadaan memungkinkan bagi KBRI di Peking untuk menjalankan kembali tugas perwakilannya). Indonesia requested Cambodia to represent Indonesia’s interests in the PRC.

These two official explanations, one from Beijing’s perspective, the other from Jakarta’s viewpoint, do not accurately describe the dynamics which led to the break in relations between Indonesia and China. Many different factors were at work in 1966 and 1967 which led to the cessation of diplomatic relations between the two nations. The explanations cited above leave out references to the pervasive disorder wrought by the Cultural Revolution in China, as well as the widespread confusion which existed in Indonesia during the
intense struggle for power launched by the Suharto-army group in the quest to wrest power away from the Sukarno government between 1965 and 1968. Both China and Indonesia were intensely absorbed with domestic cataclysmic situations not seen since the founding of each young republic. As will be shown, each nation’s overwhelming absorption with internal struggles on a level of national emergency severely inhibited its ability to adequately deal with the steadily degrading relations between them.

Various Chinese language sources provide even deeper explanations, thereby clarifying Zhou’s admissions to Ne Win, in a conversation after-the-fact in August 1971, which made it clear that activities of the radical left interfered with China’s foreign policy and heavily damaged China’s relations with Burma and other countries, especially with Indonesia. For example, Wang Li, originally a member of the powerful Central Cultural Revolution Group (Zhongyang Geming Xiaozu-CCRG), and later purged as an ultra-leftist in August 1967, himself documents the Cultural Revolutionary turmoil which described China’s foreign policy during the turbulent years of 1966-1967. From his privileged vantage point (before being purged) as Deputy Director of the CCP International Liaison Department and Politburo Secretary, at times personally working for Mao, he observed that Mao Zedong “arrogated all power to himself in foreign affairs” (duiwai gongzuo, daquandulan) as well as in
other fields at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. Wang Li quotes Zhou Enlai as having personally told him and others...

... in doing diplomatic work, foreign affairs work, absolutely remember four important words “power has its limitations” [Yuanquan you xian]. The most important issues must be decided by the Chairman [Mao] himself. I am quite clear on which things must be decided by the Chairman, and which things are within the purview of my position and authority. Nonetheless, great mistakes are possible.8

The aforementioned information, from internal sources, drives home two important points: that Mao himself controlled China’s Foreign Affairs, and that the loss of that control in 1967, as Mao later admitted, was a major derailment of China’s foreign affairs process. It was in that context that China’s diplomatic relations with Indonesia took a downward spiral.

7 Wang Li, Xianchang lishi wenhuadageming jishi [Eyewitness History: A Record of the Great Cultural Revolution], (Hong Kong: Niujin daxue chubanshe, 1993), 118.

8 Wang Li, 118. By “great mistakes are possible” Premier Zhou meant that Chairman Mao could be quite severe in dealing with those whom he thought had acted without his authorization; one wouldn’t want to make the mistake of falling afoul of Mao’s beneficence. Premier Zhou is referring to Mao’s unhappiness with, and his pattern of striking out against, anyone whom he perceived as subverting his decision making power, after all that very issue was the wellspring of the Cultural Revolution itself. Also, this private conversation related by Wang Li bolsters the argument that Mao was the person in charge of China’s foreign policy. Zhou certainly was responsible for helping shape, and figuring out how to implement, foreign policy approved by Mao. Foreign Minister Chen Yi, as Zhou’s most trusted subordinate, carried the responsibility for execution of approved foreign policy, conducting China’s foreign affairs, and for running China’s foreign ministry to include overseas operations.
During the same period that China's foreign affairs infrastructure was under assault by Cultural Revolutionary activities, and losing its grip on diplomatic relations, Indonesia's foreign affairs infrastructure was also under assault from the domestic turbulence which was part of Gestapu Coup, and its aftermath. Details will be provided in the following chapters, but a general picture is presented here as a counterpoint to China's troubles with its foreign affairs structure at that time. As Damien Kingsbury wrote in The Politics of Indonesia,

In the political maneuvering between late 1965 and March 1967, Suharto and his supporters in the Army not only purged the Armed forces, but also cleared the Civil Service of pro-Sukarno elements. The process of bringing the bureaucracy to heel was partly brought about through the army's political organization GOLKAR [Golongan Karyawan-Group of Functionaries], originally the organization of functional groups, which rapidly assumed the status of an institutionalized government party.9

Concerning the effect of the disruption of Gestapu and its aftermath, in Hal Hill's Indonesia's New Order: The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation (1994), Jamie Mackie and Andrew MacIntyre point out

People [Indonesians] do not want to return to the ideological conflicts of the past, just as in China few want to return to the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. Fears of relapse into the

social turmoil of 1965-66 are still strong in the memories of many who lived through that period.10

These two writers, assessing the impact of the traumatic shift from Sukarno's Old Order (Orde Lama) to Suharto's New Order (Orde Baru), show the concomitant deleterious effect upon Indonesia's foreign affairs mechanism.

Because the New Order has been preoccupied with waning political stability and promoting economic growth, foreign policy issues have had comparatively low priority. The Foreign Ministry has not been a powerful part of the state structure. Successive Foreign Ministers have had to contend with interference by the Armed forces leadership in various international issues deemed to have security implications . . . .11

Suharto and the Army used the excuse of the attempted coup, Gestapu, to attack and eliminate all opposition (chiefly the PKI, but also opposing Muslim and political parties, and any others in opposition to Suharto and the Army) in order to secure power over all Indonesia, and to rule unopposed (they did rule virtually unopposed until 1998, when Suharto was toppled, and the Army weakened).12 As Adam Schwarz pointed out the New Order (Suharto and the Army) "Not only held the [Communist Party] responsible for the Coup, but have also made communism an


11 Mackie and MacIntyre, in Hill, ed., 43.

enduring bogeyman to be dredged up regularly to dismiss and
delegitimize criticism of the ruling [Suharto] regime."\(^\text{13}\)

As will be demonstrated in the following chapters dealing
with the Indonesian domestic situation, that ploy was used
against China (the PRC government as well as the Party); the
New Order used the *bogeyman* of a dangerous external threat --
China -- to garner support for its policies, and to silence
opposition to New Order rule.\(^\text{14}\) It's not so much that Suharto,
General Nasution and the Indonesian Army were violently opposed
to the PRC and the CCP, but that, in their use of China as a
threat to Indonesia, as a tool to expand New Order rule over all
of Indonesia, diplomatic relations with China became
increasingly frayed; this at the same time (1966-1967) that the
extreme activism of the Cultural Revolution was critically
damaging China's conduct of its foreign affairs abroad. The
resultant breakdown of relations between the two countries can
be seen as a generally unintended effect. During those troubled
years both sides had internal policies which stated that they
wanted to maintain diplomatic relations.\(^\text{15}\) Despite

\(^{13}\) Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the
1990s*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), 20; also see
Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for

\(^{14}\) Elson, 176-178, 181.

\(^{15}\) Xie Yixian, ed., 387; Departemen Luar Negeri [Indonesia
Ministry of Foreign Affairs], *Dokumenta Diplomatica No. 5, Kabinet Ampera: Aktivitas-aktivitas Kabinet Ampera Didalam*
pronouncements of policy, diplomatic relations were suspended. As the authoritative Diplomatic History of the People's Republic of China, Zhongguo waijaoshi, presents it

The Chinese government hereby proclaims that it strongly opposes the Indonesian government’s suspension (Zhongduan) of the two countries’ foreign relations. In that the Indonesian government has taken such grave steps, the Chinese government has no choice but to announce a temporary closing of the Chinese embassy and consulates in Indonesia, and will recall all diplomatic personnel. As of October 30, [1967] relations between the two countries will be suspended [Zhongduan].

In the case of the PRC, the extreme radicalism of the Cultural Revolution can be seen to have played itself out domestically, as well as in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, other foreign affairs agencies, and overseas in Chinese embassies, consulates, and related agencies. First to be considered will be the Cultural Revolution’s effect on China’s foreign affairs, then will follow a specific examination of the Cultural Revolution’s effects on China’s relations with Indonesia.

Melaksanakan Kebijaksanaan Politik Luar Negeri [Diplomatic Series Document No. 5, Ampera [Presidential] Cabinet: Activities of the Ampera Cabinet in the Implementation of Foreign Policy], (Jakarta: Direktorat Research, Biro Research Umum, 1968), classified Hanja untuk intern Deplu [for internal distribution within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs only], mimeograph copy on legal-size paper, this title was changed to Kabinet Ampera: Dokumen-dokumen Pokok tentang Kabinet Ampera Aktivitas-aktivitas dan Pelaksanaan Kebijaksanaan, but the contents were not changed; date of the title change is unknown, 110-112, 125.

16 Xie Yixian, ed., 729.
THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION'S EFFECTS ON CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

The two months July and August, 1967 were particularly bad, everything was in great disorder [tianxia daluanle]; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was thrown into a complete mess [naode yidahutu]; we lost control for a period of a month and a half, control fell into the hands of the counterrevolutionists.

Chairman Mao, December, 1970.  

Chairman Mao’s and Premier Zhou’s loss of control over China’s foreign affairs during the summer of 1967 brought the PRC to an unprecedented low point in the history of its foreign relations between 1949 and 1967; as Barnouin and Yu point out, 

The turmoil within the country at that time was of such dimensions, factionalism so rampant, ideological discourse so incendiary, that all this had a strong impact on foreign affairs—on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on Chinese conceptions of the outside world and on the decision-making process pertaining to this sector.

The vast array of written works dealing with the Chinese Cultural Revolution, 1966–1976, available to scholars of the subject after China’s opening in 1984, include relatively limited coverage of China’s foreign relations during that ten year period of unprecedented domestic upheaval, and, especially,

17 Jin Ge, in An Jianshe, ed., 235. Mao made this statement during the campaign to criticize Chen Boda’s counter-party anti-army activities.

18 Barnouin and Yu, Chinese Foreign Policy, vii.
little coverage of the two year period leading up to the rupture of China's relations with Indonesia.\(^{19}\)

The history of China's Cultural Revolution is extensively covered in many other sources and need not be repeated herein; however, some examination must be made of China's relations with other nations during the mid-1960s in order to set China's relations with Indonesia into perspective. Again, as previously stated, China lost diplomatic relations with only one major partner, Indonesia, in the midst of the PRC's disturbed relations with many other countries during the period of the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1976.\(^{20}\)

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\(^{19}\) Xie Yixian, ed., 729.

\(^{20}\) Sheng Bingjie, Table: Geguo guoming, shoudu ji yu zhongguo jianjiao richibiao [Country Listing, Capitals, and Date of Establishment of Relations], 678-690. Indonesia, on page 678, is one of fourteen nations in Asia with which China had established relations by 1965; altogether the PRC had established relations with a total of fifty nations world-wide by 1965 (according to the count in this table -- see, also, "notes" on page 690, which explain the PRC's relations with East Timor, Israel, Bhutan, and the PLO). Also this list counts only officially established normal diplomatic relations. Various arrangements short of formal diplomatic relations (chargé d'affaires, Consulate, Mission) existed earlier than the dates given in this table; and those relations and dates are annotated. The official count in this source Guoji shishicidian is precisely fifty countries by mid-1965; in fact, Indonesia is the only major nation listed as having broken relations with China "Zhongduan waijiao guanxi" [suspended foreign relations], on page 678, up through the date of the source, 1984. The PRC had troubled, sporadic, relations with some of the smaller, newly emerging nations in Africa, as found on pages 681-684.
During the first phase, the most virulent stage of China's Cultural Revolution (1966-1968), Premier Zhou Enlai exercised oversight over China's foreign affairs and Mao directed (or dictated) foreign policy; as Michael Hunt put it, Zhou was "Mao's Chief lieutenant in foreign affairs."\(^{21}\) Zhou readily admitted to Mao's primacy in foreign affairs, even prior to the Cultural Revolution,

\[ \ldots \] all great issues of foreign affairs were the direct concern [guowen-which could also be translated as interfered with] of Chairman Mao himself, in this way during the past seventeen years [1949-1966], he has brought about splendid achievements (huihuang yeji) in foreign affairs.\(^{22}\)

If Mao decided China's foreign policy, and Zhou oversaw foreign affairs and guided China's foreign policy, then it was Marshall Chen Yi, Premier Zhou's most trusted subordinate, who was responsible, as foreign minister, to implement foreign policy and to direct the activities of the foreign ministry as well as overseas operations.\(^{23}\) Carol Lee Hamrin points out that from as early as the 1950s Chen Yi was given this authority

A joint circular went out in 1958 from the Central Committee and the State Council establishing a


\[^{22}\text{Jin Ge, in An Jianshe, ed., 217.}\]

\[^{23}\text{Quan Yanchi, Longhudou: He Long yu Lin Biao shusizhizheng [The Dragon-Tiger Battle: He Long and Lin Biao's Struggle to the Death], (Xianggang: Tiandi tushu youxian gongsi, 1997), 401.}\]
Central Foreign Affairs Small Group (zhonggong zhongyang waishi xiaozu) and a State Council Foreign Affairs Office. Politburo member, member of the Military Commission, Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Chen Yi became director (Zu Zhang) of both organs, with responsibility for "leading all aspects of foreign affairs work."  

Chen Yi continued to exercise this authority right up to the early stages of the Cultural Revolution as demonstrated by Premier Zhou when defending Chen Yi against Red Guard attack, in January, 1967, when he stated:

Comrade Chen Yi's [public] examination has been a particularly painful procedure, from the standpoint of division of labor, he handles a great number of things, we cannot further burden Comrade Chen Yi's work; he has worked for the Party for over 40 years, of course he has made not a few errors, but these long years he has been a faithful Comrade following Chairman Mao. I hope that everybody will help him [Chen Yi] with an attitude of camaraderie and brotherhood. In this way I can feel relatively rest assured with the business of foreign affairs, if you allow him to be more engaged, then I will be able to use my energy attending to other matters.  

This particular collaring and criticizing meeting is also described in Yan Jiaqi and Gao Gao (translated and edited by Professor D. W. Y. Kwok) Turbulent Decade: A History of the Cultural Revolution, 1996. This section of the book, entitled "Collaring Chen Yi" provides an excellent first-hand description of what happened to both Chen Yi and his Chinese Foreign

24 Carol Lee Hamrin, "Elite Politics and Foreign Relations" in Robinson and Shambaugh, eds., 110.


26 Yan and Gao, 224-228.
Ministry at the hands of the Central Small Group and the radical groups it directed. Marshall Chen Yi’s emotional state in reaction to these troubles is highlighted by his elegant poem "Red Leaves" which appears on page 225.

THE DYNAMICS OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AS RELATED TO CHINA’S FOREIGN AFFAIRS INFRASTRUCTURE

In order to address the political dynamics which brought Foreign Minister Chen Yi into public attack and Premier Zhou to risk his own safety in order to protect Chen Yi, it is necessary to first review the larger setting of the Cultural Revolution itself as a way to more fully understand the Cultural Revolution’s effect on China’s foreign relations, generally, and upon China’s relations with Indonesia, specifically.27 As mentioned earlier, the Cultural Revolution has been written upon

27 Although further references will be cited in this chapter, the classic source issued by the Chinese Communist Party, and heavily encouraged for use by me by one of its authors, in Beijing in 1996, is Xi Xuan and Jin Chunming, Wenhua dageming jianshi [A Concise History of the Great Cultural Revolution], (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1996). Professor Zhang Xizhen, International Political Department, Beijing University, informed me that this work was intended to be the official last word on the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, that summer (1996) the government issued instructions prohibiting further publication of books dealing with the Cultural Revolution.
extensively in the past three, almost four, decades; and the most recent reference sources have already been cited. 28

The Cultural Revolution purported to reinvigorate, and to continue on with, the Chinese Communist revolution which began with the founding of the Party in 1921, and was seen to have succeeded with the declaration of the establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949. The declared aim was to revolutionize the PRC's culture; the culture of the early-to-mid 1960s; a culture that was viewed by Mao, primarily, as one that had become frozen in its march toward ultimate socialist goals, a revolutionary culture that had become bogged-down with the trappings of the old (or traditional) ways of doing things. A good demonstration of the concept can be seen in the fervent activities of the young student Red Guard movement which

... first assaulted the Four Olds, that is, old ideas, culture, customs, and habits. Such direct

28 Some key bibliographic sources can appropriately be referred to here. Tony H. Chang, China During the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1976: A Selected Bibliography of English Language Works, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1999), is one of the most valuable reference sources on the subject. An earlier, and valuable, bibliography which includes sources in Chinese, Japanese, English, and other Western languages is the Harvard-Yen-Ching Library Bibliographical Series VI, compiled by Yeng-Yi Seng and Dajin Sun, The Cultural Revolution: A Bibliography, 1966-1996, edited by Eugene W. Wu, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, 1998). For the purpose of this treatise, "Chapter XI, Foreign Policy and Relations" has been key; I acquired my own Chinese language sources published in 1996 and after, both in China and abroad; but this chapter in this bibliography is a good foundation up to 1996.
experience, which involved struggle and self-questioning, was to provide the personal "steeling" that would ostensibly transform them into the revolutionary heirs for whom Mao longed.  

That, and other concepts, formed the ideological foundation of the Chinese Cultural Revolution.

A useful summary analysis of the Cultural Revolution can be found in an examination of an official document of the Chinese Communist Party, from the Sixth Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee: The Resolution begins with

The "Cultural Revolution" which lasted from May 1966 to October 1976, was responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the Party, the State, and the People since the founding of the People’s Republic.

Professor Jin Qiu in her book on the Lin Biao incident provides a very effective approach to exploring a subject within the historical framework of the Cultural Revolution, while at the same time, not having to present the history of the Cultural Revolution itself:

I wish to emphasize that this is not a study of the Cultural Revolution as such. Indeed, the Cultural Revolution, which lasted from 1966 to 1976, was a multidimensional phenomenon that no single volume can cover comprehensively. From a macro-

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historical viewpoint, the Cultural Revolution was in fact many revolutions related in form but with considerable diversity in content and process. The Cultural Revolution intended by party leaders, particularly Mao, was quite different from the Cultural Revolution that actually occurred. Moreover, the Cultural Revolution in Guangdong differed from that in Sichuan, which in turn differed from those in Yunnan, Xinjiang, and elsewhere. Each province and even each city had its own revolution. Obtaining archival materials from across China and conveying the complexity of the Cultural Revolution itself are daunting challenges to any researcher seeking to write its comprehensive history. Nevertheless, the Cultural Revolution does provide organizing themes for scholars looking into individual facets of Chinese politics and society in the last decade of the Mao era.31

Directions to the people of China to carry out "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" were provided by the Party Central Committee decision in August, 1966.

The proletariat . . . must meet head-on every challenge of the bourgeoisie in the ideological field and use the new ideas, culture, customs and habits of the proletariat to change the mental outlook of the whole society. At present, our objective is to struggle against and crush those persons in authority who are taking the Capitalist road, to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois "authorities" and the ideology of the bourgeoisies and all other exploiting classes and to transform education, literature and art and all other parts of the superstructure that do not correspond to the

31 Jin Qiu, *The Culture of Power: The Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural Revolution*, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999), 2. I feel compelled to express great thanks to Jin Qiu for her patience, willingness, and forbearance in efforts to get me to understand, at a deeper level, the history of this era of China’s long history, indeed the very flow of China’s modern history.
socialist economic base, so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system.\textsuperscript{32}

This public pronouncement laid out the framework to be followed by the people to carry out the Cultural Revolution. The following day the Central Committee published a communique which provided the blueprint (at least the official, declared blueprint) for the implementation of the Cultural Revolution.\textsuperscript{33}

This communique publicly announced various specific policy decisions and measures concerning domestic and international questions adopted by the Politburo. This document contained a number of important provisions, worth repeating here as a means to convey the framework of one of the largest mass movements in world history. Mao “stressed the theory of contradiction, classes and class struggle in socialist society.”\textsuperscript{34} The country was directed to “carry through to the end in both rural and urban areas the ‘Four Clean-up’ Movement,” that is, the


\textsuperscript{34} “Communiqué,” 220.
socialist education movement to clean up politics, ideology, organization and economy.35 The masses are directed to

Dare to make revolution and be good at making revolution. Don't be afraid of disorder. Oppose the taking of bourgeois stand, the shielding of Rightists, the attacking of the Left and repression of the great proletarian Cultural Revolution.36

Goals were laid out of

. . . consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system . . . preventing the restoration of Capitalism . . . insuring that [China] adheres to proletarian internationalism, and actively supports the revolutionary struggles of the peoples of the World and for insuring [China's] gradual transition to communism in the future.37

Addressing the international arena, the communique stated that China was "now in a new era of world revolution."38 The Communiqué stated that "proletarian internationalism is the supreme principle guiding China's foreign policy."39 Besides those general guidelines, the section dealing with international policy of the Cultural Revolution dealt mainly with the United States, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam as well as some more generalized directions to "unite with all the people in the world who are against imperialism and colonialism," and to

35 "Communique," 221.
36 "Communique," 222.
37 "Communique," 222.
38 "Communique," 222.
"carry the struggle against modern revisionism [read: The Soviet Union] through to the end . . . "." 

The 11th plenary session of the 8th Central Committee calls on all the workers, peoples commune members, commanders and fighters of the People’s Liberation Army, revolutionary cadres, revolutionary intellectuals revolutionary teachers and students and scientific and technical personnel of the country to raise still higher the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung’s thought, unite with all those who can be united, surmount the resistance coming from different directions, from the counterrevolutionary revisionists and the “Left” and Right opportunists, overcome difficulties, short-comings and mistakes, cleanse the dark spots in the Party and society, carry the great proletarian cultural revolution to the end, carry the socialist revolution to the end, . . . and build China into a powerful socialist country." 

On the international scene the masses were exhorted to . . . do a good job of building socialist China which has a quarter of the world’s population, and make it an impregnable state of the proletariat that will never change its color . . . liberate Taiwan . . . guard against surprise attacks from US imperialism and its accomplices. 

All of the above constitutes the official, formal rationale for, and direction to carry out, this new mass movement in China; beginning in 1966. For the purposes of the present study, it is necessary to examine the mirror image of the official, formal, side of this 10-year political/social mass movement: did Chairman Mao really want to "continue the 

40 “Communique,” 224-225. 
41 “Communique,” 226. 
42 “Communique,” 226.
revolution”? Or, was he, in actuality, really striking out and striking back at his enemies (real and perceived) in the Party and government as a way to recoup and insure his supremacy in his rule over all China? The answer to this question is important because relations with Indonesia were ruptured, in great part, by the disastrous effects the Cultural Revolution had on China’s relations with many other nations including Indonesia. Had there been no Cultural revolution would relations between China and Indonesia been ruptured? Of course historiographical principles prohibit addressing that question, nonetheless, the root cause of the Cultural Revolution, as considered herein, bears directly on the issue.

After all, Mao was forced to step back from his position of Chairman of the Republic in 1959 after the massive failures of the Great Leap Forward during the years 1957 to 1959; and it was Liu Shaoqi, later purged during the Cultural Revolution, who took Mao’s place as Chairman of the PRC.43 Dr. Li Zhisui became convinced that the key targets of Chairman Mao were PRC Chairman Liu Shaoqi and Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Deng Xiaoping, along with other key leaders whom Mao perceived to have been in opposition to him; and the Cultural Revolution was the vehicle to be used to depose them.44 At that juncture in

43 Uhalley, 122.

44 Li Zhisui, Chairman Mao, 442.
the history of the Cultural Revolution, Dr. Li's convictions that Mao really launched the movement to regain power from Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping and others are now convincingly supported by subsequent analysis.  

Roderick MacFarquhar's interpretation is that Mao's aim was "getting rid of Liu Shaoqi and conducting a revolutionary regeneration of the whole top leadership."  

Professor Uhalley expresses the view that in 1959 "Mao voluntarily relinquished the state chairmanship with its ceremonial obligation but retained the more important party chairmanship." There exist different views on Mao's status and subsequent activities in 1959 and the few years after, up to the point that he launched the Cultural Revolution. Maurice Meisner in Maos China and After (1986) sees Mao as having gone into "relative political seclusion between 1959 and 1962." Ross Terrill in Mao: A Biography (rev. ed., 1999) describes Mao as one, who from 1961 "drew back into himself, quizzical in


46 MacFarquhar, Coming of the Cataclysm, 443, 460-465.

47 Uhalley, 122.

mood, bowing to political and economic reality." Terrill goes on to describe how power accrued to Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping (both, it should be noted here, were purged during the Cultural Revolution). Obversely, Roderick MacFarquhar, in volume III of The Origins of the Cultural Revolution (1997), states "from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, the record shows that Mao was always in overall charge if not always in day-to-day command." A rather more cynical view, based on practical day-to-day personal experience comes from Mao's former personal physician Li Zhisui in his exclusive The Private Life of Chairman Mao, "Mao resigned as Chairman [of the Republic] only to become emperor. He was still the supreme leader and coming to be seen as infallible and nearly omnipotent.”

It is important to know the root causes of the Cultural Revolution because of the role which that mass movement ultimately played in China's loss of relations with Indonesia.

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50 MacFarquhar, Coming of the Cataclysm, 468.

51 Li Zhisui, Chairman Mao, 281. One Chinese language text contains no mention of emperor and although it says "the highest (or supreme), leader" (zuigao lingshou) that reference cannot be construed as implying the concept of emperor. Additionally, that Chinese language text contains no reference to Mao as having been infallible (yungyuan bu hui cuode; jue wu, wude) or omnipotent (wannungzhe, quannungzhe, yan gue da quanlizhe) or even relatedly similar words; Li Zhisui, Mao Zedong siren yisheng huixilu [Mao Zedong's Personal Physician's Memoirs], (Taipei: Shibiao wenhua chuban, 1994), 270.
The public, official, reasons for the Cultural Revolution, as they are described above, would, in and of themselves, have only peripherally involved Indonesia, if at all. China's Cultural Revolution was directed inward, designed to revamp a socialist evolvement, to restart a flagging communist revolution; all the many directives, orders, editorials, later the big Character wall posters, Red Guard circulars, the 16 points decision (the Communiqué of the 11th Plenary Session of the CCP 8th Central Committee); all were directives to various levels throughout China for the implementation of one of the greatest mass movements in history. Hidden within that massive program was a blueprint that called for personal infighting between power figures responsible for running the most populous nation in the world. Roderick MacFarquhar describes Mao's success in carrying out his own designs:

He [Mao] was able to safeguard his own position by getting rid of his colleagues, suspect because of their independent stature and authority, and surround himself with toadies whose loyalty was to himself rather than to the party, Marxism-Leninism, or their peers. Mao thus stripped China of a priceless asset, a united and capable leadership, the Yan'an Round Table, that "elect group" which had conquered China and guided it through the early travails of nation-building. 52

It was this personal infighting which so harmed China's foreign affairs in 1966-67. The attacks on foreign minister Chen Yi and his ministry were perpetrated by the leadership of

52 MacFarquhar, Coming of the Cataclysm, 471.
the CCRG, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, Chen Boda, and affiliates, through the instruments of Wang Li and Yao Dengshan, and were one stage of a campaign to get at Chen Yi’s boss, Zhou Enlai. In the process, China’s foreign affairs infrastructure was thrown into disrepair, its overseas representation rendered dysfunctional. All but one ambassador were recalled to undergo Cultural Revolutionary vetting. Radical Red Guard-like political activism was carried out in China’s embassies, consulates, and other representational sites abroad. The domestic flavor of the Cultural Revolution had spilled abroad;

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53 Xi and Jin, 153-156; Barnouin and Yu, Chinese Foreign Policy, 22-23.


56 Yin Qingyao, Zhonggong de tongzhan waijiao [Chinese Communist United Front Diplomacy], (Taibei: Youshi wenhua shiye gongsi, 1984), 79-80.
Indonesia was its biggest casualty. As the *Current Scene: Developments in Mainland China* of the period stated:

The Cultural Revolution in its impulse to purge has also made deep inroads into China's foreign policy apparatus, weakening leadership, confusing policy and encouraging almost forcing-conduct in foreign relations compatible with the strident fervor which has characterized internal policies.\(^{57}\)

One official Chinese history criticizes heavily the period of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), but also fails to mention the public attacks on, and trials of, Foreign Minister Chen Yi, or to Mao's and Zhou's later admission of having lost control of China's foreign affairs during this same period of time (July and August, 1967), as referred to earlier herein.\(^{58}\)

More importantly, this official history omits any mention of a break in China's relations with Indonesia. Further, there is no mention of the Chinese Red Guard attack on, and ransacking and burning of the Indonesian embassy in Beijing; an event described earlier in the present study. One of the compulsions for writing this dissertation emanated from this example: an official government history which omits mention of key events. China is certainly not alone in leaving out of its official history politically, socially, or economically embarrassing, or

\(^{57}\) *Current Scene*, "China's Foreign Policy," 1.

\(^{58}\) Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi [Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Institute of Party History], *Zhonggong dangshi dashi nianbiao* [Chronicle of Key Events in the History of the Chinese Communist Party], (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1987), 361-362, hereafter cited as *Zhonggong dangshi*. 69
troubling episodes. The official histories of Suharto’s Indonesia are found to be quite rife with important omissions, as will be pointed out somewhat later in this text. Rescission and redaction of U.S. Government histories, such as the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) volumes for both China and Indonesia, achieve a similar effect of obscuring the history of the Johnson administration foreign policy deliberation and implementation. Examination of Great Britain’s official China: Political Reports 1961-1970, in three volumes, is also seen wanting in fullness of coverage, for example the episode of the attack and burning down of its own chancellery, in Beijing, in August, 1965. Such thin coverage tends to obscure one of the key turning points in China’s foreign affairs history. The widespread abhorrence both in China and abroad of this act of Cultural Revolution extremism (burning down the British


Chancellery) enabled Premier Zhou to censure key radical activists, tamp down CCRG leadership decision making power, and begin the process of rerouting the Cultural Revolution to a more benign track; as Barnouin and Yu describe it "a change of direction in the Cultural Revolution." 61

At the height of the most virulent stage of the Cultural Revolution, the summer of 1967, Chairman Mao and Zhou Enlai lost control of China’s foreign affairs to radical-left elements directed by the CCRG. 62 Especially important are the official Chinese histories which depict both Mao and Zhou telling visiting foreign dignitaries that the Chinese leadership had, indeed, lost control. 63 This fact (of their loss of control over foreign affairs) somehow appears to have received scarce attention by Western writers. Carol Hamrin mentions “the abortive effort by Kang [Sheng] and Wang Li to take over the Foreign Ministry” but, unfortunately, quotes the wrong year,

61 Barbara Barnouin and Changgen Yu, Ten Years of Turbulence: The Chinese Cultural Revolution, (New York: Kegan Paul International, 1993), 154; also see Jin Ge, in An Jianshe, ed., 237-243; and Xi and Jin, 172-175. Information is related in greater detail later in this chapter.


1968, instead of 1967.\textsuperscript{64} In the footnote on the same page Hamrin (very importantly) notes that

One [Chinese] specialist told me the important turning-point away from a radical foreign policy was the defeat of the ultra-leftist effort to take over the Foreign Ministry after which Zhou Enlai restored Chen Yi's power in the system.\textsuperscript{65}

Uhalley does describe how "leftists drastically disrupted China's foreign affairs work when they forcibly occupied the ministry of Foreign Affairs for five days or more in August 1967."\textsuperscript{66}

Michael Schoenhals, (ed.), in \textit{China's Cultural Revolution} (1996) does not even mention the Red Guard attacks on Chen Yi and the Foreign Ministry in August, 1967, in his otherwise comprehensive \textit{Chronology}.\textsuperscript{67} Chih-Yu Shih in \textit{The Spirit of Chinese Foreign Policy} devotes less than a paragraph to Red Guard "'Young revolutionaries' attacks on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and foreign ambassadors."\textsuperscript{68}

Just as Cultural Revolution radicalism attacked and disabled many different sectors of societal, political,

\textsuperscript{64} Hamrin, in Robinson and Shambaugh, eds., 88.

\textsuperscript{65} Hamrin, in Robinson and Shambaugh, eds., fn, page 88.

\textsuperscript{66} Uhalley, 151-152.


educational, economic and other areas, so did it also attack and greatly disrupt China's foreign affairs and foreign relations. Both the infighting, for political power, and the extreme radical ideological bases for the Cultural Revolution served to bring about severe damage to China's foreign affairs infrastructure and to the PRC's relations with other nations, especially between 1966 and 1968.

Han Suyin's book about Zhou Enlai makes clear some of the political motivations behind attacks upon Foreign Minister Chen Yi by the May 16 Group, organized by his [Zhou's] enemies in the CCRG

The ebullient Foreign Minister, Chen Yi the footballer, was an appropriate target. If he could be ousted from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this would destroy Zhou Enlai, already a minority of one due to the downfall of Tao Zhu, of Ye Jianying, and of Li Xiannian. Chen Yi had already been subjected to verbal sniping since early September 1966. His most vociferous opponents were from the Foreign Language Institute, which trained future diplomats, and which outshone other places of higher learning for the viciousness of some—not all—of its students. Zhou refused to let them get their hands on Chen Yi. The Red Guards set up loudspeakers outside the western Gate of Zhongnanhai and shouted, "Drag Out Chen Yi!"

Probably the best descriptions of the political dynamics underlying opposition attacks on Zhou, Chen Yi, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are in the Chapter on Zhou and foreign

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69 Han Suyin, 345.
affairs in An Jianshe's book on Zhou's final years. That chapter, written by Jin Ge and entitled "Zai waijiaobu 'duoquan' qianho" [The Seizure of Power at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] goes into great depth on the subject of Cultural Revolution radical attacks on Zhou, Chen Yi and the Foreign Ministry. This single chapter is so important, and so descriptive concerning attacks against Foreign Minister Chen Yi and the Foreign Ministry, that the contents of the chapter will be summarized herein; with some specific passages referenced by page number.

The beginning of the chapter describes the close, five-decades-long relationship between Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi, pointing out that Chen Yi followed Zhou, as the second of the PRC's foreign ministers, in February, 1958. By 1965, as a result of their work, China had established diplomatic relations with 49 countries; foreign affairs were continually improving for China. Then, suddenly, with the onset of the Cultural Revolution, China's foreign affairs and policies were knocked (thrown) into confusion (daluan) and ruined (bei puohuai).72

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70 Jin Ge, in An Jianshe, ed., 207-243.


72 Jin Ge, in An Jianshe, ed., 208. As explained earlier in this chapter, the PRC had diplomatic relations with fifty countries by 1965, not 49 as stated by Jin Ge.
The section of the chapter entitled "Zhou Enlai uses his own body as a shield" describes Zhou's fervent actions to shield Chen Yi (and by association, Zhou himself) from increasingly virulent attacks, in late spring, early summer 1966, from activist groups charging Chen Yi with being a "Capitalist roader who holds power within the Party, a member of the 'black line' and 'black gang,' and a participant in the November Black Wind."^73

The more charges that could be leveled at Chen Yi (and his subordinates in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and, as a result, the more ideological momentum which could be brought to bear, the more chance the opposition had of successfully struggling him, and, eventually, casting him out of any and all positions of power. If Chen Yi had been cast out, Zhou Enlai, as his protector, would then have been exposed to a similar fate.

Jin Ge's chapter contains verbatim accounts of two major clashes between Premier Zhou and the attackers, the Beijing Foreign Language Institute Red Guards (controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) on December 3, and December 13,

^73 Jin Ge, in An Jianshe, ed., 209-211. All the terms relating to black are epitaphs assigned by the radical leftists to besmirch opponents, see Zhongguo Chuban Gongs [The China Publishing Company], Zhonggong shuyu huijie [Collection of Chinese Communist Technical Terms], (Taipei: Zhongguo chuban gongsi, 1971), 361.
1966. The interested reader will want to read these two accounts personally, but suffice it to say Premier Zhou is unbending and tough in his spirited defense of Foreign Minister Chen Yi (and of himself). It is testament to Zhou’s overpowering stature as well as his superior wit (along with Mao’s favoritism) that he was able successfully to fend off those two fervent attacks (at least for that year, 1966).

Jin Ge proceeds on to explain that Madame Mao, Jiang Qing, was the prime mover behind the Red Guard attacks on Chen Yi; the real target having been his boss and protector, Zhou Enlai. She gained increasing power within the CCRG and by the New Year (1967) she was able to bring about a PLA struggle session against both Chen Yi and Marshall Ye Jianying. Again, Zhou successfully thwarted the attempt.

The following section, entitled “Zai quanmian ‘duoquan’ de kuangchao zhong” (In the Midst of the Mad Tide of Power Seizures) relates that Red Guard calls of “dadao Chen Yi” (strike down Chen Yi) were really “a prelude to seizing total power in [China’s] foreign affairs.” Most importantly, on January 22, 1967, CCRG deputy chairman, Zhang Chunqiao (later

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74 Jin Ge, in An Jianshe, ed., 210-213.
76 Jin Ge, in An Jianshe, ed., 215.
tried as a member of the gang of four) stated publicly that
"... the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, from beginning
to end is all about seizure of power, we want to seize all power
wherever it is."77

On January 17 Zhou faced down key political opponents: Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, Qi Benyu, Wang Li, and others at a major Red Guard Conference in Beijing, in the Great Hall of the People. Zhou insisted that Red Guard units could not be allowed to seize power in the realm of government professional work (or business-yewu); only in leadership of the Cultural Revolution itself. Before Premier Zhou could finish his statement, Jiang Qing responded "This does not need to be studied, power over work will be seized (Yewu quan, ye yao duo, buhui xue ma!)." 78

Jin Ge continues on to the rest of the chapter explaining the details of "seizure of power in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." What follows here are key points from this extremely important, knowledgeable and detailed account of just how the Cultural Revolution affected China’s foreign affairs in 1967, the year which also culminated with China’s loss of diplomatic relations with Indonesia.

77 Jin Ge, in An Jianshe, ed., 216.
78 Jin Ge, in An Jianshe, ed., 216.
On January 18, 1967 Zhou and Foreign Minister Chen Yi became aware that the "Foreign Affairs Cultural Revolution Liaison Station (waijiaobu geming zaofan lianluozhan)" indeed intended to seize power over the business of the Foreign Ministry.79

On January 24, 1967 all of the various Cultural Revolution groups within the Foreign Ministry held a massive criticism meeting directed toward Chen Yi, in the Great Hall of the People next to Tiananmen Square. The criticism meeting was attended by, among others, Zhou Enlai, Li Fuchun, Ye Jianying, Chen Boda, and Jiang Qing. At this meeting, Chen Yi read his self-criticism.80

The actual takeover of the Foreign Ministry is detailed by Barnoin and Yu and by Gurtov, among others; the following sequence is based mostly on their accounts with other sources included as noted.81 Barnouin and Yu are especially important here because their description is based on exclusive documents.

79 Jin Ge, in An Jianshe, ed., 216.

80 Yan and Gao, 225-226. Yan Jaiqi and Gao Gao relate the humorous incident in which Chen Yi asked the crowd to turn to page 271 in Mao's Little Red Book. There is no page 271. Chen Yi read out loud "Chen Yi is a good comrade". His point to the thousands of over-zealous Red Guards was that not everything could be found within the covers of the Little Red Book.

personal interviews, and other sources not available to others of us. Juxtaposing their account, Gurtov draws mainly from Red Guard publications; very useful, but, as Barnouin and Yu point out, only intermittently dependable.\(^{82}\) The aim here is to explain what happened to China's Foreign Ministry and to derive the implications for China's foreign affairs, policies, and relations, and, especially the loss of relations with Indonesia.

In January, 1967 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Cultural Revolution activists formed the "revolutionary rebels liaison station" (geming zaofan lianlouzhan) whose representatives met with Foreign Minister Chen Yi on January 18 to receive his support and to clarify boundaries delimiting liaison station activities implementing the Cultural Revolution within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.\(^ {83}\) Eventually, as Barnouin and Yu make clear,

The Ministry's personnel was [sic] then divided into two categories: one part of the staff was designated to take care of the ministry's day-to-day work, while the larger portion of the personnel was engaged in carrying out the Cultural Revolution.\(^ {84}\)

After a series of disagreements between Foreign Minister Chen Yi and the Liaison station over the handling of the

\(^{82}\) Barnouin and Yu, \textit{Chinese Foreign Policy}, 227, fn 1.

\(^{83}\) Barnouin and Yu, \textit{Chinese Foreign Policy}, 10-11.

\(^{84}\) Barnouin and Yu, \textit{Chinese Foreign Policy}, 11. The importance of this information lies in the fact that it is based on personal interviews and primary documents attained by Changgen Yu in China.
returned ambassadors and their staffs, operations of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, and the depth of implantation of the Cultural Revolution within the Ministry and other clashes, a mass rally to criticize both Chen Yi and the Chairman of the Overseas Chinese Commission, Liao Chengzhi resulted in a weakening of the Foreign Minister’s control and brought about the formation of the “Criticize Chen Yi Liaison Station (P’i-p’an Chen Yi lien-lo-chan, Wade-Giles Romanization, still used by Gurtov in 1971).”85

The Foreign Ministry’s operations became increasingly debilitated by these and other, related, Cultural Revolution activities carried out by the various revolutionary groups both within the Ministry and within its subordinate organizations such as the Foreign Languages Institute.

In each department -- depending on its size -- a supervisory group (of Cultural Revolution activists) of three to five people was set up to oversee the activities of the department heads. These groups were required to read all incoming material and to countersign all outgoing documents.86


86 Barnouin and Yu, Chinese Foreign Policy, 12.
By May 1967, Red Guard and revolutionary group attacks had become more physically destructive to Foreign Ministry personnel and property.

May 13 [1967], saw the first of a series of tumultuous incidents on the Ministry grounds as hundreds of rampaging rebels belonging to the Red Flag Detachment of the Foreign Language Institute (the organization in control of the liaison station) occupied that part of the ministry building which houses confidential documents. For six hours, according to various wall posters of May 14, the Red Guards completely disrupted normal operations, beating up officials who stood in their way, breaking open files and copying down documents (it was here that the quoted remark of one rebel—"what’s so terrific about secrets? To hell with them"—was supposedly made), and barring free entry and departure.87

Attacks continued to take place, and the Foreign Ministry became increasingly disrupted as the weeks wore on, so that...

... on May 29 [1967] about three hundred of them [Red Guards] representing one of two rebel groups within the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission raided the Ministry, forcibly removed classified material from safes, and demanded that Liao Ching-chih [director of the Commission] be handed over to them for criticism.88

Wang Li’s and Yao Dengshan’s activist roles further heightened the tensions within and around the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (as described earlier), reflecting the increased turmoil on China’s national scene, as Barnouin and Yu describe.

During the summer of 1967, the Cultural Revolution had moved into a new phase of intense radicalization.

87 Gurtov, in Robinson, ed., 331.

88 Gurtov, in Robinson, ed., 332.
leading to more and more frequent incidents of violence, armed fighting among rival factions, paralysis of national and provincial government institutions and threats to the army.\textsuperscript{89}

Foreign Minister Chen Yi's 3000 word self-criticism contained five major themes. He admitted to have followed a capitalist line toward the Cultural Revolution during its beginning stages; he followed an "incorrect line" (luxian cuowu). Secondly, he had pursued that incorrect line because he had not understood (buliaojie) the Great Cultural Revolution. Thirdly, he had obstructed various activities of the Cultural Revolution. Fourth, he was too slow to deal with handling an understanding of the attitude of the masses and to rectify his approach. Lastly, Chen Yi told the crowd that he welcomed continued criticism and help to rectify his errors (gaizheng cuowu).\textsuperscript{90} With Premier Zhou's participation and Foreign Minister Chen Yi's adroit self-criticism (Chen Yi's text had been edited by Zhou Enlai before the meeting) they both were able to hold the left-radical opposition at bay for the time being.\textsuperscript{91} However, the situation worsened as China moved further into that fateful year of 1967 which was soon to bring a nearly quarter century rupture in relations with Indonesia.

\textsuperscript{89} Barnouin and Yu, \textit{Chinese Foreign Policy}, 27.

\textsuperscript{90} Jin Ge, in \textit{An Jianshe}, ed., 217.

\textsuperscript{91} Zhou Yan, "He 'danao huairentang' de zhanyoumen" [Together with Comrades-in-Arms at the 'Great Disturbance in Huairentang Hall'], in \textit{An Jianshe}, ed., 42.
CHAPTER 3

THE FEBRUARY ADVERSE CURRENT’S EFFECTS ON CHINA’S FOREIGN AFFAIRS SYSTEM AND RELATIONS WITH INDONESIA

Chen Yi took the lead in formulating a counterforce to CCRG and Red Guard activities, to become known as the (previously mentioned) February Adverse Current (eryue niliu). There is no intention, here, to examine and describe the February Adverse Current. Sources just referenced already cover the history of that event (much more could be done; for example, publication of the original transcripts of the Huairentang meetings). The purpose here is to describe how the February Adverse Current and its aftermath affected Foreign Minister Chen Yi, the Foreign Ministry, China’s foreign policy and foreign relations, and, especially, the effects on China’s relations with Indonesia. The main point is that while Foreign Minister Chen Yi was engaged in defending himself against the Cultural Revolution’s many domestic political activities (mass rallies, criticism meetings, struggle sessions, physical attacks, writing self-criticisms, and related activities) he was forced to turn himself away from his work and responsibilities as foreign minister of China, especially in 1967, the year that relations with Indonesia were lost, especially beginning with the February Adverse Current.
The February Adverse Current meetings were held in Beijing at Huairen hall by Premier Zhou on 14 and 16 February, 1967, attended by older, high-ranking party and government officials along with CCRG representatives. At the February meetings, higher-ranking, older party and government officials heavily criticized the CCRG for the extreme disturbances and political and social chaos brought about by the Cultural Revolution during its first year (from mid-1966 to early 1967). Their criticism came to be known as the February Adverse Current (eryue niliu) because the opposition interpreted these meetings as having gone against the trends of the Cultural Revolution as it was then being carried out by activist groups under the direction of the CCRG.

The February Adverse Current is important to the present study both because of the participants, especially Wang Li, Guan Feng and Qi Benyu who lined up on the opposite side of the old comrades (lau tungzhimen) in the Cultural Revolution, and also because this event, and later reaction to this event, brought about the extreme radicalization of the Cultural Revolution.


2 Zhonggong dangshi, 359.
movement, which, in turn, damaged China's foreign affairs program, part of which played itself out in Jakarta. These February meetings are also of interest because Foreign Minister (Marshall) Chen Yi engaged heavily in criticism of the left-radical group that was directed by Jiang Qing, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng and affiliates, which then, in turn, made Foreign Minister Chen Yi vulnerable to counterattack by that group. Chen Yi . . . had been outspoken in his criticism of the Cultural Revolution, joining with other ranking military leaders in February 1967 to protest military involvement and to challenge the excesses of the young Red Guards.³

The original meetings of what later became known as the February Adverse Current were ordered by Mao and organized and presided over by Premier Zhou Enlai.⁴ These coordination meetings (pengtouhui) held by Zhou in Huairen Hall in the leader's compound of Zhongnanhai on February 14 and 16, 1967 were of record-setting importance. On the conservative (baoshou-against Cultural Revolution excesses) side were Tan Zhenlin (Politburo, Vice Premier), Chen Yi (Politburo, Foreign Minister, PLA Marshal, Vice Premier), Ye Jianying (Central Committee, PLA Marshal, Secretary General of the Central Military Commission), Li Fuchun (Vice Premier, Chairman of the State Planning Commission), Li Xiannian (Vice Premier, Finance

³ Li Zhisui, Chairman Mao, 492.

⁴ Yan and Gao, 125.
Minister-later President of the PRC), Xu Xiangqian (PLA Marshal, Vice Chairman of the CMC, PLA Cultural Revolution Group), Nie Rongzhen (PLA Marshal), Yu Qiuli (State Council Supervisor for Oversight of Production Work and CCRG member), and Gu Mu (CCRG member). This official document name list differs from other sources. The official party chronicle Zhonggong dangshi dashi nianbiao omits Yu Qiuli and Gu Mu. However, the Wenhuadageming jianshi does place Yu Qiuli and Gu Mu at the February 11 (the first) meeting.

