FACES OF PROTEST:
TWO GLOBAL MOVEMENTS AGAINST THE GULF WARS,
A VIEW FROM JAPAN

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Abstract

This thesis focuses on the social movements against Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. While the first and second Gulf Wars were notably different, the two conflicts share enough similarities to compare the two movements. By using newspaper data on anti-war protests from the *Japan Times* and the *Asahi Shinbun*, this thesis looks at the global resistance against the Iraq invasions in 1990-1991 and 2002-2003, and focuses on protests in Japan. Case studies of religious, women and nude protestors are highlighted, and the role that the Internet and email played in organizing the demonstrations against the war in 2002 and 2003 is also described. This thesis finds the anti-war activists in 2002 and 2003 to be more organized, and more able to demonstrate proactively than the protestors reacting to events in 1990 and 1991. The movement against the second Gulf War was also more international.
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

When millions of people woke up on 15 February 2003, they knew what kind of day it would be, no matter the snowy, tropical, or rainy weather outside their windows. This day was, after all, a global coming together, where people in over 600 cities\(^1\) were going to take to the streets to demand a stop to the stern threats certain world leaders were giving to Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. The movement’s momentum, fueled by several successful global days of action in the preceding months, was growing. Even though the drums of war were growing louder, people poured coffee and knew the streets of major cities around the world would soon be full of protestors. For some people, like those in Hawai‘i, when it was time to get up and attend a rally or march in one city, protestors in other cities had already finished their marches and were headed home.

The antiwar protests of 2002 and 2003 were, just like the war itself, truly international events. People in small towns such as Crawford, Texas and Fairford, England as well as in major cities like Beijing and Sydney and in countries as seemingly unconnected to the Iraqi-U.S. showdown as the Netherlands and Thailand joined to make their voices heard. Thousands marched in Tokyo, half a million took to the streets in New York City. These protests represented a new phase in the development of social movements, something that was clear to many of the active participants. Activists

\(^1\) CNN.com, 2003.
emailed around the phrase “there are two superpowers, the United States and world public opinion”. This was a global action, and the people knew it. While social movement organizations (SMOs) involved in international collective actions were nothing new (Kriesi et al., 1992; Almeida and Lichbach, 2003), these antiwar protests represented a high level of coordination and cooperation, with groups working together to organize events in hundreds of cities on the same day that all opposed the same thing: U.S. President George W. Bush leading an invasion of Iraq.

Twelve years before, there was another war between the United States and Iraq, Operation Desert Storm. Many of the leaders and issues involved in this war were the same as in the one people protested in 2003. The tactics of antiwar activists around the globe in the early 1990s were similar to, but different in important ways from, the protests of 2002 and 2003. Perhaps most importantly, while protests did occur on the same day in various cities in 1990 and 1991, the movement against the first Gulf War saw nowhere near the same level of global coordination as the build-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 did.

Being involved in the antiwar movement against the second Gulf War myself, I was curious to see how the media outside Hawai‘i portrayed the global movement, and my participation shaped the focus of this thesis. I wanted answers to the questions I had about what I saw around me: were activists in other parts of the world as connected to the Internet as we were in Hawai‘i? Did this electronic connection make them feel solidarity with the protests around the world, the way we in Hawai‘i felt that we were part of

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2 This idea of two superpowers was first used by the New York Times writer Patrick E. Tyler on February 17, 2003.
something larger that what we could see? How were the media interacting with their movements? How, specifically, were the protest events in Japan connected to the international protest events during each of the Gulf Wars. Reading about the protest events against the oncoming invasion in 2002 and 2003, it was obvious that the entire world was involved in this movement, not just activists in the United States, Germany, Italy, and other Western countries so often mentioned in academic social movement literature.\(^3\)

For all their similarities, though, the two attacks on Iraq were quite different. At their most basic levels, the first Gulf War was in response to Iraq’s unilateral invasion of Kuwait and the second was a unilateral invasion of Iraq by the United States and a “coalition of the willing,” which, in effect, meant U.S. troops fighting with a few predominately from Australia and England. This major difference – response instead of preemption – meant that opponents of the first Gulf War needed not only to support a peaceful solution to the crisis, but also to explain why Iraq’s military aggression did not deserve a military response. In 2002 and 2003, antiwar activists did not need to argue against the “eye-for-an-eye” argument as much, even though proponents of the war repeatedly drew misleading connections between Saddam Hussein and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

The political differences between the two wars, though, are not enough to explain why the massive global protests against the Iraq invasion of 2003 were so much more

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\(^3\) To give just one example, a college-level textbook on social movements, *Social Movements: Reading on Their Emergence, Mobilization, and Dynamics*, features only three articles on protestors in non-Western countries, and thirty-three about Western activists.
coordinated than similar protests against a war that took place only twelve years before. Therefore, the first question this thesis tries to answer is: what were the differences between the two protest eras, and was there any evidence of greater international protest activity coordination during the second Gulf War?

To discover the differences, I will compare the ways activists in 2002 and 2003 participated in the days of global actions with the ways their counterparts from 1990 and 1991 were organized. One country not directly involved with the military preparations for either invasion of Iraq was Japan. Still, the streets of Hiroshima and Shibuya were the sites of large protests against the wars. Since the Japanese government and the Japanese people were drawn into the debates surrounding the two wars, studying what happened in Japan can give us clues about what happened around the world during the Gulf Wars.

My data on these protest cycles comes from two Japanese newspapers, the *Asahi Shinbun* and the *Japan Times*. Using newspapers as contemporaneous sources of information about protest events is common (Koopmans, 1993; McAdam, 1983; Tarrow, 1993), but presents its own challenges. Koopmans used a sampling of newspaper articles on protest events to find data from his long time frame. McAdam relied on the *New York Times Index* for his data. Tarrow bases his data on newspaper articles, and supplements that information with “archival research, interviews with former participants, and documentary sources” (p. 331) as well as data from other studies. This thesis uses newspaper data as a sole source, but, by using the method developed by Carol Mueller, detailed below, I try to correct for limitations in coverage by one newspaper.

The second question, then, is: what types of protest events were more regularly covered by the newspapers, and did the focus of coverage change between the two Gulf
Wars? Keeping in mind the limitations of newspapers as a source, this thesis investigates how the newspapers presented the events and the participants in their pages by looking at what types of protests were covered, at what times the protestors were allowed to speak, where the stories were placed, and whether photographs accompanied stories. For deeper views of the antiwar protest events as presented in the newspapers, I looked more closely at specific groups of protestors (women and religious figures) and types of protests (nude protests). I also attempted to discern from the newspapers how the Internet influenced the movement against the second Gulf War.

Studying the *Asahi Shinbun* provides excellent insight into how the Japanese public saw the antiwar movements against the two Gulf Wars because the newspaper is widely read. In fact, Freeman (2000) writes that Japanese newspapers “enjoy one of the highest per capita readership rates in the world” (p.16). Freeman says the *Asahi Shinbun* is one of the five “core print media,” along with the *Yomiuri, Mainichi, Nikkei,* and *Sankei.* Japanese newspapers are both widely read and focus on quality (i.e., are not sensationalist), something not seen in other countries such as Britain and Germany, where national newspapers target either elites or middle- or working-class readers. The result of this hybrid quality, Freeman writes, is national dailies that “produce a paper that is consistently sober-minded rather than sensational” (p. 19). The high circulation numbers are due to the newspapers appealing to a broad readership and a “‘neutrality’ in their dealings with news sources, but this neutrality is that of the closely linked insider who rarely challenges the status quo, rather than that of the independent outsider” (p. 19).

While the English-language *Japan Times* is far from being the “newspaper of record” for Japan (that honor is commonly given to the *Asahi Shinbun*), it nevertheless
provides a fair collection of international news stories, especially from the Asia-Pacific region and America. Since the *Japan Times* is a source of world news for some of Japan’s 1.8 million foreign residents, 94,000 of who are from English-speaking countries, it has an international outlook. Another reason for selecting the *Japan Times* is that, since 95 percent of the newspaper’s reports and photos are from wire services, it serves as a sort of digest for the types of articles that were in international news circulation during the periods of the two Gulf Wars and might illustrate potential bias in the *Asahi Shinbun*’s coverage. International coverage provided by wire stories made up an overwhelming majority of the *Japan Times*’ articles on antiwar protests.

This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 is this introduction. Chapter 2 is a look at the history of protest in Japan, Japan’s relationship with the Middle East, as well as Japan’s modern connection with war, the “peace” Constitution, and the Self-Defense Forces. Chapter 2 also discusses how activists and the media interact to inform the public about the activists’ activities and goals, especially during times of war.

Chapter 3 defines the methodology of my protest event analysis study, describing how the *Asahi Shinbun* and the *Japan Times* were used to gather information, and an explanation of Mueller’s method. Chapter 4 presents the findings from a database built from the information in these two newspapers. Chapter 5 is a deeper look at four categories of protestor or protest type, including women protestors in Japan, the “Baring Witness” nude protest actions, and religious actors. This chapter ends with a look at the

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5 As the newspaper’s website states, “The *Japan Times* Online is the World’s Window on Japan. We are constantly striving to be the the (sic) uncontested No. 1 Web site for Japan-related news and information in English.”
limited information available in the newspapers about how the Internet influenced the protests against the second Gulf War, and discusses other research on how the world wide web influences SMO actions. Chapter 6 is the conclusion.

The various actions people around the world took to express their displeasure with military action in the Persian Gulf at the beginning of successive decades provide rich ground for study. How those two protest eras differed is the main focus of this thesis, and how two newspapers in Japan presented each of those protest eras is the second focus. This thesis, then, is an attempt to glimpse the constant and the mercurial natures of modern antiwar protests.
CHAPTER 2
Historical Context

Japan and the Middle East

The military histories of the two Gulf Wars are different, but both involved an American President Bush and the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. Politically, there was one main difference that those who opposed the war needed to wrestle with. The coalition led by the United States entered Iraq in the first Gulf War as a response to Hussein moving his military into neighboring Kuwait, while the second Gulf War was initiated by the United States because of a perceived threat from Hussein that has since been revealed as false. The first Gulf War was also much shorter than the second was. The bombing of Baghdad in the first Gulf War began on 15 January 1991 and a ceasefire was declared on 27 February 1991. On 15 July 1991, six months to the day after the first bombing of Baghdad, the last Allied troops left Iraq. The second Gulf War began with the United States invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003, and the end is not yet in sight. For this thesis, we will define the “end” of combat as when President George W. Bush declared that “major combat operations” were finished on 2 May 2003, although fighting continues into 2005.

How was Japan affected by the two wars in the Gulf? Three connected issues – Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, the dependence of Japan on imported oil, and the delicate subject of deploying the modern Japanese military abroad – all played a role in how Japan responded to the two wars, and thus to what issues the activists in the streets were responding. This chapter describes the modern history of Japan in the Middle East,
as well as places the anti-Gulf War protest in the context of Japan's long history of citizen action.

A popular image of Japan is as a country with an ethnically homogenous society and free of public conflict. This is, obviously, untrue, and there is a large literature on the long history of protests and social movements in Japan. Early modern Japan had its share of protests; for example, a protest against rice-hoarding by 30,000 poor people and farmers that turned violent in the early 1830s (White, 1995), millenarian cults in Japan were a protest against the state in the Meiji era (Ooms, 1993), and there were pre-war protests by peasants, coal miners and silk factory workers, sometimes violent and repressed by police (Hane, 1982). Japan's increased nationalization and militarization at the beginning of the 20th century was not without its dissidents, such as "Radical Sōtō Zen Priest" Uchiyama Gudō, who was executed for his anti-Imperialist views (Victoria, 1997). After the war, the Anpo agreements (Krauss, 1974 and see below) and the Vietnam War (Havens, 1987) brought people into the streets. Environmental issues also led to an increase of protests in the 1970s (Broadbent, 1998). Okinawa remains a site of contention today.

Of these various protest fields, there are two major protest areas that directly relate to the types of protest events this thesis looks at: the unforgettable protests against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1959 and 1960 (Sasaki-Uemura, 2001) and the continuing anti-U.S. military protests in Okinawa.

The forced ratification in 1960 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, known in Japan as Anpo, resulted in Japan's largest post-war public protests to that date, including thousands of students staging sit-down demonstrations in front of the Diet in June 1960.
Krauss (1974) notes it was the student radicals of the Zengakuren group who were the “shock troops” of the left in all key demonstrations during the Anpo protests (p. 4). Their actions included clashing with police, surround cars of key political figures, and breaking into the Diet. Sasaki-Uemura (2001) points out that the Anpo protests, “need to be seen as an extended process rather than a single, limited event” (p. 3) because they were the peak of a wave of protests that took place during the 1950s and 1960s. Broadbent (1998) also sees the increase of environmental protests in the early 1970s as a wave that fed, in part, off a larger cycle of protest activity that included the Anpo protests and the national student protests against Japan’s involvement in the Vietnam War. Havens (1987) notes that the protest against the Vietnam War – the largest antiwar movement in Japanese history – provided ordinary people the freedom to criticize the United States again.

While the protests in 1970 were larger than the Anpo protests a decade earlier, Krauss (1974) suggests the spark, the intensity, had gone out of the movement. At least one author (Kingston, 2001) sees a correlation between the decline of political protests after the 1970s and the demise of the Japanese Socialist party. Sasaki-Uemura (2001) notes that the new wave of citizens’ action in the 1970s and 1980s displaced the old paradigm represented by the Japan Communist Party and its organs and can be better understood by introducing the question of gender, which is “crucial to the development of citizens’ movements and the subsequent residence-based environmental movements of the 1970s” (p. 5). As this thesis will show, gender-based political actions are still very

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6 Broadbent distinguishes between a cycle and a wave of protest by defining a wave as “the rise and fall of a single type of protest movement” and a cycle as “a time when one type of movement (i.e., labor) intensifies and then stimulates other types of protest, such as student and environmental, causing an increase in the general level of protest” (p. 98-99).
much alive in Japan today, and, while the protests against the Gulf Wars were not as large as the *Anpo* events, there are still anti-war voices active in Japan.

Okinawa is a site of ongoing political struggle against militarization, the U.S. military in particular. Okinawa represents a strategic military location for the U.S. military, and its reach from the island has steadily grown from countries near Japan (Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan) to now include Vietnam and the Persian Gulf (Hook and McCormack, 2001). The broad anti-U.S. military movement in Okinawa caused a rift in ties with the central government in Tokyo in the mid-1990s (Hook and McCormack, 2001) and then-Governor Ota stood firmly on the side of his constituents by opposing the U.S. military’s influence on the island (Ota, 1999). Another aspect of the struggle in Okinawa is a movement against violence perpetrated by U.S. military forces against local women (Francis, 1999).

For a country ostensibly limited by a “Peace” constitution (Hook and McCormack, 2001; McNelly, 2000), Japan nonetheless has strong military ties with the United States and these effects are seen most strongly in Okinawa. As the *Anpo* event and the Okinawa protests show, Japanese activists oppose these ties and their effects. The Gulf Wars provided more examples of the Japanese people speaking out against Japan’s military actions and alliances. Still, Japan played an important role in both Persian Gulf conflicts. The two Gulf Wars gave the Japanese government a chance to strengthen its military ties with not only the United States, but the United Nations as well, and it is unsurprising that anti-war activists spoke out against the government’s military actions. Tokyo was a site of major protests against both wars.
The meaning of the Japanese Constitution’s Article 9, the role of Japanese Self-Defense Force troops in modern multinational military actions, and the validity of the military actions against Iraq were but part of the national discourse before, during and after the two Gulf Wars (McNelly, 2000; Kingston, 2001). Hook and McCormack (2001) detail four proposals for revising or more clearly defining the Constitution, including one written by Asahi Shinbun staff, released in the 1990s. Before describing the actions Japan took during the Gulf Wars, it will be useful to understand the historical context of the Japanese military after World War II and Article 9.

The legacy of Japan’s aggression and defeat in World War II looms large over the public debate about Japan’s role in modern armed conflicts. A most obvious legacy of that loss is the contentious Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution, written at the orders of General MacArthur, leader of the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers, which ruled Japan from 1945 until 1952.

Article 9 of the Japanese constitution states:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized (Kingston, p. 132).

