THE 1944 ILI MOVEMENT: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY, FRAMING PROCESS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN REVOLUTION

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Abstract

This research utilizes the 1944 Ili movement as a case study to explore the dynamics and mobilization processes of revolutionary movements. In November 1944, a powerful movement occurred in the Ili area, Xinjiang, China. Launched by Turkic Muslims in three districts of the Ili, Tarbaghatay and Altay, this movement rapidly swept through the entire region, changed the political system, and resulted in the establishment of a new government. This research specifically examines how political opportunities, movement organizations, framing process, collective representation and international relations join together to impact the dynamics of the Ili movement. Methods include the analysis of movement pamphlets, the international relations denouements, and memoires of movement leaders, complemented by interviews and talks with the witnesses and informants, and narrative histories written in Uyghur, English and Chinese.

Findings demonstrate that the confluence of macro-, meso-, and micro-mobilization processes as well as the combined impacts of collective representation and international relations are responsible for the emergence, development and decline of the Ili movement. On the macro and meso levels, the 1944 Ili movement is the outcome of domestic and international political opportunities through movement leaders’ conscious strategies of activating, organizing and mobilizing the actors. On a micro level, this movement was the outcome of the bridged movement frames such as “We Turk”, one God principle, oppression, and friendship with the Soviet Union. During the mobilization processes, the movement was facilitated by spiritual politics of Islam and its sacred cultural repertoire. Sacred cultural repertoire is a new sociological concept developed in this research fusing Durkheimian concept of sacred/profane and Swidler’s
concept of cultural repertoire. It refers to the strategy for mobilization in the name of the sacred. Sacred cultural repertoire serves, vitalizes and characterizes almost all Islamic movements. The Ili movement is a good example.

Findings in this study imply that: (1) no single perspective on social movement can best account for the dynamics and unique characteristics of revolutionary movements; the macro-, meso-, micro-mobilization processes must be equally examined; (2) the master frame and sacred cultural repertoire are anchored in the collective representation; (3) the dynamics of revolutionary movements largely depends on combining influence from five factors: political process, movement organization, effective framing, collective representation and international relations; (4) shifts in the political opportunity structure affect the organizations and resources. Movement ideologies, organizations develop dialectically through political process, and determine the construction of movement frame. International conditions indirectly impact the development of political process; (5) even if a revolutionary movement fails, it would facilitate the formation of collective identity.
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“Love makes the world go around!”

“Why do we live: to love and to be loved.”

These are two sentences I had jotted down when I started learning English in March, 1998. I learnt and memorized these sentences with enthusiasm while attending the elementary English class in Urumchi. Since then, 15 years have passed. I have recalled these two sentences many times, especially when I am moved by the help of good people, and when I am impressed with the power of love in hard times or in the face of evil.

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Yes, love makes the world go around! Especially in hard times!
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Chapter I Introduction

Why This Research?

A revolution is a powerful social movement that attempts to carry out a fundamental change in power or organizational structures, and a renewal in culture, economy and social institutions. For this reason, a revolution can also be a fascinating topic for sociological analysis with its links to political process and opportunities, ideology and organization, movement frames and collective representation. However, sociological studies of revolutions are limited. Few sociologists analyzed revolutions from a macro perspective with a particular focus on their associations with social class and class consciousness (Marx 1848), political context and nation building (Tilly 1978), state and international relations (Skocpol 1979), and Islam and political opportunity (Kurzman 1996). From a social movement perspective, sociologists have not examined the Meso-mobilization process related to revolutionary organizations, cultural symbols related to collective representation, and micro-mobilization process related to collective action frames. In fact macro elements or the structural and historical conditions alone are not adequate for explaining the rise and fall of revolutionary movements. A more comprehensive understanding requires an equal examination of structural, institutional and interpretive factors. This research is an attempt to fill this gap.

The 1944 Ili revolution provides a very interesting case for sociological analysis. This research examines the dynamics of that revolution, which has been described in Chinese official records as “the Three District Revolution.” This movement presents empirical evidence for understanding the confluence of collective representation, political opportunities, mobilizing structures, framing process and international relations on
revolutionary movements. The findings of this study contribute to a sociological understanding of (1) how the confluence of macro-, meso-, and micro-mobilization processes and their linkages provide a more useful tool for understanding revolutionary movements; (2) why sociological studies of revolutions should pay more attention to social movement theory, which has been neglected in earlier analyses.

In November 1944, a powerful movement occurred in the Ili area, Xinjiang, China. Launched in three districts of the Ili, Tarbaghatay and Altay, this movement rapidly swept through the entire region and challenged the Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party) regime. The movement developed so quickly because political opportunities and international relations together contributed to the emergence of successful movement organizations. These organizations in turn generated powerful movement frames. For example, at its earlier stage, with the aid of the Soviet Union, the movement elites took advantage of political opportunities including an economic crisis, misgovernment and mal-administration. They were able to form movement organizations such as the National Freedom League (NFL), to organize clandestine groups such as the Marxism Study Group, and to get access to arms and ammunitions. During this process, movement leaders agitated and mobilized numerous actors by arousing collective memory, emphasizing the forgotten ethnic roots, destabilizing cultural symbols and creating/bridging powerful movement frames. The bridged frames include anti-Hanism, oppression, “we Turk”, one God, which were welcomed and supported by the audience. Furthermore, the master frame of liberation guided resistance and opposition shared among the subjugated Turkic group such as the Uyghur, Qirghiz, Uzbek, Tatar and Kazak.
The paralyzed state inherited from the earlier regime failed to control the situation, and movement actors grew from a few hundred to thousands of participants.

The revolution changed the political system resulting in the establishment of the Eastern Turkestan Republic on November 12, 1944. In January 1945, with the assistance of the Soviet advisers, the Ili National Army was formed, and in summer of 1945, the Ili National Army took over the Three Districts of Ili, Tarbagahtay and Altay, one after another. In 1946, deeply impacted by international relations such as the terms of the Yalta agreement, and pressured by the political constraints imposed by Stalin, this movement witnessed a dramatic change (Forbes 1986; Benson 1990; Millward 2007). The movement leaders were forced to form a coalition government with the Chinese Nationalist Party. With the occurrence of such a political trend, this new-born regime was renamed as “Three District Government,” dropping the sensitive name of “Eastern Turkestan Government”. Although this movement concluded in 1949 with the peaceful liberation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it successfully changed the political structure and social institutions of Northern Xinjiang, contributing to the development of a strong sense of collective identity among the non-Han people who inhabited there.

**Overview: Origin of the Ili Movement**

Xinjiang lies in the heart of Asia and constitutes about one-sixth of China's landmass. American historian James Millward makes an interesting claim on its geographical territory and importance for China: “with an area of 1,664,900 square kilometers, Xinjiang is the size of Great Britain, France, Germany and Spain—or Texas, California, Montana and Colorado—combined” (2007: 4). Xinjiang borders on Tibet, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and eight Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan. Between Outer Mongolia and Afghanistan there is the three-thousand-kilometer-long Sino-Soviet frontier. The majority population composed of the Turkic such as the Uyghur, Kazak, Uzbek, Qirghiz and Tatar who practice a moderate form of Islam.

Located in the far northwest of China, Xinjiang is the largest province in the country. The majority of the population in the province consists of Muslims and other non-Han nationalities. As a pivot of Eurasia and thanks to its immense natural wealth, this region was often a target of rivalry among foreign powers since the early nineteen century. Benson claims: “the rough beauty of Xinjiang disguises the immense natural wealth that lies below the surface. The gold mines of the Altay Mountains and the fine jade of Khotan have been famous throughout China for centuries. Coal and oil were known to exist in both quality and abundance…Other riches in Xinjiang include tin, quicksilver (mercury), uranium, lead, copper, iron and massive reserves of oil” (1990: 20). In this rivalry, Russia, due to its geographical convenience, enjoyed a dominant position, especially in the Ili, Tarbaghatay and Altay districts.

The ethnic roots of Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang are traced to historic and nomadic groups or nations that populated the vast reaches of Central Asia during its ancient and modern periods. With regard to the historical origin of Xinjiang Muslims, Benson writes:

“The first groups of these nomads to settle and establish an empire were the Uyghur, whose first empire was located on the Selenga River, in present day northern Mongolia, in the seventh and eighth centuries. In A. D. 840, this empire was destroyed by another nomadic group, the Kirghiz, namesakes of the modern Kirghiz in Kirghizstan and Xinjiang. Remnants of the Uyghur empire moved into the present-day area of
Xinjiang, gradually establishing themselves in the oasis cities there, mixing with the local Persian-Turkic population” (1990: 23-24).

Islam had infiltrated into Xinjiang during the 9th century, and became a dominant religion by the 15th century. In 1755 the Qing troops conquered this region, but the native people’s struggles did not stop. The region witnessed an array of Islamic movements in the 19th century, which included the 1826 Jahangir rebellion and the 1864 Muslim rebellion. In 1867 the Kashgaria Islamic state was proclaimed and native people enjoyed a decade of independence. In 1877 the Qing conquered Xinjiang for a second time. In 1884 Xinjiang became a province and witnessed a relative peace until the 1930s. This fueled revolutionary movements that mushroomed in this restive, rebellious region.

The succession of Muslim movements from the 1820s to the 1930s were characterized by a single master frame—liberation more precisely---to be free of external rule. This master frame survived across the later movements. As described in the next chapter, between the 1820s and the 1930s, Muslim movement leaders in Xinjiang appealed to the idea of a holy war to remove Chinese rule. But most of these movements eventually failed. By contrast, the 1944 Ili rebellion represented a genuinely grassroots attempt to establish an independent state, which indeed came into being. This movement was the largest, most enduring, and best organized anti-establishment campaign in Xinjiang since the collapse of the Kashgaria Islamic state in 1877.

From 1934 to 1944, the warlord Sheng Shicai ruled Xinjiang. Under his heavy-handed rule, social movements of any type were not tolerated. Numerous people were murdered, arrested by Sheng’s secret polices or disappeared (Forbes 1986; Seypidin 1989; Benson 1990). Sheng’s totalitarian structure effectively thwarted the grassroots
movement after the collapse of the short-lived “Eastern Turkestan Islamic Republic” (1933-1934). Under such a limited political opportunity structure, it seemed an extremely difficult task to inspire even an episodic outburst of collective action; sustaining a movement for just a few days seemed impossible.

Then, given the political structure, how could such a powerfully movement emerge and develop under oppressive conditions? What factors contributed to the movement’s rapid and extensive mobilization? How were activists able to mobilize diverse ethnic groups, and what kind of political strategies did they use in doing so? What accounts for the coalition government on the middle stage of the movement?

These are sociological questions about the relationships among political opportunities, mobilizing structures, framing processes and collective representations in social movements. These questions require the researcher to examine the role of Islam and international relations. I argue that the 1944 Ili revolution is the outcome of domestic and international political structures through movement leaders’ conscious strategies of frame alignment. While identifying ideological as well as structural forces associated with the movement, I attempt to demonstrate how the 1944 Ili revolution was facilitated by bridged frames such as anti-Hanism, oppression, one God principle, and “We Turk;” and fueled by external political opportunities such as the interference of foreign powers. I also identify and analyze domestic political opportunities such as regime crisis, persistent repression and economic inflation. I assume that neither structural approach nor framing perspective was alone adequate for explaining the roots, dynamics and outcomes of this grassroots movement and its ensuing fruit— the short-lived “Eastern Turkestan Republic”.
Viewing from a social movement perspective, the movement entrepreneurs were able to overcome structural constraints and political challenges by using Islam for political purposes, and by creating, bridging resonant collective action frames synthesized from incompatible ideologies such as political Islam, nationalism and Marxism. The leaders were able to widely mobilize the masses because the bridged frames were consistent with ordinary people’s sentiments, experiences as well as traditional narratives of Islam. Movement leaders drew on these frames as well-chosen weapons. Drawing on the master frame of liberation, they developed a set of collective action frames that functioned both as goals and statements about the limitations of the existing system. These frames represented the interests of the masses and were fundamentally appealing to large social groups.

**Organization of Dissertation**

The second chapter reviews sociological, empirical literature, methodology and sources data analyzed in this research. First it reviews social movement theory with a focus on three dominant perspectives such as political process, resource mobilization and framing. The political process perspective helps explain how the 1944 Ili revolution were impacted by the shifts in political opportunities. The resource mobilization perspective helps explain how movement organizations were created, activated and integrated, while framing perspective is useful to illustrating how the movement leaders successfully framed social issues to mobilize the masses. Then, this chapter examines foundational works on relevant issues including cultural power and collective representation, revolutions and international relations, nationalism and nationalist movements. Durkheim’s theory of collective representation helps explain the vital role of Islam and
the origins of sacred cultural repertoire. Skocpol’s approach helps explain how international relations influence revolutionary movements. Smith and Olzak’s approaches to nationalist movements help explain the pan-ethnic elements associated with the movement elites. Together they provide a general framework for understanding the dynamics of the mobilization processes. The chapter concludes with a short review of the empirical literature and a brief discussion of the method and data.

Chapter three as a historical overview traces the origin of the entire processes of movement development. Since the previous movements launched between 1820s and 1930s were largely marked by Islamic symbols and ideas, I first introduce the source of Islamic collective representation and its impacts on the master frame and political processes. Then, I provide evidences to explain the relationships among master frame, sacred mobilization and political process. In the end, theoretically drawing on Durkheimian idea of sacred (1965), Snow’s concept of master frame (1992), Swidler’s idea of cultural repertoire (1986; 2001), and Smith’s concept of sacred foundation (2003), I seek to develop a new sociological concept: sacred cultural repertoire, which might help social movement scholars better understand the source of Islamic movements. The chapter closes with a proposition that political process stimulates master frame, and which in turn is fed and serviced by the cultural repertoire grounding in Islamic collective representation.

Chapter four deals with the external and domestic political opportunities associated with the Ili movement. It examines the new development of political processes as well as the structure of threats and opportunities. Its seeks to explain (1) dramatic changes in the political context and international relations; (2) the availability of a
political ally (the Soviet Union) and Movement elites; (3) the termination of Xinjiang-Soviet trade; (4) Sheng’s state terror and persistent repression; (5) GMD’s misgovernment and economic crisis; (6) the rise of ethnic Chauvinism and forced transfer of immigrants. This chapter closes with a proposition that the dynamics of a revolution and revolutionary movements largely depend on political processes and international relations; external and internal political opportunities join together to create, facilitate revolutionary movements significantly.

Chapter five focuses on the meso-mobilization process. It specifically examines the role of ideology and movement organizations as well as the actors’ attempt to seek a social change. First, it introduces the contents and impacts of three ideologies such as Marxism-Leninism, Turkic nationalism and pan-Islamism. Then the chapter focuses on the formation of movement organizations such as the National Liberation Committee and the Marxist Study Group. In the end, the chapter ends with a discussion of five propositions. They include: (1) the elite support play an essential role in the mobilization process; (2) an analysis of revolutionary movements would be incomplete it ideology and its origins are not examined or only treated as a supplementary part of political processes; (3) there is a strong link between ideology, the elite support and movement organizations; (4) ideology is of central importance in understanding social movements. It is trivialized if seen as a movement frame.

Chapter six examines how movement frames originated from cultural traditions and how they were created, bridged by the movement actors during the consensus mobilization process. It introduces the origins and contents of five movement frames including oppression, anti-Hanism, we-Turkic, friendship with the Soviet and one God
principle. The chapter ends with a discussion of propositions that: (1) ideology generates movement frames and movement frames are different from ideology; (2) in order to recruit more members, movement actors should bridge frames grounding in cultural symbols that represent the masses. The cultural symbols might include collective memory, shared religion, common destiny and territorial sovereignty; (3) in a social movement, the processes of frame bridging and frame dispute are influenced by the political constraints and opportunities.

Chapter seven examines how Islam, political structures and international conditions join together to impact the later development of the movement. It particularly examines how Islamic symbols played a key role in the development of the movement and establishment of the new government, how real power behind the government was later controlled by the Soviet Union and how the movement witnessed a dramatic change deeply impacted by the international relations. The chapter ends with a suggestion that we should give equal importance to the role of international forces, especially their influence on the development of political process.

Chapter eight concludes the dissertation with a recap of the major findings which centered on the relationships among macro, meso-, micro-mobilization processes, collective representation and international relations.
Chapter Two Literature Review and Methodology

This chapter examines the various bodies of literature that help understand the emergence, development and outcome of the Ili movement. I begin the review examining social movement theories, which provide a useful tool for understanding the macro-, meso-, micro mobilization processes of the movement. The political process perspective helps explain how the 1944 Ili movement were impacted by the shifts in political opportunities and threats. The resource mobilization perspective helps explain how movement organizations were created, while framing perspective is useful to illustrating how the movement leaders successfully framed social issues to mobilize the masses. These perspectives complete each other with providing a general framework for understanding the dynamics of the Ili movement.

The Ili movement was also deeply impacted by Islamic symbols and international conditions. For this reason, I review sociological theories of cultural power and international relations. Durkheim’s theory (1965) of sacred and Swidler’s concept (1986) of cultural tool kit provide an effective framework for understanding the power of sacred mobilization. Skocpol (1979)’s approach helps illuminate how international relations influence revolutionary movements. Next I review theories of revolution and nationalism with a focus on Tilly (1978)’s key concept of movement repertoire and Smith (2003)’s approach to scared foundation of nationalist movements; the former helps explain the content and features of sacred repertoire; the latter helps explain how Turkic nationalism enriched the content of sacred repertoire. The discussion links the cultural power and nationalism literature to the social movement literature. In the end, I briefly review the Ili movement literature with highlighting my empirical contribution. Together these
discussions provide a justification for the hypothesis that the emergence, development and decline of the Ili revolution depended not only on the dynamics of macro-, meso-, micro- mobilizations process as well as international relations, but also on sacred cultural repertoire that is anchored in and congruent with Islamic tradition.

I. Social Movement Theory

Two central strands in social movement research concerning political process and collective action frames have been originally developed separately, but in recent years applied in combination into social movement research (Koopmans and Duyvendak 1995; Diani 1996). Political process theory is guided by a conviction that social movements are created by the broader set of political constraints and opportunities unique to the national context in which they are embedded. In this tradition, political opportunities are described (Johnston, 2005: 20) as: “structural factors that affect the actions and outcomes of social movements but are external to them. Political opportunities can be conceived of as variables that shape how challenging groups perceive the likelihood of success”. Meanwhile, political opportunities are dynamic, referring to “changes in the institutional structure or informal power relations” (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996b: 3). By contrast, the concept of framing provides a very useful link between macro-level concepts such as political opportunity structure, micro-level mobilization processes, and the long term evolution of political and ethnic identities. Framing perspective centered on the notion that organizers must “frame the world in which they are acting” (Snow et al. 1986: 465). According to Johnston (2005), a focus on “frames”, the cognitive constructs activists use to interpret grievances and events, links political opportunity structures to both social movement strategies and collective identity
formation. “To make participation more attractive,” concurs Verta Taylor, “organizations must elaborate alternative cultural frameworks to provide security to provide security and meaning for those who reject the established order and remain in the group” (1989: 769). In combination, these two approaches provide an integrative tool to understand the link between macro mobilizations, meso-mobilization and micro-level mobilization processes which together influence the long term evolution of movement.

**Political Opportunity and Process**

By political opportunity I refer to consistent—but not necessarily formal, permanent or national—dimensions of the political environment which either encourage or discourage people from using collective action (Kurzman, 1994). Social movements emerge when ordinary citizens, sometimes encouraged by leaders, respond to changes in opportunities that reveal potential allies and show where elites and authorities are vulnerable. In social movement studies, the political process approach has focused on factors shaping movement emergence and development, most importantly political opportunities. Some scholars highlight the role of shifts in political constraints and opportunities structures that affect the trajectory of racial and ethnic social movements (McAdam 1999; Morris 1984; Andrews 2001). Kriesi argues that the political context approach in social movement theory accounts for the emergence of contention (2004). Tarrow (1994: 18) argues that political opportunity model helps us to understand why movements do not appear only in direct response to the level of supporters grievances. For it is political opportunities that translate the potential for movement into mobilization, then even groups with mild grievances and few internal resources may appear in movement, while those with deep grievances and dense resources—but lacking
opportunities---may not. The concept of political opportunity structure will also help us to explain how opportunities are seized and created.

McAdam (1999) demonstrates in his study of the US civil rights movement that shifts in political opportunities stimulate the rate of protest activity. Unlike earlier theories that looked only at social movements after they had emerged as formal organizations, McAdam’s political process theory used a much longer historical approach to explain the trajectory of changing political opportunities and constraints that led the civil rights movement to emerge forcefully at a particular historical moment in American history. Tarrow and Costain argue that changes in some aspect of a political system create new possibilities for collective action by a given challenger or set of challengers (1989a; 1992). Olzak claimed that the dynamics of collective action depends on political context including response to the ethnic claims by competing ethnic groups (2006). These approaches helps explain the expansion of opportunities and its opposite, the increase in political threats or constraints that impacted the movement development in the valley during the 1940s.

Framing Process

A frame is an “interpretive schema that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action” (Snow and Benford 1988: 137), thus organizing experience and guiding action by “rendering events or occurrences meaningful” (Snow et al. 1986: 464). A master frame is a macro frame that serves as the hot cognition and central value continuously impacting the cycles of protest and the subsequent developments. It evolves over time and confronts alternative interpretations. As Johnston argues (2005: 10):
“A master frame is a more general, but especially powerful –in that it evokes powerful cultural symbols---interpretive package. Master frames are linked to cycles of protest---provides of intense social activity in which the mobilization of various movements overlap in time and are often linked to one another. An innovative master frame, for example, can spark derivative collective action frames and tactical innovations at the initiation of a cycle”.

According to Johnston (2005: 165), so far three main determinants of a successful frame have been identified and theorized in social movement studies. First, political opportunity structures such as the distribution of political power and access, the availability of elite allies, and the opportunity to form coalitions, all affects the success of different mobilizing messages. The second factor that determines the viability of a particular movement frame is the relationship between a movement and its competitors. As Stephen Ellingson (1995) observes, movement fields are populated by multiple organizations in systems of alliances and rivalries. “Social movements construct the identities of protagonists, antagonists, and audiences within a movement’s field. … one of the common modes of differentiation is for speakers to structure their discourses around various sets of poles that condense what the debate is about and what can be discussed and what problems can be addressed” (Elingson 1995: 105-106). Charles Tilly argued (1978) that, social movements create or activate paired unequal categories. The ‘we’ of social movements comprises a whole category of unjustly treated persons or organizations. The ‘they’ consists of others whose action or inaction allegedly causes the condition activists are protesting…Social movements involve the construction and enforcement of unequal paired categories. Third, cultural constructs and identities forged by the previous social movements “enter the political culture…[and] serves a symbols mobilized by future movement entrepreneurs” (Tarrow 1994).

Resource Mobilization
Resource mobilization theory discusses movements as organizations focusing especially on the needs of such organizations to mobilize resources. In this theory, the term of ‘resources’ has a wide array of meanings, including economic resources, ideologies, rhetoric, and symbols. Most importantly, it examines the organizational dynamics of collective action (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996). This perspective developed in social movement research by borrowing many useful insights from organizational sociology (Clemens and Minikoff 2004). It was first proposed by McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977) who proposed that social movement organizations could be analyzed like any other organization, as the result of efforts by rational actors to mobilize available resources and build a formal organization to promote the goals of a social movement. It therefore focused on what resources were available and how the movement utilized them to build and maintain their movement organizations. It also analyzed the role of particular categories of people in relation to the social movement organization as resources. Organizations may allow movements to persist through periods when opportunities for influence are minimal (Andrews 1997; Taylor 1989). Some scholars highlighted the role of formal and informal organizations in protecting and sustaining activists during hard times (Morris1984; Taylor 1989).

Gamson argues that organizations are resources, effective organizations can be seen as hierarchies, and hierarchical organizations are valuable resources for movements (1990). Andrews argues that: “organizations are significant because they directly implement changes themselves” (2005: 110). According to Clemens and Minkoff: “the more we learn about what goes on inside of activist organizations and how such organizations are themselves embedded in complex fields of culture, politics, and action,
the more we know about the dynamics of movement development and change” (2004: 166). In this case, a focus on the internal organization and functions of movement organizations helps explain the growth, activities, and success of the 1944 revolution.

Cultural Power and Collective Representation

Rediscovering Durkheim: Sacred, Religion and Collective Representation

“Recent developments in cultural studies have moved in a more Durkheimian direction, seeing culture as constitutive, inherently collective, imbedded in symbols and practices, and necessarily infused with power” (Swidler, 1995: 38; also Alexander 1988; Alexander and Smith 2005; Smith and Riley 2009). Although Emile Durkheim pioneered functionalism, recent trends in cultural analysis have also witnessed a break of Durkheimian cultural sociology from functionalism. Being distinct from Parsonian functionalism, this new trend is called Durkheimian tradition and strongly influenced by the later Durkheim’s “Early Forms of Religious Life” (Smith and Riley 2009). Durkheimian tradition is characterized by its emphasis on cultural autonomy as well as the structure and process of meaningful systems; which are taken to be universal regardless of historical time and place.

Hall, Neitz and Battani argue that, “Durkheim focus on culture as a force of social integration”, in his view, “culture is a medium for power: people who operate within the boundaries of a culture are dominated by its categories and meanings” (2003: 174). In Early Forms of Religious Life, Durkheim wrote, religion is “unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things” (1965: 52). In order to explain how religious force integrates a society, he looked at the most primitive forms of religion—the totemism of Australian aborigines and certain American groups. In his account, the distinctive character of religion is that the world is divided into sacred and profane realms which are
opposed to one another. People first become aware of the collective nature of their lives through religion. Religion brings together believers into the ceremonial organizations such as Church. The sacred is surrounded by myriad rituals and prohibitions which distance it from the profane.

Collective representation is a key concept formulated in Durkhiem’s book. For Durkheim, all cultural systems including religion are collective representations; society is essentially a collection of sacred symbols and ideals. Religion, as a form of collective representation, serves as the vehicle of a fundamental process in which publicly shared symbols constitute social groups. In his view, religion is the basis for all categories of thinking, and religion and categories of thinking alike “are collective representations which express collective realities” (1965: 22). In another word, groups and societies need collective representations of themselves to inspire sentiments of unity and mutual support, and culture fulfills this need. According to Swidler, Durkheimian collective representation may range from the vivid totemic symbol to moral beliefs to modern society’s commitment to reason and individual autonomy (1995). According to Robert Bellah, collective representations the vehicles of a fundamental process in which publicly shared symbols constitute social groups while they constrain and give form to individual consciousness (1973).

