MAPPING MANCHURIA: THE JAPANESE PRODUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN MANCHURIA-MANCHUKUO TO 1945

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For Naoko
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a study of Japanese efforts to produce and utilize knowledge in the construction and management of their infamous "puppet state" of Manchukuo (1932-45). Using archival Manchukuo planning and policy documents from the National Diet Library in Tokyo, prewar Japanese dispatches and documents from the National Archives of Japan (JACAR), an array of Manchuria and Manchukuo-era gazetteers and information books, as well as military and civilian maps from various sources and time periods, I have traced elements of what was a vast knowledge production "industry" on northeastern China in the prewar period. An understanding of Japanese knowledge production in Manchuria-Manchukuo helps explain, beyond the well-known narrative of military violence and economic exploitation, how the Japanese were able to successfully build the foundation of a new trans-national Asian state in northeastern China.

After the introductory overview, chapter two examines the rise of Manchuria in cartography, showing that Western and Japanese maps and mapmakers played a role in creating and perpetuating both the Manchurian geo-body and its now obsolete toponym. The next chapter on the mapping of Manchukuo demonstrates that there was a great deal of continuity between it and the cartographic tradition of Manchuria. Nevertheless, once the Japanese had a free hand to map Manchuria as they saw fit, they instituted a large-scale military mapping program built upon previous Japanese, Chinese, and Russian cartography. The military mapping of Manchukuo also corresponded with the civilian cartographic industry in Japan, which, along with Western modes of mapping Manchukuo, is analyzed in chapter three.
Chapters four and five look at Japanese textual knowledge production of Manchuria-Manchukuo, as well as the evolution of Manchurian knowledge structuring from the early 20th century into the 1930s. Chapters 2-5 culminate with chapter six, an examination of Manchukuo-era low-level planning and policies, including full and partial translations of key documents. In the epilogue I explore the aftermath of Manchukuo in the wake of the Soviet invasion, and suggest avenues for future research – in particular road and minor city planning -- based on documents discovered at the Diet Library but not utilized in the previous chapters.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Between April and June 1932 a commission dispatched from the League of Nations made up of five Westerners headed by Lord Victor Alexander Lytton traveled throughout the new northeast Asian country of Manchukuo.\(^1\) Their task was to determine, particularly through interviews, if there had actually been a popular uprising there resulting in the establishment of an independent Manchu nation.\(^2\) The hapless League members had been thrust into a no-win situation, for either the Japanese or Chinese side would come away displeased regardless of the League's findings. As it turned out, the commission managed to alienate both sides. For the Chinese, who had chosen the course of diplomacy and world opinion over war, the League's report was too conciliatory to the Japanese since it recognized Japan's significant interests in Manchuria and recommended what was, in effect, a return to the status quo ante.\(^3\) From the Japanese perspective, nothing less than world recognition of Manchukuo would be acceptable. The nearly unanimous decision (forty-two nations “yea,” Japan alone “nay,” with Thailand curiously

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\(^1\) Lytton was English, accompanied by an American, an Italian, a German, and a Frenchman.

\(^2\) For this dissertation I have decided to forego the use of irony quotes around “Manchukuo”, fully recognizing that scholars in China, Japan, and to a degree the US make use of them for various reasons. Regarding spelling, I shall also stay with the traditional Romanization of Manchukuo rather than “Manzhouguo,” which is the Pinyin transliteration. The majority of Chinese place names will be transliterated into Pinyin except when an historical spelling is deemed more appropriate such as Mukden, and Manchukuo's capital city Hsinking (Pinyin: Xinjing).

\(^3\) “. . . while granting the complicated nature of Sino-Japanese relations, the commission recommended the formation of a new administrative arrangement for Manchuria that would adequately protect Japan's special rights and interests and be consistent with the principle of Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria.” James Crowley, *Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1938* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 185-86. This outcome was a result of disagreement within the Commission, the French member of which encouraged recognition of Manchukuo. Rana Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 5.
abstaining\(^4\) handed down by the League on March 24, 1933 was a disaster. Whatever structural problems the League might have had before the Lytton Commission delivered its report, it was a tremendous blow to the nascent world body’s integrity when arch-imperialist Matsuoka Yōsuke and his contingent stormed out of the main hall. Japan had decided to go it alone in the world, the first step in its “quest for autonomy,” as historian James Crowley put it, and the eventual cutting off of East Asia from the international community.\(^5\)

In a private letter to his sister Lady Betty Balfour, the distinguished Lord Lytton was frank about what he had observed during his travels in Manchuria. The Manchukuo government was a “very patent fraud” he angrily confided, “in the hands of 10\(^{th}\) rate Japanese officials, who are puffed up with preposterous vanity . . . .”\(^6\) Nevertheless, Lytton went on to make a peculiar comment about the famous Puppet State that was at odds with his commission’s recommendations: “The fact is that Japan had bitten off more than she can chew and if left alone circumstances will be too strong for her . . . with no fruits to show for their violence, liberal opinion in Japan will begin to assert itself and the military party will be criticized for the mess they have got the country into.”\(^7\) Lytton may have been right that Manchukuo was a fraud, and he was probably also correct that it was run by low-level bureaucrats from Japan. Where he miscalculated tremendously, however, was in predicting Manchukuo’s eventual demise. During its thirteen-year, five-month existence Manchukuo readily survived, if not thrived. It was functioning viably up to the


\(^5\) Crowley.

\(^6\) Nish, 134.

\(^7\) Ibid.
August 1945 bitter end despite the war in East Asia, with a growing economy and increasingly modern and complex infrastructure. In June 1942, looking back on more than ten years of history, the Manchukuo government was able to claim that it had increased its air routes from 707 km to 15,480 km.\(^8\) In that same year the government could also boast that it had the 9\(^{th}\) largest population in the world,\(^9\) and only months before the Soviet Union broke its neutrality pact with Japan and invaded Manchuria on August 9, 1945 Japanese agricultural immigrants were still arriving in Manchukuo.\(^10\) The South Manchuria Railway’s (SMR) 1944 budget was the biggest in its thirty-nine year history,\(^11\) and when the smoke cleared from World War II, Manchuria, despite its low population density relative to the rest of China, had the highest density of railroads per square mile in the entire country. Fraudulent puppet state or otherwise, the Japanese were indeed building the framework of a country.\(^12\)

It is fair to say that beyond economics and militarism, Manchukuo has, until recently, only been lightly covered in Western historiography. One sign of this relative neglect is the absence of a general narrative history of Manchukuo in the English language, although key aspects of the period and important individuals have been studied to a sufficient degree so that this dissertation will forego a recounting of what is already

\(^8\) Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Research and Analysis Branch, Program of Japan in Manchukuo with Biographies vol. 1 (Honolulu: Research and Analysis Branch, Office of Strategic Services, 1945), 157.

\(^9\) Ibid., 25.

\(^10\) As late as April 1945 a pioneer column of 82 households comprising of 312 people arrived at a Japanese settlement in Fuyu County, Jilin Province. Takahashi Yukiharu, “Manshū e okurareta hisabetsu buraku,” Kan, 318. Also, that Japan was fully committed to Manchukuo’s success to the very end can be seen, for instance, in photos and descriptions from the Pauley Commission’s report on Manchuria carried out in spring 1946 in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion and occupation.

\(^11\) OSS vol. 1, 155.

\(^12\) Here I am defining “country” as a territorial unit with well-defined borders, a stable currency, a functioning communications network including post offices and radio broadcasts, a stable centralized government, a functioning economy, a flag, national anthem, unique holidays, and its own head of state. Manchukuo had all of these features.
known. Nevertheless, without a body of academic literature exploring the multiple facets of Manchukuo’s story it is difficult to determine how a pariah state like Manchukuo managed to succeed for thirteen and a half years, surrounded by hostile neighbors, all the while defying the will of the international community. Was it simply the liberal application of brute force and rule by fear, overwhelming domination in key areas of the economy, and the aid of traitorous puppet collaborators? Naturally those elements are at the core of any understanding of Manchukuo’s history, and yet it is unsatisfying to abandon the story there.

A cursory examination of the voluminous Japanese historiography of Manchuria-Manchukuo is evidence enough that there is still a great deal to learn about this aspect of Chinese-Japanese history. More important are the archives in Washington D.C. and Tokyo (and likely Russia and China as well) whose holdings include planning documents, policy papers, and communiqués of the South Manchuria Railway, the Kwantung Army, and numerous other agencies and organizations involved with Manchukuo state-building and administration.

13 The most complete account of Manchukuo in English is F.C. Jones’ *Manchuria Since 1931* (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), which is also heavily oriented towards economics. Tak Matsukata’s *The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904-1931* is a nuanced history leading up to Manchukuo that has potentially laid the foundation for future works dealing with the Puppet State. Louise Young’s *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), while focused on Manchuko’s impact on the popular culture of 1930s Japan, also provides detailed background information on Manchukuo. Finally, David Vance Tucker’s dissertation has an extended and useful background history of Manchukuo: David Vance Tucker, “Building ‘Our Manchukuo’: Japanese City Planning, Architecture, and Nation Building in Occupied Northeast China, 1931-1945” (Ph.D. diss., University of Iowa, 1999).

14 Even the concepts of “nationalism,” “collaboration” and “resistance” among the Chinese in early Manchukuo have recently been complicated: “Chinese nationalism ... struggled to take root in occupied Manchuria, even during the fourteen long years of occupation.” Mitter, 226.

15 John Young’s *The Research Activities of the South Manchurian Railway Company, 1907-1945: A History and Bibliography* (New York: East Asia Institute, Columbia University, 1966) annotates thousands of SMR plans, projects, and studies done (for Manchuria and elsewhere) prior to the collapse of the
This dissertation takes as its thesis that at the core of Japanese activities in Manchuria-Manchukuo there was a constant accumulation, categorization, processing, refinement, and production of knowledge in most key areas, in particular cartography, surveying, geography, communications, climate, geology, transportation, commerce, and manufacturing, not to mention population and ethnic studies, linguistics, archaeology, and history. Relentless in their pursuit of knowledge, the Japanese were determined not just to know as much as possible about their new country, but to be the arbiters of that knowledge and of what could be known about Manchukuo. On the civilian end, knowledge accumulation, analysis, and production in the form of books and maps became almost an industry in and of itself.\(^1^6\) In 1932 alone *Shuppan nenkan* (The Publishing Annual) listed eighty-eight books that had something to do with Manchuria-Manchukuo.\(^1^7\) As for the government, the extant Manchuria-Manchukuo policy and planning documents speak for themselves, none of which would have been possible without a firm foundation of high quality research and knowledge production of Manchukuo’s general and specific conditions.

The process of knowledge production began decades before Puppet State was formed or even conceived, and it continued throughout the Manchukuo period.\(^1^8\) Though it might be tempting to conclude that constant information accumulation and knowledge production equaled absolute power and control in Manchuria, that was not necessarily the

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17 *Shuppan nenkan* (Tokyo: Tōkyōdō, 1933), passim.

18 Some knowledge production was also carried out by the Russians and Chinese, later to be appropriated by the Japanese. This shall be discussed later in the dissertation.
case. More accurate, perhaps, is that the vast and constantly evolving knowledge database that was gradually developed before and especially after Manchukuo's March 1, 1932 establishment allowed the Japanese to begin maximizing Manchuria's potential almost immediately in ways that did not occur under Chinese warlord rule.

A good example of this was the advanced and widespread electrical grid powered chiefly by a complex series of large-scale dam projects on many of Manchukuo's fast-moving rivers. The electrification project started in 1934 and eventually became an immense Manchukuo industry that also supported Japan's war effort (especially aluminum production). It continued to develop until the very end of World War Two.\textsuperscript{19} One result of the project was, at the time, the world's largest man-made dam built on the Yalu River. A Japanese report claimed about the overall system that "... the total array of hydro-electric power plants in Manchukuo will give this empire the sound position as one of the greatest hydro-electric industrial countries on earth."\textsuperscript{20} The project was built not just upon the backs of Chinese labor, but also that of imported skilled engineering, modern construction techniques and management expertise from Japan, combined with a thorough understanding of Manchuria's conditions including weather, river flows, the dam sites' environment, and materials usage. All of Japan's guns, bayonets, and radical imperialists could not have built Manchukuo's electrical power grid and system of dams, which was to become the backbone of Manchukuo's rapid industrialization and urbanization. The electrification project was the end result of something infinitely more


\textsuperscript{20} OSS, 135.
sophisticated than thuggish militarism and was a process that depended on a constant flow of dependable information and deep knowledge in a myriad of areas.

Two famous studies of the relationship between knowledge production and power structures in colonial settings are Bernard Cohn's *Colonialism and its Form of Knowledge: The British in India*, and Timothy Mitchell's *Colonising Egypt*. There is definite overlap with their findings and Japanese rule in Manchukuo, and it is likely that future studies will bring this to the surface. However, Manchukuo did not fit neatly into a colonial mold as Prasenjit Duara has recently shown, and as a result neither did Japan's reasons for gathering information and producing knowledge about northeastern China. Therefore, this study will not rely heavily on post-colonial theory, nor will it utilize such works as Cohn’s and Mitchell’s books as models, although the chapters on mapping have been informed by the ideas of Thongchai Winichakul. Basically, my question is how did the Japanese succeed in controlling Manchukuo beyond the overt modes of brute militarism and refined economic colonialism? To answer this query I intend to focus on the story of Manchuria-Manchukuo maps, atlases, and various informational texts, and then explore their evolution over the decades leading up to and throughout the Manchukuo period. I shall also utilize a selection of Manchukuo government planning and policy documents, with an emphasis on translations, as a way to show the scope of the Japanese activities and bring their contents to a wider audience. As we shall see, the

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A combination of these elements was a Japanese project of major proportions resulting in a far-reaching knowledge production industry about Manchuria-Manchukuo.

**Historical Background**

Manchukuo was indeed a Japanese puppet state from March 1, 1932 to mid-August 1945, initially made up of China's three northeastern provinces: Jilin, Heilongjiang, and Mukden (now Liaoning), known collectively to the prewar non-Chinese speaking world as *Manchuria*. In 1933, the Japanese added Rehe Province (western Inner Mongolia) to its geographical body after finally crushing the remaining Chinese resistance there.\(^{24}\) Although its origins are complex, Manchukuo was, at first, largely the product of Japanese militarism spearheaded by the efforts of the refractory Kwantung Army. In particular, Manchuria-based field officers Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara Kanji, Colonel Itagaki Seishirō, and Colonel Doihara Kenji ("Doihara of Manchuria") conceived of Manchukuo, and were the masterminds behind the Mukden Incident conspiracy that led to Japan's conquest of Manchuria and the eventual establishment of the Puppet State.\(^{25}\)

The Incident effectively started Manchukuo, and some scholars have come to view it as the beginning of a "15-year war" against China.\(^{26}\) Using the Qing Dynasty's last emperor Pu Yi (alleged to have been induced to participate with a salary of $600,000

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\(^{25}\) Itagaki and Doihara were tried by the Americans as Class A war criminals, found guilty, and hanged in 1948.

\(^{26}\) Sandra Wilson has problematized the "15-year War" concept in *The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society, 1931-33* (London: Routledge, 2002), 3. Note: The "Mukden Incident" is what occurred the night of September 18, 1931, while the "Manchurian Incident" is the series of military operations from Sept. 18 to the establishment of Manchukuo on March 1, 1932.
a year by Colonel Doihara\textsuperscript{27}), and various other cooperative Chinese, notably a cabal of
minor Manchurian warlords and Qing irredentists, the Kwantung Army established
Manchukuo not as a colony, or as conquered territory, but as a purportedly independent
state. China-scholar Prasenjit Duara has found this to be highly significant in his new
book on Manchukuo.\textsuperscript{28} As is well known the Manchukuo regime’s Chinese members,
from Last Emperor Pu Yi on down, were generally opportunistic figureheads who had
been bribed, or had been forced to participate with the Japanese functionaries who were
actually the ones directing the course of events, writing laws, and making important
decisions for the state.\textsuperscript{29} Hence, Manchukuo is generally referred to as a “puppet state”
and has in fact been considered an archetype for analytical purposes.\textsuperscript{30} Despite desperate
trains by Manchukuo to make itself appear “real,” and even though a fair number of
countries gave it official, semi-, or de facto recognition during its lifespan, the
Manchukuo government was little more than an arm of the Japanese government run by
the Kwantung Army.\textsuperscript{31}

Altogether, Manchukuo lasted nearly fourteen years if the Manchurian Incident
and period of conquest leading to Manchukuo’s birth are included. If Manchukuo’s
liquidation, civilian repatriation, the post-war Manchuria chaos and civil war, and the

\textsuperscript{27} Brian Power, \textit{The Puppet Emperor: The Life of Pu Yi, The Last Emperor of China} (New York: Universe
\textsuperscript{28} Duara, 1.
\textsuperscript{29} Even this truism about the nature of Manchukuo is currently being revised. See especially Duara and
Mitter.
\textsuperscript{30} The long-standing use of “puppet state” may be coming to a close however, as Duara is calling for a new
\textsuperscript{31} Besides Japan, El Salvador, the Vatican, the Dominican Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary, Spain,
Germany, Italy, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Finland, Croatia, occupied Denmark, Romania, occupied Burma,
Thailand, occupied Philippines, and occupied China either semi- or fully recognized Manchukuo.
\textit{Manshūkoku shi (kakuron)} (Tokyo: Manmō Dōhō Engokai, 1970), 363-68. The Manchukuo regime also
claimed de facto recognition by the USSR after the purchase of the North Manchuria Railway from the
Soviets in 1935. David Vance Tucker suggested in his dissertation that the recognition issue has been
downplayed too much by historians. Tucker, 88.
Soviet capture of approximately 600,000 Japanese troops are also considered, the Puppet State’s saga went on through the late 1940s. Until Manchukuo’s collapse a tremendous amount of Japanese energy and treasure were devoted to building and managing Manchukuo. Within the Puppet State the Japanese built cities, railroads, airports, roads, dams and factories -- basically the infrastructure of a modern state. Japanese authors wrote widely about their new country in books, magazines and newspapers, analyzed and planned it in official documents, imagined it in poetry and paintings, photographed and filmed it to entice newcomers and impress the outside world, and consumed it through vacation packages and various sundry ephemera, a topic well documented by Louise Young in her popular 1998 Japan’s Total Empire. Yet Manchukuo was more than just Japanese imagination: it was a place where more than 40,000,000 people of various nationalities made their livings, raised their children, and died. They watched dramatic Chinese and Japanese-language movies and newsreels produced by the Manchurian Film Company (abbreviated as Man’ei 満映) that produced nearly 1,000 films between 1937 and 1945.32 Man’ei’s chief star was a Manchuria-born bilingual Japanese woman named Yamaguchi (Shirley) Yoshiko known as Li Xianglan (J: Ri Koran) to her Chinese audience. There were also times when the people of Manchukuo sang, or at least were forced to listen to Manchukuo’s national anthem, and one Japanese newspaper in Manchuria reported that “Everyone in Manchukuo” planted trees, or would be made to plant trees on the national “Grain and Rain Day” which was

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32 Yamaguchi Takeshi, Aishū no manshū eiga 哀愁の満州映画 (The Sorrow of Manchurian Film) (Tokyo: Santen Shobō, 2000), 17.
scheduled to take place on April 21, 1935.\textsuperscript{33} It was part of a larger push by the government to get the denizens of the new state to care for and protect the natural environment.\textsuperscript{34} The government also attempted to raise awareness among those living in Manchukuo of their equine friends on Love of Horses Day.\textsuperscript{35} Naturally this recounting of Manchukuo's odds and ends is not to make the "case for Manchukuo" as American (and paid Manchukuo employee) George Bronson Rea did in his 1935 book of that name.\textsuperscript{36} Rather, it is to emphasize that Manchukuo was a complete package about which much is still unknown.

Better understood is that by 1945 Manchukuo had been heavily industrialized, and had also been well exploited for its abundant natural resources such as coal, gold, and timber, along with its excellent soil that produced half the world’s soybean crop in the prewar period.\textsuperscript{37} Manchukuo was also supposed to be a place for adventurous Japanese to make a new life for themselves outside of the earthquake-prone, economically depressed, and overpopulated imperial homeland, and hundreds of thousands did heed the call to become settlers in both Manchukuo’s modern new cities, as well as in the settled and

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\textsuperscript{33} "21 nichi no koku-u hi ni zenzokuminteki ryokka undō" 21日の種樹日に全国民的緑化運動 ("Everyone in the Country’s Afforestation Movement on the 21st’s Grain and Rain Day"), in Manshū nippō, April 17, 1935.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{35} "June 7th is the day set for the ‘love of horses.’ It was originated in Manchukuo in the 7th year of Kotoku 1939, and the Horse Bureau of Manchukuo will sponsor programs teaching the people the importance of horses." Quoted in OSS, 23.

\textsuperscript{36} George Bronson Rea, The Case for Manchoukuo (New York: Appleton-Century, 1935). Rea, a former Hearst journalist who learned how to sway opinion during the Spanish-American War, made the chief claim that Manchukuo was an important bulwark against the spread of communism, and that KMT rule in China had been an unmitigated disaster.

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unsettled countryside. One group of settlers, Japan’s traditional outcastes known as “Burakumin,” found that not only did Manchukuo allow for the escape from discrimination and prejudice in their homeland, but it also put them in the novel position of being elite vis-à-vis the Chinese peasantry.

The Japanese story is only part of Manchukuo’s history. The rise of the Puppet State is closely linked to the demise of the League of Nations as noted above, and, arguably, the death of the Chinese warlord system, the weakening of the Republic of China, and the elimination of European hegemony in East Asia. Conversely, Manchukuo’s demise corresponded with the eventual birth of Communist China. It might also be argued that Manchukuo’s creation changed the course of events in East Asia further by temporarily stopping the advance of the Soviet Union which, starting in the 1920s, was setting up a ring of its own Asian communist client states around the outside of Russia proper.

The fate of the Republic of China and the Chinese people was also intimately tied to the events occurring in Manchuria. Naturally, of the various non-Japanese peoples in Manchukuo the ethnic Chinese probably lost out the most, although exactly what happened to the Chinese in Manchukuo is not easy to gauge. Again, Mitter’s and Duara’s

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38 Chu wrote that in 1927 only half of Manchuria’s cultivable land was under the plow, and in the northernmost and largest province of Heilongjiang two-thirds of the cultivable land had yet to be utilized. Hsu, 383-84.
39 Takahashi, 323.
41 Good examples of this are Tannu Tuva and Mongolia, both of which gained their “independence” from China in 1922 with the assistance of the Soviet Union. This “independence” was not recognized by China for twenty-four years. Tannu Tuva’s “independence” was still not recognized by the ROC when it was unceremoniously absorbed into the USSR in 1946, the same year that China finally recognized the People’s Republic of Mongolia.
recent books have served to problematize the traditional oppressor-oppressed dichotomy that has generally informed thinking about the Manchukuo experience from the Chinese perspective. In the immediate aftermath of the war the Pauley Commission to Manchuria assessed that under the Japanese "... the Chinese populations were exploited and used as a source of cheap labor. Nevertheless, in general the local people had employment, housing, and health care."42 Mentioning this is certainly not to ignore Japanese outrages in Manchuria such as the biological warfare Unit 731, as well as the systemic violence, brutal repression, land confiscations, forced relocations, military conscription for the Pacific War, and the humiliation of becoming second-class citizens in one's own land. However, Pauley's comments complicate the general understanding of the nature of the Manchukuo enterprise. Travel writer Peter Fleming summed up what he had witnessed in Manchukuo in 1933 as "enlightened exploitation," a caustic but perhaps not unreasonable assessment.43

After the Chinese the second largest ethnic group in Manchukuo was the Koreans, encouraged by the Japanese to move into the territory that bordered northern Korea. Today a couple of million ethnic Koreans live in northeastern China along the North Korean border, a result of this Manchukuo-era Japanese policy. The two other main Asian minority groups in Manchukuo, the Mongols and Manchus, were also part of the mix, although the most intriguing and pathetic group was arguably the white Russian settlers of Harbin and northern Manchuria, marooned there after the rise of the Soviet Union in 1917. They appear to have embraced the Manchukuo regime quite heartily, and

suffered in the post-Manchukuo period as a result. Of the 30,833 Russians living in Manchukuo’s cities in 1939, like the Japanese, virtually all of them fled or were ethnically cleansed from China in the two decades following Manchukuo’s collapse. Manchuria-Manchukuo, as a prewar meeting point for four major countries (China, Japan, Russia, and Korea), demands historical attention.

Until recently one might have said that a “school” of Manchuria-Manchukuo studies did not exist in Western historiography because there have only been sporadic releases of Manchuria-Manchukuo materials in the post-war period. What has appeared on Manchuria (and to a lesser extent Manchukuo) over the years, some of which was referred to above, has fortunately been of high quality and has added greatly to the general understanding of specific aspects of the period. David Tucker’s and Gregory Guelcher’s 1999 dissertations provide excellent overviews of this important postwar literature on Manchuria-Manchukuo, and so readers are encouraged to look there for further details. More useful at this point would be to explore briefly the Japanese literature of Manchukuo-Manchuria, how it has developed, what its concerns are, and consider it a potential barometer for where future Western studies of Manchuria-Manchukuo might be headed.


45 Statistic from *The Manchoukuo Year Book 1941* (Tokyo: Tōa Keizai chōsakyoka, 1942), 119. The fate of the “Harbinsty” as Russians in Manchuria were called by the USSR is the subject of Moustafine Mara’s *Secrets and Spies: The Harbin Files* (Sydney: Vintage, 2002), and Olga Bakich’s “Emigré Identity: The Case of Harbin,” in *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 99:1 (Winter 2000).

Japanese Literature on Manchuria-Manchukuo

The Japanese language literature on Manchuria-Manchukuo vastly outweighs that of the United States, Britain, and the rest of the Western world combined. One source to consider first is the two-volume *Manshūkokuishi* (A History of Manchukuo) that is often cited in Japanese works dealing with Manchuria-Manchukuo.\(^{47}\) The set was written by former Japanese members of the Manchukuo regime, and should be treated with some caution. Nevertheless, it is the most complete account of the Puppet State in any language, giving it a special position in the Japanese-language Manchuria-Manchukuo canon.

Because so much has been written about Manchukuo in Japan it has been possible to develop a typology of the literature. This was carried out in the Manchuria section of the 1996 edition of *Kindai nitchū kankei shi kenkyū nyūmon* (An Introduction to the Research of Sino-Japanese Relations History).\(^{48}\) The book divides the historiography of Manchukuo into eight distinct categories, and also includes an extra section on "sources and commentaries" related to Manchuria-Manchukuo studies. Despite its length and depth the study is not exhaustive; and as the title suggests it is meant to be an introduction. For Westerners it is a glimpse into a vibrant subfield of Japanese history, virtually none of which has been translated into English.\(^{49}\) The Manchukuo chapter is made up of the following eight sections that are subdivided into specific topics:


\(^{49}\) Western scholars often draw on the findings of Japanese scholars to complement their archival research, but full translations are rare. However, they do exist. A good example is Joshua Fogel’s translation of Ito Takeo’s *Life Along the South Manchurian Railway: The Memoirs of Ito Takeo* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1988). Another recent essay, David Buck’s "Railway City and National Capital: Two Faces of the Modern in Changchun," in Joseph Esherick, ed., *Remaking the Chinese City: Modernity and National Identity, 1900-1950* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000), drew "extensively" on Koshizawa Akira’s various writings about Manchukuo city planning.
TABLE 1

1) General Works on “Manchukuo”
2) “Nation Building” and its Foundation
3) The Economic System and “Development”
4) The SMR and the SMR Research Department
5) Agriculture and the Immigrant Policy
6) The Anti-Manchukuo and Resist-Japan Movement
7) “Manchukuo” within International Relations
8) Manchukuo’s Collapse and after

Section one:
“The Memory of ‘Manchukuo’”
“The Beginning of ‘Manchukuo’ Research”
“‘Manchukuo’ as a Colony”
“Research in China”
“Leads for Research”

Section two:
“From the Manchuria Incident to State Building”
“‘Manchukuo’s’ Organization and Supporters”
“The Manchukuo Concordia Association”
“Ishiwara Kanji and Tachibana Shiraki”
“Society and Culture”

Section three:
“Economic Policy and the Transfiguration of the Manchurian Economy”
“Finance and the Market”
“Mangyō [Manchurian Heavy Industries] and Japanese Capital”
“Industrial Development”

Section four:
“SMR Research”
“The SMR and the Kwantung Army”
“The SMR Research Department”

Section five:
“Farming Village Collaboration Policy”
“Farming Village Research and Manchurian Agriculture”
“Immigrant Policy”
“The Sending Away of Immigrants”
“The Circumstances of Agricultural Management and Korean Immigrants”

Section six:
“The Foundation of the Movement”
“The Korean Resist-Japan Movement”

Section seven:
“From the Manchurian Incident to ‘State Building’”
“The Resist-Japan Unified Front of Races”
“The League of Nations and the International Dispute”
"The Soviet Union and the 'Manchukuo'/Kwantung Army"

Section eight:
"The Soviet Entry into the War and the Postwar Treatment"
"The Japanese after Defeat"

The editors also went beyond categorization by including a genealogy of Manchukuo studies in Japan, as well as showing the connections between the various works. This list clearly demonstrates the state of Manchuria-Manchukuo studies in Japan as of 1996. Another group of Japanese scholars that has considered the significance of Manchukuo studies as a whole produced "Manshūkoku" no kenkyū (The Research of "Manchukuo"), a series of scholarly essays providing numerous leads for future Manchukuo research.50 Among the topics covered in this thick volume are economic development, infrastructure development, government, tariffs, and the arts.

That Manchukuo studies in Japan continues to thrive, and has a popular as well as scholarly audience, can be in seen in the summer 2002 issue of Kan: rekishi, kankyō, bunmei (Kan: History, Environment, Civilization), "a quarterly journal on learning and the arts for global readership" as it states in English.51 Approximately 350 of the journal’s 450-odd pages are devoted to Manchukuo, making this copy of Kan -- with its special title “Manshū to wa nan datta no ka” (What was Manchuria?) -- a veritable primer on current Manchukuo historiography in Japan. True, quantity does not necessarily equal quality, but in this case quantification is instructive because it highlights for those non-Japanese interested in Manchuria-Manchukuo where potential avenues for scholarly inquiry may lie. Along with two maps and a timeline of Manchukuo, there are thirty-eight

brief articles by scholars, writers, and witnesses of the Puppet State on an array of topics ranging from aspects of the South Manchuria Railway (SMR), imperialist Gotō Shimpei, and White Russians and Jews in Manchuria, to Man'ei, photographing Manchukuo, Manchuria in history, architecture, newspapers, ethnic groups, Koreans, and tourism. Though not boundless, the future of Manchuria-Manchukuo studies is bright.

To reiterate, the chief task of this dissertation is to explore various forms of Manchuria-Manchukuo knowledge accumulation and production, its evolution, and finally the concrete use of that knowledge. In chapters two and three I shall explore this from the perspective of the growth of Japanese cartography and surveying in Manchuria-Manchukuo, a massive and complex enterprise that was in some ways symbolic of the Manchukuo project as a whole. This is followed with a detailed reconstruction of the evolution of Japanese knowledge production of Manchuria in chapters four and five, and how knowledge production was manifested in popular information books, geographies, and Manchukuo-era provincial and county gazetteers. The final chapter takes a different but logical turn, translating (or partially translating) and analyzing six disparate low and medium-level planning and research documents that were a crucial part of Japan's effort to construct the state of Manchukuo as rapidly and efficiently as possible.
CHAPTER 2
MAPPING & SURVEYING MANCHURIA TO 1931

The Japanese approached the analysis of Manchuria, and later Manchukuo, in a myriad of ways, and over time those modes evolved as the Japanese became better acquainted with the region. The end result was large-scale Japanese production of knowledge about all facets of Manchuria, best seen in its voluminous literature published through 1945. This textual aspect of Japanese involvement in Manchuria will be discussed at length in chapters four and five. Another area of knowledge production was the surveying and mapping of northeastern China. Japan was not alone in this effort; but because of its special position in southern Manchuria, and later with the creation of Manchukuo, Japan went on to become the world's foremost producer of maps of Manchuria (and China), both for civilian and government use, through the end of World War II.¹

Accurate surveying and cartography are integral to modernity, whether dealing with property and land issues, national borders, or urban development.² Good maps and surveys were also part of colonialism and imperialism, although not to the extent that one might think.³ Beyond colonial administration, a by-product of this was the use of maps to

² I use the term "modernity," along with "modern," throughout this chapter with the full understanding of the philosophical debate surrounding its meaning and significance. In the case of surveying and cartography, I define them as part of a new consciousness that prized accuracy and precision not only as a means to an end, but also as an end in and of itself. Surveying and mapping as we know them today are a direct result of this shift to a "modern" consciousness.
³ In the case of the British Empire, surveying and cartography were often neglected, especially in remote regions. In fact in 1944 only 400,000 sq miles of the Empire's total 2,250,000 sq miles had yet been mapped, 16,000 miles called for primary triangulation chains, and 1,750,000 square miles needed control at the level of secondary triangulation. Alastair Macdonald, Mapping the World: A History of the Directorate of Overseas Mapping, 1946-1985 (London: HMSO, 1996), 18.
demonstrate national greatness by virtue of how much of the map was painted, say, British Red, allowing for civilians to "touch" their colonies abroad and become intimately familiar with their shape and location. In this manner world maps played a dual role. They first showed what part of the planet was already "taken" as it were, allowing for individuals who viewed or owned a map or atlas to participate in a small way in the imperial project. At the same time these same maps and atlases exposed what was still "blank" (that is un-colonized, as was most of Africa leading up to the so-called scramble there in the late 1880s), which in turn allowed for schemes of future colonization.

Can the impact of cartography, beyond its usefulness as a tool for finding one's way or determining size and distance, actually be gauged? For official purposes, in the case of British India, surveying and mapping of the Bengal Territory began in 1765, and was later extended to the entire subcontinent, something that Bernard Cohn in his *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge* identifies as the "survey modality" of colonial knowledge production. He continues:

Upon the acquisition of each new territory, a new survey was launched, which went far beyond mapping and bounding to describe and classify the territory's zoology, geology, botany, ethnography, economic products, history, and sociology. These maps and surveys, if not directly available to the public, certainly led to the creation of civilian atlases and maps which in the age before radio, film, television and the internet would have helped define the reality of what the world looked like, and allowed and even encouraged participatory imperialism.

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4 Cohn, 7.
5 Ibid.
In this author’s opinion, the best work yet to explore modern cartography and its political implications is Thongchai Winichakul’s *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation*, a work that has at least in part informed my thinking about the relationship between maps and Manchuria-Manchukuo. The book has been well received, and in fact Benedict Anderson used Winichakul’s dissertation (before it became the book *Siam Mapped*) as the basis for one of his new chapters in the revised edition of his highly influential *Imagined Communities*. Andersen, however, was only tangentially interested in cartography. Rather, his interests were in understanding the structures of modern nationalism. Winichakul’s theoretical analysis of mapping Thailand, which revealed the ephemeral nature of maps among other findings, provided Andersen with new ways of approaching his larger questions. *Siam Mapped* also has lessons for understanding the gradual rise and near-universal acceptance of what Winichakul would call the Manchurian “geo-body,” as will be discussed momentarily.

This chapter shall look at a number of elements that eventually led to Japan’s large-scale mapping project in Manchuria. First, an overview of modern mapping, its techniques, technologies, and reason for being will be given. Then, the relationship between modern scientific surveying and cartography, and the settlement of the United States will be briefly examined as a case study. The pre-modern East Asian mapping tradition will be recounted along with Japan’s departure from that tradition as it became a modern mapping state. That will be followed with a discussion of the toponym

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"Manchuria," and how and when it became fixed on Western and Japanese maps, followed by a section looking at Manchuria and maps in the early twentieth century.

**Overview of Modern Mapping / Mapping the United States**

Maps are such an integral part of our lives that it would be difficult to imagine a world without them. It would also be impossible to imagine our world without maps because they are what allow us to conceptualize and grasp the size of territories that are too large for human comprehensibility without such a valuable tool. However, maps are not just for determining location, but have a number of parallel uses as well.

Unlike the Old World (Europe, Mediterranean, Mid-East, Asia, East Asia) the New World came into the sights of the Europeans along with the rise of modern surveying and cartography. The United States as we know it today was, in essence, a result of advanced surveying and mapping, accounting for the straight borders we see in the states west of the Mississippi River. America’s northern border with Canada was fixed long ago, not through wars, but through modern surveying. Beyond borders, America’s survey teams (an Army unit) examined the West’s topography looking for new areas for settlement and agriculture, and keeping a sharp eye on the terrain.

. . . the Corps of Topographical Engineers was a central institution of Manifest Destiny, and in the years before the Civil War its officers made explorations which resulted in the first scientific mapping of the West. They laid out national boundaries and directly promoted the advance of settlement by locating and constructing wagon roads, improving rivers and harbors, even performing experiments for the location of subsurface water in the arid regions. In short, they functioned as a department of public works for the West – and indeed for the whole nation, since the operations of the Corps extended to every state and territory of the US.8

These topographical surveys, along with the border surveys were naturally translated into maps and compiled in atlases, allowing everyone in the country to understand at a glance what the American West actually looked like. In the practical sense, it also allowed for the rapid settlement of the country. The survey movement into the west began in the early to mid-nineteenth century, without the aid of motorized vehicles, railroads, airplanes, satellites, telephones, or computers. It was an effort by well-trained Army engineers using triangulation and highly developed skills, all in the middle of the American wilderness. Even so, the process took a long time, and only by the 1930s had the lower 48 States been fully surveyed.\(^9\) Despite its low-tech nature, this surveying and mapping program produced highly accurate results, and is a testament to the modern, scientific nature of the United States’ origins. This is also how the Japanese approached the surveying and mapping of Japan, its colonies, and Manchukuo.

**East Asian Mapping and the Rise of Modern Japan**

If the modern settling of the United States was in part a product of scientific cartography and surveying, the opposite is generally true of East Asia where a quite refined, near-scientific cartographic tradition was developed only after their lands had been settled.\(^10\) This may or may not be important, but it is not the same as the American tradition. As shall be seen, the inability to conduct advanced scientific mapping and surveying expeditions, especially by the Chinese, is tied to events that occurred in mid to late nineteenth and early twentieth century China.


\(^10\) This excludes the Russian Far East, the settlement of which was the product of advanced cartography, as well as Hokkaido, settled during Japan’s modern period.
In the previous paragraph it was noted that the East Asians had developed a scientific cartographic tradition. This is especially apparent in Chinese cartography stretching back more than 2200 years. In what was congealing into the short-lived Qin Dynasty a man named Pei Xiu 裴秀, who has been compared to Ptolemy, invented a series of 18 rectangular grid maps for the empire.\textsuperscript{11} It is known that his approach was scientific, and that he was attempting to achieve the highest accuracy possible because his writings describe precisely how he made his longer extant maps. Moreover, Pei was acutely aware of his project's advanced qualities, commenting that many Chinese maps handed down from previous dynasties contained "absurdities, irrelevancies, and exaggerations, which are not in accord with reality, and which should be banished by good sense."\textsuperscript{12} Even as Greece's relatively sophisticated mapping technologies disappeared into the European Dark Age, the Chinese continued to produce high quality maps during the Song, Yuan, and early Ming periods.

The next big mapping project, China's most "modern" and extensive in its history, took place soon after the establishment of the Manchu Qing Dynasty, but this time under the leadership of European Jesuits applying the latest European cartographic techniques to Chinese soil for the first time in history. Called the Kangxi or Jesuit Atlas, it went on to become the definitive mapped representation of the Chinese Empire, not just for China but for Europe as well, and was used into the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{13} At the behest of the Qing emperor, the original survey included the territory of what would come to be known as Manchuria, the first time in history that area was mapped using modern surveying and

\textsuperscript{12} Quoted in Ibid., 539.
\textsuperscript{13} Mark Elliot, "The Limits of Tartary," \textit{Journal of Asian Studies} vol. 59, 3 (August 2000), 621.
Because of the Atlas' high quality it enjoyed great popularity in Europe, but as the Europeans attempted to understand the political situation through the Jesuit maps, they began to cartographically divide the region into "China" and "Tartary," the northeastern-most portion of which would later come to be called "Manchuria." This story shall be treated in great depth in the next section.

The existence of the Jesuit maps superficially suggests that the Chinese were once again at the forefront of cartographic developments. However, it seems that the new techniques did not work its way into the Chinese cartographic tradition in any meaningful sense. First of all, the Jesuits were commissioned to carry out the imperial survey because they had been able to prove to the Qing emperor that the original Manchu capital Mukden was not east of Beijing, but north. Throughout the 1700s the Jesuits managed to retain their position as imperial surveyors and cartographers. Therefore, modern European cartographic techniques remained in the hands of foreign experts rather than the technology being passed on to the Chinese to learn and adopt as their own. It appears, too, that the success of the Jesuit maps may have actually stunted any further "native" developments. The long-term reliance on the work of the Jesuits can be measured: In 1902 the Qing regime set out to map their empire at 1:50,000 when the Military Survey

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14 Ibid, 622.
15 Needham, 586.
16 Elliot, 621-22.
17 Needham states that Chinese modes of mapping continued side by side with European techniques. 586.
18 Map scale such as this is a ratio which can also be written as a fraction 1/50,000. In this case the 1 represents map distance and the 50,000 is the actual ground distance. What those numbers represent depends on the map and (certainly before the spread of the metric system) the origin of the map, but the 1 could be an inch or centimeter, and the 50,000 could be feet or meters. Therefore 1 inch on the map = 50,000 feet in reality. Neither Elliot nor Needham specifies what the units of measurement were for the Jesuit Maps.
Institute was established. The maps that were finished (apparently the project was never finished) were supposedly based on Jesuit surveys from decades before, but in the end the effort was a failure and the maps that were actually produced "were not too reliable." One Western scholar of the modern mapping of China has concluded that "... the Manchu government was never very aggressive in its mapping activities," and in 1929 one Chinese scholar could still state that "... The land of Manchuria has never been completely surveyed."

Because of Chinese passivity and lack of skills when it came to cartography in the modern period, foreigners – the Japanese and Russians, and to a lesser extent the British, Americans, French and Germans – would, like the Jesuits before them, be the ones to survey and map parts of China, including Manchuria, during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This is not to say that there were no attempts by the Chinese to map the country. After the 1911 Revolution the Republican government decided that mapping was important for the nation, but because of the chaotic situation of the time and a lack of coordination between the agencies charged with this vital task, mapping efforts were stymied. Surveying and mapping were made provincial matters devoid of any national master plan, a set control point, or set standards of any kind. As a result:

... up to 1916, no province had even begun geodetic surveying. When the provincial governments finally did start to work, each province had its own plan and style of mapping, including its own datum plane. The result

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19 Williams, 7.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Chu, 381.
23 Ibid., 8.
24 "Geodetic surveys" are carried out over immense areas, taking into consideration the curvature of the earth.
was a mixture of often inaccurate, poorly drawn, incomplete topographic series that were impossible to match up with ones of different provinces.\textsuperscript{25}

Modern Chinese mapping finally got underway starting in 1927 with the carrying out of first order triangulation surveys at the late date of 1929 in Zhejiang Province, followed by five more provinces in 1931. However, the surveys were done improperly, resulting in inaccurate maps.\textsuperscript{26} In the immediate postwar period the Chinese government began surveying and mapping in earnest, reportedly finishing 8,000 sheets of the necessary 24,000 that would have covered all of China. They also finished a 1:1,000,000 series of China (though that did not include the “outer provinces” of Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang), but based this series once again on the surveys done by the Jesuits in the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{27} The outcome was not just an inaccurate set of maps based on old information: Because the mapping agency used the 1:50,000 series combined with these erroneous 1:1,000,000 maps to create a new set of 1:300,000 maps, the inaccuracies were passed along further.\textsuperscript{28} Accurate national mapping would have to wait until the Communists took control of the country.

Contrarily, the Japanese were able to quickly and accurately map large swathes of Chinese territory at high levels of detail after their invasion first of Manchuria, and later of northern and central China. What is more, the Americans, in their effort to help the Chinese defeat the Japanese, also carried out large-scale aerial surveying and mapping.

\textsuperscript{25} Williams, 8.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 9.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
efforts of China starting in 1944. It was these foreign mapping projects that would become the foundation upon which the People’s Republic of China would build their advanced cartographic enterprise after 1949.

Japanese Surveying and Cartography

The difference between Chinese and Japanese responses to early modern Western stimuli is fairly well-understood. In the areas of surveying and cartography this contrast could not be greater. Before the arrival of the West in the sixteenth century Japan had developed a rather advanced pre-modern cartographic tradition. This impetus was supplemented and aided by their long initial contact with Europe from 1543 to the 1640s, the so-called “Christian Century” (ca. 1543-1639), when the Japanese were first exposed to Western maps and advanced mapmaking techniques. Marine charts, maps of Japan and of the world, as well as surveying were three main areas passed along from the Jesuits and “... their legacy can be seen in many Japanese works throughout the Edo period.”

Although the Japanese are known to have turned their backs on much that the West had to offer at the time, there were still areas of knowledge considered by the Tokugawa government to be non-Christian universals, and thus were never entirely proscribed. Advanced surveying techniques were viewed in this manner, further demonstrating that the Western impact of the “Christian Century” was never entirely erased. Cartography, too, was in this realm of acceptability, and one might say that from

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29 Ibid., 19-20.
30 Ibid., 11. Beyond Williams, a brief account of modern Chinese mapping and surveying under the PRC can be found in Asia Geo’s Chūgoku chiri kikō (An Account of Chinese Geography), (Tokyo: AsiaGeo, April 2002), 32-39.
the fringes the Japanese were silent observers and students of Western cartographical advances during the seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

The Dutch Learning School that came out of Tokugawa Yoshimune’s Kyōhō Reforms (1716-45) was a conduit for the latest cartographical knowledge to enter Japan from the West, and this too had a significant influence on Japanese mapmaking. Dutch works on cartography were translated into Japanese during the second half of the eighteenth century, and Dutch maps and atlases were rendered into Japanese maps. Copying was only part of the process, however, for in 1754 Mori Kōan produced a national map -- based on a north-south/east-west grid -- of Japan’s main islands that looks pretty much as the islands actually are. It was the first of its kind and a singular achievement that began to put Japan’s elite cartographers and surveyors on a level with Western cartographers. By the end of the eighteenth century the Japanese had been able to acquire other countries’ maps such as in 1792 when Lt. Eric Laxman of the ill-fated Laxman Affair allowed the copying of an atlas and a globe in exchange for a copy of a map of Hokkaido.

An astronomical observatory was constructed in 1807 by the shogunate in order to be able to make an accurate world map for use when dealing with the numerous foreign powers such as the Russians arriving in Japan during the early nineteenth century. Continued Japanese advances in exploration and surveying were best demonstrated with

32 Ibid., 432.
33 Unnō Kazutaka, Chizu ni miru nihon (Japan Seen in Maps) (Tokyo: Taishukan Shoten, 1999), 131. An image of Mori’s map appears on page 130.
34 George Lensen, The Russian Push Toward Japan: Russo-Japanese Relations, 1697-1875 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 106. Eric Laxman was a Finnish professor of natural sciences at St. Petersburg Academy who was sent by Catherine the Great in 1791 to accompany a Japanese castaway named Kodayu back to Japan and also attempt to open diplomatic and trade relations. Lensen, 97-100.
Mamiya Rinzo’s discovery of Sakhalin Island’s insularity from the continent, which was then charted in 1811. In 1829 an international incident arose over Japanese maps when German doctor Franz von Siebold, stationed at Dejima in Nagasaki, befriended a Japanese official named Takahashi Sakuzaemon who showed him a top secret map of Japan based on the coastal surveys of such men as Inō Tadataka. The map’s high level of accuracy is clear even today, vivid proof of the level of native attainment achieved by Japanese cartographers by the 1820s. Siebold managed to obtain a copy of the secret map, but this bit of espionage was discovered, leading to his friend’s imprisonment (and eventual death) for treason and Siebold’s banishment from Japan. However, before leaving he was able make a copy of the Japan map that he then managed to sneak out of the country. That map that appears in his famous 1832 book on Japan entitled *Nippon*.

Understanding Japanese advances in mapmaking at this time is essential because these advances were part of a process of skill development that within decades would be utilized in the mapping of parts of Manchuria. As Japan opened further to the world during the mid-1800s, the acquisition of excellent European maps and the refinement of native mapping abilities continued apace. While it should come as no surprise that one of the new Meiji government’s early tasks was to thoroughly map Japan, what might be surprising is that, as we have seen, the Japanese were well-prepared to carry out that task virtually on their own thanks to centuries of cartographic and surveying progress made by the Dutch scholars. The *History of Cartography* states emphatically that:

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36 Stephan, 43. Unnō, 187, with an image of the map on 186.
37 Harley and Woodward, 439.
38 Ibid., 440. Siebold’s version of the map, found in *Nippon* (1897 edition), is dated 1840. It is virtually identical to current maps of Japan at that scale.
The impact of Rangaku [Dutch Learning] on Japanese cartography can... hardly be overestimated. Not only were new basic maps of the country compiled and published, but many of these accurate and detailed maps were also in turn popularized by the publication of reduced and simplified versions.39

Widespread interest in maps, from government officials to the commoner on the street, is suggestive of what would come after the Meiji Restoration in 1868. Among the various fields of which Japan desired up-to-date knowledge during the early years of Meiji were surveying and cartography, and the Japanese were able to rapidly apply that new knowledge with their own advanced mapping tradition. In 1881 the General Staff Headquarters Survey Department set out to map Japan in its entirety at a scale of 1:20,000, a goal that was accomplished by August 1887.40 Eventually this mapping expertise was exported abroad as part of secret reconnaissance missions, wartime efforts, and finally within the colonial framework starting with Taiwan, and then in southern Sakhalin (Karafuto), Korea, and the South Seas Islands (Marianas, Carolines, Marshals, Yap).41 Naturally, the Japanese would survey and map their holdings on the southern tip of Manchuria's Liaodong Peninsula as well starting after 1905. The culmination of this long experience with modern mapping, from its humble sixteenth century beginnings to the highly detailed maps of the Japanese Empire, would be Manchukuo.

39 Ibid., 441.
40 Kokudo chirī'in, Sokuryō chizu kyakumenshi (A 100-Year History of Surveys and Maps), (Tokyo: Kokudo Chiri’in, 1970), 305.
41 A detailed account of the Japanese colonial and imperial mapping projects is found in Ibid., 437-495.
Early Cartographic Manchuria

That is not to say that this was a teleological process. Even though Manchukuo was a Japanese creation, the Japanese did not invent "Manchuria," except perhaps inadvertently. It shall be argued herewith that it is possible to see that Manchukuo was in certain respects not just an expression of late Japanese imperialism, but also the end result of a process that began with the modern mapping of East Asia, a task first undertaken by the Qing Dynasty as discussed above in section two.

In his article "The Limits of Tartary: Manchuria in Imperial and National Geographies," Mark Elliot explains that despite claims by current Chinese scholars regarding the rise of a cartographic Manchuria (and the Japanese equivalent toponym "Manshū" 满洲) and its connection with Euro-Japanese imperialism, its first appearance came about as a result of the Qing government's imperial mapping project (carried out by Jesuits) that emphasized "... the distinctiveness of the Manchu people vis-à-vis the Han Chinese." Elliot has found that Qing maps of the Empire from the early eighteenth century wrote toponyms north of the Great Wall in the Manchu script, while names south of the Wall were written in Chinese characters, concluding that the area with Manchu writing was meant to emphasize that it was a Manchu (non-Han Chinese) space. The Jesuit maps fairly quickly made their way to Europe where they were transliterated into various languages, bound in atlases, and became very popular.

The use of the Jesuit-produced Chinese maps by the Europeans not only accurately filled in at high detail previously blank areas on world maps, but also provided regional place names and gave a sense of what territory in East Asia belonged to whom.

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42 Elliot, 603.
43 Ibid., 624.
The problem was that the imported Qing Empire maps with their linguistic quirkiness gave an impression that the territory of the greater Qing Empire was made up of component parts that demanded cartographic parity. The title of one European copy of the atlas, a 1737 French version by Jean B.B. d’Anville from which other European versions came, captures the flavor of what occurred: *Nouvel Atlas de la Chine, de la Tartarie chinoise et du Thibet* (A New Atlas of China, Chinese Tartary, and Tibet).44

Through an unplanned twist of cartographic fate, the Chinese Empire was transformed into three distinct regions. Because of this eighteenth-century European mapmakers tended to refer to the region north of the Great Wall as “Chinese Tartary.” Some mapmakers went so far as to make the Great Wall into a border between the two “regions,” with Chinese Tartary to its north [Figure 1]. Because most Europeans had never been to East Asia, it would have to have been maps and atlases that gave Europeans the notion that there were regional differences within the Chinese Empire. As French mapmakers in the 1730s wrestled with the new information found on the Jesuit maps, they included the word “Mantcheou” in the map’s legend describing the ruling dynasty, and this was copied by the British and transliterated as “the Manchew.”45

According to Elliot, this is possibly the reason why parts of “Chinese Tartary” gradually came to be called “Manchuria” by the turn of the nineteenth century.46 The new toponym did not become truly fixed in the 1730s and 1740s, but the

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44 The atlas’ full title is *Nouvel atlas de la Chine, de la Tartarie chinoise et du Thibet: Contenant les cartes générales et particulières de ces Pays, ainsique la Carte du Royaume Corée. La plupart levées sur les lieux par ordre de l’Empereur Cang-hi avec toute l’exactitude imaginable* (1737).
45 Elliot, 626.
46 Ibid.
RECEIVED
AS
FOLLOWS
Figure 1 Detail of Bowen’s 1747 map of Asia. Note “Chinese Tartary” is used as the regional name for the area north of the Great Wall, and “Manchews” could be construed here as a separate region. David Rumsey Map Collection.

name “Manchews” did appear clearly as a regional ethnic homeland name on some early maps such as Emanuel Bowen’s map of Asia in his two volume atlas from 1747.⁴⁷

Within a few decades the increasingly advanced Japanese mapping cross-pollinated with Western maps of Asia, the end result of which was the birth of a generally fixed Manchurian toponym that accidentally came to replace the regional ethnic homeland toponym “Manchews.” In 1794 a Japanese Dutch Studies scholar named Katsuragawa Hoshu included for the first time in Japanese history the place name “Manshū” on a map of northeast Asia dealing with Russo-Japanese relations, a transliteration (with the use of characters) most likely of “Manchews.” It is not certain

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what inspired this decision, but Elliot suggests that Katsuragawa used a European map as a model, possibly a Russian map (Laxman's?) that was based on the French copies of the Qing Jesuit maps, or a Dutch map from 1751. The point is that Japanese scholars responsible for mapping the region were on the cusp of creating a toponym that would have long-term but unforeseen geo-political ramifications.

Katsuraga's map was followed in 1809 by another that also used "Manshū," and from this point forward "Manshū" was used with increasing regularity on Japanese maps. As it would happen, the very map of Japan that Philipp Franz von Siebold smuggled out of Japan in 1829 included the toponym "Manshū" for the Chinese territory north of the Sea of Japan. Siebold's map, faithful to the original, included this name, which was transliterated as "Manchuria." Both the book and its maps were extremely important for developing an understanding of the previously little known Japan. For instance, Commodore Matthew Perry used Siebold's work in his preparation for dealing with the Japanese, and was even in letter correspondence with Siebold before getting underway. Like the book, Siebold's map ought to be seen as an early document that helped Americans and other Westerners gain an understanding of Japan and its immediate vicinity. Therefore, the inclusion of the term "Manchuria" on Siebold's map was important because it would have at least helped to reinforce the idea of Manchuria as a regional toponym (rather than just an ethnic homeland marker) to a wide audience. Whether or not Manchuria's rise as regional place name is actually the direct result of

48 Elliot, 628.
these examples, "Manchuria" had indeed become common in Western Atlases and maps by the late 1830s.\textsuperscript{50}

On the other hand, even though the Japanese had inadvertently helped to invent, or at least reinforce "Manchuria" as a cartographic place, there was still a lack of consistency among nineteenth century Japanese maps as to how and when "Manchuria" was to be used. An 1850 woodblock print map of the world at a scale of 1:129,600,000 shows this [Figure 2].\textsuperscript{51} Although the map is fairly primitive in its execution, looking closely at northeast Asia Japan is easy to spot, as is Korea. What is not there is Manchuria. Three years later a similar Japanese woodblock print map of the world was published, but this time the characters for Manshū are just where one might expect [Figure 4].\textsuperscript{52} In another example the Asia map from an 1856 Japanese atlas not only has the characters for Manshū, but the "Man" character has actually been placed in Russian territory, an instance of the cartographic rendering of a "greater Manchuria," and something that will be seen on other maps as the decades go by [Figure 5].\textsuperscript{53} A beautiful 1859 woodblock of Sakhalin, Hokkaido, the Kuriles, and a sliver of the continent also shows the characters for Manshū, albeit small ones, across the water from northern Sakhalin just south of the mouth of the Amur River [Figure 3].\textsuperscript{54} Yet another world map from 1862 includes Manshū, and like the previous map, the "Man" is well

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 632.
\textsuperscript{54} Egon Klemp, ed., \textit{Asia in Maps: From Ancient Times to the Mid-19th Century} (Weinheim, Germany: VCH, 1989), plate 57.
into Russian Siberia, an area just two years before having been incorporated into the Russian empire [Figure 6]. On both of these maps the national boundary between Russia and China is clearly drawn, suggesting the at this point at least some Japanese cartographers saw Manchuria as a kind of supra-territorial region without real borders, or an historic area based on the Manchu people’s ethno-genesis, rather than an actual place. Even if that were the case, another Japanese world map from 1862 shows the Manshū characters well within the Chinese border, except that the border is now much further north since this map does not take into account the 1858 and 1860 Russian land grabs of the Amur basin and Maritime Provinces [Figure 7]. Despite moving boundaries, the toponym “Manchuria” was gaining a fixity that it did not have even a decade before.