As written – and Article 9 has not been amended – the constitution does not allow Japan to maintain armed forces of any kind. Even so, the Japanese government and courts have interpreted Article 9 to allow Japan to operate a Self-Defense Force. In 1946, the U.S. had insisted on including Article 9 in the new Japanese constitution, but in 1950, with tensions rising in the Korean peninsula, Washington began pressuring Japan to
rearm itself (Matthews, 1993). In 1950, a corps that would become the Self-Defense Force, the National Police Reserve, was established (Kingston, 2001) and it evolved into the Japanese National Safety Forces by 1952 and the Ground, Air and Maritime Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in 1954 (Matthews, 1993). As mentioned above, the late 1950s and early 1960s were times of contentious debate on the Self-Defense Force issue, but the force continued to grow. During this time, political conflicts over the type of country Japan would become were also widespread, and resulted in Japanese elites refocusing the political agenda to spur high economic growth (Katzenstein, 1996). While the debates continued, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces had four “Build-Up Plans,” which first focused on building up the Ground Self-Defense Forces (1958-60), then strengthened the Maritime and Air forces (1962-6), then introduced new weapons and modernized the forces (1967-71 and 1972-6). Since 1976, the Self-Defense Forces have been built up using the National Defense Program Outline, or programs based on the National Defense Program Outline (Sakanaka, 1993). Until the early 1980s, Japan’s defense spending was capped by an informal limit of less than 1 percent of GDP, but prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone breached this mark for the first time in 1987 (Matthews, 1993; Katzenstein, 1996; Kingston, 2001). Nonetheless, the Japanese military today plays a subordinate role at home and abroad because the military has been “put under strict civilian control, penetrated by economic ministries, hemmed in by Japan’s Peace Constitution, and barely tolerated by a skeptical public” (Katzenstein, p. 57).

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7 For a discussion on how Japan builds up its security without directly using military means, see Yamakage, 1997.
Even though there is no constitutional ban on overseas deployment of the Self-Defense Forces, the idea of Self-Defense Forces stepping foot on foreign land has “always been problematical in postwar Japan” because of memories of Japanese military expansion held by both Japanese citizens and the people of other Southeast Asian nations (Gow, p. 61). After the first Gulf War, in August 1991, the Diet discussed a bill that would have allowed the Self-Defense Forces to be dispatched, as long as five conditions were followed. These conditions were:

1. That there be a ceasefire in place.
2. That the Japanese force has the agreement of the parties involved.
3. That strict neutrality be maintained.
4. That the Japanese force would withdraw if conditions were not met.
5. That the use of arms be for self-protection only (Gow, p. 64).

After the bill fell apart because of disagreement over parliamentary approval over Self-Defense Force dispatches during emergencies, the issue of dispatching troops appeared lost until the Liberal Democratic Party was able to secure breakthroughs that allowed dispatch for Self-Defense Forces on UN peacekeeping (not peacemaking) missions and on disaster rescue operations (Gow, 1993). In 1992, a UN cooperation plan similar to the failed 1991 plan, passed that allowed the Self-Defense Forces abroad for non-military operations (Kuroda, 1994). Japanese troops were deployed abroad for the first time in 1992, when 30 Japanese army engineers went to Cambodia (Matthews and Matsuyama, 1993) and Self-Defense Forces troops participated with UN forces in Mozambique (Yamakage, 1997). It is important to note that the Asahi Shinbun, in 1995, wrote an editorial titled “Nonmilitary Activism is Japan’s Best Contribution”, which stated the Self-Defense Forces should be used exclusively to defend the country and “should not be thoughtlessly used for other purposes” (Hook and McCormack, p. 157).
Since the Cambodia deployment, though, the Self-Defense Forces have been taking active roles in international military actions and in 2004, after the timeframe of the data collected for this thesis, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi sent Self-Defense Forces into Iraq and into an active military zone for the first time since World War II. But why Iraq and why in 2004? It is in part because of Japan’s performance during the first Gulf War and Japan’s reliance on Middle Eastern oil that the Japan’s military forces were once again deployed into a war zone.

In historical terms, it is no secret Japan “came late to the Middle East” (Chiba, p. 144). In fact, the Japanese media dubbed 1973 the “first year of the Middle East” (Kuroda, p. 3). In the decades since the Second World War, the Japanese government’s relationship with countries in the Middle East has changed. While throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Japan was criticized for buckling under pressure from the Arab states from which it needed massive amounts of oil, since 1991 Japan has been more active in engaging Israel economically. Different actors promote these two sides of Japan’s Middle East policy, but there were two defining moments when the “policy line that had been tacitly but steadily pursued by the government” (Ikeda, p. 167) became abruptly overt: the 1973 oil crisis and the 1991 Gulf War.

Through the 1960s and early 1970s, Japan increased oil imports from Middle Eastern countries. The oil crisis of October 1973 – known as the “oil shock” – was triggered by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)\(^8\)

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\(^8\) OAPEC’s website explains the different roles of OAPEC and OPEC: OAPEC was established in 1968 with permanent headquarters in Kuwait. It is an instrument of Arab cooperation whose objective is to provide support to the Arab oil industry. Its activities are developmental in nature,
classifying Japan as an "unfriendly" nation. The oil export restrictions were lifted when OAPEC removed the "unfriendly" classification in December after Japan endorsed OAPEC's (i.e., the Arab and not the Israeli) position in the fourth Middle East war. Japan sent envoys to the region in the end of 1973 and in early 1974 to curry favor from the oil-producing states (Shimizu, 1993).

Delfs (1992) points out that the oil crisis "presented far more of a threat to Japan – which is almost entirely dependent on imported energy – than to most other industrialised [sic] countries, and induced a far more thoroughgoing industrial restructuring" (p. 48).

Delfs also notes that:

In response to the oil shock, The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Miti) was given extraordinary powers to allocate fuel and power, compelling factories to adopt stringent conservation measures or close their doors, while higher costs were immediately passed along to residential consumers. This greatly stimulated rapid development and installation of energy-efficient industrial processes and equipment, along with the accelerated transfer of highly energy-intensive industries (such as aluminium-smelting [sic]) to countries with lower unit energy costs (p. 48).

Kingston (2001) notes that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) orchestrated a rise in oil prices in 1973 that "fueled inflation, raised production costs, sparked industrial cutbacks and caused recession in the economies of Japan's trading partners" (p. 43). After the oil shock, Japan reduced its reliance on oil imports by

and its membership is restricted to Arab countries with oil revenues that constitute a significant part of their GNP. Furthermore, it caters for issues that relate to energy in all members of the Arab League, and for that purpose a meeting is organized every four years. OPEC on the other hand, is an international organization established in 1960 with the purpose of insuring a fair price for oil and support market stability. All issues affecting the price of oil is OPEC's prime domain (www.oapecorg.org).
investing in petrochemical plants, such as a joint Mitsubishi-Saudi Arabian plant and caused a return to the pre-war cooperation between government and business to promote export trade (Shimizu, 1993). Skov and Moeran (1995) note the 1973 oil crisis also helped bring about a shift in Japanese society. The oil crisis caused an economic restructuring, which led to a labor shortage, and then more women began working outside the home. This, in part, led to a change in Japanese marketers to focus more on qualitative consumption than on quantitative consumption.

Between 1973 and 1985, Japan’s economic ties with the Middle East became an “oil triangle” (Sugihara, 1993). In this oil triangle, Japan purchased oil from Arab states, which received military arms and Euro-dollar investments from the advanced Western economies. The Western economies, in turn, purchased manufactured goods from Japan. Sugihara points out that the oil triangle allowed Japan to circumvent the “peace” constitution’s implied ban on the explicit export of arms. Japan gave money to the Arab governments and “put pressure on advanced western economies to export arms to the Middle East” (Sugihara, p. 10).

While Japan wanted to keep good relationships with the oil-producing states, it also wanted to increase trade with Israel. The first Gulf War created the impression that Japan finally realized that “business and politics could be independently pursued” in the Middle East, but the war only made Japan’s move – begun in the mid 1980s – from a pro-Arab bias to a neutral or pro-Israel bias more apparent (Ikeda, p. 156). Because of its ties with the United States, Japan found itself wound up in the international pressures against Iraq after that country invaded Kuwait. Japan froze Iraqi assets and banned the importation of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil (Ibid., 168). Still, the international community saw
Japan as a cheerleader of the war rather than as a participant. Self-Defense Forces were kept out of the fighting in Iraq, although some units were sent to the Persian Gulf to perform minesweeper duties after the war. Japan contributed $13 billion in financial support to the war, but no troops to go with it. This sort of "checkbook diplomacy" proved to be a "humiliating experience for the Japanese government" (Kingston, p. 63).

Because of "grumblings and resistance from within Japanese society", the $13 billion of aid was delayed and this was seen by some Jewish groups in the United States and Israel as Japan's continued "slavish" adherence to the Arab boycott against Israel. Israel wanted to encourage foreign investment and saw Japan as a leader in the international economic development field, thus encouraging Japan to invest fairly in Israel (Ikeda, 168). For many nations, Japan's actions during and after the first Gulf War were too little, too late.

This international embarrassment led some people, such as conservative politician Ichiro Ozawa, to begin a debate by calling for Japan to be treated as a "normal" nation. Ozawa wrote that Japan's return to a "normal" (i.e., militarized) state was the right answer to the question of "Japan's responsible behavior in the international community" (Kingston, p. 161). In 1999, new defense guidelines were passed but the murmur of public debate "was a far cry from the street protests that rocked Tokyo in 1960 when the Security Treaty was revised and renewed" (Kingston, p. 64).

The Japanese government's actions around the time of the second Gulf War strengthened the military alliance with the United States. As Weston (2004) notes, Japan used the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 to pass the Anti-Terrorist Special Measures Law, supported the pre-emptive attack on Iraq, and decided to provide $1.5
billion for the reconstruction of Iraq. These steps “have strengthened Japan’s position in
the alliance and moved it closer to normal nation status” (Weston, p. 51-2). Despite
domestic opposition to the preemptive invasion of Iraq, Prime Minister Koizumi
continued to support the Bush administration. “There is also growing antagonism and
concern among opposition party members and the general public over blindly following
US foreign policy objectives” (Weston, p. 53). Part of the concern has to do with Japan’s
role in multilateral agreements and Japan’s relationship with European countries that
opposed the invasion of Iraq. When Koizumi gave his support for the United States
action on Iraq, Democratic Party Secretary Katsuya Okada questioned the justification of
the war based on the Bush Doctrine. Doi Takako, at the time Social Democratic Party
President, “criticized the precedence placed by the Koizumi administration on the
alliance when Japan should give consideration to the UN Charter and UN-oriented
foreign policy” (Weston, p. 53). J Sean Curtin, writing in the *Asia Times*, claims it is
because of a fear of North Korea attacking Japan that Koizumi so strongly backed the
United States, even though 80 percent of Japan’s population was against the war (Curtin,
2003).

There is, of course, one main difference between what the Japanese government
did during the first and second Gulf Wars: deploy troops. As mentioned above, this
deployment was the first into a war zone since World War II, in this case to the Iraqi city
of Samawa. The *Japan Times* (17 October 2003) reported that Samawa was considered
“the safest area in Iraq, according to a senior official of the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional
Authority for the region” and would be the focus of 80 to 90 percent of the Japanese
mission’s interest. The first Ground Self-Defense Forces arrived in the city on 8
February 2004. In total, 600 Self-Defense Forces soldiers were sent to Samawa and were, at first, the subject of much publicity. Once the Iraqi citizens realized the soldiers were not able to solve all the city’s needs, the mood soured, notes Mitsuo Maekawa, a Japanese journalist in the city. The Samawa government asked the Japanese ambassador for funds to rebuild the city’s infrastructure, but none came. The only aid the Japanese government sent was 150 carp streamers. The situation has since worsened, Maekawa notes; “Because of security concerns, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Self-Defense Force personnel rarely show their faces to the citizens. While covering events for this article, there were only two Japanese journalists stationed in Samawa. Since the beginning of July, the mood that had initially welcomed Japan has begun to change swiftly” (Maekawa, 2004).

Throughout the two conflicts in the Gulf, anti-war activists had reasons for their protests. While there was little to no sensitivity to the global antiwar protests from some world leaders during the second Gulf War, including U.S. president George W. Bush, for Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi there was a “domestic backlash” when members of the opposition party criticized him. During both Gulf Wars, anti-war activists in Japan had similar reasons to speak up. After years of discussion and movement away from the strict terms of Article 9, the political interpretation of that text was tested and changed by each crisis in the Gulf, and the government used the wars (and

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9 See, for example, the BBC’s article “Warm welcome for Japan's Iraq troops”, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3502471.stm.
10 Responding to a question on February 18, 2003 about the millions of protestors who had taken to the streets the previous weekend, President Bush said “First of all, you know, size of protest, it's like deciding, well, I'm going to decide policy based upon a focus group.” Whitehouse.gov.
11 Mainichi Daily News.
the aftermath of the first Gulf War) to expand the powers of the Self-Defense Forces. Japan's status as an international aid-giver and oil-dependent played a part in the government's response in 1991 and 2003, which prompted Japan to react more aggressively than many of its citizens wanted.

**Media, Wars, and Activists**

During a war, the media play a large role in the communication between citizens and their government. Unfortunately, this communication is rarely open and fair. David Earl Groth begins his chapter on the Japanese Bullet Train (Shinkansen) protests in the early 1980s by quoting Todd Gitlin's work on the America left in the American media, and he uses other studies of Western protestors and their relationship with various media outlets to study the Japanese protestors. Groth found that activists have little control over the content that appears in national mainstream newspapers like the *Asahi Shinbun* (Groth, 1996). Like Groth, I needed to turn to researchers who focused on activists and their relationships with the media, even if those researchers were not writing about Japanese activists. There is simply not much literature in English about how protestors in Japan interact with the media. Fortunately, we can take what we know about how activist voices related to the Western media and what little we know about the situation in Japan to form an image of the likely character of the protestors/media relationship in Japan during the two Gulf Wars. It is important to understand this relationship before looking at the protest data the newspapers present. This chapter will argue that the media have broad powers in a society with their ability to disseminate images and messages that people in that society use to understand events. This power is not lost on either activists
or those the activists are speaking out against, and so both sides try to influence the media. Touching on the American media coverage of the Vietnam War—no shortage of academic literature there—and the two Gulf Wars and beyond, we find a system designed to minimize protestor voices, both in the United States and Japan. Activists, for their part, often create their own media, and the Internet, which came into widespread use between the first and second Gulf Wars, provides more opportunities than ever for self-publicity.

America lost the Vietnam War. Perhaps more important, America lost the Vietnam War on TV. Andreas (2004) claims this easily visible defeat led to a broad anti-militarist feeling among Americans called the "Vietnam Syndrome." Small (1994) declares it was the media that "constituted the single most important influence on the way people viewed mass demonstrations in particular and the antiwar movement in general" (p. 1) during the Vietnam War. For over two decades after the fall of Saigon, large numbers of American military forces were not deployed into battle until the first Gulf War. The quick "success" of the 1991 Gulf War prompted the first President Bush to claim, "By God, we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all." Many parts of the first Gulf War were broadcast live on television and contributed to the impact of the win. The antiwar movement against the Iraq invasion of 2003, and the continued bloodshed in Iraq, though, proved the first President Bush wrong. Whether showing the

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12 Taylor (1998) alternately defines "Vietnam Syndrome" as the continuing image of the American superpower defeated in Vietnam, which some U.S. military leaders say is the fault of journalists.
United States “losing” the Vietnam War or “winning” the first Gulf War, the power of the media, especially in a time of war, cannot be understated.

Klandermans’ (1992) studied the social constructions that affect social movement organizations (SMOs) and argues that social movements sponsor ideological packages, and thereby contribute to public discourse. In order to do so, they must compete with other sponsors, such as representatives of the “official” position and other opponents. The mass media, Gamson (1989) argues, play a pivotal role in the mobilization of social movements because of media’s central role in modern societies and their dissemination of these ideological packages throughout society. Luckily for an SMO’s adherents and supporters, SMOs “can have a profound impact on media discourse” (Klandermans, p. 88).

According to Klandermans, the social construction of protest takes place at three levels: in public discourse, where “collective identities are formed and transformed”, in persuasive communication, by SMOs, their opponents and counter-SMOs, and in consciousness-raising during collective actions. The first level, which includes the media, is the only one where everyone in a society or a particular sector of that society is involved, and this is also the level where “long-term processes of formation and transformation of collective beliefs take place” (p. 87). Jane Jenson (1987) argues issues can spark protests only if they gain access to arenas of public discourse. As keyholders to the process of introducing arguments and counterarguments (and, indeed, “news” itself) in the public discourse, the mass media have immense power and play a crucial element in the process of developing public discourse. Since the media help set public discourse, it is important to understand how the media themselves define “news”.

