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State influence in the resettlement of Southeast Asian refugees in the State of Hawaii

Chabot, Richard Carl, Ph.D.
University of Hawaii, 1991

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STATE INFLUENCE IN THE RESETTLEMENT OF
SOUTHEAST ASIAN REFUGEES IN THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI'I IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
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BY
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This dissertation is written with thanks to the many people from Southeast Asia who have made their new home in Hawaii and whom I have had the honor to meet and talk with. It is also in memory of the countless numbers of people whose dreams have been to arrive at these shores but have been stopped in their attempt.

The research and writing of this work could not have been accomplished without the assistance and understanding of a great many people. There is a small group of people living in California that remain supportive of my undertakings, however off-the-wall. Gratitude first to my family, still with me after all these years. They’ve shown me that mothers, sisters, brothers, and nieces truly are inseparable. Thanks and a toke or two to Honest, Lynn, Norma, Dirk, Darien, and Richard. There are many in Hawaii that deserve thanks, but especially good friends like Carol, Ben, Heather, Bernard, John, and Leo. You are my family here.

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ABSTRACT

Refugees are involuntary migrants provided special status and consideration by modern Nation States. Such status is most obvious in the resettlement process, the State, in this case the United States, providing unique allocative and authoritative resources for the purpose of control over the integration of refugees into the U.S. social mainstream.

It is argued that the State has come to influence the creation of refugee self-help groups or MAAs, delimit important aspects of MAA goal formation, and use ethnic organizations as implementors of State policy objectives. A history of U.S. immigration and refugee legislation is found to systematically and purposefully influence individual migrant as well as community group actions. A model of resource commodification originally discussed by Offe and Ronge in 1976 aids in explaining how the State mainstreams the human resources that the act of international migration has placed within its bounds of control.

The resettlement of Southeast Asian refugees in the State of Hawaii since 1975 is used as a concrete example of both national level resettlement policy and local implementation strategies. The resettlement structure and related services in Hawaii are detailed by agency and time
period. Southeast Asian community participation in the local resettlement process is highlighted with special attention being given to Southeast Asian refugee community self-help organizations. Research methodology includes participant observation, interviewing of key personnel involved in the resettlement of Southeast Asians in Hawaii, and the reviewing of relevant documentation.

It is concluded that though the resettlement process in Hawaii is unique in its implementation, federal resettlement policy and a following tendency towards the recommodification of migrants remains a pervasive part of the overall process. Resettlement policy and the following process that has come to fund refugee self-help groups indicates a recursive and structured relationship in which national interests and ideology have the potential to influence the formation and organization of ethnic groups within the local community.
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OCS  Office of Community Services
ODP  Orderly Departure Program
ORR  Office of Refugee Resettlement
PASS Preparation for American Secondary Schools
PIP  Public Interest Parole
PLS  Program for Local Service for Vietnamese Refugees
PMSC Palolo Multi-Service Center
POS  Purchase Of Service
PREP Preparing Refugees for Elementary Programs
FSR  Planned Secondary Resettlement
RCA  Refugee Cash Assistance
RDP  Refugee Demonstration Project
REPO Refugee Employment Program Office
RICE Refugees of Indochina Culture Education program
RMA  Refugee Medical Assistance
RTAP  Refugee Targeted Assistance Program
SCIRP Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy
SCORR State Coordinators of Refugee Resettlement
SHIP State Health Insurance Program
SLEP Students with Limited English Proficiency
SWCC Susannah Wesley Community Center
UNHCR U.N. High Commissioner's Office for Refugees
USCC United States Catholic Conference
VAP  Voluntary Agency Matching Grant Program
VIVAVietnamese Immigrant Volunteer Assistance
VOLAGSVoluntary Agencies
Chapter I
INTRODUCTION

This dissertation examines the extent to which nation-states actively define roles and implement policies that affect development and future activities of populations within their oversight and control. Of specific interest is American policy concerning the recognition, resettlement, and social integration of refugees. Refugees differ from immigrants in many different ways. The most important factor is that refugees are recognized as having been driven from their homeland and face violence upon return. This dissertation will emphasize the political status of being defined as a refugee by the United States and the differential treatment provided them as opposed to immigrants through a process of resettlement in host nations. Further refining the scope of this project, special attention is given to how the refugee community and representative refugee organizations in the U.S. are influenced by and through the resettlement process.

It is hypothesized that refugee resettlement policy on the level of the nation-state: (1) influences the creation of refugee self-help groups; (2) delimits important aspects of goal formation within community-based self-help organizations; and (3) uses ethnic organizations as
implementors of government policy objectives. With these hypotheses in mind, the focus of the following research will specify how U.S. national refugee resettlement policy has come to be directed through an autonomous governmental structure.

The degree to which refugee policy and its structured means of implementation within society has affected the specific groups for which it was developed will necessarily be examined. Five points of focus for this research are: (1) autonomous state policy formation concerning refugee recognition in an international sphere of interest; (2) refugee resettlement in the U.S.; (3) the role of decentralized policy implementation in local areas across the U.S., using the State of Hawaii as a specific case in point; (4) the effect policy development and implementation concerning resettlement and social integration has had upon refugee group formation, specifically mutual assistance association (MAA) goal formation and participation within the larger ethnic community; and (5) the affect a decentralized resettlement strategy has in turn had upon policy development.

Following sections of this chapter will give a brief overview of how refugees have been conceptualized in prior research, will define important concepts used throughout this study, and will specify a model with which to examine refugees in their relationship to the nation-state.
Literature Review

Literature concerning the resettlement of refugees in the United States is not vast but does cover many topics that have only peripheral relevance to this dissertation. Refugee issues include international recognition, immigration concerns, reception, the resettlement process, retention of traditional cultural values, and integration with the host society. While some of these issues are considered in later chapters, a review of how other researchers have considered refugees and their connection to the nation-state is called for. This review will limit itself to how refugee resettlement has been conceived of and implemented by the federal government with some background on how others conceive of federal or intervention on the level of the nation-state in refugee resettlement and organization in the U.S.

Resettlement

The recognition and resettlement of refugees by nation-states and their respective governments depends upon loosely defined, subjectively interpreted, and contextually based categories that vary from nation to nation. A government must first recognize a group of people as refugees before action to alleviate those so defined can begin. Each nation, as with each state in the United States, will vary in the degree to which outside resources are provided for resettlement and social integration.
An excellent history of the Vietnamese exodus to the United States in 1975 and the process of their resettlement and acculturation here is covered by William Liu (1979). Stages of resettlement trauma and adjustment are discussed as both individual burdens that must be overcome by all of the refugees as well as social needs that America must recognize and work to alleviate. There is very much on the individual and small group level that will influence the "success" of resettlement, including education, English language proficiency, employment possibilities, presence or loss of family, and resources provided by the host society. Liu’s primary point is that the Vietnamese refugees were not passive in their resettlement; they were active in overcoming their burden and continue to work as individuals and as a community to make America their home. External resources provided through private and public sector agencies were noted as extremely important but not necessarily the only determinant factor in the resettlement process.

Refugee resettlement in the U.S. up to 1979 is painstakingly covered in a report by Taft, North, and Ford (1979). Written before the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, many of the criticisms and recommendations brought out in the report are important history but have little bearing on the present. Beyond specific recommendations, the general thrust of the report emphasizes that refugees are national charges and should be considered a human
resource, not a public burden. As with many other reports that preceded and follow it, the federal government is urged to look to the long-term care of incoming refugees and provide for their economic adjustment, health needs, and acculturation. The federal as well as the local governments and private institutions are seen as important change-agents with a responsibility to these newcomers.

A closer look at the resettlement process and the role of the voluntary resettlement agencies (VOLAGs) is covered in a 1982 volume by North, Lewin, and Wagner. While the government is again seen as a controlling factor in the refugee resettlement process, the VOLAGS, as the agencies responsible for initial reception and resettlement, are found to vary widely in how individual refugee families are resettled. While a centralized governmental structure is provided for resettlement in the U.S., localized implementation of policy and resources is found to differ from one VOLAG to another, from one state to another.

More recent researchers have begun to look at the international role of the nation-state in the production of refugees (Lawyers Committee, 1989; Zolberg et al., 1989) and the problems immigrants and refugees both have faced in trying to reach and live in the United States (Reimers, 1985; Zucker and Zucker, 1987). Resettlement issues covered tend to emphasize success of resettlement and cover either mental health or structural assimilation problems, primarily employment and adaptive socialization.
Research on refugee resettlement and social integration has been shaped by a public and increasingly political concern of the degree to which newcomers are financially dependent on their status. That is to say, the definition of an incoming migrant will determine the degree to which financial resources are made available by the nation-state. Immigrants are greatly limited from collecting any form of public assistance for their first few years in country, criticism directed at them surrounding either the mythical jobs they take away from American born workers or the cultural changes they bring to a largely Anglo United States.

Refugees, on the other hand, due to a primarily non-industrialized background as well as to their political and international status, are literally resettled and financially supported by the federal government. The federal government carries out the duties of its relationship to refugees but would prefer that refugees become self supportive as quickly as possible. For this reason for resettlement to be successful, the refugee, in the eyes of the public and the government, must become self supportive.

Caplan (1985), Bach (1985), and Church World Service (1983) are commonly referred to in the attempt to understand the link between family structure, education in country of origin, time since first entry into the U.S. and other variables and successful, long-term employment or
structural assimilation into the U.S. mainstream. The attempt to understand and potentially control the determining factor in refugee employment has led to many federal agencies sponsoring studies of the issue (Indochinese Community Center, 1983) and is a concern in many other countries of asylum (Employment and Immigration Canada, 1982). A recent and exhaustive study of Vietnamese in America by Caplan, Whitmore and Choy (1989) considers family and cultural values as important factors in the resettlement process, but retains achievement and employment as necessary indicators of successful social integration.

Studies of refugees in the State of Hawaii also tend to emphasize employment, as with a recent Department of Labor and Industrial Relations report on the elderly in the work force or a Masters thesis by Tom Riddle on the employment of Cambodians. The Department of Labor in most states, Hawaii included, are also the primary administrators of refugee social service funding. Such a strategic location in the state administrative structure insures a proper stress on employment-related social service provision. In addition, most social services are actually employment related, the federal government requiring most refugee-related funding to directly address the employment needs of the refugee being provided social services. Employment, if not the most important factor in
determining successful integration into the host society, is considered an important aspect of the refugee in the eyes of the government and tax-paying public.

Refugee Organizations

While the refugee community cannot be discussed without recognizing the differences between Chinese, Vietnamese, Lao, and Khmer ethnic and national variations, the need for the development of an ethnic community crosses all ethnic boundaries and factions. The sense of ethnic belonging is fluid and determined by situation, involving history and belief systems that influence the further development of the subjectively felt community. This is particularly so when considering people who come from one historical and contextually laden background and are forced over a period of years to move around the world to live under a very different set of social and structural norms. Nguyen (1980) is only one of many cross-cultural mental health researchers that recommends "the grouping of refugees of similar backgrounds" and the "formation of ethnic community organizations" in order that the trauma and some of the psychotic disorders associated with the refugee experience be taken care of through natural social processes. The development of a community may then allow one to relieve many of the feelings of loss and guilt (Rumbaut, 1980) and allow for the person and ethnic aggregate to look forward and work beyond past traumas.
Rather than developing an increased attachment to the physical land they left, the presence of an ethnic community allows the individual to maintain emotional and symbolic ties with the homeland while making more secure their place in a new physical locale. In order for this to occur, however, a place of resettlement requires the existence of an ethnic community with a solid institutional base within which a person or family can live and branch out from into the dominant society. A recent collection of articles on Indochinese communities in Canada edited by Dorais, Chan, and Indra (1989) repeatedly emphasize this point. Then too there are the studies of the last fifteen years on the development of the refugee community and the importance of family, friends, temples and monks, and organized community on feelings of comfortably adapting to life in the host country. Without this subjective feeling of comfort and security, there will be less of a consideration for the individual and thus ethnic aggregate to settle down and begin living a new life in a new land.

Ethnic community self-help groups have long been a part of migratory groups, organizing social, cultural, and financial resources in areas apart from their place of origin for the good and prosperity of the perceived group as a whole. While separate ethnic or cultural territories have been considered illegal in the United States since 1818 (Gordon, 1964:133), ethnic enclaves are recognized as an important haven and first step on the road to
assimilation in U.S. history. Within these enclaves many self-help groups organized formally, around some common goal or characteristics, for the mutual benefit of the group and the larger community. For more recently arrived refugees, such groups are commonly known as mutual assistance associations or MAAs.

MAAs are considered important links between resettlement policy and the successful resettlement of refugees, the MAA providing the cultural framework through which policy is made relevant to Southeast Asian migrants. Research by the Refugee Resource Center (1983) found that MAAs commonly work with more formal voluntary agencies in the implementation of resettlement efforts. Such linkages often work for the good of all involved, the MAA helping the more formal resettlement agency resettle newcomers by providing translation, sponsorship, counseling, and cultural support. Indeed, there is no lack of positive reinforcement for MAA involvement in community development and cultural integrity as well as support for government directed resettlement activities.

Yet research on MAAs as representative of single or multiple refugee ethnic communities sounds concerns about the true place MAAs hold within the community. Most research has revolved around the concern that while MAAs are important community links, their participation in resettlement activities may engender external funding that alters organizational goals.
A study of MAAs in the Washington, D.C. area in 1983 by Hien, Bui, and Khoa found MAAs to be important leadership structures for the surrounding Indochinese community. MAAs were found to be largely self-supporting while providing a mix of resettlement and retention of cultural belief systems and values. While most had some relations with more formal resettlement organizations, it was found that little in the way of professional recognition or funding for resettlement programs was provided by the social service sector. It was recommended that the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) provide such recognition and funding for the resettlement services and valuable cultural linkage they provide. The attitude of the authors is that the federal government "cannot be expected to sustain Indochinese refugee resettlement indefinitely. Therefore, it becomes vital to build capacity within ethnic community self-help groups." (Hien et al., 1983:2) In other words, these organizations should be taught how to resettle and acculturate members of their ethnic community in a way that coincides with government needs and preferences.

Such technical and financial support had already been provided by the Office of Refugee Resettlement within DHHS. A 1982 seminar held by ORR for Indochinese leaders gave information on leadership skills and the importance of self sufficiency within the refugee community. Such information and skills were provided in order to help leaders and their
respective MAAs participate to a greater degree within the private and public sector with an emphasis on reducing welfare dependency (DHHS, 1982).

Khoa and Bui (1985) considered MAAs to be important in many aspects of Indochinese community development and maintenance. Their research found that MAAs fell into the following five groupings of service provision, often mixing such services according to community needs and available resources:

1. Cultural and spiritual integrity
2. Resettlement service provision
3. Special interest
4. Economic development
5. Advocacy and political action

While such activities were seen as persisting in the near future, problems noted by the researchers centered on the lack of resources on the one hand and the overdevelopment of MAAs in the direction of depending on external funding on the other. That is to say, while MAAs lacked the necessary means to provide all the services they wished, Khoa and Bui noted with some fear that MAAs were "tending to develop only those programs that they consider fundable by government sources rather than seeking alternative funding to support projects that address the refugee community's priority cultural concerns." (Khoa and Bui, 1985:222) Though such federal funding for
 resettlement concerns was considered in positive terms, dependence on such funding was seen as a form of goal displacement and cultural disintegration on the organizational level.

Ethnic specific organizations or groups concerned with special problems related to culture or spiritual development tend to be the least influenced by external funding. However, even research analysts not part of the ethnic community have commented on the growing influence of external funding, particularly federal resettlement related funds, on the quality of other, culture specific goals and activities (Lewin et al., 1986)

Refugees And The State

Most of the literature concerning refugees and immigrants in the United States stresses their degree of integration if not assimilation into the mainstream host society. Economic self sufficiency is commonly the decisive factor, the more economically self sufficient migrant being considered to have attained structural assimilation and thus to be successful. The reason for the large number of studies concerning self sufficiency is quite rational, the federal, state, and local governments having historic ties to financially supporting refugees if they are unable to support themselves. Thus available
research on the role of the federal government on the level of the nation-state in refugee affairs concerns either international recognition or internal employment problems.

Robert Bach wrote in 1988 on how federal and local welfare policy can influence the economic integration of refugees into the American mainstream. Bach stresses that the household should be seen as the primary social unit, a pool of labor that helps the family as a whole survive better than each as an individual could. The primary reasons for this conclusion are that household members can add to the wage pool but will also affect what kinds of financial aid are available to the family and the available public aid will be indispensable in preparation for entry into the host society.

Federal government intervention is seen as taking place in the following ways: (1) there has been an increase in the number of family reunifications, as controlled and defined by the federal government; (2) federal and local governments influence the types of financial aid available to refugees; (3) refugees dependent on public assistance must attend ESL and acculturation classes, each state differing in the kinds and quality of acculturation, ESL, and job-related training classes available. That is, family structure, financial resources, and social skills are federally mandated resources that are argued to influence dependence on financial aid for any given length of time. While the make up of the family and
prior education in country of origin are of course important in the equation, long-range dependence on public assistance is seen as a policy issue. Provision of adequate education, job training, and ESL courses by the federal and local government in conjunction with adequate financial assistance will greatly decrease the probability of a refugee family becoming "addicted" to welfare.

Bach concludes by saying that state intervention shows itself to be much more a part of the refugee experience than that of immigrants. Such differences include the fact that refugee experiences in the U.S. are organized through a) the household, and b) placement and concentration in given states and administrative units. Bach's research conclusion and recommendation is that a slower pace of integration combined with job training will increase the advancement of refugees in the labor force and attainment of a meaningful self sufficiency.

While Victor Nee and co-author Jimmy Sanders agree that the family should be specified when examining the incorporation of newcomers into a host society, they do not consider Bach's emphasis on macro structural factors as important as other forms of resources. Family resources are of primary importance, the obligations and relationships that allow the family to operate as a unit within a given social environment being of utmost value for individual and family existence. The resources made available through the total context of the family and its
members are characterized by Nee as "social capital." The migrant family also maintains what is called "cultural capital," this including institutionalized capital such as educational credentials and information processes that include foreign language abilities, religious beliefs, and social values. These may be brought with members of the family as well as learned and defined while in the host nation.

Incorporation into the host society is due more to a mix of financial, social, and cultural capital, all blended best within a family setting. Social capital is instituted in the family household, extended family, or non-kin social networks. "Social capital is both embodied in relationships within the family, and external to it in social networks that include kinship, ethnic and nonethnic ties." (Nee, 1989:18) It is the interplay of family resources, the ethnic community, and the larger social system that ultimately determines individual action and integration patterns. The make up of the family and its sharing of resources is key here, not external resources or structural barriers.

Bach and Nee agree that the sharing of resources within a family setting is very important to successful incorporation of the migrants into the host society. However, while Bach looks to external constraints and resources as vital to self sufficiency, Nee views family networks and resource sharing as more important.
Jeremy Hein (1988) researched the influence of government hiring practices and the development of ethnic enclaves in the area of refugee and immigrant social services. He found that ethnic Chinese from Vietnam are found to be more likely to enter into the social service sector, having not only the education but community support to enter this kind of work. The Chinese-Vietnamese were in particular more likely to be mediators in ethnic or family quarrels in which cultural role clashes leave little room for maneuvering or face saving. In this study there was no attempt to show that the federal government was trying to hire Chinese over other Vietnamese as social workers. However, the unintended consequences of government needs for such in-group mediators was the development of a middleman minority that mediates community problems without the financial reward or social status of middlemen in the business sector.

Theoretical Implications
The State As Care Giver

The history of the social welfare process as moral duty and institutional responsibility in the United States since the 1950s includes an increase of linkages between voluntary nonprofit, for profit, and governmental human service sectors. The distinctive characteristics that have historically made up voluntary efforts to organize the local community or help the needy have been increasingly
replaced by their becoming professionalized service agencies with economic and professional ties to government regulators. Private and public service sector organizations have increasingly come to reflect the ideological ascendancy of marketplace values, providing services to a group of people as a service for the larger postindustrial society. Heartfelt selflessness has become a questionable liability within a professionalized service sector, operating not just for the good of the needy but to meet government requirements related to maintenance of a stable social order.

In discussing where the service sector stands in the present day, Austin (1988) provides the following summary:

"Most human service industries are undergoing a general process of service production decentralization with the downshifting of federal administrative controls attached to federal categorical funding to state and local levels under block grant funding; the appearance of numerous new "alternative" service organizations; the development of new types of specialized services to meet the needs of specialized segments of the user market; the increasing use of contracting with a number of different service producers by governmental service organizations; the growth of private practice in such fields as social work; the emergence of for-profit firms; and the growth of human service activities within business firms." (Austin, 1988, p. 238)

The changes that have come about in the organized process of caring for the needy have not been sudden or accidental but have a strong link to the process of modernization other institutions have gone through. To understand the specific institution of public assistance
and social welfare in the United States, three separate levels of action must be given consideration. First is the condition of being in need, how that condition is perceived by others in society, and what is considered necessary on behalf of both sides to alleviate such need. Second is the organization of alleviating this need; perhaps with the help of the church along spiritual lines, with the help of businesses and their monetary assets, or simply through the combined efforts of individuals in the community. Third is the degree to which local or national government attempts to influence and regulate such activities.

Of particular interest to this study is the transformation that has led the nation-state to regulate social welfare institutions and the degree to which such regulation has altered the form and process of the care giving institution. With an alteration in structure there necessarily follows a change in outcome, in this case how care is provided to those in need and how those needy are themselves affected by the process of aid distribution. Special emphasis is therefore given to the United States as a nation-state and its influence in the provision of public assistance, particularly for immigrants and refugees.

Bureaucratization And The State

The nation-state has become increasingly bureaucratic; that is to say state activity on the federal level serves the ideology of the state in a rational and routinized
manner. As social institutions have entered into the sphere of state interests, they are altered through their relationship to the state and the state's increasing control over or regulation of social or public sector activities. Such changes come in two distinct though interrelated forms: (1) increasing bureaucratization; and (2) an emphasis on professionalism in the social service marketplace.

The influence of government regulation in the bureaucratization of social welfare institutions is of very special significance to the state's later influence on how public assistance agencies are organized and managed. The bureaucratization of institutions involved in social integration is likely to have adverse affects on the qualities of interaction that are part of the process of social development.

In his life and throughout his writings, Max Weber "simultaneously welcomed and opposed the modern rational techniques of social organization associated with the emergence of bureaucracies on all levels of society. He emphasized throughout his work [The Protestant Ethnic and the Spirit of Capitalism] the specific advantages of bureaucratic techniques for the achievement of rational conduct in social affairs, but he was quick to point out that the process of bureaucratization was bound to have adverse effects on a liberal social order built around the principles of individuality and personal self-realization."
(Mommsen, 1989, p. 111) Though the bureaucratic process was perceived as superior in some ways to traditional social forms, Weber feared the stifling of individual creativity and warned that within a bureaucratic organization leadership will become void of all individuality, creativity, or initiative.

In the area of social welfare and the provision of care for the needy, the state had only momentary influence until after World War I. To theorists like Weber this separation of state and care giver was best for both society and the individual care seeker. Weber was supportive of social support systems for the indigent, but was wary of anything that appeared to indicate state mediation of social identity and development. "For Weber the primary task of the economic and social policies of the state should be that of safeguarding in every case the social balance between the particular social groups in society without, however, mediating their competitive struggle with one another." (Mommsen, 1989, p. 41) Weber believed in state intervention but only for the purposes of fairness for all players in an inherently unequal system, not for a level of control that predetermines outcome.

As a nation-state acts through its governmental agencies on a rational-legal level, its impersonal policies and practical applications expand the actions of the state along rational lines to previously unheard of lengths.
"Modern government exercises power through a multiplicity
of bureaucratic institutions rather than in a personalized way and therefore it is often difficult effectively to evaluate its actions according to political or moral standards." (Mommsen, 1989, p. 48-49) The power of modern government depends, according to Weber, largely upon the trust and belief of its citizens in the government's increased rights and legitimacy of action. Unfortunately, expediency is often the base for newly enacted powers and action, the rights and legitimacy of the state increasing long before its citizens have time to think through and discuss the correctness of such an increase.

Weber's model of rational-legal legitimacy is bordered by the realization that bureaucracy is simultaneously a necessity, a blessing, and a curse. Hierarchical structures are to be expected in the increasing complexity of the modern nation-state. While the positive aspects of the bureaucratic model are many, there follows a decline in individual participation within decision making and an ever increasing blur between public and private rights and duties.

The State Regulation Of Social Welfare

De Swaan (1988) examines the history and tradition of how the many separate institutions that make up health care, education, and public assistance in the western world have been transformed from private or local concerns into a public affair at the level of the city, state, and national
level. He discusses how different groups in society, in particular organized social welfare institutions, form interdependencies, alliances, and opposing interests in relation to the welfare state. He does not see the state as a neutral force nor as an arena for special interest groups but as an interested participant that shapes the collectivizing process. This process takes shape in poor relief, health care, the educational system, and other social institutions. In the case of refugee resettlement, de Swaan would see the American government, the American nation-state to be more exact, as a large actor that increases its informal control among social groups (de Swaan, 1988, p. 5).

In discussing the development of the collectivization of care arrangements within the modern welfare state, de Swaan sees three dimensions emerging. First, the scope of the process has come to include entire nations rather than limited geographic or kin groups. Second, the condition of the person, rather than the personal relationship of the needy to the able, determines the distribution of care. Third, arrangements for providing care and services have been taken on by large public bodies as overseen or regulated by the nation-state, "providing them with the authority necessary to exact compliance and the bureaucratic apparatus needed for their implementation." (de Swaan, 1988, p. 7) The extent and scale of social intervention in the care of others, be they uneducated
children or unhealthy elderly, depends primarily on the magnitude of the problem, the efficacy of the available remedies, and the effect of such problems upon the rest of society.

The American nation-state, through governmental mechanisms and agencies, develops policies that determine the impact on given groups, such as incoming refugees, upon the rest of society and implements such policies accordingly. Through the increasing use of state-level policy as social regulator, the federal government has come to have an enormous influence over the shape and practice of social welfare. More specifically, the state has come to control the reasons for providing public assistance as well as the manner in which it is provided. "The contemporary welfare state has become a vast conglomerate of nationwide, compulsory and collective arrangements to remedy and control the external effects of adversity and deficiency." (de Swaan, 1988, p. 218) The federal government is more than just a regulating agency; it provides resources for, as well as determines the institutional structure of, distribution and the social definition of what conditions make a person eligible for aid.

Such care is provided by experts in the field of social welfare in the name of the nation-state for the good
of society. The role of these care-giving professionals is to integrate into the rest of society those who are not able to maintain a viable social role for themselves.

The professionalization of the service sector came about largely through the merging of government with private sector human service activities. A continuing decentralization of services is in reality a model meant to bring both for-profit and special social enclave organizations into an increasingly governmentally-ordered social service sector.

These professionals perform their roles in society with three constituencies: the state, the profession, and the clientele. "The state and their particular profession provide these experts with the remedies and resources to apply at any given moment." (de Swaan, 1988, p. 232) We may say that allocative or material resources as well as authoritative resources in the way of legitimacy and the right of social control and supervision come to the experts by way of recent linkages with government and the creation of social care as a profession. Care givers have evolved into human resource managers.

Intervention in the area of social services by the federal government has led to a bureaucratization of what has become a professionalized service industry. While more efficient, the caring aspect of the profession has been undercut by the social worker's relationship to profession and government. "In this manner, the clients' needs and
interests have been defined for them; curricula, therapies and programs have been scheduled before-hand by the organized professions and the state, leaving it to the state-related experts to fit them into such schemes with a due measure of discretion and flexibility. This is their management task." (de Swaan, 1988, p. 233) The social service sector has thus become an industry, whereby services are regulated by the state and administered along efficient and rational lines. The client is often only considered in terms of projected outcomes, in particular the percentage that will be able to enter into the mainstream marketplace. As bureaucratization has structured the caring factor in social service provision, so such services have relegated the individual's needs to society's expectations of the person.

Process And Client

In his theoretical development of capitalism and the growth of a modern bureaucratic society, Weber came to believe that "the only creative factor in society is the free initiative of the individual personality." (Mommsen, 1974, p. 98) With this realization came fear of its defeat through stagnation. His pessimism concerning the inevitable "bureaucratic techniques of regulating the economy" and social system is based upon an increasingly
complex and bureaucratized government that takes the personal sphere as public and thereby as worthy of control (Mommsen, 1974, p. 100).

To Weber, it remains the value laden actions of the individual, of the small group, of the interested collective that makes for social change. The alteration of values and meaning in the minds of the individuals of the world are what makes for the revolutions that alter tradition and make for history. Normative principles that make up the precepts for life among separate social groups and cultures must be understood, lived, and changed at the individual or small group level if they are to have meaning for the people that carry them out. While Weber considered capitalism a social force carried by the spirit of entrepreneurial innovation and change, its growth has become dependent upon the practices of routinization, rationalization, and bureaucratization. These recently perfected social processes act as change agents that lack the human qualities Weber considered essential. Just so, this dissertation focuses on how the individual qualities that make up social services may have become structured through government intervention.

The depersonalization of social services has had two very distinct effects on the people that receive aid. First, the relationship that exists between the giver and the needy has become structured, a relationship of condition and category rather than one of responsibility
and caring. Finally, aid has come to require change on the part of the receiver, acceptance of public assistance at the loss of personal authority while acquiescing in the attempted transformation of the person into a more socially responsible person.

Discussion

It is theorized that the state has come to be a very important actor in the provision of social services in the postmodern world. Historical and theoretical writings discuss how social institutions, the state included, have become increasingly bureaucratized and operate on a more routinized and rational basis of action. More importantly, social service institutions have come to answer to and be regulated by the state, both the provision of services and the outcome of such services being considered by the state of national concern. Such regulation has unquestionably altered the relationship between service provider and those in need, but the extent of such a social change cannot easily be generalized.

In this dissertation the history of state intervention in the social services will focus on refugee resettlement in the United States. State regulation of the definition of refugees, migration of refugees to the U.S., and the resettlement process overall will be detailed in following chapters. The following sections of this chapter define
important concepts used in the discussion of the state and outline a model of state intervention in refugee resettlement service provision.

The Resettlement Process

The literature that has covered the resettlement of refugees in the United States recognizes the nation-state as an important player in the resettlement process but only incompletely models the place governments have in the relatively recent practice of refugee recognition and resettlement. More importantly, researchers have often referred to but never completely described, explained, and placed in perspective the effect federal resettlement policies and practices may have on the refugees themselves. Of particular importance is the potential impact of state action on refugee community and specific group organization. This includes intentional roles played by the nation-state as well as the unintended consequences of these roles as proscribed by resettlement policy. Concepts central to a discussion of federal action in the resettlement process are discussed below and are followed by a model that will be used throughout this dissertation.

The State And Refugees

The U.S. government is commonly viewed as a formal organization through which official institutions may attempt the implementation of specific goals. However, for
all activities on the federal level to be taken into
consideration on a theoretical as well as grounded level of
discussion, the federal government will have to be defined
as more than just an arena of action. The following
section clarifies certain vocabulary and concepts used
throughout the dissertation with special emphasis on the
role of the federal government in refugee resettlement.

In referring to policy development or other activities
on the national or federal level, the terms "state" or
"nation-state" will be used. There is an assumed
difference between governmental apparatuses and the nation
within which they operate. While the former may include
various offices, agencies, or departments provided power to
implement policy, it is the nation-state that is provided
the legitimacy necessary to make and enforce such policy.
While each nation-state is a symbol of and representative
for a people, the government is but an apparatus that is
dependent on the social legitimacy of the nation-state for
implementation of day-to-day activities. The terms
government, federal government, state, and nation-state are
all used in this dissertation, usually referring to action
taken on the federal level in the name of the nation-state.
The State of Hawaii and other individual or localized
states are also referred to and care should be taken in
determining what level of governmental action is being
discussed.
The modern nation-state is recognized by Giddens as: involving the development of a highly-complex administrative infrastructure; being set within pre-defined geographic boundaries; and being dependent on a system-wide practice of surveillance; while co-existing with other nation-states (Giddens, 1985). Giddens writes that "[t]he nation-state, which exists in a complex of other nation-states, is a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries (borders), its rule being sanctioned by law and direct control of the means of internal and external violence." (Giddens, 1981, p. 190)

Such a conceptualization of the state is consistent with Max Weber and his analysis of the modern nation-state in terms of an increasingly complex bureaucracy. To Weber, one of the West's most significant social achievements has been the conceptualization of and transformation into "a bureaucratically organized institutional state, with a clearly delimited territory, a rational legal order and its own staff of bureaucrats serving only the reasons of state and operating within the framework of clearly defined competencies, but above all in possession of the monopoly of physical violence." (Mommsen, 1989, p. 13)

However, the state is more than just a resource center and semi-autonomous structure used by interested outside parties. Neither an arena nor an autonomous automaton, the
policies and laws that the nation-state formulates and oversees often reflect its own interest in social order and control.

The state is to be considered as distinct levels of organization and action that structurally define the meanings and methods of localized action. Linked with national-level policy indicating state intention, the definition of the state is altered to follow that given by Skocpol and Amenta in an article concerning state initiatives and institutional structures: "States are organizations that extract resources through taxation and attempt to extend coercive control and political authority over particular territories and the people residing within them. "Policies" are lines of action pursued through states." (Skocpol and Amenta, 1986, p. 131)

This definition will be expanded to allow the state to be recognized as a source, not just a means, of power separate from though connected to civil society. In accordance with this expansion, the definition of policy as enacted and implemented by the federal government may be broadened: "All public policies are intended to influence or control human behavior in some way, to induce people to act in accordance with governmentally prescribed rules or goals..." (Anderson, 1984, p. 100) There follows a constant search for emphasis and balance between two interacting extremes: (1) centralized policy definition and coordination; and (2) decentralized capacities for the
pursuance of goals. In the area of refugee resettlement, policy and attending problems of capacity involve the centralized policies instituted by the United States government and the local forms such policies take when applied to Southeast Asian refugees in the State of Hawaii.

Resources are used by the nation-state and related government apparatus to influence and reproduce social systems. The predictability of social relations is very necessary for any government that wishes to stay in power and for the stability of any nation-state. "All states involve the reflexive monitoring of aspects of the reproduction of the social systems subject to their rule." (Giddens, 1985, p. 17) This statement concerns modern nations, socialist or capitalist, participating within a world system whose populace must accept and desire to accomplish the objectives set by the government for stable economic and political relations over a long period of time and across a wide geographic expanse.

State administrative bodies are organized in order to better appropriate, administer, and distribute social and material resources for the sake of social and national stability. Such resources are broken into two kinds: allocative and authoritative resources. Allocative and authoritative resources and the structures that are designed to make them available for public or other use are concepts identified and developed by Anthony Giddens in his works of the last decade. For the following arguments
concerning the resettlement of refugees in the United States, the use of these terms is not far different from how Giddens himself used them but are made more specific in keeping with the theme of the argument.

Allocative resources are taken as the material and technological resources controlled by a nation-state, in particular those influencing its participation in the capitalist world-system. Authoritative resources make up the powers of surveillance, definition, ideology, and administration of government policy that strongly influence how the nation-state distributes allocative resources. It is through the concentration of allocative and authoritative resources within the nation-state, and as administered by relevant government agencies, that the nation-state is able to retain its place and power internally in the eyes of its citizenry as well as externally with other nation-states.

Specific to the arguments made within this dissertation, allocative resources are those goods and services made available to portions of the public sector to meet agreed upon needs. Food, increased public housing, or monetary grants are common forms of resources allocated to local governments or private groups for the seemingly objective and benign reasons of health, social stability, or the public good. Authoritative resources are more
political in nature and serve to influence the structure of
group organization while altering the system of social
relations that make up a given community.

Though allocative resources are usually the more
visible, the two forms of resources are never separate and
authoritative resources are the more important. The
authority given to specially selected groups or the change
in goals or ideology due to government sponsorship may have
more long lasting and influential effects on the future of
a newly-forming community or group. Thus, authoritative
resources will be emphasized here, the resettlement
structure being such that resettlement policy may be more
important than or may unduly influence use of the actual
physical resources allocated for the resettlement process.

When the nation-state and supporting governmental
structure attempts to implement policy on the national,
state, and local level, a bureaucratic hierarchy or
rational structure of policy and action is formed. There
are three levels through which the refugee resettlement
process operates: (1) the federal government and attending
government departments under the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches; (2) the middle level implementors of
resettlement policy that include the individual states,
local governments, and the national voluntary agencies or
VOLAGs with their local affiliates; and (3) the refugee
communities and ethnic organizations that participate in
the resettlement, acculturation, and cultural maintenance
needs of a growing refugee community. The VOLAGS are probably the most difficult of the three to understand and will be quickly described here. VOLAGS are private sector, non-profit, yet bureaucratic organizations organized on a national and, in some cases, an international level. North describes them as follows: "all are non-profit entities; all are engaged in resettling refugees in the United States; and all have identical R&P (reception and placement) cooperative agreements with the State Department." (North, 1982, p. 26) In short, they are competitive groups that contract out with the Department of State to resettle refugees through affiliates in specific geographic locales of the U.S. such as Honolulu. More will be said about each of these levels in following chapters.

In addition, numerous acronyms are used to refer to the many organizations, agencies, and departments that are part of the refugee resettlement process. A list of acronyms and their meanings precedes this first chapter and should be referred to when needed.

Human Resources And The State

From a historical perspective, the nation-state has come to play an increasingly important role in the resettling of refugees within the U.S. Of special theoretical significance is the institutionalization of state dominance through the authorization process concerning immigrant and refugee policy. The theoretical
basis for such an argument assumes an active dimension to the structural elements of government policy and administration. The methodology behind this paper makes no such assumption but rather comes across what might be termed "reified traces" of government influence as hinted at by previous researchers, government documents, and over the course of many months of active participant observation.

To model a potential relationship between the federal government, policy implementors, and local community organizations has not been an easy task. At first glance the organization of refugees within the U.S. are of no obvious interest to the nation-state. However, as recognized by the nation-state on an international level and as resettled within a nation’s borders, refugees are political and capable of both strengthening or disrupting pre-defined social and economic patterns of organization.

A conceptual framework introduced by Offe and Ronge visualizes how the modern welfare state actively influences aggregate assimilation into a market or capitalist-bureaucratic economy. There are three levels of action the nation-state may take concerning integration of outside groups into a core culture and economy: (1) inaction; (2) subsidization; and (3) administrative recommodification. On any of the levels of action, the goal is to assure the commodifiable nature of the daily activities of the individuals and groups that make up a society. This is
because the commodity form is the abstract point at which all values may be linked to the accumulation process. "The link between the political and the economic structure of capitalist society is the commodity form. Both substructures depend upon the universalization of this form for their viability." (Offe and Ronge, 1975, p. 348) Offe and Ronge see the modern nation-state as attempting to maintain control over opposing, uncontrollable, peripheral, or non-productive members of society.

The state prefers inaction, the larger social community as well as the dynamics of a free market economy steering the majority of non-productive individuals into some form of market participation. If the people in question remain aloof from the commodification process, then the government can attempt to subsidize them, either in the form of education, job training, or welfare support for the disabled.

In other words, if possible the state will ignore the group or organization in question, saving money on funding and relying upon the larger society to socialize and assimilate. Time often turns young radicals into middle-aged taxpayers, the desire for the means to acquire material or style-laden goods too pervasive to ignore. Along these same lines, newly organizing groups, whatever their ideology, fail or become bureaucratized in an attempt to maintain themselves. Many more groups are simply subsidized to death. Youth pass through subsidized
education and the unemployed experience subsidized welfare guilt. Subsidies usually only go to institutions that make government inaction possible, largely through the process of socialization, acculturation, and value (discourse) internalization.

The social service system and the health service system are themselves subsidized and institutionalized, yet such action remains on the level of the individual. Social sub-groups and organizations, such as the refugees and their MAAs, are given access to resources and recognition only if a specialized discourse is practiced and acceptable values maintained. In this case the government acts through the discourse of commodification, a means that allows control of the organizations in question.

Seen as the most advanced strategy of the capitalist nation-state, the third method of commodification of value is implemented by allowing the group or sector to disintegrate and be reabsorbed by the market while at the same time the government urges them to "recommodify" themselves. This third level, administrative recommodification, has been broken into three sub-steps in order to show how it may manifest itself on a realistic level of action. First, the government uses sanctions, primarily allocative or monetary funding, in an attempt to lever the individuals or groups into a more commodifiable position within a market society. While the previously mentioned government subsidies maintain and influence
stable social institutions, government sanctions are simply funds provided as incentives for individual or group change.

The second level is more authoritative in nature, the policy direction being political in content but economic in its implementation. While the nation-state gives more power to the role of the private sector or individual states within which refugees are resettled, economic and political support from the federal government assumes overall control and definition of action goals. The emphasis on self sufficiency, the redefinition of refugees as homeless individuals who automatically become immigrants without a history after one year of residency, or the possible use of refugee community groups as extensions and implementors of government policy are forms of authoritative resources. That is, they are definitions or policy strategies that influence how allocative resources are to be spent and how policy is to be implemented on the local level. This second level of recommodification necessarily follows the first.

The third step involves the power of definition and redefinition and is inherently bonded to the first two steps of resource distribution. The definition of social situations or social status placement is commonly dependent upon those with the allocative and authoritative resources within a given area of social activity. For instance, in the field of medicine, primarily on the level of doctors
and the AMA, the human condition is studied, defined, and treated on a subjective as well as objective level. It is here that alcoholism has been redefined as a disease rather than as a normal part of adult life or as a weakness of the Godless. It is on the level of the nation-state that refugees are considered as socially dependent seekers of refuge who are fleeing an illegitimate and possibly cruel government.

This process of definition and redefinition is not a simple or easy act of conceptualization and action. It requires generations of socialization, collectivization, and legitimacy within and by society. "In fact, the process is much better understood as one of interaction, of contest and collaboration, collusion and duplicity, between bureaucrats and experts on one (not always the same) side, and their clients on the other hand." (de Swaan, 1988, p. 248)

Action on the level of recommodification and redefinition depends upon the resources held by the nation-state in question. If previous efforts at internalization and integration fail, or if the government simply does not want to recognize a group in the first place, the group in question may be redefined or simply dropped from formal recognition. To act counter to government resource manipulation leads a group to be either caught in a bureaucratic shuffle or branded as reactionaries and potential dangers to society.
The problems experienced by specific groups of people in society, such as the homeless or increasing suicide rates among Native Americans, can also be ignored or redefined by society at large or responsible governmental agencies. The authoritative resources of the government thus include inclusion of a group, the Palestine Liberation Organization or American Indian Movement, recognition of a problem, such as the degree to which homeless are forced to sleep on the sidewalks or do so out of free will, and definition of a problem, such as whether Southeast Asian refugees in the U.S. suffer acculturation problems due to a lack of employability or whether they suffer a lack of employability due to a lack of adequate and culturally relevant social support.

It is possible for an autonomous group to simply ignore outside funding sources, including governmental resources, and to remain aloof from imposed boundaries or bureaucratic requirements that seem to follow the acceptance of external funding. Refugees are special in that government recognition and support create their very existence in the first place. It is possible that people on the periphery of society such as large waves of immigrants or refugees, or even the unemployed or sick, may come to exist beyond a certain level of governmental discourse. However, as a group they will eventually
experience a need to participate in some way in the process of resource allocation and authorization, even if only on the level of government subsidies.

In a 1985 article on the politics behind the giving of public status to interest groups, Offe emphasizes the labor and capital dichotomy within the public process. Describing the corporatist methods of sanctions, transformation, and incorporation, he writes that incorporation keeps power interests from becoming too unhappy about the expense of social transformations (or social intervention) such as socialized health care. Yet, incorporation of organizations such as those within the refugee community is also seen by him as an important aspect of a pluralist structure, and the ends remain very much the same: "parademocratic political structures serve to contain and depoliticize conflict in a fragile reconciliation of the functionally required and the politically feasible." (Offe, 1985, p. 247) In other words, ethnic and other socially constructed organizations are institutionally defined and given public status in order to control intra-group conflict, leadership strategies, and share blame in case of social conflict.

In summary, the model places the nation-state in control of important resources that influence the life chances of specific activities and groups. While most individuals and groups work in hand with the federal government to maintain the existing status quo, certain
strategies must be acted upon to bring in more peripheral members of society. Recommodification strategies take place through the allocation of tangible resources, the definition of how such resources may be used, and the drawing of boundaries around what groups are to be recognized as eligible for such resources. Finally, Offe notes that bringing ethnic representatives into the recommodification process will strengthen and provide legitimation for the strategies as they are implemented on the local level. In other words, ethnic organizations or refugee MAAs may potentially be used as the means to implement federal resettlement strategies.

Research Problem

The problem addressed is that of state control over a process that involves the movement of human beings from one geographic and cultural context to another. More to the point, it is a process that has become extremely political, human resources becoming commodified and controlled through definition of the migrant as refugee. To clarify the problem it is the intent of this dissertation to do the following: (1) review the status of refugees in the eyes of the U.S. federal government; (2) examine the resettlement structure as organized on a national level; and (3) determine the means by which resettlement policy has been implemented on a local level.
A model of human resource commodification adapted from Offe and Ronge suggests that the nation-state will influence resettlement strategies for intended effects, particularly with the intent of making refugees more commodifiable or able to participate in mainstream American society. The mechanism for change remains the measured distribution of resources in the form of material aid to or the definition of rights and behaviors by those agencies and groups participating in the resettlement process. Controlled manipulation of these resources is meant to influence the integration of newly arrived refugees into the American social and economic system.

The unintended consequences of such strategies will be the alteration of ethnic community organizations, particularly in terms of the manner in which specific organizations develop goals and define community needs. Though not all refugees resettled in the United States are directly affected by the intended and unintended consequences outlined above, evidence indicates that the organization of refugees in the United States is affected to some degree. In addition, it is believed that as the process of decentralized resettlement is implemented, the numerous government, private, and ethnic participants will return to influence future resettlement strategies. Most relevant to this last point will be information gathered on a local level, in this case the State of Hawaii.
Research Strategy

The strategy of this research is to link federal policy with local refugee resettlement practices. This is done through the gathering and analysis of secondary data, historical analysis, and participant observation. The State of Hawaii is used as a case in point, federal resource strategies in the resettlement process being delineated and the place of refugee ethnic organizations in this process clarified.

Secondary data comes from a variety of sources. National level data are obtained from congressional records and transcripts, immigration laws and acts, and published accounts of refugee and immigrant movements into and within the United States. Hawaii data are obtained from records available from federal and state offices, the minutes and records of social service organizations, and newspaper accounts of refugee and immigrant movements into and within the State of Hawaii. Historical data on a national as well as local level has provided information relevant to migrant processes on a national and local level.

Participation in the resettlement process in Hawaii has allowed the author to gather data through observation, interview, and actual implementation of refugee and immigrant social service programs in Honolulu. Observation has included participation within many formal and informal organizations and activities related to refugee resettlement and social service planning. Such
participation has been on a localized state as well as program- or population-specific basis. The author has at times acted as an agent of change, personal preferences and professional concerns thus influencing the development and implementation of a number of refugee and immigrant social service programs in the Honolulu area. Such concerns and areas of interest have naturally shaped the research question and development of this dissertation. It goes without saying that personal biases have to as great an extent as possible been excluded from the process of research and analysis.

Given the relatively recent role of government in the recognition and resettlement of refugees, research and data gathering has concentrated on documenting the concept of refugee, placing the refugee in the context of government action and control, and the potential influence such a relationship may have upon the resettlement of refugees within the State of Hawaii and the United States. Following chapters emphasize refugee resettlement in the State of Hawaii, how this localized history may be placed within a larger national context, and the importance of government definition and control in the development of ethnic, minority, or other group development. Qualitative methods stressing the gathering of historical data as guided by personal observation and an accompanying model of government action can be seen in each of the chapters.
The chapters of this dissertation are arranged in a manner that emphasizes the increasingly dominant role of the nation-state in defining and controlling the process of migration to and within the United States. All chapters provide the structure by which to understand Hawaii's contextually specific yet generalizable resettlement process.

Chapter Two gives a history of immigration and refugee migration to the U.S., specifying federal levels of involvement and control in the migration process. Chapter Three then targets refugee resettlement, providing description, explanation, and analysis of how refugees have come to be perceived and acted upon as a human resource by the nation-state. As in all other parts of this dissertation, Southeast Asian refugees will be highlighted though other refugee groups will be noted when special interjections of federal control are important.

Chapters Four and Five discuss Southeast Asian refugee resettlement in Hawaii, recent interviews providing much of the information on how a national program for resettlement was implemented on a local level. Chapter Six specifies refugee community organizations that rank as the most important MAAs in Hawaii. While Chapters Four and Chapter Five outline the influence of federal and local governmental policy in the resettlement process, Chapter Six provides a comparison of local organizations and how
their internal structure has or has not been altered through formal participation in federal resettlement policy.

Finally, Chapter Seven provides an analysis of how community organizations may be altered through dependence upon external resources such as the federal government.
Endnotes For Chapter I

1. Reference to refugees will, unless otherwise noted, be specifically referring to those Southeast Asian refugees brought into the U.S. since 1975.

2. It is necessary to be sensitive to the many differences that distinguish the experiences of the immigrant and the refugee. Researchers such as Richmond (1988) have noted that "[a]mong the most important pre-migration factors are those concerning the motives and intentions of the migrants" (page 51), the history of the person and ethnic aggregate being considered decisive in determining acculturation patterns in a host society.

Recent immigrants largely apply for entry into another country in relative peace; are likely to maintain or improve prior living status, habits, and standards; are less dependent upon an ethnic community; and retain the possibility of returning to their native country. Refugees are those who flee from persecution and request help and asylum in the midst of political strife and humanitarian outrages. They flee from what had been their nation and livelihood without a chance of returning; have suffered immense social, personal, and economic losses; and are required by circumstances beyond their control to be resettled within a host nation. Interaction with host society members are rarely prepared for and ethnic community networks are developed as quickly as possible to replace pre-existing primary social bases (Rumbaut, 1980; Liu and Cheung, 1980).

Note, however, that if a host nation decides not to define an action of violence against a group of people as probable cause for fear and need for resettlement in another nation of asylum, then these particular migrants would be considered unwelcome or illegal immigrants and not refugees. Subjective and political biases play a large part in determining just who is considered and treated as a refugee. What this dissertation considers in detail is the special consideration given refugees not historically provided to any other migrant group by the nation state.

3. Milton Gordon has written of early immigrant community self-help groups but it is the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville that clearly point to community-based organizations as the strong point of American society. Neither dependent upon government intervention nor immersed in selfish or disinterested individualism, de Tocqueville wrote of an America that was actively involved in common community concerns. Forming intermediate structures
between government involvement and the local concern, community organizations provided a voice for what was commonly considered a community responsibility, something neither the government nor the individual would dare to question.
Chapter II

THE STATE AND THE POLITICS OF MIGRATION TO THE U.S.

Migration has been defined as "the permanent movement of persons or groups over a significant distance." (Peterson, 1975, p. 41) While useful for general use, such a definition excludes the personal, social, and political factors involved in the migration of peoples. The analytical concept of migration and the very real act of migration are too often separated from one another without any inclusion of the power of respective national governments or world political opinion. Questions to be raised in understanding the context of migration must involve national boundaries and relevant ideologies or belief systems that initiated both migration and acceptance or rejection of the migrants.

When did the federal government begin defining the rights and movement of migrants? While local areas of settlement were quick to stereotype and accordingly act upon recent migrants, how is it that the federal government has come to evaluate, rate, define, and differentiate among the many migrants wishing to come to the United States? The history of immigration is replete with incidences of federal intervention, and it is hoped that an overview of this history will clarify the place of government in
migration today. In addition, an understanding of how different refugees are from immigrants in the eyes of the federal government must be made clear. Are refugees simply a new form of immigrant, or is the modern-day refugee a political migrant with unique characteristics? What are the historical as well as recent actions taken by the nation-state, by the federal government in the best interests of the United States as a nation-state, that give precedence for and substance to present immigration policy?

In answer to these questions, this chapter introduces a short history of migration to the United States with an emphasis not upon objective historical fact but upon important points of pressure that have influenced migration patterns. Internal social policy and the role of the government in determining the status and number of immigrants is given particular attention. Discussion of the model of state intervention in the process of social integration, introduced in the previous chapter, and how well immigration and refugee policy can be explained by it, will be included in the final section of this chapter.

Patterns Of Immigration In U.S. History

The process of immigration has not always been as centralized a function as it is at present. Immigration has always been controversial, however, and over the last two centuries of American history the arguments have often been split between those in favor of unrestricted laws that
aid migration and those in favor of stricter laws that more tightly control the numbers and kinds of people crossing these borders.