Durkheimian idea about sacred and collective representation influenced many sociologists and anthropologists such as Robert Hertz, Victor Turner and Mary Douglas who assume that society is governed by cultural patterns and shared beliefs. Hall, Neitz and Battani argue that (2003: 174), Durkeimian scholars tend to see “culture as a medium of power and a profound source of spiritual meaning”. For example, Robert Hertz,
Durkheim’s student, studied (1960) death as “collective representation”, that is as something that derives from the social and symbolic life of the community. Meanwhile, at the core of Victor Turner’s analysis was a Durkheimian thinking about collective representation. In *Ritual Process*, Turner examined “the role of symbols—religious, mythic, aesthetic, political, and even economic in social, cultural processes” (1969: v). His research demonstrated that liminality can be seen as an incitement to action and social change; societies or groups tend to oscillate between periods of order and periods of disorder; communities involved contact with the sacred, generated intense emotional experience and were responsible for renewing social bonds and energies. Turner explained his arguments with a discussion of kinship and the ancient ritual process involved in the ascension of a king among the Ndembu of Zambia. Turner applied Durkheimian concept of collective representation into his analysis of symbols and rituals.

Following Durkheim, in her *Purity and Danger*, Mary Douglas (2002[1965]) examined the power of symbolic pollution to understand the link between classification system and the dangerous. Douglas looked at Jewish dietary prohibitions as set out in the biblical book of Leviticus. Her research demonstrated that the sacred and profane are not only intracultural sources of symbolic classification but sources of strong moral and emotional commitment, and in fact, social control. Ideas of purity and danger are central to cultural life. Pollution is a weapon for classifying and strengthening the symbolic order.

**Movement Repertoire and Cultural Repertoire**

In his book, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, Tilly (1978) sought to understand the link between power and collective action in general and political mobilization in particular. He introduced what he called the “mobilization” model of collective action,
arguing that “collective action consists of people’s acting together in pursuit of common interests. Collective action results from changing combinations of interests, organization, mobilization, and opportunity (1978:7). In this book, Tilly formulated the concept of movement action repertoire, which he sees as driven by strategic considerations of costs and effects in interaction with existing authority. The notion of repertoire refers to the specific kinds of protest and discontents that emerge among common people in an historical epoch.

Understanding how culture shapes social movements requires rethinking how culture works (Swidler 1995). Scholars such as David Snow and Robert Beneford (1988; 2000) stress the cultural preconditions or movement frames of social movements. Friedman and McAdam argue that, movements are the sites where new cultural resources, such as identities and ideologies, are most frequently formulated (1992). Swidler is not a social movement scholar. But, among other things, she attempted to account for the relationship between culture, power and collective identity (1986). She argues that culture becomes more important in unsettled times of social unrest, revolution, war, and the like. In stable times cultural experiences and socially structured situations reinforce each other, but when times are unsettled, submerged ideologies can establish new styles or strategies for action. In unsettled times core cultural meanings are destabilized. At such a time culture serves as a “tool kit”, thus, analysis should focus on culture as a casual agent in “providing cultural components that are used to construct strategies of action” (1986: 273). In “Talk of Love”, Swidler (2001) further formulated the concept of cultural repertoire to develop a general concept of culture that allows it to play a casual role in influencing action. For Swidler, cultural repertoire refers to a “tool kit” of symbols,
stories, and worldviews that people use to solve different problems. Under her model, culture is not a unified system but a repertoire from which to draw. Culture provides the components used to construct “strategies of action” or “persistent ways of ordering action through time” and can thereby have a casual role. The elements that shape one’s tool kit come not only from direct experiences or social interaction but also from the wider culture through institution such as the media, schooling and religion.

**Revolution, Nationalism and Nationalist Movements**

**Revolution and International Relations**

By revolutionary movement I mean “a social movement that seeks, at minimum, to overthrow the government or state” (Goodwin and Jasper, 2009: 4). The concept is employed to denote a change in socio-political institutions. Jeff Goodwin gives two definitions of a revolution. According to him, broadly speaking, a revolution refers to “any instance in which a state or political regime is overthrown and thereby transformed by a popular movement in an irregular, extra-constitutional or violent fashion”. In a narrow sense, a revolution refers not only to “mass mobilization and regime change, but also more or less rapid and fundamental social, economic or cultural change, during or soon after the struggle for state power” (Goodwin, 2001: 11). According to Charles Tilly (1978), revolution and revolutionary movements are the outcome of power struggle between competing interest groups.

In her influential book titled *States and Social Revolutions*, Skocpol (1979) examines the role that the structural conditions and international forces played in the major revolutions of the past two centuries. According to her, the nature of social
revolutions can’t be fully examined with the existing Marxist or non-Marxist theories because most of them neglect the origins of social revolutions. She argues:

“Transnational relations … contribute to the emergence of all social revolutionary crises and… invariably help to shape revolutionary struggles and outcomes….all social revolutions must be seen as closely related in their causes and accomplishments to the internationally uneven spread of economic development and nation-state formation on a world-scale. Unfortunately, existing theories of revolution has not explicitly taken this perspective (Skocpol, 1979: 19)”.

**Nationalism and Nationalist Movements**

The concept of nationalism has been much discussed by many sociologists such as Ernest Gellner (1983), Michael Hechter (2000), Anthony Smith (2003), Susan Olzak (2006), and few scholars in other disciplines such as Deusch (1969), Anderson (1991), leading to the formation of several schools of thoughts. According to Gellner (1983), nationalism, as a form of political and social expression, emerged in the eighteenth century with the emergence of the first modern nation-states in Europe and the United states. Gellner argued that nationalism is the reaction to the disintegrating and fragmenting consequences of industrialization. Gellner’s assumptions on nationalism are based on his broader conception of the modern era breaking with the past, and which can never be reversed, despite the nostalgia for some aspects of pre-modern era. Unlike so many other scholars of nationalism, Anderson (1991) refuses to view nationalism as the product of other forces such as industrialization, massive socio-economic change. Anderson maintained that while Marxism is unable to move people to the same level of personal sacrifice, the success of nationalism lies in its paradoxical ability to combine universalism and particularism while remaining compatible with a range of political ideologies.
Anthony Smith is Gellner’s student. But his assumption on nationalism makes an interesting contrast to Ernest Gellner’s. Smith (2003) defines nationalism as an ideological movement that supports a people’s desire to become independent like other nations. According to Anthony Smith (2003), a sacred foundation of the people provides the political basis of nationalist movements. In his word, sacred foundation constitutes three underlying dimensions of the nation: community, territory, and destiny. In a same manner, Olzak argues (2004) that nationalist movements are social movements invoking claims for territorial sovereignty.

Religious nationalism also triggers its influence on the movement because religious beliefs and cultural practices were integrated and rarely divorced from ethnic sentiments. Robert Nisbet (1996) argues that religion goes to the heart of most classical sociology; the concern for religion and community, along with authority, legitimacy and order were dominant concerns of the classical sociologists. According to Anthony Smith (2003), a sacred foundation of the people provides the political basis of nationalism. In his word, sacred foundation constitutes four underlying dimensions of the nation: community, territory, history, and destiny. These four dimensions, in turn, constitute the “core doctrine” of nationalistic belief system. Dingley (2007: 6) argues that: “religion, as a significant element in the construction of national and ethnic categories, provides a natural link for society and nation, which goes to the heart of Durkheim’s sociology”.

The Ili Movement Literature

A lot of efforts to study Xinjiang in the 20th century have been made by Western Scholars. But the Ili movement has received little attention. While none of the existing
studies has examined the movement from a social movement perspective, the literature does raise some critical questions about the nature of the Ili movement.

Lattimore, the most well-known Central Asian scholar in the West, dealt with Xinjiang during this period. His book, *Pivot of Asia: Xinjiang and the Inner Asia Frontiers of China and Russia* (1950), is the first comprehensive study of the contemporary Xinjiang in the West. A full analysis of the GMD’s ethnic policy from 1944-1949 in Xinjiang is presented in Chapter 3: “Chinese Policy in Xinjiang.” It indicates that the failure of the GMD in Xinjiang was the trigger of the Ili revolution (Lattimore, 1950: 90-93). Whiting’s *Sinkiang* (another way of spelling Xinjiang in English): *Pawn or Pivot* (1958) focuses on the contentious politics and diplomatic relations between Chinese state and the Soviet Union. Unlike Lattimore, Whiting views the movement as the result of Sino-Soviet relations between 1944 and 1949.

Jack Chen’ *Sinkiang Story* (1977), a comprehensive history of Xinjiang between 1910s and 1970s, roughly covers the Ili movement. According to Chen, the Ili rebellion “was a revolutionary, national liberation struggle…deeply influenced by the ideas Marxism-Leninism” (1977: 272). With respect to the Soviet Union role in the negotiations between the Ili regime and the GMD, he claims that it was a product of socialist internationalism. Donald McMillen’s work *Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949-1977* (1979) is a political history of Contemporary Xinjiang after 1949. In his view, the Ili revolution was supported by the Soviet Union. He writes in his book: “throughout the course of the Ili rebellion, the insurgence was given support and encouragement by the Soviets” (McMilen, 1979: 22). But he does not provide any details about GMD policy and the relations between the ETR and the Soviet Union.
Forbes’s *Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: a Political History of Republican Sinkiang, 1911-1949* (1986) dealt with the internal warlords and Islamic polices of Xinjiang as well as the “great power” interests in this region. The last two Chapters, entitled “Sinkiang, 1944-1946: Muslim Separatism under Guomindang” and “Sinkiang, 1946-1949: Muslims on the Eve of the Communist Takeover,” are about this period. Hasiotis’s thesis (1987) covers the Soviet’s political, economic and military involvement in Xinjiang from 1928 to 1949. It specifically examines the aims, policies and methods of the Soviet Union and its attempts to control Xinjiang during the period from 1928 to 1949. His study offers a much fuller account of the international background to Xinjiang affairs. *The Ili rebellion: the Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944-1949* (1990) by Benson is the only monograph which focuses on the 1944-1949 period of Xinjiang history. Unlike other Western scholars who approach Xinjiang affairs from a rather broad background of world history, Benson focuses on the policy of the Chinese government. In her own words, her study is “an investigation of Chinese government policy in Xinjiang, between 1944-1949, as seen in the Chinese response to the Ili rebellion and establishment of the Eastern Turkistan Republic” (1990: ix). According to Benson, Chiang Kai-shek, “erroneously believed that the USSR was in fact behind the formation of the Ili rebellion” (1990; 178). None of these studies however analyze the relations between the macro and micro elements associated with the Ili movement.

Among the eyewitness accounts, Zhang Zhizhong’s autobiography, *The Xinjiang Question: from Negotiations in Urumchi to Peaceful Liberation* (1994) contains evidence of policy and involvement in the negotiations. He recalls his several talks with the Soviet
Consul in Urumchi and the process of long negotiations between 1945 and 1946. Burhan (The Xinjiang Governor posted from 1948 to 1955)’s *Fifty Years of Xinjiang* (1990) is a history of modern Xinjiang as well as his own personal story. It includes all major historic events and personalities in Xinjiang. His autobiography is a very vivid first-hand source for scholars focusing on this period.

However, while describing the structural roots and consequences of the Ili revolution, the empirical literature failed to explain many elements. Specifically, they overemphasized the role of international relations and structural nature of opportunities neglecting the role of Islamic symbols and the collective action frames on the basis of which the mass were mobilized. I will use this case to address this shortcoming. This is a perfect case for understanding the link among international relations, political opportunities, framing process and collective representations.

**Method and Data**

I have attempted to evaluate the data presented on the various levels and to analyze them according to the main themes that emerged in the relevant literature. Since my case is historical, and historical sociology largely depends on secondary data, I mostly rely on secondary sources written in Uyghur, English and Chinese. They include previously accessible but unexplored materials such as memoirs, leaflets and movement documents. Together, these materials present a fairly comprehensive picture of the dimensions of the Ili movement: political process and opportunities, resources, symbols and strategies, ideologies and subsequent frames, frame bridging and frame disputes, master frame of independence and its transformation, contention and counter-movements, foreign powers and the ways they pursued their own goals in a strategic region after
World War II. Of the most importance are two documents: the “the Ili Declaration: Struggle for Motherland”, which was drafted by the Soviet Counsel in Ili; and the movement pamphlet titled “Why are We Fighting?”, which was drafted by Alihan Tore, the president of the East Turkestan Republic. Both of these two important documents were put in Benson’s book as appendixes. But Benson did not analyze these documents. According to Benson (1990), the original translations of these two documents were made for the U.S Consulate in Urumchi. *The Ili Declaration* helps understand the movement goal, political structures and international relations while the pamphlet helps understand the framing process, particularly how the movement leaders were able to widely mobilize the masses by bridging frames resonated with ordinary people’s sentiments, experiences as well as traditional narratives of Islam, nationalism and pan-Turkism. Meanwhile, the international relations documents such as *The Coalition Government Peace Treaty* and *the Yalta Agreement* (see appendix) proved to very helpful. *The Treaty* reveals the contents of negotiations between the ETR representatives and the GMD regime, while *The Yalta Agreement* helps explain how the international relations played a key role in the decay of the movement.

Also, of basic importance are memoirs and eyewitness accounts of the movement, most of which I found at the Indiana University Library during my field work in Bloomington. The primary date analyzed in this research include Seypidin (Education Minster of the Coalition Government 1945-1947)’s *Tengritagh Eagle* (1988, Biography of another Marxist Leader Abbasov) and *My life: a Memoir* (1989), Bughra (The Civil Affair Minster of the Coalition Government)’s *My Struggle* (1989), Seypullayew (the Editor-in-Chief of “National Struggle”, a Monthly of the Eastern Turkestan Republic)’s
the Anecdotes I had Witnessed (2004). The memoir of Seypidin mirrors the shifts in the political opportunity structures, formation of Uyghur organizations and transformation of master frame from independence to autonomy. His other book titled Tengritagh Eagle (1988) confirms the fact that the Soviet indeed interfered in the movement. I drew on these materials as life history.

Some participants in the movement published their own memoirs too. Among them, Saudanov, the head of the political department of the East Turkestan Revolutionary Army, recalled the main stage of the Ili Revolution in his book entitled The Adventures of Ili Revolution (1994). He cited Mao Zedong’s statement that “the Three District Revolution was a part of the People’s Democratic Revolution of China”. Furthermore, the 50 Year of Xinjiang”, a memoir of Burhan Shahidi, an important historical figure in contemporary Xinjiang, also described how the Soviet assisted the movement. But since all of these publications follow the official line of the Chinese authorities, I tended to read them with critical eyes, and if necessary, turned to secondary English sources written by Western scholars.

Interviews and interview notes with the informants and the witnesses of the movement provided me with the helpful information to fill in the gap between secondary English sources presently available and memoirs previously published in Uyghur and Chinese. I interviewed some ten people. One of the interviewees told me very important information about the development of the Ili revolution. Others help me identify the relationships between the assistance of the Soviet and the frame of friendship with the Soviet. The interview with an informant, a historian in Washington DC helps to make
clear the claims and political contexts of the Uyghur activists in the Soviet Central Asia during the 1930s and 1940s.

**Contribution of This Research**

This research contributes to the above literature, as it weaves together components of Snow and Benford’s theory (1986, 1992) of framing process, Durkheim (1965) and Swidler’s theories of cultural power (1986, 2001) and Tilly’s concept of movement repertoire (1978). Unlike the previous studies of revolution only concerned with structural factors, this research seeks to examine how combined factors such as political opportunities, movement organizations, framing process, collective representation and international relations join together to impact the revolutionary movements. It was hypothesized that the confluence of macro-, meso-, and micro-mobilization processes as well as the combined impacts of collective representation and international relations are responsible for the emergence, development and decline of the Ili movement. I suggest that sociological studies of revolutions should pay more attention to social movement theory.

By empirically investigating the mobilization process that unfolded in the name of Islamic sacred, I seek to develop a concept of scared cultural repertoire that fuses Durkheimian theory of collective representation (1965), Tillian concept of repertoire (1978), Swidler’s concept of cultural repertoire (2001) and Snow’s concept of movement frame (1988). Drawing on these sociologists, I argue that Islamic sacred and classification systems in the face of political threats serve as a cultural repertoire for mobilization, and even for a revolutionary movement. In Islamic societies, sacred as a cultural repertoire not only integrate people but also creates exclusion or even
mobilization in unsettled times. In settled times sacred is an integrative sacred that holds together people. In unsettled times, sacred is an exclusive sacred and serves as a movement tool kit that destabilizes implicit cultural meanings and classifies, excludes and mobilizes certain people. Bringing back Durkheim’s concept of sacred into social movement studies, I will try to bridge a gap between the later Durkheim and social movement studies. This is because Durkheimian theory of collective representation only focuses on the integrative aspect of sacred at the cost of its exclusive nature. By contrast, framing theory focuses on the cognitive schema and psychological elements neglecting the role of collective representation.
Chapter Three Historical Overview (1820s-1930s): Islam, Sacred Cultural Repertoire and Political Process

This chapter as a historical overview traces the origin of the Ili movement and the development of a long political process from 1750s to 1940s. The Ili movement is the continuation of three previous rebellions that were largely impacted by the elements of Islamic collective representation. For this reason, I first introduce the source of Islamic collective representation and its impacts on the process of consensus mobilization. Then, I present evidence to explain the relationships among master frame, political process and sacred cultural repertoire, a concept that I seek develop in this research. In order to develop this concept I draw on Durkheimian idea of sacred (1965), Snow’s concept of master frame (1992), Swidler’s idea of cultural repertoire (1986; 2001) as well as Smith’s concept of sacred foundation (2003). I assume that the concept of sacred cultural repertoire might help better understand the source of the sacred-oriented mobilization in Islamic movements.

Before the 1944 Ili revolution, Muslim leaders turned to liberation as a master frame since the freedom-oriented cultural narratives were anchored in Islamic classification system and Muslim collective consciousness about their collective identity. This master frame reflects an affirmation of Xinjiang Muslims’ refusal to compromise with the dominant non-Muslim authority that existed since 1750 in Xinjiang. From the early 19th century to 1930s, Movement leaders sought to construct the mass’s accumulated grievances by choosing liberation as a master frame and by strategically creating tactics, providing justifications for holy wars and other types of mobilization. The master frame of liberation continuously showed its influence and shaped the cycles
of protests. It echoed themes in deep from Muslim culture. These themes include mobilization in the name of one God, unification in the face of external threats and martyrdom for the sake of sacred objects such as one God, territory, the Prophet and holy books.

Meanwhile, the master frame of liberation survived across the last two centuries in a wide variety of disparate movements including the 1826 Jahangir rebellion, the 1864-1877 Kashgaria Islamic state movement and the 1933 rebellion. This process witnessed an ideological strategy: during the 19th century, Islamist leaders largely depended on Islamic ideology (Kim 2004) under the rubric of freedom, whereas during the 20th century the nationalist leaders glorified the Turkish heritage exalting local history and language, drawing boundaries with the ethnic Han, and mobilizing ethnic sentiments for political purpose.

**Islam and ‘Sacred’ Politics: Collective Representation and Collective Action**

In October 2003, in his a long and wordy speech to the World Islamic Conference, Mahathir Bin Mohammad, the prime minister of Malaysia, hinted the source of Islamic collective representation:

>This world is not for us. Ours are the joys of heaven in the afterlife. All that we have to do is to perform certain rituals, wear certain garments and put up a certain appearance. Our weakness, our backwardness and our inability to help our brothers and sisters who are being oppressed are part of the Will of Allah, the sufferings that we must endure before enjoying heaven in the hereafter. We must accept this fate that befalls us. We need not do anything. We can do nothing against the Will of Allah (quoted in Wheatcroft 2004:332).

In his politely applauded speech, Mahatir highlighted the core element of Islamic collective representation and emphasized what deemed sacred and crucial for Muslims. Among devout Muslims, not physical world, but the hereafter and the mystic reality are much more valued or regarded more important. Most Islamic societies operate under the
five pillars of Islam: testimony, fasting, prayer, tithing, and pilgrimage. This means that the five pillars of Islam are seen by Muslims as the core of their cultural practices. The five pillars of Islam guide, regulate, justify and perpetuate Muslims’ practical activities and shape the basis of their collective representation.

Collective representation is a key concept formulated in Durkheim’s *Early Forms of Religious Life* (1965). For Durkheim, all cultural systems including religion are collective representations; society is essentially a collection of sacred symbols and ideals. In his view, religion is the basis of all categories of thinking, and religion and categories of thinking alike “are collective representations which express collective realities” (1965: 22). In another word, groups and societies need collective representations of themselves to inspire sentiments of unity and mutual support, and culture fulfills this need. According to Robert Bellah, collective representations are the vehicles of a fundamental process in which publicly shared symbols constitute social groups while they constrain and give form to individual consciousness (1973).

In traditional Islamic societies, five pillars of Islam, as the source of collective representations, serve as the vehicle of a fundamental process in which publicly shared sacred symbols constitute the core of cultural practices. The Pillars of Islam (*arkan al-Islam*; also *arkan ad-din*) are regular basic acts in Islam, “considered obligatory for all believers” (Cornel, 1999: 77), and “symbolized by five obligatory acts (Golschmidt and Davidson, 2006: 44).

The five pillars do not cover all Muslim duties. There is another, which some call the “sixth pillar of Islam”, some call Jihad (holy war), which originally means struggle against personal desire, in warfare it refers to “struggle for the sake of God”
(Armstong 2002; Nasir 2003; Fadle 2005). Jihad is a core principle in Islamic theology; the word itself literally means “to strive, to apply oneself, to struggle, to preserve.”

Bahtkin wrote in his final work: “nothing is absolutely dead: every meaning will have its homecoming” (1967). His prediction that words and ideas can be revived best fits into the politics of Jihad. The reason is that, during the pre-modern era, “the language of holy war had become a means of mobilization, unconstrained by the limits of law. Talking of either ‘crusade’ or jihad sounded a powerful chord, an irresistible call to arms. It was a deep conditioned memory of fanatical zeal and heroism given new life each time its language and ideology were reviewed” (Wheatcroft 2003: 203).

In contemporary world politics, Jihad has become a word whose initial meanings are revived to represents more than struggle, war and mobilization. In Western Media today, no aspect of Islam receives more attention than the issue of Jihad; which stands at the foundation of most debates about the capacity of Islam to coexist or cooperate with non-Muslims (Wheatcroft 2003). This is because, in Islamic world some Muslim statements and conducts have made this concept confusing and even chaotic while the meaning of Jihad is exploited, corrupted and distorted by terrorists; being associated with the idea of a holy war that is propagated in the name of God against non-believers (Nasir 2003). For this reason, in the Western media, it is often equated with the most vulgar images of Islamic intolerance; thus, non-Muslims have tended to think of Jihad as Islam’s holy war against all other religions. This is not wholly true. In fact, Jihad, an Arabic word, means any kind of battle in a good cause including personal struggle and just war against injustice or invasion. In what follows, drawing on the most well-known Islamic scholars, I explain different meanings of Jihad.
In Muslims’ daily life, Jihad is a powerful symbol for perseverance, hard work, and success in Islamic society. As a symbol, it is used to rally enthusiasm and excitement for a variety of causes (Fadle 2004). Nasir, a well-known Islamic scholar in the US argues that:

“Jihad means simply ‘exertion in the path of God’….One meaning of jihad is to struggle to protect Islam and its borders, but the term has much a wider usage and meaning for Muslims….In fact, the whole of life may be said to be a constant Jihad between our carnal and passionate soul and the demands of the immortal spirit within us” (2003: 96-97).

As the preliminary source of the concept, the Qur’an indeed uses Jihad to refer to the act of striving to serve the purposes of God. In everyday life, however, the word of Jihad has broader meanings than that mentioned in the Qur’an, which also includes the internal struggle against evil or temptation. Seyyed Husseyin Nasir, a University professor at Georgetown University and a leading Islamic philosopher in the US, argues that the Prophet Muhammad repeatedly taught that the greatest form of Jihad is to struggle against one’s own base desires or to speak the truth before an oppressive power and to suffer as a consequence of speaking out (Nasir 2003, also Hadith of Bukhari, 2008).

“It was in reference to this profounder meaning of jihad that the Prophet said to his companions after a major battle in which the very existence of the early Islamic community was at stake, ‘verily ye have returned from the lesser jihad to the greater jihad.’ And when one of the companions asked what the greater jihad was, he answered, “to battle against your passionate souls (nafs).” Islam, therefore, see jihad as vigilance against all that distracts us from God and exertion to do His Will within ourselves as well as preserving and reestablishing the order and harmony that He has willed for Islamic society and the world about us” (Nasir, 2003: 96-97).

Here one message is clear. According to the Prophet’s teachings, Jihad connotes a strong spiritual and material work ethic in Islam. Namely, piety, knowledge, health, beauty, truth, and justice are not possible without Jihad—that is, without sustained and diligent hard work. Therefore, cleansing oneself from vanity and pettiness, pursuing
knowledge, curing the ill, feeding the poor, and standing up for truth and justice, even at greatest personal risk, are all forms of Jihad. According to Abull-Abbas al-Sabti, one of the most important Sufi social critic in 12th century, “the real meaning of Jihad is not holy war against the unbelievers, but rather, the expenditure of oneself for the pleasure of God Most High, emptying oneself of everything for His sake, and divesting oneself of reliance on the material world” (quoted in Cornell, 1999: 102-103). According to Armstrong, a well-known British Islamic scholar, “the term of Jihad refers to internal efforts to reform bad habits in Islamic community or within the individual Muslim. The term is also used more specifically to denote a war waged in the service of religion” (2002: 205).