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Gitlin (1980) uses the term media “frames” to explain what is news, and his terminology is still valid today even though new media have developed for news dissemination. News is “the event, not the underlying condition; the person, not the group; conflict, not consensus; the fact that “advances the story,” not the one that explains it” (p. 28, emphasis in original). Gitlin’s larger point, made throughout his seminal *The Whole World is Watching*, is that the organizational policy of newsrooms — the way editors assign stories and the way reporters pitch them, the way publishers express their opinions on the organization’s coverage — is responsible for these frames. Covering the antiwar movement in 1965 or 1991 or 2003, major news media are always operating from an entrenched position that defends the status quo (see also Parenti, 1993, p. 33-50). Taylor (1998) argues that media cannot, from this position, perform the role of neutral observer in covering public political discussions, and that “the media are no longer simply an observer of events. They never were anyway. Because warring factions are now increasingly conscious of a watching world, they are equally conscious of the need to secure appropriate publicity for their cause” (p. xxiii-xxiv).

Taylor touches on an important point here, that many people and groups who appear in the media are present because they actively engaged in securing coverage. Self-publicity strategies by activists are often carried out because activists know how powerful the media’s impact can be. Durham (2002) notes that “newspapers are social sites representing an intersection of multiple meanings, both from within and beyond their walls and their control” (p. 65). It is not necessary for activists to know Gurevitch and Levy’s (1985) description of the mass media as the “site on which various social groups, institutions, and ideologies struggle over the definition and construction of
reality" (p. 19) for them to know that the media may be watching them at any time and
the public is watching the media.

While activists often attempt to control aspects of their media appearances by, for
example, sending out press releases before protest actions to give the press detailed
information on where and when a protest will occur, the “other” side can be just as eager
to attract the media’s attention. For example, during the first Gulf War, U.S. Navy
officials “expressed regret that the video recorders on their aircraft had produced pictures
that were not as technically clean as those made by the Air Force, resulting in less media
recognition of their service’s contribution to the war” (Baroody, p. 19). Political actors
know the value in garnering media coverage.

The military also has their own idea of how the media should cover their work.
For one, most militaries do not want the press to freely cover everything they do. Taylor
(1998) claims that keeping the media away from the United States’ wars in Grenada and
Panama, and the subsequent military control over the way the media portrayed the
American “success” of the first Gulf War, were ways the military attempted to overcome
America’s “Vietnam Syndrome” (p. 4). During the second Gulf War, the military
“embedded” reporters with troops invading Iraq. Baroody (1998) says the media and the
government are often “antagonists” (p. 3), even though “journalists depend on their
sources for information, and officials need journalists not only to disseminate data, but in
so doing, to shape the audience-constituencies’ perception of events” (p. 46).

With actors on different sides often pressuring editors and writers this way or that,
no reporting of contentious issues can please all sides. Gitlin (1980), for example, notes
six ways a New York Times article from April 1965 could have more accurately covered
an antiwar March on Washington (p. 53-58). While the details are different depending on where and when a protest event takes place, the main flaws that result from the hegemonic news frames the *Times* used are unfortunately still in place in many newsrooms.

The public, though, in order to make informed decisions on policy and leaders, needs to be informed about what is going on. The military may want to shape the public’s minds and the activists may have their own interpretation of events, but it is the media’s role to take all sides of an issue into account, including the messages the antiwar movement is attempting to spread. Balanced reporting was not the case in the United States during the first Gulf War, though, as many commentators have pointed out. Jim Naureckas (1991) argues that there was a lack of emphasis in U.S. media on opposition to U.S. involvement in the first Gulf War. Oliver, Mares, and Cantor (1993) claim that anecdotal evidence “suggests that the mass media presented the U.S. involvement in a positive light, and encouraged identification among viewers with U.S. military in the Gulf” (p. 147). Noam Chomsky (1992) goes further and says the media “overwhelmingly” closed ranks and became a cheering section for the United States (p. 54). Where the American media went, some Japanese media followed. Tetsuo Kogawa (1992) claims that after the first Gulf War began, Japanese television networks used their contracts with the major U.S. networks to obtain news footage for their own broadcasts, and that “Japanese television became American television” (Kogawa, p. 90, emphasis in original).

Unfortunately, U.S. television news is often an unreliable information conduit. Studies done on television news during each of the Gulf Wars found viewers who
watched television news often knew few facts about the wars. Looking at the attitudes about the first Gulf War, Lewis, Jhally, and Morgan (1991) found that the more people watched television coverage of the war, the less they knew about the details of the war or inconsistencies in U.S. foreign policy. A study released by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (2003), found that television news viewers during the second Gulf War, especially those who watched the pro-Bush Administration U.S. cable news network FOX, were likely to be misinformed about facts such as whether or not any weapons of mass destruction had been found in Iraq or whether or not Saddam Hussein had direct connections to the terrorist group Al Quaeda.

Japanese television has also been selective in its coverage of non-governmental viewpoints since at least the Anpo protests. Krauss (2000) looked at how news reports were prepared at one of Japan’s most influential and institutionalized media outlets, the television broadcaster NHK. He found the protests surrounding the Anpo controversy of 1960 were “the first major political event in Japanese history vicariously experienced by the public via television” (p. 126) and coincided with an explosion of televisions in Japanese households. After the protests, NHK and “many other media organizations” (p. 127) began to limit coverage of violence and extreme views in political coverage. As we will see below, the Asahi Shinbun continues this trend today.

One way the Japanese mass media exclude extreme political views is through press clubs. Freeman (2000) calls the *kisha kurabu* (press clubs) that form the backbone of the major media players in Japan “information cartels.” She also argues that the club system “has, if not by design then by actual practice, placed journalists in a position
whereby the news they report and the agenda that gets presented are primarily those of their official sources” (p 15-6). Freeman defines her use of “cartel” by stating:

The information-gathering process takes place within a “closed shop” made up of journalists having proprietary access to information and sources. Contact with official sources is limited to a select group of individuals or organizations that have established a clearly defined, if not codified, set of rules and practices. The perpetuation of the closed shop is guaranteed by the enforcement of sanctions or the threat of their enforcement. (p. 67-8)

For journalists in a press club, developing personal relationships with sources is one of the main goals, for it is these sources that provide information. One example Freeman cites is a pamphlet used by journalists at the Yomiuri Shinbun that says the police are considered major supporters of newspaper companies because of the information the police supply. The pamphlet encourages journalists assigned to the police press club to bring bottles of whiskey to the police officers’ homes in order to foster good relationships.

Because this thesis uses both the Asahi Shinbun and the Japan Times to collect data, the way press clubs deal with non-Japanese reporters is important. Freeman describes how the trade association Nihon Shinbun Kyōkai (Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association) monitors the various press clubs. Many groups, such as freelancers, newsmagazine writers and, most importantly for this thesis, foreigners, are excluded from the clubs. Recently, foreign journalists were granted some access to press clubs, but they still do not have parity with Japanese journalists. Freeman writes that “although foreign journalists in any country have less access to important sources than the indigenous press, the extent to which the foreign press has been excluded in Japan is
remarkable” (p. 97). How the Japan Times, an English-language daily newspaper written in part by reporters who are not native to Japan, fits into the press club system, Freeman does not say, but the chances that the Asahi Shinbun and the Japan Times have the same level of access are indeed slim.

Just because the Asahi Shinbun participates in the press clubs does not make it an obedient government mouthpiece. According to Groth (1996), the Asahi Shinbun regularly publishes articles “sympathetic toward citizens’ movements dealing with environmental issues” (p. 220) and Katzenstein (1996) writes the Asahi Shinbun is one of the major newspapers playing the role of the “loyal opposition” against the government, but remains a vital part of the political system (p. 42).

Unquestionably, the media has great (but not exclusive) power in determining which groups and issues commonly reach the public ear. The way the media frames activists’ messages – the way the media unwrap the ideological package – has a powerful impact on the way the activists are perceived by the public.

If the unwrapped ideological package is positive, it may lead readers to activism. During the 1960 protests against Anpo, women who read about the protests in the popular women’s magazine Fujin kōron (Women’s Forum) or similar publications that discussed political issues made up a majority of the women who took part in those protests (Sasaki-Uemura, p. 136). Some scholars (Rojecki, 1999) define SMOs as starting from the bottom up, with organized groups making “the larger public aware of an issue and a preferred solution. When and if the public responds, if it finds the appeal persuasive, a movement occurs” (p. 7). If, on the other hand, the ideological package is negative or not
positive enough, what options do activists have to disagree with or enhance the image the media puts forth?

First, activists are often quick learners in how to interact with the media, by, for example, preparing advance copies of speeches for the press (Small, p. 14) or dressing for television (e.g., Ralph Nader and other public-interest lawyers interviewed in suits while sitting in front of bookshelves) (Gitlin, p. 284). McAdam and Snow (1997) argue that the “doggedness with which most movement groups seek media attention should caution us against a wholly negative view of the media” (p. 365). Strategies by protestors to increase and control mass media coverage are also present in Japan, as both Groth and Sasaki-Uemura note. Groth (1996) found SMO leaders involved in the anti-Shinkansen movements in Nagoya and the Kita Ward of Tokyo “specifically instructed members to avoid independent contact with the mass media” (p. 223), designated representatives for the media to interview, barred mass media representatives from certain movement activities, and tried to create news events with creative protest actions. Sasaki-Uemura (2001) notes that during the Anpo protests, activists “began to keep vigils at the Diet press club and to carry placards demanding that journalists heed their consciences and tell the truth. Other banners implored editors not to cave in to the authorities” (p. 52).

Another possibility for activists to respond to the mass media image is to write and create their own media. Physical public message boards have long been used to inform the public of news and events.14 Activist-created leaflets and newsletters have

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14 Discussion of a physical message board surfaced at least once during the first Gulf War. In an article in the *Asahi Shinbun* from 3 February 1991, the members of the Tokyo YWCA discuss setting up a physical bulletin board for citizens to post comments to about the war. There were no mentions of such a message board during the second Gulf War.
also been used around the world. Sasaki-Uemura notes the use of *mini komi* by protestors in Japan. *Mini komi*, which stands for mini-communications (as opposed to *masu komi*, or mass media), are made up of self-produced media such as small-scale magazines or mimeographed newsletters. Today, it is possible for activists to go further and use their own electronic media channels to disseminate their message, for example through websites such as Indymedia.org, text messages on cell phones\(^{15}\) or self-made video documentaries.

The Internet became a common communication tool after the first Gulf War ended. The mass media (slowly being renamed “legacy media”) framed the antiwar movement in their own way, but on the Internet – through emails written by individuals or through public message boards where like-minded individuals can discuss recent or upcoming actions, as well as broader topics related to the war – the frame is created by those inside the “image”. I believe the major differences between the protests against the two wars can be attributed in a large part to the ability of activists to directly control their ideological packaging. In short, the Internet allows anyone with the technical and financial capabilities to frame a message exactly the way they wish it to appear. The impact of the Internet on the protest against the second Gulf War can only be seen indirectly in this thesis, but its presence must be kept in mind when attempting to understand how millions of people around the world took to the streets on the same day.

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\(^{15}\) Cell phone text messages were used by SMOs as a real-time news source during the anti-Republican National Convention protests in New York City in August and September 2004. See Scahill, 2004.
CHAPTER 3

Where Does the Information Come From – Rules and Methodology

During the fall of 2002 and the spring of 2003, the people of the world knew they were engaged in a global action. How well the media presented what the people were doing with it is another issue, even though they had had an introduction to a similar sort of global antiwar protest twelve years earlier. To determine how the Japan Times and the Asahi Shinbun reported the antiwar movements against the Iraq invasions of January 1991 and March 2003, I used articles from the two newspapers as primary sources in a systematic content analysis. How legitimate is it to use mainstream newspapers as a source for information on people who are, at times, speaking out against the mainstream? What types of bias can we expect, and how can we take the bias into account so that the data is still useable?

As mentioned in the introduction, newspapers are a common resource for scholars of protest events (Koopmans, 1993; McAdam, 1983; Tarrow, 1993). The benefits are obvious, for newspapers (and, increasingly, other media sources) provide a detailed record of events as they happen, and sometimes these reports are the only records available. Newspapers often present the best source of daily coverage of protest actions, even if this usage is often the result of a “negative choice” (Kriesi et al., 1992), and different scholars use newspapers differently. Gitlin (1980) used comprehensive research instead of sampling the coverage by the New York Times and CBS News from 1965, reading “all of them, piece by piece” (p. 303) for his look at the media’s relationship with
the New Left. Koopmans (1993) looked at Monday issues of one of Germany’s leading
dailies, the Frankfurter Rundschau, to gauge the level of political protest in Germany
from 1965 to 1989.\textsuperscript{16} Kriesi et al. (1992) also used data from newspaper articles in
Monday editions of a major newspaper in four countries to analyze New Social
Movements in Europe. McAdam (1983) used the synopses of relevant articles in the New
York Times index from 1955 to 1970 under two separate headings. Tarrow (1993) used
newspaper data from Italy from 1965 to 1974. For all their faults, “among the possible
sources of qualitative data on protest development, newspapers are clearly the best
choice” (Kriesi et al., 1992).

Best choice or not, the validity of using any newspaper as a source of information
on activists has long been debated in mainstream journals like the American Sociological
Review and elsewhere. The literature in English (which, again, focuses in a large part on
protests in the United States and Western Europe) warns against treating newspaper
sources as the complete picture. Danzger (1975) found the New York Times did not
present a complete picture of all activist activities. Snyder and Kelly (1976) found errors
in newspaper coverage when the stories focused on actions of low conflict intensity.
Mueller (1997) warns researchers that “the origins of a protest cycle are poorly
represented in the international press beyond the countries that border on the protest site”
(p. 831). McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith (1996) compared the records of demonstration
permits in the Washington, D.C. area by three permitting agents – the National Park
Service, the U.S. Capital Police, and the D.C. Metropolitan Police – against newspaper

\textsuperscript{16} Koopmans’ calls his use of Monday editions “particularly efficient” (p. 368) because
the majority of protests are concentrated on weekends in modern Western democracies,
and weekday protests are often referred to in follow-up stories in Monday newspapers.
coverage of protest events in the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* and the television news reports on ABC, NBC, and CBS. They found “the picture of Washington demonstrations portrayed in the mass media differs dramatically from that generated from demonstration permit records” (p. 487). The media covered only 13 percent of the permitted protests in 1982 and 7.1 percent in 1991. The 1991 protests included over 300 permitted events protesting against the first Gulf War, and “the media focus on demonstrations in 1991 was skewed toward the Gulf War” (p. 488). More recently, Almeida and Lichbach (2003) found activist-based websites provided a much clearer coverage of activist actions than local, national, or international newspapers during the protests against the World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle in the fall of 1999.

Newspapers may be biased, but they are consistently biased, and media outlets are likely to be swayed by the size of a protest event. McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith (1996) found that while the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* were both biased in similar ways (i.e., against protest events of small size) but “the national print media provides an amazingly stable portrait of the churning mixture of protest forms, purposes, and contexts in Washington, D.C. during 1982 and 1991” (p. 496). Oliver and Myers (1999) found a similar bias against small events (not just protest events) in their study of how two local newspapers covered public events in Madison, Wisconsin in 1994. While Oliver and Myers could not find data on every single public event, their study found medium-size events were reported on with a rate similar to the smallest events, but “small events (involving fewer than 16 people) were much less likely to be covered, and the largest events (involving 500 or more people) were much more likely to be covered” (p.
Almeida and Lichbach (2003) also found large numbers of people at a protest positively influenced media coverage.

Oliver and Myers found that the location and the presence of a message of the public event also influenced newspaper coverage. Mueller's (1997) study of protest events leading to the collapse of the German Democratic Republic in 1989 found that violence at and long duration of a protest event were significant predictors for coverage for some newspapers, but protest size was significant in all English-language newspapers in her study (London Times, Guardian, New York Times, and the Washington Post).

For the data in this thesis, it is important to keep in mind this general trend of reporting large protests over small ones, which indicates that on days when there are hundreds of protest actions around the globe – such as 18 January 2003 and 15 February 2003 – it is likely small protests will go unreported. Anecdotally, marches in Honolulu of 1,500 and 600 people on these days, respectively, made the front page of local newspapers but were not reported in either the Asahi Shinbun or the Japan Times.