Zucker and Zucker have found that the American people harbor conflicting views about the ideology of freedom and equality they wish to share with the world. This contradiction may be summed as follows: newcomers are welcome to these shores, but foreigners should be restricted. Restriction of entry and control upon arrival is considered essential by the American public yet only if the group in question is one that cannot be identified or empathized with. That is, peoples with similar ethnic and cultural backgrounds prove to be more welcome in times of extreme need or crisis than those who appear as ethnic or cultural strangers.

The Zuckers have identified three different migrant-control strategies taking place at different times over America’s history: "curtailment of immigration; barriers to immigration; and finally, the strict regulation of the numbers and types of immigrants permitted entry." (Zucker and Zucker, 1987, p. 3) Curtailment includes exclusion of groups that have come under disfavor by the public or others in power, such as the exclusion of all Chinese laborers in 1882. Barriers to immigration allow in specific desirable types among different population groups, such as requiring a certain level of literacy or skill in a given occupational area. Regulation of numbers and types
is most commonly used in today's immigration laws, appearing objective in allowing all people's into the country but only to the extent that they do not overwhelm the host community and are economically self-sufficient.

Cafferty, et al. (1983) also see immigration policy as being grouped into three periods. First is that period before 1875 when immigration was regulated but restrictions were kept minimal. It was towards the end of this period, just after the Civil War, that immigration and immigrants were becoming social concerns of political importance and the second period of American immigration policy began. The federal government, with an 1875 Supreme Court ruling to back its moves, denied local state regulation of immigrant migration and civil rights. Restriction and exclusion mark the 90 years of this period of isolationism. The third period began in 1965 with the passing of the amendments to the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act. These amendments ended the national quotas set in place forty years before and made family reunification the cornerstone of U.S. immigration policy. More importantly, this most recent period has inexorably altered the ethnic make up of the United States, East Asia and other sectors of the western hemisphere for the first time in this country's history outnumbering the immigrants coming from Europe.

Michael LeMay (1989) differs with Cafferty and instead divides immigration and control patterns in accordance with political policy. In his words, "[e]ach major shift in
immigration policy in the past was enacted shortly after a major shift in the composition of the influx of immigrants." (LeMay, 1989, p. 4) The periods LeMay believes to be formed by American immigration patterns and policy are: (1) an "Open-Door Era" from 1820 to 1880 with virtually no limits being set upon immigrant numbers; (2) the "Door-Ajar Era" from 1880 to 1920, with relatively more attention being given to restrictive limitations; (3) the "Pet-Door Era" from 1920 to 1950, a period of restrictions and national origins quotas; and (4) the "Dutch-Door Era" from 1950 to the present, many being allowed in but only under special provisions.

Immigration analysts tend to omit immigration patterns occurring before American nationhood, and U.S. importation of Africans as enslaved laborers is largely ignored. Allowing states the right to change an individual's status from "indentured laborer" to "slave" due to color of skin, ancestry, lack of political protector, or other political or business reasons should be considered the most important decision concerning rights of grounded residents ever decided upon. The government's 1808 decision to outlaw importation of slaves of any nationality or race is equally important, followed only by much later decisions to allow (and enforce) different ethnic groups the right to vote, to naturalize, or to enjoy guaranteed civil rights without fear of retribution.
For the sake of continuity, in this analysis immigration to the U.S. following the War of Independence will also be broken into three periods, roughly following the outline given by Cafferty but with increased emphasis on the political aspect of immigration as attempted by LeMay. These three periods are: (1) Open Door; (2) Restriction; and (3) Regulation. Refugees, as a very recent and special form of migrant into the U.S., are included as heavily regulated and, once in the U.S., heavily controlled immigrants of a more than common political nature. As with all other chapters that surround this one, federal influence over migration patterns and possibilities will be emphasized.

Open Door

The first period in American immigration history extends from the beginning of this country as a nation to 1875. Immigration policy was largely non-existent but was influenced by laws exercised by federal and state governments and local officials alike, the local administrators having more influence in determining exactly who could move into and live freely within a given section of a county or town. The fears of organized nativist groups were especially felt and acted upon within a local context. National restrictions were limited to those considered political or moral dangers, such as anarchists, spies, or prostitutes. In no systematic way was there any
federal or state-level attempt to alter the types and nationalities of immigrants. This does not mean that foreigners and immigrants were considered or treated equally. Limitations on citizenship, residence, and other rights were severely enforced by federal, state, and local laws and practice. However, the migration of peoples as considered by Peterson was largely unimpeded by federal law or policy.

Restriction

After the Civil War, the concept of "foreigner" was increasingly applied to immigrants. This was largely due to the growth in immigration from countries other than northern Europe. With public outrages for control and moves on the local level to alter internal population rights and make up, the federal government made a conscious effort to take control of immigration concerns. This second phase of U.S. immigration history began with centralized state influence over immigration through increased restrictions of both migration and civil rights. Increased importance of immigrants in the eyes of the federal government and its native public may be marked by the creation of the Bureau of Immigration under the Treasury Department in 1891. Over the following half-century the state institutionalized its right to define and control the process of immigration into the United States.
This period may be broken into three cumulative patterns of behavior and effect that the American public as well as public law demonstrated: restriction, regulation, and isolation. Restriction was the first key demand heard in both local gathering place and senate antechamber. Exclusion, as an extreme form of restriction, was considered a necessary means of control over contract laborers from certain countries, sometimes through legislation and sometimes through treaty. Such exclusion had a racist base to it, Chinese, Japanese, and other non-European laborers being banned from immigration while European nations at worst had their immigrants screened and cut in number.

Regulation of the kinds and types of laborers and immigrants came to be a middle-ground upon which labor-hungry businesses worked in hand with newly developing labor organizations. Such actions may also be seen as a form of quality control, Americans early in this century coming to look upon the destitute of Europe as being unfit for and taking advantage of America’s bounty. In particular after World War I, regulation through law or administrative preference came to screen the many in Europe still eligible to at least apply for immigration. The extremity of such regulation came from an increasing sense of uniqueness within the world, an attitude that culminated in isolationism. The United States, in policy and social concerns of the day, did not see itself as being
responsible for or in any way wish to be a part of the rest of the world. Immigration was considered a means for foreigners to take advantage of America and its fruits.

This feeling of isolationism continued up to World War II. After the war the people and representatives of the U.S. saw America as both protector of and role model for the rest of the world, as symbolized by a uniquely American history of refuge for the oppressed and as placed against the growing power of communism. The laws and attitudes that made up the formal regulation of those within and exclusion of those without this country was not completely altered until the signing of the 1965 Amendments to the 1952 Immigration Act.

Restriction

The Immigration Act of 1875 marked the beginning of a period of exclusion of specific undesirables, in this case prostitutes and convicts. While morals remained high on the list of determining acceptability of an individual to immigrate, labor made its concerns known to Congress and in 1875 had the importation of contract labor made illegal.

Of greater national impact was the Supreme Court ruling in 1876 that declared regulation of immigration a federal privilege under the Interstate Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. While American immigration laws were largely limited to regulation until 1917, exclusion was practiced with a racist vehemence up until 1965. It is
approximately at this time that restrictive immigration laws began to be argued for and passed in an attempt to control numbers and types of people crossing these borders. Perhaps the most infamous laws are the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act and the 1907 "Gentleman’s Agreement" with Japan to limit the number of Japanese laborers entering this country.

This pattern of restriction, to last through to the 1965 Immigration Act, was not due solely to control of migration being restricted to federal control. The 1876 Supreme Court ruling came about due to increased pressure by the American people and by individual states attempting to control both ingress of migrant peoples and the rights and privileges granted them upon entry. The federal government was thus given the power to define, control, and restrict immigrants at a time in this country’s history when immigrants were becoming seen as foreigners.

Regulation

The vision of immigrants as foreigners is not hard to explain since a drastic change in types of immigrants entering this country had begun some decades before 1876. The immigrants that had come to settle the land known as the United States were largely from central and northern Europe and, of course, Great Britain. Later immigrants included increasing numbers of Germans and Catholic Irish, both greatly debated about by the English Protestants that
made up most of the American populace of the time. Then came those from the southern and eastern parts of the European continent, the Yugoslavians, Polish, and Italians. The skills, languages, and foods of these immigrants were seen not as an addition to a growing land but as an intrusion upon an industrialized nation with traditions of its own. In addition, laborers from China had arrived to work in California and any other state with work that was undesirable to its Anglo-Saxon population. A sense of nationhood and separateness from other nations had developed, a form of xenophobia known only to those who feared that what good they had may be lost if shared with others.

Little was done to restrict European immigrants, though in 1907 what has come to be known as the Dillingham Commission was formed to study the matter. There was enough pressure against the Japanese entering United States territories as laborers for President Roosevelt to require the Japanese to sign a treaty drastically limiting further immigration. Policy up to this time then was principally concerned with and blatantly excluded anarchists, criminals, and East Asian ethnic group members.

However, in 1911 the Dillingham Commission finally came out with the results of its study. The commission had concluded that recent immigrants lacked the positive qualities of previous (Northern European) immigrants and should be more carefully screened, specifically through the
implementation of a literacy test. Numbers were also considered a problem, the ten year period between 1905 and 1914 bringing a larger number of immigrants to these shores than any other, 10.1 million (Bouvier, p. 9). Restrictions based on the percentage of the nationality group already in the country were also proposed.

The Immigration Law of 1917 took these recommendations seriously and moved to restrict immigrants, in particular the European hordes displaced by World War I, through a literacy test, increased legal authority to deport undesirable aliens, and increased Asian and Pacific exclusion. This last restriction took the form of an Asiatic Barred Zone, a region including much of East Asia and the Pacific, from which no immigrants were to be allowed. Fears of lost job security on the West coast was the primary reason for this clause.

This law brings to light immigration trends that have continued through to 1965 and racist sentiments that continue to this day. Family reunification was considered important enough to be able to bypass the literacy test as well as those who could prove that they were fleeing religious persecution. Political refugees were not considered at that time, revolutionaries and dissidents being considered dangerous enough to be the reason for strengthened deportation laws. Asian exclusion and the fear of being overrun by the "yellow hordes" increased in fervor up through World War II. It was also in this law
that the concept of non-immigrant foreign workers became a part of Department of Justice and State Department jargon, primarily referring to Mexican and other laborers from the western hemisphere.

Isolation

Conservatism, xenophobia, and a belief in America as a nation of destiny for white Anglo-Saxons led to a stronger 1921 and 1924 immigration bill. With a rise in the fear of cheap labor and the recognition that the literacy test was not strong enough to keep out more than a handful of people, a nationality quota system was put into practice. While many bills were heard that would suspend all immigration, the Quota Act of 1921 became the nation’s first piece of legislation that restricted immigration through national quotas. With an established yearly ceiling for all European immigrants, a slightly higher percentage for those from northern Europe than those from the south, and maintenance of total exclusion of Asian immigrants, its biases were clear. At the same time, there was no limitation on immigrants coming from the Western hemisphere, farmers and business interests fearing higher labor costs if Mexico had restrictions placed upon its peoples. This special privilege for Mexican workers was itself restricted as the depression era came to dominate labor activities in the early 1930s.
A more permanent version of the 1921 act was adopted in 1924, known as the Johnson-Reed Act or, more descriptively correct, the National Origins Act. This act reduced the total number of immigrants to less than 200,000 (150,000 of these from Europe alone), allowing a quota of no more than two percent per year for each nationality as found in the 1890 census. This quota scheme was changed in 1929 to be more representative of the U.S. population through the use of the 1920 census, but the overall effect of the bill remained the same: those of Anglo-Saxon or European descent were favored above all others for immigration. Zucker and Zucker find two major themes in these related laws culminating in the 1924 act: "fear of opening the floodgates and fear of a threat to the existing social order." (Zucker, p. 11) Such fears were especially apparent concerning Asian workers and immigrants. All Asians became truly equal in the United States when in 1922 Japanese immigrants were legally denied rights to naturalization and Japanese immigration came to an end with the enactment in 1924 of the Oriental Exclusion Act.

Yet the kinds of people seeking a home in the United States had changed. In the 1920s there was a rise in the number of people fleeing war and persecution, the Russians and Armenians becoming homeless refugees, rejected by the majority of European nations. But with the 1930s more people began to fear a return of violent change over the European landscape and tried to buy their way into the
United States with their skills. Rather than poor and uneducated rural farmers, the restrictionist laws were now keeping out skilled and educated urbanites. The Jews of Germany are perhaps the most well known example of Europeans kept out of the U.S. While some bills considered admitting German and British children in the wake of a rising German war machine, the great majority of the American public preferred to remain restrictionist and isolationist.

The only change was in fact more restrictive and administratively based. In 1941 consuls were given the power to deny a visa to anyone they thought might be a danger to the U.S. This was supposedly in fear of war enemies or communists who might try to come into the U.S. and commit sabotage. It was in fact a power allowing consuls to limit to only the select few the right to come to the U.S.

Post-World War Two Immigration Patterns

Little was done until after World War II to change immigration laws or visa requirements. The Chinese Exclusion Act was abolished in 1943, but sharp restrictions on all Chinese entering the United States remained in place. More important was the recognition of the concept "displaced persons" after World War II. President Truman was in favor of increased immigrant admissions, and many in
the United States began to feel that increased admissions in light of the problems in Europe were necessary, but restrictionism remained strong.

The Zuckers note that after the war a new argument for increased immigration rights was introduced. While the restrictionists relied on questions concerning the danger of allowing in ethnically strange and politically unsound strangers, questioning the effect foreigners may have on American society, others were arguing that the United States had an obligation to help the needy and displaced in Europe. This "moral obligation" argument was new at the time but remains today as a strong rallying point for those favoring increased admissions.

The McCarran-Walter Immigration Act of 1952, also known as the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, was the first comprehensive immigration bill adopted since 1924. President Truman disliked its nationality quotas and philosophy of restrictionism retained from the 1920s but his veto was overridden. The act retained strict and token ethnic and nationality quotas (in particular those from Asia and the Pacific), barred all political dissidents and radicals (save those from communist nations), gave non-quota status to immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, and gave the president parole power in the case of emergencies. It also gave the right of citizenship to Americans of Asian descent and Asian immigrants living in the United States.
Many other immigrants were allowed in beyond the quotas set down by the 1952 bill, spouses and children in particular. "Only an estimated one out of three immigrants of the 3.5 million admitted between 1952 and 1965 was actually a quota immigrant under the national origins system for the Eastern Hemisphere." (Bouvier and Gardner, 1986, p. 13) This inconsistency between law and reality is explained by the non-quota status given to the relatives of U.S. citizens. The great majority of the Chinese and Japanese that entered the U.S. between 1950 and 1965 came as a "non-quota relative" of newly naturalized Chinese- and Japanese-Americans or as a spouse of American soldiers under the War Brides Act.

During this era communism had become a major tool for national and foreign policy. As politicians made names for themselves in the United States for being anti-communist, so foreign policy in the form of immigration and refugee admissions was based on an anti-communist ideology. The Internal Security Act of 1950 was enacted to combat the possible rise of communism in the U.S., specifically giving the government increased power to exclude or deport any person suspected of being a communist. The Escapee Program was begun in 1952 and provided a means for resettlement and resource allocation in the United States, but only if escaping from certain communist governments. The Refugee Relief Act of 1953 flew in the face of the McCarran-Walter Act and allowed admissions to unprecedented numbers of
immigrants if they claimed that they were fleeing a communist government. In a war against communism that has only recently begun to slacken, acceptance of those fleeing communism became a major media tool used by the federal government for ideological and political reasons. Such rationalization at the federal level in forming immigration policy continues to have an effect on present and growing immigrant and refugee communities in the U.S.

Regulation

The 1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (from here on known as the 1965 Immigration Act) radically altered previous immigration policy. Though it did not take full effect until 1968, it abolished the national-origins system and ended the Asian-Pacific Triangle provision that kept almost anyone east of Italy from entering the United States. The bill was a mandate to end racist discrimination and to allow all peoples a chance to immigrate to the United States through a number of avenues according to personal or family status. In a reversal from the 1952 bill which emphasized skills in its system of preference, family reunification became a primary goal and the means by which immigration law and preference was supposed to work. "Labor qualifications were the criteria only for the third preference (members of the professions and scientists and nonperforming artists of
exceptional ability) and the sixth preference (skilled and unskilled workers "in occupations for which labor is in short supply"), with 10 percent apiece." (Bouvier and Gardner, 1986, p. 15)

The end of national quotas in 1965 made America’s doors less exclusionary but did not end restrictions. The change in American attitudes towards foreigners is explained by the following reasons: (1) the U.S. becoming the major military and economic power in the world; (2) a wish to be seen as a leader among concerns for human rights, particularly those involving communist nations; and (3) recognition that East Asia in particular and the world in general was a supplier of labor, resources, and political power within a shrinking world system.

The 1965 Immigration Act was not totally without bias, for Eastern Hemisphere peoples were chosen according to a numbered preference system while those from the Western Hemisphere, though limited to 120,000 per year, were not limited by a preference system until 1976. This change was largely due to an increased number of immigrants arriving from Mexico and Central America at a time that many Americans were beginning to feel less sure of their continued economic affluence. Not until 1978 would the distinction between the two hemispheres be abandoned and a world-wide ceiling be adopted.

This single sweep of prior immigration law changed the ethnic make up of the United States. While traditionally
most of America's immigrants had come from Europe, within
two decades the vast majority would be coming from points
east. Asian immigrants were most likely to make use of the
third and sixth preference categories for labor needs, many
arriving as students and staying to take on jobs and become
citizens, thereafter bringing family members in by way of
the other preference categories. Such chain migration
remains a common practice of those from East Asia.

Refugees were given little attention by the
immigration act. Though an annual quota was finally
allocated in recognition of the continuing importance of
refugee movements in world affairs, they were given the
least important level within the preference system
instituted by the 1965 Immigration Act. As before,
refugees were defined and limited by geographic, ethnic,
political, and economic factors, not their immediate needs
as human beings. Still, the idea that the United States
had a moral obligation to aid those refugees of the world
was present.

Refugee: A Special Kind Of Immigrant

While refugees and the seeking of asylum and safety
from perceived danger is not new, the institutionalization
of such a status and the international definitions that
have come to define and shape the actions of individual
nations since World War II is unprecedented in world
history. The following sections look at the development of
the concept of "refugee" over the last century and how the international community has differed in implementing a process of recognition and support.

Immigrants And Refugees

The participation of the nation-state in the immigration, refugee, and asylee process is a mute point for it is the nation-state which has created and institutionalized these concepts and perpetuates their existence. The concepts of the sovereign nation, of immutable borders, and nationalism are recent requirements of and tools for the building and protection of nations. To allow free entry of all peoples, cultures, and ideologies would be to deny the sovereign power of any government in power, of any dominant culture or ideology. As the world has learned to cross borders through transportation and communications technology, the feeling of separateness from others appears to grow and harden into a demand for ethnic, religious, or historical rights to sovereignty over a separate piece of land.

In attempting to determine differences between immigrants and refugees, it is necessary to be sensitive to the many differences that distinguish the experiences of immigrants and refugees. Richmond (1988) notes that "[a]mong the most important pre-migration factors are those concerning the motives and intentions of the migrants" (p. 51), the history of the person and ethnic aggregate being
considered decisive in determining acculturation patterns in a host society. Thus any dichotomous description of immigrants and refugees would be but a rough generalization that simplifies what is in fact a set of very special relationships between people and sovereign nations. These relationships have varied across time and between peoples and nations, as was made clear in the prior chapter on immigration. This section will discuss the general differences between the two groups while following sections will develop the concept of "refugee" as recognized over time by different nations and national groups.

Recent immigrants apply for entry into another country in relative peace; are likely to maintain or improve prior living status, habits, and standards; are less dependent upon an ethnic community for economic or social resources; and retain the possibility of returning to their native country. Refugees are those who flee from persecution and request help and asylum in the midst of political strife and humanitarian outrages. They flee from what had been their nation and livelihood without a chance of returning; have suffered immense social, personal, and economic losses; and are required by circumstances beyond their control to be resettled within a host nation. Interaction with host society members is rarely prepared for and ethnic community networks are developed as quickly as possible to replace pre-existing primary social bases (Rumbaut, 1980; Liu and Cheung, 1980).
Zolberg, et al. argue against the most common means of differentiating between immigrants and refugees. Immigrants are often seen as voluntary migrants who cross borders for economic reasons. Refugees are those who are involuntarily forced to move due to political beliefs. It is argued that some refugees, such as the Cubans, leave of their own free will and are not forced. In addition, while refugees have been used to make political arguments by receiving nations, many refugees leave from a fear of starvation or economic deprivation. Recent examples are those peoples escaping from El Salvador, many being referred to by the U.S. State Department as economic migrants because no political points can be gained from calling them refugees.

The conceptualization of the term "refugee" has finally come to be made up of three categories, formed and fused across history and by international agreement. Zolberg describes these categories as follows:

"The first two, constituting the U.N. definition, are a formalization of the classic types. They include the refugee as an activist, engaging in some politically significant activity that the state seeks to extinguish; and the refugee as a target, by misfortune of belonging—often by accident of birth—to a social or cultural group that has been singled out for the abuse of state power. The major change in the definition since its inception in the 1950s is the emergence of a third category, the refugee as a mere victim. This covers persons displaced by societal or international violence that is not necessarily directed at them as individuals but makes life in their own country impossible." (Zolberg, et al., 1989, p. 30)
Each of these three categories can be pinpointed in U.S. refugee history. The political refugee is that individual or group leaving a politically repressive regime, like those escaping from Hungary in 1956. Those Dutch-Indonesians forced out of Indonesia when that country became independent are a good example of the second type. Finally, many of the Ethiopians or Afghanistanis accepted by the U.S. as refugees over the last decade may be referred to as victims.

Foreign policy and the recognition of what constitutes an immigrant or refugee is followed by resettlement policy or differential treatment of different migrant groups once permission to enter the U.S. is given. In the U.S., as a nation of second asylum for Southeast Asian refugees, entry and resettlement policy will differ greatly from immigration policy.

First, refugees are more likely to come from Third World or non-industrialized countries. The resources afforded them and thus their status in this country will be different from that of immigrants, most of whom come from industrialized or industrializing nations.

Second, refugees, unlike immigrants, are given economic support for a time long enough to help them adapt to social and other conditions in the U.S. This special
relationship did not take full effect until the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, but some degree of government assistance was given to refugees as early as the Refugee Relief Act. Immigrants are allowed no assistance for up to five years after entry.

Third, while immigrants either enter expecting to begin work immediately or rely upon and live with relatives, refugees are provided special support services through federally subsidized Voluntary Agencies or VOLAGS. This relationship between refugees and the political process, something that has become synonymous with all modern nation-states, will be more fully developed in the following sections.

International Recognition Of Refugees

Prior to World War II few nations had the resolve or international support to recognize and fight for the rights of those groups of people dislocated or persecuted by events that finally led to a second global war. Those dislocated by the war were recognized by the international community as being deserving of aid and resettlement, initial repatriation and resettlement services being provided by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency.

In 1947 the International Refugee Organization (IRO) was set up to alleviate what was still considered to be a temporary situation of wandering homeless and excluded
minorities in Europe, emphasizing resettlement in any willing nation. Zolberg, et al. note that the IRO developed the individualized framework that is used today by nations and organizations working with refugees, "shifting away from the collective approach that had marked previous international efforts toward a more individual one that was inherently more appropriate to a universalistic orientation." (1989, p. 23) That is, objective standards of suffering and need had to be met by the individual before the status of refugee could be used. Even given this limitation, more than one million refugees were resettled between 1947 and 1951 (Gallagher, 1989, p. 579).

The temporary nature of the refugee situation turned out to be a false hope, and in 1949 the U.N. High Commissioner's Office for Refugees (UNHCR) was revived by the U.N. General Assembly, becoming a formal office within the UN in 1951. The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration was then created in 1952 to assist with the required transportation for resettlement of eligible refugees. The target population remained limited to those on the European Continent suffering from the ravages of the war and "dislocated" before 1951. Other forced migrant populations, such as those created through the tensions manifested between Muslim and Hindu in India, were dealt with on a more ad hoc or case by case basis.

Over the last forty years the UNHCR has evolved a mandate that has taken into consideration all exiles
deprived of rights or home. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948 remains the standard for all nations for determining national and international responses to the human condition. Refugees as a special case were defined and given international rights through the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, known simply as the Convention. This document gave refugee status to those fleeing persecution and danger, objectively real or subjectively perceived, without political, religious, or geographic requirements. For this reason the United States, with its strong anti-communist stance, was not a signatory. There was a time restriction to the document, however, as the reason for its inception was the masses of refugees and displaced persons remaining from the aftermath of the war. Thus only those whose status existed prior to January 1, 1951 could be deemed eligible for recognition by the United Nations and the signatories of the document.

This limitation ended in 1967 when the United Nations adopted the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Protocol), containing the earlier phrasing and definition of refugee without any time restriction. The rights of refugees and the responsibilities of signatory nations addressed in these documents became models for individual nations, such as the U.S. in 1980, and national groups, such as the Organization of African Unity in 1969.
The status of refugee is dependent upon the physical and emotional state of the individual, the phrase "well-founded fear of persecution" being the key element in all following definitions. The 1967 Protocol, in line with the 1951 Convention, phrases the definition of a refugee as one who,

"owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reason of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it." (Department of State, 1969, p. 6261)

Also spelled out in the Convention and the Protocol is the requirement that signatories not return asylum seekers to their countries of origin where there may be some danger to their person or freedoms. Signatories need not grant asylum but must agree to the prohibition of refoulement.

Refugee Status In The United States

Though refugees as seekers of safety and asylum have long been a part of human society and more recently the history of the modern nation-state, the definition of just who is a refugee or is worthy of asylum has always differed from group to group and nation to nation. The United States has experienced internal differences of opinion as to who is a refugee and what constitutes a good reason for seeking asylum. Likewise, the implementation of powers to
give or deny asylum has long been a matter of contention between the executive and legislative branches of government as well as between politicians and the American people in general.

In addition, though a law may recognize a people as refugees, the law does not require that those people, of any number, be resettled in the U.S. Recognition may give only support of the group's claim without acting on their needs. Only once the refugee has been recognized and taken within the borders of the U.S. is the government then forced to follow more restrictive resettlement policies. The policies formulated and acted upon by the United States since World War II stand out in their dependence upon political agendas rather than humanitarian concern.

American Refugee Policy In Practice

After World War II, President Truman used his administrative powers to loosen restrictions for those who were displaced in Europe, but very few were able to take advantage of rules that were bound by immigration law. The Displaced Persons Act of 1948 was more a restrictionist's answer to a moral dilemma than a recognition of the plight of the displaced in Europe, but it was signed by Truman. Restrictions ran throughout the bill, limiting even the number and type of Jews who could apply through this act for admission. Employment and social stability remained the primary concerns of the public and officials. The
majority of those applying for entrance through this bill "had to provide assurances that he would be able to obtain employment and housing without displacing an American, and that he would not become a public charge." (Congressional Research Service, 1980, p. 7) Assurances and support upon entry were largely given by private nonprofit voluntary agencies, easing the explanations the government had to give to an ever-wary public. Aid to the "displaced" of Asia was brought up only by opponents of the bill, trying to raise fears through anti-Asian sentiments that remained strong in the United States (Reimers, 1985, p. 23).

With amendments and extensions as well as a liberal administration, the bill was to allow a home to more than four hundred thousand refugees. Though badly flawed and brought about in an ambivalent spirit of Americans patronizing their European neighbors, the Displaced Person's Act remains "the first significant refugee legislation in American history." (Zucker and Zucker, p. 28)

When the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia, ending an anti-communist revolt taking place there, anti-communist feelings led to additional administrative and legal procedures giving precedence to anti-communist immigrants seeking refuge in the U.S. As these immigrants were fleeing political persecution and did not have the luxury of applying for and waiting for a visa, they were termed refugees.
Some of the "freedom fighters" from Hungary were also admitted under the terms of the Refugee Relief Act, but others were admitted through a very vague loophole in the 1952 McCarran-Walter Immigration Act that gave the attorney general the power to give parole status to those deemed fit or in need of immediate entry. While this clause was meant to be used on a case-by-case basis for such things as medical emergencies, more than 32,000 Hungarians were paroled with special rights to obtain permanent resident status after two years.

Perhaps this power of parole as used by the attorney general with authorization from the president was not so much a loophole as a serious flaw in the immigration act that could be gotten around in no other way. "Because of the limitations of the conditional entry provision...parole continued to be used as the major authority for the entrance of groups of refugees into the United States."

(Congressional Research Service, 1980, p. 13)
Congressional attempts to end this power to parole aliens have largely failed, fickle public sentiments being the greater weapon or failing of either side.

The Refugee Escape Act of 1957 was passed in order to allow more Hungarians in without the use of administrative tactics, such as giving parole to whoever pleased the president. More importantly, it gave a more liberal definition to the term "refugee." Such refugee-escapees were defined as "victims of racial, religious, or political
persecution fleeing Communist or Communist-occupied or dominated countries or a country in the area of the Middle East." (Congressional Research Service, 1980, p. 9)

Following the Hungarians came other refugee groups; the Dutch-Indonesians after Indonesia gained independence from the Netherlands and the Cubans when Cuba fell to Castro in 1959. The Refugee Fair Share Law was passed in 1960 and was designed to create a structure through which refugee admissions and resource allocations could be administered. Congress was constantly attempting to develop a refugee admissions policy that made the designation of the status of refugee fair according to agreed upon guidelines and keeping the attorney general from being too free in giving large groups of people parole.

With this increased Cuban presence in the U.S. came the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, a bill pushed by President Kennedy that authorized funding for refugee assistance in this country and allotted contributions to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. For the first time programs that aided refugees to adjust to life in the U.S. were funded by the federal government and the Executive Branch was given increased latitude in dealing with immigration issues as well as powers to allocate funds for emergency refugee and migrant needs.
The 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act did no more than its predecessor in 1952 to formalize recognition of the concept of refugee in national immigration law. There was recognition of an increasing need for some provision to allow the legal entry of large numbers of asylum seekers into the country. Congress felt that the Attorney General had stepped beyond the limits of power of that office when asylum was given to the Hungarians and Cubans in previous years. To keep the doors open for future emergencies, Congress included what is known as the seventh provision for entry or conditional entry provision. Limited to only six percent of the total immigration ceiling of 170,000 for the Eastern Hemisphere, creation of this provision indicates that Congress both disliked the uses to which the Attorney General had implemented parole authorization and recognized the rising needs of peoples other than legal immigrants.

The primary arguments and problems that surrounded the 1965 Immigration Act concerned nationality quotas, family reunification, and limits for the Western Hemisphere. Refugees and the crises of recent political upheavals were considered temporary and abnormal occurrences of a prior era. Some pointed out that such "freedom revolutions" as the Hungarian revolt should be prepared for, the 1962 Migration and Refugee Assistance Act bringing organization to and funds for refugee reception and placement without providing for regular procedures of admission (Reimers,
During this same period of time, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson both wanted increased executive flexibility in determining the entrance of refugees, but Congress was willing to give only limited parole powers. Congress did not even consider the Western Hemisphere worthy of a refugee ceiling in 1965, that area of the world being considered stable and unlikely to present future problems. The Eastern hemisphere refugees, as defined by the seventh and lowest preference in the act, were allowed a ceiling of 10,200 places. If and once admitted, these refugees were to be considered "conditional entrants." Only after two years were they to be considered eligible for residency status. This was an especially controversial issue as in 1965 Congress refused to allow earlier paroled Cubans to change their status to resident alien, thus keeping them from becoming eligible for citizenship until 1966.1

The power of parole was to be given by the attorney general on a case by case basis, not en masse as had been practiced in the decade before. Communism and the fleeing of communist regimes remained ingrained in the requirements to be considered for parole. Natural disasters were also considered by Congress to be worthy of escaping from, but this category has never been used by a president or attorney general to confer parole. Thus, only a very small number of refugees were allowed to enter the country
through the preference system, all other refugees having to rely upon a special parole from the Executive Branch of government.

The political agendas that denied a broad view of the world's refugee situation also allowed an impossibly inadequate means for refugees to enter the U.S. The collapse of the republican governments of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in 1975 led to the Attorney General allowing over one hundred thirty thousand Indochinese into the United States through parole authorizations. In 1977 the limitation of 10,200 was upped to 17,400, but this was still too low. Parole authorizations were given or extended ten times between 1975 and 1979 (Congressional Research Service, 1980, p. 13). Use of the parole provision, however excellent the humanitarian reasons, was very unpopular in Congress and the Ford administration agreed to stop its use until more permanent refugee entry procedures had been agreed to. The election of President Carter in 1976 voided such an agreement and the parole provision was used up to, and even after, 1980.

The majority of refugees entering the United States until 1980 had been eligible for entry under the conditional entry provision of the 1965 Immigration Act, primarily due to their escaping communist governments in East Asia. Other than the fact that the numbers seeking entry had been far in excess of those allowed by the provision, the ideological and geographic limitations
imposed in 1965 were in contradiction with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed by the United States in 1968. As long as the United States followed parole procedures and did not deport those seeking parole, no problems were encountered. The philosophical basis for parole differed from the United Nations' definition of refugee, however, leading to increased pressure to change the definition of refugee while allowing for more orderly procedures for refugee entry.

An additional problem was that immigration laws did not give a clear means for people to claim asylum or gain residency once on American soil. In 1968 the U.S. agreed to the United Nations Protocol on Refugees, binding the U.S. to allow refugees once in the U.S. to remain. This was a windfall for Haitians who were trying to flee a dictatorship that was not communist. The 1978 Amendments to the 1965 Immigration Act allowed seventh preference immigration status for those in the Western Hemisphere and allowed all those under parole status to change their status to resident alien.

Those escaping from non-communist dictators, such as the Haitians, were found to experience many barriers in having their claims recognized and their rights protected. (U.S. Senate, 1980) Such inequalities led to the changing of the definition of refugee to more closely follow that used by the United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees. Conditional entry, requiring the entrant to wait two years before resident alien status can be conferred, was also changed.

Additional pressure for a comprehensive refugee act came from the lack of an organized resettlement structure for large numbers of people. When 130,000 Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian refugees and asylum seekers entered the country in 1975, no governmental or private structure existed through which resettlement could be implemented. The types of refugees changed over time as well. While those arriving in 1975 were largely urbanized and well educated, those arriving from Vietnam after 1978 were primarily ethnic Chinese and had been involved in small business. The Lao and Khmer that began arriving in significant numbers after 1978 were less educated and more rural in their backgrounds than the Vietnamese. The amazingly successful yet frustratingly ad hoc nature of the resettlement process led to what is perhaps one of the most important aspects of the 1980 Refugee Act: a formal structure with specific offices and lines of authority for resettling and assisting in the acculturation of refugees entering the United States.

The 1980 Refugee Act

As noted above, ad hoc procedures of resettlement, a lack of a clear definition of refugee status, an unequal and often costly system of reimbursing individual states
for refugee resettlement needs, and ungoverned use of parole powers by the Attorney General led to the eventual creation of the 1980 Refugee Act. Discussions involved in the creation centered on the numbers to be admitted, the actual resettlement of those admitted, and the structure of the offices that would be concerned with resettlement programs and assistance.

The 1980 Refugee Act was unique from the laws implemented by other nations in that a large segment of it constructed the necessary legal framework for what and how many refugees would be recognized and allowed entrance into the U.S. All concerned with the construction of this act agreed that the concept of refugee must leave out any of the ideological and geographical limitations used by prior acts and parole authorizations. At the same time, the administration emphasized a need for refugee allocations to be sensitive to the national agenda and political priorities. Foreign policy considerations, people of "special" concern to the U.S., and those with past relations of some form with American interests were to balance other moral and humanitarian factors for determining refugee status. Given the proper political or economic conditions, the act allows for the "continued selectivity in the distribution of admission offers" or possible "denial of resettlement to certain groups, especially if other solutions to that particular refugee problem are available." (Martin, 1982, p. 106)
Perhaps of greatest significance in the definition of refugee status is that the 1980 Refugee Act made the definition correspond with that used by the United Nations in its 1967 Protocol. That is, ideological considerations requiring that those in question be escaping from a nation under the control of a communist government were dropped. In the 1980 act, a refugee was considered to be:

"...any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion..." (Public Law 96-212, 96th Congress, Title II, Section 201.)

Notice that this revision of refugee law dropped earlier provisions that recognized victims of natural catastrophes. An unprecedented provision that was through dictionary allowed that the President may, after consultation with Congress, recognize those trapped inside their countries as refugees and in need of special entry.

The number of refugees to be allowed into the United States in any one year was not to exceed 50,000, family members included. In addition, the worldwide limit on immigrants was cut from 290,000 to 270,000 and the conditional entry provision of the 1965 Immigration Act was repealed. Each year the President was to consult with the Judiciary Committee on the total number of refugees to be
admitted over the coming year. Any in excess of 50,000 required approval from Congress. In addition, those admitted would automatically be eligible for permanent residency status after residency of one year. Under this act, all refugees would be exempt from the Immigration and Nationality Act's exemption provisions.

Parole authority remained an important area of discussion and the Attorney General was granted prior powers of parole as long as parole status was not given to one who could be instead defined as a refugee. Otherwise, the granting of parole by the Attorney General was dependent upon "compelling reasons in the public interest." The Attorney General was given the powers to waive, on a case by case basis, bases for exclusion to assure family unity.

Resettlement assistance, under Title III of the act, created the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) under the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (soon after reorganized and renamed the Department of Health and Human Services or DHHS) to take over the duties of the Office of Refugee Migration Affairs under the Department of State. ORR, was not intended to become a formal and operating part of the institutional structure until 1982, by which time the President was allowed to suggest a better means of resettling incoming refugees in the United States.

To coordinate refugee affairs overall, though without the powers to interfere with the programs and policies of
the ORR, the act also established a U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs as an Ambassador at Large, later placed under the Office of the President.

The 1980 Refugee Act was perhaps most controversial in its funding on a stable and regular basis the resettlement and acculturation process of those admitted as refugees. Assistance was to be given to each refugee for up to 36 months. Conditional entrant status was retained but cut from 2 to 1 year, resident alien status then being available upon application and approval.

Assistance to refugees was roughly equal to that given to those refugees entering the United States since 1975 through the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program (IRAP). Financial, medical, and other assistance to the refugees was to be limited to the first three years after their arrival in the United States. The limitation of these special federal funds for assistance came from the long-term assistance programs that remained in place for those who had escaped from Cuba a decade or more before. The three year limit was to begin one year after the approval of the act, April 1981, and was to include 100% reimbursement of all cash and medical needs of the refugee and his or her family.

The director of the ORR was specifically required by the act to do the following: "provide resources for employment training and placement; to provide refugees with English language training; to insure that any cash
assistance made available to refugees not discourage their economic self-sufficiency; and to insure that women have opportunities equal to men to participate in training and instruction." (Congressional Research Service, 1980, p. 57)

Local or state governments, voluntary agencies (VOLAGS), and other local resettlement agencies were to be consulted with in implementing these provisions.

Implementation

The law that refugee policy stands upon never really existed until 1980. Until that time, vaguely worded declarations and agreements between nations allowed the U.S. government to define and act upon any developing refugee situation in accordance to private preferences. Yet even with the passage of the 1980 law, the definition of exactly who is a refugee and exactly how that person should be admitted remains vague, this loophole becoming a tool of policy and political preference. The weakening of the legal objectives pre-supposed by passage of the law was compounded when the refugee coordinator, envisioned by the act as a policy maker, came to be nothing more than a spokesperson for refugee policy as determined by the executive office. Definition and implementation of the law have largely been based upon executive privilege to policy formation and Congressional indifference.

The 1980 Refugee Act was a landmark piece of legislation, but was immediately ignored by Presidents
Carter and Reagan. Carter chose not to invoke the act upon arrival of the Marielitos, and both presidents exceeded the 50,000 limit set for refugees in the act. Financing of these refugees became the primary topic in Congress. In addition, while the definition of refugee in the act stressed "well-founded fear of persecution" rather than "escaping from a communist nation," neither president altered policy to give asylum to those escaping from countries such as Haiti or others in Latin America except Nicaragua. For example, support and resources has not been readily forthcoming for those escaping right-wing dictatorships, as from Chile in 1973 or Guatemala in the 1980s (Reimers, 1985, p. 185).

The Mariel boatlift was the test case for the 1980 Refugee Act and previous fears and political maneuvering won out. Rather than objective policy and procedure according to legal standards, the mass of migrants was greeted by a legal system that refused to recognize them as refugees. That was what the 1980 Refugee Act hinged upon: the recognition of refugee status by a host nation. Without this political act as followed by procedures for resettlement in the host nation, the 1980 Refugee Act means little to applicants.

The refugee act requires a prescreening of the individual refugee if status is to be given. The individual must first prove a "well founded fear of persecution" and only then be judged. This attempt at
bureaucratic order is almost impossible when the U.S. is used as a nation of first asylum, something the writers of the act blithely ignored. The Cubans that crashed across the American border had to be first evaluated and then resettled in the U.S. or elsewhere according to status. The U.S. Government considered the Mariel Cubans not as political refugees but as economic migrants.

With the influx of Cubans there was an awareness of an increased number of Haitians fleeing to the U.S. Together these two groups turned the U.S. into a country of first asylum, undermining the administration’s desire to have total political control over the definition and entry of refugees. Foreign policy and relations with the home nation have also had a great deal to do with the rights given to incoming asylum seekers. Haiti and Cuba are treated very differently because Haiti is a friendly authoritarian regime while Cuba is communist. This double standard continued throughout the early and mid-eighties (Zucker and Zucker, 1987, p. 67).

In order to keep Haitians and Cubans from being designated as "refugees," thus denying them the political status and economic resources afforded those considered as refugees, the administration instead invented a new label for them: special emigrant. Yet the Cubans were given the right to apply for permanent residency while the Haitians
were declared ineligible and placed in a special holding status until they decided to return to Haiti. In this way the administration was able to redefine both groups as other than refugee while also giving rights to Cubans but not to Haitians. Though the ink on the paper was still wet, the Refugee Act meant very little to the Cubans or Haitians.

Changes In The Definition

The Reagan administration had questioned the vagueness of the term "fear" and began instituting the requirement that there be "clear probability" of such fear. The March 9 Supreme Court ruling ended so narrow an interpretation. Associate Justice John Paul Stevens noted that the 1980 Refugee Act and its definition of "refugee" follows the UN definition. He wrote that "There is simply no room in the United Nations' definition for concluding that because an applicant only has a 10 percent chance of being shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted, that he or she has no 'well-founded fear' of the event happening." (quoted from Refugee Reports, 1987, Volume VIII, 3, p. 6)

Following this ruling, the Board of Immigration Appeals turned to the concept of "persecution" in the phrase "well founded fear of persecution." Following a history of focusing on individual actions as separate from the political context they arose from, the Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA) argued that there are many kinds
of persecution and that beatings or physical violence in some situations cannot be defined as "political" or "persecution." Following federal cases in the Ninth Circuit Court (Arteaga v. INS) and the Fourth Circuit Court (Matter of Salim) disagreed with the BIA and required INS and BIA prosecutors to follow the spirit of the meaning behind the earlier Supreme Court ruling.

The matter of definition and application of just who was a refugee had not ended, however. In the late 1980s, there was an increase in the number of Soviet Jews and Pentacostals applying for entry into the United States, most trying to go around immigration limitations by declaring themselves to be refugees. In 1989 the INS was charged by World Relief and by the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society with once again individualizing the plight of Russian emigres and narrowly determining their level of "fear" and degree of proven "persecution." The standard letter of denial is reported to have read as follows: "Although there is no question that the applicant was subject to a certain amount of discrimination, the facts presented are not sufficient to determine that the discrimination was so severe as to place 'serious restrictions' on his ability to become educated, to earn a living or practice his religion." (Refugee Reports, 1989, Volume X, 3) Such a narrow interpretation, it was charged,
showed a clear intent of group denial, no single individual being able to rise above the maze of requirements the INS lays before applicants.

The 1989 Lautenberg-Morrison Amendment (part of the FY1990 Foreign Aid Appropriations Act) allowed a proven history of persecution against certain groups to certify members of that group the right to apply for and receive refugee status. Specific groups include Russian Jews, Evangelical Christians, Catholic and Orthodox Ukrainians, and some Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians. This relieves persons from having to prove persecution against them as specially chosen victims of any given government.

The actual choosing of refugees from among the many millions around the world for entry and resettlement in the U.S. also has its political agendas. Throughout the nineteen-eighties, foreign policy, fiscal, and internal resettlement agendas dominated refugee policy. Policy thus had less to do with objective conditions than the political constraints that had to be weighed in deciding upon the impact of incoming refugees. First the political and economic implications were decided upon, and then the numbers and definitions were agreed upon. "Ideology and geography, not solely humanitarian impulses, shape the policy. Before a person may be granted refugee status, two determinations must be made. First, whether refugee numbers have been allocated for the region of a person's nationality; and second, whether the person is within a
group designated to be of "special humanitarian concern." Even an individual who could qualify for admission under the Refugee Act will not be admitted if no allocations exist for his country and his group." (Zucker and Zucker, 1987, p. 73)

Geographical allocations for refugees of special humanitarian concern are brought before the Congress each year. The 1980 Refugee Act allows for Congressional approval of the refugee ceiling as set by the executive office each year. These numbers are set in accordance with the Worldwide Priorities System (WPS) which act as guidelines for Congress and the attorney general. Zucker and Zucker argue that Congress largely ignores the priorities system, treating the prioritizing of refugees in different countries as an administrative matter best handled by specialists in the area. Yet while geographical allocations determine the numbers allowed in per region, the priorities system determines how refugees are to be defined and accepted in each country. Each administration is thus capable of defining refugee status according to different countries from year to year.

The priorities system is based on danger to the individual in the home nation, previous links with the U.S., presence of family members in the U.S., and membership in regional groups whose interests are of special concern to the U.S. Such priorities, as wielded by political interests, leaves the possibility for subjective
definition and application of a law that had originally been designed to make the refugee selection process more fair, orderly, and objective. As stated by Zucker and Zucker, "No matter how well-founded a refugee's fear of persecution may be, if he does not fit into a priority for his country, he is ineligible for consideration." (Zucker and Zucker, 1987, p. 77) The existence of such a priority system, and in particular the weighting of refugee status by family or business connections in the U.S., blurs the edges of what the Refugee Act defined as those in need of humanitarian assistance. In addition, when the State Department limits the number of priorities that may be applied to a region, it also cuts the number of refugees allowed for that region.

Belonging to a high priority group does not assure one of resettlement in the U.S. U.S. governmental or administrative interest influences if not dictates which groups around the world will be accepted for resettlement. For instance, in 1989, refugees from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were automatically considered eligible for resettlement, whatever their placement in the list of priorities. For East Asia, policy since 1982 has been to process only those in the first five priorities. Most other nations and areas of the world are limited to priorities one through five, though Near Eastern and South
Asian refugees are considered only for the first four priorities. The priorities followed by the Department of State as of 1990 are as follows:

1. Compelling Concern/Interest: Whereby a refugee is in immediate danger of loss of life and for whom resettlement in the United States is the only alternative, or whereby the refugee is of compelling concern to the United States, in particular concerning political activities.

2. Former U.S. Government Employees: Including refugees who have been employed by the U.S. government for at least one year prior to filing for refugee status or were at least of important service to a U.S. Government office.

3. Family Reunification: Close family members to U.S. citizens, lawful permanent resident aliens, refugees, or asylees.

4. Other Ties to the United States: Refugees who were employees of or had attended school at U.S. companies and institutions.

5. Additional Family Reunification: Distant relatives of persons in the United States.

6. Otherwise of National Interest: Refugees who belong to other specified national interest groups.

(U.S. Coordinator, 1989, pp. 18 - 20)

Regions are also awarded larger numbers and more liberal use of the priorities system according to preference by the positions of the State Department. For instance, the only large numbers of refugees the U.S. has allowed in from Latin America are Cubans, those escaping a communist regime, followed by Nicaraguans, also fleeing communism.

Before 1981 the INS defined the majority of Southeast Asians fleeing Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam as refugees.
About this time an emphasis on individual reason for fleeing was imposed. Cambodians were in particular singled out for denial, being labeled as economic refugees by the INS and redefined as "displaced persons" by the Thai government. Zucker and Zucker report that the application of the law was politically influenced and strongly affected by personal and INS departmental biases. It was not until 1983 that the INS commissioner issued what has become known as the Worldwide Guidelines for Overseas Processing."

Categories were given by which an individual could be judged as a refugee or not. These guidelines notwithstanding, the INS has been strongly criticized for their inconsistent and biased application of the priorities system and the granting of refugee status. Unfortunately, while there have been bills presented in Congress giving the State Department the authority to admit refugees, no change has been forthcoming.

Recent Developments

The 1980 Refugee Act "ran out" in 1983 but was not formally extended until 1986. The Refugee Assistance Extension Act of 1986 (PL 99-605) had special requirements for VOLAGS in the area of increased performance reports and criteria, but did not change the spirit of the original law in any way. The act has not been extended as required by law but, as before, this has not hampered the quality or
kinds of services being offered refugees. Internal political agendas will probably keep the act from being extended until 1992.

The administration and Congress have both attempted to find a way to lower the cost of helping refugees. Solutions include admitting refugees as immigrants, bringing refugees in under immigration quotas, and defining as immigrants those who do not qualify as refugee but still desire asylum. Such politically motivated actions give the U.S. the look of being humanitarian without having to pay for the services provided refugees by the 1980 Refugee Act. Most cost cutting measures have affected the quality and length of social services offered to refugees during the resettlement process in this country. More information on these actions and their consequences can be found in the next chapter. What follows is a description of two programs that have roles of major importance in America’s refugee selection process and resettlement program.

The Orderly Departure Program

After the original influx of Vietnamese refugees between 1975 and 1978, many involved in the refugee resettlement program realized that there were many still in Vietnam who could not escape yet were worthy of emigrating to the U.S. for family, political, or other reasons. Because the U.S. lacked formal diplomatic relations with Vietnam, the UNHCR signed an agreement with the Vietnamese
government in 1979 that would allow the development of a mechanism for orderly emigration of those acceptable by the U.S. State Department.

To meet the criteria as a refugee in what has come to be known as the Orderly Departure Program (ODP), one must have family members in the U.S. yet be ineligible for an immigrant visa, be a former employee of the U.S. government, or have been in some other way closely associated with the U.S. presence in Vietnam. Those applying for entry into the U.S. through ODP have been able to apply as immigrants or refugees. The majority of those entering the U.S. through the ODP program have entered as refugees.

Beginning in 1989, those ODP applicants who failed to qualify were given the chance to apply for entry into the U.S. through the Public Interest Parole (PIP) program. As with parole in general, the U.S. Attorney General had the discretion to choose among those applied for individuals of special interest to the U.S. Education, occupation, and the presence of close relatives already living in the United States greatly enhances the chances for a person's being allowed in through the PIP program. Recent changes such as this one in refugee law and entry clearly show a trend towards limiting the number of "pure" refugees while channeling other claimants into categories that approach immigration categories.
Amerasians

The Amerasian Act of 1982 allowed a small number of children into the U.S. through the Orderly Departure Program if they were fathered and abandoned by American servicemen since 1950. In April 1986 this legislation was amended to provide for the entrance of Amerasian children and their mothers as well as other close relatives. The Amerasian Homecoming Act of 1987 gave a two year time limit to the entrance of Amerasian children and family members beginning March 21, 1988. Under this latest and more extensive law, the Amerasians and their accompanying family will enter as immigrants but with full refugee benefits. No numerical limitations have been set on how many Amerasians and family members can take advantage of the act but Bureau for Refugee Programs (BRP) officials have admitted that budget and technical resources, such as transportation, will limit who can enter under the March 1990 time line. For this reason, the act has been extended.

In consideration of the special circumstances surrounding the Amerasian ordeal in Vietnam and probable resettlement needs once in the United States, the many VOLAGS and other agencies responsible for refugee resettlement in the United States formed a special coalition just for the resettlement of the Amerasians. Known technically as the American Council for Voluntary International Action but more generally as InterAction, the
coalition has contracted all responsibility for resettlement of the Amerasians with ORR, including the development of special cluster sites, family reunification, and short term resettlement needs. InterAction members have complained, however, that those entering under the title of "Amerasian" have special social and psychological problems that will require support systems far in excess of the funding being allowed. Future funding extensions and special discretionary funding to provide special support services to those entering under the Amerasian act is expected.

Discussion

The preceding sections of this chapter detail how control over migration from one country to another is a process that has been slowly usurped by the federal government. Nationality, ethnic group, occupation, geographic placement of the nation of origin, relationship with a citizen of the receiving nation, and political origins have come to have great meaning in the developing of immigration policies on the level of the nation-state. Concepts of control and accompanying infrastructure have only slowly developed, and as the policies for control have been implemented, so the populace has seen government as the rightful gatekeeper of our nation’s boundaries.