**Jihad as War: Classification of Islamic Zone** Islam had developed a coherent theory of a holy war long before. Striving or working hard in war, provided that the war is just and good, is also jihad. According to Fadle, the Islamic law professor at UCLA, “resisting an unjust rule, an invasion even if by force could be jihad” (Fadle 2005). Findley, an American professor, a well-known historian of Turkic people, suggests meanings of Jihad “range from the struggle for self-mastery to ‘holy war’ to defend Islam and expand the frontiers of Islamic rule. During war, the term of Jihad would become a leitmotif in Muslim’s imagination and give them a sense of common purpose that transcends racial, ethnic differences” (2004: 58). Here the word means a “holy war” in the purely military sense. The Qur’an bears the emphasis that as long as the objectives or cause is good, struggling to achieve it is Jihad. With regard to the warfare Jihad, the Prophet says: The best Jihad is the word of Justice in front of the oppressive Sultan (ruler) (from Hadith).
Here it would be necessary to introduce the Islamic meaning of martyrdom. Robert Hertz, Durkheim’s student, studied (1960) death as “collective representation”, that is as something that derives from the social and symbolic life of the community. Fadle (2005), argues that, in Islamic theology, if the war is justified or launched against injustice and invasion, those killed in the battle are considered martyrs. Fadle further argues that, in warfare, if the fight was between Muslims and non-Muslims, then the ruler would be the one calling for Jihad. If, however, the cause was an internal matter, such as a civic protest, a rebellion, the call for jihad would usually be issued by the most honored and respected scholar who happened to be championing the particular cause. Degree of mobilization depends on the moral authority and persuasive weight that the scholar or ruler carried in the community. Only when a particular ruler had implemented forcible military conscription, the call for jihad would persuade enough people to join the fight---whatever the cause might be. Fadle further argues that, “according to the Quran, war might be necessary, and might even become binding and obligatory. But, it is beyond dispute that the Quran never endorses the military option without conditioning that choice in some significant way” (2005).

The 1826 Movement: Jahangir’s Holy War against the Qing Invasion

The 1826 movement provides a good example for the operation of Jihad (holy war) against political threat and how sacred cultural repertoire and master frame of liberation originate from the Islamic collective representation. In Islam, in settled times sacred is an integrative sacred that holds Muslims people. In unsettled times, sacred is an exclusive sacred and serves as a movement frame that destabilizes implicit cultural
meanings and classify, exclude mobilize certain people to change the world through involvements in social movements. The Jahangir’s holy war is an example.

Islam infiltrated into Xinjiang in the 10th century. Satuq Buhrahan, the Uyghur king of Qarahan Dynasty, contributed to the Islamization of Xinjiang. By 15th century, Islam became the dominant religion in Xinjiang. One of the consequences of expansion of Islam in this region was the rise of the Khoja system. Khoja is a religious title referring to the people who believed themselves as the descendants of the Prophet. Khoja system refers to the religious authority of these people. Before the Qing’s arrival in Xinjiang in 1750, they ruled the Kashgaria region. Under the Khoja system, Islamic law was practiced, Islamic symbols were protected, many Islamic sites were created; political power and religious authority were brought together as one. So, when the non-Muslim Qing troops invaded Xinjiang in 1750s, they found the Qing intervention irksome.

“By 1755 Zungaria and the Ili valley (Northern Xinjiang) were brought fully under Qing’s control, whilst the Tarim Basin region of Altishar (Southern Xinjiang) fell to the Qing with the capture of Kashgar in 1758” (Kim 2004: 10). To secure its colonial rule in Xinjiang, the Qing stationed a large number of troops there. The Qing divided the whole of Xinjiang into “three circuits (Lu). Zunggaria was renamed Tianshan Beilu (Northern Circuit of Tianshan) and encompassed the area around Ili and Tarbaghatai” (Kim, 2004: 15). The Qing called Kashgaria Tianshan Nanlu (Southern circuit of Tianshan). It included the four western cities of Khotan, Yarkand, Yangihissar, and the Kashgar and the Four Eastern cities of Ush, Aqsu, Kucha, and Qarasheher, “which were together known as the ‘eight cites’ equivalent to the Turkic terms such as Altishahr (six
cities) and Yattuushar (seven cites)” (Kim, 2004: 69). There was a third division called Donglu (Eastern circuit) that included Turpan, Qumul, Barkul, QurQarasu, and Urumchi.

**The Map of Altishahar (Kashgaria)**

The Qing troops drove the Khojas out of Kashgar in 1750s. The Khojas settled in neighboring Khoqand area. Under the tight control of Qing army, Kashgaria enjoyed the relative tranquility for about 60 years. In the 1810s, however, the problems arose on the western frontier. On the Western side of the Tian Shan Mountains, the Khojas were plotting from a temporary power base in Kokand located in Russian central Asia. The Khojas deeply resented losing their leadership of Kashgar area, and they were further enraged by reports that their kinsmen’s wives and daughters were being tortured by the conquering Manchu (Tyler, 2004). Another main threat to Qing rule in Xinjiang arose from central Asian, precisely the Kokand Sultanate. The Qing troops alarmed Muslim rulers all over central Asia who were disturbed to find the Chinese right on their doorsteps. Before the Qing’s conquest of Xinjiang, the state of Kokand in Ferghana, host
to the refugees Khojas, enjoyed special trading privileges in the Tarim Oases (Sairami, 1988; Millward, 1998). Now Kokand emirate faced the threat of the Qing. And when the Khoaja’s demands were rejected, the Ferghana ruler unleashed the Khojas to preach holy war against the Kaffir, the infidel Chinese. Religious community leaders also called for holy war against the unbelievers, more precisely the Qing troops.

During the 1820s, the Khojas’ influence had risen with the worsening of political, economic conditions in Kashgaria. That was a period when the Qing suffered from ideological shortcomings in Kashgaria. As Josep Fletcher and Kim Hodong pointed out, despite some patronage of Islamic sites and the employment of some local people, the Manchu could not co-opt Islamic sources of legitimacy (Fletcher, 1968; Kim, 2004). Meanwhile, many Muslims of Kashgar area had become disaffected due to the excess of rule by the Qing authority. This provided a good opportunity for Khojas and they again began to play an important role in Muslim-based Kashgaria. After Qing’s occupation, they indeed lost their dominance, and their role was downplayed, but they never gave up their intention to wage a “Holy War” and undermine the legitimacy of the Qing in Xinjiang (Kim 2004; Tyler 2004). During that time, ethnic markers were not obvious in Kashgaria and Muslim people including the Turkic and Chinese Muslims tended to sense their collective identity on the basis of Islam. Many Muslims viewed themselves as the victim forced to live under the unjust rule of “infidels”, and they responded actively to the call of the Khojas (Kim 2004; Tyler 2004).

At the beginning of 1820s, Jahangir Khoja, the grandson of a prestigious Khoja who ruled Kashgar before the invasion of Qing, proposed in Khoqand that he and the Khan of Khoqand should ally to launch a “holy war” against the Qing troops in Kashgar,
but his proposal was not accepted by the Khan. So he fled from Khan’s surveillance with his men that summer, and fled to the area of Qirghiz tribe who inhabited the northern districts of Kashgar (Kim 2004). The nomadic Qirghiz were also willing to participate in Jahangir’s attempt to fight the non-believers—the Qing troops. The Qirghiz were Turkic people, but they got used to call themselves as Muslims during that time. The community leader of the Qirghiz tribe provided Jahangir with three hundred troops. Then, Jahangir’s followers and the new recruited Qirghiz joined together to attack the Qing authority.

In 1825, Jahangir Khoja attacked Kashgar with the aid of a couple of hundred troops. He was able to mobilize his followers as well as the new recruited Qirghiz in the name of holy war against the “infidels” (Kim 2004). The Qing government dispatched a small numbers of troops to defeat Jahangir and his followers. But the Muslims frustrated the Qing troops. The victory of the rebellion boosted Jahangir’s prestige. By the summer of 1826, Jahangir had succeeded in gathering together diverse Muslims---a considerable number of Qirghiz, the Kashgar Uyghurs, and Khoqandian followers (Sayrami. 1988). Jahangir then appeared in Artush, the city near Kashgar in July where “he started his holy war by paying a visit to the holy shrine of Satuq Bughra Khan” (Millward, 2007: 123). His visit is attributed to the idea of pilgrimage in Islam. Throughout Islamic history, “the pilgrimage rites have served to bring Muslims together and to break down racial, linguistic, and political barriers among them” (Golschmidt and Davidson, 2006: 47). Satuq Bughrahan was the king who contributed to the Islamization of Xinjiang during the tenth century.

On receiving the news, the Qing army arrived and besieged the shrine. However, the Qing force was defeated with aid of Muslims in the immediate regions.
Then, Kashgarian Muslims gathered to join Jahangir’s camp along with a large number of Qirghiz Muslims. Jahangir was able to mobilize his followers in the name of holy war against an “infidel” power (Kim 2004). In the summer of 1826, Jahangir had successfully gathered a considerable number of diverse Muslim groups including Qirghiz, Kashgarian, and Kokandians. All of these different groups were united in the service of “holy war” (Kim 2004; Tyler 2004). With his followers, Jahangir attacked Kashgar again and laid siege to the Manchu fort. At this time more local Muslims from Yangihissar, Yarkand, and Khotan joined him and attacked Qing outputs and Han merchants. After executing the vice governor of Kashgar—a Turkic Muslim appointed by the Chinese, Jahangir decreed that turbans be worn in place of the official Chinese headgear (Sairami 1988; Kim, 2004). This was the signal for revolt and Islamic revival all along the south road and a massacre of the Chinese civilians who refused to be converted to Islam. Jahangir ruled Kashgar as Sultan for nine month.

The Qing dispatched troops from Zunharia at great expense to retake the territory, but at this time some officials in the Qing court began to question the legitimacy of Qing rule in this region and suggested pulling back the Qing military forces abandoning Western Altishar cities by granting all-but-complete autonomy to the Muslim begs (Millward 1998). The emperor rejected this proposal and instead dispatched Nananceng, a Manhcu general to Kashgar to overtake the Kashgar area. Indeed, under the command of Nanaceng, the Manchu general, the Kashgar area was retaken. This full-scale rebellion eventually failed and Jahangir Khoja was taken to Beijing to be executed.

After the failure of Jahangir’s holy war, Nayanceng, the Manchu general, as a special commissioner to Xinjiang, undertook a review of fiscal, military, and
administrative regimes in the territory. He supervised the reconstruction process and implemented reforms of Xinjiang’s trade, taxation, troop development, currency, fiscal, and foreign policies that consolidated the Qing imperial rule in Xinjiang. The new government increased troop levels in Kashgaria and enforced a boycott on Kokandi trade. Using moneys confiscated from Khoqandi merchants and local Jahangir supporters, the Qing rebuilt its westernmost cities and constructed stronger fortifications in Kashgar (Millward, 1998: 35).

Jahangir’s holy war failed. But the contention kept unfolded on the basis of believer/unbeliever criteria. Few years later, Jahangir was followed by his elder brother Yusuf from the Khoqand. Yusuf’s followers attacked the fortress in Kashgaria. After they were retreated by the Qing troops, a number of Chinese merchants began killing Muslims, thinking them to be in league with the forces outside. During a night, a mob of Chinese went out to kill over 200 Muslims and set fire on the buildings. Many Turkic Muslims who had not taken any part in attack were killed on the ramparts by the Chinese merchants (Sayrami 1988; Millward Millward 1998). Seventy or eighty Muslims died in this way before the Manchu governor stopped the slaughter. This savagery against local subjects was in revenge for the deaths of Han and Hui Muslims killed at Kashgar during the previous invasion by Jahangir. But the Han merchants were later absolved, because they had fought against Yusuf’s followers.

The failure of Khoja rebellions caused the Qing to change its policies. The Qing had previously restricted Chinese population to northern and eastern Xinjiang. This was a deliberate policy to limit Chinese influence and avoid the friction it would cause in the Tarim Basin (Sairami 1988). After Jahangir rebellion, the Qing encouraged Chinese
settlement in the Tarim Baisn, which marked the shift away from its earlier stance. The Government also developed new agricultural zones and encouraged Han immigrants.

**Table 2 Population of the Western Region (Xinjiang) in Early 1800s**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>155,000</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qing Officials</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>517,000</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Furthermore, “after the Jahangir rebellion, the Qing government increased the local share of the region’s administrative cost by collecting more revenue” (Kim, 2004: 18). But all these efforts failed to produce the desired results. The tax revenue obtained from Xinjiang’s Muslims would never be sufficient to support the military cost garrisoning the region. The government would have to depend permanently on subsidies drawn from the inland provinces to cover the expenses of its occupation. However, because of the enormous amount of military spending associated with quelling the Taiping rebellion in Central China, the annual subsidies for Xinjiang were soon reduced and sometimes even cut off entirely. This circumstance forced the local administration to increase the tax burdens even more on Muslims in Xinjiang, which in turn inevitably aggravated the population and worsened the region’s socioeconomic conditions (Tyler, 2004). The Khojas of the neighboring Khanate of Kokand fully exploited this weakness of the Qing. Khoja rebellions flared up repeatedly after this, and was recorded as the seven Khojas rebellion. During this rebellion, the Khojas and their followers launched
attacks on Kashgar, Yarkand, and Yangi Hisar (Millward, 1998; Sairami 1988). But they were defeated again.

During that time many Russian merchants traded at seasonal official markets in Tarbaghatay neighboring the Russian frontiers. This granted the Tsarist government permanent consulates in these cities. In 1860, Russia forced the Qing to sign a treaty. This treaty is called the 1860 Peking treaty in historical records. Russia managed to extract consular and trade rights in Xinjiang that would develop later in the century. However, “it was neither the Khojas nor Russians, but the almost simultaneous eruption of rebellions by Chinese Muslims throughout Xinjiang in 1864 that became a catalyst in wiping out the last vestiges of Qing control in the region” (Kim, 2004: 38). Plagued by
the rebellion in central China as well as the chronic fiscal shortages, the Qing lost its control in Xinjiang. Thus, the way was made clear for a Kokandi Muslims to invade Altishahr and for Russia to occupy the Ili Valley. Jahangir’s holy war ended, but this region was about to witness a new movement fully marked by Islamic beliefs. The Qing troops were shattered in another holy war, which proved more powerful than the Jahangir’s.

The 1864 Rebellion and Kashgaria Islamic State (1864-1877)

Islam has a systematic moral ideology that requires, among other things, obedience and loyalty to the one God, and struggle against colonizers and oppressors. During unsettled times such as invasion and political threats, Muslim leaders call for holy wars. By using the slogan of holy war, the activists were able to agitate the enthusiasm among Muslims. The 1864 rebellion was not an exception.

The 1864 rebellion began with an enormous political upheaval that engulfed Xinjiang in 1864 leading to the expulsion of the Qing dynasty from central Asia and the establishment of an independent Muslim state named Kashgaria. This Islamic state, led by Yaqub, a Muslim military officer from Central Asia, enforced Islamic law. Kim argues that the 1864 rebellion was an Islamic movement against ‘infidel’ Manchu rule (2004). But how did it happen under the control of powerful Qing dynasty?

At the beginning of the 1860s, the Qing had already been challenged by a series of rebellions in China itself such as those by the Taiping, the Nian and Muslims in Shanxi-Gansu and in Yunnan (Spence 1990). The Qing was also pressured by the territorial and trade demands from the Western imperial powers. But most serious problems that the Xinjiang officials encountered were a shortage of financial resources. They had previously
depended on subsides from other provinces in China, but the Opium war and the powerful Tayping rebellion, which occurred in the 1850s, had driven the Qing dynasty into crisis, greatly reduced the ability of the central government to send such an aid. Thus, the financial conditions in Xinjiang had become very grave on the eve of the 1864 rebellion (Millward 1999; Kim 2004). Even government officials began to sell offices publicly to secure more money since tax receipts were insufficient. Charismatic leaders can amplify frames and attract followers by the force of their commitment and personality (Jamison and Eyerman 1994). The Khojas played such a role in Kashgaria. “the domination of Manchu who were non-Muslims not only contradicted Islamic principles but also was doomed to face the challenge from the Khojas who retained their religious charisma” (Kim, 2004: 70).

After the Jahangir rebellion, the Qing court advocated the full-scale assimilation of Kashgaria Muslims to Chinese norms as means of securing the territory. The government enforced Sino-centric ideology and process of Sinicisation which would govern China’s relations with non-Chinese Muslims and neighboring countries (Millward 1998; Tyler 2004; Milward 2007). The Qing attempted to implement assimilation policies by eradicating non-Chinese cultural elements and converting the Muslim people to Chinese ways. Through this way the Qing wanted to assimilate all different ethnic groups into the Manchu identity. This attempt facilitated the grievances of Xinjiang Muslims who had been impatient with the Qing rule after the Jahangir rebellion.

At first the Chinese Muslims, not Turkic Muslims, played a key role of the emergence of movement. Chinese Muslims (Tungans) were the sinicized descendants of Arabic invaders who came to China to spread Islam during the 9th century. Chinese Muslims are recorded as Hui Muslims or Tungans in historical documents. Unlike the
Turkic people they don’t have their own language; Chinese Muslims use Chinese language in daily life and official documents. Their appearance resembles that of Chinese people. For over a century, Chinese Muslims had served financially and militarily for the Qing emperor to pacify the Turkic Muslim region. But, they were sensitive to any slight hint against their religion and were ready to respond with violence. Their discontent proved to be infectious after they heard the rumor that the Qing troops were coming to kill them (Sairami 1988). This was a period when the Turkic Muslims had become tired of paying for the Chinese garrisons that controlled them. There were sales taxes, poll taxes and forced laborer in mines and canals. People felt exploited by the Chinese merchants—it was said that several debtors were thrown into the Khotan river each day because they could not pay (Kim 2004).

Thus, when the Chinese Muslims took up arms in 1862, the Turkic Muslims were in a good mood to support them. The catalyst of rebellion was a rumor, which began circulating in Kucha in the early 1862, that the Chinese governor general at Ili, or even the court at Beijing, had ordered extermination of the Muslims (Sayrami 1988). Whether such news of genocide was true or not, or whether it was invented by the Gansu rebels in order to gain support in Xinjiang, is not known. But its effect was obvious and devastating. In Central China Tungan rebellion against the Qing had already been launched since 1862 in Gansu and Shanxi provinces. Numerous Chinese Muslims originally from these provinces engage in farming, running small businesses, or serving in the Qing Military in Xinjiang. When the rumor reached there, tensions among the Chinese Muslims, Han Chinese civilians and Manchu authorities had already increased in Xinjiang.
According to Sayrami (1988) as a local witness, the rebellion began during the night of June 3-4, 1864. The Chinese Muslims, armed with axes, hoes, and clubs, initiated the rebellion by setting fire to the suburban markets and, with the slogan of holy war, killed “infidels” joined by Turkic Muslims. These two groups of people, allied together, stormed into the government buildings and crushed a detachment of the Qing army that came out of the fort to suppress them. They burnt official buildings, warehouses, and shops, and killed about one thousand Chinese and 150 Mongols. Sayrami, asserted (1988) that the imperial order of the Chinese Muslim massacre was the immediate cause of the revolt. Chinese Muslims were thrown into a panic by a rumor that the Qing government was plotting to exterminate them.


At that time Tongzhi (emperor), the cursed, was ruler.
The paganism is worse than the tyranny.
This tyrant sent a letter.
As soon as the letter reached the General of Ili,
An enormous stir was caused,
Its contents was as follows:
“Tungans rebelled against us.
Many Tungans live in the city of Ili
Kill them all and exterminate”.

The rebellion in Kucha County was followed rapidly by cycles of the protest in other cities (Sairami 1988). In the Ili valley, Chinese Muslims and Turkic Muslims
attacked Qing authority in November 1864. Though Chinese Muslims generally rose first, later they were quickly followed by Turkic Muslims, and leadership of local rebels soon shifted from Tungans to local Turkic religious leaders in eastern cities where Tungans were in the majority. During this rebellion, Islam united different groups such as Chinese Muslims, Taranchis (a tribe of Uyghur), Qirghiz as well as the Muslim immigrants and merchandisers such as Khoqanians (population of the current Uzbekistan), Kabulis (population of the current Afghanistan), Kashmiris. Kim argues, “These diverse groups came together under the banner of Islam because they were Muslims…. Islam emerged as the most powerful unifying ideology” (2004: 68).

The military force in the neighboring Kokand closely observed the collapse of the Qing regime in Tarim basin and endeavored to take advantage of it (Kuropatkin, 1882). In 1864, Alim Quli, the ruler of Khoqandi, sent Buzurg Khan, under the direction of a military official, Yaqup Beg. Yaqup beg’s troops besieged, defeated the Qing authority in Kashgar.

Yaqup Beg, a military official came from Kokand, as the beneficiary of this rebellion, proclaimed the establishment of an independent Islamic state called Kashgaria (1864-1877). Taylor writes: “the self-styled new king was not a native Kashgar, nor even a rebel against Chinese rule. He used to be a soldier and courtier of the Emir of Khoqand and—unlike the Khoqandis of previous years—he was sent by the Emir as an aide. After coming to Kashgar, Yaqup beg seized every opportunity to rob the victory of rebellion” (Tyler, 2004: 75). According to Taylor, he proved to be a successful commander and shrewd ruler in Kashgaria. After taking Kashgar, his forces massacred thousands of Chinese merchants (Biran 1997). In the next year Yaqup beg conquered the cities to his
south-east and north east, where his advance was very successful. Kucha fell in the spring of 1867. Yaqup Beg took Urumchi in the end of 1867.

In this rebellion, the slogan of Holy war was used not only as an ideal, but also as the strategy to mobilize Muslims regardless of ethnic origin, class and regional identity. The participants ranged from highly educated intellectuals such as Mola Musa Sayrami, Mulla Bilal to those who belonged to the lowest social stratum. Having positioned himself as a defender of the faith and holy warrior against the infidel Khtay (Chinese), Yaqub beg pursued Sharia---a strict Islamist law (Forsyth, 1875). According to Nasir, a well-known Islamic scholar in the US, the word Sharia comes from the Arabic root shr’, which means “road”, and the Sharia refers to:

“the road that men and women must follow in this life. Since Islam is a complete way of life, the Sharia is all-embracing; it includes all of life from rites of worship to economic transactions … The roots of the Sharia are found in the Quran, and God is considered the ultimate legislator (al-Shari’). The Hadith, however, complement the Quran as the second major source of the Sharia, for Prophet was the interpreter par excellence of the meaning of God’s Word (Nasir, 2003: 76-77).

Yaqub Beg’s officials enforced Sharia, banned prostitution and consumption of alcohol and sale of such Haram (Impure) meats as cat, dog and ass---all of which are alleged to be common in the bazaars under Qing rule. Qadi Rais (religious judges) patrolled the streets with squads of police to maintain the Islamic law, dealing out floggings to improperly veiled women or men without a turban. Yaqub beg also restored, endowed and visited key shrines of the people who had contributed to the development of Islamic civilization (Kim 2004).

Political Islam as an ideology and independence as a master frame show deep their impacts in this movement. In social movement studies, an ideology links a theory with a cluster of values about what is right and wrong as well as norms about what to do
(Oliver and Johnston 2005). The political Islam and the idea of holy war as a belief system is responsible for this mobilization. It is linked to the core value of Islamic community. In Islam, during unsettled times, especially revolutions or wars, the phrases of “Allah be praised” and “Shahid for the sake of Allah” as an Islamic discourse is repeatedly used in prayers. Dream of being “Shahid” (martyr) would become the goal of devout Muslims who believe it honorable to die fighting defending their faith, country or family. In the movement the idea of holy war and master frame of independence resonated because they were consistent with Muslims’ experiences of injustice.

Millward argues (2007) that the 1864 movement was not motivated by ethnic sentiments. Muslim writers such as Molla Musa Sayrami and Molla Bilal simply described the rebellion as holy war. Although such descriptions oversimplified complex and confusing series of events, the dynamics and outcomes of the movement confirm such a statement. In this rebellion Islam served as a cultural repertoire by uniting the Muslims, mobilizing the masses and providing the unifying ideology that integrated Chinese Muslims with Turkic Muslims and rulers of different oases. In his well-written book, “Holy War in China: Muslims Rebellions and State in Chinese Central Asia, 1864-1877”, historian Kim (2004: 70) argues:

“In 1864 Muslims rose against the Qing, they denied the imperial rule not merely because it was unjust but also because such injustice was caused by ‘infidel rule’. Since the 1864 rebellion in Xinjiang was the movement of Muslims under the non-Muslim domination, its ideal could be best postulated by holy war (ghazat). In almost every page of this historical drama we can read their fervor to expel the “infidels” and to establish the kingdom of Islam. Rashidin called himself holy warrior (ghazi) in 1830s and Jahangir himself as a king in Kashgar in 1820s… Holy war was not only their ideal, but it was also their best strategy to mobilize the Muslim masses regardless of origin and class”.
Mulla Bilal (1988) described the rebellion as an Islamic revival motivated by opposition to the unbelievers of any kind. Indeed, fatwa authorizing holy war were issued in some cities, and Qing forces claim that in Urumchi the revolt had been planned for over a year by the Chinese Muslims and weapons had been stockpiled in the mosque.

“In the middle of nineteen century, Xinjiang was not fully incorporated into the Qing imperial system and its relationship to China was problematic. The Muslims in the region of course recognized the political reality of Qing rule, but culturally they identified themselves as a part of the larger Islamic world and not a part of greater China” (Kim, 2004:XV). Therefore it is not surprising that, with its Islamic color, the 1864 Xinjiang rebellion took a different path than those initiated by Han Chinese rebels in China such as the Taiping and the Nian. At least at its initial stage, they saw themselves as engaged in movement designated to revitalize a living Islamic spirit that would return their land to the Dar al-Islam ("abode of Islam"). To make this a reality, the infidel rulers (the Qing) needed to be overthrown and replaced by Muslim rulers who would employ Islamic law (Kim 2004). Meanwhile, the non-Chinese Turkic speaking Muslims who made up the overwhelming majority of the population in Eastern Turkestan simply called them Musulman (Muslim).

Independence ended with Yaqub beg’s death in 1877, and the Chinese conquered the region for the second time. But, for the first time after the Qing invasion, the people living there were united in an independent state for which they sought recognition and support from the outside world. In spite of the many catastrophic results that came in the wake of the rebellion and the Qing conquest, Eastern Turkestan’s decade of independence from China caused the local people to reflect anew on their self-identity
(Millward 2007). The period of autonomy in the nineteen century then served as a source of inspiration for a new generation of nationalist leaders in the twentieth century. Another legacy of this period was the awakening of historical consciousness among the region’s intellectuals, which resulted in an unprecedented flood of writings by local authors, like Molla Musa Sayrami (2004).

In this movement Islamic sacred united, integrated certain Muslims through political processes to classify and exclude certain others. So I suggest that sacred and classification systems in Islamic societies serve as a sacred cultural repertoire for mobilization, and even for a revolutionary movement. In Islamic societies, sacred as a cultural repertoire not only integrate people but also creates exclusion or even mobilization in unsettled times.