An Jianshe’s Zhou Enlai de zuihou suiyue has Zhou defending a number of ranking comrades implicated in the February Adverse Current: Chen Yi, Li Fuchun, Nie Rongzhen, Huo Xigang, Tan Zhenlin, Li Xiannian, Yu Qiuli and Xu Xiangqian. Regardless of the exclusion of certain names in the different sources, these various lao tungzihmen (old comrades) generally can be seen to have formed one side of the polemical-ideological battle line of the Cultural Revolution -- opposed to (and by) the left-radical group composed of members of the CCRG and their allies, later to be designated as the gang of four (Jiang Qing, Yao Wen-yuan, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen) and various

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5 Xian Chaoran, et al., 137.
6 Zhonggong dangshi, 359.
7 Xi and Jin, 148.
8 Jin Ge, in An Jianshe, ed., 42-43.
associates (Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Wang Li, Qi Benyu, Guan Feng, Yao Dengshan, and Lin Biao). These then were the two poles of the battle for authority within China; there were many fronts and many battlefields, especially in the virulent time-period of interest in the present study, 1966-67.

The watershed in the radicalization of the Cultural Revolution appeared in February, 1967, when the old comrades (lau tungzhimen) just mentioned, directed severe criticism toward the CCRG and Red Guards for the manner in which they were carrying out the Cultural Revolution. Those who were directly criticized were: Kang Sheng (adviser to the CCRG and a party intelligence operative, among other posts), Chen Boda (director of the CCRG, and, inter alia, editor of Red Flag (Hong Qi), Jiang Qing (Madam Mao, Deputy Director and de facto head of the CCRG), Zhang Chunqiao (Deputy Director of the CCRG, a confidante of Mao), and Yao Wenyuan (wrote the criticism of the play Hai Rui Dismissed from Office, which initiated the early phase of the Cultural Revolution; he was the youngest member of the CCRG).9 Others were associated with this core group and may or may not have received face-to-face criticism from the old comrades at the February meetings run by Zhou Enlai. The most important associates were: Lin Biao (number two to Chairman Mao and Minister of Defense, among many other posts); Wang Li (Vice

9 Yan and Gao, 125; Schoenhals, ed., China’s Cultural Revolution, 373, 376, 382, 384; Han Suyin, 453, 454, 467-468.
Mayor of Beijing, member of the Beijing Municipal Party Secretariat, and anointed, ex-officio Cultural Revolution political activist with close connections to Mao), and Qi Benyu (Mao’s secretary, junior member of the CCRG).¹⁰

These opposing sides, at the top, drove the cataclysmic clash which engulfed the entire country from top to bottom during the period of interest here, 1967. There were many others who played varying roles, but these were the most powerful participants. Two who held major importance in the breakdown of relations with Indonesia were Wang Li, already mentioned, and Yao Dengshan, a political radical activist who served as chargé d’affaires in Jakarta in 1966-1967. He was declared persona non grata, and later seized power over Beijing’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1967.¹¹ His activities will be discussed in greater detail later.

Some of the old comrades’ criticisms of the CCRG, affiliates, and of the Red Guards have become available since the coming about of a more open publication atmosphere in China, and are pertinent to the major clash between the two sides which in turn was played out throughout China and, ultimately, led to

¹⁰ Han Suyin, 456-457, 464; Schoenhals, ed., China’s Cultural Revolution, 376-378, 380, and 382.

¹¹ Hongweibao [Red Guard Newspaper], “Yaodengshan, Hexu Ren Ye” [What Kind of Person is Yao Dengshan?], editorial, (Beijing: Hongweibao) 1 Oct. 1967: 6; for a brief description of Yao Dengshan’s role in China’s foreign affairs, see Yan and Gao, 253.
the derangement of the whole Chinese foreign affairs complex in 1967. These criticisms inform of the central argument between the left radical groups (Jiang Qing, et al.) and the moderates (Zhou Enlai and subordinates, as well as members of the old comrades group) and are repeated here to provide a clear understanding of the divisive issues of 1967. These issues played themselves out in frantic political infighting between the two opposing sides and affected all aspects of party and government operations, including foreign affairs. At the February 11, 1967 coordination meeting (pengtouhui), chaired by Zhou Enlai:

During the discussion, Ye Jianying censured (zhize) the CCRG "you have messed up (gaoluan) the Party, the government, industry and agriculture! That not having been enough, you still want to mess up the military. What do you all think you are doing messing things up like this?" Xu Xiangqian insistently slapped the table saying "the military is the mainstay (zhizhu) of the dictatorship of the proletariat. If the military is rent asunder in this way, will that mainstay still be there? No wonder all of us here disagree."¹²

After further sharp questioning of Chen Boda about Qinghua University's Red Guard Peng Dafu's and Lieutenant General Liu Zhijian's roles in relation to military and political organizations, the old marshals (lau shuaimen), were extremely

¹² This passage is translated from Xi and Jin, 148. Very similar quotes are found in the English language in Yan and Gao, 126. Note that Xi and Jin date the meeting as February 11, while other sources, mentioned herein, use the date February 14.
angry at Chen Boda’s unreasonable attitude. Ye Jianying seized upon the issue of the *Shanghai Commune* and quizzed Chen Boda:

> What did you think you were doing when you seized power in Shanghai, and changed the name to Shanghai Commune, interfering in an issue of such national import, just going ahead and changing the label on your own without discussing the issue with the Politburo?  

Marshall Ye then mocked Chen Boda:

> We don’t read books, or read newspapers, nor do we understand anything about the principles of the Paris Commune. Please enlighten us a little, what are these principles of this Paris Commune? Can there be a revolution without Party leadership? Is a military not needed?  

In the context of political dynamics within the decision-making ranks of China’s Party and government, these charges, leveled directly at the left-radical group (generally, the group directed by Jiang Qing) by the moderate faction (generally, the group led by Premier Zhou Enlai), were extremely grave and could have possibly derailed the CCRG’s and the left-radicals’ programs (again it was because of the moderate group’s damaging criticisms both at the first coordination meeting (pengtouhui) on February 14 and a second, similar meeting of February 16,

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13 Xi and Jin, 149.

14 Xi and Jin, 149.

15 Xi and Jin, 149.
1967 that these activities engendered the label  eryue niliu (February Adverse Current). The Chinese Communist Party History  Wenhua dageming jianshi (1995) describes the February Adverse Current as “the second high tide of resistance” (kangzhengde dierci gaochao) to the Jiang Qing-Lin Biao group and their conduct of the Cultural Revolution. The same source labels the backlash to the February Adverse Current, instigated by Jiang Qing, Lin Biao, Kang Sheng and associates as “stirring up the high tide of counterattack against the ‘February Adverse Current’” (xianqi fanji suowei “eryue niliu” de langchao). These two conflicting movements spawned the most virulent phase

16 Xian Chaoran, et al., 137, lists the dates of the two pengtouhui as February 14 and 16. Yan and Gao also use the dates February 14 and 16, on page 126. Zhou Yan, in An Jianshe, ed., gives the dates as February 7 and 16, on page 35. Han Suyin, says “the meetings lasted two days, February 13 and 14, and were full of invective and fury,” on page 343. Zhonggong dangshi, lists the dates as February 11 and February 16 respectively, see page 359. Zhongguo Chuban Gongsi, refers to “a movement to reverse decisions” (fanafeng) having taken place between the winter of 1966 and the spring 1967, with the high point having occurred in February, 1967, see page 29. This entry discusses the eryue niliu (February Adverse Current) from a different perspective than other sources. The variations in information from these different sources are important for this dissertation which draws from all these sources in order to create a picture of the major issues between the left-radical group and the moderate group which, in turn, led directly into the ensuing conflict which ultimately derailed China’s foreign affairs in 1967 to include the rupture in diplomatic relations with Indonesia.

17 Xi and Jin, 148.

18 Xi and Jin, 154.
of the Cultural Revolution, in 1967. As the *Wenhua dageming jianshi* puts it, by the end of March, 1967

... the Politburo had ceased carrying out its functions, and the Cultural Revolution Small Group had taken over the powers of both the Politburo and the Central Secretariat (*zhongyang shijichu*).20

As Michael Schoenhals chronicles the situation as of June 1967

... a one-time CCP leader, Li Lisan commits suicide while in custody of the Central Case Examination Group. A gradual descent into a state of near civil war continues as thousands of civilians die in pitched battles between opposing "mass" organizations in Sichuan, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Henan, Anhui, Ningxia, Hubei, and Shanxi. In Wuhan, clashes between members of two large mass organizations resulted in at least 103 dead and 2,744 wounded.21

In order to understand the genesis of the developments which led to this "state of near civil war" and the eventual deleterious effects on China's foreign affairs and, especially, degeneration of China's relations with Indonesia, it is necessary first to understand just what the two main opponents (Zhou Enlai and associates versus Jiang Qing, Lin Biao and associates) were arguing about, and, most importantly what roles Chairman Mao played in this battle of titans which unfolded with all the high-drama, sturm und drang, of the most classical of

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20 Xi and Jin, 156.

the famed Beijing operas (jingju)\textsuperscript{22}. In fact, Madame Mao's successful movement to proletarianize and modernize traditional Chinese Opera was an integral part of the Cultural Revolution, and therefore needs to be recognized here.\textsuperscript{23}

Through her powerful influence, garnered from her position as Mao's wife, she was able to develop extravaganzas such as The White Haired Girl (Baimonu), Fire Amidst Agitated Reeds (Ludong Huozhong, later, at Mao's urging, renamed Shajiabang-a Place of Revolutionary Activity), Taking Tiger Mountain by Stratagem (Zhiqu Weihushan), and others.\textsuperscript{24} Jiang Qing's efforts in

\textsuperscript{22} Because the two main opposing sides of the Cultural Revolution continued the conflict in Beijing (Northern Capital) the use of the traditional term jingju, or, even jingxi seems appropriate here. Other terms for Chinese Opera are gaining currency in China; thus newer, different terms (xiju, wuxi) are being used to describe the traditional Chinese Opera that today plays all over China and abroad. I am indebted to Professor D. W. Y. Kwok's series of China Seminars, conducted in Honolulu, especially those sessions directed toward the Chinese opera, in the early 2000s, for insight into this important dimension of China's cultural mosaic. During 2001-2002 a "Jingju Resident Training Program and Production" was conducted at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa by members of the Jiangsu Province Jingju Company -- Shen Fuqing, principal musician and composer; Lu Genzhang, leading actor; Li Zhenghua, leading actress, and other Company members. Professor Kwok's China Seminar, featuring the Jingju Company, allowed for a particularly valuable opportunity to gain deeper insight into the important influence of the Jingju on Chinese society and worldview.


\textsuperscript{24} "A Chronicle of Chiang Ch'ing's Activities in the Field of Literature and Art (May 1967)" in Classified Chinese Communist Documents: A Selection, (Taipei: Institute of
transforming traditional Chinese Opera are not to be taken lightly; she brought about overt, far-reaching changes in this important aspect of culture during the Cultural Revolution and created the geming xiandai jingju (the revolutionary modern Beijing opera).

Douwe Fokkema, in a section titled “The model Peking Operas on contemporary revolutionary themes” in the Cambridge History of China, establishes the close connection between the “model Peking Operas” and the increasing power of Jiang Qing within the political and ideological framework of the Cultural Revolution.25

As Yan and Gao remarked, Jiang Qing

. . . made great efforts to expand her influence in the ideological and the cultural field with the help of the Beijing opera reform, . . . vast resources of both personnel and materials became available to concentrate on her “model dramas.” Every work could

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International Relations, National Chengchi University, 1978), 711-720, 718-719.

25 Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank, eds., The People’s Republic, Part II, Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966-1982, vol. 15 of The Cambridge History of China, General Editors, Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 607-611, hereafter cited as CHOC, vol. 15. In addition to a deep explanation of the transformation from the traditional opera to the “model operas” of Jiang Qing, Douwe Fokkema makes the important (but obvious) point that “it is probably correct to assume that the Cultural Revolution would not have been possible without radio and telephone.”
be filmed, then films distributed throughout the country, and all organizations and schools ordered to view the [Jiang Qing's] films.  

Since the end of the Cultural Revolution and the beginning of China's opening (1976, 1984 and, variably, since) Jiang Qing's "eight model dramas" have faded into the background and the ages-old, traditional, opera with all its variegation, splendor and deliciously complex plots (which can be seen to have been replicated in the real-life complex plots which were played out in the course of the Cultural Revolution) are back. To be sure, there is one television channel in Beijing which plays out traditional opera and serials based on traditional themes, around the clock. There certainly was a cultural plank to the political platform of the Cultural Revolution, and that plank was a handy springboard for playing out personal vendettas against, and wreaking revenge on, the left-radical group's (Kang Sheng, Chen Boda, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Wang Hongwen, and associates) opponents, directed by Jiang Qing with Chairman Mao's powerful personal backing. While in the short run Jiang Qing did enjoy success in her new-found power, in the end, as the most virulent stage of the Cultural Revolution began to abate in 1968, the Chinese people began to see through the  

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26 Yan and Gao, chapter 25, "Arts Criticism and the 'Revolution of Beijing Opera'", especially pages 400-402.
political manipulation used by Madame Mao. As Douwe Fokkema explains:

Being a tool in the hands of the politicians, the Maoist hero did not succeed in creating a new myth. The audience for the model Peking Opera had too much knowledge of the discord, blackmailing, unlawful detention, suicides, and killing behind the scenes to believe in the operatic stylization of communist behavior.27

Nonetheless, as China moved into the year 1967, the growing power of Jiang Qing and her allies, attributed in such large part to her role in the revision of the Peking Opera and other initiatives in the cultural field, was shortly to bring about a colossal battle between the oppositional forces lining up against each other as the battle lines became increasingly more clearly drawn.

As previously mentioned, the February Adverse Current episode, and its backlash, in 1967, was the highpoint of the bitter oppositional struggle between the left-radical group and those who were perceived, by them and Mao, as their adversaries.

The major issues identified during the February coordination meetings (pengtouhui) presided over by Premier Zhou Enlai, and put forth by the lauyi bei gemingjia (the older

27 CHOC, vol. 15, 611.
generation of revolutionists), also known as lau shuaimen (old marshals), are seen to have been three:

The old generation revolutionaries and the Lin Biao, Jiang Qing band’s [Lin Biao, Jiang Qing, Yihuo] conflict was most importantly centered on three questions, namely: 1.) Should the leadership of the Party be upheld in the course of the Cultural revolution? 2.) Should all of the old cadres be toppled or not? 3.) Should stability [wending] be preserved in the military during the course of the Cultural Revolution or not? These three questions were the great issues directly related to the fate and the future of both the party and the nation. Naturally these three key questions were also directly related to the review (pingjie), and acceptance or rejection of the Great Cultural Revolution itself. Therefore, differences in opinion became directly related to personalities. Thus, there came about extremely sharp conflicts over attempts to correct extremist leftist errors in the Great Cultural Revolution.28

The lines were clearly drawn in the aftermath of the February coordination meetings (pengtouhui) where so much criticism had been directed, by "the older generation of revolutionaries", at the Lin Biao-Jiang Qing faction, which had devolved into the Cultural Revolution Small Group, also known as the Central Cultural Revolution Group (CCRG).29

28 Xi and Jin, 152. A more complete explanation of these three issues is found in Hou Wenfu, ed., 422-423.

29 Zhongguo Chuban Gongsi, 173-75. This is a detailed description of the transformation from the original Cultural Revolution Five-Person Small Group (wenhua geming wuren xiaozu), established July 13, 1965, into the Cultural Revolution Central Small Group (zhongyang wenhua geming xiaozu-CCRG) in May, 1966, to include group member's names and government positions. The CCRG began with seventeen members, after political infighting and factional conflict, the CCRG ended up, at the end of 1967,
Jiang Qing took over as leader of the CCRG on August 30, 1966 and from that time forward the CCRG "replaced (qudai) the Politburo and the Central Secretariat; the CCRG had become the actual controlling organization of the Great Cultural Revolution." ³⁰

Mao Zedong's backing allowed the CSG (later formalized into the Central Cultural Revolution Group - CCRG) to gain the dominant position of power over the Cultural Revolution and over its opponents in 1966 and 1967; his enmity toward his high-ranking colleagues enabled their persecution.³¹ On the night of February 18, 1967, Mao convened part of the Politburo for a meeting, during which he sharply criticized those [old comrades] present at the Huaiiren Hall meetings who disagreed with the Cultural Revolution, charging them with tampering with restoration and engaging in reversals of verdicts. During February and March, 1967 a series of party cell meetings were held in Huaiiren Hall to criticize Tan Zhenlin and others.³²

As mentioned earlier, Professor Roderick MacFarquhar states "there is only one source providing testimony to the

with only five key, powerful, members: Kang Sheng, Chen Boda, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan.

³⁰ Xian Chaoran, et al., 54.


³² Wang Nianyi, 216-217; Yan and Gao, 130-131.
Chairman's [Mao] innermost feeling about his principal deputy [Liu Shaoqi]: the memoirs of Dr. Li Zhisui." Then, in turn, Dr. Li Zhisui reveals his sudden insight into Mao's view of Liu Shaoqi. Li states:

My heart sank. I had been deluding myself about the Cultural Revolution [in July, 1966], and now its purpose was clear. The ultimate targets were Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. They were the "counter revolutionaries" Mao insisted were hidden in the Party, the "party people in authority taking the capitalist road." The Cultural Revolution was a campaign to destroy them.  

Important here is the logic of personal enmities, feuds, which lay behind (or at the very root of) the Cultural Revolution. The ideological basis, as outlined here and in numerous other sources, can be clearly seen. The dynamics of personality interaction remain less clear, and are very difficult to discern and describe. Professor Jin Qiu provides a very useful inside view of the dynamics of the Cultural Revolution saying "the extra-institutional factors, such as personal ideas, behaviors, and personalities are at least as important as the institutional factors that functioned in the Chinese political system under Mao." Her amplification of this very important point facilitates understanding of the dynamics of the interpersonal conflicts evident during the

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33 MacFarquhar, Coming of the Cataclysm, 416.

34 Li Zhisui, Chairman Mao, 470.

35 Jin Qiu, 16.
Cultural Revolution. Chih-yu Shih provides important counterpoint in his examination of China's psychoculture, as related to elite interaction, Marxism, and diplomacy. Professor Shih poses a convincing argument linking together the various elements in Chinese psychoculture which play into both domestic, and foreign, affairs; one focus of this dissertation. He makes the connection between such elements as the rebellious norm, self-cultivation, Marxism, and psychoculture and diplomacy, all leading to a greater understanding of the norms China pursues in its international relations.\textsuperscript{36} Important in both Professor Jin Qiu's and Professor Chih-yu Shih's assessments are the insight into the strains of Chinese cultural dynamics and the connection between domestic and foreign affairs.

How was it that Chairman Mao managed to come into possession of the power to bring about the Cultural Revolution at all, while still in its earliest stages, before it really began to gain traction, and himself, in the second rank (erxian) in the Chinese Communist leadership lineup? As we have seen herein, Mao had allies and operatives to do his bidding -- Chen Boda, Jiang Qing (originally Li Yunhe, also known as Li Jinhai, pen name Junling, stage name Lan Ping,), Lin Biao, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Kang Sheng, Wang Li, Yao Dengshan, Guan Feng, Qi Benyu, and, intermittently, Wang Dongxing. These

\textsuperscript{36} Chih-yu Shih, 48-61.
were the major figures to do Mao's bidding as well as to carry out their own agendas in the power of his name; there were others, especially subordinates of these main figures. Still, how did he, and they, in the status of the erxian position, manage to have their way with the Cultural Revolution, and to defeat, do away with, banish, and even eliminate so many of those in the first rank (yixian) of Communist China's leadership in those days -- Liu Shaoqi, Luo Ruiqing, Deng Xiaoping, (especially for this dissertation) Chen Yi, Lu Dingyi, Yang Shangkun, Peng Zhen, and others who were carrying on with the duties of running the largest government structure in the world? Roderick MacFarquhar intimates the dynamics which enabled Mao to predominate over those in the first rank, and Feng Zhijun amplifies the explanation. 37

37 MacFarquhar, Coming of the Cataclysm, 456-458; Feng Zhijun, Liu Shaoqi yu Mao Zedong [Liu Shaoqi and Mao Zedong], (Xianggang: Xingfu guoji youxian gongsi, 1998). Note that Feng Zhijun's book came out the year after Roderick MacFarquhar's Part 3. MacFarquhar credits Huang Jing in "Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics" an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1995, with pointing out that Liu Shaoqi was abroad on a State visit when Mao made his key moves to cut down Liu Shaoqi, MacFarquhar, see footnote number 152 on page 651. MacFarquhar omits the important fact that Foreign Minister Chen Yi was with Liu Shaoqi and his wife, see Liu Shufa, Chen Yi Nianpu [Chronicle of the life of Chen Yi] vol. 2, multivolume, (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1995), 1139-44. Both Foreign Minister Chen Yi and his wife, Zhang Qian, accompanied the Lius on the trip to South Asia, "Dangdai Zhongguo," ed., Chenyi, 591. Both Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yi, powerful members of the Party and State apparatuses, who could have impeded Mao, were either out of country, or in Kunming or Urumchi, away from Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Beijing, during the period (March 25 to April 20, 1966), when Mao made major moves against Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, 101
Both MacFarquhar and Feng Zhijun make the case that Mao moved to disable the powers of Liu Shaoqi’s administrative apparatus, and remove key Liu allies during the time Liu Shaoqi was away from Beijing, engaged in State visits to Pakistan, Afghanistan and Burma from March 25, to April 19, 1966.\textsuperscript{38} China’s interest in those border countries emanated from continuing tensions with India relating back to the border clashes between India and China in 1959, 1962, and 1965; as it turned out another outbreak in fighting would take place the following year, in September, 1967.\textsuperscript{39}

Chairman Mao took advantage of the timing of Liu Shaoqi’s and Chen Yi’s absence of nearly one month to implement a number and the various administrative organizations so important to Liu Shaoqi’s conduct of the business of his office as President of the People’s Republic of China. I am indebted to Professor Guo Weidong, History Department, Peking University (Beida), for convincing me to explore the importance of the Liu Shaoqi saga as relates to my dissertation topic.

\textsuperscript{38} MacFarquhar, \textit{Coming of the Cataclysm}, 456-458; Feng Zhijun, 566-569.

\textsuperscript{39} Xia Dongyuan, ed., \textit{Ershi shiji zhongguo dabolan} [Chronicle of 20\textsuperscript{th} Century China], (Jilin: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1994), for the 1959 clash, 752, 754; for the 1962 clash, 785-786, MacFarquhar provides an exceptionally informative account of the importance of this clash, \textit{Coming of the Cataclysm}, 298-314; for the 1965 clash, involving China’s ally, Pakistan, see Xia Dongyuan, ed., 814; for the border clash with India in the vicinity of Sikkim in September, 1967, see 839. Liu and Chen Yi’s State visits to Pakistan, Afghanistan and Burma were needed to shore up cooperation between China and its neighbors bordering India. They visited East Pakistan (today’s Bangladesh), April 15-17, 1966, as part of the concern with cementing a buffer against Indian aggression, for details on the East Pakistan visit see Liu Shufa, 1143.
of tactical moves which would place him in a position of power to charge ahead with the Cultural Revolution. As Harry Harding notes "During many of these dramatic developments, Liu Shao-ch'i was away from Peking on an ill-timed visit to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Burma, and was thus unable to lead a defense of P'eng Chen and Lu Ting-i."\(^{40}\) In effect, Mao presented his moves as a fait accompli upon Liu Shaoqi's return to Hangzhou, on April 20, 1966; Feng Zhijun describes these moves by Mao as amounting to a palace coup (gongting zhengbian).\(^{41}\)

As Feng Zhijun describes, during Liu Shaoqi's and Chen Yi's absence, or even while Liu Shaoqi was distracted, preparing for the trip, Mao engineered the dismissal of Peng Zhen and Lu Dingyi, disbanded the Central Committee Cultural five-person group and set up the new Central Cultural Revolution Small Group (CCRG), placed his allies Chen Boda and Jiang Qing as Chair and Vice-Chair of the new CCRG, relieved (thereby paralyzing -- tanhuan) the CCP Central Committee Propaganda Department of its duties, disassembled the Party Beijing Municipal Committee, and attained preliminary approval of the draft of the (later to be

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\(^{40}\) CHOC, vol. 15, 131. Harding's view of Liu Shaoqi's visit as ill-timed should be weighed against the importance of the Sino-Indian border problems, as delineated above. Also to be noted here is that Harry Harding did not mention that Foreign Minister Chen Yi, a close ally of Luo Ruqiang, as well as a potential defender of Peng Zhen and Lu Dingyi, accompanied Liu Shaoqi on the State visit to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Burma.

\(^{41}\) Feng Zhijun, 567.
called) May 16 Circular which would be approved at the following
month's Politburo meeting, and which would, inter alia,
officially depose Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi, and Yang
Shangkun. 42

The May 16 Circular deserves special explanation. As
Wen-hsun Chi reports "there was no recorded meeting of the
Central Committee at this time [May 16, 1966] which could have
approved it . . . and it was not made public until after the
lapse of one year." 43 Wen-shun Chi explains the strong impact
the May 16 Circular had on the course of the Cultural Revolution
when it did appear, after the fact, in Hong Qi and Renmin Ri Bao
on May 18, 1967; but concerning the Circular's immediate impact,
in 1966, he explains

There is no doubt, though, that it was
immediately effective. It revoked the "Outline
Report of February 12, dissolved the Group of Five,
and established a new Central Cultural Revolution
Group dominated by Chiang Ch'ing, Ch'en Po-ta, and
K'ang Sheng, directly under the Standing Committee of
the Politburo. This new group took over control of
the Cultural Revolution from May 1966, and P'eng Chen
went into oblivion. 44

Feng Zhijun also explains the overall course of events
which enabled Chairman Mao to accrue enough power to begin to

42 Feng Zhijun, 566-567. Wen-shun Chi makes clear that the
May 16 Circular was not made public until a year later (May 18,
1967), Wen-shun Chi, 261.

43 Wen-shun Chi, 261.

44 Wen-shun Chi, 261.
direct the course of the Cultural Revolution as a result of these various tactical moves, made while Liu Shaoqi, Wang Guangmei, and Foreign Minister Chen Yi were away on state visits to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Burma.

In the course of just less than one month during Liu Shaoqi’s absence abroad, Mao Zedong seized the advantage (chenji) and decided and settled so many of these important matters (jemma zhongdadi shixiang). Mao destroyed (dadiao) four of the most important and powerful members of the first line of leadership in the Party’s Politbureau and Central Secretariat; the Party’s Beijing Municipal Committee; the Central Propaganda Department; and the Central Secretariat; all key organizations and persons relied on by Liu Shaoqi to carry out his duties as President of the People’s Republic of China. Upon his return from abroad Liu found his position critically weakened, he now could only depend upon a single person—Deng Xiaoping.45

The first of this series of key meetings can be seen to have been the Central Committee Work Group Meeting from March 4—April 8, 1966 during which Luo Ruiqing made a confession of faults on March 12, and which meeting made the following recommendations to the CC CCP:

- Luo Ruiqing should be dismissed from all his duties in the military affairs system.
- Luo should be dismissed from his duties as vice-minister of the State Council.
- Luo should be dismissed from his duties as member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CC CCP.
- A political and organizational summing up should be made of Luo’s mistakes.

45 Feng Zhijun, 557.
-the report of the CC Work Group and the documents it has produced should be circulated to the proper [regional and local] levels in order to eradicate Luo's influence. 46

The next key meeting was the Central Committee Work Conference, in Shanghai, March 28-30, 1966, while Liu Shaoqi, and Peng Zhen and their wives were away on the state visit to Pakistan, Afghanistan and Burma

Mao Zedong: March 28, 1966 . . . attacks Peng Zhen, Wu Han, the Ministry of Propaganda, and the Beijing Municipal Committee; threatens to disband the Beijing Municipal Committee, Ministry of Propaganda, and the Five-man Cultural Revolution Group headed by Peng Zhen . . . . 47

It was at the Meeting of the Secretariat of the CC CCP, April 9-12, 1966, some eight days prior to Liu Shaoqi and Foreign Minister Chen Yi's return, that the Secretariat passed a resolution to dissolve the Five-man Group and to set up a new Cultural Revolution Group answerable to the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, clearing the way for the dismissal of Peng Zhen as the First Secretary and the Mayor of Beijing and the removal of Lu Dingyi as the head of the propaganda Department at the May 23 Enlarged Meeting of the Politburo of the CC CCP. 48

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47 Lieberthal and Dickson, 182.
48 Lieberthal and Dickson, 186.
Thus had Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, having drawn back to the erxian, reinserted himself into the commanding position required to implement his Cultural Revolution. The methods he employed were designed to work around the system of the party and government. A closer look shows that Mao had couched his moves within the basic principle which had guided the Chinese Communist Party through a successful series of revolutions and a civil war to ultimate governance of China. That concept calls for a balanced engagement of government, party, and army.⁴⁹ In this case Mao

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⁴⁹ The understanding of this concept has been long established in the Sinologic field. Classic treatment of the principle is found in Franz Schurman, Ideology and Organization in Communist China 2nd ed., (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), "Supplement, II. Organization: Party, 534, Army, 557, Government, 574". Many others have dealt with the concept as it was incorporated into Chinese Communism: Doak Barnett, ed., Chinese Communist Politics in Action, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969); John Wilson Lewis, ed., Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970); William W. Whitson, et al., The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics 1927-1971, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973); and, of course, Mao Zedong himself, Mao Zedong xuanji [The Selected Works of Mao Zedong], Di san juan [Vol. 3], (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1971), 888. The original concept is found in Clausewitz's formulation of the remarkable trinity which devolves into the important understanding of the need for maintaining a balance between the important three elements of "the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government", Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89. Note that in a later edition the editors changed the term remarkable trinity to paradoxical trinity, Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1993), 101. My studies indicate that there is no evidence to show that Mao read Clausewitz. It seems that Mao borrowed this concept from Lenin,
assured himself of control of all three elements of national power by engineering the replacement of key members of each element with subjects who would do his bidding.

The May [1966] politburo meeting set the stage for the reorganization of the Peking Municipal Party Committee, the Party Propaganda department, and the Party Secretariat, which was announced in early June. P'eng Chen was replaced as Peking's first Secretary by Li Hsueh-feng, then the First Secretary of the North China Bureau; Lu Ting-I was replaced as the head of the Propaganda Department by T'ao Chu, previously first Secretary of the Party's Central-South Bureau; Yang Shang-k'un was replaced as staff director of the Party Secretariat by Wang Tung-haing, a vice-minister of public security who concurrently commanded the elite guards unit in the capital.\(^5\)

The linchpin to Mao's enlargement of his power to move forward with his Cultural Revolution was, above all, the successful dismissal of Luo Ruqing as the Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army and, especially, the replacement of Marshall Luo with Marshall Lin Biao, thereby

who did study Clausewitz, among other European thinkers, and who adapted Clausewitz's original concept, based on a society organized along feudal lines, to a Marxist-Leninist Communist societal structure by substituting \textit{party} for \textit{people} as one corner of the \textit{remarkable} trinity. Chairman Mao read no foreign languages, but rather depended on translations into the Chinese language. Another example of his borrowing from Clausewitz, through the works of Lenin, is the idea that "war is a continuation of politics by other means," a concept which originally appeared in Clausewitz's \textit{On War}, written in the early 1800s (published in 1832), Clausewitz, (1993), 99. Mao specifically quotes Lenin to support his concept that "Zhanzheng shi zhengzhidi teshu shouduandi jixu" [War is the continuation of politics by other means], Mao Zedong, \textit{Mao Zedong xuanji} [The Selected Works of Mao Zedong], Di er juan [Vol. 2], (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1968), 447, fn 483.

\(^{50}\) \textit{CHOC}, vol. 15, 133.
insuring Mao control over the military apex of the party-army-government triangle of power.51

Yan Jiaqi and Gao Gao also provide insight to added influences in the process

The Cultural Revolution was a time of abrupt changes in the power relations of the Chinese polity. These changes trampled the constitution and laws of China. To fortify their positions and gain ever more power, Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, and the members of the Central Small Group used the heat of the Cultural Revolution to unleash a frenzy of false accusations and persecutions. From the Central to the regions Mao believed that there was an organized "Headquarters of Capitalism" and that to topple this headquarters, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Tao Zhu, Peng Zhen, Luo Ruqing, Lu Dinggi, and Yang Shangkun had to be overthrown along with other members of this command post. Others in disagreement with Mao Zedong and Lin Biao, especially the latter, and those who were not in enthusiastic agreement with the enactment of the Cultural Revolution, such as Marshals He Long, Peng Dehuai, Zhu De, Ye Jianying, and Chen Yi, also met with false accusations and persecution. In this frenzy of unconstitutional and illegal acts, they lost all power, authority, and guarantees of life and liberty [emphasis added].52

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51 Yan and Gao, 32-38. This is a particularly full explanation of the dismissals of key people and the resultant shifts in power over to Chairman Mao and his supporters. Not mentioned is the fact that Liu Shaoqi was away on a State visit to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Burma during the key activities between March 25 and April 20, 1966. Also left out is that Foreign Minister Chen Yi accompanied President Liu and his wife, Wang Guangmei; all three of them could have significantly impeded Mao if they had been present in their regular capacities in Beijing, Shanghai, and Hangzhou during the end of March and through April 20, 1966. Wang Guangmei reported that, while on their trip, they were not kept abreast of the developments which were being wrought by Mao; also she describes Liu Shaoqi's health problems as having degraded all of their normal levels of functioning; Feng Zhijun, 567.

52 Yan and Gao, 197.
Important for the purposes of this dissertation is the inclusion of Foreign Minister Chen Yi's name among those who met with "false accusations and persecution." The very process of the Cultural Revolution, while not aimed directly at China's foreign affairs establishment, acted to cripple foreign minister Chen Yi's efficiency, disrupt ministry officials' work, derange the ministry itself, and seriously harm China's diplomatic representational work overseas with political struggle sessions, factional fighting within overseas facilities, along with recall of China's diplomatic personnel to China for political vetting. The effects on relations with Indonesia were especially telling.
CHAPTER 4

THE REVOLUTIONARIES’ SEIZURE OF FOREIGN MINISTER CHEN YI, THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CHINA’S FOREIGN AFFAIRS SYSTEM, AND RESULTANT EFFECTS ON SINO-INDONESIAN RELATIONS

Just as the Cultural Revolution affected virtually all aspects of China’s domestic scene including government and party functioning, so did it directly, and indirectly, impair China’s foreign affairs, especially in its early, most virulent stage, 1966-68. China’s foreign policy personnel, institutions, facilities and operations were derailed by direct political and physical attacks by Cultural Revolution forces (the Red Guards, various special activist organizations, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group - CCRG) both in China and abroad.¹ The Chinese were attacking their own foreign affairs and foreign policy structure.² It’s not as though some menacing foreign power was


assaulting China's national security and in the process threatening its foreign affairs structure at home and abroad, the Chinese were doing it to themselves.³

Importantly, during the same time period, in Indonesia, during the course of the struggle for power between the Orde Lama (Sukarno's Old Order) and the Orde Baru (the Suharto-Army New Order), the Indonesians were attacking their own foreign affairs infrastructure, attacking and imprisoning (with a death sentence) Foreign Minister Subandrio, ransacking the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and purging the Ministry's ranks in 1966-67.⁴

³ Gurtov, in Robinson, ed., 360-366. Melvin Gurtov's chapter on the subject assesses the effects of the Cultural Revolution activist attacks on Chen Yi, the foreign ministry and the foreign affairs system. He does not address the breakdown in relations with Indonesia. Also, care must be taken with his heavy reliance on Red Guard sources, some of which have been found to be unreliable, as Melvin Gurtov himself cautions, see China Quarterly, "The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs during the Cultural Revolution," London: Information Bulletin, Ltd, vol. 40 (Oct-Dec. 1969): 66; also see Thomas W. Robinson, "Chinese Foreign Policy from the 1940s to the 1990s," in Robinson and Shambaugh, eds., 555-556.

⁴ Details will be laid out in the following chapters dealing with the Gestapu coup and countercoup effects on Indonesia's relations with China. Descriptions of the attack on Subandrio have become available in his own words, after more than three decades of imprisonment, Soebandrio, Kesaksianku. For attacks on the Indonesian Foreign Ministry by student groups and affiliates (found to have been organized, directed, supported and protected by the Army), see Ridwan Saidi and Arbi Sanit, Mahasiswa dan Lingkaran Politik [Students and Political Circles], edited by Bambang Soesatyo, (Jakarta: PT. Mapindo Mulathama, 1989), 86-88. Purges within the Indonesian Foreign
The attacks on the Chinese foreign ministry and the Minister of Foreign Affairs were really aimed at Premier Zhou Enlai. If the foreign ministry, the conduct of foreign affairs, and the foreign minister himself could be successfully attacked, then the official with overall responsibility for them, Premier Zhou Enlai, could also be successfully attacked. Barnouin and Yu underscore

... the deep dissatisfaction Jiang Qing and the Central Cultural Revolution Group felt vis-à-vis Zhou Enlai's policies within the Foreign Ministry. For one thing, the CCRG considered him too powerful and too independent in his handling of the Ministry's day-to-day affairs. For another, his approach to the Cultural Revolution in the Ministry and, in particular, his attitude towards the rebels left much to be desired. For the Central Cultural Revolution Group, Zhou displayed distinct signs of ambiguity in all these respects. While he ostensibly supported the rebels, he also maintained close contacts with conservative groups and, to the dismay of the radicals he insisted that the moderates should be included in the revolutionary activities within the Ministry.5

Recall that Chairman Mao had accrued enough power by the summer of 1966 to take the offensive against those who opposed him (or those whom he perceived to have opposed him). He was able to push the sixteen-point official decision through the


5 Barnouin and Yu, Chinese Foreign Policy, 24-25.
Eleventh Plenary Session of the Party's Eighth Central Committee, thereby setting into place his blueprint for the Cultural Revolution. 6 Melvin Gurtov pointed out that the sixteen-point decision cancelled the earlier work teams (gongzuodui), which were used by Foreign Minister Chen Yi "to defend organizational units loyal to him in the foreign affairs system." 7

According to Red Guard publications Chen Yi protected key subordinates, loyal to him, and maintained in office:

Li Chang, Vice Chairman of the Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and secretary of its Party organization; Fang Fang, head of the Party Committee of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission; Nan Han-Chen, Chairman of the Committee for the Promotion of International Trade, who was later to commit suicide; Liu Hsin-Chuan, a Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Lo Chun, director of the Foreign Language Publications and Distribution Bureau. 8

These would all come to be targeted by the revolutionary committees which were soon to physically seize the various officers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.


7 Gurtov, in Robinson, ed., 317. Again note that Melvin Gurtov uses the Wade-Giles Romanization system, common among western scholars during that period of time.

8 Gurtov, in Robinson, ed., 318.
One official Party history describes the August, 1967 revolutionary group (zaofanpai) attack on the Foreign Ministry in this way:

On the same day [August 7, 1967], Wang Li delivered a talk which incited a seizure of power over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Under the instigation (suoshi) of Wang Li, Guan Feng and others, the revolutionary group smashed (zalan) the Foreign Ministry’s political department to pieces, sealed off the department’s committee (dangwei), and thereby seized power over China’s foreign affairs. Their power over China’s foreign affairs continued on through August 22, when the British Chancellery in Beijing was burned down along with other similar acts of interference in foreign affairs; which severely damaged our country’s foreign relations and reputation.9

Earlier, in June, 1966, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Party Committee had singled out Vice Ministers Wang Bingnan, Chen Jaikang and Meng Yonggan for targeted criticism. As Barnouin and Yu point out

In order to avoid being chosen as targets themselves, people felt compelled to prove their loyalty to the Party and their willingness to participate actively in the movement. Thus they began to compete with each other in the task of discovering other people’s political mistakes. Everybody’s attitude towards the socialist system and towards socialist policies over the years became subject to scrutiny.10

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9 Zhonggong dangshi, 361-362.

10 Barnouin and Yu, Chinese Foreign Policy, 5. Changgen Yu’s observations are particularly important for understanding just how the Cultural Revolution influenced China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was able to interview many of the participants as well as to gain possession of important documents; many of his observations are based on his “personal notes” taken from documents and interviews.
In the course of burgeoning attacks on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, designed to topple Foreign Minister Chen Yi, which in turn would cripple his supervisor and mentor, Premier Zhou, the radical elements in the Ministry began recalling Chinese ambassadors and embassy staff members from overseas.\(^{11}\) The CCRG along with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Cultural Revolution Liaison Station (lianluozhan) carried out the project of recalling the Ambassadors and staff personnel, as well as overseeing the vetting of returned diplomatic personnel.\(^{12}\)

The recall of ambassadors and ranking embassy staff held great importance in China's conduct of its relations with the 50 nations with which China held diplomatic representation; in China's conduct of its own foreign affairs. As one source on international diplomacy states:

> The Chinese Foreign Ministry had itself run amok for part of this period [the Cultural Revolution], with senior officers dismissed, its

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\(^{11}\) Zhu Lin, *Dashi furen huiyilu: Xiongyali, Yinni, Faguo, Meiguo* [Memoirs of an Ambassador's Lady: Hungary, Indonesia, France, and America], (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1993), 144-155. Zhu Lin provides a first hand description of her persecution at the hands of the Foreign Ministry's Revolution Group after she was recalled back to China from France. The one Chinese Ambassador not recalled during this period was Huang Hua, Ambassador to Egypt, he was deemed to have been vetted prior to his posting; *Current Scene*, "China's Foreign Policy," 3.

\(^{12}\) Xie Yixian, ed., 390.
premises raided by Red Guards, and all but one of its ambassadors abroad recalled for an indefinite period. 13

Specifically, in the case of Indonesia, the Chinese Ambassador, Yao Zhongming was recalled to China in April, 1966 (prior to the mass recall), and was never replaced with a fully-ranked ambassador after that. 14 Although the momentum of the Cultural Revolution was still low in late 1965 and early 1966, the impetus in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs grew in such a way that by September, 1966 there was a full campaign under way to recall China's ambassadors, along with key staff members; Zhou Enlai was finally forced to implement a full recall in early 1967. 15 Chih-yu Shih in his work, The Spirit of Chinese Foreign Policy: A Psychocultural View, sees China as having greatly injured itself with the international isolation


14 Yi Jiaqi, Xin zhongguo waijiaode puluzhe [Pioneers of New China's Diplomacy], (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmim chubanshe, 1992), 7; Ricklefs, (1993), 290.

15 Barnouin and Yu, Chinese Foreign Policy, 12-14.
that resulted from the recall of its ambassadors during the Cultural Revolution. Shih also points out that:

Domestic challenges to the commanding national image would inevitably affect the diplomatic servomechanism. Chinese diplomats have encountered a few periods of chaos. The first was, of course, the Cultural Revolution. All but one ambassador were recalled home and red guards were sent to foreign offices.

In the world of international diplomacy, absence of an ambassador, except for routine, or emergency, home leave or professional reasons such as a regional conference, etc., is of major importance to the state of relations between countries. Absence of an ambassador and his senior staff can severely degrade the level of diplomatic relations between states.

A passage from Gurtov reinforces the importance of diplomatic representation in-country

The departure of the Chinese Ambassador and most of his staff from Rangoon in March 1967, followed by a return of a chargé d'affaires and (reportedly) several Red Guards, inaugurated a series of events that were to be repeated with little variation in other countries: The transformation of the Chinese embassy and the New China News Agency

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16 Chih-yu Shih, 115.

17 Chih-yu Shih, 136. Other periods of upset for China's ambassadorial corps, according to Shih, came about during the purge of the Gang of Four in 1976-77 and in 1989 in the wake of the Tiananmen Massacre.

into centers for the propagation of Mao's thoughts; the distribution or attempted distribution of Mao badges and other symbols of the Cultural Revolution's personality Cult; and the ensuing clash with local government authorities over Chinese insistence on the justifiability of distributing Maoist literature and badges without interference. 19

Gurtov's description of the Cultural Revolution's activist activities at China's diplomatic post in Burma serves as an accurate description of the situation of the PRC's representation in Jakarta when Yao Dengshan and Xu Jen assumed the post of interim chargé d'affaires and consul general respectively. 20 One knowledgeable source I interviewed in Beijing told me that in his view, the break in relations could have been avoided if it weren't for the extreme activism of the Cultural Revolution. 21 He said that when Indonesian Foreign Ministry personnel appeared at the Chinese Embassy to calm the tense standoffs between local student-led mobs and Embassy personnel, the Indonesian officials themselves were berated and abused by Chinese Cultural Revolution tactics employed by Chinese diplomatic personnel, led, especially by Yao Dengshan, the Interim Chargé d'Affaires. 22

19 Gurtov, in Robinson, ed., 341.
20 Gurtov, in Robinson, ed., 333; Xia Dongyuan, 834-835.
21 Huang Ailing, Personal interview, in Beijing, with Huang Ailing (An Indonesian-Chinese), former Director of the Southeast Asia Broadcasting Division, Radio Peking, 16 August 1996.
22 Huang, Personal interview.
Melvin Gurtov highlights the importance of Yao's role

Although it has been suggested that the Red Guard's principal motive in opposing the Central Committee was probably sheer loss of patience over the dilatory tactics of [Premier] Chou and [CCRG leader] C'hen Po-ta, it may also have been their acquisition of a leader-Yao Teng-shan-that gave them added audacity to fight their way into the Foreign Ministry. Yao Teng-shan, until late April 1967, had been the senior C.P.R. [Chinese People's Republic] official in Indonesia as Chargé d'Affaires ad interim. On 28 April, he and Hsu Jen, the Counsel General in Djakarta, were declared personae non gratae by the Indonesian Government and ordered to leave the country. This action was hardly surprising in view of the rapid deterioration of Sino-Indonesian relations following the unsuccessful PKI coup attempt of 30 September 1965. When Yao and Hsu returned to Peking on 30 April, they were declared "red diplomatic fighters" and given heroes' welcomes. Virtually every leading member of the government (except Mao), including the entire hierarchy of the Foreign Ministry, was reportedly present to greet them at the airport. 23

Gurtov deserves great credit for his early work on the connection between the radical Cultural Revolution activities and the damage to China's Foreign Ministry and foreign affairs. He drew attention early on to the importance of Yao Dengshan's central role in the decline in China's relations with Indonesia and attacks on Chen Yi's Foreign Ministry. Yao Dengshan's return to the PRC after being ejected from Indonesia became a cause celebre for the radical left as it continued to radicalize

China's relations with other nations; Yao Dengshan became the poster boy for the cause.24

Huang Ailing holds that the actions of the Chinese Embassy personnel were blatantly provocative; that there was no diplomatic atmosphere in which to engage and compromise. Huang said that the hostile, Red Guard-like, activities of the Chinese diplomatic personnel killed any chance of saving diplomatic relations between the two countries. Huang Ailing specifically blamed the turbulence and disorder of the Cultural Revolution for the breakdown in relations between China and Indonesia.25

The recall of Chinese ambassadors and senior embassy officials along with the accompanying degradation of overseas embassy and consulate operations is just one aspect of the injurious effect of the Cultural Revolution upon China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its foreign policy and foreign relations. Further detail on just how the degradation of Chinese representation directly affected relations with Indonesia will be covered in the chapters dealing with Indonesia. At this point more exploration of how Cultural

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24 China Pictorial, Peking, "Seven Hundred Million People Protest," vol. 33 (July 1967): 35-37, shows Zhou Enlai warmly greeting Yao Dengshan on his arrival from Jakarta on April 30, 1967, as well as a photo showing Mao and Lin Biao warmly receiving Yao Dengshan and Xu Ren at a May 1, 1967 (May Day) reception. The text accompanying this article describes the Chinese view of the deterioration of relations with Indonesia following Yao and Xu's tour and expulsion from Jakarta.