Migrant control strategies are shown to be a power of the nation-state that has developed and grown over a period
of decades. Restrictions placed on incoming migrants have had local roots but the implementation of policy, restrictive or otherwise, has required federal approval. Not until Hungarians and Cubans were forced to escape from communism in the 1950s did the U.S. government begin supplying monetary and social resources to aid in the resettlement process. It was during this period that the U.S. government became an active change agent in the social restructuring of migrants and their communities in the United States.

While not directly impacting on the primary hypothesis of this dissertation, such information is essential in the understanding of how governmental policy defines and determines the life chances of potential migrants. Points of focus established in the first chapter have been addressed through a historical description of government policy and social process. Immigration policies are shown to have slowly restricted and regulated the entry of foreign nationals, concepts of power and control that became very important in the more recent forming of refugee policy. The modern concept of refugee contains within it a political agenda determined by sending and receiving nations as well as by the larger international community. Recognition and reception of refugees is political and implies a relationship between the nation-state and refugee that provides special allocative and authoritative
resources not available to immigrants. This relationship is unique, recent, and under the control of the receiving government.

The allocation of resources to potential migrants is dependent on federal definition of the group or individual in question, this definition being political and only secondarily having an objective nature. The fiscal resources for control over migration or policy implementation as well as the authoritative resources that make up such definitions and attending policy greatly influence entry as well as resettlement within the United States. Immigrants are treated in one manner and refugees in another manner, refugees essentially becoming charges of the federal government for a short period of time.

The model detailed in the first chapter is useful in that it specifies the power of the nation-state to define the differences between and access to resources by immigrants and refugees. While immigrants are immediately placed within the almost invisible social processes of civil society, refugees are recognized as being potentially in need of recommodification. Special resources are intended to accommodate refugees to life in the United States. Such allocative and authoritative resources support, educate, and alter those who are unable to conform to American social and economic institutions.

Refugees, especially those from non-industrialized nations, are seen as different by the state and are treated
accordingly, recommodification being one possibility that is commonly turned to in the process of resettlement. The specific laws, policies, and regulations that detail how refugees are defined and treated by both the state and the locale they are placed within is outlined in the following chapter.
Endnotes For Chapter II

1. Following a precedent set by special laws passed for the Hungarian "freedom fighters," in 1966 Congress finally passed the Cuban Adjustment Act, giving those refugees the right to apply for resident alien status.

2. For more information concerning this matter, refer to Janet L. Parker's article titled "Victims of Natural Disasters in U.S. Refugee Law and Policy."
Chapter III

THE ALLOCATION, RECEPTION, AND RESETTLEMENT
OF REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES

The influence of the nation-state is pervasive, and following a world systems model it is easily understood how even the most remote of villages in the least industrialized of nations can be influenced by world political, economic, and social concerns. Thus when a war between the United States and Vietnam (or Iraq) escalates into a fight between opposing ideologies and cultural histories, no villager however innocent will escape unscathed. Many peoples around the world have attempted to escape the destructive powers of leaders who act according to ideology rather than the immediate welfare of the people concerned. Herein lies the basis for extensive internal and international migration.

This influence of the government, noted in the prior chapter, may first be seen in areas of displacement, where politics, war, and economic ruin create waves of people who lack consistent control over their lives. Immigrants are marked by planned and controlled actions, though they may have to wait years before actually travelling to the
country of their choice. Refugees are thrust into "the wind's shawl" and must exist however they can, fleeing before destruction often being their only recourse.

After flight across the border, unless a family member can be found in this first nation of asylum, the survivors are considered as strangers and are placed in a temporary holding camp. The majority of these camps in Thailand, Pakistan, Mexico, Zimbabwe, and many other nations around the world are at least partially supported and funded by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Such support keeps the nation of first asylum from immediately rejecting the needs of those people seeking asylum. In addition, these internationally recognized camps give the nation of first asylum the authority to maintain control over the increasing population of newcomers without immediate danger to its own place in the international political sphere.

Some refugees remain in these camps for many years, existing in a stage of limbo; their country of origin is politically or economically intolerable and no other nation is willing to sponsor their permanent resettlement. To remain in a camp a person must demonstrate that refugee status is deserved, that political reasons and a fear for life and freedom was the reason for fleeing. Those considered without such reasons are termed "economic migrants" or "displaced persons", politically expedient terms that suppose economic and other non-political reasons
for flight. Their situation is considered morally neutral and without sufficient power to require other nations to donate aid to or take responsibility for them. For example, by 1990 there were approximately 17,000 Cambodians considered as "refugees" staying in camps in Thailand and seeking another nation for more permanent resettlement. There were an additional 270,000 Cambodians in Thai camps considered as "displaced persons" (U.S. Dept. of State, 1990, p. 35).

Once given refugee status, a refugee may wait in a border camp for years, hoping that a nation of second and more permanent asylum will be choose him or her as a part of a predetermined quota of refugees for that year. Having family members living in another country, having past ties with corporate or government employees, or just being able to speak some of that nation's language will provide the necessary reason for a particular country to choose this particular refugee for resettlement. ¹

Following acceptance, language and acculturation classes are commonly required. In the nation of resettlement, a host family or perhaps members of the refugee's own extended family is notified and makes preparations for the resettlement experience. Once all of the paperwork is out of the way, something that may take months due to communication, housing, or other problems,
the refugee is transported to his or her new home. This transportation is not free and must be repaid by the refugee once resettled and actively employed.

Given the above opening scenario, the tension that is inherent between governments and refugees is very obvious. Reimers (1985) notes that the government is the other half of the resettlement of refugees. Immigrants are not resettled, they are simply admitted. Refugees hold a special status in that they are considered government trusts from the time of formal recognition until they are given residency status. Thus while VOLAGS and other community agencies are needed to help in the resettlement and acculturation work, it is the government's decision to label such people "refugees" that makes such services available to them. This recognition, this status, automatically brings the government into whatever experience a refugee will have to go through in the acculturation and resettlement process.

A very special and unquestionably political has come to exist between government and refugee to an extent that far surpasses any state linkages with immigrants. Given this historical precedent, questions arise concerning how refugee policy is made and implemented by the U.S. government. Following the hypothesis and special focus points that drive this dissertation, the placement of allocative and authoritative resources by the nation-state are of special concern. To what extent does the nation-
state centralize control over the definition of "refugee" and the development of resettlement policy? How are the resources provided by this policy directed on the local level? What formal and informal steps have been taken on the federal level to bring the refugee community into the resettlement process? Given that the nation-state has come to control both policy development and resource allocation, how has such control differed among the refugee cohorts that have been affected over the last thirty years? Such questions require a detailed analysis of how the American government has structured the political arena of refugees on both a national and local level. If a relationship is shown to exist on the local level to as great an extent as exists on the national front, it will be possible to affirm at least a potential link between federal policy and local refugee community development.

Resettlement Structure

Government financial aid is the most common and most easily identifiable proof of the relationship that exists with refugees. If refugees had remained a European phenomenon or one only existing between industrialized nations, perhaps the degree of governmental financial support now common for refugee resettlement would never have come about. Refugee movements recognized by and acted upon by the U.S. government up to the late 1950s originated in Europe and received little or no host-country support.
beyond what was extended to immigrants. Later refugee movements have come from and continue to arise in less developed areas of Central or Latin America, Cuba, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and many nations in Africa. In addition, communist nations have been specially targeted by U.S. politicians in the passage of preferential immigration laws over the last half century. Support and numbers have walked hand in hand with political preference, level of development, and geographic area of the sending nation.

The refugees that escaped from Hungary in 1956 and were later accepted into the United States as refugees were given only a small amount of support from the federal government, the majority of services and resources arising out of community efforts and VOLAG-based organizations. Not until the fall of Cuba and the eventual flood of political exiles and refugees to this nation in the early nineteen sixties did federal aid actually support and thus intentionally mold resettlement efforts. Though the programs organized around resettlement of the Cubans were strongly criticized in the nineteen seventies for the extent and length of support given to Cuban refugees, limitations imposed on following waves of Cuban, Southeast Asian, or other refugees have not been significant until the last two years.

Linked with the refugees' probable lack of experience in an industrialized or urban setting, many are recognized
as needing at least a token amount of language and acculturation training before travelling to the U.S. English language classes, job skill training, case management, and acculturation programs remain heavily funded in 1990 by the federal government through the Office for Refugee Resettlement (ORR). In this way the government maintains a close association with them throughout the resettlement process, defining the means and ends of valuable resources necessary for rebuilding a life and a community in a new land. However, recent cuts in aid and support by the federal government over the past decade have only underscored the control the federal government has over resettlement activities and potential community development. The reduction of funds, often referred to as a "reprogramming" of available resources, is probably permanent and more than likely only a preparation for greater structural change.

Resettlement is not a simple process, and is in fact a long process of personal and cultural adjustment that may never be attained. One’s reception, available housing and accommodations, presence of family or same ethnic community members, and past education and occupation will play a large role in how well the refugee acculturates into the host society. The surrounding local government, state administration, and available federally funded programs will heavily influence the refugee’s acculturation process,
primarily through the material resources and policy guidelines resettlement agencies are given to work by and with.

A model of resettlement agencies commonly divides them into four different sections, each section based upon the group that implements, funds, or determines the resettlement of a refugee. These four are: the U.S. Government; the VOLAGs; state and local governments or administrations; and the local community. This latter group of individuals and well-meaning organizations (often churches) should itself be split into two very distinct groups. Very important but of only temporary significance is the local community, in particular the church groups that made up many of the sponsors for refugees and their families and who dedicated some measure of their lives to helping others adapt to a new social and cultural context. Of greater long-term importance is the ethnic community, most especially the self-help groups or Mutual Assistance Associations (MAAs) whose primary function is to provide culturally sensitive support during and beyond the resettlement period.

The following sections of this chapter outline the policy, procedures, and structure that make resettlement in the U.S. possible, beginning first with the four institutional sectors that make up the recognition and resettlement of refugees in the U.S. Following will be an explanation of the application of the policy of the United
States government and how it has structured the resettlement of two specific ethnic and nationality groups over the last few decades. A section on government funding and resettlement policy and history gives a more detailed explanation of what specific variations and patterns have had an impact on refugee resettlement.

Federal

Though rulings by the judicial branch of the government have not directly affected resettlement of refugees in the U.S., both the legislative and executive branches have been primary factors in refugees even being allowed into this country. Congress has been instrumental in passing laws concerning the limits of executive powers, allotting money for agencies under executive control, and generally influencing but not directing the actual resettlement of refugees. Within the executive branch of government the process of refugee allocation and resettlement involves the following departments: State; Justice; Health and Human Services (whose duties were formerly directed by Health, Education, and Welfare); and Defense.

Department of State

Within the Department of State, the Bureau for Refugee Programs (BRP) is responsible for all international refugee programs as well as initial in-country resettlement, in
particular voluntary agency grants. The Department of State performs three refugee-related functions: (1) it is very influential in the case-by-case application of the concept of refugee as well as determining who may enter the United States; (2) it provides resources and support services for those people overseas who are recognized as refugees, in particular those about to enter this country; and (3) it provides monetary grants and technical assistance for those VOLAGs it contracts resettlement functions out to. This third function of the State Department is the only domestic activity related to resettlement that it is responsible for.

The separate services funded by the BRP include voluntary agency services overseas, language and orientation programs overseas, transportation loans, and reception and placement agreements with American voluntary resettlement organizations. Special funding for recent programs for refugee assistance overseas goes to the State Department's Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) and Emergency Refugee Migration and Assistance (ERMA) fund. Pre-entry programs to prepare East Asian refugees for the transition to American life include English as a Second Language classes, Preparation for American Secondary Schools (PASS) for adolescents, and Preparing Refugees for Elementary Programs (PREP) for younger children. Transportation of refugees is funded by the State Department through a program administered by the
Intergovernmental Committee for Migration\(^2\) (ICM). Airfare for the refugees is paid in advance but is considered a loan, each refugee being expected to repay the Department of State.

**Department of Justice**

The Justice Department is perhaps best known by its overseeing of the Immigration and Naturalizations Service (INS). The INS participates in the selection of refugees overseas, screens refugees and seekers of asylum, and again screens those who apply for resident alien or citizenship status. The Justice Department also works closely with the Attorney General, a power whose sole authority has allowed more refugees into the United States than any law previous to the 1980 Refugee Act. Funds that go to the Justice Department specifically for refugee related matters are very small, most of its work with refugees being a consequence of working with all newcomers to the United States.

**Department of Health and Human Services**

The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare had traditionally administered the development and funding of refugee related resettlement and social service programs through the office of Social and Rehabilitation Service. When HEW was reorganized in 1977, refugee related program activities were transferred within HEW to the Social
Security Administration. As a part of this reorganization, Cuban and Indochinese refugees, who had earlier required separate appropriations from Congress, were able to be funded from a single appropriation request beginning FY1979 (Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations. Hearings Before A Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 1978).

The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), having taken over from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1980 the long term provision of services to refugees once settled in this country, contains the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). Programs administered by this office include a variety of state administered programs, special programs for voluntary agencies (in particular those relating to case management and employment services), and preventive health programs. Other DHHS programs that exist outside of ORR control but impact on the refugee population include Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Medicaid, and Supplemental Security Income.

While the State Department provides the support for VOLAGs and initial placement (sometimes with funds appropriated through DHHS), it is Department of Health and Human Services funding that has maintained the long-term support services that refugees (and surrounding community) has come to depend upon. This funding and the services
provided are naturally dependent upon government policy concerning refugees and resettlement. Just as political partisanship influences the number of immigrants or refugees that may be allowed in from a given country, so policy will influence how monies are to be spent on support services once the refugee has entered the United States. Researchers including Taft (1979), Martin (1982), and Zucker (1987) agree that government policy is very important at this stage of the refugee's resettlement, and while noting that policy in 1979 emphasized placing the refugees in mainstream life as soon as possible, also expressed dismay at the narrow and, at times, inappropriateness of such a policy.

The largest of HEW and DHHS expenditures these last three decades has been for income maintenance or cash assistance for those too socially, psychologically, or physically disabled to enter the social and economic mainstream. Taft (1979) notes that the majority of the funds expended by HEW for Indochinese refugee services were income maintenance, such as AFDC, as opposed to human development programs, such as education and job skills training. Selected states and school districts did receive funds to work with the additional Indochinese students, both young and adult. The majority of refugees who have problems in gaining employment were given economic support through the HEW program known as the Office of Family Assistance within the Social Security Administration.
After passage of the 1980 Refugee Act, refugees received assistance through the Office of Refugee Resettlement, located in the Social Security Administration of DHHS and later within the Family Support Administration. This assistance is largely federally financed but partially matched or supported in-kind by state and local governments.

Immigrants to the United States must sign a form that denies them welfare or cash assistance benefits for the first three years of their stay in the U.S. Those Cubans who entered the U.S. immediately after the fall of Cuba to Castro in 1958 were given no more support than what the surrounding ethnic community could offer. Only later did the federal government begin a variety of programs that provided for cash assistance and social services over an extended number of years. Other refugees, such as the Kurds and Chileans who entered early in the 1970s, were able to receive cash assistance, Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) for instance, only if they meet the requirements that all other citizens of the state must meet for such assistance. However, upon meeting such requirements the state government paid only a small portion of the assistance and the federal government paid the rest. Indochinese refugees have received financial assistance in varying forms since 1975 but have largely been 100% Federally funded for increasingly shorter periods of time.
Those deemed eligible for AFDC are of course eligible for Medicaid, a federal and state supported program that provides medical assistance to low income families. Taft reports that as of 1979, 100% of medical costs for Indochinese refugees was Federally financed, 85% for Cubans, and at varying rates for other refugee groups (Taft, 1979, p. 37). For more information on the social services and support systems offered refugees, refer to the following sections concerning Cubans and Indochinese refugees.

Department of Defense

The military has played an important role in the creation and resettlement of Indochinese refugees, but their involvement in the reception phase of resettlement was only for the short term adjustment immediately after arrival in 1975. In the Hungarian program it was the military that provided transportation and refugee camp support services. For the Indochinese, the military was instrumental in creating small cities for the welcoming of over one hundred and thirty thousand refugees in 1975. The military has thus been decisive in providing the structure for immediate implementation of social process during a period of social breakdown, but has not been used for long-term resettlement. At the same time it should be remembered that the military is also relied upon at times
to interdict seekers of asylum, such as the Haitians fleeing Haiti by boat, and return them by force if necessary to their place of departure.

VOLAGs

Though immigrants have always relied to some extent upon help from national voluntary agencies (VOLAGS) in becoming settled in a host country, VOLAG services for refugees have become an institutionalized form of aid and service that goes hand in hand with their political status. Such VOLAGS set up by church, civic, and other community groups began with lobbying for and help with the resettlement of World War II’s displaced and homeless.

The first formal relationship between federal and private resettlement organizations in the U.S. began when VOLAGS grouped together and promised the government that they would support and resettle all those displaced persons allowed into the country. Under the Corporate Affidavit Program of 1946, many thousands of European homeless and dispossessed were given a chance to enter America and start lives they would otherwise not have had the chance to live. It was due to the success of this program that led the federal government to continue these activities with the signing of the Displaced Person’s Act of 1948. By the 1960s these VOLAGS had become recognized as an integral part of the resettlement process (Reimers, 1985, p. 156)
From the beginning of this special relationship between government and private nonprofit humanitarian groups a structure and hierarchy of relations had been worked with. In recognition of the need for coordinated action in the resettlement of exiles and displaced people coming to America, the VOLAGs operating in the United States in 1944 set up the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, Inc. (ACVAFS). It continues to be operated by representatives of member VOLAGs and has been crucial in working with the government and various voluntary agencies in determining how a refugee is to be brought into the country and resettled. Refugee resettlement is given special attention by the Committee on Migration and Refugee Affairs (Zucker, 1982, p. 164). Zucker also notes that the ACVAFS is reproduced on an international scale by the International Council for Voluntary Agencies, representing and coordinating the actions of voluntary resettlement agencies in countries around the world.

The relationship between government and VOLAG has changed remarkably little over the past 30 years. Taft (1979) and Zucker (1982) break the growing relationship between VOLAGs and the government into three phases. First was the limited relationship that developed through the Cuban and Vietnamese emergencies. During this period of the 1960s and much of the 1970s, the resettlement process became institutionalized and the roles of the different
players became established. The second phase is recognized as beginning when a phasedown of federal support for refugee resettlement was enacted in 1978. More importantly, at this time Congress enacted what has become known as the "Soviet and other" refugee program. Specific groups of refugees, in particular Soviet Jews, were to be accepted into the United States on a matching grant basis, the VOLAGs being given half of required per capita resettlement funds with the VOLAGs being required to obtain the other half on their own. The third phase is recognized by the unprecedented appointment by the Executive Office of a Coordinator of Refugee Affairs in 1979. Completing this third phase was the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act. The federal government had, for the first time, recognized and delineated its responsibilities to refugees, including those who should be accepted into this nation under the status of refugee as well as resettlement rights and needs of those refugees.

The basis for the use of VOLAGs is their ability to work within a local community and provide for the immediate resettlement needs of the refugees. Sponsorship, housing, education, and employment are the most pressing needs that must be seen to and each VOLAG will differ according to how the money is spent and the necessary reception and placement services provided. There are many VOLAGs in the United States, some with international connections and a few with only limited geographical reach. Most have
headquarters in Washington, D.C. or New York with affiliates or membership offices located around the nation. When it is mentioned that the government has contracted out services to a certain number of VOLAGS, it is these national agencies that are being referred to, not the local affiliates. Thus it is the central headquarters for each separate VOLAG that negotiates with the State Department for the number of refugees it can resettle, depending upon the abilities of its various members and past experience. In this way refugees may be seen as a commodity that needs to be transported to and warehoused in different areas around the nation. VOLAGs are businesses that vie for the number of refugees the State Department will pay them to resettle (warehouse), depending upon the agreed upon cost per refugee and proven ability of the VOLAG.

Some VOLAGs specialize in certain groups, such as the Polish American Immigration and Relief Committee, Inc., or the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society. Others have simply specialized in the business of refugees and resettle all those allowed into the country by the State Department. The largest of these VOLAGS continues to be the Migration and Refugee Services of the U.S. Catholic Conference. While a number of states in the strictest sense did become VOLAGs in 1975, resettling refugees for a contracted fee, most ended this kind of relationship with the State Department after only a few months in 1975. The Bureau of Refugee Programs of the Iowa Department of Human Services
remains the only remaining state-level VOLAG. The majority of the VOLAGs belong to the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, Inc., a form of umbrella agency that aids in regulating the quality of service provided by the overall consortium.

Each agency is known for its own resources, networks, and resettlement strategies. Each of the VOLAGs and their local resettlement agencies must follow specific guidelines to assure the safety and well being of each refugee contracted out for. From the very beginning of contracting out services to VOLAGS, it has been the government’s contention that the services provided must have immediate impact upon the future employability of the refugee (Taft, 1979, p. 42).

The link between Federal government, in this case the State Department, and the VOLAGs is the per capita grant given to the VOLAGs. Such grants have been available only from the start of Hungarian and Cuban refugees, and then not to the extent that we know of them until the 1975 influx of Indochinese refugees. Grants provided to the VOLAGs by the Bureau for Refugee Programs in the Department of State to resettle refugees has varied over time. The VOLAGs received $500 up to 1977, $300 in 1977, and $350 in 1978 to resettle each refugee. At times the grants varied by the group being resettled. For example, in FY1982 agencies received $365 for resettling refugees from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe but received $525 for
resettling all other refugees (DHHS, 1983, p. 4). These grants have never proven able to cover the total cost of receiving and resettling any but the most atypical refugee. Such financial constraints naturally led to limited resettlement activities and support as well as a wide fluctuation in the types of support services offered by each VOLAG and its local affiliate. Taft reports that the VOLAGs reported a per capita cost of $877 for the first nine months of 1977, far above the $300 being offered by the government (Taft, 1979, p. 120).

Thus, the "grant" to the VOLAGs by the State Department is not full compensation for resettlement costs. Rather, the money is a partial payment that is made up only by community fund raising, contracts with other federal or local state governments for resettlement services, and through other means that varies with the agency and ethnic group. The cost to the State Department for resettlement is negligible when compared to overseas activities. For example, in FY1978, actual expenditures for domestic resettlement (grants to VOLAGs) amounted to $25,776,000 while overseas expenditures for the first two activities noted above totaled $52,593,000 (Taft, 1979, p. 35).

The services funded by the Bureau of Refugee Programs and implemented by the VOLAGS in this country are decided upon by mutual consent and, ultimately, the real needs of the refugees themselves. However, the VOLAGs are not given carte blanche to resettle and acculturate each refugee.
In addition to a lack of adequate monetary support for resettlement activities, the federal government also lacked any inclusive requirement of support services to be followed by all of the VOLAGs. Each agency remained a separate and largely unconnected entity with no strict guidelines to follow other than past experience and moral obligation. A lack of quality control, monitoring, or accountability has been a constant complaint of the VOLAG system from day one of the Indochinese resettlement effort (Taft, 1979; Zucker, 1982; North, 1982).

The Refugee Assistance Amendments of 1982 altered this oversight, outlining in more detail the responsibilities of receiving and resettling agencies. "In FY1982, the voluntary resettlement agencies were required for the first time under the terms of the agreement to develop overall descriptions of their agencies' reception and placement philosophy as well as details of their operations in each State where they placed refugees." (DHHS, 1983, p. 5) In addition, the Bureau for Refugee Programs with ORR established the American Council of Voluntary Agencies Refugee Resource Center, the goal of which was to help, in particular provide guidelines, in the resettlement and delivery of services to refugees.

In addition to fluctuating support costs and systems for VOLAGs, the VOLAGs themselves altered in number. At the beginning of the Southeast Asian exodus in 1975, nine VOLAGs were under contract to the Department of State.
This number increased to eleven by 1980 (SRI, 1981) and in 1984 had grown to fourteen (U.S. Department of Justice, 1984). In 1989, 12 national VOLAGS were under contract to the State Department and were being paid a per capita sum of $525 (U.S. Refugee Coordinator, 1989, p. 24). This number includes one state, Iowa, that operates as a VOLAG for the resettlement of refugees within its borders.

A new program was instituted by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) in 1985 to fund increased resettlement activities by VOLAGS. The monies were allocated to the State Department for distribution to the VOLAGS yet this particular program would be considered separate from the initial reception and placement grants given the VOLAGS. This program was initiated in the hope of making voluntary resettlement agencies more financially and legally responsible for the needs of refugees during their first 90 (up from 30) days after arrival in the United States. It was believed that this increased funding for VOLAGS would clarify the duties VOLAGS have to their clients and help the refugee to avoid early dependency on public assistance. The norm remains 30 days or one month of responsibility for the refugee's well being. "Under the cooperative agreements between the State Department and the national voluntary refugee resettlement agencies, the agencies assure the provision of food, clothing, and shelter during a refugee's first 30 days in the U.S."

(Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services,
A federal matching grants program provided up to $1000 per refugee to the VOLAGS and is known as the Voluntary Agency Matching Grant program (VAP). Providing an alternative to the state-administered programs funded by ORR, the VAP had been initiated with the influx of a large number of Soviet and East European refugees in 1979 and 1980. It has been continued and expanded to include all refugees in the hope that VOLAG support and resettlement activities would increase the refugee's chances of becoming self sufficient (House Hearings, 1985, p. 966). Cuts in matching grants funds to as low as $500 per Soviet and East European refugee resettled through this program was argued by ORR in 1985 to be "in acknowledgement of the expectation that the private sector can expand its support for this relatively small caseload through selective placement practices." (House Hearings, 1985, p. 1093) Matching funds in 1986 were in reality reduced to only $957 and participating agencies were provided additional reimbursement for "significant expenses" at the end of FY1988 (DHHS, 1990, p. 51).

While support for this program remains very strong in 1991, requirements for application to the program have been stiffened, such as requiring at least one refugee family
member to be deemed employable for settlement through the matching grants program. An open letter from the Director for Refugee Services within ACNS to affiliate resettlement agencies warns of the additional burden attached to participation within this program.

"As you evaluate matching grant, please bear in mind that the program requires an even match of federal funds, $860 (20% of which must be in cash). ACNS would not be able to assist with this match. Also keep in mind that to be successful, a matching grant agency must be able to employ a significant number of its clients within 120 days." (ACNS memorandum (91-80) to the Executive Directors of resettlement agencies, August 12, 1991)

As of late 1991, the two resettlement agencies in Hawaii, CIC and KPISC, are seriously considering participating within the matching grant program through their respective national VOLAGs.

State And Local Governments

While it is the federal government that allows refugees to enter the United States, the individual state and local governments actually administer the resettlement of the refugees placed in their locale. Being constantly reminded of this, the federal government had originally attempted to buy complacency and support for what was in reality international foreign policy by reducing the burden of refugee resettlement on states. This was initially carried out for Cubans and the Indochinese by resettling individuals and families in different cities and counties
across the nation. Secondary migration on the part of the individual refugee largely negated this attempt to keep counties favored by the refugees from shouldering too large a burden.

The federal government also agreed to cover the cost of long term Cuban and Indochinese resettlement, above and beyond the money being given to the VOLAGs for reception and placement. States directly administer the resettlement program through resettlement plans submitted to and cleared by ORR. State agencies are normally held responsible for administering the plan according the that state’s and ORR’s stated provisions. The only exception to this state administered system is the matching grant program, through which Soviet and East European refugees bypass the state system and are directly resettled by VOLAGs under special contract to the Department of State.

A broad range of social services are provided by each state yet are funded by the federal government through purchase-of-service agreements (POS). Under an allocation formula instituted by ORR in 1982, 85 percent of these funds must be employment related, but each state and the many agencies and offices that implement the programs vary their objectives and goals according to context and need. ORR priority services include ESL training and other services specifically related to employment though not necessarily job skills training classes; self sufficiency remains the key to a priority service.
Thus, the federal government does not directly provide services. It merely acts as the capital backer of and policy determinant of the various programs that are made available for refugees on the long road to acculturation. The states, counties, and local agencies that do arrange for and provide the agreed upon services are thus merely the means for the resources to reach their final target. The federal government does not implement but it does provide the allocative and authoritative resources necessary for the necessary programs to proceed.

In 1979 Taft et al. complained that "given the scattering of Federal activities administered through various State, substate and private systems, no single program coordination can be (or is) imposed from Washington down." (Taft, 1979, p. 44) The 1980 Refugee Act attempted to impose a structure and administrative center to coordinate the "scattering" of programs mentioned through creation of the Office of Refugee Resettlement and the Coordinator for Refugee Affairs. Changes made through amendments, as in 1982, have created new offices and instituted needed reforms to improve the resettlement process. Unfortunately, Taft's blanket statement remains largely true due to the large number of refugees that continue to enter the nation, the varied experiences and needs of each of the refugee groups, and the numerous state
and local agencies that funnel both money and federal requirements on to the agencies implementing the required programs.

State officials and local resettlement agency representatives are important factors in the success and development of resettlement and acculturation programs (Taft, 1979, p. 44). The link between federal refugee resettlement policy and actual implementation is best served at the state level, states with federally approved resettlement plans having a refugee coordinator to link policy and local implementation of the resettlement process. The position of refugee coordinator has been created by the majority of states in the U.S., administrative funds being supplied by the federal government as stipulated by the 1980 Refugee Act.

SCORR

While individual refugee coordinators are given flexibility in the resettlement process, local implementation of federal policy is strongly influenced by the objective factors and political direction of each state. To coordinate efforts between states and to disseminate information about different resettlement practices, regional and national meetings between state coordinators and ORR representatives have been regularly held. The history of this level in refugee resettlement gained special importance in October 1988 when thirty-one
refugee coordinators decided to pool their energies and held their first annual meeting for what has come to be called State Coordinators of Refugee Resettlement (SCORR).

The formal reasons for the organization of the now forty plus refugee coordinators into SCORR are twofold. First, to share information about each state’s refugee situation, progress, and problems. Second, to act as a lobbying group to influence federal refugee entry, support, and resettlement policy. In essence, state coordinators had become disenchanted with the centralized and very bureaucratic nature of ORR and hoped that by forming an organization they would be able to better lobby their positions and needs at the national level.

Their principal concern has been with the allocation policy of refugees to different states and the decreased funding being given by the federal government for the increasing number of refugees being brought into the U.S. The mission statement for SCORR reads as follows:

"The State Coordinators of Refugee Resettlement join together to establish and enhance individual professional development; to coordinate and thereby eliminate gaps in information dissemination; to promote improved service delivery through the active sharing, assessing and developing of best practices; to advise and inform and thereby to facilitate responsive planning within the federal government." (SCORR Bylaws, p. 2)

The above mission statement for SCORR states the intent to influence government refugee allocation, resettlement, and support services. The first year’s meeting identified the unequal resettlement of an
increasing number of refugees in fewer and fewer states and localities as their primary concern. Meetings with the Office of Refugee Resettlement, Bureau of Refugee Programs, and InterAction (working to resettle Amerasians) were positive, in particular trying to make the resettlement of Amerasians more equitable for all states concerned (Minutes, 1989 National SCORR Meeting). The second meeting in 1989 targeted the reauthorization of the 1980 Refugee Act by Congress and affects amendments might have on the burden of refugee resettlement placed on states. The third meeting in January 1991 found SCORR with 45 state coordinators as members and discussing continuing cuts if not total lack of reimbursement by ORR in cash and medical assistance for refugees. The future of SCORR is really dependent on the future of federal and state policy towards refugees. For the present it remains a powerful intermediary between federal willfulness and localized needs.

Mutual Assistance Associations

Resettlement within a community of like ethnic members is considered a positive reinforcement for people who have just recently undergone traumatic psychological and physically abusive conditions. Given a large enough ethnic community, research shows that community support aids in the resettlement process by providing a psychologically and culturally sensitive support system for overcoming the
shock of forced removal from one's homeland. In addition, the ethnic community often provides the newcomer with economic support, perhaps a first job in the community's business section of town, food that is palatable to a non-westernized tongue, and the basis for believing that life can go on.

It was in 1982 that the Office of Refugee Resettlement attempted a formal incorporation of refugee self-help groups or mutual assistance associations (MAAs) into the federally subsidized service sector through what was called the MAA Incentive Grant Initiative. This was not a first attempt to bring the refugee community into the resettlement process and social service delivery. In 1978 the federal government made a tentative move towards involving MAAs in the delivery of social services to refugees when an Indochinese Mutual Assistance Division was established in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (Lewin et al., 1986, 1.2). In 1980 the newly formed ORR, in accordance with the 1980 Refugee Act, provided discretionary grants to MAAs, a maximum of $50,000 for each grant awarded. "The competition focused on encouraging MAA's (sic) to direct their attention to refugee needs which currently were not being met in their communities. Priority was given to organizations with demonstrated support from, and identification with, the refugee community, which were not already receiving significant public funding from other sources." (DHHS,
Of the 204 grant applications received, 25 were funded, the majority being specifically Southeast Asian. Services provided with these funds emphasized orientation, information and referral, and provision of English language courses.

The move in 1982 to use discretionary funds to support a project bringing more and varied refugee MAAs into the service sector was unique in that it was intended to be long term, potentially a permanent part of the resettlement and social service delivery sector the government had taken upon itself to fund and control. A total of $791,462 was allocated for FFY1982 for states to improve or develop their use of MAAs in the delivery of social services. Many states applied for the funding but only 12 received this aid, the amount being dependent on each state's proposal and refugee population. The MAAs each state proposed to support were required to meet the following requirements:

1. Be a legally incorporated non-profit organization.
2. Demonstrate intercultural and interagency linkages.
3. Be amenable to coalition building with other MAAs.
4. Be able to maintain records and manage the proposed service project, including accounting and bookkeeping.
5. Have clearly defined goals and objectives relevant to the proposed service project.
6. Demonstrate the ability to utilize the resources of other service agencies.

(Lewin et al., 1986, 2.3 - 2.4)
The MAA Incentive Grant was continued in 1983 with minor changes in the requirements for funding. States were required to maintain or continue a minimum level of funding for the MAA(s), using the federal monies as a form of matching fund. Preferred MAAs were to be those providing services at what was known as Favorable Alternate Sites, areas of special concentration for refugees due to their low number and the potential for employment. Finally, ORR emphasized that all MAAs were eligible for these funds, not just the Southeast Asian groups that had dominated service sectors over the previous few years. A total of 14 grants were made available in FY1983 for a total of $917,478 in federal funds and $1,706,539 in recorded state funds (Lewin et al., 1986, 2.6).

This competitive system of providing funds to MAAs around the nation changed to a formula-based one in 1984. Instead of competing for limited funds, each state was to have a specific amount of federal dollars allotted to it based upon the number of refugees living in that state who had been in the country three years or less. This "egalitarian" form of economic support for bringing MAAs into the mainstream social service sector increased both the number of MAAs and the number of states that received federal funds. This system of allotment for MAA service delivery has continued to the present, each state's potential funding varying with the number of recorded recent arrivals.
Other attempts at including the refugee community in resettlement and service delivery include the 1981 funding by the ORR of the Khmer Guided Placement Project. A single MAA, the Cambodian Association America, was funded to aid in the reception and placement of up to 10,000 Cambodian refugees. In 1983 the ORR funded the Indochina Resource Action Center to organize and provide national workshops "to assist refugees in their organizational development." (Lewin et al., 1986, 2.5) In addition, funds have been consistently made available to MAAs and other refugee-related organizations for technical assistance. An ORR report on policy and planning recommendations in 1986 reiterated support for the use of MAAs as community-based levers for implementing policy objectives though future studies of MAA participation were urged (U.S. DSSH, 1986).

Refugee Resettlement In Practice

The following two sections discuss the increasing involvement of the American government in the definition of and resettlement of refugees. The Cubans and the Indochinese are chosen as special examples, providing clear examples of how government policy shifted from observer to care provider. In accordance with the focus of this dissertation, there is an emphasis on the bestowing of refugee status, the allocation of material resource for resettlement, and the development of resettlement policy along the lines of internal and international interests.
The final section concerns refugee resettlement policy over the last decade, again prioritizing the changing and increasingly important role the government has in resettling those migrants considered as refugees.

Cubans As Refugees

With the fall of Batista from power in Cuba in 1958, many thousands of Cubans fled their island nation, being accepted upon arrival in Florida as legal seekers of asylum. These first asylees were largely flown in by plane, but upon suspension of this arrangement many more began arriving by boat. This was the first, though not the last, time that the United States had become a nation of first asylum for a large group of refugees.

Government leaders, the U.S. public, and the refugees themselves thought the move was temporary, a belief that directly influenced the numbers of people allowed in and the services offered to them. Yet by 1977 more than 665,000 had entered the U.S. as immigrants, various forms of non-immigrants (visitors with the intent to remain), or parolees (Taft, p. 67, 1979). Taft notes that the numbers would be much higher if we counted all those applying for residency status who had been born in Cuba but had come to the U.S. though a circuitous route, such as through a third or neutral nation.

There was no refugee policy in place in 1960, the concept of refugee being limited to individuals escaping
communist governments and with strong ties to the U.S. The masses of Hungarians, Cubans, and Chinese that were given "refugee" status up into the 1970s were in fact paroled, given recognition as being in need of special protection if not economic assistance by the executive branch of government.

As with the resettlement of Hungarians a few years prior, VOLAGS were given the responsibility for organizing the resettlement of the Cubans, a group of people and an act of federal intervention that was first and foremost political in the eyes of the federal government. As most of the Cubans were Catholic, the Catholic Refugee Committee was the most active in the resettlement process. Other religious-based organizations, such as the Protestant Church World Service and the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Service and the secular International Rescue Committee were also involved in the resettlement process.

The first year or so of aid given by the voluntary agencies was provided by the private sector. Neither county officials nor the federal government wanted to set a new precedent by giving direct support to the thousands of Cubans entering Miami in 1959 and 1960. It was decided to instead give indirect support to local governments, Cuban community organizations, and select VOLAGS. Taft emphasizes that the people of Miami were concerned about the potential cost of a seemingly long-term and costly process of resettlement.
Dade county, containing most of what is considered Miami, was noted at the time for having very strict welfare and social assistance laws pertaining to all state and federal aid, having a five year residency requirement before benefits could be collected (Taft, p. 68, 1979). When Cubans began arriving by the thousands, and then tens of thousands, county officials had no structure or guide to follow other than the hope that the people of Miami, in particular the small Cuban community that resided there, and various church organizations could providing a plan for resettlement.

It was finally realized that Castro might not fall from power as quickly as was hoped. Late in the year of 1960 the State of Florida funded the Cuban Refugee Emergency Employment Center (Reimers, 1985, p. 158; Taft, 1979, p. 69). Four VOLAGs were responsible for running the center and distributing aid to the refugees. The federal government’s role remained largely devoted to supplying transportation to the displaced Cubans. In late 1960, in response to state and county pleas as well as an organized lobbying effort by the multi-functional Cuban Refugee Committee based in Florida, an additional one million dollars was allocated from the contingency fund of the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) to alleviate emergency resettlement needs. The forerunner of the Agency for International Development (AID), ICA used these funds
to establish the Cuban Refugee Corporation of Miami, Inc.
and to provide administrative and legal services to the
corporation (Taft, 1979, p. 70).

The limited, ad hoc, and hind sighted federal response
shown thus far was due largely to Eisenhower's placing of
resettlement policy in the hands of Tracy Vorhees, the same
man that oversaw the highly successful resettlement of the
Hungarians in the preceding decade. However, differences
between the two populations were such that the federal
government was almost forced into new and unfamiliar
attempts to maintain some form of control over a situation
that grew more complex with every boatload of
refugees/asylees that arrived.

With a change of presidents came a change in
philosophy. The Kennedy administration recognized the need
for increased federal involvement in the Cuban resettlement
process, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) being instructed to oversee the implementation of
federal aid to the Cuban resettlement process.
Institutionalized federal control of refugee reception and
resettlement became formal when Congress passed the
Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, thereby
creating the Cuban Refugee Program (CRP). HEW worked
through the Cuban Refugee Program to provide federally
funded cash, medical, social service, and educational
assistance directly to the refugees. Federal and state
administrative structures and agencies were used, but all
local and state funds allocated for most resettlement needs were reimbursed one hundred percent by the federal government (Zucker, 1983, p. 174).

Following administrations did not alter this initial structure. The idea that the federal government was responsible for creation of the concept "refugee" in policy and was thus responsible in terms of resettlement resources grew in the minds of local governments, VOLAGS, and the refugees themselves. Even before the 1980 Mariel Boatlift of 1980, the federal government had spent over 1.4 billion dollars on refugee transportation and resettlement (Zucker, 1983, p. 174). Lawmakers had not included a time limit for the reimbursement to states for money spent for providing CMA, AFDC, or other social services to the Cubans. This oversight had become such a sore point that it became a major consideration in the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act.

The Kennedy administration developed a nine point program of resettlement and assistance for the increasing number of Cuban refugees. The core of this plan was increased federal responsibility in the area of resettlement, but not without a corresponding influence in defining resettlement problems and needs. Monies and assistance went largely to subsistence, transportation, and health needs of the increasing crowds of Cubans, but a very strong emphasis was also placed on employment and job skills training.
This program followed a newly formed federal policy that continued a dependence upon traditional resettlement methods but with increased local resettlement powers given to the federal government in return for monetary support and technical assistance. It was also decided that the Commissioner of Social Security would be responsible to the Secretary of the Department of HEW so that a pyramidal hierarchy of command and control could be instituted early in the process. While outlining a "Bill of Rights" for the freedoms due all those who come to these shores in need, the policy emphasized the use of public, private, and refugee community groups (MAAs) in the implementation of the programs.

This nine point program was, in the words of Taft, "the real beginning of the Cuban Refugee Program and the first deliberate and substantial involvement of the Federal Government in a major refugee resettlement activity." (Taft, 1979, p. 71) Yet Zucker (1983) argues that the federal government began the precedent of supporting refugee resettlement through its politically motivated use of military infrastructure and monetary reimbursement for the Hungarian program in 1956. The amount overall was small, only $40 for each Hungarian refugee resettled going to the voluntary agencies, a total of only $1.5 million, but it was this small step that led to the larger Cuban and then Indochinese resettlement programs (Zucker, 1983, p. 173). Both researchers may be conceded their respective
points, recognizing that both are on the same track in calling attention to the historic intervention of government resources in the resettlement of incoming migrants. What is special about these migrants is that they had become politicized.

Cubans And The Voluntary Agencies

With the amount of federal assistance that had been made to the overall resettlement process, Taft notes that, unlike the Hungarian program, extensive voluntary and community-based services were not developed or relied upon by the Cuban refugees. While early arrivals in 1959 and 1960 were supported by community or private resources, the federal government quickly entered the arena through the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in the form of resettlement and social service contracts. The most important agencies implementing resettlement activities, both privately and publicly funded, were the Catholic Relief Service of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, Church World Service, United HIAS Service, and the International Rescue Committee (Zucker, 1982). Over a very short period of time, however, federal funds, policies, and structures were being relied upon.

Sometimes the work of the VOLAGS was entirely dependent upon federal policy and definition of just what the refugee problem was. With growing numbers of refugees arriving in Dade County, the government decided to define
the concept of "resettlement" as relocation away from the Miami area (Taft, 1979, p. 84). The four VOLAGs were given the contracts to move the refugees to other areas of the United States and see that they were successfully resettled. Refugees who refused to relocate when asked to do so were denied continued cash assistance. Thus many of the Cuban refugees that entered the United States in other places were not eligible for cash assistance or other special benefits. VOLAGs were then dependent upon their own resources to maintain the resettlement structure when unacceptable refugees required their assistance.

By 1961, welfare assistance made to the Cuban refugees was completely funded by the federal government (Taft, 1979, p. 72). Consistent funding was made possible though the enactment of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962. Some rules for collecting assistance were very unfair and unnecessary, such as the requirement that only those who registered at the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center in Miami could be eligible for assistance.

Implementation of social services was largely dependent on a HEW contract with the Florida State Department of Public Welfare, including programs for cash assistance, hospitalization, child welfare services, and the distribution of surplus foods. Payments of money were on a sliding scale, depending on the year and number of dependents, but varied around one hundred dollars a month for a refugee family.
In 1966 the number of Cubans entering the U.S. began to rise and Congress voted to increase the amount and types of aid available for Cuban resettlement. Such federally funded programs grew until 1978 when Congress passed Public Law 95-205, initiating a six year phasedown that would last through 1983 and cut reimbursements to states for cash assistance, medical assistance, and administrative (Congressional Research Service, 1980, p. 28). The Refugee Act of 1980 maintained this phasedown but the Reagan administration terminated the Cuban Refugee Program in 1981.

Expenditures by the federal government for the Cuban Refugee Program started at a low of $4,089,000 in 1961 to a high of $143,686,000 in 1974, but then with a dramatic decrease to $80,000,000 only three years later (Taft, 1979, p. 80). This reflects the numbers of refugees entering the country over a period of years, interest in the federal government in the resettlement process, and the eventual decision to retain control of the resettlement process without completely funding the implementation of necessary if not required programs.

Marielitos

In April of 1980, immediately after passage of the 1980 Refugee Act, the Cuban border was opened by Castro to any who wanted to leave Cuba. Between April and the end of September 1980, 124,769 Cubans entered the U.S. (Zucker,
1983, p. 179). Called Marielitos after one of their points of departure in Cuba, the refugees were not warmly welcomed by the American public and were not given refugee status, a concept made available in the recently passed Refugee Act. The newly arrived Cubans, and the Haitians that had begun entering the U.S. by boat only slightly earlier, were given a special parole status by President Carter and left in a gray or indeterminate area. Rather than refugees these most recent of entrants came to be legally designated as "Cuban-Haitian entrant."

President Carter assigned the Federal Emergency Management Agency to coordinate resettlement efforts, thus treating the influx of refugees as an incursion of uncontrolled aliens and attempting to control their effect on the nation through federal intervention without formally assigning the Marielitos or Haitians refugee status or the support services that go along with such status. The non-profit voluntary agencies again formed a vital part of the resettlement structure for the Marielitos. The majority of documented Cubans were kept in holding camps until the VOLAGs were able to find a place to resettle them and then, for a prescribed per capita fee supplied by the State Department, transported and resettled them across the nation.

The Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-422) authorized refugee assistance services to Cuban and Haitian entrants. This special clause was required because
they were not considered refugees and could not receive federal support through the 1980 Refugee Act (House Hearings, 1989, p. 816). Resettlement and social service funds provided by the federal government were made available only for that limited group of Cubans and Haitians who had entered the U.S. during a specific time period, between 21 April and October 10, 1990 (Zucker, 1983, p. 180).

Indochinese Refugees

Though the United States and South Vietnam were closely allied during the fight against the North in the two decades before the fall of Saigon, few Vietnamese lived in the United States in 1975. Of those that did, most were students or wives of returning soldiers and no Vietnamese community of any size or complexity existed in any of the fifty states. This fact is even more true for the Lao and Cambodians who were inadvertently drawn into the war and the eventual flight from localized totalitarian oppression. Perhaps the only community group with a complex system of social institutions and networks that was able to organize around the welcoming and resettling of all three nationalities were the Chinese, long used to having to fend for themselves in a land that has been traditionally frigid toward Asian in-migration.

The fall of the governments of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia was so sudden and the number of people seeking
asylum so large that no community organization could have attempted to play the role that had traditionally been given to and expected of ethnically based self-help organizations. Given the lack of a complex ethnic community or institutional base and the size of the refugee population, the federal government was the only organized institution capable of moving and resettling the more than 130,000 Vietnamese, 5,000 Cambodians and some hundreds of Lao that arrived between April and December of 1975.

Other factors supported this obvious need for government intervention. One reason was that the government had already started a precedent through giving a large amount of support and services to the Cuban refugees who continued to seek asylum in Florida and other states. Second and most importantly the exodus of Vietnamese was in large part due to American intervention in Vietnamese internal affairs more than a decade before and it was argued that America, its people and its government, had an obligation to the people of Vietnam.

A Gallup Poll taken in May indicated that 54% of Americans polled did not favor admitting the Vietnamese (Time Magazine, May 19, 1975, p. 9). The moral and historical issues proved greater, however, and that same May Congress passed the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975, authorizing more than five hundred million dollars in reception and resettlement aid for the first year through a program known as the Indochinese
Refugee Assistance Program (IRAP). Most of the money was spent on evaluation and maintenance of holding centers in Guam, Wake, Hawaii, and other states in the mainland U.S. Another $455 million in funds was used in "resettlement, vocational training, medical care, language instruction, and other social services." (Reimers, 1985, p. 177) This act was supplemented by the Indochina Refugee Children Assistance Act of 1976 in order to reimburse states for the special education needs of refugees under their care.

Congress initially allowed the parole of 130,000 Vietnamese. In August 1975 the U.S. government then authorized two separate parole programs to allow in the increasingly crushing numbers of refugees. One was for Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees and one for refugees from Laos. The number of parole programs authorized or extended by the Attorney General totaled ten times between 1975 and 1980 and more than 360,000 individuals resettled. (Congressional Research Service, 1980, p. 13).

As the crisis in Vietnam worsened and temporary holding camps (also known as "reception centers") were set up for the tens of thousands of Vietnamese and others fleeing the chaos in Southeast Asia, the President authorized creation of the Interagency Task Force for Indochina Refugees (IATF). This task force was responsible for the allocation of funds for and the organization of holding camps, orientation, reception, and resettlement of the escaping Vietnamese. That the IATF was not formed
until after the fall of Saigon and the initial flood of
refugees entered the U.S. says much for the task force’s
quality personnel to work fast but also points to the
government’s own inexperience in refugee matters.

The IATF was placed within the State Department but
was in reality made up of representatives, and thus
services, from the following twelve departments and
agencies: State, Justice, Treasury, Defense, Interior,
Labor, HEW, Housing and Urban Development, Transportation,
AID, Office of Management and Budget, and the CIA (Taft,
1979, p. 104). The institutional framework for the
resettlement effort for the Indochinese included: the
public sector (federal agencies); the relationship between
the public and the private sector (VOLAGs and voluntary
efforts); and the state and local governmental agencies,
often acting in accordance with Federal funds and
guidelines.

After The Flood

The majority of experts in the United States expected
the situation in Southeast Asia, in particular Vietnam, to
last only temporarily and for the flood of refugees to
quickly taper off to a few seekers of political asylum.
Refugees continued to arrive, however, through neighboring
countries such as Thailand and Indonesia. For this reason
the original act providing funds and parolee status to the
Vietnamese was extended (PL 95-145) and amended with
special provisions. Federal reimbursement was specifically provided to states for all non-Federal share costs covered by title IV of the Social Security Act, including AFDC and certain medical services (Congressional Research Service, 1980, p. 29). Special Project funding was included in this extension, providing funds to help refugee adults to learn job and language skills that would help in the acculturation process (Taft, 1979, p. 109). This reimbursement plan included a "phase down" of reimbursement for states from 100% in 1977 to 25% in 1981, but in 1978 Congress passed Public Law 95-549, maintaining full funding for the Indochinese Refugee Program, but with a suspension of all funding in 1979 (Congressional Research Service, 1980, p. 29).

Many Laotians, Hmong, and Cambodians were escaping from their countries only to be interned in Thailand, then applying to the U.S. to be given refugee status. Many Vietnamese were also attempting to escape their country by boat. In 1978 the few tens of thousands that had entered the U.S. in 1976 and 1977 swelled as Vietnam began persecuting the business-oriented ethnic Chinese that remained there. By 1979 more than 65,000 attempted to escape by land and boat every month.

The "boat people" and refugees entering Thailand overland from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia indirectly placed pressure on the U.S. government to take in more refugees. After the initial wave of 135,000 in 1975, the numbers of
Southeast Asian refugees had diminished to 15,000 in 1976, 7,000 in 1977, and 15,000 in 1978. This pattern quickly jumped to 78,000 in 1979, 167,800 in 1980, and 131,139 in 1981 (North, 1982, p. 4). This "second wave" of refugees from Southeast Asia were different in socioeconomic, educational, and urban background from the previous, primarily Vietnamese, wave (North, 1982). While those entering in 1975 and immediately after had extensive contact with Americans, were generally well educated, and were urban Vietnamese, this second wave was made up of people from largely rural areas of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. While the government saw only an increase in numbers, the VOLAGs, as well as the state and local administrative agencies, were hard pressed to meet the needs and expectations of this very differentiated mix of classes and cultures.

In 1978 the private agencies that helped in the resettlement of refugees in the U.S. formed a Citizens Commission on Indochina Refugees, lobbying for increased ceilings for refugees and increased aid for resettlement. Each time the Attorney General allowed in more refugees, funds had to be approved by Congress to pay for resettlement in order to relieve local communities of the burden.

Within a year Congress had passed another bill that had immediate impact upon the refugees already in the United States. This time it was decided that the
previously mentioned phase-down should be canceled and all reimbursements to states remain at 100% until September 30, 1979, at which time all funding would simply cease. The reason for this was that Congress was unhappy with the lack of structure and planning associated with the refugee resettlement program. While IRAC and the VOLAGs were seen as doing an excellent job, Congress wanted the administration to formulate a comprehensive refugee strategy that would forgo the need for extensions and reactive program funding.