**The First ‘East Turkestan Islamic Republic' (1933-1934) Movement**
With the collapse of the Kashgaria Islamic state, Xinjiang was about to undertake a new political process. During the Qing’s attack, Xinjiang became a shattered land where ruling institutions, government buildings, irrigation system, bridges, roads, and cities were devastated; the former Qing personnel were either dead or stripped of their lands. Xinjiang governor Liu Jintang (1894-1911) lamented that “since the chaos, the old system has been entirely swept away, and to restore it involves myriad difficulties” (quoted in Millward 2007: 136).

The Qing annexed Xinjiang in 1877, and transferred a large number of Han immigrants from Central China to Xinjiang. Qing administration was mainly dominated by ethnic Han and Xinjiang would no longer be under the jurisdiction of a Manchu general in Ili, but of Han governor Liu Jintang in Urumqi. Local autonomy, granted to Muslim community leaders on the local level, gave ways to administration by Han county, sub-prefectural, and prefectural magistrates. In 1884, the Qing proclaimed Xinjiang as a new province. Xinjiang means new border in English. According to Lattimore, Xinjiang provincialization was a grand design on which the Qing court and Han officials rested high hopes (Lattimore 1940). The new schema began based on a reworking of the region’s administrative and military arrangements as well as establishment of prefectures, sub prefectures and counties in both northern and southern Xinjiang.

Until the 1870s, Muslim people of Xinjiang turned to the Central Asian Khanates of Bukhara and Khokand for religious and political inspirations. This factor certainly promoted Zuo Zongtang (the Manchu General who retook Xinjiang)’s order for the execution of all Khokandi Muslims doing business in southern Xinjiang. Zuo Zongtang, the Manchu General, remarked, “if we wish to change their peculiar customs
and assimilate them to our Chinese ways, we must establish free schools and make the Muslim Children read Chinese books, recognize characteristics and understand spoken language” (quoted in Millward 2007: 118). The Qing’s ideological policies in Xinjiang increasingly reflected a Sinicising agenda (Lattimore 1940; Chen 1999). The reconstruction agencies set up Confucian schools in the Muslim cities of the Kashgar area. Confucian classics and Chinese values began to be taught at schools in the end of 19th century. At each school, a teacher supervised the rote learning of Confucius classics by between fifteen and twenty Uyghur boys, mostly sons of begs (Chen 1990). The Qing attempted to sinicize the administration, population and economy of Xinjiang. In practice, however most changes were symbolic, and Xinjiang authorities achieved few concreted results. In the early decades of 20th century, this region welcomed a countermovement with the infiltration of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism

As early as 1909, Sir George McCartney, the British counsel-General at Kashgar, warned that “the Chinese would have to take into account pan-Islamic influences which were awakening amongst the Turkish speaking Muslims of the province” (McCartney, 1909: 18-19). McCartney’s warning was not groundless. The outbreak of the First World War and Turkey’s involvement in it provided an impetus for pan-Turkic activists in Xinjiang. In 1910s an Ottoman subject named Ahmad Kamal started a school of modern education at Kashgar where the local Muslim children were encouraged to look to the Turkish Caliph as their spiritual father (Kamal 1940; Forbes 1986). That was a time when the neighboring Russian central Areas witnessed the rise of pan-Turkic ideas. Forbes argues that, “the victorious Russians planted the seeds of Modern Turkic nationalism when they first entered the oases and deserts of Inner Asia (1986: 16). In Russian Central
Asia (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan), the presence of Russian settlers and political exiles contributed to the growth of Uzbek, Tajik and Turkmen national consciousness. Muslims living there were increasingly influenced by pan-Turkic reforming groups such as the Jadidists (preachers of enlightenment and new education). Under the leadership of Tatar intellectual Ismail Bay Gaspirali, a series of religious, cultural, and educational reforms were introduced into central Asia with the aim of reinterpreting Islamic law in response to contemporary conditions and Russian domination. In 1909, a clandestine revolutionary organization named “young Bukharans” was formed in Western Turkestan. The Jadid movement grew so fast that by 1916 there were in excess of 5000 Jadid-ist schools scattered throughout the Russian empire. As a result of these processes within the Russian Empire, concepts of Islamic religious reform and of a common pan-Turkic political destiny began to infiltrate into Xinjiang.

In 1921, a group of Uyghurs known as the Organization of Workers and Farmers of Altishahar (Kashgar area, Southern Xinjiang) and Zungaria (Northern Xinjiang), convened a congress in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. In the conference this congress renamed itself as the Organization of Revolutionary Uyghur, which was to carry out an independent rule in Xinjiang (Lattimore 1940; Forbes 1986; Tyler 2004). This congress, often cited as the source of modern Uyghur identity, proposed that there was a need to revive and utilize the ethnic term of Uyghur for urban and agrarian Turkic population of Xinjiang and Russian Central Asia. In these years, Xinjiang welcomed many upper class and highly educated Tatars, Uzbeks and others who shared Turkic-nationalism and anti-communist beliefs. There were the people who had fled the Soviet to escape the political executions of the Bolsheviks. These liberal, nationalistic intellectuals influenced the
revival of the term of Uyghur and engaged in publishing in Xinjiang. Such an ideological infiltration proved to be effective and, opened a new path to the rise of modern Uyghur identity. At the beginning of 1930s, ethnic policies were reformed in Xinjiang and the ancient name of Uyghur was used again to identify the Uyghur population. Consequently, local people began to pursue, experience their own ethnic identity in the face of political opportunities. Subsequent movements and ethnic conflicts were thus left untouched by ethnic markers.

In the end of 1932, the region witnessed a historical event in the development of Uyghur nationalism. A rebellion occurred in Khotan under the leadership of a religious teacher named Muhammad Emin Bughra and his two brothers (Hedin, 1936). With their followers they defeated the Han troops in Khotan, and announced themselves as the “emirs” of the new state (Khotan Emir-hip). A teacher in a religious school, Bughra expressed his impatience with the ethnic Han in the following remarks:

“You infidels think because you have rifles, guns and money, you can depend on them; but we depend upon God in whose hands are our lives. You infidels think that you will take our lives… If we die we are martyrs. If we survive we are conquerors. We are living but long for death” (quoted in Forbes, 1986: 75).

These Muslims in Khotan were joined by an Islamic scholar and former magistrate from Gulja prefecture, Sabit Damulla, who had travelled abroad—to the Soviet Union, Turkey, Egypt and India. Bughra and Sabit formed a committee, which was anti-communist, pan-Islamic and pro-Turkic (Chen 1999; Tyler 2004). This means that pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism joined together to show their influences in this
movement. The Committee recruited 300 members, and boasted 50 antiquated rifles. On 20 February, 1933, the committee set up a provisional government with Sabit as ‘prime minister’, and Muhammad Bughra as the head of the armed forces. The ‘provisional government’ extended its influence westward toward Kashgar. In July 1933, one of the Bughra brothers, along with Sabit Damolla, set up an office in Kashgar known as the Kashgar Affairs Office of the Khotan Government. The Khotan emirate’s Kashgar affairs Office turned into the East Turkistan Republic Government. Uyghurs and other Central Asians with progressive and nationalistic views took posts in the provisional government.

The group borrowed the Swedish mission’s printing press to print nationalistic periodicals and manifestos (Forbes 1986). The ministers of the new government were drawn from circles associated with the Jadidist movement of the 1910s and 1920s. Cabinet ministers included Turkic ethnic groups such as Uzbek, Kyrgyz and Uyghur Muslims. Chinese historian Chen’s interpretation ascribed this new movement to “fanatical separatism and extremist religious elements” (1999).

The ETR constitution claimed that the new state was founded on the modernizing, innovative and developmental ideals of the Jadit movement (Seypidin 1989; Forbes 1986). The constitution’s first clause also announces that it will govern in accordance with Islamic Law (Sharia). The religious color extends even to the name of the new government. It struck its first copper coins in the name of the Republic of Islamic Uyghuristan, which caused disputes among the representatives of different Turkic groups. After some debate, the government decided on “Eastern Turkistan Republic” on the ground that there were other Turkic peoples besides Uyghurs in Xinjiang and in the newly established government (Chen 1999; Tyler 2004). This name was later put in the
coins and passports as well. The new regime, which tried to extend northeast to Aksu and Southwest to Khotan, was eventually hard pressed to maintain its foothold in Kashgar. It suffered from runaway inflation, and enjoyed no international recognition but rather the active antipathy not only of the Nanjing government but also of the Soviet Union (Millward 2007).

The time period between 1933 and 1934 witnessed an array of turbulent movements in the Kashgar area. This was also one of the most chaotic periods in the 20th century Xinjiang history awash in cruel ethnic conflicts and struggles for nation states. Exclusions and mobilizations also occurred on the basis of ethnic boundary. Madotay, a Chinese Muslim, was posted as the chief of Kashgar prefecture from 1922 to 1932. His reign of cruel had already broken the relationships between Turkic Muslims and the Chinese Muslims. Thus, at the beginning of 1934, Uyghur Muslims began to fight not only against the Han troops, but also against Chinese Muslims with whom they were united in the 1864 revolution under the flag of Islam (Forbes 1986; Tyler 2004; Millward 2007).

In January, 1934, Chinese Muslim soldiers of Ma Chan-tsang, the military chief of the Chinese Muslim in Kashgar, besieged Kashgar city where the East Turkestan Headquarter was located. Chinese Muslims, working for Chinese Nationalist Party, had their own motives and wanted to create their own nation state in Kashgar at the cost of the East Turkestan Government. On February 5, 1934, under the fierce attack of the Chinese Muslim forces, Sabit Damolla and Khoja Niyaz Haji, the Islamic republic leaders, withdrew towards Yangi-Hissar city. The city was still controlled by Nur Ahmadjan, youngest of the Khotan emirs. Chinese Muslim soldiers captured Kashgar.
The troops of Eastern Turkestan government were forced to flee from Kashgar (Bughra 1940). Following the capture of Kashgar, on 14 February 1934, the Chinese Muslim forces began to take revenge on the co-religious Turkic population. In two days Chinese Muslims systematically looted Kashgar old city, while between 1700 and 2000 Turkic Muslims were massacred. The East Turkestan Republic thus collapsed.

As described above, the 1930s produced two short-lived states, the first was called Khotan Islamic Amir-ship grounding in Khotan in 1932; and second was called Eastern Turkestan Islamic state grounding in Kashgar in 1933. Religious leaders of these two different states were Memtimin Hezret and Sabit Damolla; and both of these short-lived states were created by Turkic people. These leaders promulgated Islamic constitution and declared Islam as state religion. During this process, ethnic markers began to show their influences. Different ethnic groups such as Uyghur and Chinese
Muslims began to struggle for national liberation. The new government of East Turkestan met resistances from Chinese Muslims. The classification between Uyghurs versus Han/Hui triggered its impacts on the development of the movement. In the mass’s consciousness, sacred nation had already replaced sacred religion.

**Discussion and Summary: Political Process, Master Frame and Sacred Cultural Repertoire**

This chapter as a historical overview traces the origin of contention and the entire processes of movement development rather than a particular phase of the political process. Findings indicate that there are relationships among political process, master frame and sacred cultural repertoire. Political process stimulates master frame, and which in turn is fed and serviced by cultural repertoire that is entrenched in collective representations.

Theoretically, a political process represents “continuous process from one generation to another, rather than a discrete series of developmental stages” (McAdam, 1990: 36). A frame refers to “interpretive schema that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action” (Snow and Beneford 1988: 137), thus organizing experience and guiding action by “rendering events or occurrences meaningful” (Snow et al. 1986: 464). By contrast, a master frame is a macro frame that serves as the hot cognition and central value continuously impacting the cycles of protest and the subsequent developments. It evolves over time and confronts alternative interpretations. As Johnston argues (2005: 10):

> A master frame is a more general, but especially powerful –in that it evokes powerful cultural symbols—interpretive package. Master frames are
linked to cycles of protest—provides of intense social activity in which the
mobilization of various movements overlap in time and are often linked to one
another. An innovative master frame, for example, can spark derivative collective
action frames and tactical innovations at the initiation of a cycle.

The later Durkheim provides a useful tool for understanding the vital power of
Islam. According to Durkheim, religion, as a form of collective representation, serves as
the vehicle of a fundamental process in which publicly shared symbols constitute social
groups (Durkheim 1965). In Durkhiem’s view, religion is the basis for all categories of
thinking, and religion and categories of thinking alike “are collective representations
which express collective realities” (1965: 22). In another word, groups and societies need
collective representations of themselves to inspire sentiments of unity and mutual support,
and culture fulfills this need.

During the 19th century, movement leaders chose holy war as a movement goal
since the freedom-oriented cultural narratives were anchored in Islamic collective
representation as well as native people’s beliefs about their roots. Liberation as a master
frame reflected an affirmation of native people’s refusal to compromise with the
dominant authority that existed since 1750 in Xinjiang. Political Islam emerged as the
most powerful unifying ideology both in the 1826 and the 1864 movements. Diverse
groups such as Uyghur, Qirghiz and Uzbek came together under the banner of Islam
simply because they were Muslims. In Islamic texts, the Muslims were encouraged to
keep social bonds regardless of class, race and ethnicity, to become heroes for the sake of
sacred objects, and to be honored after their death (Esposito 1999; Armstrong 2000). In
settled times, these cultural meanings are hidden, stabilized and invisible. But whenever
war or revolutionary movements break out, these deep cultural meanings (what Swindler
coined “tool kit”, 1986) are destabilized; the idea of mobilization for the sake of sacred objects (God, Prophets, Holy books, territory, nation, etc) serves as sacred cultural repertoire; the slogan of holy are used as a powerful strategy to agitate and mobilize the mass.

Particularly, in the face of non-Muslim threats, rigid Islamic classification such as believers and unbelievers unites the Muslims from diverse ethnic backgrounds; provides the unifying ideology for the master frame: liberation from the external threat. This master frame reflects two twin elements entrenched in Muslim’s collective consciousness: worship of freedom and political recognition of the status of Islam. The first two movements (the Jahangir rebellion and the 1864 rebellion) show how master frame of liberation is guided by these two elements and by what I coin sacred cultural repertoire: mobilization for the sake of Holy. Sacred cultural repertoire again showed its influence as soon as the political opportunities were open on the eve of the 1944 movement. Next chapter shows the structure of these opportunities.
Chapter 4 Macro-mobilization: Political Threats and Opportunities

Kriesi argues that political process approach in social movement accounts for the emergence of contention (2004). This approach allows us to understand the structure of political context, conditions of political constraints and opportunities that contribute to the emergence of a social movement. “Political opportunities are dynamic, referring to “changes in the institutional structure or informal power relations” (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996b: 3). Tarrow argues that, “people join in social movements in response to political opportunities and then, through collective action, create new ones” (1994: 17). In Tarrow’s word, political opportunities are structural factors that effect actions and outcomes of social movement but are external to them. They may include the availability of political allies to challenging groups and the stability of political alignments. When any of these factors are available, they create openings that enable challengers’ demands to be heard. When these factors are absent, mobilization is constrained.

This chapter deals with the external and domestic political opportunities associated with the Ili Revolution. I also examine the new development of the political process that unfolded between 1911 and the early 1940s as well as the structure of international relations. In this case, the external, domestic political opportunities include the following: (1) dramatic changes in the political context and international relations; (2) the availability of a political ally (the Soviet Union) and Movement elites; (3) the termination of Xinjiang-Soviet trade; (4) Sheng’s state terror and persistent repression; (5) GMD’s misgovernment and economic crisis; (6) the rise of Han Chauvinism and the forced transfer of Han immigrants. I seek to demonstrate (1) that understanding the dynamics of revolution and revolutionary movements requires examination of the
structure of political process and international relations; (2) that external and internal political opportunities join together to create, facilitate revolutionary movements significantly.

**Sheng and the Soviet Union: Political Process and International Relations**

After the collapse of the Qing in 1911, Yuan Dahua, the Xinjiang governor resigned and was replaced by a warrior named Yang Zengxin. He tightly controlled Xinjiang until his assassination in 1928 (Forbes 1986; Seypidin 1989; Burhan 1990; Benson 1990; Sepullayev 2004). Zeng Xing’s replacement, Jin Shueren, increased the number of secret police and placed many of his family members in the highest posts of government. He proved to be an incompetent ruler and was unable to maintain the control which had characterized Yang’s rule. As described in the historical overview chapter, this led to chaos and a series of insurrections such as the Hoten rebellion and the Kashgar movement. Jin Shuren, unable to control the situation, invited a military officer from the Central China in order to maintain the stability. This military official was Sheng Shicai.

Educated in Japan, Sheng was ambitious and clever enough to clearly see the opportunity inherent in a posting to Xinjiang. In 1931 he left Nanjing, where he had been an officer on Chiang Kai-shek’s staff. After his arrival in Xinjiang, he quickly established himself as young military leader, replacing Jin Shuren, becoming de facto ruler. After coming to the power, Sheng developed close ties to the Soviet Union and wanted to use the Soviet Union to consolidate his position in Xinjiang. He visited Moscow in early 1934.

He returned from the Soviet as a de facto Communist in late 1934, found his government short-staffed, and approached the Chinese communists in Yan an for help.
This was the period of the CCP---GMD unified front when the Communist Party was cooperating with GMD (Millward 2007). The CCP sent dozens of its cadres to Xinjiang. The CCP members worked mostly in high-level administrative, financial, educational and cultural ministerial positions in Urumchi, Kashgar, Khotan and elsewhere, helping to implement Sheng’s policies and maintain communications with the Soviet Union. Mao Zedong’s younger brother, Mao Zemin, served as a Deputy Finance Minister in Sheng’s Xinjiang government.

Because of its location on international borders with the USSR, British India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Xinjiang was politically and militarily sensitive. It was not only significant to the Chinese government, but also to the international powers whose interests in Asia were part of the power politics involving the future of Asia. During the early 1930s there was a British Consulate in Kashgar and rivalry between the Russians and the British. Meanwhile, in the early 1930s Japan invaded China and annexed the Manchuria region, which includes the provinces of Heilungjiang, Liawneng and Jilin. Strategically, the Soviets feared Japanese annexation of Xinjiang. While Sheng intended to rely on the Soviet force to consolidate his position, the Soviet Union wanted to take advantage of Sheng’s position to create a pro-Soviet regime and eliminate the imperialist elements in the region.

The Soviet-Sheng alliance thus began and continued until 1942. During this period (1934-1942), Xinjiang became a Soviet satellite much like Outer Mongolia; the Soviet Union played a significant role in political, economic, and military developments (Zhang 1986). Before making decisions on any political issues or any personnel appointments, Sheng Shicai had to discuss them with the Soviet Consul General at
Urumchi and ask for his advice. As many as three hundred Soviet political, military, financial, and foreign affairs advisers and expert were assigned to offices of the Xinjiang government. In this way the Soviets helped Sheng’s regime pacify the whole of Xinjiang. In return for the aid, Sheng granted the Soviets open concessions of Zungaria’s mineral wealth. Sheng also forced the British consulate to leave Xinjiang and kept the GMD influence away from this region.

In the winter of 1935, Sheng initiated a three-point policy of Anti-Imperialism, Peace and Pro-Soviet Union. In 1936, with the participation of Russia, this policy was reaffirmed as the Great Six Policy: Anti-imperialism, Pro-Sovietism, Clean Government, Peace; Reconstruction and Racial equality. In the same year, the anti-imperialist association was founded in Urumchi and published the journal *Anti-imperialist Front*. A Sino-Soviet Cultural Association was also organized in Urumchi with branches in the three districts. The association widely circulated Russian periodicals, books, and leaflets in Xinjiang. Soviet movies were also shown frequently by the association and a number of youths were sent to be educated in the Soviet Union (Seypidin 1989; Seypurlayew 2004).

From 1937 on, taking advantage of the “Great Purge Movement” in the Soviet Union, Sheng Shicai initiated successive massive purges in Xinjiang (see below). In June 1941 Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union, and by winter the Germans reached Moscow and Leningrad. Thus, Xinjiang witnessed the deep impacts of the dramatic changes in international relations. While Stalin was preoccupied with Hitler, Chiang Kai-shek tried to extend his influence to Xinjiang. Sheng closely observed the development of this new political process, and, thinking that the Soviet Union was doomed to lose in the war, he
hurried to eliminate the Soviet influence in Xinjiang and to restore the relationship with the GMD government.

However, “Moscow was not prepared to relinquish its prize in Xinjiang without contest” (Whthing, 1958: 84). Stalin sent his vice-commissioner of foreign affairs, Dekanozov, to negotiate with Sheng Shicai, a few days before senior officers of the GMD visited Urumchi in July 1942. Dekanozov asked Sheng to reconsider his relations with the Soviet Union seriously. However, his efforts ended in failure with Sheng’s refusal to resume relations with the Soviet Union. Early in 1943 a number of GMD officials arrived in Xinjiang. On 9 February, Chiang Kaishek ordered Sheng Shicai to force the Soviet Union to withdraw its personnel. Thus, under Sheng’s pressure, Russian advisers, instructors, experts and doctors went back to the Soviet Union. Offices of the Soviet trade agency throughout Xinjiang were closed, and trade with the Soviet Union came to an end.

**Availability of Political Allies and Movement Elites**

Political opportunities are dynamic, referring to “changes in the institutional structure or informal power relations” (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996b: 3). The Soviet involvement played a fundamental role in the emergence of the rebellion and subsequent development in Xinjiang. According to Seypidin (1989), the Soviet authorities had long paid close attention to political situations of Turkic people on both sides of the border. Forbes argues: “the history of the following decades after the 1911 revolution was characterized by provincial misrule and ethnic conflicts creating opportunities for the injection of Soviet power into a region that had long been the target of Russian expansionism (1986: 133)”.
In early 1920s, there were about 200,000 Uyghur and Hui settlers in the Soviet Central Asia republics. Stalin’s ethnic policies in Russian central Asia facilitated the restoration of ancient name of Uyghur, which had been used for the ancient Uyghur Empire between seventh and the ninth century. In the early decades of the 20th century, Turkic speakers of Xinjiang were not called as Uyghur but well-known as Turks or Turki. A group of Turkic intellectuals including Abdulla Rozibaqi reintroduced the name Uyghur to central Asia in the 1920s. At a Tashkent conference of Uyghurs living in Russian republics, representatives of Turkic peoples decided to adopt the name of Uyghur for the people who have lived in Xinjiang. In 1921, an organization called Uyghur Union was established in Tashkent with many branches in major cities and towns in Russian republics. The union was under the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party. The Uyghur Union leader Abdulla and many members of the union had already been admitted into the Communist Party. Directly and indirectly, the activities of the Union had a long-term influence on the people of Xinjiang, especially the Muslim population. Thus the modern use of name Uyghur began under the influence of nationalist leaders, first in the newly established Soviet Union, then in the three districts bordering the Russian Republics (Seypidin 1989).

“Newspapers published for the Uyghur in Central Asia spread the idea of the unification of all revolutionary forces in the struggle for liberation from foreign imperialism, preached Pan-Turkist and pan-Islamic ideas; which triggered impacts on the nationalist movements in Xinjiang. Many Xinjiang people returned from the Soviet Republics with liberal ideas” (Seypidin,1989: 124).
During the Sheng-Soviet alliance period, a number of progressive Turkic young people were sent to Alma-Ata, Tashkent, and Moskow to be trained. These people became a major force in the later development. Meanwhile, well-printed, low-priced Soviet publications and propaganda materials in different language were widely circulated across Xinjiang without any censorship. Many of these materials were about Marxism-Leninism. Learning Russian became a fad in Xinjiang, although native speakers of Russian constituted less than 0.5 percent of the population. The Soviet consulates in Xinjiang were centers of urban cultural life. Russian schools were established in Xinjiang, particularly in Ili, Tarbagatay and Urumchi, and Soviet textbooks were introduced in these schools. As a result, most of the educated Muslims in these areas could speak Russian. Soviet films were frequently shown by the Soviets in Xinjiang.

An American consulate was established in Urumchi in 1943. In 1945, Robert Ward, American consul in Urumchi, clearly perceived the influence of Soviets on the ETR movement. He reported to Washington as follows:

“….they [the Muslims in the three districts] had chances to learn new information from the papers that smuggle across the border. They know that there is a Kirgizstan Republic, a Kazakstan Republic and any number of other republics…so it is that all the Turkic people want their East Turkestan Republic” (quoted in Zhang, 1994: 118).

Saudanow, the Uyghur general of the East Turkestan National Army, claimed:

Under the strong influence of Soviet culture, a new type of intellectual emerged in Xinjiang. A number of local minority nationalities had their education in the Soviet Union and had chances to study the classical works of Marxism-Leninism. Even in the Xinjiang province, Marxist materials were not forbidden for a period of time…On the eve of the national liberation movement of 1944, there were two important characteristics of the
situation in Xinjiang: the existence of a great number of progressive intellectuals and the dissemination of Marxist-Leninist ideas within the province. These characteristics obviously influenced the movement in Xinjiang at that time (Sawdanow, 1994: 35).

Seypidin, one of the leaders of the East Turkestan Movement stated in his memoir that: “without Soviet participation, such a revolutionary movement could not have succeeded. Muslim discontent and unrest caused by the misrule of Guomindang and the GMD regime gave Stalin an opportunity to extend Soviet influence in Xinjiang. Stalin used Islamic nationalism to encourage resistance against the GMD regime” (1989: 78).

The presence of Russian representatives in Xinjiang facilitated the spread of political concepts from the West into the region, especially the idea of nationalism and the right of self-determination. First of all, the idea of nationalism was promoted by the Russian revolution and ultimately took root in the Turkish elite’s growing desire for control over the region’s domestic affairs. Muslim activists not only ideologically depended on the Marxist, Islamist and Nationalistic frameworks to agitate the mass, but also purchased military supplies from the USSR in 1944-1945. Soviet civilian advisers accompanied these military supplies (Sawdanow 1994).

To fulfill its own ideological missions, the USSR tended to support long-oppressed groups on its borders. Again, Soviet dissatisfaction with Chinese border policy and with GMD in particular also served to prompt USSR effort to support the rebellion. Meanwhile, the restive Ili region was a particularly wealthy area, rich in natural resources and in potential for supplying raw materials to the USSR. If this region can be put under its influence, the Soviet would gain economic profit free of interruption or interference by the Chinese government.
As illustrated in the second section, ethnic discrimination and economic hardships in Xinjiang had already caused discontents among the non-Han people. The mass’s grievances and internal discontent created the opportunity for the Soviets to interfere in Xinjiang affairs (Sawdanow 1994). The closing of the Sino-Soviet border by Sheng facilitated this political trend and the Russians intensified its infiltration in the region.