Figure 2 1850 Japanese map of World, NE Asia detail. Note: no Manchuria. David Rumsey Map Collection. Berkeley Map Collection.

Figure 3 Detail of 1859 Japanese map of Sakhalin, Hokkaido, and Kuriles. Source: Asia in Maps.


Figure 4 1853 Japanese World Map detail. David Rumsey Map Collection. Berkeley Map Collection.

Figure 5 1856 Japanese World Atlas NE Asia map detail. David Rumsey Map Collection. Berkeley Map Collection.

Figure 6 1862 Japanese World Map, NE Asia detail. Rumsey. Note: "Man" character in Russian Siberia, and Qing in lower left. David Rumsey Map Collection. Berkeley Map Collection.
After the Meiji Restoration Japanese-made world maps began to increase in quality compared to those just discussed, and by the looks of these "modern" maps it appears that they were close copies of foreign maps. Although the reason is not clear, a new perception not only of "Manchuria" but East Asia as well arose with at least some of these new maps. In an 1874 (reprinted in 1887) Mercator projection world map the toponym "Manshū" has been placed precisely where it will be seen, with few exceptions, for the next 71 years. Adding to that, the map has done something strange with the Manchurian toponym because of how the world was cut in order to be fit into the mapped space. That is, the middle of the map is the Americas (alluding that the original map was American) and on the far right-hand side of the map's northern hemisphere is Southeast

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Asia, Mongolia, part of Siberia, and China proper. On the far left hand side of the map in the northern hemisphere is the Kamchatka peninsula, Japan, the Kurile Islands, Sakhalin, Korea, and Manchuria [Figure 8].\textsuperscript{58} The effect on the people of the time who were perhaps new to accurate Mercator projection maps of this sort is difficult to measure, but it is conceivable that after repeated viewings not only would Manchuria become part of a northeast Asian region rather than an integral part of China, but it might even have appeared to be an independent country.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure8.png}
\caption{1887 Japanese World Map detail of NE Asia. Berkeley. Note: Manchuria is part of a Japan Sea-centered region. David Rumsey Map Collection. Berkeley Map Collection.}
\end{figure}

It certainly is mapped as such in this case, even though that insularity was a cartographic accident. And because this map was reprinted as late as 1887 without change to that

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}
section of the map, it is possible that among Japanese the idea of a northeast Asian region centered on the Japan Sea that excluded China may have caught on to some degree. Another 1887 map, clearly based on a foreign original, shows a distinct Manchurian geo-body which is further enhanced by the use of a color different from that of China [Figure 9].

Figure 9 1887 Japanese World Map detail. Manchuria is clearly demarcated as a distinct geo-body relative to the surrounding territory. David Rumsey Map Collection. Berkeley Map Collection.

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Nevertheless, Japanese perceptions of the world during the 1870s and 1880s would still have depended on which map was being examined. Although the above example included a very precise "Manshū," other Japanese world maps from the period show it in
different places, or on occasion do not show it at all. An example of this is in 1875, wherein Manchuria is once again mapped as encompassing a greater area both north and south of the China-Russia border [Figure 10].60 Two other maps (one from 1876 and a later printing from 1886 have left the characters for Manchuria off entirely) show the Manchuria region being an integral part of China in much the same manner as current maps of China [Figure 11].61 Examples also exist of Japanese world maps from as late as 1899 exist that do not include “Manshū.”62

A question that arises is that even though for Japan in the late 1800s Manchuria was not an entirely fixed toponym, could those maps that did employ “Manshū” have possibly shaped perceptions about China and its relationship to Manchuria? The 1898 biography of a Japanese Christian missionary named Jenichiro Oyabe suggests it was indeed possible. Oyabe would later travel a great deal outside of Asia, but in his relating of the early days (the date is not given, but likely the 1880s or early 1890s) after his conversion he claims to have been sitting in his house in Japan imagining what he might do to help spread Christianity. “Just as I was copying the maps of Manchuria and Siberia . . .”63 a revelation occurred:

Now I made up my mind positively to leave my earthly father, to devote myself to work among the Ainu people, to remove them from their miserable island home to somewhere in Manchuria or Siberia; and to rule

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over them and set up my new kingdom on the vast unknown [emphasis mine] continent.\textsuperscript{64}

It seems that it was Oyabe's religious fervor combined with viewing the maps of northeast Asia that expanded his mind. Although his dream of setting up a Christian Manchurian kingdom never came to pass, could a similar seed have been planted in the minds of those men who were determined to add Manchuria to the Japanese Empire?

This section has attempted to show, based on the research of Mark Elliot combined with analysis of a cross-section of Japanese and other maps, the origin and evolution of the Manchuria toponym. While it is possible to trace a kind of progression from its accidental birth in the early 1700s, it was a haphazard "progression" at best, and there are no particular patterns to be found in terms of toponymical usage in Japanese or Western maps and atlases.

\textit{Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Cartographic Manchuria}

During the late nineteenth century Manchuria became the meeting point of three empires: China, Russia, and Japan. Simultaneously, it also became a surveying and cartographic convergence point for those same three empires. The Qing Dynasty did not cartographically neglect its northernmost territory as the 1899 61-sheet \textit{Heilongjiang Atlas} suggests.\textsuperscript{65} A multi-sheet project of this sort would have taken great effort and was undoubtedly a significant achievement for the Qing, and moreover, shows a genuine commitment on the part of the Chinese to developing an understanding of that remote

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., 26.

\textsuperscript{65} T'u Chi, \textit{Heilongjiang yutu} (Atlas of Heilongjiang Province 黑竜江輿圖), 61 sheets (1899), 7.
Upon close examination however, even a non-expert can see that Chinese cartographic (and presumably surveying) techniques at the time were crude [Figure 12].

That was a serious problem considering China’s need to effectively integrate Manchuria into the rest of the Empire, combined with the immediate threat posed by the Russians and Japanese. Twentieth century Chinese mapping of Manchuria will be explored further momentarily, but native Chinese efforts such as the above must be kept in mind when discussing the greater Manchurian mapping and surveying project during this time.

The Russians had long-standing interests in northeast Asia, and as a European power they would have utilized advanced cartography and surveys in their conquest of what became the Russian Far East, an area that eventually came to include a huge piece of Manchuria in 1858-60, turning the Amur River into the border between China and Russia. As early as November 1895 a team of Russian surveyors were already at the border of Manchuria, reportedly dispatched there to execute surveys for a planned
railroad that would go by way of Qiqihar in northern Manchuria.\textsuperscript{66} The intelligence turned out to be correct, and it is certain that maps would have resulted from those surveys. Within the next couple of years the Russians did indeed build the last leg of the Trans-Siberian Railway across the heart of Manchuria and into the Liaodong Peninsula after making secret agreements with the Qing government. That project, too, would have called for more modern surveys and maps of the parts of Manchuria where the railroad traversed. Of the maps that the Russians made of Manchuria, at least some of them would later be incorporated into Japan’s Manchurian topographical military mapping program that will be discussed below.

The above are generally known historical facts which are stressed here in order to display that for the first time in history there was sustained attention on Manchuria as a distinct and conceivably independent region. By the time the smoke cleared on the Liaodong Peninsula in 1905, Japan was not merely in control of a small piece of Chinese territory, and hegemony over a larger region. It now had a toehold on contested Chinese territory, a massive piece of land over which Chinese sovereignty was growing increasingly tenuous – the 1901-04 Russian occupation and Russo-Japanese War had proven that without a doubt.

A bi-product of Russian and Japanese imperial activities in Manchuria during the 1890s and early 1900s was a sustained focus on the region by newspapers and analysts. Within a couple of decades Manchuria went from being a virtually unknown and undeveloped Chinese backwater to a potentially valuable addition to the global imperial

\textsuperscript{66} Saionji Kimmochi, “Rōkoku seifu yori shinkoku Manshū e sokuryōshi haken ni kan suru ken” [“Matter regarding the dispatch of surveyors to Chinese Manchuria from the Russian government”], Kō bun zassan (Gaimushō yon, dai kyū ken, Nov. 6, 1895). JACAR reference code: A04010016600.
pie. For instance, in 1870 one American writer was vaguely aware of Manchuria’s ginseng, but concluded dryly that Manchuria’s three provinces “are excessively cold in winter, and sterile and thinly peopled.” By 1879 “sterility” had given way to “fertility” of the soil, combined with familiar but untapped potential: “... in those mountainous regions there are constant suggestions of home – fields of cowslips and buttercups, primroses and violets that nestle by the roots of oaks and elms and hazel . . . .” This shift in consciousness, if it can be called that, did not seem to attract undue attention to the region, although travel books such as *The Long White Mountain* by H.E.M. James would have raised awareness about Manchuria’s vast economic and colonization potential. Moreover, the author of *The Long White Mountain* was keenly aware of the geopolitics of the time, stating presciently in the preface that “... As the scene of a great conflict in the past, for supremacy over Eastern Asia, and perhaps of a still greater in the future, Manchuria merits alike the attention of historical students and contemporary statesmen.” Among his detailed descriptions of Manchuria’s “delightful walks” and “charming wooded valleys . . . dotted with oaks like an English park . . .” James was careful also to point out Manchuria’s untapped mineral and other wealth in natural resources. This might explain an article in the *Dunkirk Observer Journal* a year after James’ book was published listing the undreamed of mineral and natural wealth that was just waiting to be gathered up by whoever could get to Manchuria first. The writer was

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70 Ibid., 238.
certain that along with the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway "... Some day a
great population of the Caucasian race will fill this country [Manchuria] and reach out to
trade with the United States."\textsuperscript{71}

While not all would have agreed with this imagined outcome, the Sino-Japanese
War, the location of its battles (Manchuria), and Japan's demand (and subsequent loss) of
the Liaodong Peninsula gave the region dramatically increased relevance, bringing
Manchuria squarely into the geopolitical spotlight. The 1896 Sino-Russian Li-Lobanoff
secret treaty of alliance, an agreement that basically turned over Manchuria in its entirety
to the Russians, was further grist for the mill, leading some analysts of the time to declare
that Manchuria's, and even Korea's, fate had been sealed: "When the two annexations
have been completed, Russia's sparse population in Asia will have been increased by
about forty million new subjects."\textsuperscript{72} By October 1898 the former US deputy consul-
general at Shanghai was able to state that in the partition of China "... Russia has gained
more than any other power, for Manchuria has become a Russian province in all but
name."\textsuperscript{73} An Englishman named Younghusband, who went along with James during his
trip through Manchuria in 1886, contemplated the future of post-Li-Lobanoff Manchuria.
The people of Manchuria will "... by themselves be unable to arrest ... the eventual
absorption of Manchuria by Russia," he insisted.\textsuperscript{74} Younghusband was not necessarily
arguing that this was a bad turn of events, but that the English needed to realize what was
happening and get in while they still had a chance "... For we are engaged in a keen

\textsuperscript{71} (Editorial), \textit{Dunkirk Observer Journal} (Dunkirk, NY, July 13, 1889),
\textsuperscript{72} Holt S. Hallett, "France and Russia in China," \textit{The Living Age} (Boston: The Living Age Co., No. 2754,
Apr. 17, 1897), 191.
\textsuperscript{73} Mark B. Dunnell, "Our Policy in China," \textit{The North American Review} (The North American Review
Publishing Co., vol. CLXVII no. 503), 393.
\textsuperscript{74} Younghusband, "The Future of Manchuria," \textit{The Living Age} (Boston: The Living Age Co., No. 2804,
Apr. 2, 1898), 49.
struggle with the great civilized powers of the world, and have to press and maintain
our rights or fall behind in the race."\textsuperscript{75} He went on:

We may console ourselves with the reflection that this pressing of our
rights to trade is causing no evil, but is, on the contrary, conferring a
benefit upon those upon whom we press them, and that no people have the
right, which the Chinese are assuming, to arrogate to their exclusive use so
rich a portion of the earth's surface as Manchuria . . . \textsuperscript{76}

Younghusband's shrill tone notwithstanding, the English-speaking readership of the end
of the nineteenth century was increasingly paying attention to Manchuria.

This supposition that Manchuria went from irrelevance to center-stage in a brief
period of time can actually be quantified. The following chart was created using the \textit{New
York Times} on-line archive whose search engine checks more than 15,000,000 articles
going back to 1851.\textsuperscript{77} The numbers reveal rather precisely when it was that "Manchuria"
 began to appear in the American news with regularity:

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{New York Times Articles}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Dates} & \textbf{Number of articles that contain "Manchuria"} \\
Jan. 1, 1851 to Dec 31, 1875 & 12 (also "Manchooria," and "Manchouria") \\
Jan. 1, 1876 to Dec 31, 1889 & 15 (also "Manchooria") \\
Jan. 1, 1890 to Dec 31, 1899 & 174 \\
Jan. 1, 1900 to Dec 31, 1910 & 2,643 \\
Jan. 1, 1911 to Dec 31, 1920 & 807 \\
Jan. 1, 1921 to Dec 31, 1930 & 2,246 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 58.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{77} New York Times on-line archive http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/nytimes/advancedsearch.html?
Even if the NYT search engine contains mistakes, the leap in instances where “Manchuria” appears somewhere in an article is too drastic to be an anomaly.

It is possible, then, to conjecture that just as Manchuria became a regular place name in the papers (especially during the Sino-Japanese War, the Boxer Rebellion, and most prominently, the Russo-Japanese War), when someone was curious about just where this exotic-sounding “Manchuria” was located, he or she would have turned to an atlas if the newspaper had failed to provide a map. In turn, mapmakers would have been increasingly cognizant of the need to clearly show Manchuria’s whereabouts in order to satisfy the readership’s needs. It is hardly a leap in saying that this twelve-year period – 1894 to 1905 – saw the birth of an “independent” Manchuria that replaced a somewhat vague ethnic territorial toponym connected to the Chinese empire.

Western Mapping of Manchuria in the Early Twentieth Century

Owing to sustained media attention on northeast Asia, and increased awareness of the current political situation there, by 1904 it had become possible to map Manchuria in new ways that reflected changes in the East Asian political structure. For instance, in 1904 C.S. Hammond & Co. produced a giveaway map for the Home Insurance Company of New York entitled Map of Japan, Corea and Manchuria [Figures 13]. What was the reason for this map? Since the territory it covers embraces part of Mongolia as well as the eastern coast of China, should not those areas have been included in the title as well? At some point – likely the mid to late-1890s – Manchuria came to be associated as much with Japan and Korea as it did with China.

A variation of Figure 13 was a type of prewar map that showed the entire Korean peninsula attached to southern Manchuria. The origin point of this particular view of the region remains elusive, but it can be traced back to at least 1904 in a joint Korea-Manchuria map in the 1904 Royal Geographic Society's journal [Figure 14].79 A similar map was published by Dodd, Mead and Co. in 1906 [Figure 15]. This view of the region continued to have staying power: An almost identical version can be found in the 1930 edition of the Dodd and Mead New International Encyclopedia, the only difference on

the map being that the toponym for "Korea" had been changed to "Chosen," the prewar Japanese name for Korea. ⁸⁰

Figure 15 1906 “Manchuria and Korea” by Dodd, Mead & Co.. Note: China is erased from this cartographical perspective.

In certain respects the Dodd and Mead map reflected a Russo-Japanese War perspective. It was also a Japanese view of the region commonly employed by the South Manchuria Railway (SMR) that most effectively mapped the area served by the railroad. An example of this can be found attached to the English-language book Manchuria: Land of Opportunities [Figure 16].⁸¹ Entitled “Manchuria & Chosen,” this 8x10.5 full-color map shows Romanized names for every train station along the SMR and the Korean

Railway. The geographic focal points are the Korean peninsula, the Liaodong Peninsula, and part of the Manchurian plain up to Changchun. What makes this map somewhat unusual, and therefore useful for analysis, is that the “Manchuria” geo-body that will in ten years become Manchukuo does not appear here. Rather, the toponym “Manchuria” on this map is drawn in west of Korea and east of Mongolia, with the SMR main line serving as almost a border between Manchuria and Mongolia.

Figure 16 1922 Map of Manchuria and Korea from SMR's *Manchuria: Land of Opportunity*. Note: Toponym “Manchuria” is placed east of the SMR’s mainline, and “Mongolia” is west of the line. China only appears in this map as an inset.
Figure 17 1919 SMR Japanese language map of Manchuria and Korea. Note: China has all but been erased from this perspective. Source: Zusetsu: Mantetsu: "Mansha" no kyojin.

Unlike maps that portrayed the Manchurian geo-body as stretching from Siberia in the north, to Outer Mongolia in the east, and the Great Wall of China in the southwest, this map has truncated “Manchuria” into a small but coherent regional name. A Japanese-language SMR map from 1919 is similar in approach to the above, but in fact goes further in emphasizing the area east of the SMR’s mainline as “Manchuria” by shading
that area as a darker yellow, the same as Korea [Figure 17]. By placing the characters “Manshū” in this zone, which is also delimited in the north by the Chinese Eastern Railway, the illusion is created that this fenced off (by railroads) territory is not just physically contiguous with Korea, but is politically contiguous with it as well. That the Korea-Manchuria border is marked with a line thinner than the railroad line accentuates this illusion. At least from 1919 to 1922, the SMR was cartographically constructing a Manchuria-Korea ecumene that did not include northern Manchuria or any part of Inner Mongolia.

Among the great early twentieth century arbiters of knowledge about the world was the *Encyclopedia Britannica* (EB). The 1911 edition has a fairly long article on Manchuria that also included a map [Figure 18]. That the *Encyclopedia Britannica* was a basic source for general knowledge about pretty much everything at the turn of the century almost goes without saying. Therefore, what *EB* had to say about Manchuria, and how it mapped the region, is reflective of how the world actually was to its readers (this is not to argue that the *EB* article was 100% correct, but at this time what it said about Manchuria would have been akin to that because of *EB*’s stature, and thus even the inaccuracies might be seen as the “truth” for that time period). In the map, Manchuria and its three provinces are firmly mapped as independent from China, and the same international border line that divides Manchurian territory from Russia, Korea, and

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Japan’s Kwantung Territory also separates Manchuria from Mongolia and China. A quick glance at the page would evoke this separateness quite clearly to the observer. This 1911 shape is fairly close to the completed Manchukuo-era geo-body, apart from the inclusion of Jehol (Rehe; i.e., part of Inner Mongolia). In sum, this map is a good early example of the gradual rise of a cartographically autonomous Manchuria.

Figure 18 1911 Encyclopaedia Britannica map of Manchuria. Note: In this case Manchuria is represented as an independent geo-body.

Outside of the US government one of the most trusted American map producing organizations has been and continues to be the National Geographic Society. Because of the magazine’s massive circulation, pass-along readership, longevity (people tend to keep
NG for years, even decades, and occasionally generationally), and its authoritative position, it is essential to see how such an influential magazine portrayed Manchuria as

Figure 19 1929 Map of Manchuria from National Geographic Magazine. Note that Manchuria is cartographically distinct from China and has been placed at the center of northeast Asia.
part of this study. \(^8^4\) Actually, Manchuria appears to have been something of a favorite among the *National Geographic* contributors: between August 1900 and January 1932 both short and long articles on different aspects of the region appeared in eleven issues. Generally speaking, for orientation purposes the magazine provides small maps along with their articles no matter what the topic, either as a close-up or within a regional context. A good example is the 49-page article “Manchuria, Promised Land of Asia” that appeared in the October 1929 edition. The article’s map takes up half a page [Figure 19], covering about 45 degrees of longitude and 25 degrees of latitude, with the caption title explaining “Manchuria is Larger than France and the British Isles Combined.” \(^8^5\)

The map is political (rather than topographical) and places Manchuria in the center of a greater northeast Asia region with Siberia (no mention of the USSR) across the north and northeast, the Russian Maritime Provinces to the East, Mongolia to the west, China to the southwest, Korea to the south, and finally Japan and Sakhalin to the east and southeast. Nowhere on this map is it suggested that Manchuria is part of China, although the article thoroughly explains that Manchuria is indeed part of China. Because Manchuria is the focus of the map it is shaded in a darker color than the surrounding countries. By 1929 Manchuria had increased in size from the 1910s, and its geo-body in this map is almost the same as how it will appear during the Manchukuo period. Because of the manner in which Manchuria is presented on this map, if someone saw it without

\(^8^4\) A thought-provoking study of *National Geographic*’s impact on how Americans have come to view the outside world is found in Catherine A. Lutz’ and Jane L. Collins’ *Reading National Geographic* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).

reading the article they would possibly assume that Manchuria was a semi-independent place, and might even conclude that it was a separate country.

Besides maps embedded in the articles, National Geographic also includes from time to time “map supplements” which are loose, often large folding maps. There were three Manchuria-related map supplements that came with the magazine before Manchukuo was created: March 1904 (Map of Korea & Manchuria), June 1905 (Kirin, Harbin, Vladivostok), and October 1912 (Map of China and its Territories).86 The 1904 and 1905 maps are likely to have been produced as a result of interest in the Russo-Japanese War. The 1912 map puts Manchuria within its larger Chinese context so the viewer would presumably have associated Manchuria with China. However, by 1929 National Geographic was mapping Manchuria as all but independent from China.

Western Atlases

The Complete Atlas of China is a first rate work of cartography, a book of which approximately 6500 copies were printed.87 It is medium-sized with full-color curvature-corrected maps of all of China’s 1917-era provinces and regions. Overall the maps appear to be highly accurate, although at the large scale at which they were drawn it is hard to determine how precise they really are. Altogether there are twenty-three separate maps, one for each of China’s nineteen traditional provinces, plus a national index map that shows a greater China, a map of Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia (outer), and a separate map of Manchuria. Like most Western prewar maps discussed to this point, Manchuria in this

86 National Geographic on-line index: http://www.nationalgeographic.com/publications/explore.html
The atlas is called “Manchuria,” not “the Northeast,” or “Three Eastern Provinces” Figure 20. Moreover, its three provinces are not mapped individually. Rather, they are lumped together as a greater “Manchuria.” Why this was done is not clear, but it is almost as though the mapmakers saw Manchuria as a single “province” of sorts. It may be concluded that this is one of the reasons why the idea of Manchuria, and the toponym “Manchuria” had such staying power in the West.

Figure 20 1917 map of Manchuria (and Korea) from the Complete Atlas of China. Note: This map shows Manchuria in its northeast shown as individual provinces, unlike the manner in which the provinces of China proper were portrayed. In this case, Manchuria in its entirety is connected to the Korean peninsula.

The end result was that Westerners simply never saw China’s northeast shown as individual provinces, unlike the manner in which China proper was portrayed. In this
case (as with most other maps from the time period), “Manchuria” and its geo-body are emphasized to such a degree that if someone viewed this map out of context (apart from the rest of the atlas) they would again have to assume that “Manchuria” was a semi-separate country or dependency. The area shown in this 12”x7” map is 1:7,500,000, and includes the Korean peninsula, part of eastern Inner Mongolia, some of Siberia, and the Shandong Peninsula.

Prior to the Complete Atlas of China was the Everyman’s Atlas: A Literary and Historical Atlas of Asia was part of the Everyman’s Library, a series of great literature for the masses. Whether or not every man in 1912 actually owned an Everyman’s Atlas is beyond the scope of this paper, but it probably had a fairly wide circulation since the series was designed for economic accessibility. Therefore, this atlas’ maps, like those in the other high-readership works above, have special significance to this paper in terms of determining how views of Manchuria were shaped in the prewar period. More importantly is that this is an Asia-specific atlas, so it is likely that the editors would have spent considerable effort on ensuring the region’s accuracy. Along with “China,” “Siberia,” “Korea,” “Japan” and “Mongolia,” “Manchuria” is a salient toponym throughout the book, appearing on five different historical and contemporary maps.

The first map that the toponym “Manchuria” appears on is called Asia: Early Explorers where the word “Manchu” in the general area of Manchuria. There are no political borders on this map, and many of the toponyms are classical Romanizations of such place names such as “Cathay,” “Caoli” (Korea), and Zipangu (Japan) suggesting that the map’s time frame was from Marco Polo’s period (the mid to late thirteenth

89 Asia: Early Explorers [map], approx 8”x14”, scale not given. In Everyman’s Atlas.
century) to the late 1600s. It does not say what the original source of the map was, but in Marco Polo’s time the Manchus did not formally exist as a people and Manchuria certainly did not exist as a region. As a result, “Manchu-Manchuria” has been projected into a non-existent past on this map, a cartographical phenomenon that will be discussed in the next chapter.

The next map, The Far East: 1800, shows the toponym “Manchuria” in the heart of Manchuria, although maps from that time period were not yet using “Manchuria” regularly, and its position had hardly been fixed at that location. Once again, a historical map published in 1912 was projecting a current geographical idea into a past where it did not belong. Another map that includes “Manchuria” is one of China and Japan, and in this map the Manchurian geo-body is part of a greater China, although it is also shown as being somewhat separate along with Chinese Turkestan (modern day Xinjiang Province), Tibet, and Mongolia, China’s “dependencies” as they were called at the time. If the reader were to skip to the next map he would find a close-up map of Manchuria and Korea, the focal point of which is the Korean peninsula and the southern and central portion of Manchuria. It is identical to the Dodd and Mead “Manchuria and Korea” map discussed previously. The final Everyman’s map on China is entitled North China, and while today when one thinks of “north China” he or she probably thinks of Manchuria and the region immediately below the Great Wall.

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Figure 21  *Everyman’s Atlas* “Northern China” map. Note: At this time Manchuria was not considered “northern China.”

However, the cartographers who drew this map only included those lower provinces, one of which at the time (Chihli – today’s Hebei Province) extended into what would become Rehe (Jehol). The message from the *Everyman’s Atlas* was that Manchuria was not “Northern China” even though Manchuria is China’s geographically northernmost region [Figure 21].91

The “North China-Manchuria” split was fairly common in other prewar atlases, and this way of thinking about dividing China and Manchuria was still common in the West into the 1930s. Changes in perspective about Manchuria’s provinces and their

91 *Northern China* [map], approx 8”x14”, scale not given. In *Everyman’s Atlas*. 
relationship with the rest of China were ongoing however. In the 1930 edition of
*Geographie de la Chine*, a French atlas and gazetteer, Manchuria (“Mandchourie” in
French) and its three provinces were treated as cartographically integral to China
proper. 92 Beyond the first two China maps that refer to northeastern China as
“Mandchourie,” the rest of the book is a province by province look at China. Manchuria
is not dealt with separately, but Tibet, Outer Mongolia, and Xinjiang are. The only map
in the book that reinforces Manchuria’s semi-distinctness is a railroad map whose geo-
body is virtually identical with what would become Manchukuo two years later. 93

**Japanese Manchuria**

It was explained previously that towards the end of the nineteenth century
Japanese world maps were still inconsistent in their usage of the toponym “Manshū.”
This changed radically in the early twentieth century as southern Manchuria and Korea
started to become integral parts of the imperial Japanese economy and transportation
network.

Mapping Manchuria, it turns out, was a deeply serious enterprise for the Japanese
in the years leading up to the Sino-Japanese War which broke out in July 1894. The
effect of this mapping and its connection to Japan’s victory over the Chinese can be seen
in the frantic writings of Qing official Li Peiyuan, a sub-prefect from Mukden Province,
who claimed the following as the situation for the Chinese in the Sino-Japanese War
began to deteriorate badly:

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93 Ibid., 61.
... The weakness of our troops and the strengths of the enemy [Japan] contrast too greatly. We operate on our own territory and yet do not know the topography, but they all carry maps individually and move over obscure paths and waterways as if they were old familiar roads...

This quote speaks volumes about the importance of good maps, and provides one potential reason for China's loss in that war. When fighting a war on the ground, knowing where one is and how to get to the next location is only possible with accurate maps. According to the sub-prefect, the Chinese side did not have maps for their battles, hinting that the Qing regime had not bothered to officially survey and map parts of their own country at a usefully detailed scale. The Japanese, conversely, had very accurate maps of at least parts of northeastern China, and this preparation should be seen as at least one reason for Japan's success during its first major war. What remains to be answered is why did Japan have such good maps of Chinese territory? It can be deduced that the Japanese maps had not been stolen from the Chinese since the government official above admitted that his own country's troops did "not know the topography."

Therefore, Japan's battlefield maps must have come from elsewhere. Another question is, why did the Chinese not have good maps, and why had they not bothered to make them in the first place?

The account about China's mapping history from the beginning of this chapter helps explain the Qing's lack of good maps of its own land during the first Sino-Japanese War. Regarding the Japanese wartime maps, by 1894-95 it is conceivable that the Japanese might have gotten their hands on some maps either through espionage, purchase,

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or even as a gift. More likely, however, is that Japanese spies first carried out “secret surveys” and then Japan made its own.

From 1892 to the Manchurian Incident in 1931 Japanese surveyors undertook “secret surveys” in Manchuria. Usually the trained surveyors would take a trip to some part of Manchuria or Mongolia where they would pretend to be traveling drug salesmen or doctors, and then do their surveys as the opportunity arose. In this kind of situation -- with the proper training of course -- surveyors can determine their general location with “dead reckoning” that allows for quite accurate initial area surveys without the need for towers or carrying out triangulation. Lewis and Clark, for instance, did this sort of surveying which provided enough information for the United States to put together their first accurate maps of the West. In the case of already settled parts of Manchuria, the Japanese spies could have memorized features, roads, and town layouts, all of which would have been sketched later.

The earliest “reconnaissance mission” to Manchuria took place in 1872 when Saigo Takamori sent two officers to Shengjing (Mukden; modern day Liaoning) Province to check on the conditions in Qing China in preparation for the Seikanron effort. Soon after reconnaissance missions were sent to inspect the banks of the Yalu River which borders northern Korea and western Manchuria. From 1882 to 1891 numerous Japanese officers were sent on secret reconnaissance missions every year to Korea where they

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95 “Secret surveys”: 秘密測量 Himitsu sokuryō.
96 Shima Yoshi, Manshū zakkan: Manshū sokuryō yobanashi 満洲随想：満洲測量夜話 (Miscellaneous Thoughts about Manchuria: Unofficial Talks on Surveying Manchuria)(Tokyo: 1972), 87
97 Ibid., 146. Seikanron (Invade Korea Debate), spearheaded by Meiji hero and “last Samurai” Saigō Takamori, came to a head in 1873 concerning Korea’s unwillingness to accept the new Meiji government. The movement was diffused later that year, but it did mark Japan’s early aggressive position vis-à-vis Korea.
were able to execute road maps. From this extended operation a 1:200,000 map was compiled.\footnote{Ibid. It is not clear in the text if a map set was produced, or just a single sheet.} According to Shima the earliest mapping of parts of Manchuria began in 1892, two years before the war with China broke out, perhaps explaining the Qing official’s observations quoted above.

However, there is evidence that the Japanese were actually producing detailed topographical maps of at least parts of Manchuria prior to what Shima understood to have been the case. The marginalia on four Japanese 1:200,000 maps entitled \textit{Shinkoku jōkyōshō} (Qing Country’s [China] Shengjing\footnote{Shengjing Province 盛京省 is the old name for present-day Liaoning Province. After 1911 it was also called Mukden Province, and at times, Fengtian Province.} Province), a set that covers the area of southeastern Manchuria on the Korean border to the city of Shenyang, states that it is a revised (1904) version of a map originally made in 1884.\footnote{Dainihon teikoku sanbō honbu, \textit{Shinkoku jōkyōshō}, 1:200,000. Series title unknown, sheets 146, 147, 149, 150 (Tokyo?: Dainihon Teikoku Sanbō Honbu, 1884). Revised 1904.} If true, these maps may have been the result of the early Yalu River reconnaissance missions described above. The maps are stamped “Military Secret,” and are a small sample of sheets out of a large set that, as the map’s marginalia suggests, may have had as many 156 sheets covering parts of Manchuria, China, and the border with Korea.

What is certain, however, is that by the Sino-Japanese War the Japanese were well-prepared in terms of maps. Unfortunately for the Chinese, the war’s conclusion did not put an end to Japan’s development of a cartographic database of Chinese territory, including Manchuria. Just months after the war’s April 1895 conclusion, a notice came from the Imperial Army concerning nine topographical maps of Chinese provinces.\footnote{Rikugunshō kōkyū fukkan, “Shinkoku chishi gai 13 ten kaifu hō no ken” 清国地誌外 13 点陸付方の件 [“The matter of the issuance of the 13-point transmission of Chinese topographical [Maps]”], Ichidai nikki}
One of the provinces was the southern Manchurian province of Shengjing (Mukden) (also the object of map just discussed), and the notice mentions maps of eastern Shengjing, southern Shengjing, and Western Shengjing.\textsuperscript{102} The Japanese mapping of Manchuria had gained a foothold.

If the Sino-Japanese War is any indication regarding Japanese mapping of Manchuria, then the Russo-Japanese War must also have been fought with the aid of accurate and detailed maps, and tangential references to maps are found in the popular literature of the time. One writer was impressed with more than just the Japanese military’s prowess and duplicity that allowed for its key victories:

Ever since their war with China the Japanese had been perfecting their military organization, as though the coming war with Russia was a certainty. They had \textit{military maps} [emphasis mine] of every nook and corner of Korea and Manchuria; they had spies working as coolies on the Russian railroads, and in Russian ports and shipyards . . . \textsuperscript{103}

This reference again to maps in explaining Japanese war gains is tantalizing. True, it is unlikely that the Japanese military had maps of “every nook and corner” of Manchuria, but they obviously had enough maps to carry out their battles successfully. Combining this quote with the similar one by the Manchurian sub-prefect above, it is quite apparent that surveying and mapping were part of Japan’s strategy in Manchuria from almost the very beginning.

The Russo-Japanese War broke out in February 1904, and in May an official notice came in regarding secret military maps of the Liaodong Peninsula, one of the chief

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., 1498.
\textsuperscript{103} In B.F. Collier and Son, ed., \textit{The Russo-Japanese War: A Photographic and Descriptive Review of the Great Conflict in the Far East} (New York: B.F. Collier and Son, 1904), 25.
battlegrounds of that bloody war. June 16, 1904 saw the transmission of an official notice of the transference of eleven 1:50,000 Liaodong Peninsula maps of Jinzhou (near the southern tip of the peninsula). In January 1905 a request was received from the Army Engineering Corps asking for six 1:20,000 maps of Port Arthur (J: Ryōjun) and the vicinity.

In early March the following year a request came in for 1:100,000 scale maps of Mukden city and its vicinity. Later that month the Imperial Army Engineering Corps requested 112 individual sheets (plus an index map) of a 1:50,000 scale map set of the Liaodong Peninsula. Since the War officially ended in September 1905, after which time the Japanese took over Russia’s holding in Southern Manchuria, the existence of secret military maps for much of the Liaodong Peninsula at a very detailed scale is important to note. Meanwhile, official notices regarding maps continued to come in. In the same batch of documents there was a message regarding the borrowing of Manchuria 1:1,000,000 maps in April 1905, and then a directive to replace a number of Chinese,
East Asia, and Manchurian maps of various scales.\textsuperscript{110} As the Russo-Japanese War was winding down, another example of maps appeared in an official notice, this time as a request for 1:200,000 maps of locations throughout southern Manchuria and into Korea.\textsuperscript{111} By 1905 Japan had through first-hand experience and extensive mapping and surveying become very knowledgeable about southern Manchuria, and this knowledge would serve the up-and-coming Empire well over the coming decades.

During the 1900s, 1910s, and 1920s Japan’s economic, military, and political interests continued to deepen in Manchuria. It should not be surprising, then, that cartographically independent maps of Manchuria continued to be produced in Japan at this time as well. An early Japanese language example of this is from November 1910 – about a year before the first Chinese Revolution -- entitled \textit{Manshū zenzu} (Complete Map of Manchuria). The scale is 1:3,000,000 and is measured in \textit{shaku}, equivalent to one foot, with a size of 74x50 cm making this a fair sized map.\textsuperscript{112} According to the marginalia, it was printed in Kanda, Tokyo, suggesting that the map was for public sale and use. The map’s colors, used sparingly, are blue, brown, black, and white, giving it a somewhat plain appearance, although the topography is quite detailed hinting at the gains in knowledge about Manchuria by this point. There are twelve smaller inset maps which are close-ups of coastal harbors and important towns and cities. There is also a small inset map along the bottom entitled Manchuria-Korea Mileage Chart which shows graphically the distance between Manchurian, Korean, and Russian ports, train stations, cities from

\textsuperscript{110} Hongō Nobu(?)tarō, “Kimitsu chizu henkyaku no ken” 機密地図返却の件 ["Return of secret maps"], \textit{Man dainikki} (May 25, 1905). JACAR reference code: C03027624800.
\textsuperscript{111} “Shinkan no shochizu seikyu oyobi henrin 1 ten” ["One point? return and request for maps of China and Korea"], \textit{Man dainikki} (July 1905). JACAR reference code: C03026537000.
\textsuperscript{112} Ito Masamitsu? 正三, \textit{Manshū zenzu} 満州全図 [map], 74x50 cm, 1:3,000,000 (Tokyo: Hakuaikan, 1910). National Diet Library Map Collection.
the perspective of the Korean peninsula looking northward. Overall, in this map Manchuria is a distinctly independent geo-body, and the future Manchukuo borders are virtually in place except for the Inner Mongolia region (the same as the contemporaneous *Encyclopedia Britannica* map discussed above), and the southern border which is defined by the “Long Fence” 長柵, a “fence” of some sort that connected from the Great Wall at Shanhaiguan into Mukden Province. The map makes Manchuria appear that much more separate by labeling the region south of the Great Wall as “Shina hondo” (“China Proper” 支那本土). On the other hand, the mapmakers also placed the large characters Qing Country 清國 in the middle of the map so that the viewer would understand that Manchuria was indeed Qing territory. Because of this it is impossible to say with certainty that the Japanese were attempting to cartographically sever Manchuria away from its rightful owner. Nevertheless, this early map is a prime example of what amounts to a de facto independent mapping of Manchuria, and it is basically the same map that will appear as “Manchukuo” in a couple of decades. Most significantly is how much the Japanese already knew about Manchuria by this early date, and that they were able to then reproduce that knowledge in mapped form.

Size was a feature of Japanese mapping of Manchuria. In September 1912 a *secret* map of Manchuria named *[Manshū zenzu] Manshū shifuzu* (Complete Map of Manchuria) was released by the Kwantung Army’s Accounting Department. 113 This magnificent work of cartography reveals without question not only the grave seriousness

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113 Kantō totokufu rikugun keiribu, *[Manshū zenzu] Manshū shifuzu* [満洲全圖]滿洲誌附圖, approx. 7’x7’, 1:1,000,000 (Kantō Totokufu Rikugun Keiribu, 1912).
of Japan's mapping of northeast China, but how far Japan's ability to map this foreign territory had come in a relatively short period of time.

Figure 22 Upper right panel (approx. 2'x1') from multi-panel 1912 secret Kwantung Army map of Manchuria. Section shows Manchuria (lower left) surrounded by Siberia. National Diet Library Collection.

The map's scale is 1:1,000,000, but because of its immense size (approximately seven to eight square feet) it still appears extremely detailed [Figure 22]. It is full color with some topography, although its real focus is place names and the political divisions of late Qing Manchuria. It includes provinces, departments, prefectures, sub-prefectures, districts (counties), Mongolian banner lands, and even Mongolian Leagues. Considering its source and secret status, this map is fairly strong evidence that the Japanese had been actively surveying Manchuria in the years before this map was drawn and printed, and that the
Kwantung Army was using its Liaodong Leasehold as a base to accumulate as much
information about Manchuria as possible.

Though not quite as immense, the following map from February 1923 was also
large by most standards at approximately 3x4.5 feet. With the title Manmō shibiri chizu
(A Map of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Siberia), it covers a fair amount of northeast Asian
territory at a scale of 1:2,000,000.\(^{114}\) Besides Mongolia and part of Siberia, it also shows
Manchuria’s three provinces along with their combined eight circuits 道, a Chinese mode
of internal territorial division that was eventually phased out after 1911. The map's
publisher was a private printing company in Tokyo named Kojima Insatsu, and it is not
marked “secret,” so this map was likely available on the civilian market. The Manchurian
geo-body is clearly visible on this map, and it looks almost identical to what will become
Manchukuo.

Even as the Japanese continued their “secret surveys” of Manchuria, and
produced increasingly high quality and precise maps of the region for both military and
civilian use, a Japanese author writing about Manchuria in 1924 had this to say about the
mapping and surveying situation in China and Manchuria:

Students who consider the geographical details of China in general and of
Manchuria in particular should always keep in mind the central fact that
not even in China proper has there been a scientific survey of the whole
land since the days the Sacred Dragons lorded over it. Such surveys as
have been carried out in recent years are of fragmentary character. If there
is not an official or private survey of China Proper, it goes without saying
that there is no such thing about outlying and outside dependencies like
Manchuria and Tibet . . . . In a small section of the country, such as the
leased territory of Kwantung under the Japanese administration it is
different. There the whole land is surveyed carefully, and the census

\(^{114}\) Kawamura Takechi, Manmō shibiri chizu 满蒙东西地圖, 120x150, 1:2,000,000 (Tokyo: Kojima
register is as dependable as in any section of Japan proper or in the City of New York.\textsuperscript{115}

Therefore, even in 1924 Manchuria was cartographically an ill understood place. But that was not all. Adachi continues to criticize China’s handling of its own territory:

This accounts for many astounding discrepancies in so-called “official” figures of various parentage. The Fengtien (or Mukden) official report of 1909 puts the area of the Mukden Province at 18,679 square ri (one ri is 5.955 square miles). Japan army authorities in their report of 1910 placed it at 9330 square ri. The Agricultural Research Status Report of the Fengtien Province of 1911 placed it at 20,476 square ri. An Army authority connected w/ the Kwantung governor general in 1916 declared it to be 12,721 square ri; and the same yr the experts of the SMR put it at 14,932, which was later revised to 15,151 square ri.\textsuperscript{116}

Assuming Adachi is correct, what this shows, besides levels of incompetence on both sides, is that the Japanese were conducting surveys in Manchuria outside of their leasehold quite regularly. This would account, in part, for the production of the maps described above.

As the Japanese became more familiar with Manchuria, maps came to be drawn in new and creative styles. One of these was a 1927 SMR 10-panel folding tourist map of Manchuria entitled Manshū no chōkan (A Bird’s-eye View of Manchuria) [Figure 23].\textsuperscript{117} Although just a tourist map, its value for this current analysis is nonetheless significant. First, it perpetuates the notion of Manchuria being at least semi-separate from China through both its title and its subject matter. In fact, its viewpoint (which is hardly a “bird’s-eye – more like a low-earth orbit satellite view) that shows the curvature of the earth creates the sense that Manchuria belongs with Korea, Siberia, and Mongolia as a

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 13.
\textsuperscript{117} Minami manshū tetsūdō kabushiki gaisha, \textit{Manshū no chōkan} 満州の鳥瞰, 14”x20”, scale not given (Tokyo: Minami Manshū Tetsūdō Kabushiki Gaisha, 1927). Reverse side has textual information about tourist locations along the SMR. National Diet Library Map Collection.
unified northern Asia region. The northern tip of China can be seen, as can western Kyūshū, but these locations are mere reference points. This particular map is quite handsome, is in full color, and demonstrates graphically Manchuria’s chief topographical features; the Manchurian plain and its surrounding mountain ranges. Manchuria’s main rail lines are shown, along with the large stations. The SMR is drawn in red, with all other regional railroads in black. The effect of this map, much more so than a traditional straight-down view, brings to life the vastness of Manchuria, its extreme topography, its remoteness and lack of development and major human settlements in the north, as well as its relationship with its neighbors.

Figure 23 1927 SMR Bird’s-eye view of Manchuria, Korea, western Inner Mongolia, and Siberia. The dark lines are railroads. National Diet Library Collection.
During the early twentieth century "Manchuria" became a firmly fixed toponym. Nevertheless, there is little cartographic evidence that the Japanese were purposely using maps at that time to foster the notion of a separate Manchuria. On the contrary, the characters for Manshū are usually smaller than those of Qing, or later, Shina (the preferred name of China in pre-1945 Japan), both of which generally appear on pre-1932 Japanese maps of Manchuria.

**China and Manchuria**

Japanese and Western maps of the world and of Asia are generally in agreement regarding Manchuria up through 1932. The situation with Chinese maps is much different. This had to do with the politics of the name “Manchuria” when it was rendered into Chinese characters. In his *Journal of Asian Studies* article mentioned above, Mark Elliot also discussed the political implications of the toponym Manchuria, especially its character form 滿洲, pronounced Manshū in Japanese, and Manzhou in Chinese. Elliot shows quite clearly that the Qing Dynasty did officially use the characters, albeit on a limited basis, and thus it is difficult to say that the Japanese toponym for northeast China was purely an imperialistic device. The origin of the toponym further downgrades this notion — its creation was an accident of cartographic history. Where Elliot is unconvincing in his argument is that Western term “Manchuria” is “controversial”, is “troublesome,” that it “... calls up unpleasant associations with Russian, and, especially, Japanese imperialist designs on the Asian mainland” related to the establishment of
Manchukuo, and that "using the name "Manchuria" is thus not only inaccurate, but implies a sanction of odious colonial projects." 118

But for whom is it problematic? Because the Americans did not have designs in Manchuria apart from desiring the "open door" for trade, that country's use of the term cannot be seen as "imperialistic." While the British were imperialists in China, they supported neither the Russian nor Japanese dismemberment of northeast China, and moreover, neither Britain nor France officially recognized Manchukuo during its thirteen-year existence. Therefore, the only country for which the toponym "Manchuria" might be controversial or troublesome is China. However, just as Elliot showed that the Chinese government and certain individuals did on occasion use the characters Manzhou on their maps or in writings, the English term "Manchuria" was almost always used by the Chinese government or individual Chinese when discussing the region in English during the prewar period. For instance, the Father of modern China, Sun Yat-sen used the term "Manchuria" exclusively when discussing the region in his 1922 book The International Development of China. 119 It must be reiterated that "Manchuria" was the accepted translation for what the Chinese called the "Three Eastern Province," or the "Northeast."

Pre-war Chinese-language maps and atlases are indeed clean of the characters for "Manzhou," where the three northeastern provinces are treated in the same manner as China's other provinces, or, if they are shown together as a unit, they are called "Sandongsheng" 三東省 ("The Three Eastern Provinces") or "Dongbei" 東北 ("The

118 Elliot, p. 603.
Comparatively speaking, the quality of Chinese maps of this territory is noticeably inferior to that of Japan and the Western countries. An example of this is the 1896 Qing Government produced 68-sheet map series on Heilongjiang Province mentioned previously.

This map series reflects the fact that unlike the Japanese and the Russians, the Chinese neither knew much about Manchuria nor had surveyed it beyond at a basic level. Discussing Manchuria's forests at the relatively late date of 1921, "the largest . . . in the world" with their "... almost inexhaustible supply of timber," High Industrial Commissioner for the ROC Yeh Kung-cho stated bluntly: "As they have not been surveyed, it is difficult to give details concerning them." Yeh did not say this to be critical, but even as he made this claim the Japanese and Russians were steadily (and secretly) advancing their knowledge of the region through surveys and maps.

What the Chinese actually surveyed and mapped at this time was generally poorly done, something not lost on mapping experts from the Far Eastern Geographical Establishment of Shanghai:

The ineptitude of the Chinese Government . . . in respect to map-making is almost incredible. It is true that every prefecture publishes a record . . . and a map or maps showing towns, waterways and hills. These maps are grossly inaccurate so far as proportion and direction are concerned . . . . As may be imagined, seeing that they are locally drawn by individuals of varying ability and knowledge, no small ingenuity is required to make them agree with one another.\footnote{\textsuperscript{122}}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{120} Although I have never encountered one, it is possible that prewar Chinese-language maps of Manchuria from Taiwan were published, as well as Manchukuo maps from occupied China after 1937. If they do exist they would not be relevant to this analysis.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{121} Kung Cho Yeh, \textit{Industrial Tour Around Manchuria} (Beijing: Office of the High Industrial Commissioner, 1921), 4.}

Still, by the post-Qing period the Chinese began to produce civilian atlases and maps for reference use, maps whose scale was small enough that accuracy problems would not have caused too much havoc. One example of this is the second edition of the *Zhongguo xin yuto* (A New Atlas of China).¹²³

This work is entirely in Chinese and was designed for a Chinese audience. Among its uses to us today is to contrast it with comparable atlases that were being produced about China by foreigners at the same time; for example the *Complete Atlas of China* mentioned earlier. By 1917 the science of cartography and its adjunct surveying had

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¹²³ Ch’en Hao-chi, *Zhongguo xin yuto* 中国新舆图 (Shanghai: Commercial Press Ltd., 1917).
evolved greatly in the United States, Europe, and Japan. This book simply does not reflect those refinements and advancements. However, it is suitable enough for analysis [Figure 24]. As might be expected there is no mention of "Manchuria," and moreover, the "three Eastern Provinces," does not appear as a separate entry. Rather, Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Mukden are simply listed along with the other provinces. Taiwan is not shown as being Chinese territory, and the Japanese Kwantung Leasehold does not appear in the maps of that area. This non-use of Manchuria/Three Eastern Provinces was possibly a political statement: i.e., there is no such thing as "Manchuria." At the least it meant that the Chinese in this case were telling themselves that Manchuria was in no way separate from the rest of China.

Figure 25 Detail from 1923 Chinese map of Manchuria. University of Hawaii at Manoa Collection.

There were instances, however, when the Chinese did indeed cartographically recognize the special position of their three northeastern provinces within a greater China. The end result was the mapping of those three provinces together as a single region called
the “Three Eastern Provinces.” Maps of this sort are identical to contemporary Japanese maps of Manchuria, and are firm evidence that the Chinese had accepted the political realities of the time – at the least that Manchuria could be mapped and analyzed as a semi-separate political unit. An example of this is Dongsansheng mingxi quantu (A Clear and Detailed Complete Map of the Three Eastern Provinces) from 1923 [Figure 25].124 Assuming that Japanese maps of Manchuria were political statements, or possibly even statements of imperialistic intent, the same cannot be said of Chinese maps carrying the identical content. “Manchuria” was not a regional appellation along the lines of “New England” – it was a name with serious political ramifications.

Figure 26 Front & back of Qing-era 1909 coin used in the Three Eastern Provinces / Manchuria (author’s collection). Note that the government used the toponym “Manchuria” as the official translation for “Dongsansheng.”

While the Chinese might not have used the term Manzhou does not mean that they saw its Romanized form of “Manchuria” as cartographically and toponymically unacceptable. On the contrary, it was in fact the official term in late Qing (and throughout

124 Dongsansheng quantu 東三省明細全圖 (China, 1923). University of Hawaii Map Collection.
prewar China in general) as seen on the images of the coin above [Figure 26]. A cartographic example of this is found in the form of a massive atlas called the *China Postal Atlas: Showing the Postal Establishments and Postal Routes in Each Province*, published and produced by the ROC Directorate General of Posts in 1933.\(^{125}\) The preface, in English (and also French and Chinese), states that "... the entire work, with the exception of the printing, has been carried out by the staff of the Chinese Post Office."\(^{126}\)

There are twenty-nine maps in the volume, each one 22"x25", which is rather large. The maps are full-color and drawn to show the curvature of the earth, but because of their purpose was to show provincial mail routes they are not topographical. Each

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\(^{126}\) Ibid., preface.
province is mustard colored, with outside territories in light green and borders in red. Postal routes, including airmail, are represented with straight arrowed lines between destinations.

Map number one is the Index Map [Figure 27] which shows China in its entirety. Each of its component provinces and regions is demarked by a provincial-regional boundary, a number that matches with its map, its Chinese name written in characters, and Romanization. Most of the provinces have been transliterated from Mandarin, but some, as with today, are not. Tibet is written as “Tibet” instead of Xizang, and (Outer) Mongolia is “Mongolia.” The last non-transliteration on this bilingual map is “Manchuria,” written as “Three Eastern Provinces” in Chinese characters. More intriguing is that not only is northeastern China written as “Manchuria” in an official Chinese atlas, but it appears here as a complete geo-body – there are no lines that denote provincial boundaries within the Manchurian space. Except for Rehe (Jehol) which is shown as politically separate from Manchuria, this is the same Manchurian map that the Japanese and Westerners were using.127

The use of the toponym “Manchuria” in the index map was not anomalous, nor was the use of the Manchurian geo-body. The bilingual table of contents shows that map nine is entitled “Manchuria,” map ten is entitled “Manchuria: Central Section,” and map eleven is “Manchuria: Southern Section.” The Chinese says the same thing, but again is

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127 It is worth pointing out just how much Chinese-produced maps of their own territory have changed since the 1920s. In 1929 the region that is now Inner Mongolia was transformed into four provinces, none of which exist today, but all of which are on found in this atlas. Outer Mongolia, which had been de facto independent from China since 1922 is drawn in as part of China, while Taiwan is shown through its coloring as being foreign territory. The Korean peninsula is Romanized as “Korea,” but its characters are 高麗 Koryo, the traditional Chinese name for Korea when it was a tributary state. Vietnam is Romanized as Tongking, with the equivalent characters. While I am concerned with Manchuria as a toponym, the Chinese politics behind this map are unmistakable and would make for an interesting future study.
written as "Three Eastern Provinces." Map eleven, the main "Manchuria" map, is indisputably the Manchuria geo-body -- and Manchukuo -- with the exception of Rehe. The Chinese characters say "Three Eastern Provinces," while in a much bigger (and in uppercase) font is the word "MANCHURIA" [Figure 28].

On the other hand, "Manchuria" is not written inside the borders of the region; instead, it is divided into its three provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang, and shows those names in both Chinese and their Romanized forms. It is quite a handsome and complex map at 1:2,500,000, is corrected for the curvature of the earth, shows a large number of local place names, and includes rivers and railroads along with the postal routes. Map ten, Manchuria's southern section, is 1:900,000 scale and shows the Liaodong Peninsula, all of Liaoning Province, and part of Jilin. As with Figure 27, it is named "Manchuria" written in larger upper case letters. Map eleven is also entitled

Figure 28 1933 China Postal Atlas "Manchuria" map detail.
“Manchuria” in the large font, is 1:900,000 in scale, and is a close up of the central area from about Sipin 四平 in the south to a full degree of latitude north of Harbin. Why the northernmost part of Manchuria was left out is not stated.

The point of the extended analysis of the *Postal Atlas* is to show that official Chinese publications used the word “Manchuria” when providing English translations. It also shows that by the 1930s the Chinese had also come to map their northeast in the same manner as the Japanese and Westerners.

**Conclusion**

Maps reinforced and perpetuated the toponym Manchuria. Although maps and atlases can be neutral tools, their usage and presentation can also be very political. It was one thing for journalists to discuss events going on in Manchuria, but for it to be mapped; that is what brought the region to life as an actual place. Although some modern scholars (such as Elliot) claim that the terms “Manchuria” and “Manshû” are problematic, their existence has more to do with unforeseen regional political events, especially the first Sino-Japanese War, the Boxer Rebellion, the Russo-Japanese War, and possibly the Siberian Intervention as well. Each of these events emphasized Manchuria as a place not entirely Chinese. In turn, the area was mapped separately, the end result being a cartographic vicious circle that has been discussed in this section. The ultimate outcome of the de facto cartographic separation of Manchuria was Manchukuo, the mapping of which is the subject of the next chapter.
"I think, therefore I am." - Descartes

"I am mapped, therefore I am." - Manchukuo

At the turn of the twentieth century northeastern China had become the object of a regional geopolitical free-for-all. During that time cartographers generally had come to agree that Manchuria was a region suitable for independent or semi-independent cartography. Even so, despite Japanese and Russians rail lines traversing the area, independent British encyclopedia entries, and Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin’s semi-independent foreign policy, currency, and even flag, Manchuria managed to remain politically a part of China. This was a remarkable feat. Nevertheless, the feel of nominal independence was evident, reified most graphically by maps. By at least 1931 a number of powerful Japanese had decided that the time had come to sever Manchuria from China once and for all, and on March 1, 1932 the “Puppet State” of Manchukuo was born. Little changed geographically that day, as “Manchuria” maps became “Manchukuo” maps almost overnight.

When precisely does a country become a “real” country? This not merely an academic question. Thongchai Winichakul confronted this query in a roundabout way in his well-known study of the origins of Thai nationalism Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation. His conclusions about the nature of the modern Thai state are instructive for understanding a similar process that occurred in the borderlands of late Imperial China, in particular Manchuria.
What Dr. Winichakul uncovered is that Thailand, one of the few Asian countries to avoid European or Japanese colonization, owes its modern-day geographic shape -- its geo-body as he coined it -- to the colonialism that was going on outside its borders. That is to say, the British in Burma in the west and Malaya in the south, and the French in the east in French Indochina effectively created Thailand as a by-product of their political expansion, surveys, and cartography, compelling the Thais to begin defining their boundaries starting in the early 1800s. Put succinctly: “Siam was bordered, its geo-body emerged.” As the process of firming up boundaries continued, Thais were being introduced to modern geography (in particular the knowledge of a round earth within a heliocentric solar system, and the concept of a world made up of differing nations) via maps and atlases by Westerners, resulting in a growing Thai understanding of their place in the world.