25 Huang, Personal interview.
Revolution activities interfered with China's Foreign Ministry is in order.

Again, Melvin Gurtov makes clear, through his extensive use of Red Guard newspapers and other documents, the details of leftist activists' assaults (polemical as well as physical) upon Foreign Minister Chen Yi and Ministry personnel and property.

At one point Gurtov relates:

Speaking to Red Guards at the airport on February 12 [1967], Chen said: "The facts prove what I said last year was not wrong, not all wrong. Look at things now, we must still do things my way. If things had all along been done my way, we wouldn't have come to this state. At present look at what has happened to the ministry: no order, no organization, foreign affairs secrets have been taken away."^26

The Zhongguo waijiaoshi [History of China's Foreign Relations] continues on after describing negative reactions to Chinese embassy activities in Burma, Nepal, Sri Lanka (Ceylon) to state that:

Especially important to point out (tichu), Lin Biao, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng and their associates, after the "Great Cultural Revolution" got underway, meddled (chashou) in foreign affairs; during July and August, 1967 power over China's foreign affairs fell (panglou) largely into their hands. They used the slogan "World Revolution" and the so-called idea that China "has risen to be a country which is a decisive factor in world revolution" [as taken from Lin Biao's speech of March 20, 1967]. These types of phrases, were designed to gain control (longluo) of the people's spirit; moreover they tried to use the slogan "World Revolution" to stir up (shandong) the masses, all as a means to achieve their [Lin Biao,

^26 Gurtov, in Robinson, ed., 325, fn 30; also see Xie Yixian, ed., 388-389, for descriptions on Red Guard activities and responses from Burma, Nepal, Sri Lanka (Ceylon).
Jiang Qing, et al. goals. In order to carry out their schemes, they casually and blatantly cast aside (paoqi) all the principles necessary to ensure normal interaction between countries, and even the basic standards of international relations. It was just during this time-period that the so called sanzayishao (three smashes, 1 burning) took place [that is, the smashing of the Indian, Burmese and Indonesian embassies in Beijing, and the burning-down of the British Chancellery]. Jiang Qing, Lin Biao, Kang Sheng and others ignored the Central Committee's strategy and decisions, and caused a crisis in the threat to take back Hong Kong by force of arms, they alienated (shuyuan) official authorities charged with the conduct of foreign affairs business with foreign representatives in-country; and allied with opposition groups to bring about trouble. At mass rallies, they brazenly incited the masses to chant the slogan "smash all foreign governments," and so forth. In all, Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and their group, insofar as foreign relations are concerned, rejected the five principles of peaceful coexistence and, under the guise of "World Revolution," attacked everything, and struck down everything (ximian chuji, dadao yiqie). This period saw a severe curtailment of official foreign delegation visits to China. Due to problems big and small, in China at the time, the number of countries at odds with China greatly increased. All of this caused severe damage to China's foreign relations.27

Left out of the passage above are factors such as Jiang Qing's enmity toward Premier Zhou and that it was she who engineered attacks on Foreign Minister Chen Yi and his ministry hoping to tear him down and leave his boss, mentor, and protector, Zhou Enlai, vulnerable. Also omitted in the previous passage is the recall of all but one of the Chinese ambassadors

27 Xie Yixian, ed., 389-390. This entire passage is translated from the waijiaoshi because it accurately portrays what can be considered the official Party line on Lin Biao, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng and associates' damage to China’s foreign affairs during the 1966-1967 period.
(Huang Hua-Egypt, who was deemed liberated) as well as embassy staff members. Also, this passage, along with other parts of the Zhongguo waijiaoshi omits the details of the physical takeover of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. How was that accomplished? Han Suyin states:

The CCRG left extremists had decided [summer 1967] to take control of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, and the Wang [Li] - Guan [Feng] - Qi [Benyu] trio, directed a team of Red Guards to search the ministry rooms where confidential documents were stored. "What is so confidential? Why all these secrets?" cried the ignorant young as they tossed the files about. 28

Wang Li, appointed to the Central Cultural Revolution Group (CCRG) in 1966, as pointed out earlier, can be seen as the CCRG's point man for the assault on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 29 It must be pointed out that Wang Li himself denies having been the chief instigator of the takeover of the Ministry. 30 In his book Wang Li goes into great detail to show that he has been falsely accused. He challenges both domestic and foreign characterizations of him as the perpetrator of the July-August attacks; in his Chapter "August 7th Speech" (Ba Qi Jianghua) he opposes the Cambridge History's account of his

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28 Han Suyin, 344-346.

29 Li Zhisui, Chairman Mao, 492-493; Also, Yan and Gao, 226-227.

30 Wang Li, 53.
responsibility for the attacks on China’s Foreign Ministry as well as the burning down of the British Embassy. Wang Li writes:

The volume’s [Cambridge History] editor is Harvard University’s expert on the history of China’s Cultural Revolution, Professor R. Macfarquhar [sic], a very serious scholar. Unfortunately, it is very difficult for foreign scholars to research clearly because they are only able to rely on available documents which amount to nothing more than confused and inaccurate materials, as well as on their own conclusions. It is a good thing that someone like me who actually took part in the events is still alive. I have never divulged information on this issue before, now I will discuss it. 31

Despite his protestations, the evidence is overwhelming that Wang Li was, at the direction of the CCRG, the instigator (at least) of the revolutionary group attacks on Foreign Minister Chen Yi as well as the takeover of his ministry during June, July, and August, 1967. The fact is that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Waijiaobu) revolutionary group (zaofanpai) launched their attacks, polemical and physical, in the days following Wang Li’s address to them, at the Ministry, of his famous baqi jiang hua (August 7th Speech) as it is now known. This fact is laid out clearly in the Party’s official history.

done by the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee, Party History Institute, and other sources.32

No less an authoritative work than the *Wenhua Dageming Jianshi* blames Wang Li for inciting severely damaging attacks both on Foreign Minister Chen Yi and on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In this very period when strengthening of leadership in foreign affairs was so urgently needed (jixu), just then did Foreign Minister Chen Yi encounter the revolutionary group's (zaofanpai) increasingly strident public criticism attacks at every turn (pidou weigong). Zhou Enlai many times went forth to intervene but could not rectify the matter (wujiyushi). On August 7 [1967], Wang Li, only recently returned from Wu Han as a hero and a braggart (ziwu), when received by the Foreign Ministry revolutionary group, delivered an unscrupulous (ziwujidan), wildly arrogant (kuangwang) speech. He openly instigated and supported seizure of power within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Shortly after, the Foreign Ministry Party Committee [the control element of the Ministry] was sealed off, the Ministry’s Political Department was smashed to pieces (zalan), and excessive directives were issued abroad in the name of the Foreign Ministry, along with other incidents. Then, on August 22 came the very serious incident of the burning down of the British Embassy. That greatly damaged China's reputation abroad, and also threw China's foreign affairs into the most tumultuous period to have been experienced since the foundation of the Republic [1949]. In later years, Mao Zedong, when talking to [Edgar] Snow, stated that "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs fell into a complete mess (yitahutu). It was out of control for a month and a half. July and August, 1967 were terrible, there was great disorder everywhere (tianxiadaluanle)."33

32 Zhonggong dangshi, 361-362; Wang Li, 267.

33 Xi and Jin, 173.
It is to be noted that this state of extreme upset in China’s foreign affairs infrastructure existed just two months prior to China’s breakdown of relations with Indonesia (October, 1967). At the same time, as related earlier in this chapter, Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry was in the throes of a massive purge and reorganization under direction of Suharto’s new Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, who, just the year before, had replaced Foreign Minister Dr. H. Subandrio who, in turn, had been arrested, imprisoned, and sentenced to death by the Suharto government.

Insofar as Wang Li’s claims that he did not instigate the attacks on Chen Yi and the takeover of the Foreign Ministry, the most telling evidence to the contrary appears in the form of Red Guard documentation and the authors’ analysis found in Barnouin and Yu’s China’s Foreign Policy During the Cultural Revolution:

The most serious disturbances within the Foreign Ministry were not created by the Red Guard’s assaults; they were directly related to a talk given by Wang Li, on the evening of 7 August, [1967] to Yao Dengshan and a number of representatives of the [Foreign Ministry] liaison station. Wang Li, a former deputy minister of the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee and a senior member of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, was at the height of his prestige after his return from Wuhan as a national revolutionary hero. Yao Dengshan, who had returned to China from Indonesia as a much celebrated “red diplomat”, was one of the few senior Ministry staff who enjoyed high prestige among
the Ministry rebels, so much so that he had been invited by Zhou Enlai to act as an adviser to the liaison station's nucleus group.  

Barnouin and Yu proceed to describe, in detail, how Wang Li went about stirring up the Foreign Ministry rebels. In their discussion of the takeover, two important points emerge. One point is the prominent role played by Yao Dengshan in the attacks on the ministry. The other is the statement that "Wang's intervention was also an embodiment of the deep dissatisfaction Jiang Qing and the Central Cultural Revolution Group felt vis-à-vis Zhou Enlai's policies within the Foreign Ministry."

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34 Barnouin and Yu, Chinese Foreign Policy, 23-24. The authors do not include Wang Li's memoirs, neither the Chinese language edition (1993) nor Schoenhal's 96-page translation: An insider's account of the Cultural Revolution: Wang Li's memoirs, (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1994) as listed in Chang, 131. References for this passage are Barnouin and Yu's own book on the Cultural Revolution, along with Yu's personal interview with former Cultural Revolution and Foreign Ministry Activist Yao Dengshan (in 1991). In 1996, while in Beijing, I was politely declined in my requests to the Foreign Affairs Office, Peking University (Bieda), to interview Yao Dengshan. I was informed, eventually, by close associates, that Yao Dengshan simply is "not allowed" to give interviews, and that he is kept secluded by the Chinese government. Barnouin and Yu were most fortunate to have had the benefit of an interview with Yao Dengshan; more on this subject will be addressed in the chapters dealing with Indonesia.

35 Barnouin and Yu, Chinese Foreign Policy, 23-26.

36 Barnouin and Yu, Chinese Foreign Policy, 24-25.
Another very important aspect of Barnouin and Yu's coverage of Wang Li's role in instigating the takeover of the Foreign Ministry is their translation of the Red Guard newspaper (Waishi, Fenglei-[Events in Foreign Relations], 7 August, 1967, Beijing) copy of Wang Li's speech and dialogue with the Foreign Ministry rebels (Liaison Station).\(^{37}\) Wang Li, in his memoirs, laments that he, himself, after 10 years of searching, was not able to find a true copy of his own speech "wo jiaole shinian, dou meiyou jiaodao yifen dangshide jianghua jilu quanwen" [I searched for ten years, and I was totally unable to find a complete copy of the speech as I gave it at the time].\(^{38}\)

Despite Wang Li's lengthy, involved, protestations, in his memoirs, that he did not instigate the revolutionary group's attack on Foreign Minister Chen Yi and the takeover of the

\(^{37}\) Barnouin and Yu, Chinese Foreign Policy, 155-159.

Foreign Ministry, he does make some important points relating to the increasing disarray in China's foreign affairs.

Around May Day [May 1, 1967] there could be seen a change in attitudes toward uniting (tuanjie), but the way I see it, extremist activities also occurred and increased during June, July, and August of 1967; and they were especially apparent in the field of foreign affairs. Certain particular extremist ways of thinking, issues, and activities reached their zenith (dingdian) in the area of foreign affairs. The Great Cultural Revolution originally was China's own affair. Then came a growing ideological trend (sichao he liangchao) to use China's Great Cultural Revolution to promise (tuidong) a world-wide proletarian revolution. Moreover, our [China's] foreign policy became mixed up (hunxiaole) with the world-wide proletarian revolution and with international communist movements. This went against (weibei) Mao's own international strategy; a long-standing and correct international strategy. An example was the two united fronts (tongyi zhanxian) idea. The first United Front was to unite with oppressed and newly independent nations. The second was to unite with Western Capitalist nations and with East Asian countries to exclude America and Russia. Success at establishment of the second united front would achieve the successful isolation of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Mao upheld and supported the five principles of peaceful coexistence, but the five principles got diluted (chongdan). We made enemies (shudi) around the world; there was no place where we didn't make enemies.\(^{39}\)

Wang Li continues on by relating discussions he had with Mao about some of the issues quoted above. Wang Li was against allowing foreigners, residing in China, license to take an

\(^{39}\) Wang Li, 51.
active part in public activities of the Cultural Revolution; he feared that would make more enemies abroad. Mao disagreed.\footnote{Wang Li, 52.} Most importantly for this dissertation, Wang Li says that he opposed handing over to the Central Liaison Committee (zhonglianbu), for the purpose of unmasking (jiewu) Liu Xiaoqi, "extremely sensitive (jichuan) top secret (jimi) neibu [classified: internal circulation only] materials on the history of the Party's handling of revolutions in each country in Southeast Asia."\footnote{Wang Li, 52.} As mentioned earlier, I have been able to gain possession of a number of sensitive, restricted, Chinese Communist Party documents dealing with Indonesia and the PKI. Although they are used in following chapters which deal with the PKI's activities, the roles of the Indonesian student groups, the Indonesian army, and the Indonesian Chinese in Indonesia's relations with China, a listing of these documents here seems appropriate because they are of the genre referred to by Wang Li. One of these documents is the serial numbered (13370) 
\begin{center}
\textit{Geguo gongchanjuyi zhengdang wenzi [Collection of Various Nation's Communist Party Writings], Yindunixiya gongchandang [The Communist Party of Indonesia]: Diliuzi quanguo daibiaodahui wenjian [Documents of the Sixth National Congress], Beijing:
\end{center}

\footnote{Wang Li, 52.}
Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1961, (371 pages). This document's serial number is important because of its sequential relationship to a later, similar classified document -


number on this classified document (13374) is quite near in sequence to the first document mentioned above (13370), showing continuity in Chinese documentation related to the PKI, certainly among Wang Li's concerns.

Also included in the category referred to by Wang Li is the classified (neibu) series Yinni geming ziliao [Indonesian Revolutionary Materials], Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang duiwai lianluobu bianyin [Compiled by the Foreign Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Central Committee], various dates. In my possession are: dierji (Volume 2), November 22, 1951 (134 pages); and disiji (Volume 4), April 3, 1953 (138 pages). Both volumes are serial numbered and are printed as dangnei kanwu [Internal Party Publication], fuze baocun [protect responsibly].

These four documents contain information on PKI internal policy, decision making, party proclamations, organization,

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Yinni geming ziliao [Indonesian Revolutionary Materials], Series, (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang duiwai lianluobu bianyin [Compiled by the Foreign Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Central Committee]), various dates, dierji [volume 2], November 22, 1951, serial No. 047, classified dangnei kanwu [Internal Party Publication], fuze baocun [protect responsibly]; Yinni geming ziliao [Indonesian Revolutionary Materials], Series, (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang duiwai lianluobu bianyin [Compiled by the Foreign Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Central Committee]), various dates, disiji [volume 4], April 3, 1953, serial No. 023, classified dangnei kanwu [Internal Party Publication], fuze baocun [protect responsibly].
(political and territorial), names of party members and their positions of responsibility, and other similar types of information. As will be shown in the later chapter on the role of the PKI in Indonesia's relations with China, these classified Chinese Communist Party documents provide important understanding of PKI personalities and activities in the years leading up to 1965, as well as the subsequent, important, years, 1966-67.

Wang Li's activities which led to derailment of China's foreign affairs during the spring and summer of 1967 were all intertwined with the role of Yao Dengshan in foreign affairs. Yao Dengshan, as a Cultural Revolution activist, held the post of Chargé d'Affaires in Jakarta, from June, 1966, up until, as the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Chinese government that

... the Government of Indonesia has decided to declare (memutuskan untuk menjatakan) persona-non-grata Tn. [Tuan-Mr.] Yao Teng-shan, Chargé d'Affaires (Kuasa Usaha a.i.) of the Chinese Embassy and Tn. Hsu Jen, Chinese Consul General in Djakarta, because those two officials were responsible for the activities of the Chinese Embassy and the Consulate General which deliberately created an atmosphere which worsened relations between Indonesia and China. 45

More description of Yao Dengshan's actions while serving as Chargé d'Affaires in Jakarta, and his role in provoking Indonesian student groups, as well as Indonesian Foreign Ministry personnel, to the point of he and Xu Ren having each been declared persona-non-grata will be covered in the following chapters dealing with Indonesia.\textsuperscript{46} Yao Dengshan and Wang Li, at the bidding of the CCRG, continued to increase the level of activism around foreign missions in Beijing as well as at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as one authoritative source described

By the end of July, the pro-Mao "masses" had registered their indignation at the missions of at least ten countries, all of them in the category of "imperialist" (Britain, France), "revisionist" (USSR, Yugoslavia, Mongolia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia) or "reactionary" (Indonesia, India and later Burma).\textsuperscript{47}

Among the crises brought about by Wang Li and Yao Dengshan was the event which came to be labeled sanzayishao (three smashes, one burning—that is, the smashing of the Indian, Burmese and Indonesian embassies in Beijing, and the burning-down of the British Chancellery).\textsuperscript{48} As made clear in Chapter two, Red Guard groups demonstrated against, broke into,

\begin{footnotes}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{46} Gurtov, in Robinson, ed., 333.
\item \textsuperscript{47} \textbf{Current Scene}, "China's Foreign Policy," 4.
\item \textsuperscript{48} Xia Dongyuan, ed., 839.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotes}
ransacked, and set fire to the interior of the Indonesian embassy; Indonesian diplomats and staff were abused in the process. In the days to follow, Wang Li and Yao Dengshan would increase the chaos by directing Red Guard attacks against broader targets.

Just at the time when China’s relations with Indonesia needed especial attention and restorative care, China’s foreign minister, Foreign Ministry, along with its foreign affairs, policies, and relations were in an extreme state of disarray.

One source relates that

Concerning that period’s seizure of power (duoquan) over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Comrade Mao Zedong while meeting with a foreign guest pointed out: “the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was taken over by leftists (zuopai). For about a month power was out of our hands and was in the hands of those so-called “leftists”. These so-called “leftists” really are just anti-revolutionists. 49

As described earlier, Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry was also in an extreme state of flux as the Suharto-Army faction continued on its push to gain total control over the country. Newly appointed Foreign Minister Adam Malik and the recently purged Foreign Ministry staff were forced to subordinate their programs (one of which was to maintain relations with China) to

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the Suharto-Army agenda for total takeover of Indonesia.\textsuperscript{50} As the summer of 1967 turned to autumn, China and Indonesia were to find themselves just weeks away from a rupture in relations which would last for the coming 23 years.

CHAPTER 5

THE QUESTION OF THE ROLE OF THE INDONESIAN-CHINESE IN THE
BREAKDOWN OF RELATIONS BETWEEN INDONESIA AND CHINA

Chinese Indonesians to Celebrate New Year

Jakarta [January 23, 2001]. After fighting for three years, Chinese Indonesians tomorrow will be able to officially celebrate the Lunar New Year.

The ethnic Chinese community regained their freedom to profess their own religions and beliefs and to celebrate traditional festivals only following a decree by President Abdurrahman Wahid early last year that annulled a 1967 presidential order banning all forms of Chinese culture in Indonesia.

In 1999, then President B. J. Habibie verbally revoked the ban and allowed Chinese Indonesians to set up their own political party.

The ethnic Chinese minority had celebrated Chinese New Year in the predominantly Muslim country freely until after an abortive coup in 1965, allegedly by the Indonesian Communist Party that many Indonesians believed was backed by China, caused a widespread crackdown and then ban on Chinese culture.\(^1\)

The New Order government (Suharto, the Indonesian Army, and his administration) banned the appearance of written Chinese, and closed Chinese schools; Chinese businesses, public activities, and freedom of movement were all tightly regulated, and curtailed. Nationwide restrictions were applied to

Indonesian-Chinese and to Chinese from overseas residing in
Indonesia.²

Within a period of two years, from October 1, 1965 to
October 30, 1967, Indonesia’s relations with China went from a
level of a mutually beneficial and effective exchange to a
complete breakdown of diplomatic intercourse. Indonesian-
Chinese, Chinese from abroad residing in Indonesia
(expatriates), and the PRC itself all came in for “a widespread
crackdown and . . . ban” as pointed out in the Honolulu Star-
Bulletin news article. Such a wide tectonic shift in
Indonesia’s relations with China in two short years, a rather
startling phenomenon in and of itself, requires investigation
and explanation.

Many different factors in the mid-1960s played into
Indonesia’s eventual breakdown of relations with China. The
framework of the Cold War, with Indonesia in the balance between
leaning toward the World Communist block or toward the Free
World (as it was then called) cast a long shadow over
Indonesia’s foreign relations, and not just with Communist
China.³

² Charles A. Coppel, Indonesian Chinese in Crises, (Kuala
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1983), 173; Nicola Frost,
Indonesia: An Oxfam Country Profile, (United Kingdom, Oxford:
Oxfam GB, 2002), 42-44.

³ Certainly, America’s war in Vietnam, at its height just
about this time (1965-1968), also in the framework of the Cold
War, induced pressure, on all sides, for Indonesia to come down
The role of the Chinese, both indigenous and expatriate, in the PKI, as well as in Gestapu, was questioned at the time by Far Eastern Economic Review reporter Harold Munthe-Kaas.

There is very little evidence to show that Indonesia's Chinese have been proportionally more involved in PKI/Gestapu activities than the Indonesians themselves . . . . In the subsequent arrests and trials, none of the top people involved was Chinese. Chinese names rarely crop up in connection with proceedings involving Gestapu elements. 4

Munthe-Kaas's assessment is further supported by an official Chinese Communist Party document which carried the names of the PKI hierarchy just a few years prior to the Gestapu failed coup. 5 According to this Chinese language translation of the PKI’s 6th National Congress proceedings, there were only two Indonesian-Chinese elected to the top ranks of the PKI which included: the Central Committee and its alternate, the Central Inspectorate, the Politburo and its alternate, the Central

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4 Munthe-Kaas, 281-282.
5 Xinhua She, Geguo gongchanjuyi. Although this CCP document, which came into my possession in Beijing in 1996, is not classified, it does carry a serial number, indicating a method of accountability, distribution, and use. Also, this document carries the imprinted stamp of the Tianjin renmin chubanshe ziliaoshi [Tianjin (City) People’s Publishers Materials Unit], as well as other imprinted work unit stamps and serial numbers.
Secretariat, and the Central Advisory Committee. A number of party members filled more than one position.*

Jusuf Adjitorop - CC; Alternate (1); PB; Sec. (1); Vice-Chair, Sec.
D. N. Aidit - Chair CC; PB (1)
Anwar Kadir - CC; Sec. (2)
Amir Anwar Sanusi - CC; Sec. (3)
Djoko Sudjono - CC, Sec. (4)
M. H. Lukman - 1st Deputy Chair CC; PB (2)
Njono - CC; Alternate PB (2)
Njoto - 2nd Deputy Chair CC; PB (3)
Peris Pardede - CC; Sec. (5); Supervisory Committee (4); Chair, Supervisory Committee
Ir. Sakirman - CC; PB (4)
Siswojo - CC; Sec. (6);
Sudisman - CC (25); PB (5); Sec. (7);
General Secretary
Sujono Pradigdo - Inspec. (6); Chair Inspec.
Laurens Darman Tambunan - Inspec. (9);
Vice-Chair Inspec.

*(CC = Central Committee, (or Alternate), PKI; PB = Politburo; Sec. = Party Secretariat; Inspec. = Party Inspectorate Committee; (Number) = standing in the organization listed).

Of the 77 designated positions within the hierarchy of the PKI as it entered the 1960s, these 14 individuals occupied 33 of those positions; nearly one-half. The quality of these positions in terms of power and influence must be taken into consideration when counting the numbers of positions. All of

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7 The name listing is taken in the order of appearance as members of the PKI Central Committee. Even though Adjitorop stood above D. N. Aidit in CC ranking, Aidit was the Chair of the Central Committee as well as the top-ranking member of the powerful politburo. Also, two important personages, Sujuno Pradigdo, Chair of the Inspectorate and his Vice-Chair, Laurens Darman Tambunan, were not members of the PKI Central Committee.
the PKI organs of major importance in running the party were
dominated by the list of fourteen people which appears above.
Recalling that the PKI was a fully legitimate political party
(up until acting President, Lieutenant General, Suharto outlawed
the PKI on March 12, 1966), and that the PKI was becoming the
most powerful and populous party in Indonesia, with some members
represented on Sukarno's presidential (exterior, 108 member)
cabinet, these fourteen men listed above can be seen to have
wielded significant political, economic and social power, in
Indonesia, during the first half of the 1960s, up until
Gestapu. David Mozingo states that "numerically and
organizationally, by early 1963 the PKI had become the strongest
single political force in Indonesia."  

There were only two women in the top ranks of the PKI
going into the 1960s: Mrs. Suharti, member of the PKI Central
Committee (No. 37); and Mrs. Sunardi, member of the PKI Central
Inspectorate Committee (No. 7), but not a member of the Central
Committee.  

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8. Leifer, 55; Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of
Indonesia 1951-1963, (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1964), 113; James T. Siegel, A New Criminal Type in Jakarta:
Counter-Revolution Today, (Durham, North Carolina: Duke
University Press, 1998), 4-5.

9. David Mozingo, Chinese Policy Toward Indonesia 1949-

Budiardjo relates her knowledge of Ibu Sunardi from their time
together in Bukit Duri and Lampung prisons as political
The only two Indonesian-Chinese listed in the hierarchy of the PKI held no significant power or influence within the party itself. Tan Ling Djie (Putonghua Cao Linru), 1904-1969, had already been pushed to the margins of the PKI by the 1960s.\footnote{WDOC, 729. This work contains in-depth information on Tan Ling Djie and other notable Chinese in Indonesia (as well as in other parts of the world).} Mr. Tan, from Surabaya, attained a Dutch education, both at home and in the Netherlands. In 1948 he served as the deputy secretary of the newly consolidated PKI. From 1948-1953, as Secretary General, he instituted a wide-ranging program in the PKI involving political, organizational, and ideological reforms, which were collectively to become known as Tan Ling Djieism.\footnote{Tan Ling Djieism is entered under a separate heading of its own in the WDOC, 455. The path of Tan Ling Djie within the PKI is also described in Hindley, 19, 23-26, 63-64, 78-79.}

Tjoo Tik Tjun (Tjoen) (Putonghua-Cao Desui), the other Indonesian-Chinese in the upper reaches of the PKI was schooled in Indonesia along with one year's attendance at the Tongji University in Shanghai. He was a political and social activist involved in various Chinese activist groups, Chinese schools, and in business dealings. Tjoo Tik Tjun was captured by the prisoners, after they were both moved to prison in Jakarta. Ibu Sunardi was a PKI member elected to parliament. She was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Suharto-Army government in October, 1976; however the Inter-Parliamentary Union secured her release at age seventy.
Dutch while he was fighting in the Chinese Baoandui (Public Security Forces—a local Chinese resistance group in Java) against Dutch occupation of Indonesia. He was captured and imprisoned by the Dutch in 1951-1952. Mr. Tjoo joined the PKI in April, 1956. He was imprisoned by the Suharto-Army government in the aftermath of the September 30th, 1965, failed Coup attempt.¹³

Interviews in Beijing in 1996 revealed other Chinese members among the PKI leadership ranks, however they were not in positions which would have enabled them to make important decisions, or to influence top-level decision making.¹⁴ Cao Dezhong and Huang Zida were both party Central Committee members. Zheng Linyu was a member of the political affairs section. Huang Ailing’s description of these three Indonesian-Chinese party members indicated that their roles, and influence, within the PKI were quite limited. He reported that during his interaction with the PKI at all different levels in 1963, and later in 1964, just prior to Gestapu, the ranks of the PKI did not contain large numbers of Indonesian-Chinese. He also told me that his assessment was that the PKI did not have a sound

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¹³ WDOC, 729.

¹⁴ Huang, Personal interview. He had returned to Indonesia for extended periods in 1963, and 1964. He traveled throughout the islands and was quite familiar with the situation, especially that of the PKI and its members.
program or organization, and that the party was not well
directed.\textsuperscript{15}

Despite this evidence that the Indonesian-Chinese held no
significant policy formulation power within the party, the
general conclusion within Indonesian society that Indonesian-
Chinese were important figures within the PKI grew more
widespread during the few years leading up to Gestapu in 1965.

The defense of the Chinese by left-wing
parties, particularly by the Communist Party, (Partai
Komunis Indonesia), only served to reinforce the
suspicions of the more fervent anti-communists that
the Chinese were politically unreliable. The
tendency by the right wing to identify the Chinese
minority in Indonesia with communism and with China
was further enhanced in the late “Guided Democracy”
years when President Sukarno (also an opponent of
Anti-Sinicism domestically) steered Indonesian
foreign policy onto a parallel course with that of
the Chinese People’s Republic and the PKI took the
side of the Chinese Communist Party in the
international communist schism.\textsuperscript{16}

Doctor Z. M. Hidayat, in his thesis for Padjadjaran
University, Masalah Cina di Indonesia [The China Problem in
Indonesia], 1976, categorizes Indonesian-Chinese into three
political orientations: those oriented toward the government of
the Republic of Indonesia; those oriented toward the government
of their forefathers (leluhur), the PRC; and those without any
discernible political orientation except to be inclined toward

\textsuperscript{15} Huang, Personal interview.

\textsuperscript{16} Coppel, 29.
Singapore and Hong Kong. He goes on to state "as relates to the second group [those oriented toward the PRC] even up to the present [1976] they do not talk about themselves and they continue to hide themselves (terus disembunyi), and many carry out subversive activities." Dr. Hidayat posits his concept of Indonesian-Chinese participation in the "pemberontakan Partai Komunis Indonesia (G.30.S/PKI) [the Indonesian Communist Party uprising (G.30.S/PKI)]" in the absence of substantive evidence. Hidayat also contends that the PKI used the Indonesian-Chinese organization BAPERKI [Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaran Indonesia-Consultative Body for Indonesian Citizenship] as an important tool (alat yang besar) in the "G30S/PKI".

The issue of the role of the Indonesian-Chinese in the PKI, and relatedly in Gestapu, in Indonesia's relationship with China, even within Indonesia's society, politics and economy, continues to be a matter of debate and contention to the present day. Dr. Rizal Sukma, Director of Research at the Centre for

17 Hidayat, 136. His references to Singapore and Hong Kong, which he labels "the third China" (the PRC is the first, the overseas Chinese Community collectively is the second) relates directly to the mercantile relationship of the Indonesian-Chinese with the two Chinese markets of Singapore and Hong Kong.

18 Hidayat, 136.

19 Hidayat, 135, and passim.

20 Hidayat, 158.

During the period of Parliamentary Democracy [1950-1957] and especially during the period of Guided Democracy [1957-1965] suspicion regarding the position and political loyalty of the aforementioned ethnic Chinese [masyarakat etnik Cina - here to include both WNI-Indonesian citizens, and WNA-non-citizens], especially suspicion within anti-communist elite political circles, were strengthened by the existence of various connections (hubungan sebagian) between them [ethnic Chinese] and the Indonesian Communist Party (hereafter: PKI) as well as with the PRC. From the beginning, the ethnic Chinese were suspected of having the role of "liaison" (penghubung) between the PKI and the PRC. The suspicions then, among other things, were related to the closeness between people of Chinese descent (masyarakat keterunan Cina) and the PKI and also because many Chinese people had become members of the PKI. At the same time, the PKI was frequently seen as the party which always defended the interests of the Chinese population (for example, the anti-Chinese episodes of 1959-60 and 1963). Besides, these suspicions were also further strengthened by the political contributions (sumbangan-sumbangan politik) from ethnic Chinese citizens (warga masyarakat etnis Cina) to the PKI. This way of behaving (sikap), then, further reinforced Indonesian Army (TNI Angkatan Darat) suspicions already present from the time of the establishment of diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1950.  

21 Rizal Sukma, "‘Masalah Cina’ dalam Kerangka Hubungan Indonesian - PRC" [The "China Problem" within the Framework of Relations between Indonesia-PRC], Chapter 6, in I. Wibowo, ed., "Masalah Cina"-Retrospeksi dan Rekontextualisasi [The "China Problem" - Retrospection and Recontextualization], (Jakarta: PT Gramedia, 1999), 133-134. In 1959 and 1960 the Indonesian Army forced a ban on alien rural trade, movement of Chinese to the cities, and return of over 100,000 Chinese to the PRC. Sukma’s reference to 1963 apparently has to do with the disturbances emanating from the PKI campaign to carry out land reform laws.
To write of suspicion of Indonesian-Chinese participation in the PKI, and support of the PRC, dilutes the characterization of non-Chinese Indonesian's views of Indonesian-Chinese; indeed, a more accurate rendering might have been non-Chinese Indonesian conviction of Indonesian-Chinese involvement with the PKI and the PRC. One definitive source which linked the Indonesian-Chinese with the PKI and PRC is W. D. Soekisman's *Masalah Cina [The China Problem]* wherein he notes that non-Chinese Indonesians were convinced that Indonesian-Chinese were all followers of Communism (*setiap orang Cina adalah pengamut komunisme*). Rizal Sukma endorses the idea that Indonesian-Chinese continued to present a threat (*ancaman*) to the security of Indonesia all during the New Order Years (1965-1998) by way of violent encounters took place throughout the islands as landlords resisted villager takeovers. For both these periods see Ricklefs, (1993), 266 and 274, respectively.

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23 W. D. Soekisman, *Masalah Cina [The China Problem]*. (Jakarta: Bangun Indah, 1976), 80, also see 67, 68.
their connections and affiliation with the PRC "in other words, ethnic Chinese (masyarakat etnik Cina) [were] seen as the linkage between the threat from within (Communism) and the threat from outside (the PRC)."24

These sources (Hidayat, Rizal Sukma, Ide Anak Agung, General Nasution, and Fuad Bahyin), unfortunately, do not supply statistical evidence, names, positions, and numbers, of Indonesian-Chinese within the PKI. As pointed out earlier Suharto New Order government and supporters’ charges that Indonesian-Chinese were mainly instrumental in directing the policies and activities of the PKI are not supported by specific information on the names and positions of such Indonesian-Chinese. Failure to provide names and positions led Munthe-Kaas, an informed observer for Far Eastern Economic Review, to his conclusion, cited earlier, that "in the subsequent arrests and trials [of PKI members in the wake of Gestapu] none of the top people involved was Chinese."25

24 Sukma, "'Masalah Cina'" in Wibowo, ed., 143. This may be the most definitive statement of Indonesia’s view of Indonesian-Chinese, considering Rizal Sukma’s qualifications (a doctorate from the Department of International Relations, at the London School of Economics) and position (Deputy Director of Studies at CSIS, Jakarta). Key here is his assessment of a Chinese threat, a view he held even in the late 1990s.

25 Munthe-Kaas, 281-282.
It is one thing to say that Indonesian-Chinese were important figures within the PKI as well as important go-betweens for the PKI to the Chinese Communist Party and government. It is quite another thing to show names and positions to support such statements. Actual membership lists, both in Chinese publications as well as in Indonesian publications simply do not support the premise that Indonesian-Chinese played major roles in the direction of PKI policies and activities or as key figures in PKI relations with the PRC or CCP. As J. A. C. Mackie noted

The PKI's relatively favourable attitude toward the Indonesian Chinese was not, contrary to widespread misapprehension, due to the fact that many of the latter were members of that party. In fact, quite the opposite was the case; in the early fifties the PKI under Aidit's leadership had quickly eliminated from its top ranks the only Chinese who had earlier been prominent in it.26

There are serious questions about Indonesian accusations that Indonesian-Chinese played predominant roles in the PKI and therefore in Gestapu and that the PRC (government and party) was involved before, during and after Gestapu.27


27 See later discussion in this dissertation, A. H. Siagian, "Dinas Intelligence (Rahasia) komunis: Marxisme Idee Penggerakan Mengchianati Tanah Air (III) [Communist Secret Intelligence Service: Marxist Ideology Behind Treason to the Fatherland, part 3], Mingguan Angkatan Bersendjata, Edisi Mandala [Armed Forces Weekly, Mandala Edition], 12 Feb. 1967: 3; 150
One set of the more direct accusations against the PRC is found in a 1977 publication by the Indonesian State Secretariat to the effect that Indonesia had frozen (pembekuan) relations with China because

The PRC had interfered in the internal affairs of Indonesia by the assistance (bantuan-bantuan) it had provided to the G-S-30 PKI affair both in preparation and implementation, as well as in the aftermath of that event . . . also because of the terror created by the Chinese in attacks on the diplomatic personnel, buildings, and property of the Indonesian embassy in Peking . . . the PRC protected leaders of G-30-S/PKI abroad, while at the same time supporting (menyokong) the resurrection of the PKI . . . the PRC used the mass media to carry out a propaganda campaign attacking the New Order.28

These five reasons for Indonesia's freeze in relations with China were, in effect, made up after the fact. At the time (October, 1967) Indonesia declared its freeze, Jakarta merely stated the situation in Beijing precluded Indonesian diplomats from conducting diplomatic representation and other diplomatic business.29


28 Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia [State Secretariat, Republic of Indonesia], 30 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka [Indonesia's 30 Years of Independence], (Jakarta: National State Secretariat, 1977), 654. This official document, with endorsement written by President Suharto and a forward written by Minister and State Secretary S. H. Sudharmono, as quoted above, lays down the official reasons for Indonesia’s freezing relations with the PRC. These reasons for freezing relations were not the ones given in 1967, as explained earlier herein, in Chapter 2; Laporan Research.

29 Laporan Research, 23.

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Absence of substantiating evidence of Chinese involvement in Gestapu leads to a search for answers as to what brought about pervasive anti-Chinese actions in the wake of Gestapu. One explanation serves to relate directly to domestic political ambitions; as Mackie puts it "Attacks on China's Embassy and consulates served the Anti-Communist [the Indonesian Army and various Muslim groups] purpose of either forcing Sukarno to yield to their pressure or revealing his inability to resist it."\(^{30}\) Sukarno's opposition (Suharto and the Indonesian Army) had to weaken President Sukarno's hold on national power in order for them to wrest that power away from him. They were able to demonstrate Sukarno's weakness by showing that he was unable to prevent or stop Indonesian attacks on Indonesian Chinese and on PRC diplomatic personnel and facilities. Mackie describes wild rumors in Indonesia about "Peking's behind-the-scenes role" in Gestapu and then expresses his view that

It is, in fact, highly doubtful that Peking had any part in the coup attempt—just as there is strong reason to doubt that the PKI itself was involved to anything like the degree that the Army version of the Coup has depicted. But in the crises-laden atmosphere of October 1965, it was not the facts which mattered so much as what people wanted to believe.\(^{31}\)

\(^{30}\) Mackie, in Mackie, ed., 112.

\(^{31}\) Mackie, in Mackie, ed., 113.
Importantly, the CIA, in its research study, done in 1968, also concludes that "there is no evidence that the PRC masterminded the Indonesian Coup." The CIA’s study does not include any information relating to any Indonesian-Chinese involvement in Gestapu.

It is important that the Cornell Paper, an in-depth study of the Coup done in the immediate months following the event, by Professors Benedict R. Anderson and Ruth McVey, also did not find Indonesian-Chinese, PRC, nor even PKI responsibility for the aborted Coup. Professors Anderson, McVey, as well as their research colleague Frederick P. Bunnell, were deeply involved in, and knowledgeable of, the situation and conditions in Indonesia around the time of the Gestapu coup attempt. One of their key assessments is that

The October 1st coup was essentially an internal Army affair, stemming from a small clique in the Diponegoro [Infantry] Division, which attempted to use both Soekarno and the PKI leadership for its own ends, and succeeded merely in irremediably damaging the moral and political authority of the one, and causing the physical destruction of the other.

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32 USCIA (US Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence), Indonesia 1965: The Coup that Backfired (Research Study, December, 1968), (Washington D. C.: U.S. GPO, 1968), 289, hereafter cited as USCIA, Indonesia 1965. This research study does conclude that the PKI played a central role in planning the coup, and, further, states that the PKI used others (military members, Untung, Air Marshall Dhani, and others) to carry out the operation, pages 266, and 269. Also important is that the coup was carried out with the express purpose of purging the Indonesian Army leadership, see page 284.
The brief "civil war" of late October, though precipitated by the events of October 1st, represented the logical culmination of deeply-felt hostilities and hatreds between a far wider range of groups and ideologies—right and left, Islam and Communism, landlord and landless, santri [Javanese strict Muslims] and abangan [Javanese nominal Muslims], prijaji [members of the official class] and peasant. 33

Anderson, McVey and Bunnell’s assessment reaches into the depth of the vortex of the Gestapu countercoup which took hundreds of thousands of lives as it ran its course, culminating only at the point of the formal swearing in of General Suharto to replace President Sukarno on March 27, 1968. Their access to inside local, Indonesian, sources, along with their thorough research of Indonesian language materials in the aftermath of Gestapu, warrants a heavily weighted consideration of their analyses and conclusions, especially as compared to other assessments of the Gestapu coup attempt and its aftermath. 34

From the standpoint of query into the causes of the interruption of relations between China and Indonesia it is imperative to have sound proof that the Indonesian-Chinese, the PKI, and the PRC (government and or party); any one, two or all

33 Benedict R. Anderson and Ruth T. McVey, A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia, with the assistance of Frederick P. Bunnell, (Ithaca: Modern Indonesian Project, Cornell University, 1971), 63, also see 93 and 105.

of them, bore any significant responsibility for Gestapu. It is possible that solid evidence of Indonesian-Chinese, PKI, or PRC responsibility, at least to some degree, may come to light in these early years of the 21st Century as Indonesia moves ever farther in time from the Suharto New Order government, as the PRC makes available more access to previously hidden information, and if the U.S. lifts its rescission and redaction of previously classified official government sources. Possibly proof of these groups' responsibility, in any significant manner, will be revealed from other quarters. At this point in the search, after having examined numerous, key sources, some declassified or still classified, in the Indonesian, Chinese and English languages, non-government and government, it has not been possible to conclude, indisputably, that the Indonesian-Chinese, the PKI, or the PRC, any or all, bore responsibility for the aborted coup in Indonesia on October 1, 1965.35

The lack of substantial proof that Indonesian-Chinese, the PRC, and or the PKI were substantively responsible for Gestapu raises enormous issues relating to the fundamental bases for the rupture in relations between Indonesia and China, a deficiency in East Asian state-to-state diplomatic relations which existed for nearly a quarter of a century (1967-1990). Southeast Asian

35 Challis, 86; I refer here to all of the various sources, in English, Chinese, and Indonesian listed in the bibliography, to include discussions with both Chinese and Indonesian acquaintances.
regional security suffered an unnecessary increase in tension because of the disruption of channels of diplomacy and state-to-state communication between the major regional powers of China and Indonesia. Sheldon Simon demonstrated that there was a 100% shift in the relationship between the two nations after the Coup: from common interest to conflicting interest, amity to enmity, and collaboration to conflict.36 Still, as Michael Leifer notes in his chapter entitled "A New Course in [Indonesia’s] Foreign policy"

The rhetoric of Sukarno was repudiated [by the Suharto Government] and membership in an anti-imperialist axis revoked, but an underlying continuity was maintained because the new political leadership, although fervently anti-communist, had given up neither opposition to membership of military alliances nor an inspiration to a pre-eminent role in regional affairs. That continuity was qualified in a novel form by a progressive economic association with industrialized capitalist states which was, in effect, an alignment. The traditional idiom of foreign policy served to blur the features of that alignment.37

Missing in Leifer’s analysis is an examination of the upset wrought in Southeast Asian regional affairs, as well as the change in Indonesia’s relations with other non-aligned movement nations. Certainly China’s role in Southeast Asian affairs changed as relations between Indonesia and China changed. The subject requires further exploration, however for

36 Simon, 201.
37 Leifer, 111-112.
this dissertation, the focus remains on the role of the Indonesian Chinese in the breakdown of relations between Indonesia and China.

EXAMINATION OF THE EXPERIENCES OF INDONESIAN-CHINESE IN THE AFTERMATH OF GESTAPU

Relations between Indonesia and China were affected to varying degrees by the Indonesian treatment of the Chinese in-country, both those residing permanently and temporarily. The experience of a single Chinese man very well illustrates the experiences of most of the Chinese who lived in Indonesia during the turbulent years of Gestapu and its aftermath. Ang Jan Goan (Putonghua Hong Yuanyuan), a civic leader in Jakarta's Chinese community wrote his autobiography with a view toward making known his life experiences in Indonesia, and why he had fled the homeland of his birth in the wake of Gestapu. Professor Liang Zhiming, who translated Mr. Ang's book into Chinese, told me, at Peking University, in 1996, that this book will never appear in the English language because Mr. Ang so willed. Mr. Ang's son, who worked together with Professor Liang on the book, and who
resides in Canada, possesses the rights to the manuscript. So, this is a valuable first-hand account of the period of Gestapu and its aftermath as experienced by Mr. Ang and those he wrote about in his memoirs, which will not be published in the English language. Mr. Ang's autobiography provides a first hand account of just how Gestapu and its aftermath unfolded for him and other Indonesian-Chinese. His account is especially important in that he was a significant power figure within the Indonesian-Chinese community, as well as the editor of the Chinese Indonesian language newspaper Sin Po (Xin Bao).38

Key to this dissertation is Ang Jan Goan's response to lengthy and repeated interrogations by Suharto-army intelligence personnel in the wake of Gestapu. He was rounded up by the Suharto-army forces and subjected to intensive interrogation. When asked whether or not the Huaqiao Zonghui (General Organization of Chinese Associations), of which he was the head,

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38 Ang Jan Goan, 31-48; WDOC, 595; Leo Suryadinata, Interpreting Indonesian Politics, (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998), 100, for a rundown on the formation of different Indonesian-Chinese groups, and their political orientations. Suryadinata contends that the Sin Po group was oriented toward China prior to the Second World War. After independence, major dominant Chinese organizations were "Baperki (peranakan-dominated Citizens' Consultative Body) and Qiao Zong (totok-dominated General Organization of Chinese Associations)". 158
was a Chinese Communist liaison organization (*shibushi Zhongguo de leisi zuzhi de fanban?*) he responded

I do not know whether or not China has this kind of liaison organization (*lianluo zuzhi*). Considering the Chinese Communist party's exercise of its extensive political power, each nation that it deals with will have its own tightly disciplined revolutionary committee structure. In my view such a liaison organization would be unwanted by China in its dealings with other nation's parties.\(^{39}\)

It is important that Ang Jan Goan's views coincided with the views expressed later by the accused, Sjam, during the Mahmilub trials, that Communist parties throughout the world have their own freedom, and that no Communist party from any one country is able to influence any Communist party of another country.\(^{40}\) In both cases, under widely divergent circumstances, both Ang and Sjam put forth the view that the Chinese Communist Party did not have significant sway over the PKI. Other sources substantiate Ang and Sjam's views; Hindley states that the "PKI

\(^{39}\) Ang Jan Goan, 305.

\(^{40}\) Departemen Luar Negeri [Indonesia Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Sjam, *Proses Pengadilan MAHMIJUB, Otak Penggerak Pelaksana Peristiwa "Gerakan 30 September/PKI": Kamaruzaman Alias Sjam* [MAHMIJUB Trial Report on Kamaruzaman Alias Sjam, the Brains behind the Implementation of the 30 September/PKI Movement], (Djakarta: Seksi Dokumentasi, Direktorat Research, 1968), mimeograph copy on legal-size paper, 26. Full discussion and translation of this passage is found in chapter six, of this dissertation, on the role of the PKI in the breakdown of relations between China and Indonesia. Neither Ang, nor Sjam, were denying the Soviet Union's control over the Eastern European Communist nations, just that, in their views, the CCP did not have control over the policies and activities of the PKI.
has repeated on many occasions the right and the need for every Communist Party to determine its own fate.\textsuperscript{41} Mozingo notes that "the PKI had 'Indonesianized' Marxism-Leninism and that it would accept no criticism from foreign communist parties."\textsuperscript{42}

What, then, of the Suharto-New Order regime’s claim of Chinese involvement with the PKI in Gestapu? What is needed is substantiating evidence of Chinese involvement; leading into rationale for the extensive, repeated, Indonesian student attacks on Indonesian-Chinese, Chinese expatriates, and Chinese diplomatic personnel and facilities.