**The Termination of Xinjiang-Soviet Trade**

In order to obtain agricultural and animal husbandry from Xinjiang, the Soviet Union organized markets along the Sino-Soviet border early in 1934. Therefore, the majority of business in the Ili area was oriented to the USSR and the economy of the three districts relied heavily on the export of agricultural and animal husbandry products to the Soviet Union in exchange for industrial materials and manufactured goods for daily use (Forbes 1986). Many of the herdsmen and peasants in Xinjiang would go to Russian market with their products to exchange them for Soviet goods. They benefited from the Xinjiang-Soviet trade since their animal husbandry products were sold at good prices (Seypidin 2004).

In 1941 the German army invaded the territory of Soviet Union. Opportunistic Sheng turned against the Soviet Union with a thought that the Russians would lose in the Stalingrad war and there would be no hope for the victory of the Communist. This new political trend resulted in the closing of the Xinjiang border with the USSR in 1942. Xinjiang-Soviet trade thus came to an end and generated new unrest and uncertainties. With the termination of trade, many local products went to waste, which resulted in complaints against the Chinese.

Regarding the hardships caused by the termination of trade with the Soviet Union, Seypidin illustrated in his memoir
“There previously existed friendly trading relations between the people of East Turkestan (Sinkiang) and the Soviet government. The closing of trade brought hardships into our lives. There are no jobs even for skilled workers because there is no one who wants to employ them. All people have fallen into dire poverty (Seypidin, 1989: 21)

Burhan, the would-be chairman of Xinjiang government, estimated in his memoir (1990) that closing of the border and termination of trade with the Soviet Union caused the loss of about 130 tons of silvers as local products lay wasted. Seypullayew stated (2004) that, since Ili’s economy relied on trade with the Soviet Union more than any other area of Xinjiang, people living there were more seriously affected by the closing of the border. It led to great shortage of industrial materials and daily necessities. According to Jack Chen (1987), iron becomes a precious metal. One pound of iron could purchase several ten-yard bolts of local woven cloth. “Tea becomes a luxury beyond the reach of the common people. Salt and sugar disappeared. Stocks of cheap manufactured cotton were soon exhausted. Islamic custom prescribes that a corpse be wound in a shroud, which requires up to twenty feet of cloth. Now there was nothing in which to bury the dead. This was the final affront and final indignity (Chen, 1987: 150)”. The seriousness of economic difficulties was presented in a pamphlet distributed in the provincial capital. According to the pamphlet, the friendly trading relations between the people of Xinjiang and the USSR had been disrupted by the Chinese administration. As the pamphlet detailed:

“The termination of trade made the local people poor, stagnated the daily business in the bazaars; for each family the daily livelihood became difficult. In the every locality
there are people who were starving, who were without clothing, who could not find employment, and whose condition is altogether pitiful. Big merchants became small; the small became bankrupt; the bankrupt became beggars…the number of miserable people increases every day. In the market there are no buyers for cattle, for the various kinds of wool, skins or grains. The powerful Soviet merchants went away from Xinjiang (from the pamphlet *why are we fighting?*)

**State Terror and Persistent Repression**

As a person with a suspicious nature or paranoia, Sheng Shicai, the governor (posted 1934-1944), had tried to maintain his dictatorship by conducting continuous “conspiracy trials” and massive purges. With the aid of his military and secret polices, Sheng carried out a reign of terror that was unique in Xinjiang’s 20th century political history. According to the eyewitness accounts of Seyidin (1989), during his ten years of absolute power (1934-1944) in Xinjiang, Sheng Shicai expanded the already excessive secret police force. In 1937, Sheng Shicai carried out an “international conspiracy plot involving many people of the upper elites” (Seyidin 1989: 150). A great number of people such as religious figures, Uyghur nationalists were arrested and thrown into prison. Their relatives and families were sent off to remote areas and put under house arrest.

Thus declares the movement pamphlet, *why are we fighting*:

Sheng, running wild, took all military and civil rule into his own hands; throughout the entire East Turkestan all rule became military; in the cities martial law was declared, and as soon as it became evening all movement in the streets was absolutely forbidden; it was impossible to leave the city without permission. After nightfall you were prevented not only from visiting your friends, but you could not go to see your closet relatives on the most urgent business, because the moment you stepped out of your door, a Chinese would seize you and begin: “Where are you going?” “For what reason?” “What have you said” and [he would ask you] many other questions. Each person was obliged to spy on everyone else and inform the police. At the present time East Turkestan [Sinkiang] has become one vast
prison; the nations are captives in it and the Chinese are the executioners. The Chinese themselves account the situation to be one of happiness and a fortunate life for the natives!

Moreover, many people in the three districts became the victim of the movement of “handing over rifles” and the “horse donation movement”. As early as 1939, Sheng Shicai forced the people of Altay prefecture to hand over their rifles and sabers to the authorities (Seypullayew 2004). In 1943, Sheng initiated a compulsory “horse donation movement”, whereby people were forced to donate to the government 10,000 horses, one from each family, without any form of compensation. Those who had no horse to donate had to pay money in the amount of 50 percent more than the market value of a horse.

In Urumchi and Ili, according to Seypullayew (2004), the secret police arrested every outstanding individual, and every elite became the target of suspicion. According to Burhan’s memoir (1990), among those held in Sheng’s prisons were also the future leaders of the movement: Ahmet Jan Qasimi and Burhan himself, the future chairman of Xinjiang province (Burhan, 1990: 269-81). Referring to this situation, Forbes states:

“No person, whether official, military officer, solider, or ordinary civilian could be exempted from the fear that he might be suddenly denounced by some secret agent and suddenly disappear. I was told that the friends of a person who had so disappeared were afraid to say so openly, and that the expression “gone to Tarbaghatay” was generally used in such cases” (Forbes, 1986: 155).

In Urumchi alone there were six prisons filled with political prisoners. By the end of 1944, there were about 120,000 political prisoners in jail. Inevitably, the majority of the captives were Turkic speaking people. Many thousands of them were subsequently tortured or executed. With his prolonged reign of terror and widespread purges, Sheng caused fear and anger, Turkic nationalism and Muslim opposition to Chinese rule
increased. Organizational resistance occurred throughout the three districts such as Ili, Altai and Tarbaghatay. Thus, in 1944 the Nationalist Central Government removed him from his post and offered him a job in Nanjing, the Chinese capital. In September 1944, Sheng finally accepted this position, leaving the province he had dominated for nearly a decade. As Sheng prepared to leave, the seeds of revolution were already planted in three districts as Ili, Tarbagatay and Altay.

**Misgovernment by the Guomindang**

Changes in some aspect of a political system create new possibilities for collective action by a given challenger or set of challengers (Tarrow 1989a; Costain 1992; McAdam 1999). Because of Sheng Shicai’s state terror, people in Xinjiang rested their hopes on the GMD administration. But, GMD’s maladministration and the political corruption in the occupational structure proved that this new regime was worse than previous ones. The new government simply presented a continuation of the oppressive Chinese rule inherited from Sheng Shicai and his predecessors. The maladministration and corruption reached to the point that government appointments could even be purchased in auctions (Burhan 1990). According to Forbes (1986), a magistracy of Turpan County cost 600-700 kape silver while the position of bao Zhang, village head cost 150-200. High taxation was another source of the people’s grievances. According to Seypidin (1989), “land taxes were often higher than the value of the land. Without clearly stated purpose, Special assessments were made at irregular intervals against land and property owners” (1989: 136).
Economic Crisis and the Han Immigration

According to Seypullayew’s memoir (2004), economic factors also made Xinjiang move toward unrest and upheaval in the 1940s. Removal of dictator Sheng and reestablishment of GMD control in 1944 facilitated the inflation of nationalist currency, which alarmed merchants and local people alike. The newly appointed GMD governor Wu Zhongxin who succeeded Sheng in 1944 was slow to take steps to control the inflation-ridden financial system. In October 1944, he finally announced that the province’s financial system would continue as before. By then, however, the Ili rebellion had already begun in the three districts.

Meanwhile, the long war of resistance against the occupation of Japan (1931-1945) had already decimated Chinese troops, and many army units were overextended. Again, in the summer of 1944, the chaotic, uncertain financial system led to general economic decline in Xinjiang, which accordingly influenced Xinjiang’s flow toward rebellion. The seeds of economic crisis were planted earlier. During Sheng Shicai’s rule, Xinjiang’s economy and money system were separate from those of China Proper. With the establishment of GMD administration in 1944, the economic decline and inflation in China Proper greatly affected Xinjiang. This influence was doubled with the release of new currency by Xinjiang government in the early decade of 1944. When the new currency was issued, the local economic system did not cease to use gold taels and Russian rubles (Saypidin 1989; Burhan 1990). The inflation-ridden currency led to the inevitable vicious circulation with the increase in the prices of staple products, and with the scarcity of basic items including flour and rice in the summer of 1944. In July that
year, prices had risen 23 percent over June. In August, prices zoomed to over 106 percent in comparison to July (Forbes 1986). According to Zhang Dajaun’s statistics (1986), from January 1943 to March 1945, the price of coal rose from 3.20 yuan per hundred Jin to 200 yuan, that of wheat flour from 30 to 4500 yuan. The government was not able to control the economic inflation.

During that time the dominant but the minority ethnic group in Xinjiang were the Han Chinese, numbering 222,401 according to the provincial census of 1946 (Zhang 1980). They mainly lived in Urumchi district---the provincial capital, where they accounted for 55 percent of the population. When the region became a province in 1884 there was a small migration of Han Chinese in this region. They came to Xinjiang with the Manchu general ZuoZongtang’s army when he embarked on pacification campaign. Then Han traders who had followed the Army to Xinjiang also settled in Xinjiang. In the early decades of the 20th century, most Han Chinese in Xinjiang worked for the government as soldiers. For this reason, the native people were hostile to the ethnic Han since they came to dominate the government and the towns in which the Muslims settled.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uyghur</td>
<td>2,984,000</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazak</td>
<td>326,000</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han</td>
<td>187,000</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>92,000</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyz</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>76,000</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,730,000</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The great Hanism has since long existed in Xinjiang as an embodiment of institutionalized racism that valued the interests of ethnic Han at the cost of marginalization of native people. This kind of political atmosphere increased unprecedentedly after the GMD came to power and made life much harder for the native people of Xinjiang (Seypidin 1989). Although Han Chinese compromised only five percent of the population, the majority of officials were Han Chinese. Along with economic crisis, this factor deteriorated Chinese-Muslim relations in the period of 1940-1944. Again, the military and prison system exacerbated poor Chinese-Muslim relations. The non-Han people suffered from every form of abuse that Han officials and troops imposed on them. The secret organizations, predominantly occupied by Han Chinese, embodied the oppressive character of Chinese rule. According to Seypidin (1989), wherever Han troops stationed, the native people expressed their hatred and grievances in various ways.

Furthermore, during the 1940s, the Chinese state settled a massive number of ethnic Hans in Xinjiang. The transfer of Han settlers played an important part in stirring local fears of massive immigration into the region. In this region, the demographic change proved “unparalleled in the modern history of central Asia” (Fobbes, 1986:234). According to Burhan’s memoir (1990), Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek, during his trip to Gansu in 1942, reportedly stressed the need to repopulate Xinjiang with immigrants from central China. Chinese officials generally agreed that this would be necessary to provide an economic base for future Chinese military control in the Northwest (Zhang 1994). Indeed by April 27, 1944, seven thousand refugees had arrived and settled in the area of Qumul.
Discussion and Summary

The Ili movement was prompted by changes in internal and external political opportunities. The political process perspective in social movement studies highlights the role of shifts in political constraints and opportunity structures that affect the trajectory of racial, ethnic social movements (McAdam 1999; Morris 1984; Andrews 2001). McAdam (1999)’s approach in his oft-cited book, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, is a powerful tool for analyzing this link. McAdam argues that: “structure of political opportunities is one of two major determinants of political protest, the other being organizational strength. The opportunities for a challenger to engage in successful collective action… vary greatly over time. And it is these variations that are held to be related to the ebb and flow of movement activity” (1982: 40-41). “Structural conditions”, McAdam argues, “do not automatically translate into protest: they are mediated by ‘cognitive liberation,’ an oppressed people’s ability to break out of pessimistic and quiescent patterns of thought and begin to do something about their situation” (1982: 48-51). Political opportunities which give rises to social movements are generally considered to include one or more of the following: (1) a change for the better in the degree to which society can influence or participate in the political system; (2) a new instability in political system; (3) the presence of elites who are favorable toward change; (4) an increase in the state’s willingness to exert repression (Tarrow 1994; McAdam 1996; Johnston 2005).

With the exception of the first, the other factors were clearly present in Xinjiang prior to the 1944 revolution. There were external, internal political opportunities for mobilization. In 1941 German invaded the Soviet territory. With a new trend in the world
politics, Sheng lost his faith in the Russians, turned against Stalin and closed the Sino-Xinjiang trade. Thus the alliance between Sheng and the Soviet broke. This in turn facilitated the involvement of the Soviet in the movement.

Second, internal opportunities such as the vulnerability of the state, economic crisis, persistent repression coincided with participation of the Soviets and new turn in the world politics. Discontents and grievances among the non-Han people of Xinjiang existed as early as the first decades of the 20th century. By the early 1940s, economic system did not appear stable. State repression continued unabated, Sheng’s secret police and prison system promoted resistance among the local Muslims against Chinese rule. Again, Han-Muslim relations had been badly deteriorated by the chauvinist ethnic polices under his rule. Conflicts between the ruling Chinese minority and the region’s Muslim majority increased. Huge number of Han immigrants was transferred from Central China to Xinjiang. At the same time, the Soviet Union took pains to publicize its culture and ideology in the region and seized the every opportunity to support movement participants. Thus, alongside internal elements, the availability of the Soviet as political ally facilitated the mobilization and rise of movement elites.

On the basis of the discussion, I conclude that (1) the Ili movement was created by a complicated political process that has been fed and developed by international and domestic political opportunities; (2) understanding the dynamics of revolutionary movements requires full attentions to the external and internal elements of macro-mobilization. But without ideological work, organizations, resources and leaders, a social movement can not develop, survive and flourish. Next chapter examines how three ideologies influenced the formation of organizations and how movement actors were supported, organized, cooperated and integrated to seize the political opportunities.
Chapter 5 Meso-mobilization: Ideologies and Organizations

This chapter focuses on meso-mobilization process of the 1944 Ili movement. Meso-mobilization refers to the process of coordination, integration, and/or activation of social groups, networks, and organizations for the purposes of collectively seeking or resisting social change (Gerhards and Rucht 1992). During the meso-mobilization process ideology provides principles and values for movement actors; and organizations in turn play an important role in recruiting, activating, integrating movement participants.

This does not mean that ideology and organization are identical. Ideology, at the very least, refers to a set of ideas ---elements that are bound together (Gerrying 1997). While applied to mobilizations studies, it refers to “the belief system of any social movement” (Oliver and Johnston 2005). Revolutionary organization entails ideology. An ideology relies on a few basic assumptions that may or may not have factual basis. It integrates the values social movement organizations; guides and regulate consciousness among the movement members. Oliver and Johnston argue that ideology “provides the elites and organizations with moral, normative principles that guide personal and collective action” (2005: 192).

By contrast, organizations allow movements to persist through periods when opportunities for influence are minimal (Andrews 1997; Taylor 1989). Resource mobilization theory in social movement studies discusses movements as organizations, and focus especially on the needs of such organizations to mobilize resources. In this theory, the term ‘resource’ encompasses a wide array of elements including ideologies, rhetoric, organizations, economic resources and symbols. Most importantly, it examines
the organizational dynamics of collective action (McCarthey and Zald 1973, 1977). This perspective developed in social movement studies by borrowing many useful insights from organizational sociology (Clemens and Minikoff 2004). It was first proposed by McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977) who proposed that social movement organizations could be analyzed like any other organization, as the result of efforts by rational actors to mobilize available resources and build a formal organization to promote the goals of a social movement. It therefore focuses on what resources were available and how the movement utilized them to build and maintain their movement organizations. It also analyzes the role of particular categories of people in relation to the social movement organization as resources.

The Ili revolution was not only impacted by the political opportunities, but also largely depended on a wide array of resources such as ideological work, movement organizations, and networks, political, military and economic resources. In this chapter I examine the organizational dynamics of the Ili revolution by focusing on the confluence of three ideologies, formation of movement organizations and rise of movement leaders. First, I introduce the contents and impacts of three ideologies such as Marxism-Leninism, Turkic nationalism and pan-Islamism; and how these ideas are intertwined to influence the movement. Then I focus on the formation of movement organizations such as National Liberation Committee and Marxist Study Group. In the end, I will discuss my findings and summarize my arguments as five propositions. I seek to demonstrate that: (1) the elite support play an essential role in the mobilization process; (2) analysis of revolutionary movements would be incomplete it ideology and its origin are not examined or treated as the supplementary part of political process; (3) there is a strong
link between the elite support, ideology and movement organization; (4) ideology is of central importance in understanding revolutionary movements.

**Ideologies, Elites and Networks in the Ili Movement**

Changes in political opportunities shape movement ideology, and that movement ideology can cause openings or closings of political opportunities. Resources, the political environment (Gamson 1990; McAdam 1999) and movement ideologies (Arnold 1995; Thomas 1999) shape organizational structure. As shown in the historical overview chapter, at the dawn of 1934, anti-Chinese sentiments and the dream of the Turkic state resulted in the failed attempt to form the first East Turkestan government. Although this short-lived government collapsed, the elites associated with it remained in Xinjiang and did not abandon the idea of an independent Turkic state. Benson (1990: 183) argues that: “the dream of an independent Turkestan…was an important element in the resistance movement”. Moreover, the break of the relationship between Sheng and the Soviet gave Stalin an opportunity to extend soviet influence in Xinjiang. The Russians facilitated the rise of three previously unconnected ideologies: Turkic nationalism, pan-Islamism and Marxism.

In the early 1940s, as the legacy of the 1933 movement, the influence of pan-Islamism remained pervasive among the devote Muslims. At the same time, with activation of the elites who influenced by the Turkic nationalism, the belief in pan-Turkic political destiny also began to show its influence in the region. The Soviet fully involved in the movement by fanning these ideologies, providing military and financial aids, educating the elites of native people who take interest in revolutionary ideas. This trend
generated movement Organizations and the movement evolved into a quick and dramatic mobilization process. Marxist intellectuals preached in their own ways the idea of liberation under the banner of ant-Chinese, whereas Islamic leaders called for all Muslims to unite in support of freedom and establishment of an independent Muslim state (Forbes 1986). Although their movement strategy was not sophisticated enough to build a political platform for all the movement actors, their claim was embraced by the mass with the Marxist utopia of revolution and nationalist slogan of independent state. Marxist, nationalist elites took advantage of the existing political opportunities, and accordingly, many people were increasingly influenced by nationalist and revolutionary ideas. Generally Speaking, the Ili revolution witnessed confluence of three ideologies on the formation of movement organizations.

Turkic Nationalism: Origin and Infiltration

In social movement studies, ideology refers to the belief system of any social movement (Oliver and Johnston 2005). Turkic-nationalism, more precisely pan-Turkism, is an ideology that deeply impacted the Ili movement. Pan-Turkism, which is used to describe the idea of political, cultural and ethnic unity of all Turkic-speaking people, rose as a pan-Turkic political movement in the late the 19th and early 20th century (Landau 1995). Its purpose was to unify all of the Turkish-speaking peoples into a pan-Turkish state in the area from Inner Asia to Turkey. While the various Turkic peoples such as Uyghur, Kazak, Qirghiz and Tatar often share historical, cultural and linguistic roots; Pan-Turkic ideas had been very popular among Xinjiang Muslims in the early decade of 20th century.
Turkey’s involvement in the First World War provided an impetus for like-minded Turkish nationalists in Xinjiang (Taylor 2004). In 1915 an Ottoman subject named Ahmad Kamal started a school of modern education in Kashgar where the local Muslim children were encouraged to look to the Turkish Caliph as their spiritual father (Kamal 1940; Forbes 1986). One year later, Yang Zengxing, the Xinjiang Governor (1911-1928), closed the school and imprisoned all the activists associated with it. Later the school was permitted to reopen on the condition that all symbols of allegiance to Turkey be removed, and that Chinese language instruction must be added into the curriculum (Kamal 1940). By 1920, the victory of October Revolution also promoted the rise modern Turkic nationalism when the Russians first entered and dominated Central Asia. In Western Turkestan (Russian Central Asia) the presence of Russian settlers contributed to the growth of Uzbek, Tajik and Turkmen national consciousness. The Muslims of Russian central Asia were increasingly influenced by reforming groups such as the *Jadid* (enlightenment) movement. People there, “like the people under colonial rule throughout the world, were thinking in new ways about their situation, questioning their social status, proposing new approaches to knowledge and promoting political reform. Xinjiang fell within the circuits of this new discourse in central Eurasia, which increasingly defined the object of concern as the Khaliq (people) or Millat (the nation)” (Millward, 2007: 132).

During this period, the Jadid movement continued to grow so quickly that by 1920 there were 5000 Jadid-ist schools scattered throughout the Russian empire, and the movement was heading toward the Xinjiang direction. In 1921, a group of Uyghurs known as the Organization of Workers and Farmers of Altishahar (Southern Xinjiang) and Zungaria (Northern Xinjiang), convened a congress in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. This
congress renamed itself the Organization of Revolutionary Uyghur, sent representatives to Moscow for consultations, and dedicated itself to the establishment of independent rule in Xinjiang (Lattimore 1940; Forbes 1986; Tyler 2004). This event is often cited as the first use of the ethnic term “Uyghur” for the Turkic population of Xinjiang. In the same period, after the victory of Russian revolution, many upper class and highly educated Tatars, Uzbeks and others with Turkic-nationalist idea fled Soviet territory for exile in Xinjiang. Later, these liberal, nationalistic intellectuals influenced pedagogy and publishing, and Xinjiang’s Turkic nationalist movement began arise. This new trend influenced the political and military developments of the 1930s and resulted in the short-lived First Eastern Turkestan Republic (1933-1934) in 1933.

Meanwhile, the Uyghur capitalists also played an important role in the rise of Turkic nationalism in Xinjiang. Uyghur capitalists such as brothers Musabay (Bawudun Musabay and Husen Musabay), who had traveled to Germany, Turkey and Russia, found their homeland to be backward (Seypidin 1990). They had travelled widely, including trips to Paris, Berlin, Moscow and Istanbul, in the course of running trading company in Artush. They also owned a leather factory in Ghulja. During their trip to Istanbul, they were influenced by liberal Turkish intellectuals and sought to promote nationalism among the Turkic peoples in Xinjiang. This was a time when pan-Turkic movement launched in Turkey during 1920s. Musabay hired teachers from Turkey, sent Uyghur students to study in Istanbul, Kazan and St. Petersburg; and opened other schools, including a teacher training program in Artush, a small city near Kashgar. The brothers Musabey also opened a publishing house in Kashgar. Returned students and graduates of the teacher’s college began to start schools elsewhere in Xinjiang. The above indicated
that Ideology has power over cognition and provides guidance towards action. It is abstracted from and created by the political context.

**Marxism and Marxist Leaders**

Thinking of the ideology of Marxism requires understandings of where that idea came from and of what its values and normative components are. Marxism-Leninism is a communist ideology, officially based upon the theories of Karl Marx, Frederic Engels and Vladimir Lenin, that promotes the development and creation of an international communist society through the leadership of proletariat dictatorship (Callinox 1999). At the beginning of 1940s, the young pro-Soviet Muslims such as Ahmatjan Qasimi, who were educated in the Soviet Union and influenced by Marxist political ideology, played a decisive role in the ongoing process. In his book, *Xinjiang Story*, Jack Chen stated that “the Ili rebellion was a revolutionary, national liberation struggle…deeply influenced by the ideas of Marxism-Leninism; it was an example of socialist internationalism” (1977: 14). With regard to the role of these progressive intellectuals in the Ili movement, Sawdanow wrote: “in Xinjiang, the growth of a revolutionary spirit among the progressive intellectuals played a very vital role in the subsequent development of the movement. During 1930-1940s, Marxist-Leninist ideas were widely spread among the advanced group of local intellectuals. If there had not been such a period, there would have not been any cadres to promote national liberation revolution.” (1994: 36)

Seypidin wrote: “…On the eve of the 1944 Ili revolution, there were two important characteristics of the situation in Xinjiang: the existence of great number of progressive native intellectuals and the dissemination of Marxist-Leninist ideas within the province. These characteristics obviously influenced the rise of liberation movement in Xinjiang”
According to Burhan’s memoir, when he worked for the Soviet Consulate in Urumchi during the 1930s, he saw members of a Marxist group studying Marxism-Leninism and reporting their work to the Soviet consulate.

But how did Marxism-Leninism spread into Xinjiang? The victory of the revolutionary Soviet regime in the neighboring Russian empire promoted the Soviet influence and infiltration of Xinjiang (Forbes 1986). According to Zhang’s memoir (1994), under the influence of Soviet culture, a new type of intellectuals emerged in Xinjiang. A number of Turkic intellectuals had their education in the Soviet Union and had chances to study the classical works of Marxism-Leninism. It is recorded in all the eyewitness accounts that the key leaders of the Ili revolution, like Ahmatjan Qasimi, Abbasov, Seypidin, Delihan, had been educated in the Soviet Union or influenced by the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. Ahmatjan grew up and was educated in the Soviet Union; Abbasov was a student of Lin Jilu, a senior CCP member in Urumchi.

Marxist ideology infiltrated into Xinjiang through the hard work of movement elites. Among the movement leaders, Ahmetjan Qasimi, the key Marxist leader of the movement, played the most important role. Native to the Ili valley and like many young men of his generation, Ahmatjan had been educated in Soviet Central Asia. Shortly after the assassination of the warlord governor Yan Zengxin (posted 1911-1928), he was taken to the Soviet Union by his uncle. There he remained for a decade, returning to Xinjiang in 1938. He was very fluent in Russian. By the time of his return to Xinjiang in 1938, Ahmatjan was a communist-minded progressive intellectual. He was imprisoned in Urumchi by Sheng Shicai for a number of years. On the eve of 1944 Ili revolution he was released. After the Nilqa uprising occurred in October 1944, he and other progressive
intellectuals acted swiftly to take control over the burgeoning rebellion. As soon as news of the event reached Ghulja, Ahmatjan, as a member of the national liberation committee, began to prepare an armed uprising to oust GMD forces from the city. Seypidin, another Marxist leader, received his early education in Xinjiang. Then he travelled to the Soviet Union where he studied law and politics at the University of Tashkent, and became fluent in Russian. Following his return to Xinjiang, he joined the National Liberation Committee. After the victory of revolution, he served as the Minister of Education (1945-1946) and as Commissioner of Education for Xinjiang in coalition government.