Winichakul stresses, though, that this new conceptualization was only possible with the aid of maps. That was a significant moment because leading up to the European arrival and the subsequent transmission of their new geographical and political conceptions, Thailand had been a pre-modern empire that, for instance, in the case of the “boundary” with Burma was really a frontier: a tract of forest and mountains several miles wide belonging to neither kingdom where regional disputes would have been local issues out of the purview of Bangkok. Correspondingly, pre-modern territorial looseness was not inconsistent with Buddhist notions, which in turn was closely connected to

1 Winichakul, 131.
2 Ibid., 130.
3 Ibid., 49-50.
4 Ibid., 51.
5 Ibid., 64. Thongchai does provide evidence that late 19th century Thais had concepts and vocabulary for terms such as “boundary and “border,” but that they did not mean precisely the same thing as what the English had in mind for delineating the Burma-Siam border. Ibid., 74-75.
Thailand’s pre-modern mapping. As a result, modern maps of Thailand created and introduced by the Westerners had the effect of injecting an alternative reality into traditional Thai perspectives on the nature of the world. Members of the Thai elite were surprisingly receptive to the new scientific knowledge, and within a couple of generations scientific geography and mapping had won the day. It is stark evidence of the power of maps to change and even create perceptions of how the world really “is.” Winichakul reflects “... Perhaps more than has been realized, the regime of mapping did not passively reflect Siam. Rather, it has actively structured Siam in our minds as on earth.”

In essence, that is the power of the map – to give meaning to that which is otherwise meaningless, especially in the reification of something as spatially immense as a country. Would it be a leap to replace “Siam” with “Manchuria”?

While Thailand’s, and at certain points Manchuria’s reality has not been in question, Manchukuo was different. Between 1932 and 1945 Manchukuo was a cartographical pariah for many, a perfectly acceptable toponym for some, and for others a toponymical annoyance that required mapmaking gymnastics in order to account for its simultaneous existence-nonexistence. Whatever else one might say about Manchukuo, its geo-body was a test case on the limits of mapping as a legitimizing tool. At the same time it exposed the power and limit of maps to shape perceptions of how the world is – among many in the Japanese Empire Manchukuo was real; among most outside of Japan,

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6 Ibid., 26-27. Native Thai-produced topographical maps were a combination of actual geographic locations and the mapping of Buddhist lore.
7 Ibid., ch. 2.
8 Ibid., 130.
Manchukuo was not real, although Figure 29 shows that some American newspapers were willing to give Manchukuo and its maps a chance. From the beginning maps were required to help explain what Manchukuo was. When the Lytton Commission was in Manchuria it asked to see a map of Manchukuo's exact area, something the Japanese

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were unable to provide. This does not mean that the Commission would have accepted Manchukuo if the maps they sought had indeed been available, but it indicates that a good map of the country was a precondition for any kind of consideration from the League of Nations representatives. Actually, maps of the new country were appearing from almost the very beginning in newspaper articles, in atlases, as individual sheet maps, and as fold-outs in books, helping to reinforce the Manchukuo geo-body’s rightful place within a greater East Asia.

The Manchukuo geo-body and the Manchurian geo-body from the late 1920s through early 1932 were virtually identical. Maps of Manchuria attached to various Japanese annuals and reports were simply renamed from “Manchuria” to “Manchukuo,” and with Hsinking replacing Changchun. Traditionally for China the Manchurian region did not include the southern province of Rehe (Jehol), but administratively Rehe had been part of Manchuria since 1929. All in all, before and after March 1, 1932 Manchuria exhibited a high level of cartographic continuity [Figure 30].

Nevertheless, because Manchukuo was a Japanese project, its mapping was carried out by Japanese surveyors and cartographers chiefly for a Japanese official and civilian audience. Therefore this section shall focus primarily on Japanese-produced maps of Manchukuo — both civilian and government — finishing up with analysis of a selection of non-Japanese maps that were the cartographic “response” to the Manchukuo dilemma.

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11 East Asiatic Investigation Bureau, Manchukuo, 11.5”x9”, 1:6,300,000, in James A.B. Scherer, Manchukuo: A Bird’s-eye View (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1933), attached map.
Japanese Civilian Maps of Manchukuo

After the establishment of Manchukuo in March 1932 maps of all kinds from an array of publishing companies appeared in Japan. These maps -- single sheet, sets, handbooks, atlases, pull-outs in books and magazines, or insets in articles or chapters -- varied in size, quality, and quantity, but they served a couple of specific purposes for the Japanese. First, and arguably most importantly, they firmly established Manchukuo as a real place, a real country, and a fact of nature just as maps of Manchuria had acted to

Figure 30 1933 English-language national map of Manchukuo.
reify that geo-body as "real" and semi-independent from China in the period leading up to Manchukuo. Secondly, these maps allowed the Japanese who viewed them to make sense of their new "country," to understand where its towns and cities were that they might have heard or read about, where their loved ones, friends, and neighbors had gone to settle, conquer, or defend, or where a recent bandit or anti-Japanese attack had just taken place. These accurate maps, usually multi-colored and highly detailed with topography, place names, and railroad lines, were a key tool for understanding Manchukuo's size, its relation to the surrounding countries, perhaps providing inspiration for those considering an adventure in the new "heaven on earth," and allowing for "participatory imperialism" as Peter Hoffenberg put in his recent book on the British Empire's spectacle industry.¹²

At its most basic, a map's chief purpose is to make immense areas comprehensible to human beings. They also make the abstract (for instance a country) into something tangible. Through maps the immensity of Manchuria-Manchukuo was shrunk down to a manageable size, and simultaneously it went beyond being a mere abstraction. In the days before television and certainly the internet, it might be concluded that maps physically connected people to faraway places, and, arguably, Manchukuo's maps linked the Japanese to their new country. The previous chapter discussed the variety of Manchuria maps, and how, through constant mapping over the decades "Manchuria" eventually became a fixed toponym for China's northeastern provinces. The idea became so firmly embedded in the collective consciousness that even the Chinese were compelled to use it in translation. However, one principal difference between Manchuria and

¹² Peter Hoffenberg, An Empire on Display: English, Indian, and Australian Exhibitions from the Crystal Palace to the Great War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).
Manchukuo maps (at least those produced for public consumption) is that Manchukuo was from the beginning mapped in its entirety as an independent geo-body. Except in the late 1920s, pre-Manchukuo Manchuria’s geo-spatial status was much less clearly defined resulting in a wide variety of maps such as the southern Manchuria and Korea combined maps, and the SMR route maps.

For Japan, throughout the 1930s and early 1940s maps created and then reinforced time and again the Manchukuo geo-body as a vital symbol of Manchukuo’s reality, arguably more so than the flag, Emperor Pu Yi, postage stamps, the national anthem, or any of the other symbols of Manchukuo’s ersatz authenticity. The country’s unique geo-body appeared in many manifestations, but most importantly on maps. The Manchukuo shape became so ubiquitous in Japan during the 1930s that it would be impossible to list every instance of its appearance here, although that might be a possible future off-shoot project from this one.

An early example of the Manchukuo map boom was the *Dai Manshukoku shin chizu tsuke shina zenzu* (New Map of Great Manchukuo, Plus a Complete Map of China), initially published in May of 1932, and already at its eighteenth printing by November 1932. Unfortunately specific details on the origins of this map or the organization that produced it have yet to surface, so that leaves deduction. Fortunately, the maps themselves tell us a great deal. The set was possibly based on an early set of Manchuria that had been changed to Manchukuo after March 1932. That would explain why the publisher was able to have it ready for sale only two months after Manchukuo’s establishment. In terms of sales figures, this kind of information also remains elusive but

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would be useful for further studies of this topic. However, it was inexpensive – 35 sen\textsuperscript{14} – and therefore likely within the price range of most interested Japanese at the time. In essence, the possibility for wide distribution was certainly there. Ultimately, this map set’s impact can only be surmised, although as part of the larger body of Manchukuo maps it is intrinsically worthy of analysis.

According to the cover it was “approved by the Manchukuo government.”\textsuperscript{15} This “map” is actually a set of maps with eight loose pages, one of which is a large format folded political map of Manchukuo. The remaining sheets are all approximately 8”x11”. There are two more maps of Manchukuo, one of which is topographical, while the other shows county political divisions and population distribution [Figure 31].\textsuperscript{16} The fourth page has four smaller city maps on it: Qiqihar, Harbin, Jilin, and Rehe. The fifth page has a small map of Hsinking, a small map showing Japan-Manchuria air and ship connections, and a chart on the organization of Manchukuo’s government. Page six has a map of Mukden (Shenyang), charts describing farm and forest acreage, as well as the number of cows, horses, pigs and sheep living in Manchukuo. The final map is a curvature-corrected map of China that includes Outer Mongolia and Tanna Tuva,\textsuperscript{17} but with Manchukuo drawn in as an independent country. The large-scale map of Manchukuo is very professional, and appears quite accurate. It is in color, is corrected for the curvature of the

\textsuperscript{14} In the prewar period Japan’s money system was based on 1 yen = 100 sen, and 1 sen = 100 mon (1930s: about 3-4 yen per US dollar, and 3-4 sen per US cent). Therefore, the map set under discussion would have cost about a dime.

\textsuperscript{15} “Manshukoku seifu kettei” 満洲国政府決定.

\textsuperscript{16} Manshūkoku kenbetsu gyōsetoku gato, 9”x6.5”, 1:9,000,000. In Dai Manshūkoku shin chizu tsuke shina zenzu.

\textsuperscript{17} Tanna Tuva was, like Outer Mongolia,” part of China until the 1920s, and its dismemberment was naturally not recognized by the Chinese government. It was finally absorbed into the USSR after WWII.
earth, and was obviously produced by trained cartographers who had detailed information about Manchuria at their fingertips.

Figure 31 Map of Manchukuo's counties and population density from Nov. 1932. Note: The new country name "Manshūkoku" is not on the map itself (only "Manshū"), indicating that this map was prepared before Manchukuo's establishment.
The remaining maps in the set are technically sound apart from the complete map of China, which is amateurish. Over all, this map set is rather like an atlas or a handbook than just a map, and probably served the same purpose as a small atlas. The Manchukuo geo-body appears four times in this set; three as an independent geo-body, and once within the context of a greater East Asia. All of these maps would have instilled in their viewers a sense of Manchukuo’s reality among the East Asian family of nations.

This early map was just one of many published in Japan along with the establishment of Manchukuo. The following is a sample list of single sheet Manchukuo maps from the early 1930s:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 3</th>
<th>Sample List of Manchukuo National Maps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newest Map of Great Manchukuo</td>
<td>Shōhan Insatsu Kabushikigaisha 1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newest Map of Great Manchukuo</td>
<td>Buyōsha Shoten 1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newest Great Map of Manchukuo &amp; China</td>
<td>Chūseidō 1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Interesting Map of Great Manchukuo</td>
<td>Shōhan Insatsu Kabushikigaisha 1932 Mukden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map of the New Nation Manchukuo</td>
<td>Osaka Yagō Shoten 1932 Tokyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big Map of the New Manchukuo</td>
<td>Waraku Roten 1932 Osaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchukuo and China Proper</td>
<td>Senryūdō 1932 Tokyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big Map of Manchukuo</td>
<td>Osaka Shūmendō 1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Map of Great Manchukuo</td>
<td>Seinen Kyōiku Fukyūkai 1934 Tokyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete Map of Great Manchukuo</td>
<td>Seinen Kyōiku Fukyūkai 1934 Tokyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete Map of Manchukuo</td>
<td>Kantō [Kwantung] Chō 1934 Ryōjun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Economic Map of China’s Five Northern Provinces and Manchukuo</td>
<td>Tōa Zenrinsha 1936 Tokyo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1932 saw a large number of Manchukuo maps go on sale. Undoubtedly there was money to be made in selling these maps, and also that the organizations responsible for the maps wanted to aggressively “push” the idea of the Puppet State by mapping it. Whatever the reason behind this cartographic outpouring, an awareness of the quantity of maps

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18 Map titles have been translated to save space. Source for titles and publishing details: Japanese National Diet Library holdings.
available at the time helps us understand at least part of the reason why Japanese people (some even today) considered Manchukuo to be a real country.

Another source for these maps, although in miniature, was the numerous Manchukuo-related gazetteer-type “information books” published following the new country’s establishment. The content of these books shall be covered in the following chapters, but their maps are also worthy of analysis. Whether or not *every* Japanese book about the conditions in Manchukuo from the 1930s included a pull-out map of some sort cannot be stated with certainty. However, it was a distinct pattern. That means that readers of the books discussed below would have had the opportunity to encounter at least one color map of Manchukuo as he or she thought about Japan’s new neighbor on the continent.

![Figure 32 1932 Manmō jijō sóran attached map title detail.](image)

An early example is a book entitled *Manmō jijō sóran* (A General Survey of Manchurian and Mongolian Conditions) published in July 1932, four months after Manchukuo’s declaration of independence. Manmō, which means “Manchuria and Mongolia,” was a proto-Manchukuo term used by the Japanese that described the Manchurian area and eastern Inner Mongolia. Because the book’s title includes the pseudo-toponym Manmō it was probably planned and at least partially written before Manchukuo became a state. The book covers general conditions in the region such as

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19 *Manshūkoku jimen* [map], 12.5”x9”, 1:6,000,000. In Rōyama Masamichi, ed., *Manmō jijō sóran* 満蒙事情総覧 (Tokyo: Kaizōsha, 1932), attached map.
transportation, government, industry, currency, and so forth. The attached folding map measures approximately 12.5x9 inches. It is at a scale of 1:6,000,000 and is topographically detailed so that the viewer knows at a glance the general attributes of any given area in Manchukuo. The title of the map is *Manshukoku jimen* (The Land of Manchukuo) [Figure 32], and although it includes the name “Manchukuo” in the title it is likely that this map was produced pre-1932 since the characters for “Manshū” (not “Manshūkoku”) are on the geo-body itself. “Manshu” is also written in the same size font as “Inner Mongolia,” suggesting that in this map they were regional rather than national toponyms. Moreover, there is no international border line between China and Manchukuo (the Great Wall eventually became the southern border) which means that when this map was produced Manchuria was still a part of China. Finally, the legend does not include a symbol for the “National Capital” but does have one for provincial capitals. However, Hsinking is written on this map with the pre-Manchukuo city name of Changchun in parentheses beneath it [Figure 33]. This is a unique transitional map, but most readers...
would have associated it with Manchukuo anyway because of the title. Approximately
two years later a similar work appeared, this time in pocketbook size. It included four
maps, two of which are larger fold-out maps. Along with the name Manshūteikoku sōran
(A General Survey of the Manchu Empire) its contents are similar to the previous book.20
Looking at the maps gives the distinct impression that the Japanese had greatly improved
in their ability to give Manchukuo an accurate cartographic form compared to 1932, and
to make use of the Manchukuo geo-body in new and creative ways as a means of
conveying information.

Map number one, *A Map of the Manchu Empire*, is about 8x10 inches with a scale of
1:7,000,000. It is color, but the color is used sparingly except for the olive-green borders, red
characters for railroad line names, and tan topography. The topographic representation is
weak, and appears only semi-accurate. However, the map is corrected for the earth’s curvature so
the geo-body and positioning are presumably correct. It is not a bad looking map, and certainly
expresses the Manchukuo geo-body clearly and concisely. Map number two shares the first map’s
dimensions and scale, but without the color and

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topography. It is a map of Manchukuo’s road building plan through 1935, with red lines representing the roads whose construction was underway, and blue lines representing road construction to begin in 1935. The map is plain and the Manchukuo geo-body is easy to see.

The other two maps in this book take up one page and are much smaller – only 3x3 inches – but portray a purely Manchukuo geo-body without interference from topography or non-Manchukuo place names [Figure 34].\textsuperscript{21} The top map is Manchukuo’s Important Railroads, and it shows the SMR lines, the Manchukuo State Railway lines, lines under construction, and a couple of connecting Chinese and Soviet lines. The lower map is Manchukuo’s “Distribution of Industry,” which in 1934 meant mining and agriculture. It is a basic plot map where the viewer is shown, through the use of colored dots and symbols, the areas where kaoliang, wheat, and soybeans were grown, where chief forest areas existed, and where iron, coal, gold, copper, lead, and magnesium were mined. Here again Manchukuo maps are being used for something much different than just showing boundaries and topography.

A similar book came out in 1934, and was revised in 1937. The title is Manshū doku hon (A Manchuria Reader) and shares the basic content to the above book except that it has many more photos and uses furigana above the kanji.\textsuperscript{22} Therefore this book was likely targeted at young adults. Its attached 1:6,000,000 map, entitled Manchukuo Outline Map was created in December 1933; at 12x17.5 inches it is nearly the same size as some of the small single sheet map, although the actual mapped Manchukuo geo-body

\textsuperscript{21} Manshūkoku no shiyō tetsudō [map] and Manshūkoku no sangyō bunpu [map], 3”x3”, scale not given. In Ibid., attached maps 1-2.
\textsuperscript{22} Tōa keizai chōsakyoku, Manshu doku hon 滿洲読本(Tōa keizai chōsakyoku, 1934). Furigana are small versions of the hiragana syllabary placed above Kanji in order to assist with reading.
is no larger than the one in the map handbook described above. The map is in color, but generally speaking it is light on information apart from key place names and rail lines. Moreover, the map is not corrected for the earth’s curvature, and its vague topography does not match later renditions, suggesting that it lacks accuracy. Again, like the map from the “handbook,” the toponym “Manshūkoku” is not used anywhere on the mapped geo-body, making it likely that this map was originally a Manchuria map. What this map does well, though, is emphasize Manchukuo’s new provincial boundaries with a thin olive-green line, and its national borders between the USSR, Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, the Kwantung Leased Territory, and China proper through the use of a thick olive-green boundary line. When looking at this map Manchukuo’s shape and its separateness from China and Mongolia become readily apparent. This emphasis on the new provincial and international boundaries would have graphically helped civilians understand the changes going on in Manchuria under Japanese control.

The 1937 edition attached map is a fine example of the degree to which Japanese civilians had been able to improve their cartographic skills of Manchuria once the territory came under the Empire’s control.23 Entitled Mantetsu jokan tetsudō ryakuzu (An Outline Map of the Railroads Managed by the SMR), it is a cartographically striking medium-sized full color map produced by the SMR in December 1936 that portrays Manchukuo in its prime.24 The size is 16.5\"x11.5\" inches, but compared to the 1934 map in the previous edition, the Manchukuo geo-body is noticeably larger thanks to its 1:5,000,000 scale. The topography on this map is also noticeably more complex than that of the other maps above, and the use of “vignetting” (a fading out of color that acts like a

23 Tōa keizai chōsakyoku, Manshū dokuhon (Tokyo: Tōa Keizai Chōsakyoku, 1937. 6\textsuperscript{th} revised edition).
24 Mantetsu jokan tetsudō ryakuzu [map], 16.5\"x11.5\", 1:5,000,000. In Ibid., attached map.
drop shadow) around the national border makes the Manchukuo geo-body appear to be floating a couple of millimeters above the rest of the map. Unfortunately, beyond the name, date, and SMR production information there is no extra information about this map. However, because the toponym Manshukoku is printed in large bold type across the middle of the map, and the capital Hsinking no longer has “Changchun” printed beneath it, it was likely designed from the beginning to be a map of Manchukuo. Manchukuo, not Manchuria, had become the object of study and analysis.

Children’s Encyclopedia

Another map-filled Manchukuo information source from the mid-1930s is volume fifteen of the 1937 Jidō hyakka daijiten (Children’s Encyclopedia). The volume’s 400 pages are divided into two parts, the second of which is an introduction to geography. The first section, made up of 271 pages, is devoted entirely to Manchukuo. Despite being a “children’s” encyclopedia, the text is sophisticated and complex, as are its images, charts, and maps. The maps are a clear focal point for the presentation of Manchukuo. Altogether there are ninety-one different maps or iconic uses of the Manchukuo geo-body. Of these, thirty-three show the Manchukuo geo-body in various forms such as political, population distribution, and agriculture [Figure 35]. There are also two “historical” Manchuria maps, and fifty-six others that are generally close-ups of places discussed in the chapter, for instance city planning or local topography. Future studies of the Children’s Encyclopedia should reveal its distribution (libraries, schools, cram schools,

26 Ibid., 204.
27 For a complete list of the maps and a typography, see appendix 1.
private homes, etc) and print runs, and thus its impact on children might be assessed.
As it stands, this book is yet another document that helps demonstrate the relationship
between maps and Manchukuo. The civilian and non-official mapping of Manchukuo
played a large part in Japanese efforts to understand their new country, to normalize and
familiarize its geo-body, to clarify its location, and for mapmakers to make money. These
maps reified the abstraction of Manchukuo into something solid, resulting in an illusion
of permanence for the Puppet State, and furthering the illusion of Manchukuo's reality.

Figure 35 Children's Encyclopedia: Manchukuo Distribution map of cotton production.
That is not to say that Manchukuo did not exist, as these maps paradoxically
prove. From the Japanese perspective Manchukuo was real, and maps were firm evidence
of that "fact." The irony is that relatively few people outside of Japan agreed that Manchukuo was a genuine country, and yet there are all of these extant maps to contend with. Were the maps merely the result of delusional cartographers and printers in Tokyo and Osaka? The answer to this question is not so simple, chiefly because the Japanese government, as well as its official surveyors and cartographers took the mapping of Manchukuo very seriously, leaving a legacy that became the foundation for both the US and Chinese mapping efforts in the postwar period.

As discussed in chapter two, parts of Manchuria were secretly surveyed by the Japanese and Russians. The wars in Manchuria had also demanded surveys and maps. The treaty areas such as the CER and its railroad towns in the north, and the SMR and its railroad towns in the south, underwent official surveying and mapping. The areas of Manchuria outside direct Japanese administrative control were little known except for surveys taken on the sly or during wartime conditions such as the Siberian Intervention. Unfortunately for the Japanese, as a land area twice the size of their own country their piecemeal "secret surveys" and military surveys would hardly have produced the kind of information necessary for controlling all of Manchuria, for determining settlement and other large-scale policies, and for fixing the boundaries of provinces, counties, and even the nation itself. In other words, wholesale mapping and surveying of Manchuria by the Japanese was a product of a situation that arose during the Manchukuo period. As a result, the survey corps wasted no time in getting a surprisingly aggressive and large-scale program off the ground.

The Manchukuo surveying and mapmaking projects were carried out by the Japanese Imperial Land Survey Department (ILS), an organization established in 1888.
The ILS cut its teeth on a 1:50,000 survey and mapping of Japan proper, and then moved on to the colonies of Taiwan, Karafuto, and Korea where they could freely map and survey these areas. Along with captured Chinese and Russian maps of Manchuria, the ILS also had in hand surveys carried out during Japan’s many decades in Manchuria.

**The Official Manchukuo Project Begins**

Good maps of Manchuria played a role in Japan’s victory over the Chinese in 1895, and were equally important in 1904-05 versus the Russians. Starting in December 1895 a Japanese survey corps commenced with a survey of the Liaodong Peninsula, and in 1896 a provisional surveying/mapping department was stationed in Jinzhou (in what would soon become the Kwantung Leased Territory) where they fixed latitude and longitude points. Maps did indeed result from the work of the survey corps in Jinzhou as was seen in the previous chapter when an 11-map set of this small section of the Liaodong Peninsula was requested during the Russo-Japanese War. A large number of accurate maps were needed during that war, and starting in 1905 a second provisional surveying/mapping department made up of 230 individuals began executing survey maps at scales of 1:50,000, 1:20,000, 1:10,000, and 1:5000, and the program broadened from there.

Beyond areas where Japan was in control, at least some Manchuria surveys were carried out by spies in the years prior to 1931 that resulted in map sets as detailed as 1:100,000. These maps were based on “secret surveys” starting in 1912 by ILS members.

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29 Kokudo chiri’in, 473.
30 Ibid.
disguised as photographers, traveling salesmen, druggists, and so forth, using celestial
observation and dead reckoning by foot and horse cart to determine distance. 31 In the
Manchurian zones where the Japanese had a free hand -- i.e., the Kwantung Leasehold
and the railway attached lands -- detailed surveying and mapping commenced early on.
Kinnosuke Adachi, author of Manchuria, mentioned that in the Kwantung Leasehold the
land was surveyed “carefully,” a claim made to highlight the difference between the
incompetent Chinese incapable of mapping of their own territory and the ever-resourceful
and proficient Japanese. 32 Adachi’s smug tone notwithstanding, he was certainly correct
that the Japanese surveyors and cartographers did a top notch job on the southern tip of
the Liaodong Peninsula. As might be recalled from the previous chapter, requests were
made for numerous maps of the peninsula during the Russo-Japanese War. But the
Japanese continued to refine what that war had started. Between 1922 and 1924 the ILS
produced a set of 64 maps at a scale of 1:25,000 that covered their Kwantung holdings.

According to the OSS in 1946:

This map is based on probably the best survey ever prepared in Manchuria.
The detailed triangulation and other work of the survey is as accurate as
the detailed surveys of Japan proper . . . . For the area covered this set
gives more reliable information than any other topographic map. 33

Another section of pre-1932 Manchuria that underwent highly detailed Japanese
surveying between 1918 and 1926 was the Yalu River border along the shore of colonial
northern Korea as part of a greater survey of the Korean peninsula. Surveyors were able
to probe into the Chinese side a bit, producing 1:25,000 scale maps that the OSS claimed

31 Ibid.
32 Adachi, 13.
33 OSS, Map Analysis of Manchuria, 4.
were “... the best coverage available for this small part of Manchuria.”\textsuperscript{34} Even better was the 1:50,000 Korean map project, which also included parts of Manchuria of upwards of a mile inland in the map sections along the Yalu. Again, the OSS was impressed with the Japanese surveying and cartography since it proved highly accurate when compared to American aerial photography of the area.\textsuperscript{35}

As with Japan’s previous wars in Manchuria, maps were a pressing need for the invading Japanese army when the Manchurian Incident broke out in 1931.\textsuperscript{36} Fortunately for the Japanese, and unfortunately for China, at this time the Kwantung Army came across a treasure-trove of Chinese maps of various scales in the Three Eastern Provinces Survey Department’s offices in Mukden.\textsuperscript{37} Regrettably, details about these Chinese maps are unavailable. Although Chinese maps from the prewar period are considered to have been sub-standard, the Manchurian government maps presumably complemented what the Japanese already had in their possession, smoothing the occupation and furthering their cartographic efforts.

A hodgepodge collection of Chinese, Japanese, and Russian maps appears to have served the Manchukuo regime (allowing for the production of a 1:500,000 scale map series of Manchukuo) adequately until September 1932 (the month Japan officially recognized Manchukuo) when the ILS sent a labor pool to survey the new country.\textsuperscript{38} In April 1933, 87 more officers and surveyors were sent to Manchukuo by the ILS under a

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{36} Kokudo chiri’in, 465.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
General Staff Office Secret Ordinance with the task to “survey Manchuria.” This was followed with the dispatch of a seven-man triangulation crew that arrived in Manchukuo in September of that same year. The Japanese and Manchukuo governments considered cartography and surveying to be a serious and necessary task of the utmost urgency. Triangulation was until recently the most accurate way to quickly survey large areas through the creation of triangulation “chains.” This would have been one of the Manchukuo surveyors’ most pressing tasks.

The triangulation project was started by the ILS but was later taken over by the Kwantung Army Survey Corps, which triangulated Manchukuo through 1945. Figure 36 is a map of Manchukuo covered with triangulation “chains” carried out by the Japanese. Although the Japanese had been trained with the European chaining method, because of the openness of Manchuria’s terrain they opted for the triangulation system developed and used in the United States, a decision made in late 1931 to early 1932. Each of the chains went between two control areas (usually urban areas), and the process of establishing points and determining height and distance would keep the 15-man survey teams out in the Manchurian countryside for long stretches at a time - sometimes upwards of thirty days in one place. The average length of one triangulation chain in Manchukuo was about 250 kilometers, and each chain was made of up hundreds of

39 Ibid.
40 Manshū no itō sankakumōzu 漠洲の一等三角網図 (Map of Manchuria's First Order Triangulation Chains), approx. 6.5"x5.5", scale not given. In Ibid., 469.
41 Ibid, 468.
42 Ibid, 467.
control "points."\textsuperscript{43} By the time Manchukuo was liquidated in August 1945 survey teams had established more than 10,000 of these survey points.\textsuperscript{44}

Before embarking on this ambitious and long-term triangulation project the early surveying team had to determine and establish three very important basic pieces of information. First, they had to observe and establish the origin point for latitude and longitude. Second, they had to observe and establish the leveling origin point.

![Japanese first order triangulation surveys in Manchuria during Manchukuo period. Source: Sokuryoku chizu hyakunenshi (100 Year History of Mapping and Surveying).](image)

Finally, they had to set up a tidal observation point. Even without any background in surveying it is probably clear why the Manchukuo government had to set up these three elements before doing anything else: These were the controls for all subsequent

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid, 468.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid, 470.
surveys. The location for the leveling origin points was in Hsinking Park, the center of an enormous traffic circle called Daidong Circle in the heart of Manchukuo’s new capital city Hsinking.\(^45\) The first survey determined precisely where Daidong Circle was in terms of height from the sea level at Dairen harbor, measured by the survey team to be 218.17 meters (715.781 feet) above sea level. This number was then used to accurately determine the height of other points in Manchukuo. It was also used as the starting point for all distances in Manchukuo.\(^46\) A place called Huanxiling 欣喜嶺 in the suburbs of Hsinking marked Manchukuo’s latitude and longitude origin point.\(^47\) Finally, a tidal observation point was established at the new Dutch-built harbor of Huludao 胡蘆島 in the northern Bohai Sea.\(^48\)

The information determined at this time was enough to get the greater cartographic project underway. Meanwhile the ILS released a set of maps of Manchukuo at a scale of 1:500,000 in 1932.\(^49\) The 1:500,000 scale set was made up of 54 individual sheets covering 100 minutes of latitude and 150 minutes of longitude, based on earlier Japanese and Russian large-scale map series, further evidence that, like so much of Japan’s colonization of Manchuria – especially the cities, railroads, and mining interests - - the mapping also had its roots in Russia’s Manchurian interlude. The 1:500,000 series, though complete in terms of area, also shows many blank areas of Manchuria that had yet to be surveyed.\(^50\) Blank spots on maps may be troublesome, but at the same time they are necessary for revealing what is unknown about an area. The 1:500,000 scale series was a

\(^{45}\) Ibid, 465.
\(^{46}\) Ibid.
\(^{47}\) Ibid, 466.
\(^{48}\) Ibid, 465.
\(^{49}\) Williams, 120-21.
\(^{50}\) OSS, 3.
major accomplishment in terms of knowledge production and Japan’s control over Manchuria, and as the creation of newer and more detailed maps by the ILS, and later the Kwantung Army’s Survey Corps, would be an on-going process until 1945. Other major ILS mapping projects included mapping Manchukuo at a scale of 1:100,000 and 1:50,000 respectively.

The 1:50,000 Scale Map Series

The 1:50,000 scale series was the most detailed of the large-scale mapping projects undertaken in Manchukuo by the Japanese, and as seen in chapter two, 1:50,000 scale maps of parts of China and Manchuria had been available to the Japanese before the turn of the twentieth century. The goal of the project was an attempt to map the country in its entirety at a scale of 1:50,000, but was never completed. The cartographers were able to cobble together works from Chinese, Russian, and Japanese sources (including new surveys), resulting in 705 individual sheets between 1933 and 1935. The OSS was convinced, however, that much of the work for 1:50,000 Manchuria series had already been completed during the late 1920s by Japanese directors overseeing Chinese surveying parties, which would explain how the maps were issued so quickly after Manchukuo’s establishment. Although 705 sheets represents a great deal of work, compared to the total land area in Manchukuo it was only a small percentage the total land area that chiefly covered a strip of the Manchurian plain from the Liaodong

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51 1:50,000 Manchukuo series index by the National Diet Library shows approximately the same number of maps.
52 OSS, 5.
Peninsula north to the 48th parallel. There is no evidence that this project was extended beyond the 705 sheets obtained by the OSS.

The 1:100,000 Scale Map Series

Less detailed but in the end infinitely more ambitious in terms of actual accomplishment was the 1:100,000 scale Manchukuo surveying and mapping project. Like the other mapping projects, this one also showed considerable continuity with pre-1931 Manchurian cartography. Observations of map marginalia suggest that at least some of the maps were indeed pieced together from disparate older Japanese, Russian, and Chinese surveys and maps, and then integrated with information coming in from new surveys. In fact, this observation is borne out when exploring the history of Japanese 1:100,000 scale mapping of Manchuria, which, as has been discussed, was a project that went back decades before the Manchukuo period began.

Among the Russo-Japanese War-era documents requesting top secret maps explored in chapter two, one mentioned a 1:100,000 map of Mukden and its vicinity. Unfortunately the document did not provide background details about the map, although it proves that 1:100,000 scale maps were part of the Manchuria mapping project from early on. The first survey that was later translated into a 1:100,000 map series of Manchuria and Korea was carried out in 1908 when a team surveyed the latitude and longitude of seven important points in southern Manchuria: Yingkou, Mukden, Changchun, Andong County, Seoul, Pusan, and Onsong 穩城, a settlement in

53 National Diet Library, Manchuria 1:50,000 Topographic Map Index.
northeastern-most Korea on the Tumen River border with China.\textsuperscript{54} In 1916 and 1917 the Japanese Army in China Land Survey Company undertook further surveys that were turned into 1:100,000 maps.\textsuperscript{55} The Japanese really hit cartographic gold, however, thanks to the Siberian intervention. In 1918 they acquired Russian regional maps at a scale of 1:80,000, and at the same time also managed to obtain numerous Chinese maps of various scales.\textsuperscript{56} These were translated into Japanese and converted to 1:100,000 maps, increasing Japan's growing cartographic database of Manchuria that much further.

By October 1918 the chaos of the Siberian Intervention had brought a reported 40,000 Japanese troops into northern Manchuria, 12,000 of which were stationed at points along the Chinese Eastern Railway.\textsuperscript{57} It was likely that among this large force were members of a provisional land investigation group that had been sent to survey the Manchurian locales of eastern Qiqihar, Keshan 克山 (due west of Bei'anzehn), Hailin 海林 (near Mudanjiang), Bayan 巴彦 (NE of Harbin), and Hulun 呼倫 (far west on the Outer Mongolian border) during the Siberian Intervention, the end result of which was a 1:100,000 scale survey map of this extensive swath along the CER through the heart of Manchuria. At this time the Japanese also captured Russian 1:84,000 series topographical maps of Manchuria, and managed to acquire Chinese 1:100,000 maps as well, and in 1919 did a joint survey with the Chinese in northern Manchuria.\textsuperscript{58} Japanese surveying and mapping (both surreptitious and overt) at 1:100,000 and other scales likely continued right up to the Manchurian Incident, leaving the Japanese with a firm

\textsuperscript{54} Kokudo chiri'in, 473.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 474. Japanese Army in China Land Survey Company = Shina chūton guntochi chōsahan 支那駐屯軍土地調査班
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{58} Kokudo chiri'in, 474.
cartographic foundation on which to build their much greater projects. The degree to which Japan had mapped Manchuria can be somewhat reconstructed by examining prewar map request documents. In September 1922 the newly formed Japanese Railroad Ministry\(^5\) requested maps from six 1:100,000 sets from the “secret” northern Manchuria and the Siberian border map series, for a total of 150 individual sheets.\(^6\) This document is chiefly a map request, although it mentions a planned rail line between Qiqihar and Heihe on the Amur River. Why the Japanese national Ministry of Railroads was involved with the planning of a northern Manchurian railroad is not specified. This document does, however, reveal how and by whom the 1:100,000 map series was being put to use in the years leading up to the Manchurian Incident.

Along with confiscated Russian and Chinese maps, the various examples provided above would help account for the rapidity at which highly detailed topographical Manchukuo-period map series were produced and issued. More sheets from the 1:100,000 series’ also became available within the first two years of Manchukuo’s existence. The following five images show how the system worked once the surveys and their commensurate maps were completed. The first image [Figure 37] on the next page is a legend for what Jack Williams in his *China in Maps* believed to be the entire 1:100,000 Manchukuo map series.\(^6\) It clearly characterizes the systematic nature of the ILS’ 1:100,000 map project for Manchukuo, and simultaneously reveals how much

\(^5\) According to the *Kōgien* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten 5th ed., Casio Electronic Dictionary XD-V6300), the Railroad Ministry replaced another railroad agency in 1920, and then was absorbed into the Transportation and Communications Ministry in 1943.


\(^6\) I am using Williams’ legend because it is of high quality and was based on Library of Congress holdings and OSS research, but he was mistaken that this was the extent of Japanese 1:100,000 mapping in Manchukuo. There will be more on this below.
Figure 37  Index of Manchukuo 1:100,000 scale map series from Jack Williams' *China in Maps*. Edited by author.
Figure 38 1934 Manchukuo map. Grid by author. Grey square represents the location of the following figures.
Williams (and the OSS) believed had been left unfinished by the Manchukuo cartographers. On the legend each large rectangle is created by five square degrees of earth’s surface (five degrees of latitude and five degrees of longitude), and then the large rectangles that are completely filled are made up of six squares that represent 1:100,000 scale map sets (labeled by the Library of Congress with letters A through Y\textsuperscript{62}).

Except for the two sets at the bottom covering the Liaodong Peninsula, each of the squares consists of twenty-five smaller squares which correspond to individual map sheets. Figure 38 is a complete map of Manchukuo from circa June 1934 that illustrates the size of the area of focus.\textsuperscript{63} When producing a highly detailed series of maps of a large area such as Manchuria, cartographers use lines of latitude and longitude to block off sections of territory into increasingly smaller pieces. The next three images help demonstrate this. In the map above the grey square covers a section of land that stretches from (south to north) 41.40' to 43.20' latitude, and (west to east) 125.0 to 127.30' longitude. Figure 39 is a close-up representing the area inside the square.\textsuperscript{64} Figure 40 shows the close-up of the same small section of Manchukuo with the 1:100,000 series grid numbered 1-25 laid on top of it. For cartographic purposes the ILS named it Hailongcheng 海竜城 which is also the name of sheet 18 in the set. Figure 41 is just the

\textsuperscript{62} The A-Y system, presumably that of the Library of Congress (LOC) is found in Jack Williams’ book, while the National Diet Library (NDL) in Tokyo catalogs their 1:100,000 collection according to numbers which have a corresponding 1:500,000 map and Chinese regional name.

\textsuperscript{63} Manshiiteikoku [map], 10.5"x7.75", 1: 1,000,000. In Manshiiteikoku sōran, attached map 3. Overlaying grid by author.

\textsuperscript{64} Zhonghua minkoku xinchitu (Shanghai: Shenbaoguan, 1934), plate 18. Although the image looks detailed, it was taken from a 1:2,000,000 map, a scale of which is fairly un-detailed apart from major points such as rivers, larger roads, railroads, cities, county seats, and larger towns. A map at this scale includes only the basics because there simply is not enough room on a 1:2,000,000 scale map to include much more than that. The way cartographers get around this problem is to reduce the scale, which in turn decreases the viewable area while simultaneously increases map detail. The end result is multi-sheet series such as the one under discussion.
numbered grid for Hailongcheng, followed by a chart with the names of each map in the Hailongcheng set.

Figure 39 Detail of Manchuria map at location of grey square in previous figure.

Figure 40 Same map detail covered with grid and numbering system.
Figure 41  Numbering system with latitude and longitude. 1-25 here equals one map set, named “Hailongcheng” in the greater 1:100,000 map series.

**TABLE 4**

Hailongcheng (1:100,000 Manchukuo map series set “I” (LOC) / 20 (NDL))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<th>Location</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Erdaoge Yantongshan Qumacaige</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Qumacaige</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Goudaogezi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ligekouzi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Dalingedan</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Yantongshan</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Zhaoyangzhen</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Guanjie</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Yangziyu</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mengjiangdadianzi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Chenmujiang man</td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Nanshanhanchenggzi</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Tongkou</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Sandaoaoye Fuling</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Dapingchuan</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Xinbingbao</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Badaojiang</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Maoershan</td>
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<td>Keqizikoumen</td>
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<td>120.5°E</td>
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<td>40.40°N</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>40.20°N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The table lists the locations corresponding to the numbering system.*
The 1:100,000 series set “I” was called *Hailongcheng* by the ILS. Sheet eighteen in the chart above had the same name. Hailongcheng appears to have been the local name for Hailong County in Mukden Province, but there does not seem to be any particular reason why among the twenty-five sheets this particular name was chosen as the name for the entire 25-sheet set. The *Hailongcheng* set’s area is close to the Korean border, and maps five and ten in the lower portion actually include a tiny portion of Korean territory. Overall they are highly detailed topographical maps that show terrain such as mountains, valleys, agriculture, swamps, roads, paths, local place names, and much more. Some of the sheets also have empty patches. For instance, sheet number five *Keqizikoumen* is about five percent blank, which would have been important for the ILS as a quick reference for areas of Manchukuo that were still unknown (or unsurveyed) at this level of detail.

The 1946 OSS cartobibliography of Manchuria stated that the series was incomplete, and that altogether only 442 1:100,000 map sheets were issued between 1932 and 1936, and that those 442 sheets “…cover nearly all of the central plain, part of the bordering mountains, and most of the Kwantung Leased Territory.” In 1974, using the Library of Congress holdings (presumably the same collection that the OSS used), Jack Williams was only able to say that there were “approximately 440” sheets in the set, but did add that the 1:100,000 series was issued from 1932 to 1939, three years longer than the OSS stated. Williams also provided a legend of the 1:100,000 series, shown above [Figure 36]. However, both the OSS analysts and Williams were unaware that the

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66 OSS, 8.
67 Williams, 124.
Figure 42 Example of 1:100,000 scale Manchukuo-era topographical map. This map was unknown to the OSS or Jack Williams. National Diet Library Collection.
1:100,000 series was much more extensive than they believed. In fact, the *100 Year History of Surveying and Mapping* indicates that all of Manchukuo was indeed mapped at 1:100,000, although regretfully the book does not provide a full cartobibliography so the veracity of the claim is difficult to ascertain. However, the *100 Year History* does provide a complete 1:100,000 Manchukuo index map, and a quick count of the individual squares results in the number of sheets that would have been necessary for full coverage of the Manchukuo at that scale was 990.\(^{68}\) Since each map (not including margins or legend) is 14.5 inches by 15.5 inches [Figure 42],\(^{69}\) if placed side to side they would create an enormous Manchukuo map of approximately 39 feet by 41.5 feet. Like so much of what the Japanese carried out in Manchukuo, this was on its way to being a truly massive project, and absolutely essential for their long-term control of the territory and continued deepening of the pool of Manchurian knowledge.

Whether or not the 1:100,000 mapping project fully completed, it must be reiterated that based on their cartobibliographies the OSS and Jack Williams did not know that more maps from that set existed. Apart from covering all of southern Manchuria and up through the central plain as shown on Williams’ index map, 1:100,000 map sheets were also produced for virtually the entire Manchukuo national border except for a small section along the border with Inner Mongolia.\(^{70}\) The index for the National Diet Library’s 1:100,000 collection shows that the entire border with the Soviet Union along the Amur River, and then down to the mouth of the Tumen River where Russia,

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\(^{68}\) Kokudo chiri’in, 475. The 990 sheets would also have included maps of the Kwantung Leasehold.

\(^{69}\) Kantōgun sokuryōtaï (Kwantung Army Survey Corps) and Rikuchi sokuryōbu (ILS), *Daomugou (J: Tōkikō)* [map], 14.5”x15.5”, 1:100,000 (Topographic). Hulin set, no. 18, Manchukuo 100,000 series (Tokyo?: Rikuchi sokuryōbu, 1935). Sanbō Honbu.

\(^{70}\) Based on the NDL’s *Manshu 1:500,000, 1:200,000, 1:100,000 Index Map*. 
North Korea, and China meet today was mapped as part of the 1:100,000 series. Many of these border area sheets also include Russian territory in them. The border with Outer Mongolia is equally well-covered with 1:100,000 maps.

It is odd that the OSS, and later Williams, missed these extra 1:100,000 maps, but their existence should not be considered surprising in view of Japan’s emphasis on mapping, its concern with Manchukuo’s security, its access to captured Russian and Chinese maps, and its extensive secret military activities in Manchuria and Siberia leading up to the Manchurian Incident. By 1935 only one area remained unsurveyed: a remote corner of Sanjiang Province in the extreme northeast of Manchukuo – known at that time, it is said, for opium poppies and its popularity among Japanese immigrant farmers – where the Kwantung Army was planning to build a railroad.\textsuperscript{71}

Above, and in the previous chapter evidence has been provided that show directly how Japan utilized its secret Manchurian maps. Although top secret, there were instances when Japan’s Manchuria maps were exposed to the public, such as during the Nakamura Incident of June 1931.\textsuperscript{72} At the time when Captain Nakamura Shintarō and his party were captured in northwestern Manchuria, Chinese authorities discovered that he was carrying large sums of Heilongjiang provincial money, fake documents, six revolvers, heroin, surveying equipment, and a secret military map.\textsuperscript{73} The cloak-and-dagger activities of pre-

\textsuperscript{71} Shima, 45-46, 48.
\textsuperscript{72} The Nakamura Incident became an international incident between China and Japan. Although China tried and executed the soldiers responsible for Nakamura’s death, Japan continued its belligerency over the matter (some were even calling for war), which became something of a media event in Japanese newspapers. The incident was never fully resolved, becoming subsumed by Japan’s September 18 invasion of Manchuria. A concise account of the Nakamura Incident and its impact on Japanese thinking can be found in Wilson, 19-20.
1932 Manchuria may or may not have disappeared in the Manchukuo period, but after
the Japanese gained control over Manchuria the production and use of increasingly
accurate and refined secret topographical maps such as the 1:50,000 series, and especially
the 1:100,000 series continued.

Extant Japanese government documents reveal to a certain extent by whom the
maps were used, for what reasons, and at times their fate. On January 25, 1937 the
Kwantung Army reported that First Sgt. Mita attached to an Independent Garrison\(^{74}\)
called the Jinsen Unit in a small Manchurian settlement named Dongjingcheng 東京城 in
northern Manchuria had accidentally burned a number of secret military maps.\(^{75}\) The
report stated that Sgt. Mita had kept the maps after his participation in a “fall punitive
expedition.” Through his negligence -- actually the result of his middle daughter tidying
up while he was away -- ten of the top secret maps from four different 1:100,000 sets
were mixed in with old newspapers, unused documents, and magazines, all of which were
subsequently burned together.\(^{76}\) At least the Army knew what had happened to those
maps. On June 28, 1938 a message came through reporting that on June 19\(^{\text{th}}\) the
Cavalry’s 24\(^{\text{th}}\) Regiment had lost maps two and four of the 1:100,000 Jiamusi map set in
Fujin County 富錦県 [Sanjiang Province] during a skirmish with “bandits” in northern
Manchuria.\(^{77}\) On the evening of August 19 of the same year a group of bivouacking

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\(^{74}\) Independent Garrison: dokuritsu shubitai 独立守備隊, Jinsen Unit: Kinshin butai 金森部隊.

\(^{75}\) Ueda Kenkichi, “Himitsu chizu goyaki ni kan suru ken” 秘密地図誤焼に関する件 [“Notice Regarding
the Accidental Burning of Secret Maps”], Manju dainikki dai 23 satsu no uchi sono 3 no 2, (Böeichö
bōeikenkyūjo, Rikugun, Rikugunshō Dainikkirui, Jan. 25, 1937), 1412. JACAR reference code:
C01003228900.

\(^{76}\) Ibid., 1412-13.

\(^{77}\) Kantogun shireikan, “Chizu funshitsu ni kan suru ken” 地図紛失に関する件 [“Matter Regarding the
Loss of Maps”], Rikuganmitsu dainikki dai 26 gõ, (Böeichö bōeikenkyūjo, Rikugun, Rikugunshō
soldiers in Dongning County [Mudanjiang Province] near the Soviet border in eastern Manchuria also lost two 1:100,000 secret maps when water levels rose and swept the maps away.\textsuperscript{78} It was such a serious matter that the notice was sent as a telegram by the assistant chief of staff. Reports about maps did not always deal with trouble. In April 1939 a request came through asking for the loan of fifty-seven 1:100,000 scale military maps from five different sets.\textsuperscript{79} The location of the maps was the new Mudanjiang Province in northern Manchuria, necessary, the message claimed, for general administrative operations regarding security and air defense.\textsuperscript{80}

The military was not the only organization to make use of Manchukuo’s “Military Secret” maps. On June 16, 1938 a map loan approval came through for 51 maps from eight northern Manchuria 1:100,000 sets to assist a Manchukuo Department of Industry plan for the establishment of Japanese colonization in that area.\textsuperscript{81} The request also approved seventeen maps from four other 1:100,000 sets for use in planning a logging railroad in northern Manchuria. In November 1938 another approval of a map loan was recorded, this time for the Manchurian Mining Company which needed 120 sheets from eight northern Manchukuo map sets for areas in Sanjiang and Jiendao Provinces where the company intended on carrying out mineral exploration and surveys.\textsuperscript{82}


\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 1052-2.

\textsuperscript{81} Ueda Kenkichi, “Gunji gokuhi chizu taiyo ni kan suru ken” 軍事極秘地図貸与に関する件 [“Matter Regarding Military Top Secret Map Loans”], \textit{Rikaganmitsu dainikki dai 22 gō} (Bōeichō bōeikenkyūjo, Rikugun, Rikugunshō Dainikkirui, June 16, 1938), 438 and 440. JACAR reference code: C01003379300.

\textsuperscript{82} Ueda Kenkichi, “Gunji gokuhi chizu taiyo ni kan suru ken” 軍事極秘地図貸与に関する件 [“Matter Regarding Military Top Secret Map Loans”], \textit{Rikaganmitsu dainikki dai 30 gō} (Bōeichō bōeikenkyūjo,
28, 1939 a map loan approval appeared for 1:100,000 maps for an investigation into the actual conditions of industry in Sanjiang Province and Xing-an South Province. In this request the SMR asked for 183 sheets from ten different maps sets. Just a few weeks before that request on April 14 approval had gone through for the SMR’s request to extend the loan period of multiple sheets of top secret 1:100,000 maps was approved. The SMR was conducting research on northern Manchuria’s transportation, and needed 122 maps from eighteen different sets. Among the eighteen sets was one with the name of “Hulin,” directly translated as “Tiger Woods.”

Case Study: “Tiger Woods” 1:100,000 Maps

For their northern Manchuria “transportation survey” the SMR needed eleven secret military topographical maps from the Tiger Woods (Hulin) 1:100,000 set: 6, 11, 12, 13, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, and 25. Tiger Woods County was an extremely isolated region along the border with Soviet Union’s Maritime Provinces. At that scale the map’s users would have had an excellent command of the border area into Soviet territory, as well as the forests, rivers, minor settlements, and roads. Because the SMR was ostensibly concerned with transportation, the Tiger Woods maps, combined with the other northern Manchukuo maps they had borrowed from the Kwantung Army, would have allowed
them to visualize the best potential routes for a new rail line or road before even setting foot in the region.

Manchukuo border maps such as those from the Tiger Woods set certainly help explain why surveys and cartography were such an important aspect of the greater Manchukuo project in terms of knowledge production, whether for general information accumulation, or examining industry, agriculture, colonization, military strategy, national security, or planning. The set is actually entitled *Iman* (the Russian area name), with the local Chinese name Hulin 虎林 ("Tiger Woods") in parentheses. The set's area is a square that covers 132.5' to 135.0' longitude, and 45.0' to (approx) 46.40' latitude. Although the maps were drawn and numbered as though the area of coverage was a full square divided into twenty-five units (as with the Hailongcheng set analyzed above), only seventeen of the maps appear to have been produced. Since the Japanese were also actively mapping Siberia it is likely that the blank eight squares might have been found in separate map sets of Soviet territory. As a sample, this section will closely examine map numbers 18-20 (three of the eleven being used by the SMR for their transportation survey) in the "Tiger Woods" set. Tiger Woods County skirted the Soviet border along the northward flowing Ussuri River, and as a result Russian towns, roads, and other landmarks are clearly visible on the right hand side of the maps east of the Ussuri. Place names in the Soviet area are identified with their Russian name either transliterated into *katakana* [Figure 43] or in Cyrillic with the *katakana* transliteration above it.

As can be seen in Figure 42 (page 119), there are actually two parts to each 1:100,000 sheet. On the left is the map itself taking up about 80% of the page, and on the right 15% percent of the page is an extremely detailed cartographic legend in Japanese
Figure 43 Detail from Hulin ("Tiger Woods") set showing the Manchukuo-USSR border. Note the Russian place name in *katakana* above the number 690. That explains how to decipher the map. While the maps are exceedingly detailed topographically (one centimeter on the map equals one kilometer of actual land) with dozens of specialized survey and cartographic symbols, anyone able to read Japanese can easily determine what kind of terrain or feature it is that they are looking at.

Figure 44 Detail from Hulin. The large characters lower right are Hulin xian, or Hulin ("Tiger Woods") County.
All seventeen of the Tiger Woods 1:100,000 maps are on a grid that represent just thirty minutes of longitude and 20 minutes of latitude. The three maps currently being analyzed are connected vertically and share the longitude 133.0' to 133.30'. Because of this minuteness in detail the latitude and longitude are only marked in the corners. Also, because it such a small area the curvature of the earth is not taken into account. The topography is highly detailed, showing, among other things, foot paths, twists and turns in rivers and streams, buildings and small settlements, as well as natural features such as swamps, deciduous and pine forests, bamboo groves, and even hot springs [Figure 44].

Figure 45 Close-up of map title for Daomugou (seen above in figure 42). The other information explains what series the map belongs to, and where in Manchuria it is located.

Figure 46 “Military Use Top Secret” stamp that appears on the Manchuria map series.

Figure 47 Detail of the nine-square position grid for orienting maps. The center rectangle is the map currently being used, while the surrounding names are those of connecting maps in the set. The blank squares mean that there are no maps for that territory, or that they belong to another set.

Besides the map and the legend there is other useful information on each sheet.

First of all, the maps were classified at the time “Military Top Secret” 軍事機密, a stamp
that appears at the top in big characters at the top of every map sheet [Image 46]. This means that the number of people who either viewed or had access to these maps would have been quite small, although official messages of the sort analyzed previously suggest that the Kwantung Army was willing to share them with non-military agencies. Each map also includes the map’s scale, its number within its set, the name of the individual sheet [Figure 45], and a nine-square chart showing where the map exists relative to the eight surrounding sheets [Figure 47]. To insure that the viewer was certain of the map’s location the province and county (-ies) are also provided. Additionally, since these three maps include Soviet territory on them there is a note explaining where in the USSR it is located.

Also of interest is the provided information on each sheet’s printing and surveying background, especially important when attempting to reconstruct the history of cartography in Manchuria. In map eighteen of the Hulin (Tiger Woods) set entitled Daomugou 倒木講 [Figure 42], the marginalia states that the area was surveyed by the Kwantung Army’s Survey Corps in 1934, resulting in a map that was created and published by the ILS in 1935. Map nineteen with the Russian name Lutkovskoe (transliterated into Japanese katakana as Rutsukōfusukoe ルツコーフスコエ from Лутковское -- a small Russian railroad settlement on the Ussuri River), whose visible mapped territory is about half that of Manchukuo and half that of the USSR, was first published in 1919 based on a Russian map originally issued in 1906. The Kwantung Army Survey Corps corrected the survey in 1934, and the ILS produced and issued the

86 Kantōgun sokuryōtai (Kwantung Army Survey Corps) and Rikuchi sokuryōbu (ILS), Rutsukōfusukoe (R: Lutkovskoe) [map], 14.5"x15.5", 1:100,000 (Topographic). Hulin set, no. 19, Manchukuo 100,000 series (Tokyo?: Rikuchi sokuryōbu, 1935). Sanbō Honbu. Based on original Russian map.
new map in 1935. Map twenty, *Shmakovka* (Shimakofuka シマコフカ Шмаковка – another small Russian railroad settlement between the Ussuri River and Manchukuo border), includes the same Japanese publishing information, but came from a map produced by the Russians in 1905. The use of Cyrillic on maps nineteen and twenty (but not on map eighteen) evokes their Russian origin.

The 1:100,000 maps of Manchuria were just one part of a much larger Japanese project to map East Asia at this and other scales, a project that would easily have been accomplished with aerial surveys if the war had turned out differently. As it was, Japanese survey teams managed to cover immense swaths of territory through 1945, and much of central and eastern China was also mapped at 1:100,000. Specific sections of Manchuria-Manchukuo received different levels of detail in surveys and maps. The following charts show the variety of highly detailed large and medium scales that the Japanese used in their mapping of Manchukuo until 1945:

<table>
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<th>TABLE 5</th>
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<td><strong>1:1,200 (10)</strong></td>
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| **1:3,000 (1)** |
| Yingkou |

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87 Kantōgun sokuryōtai (Kwantung Army Survey Corps) and Rikuchi sokuryōbu (ILS), *Shmakovka* (R: Shmakovka) [map], 14.5"x15.5", 1:100,000 (Topographic). Hulin set, no. 20, Manchukuo 100,000 series (Tokyo?: Rikuchi sokuryōbu, 1935). Sanbō Honbu. Based on original Russian map.

88 See map 4-1 in Kokudo chiri’in, 440, which shows the extent of Japanese 1:100,000 and 1:250,000 scale mapping efforts in China, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Australia.