Reception

The holding centers so hurriedly thrown together and used until the end of 1975 were organized and run primarily by the Department of Defense. As Taft so bluntly states, "without the logistical participation of the military, the evacuation and initial reception of the refugees in the Western Pacific holding centers would not have been possible." (Taft, 1979, p. 106) Each holding or receiving center was in fact more like a large tent city holding tens of thousands of people with an administrative infrastructure being staffed by the Department of Defense and various VOLAGs. The primary goal for each of these centers was to receive, identify, and release individuals and families to sponsors in the United States as quickly as possible. Most of the initial paperwork was carried out by federal agencies, principally the Departments of State,
Defense, and Justice (Immigration and Naturalization Service). The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare followed with health screening, orientation, education, and links to sponsors or resettlement agencies in the U.S.

The VOLAGs, under contract to the Department of State, were responsible for the reception of the refugee into the private sector and initial resettlement including housing, orientation, and, hopefully, employment. There were a total of nine VOLAGs under contract to the State Department in 1975 (not counting individual state or corporate sponsors), each of a different size and different resettlement strategy, each in turn being dependent on contracts signed with local affiliates scattered across the nation. The national headquarters for each VOLAG received a flat $500 fee for the resettlement of each refugee contracted for. The amount of money passed on to the local affiliate for the actual resettlement process and the actual use of this money for resettlement activities by the affiliate, such as housing, furniture, or even giving it over to the refugees in question, varied by agency and affiliate.

With few exceptions, refugees could not leave the holding centers without the sponsorship of an individual, family, or organization in the U.S. After VOLAGs interviewed each refugee and needs and potential problems had been ascertained, a sponsor was found and the refugee given transportation to a new home. Taft notes that the
VOLAGs had very little responsibility for the refugee other than initial resettlement with a sponsor and that continuing support services were more a moral than a legal obligation (Taft, 1979, p. 108).

While there were many single families and individuals who sponsored refugee families, the majority of sponsors, and by far those found to be the most supportive over the long run, were organizations such as church or community groups. With the coming of the second wave of Indochinese refugees beginning in 1978, the burden of sponsorship shifted from individual and local (church) sponsors to the local offices of VOLAG and refugee family members (Caplan, 1989, p. 33).

Placement

The general human needs of the refugees being resettled in the United States were seen to by the 1975 Refugee Assistance Act and overseen by HEW’s Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program. The aid, primarily economic support and reimbursement, was channeled through each state’s human resource and social service agencies, depending on its expenditures for resettlement.

While the VOLAGs were attempting to follow federal guidelines and disperse the refugees across the nation, they found that many of the refugees simply did not want to stay in a given area and practiced what came to be known as secondary migration. In addition, some states were found
to be more expensive than others to resettle refugees in. This was due primarily to the individual state's social service system and the cost of housing, food, etc., but was also connected to the efficiency of the VOLAG and affiliate as well as to the amount of voluntary or community support that was made available to the newcomers. Taft reports that the average cost for medical support across the nation in 1977 was $155 per capita, the range in selected states was a low of $13 (Mississippi) to a high of $479 (Hawaii). Cash assistance was equally varied, $21 per capita in Mississippi and $927 per capita in Hawaii (Taft, 1979, pp. 110 - 112). In their survey of Indochinese in the early 1980s, Caplan et al., found AFDC payments to also vary by state to exaggerated degrees, "from $601 in California to $118 in Texas, with Washington ($541, Massachusetts ($445), and Illinois ($368) falling between these two extremes." (Caplan, 1989, p. 35)

Services generally available to most refugees, in particular those Indochinese in the late 1970s and up through the late 1980s include the following:

Cash and Medical Assistance (CMA): This is a general all-inclusive term that has included Refugee Cash Assistance (RCA), Refugee Medical Assistance (RMA), General Assistance (GA), Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and Supplementary Income (SSI). AFDC and GA funding reimbursement from the federal government had largely come to an end by 1990.
Refugee Cash Assistance (RCA): Those refugees who do not have the proper family profile to benefit from AFDC related funds may receive special Federally mandated funds known as RCA. The time limit for this assistance, presently set at 8 months, has historically been less than that allowed for those qualifying for AFDC.

Medical Assistance: Medical assistance is usually given through a Medicaid-like program known as Refugee Medical Assistance (RMA). The Federal government reimbursing states 100% of their costs for the same time period as RCA.

General Social Service Funds: Each state receives funds from the Federal government for programs that cover employment services, language training programs, social adjustment services, among others.

Refugee Targeted Assistance Program (RTAP): Funds for areas with large numbers of refugees who have been unable to attain self-sufficiency and are considered in need of special skills training.

Thus a large variety of social services were provided for by federal funding, in particular those for counseling, English language, and job skills training classes that would help the refugee to become self sufficient. One channel for this aid was the Title XX Social Security Act plan each state was expected to submit to the federal government. Once approved, funds were made available for the programs. Another channel went directly through HEW for education, employment related, and mental health projects. The special mental health needs of the refugee population were recognized by HEW and, through a Special Projects grant in 1979.

Special monies were set aside for those schools that enrolled refugee children. In 1976 Congress passed the
Indochina Refugee Children Assistance Act, providing special funds for those districts impacted by refugee children. Special discretionary funds were also available for English and job skills training. Taft notes that of the many bilingual education programs made available by HEW, only a very small amount was to districts that offered Lao, Vietnamese, or Cambodian language assistance (Taft, 1979, p. 115).

Refugee Resettlement After 1980
The 1980 Refugee Act

Funding for the resettlement of Indochinese refugees has varied over time. Funding has been piecemeal, different amounts of money for different programs being voted on by Congress and altered by the Executive branch every year. A bill to establish a more consistent and uniform refugee policy was introduced in 1977 and 1978 but neither was passed. All individuals and agencies involved agreed that a refugee policy and resettlement structure was needed but agreement between the two sides of Congress and the executive branch came slowly. With a drastic increase of refugees entering the U.S. in 1979 due to the many Vietnamese escaping Vietnam by boat, President Carter authorized the creation of the post of U.S. Coordinator of Refugee Affairs as well as the Interagency Coordinating Committee. This action was taken in the hopes that refugee affairs, both internal and external to the nation, could be
better coordinated and made more efficient. At the same time an Office of Refugee Affairs was created with the Department of State in order to consolidate refugee affairs. HEW did the same, placing its Office of Refugee Affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary.

With the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act, a new structure and system of payments was instituted to control the types and numbers of refugees entering the nation (Martin, 1982) as well as to coordinate the internal resettlement of refugees. Little was changed in terms of economic support for refugees entering the nation, time lines, time limitations, and formal structures for delivering promised funds for recognized programs being more completely delineated in the act. The act had specified that each refugee entering the U.S. was eligible for 36 months of Cash and Medical Assistance, after which that person would be required to apply for welfare and medical assistance under the laws and conditions as provided for by that particular state.

The structure of resettlement responsibilities and coordination also changed with the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act. There came into being the Office of the Coordinator for Refugee Affairs (thus far alternating offices between the State Department and the White House Cabinet), the Office for Refugee Affairs, the State Coordinators who oversaw local implementation of federal guidelines, and the State Refugee Councils.
Post-1980

When Ronald Reagan took office, what can be politely called "a policy of retrenchment" took place, a conservative backlash against allowing foreigners into this nation, denying refuge to those seeking asylum who were not from politically advantageous regions. While on the one side the administration pushed for drastic cuts in CMA and AFDC payments to states, the government was also working to limit the numbers of people able to enter the country. This was done through limiting the numbers of visas made available to refugees and immigrants as well as turning back those seeking asylum from Latin America. For example, in 1981 the Reagan administration enacted Proclamation 4865 and Executive Order 12324, establishing the Haitian Migrant Interdiction Program and giving the means to interdict and return all Haitian attempts to enter this country illegally by boat in their attempt to seek asylum.

In April of 1982, the Reagan administration instituted a new provision that cut the time for federally subsidized assistance in half, to only 18 months. More recently, 1989-1991, the cuts have been quicker and deeper. As of October 1991, the federal government has been willing to offer eight months of refugee cash and medical assistance but no AFDC or GA support. While this pattern of budget cuts and funds manipulation has made refugee resettlement cheaper for the federal government, the states that have
become home for the majority of refugees have had to shoulder the burden through their own welfare and AFDC programs.

During the Reagan administration, emphasis was placed on decentralizing federal funding of national programs, retaining control of but localizing the cost of federal immigration and refugee policy. In an attempt to lessen the cost of resettlement without continuing cuts to social services or resettlement grants, private sector initiatives were initiated for a variety of nationality groups. For instance, 1600 Armenians were admitted toward the latter part of 1988 through a private sector plan that required private Armenian sponsors to pay for all transportation costs but allowing initial resettlement and other refugee assistance funding by ORR.

The peak influx of refugee entry into the U.S. lasted only a few years, primarily between 1979 and 1982. Though few cared to comment on how political and administrative preferences held back the many refugees in need of entry, the GAO and others have concluded that funding for resettlement activities and support services can be cut as numbers fall. "The large refugee and entrant flows of 1980 through 1982 have not continued. The flows have been at a relatively low rate during the last 2 years and the same is true of the flows anticipated in FY1985 and FY1986 (70,000 and 68,000 respectively). Thus, new and heavy concentrations of refugees are not anticipated." (Committee
This assumption was quite false, but the federal government has continued to cut funding to resettlement programs, particularly those public assistance programs mentioned earlier.

In addition to a shifting of resettlement responsibility and cost to states and the private sector, the federal government has continued to retain control of how refugees enter the United States under what politically agreeable label. Attempts have been made to bring more refugees into the United States as immigrants whenever feasible. With an increasing number of America's refugees gaining citizenship, it is possible that some entering as publicly-assisted refugees could instead enter as an immigrant. Recent reports have also noted that more and more asylum seekers in nations of first asylum could instead be defined as "economic migrants." (U.S. Department of State, 1986) While this reinterpretation of the concept of refugee and pattern of entry into the U.S. has not been of enormous impact, the future bodes change and a further stepping back of the federal government from resettlement responsibilities.

Social Service Programs In The 1980s

The General Accounting Office estimated that between the period of April 1975 and February 1979, the U.S. had spent more than one billion dollars in the resettlement of
170,698 Indochinese refugees (Comptroller General, 1979). The majority of this money had been spent on HEW programs, a much smaller amount going to the VOLAGs for actual resettlement costs. Taft summarizes federal expenditures in a simple criticism of how the funds have been spent and maintained over the first few years of resettlement. She complains that more than 80% went through the Social Security Administration for cash and medical assistance, leaving a very small amount for human resource development. Educational services ceased to be funded beyond token bilingual programs and even the reception and placement grants from the State Department dried up toward the end of 1979. Consistency, foresight, and planning are not seen as traits of the agencies and institutions that were responsible for these first few years of resettlement. Unfortunately, much can be said of the 1980s as well.

The Refugee Assistance Amendments of 1982 (P.L. 97-363) were designed to make more effective the administration and implementation of the 1980 Refugee Act. The structure of state purchase-of-service (POS) contracts was made more restrictive and based largely on each state's proportion of new refugee arrivals. Refugees deemed employable yet collecting Cash and Medical Assistance were required to be enrolled in job and language training programs. A system of case management that made more efficient use of existing social services and emphasized self sufficiency within as short a time period as possible
was also implemented. These amendments concentrated on retaining the humanitarian nature of the refugee act while providing a structure to ensure "reduced welfare dependency" and "individual progress toward self-sufficiency" within an existing support system (Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 1984, part 5, p. 1103). These changes also lessened the degree of special treatment for refugees that had unintentionally "resulted in unequal treatment among low-income populations." (DHHS, 1983, p. 8)

While not all programs and initiatives authorized by these amendments were specifically designed for immediate reduction of refugee dependence on state welfare programs, most either emphasized training that related to faster employment or made resources available for use by programs that were aimed at reducing the public assistance rolls. Some examples of projects funded by the National Discretionary Funds Program, as provided for by the 1982 amendments, are as follows:

The Refugee Outplacement Program - more effectively linking cash and medical assistance funds with employment activities.

The MAA Incentive Grant - using MAAs as social service providers with the hope of increased mainstreaming of hard-to-place refugees.

The Favorable Alternative Site Program and Planned Secondary Resettlement - providing placement and resettlement options for VOLAGS with an emphasis on placing refugees in areas not heavily impacted by earlier refugee movements and with better than average employment prospects.
Refugee Demonstration Project (RDP) came about through the Wilson/Fish Amendment in 1984 and led to the 1985 California and Oregon Refugee Demonstration Project. The California project enabled AFDC and AFDC-UP parents to continue collecting public assistance while being employed up to 100 hours a month. The Oregon project linked case management with public cash assistance, providing job skills training and employment services. The goal of the project was to encourage self-sufficiency among those refugees in the country 36 months or less and support the coordination of resettlement agencies.

Funds made available by Discretionary Social Service Initiatives through ORR were aimed at placing refugees in job skills training or employment as soon as possible. The Key State Initiative (KSI), Community Stability Projects (CSP), and Job Links have been the primary avenues for this funding.

KSI was developed for those states suffering from both high refugee impact as well as high unemployment. The initiative encouraged states to submit proposals for "developing social service initiatives to reduce welfare dependency by assisting welfare dependent and recently arrived refugees in finding employment and achieving economic self-sufficiency." (U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, 1987, p. 25) Of the five proposals accepted and implemented in 1985, programs varied from state to state
but were required to maintain general initiative employment-related goals. Four of those five initiatives were continued through 1990.

Community Stability Projects were initiated for those states that did not participate in KSI. This project provided monies to keep refugees with employment skills and stable employment from moving to another state or community setting. Funds were to go to states attempting to stabilize refugee communities and keep members from moving to areas already adversely impacted by incoming secondary migrants. These resources would be available to support local community development, provide a positive family environment, and discourage secondary migration to other areas or states.

The bulk of CSP monies are required to be employment-related but other areas of service are supported, including the following: "help for mental health, family case management, youth training and counseling, community education services, the strengthening of refugee/entrant mutual assistance associations (MAAs), and such support services as employment-related transportation and day care, information and referral, and translation/interpretation." (U.S. Coordinator, 1987, p. 25) CSP has recently come to be called Job Links and offers non-KSI states funding to provide specialized social services to refugees in stable, low-impact communities and to encourage refugees in high-impact areas to migrate to and settle in these areas.
A related ORR supported initiative is referred to as Planned Secondary Resettlement (PSR). As a balance to the Community Stability Project, PSR provided funds to resettle eligible refugees from high-impact, low employment areas to areas with better employment prospects. This relatively recent attempt at moving groups of under-employed refugees from one area to another will soon be demonstrated in Hawaii. While other projects have moved groups from one state to another, Hawaii will be the first to implement intra-state secondary resettlement, moving up to 25 Lao families from Honolulu to the island of Hawaii to work in agriculture.

The Targeted Assistance program was initially started in 1982 as a form of jobs program for Cuban and Haitian entrants but was opened to refugees in 1983. It was initiated with areas of dense or high-impact refugee populations in mind, particularly when state, local, or private programs have proven inadequate to meet the needs of refugees.

Only a very small amount of these funds were made available for indirect activities not immediately concerned with the refugee gaining employment. In testimony before Congress in 1989, it was asked if anything could keep the states from using targeted assistance funds for such purposes as "assisting local schools and hospitals to cope with an influx of refugees." It was replied by a representative from ORR that "Yes, 85 percent of these
funds have to go to employment services under the regulations." (House Hearings, 1989, part 5, p. 695)

Targeted assistance programs for FY1989 totaled $34.1 million and $15.8 million was appropriated for agencies participating in the matching funds program.

Discretionary funds approved for FY1989 was approximately $9.8 million, of which $7.9 million was obligated by ORR. The major obligations listed in DHHS’s Report to the Congress (1990) are as follows:

- $2.3 million to support a special initiative (Key States Initiative) in four States with large numbers of refugees on welfare.

- $3.4 million in Job Links grants, designed to strengthen linkages between employable refugees and potential employers in communities with good job opportunities.

- $837,383 for four grants under the Planned Secondary Resettlement Program, which provides an opportunity for unemployed refugees and their families to relocate from areas of high welfare dependency to communities with favorable employment prospects.

- $960,500 to Inter-Action, as agent for the national voluntary resettlement agencies, to assist in the resettling of Amerasian young people and their families.

- $785,300 to address Hmong resettlement needs in areas of high concentration, particularly to alleviate social adjustment problems and to increase self-sufficiency.

- $500,000 to the Public Health Service to carry out hepatitis B screening and vaccination as appropriate, of pregnant refugee women who have been in the United States since 1981." (DHHS, 1990, p. 19 - 20)
Since 1980, funds allocated through the Department of Health and Human Services for state administered programs have primarily covered cash and medical assistance, state administration and various employment services. These federally allocated state funds are authorized by section 412 of Title IV of the Immigration and Nationality Act and Section 501 of Title V of the Refugee Education Assistance of 1980. These acts provide federal reimbursement to states for refugees and Haitian/Cuban entrants eligible for state or local public assistance funds for the first 36 months after entering the country.

This period of transition for which the federal government gives full CMA reimbursement has quickly fallen from 36 months in 1985 to 8 months for FY1992, AFDC funds for refugees/entrants having been cut to nothing in 1989. The initial cuts began in 1982, at which time it was decided that RCA and RMA would be available for the first 18 months in the country but that the second 18 months of support would be dependent on that person qualifying under state or local public assistance guidelines. Note that all 36 months remain federally financed. The reimbursement period for AFDC and Medicaid support to states changed from 36 to 31 months in March 1986 and to the present 24 months in February 1988 (House Hearings, 1989, pp. 735--737).

This action was matched by ORR when it announced in August of 1988 that FY1989 refugee cash assistance (RCA) and
refugee medical assistance (RMA) was to be cut from 18 months to 12 months. However, ORR continued to reimburse states for those refugees collected General Assistance during the 13th to 24th month of stay in the United States. ORR announced in January 1990 that federal reimbursement to states for cash and medical assistance to employable refugees was to be reduced from 12 months to 4 months, a reduction of five hundred percent.

This paring down of AFDC, RCA, RMA, and funds for social service programs during the last half of the 1980s followed a consistent philosophy of the Reagan era that few states, VOLAGs, or refugees agreed with. Social services, now known as employment services,4 funded by the federal government emphasized language, employment skills development, and job placement. Proposed cuts to ORR programs in 1987 were extensive, some in the Reagan administration saying that the fiscal cuts would lead to a reduction of refugee admissions while others noted that refugee admissions had dropped over the last few years and resettlement-related funding should follow. Most ominous among the cuts was the attempt by ORR to save $45 million by reducing Cash and Medical Assistance support to states. It was believed that this action would provide states with a greater incentive to make refugees self sufficient at a sooner date after initial arrival. This was seen as an easy way to cut the budget while arguing for more individual refugee and state employment initiative.
One of the major difficulties in imposing policy restrictions and the limited success at coordinating both federal and local agencies through decentralized procedures can be explained by the policy of directing the majority of federal monetary support toward making refugees self-sufficient (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1986, p. 36). Section 411 of the 1980 Refugee Act stresses that the primary duty of ORR is to see to the priority of employment training and self-sufficiency in refugee resettlement. From the very beginning of federal intervention in refugee resettlement the emphasis on services and programs based on early self-sufficiency has been expected and complied with. Less understandable throughout the period of budget cutting over the last seven years has been the government's rationale that less funding will push the states into making the refugees employable in a shorter period of time.

The ORR had available $68,617,000 in FY1988 for refugee social service funds (Federal Register, V.52, No.7, p. 1244). Of this amount, $58,000,000 was to be made directly available to individual states. $55,000,000 was to be allocated according to each state's proportion of the nation population of refugees who had been in the U.S. less than 3 years. Another $3,000,000 was to be available for MAA Incentive Grants. The remaining ten million was used by ORR for special individual projects that contributed to the resettlement program as a whole.
Policy dictated that for those funds made available to states, "at least 85% of a State’s award be used for employment services, English language training, and case management services, reflecting the Congressional objective that "employable refugee should be placed in jobs as soon as possible after their arrival in the United States."" (op. cit., p. 1245) Case management, while possibly including general counseling or social services, has been a relatively recent but quickly institutionalized method of directing refugees toward employment while seeing to their general problems during the process of resettlement. It has been criticized for not stressing employment services, however. A 1985 report for ORR/DHHS, while recognizing the need for local procedural variations, encourages rigid goal definition by state refugee coordinators and the rewarding of case managers for furthering employment objectives (Lewin and Associates et al., 1985, pp. 7-8). The entire document takes for granted that quick and permanent employment are the primary objectives of case managers.

While the state coordinators and VOLAGS objected to the proposed cuts, none were ready for the retroactive nature of the cuts as demanded by the administration. In March of 1988, the ORR noted that Congress had appropriated an amount for state administrative costs 38 percent smaller than that being followed in the fiscal year allocation
plan. For this reason states were notified that further allocations for state administrative costs would account retroactively for this reduction.

In 1989 ORR argued that a cut to 15 months would "provide States with a stronger incentive to move quickly to help refugees to become independent and self-sufficient as soon after coming into this country as possible." (House Hearings, 1989, p. 826) Budget constraints in midyear FY1990 again forced ORR to cut back CMA reimbursements to states. Appropriations provided less for ORR resettlement programs despite the fact that the admissions ceiling had been increased from 116,000 to 125,000. Chris Gersten, ORR Director, attributed this regrettable action with ORR’s failure to adequately estimate the timing and origin of refugee entry as well as the rising cost of medical care. He stated that those at ORR "were very disappointed and unhappy that the estimates had been as far off as they were." (from an interview in Refugee Reports, Volume XI, 11, p. 2).

The reasoning of many in the administration for such cuts was that with (supposedly) fewer refugees entering the nation and with liberal state governments giving too little attention to high welfare rates among the refugee population, fiscal cuts would both trim unnecessary support funds and push the states to improve employment-related programs. Arguments against this action were numerous. Most vociferous were those states that had been spending
administrative support funds at previous levels, thereby facing a fifty percent shortfall for the last half of the fiscal year. Such a retroactive cut was argued to be at the very least demoralizing to staff, destructive to exiting programs, and unfair.

Arguments between those who resettled the refugees and the federal government have also arisen concerning the level of refugee admissions and funding for related programs. The National Governor's Association wrote that the prescribed funds would be inadequate because "the FY 88 budget request from ORR was based on 52,000 refugee arrivals, while in October the President approved refugee admissions for FY 88 at 68,500. Instead of requesting additional funding to meet projected needs, ORR chose to reduce federal reimbursement and shift the costs to state and local governments." (quoted from Refugee Reports, Volume IX, 4, p. 8) This reduction in reimbursements occurred again in 1989, leading the New York state refugee coordinator, Bruce Bushart, to say that such actions by the ORR "continues a trend of shifting the burden of refugee resettlement from the federal government onto the states," slowly eroding the traditional federal support for refugee programs (quoted from Refugee Reports, Volume X, 11, p. 2). ORR simply replied that its planned allocations were based on what was given to it by the Office of Management and Budget.
Federal Philosophy

Since 1975, when many states voiced fears about the placing of a large number of Vietnamese within their borders, the executive branch and administrative members have emphasized the responsibility of the federal government to support the resettlement of refugees. "The Refugee Assistance program is designed to assimilate refugees and Cuban-Haitian Entrants into American society as quickly and effectively as possible while minimizing the burden to States and localities." (House Hearings, 1984, part 5, p. 1102) This reassurance, to states, resettlement agencies, and the refugees themselves, was repeated by ORR director Phillip Hawkes when he stated the following: "It was the intent of the Refugee Act that the Federal Government be responsible for refugees for the first three years that they are in this country, and we do not expect to retreat from that position." (House Hearings, 1985, part 5, p. 968)

ORR's "strategy for adjustment to resettlement" has consistently emphasized "programs and initiatives to promote economic self-sufficiency and discourage refugee dependency on State welfare systems." (House Hearings, 1984, part 5, p. 1103) Services other than those immediately connected to obtaining employment for recently arrived refugees are not considered useless; they are simply not a practical use of taxpayer's dollars. At 1989 hearings before the House of Representatives, a
representative for DHHS/ORR stated that "We do not contend that non-employment services are not helpful. Rather, in a period of serious Federal budget constraint, we propose that available funds be concentrated on those services most directly associated with job placement." (House Hearings, 1989, p. 740)

Hearings before a House appropriations committee in 1989 criticized this attitude of the administration's. John Porter, long a member of this particular subcommittee, was very critical of the continued underfunding, in particular when the administration insisted on playing games by admitting increased numbers of refugees for political reasons while refusing to increase funding for resettlement services. Agencies such as the Family Support Administration, within which ORR exists, were chastised for silently bending before the administration's demand for more "cost efficient" programs without ever trying to formulate a comprehensive resettlement plan that both fit the administration's philosophy without making refugees and the rest of the country suffer. Succinctly put, Porter said that "ORR must be advocates for a solution. Instead, we have a classic example of budget numbers writing regulations and policy claims. It seems that most of the tinkering with ORR is driven by attempts at cost savings, not by real policy considerations." (House Hearings, 1989, part 5, pp. 672 - 673)
Porter went on to note that social services cut by the administration were in fact money saving programs when viewed from the long term. While initial resettlement costs may appear startling to the average taxpayer, a properly implemented system of resettlement support services and initial cash and medical assistance better prepares the refugee for avoiding a later dependence on public assistance. "When we cut refugee resettlement, we damage the success of those efforts--refugees end up on Medicaid, food stamps and SSI, costs which eventually accrue to the government." (Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 1989, part 5, p. 673)

It has most recently been argued that the federal government is only kidding itself when policy states that forced early employment will lead to economic self-sufficiency. In testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, Susan Forbes Martin stated that "[m]uch of the emphasis at present is on welfare reduction and/or early employment, neither of which in and of itself will lead to economic self-sufficiency." (Martin, 1991, p. 3) As an example, in a recent draft of matching grant program guidelines, ORR states the following: "Federal policy requires that, if necessary, refugees accept "entry level" positions rather than resorting to public cash assistance for support." (DHHS, 1991, p. 4) Ms. Martin notes in a Refugee Policy Group report that this kind of emphasis on immediate reduction of
welfare dependency within the refugee community is leading to "the elimination of other aspects of social and economic adjustment" and impedes the implementation of more effective resettlement models (Martin, 1991b, p. 5).

When the administration has been accused of cutting funds to refugee resettlement services, it has been able to answer back that in fact ORR special discrepancy funds for social services have increased. This is true, but so too have refugee numbers increased, and to be able to pay the relatively cheap matching grant to voluntary agencies for resettlement services, CMA and AFDC monies have been drastically cut. ORR has thus allowed refugee allocations to increase without demanding an equal increase for in-country resettlement funds, ORR representatives rationalizing that if these funds are required, they can be transferred from other accounts. Such policy places the burden of long-term resettlement costs on individual states, the federal government defining resettlement policy without being willing to pay for it. When questioned about why DHHS/ORR did not request supplementary funds to meet increased demand, it was stated that "[t]he Administration believes that any additional costs generated by the higher refugee ceiling can be absorbed within existing funding levels." (House Hearings, 1989, p. 730)

Part of the problem with the discrepancy between entry and fiscal allocations has to do with HHS/ORR developing a budget in January of each year while the State Department
determines refugee admissions almost nine months later without any attempt to communicate and work with ORR. Such a problem could be easily overcome but these many years have found it untouched, the administration showing an uncaring attitude toward resettlement service quality or needs (House Hearings, 1989, part 5, page 718). When recent hearings brought up the discrepancy between increased allotments for incoming refugees without a matching increase in social service funding, an ORR representative simply replied that the office intended to move monies from CMA to the voluntary agency matching grant program.

ORR has also argued that it requested supplemental funds over what was granted for 1990 but that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) denied additional funding. "The original fiscal year 1990 budget request to OMB for Refugee Resettlement was $342.7 million; the OMB mark was $242.3 million. The original request would have funded 83,500 refugees for a period of reimbursement to the states for 24 months. OMB's mark was based on an estimated fiscal year 1990 ceiling of 72,200 and a 21 month period of reimbursement." (House Hearings, 1989, part 5, p. 674)

The heart of ORR and administration philosophy concerning the future of and federal responsibility for resettlement programs is that the cuts will make existing services more efficient: "In fact, we believe that shortening the period of special Federal refugee funding
would be an incentive to the states with high dependency rates to provide services that are focused directly on getting newly arriving refugees into jobs more quickly." (House Hearings, 1989, p. 733) Such cuts have been looked upon by the Reagan and the Bush administrations as a healthy incentive for states to initiate better and faster employment rates for refugees. Catherine Bertini, the acting assistant secretary for the Family Support Administration, noted in testimony before Congress that if cuts were to occur in the length of kind of support to refugees, "States would have a stronger incentive to help refugees become independent and self-sufficient as soon after coming into this country as possible." (House Hearings, 1989, part 5, page 718)

Discussion

While the previous chapter concerned the history of immigrant and refugee migration to the United States, preceding sections have detailed the specific policies and actions of the federal government in resettling refugees. Such policies and the means by which they were implemented have been developed as required, historically showing an ever increasing interest of the U.S. government in controlling both the conceptualization of migration and the settlement of newcomers within American borders.

Of greatest importance to the present study, a complex structure for resettling peoples of political interest to
the U.S. government has come to be developed. Federal, state, private, and refugee community agencies are incorporated into a single resettlement structure. On the federal level, various departments determine resettlement policy and arrange for its implementation with primarily federal funds. It is on this level that refugees are conceptualized, defined, and brought into the country as both political and social resources. The private sector is very important at the point of refugee entry, organizing national level voluntary agencies that handle the initial resettlement of refugees. State and local agencies act as the administrators of federal policy, altering policy to some degree as the local population requires. Finally, mutual assistance associations have also become important implementors of policy due to their intimate relationship with the refugee community.

The allocative resources provided by the federal government for entry into the U.S. and resettlement on the local level are easily followed in this and the preceding chapter. Money is provided for the special schooling and support of refugees in a variety of different programs over a long stretch of time. More importantly, authoritative resources are shown to control the flow and impact of the allocative resources. Policy is quickly turned into tangible resources when life chances are taken into hand by the federal government in the name of the nation-state. Recognition of a group of people as refugees relies on
governmental approval of their subjective claim to persecution. Upon entry, federal policy heavily influences locale of resettlement, length of eligibility for public assistance, and development of special projects meant to acculturate refugees and make them economically self supporting.

Refugee community groups are also considered as implementors of federal policy, used as a means to attain federal policy ends. The model of commodification of human resources, as introduced by Offe and Ronge and further developed for use in this dissertation, shows itself to be of immediate relevance. The information detailed in this chapter outlines the general plan of recommodification that is woven into the resettlement process. Unable to integrate into mainstream society through increased subsidies to existing social institutions, refugees have required immense cash supports bolstered by special privileges based on their status and historicity.

The intended results of such resources and provided by federal policy is the making of a socially and economically self sufficient American immigrant. Within this process of recommodification there is the unintended consequence of social manipulation and community adjustment. Refugee self-help groups were used as implementors of federal resettlement policy, their link with the refugee community providing a quicker and surer way to obtain the trust of the overall community. Self sufficiency as an end product
is not considered a negative point, but the use of and possible co-optation of refugee MAAs to reach this goal is extremely important to the community at large. The potential for influencing if not creating or re-making refugee community self-help groups is obvious. The actual impact of the resettlement process on the refugee community over these past fifteen years is less clear. While the hypothesis is given support in the form of a federal policy aimed at using refugee MAAs as policy tools, it will require localized researching of examples to understand how such policy actually affected community group development.

Conclusion

The resettlement structure of the prior decade appears rational and is impressive simply by the fact that it has worked. It is important to note that such a relationship between refugee and government was never formally recognized until 1960 nor incorporated into a resettlement structure until the demands of 1975 arose. The special relationship that exists between federal government and refugee, the resettlement structure set up to formalize this relationship, and the provision of material resources connected with authoritative policy requirements within the resettlement process makes clear the control inherent in the resettlement process.

This relationship is changing, however. In his 1991 State of the Union Address to the American Congress,
President Bush demanded that the federal government give up some of its power and return to the American people some of the power that Washington had monopolized. Federal programs and responsibilities were to be returned to the states, an idea that drew tepid applause until the president added that block grants would reimburse these programs for one hundred percent of their cost.

This appears to be what is happening at the present time in the area of refugee resettlement, the federal government attempting to give the responsibility of resettling refugees to the individual states. What is striking about this move is the history, context, and control that gives depth to the situation. As this and the previous chapter have pointed out, it is the national government that has created the concept of and requirements for refugee status. With this status has come increasing demands for the government to take care of the refugee in an increasingly complicated resettlement process. The policy created to both define and resettle refugees maintains government control over both definition and use of resources, authoritative resources providing the basis for allocation of more material resources. Yet now the federal government is backing away from three decades of responsibility, attempting to redefine refugees as a special form of immigrant and leaving more powers of policy interpretation and fiscal appropriation to the individual states.
At present, however, the government is seen as shirking fiscal responsibility for a group of needy people created in large part by federal policy. This point is noted by Susan Forbes Martin in a recent report for the Refugee Policy Group: "The financial responsibility at the national level has been eroded...as has the leadership that the federal government should be providing in setting policies and priorities." (Martin, 1991b, p. 2) With increasing federal indeterminism, the individual states are having to step in and fill a role that holds responsibility but little or no real power over policy decisions and development. The following two chapters show how the State of Hawaii, as one example of a site for resettlement of Indochinese Refugees, carried out and interacted with federal resettlement policy.
### Endnotes For Chapter III

1. See the volume titled *Kaleidoscope: The Resettlement of Refugees in the U.S. by the Voluntary Agencies*, by David S. North, et al., for more information on how individuals were chosen and resettled in the U.S. up through 1982.

2. Changed in name only in 1989 to the International Organization for Migration.

3. **Southeast Asian Refugee Arrivals In The United States 1975 through September 30, 1989** 
   (Source: DHHS, Report to the Congress)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Type</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resettled under Special Parole Program (1975)</td>
<td></td>
<td>129,792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resettled under Humanitarian Parole Program (1975)</td>
<td></td>
<td>602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resettled under Special Lao Program (1976)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resettled under Expanded Parole Program (1976)</td>
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<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resettled under &quot;Boat Cases&quot; Program as of August 1, 1977</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resettled under Indochinese Parole Programs:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1, 1977--Sept. 30, 1977</td>
<td></td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Year 1978</td>
<td></td>
<td>20,397</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fiscal Year 1979</td>
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<td>80,678</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fiscal Year 1980</td>
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<td>166,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resettled under Refugee Act of 1980:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Year 1981</td>
<td></td>
<td>132,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Year 1982</td>
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<td>72,155</td>
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<td>Fiscal Year 1983</td>
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<td>Fiscal Year 1984</td>
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<td>52,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Year 1985</td>
<td></td>
<td>49,853</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fiscal Year 1986</td>
<td></td>
<td>45,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Year 1987</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Year 1988</td>
<td></td>
<td>35,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Year 1989</td>
<td></td>
<td>37,066</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL**...........................................918,558
4. "Effective with the FY 1989 budget, employment services represents the refocusing of Social Services with emphasis placed on employment related activities." (House Hearings, 1989, p. 829)
Chapter IV
INDOCHINESE RESETTLEMENT IN HAWAII
(1975 - 1982)

Discussion of implementation of the resettlement process in Hawaii will be broken into two time periods: 1975 to roughly 1982 and from 1982 to 1991. This chapter covers only from the fall of Saigon in 1975 to the early 1980s. The following chapter will bring the activity and structure of resettlement in Hawaii up to date. Such a separation by time periods is due to the different emphases placed on the two chapters.

The first section of the present chapter covers the initial set-up of a resettlement structure and following development in 1975 and 1976. The second section covers to the early 1980s. Each of these time periods covers the different levels involved in the resettlement process: federal government, local government, VOLAGs with an emphasis on their local affiliates, local social service activities in the public and private sector, the ethnic community, and responses of the people of Hawaii. An important theme present throughout these early years of resettlement is the cry by government and public alike that incoming refugees become self sufficient as quickly as possible. While government definition of refugees as being
worthy of American support and hospitality was accepted by the general public, the requirement for efficient programs aimed at acculturation of those foreign to American ways was constantly present. It is also in this first chapter that government use of local and ethnic community resources for federal policy implementation is outlined. Special attention is given to how the federal government began incorporating refugees and refugee community organizations into the resettlement process.

The next chapter, Chapter Five, analyzes the impact that federal resettlement policy has upon the structure of long-term resettlement in a specific locale. As the federal government formalized its relationship with refugees in the Refugee Act of 1980, actors within the private and public sector social service system began organizing around increasing federal control of authoritative resources paralleled by a lessening in the outlay of federal monetary support for resettlement. Of special interest in this second chapter will be the inclusion of refugee community organizations in the resettlement process.

The Indochinese Come To Hawaii

The first of the Vietnamese refugees to escape Vietnam before the fall of Saigon came first to Hawaii and watched the last hours of Saigon on a television set with Mrs. Minjo McKinny. Mrs. McKinny and her husband, Dr. Wayne
McKinny, were well known to the INS, State Department, and other organizations working with immigrants due to the McKinny's long history of bringing Vietnamese orphans into the U.S. While much of their background includes work in Vietnam in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the McKinnys had been especially busy in Honolulu in 1974-75 trying to bring as many Vietnamese orphans into Hawaii as possible. Employees of Pan Am and United Airlines had come to know them on a first name basis as they often met the planes carrying orphans from Vietnam and took care of the initial paperwork.

Thus it was no surprise to the McKinnys when, on April 21, 1975, airport officials called "the people working with the orphans" to help them with a more difficult problem. It was explained to them that 99 Vietnamese, working in sensitive areas such as the Embassy and relatives of ranking officials, had just flown in from Guam with no passports, visas, or other required documentation. Newspaper articles from that time say that the 99 Vietnamese were a mix of Flying Tiger Cargo Airline employees, American Express workers, and USAID staff. The same articles noted that one of the group of Vietnamese had papers but that the rest had to bribe their way out of Vietnam. The State Department and INS were understanding about the situation, giving them permission to stay in Hawaii ten days while more legal arrangements could be worked out for them to stay in the country (Star-Bulletin,
4-22-1975). While many Vietnamese had come in as military dependents months before the final fall of Saigon, this was truly the first group of Vietnamese refugees to seek asylum in America. In a recent interview, Minjo McKinny said that when the McKinneys were contacted, it was requested that they help in taking care of the "illegal aliens" until the matter could be cleared up. In a spirit like that given in their attempts to help the orphans and indicative of their work over the next five years, the McKinneys helped to find them homes to stay in and worked closely with the INS to complete required documentation for an undetermined length of stay in America. Mrs. McKinny stated that it was this initial work with these 99 "pre-fall" refugees that prepared them for the wave that was to follow.

Though most of the Vietnamese had continued on to the U.S. mainland after only a few days in Hawaii, many of this first group of 99 gathered with Mrs. McKinny to watch the fall of Saigon from her home in Aiea Heights. While viewing the chaotic scenes on the television, some of them called relatives still living in Saigon to inform them of what was happening.

The country had known for at least a week that the collapse of Vietnam was imminent. Congress had already passed a bill for $237 million for the expected evacuation of all U.S. personnel and those Vietnamese with close contacts with the U.S. government or its staff (Star-
Bulletin, 4-24-1975). A week before the fall a group of Vietnamese living in Hawaii hastily formed an ad hoc organization known as Concerned Vietnamese Americans in Hawaii, the first of many Vietnamese organizations related to the refugee movement. They advertised that they would make their services and the services of immigrant social service workers at the Kalihi-Palama Immigrant Service Center (KPISC) available to concerned Vietnamese worried about family members. Many of the Vietnamese living in Hawaii, mostly relatives of U.S. military personnel, flocked to KPISC to fill out emergency evacuation requests for relatives still in Vietnam (Advertiser, 4-4-1975).

Unlike most other states, Hawaii was well aware of its special place in relation to Vietnam. In anticipation of the possible permanent relocation of 5,000 Vietnamese over the following months and a potential holding camp of many thousands more, Governor George Ariyoshi authorized the formation of a state refugee task force on April 23, almost a week before the fall of Saigon. This task force represented 9 state agencies and was assigned to work on the long range needs of the potential refugees. They quickly formed a two-pronged plan based on health needs and economic assistance with the KPISC being assigned to take care of the preliminary needs assessment portion of resettlement (Advertiser, 4-24-1975). During this time period many in Hawaii, the governor in particular, were worried about a literal invasion of the islands by a horde
of Vietnamese. The military and INS were of a directly opposite viewpoint and tried to calm worried islanders, emphasizing that a major state plan was not needed and that the majority of Vietnamese would be "passing through," perhaps only 2,000 staying on with relatives here (Advertiser, 4-24-1975).

The mayor of Honolulu, Frank Fasi, told reporters a week after the fall of Saigon that his administration had foreseen the impending fall and aftermath a full year and a half before. He contended that this foresight was the reason for the city increasing staff at KPISC with federal CETA funds (Advertiser, 5-6-1975). A similar difference of attitude between the city (Mayor Fasi) and the state (Governor Ariyoshi), as well as open antagonism, is visible throughout the first years of refugee resettlement in Hawaii.

The federal government was not quite so prepared as Mayor Fasi, but had begun the airlift of U.S. personnel and their relatives to the U.S. mainland as early as late March. Large scale evacuation through what the military called "Operation New Life" did not begin until later, however. Taft notes that evacuation of Saigon military and embassy personnel and relatives to Guam began April 23 and that by April 28, one day before the fall of Saigon, there were 20,221 refugees on Guam (Taft, 1979, p. 105). Nguyen, on the other hand, wrote that the first planeload of 200 Vietnamese refugees, primarily military dependents, left
for Travis Air Force Base on April 22 (Nguyen, 1977). Of those leaving in a less orderly fashion, the first of those fleeing Vietnam are said to have arrived in Hawaii about a month before the fall of Saigon, some being married to American service personnel and others being connected to operation babylift (Nguyen, 1977, p. 17). None of these were refugees, however, and were very unlike the 99 Vietnamese who came to Hawaii asking for asylum.

Under executive office orders the military moved quickly to prepare temporary receiving camps for the more than 130,000 refugees that were to come to the U.S. by the end of 1975. Though there were initial reception centers at Subic Bay in the Philippines and at Wake Island, the center in Guam was placed under the greatest strain.2 Figures released by the Interagency Task Force on Vietnamese Refugees and appearing in a Honolulu Advertiser article on May 18 gave the following numbers for each of the temporary holding or resettlement centers:

**Vietnamese Refugee Population as of May 17, 1975**

**Pacific Region Centers**
- Guam: 25,734
- Subic Bay: 2,116
- Hickam: 90
- Bases in Thailand: 89

**U.S. Mainland Centers**
- Ft. Chaffee, AK: 22,436
- Eglin AFB, FL: 4,290
- Camp Pendleton, CA: 17,167
- Indiantown Gap, PA: 14,696

Resettled with sponsors as of May 17: 36,816
Note that in comparison to mainland areas, Hawaii was hardly touched by the resettlement effort. The evacuees that stayed in these centers were there for only a short period of time, waiting only for paperwork to clear before being moved to many of the other resettlement centers in the United States. From there VOLAGs found sponsors for them and moved the majority out of these camps within a hundred days of their arrival. Family units were maintained and members resettled together in the United States whenever possible.3 Individual preferences for geographic placement were allowed as time and paperwork allowed. On December 20, 1975, with the deactivation of the Fort Chaffee, Arkansas holding camp, the State Department called the resettlement effort a success and formally over. In Hawaii, as in every other place of resettlement across the U.S. and around the world, the process of resettlement has never really ended.

Welcome

Reception of the refugees around the country was mixed, the majority of detractors worrying about the cost of resettlement and long-term care requirements. The usual feelings of antagonism rested on worries that the refugees would have a detrimental effect on the jobs of resident Americans or the U.S. economy as a whole. A common example of how these feelings were expressed occurred in a small
town in Vermont in August of 1975. While three families in the town of 1200 had already arranged to sponsor 15 Vietnamese, town officials turned the refugees away fearing that they would have a negative impact during a period of hard economic times (Advertiser, 8-4-75). Those working to resettle refugees were also targets of expressions of economic fear and racial hatred. Resettlement workers at the camp in Fort Chaffee, for instance, experienced many "incidents" of disfavor at the hands of local residents (Star-Bulletin, 1-1-1976).

In Hawaii, refugees came in both directly to stay with relatives or friends, as well as to Hickam Air Force Base for temporary placement procedures before being moved on to the care of a permanent sponsor somewhere on the mainland. Negative feelings openly expressed by local residents towards the refugees were rare. This is not to say that people were not worried about the impact of the refugees on the local economy or were entirely receptive to bringing Vietnamese to settle in the islands. It was reported that when Wayne McKinny flew to Vietnam in March of 1975 to bring back some orphans, he even then ran into opposition. "I got a lot of hate calls back then," McKinny said in a 1980 interview, "It was awful in the beginning, but its much less traumatic now." (Star-Bulletin, 5-26-1980)

The political front also had its supporters and detractors. The mayor of Honolulu at that time was Frank Fasi and was an immediate supporter of resettlement in
Hawaii. The governor in 1975, newly elected George Ariyoshi, never went so far as to echo California Representative Burt Talcott’s famous claim, \"Damn it, we have too many Orientals,\" but he was quickly seen as a scrooge when it came to welcoming the needy (Kelly, 1977, p. 18). In fact, Ariyoshi’s main concern was over the limited space and economic resources of the state. A May 2 article in the Honolulu Star Bulletin noted that Ariyoshi was reluctant to welcome the refugees due to the state’s limited economy and high unemployment rate.

Dr. McKinny, at that time and in a recent interview, also chastised Governor Ariyoshi for balking at accepting more refugee orphans due to the \"poor health\" of the orphans and high health standards required by the state (Star Bulletin, 4-28-1975). This reluctance of the Governor’s, and many others in Hawaii, to welcome an unknown number of \"economic burdens\" was based on the fact that funding by the federal government had still not been worked out and could not be said to be forthcoming. While Ariyoshi’s concerns may have been objectively valid, his comments to the press and others left those most intimately involved with the resettlement process in Hawaii with a very negative image. An article on refugee resettlement in Hawaii in the Honolulu Star Bulletin, May 28, 1975, quoted him saying the following: \"My position has always been that I do not encourage them to come to Hawaii, but once
they are here I will do my utmost to make their stay as comfortable as possible." Not entirely a cold shoulder, but far from a warm reception.

The other side of this picture is that of the refugees, their views of America being very different from the stereotypical paradise many Americans thought they were being offered. A small number of those evacuated from South Vietnam did not fully understand the implications of their leaving and after given the time to reflect upon their choice, decided to return to Vietnam. Nguyen notes that 1600 refugees returned to Vietnam in October 1975 (Nguyen, 1977, p. 9). Others in the holding camp on Guam demanded and finally obtained a boat to sail back to Vietnam in. The vast majority of the 130,000 Vietnamese that came to America in that year chose to remain, but not without suffering from their decision to stay.

While the survivors had come to a land without war, this land also lacked the social or cultural context within which to live the lives they were used to. The rules, roles, and norms of a Vietnam with two thousand years of history and a half century of war had been replaced by an absence of history, the "start of a new life," and social contradictions that led to a high rate of depression, family break-up, and suicide.

A major problem with the resettlement of the Vietnamese in America was due to the lack of a Vietnamese community here to welcome them or help them to adjust to a
new social environment. After a visit to the refugee camp at Fort Chaffee, Francis FitzGerald wrote that "Ft. Chaffee was a purgatory, but it was also, the refugees said, "the last Vietnamese village." Once outside the camp gates, the refugees could not get back in, for, legally speaking, the camp was not in America: It was nowhere. And by October there were a lot of people who did not want to leave the camp." (Star-Bulletin, 1-1-76).

Upon entering mainstream America, refugees found themselves unable to continue with the lives they had left behind in Vietnam. Lawyers and administrators in Vietnam were largely unable to transfer their skills and had to be satisfied with menial jobs, such as working in the pineapple cannery, or going back to school for retraining in some other field. Dona Butler remembers that a Hmong family she and her husband sponsored in Honolulu were happy at being in Hawaii but still experienced problems in adjusting to the change from living in the mountains of Laos to living in urban Honolulu. When asked about how he felt about living in America, the father replied, "In Laos I had everything; here I have nothing." Obviously the perceptions, needs, and reactions of the refugees were very different from what American residents considered they should be.

The first wave of Vietnamese in 1975 were relatively well educated and had some exposure to the English language, their adjustment being less traumatic than those
who came later from a relatively less developed Laos or the more rural areas of Vietnam. For the majority the move to the U.S. was a step down, occupational status and culturally appropriate roles learned over a lifetime having to be thrown away. In private many bemoaned their fate but continued to work for a new future, if not for themselves, then for their children. In public they had to smile and be thankful that the American people had saved them.

Along with the overt acts of discrimination and violence Vietnamese experienced, Americans also expected the refugees to be grateful, to thank America for what little they had and what bounty they could expect if they worked hard. Volunteer resettlement workers in Hawaii experienced some of the same feelings, thinking the refugees should be grateful for being here and being resentful when demands for better housing or more money were voiced. These attitudes have not changed over these sixteen years, modern societal expectations in New Zealand of how refugees should act being summarized as follows: "You are welcome here as long as you fit in, don't criticise, are grateful, undemanding, and become like us as soon as possible; if you can't become like us, then keep to yourselves or go elsewhere." (C. Hawley, 1987, quoted from Wellbeing and Cultural Maintenance by Man Hau Liev, 1989)
Discussions with members of the refugee community in Hawaii about the experience of being resettled in America invariably includes the hardships that had to be overcome, that the individual or family are still living with. Objectively the refugees have more in the way of material possessions and potential for growth in the American system, but they have lost much of what they were in their homeland. The eyes of those being interviewed bespeak the fact that it is not easy to start over when you don't even know where you are. Minjo McKinny spoke with a Lao friend a short while before I interviewed her in 1989 about coming to the U.S. The Lao friend was quoted as saying, "It was like coming into darkness." Unfortunately, though these feelings have come to be understood by the agencies and organizations that make up the structure we call the social service sector, limited resources or support systems exist to bring light to those that continue to enter what we suppose to be a paradise.

The Basis For Resettlement In Hawaii

Resettlement of refugees in Hawaii followed an ad hoc process that paralleled that of other parts of the U.S. The waves of refugees coming from Southeast Asia has likewise been similar. The relatively well educated Vietnamese made up the first 130,000 in 1975 with some Lao, Khmer, Hmong, and other Vietnamese to follow over the next two years. The second wave was made up of "boat people,"
largely Chinese-Vietnamese fleeing persecution in Vietnam as well as a large number of Lao, Hmong, and Khmer fleeing overland from their own governments into Thailand. Following waves have included relatives allowed into the U.S. through the Orderly Departure Program or other immigration channels, the Amerasians and their family members, and, most recently, Vietnamese reeducation camp survivors. The majority of Southeast Asian refugees arriving in the U.S. in recent years are relatives of residents or citizens already living here, but there continues to be a flow of individuals and families who come with no other welcoming hand than what has been organized by the government and refugee community over these last fifteen years.

Before discussing the creation and maintenance of the resettlement and support structure in Hawaii, it must be remembered that Hawaii is unique in comparison to many other states. While New York, Texas, and California, among others, have resettled a large number of the over eight hundred thousand Southeast Asian refugees that have arrived since 1975, they have also welcomed tens of thousands of refugees from Cuba, Latin America, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and the Soviet Union. Hawaii, in contrast, has no more than a handful of these latter groups. References to refugees, the refugee community, and refugee services are with the Southeast Asians specifically in mind.
Federal Involvement

The initial flow of Vietnamese were received with no existing laws for entry or funds for resettlement. A flurry of Congressional activity provided the means for resettlement, but it was not until 1980 that a somewhat permanent structure of allocation, reception, and resettlement was created.

The May 1975 Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act provided $405 million over a 28 month period for refugee costs. Assistance similar to Aid for Families with Dependent Children was available to all those classified as refugees, with children or without. Following laws and ad hoc fillers took care of most of the problems, but implementation of these laws required action on the local level.

The Process Of Resettlement In Hawaii

VOLAGs

Even before the fall of Saigon in April 1975 the national voluntary resettlement organizations or VOLAGs had again been contracted out to by the U.S. State Department to interview and arrange for the placement of refugees. The first phase of such work took place in the special holding camps noted above, but later refugee movements required the setting up of camps and VOLAG facilities in Thailand and other countries.
Resettlement at the local level, in Honolulu for example, required sponsors and some form of resettlement structure. Government contracts with the national VOLAGs to resettle the Vietnamese that entered in 1975 ran until June 30, 1976, as mandated by legislation passed by Congress (Star-Bulletin, 5-10-1975). As refugees continued to enter the U.S., such contracts became a yearly necessity with specifications and agreements changing from year to year. The decision as to how many refugees could enter the country was made on a federal level by the President, Attorney General, and State Department. Once recognized as refugees and allowed to enter the U.S., VOLAGs were contracted out to by the State Department to handle resettlement procedures. The number of refugees to be resettled in each area around the country was mutually decided upon by the national VOLAG and the local affiliate.