Abdukerim Abbasov, another Marxist who served as a key leader of National Liberation Committee and as a Deputy Secretary General of Xinjiang Coalition Government, was born in Kirgizstan in Soviet Central Asia. His ancestors’ hometown was in Atush county, Xinjiang. At the age of 6, he moved to Ili with his parents. After he finished elementary school in Ili county, his father sent him to Urumchi for high school in 1936. The then headmaster of Provincial No. 1 high school in Urumchi, which Abbasov attended, was Yu XiuSong, one of the founders of the Communist movement in China. According to his biography written by Seypidin (1990: 84), a few years later Abbasov remembered him as his idol: “the most important political achievement during my years of junior high school was that I had a very good opinion of the CCP cooperation. At this time, many CCP members were appointed to the college”. In September 1938, Abbasov went to Xinjiang College where many Chinese Communist members were appointed to teach. The college, regarded as the “second anti-Japanese Military-Political University” after the Yan An in Central China, taught a wide range of courses on Marxist revolutionary theory. It was here that Abbasov received his deeper understandings of
Marxism-Leninism. Fascinated by the study of Chinese, he started to read works on Marxist-Leninism by Mao Zedong. Ababsov spoke fluent Chinese, but he did not know Russian. This was in sharp contrast to other Ili Regime leaders, such as Ahmatjan, Ishaq Beg and Seypidin, who had very strong Soviet backgrounds and spoke very good Russian. He regarded the Chinese Communists, especially Lin Jilu, as a model revolutionary (Seypidin 1990).

Movement ideologies and organizations develop dialectically through political process. Under the guidance of the Soviet consulate, on the eve of Ili movement, early activists were involved in small, compact Marxist Study Group in which face to face interaction was provided. The earliest members were even handpicked by the Soviet council to join the group. Early Marxist members relied on each other and welcomed other like-minded people. Bound together in a mutual-inspiring community, the people who took interest in Marxism knew each other and worked together as a circle of friends. During this process, other Marxist activists such as Seypullayew and Qembiri played an important role in pushing forward the revolutionary ideology in Ili (Seypullayew 2004). They had long been involved in the Marxist circle serving as pamphlet distributors. In Marxist circle, the activists were taught a revolutionary framework for understanding injustice and who or what is responsible for social problems as well as strategies and goals for social change. Through shared experiences and conversations, these activists reaffirmed their own political ideology and identity.

In order to recruit more members, activists reconsider their choices of issues and seek to combine different and opposing ideologies. The majority of activist organized around Marxist issues. On occasion Marxist intellectuals and Muslim scholars united
strategically on the issue of oppression and inequality and in response to the horse
donation movement. Furthermore, activists made good use of the roles of institutions and
organizations such as mosques and Marxism Study Union. Here Marxist revolutionary
ideology began to show its influence together with pan-Islamic ideology. Movement
actors distributed at mosques the pamphlets and leaflets imported from Soviet Central
Asia. Alihan Tore, the future president of East Turkestan Republic, was an Imam at the
Baytulla Mosque. He played a key role in mobilizing the Muslim attendees through his
powerful speeches.

Seypidin elaborated on the role of Alihan Tore:

“Alihan Tore had the capacity to agitate people with his provocative
speeches. I am sure we (Marxists) would have opposed his slogan of Islamic
community, because his idea seemed unrealistic and unacceptable. But with
other Marxist youth we had reached an agreement that this person would
help us recruiting more people, whom we cannot persuade only with
revolutionary ideas. During our talks with Alihan, we tolerate his discussions
of Islamic community despite our dissatisfactions. We know that the more
we can unite diverse type of people, the more we would become

**Origin and Influence of Pan-Islamism**

Chosen ideas are abstracted from and created by the political structure. By the
closing of 19th century and the beginning of the twentieth century, concepts of Pan-
Islamism had begun to infiltrate into Xinjiang. Pan-Islamism is a political movement
espousing the unity of Muslims under one Islamic state—often a Caliphate (Keddie 1972).
As a form of religious nationalism, it distinguishes itself from pan-Turkism by excluding
culture and ethnicity as primary factors toward unification. In the modern era, Pan-
Islamism was pioneered by Jamal Aldin al-Afgani (1819-1897), an Iranian thinker and
reformer who urged Muslims of all persuasions to band together and modernize Islam to
avoid the cultural and political hegemony of the colonizers. Travelling and delivering
lectures in Arabia, Egypt, Turkey or Europe, he asked the people of the Islamic world to join forces against the external threat (Armstrong 2002). Then his disciples such as Muhammad Abdu (1848-1905), Rashid Rida (1865-1935) tried their best to spread his ideas.

Since the idea of pan-Islamism means establishing a universal Islamic state under the leadership of the Turkish Sultan of Caliph, it also attracted many Muslims in Xinjiang. Numerous religious scholars such as Sabit Damolla and Alihan Tore preached the idea of pan-Islamism at the mosques. As shown in the overview chapter, during the development of the failed 1933 Revolution, “Islam provided the basis for unity within Xinjiang where over three-fourths of the population was Muslims” (Benson, 1990: 145). Two principles such as worship of freedom and recognition for the status of Islam guided and characterized political ideal of short-lived first ETR government.

According to Seypidin (1989), before the 1944 movement, the Soviet Union encouraged pan-Islamism to mobilize more Muslims for the Ili Rebellion and used Islam as an ideological tool for preaching anti-Hanism. This was because, at the earlier stage, the propaganda on the basis of Marxist ideology achieved only limited results. Most Muslims, except for some young intellectuals, were not interested in revolutionary theory. Thus, the Soviet advisers had to turn to Islamic faith and Turkic nationalism. The mosque Baitula in Ili was chosen as the major center of this sort of religious discourse.

The primary role of social movement entrepreneurs is to communicate the movements’ messages to current and potential constituents. “The cultural tool kits” of the potential recruits may already contain the symbols constituting a particular collective action frame (Swidler 1986), but these symbols are “not automatically available as
mobilizing symbols” and “require concrete agency to turn them into collective action frames” (Tarrow 1998: 133). Moreover, because a cultural stock contains diverse and often contradictory symbols, social movement entrepreneurs must choose which symbols to emphasize and how they will be packaged. It is this selective “punctuating and encoding of objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action that renders events meaningful to potential recruits” (Snow and Beneford 1988: 137). In other words, social movement entrepreneurs often must navigate their organizations through cultural fields awash with alternative interpretative schemata in order to label some acts or events as unjust, define the opposition, and make the case for action (Gamson 1988).

During the development stage of the movement, Alihan Tore as Imam called for holy war. In the cultural narratives of Islam, the Muslims were encouraged to be heroes in their life-times, and to be honored after their death (Armstrong 2000). Imam called for prompt action to unite all Muslims to expel the non-believers—Han Chinese from Xinjiang. Rigid Islamic classification such as believers and unbelievers united the Muslims from diverse ethnic backgrounds and provided the unifying ideology that facilitated other non-Han population’s enthusiasm to join the movement. At least in its initial stage, movement actors saw themselves as engaged in movement designed to revitalize a living Islamic spirit that would return their land to the Dar al-Islam (“abode of Islam”). Such belief also formed the basis of the liberation master frame, according to which, the colonizer needed to be toppled from power and replaced by Muslim rulers who would employ Islamic law, as shown in the following movement claim, which was read at the Mosque:

Long live our Muslim republican government.
Long live the great, the heroic warriors.
Long live the crescent calling for our thirty days of holy fast.
Long live the star calling for our free daily prayers.

----From the movement pamphlet “Why Are We Fighting?”

This movement strategy achieved good results among the Muslims. Ever since the establishment of Kashgaria Islamic state in the 19th century, Muslim sentiment had played a considerable role in previous Muslim struggles in Xinjiang; and independence had long been the dream of some of the influential figures and the upper classes of the Muslims in this area, but they had never been powerful enough to achieve this goal on their own. So, in the 1944 movement, calling for Muslim nationalism suited the interest of Xinjiang Muslims. According to the memoir of Burhan (1990), rapid growth of the Liberation organization in Xinjiang was due to the success of Islamic ideology preached by Alihan Tore, the influential Imam.

Formation of Movement Organizations

There is a strong link between the elite support, ideology and movement organization. Ideology is indeed of central importance in understanding the formation and development of movement organizations. But, without organizations, a movement ideology fails to put into practice and fails to turn into the collective consciousness of the mass. Gamson (1990) argues that organizations are resources, effective organizations can be seen as hierarchies, and hierarchical organizations are valuable resources for movements. Andrews argues that: “organizations are significant because they directly implement changes themselves” (2005: 110). “If institutional political systems shape the prospects of collective action and the forms movements take, their influence is not independent of the
various kinds of mobilizing structures through which groups seek to organize. …mobilizing structure …*means* those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action” (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996: 3).

The Ili movement provides evidence to show that organization profiles, including strategies, tactics, and targets, are shaped by movement ideologies, which in turn influence the construction of organizational structure. To some degree one can say that the successful development of the mobilization in the Ili movement was the outcome of the integration of movement ideologies and resistance organizations aimed at expelling Han Chinese from Xinjiang. According to Seypidin (1989), during the late 1930s, an organization for the protection of the nation was established in the Altay area under the leadership of Yunus Hakim. Branches of this organization existed throughout the Altai prefecture. Sheng’ spies were able to gather information on this organization, and in March 1940, some 350 of its members were arrested by Sheng’s agents. However, not all the leadership was eliminated by these arrests. Mobilization against the Chinese continued unabated under the leadership of Osman Batur and Ali Beg Hakim. Actively opposing Chinese rule, members of this organization served to propagate the idea of Turkic nationalism and encouraged Muslim zeal for an independent Muslim state.

According to Burhan’s Memoir (1990), in the early 1940s many Soviet-educated Turkish intellectuals were forced to flee across the neighboring Sino-Soviet frontier due to Sheng’s widespread purges. During this process new elites arose as movement leaders. Ishaq beg, a Qirghiz, fled to Soviet Union in 1942, where he organized the Muslim Refugees Union. This was a time when the Xinjiang-Soviet trade terminated and the
Soviet wanted to take revenge on Sheng. With the assistance of the Soviet authorities, Ishaq beg gathered about two hundred refugees and organized them into two battalions for political and military training. When the Ili rebellion began, he actively organized Soviet-trained personnel and sent them back to support the rebellion with weapons. Fatih, a Tatar manager of the local Products Company in Nilqa County, travelled to the Soviet Union to organize the supply of ammunition. According to Burhan’s claims (1990), in the Soviet Union Fatih met Ishaq beg. They discussed plans for uprising in Nilqa.

According to Seypidin Azizi (1989), Abbasov, another major leader of the Ili National Liberation Organization, shortly before the Ili rebellion began, crossed over the Soviet border and met Ishaq Beg to organize a guerilla force of more than a hundred people. The Soviet authorities equipped them with ammunition. In October 1944, on the eve of the Ili uprising, Abbasov went back to Ili with his men. Shortly thereafter, Abbasov made contact with Fatih’s guerilla group in Gongha and together they made a plan to attack Ili GMD authorities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Organizations</th>
<th>Leader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Altay, Xinjiang</td>
<td>National Protection Organization</td>
<td>Yunus Hakim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almata, USSR</td>
<td>National Liberation Committee</td>
<td>Ahmatjan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alamata, USSR</td>
<td>Muslim Refugees Union</td>
<td>Ishaq Beg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 Main Movement Organizations

After the termination of Soviet-Xinjiang trade, Turkic speaking refugees were welcomed and trained in the Soviet Union. In 1943, a “Xinjiang Turkic People’s National Liberation Committee” was set up in Alma Ata, the capital of Soviet Kazakhstan, with an aim to organize “progressive” opposition to the oppression. Ahmatjan Qasimi became the
organization leader and, through contacting Abbasov, formed a branch organization in Ili. Turkic speaking Muslim of the Ili valley started to join this organization. In his memoir, Zhang ZhiZhong (1994), the future chairman of the Xinjiang coalition government (1946-1947), called the planning body simply “Ili Committee, predecessors of East Turkestan Republic, established to throw off Chinese rule”. This organization was very active throughout the three districts. At the height of its strength, it claimed a membership of some 30,000 throughout the three districts in Ili valley. This was a highly nationalistic, pan-ethnic organization in favor of establishment of an independent Turkic state in Xinjiang. This organization saw the establishment of East Turkestan Government as the ultimate goal, continuing to work for the total withdrawal of Han Chinese from the Muslim area. In the summer of 1943, the Soviet Union started to dispatch underground activists to Ili to take an active part in the preparation for the rebellion under the leadership of the Soviet Consulate in Ili. Before the Ili rebellion broke out, many secret societies with Russian elements actively performed their duties in Xinjiang, especially in the three districts such as Ili, Tarbagatay and Altay. The Soviets helped the local people to organize their own groups such as the Marxism Study Group and the Schoolmate Association for Intellectuals.

In the early 1940s, the Marxist movement in Ili was quite active. One important trigger of activity was Marxist Study Group. Many young people, impressed with Marxist ideology and the discussion of victory of Russian revolution, joined and continued to work for spreading Marxist ideas. The focus of Marxist discussion was injustice and oppression. Marxist networks in Ili activated from time to time to support collective action. After the horse donation movement, a number of progressive people who had
opposed the horse donation joined in the activists. The Soviet consulate provided financial subsidiaries.

In order to recruit more members, activists should reconsider their choices of issues and seek to combine different and opposing ideologies. In April 1944, the Marxism Study Group and National Liberation Committee joined together to establish the Liberal Organization, also called the Liberation Society in Ili. In order to attract more members, this organization heavily relied on political Islam, which is originally incompatible with Marxism. Headed by Ali Han Tore, a Soviet Uzbek Imam who had fled to Xinjiang after the Bolshevik revolution, its members were recruited from different social circles. Of the twelve-member central committee of this organization, four were from religious circles, six were tradesmen, and two were Marxist intellectuals, including Abbasov and Ahmatjan Qasimi. The Liberation Organization became the leading underground organization in Ili and was under the full control of the Soviet consulate in Ili. The cadres of this organization were Soviet underground activists and local youth. Their main goals were to: (1) speed up mass mobilization; (2) coordinate and arrange activities among the secret societies inside and outside of Ili; (3) organize ammunition for the rebellion. As mentioned above, there were also liberation organizations and secret societies in other prefectures such as Altay and Tarbagatay. The aim of all these branch organizations was to oppose GMD regime and to struggle for democracy, freedom, and equality among all nationalities. In order to realize this aim, these organizations did large amount of propaganda work and made preparations for the armed struggle. By the summer of 1944 branches of the Liberation Organizations were established in Altay, Tarbaghatay, Ili and
Puli. Saudanov Zahir (1994), one of the Ili National Army Leaders, claimed that the Liberation Organization in Ili was responsible for the activities of the rebels in Nilqa.

In July 1944, The Liberation Organization in Ili, which was under the leadership of the Soviet Consulate, decided to start a rebellion in Ili, taking advantage of the horse donation movement. In order to lure the GMD Garrison away from Ili, the organization chose Nilqa county, which was about 100 kilometers east of Ili, for the uprising. In August 1944, the Liberation Organization sent its people to Nilqa. A guerrilla force was organized in Nilqa county. On 20 August the Guerilla force was reorganized into three battalions of more than 200 troops. On 5 October, the day after Wu Zhongxin, the new Xinjiang Governor, arrived in Urumchi to take up the governorship, the guerilla force and 1600 people joined together at Ulasultai village under the leadership of Fatih, to launch an attack on Nilqa County. A few days later, the county fell to rebels. The uprising in Nilqa was well-organized and well-prepared by the Liberation Organization with Soviet assistance. According to Seypidin (1989), the plan for the uprising was discussed and worked out by Fatih and Ishaq Beg in the Soviet Union. According to Zhang Dajun (1980), Fatih himself had brought thirty rifles and two machine guns from the Soviet Union.

Discussion and Summary

Ideology, as set of conscious and unconscious ideas, constitutes SOM’s goals, expectations, and actions. An ideology is received consciousness among movement leaders as well as a comprehensive vision and a way of looking at things inside the organizations. An ideology plants the seed around which further movement organizations and their goals grow. The Ili revolution witnessed confluence of three ideologies on the formation of
movement organizations. They include Marxism-Leninism, Turkic nationalism and pan-Islamism. These three ideologies provided prescriptions helping activists grasp how to look at events and people, it offered them simplifying perspectives through which they can make sense of problematic social conditions.

Marxism-Leninism was the ideology that mostly impacted this movement. During the 1930s and 1940s, under the influence of Soviet culture, a new type of intellectuals—Marxists emerged in Xinjiang. A number of local minority nationalities had their education in the Soviet Union and had chances to study the classical works of Marxism-Leninism. This contributed to the formation of the first movement organization and rise of Marxism as a dominant ideology. Marxist revolutionary ideology provided the activists with an insightful perspective creating simplified images of oppression and political opportunity.

However, any ideology that sought to establish its dominance on the basis of popular support in Xinjiang would have to protect religious freedom and, in particular, respect for the Islamic religion. When the Marxist ideology proved ineffective among the Muslims at the early stage, the Soviet advisers turned to Islamic ideology. During this process, through Alihan Tore’s passionate speeches, Islamic discourses such as One God and Holy war mobilized religious, ethnic sentiments by classifying, excluding the ethnic Han as enemy. Infiltration of pan-Turkism into Xinjiang accompanied this process. Under the influence of Pan-Turkism and pan Islamism, movement actors constructed a collective identity such as “we Turk”, which served as the basis for collective action. Islamic vision of an ideal society and Turkic narration of independent Turkish state boosted the enthusiasm and motivation of movement participants.
Clemens and Minkoff argue that: “the more we learn about what goes on inside of activist organizations and how such organizations are themselves embedded in complex fields of culture, politics, and action, the more we know about the dynamics of movement development and change” (2004: 166). Taking a look at the functions of organizations helps explain the growth and persistence of the Ili movement. The first movement organization was set up in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan in 1942 and called the National Liberation Committee, which later transformed into National Liberal Council. Its goal was to establish an independent state free of Chinese rule. It recruited members for “liberation army of refugees”, many of whom served in the forces of the Ili National Army after the victory of Ili revolution. This group was headed by Ishaq Beg in Alma Ata, Kazakhstan, a Kazak general and engaged in activities until the activists entered Ili. In 1938 Marxism Study Union was created in Ili and it became one of the main forces in the development of Ili movement. Until 1944, these two movement organizations were scattered. Due to the unity of Marxist study group and National Liberation Committee, the Ili movement had flourished and recruited more members first from the circle of the progressive youth, then with the help of Alihan Tore, from pious Muslims.

Meanwhile, in this revolution the elite support facilitated the development of movement ideology and organizations. The elite support basically originated from the Soviet Union. Five eyewitness accounts written by Zhang (1994), Zhang (1986), Seypidin(1989), Burhan(1990), Sawdanow (1994) held that the Soviet had constantly contributed to the development of movement by establishing Marxist study groups in Ili and Urumchi, training progressive intellectuals, supporting the refugees group, and providing the activists with military equipment.
On this basis of the above discussion, I summarize my findings as four arguments. They are: (1) in order to recruit more members, activists reconsider their choices of issues and seek to combine different and opposing ideologies; (2) chosen ideas are abstracted from and created by the political structure. (3) organizational profiles, including strategies, tactics, and targets, are shaped by movement ideologies, which in turn influence the construction of organizational structure; (4) movement ideologies and organizations develop dialectically through political process.

But in order to unify consensus, Social Movement Organizations should depend on cultural traditions to produce frames, diagnose the wrong, identify the solutions and motivate the actors. This requires examination of micro-mobilization and framing process. In next chapter I focus on this process by particularly taking a look how movement leaders depended on Islamic collective representation and pan-Turkic narratives to create, bridge and integrate collective action frames.
Chapter 6 Micro-mobilization: Framing Process

Let these oppressors depart quickly from our “Eastern Turkestan”.
Let these spies, traitors and puppets also leave at once.
Let these running dogs of the Chinese and their coterie get out also.
Long live free “Eastern Turkestan”.
Long live our Muslim republican government.
Long live the great, the heroic warriors.
Long live the crescent calling for our thirty days of holy fast.
Long live the star calling for our free daily prayers.
Away with, away with, away with those oppressors, those spies, those pro-Chinese.

---- from the Ili Declaration “Struggle for Motherland ?” (Benson, 1990: 208)

Micro-mobilization refers to the “interactive process devised and employed by social movement organizations and their representative actors to mobilize or influence various target groups with respect to the pursuit of collective or common interests” (Snow et al. 1986: 464-465). In the last two chapters I have introduced the macro-, meso level conditions and elements that promoted the emergence and development of the 1944 Ili revolution. However, I assume that these objective elements were necessary but insufficient triggers of the movement. In the Ili revolution, in order to turn macro-meso elements into mass mobilization, movement leaders tried hard to persuade the masses to act collectively toward achieving their shared interest and goals. Indeed, political opportunities, organizations and networks all served as very important catalysts, but are insufficient for explaining consensus mobilization in the early stage of the revolution. Framing was the actual process of meaning construction and the alignment of frames facilitated the relationship between the movement and potential members.

The current cultural turn in social movement research explores, among other things, the meaning systems created by movement actors that move people to act in non-normative ways (Taylor and Whitter 1995). A useful concept formulated out of this body
of research is framing. Framing “refers to an interpretive schema that simplifies and condenses ‘the world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action within one’s present or past environment” (Snow and Benford 1992: 137). It calls attention to the grievances, names it as unjust and intolerable, attributes blame and responsibility, and suggests how to ameliorate the situation (Snow et al. 1986). In a social movement, by applying three core framing processes such as diagnostic framing, prognostic framing and motivational framing, a movement is able to attract people or ensure their commitment by resonating with the beliefs or needs of current or potential participants (Snow and Benford 1988). The first two core framing tasks constituted of diagnostic framing through which a problem and its source are identified, and prognostic framing which proposes a solution to the problem in favor of consensus mobilization. If successful, these framing can persuade people to agree with the movements’ issues and goals. However, at this point movement members might not be motivated to take any action. The third core framing task, motivational framing, calls for specific action to solve the problem. This is needed to switch people from consensus mobilization to action mobilization in which they actively participate in the movement (Benford and Snow 2000).

In this chapter while identifying how ideology is different from frames, I empirically examine how collective action frames are grounded in collective representations and how they are bridged by the movement actors during consensus mobilization process. I seek to analyze the origins and contents of five frames used by the Ili movement leaders as they worked at the early decades of 1940s. I include the following frames in my analysis: oppression, anti-Hanism, we-Turkic, friendship with the
Soviet and one God principle. Each frame was grounded in a particular cultural tradition and guided by certain ideology. For example, two frames such as oppression and friendship with the Soviet were grounded in the Marxist tradition and guided by Marxism-Leninism; we-Turkic frame and anti-Hanism frame were grounded in the collective memory of Turkic people and guided by Turkic nationalism; one God frame was grounded in Islamic collective representation and fed and served by sacred repertoire. The oppression frame held that the existing living conditions were unjust and intolerable; the frames of anti-Hanism and “we Turk” held that the native people should be independent; the frame of friendship with the Soviet held that the revolutionary should regard the Soviet as a political ally. Meanwhile, movement leaders bridged distinct frames at the critical moments to recruit more members by producing discourses that emphasize the oppressive rule and wretched living conditions. The movement frame resonated with the value of majority people. Eventually Marxist Frame survived and Islamic frame declined. This process was largely influenced by the constraints in the political opportunities.

**Ideology, Frames and Frame Bridging**

In social movement studies frame bridging refers to linking two or more frames that were previously unconnected (Benford and Snow 2000). The strategy of frame bridging promotes empirical credibility of the movement, if activists are able to create an apparent fit between the framings and events in the world. In the Ili revolution, the activists were able to bridge collective action frames effectively as they worked at the early decades of 1940s. The Islamic leader Alihan Tore was a provocative orator. He articulated frames by connecting and aligning different elements. This process was done
in such a sophisticated way that the mass from different backgrounds were attracted in a relatively unified and compelling fashion. The Marxist frame oppression was bridged with the frame of the Friendship with the Soviets. The anti-Hanism frame was bridged with the frames of We Turk and one God principle. Each frame was guided by the master frame of liberation and grounded in certain cultural tradition. For example, two frames such as oppression and Friendship with the Soviet Union originated from Marxism-Leninism; we-Turkic frame and anti-Hanism from Turkic nationalism, and one God principle from political Islam.

During the micro-mobilization process, two movement documents played an important role in attracting the mass. The movement pamphlet titled Why are We Fighting?, drafted by Alihan Tore, were distributed at the earlier stage of mobilization and served to agitate the potential actors. By contrast, the Ili declaration, Struggle for Motherland, were drafted by the Soviet Consul in Ili and announced as the objective of provincial government after the proclamation of the ETR. Below I largely depend on these historical documents to illustrate the framing process. Earlier research on the relationships between GMD and the Ili movement (Benson 1990) treated these documents as an appendix without analysis.

**Marxist Ideology and Frame Bridging: Oppression +Anti-Hanism+ Friendship with Soviet**

The early leaders of this movement Ahmatjan Qasimi, Seypidin and Seypullahayew were Marxists who trained and educated in the Soviet Union (Seypidin 1989; Seypullahayew 2004). So naturally they first chose the Marxist oppression frame since it resonates with the grievance of the mass. Then the frame of oppression was bridged with
anti-Hanism frame because this kind of alignment strategy is consistent with non-Han citizen’s accumulated grievances and anti-Han sentiments. Thus declared the pamphlet titled “why are we fighting?”:

Our fathers and grandfathers were for hundreds of years oppressed by the savage Chinese. To understand the nature of that oppression, we need only regard the way in which our people being oppressed by the Chinese at the present time…. Many times in the past our people have been unable further to endure this oppression; their patience exhausted, they have turned on their savage oppressors and fought with great heroism. These battles are known to history. The beloved names of our heroic grandfathers who died in these struggles should serve us banners calling us forward to do battle against Chinese who enslaved us!