89 Ibid., 480-82. Also, Ibid., map 4-1, 440.

90 Ibid., 475-76.
The scope of Japan’s mapping and surveying projects in Manchuria-Manchukuo, and the sheer quantity of maps produced should give us pause, but there remains a great deal to understand about the history of this part of Japanese knowledge production in Northeast China. As we saw above, in the case of mining and other surveys in northern Manchuria, results of the mapping project can partly be traced to very practical outcomes during the Manchukuo period.
Cartography's Practical Use: Urban Planning Maps

Accurate topographical maps were essential to Japan's control and development of Manchuria-Manchukuo. Beyond military use, one area where this applied was railroad and road building as with the SMR example above, as well as mineral exploration. Another was for the projecting of colonization and agriculture in largely uninhabited regions, which was also linked to transportation development. In terms of large-scale projects, surveys and maps assisted greatly in laying the groundwork for the Manchukuo urbanization scheme as outlined in Manshū toshi kensetsu ippan hōsaku (General Policy on the Construction of Manchurian Cities) in February 1934. Maps not only assisted in determining potential locations for new cities, but were also utilized to a great extent in the project's visualization process. The General Policy on the Construction of Manchurian Cities, for instance, included a full-color map of Manchukuo that plotted the future cities' location, when their construction would begin, and what the desired future populations would be [Figure 48]. This image, which is a northern Manchuria detail from the map shows Heihe 黑河 (upper right) -- across the Amur River from the Soviet city of Blagoveshchensk -- is expecting a linking rail line soon, and that its current population is 9,000 with a planned population of 120,000. Due south of Heihe is Bei’an zhen 北安鎮, and west of Bei’an zhen is the city of Nohe 諏河 which, according to the map, was being planned for a future population of 57,000. The entire Manchukuo urbanization plan map shows dozens of cities in this way.

91 Minami manshū tetsudō keizai chōsakai, Manshūkoku keikaku toshi ichiran zu 満州国計画都市一覧図 (A Catalogue Map of Manchukuo City Planning), 27"x18.75", 1:3,300,000. In Minami manshū tetsudō keizai chōsakai, Manshū toshi kensetsu ippan hōsaku (Dairen: Minami Manshū Tetsudō Keizai Chōsakai, 1935). There will be more on the details of this urbanization scheme in the Epilogue (chapter 7).
92 Minami manshū tetsudō keizai chōsakai, Manshūkoku keikaku toshi ichiran zu 満州国計画都市一覧図 (A Sight Map of Manchukuo City Planning), 27"x18.75", 1:3,300,000. In Ibid., attached map.
As this map detail demonstrates, the greater plan called for what appears to be the rapid settlement and urbanization of Manchuria, especially in the lightly populated north.

Figure 48 Detail from Manshū toshi kensetsu ippan hōsaku's attached map. Circles represent towns slated for planning. The lower number is the current (1934) population, and the upper number is the planned population. National Diet Library Collection.

This included the modern planned construction of the cities Mudanjiang and Bei’anzhen. Policy-planning documents were written for both of these potential cities, and attached were a number of large and small planning maps. Of these two planned cities Mudanjiang’s construction was actually started and it is currently one of larger cities in northeast China. There is no evidence that construction in Bei’anzhen was ever

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93 Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, Hokuanchin toshi kensetsu hōsaku 北安鎮都市建設方策 (Measures for the Construction of Bei’anzhen City) (Dairen: Mantetsu Keizai Chōsakai, 1936), attached maps. Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, Botankō toshi kensetsu hōsaku 牡丹江都市建設方策 (Measures for the Construction of Mudanjiang City) (Tokyo: Mantetsu Keizai Chōsakai, 1936), attached maps.
started under the Japanese, and thus an examination of their respective maps is not just a study of the end result of surveys and cartography, but also in the ephemeral nature of Manchukuo planning itself.

Figure 49 1:100,000 scale map of planned Mudanjiang City and environs. National Diet Library Collection.
For reference, both planning documents included area topographical maps. As an example, the map above is Mudanjiang City at a scale of 1:100,000 [Figure 49]. It is topographic, and the planned city shape and location north of the Mudan River is clearly visible. The cartographers of this map in all likelihood made use of the surveys that were used to make Manchukuo 1:100,000 maps series, or possibly used the 1:100,000 maps directly.

Among the variety of attached planning maps, the most interesting for both of these cities are the full color proposed city plans superimposed over an area topographical map. There are two alternative planning maps for both Bei’anzen and Mudanjiang, and beneath the lines that represent the completed future city one can discern a tiny but established Chinese settlement with a scattering of buildings and local roads. It is fairly obvious just by looking at the maps what the Japanese had in store for these two northern cities: First, according to the Manchukuo greater city planning map, both Mudanjiang and Bei’anzen were slated for future populations of 50,000. In both cases the cities were positioned along a major railroad line and a large river that would have ensured good communications with the rest of the country, and easy access to larger population centers. In terms of quality of life, a fair proportion of city land had been slated for park land, called “green” land, and “exercise” areas, conceivably as planned attractions to ensure a steady stream of new inhabitants. The maps show planned schools of various levels throughout the cities, and an airport as well. The wide city roads and ubiquitous traffic circles shown on these maps – a feature of both Russian and Japanese

94 Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, Botankō toshi keikaku ippanzu (Mudanjiang City Planning General Map), 12”x8”, 1:100,000. In Mantetsu keizai chōsakai. Botankō toshi kensetsu hōsaku, attached map.
urbanization schemes in Manchuria – would have ensured the smooth flow of city traffic well into the future of these emerging urban areas.

Figure 50 Detail from Mudanjiang city planning map. National Diet Library Collection.

As a police state the military was a feature of life in Manchukuo, and thus the city planners included tracts of land set aside for military use. And because the railroad was the driving force behind the control and development of Manchukuo it is not surprising to see that large sections of land in both Bei’anzhen and Mudanjiang had been set aside for railroad use. An industrial area was planned to be built near the railroad zone. Other features found on the planning maps include Shinto shrines, cemeteries, residential and
commercial zones, and in one case, a crematorium. Overall, these initial city planning maps appear to be thoughtful, working with an environment that included twisting rivers, mountains and valleys, and Manchuria's famed climatic extremes.

Both the Bei'anzhen and Mudanjiang maps are especially telling in terms of what the planners envisioned for Manchukuo's urban future. That is, all of Manchukuo was going to be grandiose, exemplified with ultra-modern city planning similar to that of the capital Hsinking.95

Figure 51 Detail from Bei'anzhen city planning map. National Diet Library Collection.

In a detail of one of the Mudanjiang city plans looking north of the train station the Manchukuo spirit comes through [Figure 50]. Wide streets connected at traffic circle hubs, numerous schools, small green areas, and what must have been planned as the city’s key feature, a complex patterned road network within Mudanjiang’s large northeastern park. In order to even have begun conceptualizing this project – especially the exact location and its shape – the groundwork laid by the ILS surveyors and cartographers would have been absolutely essential. For a city of only 50,000, the never-built Bei’anzen would also have been a showcase of Manchukuo city planning with an emphasis on wide streets and plazas, traffic circles, and in one of the plans, a central park area in the middle of the city heading north from the train station [Figure 51]. Like Mudanjiang, this planning could only have come about with the highly detailed surveys and maps produced during the Manchukuo period. In Bei’anzen’s case, the area was mapped by the Japanese at the extremely large scale of 1:6,000, strong evidence that even though Bei’anzen was never constructed the Japanese did indeed have long-term goals for that part of Manchukuo. In 1937 the ILS survey corps completed first-order triangulation chains in northern Manchuria that connected both of these cities’ to Harbin, additional evidence of that area’s importance in Japan’s long-term planning for Manchukuo.

96 Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, Botankō toshi keikakuzu an fuzu (Mudanjiang City Planning Proposal Attached Map), 16”x28”, scale not given. In Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, Botankō toshi kensetsu hōsaku, attached map.
97 Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, Hokuanchin toshi keikaku (Bei’anzen City Planning Map), 18.5”x26.5”, 1:10,000. In Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, Hokuanchin toshi kensetsu hōsaku, attached map.
98 Kokudo chiri’in, 475.
99 Ibid., 468.
Overall Manchukuo’s secret government-use map project was massive, and was an essential part of the greater Manchukuo project, whether in terms of knowledge production, planning, or strategy. As mentioned, the Kwantung Army Survey Corps did their work almost up to the end of Manchukuo’s existence, made much simpler by the move to aerial photo surveys in the 1930s that covered not only all of Manchukuo with great accuracy, but also the USSR and Mongolian borders, Soviet railroads near the Manchurian border, and much of Japan’s wartime Greater East Asia. These surveys resulted in highly accurate tactical and conventional maps.100 Moreover, the survey work carried out along the former Manchukuo border with the USSR, Mongolia, and North Korea helped fix the international boundaries that are still in existence today.101

Although these maps were secret and for official use, the work was not kept entirely for official purposes: Basic maps such as the single sheet and gazetteer fold-out maps from the early to mid-1930s are examples of Manchukuo maps created for consumers, a period might be thought of as phase one. By the early 1940s Manchukuo had exhibited staying power, and within the cartographic realm it was deemed necessary to create something more substantial. The result was the crowning achievement of the civilian-use Manchukuo mapping program: Manshū bunshō chizu chimei sōran (The Atlas of Manchurian Provincial Divisions and Comprehensive Bibliography of Place Names) [Figure 52].102

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100 Shima, 95-96.
The atlas went on sale July 20, 1942, marking (a couple of months late) the ten-year anniversary of the founding of Manchukuo. Though Manchukuo’s status as a “Puppet State” was never in doubt among the Chinese and Americans, by 1942 Manchukuo had become a geo-political fact of nature for the average Japanese, and naturally a large format atlas of this sort would have buttressed that belief and further encouraged imaginative participation in the Manchukuo project. Altogether there are twenty-two large-format folded maps, and 160 pages of “text”: primarily place names, postal information, and various organizational information.
There is a large map of Manchukuo itself, and there is also one of the Japanese-controlled North China 華北, along with a map of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Figure 53 Detail of Sanjiang Province map. Original full color. By 1942 Japanese civilian cartography of Manchukuo had reached its pinnacle.
Together these maps provide a larger context for Manchukuo and, of course, the provincial maps that follow. The nineteen provincial maps are of high quality and detail. They are also of differing scales, meaning that removing the maps and taping them together to make a giant Manchukuo wall map would be impossible. For instance, Jiandao Province is 1:600,000, Jinzhou Province is 1:740,000, and Sanjiang Province is 1:1,000,000.

Each map in *The Atlas of Manchurian Provincial Divisions and Comprehensive Bibliography of Place Names* is in color, is corrected for the curvature of the earth, and is highly detailed [Figure 53].¹⁰⁳ The maps’ topographical features such as hills, mountains (height determined by cartographical shading techniques and color), mountain peaks, valleys, plains, rivers, lakes, deserts, and so forth are readily discernable. Borders are easy to distinguish, whether national (USSR, Korea, Mongolia, China proper), provincial, or county. Agricultural areas are denoted in red characters of whatever product is grown in a particular area: soy beans, millet, tobacco, onions, linen, beans, and kaoliang. Stock breeding areas are marked as well: horses, cattle, swine, sheep, etc. Airplane flight paths, railroads (mainlines and light rail lines), train stations, roads (main and local), cities, villages, county seats, pioneer agricultural settlements, youth pioneer training areas, Japanese battle memorials and Shinto shrines, and hot springs are all clearly marked. The amount of visual data packed into each map is the culmination of decades knowledge production, survey, and map work by Chinese, Japanese, and Russians leading up to and during the Manchukuo period.

¹⁰³ Kokusai chigaku kyōkai, *Sankōshō 三江省 [map]*, approx. 13"x19", 1:1,000,000. In Kokusai chigaku kyōkai, map no. 8.
Quality-wise, each map is hand-drawn and lettered, as opposed to precision computer-based maps of today. Using recent Chinese-produced maps as a control, these Manchukuo-era maps manage to hold up well in terms of accuracy. That is, the place names, rail lines, and topographical features mesh with recent maps. Northeastern China has developed tremendously since 1942, but the key points and features are the same. Presuming that modern Chinese cartography is highly accurate, that means that the maps in this atlas are also highly accurate. As shall be recalled, only decades before the topography and even true size of Manchuria was little understood. The Atlas of Manchurian Provincial Divisions and Comprehensive Bibliography of Place Names, though still at a rather large scale, is further evidence of the effort Japanese surveyors and mapmakers put into the overall Manchuria-Manchukuo knowledge production enterprise.

In that case it might be said that maps and Manchukuo had a symbiotic relationship. Just as Manchukuo was reified by maps, more maps were in turn produced, and so on, as the one encouraged the other. Atlases, single sheet maps, map sets, historical maps, pull out maps, orientation maps: after a while, if not from the beginning, all of these hundreds, possibly thousands of cartographic entities had to have had their impact on the Japanese. It is one thing, though, to produce a map or an atlas. It is something entirely different to get an entire nation to believe in the reality of a "puppet state." Somebody was buying these maps, or the books that they appeared in, and somebody was viewing them, all of which encouraged further map production. Sales figures might give us interesting insights, but raw statistics cannot determine the emotional impact of seeing a map, assuming that there is indeed an emotional response associated with maps. This brings the discussion to Kitahara Hakushū.
Kitahara Hakushū was born in 1885 and died of diabetes at the age of 57 in 1942. His simple but evocative children's songs such as *Akai tori kotori* (Red Bird, Little Bird, 1917) are much-beloved today, as are his poetry collections such as *Kiri no hana* (Paulownia Blossoms, 1913) and *Omoide* (Memory, 1911). What is often left out of the story is that, for instance, during the 1930s and early 1940s Kitahara wrote patriotic military songs, better known as *gunka* 軍歌, the most famous of which is *Banzai Hitler Jugend*. More germane to this paper is that during the heady 1930s and early 1940s he was inspired to write about Manchukuo, and it is here, in Kitahara’s little-known poetry collection for young people entitled *Manshū no chizu* (A Map of Manchuria), that we have confirmation of the connection among Manchukuo maps, an emotional response, the encouragement of participatory imperialism, and even the creation of art. This collection of poetry, inspired by Kitahara’s various trips to Manchuria-Manchukuo went on sale to the public on September 1, 1942 to commemorate Manchukuo’s tenth anniversary. Kitahara hoped that his poems would allow “... young people to connect to their lives geography and history interwoven with Manchuria’s climate, customs, seasons, legends, as well as the Russo-Japanese War’s role, the Manchurian Incident, and the current Greater East Asian War.”

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105 Ibid.
106 Kitahara’s move toward promoting Japanese militarism and expansionism is not discussed in, for instance, the 1975 entry of the *Nihon rekishi daijiten*, nor is it mentioned in the *Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan’s* or *Kojien’s* entries.
108 Ibid.
encourage further sales of Manchukuo maps, or at least their use when reading Kitahara’s poems, or even vacations or emigration to the puppet state?

The collection’s meaning is straightforward. Kitahara wrote eighty-five new poems and included fifteen more from previous sources, for a total of 100 poems of varying lengths that all relate to Manchuria-Manchukuo in some way. One sub-topic is animals: *The Magpie’s Nest*, *Black Pig Little Pig*, and *Raising Cattle*. Another is Russians: *Kuropatkin, Kitaskaya*¹⁰⁹ and *The Russian Cemetery*. Kitahara also explored the “natives” of Manchuria in such poems as *Coolies, The Immigrants from Shandong, The Nyan-nyan Women’s Festival* and *Bandits*. However, the bulk of the poems are about Manchukuo’s places, both cities and of the natural world, such as rivers. Kitahara starts off the collection with an ode to the Emperor of Manchukuo in *The Opened Orchid*闇いた蘭花 (*Aita ranhana*).¹¹⁰ In the next poem in the collection, simply entitled *A Map of Manchuria* Kitahara describes the last moments on a steamer bound for Manchuria, where in their excitement he and his friends unfold a map of Manchukuo and begin their exploration of the country even before hitting land:

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¹⁰⁹ Kitaskaya was the main boulevard in Harbin.
¹¹⁰ The orchid was Manchukuo’s state symbol, equivalent to the chrysanthemum in Japan.
¹¹¹ Kitahara, 416-17.
Whatever its technical merits, this poem is evocative, bringing together the physical Manchukuo and its mapped form. Kitahara’s strange mixing of bald propaganda and beautiful imagery is unusual, and yet this seemingly contradictory style is really a metaphor for Manchukuo as the Japanese saw it. For many pre-war Japanese propaganda was reality, and maps were firm evidence that Manchukuo was genuine nation state regardless of what the rest of the world believed.
The dozens of Kitahara’s poems that follow *A Map of Manchuria* are a continuation of this introductory one’s theme. Starting with a poem about Dairen, Kitahara basically follows the map up the Liaodong Peninsula to Mukden. He then detours southwest in the Rehe region along the Bohai Gulf with three poems about Jinzhou. After that his poems direct the reader north to Mukden again, examining the Liao River, Anshan, Fushun, Tieling, and more. From here Kitahara goes east toward the border of Korea, waxing poetic about various lakes, rivers and towns in the region, ending at the border city Andong. Heading back to south-central Manchuria he follows the map further, writing about the railroad town of Siping, after which he travels into the Mongolian area encountering the desert, desert homes, the Re River, camels, and finally the Great Wall. From the Great Wall he stops by the new capital Hsinking, mentions some nearby towns, and then enters Harbin which inspires poems not only of the city, but of the wide Sungari River which runs through the city, Russians, and Harbin’s “white nights.” Before heading northwest along the former CER he writes about Japan’s brave soldiers in the Russo-Japanese War, followed by a poem about Manchukuo’s Young Pioneers. Along the old CER he stops by and writes about Hailar, Qiqihar, and Manchuli. Finally, he sees the Amur and Mudan Rivers and finds them poem-worthy. The final poem of the collection is fitting – *Kantōgun wo negirau uta* (A Song of Thanks to the Kwantung Army 関東軍をねぎらう歌). No doubt this gratitude was genuine, for without the Kwantung Army there would have been no Manchukuo, no maps of Manchukuo, and thus no Kitahara Hakushū collection of poems entitled *Manshū chizu*. 
Manchukuo Maps for non-Japanese

After Manchukuo was formed the Japanese wasted no time in mapping its image for foreign consumption, along with the numerous made-for-Japan maps [see Figures 29 and 30]. As a result a number of generally high-quality, Romanized maps appeared between 1932 and 1942, and possibly later. Although total viewership is difficult to assess, the non-Japanese who saw these Japanese-produced maps were probably limited to area specialists, businessmen, government officials, and academics. A couple of the maps possibly had larger audiences, but how big those would have been is unknown. On the other hand, there are numerous examples of the Manchukuo map appearing in American newspapers after it was founded (see Figure 29, pg. 87).

Figure 54 English-language children’s map of Manchukuo. Original in color.
Figure 55 Map detail (Harbin and environs) showing some of the agricultural products of the region.
Not everything in the world of Manchukuo mapping was quite so serious or necessarily accurate. Figures 54 is a map in an English-language book on Manchukuo for children. Because the book is targeted at children the map is naturally also for them, and is recognizable as a particular genre of souvenir map where cartoons of local products and industries are the main features [Figure 55]. In this kind of map accuracy is not as important as leaving an impression of what was grown, mined, or produced in Manchukuo, items such as “pigs,” “honey,” “gold,” “forest products,” “salt fields,” and “coal”. The area outside of Manchukuo’s borders is solid orange, showing only a couple of connecting rail lines, as well as the place names USSR, Korea, and North China. Souvenir maps of this sort were common in the United States, and for the same purpose – to give a broad overview of what was going on inside the mapped area without concern for topographical or political markings, or for showing latitude and longitude. In effect, it was for fun. This raises an important philosophical question – can we ever equate a serious imperialistic enterprise such as Manchukuo with “fun”?

Prewar Historical Maps and Atlases

Of course the answer is “no” because colonialism and imperialism were not “fun” as so many postcolonial studies have made perfectly clear. One of the “technologies” of the colonial project was to control the present by controlling the past of the colonized people. Certain maps played a part in this process. Bernard Cohn noted in his *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge* that colonial surveys in India were used not just for making maps of present conditions, but could also be used to map the past. It has been

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shown that this technique was fairly common in Western atlases of China and Asia, although that does not necessarily mean that those were overtly colonial efforts. Maps of this sort were offshoots of the European tradition of historical mapping which came to life as far back as the 1500s, but reached fruition in the nineteenth century. The Japanese also created a past for Manchuria via maps, and it is difficult not to conclude that it was done for similar purposes as to what the British were doing in India. Through detailed historical maps, the Japanese and Westerners bestowed upon Manchuria-Manchukuo a unique and independent historical past, just as they were attempting to create an independent present. A prime example of this is the two-volume Manshu rekishi chiri (Historical Geography of Manchuria) which originally came out in 1913 and then was reprinted in 1940. The 1940 edition included a set of eighteen large folded pull-out maps, but it is not clear if the 1913 edition did. Of the maps, some also include map insets, increasing the total number of maps to twenty-seven.

Technically the maps are finely realized: they are corrected to the earth’s curvature, exhibit some topography, and are measured both in Chinese ri and kilometers [Figure 56]. The cartographers also made use of the Western dating system for the history. The scales of the maps vary, but many are the same basic map of a greater Manchuria, or a combined Manchuria and the Korean peninsula.

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In the first volume's maps there is no mention of China/Shina anywhere, and the names of the Chinese dynasties are consistently written in the region south of the Great Wall. One salient feature of the maps is that in order to explain when and where a particular group of people settled in Manchuria, border lines representing the furthest extent of political control are superimposed on top of the map.

Most intriguing is that the cartographers occasionally included anachronistic place name as reference points. The use of modern place names on historical maps is not
Figure 57 Close up detail from Song and Tang Dynasty map. Note: Usage of anachronistic place names as reference points such as Harbin (upper left), and Jilin (large characters lower right). unusual, but the outcome creates an anomalous map that could never have existed. Figure 57, for instance, shows Harbin (written in katakana) in the upper left, and Jilin (in large characters in the lower right). Jilin is a relatively new name that can be traced back to the 1600s and 1700s. In the late 1800s there was fishing settlement where Harbin now stands, but the city itself was built by the Russians starting in 1898. The full map also shows the post-1860 Manchurian border with Russia, and even Russian place names such as Vladivostok that appeared after the 1858-60 annexation of the Maritime Provinces.

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115 Minami manshū tetsudō kabushiki geisha, Sui dai oyobi tō hatsu: Manshū zu (Sui Dynasty and Beginning of Tang Map of Manchuria (589-668 AD)), approx. 20"x17", 1:4,000,000. In Ibid., vol. 1, map 7, 400a.

116 Manshukoku chimei daijiten (Manchukuo Place Name Dictionary), 170.

117 Ibid., 256-57. The Manchukuo Place Name Dictionary, and most other accounts give Harbin’s birth date as the late 1890s since it was a Russian railroad town along the CER. However some Chinese scholars claim Harbin existed long predated the Russian development. See Søren Clausen and Stig Thøgersen, The Making of a Chinese City: History and Historiography in Harbin (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995).
Some of the maps are even more egregiously ahistorical. Map twenty is entitled *Yuan Period* [1260-1368] *Transportation* and shows a greater Manchuria, part of Inner Mongolia, northern Korea, and the coast of Japan and Karafuto. Not only does it include many modern place names, it also shows railroad lines, presumably as another point of reference. The toponyms found on this map include Manshu, Mongol, Chosen, Nihonkai (Sea of Japan), Karafuto, as well as Vladivostok and other Russian towns. While it does show the Yuan period transportation routes, this map is not so much a Yuan period map as it is a modern Manchuria map that includes some Yuan period historical information.

Overall these are professionally produced maps that do a superb job of graphically demonstrating to the reader how history leading into the twentieth century shaped *Manchuria*, not China. This, however, was not the only work of its kind as the construction of Manchuria’s past through maps continued well into the Manchukuo period. One example of this is a set of twenty-four maps produced by the SMR’s North Manchuria Research Department in 1939. In terms of description, there is some color on the maps used to denote extent of particular group’s extent of control w/in Manchuria, or, in the later maps, to show routes of European explorers in Manchuria. Topography is limited to rivers. Most maps contain the identical Manchurian geo-body but with different information placed on top of them. However, whether large or small (amount of longitude varies), and no matter when in time they are meant to be showing, all of the

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118 *Manshū rekishi chiri*, vol. 2, 428a.
119 An annotated list of all of the maps from both volumes can be found in Appendix 2.
maps include Manchukuo's post-1932 political boundary, along with both the
Manchurian and Soviet rail lines. All twenty-four maps focus on either Manchuria, or
pre-1860 greater Manchuria, eliminating entirely the territory south of the great wall and
the Korean peninsula. Chinese names are Romanized in Wade-Giles rather than using
*katakana*, which may indicate that these maps were not originally Japanese. The maps
time periods are denoted by Western calendar, not Japanese or Chinese, another possible
cue that the maps were of foreign origin. The maps projected the present into the past,
and vice versa, giving Manchuria a historical timelessness. Moreover, this map set
happens to show the variety of ways that the Japanese were able to make maps of
Manchuria, something at which they became increasingly adept during the Manchukuo
period. 121

In the pre-1932 maps discussed in chapter two examples were given that
Westerners also tended to anachronistically give Manchuria a place on historical maps of
China and East Asia where that toponym did not belong. It is almost certain that the
cartographers did it for reference purposes only, but the effect was to create the illusion
of toponymical permanence for "Manchuria." Japanese authors took this to the next stage,
drawing Manchuria-specific historical maps that thrust the geo-space "Manchuria"
thousands of years into the past, and then writing entire books around these historical
maps.

English-language versions of these kinds of historical geographies and maps
specific to the history of Manchuria appear not to exist, but there was at least one from
the Manchukuo period that covered China and also included Manchuria: Harvard's

121 An annotated list of the entire map set can be found in Appendix 3.
Historical and Commercial Atlas of China. This atlas' approach to the historical mapping of Manchuria shares certain characteristics with similar Japanese efforts, but the differences are also apparent. Whereas the Japanese had invented an ancient and historical Manchuria, the Historical and Commercial Atlas of China generally used "Manchuria" as a reference point, or to put Manchuria within its larger Chinese context. This highlights the different cartographic techniques used by the Japanese in their efforts to construct a past for Manchuria.

In most respects the Historical and Commercial Atlas of China is fairly typical of historical atlases of the time. It also had expanded upon the "history" theme by mapping the spread of racial and linguistic groups within China, as well providing maps of recent economic and agricultural developments. Manchuria, considered by the author as one of the "territories of modern colonization," is treated as both a legitimate toponym and a historical and present-day fact, appearing in numerous places throughout the book. Overall the author appears to have worked hard at achieving accuracy based on the information available at the time, and for the most part the Manchuria region is placed within its larger Chinese and northeast Asian context, usually without relying on current toponyms for reference purposes.

Similar to the Japanese maps, however, this atlas occasionally falls into the trap of projecting a non-historical "Manchuria" back into the past. An example of this is found in a map entitled "Physical Geography with the Boundaries of Ancient [emphasis mine]
The map includes such items as the extent of elephant herds in China, loess deposits, and ancient historical boundaries. Apart from the Liaodong peninsula, Manchuria is not included as a part of historical China. Nevertheless, and despite its ahistoricity, “Manchuria” does appear on this map in the space generally considered to be “Manchuria” [Figure 58].

Figure 58 Detail of “Physical Geography with the Boundaries of Ancient China.” Note: Anachronistic use of the toponyms Manchuria, Mukden, and Vladivostok.

The end result is that this map anachronistically thrusts the Manchurian name and geo-body into a pre-historic timeframe. A similar thing occurs in the map “Manchuria and Mongolia under the Liao (Kitan) Dynasty, 937-1125 A.D.” [Figure 59]. The title of this map is self-explanatory, giving Manchuria a millennium-long history. More surprising is that the map has quite solid looking, even modern borders. For example, within the boundaries of the Liao lands we can distinctly see much of the shape that

124 Georg Westermann, Physical Geography with the Boundaries of Ancient China [map], 11”x13”, 1:10,000,000. In Ibid., 6-7.
125 Ibid., Manchuria and Mongolia under the Liao (Kitan) Dynasty, 937-1125 A.D. [map], 11.5”x6”, 1:10,000,000. In Ibid., 44.
would later become Manchuria — the Amur in the north, the border with Outer Mongolia, and the border along the Yalu with Korea. The title claims that the book is a “historical atlas,” but it is much more comprehensive than that, to the point that there is a separate map called “Modern Manchuria — Political.”

Figure 59 “Manchuria and Mongolia under the Liao (Kitan) Dynasty, 937-1125 A.D.” Note: Clear demarcation of ahistorical boundaries more or less consistent with nineteenth and early twentieth century political situation.

This is a full map of Manchuria circa 1935 (including part of Rehe) based on a Japanese 1:2,000,000 scale map of Manchukuo. A caveat at the bottom says “boundaries and new names of the Emp. Manchoutikuo (recognized only by Japan) are marked in Red.” Without claiming that Manchukuo was independent, the map reflected contemporary sentiment and geopolitical realities that Manchuria was separate enough from China to warrant an independent political map of the area.

126 Ibid., 72.
127 Ibid., 87.
This pre-war historical atlas is an important artifact in the reconstruction of non-Japanese attitudes toward mapping Manchuria and China in the pre-war period. Among China specialists it was a significant source of knowledge, as the preface of the revised 1966 edition of the *Historical and Commercial Atlas of China* made abundantly clear:

Since 1935, when the Harvard-Yenching Institute first published Albert Herrmann’s *Historical and Commercial Atlas of China*, the *Atlas* has been an indispensable companion of scholars and students of Chinese civilization and history. Indeed, it has no rival in the Western-language literature and has been, in many ways, more convenient and reliable than rival modern publications in Chinese and Japanese.\(^\text{128}\)

The revised edition also contained an essay on Herrmann, his project, and an assessment of the book’s overall impact. In 1935 it was “generally well received,”\(^\text{129}\) and despite problems which have been dissected over the years Herrmann “… did manage to forge a tool which even today, chipped though it is after three decades of constant use, gives no indication that it is likely to be superseded in the near future.”\(^\text{130}\)

In their zeal to update Herrmann’s towering but imperfect work, the editors of the new edition expunged all reference to “Manchuria,” except for one historical map named “Manchuria and Mongolia under the Liao (Kitan) Dynasty, 937-1125 A.D” [Identical to Figure 59].\(^\text{131}\) Considering how salient a feature of the original edition Manchuria was, this unexplained elimination of a troublesome toponym is an erasure of cartographic history, and a sweeping under the rug of how eminent scholars such as Herrmann assisted in perpetuating the idea and legitimacy of the toponym “Manchuria.”


\(^{129}\) Paul Wheatley, Prefatory Essay to Ibid., vii.

\(^{130}\) Ibid., xxix.

\(^{131}\) Ibid., 36.
RECEIVED
AS
FOLLOWS
Maps, Atlases, and Gazetteers

Despite US non-recognition of Manchukuo, the Puppet State managed to appear on many American maps, occasionally fully independent, but often treated in the same manner as the yet to be recognized Outer Mongolia. This is to say, it was mapped as still within the borders of a greater China, but drawn with the new name firmly in place. This approach must have been a compromise by the cartographers who felt compelled to include it for the sake of the map-using public searching for the name “Manchukuo.” Yet, even if this conjecture is correct, the usage of the name “Manchukuo” on any map was a capitulation to a Japanese-constructed East Asian world order, and was tantamount to
recognition by the mapmakers. As was noted above, the most extreme anti-Manchukuo statement was to feign its non-existence, which was the consistent Chinese mapping policy. For the Americans, the most politically savvy approach was to continue using the toponym "Manchuria," but put "Manchukuo" in parenthesis beneath it, or even mention to the effect "occupied by Japan."

One example of the American response to the Manchukuo challenge can be seen in the graphic below, a close up of the northeast Asia section of *Cram's Detailed Map of the Pacific Ocean* [Figure 60].\(^{132}\) The George F. Cram Company of Indianapolis entered the map business in 1867, and is still making maps today.\(^{133}\) With such a long history, Cram ought to be considered a civilian mapmaking authority, if not an institution, and this particular map was undoubtedly viewed by untold numbers of individuals helping to determine their understanding of current political boundaries.

![Figure 61 Detail of Cram's map in Figure 60.](image)

Cram decided to give Manchukuo the status of a geographically independent state in terms of color and an international boundary line between it and China proper.\(^{134}\) Cram also included a caveat stating in tiny letters left of Manchukuo’s geo-body "Manchuria,

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\(^{132}\) George F. Cram Co. Inc., *Cram's Detailed Map of the Pacific Ocean*, 64x93 cm, 1:25,344,000 (Indianapolis: George F. Cram Co. Inc., ca. 1935).


\(^{134}\) The original color for Manchukuo on this map is pink, the USSR is green, China and the Mongolia’s are dark yellow, and Korea is crimson.
China, seized by Japan Sept. 18, 1931. Not recognized by U.S. Government” [Figure 61]. In this case Cram cleverly managed to cover both sides of the issue. The United Kingdom, which joined the US in its non-recognition policy, also had to deal with the Manchukuo situation when it came to maps and atlases.

Figure 62 Detail from 1936 *Oxford Advanced Atlas*.

The *Oxford Advanced Atlas* from 1936 is instructive wherein Manchukuo is given the cartographic status as a virtually independent state within East Asia, appearing on the atlas’ “China and Japan” map. Its political status can be gauged first and foremost by observing Oxford’s choice, size, and weight of the font for the Manchukuo toponym, all of which are identical to the other independent states on the map. “Manchuria” is also used, but in parentheses and in a smaller, lighter font beneath “Manchukuo.” On the other hand, it is difficult to discern whether or not the boundary with China is meant to be international. Overall, the effect is that the Oxford cartographers of 1936 had determined that there was indeed a place in northeast Asia called Manchukuo.

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The 1940 Collier's Atlas and Gazetteer is another example of the how the Americans dealt with the Puppet State. In 1940 Manchukuo was celebrating its eighth anniversary, was going strong, and had outlasted the prediction of Lord Lytton that Manchukuo would simply collapse under its own weight. Putting aside our knowledge of Manchukuo’s sudden 1945 extinction, mapmakers in 1940 cannot be faulted for concluding that Manchukuo had become a legitimate toponym worthy of space on the map. In the case of Colliers, the toponym “Manchukuo” appears on four different maps and is treated as an independent state in the gazetteer section as well [Figure 63]. Manchukuo’s cartographical status has transformed to the degree that the toponym “Manchuria” appears in this atlas only twice: In the “Nations and their possessions” section where it defines Manchukuo as being “composed principally of the former Chinese territory of Manchuria,” and in parenthesis next to “Manchukuo” in the table of contents. Manchuria and its connection to China had been virtually erased. This is best seen in Collier’s map of China, where the boundary demarking the national border stands out boldly. Despite the fact that Manchukuo is listed beneath China in the right-hand marginalia, Colliers (and Rand McNally, the company responsible for the maps in this atlas) was in general agreement with the Japanese on Manchukuo: it was “independent.”

137 Rand McNally & Co., Outline Map of Japan [inset map], approx. 4”x2.5”, scale not given. In Ibid., 104. “Manchukuo” also appears on a Mercator map of the world (10), map of Asia (98), and map of China (103).
138 Ibid.
Conclusion

Popular historian Will Durant once wrote “Let us look at the map, for maps, like faces, are the signature of history.” What would Durant have said about the maps of Manchukuo? As a “puppet state,” the general narrative tells us, Manchukuo never really existed except in the minds of delusional Japanese militarists and their collaborationist

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Chinese stooges. It was an occupation which the August 9, 1945 Soviet invasion succinctly brought to an end, bringing “liberation” from thirteen years of diversionary Japanese activity. “Manchukuo” was a historically distasteful blip, a period of non-history in the greater continuum of the Chinese drama. Most likely Durant would never have known about the prodigious outpouring of Japanese maps, but if he had, would he have said they, too, are the “signature of history”?

A question of this sort is best left to philosophers. More relevant to the discussion is that Japanese maps of Manchuria-Manchukuo are one of the keys to understanding the structure of Japanese prewar involvement in northeast China. Beyond the violence, duplicity, and brute imperialism exhibited by the Japanese on Chinese soil, Manchuria-Manchukuo was an exercise in the creation and assimilation of knowledge, and maps were the incarnation of at least some of that knowledge production starting in the years before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. Another manifestation of knowledge production was found in the written word, the subject of the next two chapters.
CHAPTER 4
THE ROOTS AND STRUCTURE OF MANCHURIAN KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION

In the previous chapter it was shown that through extensive ground surveying and the voluminous outpouring of a variety of maps Manchukuo came into being in a geographic sense, at least from the Japanese perspective. In turn the maps were a bridge to that territory for those who gazed upon them. Most importantly, perhaps, is that the surveys and maps were part of a larger project of what should be recognized as knowledge accumulation and knowledge production that started long before 1932, but came to full fruition during the Manchukuo period. Besides surveys and map making, what other knowledge accumulation occurred, and how was it used? How did it manifest itself beyond the abstract, and what were its effects?

This chapter, along with chapter five, will focus on an area that arguably grew out of Japan’s increasingly refined understanding of Manchukuo: the administrative structuring of the new state and the Japanese view of how things ought to be in Manchuria. Making use of pre-1932 Manchuria gazetteers, as well as government documents, and Manchukuo-period works dealing with the various levels of the state’s administrative structure, this chapter will attempt to reconstruct the process that the Manchukuo functionaries developed in order to organize the puppet state. In addition, the relationship among knowledge accumulation efforts, knowledge representations, and the continued deepening of information databases shall be demonstrated.

But why should the Japanese have invested so much energy into becoming familiar with their new territory? The answer is that it was precisely that knowledge
about Manchuria that gave the region its value in the first place and subsequently
allowed and created a demand for Manchuria's economic development and mass
colonization before and after the Manchurian Incident. In the case of Manchukuo
knowledge was power, but it was also wealth, control, security, and stability. The
knowledge collected by the Japanese led to all kinds of plans and policies such as a
massive high-grade road network, an extensive rail system more than 10,000 km long,
and some of the largest hydro-electric dams in the pre-war world on Manchuria's fast-
flowing rivers.¹

As this chapter delves more deeply into the modes of Manchukuo knowledge
production a bit more needs to be mentioned about the terms used in this chapter. As
noted, the highest territorial administrative unit in Japan beneath the state is the
prefecture, or *ken* 県 in Japanese. In present-day China a modified version of the same
character is used at the local level, pronounced *xian* 县. However, *xian* is typically
translated in current Chinese-English dictionaries as "county." In the pre-war period the
Japanese translated *xian* as "prefecture," while some Western sources referred to the term
as "district" or "sub-prefecture." Nevertheless, since the largest territorial body beneath
the state in China is the province 省, one might argue that the Japanese equivalent to the
province 省 is actually the prefecture 県.² Therefore, Japan's *ken* (prefecture) and China's
*xian* (county) are really two different things even though they share (variations of) the
same older Chinese character for prefecture 県. This has prompted the use of the current

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¹ According to Japanese surveys, more than fifty places on the various rivers were considered suitable for
² Japan's size and population make the entire country akin to a Chinese province. However, for the
purposes of analysis I shall treat Japanese prefectures and provinces as functionally the same thing.

**The Roots of Manchurian Knowledge Production**

Precisely when a deep-seated interest in Manchuria emerged in Japan is difficult to pinpoint. Official Japanese mapping of parts of Manchuria went back to at least the early 1890s. Considering the early Meiji government’s pressing concerns such as the Taiwan Expedition (1874), the Satsuma Rebellion (1877), the “opening” of Korea (1876), Treaty Revision with the Powers, and the consolidation of the early empire (Bonins, Okinawa, Hokkaido), official interest in Manchuria is unlikely to have its origins any earlier than the 1880s, although there were intelligence forays into Manchurian territory in preparation for the aborted Korean Expedition of the 1870s. Moreover, the example of the young Japanese missionary with his grandiose dream of starting a Christian kingdom in Manchuria sometime in the 1880s is tantalizing, but remains at best an anecdote.

Louise Young claims that Japanese military “circles” desired a “foothold” in Manchuria as far back as the 1880s, pointing us to James Crowley who states that in the wake of the Treaty of Tianjin of 1885 military thinkers considered the seizure of the Liaodong Peninsula as a way to establish Korean independence from China. Tak Matsusaka alludes that along with the start of Trans-Siberian Railway in the mid-1880s came fears from such Japanese generals as Yamagata Aritomo that the railroad would bring “crisis” to Korea. These examples clearly demonstrate that the Japanese were...

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3 Young, 24.
4 Crowley, 8.
5 Matsusaka, 24.
focusing on the Korean Peninsula more than the Liaodong Peninsula at this point. Moreover, the private journal of chief Japanese negotiator Mutsu Munemitsu, a document that covered the negotiation process of the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War from his personal perspective, indicates that the Japanese demand (and ill-fated receipt) of the Liaodong Peninsula was a matter of opportunism and a response to popular jingoism at home rather than the result of a grand design on Chinese territory. Initially when Mutsu was devising various peace proposals to end the war the Japanese demands regarding Manchuria were fairly light:

Plan A. 1. China will recognize Korea’s independence and will cede Port Arthur and Talien [sic] Bay to us as a permanent guarantee against any further Chinese interference in Korea’s internal affairs.⁶

Eventually the demand became the entire Liaodong Peninsula, but there is little to suggest that Japan initially went to war with China in order to gain Manchurian territory. Plan A reveals that Japan’s original demands were squarely in line with other nineteenth century Treaty Port concessions rather than the coveting of a significant chunk of Manchurian territory. It was only as the war continued in Japan’s favor that the entire Liaodong Peninsula was viewed by some in the army as a strategic necessity in the matter concerning Korea.⁷ Others hinted that if Japanese forces were unable to fully occupy the Liaodong Peninsula, then Japan would force China to cede it to Korea, from whom Japan would then lease the peninsula.⁸

Still, Mutsu also alleged that there were calls by some Japanese officials for much greater territorial handovers, including one plan for the cession of most of Mukden and

⁷ Ibid., pg. 144.
⁸ Ibid.
Kirin Provinces in Manchuria, as well as Hebei Province in northern China. At the most extreme, the Liberal Party (Jiyūtō) wanted all of Manchuria’s three provinces, along with Taiwan. What this indicates is that Manchuria only became an official object of desire when Japanese soldiers were on the ground making an occupation there appear feasible. Even so, while the Triple Intervention and forced retrocession of the Peninsula wounded Japanese pride, and the 1898 lease of that same territory to the Russians was understandably galling, Japan had achieved its principal goal in the war: the independence of Korea from its traditional tributary bond with China.

It is true that Kokuryūkai (Black Dragon, or Amur River Society) -- the rabidly pro-expansionism society that was founded in 1901 during the Russian occupation of Manchuria after the Boxer Rebellion -- had as its goal the eventual Japanese absorption of Manchuria. Yet there were others who did not share that infamous organization’s vision for Japan’s future. On the contrary, at least some Japanese were resigned to Russia’s predominance and even eventual annexation of Manchuria as late as April 1903. Ernest Satow, British Minister to Japan (1895-1900) and China (1900-1906), noted in his diary that the Japanese minister to Great Britain Hayashi Tadasu “... regards Manchuria as gone; to turn Russia out would be no good, for China could not govern it properly, and no one else could afford the expense.” As a result of the perceived fait accompli in Manchuria the Japanese government made secret overtures to the Russians to the effect that Korea would be Japan’s sphere and Manchuria would be Russia’s. The Tsarist

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9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., 145-46.
12 George Lensen, Korea and Manchuria between Russia and Japan, 1895-1904: The Observations of Sir Ernest Satow, British Minister Plenipotentiary in Japan (1895-1900) and China (1900-1906) (Tokyo: Sophia University Press 1966), 203-04.
representatives, in a fit of inexplicable hubris, made what they must have known was
an insulting counter-offer that would have given Japan only southern Korea as its sphere,
reserving the northern half for Russian encroachment. Since the Korean peninsula was
Japan’s concern all along, that was the final straw, and in February 1904 Japan declared
war on Russia, fighting a great many battles on Manchurian soil. They would not be
leaving northeastern China for another forty years.

After the Russo-Japanese War information such as accurate descriptions,
quantitative data, climatic conditions, as well as information about resources, local trade
conditions, the environment, the people, transportation and communications increasingly
flowed from Japan’s numerous consulates in Manchuria, providing a solid database of
knowledge. But when Manchuria was more of an imagined place, as with the Japanese
Christian missionary, this sort of hard information was perhaps unnecessary. It was the
outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the Boxer Rebellion and subsequent Russian refusal
to pull out of Manchuria, and finally the Russo-Japanese War that determined that the
gathering at least certain types of knowledge about Manchuria were essential.

During the effort to carry out a genealogy of Japanese knowledge production of
Manchuria I have come across a large number of works published during the years before
the Manchurian Incident, most of which were, as far as can be ascertained, available to
the public. Among those, the books analyzed in this chapter will be kept to four
representative works. This is just a small sample: The sheer quantity of materials on
Manchuria produced by the SMR and other Japanese organizations is staggering, and a
study of that aspect of Japanese imperialism would certainly be a rewarding assignment
for another time. The task at this point is to understand where information came from, how it was presented and structured, and what was considered significant to the Japanese who were analyzing Manchuria.

These four titles represent the seriousness of what ultimately became a project of massive proportions. They are important not only for the information contained in their pages, but also for giving a glimpse of the process that Manchurian knowledge accumulation, production, and presentation underwent during the early 20th century. The first of this representative group is entitled *A Historical Geography of Manchuria* (two volumes) originally published by the SMR in 1913 (the book’s numerous maps were analyzed at length in the previous chapter). That shall be followed with an in-depth look at a nine-volume Manchurian information series called *Manshū jijō* (Manchurian Conditions), published at about the same time. After that will be analysis of a similar one-volume book – *Kita manshū* (Northern Manchuria) -- translated from Russian, a massive work that arguably marked a turn in the Japanese approach to the greater project of Manchurian knowledge accumulation. The chapter shall conclude with a close examination of book a on Manchurian geography that appeared about a year before the Japanese invasion commenced.

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14 Information about Manchuria was generated by various Japanese sources, including Manchuria-related societies, Japanese-language newspapers in Manchuria, and also magazines, some of which were devoted heavily to Manchuria such as *Manshu hyōron* (Manchuria Review). These areas of knowledge production will not be explored in this dissertation.
Historical Geography of Manchuria, Volumes 1 & 2

*Manshū rekishi chiri* (Historical Geography of Manchuria) was a product of the South Manchuria Railway Company.\(^\text{15}\) It is well known that the SMR was not just a railroad, and its famed Research Division worked for decades, beginning in 1907, gathering, analyzing, and synthesizing information about conditions in Manchuria, and throughout East Asia.\(^\text{16}\) From time to time they would publish books based on their findings for the general public in both Japanese and English: the two-volume *An Historical Geography of Manchuria* is an example of this type of SMR production. Although a “historical geography,” the books are germane to this discussion because they help distill what the Japanese knew and did not know about Manchurian history as of 1913. They also highlight a particular structure for the presentation of geographical knowledge on Manchuria that appeared throughout Japan’s Manchuria-Manchukuo period. Finally, they serve, deliberately or otherwise, to give Manchuria a two millennium-long history more or less independent from that of the surrounding region, including China.

As seen in chapter two, one of the effects of mapping Manchuria was the eventual creation of an independent Manchurian geo-body. Atlases on Manchuria furthered this virtual removal of Manchuria from its ties to China. Historical atlases and map collections deepened that rift, not just by eliminating vestiges of China from maps, but also by removing from, or minimizing China in Manchurian *history*. To reiterate, the


\(^{16}\) See part one of John Young, *The Research Activities of the South Manchurian Railway Co., 1907-1945*, 3-34.
effect of historical maps was that rather than analyzing or considering Manchuria as being an appendage of a greater China, Manchuria came to be analyzed on its own terms, relegating China as just another neighbor with whom Manchuria had had long standing contact. Both volumes of *An Historical Geography of Manchuria* and their multiple maps carried this process a step forward by projecting a coherent Manchurian geographical and political region back centuries, even millennia, in time, giving it an independent history that it may or may not have actually had.

The research in these two volumes is well-referenced (see Volume 1, 1-57), clarifying that the editors relied on Chinese sources when reconstructing their historical Manchuria. What they discovered is intriguing: Manchuria under the non-Han Liao Dynasty 遼 (916-1125), the Jurchen Jin Kingdom 金 (1115-1234), and other ethnic minority regimes was administratively structured to a surprisingly high degree. Under the Liao, for instance, the region was divided into three sections using the large-scale territorial unit the circuit 道, based upon the capital city Liaoyang as the center. 17 Therefore, the regions were called (using Mandarin Chinese for transliteration) Dongjingdao 東京道 (circuit east of the capital), Jungjingdao 中京道 (circuit centered on the capital), and Shangjingdao 上京道 (circuit above the capital). Beneath the circuits, similar to the Qing administrative system, were fu 府 and zhou 州. Sometimes beneath the fu 府 were zhou 州 and then xian 縣. The SMR scholars presented this information in chapter sections, with each section devoted to a circuit and its lesser units. For instance,

17 Ibid. (vol. 2), ch. 1.
Dongjingdao consisted of forty-three smaller units, some fu but mostly zhou.\(^{18}\) The Jungjingdao had eight smaller administrative units,\(^{19}\) and Shangjingdao had twenty-eight, some of which the SMR scholars were unable to figure out where precisely they had been located.\(^{20}\) The area encompassed by the Liao Dynasty was not enormous, but with a total of 79 administrative units it was a complex polity. This analytical formula of Manchuria’s past was virtually identical to that of ongoing studies of Manchurian conditions.

Manchuria’s Jurchen Jin Kingdom 金国, the second period analyzed in volume two, administratively divided its territory into circuits as did the Liao, but used the character meaning “road” 路 (Mandarin: lu). Under the Jin there were four of these circuits (roads), and like the Liao-era circuits they were further divided into the smaller administrative units of fu, zhou, and xian.\(^{21}\) Although the northern Manchurian Jin (which eventually went on to conquer parts of northern China\(^{22}\)) was not as complex as the Liao, it did absorb some of that dynasty’s territory, and according to *A Historical Geography of Manchuria* the result was an overlap in the genesis of Manchuria’s administrative ordering.\(^{23}\) What must be stressed is not so much the significance of the SMR’s findings (though this book is an obvious addition to scholarship about early northeast China), but rather the political ramifications of constructing a non-Chinese Manchurian history, and then linking that history back to the present-day (1913) Manchuria.

\(^{18}\) Ibid.
\(^{19}\) Ibid., 53-80.
\(^{20}\) Ibid., 88-98.
\(^{21}\) Ibid., 163.
\(^{23}\) Inaba (vol 2), 163.
This is best seen in the descriptions of each of the historical administrative units. Included with location information, name changes under subsequent regimes, and Chinese historical sources on the region is a brief mention of the 1913 location of the area under examination. For example, the Liao Dynasty’s Hai zhou 海州 located in the Dongjingdao was, according to *An Historical Geography of Manchuria*, the same place as 1913 Manchuria’s Haicheng xian 海城縣.24 Jungjingdao’s Jinzhou 錦州 was the same place as the 1913 Jinzhou-fu 錦州府,25 and Shangjingdao’s Tai zhou 泰州 was in the same location as the southwestern part of Bian’an xian 農安縣 in 1913.26 The emphasis on continuity between the distant non-Chinese past and modern Manchuria is plain.

All of this back-and-forth referencing and re-referencing of the administrative structure and Manchuria-specific historical toponyms, and in turn the connection of those ancient place names with the current names helped give Manchuria a *national* history it might not otherwise have had. In terms of knowledge production it set the tone for much of the Manchuria-Manchukuo scholarship that was to follow. By way of example is the 1938 *Manshukoku chimei daijiten* (Manchukuo Place Name Dictionary) whose historical entries are firmly grounded in this same Manchuria-specific universe of thought. Politically too, the elimination of China from Manchurian history would have made the idea of an independent Manchuria an intellectual possibility.

As the *Historical Geography of Manchuria* was going to press the new Republic of China, as part of their its larger efforts at reform, eliminated all territorial administrative units except for the province and county (xian), rendering obsolete a

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24 Ibid., 11.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., pg. 86.
portion of the “new” information provided in *A Historical Geography of Manchuria*.

However, the book’s structuring of information, despite it being historical data, is very similar to Manchuria-Manchukuo information works that will appear in the coming decades, displaying continuity with the larger knowledge production effort as a whole.

**The Manshū jijō Series**

The two-volume set of *An Historical Geography of Manchuria* is one bridge into understanding the origins of Japanese knowledge production about Manchuria. In a different category of knowledge, but even more important to the ideas of this and the next chapter, is a multi-volume set entitled *Manshū jijō* (Manchurian Conditions) put together by the Japanese government’s Ministry Foreign Affairs Trade Agency from 1912-1915, and again in an updated version from 1920 to 1924. The link between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and this information series had its roots in Japan’s diplomacy with China.

By 1923 the Japanese government had a series of forty-three consulate generals, consulates, and consular annexes spread throughout the Republic of China, twenty-three of which were in Manchuria. The following is a list of their status and location:

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consulate General 總領事館</th>
<th>Consulate 領事館</th>
<th>Annex 分館</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Harbin 哈爾濱</td>
<td>1) Niuzhuang 牛莊</td>
<td>1) Xinmin 新民</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Mukden 奉天</td>
<td>2) Andong 安東</td>
<td>2) Juzijie 局子街</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Jilin 吉林</td>
<td>3) Tieling 順鉄</td>
<td>3) Toudaogou 頭道溝</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Jiendao 開島</td>
<td>4) Liaoyang 遼陽</td>
<td>4) Hunchun 琏春</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Changchun 長春</td>
<td>5) Qiqihar 齊齊哈爾</td>
<td>5) Nong’an 廣安</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Tieling 順陽</td>
<td>6) Chifeng 赤峰</td>
<td>6) Taolu 掏鹿</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Jilin 吉林</td>
<td>8) Zhengjiatun 鄭家屯</td>
<td>7) Tonghua 通化</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Jiandao 捷進口</td>
<td>9) Nong’an 廣安</td>
<td>8) Hailong 海龍</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Manshuli 滿洲里</td>
<td>10) Manshuli 滿洲里</td>
<td>9) Bocaoogou 百草溝</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Plotting these locations on a map of Manchuria results in the following:

![Map of Manchuria with marked locations](image)

Figure 64 Locations of Japan’s Manchurian Consulates and annexes circa 1923. Map by author.
Figure 64 shows that by the early 1920s the Japanese Foreign Ministry \( (Gaimushō) \) had a considerable presence on Manchurian soil where, it can safely be assumed, they were engaged in spying and other secret activities. One of their outward functions, however, was to gather routine intelligence that was compiled and sent back to Japan - for instance gathering and translating local newspaper articles. They also kept a close eye on regional economics and the local situation, producing reports called \textit{Manshū jijō} (Manchurian Conditions), which the Gaimushō later bound together into the multi-volume sets using the \textit{Manshū jijō} name.

The Manchurian consulates were responsible for gathering intelligence in the area surrounding their headquarters. For instance, in 1923 the Niuzhuang (Newchwang) Consulate’s zone of responsibility was eleven counties in Mukden Province: Yingkou County 营口縣, Jin County 錦縣, Panshan County 盤山縣, Beizhen County 北鎮縣, Gi County 羅縣, Jinxi County 錦西縣, Xingcheng County 興城縣, Suizhong County 綏中縣, Haicheng County 海城縣, Gaiping County 蓋平縣, and Fu County 復縣.\textsuperscript{29} It was not a tremendously large area, but considering road conditions and the lack of modern transportation and communications, at times gathering information about its “conditions” must have been an arduous task.

As Figure 65 shows, the Niuzhuang Consulate zone of responsibility was a fairly compact area that surrounded the Gulf of Liaodong. Because Japan controlled the southern tip of the Liaodong Peninsula, and had jurisdiction over the SMR stations and railway properties through the heart of the Liaodong Peninsula and north to Changchun, the Niuzhuang Consulate’s area of responsibility and immediate vicinity were thoroughly covered by a treaty-based, legal Japanese intelligence network. Further research will reveal the entire extent of Japanese intelligence coverage in Manchuria during the 1920s, but the plot map of Japanese consulates and annexes in Figure 64 helps show that it was extremely complex and on a massive scale.

For the Japanese precisely what constituted Manchurian “conditions” (that actually made it to print) ranged widely. Conditions might, for instance, be as simple as a
recounting of the year’s local weather. “Conditions” also included tabulating the number of local resident Europeans – specified by nationality and sex – as well as the number of individual Japanese living within the consulate’s jurisdiction, tracked by home prefecture.\textsuperscript{30} The Chinese inhabitants were closely watched as well, and their population and employment statistics were duly noted. Among the other conditions reported by the consulates were Chinese apparel, housing, society, sanitation, epidemic disease prevention, crematoriums, and even local food. Most importantly, however, was following and recording local economic conditions.

In December 1919 the Niuzhuang Consulate sent out its respective *Manshū jiijō*, divided into eight handwritten parts (on Niuzhuang Consulate paper) that covered local “conditions” through 1918.\textsuperscript{31} In August 1921, after being typeset, the 279-page Niuzhuang *Manshū jiijō* was printed and circulated. Although not marked secret, it appears to have been an internal document for distribution within the Japanese government. No major changes seem to have been made to the information in the original handwritten copy apart from the addition of a cover page, although some material from the original may have been left out of the typeset version. Soon after the Niuzhuang *Manshū jiijō* was combined with other Manchurian consulate reports as part of the 1920-24 four-volume edition of *Manshū jiijō* published by the Gaimushō. These volumes were available to government members and likely the general public as well, adding to the growing production of Manchurian knowledge at the time. This was the second edition of the Gaimushō’s bound version of the various consular *Manshū jiijō*. The first edition of the series, to be discussed below, appeared between 1912 and 1915.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., JACAR reference codes: B03050406900 through B03050407600.
Manshū jijō was a generic book name used at least twice before the Gaimushō printed its books under that title. In August 1905 a book named Manshū jijō became available, followed by another in December 1905. Therefore, the Gaimushō’s version was not an original idea, but it was unique. Utilizing the consular reports from throughout southern Manchuria the Manshū jijō series was a fairly comprehensive reference guide and gazetteer covering a wide variety of current and recent Manchurian topics, placing it in a much different category from the Historical Geography of Manchuria. Yet, like that work, the Manshū jijō series followed a fairly strict pattern of knowledge production and presentation about Manchurian topics of the kind that was continued quite rigidly throughout Japan’s period of involvement in the region. True, it was not the first Manshū jijō, and in fact it is likely that other multi-volume Manshū jijō-type works existed before the Gaimushō’s, but it shall be treated as a foundational work nonetheless for a couple of reasons.