In any case, Ang Jan Goan writes that the Chinese organization, Baperki (Chinese language-Yindunixiya Guojiban Shanghui), was not involved with Gestapu. He explains that, indeed Baperki had leftist (zuopai fenzi) and progressive (jinbu fenzi) members in its ranks, but that they participated in Baperki mainly to join together to fight racial discrimination (zhongzu qishi) leveled against the Chinese in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{43} Donald Hindley’s research supports Mr. Ang’s assessment.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{41} Hindley, 299.
\textsuperscript{42} Mozingo, 219, and, especially 233.
\textsuperscript{43} Ang Jan Goan, 308.
\textsuperscript{44} Hindley, 216.
Charles Coppel goes even further to say that while the majority (98 percent) of Baperki members were of Chinese descent

Baperki’s activities were not confined to the political field. Its most notable achievements after 1957 were probably in the field of education. In 1957 it began to set up schools, which spread so rapidly that there were said to be about 100 by 1963. They were national schools, in that their curriculum was Indonesian and the language of instruction was also Indonesian. Admission to them was in principle open to indigenous Indonesians and Chinese, both citizens and aliens. The vast majority of the students in most Baperki schools was Chinese, many of them Indonesian citizens who had, since 1957, been forbidden to attend Chinese-language alien schools. In addition, Baperki established a university [Res Publica] in Jakarta with a branch in Surabaya which was well-equipped and staffed, and was prepared to accept graduates of the alien Chinese schools.\textsuperscript{45}

Mr. Ang explains, in some detail, that Baperki was mainly composed of a mix of Chinese people of different levels of economic means who were, for the most part, looking for ways to enhance their livelihoods, and who particularly avoided any involvement with political affairs or political parties, much less were involved with Gestapu.\textsuperscript{46}

Another valuable view questioning the role of the Chinese in Gestapu is provided by Carmel Budiardjo, an English woman who was married to an Indonesian, who had become an Indonesian citizen, and who describes events in Jakarta which led to the suspension of relations between Indonesia and China. She had

\textsuperscript{45} Charles A. Coppel, "Patterns of Chinese Political Activity in Indonesia" in Mackie, ed., 49.

\textsuperscript{46} Ang Jan Goan, 308.
worked as a translator and unofficial advisor to the PKI during the late 1950s and 1960s up until Gestapu. Budiardjo was arrested in 1968, interrogated, and imprisoned for three years, with a two month house arrest in Mid-1970. She was finally freed by the Suharto government following international pressure which eventually brought about her release. As of the early 2000s she was living in England. Her eye-witness accounts have shed much light on the situation in Jakarta and wider Indonesia during Gestapu and its aftermath. Budiardjo tells the inside story of the activities of the PKI, Suharto and the Indonesian Army's activities, and about the army-inspired student activities which, in her view, "led to the severance of diplomatic relations." Her authenticity is attested to by, among other things, her having been awarded the 1995 "Right Livelihood Award" for "holding the Indonesian [Suharto] Government accountable for its actions and upholding the universality of fundamental human rights." Her information from the PKI, Res Publica University where she taught economics, and, especially from conversations with her fellow prisoners all work to provide an inside picture of the internal situation in

47 Budiardjo, Surviving Indonesia's Gulag, 129; also, see chapter eight, later in this dissertation. Carmel Budiardjo, in our correspondence, graciously provided me with important direction, especially relating to the contentious argument surrounding the participation of the PKI in Gestapu.

48 Budiardjo, Surviving Indonesia's Gulag, back cover.
Indonesia leading up to the suspension of relations with the PRC.

Soon after the Suharto [Counter-] Coup, thousands of students were mobilized by the [Indonesian] Army to hold demonstrations on the streets, taking as their targets the politicians Suharto needed to discredit. They spearheaded the demand calling on Sukarno—who still held nominal power—to outlaw the PKI. It was also alleged at the time that the student demonstrators had been funded by the CIA. The students operated in close alliance with Kostrad, Suharto’s special strategic force, and played a role in helping to topple Sukarno and establish a military regime. Their “radicalism” had nothing to do with the spirit of 1968.49

49 Budiardjo, Surviving Indonesia’s Gulag, 127-128. Relating to the spirit of 1968, Budiardjo is apparently referring to the international student movement in protest to America’s war in Vietnam, begun on Western campuses as early as 1965. Concerning “alleged” funding by the CIA, see my passage in chapter eight which discusses the U. S. Government’s stated intention to provide 50,000,000 rupiah to the Kap-Gestapu activist group, one of the lead organizations in public demonstrations and attacks on Chinese Indonesians and PRC diplomatic personnel and facilities. For more on “KAP Gestapu/PKI” see Dr. H. R. Soemarno Dipodisastro, Tritura dan Hanura: Perjuangan Menumbangkan Orde Lama dan Menegakkkan Orde Baru [The Three Demands and Hanura (Hati Nurani Rakyat-The Pure Heart of the People): The Struggle to Bring Down the Old Order and to Raise the New Order], (Jakarta: Yanense Mitra Sejati, 1997), 28-31. Regarding Ms. Budiardjo’s reference to the CIA, much has been written on the subject, but as yet the question remains unanswered. My search through the Indonesia FRUS, and earlier documents attained through the Freedom of Information Act, as well as various other materials, has resulted in a finding of no proven CIA role in Gestapu. The subject is still being debated, but until solid evidence is provided, the question will remain open. One extensive search into the subject is found in the chapter entitled “‘Operasi Klandestin’ CIA: Pra dan Paska G30S” [“CIA Clandestine Operations”: Before and After G30S], in Tim ISAI [The Institute Studi Arus Informasi (The Current Studies Information Institute) Team], Bayang-Bayang PKI [Shades of the PKI], (Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi, 1995), chapter III, 45-101. There is an extensive collection of writings on CIA involvement in Gestapu, but that subject lies outside the purview of the present study.
Mr. Jusuf Wanandi, later a director of the Indonesian government's Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, was one of the key leaders of the most virulent student organizations involved in the attacks described by Ms. Budiardjo. Mr. Wanandi, born in 1937, was an Indonesian-Chinese named Liem Bian Kie (Putonghua-Lin Mianji) who took out Indonesian citizenship and adopted the name Jusuf Wanandi. Adam Schwarz points out that Wanandi choose his Indonesian name because wana in Bahasa Indonesian and Leim (Lin in Putonghua) both mean forest.

Wanandi graduated from Catholic high school, and later attended Catholic University where, as the mainland Chinese biographical dictionary relates, "he was the most famous leader of the Catholic Students Organization" (PMKRI). He was also one of the key organizers of the powerful student activist group KAMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia-Student Action Command) which carried out the many devastating attacks on both Indonesian-Chinese people and property as well as on the diplomatic personnel and properties of the PRC.
KAMI also was used by the army to attack its domestic opposition as well. Marshall Green, the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, July 1965 - March 1969 describes KAMI's actions against Suharto/Army opposition:

The most significant development of January 1966 was the rising prominence of the Student Action Council (KAMI). It protested the runaway inflation [under Sukarno] that left students unable to afford even bare necessities like food and transportation. Increasingly, KAMI's demonstrations and graffiti were directed against those it held responsible for the nation's economic mess and cabinet members and cronies of Sukarno, who were denounced for corruption and self-aggrandizement at the expense of the people. KAMI members stopped short of denouncing Sukarno himself, but they were headed in that direction. Sukarno sought to placate them by meeting with KAMI leaders at his palace in Bogor. Although he failed to allay their concerns, the students still hesitated to target him. Like the Army leaders, they refrained from a showdown with the "Great architect of Indonesian Independence."

KAMI's fame inspired imitation. Soon other "Action Commands" sprang forth: high school students (KAPPI), university graduates (KASI), teachers (KAGI), and many other groups were marching alongside KAMI. 54

Ambassador Green is referring to a Presidential Cabinet meeting which took place in Bogor on January 15, 1966 attended by a delegation of KAMI. 55 There was a significantly important meeting between President Sukarno and student leaders in the


55 Dipodisastro, 66.
Istana Merdeka (Independence Palace) in Jakarta on Tuesday, 18 January, 1966

A KAMI Central delegation, led by Zamroni (Ketua Presidium KAMI Pusat) [Chairman of the Presidium of the KAMI Central Organization] met with President Soekarno in the Istana Merdeka. The delegation was received by President Soekarno accompanied by Minister PTIP [Perguruan Tingi dan Ilmu Pengatahan-Department of Higher Education and Sciences] Syarif Thayeb, Perkebunan [Departemen of Commercial Agricultural Enterprise] Minister Frans Seda, and Menko [Mentri Koordinator-Coordinating Minister] Ruslan Abdulgani. President Soekarno expressed anger (memarahi) at the students because their actions went counter to the President’s intentions.\(^\text{56}\)

It was during this session that the Indonesian-Chinese student leader Liem Bian Koen (Sofyan Wanandi) challenged President Sukarno regarding past activities of PMKRI (Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia-Association of Catholic Students of the Republic of Indonesia) thereby angering the President even more.\(^\text{57}\) In the Indonesia of 1966, a face-to-face meeting with the President was a rare and important opportunity. This meeting demonstrated the increasing importance of the student groups as well as a public recognition by Sukarno that the students had to be dealt with directly.

President Sukarno’s daughter, Rachmawati, provides a first-hand record of her father’s meeting with the students, one which differs significantly from the account above. She hid

\(^{56}\) Dipodisastro, 141.

\(^{57}\) Dipodisastro, 69-70.
herself from view while she observed the meeting which took place in a gallery in one corner of the palace. Rachmawati said that she had been quite worried about the encounter between the students and her father; she feared that there would be trouble. She was pleasantly surprised when she heard her father and the students talking amicably, and laughing. Also important is that Rachmawati places the Indonesian-Chinese student leader Liem Bian Kie (Jusuf Wanandi) as well as his brother Liem Bian Koen at the meeting with her father. That both Wanandi brothers had been among the student elite chosen to meet with President Sukarno demonstrated their importance within the student groups. Especially to be noted is that they, as Indonesian-Chinese, were able to accrue such a large measure of access and influence.

The student group attacks, on domestic opposition, Indonesian-Chinese, expatriate Chinese, and Chinese diplomatic personnel and installations, inside Indonesia, were directed by the Indonesian army as a way to weaken and eliminate opposition so that the Army could gain full power over Indonesia. An important point to be noted is that Jusuf Wanandi (AKA Liem Bian

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58 Soekarno, 185-186.

59 Soekarno, 186.

Kie), one of the directors of the most active student organization - KAMI, was a working member of the Supreme Advisory Council (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung), a group set up in 1964 by Sukarno to implement national level programs. In the midst of the turmoil on the first day of Gestapu (October 1, 1965) it was he

. . . Catholic activist Lim Bian Kie (who later changed his name to Jusuf Wanandi), [who] had a position with the Supreme Advisory Council and a government jeep with palace plates, and it was decided to send him in search of information; Lim drove through the square, saw the army units in formation there, and found the palace staff in a state of confusion: no one knew where Sukarno was. As time passed without further news, the Youth leaders waited. When the State radio announced in the evening of October 1 that army units under the command of General Suharto were in control of the City, they saw as well as anyone the significance of the event.

This passage demonstrates Wanandi’s powerful political position at the time of Gestapu which he parlayed into even more political power as time went on. He became personal assistant to Indonesian Army General Ali Murtopo, who himself carried out key projects for Suharto. Wanandi subsequently was appointed to the Indonesian Parliament in 1971, participated in the organization of the government’s political party GOLKAR and was

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61 WDOC, 84; Ricklefs, (1993), 266 and 269.
63 WDOC, 84; Kingsbury, Politics of Indonesia, 144.
a member, and assistant secretary of the Central Leadership Council. He then organized and became the director of the well-known Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta.\textsuperscript{64} So, it was he, Jusuf Wanandi who played a key role in the most powerful Indonesian Student Group, KAMI, during Gestapu and its aftermath. And it was KAMI, other student organizations, and other, smaller, activist groups which carried out harassment of, and attacks on, Indonesian-Chinese and on Chinese diplomats and property. This harassment and these attacks were partially instrumental in the breakdown in diplomatic relations between Indonesia and China.\textsuperscript{65}

Ricklefs describes student group activity as very severe and pervasive:

The army began publicly blaming PKI for the coup attempt, which was now called GESTAPU (from Gerakan September Tiga Puluh, 30\textsuperscript{th} September Movement) with clear allusion to the Gestapo of NAZI Germany. PKI denials of involvement had no effect . . . Anti-Communist youth now took to the streets, burning the PKI headquarters in Jakarta on 8 October. In late October Anti-PKI university students formed KAMI [Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia, Indonesian Students' Action Front] with Army encouragement and protection. Its core consisted of Islamic, Catholic and former PSI [Partai Sosialis Indonesia] Youth groups. A similar high school student's front called KAPPI [Kesatuan Aksi Pelajar Pemuda Indonesia, Indonesian Youth and Student's Action Front] and a university graduates front KASI [Kesatuan Aksi Sarjani Indonesia, Indonesian Graduates Action Front]

\textsuperscript{64} WDOC, 84.

\textsuperscript{65} Ricklefs, (1993), 90; Schwarz, (1994), 105-106; Green, 150-151.
were formed early in 1966, both with a Masyumi [Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, Modernist Islamic Party]-PSI core. Meanwhile arrests were underway, over 10,000 PKI activists and leaders having been picked up in Jakarta and West Java by December 1965; among them was Pramudya Ananta Tur. 66

Ricklefs continues on to describe those who were victims of these killings and affiliates: Indonesian-Chinese, uninvolved, but unlucky ethnic Indonesians, and some Chinese citizens living in Indonesia, to include some diplomatic personnel from the PRC. Rhodes Murphey points out that

The coup was officially interpreted [by Suharto and the Army] as a Communist plot to seize power, although evidence for this is poor. It [the coup] was quickly suppressed by the army under General Suharto, and the army then went on to wipe out the Communist party and all who were suspected of sympathy with it, aided by bands of youth [student

66 Ricklefs, (1993), 287. Tur (old spelling-Toer) was a writer, born in 1925, who had gained a wide following in Indonesia (and abroad) for his exceptional prose which voiced objection to oppression, first by the Japanese, then by the Sukarno regime, and finally by Suharto's New Order government. Of note is that his works were also translated into Chinese, at Peking University (Beijing Daxue), one of which was classified neibu faxing (internal distribution), Pulamudiya Ananda Tuer [Pramudya Ananta Tur], Renshijian [Bumi Manusia: Sebuah Roman - A Human World: A Novel], (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, xiaonei, 1982). Information I gained at Peking University in 1996 was that the PRC government did not want to unduly alienate the Suharto regime by openly publishing the work of Mr. Tur, especially at that time when feelers were being put out for Indonesia and China to enter into a limited trade agreement, which they did in 1985. Beida published four of Tur's books: Renshijian [Bumi Manusia - A Human World], Wangguo Zhizi [Anak Semua Bangsa - Child of All Nations], Zuji [Jajak Lanka - Footsteps], and Bolishi [Rumah Kaca - Glass House]. Mr. Tur was finally granted Reform government authorization to travel abroad in March, 1999, after being denied permission for forty years, see Tempo article about Tur, "Pramoedya ke Luar Negeri".
organizations] and local mobs. The victims included many thousands of Chinese, who were suspected because China had gone Communist, but were also turned on as targets for long-standing ethnic resentment against them as alien exploiters. In this horrendous bloodbath probably at least half a million unresisting people were killed, some say a million. Sukarno was forced into retirement, and General Suharto took over. 67

A SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF THE QUESTION OF THE INDONESIAN-CHINESE ROLE IN THE BREAKDOWN OF RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND INDONESIA

Thus far this study reveals that Indonesian-Chinese (either indigenous or expatriate) did not hold positions of power in the hierarchy of the PKI; they did not hold sway over the policies and activities of the party. That being the case, the Suharto-New Order government claims of Chinese involvement, in the PKI, in Gestapu, were falsely based.

In a like manner, the continuing claims that the Indonesian-Chinese acted in a liaison capacity between the PKI and the Chinese Communist party have failed to stand up under scrutiny. The originators of such claims are intrinsically committed to provide detailed evidence to support their positions; names, organizational responsibilities, and

information about liaison activities. This is not to say that, indeed, there may not have been liaison between the Indonesian-Chinese and the Chinese Communist party on behalf of the PKI, only that the Suharto-New order government, and affiliated sources, did not provide substantive evidence to back their claims. Personal testimony by Ang Jan Goan, former Foreign Minister Dr. H. Subandrio, Carmel Budiardjo, Huang Ailing, and others as referred to herein, combined with assessments by Benedict R. Anderson and Ruth McVey (the Cornell Paper), even the CIA Research Study’s position that the PRC was not seen to have been involved in Gestapu, all add up to refutation of the Suharto-New Order position that the Indonesian-Chinese and the PRC were involved in Gestapu.

Of related importance to the question of the role of the Indonesian-Chinese in the relations between Indonesia and China during the critical period leading up to Gestapu, and then in the two years after, 1966-1967, is the situation of certain Indonesian-Chinese who were affiliated with general Suharto and his New Order government. Indonesian-Chinese provided financial wherewithal needed for the Suharto group to succeed in wresting power from President Sukarno as well as to enable the New Order to embark on a three decades-long national program of economic development.\(^{68}\) Former Foreign Minister Dr. Subandrio explains

\(^{68}\) Hill, ed., passim.
how Liem Sioe Liong and (Indonesian-Chinese) The Kian Seng
("Bob" Hasan) engineered commodity price rigging as a way of
demonstrating president Sukarno's inability to meet the third of
the student's Tritura demands (lower commodity prices). Also
to be considered is that key Indonesian-Chinese student leaders
played pivotal roles in leading the anti-Chinese activities of
KAMI, KAPPI, and affiliated groups, and, further that many of
these Indonesian-Chinese student leaders ended up with
significant positions of power within the Suharto New order
regime in the decades that followed. Jusuf (Liem Bian Kie) and
Sofyan (Liem Bian Khoen) Wanandi both attained significant
positions in business and key organizations such as the Jakarta
Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Others moved in
increasingly influential circles as the New Order government
consolidated power over Indonesia. Soe Hok Gie even gained a
fellowship from the East-West Center at the University of
Hawai'i.

The Indonesian-Chinese, then, can be seen to have played
both active, and passive, roles contributing to the breakdown in
relations with the PRC, depending on who they were, and on their
positions in the socio-politico-economic setting. They were
seen to have directly and indirectly contributed to the
worsening of relations with China. Young Indonesian-Chinese

69 Soebandrio, 85-86.
student activists played a leading part in organizing and
leading student groups to attack Suharto-army opponents as well
as indigenous and expatriate Chinese and diplomats and
facilities. Those young Indonesian-Chinese were seen to have
fared quite well in the subsequently established Suharto-army
Orde Baru.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, Indonesian-Chinese did
not wield power in the leadership ranks of the PKI (also, refer
to chapter six on the role of the PKI). Relatedly, evidence
does not sufficiently demonstrate that the PRC had directive
power over the PKI, either through indigenous Chinese as
liaison, or in party-to-party interaction.

The larger population of Indonesian-Chinese, the peranakan
and totok individuals and families, and their property were
targeted by the student groups which were organized, directed,
supported, and protected by the Indonesian army (for more
detail, please see chapter eight on the role of the students and
the army in the breakdown of relations with China and Appendix
B: Translations of the PRC’s Diplomatic Notes to the Government
of the Republic of Indonesia). The main impetus of those
attacks have been seen in this study to have been to publicly
demonstrate President Sukarno’s incapacity to prevent or control
the attacks, but were not related to any particular student
ideological or political platform against the Chinese or China
itself. The many indigenous Chinese who underwent extreme
suffering were hapless victims of a massive domestic struggle for power over Indonesia carried out between Sukarno and his supporters and Suharto and his supporters, the ultimate battle between October 1965 and March 1968, when General Suharto was appointed president of Indonesia and Sukarno was formally vanquished.

Other indigenous Chinese such as Liem Sioe Liong and The Kian Seng (Bob Hassan) played roles of enabling and support, financial support, to Suharto and his regime, as demonstrated herein. Such support continued to enable a firm New Order grip on Indonesia for more than three decades.70

Now that the Indonesian-Chinese have regained a measure of freedom under recent reform governments, since the end of the Suharto New order regime, as described by the Honolulu-Star Bulletin news article at the start of this chapter, further inquiry into the roles played by indigenous Chinese in events between 1965 and 1967 may be in the offing. This chapter is explicitly meant to be digested along with the following chapters relating to the PKI’s role, and the Indonesian students’ and army’s roles in the breakdown of relations between China and Indonesia.

70 Schwarz, (1994), 109-115, 139-141; Mackie and MacIntyre, in Hill, ed., 13, and 32.
CHAPTER 6

QUESTIONING THE ROLE OF THE PKI IN GESTAPU ALONG WITH CHINA'S INVOLVEMENT WITH THE PKI AS RELATED TO THE BREAKDOWN IN INDONESIAN RELATIONS WITH CHINA

Last week the Constitutional Court revoked the ban on former members of the Indonesian Communist Party, better known by its acronym of PKI, from running in the general elections. This is a truly historic revision, a legal decision aimed at restoring the political rights of people who have been shackled for the past 30 years.

Tempo Magazine, March 8, 2004

It is important to this dissertation to clarify the role of the PKI in Indonesia's relations with China during the period just prior to Gestapu and during the course of the initial Suharto-army purge of the PKI in the years (1965-67) following the initial coup. Indonesia's relations with China were strained by the Suharto New Order government's policy position that the PKI, with the support of China, executed the initial coup attempt, Gestapu. The Suharto group's attacks on, and elimination of, the PKI were conjoined with Suharto New Order

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3 Leifer, 105-110; Mackie and Macintyre, in Hill, ed., 34, 42; Sukma, 33-34.
government accusations that the Chinese government and communist party had been involved in the PKI's implementation of Gestapu. These accusations played themselves out in political, polemical, and physical attacks on Chinese diplomatic personnel and facilities in Indonesia as well as political attacks on the PRC in the overseas realm. Relations between the two countries worsened as a result of a growing crescendo of hostile polemical attacks back and forth between China and Indonesia. The alleged PKI role in Gestapu and China's support of the PKI became important factors in the final breakdown of relations in 1967.

But what if, in fact, the PKI was not responsible for Gestapu; if the PRC did not play a role in the attempted coup? If that were the case, then the rupture of relations, to the degree that it was based on PKI-PRC involvement in the coup would be seen to be based on a false premise. The implications are quite important, to wit: that the ensuing 23 year break in relations between Indonesia and China was based, to whatever degree, on the falsity that the PKI carried out the coup attempt with China's backing. The hypothesis used in this dissertation is that the simultaneous occurrences of the Cultural Revolution in China and the Gestapu coup and countercoup in Indonesia, with the accompanying domestic chaos and resultant damage to each nation's foreign affairs infrastructure, between October 1965 and October 1967, played the major role in the rupture of relations between them. That hypothesis is weakened if it is
proven that the PKI, backed by the PRC executed Gestapu; strengthened if it were to be found that the PKI was not responsible for the coup, and was not backed by the PRC.

The question of whether or not the PKI and the PRC were involved in Gestapu is not yet settled. While the New Order regime insisted the PKI implemented the coup with the support of the PRC, other sources challenge that position. The focus here is not to explain Gestapu, any more than it is to explain the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Both topics have been widely addressed and written upon during the past four decades. This chapter will consider the challenges to the Suharto position that the PKI was responsible for Gestapu with the involvement of the PRC, and then evaluate the resultant effects on Indonesia’s relations with China.

As previously described, from the beginning, Major General Suharto’s position was that the PKI was responsible for the attempted coup.4 At that time he did not implicate China, nor did he implicate any Indonesian-Chinese (neither indigenous nor expatriate). As presented in other portions of this study, the litany of China’s involvement in Gestapu grew as the weeks and months wore on.

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VARIOUS CHALLENGES TO PKI/PRC INVOLVEMENT IN GESTAPU

At this point it is appropriate to capture some of the more important sources which challenge the Suharto-army accusations of PKI involvement in the Gestapu coup attempt. One most qualified observer, R. E. Elson, expresses doubt that "Suharto really believed at this point [October 1, 1965] that the PKI was ultimately responsible for Gestapu", and goes on to express the view that Suharto could further his aims "by focusing on a convenient scapegoat."\(^5\)

Damien Kingsbury states

According to this official [Suharto New Order government] view, the killing of the generals was the result of an "attempted coup" that failed to win popular support and was subsequently put down by loyalist forces. The PKI might have been involved, but the scenario that it was primarily a PKI-planned event seems unlikely and makes more sense as a rationalisation for the massacres that followed, as well as the army's final demolition of its old enemy, the PKI. It is also useful to note that the most practical method of determining who has successfully staged a coup is to look at who has achieved office as a consequence of the events in question.\(^6\)

One particularly poignant refutation that the PKI was involved in Gestapu comes from Dr. H. Subandrio, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was arrested, tried and sentenced to death by the Suharto-army government. After his

\(^5\) Elson, 124.

\(^6\) Kingsbury, 57.
reprieve, and, later, his release from prison after some thirty years, his book *Kesaksianku Tentang G-30-S*, resolutely denies that the PKI carried out the attempted coup.\(^7\) It is important to remember that Dr. Subandrio is not, and has not been, a communist, nor a member of the PKI.

Donald Hindley, writing even before Gestapu, makes a convincing case that, even as late as 1963, "a Communist rebellion is out of the question in the foreseeable future."\(^8\) Hindley based this and other conclusions on his in-depth analysis of the state of the PKI, up through 1963, based on his in-country investigation, personal interviews, and an exhaustive examination of related documentation. His assessment, at that point in time, was in accord with other unaffiliated observers such as the New China News Agency’s Zhang Haitao, who had open access to the highest ranking PKI authorities in Indonesia between 1963 and 1966; recalling that the PKI was a fully legitimate political party up until it was banned by (then) Lieutenant General Suharto on March 12, 1966.\(^9\) Zhang Haitao

\(^7\) Soebandrio, 62-63, 104-106.

\(^8\) Hindley, 301.

\(^9\) Zhang Haitao *Di sanci baise kongbu* [The Third White Terror], (Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe, 1988), *classified nei bu faxing* [internal distribution], see for example Zhang’s interview of PKI Second Secretary, Nyoto, 87-88, and Zhang’s attendance at a PKI Central Committee leaders’ meeting and other important party meetings, 133-35. Just like Donald Hindley’s book, Zhang’s book is written in great depth and voluminous detail, and neither can be adequately covered here; the
explains in depth just how the PKI was indicted by (then) Major General Suharto and (four star) General Nasution, especially by both of them applying pressure on President Sukarno after the discovery of the bodies of the dead generals (October 4, 1965), particularly by way of Nasution's five demands (wudian yaoqiu), interpreted by Zhang Haitao to mean that Sukarno must 1) stand together, politically, with Suharto, Nasution, and other army generals; 2) formally appoint Major General Suharto as commander of the Indonesian Army; 3) reform the Indonesian Air Force leadership; 4) ban (qudi-can also mean to punish violators) the PKI and all affiliated organizations; 5) do away with (boduo) the intelligence unit controlled by First Secretary [and Foreign Minister] Subandrio.¹⁰

The original wording of the five points, as related by General Nasution, appears in his memoirs Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas [Answering the Call to Duty], and certainly implies the message just as Zhang Haitao interprets it, even though Nasution's wording quite veils the true meaning, as related by Zhang.¹¹ The point of contention is that General Nasution

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interested reader will wish to avail him/herself of the value of their research by comparing the two texts.

¹⁰ Zhang Haitao, 51-52, Subandrio's intelligence unit was called BPI-Badan Pusat Intelijen-Central Intelligence Agency.

¹¹ Dr. (Djendral) A. H. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Jilid 6: Masa Kebangkitan Orde Baru [Answering the Call to Duty, vol. 6, multivolume: The Era of the Building of the New Order], (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1987), 304.
states in his memoirs that he was certain that the PKI was behind Gestapu (Saya yakin bahwa PKI berada di belakang G30S . . . .), but the search for his evidence to support this position is in vain.¹²

THE QUESTION OF CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE PKI AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, GOVERNMENT AND PARTY, AND GESTAPU

The part played by the PKI in the breakdown in relations between China and Indonesia is of great importance and fraught with murkiness and misunderstanding. The PKI was closely connected with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) government. Chinese party line and party influence were heavily felt in the upper ranks of the PKI. The PKI was a legitimate political party in Indonesia, and had gained significant political influence and popular backing throughout the country by the mid 1960s. Sukarno was able to use the PKI as an instrument to offset the Indonesian military's growing power and threat to his own position of power. The

¹² Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, vol. 6, 304, and following text. As brought out in this dissertation's chapters on the role of the Indonesian student groups, and the role of the Indonesian Chinese, the reasons for Nasution's citing the PKI and PRC collusion in Gestapu are simply not substantial, see Volume 6, 333-335 and passim.
PKI’s increasing power, together with Sukarno’s use of the party against the military, both eventually led to the Indonesian military’s backlash against the Indonesian Communist Party.

Major General Suharto, four-star army General Nasution and the Indonesian military (variously known as Tentara Nasional Indonesia-TNI, or Angkatan Bersendjata Republik Indonesia-ABRI) and especially the Army (Angkatan Darat) placed the blame for the aborted coup on the shoulders of the PKI. They named the event Gestapu as a way of inferring that the coup perpetrators should be cast in the image of the infamous German NAZI police organization, Gestapo, during Adolf Hilter’s reign.13 The Suharto group carried out a purge of its various opponents in the guise of stamping out the danger posed by the PKI. In the campaign of extermination which followed (1965-1967), hundreds of thousands were killed, hundreds of thousands were imprisoned.14 The purge, in the name of attacking the PKI, also

13 Elson, 124.

14 Accurate numbers of killed, injured, and jailed remains unknown. Concerning deaths, various estimates range from the tens of thousands to over a million, even up to a few million. Robert Cribb provides a compilation of over 30 various sources with ranges of the numbers of deaths from a low of 78,000 to a high of 1,000,000; see “Table I: Number of People Killed according to various estimates” in Robert Cribb, ed., The Indonesian Killings 1965-1966, (Australia: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990), 12; the number imprisoned as part of the Suharto-army campaign against its opponents is estimated to be around one million, see Article XIX The International Centre Against Censorship, Surveillance and Suppression: The Legacy of the 1965 Coup in Indonesia, (London: Lancaster House, September, 1995), 1, 4.
enveloped large numbers of non-Chinese and non-PKI people. Many different national and local groups and individuals used the turbulent months-long rampage of the counter-PKI campaign as an excuse to eliminate opponents and even to settle long-standing personal scores which had nothing to do with the PKI.  

The Suharto group held the PKI responsible for the failed coup, proceeded to directly attack the PKI, and publicly blamed China for being behind the alleged PKI play for national power. The Suharto group’s actions contributed to the eventual breakdown in relations between Indonesia and China, but it must be remembered that the Suharto group’s attack on the PKI was carried out for internal domestic reasons, for that group to be able to gain control over Indonesia, and not for reasons related to Indonesia’s foreign relations with China. The Suharto group’s nation-wide months-long attack on the PKI was part of a domestic power struggle which also had the side effect of worsening relations with China. As J.A.C. Mackie pointed out when assessing one of Suharto’s new Cabinet members

Foreign minister Adam Malik sought to avoid a breach with the Soviet Union and even to maintain diplomatic relations with China as long as possible,

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until his hand was forced by domestic political pressures during mid-1967.\textsuperscript{16}

One contemporary assessment of the various interpretations of Gestapu is provided by R.E. Elson in his biography of Suharto.

The first, the version cultivated by the New Order regime, was that the coup attempt was the work of the Indonesian Communist Party, which recruited dissident members of the Army and the Air Force—after a long period of managing them—to assist in its efforts to destroy its influential opponents amongst the General Staff and seize power. The second was that the attempt was orchestrated by dissident members of the Armed Forces, with PKI members only peripherally involved; this view has been most famously presented in the so-called “Cornell Paper”, which argued that “the October 1st coup was essentially an internal Army affair, stemming from a small clique in the Diponegoro Division, which attempted to use both Sukarno and the PKI leadership for its own ends, and succeeded merely in damaging irremediably the moral and political authority of the one, and causing the physical destruction of the other.” The third saw the “coup attempt” as a coordinated and more-or-less shared effort by members of the PKI in cooperation with dissident junior army men, each acting from different motives, to destroy, or at least cripple, the corrupt General Staff.\textsuperscript{17}

The fact that, almost forty years after Gestapu, one of the most qualified scholars on Suharto and his Indonesia cannot determine the evidentiary role of the PKI in the attempted coup

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\textsuperscript{17}Elson, 110. One particularly thorough Indonesian study of Gestapu provides a comparison between the various theories about who was responsible for G30S, Tim ISAI, in Chapter II “Mencari Dalang G30S” [Searching for the Dalang of G30S], 11-44; especially see the comparison chart 37-38. Of importance is that while the PKI tops the list of candidates for dalang, Suharto is not even considered as a possibility.
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shows clearly the enigma which still surrounds the event. What is known is that, on the morning of October 1\textsuperscript{st}, six ranking Indonesian Army officers and one junior aide were seized and murdered, that Major General Suharto, commander of the Indonesian Strategic Reserve Force (KOSTRAD-located in Jakarta with a mission to deploy anywhere in Indonesia to put down civic disturbances) was not included in the roundup, that radio announcements explaining the coup were made by Lieutenant Colonel Untung, Commander of the Cakra Birawa palace guard, and that Suharto was able to marshal efforts and forces to put down the coup within 24 hours with only a few (if any) shots fired. Many other facets of Gestapu remain conjectural and controversial.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{18} The literature dealing with Gestapu is extensive; still the enigma remains. Certain works can be cited as a way of narrowing the focus as related to this dissertation. Official Indonesian works, to be used selectively, but filled with useful material are Alex Dinuth, ed., Dokumen Terpilih Sekitar G.30.S/PKI [Selected Documents Relating to the G.30.S/PKI-Coup], (Jakarta: Intermas, 1997); Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, 30 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka; Boerhan and Soebekti, Fakta dan Latar-Belakang Gerakan 30 September [Facts and Background behind the September 30\textsuperscript{th} Movement], (Djakarta: Lembaga Pendidikan Ilmu Pengetahuan dan Kebudajaan Kasgoro, 1965), Serial Number KEP. PEPELRADA No. KEP:-150 P/I/1966. More recent, first hand information of significant importance is found in Soebandrio; and Latief. Basic English language works are USCIA, Indonesia 1965, and Anderson and McVey. Important counterpoint to these sources is found in the works done by an organization whose activities are aimed at the release of political prisoners in Indonesia: Carmel Budiardjo, "Did Suharto Mastermind the 1965 'Coup Attempt,'" Tapol Bulletin, vol. 50 (London: British Campaign for the Release of Indonesian Political Prisoners), (March, 1982): 12-14; and two articles, authors unnamed, Tapol Bulletin, "Seeking the Truth about G30S,"
To understand this phenomenon more clearly, it is necessary to explore the particulars of the parameters of PKI organization, affiliations and activities.

ASSESSMENT OF THE PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA AS IT ENTERED THE PERIOD OF THE GESTAPU COUP AND COUNTERCOUP

The Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) was decimated by the Suharto-Army forces within a few weeks after Gestapu while attacks continued through early 1966; and it was officially banned by General Suharto after he garnered national power from President Sukarno through the auspices of Sukarno’s Presidential authorization of March 11, 1966 known as Supersemar.¹⁹

¹⁹ Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia [State Secretariat, Republic of Indonesia], Gerakan 30 September Pemberontakan Partai Komunis Indonesia: Latar Belakang, Aksi, dan Penumpasnya [The September 30th Movement, The Attempted Coup by the Indonesian Communist Party: Its Background, Actions, and Eradications], (Jakarta: P.T. Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1994), 130, (for description of physical attacks on the PKI and affiliate offices as early as October 8, 1965); 131, (for student movement activities); 202-203, (for copy of Sukarno’s Presidential order -- Supersemar -- 11 March, 1966); 148, (for Parliamentary Decree No. IX/MPRS/1966, legalizing the March 11, 1966 Presidential Order); and pages 104-105 (citing Lieutenant General Suharto’s official decision on behalf of President
Therefore, the PKI played no active role in the breakdown in relations between Indonesia and China between October 1, 1965 and October 30, 1967, but rather, the PKI was used in a passive mode as a reason to implicate the PRC as well as to pose China as a threat to Indonesian national security in order to further unite the Indonesian nation behind the New Order; as Rizal Sukma states:

The acute worsening of Indonesia-China relations was the inevitable consequence of the anti-communist movement in Indonesia after the 1965 abortive coup. The collapse of the PKI in late 1965 and the rise of the army to power in Indonesia led on to the breakdown of diplomatic relations. China’s alleged involvement in the 1965 coup was regarded as the main reason for the [Indonesian] government to sever diplomatic ties. And China’s subsequent hostile behavior provided further justification for Indonesia to suspend diplomatic relations in October 1967.\(^{20}\)

While Dr. Sukma points to an anti-communist movement in Indonesia after Gestapu, it must be noted that Indonesia only lost relations with one communist nation, China. Relations were retained with the Soviet Union, the various communist Eastern European nations, North Vietnam, North Korea, and even Cuba, whose embassy had, like the PRC embassy, refused to lower its national flag to half mast in honor of the Indonesian army officers murdered on October 1, 1965. Rizal Sukma’s

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\(^{20}\) Sukma, 38.
characterization of the "collapse" of the PKI lends a flavor of PKI self-inflicted injury brought upon the party by its own machinations. In fact, the PKI did not collapse; it was obliterated by the Suharto New Order government. Sukma then poses the collapse of the PKI as one of the two reasons for the breakdown in relations with the PRC; in effect saying that after the PKI was attacked and demolished by the Suharto-army forces, then the PKI's collapse was cited as having "led on to the breakdown of diplomatic relations." Underscored here is Dr. Sukma's use, as late as 1999, of the term alleged when referring to China's involvement in the coup. Puzzlingly, Dr. Sukma says that China's involvement in Gestapu was the main reason for the Indonesian government to sever diplomatic relations. Indonesia did not sever ties with China, rather Indonesia froze (membekukan) relations with the PRC; the difference between sever and froze is of major significance in terms of international diplomatic relations, as explained earlier.

The Suharto-Army Government's casting of the PKI as having direct organizational lines of command and communication from Communist China also proved very damaging to relations between Indonesia and China. One striking example of these connections was published in the Indonesian Armed Forces (Angkatan Bersenjata) newspaper; a publication directed at the public as
well as at members of the military.\textsuperscript{21} The Armed Forces Weekly edition (Mingguan Angkatan Bersendjata) published an organizational diagram which showed direct lines of command and control from the top of the Chinese Communist Party and Government to the PKI, through the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta (see accompanying organizational diagram Appendix A). The article, written by A. H. Siagian, did not explain specific details of the organizational connections from Beijing through Jakarta out to the peripheral regions of the islands, nor did it provide the source of the chart; in fact none of the series of Siagian’s articles, written in the Angkatan Bersendjata weekly between January 29, 1967 and June 11, 1967, provide details on this chart.\textsuperscript{22} According to Siagian’s organizational diagram, channels of authority ran from the Chinese Communist Party Politburo, through the CCP Secretary General and offices in Indonesia, to the PKI Secretariat. Additionally, lines of

\textsuperscript{21}Angkatan Bersenjata was a major newspaper all during the Suharto regime (1965-1998). It was, during those years, considered to be the source of government information available to the public, as I found from my own personal experience of having worked with the Indonesian military and with the US Embassy in Jakarta from 1986 through 1988 as Chief, U.S. Office of the Military Attaché for Defense Programs (OMADP). The Press Act of 1966 allowed for banning and censorship of any media not in conformance with the Suharto-Army government’s standards (see Kingsbury, 152 and Budiardjo, Surviving Indonesia’s Gulag, 44). Nearly one-third of all newspapers were shut down by the Suharto-army government with the result that Angkatan Bersendjata became a major source of information for the public.

\textsuperscript{22}Siagian, subsequent periodic articles in the series are found in Asia Microfilm S91156, January through December, 1967.
authority are shown running both through the Chinese military Secret Service and the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta directly to the PKI Secretariat.

Along with channels of communication from the CCP Politburo through International Front Organizations to various Indonesian Front Organizations, as well as through the Communist Party Cominform, directly to local commissions in Indonesia, the meaning of this diagram is extremely important. According to Siagian's organizational diagram the PRC can be seen to have had significantly powerful control over the PKI and its affiliates in Indonesia around the time of Gestapu. Moreover, the effect that this chart would have on both the Indonesian military and the populace would be, literally, electric. Here was proof of the PRC's direct involvement in Indonesian internal affairs, through the vehicle of the PKI and its affiliated groups. The timing is seen to have been sixteen months after Gestapu, eight months prior to the breakdown of relations with China, and one month prior to General Suharto's promotion to acting president of Indonesia. How authentic is this organizational chart?

A. H. Siagian's name does not show up in a search of authors in Indonesia. The reference to Cominform in this

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23 Standard bibliographical search of Indonesian language sources does not reveal the name A. H. Siagian, although computer search reveals eleven Indonesian authors surnamed Siagian, none with the initials A. H. Departemen Luar Negeri [Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Katalogus Perpustakaan Departemen Luar Negeri, vol. 1 of 2 volumes, [Library Catalogue 191
diagram (Chinese “Communist Party Cominform”, and “Cominform Representatives in Indonesia”) raises doubt about the authenticity of the organization diagram (see Appendix A). The Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) was a “Moscow-dominated grouping of world Communist parties”, not an organizational structure employed by the CCP.24

The organizational block, in Siagian’s chart, entitled “Chinese Military Secret Service” does not fit with known Chinese organizational principles at that period of time. Kang Sheng’s secret service (tewu) was not military and it was oriented in the 1960s chiefly toward internal, domestic

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intelligence activities. This was because of the specific exigencies of the Cultural Revolution which intrinsically required maximum resources to be devoted to domestic intelligence operations because the main battlefield was domestic, not foreign. As one source puts it "disciplining his own camp was more important to Kang than defeating enemies from abroad." Still the power and span of Kang Sheng is never to be underestimated. As Yu Maochun points out in his comprehensive work OSS in China

To compete with the independent NKVD/GRU intelligence presence in Yenan, which grew rapidly after the Nazi-Soviet pact, Mao Zedong responded with swift overhaul and centralization of his wartime intelligence system. In August 1938, Kang Sheng was chosen by Mao Zedong to consolidate Communist intelligence in China. Kang was simultaneously

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appointed chief of two agencies: the Social Affairs Department (She Hui Bu, political intelligence and internal security) and the Department of Military Intelligence (Jun Wei Qingbao Bu, under the military council of the CCP).  

Supporting Professor Yu’s view, a later Chinese language source confirms that the PRC national intelligence services were primarily divided into military and non-military groups and activities by the mid-1960s.  

The Party Central Foreign Liaison Department (also known as the International Liaison Department), under the control of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee would have been the operative intelligence agency dealing with Indonesia.  

Also, during the early 1960s Li Kenong, a first-generation Party member and Tewu founding member was the person-in-charge of overseas Chinese Intelligence activities.  

Although Kang Sheng wielded vast power as advisor to the Cultural Revolution Group as well as control over domestic security in 1966 and 1967, Li Kenong’s organizational influence was retained, through Li Kenong’s protégés and

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27 Yu Maochun, OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 42, also see 276, and fn 280, for additional information relating to Kang Sheng.


29 Zheng Yi, 395.

successors, as directive authority over China’s foreign intelligence realm.\footnote{Zheng Yi, 395. It should be pointed out that Byron and Pack state that Kang Sheng, at one point in the Cultural Revolution was “the Chinese leader responsible for dealing with the international Communist movement”, Byron and Pack, Claws of the Dragon, 356. Unfortunately, they do not provide sources or evidence to support their statement. It is possible that they were referring to only the subject being addressed at that point in their book—the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia. The authors, just as many others, who wrote about this time period, do not address the subject of China’s relations with Indonesia. It is rather a mystery that so many observers neglect to address, or to analyze the Sino-Indonesian relationship during those first two years of the Cultural Revolution. After all, the break in relations was certainly an issue of great import, with ramifications which affected China’s relationship with Southeast Asia for over two decades. For example, in the 1980s, as the PRC was beginning to establish relations with Thailand and Malaysia, Singapore waited until the Republic of Indonesia reestablished relations before it moved to lay the groundwork for putting diplomatic ties in place.}

In fact, the Suharto government’s official delineation of the organizational structure of the PKI contradicted Siagian’s description as it appeared in Angkatan Bersenjata. The organizational elements differed, and Suharto’s New Order government description carried no reference to the Chinese Communist government or party. Lieutenant General Suharto, acting under the authority of Supersemar, formally described the organizational structure of the PKI and affiliated organizations in the official government document related to his banning of the PKI as follows

A. PKI Organizational Sections from the Central to the Regional Levels are:
   1. C. C. P. K. I. (Central Committee)
Central Level.

2. C. C. B. P. K. I. (Regional Committee) Provincial Level.


4. C. S. P. K. I. (Committee Section) District Level.

5. C. S. S. P. K. I. (Committee Subsection) Sub-District Level.

6. C. K. P. K. I. (County Committee) Village Level

B. Organizations Sharing the Same Basic Principles/Protected by/Under the Aegis of the PKI [altogether, 111 organizations are named, the list that follows here only includes primary groups, and groups which appear in the diagrams from Angkatan Bersendjata Mingguan, previously displayed]:

1. B. T. I. (Indonesian Farmers’ Front)

2. S. O. B. S. I. (All Indonesian Central Labor Organization)

[62 sub-groups are entered here]

3. Pemuda Rakyat (Communist Youth Organization)

4. C. B. M. I. (Indonesian Student’s Concentration Movement)

5. G. E. R. W. A. N.I. (Indonesian Women’s Movement)

6. L. E. K. R. A. (People’s Cultural Institute)

[unrelated groups omitted]

9. B. A. P. E. R. K. I. (Indonesian Chinese Citizenship Consultation Board), including:


2. PPI (Indonesian [Chinese] Youth Consultation Body)


[unrelated groups omitted]

23. L. P. N. (National Education Institute)

[here follows a list of 26 organizations]32

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32 Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, Sekreteriat Negara Republik Indonesia [State Secretariat, Republic of Indonesia], The September 30th Movement, the Attempted Coup by 196
The Angkatan Bersendjata (the military newspaper) diagram, constructed by Siagian, displayed a different set of relationships between elements of the PKI and with elements outside the Party, than did this Indonesian Government's official document (No. 85/KOGAM/1966). Not only did the Suharto Government document make no connection between the PKI and the PRC, it also established no affiliation of the PKI with international elements (International Front Organizations and Cominform) or with China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, nor with a "Chinese Secret Military Service" as does the Angkatan Bersendjata chart. On the one hand, the executive branch of the government of Indonesia (Acting President Suharto and his administration, to include his new Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, appointed to replace the jailed Dr. Subandrio) does not implicate the PRC (neither government nor Party) whereas the Army-sponsored Angkatan Bersendjata expressly demonstrates avenues of command, control and liaison from the PRC through the PKI down to its lowest reaches (PKI Commissions and Front Organizations). In effect, the Suharto administration and the Indonesian Army (Angkatan Darat) held two different positions on

the subject of China’s involvement in Gestapu. The Army, and
the student organizations it sponsored, held that the PRC was
involved in the attempted coup. Suharto, and the newly
appointed foreign minister, Adam Malik did not directly
implicate the PRC, and took the policy position of continuing
relations with the PRC.

In fact, even as late as October 30, 1967, acting
President Suharto expressed a desire to continue relations with
China.

The people of Indonesia, from all walks of
life, have urged Acting President General Suharto to
immediately sever (memutuskan) relations with the PRC
because it has been proven that the PRC was mixed up in (ikut campur) the coup which claimed the lives of
seven revolutionary patriots. Also Sam Prachechon,
the Thai language Weekly, in its latest edition
revealed a freeze (pembekuan) in Indonesia’s
diplomatic relations with China.