They criticized the wrongs reducing the root of problem to the ethnic Han. The message is clear: the leaders tried very hard to win sympathy and active support from all the non-Han population. They achieved and sustained such a balance through bridging oppression frame with anti-Hanism frame. The anti-Hanism frame can also be perceived from the following claim:

We will not throw down our arms until we have made you free from the five bloody fingers of the Chinese oppressors’ power, not until the very roots of the Chinese oppressors’ government have dried and died away from the faces of the earth of East Turkestan, which we have inherited as our native land from our fathers and our grandfathers” (from Why are We Fighting?).

Meanwhile, the movement leaders tended to agitate the mass through emphasizing collective identity and mobilizing collective memory of the native people. The concept of collective memory, initially developed by Halbwachs (1992 [1950]), refers to the shared pool of information held in the memoires of a social group. According to Halbwachs, there is not only an individual memory, but also a group memory that exists outside of and lives beyond the individual. A society can have a collective memory and this memory is dependent upon the framework within which a group is situated in a society. Consequently, members’ understanding of the past is strongly linked to the group. The claim quoted above contested and questioned the
problematic situation to remind the movement actors of the common destiny. In another word, collective memory served as a medium with which the native people recall their common destiny and shared past.

Rothmon and Oliver (2002) argue that changes in political opportunity influence a movement’s frame-bridging activities. After the termination of Xinjiang-Soviet trade, Stalin wanted to take revenge on Sheng Shicai. Thus the frame of friendship with the Soviets was brought into the frame package as being congruent with the interests of the Soviet Union. While stating its goals, claims and movement objectives, the movement document *Struggle for Motherland* integrated pro-Soviet sentiments with the claim of liberation:

> The National Freedom Group must fight to free all people from the claws of death by hunger, to establish anew strong and truly sincere relations of friendship with our great, freedom loving friend and neighbor, the Soviet Union, and to develop wide and full trading relations between all our trading men and the Soviet.

The Soviet Union was the political ally and a pro-Soviet stand was necessary to achieve movement success. So, in the above statement, the friendship with the Soviet Union was emphasized as another key message. The movement leaders encouraged the mass to stand on the Soviet side to gain political, financial support. According to Zhang Dajun (1980), one of the leaflets calling for Islamic believers to unite with the Soviet Union in their struggle for happiness and liberation stated that: “Stalin will serve the Euro-Asian Muslim people’s congress. Muslim should regard Stalin as a fighter for democracy in the East, as Roosevelt is regarded in the West” (1986).

**Islamic Ideology and Frame Bridging: One God + Anti-Hanism**
The frames of oppression and anti-Hanism proved effective due to their congruence with the experiences and grievances of the non-Han population. But they are insufficient, and the leaders did more than bridging with these two frames. Since the majority non-Han populations were Turkic Muslims such as Uyghur, Kazak, Tatar, Uzbek and Qirghiz, they should make use of Islamic symbols and ideas. According to Seypidin (1989), in the early days of revolution, Marxist discourse proved insufficient since the majority population in Ili was not fully interested in revolutionary ideas. Thus movement leaders perceived the need to bridge Islamic discourse with the frame of anti-Hanism to stir up the Muslim population. The movement leaders believed that an appeal to the Islamic spirit and Muslim nationalism would certainly achieve good results among the Muslims.

Indeed any movement that sought to flourish on the basis of popular support in Xinjiang would have to turn to Islamic discourse and show respect for Islam. Thus, through consulting the Russian consul, the Marxist leaders Ahmetjan Qasimi and Abbasov turned to Islamic faith. Since earlier propaganda and agitation had not proved effective as the Soviets expected, a special meeting was organized in the summer of 1944 by the Soviet Consul to discuss the movement strategy. The meeting reached a consensus that it was very hard to influence and motivate the Muslims by revolutionary theory.

Therefore, the Soviet consulate in Ili kept in close touch with senior Muslims. The consul himself paid private visits to Imam, bringing tea, sugar, and silk as gifts for the Festivals of Ramadan and Qurban. Religious leaders such as Alihan Tore and religious institutions such as Beytulla Mosque in Ili played an important role in mobilizing the mass. In the mosque anti-Han and pan-Islamic rhetoric were delivered by the religious leader
Alihan Tore during daily prayers and Friday prayer. The mosque Baitula in Ili was the major center of this sort of religious rhetoric. This can clearly be seen from the Ili Declaration titled “struggle for Motherland”, which was announced as the objective of provincial government after the proclamation of the ETR. The pamphlet contained the following Islamic discourse:

“The Turkestan Islamic Government is organized: praised be to Allah for his manifold blessings! Allah be praised! The aid of Allah has given us the heroism to overthrow the government of the oppressor Chinese. But even if we have set ourselves free, can it be pleasing in the sight of our Allah if we only stand and watch while you, our brethren in religion…still bear the bloody grievance of subjection to the black politics of the oppressor government of the savage Chinese? Certainly our Allah would not be satisfied”

---- from the “Ili Declaration”

According to Forbes (1986), the pamphlet “why are we fighting?” was written by the religious leader, Alihan Tore himself. The pamphlet contained the following claim:

Long live our Muslim republican government.
Long live the great, the heroic warriors.
Long live the crescent calling for our thirty days of holy fast.
Long live the star calling for our free daily prayers.

The frame grounded in Islamic collective representation was very effective with its alignment with anti-Hanism. During the early 1930s, all members of the government at all levels in Xinjiang were Han. From the very beginning of the Ili Rebellion, all movement participants were non-Han. For this reason, also targeting the non-Muslim population such as Mongols, the movement leaders framed the movement as liberation movement against the Han Chinese. It was written in the pamphlet “why are we fighting?” that:

Let these running dogs of the Chinese and their coterie get out also.
Away with, away with, away with those oppressors, these spices, these pro-Chinese.
As we have seen, the ethnic Han were described as “Savage Chinese”, “Running Dogs”, “Oppressors”, their allies as spies. Alihan Tore as an Imam called for action to expel the Han Chinese from Xinjiang. In native people’s eyes, the government amounts to Han Chinese.

Pan-Turkic Ideology and Frame Bridging: We Turk + One God + Anti-Hanism

Diani (1996) argues that different configurations of political structure are conductive to different frames. According to Elingson (1995: 105-106), “Social movements construct the identities of protagonists, antagonists, and audiences within a movement’s field. … one of the common modes of differentiation is for speakers to structure their discourses”. Collective identities are not static but change as activists, external factors and collective action goals change. Movement actors define their collective identity in opposition to other groups in society, including targeted groups such
as the state or countermovement groups. In other words, groups enact boundaries to
distinguish between members and non-members.

Taylor claims that “the ETR movement was a Muslim nationalist independence
movement” (2004: 100). Indeed, during 1940s, Turkic people constitute the majority of
population in the Ili valley. In order to gain support among the majority Turkic Muslims,
Turkic nationalists preached the ideology of Turkic nationalism, whose purpose was to
unify all of the Turkish-speaking peoples into a pan-Turkish state (Burhan, 1990). At the
Beytulla mosque, the leaders asked the question of ethnic identity, emphasized pan-
Turkic root and glorified the history of Turkic people. The pamphlet, *why are we
fighting*, delivered the following message to the mosque attendees:

Who are we? Who are our near and far relations? Where are the burial grounds—
so dear to us---of our beloved and renowned ancestors?

In answer to these questions, any man who seeks the truth and whose
heart is right cannot fail to say that the root of our nation and soul is not in China, but in
central Asia, in Kazakstan, Kirgizstan, Uzbekistan and Tatarstan. Our native place is East
Turkestann; we are the eastern branch and part of that race—bound to us by blood
relationships—the other parts of which lie within the Soviet Union; we are the part that is
fighting.

As seen, the frame of “we Turkish” was not chosen alone, but synthesized into the
interpretive package of religious freedom. During this process, political Islam was used
as the most powerful weapon. Since Islam is a traditional belief system that requires,
among other things, resistance against the oppressors and loyalty to one God (Esposito
1999; Armstrong 2002). As seen below, the pamphlet advocated Turkic nationalism and
pan-Turkic identity in the tradition of Islamic collective representation, under the rubric
of master frame: liberation:

Our fathers and our father’s fathers called the place where we are living
“East Turkestan”. From ancient time there have lived in this place Uyghurs,
Qirghiz, Kazaks, Uzbeks, and Tatars; at the present time also it is the place of their habitation. In this territory there are counted to be four million people; more than three million of them are of these nations (that we have named); for that reason the area Turkestan---was called the hearth of the Turkish nations. Our nearest blood relations are Kazaks, Qirghiz, Uzbeks, and Tatars. In the Soviet Union each of these races has organized its own Government and its members are living free and joyful lives. Let us listen to the white bearded old men among us while they tell us, as they alone can, what was the beginning of the history of our East Turkestan nations, and how it began.

Long live free Muslim Turkestan!

---- from the movement pamphlet “why are we fighting?” (Benson, 1990: 200)

In Islamic collective representation, all Muslims are seen as one community, thus ethnic claims are not welcomed, especially during wars and social movements. Although two traditions such as Islam and nationalism are distinctive, even opposing belief systems, as shown above, the frames of “we Turk” and religious freedom were intertwined in the movement. However, due to the Russian intervention and Islamic color of the movement goal, there were some contradictions in the political aims: calling for equality for all ethnic peoples and freedom of religion while encouraging anti-Hanism and religious extremism. This can be seen from the pamphlet:

Our national freedom groups and all the members of every group have taken an oath in the name of one God, before the souls of our heroic grandfathers and in the presence of all the people, to achieve, through enthusiasm and heroism, by legal and illegal means, by words and by force of arms, by night and by day and without resting the objectives set below. Why are we fighting?

1. We are fighting to do away with Chinese rule in all our East Turkestan and to destroy for all times the roots of Chinese tyranny in our territory.

East Turkestan belongs to the real masters of the territory, the Uyghurs, the Taranchis, the Kazaks, the Kirghiz, the Tatars, the Uzbeks, together with all those who live among them in peace and friendship and alike suffer Chinese oppression, such as the Mongols and other non-Chinese nations. There is no place in East Turkestan for Chinese colonial government for Chinese colonists.

2. The national freedom groups and all of their members are fighting to establish in East Turkestan a real equality of rights between all races one with the other.
This time the claims of leaders also are based upon ethnic identity. They demanded independence, full scale separation from the Chinese state. Therefore, this movement can also be seen as a nationalist movement. Olzak argues (2004) that nationalist movements are social movements invoking claims for territorial sovereignty. According to Anthony Smith (2003), a sacred foundation of the people provides the political basis of nationalist movements. In his word, sacred foundation constitutes three underlying dimensions of the nation: community, territory, and destiny. The aforementioned narrative, representing the common past of the Turkic people in Xinjiang, enable the actors to recall a sense of heritage and commonality. Constituting the core of diagnostic frame, it provided a natural link between mosque attendees and their collective identity. Emphasizing pan-Turkic identity, the leaders called for ethnic sovereignty in efforts to render the group distinct, in terms of language, heritage, shared culture, or other features.

Rise and Decline of Islamic Ideology in Framing Process

While anti-Hanism was chosen as a frame to express strong ethnic opposition against the misrule by the Han ruling class, it was encouraged and facilitated by Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkist ideologies in Xinjiang. Pan-Islamism was infiltrated into Xinjiang in the late nineteen century. That was a time when Great Britain had wished to expand its colonial sphere of influence to Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, Egypt, and to the French colonies in northern Africa. Pan-Islamism appealed to all Islamic countries and people due to its ambitious attempt to establish a universal Islamic state (Esposito 1999; Armstrong 2002; Finley 2005). Pan Islamism spread in Xinjiang with Pan-Turkism. There were two types of schools in Xinjiang in the early decades of 20th century: the old
religious schools, called Usule Kader, which specialized in teaching Islamic scripts, and the new schools, called Usule Kate, which can be seen as the outcome of the Jadid movement introduced earlier. This new school taught religion, mathematics, geography and history (Burhan 1990).

Pan-Islamism was taught in the old schools, while the pan-Turkism was active in the new schools. This means that both pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism had their markets among Turkic Muslims and generated obvious outcomes influencing both the 1933 movement and the Ili movement. In the Ili movement, religious council was formed, and on this council were five Turkic religious leaders. Although the actual function of this council remains unclear, the respect for Islam through its creation is obvious. This council formed the basis of Ministry of religious affairs after the proclamation of the ETR. Salih Jan Bey, one of the religious leaders of the movement, served as the minister of religious affairs (Millward 2007). Due to such a cultural background, the strategy of bridging religious frame with pan-Turkic frame proved effective during the micro-mobilization process and attracted huge number of movement participants, promoted consensus mobilization during the ongoing process.

According to Seypidin (1989), in the later development of the movement, around November 1944, the following members constituted the provisional government:

Chairman: Ali Han Tore
Vice-Chairman: Hakim Beh Khoja
Minister of Justice: Mehmetjan Mekhsum
Minster of Religious affairs: Alim Akhon
Tore, Khoja, Mekhsum and Akhon are the religious tiles referring to community leaders in traditional Islamic society. This means that the religious people constituted the core members of the Ili government. Judging from the list, it appeared to be a unified Muslim government. All of its members, except the Russian military leader Peter Alexandalov, were Muslim. The role of Islamic ideology can also be seen in the symbols of government: “the flag of the new republic incorporated the Muslim crescent and star. The people of the area demonstrated their solidarity with the Islamic-led government by wearing badges bearing the same Islamic symbol, and gold and silver badges bearing the star and crescent were given as tokens of honor and friendship among the various allies of the ETR, especially in the first year (Benson, 1990: 67-68).

Seypidin (1989) stated that Islam and Islamic flag were used to invite more Muslims to join the movement. Savdanov, the Uyghur general of the Ili National Army stated that: “in Xinjiang, where the economy and culture were backward, it was not surprising that religion was used in the revolution …the flag of religion played an active and positive role…the slogan for independence and the Holy war was a means of achieving the strategic objectives of the revolution” (Savdanov 1994). In the 1960s, Burhan, the chairman of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, said: “supported by the Soviet Union, Ali Han Ture used slogans of religion and nationalism to initiate anti-Hanism…By using the flag of Islam and the slogans nationalism; the Yili Regime expelled the Guomindang troops” (1989: 126).

During the later development of movement, a serious split emerged between the pro-Soviet and pan-Islamic Muslims (Forbes 1986; Seypidin 1989). Ali Han Tore and the nominal presidency of Hakim Beg disappeared. Their disappearance indicated that Ali
Han Tore and Hakim Beg, the two most influential religious figures in Ili were excluded because of their Islamic ideology, which the Soviet did not like, and the Ili Regime was controlled by the Soviets through Ahmetjan and his pro-Soviet followers. Forbes claims that, after this development, political power within the Ili region passed entirely into the hands of Russians, and Soviet influence within the valley became still more marked (Forbes, 1986).

**Political Constraints, Frame Dispute and Survival of Marxist Frame**

Ann Swidler argues that: “Structural opportunities for action determine which among competing ideologies survive in the long run” (1986: 273). In the Ili revolution, as the political process developed, three ideologies for three factions emerged: Marxism, political Islam and Turkic nationalism. Ali-Han Tore’s faction was Islamists with anti-Soviet elements who aspire to establish an Islamic state; Ahmatjan and his followers were Communists with an aim to establish communist state; Isa, Masud and Alptekin who became active in the coalition government were Pan-Turkist with a slogan of supreme autonomy (Seypidin 1989). Marxist revolutionary ideology eventually won because of the Soviet role in the movement. In the summer of 1946, Alihan Tore disappeared, and the pro-Soviet faction of Ahmetjan with Soviet assistance overcame Ali Han Tore’s anti-Soviet faction.

With the formation of coalition government in 1946, the Nanjing government offered pan-Turkist Uyghur leaders such as Isa, Masud and Bughra important positions in the provincial government, and thus the divisions and disputes between the Marxists and pan-Turkist became apparent. Under the influence of nationalistic leaders, in the southern Xinjiang and the three districts of Tarbagatay, Ili and Altay, there were pan-Turkic
activists with the slogan of supreme autonomy, and the latter frame was not congruent with the claim of the Marxists. According to Seypidin’s description, within the Ili area, Alihan Tore’s pan-Islamic followers opposed the pro-Soviet group led by Ahmatjan Qasimi. In the southern Xinjiang, the pan-Turkist factions headed by Masud Sabiri confronted the pro-Soviet faction led by Seypidin. It was much easier for the Soviet advisers to cope with the pan-Islamists within the Three Districts. But, after the provincial coalition government was formed, the Soviet Union could not do anything directly to counter the pan-Turkists in southern Xinjiang.

As mentioned earlier, at the very early stage of the Ili Rebellion, pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism were encouraged and religious leaders were used by the Soviet Union in order to attract the ideologically conservative mass. Alihan Tore was a famous Imam, a typical representative figure of the pan-Islamic influence in the Ili movement. Seypidin (1989:198-199) wrote in his memoir:

At that time Alihan Tore was the most influential figure in the propaganda war against the Sheng Shicai-GMD rule. With a glib tongue, he delivered vivid and moving speeches at the Baytulla Mosque. The mass were strongly attracted by him through his impressive speeches.

On the question of establishing a unified front, Abbasov thought it was very necessary to use Alihan Tore. Abbasov’s ideas were supported by all colleagues. One day, Abbasov, Seypullayev and I got together to discuss our policy toward Alihan Tore.

Abasov said: “Alihan Tore was worth his weight in gold. Without him, we would have lost most of the masses…I hate his dedication to pan-Islamism. In spite of this, we were still able to find something common with him…It is said that Ali Han Tore is prepared to establish his own organization cooperating with the so-called “speakers of Alla”…

I [Seypidin] said: “…it is better for us to cooperate with this old man. By using his prestige and influence, we will pursue our own objectives”.

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Abasov agreed: “…we should not only cooperate with him, but also struggle against him when it is necessary…In any case, by cooperating with him, the initiatives should always be in our hands.”…

After our discussion, we asked advice from other comrades. Finally, we decided to establish a “Liberation Organization” with Alihan Tore.

**Discussion and Summary**

Framing perspective is necessary to elucidate the cultural and symbolic dimensions of the 1944 Ili revolution. So in this chapter I sought to empirically examine the framing process. Findings indicate that ideology is different from frames; movement frames are grounded in cultural traditions, impacted by the constraints in the political opportunities; and movement actors bridge different sets of frame in order to recruit more members. I include the following frames in my analysis: oppression, anti-Hanism, we-Turkic, friendship with the Soviet and one God principle. Each frame was grounded in a particular cultural tradition and guided by certain ideology.

Three ideologies have already been introduced in the last chapter. Then, why is it necessary to open a new chapter to framing processes and movement frames? Although ideologies and frames are related concepts and overlap somewhat in their empirical referent, each points to different dimensions of social construction. Oliver and Johnston (2005) criticized framing theory for its failure to address the relation between frames and much older, more political concept of ideology. According to them, it would be wrong to reduce ideology to frame, framing points to process while ideology points to content. “If think of frames as synonymous with ideologies, we will lack the analytical tools, even the very language, for talking about this fascinating instance of the same frame being tied to diametrically opposed ideologies” (Oliver and Johnston, 2005: 187). To study ideology is
to focus on systems of ideas which couple understandings of how the world works with ethical, moral, and normative principles that guide personal and collective action. To study frames, by contrast, is to identify “evocative cultural symbols that resonate with potential constituents and are capable of motivating to collective action” (Tarrow 1994). So it would be necessary to treat frames and framing process separately. This chapter is an attempt to provide evidence for this claim.

Let us first see the role of political Islam as an ideology. In this case, the movement leaders tried to mobilize the Muslims through political Islam. In political Islam, while facing threats or oppression, the Muslims are encouraged to take actions for the sake of God, to be heroes in their life-times and to be honored after their death (Armstrong 2002). As seen from the movement pamphlet, oppression and repression were identified as wrong or the diagnostic frame, a call for mobilization was encouraged as a solution or prognostics frame. But the leaders did not stop at this stage. The mass should be motivated through some ways. Then, the holy war as summoned by Alihan Tore as a motivational frame. In order to understand this particular framing process of Islamic mobilization, one needs to inquire why a call for holy war proves effective for pious Muslims in unsettled times. The theoretical explanation can be found from Durkheimian concept of collective representation (1965), and the empirical explanation from the Islamic collective representation which deeply influences cultural practices in Muslim societies.

Theoretically, collective representation is a key concept formulated Durkhiem’s classic book, *Early Forms of Religious Life*. For Durkheim, all cultural systems including religion are collective representations; society is essentially a collection of sacred symbols and ideals. Religion, as a form of collective representation, serves as the vehicle of a
fundamental process in which publicly shared symbols constitute social groups. In his view, religion is the basis for all categories of thinking, and religion and categories of thinking alike “are collective representations which express collective realities” (1965: 22). In another word, groups and societies need collective representations of themselves to inspire sentiments of unity and mutual support, and culture fulfills this need. According to Swidler, Durkheimian collective representation may range from the vivid totemic symbol to moral beliefs to modern society’s commitment to reason and individual autonomy (1995). According to Robert Bellah, collective representations are the vehicles of a fundamental process in which publicly shared symbols constitute social groups while they constrain and give form to individual consciousness” (1973).

In this case, frames grounding in Islamic collective representation had an appeal to the Muslim people in Xinjiang. Ever since the establishment of Kashgaria Islamic state in the 19th century, independence had become a master frame and become a dream of some of the influential figures from the religious circles and the upper classes of the Muslims, but they had never been powerful enough to achieve this goal on their own. In the 1930s Sheng’s great Hanism and persistent repression had caused discontent among majority Muslims. So the movement activists made use of Muslim sentiments in order to recruit members from the religious devotees with a perception that, if they only frame the grievances in Marxist revolutionary terms, they could not effectively persuade most Muslims to join the movement.

Gamson (1992b) identify three necessary components for collective action frames: injustice, agency and identity. People must have a sense of unjust situation that must be corrected, a sense that they can have an effect in changing it, and an
identification of who is responsible for the problem (an “us” and a “them”). In this revolution, the Islamic scholar Tore as an agent (agitator) framed the situation with the aid of rhetoric discourse at the Mosque telling the mosque attendees what is wrong, what can be done to fix it, and why they should mobilize. In the religious ritual, utopian Islamic ideology was preached by him and his assistants to justify cognitive, affective, and moral basis of mobilization.

Frames must come from somewhere and should articulate the received set of categories and understandings and should reflect the structural aspects of cultural tradition, codes, repertoires, and scripts (Beneford 1994). Since what Tore preached is Turkic nationalism, and Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang possessed highly articulated belief systems that were tied to the history of native people in Xinjiang, the mosque attendees were easily persuaded as to why the existing world is unjust and how it became that way. Tore’s speech was successful because he made good use of Islamic symbols and metaphors to legitimize his political claims. Again since Islam is a religion that does not take the existing world as the ultimate value and tends to critique status quo, his articulation proved very effective.

This movement also witnessed frame dispute. According to Beneford (1994), social movement organizations devote considerable effort to construct particular versions of reality, develop and espouse alternative visions, and attempt to affect various audiences' interpretations. This process might generate dispute and controversies. In the Ili revolution, distinct ideologies resulted in frame disputes in face of political opportunities. But, because of the availability of Soviet as political ally, eventually
Marxist frame and Marxist ideology won. This means that both frame alignment and frame dispute is largely influenced by the constraints in the political opportunities.

On the basis of above discussion, I summarize my findings as five arguments. They are (1) ideology generates frames; frames are different from ideology; (2) in order to recruit more members, the movement actors should bridge frames grounding in cultural symbols that resonate with the experiences of the mass. The cultural symbols might include collective memory, shared religion, common destiny or territorial sovereignty; (3) both frame bridging and frame dispute are largely influenced by the political constraints and opportunities; (4) while examining the micro-mobilization process of Islamic movements, social movement scholars might consider the implications of Durkheimian concept of collective representation in order to search deeps source of cultural meanings.
Chapter 7 Later Developments: International Relations and a New Turn in the Political Process

This chapter explores how Islam, political structures and international conditions join together to impact the later development of the Ili movement. In her influential book *States and Social Revolutions*, Skocpol (1979) examines the role that the international forces played in the major revolutions of the past two centuries. According to Skocpol, the nature of social revolutions can’t be fully examined with the existing Marxist or non-Marxist theories because most of them neglect the origins of social revolutions: (1) international conditions and circumstances that play a major role in promoting revolutions; (2) the role of states that play major parts in the success of a revolution and, contrary to Marxist interpretation, may act in ways autonomous of social classes and economic forces to impede or promote the success of a social revolution. Skocpol’s approach to revolutions is unique thanks to its nice treatment of the role of state and international relations, but is still inadequate for explaining the relations between international relations and political process. Her approach also fails to explain the role of agency and cultural practice in the movement. Political process theory and Swindler’s approach to cultural power in a movement (1995) complete such a shortcoming.

The political process theory in social movement studies centered on the assumption that social movements are ongoing product of mixed factors: “political threats and opportunities” (McAdam 1999), “changes in the institutional structures and informal power relations” (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996b: 3). Many movements are successful because “their time has come” in terms of political opportunity (Diani
1996). Movements may develop into a new stage when an ongoing process of interaction unfolded between movement groups and the larger socio-political environments, which include political threats and international relations. The later development of the Ili movement can be best explained, if Skocpol’s approach to international relations is synthesized with the elements of political process theory.

Islam played a key role in the initial development of the movement and establishment of the Ili government. However, with the proclamation of the East Turkestan Islamic government in November 12, 1944, the real power behind the government was controlled by the Russian. Shortly after that, the movement witnessed a dramatic change deeply impacted by the elements of international relations. Shifts in the political opportunity structure led to a coalition government. During the coalition period, the master frame of liberation as the basic dynamic remained the same, but the movement goal of independence was replaced by autonomy. In this chapter I argue that the later development of the Ili movement witnessed the combined impacts of Islam, political threat and international forces. This chapter is an attempt to show how this process occurred and developed.

**Islam and Political Development**

Islam played a key role in agitating the masses. In October 1944, the revolutionaries in Ghulja city captured the GMD building, police headquarters, and power stations (Forbes 1986; Seypidin 1989; Millward 2007). On November 15, 1945, while the Ili valley had still not been cleared of GMD troops and rebel guerilla forces were still fighting in nearby areas, the Eastern Turkestan Republic was proclaimed, and its green flag with a white crescent and star was placed on the building of the Ili
Government. Alihan Tore, the Imam of the Beytulla Mosque, declared the formation of “the Turkestan Islam Government”.