First, the first Manshū jijō series appeared at the time when Japan’s concrete business and strategic interests in Manchuria had materialized, thus the volumes are relevant to a radical geo-political shift occurring in northeast Asia. Secondly and more importantly for this analysis, although the series’ basic information is fairly consistent with informational works produced well into the Manchukuo period, the overall structure (the reprinting of consular reports) is different enough to make Manshū jijō an object for analytical contrast. As with the Historical Geography of Manchuria, through a close examination of the Manshū jijō series it is possible to do a genealogy of Japanese

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knowledge accumulation and production that took place over the next couple of decades as Japan’s interests and influence in northeastern China deepened.

The 1912-15 run of *Manshū jijō* consisted of five thick volumes averaging about 400 pages each, with volume three reaching 816 pages. As with the Niuzhuang Consular *Manshū jijō* reports described above, each of the volumes sections included an assortment of statistics and other regional information. However, as the map below reveals, there were serious limitations in the utilization solely of consular information.

Figure 66 Plot map of areas in Manchuria covered by the first *Manshū jijō* series, 1912-15. Map by author.
The areas covered in the first series (1912-15) are as follows (and plotted in Figure 66 by volume number):

- Volume 1 Mukden 奉天, Shinmin-fu 新民府
- Volume 2 Niuzhuang (Yingkou) 牛莊 (營口), Andong 安東
- Volume 3 Liaoyang 遼陽, Tieling 鈦嶺, Changchun 長春
- Volume 4 Jilin 吉林, Jiandao 間島, Harbin 哈爾濱
- Volume 5 Qiqihar 齊齊哈爾, Toudaogou 頭道溝, Juzijie 局子街, Hunchun 瑷春

Second series (1920-24):
- Volume 6 Jilin 吉林, Changchun 長春, Nong-an 農安
- Volume 7 Jiandao 間島, Juzijie 局子街, Toudaogou 頭道溝, Hunchun 瑷春
- Volume 8 Niuzhuang (Yingkou) 牛莊 (營口), Qiqihar 齊齊哈爾
- Volume 9 Zhengjiatun 鄭家屯, Harbin 哈爾濱, Liaoyang 遼陽

In 1912 Manchuria consisted of three provinces, and logic would have suggested that for the sake of simplicity there would have been only three volumes, one on each of the three existing provinces (and a provincial approach was precisely the Japanese method during the 1930s). However, neither the first nor the second edition Manshū jijō used provinces as their chief focal point, instead sticking with the consular zones.

**Case Study: Manshū jijō Volume Five**

Volume five is a case in point. The first section, which makes up the bulk of the book, is entitled [translation] “The Region under the Jurisdiction of the Qiqihar Consulate” consisting of information gathered by the Japanese consulate there in 1914.33

The region under jurisdiction included central Heilongjiang Province to the territory of the Harbin consulate (but not Harbin city), to the central Inner Mongolia territory covered by the Tianjin consulate, to the uninhabited border lands near Outer Mongolia, as well as

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33 *Manshū jijō*, vol. 5, foreword.
"the lands of barbarian peoples." In other words, it was a huge, vaguely defined area centering on Qiqihar that meshed with the Chinese territorial administration of Heilongjiang Province. The material for the other three sections of volume five was gathered in the fall of 1912, all of which was the responsibility of remote consular annexes in those locations. The result, unlike the refined works of the Manchukuo period, is scattershot.

Of the four areas dealt with in volume five, only Qiqihar city in the northernmost Heilongjiang Province was a settlement of any consequence thanks to its position along the newly constructed CER. It was also the administrative center for the Chinese government at the time. In 1914, one year before volume five was published Qiqihar had a small population of 33,623 Mongols, Manchus, Chinese, and "others," making it one of only a handful of northern Manchuria population centers outside of the new Russian-built city of Harbin. The locations of the consular annex reports in volume five were obscure even for early 20th century Manchuria. This can be seen not just by looking at their placement on the map above, but also by checking their backgrounds circa 1900-15. Toudaogou (located in the southwestern corner of the old Kirin province close to the Korean border) was a mere "out of the way village" as late as 1899. Juzijie 局子街, whose name was changed to Yanji-fu 延吉府, and then Yanji County 延吉縣 in 1914, was also largely uninhabited until it became an area for Korean settlement in the

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34 Ibid., 1. Who the "barbarians" were is not specified.
35 Ibid., 62.
36 Manshukoku chimei daijiten, 469.
37 Ibid., p 639.
late 19th century. Lastly, Hunchun was a *fu* 府 when this volume of *Manshū jijō* went into production, becoming a county in 1913. It, too, was very close to the Korean border, and had been largely unpopulated until the end of the 19th century. Again, glancing at the map above and considering the background on these places, the information in volume five of *Manshū jijō* cuts across provincial, prefectural and county boundaries with little regard for Manchurian structural meaning, continuity, or integrity – the intent was to report on Manchurian conditions from the perspective of the consular system.

Overall, the 399-page volume five is broken down in the following manner: The first 363 pages are devoted to a variety of primarily Qiqihar and Heilongjiang provincial topics, with the remaining three annex reports relegated to the very tail-end 26 pages of the book. In short, this volume is chiefly about the conditions in and around Qiqihar, with some mention of conditions in the other northern frontier cities of Hailar and Manchuli, and the region’s prefectures and counties.

Altogether there are fourteen chapters on Qiqihar-Heilongjiang, each broken down into numerous sub-sections. This structure shows continuity with later Manchuria-Manchukuo informational works. Chapter one covers such basics as topography, area, population, and occupations, while chapter two looks at business characteristics. Chapter three compares general living conditions among ethnic Manchus, Chinese, Mongols, and other local ethnic groups, and chapter four looks at climate and hygiene. Chapter five departs from these mundane topics, moving into one of the primary reasons for Japan’s interest in Manchuria: trade. Here the level of detail begins to increase, as the writers

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38 Ibid., 56.  
39 Ibid., 333.
explore not only with whom Qiqihar was trading (much of it seems to have been local; for instance trade with the Russian-Manchuria border towns Manchuli and Aigun was active), but also what it was trading for (cotton thread, cotton and other cloth, coal, sugar, rice, medicine, fruit, cigarettes, etc). \(^{40}\) Chapter six continues the focus on economics, with details on commerce and markets, whereas seven, a quite involved chapter, looks at aspects of regional manufacturing and mining. Chapter eight highlights agriculture and stock farming, while chapter nine looks at fisheries and forestry. Chapter ten, on the currency and weights/measures situation would have been an extremely handy resource for anyone considering doing business in Qiqihar, especially because both Russian and Chinese measurement systems were in use there at that time. \(^{41}\) Chapter eleven is on communications, which at the beginning of the 20th century in northern Manchuria chiefly meant the Russian-controlled Chinese Eastern Railroad, as well as some new Chinese lines, plus roads, river traffic, telegraphs, and the postal system. Along the CER right-of-way were Russian concessions, covered briefly in chapter twelve. Chapter thirteen is the Qiqihar section’s most extensive, a careful scrutiny of all levels of the current administrative system in the area. This includes different types of taxation at the national, provincial, and county levels, Heilongjiang’s provincial administration, the functioning of Japanese regional legations, local education, police, military affairs, hospitals, places of worship, philanthropic groups, and finally local public undertakings such as libraries, experimental agricultural stations, parks, theaters, cemeteries and crematoriums. \(^{42}\) The concise final chapter is on Qiqihar’s land prices, either for rent or

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\(^{40}\) Ibid., ch. 5.

\(^{41}\) Ibid., 207-12.

\(^{42}\) Ibid., ch. 13.
purchase. Following Qiqihar, the final three sections -- Toudaogou, Juzijie, and Hunchun – are extremely brief, reflecting the remoteness of these out of the way border settlements. All the same, they are handled in much the same way as Qiqihar, but on a much truncated level. Each is divided into thirteen mini-chapters, covering nearly the identical topics as the Qiqihar section, making use of what little information did exist.

Just what exactly does volume five of Manshū jijō tell modern readers about Manchuria-Manchukuo and the Japanese production of knowledge regarding that ill-fated expanse of Chinese territory? First of all, while this discussion has been limited to only one volume out of nine, what has been presented is the basic structural formula for the entire series. That is, Qiqihar-Heilongjiang’s fourteen chapters and their sub-sections are nearly identical to the presentation of local information in the other four volumes. This effort at publishing a somewhat comprehensive guide on conditions throughout Manchuria is an early stage of what will become a massive project as increasing quantities of Manchurian information becomes available. Moreover, it reveals Japan’s deep commitment to Manchurian knowledge production, and the painstaking way in which that knowledge was accumulated. Altogether, the amount of material in just the five volumes of the first series amounted to at least two thousand pages, a quantifiably impressive project from any perspective. Manshū jijō is an early and important link in the process of Japanese knowledge production about Manchuria, a process that will last until the end of World War II.
Northern Manchuria

Early Japanese efforts at mapping Manchuria-Manchukuo were built at least in part upon a Russian foundation of surveying and cartography. In terms of infrastructure -- the planned cities and towns along the rail lines, the SMR in southern Manchuria, the development of coal mines along the way, the city of Dairen (Russian name: Dalny), as well as various rights in the leasehold area -- much of the groundwork for Japan's hegemony and encroachment in Manchuria was already in place as a result of Russian imperial activities. In 1916 a new work appeared from Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the same agency responsible for Manshū jijō) with the utilitarian title Kita manshū (Northern Manchuria), a book that shows that when it came to knowledge production the Japanese were once again looking to the Russians. More interesting is that this particular book appears to have marked a turning point in Japan's Manchuria knowledge production endeavors.

One important outcome of the Russo-Japanese War was the dividing of Manchuria into Russian and Japanese spheres of influences, with the Russians in the north and the Japanese in the south. The preponderance of prewar Japanese consulates in southern Manchuria belies that point. As a result, up through and even into the 1930s the northern Manchurian region was often analyzed separately from southern Manchuria. Consequently, the south and the north were thought of as somewhat different places. L. Richard's Comprehensive Geography of the Chinese Empire and Dependencies from 1908 stated that "Manchuria is naturally divided into two distinct regions: the northern which slopes toward the Amur . . . (and) the southern which inclines towards the Gulf of
Perhaps it was this geological accident that allowed for the smoothness of the secret 1906-17 Russo-Japanese agreements in the post-Russo-Japanese war period that split Manchuria into the northern and southern Japanese spheres. Also, the Russian-dominated Chinese Eastern Railway line had the affect of snipping Manchuria in two, giving it the appearance of having a "natural" north-south dividing line when looking at maps.

Nevertheless, not everyone at the time was convinced of the reality of a north-south division. One Japanese writer raised suspicions about the concept:

In newspapers and on the lips of politicians and travelers one meets constantly nowadays the expressions, North and South Manchuria. The Russians who first used these terms had not the remotest idea as to the exact line which divided the North from the South. They don't know it now. Neither is there a single geographical authority up to this very day who can trace the line on the map with precision . . . . In the now classic days of "Spheres of Influence" the North meant the Russian and the South meant the Japanese sphere in Manchuria . . . .

The author went on to explain that

The most popular and widely accepted meaning of the expressions, as they pass current now, is that South Manchuria takes in the whole of Mukden and that part of eastern Inner Mongolia under the administrative jurisdiction of the Province of Mukden and also the southern half of Kirin . . . . Northern Manchuria covers the rest of the eastern three provinces, namely, the whole of Amur and northern half of the Province of Kirin . . . .

This book was published in 1925, which means that Adachi had some hindsight as to the problematic nature of the terms "South and North Manchuria. Yet the north-south split

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45 Adachi, 11-12.
46 Ibid., 12.
preceded Japanese involvement in Manchuria since the southern portion of Manchuria had been a Chinese cultural and colonization sphere for centuries, whereas the northern reaches of Manchuria had been off-limits to Chinese colonization due to official decrees, and largely uninhabitable because of extreme winter weather conditions and, apart from river traffic, unreliable or non-existent transportation. The outcome was that northern Manchuria was in many respects a Chinese space only on maps, or through treaties with Russia, and then later through some colonization. The Russians on the other hand had their Manchurian railroad (the CER) along with its planned colonial settlements that were inhabited with increasing numbers of Russians. From that base the Russians were able to occupy all of Manchuria with little resistance after the Boxer Rebellion. If Manchuria as a whole was a product of 19th century imperialistic machinations, then the creation of northern Manchuria was the 20th century stage of this process urged further by the Russians.

Enter *Northern Manchuria*, originally a Russian book that was rapidly translated into Japanese by the Japanese government’s Harbin office.47 This interest on Russian research in northern Manchuria is not surprising when one examines the map above showing Japan’s pre-1931 consular intelligence network that was located chiefly in the lower third of the country. Apart from spies and the Harbin, Qiqihar, and Manzhouli offices, the Japanese had few nationals stationed in the north where they could gather information and analyze “conditions.” *Northern Manchuria* must have been a real treasure when it came out. It is 871 pages and appears to have been a reference work designed for use by scholars, government officials, and interested members of the general public.

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47 *Northern Manchuria*, foreword, 1.
public. The introduction is perfectly up front about its Russian (Chinese Eastern Railway) origins and its translation by the Harbin Consulate. The Gaimushō was the organization responsible for translating and publishing *Northern Manchuria*, indicating the seriousness behind their continued promotion and creation of knowledge about Manchuria.

Russian research for the original edition started in 1914, and the book appeared in July 1916. According to the introduction, this volume kept its coverage to Manchuria’s Jilin Province, and that it was number one of a series that the Russians had produced on the Manchurian provinces, with volume two on Heilongjiang, and volume three on Mukden. Because *Northern Manchuria* only covers Jilin Province, the title is vague and even misleading – Figure 4 below shows that the book’s coverage was limited to east-central Manchuria.

Although a Russian effort, *Northern Manchuria* shares some similarities with the *Manshū jijō* series. For instance, although *Manshū jijō* lacks a true organizational structure in terms of place, the format for presenting the information was quite rigidly followed as seen above. *Northern Manchuria*, too, methodically covers history, topography, administration, communications and transportation, population, area and economics, agriculture, industry, fisheries, and so forth.

48 Ibid. “The translator, bearing the burden of the extreme heat, was going to try and translate this voluminous book which reached well over 600 pages . . .”

49 Interest in the northernmost reaches of Manchuria was already on Japan’s radar before 1917, and *Northern Manchuria* was not the first Japanese language work to appear in Japanese on the topic. By way of example, In August 1904 a general history of exploration in the region simply entitled *The Amur* was published in Japan. In 1909 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs produced *The Industry of Northern Manchuria*, while the SMR came out with a book entitled *Materials on the Economic Research of Northern Manchuria* in 1911.

50 *Northern Manchuria*, author’s note, 1.

51 Ibid., 4. It is not clear if the Russians actually produced these volumes, and if they did, whether the Japanese translated them.
Similarities between *Manshū jijō* and *Northern Manchuria* notwithstanding, a key difference arises in the Russian volume that seems to have sent Manchurian information production in a new direction, and likely determined Japanese approaches to Manchurian knowledge presentation for the remainder of their time in Manchuria. The cornerstone of Russian analysis in *Northern Manchuria* was through the examination of Manchuria's counties (*xian*) which had gained a newer and much higher administrative status since the Nationalist Revolution. It needs to be emphasized that the Russian method utilized for structuring information in *Northern Manchuria* was likely new to the Japanese because the Chinese county system had only been in existence for a couple of years before *Northern Manchuria* was originally published in 1916. Analytically, the focus on counties was a distinct advancement beyond the haphazard methodology of the *Manshū jijō* series which, though concerned tangentially with administrative divisions beneath the province, presented information centered on a particular consulate’s zone of jurisdiction. As shall be seen, county-level analysis will become increasingly entrenched in Manchuria studies in stark contrast to the *Manshū jijō* approach, especially with the advent of Manchukuo.

In preparing *Northern Manchuria* the Russians analysts examined Jilin Province’s the thirty-seven counties, through many of which CER trains and Sungari River-plying Russian steamships passed. By plotting on a map those thirty-seven counties a distinct pattern emerges – the old shape of Jilin Province. The following is a list of the counties in correspondence to the plotted numbers on the map:

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53 Although the time period is Manchuria circa 1916, I am using the Manchukuo-period geo-body for the sake of utility.
Figure 67 Locations of the thirty-seven counties covered in *Northern Manchuria*. Map by author.

**TABLE 7**

Jilin Province's thirty-seven counties analyzed in *Northern Manchuria*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>County</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>County</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>County</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Fuyu</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nong'an</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Changtai</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Dehui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Hecheng</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Wuchang</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Tongbin</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Yushu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ning'an</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Muleng</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Tongning</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Shuangcheng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Bin</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Fangzheng</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Yilan</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Huachuan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Dangjin</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Mishan</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Hulin</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Suiyuan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Tongjiang</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Changchun</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Jilin</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>吉林</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Baxing</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Baihe</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Emu</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Huachuan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Shuangyang</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Yitong</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Mengjiang</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Dunhua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Yanji</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Wangqing</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Helong</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>和龍</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The coherent and rational structure based on county analysis of *Northern Manchuria* is in contrast to the *Manshū jijō* series which was only secondarily concerned with Chinese administrative divisions. *Northern Manchuria* reversed this, making the county (*xian*) and its related background information the *center* of the study. A result of this switch in emphasis was to not only show what was known about Jilin’s counties, but to also accentuate what was *unknown* about them. In the case of *Manshū jijō*, a tremendous amount of *known* information was provided. Yet, there was really no gauge for determining what information was missing under the *Manshū jijō* “system.” In *Northern Manchuria*, because it is structured county by county, even a simple perusal of the table of contents makes it apparent which counties were well-understood by the Russians (and later by the Japanese), which counties were vaguely understood, and which counties were so lacking in detail as to be virtually unknown.

For instance counties 19, 20, 21, and 22 from the map and chart above are examples of the unknown. For these four places Russians researchers were able to provide only a minimum amount of information covering history, topography, communications, area, population, and work. Most counties studied in *Northern Manchuria* fall into what might be called the “vaguely understood” category, for example those numbered 10-15. Their chapters included the above basic categories, but also have sections on agriculture, stock farming and breeding, forestry, administration, commerce and industry, and money. Counties that were well-understood when *Northern Manchuria* appeared include numbers 1 and 23, and it here that the discussion shall concentrate on county number one – Fuyu County 扶余縣 -- at an in-depth level in order to further
elucidate how Russo-Japanese knowledge production of Manchuria functioned around 1916-17.

**Northern Manchuria: Fuyu County**

The first section of the Fuyu County chapter looks at its history, explaining that the county came into existence in 1914, just two years before the Russian edition of *Northern Manchuria* was published. During its approximately 1000 years of recorded settlement, Fuyu underwent numerous name, administrative status, and surface area changes. It existed under various Chinese and non-Chinese dynasties which controlled that part of Manchuria over the centuries. Fuyu was located just southwest of Harbin at the heart of what would become Manchukuo. In 1916, before the Manchukuo-era border changes took place, it was also close to Inner Mongolia, and approximately halfway between the far northern reaches of the Amur River valley, and the Liaodong Peninsula in the south.

It is curious that the Russians knew so much about Fuyu County, although its proximity to Russia’s Manchurian stronghold, Harbin, had to have been part of the reason. Furthermore, it is on the Second Sungari River, close to the confluence with the main Sungari just upstream from Harbin, connecting it to the greater Tsarist Russian “communications” network of rivers and railroads. Fuyu’s county seat was locally called Boduna, a settlement that had 43,115 people in 1913. In that same year the

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54 *Northern Manchuria*, 1-74.
55 Ibid., 3.
56 Ibid., 1-3.
57 Ibid., 27.
entire county’s permanent population consisted of 355,806 Mongolian, Manchurian, and Chinese men and women, a number that had declined by nearly 20,000 from 1911.  

A large portion of the Fuyu chapter—pages 5-29— is devoted to communications and transportation, especially river traffic, which was still more significant than the railroad at this time. There is also a good deal of information on the roads that linked Fuyu with other nearby settlements both within and outside the county boundary. The section on agriculture is also quite substantial, evidence of Manchuria’s fame as a pre-war Chinese breadbasket. For instance, farmers in Fuyu produced a variety of crops for market, from grains such as wheat and barley, onions, a variety of beans, linen, even tobacco. Statistics are provided for the 1914 harvest, as well as acreage under the plow. This is followed by sections on agricultural exports, by river, rail, and road, and then sections on stock farming and breeding, as well as fisheries and hunting. After this, sections on local commerce and industry (paper, dying, timber) appear, along with a brief mention of local mineral production, leather and fur production, and the local money situation. The final section, is entitled “The Export and Import of Goods and the Relation to the CER,” about the only indication of the region’s link with Russian economy. A quick glance at the charts on these pages indicates that the CER’s impact on the county was substantial, and moreover, that its ties to the Russian “sphere of influence” were equally so.

The Japanese translation of Northern Manchuria meant that its information about the Russian part of Manchuria had been integrated into the growing body of Japanese

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58 Ibid., 26.
59 Ibid., 10-20.
60 Ibid., 35-36.
61 Ibid., 30-33.
knowledge about Manchuria. The book's structure based on the county, however, was not immediately adopted by Japanese knowledge producers. The indefatigable South Manchuria Railway Company, whose research departments published dozens of Manchuria-related books leading up to the Manchurian Incident, structured the information in their 1923 seven-volume *Manmō zensho* (A Compendium of Manchuria-Mongolia) in a manner similar to *Manshū jijū*, albeit not from a consular perspective.⁶²

Among the *Manmō zensho* volumes, number one looked at geography, population, climate, history, modern races, and so on. Volume two focused on government, finance, and the military. Volume three was on agriculture, forestry, stock farming, and the fishing industry, while volume four was devoted to manufacturing and mining. Volume five looked at currency, finance, weights and measures, and insurance. Volume six was on the legal system, immigrants, and colonization, with volume seven's pages looking solely at Manchuria’s cities. As far as the SMR in 1923 was concerned, the Manchurian administrative structure was still not the best mode for delivering facts, statistics, and general information about Manchuria.

In the longer continuum of Manchurian studies however, *Northern Manchuria* was a harbinger of the kind of knowledge production that would dominate during the Manchukuo period as Japanese researchers turned increasingly to basing their studies of Manchurian conditions through a fixed analytical structure of Province and County. This shall be explored further in the next chapter.

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A Study and Geographical Description of Manchuria

Before advancing into a discussion of Manchukuo-period knowledge production, it would serve well to examine the degree to which Japanese books on Manchuria had evolved on the eve of the Japanese takeover and occupation of northeastern China. An example of this is Manshū chishi kenkyū (A Study and Geographical Description of Manchuria), a survey of approximately 400 pages that is one of the few Japanese books on Manchuria to include a bibliography. Along with numerous pictures and maps is the usual gazetteer information described in the previous sections: transportation, forestry, agriculture, aquaculture, stock farming, mining, commerce, and so on. As a book dealing with geography it includes descriptions of the topography, climate, mountains, and major rivers. There is also a discussion of Manchuria’s people, and a history of the region’s development. Overall, Tanaka’s work is largely derivative of the numerous works that came before it.

Where the book is different is in its analytical handling and structuring of Manchuria’s territory. Whereas Manshū jijō was structured around the locations of Japanese consulates and consulate annexes, and Northern Manchuria was based on the county, A Study and Geographical Description of Manchuria divided Manchuria into ten different geographical zones which were the starting point for analysis:

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63 Tanaka Shūsaku, Manshū chishi kenkyū 滿洲地誌研究 (Tokyo: Kokin Shoin, 1930). While I have not examined every Manchuria book from the period, among those I have seen bibliographies are generally absent.
Figure 68 is a map from *A Study and Geographical Description of Manchuria*, and shows zones I-X in their appropriate locations. The concept of geographical zones was quite innovative for studies on northeastern China, especially in contrast with other Japanese works. The fact that a Japanese geographer was now able to conceive of Manchuria's geo-body in this manner highlights the degree to which the conditions in Manchuria had come to be understood in the decades since Japanese involvement in northeast China had commenced. Coinciding with this new conceptualization of Manchurian space, the author then grouped the counties accordingly, giving a brief overview of each one in a manner that would become commonplace during the Manchukuo period, but placed within their new geographical zone rather than as part of a provincial unit. Tanaka had come to the conclusion that along with the traditional modes of geographic analysis based on political divisions, it was also necessary to break down and analyze Manchuria by its smaller geographic zones, each of which had some sort of propinquity regarding location.

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64 Tanaka Shûsaku, *Mannō chiri kuzu*, 4.5"x3.5", 1:15,000,000. In Ibid., 254.
65 Tanaka, 251.
Figure 68 A 1:15,000,000 scale map of Manchuria divided by geographical zones. Source: *A Study and Geographical Description of Manchuria*.

His list of requirements included watersheds, lines along the base of a mountain(s), and structural belts such as climate and vegetation, beneath all of which he
then considered political and economic areas such as commercial networks, harvest regions, and transportation connections.\textsuperscript{66}

There is little evidence to suggest that this new analytical framework caught on among Manchuria experts, although geographical conditions were invariably covered in later Manchukuo-era works of this sort.\textsuperscript{67} Most books would continue to focus on economic and political issues, but through yet another lens: the Province and County.

\textit{Conclusion}

Because series one of the Gaimushō's \textit{Manshū jijō} and the translated \textit{Northern Manchuria} came out at approximately the same time, and because they cover core material in similar ways, they are indeed worth comparing. Less comparable to these, but no less significant in terms of Manchuria knowledge production, are \textit{An Historical Geography of Manchuria} and \textit{A Study and Geographical Description of Manchuria}. In fact, it is their differences that actually make them useful for this study, for it is here that we see analytical false starts and turns in knowledge representations that will have long-term ramifications on how the Japanese came to view and think about their Manchurian possession. In essence, even at this early date Japanese scholars and analysts had begun to develop a basic structure that would culminate in the large-scale information projects of the mid- to late 1930s, the subject of the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{67} Though beyond the purview of this paper, the Tanaka map's divisions are close to provincial divisions made by the Manchukuo government in December 1934, discussed at depth in chapter five.
CHAPTER 5
KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION AND THE STRUCTURING OF MANCHURIA

Japanese in-depth research and knowledge production about China did not begin with Manchuria. While books and government materials with the title Manshū jijō (Manchurian Conditions) can be traced back to the Russo-Japanese War period, modern Japanese books dealing with the conditions in China as whole go back to at least mid-Meiji. One example is Shina chishi (The Topography of China) from 1884, a book that drew on British, Chinese, and Japanese sources.¹ There was also on-going research about China proper carried out by a Shanghai-based Japanese research organization called the Tōa Dōbunkai — a group subsidized by the Japan’s Foreign Ministry,² and in certain respects an intelligence gathering organization for the government — and its predecessor organization the Nisshin Bōeki Kenkyūjo.³ Along with gathering information about Chinese conditions, they also published a number of books based on their findings. The earliest Japanese work on China of the kind under analysis in this and the previous chapter was entitled Shinkoku tsūshō sōran: Nisshin bōeki hikkei (Commercial Handbook of China: Essentials of Japan-China Trade). The three-volume set came out in 1892 and was written by the deputy director of the Nisshin Bōeki Kenkyūjo, a man named Nezu Hajime.⁴ Historian of Sino-Japanese relations Douglas Reynolds claims it was the first of its kind, a “landmark compilation . . . [that] was a veritable encyclopedia of information

³ Ibid., 223. Nisshin Bōeki Kenkyūjo 日清貿易研究所.
⁴ Ibid.
on Chinese topography, politics, finance, economy, transport, currency, and trade . . . .”5 This is the exact same structure for information presentation adopted in the Manshū jijō and the other works discussed in the previous chapter. Therefore, if Reynolds is correct that it was “the first of its kind,” then Japanese Manchurian knowledge production from the early twentieth century was also a new phenomenon.6

The Tōa Dōbunkai’s work was also gathered and compiled into reference sets designed for general consumption. An early example of this was a five-volume series called Shinkoku shōgyō sōran (General Survey of Chinese Commerce and Industry), edited by Negishi Tadashi, that came out between 1906 and 1908.7 Like the Manshū jijō series, these five volumes (averaging about 494 pages each) are organized thematically rather than regionally. Published almost simultaneously was the twelve-volume collection entitled Shina keizai zensho (Chinese Economic Series). The books are 700-1000 pages each, the first nine of which “... while mainly economic, are also politico-socio-geographic, touching on almost everything but the Chinese mind,”8 with only volumes ten, eleven, and twelve focusing on the provinces and cities. This de-emphasis on the provinces and cities vis-à-vis China’s overall conditions is also similar to the structure of the Manshū jijō.

5 Ibid.
6 The bibliography in Owen Lattimore’s The Mongols of Manchuria (New York: Howard Fertig, 1969. Reprint of 1934 edition) lists two Chinese late 19th century Jilin gazetteers, and one from Heilongjiang written in 1810. It stands to reason that this was just a small sample of native Chinese information works on the Manchurian provinces. These works were likely known and used by early Japanese analysts of Manchuria.
8 Ibid., 175.
A departure from this mode of information conveyance occurred between 1917 and 1920 when the Tōa Dōbunkai published its massive study of China, the 18-volume *Shina shōbetsu zenshi* (Comprehensive Gazetteer of the Various Provinces of China), with each book covering a single province. In the 1918 Yunan Province volume, for instance, the material is basically structured around the smaller local administrative units such as counties, as well as the recently abolished prefectures and sub-prefectures. In the sections of the book dealing with specific topics; i.e., agricultural products, information is still connected to their regions of production. Either way, the researchers who put this book together relied heavily on regional administrative units to give structure to their overall work. The 1941 edition of the Yunan Province volume is largely the same as the 1917 one except for the book’s length (1917 edition has 1,016 pages, while the 1941 edition has 1,216), as well as adding an index and table of contents. The structural emphasis of the book is on the county, whether in specific county chapters or in the topical sections of the book. What should be stressed here is that the evolution of Japanese knowledge production about China started thematically (“general conditions”), but gradually moved to a *province-centered* approach to those conditions. This shift away was, according to China scholars John Fairbank and Masataka Banno, a “...logical and almost inevitable end product of the effort to get a grasp on China through the amassing of data.” The “inevitable end product” of the voluminous Manchurian knowledge accumulation was similar, but two-fold: not only was there a Manchukuo province series, but there was a county series as well.

11 Fairbank and Banno, 177.
Assuming that Fairbank and Banno are correct that Japanese knowledge accumulation on China *inevitably* led to the 1917-20 China province series, then the same might be said about Japanese Manchuria-Manchukuo research and knowledge production. This was certainly the case with the counties, and it happened with the provinces as well.

*The Process Begins*

As part of their respective modernization programs, both Japan and China embarked on programs of rationalization of local territorial administration, and, as mentioned previously, in both countries the character 県 (Japan ken: prefecture; China 县: county) was adopted to represent an important element of the territorial organizational hierarchy. In Japan the prefecture was adopted in 1868 and became the highest division beneath the state. In the case of China, the county was not new but had traditionally been the lowest subdivision of a province, falling beneath the higher level and much larger 府 and 州 (usually translated as first-class and second-class prefectures respectively). In the years after 1912 counties became the standard local administrative unit, gradually replacing every other traditional administrative type beneath the province. When Manchukuo appeared two decades later the modern national structure of province-county was already firmly in place. A good example of

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12 This character is the classical version. Today Japan uses the simplified version 县 while China has simplified it as 县.
13 Hokkaido’s 道 (circuit), as well as Tokyo ト (metropolis), and Osaka and Kyoto’s 府 (translated as “prefecture”) are administratively at the same level as the ken.
14 The changeover to a 县-only system was not instantaneous, but the Republican reforms marked the beginning of the elimination of other administrative types. Besides the 县, there is cartographic evidence that the 道 (circuit) survived into the first few years of the Republic.
continuity with the pre-1932 government is that the Manchukuo regime kept the province-county system intact.

Even before the establishment of Manchukuo counties were seen as a key to effectively gaining control of Manchuria. As a means of "restoring order" about twenty counties in Mukden Province were utilized by the Japanese immediately after the Manchurian Incident broke out.\textsuperscript{15} Four months after the March 1932 establishment of Manchukuo the government promulgated the county administrative system (Decree number 54) which turned the counties into self-governing bodies (Decree number 55).\textsuperscript{16} In August 1933 the \textit{xian} were reorganized and the "system underwent a complete change":

\begin{quote}
\ldots the hsien [\textit{xian}] office and various bureaus which were hitherto in conflict with the former were unified and amalgamated with the hsien office. The execution of functions was, moreover, rationalized, the budget and accounting systems were inaugurated, the contract system which was the root of all corruption under the former regime, was abolished, and sound and honest hsien finance was introduced.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

As Manchukuo evolved in the mid-1930s tinkering with the \textit{xian} continued, especially when the government discovered that such a thorough streamlining of the county structure was impractical, leading the June 1937 promulgation of revised county reform. For example, a few new counties were formed at that time, while others were eliminated or had their boundaries altered due to the establishment of new municipalities or other local changes.\textsuperscript{18} Other reforms included the strict decree that counties \textit{xian} were not allowed to have consultative bodies, and that various county offices were abolished in

\begin{footnotes}
\item[15] \textit{Manchoukuo Year Book 1941}, 147.
\item[16] Ibid.
\item[17] Ibid.
\item[18] Ibid., 148.
\end{footnotes}
order to reflect better local conditions, especially with Manchukuo's unilateral elimination of extraterritoriality in 1937. Although the number of counties did not fluctuate wildly during the Manchukuo period, it was by no means fixed.

TABLE 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of counties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1933 (Apr.)</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942 (July)</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The counties were subject to various changes in usage, especially as international tensions flared up. Heihe Province, formed in 1934, was a sparsely populated, undeveloped, and remote province that stretched along the long northern Manchukuo border with the Soviet Union on the Amur River. In 1941 its ten counties were placed under full Japanese leadership, a move seen as necessary in order to take care of the forces stationed on the border.

Placing attention on the counties ensured that they would be significant to the state, not just in dominance and control, but also as part of its larger knowledge accumulation and production efforts. This can be measured to a degree through an examination of *Manshukoku kenbetsu shiryō sakuin roku* (Manchukuo County Division Materials Index Record -- *MCDMIR*), a “secret” four volume government document

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19 Ibid.
20 *Manshūkoku (kakuron)*, 175.
released by the SMR’s Economic Research Department in April 1933 that showed the current status of knowledge accumulation at the county level.²¹

The analysts involved with the MCDMIR handled their project as systematically as possible, based on the province-county system already in place under the Zhang regime. Manchukuo started with four provinces: Manchuria’s three traditional provinces of Mukden, Jilin, and Heilongjiang, as well as Rehe which had come under a new “Northeast Political Council” Manchurian administration in late 1928, a move that had been designed to help cement ties between the KMT and Zhang Xueliang.²²

The purpose of the MCDMI, was, as its title suggests, to have on paper a detailed listing of Manchurian information resources that could be used as both a quick reference and as a source that showed precisely where lacunae existed in the Manchurian information database. Presuming that these four volumes are a fairly exhaustive listing of the materials available to the Manchukuo researchers, it can be deduced that in 1933, even after decades of collecting detailed information about Manchuria, the Japanese were still ignorant about much of Manchuria outside the Kwantung Leasehold, the railway zone, and their consular posts. The Japanese were keenly aware of this, hence the necessity of this project.

Of Manchukuo’s five original provinces, Mukden was by far the most important. As with the rest of Manchuria its soil is exceedingly fertile, it had the largest population,

²¹ Mantetsu keizai chōsakai daiichibu, Manshukoku kenbetsu shiryō sakuin roku 滿洲國縣別資料索引錄, 4 volumes (Dairen: Mantetsu Keizai Chōsakai daiichibu, 1933).
²² Matsusaka, 352.
and it was the traditional heart of the Han Chinese presence north of the Great Wall.23

Geographically it included the Liaodong Peninsula south to the border with the Kwantung Leasehold, and north to encompass Manchuria’s largest city Mukden (Mandarin: Fengtian, later Shenyang), the historical capital of the Manchurians. During the early part of the twentieth century a good deal of the cultivated portion of the agriculturally productive Manchurian plain was within Mukden’s boundaries, and since agriculture was Manchuria’s source of wealth, that made Mukden province all the more prosperous.24

The SMR ran right through the heart of the Province, and important connecting rail lines arrayed forth from the Mukden City station. At 74,036 sq. miles, it was slightly smaller than Nebraska, sharing a long and erratic border with the other three provinces as

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23 The total population for the three northeastern provinces was estimated at approximately 25,000,000 in 1927. Chu, 410. Mukden was by far the largest about 14-15,000,000, with about 7.5 million in Jilin, and the rest in Heilongjiang.
24 Mukden Province was well ahead of Jilin and Heilongjiang in terms of cultivated acreage until 1918 when Jilin caught up with Mukden. By 1926 Jilin had surpassed Mukden, but the massive Heilongjiang still lagged behind the other two provinces at that date. Ibid., 387.
can be seen in Figure 1. In 1933 there were fifty-eight counties in Mukden Province, and if the 147-page Mukden volume of MCDMIR can be used as a barometer, Japanese knowledge about these counties varied widely. For instance, Shenyang County, the location of Mukden (Shenyang) city, includes three and a half pages of material on four different Japanese-language works. Tie'ling County has seven pages of material, both Japanese consular materials (the Manshū jijō reports) and Chinese works.

Other counties were listed as having little information available when MCDMIR came out. Dao’an County, a good example of this. Located in the center of Manchukuo due north of the Liaodong Peninsula, its 1934 total population was 25,287. The only resource on Dao’an that the Manchuko County Division Materials Index Record research group had available was the Daonan Area Conditions volume. The next county, Kai-tung, included ten topics of information that were also pulled from the Daonan Area Conditions volume. Counties Zhendong, Anguang, and Huaide, among others, have no information at all, and thus their pages in the MCDMIR are completely blank. Mukden Province, although the most populous, economically developed, and closest to long-standing Japanese interests in Manchuria, remained only partially understood by the Japanese, even during the first couple of years of Manchukuo’s existence.

26 Ibid., 1-4.
27 Ibid., 5-11.
28 Chimei Daijiten, 620.
29 MCDMIR vol. 1, 141.
30 Ibid. 140.
31 Ibid., 142-43, 147.
Jilin Province had forty-two counties in 1933. Like Mukden, the SMR ran through part of Jilin to its northern terminus in Changchun city 長春市 where the Japanese had been gathering intelligence and information there for almost three decades. The first entry of volume two of *MCDMIR*, Jilin County 吉林縣 (also 永吉縣) proves that the area had been well-researched by the Japanese. It lists ten pages of materials, all but one item of which are Japanese. There is considerable depth in terms of time and subject matter, with sources ranging throughout the 1910s, 20s, and even early 1930s, and with subject matter going well-beyond simple outlines of commerce and transportation. As with some of Mukden Province's counties there were counties in Jilin where the Japanese apparently had no information at all, including Qian'an 乾安縣 and Zhuhe 珠河縣. Overall, in certain areas of Manchuria where Japanese interests were long-standing and firmly embedded much was already understood and had been compiled. At the same time

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32 *MCDMIR* vol. 2, 1-10.
33 Ibid., 152-53.
gaping holes in this knowledge database did indeed exist throughout a good portion of the Jilin hinterland.

Figure 71 Heilongjiang Province, circa March 1932. Map by author.
Figure 72 Rehe Province, circa March 1932. Map by author.

The long MCDMIR volume on the lightly populated Heilongjiang Province (175 pages) and even longer (188-page) volume on the small Rehe Province (that included a brief section on Xing’an) are evidence that the Japanese had managed to compile an impressive database of material on these two provinces before the 1931 hostilities broke out.34 In 1933 there were forty-two counties in Heilongjiang Province, and despite the region’s sparse population and lack of development, a glance at volume three of MCDMIR shows that already in 1933 there was a fairly firm knowledge base about the region comprised of Japanese, Chinese, and Russian sources. In fact, among the four MCDMIR, the Heilongjiang volume is the most complete in terms of available knowledge per county. Like the Heilongjiang volume, most of the Rehe counties are

34 MCDMIR, vol. 3. MCDMIR, vol. 4.
listed in its respective MCDMIR volume as having at least some available materials, perhaps because of Japan’s long-standing consulate presence in the Bohai Gulf region.

At first glance a document such as MCDMIR might be easy to overlook. Many of the pages in volumes one and two are completely blank, listing the names of obscure Manchurian counties. And yet it is this very lack of information that gives insights into understanding one side of Japan’s approach to the occupation and nation building project in Manchuria. This seemingly insignificant four-volume government document shows clearly, too, that the Japanese planners still knew little of the overall conditions of the country they had just conquered, despite decades of official knowledge accumulation and production (under the SMR and consuls) leading up to 1932. But it also shows the commitment that the Japanese had to the counties from the beginning as their base for Manchukuo-period knowledge production. In the years following the MCDMIR knowledge accumulation about conditions at the local level will manifest itself in a couple of very specific ways, notably in two major gazetteer series: one on Manchukuo’s provinces, and the other specific to the counties.

**The County Series**

*Manshūkoku chihō jijō* (Local Conditions in Manchukuo, which shall be referred to as “The County Series”) was a planned series of 200 volumes on each of Manchukuo’s 160 counties, thirty-three Mongolian banners, and seven important urban areas.\(^{35}\) It is unlikely that all of the volumes were actually published, but the long-term plan would

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have resulted in something like the following table. It was an effort that marked a radical change in the Manchuria-Manchukuo publishing world:

TABLE 10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual Manchukuo books covering Manchuria-Manchukuo in its entirety</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manchukuo Province Series – 9 volumes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchukuo County Series – 200 volumes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This displays how Japan’s ever-expanding body of Manchukuo knowledge was manifested outside of government policy and planning documents. It also shows the continuous refinement of the means of representing that information.

The County Series first appeared in 1935, and already at that early date forty-six volumes were advertised as being available for sale. Compiled and produced by Manchukuo’s little-known Daidong Academy, the Manchukuo Area Conditions series was a clear continuation of the Manchurian knowledge accumulation process that started around the post-Russo-Japanese War period. Within just a couple of years of Manchukuo’s establishment nearly twenty-five percent of its territorial administrative regions had already been analyzed and put into book form.

36 There was a precursor to the 1935 Manshukoku chiho jijo 滿州國地方事情, also by Daidong Academy, the first volumes of which came out in January 1934. It is not clear what the scope of that project was, but a few volumes were indeed published.

37 Daidong Academy, established in July 1932 with the goal of training Manchukuo’s government bureaucrats (Japanese and non-Japanese), provided classes in various fields of inquiry as well as conducted surveys of rural conditions. This school should not be confused with the Nation Building University established in May 1938, an organization discussed in Mariko Asano Tamanai’s May 2000 Journal of Asian Studies article “Knowledge, Power, and Racial Classifications: The ‘Japanese’ in ‘Manchuria’,” 248-76.
The County Series shared similar qualities with other Manchuria-Manchukuo information books and gazetteers published before and after 1932. It was structured in basically the same manner, and had the same dry, antiseptic, seriousness of those numerous works. The difference was the emphasis on local areas, which included specific information that would not have fit into, or would not have been relevant to, a gazetteer about Manchuria-Manchukuo on the national or provincial level. The planned total of 200 individual books was divided into fifteen smaller, more manageable sets based on each of Manchukuo’s fourteen provinces (plus one set devoted to important cities) that were designated with a letter from the Roman alphabet. The following list shows how the system worked:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Series A</th>
<th>Jilin 吉林 (18 counties)</th>
<th>A1-A18</th>
<th>18 volumes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Series B</td>
<td>Longjiang 龙江 (27 counties)</td>
<td>B1-B27</td>
<td>27 volumes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series C</td>
<td>Heihe 黑河 (8 counties)</td>
<td>C1-C8</td>
<td>8 volumes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series D</td>
<td>Sanjiang 三江 (14 counties)</td>
<td>D1-D14</td>
<td>14 volumes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series E</td>
<td>Binjiang 滨江 (28 counties)</td>
<td>E1-E28</td>
<td>28 volumes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series F</td>
<td>Jiandao 間島 (5 counties)</td>
<td>F1-F5</td>
<td>5 volumes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series G</td>
<td>Andong 安同 (11 counties)</td>
<td>G1-G11</td>
<td>11 volumes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series H</td>
<td>Fengtian 奉天 (28 counties)</td>
<td>H1-H28</td>
<td>28 volumes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series I</td>
<td>Jilin 錦州 (12 counties)</td>
<td>I1-I12</td>
<td>12 volumes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series J</td>
<td>Rehe 熱河 (12 counties)</td>
<td>J1-J12</td>
<td>12 volumes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series K</td>
<td>West Xing’an 興安西 (10 banners)</td>
<td>K1-K10</td>
<td>10 volumes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series L</td>
<td>South Xing’an 興安南 (9 banners)</td>
<td>L1-L9</td>
<td>9 volumes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series M</td>
<td>East Xing’an 興安東 (5 banners)</td>
<td>M1-M5</td>
<td>5 volumes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series N</td>
<td>North Xing’an 興安北 (6 banners)</td>
<td>N1-N6</td>
<td>6 volumes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series O</td>
<td>Important Cities (7)</td>
<td>O1-O7</td>
<td>7 volumes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 15 Sets 200 volumes
Among these 200 volumes, forty-six had been published or were set for publication by July 1935. Overall they differ greatly in length. Volume A-8 (Changchun County) is 557 pages long, and volume H-9 (Fu County, also discussed below) is 202 pages.

Some volumes were also quite short, presumably because those counties were still little understood. Jilin Province’s Changling County 長嶺縣 (volume A-10) is seventy-five pages, B-10 (Kedong County 克東縣 in Longjiang Province) is a mere thirty-four pages.
(1935), and A-4 (Huadian County 榖甸縣, also in Jilin County) is forty-one pages.

The greater project, immense in scope, was off to a good start. Considering how little the Japanese actually knew about large swaths of Manchuria in 1933 when the *Materials Index* came out, it was an impressive feat. The following is a list of the forty-six volumes advertised in 1935:

### TABLE 12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Series/Province</th>
<th>County Name</th>
<th>Volume</th>
<th>Pop.(^{38})</th>
<th>RR (1935)(^{39})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Jilin 吉林</td>
<td>榕甸縣 Huadian</td>
<td>A-4</td>
<td>132,310</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>雙陽縣 Shuangyang</td>
<td>A-7</td>
<td>253,270</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>長春縣 Changchun</td>
<td>A-8</td>
<td>468,428</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>長嶺縣 Changling</td>
<td>A-10</td>
<td>127,208</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>乾安縣 Qian'an</td>
<td>A-11</td>
<td>52,791</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>榆樹縣 Yushu</td>
<td>A-15</td>
<td>553,759</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Longjiang 龍江</td>
<td>嫩江縣 Renjiang</td>
<td>B-6</td>
<td>22,624</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>龍鎮縣 Longzhen</td>
<td>B-8</td>
<td>19,106</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>克東縣 Kedong</td>
<td>B-10</td>
<td>43,284</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>克山縣 Keshan</td>
<td>B-11</td>
<td>159,402</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>泰來縣 Tailai</td>
<td>B-17</td>
<td>142,353</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>洮南縣 Daonan</td>
<td>B-22</td>
<td>157,511</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>開通縣 Kaitong</td>
<td>B-23</td>
<td>66,805</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Heihe 黑河</td>
<td>烏雲縣 Wunan</td>
<td>C-7</td>
<td>3,290</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Sanjiang 三江</td>
<td>依蘭縣 Yilan</td>
<td>D-5</td>
<td>172,559</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E Binjiang 濱江</td>
<td>阿城縣 Echeng</td>
<td>E-3</td>
<td>191,987</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>綏化縣 Suixian</td>
<td>E-14</td>
<td>241,887</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>東興縣 Dongxing</td>
<td>E-17</td>
<td>28,527</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>木蘭縣 Mulan</td>
<td>E-19</td>
<td>89,327</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[寧古塔 Ningguta]寧安縣 Ning'an</td>
<td>E-23</td>
<td>207,892</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>密山縣 Mishan</td>
<td>E-26</td>
<td>147,320</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^{38}\) Source: *Chimei daijiten* (most figures from 1920s, early 1930s). Most statistics represent the population of the entire county. Smaller numbers (especially those for Jinzhou and Rehe Provinces) are probably the population of the administrative seat only.

\(^{39}\) Source: *Chimei daijiten* attached map. This column denotes whether or not there was railroad (RR) service to the county seat.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G Andong 安東</th>
<th>汪清縣 Wangqing</th>
<th>F-2</th>
<th>56,861</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>福城縣 Fengcheng</td>
<td>G-4</td>
<td>525,382</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>開化縣 Kuandian</td>
<td>G-5</td>
<td>328,886</td>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>桓仁縣 Huanren</td>
<td>G-6</td>
<td>218,538</td>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>遠化縣 Tonghua</td>
<td>G-7</td>
<td>184,396</td>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>長白縣 Changbai</td>
<td>G-11</td>
<td>39,464</td>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H Fengtian 奉天</th>
<th>濟陽縣 Shenyang</th>
<th>H-1</th>
<th>647,366</th>
<th>Y</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>本溪縣 Benqi</td>
<td>H-3</td>
<td>327,722</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>青縣 Fu</td>
<td>H-9</td>
<td>545,633</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>鐵嶺縣 Tieling</td>
<td>H-11</td>
<td>366,590</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>遼源縣 Liaooyuan</td>
<td>H-14</td>
<td>98,471</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>開原縣 Kaiyuan</td>
<td>H-18</td>
<td>336,917</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>西豐縣 Xifeng</td>
<td>H-19</td>
<td>45,738</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>龍泉縣 Hailong</td>
<td>H-22</td>
<td>290,205</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>興京縣 Xingjing</td>
<td>H-24</td>
<td>263,114</td>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>濟江縣 Mengjiang</td>
<td>H-28</td>
<td>24,836</td>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I Jinzhou 錦州</th>
<th>北鎮縣 Beizhen</th>
<th>I-2</th>
<th>28,954</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>黑山縣 Heishan</td>
<td>I-3</td>
<td>16,545</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>台安縣 Tai'an</td>
<td>I-4</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>盤山縣 Panshan</td>
<td>I-5</td>
<td>3,525</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>興城縣 Xingcheng</td>
<td>I-7</td>
<td>8,066</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>錦西縣 Jixi</td>
<td>I-8</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>義縣 Yi</td>
<td>I-9</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| J Rehe 熱河 | 豐寧縣 Fengning | J-3 | 8,000 | N  |

Figure 72 and Table 12 were created as a means of determining whether or not there are patterns behind the choice of these forty-six counties. As for the map, there are no discernable patterns per se, although there are some glaringly empty regions, especially in the very isolated northern twenty percent of the country, and much of the western region which was a sparsely settled ethnic Mongol stronghold. The southern region is better covered, and the central plains area is also well-represented. Regarding the chart, whether or not the county seat had rail service in 1937 tells us how isolated that particular place was. Eighteen of the volumes dealt with counties without rail service to their respective capital, while twenty-eight of them did have rail service. This is a pattern.
Population numbers in the counties vary widely, eliminating a pattern there. Overall, the choice for these particular counties appears to be random.

Most of the volumes in the County Series that had not been produced already had scholars assigned to them, a sign of the seriousness of the project. Only the Mongolian banner volumes in the four Xing'an provinces lacked authors. All told, forty-six books were listed as on sale or newly published, and another 119 presumably made it to at least the draft stage, leaving only 34 unassigned areas as of July 1935. Library database searches suggest that it is unlikely that few of the remaining 154 volumes were published.

Finally, among the forty-six completed volumes, there does not appear to have been any particular order in which they were published. Six of these volumes were from set A (Jilin), eight were from set B (Longjiang), plus one C (Heihe), one D (Sanjiang), six Es (Binjiang), one F (Jiandao), five Gs (Andong), ten Hs (Fengtian [Mukden]), seven Is (Jinzhou), and finally one from set J (Rehe). As of July 1935 none from sets K, L, M, N, or O (the four Xing'an Provinces, and the set on important cities) had appeared.

Case Study 1: H-9 Fu County 復縣

Having given an overview of the Manchukuo Area Conditions series as a whole, two individual volumes shall be introduced in this section as a means of showing the considerable depth of knowledge that the Japanese had acquired about multiple areas at the local level during the first few years of Manchukuo’s existence. An examination of specific volumes will also show the great lengths to which Manchukuo’s knowledge producers went when presenting this information to the general public. The first volume

40 Manshūkoku chihō jijō H9: Hōtenshō fuku ken [Fu County], 207-211 (final appendix).
under study is that of Fu County which directly bordered Japan’s Kwantung Territory on the Liaodong Peninsula. Its proximity to Japanese-controlled territory was a possible reason why the Japanese decided to make this one of the early volumes in the series. It is also reasonable to assume that Japan had been gathering intelligence about Fu County and its general conditions well before Manchukuo appeared. That would have made this one of the easier books to compile.

The length of volume H-9 is 201 pages, and is divided into thirteen chapters: General Remarks (history, etc), Topography and Customs, Area Systems (government), Finance, Policing and Security, Primary Industries, Manufacturing, Communications (transportation), Commerce and Currency, Education and Religion, Social Undertakings, Hygiene, and the Conclusion. Not only is this primarily the same basic formula for pre-Manchukuo information books, but as shall be shown it is fundamentally the same structure as the multi-volume series on Manchukuo’s Province published between 1935 and 1937. What, then, was new in the County Series?

To begin with, in chapter one Fu County’s ancient history is dealt with in considerable depth, providing details that go back more than two millennia. There is also a short section on local events on and after the Manchurian Incident where one finds, for instance, that upon Japan’s invasion the county head fled to Beijing, after which the Japanese simply integrated the functioning Chinese county into the Manchukuo system with the help of accommodating local leaders.41 This background is followed by a description of the government buildings in Fu County, an organization chart of the various agencies and bureaus, and then multiple pages of the lower level governmental

41 Ibid., 6. Names of Chinese individuals are listed.
apparatus and its responsibilities. The final section of this chapter is a multi-page listing of the provisional rules of the local office on a range of county-level subjects. This section is generic enough that much of the information could have been used in the same section of the other County Series volumes.

The second chapter on Topography and Customs is much more specific to Fu County than the information in the previous chapter. This includes topography of course, as well as general local information such as population, surface area, area under cultivation, important inner-county areas, climate (a detailed year-round chart provided), ethnic groups, food, clothing and shelter, and local customs (marriages, funerals, ceremonial days, etc).

The next chapter (local systems) is also specific to Fu County. Here the author provided a background on the county's traditional administrative divisions. Just as Manchukuo was divided into a number of provinces, and those provinces were divided in counties such as Fu, the counties themselves were further divided into component parts, one of which was the village. There were sixty-three villages about which the book gives detailed 1934 village financial information on income and expenditures. The final section gives an overview of the autonomous governmental system in Fu County.

Chapter four on county finances shows some of the details that the Japanese were able to come up with in their efforts at Manchukuo knowledge creation, although some of the background references are pre-1932 Chinese government sources. The chapter on the whole is noteworthy for its depth and complexity, and the numbers in this section could

[42] 1941 Manchoukuo Yearbook, 149. There were 1,970 villages in Manchukuo in 1941.
[43] Manshōkoku chihō jijō H9: Hōtenshō fuku ken [Fu County], 35-38. Fu was also divided into sectors 区, which were used for analytical purposes throughout the Fu County volume.
have been used in the 1930s as a basis for serious county-level financial and other
decision-making and planning.

Chapter five – Policing and Security – is made up entirely of Fu County
information. Starting with a brief history of policing and security in Fu County (and its
predecessor, Fu Department 復州), the author provided 33 pages of material covering this
important topic. Names of both jurisdictions and their policemen are included, as well as
specifics on a range of crimes. Chapter six looks at primary industries such as agriculture,
forestry, stock farming, mining and fisheries, again providing in-depth statistical
information on these areas and others specific to Fu County. This kind of information,
which was really about Manchukuo’s ability to create wealth, would have been of great
interest to any number of individuals during the 1930s and early 1940s, whether
researchers, businessmen, administrators, or military. A small percentage of the
information is from the pre-Manchukuo period, but most of it was generated in 1932 and
1933, making it fresh and relevant to the book’s readers. The statistical information bears
out that Fu was potentially an important county, and its location along the SMR ensured
excellent and reliable transportation for its products.

Compared to agriculture the author explains that Fu County’s industrial
development was still nascent, as is found in chapter seven. Still, Manchukuo
statisticians had managed to accumulate enough material on Fu’s light industries to
provide a brief chapter for this book. The information is in database chart form (like the
other chapters), giving factory names, their location within Fu, capital value, products
manufactured, yearly production value, and workforce. Of the twenty-three factories

44 Ibid., 127.
listed, workforces ranged from three people (white cloth production) at the smallest to 150 employees (silk spinning) at the biggest.\textsuperscript{45} Other light industries included soybean oil and soybean cakes manufacturing, and the making of iron implements. On top of this the author created another chart with product names, markets (generally local or in surrounding counties), and areas where raw materials could be purchased based on

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 127-29.
information gathered in 1932.\textsuperscript{46} Chapter eight, on local communications (a term which in the pre-war period included transportation), included details on roads, telegraphy, mail, and telephones. From a historical perspective this book is an excellent source for understanding not only the specific conditions in a small part of Manchukuo, but also as an example of the on-going Japanese knowledge production.