The first of the contracts with the State Department only required the national VOLAGs to arrange for meeting the refugees at a transportation center, arranging for housing, and providing some form of general orientation. Sponsors for the refugees, who ranged from local church congregations to individual families to the local affiliate of the national VOLAG, were also counted on to help in acculturating the arriving refugees.

In return for their services, the national VOLAGs, numbering nine in 1975, received $500 from the State Department for each refugee resettled. In 1977 this amount
was cut to $300 per capita, then raised to $350 in 1979. The local affiliates in each area or city that did the actual resettlement work received only a portion of this money, and often only half of this, if any at all, reached the refugee in the form of cash or material goods. This disbursement of federal monies naturally led to many misunderstandings between the local resettlement agency and the refugee community.

Due to the sheer number of refugees needing sponsors and resettlement in 1975, many churches and ad hoc organizations were able to contract out with the State Department to resettle a family or small group of refugees without having to go through a national VOLAG. However, the majority of refugees resettled at that time and up to the present has been through local affiliates of the VOLAGs. Catholic Social Service (CSS) and Vietnamese Immigrant Volunteer Assistance (VIVA) were the only agencies in Hawaii authorized to resettle incoming refugees and receive federal resettlement funds through the national VOLAGs they were respectively affiliated with.

VIVA

Vietnamese Immigrant Volunteer Assistance or VIVA did not exist until well after the fall of Saigon. Dr. McKinny and his wife, Minjo, well known for their work with Vietnamese orphans, were not happy at the lack of organization behind the resettlement of the nationless
Vietnamese. Together with friends George Chaplin and Joel Irwin, they decided to start their own resettlement organization. Incorporation occurred on May 19, 1975, and to quickly meet the needs of incoming Vietnamese, temporary office space was frantically searched for. Mayor Frank Fasi proved willing to let the organization use his campaign headquarters on Bishop Street during the daytime without charge, complaining all the while that the state should be taking on such responsibilities (interview with Dr. McKinny and Minjo McKinny).

The organization of the upstart resettlement center was quickly pulled together. Dr. McKinny was president, Minjo McKinny was program director, and Frances Viglielmo and Wilma Henley kept the office running on a daily basis (Star-Bulletin, 5-23-1975). There was little formal funding at first. Voluntary donations of money, food, clothing, and labor kept VIVA alive for its first few months and maintained its spirit for almost five years. Dr. McKinny has said that the first donation VIVA ever received was $25 from a Channel Nine camera man covering the opening of the new office. In fact, the McKinneys donated the money for starting up VIVA from their own pockets, funds they had been saving to open a hospital in Laos. Given that Laos had suffered the same fate as Cambodia and Vietnam, VIVA seemed the best way to use their funds for the good of the people they wanted to help.
The rest of Hawaii seemed to share their spirit and willingness to help. Dr. McKinny is quoted as saying that there were many "calls from people offering help," "offering trucking service to move things, furniture, clothes and other items that might be needed by the new immigrants to set up housekeeping." (Star-Bulletin, 5-23-1975) Minjo McKinny remembers that the teenagers of Honolulu were especially wonderful. All through the summer she remembers them coming by the office to drive newly arrived refugees to the Lanakila Health Center, Leahi Hospital, the Social Security office, and other places to get paperwork taken care of. A group of "Punahou kids" are vividly recalled, trips to important agencies being planned and organized on a weekly basis. In August they and other high school volunteers were the ones that helped in registering some of the Vietnamese in school, telling them what classes to take and what to expect of an American class setting.

Individuals and church groups and many other organizations are remembered for donating portions of their lives to help keep VIVA running. Many of the volunteers were members of the local Vietnamese community, giving bilingual assistance and helping with the translation of the never ending paperwork. Other volunteers had no experience at all in working with immigrants, and especially not with refugees. One woman who was recently interviewed asked to remain anonymous but has been referred
to in past newspaper articles as "Peggy." During the
summer of 1975 she had been working for St. Andrews Thrift
in downtown Honolulu. Someone called and asked her to
bring as many pots and pans as she could over to VIVA and,
when she did so, discovered Minjo McKinny and a woman named
Kathy Fischel in an office full of Vietnamese. From that
time on all of her (and her husband's) spare time for the
next five years was spent in helping find, scrounge, and
repair items that might come in useful for the generally
destitute refugees arriving at VIVA's doorstep. In all,
VIVA is reported to have had approximately 25 regular
volunteers in the summer of 1975 with few paid staff
(Advertiser, 7-2-1975).

Dr. McKinny believes that the main job of VIVA after
reception and resettlement was to find jobs for the
refugees. Chinese-Vietnamese are remembered as having a
relatively easy time in finding employment due to the
strong support given by the Chinese community in Hawaii.
C.S. Wo furniture and the restaurant Michel's are two
companies mentioned by many respondents as being very
supportive in helping incoming refugees find employment.

A volunteer bookkeeper, Kathy Fischel, was first with
the idea for VIVA to ally itself with a national VOLAG.
She wrote to the main office of American Council of
Nationalities Services around the month of July in 1975 and
was quickly rewarded with a visit by representatives. The
ACNS awarded VIVA an initial $5,000 to help in the
resettlement of the 107 families or 450 individual Vietnamese its staff were currently working with (Star Bulletin, 7-10-75) and later began reimbursing them with a large portion of the $500 per capita awarded by the State Department. The Legal Aid Society of Hawaii is remembered by Minjo McKinny as being instrumental in providing VIVA with the necessary paper infrastructure (such as By Laws derived from those of a local canoe club) to make incorporation and affiliation under ACNS possible.

The number of refugees entering Hawaii was mutually decided upon between the national VOLAGS, USCC and ACNS, and their local affiliates, CIC and VIVA respectively. Dr. McKinny remembers that weekly telephone conversations with ACNS gave VIVA staff some say as to how many should enter Hawaii through VIVA and what work load could be expected for the upcoming week or two. Since VIVA had Chinese, Lao, and Vietnamese speaking staff and volunteers, ACNS was told that members of these groups would be welcome but that Cambodians that spoke no Chinese could not be worked with. Available housing, employment opportunities, and local attitude toward the incoming refugees were considered important factors in deciding how many could be resettled in any one place. Thus there was a close relationship between local ability to resettle and national political agenda during the entire period of resettlement.

Even under ACNS money was very tight, and often VIVA staff, of those few hired for pay, had to work in
anticipation of payment by a national government and VOLAG that always reimbursed payments after the fact. When checks were written and the money was unavailable, Wayne McKinny credits First Hawaiian Bank with keeping the checks from bouncing. Such trust and understanding is said to have been most critical in 1978 when Congress wasn’t sure it wanted to pay out any more money for an ad hoc resettlement system and First Hawaiian had to carry VIVA more than once.

As VIVA became a more formal and recognized player in the resettlement game, other sources of funding became available, given a willingness by VIVA to become more mainstream. In July VIVA was awarded an $82,000 federal grant to provide bilingual support services to the Vietnamese refugees, positions being filled by members of the Vietnamese community for a $274 per capita stipend. This money was probably made available through the ACTION grant awarded to the State of Hawaii and was administered by the Progressive Neighborhood Program located in the governor’s office (Star Bulletin, 7-2-1975). In two months VIVA evolved from a disgruntled feeling of need to an office of volunteer laborers to the most active resettlement agency in Hawaii, a position it would keep into the next decade.
Catholic Social Service is remembered by Dr. McKinny as doing a lot of talking without much action, one of the reasons why he started VIVA in the first place. In May, as the immensity of the evacuation and resettlement operation was finally reaching the general public, it was a call from Bishop Scanlan that led 16 Hawaii parishes to sponsor refugees. Each of the churches was asked to sponsor one Vietnamese family, supplying the housing, food, and other materials necessary for three months or until the family could begin to support itself.

This effort on the part of the Hawaii Catholic congregation to help in the resettlement of Vietnamese refugees was called Operation Aloha and was a joint project of the United States Catholic Conference (USCC), Catholic Social Service (CSS), and local parishes (Advertiser, 5-27-1975). USCC was the largest of the national VOLAGs and arranged for refugees to be resettled in Hawaii while CSS acted as its local affiliate, receiving, counseling, and resettling with sponsors each of the refugees for whom the USCC had contracted.

Operation Aloha was an interdenominational religious task force set up by CSS and coordinated by Sister Sandy Galazin, working with all faiths and agencies for the resettlement of the refugees but with special ties to their own national VOLAG (Advertiser, 7-2-75). By September of 1975, although Sister Galazin had been replaced by Noreen
Moon as coordinator of Operation Aloha, 300 refugees had been settled with 40 churches (Advertiser, 9-15-1975). CSS and Operation Aloha were not entirely supported by USCC monies from State Department contracts or through the Catholic Church, but their organization and resettlement-related services were running prior to the inflow of refugees and had a ready population of church members willing to participate in a church-related activity. Its office on Vineyard St. was not ideal, but was far more prepared to meet its responsibilities than VIVA was that spring and summer.

VIVA often acted as a sponsor for many Vietnamese refugees but CSS was able to appeal to church members for help in sponsoring incoming families of Vietnamese. While a few sponsorships had broken down or not worked out, most had been very successful. For instance, Wesley United Methodist Church had sponsored a 5 member family through CSS, the church organizing the necessary committees to work with the family's needs and using the government’s fiscal grant to CSS to pay the first month’s rent on an apartment (Star-Bulletin, 9-6-1975). By the end of the year, CSS was reported to have resettled between four and five hundred refugees (Star-Bulletin, 1-1-1976).

Other services offered by CSS were sometimes made available through the Catholic Immigration Project, an immigrant services center that targeted the rising number of Filipino immigrants in Hawaii. Refugees were often to
be found in their English language classes and general social services and referrals were open for refugee use in times of need.

Problems Faced By VOLAGs

Of the $500 given by the State Department to the national VOLAGs for each refugee resettled, CSS set a limit of $300 to go directly to the immediate needs of each refugee they resettled, the other $200 being taken by USCC for administrative costs. VIVA was more fortunate, receiving $450 from ACNS (AD 9-15-75) and allocating the majority of that to immediate refugee needs. When the State Department cut support funds to $300 per refugee, ACNS continued to cut only $50 for administrative needs, leaving $250 for VIVA (Star-Bulletin, 5-18-1978). After using some of the money for their own administrative needs, VIVA was able to utilize $175 directly for refugee needs (Advertiser, 8-13-1978). These differences between the two organizations and the complexity of refugee resettlement funds in general has led to much misunderstanding throughout these following fifteen years.

As of September 1975, VIVA had already paid out over $18,000 to 215 refugees, averaging less than $100 per refugee, while CSS had applied for $60,000 in reimbursement from USCC for the more than 200 refugees it had resettled. Due to the slowness with which USCC was handling this request for reimbursement, many Vietnamese were feeling
cheated by CSS (Advertiser, 9-15-75). At the same time, a letter to VIVA from a group of Vietnamese alleged that VIVA was keeping money meant for the refugees to itself. The October 15, 1975 Advertiser reported that Dr. Wayne McKinny of VIVA denied all charges of being unfair with resettlement funds.

McKinny reiterated in the article and in a recent interview that these funds were partly used for administrative purposes on the national and local level, but that most of the money went to help the refugee. VIVA, as with all of the other local resettlement agencies, was reluctant to give the money directly to the refugee in question, for then it would be counted against them by the state's social welfare unit. Instead, the money was commonly used to buy food, furniture, pay rent, or help the refugees in some other way. McKinny also noted that these complaints were a common misunderstanding and came up every month.

As early as June VIVA and the Kalihi-Palama Immigrant Service Center were disagreeing with one another over resettlement issues (Advertiser, 7-2-75), and soon after the arguments over allocation and use of resources spread to encompass CSS as well. During a June meeting of Operation Aloha arguments broke out over the lack of communication and cooperation between local resettlement agencies. CSS complained of VIVA lacking a proper attitude to work in tandem with other agencies. The same accusation
was made of the Committee for Relief of Vietnamese Evacuees, a Vietnamese community organization headed by Vu-Dinh Dinh, an instructor of geography at the University of Hawaii at Manoa. VIVA then reportedly turned and blamed the other resettlement agencies for not appreciating their efforts, noting in the press that VIVA had to come into existence because of the backlog of clientele and lack of organization at KPISC and CSS (Advertiser, 7-2-1975).

Because the resettlement and social service agencies gained their reputation, power, and funding at least partially from the refugees they served, there was also the occasional disagreement over who was helping how many do what. An interview with "Peggy" in 1989 provides reference to such arguments between CSS, VIVA, and sometimes other agencies. Many disagreements came about when refugees resettled by one agency then helped in housing relatives or friends resettled the other agency, services and resources being drawn upon according to need, not according to what agency a piece of paper says they belong to. Another time "Peggy" gave addresses of refugees to the YMCA to take beds to, only to have the YMCA then claim that it was resettling these families.

KPISC

The Kalihi-Palama Immigrant Service Center was not a resettlement agency at that time and was not affiliated with a national VOLAG. Formed by the Palama Inter-Church
Council at a time when a large number of immigrants were moving into its neighborhood (Star-Bulletin, 8-17-1982), the center was critical in providing needed social services and support to the newly arriving Vietnamese. For example, as early as May 1975 it offered 24 hour interpretation service for Vietnamese, largely staffed by students from the University of Hawaii who were themselves concerned about their families still in Vietnam (Advertiser, 6-1-1975). In June it helped to organize a Keiki Bible Club Walk-A-Thon to buy rice as well as arranging for other donations to give to needy Vietnamese (Star-Bulletin, 6-7-1975).

While some of the hired staff were paid by city controlled federal CETA funds, KPISC overall operated with both public and private funds and was overseen by the Kalihi-Palama Interchurch Council (Advertiser, 7-2-75). Most resettlement funding went to the two major resettlement organizations, CSS and VIVA, and KPISC was largely kept in the background serving refugees on an informal and case-by-case basis until early in the next decade.

Other Private-Sector Resettlement Services

Resettlement efforts in Hawaii concentrated on finding sponsors for incoming refugees, arranging for housing, and preparing the refugees for employment in an American workplace. Many of the state’s church’s, of all faiths,
and hundreds of individuals and families worked through CSS, KPISC, and VIVA to sponsor and support the many Vietnamese and Lao that finally resettled in these islands.

Other than CSS, VIVA, and KPISC, there remained a large number of private sector organizations that organized efforts on behalf of refugee resettlement in Hawaii. A peripheral refugee service provider in 1975 was the Susannah Wesley Community Center, a community center dating back to 1899 that started off as a home for girls and began offering immigrant services in 1965 as more and more immigrants began moving into the Kalihi-Palama area (Star-Bulletin, 8-17-1982). Though one of the first bilingual social services in the state with the hiring of a Samoan services coordinator, it was not until the mid-1970s that it organized its services into a comprehensive immigrant services center. Services for refugees were limited to very general information and referral but have since grown to include Southeast Asian refugee health and mental health counseling and referral.

There were others that resettled refugees as well. Church of the Crossroads, under Church World Services, is remembered by Arlie Porter as having resettled 15 to 20 refugee families when he was there in 1975 and 1976. Most of those resettled by Church of the Crossroads were Lao due to the fact that one of their members, John Rantella, had
worked in Laos for some years. Not set up to do more than initial resettlement, the church withdrew after this number and left resettlement services to the other major agencies.

The Hawaii Council of Churches was also active in organizing members of many of Hawaii's various congregations in providing English language classes, sponsoring refugee families, collecting food goods and second-hand items for use by the refugees, and supporting other areas of service delivery for the refugees.

One other specific church that is often remarked about in interviews with resettlement workers of that time is the Kaumakapili Church on North King Street. The congregation had a long history of providing services for immigrants but were especially accommodating to the refugees. A dental clinic was made available for their use and one day a week was set aside for the refugees to come into their "rummage room" and select household items and clothing that might be of use in their homes.

Ethnic Organizations

The ethnic Vietnamese community had early on organized in an attempt to help family and friends in Vietnam, establishing the group Concerned Vietnamese Americans in Hawaii to help with evacuation requests in April. Another organization devoted to helping Vietnamese refugees in the reception and resettlement process was the Committee for
Relief of Vietnamese Evacuees, a Vietnamese community organization headed by Vu-Dinh Dinh, an instructor of geography at the University of Hawaii at Manoa.

The first refugee organization to incorporate and become registered as a non-profit organization in Hawaii was the Vietnamese Amity Society of Hawaii. It was formed by a group of Vietnamese refugees living in Hawaii who wanted to help other refugees learn about America. Established in early October, its first priority was to get more ESL, job preparation, and acculturation classes started for Vietnamese to attend. The organization’s president, Pham Quang Loc, reported that one hundred families or about 500 individuals were members in the organization. Dues were only $1.00 per year, meetings being held at Loc’s home (Advertiser, 10-21-1975).

By January, the Vietnamese Amity Organization was reported to represent about 300 Vietnamese, published a Vietnamese newsletter, and had a half-hour Vietnamese language radio program every Sunday on station KAHU. It had also sponsored the Vietnamese cultural show in November at Kapiolani Park.

Unfortunately, only three months after its inception, the Vietnamese Amity Organization was suffering from internal strife. An article in the Honolulu Advertiser, January 17, 1976, reported that six members of its 12 member board had resigned. Another board member had left the organization earlier when members had requested he stop
producing a radio program for an undisclosed reason. This most recent split was said to have occurred because "the society no longer functions in accordance with its stated principles and goals." It appears that board members believed that the president, Pham Quang Loc, had secretly arranged for some single Vietnamese men to work as live-in laborers on his landlord's farm, referred to as the Makaha Self Help Project.

The City and County of Honolulu was also an unwitting sponsor of ethnic community growth. The city is well known for fighting to change a law that barred all city jobs from those not residents of Hawaii nor citizens of the U.S., a barrier that was held up much longer at the state level. The City and County Department of Parks hired a number of Vietnamese and helped in publishing a newspaper in Vietnamese and English editions for the Vietnamese community. This effort ended in approximately late 1977 when Dr. McKinny found that much of the English edition of the paper did not mention the very slanted, nationalist politics the Vietnamese edition pushed upon its readers.

Memories of the many people interviewed about the resettlement process in the 1970s include the conviction that the refugees did not form a cohesive community. Not only did the Lao, Hmong, Vietnamese, and Chinese-Vietnamese seem to act separately, for obvious reasons, but they were
in turn split between high and low class, Catholic and Protestant, or respected community members and ex-bar girls.

City And State

The State of Hawaii under Governor Ariyoshi only grudgingly accepted the fact of refugee resettlement in the islands yet was organized enough to form a special state task force to aid refugees. Wayne McKinny criticized this task force for having only a token non-refugee Vietnamese as one of its members, much as Spark M. Matsunaga criticized President Ford for not appointing an Asian-American to the President's Advisory Committee on Refugees (Star-Bulletin, 6-12-1975). Yet while the federal government prepared to take in ever more refugees and passed legislation to give support similar to that of Cuban refugees arriving in the 1960s, the State of Hawaii openly used its prerogative to deny entrance to any more than a bare minimum of Vietnamese refugees. For example, on June 3, 1975, Governor Ariyoshi turned down the State Department's request for Hawaii to take in more refugees, stating that Hawaii had "more than its share."6 (Star-Bulletin, 6-3-1975) This decision was announced after a half hour meeting with Everet Bumgardner, member of the federal Indochina Interagency Task Force, and Dan Apargue, deputy director of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Ariyoshi was reported to have said that "since it
is a federal decision to help refugees from Vietnam, our State will pull its share. However, I don't want us to pull a disproportionate share." (Star-Bulletin, 6-3-1975)

At this same meeting, Ariyoshi stated that the State of Hawaii would not become a VOLAG or resettlement agency as some other individual states had done.

The City and County of Honolulu had a very different approach to the resettlement of refugees in Hawaii, and while perhaps no less self serving, Mayor Fasi certainly made the city appear more accepting of the state's newest members. Though not becoming an official VOLAG as some states had, the city did help in resettling many Vietnamese in Hawaii. In October 1975, the Office of Human Resources of the City and County of Honolulu subcontracted with VIVA and CSS to find sponsors, provide services, and aid in the resettlement of incoming Vietnamese refugees. This contract was paid for by a $400,000 grant with the State Department to resettle anywhere from 200 to 250 refugees in the state. Such monies were made available through the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 and, like the other two agencies, the City and County was to receive $500 for each refugee resettled (Star-Bulletin, 10-16-1975; Advertiser, 10-17-1975). Naturally this move by the city infuriated the governor. It was reported in the Star Bulletin on October 17 that Governor Ariyoshi was very upset with Mayor Fasi accepting the $400,000 contract,
saying that the state should be a part of all such negotiations and complaining that the state was spending enough of its own money on resettlement efforts.

The governor was able to announce in June that the state had arranged for a $900,000 six month grant to provide services in the resettlement of Vietnamese refugees in Hawaii. Monies were to be made available through ACTION, the federal parent agency of such programs as the Peace Corps and Vista. Funds were provided to hire 35 Vietnamese bilingual workers, officially termed volunteers and paid a minimal stipend, to assist various local and state agencies with the necessary bilingual support during that early period of the resettlement process (Star Bulletin, 6-3-1975). Some ACTION funds also went to the teaching of English through the Council of Churches (Advertiser, 7-19-1975).

This use of ACTION funds to supplement resettlement costs and direct resettlement activities was a calculated move on the part of the federal government, one that Governor Ariyoshi would have had to fight to turn down. ACTION was an agency created by the Domestic Volunteer Service Act of 1973 and formally begun in 1974 within the executive branch of the federal government. Appointed by the President, the director of ACTION was to administer such programs as Peace Corps and National Volunteer Anti-Poverty Programs. ACTION's primary goal was "to help disadvantaged persons in our Nation to help themselves."
(Domestic Volunteer Service Act of 1973, p. 31) Its primary activity was to arrange for educational and vocational training of volunteers to use their skills to train others in need of help to enter the American economic mainstream. In this case, ethnic community bilingual support workers and other specialists with valuable marketplace skills were hired at less than minimum wage to mainstream the Vietnamese refugees.

The state did not limit services for refugees to federally funded projects though new programs were heavily influenced by federal support made available to the state. One new state agency called the Program for Local Service for Vietnamese Refugees (PLS) was started with federal funds but with a large state matching portion. The 6 month, $80,000 program was supported by $56,082 in state funds and was developed to place Vietnamese refugees in long-term employment that matched their skills and needs (Advertiser, 7-19-1975). The State of Hawaii Department of Social Services and Housing (DSSH) hired some Vietnamese linguists under a six month contract with the PLS. This was a temporary placement until the DSSH was able to form its own refugee unit for cash assistance and housing needs.

In December of that same year DSSH opened an 8 person Refugee Assistance Unit headed by Elaine Sandobal, administrative expenses and other financial assistance being paid for with federal funds. It started in the Kalihi-Palama Community Center but in January moved to the
Brainard and Black Building for long-term service delivery. Services provided by "culturally oriented staff" included bilingual assistance with financial aid, food stamps, social services and medical aid for an estimated 1,245 refugees (Advertiser, 1-2-1976; Star-Bulletin, 9-2-1977).

Social services and public assistance became targets of both program coordinators and critics of the resettlement process. The state's Dept. of Social Services and Housing, as of the end of May 1975, had approved 27 applications for assistance, including Aid for Families with Dependent Children, entirely reimbursed by the federal government. The Vietnamese refugees were relatively well educated and wanted employment, but poor English language skills and the inability to easily transfer job skills considered useful in Vietnam led to underemployment and job dissatisfaction. As of mid-August a total of 250 Vietnamese had applied for jobs through the state but the State Employment Service said that only twenty percent had been placed. Of these 56 people, 41 had been hired as interpreters with ACTION funds for local social service programs. The other 15 had been placed in a variety of odd jobs, the majority on Oahu. It was assumed that most of the other refugees in the state had been able to find employment with sponsors or on their own (Star-Bulletin, 8-21-1975).
State efforts at controlling and directing refugee resettlement involved the State of Hawaii Immigration Service Center. This center was established as a pilot project in 1970 under the State Commission on Manpower and Full Employment and made a permanent part of the state in 1975 (State Immigration Service Center, 1973). Placement of the Immigration Service Center was under the Office of the Governor and was made the administrative center for all funds and projects related to refugee resettlement. The duties of the center originally included studying the impact of immigration on Hawaii and offering limited information and referral services to immigrants. Under the reign of its director, Bienvenido D. Junasa, its duties were changed to be more of a state-level luna, duties in 1975 centering on assisting and coordinating the many agencies and organizations providing services to immigrants and refugees in Hawaii. It was this agency that administered education and English language training funds and initiated the State Neighborhood Task Force, made up of Vietnamese volunteers to provide bilingual and interpretation services to the statewide resettlement effort (Advertiser, 7-11-1975). It was later to have an important role in the administration of federal funds for refugee resettlement and acculturation.

With the increasing number of refugees applying for public assistance, officials and legislators formed the Governor’s Demonstration Project for Employable Refugees in
July 1976. Under the Office of the Governor, under the administration of the Immigration Service Center, and with the direction of Kelly Salve, this project's first office was an unoccupied schoolroom in Kaiulani School on N. King Street. Activities centered around vocational training and, though largely federally funded at $300,000 per year, was unique in being implemented on a state level (Advertiser, 8-13-1978). Reports indicate that by the middle of 1980, the project had placed 1,142 refugees in permanent jobs and that more than 3,000 refugees had utilized its English language and vocational programs (Star-Bulletin, 5-26-1980).

The major burdens on the state were medical (in particular health screening at Leahi Hospital), education related (including additional bilingual aides and English language programs), and public assistance (primarily increased staff and administrative support), but even these were areas heavily subsidized by the federal government.

Education of the Vietnamese youth entering the state was also considered by the state as a burden it unfairly shouldered with little federal support. As of June 5, 1975 there were 515 Vietnamese in Hawaii, half of them under the age of 17. The federal government said that the education of these children was to remain a local problem (Advertiser, 6-6-1975). This claim was borne out by Congress' recent appropriation of $405 million, very little
of the monies going for the education of the recently arrived Vietnamese children, few of whom understood or spoke any English.

Special state funded public summer school courses included Vietnamese students as well as adult education/language classes. The Department of Education estimated that as of July 1, 1975, 410 Vietnamese refugees between the ages of 6 and 18 were enrolled in public summer school classes. Of the 410 Vietnamese refugees enrolled in public education/language classes, 60 were of school age. Most of these refugees were attending classes in the Honolulu School District, though summer classes for Vietnamese were being held at many other schools around the island. Because of the additional classes and resources expended for the needs of the refugees, the Department of Education sought $301,281 in reimbursement from the federal government (Advertiser, 8-5-1975).

The Department of Education expected 600 to 1000 Vietnamese youngsters to attend school in the fall of 1975. The DOE noted that a total of 25 Adult Basic Education Classes had been held during the summer, being taught in schools, churches, and community centers (Star-Bulletin, 9-4-1975). Some of these courses continued, in both day and evening, throughout the fall of 1975.
Post-1975

Estimates place the number of Southeast Asian refugees in Hawaii at the end of 1975 at 2,000. The people of Hawaii and the rest of the United States had hoped that the total of 135,000 that had been resettled would be not the first but the only migration of refugees into America. This was not to be. In May of 1976 the U.S. agreed to accept 9,000 refugees living in refugee border camps in Thailand, most being from the group of 70,000 to 85,000 Lao and Cambodians seeking asylum in Thailand (Star Bulletin, 5-14-1976). Over the next two years, the numbers of refugees seeking asylum in the U.S. declined, but in 1978 the numbers rose due to those who have become known as the Vietnamese boat people, peaking in 1980 and 1981.

In Hawaii, the refugee count in 1978 was still only 3,500, but by January 1, 1980, the Star-Bulletin reported that there were 4,196 refugees from Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam living here, 61 percent requiring financial assistance. In its Report to the Congress, DHHS reported the number of refugees to total 3,637: 15 Cambodians; 973 Lao; and 2,649 Vietnamese. It is probable that these are the numbers formally resettled in Hawaii, another section of the same document listing Hawaii as having 4,200 Indochinese refugees as of January 1980. The peak arrival of refugees to Hawaii was 290 in October 1979, but by May 1980 only about 100-150 were entering Hawaii each month. It should be noted that a small percentage, perhaps half,
of the 9,000 to 10,000 refugees that had landed in Hawaii remained as of 1980. The numbers in May were estimated to be about 3,000 Vietnamese and 1,500 Lao and Hmong. Resettlement patterns showed that four out of five of those remaining came here to join family members already living in Hawaii (Star-Bulletin, 5-26-80).

By late 1981, this estimate had grown to 6,200 refugees living in Hawaii, about 60 percent being Vietnamese and 30 percent being Lao, and only 50 or so Cambodians (Star-Bulletin, 10-30-1981). Official DHHS counts find Hawaii with a population of 3,781 at the end of September 1979. This number quickly grew to 4,200 for June 1980, 5,800 for September 1980, 6,100 for September 1981, and 5,600 for September 1982 (DHHS, Report to the Congress). These numbers show two very important patterns. The first is that not all of the refugees entering Hawaii chose to stay, approximately half of those being resettled here choosing to move to other states. Second, within two years the number of refugees entering the State of Hawaii almost doubling. However, while a high of 2,385 entered the state in FY1980, this peak quickly dropped to a more consistent 333 Southeast Asian refugees entering Hawaii in 1983. This rise and drop showed itself to be an important factor in the development and fall of refugee programs and agencies in the state.

Though relatively small in number when compared to the hundreds of thousands being resettled in the continental
United States, Hawaii came to be ranked among the most heavily impacted states due to the percentage of refugees here in comparison to the size of the local population.

Mainstreaming The Refugees

January 1976 found state officials amazed at how easily the resettlement of Vietnamese refugees in Hawaii had been. The basic problems of finding sponsors, housing, and helping acculturate refugees to American life continued. VIVA advertised for sponsors because the State Department cleared 10,000 Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodians stuck in Thailand but in need of the required sponsors to enter the country. While VIVA was seeking 100 sponsors, CSS already had the sponsors necessary to bring in 50 of these new refugees (Advertiser, 1-22-1976).

For the most part, however, everyone was relieved at the few problems experienced during that wave of reception and resettlement. Staff at Catholic Social Service noted that the first phase of the resettlement phase was housing, but that for 1976 the resettlement agencies had to think of long-range problems, like education and employment. Wayne Omori, director for KPISC, reportedly said that 80% of the refugees in Hawaii were under-employed. This was echoed by the head of the state's Employer Services, saying in addition that English was the main barrier to employment.
They both hoped that the 8 person Refugee Unit in DSSH would be able to relieve some of these problems (Star-Bulletin, 1-1-1976).

English and orientation classes were among the most important services to be delivered to incoming refugees. Kim Winegar remembers that while CSS and KPISC both had English classes for immigrants at that time, none were ready to meet the number and needs of the refugees that poured into the state. The initial and hastily arranged English Language Program was entirely voluntarily, Kim heading the effort due to his prior five years of English teaching experience in Vietnam. While well educated, Kim noted that many of the arriving Vietnamese had a very poor command of English.

The English Language Program was located at Kapiolani Community College on Pensacola as well as at the McKinley Annex (formally called the McKinley Community School for Adults and located at Beretania and Victoria Streets near McKinley High School) and, to a more limited extent, at the Central YMCA. For the first few months of this program there was no formal funding, only donated space, time, and materials. With the arrival of federal ACTION funding as funneled through the state, the Program for Local Services was able to provide subsistence allowances for the volunteers teaching English. Because all ACTION funding required the recipient to have a "local sponsoring agency,"
Kim's program arranged for Hawaii Council of Churches to be their sponsor, more in name for bureaucratic reasons than for actual material support.

ACTION funding was provided for a relatively short period of time, until the spring of 1976. The federal government finally started to provide direct English language and acculturation services support funding through its Refugee Resettlement Program in 1976. These funds were provided to individual states according to the number of refugees residing in the state and the proposals submitted by each state. In Hawaii, the Immigrant Service Center in the Office of the Governor funneled the available monies into the Department of Education, making the DOE the administrator of government approved ESL classes. Due to fiscal links with the government, such classes of course had a strong emphasis on employment-related English and the mainstreaming of students as quickly as possible. From the fall of 1976 to approximately 1982, such DOE administered English classes for Southeast Asian refugees were primarily based in the McKinley Annex.

In August 1978 the McKinley Annex program under Kim Winegar had approximately 266 students 18 years of age and older. Most were Vietnamese but 50 Hmong were also among the student body. All were probably receiving some form of public assistance and were thereby required by federal law to attend these English language classes. The separation of classes by age was required by recent government
regulations that targeted special funds for specific groups. Special English and tutoring classes for refugee children were held at Royal Elementary and Central Intermediate schools (Advertiser, 8-13-1978).

Closely linked to these English classes was the state's attempts to provide employment training and support for incoming refugees with federal funds. The state's initial project known as the Governor's Demonstration Project for Employable Refugees changed its name to the Indochinese Refugee Employment Project (IREP) in 1977 and was placed under the direction of Arlie Porter. English language classes offered through the DOE as well as the job skills courses taught through IREP were the primary means by which the government attempted to mainstream members of the refugee community. Porter was very liberal with the program, placing refugees in programs and places of work that were able to both understand the cultural background of the refugee while introducing him or her to the American system of work.

Some workers were "trained" in the field of resettlement processing, working at VIVA or providing bilingual services for other agencies. C.S. Wo and Company trained many refugees over a four year period in the art of making furniture. Other innovative programs included a restaurant run by the Sananikone family near the University of Hawaii at Manoa in a corner section of the Atherton YMCA building on University Avenue. Refugees were given work,
trained in how to run a restaurant, and made available good food with a slightly French accent to university students. Another program run by John Rantella provided training in carpentry, metal working, and agriculture in a shop on lower campus road. Most of these programs, according to Porter, were only four months in length with 15 to 20 people in each.

A related program not under IREP was the Apprenticeship Program that operated through Honolulu Community College. While no federal resettlement monies were used to fund this program, IREP surreptitiously transferred money sideways to pay for the tuition of willing but broke refugee clients.

In summary, federally funded employment and English training programs were not provided directly through the resettlement or social service agencies in Hawaii. The state and federal government controlled the funding and implementation of these vital acculturation and assimilation programs and implementing structures (DOE and IREP) while leaving the local resettlement and social service agencies (CSS, VIVA, KPISC) to exist on the lean monies made available by the national VOLAGs or through voluntary labor.

Employment and English language services were initially an activity controlled by the Office of the Governor through the State Immigrant Services Center, an agency that controlled the funding that went to such
activities as the Indochinese Refugee Employment Project. In 1979 DHHS reported that Hawaii State Immigration Services (Immigrant Services Center) received $588,622 from ORR to provide employment services, vocational training, and ESL programs to a minimum of 1,000 refugees. Just a year earlier in 1978 control of these services was shifted to the Department of Social Services and Housing (DSSH) which in turn contracted out to the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (for employment related training) and the Department of Education (for ESL). In this switch of administering bodies, the local service providers and VOLAG affiliates were also left out of the picture.

The following year, 1980, found the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations receiving $416,776 from ORR for the same services provided by the state’s Immigrant Services Center the year before. The money was channeled through DSSH to the Department of Labor and the Department of Education for final disbursement to the agencies that did the real work, such as the Indochinese Refugee Employment Project. In 1982 even more money was made available, $150,000 for the Department of Education to implement ESL courses for refugees and $640,192 for the Department of Labor to intensify employment and vocational training services. Again, the monies went originally through DSSH and were filtered by the DOE and DOLIR for appropriate disbursement to relevant programs. Due to a drastic fall in the number of incoming refugees, the total
amount coming from ORR for employment related services other than ESL (transferred from the DOE to the Hawaii Council of Churches) for a minimum of 835 refugees was $294,723 (DHHS, Report to the Congress).

Given the problems that large bureaucracies have in implementing human services, in 1982 the Department of Social Services and Housing decided, with the blessing of the DOE, to contract with the Hawaii Council of Churches to provide ESL training for refugees. The original contract with ORR to teach ESL to refugees in 1982 was for the sum of $100,392. English language and acculturation courses then moved from the McKinley Annex to Olivet Baptist Church on Beretania. Kim Winegar asserts that this move in administration and environment made the program more efficient and applicable to the needs of the students.

Only one year later in 1983 DSSH decided to move the employment related services program from the Department of Labor to a private sector contractor, Child and Family Service (CFS). While CFS had no history of experience with refugees, the federal government, under President Ronald Reagan, had been pushing for an increased use of the private sector as well as what has been termed "case management." Case management, as defined and funded by the federal government, was a concept of orienting the newly arrived refugee towards immediate employment in the market sector while controlling for any resettlement-related social service problems. In essence, a case management
worker was, and remains, a bilingual social service worker whose end goal is to link the refugee with employment as soon after entering the U.S. as possible. CFS appeared promising in these regards and was given the contract by DSSH over the claims by the local resettlement agencies, KPISC and CSS, that they had earned the right to and deserved the funding that CFS, a relative newcomer, was to receive. The bickering over this issue continues to this day.

City And State In The Resettlement Structure

After the first couple of years of refugee reception and resettlement, the initial enthusiasm of the city waned and the state accepted the fact that refugees were here not just to stay but to even grow, albeit slowly, in number. Little changed within this level of the resettlement process largely because the primary funding came from the federal level and those implementing the resettlement program looked to the state only as a middle-layer or unnecessary bureaucrats.

Federal money for additional resettlement and acculturation programs was constantly sought by state and local representatives and highly publicized. Governor Ariyoshi was applauded in 1980 for negotiating a $37,904 grant (largely a continuation from past grants) from ACTION to aid 23 refugee resettlement agencies here in developing an Indochinese Refugee Volunteer Program. ORR is reported
to have paid ACTION $97,060 to help in continuing these activities nationwide (DHHS, 1982, p. 11). These monies were unique in that they were specifically targeted to help agencies promote intercultural understanding between agencies and between the refugee community and the surrounding society. However, the majority of funds were used to coordinate volunteers, provide workshops, train refugees in new technologies, and make them self-sufficient; not very different from past or future funded projects originating with the federal government. The agencies involved in this specific grant included Volunteer Refugee Assistance, CSS, DOH, DSSH, HRRO, and Hawaii Council of Churches (Star-Bulletin, 7-17-1980).

The total amount of federal aid received by Hawaii in FY1980 was approximately $12.6 million for all Indochinese services and financial assistance. The people of Hawaii, as with the residents of other states, were most concerned about the degree of welfare dependence of the refugee community. About 61% of the 4,196 refugees living in Hawaii in 1980 required financial assistance of some sort (Star-Bulletin, 1-30-1980). Refugee applications to DSSH for financial assistance reportedly doubled between 1979 and 1980. This was largely due to the increased numbers and kinds of refugees entering the United States at that time. DHHS, in its Report(s) to the Congress, reported that as of April 1, 1979 Cash and Medical Assistance was being received by 2,051 refugees in Hawaii. As of April 1,
1980, a reported 3,678 were receiving Cash and Medical Assistance. The Honolulu Star-Bulletin reported on January 30, 1980 that about 4,300 refugees received federally reimbursed public assistance through DSSH in Hawaii. These numbers included all other forms of public assistance to unaccompanied minors, disabled elderly, and others. Payments to those receiving public assistance were reported to be as follows: $5,220,000 in General Assistance for 1,500 people averaging $290 each per month; $1,824,000 for 380 families receiving AFDC and averaging $400 per month; $5.4 million for health care payments; $57,600 for aged/blind refugees; and $104,400 for refugee children in foster homes (Star-Bulletin, 1-30-80).

It was also reported that Hawaii received $169,226 for 935 children participating in the Transition Program for Refugee Children (DHHS, 1981). This program provided money on a formula basis to all states for any refugee child entering a public school for the first time. This program was formally begun in 1980 but was in fact a continuation of the 1979 Indochina Refugee Children Assistance Program. Such monies are made available yearly according to the number of eligible children reported by the state.

Despite the resources provided by the federal government for resettlement, the state remained dissatisfied with the resources being provided by the federal government. In the spring of 1980, representatives from the State of Hawaii DSSH were reported as telling the
12th regional hearing of the Select Commission on Immigration on Refugee Policy in San Francisco that the federal government must give more support and money (Advertiser, 6-9-1980).

Though the Refugee Act of 1980 did make the potential for more support services and programs available, time limits were placed on federal payments for assistance to refugees and more explicit guidelines were instituted for federally funded programs. Those in the United States for three years and receiving federal aid dispensed by state level public assistance offices (DSSH in Hawaii) were to no longer be federally supported. The term "refugee," which used to mean only Indochinese, was redefined by DSSH to mean "individuals of any nationality who are designated as refugees by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization [sic]." (Star-Bulletin, 4-1-1981) Unaccompanied minors were exempt from this three year limitation. The cost of refugees living in Hawaii to federal assistance in 1981 was estimated to be about $5.4 million in cash and $3 million in Medicaid. Only about sixty people in Hawaii were dropped as a result of the new regulations (Star-Bulletin, 4-1-1981).

In 1982, federal cutbacks hit hard at all aspects of the resettlement programs. While refugees had been eligible to receive up to three years or 36 months of federal support, as of the spring of 1982 a refugee was guaranteed federally funded assistance for 18 months, after
which each person or family must meet the same requirements as non-refugees in the state of residence. If eligible, the refugee applicant would receive assistance through the state's General Assistance fund, all of which was to be reimbursed by the federal government for a second 18 months. About 3,500 refugees in Hawaii received public assistance in the first half of 1982, these new regulations dropping recipients by 40 to 50 persons per month. The Refugee Resettlement Program, under the Department of Social Services and Housing, was also affected by the cuts in federal support services, just as every other refugee resettlement program in other states. Robert Ng, coordinator for the program in 1982, was reported to have stated that the cutbacks left future funding predictions shaky, Hawaii receiving $353,000 for FY1983, only half the amount received the year previous (Star-Bulletin, 12-8-1982).

Naturally refugees entering Hawaii were not simply allowed to go on welfare and live at peace and in joy for those first months of federal subsidy. Refugees entering Hawaii first were required to check with DSSH so that state officials could ascertain whether or not public assistance was required. Employable adults were then required to check with the state Refugee Employment Program Office (REPO) under Arlie Porter, an office previously known as
the Indochinese Refugee Employment Project or IREP. There they were screened and tested and referred to appropriate employment or employment-related and job-skills programs.

The concept behind REPO had originated in 1976 and had been placed under the Office of the Governor, State Immigrant Services, until 1976. This employment-related service project was moved from State Immigrant Services to the Department of Social Services and Housing in 1978 where it stayed for approximately two years. Administration of REPO was then placed under the Department of Labor's employment services division. It attempted to train refugees to become self-sufficient and reportedly served 6,000 to 7,000 employable adult refugees between 1976 and 1982. A 1982 evaluation of REPO noted that REPO "support services priority has been placed on employment training, job placement and on English as a Second Language training as related to employment." (Sak, 1982, p. 10) Most of its clients were referred from the income maintenance unit of the State Welfare Program, REPO job developers and counselors being expected to teach the unemployable refugees the work attitudes and habits of American society.

An August 16, 1982 article in the Star-Bulletin reported that the project averaged 400 to 500 clients a month. However, as with other federally funded programs, federal cutbacks in 1982 had led to a cut in employer training and job training programs and a halving of staff. Arlie Porter, project director, was quoted as saying that
there was not enough commitment from the federal government for the numbers of refugees being brought in, in particular at the very beginning of the Reagan administration. Bemoaning the lack of a consistent English program funding or commitment to a quality resettlement organization, Porter went on to state that "this country has never gotten its head together as to whether it wants refugees." (Star-Bulletin, 8-16-1982)

Health and especially mental health was a poorly funded part of the resettlement structure. The state has received federal monies from the federal government since 1980 to cover refugee health screening and maintenance. Two health related programs for the non-English speaking immigrant were also utilized by Southeast Asian refugees. One was specifically for Indochinese, the other for immigrants in general. The Health Care for Refugees Project was set up in April 1981 through the Refugee Act of 1980. It was federally funded to the tune of $90,000 for the first year and targeted communicable diseases such as TB. As before and after, there was very little in the way of emotional or mental health support (Star-Bulletin, 8-21-1982). For immigrants there was the Bilingual Health Education Aid Program. Originally started in 1969, it was provided some federal support and in 1982 had 11 bilingual health aides, including Indochinese. Also utilized by refugees in the Kalihi-Palama area was a volunteer health clinic targeting Filipino immigrants known as the Bayanihan
Health Services clinic operating out of Catholic Immigration Service (CSS) at St. Theresa's Church on School Street (Star-Bulletin, 8-21-1982).

VIVA/HRRO

The state was a controlling influence for many refugee resettlement services, the Department of Social Services and Housing continuing to be the administrative office for handling a myriad of contracts. The major refugee contractors were: the Department of Labor, $437,000; Hawaii Refugee Resettlement Organization (originally VIVA) $181,000; Catholic Social Service, $75,000; Institute of Behavior Sciences, $60,000 (for a "short-term project"); the Kalihi-Palama Immigrant Service Center, $41,000; and the Department of Education, $38,000. An undisclosed amount of money also went to help fund the refugee unit that continued to operate within DSSH (Star-Bulletin, 8-16-1982).

Vietnamese Immigrant Volunteer Association or VIVA became VIVA II when Lao and Hmong began arriving in 1976 but remained commonly known as VIVA. The organization grew out of its offices in the Mayor’s election headquarters and moved a number of times over the next few years. Its first move was to 111 Bishop Street and by 1978 it had two paid bilingual case workers (Star-Bulletin, 5-18-1978). While a number of other resettlement-related organizations such as CSS had state-funded and ACTION workers, in 1978 VIVA
had only one full time and three part time salaried workers. These numbers were boosted by the many volunteers that continued to keep VIVA active, including many from within the refugee community itself, concerned Hawaii residents such as "Peggy and Bill" who devoted much of their waking hours to gathering donated items for refugee families to use, and the McKinny’s (Advertiser, 8-13-1978; Star-Bulletin, 5-18-1978).

In 1978 VIVA was given $5,000 by the Temple Emanuel to help the resettlement of refugees in any way they deemed fit. The money was spent on six months rent for a large, multi-bedroomed house in Kalihi to provide temporary housing for newly arrived refugees. Initially called the Aloha House it quickly became known as the Gulick House from the street it was located on. Sharon Hahn worked for VIVA as a housing director for approximately one year and lived in the Gulick House for a short while. She remembers it as being crowded, always full of refugees, children playing, women cooking, and very noisy. Not unusual seeing that small families were housed in each of the house’s six bedrooms.

Between 1978 and 1981, the number of refugees entering the U.S. from Indochina increased dramatically, leading to increased funding for VIVA and many internal changes. In 1979 VIVA was officially renamed the Hawaii Refugee Resettlement Organization. It moved its offices from a small, unassuming storefront on Ala Moana Blvd. to an
office in the Chinese Cultural Center. By 1980 it had come to be known as "the principal refugee resettlement agency in the Isles." (Star-Bulletin, 5-26-1980) The number of refugees processed by the agency jumped from 90-100 per month in January of 1979 to 150 per month in the fall due to increased admissions (Star-Bulletin, 2-22-1980). The agency retained approximately 60 tutors to help arrivals learn English, some of them salaried but the majority volunteering their time. An interview with a staff member of HRRO in May 1980 noted that the staff had become "professional" and was made up of five Vietnamese, five Lao and one Hmong case worker (Star-Bulletin, 5-26-1980). To maintain connection with the community, HRRO had even become sponsor of the Vietnamese unit of the Aloha Council of the Boy Scouts of America started by Hui Ly, Troop 67.

The "professionalization" of VIVA/HRRO was largely due to Mary Ho, the most well known of HRRO's Executive Directors. It was this same professionalization that led to the organization somehow change from a volunteer oriented, community-based refugee assistance organization to a more bureaucratized social-services agency in competition with other mainstream service providers. Some staff members liked this change but others have mentioned that the "family-like atmosphere- that surrounded the administration of Minjo McKinny was a real loss when VIVA became HRRO.
In October of 1981 HRRO came to have an annual budget of $676,000 with 28 persons employed full and part time (Star-Bulletin, 10-30-1981). Affiliated with Aloha United Way (though never receiving direct funding from AUW), recipient of a number of small grants for English language and other acculturation-related programs, and its longstanding relationship with ACNS led HRRO to be viewed with much more respect in the community.

Mary Ho left HRRO at the end of 1981 after two years of being its Executive Director. The new director, Jean Whiles, was also controversial but proved to be a strong advocate of HRRO as a refugee service provider. Interviewed in August 1982, she was quoted by the Star-Bulletin as believing that HRRO "is the key link between most refugees and the community. It meets new arrivals at the airport, sets up in temporary housing, provides furnishings, food and food allowances, and puts them in touch with other resource agencies. It registers them for Social Security, enrolls them in English language classes, provides them with emergency medical care and begins the groundwork for finding jobs." (Star-Bulletin, 8-16-1982) Frank Chong, HRRO board chairman, said that HRRO had changed from being a resettlement agency to a social services agency. The funds HRRO operated on came primarily from ACNS (through contracts with the State Department) and DSSH (through contracts with the Office of Refugee Resettlement).
Unfortunately Jean Whiles and Frank Chong were also unwilling to share control of or accept criticism of the agency. While they were willing to discuss the agency in general with newspaper reporters, they refused to discuss more intimate matters that had recently come up for criticism and did not allow the staff to be interviewed on problems HRRO was having with ongoing programs. Wayne McKinny, founder of VIVA and on the board of directors of HRRO until his resignation in the spring of 1982, was a harsh critic of what VIVA had become. He was quoted as saying that too much money was being wasted on HRRO administration and overhead while too little of it was going to help the refugees (Star-Bulletin, 8-16-1982). One small but significant light on the direction HRRO had taken was made evident in an interview with Scoutmaster of the Vietnamese Scout Troop 67 HRRO was sponsoring. Hui Ly noted that a new and more active sponsor was needed for the troop because HRRO just didn’t have the time or manpower (Star-Bulletin, 8-23-1982).

HRRO continued to try to diversify and become a part of the mainstream social service sector. It continued in its attempt to become funded by Aloha United Way and hoped to expand its services to include bilingual staff and volunteers for not only those refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea, but from Afghanistan and Ethiopia as well (Star-Bulletin/Advertiser, 10-24-1982). Such hopes were never realized. Refugee resettlement funds and
expectations were drastically cut back due to federal withdrawal from support of services and the continuation of a low admissions ceiling for refugees (64,000 for FY1983). HRRO admitted that it would have to start refocusing its programs to concentrate on job development and placement, areas most concerned with by the federal and local government. That is, employment related rather than social service oriented programs would be emphasized, self sufficiency being the key for defining successful resettlement as well as to receiving future government funding (Star-Bulletin, 12-8-1982).

There were many other hopes by the staff and administration of HRRO, such as working with the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta to research the long term effects of Agent Orange, but none ever saw fruition. In the winter of 1983, the Executive Director of the American Council for Nationalities Service was summoned to Hawaii to resolve internal feuding between HRRO board members. Half of the BOD had attempted fire the Executive Director, Jean Whiles, and replace her with another more favored person. The other half of the board had not been notified of the action and threatened a lawsuit. A review of declining refugee clients, HRRO program and fiscal records, and ongoing internal problems led to ACNS supporting a vote by the BOD to dissolve HRRO immediately. The Executive Director of ACNS flew back to New York with a check for $300,000 in un-used resettlement funds and HRRO activities
were transferred to KPISC through mutual agreement. KPISC quickly applied to ACNS as a local affiliate and was accepted.

CSS

Catholic Social Service was only peripherally involved in the resettling of refugees, many other facets of human life concerning the local diocese. CSS remained, however, one of the two resettlement agencies in the islands, declining and growing with the size of the refugee population needing to be resettled in the islands. The budget for refugee resettlement in 1978 was only $30,000, less than half of what it had to work with in 1976, but services were maintained with the help of two state funded job developers and two ACTION (Indochinese volunteers with limited stipends) workers (Advertiser, 8-13-1978).

By 1982, CSS had resettled over 2,000 Indochinese refugees through its affiliation with US Catholic Conference. Resettlement staff consisted of an immigrant program coordinator, two bilingual social workers (including Sengdao Rattanasamay) four case workers (two Vietnamese and two Lao), and a job developer. With an average caseload of 60 per month, the primary programs within the resettlement program consisted of 1) resettlement, 2) support services, and 3) social services. As a general rule, after 3 to 6 months in Hawaii, the refugee was questioned and, if needed, referred to the
support services program providing outreach and information and referral. Any crisis or long-term personal problem was taken care of by a social worker attached to the social services program (Star-Bulletin, 8-16-1982).