While that is moving forward, however, General
Suharto does not yet (belum lagi) want to adopt a
policy of severance of relations which probably means
that he wants to allow the PRC time to mend its
incorrect attitude toward Indonesia.33

Acting President Suharto and his new foreign minister Adam
Malik, along with the ministry itself, held forth both publicly
and privately, between October, 1965 and October, 1967 that
their position was to continue Indonesia’s relations with

33 Angkatan Bersendjata Medan Indonesia [Armed Forces
Newspaper Medan Edition], "Tjina Komunis derita kekalahan
politik terbesar [Communist China Suffers its Greatest Policy
China. The PKI’s role in Gestapu, its relationship with China, and whether or not China was involved in Gestapu are all key issues relating to the breakdown in relations between China and Indonesia during this two year time frame. Absence of diplomatic relations for nearly a quarter of a century between these two important East-Asian nations greatly affected the geopolitical and geo-strategic course of history during the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, as pointed out earlier. Therefore, the causes of the breakdown in relations are of key importance for being able to clearly understand the nature of the course of events in East Asia during that time period.

Indonesia’s charge; that the PKI, in conjunction with the PRC, carried out the Gestapu coup, played a major role in the breakdown of relations between Indonesia and China. As discussed earlier, both those charges, so important to the relations between the two countries, are seriously vulnerable to challenge, especially in light of more recent information from

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34 Elson, 162; Departemen Luar Negeri, Dokumenta Diplomatika No. 5, 125; Departemen Luar Negeri [Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Suli Suleiman, ed., Garis-Garis Besar Politik Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia [Main Outline of the Republic of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy], (Jakarta: Director, Agency for Research and Development of Foreign Affairs Problems, 1973), STC. No.: 041/STR/6/VIII/73, Part 1, Naskah Lengkap [Complete Manuscript], mimeograph copy on legal-size paper, 23.

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Dr. Subandrio, Colonel Latief, the U. S. Diplomatic history of the period (*FRUS INDONESIA*) and other sources.\(^{35}\)

Even at the time (mid-1960s) there were serious doubts about whether or not the PKI was responsible for Gestapu. Could this nearly quarter-of-a-century rupture in diplomatic relations have been based on false premises of PKI-PRC-CCP involvement in the Gestapu Coup? And if that is the case, how does that reorder the history of Southeast Asia from the 1960s to the 1990s? Was the entire period of the Suharto New Order based upon a myth of PKI-PRC-CCP responsibility for the Gestapu Coup?

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\(^{35}\) Soebandrio, see especially page 42, 62-63, 70, 78. Dr. Subandrio's memoir, available in the year 2000, is a riveting revelation of the behind-the-scenes history of the very years dealt with in this dissertation, 1965-1967. Latief, see especially, xxx, 22, 30-32, 129, Epilogue, xxxiv. Colonel Latief's *Defense* reassesses the proceedings of his trial and conviction in 1965. This work, written after his release from Cipinang Prison after thirty-three years, is convincing complement to Dr. H. Soebandrio, *Kesaksianku*; along with the *FRUS INDONESIA*. The recently declassified information contained in over 500 pages of text pertaining to Indonesia is replete with references which shed light on the events related to the eventual breakdown of relations between Indonesia and China. More direct conclusions will be drawn whenever presently rescinded and redacted portions of the FRUS become declassified in the future. Especially important are the entries on the 303 Committee; "secret, eyes only" information pertaining to U. S. Administration programs to develop "An operational program of political action in Indonesia on foreign and domestic policies of the PKI and the Government of Red China", 234, February 23, 1965. Also see 236, 301, 321-322, 324-325, 335-336, 339, 349; the Indonesian Working Group (Top Secret, Sensitive), 351, 353, 376, for two full documents "denied" declassification see 380 and 383; 404, 420, 428, 434, 452, 456; for further denial to declassify a 303 Committee, "Secret, Eyes only" text, September 20, 1966, see page 469; for "National Intelligence Estimates" (NIEs) summarizing the period 1964-1968, "Secret, Controlled Dissemination", 564-576.
Despite Foreign Minister Adam Malik's intention of preserving diplomatic relations with China, along with efforts by his Department of Foreign Affairs to maintain relations with China, those relations were eventually broken off on October 30, 1967, in the midst of the domestic turmoil in Indonesia created by Gestapu and its aftermath. Harold Crouch, very importantly, explains

In 1966 and the first part of 1967, Adam Malik was able to convince Suharto and the other top generals that relations should be maintained with China. Only when a renewed outbreak of anti-Chinese rioting in Jakarta coincided with the takeover of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign affairs in Peking by an "ultraleft" group in the middle of 1967 during the Cultural Revolution, did the Indonesian government come to the conclusion that the expected long-term benefit of maintaining diplomatic relations was outweighed by their potentially destabilizing consequences in the long run. When the decision to withdraw Indonesia's embassy staff from Peking was taken in October 1967, however, Adam Malik quickly coined the term "frozen" to describe the state of diplomatic relations between the two countries, thereby blocking moves to recognize Taiwan and facilitating the possible "normalization" of relations in the future. 36

Unfortunately, Harold Crouch does not indicate the source of his assessment that the Indonesian government came to the conclusion that destabilizing consequences of continued relations with the PRC outweighed the long-term benefit of continuing relations with China. Also, he does not provide sources to support his assessment relating to Taiwan. My

36 Crouch, 333.
research reveals that Taiwan does not seem to have been a participating party in the play in relations between Indonesia and China. Indonesia's own official explanation for the breakdown in relations with China, as recounted in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Laporan Research, centers around the PRC's attitude and other factors:

In the following developments the Government of China took actions which openly indicated an Anti-Indonesia [sic] attitude, among other things, the following:

A. The Government of China provided protection to the claimed participants in G-30-S/PKI [Gestapu] (such as A.M. Hanafi, Djawato, Tahsin, Soekrisno, J. Adjitorop who himself is the leader of the PKI delegation to Peking, as well as other coup makers) and also [China] gave them free reign to engage in Anti-Indonesian activities, to include opportunities given to those persons to launch broadcasts from China, directed toward Indonesia in such a manner that it appeared the broadcasts were being done by teachers and students who had participated in G-30-S/PKI [Gestapu]. In hopes of reviving the residue of the PKI, the PRC trained [Indonesian] cadre inside China.

B. At the beginning of the PRC's launching of a new anti-Indonesian campaign, China used the mass media (Radio Peking, Hsin Hua [Xinhua] news Agency, and newspapers) as well as Anti-Indonesian public rallies (rapat-rapat) organized in nearly every large city in China. The first occurrence was on 27 April 1967, Chinese government official, HSIEH FU-CHIH, the acting minister of the Public Security Ministry denouncing the Indonesian government in a speech to a giant public rally in Peking, said, among other things: "... since the counter revolutionary coup, the Indonesian government has been brutally oppressing the Indonesian people, [also] taking a fascist government road domestically, while in the international world enslaving itself to imperialist America, the revisionist Soviet Union and brutal persecution of Chinese citizens on a scale heretofore unknown. All of this indicates that Indonesia is bent on placing itself in that group which opposes
China and which planned to wreck relations between the two countries . . . .”37

Again, this is the official rendition of some of the charges against China, as appears in the Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs report, done some six years after the events. These charges against China serve, in part, to provide rationale for Indonesia’s freeze of relations with China.

The Indonesian Foreign Ministry’s History Volume Dua Puluh Lima Tahun Departmen Luar Negeri 1945-1970 (Twenty Five Years of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1945-1970), in the section on “Strategie Politik Luar Negeri” (Foreign Policy Strategy), “Tahap Penjelamatan (Djuli-Desember 1966)” (Redemption Phase July-December 1966), in regard to the PRC, states that Indonesia would proceed “in accordance with the principle that the Republic of Indonesia would not initiate a severance in diplomatic relations (dengan prinsip bahwa R. I. tidak akan memulai memutuskan hubungan diplomatic).”38 This passage records such directives as having been given to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Ampera (Amanat Penderita Rakyat—Message of the People’s Suffering) Cabinet, established by Suharto, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.39 If Suharto’s new government

37 Laporan Research, 15-16.
38 Departemen Luar Negeri, Penitya Penulisan Sedjarah, Dua Puluh Lima, 305.
39 For the original passage see: Departemen Luar Negeri, Dokumenta Diplomatica No. 5, 125.
and Cabinet ordered, in 1966, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to proceed in accordance with the principle that Indonesia would not initiate a severance of relations with China, then what happened to bring about Indonesia's freeze in relations in October 1967?

Many factors played a role in the rupture of relations between Indonesia and China, all occurring between October 1965 and October 1967 when relations were broken off. The competition between the Cold War camps tempted President Suharto to veer away from close affiliation with China when he assumed power from the pro-Chinese Sukarno, and to lean toward the Western powers. Competition between the PRC and the USSR tended to cause third countries to have to make a choice between one and the other. The Indonesian Army's severe competition with the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) caused the Army to move to eliminate the PKI, as Suharto and the Army moved toward power in 1966 and 1967. The Army's decimation of the PKI extended to casting the PRC and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) into the role of enemies who had at least condoned, if not supported, or outright masterminded, the PKIs activities. When Suharto blamed the PKI for Gestapu, whether that was in fact true or not, the PRC and the CCP were both implicated by association with the PKI. The need for Suharto to create a threat to Indonesia's national security as a way of legitimizing his power-hold over
the nation caused him to characterize the PRC and the CCP as the *betenoirs* behind the PKI.

Issues with the Indonesian-Chinese (Peranakan-Chinese with some Indonesian ancestry; and Totoks—full-blooded Chinese) between October 1965 and October 1967 irritated relations between the two countries; mainly manifested by PRC objections to mistreatment of Indonesian-Chinese and by arguments over repatriation of Indonesian-Chinese (see Appendices B and C).

But would all these factors be of a serious enough nature to bring about a rupture in relations between Indonesia and China in October 1967; especially after both Suharto and his new Foreign Minister Adam Malik had expressed, publicly, as well as privately, that they did not want to break-off relations with China?

The Gestapu coup and the Suharto-Army counter-Coup, from October 1965 to the breakdown in relations in October 1967 played key roles in Indonesia’s loss of diplomatic relations with China. This was the most cataclysmic period in the Republic’s short history (since attainment of independence in 1950) with major reorientation in foreign affairs and pervasive effect on foreign policy institutions. During this period the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was ransacked by army supported student-led mobs; the Minister of Foreign Affairs was attacked, arrested, imprisoned, and replaced; and the ranks of Ministry personnel were purged and replaced with, often, unqualified
people. \(^{40}\) Student and political activist groups attacked Chinese diplomats and diplomatic facilities in Indonesia. Mass murders were carried out throughout the nation as part of the struggle for power carried on by General Suharto and the Indonesian Army, designed to eliminate any significant opposition to Suharto-Army rule, and especially to seize power from President Sukarno and his allies. The breakdown in civic order allowed for mistreatment, oppression, and attacks on Chinese people and infrastructure (Indonesian-Chinese and Overseas-Chinese) throughout the islands. Economic, political and civic turmoil continued, really, up until the point (March, 1968) when General Suharto was appointed as the President of Indonesia. From October 1965 to October 1967, domestic turmoil and disorder made it increasingly difficult for Indonesia to maintain its relationship with China; despite earlier private and public declarations to the contrary, Indonesia froze (membekukan) relations with China in October 1967. But, Indonesia was able, however effectively, to maintain relations with other nations; even other Communist nations (the Soviet

\(^{40}\) Departemen Luar Negeri, Penitya Penulisan Sedjarah, Dua Puluh Lima, 341-346. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Order No. 253/PD/IX/66, April 7, 1966, formed the "TEAM TERTIB" [the Team of Law and Order] whose mission was to place in order and to cleanse the Ministry's structural organization (menertib dan membersihkan aparatur Departemen tersebut) to rid the Foreign Ministry's ranks of "G.30.S./P.K.I. political guerrillas" (gerilja politik G.30.S./P.K.I.) in the foreign affairs system, both at home and abroad.
Union, Eastern European Communist nations, North Korea, North Viet Nam, and Cuba). What accounts for loss of diplomatic relations with China?

As shown earlier, the People's Republic of China, during this same time period, was undergoing its greatest upheaval in its short (since its founding in 1949) history: the Great Cultural Revolution. In 1966 and 1967 the Chinese foreign affairs system was repeatedly attacked by Red Guard and Cultural Revolution activist groups. The Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, was attacked politically and polemically (during public criticism and struggle sessions) and toppled. The Chinese Foreign Ministry was broken into and ransacked, and Ministry officials attacked and harassed. Cultural Revolution activists extended their reach overseas through diplomatic facilities and student groups; not the least affected was Chinese representation in Indonesia where there were to be a number of cases of Indonesian declarations of persona-non-grata against Chinese diplomatic personnel. During the most virulent stage of the Cultural Revolution (August 1966 to early 1968) breakdown in civic order and fighting between contending political groups disrupted orderly governance and, among other effects, derailed China's foreign affairs programs. Nonetheless, in the end, China only lost relations with one key nation: Indonesia. What accounted for the PRC's loss of relations with Indonesia, while it had been able to maintain diplomatic relations with other nations
even less inclined toward China (during 1966 and 1967, especially the Soviet Union, Burma, Cambodia, India, and Great Britain)? As the present study demonstrates, the very occurrence of unprecedented, cataclysmic domestic upset in both Indonesia and China, during the same time period (1966 and 1967) played an overwhelming role in the rupture of relations between them in October, 1967. Other factors, as mentioned earlier, played a role in the breakdown in relations between Indonesia and China, but the existence of unprecedented domestic turmoil in each of these two nations with heavy effect on foreign affairs, during the same two year period, made it increasingly difficult for the two nations to conduct effective relations with each other as witnessed, in part, by the fact that neither country lost relations with other significant diplomatic partners during those two years.

MAJOR GENERAL SUHARTO’S ACCUSATION OF PKI COMPLICITY IN GESTAPU, AND RESULTANT EFFECTS

On day one (October 1, 1965) of the Gestapu Coup, Major General Suharto, as he relates in his autobiography, upon hearing Lieutenant Colonel Untung’s radio announcement of the September 30th Movement, concluded “I’m sure that this move by
Untung has been masterminded by the PKI."41 He did not provide, nor did he possess, evidence to back his statement to other officers, that early morning of day one, that the Coup "pasti didalangi PKI" (the coup was certainly masterminded by the PKI).42 From this point forward, the PKI was pinned with having been the organization which hatched the coup. As Major General Suharto and the Indonesian Army proceeded to expand and ultimately to gain power over Indonesia, the theme that the PKI masterminded (mendalangi) the Coup was played out and embellished upon further in a series of trials -- Mahmilub [Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa-military tribunals for both military and civilians accused of complicity in Gestapu]; all beginning from Major General Suharto's initial accusation that the PKI was responsible for the coup, made at Kostrad Headquarters on October 1, 1965, at 7:00 a.m., within only a few

41 Soeharto, Suharto: My Thoughts, Words and Deeds--An Autobiography As told to G. Dwipayana and Ramadan K. H., (Jakarta: PT. Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1991), 100. Not mentioned in this English language translation is that in the original Indonesian language version Suharto made this statement to two other officers with a smile and a wink (diam sekejap), Soeharto, Soeharto, Pikiran Ucapan, 120.

42 Soeharto, Soeharto, Pikiran Ucapan, 120. The term didalangi, comes from the root word dalang meaning "narrator and puppeteer of traditional shadow plays" (Wayang); the second definition for the English language meaning is "mastermind, manipulate" see Echols and Shadily, 129.
hours after the Indonesian Army Generals had been kidnapped.

Some two hours later, as biographer Elson relates:

> Upon dismissing the battalion deputies, Suharto immediately called a staff conference around 9:15 a.m. [October 1, 1965], attended by Yoga Sugama (assistant, intelligence), Colonel Wahono (assistant, operations), Col. Joko Basuki (assistant IV), Col. Sruhardoyo (assistant III), and his Chief of Staff, Brig.-Gen. Achmad Wiranatakusumah. Suharto, so he later recounted, explained that he had long known Utung, "who has been a disciple of the PKI figure Alimin since 1945"; there was, moreover, no such thing as a Council of Generals. He later related putting his view of what had happened: "In my view this is not merely a movement to confront the so-called Council of Generals, but something rather different. They have organized a coup to seize power of the State by force and the PKI is definitely behind it!"43

Various activities both inside and away from Jakarta were seen to have supported Suharto's conviction that the PKI had directed the failed coup; however, some of these activities took place, suspiciously, after Suharto had quelled the attempted coup in Jakarta. Ricklefs states:

> The Diponegoro Division in Central Java was the base of the military conspirators. During 1 October a series of intra-army coups left five of the Diponegoro's seven infantry battalions in the hands of the 30 September Movement. The PKI Mayor of Surakarta announced his support and on 2 October, by which time the coup had utterly collapsed in Jakarta, PKI turned out in Yogyakarta for a march in support of the movement. Also on 2 October, PKI's Jakarta Daily Harian Rakyat incredibly published an editorial in praise of the Movement, which it depicted as an internal army affair. These events, in conjunction with the role of Gerwani, and Pemuda Rakyat in the killing at Halim, sealed PKI's fate. Anti-PKI Army

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43 Elson, 101.
officers no longer wanted to restrict or ban PKI; they now saw reason and occasion to annihilate it. Anti-PKI civilians, especially Islamic activists, were in hearty agreement.44

As General Suharto points out, within a week of the coup failure, "the people" had already burned down the PKI headquarters building in Jakarta.45 On Friday, October 8, 1965, as described earlier in this chapter, Major General Suharto, as Commander of Komkaptib (Command for the Restoration of Security and Public Order) ordered the closure of the PKI office in Jakarta, along with the offices of any mass organizations which came under the mantle (yang menjadi mantel) of the communist party, such as Gerwani (Women's Organization), Pemuda Rakyat (Youth Organization), and SOBSI.46 By May, 1966, the list of proscribed organizations totaled 120 to include the various committees of the PKI and organizations which the Soeharto government declared as "founded under, sheltered by, in the shadow of" (jang seasas/berlindung/bernaung) the PKI.47 This list proscribed labor organizations, youth groups, educational


46 Dwipayana and Sjamsuddin, eds., 9.

47 Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, Gerakan 30, 39-43; Sekreteriat Negara Republik Indonesia, September 30th Movement, 206-213.

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organizations—schools—and universities, and even the "Trishan [three-wheel rickshaw] Driver's Association" (Persatuan Pengendara Betja). As for the PKI, Suharto's directive, as detailed earlier in this chapter, specifically banned the Central Committees, Regional Committees (Provincial level), City Committees (Municipal level), Committee Sections (District level), Committee Sub-Sections (Sub-District level), and County Committees at Village level. The May 31, 1966 directive by Suharto also included organizations related directly to Indonesian-Chinese. Baperki "was a political movement of the 1950's and 1960s to integrate ethnic Chinese into Indonesian society."

Even if Baperki were a PKI subordinate organization, the PKI itself was a fully legal party, with members seated in President Sukarno's exterior (108 member) cabinet as well as in Parliament up until Suharto declared the party to have masterminded Gestapu, after which he subsequently closed its offices and attacked, and banned, the PKI. Baperki had drawn

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48 Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, Gerakan 30, 39-43; Sekreteriat Negara Republik Indonesia, September 30th Movement, 206-213.

49 Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, Gerakan 30, 39; Sekreteriat Negara Republik Indonesia, September 30th Movement, 206.

50 Echols and Shadily, 52; Charles A. Coppel provides a full description and history of Baperki in "Patterns of Chinese political Activity in Indonesia," in Mackie, ed., 44-63.
closer to the left in 1964 and early 1965 in order to strengthen itself politically by closer association with a President, and a PKI, whom had also leaned to the left in ever closer association with the PRC. Still, after Major General Suharto's pronouncement that the PKI had masterminded Gestapu, Baperki and its affiliated organizations came under severe attack. Within the week (first week in October, 1965) Baperki's University Res Publica was burned down by anti-PKI groups.

Many of the more prominent Baperki members were jailed and numerous others lost their jobs as a result of the administrative purges. It was alleged that Baperki had financed the PKI in co-operation with the Chinese People's Republic, which was by now the target of constant fiery denunciation and retaliation by abusing the Indonesian government by way of Radio Peking and its news agency [emphasis added].

By May, 1966, in addition to Baperki having been banned by the Suharto government, its (earlier mentioned) affiliates: Perhimi (Indonesian University Students Associations), PPI (Indonesian Youth Consultative Body) and Res Publica University were all banned also.

Suharto’s blame of the PKI and his banning of Baperki and its affiliates set the stage for attacks on Chinese throughout

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51 Coppel, in Mackie, ed., 60.
52 Coppel, in Mackie, ed., 63.
53 Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, Gerakan 30, 41; Sekreteriat Negara Republik Indonesia, September 30th Movement, 209.
Indonesia as well as upon PRC diplomatic facilities and personnel, all prompted by an ethos of guilt by association: if the PKI was guilty of masterminding Gestapu, and the PKI was affiliated with, and had, Chinese members, then Indonesian-Chinese must also be guilty. If Indonesian-Chinese were guilty of involvement in Gestapu and they were close to Chinese personnel from the PRC, then the PRC must have been guilty also; so went the thought processes of that time.

The official Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs research document on relations with China after Gestapu (and classified Hanja untuk intern Deplu, Foreign Ministry internal use only) addressed China's increasingly unfriendly attitude toward Indonesia as follows:

This matter now clearly cannot be separated from the PRC's political goals as relates to Indonesia, where the PKI appears to be the primary tool (alat utama) in the PRC's efforts to reach that political goal, namely to convert Indonesia into a country under the influence of Peking.

It has been proven that this political goal of China was to have been accomplished by China's direct interference in the internal politics of the nation of Indonesia, that is, by involving itself in the treasonous (pengchianatan) G.S.30/PKI [Gestapu].

One difficulty with the Ministry's statement is that the term "it has been proven" is unsupported. Unfortunately, this

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54 Departemen Luar Negeri, Dokumenta Diplomatica No. 4, 2.
and other ministry documents do not provide sufficient evidence to support the claim of the PRC’s involvement in Gestapu.  

This chapter suggests that the break in relations with China was, partially, based on the doubtful premise that the PKI was responsible for Gestapu. A thorough examination of available material, as described in detail above, and in earlier chapters, fails to provide convincing evidence that the PKI carried out the failed Gestapu coup on September 30-October 1, 1965.

A note of caution must be voiced. Based on the politically engendered murkiness surrounding the events of Gestapu, PKI involvement cannot be definitively denied as of this writing; my position is that PKI involvement has yet to be positively proven.

If the PKI did not conduct Gestapu, then, ipso facto, the PRC could not have been involved as charged by the Suharto New Order government and sources such as Dr. Rizal Sukma and General Nasution. The implications are very weighty—that relations with China were broken for nearly a quarter of a century predicated on a falsehood. Still, there must be more examination of the parameters of China’s relationship with the PKI and the possibility of China’s involvement with Gestapu; the focus of the following chapter.
Lack of substantive evidence of PRC involvement in Gestapu is a major issue in the assessment of the history of the breakdown in relations between Indonesia and China between October 1965 and October 1967. If, in fact, China was not involved in Gestapu (as the Indonesian government—the military and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as student groups purported it was) then Indonesia’s use of Chinese involvement as a basis for the rupture in relations is a false premise. Where is the substantive evidence that the PRC was involved in Gestapu?

The Suharto government has cited information produced by the MAHMILUB (Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa) special court martial for members of the Armed forces involved in G.30.S/PKI, and for members of the Communist Party.1 Mahmilub testimonial and

1 For definitions see Echols and Shadily, 354. This dictionary entry spells the acronym with only one l, whereas common usage at the time used two. Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, Gerakan 30, defines Mahmilub as an “Extraordinary Military Tribunal set up by virtue of Law no. 11/PNPs/1962 and on Presidential Regulation No. 16, dated December 24, 1963, to try unlawful acts categorized as revolt or subversion.” It was “reactivated in 1966, to try the people involved in the G-30-S/PKI attempted coup. The first PKI person tried in 1966 was Njonobin Sastroredjo, on February 14, 1966,” 232; Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, Gerakan 30, 69-70 in the Indonesian language volume; Pusat Pendidikan Kehakiman A. D. [Indonesian
evidence must be used with extreme caution. The process used to elicit and complete testimony and evidence was fraught with intimidation and coercion. Arnold C. Brackman and Sheldon Simon both attest to the basic unreliable nature of Mahmilub testimony and evidence. Brackman stated "such testimony is naturally not above suspicion" and his supporting endnote goes on to say

By illustration, Njono retracted statements attributed to him during preliminary interrogations because they had been made in an "atmosphere of Communist-Phobia." Lt. Col. Heru Asmodjo, a Dhani Aide, charged from the dock that in person he had been humiliated, tortured, and coached. PKI defendants also frequently misled the prosecution by citing, for example, Aidit's role at secret deliberations in June and July, 1965, when in point

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2 Ricklefs (1993) warns that the evidence from these trials "is suspect," 280.
of fact he was abroad, a reflection on the Army’s lack of intelligence on even overt PKI activities. The Mahmillub also permitted Sudisman and Njono to talk freely over the heads of the Court to the underground, remnant PKI, steeling them for the future. Much of the testimony was windy and irrelevant. See also Sheldon W. Simon, The Broken Triangle-Peking, Djakarta and the PKI (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1969) hereafter cited as Sheldon. “With representatives of the Suharto government serving as both prosecutors and judges, the results of the ‘trials’ could easily be predicted,” Sheldon said.3

Examination of the original record of portions of the trials reinforces the questionable nature of the testimony and also provides primary source evidence of the Suharto government’s efforts to blame Peking for involvement in Gestapu.4 In the original (hand-typed and mimeographed) record of the trial of Sjam one section is titled “Versi Kommunisme Aidit Punja Persamaan Dengan Partai Kommunis Tiongkok” (Aidit’s Version of Communism is in Agreement with the Chinese Communist

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3 Brackman, 55 and fn 34, 224.

4 Concerning the reliability of trial testimony and evidence Brian May delves deeply into the question and, at one point, concludes, “In my opinion, no conclusions, tentative or otherwise, should be drawn from the trials; while no possibility should be ruled out, the only acceptable state of mind is that of genuinely suspended judgment,” Indonesian Tragedy, 110.
Party) the evidence does not support Sjam’s testimony.\(^5\) In a later section entitled *Hubungan PKI dengan PKI RRT* (PKI Relations with the Communist Party of the PRC) the witness (Sjam) surprisingly downplays the relationship:

Aidit’s visit to the PRC, prior to Gestapu, remained a matter of attention by members of the court in that the visit had been characterized as only a friendly visit (kunjungan persahabatan sadja). The accused [Syam] later provided clarification. The visit had also served as a consultative visit between the leader of the PKI [Aidit] and the Communist Party of the PRC relating to the Chinese Communist Party’s posture toward the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Court Member: “Did the PKI Special Bureau (Biro Chusus-BC) have a relationship with any intelligence agencies of the PRC?”

Accused [Sjam]: There was not a relationship because Communist Parties in various nations have their own freedom. A Communist Party from one country does not have power over (menguasai) a Communist Party in another country. The PKI Special Bureau did not have a relationship with any intelligence agency of the PRC, rather the BC PKI was an apparatus of the Chairman of the Party [Aidit].\(^6\)

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\(^5\) Departemen Luar Negeri, *Sjam*, 20-21. This is a typewritten, mimeographed, copy with an official State cover and attested to as an official document of the Republic of Indonesia by the Director of the Documentation Section, Arifin Alabbasy. This Ministry of Foreign Affairs document has a total of 89 text pages plus a cover and coversheet and a one-page authentication. Also, by error, pages 85-89 were again, mistakenly, repeated at the back of the document. An official source widely used within Indonesia, which relies heavily upon court records, but is heavily laden with political trappings, is Boerhan and Soebekti.

\(^6\) Departemen Luar Negeri, *Sjam*, 26. The accused [Sjam] had earlier testified that he had been the Chief of the Special Bureau (Biro Chusus-BC). The point of this line of questioning (the Court’s questions and his answers) was to demonstrate Aidit’s guilt by showing that Aidit controlled the BC, and hence used the BC to carry out Gestapu. In the process of showing Aidit’s control of the BC, Sjam testifies, rather astonishingly, that the PKI had no relationship with PRC intelligence agencies.
Of major importance from this official transcript of Sjam's military trial is his claim that the PKI, as a party, was not responsible for Gestapu

[Sjam] tried to rescue (menjelamatkan) the PKI from bearing responsibility for G-30-S by contending that the responsibility did not rest with the PKI, but rather with [only] some people of the Party, because G-30-S was not a decision (keputusan) of the Congress of the PKI.\(^7\)

This tack fits in with the fact that the PKI did not mobilize its three million-some members in the period leading up to, during, and after Gestapu (late September, 1965 to late October, 1965); also, Sjam's position supports various observers' analysis that the hierarchy of the Party was not involved in Aidit's (and possibly Sjam's) decision to implement

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\(^7\) Departemen Luar Negeri, Sjam, 66. Sujono said that Untung was merely a tool of Sjam. Also, Sjam testified that it was from Sujono that Sjam heard that weapons had recently arrived from the PRC, Departemen Luar Negeri, Sjam, 67.

Departemen Luar Negeri, Sjam, 81.

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an attempted coup.\(^8\) As former Suharto regime political prisoner Carmel Budiardjo states

Things were complicated for the PKI because Aidit had a secret intelligence unit called the special Bureau (Biro Khusus) which was under his personal control, outside the Party's constitutional structures. Sjam Kamaruzzaman [sic], the man who headed the bureau, fed information to Aidit, leading him to believe that a successful move by 'progressive army officers' would bring about a favorable turn in the Party's fortunes. Insofar as anything is known about Aidit's intentions and actions leading up to 1 October, they suggest that he was confronted by an event within the armed forces that was pressing ahead, under the control of Army Officers [not civilians, such as Aidit was] who were pursuing their own political agenda to resolve internal army conflicts. His actions were limited to deciding the Party's response. Where he may come in for criticism is the inadequacy, or even the futility, of that response, and the soundness of his judgment in accepting Sjam's word. Aidit's day-to-day dealings with Sjam were so secretive that no one else on the politbureau was kept informed. As politbureau member Sudisman stated at his trial, the Party had complete confidence in Aidit to handle the matter.\(^9\)

\(^8\) A number of qualified observers doubt the evidence that Gestapu was planned and carried out by the PKI: Schwarz, (1994), 19; Kingsbury, 57-58; Elson, 124; Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure for Change 2\(^{nd}\) ed., (New York: Routledge, 1994), 64; Ricklefs, (1993), 280; Suryadinata, Interpreting Indonesian Politics, 8; Anderson and McVey, 20, 25, 63, 69, 105. Only since Suharto's downfall have Indonesians dared to challenge the Suharto government's evidence that the PKI masterminded (mendalangi) Gestapu. The two best examples are the books written by the recently released political prisoners Latief; and Soebandrio; also see Elson, 372.

\(^9\) Budiardjo, Surviving Indonesia's Gulag, 47-48. Carmel Budiardjo had performed part-time work for the PKI Secretariat translating documents into English and assessing economic
Pertinent to the present study is the issue that if the Suharto government's claim that the PKI masterminded Gestapu is false, then the claims that China was behind the PKI's implementation of the attempted coup are also false. If that, in fact, is the case, then the Suharto government’s claims that one reason for its freeze in diplomatic relations was China’s backing of the PKI in Gestapu is an unfounded claim. More than that, the Suharto government’s attacks, arrests and imprisonment, executions, and other activities against the PKI and affiliates, Chinese in Indonesia, and attacks against the PRC and the CCP were all carried out on a falsely based premise: that the PKI planned and carried out Gestapu with China’s involvement. This dissertation does not attempt to either prove or disprove the claim that the PKI masterminded Gestapu. The very fact that the claim is seriously challenged means that the Suharto government rationale that one reason Indonesia froze relations with China was because of China’s support to the PKI, is, ipso facto, also challenged.

As President Suharto's official documentation team records Sunday, 1 October [1967]. Today the cabinet proclaimed that diplomatic relations between the Republic of Indonesia and the People's Republic of China have been frozen (dibekukan). The reason for this freeze in diplomatic relations, among other things, is that it has been proven that the PRC issues. She was arrested apparently because of her part-time work for the PKI, and because her husband had been caught up in the net of widespread arrests after Gestapu.
provided assistance (memberikan bantuan) to G-30-S/PKI, both during its preparation and implementation, as well as during its aftermath.10

One key source relating to China's possible role in Gestapu is the CIA's research study (sometimes referred to as the white paper) of 1968,

... in summary, although the Chinese may have been aware of the coup plans and certainly very much in sympathy with them, there is no evidence that the Chinese masterminded the Indonesian coup.11

The research study goes on to conjecture about various facets of exchange of information between the PKI and China, and further states "on the matter of Chinese involvement, the evidence is simply not conclusive, much less so than it is on other aspects of the Coup."12 The CIA study caveats its statement with the proviso that something about China's possible involvement in Gestapu could be learned from testimony on Aidit's visit to China in early 1965, and Air Marshall Dhani's contact with Chinese authorities in September, 1965.13 Subsequent Mahmilub testimony, as shown in documents cited herein, did not reveal

10 Dwipayana and Sjamsuddin, eds., 213. This passage goes on to list yet another reason for the break in relations as having been the inability of Indonesia to tolerate Chinese attacks against Indonesian diplomatic personnel and facilities in Peking. That, however, was much later, August 5-10, 1967. See chapter two for discussion of Chinese attacks on Indonesian personnel and property in China.

11 USCIA, Indonesia 1965, 289.

12 USCIA, Indonesia 1965, 289.

13 USCIA, Indonesia 1965, 289.
substantive evidence of Chinese involvement in the Indonesian Coup. One would expect that, of all the parties in observance, certainly the CIA would have been forthcoming in accusing China of involvement in Gestapu, if there had been even a remote evidentiary basis for doing so.

One rather recently published work implies that the breakdown in diplomatic relations was, indeed, tied to China's involvement in Gestapu,

... along with the destruction of the PKI in the domestic arena, the [Indonesian] army also moved to eliminate the Party's external ally, China, by charging it with supporting the abortive coup. Consequently relations between Indonesia and China deteriorated sharply.15

Again, what is needed is substantiated evidence that the PRC was involved with the PKI in Gestapu, not merely baseless assumptions.

This question of China's role in Gestapu is of key value in the study of the rupture of relations between China and Indonesia. If China played any sort of significant role, then the breakdown in relations can be cast in the light of China's role...

14 See Departemen Luar Negeri, Sjam, Mahmilub references cited earlier as well as recent books by Latief, passim; and Soebandrio, passim.

15 Sukma, 33. Sukma's book focuses on the period between the break in relations in 1967 and reestablishment of relations between Indonesia and China in 1990; in other words, his book takes up where this dissertation leaves off; October, 1967. Rizal Sukma devotes less that two pages to the analysis of the period covered by this study in his sub-section entitled "The breakdown of diplomatic relations (1965-1967)", 33-34.
direct interference in the internal affairs of Indonesia. If China had little or no involvement in the aborted coup on the night of 30 September-1 October, 1965, then the rupture of relations must be explained in terms other than China’s direct involvement; other explanations must be found. The nearly quarter century cessation of diplomatic relations between these two key nations of Asia is a matter of great moment, especially in view of the nature of the times; the turbulent decades of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. In this regard, Rizal Sukma’s book adds to our understanding of this period of the absence of relations between 1967 and 1990. Left unclear, however, is whether or not China (the government and/or the Party) was involved in Gestapu, and, if involved, the nature of China’s role. If it is found that China played no significant role in the coup, then 23 years of broken relations were based on false premise. As one international observer organization concluded in 1995

Throughout the period of Suharto’s rule, his government has kept alive the spectre of a Communist resurgence and a return to the turbulence and excesses of the coup era. This threat is used not only to justify continuing restrictions on former political prisoners and their families but also to silence political opposition and criticism and to buttress the military-dominated government’s monopoly of power. The government has repeatedly responded to criticism of its policies and practices by arbitrarily labeling those who speak out as communist sympathizers or accusing them of links with the banned PKI. Those unfairly denounced in this way have virtually no means of redress. Yet, the consequences can be severe, such is the political and
social stigma attached to any association with the PKI. The government reinforces this through a variety of means: by regularly reminding the public of the crises which the country experienced in 1965, according to the government’s own contentious version of events; through propagation of its official ideology, Pancasila, and by perpetrating discrimination against former political prisoners, who continue to be regarded as potential subversives. Periodic government statements about the small group of political prisoners still serving sentences imposed after the coup, some of whom remain on death row and could still face execution, also serve to keep the issue in the public eye.  

Others have expressed views similar to those in the previous quote from the International Centre Against Censorship; as Rizal Sukma states “the suspension of diplomatic relations with China reflected the New Order’s image as an anti-communist force, and in turn, strengthened its legitimacy and power at home.” Damien Kingsbury notes  

... to maintain Indonesia’s new [New Order] consensus, not only were the PKI and affiliated or suspected sympathetic organizations banned, but the 

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16 Article XIX, 1. The article proceeds with discussion of the history of the 1965 Coup d’état, political persecution, and human rights in Indonesia, as well as lack of freedom of the Indonesian press, all assessed from the vantage point of 1995, thirty years after Gestapu, three years before Suharto was forced out of office. The article relies on solely Indonesian publications. The title of this organization emanates from Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights concerning rights to freedom of opinions and expression. Issue 43 points out that “some 2000 books have been banned since the New Order [Suharto] government came to power; among them many deemed to contain elements of communist ideology.”, 15.  

17 Sukma, 106.
New Order government also explicitly rejected liberalism and severely curtailed any association for a participatory, representative democratic process.\(^{18}\)

Michael Vatikiotis is even more to the point

On 30 September 1965, the murder of six generals and the declaration of a revolutionary government took the Republic to the brink again, this time with the assumed—but never proven—threat of a communist takeover. The prompt suppression of the uprising by Major-General Suharto once again saved the Republic and brought the military to power for the first time in its history.\(^{19}\)

Leo Suryadinata wrote of the 1980s Indonesia that

Indonesian concern with communism and its internal security is reflected in its relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a country believed by the New Order government to have been involved in the 1965 abortive coup. Indonesia suspended diplomatic ties with the PRC in October 1967 and ties had been "frozen" ever since then. Indonesian fear of both the PRC and ethnic Chinese (Overseas Chinese), together with the PRC’s accommodation of the PKI remnants in Beijing, has caused Indonesia to be cautious in restoring Sino-Indonesian relations.\(^{20}\)

In another, earlier book, Suryadinata wrote “the alleged involvement of the PRC in the 1965 coup—despite inconclusive evidence—has been mentioned consistently by Indonesian leaders as evidence of China’s ulterior motives towards the Republic.”\(^{21}\)

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\(^{18}\) Kingsbury, 69.

\(^{19}\) Vatikiotis, 64-65.


Michael Leifer, in his book, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy*, points out

... the domestic political consequences of the abortive coup were profound. The cloak of nationalist rectitude was stripped from the corporate body of the PKI, which was depicted by Army commanders and Muslim leaders as having engaged in another attempt to stab the Republic in the back—on this occasion as an agent of China.\(^{22}\)

Doubts, as expressed above, as to whether or not China (the government and/or the party) was involved in Gestapu engender a need to search widely for evidence to either prove or disprove the charge that China played a role in Gestapu. A search of government classified documents, many recently declassified, or simply now available but not necessarily declassified, could be expected to reveal whether or not China played a role in the attempted coup. These sources are now available at the end of the 1990s and the first years of the new century. Chinese sources classified neibu (for internal use only) or dang nei kanwu fuze baocun (internal [Communist] Party publication—protect responsibly) would be expected to contain information on China’s actions relating to any intended role in preparation, implementation and aftermath of the September 30/October 1 Coup. Indonesian classified sources (terbatas—restricted, or Hanya untuk intern Deplu— for Ministry of Foreign Affairs internal use only) could also be expected to

\(^{22}\) Leifer, 106.
contain any and all available evidence of China's role in
Gestapu. U. S. government material (ranging in classification
from unclassified through confidential, secret, top secret-code-
word, up to and including "eyes only" at the President's level)
could also be expected to contain evidence of any Chinese role
in Gestapu in view of America's urgent interest in events in
Indonesia between 1965 and 1968, and considering the U.S.
Government's close contact with Indonesian personages before and
after Gestapu. Much material is now available that was not
previously so. China's opening since 1984, and especially it's
loosening of restrictions on translation, publication, and sale
of printed material, beginning in the late 1980s, early 1990s,
has wrought a major bibliographic change in Sinitic research.\(^{23}\)

\(^{23}\) See especially David Shambaugh, "A Bibliographic Essay
on New Sources of the Study of China's Foreign Relations and
National Security", an appendix in Robinson and Shambaugh, eds.,
602-618. Also see Michael Hunt's "Afterword: A Guide to the
Literature" in Hunt, 251-272; especially the section "The
Foreign Policy of the PRC," 266-272. Andrew Nathan and Perry
Link provide insight to Chinese classified material in a passage
about "'neibu', or 'internal', classification, which meant that
the material should officially be given limited circulation,
although such documents often end up being circulated rather
widely, sometimes even being pirated by underground Chinese
publishers for black-market commercial distribution." Zhang
Liang, Perry Link, and Andrew Nathan, The Tiananmen Papers: The
Chinese Leadership's Decision to Use Force Against Their Own
People in Their Own Words, (New York: Public Affairs, 2001),
468, provides a solid demonstration of the vast value of
classified records of Chinese policy members' deliberations and
decisions caught in the very process of making state policy. A
most extensive Chinese language listing of Chinese materials
which include 'neibu' sources is found in Professor D. W. Y.
Kwok's "Authors' Bibliography" in Yan and Gao, 579-610. This
extensive bibliography contains some 200 books, monographs, and
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Indonesian government classified sources are less available than U.S. or Chinese classified material, but for the purposes here, pertaining to the subject of relations between Indonesia and China, significant materials are available. 24


24 Many of these documents have already been referred to earlier. The two main classification levels are Hanja untuk intern Deplu (for Ministry of Foreign Affairs internal use only), and Terbatas (Restricted). Of significant value are documents which approximate the U.S. Official History of its foreign affairs "The Foreign Relations of the United States" (FRUS) series. The Departemen Luar Negeri, Penitya Penulisan Sedjarah, Dua Puluh Lima, draws from formerly classified materials, (just as does the U. S. FRUS series). Some of the classified material is found in the previously cited Departemen Luar Negeri, Dokumenta Diplomatica No. 4, and Departemen Luar Negeri, Supplemen Documenta; Departemen Luar Negeri [Indonesia Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Kabinet Ampera Bidang Luar Negeri; Himpunan Joint Communiques dan Joint Statement dsb. Periode September 1966-April 1968 [The Ampera Cabinet in the Field of Foreign Affairs: Compilation of Joint Communiqués and Joint Statements during the Period September 1966-April 1968], (Jakarta: Direktorat Research, 1968), No. 08/IV, classified Hanja untuk intern Deplu [for internal distribution within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs only], mimeograph copy on legal-size paper. Also of use is Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan [Indonesian Department of Defense], Laporan Diskusi (Dengan Persiapan Kertas-Kerdja) Djudul Usaha-Usaha Kearah Pentingkatan Stabilisasi Politik Dalam Negeri [Report on Discussions (along with prepared working papers) Relating to Efforts toward Increasing Political Stabilization within the Country], (Jakarta: Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, Staf Pembinaan Karyawan [Staff for the Restoration of Official Employees], 1970), classified Terbatas [restricted], mimeograph copy on legal-size paper. Especially pertinent are the portions of the
In addition to Chinese government (and Party), and Indonesian government classified material, a search of U.S. Government classified materials seems appropriate as a means of ascertaining information on the question of China’s involvement in Gestapu. The U.S. was a most interested observer of events between 1965 and 1968 as demonstrated by the release, in 2001, of formerly classified information in the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Historian's Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines. This volume edited by Edward C. Keefer, report which pertain to foreign affairs, the PRC, and the PKI. These are the most useful government classified documents available, while other government documents drawn partly from classified material are also helpful: Departemen Luar Negeri [Indonesia Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Intisari Masalah Luar Negeri [The Gist of Problems of Foreign Affairs], (Jakarta: Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan Masalah Luar Negeri, 1977), No. 07/IS/1977. Also see the valuable Laporan Research. This is probably one of the most effective documents for this study. The document does not carry a classification, but is serial numbered (No.: 007/STR/23/XII/7d) which indicates a measure of control within Deplu. Another important document relating to the subject at hand, the PRC and relations with Indonesia, is Departemen Luar Negeri, Suli Suleiman ed., Politik. Not as reliable, but drawn partly from formerly classified material is Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, Gerakan 30, and the English Language edition, Sekreteriat Negara Republik Indonesia, September 30th Movement. There are other Indonesian government documents, both classified and unclassified, but which touch only tangentially or little on the question of China’s involvement in Gestapu. Of course many non-government, therefore unclassified, works address the subject. Here, however, the quest is to find Indonesian government, preferably classified, material dealing with the question of China’s involvement in Gestapu through its backing of the PKI.
General Editor David C. Patterson, devotes 576 pages, of an 800-some page volume, to Indonesia alone. The classified levels range from unclassified, through confidential, secret, top secret-code word, and up to "eyes only" for the President:

Most of the finished intelligence included in this volume relates to Indonesia during the transition of power from Sukarno to Suharto . . . the volume covers covert political action policy in general, especially in the Indonesian compilations. 25

Understanding that this FRUS volume carries numerous redactions, still, a search for U.S. intelligence information on China's involvement in Gestapu is appropriate. For Indonesia, three documents were "denied in full and three documents were released with major excisions"; excisions were also made on sentences and paragraphs throughout this volume. 26

Another volume of declassified materials directly apt to this dissertation is the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, 1998; also a compilation of declassified Presidential, NSC, CIA and DOD documents ranging from unclassified through confidential, secret, top secret-code word, special distribution up to and including "eyes only" for

25 FRUS INDONESIA, iv.

26 FRUS INDONESIA, vii.
the President, all containing U.S. foreign affairs and intelligence information relating to China (the PRC and the ROC).\textsuperscript{27}

Both FRUS volumes, XXVI (relating to Indonesia, 1964-1968), and XXX (China, 1964-1968), are valuable especially for their content of National Intelligence Estimate (NIEs), and "the 303 Committee that reviewed and authorized covert operations" for the U.S. Government.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{27} FRUS CHINA. This work contains intelligence information gathered covertly and overtly from inside China as well as from abroad. This Volume, XXX, is important for its intelligence information on the Cultural Revolution, declassified contents of secret talks in Warsaw between the U.S. and the PRC, and on Chinese activities abroad.

\textsuperscript{28} National Intelligence Estimates were done by the CIA collecting some of the most current and sensitive information on a subject for use of the Executive Branch for the purpose of formulating and implementing U.S. policies. Of the 14 NIEs produced for the period (1964-1968), as reported in the FRUS CHINA, two are particularly applicable: NIE 12-7-67, "The Chinese Cultural Revolution," Secret, Controlled Dissemination, 573-574; and NIE 13-9-65 Secret; Controlled Dissemination, "Communist China Foreign Policy", 168-170. Of the eight NIEs produced between 1964 and 1968, as reported in the FRUS INDONESIA, two are especially applicable to this dissertation: NIE 4/55-65 "Prospectus for Indonesia and Malaysia," Secret, Controlled Dissemination, 270-271; and NIE 55-68; "Indonesia," Secret; Controlled Dissemination, 564-576. Concerning covert operations, the 303 Committee deliberated on those endeavors. "The 303 Committee was an interdepartmental committee that reviewed and authorized covert operations. Established under NSC 5412/2, December 28, 1955, it was known as the Special Group or 5412 Committee until National Security Action Memorandum No. 303, June 2, 1964, changed its name to the 303 Committee. From 1964 to 1968, it consisted of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and the Director for Central Intelligence", FRUS CHINA, 76. Some of the most sensitive and revealing intelligence information on China 234
Other U. S. Government declassified sources of information are available besides those found in the FRUS series on China and Indonesia, 1964-1968. One document, which I obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, is a CIA Intelligence Report, done in October 1966, which provides details of "Communist Military Assistance to Indonesia." One important statement from this report reveals the posture of the Soviet Union after the Gestapu coup as

Unable to influence events in Indonesia, the USSR stood by and waited, avoiding any action that could arouse the Indonesians' sensitivity to foreign interference and hoping that a regime would emerge that they could deal with.