The literature thus makes it clear that newspapers should not be thought of as complete data repositories for any particular movement or group of protests, and the coverage of the movements against the two Gulf Wars was no exception. For example, there were conscientious objector soldiers who refused to fight during both Gulf Wars. Some news about soldiers refusing to go to Iraq was mentioned in other media or on activist-based websites (e.g. notinourname.net), but their stories were not reported in the Japan Times or the Asahi Shinbun. Since we know newspapers present an incomplete picture of protest events, how can we best compensate for the lack of completeness and still use the information that is in the newspapers?
While studying the 1989 protests in the former German Democratic Republic, Mueller (1997) used a method of coding newspaper coverage of protest events that dramatically increases the reliability of the data. Mueller used six "quality" newspapers in three countries (the former West Germany, England and the United States) to construct a list of nonredundant protest events. The newspapers were the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, the *London Times*, the *Guardian*, the *New York Times*, and the *Washington Post*. Each mention of a protest event in one of these newspapers was entered into a list that considered each event unique, no matter how many newspapers reported it. Mueller was interested in how an event's intensity contributed to its media coverage, and the list allowed Mueller to see which newspapers covered which protest events. Mueller found that the West German newspapers were writing about the protest event much earlier than the newspapers in England or the United State. Mueller found that "The intensity of an event becomes more important in attracting media coverage the farther the press is from the protest site. For these largely nonviolent events, the number of participants is by far the most important dimension of event intensity" (p. 831). Her conclusion for acquiring the best data on protest events from newspaper articles is that her "analysis argues strongly in favor of gathering data from 'local' coverage by the most proximate quality newspapers and also coding from more than one newspaper" (p. 831). Since this thesis looks at both the Japanese protests and the global protests against the Gulf Wars, the *Asahi Shinbun* and the *Japan Times* meet, to some degree, Mueller's suggestions.

Two of the most common methods for reducing stacks of newspapers to useable data are to identify relevant articles in a newspaper's annual index (McAdam, 1983) or to
use a sampling of newspaper articles (Koopmans, 1993). The most time-consuming method is to look through every issue of a newspaper for a given time period and code any relevant articles found. For this thesis, I used indexes where available and looked through every issue of the newspapers themselves (the hard copy or on microfilm, depending on what was available) where there was no index to create a nonredundant list of events similar to Mueller's.

To further mitigate the bias that newspaper articles are wont to present, the data for this thesis was collected without sampling and was made up, for the most part, of facts from the articles instead of opinions. For projects with long time frames such as Koopmans', sampling is a valid solution to the problem of sifting through so much potential data. In collecting data for this thesis, though, I eschewed sampling and gathered the entire universe of coverage from the two newspapers during the time periods selected. While the Japan Times index does not describe individual articles, it does give enough information about the article to safely ignore Olzak's (1989) warning on the dangers of using a newspaper index — in that case the index from the New York Times — to gather data.

Danzger (1975) warns researchers against potential bias in newspaper articles finding its way into the data used for analysis. He suggests analyzing indisputable facts (protestor counts, whether or not the police were called in, which groups were involved) rather than details that may be called into question (such as protestor attitudes). While protestor counts in newspaper reports are often contentious (Gitlin, 1980; Small, 1994), the database I built and used includes only information that falls into Danzger's "hard facts" category. Although McCarthy, McPhail and, Smith (1996), for example, note that
newspapers do not provide a complete list of all these “hard facts”, the issue here is not whether all protest events that occurred were included in the database, but that all the information in the database is a “hard fact”. The only exceptions were in the “detailed protestor statements” field, which, it could be argued, were subjective decisions on my part as to what represented detailed statements and what did not.

Keeping all the abovementioned shortcomings of using newspapers to understand protest events in mind, it is still important to accurately define what is an antiwar “protest event” for the purpose of this thesis. What constituted a protest event against one of the Gulf Wars, and where were the limits set? For this thesis, antiwar protest events were actions by one or more people that opposed any military action threatened or occurring in the Persian Gulf. Researchers disagree on how many people are required for an action to be considered “collective”. Tilly (1978) suggests 50, Mueller (1997) defines a collective action as “involving 10 or more persons” (p. 826), and Ozark (1989) has at times considered any action by two or more people to be “collective”. Because this thesis is concerned with the collective antiwar actions of people around the globe, I included actions by individuals in the database. By using only protest events that specifically addressed military action in the Gulf, certain types of protests that could be construed as opposing war in general or supporting other antiwar protests were left out. For example, while there were many protests against the two Gulf Wars in Okinawa, protests against an aspect of the U.S. bases there (e.g., nighttime flight training) were not included in the database because they were not directly addressing the conflicts in the Gulf. There were a large number of similar anti-U.S. military protests in South Korea that were also not included in the database.
So, what articles were included in the database? Finding articles in the *Asahi Shinbun* and the *Japan Times* required different strategies, although the two newspapers were treated as similarly as possible. The data were collected for both newspapers from the 16-month period from September 2002 to December 2003, as well as the 14-month period from July 1990 to August 1991. These dates were chosen because they include the period of heavy active combat and the six or eight months bookending these phases. Even though fighting in Iraq continues at the time of this writing (February 2005), the December 2003 cut-off period provides a convenient time frame with which to compare the two Gulf Wars. The time frames were selected so the articles analyzed included actions carried out in the buildup to the war as well as the ongoing protests during the occupation period following the end of “major combat operations” in the case of the second Gulf War and the period of withdrawal from Iraq after the first.

For the *Japan Times*, every article that reported on antiwar protests, except for opinion articles, was analyzed and coded. In addition, news analysis articles that may not have mentioned specific protests but featured a photo of an antiwar protest were also coded, and each photo and caption was coded the same way articles were. Antiwar protests were defined as a protest action initiated by people outside of the institutional government system. Therefore, statements or rebukes by political leaders – both inside the United States, the country leading the drive to war, and in other countries – were not counted. Under this system, a warning against military action by German Chancellor Schröder was not counted, but an antiwar statement released by a group of Nobel scientists, for example, was included.
Due to the recent nature of some of the subject matter, it was not possible to search for all articles in the same manner. The available Japan Times media included the 1990, 1991 and 2002 issues on microfilm, from which articles were identified using the annual index prepared by the Japan Times, and the 2003 issues as hard copies, each of which was manually scanned for relevant articles. To compare the results of the two search methods, I visually scanned a week’s worth of 2002 issues (22 October through 28 October) on microfilm and came up with the same records as the indexed search, with one discrepancy: a photo of a street demonstration in San Francisco was not revealed in the index. This photo was printed next to an article about the French government opposing the U.S. actions, a category of “protest” that I did not include in my data. This reveals a minor weakness due to the unavoidable necessity of using two separate searching methods.

To find articles from the Asahi Shinbun, I searched the newspaper’s monthly index. For the articles from 1990 and 1991, I used the bound hard copy of monthly indexes, which the Asahi Shinbun releases every five years or so. To find articles relating to the second Gulf War, I searched the monthly indices that accompany the monthly microfilms. The monthly and annual indexes are structured exactly the same way, so articles from the two wars could be found in the same index category. Both of these searches were conducted with help from a native speaker of Japanese to ensure accuracy.

An initial scan for all the Asahi Shinbun articles from a given month (January 1991) revealed the bulk of the articles that mentioned antiwar protests were filed under the “Politics” heading (政治). The second Gulf War provided an exception, though, as the Asahi Shinbun included a special “Iraq War” heading (イラク戦争) for the March and
April 2003 indexes. I searched all articles in this special section in addition to the “Politics” section for these two monthly indexes. Freeman (2000) describes the mendate practice Japanese newspapers regularly use as “where pages of the newspaper are reserved for a certain category of news—either general, political, economic, international, social or sports” (p. 19) which reinforces the validity of the decision to use these headings to find all relevant articles. I translated the articles from the Japanese, with help and advice from both a native speaker of Japanese and a professor of Japanese literature. In all other ways, the articles from the Japan Times and the Asahi Shinbun were treated equally. Once collected, the articles were examined for information to fill the fields in a FileMaker Pro database.

The database included the obvious fields for the “hard facts” about the protest event such as the location, number of participants, and date. The database also included fields for Koopmans’ four action form categories (described below), repression or facilitation from establishment actors and whether or not protestors were allowed to speak in the article. The protest type field in the database was a dynamic field that in the end contained forty-three different types of protest. A protest might include more than one protest type if, for example, some members of a march broke off and became involved in a confrontational protest with police. Some of these protest types may have appeared only once or twice in the entire dataset, but using the flexible nature of a relational database allowed me to categorize these actions as exactly what they were, and then assign them to an “Other” field if necessary when creating the data tables and charts.

Following Koopmans’ (1993) coding scheme (similar to Kriesi et al., 1992), I coded each protest event as having at least one type of action form, and some had two.
Koopmans defines four categories of non-exclusive action forms that a protest event can have. These four categories include Demonstrative, legal actions that “usually aim at mobilizing large numbers of people,” Confrontational, actions that are “nonviolent, but they aim to disrupt official policies and institutions, and for that reason are usually illegal,” Light violence, actions that “include limited forms of movement-initiated violence (e.g., breaking windows or throwing stones at the police during a demonstration),” and Heavy violence, actions which include “severe and usually conspiratorial violence” (for further details on the coding scheme, see Koopmans 1993, p. 369).

Before we move along, some definitions. Throughout this thesis, the terms “protest event,” “protest type”, and “action form” are used. It is important to carefully define these terms. “Protest event” is simply a generic term used to describe a protest done by an individual or a group of people. “Protest type” and “action form” are both terms used in the analysis based on codes in the database. “Protest type” refers to what the protestors actually did, for example a street demonstration or collecting signatures for a petition. “Action form” refers to one of the Koopmans’ (1993) four categories.

Kriesi et al. (1992) used a more detailed version of Koopmans’ coding scheme, and parts of their definitions are suitable for the current project. For example, I followed their definition of the delimitation of protest event’s timing. Each protest event was considered unique on the day it began. For example, a weeklong hunger strike was considered one action. In addition, Kriesi et al. defined how they used protest events that newspapers described as one event (p. 265). They considered protest events that might be considered separate (i.e. a march that leads to a rally) as one event with two action
forms if the number of participants and the goals of the protest action were the same. Thus, the march and rally can be counted as one protest event, but a peaceful march of 10,000 people from which 50 people break off and cause damage is counted as two protest events.

A problem in the protest type coding scheme manifested itself for the time after President George W. Bush’s May 1, 2003 declaration that “major combat operations” in the second Gulf War were finished. This is when the occupation officially began, and anti-Occupation protests taking place in Iraq began to get more coverage. There were two main types of anti-American events taking place in Iraq. First were actual street demonstrations, some of which got out of hand and resulted in confrontational or light violent actions, and some of which resulted in Iraqi protestors being shot by American soldiers, such as in Fallujah at the end of April 2003. The second type of event, which was not coded, was the actual attacks against American and British soldiers. While these attacks could have been interpreted in the coding scheme as Heavy Violence, I felt the attacks should be considered part of the war itself.

Koopmans’ action forms are suitable for this project in many ways. First, they obviously allow a deeper coding than just when and where an event took place, and who participated. Second, by using a relational database with two layouts, each different action form in a protest event and each protest event was given its own unique entry. This categorization allows for accurate analysis of the types of protests the war’s opponents were engaged in as they demonstrated, at least as reported by the Japan Times and the Asahi Shinbun. Since each protest event was also assigned its own action form,
the four “action form” variables allow us to determine the level of radical behavior for each protest event.

The database included other identifying features for each entry. Repression by state actors against the protestors, including police actions such as arrests or firing rubber bullets, and facilitation from establishment actors, such as a church, a political party, or a celebrity, was also coded. Here, I used a different definition of repression than Koopmans. His definition includes instances of authorities depicting “activists or organizers as criminals” (p. 369). For my database, only overt acts of police or state repression that fit into Danzger’s “hard facts” categories, such as arrests or crowd dispersal techniques, were considered repression. Koopmans’ definition of facilitation, the presence “of support from established political actors for an action” (Ibid.) is straightforward enough and was therefore used. For example, celebrities speaking during a rally or a church helping to promote or organize an event were considered facilitation.

Each protest event was also coded as to whether or not the article included detailed statements from the protestors themselves about why they were protesting. Detailed protester statements did not include simple reporting of what was listed on signs seen at the street demonstration, but required a quote of some detail from a protestor at the scene (an organizer or an individual participating in the action). Other details of the article, such as whether it included a photograph and which stories ran on the front page, were also coded. Looking at the number of times a newspaper gives its readers detailed information about what some of the demonstrators are thinking and when such detail appears, is a way to gauge how full a picture readers can obtain. By viewing the amount
of detailed protestor statements over time, it is possible to see when the newspaper felt it was important to give its readers this fuller picture.

The details above describe just what went into the database I used for this thesis, but there is one final methodological point to make. This thesis uses the Asahi Shinbun as the newspaper of record for Japan. To see if there was any bias in the Asahi Shinbun's coverage, I used the Japan Times as another, more international, source. By combining the results using Mueller's method, I found a vast discrepancy in the two newspapers' coverage. The Japan Times, most likely because of its international focus, did a much better job of covering protests outside of Japan, while the Asahi Shinbun's coverage of domestic protests far outdid the coverage in the Japan Times.

The Japan Times and the Asahi Shinbun contained a total of 378 antiwar movement articles. Of these, 86 were from the Japan Times in 1990 and 1991 and 182 from 2002 and 2003. Another 84 came from the Asahi Shinbun in 1990 and 1991 and 106 from 2002 and 2003. In these 378 articles, the two newspapers reported a total of 867 protest events. During the two Gulf wars only 36 protest events (4.2%) were reported in both newspapers, and 831 (95.8%) were reported solely in one or the other. For example, during the first Gulf War, the Asahi Shinbun reported 127 domestic protest events that the Japan Times did not cover, and the Japan Times reported 66 that did not appear in the Asahi Shinbun. Only 10 domestic protest events were covered by both newspapers. The two newspapers also presented international protests differently. The Asahi Shinbun covered 22 that the Japan Times missed, the Japan Times reported on 92 that were not covered in the Asahi Shinbun, and there were four protest events that both newspapers noticed. This unbalanced trend continued for the second Gulf War, when the
Asahi Shinbun reported 94 domestic protest events that the Japan Times did not cover, the Japan Times reported 31 that did not appear in the Asahi Shinbun, and there were 9 that made both papers. For protest events outside of Japan, the Asahi Shinbun covered 60 protest events that the Japan Times did not, and the Japan Times mentioned an amazing 339 protest events that the Asahi Shinbun did not. There were 13 protest events outside of Japan that both newspapers reported on. These are the first in a series of findings that show the Asahi Shinbun and the Japan Times presenting vastly different aspects of the global anti-war movements, meaning that the view readers had of the movements varied depending on which newspaper they were reading. See Table 1. It is not possible here to determine the reasons for the decrease in domestic protest event coverage by the Japan Times and the increase in coverage of international protest event coverage by the Asahi Shinbun from the first to the second Gulf War, although possible explanations are changes in staff numbers or an increased reliance on wire reports.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gulf War I</th>
<th>Gulf War II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asahi Shinbun only</td>
<td>Japan Times only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japan</strong></td>
<td>127</td>
<td>85.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International</strong></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>149</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Before any further discussion of what protests were covered by which newspaper, it is vital to discuss the findings in Table 1. Knowing that within the combined dataset of 867 protest actions, only 36 were mentioned by both newspapers does not allow for a
discussion of what the media in Japan was saying about the protest events, since the two newspapers reported such an incredibly different face to the anti-war movements. In effect, the *Asahi Shinbun* provides a reasonable picture of protest events in Japan, while the *Japan Times* provides a reasonable picture of protest events in other places. By using the combined dataset, we can see how protests in Japan against the two Gulf Wars were related to protests happening elsewhere. This dataset is also valuable in understanding the levels of international coordination in the protests against the second Gulf War.
CHAPTER 4

Findings

The antiwar movements against the two Gulf Wars were filled with creative people doing creative things. Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of the protests covered in the Japan Times and the Asahi Shinbun were tried-and-true street demonstrations. One important difference between the two newspapers during the Gulf Wars – that neither newspaper managed to present a balanced view of the international protests with domestic protests – was described at the end of the Methodology section. Using the combined list of all protest events reported in either newspaper, though, we are able to compare the differences between the movements against the two wars, which is where we will start explaining the findings.