The immigrant portion of CSS was not formally divided into a separate section until January 1980 when Sister Grace Dorothy Lim moved what was known as the Catholic Immigrant Project to a building behind St. Theresa’s Church on school street. While its refugee program remained housed within CSS until a few years later, this special program for primarily Filipino immigrants was "funded by the Catholic Diocese, the Maryknoll Fathers and private donations." (Star-Bulletin, 8-17-1982) This sector of CSS also housed the Bayanihan Health Services clinic, a volunteer program that offered free medical treatment for refugees and immigrants. Most of the clients were Filipino and, in 1982, was staffed by 31 doctors who volunteered their time and services.

Other Services

After the initial year of resettlement activity, a large variety of refugee social services were made available to refugees and resettlement agencies in Hawaii. Many arose within a pre-existing organizational structure, providing services or assistance as an addition to other activities that had little to do with the refugees. For example, in 1979 the Hawaii Council of Churches (HCC)
organized the Volunteer Refugee Assistance Program, wherein representatives of various agencies came together to help in the resettlement process and to act as a support agency to other existing agencies. Comprised of 150 member churches, HCC was able to use private sector resources to strengthen publicly funded services for refugees. Emmett Cahill, acting coordinator of the Volunteer Refugee Assistance Program, noted that duplication of services would be cut and that the state should have organized such a service four years before. The VRA also became known for setting up the Refugee Supply Center at the National Guard's Fort Ruger (Advertiser, 2-2-1980; Star-Bulletin, 7-18-1979).

There is a much longer story to this refugee supply center, an activity and place made up largely of one woman and her husband, "Peggy and Bill." These two had organized the collection of donated articles for immigrant and refugee use to such a fine degree that a large warehouse was required for storage. While primarily connected with VIVA from 1975, this collection effort later involved a number of other organizations including the Hawaii Council of Churches, Church of the Crossroads, and Volunteer Information and Referral Service.

In 1980 the Refugees of Indochina Culture Education (RICE) program came into being. Directed by Bruce Bliatout, it offered no direct services but trained para-professionals to work with Indochinese in mental health
counseling and familiarize community leaders and social service agencies with the psychocultural background of Hawaii's Indochinese residents. Funding was provided by federal funds as funneled through DSSH (Star-Bulletin, 5-26-80; Star-Bulletin and Advertiser, 8-2-1981). Operating through the Institute of Behavioral Science and located on Ward Avenue, RICE provided mental health services for members of the refugee population. In a resource guide for refugee women's program development, the Center for Applied Linguistics in 1981 described RICE as follows:

Southeast Asian paraprofessionals are trained under this program to bring together refugee clients and mental health professionals. They work in the Lao, Hmong, and Vietnamese refugee communities in Hawaii. Their functions include serving as cross-cultural communicators and aides in recognizing and alleviating mental health programs.

(Center for Applied Linguistics, 1981, p. 28)

Entirely federally funded, RICE received $65,900 in 1979, $27,465 in 1980, and $34,017 in 1982 (DSSH, Report to Congress). Funding for RICE was not continued after this time.

The Kalihi-Palama Immigrant Service Center remained committed to immigrant and refugee services and was successful at pulling in federal money for refugee related activities. The agency received $17,800 in 1979 for information and referral, social adjustment, housing related problems, and translation/interpretation services for a contracted minimum of 1,000 clients. In 1980 this
amount rose to $20,219 for servicing 700 refugees, and in 1981 $21,625 for more intensive resettlement services to only 175 refugees.

Active participation in the resettlement process during this time probably helped enormously when the agency applied to become the ACNS affiliate after the dissolving of HRRO. Bettye Jo Harris, Executive Director of KPISC at that time, remembers that Wes Kline of ACNS worried about the agency’s link with the Episcopal Church. Formal affiliation with ACNS began in 1983 and continues to the present.

A little heard of program was run by the Leeward Young Women’s Christian Association, receiving federal funds from ORR to provide social adjustment and interpreter services for a minimum of 60 refugee youth. Funding only lasted for 1980 and 1981 and was for less than $10,000 each year, but this organization’s participation in the resettlement process emphasizes the diversity of the service providers and the range that federal monies reached in Hawaii.

Immigrant concerns remained a predominant concern of most social service agencies working with non-residents, including the Immigrant Youth Program, Susannah Wesley Community Center, and the Chinese Counseling Clinic. Refugees were indirectly brought into the services at times, but most services did not come into being solely out of the needs of the refugees. The Interagency Council for Immigrant Services (IAC) falls into this category as well.
In 1982 the IAC was comprised of more than four dozen member agencies that together coordinated immigrant services as well as acted as an advocate for immigrant rights (Star-Bulletin, 8-17-1982). Meeting once a month at the Susannah Wesley Community Center, this organization did not receive any funding for its activities.

Other, less centrally organized activities also made up the many services made available to the refugee community. One such activity was when the Friends organized the selling of pieces of Hmong embroidery in order for Hmong women in Hawaii to be able to earn a little money of their own (Advertiser, 10-24-1979). Sometimes private individuals attempted to help the refugees in ways that more mainstream service providers had serious doubts about, such as when the Refugee Rescue Council of Hawaii tried to raise funds to buy a ship and go rescue refugees stranded off of the Malaysian coast in 1979 (Advertiser, 6-23-1979). This latter effort failed before the ship was even bought, but the many other acts of good will acted out as individuals or small-groups were what provided the real basis for refugee resettlement in Hawaii.

Ethnic Organizations

The Southeast Asian ethnic community was also very active in helping its own people settle in Hawaii. Some community members became leaders either out of their education, their English language ability, their status in
their homeland, or their real concern for the need of an organized community to meet the needs of their people, but most of the "community leaders" that came forward had a mix of all of these. Many worked not only as volunteer leaders for their people but also worked within the social service sector for a paycheck. Sengdao Rattanasamay, a well known advocate for the local Lao community even today, worked for Catholic Social Service and now works for Catholic Immigration Center. Bruce Bliatout, president of the Hmong Association of Hawaii and one-time East-West Center grantee, was also director of Refugees of Indochina Culture Education (RICE).

Most ethnic organizations, also known as self-help organizations or mutual assistance associations, originated within and around very real ethnic community needs and desires. The Vietnamese Buddhist Association in Aina Haina or the Lao University of Hawaii Students Association are good examples. Many of the MAAs in Hawaii have a history of political activity and factionalism. The previously mentioned Vietnamese Amity Society of Hawaii, formed in 1975, and the organization known as Free Vietnam are examples of this sort. Some of these organizations are given a detailed examination in a later chapter.

Discussion

In this first chapter of two chapters concerning the resettlement of refugees in Hawaii, the role of government,
local authorities, private-sector resettlement agencies, and a multitude of other social service organizations has been examined on a local level. While the previous chapter examined the federal policies and regulations that have come to influence the general life chances of refugees entering the U.S., this chapter has provided details of how such policy is implemented in a specific community. The levels of refugee policy implementation in Hawaii parallel all other parts of the nation and include VOLAG affiliates, City of Honolulu and State of Hawaii social service agencies, private sector social service agencies, efforts by the local community, and the participation of the refugee community. While federal resettlement policy appears clear and simple on paper, its implementation on the local level, is shown to be very complex and far from linear in its effects.

The most obvious factor in the entire resettlement process is that the federal government controls both allocative and authoritative resources, providing the capital for resettlement services, conceptualizing and defining the people and activities required for resettlement to take place, and yet remaining far enough in the background to allow a large degree of decentralization to take place. It appears that while federal policy was a determining factor, local implementation of federal policy allowed for a wide degree of variation.
An example of why this variation was allowed is provided by the uncertain funding of resettlement services by the government until the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980. Monetary support had been grudging and noncommittal from year to year. Services provided by state agencies and local resettlement agencies in Hawaii note 1978 as an especially bad year, Congress battling the administration for a clearer and more long-range resettlement structure. Even after 1980 funding was not to be taken for granted, changes in 1982 leading to cuts in cash and medical assistance for refugees as well as development of new programs to service government priorities.

A centralized policy setting structure existed in Washington, D.C., but local (Honolulu) interpretation of policy allowed leeway in how policy was to be implemented. Allocative and authoritative resources were set by the federal government and changed only through intensive lobbying by the individual states or VOLAGs. Authoritative resources allowed the government to define people, objectives, and goals as the situation allowed: political in content but with strong economic implications. Changes in administration, the economy, and the world system overall (such as public reaction to Vietnamese aggression in Cambodia) allowed the President, among others, to alter priorities and practice. Merely defining those escaping from Vietnam in 1975 as refugees rather than as special
immigrants spoke of the relationship between the U.S. and Vietnam's communist government while allowing special resources to be spent on Vietnamese asylum seekers.

Children are another example of the way that centralized control over authoritative resources influenced local resettlement of refugees. Children were not at first seen by the federal government as requiring special resources but arguments from school districts and governors led the government to redefine even Vietnamese school-children as in need of special services, treatment, and money. In accordance with revised requirements for resettlement services, ESL courses became mandatory for refugees dependent on public assistance in 1978 and such courses started emphasizing employment-linked vocabulary and usage. In 1982, while funds were cut simply out of a cost-cutting attempt based on the administration's general dislike of public assistance of any kind, there was a strong emphasis on employment-related programs, moving programs into the private sector, and physically relocating refugees to areas with greater employment prospects. Money or allocative resources funded special programs but only after definitions and conceptualizations concerning American values and accepted acculturation patterns were altered or made appropriate for such funding. That is, federally controlled authoritative resources continued to define the boundaries for who was to be resettled in what manner.
Local implementation of federal programs and priorities concerning refugee resettlement altered only in form the intent of the overall process. In Hawaii, federal monies were sought by all levels involved in resettlement, control of the money providing power through associated control of the authoritative nature of each project. Some agencies, such as VIVA, were initially community-based and largely voluntary, allowing the implementation of decisions made in Washington, D.C. to impact as positively as possible on the refugees themselves. Other agencies, such as the Refugee Employment Project under the Governor’s office, were also surprisingly flexible in their ability to funnel funds into employment-related activities while being culturally sensitive and aware of the needs of the target population.

The model of commodification of human resources used as a probing instrument for analysis of this data is found useful. In an attempt to efficiently acculturate incoming refugees, the nation-state manipulates definition of, access to, and control over specially designated resources. These resources exist only due to intervention by the nation-state and, while implementation of the resettlement process is done on a local level, goals to be obtained from delivery of these resources remain controlled by the nation-state as well.

The information provided in this chapter provides the hypothesis of this dissertation more secure ground to be
worked with as well. While the previous chapter noted the interest of the federal government in using refugee community groups as implementors of policy, it is in this fourth chapter that there is detailed evidence of refugee groups participating in resettlement activities. However, up to the period of time covered in this chapter, MAA involvement remains informal in Hawaii and without direct consequence to resettlement objectives. Refugees as individuals were brought into the process, acting as precursors for what is hypothesized to occur in later years. Unfortunately, refugees were themselves brought into the resettlement process only as low-paid consultants and linguists, compliant door-keepers for American policy experts. While helping to resettle very needy compatriots from their home country, such gatekeepers made the commodification process into a workable and benign model for acculturation.

Analysis of information provided thus far sees the nation-state as a change agent, providing resources for politically created and expedient groups to enter into the American mainstream. Implementation of the resettlement process was done locally and on this local level changes were demanded that only rarely altered the general structure of resettlement or the system of future policy development. The refugee community was recognized as an important level for policy implementation to occur, thus recognizing newly formed communities and their various
organizations as resources in their own right to be used for state resettlement aims. It is necessary to review the decade of the 1980s in detail in order to determine the extent to which the federal government actually carried out this form of community involvement. The following chapter again uses the State of Hawaii as the locale for implementation of federal resettlement policy with special emphasis being given to the development of resettlement organizations and agencies on all levels of the private and public sector.
Endnotes For Chapter IV

1. The facts change with who is telling the story and when it is told. An interview by the Star-Bulletin in May of 1980 with Wayne McKinny noted also that the first Indochinese refugees began arriving a few weeks before the fall of Saigon. However, McKinny stated that "96 Vietnamese employees of American Express and others associated with Americans fled Saigon, fearing its demise, and landed in Honolulu "without papers, without toothbrushes and without anything."" An interview with MinJo McKinny in 1989 found her saying that 99 Vietnamese had entered Hawaii but had arrived on a Pan Am flight.

2. It is interesting that the Cambodian Navy contributed significantly to the movement of Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees to Subic Bay in April and May of 1975. While during the early days evacuation was carried out by airlift, later "refugees were to arrive by ships including United States Naval Vessels, Military Sealift Command Ships and former South Vietnamese and Cambodian Naval Vessels." (Photographic Diary of Southeast Asian Refugee Operations on Grande Island, Subic Bay titled Xin Chu-Y, Xin Chu-Y. Published by the United States Naval Station, Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines. 1975.) Movement was both to Guam and the United States, probably depending on the presence or lack of sponsors and relatives in the U.S.

3. The U.S. Interagency Task Force had intended to maintain family integrity by resettling refugee families as a group. However, many of the families included up to four generations and numbered close to 20 people. Due to these kinds of logistical problems resettlement officials attempted to keep families together in the same community but with a number of different sponsors and possibly different living units (Honolulu Star-Bulletin, May 10, 1975).
This concern for the family is repeated in another way by a U.S. Naval document published concerning the relatively short, two month, stay of Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees in Subic Bay, the Philippines. "The basic policy of the camp was "First In, First Out", with two exceptions. One was that family units would not be divided and the other provided that the refugees could remain in the camp if they desired in order to rest or to attempt to locate relative or friends." (unnumbered section titled "Departure," in the document Xin Chu-Y, Xin Chu Y: Southeast Asian Refugee Operations On Grande Island, Subic Bay, published by the United States Naval Station, Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines, 1975.)

4. VIVA's officers were as follows: President--Dr. Wayne McKinny, chief pediatric resident at Children's Hospital; Vice Pres.--Joel L. Irwin, an advertising executive; Secretary/Treasurer--Wilma Henley. The BOD was made up of Sister Maureen, administrator of St. Francis Hospital; Baron Goto, vice chancellor emeritus of the EW Center; Stan Sagert, president of Hawaii Baptist Academy; Captain Raymond L. Peacock of the Salvation Army; William B. Say, president of Glorie Del Lutheran Church; and Mrs. June Grover, a native Vietnamese resident of Hawaii (Advertiser, 5-20-1975; Star-Bulletin, 5-23-1975)

5. Room 211 at 1145 Bishop St.

6. As of June 18, 1975 there were a reported 455 refugees in Hawaii, most of whom had relatives as sponsors (Advertiser, 6-18-1975).

7. Secondary migration is an important factor in determining the number and stability of the immigrant or refugee population in any specific area in the United States, Hawaii included. Data from the federal government shows that out-migration was far greater than in-migration in the late nineteen-seventies and early nineteen-eighties. The entire Hmong population of Hawaii, for example, moved to California in 1982 and 1983. However, recent data provided by DHHS is probably wrong when it shows a larger number of out-migrants than in-migrants. The inability to track secondary migrants makes such centralized data collection questionable.
8. Reports on the number of refugees entering the United States or even just a single state such as Hawaii vary according to information source and other factors. The following two tables show federal and state aggregate totals for Southeast Asian refugees entering the State of Hawaii.

SOUTHEAST ASIAN REFUGEES
ENTERING THE STATE OF HAWAII
Excluding Secondary Migration
(Source: DHHS Report(s) to Congress)

<table>
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<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
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<td>1,649</td>
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<td>1988</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
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Resident population September 30, 1989: 8,000
State of Hawaii Department of Health
Office of Refugee and Immigrant Health

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<td>296</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
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</table>
9. A 1983 DHHS report noted that Hawaii's General Assistance program was "open-ended" and had a caseload of 5,444 monthly average cases. Such cases were limited to "U.S. citizens, permanent residents, lawful aliens and refugees." (p. 92) Standards of assistance and payment were the same as AFDC, individuals being allowed a maximum of $297 and a family of 4 being allowed a maximum of $546. Administered by the State of Hawaii's Public Welfare Division of the Department of Social Services and Housing, such assistance commonly provided cash maintenance and medical support to those not eligible for AFDC or SSI.

10. Large, old buildings that varied with time and place would be a better description. For a year or two in unused dormitories by Leahi Hospital, then to Building 31 at Fort Ruger, and finally to Building 18 on Diamond Head Road. This last building was emptied by Volunteer Information and Referral Service in an attempt to centralize the collection of goods and articles for use by all the needy people of Hawaii. That is, VIRS was successful at obtaining control of a politically powerful resource based on the throwaways of one group and the urgent needs of another.
Chapter V
THE PRESENT RESETTLEMENT STRUCTURE IN HAWAII
(1982 - 1991)

The prior chapter noted that the most consequential of federal refugee resettlement legislation concerned refugee public assistance and local reception and placement functions. Federal resettlement agencies as well as most state governments were very concerned about the quality of the resettlement process, in particular that related to refugee employment and self sufficiency. Due to the large increase of incoming refugees with little or no education, a general increase in the overall numbers entering the U.S. since 1978, and the impact of a recessionary economy, an increasing percentage of Southeast Asian refugees in the U.S. were dependent on public assistance for survival. Politicians and resettlement workers of all levels acted out of fears of public backlash against welfare-dependent refugees, increased strain on tight government coffers, and a large group of relatively innocent but ill-prepared refugees languishing in a culture and society they do not understand. While culture and tradition were at least given cursory respect, most came to agree that self-sufficiency by way of immediate employment was the best way to integrate refugees into American society.
This chapter expands on these political and social developments with special attention being given to the development of an active resettlement structure in the State of Hawaii during the 1980s. The year 1982 was a critical turning point in refugee reception and placement in the United States. Just as the 1980 Refugee Act spoke of the formal duty the federal government felt towards the politically displaced, so, too, did laws passed and implemented on the federal level start to delimit the federal share of resource allocation while strengthening the degree of federal control or resource authorization in the resettlement process. The federal government increasingly shifted responsibility for the structuring of resettlement policy to state and local coordinators. During the same period of time many states, Hawaii in particular, made implementation of the resettlement process a resource available to the private sector. Such responsibilities involving locally designed resettlement structures were based on carrying-out the increasingly ill-funded refugee policy and resettlement criteria of federal authority.

The hypothesis that has spurred-on this dissertation concerns the influence of State policy in refugee community development. While Chapter Four provided evidence of national as well as local Hawaii incorporation of refugee community resources in the resettlement process, community alteration could not be pointed to. In this chapter the
resettlement structure developing within the State of Hawaii over the last decade is shown to provide more conclusive evidence of local autonomy in the resettlement process but with an increasing impact on the refugee community as well.

Federal Policy Development

Congress established the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP) in 1978 and while having some influence in the development of the 1980 Refugee Act, the commission's 1981 final report greatly influenced later changes in federal improvements in reception and placement policy. However, while the report recommended specific services and financial aid packages to improve the resettlement process, the Reagan administration simplified the problem to that of being too many refugees receiving too much money in too many places. Executive branch initiative led to a restriction of admission flows, a reduction of cash and medical assistance, and state and local involvement considered in terms of financial rather than advisory terms. "Federal funding was reduced for social services, job training, housing, education, and public welfare." (Zucker, 1983, p. 181) A key element of changing resettlement strategy was to de-emphasize acculturation and preparation programs for refugees and to instead force them into becoming self sufficient as soon as possible.
In an attempt to force state and local governments to help these refugees become self sufficient, the federal government altered the rules for availability of refugee cash assistance (RCA) and refugee medical assistance (RMA). Beginning April 1, 1982, RCA and RMA, previously available for 36 months and 100% subsidized by the federal government, was cut to 18 months. After this period of time, the refugee in question was required to apply and be eligible for general assistance (GA) under the guidelines of the particular state of residency. If the refugee was found to be eligible, the federal government reimbursed the state for all costs up to 18 months. After that period of time, a maximum of 36 months, the refugee was the responsibility of the state and local governments.

In a further attempt to oversee the implementation of federal resettlement policy and philosophy, the Bureau for Refugee Programs created what was called the Office of Reception and Placement in 1982. This office was specifically created to review the reception and placement activities of resettlement agencies at key sites across the nation. These sites included Boston, Seattle, Los Angeles, New York, and Houston. To insure proper resettlement, reception, and placement of the refugees, and supposedly increase the probability of early self sufficiency (employment), more responsibilities were required of resettlement agencies. It was the job of the Office of
Reception and Placement to study the effect of these changes and recommend changes on both the federal and local levels.

New requirements of the cooperative agreements designating core services signed by the voluntary resettlement agencies emphasized longer terms of responsibility for the refugees, particularly in the areas of "monitoring, early employment, and self sufficiency." (DHHS, 1984, p. 4) The modified agreements required a more detailed description of the agency's reception and placement philosophy and projections for possible refugee placements for each state. Shorter lag times between reviews of resettlement claims and financial data were also instituted.

State administration of refugee resettlement was considered an important cornerstone of the entire resettlement process but was also recognized as not meeting federal expectations. To better understand this level of the resettlement structure, a study was funded by ORR in 1981 on resettlement patterns and problems in nine states. Many factors were found to influence the scope and quality of refugee resettlement, including the changing American social and economic context, structural placement of the resettlement program within the state's administrative body, program design and coordination, and evaluation and follow-up systems.
While too descriptive to be taken as a document for change, the study concluded that states felt a lack of control over refugee matters that directly influence them. They were reported to "complain about their lack of involvement in refugee placement decisions, about shifts in federal funding allocations for refugee social services, about delays in quarterly funding flow to the states, and about changes in federal regulations about refugee eligibility for cash assistance programs." (DHHS, 1982, p. 153) Similar charges were made in the 1981 SCIRP report with recommendations for increased state involvement in resettlement policy formation. Hawaii being no exception, such localized complaints have influenced federal policy over the last ten years but remain secondary to the philosophy of the executive branch, the foreign policy of the State Department, and the budgetary concerns of Congress.

The 1981 study found that the various states utilized a wide selection of service providers, including the voluntary resettlement agencies, private sector agencies, ethnic community groups, and educational institutions. It was reported that with the decrease in federal support for social service programs and cash/medical assistance, there was an increase in the use of single-purpose contracts due to a perceived ease in accountability and administration from such a change.
The link between the state (refugee coordinator's office) and local VOLAG affiliates was considered crucial to effective resource management and program implementation. With the use of single-purpose contracts came the POS or purchase-of-service contracts with specific resettlement or social service agencies to provide services to the refugee community.

However, there is a contradiction at work here, funds for service provision being the catalyst that turns the needs of one group into a resource for another. It was noted in the ORR funded study that the "relationship between voluntary resettlement agencies and state refugee program offices is perhaps one of the most delicate but critical factors in the coordination of the refugee resettlement programs. Inherent tensions between the state and voluntary agencies arise from the structure of the national program in which resettlement agencies are responsible for initial reception and placement of refugees and sometimes rely on the state-administered refugee social services resources for carrying out some of these functions." (DHHS, 1982, p. 117) That is, refugee resettlement is not a profitable business and the only way to make a payroll and keep the agency alive is through contracts with states for their largely federally funded resettlement programs. The study emphasizes coordination of services but does not dwell on the growing tension
between refugee service providers for such scarce resources. Such tension is an important part of Hawaii’s resettlement and service provision history.

Changes In Hawaii Service Provision

In 1983 services for immigrants and refugees in the United States included resettlement, acculturation, ESL, education, employment, and, as necessary, public cash and medical assistance programs. Immigrant services remained largely dependent on state or local funding and community support systems. Most of the refugee resettlement social service and acculturation programs were federally supported but locally implemented, each state and locale differing in just how federal policy was to be carried-out and perhaps supplemented with local funds and initiative.

Immigrant services had been recognized by the 1983 Hawaii State Legislature as being critical in the acculturation of the rising number of immigrants coming to Hawaii. The 1983--1985 budget included funds for the Susannah Wesley Community Center (SWCC) and the Kalihi-Palama Immigrant Service Center (KPISC) to work together in coordinating immigrant services for metropolitan Honolulu and outlying areas, each being given a geographic section of Oahu to concentrate services within. State funding for a variety of immigrant services has been steady since that time, though philosophy and area of emphasis for such funding has varied across the years.
Services for refugees in Hawaii in 1983 were mandated and thus funded by the federal government. Some community action groups, ethnic community organizations, and parallel services that refugees were given access to did not depend on federal funds but the formal programs that made up refugee resettlement and integration services were entirely the result of federal policy and funds. Medical screening and health services have been provided through federal funds, as have ESL courses, job skills training, case management, and acculturation services.

Since 1983 Kalihi-Palama Immigrant Service Center and Catholic Immigration Center have remained the two resettlement agencies in Hawaii, receiving and placing incoming refugees with monies provided by the Department of State and indirectly supported by state and foundation funds. Federally funded (and mandated for those receiving public assistance) ESL\(^1\) courses for newly arrived refugees in 1983 was provided by Job Preparation Language Program (JPLP) under the Hawaii Council of Churches. Case Management services and employment counseling was contracted-out to a relative newcomer to refugee services, Child and Family Services.

The State of Hawaii Department of Social Services and Housing (DSSH) administered all such funding through its Refugee Resettlement Program, the Director of DSSH acting as the State Refugee Coordinator. The Governor's Office remained a branch of state government that oversaw such
programs as the Progressive Neighborhoods Program, the Hawaii Office of Economic Opportunity, and the State Immigrant Services Center. Such programs continued to have some contact with and control of ESL and employment related programs for refugees, but money to support such refugee programs was federal in origin with policy definition and administration being tightly controlled by DSSH.

The 1984 Hawaii State Plan noted that English language deficiencies and cultural differences were the most severe of the problems encountered by incoming refugees. These problems were said to impose "major barriers to achieving better health status and socio-economic well-being in terms of employment, housing, education and formal assistance." (State of Hawaii, 1984, p. 159) The goal of federally funded DSSH refugee programs was noted in the state plan when it referred to the 1983 DSSH Refugee Resettlement Program Service Plan: "The goal of this program is to assist refugees to "achieve economic self-sufficiency and successful resettlement" through "gainful employment in non-subsidized jobs, and the independent use of existing community resources to meet basic needs."" (as quoted in the Hawaii State Plan, State of Hawaii, 1984, p. 177) The federal emphasis on employment as the means to end acculturation and resettlement problems had thus been taken on by the state in its implementation of federal policy.
State implementation of federal resettlement guidelines and administration of federal refugee resettlement/acculturation funds was drastically altered in 1985 with the creation of the Office of Community Services. As early as 1983, with the awarding of case management funds to Child and Family Services (CFS) instead of one of the existing resettlement agencies, the Department of Social Services and Housing had been criticized for its administration of programs and handling of refugee related funds. In 1984 criticism of its "autocratic" style, single individuals in DSSH often being pointed out in interviews with people participating in programs at that time, had grown to such a fervor that it was considered necessary to change the way the state was handling refugee resettlement funds and programs. Existing criticism of immigrant service programs, the lack of coordination between refugee and immigrant service centers, and the apparent overlapping of services for each of these two populations, led to a creative redesigning of the administrative level for such programs.²

A bill was introduced in the state legislature that created a new agency under the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations within which all immigrant and refugee related service activities were to be placed. Act 305, SLH 1985, as passed by the 1985 Legislature, created what was
called the Office of Community Services (OCS) and moved relevant social service, immigrant, and refugee programs from other state offices to this one central office. This legislative action required the merging of four of the most active social service programs that related to immigrant and refugee services: The Progressive Neighborhoods Program; the Hawaii Office of Economic Opportunity; the State Immigrant Services Center; and the Refugee Resettlement Program (State of Hawaii, DLIR, 1985). Instead of DSSH administering the allocation of money for DLIR employment related programs, the DLIR/OCS administered the sub-contracting of federal funds for special refugee programs while, through a special cooperative agreement with DSSH, reimbursed State of Hawaii spending on refugee cash and medical assistance services.

OCS was not to provide services but was to administer, oversee, and evaluate the funds and programs provided by both the state legislature and the federal government for immigrants and refugees living in the State of Hawaii. "The primary purposes of the new office are to facilitate and enhance the development, delivery, and coordination of effective programs for those in need and to provide advice and assistance to the agencies of the executive branch, other private agencies in the human services field, and the legislature." (State of Hawaii, DLIR, 1985, p. 258) OCS was then to administer available funds while at the same time working with service provision agencies, in
coordination with other levels of the state and federal governments, to improve service delivery with community needs in mind. One of the possible reasons for the placement of such an office within the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations was to maintain an emphasis on the employment-related aspect of all such acculturation and social service programs. Employment remained the primary operating philosophy of all following policy for the integration of immigrants and refugees into the Hawaii social mainstream.

In compliance with federal requirements the State of Hawaii was to write and submit a yearly refugee resettlement plan. OCS became responsible for yearly revisions and implementation of the state resettlement plan, the refugee program specialist under the Executive Director of OCS being required to oversee both initial resettlement and ongoing social service delivery for recent arrivals. Due to the small size of the state and the fact that the majority of refugees had been settled in the Honolulu area, the State of Hawaii received a waiver from the required Quarterly Consultations on Pre-Arrival Placement. The monthly availability of information on incoming refugees and the ease with which the refugee specialist in OCS was able to meet with the directors of resettlement and social service coordinators were also factors in this decision.
Once or more times per year refugee forums have been held in Honolulu with OCS providing information on past and future resettlement trends for Hawaii. Funding for the upcoming fiscal year, progress of ongoing programs, networking with other service providers, and information on incoming refugees has been the core of these forums. "Primary coordination efforts will involve meetings of the Refugee forum which will meet on an as-needed basis, ongoing contracts, linkages and working sessions with providers and community service agencies, the provision of technical assistance, and the dissemination of information on the international, national, state and local refugee programs." (State of Hawaii, DLIR, 1988, p. 5) Thus, the State of Hawaii, specifically OCS since 1985, has been the connecting link between refugee service providers, state agencies, and federal policy makers. Even the links between local affiliates and their national VOLAGs are given close attention by OCS. Though not the final authority in refugee resettlement, this office is a critical voice in the shaping of on-going service provision and program development in the area of refugee resettlement for the State of Hawaii.

As previously noted, OCS was not to be nor has been a service provider. Refugee service providers implement state and federal contracts for refugee and immigrant service provision through OCS. State of Hawaii Purchase of Service contracts with non-profit refugee service provider
agencies are the primary means of determining what is to be funded and how administration of funds is to take place. There is also a special cooperative agreement with the Department of Human Services or DHS (formerly Department of Social Services and Housing) to provide cash assistance, medical assistance, and certain social services for refugees. The 1988 Hawaii State Refugee Profile stated the relationship between the two departments as follows:

"OCS is responsible for the overall administration of the refugee program. It entered into an interagency agreement with DHS whereby DHS will continue to provide cash and medical assistance (CMA), services to Unaccompanied Minors, and Title XX-type services to refugees. However, DHS is only seeking reimbursement from ORR, through OCS, for CMA."

With a strong emphasis on the employment of welfare-dependent refugees, there has also developed a strong link between DHS and the Refugee Employment and Social Assistance Program of CFS. This relationship between the two agencies, one a state department and the other a private sector service provider, has provided both a policing of the refugee community as well as a means by which referrals for immediate needs of clients can be done quickly and with easy follow-up. The Department of Health and Department of Education also work closely with OCS in the provision of medical screening, health program provision, and education programs for the refugee community.
Fiscal Year 1986 (July 1985 through the end of June 1986) saw OCS administering more than seven million dollars worth of grants and purchase of service contracts to private non-profit and other public agencies. The single largest program for refugees was that overseen by DSSH for cash and medical assistance, that being $1,700,880. Child and Family Services was second in terms of federal funds for refugee services, receiving $523,594 for an employment related program (RTAP-II) and $282,000 for case management, job development, and job placement services for refugees (State of Hawaii, DLIR, 1985, p. 32).

Catholic Charities And CIC

While the arguments for the removal of immigrant and refugee social services from DSSH were being developed in 1984, Catholic Social Services was undergoing drastic changes of its own. CSS was completely restructured, leading to the dismantlement of some programs and the merging of others. This reorganization led to the changing of Catholic Social Services into what is now known as Catholic Charities. Though the actual reorganization required many months of planning, in February 1985 Catholic Social Services was internally reorganized into three separate affiliate agencies of Catholic Charities: (1) Catholic Services to the Elderly; (2) Catholic Services to Families; and (3) Catholic Immigration Center.
The Catholic Immigration Project, as funded by the local Catholic Diocese, was a small part of CSS and had become a formal immigrant services organization in 1980, located behind St. Theresa’s Church on School Street. The reorganization maintained refugee resettlement activities as coordinated with the U.S. Catholic Conference, but such duties were moved both physically and administratively to the School Street office in 1985. Together they were formally known as the Catholic Immigration Center (CIC). Operation Aloha continued to resettle and administer to the needs of the refugee population and Catholic Immigrant Services had its own agenda for the needs of the immigrant community. Together forming the core of what was CIC, they continue to have an impressive impact in the local social services arena.

The Birth Of MAAC

During that same period of time, 1984 and 1985, one other major change in the refugee social service sector took place. Though earlier attempts at cooperation and coalition building had failed, in 1984 Free Vietnam, the Lao Buddhist Society, and the Cambodian Community in Hawaii came together to form an organization that could represent refugees in Hawaii and apply for federal MAA Incentive Grant funding. In 1985, leaders of these organizations worked with Catholic Charities and the Catholic Immigration Center to apply for and receive MAA discretionary funds
from the federal government. With the support of the newly reorganized CIC, a proposal to ORR in Fiscal Year 1986 (October 1985 through September 1986) was successful and, using Catholic Charities as a non-profit umbrella agency, the community-based MAA known as MAAC or Mutual Assistance Associations Center started off with a federal budget of $20,071 (State of Hawaii, DLIR, 1985, p. 29).

The objectives of MAAC were relatively simple, most of the activities centering around "job-clubs" or organized meetings of people interested in learning how to become economically self-sufficient if not self-employed. More importantly, MAAC was to serve as a hub around which other Southeast Asian refugee organizations could organize themselves and their activities. The By-Laws of MAAC put the organization’s dual purpose very simply: "The activities of the Corporation shall include but not be limited to those necessary and appropriate to assist refugees in finding ways of entering the mainstream of American life and helping them maintain their cultural identity (Original By-Laws, presented at the MAAC Board of Director’s meeting June 1986). That is, help integrate the refugees by giving them employment training but encourage community development and maintenance of traditional Lao, Vietnamese, and Khmer values and customs.

Thus, within the years 1984 and 1985 there was the creation of OCS with all of its merged goals and responsibilities, the reorganization of Catholic Charities
and the creation of CIC, and the birth of a grassroots, refugee community-based social service organization known as MAAC. Consideration of these changes must include the rise of KPISC as the local refugee resettlement affiliate for ACNS in 1983 and the introduction of CFS as the local case management agency for time-eligible refugees. This reorganization of the refugee social service sector in Hawaii remains a major factor in the existing service delivery system available to refugees and immigrants in the State of Hawaii.

Present Service Providers In Hawaii

The following private, non-profit organizations are responsible for the vast majority of formally organized services provided to refugees in Hawaii, primarily on the Island of Oahu. The list is far from complete but does cover the most important agencies and services available to refugees since approximately 1985.

CIC

Immigrant and refugee services were provided by Catholic Social Services in separate programs until it became Catholic Charities in 1984. It quickly thereafter merged its immigrant and refugee social service programs under the Catholic Immigration Center, the refugee reception and placement section retaining the name Operation Aloha. As the local affiliate for U.S. Catholic
Conference, CIC resettles approximately 150 to 200 refugees each year, the great majority from Southeast Asia. General services offered to all immigrants and refugees include bilingual services including interpretation and translation, ESL classes, immigrant youth services, occupational skills training, and community advocacy. Refugee resettlement services specifically include the following: "pre-arrival, reception and post-arrival services like sponsor orientation, airport reception, cash assistance, information and referral, personal counselling, job counselling, interpretation, school enrollment, medical screening and housing search." (Source: general information flier) CIC is also the local cluster site service provider for all Amerasians resettled in Hawaii through CIC and KPISC.

JPLP

Job Preparation Language Program is the primary English language service provider for recently arrived refugees in the state, providing classes in vocational English for all newly arrived or time-eligible refugees. JPLP had been under the Hawaii Council of Churches until 1986 when it moved to become a part of CIC.

JPLP is also the primary provider of the pre-employment training program known as the Refugee Targeted Assistance Program (RTAP). This federally funded training program recruits refugees with limited education, long-term
minimum wage employment, or those appearing to be dependent
on CMA/AFDC. JPLP remains largely dependent on federal
funds, acting as a referral source for CFS by providing the
English language component of CFS case management services
and the occupational skills training component of CFS. It
has recently begun receiving state funding and has expanded
its English language services to include immigrants as well
as refugees.

KPISC

The Kalihi-Palama Immigrant Service Center is the
local refugee resettlement affiliate for the national VOLAG
American Council for Nationalities Service (ACNS).
Resettling approximately 100 to 150 Southeast Asian
refugees each year through its reception and placement
program, KPISC has built upon its long history as an
immigrant services provider in Honolulu.

Bilingual staff from the many ethnic groups that make
up Honolulu provide services that include "bilingual
counseling, interpretation, outreach, information and
referral, and assistance in the areas of employment,
housing, health, welfare, education, Immigration Law and
Cultural Orientation." (Source: 1990 information flier)
Service philosophy emphasizes cross-cultural awareness,
community involvement and advocacy, and occupational skills
training.
The programs provided through KPISC offer services to many different levels of the refugee and immigrant population in Hawaii. Services are generally available to any refugee or immigrant, American National or alien resident, English or non-English speaking person in need of help. Some programs do have limitations imposed by the funding source or contract. The Immigrant Services Program is restricted by a special State of Hawaii, Office of Community Service, plan to serving only immigrants living in the Kalihi-Palama area. The Refugee Resettlement Program is limited to providing services to those refugees resettled under the sponsorship of the American Council for Nationalities Services. Responsibility for these refugees is limited by contract to 90 days though services and support generally last far beyond this.

Of the many programs offered by KPISC, one of the most noteworthy is its Immigrant Learning Center (ILC). The ILC was started in 1984 and brought to fruition with a $100,000 Gannett Foundation award in 1985. The ILC provided computer-based tutoring services that emphasized vocational English language classes as well as some job skills workshops and job placement for immigrants and eligible refugees. Acculturation skills were have also been provided by the program, the primary target population being "those new immigrants "hidden" from society with little opportunity for contact with Western ways." (Star-Bulletin, 12-13-1985) The center received a second Gannett
Foundation award in 1986 for $95,000 and since then has been supported by a mixture of state (Department of Education) and other private sector funding.

CFS

Child and Family Services is the largest of the non-profit social service agencies in Hawaii, providing a variety of educational and counseling services for all Hawaii residents. The refugee unit within CFS is the sole source provider of case management services for newly arrived refugees resettled in Hawaii by CIC and KPISC. Case management services are provided to time-eligible as well as time-expired refugees, services being unavailable only to those who become U.S. citizens. Program components include bilingual case management services, and job development and placement.

CFS has also worked in tandem with JPLP in implementing the local Refugee Targeted Assistance Program (RTAP) for the last few years. The role of CFS within this program is to provide case management and counseling services for refugees who are then referred to JPLP for job development, job placement, and on-the-job training services. For Fiscal Year 1990, Child and Family Services was given $123,150 in federal funds to provide employment-related case management, job development, and other supportive services. Job Preparation and Language Program,
under CIC, was awarded $159,000 to provide pre-employment training, vocational English classes, and some occupational skills training.

CFS is also implementing a secondary resettlement program financed by ORR and administered by OCS. Lao refugees on Oahu who have been in the U.S. for 18 months but continue to be recipients of cash and/or medical assistance are provided the resources to move to the Island of Hawaii. There the Lao families are resettled and provided employment, primarily within the agricultural sector.

Susannah Wesley Community Center

The Susannah Wesley Community Center is a non-profit community agency that has had a tradition of providing bilingual services to immigrants. Services to immigrants are geographically limited by state contract to areas including Kalihi-Palama, Central, and West Oahu. There are currently two programs within the agency that specifically target the immigrant and refugee population. The family development case management program specializes in bilingual case management and immigrant community assistance. This program offers bilingual services that have developed over a period of sixteen years yet has received state financial support only since 1982.

In 1989 SWCC was awarded a contract by the State of Hawaii Department of Health to provide prevention and
intervention mental health services for immigrants and refugees. The program is staffed by six bilingual case managers with language capabilities in Tagalog, Ilokano, Samoan, Korean, Cantonese, Vietnamese, and Lao. The program's major functions include: (1) identification of immigrants and refugees who may have or are at risk of experiencing emotional and/or mental illness; (2) promoting accessibility and utilization of mental health and social service resources; (3) supporting clients in this and other treatment programs; and (4) preventative education.

MAAC

The Mutual Assistance Associations Center is a refugee community-based organization that started with federal MAA incentive funds in 1985 and provided employment-related services to the Lao, Vietnamese, and Khmer communities. Since that time, it has gained non-profit status and diversified in the many services offered to the refugee community. MAAC is presently located in Palolo Valley and serves primarily those refugees who are no longer considered time-eligible and live in the Kaimuki or Palolo Valley areas. With Hawaii state funds provided by the 1990 state legislature and a variety of federal contracts, MAAC now provides information and referral, cultural activities and programs, ESL and sewing courses for homebound refugee women, and community advocacy for immigrants as well as refugees. Its funding sources have included ORR, National
Endowment for the Arts, and Aloha United Way. It was awarded a contract by DHHS in 1990 to develop a coalition of immigrant and refugee community groups in the interest of sharing information on and methods of drug abuse prevention on Oahu. MAAC was also the umbrella for the Palolo Multi-Service Center, an information and referral agency that had received funding from the City and County of Honolulu through June 1991.

General Available Services

Na Loio No Na Kanaka provides legal services that are available to the immigrant and, to a lesser degree, refugee community who are economically disadvantaged or are experiencing immigration related legal problems. It is state funded through OCS.

Volunteer, Information and Referral Service offers interpretation services to employers, social service agencies, and immigrants who reside in the State of Hawaii. Its programs include Language Interpretation Services for Immigrants, more commonly known as the Bilingual Access Line. The program provides language interpretation and translation services for immigrants, refugees, and other limited or non-English speaking individuals. It receives state funding through OCS.

Perhaps the most valuable form of service provided to the refugee community comes through a coalition of immigrant, refugee, and local minority service agencies
known as the Inter-Agency Council for Immigrant Services (IAC). Established in 1973 and incorporated in 1980, members work together as both planners of and advocates for the provision of social services to immigrants in Hawaii. IAC coalition efforts in the state legislature have led to annual information sessions provided for legislators at the beginning of each legislative session and the successful passage of state funding for mental health, case management, and other immigrant and refugee services.

MAAs

The formal refugee self-help organizations, referred to as mutual assistance associations or MAAs by ORR, number approximately 15 in Hawaii but many more exist as informal groups of Lao or Vietnamese with similar interests or concerns. The Mutual Assistance Associations Center is the only MAA in Hawaii receiving federal MAA incentive funds and appears to be the only MAA with funding coming from outside the refugee community to provide social services for community members. More information on these MAAs is provided in the next chapter.

Hawaii State Refugee Service Provision

Many different departments and public agencies have offered and continue to develop specialized services for members of the refugee community. Federal funding for refugee programs within the state commonly go through the
relevant state agency. The Office of Community Services is most commonly seen interacting in daily refugee affairs, but many other departments have been of vital importance to the integration and acculturation of refugees in Hawaii.

When refugees enter the State of Hawaii they are provided reception and resettlement services by the appropriate resettlement center, CIC or KPISC, for the first 90 days. They are provided medical screening and are interviewed for any needs they may have, such as children who are of school age. The Department of Human Services decides who is to be considered eligible for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Refugee Cash Assistance (RCA), or state funded General Assistance if any assistance is needed. At present, RCA time eligible refugees must participate in case management and employment training services through CFS as well as ESL, pre-employment training, and VESL courses offered by JPLP. With federal cutbacks in reimbursement for refugee public assistance funds, only RCA funds will be reimbursed and only RCA clients will be required to participate in case management services and ESL courses. AFDC refugee clients will be considered as all other AFDC clients and may have either Job Help Store (DLIR) or JOBS (DHS) services to turn to for employment options.
Health

Health and mental health services for refugees and immigrants has varied year by year with most emphasis being on the physical health and employability of the refugee community. The many service agencies available to refugees do offer bilingual and bicultural support but not until 1989 was a formal bilingual mental health prevention program funded by the state.

Past programs have included a marriage and family counseling program provided by CFS and funded by ORR through OCS for FY1987. Another past program that was successful in the area of physical and mental health was the Salvation Army's Indochinese Life Adjustment Program. It provided bilingual services and counseling in the area of alcohol- and drug-related problems to the refugee community in 1988 and 1989.

Starting in FY1986 the State of Hawaii Department of Health, Mental Health Division, contracted with Volunteer Information and Referral Services to provide training to staff in the Department of Health as well as other public and private agencies in the areas of culture, resettlement needs, and mental health problems of Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian refugees in Hawaii. In addition to such training, a mechanism for bilingual mental health provision for the islands was developed through a grant provided by the National Institute of Mental Health. The project was
funded for three years, FY1986 through FY1988, with all funds being provided by DHHS without need of state matching funds.

The result of the training, research findings, and service provision mechanism supplied by this project led to a state-funded bilingual mental health program implemented by the Susannah Wesley Community Center. Such bilingual services have been provided for the refugee and immigrant community since July 1, 1989.

Reception and placement services have always included health screening and immunizations for incoming refugees, most services being provided by the State of Hawaii Department of Health but reimbursed by DHHS/ORR. Reimbursement primarily covers health assessment and hepatitis B screening as well as vaccination funds. It is common for more than half of incoming refugees to test positive for tuberculosis and for almost one hundred percent to require some form of immunization.

The State Health Insurance Program (SHIP) is a state funded health program intended to provide health coverage for low-income or self-employed persons and their dependents. The program started FY1990 and is intended to provide low-cost health insurance for all residents of Hawaii including those in the refugee community.
DLIR/OCS

The Office of Community Services was created within the State of Hawaii Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (DLIR) in 1985. Though a formal part of the DLIR, OCS is staffed and overseen by the Office of the Governor. The refugee component of OCS was formerly a part of the Department of Social Services and Housing, now reorganized and referred to as the Department of Human Services (DHS). Though some special use funds are provided to the Department of Health and Department of Education, most immigrant and refugee social service funding for the state are usually channeled through this office. Most agencies that receive state or federal funds for immigrant or refugee services are provided contracts through and evaluated by OCS.

The Job Help Store took the place of the Employment Opportunity Center which had a decade earlier provided employment services to refugees under the Office of the Governor. The Job Help Store is located in the DLIR, indirectly providing a service for the immigrant community though occupational training and skills development courses aimed at the minority and low income population of Hawaii. Bilingual services are available but are not considered a strong point of the program.
DOE

The Department of Education is responsible for a number of programs that impact on refugee and immigrant youth. Students With Limited English Proficiency (SLEP) is perhaps the most noted of DOE state-funded programs (with federal matching grant). The emphasis of SLEP has been to encourage regular teachers in all grade levels to provide differentiated teaching according to student needs while providing ESL and tutoring classes to immigrant and refugee students.

DHS

Finally, the Department of Human Services (DHS) is responsible for the provision of public resources and financial assistance to the poor and indigent of Hawaii. Time-eligible refugees are those eligible for federally-reimbursed public assistance or CMA funds. Funding eligibility changes as ORR determines and redetermines eligibility levels and states react to these changes in cash availability. At present, only RCA clients are eligible for CMA in the State of Hawaii.

DHS provides eligible refugees with the cash and medical assistance made available by the federal government but fronted by the State of Hawaii. Reimbursement is applied for through OCS by a memorandum of understanding which, in turn, requests funds from ORR. DHS also works closely with CFS and JPLP to determine which refugees are
actively seeking employment through available ESL courses, participating in case management, or attending occupational skills training. Those refugees no longer eligible for federal support must reapply and meet eligibility requirements for public assistance as any other resident of Hawaii.

Post-1985 Service Provision In Hawaii

The general structure of service provision for refugees in the State of Hawaii has changed very little since 1985. Perhaps the most important element to be included in the model is the addition of funding from the Hawaii State Legislature to supplement federal cuts in refugee services. The most important developments are listed and discussed in this section. The Office of Community Services is considered first with special attention given to refugee funding forums and public discussion of priorities for refugee resettlement program funding on the local level.

Funding sources are also considered, federal funding cuts and state provision of funds for refugee services remaining the two most important providers of both authoritative and allocative resources. Programs of special importance to the future of the refugee community in Hawaii are then discussed. These programs include local implementation of the Family Support Act of 1988, Mental Health support services in Hawaii, the Refugee Targeted
Assistance Program as provided through CFS and CIC, and the choice of Honolulu as a cluster site for resettling Amerasians from Vietnam.

Cash And Medical Assistance For Refugees

The status provided refugees when they enter the United States allows special allocative resources that include cash and medical assistance, amount and length of time being determined by family status, time of entering the country, and cutbacks in funding by Congress. Each state differs in how federal funds are applied for and used to meet resident refugee needs. The most basic of services and resources available to new refugees resettled in the United States includes monetary and social service support from a local VOLAG affiliate as well as some cash and medical assistance.

In the State of Hawaii, the two local VOLAG affiliates are CIC and KPISC. They provide incoming refugees with federally supplied funds for the first 30 days in the country and social support services for the first 90 days. Support services include helping the client obtain a social security number, find housing, be checked by a doctor for physical or mental health problems, and acculturate to these new surroundings that are now home. During this period of time the refugee is referred to the Department of Human Services (DHS) as well as Child and Family Services (CFS).
DHS determines the eligibility of the refugee for cash and medical assistance, some being eligible only for RCA/RMA (reimbursed by the federal government for 8 months as of October 1, 1991) and others in family groups being eligible for AFDC (provided by the State of Hawaii). Those who are deemed eligible to receive RCA/RMA are mandated to attend CFS case management and other services. Those who are deemed eligible to receive AFDC state funds may be mandated to participate in the State of Hawaii version of the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Program.

At CFS a case manager screens the client for English language ability, employability, and general needs that must be met if social and economic self sufficiency is to be attained. Federally funded programs include ESL classes as provided through contractual agreement with JPLP, job training, pre-employment training as provided through contractual agreement with CIC, job development and job placement, and other training programs. If, after the time period provided for RCA/RMA funds, the client is still in need of support services and must be switched from federally funded RCA/RMA to state funded General Assistance, he or she may continue to benefit from CFS’s case management services and other programs.

OCS And Refugee Services

The Office of Community Services has remained the structural cornerstone of immigrant and refugee services in
Hawaii since 1985. It's most important function is to plan, organize, administer, oversee, and evaluate federal and state programs that impact on these communities. Located in the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, OCS oversees the majority of immigrant and refugee social service programs as funded by the federal and state government. As funds for programs are made available, OCS releases Requests For Proposals (RFPs) that make the need for such services available to the public. Private and public sector organizations and agencies interested in providing such services apply to fill such RFPs through Purchase Of Service or Grant In Aid Requests as examined by the state legislature. The Departments of Health and Education have federal and state programs of their own that directly impact on refugee and immigrant needs in Hawaii but are not formally administered by DLIR or OCS.

One of the most important impacts OCS has had upon the immigrant social service sector has been the division of service provision into geographic areas. Susannah Wesley, Catholic Immigration Center, Kalihi-Palama Immigrant Service Center, and Child and Family Services all have offices within a mile radius of one another but are provided state funds for case management, acculturation services, and other activities by region on Oahu as well as on the other less populated islands.
Refugee services are not hampered or controlled by such geographic limitations, the different agencies regulating their services by specializing in specific refugee sub-populations and their needs. CIC, CFS, and KPISC, and to a lesser degree MAAC, remain the major service providers for refugees in Hawaii.

OCS also organizes the public sharing of resources concerning refugee resettlement, particularly in the areas of information and fiscal allotments for the upcoming fiscal year. More importantly, OCS is the mediator and primary vote in deciding how to allot federal and state funds for refugee programs, this office being given the responsibility by ORR to make ground-level decisions concerning refugee resettlement and related services in Hawaii.

Forums that prioritize the needs of the refugee community in Hawaii are held on at least a yearly basis. OCS, as the administrative agency for distributing federal and state funds for refugee and immigrant services in Hawaii, organizes the forums which sometimes run over the period of a couple of months during the spring of the year. Probable availability of federal funds and the problems associated with ever declining funding levels has always been an important aspect of this forum. Of greater interest is that agency representatives that attend the forum have been given detailed information on refugee services in Hawaii and a voice in how future funds should
be allocated by OCS. A December 1986 letter from OCS concerning FY1988 funding to service providers and community organizations underlines this point.