Case Study 2: A-8 Changchun County 長春縣\textsuperscript{47}

Another book in the County Series is number A-8 on Changchun County, home to Manchukuo’s independently administered capital city Hsinking. The Changchun volume came out in July 1935, a couple of months after the Fu County volume. As a gazetteer whose information was chiefly gathered in 1934, and for being a book on just one small county, its length of 433 pages is surprising. The categorized information is localized, but is the same type as the Fu county volume discussed above. One thing worth noting is the emphasis placed on further dividing the territory into smaller and smaller component parts. Although Manchukuo had nearly 2000 towns and villages beneath the county level, the counties were also divided into \textit{qu} 区, or sectors. In Changchun’s case, some of the sectors were further divided into \textit{jia} 甲.

In China the \textit{jia} were part of the \textit{baojia} system, a traditional method for low-level local government. Jonathan Spence has defined \textit{baojia} [保甲] as

\ldots a method of household organization and control \ldots . One hundred households were organized into a \textit{jia}. Ten \textit{jia} made a \textit{bao}. The leaders of

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 129-30.
\textsuperscript{47} Manshûteikokoku daidō gakuin, Manshûkoku chihō jijō A8: Kitsurinshō chōshun ken (Tokyo: Manshûkoku Chihō Jijō, 1935).
the units, elected on a rotating basis, were charged with maintaining local order, supervising community works, and enforcing tax collection.\textsuperscript{48}

Since Manchukuo was basically a Chinese state, it appears that the government was making use of this traditional system as part of its overall system of control.\textsuperscript{49} Spence notes that Chinese governments, from the Song to the Qing used the Baojia system with varying degrees success. More germane to this present discussion is that the Japanese used the \textit{jia} as a way to organize local information and conditions discussed in the Changchun volume of the County Series.

There were fifty \textit{jia} in Changchun County in 1934 when the information was being gathered. Each \textit{jia} was charted in a very specific way: villages/colonies (each demarked with a number), location, and distance in \textit{ri} from \textit{jia} number one. Most included the name of the village gentry, and some also included the number of households and village population. The following is a table with the \textit{jia} names and exact number of villages in the \textit{jia}.\textsuperscript{50}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
\textit{jia} name \hspace{1cm} number of villages in \textit{jia} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{48} Jonathan Spence. \textit{The Search for Modern China} revised edition (New York: W.W. Norton \& Co., 1999), pg. A47.

\textsuperscript{49} It is not entirely clear if the Manchukuo system was identical to its Chinese predecessor.

\textsuperscript{50} "Village" in this case is \textit{shūraku} 集落(聚落). "Gentry" here is 紳董.
TABLE 13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Number of Villages</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Number of Villages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) 德隆甲 Delongjia</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>26) 北盛甲 Beishengjia</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) 顺山甲 Shunshanjia</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27) 庫金甲 Kujinjia</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) 济亜甲 Jiyajia</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28) 朝陽甲 Chaoyangjia</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) 萬寶甲 Wanbao</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>29) 慶春甲 Kangchunjia</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) 天吉甲 Tianjijia</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30) 北乾甲 Beiqianjia</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) 朱城甲 Zhuchengjia</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31) 隆極甲 Longijia</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) 東鉄甲 Dongtiejia</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>32) 济生甲 Jishengjia</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) 晋昌甲 Jinchangjia</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33) 撫懷甲 Fuhuaijia</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) 福德甲 Fudejia</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>34) 富春甲 Fuchunjia</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) 濱河甲 Binhejia</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35) 竜山甲 Baoshanjia</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) 仁泉甲 Renquanjia</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36) 長發甲 Changfajia</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12) 普昌甲 Puchangjia</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>37) 南綏甲 Nansuijia</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13) 新民甲 Xinminjia</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>38) 明德甲 Mingdejia</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14) 北原甲 Beiyanjia</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>39) 永樂甲 Yonglejia</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15) 裕和甲 Yuhejia</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>40) 福聚甲 Fujujia</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16) 平靖甲 Pingjingjia</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>41) 玉成甲 Yucheng</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17) 福泉甲 Fuquanjia</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>42) 湧泉甲 Yongquanjia</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18) 同太甲 Tongtaijia</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>43) 西崑甲 Xikunjia</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19) 東屏甲 Dongbingjia</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>44) 綏安甲 Sui’anjia</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20) 魁清甲 Kuiqingjia</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>45) 公平甲 Gongpingjia</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21) 開原甲 Kaiyuanjia</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>46) 裕仁甲 Yurenjia</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22) 慈佑甲 Ciyoujia</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>47) 埣岡甲 Bugangjia</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23) 景田甲 Jingianjia</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>48) 積成甲 Jichengjia</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24) 萬豐甲 Wanfenjia</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>49) 東慶甲 Dongkangjia</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25) 永安甲 Yong’anjia</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50) 克林甲 Kelinjia</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

51 Manshūkoku chihō jijō A8: Kitsu rinshō chōshun ken, 28-111. Because this source did not provide katakana transliterations for these (and the following) place names I have had to guess with the reading for the characters with multiple Mandarin readings.
The system did not stop at the *jia* level however, and in fact each *jia* could be divided into smaller component parts. In 1934 Zhuchengjia 朱城甲 (number six in the *jia* chart above), located in the eastern-most north-central part of Changchun county, consisted of 25 smaller units. Zhuchengjia's total 1934 population was 8,597 (40% of which occupied the main settlement area Zhuchengzi 朱城子, considered the center for distance purposes) living in 1,365 households.52

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1) 朱城子 Zhuchengzi</th>
<th>9) 上壜子 Shangtaizi</th>
<th>17) 後恒發店 Houhengfadian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2) 史家窪堡 Shijiadoubao</td>
<td>10) 趙家店 Zhaojiadian</td>
<td>18) 新立屯 Xinlitun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) 小唐家丈子 Xiaotangjiazhangzi</td>
<td>11) 于溝子 Yugangzi</td>
<td>19) 三不騙 Sanbuguan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) 楮家丈子 Biznangjiazhi</td>
<td>12) 哈拉哈 Halaha</td>
<td>20) 興隆堡 Xinglongbao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) 前恒發店 Qianhengfadian</td>
<td>13) 宮家店 Gongjiadian</td>
<td>21) 大房子 Dafangzi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) 椿坡子 Pianpozi</td>
<td>14) 三家子 Sanjiazi</td>
<td>22) 王家樓 Wanjialou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) 唐家窪堡 Tangsandoubao</td>
<td>15) 大唐家丈子 Datangjiazhangzi</td>
<td>23) 永利莊 Yonglizhuang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) 段家窪堡 Duanjiadoubao</td>
<td>16) 瓦盆管 Wakeguan</td>
<td>24) 瓦房 Wafang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25) 寶家窻堡 Doujiadoubao</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another section divided Zhuchengjia further, to the point of listing the number of wells in each of the subdivisions.53

Not all of the information in the Changchun volume was so mechanical. In 1934 the Manchukuo government, which had established a youth organization for 18-26-year-old Manchukuoan (Chinese) males, chose top individuals from various *jia* in different

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52 *Manshūkoku chihō jijō A8: Kitsurinshō chōshun ken* [Changchun County], pg. 38-39.
53 Ibid., 116-17.
counties to visit Japan on an all expenses paid 23-day tour of its top tourist spots. A couple of individuals wrote accounts about their trips, which were reprinted in the Changchun County volume. One young man named Guo Zhonghou 郭忠厚 wrote a long essay filled with platitudes about Japan and its wonders. It is a fascinating human-faced account from a member of Japan’s new order in East Asia, contrasting sharply with the dry statistics and multiple lists.\(^{54}\) It is also a concrete example of how the Manchukuo regime used the jia system as a way of encouraging Chinese to develop a Japan-centered East Asian identity. Thus, the significance of the Manchukuo government’s gathering and maintaining detailed information databases such as the County Series is apparent.\(^{55}\) As the County Series was getting underway during the mid-1930s, another multi-volume Manchukuo gazetteer series appeared that also covered all of the regions of Manchukuo, but this time at the provincial level.

**The Province Series**

When Manchukuo came into existence the new regime claimed sovereignty over the three Manchurian provinces, as well as Rehe Province just north of the Great Wall. On March 9, 1932, eight days after Manchukuo declared statehood, the government created out of much of western Manchukuo Xing’an Province, a largely ethnic Mongolian enclave sub-divided into “banners” rather than counties.\(^{56}\) On December 1,

\(^{54}\) Ibid., 466-74.

\(^{55}\) In 1939 a single volume book on each of Manchukuo’s counties divided by province was published: Manshûkoku jijō annaijo, Manshûkoku kakuten jijō (Hsinking: Manshûkoku Jijō Annaijo, 1939). Reprinted as Manshûkoku zenken ryakushi (Tokyo: Hirofumisha, 1979).

\(^{56}\) There is no one succinct definition of “banner.” It was originally a military designation for Manchu and Mongol tribes during the Qing. During the Manchukuo period the Japanese recognized “banners” as “a self-governing administrative unit” for the Mongols in Manchuria. Manchoukuo Year Book 1941, 148.
1934 Manchukuo undertook its first radical restructuring of the administrative order received from the previous regime, marking what would become an almost continual provincial re-ordering until the death of Manchukuo in 1945. The result of the provincial reform was a near tripling of the amount of provinces to a total of fourteen. The following maps show Manchukuo’s provincial transformation after December 1, 1934:

Figure 75 Manchukuo’s original five provinces, March 9, 1932. Map by author.
Figure 76 Manchukuo’s fourteen provinces, Dec 1, 1934. Map by author.

TABLE 15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Five Provinces (March 9, 1932)</th>
<th>Fourteen New Provinces (Dec. 1, 1934)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Mukden (Fengtian)</td>
<td>1) Mukden 奉天</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Jilin</td>
<td>2) Jilin 吉林</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Heilongjiang</td>
<td>3) Longjiang 龍江</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Rehe</td>
<td>4) Rehe 熱河</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Xing’an</td>
<td>5) Andong 安東</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6) Jiandao 閔島</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7) Binjiang 濱江</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8) Sanjiang 三江</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9) Heihe 黑河</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 Jinzhou 錦州</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11) North Xing'an
12) West Xing'an
13) South Xing'an
14) East Xing'an

The provincial reform also marked a distinct shift in Manchuria-Manchukuo knowledge accumulation. Rather than conceiving of Manchuria's administrative space as being continuous within Chinese-Manchurian history, especially Chinese concepts about the ordering of Manchuria's internal borders, the door had been opened for a re-imagining of Manchukuo space in new and creative ways. For instance, Manchuria's northernmost and largest province Heilongjiang, traditionally the most lightly populated and remote province, lost its name as it was split into Heihe and Longjiang Provinces in the December 1, 1934 reform. Likewise, Jilin, though retaining its provincial toponym was dismembered to a degree, out of which sprang Sanjiang, Jiandao, Binjiang, as well as a truncated Jilin. Mukden was also partitioned, the eastern flank of which on the Korea border became Andong Province. Likewise, Jinzhou Province evolved out of parts of Mukden and Rehe Provinces. Since the purpose of this section is to analyze Manchukuo knowledge production in the form of books, a history and analysis of the entire thirteen years of administrative restructuring shall be given towards the end of the chapter.

The Shōsei iran (Provincial Government Overview) Manchukuo Province Series was a nine-volume set published in the three years following the December 1934 organizational reforms. The analysts behind the project primarily made use of new information that had been gathered at the local level during Manchukuo's earliest years. This project, even more so than Daidong Academy's ambitious County Series, was

arguably the crowning achievement of the Manchukuo knowledge production experiment because it was basically completed.\textsuperscript{58} It is highly reminiscent of the China Province Series discussed at the beginning of the chapter, not only because it focuses on the provinces, but also because of its structure, its attention to detail, and even its staggered publishing schedule. The organization that produced the series was Manchukuo’s Department of State General Affairs Board Information Bureau.

The series was not without its problems. Though the statistics and information are considered reliable by Japanese scholars,\textsuperscript{59} the volumes are extremely formulaic, in some instances sharing exact paragraphs of text from one volume to the next. Therefore, while one might turn to the Sanjiang Province volume (volume 4) for specific information on that province’s climate or commerce, he or she would find almost nothing new or different in the province’s history section relative to the other volumes. The Province Series was to be a quick reference on local conditions, resulting in high structural continuity throughout all the volumes.

Like the other Manchuria-Manchukuo gazetteers and handbooks, the structure of each of the volumes followed a strict formula: Introduction, topography, administration, finance/markets, industry/economy, transportation/communications/civil engineering, education, society/hygiene, judiciary/prosecutor, military/police/security, cities, and the conclusion. At the center of each of these topics was the county, which connected the Manchukuo Province Series to the earlier Japanese knowledge production efforts in China proper as outlined above. In order to see precisely how the books worked, the following is an analysis of an individual volume.

\textsuperscript{58} Volumes on Rehe and the four Xing’an Provinces were never produced.
\textsuperscript{59} Jilin Province, vol. 1, introduction, 5.
Case Study: Volume 7 Andong Province

The Province Series' volume on Andong Province came out September 1936. Because Andong was a new province, a close examination of its contents should be useful in terms of gauging Japanese research and knowledge production that made use of the province as its focal point.

At 48,226 square kilometers (18,620 sq. miles, about a third larger than the state of Maryland, or a little less than two-thirds the size of Hokkaido) Andong Province was ranked twelfth in size among the fourteen provinces, and was about 3.7% of Manchukuo's total area. In a word, it was small, but only by Chinese standards. The comparison with Maryland puts the size of Manchukuo's (Manchuria's) original provinces in perspective and indicates why the Japanese were so intent on modifying their size. Despite its relative smallness, Andong's population at 2,720,363 was about nine percent of Manchukuo's 1934 population of 30,879,717. It was located in the extreme southeastern corner of Manchukuo, sharing a border with northern Korea. This proximity with Japan's Korean colony was the reason why more than 73,000 of Andong's residents were ethnic Koreans. Andong was made up of eleven counties and one city Andong City (current name: Dandong City), which lies on the Chinese side of the Yalu river connected to Korea by a massive Japanese-built steel railroad bridge.

While many of the generic Manchukuo background details are identical to those in the other books in the Province Series, each volume relies heavily on Manchukuo-

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60 Chimei Daijiten, 12.
61 Shōsei ikan volume 7, Antōshō, 7-8.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., 9.
period statistical information gathered by various province-level agencies during the years preceding its publication. Chapter five of the Andong Province volume, containing information that was released by the government in December of 1935, is enlightening. Andong’s counties were used for division purposes; the first chart states their size, how much land was available for cultivation in each, and how much land was either already under cultivation or not yet under cultivation. 64 These numbers are rendered into percentages, so at a glance one knows what percentage of Andong’s cultivable land is under the plow, the remaining percentage not yet being used, and the percentage of land impossible to cultivate. Province-wide averages are also given. Finally, not only is the average farm size per household in each county charted, 65 but also the average for Andong Province as a whole. Making use of this first chart it can be deduced that in 1935 only about six percent of Andong’s land was cultivable, and of that only about two-thirds was being worked with the remainder still idle. Other statistics tell the reader that 88.2 percent of the relatively small Andong County’s land was cultivable, while 95.5 percent of the largest county, Fengcheng, was uncultivable. 66

The next chart, from 1935, and again based on the county, shows Andong’s tenant farmers versus landed farmers, in terms of total households, as well as percentages and averages of the numbers. 67 The following two pages are an introduction to Andong’s main crops and their production for 1935: Soy beans, beans, kaoliang, onions, chestnuts, 68

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64 Ibid., 85.
65 Based on the Chinese area unit 吨 (shou) / 吨 = 7 歮 / 1 歬 (mou) = about 100 sq. m / 1 吨 = about 700 sq. meter.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., 89.
wheat and barley were just some of the crops grown in Andong that year.\textsuperscript{68} Along with crop types is information is acreage devoted to each crop, percentage of the total, the total crop and output per \textit{shou}.\textsuperscript{69} This chart is then followed with charts that break the same crop information down individually where each vegetable and grain is analyzed county by county.\textsuperscript{70} The remainder of the Andong (and other provinces) volume’s information is similar to this. It remains a snapshot of specific provincial conditions during the first years of the Manchukuo period, and is also indicative of the degree to which the Japanese went in their production of knowledge about the Puppet State.

Despite years of work, by July 1937 the Manchukuo Province Series was semi-obsolete, and by 1941 it was a virtual antique. The Manchukuo regime, unsatisfied with its initial reforms, created two new provinces starting July 1937, and this process of provincial restructuring would continue through 1945. Keeping current heavily structured knowledge projects such as the Province Series and the County Series would have been a near impossibility, and in fact there is no evidence that other provincial series such as this were ever produced. One can imagine, however, that as part of the general knowledge accumulation process in Manchukuo, multi-volume book series of this type would have been an on-going effort, and undoubtedly would have appeared in updated form if Japan had been successful in the War. Overall, the Province Series is concrete evidence of the length to which the Japanese went in their quest to produce knowledge and accumulate information of all sorts about Manchukuo.

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., 90-91.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 94-111.
Ordering, Structuring, Re-ordering and Re-structuring

To this point the discussion has focused on the connection between knowledge accumulation and production, administrative structuring and restructuring, and finally the substantial Manchukuo-related publishing world that dealt with and made use of the information that came out of the information process. At this juncture it would be appropriate to explain in detail how the continuous Manchukuo administrative restructuring worked, what it looked like, and then provide some further analysis about what it all possibly meant.

Figure 77  Manchuria’s three provinces, circa early twentieth century. Map by author, based on 1911 Encyclopaedia Britannica map of Manchuria.

The Provinces in Evolution

As is well known, prewar Manchuria was generally called the “Three Eastern Provinces” (Mandarin: Sandongsheng) by the Chinese [Figure 77]. This name was misleading since the three provinces are actually located in China’s northeast. However,
as a synonym for "Manchuria" most would have known what Sandongsheng (Three Eastern Provinces) meant. At any rate, there were traditionally only three provinces in Manchuria, and few changes, apart from the 1929 addition of Rehe as part of the Manchurian administration, took place at the provincial level before the Japanese takeover. Among the changes that did occur, the most important was the Russian annexation of Manchurian land to the Amur and Ussuri Rivers between 1858 and 1860 which was the first step in the emergence of the Manchurian geo-body. In 1907 Shengjing Province 盛京省 was renamed Mukden (Fengtian) Province, and then was once again renamed Liaoning by the Republicans sometime in the 1920s. These cosmetic changes, along with the addition of Rehe in 1929 and numerous changes at the sub-provincial level show that Manchuria's administration was already in flux before the Japanese invasion.

Figure 78 Manchukuo, March 1, 1932. Map by author.
Figure 79 Manchukuo, March 9, 1932. Map by author.

71 Mukden is the Chinese pronunciation of the characters 奉天, pronounced as Fengtian in Mandarin.
The constant partitioning of the Manchurian geo-body, however, was a Japanese invention. Manchukuo's first stage called largely for consolidation and general continuity with the immediate Manchurian past. However, a sample of the much larger changes to come was the creation of Xing'an Province on March 9, 1932 in northwestern Manchuria, carved primarily out of western Heilongjiang Province [Figure 79]. This immense expanse of territory that shared a border with Outer Mongolia was not only thinly populated, but among its residents most were Mongolian. Because of the creation of Xing'an, strictly speaking Manchukuo started off with five provinces, already up two from China's long-standing tradition of Manchuria comprising of the "three eastern provinces." As noted above, compared to what was in store administratively for Manchuria, the initial creation of Xing'an was a minor alteration. Xing'an's break-up into four (north, south, east, and west) smaller provinces in June 1932 was the first step in a direction that would radically alter the structure of Manchuria's traditional ordering.

Figure 80 Manchukuo, after the Dec. 1, 1934 provincial reform. Map by author.
Figure 81 The Height of Manchukuo provincial reforms, circa 1942. Map by author.
The next phase of provincial reform was promulgated on December 1, 1934 (detailed above), a clear departure from the period of Chinese rule in Manchuria. In July 1937, after only three years of the earlier provincial reform, the fourteen provinces from 1934 became sixteen with the addition of Tonghua 通化省 and Mudanjiang Provinces 牡丹江省. In 1939 two more provinces appeared on the Manchukuo map: Dong’an 東安省 and Beian 北安省. This left Manchukuo with eighteen fairly small provinces. The fine tuning of the administrative order had yet to cease, however, for on July 1, 1941 another provincial restructuring occurred resulting in the creation of Xiping Province 四平省. At nineteen provinces Manchukuo had reached its peak.

Figure 82 Manchukuo’s provincial reform circa 1943. Number 8 is the new Dongman Province. Map by author.

What appears to have been the final restructuring of Manchukuo occurred when the Manchukuo government announced that in fall 1943 Mudangjiang, Dong’an, and Jiandao provinces would be combined to form a new province called the Eastern Manchukuo Administrative District, or Dongman Zongsheng Province 東満總省. At the same time the four Xing’an Provinces (with the addition of a county from neighboring
Longjiang Province) would be recombined into just one Xing'an. The 1943 provincial restructuring would have resulted in a completely new map [Figure 82] and the following provinces:

TABLE 16

1) Rehe  
2) Jinzhou  
3) Mukden  
4) Andong  
5) Xiping  
6) Jiandao  
7) Jilin  
8) Dongman Zongsheng  
9) Binjiang  
10) Longjiang  
11) Sanjiang  
12) Heihe  
13) Xing’an

If the fall 1943 reshuffling did indeed take place, Manchukuo fell to the invading Soviet army with a total of thirteen provinces. Like so much of Manchukuo – its cities, railroads, and roads -- its administrative order was under constant construction, resembling to a degree the first couples of decades of Meiji Japan when that new government also struggled with how best to re-order its territory.

OSS Research and Analysis Branch, *Programs of Japan in Manchukuo with Biographies* assemblage #53, vol 1 (Honolulu, April 1945), p 2. Despite this news story, the OSS later listed, based on a 1944 dispatch, 19 provinces in Manchukuo. OSS Research and Analysis Branch, *Programs of Japan in Manchukuo with Biographies* assemblage #53, vol. 2 (Honolulu, April 1945), 209. This suggests that the October 1943 reorganization might not have occurred. On the other hand there is also evidence that Tōman Province was indeed established, only to be dismantled in mid-1945.

In 1868 Japan retained its system of approximately 300 feudal domains, but added a handful of prefectures and municipalities. In 1871 the more than 300 domains became prefectures, but later that year all were restructured into 71 prefectures. In 1873 Okinawa was absorbed into the Japanese Empire where it was made a domain (Japan’s last one), but was converted to a prefecture in 1879. From 1882-86 Hokkaido was divided into three prefectures. In 1888 Japan decreased the number of prefectures to 43 where has remained ever since.
Conclusion

The sheer quantity of Japanese-produced Manchuria-Manchukuo textual material through the end of WWII is nearly overwhelming, especially the various handbooks, gazetteers, geographies, and books on "conditions" in Manchuria-Manchukuo. True, there tended to be a good deal of repetition in their contents, but the Province Series and County Series were a marked departure from the typical Manchukuo "handbook" of that sort. In many respects the works examined in this section were a sort of early climax on the academic side of the Manchukuo project, and if the Puppet State had continued beyond 1945 it is almost certain that a new generation of similar but even further refined materials taking into account another decade's worth of accumulated knowledge would have been published.

The Province and County Series were one outcome of Japan's concentrated efforts on Manchuria-Manchukuo knowledge production. Maps were another. A third area was planning, the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER 6
LOW-LEVEL PLANNING IN MANCHUKUO

General planning was the end result of decades of Japanese information accumulation and knowledge production in Manchuria. It was also a vital part of Manchukuo’s ground-level state building, and was one of the more salient features of Manchukuo’s brief existence. This chapter will begin with an overview of the rise of planning as a feature of the prewar socialist state,1 followed by an in-depth account of a cross-section of smaller, more immediate plans devised by Manchukuo’s own planners.

Modern Planning, the Soviet State, and Manchukuo: An Overview

It would be difficult to continue here without contextualizing what might be referred to as the Manchukuo planning system, a type of planning mentality where the vagaries of the market and local conditions were not left to chance.2 By at least the 1930s the idea of “scientific” and “rational” planning began to capture the imagination of many as a way of circumventing the problems associated with non-planned capitalist societies. This occurred at least in part due to the apparent success of national planning in the USSR, as well as the resuscitation of the German economy under the Nazis. Whether as part of world socialism headed by the Soviet Union, or autarkic systems conceived by the Nazis and Japanese, in the metropole or in colonies and possessions, much of the prewar world came to believe that through proper planning civilization could be advanced

1 In the prewar period there were few socialist states, so I am considering the Soviet Union, with its state control over the means of production and its government-controlled economy, as the model for the period.
2 I use the term “system” here so as not to confuse Manchukuo’s national planning with that of such countries as the United States where, except in extreme cases (i.e.; the national highways, the military, etc.), planning has generally been left to individuals, private companies, and at the state and local and level.
quickly, and a better society could be created. As the extant official documents examined in this chapter reveal, Manchukuo, puppet state or otherwise, had policies and plans very much in line with the emerging prewar planning mentality, and was a forerunner of what would become mainstream thinking on economic development in the postwar period, especially in the developing world.

The *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (IESS) refers to the Manchukuo-type planning as “development planning,” explaining that plans vary in length and look several years in advance: “Typical periods are three, four, five, and six years. Longer plans are sometimes made for 10, 15, or even 20 years ahead.” The article continues; “... the first documents resembling development plans were published just after World War II,” and that “Some development plans are now devoted mainly to discussing such subjects as industry, agriculture, mining, investment, saving, and the balance of payment . . . .”

The IESS article is quite comprehensive in its explanation of the process of how planning should work:

Development planners begin with surveys. The land should be mapped and surveyed for minerals, water, and fertile soils. Adequate staff must be provided for the departments of geology, hydrology, meteorology, survey, and soil survey. Equally important is research into the utilization of these natural resources, especially agricultural research, and research into industrial uses of local products. Next comes economic, statistical, and market research.

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4 Ibid.
5 Ibid, 120.
In other words, planning follows the accumulation of information and the production of knowledge.

Besides postwar Communist states, the new postcolonial nations were also attracted to planning as a way to address urgent economic and development needs. In the prewar period, however, the implementation of large-scale development planning was a highly innovative creation. The idea can be traced back to the 1841 writings of a German named Friedrich List, who in turn informed the ideas of fellow German Karl Marx. Considering that the Germans created and then popularized the concept of national planning, it should come as no surprise that they also pioneered national planning in practice during WWI. Impressed with German achievements at that time, Vladimir Lenin considered planning as the key to success in the new Soviet Union. The first plan of its kind began in 1920 as the USSR attempted to electrify the country. By 1925 the Soviet planning machinery was in place, and in 1928 the USSR announced its first five-year plan. Of course multi-year plans became stock-in-trade in the postwar Soviet Union, China, and throughout the Communist and developing world. However, it was during the 1930s when development planning first caught on as a global phenomenon. In 1933 alone the Nazis started their initial four-year plan, the Fascist Italians started a similar plan, and the even the United States began its development of the Tennessee Valley based on government planning.

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6 Ibid, 125.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid, 126.
10 Sills, 127.
11 Ibid.
According to Marxism, Communism, and Western Society, economic planning by governments and private enterprises "... can be traced back to socialist ideas, as well as to the ever-growing tendency to organize all human activities."\(^{12}\) This book’s advice regarding long-term planning is that:

In projecting economic and social policy it is advisable to make approximate plans for optimum development. The broad lines of development should be laid down in long-term plans or perspective plan-programmes [sic], the finer details worked out in medium-term plans – five-year plans, as in the USSR, for instance [emphasis mine] – and the actual measures of economic policy stipulated in annual or similar short-term plans.\(^{13}\)

For Marxists of the 1970’s (such as the individual who wrote the above quote) the USSR was a model from which to draw numerous examples. It was also an example to be held up in order to demonstrate how a planned system functioned in practice. Planning in the USSR had a constitutional basis because the state had rights over virtually all means of production. The 1936 USSR Constitution stated explicitly that:

The land, mineral deposits, waters, forests, mills, factories, mines, railways, water and air transport, banks, means of communication, large state-organized agricultural enterprises ... are state property, that is, the property of the whole people.\(^{14}\)

It went on to state that:

The economic life of the USSR is determined and directed by the state plan of national economy for the purpose of increasing the public wealth, of steadily raising the material and cultural level of the toilers, and of strengthening the independence of the USSR and its power of defense.

Basically, planning was at the core of the Soviet state.

\(^{12}\) Kernig, 303.

\(^{13}\) Ibid.

\(^{14}\) Quoted in Ibid, 306.
Manchukuo, while not Communist (in fact it was officially and staunchly anti-Communist), shared surprisingly similar attitudes about planning and economics with its purported nemesis the Soviet Union. The Puppet State’s administrative policy, promulgated on March 1, 1934, was unambiguous about how the economy would function:

In the field of domestic economic activities, the new programme [sic] requires a revision of the laissez-faire policy of capitalistic tendency. In other words, those economic activities of the people which have important bearing on the national life at large shall be positively placed under national control and supervision. By so doing a positive realization of national economy, which is so schemed as to combine the features of both the laissez-faire system and planned economy [emphasis mine], can, on the one hand, prevent economic activities from perishing, and, on the other, put a limit on despotic activities and monopoly of resources by a few privileged capitalists.15

Was this a national socialist middle way? Perhaps in theory, but in practice Manchukuo’s governmental control over much of the means and direction of production leaned the country more toward the Soviet way. Like the USSR, the traditional capitalist “monopoly of resources” described above would be transferred away from capitalists to the Manchukuo state. For instance Ordinance Number 149, entitled the “Oil Monopoly Law” was promulgated on November 14, 1934, giving complete control of “oils” (gasoline, kerosene, gas oil, heavy oil, benzol, and fuel oil substitutes) to the Manchukuo government.16 Article II of the new law stated “the sale of oils shall be a government monopoly.” Similarly, the Mining Law of August 1, 1935 stated in Article III that “all minerals (including dross and duffers) not yet mined shall belong to the State.”17 While the Oil Monopoly and Mining Laws were not anti-capitalist diatribes per se, and in fact

15 Quoted in Manchoukuo Year Book, 1941, 831.
16 Quoted in Ibid, 839.
17 Quoted in Ibid, 873.
appear to have been designed to regulate those industries, numerous articles in the
laws ensured that the government was the final arbiter on these two important aspects of
Manchukuo’s economy and society. At its core the Manchukuo economic system, as with
the USSR, was designed to serve the “good of society” and the people:

In order to avoid the baneful effects which capitalism when unbridled may
exert, it is necessary, in constructing our national economy, to apply a
certain amount of national control thereto, and to utilize the fruits of
capital so that a sound and lively development in all branches of the
people’s economy [emphasis mine] may be realized. Thus will the
economic life of the great mass of citizens be enriched and rendered secure,
the standard of their national life elevated, and the country’s power
strengthened, and in turn enable this country to contribute to the
development of world economy, and advance the cause of culture.\(^\text{18}\)

It is difficult to dispute that Manchukuo was, at least on paper, a “people’s state.” For
Manchukuo the only way to ensure the success of such a Soviet-style semi-command
economy was, like the USSR, with large-scale sophisticated planning, research, and
policy making in a myriad of areas.

\textit{Manchukuo Planning -- Overview}

Generally speaking the Manchukuo government was open about its planning – in
fact, it seems to have been a source of governmental pride -- and period Japanese-
language newspapers reported regularly on the various plans. On Manchukuo’s first day
of existence the \textit{Asahi Shimbun} provided details about “The National Capital
Changchun’s Massive Construction Plan.”\(^\text{19}\) This example highlights the fact that from
the moment of Manchukuo’s birth on March 1, 1932 the Kwantung Army already had
extensive planning for the new state underway. The plan, called the “First Stage

\(^{18}\) Manchukuo’s Policy of Economic Construction statement from March 1, 1933, quoted in Ibid, 162.
\(^{19}\) “Kokuto choshun no tatsudai na kensetsu keikaku,” \textit{Asahi Shinbun} (March 1, 1932), 7.
Economic Program," was vast. It "called for improving the region's transport and communications infrastructure; expanding the supply of raw materials from agriculture, forestry, and aquatic resources; constructing new industry and mines; upgrading commerce and finance; and encouraging the region's private sector to develop its resources for improving public welfare and revitalizing local communities and their private organizations."21

On March 1, 1933 the Manchukuo government released much more specific comprehensive planning information on a long list of topics including the following.22

| TABLE 17 |
| Railroads – National network with a planned length of 25,000 km |
| Roads – National network with a planned length of 60,000 km after ten years |
| Air Transport – 3,500 km of new routes to be opened in three years, along with connections to Europe and Asia |
| Cities – Hsinking, Mukden, Harbin, Jilin, Qiqihar slated for modern city planning |
| Agriculture – Planned acreage and output of wheat and cotton |
| Stock-farming – 2,000,000 Superior horses, replacement of 4,000,000 local sheep with Merinos, introduction of 2,700,000 superior quality cattle |
| Land reclamation – 5,000,000 cho of untilled land to be developed by settlers over the next 15 years |
| Planned Industrial Districts – Mukden, Andong, Harbin, Jilin |

From the beginning the Manchukuo government relied heavily on specific planning, leaving as little as possible to chance. After all, the Japanese had a window of opportunity in Manchuria and needed to act quickly. There was to be no confusion or surprise about what was in store for the future of Manchukuo because the government

20 The Manchoukuo Year Book, 1941, 608.
22 The Manchoukuo Year Book, 1941, 162-171.
was going to determine that future. However, the above initial list was simply to get
the ball rolling, as it were, for in 1937 a Soviet-style five-year industrial plan was put into
effect. The plan and was slated to run from 1937 to 1941 and included three main goals:

1) Establishment of Heavy Industry
2) Development of Agriculture
3) Expansion of Network of Communications

As with the 1933 draft, very specific, immense, USSR-style numerical production goals
were provided for this first five-year plan:

TABLE 18

| **Iron**: | 5,000,000 metric tons annually |
| **Liquid Fuel**: | 2,000,000 annually |
| **Food**: | Self-sufficiency for Manchuria and Asia as a whole |
| **Immigration**: | 1,000,000 Japanese farm families over 20 years |
| **Immigration**: | 10,000 Korean farm families annually |
| **Land**: | Expropriation of 20,000,000 chōbu (8,163,265 acres) of unutilized land for agriculture |

This five-year plan happened to coincide with a three-year “Frontier Development
Plan,” based on one of the Manchukuo government’s three “cardinal policies.” The Frontier Plan was similar to the other comprehensive mega-plans, but with a focus on
northern Manchuria and the border areas with the USSR. The frontier plan, which the
Manchoukuo Year Book called the “Development Plan of [the] Northern Frontier
Districts,” was further refined in 1941. There were various key areas that the plan
emphasized, along with providing concrete numerical goals, including the following:

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23 Ibid, 177. The “three cardinal principles” were 1) Heavy Industry, 2) Expansion of Agriculture, and 3) Expansion of the Communications Network.
24 I have coined the term “mega-plan” as a way to differentiate this type of planning with low-level, often narrow single-topic plans.
25 Manchoukuo Year Book 1941, 192-96.
TABLE 19

1) **Adjustment and Renovation of Traffic, Communication Facilities:** roads, telephones, radio, postal, air service, riparian works
2) **Electricity, Water Supply, City Planning:** 30 power plants so that all outlying regions would be electrified; city waterworks, city public facilities
3) **Colonization:** 230,000 hectares of uninhabited frontier land to be cultivated
4) **Production and Concentration of Materials:** 370,000 hectares to be cultivated, stock breeding with superior animals to be encouraged
5) **Thorough Air Defense**
6) **Sanitation and Prevention of Epidemics:** Anti-epidemic institutions and hygienic labs established in population centers throughout the north; SMR and Manchukuo Red Cross sponsored hospitals and clinics established in 35 locations

With the outbreak of the China War in July 1937 Japan’s trajectory in East Asia was redirected. Nevertheless, the initial five-year plan for Manchukuo was carried to completion with results that were satisfactory enough to prompt a second five-year industrial plan scheduled to run from September 1941 through late 1946.²⁶ Besides the objective of supplementing the incomplete aspects of the first five-year plan, there were four new points to this second industrial mega-plan:²⁷

TABLE 20

1) To situate Manchukuo in industry that contributes to the establishment of a self-sufficient bloc economy in basic resource industries: Coal, agricultural products, steel, hydro-electric power, liquid fuels, non-ferrous metals, light metals, salt, electro-chemistry, factories, especially concentrating on increased production of coal and agricultural products.
2) Military munitions, the possession of which is absolutely necessary for the frontline bases in the field.
3) Important collateral industries directly necessary to the industry mentioned above: Cement, mining machinery, railroad cars, farm implements, hemp sacks, etc.
4) Along with industry, essential transportation and communications facilities.

²⁶ *Manshūkokushi (sōron),* 714.
²⁷ Ibid, 715.
Specific increases in numbers were proposed as the five-year plan’s goal.\(^{28}\)

**TABLE 21**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>End of 1941 Capacity</th>
<th>Expansion Goal</th>
<th>End of 1946 Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>2,050,000 kg</td>
<td>240,000 kg</td>
<td>2,290,000 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel ingots</td>
<td>580,000 kg</td>
<td>996,000 kg</td>
<td>1,576,000 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel products</td>
<td>675,000 kg</td>
<td>277,000 kg</td>
<td>952,000 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>12,200 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zinc</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8,900 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>600 tons</td>
<td>4,600 tons</td>
<td>5,200 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>1,050,000 tons</td>
<td>1,280,000 tons</td>
<td>2,330,000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical fertilizer</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Ammonium sulfate 301,000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric power</td>
<td>1,114,000 kw</td>
<td>1,594,000 kw</td>
<td>2,708,000 kw</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This chart, covering parts of the second five-year plan, is provided to demonstrate three things: First, and most importantly, it shows how significant mega-planning was to the puppet state. Wartime exigencies did indeed account for some of the projected numbers; but contrasted with Manchukuo’s earlier planning, there is still continuity with the original Manchukuo model. Second, this chart shows not only the early and massive scale of Manchukuo industry, but also its potential for future development. Both of these have been of serious interest to scholars in the post-war period, notably Ramon Myers of the United States who suggested in his dissertation that Manchukuo’s planning should be considered as a model for Third World Development.\(^{29}\) Finally, despite the input of private capital, Manchukuo’s mega-plans compare favorably with those of the Soviet Union. For example, the Soviet government announced in early 1932 that it intended to produce 250,000,000 tons of coal, 22,000,000 tons of pig iron, 130,000,000 tons of wheat,

\(^{28}\) Chart translated and modified from Ibid, 717.

and 100,000,000,000 kilowatt hours of electricity under its second five-year plan of
1932-1937. The announcement, though not necessarily the achievement, of massive
figures of this sort was also a major part of the planning in both countries.

Overall, the Manchukuo government’s two five-year plans generally revolved
around capital intensive infrastructure development (dams, cities), communications
(roads, radio, movies), and natural resource development – areas that could be handled
only with the kind of financial resources to which a strong central government would
have had access, and more importantly, would have been able to provide. On the other
hand, the 1941 Manchoukuo Year Book stressed repeatedly that the government had no
intention of standing in the way of private initiative, and that special corporations would
be established to handle the industrial projects. This is where Manchukuo planning and
that of the USSR (and postwar Communist states) part company.

Beyond the industrial development outlined above, quite possibly the best known
of the Manchukuo mega-plans among Westerners is that of mass Japanese emigration to
Manchukuo, an aspect of the Manchukuo project well-covered by Louise Young in her
Japan’s Total Empire. The idea was to have 1,000,000 Japanese farm households (made
up of 5,000,000 people) settle chiefly in the under-populated northern Manchuria, a plan
translated as “Millions to Manchuria” by Young. If successful (which it was not), ethnic
Japanese would have made up about twenty percent of Manchukuo’s population. There
was a Colonization Bureau and its affiliate organizations such as the Manchurian
Colonization Corporation (Manshu tokushoku kosha, or Mantaku 满洲拓殖公社) to
handle the settlements, and a network of research stations stretching from Hsinking to

Rapids, Wisconsin) 1932-04-04, 3.
Harbin, Heihe (on the USSR border in the far north), to Jiamusi. Similar to the industrial five-year plans, nothing was being left to chance in the colonization plan either, a feature found in so much of Manchukuo's development.

Considering the above outline of Manchukuo planning and its parallels to that of the prewar Soviet Union, it is notable that an understanding of the (quite often successful) Manchukuo mega-planning has slipped past not only the reference works cited previously, but also such bastions of knowledge as the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, which states that "... until World War II there was no serious attempt at economic planning outside the Soviet Union." This is clearly not the case. Nevertheless, the USSR-Manchukuo analogy can only be taken so far since, as noted, the Manchukuo government was careful to leave the basic economy mostly in private hands while attempting to plan, fund, and guide the large-scale, long-term development projects. This has basically been the postwar policy of Japan's postwar Ministry of International Trade and Industry, or MITI, a policy generally credited with not only resurrecting Japan's economy in the wake of WWII, but also with turning Japan into the second largest economy in the world. As the *Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan* (KEJ) explains:

The primary function of MITI until the early 1970s was to lead the private sector of the economy toward rapid economic growth. It was responsible for the introduction of new technology into Japan, the heavy industrialization of the economy, the rapid expansion of exports, and the import of energy and industrial raw materials. As a planning and guidance organ of the Japanese government in the context of one of the world's most vigorous open-market economies, MITI had no exact parallel with any ministry of economic affairs in other advanced capitalist nations.

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31 Young, 356-57.
33 "MITI," in *Kodansha Encyclopedia* on-line.
This could be a description of Manchukuo’s little-known planned economy. Although *KEJ* makes no mention of Manchukuo in its article on MITI, it would be surprising if links between Japan’s experience in Manchukuo and its postwar economy did not exist.

*Manchukuo: A Planned State*

The connections among planning theory, Manchukuo’s development, the USSR, and even post-war Japan are fairly evident. However, the nature of planning in Manchukuo went deeper than what has been discussed so far. At the moment of conception Manchukuo was a planned country, from its geo-body (planned from the beginning to include Rehe along with the Three Eastern Provinces), to its flag, the shape and size of its capital city, its racial make-up of five Asian “races,” its independence day and other holidays, and on and on. The general scope of the most visible of this large-scale planning has been fairly well covered in both volumes of *Manshūkokushi* (A History of Manchukuo, 1970). Japanese Manchukuo scholar Koshizawa Akira has added to this with three works and various essays on Manchukuo city planning, as has fellow Manchukuo scholar Nishizawa Yasuhiko whose essay in *Manshūkoku kenkyū* (A Study of Manchukuo) explores potential future avenues for research on Manchukuo road and smaller city planning. Within this planning, what Japanese and Western scholars have

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34 Long-term planning was also attempted in Japanese colonies such as Taiwan where, for instance, a 200,000,000 yen ten-year industrial development plan was announced by the government in September 1935. “Taiwan sangyō no kaihatsu ni 10 ka nen ni oku en no keikaku” 台湾産業の開発に 10 年二億円の計画 (“10-year, 200 Million Yen Plan to Develop Taiwan’s Industry”), in *Jiji shimpo* (Sep. 1, 1935).

to this point generally bypassed is low-level planning and policy development that had little to do with steel production, mass emigration, or grandiose city planning.

_Low Level Planning and Research_

Because of the magnitude of Manchukuo's comprehensive mega-planning projects, as well as the likely link to Japan's postwar economic success, scholars have understandably been attracted to them as objects of study. This chapter takes the position that while knowledge of the five-year economic plans and the 20-year immigration plan is essential to understanding Japanese activities in Manchukuo, small-scale plans and research studies should be considered as well if our knowledge of the Manchukuo project is to be further refined. Fortunately hundreds of these plans are extant.

From this point forward the chapter will examine six Manchukuo government documents related to some aspect of fairly low-level planning, research, or policy making. Through translations and analysis it should become evident that the same attention to detail and energy that informed the mega-plans also pervaded plans to improve Manchukuo's pig population, rationalize its weights and measures, institute dairy farms modeled on those of Hokkaido, list other and future plans, and study the current and potential use of two-humped camels. Though some might consider these unusual choices, they are absolutely germane to this dissertation's larger argument about the production of knowledge, as well as essential for developing a deeper understanding of the complexity of the Manchukuo project as a whole.
Manchukuo and Hog Breeding

The first case study is a “secret” September 1932 document entitled Manshū zairaibuta kairyō keikaku an (A Planning Proposal for the Improvement of Native Hogs in Manchuria). Though short (four pages of text and five pages of charts in the original Japanese), this plan and others like it produced at the beginning of the Manchukuo period are indicative of the tone of the planning process and of the seriousness with which the new government approached agriculture in general. It might be recalled that the Manchukuo government targeted agriculture, including livestock, early on as one of its key sources of national wealth production. Overall, a number of plans, policies, and studies dealing with some aspect of livestock were produced by different research groups before and after the establishment of Manchukuo. The following is a sample of official studies listed in The Research Activities of the South Manchurian Railway Company, 1907-1945:

TABLE 22

- Survey Reports on Conditions of the Livestock Industry Made by the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Colonization Groups (1939 Research Dept.)
- Sheep Raising in Southern Manchuria (1922, Agricultural Testing Station)
- Special Characteristics of the Animal Industries along the North Manchuria Railway and Plans for Improvement (1937, Dept. of Industry)
- Conditions of Livestock Breeding in Hulunbair ([no date given] Railway General Dept.)
- Measures for Improving Livestock in Manchuria and Mongolia (1932, Economic Research Meeting #2)

36 Keizai chōsakai dainibu daisanhan, Manshū zairaibuta kairyō keikaku an 滿洲在来豚改良計劃案 (Dairen: Keizai Chōsakai Dainibu Daisanhan, September 1932).

38 John Young, passim.
A number of pig-specific reports and plans from the Manchuria-Manchukuo are also extant:

- A Survey Report on Stock Raising in the Suburbs of Harbin with Special Reference to Pig Breeding (1939, North Manchuria Economic Research Institute)
- A Survey on the Supply and Demand of Live Cattle and Live Pigs in and around the Vicinity of Harbin (1937, North Manchuria Economic Research Institute)
- Survey of the Manchurian Pig (1924, Nōji Shikenjō Ihō)
- Report of the Fifth Annual Exhibition of Select Breeds of Pigs for the Purpose of Encouraging and Promoting Better Breeds in Manchuria (1937, Dept. of Industry)
- Handbook on Hog Raising in Manchuria (1929)
- A Statistical Survey on Hog Farming for the Purpose of Improving the Breed and Economic Income (1937, Dept. of Industry)
- Hog Raising Method of Feeding Small Amounts of Concentrated Fodder (1943, North Manchuria Economic Research Institute)

This list is just a sample of what was a much larger agricultural enterprise, and future research should more fully expose the extent of stock farming in the imagination of Manchukuo planners. What this list does suffice in showing are Japanese concerns about the livestock situation -- in particular swine -- in Manchuria-Manchukuo. Because pork has traditionally been a part of the Chinese diet it is hardly surprising that initially the South Manchuria Railway Company, and later Manchukuo-period researchers, devoted considerable thought and energy toward hog raising, breeding, and improvement. What is surprising, one might contend, is that this particular aspect of planning was designed to help the Chinese living in Manchukuo.

This tells us at least two things about the early Manchukuo regime: First, as self-serving a project as Manchukuo is known to have been, the regime was indeed committed
to reform and improvement in Manchuria, certainly on paper, and at least on particular concrete issues. In the plan translated below (*A Planning Proposal for the Improvement of Native Hogs in Manchuria*) the planners were claimed that they wanted to make an important part of the Chinese diet much more “wholesome and healthy.” This paternalism was presumably out of genuine concern for the masses under Japanese rule, but perhaps also for the sake of state prestige and legitimacy, and as a way to distinguish the new Manchukuo government from the “feudal” (as it was often dubbed) Zhang Xueliang regime that had come before it. Like modern cities, sewer systems, railroads, dams, telephones, electricity, and so forth, modern agriculture (including animal husbandry) has generally lead to an improved standard of living where it has been applied.\(^39\) Until recently these objects of modernity were used uncritically in the basic discourse on development to bifurcate the past and the present, the primitive and the advanced, and of course “illegitimate” predecessor regimes and current “legitimate” governments. We therefore should not underestimate this element in the thinking and formulation of plans and policies during the Manchukuo period, for the Japanese were, and continue to be, acutely aware of the pre-modern/modern dichotomy in their own recent history.

Second, that *A Planning Proposal for the Improvement of Hogs in Manchuria* and other Manchukuo planning documents like it are generally stamped “secret” or “top secret” is noteworthy.\(^40\) In the case of hog breeding, why would the Manchukuo regime

\(^{39}\) This is purely in reference to *material* standards of well-being, and is not a judgment of the nature of modernity itself.

\(^{40}\) There were at least two different types of “secret” and “top secret” during the Manchukuo period. Besides those used for state documents, the Kwantung Army also had its own “military top secret” stamp. It is not clear if there was overlap between the two systems.
have bothered with secrecy for a project of this sort? When thinking about
Manchukuo's "secret" planning one would have to include the nefarious Unit 731 and
perhaps even the Japanese mass colonization schemes that at times involved land
expropriations, mass forced relocations, and even massacres of ethnic Chinese.41 Yet a
"secret" plan to improve the country's hog population suggests genuine concern on the
part of the planners and the Manchukuo government, providing a striking contrast
between the Manchukuo of Unit 731 and this other, less-explored Manchukuo. Therefore,
the "secret" label on this document implies serious intent about bringing it to fruition.

Below is a near-complete translation of A Planning Proposal for the Improvement
of Native Hogs in Manchuria. Apart from its dry professionalism and thoroughness, most
notable is its benign and bureaucratic tone. In that respect, it could easily have been
drawn up by ethnic Chinese functionaries working for the Republican or Communist
regimes.

A Planning Proposal for the Improvement of Hogs in Manchuria

SMR – Economic Research Body, Dept. 2, Group 3

September 1932

1) There are purported to be 8,500,000 hogs in Manchuria-Mongolia, and as an essential food of the Manchurian people there is an enormous demand. The common pig is thin and has unwholesome flesh, is late maturing, and because its growth demands a long period of time economically they are unprofitable. Improvement by crossbreeding and refining with Berkshires is planned for the development of this enterprise.

2) [Skipped]

A) Course of improvement

1) In the first phase of the plan improvement will be relatively easy. The zone along the SMR line is an important hog raising area with 6,600,000 head. In 11 years we can pursue a policy of replacing the common breed through crossbreeding.

2) The breeding males for improvement are Berkshires and superior pigs that have been crossbred two times in private production.

3) After the first phase of the plan is finished we will move to phase two. In phase two we are planning to crossbreed and improve the pigs in all of Manchuria-Mongolia. In the future this will come to 15,000,000 head.

B) Concrete methods for the first phase:

1) Setting up the stud hog place
At first we will set up two hog breeding places (the candidates are Changchun and Anshan), with a base of 50 breeding males and 10 breeding females. From there the produced pigs will be distributed to prefectural hog breeding centers and general dealers. Meanwhile, the bred males will go and mate with nearby common females.

2) Setting up the stud hog rearing centers
As for the stud hog rearing centers, in the important hog raising areas there will be a ratio of 1 center per prefecture, and within the four eastern provinces we will set up [a total of] 100 centers.
Mukden Province 45 locations
Jilin Province 21 locations
Heilongjiang Province 26 locations
Rehe Province 8 locations
3) Every year from the second year on twenty stud hog rearing centers will be established in appropriate places, advancing the course to the 6th year when it ends. The extra breeding hogs will always be distributed from hog breeding centers.

4) 種豚飼育所一箇所の基本種豚バークシャ種牡五頭牡三頭とす生産種豚は管下当業者に有償配付し一方繁殖牡は附近在来牝に余(余)勢種付を行うものとする。 At each of the stud hog rearing centers the basis will be five female Berkshires and three male Berkshires. Skilled individuals at the facilities will purchase and distribute the production stud hogs, while superior male raised hogs will be encouraged to reproduce with the local female hogs.

5) The following has the amount of expenses for the stud hog markets and stud hog rearing centers (in units of yen):

\[
\text{TABLE 23}
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Expense amount</th>
<th>Earnings amount</th>
<th>Expense deduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Breeding hog markets</td>
<td>375,400 yen</td>
<td>26,800 yen</td>
<td>348,600 yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breeding hog rearing centers</td>
<td>1,214,000 yen</td>
<td>165,200 yen</td>
<td>1,048,800 yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidy</td>
<td>885,500 yen</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>885,500 yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,474,900 yen</td>
<td>192,000 yen</td>
<td>2,282,900 yen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6) Improvement recommendations
   i. Establish hog rearing associations, hold improvement fairs, and work to encourage reform
   ii. Currently Manchuria-Mongolia hog farms suffer attacks of swine cholera, resulting in large-scale damage. We anticipate the complete prevention and pacification of this disease and expect a speedy increase in the decline of the death ratio.
   iii. The conventional male pigs will undergo mandatory castration helping to encourage the spread of the improved pigs

[What follows is from the document’s attached charts]

1) Stud Pig Farms, Stud Pig Cultivation Chart and Number of Head for Distribution
   A)
   1. Stud pig type: Berkshire
   2. Stud pig breeding use year limit: 4
      3. Adult hog yearly death ratio: 10%
      4. Adult hog yearly hog discard ratio: 10%
      5. Breeding sow yearly piglet production: 10 head
      6. Piglet cultivation ratio (to 6 months): 70%
      7. Breeding use ratio: 80%
      8. Hog/sow sex ratio: 50%

\[42\] The original Japanese is inserted here as a sample of the language of the original document.
9. Discard ratio of stud hog breeding use after four years from first year breeding use: 40%

(TABLE 24)

1) Stud Hog Farms & Hog Cultivation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year &amp; Sex</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Pigs</td>
<td>50/10</td>
<td>40/8</td>
<td>40/8</td>
<td>20/4</td>
<td>36/7</td>
<td>36/7</td>
<td>36/7</td>
<td>36/7</td>
<td>36/7</td>
<td>36/7</td>
<td>36/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production restocking pigs</td>
<td>10/2</td>
<td>10/2</td>
<td>10/2</td>
<td>30/6</td>
<td>14/3</td>
<td>16/3</td>
<td>14/3</td>
<td>22/4</td>
<td>16/3</td>
<td>16/3</td>
<td>16/3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(TABLE 25)

2) From Stud Farms to Stud Rearing Centers and Civilians: Numbers of head for distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year &amp; sex</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of pigs distributed to rearing center</td>
<td>100/60</td>
<td>100/60</td>
<td>100/60</td>
<td>100/60</td>
<td>100/60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of pigs distributed to civilians</td>
<td>30/78</td>
<td>30/78</td>
<td>30/78</td>
<td>10/74</td>
<td>26/77</td>
<td>126/137</td>
<td>126/137</td>
<td>126/137</td>
<td>118/136</td>
<td>124/137</td>
<td>124/137</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) Stud Hog Breeding Center Stud Hog Production Chart and Numbers of Head for distribution along with Each Year Distribution Numbers for Stud Hog Yards, Breeding Centers.