As benefiting a worldwide movement, some articles on the protest events mentioned the global aspect of the antiwar sentiment. During the first Gulf War, there were a few days of protest where events took place around the world, including, for example, solidarity events in Uganda and Taiwan. Looking at the stories in both newspapers, we find reports of 49 “global” protest events, with “global” here meaning a protest event that occurred on the same day as protests around the world and the article mentioned the concurrent protests. Looking at where the protest events occurred, without regard to how the newspapers framed the event, we can see that the overwhelming majority of protests in 1990 and 1991 were limited to countries in Western Europe and America. See Figure 1. The antiwar movement was much more geographically varied
during the second Gulf War, although there were still more protest events in Europe and America than in other areas. See Figure 2. The number of geographic regions where protests occurred in 2002 and 2003 was a spice market compared to the salt-and-pepper shaker locations seen during 1990 and 1991. See Table 2.

| Table 2. Comparison of Domestic and International Protest Events During the First and Second Gulf Wars |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Gulf War I | | Gulf War II |
| | N | % | N | % |
| Japan | 203 | 63.2% | 134 | 24.5% |
| International | 118 | 36.8% | 412 | 75.5% |
| North America | 69 | 21.5% | 107 | 19.6% |
| Europe and Russia | 30 | 9.3% | 120 | 22.0% |
| The Middle East and Central Asia | 8 | 2.5% | 73 | 13.4% |
| Asia (excluding Japan) | 6 | 1.9% | 58 | 10.6% |
| Australia and New Zealand | 4 | 1.2% | 39 | 7.1% |
| South America | 0 | 0.0% | 4 | 0.7% |
| Africa | 1 | 0.3% | 7 | 1.3% |
| Global | 0 | 0.0% | 4 | 0.7% |
| Totals | 321 | 546 |
Figure 1. Location of protest events during the first Gulf War. A darkened country indicates at least one anti-Gulf War protest event took place in that country between July 1990 and August 1991.

Figure 2. Location of protest events during the second Gulf War. A darkened country indicates at least one anti-Gulf War protest event took place in that country between September 2002 and December 2003.
As Figures 1 and 2 clearly show, activists in many more countries were involved in the movement against the second Gulf War than against the first. Table 2 shows the numerical differences between the protests against the two wars. During the first Gulf War, there were 203 protest events reported in Japan and 118 outside of Japan. The number of domestic protest events during the second Gulf War decreases to 134, but the number of international protest events increases dramatically to 412. In all of the geographic categories there are more protest events during the second Gulf War than the first, but the internationalization of the movement can perhaps best be seen in the large increases in protest events in the Middle East and Central Asia, Asia (excluding Japan), and Australia and New Zealand. These regions each had fewer than 10 protest events during the first Gulf War, and 73, 58, and 39 (respectively) during the second. In Europe and Russia, the number of protest events quadrupled from 30 to 120. South America and Africa, regions that had only one protest event between them during the first Gulf War, had 11 during the second.

Even though this thesis is most interested in how the two movements differed between the two wars, looking at how the two newspapers covered the two wars differently allows us to see the bias each newspaper has. See Table 3.
Table 3. Comparison of Domestic and International Protest Events During the First and Second Gulf Wars, by Newspaper

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gulf War I</th>
<th></th>
<th>Gulf War II</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asahi Shinbun</td>
<td>Japan Times</td>
<td>Asahi Shinbun</td>
<td>Japan Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>N %</td>
<td>N %</td>
<td>N %</td>
<td>N %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>137 84.0%</td>
<td>76 44.2%</td>
<td>103 58.5%</td>
<td>40 10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>10 6.1%</td>
<td>63 36.6%</td>
<td>24 13.6%</td>
<td>88 22.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and</td>
<td>12 7.4%</td>
<td>18 10.5%</td>
<td>21 11.9%</td>
<td>100 25.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1 0.6%</td>
<td>7 4.1%</td>
<td>16 9.1%</td>
<td>60 15.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Middle East</td>
<td>1 0.6%</td>
<td>4 2.3%</td>
<td>8 4.5%</td>
<td>52 13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Central Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia (excluding Japan)</td>
<td>2 1.2%</td>
<td>4 2.3%</td>
<td>8 4.5%</td>
<td>52 13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia and New Zealand</td>
<td>1 0.6%</td>
<td>3 1.7%</td>
<td>4 2.3%</td>
<td>37 9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>0 0.0%</td>
<td>0 0.0%</td>
<td>0 0.0%</td>
<td>4 1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>0 0.0%</td>
<td>1 0.6%</td>
<td>0 0.0%</td>
<td>7 1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>0 0.0%</td>
<td>0 0.0%</td>
<td>0 0.0%</td>
<td>4 1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The coverage in the *Japan Times* and the *Asahi Shinbun* sometimes seemed to be focusing on two different antiwar movements during each of the Gulf Wars. In the *Japan Times*, the majority of the protest events the newspaper reported on were protests that took place outside of Japan. Given the newspapers' main focus, domestic or international, a slight trend of this nature would not be unusual. The incredibly lopsided approach to the coverage the two newspapers printed, though, is surprising, and reveals severe undercoverage in the *Asahi Shinbun* of protest events that occurred outside of Japan.

During the first Gulf War, the *Japan Times* reported 96 protest events that took place outside of Japan; during the second Gulf War, this number increased dramatically to 352. The *Asahi Shinbun*, on the other hand, presented most of its stories from both wars from a more Japan-centric perspective. The *Asahi Shinbun* reported on only 26 international protest events during the first Gulf War, and only 73 during the second. While the *Asahi Shinbun*’s coverage does show the increased international protests, it
does not fully present the anti-war movement against the second Gulf War as the obviously global movement that it was. The newspaper still presents the majority of protest events as happening within Japan, and ignores the protest events in some regions (Africa, South America) entirely. The newspaper also mentions only between 11 and 27 percent of the protest events that occurred in all other regions, except Japan, when compared to the coverage in the Japan Times. Anyone reading the Asahi Shinbun missed many of the different faces of the movement against the second Gulf War.

Even though overall there were more protest events covered during the second Gulf War, coverage of domestic protest events in both papers dropped. The Japan Times covered 76 such events in 1990 and 1991, and only about half as many, 40, in 2002 and 2003. The decrease in the Asahi Shinbun was not quite as dramatic, from 137 in 1990 and 1991 to 103 in 2002 and 2003. Where the Asahi Shinbun fell short internationally, there is a case to be made that the Japan Times could have reported a lot more on domestic protest events in order to fulfill their stated goal of striving to be the “uncontested No. 1 Web site for Japan-related news and information in English.”

The spread of protests around the world against the second Gulf War is only the first major difference between the two protest cycles. Beyond the increased number of international protest events, it is vital to look at when these protest events took place. The second most striking and interesting difference between the two wars is that so many protest events against the second Gulf War took place before the war even started, whereas the protest events against the first Gulf War really centered on the beginning of the actual bombing campaign. See Table 4.
Table 4: Number of Protest Events During the First and Second Gulf Wars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Frame</th>
<th>Gulf War I</th>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Gulf War II</th>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before the War</td>
<td>71</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>177</td>
<td></td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month the War Starts</td>
<td>146</td>
<td></td>
<td>46.5%</td>
<td>231</td>
<td></td>
<td>44.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After the War Started</td>
<td>97</td>
<td></td>
<td>30.9%</td>
<td>112</td>
<td></td>
<td>21.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>314</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>520</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These totals do not match those in Table 2 because the articles on some protest events do not specify what date the protest event took place.

Table 4 makes clear that there were more protest events in the months before the start of the second Gulf War (177) than there were right when the first Gulf War began (146). Before the second Gulf War, well over twice as many protest events took place than did before the first Gulf War. As a percentage of the protest events for each war, during the first Gulf War, 22.6 percent of the protest events took place before the war, compared to 34 percent before the second. While this represents a 12 percentage point increase, the increase does not have an impact on the percentage of protest events that took place when the war started (around 45 percent for both wars). This increase in pre-war protest events begs the interesting question of what caused there to be so many protest events before the bombing began in 2003. The answer that initially jumps to mind is that the Internet, providing easy and mass communications to the movement in 2002 and 2003, played a large role in mobilizing people before the war began, and that activists were able to announce dates of coordinated protest to one another, circumventing traditional media channels. Although it is not possible to understand exactly what role the Internet played in the protests against the second Gulf War, there were hints in the newspapers of how the Internet influenced activists and how it was used
to coordinate opposition. These hints are discussed in the “What Lies Beneath” section, below. Whatever the reason(s), activists were taking to the streets around the world on the same day in a way never before seen.

Looking at the protest events as weekly totals allows an even more dramatic comparison between the two wars, and a better example of just how coordinated the protests against the second Gulf War were. See Figure 3. ¹⁷ The tall peaks in Figure 3 representing the movement against the second Gulf War are the result of two amazing weekends when protests took place literally across the globe. During the weekend of 14-16 February 2003 (Week -5), millions of people woke up and decided it was time to take to the streets — represented in the Asahi Shinbun and the Japan Times by 52 protest events. A month earlier, during the coordinated protests on 18 and 19 January (Week -9), 31 protest events took place. Twelve years earlier the highest number of protest events the global antiwar movement could manage in any one week before the first Gulf War began was thirteen protests on the week of 15 October 1990 (Week -13).

¹⁷ In every reference to data organized by week, such as in Figure 3, a week was defined as a Monday through the following Sunday. This method allows weekend protests, often the busiest times for demonstrations, to be placed together in the same week.
Unsurprisingly, protest events for the second Gulf War peaked noticeably at times that coincided with coordinated global protest dates. That is, on the weekends of 25 October 2002, 18 January 2003, and 15 February 2003, as well as around 20 March 2003, the day the bombings began. The movement against the second Gulf War also began far earlier than the antiwar movement in 1990. The earliest antiwar protest event seen in all the data is an antiwar meeting held by high school students (Asahi Shinbun, 25 March 2003) that took place on 15 August 2002, a full seven months before the second Gulf War began. Notice, though, that the Asahi Shinbun did not mention this event until the war began. The first published stories of antiwar protest events took place in early October 2002. There were 19 protest events in October 2002. Following these early warning protests, every month before the second Gulf War saw some sort of protest event. As discussed below, most of the protest events that took place before the war were Demonstrative, although a small but noticeable number were Confrontational.

This build-up to the massive protests of 18 January and 15 February 2003 stands in stark contrast to the subdued build-up of the protests against the first Gulf War. While there is mention of three protest events taking place five months before the first Gulf War started, there is no coordinated protest movement seen in the data. The pre-war period before the first Gulf War is not devoid of protest events – there are a handful of weeks with about ten protest events – but the most active time of the 1990 and 1991 protest movement was in response to the start of the bombing.

It is worthwhile at this point to view the data on the protest events for each war using Koopmans’ (1993) four action form categories. See Table 5. From Chapter 3 we remember that Koopmans’ coding scheme four categories include Demonstrative, legal
actions that "usually aim at mobilizing large numbers of people," Confrontational, actions that are "nonviolent, but they aim to disrupt official policies and institutions, and for that reason are usually illegal," Light violence, actions that "include limited forms of movement-initiated violence (e.g., breaking windows or throwing stones at the police during a demonstration)," and Heavy violence, actions which include "severe and usually conspiratorial violence". Dividing the data this way makes clear the activist's overwhelming reliance on standard Demonstrative action forms during both wars, with the numbers of Confrontational action forms, the next-highest category showing different rates in the two wars.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Frame</th>
<th>Gulf War I</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Demonstrative</td>
<td>Confrontational</td>
<td>Light Violence</td>
<td>Heavy Violence</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Demonstrative</td>
<td>Confrontational</td>
<td>Light Violence</td>
<td>Heavy Violence</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Demonstrative</td>
<td>Confrontational</td>
<td>Light Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before the War</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>277 80.5% 16.0% 55 7.2%</td>
<td>10 3.5% 2 0.6%</td>
<td>687 567 82.5% 98 14.3% 22 3.2%</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month the War Starts</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>126 80.3% 15.3% 24 1.5%</td>
<td>1 0.6% 2 0.1%</td>
<td>284 205 72.2% 64 22.5% 15 5.3%</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>After the War Started</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>88 80.7% 16.5% 18 1.7%</td>
<td>1 0.2% 2 0.2%</td>
<td>87 74 85.1% 10 11.5% 3 3.4%</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>277 80.5% 16.0% 55 7.2%</td>
<td>10 3.5% 2 0.6%</td>
<td>687 567 82.5% 98 14.3% 22 3.2%</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Looking only at the percentage totals, it appears that the movements against the two wars were basically identical. In each case, Demonstrative action forms made up about 80 percent of all the action forms. Confrontational action forms made up about 15 percent, and cases of Light or Heavy Violence never made up more than 3.2 percent. Most interestingly, there is no action form that increases or decreases by more than two
percentage points between the two wars. It is only by looking more carefully at when activists employed more or less of a particular action form that the difference between the two wars is apparent.

In protesting the first Gulf War, demonstrators acted remarkably consistently throughout the time when data was collected. In fact, the percentage of Demonstrative actions in relation to the total varies by only half a percentage point (between 80.3 and 80.8) no matter what time frame we look at. The other action forms — Confrontational, Light Violence, and Heavy Violence — are also nearly consistent throughout the entire war. The only minor change to note is that there is no instance of Heavy Violence before the war starts, but a few cases once the war started. Over a year’s worth of protest events in 1990 and 1991, but there is almost no change in what types of protest action forms the activists are doing.

We can see in Table 5 that most of the protest action forms against the first Gulf War occurred the month when the U.S. attack on Iraq began, in January 1991. Since it is unsurprising for antiwar activists to respond immediately to such an event, this is an easily explained number. Still, only 157 action forms took place then. The numbers for the second Gulf War, once again, stand in stark contrast. During the month the war started, March 2003, 284 action forms took place, and 316 action forms took place before the second Gulf War even began.

Demonstrative action forms make up over 90 percent of the action forms before the second Gulf War then fall to only 72.2 percent once the war starts. Taking the place of the relatively safe Demonstrative action forms when the invasion begins, the percentage of Confrontational action forms increases from 7.6 percent to 22.5 percent of
all action forms. Instances of Light Violence also increased once the war began, jumping from four cases to 15, or 5.3 percent.

The most important point to take away from this is that the movement against the second Gulf War seems to be much more flexible than the movement against the first. There are many possible reasons for these dramatic changes. One possibility is that the act of coordinating large pre-war protest events allowed emboldened anti-war activists to take a more confrontational stand once the war began. Another possibility is that activists were frustrated by the inability of the large protest events to stop the war, and therefore acted more dramatically than they otherwise would have. If this is the case, it is important to note that at no time during the protests against the second Gulf War did activists turn to Heavy Violence to make their message heard.
As noted earlier, facilitation and repression are two possible ways institutional actors can respond to protest actions (Koopmans, 1993). The times that institutional actors facilitated or in some way repressed activists offer two more views on the differences between the two movements. While there were instances of facilitation before each of the two Gulf Wars, there was also a sharp increase of repression (usually arrests of activists) coinciding with the outbreak of war. See Table 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6. Number of Instances of Facilitation and Repression During the First and Second Gulf Wars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gulf War I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before the War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Forms with Facilitation: 20 (25.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Forms with Repression: 4 (5.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month the War Started</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Forms with Facilitation: 20 (12.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Forms with Repression: 12 (7.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After the War started</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Forms with Facilitation: 30 (27.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Forms with Repression: 12 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Forms with Facilitation: 70 (20.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Forms with Repression: 28 (8.1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We see in Table 6 that over a quarter of the protest action forms that occurred before and after the first Gulf War started had facilitation from an institutional actor. The month the war started, the number of facilitated action forms drops to only 12.7 percent, which could be explained by activists taking to the streets in response to the beginning of the attack, and not having time to fully plan protest events. For example, the Japan Times from 17 January 1991 mentions a protest at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo where "groups joined in the protest as the day went on". During the second Gulf War, the percentage of protest action forms that were facilitated by institutional actors stays constant at 12.7 percent before the war and during the month the war started. Perhaps the better
coordination that led to the weekends of global protest events also allowed activists to keep those who facilitated protest events in the build-up to the war on board once the quickly-planned response protest events took place. Once the second Gulf War was underway, the percentage of facilitated action forms again increases, to 19.5 percent. At no time does the movement against the second Gulf War achieve the same levels of institutional support that the movement did twelve years earlier, making the global effort of 2002 and 2003 more incredible.