More importantly this report shows that, despite Suharto Government claims of strong support to the PKI, overall

and Indonesia for the period 1965-1967 is contained in the recordings of the many 303 Committee meetings as reproduced in both the FRUS CHINA and the FRUS INDONESIA; most of them recorded as "memorandum for the record" by the Director of Central Intelligence (Director of CIA), and invariably classified "Secret; Eyes Only".


30 USCIA, Intelligence Report, 7.
Chinese aid to Indonesia between 1957 and 1965, was quite small

A. Communist Arms Aid

Since Communist arms aid began in 1957, Communist countries have provided over $1.3 billion worth of military equipment to Indonesia, or nearly 30 percent of all arms aid supplied to the less developed countries of the Free World. Of this total, over $1.1 billion (83 percent) has come from the USSR, $199 million (15 percent) from Czechoslovakia and Poland, only $21 million (2 percent) from Communist China. All of the Czechoslovak, Polish, and Chinese aid and three-quarters of the Soviet aid has been provided in the form of credits. The rest of the Soviet aid, in effect, has been a grant in the form of discounts. 31

Bryan Evans III, in his very important article about the Indonesian military in the journal Indonesia somehow misses the low level of military assistance from China to Indonesia when he describes how the Civic Action Program, part of the U. S. Military Action Program, had an influence on the TNI's development which "came to overshadow the massive Soviet and Communist Chinese aid programs to the other services [emphasis added]." 32

31 USCIA, Intelligence Report, 9. "Table 1, Communist Military Aid Agreements with Indonesia-1957 to June 1966" following this passage, has been blacked out.

32 Bryan Evans III, "The Influence of the United States Army on the Development of the Indonesian Army (1954-1964)," Indonesia 47 (April 1989): 25-45, see page 35. Evans had access to the same CIA document as listed above. With China's portion of Communist nations' aid to Indonesia amounting to a mere two percent it's a wonder how he could refer to "massive" aid in regard to China. Also, he dates the CIA report as October, 1966 rather than the correct month, September, 35.
Another CIA Intelligence Memorandum, obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, describes the changing status of Indonesia's confrontation (Konfrontasi) as of 1966. One quite revealing passage reads

5. Since the beginning of confrontation, Indonesian forces in Borneo have provided training and arms to dissident Sarawak Communist Chinese and helped them infiltrate back into [Malaysian] Sarawak. This operation, which has posed the greatest threat to Sarawak, has been curtailed in the current anti-Communist and anti-Chinese atmosphere within Indonesia, and it appears likely that all cooperation between the Indonesian military and the Sarawak Communist Chinese may soon end.

In fact the degree to which any of the Chinese minority in Northern Borneo were indeed Communist Chinese is a matter of debate; even more so that the PRC sponsored them. One authoritative source, Stephen Fitzgerald, says not. Key to


34 USCIA, Intelligence Memorandum, 3.

35 Stephen Fitzgerald, "Overseas Chinese Affairs and the Cultural Revolution" China Quarterly vol. 40 (Oct-Dec. 1969): 103-26, see 107-108. Fitzgerald shows that, in fact, Beijing found it counterproductive to encourage Chinese living in other countries to engage in revolutionary activities, to the point where he states "the CCP has never exhorted the Overseas Chinese as a group to make revolution.", 107. One of the charges, during the Cultural Revolution, against Liao Zhengzhi, Director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, effectively since 1949, was critical of his policy that Overseas Chinese should do all they could to avoid irking host governments by dabbling in local revolutionary or, even, political activities, 112.
the present study is that these operations were far from Jakarta and the other main centers of concern, and played only a peripheral role in the events relating to the breakdown in relations with China.

Aside from the 1968 CIA research study conclusion that "There is no evidence that the Chinese masterminded the Indonesian coup," as noted earlier, a search of U. S. Government declassified documents as listed, herein, reveals no evidence that the PRC was involved in Gestapu.36

Insofar as Chinese classified (neibu) documents are concerned the search for evidence of PRC (government and/or

36 USCIA, Indonesia 1965, 289. A search of well over 1,000 pages of U.S. Government declassified material in the FRUS CHINA, the FRUS INDONESIA, and various individual declassified documents from various agencies (NSC, State, Defense, CIA, White House Staff, etc.) revealed no evidence of PRC involvement in Gestapu. It must be made clear that, as of the early 2000s, some material is still being held back from declassification ("excised" in this dissertation) where, in 2001, the USG found that "the release of the information would reveal intelligence sources or methods, disclosure of which would 'clearly and demonstrably' damage U.S. National Security interests, as allowed in Executive Order 12958," FRUS INDONESIA, vii. The context of excised materials, wherein the text has been blanked out, does not, in any case lend itself to an interpretation of China's possible involvement in the planning or implementing of the Indonesian Coup; that was not the subject being addressed at the point of excision. As the 2001 FRUS INDONESIA states "despite these denials and excisions of specific sources and methods, as well as details of implementation, the broad outline of the limited U.S. covert policy in Indonesia is documented in the compilation," leading one to believe the excision dealt (mainly at least) with U.S. covert operations not with information about China's possible involvement in Gestapu, FRUS INDONESIA, vii.
party) involvement in Gestapu cannot be said to be as clear-cut as is the case with U.S. government declassified material. Would the Chinese allow materials revealing their involvement in Gestapu to be found at all? Recalling Andrew Nathan’s and Perry Link’s assessment that neibu documents “often end up being circulated rather widely, sometimes even being pirated by underground Chinese publishers for black market commercial distribution” the possibility is ever-present that information about Chinese involvement in Gestapu could be found in neibu documents if it existed at all.37 One of the most important sources, almost equivalent to a FRUS publication is the Chinese government’s multi-volume Zhongguo waijiaoshi (China’s Diplomatic History), Volume 3, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shiqi 1949-1979, (The Period of the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1979) described as “addressing China’s foreign affairs direction, policies, and activities, for the period after New China’s establishment in 1949.”38 A thorough reading of the Zhongguo waijiaoshi reveals no hint of Chinese involvement in Gestapu.39

Another neibu document which applies directly to the subject of this dissertation is Huang Ailing’s Zhongguo yinni guanxishi jianbian [A Concise History of Relations between China

37 Zhang, Link, and Nathan, 468.
38 Xie Yixian, ed., 1.
39 Xie Yixian, ed., 678 and passim.
and Indonesia]. Also in his separate, unpublished, manuscript, which he gave me, Huang Ailing wrote

... a great many historians and journalists have written a great many theses, dissertations, treatises, papers, and commentaries on the subject of the September 30th affair, but up to now there are still many questions which have not been suitably clarified (dengqing): In reality, who was it actually that instigated the affair? Who was it really that gave the order to execute the six generals? Why did Sukarno suddenly go back on his word (biangua) and not go to Yogyakarta (after departing from Halim Air Force Base)? Also to be addressed are questions such as 'was the September 30th affair a trap (quantao) designed to dissipate (busha) the power of the PKI; was the Party baited (shanggou) by the affair,' and other questions. All of this can only be left for future historians to verify (kaozheng).

Huang Ailing's works are devoid of any reference to the Chinese Communist government and/or party ever having colluded with the PKI on the Indonesian Coup. He did tell me during a

40 Huang Ailing, Zhongguoyinni guanxi shijianbian [A Concise History of Relations between China and Indonesia], (Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1987), classified neibu faxing [for internal distribution only].

41 Huang Ailing, Yindunixiya xiandaishi gaishu 1904-1990 [Outline of Indonesian Contemporary History, 1904-1990], (Beijing: n.p., n.d., unpublished manuscript, written between 1991 and 1996), 29. During an interview with Huang Ailing, in his apartment in Beijing, on August 16, 1996, in addition to giving me a copy of his unpublished manuscript, he made clear to me that these questions about Gestapu would have to be answered before conclusions about the PRC's role in Gestapu could be made clear. With the advent of the Reform regime in Jakarta following the ouster of President Suharto and the New Order government, information is now (in the early 2000s) coming to light in regard to Huang Ailing's questions. Both Soebandrio and Latief are major contributions toward the search for these answers.

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personal interview that in his view, Cultural Revolution activism (by Yao Denshan and others) in Jakarta accounted for a large portion of the blame for loss of diplomatic relations between the two nations. He stated that the times that Indonesian foreign ministry personnel met with Yao Dengshan and others to advise the Chinese embassy personnel to avoid antagonizing Indonesian demonstrators around Chinese diplomatic facilities, the Indonesian diplomats were met with Chinese Cultural Revolution activism in the form of shouted Red Guard slogans, waving around the Little Red Books posting of Mao’s portrait and other unruly activities.\footnote{Huang, Personal interview.} The Indonesian foreign ministry officials were not able to prevent Yao Dengshan and other Chinese diplomatic personnel from antagonizing Indonesian demonstrators gathered around Chinese diplomatic facilities.\footnote{New York Times, 17 April, 1966: 3; New York Times, “Indonesian troops force 4 Chinese Aides to retreat into the Chinese embassy when they stepped outside with placards attacking the Indonesian government” 7 Oct. 1967: 8; Kompas, “Gedung Kedutaan Besar RRT Diserbu Setjara Mendadak” [The PRC Embassy Facilities Come under Sudden Attack], 2 Oct. 1967: 1.}

Because of Huang Ailing’s special expertise gained as a Chinese person born and raised in Indonesia, coupled with his special position as the Director, Southeast Asia Section, China Broadcasting, his views on the breakdown of relations, as laid out in his neibu volume, his unpublished manuscript, and our interview, merit examination. He lays out a sequence of events
which led to increasingly worsening relations. First the Chinese embassy refused to fly their flag at half mast in honor of the six murdered Indonesian generals.44 Xinhua She (New China News Agency) criticism of the news article in the Indonesian Army Newspaper Angkatan Bersenjata (Lujun jiguang bao), which scolded China, created the beginning of soured relations (yinni he Zhongguode guanxi kaishi eluan).45 The second stage of declining relations was wrought, among other things, by increasing criticism by the Indonesian media against China and Chinese people, which in turn incited more anti-Chinese violence.46 Indonesian destructive attacks on Chinese facilities and the wounding and murdering of overseas Chinese (huaqiao) brought the relations to a critical stage.47 Huang Ailing states "On April 7, 1966, Chinese ambassador to Indonesia, Yao Zhongming left Jakarta to return to China to report on his work (shuzhi), from that point on China did not post an ambassador [that is, a diplomat of ambassadorial rank] in Indonesia."48

44 Huang, Zhongguo, 100.
45 Huang, Zhongguo, 100.
46 Huang, Zhongguo, 101.
47 Huang, Zhongguo, 102.
48 Huang, Zhongguo, 102. One year prior to the Cultural Revolution recall of ambassadors, Ambassador Yao Zhongming returned to China from Jakarta. By April 1967, radical elements in the Chinese foreign ministry were forcibly ordering
The next stage of worsening relations is a rather startling event in terms of international diplomacy

... after President Sukarno was reigned in, and Suharto became acting President, the Indonesian Ambassador to China, Chaheduo (Djawoto), on April 16, 1966, at a news conference for foreign and domestic journalists, held in Beijing, announced that he could no longer fulfill the responsibility of Indonesian Ambassador to China. During his announcement he said, "Because of the changes in Indonesian circumstances (qingkuang) and political situation which has caused the relationship between the two countries of Indonesia and China to deteriorate (ehua), I can no longer fulfill the responsibilities given to me by President Sukarno two years ago. The duties given to me by President Sukarno were primarily to continue to expand and unceasingly strengthen the friendly relations between the Republic of Indonesia and the People's Republic of China. The deterioration of relations between the two nations has been brought about by the events which occurred in Indonesia at the beginning of October [1965], for which the rightist faction in Indonesia is responsible." Djawoto's announcement clearly indicated the worsening of relations between the two countries, to the point of no turning back (niuzhuan).49

According to Huang Ailing the next stage of deteriorating relations was brought about by Indonesia's closure of the New China News Agency (NCNA) branch office in Jakarta on March 25, 1966.50 Following this, as Huang Ailing explains, the Army-inspired and protected student groups and right-wing factions

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49 Huang, Zhongguo, 101; see New York Times, April, 1966.
50 Huang, Zhongguo, 102.
carried out a series of attacks on Chinese diplomatic personnel and facilities throughout Indonesia.

During the period they attacked and forcibly occupied the Chinese Consulates in Medan, Macassar, and Banjarmasin, as well as the General Consulate in Jakarta, Chinese Foreign Service personnel were injured.\textsuperscript{51}

Huang Ailing next points out that the relations between China and Indonesia were worsened on April 15, 1966 by

Indonesian right-wing activists under the military's protection in a planned, large scale attack on the Chinese embassy, wounded diplomatic personnel, opened fire and wounded embassy worker Yue Xiaoshou and created a bloody (liuxue) affair.\textsuperscript{52}

Huang Ailing goes into further depth regarding the steps to broken relations between China and Indonesia summing up

From October 1965 to October 1967, during those two years, the Chinese embassy dispatched 60 diplomatic protests to the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This is rarely seen (hanjian) in the history of foreign affairs. China, from beginning to end, struggled against Indonesian anti-Chinese outbursts, and always avoided taking retaliatory actions, all in the hopes of possibly maintaining relations between the two nations [emphasis added].\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{51} Huang, Zhongguo, 102.

\textsuperscript{52} Huang, Zhongguo, 102.

\textsuperscript{53} Huang, Zhongguo, 102. It must be emphasized that these are the steps to a breakdown in relations between China and Indonesia as related by Huang Ailing in a PRC Government, classified (neibu), book. On the one hand, the neibu book would have been intended for Chinese government officials who needed to have this information as they approached reestablishment of relations with Indonesia in the early years (1987-1989). On the other hand it must be noted that Huang Ailing omits Yao Dengshan and other Cultural Revolution Red Guard activists' provocative behavior in Indonesia, as well as the effect Cultural Revolution
Another Chinese interpretation of the rupture in relations between China and Indonesia is found in a neibu classified book by New China News Agency reporter Zhang Haitao, Di sance baise kongbu (The Third White Terror).54

activist attacks on Foreign Minister Chen Yi, his subordinates and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing, would have had on China's relations with Indonesia. The need to look at both the Indonesian and the Chinese sides of this critical two year period in the history of relations between the two nations is the driving compulsion behind this dissertation.

54 Zhang Haitao, neibu faxing, marked with the seal guoji zhengzhixi (international political section), tushu ciliao (book material). The term baise kongbu means white (anti-Communist) Terror: The term "White Terror" comes out of the Russian Communist Revolution "there was also a White Terror, whose worst moment was the terrible wave of pogroms carried out in the Ukraine in the summer and autumn of 1919 by Simon Peltry's detachments from Denizens Armoire, which accounted for more than 150,000 victims." Courtois, et al., 82. "The White Terror most often was a series of reprisals by the police acting as sort of military counter-espionage force." The term baise kongbu (white terror) does not appear in either the Huang, Zhongguo; or in the Zhonggong dangshi. "White terror" in terms of the history of the Chinese Communist Party alludes to the Nationalists' decimation of the CCP beginning in Shanghai, during the Northern Expedition in 1927, and the Nationalists' extended attacks on the CCP during the first half of the 1930s, the KMT's Encirclement Campaign which eventually forced remnants of the CCP to flee for their very lives on the Long March, 1934-1935, to Yenan. The term "White terror" does appear in the Nationalist Zhongguo Chuban Gongs, 213. However, the Nationalist definition attributes the term to have been used by the Mao-Lin (Biao) group against the Liu (Xiaoqi), Deng (Xiaoping), Tao Zhu group to describe their actions taken to gain control of the Cultural Revolution. No help here. The term does not appear in the Chao Peng, ed., Wenhuadageming cidian [Dictionary of the Great Cultural Revolution], (Hong Kong: Ganglong chubanshe, 1993). William Whitson employs the term twice to describe Nationalist violence against Communists, and once, taken from a Red Guard poster, in 1968 "Changking, according to Red Guard posters, fell into a state of 'White Terror'," Whitson, et al., 28, 126, 392. Although Zhang Haitao
Zhang Haitao reports both on PKI high-level Party meetings in Indonesia and PKI leaders' meetings with government and communist party leaders in China from the late 1950s up to the Indonesian Coup in September/October 1965. Zhang Haitao also demonstrates exactly how the PKI went about formulating a party policy of peaceful political participation as the means by which the PKI would come to power in Indonesia. It was this policy that made the PKI so vulnerable to attack and decimation by the Indonesian Army following the September 30th failed coup.

The PKI first announced its intent to pursue a "peaceful, parliamentary road to power" (heping guodu, yihui daolu) in September 1959 at the Party's Sixth National Congress. Ricklefs, in discussing the period of the mid-to-late 1950s, doesn't explain the meaning of the term, it refers to the third time government forces attacked and crushed the PKI: November 1926-January 1927 by the Colonial Dutch Government; 1948 in the Madiun Affair; and 1965-1966 the Suharto-Army decimation of the PKI, the subject of Zhang Haitao's book Di sanci baise kongbu, and hence the title The Third White Terror. Zhang Haitao was a reporter, in Indonesia from 1963 to April 1966, with the New China News Agency; his first hand accounts of events of the period of the coup and counter coup are especially important. His interaction with the PKI from 1963 up to the attempted coup, September 30/October 1, 1965, and after, along with Huang Ailing's visits to Indonesia and his interaction with the PKI, both provide a rare insight into pre-coup PKI activities and programs.

55 Zhang Haitao, 18, 87, 133, 135-136, 167, 170-173, 180. For early meetings which Zhang researched and reported on see pages 137-142.

56 Zhang Haitao, 140-142.
points out "the strategy of seeking a peaceful parliamentary path to power by building an enormous mass membership was now so successful that it would be difficult for PKI to contemplate any other path." In a formal letter to President Sukarno, written on April 12, 1961, PKI Secretary General D. N. Aidit declared the Party's policy of using peaceful parliamentary means for its transition to power stating that the PKI's "objective for the present is to bring about a Peoples' Democracy, the next step will be to bring about a Socialist Society and later, a Communist Society." Indeed Zhang Haitao's view can be confirmed by Aidit's act of presenting his party platform before the vaunted SESKOAD, the Indonesian Army Command and Staff College at Bandung, mentioned earlier. Of all the places for him to air his program, the seat of army reactionary, opposition, activities, with key army leaders in attendance, this was probably not the wisest choice. On the other hand, Aidit demonstrated the PKI's conviction that the party had emerged, by 1964, as a viable force in the national political machinations so lively in Indonesia at that time. In a lengthy presentation, PKI Chairman Aidit laid out the progression the PKI planned to use to transition Indonesia

Hopefully the concept of 'Dwitunggal Rakjat dan Angkatan Bersendjata' (duumvirate of the people and

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57 Ricklefs, (1993), 249.

58 Zhang Haitao, 145.
the armed forces) will continue to blossom (berkembang) as the single absolute condition for the attainment of the goal of all the people of Indonesia; that is, continuing the national-democratic revolution as an absolute requirement which must be met before we can begin our further revolutionary task, namely building a socialist Indonesia. 59

From this point forward, the PKI expanded its commitment to a peaceful parliamentary path to power right up to the attack and obliteration of the Party by the Army beginning after Gestapu, September 30-October 1, 1965. Zhang Haitao lays out the many occasions on which Party leadership reiterated this policy:

As early as March, 1954, at the PKI's 5th National Party Congress the Party leadership passed provisions for the Party to seek transition to Socialism through parliamentary (yihui) means. The Congress reiterated that the PKI had not advocated bloodshed (liuxue) and Civil War as a requirement to bring Indonesia to Socialism. The PKI stated its intentions to follow a peaceful path to Socialism. 60

On June 27, 1956, at a PKI hearing committee, Chairman Aidit (in a talk which was later published) advocated that the Indonesian Communist Party should carefully deliberate the question of whether or not

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59 D. N. Aidit, Menko/Wakil Ketua MPRS dan Ketua CC PKI [Coordinating Minister/Senior Representative, National People's Consultative Council and Chairman of the Central Committee, PKI], Angkatan Bersenjata Dan Penjesuaian Kekuasaan Negara Dengan Tugas-tugas Revolusi (PKI dan Angkatan Darat-SESKOAD) [The Armed Forces and the Accommodation of National Power with the Duties of the Revolution (the PKI and the Armed Forces-SESKOAD)], II. A presentation to the Indonesian Army Command and General Staff College [Bandung], (Djakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1964), 61.

60 Zhang Haitao, 138.
Indonesia could transition to Socialism through Parliamentary means.\textsuperscript{61}

In June, 1956, at the PKI’s 4\textsuperscript{th} Plenum of the 5\textsuperscript{th} Party Congress, Chairman Aidit presented his paper “Unite and Carry Out the Demands and Struggles of the August, 1945 Revolution” (tuanjieqilai, shixian 1945 nian 8 Yue gemingde yaoqiu er fendou). At that time, the PKI was riding high on a wave of recent election victories the year prior, 1955.\textsuperscript{62}

At the PKI’s 6\textsuperscript{th} National Party Congress in September, 1959 in Djakarta, the Party decided on its mass line: continue to develop a popular mass front, continue to carry forward Party-building, and resolutely carry out the goals of August 1945 [the Party platform upon its reformation after World War II]. For the first time the PKI proclaimed its intention to pursue “a peaceful transition (heping guodu) and a parliamentary path (yihui daolu)” in its quest for a Socialist society. Party leader Lukman stated that the PKI’s policy decision was heavily influenced by proceedings at the Soviet 20\textsuperscript{th} Congress, held in Moscow, which heavily advocated the possibility of a peaceful road to socialism.\textsuperscript{63}

In 1961 President Sukarno formed a forum of 3 Ministers to formulate a slate for political parties in Indonesia. At the April 12, 1961 session PKI Chairman D. N. Aidit submitted a letter which conveyed the PKI’s platform: PKI objectives were to establish a Socialist society as an interim phase toward the final establishment of a Communist society, PKI objectives and the Republic of Indonesia’s founding principles and goals were not in contradiction, the PKI planned to transition to a people’s democracy, through a Socialist society to a Communist society, the PKI would use peaceful democratic means to attain its objectives.\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{61} Zhang Haitao, 137.

\textsuperscript{62} Zhang Haitao, 139.

\textsuperscript{63} Zhang Haitao, 140.

\textsuperscript{64} Zhang Haitao, 143.
PKI Chairman D. N. Aidit during a Party visit to the PRC in September, 1963, in a report to the Guangdong Party Institute on Issues of revolution in Indonesia stated that the “PKI leadership didn’t subscribe to the use of armed struggle as a means to achieve Indonesia’s ‘liberation’” as had been the case with China. Aidit pointed out significant differences between the two country’s pre-revolutionary situations: Indonesia is an island nation, Islam has widespread influence throughout the country, Indonesia did not have disruptive Warlord war-fighting as China had had. Thus, the PKI constructed the argument for a “peaceful" "Parliamentary" transformation to people’s democracy, thence to a socialist society and finally to a communist society. [At this point, the author, Zhang Haitao points out that] “as was clearly demonstrated upon Major General Suharto’s occupation (janling) of Jakarta [October 1965] PKI leadership in fact did not prepare at all to use armed revolution to oppose an armed counter revolution [Suharto-Army attacks on the PKI].”65

In 1964, the author Zhang Haitao, while a house guest of “a high-ranking PKI Central Committee leader,” in Jakarta, was told

Our Party works in an environment (huanjing) of peacefulness. But, we Communists are half in jail (jianju), half out. Yes, our Party, consisting of over 3,000,000 members is indeed a huge party. So, if the reactionaries [anti-PKI elements] want to make their move, they do not have prisons enough.66

As Zhang points out, that was a fatal miscalculation (gujide hen bugou) on the part of the PKI leadership.67

65 Zhang Haitao, 135-136.

66 Zhang Haitao, 133-134

67 Zhang Haitao, 134.
Could there be an instance wherein the PRC, if it had been involved in Gestapu, would actually divulge that information, either in public or in classified documents? Conversely, it would seem that, if China weren't involved in Gestapu, there would be no hesitation to deny accusations that it was involved. Another alternative is that the PRC simply chose not to dignify Indonesian military and student group accusations, of China's involvement in Gestapu, with any response at all.

Huang Ailing, writing from the position of a Chinese government official, in his book classified neibu faxing (limited distribution), emphatically states "China has never meddled (ganshe) in any nation's domestic affairs (neizheng), and had no connection whatsoever with the 'September 30th affair' (jiu sa shijian) which took place in Indonesia." 68 He goes on to talk about the number of years which have passed, the voluminous amount of material which has appeared on the subject, and a description of China's denial of involvement in Gestapu based on the logic of the PRC policy of maintaining sound relations with Indonesia. Huang Ailing's firm denial of PRC involvement in Gestapu, carried in a classified book, meant to

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68 Huang, Zhongguo, 105.

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be used by official China in its early stages of preparation to resume diplomatic relations with Indonesia, must be accorded some value of dependability. From a courtroom lawyer's standpoint it is easier for the prosecutor to prove the suspect committed a violation than it is for the defendant to prove that he/she did not commit a violation if, in fact, the suspect really didn't commit the violation. Evidence exists in the case of factual guilt. Where can evidence be found in the case of no factual guilt? How does one prove one didn't commit a violation one didn't commit? Where is the evidence?

One place to look for PRC acknowledgement of involvement in Gestapu would be in Chinese works dealing with Indonesia and directed toward an internal Chinese audience. A reading of a manuscript produced by the Indonesian language special project section of the Beijing University Eastern Languages Department reveals no acknowledgment of PRC involvement in the Gestapu affair.69 Also a reading of a later contemporary history by Sun Fusheng, published by Xiamen Daxue, reveals no admission of PRC involvement in Gestapu.70

69 Vinni minzu jiefang yundong jianshe (chugao) [A Concise History of Indonesia's National Revolutionary Movement (first draft)], manuscript, (Beijing: Beijing daxue dongyusi yinniyu zhuanye, 1972), for the Gestapu coup and countercoup period, see 123-166.

70 Sun Fusheng, Yindunixiya xiandai zhengzhi shigang [An Outline of the Contemporary Political History of Indonesia], (Xiamen: Xiamen daxue chubanshe, 1989), for specific coverage of Gestapu see 233-252.
Of even greater significance is a work in Chinese written in 1992, after reestablishment of relations between China and Indonesia, wherein, among other things the authors clearly deny any involvement by China in Gestapu.\textsuperscript{71} They make the point that China was able to successfully reestablish relations without having to admit to, much less apologize for, involvement in Gestapu, or promising not to interfere in Indonesia’s internal affairs, as originally required by Suharto as a precondition for resuming diplomatic relations.\textsuperscript{72}

Taking into consideration all of the sources (both written and person-to-person) examined for this dissertation, it has been found that substantial evidence of Chinese government or party involvement in Gestapu is unavailable. A search of government classified material from Chinese, U. S., and British government sources, as covered in the previous chapters of this

\textsuperscript{71} Wu Xiuhui and Yu Jinji, \textit{Yinni zongtong Suhatuo} [Indonesia’s President Suharto], (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1992), 107-108.

\textsuperscript{72} Wu and Yu, 107-108; and Departemen Luar Negeri, Suli Suleman, ed., \textit{Politik}, 28. For preconditions to recognition, Kompas, “Normalisasi Hubungan RI-RRC Paling Lampat Awal Tahun 1991” [Normalization of Relations Between RI-PRC Will Take Place in the Beginning of 1991 at the Latest], 7 Feb. 1990: 1; Kompas, “Cina Taruh Harapan Besar dari Kunjungan Ali Alatas” [China Draws Great Hope from (Foreign Minister) Ali Alatas’s Visit], 30 June 1990: 1; Jakarta Post, Editorial, “Importance of China Ties,” 9 Feb. 1990: 3, important is this editorial’s statement that “Bilateral relations between the two were frozen in 1967, as may be remembered, due to ‘internal’ developments in both countries.” This is a rare characterization by either side, and directly supports the hypothesis of this dissertation.
study, resulted in no findings of Chinese involvement in Gestapu. The declassified British Foreign Office correspondence, of the original collection of China Political Reports, held at the British Public Record Office and released under the 30-year retention rule, specifically addresses the period of this dissertation, 1965-67.\(^{73}\) As referred to earlier, and as examined for this chapter, there is no reference to PRC involvement in Indonesian affairs.

Examination of both the U. S. government's \textit{FRUS CHINA}, and the \textit{FRUS INDONESIA}, for the period 1964-68, revealed no reference to PRC involvement in Indonesian internal affairs.\(^{74}\) We do, however, again as mentioned earlier, have the U. S. CIA research study (1968) assessment that the CIA found no evidence of PRC involvement in Gestapu.\(^{75}\)

Taken altogether, the sources referred to above reveal both Chinese denial of involvement in Gestapu, or omission of evidence of China's involvement in Gestapu. Jakarta's accusation that China was involved, along with the PKI, in Gestapu, stands unsubstantiated. The Suharto government's use of that accusation as one justification for the freeze in relations with Beijing was not adequately justified.

\(^{73}\) Jarman, China, vol. 3.

\(^{74}\) \textit{FRUS INDONESIA}; \textit{FRUS CHINA}.

\(^{75}\) USCIA, \textit{Indonesia 1965}, 289.
CHAPTER 8
THE INDONESIAN STUDENT MOVEMENT AND SUPPORTING INDONESIAN ARMY
ACTIVITIES THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE BREAKDOWN IN RELATIONS
BETWEEN INDONESIA AND CHINA

The student organizations, KAMI (Kasatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia-Indonesian Student Action Front-Universities) and KAPPI (Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda dan Pelajar Indonesia-Indonesian Youth and Student Action Front) and their affiliates played key roles in the Suharto-army gradual takeover of national power and authority from the Sukarno government between 1965 and 1968. Political pressure brought about by KAMI and KAPPI demonstrations against, and attacks on, Chinese people and facilities (both domestic and foreign, in-country) played less clear, but still key roles in the eventual breakdown in Indonesia’s relations with China.

Dr. H. Subandrio, former Sukarno Cabinet minister and minister of foreign affairs, jailed for three decades by the Suharto government relates

In order to counteract—even more to paralyze (melumpuhkan)—Bung Karno’s [Sukarno’s] power, Soeharto set the students in motion . . . toward the end of October 1965 in Brigadier General Syarif Thayeb’s-[sic] quarters KAMI was formed as ordered by Soeharto. From then on student demonstrations, supported by the military (didukung oleh tentara), continually critically attacked President Sukarno.¹

¹ Soebandrio, 85. Reference is to the hard-cover bound copy of Soebandrio’s book which was earlier withdrawn from
The ever-more frequent KAMI demonstrations, directed and supported by the Indonesian military, placed extremely heavy pressure on Sukarno, his cabinet and his government. R. E. Elson goes so far as to say

The student movement originally energized in Bandung but increasingly centered around the Medical Faculty in Salemba [Jakarta], was a crucial element in broadening public debate beyond the 1 October events and the role of the PKI to one of the Sukarno government's management of State affairs. Thereafter it became the focus and vehicle for political change, without it, it is difficult to see how Suharto might have maneuvered his way around an increasingly aggressive president [Sukarno].

The power of the student movement also played a key role in bringing about a crisis in Indonesia's relations with China, as will be shown below. The pervasive effectiveness of student movement demonstrations and attacks in toppling Sukarno and breaking down relations with China deserve more study and attention. There seems to be a distinctly discernable tendency on the part of those who write about the Indonesian years 1965 to 1967 to minimize, or even, to overlook, the decisive role played by KAMI, KAPPI, and affiliated student groups. In some publication, and then scheduled to be published by the Gramedia Company in Jakarta, also see Elson, 372. Indonesian sources, to remain anonymous, state that it was too risky (politically, economically and even physically) for any publisher to put its name on the book, even two years after Suharto left office.

2 Elson, 130.

3 There were many associated groups under the umbrella of KAMI, Ridwan Saidi, Kelompok Cipayung, HMI-GMKI-PMKRI-GMNI-PMII:
cases it appears that assumptions are made that the
demonstrations and attacks were spontaneous manifestations of
widespread, generalized student dissatisfaction with the
political and economic situation of Indonesia at that time.4
There is a general inclination to view the Indonesian student
movement as like unto the student movements in the U.S.,
occurring during the same years, as a sincere natural reaction
to objectionable political and economic conditions created by
government ineptness, deceit, and wrongdoing. As the present
study demonstrates, the Indonesian student movement was planned,
supplied, directed, orchestrated, and, even, protected by
Suharto and associates, along with the army, to be used as a
weapon to attack and defeat the Sukarno regime and any opponents
to the Suharto regime -- the Orde Baru—the New Order. In fact,

Analsis Gerakan Mahasiswa Pasca Aksi Tritura 1966 [The Cipayung
Group, HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam-Muslim Students’
Association)—GMKI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia—
Indonesian Christian Students’ Movement)—PMKRI (Perhimpunan
Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia—Association of Catholic
Students of the Republic of Indonesia)—GMNI (Gerakan Mahasiswa
Nasional Indonesia—National Indonesian Students’ Movement)—PMII
(Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia—The Indonesian Islamic
Students’ Movement): Analysis of the Collective Movement and
Thought of Student Mass Movements in the Era of Tritura (Tri
Tuntutan Rakyat—the People’s Three Demands) 1966], (Jakarta:
Lembaga Studi Informasi Pembangunan [LSIP], 1993). Not all the
members of these groups were students. As will be pointed out
as this chapter continues, non-student adults, and even
Indonesian military personnel, in mufti, were known to have
participated in student demonstrations and other activities.

4 May, 131; Challis, 108; Brackman, 98-103; Justus M. Van
der Kroef, The Sino-Indonesian Rupture, (New York American-Asian
there are startling parallels with the way in which the Chinese Red Guard student movement was planned, directed and orchestrated by the Maoist-affiliated group (Mao, Jiang Qing, Chen Boda, and, especially, Kang Sheng, Wang Li, Yao Dengshan, and associates) to attack and defeat their perceived enemies. In both cases the student movements, which were generated for domestic use, also played key roles in bringing about the breakdown in relations between China and Indonesia. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that the creation and use of both student movements came about in response to purely domestic requirements, and not in response to any foreign affairs issues.

THE GENESIS OF KAMI

Major General Suharto, Commander of KOSTRAD, the Indonesian Army Strategic Corps, arranged for his subordinate, Colonel Sarwo Edhie, Commander of RPKAD, the Army's Rapid Response Force, to coordinate with key university student leaders such as Lien Bian Khoen (Sofya Wanandi, Jusuf Wanandi's brother), Cosmas Batubara, Nono Anwar Makarim, and others to form KAMI and to develop the political platform known as
Tritura.\textsuperscript{5} Tritura (Tri Tuntunan Rakyat) [Three Demands of the People] called for 1) Banning the PKI, 2) Ridding the Presidential Cabinet of remnants of the PKI, 3) Bringing down commodity prices.\textsuperscript{6}

Former Indonesian First Deputy Premier, and Foreign Minister Dr. H. Subandrio, describes how Suharto and ABRI formed KAMI to be used as a weapon, a tool, to attack the Sukarno regime. One of the methods which Subandrio outlines is important to understanding just how Major General Suharto, Commander Kostrad, and promptly promoted to three stars on October 14, 1965 (thirteen days after the Gestapu failed coup attempt) was able eventually to topple President Sukarno. According to Subandrio, Suharto was able to engineer sharp rises in the price of market goods, rice, oil, sugar, because his long-time allies, Indonesian-Chinese businessmen Liem Sioe Liong and The Kian Seng ("Bob" Hasan), both of whom controlled the wholesale purchase and distribution of daily necessity market goods, manipulated prices.\textsuperscript{7} Lest this seem rather unimportant in the context of the subject, it needs to be pointed out that during that decade in the life of Jakarta working families engaged in the manufacturing sector "an average of 95.83 per

\textsuperscript{5} Saidi and Sanit, 78-79.

\textsuperscript{6} Dwipayana and Sjamsuddin, eds., 39.

\textsuperscript{7} Soebandrio, 85-86.

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cent of expenditure was on consumption 'in order to live'... 60.0 per cent was on food, of which 49.12 per cent was on rice alone."^8

As prices rose precipitously, Suharto and ABRI set the students to demonstrate widely against the Sukarno government for failure to control the economy and keep prices low. And the artificially created commodity shortages, brought about by Liem and Hasan, kept prices high and disturbed the Indonesian populace, who then responded favorably to KAMI's agitation to have the Sukarno government fulfill Tritura demand number three, bring down prices of daily necessities. Subandrio, a primary Cabinet Minister to Sukarno at the time states

... in my estimation, only a portion of those students who demonstrated did so out of a motivation of feeling strangled (tercekik) by high prices of daily necessities. The students were not run-of-the-mill (awam) people; they were not children. Most of them clearly knew that prices of daily necessities skyrocketed (melajit) as a result of Soeharto's engineering of price changes. They were intellectuals who followed developments in their country. But, their movement was supported by the military and the people, two main forces in society, to the point where most knew the real conditions, but were afraid to go against the current (menentang arus). All were clearly looking out for their own

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^8 Hindley, 16. While these figures were based on surveys done by the Ministries of Labor and Health in 1957, "the ministry's report, written in 1959, added that 'it can be estimated that the present situation is already very different and is becoming worse.'" The economy of Indonesia only worsened as it moved into the 1960s.

^9 Soebandrio, 85-86; Crouch, 164-167.
well-being. They were forced to go with the flow (terpaksa terbawa arus) and against the [Sukarno] government.¹⁰

Once organized, the student demonstrations erupted in quick succession, aimed at different targets. Ridwan Saidi claims “January 10, 1966, became known as ‘the day of student awakening’ because that was the day the students hardened their attitude toward the [Sukarno] government.”¹¹ From that point the students engaged in a series of demonstrations and attacks as recorded by Yozar Anwar, one of the KAMI leaders:¹²

February 23, 1966: KAMI demonstration at the Presidential Palace in Jakarta to protest the new Cabinet. They were intercepted by the Palace Guard, the Cakrabirawa Regiment, and fired upon. Eight people were wounded.

February 24, 1966: A massive KAMI demonstration returned again to the Jakarta Palace. They interrupted traffic and caused vehicles to be stopped by flattening tires, all with the objective of preventing the [Sukarno] Cabinet from going into session. The attempt failed because the Ministers flew to the Palace by helicopter. Two students were killed (tewas) and eleven were wounded.

February 25, 1966: Arif Rachman Hakim, Ph.D. candidate, University of Indonesia, killed near the Palace, was laid to rest today.

March 3, 1966: After KAMI was banned [by Sukarno], then rose KAPPI [Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia] to take over demonstrations. The target was the Minister of Education and Culture (Menteri P

¹⁰ Subandrio, 87-88.

¹¹ Saidi and Sanit, 86.

¹² Saidi and Sanit, 86-88.
March 8, 1966: Student demonstrations were directed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Departemen Luar Negeri). Tear gas was used against the students and they responded by breaking into the Ministry building, destroying the interior contents, tearing up materials and so forth [emphasis added].

March 10, 1966: Demonstration at the Chinese (PRC) Consulate. Students burned down the Hsin Hua [Xin Hua News Agency] building [emphasis added].

March 11, 1966: President Sukarno relinquished his power to General Soeharto with the formal document to become known as Supersemar [Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret—The Presidential Letter of Authorization of 11 March].

March 12, 1966: General Soeharto took immediate steps to ban the PKI, something that President Soekarno always refused to do.

March 18, 1966: General Soeharto arrests many “yesmen” such as Foreign Minister Dr. Subandrio, Economics Minister Chairul Saleh, Information Minister Major General Achmadi and many other Ministers.

Following these steps, a new path opened for General Soeharto and he formed a new Cabinet together with Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX and Adam Malik, later to become known as the Triumverate.

This chronological rendering of events, related in a book directed toward an Indonesian readership, succinctly lays out the symbiotic relationship between KAMI/KAPPI activist demonstrations and attacks, and the ascension to power of (then) Lieutenant General Suharto as he whittled away at the power of President Sukarno and his cabinet ministers. While the destructive student attacks on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs along with Suharto’s arrest of Foreign Affairs Minister Dr. Subandrio who was known to be a PKI sympathizer.
Subandrio can be viewed as part of an internal Indonesian struggle for power, the effects were manifested far beyond Indonesia itself. As described earlier in this study, the damage went beyond the ransacking of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Ministry Personnel were attacked, arrested, interrogated, imprisoned and replaced. The Foreign Affairs establishment of Indonesia was in total disarray around the same time (1966-67) when the Foreign Affairs establishment of China was confronting a startlingly similar fate as it faced increasingly virulent domestic assaults during China's Cultural Revolution. Both nations' Foreign Affairs establishments, in such unprecedented disarray, would play pervasively deleterious roles in the progressively deteriorating relations between Indonesia and China up to the complete breakdown in relations in October 1967 (see Appendices B and C for chronological and descriptive detail).

The various demonstrations and attacks delineated above were followed by numerous others during the remainder of 1966 and during 1967. This series of student demonstrations and attacks can be seen, as described above, as having been chiefly instrumental in bringing Lieutenant General Suharto (to be promoted to full general-four stars-in July, 1966, ten months after the failed Gestapu coup) to the point where he was able to cow President Sukarno into handing over defacto power to Suharto as conveyed through the instrument of the presidential letter,
Supersemar, on March 11, 1966. This enabled Lieutenant General Suharto to use the power of his position; as the armed forces commander to begin the path to his assumption of full power in the course of the next two years, to the point where he was appointed President of Indonesia by the Parliament on March 27, 1968. It is to be noted that Lieutenant General Suharto’s first move (within 24 hours) after he gained decisive power through Supersemar was to declare a ban on the PKI. After banning the PKI on March 12, 1966, Lieutenant General Suharto’s next major move, four days later, March 16, was to issue an

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13 The very term Supersemar relates to one theme of this dissertation: the heavy influence of the traditional Wayang Play upon the political events played out in Indonesia between October 1965 and the freeze in relations with China in October 1967. Ricklefs, (1993), 287, notes “With allusion to Semar, the most powerful God-Clown of the Javanese Wayang theatre, this document was called Supersemar (from Surat Perintah Seblas Maret, 11 March letter of instruction).” If Semar, the most powerful God-Clown known to the great masses of Indonesians because of their immersion in the Wayang scripts was seen as so powerful, certainly Supersemar would be reckoned as so much more powerful. It is not known whether or not the Suharto group intentionally selected that day, Seblas Maret-11 March, for its almost supernatural impact conveyed by the term Supersemar, or whether the choice was purely coincidental. In any case, the symbolism was extremely effective and rendered a further aura of power to Suharto.

14 Dwipayana and Sjamsuddin, eds., 267. This book, compiled by the Indonesian Presidential Documentation Team, describes the historical sequence of key events in Suharto’s accession to power between October 1, 1965 and March 27, 1968.

order to arrest fifteen members of President Sukarno's Cabinet (Kabinet Dwikora); Dr. Subandrio, First Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs was first on the list to be arrested.16 As R. E. Elson describes it

Bolder than any of this [banning of the PKI and other actions], however, was Suharto's move on 18 March, under pressure from students and radical army elements to arrest fifteen members of the so-called reformed Dwikora [Sukarno] Cabinet, on the basis of their being suspected of playing a role in the coup attempt or on the grounds of corruption. Sukarno had strongly resisted army attempts to reshape his Cabinet, but the dramatic arrests showed how quickly his real authority was ebbing in the wake of Supersemar. Nonetheless, Suharto was careful not to push "to behead the man who had once been his 'king,'" and probably did not judge it a 'realistic' or even desirable option at that time.17

Two aspects of this statement by R. E. Elson beg closer examination. First, the statement that Suharto acted "under pressure from students and radical army elements." This present study shows that Suharto and his affiliates controlled the student groups. The characterization might have more accurately described Suharto as having used the student groups as a reason

16 Dwipayana and Sjamsuddin, eds., 58.

17 Elson, 139. Both Professor Elson and Yozar Anwar use the 18th day of March; official Indonesian sources, as used just above, herein, place the date of arrest as March 16, 1966. It is understandable that Elson and Anwar would use the 18th instead of the 16th, because the public announcement of the arrests was done, and the official document was dated, the 18th -- for a copy of the official document, signed by Lieutenant General Suharto in the name of President Sukarno, see Yozar Anwar, Protes Kaum Muda! [Student Group Protests!], (Jakarta: PT Variasi Jaya-Kartini Group, 1982), 228-230.
for acting. Also, as this dissertation shows, Suharto and his colleagues had, by March 1966, already purged the army of any and all opposition; they had the army under their full control.\(^{18}\) Again the idea of "radical army elements" would have been used as only another excuse to act.

Secondly, Professor Elson's phrase that Cabinet members were arrested "on the basis of their being suspected of playing a role in the coup attempt or on the grounds of corruption" needs to be examined. As demonstrated in this study, substantive evidence has not been made available since 1966 to confirm suspicions of coup involvement or corruption on the part of Dwikora [Sukarno] Cabinet members, especially Foreign Minister Subandrio. Examination of memoirs of Dr. Subandrio and Colonel Latief, of Court proceedings, of Suharto's own autobiography, and of the many other sources used herein, show a dearth of convincing evidence to support suspicion of coup involvement or corruption.\(^{19}\)

\(^{18}\) Herbet Feith, "Political Control, Class Formation and Legitimacy in Suharto's Indonesia," in Christine Doran, ed., 221-222.

\(^{19}\) Most revealing are the denials by Soebandrio, and by Latief. Suharto's own Soeharto, Pikiran Ucapan, does not present evidence to substantiate any of the fifteen ministers' involvement in Gestapu nor of the corruption of any of the Ministers. Other works consulted also do not produce evidence of the fifteen ministers' involvement in Gestapu or their corruption. P. Bambang Siswoyo, Menelusuri Peran Bung-Karno Dalam G30S-PKI [Investigation of the Role of Comrade [Su]Karno in G30S-PKI], (Jakarta: U.D. Mayasari Publishers, 1989), provides exhaustive detail on various ministers, especially
FORMATION AND ROLES OF ARMY-SUPPORTED INDONESIAN STUDENT GROUPS

The primary student group, KAMI, was formed by coordinated efforts between Indonesian army officers and key student leaders; not all of the leaders were actually students. Three of the top leaders of KAMI were Indonesian-Chinese: Liem Bian Subandrio's, activities and testimony, yet does not produce evidence of coup involvement or corruption. The key work by Boerhan and Soebekti, also fails to provide reliable evidence of the fifteen ministers' coup involvement or of their corruption. There are many written works about the subject of complicity in Gestapu, but they do not produce convincing support of the accusations of the ministers' involvement in Gestapu, let alone Sukarno's or the PKI's involvement, and certainly no convincing evidence of China's involvement in Gestapu. An even later work casts suspicion on the very process of prosecuting those supposed to have been involved, Sudisman, *Pleidi Sudisman & Statement Politiknya Menyongsong Eksekusi* [Sudisman's Defense and Political Statement Opposing His Execution], (Place of Publication not named: Pustaka Pena, 2001). This is a publication of Sudisman's own written defense before the Military Tribunal, done prior to his execution in 1968, and only now coming into the public realm. Sudisman was a member of the PKI Politburo.

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20 Soe Hok Gie, *Catatan Seorang Demostran* [A Demonstrator's Notes], (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial, 1989), 41-43. Also, see Part V, the same title. This book, written for Indonesian readership, provides a detailed, first-hand account of the Indonesian student movement and its relationship with the Indonesian Army and University faculty. Particularly important are Soe's record of his student group (COR, later called Rombongan Sastra—the Sastra Group) confrontation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and, later, at Foreign Minister Subandrio's home (196 and 197). Soe also provides a first-hand account of his stay at the East-West Center, Mānoa, Honolulu, Hawai'i; or as Soe called it UNHA-Universitas Hawai'i (224-234). Soe, like some of the other student leaders, was of Chinese descent (*keturunan Cina*).
Khoen (Sofya Wanandi), his brother Liem Bian Kie (Jusuf Wanandi), and Soe Hok Gie.  