(TABLE 26)

B) 1) The Stud Hog Rearing Center 20 Locations’ Stud Hog Cultivation Chart

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year &amp; sex</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Pigs</td>
<td>100/60</td>
<td>80/48</td>
<td>80/48</td>
<td>40/24</td>
<td>72/43</td>
<td>72/43</td>
<td>72/43</td>
<td>56/34</td>
<td>69/41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offspring?</td>
<td>20/12</td>
<td>20/12</td>
<td>20/12</td>
<td>60/36</td>
<td>28/17</td>
<td>28/17</td>
<td>28/17</td>
<td>44/26</td>
<td>31/19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
[TABLE 27]

2) Heads for Distribution Yearly from the Hog Rearing Centers 100 Locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year &amp; sex</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heads for distribution</td>
<td>232/240</td>
<td>464/480</td>
<td>696/720</td>
<td>888/936</td>
<td>1112/1171</td>
<td>1104/1166</td>
<td>1096/1161</td>
<td>1072/1147</td>
<td>1101/1164</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[TABLE 28]

C) Heads for Distribution Yearly from Stud Farms and Rearing Centers to Civilians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year &amp; sex</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
<td>F/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Stud Farm</td>
<td>30/78</td>
<td>30/78</td>
<td>10/74</td>
<td>26/77</td>
<td>126/137</td>
<td>126/137</td>
<td>118/136</td>
<td>124/137</td>
<td>124/138</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Rearing Center</td>
<td>232/240</td>
<td>464/480</td>
<td>696/720</td>
<td>888/936</td>
<td>1112/1171</td>
<td>1104/1166</td>
<td>1096/1161</td>
<td>1072/1147</td>
<td>1101/1164</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30/78</td>
<td>262/240</td>
<td>494/706/7</td>
<td>706/7</td>
<td>914/1013</td>
<td>1238/1308</td>
<td>1230/1303</td>
<td>1214/1297</td>
<td>1196/1284</td>
<td>1225/1302</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[TABLE 29]

3) First improvement process of the common pig

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stud males</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>1,104</td>
<td>2,334</td>
<td>4,238</td>
<td>7,022</td>
<td>10,618</td>
<td>15,085</td>
<td>20,460</td>
<td>26,756</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berkshire stud males</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>1,094</td>
<td>2,273</td>
<td>4,019</td>
<td>6,438</td>
<td>9,336</td>
<td>12,623</td>
<td>16,199</td>
<td>19,960</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berkshire stud males for distr.</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>1,013</td>
<td>1,308</td>
<td>1,303</td>
<td>1,297</td>
<td>1,284</td>
<td>1,302</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Berkshire stud sows 72%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>1,209</td>
<td>2,051</td>
<td>3,192</td>
<td>4,416</td>
<td>5,706</td>
<td>7,043</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- over 3 yrs</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>1,787</td>
<td>3,079</td>
<td>4,841</td>
<td>6,910</td>
<td>9,209</td>
<td>11,615</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superior males produced from cross-breeding</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>1,282</td>
<td>2,662</td>
<td>4,261</td>
<td>6,796</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 1 time and 2 times crossbred females</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>1,458</td>
<td>2,359</td>
<td>3,551</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>1,004</td>
<td>1,902</td>
<td>3,245</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breeding sows</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>27.59</td>
<td>59.350</td>
<td>105.90</td>
<td>175.50</td>
<td>265.450</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common sows</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8.98</td>
<td>42.36</td>
<td>68.98</td>
<td>102.89</td>
<td>137.853</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 time crossbred</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>4,208</td>
<td>12.25</td>
<td>26.74</td>
<td>48.68</td>
<td>78.669</td>
<td>114.52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From common type</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>3,594</td>
<td>8,888</td>
<td>16.94</td>
<td>27.59</td>
<td>41.157</td>
<td>55.141</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- over 3 yrs</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>3,366</td>
<td>9,803</td>
<td>21.09</td>
<td>37.512</td>
<td>59.380</td>
<td>84,839</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crossbred 2 times</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>2,052</td>
<td>7,364</td>
<td>19.53</td>
<td>42.795</td>
<td>82,100</td>
<td>142,03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crossbred 1 and 2 times 40%</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>1,806</td>
<td>5,722</td>
<td>13.64</td>
<td>27,289</td>
<td>48,586</td>
<td>78,648</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- over 3 yrs</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>1,642</td>
<td>5,891</td>
<td>15,506</td>
<td>33,514</td>
<td>63,391</td>
<td>108,17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berkshires</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>1,679</td>
<td>2,849</td>
<td>4,434</td>
<td>6,133</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Berkshires for 
|                        |     |     |      |      |       |       |       |
| distribution         | 30  | 262 | 494  | 706  | 914   | 1,238 | 1,230  |
| From Berkshires      | 11  | 107 | 302  | 604  | 1,026 | 1,596 | 2,208  |
| Berkshires 36%       | 24  | 238 | 671  | 1,331| 2,170 | 3,307 | 4,523  |
| Replacement Berkshire| 30  | 1,06| 5,354| 15.98| 36.96 | 72.65 | 127,777|
| and total of crossbred sows | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Number of pigs for | 14,77| 75.85| 207.8| 439.5 | 797.53| 1,320.7| 1,996,0 |
| slaughter: Berkshires & cross-breeds (at 2 yrs old) | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |

Memorandum [TABLE 29]

1) Stud hog breeding years: 4
3) Adult hog death ration: 10%
4) Adult hog discard ratio: 10%
5) Male stud hogs per distribution female: 25 head
6) Annual production piglets per stud Berkshire sow: 9 head
   i. Production piglet male-female ratio: 50%
   ii. Ratio of sow breeding-usage candidates among the production piglets: 10%
   iii. Ratio of male breeding-usage candidates among the production piglets: 20%

43 This number is illegible in the original document.
44 Same.
iv. Rearing center (breeding time production) death & discard ratio: 20%
7) Annual number of production piglets per common and crossbred sows:
   10 head
   i. Male-female production piglets ratio: 50%
   ii. Ratio of sow breeding-usage candidates among the production piglets: 10%
   iii. More than twice crossbred superior male breeding-usage candidates: 0.3%
   iv. Rearing center (breeding time production) death & discard ratio: 20%
   v. Once crossbred males will all be used for eating
8) Stud hogs breeding 4-year 's discard ration at 2 years: 40%
9) Among the produced piglets, besides being breeding usage pigs all of them ____ [illegible]. Discard ratio of 12-month olds while being reared: 40%
4) Necessary expense estimate for the first common pig improvement centers: 2,282,920 yen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Study hog markets: 2 locations</td>
<td>Project Fee</td>
<td>56,850</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>56,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rearing centers: 100 locations</td>
<td>Project Fee</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>20,400</td>
<td>20,400</td>
<td>20,400</td>
<td>20,400</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>102,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Business Costs</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>27,800</td>
<td>55,600</td>
<td>83,400</td>
<td>111,200</td>
<td>139,000</td>
<td>139,000</td>
<td>139,000</td>
<td>139,000</td>
<td>139,000</td>
<td>1,112,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revenue Balance</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4,700</td>
<td>9,400</td>
<td>14,200</td>
<td>18,900</td>
<td>23,600</td>
<td>23,600</td>
<td>23,600</td>
<td>23,600</td>
<td>23,600</td>
<td>165,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deduction Required Amount</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>48,200</td>
<td>71,300</td>
<td>94,400</td>
<td>117,400</td>
<td>140,500</td>
<td>115,400</td>
<td>115,400</td>
<td>115,400</td>
<td>115,400</td>
<td>1,048,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Project Fee</td>
<td>56,850</td>
<td>20,400</td>
<td>20,400</td>
<td>20,400</td>
<td>20,400</td>
<td>20,400</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>158,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revenue Balance</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2,680</td>
<td>7,380</td>
<td>12,080</td>
<td>16,880</td>
<td>21,580</td>
<td>26,280</td>
<td>26,280</td>
<td>26,280</td>
<td>26,280</td>
<td>192,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deduction Required Amount</td>
<td>86,580</td>
<td>74,800</td>
<td>97,460</td>
<td>120,560</td>
<td>143,560</td>
<td>166,660</td>
<td>141,560</td>
<td>141,560</td>
<td>141,560</td>
<td>141,560</td>
<td>1,397,420</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Improvement Subsidies

| Expenses to participate in fairs (500 yen p/center) | -- | -- | 5,000 | 10,000 | 10,000 | 10,000 | 10,000 | 10,000 | 10,000 | 10,000 | 10,000 | 85,000 |

266
| Animal Disease Prevention Subsidy (2 yen p/ head) | -- | 200 | 1,400 | 3,900 | 8,100 | 14,200 | 22,900 | 33,600 | 46,200 | illegible | 77,200 | 268,500 |
| Purchasing Amount for Civilian Production of Berkshire Males (5 yen p/ head) | -- | -- | 100 | 1,100 | 3,000 | 6,000 | 10,300 | 16,000 | 22,300 | illegible | illegible | 123,000 |
| Expenses for the Leader (1 person p/ county) | -- | 10,000 | 20,000 | 30,000 | 40,000 | 50,000 | 50,000 | 50,000 | 50,000 | 50,000 | 400,000 |
| Other Subsidies | -- | -- | 1,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 9,000 |
| Total | -- | 10,200 | 27,500 | 46,000 | 62,100 | 81,200 | 94,200 | 110,600 | 129,500 | 150,500 | 173,700 | 885,500 |
| Grand Total (w/ above) | 86,580 | 85,000 | 124,960 | 166,560 | 205,660 | 247,860 | 235,760 | 252,160 | 271,060 | 292,060 | 315,260 | 2,282,920 |

4a) Note
   a) In the first year two Stud Hog Centers to be established. One center's business costs 28,425 yen; operations costs 14,865.
   b) From the second year 20 stud hog rearing centers to be established each year, to be completed in five years. Once center's business costs 1,020 yen, operations costs 1,390 yen.
   c) Expenses for participating in fairs: 500 yen per center.
   d) Animal Disease Prevention Subsidy (Swine cholera prevention per year per head is 4 yen / half the cost put up by hog raiser)
   e) Annual amount for one leader (including travel expenses) 500 yen

[The final page of the plan has been skipped]
Despite the plan’s brevity, it is quite comprehensive and detailed and would undoubtedly have served as at least a starting point for whatever subsequently transpired in the world of Manchukuo hog breeding. Moreover, to call this plan “low-level” is a bit misleading considering the scale, cost, and aims of the project. After all, it was national in scope (100 counties), was scheduled to run for eleven years and would have involved millions of yen and, in the end, millions of pigs. And not just any pig, but a kind of super-pig: A hybrid Berkshire-Manchurian pig that was to be the product of Manchukuo’s scientific, rational, and planned approach to stock farming. This was in contrast to the situation under the displaced Manchurian warlord Zhang Xueliang during which, as pointed out by a Chinese scholar in 1929, pasture land was rapidly being turned into crop land, few farms in Manchuria were engaged exclusively in stock raising, and that “... this industry is now on the wane.”

The above translation is presented not to show what actually happened from 1932-45 – a topic of future research perhaps -- but as a means of gaining insight into how the people running the Manchukuo regime approached the task of state building and planning. Further studies of subsequent documents should reveal the impact of cross-breeding common Manchurian pigs with the Berkshires, whether or not there were actual improvements in the quality and quantity of the animals as predicted, and also whether this plan managed to capture the imagination of Manchukuo’s hog producers. Whatever the real outcome was, this plan complicates received wisdom of what exactly the Japanese had set out to accomplish in the Puppet State.

45 Chu, 389. Chu also noted that of the 30 million stock animals in Manchuria about half were fowl.
Curiously, in their quest to build a better pig the Japanese in Manchukuo were in good company. In 1942 the United States offered the Chinese government a team of American technical specialists to help the Chinese in their war effort against Japan. Within this group were two farm animal specialists: Dr. Ralph Phillips of the US Department of Agriculture, and Professor Ray Johnson of Oregon State College’s animal husbandry department, both of whom spent all of 1943 in un-occupied China. Based on their findings, along with the input of another American animal breeding expert named Dr. Raymond Moyer who had worked in China between 1931 and 1942, the United States Department of State released a reference document in 1945 entitled The Livestock of China. Besides a general section on improving Chinese livestock, the animal studies carried out in this obscure but comprehensive publication examine horses, donkeys, mules, camels, cattle, water buffalo, yak, sheep, goats, chickens, ducks, geese, and swine.

The swine study section in this American document looks closely at Chinese pigs, pig breeding, types of pigs, gives various statistics, and discusses United States’ sponsored research on hog improvement. While it is unlikely that this American study was unduly influenced by similar Japanese studies from Manchukuo (though its authors were aware of Japanese hog research in Manchuria via the Japan-Manchukuo Yearbooks), the approach to the US research, and especially its conclusions about Chinese livestock are generally in accord with those of A Planning Proposal for the

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47 Ibid., 117-33.
48 Ibid, 123.
Improvement of Native Hogs in Manchuria analyzed above.\textsuperscript{49} For instance the report stated about Chinese farm animals in general:

Most of the farm livestock and poultry in China are of rather primitive, unimproved types. Some of the existing types are meeting the needs of the country reasonably well but others need to be improved in certain of their functions so that they can make greater contributions to national welfare.\textsuperscript{50}

The Americans concluded that the Chinese had three options for improving their animals:\textsuperscript{51}

1) Selection within native types.
2) Grading up with already improved types or breeds from other countries.
3) Development of new types out of animals that are graded only part of the way up to the purebred type.

The Japanese, who had been working on this problem for decades in their south Manchurian railway zone, opted for choices two and three when it came to the question of pigs. However, the issue of livestock improvement was just one of many mundane but important issues confronting the new regime in Manchuria.

**Weights & Measures**

The plan to improve pigs was a specific response to a specific problem. Many issues that the Manchukuo regime had to deal with were of a broader nature. For instance, there was the issue of establishing a national system of measurement. One of the prerogatives of regimes throughout world history has been to establish unified systems of weights and measures, and while it is arguably a beneficial act, it can also be analyzed as

\textsuperscript{49} In terms of general information, the US report is much more detailed than the Japanese one under examination, especially its examination of Chinese hog rearing practices, a topic of which the Japanese, too, had to have been aware.

\textsuperscript{50} Johnson, Phillips, Moyer, 161.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
an expression of a new regime's power and authority in determining something so basic as the standards of what an object is to weigh, how its length is to be measured, and so forth. After all, it took a revolution and the establishment of the USSR for the metric system to become the standard in Russia.\textsuperscript{52}

In the modern period virtually all countries have come along, at one point or another, to embrace the metric system, including Japan which officially went metric only in 1959 (but much earlier in the scientific community) while still simultaneously utilizing its traditional measuring units such as the \textit{shaku} 尺.\textsuperscript{53} The problem of weights and measures was not lost on the American Founding Fathers. Thomas Jefferson proposed reform of the English system that the US had inherited from the pre-revolutionary days, retaining the old names such as pound and foot, but basing them on units of ten. If enacted it would essentially have been an American metric system.\textsuperscript{54}

The Manchukuo regime, in its on-going quest to assert authority, decided to rationalize the chaotic mélange of measurement systems used in Manchuria by carrying out its own reforms in weights and measures on the national level. The intent of this section, using an early Manchukuo planning document as well as other background information, is to discuss the Manchukuo planning and reform of system of weights and measurements as a key step in the state building process.

An October 1933 \textit{Osaka Asahi Shim bun} article on Manchukuo's industrial planning of steel, weapons, electricity, aluminum, and so forth also highlighted weights

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{52} Andro Linklater, \textit{Measuring America: How an Untamed Wilderness Shaped the United States and Fulfilled the Promise of Democracy} (New York: Walker & Co., 2002), 248. Linklater mentioned that the adoption of metrication by former Spanish colonies in Central and South American states in the later 19th century symbolized "progressive credentials." 242.
\item \textsuperscript{53} "Weights and Measures," \textit{Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan}. Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan Online.
\item \textsuperscript{54} Linklater, 112.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
and measures, indicating the significance the government was placing on accurate measurements. In order to control the "haphazardness" of Manchurian weights and measures the government was promulgating a weights and measures law in January 1934, was allocating 1.5 million yen for the establishment of the Manchurian Planning Company, and was founding a "Calibration Bureau" to manufacture measuring equipment. These were clearly corrective measures, but for what? The 1941 Manchoukuo Yearbook explained the weights and measures situation in the following manner:

Generally speaking they may be classified into the Chinese, Japanese and Russian systems, the international metric, and the British "foot-pound" systems. Each has its own particular field of use, the Chinese system being employed among the Manchurians and Chinese, the Japanese among the Japanese, the Russian among the Russian population, and the metric and the foot-pound standards among those having transactions with the South Manchuria Railway Co. In order to reform this confused state of affairs, the Government, on January 25, 1934 promulgated the Weights and Measures Law, stipulating that for general transactions and for purposes of certification, the international metric system or the new "chih-chin" [chi-jin 尺斤] system should be used. In September, 1935, a measurement law was enacted to unify all weights and measures which were excluded from the Weights and Measures Law of 1934.

In order to rein in a frustrating plurality of modes of measurement, laws were passed to insure universality within Manchukuo’s borders. This standardization -- i.e., moving to the metric system and the new "chi-jin" [Wade-Giles chih-chin] (a transitional system for Chinese in Manchukuo pegged to the metric system) system -- was not simply to ensure that all of Manchukuo’s denizens would measure and weigh things in precisely

56 Manchoukuo Year Book 1941, 266.
the same way. It was also to put Manchukuo within the larger global standardized system of metrical systems. Actually, it was more progressive than that because by adopting the metric system Manchukuo was joining vanguard states such as the USSR and various western European states that were working to slough off anachronisms of pre-modernity such as illogical systems of weights and measures. In 1934, when the above-mentioned Weights and Measures Law was put into effect, a good deal of the globe, including the United States, the British Empire, and even Manchukuo’s master Japan had yet to begin benefiting from metrical systems except in limited fields such as science.

Even though the new system for weights and measures became law on January 25, 1934, the Manchukuo regime’s effort to move the country to the metric system can be traced back to at least October 1932 with the appearance of the following “top secret” document: *Manshukoku doryōko no meishō, me'i no seitei an* (A Proposal for the Formulation of the Names and Ranking of Manchukuo’s Weights and Measures (Revised)). The document’s origins go back “at least” to October 1932 since this document is notated as “revised,” suggesting that weights and measures were designated as one of the earlier elements for reform. It is fifteen pages with the table of contents, and thus was possibly designed as a quick reference for those involved with planning. Yet brevity in this case did not mean lack of completeness, and beyond such basics as distance, weight, length and volume are the new units of power, temperature and pressure.

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57 Minami manshū tetsudō keizai chōsakai daiyonbu, *Manshukoku doryōko no meishō, me'i no seitei an (saiitei)* 満洲國度量衡の名稱、命位の制定案（再訂） (Dairen: Minami Manshū Tetsudō Keizai Chōsakai Daiyonbu, 1932).
The following chart that shows eight different weights and measures systems being used simultaneously at the time of Manchukuo’s inception:

### TABLE 31

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Length</td>
<td>1 micro</td>
<td>0.03000</td>
<td>0.03125</td>
<td>0.03300</td>
<td>0.00004 in.</td>
<td>0.00004 in.</td>
<td>0.00394</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 mm</td>
<td>3.00000</td>
<td>3.12500</td>
<td>3.30000</td>
<td>0.03937 in.</td>
<td>0.03937 in.</td>
<td>3.39701</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 cm</td>
<td>3.00000</td>
<td>3.12500</td>
<td>3.30000</td>
<td>0.39370 in.</td>
<td>0.39370 in.</td>
<td>3.93701</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 dm</td>
<td>3.00000</td>
<td>3.12500</td>
<td>3.30000</td>
<td>3.93701 in.</td>
<td>3.93701 in.</td>
<td>3.87871</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 m</td>
<td>3,000 chi or 2 li</td>
<td>3,125 shaku or 1.7361 li</td>
<td>3,300 shaku or 9.16667 cho</td>
<td>3,093.61330 yd or 1.09361 yd</td>
<td>0.62137 mile</td>
<td>621.37 mile</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 km</td>
<td>3,000 chi or 2 li</td>
<td>3,125 shaku or 1.7361 li</td>
<td>3,300 shaku or 9.16667 cho</td>
<td>3,093.61330 yd or 1.09361 yd</td>
<td>0.62137 mile</td>
<td>621.37 mile</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>1 Are</td>
<td>900 sq chi</td>
<td>1 chen</td>
<td>976.5250 sq chi</td>
<td>1.09361 sq yd</td>
<td>119.59900 sq yd</td>
<td>21.96715 sq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 fen</td>
<td>100 sq chi</td>
<td>1 fen</td>
<td>106.2760 fen</td>
<td>1.09361 sq yd</td>
<td>119.59900 sq yd</td>
<td>21.96715 sq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 tian</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1 tian</td>
<td>16.27604</td>
<td>1.09361 sq yd</td>
<td>119.59900 sq yd</td>
<td>21.96715 sq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100 are</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100 are</td>
<td>16.27604</td>
<td>1.09361 sq yd</td>
<td>119.59900 sq yd</td>
<td>21.96715 sq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volume</td>
<td>1 ml</td>
<td>0.96574</td>
<td>0.55435</td>
<td>0.26417 gal</td>
<td>0.00704 gal</td>
<td>0.03381 oz</td>
<td>0.00813</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 dl</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.96574</td>
<td>0.55435</td>
<td>0.70392 gal</td>
<td>0.08130</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 l</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.96574</td>
<td>0.55435</td>
<td>2.1998 gal</td>
<td>0.81305</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 dkl</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.65744</td>
<td>0.55435</td>
<td>27.4969 gal</td>
<td>0.9153</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 kl</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.65744</td>
<td>0.55435</td>
<td>27.4969 gal</td>
<td>0.9153</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight</td>
<td>1 mg</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.26667</td>
<td>0.01543</td>
<td>0.00704 gal</td>
<td>0.00813</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 g</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.67556</td>
<td>15.43210</td>
<td>15.43236</td>
<td>22.50481</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 kg</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>266.66667</td>
<td>2.20459 lb</td>
<td>2.20462 lb</td>
<td>2.44193</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 ton</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2.20454 lb</td>
<td>0.98419 ton</td>
<td>0.98419 ton</td>
<td>61.04821 pud or 1.01747 ton</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regardless of who happened to be in control of Manchuria there was an unambiguous need for some sort of rationalization of weights and measures. Equally important, one could argue, was the politics behind this action, something that many new regimes in the nineteenth and twentieth century also carried out. The Manchukuo government was attempting, through documents such as A Proposal for the Formulation of the Names and

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58 Minami manshū tetsudō keizai chōsakai daisanbu, Manshu ni okeru jidōsha kōtsū jigyō ni tsuite 満洲における自動車交通事業に就て(About the Automobile Transportation Enterprise in Manchuria) (Dairen: Minami Manshū Tetsudō Keizai Chōsakai Daisanbu, 1934), 978-91.

59 China apparently adopted the metric system in the early 1920s, but that decision does not seem to have penetrated deeply into Manchuria.
to establish itself as the sole arbiter of measurement standards within the confines of Manchukuo’s borders. While metric was not a new system, it would likely have been new to many people living in Manchukuo. As for the chi-jin system, it was designed for the majority Chinese population in Manchukuo as a transitional measuring system that kept old measurement names and characters but was pegged to the metric system as can be seen in the above chart. It was a system that provided continuity from the old world to the new. In that sense the thinking behind chi-jin system is almost identical to Thomas Jefferson’s ideas about improving America’s weights and measures by simply rationalizing and decimalizing the existing chaotic British system. Overall, the proposed and enacted transition from eight different systems to two was a crucial step in the Manchukuo state-building process.

The following is a partial translation of *A Proposal for the Formulation of the Names and Ranking of Manchukuo’s Weights and Measures*. The document addresses certain aspects of the task of dealing with the standardization of weights and measures, and how the Japanese intended to approach it. It also charts precisely what the names and characters (all the metric characters such as “kilometer,” “hectoliter,” “milligram” were Japanese additions to kanji lexicon) would be in the puppet state.
A Proposal (Plan) for a System of Names, Order, and Rank of Manchukuo’s Weights and Measures

Table of Contents

Section 1  The Reason for Enactment of Names, Order and Rank
Section 2  Chi-jin System Weights and Measures Names, Order and Rank
Section 3  Metric System Weights and Measures Names, Order and Rank
Section 4  Measuring Land and Liquids, and also the Names, Order, and Rank of Special Case Measurements
Section 5  Metric System Weights and Measure Universal Names and their Abbreviated [Kanji] Form
Section 6  Temperature, Density, Pressure, Power, and other Units of Measurement for Conditions and Efficiency
Section 7  The Abbreviated Forms [Kanji] of the Measurement Names which were established as a rule in Section 6

Section 1
1) The chi-jin system names charted with the customarily commonly used characters
2) We are following the universal usage of the metric system names, order and rank. Commonly in China regarding the names for the metric system, for expediency’s sake the conventional characters chi (J: shaku) 尺, jin (J: kin) 坤, and sheng (J: shō) 升 have been used by writing the character “chi” for meter, but pronouncing it as “meter.” As a way to ease the confusion with the chi-jin system names, preferably phonetic characters would be used with the identical language and pronunciation as in the Japanese Empire. However, the Japanese Empire’s official script is expressed in katakana, and since katakana is not used in Manchukuo, simplified kanji should be used as the official script.60 Because these many characters are commonly used in the Japanese Empire, for expediency should be used for the purpose of controlling communications and for convenience.

[The following is a simple description of each section’s contents]

Section 2
[li 6]]

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60 Katakana is one of the two Japanese syllabaries, usually used for writing foreign loan-words. The meaning of “simplified characters” in this case are the Japanese-created metric characters, examples of which are provided on page 268.
Section 3
[list of metric measurement characters for weight, amount, surface, and length, Japanese readings in katakana, and the component value (mostly) in meters]

Section 4
[list of metric characters land area, ocean area, liquids, tonnage, and carats, plus the metric component value]

Section 5
[list of characters, universal metric spellings, and universal abbreviations]

Section 6
[list and explanation of terms for temperature, density, pressure, power, and other units of measurement for conditions and efficiency: i.e., mega-dyne\textsuperscript{61}, bar (a unit of pressure equal to 100,000 pascals), joule, kilowatt, and then their unit variations with the metric prefixes]

The contents of this concise document are, like those of the hog breeding plan, indicative of the kind of intricate tasks that the Japanese took on quickly during the establishment of Manchukuo. It is also obvious that the rationalization of weights and measures was indeed rational. Moreover, the changeover to metric was the prerogative of the new regime during the transitional period of 1932-33, just as France moved to the metric system after the French Revolution, and a new system of weights and measures was set up in China under the Qin more than two millennia ago. Notably, unlike countries that use alphabets, Manchukuo planners had the added burden of overcoming not just long-standing norms for weights and measures, but also a long-standing written system of symbols (Chinese characters) that corresponded to the weights and measures that the progressive Japanese hoped to bring up to the same standards as other modern states.

\textsuperscript{61} According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, a dyne is “the unit of force in the centimeter-gram-second system equal to the force that would give a free mass of one gram an acceleration of one centimeter per second per second.”
Dairy Farming Plan

A unified system of weights and measures would have been useful and necessary for the smooth operation of the Puppet State, but more pressing was the creation of wealth and the transplanting of Japanese farmers to Manchurian soil. This is where it is possible to return more closely to the better understood Manchukuo narrative. That is, if hog breeding was implemented to benefit the average Chinese person, and rationalizing weights and measures was progressive and served everyone regardless of ethnicity, many other Manchukuo state building projects were baldly designed to serve the purposes of the Japanese Empire.  

One dimension of this self-serving aspect of Manchukuo was the planned settlement of large numbers of Japanese farmers described previously. It is true that the plan to settle five million Japanese colonists in Manchukuo never came to fruition. However, a couple of hundred thousand farmers heeded the call, laying the spade in both virgin soil and already settled lands that had been cleared of their Chinese inhabitants by the Kwantung Army. But what were the Japanese immigrants to do after arriving in Manchuria?

Before the Manchukuo period Manchuria was best known for its soybeans, an agricultural success story from most perspectives. But many things grew abundantly in Manchuria’s alluvial soil resulting in prewar Manchuria becoming an export cash cow, as it were, for an otherwise distressingly poor China. Cows, too, were part of the equation,

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62 Gregory Guelcher wrote of the agricultural colonists and planning in his dissertation “The Japanese Agricultural Colonization of Manchuria, 1931-1945” (University of Iowa, 1999). His account reveals the general callousness of the planners toward both the Japanese being thrown into Manchuria, and the Chinese who already lived there. This section of the chapter, however, is written purely with the intent of examining the specific contents of one particular plan.

63 It is estimated that approximately 18% of the land settled by Japanese had been previously settled by Chinese or Koreans. Louise Young, 401. The remaining 82% was presumably newly opened land.

64 Chu, 399.
thriving in various parts of China. In fact, before Japan’s subsequent 1937 invasion of northern China, dairy cattle in particular were becoming increasing common there, especially in the coastal cities. Moreover, the prewar Chinese had been actively importing cows, most of which were of one dairy type or another. As a result, a thriving modern dairy industry appears to have been developing in China’s coastal cities, and also inland to a certain extent. Unfortunately, dairies were targeted for destruction or confiscation by the occupying Japanese army, stunting the nascent industry’s growth in China proper.

In Manchuria it is not as clear what role ethnic Chinese played in the dairy industry, although there was a cattle population of 1,269,414 in the Three Eastern Provinces in 1926. According to the Manchoukuo Year Book milk was not traditionally part of the Chinese diet, and so the “native” Manchurian milk production, using native cows, was carried out by Mongols. It is unlikely that this was an “industry” in any meaningful way. As a result, the Japanese, who had been manufacturing dairy products since the Meiji Restoration, were able to transfer the knowledge of that industry into the SMR railway zone in southern Manchuria during the first decades of the 20th century in order to cater to the Japanese living there.

Nevertheless, dairy farming was a fairly new industry in Japan where it did not exactly take off. By 1911 there were only 55,741 dairy cows in the entire country. By the mid 1930s, however, these numbers had tripled, indicating both the spread of the

65 Phillips, 56.
66 Ibid, 58. Holsteins were the most common, but Guernseys, Jerseys, and Ayrshires were also imported.
67 Ibid.
68 Chu, 390.
69 Manchoukuo Year Book 1941, 454.
70 Ibid.
industry within Japan and an increased acceptance of dairy products in the Japanese
diet. One aspect of this growth of the industry was the opening of dairy farms in
Hokkaido in the mid to late 1920s, a process encouraged by the Hokkaido government.\(^\text{72}\)

Japanese planners combined the general success of cattle rearing in southern
Manchuria with knowledge gained about dairy farming in Hokkaido (and more than
likely also took into consideration that kind of farming as a potential for national wealth
creation), conceiving of a scheme to populate sections of northern Manchuria with a
series of dairy farming and stock breeding cooperative settlements. Below is a partial
translation of a “secret” document from July 1, 1937 entitled Hokuman takushoku
keikaku shiryō sono ni (Northern Manchuria Colonization Plan Materials no. 2: A Plan to
Set Up Immigrant Dairy Farms and Stock Breeding in Hokkaido), followed by analysis
of a dairy farm planning document specific to Manchukuo that came out in October
1937.\(^\text{73}\) Of these two plans, the initial one on Hokkaido was largely a reprint.
Manchukuo planners had concluded that it would be appropriate for Manchukuo to
emulate the successful implementation of Hokkaido’s dairy farms since that island had
conditions similar to northern Manchuria.

\(^{72}\) Ibid.

Planning Paper no. 2 on Northern Manchuria Colonization

A Planning Document for Setting Up Immigrant Stock and Dairy Farms in Northern Manchuria

1937

Foreword

Corresponding to the practice of the comprehensive draft of the Northern Manchuria Colonization Plan, it is necessary here to study our Hokkaido agricultural developmental process.

This volume deals with a group of dairy farming villages centered on Hokkaido’s Takigawa Village in Ishikarinokuni Sorachigun and the newly opened settlement in the volcanic soil lands of Anpei Village in Tanbutsunokuni. A planning document for colonization of the place in question is currently being drafted. Since the system has something in common with the Northern Manchuria Special Zone Development Plan we will excerpt it as a reference.

Contents

A) Stock breeding management scheme
B) Management Plan
  1) Land
  2) Buildings
  3) Animals
  4) Farm tools
  5) Fertilizer
  6) Livestock feed
  7) Breakdown costs
  8) Taxes
  9) Summary chart of capital
 10) Stock breeding income
 11) Increasing income
 12) Expenditures
 13) Closing balance
C) Deciding on the number of head of cattle
D) Crop allotment and rotation

74 Archaic name. Located on Hokkaido’s Ishikari Plain east of Sapporo.
E) Rotation methods and fertilizer
F) Methods of crop cultivation and seeding

Page 3

- Mode of management: Stock dairy farm management
- Management organization: As a cooperative association
- Association membership number: 25 (with a plan to accommodate 30 households), with family members numbering 174, and among them 110 workers
- Size of land: About 1000 "chōbu" 町歩 (the planned area for one household is 30 "chōbu")
  - Field land area presently used is 470.3
  - wilds 16.5 "chōbu
  - pasture land 274.9 "chōbu
  - Total is 860.2
- Number of breeding livestock
  -- Cattle 164 head (6.5 p/ household)
  -- Calves 94 head (3.8 p/ household)
  -- Total 258 head (10.3 p/ household)
  -- Plow horses 61 head (2.4 p/ household)
  -- Colts 26 head (1 p/ household)
  -- Total 87 head (3.4 p/ household)
  -- Sheep 21 head (0.8 p/ household)
  -- Hogs 41 head (1.6 p/ household)
  -- Chickens 601 (24 p/ household)
- Land 30 "Chōbutan" 町歩 at 7 yen 76 2100 yen
- Building cost 4875 yen
- Livestock cost
  -- Horses 2 head, 200 yen each 400 yen
  -- Cattle
    -- Milking cows 10 head, 350 yen each 3500 yen
    -- Males & candidate cows 10 head, 150 yen each 1500 yen
  -- Total [livestock costs] 5400 yen
- Farm implements cost:
  Expensive heavy items for Communal use and simple things: 600 yen

Things that should be used jointly by the entire group:

---

75 One "chōbu" = 2.45 acres
76 The original document says seven yen, but this must be a typo for 70 yen since the total cost for land is 2100 yen.
-- Tractor (5000 yen Kuretorakku クレトラック ① for 40 homes) recommended by the Agriculture & Forestry Ministry (25 hp) new cultivation plow
-- Fire fighting pump (gasoline), communal for 40 homes 3800 yen

Things that should be used jointly by four households:
-- Seed cow 2
  -- 5 hp engine (Yanmar) 1 6700 yen
  -- Silage cutter 1 720 yen
  -- Feed grinder 1 170 yen
  -- New cultivation plow 1 35 yen
  -- Drill 1 690 yen
  -- Reaper 1 405 yen
  -- Mower -- 280 yen

(other farm implements are being researched at the Kushiro [region in Hokkaido] Farming Test Ctr)

Thereafter the document moves into a detailed explanation about how the plan would work in Hokkaido’s special conditions.

The above document is interesting for various reasons. For instance, it reveals the link between the Japanese colonization experience in Hokkaido, and how that knowledge was theoretically applied to the situation in northern Manchuria. Though localized, it is comparable to the Manchukuo hog breeding plan in terms of specific details even down to percentage points and precise amounts of yen. These were the kinds of details that would ensure that the plan got off the ground with as little friction as possible.

On the other hand, this plan is vague in its lack of detail regarding where exactly in “northern Manchuria” the dairy and stock breeding farms were to be located, and what kind of results might be expected once in operation. However, the document’s foreword

77 This is the transliteration for “Cletrac,” or Cleveland Tractor Company, which produced small tractors/crawlers for farm and other uses from the 1910s to the mid-1940s.
Figure 83 Location of Nenjiang and Nahe Counties. Map by author.

states that a northern Manchuria colonization planned was being drafted, more than likely a reference to another SMR-NMR Economic Research Center document with the title *Tokushoku chitai takushoku keikaku an (sono shi) gyūnyū o omo to suru rakunō*
The Special Area Colonization Plan (No. 4) came out on October 22, 1937, three months after the Hokkaido-Manchuria study appeared. The “Special Area” in northern Manchuria for colonization was “in particular” the region of Nenjiang County and Nahe County [Figure 83]. These were the second and third main train stops almost due north from Qiqihar on a rail line that paralleled the Nen River leading into northernmost Manchuria. It was a mountainous, forested, and undeveloped section of the country between the old Russian-built North Manchuria Railway line and the Amur River.

The dairy farm plan for Nenjiang and Nahe is more detailed and longer than the original Hokkaido plan. The planners did not use the traditional Japanese land measurements (chōbu, etc), opting for metric instead. Information about the number of animals per family, families per tractor (30), hectares per thirty households (42.5), and so forth is similar to the above. Different, however, are the charts in this document that graphically explain how the system was designed to work when implemented. For instance, the following is a chart on the area of land needed per animal:

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78 Hokuman keizai chōsajo, Tokushoku chitai takushoku keikaku an (sono shi) gyunyu wo omo to suru rakunō shuchiku imin settei keikaku an 特殊地域殖產計画案(其四) 聖沃主 Toslo Laptop 農進殖移民設定計画案 (Harbin: Hokuman Keizai Chōsajo, October 1937).
79 Ibid., foreword.
80 This document also made use of a Russian weight measurement called a “pud” (or “pood” / 1 pud = about 36 lbs, or 16.3 kg) interchanging it with kilograms. This, along with the planned used of “improved” Russian cattle for breeding, suggests that there may have been some Russian colonial planning elements used in preparation for this document. However, this is not mentioned in the document, so is only conjecture.
81 Ibid, 5.
As with the Hog breeding plan, a number of assumptions are made by the planners, and in some ways it is this unswerving focus on optimum conditions and specific percentage points that is so much a part of Manchukuo planning. Of course modern, rational, and scientifically handled agriculture must rely on precision in order to function properly, so the figures in this document were presumably accurate. The document also claims that these numbers are for farms in the Nenjiang and Nahe region, and that those in other areas would probably need more land for a similar operation.  

Throughout the document are more numbers: proper amounts and types of feed, appropriate acreage for vegetables, beans, and grains to be grown, etc, and the farm construction process itself was broken down by year. For the first year of operation various items were listed, most of which were necessary to get the farmers moving along in their business as expeditiously as possible. Farm buildings, for example, were accounted for down to the last yen per household (1,584 yen).  

TABLE 33

- Farmhouse: 45 sq. meters at 13.33 yen p/ sq. meter = 600 yen
- Storehouse: 27 sq. meters at 4.44 yen p/ sq. meter = 120 yen
- Barn for 2 horses, 5 cows, and 13 calves: 81 sq. meters at 4.44 yen p/ sq. m = 360 yen
- Barn: 45 sq. meters = 200 yen
- Pig pen for 1 female hog, 7 juveniles, and 7 piglets = 160 yen
- Fence for premises: 84 meters = 120 yen

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82 Ibid.
83 Ibid, 16-17.
Well for 10 houses: 24 yen p/household

Livestock prices were included, totaling 540 yen:\(^8^4\):
- 2 horses: 300 yen
- 1 milk cow: 200 yen
- 1 stud bull for 30 households: (1200 yen) 40 yen p/household

Tractors and other farm implements, as well as the fuel, oil, and everything else to keep those items operating was assessed at 6,804 yen, similar to the Hokkaido plan. The human element was also taken into consideration as the planners determined what it would cost for a family of five to live for a year with such essentials as flour (1,024 kg = 192 yen), salt and soap (7 yen), tea (9.6 yen), vegetable oil (9 yen), kerosene (1 can = 9 yen), and medicine (2 yen). Grand total: 302.1 yen. Overall, for everything each family would need 3,172 yen, and the entire 30 family collective unit would need 95,189 yen.\(^8^5\)

The document’s planners also detailed what the costs would be for the second year of operations. Livestock in year two equaled 1,020 yen per household:

**TABLE 34**

- Four improved Russian breeding cows: 800 yen
- Four more stud bulls to be used by 30 households: (4,800 yen at 1,200 yen each) 160 yen
- One common female breeding hog: 50 yen
- One stud male hog for 30 households: (300 yen) 10 yen

The costs for tools for the second year were planned at 526.65 yen:\(^8^6\)

- One horse cart: 70 yen
- One seedling planter (*shōbanki* 播種機) for six households: (577.5 yen) 96.25 yen
- One harvester (*gaikaki* 幹機) for six households: (612.5 yen) 102.08 yen
- One concentrating (polish & select) machine (*seisenki* 精選機) for 15 households: (100 yen) 6.66 yen

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\(^8^4\) Ibid, 17.
\(^8^5\) Ibid, 20.
\(^8^6\) Ibid, 21-22.
One hand-operated mound/bank making machine (teoshishiki moritsuchiki 手押式盛土機): 30 yen
One “pound the husks machine” (yōdakakuki 用打穀機 [direct translation of the characters]) for 30 households: (6,650 yen) 231.66

The way in which the Japanese dairy farmers were eventually going to make money was very important, thus planners also took the business end of the farms into account. For the grains the farmers would be growing on their land there was to be a 45.5 square meter flour milling factory shared by the thirty families billed at 26.66 yen per household. The buildings to house the five stud bulls and one stud hog for thirty families was priced at 8.89 yen per household, and a butter and cheese factory, an underground cellar, an ice room, and housing for the factory hands and laborers came to 59.33 yen per household. 87

Besides the dairy, the immigrant farmers were expected to grow crops which they would both eat and sell on the market. Three hectares 88 of land was to be planted with wheat which would result in 3,360 kilograms of grain. 1,600 kg of that would go to the communal mill, 480 kg would be saved for seed, and the remaining 1,280 kg was for the open market. There was a similar plan for potatoes (.5 hectares, 9,600 kg production, 2,400 kg of which was for the farm families and 7,200 was for livestock feed), onions (2.5 hectares, 4,800 kg production, 100 kg for seed, 4,720 kg remaining with usage not specified), barley (1 hectare, 1,440 kg production, two-thirds to be milled, about 9% for seed, and the remaining 352 kg for animal feed), and last but not least Manchuria’s most

87 Ibid, 22-23.
88 One hectare equals about 2.5 acres.
famous crop: soybeans (3 hectares, 3,840 kg production, 192 kg for seed, 3,648 kg
remaining for sale on the market)\textsuperscript{89}.

Along with growing crops, the planners were counting on profits from selling
butter and fresh milk, although during the first couple of years dairy production would be
for farm consumption only. Money would also be made by selling piglets. The following
chart projected the expected earnings over a six year period:

\textbf{TABLE 35}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revenue Items</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>Year 4</th>
<th>Year 5</th>
<th>Year 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crops</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>77.52 yen</td>
<td>77.52 yen</td>
<td>77.52 yen</td>
<td>77.52 yen</td>
<td>77.52 yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butter</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>132.90 yen</td>
<td>265.95 yen</td>
<td>265.95 yen</td>
<td>265.95 yen</td>
<td>265.95 yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hog Raising</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>35 yen</td>
<td>235 yen</td>
<td>235 yen</td>
<td>235 yen</td>
<td>235 yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>225 yen</td>
<td>150 yen</td>
<td>250 yen</td>
<td>250 yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>245.42 yen</td>
<td>578.47 yen</td>
<td>803.47 yen</td>
<td>728.47 yen</td>
<td>828.47 yen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Year one was for settling down in the new environment, getting structures built, and
initiating farm operations. Year two, the planners promised, would see the yen (they did
not bother converting to the Manchukuo currency, the Yuan) start pouring in, and then
year after year, except for a slight dip in year five, that revenue would continue to
increase. That in turn would create stability in the region, and the state would further
benefit from taxes.

What these documents are describing is a collective farm, providing another
connection between Manchukuo and Soviet planning, although profit was a distinct
element of the Japanese plan. The collective farm principle was logical from the Japanese
perspective not only as a way to keep costs down by having the thirty communal families
share a tractor or five stud bulls, but was also a way to provide collective security in an

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid, 28-30.
isolated, cold, and potentially hostile environment. It might even be the case that this was the only reasonable way for the Manchukuo planners to approach the issue of transplanting Japanese farmers to Manchurian soil.

Whether or not this is exactly how Japanese farm “pioneers” were settled in Manchukuo, and whether the plan was ever brought to fruition are two questions beyond the scope of this dissertation. As with the other plans examined above, the point here is simply to analyze the planning in and of itself in order to glean insights into Japanese thinking about Manchukuo, to see the concrete results of Manchurian knowledge production, and to see where their state building project was headed. Because this section’s documents are so specific it is easy to understand what outcome was desired for the dairy farms and their farmers. That very rigidity, though, could easily have had its drawbacks, and the lack of flexibility in the plan raises the question of how much leeway the hapless settler-farmers from rural Japan would have had in determining their own destiny. That seems not to have been a concern of the planners. Where the Manchukuo planners excelled was at predicting the future as brightly as possible, and then implementing that future.

1941 Investigation Planning Chart

To this point a bit of the mindset of Manchukuo’s planners -- and the role that planning played in the state building process -- has been shown through the translation or partial translation and analysis of four select Manchukuo planning documents. These

90 The location of the dairy farms continued to be of interest to researchers into the 1940s, with one Manchukuo study examining farm mechanization in Nenjiang and Nahe counties. See Mantetsu chōsajo, Shōwa jūrokunendo chōsa keikaku 昭和十六年度調査計画(Hsinking: Mantetsu Chōsajo, 1941), 6.  
91 For more on the fate of the Japanese immigrant farmers see Young, Japan’s Total Empire, ch. 7-9.
plans were part of a complex *pre-planning* and research process developed out of the massive and ever-growing information stockpile which the Manchukuo researchers were constantly compiling and refining. How the system of research plan development worked can be seen in certain Manchukuo documents such as *Shōwa jūrokunendo chōsa keikaku* (A Plan of Surveys for 1941) assembled by the Hsinking branch office of the SMR’s Research Department. 92 This handwritten and straightforward document is essentially a detailed database of completed research plans, as well as research plans scheduled for the coming year. In total the document lists forty-four projects of various sorts, in different stages of production, each with brief but rather detailed information on the following topics:

1) Research Topic  
2) Object [area] of the Research  
3) Research Schedule  
   Actual Research Period  
   Document Completion Time  
4) Charge  
   The Person(s) in Charge  
   Cooperative Relations [outside organizations]  
5) Shape of the Report  
   Treatment [i.e.; regular, secret, top secret]  
   Amount of Copies  
   Publication Method  

The information provided for each study was enough to chart progress, follow who was responsible for execution, and find out how broadly the completed document was to be disseminated. Most of the studies were of a short duration and had been completed by December 1941, although some of the more involved plans were scheduled to run well into 1942. The studies were generally handled by one to three people -- all Japanese by

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92 Ibid.
the look of the names – with the close assistance of various “Cooperative Relations” such as the *Kaitaku sōkyoku* 開拓総局 (General Directorate of [land] Reclamation), the *Hokkei* 北経 (presumably an abbreviation for Hokkei chōsa: North Manchuria Economic Research Institute), and *Mantaku* 漯拓 (Manshū takushoku kōsha). A few of the materials also included Japan and Korea as their “object,” but for most of this batch of forty-four studies and plans the research and planning locations were generally located in Manchukuo.

Among the studies, some dealt with Manchukuo in its entirety, while others focused on just the south or the north. Others dealt with a couple of provinces, a single province, multiple counties, or a combination of counties and villages. Overall the subjects for research and planning were fairly narrow with an emphasis on aspects of agriculture and industry. Regarding “treatment” (that is, the document’s sensitivity status), twenty-one of the forty-four studies are “regular,” which suggests that their readership was not tightly controlled. Eleven were stamped “secret,” and seven were labeled “top secret.” The “treatment” for a couple of the studies was not noted. Most of the “top secret” documents were on industrial topics, while the “regular” and “secret” ones primarily dealt with agriculture. Below are the entries found in the 1941 *Investigation Plan* document.

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93 Mantaku was a “... quasi-public colonial development company ... Modeled on the original conception of the Oriental Development Company in Korea.” Louise Young, 356.
A Plan of Surveys for 1941

TABLE 36

1) Basic Investigation about the Configuration and Setup of Superior Private Farms by Region

2) Research about the Desolation and Productivity of Agricultural Land Development

3) Investigation about the Advancement of Wet Rice Crop Technology

4) Investigation about Stockbreeding Management in the Farming Belt

5) Investigation about Man-made Forests in Manchuria

6) Investigation about the Advancement of Large River and Lake Aquaculture Production Technology

7) Investigation of Pasture Vegetation

8) Investigation about the Source of Supply of Livestock Feed in Cities

9) Investigation of the Possession of Large Landed Estates

10) Investigation of Wealthy Farmer Management Characteristics

11) Investigation of Japanese Pioneer Characteristics

12) Investigation of Seasonal Labor

13) Investigation into the Commodification of Farm Produce

14) Investigation of the Role of Cooperative Societies in Agricultural Modernization

15) Analysis of Farming Business Management

16) Focusing on Scale of Operation in Farm Management, Transition and Direction

17) Investigation of Farm Debt in Farming Villages in the Vicinity of Cities

18) Investigation about the Equal Division of Inheritance
19) Investigation of Tenant Disputes in the Central Manchuria Special Zone 中満特殊地域における小作紛争の調査 SECRET
20) 開拓農地法制定の過程内容及影響 SECRET
21) Research on Village Community Structure in Manchuria, especially its Dismantling Process 満州に於ける村落共同体の機構調査、特にその解体過程

22) Investigation about the Advancement of Regional Agricultural Management 地域的農業経営高度化に関する調査
23) Investigation about Farm Mechanization in Northern Manchuria 北満に於ける農業機械化に関する調査
24) Investigation of Manchu Farm Management 満人農家経営調査
25) Investigation of the Farm Management Style of Japanese in Manchuria 在満邦人営農様式調査
26) Investigation of Management of Dairy Farms in Japanese Settlements 邦人開拓に於ける酪農経営調査

27) Investigation of Farm Economics and Agricultural Management among Mongol Farmers 蒙古人農家の農業経営及び農業経済調査
28) Investigation of Camels 腓駝調査
29) Investigation about the Supply and Amount of Agricultural Production 農産物生産及び出荷量に関する調査
30) Investigation of the Pricing Structure of Agricultural Products 農産物価格構成調査
31) Investigation of the Number and Quantity of Farm Products 農産物加工数量調査
32) Investigation of the Quantity of Farm Product Stock at Peak Season’s End 農産物旬末在荷数量調査

33) Investigation about the Terms and Conditions of the Expansion and Reorganization of the Manchurian Steel Industry 満洲製鉄業の再編拡充の諸条件に関する調査 TOP SECRET
34) Investigation about the Terms and Conditions of Reorganization in the Manchurian Coal Mining Industry 満洲採炭業に於ける再編成の諸条件に関する調査 TOP SECRET

35) Investigation about the Terms and Conditions of the Expansion and Reorganization of the Acid-Alkali Industry in Manchuria 満洲に於ける酸アルカリ工業の再編拡充の諸条件に関する調査 TOP SECRET
36) Investigation about the Terms and Conditions of the Expansion and Reorganization of Allied Industries with a Focus on Heavy Industries and the Heavy Chemical Industry
This list is fairly self-explanatory, and would make a fine departure point for later studies about Manchukuo research and planning, especially if more Investigation Plan documents such as this one are unearthed. Also of note is that it shows the spectrum of activities in which the planners and researchers were engaged, from labor and land issues, to steel, chemical, and farming projects.94

94 John Young’s The Research Activities of the South Manchurian Railway Co. is an annotated bibliography of the massive SMR research archive obtained by the US in the wake of WWII, and is the best place to start
An Investigation Related to Camels

Many of the forty-four studies and plans scheduled for execution and completion by the Hsinking Research Section during the period of late 1941 through early 1942 are stated to have been completed. Fortunately an extant copy exists of the completed investigation of topic number twenty-eight (Investigation of Camels, Rakuda chōsa 駱駝調查), but with the slightly altered title of Rakuda ni kan suru chōsa (Investigation Related to Camels). It would be useful to contrast the SMR’s plan for the research and what actually was produced. The following is the information given for the camel study mentioned above in A Plan of Surveys for 1941:

**Research Topic:** An Investigation of Camels

**Research Items:**
1) Mobility and distribution
2) Relation to trade
3) Ability
4) Breeding/rearing management and relation to transport

**Object (area) of Research:** Xing’an South Province, Xing’an West Province, Rehe Province

**Research Schedule:**
- Actual Research Period:
  - November, Xing’an South & Jehol
  - January, Xing’an West
- Document Completion Time: End of March 1942

**Charge**
- The Persons in Charge [first names not provided]:
  - Staff Member Nishio
  - Junior Clerk Takahashi
  - Assistant Satō
- Cooperative Relations: [none]

**Shape of the Report**
- Treatment: Regular
- Amount of Copies: 200
- Publication Method: Typography

In order to understand the scope of the greater Manchukuo research and planning project. The document examined here is more useful for the details it provides about the process of producing those studies, who was involved, when they were carried out, and their relationship to other studies.

Hokkei chōsajo, Rakuda ni kan suru chōsa 駱駝に関する調査 (Harbin: Hokkei Chōsajo, July 1941).
The completed product was entitled *Research Related to Camels*, which when typed and mimeographed came to twenty-nine pages including the cover, table of contents, and photographs. It appeared under the auspices of the Hokkei Chōsajo (North Manchuria Economic Research Institute), labeled as “special number 35.” *A Planning Survey for 1941* called for the camel study to be a “regular” document, but the completed study was stamped “secret.”

The one-page foreword is by staff member Nishio Shinroku whose name was listed in *A Planning Survey for 1941* along with two other researchers whose names do not appear in the completed document. Nishio appears to have become the Research Department’s camel expert, and it might be interesting to see what this led to in his later career, both during the Manchukuo period and after. He wrote the foreword on June 30, 1941, and the following is a translation of the investigation’s purpose:

This study was planned in order to investigate the economic value of camels in the Manchuria Special Zone. This volume, as forecasted, surveyed the usage conditions as well as breeding/rearing management of camels in the Xing’an North Province during the winter of 1940. The results of the survey in the target region show a trend toward the gradual decline in the use of camels since the cutting off of all communications with the Outer Mongolia region. [In fact] the main Mongolian camel owners leave them in pasture throughout the year without even thinking of utilizing them. Recently Russians living along the railroad have recognized the superiority of this kind of draft animal, so again the tendency towards their use has appeared.

This year we plan to advance research related to usage conditions along with breeding/rearing management methods, capability, as well as economic value, broadening our research to other parts of Manchuria and into northern China’s Menchiang region.

PREPARED, North Manchuria Economic Research Institute
Nishio Shinroku
June 30, 1941
In many respects this is an example of Manchukuo planning and thinking in its rawest and purest form. Although just the foreword, we get a bit of background on the situation, Nishio’s (and naturally Manchukuo’s) sense of problem, and what needs to be accomplished. Despite its title the investigation is not just about camels, but rather the camel’s place within the economy and even traditional culture of northern Manchuria. Moreover, this study, which is clearly related to planning and thus state building, appears similar in tone to the planning document on hogs. That is, it conveys an emphasis on improvement, a key theme for much of the Manchukuo project. What follows is a translation of the table of contents, along with translations of select passages from the document:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1) The characteristics of camels
   a. Distribution of types and outer appearance
   b. Camel capabilities

2) The breeding/rearing management of camels
   a. Summer
   b. Winter
      1. Domestication
      2. Relationship between rumination [cud chewing] and labor
      3. Health characteristics
   c. Barn structure
   d. Camel breeding
   e. Camel illnesses
   f. Wool shearing
   g. Appraising a camel’s age

3) The economic value of camels
   a. The camel as an engine of transport
   b. Camels as farm animals
   c. Use of their hides

4) Concluding words

5) Reference materials
Prior to moving into the chapters outlined above, Nishio provided a background on camels for the uninitiated. For example, at the time of the report there were about 15,000 head in Xing’an South Province, Xing’an North Province, Xing’an West Province, and Rehe. Moreover, until recently (the time of the report) they had been used for transportation and shipping supplies in Inner and Outer Mongolia, and in fact were the only mode of transportation in that immense region. However, with the cutting off of Outer Mongolia, combined with new forms of modern transportation, the use of camels had declined precipitously. As a result, except for some Russians, Japanese, and Mongolians who used camels in the winter along the rail line between Hailar and Manchuli, most camels were left to graze in the fields year round. Nishio went on to explain:

Yet right now in Xing’an North Province, especially near Hailar as well as in the Sanhe area we observed the actual use of camels in the winter. At the same time we listened to their Japanese, Russian, and Mongolian users, and also had chance to meet with participants in military camel training. Looking at the results this animal should not be neglected as a relic of the past, which has lost its simple usage value. There is also the issue of the future usage as a military-use animal. As a mode of supply shipping and transportation in the vast area of Manchuria’s unopened frontier, we know they are an indispensable animal.

Beyond analysis of the current state of Manchurian camels and basic recommendations for their future use, Nishio’s report delves into the characteristics of camels, providing a brief comparison between the African camel bactrianis and the Asian camel dromedarius, which is sometimes further divided between the cold-weather Mongolian type, and the warmer climate southern part of North China type (Nishio says they are absolutely the

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96 Ibid, 1.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
The report provides information on the differences between males and females, as well as a typical camel's height, weight, winter coat, color of fur, and so forth. Essential, it would appear, to understanding a camel's usefulness is appreciating the shape and size of the beast's feet (at 20x22 cm in the front, and 15x17 cm in the back they are particularly well-suited for trudging through snow drifts), the distance between footprints while walking as compared to a trot, and the total distance covered in one complete stride (210-30 cm). The document provides detailed illustrations of camel footprints and length of stride, along with maps that show where camel herds are concentrated, a hand-drawn map of camel routes circa 1941, and a detailed rendering of a camel saddle.

The next section looks at camel abilities, and is followed by the bulk of the report which is on the management of rearing and breeding of camels. This section is divided into seven sub-sections, and the one on winter-time camels has three further sub-sections. The final section of the report looks at the economic uses of the humped creatures, which is further sub-divided into three more sections: transport uses, farm uses, and the value of camel wool. In one particularly useful chart Nishio contrasts camels and trucks in the carrying of bags of oats. His study showed that while a truck could carry thirty-four bags totaling 1850kg, and a camel could only handle nine bags totaling 500kg, camels still had the advantage in terms of cost. That is, the shipping cost for that camel came to 30 yen, while the truck was 162 yen. That meant that one bag of oats cost 3.33 yen to ship by camel versus 4.77 yen by truck, a clear cost advantage for camel usage. In another
comparison, this time between camels and horses, camels once again came out the winner. A single horse could not carry as much as a camel, but they were significantly cheaper to hire making their per bag transport cost less. It turned out, however, that horses required more feed than a camel, so much so that their initial advantage disappeared and the camel turned out to be the more cost-effective animal.\textsuperscript{103} It seems that Nishio’s study indeed yielded fruit by showing that camels were by no means an anachronism. Far from it actually: camels had a distinct role to play in the economy of northern Manchuria.

In the document’s conclusion Nishio reiterated the contents of the study, and then mentioned an upcoming camel study that would go beyond what had been carried out in this “extremely short” winter survey.\textsuperscript{104} Overall, this study is squarely in line with the other livestock research discussed above, providing foundational knowledge about this indigenous animal and conclusions about improvements and usage expansion. In terms of Manchukuo state building and knowledge production, the document is a small but important artifact. Securing Manchukuo’s border, especially with the Soviet Union, was an understandably pressing concern for the regime. Another concern was to begin filling up empty spaces on the map – the frontier – with Japanese settlers. Camels, it would seem, might have been part of the solution. In the five years between the execution of this study and Manchukuo’s demise it is not clear what role these animals played in northern Manchuria apart from their traditional transport and military uses, but undoubtedly the Japanese would have had something planned for them.

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid, 19.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid, 22.
In contrast, there is again the US Department of State's *The Livestock of China* from 1945 that also devoted an entire section to Chinese camels.\(^{105}\) It echoes the Manchukuo report to a degree, although the American researchers admitted that little was known about camels at the time. Moreover, they had to base most of their information on that of a Chinese researcher. The chief features of the chapter include breeding habits, diet, camel management, possibilities for human consumption of meat and milk, and dispelling myths about camels. Overall, the Manchukuo report is much more advanced, for not only did Nishio and his group gather together a great deal of background information, but they went out in the field with the camels, and also interviewed individuals making use of camels in real-world situations. It is fair to say that because of this access to camels the Japanese were more easily able to envision and plan the camel’s potential uses in Manchukuo’s future.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have looked at six fairly disparate low to medium level plans and studies produced by the Manchukuo government in its attempt to develop and build the state as part of a process to transform Manchuria into an integral and productive unit of the Japanese Empire. Whether in agriculture, raising pigs, dairy farming, finding new uses for camels, or merely establishing weights and measures, the Manchukuo planners were extremely thorough in researching and preparing the documents that would bring the state building project to fruition.