Table 6 also shows a gradual increase in repression against the movement against the first Gulf War, from 5.1 percent of all action forms before the war to 11 percent after the war started. Repression against the movement against the second Gulf War also increases after the pre-war period, but is highest when the war started. Remember, the month the second Gulf War started is also when instances of Confrontational and Light Violence action forms increased. This increase is more dramatic than the increase in Confrontational, Light and Heavy Violence action forms during the first Gulf War, and may help explain the increased repression.

While the data show state institutions cracking down hard on protestors as the bombs began to fall, too much should not be read into this data as it is difficult to accurately measure the amount of facilitation or repression from these newspaper accounts. There were some explicit examples of repression detailed in the articles, for example a photo of police on horseback chasing after elementary school children who broke windows in Sydney, Australia to protest the war (Japan Times, 27 March 2003). This level of detail was regularly lacking from articles from both Gulf Wars, especially about smaller protests in remote cities, which were often reported simply as a the bare
facts of the protest event. A terse statement, such as, “more than 1,000 hit the streets in Stockholm, Sweden” (Japan Times, 28 October 2002), was common. Still, the heightened actions by protestors at the start of the wars unquestionably elicited harsh responses from police.

More Than Numbers: Protest Actions in Word and Image

Detailed Protestor Statements

Newspaper coverage of protest events is about much more than the number of things reported. Another way to analyze the data is to understand what types of protest events resulted in the newspaper printing a detailed explanation of a protestor’s or protest group’s reasons for protesting. The vast majority of the time during the two wars, the Japan Times and the Asahi Shinbun did not include these details. The newspapers included detailed protestor statements only 27.4 percent of the time during the first Gulf War, and 20.3 percent of the time during the second. See Table 7.
Before analyzing the data from Table 7, a point of clarification. As is obvious from the number of “Total Protest Events” at the top of the chart, and the “Totals” (of protest types) at the bottom, there may be more than one type of protest at an event. This causes some of the tables to have different totals from each other, but it is necessary to fully understand the data. For example, the Asahi Shinbun from 2 March 1991 reports a protest march in Tokyo of 500 people, from which about 50 held a die-in in the street. This is one protest event with two protest types. With this clarification in mind, we can move on to what the data reveal.
Neglecting details of activist's reasons for protesting is a trend that has not changed since Todd Gitlin's (1980) research on how the media covered the rise of the Students for a Democratic Society. Melvin Small (1994) writes "oppositional mass movements have a difficult time obtaining fair, much less favorable, coverage from establishment media," (p. 2) and establishment reporting often ignores the political arguments protestors are making. While Small mentions only the arguments presented by movement leaders, the lack of detailed statements by protestors – allowing the protestors themselves to explain their reasons for taking to the streets or creating their art – is something missing from many protest reports in the Japan Times and the Asahi Shinbun as well. It is worthwhile to remember here that the newspapers in question are national newspapers. As Rucht and Neidhardt (1998) make clear, national newspapers have a "nationwide relevance" criterion for the news they cover, which means that many smaller protests will not be covered in the paper (p. 74).

By analyzing the articles that contain detailed protestors statements and the type of protest these statements are connected with, it becomes clear that creative or confrontational protests are more likely to receive newspaper space to explain the thought behind the action than those without. In addition, as Table 7 shows, activist actions that consisted solely of an individual or group statement also, unsurprisingly, often garnered detailed explanation in the newspapers.

Creative or confrontational protest types during the first Gulf War were more likely to garner enough space in the newspaper so that the activist's words were published than during the second Gulf War. Setting aside events with fewer than 10 instances, we can see that confrontational protest types (such as die-ins or human shield
actions), individual or group statements, emergency meetings, and artistic protests were likely to get the activist’s detailed message in the newspaper in 1990 and 1991. During the second Gulf War, activists who released group or individual statements were most likely to be heard in detail in the newspaper, with emergency meetings and artistic statements (such as the “Baring Witness” actions, described below) also liable to allow the activist to speak directly in the newspaper. Articles about emergency meetings, which describe students or housewives or another social group who met to discuss and possibly act against the war, were unique to the Asahi Shinbun. Since these events were basically talk and no action, it makes sense that the reporter found the space to include the details of what the meeting’s participants were talking about. While activists engaged in confrontational protest types were able to make their statements in the press 45.5 percent of the time during the first Gulf War, similar activists were successful in garnering detailed statement coverage only 29.1 percent of the time during the second Gulf War. Non-confrontational actions, such as the peace camps\textsuperscript{18}, did not produce many detailed statements during either war.

As mentioned above, the Asahi Shinbun tends to focus on domestic protests. For a Japanese reader to hear directly from a fellow Japanese person why he or she is protesting one time out of three gives a fuller picture of the people at a protest than the simple numbers reported in the rest of the cases. While the Japan Times did a better job of presenting wire service stories of protests happening around the world, Asahi Shinbun reporters regularly went to the local protests and talked to people. In some cases, such as

\textsuperscript{18} Similar to the human shields, activists who set up peace camps hoped that their presence, in this case camped between the Iraqi and Coalition armies on either side of the Iraqi border, would avert an attack.
in an article from 21 March 2003, the *Asahi Shinbun* ran an entire page of quotes from activists hoping for peace.

The *Asahi Shinbun* did not limit detailed examinations of antiwar activists' reasons to Japanese protestors. On 27 March 2003, they devoted almost an entire page to the story of Charlotte Adlebron, an American girl who gave a speech at a Maine peace rally 15 February 2003. The text of her speech was emailed around the world and a month and a half later appeared in the *Asahi Shinbun*. Interestingly, the *Japan Times* did not cover this story.

When the *Japan Times* and the *Asahi Shinbun* printed detailed protestors' statements is also interesting. Both newspapers published a large number of detailed protestors' statements around the time of the beginning of both conflicts. See Table 8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gulf War I</th>
<th>Gulf War II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Detail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before the War</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month the War Started</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Month of the War</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After the Second Month</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Some protest events (26 in the first Gulf War and 14 in the second) were not reported as happening on a specific day, and so are not included in the above totals.

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19 The text of the speech can be found at Fiveletters.com

67
The highest percentage of protest events which had an article that included detailed statement was before the first Gulf War, when almost half of the articles included these statements. Before the second Gulf War, only 16.9 percent of the articles included detailed protestor statements. In both wars, there were 30 instances of detailed protestor statements before the war started.

If we simply compare the 30 detailed statements made before each of the Gulf Wars, we might assume that after a few dozen detailed statements or so, a newspaper begins to limit the details. This brings up another possibility to understand when newspapers included detailed protestor statements. There may be a saturation point to detailed protestor statements, and may come a time when the details of why activists are doing their actions is no longer news. It is possible that the longer a story goes on, the more familiar reporters become with the story, the more they will assume the readers know about the background, and the less they will feel the need to fully describe the activists’ motives through detailed statements. If we focus on the percentage of stories that feature detailed statements, instead of the number, then we see in Table 8 that during the course of the second Gulf War, the percentage of protest events that garnered detailed statements actually grew, slightly, from 16.9 percent to 21.2 percent from before the war until the second month of the war. After the second month of the war, this number dropped slightly to 20 percent. The percentages during the first Gulf War fluctuate from almost 50 percent before the war to only 17.1 percent when the war starts then back up to 35.7 percent the second month of the war. The data seem to indicate that there is no saturation point that can predict when a newspaper will tire of reporting the details.
Indeed, remembering Table 7, convincing newspapers to give the details of a protestor’s actions is something the activist might have some control over.

As mentioned above, there were substantial differences between the political contexts of the two Gulf Wars, especially after the end of ground combat in Iraq. There was a distinct decline in both papers in reporting protestors’ reasons for protesting after the end of fighting in both wars. There is a brief uptick in April 1991 due to reports of protestors angry at Japan sending Self-Defense Forces to Iraq to work as minesweepers and people protesting soldiers as they returned to Midway. Since the data for this thesis cuts off before the Self-Defense Forces were sent to Iraq during the second Gulf War, any possible uptick in 2004 to match the 1991 protests is not covered.
Front Page News

While getting a detailed message across is valuable to a movement’s adherents, making a splash on the front page, the most coveted space of a newspaper, can also be useful in spreading one’s message. Just as looking at what kinds of protest actions garner coverage of detailed statements from protestors, analyzing what protest types are covered on the front page reveals what sort of protest actions best serve activists in garnering this valuable media space. For an analysis of what makes the front page, we can gain more insight looking at the second Gulf War, as there were only nine protest events on the front pages during the first Gulf War, all from street demonstrations.

During the second Gulf War, there were 54 protest events featured in cover stories or in feature photos on page one. Forty-eight of the front-page stories were of street demonstrations, three were anti-American demonstrations in Iraq, one was an artistic statements, one was a petition signing, and one was a report of an individual or group statement. The newspapers were most likely to cover street demonstrations on their front pages. Since the protests of 2002 and 2003 were larger than those that occurred in 1990 and 1991, and larger protest are more likely to be covered, we can account for the increased front page coverage as another sign that the anti-war movement’s coordination had a positive impact on media coverage.

It is also interesting to note the three anti-American protest events in Iraq. In the chaotic aftermath of the war, during the time when many supporters of the war had
claimed the Iraqi population would welcome the coalition forces\textsuperscript{20}, the anti-American protesters in Iraq clashed not only with the troops on the ground but with official expectations. At the time these protests were taking place, Iraqis were increasingly fighting back, and U.S. troops were being attacked in various ways up to 20 times a day.\textsuperscript{21} The effects of these events are difficult to judge. For this thesis, it is enough to keep in mind that as the attacks against occupation forces escalated in number, intensity, and fatalities caused, newspapers around the world reported them. It is plausible they, along with the non-violent or lightly violent anti-occupation protests in Iraq in the summer months, influenced an increase of demonstrations around the world in late September 2003.

\textsuperscript{20}During a 20 February 2003 appearance on \textit{The Newshour with Jim Lehrer}, for example, Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld said the following:

\begin{quote}
Jim Lehrer: Do you expect the invasion, if it comes, to be welcomed by the majority of the civilian population of Iraq?
Donald Rumsfeld: There's obviously - the Shiite population in Iraq and the Kurdish population in Iraq have been treated very badly by Saddam Hussein's regime. They represent a large fraction of the total. There's no question but that they [the coalition troops] would be welcomed.
\end{quote}

Also, on 16 March 2003, vice-president Dick Cheney said on MSNBC's \textit{Meet the Press} (quoted from www.dailykos.net as MSNBC does not offer free transcripts of shows more than a month old), "Now, I think things have gotten so bad inside Iraq, from the standpoint of the Iraqi people, my belief is we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators."

\textsuperscript{21}Usatoday.com
Faces of the Protestors

Just as a front page story can have a great impact, so too can a photograph of a protest. While certain protests, like "Baring Witness" actions, are almost guaranteed to result in a photograph, many types of protests are used for their visual power in newspapers. More interesting, though, is the increased internationalization of the movement against the second Gulf War that is once again visible – literally – in the massive increase of photographs from outside of Japan in 2002 and 2003. See Table 9.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9. Number of photographs - domestic and international - published during the first and second Gulf Wars in the Asahi Shinbun and the Japan Times.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gulf War I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While the number of photographs of protest events within Japan made up 65.5 percent of the photos during the first Gulf War, they made up only 24 percent during the second. Although not in Table 9, the data show that photos of street demonstration dominated the images of protest events during both Gulf Wars, making up over half of all the images. The newspapers also published photographs of creative or confrontational protest events, although there is not much difference by protest type.

**The Asahi Shinbun and the SDF protests**

One final informative breakdown of the data comes from the Asahi Shinbun's focus on domestic issues during the first Gulf War. During the first Gulf War, the articles in the Asahi Shinbun reveal that three major issues were taken up by protestors within Japan. These three main themes were: anti-war, anti-aid money, and anti-SDF deployment. See Table 10.
Table 10. How often certain messages were reported in the Asahi Shinbun during domestic protest events against the first Gulf War.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Message Description</th>
<th>Number of times a message was present at a protest event</th>
<th>% of total*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-war message</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>65.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-SDF deployment message</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>54.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-aid message</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total number domestic action forms = 203; Total number in Asahi Shinbun = 137

*Multiple messages were present in some protest events, giving more than 100 percent total

By far the majority of the protest events opposed the general war itself (101). Almost half as many protest events, though, spoke out against the deployment of Japan's Self-Defense Forces to the Gulf region (48). The issue of Japan's monetary contribution to the multinational forces also formed a substantial amount of protest events (18). There were some protest events, of course, that addressed two or all three of these issues, so these numbers add up to more than the total number of domestic protest events the Asahi Shinbun reported during the first Gulf War (137). The data collected for the second Gulf War did not show any protest events focused on either the Self-Defense Force deployment issue or the aid issue. The aid contribution issue was not present in 2002-2003, and the issue of sending Self-Defense Forces to Iraq did not arise as a major topic of protest events until after December 2003 and so is not included in this thesis data.

Once again, looking at when activists did something can help to understand the numbers. See Figure 4.
In Figure 4, we can see the anti-war and anti-aid messages were part of the protest events almost exclusively in January and February 1991, the month the war started and the month after that. Unsurprisingly, anti-war events were more frequent than anti-aid or anti-deployment actions at this time. The most unusual aspects of Figure 4 are the two spikes in anti-deployment actions in November 1990 and April 1991, but they are easily explained by looking at the news of the day for these months.

At the end of October 1990, with 200,000 U.S. forces in the Gulf and a UN resolution holding Iraq responsible for the financial and economic damage done to Kuwait, the Japanese Diet was debating the UN Peace Cooperation bill. According to an
article in the 30 October 1990 Japan Times, the government claimed the purpose of the law was:

> to enable Japan to contribute ... to the efforts and activities of the United Nations undertaken under U.N. resolutions for the maintenance of international peace and security by setting up a system for dispatching abroad a Peace Cooperation Corps, taking measures for extending material assistance, and providing for cooperation by the governments and by the private sector.

The article also said the bill stipulated that the Self-Defense Forces would send their units to join the corps if the prime minister requested it. The spike of protests – representing thousands of people staging protests in Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto and other cities – resulted in a rekindling of what Ishizuka (2002) calls, “the old debate on the constitutionality of the SDF, and finally the Bill was abandoned before the completion of its deliberations” (Ishizuka, p. 10).

The second protest spike was due to the government’s decision to deploy Self-Defense Forces to Iraq as minesweepers in April 1991, after a cease-fire was established in Iraq, without debating any new legislation. Ishizuka (2002) writes that America criticized Japan for offering “too little too late.” The international community’s response to Japan’s “checkbook diplomacy” was harsh, and “a consensus was being created among main political parties and the Japanese public that Japan must play a more active role in maintaining international peace and security rather than simply contributing money to solve global problems” (p. 11).

In 1992, according to a Yomiuri Shinbun poll, almost 70 percent of the population supported sending Self-Defense Forces on peacekeeping missions. Still, in April 1991, the Asahi Shinbun published stories of dramatic protests taking place against the government’s decision to send Self-Defense Forces to Iraq. Aside from rallies taking
place across Japan, “about eight” Maritime Self-Defense Force members refused to participate in the deployment to Iraq, and three soldiers were arrested after attempting to enter the office of the Defense Agency director general to present him with a letter protesting the deployments. Citizens also took direct action after the decision to send minesweepers was announced. Cars near Self-Defense Forces dormitories were set on fire and activists piloted rubber dinghies to within two meters of Maritime Self-Defense Force ships.

This look at the Asahi Shinbun articles from the first Gulf War provides a way to wrap up this discussion of the findings. First, notice that there were distinct messages identifiable in the protests against the first Gulf War. Of these three messages, two were concerned about the domestic impacts of the war. The third message was against the war itself, which is the default stance for an anti-war protest. During the second Gulf War, though, there was no identifiable domestic message aside from activists wanting to stop the war (for it would have an effect on Japan). The articles often mentioned protests around the world intent on stopping the same war that the students in Shibuya were intent on stopping. It was a global war, and there was a global mindset in the activists who spoke out against it. As mentioned above, there is a likely rise in anti-Self-Defense Force deployment protests in 2004, but not in the data collected for this thesis.