These Indonesian-Chinese students, along with other student leaders, led their student groups in demonstrations against, and attacks on, Chinese diplomatic facilities and personnel, called for severance of relations with China, and led the demonstrations, attacks, and ransacking of Foreign Minister Subandrio’s Foreign Ministry. As Dipodisastro describes the attack:

During March 7 and 8, 1966, the demonstrators took to the streets even more. Masses of high school students (pelajar) occupied the Education and Culture Ministry building on Merdeka Timur Road; later that building was made the headquarters of KAPPI. After that, university and high school students attacked (menyerbu) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on Pejambon Road, where Subandrio had his office. Soebandrio, widely known as a slanderer (tukang

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21 For lists of student leaders see Saidi and Sanit, 50, 253-254 and for a photo of eight key leaders at a demonstration on February 1, 1967, see 79. For Soe Hok Gie’s assessment of Indonesian-Chinese of his own generation see Catatan Seorang Demostran, 129-131.

22 Dwipayana and Sjamsuddin, eds., 45, 51, 61, 66-67, 73. This book, assembled by the “President’s [Suharto] Documentation Team” completely leaves out the month of March, 1966, in which, among other things, Sukarno, having granted Supersemar to [by then] Lieutenant General Suharto (March 11), Suharto’s order to ban the PKI (March 12), and Suharto’s arrest of the 15 Cabinet members (March 16). This is a clear case of the Suharto regime’s publication of revisionist history. For the attack and ransacking of the MFA (also left out of Dwipayana) see below and earlier descriptions in this study and those sources. For a more detailed discussion of the historiography of the Suharto-New Order regime, see Razif Bahari, "Remembering History, W/Righting History: Piecing the Past in Pramoedya Ananta Toer’s Buru Tetralogy," Indonesia 75 April, 2003: 61-90.
fitnah) and dubbed a trouble-maker (Durno) was not there. With that the anger of the masses was unleashed in a frenzy of burning and destruction of the premises, accompanied by scattering of documents in a search for facts pointing to Soebandrio’s involvement [keterlibatan-presumably in Gestapu, possibly with the PKI]. Despite the pushing, shoving and use of tear gas by the security forces, the demonstrators were able to break through the ring of guards. The students temporarily occupied the Pancasila Hall after they successfully infiltrated the Ministry building.23

Available sources do not reveal the rationale for KAMI’s vituperative demonstrations against and attacks upon Chinese diplomatic facilities and personnel. The attacks took place over the entire two year period from shortly after Gestapu, October, 1965, to the break in relations, October, 1967. The KAMI platform provides little reason to support KAMI’s call for the (at first the Sukarno and, later, the Suharto) government to sever relations with China. In the end, in October, 1967, the Indonesian (Suharto) government took the less severe step of freezing (membekukan) relations with China rather than severing (memutuskan) relations; a very important level of difference in the world of international diplomacy, as pointed out earlier.

While KAMI continually militated for severance, in the end the Suharto government only froze, not severed, relations.

23 Dipodisastro, 92, for a photo of the students in the attack on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs grounds, facing a security guard with drawn pistol and a bayonet in hand, 93. The caption beneath the photo lists the various student groups as the Arief Rachman Regiment, with support from KAPPI, KAPI and a contingent of demonstrators from the City of Bandung.
The Suharto-ABRI group directed the activities of KAMI, as already shown earlier here, beginning with Major General (later Lieutenant General) Suharto’s early declaration that the PKI was responsible for the September 30 coup attempt.\textsuperscript{24}

While Major General Suharto declared the PKI to have masterminded the coup, he did not implicate Indonesian-Chinese, Chinese expatriates, or the PRC as having been involved in the September 30-October 1 coup attempt.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{24} Soeharto, Soeharto, Pikiran Ucapan, 100-101. The two texts differ. The Indonesian version (1989) states “Mereka mengadakan gerakan kup untuk merebut kekuasaan negara secara paksa” (They [coup participants] are carrying out this coup movement in order to attain national power by the use of force), 121. Suharto goes on to state “Dan pasti didalangi PKI.” (And certainly it was masterminded by the PKI.), 121. The English language version, Soeharto, Suharto, states “They have staged a coup to seize power by force. The PKI is definitely behind it.” 101. Suharto provides no evidence to substantiate his conviction that the PKI masterminded the attempted coup; a statement he made at a 9 O’clock staff meeting on 1 October, five hours after the coup was determined to have begun. A growing crescendo of accusations against the PKI emanated from this point forward. In keeping with a theme of this dissertation that political actions in Indonesia are heavily influenced by the scenarios of Wayang plays (the earlier example of Supersemar is cited) the very term didalangi (masterminded by) has as its root the “dalang—the narrator and puppeteer of traditional shadow plays”, Echols and Shadily, 129. This dictionary is absolutely indispensable as a tool for translation from Indonesian to English.

\textsuperscript{25} Soeharto, Soeharto: Pikiran Ucapan, 100-101, both the Indonesian and the English language versions of Suharto. While he describes student graffiti condemning Foreign Minister Subandrio as a “Peking dog”, and student attacks on the Chinese embassy (138, 140 English version, 161, 164 Indonesian version), he does not implicate Indonesian-Chinese, Chinese expatriates, nor the PRC as having been involved in the coup. As mentioned earlier, Suharto was critically dependent on Liem Soe Liong and Bob Hassan, two Indonesian-Chinese, and their associates, for
There are no indications that General, later President, Suharto intended, as a policy initiative, to break relations with China. Earlier in this study it was shown that he publicly declared that Indonesia should continue its relations with China. Suharto has not addressed the subject of relations with China in his autobiography. He makes a single reference "our ties with the People's Republic of China did not improve [by the summer of 1967]. Instead we recalled our embassy staff from Peking because of an insult directed at us at the height of the Cultural Revolution there." While he went into exhaustive detail on other subjects (Japanese worldview, countercoup activities, his national policy formulation, and other topics) he did not reveal any information about a topic of major importance to Indonesia and Southeast Asia, Indonesia's freeze of relations with China.

his financial and economic arrangements from the time he was a mere major in the Diponegoro Division continually right through to when he left office in 1998. We have also seen that Suharto was dependent on, in part, the three key Indonesian-Chinese student leaders, Liem Bian Kie and his brother, Liem Bian Khoen, and Soe Hok Gie to provide mass organizational support from student groups. General Suharto's reliance on these Indonesian-Chinese would be in direct contradiction to any policy of anti-Chinese activism on his part.

26 Soeharto, Suharto, 169 (English language copy), Soeharto, Soeharto, Pikiran Ucapan, 200 (Indonesian language copy). Apparently the "insult" (penghinaan, more correctly translated as "humiliation") is probably the Red Guard attack on the Indonesian Embassy and diplomatic personnel, staff and family members, and subsequent ransacking and burning of the Chancellery, which took place in Beijing in August, 5-10, 1967.
Student (KAMI and KAPPI) attacks on Chinese diplomatic facilities and personnel continued during 1966 and 1967. The purpose of student attacks seemed designed more for domestic consumption than as a political move toward China itself. J. A. C. Mackie makes clear that attacks on China's Embassy and consulates "served the anti-Communists' purpose of either forcing Sukarno to yield to their pressure or revealing his inability to resist it."27 If the purpose of attacks on PRC diplomatic facilities and personnel was to force Sukarno's hand, the tool used was the student movement—KAMI, KAPPI and other lesser, related, groups.

STUDENT GROUP ACTIVITIES STRENGTHEN GENERAL SUHARTO'S HAND

The process of formation of the student groups, as well as their activities, becomes important in understanding their role in strengthening General Suharto's hand against President Sukarno, their role in toppling the PKI, and their role in

27 Mackie in Mackie, ed., 112.
bringing about the breakdown in Indonesia's relations with China.28 Ridwan Saidi relates

... the growth of this [a new generation student activist movement] came about after the failed PKI coup d' etat of 30 September, 1965. By 25 October of that year also, Major General Sjarif Thayeb, Minister of Higher Education and Science (RTIP) gathered together leaders of various student organizations such as the Muslim Students' Association (HMI), the Indonesian Islamic Students' Movement (PMII), the Republic of Indonesia Association of Catholic Students (PMKRI), the Indonesian Christian Students' Movement (GMKI), the Secretariat for Local Students Organizations (SOMAL), the Indonesian Socialist Student Pioneers (PELMASI), Students of Pancasila (the five principles) MAPANCAS, and the Indonesian Student Press Association (IPMI), all brought together to form an Anti-Communist Indonesian Student Organization. The Indonesian Student Action Front (KAMI), endorsed by the military (tentara), was born from that gathering. Such an organization, run by activist students, was more coordinated and easier to lead. Throughout 1966 KAMI conducted a number of public demonstrations and thereby gained the support of the Indonesian people. KAMI also capitalized on the strength of the Indonesian Youth and Student Action Front (KAPPI). Support for KAPPI was for strategic reasons, because their comparative ages were much younger, the straightforwardness (kepolosan) of their movement psychologically

reinforced the tactic of taking control over the main thoroughfares of the Capital.\textsuperscript{29}

Saidi goes on to point out that the Indonesian army protected the students from pro-communist groups, and that KAMI maintained the closest of relations with army leaders to include Colonels H. R. Dharsono, Kemal Idris, and Sarwo Edhi.\textsuperscript{30} R. E. Elson takes the position that these three army officers, along with some others, were "the so-called New Order radicals," who "wanted to see the complete destruction of civilian-dominated party politics."\textsuperscript{31} The students developed a sobriquet for these three army officers who liaised directly with the various student groups:

Many of those active in the early movements in 1966 have emerged, changed greatly and met with success since then. For example the three who were known as the "K-S-D" trio or "Kemal Idris-Sarwo Edhie-Dharsono". Kemal Idris and Dharsono are now [1980] retired Lieutenant generals. Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, now a Lieutenant General in the TNI, had gone on to be the Ambassador to South Korea and Inspector General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{32}

The political platform of the student movement, endorsed by the Indonesian army, was called "Tritura," \textit{Tri Tuntunan Rakyat} - Three Demands of the People. The three demands were:

\textsuperscript{29} Saidi and Sanit, 75.

\textsuperscript{30} Saidi and Sanit, 77.

\textsuperscript{31} Elson, 163.

\textsuperscript{32} Yozar Anwar, \textit{Angkatan 66: Sebuah Catatan Harian Mahasiswa} [Generation 66: A Student Diary], (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1980), viii.
1) Ban the PKI, 2) Purge the (President Sukarno's) Cabinet, and 3) Bring down market prices of daily necessities (rice, cooking oil, sugar, gas, etc.); in the Indonesian language: 1) Bubarkan PKI, 2) Retool [rombak-reorganize] Kabinet, and 3) Turunkan Harga.33

But Tritura was KAMI's public platform, designed to rouse the Indonesian masses to support student demonstrations and attacks. The students' less public platform was not propagated to the general population, and had, at base, unremitting opposition to President Sukarno and his government as well as to the PKI. Daniel Dhakidae describes a manifesto designed by Professor Sumitro Djodjohadikusumo, who at the time, in 1961, was the Minister of Finance in Sukarno's Burhanuddin Cabinet, and which manifesto was later used as the basis for the student movement's platform, and referred to as "the movement to renew Indonesia" (Gerakan Pembaharuan Indonesia).34

Sumitro's manifesto among other things accuses Sukarno and his government of being dictatorial and of not having the best

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33 Saidi and Sanit, 86. A later source describes Colonel Sarwo Edhie's role in developing Tritura through his assigned interaction with the students; Martha, Ahmaddani G., Christianto Wibosono and Yozar Anwar, Pemuda Indonesia Dalam Dimensi Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa [The Youth of Indonesia in the Historical Dimensions of the People's Struggle], (Jakarta: Yayasan Sumpah Pemuda, 1984).

34 Daniel Dhakidae, "Soe Hok Gie, Sang Demonstran," in Saidi and Sanit, eds., 41-42.
interests of the Indonesian people as the basis for Sukarno’s
Guided Democracy, and as Daniel Dhakidae relates

... the manifesto above was signed by Prof. Sumitro
himself who at once (serentak) became the key leader
of the renewal movement. That movement itself had
several programs, among them the replacement and the
change of national leaders and the Sukarno government
by use of radical means.35

Dhakidae proceeds to lay out the organization of the
renewal movement along with the means to carry out its
programs.36 Even more importantly, Dhakidae provides the
following analysis of the importance of the Indonesian Renewal
Movement which came into being some four years before Gestapu:

Within this [University political] framework
[Soe] Hok Gie had very close connections with Nugroho
Noto Susanto who himself was very well known to have
the closest of connections with Colonel Suharto who
had even closer (menjalin) connections with the Army
Staff and Command College (SSKD or SSKAD) which later
became SESKOAD (Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan
Darat) an institution specifically designed to
educate intellectuals (cendekiawan) in uniform,
specifically military people especially selected to
fill military managerial positions and who would
later rise to positions of power within the country.
Within these many connected relationships it soon
became clear that Soe Hok Gie completely immersed
himself in activities opposing Soekarno of the same
nature as the student demonstrations designed to tear
down (meruntunkan) the Soekarno regime during early
1966. Within the framework of these relationships we
see the origin of the utilization of permanent
relations with the military. Whenever the students

35 Dhakidae in Saidi and Sanit, eds., 42, the exact wording
of the manifesto itself is found on page 42.

36 Dhakidae in Saidi and Sanit, eds., see 42-44 for the
organization chart used for the movement with explanations of
various offices and functions.
demonstrated against Soekarno, Soe always contacted the military directly himself either to ask for protection from the army or for any other related needs he may have had as he himself writes below [Soe Hok Gie’s own notes follow at this point].

The student movements’ platforms, then, were a combination of Tritura and Professor Sumitro’s manifesto as exemplified by the actions carried out by student leaders Soe Hok Gie, Slamet Sukirnanto, Cosmas Batubara, Yozar Anwar, Nono Anwar Makarim, Liem Bian Khoen (Sofyan Wanandi), Mar’ie Muhammad, David Napitupulu, Jhonny Simanjuntek, Fami Idris and others.

The concepts used to firm up KAMI’s ideological platform sprang out of the ferment of KAP-Gestapu and its original membership.

The directorship [pengurus] of KAP-Gestapu was composed of [berintikan] the following youths: Chairman H. M. Subchan Z.E. (NU) [Nahdatul Ulama-Association of Muslim Scholars], Sekjen [Secretary General] Harry Tjan SH [Sarjana Hukum-Master of law] (Katolik) [Catholic]. Lead Secretaries, for Mass Recruitment Lukman Harun (Muhammadiah) [a National Muslim movement], for Security: Erwin Baharuddin (IPKI) [a misprint which should read IKIP-Institute Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan-Teachers’ Training College], for finances: Syarifuddin Harahap (HMI) [Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam-Association of Islamic Students], Agus Sudono, Ismail Hasan SH, Yahya Ubdah SH, Liem Bian Kie [Jusuf Wanandi], Mar’ie Muhammad, Syarifuddin Siregar Pahu, Ramli Harahap, Husain Umar,

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37 Dhakidae in Saidi and Sanit, eds., 45.

38 Saidi and Sanit, eds., 79.
Dahian Ranumihardjo SH, Sumarsono and others. The Secretariate was located on Sam Ratulangi Road, No. 1, Jakarta.\textsuperscript{39}

What is not found in the political platforms developed by these students is any call to criticize and attack Indonesian-Chinese, Chinese expatriates, or the PRC government or party. Attacks on, and banning of, the PKI was a basic plank in the student movement political platform, but not action against the Chinese or China. Indeed, a number of the student leaders themselves were Indonesian-Chinese (keturunan Tionghoa) such as Soe Hok Gie and his close compatriots, and the Leim (Wanandi) brothers and their close colleagues.\textsuperscript{40}

The student groups demonstrated against and attacked PRC diplomatic facilities and personnel despite the fact that such activities were not included in the student political platform based on the Gerakan Pembaruhan Indonesia (Movement to Renew Indonesia), nor in Professor Sumitro's manifesto, and certainly not within the contents of the Tritura program of student action. Yet, the student movement, early-on, conducted

\textsuperscript{39} Martha, Wibosono and Anwar, 293, endnote number 16 on pages 397-398. This entire passage was in italics in the original, I use brackets for clarification.

\textsuperscript{40} Soe Hok Gie, 168-173; Saidi and Sanit, eds., 50, 253-254.
public protests against the PRC and called for severance of relations.\footnote{Current Scene: Developments in Mainland China, "Crises in Djakarta: Peking and its Indonesian Experiment in Revolution," (Hong Kong), 3, no. 30 (1 Nov. 1965): 8-10.}

One Chinese source in July, 1967 described the months-long Indonesian Suharto government and student activities directed toward China and the Chinese as follows:

Since coming into power through a counter-revolutionary coup d'etat in 1965, the Indonesian right wing military clique has done its utmost to undermine relations between China and Indonesia. They have attacked and raided Chinese diplomatic missions more than 30 times, injured by beatings or wounded by gunfire over 40 Chinese diplomatic and consular personnel and correspondents, forcibly occupied more than 10 office and residential premises belonging to Chinese diplomatic missions and committed a series of outrages seldom seen the history of diplomacy.\footnote{China Pictorial, "Seven Hundred Million People Protest," 35-37.}

As noted earlier, an increasing crescendo of formal protests was registered through official diplomatic channels (delivered by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Indonesian Embassy in Beijing, as well as to the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta) protesting Indonesian army-supported student demonstrations against, and attacks upon, Indonesian-Chinese, expatriate Chinese, and Chinese diplomatic personnel and facilities. The PRC's partially declassified official
diplomatic history, Zhongguo Waijiaoshi, contains details of descriptions of these events and the PRC's protests to the Indonesian government. 43

The most detailed description of activities and Chinese government official protests appears in the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs internal Laporan Research report. 44 All together the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs records a total of sixty-three Diplomatic Notes (of protest) from the Chinese government to the Indonesian government between October 19, 1965 and October 28, 1967: 1965, eleven Notes, 1966; thirty-six Notes, and 1967; sixteen Notes. 45 Not all of the PRC's diplomatic notes dealt with student attacks, some protested against the Indonesian government, and military, and persecution of Indonesian-Chinese. Others rendered complaints against Indonesian government failure to cooperate in various areas of the relationship—such as air and ship clearances and other diplomatic interactions. This section of the dissertation


44 Laporan Research, for a detailed description of events and PRC protests, from October 19, 1965 (China's first official protest note), to October 28, 1967, (China's notification of cessation of relations-menghentikan hubungan), closure of Chinese diplomatic facilities throughout Indonesia, and notice that the Rumanian Embassy would thenceforth represent the interest of the PRC regarding Indonesia, 4-12.

45 Laporan Research, 4-12.

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addresses those Chinese diplomatic notes which provide information on Indonesian student demonstrations against, and attacks on, Indonesian-Chinese, expatriate Chinese, Chinese-owned property, and against Chinese diplomatic personnel and facilities, in Indonesia. Other actions besides Indonesian student activities appear in Appendix B: Translations of Chinese Diplomatic Notes to the Government of Indonesia. Also, a record of the fourteen Indonesian government diplomatic notes (considered applicable by Laporan Research), in protest to the government of China appears in Appendix C: Translations of Indonesian Diplomatic Notes to the Government of China.46

The following are translations to English of the twenty PRC Diplomatic Notes, to the government of the Republic of Indonesia, relating to Indonesian student attacks. The page number on which each note appears in the original Indonesian language Laporan Research is included at the end of each translated entry:

November 2, 1965, between 3 and 4 thousand rioters (perusuh) attacked the PRC Consulate in Medan, the Chinese flag and State symbol were taken down [PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note October 4, 1965, Laporan Research, 4].

November 10, 1965, there occurred a demonstration against the PRC Consulate in Makassar accompanied by destruction of Overseas Chinese (perantau Tionghoa) shops, clubs, and schools in various parts of Sulawesi [PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note November 19, 1965, Laporan Research, 4].

46 Laporan Research, 12-15.
December 10, 1965, the PRC Consulate in Medan was attacked (diserbu—attacked by throngs of people) for the second time. On that same day, in various locations in Medan, such as Titipan, Simpangtiga, Tanjung Morawa, Barangkuis, Stabat and other places, rioters destroyed Overseas Chinese homes and shops, and killed a number of Overseas Chinese [indigenous and expatriate Chinese] [PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note, December 16, 1965, Laporan Research, 5].


February 3, 1966, many more than (sebanyak lebih dari) 1,000 members of the KAMI [Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia—Indonesian Student Action Front] attacked (menyerang) the PRC Embassy. An Embassy staff member was injured [PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Note, February 3, 1966, Laporan Research, 5].

February 10, 1966, hundreds of KAMI members attacked (menyerbu) the PRC Consulate in Banjarmasin. Subsequently, on February 2, 1966, Overseas Chinese (perantauan Tionghua—indigenous and expatriate Chinese) homes and the Chinese Association (Chung Hua Chung Hui) building in Banjarmasin was destroyed for the second time (dirusak untuk dua kalinya) [PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note, February 15, 1966, Laporan Research, 5].

February 25, 1966, more than 300 members of KAMI attacked (menyerbu) the PRC Consulate in Makassar. Consul Officer Shih Chin-kan was injured in the chest and elbow. Other Consulate members were also injured among whom the most seriously injured was Lin Shenmu, who received a grave injury to his stomach [PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Note, February 27, 1966, Laporan Research, 6].

March 9, 1966, several hundred rioters (hooligans) attacked (menyerang) the PRC Hsin Hua News Agency Offices in Jakarta. Several Hsin Hua correspondents were injured, namely Chang Hsi-tao, Li Jui-feng and Tang Tung-pai. Later, on March 10, 1966, those hooligans attacked (menyerang) the PRC Consulate General building and injured Consular Officer Ma
Teng-chieh, Junior Consular Officer Li Hui-ching, and 8 other Consulate General Staff members. On that same date the PRC Commercial Consular’s Office was attacked and destroyed and Commercial Consular Wang Pin, Second Secretary Chang Feng and two staff members, Kuo Kai-shan and Lu Chung-yun were all injured [PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Note, March 10, 1966, Laporan Research, 6].

March 19, 1966, notification that the offices and residences (tempat-tempat kediaman) of the Commercial Consular; Consulate General and Hsin Hua News Agency have all been moved and are now housed within the premises of the PRC Embassy in Jakarta [PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note, March 19, 1966, Laporan Research, 6].


March 29, 1966, many more than (lebih dari) 1000 rioters (perusuh) calling themselves KAPPI BRIGADE AMPERA ARIEF RACHMAN [Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia Brigade Ampere Arief Rachman-the Arief Rachman Ampere Brigade of the Indonesian Youth and Student Action Front] destroyed the PRC Consulate in Medan. This was the third attack (penyerbuan) on the Consulate [PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note, April 2, 1966, Laporan Research, 6-7].

April 8, 1966, KAMI and KAPPI occupied more than 10 buildings in Jakarta belonging to Overseas Chinese associations [perkumpulan perantau Tionghoa] [PRC Note, April 10, 1966, Laporan Research, 7]

April 15, 1966, the PRC Embassy was attacked (diserang) by more than 1000 rioters coordinated by armed military forces along with two armored vehicles (panser). Seven PRC Embassy vehicles were destroyed (hancur) and three others were stolen. A diplomat and two workers were injured while one person was shot and seriously wounded. [Indonesian Foreign Ministry Note: three notes were received in relation to this event, two from the PRC Embassy and one from the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The PRC Embassy Note had attached the initial Notes detailing items
April 19, 1966, the PRC Consulate General building was occupied by more than 300 people led (dipimpin) by three policemen [PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note, April 20, 1966, Laporan Research, 7].

April 21, 1966, the personnel residences of the PRC Embassy at Jati Petamburan No. 72 [Jakarta] were occupied by rioters as were the Commercial Chancellor's Office, the Consulate General’s Office and the residence of the Consulate General of the PRC [PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Note, April 22, 1966, Laporan Research, 7].

April 21, 1966, the PRC Military Attaché Office was attacked and occupied. On April 23, 1966 the PRC Embassy personnel residence at Number 4, Labu Road [Jakarta] was looted (dirampok). [Note, at this point Laporan Research quotes the rest of the Chinese Diplomatic Note in the English language] "In the meantime, Mr. Sumitro, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, brazenly declared that the hooligans who seized offices and living quarters of the Chinese Embassy and Consulate-General [sic] were, 'revolutionary' and 'progressive youth'; he even cried that these buildings would be under the 'control' of the Dwikora (dwikomando rakyat-Sukarno administration label based on the two mandates of the people to crush Malaysia and to defend the revolution) Administrator" [PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Note, April 24, 1966, Laporan Research, 8].

May 4, 1966, the PRC Consulate building in Makassar was forcefully occupied [PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note, May 7, 1966, Laporan Research, 8].

June 9, 1966, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered a Diplomatic Note of 4 ¼ pages filled with objections (bantahan) to the Republic of Indonesia's (RI) Peking Embassy Diplomatic Note of May 12, 1966, among other things the Chinese side stated that the attack (penyerbuan) against the PRC Embassy in Jakarta was, indeed, organized by the Government of Indonesia. The cessation of the Confrontation (Konfrontasi) against Malaysia [by the New Suharto
Cabinet] demonstrates that Indonesia is following along with (menekor) American imperialism [PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Note, June 9, 1966, Laporan Research, 8].

June 28, 1966, the PRC Embassy was attacked (diserbu) again. According to the PRC Embassy that attack constituted the twentieth attack against the Chinese diplomatic delegation (perwakilan) in Indonesia [PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note, June 26, 1966, Laporan Research, 8].

July 2, 1966, the Hsinhua News Agency has been closed since March 25, 1966 after it was taken over illegally (dikangkangi) by rightist (golongan kanan) rioters. Moreover, since March, 1966, the Government of Indonesia has repeatedly (berturut-turut) illegally occupied more than 8 Chinese diplomatic facilities [PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note, July, 3, 1966, Laporan Research, 9].

Chinese Diplomatic Notes from this point in time up to the Note informing Indonesia that, in view of the fact that Indonesia had already stopped (menghentikan) its relations with China, China was closing its diplomatic facilities and would rely on the Rumanian Embassy in Jakarta to handle China’s interests in Indonesia (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Note, October 28, 1967, Laporan Research, 12), all dealt with issues other than student attacks on Chinese diplomatic personnel and facilities (see Appendix B).

It is important to point out that all the Diplomatic Notes, translated above, have described demonstrations against and attacks on Chinese diplomatic personnel and facilities which were carried out by Indonesian mobs spearheaded by, and mixed,
with students. Student activist Soe Hok Gie's personal notes (diary) as described earlier, reveal a very active student movement led by very active student leaders. Ridwan Saidi, as previously discussed herein, also relates a picture of a very busy student movement.

In view of the contents of Dr. Sumitro’s manifesto and KAMI’s platform of Tritura, KAMI and other organizations having called for severance of relations with China, along with repeated demonstrations against and attacks on Chinese personnel and facilities, all taken together, raise wonderment about anti-Chinese activities. Without an Anti-Chinese political platform, KAMI and its related organizations attacked China and the Chinese over-and-over again. R. E. Elson explains that Lieutenant General Suharto, in early 1966

. . . lent encouragement to Anti-Sukarno officers to stimulate heightened student activism and raise tensions to such an extent that Sukarno would have no choice but to take refuge in Suharto’s capacity to ensure order. Notwithstanding Suharto’s claim to have controlled the student movement, it enjoyed something of a life of its own, even if it relished his barely disguised support. Kostrad, operationally commanded by [Colonel] Kemal Idris, who came to an agreement with Amirmachmud to assume effective command of Jakarta’s troops, became the intelligence center of the student movement. Suharto was kept

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48 Soe Hok Gie, chapter five, and passim.

49 Saidi and Sanit, eds., 86-88 and passim.
closely informed of these moves via his former Kostrad intelligence officers, notably Yoga Sugama and Ali Murtopo; Ali himself played an active role by deploying [Indonesian Army] troops at strategic points to protect demonstrating students.\(^{50}\)

Elson's assessment reinforces M. C. Ricklefs view that KAMI activities played a major role in "Soeharto's policy to encourage such violence in Jakarta that in the end Sukarno would have to hand power to him to restore order."\(^{51}\)

Actions directed at the Chinese and China between October 1965 and October 1967 were not a result of mainstream Indonesian concern about China and the Chinese, but rather they were prompted by almost entirely domestic motivations intersticed with a massive struggle for power over all Indonesia, carried out between President Sukarno's Old Order (Orde Lama) and General Suharto and the army's New Order (Orde Baru). Charles Coppel concluded that

> Important as they must have seemed to Indonesian Chinese, the issues of Sino-Indonesian relations and Anti-Chinese violence were not central ones in the political scene during the months after the coup attempt. They were probably viewed as minor, if related, matters to the over-riding question of what should be done about the PKI.\(^{52}\)

Student movement attacks against China and demands to sever relations with China are credited to the instigation of

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\(^{50}\) Elson, 133.

\(^{51}\) Ricklefs, (1993), 289.

\(^{52}\) Coppel, 61.
Army Colonel Kemal Idris. As mentioned earlier in this study Leo Suryandinata attributed New Order troubles with Sino-Indonesian relations to "Indonesian fear of both the PRC and ethnic Chinese (overseas Chinese), together with the PRC's accommodation of the PKI remnants in Beijing."54

Carmel Budiardjo describes KAMI and KAPPI activities as having been designed to arouse public sentiment against President Sukarno by way of casting the PKI in the role as instigator of Gestapu and also by "heaping blame for all the country's ills on Sukarno."55

Dr. H. Subandrio, who was summarily removed from his position as Minister of Foreign Affairs and imprisoned by the Suharto government in 1966, states that the student groups were set up by the Soeharto government,

Toward the end of October, 1965, at his home, Brigadier Syarif Thayib, Minister of Higher Education and Science of Knowledge, at the order (atas perintah) of Soeharto, formed the Indonesian Student's Action Front (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia) KAMI. It was his embryo student movement which was provided support by the military (tentara). KAMI thereafter always demonstrated with the support of RPKAD and Kostrad troops.56

53 Sukma, 33.
54 Suryadinata, Interpreting Indonesian Politics, 155.
55 Budiardjo, Surviving Indonesia's Gulag, 49.
56 Soebandrio, 76.
A primary force having to do with military-student relations and activities, and expressing enmity for the PKI and the PRC was (four star) General A. H. Nasution, the highest ranking officer remaining in the Indonesian military after the deaths of the six Generals during the Gestapu affair; Nasution outranked Suharto by two stars. As Dr. Subandrio has stated, General Nasution, who barely escaped capture by the Coup group, was widely known to be anti-PKI.\(^{57}\) General Nasution has also expressed his views on the PRC and Chinese involvement in Gestapu in his memoirs in which, after he roundly accuses the PKI of having carried out the attempted Coup, he goes on to say...

\(^{57}\) Soebandrio, 77.
China from Indonesia, the term "Soon there will be an improvement" (akan segera ada perbaikan).

3. Just prior to 1 October 1965 quite suddenly (mendadak) a cable was received from Peking that the PRC Air Force Chief of Staff would not be coming to Jakarta as the invited guest of the Indonesian Air Force Chief of Staff to attend the Indonesian National Military day celebration.58

This passage is the most straightforwardly accusative of PRC involvement in Gestapu to be found in Nasution's multi-volume set of memoirs and, also, in his speeches.59

Conversely, in a specially written portion of a book relating to Gestapu, written in the last year of his life, General Nasution doesn't even mention the PRC. In this section of the book, entitled "Pak Nas bicara tentang Komunis" [Pak Nasution talks about the Communists], though he continues to find Subandrio, Leimena, Untung, Aidit and others guilty of carrying out Gestapu, he omits any reference to China or to the Chinese.60 It's as though the widespread attacks on Indonesian-Chinese, Chinese expatriates, Chinese property, and upon Chinese diplomatic personnel and facilities, had never taken place; as

58 Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, vol. 6, 333.


60 Anton Tabah, ed., Dua Jendral Besar Bicara Tentang Gestapu/PKI [Two five-Star Generals talk about Gestapu/PKI], (Jakarta: CV. Sahabat, 1999), 10-15.
though there had not been this major event, the break in relations with China. Again, this suggests that targeting the Chinese and China, between 1965 and 1967, was done for internal consumption -- to help wrest power from President Sukarno by demonstrating his inability to cope with those attacks-rather than any particular major international problem with the PRC itself.

General A. H. Nasution was, research shows, very involved with the organizations and with direction of student groups (KAMI, KAPPI and affiliates) around the time of Gestapu (late 1965 and early 1966). General Nasution states in his memoirs and in his summary of speeches that he frequently met with student leaders and student groups and that he worked very closely with them. Also, as the ranking four-star general in the Indonesian army he was in a position to direct the activities of the three main Indonesian army officers who had actually been assigned to work together regularly with the student groups: Colonel (later General) Sarwo Edhi, Colonel Kemal Idris, and general Dharsono. Nasution makes the

61 Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, vol. 6, 143, 298, 338-341, photos 350-351, 373, 394, 398-400. General Nasution presented detailed information on his close involvement with these student groups here in volume six as well as in volume seven of his memoirs.


63 As mentioned earlier in this chapter, these were the three key officers the students themselves credited with having
connection between the Indonesian student activist programs and the attacks on PRC diplomats and facilities in the first description, in his memoirs, of student attacks which took place within the very first week after Gestapu

Then began [October 8, 1965] the burning down of the PKI office building on Jalan Kramet Raya by a group of youths (seklompok pemuda) in Jakarta. After that the targets for burning became the offices of PKI affiliates such as SOBSI [Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia—All Indonesia Federation of Labor Organizations], Lekra [Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat—the People’s Cultural Association], Pemuda Rakyat [People’s Youth Organization], CGMI [Central Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia—Central Indonesian Student Movement], and PKI leaders’ homes. Also included were the PKI property at Ali Archam University on Pasar Minggu Road, the [Chinese] Res Publica University in Grogol. Various Baperki schools and PRC Consulates were also added. 64

All of these attacks took place within the first week after the failed coup attempt. It must be remarked upon that these events, carried out in such a short time period after October 1st, can be seen to be the exception to the rule in the context of the way things are generally done in the Indonesian culture.

More conventionally, contemplated activities are carefully coordinated over extended periods of time with consultation with all participants affected and with the need for majority played key roles in the students’ activities “against the communists”; see Saidi and Sanit, eds., 77.

64 Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, vol. 6, 277. For more details see Dipodisastro, 40, 138; Martha, Wibosono and Anwar, 295-296.
concurrence -- a social institution termed *musyawarah*, or *musyawarat*. Plans and activities are carefully synchronized with degrees of ritualistic consultation and even ceremonial activities in the form of selamatan (*slametan* in Javanese) which is a communal gathering involving food which invokes a type of blessing on the activity to be embarked upon or successfully completed. All of these social strictures are aimed at achieving *mufakat* -- a general consensus designed to keep social friction to a minimum.

These prescribed social procedures, especially in earlier years, such as the 1960s, normally were carried out over necessarily extended periods of time. General Suharto's impressive feat of rallying Indonesian army units and defeating the coup within twenty four hours from a dead standstill is a rather startling phenomenon in the context of a culture steeped in *musyawarah*, *slametan*, *mufakat*, and other generally expected forms of conducting affairs. More so, the coordinated attacks on, and destruction of, PKI facilities and leaders' homes, throughout the archipelago, within a week of the events of October 1st raise suspicions that organizations and plans were formulated by the Indonesian army and the student groups well prior to Gestapu.

The inclusion of General Nasution's position, stated herein earlier, that the PRC "participated with the other side" (*keterlibatan pihak sana*–the PKI) reveals his conviction that
the PRC was involved in Gestapu.  

R. E. Elson's more recently published biography of President Suharto provides a clearer picture of the Indonesian Army's role in student attacks, which both decimated the PKI and promoted increasingly strained relations with China.

Already within a few days of the coup attempt, the local organizations of the PKI in Jakarta had been smashed, and the offices of the party and affiliated organizations closed. On 10 October [1965] Suharto established Kopkamtib (Operations Command for the Restoration of Order and Security). He also "issued instructions containing basic policies to curb and get rid of G.30S./PKI people in departments, institutions and other bodies within the government service".

Even while the coup drama was playing itself out, Suharto and other army leaders had begun to foment a mood of accusation against and retribution towards the PKI. The canny chief of Koti's political section (Koti G-V), Brig-Gen. Sucipto, brought together younger anti-communist parties and groups on 2 October; with army encouragement, they established, under the leadership of Subchan Z. E. and Harry Can Silalahi, an "Action Command to Crush the 30 September Movement" (KAP G.30.S), which held its first modest demonstration on 4 October. A second demonstration, attended this time by a huge throng as the anti-communist fever grew, was held four days later; it was followed by attacks on the home of PKI leaders and ended with the burning of the PKI headquarters, with no sign of the Army to protect PKI property.

The student attacks on the PRC Consulates were made to appear to have been an afterthought on the part of the student groups. General Nasution describes the "youth group" attacks as

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65 Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, vol. 6, 333.

66 Elson, 123.
though he were merely a disinterested observer characterizing spontaneous public demonstrations which led to physical attacks on the many sites singled out by the students. However, in his multi-volume memoirs he relates that he had intimate contact with student leaders and groups of students. Also, left out by R.E. Elson, is that the group KAP G.30.S (or, KAP-Gestapu), so effective in its attacks on opponents of the army, as well as on Chinese personnel, both foreign and domestic, was heavily funded by U.S. covert action initiatives. A highly classified ("Secret; Priority; Roger Channel [to protect sensitive personnel issues]; Special Handling") telegram from U.S. Ambassador Marshall Green to Assistant Secretary of State Bundy is of such importance in its revelations as to warrant full replication here.

Djakarta, December 2, 1965

1. This is to confirm my earlier concurrence that we provide [future Foreign Minister under Suharto, Adam] Malik with fifty million rupiahs requested by him for activities of the Kap-Gestapu movement. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
2. The Kap-Gestapu activities to date have been important factor in the army's program, and judging from results, I would say highly successful. This army inspired but civilian-staffed action group is still carrying burden of current repressive efforts targeted against PKI, particularly in Central Java. A. Malik is not in charge of Kap-Gestapu movement. He is, however, one of the key civilian advisers and promoters of the movement. There is no doubt whatsoever that Kap-Gestapu's activity is fully consonant with and coordinated by the army. We have
had substantial intelligence reporting to support this.

B. I view this contribution as a means of enhancing Malik's position within the movement. As one of the key civilians, he is responsible for finding funds to finance its activities. Without our contribution Kap-Gestapu will of course continue. On the other hand, there is no doubt that they need money. The latter, despite inflation, is in tight supply, and the comparatively small sum proposed will help considerably.

C. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Our willingness to assist him in this manner will, I think, represent in Malik's mind our endorsement of his present role in the army's anti-PKI efforts, and will promote good cooperating relations between him and the army.

D. The chances of detection or subsequent revelation of our support in this instance are as minimal as any black bag operation can be [2 lines of source text not declassified]

Green⁶⁷

General Nasution relates how he moved quickly, prior to October 1965, to subvert Sukarno's establishment of a fifth

⁶⁷ FRUS INDONESIA, entry no. 179, 379-380. Ambassador Green does not mention this support of Kap-Gestapu in his memoirs, which is probably because this subject was so highly classified, still, at the time of his writing; Green. Also important is that the very next entry in the FRUS INDONESIA was "denied" in its entirety, "Entry no. 180, Memorandum From the Chief, Far East Division, Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (Colby) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy), Washington, December 3, 1965, [Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files: Job 78-00061R, Indonesia 2/2-State Department Liaison (1959-1966); Secret. 4 pages of source text not declassified]", 380. Also a subsequent entry, in this time frame, has been denied, "Entry no. 182, Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee [the covert action committee], Washington, December 8, 1965, [Source: National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Subject Files, Indonesia. Secret. 4 pages of source text not declassified]", 383. Until these two documents are declassified, the issue of the extent of the assistance rendered by the U. S. to Kap-Gestapu, or, indeed, other involvement in Gestapu, will continue to be surrounded with questions.
column by establishing "regiments of students in the universities" (pemerataan resimen–resimen mahasiswa di universitas–universitas). He even brags that "we beat them to the punch [emphasis added]" (Kami dahului mengisi "pasaran").

Later, the student organization KAPPI received Nasution’s permission to form the Ade Irma Brigade, named after General Nasution’s daughter who had been shot during Gestapu and later died.

General Nasution revealed a personal closeness with the students, as he related in his memoirs, to the extent that when he presented a working paper (prasaran) to a student gathering on January 10, 1966

I felt a spiritual unity (rasakan [sic] persatuan batin) with those students gathered around me. My speech necessarily was of a technical and scientific nature which later became the bases for New Order [economic] policies. I remembered that the students were not just riskiing danger ber-vivere pericoloso --[a Sukarno-era slogan from tahun vivere pericoloso -- the year of living dangerously], brushing up against danger. Now the students made their identity very clear. In accordance with that, General Suharto placed great value on the student demonstrations as a means of social control within the framework of Guided Democracy.

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68 Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, vol. 6, 143.

69 Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, vol. 6, 143.

70 Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, vol. 6, 298.

71 Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, vol. 6, 342. For understanding General Nasution’s reference to "the Year of living dangerously", see Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, A Year of Living Dangerously (Tahun "Vivere Pericoloso"): Address by the President of the Republic of Indonesia.
Nasution's close involvement is further shown by his statement "so [because of student activities] I became extremely busy and [student] movement leaders became routine guests both in the office and in my home."\(^72\) This statement is followed in Nasution's memoirs by a photo showing him standing on an army armored car, along with army subordinates, receiving the student demonstrators (Aku menerima demonstrans KAMI/KAPPI, June 1966).\(^73\) Another photo shows General Nasution in discussion with the leaders of "'Generation 66' [students] in the city of Medan in Sumatra."\(^74\) These are clear indications of General Nasution's busy involvement with Indonesian student groups.

Even after President Sukarno banned KAMI and removed General Nasution from the Cabinet in February, 1966, Nasution states that he continued to receive reports from KAMI, KAPPI and other student action groups along with reports from Kostrad and the army.\(^75\) It is in student and army backlash that General Nasution describes student destruction (diobrak-abrik) of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that the Foreign

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\(^72\) Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, vol. 6, 345.

\(^73\) Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, vol. 6, 350.

\(^74\) Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, vol. 6, 351.

\(^75\) Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, vol. 6, 382-384.
Minister, Dr. Subandrio, became the student’s main target (sasaran utama mereka). Later, General Nasution describes how KAPPI seized a number of ministers (beberapa orang menteri) on March 16, 1966, and turned them over to Kostrad.

Nasution further relates, showing even deeper involvement with students and universities, about his role in doing away with some universities considered to be inimical to the New Order. He changed the name of the Chinese university, Res Publica, to Universitas Trisakti. He also combined two universities, one led by a Cabinet Minister, and one led by the wife of the recently toppled Foreign Minister Subandrio, and renamed the new institution Universitas Pancasila; Nasution became a member of the board of directors.

All of the foregoing demonstrates General Nasution’s deep involvement, in his capacity as the senior-ranking officer (and, after the murders of the other Indonesian army Generals on October 1, 1965, the only four-Star General in the army until Major General Suharto’s eventual promotion to four Stars on July 28, 1966, ten months after Gestapu), with the student groups

76 Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, vol. 6, 385.
77 Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, vol. 6, 400.
78 Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, vol. 6, 400. The meaning of the term is from the Indonesian sakti-sacred powers, hence “Three Sacred Powers”.
79 Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan, vol. 6, 400.
KAMI, KAPPI and affiliates, as well as with the universities. As unusual as it may appear for any nation's 4-Star army general to be so deeply involved with university and high school student groups, in this case, the rationale was to use KAMI, KAPPI and affiliates as a tool, a weapon, to attack the Sukarno regime, the primary opposition—the PKI, (and all other Suharto-Army opponents), and, puzzlingly, the Chinese and China. In this way the army was able to evade accusations of the army itself having attacked Sukarno, the PKI and other political opponents, or China and the Chinese. In a characteristically Wayangesque manner, the myth was perpetrated that KAMI and KAPPI were spontaneous student uprisings, motivated only by patriotic concern for the well-being of the Tanah Air-Fatherland. In fact, as shown in this study, KAMI and KAPPI were carefully formed, nurtured, directed, supported, and protected by the Indonesian army, Generals Nasution, Kemal Idris, Colonels Sarwo Edhie, and Dharsono (the "K-S-D" trio referred to earlier), and others.

Student attacks on Chinese diplomats and facilities were not predicated on student political platforms such as Tritura (ban the PKI, cleanse the Presidential Cabinet, and lower commodity prices). The attacks, as carefully described herein, were coordinated, intense, destructive, and carried out under the protection of the military (police having been a branch of
the military in Indonesia at the time) and while, in some cases, firefighting units stood by idly while facilities burned.\(^{80}\)

In the absence of a discernable student mandate to attack Chinese diplomats and facilities, and to publicly call for severance of relations with the PRC, the genesis of such actions remains a subject of debate. Descriptions contained herein indicate that students' attacks on Chinese diplomats and diplomatic facilities in Jakarta, Medan, Sumatra, Surabaya, Banjarmasin, and other places were orchestrated and deliberate, not spontaneous and sporadic. General Nasution has been shown herein to have been of the view that the PRC participated in Gestapu activities along with the PKI.

Some important points need to be made relating to the Indonesian Army and Indonesian Student movement activities against Chinese diplomatic personnel and facilities. The attacks in Indonesia took place months, more than a year, before Chinese Red Guard attacks on Indonesian diplomats and the embassy in Beijing. Thus, Indonesian student attacks on Chinese diplomatic personnel and facilities cannot be seen as a tit-for-tat activity during the period of the height of the attacks throughout Indonesia (January-April, 1966). The Red Guards didn't even begin their activities in Beijing until August 18,

\(^{80}\) Hughes, 132-133.
Although there had been Red Guard demonstrations in front of the Indonesian Embassy earlier, it wasn’t until August 5-10, 1967, that Red Guards marched on, demonstrated against, and ransacked, and, finally, burned the Indonesian Embassy in Beijing.\footnote{Laporan Research, 22.}

Earlier it was demonstrated that Indonesian leaders (first Sukarno and his foreign minister Subandrio, then, after March 11, 1966 (Supersemar), General Suharto and his foreign minister, Adam Malik) held a policy position of wanting to continue on with diplomatic relations with the PRC in the wake of Gestapu. The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as shown earlier herein, by use of both classified and unclassified sources, adhered to the policy position of wanting to maintain relations with China. Yet, student demonstrations against Chinese diplomats and facilities called for, among other things, severance of relations with China. But student notes and memoirs, and the basic student political action platform, as contained in the manifesto and in the Tritura, did not even refer to the PRC, much less lay out a political action program against the PRC. Still, KAMI, KAPPI and affiliate attacks on Chinese diplomats and facilities played a large role in the eventual shutdown of relations between the two countries.

\footnote{Xia Dongyuan, ed., 826.}
However, the Indonesian student attacks did not directly precipitate the break in relations. Officially the Chinese Government’s historical account states

Anti-Chinese incidents occurred incessantly throughout Indonesia. Even though through it all China continually protested and struggled, on October 9 and 23, 1967, Indonesian authorities announced the closure of the Embassy in China, and moreover requested China to close its [Embassy by then reduced to a] Consulate in Indonesia. On October 28, 1967, China again raised a protest and, at the same time, announced a suspension (tingzhi) of formal diplomatic relations between the two nations. 83

In this passage from the PRC’s diplomatic history Zhongguo Waijiaoshi, it is important to note that the terminology used does not confine the anti-Chinese incidents to PRC diplomats and facilities, but rather the term used, fanhua paihua, denotes widespread, generalized, anti-Chinese activities; China protested Indonesian mistreatment of all Chinese people and facilities in Indonesia, not just abuse of Chinese diplomats and facilities. 84

The Indonesian government’s official historical version states that after its recall and recovery of its diplomatic

83 Xie Yixian, ed., 387.

84 Laporan Research, 4-12, records a total of sixty-three Diplomatic Notes of protest from the Chinese embassy or from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, twenty of those Notes complained of Indonesian student attacks on Chinese diplomatic personnel and facilities, the other forty-three diplomatic notes complained about mistreatment of other Chinese in Indonesia, either peranakan or totok, termed keturunan (descendent), or Chinese expatriates; see Appendix B.
representatives from China on October 31, 1967, because China had failed to provide diplomatic facilities and lodging to replace those destroyed by the Red Guard attacks.