\(^{105}\) Johnson, Phillips, Moyer, 39-46.
There may have been long-term impact from these plans, but that will remain elusive until researchers begin sifting through other extant documents and studies of Manchukuo’s medium and low-level planning. More immediate, and arguably more interesting was the imagination and effort behind Manchukuo’s knowledge production that culminated in plans such as those analyzed above. They are specific reminders of how the Japanese scrambled desperately, and in the end fruitlessly, to absorb the Manchurian territory into their new world order.
CHAPTER 7
EPILOGUE

There is a cynical old saying that treaties are made to be broken. If so, the Manchurian Japanese, calmly assured by the five and a half-year old Russo-Japanese neutrality pact, might have seen what was coming. On August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union began one of the largest land invasions in history as 5,000 airplanes, hundreds of thousands of soldiers, and thousands of tanks poured into northern Manchuria through a 5,000 km semi-circular front ranging from Outer Mongolia, all along the Amur River, and from the Maritime Provinces. 1 The Japanese were utterly routed by the overwhelmingly superior Soviet forces that destroyed in months what had taken the Japanese thirteen years to build. Just as the Japanese invasion of China, starting with Manchuria, had wreaked havoc on Chinese society, the Soviet occupation of Manchuria had a similar effect, but this time it was Japanese along with the Chinese who felt the brunt of a mailed fist. 2

Approximately 600,000 former Manchukuo-based Japanese soldiers were captured and brought to the Soviet Union where they lived in hundreds of permanent and mobile POW camps, made up of an average of 1800-2000 men. 3 There they were used as disposable slave labor to build Siberian dams, construct the Baikal-Amur railroad, work in the oil and timber industries, and other projects throughout the USSR. 4 Over the years

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2 It is estimated that 78,500 Japanese civilians died, mainly of starvation or illness, in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion. L. Young, 411.
4 There is a great deal of literature in Japanese concerning the Siberian POWs. One of the more intriguing works by a former prisoner is Satō Kiyoshi, *Shiberia ryōshū ki* (A Record of a Siberian Prisoner)(Tokyo: Miraisha, 1979) which contains more than a hundred water color paintings detailing his ordeal. I have yet
of the immediate postwar period many of those soldiers were eventually returned to Japan, but an estimated 55-60,000 today still “sleep in Siberia’s frozen ground” as the more emotional accounts grimly put it, victims of hunger, extreme cold, non-existent medical care, and overwork.\(^5\) Japanese soldiers’ graveyards can still be found in Siberia such as the one near the Khabarovsky airport at the confluence of the Ussuri and Amur Rivers.\(^6\)

There are also harrowing tales of Japanese civilians who, in flight from Soviet forces met with harsh reprisals at the hands of vengeful local Chinese, a less than fond farewell from their former “heaven on earth.” Complicating the “vengeful Chinese” narrative, however, are reports of almost inexplicable kindness by Manchurian locals toward some retreating Japanese.\(^7\) Much worse for the Japanese civilians, it appears, were the overly acquisitive Russian soldiers whose systematic looting often included the pleasures of Japanese females when the opportunity presented itself.\(^8\) Unfortunately, the Russian conquest was just the first act in this extended post-Manchukuo drama. In the summer of 1946 an estimated 6,000 Japanese civilians were living in the former capital Changchun.\(^9\) As late as 1948 Changchun still had a sizeable Japanese refugee population which, along with what must have been hundreds of thousands of Chinese civilians, were to discover evidence that Japanese soldiers were used by the Soviets in the 1945-46 dismantling of Manchuria’s industry, although that is distinctly possible.

\(^5\) Manshū teikoku, 141.

\(^6\) Takeshima Toshimoto, “Maboroshi no bamu tetsudo wo yuku,” Tetsudō janaru (Nov. 1991, no. 311), 118.

\(^7\) Not all relationships were negative. A former teacher at an agricultural school in northwestern Manchuria describes the emotional farewell he received from some of his Mongolian students when forced to flee the area upon the Soviet attack in Tamae Hideo, Manshū 1945 nen (Tokyo: Shinjinbutsu Juraisha, 1973), 11.

\(^8\) Soviet attacks on Japanese civilians, including widespread rape, is mentioned numerous times in the Pauley Mission report. Instances of Russian excesses and can also be found in personal memoirs of the experience such as Sare do wa ga Manshū, a book of brief vignettes by Japanese recounting the last days of Manchukuo and its aftermath.

trapped in the city as the Nationalists cut it off from the outside in order to stop the
Communist Chinese 8th Route Army advance. One Japanese survivor, who claims that
300,000 people died during this time, told a horrifying tale of mass starvation, disease,
mountains of corpses, and bands of “famished devils” who managed to get into the city
and engaged in looting the already destitute and starving inhabitants.\textsuperscript{10} Another survivor
wrote that the situation became even more perilous as the famished people turned to
eating weeds and the buds off of trees, as well the meat of wild dogs that had been
fattened on human flesh. There were even reports of some of the hungry devouring
recently deceased infants, and whisperings of a “human meat market” in the city.\textsuperscript{11}

Among the Japanese civilians who were able to flee to the perceived safety of the
south, sometimes by foot, or if lucky, hidden in railroad boxcars, most were hastily
repatriated to Japan through formerly Japanese-controlled ports such as Huludao and
Dairen.\textsuperscript{12} Not all civilians made it home however. The number of dead is hard to assess,
but there were also many (possibly thousands) of Japanese children stranded in
Manchuria, some ultimately to be cared for and raised by sympathetic Chinese civilians
(further complicating the “vengeful Chinese” narrative), the so-called \textit{Chūgoku-zanryū-koji} 中国残留孤児 or “Japanese children left behind in China after WWII,” a story that
has gripped Japanese society since the beginning of normalized Sino-Japanese relations
in the mid-1970s.\textsuperscript{13}

\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{10} Takenaka Shigetoshi 重寿, “Iki jigoku no dasshutsu” (“Escape from the Living Hell”), in \textit{Saredo, wa ga
“Manshū,”} 156-59.
\item\textsuperscript{11} Endō, 161.
\item\textsuperscript{12} The repatriation of Japanese from Manchuria was carried out under US supervision. L. Young, 410.
\item\textsuperscript{13} A fictionalized but moving account of this drama called \textit{Daichi no ko} (Child of the Continent) was
played out in a ten-part NHK television series that first aired in Japan in 1996 to much acclaim, and was re-
After the Soviets completed mop-up operations against sporadic Japanese resistance during late summer 1945, they militarily occupied Manchuria through early 1946. During that time the Russians also took the opportunity to put Japanese weapons in the hands of the Communist Chinese, an act that effectively allowed for the division of Manchuria into two Manchurias: one Communist-controlled, and the other Nationalist-Controlled. They also steadfastly refused to allow KMT forces to enter Manchuria during the first months of the occupation. At the same time the Soviets engaged in widespread looting of Manchukuo’s sophisticated infrastructure as “war reparations.” The piracy was so egregious and widespread that the Chinese government filed an official complaint – based on the research of former Manchukuo Japanese experts no less -- to the United Nations that included a list and dollar value of everything the Soviets were claimed to have appropriated and sent back to Mother Russia during their brief occupation. The SCAP-sponsored 1946 Pauley Mission to Manchuria was aghast at the wanton and obviously systematic destruction found in the wake of the Soviet storm, but little could be done beyond making protests. The USSR effectively possessed Manchuria, and had acquired it legitimately as part of the Allied effort to defeat the

aired in 2003 to mark NHK’s 50th anniversary of television broadcasting. Notably, the film was shot primarily on location in northeast China and Inner Mongolia utilizing a joint Chinese and Japanese cast.

The Nationalists were equipped with Americans weapons, making the Manchurian phase of the Chinese civil war akin to an early US-USSR proxy conflict.

This strange twist of the immediate post-Manchukuo situation was documented repeatedly by the KMT’s representative to reclaim Manchuria, Chang Kia-ngau. Donald Gillin and Ramon Myers, eds, Last Chance in Manchuria: The Diary of Chang Kia-ngau (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1989).

Understandably the defeated Japanese did not help the situation much in occupied China proper, and at times, likely in Manchuria as well, although the Pauley Mission was convinced that most destruction of property was at the hands of the Russian soldiers or Chinese mobs.

Tung-pei kung yeh, Havoc Done to Industries in Manchuria by Russian Occupation army: Investigated and Reported by the North-Eastern Industrial Association and Rehabilitation Liaison Office for Japanese in Manchuria, February, 1947, Translated by the Economic Committee (Taipei?: Chinese Association for the United Nations, 1951).

Japanese as per the secret agreements of Yalta that basically turned over Japan’s area of control in northernmost East Asia to the Soviet Union.

Beyond the looting and devastation, the invasion might have been seen at times by the Nationalists and Americans less a liberation than a bald reinstatement of traditional Russian imperial prerogatives in Manchuria. One Chinese government official wondered in his diary if the Soviets were really going to leave at the scheduled time.\(^{19}\) In particular, the gaining of exclusive rights at Dairen and Port Arthur, as well as their old railroad rights (reinstated for thirty years) throughout Manchuria pointed to ulterior motives on the part of the Soviets.\(^{20}\) Seizing the moment, they appear also to have been reinstating the Russo-Manchurian frontier by turning back Manchukuo-period Japanese efforts to “open” Manchuria’s northern reaches by means of railroads and “pioneer” farm settlements.

Though the fate of Japanese civilian farmers who had located in rural areas is somewhat understood, little if anything has been written about the Soviet force’s dismantling of Manchukuo-era rail lines that connected parts of isolated northern Manchuria with, for example, the Amur River city of Heihe (across from Blagovenchensk) to the rest of Manchuria. A 1950 US Army Map Service map of Manchuria simply designated the lines to that lonely area as “abandoned,”\(^{21}\) but the lament of former Manchukuo surveyor Shima Yoshi who found out about the line’s

\(^{19}\) Gillin and Myers, 67.
\(^{21}\) Army Map Corps, *Manchuria Road Map* 1:2,000,000, Series L-201 (1963).
dismantlement as he rode down the Amur on his way back to Japan is evocative.\textsuperscript{22}

Not only did the Soviets widen the rail line north of Harbin to the Russian 5-foot gauge,\textsuperscript{23} the Nationalist Chinese claimed that more than 2,000 kilometers of track had been removed by the Soviets, as well as hundreds of locomotives and passenger cars, and 15,000 freight cars.\textsuperscript{24} Considering how necessary railroads were for economic development in the prewar period, and particularly in war-ravaged China, why would the Soviets have torn up rail lines as part of their "liberation" effort? Sergei Witte, Tsarist Russia's Finance Minister and chief proponent for imperial expansion into Manchuria realized decades before the Japanese invasion that "... if Manchuria were allowed to become a manufacturing country (rather than a market for Russian products), it 'would be able to flood Russian territory with manufactures produced at so cheap a cost that no Russian industry would be able to compete.'"\textsuperscript{25} No doubt Count Witte would have approved of the Soviet handling of the renewed Manchurian threat to Russia. The 1946 SCAP-sponsored Pauley Mission to Manchuria was highly suspicious of the motives behind the systematic Soviet destruction and looting there, at times frankly stating what appeared to be the underlying Soviet motives in the region: "If the Soviets planned to delay the economic recovery of the Orient a full generation, and to sow the seeds of violent social unrest, their plans have been successful."\textsuperscript{26}

Perhaps as a result of the rapidity of Manchukuo's liquidation, the collapse of the Japanese Empire, the Soviet occupation, the rise of the Communists in the region, and

\textsuperscript{22} Shima, 29. One Soviet account of the invasion claims it was the Japanese themselves who dismantled frontier railways starting in July 1945 with the expectation of the coming war. \textit{Finale}, 64. This is an issue that deserves future attention.
\textsuperscript{23} Gillin and Myers, 78. China's and Manchukuo's railroad gauge was 4'8.5", known as "standard gauge."
\textsuperscript{24} Tung-pei kung yeh, 18-19.
\textsuperscript{25} Lensen, \textit{Korea and Manchuria Between Russia and Japan}, 31-32.
\textsuperscript{26} Pauley, 35.
most saliently the uncomfortable feelings the name "Manchukuo" evokes among many scholars of all nationalities, relatively little (apart from accounts of the success of the Soviet military operations in Manchukuo, and the voluminous Pauley Mission Report) has been written on post-Manchukuo Manchuria.\(^{27}\) The nature of the occupation in Manchuria is no doubt at the core of the problem. The Soviets claimed exclusivity during their tenure in postwar Manchuria, similar, perhaps, to the American refusal to entertain a Russo-American co-occupation of Japan. Unlike the Americans who shared some responsibility and were generally open about their operations in Japan, the same cannot be said of the Soviets who blocked the Pauley Mission and even members of the Chinese government and military from entering Dairen and other areas of northeastern China. Only after the collapse of the USSR have the Japanese have discovered that a library of presumed lost films from the Manchurian Film Company (Man’ei) had been appropriated and taken back to the Soviet Union during the occupation period, a discovery that has opened new avenues for the study of Japanese film history and its relationship to the Manchukuo project.\(^{28}\) It was also recently discovered that the Soviets made off with the imperial mirror from Shinto Shrine on the grounds of Pu Yi’s Hsinking palace.\(^{29}\) That other secrets from the period of Soviet Occupation continue to lurk should not be discounted.

A lacuna in knowledge about the post-Manchukuo situation notwithstanding, there is evidence that “Manchukuo” did not immediately disappear after Last Emperor Pu

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\(^{27}\) Steven Levine, *Anvil of Victory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987) and *Last Chance in Manchuria* both deal with the period, and there are personal Japanese accounts such as *Manshū 1945 nen* that describe the period immediately after the collapse.

\(^{28}\) Japanese author Yamaguchi Takeshi has written extensively on Man’ei in such books as *Aishū no Man’ei eiga* (The Sorrowful Manchurian Film Company Movies) (Santen shobō, 2000).

\(^{29}\) NHK Television, “Rasuto enpera- saigo no hi: “Manshūkoku” to kotei fugi” (The Last Day of the Last Emperor: Emperor Puyi and “Manchukuo”), *Sono Toki: Rekishi ga ugoita* no. 81 (aired Jan. 16, 2002).
Yi abdicated on August 18, 1945. Donald Gillin and Charles Etter’s article “Staying On: Japanese Soldiers and Civilians in China, 1945-1949” shows that Japanese soldiers participated on both sides of the postwar Chinese civil war. Moreover, in the Pauley Mission’s attempt to piece together what had happened in Manchuria since the Soviet invasion, members interviewed numerous Japanese civilians still residing and working in Manchuria.

Figure 84 Manchukuo postage stamp overprinted for use in post-Manchukuo Manchuria. The top line says “China Post,” the middle four characters tell its value, and the character at the bottom in parenthesis indicates that it is to be used in Mudanjiang.

Stranger still was the Chinese government’s use of overprinted Manchukuo-era postage stamps, a temporary measure to be sure, but one that in a convoluted way had the effect of legitimizing the very Manchukuo postal system that the Chinese had worked so hard to reject.

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30 Manshū teikoku, 146.
32 Pauley, passim.
33 The Sino-Manchukuo postal agreement of 1935 was a political coup for Japan, although special “face-saving” stamps without the name “Manchukuo” on them were used to assuage Chinese sensibilities. See
Based on some of the material analyzed in this dissertation, another instance of post-war Manchukuo continuity was the 1945 transformation of the Chinese toponym for (Manchuria) "The Three Eastern Provinces" into the "Nine Eastern Provinces". As explored in chapter five, between 1932 and 1945 Manchukuo underwent almost continuous administrative restructuring, fractured into numerous smaller provinces along the way to a maximum of nineteen by 1942. This was followed by more reshuffling so that by August 1945 there were thirteen provinces in the Puppet State. After Manchukuo’s dissolution the Chinese government did not include the territory of Rehe Province as part of Manchuria, but it did partially keep the Japanese administrative structure intact. The compromise was nine provinces with the following names:

1) Heilongjiang
2) Xing-an
3) Liaobei
4) Nenjiang
5) Hejiang
6) Songjiang
7) Jilin
8) Andong
9) Liaoning

Of these, four names were carried over from Manchukuo: Heilongjiang, Xing-an, Jilin, and Andong. This new administrative status lasted until January 1950 when Manchuria became the "Six Eastern Provinces," eventually reverting back to three provinces in 1954. The 1950 and 1954 PRC administrative changes in Manchuria notwithstanding,

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Zirkle (1964) for more on Manchukuo stamps in general. Allen Kerr’s 2003 (revised) 4-volume work *The Local Overprinted Stamps of Manchuria 1945-7* on the post-Manchukuo ROC overprint stamps (such as Figure 1) is a standard work. Manchukuo postage stamps are a thriving philatelic sub-field, and an area ripe for potential scholarly endeavor.


35 According to Jonathan Spence, in the immediate postwar period “... Chiang Kai-shek exacerbated ... problems by assigning non-Manchurians to virtually all the key posts in the three provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning, which he sub-divided into nine newly [emphasis mine] designed administrative districts in order to weaken local allegiances.” *The Search for Modern China* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), 470. As we have seen, the Japanese were responsible for the initial break-up of the original provinces. Spence makes no mention about Japanese administrative changes during the Manchukuo period, suggesting that he was unaware of those activities.

36 Ibid., 40. Liaoning, Heilongjiang, and Jilin.
the Taiwan National War College’s multi-volume *Atlas of China* contained maps of Manchuria showing nine provinces as late as 1961.  

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37 Wang Ch’eng-ching, *Dongbei zhijing ji ziliao* (1947), attached map.
Another area where the Japanese legacy in postwar Manchuria has yet to be fully explored is cartography. Just as Russian and Chinese cartographic knowledge of Manchuria had been handed off, so to speak, to the Japanese, Japan's large-scale mapping efforts in Manchuria (and elsewhere) made their way into the hands of the Americans and Chinese, and likely those of the Russians as well. Many US Army Map Service (AMS) maps of East Asia were based on Japanese surveys and maps as clearly stated in the marginalia's "source" information. The AMS index for the May 1949 1:250,000 Manchuria 125-sheet map series notes that it was "Compiled from various medium and small scale Japanese and Chinese maps." The AMS' 1968 follow-up 100-sheet 1:250,000 Manchuria series' source information was altered slightly: "Compiled by the Army Map Service from various large and medium scale maps (principally Japanese) and hydrographic charts, aerial photography, and intelligence information."

Through at least the late 1960s, apart from some aerial mapping, the AMS was almost completely reliant on Japanese maps of Manchuria. While the OSS cartobibliography of Manchurian maps was frank about the overall low-quality that they had observed, the analysts saved their special indignation for the Chinese-produced maps, concluding that they were on the whole unreliable, of little value, and should be avoided unless other options did not exist. Japanese maps, too, were on occasion scathed by the OSS for inconsistencies, but there is no mention in this document that their maps of Manchuria were to be avoided. American cartography scholar Jack Williams was much

39 Army Map Service, Index to Maps of Manchuria, AMS Series Number AMS L541 (AMS, 1949).
more sanguine about the Japanese maps analyzed in his cartobibliography of Chinese maps:

Prior to WWII the Japanese were unquestionably the major producer of maps of China. The quality and quantity of their topographic surveys far surpassed anything else produced up to that time. Not until the US Army Map Service began its operations in China during the War did Japan begin to lose its position of dominance. As it is, Japan produced a greater variety of topographic series, covering greater areas, than has been produced by the AMS to date [1972] . . . . Even today, these long out of date series offer the only available large-scale topographic coverage for many areas of China . . . .41

Williams went on to claim that:

The [Japanese] Imperial Land Survey [ILS] ranked as one of the world’s greatest topographical mapping agencies, surpassed (in the China field) by perhaps only the Army Map Service . . . . The quality, however, of the ILS publications was the major reason ILS maps were and still are so highly regarded by map makers the world over. The Army Map Service readily admitted, “Due to the accuracy and homogeneity of the Japanese maps it was possible for AMS and other mapping agencies to quickly compile a tremendous quantity of maps in a variety of scales and types on a mass production basis for the military needs of WWII in the Pacific and Far East.42

The AMS continued to use the term “Manchuria” through the 1960s,43 this despite the fact that the Chinese government had ceased using the term “Manchuria” as an official English-language equivalent for northeast China. China’s decision to drop the name “Manchuria” was understandable considering that the separate name and separate maps had helped to create a separate identity upon which the Japanese and Russians had readily pounced. Yet, the name change created an odd situation for the cartographic world outside of China because virtually overnight not only had “Manchukuo”

41 25.
42 Ibid.
43 It is possible that the toponym “Manchuria” was used by US government agencies in the 1970s, although it does not appear in a CIA atlas of China from January 1970. Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence, Communist China: Provincial Maps (CIA: 1970).
disappeared, but now the toponym “Manchuria,” a fixture on maps everywhere except for those of China, had been unilaterally proscribed. Naturally map companies did not immediately comply with the new toponymical situation; and while “Manchukuo” was unceremoniously deleted from the face of maps of China, “Manchuria” had surprising staying power well into the 1960s and 1970s.

The 1947 Encyclopedia Britannica World Atlas confirmed the cartographic confusion regarding northeastern China in the immediate postwar period. In this case Manchuria remained as a toponym, but Manchukuo was still found on the map as well, nearly two years after the Puppet State had expired. Moreover, Manchukuo’s borders were still intact in this atlas, as was the name of the capital Hsinking. By 1952 Manchukuo had been virtually eliminated from the EB atlas except for a parenthetical mention in the table of contents, and the name Hsinking in parenthesis beneath the restored Changchun. While the toponym “Manchuria” remained on various maps in the atlas, its status as a toponym had clearly been altered, especially on the “Northeastern China” map where Manchuria was written diagonally in a small font, and a large CHINA toponym dominated Manchuria’s geo-space. The 1950 Oxford World Atlas also retained the name “Manchuria” quite clearly, though its fellow British publication the (London) Times Atlas of the World: Mid-century Edition presciently showed the way of the future by eliminating Manchuria from its pages entirely. That, however, was an exception. The 1960s was for the most part cartographically the same as the 1950s, with Manchuria

appearing in most major atlases such as the *1963 Reader’s Digest Great World Atlas*, the *1966 Edinburgh World Atlas*, and the *1966 National Geographic Atlas*.

That the toponym “Manchuria” made it beyond the 1960s was indicative of the importance of the name when thinking about northeast Asia. It is true that some atlases such as *Hammond’s International Atlas* were expunging it, and yet the 1972 *Rand McNally World Atlas: Imperial Edition* retained it (albeit in almost imperceptibly small, light blue letters on a light blue background), as did the 1974 Bartholomew’s *The World Atlas*. Most telling was *The Atlas of China* by a Chinese cartographer who not only used “Manchuria” as an equal synonym for the “Northeast,” but devoted an entire section to Manchuria’s topography, climate, population, and resources in a manner highly reminiscent of pre-war Japanese geographies of the region.

By the 1980s “Manchuria” appeared less often on maps, though it did not disappear entirely. The same can be said for the 1990s when Manchuria occasionally reared its head, finding its way onto, for instance, the 1990 National Geographic *Map of the World* wall map, and among the pages of the 1998 Macmillan’s *The History Atlas of Asia* in which Manchuria is shown repeatedly as a virtually independent country with a long historical presence in the region. As though history had reversed itself, this atlas uncritically used the toponym “Manchuria” in much the same way that prewar historical atlases had.

This tracing of the usage of “Manchuria” on maps serves to show that the idea of Manchuria at one point (approximately 1895-1905) bore down so deeply into the cartographic world’s collective consciousness that it still shows no sign of disappearing.

completely, perhaps the result of the cartographic vicious circle posited previously: Maps reinforce the idea of "Manchuria," and in turn cartographers and the general public continue to see the name, thus perpetuating the need for the term on future maps. On the other hand, Manchuria’s longevity is a fairly unusual case since cartographers change and/or eliminate place names quite regularly. The toponym "Rhodesia" (today’s Zimbabwe) a British colony from 1923 to 1965, and an independent country from 1965 to 1980, never appears on current maps of Zimbabwe, and the USSR, until 1990 the dominant geographical body on the Eurasian continent, has vanished from maps. Perhaps the answer is that "Manchuria" is actually a "place." Mark Elliot noticed while conducting his research on the history of Chinese mapping of Manchuria that even for modern Chinese people the Northeast still has a "special regional identity."

For the Japanese the Manchurian toponym is highly problematic because of its connection with prewar imperialism and militarism. Yet a conundrum has arisen for those scholars who are at once sympathetic to Chinese suffering under the Japanese (understanding fully the relationship between the toponym “Manshū” and Japanese imperialism), but still desire to write about Japan’s history and involvement in Manchuria. The dilemma has been; if not “Manshū” then what exactly is the appropriate toponym for northeast China beyond referring to it as the somewhat vague “northeast” 東北, a descriptive term also used for Japan’s own northeast? The result over the past six decades has been mixed, but often resulting in what amounts to politics mixing with academics as

48 The Summer 2004 film The Manchurian Candidate has revived the name for a broad audience yet again.
49 Southern Rhodesia unilaterally (and illegally) declared independence from the British Empire on November 11, 1965, after which it called itself “Rhodesia.” It was normally mapped as Rhodesia until the name changed to Zimbabwe in 1980.
50 Elliot, 603.
Japanese scholars have given way to the politicized Chinese view of history. Chinese scholars, when mentioning Manchukuo at all generally add a character suffix that means “fake” (Fake Manchukuo 傀儡国家). Though some Japanese have adopted that idea, or translate the English “Puppet State” 傀儡国家, many scholars use the character kyū 旧 before “Manchukuo,” which means the “former Manchukuo” 旧滿州國, probably the most accurate approach to a problematic toponym.

The use of irony quotes around “Manshukoku” and “Manshu” 滿州國 is often employed in order to emphasize Manchuria-Manchukuo’s historical unreality. As a result, there is only one former country and possibly only two words in the Japanese lexicon that are more likely than not written with irony quotes around them – “Manchukuo” and “Manshu.” The use of irony quotes surrounding the word “Manchukuo” in Japan appears to have started in mid-1932 in the pages of Akahata (Red Flag) newspaper, the official organ of the Japan Communist Party that was shut down in the mid-1930s. What started as a defiant anti-militarist political commentary from the Left continues to frame the Manchurian debate in the 21st century.

Japanese mapping and surveying of Manchuria-Manchukuo and China may have stopped abruptly along with the war, but the old Manchukuo maps are still extant – there was no purging or wide-scale destruction of Manchukuo books, ephemera, and souvenirs after the war – and can be readily found for sale (often at premium prices) in Tokyo’s

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51 Irony-quoted “Manchukuo” can also be found in Western usage, although it is not as firmly entrenched a tradition as in Japan.
52 The example of Akahata’s use of irony quotes for “Manshūkoku” is an article from March 15, 1932 entitled “Nihon teikokushugi Manshūkoku” o tsukuru,” 6. Akahata was not 100% consistent with its writing of Manchukuo in this manner, although it was a salient aspect of the newspaper’s position on Manchukuo.
Kanda used bookstore area, as well as in individual collections, and housed in Japanese libraries. Chapter three showed that virtually all prewar and wartime Japanese and English-language books on Manchuria-Manchukuo included a map or maps that at times placed Manchuria in its regional context, at other times provided just a close up of part of Manchuria (e.g.; the SMR’s route map), and sometimes only the Manchuria-Manchukuo geo-body. A close examination of recent post-war Japanese-language works on Manchukuo reveals that modern authors tend to rely heavily on maps of the Manchuria-Manchukuo geo-body for their projects, similar to the maps created for and used throughout this dissertation. What is unusual is that in almost 100% of the works examined that make use of maps, they are either *originals* from the Manchuria-Manchukuo period or are exact copies that include period place names, used uncritically and without analysis. Moreover, in these maps Manchuria-Manchukuo is rarely placed within its greater Chinese or East Asian context. The assumption is that maps are neutral tools that transcend politics (and even history), and thus can be utilized in the way in which they were originally designed. My research, detailed in chapter three suggests otherwise: maps of Manchuria and Manchukuo were far from neutral. On the contrary, they were “tools of empire” that allowed for participatory imperialism, reinforced the idea of Manchuria-Manchukuo’s independence from China, and made the Puppet State tangible, and therefore “real.” The maps are important historical documents, and are also tools, but their usage today as genuine national maps should be problematized.53

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53 The most glaring example of current uncritical map usage is the low-priced *Zusetsu* books (Kawade Shobo Shinsha) on Manchuria-Manchukuo. These short books are popular titles, available in corner bookstores throughout Japan. There are four titles available so far, three of which were written by Manchuria-Manchukuo scholar Nishizawa Yasuhiko. While the text is generally thoughtful regarding the
Less clear is where the line between "history" and "present" is blurred in the reprint of the *The Atlas of Manchurian Provincial Divisions and Comprehensive Bibliography of Place Names*, the 1942 edition of which was discussed at length at the end of chapter three. Because of wartime conditions the original from 1942 was printed on thin, cheap paper. A reprint of this atlas came out in 1980, printed on heavy slick stock, hardbound in a silk cover, and sold in a slipcase for extra protection. Apart from the high quality paper and binding, everything in this edition is identical to the original -- from the frontispiece and publisher's page to the introduction -- with the exception of a new publisher's information page and the reprint publisher's own introduction where it is explained why this Manchukuo Atlas was reprinted:

This book is a reprint of one that was published in 1942. The main content of this book includes listing up by administrative divisions Manchukuo’s former nineteen provinces, the distribution of industry, the whole picture of transportation, the situation of pioneer immigration group settlements, youth volunteer training camps with a chart of their names, as well as all of the Shinto shrines, notable ruins, and natural monuments . . . . Whether it was right or wrong, [the Atlas] could be used for various resources as the best window of the bygone days concerning the relationship between Manchukuo and Japan. It is from this viewpoint that this book was reprinted. In essence, original maps of Manchukuo do matter and continue to be relevant.

Beyond the study of cartography, another valuable dimension for scholarship would be further examinations of Manchukuo planning and its long-term impact on northeastern China. This paper has explored a few smaller plans in order to accentuate ramifications of Japanese activities in Manchuria, the numerous maps are used exactly the same way as they were 60-80 years ago: to show the Manchuria-Manchukuo geo-body as an independent region.

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54 The cover price in 1980 was 9,800 yen, which was expensive at the time, and used editions today sell for upwards of 20,000 yen (approximately $200). The reprint volume is hard to find, hence its extra value. I am basing its used price on my personal copy which cost 20,000 yen.

the relationship between knowledge production and semi-concrete Manchukuo activities, all of which provide further insights into the complex nature of the regime. Among Japanese scholars research continues into aspects of Manchukuo planning, and in “Manchukuo” no kenkyu Nishizawa Yasuhiko described the Manchukuo state highway and road building mega-plan as one avenue for future research. A cursory examination of some of the extant road planning documents proves his point.⁵⁶

Planning for a major road network in Manchukuo went back at least as far as September 1932, and possibly earlier. One top secret plan from this time period called for a 56,750 km long system to be built in phases at a total cost to the state of 70,937,500 yen.⁵⁷ ⁵⁸ This same document said that the spread of roads and railroads were needed to combat “bandits infesting the interior of the country that were causing misery and extreme starvation among the law abiding people.”⁵⁹ In a sister plan from the same month the planners had already decided on 71 routes, one (Hsinking-Manzhouli) at 1,127 km in length, with the rest between 73 and 944 km, using Hsinking as the network’s hub.⁶⁰ A third document related to the previous two explained that the 56,750 km network would be divided into two kinds of roads: National Roads (29,775 km), County Roads (26,975

⁵⁷ Mantetsu keizai chōsakai sanbu, Manshūkoku dōro kensetsu keikaku an (A Proposal Plan for Constructing Manchukuo’s Roads) (Dairen: Mantetsu Keizai Chōsakai Sanbu, 1932), 11.
⁵⁸ An American scholar claimed in his dissertation that the Manchukuo government had approached the United States asking for help building a 200,000 km highway system. See Tucker “Building Our Manchukuo” (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Iowa, 1999).
⁵⁹ Manshūkoku dōro kensetsu keikaku an, 1.
⁶⁰ Mantetsu keizai chōsakai sanbu, Manshūkoku dōro keikaku rosen setsumeishō (An Explanatory Document of Manchukuo Road Plan Lines) (Dairen: Mantetsu Keizai Chōsakai Sanbu, 1932), passim.
km).\textsuperscript{61} The plan also listed five reasons for the road network: general transportation use, security, national defense, political, and development.\textsuperscript{62} While it appears that Manchukuo was never able to construct 56,750 km of roads as it had set out to do,\textsuperscript{63} plans such as those above provide insights into the nature of the early regime also found in the Hog Breeding and Dairy plans discussed in chapter six.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.4\textwidth]{sample_photos.png}
\caption{Sample photos from Manchukuo vehicle test document, p. 316.}
\end{figure}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{61} Mantetsu keizai chōsakai sanbu, \textit{Manshūkoku dōrokō keikaku an} (A Proposal Plan for Manchukuo’s Road Network) (Dairen: Mantetsu Keizai Chōsakai Sanbu, 1932), 4.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 5-6.
\textsuperscript{63} Manchoukuo Year Book 1941, 574-76.
\end{flushleft}
Figure 87 Close-up of center photo. A view of one of the test vehicles, and a good example of a Manchurian “road” circa 1935.

Subsequent road plans and related activities are equally intriguing. One 1935 study carried out during a fifteen-day period at the peak of Manchuria’s winter was a vehicle performance study of twelve different vehicles on the punishing 1,700 km route between Mukden and Harbin via Hsinking. The list of individuals and organizations involved with the study was surprisingly large, and the choice of trucks, buses, and motorcycles used in the study should sound familiar: Chevrolet Trucks, Ford Buses, Ford Trucks, GMC Trucks, International Buses, and even Harley Davidson Motorcycles, all of which are evidence of America’s economic involvement in Manchukuo. The dozens of sharp photos of the event brings the project to life [Figures 86 and 87] (and also provides

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65 Ibid., 2-5. Technically, American involvement was indirect since the vehicles appear to have arrived in Manchuria via Japanese subsidiaries. Future exploration of the involvement of US auto companies in Manchukuo has potential for understanding the complexities of the situation. There were also two Japanese-made trucks used in the study. As an aside, the United States was Manchukuo’s second biggest trading partner after Japan. See statistics in various editions of the Manchoukuo Year Book.
many unusual views of 1935 Manchuria), as do the vehicle’s technical drawings (in English), and the many charts detailing the results of each day’s performance per vehicle.

Japanese city planning in Manchukuo is another area of great potential for scholarship. As noted, Japanese scholars such as Koshizawa Akira and Nishizawa Yasuhiko have brought aspects of this area of Manchukuo studies to light. Building on Koshizawa’s work, China scholar David Buck has interjected Japanese capital city planning in Hsinking into the historiographical discourse of Chinese modern city planning. There has also been interest in Russian city planning in Manchuria -- notably Harbin -- such as To the Harbin Station: City Building in Russian Manchuria, 1898-1914, Creating a Chinese Harbin: Nationalism in an International City, 1916-1932 by James Carter. However, little is known about the much more extensive city planning project for all of Manchukuo implemented by the Japanese.

As with roads, a fair amount of prewar materials on city planning are extant and readily available to scholars. Besides documents on the far-reaching and expansive Hsinking city plan, materials remain from other Manchukuo cities as well. Translation and analysis of these will help to further our understanding of the Manchukuo project as a whole. In the short but comprehensive Manshū toshi kensetsu ippan hōsaku (Manchurian City Construction General Measures) it is explained that:

Together with the rapid expansion of Manchukuo’s main cities after the Manchurian Incident, as well as the construction of new railroads and other forms of transportation, a corresponding rapid rise in population and the appearance of new towns can be expected in those areas. If these cities are left to develop naturally, the places that evil [“natural” development] will reach will not be few. The dominant opinion is that we should fix the
land usage laws, and before construction begins quickly complete the city plans.\textsuperscript{66}

The element of leaving nothing to chance in the building of Manchukuo is readily apparent in this passage. The document itself is actually an overview plan for city planning, listing \textit{fifty-two} Manchurian cities scheduled for attention over a six-year period. Concrete details are limited, but one figure provided was the current and projected population for \textit{thirty} years in the future, a number that projected planning into the mid-1960s. There is also a tiny bit of information of what kind of city it was projected to be, such as industrial, provincial or county seat, railroad hub, and so on.\textsuperscript{67}

\begin{table}
\caption{Already planned}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
City name & Location & Current Population & 30 Year Planned Pop. & Planned Increase & Explanation of significance (not provided) \\
\hline
Mukden & South S. & 400,000 & 1,000,000 & 150\% & \\
Hsinking & Central & 200,000 & 500,000 & 150\% & \\
Harbin & Central & 400,000 & 1,000,000 & 150\% & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\begin{table}
\caption{Planned for 1934}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
City name & Location & Current Population & 30 Year Planned Pop. & Planned Increase & Explanation of significance \\
\hline
Tumen & E & 15,000 & 100,000 & 567\% & - Nat’l border city, regional market \\
Beianzhen & NC & 5,000 & 50,000 & 900\% & - RR junction, special production mkt, brigade HQ location \\
Jilin & SC & 130,000 & 370,000 & 185\% & - RR junction, provincial gov’t office, place of beauty recreational city \\
Anshan & S & 10,000 & 150,000 & 1400\% & - Industrial city \\
Taoan & WC & 9,000 & 60,000 & 567\% & - Junction for four rail lines, seat of county gov’t \\
Qiqihar & NCW & 76,000 & 170,000 & 124\% & - Location of division HQ, seat of prov. gov’t, along the RR \\
Mudanjiang & E & - & 50,000 & - & - Jct. for 3 RR lines, area of military use \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{66} Minami manshū tetsudō keizai chōsakai, \textit{Manshū toshi kensetsu ippan hōsaku} 満洲都市建設一般方策 (Dairen: Minami Manshū Tetsudō Keizai Chōsakai, 1935), 1.

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 41-45. The information in these charts is taken directly from the policy document except that I have added the information in the “location” and the “planned increase” columns.
### TABLE 39

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Current Population</th>
<th>30 Year Planned Pop.</th>
<th>Planned Increase</th>
<th>Explanation of significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jiamusi</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>300%</td>
<td>Rail line end pt., immigrant area special products market, seat of prov. gov’t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chengde</td>
<td>SW</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>400%</td>
<td>Location of division HQ, seat of prov. gov’t, rail line end pt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chifeng</td>
<td>SW</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>257%</td>
<td>Location of division HQ, rail line end pt., seat of county gov’t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeposhau?</td>
<td>SW</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>On rail line, RR junction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jinzhou</td>
<td>SW</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>283%</td>
<td>seat of prov. gov’t, along RR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huludao</td>
<td>SW</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Port city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andong</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>155,000</td>
<td>360,000</td>
<td>132%</td>
<td>Port city, seat of prov. gov’t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yingkou</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>127,000</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>176%</td>
<td>Port city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yilan</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>64,000</td>
<td>433%</td>
<td>Rail line end pt., seat of county gov’t, special products entrepot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daheihe</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>1233%</td>
<td>Seat of prov. gov’t, rail line end pt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sipingkai</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>52,000</td>
<td>84,000</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>RR jct. (2), special products market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yanji</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>78,000</td>
<td>255%</td>
<td>Seat of prov. gov’t, along rail line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ang’angxi</td>
<td>NCW</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>54,000</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>(no explanation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 40

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Current Population</th>
<th>30 Year Planned Pop.</th>
<th>Planned Increase</th>
<th>Explanation of significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suifen</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>233%</td>
<td>Along NMR, national border city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manzhouli</td>
<td>NW</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>208%</td>
<td>Along NMR, national border city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imienpo</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>58,000</td>
<td>123%</td>
<td>Along NMR, seat of county gov’t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mishan</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>400%</td>
<td>Seat of county gov’t, along rail line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hulin</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>900%</td>
<td>Nat’l border city, river port area, seat of county gov’t, RR end pt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xian</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>138%</td>
<td>Mining city, special products market, seat of county gov’t, rail line end pt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shinmin</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>64,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>Seat of county gov’t, RR junction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hailar</td>
<td>NCW</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>275%</td>
<td>Important area along NMR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nehe</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>57,000</td>
<td>418%</td>
<td>Seat of county gov’t, along rail line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonghua</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>Seat of county gov’t, along rail line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suolun</td>
<td>WC</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>1900%</td>
<td>Seat of county gov’t, along rail line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pingquan</td>
<td>SW</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>358%</td>
<td>Seat of county gov’t, along rail line, densely populated city</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 41

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Current Population</th>
<th>30 Year Planned Pop.</th>
<th>Planned Increase</th>
<th>Explanation of significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shanhaiguan</td>
<td>SW</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>63,000</td>
<td>425%</td>
<td>Nat’l border city, rail line end point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fushun</td>
<td>SC</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>130%</td>
<td>Seat of county gov’t, along rail line, densely populated city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuyu</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>51,000</td>
<td>158,000</td>
<td>210%</td>
<td>same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nong’an</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>216%</td>
<td>same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hulan</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>194%</td>
<td>same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tongliao</td>
<td>SC</td>
<td>41,000</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalai</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>213%</td>
<td>same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faku</td>
<td>SC</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>57,000</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shuangcheng</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>62,000</td>
<td>89,000</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaoyang</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>59,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>69.5%</td>
<td>same</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 42

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Current Population</th>
<th>30 Year Planned Pop.</th>
<th>Planned Increase</th>
<th>Explanation of significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hunchun</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>829%</td>
<td>Densely populated city, seat of district gov’t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunhua</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>64,000</td>
<td>137%</td>
<td>Densely populated city, seat of district gov’t, along rail line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhaoyangzhen</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>Densely populated city, along RR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanchengzhen</td>
<td>WC</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>49,000</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>Densely populated city, seat of district gov’t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tieling</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>67,000</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>Densely populated city, seat of district gov’t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benqi</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>333%</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hailun</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>58,000</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>Densely populated city, along RR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Besides the numbers, various patterns emerge in the “location” and “explanation” columns, especially the significance of railroads to Manchukuo’s development, and issues such as heavy population density and political importance.

When this document appeared in 1935, among the fifty-two cities three projects were already underway: Harbin, Hsinking, and Mukden, with thirty-year projected populations of 1,000,000, 500,000, and 1,000,000 respectively. These three cities were already quite large when the Japanese formed Manchukuo, but the plans were calling for them to become modern metropolises. Overall the numbers and city locations tell us a
great deal about Manchukuo’s city planning program as a whole. While some of the numbers for growth seem overly conservative for a thirty-year period (e.g., Tieling by 1968 was only slated to increase 52% to 67,000 people), other cities were projected for tremendous rates of growth. Hulin [“Tiger Woods’], described as a “national border city,” “rail line end point,” “seat of county government,” and “river port area” was given a projected growth rate of 900% in thirty years, although it was only planned to go from 2000 to 20,000 people. On the other hand, some of the already sizeable cities such as Jilin and Hsinking were expected to see 150-200% growth in population over thirty years. Planned urban growth of this kind in multiple cities is impressive in a general sense, and particularly as a pre-World War II undertaking. Hsinking’s planned population numbers turned out to be conservative however – by 1942 the city’s population had already reached 655,000, forcing the Manchukuo planners to develop a new plan in the early 1940s.\textsuperscript{68}

Among the other cities, particularly intriguing are those planned to have been built throughout northern Manchuria as part of Japan’s general project of developing and populating that traditionally rural area. Of the seven whose planning was to start in 1934, all were located in either central or northern Manchuria: Tumen, Bei’anzhen, Jilin, Anshan, Tao’an, Qiqihar, and Mudanjiang. Extant plans exist for Tumen near the Korean, Chinese, and Russian border (\textit{Tomon toshi keikakuan gaiyō} [An Outline of the Proposed Tumen City Plan])\textsuperscript{69}, Bei’anzhen (\textit{Hokuanchin toshi kensetsu keikakuan} [Planning

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\textsuperscript{68} Koshizawa Akira, \textit{Manshūkoku no shuto keikaku: Tokyo no genzai to mirai o to} 滿州国の首都計画：東京の現在と未来を問う (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, 1988), 171.

\textsuperscript{69} Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, \textit{Tomon toshi keikakuan gaiyō an} 園們都市計畫案概要案 (Tokyo: Mantetsu Keizai Chosakai, 1935).
Proposal for Bei’anzen City Construction], Mudanjiang (Botankō toshi kensetsu keikakuan [Planning Proposal for Mudanjiang City Construction]), and possibly others as well. Of course these were just proposals, but of the Japanese cities proposed for planning in the list above, some were eventually started such as Mudanjiang and Jiamusi. Further research should expose the extent and impact of Manchukuo’s unique large-scale city planning and construction project.

This dissertation has foregrounded, through an examination of some very narrow areas of enquiry, some little-known aspects of Japan’s much-maligned activities in Manchukuo. Although in many instances that maligning is richly deserved, and explorations of Japanese militarism, atrocities and ill-behavior in Manchuria is necessary, there is another history here – as should be expected after thirteen years of existence – that transcends the general Manchukuo narrative and deserves, even demands, scholarly attention. The Japanese have taken the lead in this effort as their rich literature clearly shows, and the growing body of English-language works on Manchuria-Manchukuo suggests that Western scholars are increasingly finding Manchuria to be a subject worthy of academic endeavor. These are good signs that bode well for the future of not just studies of modern Japan, but also Chinese history, Sino-Japanese history, and the study of the greater northeast Asia region as a whole.

70 Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, Hokuanchin toshi kensetsu hōsaku 北安鎮都市建設計画案 (Dairen: Mantetsu Keizai Chōsakai, 1936).
71 Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, Botankō toshi kensetsu hōsaku 牡丹江都市建設計画案 (Tokyo: Mantetsu Keizai Chōsakai, 1936).
72 The large-scale urbanization program in Manchukuo was a Japanese invention, although there certainly was continuity from Russian urban planning, and Chinese settlements existed throughout most of Manchuria. According to Li Zhang’s China’s Limited Urbanization under Socialism and Beyond (New York: Nova Press, 2004), not only does China remain “under-urbanized,” but that under Mao the country actually underwent de-urbanization. 4.
APPENDIX 1

1937 *Jidō hyakka daijiten* (Children’s Encyclopedia, [Manchukuo volume])

**Map Typology, Page Number and Title/Description**

The heavy reliance on maps of various sorts in a publication targeted for children and young adults indicates the importance of using maps as part of an effort to not just understand Manchukuo, but also as an effort to acclimate the youth of Japan to Manchukuo as a real, mapped place.

**Iconic Manchukuo Geo-body Usage and Maps [33 total]**


**Map Details [56 total]**

Historical Maps [2 total]

5-Greater historic Korea / 6-Bohai Kingdom
APPENDIX 2

List of Maps from Manshū rekishi chiri (Historical Geography of Manchuria)

Volume I

1) Former Han Dynasty Period Chōsen (old name for Korea) [includes a similar inset map] – Manchuria’s Chinese characters do not appear on this map. However, there are numerous modern and anachronistic reference points include Jilin Province, Dairen, Fushun, Seoul, and northern Kyushu). Shows the Korean Peninsula and southern Manchuria as a unit.

2) Former Han Dynasty Period Manchuria – Anachronisms abound on this map: Use of Manchuria characters, Mongolia characters, and Chōsen characters. Modern reference points include Vladivostok, Seoul, Dairen, Lushun (Ryōjun), and Andong.

3) Later Han Dynasty Period Manchuria -- Manchuria characters, Mongolia characters, and Chōsen characters. Modern reference points include Vladivostok, Jilin Province, Heilongjiang Province, Changchun, etc.

4) Three Kingdoms Period Manchuria -- Manchuria characters, Mongolia characters, and Chōsen characters. Modern reference points include Vladivostok. Shows a Korea-Manchuria joint geographical space.


6) Former Yan 燕(337-370) Dynasty Period (Manchuria and Chosen characters. Modern reference points similar to above, although historical names used here too. For instance, a pre-modern place name for Dalian (Dairen). Basically a northern Korea, Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Yellow Sea geographical region.

7) Later Wei Period Manchuria -- Manchuria characters, etc, although it must be noted that in this map more historical names appear with just a few modern place names for reference. Again, the Korea-Manchuria joint geographical space.

8) (inset 1 on map #7) Later Wei Period Northern Manchuria -- Obviously Manchuria, although no Manchuria characters. However, characters for Mongolia, all three Manchurian provinces, plus Habavarovsk, etc. The area is clearly Northern Manchuria.

9) (inset 2 on map #7) Later Yan Period Manchuria.

10) (insets 3 and 4 on map #7) Small, insignificant.
11) **Sui & Early Tang Dynasty period Manchuria** – Important: Purely anachronistic. This is, in effect, a map of modern 1915 or so Manchuria that includes modern borders with Russia and inner and Outer Mongolia. This map could never have existed during either the Sui or Tang Periods. It also makes some use of modern place names, including Russian ones, and shows the pre-Treaty of St Petersburg greater Manchuria Prefectures. Characters appear for Manchuria, Mongolia, Beijing, and Chōsen in place.

12) **Bohai Period Manchuria** -- This is also a map of modern Manchuria circa 1915. It includes modern borders with Russia and Inner and Outer Mongolia. This map also shows partial coast of Honshu, and the character for Tang.

Volume II

13) **Liao (916-1125) Period Manchuria** -- Shows great Manchuria well into Siberia. Manchuria’s political border is in place. Modern place names such as Manchuria, Mongolia, Chōsen, Siberia are written in large characters. There are modern toponyms such as Vladivostok. Many historical names as well.

14) **Shikinkoku (1125) Distance Map** -- This is the most “historical” so far in the sense that it avoids using anachronistic place names and borders. Song Dynasty characters are placed south of Great Wall. Includes characters for Mongolia, Manchuria, and Chōsen. Otherwise, pretty blank apart from government roadside settlements. Holistically the map basically shows the Liaodong Peninsula and northern Korea at the bottom into central Manchuria and central Inner Mongolia. The only true reference points on this map are rivers, and longitude and latitude.

15) **Jin (1115-1234) Period Manchuria** -- This map is clearly marked as Manchuria with modern borders for reference. Characters appear for Manchuria, Mongolia, and Chōsen. Includes some modern place names such as Vladivostok.

Close up the area on the border between Korea-Manchuria at the mouth of the Yalu R. Most names seem historical, but it does show the characters for Shengjing Province and Chōsen for reference.

17) [inset on map #16] Location unclear except that it is in Shengjing Province.

18) **Yuan Dynasty Manchuria** -- Large map compared to the other. Does not show Manchuria’s political borders, but does show a greater Manchuria, some Siberia, and western Sakhalin. Most names appear historical, although the Manchuria Provincial names are anachronistically used, as well as those of Manchuria, Mongolia, Chōsen, and Vladivostok.

19) [inset on map #18] Close-up of Yuan period northern Korea-Manchuria border area (appears as though the Koreans lost some territory at this time).
20) Yuan Period Transportation Road Map -- This is another large map that shows a
greater Manchuria, part of Inner Mongolia, northern Korea, and the coast of Japan and
Sakhalin. Absolutely ahistorical. Not only does it include many modern place names, it
also shows railroad lines, presumably as a reference. Toponyms include Manchuria,
Mongolia, Chōsen, The Sea of Japan, Karafuto [Sakhalin], Vladivostok and other
Russian towns (that could not possibly have existed: Russians do not arrive in eastern
Siberia until the 17th century), etc. Does show the Yuan period transportation routes as
well.

21) Ming Dynasty Liaodong Map -- Does not mention Manchuria in the title. Basically, a
close up of the Liaodong Peninsula, southern Manchuria, and the Liaodong Bay. Place
names look historical. “Southern Manchuria” appears in big characters, as well as Chōsen.
Detailed topography.

22) [inset on map #21] Higher view of same map for contextualization. Does not add
much.

23) Ming Dynasty 建州衛図? -- Small map, but includes Manchuria, much of Siberia,
Sea of Japan, and the coast of Sakhalin. A bit of Japan is also visible. Pretty historical,
although characters for Manchuria, Mongolia, and Chōsen used. Vlad is there too.

24) 黒圖 阿拉 Heituela and Environs [Map’s location unclear / place name
transliteration has been guessed -- Extreme close up of an area in southern Manchuria.
Shows, for example, Fushun. Topographical, with just a couple of roads and their
settlements.

25) Beginning of Qing Meng Area 1616 -- Greater Manchuria with chiefly historical place
names. No Russian names. Manchuria is placed in center of map. Also Mongolia, Chōsen,
and others. Shows topography in great detail, as well as historical roads and settlements.
Especially large map: Approx. 2’1”x2’9”.

APPENDIX 3

List of maps from Manshū no tanken oyobi kōbutsu shigen chizu (A Map of Manchurian Exploration and Mineral Resources)

The following is a translation and description of the twenty-four maps of various sizes found in the SMR’s North Manchuria Research Department Maps of Manchurian Exploration and Mineral Resources, published in 1939. Overall the maps are not technically impressive, and all contain anachronisms, most notable of which are rail lines and modern place names. Virtually all of the maps include legends, and most utilize color which is used to differentiate tribal groups as well as paths of exploration. Overall, they are further evidence of Japanese efforts to create an independent Manchurian history through the use of cartography. Some Chinese historical names, as well as the names of explorers are Romanized, indicating the possibility of foreign origins (German?) of this map set.

1) 2350 BC to 200 BC – shows the movement and extent of a number of different ancient Manchuria-area ethnic groups such as Suschen, Ur-Tungusen, Wui-Wei, Mai, and of course the Manchu people.

2) 2nd Century BC to 3rd-7th Centuries AD – Shows especially the extent of Koguryo into southeastern Manchuria. Includes very specific dates per tribal group and the territory where they lived at the time.

3) Sienpi and Wuhuan: 300BC to 600 AD -- Includes very specific dates per tribal group and the territory where they lived at the time.

4) Invasion of Manchuria by the Murong People: 3rd-4th century AD – same as above.

5) Fuyu: 37 BC to 285-400 AD – same as above.

6) Place Names of Zhou to End of Yuan – same as above, but no legend at bottom.

7) Yan, Sui, and Tang Periods: 3rd to 9th centuries – same as above.
8) 鞑靼 and Bohai: End of 7th to Beginning of 10th Century – same as above, although compared to the previous maps, this one is bit more concise with its area information.

9) Khitan / Liao Empire: 10th to 12th centuries (916-1125) – same as above.

10) Jin Empire Period: 1115-1234 – same as above.

11) Mongol Empire – same as above.

12) Han Race / Ming Empire Period (1368-1644) – clearly shows extent of Ming control and Ming period names. Sakhalin shown as Ming territory.

13) The Invasion Places of the Han Race in Manchuria – Includes very specific dates per tribal group and the territory where they lived at the time, as well as extent of Ming control. Note: Use of the term “invasion” 侵入 emphasizes that Han Chinese are foreigners in Manchuria.

14) The Various Races of Qing Period Manchuria (1636-1912)

15) Manchuria Administrative Division Map: (Green lines 1932, red lines 1937-38) – a very messy map; hard to follow. Shows modern place names, as well as modern provinces and extended railroads. I believe this should be seen as the culmination of the information in the previous maps. In other words, it suggests teleology, with the ultimate result being Manchukuo.

16) Walking Manchurian Journeys from 1640 to 1900: Explorers, Surveyors, Envoys – larger map, with a focus on Manchuria’s geo-body by showing the modern Manchukuo borders. Quite complex with lines representing the Manchurian journeys of the long list of foreigners at the bottom.

17) Exploration Journeys of Russian Officers – long list showing names from 1864-1910. Each explorer given his own specific line style drawn to show the path of his trip.

18) Survey Map to 1928 – shows, using various colors, what part of greater Manchuria was already surveyed, and if mapped at what level, and who made the survey. Also shows in white the areas that had yet to be surveyed.

19) Scientific Survey Journeys in Manchuria and Surrounding Area, 1845-1913 – similar to maps 16 & 17 with journey routes graphically portrayed. Gives names and dates of journeys in the bottom index. More than 40 shown, all of whom non-Chinese.

20) Scientific Survey Journeys in Manchuria, 1914-37 – similar to 19 except specific to Manchuria. All names European.
21) General Geology & Applied Geology Research Area and Route Map: Chinese Plan in Basic Undertaking -- at the bottom is a list of names and corresponding routes, plus date of journey. Many names are Chinese, although about 25% are foreign.

22) Manchuria Geologic Mineral District Research Areas and Route Map: Based on Japanese Operations -- same as above, although list at bottom made up of Japanese names who conducted surveyed from about 1908-37.

23) Map of Manchuria’s Ancient Mines and Smelting Facilities (?) 製煉, and Present-Day Important Mines and Smelting Facilities -- shows ancient mines in red, and current ones in blue. Surprising variety of minerals being mined, but also reveals how little of Manchuria had been surveyed for minerals (gold, iron, etc.)

24) A Geological Map of Manchuria: Geologic Survey Routes Made before 1904 -- coverage within Manchukuo’s borders only. Shows what appear to be the rock types of the different regions in Manchuria. Gives list of explorers names in katakana, all of which are foreign.
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¹ According to Muta Shōhei of JACAR, in the case of documents that include an individual’s name it is not clear whether those individuals actually wrote the documents, especially high-level government officials such as Saionji Kimmochi. However, for the sake of reference and historical interest I shall include the attributed name. Correspondence with Mr. Muta,, Sept. 20, 2004.


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