When divided into months, it is interesting to note how protests in the three areas of focus were dependent on news during the first Gulf War. That is, for the most part, the protest events against the deployment of Self-Defense Force troops were reactive. Without knowing the circumstances, the October and November actions seem to indicate some sort of organized attempt to stave off the Self-Defense Forces being sent into the
upcoming war. Knowing that they actually followed debates going on in the Diet shows how the protestors in 1990 and 1991 were reacting to events, rather than stepping out in front of them. As we saw in Table 4, the movement against the first Gulf War had only 22.6 percent of its protest events take place before the war. By contrast, the massive organized global protests of 2002 and 2003 were more proactive, with 34 percent of the protest events staged in the months before the war began. Of course, those in charge were hinting about a possible war in Iraq in the fall of 2002, but the true imminence of the attack was not available to the public until President Bush gave Saddam Hussein a 48-hour ultimatum on 17 March 2003. This ultimatum indicated the start of the second Gulf War, but by this time, many activists were old hats at making their voices heard.
CHAPTER 5

Case Studies: Nudity, Religion, Housewives, and the Internet

Group Nudity as Tactical Innovation on the Internet

As the articles from both the Japan Times and the Asahi Shinbun show, one way to enter the media’s site of struggle is to come up with creative protests. At times, a quirky or dramatic protest can be just as effective in garnering column inches as a massive demonstration. The wide variety of antiwar protest actions seems, if not specifically calculated to increase press coverage, then at least accidentally successful in doing so. The Japan Times and the Asahi Shinbun covered antiwar protests as diverse as comic books deconstructing the U.S. military industry, a worldwide theater project, nude protestors spelling out phrases such as “No War” with their bodies, musical releases, and websites full of poems submitted by people around the world.

It is not at all unusual for activists to use various types of protest actions. Sasaki-Uemura (2001) began with the premise that the massive anti-U.S.-Japan Security Treaty protests in Japan in 1960, “like other large-scale movements, were not monolithic or homogeneous. The demonstrations comprised several diverse elements, some of which conflicted with others (especially the opposition parties), and although the massive marches around the Diet drew the most attention, protestors engaged in a variety of actions” (p. 5-6). The protests against the Gulf Wars, within Japan and around the world, included massive marches near political centers as well as diverse and creative actions, some of which popped up in one part of the globe and were quickly replicated elsewhere.
Tilly (1995) uses “repertoires of contention” to describe protest forms changing over time. In a study that encompasses seventy-five years of Social Movement Organizations, he finds movements that change, and claims, “At any particular point in history, however, they [protestors] learn only a rather small number of alternative ways to act collectively” (p. 26). In the movements against the Gulf Wars, people created new and adapted old forms of protest as an increased array of tools, such as the far-reaching and immediate communication provided by the Internet, become available. Tarrow (1993) explores how rapidly repertoires change during protest cycles and describes new protest repertoires that become “diffused, tested, and refined in adumbrated form and eventually become part of the accepted repertoire” (p. 329) as “modular.”

McAdam (1983) identifies the use of tactical innovation, new “protest techniques that offset their [the protestors’] powerlessness” (p. 355), among protestors to flummox the institutions and create successful protest actions. Rojecki (1999) argues that movements can overcome the disadvantage of not having the presumption of legitimacy elected officials do by having a wide base of support. While McAdam found tactical innovation triggered periods of heightened protest activity, the varied creative protest actions found in the movements against the Gulf Wars suggest the possibility that perhaps the heightened protest activity prompted innovative protests and similar antiwar acts. For example, it is unclear whether the San Francisco woman who spoofed the United States military’s “most-wanted” list of 55 Iraqis (printed up as decks of playing cards) by making a deck of “most-wanted” playing cards featuring members of the Bush Administration (Japan Times, 18 July 2003) would have been willing to do so if the antiwar protests were not as present in the media as they were.
Other examples of small groups of people staging unusual protests that the *Japan Times* and the *Asahi Shinbun* covered include hunger strikes, human shield actions, a housewife who conducted a solitary protest for a week (*Asahi Shinbun*, 19 February 1991), and Yoko Ono’s September 2003 replay of “Cut Piece” (*Japan Times*, 17 September 2003). “Cut Piece” is an interactive antiwar artwork Ono has performed periodically since 1964. In the piece, Ono sits perfectly still in a chair while audience members come up and cut pieces of her clothing off. Ono’s celebrity obviously influenced media coverage of her protest, but the housewife who sat in front of the Japanese Diet for a week in February 1991 was able to make her voice heard simply by doing something unexpected. These examples show people engaged in creative protests, but it is the nude protestors, known as the “Baring Witness” movement, that offer the best example of how tactical innovation and modular protests resulted in increased media coverage during the two Gulf Wars.

The *Japan Times* first ran a wire story on 19 January 2003 on the nude protests, complete with two photographs. The article, headlined “Nude protests against ‘naked aggression’”, reported on the origins of the movement in California and interviewed Donna Sheehan, the main organizer. The article listed Point Reyes, California, Sussex, England and cities in Montana, Florida and Germany as locations where the nude protests had taken place included. The reporter wrote “… the idea appears to be catching on thanks to the power of e-mail”. The group behind the nude protests, Baring Witness,

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22 Finding humor in the protest, the *Japan Times* headlined this story “Oh no! 70-year-old Yoko strips off.”

23 “Baring Witness” is a group based in California. The group is connected with, but separate from “Bare Witness”, an English group that also uses naked protests to convey a message.
developed a website that not only showcases actions from around the world, but also has
detailed instructions on how to run a Baring Witness action, including tips on how to deal
with unknown photographers and police.\footnote{www.baringwitness.org/Do-It.htm} It is interesting that not only did antiwar
protestors around the world learn about and copy the “Baring Witness”-style protests, but
that Sheehan said she was inspired by Nigerian women who threatened to disrobe in
protest of an oil company’s behavior. In the global protest era, tactical innovations
spread quickly across great distances and causes.

On the “Baring Witness” website, the organizers promote both the modularity of
the nude protest style and the connection the actions have with media:

When 45 Marin County, California women were photographed on November 12,
2002, forming the word PEACE with their naked bodies, it struck a deep chord
around the world. Our exposure of the vulnerable human flesh we all share has
created a powerful statement against the naked aggression of our country’s
policies. More than 170 nude and clothed pro-peace actions have since taken
place across the U.S. and around the world. Baring Witness-style actions are
popping up all over the world in several related causes, such as protests against
GMO crops, the WTO and the FTAA. . . .
Baring Witness has become a global political tool that simply spells a word or
words with nude or clothed human bodies, which attracts uniquely supportive
media coverage. Access to the media is critical in educating, informing,
increasing awareness, and gaining support.

Our political focus is to increase voter registration in the United States by spelling
the word “\textsc{vote}”\footnote{www.baringwitness.org}

This introductory statement, which appears at the top of the group’s main page,
shows how the organizers are aware of the power of their naked protest meme.

\citeauthor{mca}’s (1983) warns that “the simple introduction of a new protest technique in a
single locale is not likely to have a measurable effect on the pace of the movement

\footnote{www.baringwitness.org/Do-It.htm}
\footnote{www.baringwitness.org}
activity unless its use can be diffused to other insurgent groups operating in other areas” (p. 341). The “Baring Witness”-style protests, though, are broadly applicable and adaptable, and thus are a strong example of tactical innovation. McAdam’s findings are that tactical innovations do not allow insurgent groups to rest on their laurels, for movement opponents can minimize the effectiveness of new tactics through tactical adaptation. It is unclear how opponents can effectively stop the nimble “Baring Witness” protests, but too much media coverage will eventually decrease the likelihood of the media covering future nude protests. Paradoxically, for “Baring Witness” to remain effective, it might not attempt to become too effective.

The Face of Peace: Public Identity of Religious Actors

Religious actors in the antiwar movements against both Gulf War appeared with some regularity in headlines and photographs in both the Asahi Shinbun and the Japan Times. All of the world’s major religions were represented. Buddhist temples, Catholic nuns, Islamic mosques, and other religious sites were all involved at some level of protest against the two Gulf wars.

Hunt, Benford, and Snow (1994) claim identities are conceptualized in three ways: as products of biological, psychological or social structures, as manifestations of macro social change, and as interactional accomplishments. Of these, the third tendency is perhaps the most useful in understanding some of the trends the movements against the two Gulf Wars reveal, such as the trends observed in articles on religious and women activists. Interactional accomplishment theory says, in short, that interactions between
members of a group help define who the group is. Hunt, Benford, and Snow also claim studies show “personal identity, regardless of its objective constitution, is an interactional accomplishment that is socially (re)constructed” (p. 190). In this way, social movement actors “provide ‘appropriate’ vocabularies and stories for participants and sympathizers to (re)construct their personal identities in ways that link or further commit them to the movement or SMO” (p. 190). The social reconstruction of personal identity can be played out, in part, in the media. Klandermans (1992) claims the media is one level of public discourse where “collective identities are formed and transformed” (p. 87). The following examples of religious actors appearing in the media as part of the anti-war movements provides a way for non-religious activists to associate with religious figures and for non-activist religious people to associate with activists. Examples of women activists follow in the section below.

There were two main types of protest actions with a religious component. The first, more common, religious message made a general association between the religion in question and peace. Examples of this kind of protest include over 600 Buddhist temples ringing their bells in a call for peace in February 1991 (Japan Times, 17 February 1991), men in Baghdad calling for the foreign occupiers to leave the soil during Muslim prayer in April 2003 (Japan Times, 30 April 2003), the National Council of Churches of the United States calling on churches in America to offer sanctuary to soldiers who refused to fight in the war in February 1991 (Japan Times, 14 February 1991), and Buddhists and Christians and Moslems gathering in front of the U.S. embassy in Tokyo in March 2003 to pray to avoid war (Asahi Shinbun, 2 March 2003).
The second type of religious protest included a more confrontational, sometimes violent religious stance against the war. Small groups of religious converts, and even individuals, who acted aggressively to protest war were often able to garner headlines and photographs, although whether this was due to the aggressiveness alone or the apparent contradiction between the peaceful religion and the dramatic act remains unclear. Some examples of these actions include three Catholic nuns who were arrested for painting crosses on the ground near Minuteman III missile silos with their own blood in October 2002 (Japan Times, 1 April 2003; Japan Times, 27 May 2003), Jordanians in a Palestinian refugee camp going to Friday prayers by stepping on the U.S. flag in March 2003 (Japan Times, 25 March 2003), and a parishioner, John Schuchardt, interrupting a church service attended by president George H.W. Bush in Kennebunkport, Maine in February 1991 (Japan Times, 19 February 1991). Schuchardt stood when the reverend asked if anyone had special concerns and said ‘The spirit of the Lord is upon me,” before launching into a 5-minute speech pleading with the president to think of the harm the daily bombs were causing in Iraq. Another parishioner told Schuchardt, “this is not a political forum, sir, this is a church of God. Get out of here!” When Schuchardt was carried away by secret service men, he cried “In the name of God, stop the bombing!” Bush later said he was “not in the least” bothered by Schuchardt’s protest.

Ardeth Platte, Carol Gilbert, and Jackie Hudson were the three Dominican sisters arrested after entering federal land and hammering on the missile silo, as well as pouring their blood on the ground. They were dressed in mock chemical weapons inspector’s suits and said they were a “Citizens Weapons Inspections Team” symbolically disarming the United States. Forty-five minutes after entering the missile site, they were arrested
and each of them is currently serving time with a release date scheduled for sometime in 2005.

Perhaps the most dramatic religious-themed protest was by a man who made no claims to be of any particular religious background (Japan Times, 19 February 1991). In February 1991, an unidentified man performed self-immolation in Amherst, Massachusetts. He refused help from passersby who tried to douse the flames, and held a sign with the world “Peace” on it and his driver’s license taped to it. While the exact reasons for this action were not revealed by the Japan Times, the connection between this action and the many self-immolations during the Vietnam War, the most famous being Thich Quang Duc’s self-immolation in protest for religious equality in 1963, cannot be denied nor ignored.

Using Tilly’s language, Michael Biggs (2003) claims Duc’s act introduced self-immolation into the global ‘repertoire’. Biggs defines ‘self-immolation’ as having three components:

(1) an individual intentionally kills him or herself, or at least inflicts harm on him or herself with a high probability of death, (2) without harming anyone else or destroying any property, (3) on behalf of a collective cause. This can be contrasted with other kinds of death: martyrdom, which though welcomed is actually inflicted by the opponent (contrast 1); suicidal terrorism, which is intended to harm others (contrast 2), and personal suicide, which is undertaken for individual or familial reasons (contrast 3). Note that this definition does not specify any particular method of self-inflicted death; ‘immolation’ strictly means sacrifice, not death by fire (p. 5).

Biggs says self-immolation is intended as a public act, and is rare and spectacular, so it is “exceptionally newsworthy” (p. 7). Indeed, one of the most famous of all antiwar photographs is one of Duc’s burning body. Biggs correctly notes the media’s fluctuation with sometimes covering and then not covering self-immolations, depending on
circumstances such as who committed the act and where it took place. Still, it is notable that the Amherst self-immolation is mentioned only once by the *Japan Times* and not at all by the *Asahi Shinbun*.

The Amherst self-immolation did have an effect, though. Just as Duc’s action affected an American journalist, David Halberstam, who was there\(^{26}\), the man in Amherst affected a patron eating at a nearby café who saw the event. The patron, Eddy Goldberg, participated in a candlelight vigil at the same location on the evening of the event and was quoted in the *Japan Times* (19 February 1991) as saying, “I watched a person die right here. ... It’s one life here, but how many are dying in this war? I watched his face as his life went out of him. It’s hard to just go home like everything is normal.”

There were other Buddhist antiwar actions mentioned in either the *Japan Times* or the *Asahi Shinbun*. In February 1991, the leader of the Tendai sect publicly called for “an immediate end to the war” (*Asahi Shinbun*, 3 February 1991). Also in February 1991, the leader of the Nichiren sect sent letters protesting the war to the presidents of America, Iraq, and to the leader of the United Nations (*Asahi Shinbun*, 3 February 1991). At Kiyomizu Temple in January 1991, a tower that had been “lit up” at night for 87 years was not lit up when war began. A monk at the temple said, “In war, human lives are lost, so it is not appropriate to light up the tower. I will pray for peace, and I think a peaceful day will come again” (*Asahi Shinbun*, 3 February 1991). In early 1991, Buddhist monks staged a hunger strike while sitting in front of the Shibuya train station in Tokyo. The monks were criticizing the American and Iraqi move towards war, and the Japanese

\(^{26}\) Biggs quotes Halberstam as saying, “I was too shocked to cry, too confused to take notes or ask questions, too bewildered to even think” (p. 1).
government’s complicity (Asahi Shinbun, 3 February 1991). In March 2003, a well-known Buddhist nun named Seitouchi Jakucho published a message in the Asahi Shinbun against the Iraq war, claiming it was against the main Buddhist precept: “Do not kill and do not cause to kill” (Asahi Shinbun, 4 March 2003).

Religion and the antiwar movement crossed in a variety of forms during the two Gulf Wars, as the following examples from articles in the Japan Times or the Asahi Shinbun show. A common phrase seen during protests in Iraq during the second Gulf War was, “No Bush, No Saddam, Yes, Yes for Islam” (Japan Times, 24 April 2003). During an April 2003 Lenten antiwar demonstration in Manila, a woman held a cross with a sign that read, “No to war! Yes to peace!” (Japan Times, 17 April 2003). In San Francisco in March 2003, 75 clergy from various religions, Buddhist monks, Christian priests and nuns, and Jewish rabbis were arrested during a protest near the city’s federal building (Japan Times, 30 March 2003). While the article does not specify why the clergy were arrested, it does quote Rabbi Michael Lerner as saying “We are here as Jews, Christians, Muslims and Buddhists to proclaim that the world can be healed.” In Australia in April 2003, religious leaders from the Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, and Jewish faiths led prayers for peace during a Palm Sunday antiwar rally (Japan Times, 14 April 2003). A woman in New Zealand wrote a letter to George Bush in March 2003 asking him to “crucify me instead of attacking Iraq” so he can understand the kind of pain and suffering war with Iraq would cause. With a larger audience in mind, she also sent her letter to newspapers, who then covered the story (Japan Times, 7 March 2003). In February 2003, “Muslims for Peace” staged a protest in Bangkok (Japan Times, 7

The details of the “ideological package” at work in these religious examples varies, but in general the two anti-Gulf War movements featured religious leaders in their traditional roles calling for peace. The non-traditional actions by religious figures (e.g., the nuns in the missile silos) garnered a fair amount of press, matching the increased coverage that non-religious, non-traditional protests received.