That diplomatic relations between the Republic of Indonesia and the People’s Republic of China were in a state of freeze (pembekuan) which was termed by the PRC as “a temporary severance (pemutusan sementara) of its representation in Indonesia”, while the Indonesian side characterized the situation as “a closure of Embassy offices in Peking until such time as it becomes possible for the Indonesian Embassy in Peking to return to its representational duties” [emphasis added].

Diplomatic relations were broken off, to a large degree, because each country found it too difficult to conduct its representational functions (the business of diplomacy) in the other country because of the untenable domestic turmoil within the other country. China faced a regular fare of anti-Chinese activities in Indonesia as part of the domestic political struggle. And part of that public turbulence played itself out in attacks on Chinese diplomats and facilities. Indonesia makes clear in its Ministry of Foreign Affairs report that Indonesia could no longer conduct diplomatic affairs in China because the Chinese government did not make available, as requested by the Indonesian government, replacement facilities and lodging for those which had been destroyed by the Red Guards two months earlier, in August, 1967.

85 Laporan Research, 23.
86 Laporan Research, 22.
The freeze (Indonesian characterization - pembekuan), or the suspension (Chinese characterization - zhongduan) in relations between Indonesia and China, in the interpretation of each country's official rendering of the event, can be said to have come about as a result of the chaotic internal situation in each country at the same time: The Gestapu coup and Suharto-army countercoup in Indonesia, October 1965–March 1968, and the most virulent phase of the Cultural Revolution in China, July, 1966–September, 1968, by which time the PLA had established a degree of order and successfully manifested its power through its membership on Revolutionary Committees throughout China. Just as both Indonesia and China had attained a degree of domestic stabilization, it was too late for the diplomatic relationship between them. The breakdown in relations would last for another twenty-three years.

87 Xi and Jin, 183-187.
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION

Extreme domestic turmoil, the Cultural Revolution in China, and the Gestapu coup and countercoup in Indonesia, during the same two key years of 1966 and 1967, derailed normal governance, engendered the deaths of hundreds of thousands and the ruination of millions of lives in both countries, severely damaged each nation’s foreign affairs infrastructure, and subsequently endangered each nation’s diplomatic relations, especially with each other. Both nations went through the most chaotic period in each republic’s short history (China, since 1949; Indonesia since 1950) between 1965 and 1968.

The first shot of China’s Cultural Revolution can be interpreted as Yao Wenyuan’s article in the Wenhui bao intellectual newspaper on November 10, 1965, criticizing Wu Han’s play Hai Rui Dismissed from Office, although the Cultural Revolution didn’t begin to play out in public until the Politburo approved Mao Zedong’s 16 point draft to the Central Committee, published in May, 1966, and termed the May 16 Bulletin. It wasn’t until 1968, with the consolidation of the regional three member Revolutionary Committees, and the extension of PLA control to the regions, that China began to return to any sort of civic order.
Likewise massive domestic turmoil began on October 1, 1965 with the Gestapu Coup, which led to the Suharto-army countercoup which wracked Indonesia in a bitter struggle for power between the Sukarno government and the Suharto group, and which didn’t subside until General Suharto was appointed president to replace Sukarno in March 1968. In the midst of the upset, indeed chaos, in each country, between October, 1965 and October 1967, China and Indonesia lost normal diplomatic relations with each other.

The most prominent factor in the breakdown in relations was the derailment of each nation’s foreign affairs system over the same two year period. Foreign Minister Subandrio and Foreign Minister Chen Yi were both under attack from activist, mostly student, groups, as this two year period played itself out. Subandrio was attacked in the Foreign Ministry and at his home by the Indonesian student groups, which were organized, directed, supported, and protected by the Indonesian army, and coordinated by General Suharto with General Nasution’s backing. Between October 1965 and March 1966 student groups demonstrated against and invaded the Indonesian Foreign Ministry; Foreign Service personnel were attacked and harassed, offices were ransacked, and official files were destroyed and lost. After the arrest and trial of Foreign Minister Subandrio by General Suharto, under the authority of Supersemar, the letter of authorization forced from President Sukarno, in March, 1966, Suharto appointed Adam Malik Foreign Minister in Subandrio’s
place. During the remainder of 1966, and into 1967, Malik and the New Order government carried out a purge of the foreign ministry, spearheaded by the Team Penertib to bring order to and to cleanse the Foreign Ministry of G.30.S/PKI guerrillas.

While Indonesia’s foreign affairs establishment was undergoing major changes both at home and overseas, China’s foreign affairs infrastructure was also undergoing pervasive turbulence inside China and abroad.

In the PRC’s case, beside the tumult engendered by the political activism of the Cultural Revolution in general, the link made in this dissertation was that the February Adverse Current event in 1967, and its backlash, resulted in bitter oppositional battles that brought disturbance to China’s foreign affairs establishment and to its foreign relations in a major way. The sharp criticism of the Cultural Revolution’s excesses, brought by the relatively more moderate lau tongzhimen (old comrades) and lau shuaimen (old Marshals) against the left-radical Cultural Revolution activists led generally by Chen Boda and Jiang Qing and supported by Mao, set off a veritable firestorm of competition between leaders at the highest levels of government and party, which played itself out in brutal fashion in the various regions of China. The Chief target of the Central Cultural Revolution Group (CCRG), spearheaded by Madame Mao, was Foreign Minister Chen Yi, and, of course, his foreign ministry. The attacks on Chen Yi were designed to get
at Premier Zhou Enlai by toppling his chief lieutenant; in the Chinese milieu, if one cannot successfully protect his or her subordinates, one is laid open to being personally attacked and vanquished. The story of Zhou Enlai’s survival through all this carries with it all the drama and tension of the best of the Jingju, the Beijing Operas. Foreign Minister Chen Yi and his ministry were casualties, to the great detriment of China’s foreign relations, especially with Indonesia, especially during 1966 and 1967.

As Foreign Minister Chen Yi was brought low, and finally toppled in mid 1967, the power of the CCRG became increasingly manifested in the growth of power among the Cultural Revolution groups which infiltrated the Foreign Ministry; the Foreign Language Institute activists, and the lianlouzhan (the Cultural Revolution Liaison Stations). Facilitated by Kang Sheng, Wang Li, and Yao Deng-shan, by late 1966, into early 1967, CCRG control was strengthened over the Foreign Ministry, as manifested by the forced recall of China’s ambassadors from all but one posting, Huang Hua in Egypt, who had been deemed sufficiently revolutionized. Left-radical activists were sent to overseas diplomatic missions to imbue China’s diplomats with the revolutionary spirit, as well as to bring the Great Cultural Revolution to host nations. All of these initiatives ended in increasingly severe troubles between the PRC and its diplomatic partners; as shown herein in cases such as the U.S.S.R., Great
Britain, India, Burma, and even Sihanouk's Cambodia. In the end (even as the Cultural Revolution officially continued on to 1976) China lost diplomatic relations with only one major partner: Indonesia.

Part and parcel of the ultimate rupture in relations between the two nations were the attacks on each other's diplomatic personnel and facilities. The most pervasive, frequent and severe attacks took place in Indonesia, as described in detail in this dissertation. Nonetheless, the Red Guard seizure, invasion, abuse of occupants, ransacking, and setting fire to Indonesia's Embassy in Beijing in August, 1967, can be interpreted as a direct trigger to Indonesia's ultimate move to freeze (membekukan) relations with the PRC. General Suharto and Foreign Minister Malik are shown herein to have resisted a breakdown in relations with China. The fact the PRC didn't move to relieve the plight of Indonesian diplomatic personnel and staff after the five day attack from August 5 to August 10, 1967, is cited by Indonesian official government sources as a final determining factor in the move to freeze relations with China.

It is a most important consideration that the attacks on each other's diplomatic personnel and facilities weren't really motivated by the attackers' dissatisfaction with the other nation, but were, rather, prompted by domestic dynamics. KAMI, KAPPI and affiliated student group attacks on Chinese
installations were, as explained in this study, designed to
demonstrate President Sukarno's weakness and loss of power
to prevent not only those attacks, but also, student attacks
on Indonesian-Chinese and property, and even on Indonesia's
Foreign Ministry. Of course the Chinese, as known from
Indonesia's past, were a handy and easily identifiable target
with all the earmarks of otherness required of a public
scapegoat. Tellingly, counter-Chinese policy was not a
political plank of either the student Three Demands (Tritura),
or the student manifesto, part of the student platform for
renewal (pembaharuan) of Indonesia. Classified and unclassified
Indonesian Foreign Ministry, Department of Defense, and
Presidential Cabinet documents show no program to attack and
endanger Indonesia's relations with the PRC; on the contrary
those sources stipulate that Indonesia sought to maintain
relations with China. Nonetheless, the Indonesian student
attacks persisted intermittently throughout 1966 and 1967 up to
the freeze in relations. One Chinese diplomat was killed, and
some forty diplomats and staff were wounded; and all Chinese
diplomatic facilities were destroyed or at least damaged.

The episode of the Red Guard demonstrations and attack on
the Indonesian Embassy in August 1967 was not directed so much
at Indonesia or its policies, but as part of a new level of
radical activism which resulted, during the same weeks, in
attacks on the Indian, Burmese, and British embassies, later
referred to as the sanzayishao (three smashes, one burning—that is, the smashing of the Indian, Burmese and Indonesian embassies in Beijing, and the burning-down of the British Chancellery). In the end there was a rupture of China’s relations with only one of those four diplomatic partners: Indonesia.

While the events, personalities, and groups in the Cultural Revolution, such as the February Adverse Current and its backlash, and the rampages of the Red Guards, can be made out to be instrumental in the breakdown of relations with Indonesia, the roles of individuals, groups, and events are not as easily discerned on the Indonesian side. One reason has been the repression of information during Suharto’s New Order rule from 1966 to 1998, not only inside Indonesia, but through the convenience of sources abroad. The thrust of this dissertation has been to examine the roles of various, disparate groups to see the nature and extent to which each group may have contributed to the break in relations with China. The activities of the student groups, KAMI, KAPPI, KASI, and affiliates, organized, directed, supported, and protected by the Indonesian army, under the direction of General Suharto and his subordinates, with the active involvement of General Nasution, contributed in a major way to the rupture of relations with China.

The role of the Indonesian Chinese was found to be greatly more variegated; the nature of the role depended on which groups
of Chinese were being looked at. Note that Indonesian-Chinese played active parts in activities of both the PKI and the student groups, but not in the Indonesian military, government, or foreign affairs activities. The findings of this dissertation are that the Indonesian-Chinese did not hold sway over the policies and activities of the PKI during the period leading up to Gestapu. The New Order government position that the PKI masterminded the failed coup on September 30 and October 1, 1965, is challenged by the findings of this research. If the PKI wasn’t responsible for Gestapu, then, by definition, neither the Indonesian-Chinese, nor the PRC (government nor party) could have been responsible for the attempted coup. It follows then that Indonesia’s freeze of relations was falsely based insofar as the Suharto government blamed China for Gestapu.

Indonesian-Chinese leaders of the student groups bear a direct responsibility, along with indigenous student leaders (príbumí students), and the Indonesian army which backed the student groups, for the rupture of relations with China.

Indonesian-Chinese businessmen, Liem Sioe Liong, “Bob” Hasan, and others played key roles in toppling President Sukarno and strengthening the hand of General Suharto and the army. The term businessman is inadequate to describe their categories; cukong, meaning financial backer and underwriter in a borderline legal sense, is the Indonesian term that is most fitting. General Suharto’s cukongs, as pointed out earlier also enabled
him to continually amass power and control as the New Order moved into programs of economic development between 1965 and 1998. In the ethos of Indonesian culture, the admixture of pribumi (predominantly Javanese) political power and Indonesian-Chinese wealth is a winning combination for exertion of control over the country. The result is a win-win for both sides; the indigenous Indonesian political (or military, or both) leader is able to fund his or her grand designs, and the Indonesian-Chinese financial backers are able to receive regime protection, for themselves and others favored by them, from anti-Chinese activities.

The final cluster of Indonesian-Chinese to be addressed incorporates those not mentioned above, all others, peranakan and totok shop keepers, small businessmen, craftspeople, farmers, workers, teachers, artisans, and other walks of life along with their (usually extended) family units. Their role was that of scapegoat and the persecuted. They were repeatedly attacked, and their property destroyed or confiscated. Herded into camps, with some shipped off to the PRC, this group became a political football between the Republic of Indonesia and the People’s Republic of China (note especially the contents of Appendix B). While these Indonesian-Chinese held no power in the political mosaic of the Indonesia-China face-off; the negotiations concerning their fate had quite a bit to do with the final rupture of relations between the two countries. In
effect Indonesia held them hostage in order to wheedle what was
desired out of the PRC. The PRC had to deal with the obvious
loss of power, and face, as demonstrated by its inability to
protect and preserve Chinese in Indonesia thereby
disenfranchising China’s claim to sovereignty over Chinese
living abroad.

The Indonesian New Order government’s claim of PRC
involvement in Gestapu remains unsubstantiated. Beside the
authoritative CIA research study, Indonesia 1965: The Coup that
Backfired which states that evidence does not exist to prove PRC
involvement in Gestapu, other sources and authors, as shown
herein, also challenge, question, or deny China’s backing of
Gestapu. Examination of Indonesian sources failed to turn up
substantial evidence to support the Suharto government’s claim
of Chinese government or party involvement in Gestapu.
Extensive review of Chinese sources, classified, declassified,
unclassified, private, manuscripts, and interviews and
conversations all resulted in lacunae in the evidence to
indicate PRC involvement in Gestapu. Granted the PRC would be
reluctant to admit if it had been involved in Gestapu, however
this dissertation scoured sources in Chinese (both inside China
and abroad), in Bahasa Indonesia, and in the English language,
classified as well as declassified, to discover evidence of
Chinese involvement in Gestapu. Authoritative sources such as
Zhang Haitao (New China News Agency-in Indonesia before, during
and after the failed coup) and Huang Ailing (the Indonesian-Chinese Director of the Southeast Asia Division of Radio Peking at the time) directly deny PRC involvement in Gestapu. If China was not involved in Gestapu, the Suharto government’s claim that one reason for its freeze in relations was China’s involvement in Gestapu is a false claim, and a false reason to break relations; the result having been nearly a quarter century of ruptured relations based on a false premise.

As in the case of the New Order government’s claim that the PKI masterminded (mendalangi) Gestapu, the Suharto regime’s claim that the PRC was involved (diterlibatkan) in the attempted coup is not to be understood to have been wholly refuted herein. More information may emerge as both societies move toward greater openness. This dissertation challenges the Suharto New Order government’s claim that China was involved in the attempted coup. That challenge is based on a review of sources in three languages and inquiry in both China and Indonesia. Solid proof of the Suharto government’s claim would be heartily welcome.

Now that the two governments have reestablished diplomatic relations the search for the reasons for the rupture in relations becomes at once more possible and more difficult. Neither country wants to reopen old wounds of those chaotic years of the mid-1960s. On the other hand, third party observers are now able to attain more information on that time.
in history, especially as Indonesia moves forward in its reformasi and China experiences increased openness in its information sources. In the meantime this dissertation uses the available evidence to frame the breakdown in relations between China and Indonesia in terms of the chaotic domestic situations in each nation, during the same two year period between October 1965 and October 1967. Those domestic dramas played themselves out in their foreign relations, the Jingju-Wayang encounter, and resulted in the final rupture in their relations in October, 1967.
APPENDIX A

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND THE CHAIN OF COMMAND IN
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST-PKI SYSTEM

HUBUNGAN LALU LINTAS INTELLIGENCE DAN RANTAI KOMANDO KOMUNIS

This organizational diagram, level one, is modified from the original. Some words are illegible on the original copy by A. H. Saigian, "Dinas Intelligence (Rahasia) komunis: Marxisme Idee Penggerakan Mengchianati Tanah Air (III), Mingguan Angkatan Bersendjata, Edisi Mandala, 12 Feb. 1967: 3.

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This organizational diagram, level one, is modified from the original. Some words are illegible on the original copy by A. H. Siagian, "Communist Secret Intelligence Service: Marxist Ideology Behind Treason to the Fatherland, part 3, Mingguan Angkatan Bersendjata, Mandala Edition, 12 Feb. 1967: 3.
FRONT ORGANISASI INTERNASIONAL
BURUH, WANITA,
AHLI HUKUM, PEMUDA, WARTAWAN,
KONGRES (..), PENDERANG [SIC] (..),
ORGANISASI TINGKAT,
ASIA DAN AFRIKA

FRONT ORGANISASI INDONESIA
B.T.I. (BARISAN TANI INDONESIA)
LEKRA (LEMBAGA KEBUDAYAAAN RAKYAT)
SOBSI (SENTRAL ORGANISASI BURUH
SELURUH INDONESIA)
GERWANI (GERAKAN WANITA INDONESIA)
PEMUDA – RAKJAT
C. G. M. I. DLL.
(CENTRAL GERAKAN MAHASISWA INDONESIA)
DLL. (DAN LIAN-LAINYA-AND SO FORTH)

This organizational diagram, level two, is modified from the original. Some words are illegible on the original copy by A. H. Saigian, "Dinas Intelligence (Rahasia) komunis: Marxisme Idee
Penggerakan Mengchianati Tanah Air (III), Mingguan Angkatan
Bersendjata, Edisi Mandala, 12 Feb. 1967: 3."
This organizational diagram, level two, is modified from the original. Some words are illegible on the original copy by A. H. Siagian, "Communist Secret Intelligence Service: Marxist Ideology Behind Treason to the Fatherland, part 3, Mingguan Angkatan Bersendjata, Mandala Edition, 12 Feb. 1967: 3.
This organizational diagram, level two (continued), is modified from the original. Some words are illegible on the original copy by A. H. Saigian, "Dinas Intelligence (Rahasia) komunis: Marxisme Idee Penggerakan Mengchianati Tanah Air (III), Mingguan Angkatan Bersendjata, Edisi Mandala, 12 Feb. 1967: 3.
This organizational diagram, level two (continued), is modified from the original. Some words are illegible on the original copy by A. H. Siagian, "Communist Secret Intelligence Service: Marxist Ideology Behind Treason to the Fatherland, part 3, Mingguan Angkatan Bersendjata, Mandala Edition, 12 Feb. 1967: 3.
This organizational diagram, level three, is modified from the original. Some words are illegible on the original copy by A. H. Saigian, “Dinas Intelligence (Rahasia) komunis: Marxisme Idee Penggerakan Mengchanati Tanah Air (III), Mingguan Angkatan Bersendjata, Edisi Mandala, 12 Feb. 1967: 3.
This organizational diagram, level three, is modified from the original. Some words are illegible on the original copy by A. H. Siagian, "Communist Secret Intelligence Service: Marxist Ideology Behind Treason to the Fatherland, part 3, Mingguan Angkatan Bersendjata, Mandala Edition, 12 Feb. 1967: 3."
This organizational diagram, level four, is modified from the original. Some words are illegible on the original copy by A. H. Saigian, "Dinas Intelligenz (Rahasia) komunis: Marxisme Idee Penggerakan Mengchianati Tanah Air (III), Mingguan Angkatan Bersendjata, Edisi Mandala, 12 Feb. 1967: 3.
This organizational diagram, level four, is modified from the original. Some words are illegible on the original copy by A. H. Siagian, "Communist Secret Intelligence Service: Marxist Ideology Behind Treason to the Fatherland, part 3, Mingguan Angkatan Bersendjata, Mandala Edition, 12 Feb. 1967: 3.
APPENDIX B

TRANSLATIONS OF CHINESE DIPLOMATIC NOTES TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA

All PRC Diplomatic Notes other than those dealing with
Indonesian student attacks and related activities (translated in
Chapter eight) are translated from the original Indonesian as
contained in Departemen Luar Negeri [Indonesia Ministry of
Foreign Affairs], Laporan Research-Ikhtisar Kejadian-Kejadian
Dalam Hubungan: R.I.-R.R.C. Setelah Peristiwa Percobaan Kudeta
G.30.S/PKI 1 Oktober 1965 Sampai Pembekuan Hubungan Diplomatik
Akhir Oktober 1967 [Research Report- A Recapitulation of Events
in Relations between R.I. (Republic of Indonesia)-R.R.C.
(P.R.C.-People's Republic of China) after the Attempted Coup
d'état G.30.S./PKI [Gestapu] 1 October, 1965 to the freeze in
Diplomatic Relations in late October, 1967], (Jakarta:
Direktorat Research, 1972, Serial No. :007/STR/23/XII/72;
mimeograph copy on legal-size paper), 4-12. The format follows
that which is found in the original except that the Laporan
Research page number is added at the end of each entry.

21-10-65 the quarters of PRC Embassy personnel and
Conefo (Conference of New Emerging Forces) building
construction technical specialists located at Number
27, Jati Petamburan Road [Jakarta] were forcibly
searched by a soldier armed with a machine gun and
accompanied by two [Indonesian] civilians (orang
preman) (PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note 22-10-65,
Laporan Research, 4).
22-10-65 Chinese technical specialists here to assist the Republic of Indonesia in construction of the Banjaran textile factory were examined and frisked by Indonesian Army troops (PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note 25-10-1965, Laporan Research, 4).

The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Note of 26-10-1965 states among other things that [original is in English] “The Indonesian Army authorities have spread the lie that China has smuggled in arms along with shipments of building materials for the mansion of the Conference of New Emerging Forces” (Laporan Research, 4).

Since the beginning of October 1965, in various parts of Indonesia there have occurred tyrannical crimes (kejahatan-kejahatan penganiayaan) carried out by Indonesian rightist forces (kekuatan kanan Indonesia) against Overseas Chinese (perantau-perantau Tionghoa) (PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note 4-11-1965, Laporan Research, 4).

Serious mistreatment was suffered (diderita) by Overseas Chinese in Ambon, Bonthain and other locations (PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note, 26 November 1965, Laporan Research, 5).

Mistreatment [has taken place against] Overseas Chinese in Central Java to include Semarang, Solo, Cepu, Yogya and other places (PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note, 27 November 1965, Laporan Research, 5).


Mistreatment [has occurred] in various locations on the Island of Bali from 29 November to 10 December 1965, namely in Singaraja, Denpasar, and Klungkung.
The Year 1966

The PRC Embassy Note of 12 January 1966 says that between 25 and 30 December 1965, there occurred mistreatment and killings (pembunuhan) in a number of places on the Island of Lombok. More than 20 people were killed (Laporan Research, 5).

PRC Embassy Note 27-3-1966 states that on 12-3-1966 thousands of rioters (perusuh) attacked 13 Overseas Chinese schools in the City of Bandung. That followed the rioters' forceful occupation (diduki dengan paksa), from 14 to 19 March 1966, of Overseas Chinese schools in Bogor, Krawang, Cimahi, Garut, Cianjur, Purwakarta, Sukabumi and Tasikmalaya, to the point where 30 thousand overseas Chinese students [were forced to] abandon (terlantar) their schools. In the same manner on 18-3-1966 three Overseas Chinese schools in Jakarta and 7 Overseas Chinese schools in Makassar were damaged by rioters (Laporan Research, 6).

21-3-1966 saw attacks on and destruction of Overseas Chinese schools, association halls, shops, and homes in Lampung and Jambi (PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note, 2 April 1966, Laporan Research, 6).

PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Note 12-4-1966 seeks 4 types of permits from the Government of Indonesia as follows:
1. Immediately prepare shipping to receive PRC citizens (WN-Warga Negara) who wish to return [to China] of their own free will.
2. Allow them to bring their possessions and funds (dana).
3. Guarantee food and safety for them while at the port of departure (dipelabuhan-pelabuhan).
4. Provide shelter for official representatives of China who will be assisting with the arrangements for the return of Chinese citizens to China (Laporan Research, 7).

Since the middle of January 1966 there has been widespread mistreatment and killing in the Bima regency (Kabupaten) in the Province (Propinsi) of West Nusatenggara (PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note, 25-4-1966, Laporan Research, 8).

Since 15 April 1966 there have been many anti-Chinese (anti-Tionghoa) incidents in the Aceh area. (PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note, 11 May 1966, Laporan Research, 8).

PRC Embassy Note 22 May 1966, five pages long, describes events which have taken place at, or which were taken against, Overseas Chinese schools and associations throughout Indonesia (Laporan Research, 8).

On 28 May 1966, the PRC Consulate in Banjarmasin was occupied by Indonesian rightist rioters along with bad elements (anasir-anasir) of the Chiang Kai-sek (Chiang Kai Shek) gang (gerombolan) (PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note, 1 June 1966, Laporan Research, 8).

In the beginning of May 1966, within the framework of warnings implemented in Langsa (Aceh) by Military Command (Korem) 011, Regional Military Command (Kodam) 1 Indonesia, Commander (Panglima) Kodam 1 ISHAK DJUARSA arrived in Langsa and ordered the Panca Tunggal (the five top officials in a provincial
government) to more intensively plan anti-China (anti-Tiongkok) and anti-Chinese (anti-Tionghoa) activities. The result was a declaration that "All Chinese must leave Aceh by June or July at the latest, you may not stay here" (PRC Diplomatic Note, 27 June 1966, 5 pages, Laporan Research, 8).

Commander (Panglima) Military Area VI Indonesia Ibrahim Adjie as the Regional Authority to Implement Dwikora (Pepelda [sic] Pepelrada-Penguasa Pelaksanaan Dwikora Daerah), West Java, on 6 July 1966 issued a directive which prohibited and banned all Overseas Chinese and Chinese citizen (WN RRC) associations within the territory and for confiscation of all wealth, riches, and property belonging to said associations (mensita semua harta benda milik perkumpulan-perkumpulan tersebut) (PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note, 19-7-1966, Laporan Research, 9).


More than 3100 Chinese citizens (WN RRC) from Banda Aceh, Meulaboh, Sigli, Tapatuan, Bireuen, Takengon, Lhokseumawe, Idi, Langsa, Mualal Simpang, Kutacane and other cities in Aceh have been [forcibly] moved to Medan since the first week in August 1966 (PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note, 31-8-1966, 4 pages, Laporan Research, 9).

Since the end of July 1966, the Immigration Offices in West Jawa, Sumatra, Kalimantan, and other areas, have all contacted the the principals of Overseas Chinese schools and given them the order to, along with their families (beserta keluarga), depart Indonesia within a limited time period (dalam waktu terbatas). As the principals are not capable of returning to China at their own expense the Government of Indonesia has the responsibility to return them (PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note, 1 September 1966, Laporan Research, 9).
On 17 September 1966, the Deputy Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Asia-Pacific Division (ASPAC DEPLU), MARSJUNI in response to the PRC Consul-General in Jakarta, stated that the Government of The Republic of Indonesia only agrees to Junior Consul Kuang Shu-ming traveling to Medan to arrange for the return of Chinese citizens [to the PRC]. Besides the Consul-General and the Consul for Medan, others are not authorized (Adapun lain-lainya ialah Konsul Jenderal dan Konsul untuk Medan tidak diperbolehkan) (PRC Embassy Note, 17 September 1966, Laporan Research, 9).

PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Note 20 September 1966 informed that the first Chinese ship, s.s. Kuang Hua would arrive at the port of Medan on 22 September 1966 to receive those Chinese citizens who wished to return of their own free will (Laporan Research, 9).

On 10 October 1966 there was an incident in the holding area for evacuees (pengungsi) from Aceh, located at a school in Medan. 40 to 50 evacuees [original text moves to page 10] were taken into custody, they engaged in a hunger strike (mogok makan) in protest (PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note, 18 October 1966, Laporan Research, 9-10).

The ship the s.s. Kuang Hua will reach port at Medan, for the second time, around 6 November 1966 (PRC Foreign Ministry Diplomatic Note, 29 October 1966, Laporan Research, 10).

On 9 November 1966 more than 400 Indonesian rightist rioters attacked and injured (melukai) more than 80 Chinese citizen evacuees at the evacuation camp just as the ship Kuang Hua was docked (berlabuh) at the port in Medan (PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note, 13 November 1966, Laporan Research, 10).
PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note 11 January 1967 stated that on 20 December 1966, the Commander of Komando Daerah Militer [Kodam] XII KAYACUDU issued an "order" (Surat Keputusan), to be carried out within one month, in which it was directed that there would be an evacuation from the Province of West Kalimantan of Overseas Chinese responsible for Overseas Chinese associations (Laporan Research, 10).

PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note 15 January 1967 states that on 31 December 1966, the Commander of Indonesian Daerah Militer VIII Sumitro in his capacity as the Regional Authority to Implement Dwikora (Peplrada) in East Java issued 4 "orders" as follows:

1. Chinese citizens (WN RRC) are prohibited from engaging in major business activities or acting as business intermediaries (perantara) in East Java, and especially in the municipality (kota-madya) of Surabaya;
2. Chinese citizens are forbidden to move from one area to another area in the region of East Java.
3. Each Chinese citizen permanently residing in East Java must provide a mandatory special contribution (sumbangan wajib istimewa) of 2,500 Rupiah,-new money for 1966 (-uang baru bagi tahun 1966);
4. The Chinese spoken and written language (Bahasa dan huruf Tionghoa) is forbidden to be used in the economic, financial, administrative, and telecommunication sectors in East Java (Laporan Research, 10).

PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note 25-1-1967 expressed significant anger (menyatakan kemarahan yang sangat besar) over the eviction of Assistant Naval Attaché Shih Hsin-jen who was given a very limited time period in which to depart Indonesia (Laporan Research, 10).

More than 300 Overseas Chinese association evacuees from Sinkawang, Pasi, Tebas [original text moves to page 11] Selakau, Bengkayang, Pamangkat, Sei Duri and Senggau were forcibly herded (digiring dengan paksa)

On 14 March 1967, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs changed the name Republik Rakyat Tiongkok to "Republic Rakyat Cina" on envelopes and documents sent to the PRC Embassy (PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note, 18 March 1967, Laporan Research, 11).

Anti-Chinese and anti-China incidents in Situbondo on 6 and 7 April 1967, caused the death of Oey Kian Min, who has been cited as a fallen hero (pahlawan almarhum) in two PRC Embassy Diplomatic Notes, of 8 and 12 April 1967 (Laporan Research, 11).

In the case of the incident wherein NING SIANG YU was killed at the place where he had been imprisoned since 8 April 1967 [,] on 20-4-1967 he was taken for burial. Enrout, on the Mangga Besar bridge those in the funeral procession were attacked by armed troops and Indonesian rightist rioters, with the result that many Overseas Chinese were herded together and injured (PRC Diplomatic Note, 20-4-1967, Laporan Research, 11).

PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note 23 May 1967 refused to accept and would not acknowledge the reasons put forth by the Government of Indonesia relating to the death of Ning Siong Yu, which had been contained in the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Note [of] 28 April 1967 with two appendices (Laporan Research, 11) [see Appendix C: Translations of Indonesian Diplomatic Notes to the Government of the People’s Republic of China, for the Indonesian Foreign Ministry Note of April 28, 1967 (Laporan Research, 13)].

As late as 21 May 1967, many Overseas Chinese were rounded up (dikonsetrasikan [sic]) in Menpawah, Kabupaten (regency) Pontianak, with a count of over 500 people (PRC Diplomatic Note, 27 May 1967, Laporan Research, 11).
PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note 27 May 1967 opposes the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Note 27 May 1967 which asserted that the Government of China did not fulfill its responsibility for the protection of the personal safety and possessions of those in the Indonesian Embassy in Peking when it was demonstrated against (Laporan Research, 11).

PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note 4 July 1967 opposes the indictment relating to (mengajukan tuntut-tuntutan berkenan) the problem of the Overseas Chinese gathered together in Medan (in 14 collection sites which still contain 6,600 [sic] people remaining after a total of 4,251 [sic] people have already been returned to China in two previous shiploads). The indictment referred to depicts the Government of China as failing to make preparations to dispatch another ship for a third trip (Laporan Research, 11).

Since February 1967 the Government of Indonesia has refused entry of all items mailed (semua barang-barang kiriman pos) from the PRC to the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta. Since 16 September 1967 items which have been mailed have reached a total weight of about 5000 kg, and have contained items such as “Ren Min Rih Bao”, “Peking Review”, “Tiongkok Rakyat” and various other Chinese books and magazines (PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note, 16 September 1967, Laporan Research, 12).

On 14 September 1967, the Government of Indonesia announced that the Chinese Embassy is prohibited from continued use of (tidak diperbolehkan melanjutkan penggunaan) its [communications] transmitter (PRC Embassy Diplomatic Note, 16-9-1967, Laporan Research, 12).

Interim Charge d'Affaires (Kuasa Usaha a.i.) of the Republic of Indonesia in Peking, NAHAR SJAMUDDIN, and Second Secretary (Sekretaris II), ALEX RUMASI, have been declared personae-non-gratae (dipersona-non-gratakan) by the Government of the PRC. They must leave the PRC prior to 29 September 1967 (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Note, 25 September 1967, Laporan Research, 12).

PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Note 28 October 1967 states that in relation to the Government of Indonesia having already halted diplomatic relations with the PRC (telah menghentikan hubungan diplomatic dengan RRC), the PRC Government has decided to close temporarily (menetapkan untuk menutup sementara) the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta, and the PRC Consulates in Jakarta, Medan, Makassar and Banjarmasin. Henceforth the Rumanian Embassy will represent the interests of the PRC (Selanjutnya Kedutaan Besar Rumania mewakili kepentingan-kepentingan RRC) (Laporan Research, 12).

This ends the recording of the Indonesian summaries of the contents of The People's Republic of China's Diplomatic Notes to the Government of The Republic of Indonesia. The entire collection of Chinese diplomatic notes between October 8, 1954 and September 21, 1967, in full text, in Indonesian (some in English) is contained in Departemen Luar Negeri [Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Dokumenta Diplomatica No. 4, Hubungan Republik Indonesia Dengan Republik Rakyat Tjina Dalam Masa Sesudah G-30-S/P.K.I. [Diplomatic Series Document No. 4, Relations between the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of China During the Period Following G-30-S/P.K.I.], (Djakarta: Direktorat Research, Biro Research Umum, 1967), classified Hanja untuk intern Deplu [for internal distribution within the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs only], mimeograph copy on legal-size paper, Bagian Kelima (Part V), Lampiran II (Annex II), 76-126.
APPENDIX C

TRANSLATIONS OF INDONESIAN DIPLOMATIC NOTES TO THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

All Indonesian Diplomatic Notes are translated from the
original Indonesian as contained in Departemen Luar Negeri
[Indonesia Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Laporan Research-
Ikhtisar Kejadian-Kejadian Dalam Hubungan: R.I.-R.R.C. Setelah
Peristiwa Percobaan Kudeta G.30.S/PKI 1 Oktober 1965 Sampai
Pembekuan Hubungan Diplomatik Akhir Oktober 1967 [Research
Report- A Recapitulation of Events in Relations between R.I.
(Republic of Indonesia)-R.R.C. (P.R.C.-People’s Republic of
China) after the Attempted Coup d’etat G.30.S./PKI [Gestapu] 1
October, 1965 to the freeze in Diplomatic Relations in late
October, 1967], (Jakarta: Direktorat Research, 1972, Serial No.
This information is translated from Section B., Part V of the
Laporan Research. The format follows that in the original
except that the Laporan Research page number is added at the end
of each entry.

V. Republic of Indonesia Protest Notes (Nota-Nota Protes RI)

The contents of the notes from the Indonesian side
generally are concerned with making clear to the PRC that the
incidents which have come about since the treasonous G-30-S/PKI
(pengkhianatan G-30-S/PKI) have been engendered by the
unfriendly behavior of the PRC (sikap RRC yang tidak
bersahabat). Only 14 Indonesian Notes have been gathered (terkumpul) herein by the Directorate of Research. The most applicable Indonesian Notes (Pada pokoknya Nota-Nota RI) address issues as follows:

Republic of Indonesia Note 9 February 1966 - This Note responded to the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (KEMLU RRC) 3 February 1966, Diplomatic Note relating to the student demonstration in front of the PRC Embassy in Jakarta on 3-2-1966. Among other things the Note states that the Indonesian Government deplores (menyesalkan) the destruction of PRC Embassy property and any improper shouting (teriakan-teriakan yang pantas) from the demonstrators. On the other hand the Indonesian Government basically understands the students' anger (pada dasarnya dapat memahami kemarahan para mahasiswa itu), which manifested itself in that demonstration as a [original text moves to page 13] fitting (wajar) reaction and [illegible word] from the disappointed feelings (perasaan kecewa) which have continually been felt against the continuous broadcasts of Radio Peking lately, which seem to be an unfriendly campaign placing judgment against various problems within Indonesia. The Indonesian Government has already directed various government agencies to make an assessment and to state what might be needed to make up the material loss, in accordance with estimates by the Government of China (apabila diajukan oleh pemerintah RRC, Laporan Research, 12-13).

Republic of Indonesia Diplomatic Note 19-4-1967 states, among other things, that on 12 April 1967 several hundred youths pasted posters (plaket-plaket dan poster-poster), on the Indonesian Embassy in Peking which were filled with attacks on, and insults to, the Government of Indonesia which is a legal government (Pemerintah RI yang sah). It is to be remembered that on 11 April 1967 the Xinhua News Agency (Berita HSINHUA) in its bulletin wrote along the lines of an anti-Indonesia campaign, more over it is clear that the said youth activities are led and controlled (terpimpin dan dikendalikan) by PRC officials (oleh pihak resmi RRC) with the intention of worsening relations between Indonesia and China (maksud untuk memperburuk hubungan antara RI dan RRC, Laporan Research, 13).
Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Note 24 April 1967 declares Mr. (Tuan) YAO TENG-SHAN (Yao Dengshan), Chinese Embassy Chargé d’Affaires ad interim (Kuasa Usaha a.i.) and Mr. HSU JEN (Tuan Xu Ren), PRC Consul General in Jakarta, personae-nongratae. That is because those two officials are responsible for activities of the PRC Embassy and the PRC Consulate General in Jakarta designed to intentionally produce an atmosphere which caused a worsening of relations between Indonesia and the PRC (dengan sengaja telah menciptakan suasana yang mengakibatkan memburuknya hubungan antara Indonesia dan RRC). The two named officials are asked to depart Indonesia no later than 12.00 [sic] Saturday 29 April 1967 (Laporan Research, 13).

Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Note 28 April 1967 addresses the death of LING SIANG YU [referred to in the Chinese Note as NING SIONG YU, see PRC Embassy Diplomatic Notes 20-4-1967 and 23 May 1967, Laporan, 11] as follows: 1. Photocopy of the official report of autopsy (Visum er [sic] Repertum) by the doctor from the Criminological Institute of the University of Indonesia, Jakarta 21-4-1967 on the examination of the corpse (mayat) of LING SIANG YU (NING SIONG YU). 2. The Medical information sheet from the Police Department Doctor [,] dated 20 April 1967 [,] concerning the death of the Chinese citizen LING SIANG YU (NING SIONG YU). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejects the Chinese Embassy accusation that the death was the result of torturing (penyiksaan) by an official of the Government of Indonesia (Laporan Research, 13).

Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Note 4 May 1967 (No.D.0382/67/11) touches on (menyinggung) the public meeting in the Worker’s Stadium in Peking on 27 April 1967, where [Chinese] government officials (seorang pejabat resmi) [original text moves to page 14] in seats of honor (berkedudukan tinggi) during rantings (bergembar-gembor) and taunts with vile language (mencaci-maki) against [Indonesian] officials and against the government of Indonesia. (Note: The highest official will not be
named here). Within the framework of this anti-
Indonesian campaign the Government of the PRC did not
hesitate (tidak segan-segan) to use the power
borrowed from Djawato's name (menggunakan tenaga
sewaan Djawato). [Indonesian Ambassador Djawato
sought and gained asylum in the PRC on April 16,
1966, stating that he could no longer carry out the
duties assigned to him by President Sukarno with the
new regime under General Suharto in place, Huang
Ailing, Zhongguo yinni guanxi shijianbian [A Concise
History of Relations between China and Indonesia],
(Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1987),
classified nei bu faxing [for internal distribution
only], 102. Neither the Indonesian nor the Chinese
official chronologies record Djawato's defection, see
Xia Dongyuan, ed., Ershi shiji zhongguo daba lan
[Chronicle of 20th Century China], (Jilin: Jilin
renmin chubanshe, 1994), 821; and Xie Yixian, ed.,
Zhongguo wai jiao shi: Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo shi qi,
1949-1979 [A Diplomatic History of China: The Period
of the People's Republic, 1949-1979], vol. 3,
multivolume, (Yangzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe,
1996), 712; New China News Agency (NCNA), China's
Foreign Relations: A Chronology of Events 1949-1988,
compiled by New China News Agency (NCNA), edited by
Liang Liangxing, English language edition, (Beijing: 
Foreign Languages Press, 1989), 273-274; and
Departemen Luar Negeri, Penitya Penulisan Sedjarah
[indonesia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, History
Council], Dua Puluh Lima Tahun Departemen Luar Negeri
1945-1970 [Twenty Five Years of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs 1945-1970], (Jakarta: Departemen Luar
Negeri, 1971), Appendix A, 21; Dwipayana, G. and
Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, Team Dokumentasi Presiden RI,
eds., Jejak Langkah Pak Harto, 1 October 1965-27
Maret 1968 [Following the Footsteps of Pak [Soe]Harto
1 October 1965-27 March 1968], (Jakarta: PT Citra
Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1991), 67-68. Apparently
Djawato's defection remains a politically sensitive
subject to both governments, otherwise an event as
important as an ambassador's defection would surely
be carried in official chronologies. One wonders,
however why Djawato's defection is not recorded in
the official British Government's Embassy reporting
from Beijing, Jarman, Robert L. China: Political
Reports 1961-1970 vol. 3 of 3 volumes 1965-1970,
(London: Archive Editions Limited, Crown copyright
material from the Public Record Office, London,
We are indebted to Huang Ailing for describing Djawato's defection (Laporan Research, 13-14).

Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Note 4 May 1967 (No.D0383/67/11) registers severe protest (protes sekeras-kerasnya) to the actions of the PRC Government against the members of the Republic of Indonesia's [diplomatic] delegation in China and demands that no more incidents take place (mentuntut agar kejadian demikian tidak terulang lagi). Such actions were taken against Indonesian Chargé d'Affaires ad interim Baron SUTADISASTRA, and Chief of Information (Kepala bagian Penerangan) SUMARNO, both of whom were declared persona-non-grata [sic]. During their journey to Hong Kong, while still in Chinese territory (at the airport in Peking and in Canton) they encountered foul actions (mendapat perlakuan sangat buruk-demonstrations by thousands of people cursing them, pushing them and in some instances, striking them-didemonstrasi oleh beribu-ribu orang dengan dicaci-maki, didorong dan kadang-kadang dipukul) (Laporan Research, 14).

Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Note 24 May 1967 addresses the huge demonstration against the Indonesian Embassy in Peking over a continuous 5 day period beginning on 24 April 1967 as well as the public meeting in the Peking Worker's Stadium on 27 April 1967 attended by approximately 100,000 [sic] people, and where the PRC Deputy Prime Minister /Security Minister SHIH FU-CHIH cursed the leaders of Indonesia. This note repeats the earlier information relating to the two Indonesian diplomats' experiences enroute to Hong Kong and the contrary (sebaliknya) treatment Indonesia rendered YAO TENG-SHAN and HSU JEN, who did not encounter any annoyance (tidak mendapat ganguan) after they were declared persona-non-grata by the Indonesian Government (Laporan Research, 14).

Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Note 27 May 1967 Addresses, among other things, the Indonesian Government request that the PRC Government provide a guarantee (jaminan) for the physical support and safety (perlindungan dan keamanan jiwa-
raga) of the Indonesian Embassy staff and their families in Peking. If that guarantee is not given, then the Indonesian Government will be forced (akan memaksa) to take further steps to insure the physical safety and tranquility (ketentraman) of the Indonesian Embassy staff in Peking (Laporan Research, 14).

Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Note 24 August 1967 states, among other things, that on 5 August 1967 there began a demonstration against the Indonesian Embassy in Peking which went on continuously for 5 days and that the Embassy was attacked and destroyed (diserbu dan rusak), thus the Indonesian Government issued the authorization to [original text moves to page 15] all Indonesian Embassy staff members to depart Peking as soon as possible (sesingkat-singkatnya). The duties of the Delegation in Peking will be carried out from some other place (Tugas Perwakilan Peking akan dilakukan dari lain tempat, Laporan Research, 14-15).


Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Note 14 September 1967 (No.0764/67/11) relates the order for persona-non-grata [sic] for PRC Embassy Chargé d’Affaires ad interim LU TZU-PO and Second Secretary SU SHENG (Laporan Research, 15).

Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Note 26 September 1967 puts forth the decision of the Indonesian Government that starting on 25 September 1967, none of the entire staff of the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta are authorized to leave the DCI Jakarta Raya [Daerah Chusus Ibukota-the Greater Jakarta Special Capital District, also termed DKI Jaya-Daerah Khusus Ibukota] without the prior approval from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (tanpa persetujuan terlebih dahulu dari DEPLU, Laporan Research, 15).

Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Open Cable no.73284 [no date] to the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kawat Biasa Terbuka dari Deplu no.73284 kepada Kemlu RRC) contains the Indonesian Government’s rejection (penolakan Pemerintah RI) of the Chinese Government’s intention of dispatching a plane to transport Chinese Embassy personnel in Jakarta back to China. That [the Chinese Government’s] intention can be permitted if the Chinese Government is prepared to transport the entire staff of the Indonesian Embassy in Peking first (Maksud itu diizinkan bilamana Pemerintah RRC bersedia mengangkut semua anggota staf KB RI di Peking terlebih dahulu, Laporan Research, 15).

Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Final Diplomatic Note 23 October 1967 (Nota DEPLU terakhir tanggal 23 Oktober 1967) directs the closure of the Office of the Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in Peking, until such time that it is possible for the Indonesian Embassy in Peking to resume its representational functions (menutup Kantor Kedutaan Besar Republik Indonesia di Peking, sampai keadaan memungkinkan bagi KB RI di Peking untuk menjalankan kembali tugas perwakilannya). Additionally the Indonesian Government demands that the Chinese Government order all personnel of the Chinese Delegations in Jakarta, Medan, Banjarmasin and Makassar to depart Indonesia in the shortest possible time. The Indonesian Government considers the Mission Offices (Kantor-Kantor Perwakilan) in Jakarta, Medan, Banjarmasin and Makassar to be closed beginning 30 October 1967, within a week of the dispatch of this Note (Laporan Research, 15).

This ends the recording of the Indonesian summaries of the contents of the Government of The Republic of Indonesia’s Diplomatic Notes to The People’s Republic of China. The full collection of Indonesian diplomatic notes between October 22, 1965 and October 23, 1967, in full text, in Indonesian (some in
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New China News Agency. See Xinhua She.


WDOC. See Zhou Nanjing.


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Zhonggong dangshi. See Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi.


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"Communiqué." See New China News Agency (NCNA PEKING).


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ECQ. See Pan, Lynn.


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FRUS CHINA. See Schwar, Harriet Dashiell.

FRUS INDONESIA. See Keefer, Edward C.


________. "Indonesian troops force 4 Chinese Aides to retreat into the Chinese embassy when they stepped outside with placards attacking the Indonesian government.” 7 Oct. 1967: 8.


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3. GERMAN LANGUAGE


4. INDONESIAN LANGUAGE


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Laporan Research. See Departmen Luar Negeri.