"It is our hope that each member of the Refugee Forum and other community participants will be able to devote a total of eight (8) hours to this process which will take place during February and March [1987]. It has been the position of the OCS that maximum community participation in planning leads to programs and services most desired by this community."

Maintenance of the larger social service structure, including the continuation of OCS as the administrative center of this structure, remains as important a goal as any of the needs of the refugees serviced. As funds diminish, fewer services and agencies are funded but the original social service structure remains.

Federal funding, though partly from what are called discretionary funds, is also required to be used in specific areas of service provision. Case management services including employment related training and counseling remain most favored. For example, ORR expected to have available $68,617,000 in FY1987 for refugee social service funds (Federal Register, v. 52, No. 7). Of this amount, $58,000,000 was to be made directly available to individual states. $55,000,000 of this was to be allocated according to each state’s proportion of the national population of refugees who had been in the U.S. less than 3 years. The other $3,000,000 was made available for MAA incentive grants. The remaining $10,000,000 was used by
ORR for special individual projects that contributed to the resettlement program as a whole. In regards to those funds made available to states, it is required that "at least 85% of a State's award be used for employment services, English language training, and case management services." (Federal Register, v. 52, No. 7, p. 1245) Waivers have always been made available but most states have followed the federal formula out of a belief that its philosophy and goals are the most viable.

In addition, the reason for the existence of many of these programs is to help integrate refugees into the American mainstream. Successful integration has always been measured by the government as a refugee family's ability to be self sufficient. Thus, the attitudes and actions of federal and state administrators will vary with the state's own level of refugee cash assistance dependency. This is reflected in a May 1987 letter from the State of Hawaii Refugee Coordinator to refugee forum members: "Since the success or failure of Hawaii's Refugee Program is related directly to the dependency rate, we are most pleased that our dependency rate has dropped from 82% to 60% in the past two years." Those programs that prove themselves to have a direct and positive affect on employment rates will be funded while those that cannot show such an immediate relationship will be placed on a very long wish list. Without a doubt, the demand by ORR
that 85 percent of discretionary funds be directly linked to employment programs has had a very strong influence on the ideas presented to OCS for possible funding.

State funds also have limits placed upon them and their use. Recent attempts to gain state support of refugee services have proved successful through effective lobbying at the state legislature. Purchase-of-service orders offer a specific amount of money for a given service, often with the name of the specific service provider attached. While any organization can lobby for such support and while this system is currently up for review and probable change in the 1991 Legislative Session, DLIR/OCS remains a powerful voice in deciding who and what in the way of refugee services should be funded. Overall, any organized attempt at increased funding will be supported by OCS, a larger and more powerful system of service providers will only strengthen the office that administers and oversees these funds and services.

OCS also has an advisory council made up of community members most immediately affected by OCS programs. Members of the advisory council include a wide range of ethnic groups and nationalities as well as representing major client groups, private organizations, and each of the state counties. The advisory council meets every few months to discuss recent OCS activities and give feedback to the OCS Executive Director and staff.
OCS must also be recognized for its direct impact on the resettlement of refugees in Hawaii. Its control of information and fiscal resources on the state level has altered the local structure for resettlement of refugees. An important example of this direct impact on the resettlement process is the application by OCS to ORR for Planned Secondary Resettlement (PSR) funds. ORR has provided funds to other states for moving groups of refugees from one state locale with low employment possibilities to another state and locale that desires such labor as the refugees can provide. Thanks largely to the efforts of the Assistant Refugee Coordinator, Hawaii will be the first state to be provided PSR funds ($90,000) to move Lao families internally, from Honolulu to the Island of Hawaii. According to information provided by OCS, those family's participating in PSR must meet the following conditions:

1. The primary adult wage earner is experiencing recurrent or continuing unemployment;
2. The family is receiving public assistance;
3. At least 80 percent of the family to be resettled has lived in the U.S. for 18 months or longer.

Since service provision is not a part of the duties of OCS, the project has been contracted out to CFS.

MAA Participation In Resettlement

MAAC is the only refugee organized and controlled grassroots organization to receive federal and state funds
for social service provision. Its painstakingly developed bureaucratic infrastructure and non-profit status makes MAAC not only the most efficient and rational choice to provide community-based services but one of few eligible (non-profit status) MAAs in Hawaii for many potential grants and service projects. Most other MAAs in Hawaii are not given serious note, their activities within the refugee community being applauded but technically ineligible for consideration and thus politely dismissed as inconsequential to the larger structural issues DLIR/OCS and other departments are responsible for. An afterthought in a revised version of the state Refugee Resettlement Program does recognize the existence of these MAAs: "Regular contacts with refugee Mutual Assistance Associations will be maintained." (State of Hawaii, DLIR, 1988, p. 5) Though welcome to attend, it is rare that MAAs are formally brought into state planning sessions, the initiative of the MAA being the determining factor in whether it will participate or not.

The state Refugee Resettlement Program supports without hesitation the federally required emphasis on linking employment with any of the programs and services OCS oversees. In turn, MAA incentive funds, presently provided to MAAC, must follow OCS and federal guidelines. The services provided by MAAC and contracted out for by OCS are described as follows: "The services to be provided utilizing the MAA Incentive Allocation include job clubs
and small business workshops aimed at informing, training and counseling those interested in opening up their own small business. These programs are designed to increase the role of MAAs in the provision of services to refugees." (State of Hawaii, DLIR, 1988, p. 17) The availability of incentive funds has proven decisive in organizing one MAA as an important service provider on Oahu. Other MAAs are liable to take advantage of available funding given proper changes in organizational infrastructure, but at present no other MAAs are currently recognized as having as important a part to play in mainstream service provision to the refugee community.

ACNS Fish/Wilson Demonstration Project Proposal

In mid-1986 the American Council for Nationalities Service attempted to expand its role as a refugee service provider in seven major metropolitan areas around the nation. Honolulu was to be one of the seven selected cites with KPISC acting as the local affiliate agency. Submitted to ORR for national approval, the proposed project intended to completely alter the structure of service provision in each site.

The problems that ACNS saw with the existing resettlement and social service structure for refugees were many: a disorganized and confusing system that refugees were often unable to understand; the disjointed and inconsistent services offered by different service
providers in the same geographic area; and the lack of linkage between case management services and the provision of cash assistance (1986 ACNS proposal to ORR, pp. 14-15). The ACNS proposal to ORR intended to consolidate resettlement, case management, and related social services within a unified structure within each of the seven areas overseen by ACNS on a national level. Each area would be unique in its provision of services to clients, but each would operate according to six program elements as outlined in the 1986 ACNS proposal as follows:

1. Staff-intensive service delivery
2. In-house capacity to provide support services
3. Long term case management authority
4. Responsibility for provision of cash assistance
5. Expanded medical coverage for time-eligible clients
6. Inclusion of local MAAs

Early employment or employment-related services is in some way linked to each of these elements. Each of the seven localized projects would dismantle existing service provision structures and centralize ORR funded refugee resettlement and integration programs under the ACNS affiliate. While ACNS had successfully provided such all-encompassing services under a single roof in other areas of the country, this was its first attempt to literally take service provision monies and programs away from state and private sector agencies on such a large scale.
In Honolulu, KPISC was presented in the proposal as the best alternative in a conglomerate of resettlement alternatives. The proposed centralization of services would eliminate CIC as a VOLAG affiliate, thus simplifying reception, placement, and the tracking of arriving refugees. Case management under CFS, an agency with no resettlement powers, would become a part of the resettlement process, as would the various social services necessary for successful integration into American society. Cash and medical assistance would no longer need to be overseen by the Department of Human Services, ACNS receiving all government resettlement and support monies, reimbursing the local areas as needed. The proposal made it appear that the end product of the entire structure would be self sufficiency and employment, made possible by organized and well integrated resettlement services provided through a single agency.

The attempt by the ACNS to dismantle existing social service agencies in an attempt to, however selflessly, develop a single refugee resettlement authority was doomed to failure. Honolulu service providers were not happy at an attempt by ACNS to change the status quo. More importantly OCS and related state agencies such as DHS were not adequately consulted by the existing Executive Director for KPISC. Thus, State of Hawaii support for the proposed change was not forthcoming and ORR rejected the proposal.
What started out as a national coup wound up being a rout, not a single one of the seven sites being chosen by ORR for implementation of the proposed project.

Federal And State Funding

The federal move to cut refugee social services funding in the late 1980s while increasing the number of refugees allowed into the country was seen by local and state-level service providers as hypocritical and proof of the federal government's lack of commitment to the refugee program. In testimony before the senate on domestic refugee resettlement funding, Senator Pete Wilson of California was very critical of the pattern of federal transfer of responsibility for resettlement to the states without a sharing of power in determining policy.

Sadly, instead of seeking an appropriate level of funding—-one that is linked in some responsible manner to refugee admissions—the administration's response has been to reduce the reimbursement period despite rising admissions. Effective January 1, 1990, that fell from 24 to just 4 months, which means a cost transfer of over $85 million to the States.

"Let me underscore the point that other States are not immune to these funding transfers, ...having to shoulder, increasingly, the financial responsibility for refugee programs even though refugee policy is a Federal responsibility driven in large part by foreign policy considerations.

"States have little say in the policy, but they are being forced to pay more and more of the costs. That is patently unfair." (U.S. Senate, Congressional Record, May 1, 1990, p. 5438)

The National Governor's Association has been equally vocal in its dissatisfaction with federal cuts for refugee
support programs. A draft letter sent to refugee service agencies noted the rise in refugee admissions and cut in support payments, stating that while states have in the past supported local resettlement of refugees, such support has been done "with the clear understanding that refugee resettlement will be a federal-state partnership where the federal government will accept the funding responsibility." While funding cuts have not been as severe as many feared, the pattern of cuts remains.

A letter from DHHS/ORR to State Refugee Coordinators in November 1989 recognized the anger and confusion at the cuts in funding states had already been feeling. ORR admitted that the "funds appropriated are not sufficient to enable ORR to continue to fund states for assistance to refugees during their first 24 months in the United States, or to cover all types of CMA costs during refugees' first 12 months in the U.S., for the duration of FY 1990." That is, ORR admitted its inability to honor the funding levels promised for refugees entering the U.S. The promise of reimbursement to states was reneged due to inadequate funding by Congress.

Time eligibility for a refugee is simply the amount of time living within the United States a refugee may receive public assistance funds that have been specifically allocated by the U.S. Congress for in-country refugee assistance. This time period had started at 36 months at the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act, but has recently
undergone great debate and many cuts. Up through the end of Fiscal Year 1991 ORR has been able to provide at least 12 months of CMA, but as of October 1, 1991 RCA funds were cut to only eight months. In 1990 OCS reported that the federal government was leaving the state with a large AFDC/CMA bill that the state legislature had never appropriated funds for. A deficit of approximately $450,000 was eventually shouldered by the State of Hawaii. The state agency hardest hit by this lack of federal reimbursement has been the Department of Human Services, responsible for administering public assistance throughout the state.

Coming to realize the indeterminate state of ORR and federal irresponsibility toward refugee resettlement, the State of Hawaii implemented an act in early 1991 that began drawing on other levels of federal funding to help in the cash needs of resettling refugee families. Retroactive back to July 1, 1990, the act designated all refugee AFDC families to receive funds on the basis of and from the same federal support source as all other AFDC clients. All non-AFDC recipients fitting the definition of time-eligible (in the country 12 months or less) were to receive RCA funds made available by Congress to ORR. RCA recipients are reimbursed for one hundred percent of amount but with an uncertain time line, ORR only guaranteeing support through to the end of September 1991. The best ORR has been able to offer states and local resettlement agencies beyond 1991
is some voice in how available funds are to be allocated, the cuts themselves being seen as inevitable. Refugee case management services, technical assistance, social service support funds, and other programs will be continued to be supported by the federal government but probably under reduced amounts.6

The State Of Hawaii As A Funding Source

As early as 1988 the federal government had started to back away from agreements with states about reimbursements for cash and medical assistance during the first year of resettlement. Federal funds for promised programs were cut and refugee service providers found themselves without the funds for existing programs as well as without any secure base for what to expect in the future. This experimentation with ORR and White House versions of federalism have forced state refugee coordinators to start lobbying at the local and state level for refugee resettlement funds. As with most other states faced with the problem of funding refugee resettlement programs, the problem of refugee integration and acculturation was first seen as a federal problem, one that the federal government had forced upon the states. Yet this argument does nothing to alleviate the needs of the refugees, needs that will become social dilemmas in the form of alienated youth and unemployable adults if special programs are not funded. The states of Georgia and Minnesota were the first to
accept part of the burden of resettling refugees, but Hawaii was close behind as resettlement agencies in Honolulu lobbied the 1990 Legislature to fund those services the federal government had backed out on.

In 1990 the Susannah Wesley Community Center was already receiving state funds through the Department of Health to provide bilingual mental health services to the immigrant and refugee population. The two mainstream agencies that sought state funding to cover federal funding gaps for refugee services were CFS and CIC. Though ORR was to provide approximately $200,000 (including rollover funds) in refugee resettlement funding statewide, this was not enough to cover the ongoing programs necessary for the existing and incoming refugee population. MAAC also went seeking funding, not to replace a gap in federal funding but to enhance services being provided to the refugee population.

There were some disagreements between the three main agencies over who should be funded for what. Federal funding usually included strict rules over what monies were to be used for. KPISC and CIC received resettlement funds from the State Department to give services to newly arrived refugees for their first three months in the country. For its share of federal funding, CFS provided case management and job training services to refugees who had not yet become citizens. JPLP had been the primary provider of ESL to the refugee community for the last ten years. Federal
management of funding and state (OCS) administration of programs had led to a relatively stable structure for service provision with little overlap.

Upon deciding to apply for state funding of refugee services, the service agencies worked with the IAC and OCS to decide beforehand who was to provide what kinds of services to what category of refugees. It was thought that a lack of agreement or unnecessary overlap would give the legislature a reason not to fund for the upcoming fiscal year. Some disagreements did arise over what funds should be sought for what services, such as what kind of employment services MAAC and CFS should provide. MAAC was persuaded to limit formal service provision only to time expired refugees (in the U.S. more than 18 months) and to provide only entrepreneurship training for time expired refugees, leaving employment training to CFS.

The state legislature was generous in 1990, funding CFS, JPLP, and MAAC with only relatively small cuts in the original budgets presented them. CFS was awarded $139,000 for case management and employment training. JPLP was awarded $129,000 for ESL courses with an emphasis on vocational applicability. MAAC was awarded $100,000 for information, referral, and outreach, entrepreneurship courses, and the maintenance of culture and arts in the refugee community. OCS required MAAC to limit state funding to culture and entrepreneurship activities. The only social service designated federal funds MAAC received
for FY1991 was money set aside by ORR for employment related activities and available only to MAAs such as MAAC. MAAC was able to maintain some outreach and social services through the activities of the Palolo Multi-Service Center, an information and referral center funded by the City and County of Honolulu.

Special Programs

JOBS Bill

In 1988 the U.S. Congress passed legislation that required certain categories of AFDC recipients to participate in employment-related skills development courses and training sessions. Known as the Family Support Act of 1988 (PL 100-485) but more often referred to as the JOBS Bill (Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training), this act required all states to have a plan of implementation ready and working by October 1, 1991. The majority of funds for development of this "welfare reform" program are provided by the federal government, though Title III of the act does require child care and Medicare benefits to be made available by the state to all participants. The State of Hawaii chose to implement its version of the program at the latest possible date, October 1, 1990, limiting the first year of the program to the geographic areas of Kalihi and Waipahu. The following year the program was implemented state-wide.
Refugees will be taking part in this program but to a very limited extent. This is partially due to inconsistencies between eligibility rules of the JOBS Bill and the Refugee Resettlement Program. These include accepting employment at less than AFDC income, time periods for sanctioning, exemptions for pregnancy, and certain job search requirements. Of greater concern for refugee participation in the program is the lack of access in the way of bilingual/bicultural support services for many immigrants and refugees to training and support programs offered through the JOBS Bill.

Though many recent arrivals are eligible if not required to participate in the program, many immigrants and refugees are unable to communicate well enough in English to integrate into or take advantage of mainstream marketplace opportunities. This lack of English speaking or writing skills is often a major factor in their collecting some form of public assistance. Unfortunately, the Hawaii version of the JOBS program lacks bilingual support, in particular for the Vietnamese and Lao communities. This gap exists in spite of the fact that members of the refugee and immigrant service sector took part in the planning process for implementation of the national program on a local level.

While the Department of Human Services has kindly excused such community members from having to participate in the program, social service providers have complained
that an important avenue of social and economic mobility is being denied their refugee and immigrant clients. Citing Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, some service providers as well as a the Inter-Agency Council for Immigrant and Refugee Services have made formal complaints about this lack of access to services by non-English speaking residents of Hawaii.

There is another reason for the refugee service sector to be upset at the lack of access for the refugee population to opportunities offered by the JOBS Bill. This was hinted at during the Region IX State Coordinators Meeting in San Francisco on April 12, 1989. An outline of the topics covered by the coordinators, including the assistant coordinator for the State of Hawaii, notes that JOBS funds may be an excellent source for refugee services in the future. While refugee funds are quickly being cut by the federal government, JOBS related programs may out of necessity have to target hard to place groups such as refugees. The outline of reasons follows:

"Refugee funds are unstable while JOBS funds are much more stable.

Greater array of services with JOBS than with ORR funds.

JOBS focuses on long-term recipients (over 36 months) while ORR funds are designed for early arrivals."

(Source: handout outlining the Region IX State Coordinators Meeting, p. 4)

As funding for refugee-related programs is cut, other areas that refugees fit into, such as being categorized as poor,
female, or illiterate, will have to be used as a basis for funding special programs for refugees. The JOBS Bill is one such area that promises to provide resources for refugee service providers over a long period of time, but only if local coordinators are forced to include such hard-to-place groups in an already tightly-budgeted program.

Mental Health

Mental health services have always been rather poorly served in Hawaii and bilingual mental health workers for the immigrant and refugee population have long been neglected by all but immediate community members and the volunteer social service sector. A three-year National Institute of Mental Health funded research project provided many in the refugee social service sector with a better understanding of refugee mental health needs and reasons why the state should support bilingual mental health services for the community. Strong community and social service sector support led to a successful lobbying attempt at providing such services. In 1989 the legislature for the State of Hawaii passed a bill providing two years of funding for such a service to be offered through the state Department of Health. Roughly $200,000 was set aside for each of the next two fiscal years to provide refugee and immigrant mental health services on a statewide basis. Susannah Wesley Community Center was successful in its application to provide such services through the Department
of Health and, though funding looks less likely in this year of economic recession, some level of funding looks probable for the 1992 and 1993 fiscal years as well.

**RTAP**

The Refugee Targeted Assistance Program (RTAP) was established for national implementation in FY1983, special federal discretionary funds being made available for employment training programs aimed at making refugees independent of public assistance and more able to become self sufficient. Funds were available to highly-impacted counties, amount of funds being dependent on the number of recently arrived refugees living in the county (in relation to the overall population) who were dependent on cash and medical assistance (AFDC or RCA). At least 85 percent of a county's targeted assistance funds were required to have specific employment objectives. Later phases of RTAP varied only slightly from the original program, the most important change being an increased emphasis on what was termed "hard to place clients" or refugees most likely to remain on public assistance if not given special attention. OCS has awarded and overseen federally provided RTAP funds since the beginning of RTAP programs in Hawaii.

RTAP I and III were both administered by Work Hawaii, a division of the Office of Human Resources which in turn was a part of the City and County of Honolulu. RTAP II and all RTAP projects following RTAP III have been awarded by
OCS to CFS with JPLP providing English language and other job preparation training through a memorandum of understanding with OCS and JPLP.

Amerasians

Amerasians, or children fathered by American servicemen in Vietnam up to 1975, are the most recent of the formally recognized Southeast Asian groups given special authorization to enter the United States. The category Amerasian also commonly includes the mother and siblings of the Amerasian children. While the first group of Amerasians brought into the United States to rejoin their fathers was in 1982, many Amerasians had been entering the U.S. before that time under normal refugee or immigrant categories. In the nineteen-eighties, the Orderly Departure Program was also a common means for Amerasians to enter. It was with the passage in December 1987 of the Amerasian Homecoming Act that special legal and economic provisions were provided for their immigration here. While considered a special category of immigrant, all Amerasians and their family members resettled in the U.S. were to receive all benefits accorded to refugees as well Amerasian support services provided by the cluster cites set up by InterAction.

Past experience with Amerasian resettlement in the U.S. showed resettlement organizations that Amerasians require a larger range of services and support systems. In
anticipation of the special needs of Amerasians, the national VOLAGs, in cooperation with the Department of State and ORR, formed a coalition of agencies called InterAction (American Council for Voluntary International Action). It was decided that resettling the Amerasians as small groups in "cluster sites" or "cluster cities" would best insure each Amerasian individual or family of access to resources and support systems provided for their resettlement in the U.S. Honolulu was not among one of those original sites chosen by InterAction. This decision was largely based on Hawaii's lack of an unaccompanied minor program, not working with free cases, and rarely bringing in non-family reunification cases. Lobbying by local resettlement agencies changed this with the Catholic Immigration Center being provided the extra funds for resettlement services.

While initial reception and placement is taken care of by CIC and KPISC, CIC has been provided special funds by ORR and administered through InterAction to organize a support system for all Amerasian immigrants formally settled here. A report on the Amerasian Resettlement Program covering meetings in March and April 1988 notes that "ORR indicated that, subject to the availability of funds, and the resolution of administrative problems, it will make available a limited amount of funding on behalf
of AMERASIAN resettlement to complement refugee social services and other activities already in place. Such additional funding, if approved, would be provided to support needs identified in community level planning in individual sites." (DHHS, Amerasian Resettlement Planning Committee Report, 1988, p. 7) Unfortunately, such funding has not proven sufficient to provide all of the services required by incoming Amerasians. Counseling and mental health services have been sharply curtailed by CIC because of limited funds. Local service agencies and the state once again are required to support an insufficiently funded federal-level program.

The local Amerasian program has been strongly dependent on a local support coalition organized by CIC in late 1988 and known as the Amerasian Resettlement Task Force. Special problems areas related to the service needs of the Amerasians began with the lack of affordable housing in Hawaii but centered on inter-personal problems with family members, lack of education in Vietnam, low self-esteem, and a number of other mental health problems. Services available at the Susannah Wesley Community Center, the Kalihi-Palama Immigrant Service Center, and Job Preparation Language Program, among others, have naturally been turned to. Counseling and support networks within the Vietnamese and Amerasian community have been critical factors in resettling the five hundred Amerasians and family members now living in Hawaii.
Discussion

Hawaii remains unique among states in its multicultural make up, close relations among geographically confined social service agencies, degree of shared participation between the public and private sector of refugee and immigrant services, and recent state funding of refugee health, mental health, and resettlement services. The general structure of refugee services provides for involvement and communication between federal, state, private, and community interests. Federal resettlement policy, state funding directives, and the retention of mainstream social service and case management agencies to provide the model for acculturation for incoming refugees differs little from the rest of the country. However, local implementation of available resources does manifest unique influences on resettlement services, indicating that the process is not at all unilinear.

Federal Policy

The State is shown to maintain close control over resources that mold and determine refugee issues in this country. Though allocative resources are being cut back and the definition of refugee is likely to be altered in the near future, policy remains in the hands of the State while local authorities are required to resettle incoming refugees as best they can.
A 1986 planning and policy review document developed by ORR continued to head its list of priorities with the reduction of refugee welfare dependency. The same report recommended that "ORR develop strategy to increase the accessibility of mainstream services for refugees." (U.S. DHHS, 1986, p. 4) These services were considered essential if refugees were to become self sufficient and well integrated members of American society. However, the report emphasized the concept "culturally appropriate," recognizing that "employment is the critical element in the process of a refugee’s integration into society, but not to the exclusion of other needs." (U.S. DHHS, 1986, p. 17) For available, mainstream services to positively affect the refugee in achieving the objectives and goals as set forth by ORR, the refugee must be able to understand, utilize, and build upon such services. The report maintains that for this to occur, proven innovative programs and sensitivity to refugee problems and needs must be taken into account.

Such recommendations were seemingly made in good faith, but further federal withdrawal from the resettlement process on the local level and cutbacks in funding for both ORR and local resettlement programs have kept them from being carried out. As resources made available to states have been trimmed, the more innovative of programs were cut back on. In Hawaii, as in other states, federal
resettlement assistance funds have been cut and the private sector or other applicable federal and state funding sources have been turned to for support.

State Of Hawaii Resettlement Policy

Though the State retains control over resources related to refugee resettlement, over the last decade individual states have taken on more of a role in determining what is best for those refugees within their boundaries. Within the State of Hawaii there are many different public and private levels upon which federal policy is implemented, each with its own means of altering policy for the sake of local needs and variations in target population. Each state will have its own policy and set of definitions for local implementation of federal policy but will also have priorities and related programs of its own as implemented through the use of locally obtained resources. Within the State of Hawaii, the Office of Community Services has had the most recent and long lasting influence of how federal money is spent and policy is interpreted.

One aspect of OCS mentioned earlier in this chapter is the overseeing of federal monies for special resettlement projects. One way of bringing interested social service organizations and the general public into the decision making process has been the holding of annual forums to discuss resettlement issues. A wide variety of
organizations have attended the forums (through 1990), but these make up only a small number of the many service providers that make up the refugee social-service community.

Following state guidelines, those agencies that are to receive funding for their programs must have the necessary infrastructure and service history before funds can be entrusted to their use. Common with any small group working together to share resources in an attempt to reach a common goal, it is very difficult for someone outside of the established circle to break in unless there is going to be some benefit for the larger group. The general pattern is that those agencies that have provided service in the past will continue to be trusted to do so.

With MAAC being the exception, agency programs operate without the refugee community and exist to integrate, not necessary preserve or strengthen, the values and culture of the people served. While such is extolled, it is also seen as a luxury practiced during times of little economic surplus. OCS encourages participation of the minority, immigrant, and refugee communities that it serves but, as mentioned before, only to the extent that the community can develop an organization that meets mainstream criteria for program implementation. Chapter 42 guidelines make such requirements very clear and OCS is itself required to follow state funding practices. Though such practices are rational and pragmatic in attaining specific goals set by
state and federal resettlement authorities, this also guarantees retention of resettlement resources within the bounds of already proven mainstream providers.

Individual states are now beginning to fund resettlement projects, largely due to the cuts being made by the federal government. Such localized funding provides for a greater degree of local control and variation, but federal funding preferences tend to be adhered to. In the State of Hawaii, funds provided by the 1991 legislature for resettlement purposes primarily went to cover federal funding cuts. However, funding was also given to a local refugee self-help group, the MAAC, to provide other than case management or employment-related services. This inclusion of a refugee MAA in locally controlled resettlement plans will be covered in the next section.

Refugee MAA Participation In The Resettlement Process

This chapter shows the interest of both federal and state governments in the participation of MAAs in the resettlement process. The federal government passed specific laws and provided funding for a general policy that encouraged the use of MAAs as service providers. In the State of Hawaii, a group of organizations came forward under an already existing service structure to apply for federal funding for a single organization known as MAAC and act as a conduit within the refugee community for federal resettlement interests. While acting as advocate for
refugee community needs, there is a question of the degree to which MAAC organizational development and bureaucratization has come to interfere with community representation, advocacy, and support.

It is of equal interest to note that the State of Hawaii has also begun funding this same organization, but with important differences in how the funds are to be used. Funding for FY1991 and for FY1992--FY1993 allows expenditures for the development of culturally-oriented and at-risk group projects. The State of Hawaii, as with the federal government, is encouraging the continuation of Southeast Asian culture in these islands and funding activities meant to bring community members together and prevent cultural and social dissolution. Both levels of government are emphasizing funding for employment-related projects and services but recognize the refugee population as being in need of strengthening and encouragement. Both are using MAAs as gates by which to gain entrance to these special populations.

Internal politics also influences the degree and kind of participation the MAA has within the resettlement process. The attempt in 1989 by service providers to gain State of Hawaii funding for continuation of service projects and to consolidate service provision will provide good examples. At a state forum organized by OCS to discuss upcoming federal refugee services funding for FY1991, a vote was taken of which agencies and service
programs should be given priority for funding. The vote was non-binding for OCS, a decision being made more on its own perception of community and agency needs than the final tally of votes. Within this forum, MAAC had presented data on the information, referral, and outreach services it had been given $14,600 by OCS to provide to refugees in the Palolo Valley/Kaimuki area. While acclaimed as highly successful and valuable within open public discussion, OCS decided that such funding was not to be provided in the future. Reasons for this decision include the arguments that federal monies were short for the 1991 fiscal year and that MAAC was expected to receive state funding that could cover the cut.

A second example occurred in the same year as agencies lobbied for State of Hawaii funding for refugee services. The primary agencies seeking funding were CFS, JPLP, Susannah Wesley, and MAAC, all coming to agreement over what kinds of services would be lobbied for and provided in the future. Upon approval for funding by the 1990 state legislature, OCS informed MAAC that social services and outreach as agreed upon by the state legislature should be de-emphasized in favor of culture and general community development.

To summarize, the first four months of 1990 saw MAAC cut from a formal social service provider working in tandem with CFS, CIC, and KPISC to a culture and arts program with only limited powers to be counselor and advocate for
members of the refugee community. While some city and county funding remained for outreach and referral services, MAAC's place in the state and federal funding hierarchy had been severely delimited.

The good and the bad intentions of these actions cannot be sorted and weighed, but the pattern of influence must be recognized. Resettlement policy, on the federal and more recently on the local state level, funds refugee community MAAs to implement projects that reach specific objectives. Such interaction with MAAs through centralized planning and funding sources is shown to operate in Hawaii, but support of the central hypothesis of this dissertation will require more in-depth discussion and research. It is in the following chapter that such a study is made with a comparison group of local MAAs.

A Model Of Recommodation

The actions of the State, state and local governments, and local social service providers continue to revolve around the acculturation of newcomers for social stability and economic self reliance. While allocative resources are being increasingly required of local government, authoritative resources remain largely in the hands of the federal government. For example, while federal cutbacks require local funding of many resettlement-related services, federal requirements define how such services
must be carried out and maintained. Ideological agreements between the different levels of service provision lead to a continuation of federal guidelines and policy preferences.

Bringing refugee community MAAs into the service sector and co-opting leadership in the hope of gaining influence over the larger population has led to some struggles for resources within the general social service sector as well as within the refugee community. However, service providers agree that some link with the refugee community is necessary, even to the extent of allowing for community participation within the resettlement process. The inclusion of refugee MAAs in the resettlement process has led to their becoming the instruments of their own recommodification. Community members worry that acceptance of government money to implement resettlement policy objectives will only lead to a further interest in maintaining the organization with a lessening of interest in real community needs. The following chapter and the conclusion of this dissertation will address these issues in more detail.

Conclusion

In conclusion, federally controlled priorities, concepts and definitions, and allocation of resources does influence individual state participation in the resettlement process. State of Hawaii coordination through OCS, agency participation in resettlement programs, and
refugee community participation in the process as clients and service providers have been directly influenced by federal policy. Federal desire to bring refugees into the market mainstream without due consideration of other cultural factors, the conceptualization of social services as a marketable commodity, and the use of the ethnic community and MAA organizations to achieve policy goals follows long-range plans set down by the federal government. Such activities, objectives, and goals are realistic, are reasonably effective, and in the end help community members adjust to a new social and economic reality. However, if not judged to determine how detrimental the effects of such activities are, the pervasive influence of State resettlement policy must at least be recognized and recorded as they are implemented on the local level.
1. ESL was referred to in this program as VESL or Vocational English as a Second Language, emphasizing the employment oriented methods and goals of JPLP.

2. It is also possible that the role of DSSH in awarding case management services for refugees to Child and Family Services in 1983 rather than to a local resettlement or community agency led to personal rivalries and bitterness that in turn influenced changes in DSSH shortly afterward.

3. There are approximately 6 unaccompanied minors settled in the State of Hawaii.

4. This refers to an immigrant services apportionment plan drawn up and implemented by the Office of Community Services, Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, in 1986. Such a plan was intended to equally divide immigrant services among the various service providers by geographic area. Special cases are allowed under the plan if a waiver is signed by the client being served.

5. The amount given to Hawaii for FY 1989 was $42,431.

6. ORR announced in September 1991 that, as of the first of October, CMA would be available to each refugee for only the first eight months after arriving in the United States.

7. The services CFS and JPLP offered included occupational training and job placement, case management, and English as a second language courses.
Chapter VI
SOUTHEAST ASIAN MAAs IN HAWAII

Ethnic self-help organizations are community-based groups that have been organized to meet specific needs of the community from which they grow. They are identified by their close ties with community members, group activities and concerns being those that the larger community considers important. Such organizations are often seen and used by outsiders as convenient windows through which information on a given community can be gathered or inferred. Further, the leaders and members of these organizations are commonly used as representatives and spokes people for community concerns and when external forces attempt to intervene in the community.

While participation of such organizations and their leaders in the activities of the social and ethnic mainstream of America is not unusual, incorporation of such organizations into the infrastructure deemed necessary for policy implementation has been rare until recently. Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 noted the absence of minority members and organizations within the very social service structures set up to help them. The federal government has increasingly required community participation in the delivery of services to specific
ethnic or minority groups, and the federal resettlement of refugees in recent decades has included the use of refugee community organizations in the hope of more efficient service delivery.

The resettlement of Hungarian and Cuban refugees in the U.S. depended largely on existing ethnic communities to receive and acculturate the newcomers. The large numbers of Cubans arriving in Florida after 1959 required the federal government to step in and fund more mainstream service provision and resettlement activities, but the Cuban community remained an important part of their integration into American society. The Indochinese were different, no Vietnamese, Cambodian, or Lao community of any complexity existing to help in the resettlement process. The community organizations that now exist in the U.S. have come about only after resettlement began in 1975 and the majority have as their goal some activity or concern related to resettlement.

At the beginning of this dissertation it was hypothesized that the nation-state, specifically the United States, has influenced the creation of refugee self-help groups, delimited certain aspects of goal formation within these groups, and used these ethnic organizations as implementors of state policy objectives. Prior chapters have shown that each of these points has validity. What is now required is an understanding of how such influence takes place within the specific realm of a refugee
community organization. The refugee ethnic organization in Hawaii chosen for review is the Mutual Assistance Associations Center (MAAC), the only refugee MAA in the state that has applied for and received federal MAA support funds. Other ethnic organizations in the State of Hawaii are described and used in analysis to determine the extent of federal influence in MAA development. The conclusion of this chapter then reassesses the original hypothesis and model of recommodification used throughout this dissertation.

MAAs In Hawaii

The 1990 Hawaii State Refugee Profile lists the following officially recognized MAAs or self-help organizations in Hawaii:

- Aloha Lao Association
- Lao Unity Organization
- Lao Christian Fellowship
- Mutual Assistance Associations Center
- Vietnamese American Association

- Lao Buddhist Society
- Lao Women's Association
- Free Vietnam
- The Cambodian Community in Hawaii
- Vietnamese Catholic Community

- Vietnamese Christian Church
- Chan Khong Monastery (Vietnamese Buddhist International Meditation Center)

These are only those organizations recognized by the state's Refugee Coordinator. There are in fact many other
refugee community organizations, both incorporated and not, working for both private gain and public interest. Some of those noted above no longer function while others not listed have worked for many years within select ethnic groupings or political factions within the community.

The following expanded description of Southeast Asian groups or mutual assistance associations in Hawaii is purposely incomplete. This overview of local refugee mutual assistance associations is meant to provide a context within which to understand what significance community-based organizations have within their specific ethnic community. The most important aspect of each of the following organizations is their assumption of legitimacy and authority to represent and symbolize at least some aspect of a given ethnic group.

The Khmer In Hawaii

There are few Khmer living in the State of Hawaii, the best estimate as of 1991 being less than one hundred. In addition, the majority are white collar workers and professionals whose personal ties are more often than not structured by class and professional interests. For these reasons the Khmer of Hawaii have organized themselves on a relatively informal basis and meet infrequently, though at one time an organization meant to provide cultural and social support to community members had existed.
The Cambodian Community in Hawaii

Chhany Bun Sak had studied in Washington state before coming to Hawaii for graduate studies in the late 1970s. She was instrumental in organizing the relatively small Cambodian community into a formal organization known as the Cambodian Community in Hawaii or CCH. As of 1981 there were approximately 81 Cambodian born Khmer living in Hawaii and 6 children born in Hawaii. Of these 87 people, more than a third or 38 people were under the age of fifteen (Sak, 1981).

The purpose of the organization was to "assist in the resettlement and integration of our people in the State of Hawaii." (Preamble to the Constitution of CCH) Of special interest to the organizers was the long-term maintenance of Cambodian culture and language while assisting newcomers in the difficult short-term task of adjusting to life in the United States. "The corporation will seek to unify the Cambodian families in Hawaii by providing them with help, improving their lives and assisting them in assimilating to American culture while preserving their own culture." (Charter of Incorporation of CCH)

The structure of the CCH was complex, following a hierarchical pattern including Board of Directors, President, Vice President, Secretary, and Treasurer. Committees were made up of the following: Health and Counseling; Social-Cultural Affairs; Employment; Education and Training; Housing/Welfare; Communication;
Transportation. As of the 1981 incorporation of the CCH and the organization’s application to the IRS for tax exempt status, all executive positions and the BOD were staffed and complete.

As the make up of committees shows, there was extreme interest in the problems of acculturation and integration shock by newcomers. The areas of employment and probable need to return to school for job skills training or obtaining a degree in a different field of study than that practiced in Cambodia was also noted. Since the incorporation of the CCH few Cambodians have entered the state, approximately the same number as those leaving for other states in the continental U.S. Employment status of the Cambodian population in Hawaii is perfect, no Cambodians being listed as employable and actively seeking employment.

Though the CCH did seek outside funding in 1981 through a proposal written by its president, the organization has never been funded in any way other than through donations by members. The single exception was a single-purpose grant made to the CCH to provide incoming Khmer families with Cambodian-English dictionaries. In recent years formal dues have not even been collected and executive positions have gone unfilled. Formally, the CCH does not perform all of the duties required to maintain its status as an MAA or formal organization in the eyes of the Chamber of Commerce or OCS. However, the CCH continues to
perform its goal of giving a center to the many individual Cambodians working and studying in Hawaii. On an as-need basis members of the community organize picnics, spread news about upcoming weddings or births, and meet to celebrate holidays. This was most recently demonstrated when a large percentage of the Cambodian community got together on April 14, 1991 for a picnic to celebrate the Cambodian New Year.

The Lao In Hawaii

The Lao in Hawaii have organized groups with political as well as military/nationalist interests. In 1982 the Union of Lao Organizations in America president, Khamphoui Sisavatdy, was in Honolulu just before Christmas in an attempt to bring the local Lao Unity Organization into the nationwide group. The national union published a Lao language publication called Atipatai Lao (Lao Sovereignty) carrying news of the Lao resistance movement in Laos and openly advocated the organizing of young men to return to Laos to fight. Sisavatdy was reported as talking to Lao Unity’s president, Khamhien Sisouraj and Lao Unity’s 35 or so member families about donating money to support this resistance (Star-Bulletin, 12-29-1982).

Another Lao group was the Lao Resource Center, established in 1978-1979 by the Lao community on Oahu to help Lao immigrants acculturate and operated through Kokua Kalihi Valley, a non-profit community organization in
Kalihi. The Lao Resource Center provided counseling, translation, mediation and crisis intervention to any in need of their services including schools, police, and other social agencies. The center’s director was Prany Sananikone, a Lao social worker who emphasized that maintenance of the Lao community and provision of a place for Lao to meet, talk, and read Lao newspapers was the real goal of the entire project (Star-Bulletin and Advertiser, 10-12-1980).

A Lao-related organization supported by Kokua Kalihi Valley some years earlier was Laolima Services, a business corporation owned and controlled by refugees, mainly Lao and Hmong, with the help of a single VISTA volunteer. The business specialized in cleaning offices and had the simple goal of providing the means to have increased power and access in the job market. The business was supported by Kokua Kalihi Valley but had its original push from Arlie Porter, the state job developer for refugees, as well as a lot of help from private citizens around the Kalihi neighborhood. Contract sewing for local garment manufacturers was also noted as an area of business that some refugee women planned to enter in order to become self sufficient (Star-Bulletin and Advertiser, 7-17-1977).

Contemporary Lao organizations in Hawaii include the Lao American Organization, Lao Refugee Association, Lao Neutral, Wat Lao, Lao Tenant Association (Palolo), Lao Tenant Association (Kalihi), and Lao Young Group Cultural
Organization. Many organizations survive on paper but not in practice. For instance, the Lao Women’s Association continues to be referred to while Nimonh Chounramany, one of the group’s founders, says that it depended too much on the work of a few individuals with little community input and was dissolved in 1986. Aloha Lao is another Lao organization that exists only on paper while the Lao American Youth organization, no longer recognized as an a legally incorporated group, remains viable and active in the affairs of Lao youth.

There are thus a multitude of Lao organizations and activities, but, as with the Vietnamese in Hawaii, they are not united in their commitment to the Lao community. Kim Himphayvanh, president of the Lao American Organization, believes that no complete community unity exists partly due to the geographic and cultural split within the Lao of Hawaii (many of whom he claims are really Thai) and partly because there is no Lao Wat or temple available to the people. While a house in Palolo Valley does provide a sanctuary for Lao monks and religious artifacts, a Lao Wat with adjoining farm land for use by Lao farmers would be much more beneficial. Although the following discussion does not include personal feuds for power or arguments over community needs, the diversity as well as overlapping interests of the organizations should be noted.
Aloha Lao Association

The Aloha Lao Association began when Lao and Hmong community members gathered to organize efforts at community support and cultural preservation in Hawaii. Recent interviews with Lao community members note that the Hmong had a greater number and thus controlling voice in elections, thus alienating some groups of Lao. This slowly changed as more Lao came into the state and Hmong began moving to the mainland.

The association filed for incorporation in 1978 with total recorded assets being $165. The purpose of Aloha Lao was charitable, educational, and cultural in nature. Objectives included providing temporary shelter for displaced persons, resettlement activities, recreational activities, publishing a newsletter, and preserving Lao culture and arts. In 1980 the association dropped cultural preservation from its mission statement for unknown reasons.

In 1979 the association moved to an office on River Street and elected Jimmy (Samphone) Intasohn as president. About this time it began to conduct resettlement activities funded by the U.S. Catholic Conference through Catholic Social Services. It thus received funding from a national VOLAG to resettle Lao refugees in Hawaii. Mr. Intasohn claims to have left the association out of a dislike for other members who had taken over its administration, quickly afterwards forming the Lao Family Association in
1982. He says that this association was started in an attempt to help in resettling families from other states (secondary migration) as well as assist those coming directly from the camps in Thailand. Unfortunately the Lao Family Association had a short history and dissolved at approximately the same time as the Aloha Lao Association in 1983.

Lao Unity

Lao Unity is an MAA whose primary membership are farmers in the Waianae area but with membership covering the Island of Oahu and with strong membership in the Kalihi and Palolo areas. It was formed by Sisouk Anoulack and others in 1979 and incorporated in 1981 but has yet to become a formal non-profit organization. In the organization’s Petition for Charter for Incorporation, the purposes of the group included: Developing a working relationship with other Lao organizations; Uniting Lao families and informing the Lao community about the organization; Encouraging the Lao people to maintain their culture and traditions; Production and distribution of a Lao newsletter.

Sisouk Anoulack was elected president for the first two years after incorporation, followed by Kim Himphayvanh, and then Maychanh Sivongxay in 1985. Maychanh remains president of the organization though elections are held
every two years. They meet every three months or so, unless an emergency arises, using Palolo Housing as a middle ground for all of Oahu’s membership to meet at.

The organization now has 39 Lao families living in Waianae under membership with approximately 56 children under 18. The total number of member families across Oahu is approximately 172. No dues are collected but when activities are planned members are asked for contributions. For example, when there is a wedding, death, or other special occasion, members contribute money to help organize a proper ceremony. Attempts have been made to bring in external funding for special projects but without asking for the funds to be provided specifically to Lao Unity for implementation purposes. In 1987 and 1989 the present president of Lao Unity attended forums on refugee needs in Hawaii and asked for projects to attend to supporting Lao culture and helping Lao youth in Waianae, respectively. Both times funding was turned down.

The goals of the organization remain similar to those stated in their application for incorporation paraphrased above: to educate the youth of the community; to help the Lao people acculturate and learn to live in the United States; and to help others in the community through times of crisis. The education of youth is considered especially important, looking upon them as a community resource that will return with knowledge and help the entire community.
The majority of Lao Unity members are farmers and Lao Unity has been successful in organizing the efforts of farmers in providing vegetables to local and mainland markets.

Politics have been a part of and continue to play some part in Lao Unity. Mr. Anoulack has said that he founded the organization not to organize a revolutionary front in support of a return to their homeland as many Vietnamese and other Lao were doing at that time, but to promote the Lao people's own traditions and culture in Hawaii. However, a past president of Lao Unity, Kim Himphayvanh, has said that the goal of Lao Unity was to bring the Lao people together but that in the past some funds were collected to send to freedom fighters in Thailand.

In 1988 Lao Unity joined a national organization known as the Lao United Freedom Organization of America. This national group has been in existence since 1986 and the current president, Maychanh Sivongxay, though already having attended two national meetings, is unsure about what Lao Unity may gain from a relationship with them. Lao Unity used to be a member of the Union of Lao Organizations in America in the early eighties. Due to poor relations with this other national group, Maychanh organized a withdrawal when he became president. While organization on a national level is recognized as being important for future growth and to maintain some degree of connection
with political changes in Laos, Maychanh has stated that activity on the local level is what the group considers most important.

There is also a local political connection. The members of Lao Unity living in the Waianae area into a strong support group for the state's democratic party, actively working as volunteers in the campaigns for both State Representative Dennis Arakaki and Governor John Waihee.

Lao American Organization

Lao Unity came to be separated into three parts or emphases: 1) community, 2) employment, and 3) politics. The community portion of Lao Unity came to be known as Lao American and, in an internal disagreement over group priorities, detached itself from Lao Unity in 1987 to be headed by Kim Himphayvanh as the Lao American Organization or LAO.

Recent conversations with Kim Himphayvanh and Sisouk Anoulack find present LAO activities consistent with the purpose of the organization as described in their petition for incorporation: To promote inter-cultural understanding; to unite different factions of the Lao community; maintenance of the cultural heritage of the Lao living in Hawaii; work with other Lao organizations; assist members of the LAO in times of need; and collect donations for the purposes of the LAO.
Donations and not regular dues make up the financial base for the organization and there are no plans for applying for either non-profit status or external funding for special projects within and for the community. Activities have largely been limited to celebrations during special times of the year, support of a Lao music group and a Lao youth kick-ball club, and isolated acts of support for a family that has met some hardship.

National politics also influences this group's activities. Political interests have little to do with mainstream American politics, however. The local community continues to think of their home country and national organizations exist to plan in the eventual resettlement of Laos sometime in the future. The Federation of Lao Associations of the Americas is one of the most organized. With the hope of eventual participation in such national organizations, the Lao American Organization has organized a separate but closely linked group known as the Lao Democratic Party headed by Sisouk Anoulack. Members want a political voice and hope that this arm of the LAO can be used as a vehicle for other Lao in the community. It is separate from the LAO so that the larger aims of the group's members are not taken over by political ambitions or concerns.
The Vietnamese In Hawaii

There are numerous Vietnamese organizations in Hawaii, but the community of seven thousand or so is split by personal, political, religious, race, class, and other factions that keep even the most well meaning of activities from enjoying full community support. Apart from the many religious organizations, the most vocal and active of organizations is known as Free Vietnam. The following discussion of this organization does not take for granted other groups in the community, such as a less formal but equally well organized Vietnamese resistance faction that operates on a low key basis in Palolo Valley. Free Vietnam is highlighted here due to its long history of activity within the Vietnamese community as well as for the varied kinds of service provided for or in the name of community members.

Free Vietnam

The first formal Vietnamese community organization in Hawaii was the Vietnamese Friendship Association, made up mostly of Vietnamese students and a small number of community members living in Honolulu. This organization ended sometime in 1976 as members were incorporated into other activities and organizations that grew out of the explosion of Vietnamese refugees entering the state.
Another Vietnamese organization started in 1975 but lasting less than a year was Vietnamese Amity and has been discussed in a prior chapter.

Interviews with local Vietnamese community members who had been active during 1976 and 1977 found three goals commonly emphasized in early attempts to organize the local community: (1) support of refugees still in camps or trying to depart from Vietnam; (2) helping those Vietnamese refugees newly arrived to Hawaii; (3) support for the restoration of freedom and liberty in Vietnam. Even without an organized community voice in those early years of resettlement, the Vietnamese community sheltered groups with well organized and purposeful objectives that incorporated the above goals.

In 1976 the City and County of Honolulu gave support to these goals through its Community Service Section of Parks and Recreation’s Ethnic Program. The most immediate and long lasting support was in the form of a bilingual (English/Vietnamese) newsletter funded by the City and County’s Ethnic Program. Not published specifically for the group that was to soon become Free Vietnam, this same group of people was instrumental in setting up the style and volunteering the labor in making the newsletter a success. Early copies of the newsletter emphasized Vietnamese community activities, local activities of interest, and national events related to the resettlement process.
A second newsletter under the complete control of an organization informally known as Free Vietnam was begun in 1977. This newsletter was completely in Vietnamese and included more information on the Vietnamese community, events in Vietnam, refugee related problems in escaping Vietnam and entering the United States, and political views and comments. Chuong says that while the organization and the newsletter advocated a return of democracy to Vietnam, the group never actively participated in the funding of activities that would lead to the overthrow of the communist regime in Vietnam.

Free Vietnam finally incorporated in 1978 with a membership of more than 400 Vietnamese (Star-Bulletin, December 11, 1978). It's goals included the following: Unite all Vietnamese living in Hawaii; promote understanding; encourage participation in social and recreational activities; perpetuate culture; and nourish the spirit of freedom. It retains these goals, as well as those original by-laws and requirements for a Board of Directors and Executive Committee.

Dues were collected that first year of incorporation but were then dropped, allowing all to become members with donations being purely voluntary. In the words of Chuong Nguyen, the voice of Free Vietnam: "Dues were culturally incompatible."

The first office for Free Vietnam was the home of the organization's secretary on Piikoi Street, this quickly
changing to an office at the head of North School Street. The latter office was found to be better not because it was separate from someone's residence but because the neighbors were less likely to complain about the Vietnamese bands that practiced in the office. Both classical and modern bands were supported by Free Vietnam as they are even today. Since that time the organization has moved to a number of different locations, only over the last two years winding up back at the Ethnic Program Office of Parks and Recreation in Makiki.

Links with other Vietnamese organizations also exist but national politics and personal agendas do have some influence on how alliances are made. Free Vietnam claims to be but a small part of a large, inter-island Vietnamese network with religious, professional, mutual assistance, and social service organizations making up the many parts. The organizations include the Vietnamese Christian Fellowship, Chan Khong International Meditation Center, Association of Southeast Asian Entrepreneurs, Association of Vietnamese Senior Citizens, and the Vietnamese Youth Club. Free Vietnam is listed as simply a social service group. It is in fact the most organized and socially active of all the organizations noted within its publicly distributed literature.

Activities up to the mid-nineteen eighties show an early connection between Free Vietnam and an agenda that emphasizes politics as much as community support and social
services. The organization was featured in a 1978 article because of its organizing of a protest rally in front of the Hawaii state capital in which 300 Vietnamese and 25 Lao protested for United States action to aid boat people and Thailand border camp detainees (Star-Bulletin, 12-11-1978). In 1982 this organization was peripherally involved in the local chapter of National United Front for the Liberation of Vietnam, informally called Vietnamese Veterans of Hawaii and in March 1983 was involved in another anti-communist rally and fund raiser involving nationally known leaders in both the Vietnamese and Lao communities (Star-Bulletin, 6-1-1982; Star-Bulletin, 3-7-1983). Partisan politics remains at least a part of this organization's place and voice within the community.

Social services have been consistently at the top of the organization's agenda. One of the most active areas of work for Free Vietnam continues to be that of helping Vietnamese community members with immigration problems. In the late nineteen eighties, the most common problem is that of finding relatives, be they in Vietnam, a camp in Thailand, or in Berlin, and then working with the proper authorities to bring them into the United States. Free Vietnam workers, all of whom are volunteers, have an average load of 40 immigration and reunification cases in Thailand per month. In addition, Free Vietnam is probably the most active organization in Hawaii in terms of locating and reuniting relatives in Europe. Free Vietnam also has
experience in turning to the UNHCR when family members are denied acceptance by refugee coordinators in the camps in Thailand or elsewhere.

In 1989 Free Vietnam attempted to enter into the refugee planning forum put on by the Office of Community Services. The organization asked for funding to provide employment and language skills training for Vietnamese women who are homebound and have dependent children under school age. Their attempt at obtaining state or federal funding through OCS was not successful. They then attempted to work with the Mutual Assistance Associations Center to obtain funding for the same purpose. While some funding was provided, the relationship between the two organizations did not last and Free Vietnam withdrew from this latest attempt to procure external funding.