While the tone of the coverage was similar in both papers, the most obvious difference to note about the various religious protests mentioned above is the distinct borders the newspapers drew around which protests they covered. We have already seen the different face the two newspapers gave to domestic and foreign protests, and the *Japan Times* and the *Asahi Shinbun* gave entirely different bodies to the religious actors. None of the religious protests mentioned above were covered in both papers. Once again, it seemed the *Japan Times* and the *Asahi Shinbun* were watching completely different antiwar movements, and this trend is present during both the first and the second Gulf Wars. The anti-war movement you saw depended on the newspaper you were reading.

**Demonstrating Social Identity: Women Protestors**

There is a long history of women activists taking a role in political actions and protests in Japan. From strikes and rallies protesting the conditions in the 19th-century silk mills (Hane, 1982) to the founding of new Millenarian religions in the Meiji era (Ooms, 1993), to the “tea-pourers” rebellion in the mid-20th century (Pharr, 1984),
women in Japan have taken up various causes as the times saw fit. Sasaki-Uemura (2001) describes how, right after World War II, women had to struggle to retain the rights the new constitution gave them, and women organized around three main topics of concern: education, nuclear disarmament and the status of women. Sasaki-Uemura also notes that women were leaders in petition drives to form the Council Against the A- and H-Bombs, that many women from the peace movement later went on to participate in the Anpo protests, and that it is women who have a “major avenue” for political participation in their children’s educational issues (p. 31).

One early postwar women’s movement that formed at this time was the Grass Seeds. The Asahi Shinbun directly influenced the Grass Seeds through the column Hitotoki (a brief pause), which began in the early 1950s and was written by female readers. The first Grass Seeds meetings were gatherings to discuss the issues raised in Hitotoki columns (Sasaki-Uemura, p. 127-30). Women’s groups such as the Grass Seeds and the Tanashi-Hoya Acorns, a group of housewives established in 1957 and focused on political issues in the Tokyo suburb of Tanashi and the neighboring city of Hoya, often used discussion groups and small-scale publications, or mini-communications (mini-komi), to organize themselves. These and other women’s groups often express ideas of “face-to-face contact and decentralized, horizontal forms of association” (Sasaki-Uemura, p. 142-6).

During the two Gulf Wars, there were many groups that identified themselves as women’s groups: the Shibokusa Mothers’ Association, the Mitaka Women’s Group Opposed to War in the Mid East, the Women’s Alliance Opposed to the Road to War, the Women in Black, Ribbon, and the Downtown Women’s Group Against the War, for
example. In many cases, the women involved were confrontational and creative in their protest actions.

In the Shibokusa Mothers’ Association case (*Japan Times, 25 October 1990*), two elderly women (aged 84 and 65) went on a three-day hunger strike to protest the sending of Self-Defense Forces overseas. A demonstration on 25 January 1991 organized by the Women’s Alliance Opposed to the Road to War included a signature drive for a broad petition (*Asahi Shinbun, 26 January 1991*). The petition opposed the deployment of Self-Defense Forces and the Japanese government’s contribution to the multinational forces in the Gulf, and supported a call to the Japanese government to request America to find an immediate cease-fire and a peaceful settlement to the Iraq crisis. The *Asahi Shinbun* (4 January 2003) mentions a group called the Women in Black as a small group who dressed in black clothes and staged a street demonstration in Tokyo one evening. The *Asahi Shinbun* even printed advance notice of the Downtown Women’s Group Against the War’s a study session on 2 February 1991 to discuss “The Middle East Situation and Japan,” which was to include a talk by an atomic bomb victim (*Asahi Shinbun, 21 January 1991*). While these examples show the newspaper reporting on self-identified women’s groups, as well as the media adding their own frames to the protests, five articles in the *Asahi Shinbun* (3 November 1990, 15 January 1991, two articles on 26 January 1991, and 27 January 1991) about the Mitaka Women’s Group Opposed to War in the Mid East reveal in depth into how the women constructed their social identities themselves.

Klandermans (1992) argues there are three types of “success expectations”, namely expectations on collective action, an individual’s contribution, and the
contribution of other individuals. These expectations are not only self-fulfilling, they also embrace the negative. If there is “pluralistic ignorance,” and there is no one who takes action, then success will seem impossible (p. 86). The women in Mitaka are a positive example of a group achieving all three expectations.

A total of five protests were reported in Mitaka city for the first Gulf War, beginning in November 1990 with an emergency meeting of housewives and high school students opposed to the overseas deployment of Self-Defense Forces. Reinforcing the finding that the two newspapers were focused on different aspects of the antiwar movement, the Japan Times does not mention Mitaka in connection to antiwar protests at all. Thus, we only find in the pages of the Asahi Shinbun that the women of the Mitaka Women's Group Opposed to War in the Mid East staged multiple actions during the first Gulf War. The protest types varied, ranging from street protests to releasing statements to inserting leaflets into a newspaper. Although the 27 January 1991 Asahi Shinbun details the size of the leaflet (B4) and that the layout was done by the group themselves, it does not mention what newspaper the leaflet was actually inserted into.

The newspaper insert was the first reported action taken by group and was an ambitious goal. The women planned on distributing 30,000 copies of the flyer in a local newspaper on 10 January 1991, which would cost 300,000 yen. The women were in direct communication with each other and with people outside their group through letters, phone calls and face-to-face contact. Using these communication methods, it took the group only four days to find 412 people who supported the flyer with a contribution of 1,000 yen each. In return, the group included the supporters’ names on the leaflet when it was published. After the leaflet was included in the newspaper, the women sent copies to
the Iraqi and American embassies. The signatories paid for the insert and the Mitaka Women’s Group used the extra money to plan later protests, such as a public discussion on 26 January 1991. This meeting included over 30 groups, including the PTA and other women’s groups, and led to a call for an immediate cease-fire. These personal interactions not only beefed up the financial resources, but also the morale of the group. In fact, the slogan on the newspaper insert was “To communicate with each other now makes us all feel braver and we become stronger.”

An article on a protest in Mitaka (Asahi Shinbun, 26 January 1991) highlighted the “homemade” aspect of a protest put on by local women. While the article did not name any specific group as organizing the event – and it is not that names or labels are required to reinforce collective identity action – the high number of women’s protests in Mitaka suggests the group’s communications inspired others to act. As one woman said during a street protest, “Sitting in front of the TV following the war situation is worthless.” It is also likely that the actions of and interactions between the women in Mitaka (re)constructed their personal identities and further committed them to the movement.

**What lies beneath: the Internet as organizational tool.**

One can only imagine what impact the Mitaka Women’s Group Opposed to War in the Mid East would have had if they had the Internet. Their communications during the first Gulf War show the importance of activists talking with one another. As a participant in the protests against the second Gulf War, I know that Internet
communications – email and websites – were important tools in planning protest events. Was this common for activists around the globe? How did others hear about the protests they went to? How did they come across the news report of a military or government action that they then ended up protesting? Unfortunately, a survey of newspaper articles will not reveal a deep understanding of how activists come to their decisions. Still, there are passages in the articles that hint at an answer, a source the activists in 1990 and 1991 did not have access to: the Internet.

The Internet has long been a tool of progressive social groups, even as those groups worked with state and military actors to develop the network of linked computers (Kidd, 2003). The Internet, as an article titled “Cyberactivism comes of age” in the 20 February 2003 Japan Times clearly indicates, served as an unprecedented organizing tool for the antiwar protestors of 2002 and 2003. The article states, “Cyberadvocates say they’ve had tremendous success using an arsenal of Web sites, e-mail and Web-based discussion group lists to quickly mobilize people for rallies.” Without question, antiwar protestors in 2002 and 2003 were able to share information and adapt new tactics much more rapidly than those in 1990 and 1991.

In an article from the Asahi Shinbun (9 March 2003), the focus was on people who were coming to their first protest event. Next to a photo of two smiling young high school students, the article says that one of the students, Konatsu Honda, invited her friends to the protest using email on her cell phone. In another Asahi Shinbun article (3 April 2003), Kouichi Kimura, a Baptist Pastor acting as a human shield in Baghdad sent an email to his family describing the conditions there, and excerpts were printed in the article. A third example from the Asahi Shinbun (22 March 2003) describes how over
1,000 high school students gathered in Shibuya after an invitation went out on the Internet.

As mentioned above, an article in the Japan Times (20 February 2003) makes a direct connection between the Internet and email and the amazingly large days of protest in early 2003. The article says electronic organizing has drawbacks, but the ease is an "advocate's dream." Internet petitions are ways for peace advocates to "marshal the voices and opinions of sympathetic souls." A coalition of antiwar groups, International ANSWER, "credits Internet communications for the big turnout of January 18, when demonstrations were held in 30 countries" (Japan Times, 20 February 2003). As vague as these examples are, they point toward a way to better understand social movement organizations in the modern age.

It is undetermined how effective the populist nature of the Internet fares in creating alternative frames and frame alignment strategies for activists. Anecdotal as well as research evidence points to the Internet as a tool that enhances activists' effectiveness and encourages people to participate in political action (see Elin, 2003). Vegh (2003) claims, "the primary uses of the Internet in online advocacy revolve around organizing the movement and carrying out action" (p. 73). Rodgers (2003) argues that use of the Internet enhances activists' existing operational methods and "expands the repertoires of contention available to political activists, by providing new avenues for engagement" (p. 77).

Aside from making communication and organizing easier, the Internet also provides activists with more information, another face on the news of the day. Almeida and Lichbach (2003) compared coverage of the 1999 anti-WTO protests in Seattle and
other transnational protests in activist-based Internet websites with four other media sources, including the Seattle Times and the New York Times. They found activist-based Internet sources had more complete coverage, and were more likely to cover a protest event without any "intensive characteristics" (i.e., events that are spectacular, violent, large or long-lasting) than other news sources. While not all activists' websites were equally valuable, the overall lower threshold for reporting protest events resulted in "extensive and multidimensional information on local, national, and international political contention" (p. 266). Most interesting for this thesis, Almeida and Lichbach also found a "common organizing strategy" was for a central demonstration to take place at the site of a multilateral economic institution meeting while dozens of "simultaneous solidarity actions" took place across the globe (p. 266).

The possibilities of the Internet, this new organizing and informational tool, were clearly visible to all those activists awake and aware on 15 February 2003. To more fully understand how all those people took to the streets that day, more research is required. Specific areas of interest include understanding just how effective online messages are in attracting people to rallies, as well as how these emails and posts to virtual bulletin boards are passed around offline. Just as valuable would be a more accurate accounting of where and when antiwar protests occurred in the run-up to the second Gulf War, perhaps taken from an activist-based website, to see deeper into the movement itself and see how the Internet affected the run-up. These areas represent rich areas of study for future research.

Articles from both the Japan Times and the Asahi Shinbun hint that the people involved with the pre-war protests against the second Gulf War were aware of other
actions taking place around the world, and scheduled their own protests to take part in those days of action. Other sources make this connection explicitly. See, for example, the lede of the following Internet news story from the Wsws.org:

In a second round of massive international protests against the impending American military assault on Iraq, millions of people marched Saturday, March 15 in Australia, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and throughout the western hemisphere. The demonstrations came four weeks after the first day of globally coordinated antiwar protests, held February 15, which mobilized more than 10 million people. The March 15 protests were even more widespread than those a month earlier, with more countries and cities involved. Although the total participating was apparently smaller than on February 15, that only means that Saturday’s protests were the second largest in history.

Thanks to the Internet and traditional news media, when millions of people woke up on 15 February 2003, they knew what kind of day it would be.
CHAPTER 6

Conclusion

The two Gulf Wars seem, in some ways, to be eerily similar: the United States leading an invasion of Iraq; a President Bush squaring off against Saddam Hussein; Dick Cheney and Colin Powell playing important roles; anti-war protests across the world; and yellow ribbons across America. Although there were a host of similarities between the first and second Gulf War, it is incorrect to think of the second war as a repeat of the first. For one thing, the way anti-war activists around the world reacted to the wars sets the two conflicts apart. This thesis has tried to put a unique face on the two movements by looking at their differences. There is a long history of protest in Japan, and this thesis looks at the movements in Japan, along with the international actions, during the Gulf Wars. The movements against the two wars were different in scope, coordination and timeliness, with the movement against the second Gulf War larger, more able to hold simultaneous events across the globe, and more active before the war even started.

The international political situation for Japan was also different in the two wars, including United Nations support for or opposition to military action. After not contributing fighting forces to the war effort in 1991, many in Japan felt the time had come for Japan to once again claim “normal” (militarized) status, and a discussion took place in the country which then allowed Self-Defense Forces to be deployed to a war zone for the first time since World War II in 2004. As mentioned earlier, this deployment occurred after the data collected for this thesis. For the anti-war activists in Japan, the
Self-Defense Force issue was an important one, but more noticeable during the first Gulf War than the second.

This thesis uses data on the hundreds of anti-Gulf War protest events collected from articles in the *Asahi Shinbun* and the *Japan Times*, which were combined into a nonredundant events list similar to Mueller's (1997). Mueller's method allows us not only to see a more complete picture of the two movements, but also a bit of the bias of the two newspapers. The *Asahi Shinbun* focused more attention on protests within Japan, and the *Japan Times* covered more international protests.

During the first Gulf War, activists around the world – mostly in Western Europe and the United States – were able to respond to the attack on Iraq with street demonstrations and other, more creative protests. A more feisty and better organized movement arose to speak out against the second Gulf War. Activists were in the streets well before the “shock and awe” bombing campaign of the United States military started the second Gulf War, and the activists were in the streets in many more countries than during the first. The Middle East, Asia, Australia, and New Zealand all saw many more protest events in 2002 and 2003 than twelve years earlier. Perhaps most importantly, activists in 2002 and 2003 were able to take to the streets in massive numbers on 18 January 2003 and 15 February 2003, even though the war did not begin until 19 March 2003. These two pre-war days of action still stand in the minds of many activists as watersheds of public activism, and the *New York Times* declared a new superpower – world public opinion – born on 15 February 2003.

Daily newspapers operate at a rapid pace. Looking back at how the *Japan Times* and the *Asahi Shinbun* covered the protests against the two Gulf Wars, it is clear
protestors can maximize their chances of catching an editor’s busy eye by having an unusual protest type, although protest events with large numbers of people – often street demonstrations – made up the bulk of the coverage. Both newspapers were more likely to include detailed protestor statements when the protest in question was an unusual or creative action. Confrontational protests, which could be anything from a hunger strike to a die-in, were also more likely to be published with a photograph than more conventional protest actions such as street demonstrations. For movements as diverse and loose as the global fights against the two Gulf Wars, these types of creative protests can become modular, be copied and used in other places, perhaps even for protests about other issues. Nude protests are just one example of these creative protests that spread around the world.

This thesis is only a first attempt at understanding the two movements against the Gulf Wars, but the findings suggest further research is necessary to understand how the newspapers themselves changed between the two wars. A study of each newspapers’ editorials during the wars would also shed light on the bias of the newspaper coverage. Understanding how modern activists adapt and change now that the Internet can immediately brings global issues into people’s homes would be fruitful. In articles the Japan Times and the Asahi Shinbun published that were devoted to explaining the movement against the second Gulf War to readers, activists using the Internet and email are sometimes mentioned. This should come as no surprise to anyone who participated in the protests themselves and who was willing to give out their email address; their inboxes filled up each night with messages. Unfortunately, these types of articles were
uncommon, and it is impossible to gain anything more than hints of the ways people mobilized for the antiwar protests.

What is clear is that it was not only for mobilizing purposes that people turned to the Internet. As Almeida and Lichbach (2003) showed, activist-based listserv and websites offer a much more complete picture of what is happening on the ground than traditional media. While the *Japan Times* and the *Asahi Shinbun* cannot possibly reveal the on-line habits of the millions of protestors, it seems safe to assume from the way Internet-based activism is discussed in the newspapers that the coordinated global protests could not have occurred without the immediate coordinating and information distribution methods available through the Internet, a communication tool where one activist can contact thousands of potential protest participants in a matter of minutes. As the data shows, the antiwar movement was able to organize much more effectively in 2002 and 2003 than it was 12 years earlier.

With the first wired global antiwar movement now in the past, all social movement organizations stand at a threshold. The antiwar protests of 2002 and 2003 showed that communication and creativity were instrumental not only in bringing people into the streets (and out of their clothes) to oppose the war, but also in bringing the message to the people who did not participate, who only read about the protests in the newspaper. If communication for activists can change this drastically in twelve years, the next decade can only produce more exciting developments in the way social movement organizations organize and present themselves to the press and the public. Each day we can look forward to seeing who is showing their face in the morning paper.
Bibliography