Recently, Free Vietnam has started both radio and television programs in Vietnamese for the local Vietnamese community. Called "The Voice of Free Vietnam," the first radio program was aired in October 1990 over station KNDI. It is primarily informational in nature and provides news and other educational materials twice a week. While the radio program is produced and aired without cost, the television program costs approximately $500 per month for half an hour of Vietnamese culture and arts programming once a week.

Free Vietnam provides many other services to the local Vietnamese community. Bilingual services include
translation, interpretation, help with forms and legal documents, loans in time of financial hardship, and general community support. Major holidays are given special attention, Free Vietnam organizing and when necessary financially backing traditional ceremonies and gatherings. All activities appear to be done on a voluntary basis, even the newsletter being without advertisements or other means of revenue. Donations are the only form of revenue for this organization.

The Mutual Assistance Associations Center

The Mutual Assistance Associations Center (MAAC) is often advertised as a product of the refugee community in Hawaii, many different organizations coming together to help provide services to the Vietnamese, Chinese-Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian refugees living here. One precursor organization to MAAC was CHIMAA, the Council for Hawaii Immigrant Mutual Assistance Associations, a disparate collection of refugee MAAs that no longer exists. In fact, three specific groups are credited with forming MAAC: Free Vietnam, the Lao Buddhist Society, and the Cambodian Community in Hawaii. In 1985, leaders of these organizations worked with Catholic Charities and the Catholic Immigration Center to apply for and receive MAA discretionary funds from the federal government. Due to federal regulations that required all organizations receiving MAA Incentive Grant funds to be designated as
non-profit by the IRS, MAAC remained under the non-profit umbrella of Catholic Charities for two years. During that time the executive director of MAAC received his salary from Catholic Charities. In 1987 MAAC gained non-profit, tax-exempt status and moved its office to Palolo Valley. It continues to thrive at this same location as the only externally funded MAA in the State of Hawaii.

The services MAAC offered in its early years were in the form of job clubs or organized activities under the direction of paid, part-time bilingual staff that helped community members obtain training necessary to gain employment. The three clubs originally developed within MAAC were the Newcomer’s Club, the Farmers’ Club, and the Self Employed Business Club. Though emphasizing business and employment, in compliance to the 1980 Refugee Act and other federal stipulations in the MAA Incentive Grant, MAAC also provided services to help the general population in the process of acculturation and integration into American society.

At startup in October 1985, MAAC contained executive officers, a complete Board of Directors comprised with at least half having entered the U.S. as refugees, and the sponsorship of Catholic Charities and the Catholic Immigration Center. The budget of $20,071 came entirely from federal MAA Incentive Grant funds as administered by the Office of Community Services. Funds covered part of the Executive Director’s salary, the salaries of three
part-time bilingual job-club workers, and office supplies. The majority of the salary for the Executive Director as well as office supplies and infrastructure was provided by Catholic Charities through the CIC. The location of MAAC was the office of its Executive Director, Sengdao Rattanasamay, in the CIC building behind Saint Theresa's Church at 712 North School Street.

At the end of one year of service provision, MAAC's activities can be described as being organized into three sections. First is a range of services for newcomers, providing airport pickup, orientation to life in Hawaii, and referral to various formal service providers available in Hawaii. Much of this was provided in conjunction with Operation Aloha, the refugee resettlement program run by CIC with state and federal funds separate from MAAC.

Second, MAAC staff assisted members of the refugee community in obtaining general social services, obtaining ID, and interpretation services. These services included youth and family activity programs which "provided social and educational services to approximately 300 persons, many of whom required special counseling [sic] to cope with stressful situations common to all immigrant youths [sic] in Hawaii." (MAAC, State of Hawaii Purchase of Service Request, 1986)

The third range of services emphasized employment, operating primarily through the job clubs organized with self-employment in mind. Within its first year, MAAC
"organized a farm’s [sic] club comprising of about 75 Laotian farmers operating in Waianae, Waimanalo, Hawaikai [sic], and Kahuku... a taxi driver’s association with more than 200 members and a food vendors [sic] Association with almost 100 members operating all over Oahu and parts of Maui." (MAAC, State of Hawaii Purchase of Service Request, 1986)

Employment related services remained the primary objective for activities pursued by MAAC though some non-employment related services were provided to the community. The second year of operation included the following goal are listed in MAAC’s 1986 Purchase of Service Request to OCS are:

"Technical assistance and customized training for agribusiness and self-employed refugees.

"Employee counselling through job clubs or individuals for job maintenance and advancement

"Limited technical and cultural assistance to employers

"Counselling and referral services to youth regarding changing roles at home, at school and in the community both in socio [sic] and economic areas

"Pre-employment counselling and referral services"

MAAC operating funds were primarily dependent on the MAA funds provided by the federal government. This second year of operation also saw it acting as a sub-contractor to the City and County of Honolulu, providing Occupational Skills Training for its Refugee Targeted Assistance
Program as coordinated by Work Hawaii. Additional funds were obtained from OCS to study the needs of the unemployed elderly Indochinese collecting public assistance in Hawaii.

While emphasizing structured activities as required and agreed to by contract, it should also be noted that advocacy and general refugee community support was also a common activity of MAAC staff and volunteers. Information and referral services were almost a daily occurrence, even when specific activities were not recognized as being a part of MAAC's formal duties under contract. A good example of MAAC's role as refugee community advocate occurred when, in July 1987, MAAC staff and volunteers organized a rally in front of the state capital with banners and candle-light vigil to protest the planned closing of Kao I Dang refugee camp in Thailand.

By late 1987 MAAC was preparing to leave the umbrella of Catholic Charities and attempt to support itself as an independent, non-profit agency. MAA monies provided by the federal government were being cut requiring new funding sources, a new location was being sought, and a new Executive Director and staff had to be searched for. New staff were sought due to disagreements over the newly chosen Executive Director, a Caucasian male with experience as a federal government employee in Southeast Asia. There were fears that a new location would require a rent so expensive as to deplete MAAC funds but the Department of
Education offered free use of a room in its Anuenue Complex behind Palolo Housing. Additional funding was provided through OCS, discretionary funds being available for provision of counseling and mental health services to the Indochinese community in Hawaii.

MAAC's third year thus saw it rise to the position of being an independent, non-profit social service contractor for the state and federal government. Staff included a part-time Executive Director, part-time in-house professional counselor, full-time Lao para-professional outreach counselor, and part-time bilingual employment consultants for the Chinese, Cambodian, Lao, and Vietnamese community. During 1988 a National Endowment for the Arts proposal was funded to build traditional Lao looms at MAAC and provide for the teaching of traditional Lao weaving to Lao girls from the surrounding community. Coordination with other refugee organizations continued, Lao Unity in Waianae and Free Vietnam being the two most often mentioned in the minutes of that year.

In MAAC's fourth year, fiscal year 1989, a new part-time Executive Director was hired but general activities continued without change. Programs included incentive funds used to provide job counseling, the NEA Lao Weaving project, the counseling and mental health program, and community advocacy and networking. Though these activities appear promising and progressive, many in the social service community felt that MAAC was probably going to
cease by the end of 1989. This feeling was largely based on the low morale of MAAC staff, the lack of a regular salary for the Executive Director position, and the probable cut in federal MAA and other funding for the following fiscal year.

Fortunately, MAAC was actually able to expand its operations under the guidance of a new Executive Director and redesigned program activities. Fiscal year 1990 saw MAAC MAA Incentive Funds and Mental Health/Counseling funds cut, but additional NEA funds and the incorporation of the City and County funded Palolo Multi-Service Center allowed it to redirect its interests toward more culturally oriented and non-employment related social services. Outreach services were provided for the University of Hawaii and Operation Manong, an Aloha United Way proposal to involve children in the collection of family legends and cultural history, additional NEA funding for Lao dancing and weaving classes, and funding from the State of Hawaii was successfully lobbied for.

Unfortunately, MAAC was delegated to the area of cultural activities and community information and referral by OCS, the state office it was responsible to, with the nod of approval from the more mainstream service providers. What remained of the crisis intervention, information, and referral service monies from OCS was removed, requiring MAAC to depend on City and County funds for its remaining
community outreach services through the PMSC. Internal conflict involving the Board of Directors led to the Executive Director leaving in 1990 to direct KPISC.

Fiscal Year 1991 saw MAAC operating with State of Hawaii funds supporting cultural and community activities, City and County funds for the PMSC information and referral services, NEA funds supporting Lao dancing and weaving classes, and funding for a handful of other small projects. The greatest change in MAAC structure occurred when the Department of Health accepted a proposal written by the former Executive Director to organize a coalition of community organizations to study and provide information about drug use and drug prevention on the Island of Oahu. With a fifteen month startup cost of $427,000, this one grant was more than twice the previous MAAC budget.

With the beginning of Fiscal Year 1992 approaching, MAAC will be operating as a social services agency for immigrants as well as refugees and is providing more in the way of cultural programs and ESL services than information, crisis intervention, or advocacy for the Indochinese community. While this direction has been partially chosen by MAAC staff and past Executive Directors, OCS direction of how to spend federal resettlement funds has also influenced MAAC’s lack of participation in case management and crisis intervention. Funding comes from all sectors, including the State of Hawaii, Office for Refugee
Resettlement, and the Office of Substance Abuse Prevention. Funding from the National Endowment for the Arts was not continued into FY1992.

Discussion

While decrying the increasing homogeneity of American urban life, Richardson (1988) has also noted the increasing growth of what he calls mediating institutions. These are organizations that "provide a middle ground between public and private life and between values of homogeneity and diversity." (Richardson, 1988, p. 202) Such mediating organizations are argued to be a primary factor in allowing different ethnic or cultural groups the means to publicly express and practice what is often limited to the privacy of the home.

However, Richardson limits his argument to formal social institutions such as schools, hospitals, and religious groups, ignoring the more immediate impact mutual assistance associations have in acting as both mediator, preserver, and change agent within the ethnic community. The first chapter of this dissertation covers to a limited extent the importance that MAAs play in helping immigrant and refugee groups adapt to a new and strange culture. As Ahmed, et al. have pointed out, "[R]efugee self-help organizations clearly can provide a bulwark against some of the continuing problems such as feelings of isolation and powerlessness, and may provide an acceptable context for
mental-health counseling." (Ahmed et al., 1980, p. 510) In short, MAAs have come to provide an important structure in the maintenance and health of recently arrived ethnic refugee communities.

There are many different ways in which MAAs may be abstractly organized. The most popular means is through separation by purpose, such as political, social service, cultural, or religious (Khoa and Bui, 1985). The purpose of this dissertation calls for a separation that takes external contact and internal autonomy into consideration and for this reason MAAs will be considered as falling into three groupings. First, the geographic and political spread of the organization. Second, the degree of emphasis on a single ethnic/national group. Third, the extent to which external funding and control (allocative and authoritative resources) are depended upon.

National organizations representing the Southeast Asian refugee community abound. These include The Federation of Lao Associations of the Americas, the Cambodian Network Council, and the Indochina Resource Action Center. The Federation of Lao Associations of the Americas remains in close contact with small localized Lao organizations (such as Lao Unity) and receives only limited support from external sources. The Cambodian Network Council has, with federal support and numerous externally funded grants, become a major voice for Cambodians living in the U.S. as well as for those remaining in temporary
holding camps along the Cambodian border in Thailand. The Indochina Resource Action Center (IRAC) has become less an MAA than a centralized and government supported voice for all MAAs and Southeast Asian communities in the United States. IRAC considers itself both a voice or advocate for Indochinese in America as well as a resource for MAAs, community concerns, and researchers interested in Southeast Asian refugee affairs. Of these three national organizations, IRAC is the most dependent on external funding while claiming to provide services for all Southeast Asian ethnic and national groups.

In Hawaii, a number of the MAAs mentioned in this chapter claim to have contact with national organizations but none claim to be local extensions of a national group. Lao Unity, Free Vietnam, and even the MAAC send representatives to national conferences they have some affiliation with but none answer to a national coalition of interests or centralized authority. One, Lao Neutral, does claim to be closely allied with a well known Lao nationalist, General Kong Le, but locally organized activities remain minor.

Of all of the local MAAs, only two can claim to speak for more than one ethnic or national group. The first is the Association of Chinese from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. While limiting its membership to ethnic Chinese, the organization provides a support system that bridges
national boundaries. Funding for this organization is strictly through donations from members and occasional local fund-raising activities supported by the membership.

The only purely inter-ethnic and inter-national MAA that provides services and support to all members of Hawaii's Southeast Asian community is the Mutual Assistance Associations Center. While local in its scope of activities and providing services to both refugees as well as immigrants, its staff and services are entirely dependent on external funding sources. MAAC is the only Southeast Asian MAA in Hawaii with non-profit status (as provided by the Internal Revenue Service) and has been receiving federal MAA support funds since 1985. The allocative funds provided by a wide variety of funding sources necessarily implies externally controlled authoritative resources. Such authoritative resources include increased status in the eyes of the local refugee community, the objective reality of change agent on a large scale as projects are implemented, as well as a separation from community control as project sponsors direct both project and organization of MAAC's infrastructure.

The Mutual Assistance Associations Center stands apart from all other local self-help organizations to the extent that it claims legitimacy and authority to both represent and advocate for all members of Hawaii's Southeast Asian community through the implementation of externally funded and, to a degree, externally controlled programs and
projects. It is, in essence, a bridge that links mainstream institutions and funding sources with the refugee community.

What makes this particular bridge or organization special, as opposed to groups such as Free Vietnam or Child and Family Services, is that legitimacy and authority is claimed for both sides. As a formally recognized non-profit agency MAAC is organized and operated in a way that parallels more mainstream social service agencies. At the same time, MAAC claims to act on behalf of and with the support of the local refugee community. It provides a link between federal resettlement policy and a newly arrived, non-integrated population that other service providers cannot offer. MAAC was created out of a desire for federal funding by some refugee community leaders and its years of accepting grants from external sources has led to changes within the organization's infrastructure, objectives, and personnel. While it is possible to say that the organization has been co-opted by its dependence on external funding, it is more important to see that its relationship with funding sources has come to have meaning on the larger refugee community it purports to represent.

As a formal gate to the refugee community, MAAC provides easier access to the community in the implementation of federal policy. Acting as an instrument for policy implementation, it also makes such policy more amenable to
members of the community. MAAC has become a change agent with the interests of funding sources, for good or for bad, at heart.

Just as funding sources have directed MAAC and utilized its connections with the refugee community, so too have local state and other social service organizations influenced MAAC activity and funding levels. Funding from the State of Hawaii provides the primary source of income for MAAC’s executive director, and to retain this funding MAAC must answer to the preferences of OCS. MAAC must also rely upon the good will of other social service agencies, providing them some level of legitimacy within the refugee community when necessary and proving to them that MAAC can also be taken seriously as a mainstream service provider. MAAC has worked very hard to retain an image of having legitimacy within the mainstream service community as well as within the local refugee community. This is not a contradiction and is a goal that has been attempted by all social service providers, but MAAC’s special role has been to legitimate the activities of the nation-state to the refugee community.

Given the power invested in this organization by the special and unique role it has taken upon itself, special questions about the impact of this role upon the local refugee community must be raised. These questions, in tandem with a focus on the federal role in the resettlement process, will be addressed in the next and final chapter.
The purpose of the preceding chapters has been to provide an overview of state intervention in the immigration and migratory process of the last hundred years. Special attention has been given to refugees, involuntary migrants provided special status and consideration by modern nation-states. Such status is most obvious in the resettlement process, the U.S. federal government providing unique allocative and authoritative resources for the purpose of control over the integration of refugees into the U.S. social mainstream.

Hungarian and Cuban refugee groups have been pointed out as having received special federal resettlement funding. However, it was with the Southeast Asian exodus beginning in 1975 that government support began in earnest and in 1980 was institutionalized into the rights and duties of the American political, legal, and social system. Building on this process of state control, this dissertation also discusses the influence such government-level intervention has had upon the refugee ethnic community and its development within the United States.

The research problem followed throughout this dissertation concerns increases in government control over
refugees and the degree to which federally organized resettlement policy has influenced the creation and development of refugee community self-help organizations. It was hypothesized that state refugee resettlement policy influences the creation of refugee self-help groups, has an effect on MAA goal formation, and uses these MAAs as implementors of state policy objectives.

Four concerns based upon the research problem and directing the research of this dissertation have been: (1) autonomous state policy formation concerning refugee recognition in an international sphere of interest; (2) refugee resettlement in the U.S.; (3) the role of decentralized policy implementation in local areas across the U.S., using the State of Hawaii as a specific case in point; (4) the effect policy development and implementation concerning resettlement and social integration has had upon refugee group formation, specifically MAA goal formation and participation within the larger ethnic community; and (5) the affect a decentralized resettlement strategy has in turn had upon policy development.

Research examined in the previous five chapters has supported the contention that government intervention in the migration and resettlement of immigrants has become more pronounced and centralized over the last century. More specifically, the definition, reception, and resettlement of migrants as refugees has been shown to be a recent and radically innovative way by which a nation-
state, specifically the United States, can affect not only international political opinion but direct the acculturation and mainstreaming of newcomers within the American social system.

The crux of the research problem is the social process that involves the formation of ethnic group identity and the potential effect of centralized state policy upon this formation. The ethnic group in question has largely been limited in this dissertation to relative newcomers to the United States: the Southeast Asian refugees of Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Their substantial international and internal presence since 1975 has prompted far-reaching federal legislation aimed at influencing refugee integration into the larger social system. This legislation, under policy directives set by federal agencies, has been shown to have manipulated individual refugee as well as community group actions.

Beyond the pragmatic aspects of program implementation, it has been argued that refugee resettlement funding, starting with policy initiation, has affected the development of the ethnic community over time. Weber would support government subsidies that keep refugee families economically solvent for their first years of life in America but would condemn efforts to extend beyond the welfare system into the cultural and social boundaries of the refugees themselves. The move is rational, but of too great a danger to the autonomy of the social and cultural
organization of the refugee community in the United States. As with Weber’s antinomical theory of the instrumental-rational state, the spontaneity of the individual is an important element of society that must not be restrained.

More specifically, it is claimed that the nation-state has influenced the creation of refugee MAAs, delimited important aspects of MAA goal formation, and has used ethnic organizations as implementors of state policy objectives. This concluding chapter reviews some of the major points made in previous chapters with an emphasis on how the federally controlled resettlement process has influenced ethnic community group organization and goal development.

The State And The Migrant

Immigration policy was very un-structured and locally defined during the first century of U.S. nationhood. It wasn’t until after the Civil War that the federal government began taking control of the migration rights and patterns of the increasing numbers of immigrants. The real turning point in restriction policy came in 1921 when a bill authorizing a national-origin quota system was made law. These restrictions were nation-wide and, though class-based interests or individual state preferences may have affected policy procedures or the final number of people allowed in to the U.S., immigration policy is shown to remain a tool of state ideology.
While the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 included for the first time a definition as to what constituted a refugee, no formal plan for reception and resettlement existed until passage of the 1980 Refugee Act. The resettlement process both before and after 1980 continued to depend upon three levels of coordination and control, all receiving federal funds to implement agreed upon resettlement services. First has been the voluntary agencies and local affiliates who received and placed incoming refugees with funds provided by the U.S. State Department. Second, each individual state has been given responsibility for providing cash and medical assistance as well as other service support in times of emergency. Third, special program grants have been allotted to local private and public agencies in order to provide English language training and employment services. This structure may change somewhat in the reauthorization of the Refugee Act, but implementation of federal resettlement policy has been thus up to the present.

Mutual assistance associations or ethnic self-help groups have also become important participants in the resettlement process. Refugee mutual assistance associations have been selected as crucial points for study because these groups are traditionally looked upon by community members as physical locales for gathering and as advocates in the larger social system for ethnic community needs. Active recruitment of MAAS into the formal
resettlement process is considered of special consequence due to the multiple and possibly contradictory roles and responsibilities an ethnic community organization then takes on.

On one level it is true that simply passing legislation that makes discrimination illegal or gives additional monetary support to in-coming refugees will affect their ethnic group formation patterns. However, the direct participation by the state in MAA development and goal setting is of greater theoretical concern. As put by Paul Brass in his book on ethnic groups and the state: "Likely to be far more important in affecting the identity, cohesion, and mobilization of particular ethnic groups than specific government policies are the selection by governments of particular leaderships, elites, and organizations within an ethnic group as collaborators or channels for the transmission of government patronage." (Brass, 1985, p. 9)

The participation of refugee MAAs was most immediately affected by the 1982 Mutual Assistance Association Incentive Grant, mentioned earlier in this dissertation. This federally sponsored grant was launched to broaden the participation of refugee community groups in the resettlement and integration process of new arrivals as well as in the job-training programs funded by the government. In essence, this piece of legislation promoted the role of MAAs as formal service delivery agencies, using
incentive funding to leverage support for these institutions (Lewin and Associates et al., 1985). ORR hoped that through ethnically-based organizations its policies could be more efficiently and effectively carried out. Though many MAAs were formed before the initiative grant (500 between 1975 and 1980 and most being Southeast Asian) ORR wanted to increase participation of MAAs in the delivery of employment-related services (Lewin and Associates et al., 1985, 1.2). The initiative was to get individual states more involved in forming and supporting new MAAs while helping others to develop existing self-help facilities.

Of the funds provided, each state receiving a portion of funds according to interest and number of refugees recently resettled, ORR has placed certain restrictions on how the money can be used. In particular 85 percent of all funds must be used for direct employment-related purposes. Technical assistance has also been available to aid staff and others in setting up and running an organization. This has influenced the final make up and goals of many MAAs. "Through its contracting process, ORR has influenced the agendas of the various training programs it has funded. Generally, the emphasis of federally-supported technical assistance has been the development of a capacity within MAAs to deliver services of priority concern to the federal
government." (Lewin, et al., 1985, 2.11) MAAs have generally gotten high marks for helping to implement federal policy on the local level and, with technical assistance grants aiding in developing MAA administrative abilities, future funding to strengthen MAAs will probably continue (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1986, p. 126).

The influence that the federal government has had upon the goals, agendas, and activities of MAAs has not necessarily been to the detriment of the community as a whole. However, the influence is present, pervasive, and has an impact on the community if only through services and leadership co-opted into other areas of action. "While MAAs have frequently obtained a level of effective service provision, they frequently are not providing the type of assistance they would prefer to offer." (Lewin, et al., 1985, 5.15) That is, MAAs have been heavily influenced by available funding rather than immediate community needs. MAAs receiving federal funds have become more than simply a recipient of government aid; they have become the means by which government policy is implemented, thus losing the capacity to perform up to community expectations or meet community defined needs.

It is further argued that refugee group formation has not only been influenced by state policy preferences, but has become a convenient and very effective medium for federal policy implementation. The process of policy
decentralization and implementation has become not a way of bringing local participation into the policy-making process but a cheap and efficient means of financing service delivery as "voluntary agencies increasingly are used to carry out public purposes." (Kramer, 1981, p. 58)

As the nation-state has defined refugees and relegated them to the care of a professional class of experts, so the refugees have come to define themselves along the lines of concepts and vocabulary used by their professional caretakers. "People redefine their own troubles in terms they have borrowed from the professional vocabulary, while at the same time retaining all sorts of other vocabularies current in society." (de Swaan, 1988, p. 246) Applied to the interests of this dissertation it is seen that the refugee MAAs that have increasingly come to bring in outside aid, from the public as well as private sector, have become instrumental in the redefinition of members of the refugee community. The process of legitimation, definition, and resource distribution that had come to encompass all aspects of the social welfare system is thus an important aspect of refugee MAA service provision to community members.

The argument is that MAAs, in particular those receiving federal and other funding, are thus more than simply recipients of government aid; they have become the means for government policy to be implemented. To a great extent the process followed thus far in the provision of
federal and other funding has allowed for a great deal of innovation and experimentation on the local level. Individual state administrators and voluntary agencies in the private sector seem to be very important in the implementation of federal policy through a complex web of decentralized monetary and authority relations. Money meant to aid refugees in need of counseling and job training is able to go to specific MAAs instead of an agency that may not even have a suitable interpreter available. In this sense it is completely rational to rely upon the MAAs. However, it should be recognized that on this level MAAs are no longer a partial effect of state policy. They have come to define state policy ends and goals as their own and thus are active in the restructuring of their own identity.

The recursive nature of modern state policy is an important part of understanding the development of refugee ethnic group formation. No longer is production simply a linear collection of cause and effect, in this case policy influencing group cohesion which in turn affects the degree and kind of assimilation. Rather, with the participation of refugees in policy implementation and goal attainment as set by the state, certain chosen MAAs have become outcomes of policy, even if they had existed prior to shared participation of refugee coordination with the state.

In turn, through their increased presence and power as provided through mainstream funding and recognition, these
MAAs influence other formal MAAs and individual collectives. "At these intersections between the sphere of the state and the lives of individual citizens, expert groups have come to occupy monopolistic mediating positions." (de Swaan, 1988, p. 237) Refugee MAAs that have accepted federal funds for the resettlement of community members have themselves become actors that mediate social and governmental policy as applied to the resettlement of incoming refugees.

Influencing policy formation, implementing policy as contract or grant recipients, and at the same time acting as mediators for the refugee community, gives the MAAs more than just a passive role in large group identity formation. They now act as the means of implementing policy, as the recipient or as a group as affected by policy, and as a recursive influence on the larger social structure that they are a part of. Individual variation is possible, but state policy, as an autonomous determinant of the present resettlement structure, has set the tone and flavor of the original group.

Researchers in the areas of federal policy and ethnic community organization have long voiced concern about the influence of one upon the other. Primary and easiest to follow of federal directives has been the often mentioned policy of self-sufficiency. There are many critical of this stance, stressing that pushing refugees into low-paying jobs will not make them self-sufficient and that
"policies that make political or fiscal sense may not necessarily be in accordance with actual or possible patterns of adjustment." (Forbes, 1985, p. 33)

Dr. Liem of the University of Hawaii has had similar feelings about the reception the Southeast Asian refugees, writing in 1983 that the U.S. government is overly concerned with self-sufficiency and English programs while ignoring cross-cultural adjustment and communication problems. It is not that the former problem is minor, it is that without proper attention paid to the latter, the government's approach to refugee adaptation will remain superficial and ineffective.

While of course refugees require economic stability and goal-oriented activity to aid in the acculturation process, even more necessary is community-based solidarity and communication and information channels (Moon and Toshima, 1986; Liu, 1979; Liem, 1983). A report prepared for DHHS by SRI International in 1981 indicated that the traditional strengths of resettlement that were apparent in local involvement have become lost and the needs of the refugees misplaced. We may eventually see ourselves clear to returning to community-sector involvement, be it through ethnic enclaves or geographically determined communities, but at present the U.S. government defines the structures through which all local state and local groups must pass in order to receive funding for resettlement and, for the most
part, the state agencies who receive government funds are content with the present centralized hierarchy of policy and initiative relations.

Khoa and Bui (1985) have recognized the slump many MAAs fall into once federal funding for programs is obtained, funding agencies or prerequisite requirements coming to determine the goals of the MAA and the actual projects implemented. "It appears that, at least in some instances, MAAs are tending to develop only those programs that they consider fundable by government sources rather than seeking alternative funding to support projects that address the refugee community's priority cultural concerns." (p. 222) Liem echoes this concern, stressing the need of the refugee community to be helped in developing cultural orientation programs and self-help groups while criticizing the lopsided values of the federal government that ultimately affect refugee community acculturation patterns.

In summation, the nation-state has come to influence the creation of refugee MAAs, delimit important aspects of goal formation, and use ethnic organizations as implementors of federal policy objectives. We may say that refugee (ethnic) group formation in the U.S. is the means and outcome in the process of state policy formation and decentralized locale implementation. The political structural arrangements mentioned at the beginning of this
paper have been demonstrated to be effective in implementing policy through lower state government and then influencing ethnic group activities.

The model of recommodification called upon throughout this dissertation aids in differentiating between simple federally subsidized institutions for social support and special federal attempts at bringing groups existing on the periphery of society into the social mainstream. This dissertation has brought forward the importance of the refugee ethnic organization in carrying out this process of resettlement and recommodification. However, the process that takes place within the ethnic organization under consideration remains somewhat vague. The following section is an attempt to better explain the mechanism by which the ethnic organization is co-opted by federal preference and policy. Such a mechanism is explained through the bureaucratization of the funded agency and its realignment of self identity from ethnic community to service provider.

The Bureaucratization Of The MAA

Bureaucracy may be defined as institutionalized, structured, purposeful activity on a group level characterized by specialization of function, adherence to fixed rules, and a hierarchy of authority. Personal
relationships and social history are largely, though not always, ignored, and a pre-determined policy is followed until altered by those with authority.

These generalizations lead the concept to appear as a neutral and objective process of achieving a pre-set objective or goal within an office-like setting. Some of Max Weber's writings appear enthusiastic about the high quality of the bureaucratic method, noting that bureaucratic organization is more efficient and technically superior to any other form of organization. Like a machine, a bureaucracy can get a job done better, quicker, and cheaper. Yet to strive for efficiency is to bring in other un-named purposes and un-seen factors that will influence the planning of objectives and goals.

Bureaucracy has become an especially powerful weapon used by the state in not only controlling peripheral social factions but in turning these normative factions into the means by which the forces of control are implemented. It is for these reasons that modern feminist theory requires that "feminists", of any gender and for any cause, be aware of the context of situations rather than of just the content of an individual action. In addition, to be of a feminist mind requires individuals or groups to be able to differentiate between autonomous and manipulative situations. Forms of opposition that require such feminist theory includes any group attempting to maintain awareness of and autonomy from an external other (such as a
government agency) and are endangered when brought into contact with the bureaucratic form of social control and management. "If opposition can be rendered bureaucratic by the powerful, it can be absorbed, integrated, and eventually rendered harmless." (Ferguson, 1985, p. 180)

This is feminist discourse, to be sure, but one through which all forms of organization and awareness may speak, group awareness and participation within the political arena being the primary concern argued. Such is the present case in the area of ethnic and especially refugee studies.

The bureaucratic process, in particular within a system of advanced capitalism, touches upon the following levels of personal and group action.

(1) Individual: each person being separated from a very specific historical and cultural context only to be treated as a separate entity within a larger mechanical system.

(2) Organization: group formation and community development within the target population being influenced by state objectives and influence through allocative and authoritative resources.

(3) Class: class boundaries experienced by ethnic cohorts having little chance for influence of individual or group definition and action.

Bureaucracy or the bureaucratic model can be argued to cover all processes mentioned, but it is such an over-used concept that the noted breakdown is deemed necessary. While allocative or more material distribution of resources is of course important in group formation, the processes
mentioned are given power through their ability to influence authoritative resources existing within and through normative processes such as group formation, ethnic community development, or even class awareness. The following sub-sections highlight these areas of concern. As levels of manifestation for state processes of policy implementation and development, each will have a special influence on the authoritative nature of any ethnic organization.

Individual

Just as Ferguson views feminism as being potentially side-tracked and manipulated through state and general bureaucratic procedures, so minorities and their separate identities and forms of discourse may be appropriated as aspects of state resource control. One of the most important means by which the Southeast Asian refugees were resettled as they began arriving in 1975 was the systematic attempt to teach them how to act as individuals apart from their belonging to a historically specific ethnic group.

Dale and Foster point out that the federal government restricts welfare workers and other social service functionaries by institutionalizing any and all forms of aid and regulating all aspects of such aid. Social service workers are limited by the bureaucratic institutions they work in and serve as buffers between the groups being
served and the state. In this way state control of the group in question is maintained while hiding the collective nature of social or minority oppression.

It is argued that the individual is separated from the collective and treated as an individual deviant rather than as a member of a non-conformist or oppressed group (Dale and Foster, 1986, p. 104). Bureaucracy and bureaucrats act to hide history and knowledge, subjugating these processes to a pre-formed (bureaucratically defined) means of sensing and acting within the larger social structure. The individual is thus no longer a part of a separate social group obtaining assistance from the government but is an individual member of a nation who happens to fall within certain bureaucratic boundaries and categories, one of which happens to be gender, ethnicity, or some other personal trait.

In the case of ethnic minorities or those refugees from Southeast Asia, the resettlement process takes into consideration only those personal traits that may interfere with mainstream social services and social integration activities. Those traits are then worked with separately until some means of assimilation into American society is attained. Tradition, historic place, and personal reality must fall before a categorization process that negates that which makes the individual real.

It is recognized that many social service workers and social service projects work to help in maintaining ethnic
community identity and client awareness of tradition and culture. However, the integrative aspect of all social service programs, in particular those related to refugee resettlement, is very strong and permeates to some degree even the most well meaning of culture and arts programs.

Organization: Bureaucracy

Entering into a dependent relationship with a bureaucracy of any kind is to enter into a form of discourse controlled by the bureaucratic process. This discourse does not recognize non-rational or emotive concepts and cannot be worked with unless the bureaucratic process is followed by the organization. Speaking of bureaucracy and minority organization, Ferguson writes that "[t]he goals of the organization become increasingly focused on the maintenance of the flow of resources that bureaucratic discourse makes available, and the discourse of egalitarianism and participation dies." (1985, p. 73)

Within a bureaucracy workers are commodifiable objects and the organization is a symbiotic resource that works within a larger process at least partly for its own perpetuation. The policies and practices of a bureaucratic workplace in no way resemble the meanings found in a true egalitarian collective, however much they may look alike on paper.

Dale and Foster criticize progressive health clinics or social service professionals for falling into the trap of believing that, as professionals, they have the means
and the right to define and alter the lives of the people they work with and for. Social service workers, as members of a bureaucratic institution, continue to define the needs of the particular sub-group they specialize in, working not to understand but to help integrate a deviant social class into the larger mainstream. Social service workers and others in the field of social administration may be very understanding and caring, but the end results of the present system are tragic in that social control is placed in the hands of a bureaucratic other (1986, p. 159). When ethnic community leaders or the more educated within an ethnic group become mediators, liaisons, or cultural guides to link resources offered by the larger society with sectors of the ethnic community, a similar result of dispossession occurs.

Also demoralizing to many social service workers and ethnic leaders working in the field is that their good intentions lead them into low status and low paying positions that require them to operate more as implementors of state policy than as leaders for the community. The higher educated either leave the ethnic community behind in a search for an occupation that offers the benefits of living a middle American life or turn their attention to the needs of the community, only to be used in turn as a buffer for state-designed objectives.

The refugees and refugee organizations referred to here are largely organized by middle-class, educated, and
high status refugee community members who see the resource mechanisms offered by the state as the best way for the refugee community to acculturate and organize. The intentions of leaders and organized groups are viewed by the nation-state as a normalizing means by which the larger community can be assimilated into a specific social and bureaucratic discourse.

Community leaders doing the work of social service workers differ from the average social worker, however, for their authority lies first in their intimate relationship with the community. There must first be a sense of community, a shared emotional, historic, or cultural bond that links the individuals in question. This community looks to the leader and gives that person authority as based upon the power inherent in the group. Yet as the leader is drawn away from immediate community activities into more centralized bureaucratic organizations, whatever the formalized goal may be, the link with the community becomes tenuous and vague. The personal relations that gave strength and legitimacy to that authority are lost behind a veil of roles and displaced goals. The leader becomes a person of power without authority.

In a 1978 article, Charles Perrow refers to the unintended consequences of bureaucratically based Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMO). He says unintended because the intended consequences of an organization are often not the primary factors that determine the success or actual goals of the organization. The elements that make up the reason for existence of a bureaucratically controlled organization are three-fold: (1) it must regulate a given segment of the population, such as the sick or the poor; (2) the bureaucratic organization will be absorbing part of the work force; and most importantly (3) such organizations provide resources and are provided as a resource for other organized groups. In the case of refugee organizations who have entered into a formal bureaucratic dialogue with the state or other formal social service agencies each of these points is very relevant.

For example, refugee community mutual assistance associations are grassroots organizations that have access to and influence within ethnic communities whose participation in the social and economic sphere remains peripheral if not a negative drain on public funds and resources. By becoming a bureaucratized arm of the state, the MAA will regulate this particular segment of the population while co-opting community leaders and employing those most able to influence those who are less educated or skilled to work harder and participate in the system. In turn, as resources are given to the development of these
MAAs, they serve as a feeder for more mainstream social service agencies and support the attempts of these agencies to more efficiently control the target group in question.

Organization: Resource Sources

Katherine Newman (1980) has written of how collectives may remain centered on issues and goals that are not displaced by procedural or control-related problems. Funding sources and the extent to which outside aid is required is shown to be the primary reason for a collective to become more bureaucratic and lose sight of an egalitarian and collective form of decision making. For the majority of collectives studied, "the process of bureaucratization began at the point where they had to solicit outside support. Unable to provide funds from amongst their own membership, they turned to a variety of external agencies for the monies necessary to create collectives staffed by full-time members." (1980, p. 149)

Newman's research indicates that even voluntary, egalitarian collectives start the metamorphosis into a bureaucratic organization from the beginning of any reliance upon outside funding sources to support paid positions. One of the most important changes is that paid members tend to hold important positions and control access to allocative and authoritative resources. Paid members are also found to be more dependent than any others on the financial success of the collective, starting a slow but
definite shift of emphasis from objectives and goals to means and efficiency. Eventually internal contradictions concerning the existence of the collective lead either to its becoming fully bureaucratic or to its demise.

It is thus argued that funding may be a means of regulating the activities of organized ethnic bodies while allowing such bodies a vested interest in the structure presently in place for ethnic and minority representation. More importantly, it is argued that the nation-state has come to claim to represent the needs of ethnic communities through multicultural policies or resource sharing. In this way the state is able to depoliticize issues that deal with the needs and objectives of ethnic or other special interest groups.

In addition, by accepting funding from federal agencies the ethnic organization not only comes to depend upon future government support for its continued existence, but comes to define itself and set its goals in accordance with the actions and goals of the particular funding agency. "It is in the relationship of dependency established when an ethnic organization accepts funds from a government agency that one can observe the most serious effects of State intervention in ethnic community affairs." (Anderson and Frideres, 1981, p. 323) Such funding is valued by ethnic organizations not only for the potential
long-term support it gives but for the legitimacy the power of the state gives to the voice of that organization within the community.

Thus, such an organization does not just gain funds to continue its course of action, nor does it simply change objectives and goals in order to implement state policy, but actually gains strength and is more likely to overwhelm other ethnic community voices that have failed to attempt and obtain the backing of the federal government. Given this, the authoritative resources gained through State intervention far outweigh objective goals met through allocative resource gains.

Class And Ethnicity

The separation of the individual from cultural context and the separation of ethnicity from class relations is an active part of an ideology that is practiced by the major nations of permanent asylum for refugees: The U.S., Australia, and Canada. The policies a government formulates and then implements, be they in an attempt at multiculturalism or simple accommodation of a new immigrant group, require from the first the group in question to no longer act as a group. Group or ethnically-based actions are acceptable only when maintenance of the dominant social system and its requisite structure are seen as ultimate goals by a "culturally quaint" means. Multicultural policies of the type presently being practiced or touted by
nations such as the U.S. or Australia are dangerous in that they are becoming "strategies of containment" aimed at ethnic groups. That is to say that such policies are meant to contain the ethnic or minority group in question within a structure that demands an atomization of individual experience and cultural context.

In addition, the nation-state, Australian or American, redefines the culture, experiences, and existing relation to the means of production as "ethnic", a label which should give to each individual a sense of shared purpose of meaning. Instead the state uses ethnic labels as a tool to legitimize social service projects and a means to bring community leaders into the policy implementing process. In the words of Jakubowicz, the histories and cultures of the ethnic groups "are invalidated and rendered undialectical by the imposition on them of the category of ethnicity." (1981, p. 6)

The state and special capitalist interests have also influenced the awareness of the refugee ethnic community of internal class divisions as well as of their larger class interest. Habermas has shown interest in how rationalization of communication may allow a given group to understand how forces within a social system maintain internal conflicts and prevent directed action as a group. Moving away from the sphere of production that other conflict theorists maintain is the root of conflict, Habermas emphasizes antagonisms and class interests arising
between the larger "sphere" of production on the one hand and personal or community life interests on the other (Offe, 1985).

Thus, one's "mode of life" is argued to be a more important area of conflict and class interest than one's objective position within the sphere of production. The themes that Habermas and Offe have become concerned with involve more subjective realities that are recognized as impacting on one's objective life. Culture, ethnic community, and unique history of the person must be given some attention if conditions within, personal control of, and social relationship to the workplace are to be given any validity.

E.P. Thompson writes that conflict is not just within the context of ownership of property but must be analyzed in terms of the context that influences interacting groups. One's ethnic background and cultural history is a vital part of the context that gives meaning and impetus to individual action and then power to group forces. Thompson insists that "capitalism distributes inequitably many other things than "surplus product", including cultural opportunities and power itself." (1978, p. 371) Conflict may indeed come about through the usurpation of an historically specific culture, transmogrified into atomized variables called upon according to individual failings while learning to adapt to the host society. But conflict usually comes about only through a demand for resources due
a culturally unique aggregate. Rarely does a host culture demand recognition of its own inalienable right to exist within its own borders or dominant cultural context.

Jakubowicz believes that cultural pluralism is a form of power sharing offered by those already entrenched within the system. Its intentional consequence is to prevent cultural and political hegemony in any distinct sphere of social organization by factional groups. Alliances are made with ethnic or other groups in order to share political power and resources for policy implementation without moving away from original ideological stands. Such actions are politically reintegrative, the strategy of such actions emphasizing sharing in order to co-opt. Moves to co-opt ethnic community leaders by bringing them into the process also helps in keeping specific groups from demanding separation from the single structure the social system works in accord with.

Jakubowicz specifically argues that state attempts at multiculturalism in fact only lead back to earlier (and more honest) attempts at assimilation. The ethnic group in question is required to submit to structural barriers within an already ethnically dominant system. Community leaders and professionals are thus co-opted not through an act of defiance of their own cultural roots but through their attempts at bringing the rest of the community into synch with the existing system. The culturally and historically specific community loses its power when the
existing structure is allowed to mediate relations between community members, their culture, and their future actions as a group.

It is argued by Jakubowicz that the relationship between ethnicity and class is lost when the larger cultural context is broken apart by well meaning social service integrators and policy specialists. Behind such actions is not accident but an ideology that expects if not requires adaptation to, not separation from, the present social and political structure. This is possible only if ethnicity, culture, and other aspects of the larger historical context are broken apart, separated, and defined along the terms of assimilation.

Ethnicity, as with other aspects of a person and given group, has become separated from the person or group, allowing people to then be treated as separate variables in an equation for assimilation. Such essential parts of a person's and group's contextual and historical reality are then treated as descriptive variables and acted upon by policy makers and social service providers in terms of affective, mediating, or other influences within the dominant social system. Without the larger cultural context to draw upon, a person's ethnicity, gender, age, etc. loses essential meaning and power. In writing of Australian policies concerning ethnic minorities, Jakubowicz states that "ethnicity as ideology mediates class relations, by reifying the history of peoples into a
static category of theoretical labeling." (1981, p. 6) The person becomes atomized through destruction of history and context, then remolded according to the requirements for individual action deemed necessary by social service integrators.

Discussion

Federal resettlement policy is conceptualized as bringing minority, in this case Southeast Asian refugee, organizations into a social service system that is itself built upon the concept of integration and assimilation. Bureaucracy is considered as an end-point for organizations that operate as extensions of state control and implement policy objectives. The bureaucratization of refugee community self-help groups is considered important in that the process highlights the unique relationship that has come to exist between the nation-state and the ethnic community.

In consideration of Offe's social integration model presented in the first chapter of this dissertation, state policy has targeted MAAs as the most logical social locale through which to implement federal integration policy. To bring Southeast Asian refugees into the social mainstream, MAAs are provided allocative resources to implement federally mandated projects. More importantly, authoritative resources or policy directives concerning the integrative requirements of the project naturally adhere to
the financial support provided for implementation of the resettlement process. Such authoritative resources alter the position of the implementing agency such that it becomes less of a community resource and more of a government bureaucracy.

Bureaucracies are criticized as having useful but potentially detrimental influences on the people that are served. Personal needs, assets, and concerns are considered in terms of how such characteristics may help or hinder in the integrative process. Ethnicity or class perception is valued only to the extent that such awareness allows for the creation of organizations that may in turn be brought into a system of subtle integration and eventual assimilation. The bureaucratization of local community organizations is thus a logical extension of a government's need to bring all elements of the general population into a commodified system of value.

Such a policy, whereby refugee organizations become formalized implementors of resettlement policy, thus provides the state with additional authoritative resources: the cultural, historical, linguistic, ethnic and other resources that are originally identified with by the target population. Access to and control of these resources then provides access to each specific sub-group through newly-created or pre-existing gatekeepers. The bureaucratization of MAAs linked with the integration of refugee community
members into the social mainstream is a unique means by which both organization and general population may be organized and controlled.

MAAC As A Bureaucracy

This paper has concerned itself with the effects of federal policy development and decentralized implementation on refugee group formation within the resettlement process. In particular, this paper has reviewed the importance of autonomous federal initiative concerning Southeast Asian refugee resettlement over the last decade with state funded refugee self-help groups or MAAs being a prime example of federal policy influencing community identity and expression. The prior chapter discussed the uniqueness of the Mutual Assistance Associations Center, the only MAA in Hawaii to receive external funding other than through donation or special grants. Given the concerns outlined in this chapter, MAAC should be exhibiting signs of having been co-opted by a process meant to empower the state and de-legitimize local leadership.

While MAAC had originated from a coalition of purely voluntary community organizations, its own staff has been paid by available federal and other externally-provided funds. Such funding has required a realignment of objectives to fit contract requirements, in particular to help refugee community members gain employment and become self sufficient. While none can deny that MAAC was also
there to speak for the individual refugee, the immediate task at hand has been to properly implement contract guidelines.

The community founders of MAAC had hoped to make the center into a social and cultural gathering place as well as a means of advocacy for the refugee community. Unfortunately, federal requirements limiting funds to those activities directly related to employment has had an impact on some MAAC programs and objectives. While employment remains important to social stability and individual well being, the overemphasis on immediate self-sufficiency also retains a potential detriment. On page 4 of the MAAC Annual Report, October 1985 - September 1986, MAAC executive members recognize the inherent problems of stressing early employment for new arrivals: "The new comers seemed to show their uncertain toward early employment or any kind of vocational training. They expressed a need for more time in social adjustments."

However, a 1986 informal service plan for future activities by MAAC stated on page eight that "MAAC program staff and community leaders will develop a more thorough understanding about American bureaucratic processes and long-range planning skills."

Over the following five years, MAAC has grown into a formidable social service agency whose services cover a range of alternatives. Projects are varied, emphasizing self-sufficiency as well as culture maintenance, English
competency, and awareness of the dangers of drug abuse. The original funding made available by the federal government has become only a small part of a very large budget and self-sufficiency is only a part of a larger organizational scheme of activities. What is important is that MAAC has itself become a bureaucracy, a mainstream social service agency that no longer represents and advocates for the needs of the refugee community.

As a member of the social service community, MAAC is recognized by other formal service providers as fitting into the model outlined by Perrow earlier in this chapter. MAAC is responsible for providing special services to the refugee community, is expected to provide employment to the more able of the community, and is especially considered a point at which refugees in Palolo are referred to other agencies for specialized services. MAAC has a place in the larger social service network and is expected to work with other agencies while lobbying for funds to maintain and support that network.

Perrow notes that the way an "organization is used by other interests is much more important for understanding internal efficiency or organization networks" than any test of efficiency (Perrow, 1978, p. 111). MAAC's prior existence has always been dependent upon the willingness of other more entrenched social service agencies in Honolulu, such as Child and Family Services and the Kalihi-Palama Immigrant Service Center. We can say that the goals of
refugee community leaders and the problems they see within the refugee community as needing attention have been placed within a discursive structure manipulated by the nation-state and embedded within a pre-existing network of social service agencies.

MAAC’s place within the network of mainstream social service providers remains dependent upon continuation of programs funded by external sources. It is not the source of funding that matters in the definition of an agency as separate from community roots or as bureaucratic. More important is the dependence of an agency on funds that require the agency to change original goals, guidelines, or authority structures. In the case of MAAC, six years of attempting to be seen as equal to others in the social service arena while scrambling for funding to keep alive has taken a toll. Community representation and advocacy remains but is largely overshadowed by the organization’s need to meet project objectives. The multi-ethnic refugee community that the organization claims to represent has also been changed, the MAAC BOD voting in 1989 to include immigrants with Southeast Asian refugees as the organization’s overall target population. In addition, with an increase in funding has come an increase in the amount of power delegated and controlled by the Board of Directors. While MAAC continues to retain the
participation of refugee community leaders, it does so to no greater an extent than any other social service agency in Hawaii.

When looking back to Newman and her concerns about dependence on external funding, avoidance of centralized authority and dependence on volunteers from the core community are the keys to retaining independence and legitimacy. It is argued that with MAAC’s participation in the daily scramble for funding, meeting funding requirements, attempts to be seen as equal to other mainstream social service agencies, narrowed focus on obtaining future funding, and decreased control of agency activities in the hands of volunteer community members, has had a negative impact on its place as a voice of the community. It is even questionable that MAAC may be considered any more a refugee community based self-help group than any of the other social service agencies.

The question remains whether state resettlement policy and implementation practices has directly affected ethnic community organization and development. There is no doubt that federal resettlement policy called for the participation of local MAAs to enter into the service arena and aid in the resettlement process according to state design. This policy influenced the creation of MAAC as well as MAAC project objectives. Ensuing development into a mainstream social service provider cannot be said to be caused by federal resettlement policy. The
bureaucratization of MAAC has not been followed by any other of the many MAAs in Hawaii and such changes have in fact been welcomed by those who wish to use MAAs as implementors of more centralized policy directives, yet no clear line of causation can be drawn. In addition, MAAC remains but a single agency within a state that contains at best one percent of all of the refugees in the United States. Before even statistical lines of causation can be drawn other agencies must be examined in the same light that MAAC has been. At present, all that can be said is that MAAC is an example of what researchers such as Liu or Khoa and Bui have feared will happen once external funding becomes more important than immediate community support.

Conclusion

The primary proposition of this dissertation has been that state refugee resettlement policy has at least the unintended consequence of altering refugee group formation and, through this, influences ethnic activities. It is through the indirect control of a primary ethnic self-help group such as MAAC that central government policy is able to affect the ethnic identification and group cohesiveness of the refugee community. Rather than influencing their mobilization patterns through resource allocations, state influence over social integration and activity has been maintained through authoritative structures. Though the bureaucratization of MAAC may be linked to federal
resettlement policy, MAAC can realistically only be used as an example of how a mainstream social service organization can grow out of a community-based MAA that became viable only through the support of federally authorized monies.

While federal money and resources are most definitely an important part of group definition and development (witness the protests of other minorities when the Southeast Asian refugees began receiving attention and resources), the influence of the state in forming a recursive structural component within the refugee ethnic communities is really of greater importance. It is not meant to presume a structural-functional relationship here, the individual refugee groups existing to maintain the present social and political system. Rather, the relationship between the MAAs and the centralized policymakers that fund them form a recursive and structured relationship in which national interests and ideology direct ethnic relations and the formation and organization of ethnic groups within the local community. Though no direct line of causation can be drawn, MAAC is an excellent example of how an ethnic organization may be created as a token gatekeeper for the community and then used within that role in the implementation of various resettlement related projects.

It is not difficult to conceive of the Southeast Asian community as a large family in need of guidance, in need of leadership with the means to advocacy in a strange land.
By traditional assimilation theory, the MAAs are theoretically able to fill this role. As mentioned earlier, the concept of the MAA is a reality recognized as essential for Southeast Asian community survival and individual well-being. However, the MAA and Southeast Asian community experience in the U.S. has been strongly affected by U.S. resettlement policy. It is feared that the therapeutic strategies outlined by state policy are hindering social development while making individuals more acceptable for general social integration. To paraphrase Jacques Donzelot, "The MAA (family) is not so much an institution as a mechanism." (1979, p. 94) As Khoa (1985) and Nguyen (1983) have hinted at, the MAAs are becoming a means for policy implementation, thus drastically affecting SEA social development and group behavior.

While production and reproduction of the social structure is practiced by each of us in our daily activities, refugee groups are pointed to as conscious implementors of state policy objectives that make them formal change agents within their own community. As community centers and power mediators (if not holders) MAAs are an important part of both personal life and community cohesiveness. In the role of service provider, as VOLAG or means of resource allocation, the MAA becomes not just an efficient resource center but a mechanism for integrating ethnic collectivities into an ideologically based service milieu. The services provided are not neutral, nor is the
means by which the MAA is set up and operated when MAA Initiative Grant money is being depended upon. Rather, an ideology as influenced by resource control practices followed by the nation-state is being directly inserted into and reproduced within the refugee community.
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