According to Seypidin (1989), the members of the provisional government of the ETR were:
Chairman: Ali Han Tore
Vice-Chairman: Hakim Beg Khoja
Minster of Education: Hebib Yunicheff
Minister of Justice: Mehmetjan Mekhsum
Minster of Religious affairs: Alim Akhon
Minster of Animal Husbandry: Upurhair Manpan
Military Council: Peter Alexandalov (Russian)

The new trend in the political process indicates that Islamic belief as a cultural repertoire impacted the subsequent development of the movement. Before discussing why this is such, it would be necessary to introduce Swidler’s relevant concept.

Attempting to explain the relationship between culture, power and collective identity, Swidler argues that culture should be seen as a “tool kit” (1986). According to her, “culture serves as a cultural repertoire” (2001), and becomes more important in unsettled times of social unrest, revolution, war, and the like (1986). In stable times cultural experiences and socially structured situations reinforce each other, but when times are unsettled ideologies that emerge can establish new styles or strategies for action. In unsettled times core cultural meanings are destabilized.

In traditional Islamic societies, people with religious titles such as Akhon, Tore, Mehsum are believed to be prestigious people and religious leaders. In settled time such
people guide religious practices, fully involve in public affairs and educate community members. In unsettled times, Muslims turn to such people for guidance, inspiration and action plan. Such people deliver passionate speeches to attract the religious devotees.

The above list indicated that such people constituted the members of the provisional Ili government, and religious authority had deep impacts on the structure of provincial government. Alihan Tore, the Islamic scholar and a provocative speaker, was elected as president to lead the government. All of the government members, except the Russian military leader Peter Alexandalov, were Muslims. The Ways Islamic beliefs functioned as cultural repertoire were clearly stated in the *Ili Declaration* titled “Struggle for Motherland:”

Why did the Ili uprising occur? It was because we have the right to rise up against oppression for the sake of our liberty, the happiness and prosperity of our sons, and renaissance of our religion. We also believe that Allah has said to us, “I shall punish the oppressors.” We also are fully convinced that the power of the masses is the power of Allah. In this faith we fought and over-threw the treacherous Chinese sovereignty in the three districts to establish a free Muslim Eastern Turkestan state… Ho, countrymen, Men of the faith and members of the same blood. Fear not. Strengthen your hearts and courage and consciences.

However, the real power behind the government was soon controlled by the Russian. About forty years after the Ili movement, Forbes (1986: 189) claims: “it is now possible to state with certainty that the Soviet Union was deeply involved in the establishment of the ETR”. After the declaration of the ETR, Barisov, a Soviet consul who actively intervened in the development of Ili movement, drafted a nine-Point declaration as the political program for the East Turkestan Republic. The declaration was passed at the fourth meeting of the provisional government committee on 5 January 1945. The declaration contained the following goals:

1. To root out the misrule by the Han Chinese;
2. To establish a democratic system;
3. The Ili army belongs to the people;
4. Equality among all nationalities;
5. Respects for religious freedom;
6. Election of officials at all levels by the people;
7. Friendship with the Soviet Union;
8. To improve education;
9. To use Uyghur as the official language.

In this declaration there is no hint of autonomy within China. On the contrary, emotional language in each goal called for a Muslim government, free of Chinese rule. In terms of the political objective, the declaration strongly advocated anti-Hanism by agitating Muslim zeal for elimination of all Han Chinese from the soil of Xinjiang. Furthermore, there were some contradictions in the ETR’s political aims: calling for equality for all ethnic peoples and recognition of Islam.

**Political Process and International Relations**

The period from mid-November 1944 to January 1945 was crucial for the Ili movement. During this period, Osman Batur and his Kazaks joined in other two prefectures: Tarbagatay and Altay (Sawdanow 1994). From February 1945 when the Yalta Agreement was reached between Stalin and Roosevelt to September 1945 shortly after the Sino-Soviet treaty was resigned, the ETR’s military power grew rapidly with Soviet assistance, penetrating as far as the Manas river near Urumchi, the capital city of Xinjiang.
A group of senior Soviet advisers arrived in Ili in early 1945. On January 1945, the fourth meeting of the ETR government passed a resolution, which claimed: “in order to protect the government of the Eastern Turkestan Republic, people from all nationalities in Eastern Turkestan should be recruited for a strong Army” (Sawdanow 1994). An Eastern Turkestan Military Bureau was founded at the meeting. On the second day, the headquarters of the ETR guerilla forces was reorganized.

Three months later, in April 1945, the ETR formally established the Ili national Army with Russian General Polinov as commander-in-chief, Taipov as deputy commander in chief, and Abbasov as the head of its political department (Seypidin 1989). The Department of Warfare, Department of Politics, Department of Personnel, Department of investigation and department of Logistics were attached to the Ili National Army Headquarters. At the early stage, the Ili National Army had seven regiments (three infantry, four cavalry) and five battalions totaling 15,000 personnel, plus a guerilla force of more than 2,000 men. The Soviet advisers, appointed to the units above the level of regiment, trained a number of Muslim officials. The military officials of the Ili National Army were under the control of Russian commanders (Sawdanow 1994). With the participation of the Soviet mission, the government of the ETR was reorganized and the Ili national Army received systematic training. Then the Ili group began to fight on three fronts.

In summer 1945 the whole Ili valley was in rebel hands. On August 12, 1945, the Ili national army bombed the strategic hubs of GMD troops such as Wusu and Jinghe. The attack shocked the GMD force. During such a crisis, the National Chinese Government reached an agreement that only an international solution can tackle the crisis.
Chiang Kaishek quickly informed U.S. ambassador Hurley of the serious situation, and was advised to tackle the problem through diplomatic channels. Chiang summoned the Soviet ambassador in Chong Qing the same day and presented an official ultimatum over the Soviet interference in Xinjiang. Later GMD general Song was appointed to negotiate with Molotov—the Russian consul in Urumchi. Song asked Molotove to stop supporting the Ili group. As result of a series of negotiations, a treaty of friendship and alliance between the Soviets and the Chinese was signed. In this treaty the Soviet Union disclaimed its interest in Xinjiang, and recognized the region as the part of Chinese territory (Forbes 1986; Millvard 2007). In exchange, the Chinese government formally consented to the territorial and railway concessions in Manchuria, on which the United States had reached a consensus with the Soviet Union at Yalta in the previous February. The Yalta terms were part of the U.S. effort to obtain Soviet entry into the war against Japan. With rich concessions in northern China already in his hands, Mongolia’s Soviet satellite status ensured, and Japan no longer a threat, Stalin chose not to overreach in Xinjiang (Forbes 1986). This was also because the Soviet Union’s access to northern Xinjiang’s oil and minerals was already secure under the ETR government. Stalin could afford to recognize Xinjiang as constituting “the internal affairs of China” (Forbes 1986).

After a series of negotiations with the Chinese and American government, the Soviets decided to halt the advance of the Ili army and to keep the Ili valley under control. Thus sudden truce between the GMD forces and the ETR army occurred in the early fall of 1945. The sudden truce arose from great power politics and international diplomatic game. On October 12, 1945, three representative of the Ili government appeared on horseback on the west bank of Manas river—the temporary ceasefire line of the
Nationalist and ETR forces. After crossing, they met the GMD representatives and escorted them to Urumchi the same day. According to Zhang’s memoir (1994), all three wore the smart green military uniforms that contain the Muslim emblems of the crescent moon and the star in gold, which represents the ETR army. They were Ahmatjan Qasimi, Rahimjan Selimoglu and Ebulhayri Tore. By that time, Ahmatjan Qasimi served as the vice president of East Turkestan Republic. He was an able man who had risen to the position of vice president by virtue of his natural ability and Russian background. Ahmatjan Qasimi played a key role in the negotiations. On October 13, 1945, Evesoff, the Soviet representative and acting council, took them to the office of Wu Zhixiong---Chinese special commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was a time when the Chinese government decided to dispatch Zhang Zhizhong, a Chinese general to Urumchi, where he would replace the incompetent Wu Zhongxin as governor (Forbes 1986; Seypidin 1989). It was arranged in Urumchi that the three Ili delegates would meet with General Zhang as soon as possible after the latter’s arrival.

**Long Negotiations: From Independence to Autonomy**

Before departing for Urumchi, general Zhang first sought the advice of three Uyghur nationalists who then served as Xinjiang representatives in Chong Qing. These three people were Mesud Sabiri, Memet Emin Bughra, and Isa Yusuf Alptekin. Since these three people were the proponents of pan-Turkism, it would be necessary to briefly introduce their ethnic, social backgrounds. Mesust Sabiri was originally from Ili but had been educated in Istanbul, Turkey as a medical doctor. After returning to Xinjiang 1934, he had been involved in the spread of Turkic nationalism in the Ili (Zhang 1994). However, threatened by the espionage system of Sheng Shicai, he was forced to flee. He
then went to Chong Qing where he became a member of the Central Executive Committee of the GMD. Memmet Emin Bughra, another Xinjiang representative in Chong Qing, had been involved in the short-lived First East Turkestan Republic of 1933, but when the republic collapsed, he, too, was forced to leave Xinjiang and ended up in Chong qing, where he was made a member of the National Assembly that represented Xinjiang. Along with Isa Yusuf Alptekin, he found a publishing house in Chong Ching, and wrote and edited magazines dedicated to the freedom of Xinjiang, including Altay and the Voice of Turkestan (Seypidin 1990; Burhan 1990). Both he and Isa were known as ardent Turkic nationalists, claiming autonomy for Xinjiang and demanding that the central government recognize Xinjiang’s Turkic Muslims as one of China’s major nationalities, equal to the Mongols and Tibetans. Unlike the other two, Isa Yusuf Alptekin had been educated in Beijing and Nanjing. As early as 1932, he had appealed to the Chinese government asking for adjustments in the government’s policies toward the region and warning of Russian incursions in Xinjiang.

When the newly commissioned GMD general Zhang visited them to ask for advice, these three Uyghurs provided explicit suggestions (Zhang 1994). They requested the government to enforce the program of autonomy for minority areas envisaged by Sun Yat-sen----the founder of the GMD party, and to ensure that Turkic language be used as the medium of instruction in Xinjiang schools. They also suggested that personal freedom such as freedom of speech, association, and publication be guaranteed, and religious freedom for all be assured. According to Bughra’s memoirs, he, Isa, and Mesut were invited by General Zhang to return to Xinjiang to help resolving the Ili situation. Thus, the three men finally arrived back in their home province in October 1945 (Bughra 1995).
Armed with the three Uyghurs’ advice, General Zhang involved in the ongoing political process in Xinjiang. With a reputation for honesty and open-mindedness, Zhang was an excellent candidate for tackling the Xinjiang crisis (Forbes 1986). In the 1930s, trusted by Chiang Kai-shek, Zhang had been involved in delicate negotiations between the Nationalist Party and the Chinese Communist Party. Shortly after his arrival in Urumchi, the Soviet Union received a direct request for assistance in mediating the dispute from the representatives of the three districts. Soon thereafter, the ETR leadership, apparently pressed by the Soviet Union, requested a cease-fire and entered negotiations to form a coalition government with the GMD. They also agreed to drop the name “Eastern Turkistan Republic”, and disclaim the demand of independence. Their representatives expressed the message that the people of the three district “had no desire to separate from China, that they desired autonomy for the districts where the rebel regimes had been set up and that the reason for the revolt had been past oppression” (Seypidin 1989: 66).

Unfortunately, the negotiations met obstacles before they began. The Ili delegates recognized themselves as the representatives of the independent East Turkestan Republic and wished to be introduced as such to General Zhang at the first meeting. Zhang was informed of this intention before the meeting and conveyed a message to the Russian Consul Evesoff that he could not meet with the delegates formally on that basis, since such recognition would be tantamount to recognizing the ETR as a foreign government (Zhang 1994). Zhang informed the Ili delegation that they could not desire independence from China but only autonomous status within the Chinese state. The delegates declared that they could not accept Zhang’s proposal without specific instructions from their own
government. During the negotiation, Zhang addressed at length the subject of the government’s policy toward Xinjiang. He explained that the recent anti-Japanese war had made it impossible for the GMD government to carry out its policies in Xinjiang, and that, with the war successfully concluded; the GMD government could turn its attention toward reconstruction in China. It would soon be assisting the people of Xinjiang to build a modern province on a democratic basis. During the negotiation, Zhang also presented a program of twelve points as the basis for a peace agreement with the people of the three districts, which was based largely on the recommendations of the three Xinjiang representatives who had been in Chong Qing as advisers to the government. Zhang’s proposal of twelve points was as follows (Forbes 1986):

1. The government would assist the people of Xinjiang in political, economic, and cultural development, according them treatment equal to that of all Chinese citizens;

2. Freedom of religious belief and education would be guaranteed by the government;

3. Each national minority’s culture, customs, habits, and written and spoken language would be respected;

4. The government would protect the rights of the person, property, movement, residence, publication, and public meeting;

5. The government would put into practice a system of local autonomy in the following way:

a. within three months of the restoration of peace, elections would be held at the village level, and within six months, elections would be held at the county level for the county council, which would then put into practice the people’s government;
b. after county-level elections, laws would be passed according to the will of the local people;

c. six months after the establishment of the County Council, elections would be held for the post of county head; two would be elected, and one of these would be chosen by the government to serve as county head;

d. a vice-county head would be appointed by the government;

e. The government would use local people to as great an extent as possible when filling local government posts;

6. The government would give serious consideration to the reduction of farm and excise tax, would prohibit apportionment, assist in the expansion of agriculture and industry, and raise the people’s standard of living.

7. There would be universal education at all levels, and the government would expand social education and work to raise the cultural level. Elementary schools would use the language of each local national minority and would include the study of their own literature.

8. All military activity in the three districts would stop within one month, and all illegal organizations would be disbanded.

9. All organizations that participated in the movement would be disbanded, and all members would return to their original homes and their original jobs.

10. All who participated in the war would be guaranteed the right to live peacefully after the end of hostilities;

11. Those under arrest would have their cases investigated;
12. Participants in the illegal organizations who returned to their original homes and work would be separately investigated, and those who could serve the nation would be employed by the government.

The Ili delegates took this proposal with them when they returned to Ili on October 26 for further consultation with the government of the ETR. The Ili delegates returned to Urumchi November 12 (Seypidin 1989). This time the delegates agreed to drop the label “East Turkestan Republic”. However, they brought with them a counterproposal. That proposal consisted of eleven points written in the original Uyghur. These points were as follows:

1. Under a system of advanced autonomy in Xinjiang, local people would hold government posts, and within two months elections would be held for all government posts.

2. There would be total religious freedom within the province;

3. The language of the Muslims would be used for all official and social affairs;

4. Elementary schools, middle and secondary schools, and the university would all use the Uyghur language, and national minority education would be expanded;

5. There would be total artistic and cultural freedom;

6. The rights of publication, association, and written and spoken speech would all be guaranteed;

7. Tax would be determined only according to each person’s actual property and livelihood;

8. Free trades with other countries would be assured;
9. A national minority army would be organized in each district, armed and trained by the government;

10. Special Muslim representatives would be included in the government as recognition of the Muslim majority in the region;

11. Within three days of the signings of this agreement, all freedom fighters would be released from prison.

Negotiations began using the original twelve points proposed by Zhang and the new eleven proposals of the Ili group. Discussions began centering on cultural affairs, and agreement on this issue was reached very smoothly. The use of Turkic language and freedom of cultural development were promised to be guaranteed and the use of Uyghur in elementary schools was granted. Meanwhile, a compromise was reached on the issue of election. Zhang proposed that the province be ruled by a twenty-five council, on which ministry heads would also serve. The Chinese, it was proposed, would take fifteen posts of this council. The remaining posts would be reserved for the representatives of Ili (Seypidin 1989; Burhan 1990; Savdanov 1994; Zhang 1994).

The two sides also negotiated the question of electing the head of the provincial government, but soon reached the consensus that this issue would be left until after the National Assembly had met and adopted a new constitution. Finally, on the question of military reorganization, it was agreed by both sides that some type of reorganization was important, but the ways how this be done were left for later discussions.

After the first session of discussion, the Ili delegates returned again to Ili with the new eleven-point compromise proposal. On December 25, they came back to Urumqi to continue the negotiations. This time they brought new demands for the Chinese
government (Zhang 1994). Although Zhang had thought that agreement had been reached on the necessary issues, the Ili government now hoped to add two more points. First it requested that the numerous troops dispatched to Xinjiang to quell the unrest be withdrawn. Second, it demanded that all Chinese special service organizations (e.g., the hated secret police who were predominantly Han Chinese) be disbanded and withdrawn.

Hurrying to reach a basic agreement by the end of 1945, Zhang requested that these new questions be set aside and that discussion should be centered on the original eleven points presented by the Ili group at the previous meeting. The Ili delegates agreed with this, and finally, on January 3 1946, the provincial government announced that the Ili affair had been peacefully resolved. In fact, the announcement seemed premature because two sides had not reached consensus on some important issues such as reorganization of the Ili Army and distribution of posts within the new government. The central government wanted the total disbanding of the Ili forces. The ETR wished to maintain their own armed forces within three districts under the leadership of their own armed Muslim commanders. The Ili government also made the demand that new recruits to the provincial military forces be native Muslims and non-Han Chinese. Toward the end of 1945, Chiang Kai-shek urgently requested Zhang Zhizhong to aid in the Kuomintang-Chinese Communist negotiations which were under way and progressing on and off. The somewhat premature announcement of peace in Xinjiang was partly a result of this request.

Urged to ensure peace in Xinjiang, the central government decided in March 1946 to place Zhang at the head of the government in Xinjiang. Accordingly, on March 29, the Chong Qing government announced him as provincial chairman (Seypidin 1989; Zhang
1994). On the same day, Zhang returned to Urumchi. Zhang’s return was long awaited because the intervening period of administration under Wu was marked by misgovernment and corruption. In contrast with Wu, Zhang enjoyed high reputation and popularity among both the Chinese and Turkic population (Seypidin 1989). With optimism, Zhang proclaimed that the main goal of the new government would be to carry out the government’s new policy of autonomy in Xinjiang. He asked for the support of the local population of all nationalities so that together they could progress toward a future of peace and unity.

But, no progress was made in the negotiation despite Zhang’s attempts to reach a final consensus with the Ili delegates. In early May it was announced that Zhang felt unwell and that meetings to discuss further issues would be delayed. Then, on May 8, allegedly recovered from his disease, Zhang delivered a speech in which he clearly expressed his concern about the delay of negotiations (Sawdanow 1994). He pointed out that while the government had made many concessions to the demands of the Ili delegates, it turned to be very difficult to reach a final agreement. After six months of hard work, he hoped that the delegates would now accept the government’s generous offers in order to secure peace.

Zhang’s offers covered religious, political, economic, and social affairs. The proposals included the promise of autonomy would be fulfilled; the rule of law would be strictly implemented; corrupt officials would be punished; Sino-Soviet relations would be improved. Economically, the government would improve transportation, communication and environmental protection. In short, the central government wished to help Xinjiang modernize and advance with the rest of China during the new period of reconstruction.
Zhang’s speech was not only an appeal to the population of Urumchi, it was also an appeal to take part in the forthcoming discussions.

On May 15, 1946, the central government had proposed Mehmet Emin Bugra, a Uyghur nationalist, as vice chairman of the province. However, the Ili faction distrusted Bughra and the other two Uyghur representatives in Nanjing despite their reputation for Turkic nationalism. The Ili group instead proposed Ahmatjan Qasimi, one of the Ili delegates, as vice-chairman, and this, in the end was agreed. The other vice-chairmanship was given to Burhan Shahidi, the Tatar who had served in previous Xinjiang governments (Seypidin 1989; Sawdanow 1989).

Chairman Zhang next tackled the problem of political prisoners. He publicly ordered the local officials to inform him of the number and location of all such prisoners with an aim to facilitate their release (Zhang 1994). Such a list was drawn up naming 253 persons being held in Urumchi and 135 held elsewhere. Although their release was not immediate, Zhang managed to arrange a general amnesty for all such prisoners by June 20, when people gathered at Urumchi’s main prison to greet their relatives upon release.

During the inaugural ceremony on July 1, 1946, each new official was required to swear his allegiance to the new government, to protect the peace in Xinjiang, to support the unity of the Chinese state and strengthen the unity of the nationalities, severely punish corruption.
Table 5: Xinjiang provincial Government Council, 1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Name (nationally)</th>
<th>Political affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Zhang Zhizhong (Han)</td>
<td>Guomindang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice</td>
<td>Burhan Shahidi (Tatar)</td>
<td>Provincial appointee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice</td>
<td>Ahmet Jan Kasimi (Uighur)</td>
<td>Ili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary-general</td>
<td>Liu Mengchun (Han)</td>
<td>Guomindang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice</td>
<td>Abdul Kerim Abbas</td>
<td>Ili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice</td>
<td>Salis (kazak)</td>
<td>Provincial appointee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of administration</td>
<td>Jelaleddin Wang Cengshan (Hui)</td>
<td>Guomindang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice</td>
<td>Rahim Jan Selimoglu(uighur)</td>
<td>Ili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of finance</td>
<td>Lu Yuwen (Han)</td>
<td>Guomindang</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vice</td>
<td>Ma Tingxian (Hui)</td>
<td>Provincial appointee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of education</td>
<td>Seyfettin Aziz (Uighur)</td>
<td>Ili</td>
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<td>Vice</td>
<td>Cai Zhongxian (Han)</td>
<td>Guomindang</td>
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<td>Minister of reconstruction</td>
<td>Mehmet Emin Bugra (Uighur)</td>
<td>Provincial appointee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vice</td>
<td>Gu Jianji (Han)</td>
<td>Guomindang</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of social affairs</td>
<td>Zhao Qianfeng (Manchu)</td>
<td>Guomindang</td>
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<td>Vice</td>
<td>Ardeni (Mongol)</td>
<td>Provincial appointee</td>
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<td>Minister of health</td>
<td>Delilhan Sugurbayoglu (Kazak)</td>
<td>Ili</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vice</td>
<td>Ma Shuqia (Hui)</td>
<td>Provincial appointee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mayor of Urumqi</td>
<td>Chu Wu (Han)</td>
<td>Guomindang</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Zhang Dajun, Xinjiang’s Seventy Years of Turbulence (Taipei, 1980), 12:6880-81.

Ma was not on the twenty-five-man council.

While most of the new officials from the Ili government were in attendance, it is noteworthy that several were not. Moreover, several of those missing never arrived in Urumchi to assume their new posts at all. Ali Han Tore, president of the ETR, and Osman Batur, Kazak leader in Altai, were both ministers without portfolio in the new provincial government, but neither arrived to take the post. Following Chairman Zhang’s inaugural speech and swearing in of new officials, several other speeches were made. The speech of the new vice-chairman, Ahmatjan Qasimi was released, and his talk helped improve his reputation in Urumchi as an accomplished and charismatic speaker. His
words, printed in the Xinjiang daily in a special black-bordered box, called upon the new officials to work hard for the establishment of democratic government in Xinjiang and full implementation of local autonomy in the province.

Thus, a new phase was about to begin in Xinjiang history. A difficult compromise had been reached, and in the struggle to achieve it, both sides appeared to have given evidence for their good will and their intention to find a workable solution that would bring peace to the region. The national government of China had agreed to radical shifts in its position to minority affairs accepting that the local population would have to be given larger degree of freedom, and that the abusive and corrupt policies would have to end. These were significant concessions.

**Xinjiang’s New Government: The Council**

According to the terms of the peace agreement between the central government and the Ili group, the new coalition government was to include ten central government appointees and fifteen members drawn from the ten districts of Xinjiang (Zhang 1994). In the list that resulted from tense negotiations, ten/fifteen divisions were posted by local people as shown the table below:

The Chinese side had originally proposed Memet Emin Bugra as one of the two vice-chairmen to work with Zhang. Since the Ili group considered Memet to be too pro-Chinese, they refused to sanction this but accepted him as the minister of the Reconstruction Bureau. Thus, Memet was still a member of the national government. Isa Yusuf Alptekin, another former member of the national government, was also appointed to the council as a minister without portfolio (Seypidin 1989).
These two men were known to be Turkic nationalists who demanded greater degree of autonomous government for Xinjiang. Both also saw union with China as the best strategy in that complex political environment. For this reason they were committed to a Chinese role in the province. As Isa said in Urumchi in 1947, “I believe the Chinese Nationalist side, for all its faults, is better than the Russian and I will continue to work for autonomy under Chinese rule” (Seypidin 1989: 382). While the Ili delegates hoped for eventual independence, the Nationalist Uyghurs like Isa and Bughra feared Soviet power and preferred alliance with the weaker Republic of China.

Among the representatives of the Ili group, Ahmatjan Qasimi, held the highest provincial government rank and shared the position of vice-Chairman with Burhan. The second highest post of secretary general had two vice-secretaries, one of whom was the Ili appointee and Marxist Abdul Kerim Abbas. Among other Ili appointees Rahim Jan was appointed as vice-minister of civil administration; Seypidin as minister of education and Delilhan as minister of health. A further three Ili representatives were made ministers without portfolio: Ali Han Tore, Osman Batur, and Izhak Han Mura Haji.

In addition, Ali Han Tore, president of the ETR, was stealthily kidnapped by the Soviet force in August 1946 (Forbes 1986). Since no one seemed sure whether he would return or not, his place on the provincial council also remained empty. This increased the Nationalist majority to seventeen in comparison to the Ili four. Furthermore, another institution available to the central government was the system of inspectors-general which existed at provincial, district, and county levels. These appointed officials had great supervisory powers. Xinjiang’s first inspector general was Mesut Sabiri, a Uyghur
nationalist member of the Guomindang. With his appointment, Turkic nationalists strengthened their position in the province.

**Strengthen of Turkic Nationalism and anti-Chinese Unrest**

Since many Uyghur took posts in the new government, the coalition brought about the emergence of stronger sense of Turkic nationalism and collective identity. Excited over a victory over the Chinese in the Ili valley, local Turks in Urumchi hurried to make resident Han Chinese aware of their minority status in the region. With the outbreak of anti-Chinese riots on the first day of the new government’s official business, small outbursts of anti-Han sentiment exploded periodically during the first months of coalition government. For example, on July 29, a Chinese airline official, Jin Xuedong, was murdered. When two Turkic suspects in the murder were finally arrested on October 21, a mob gathered at the prison demanding their release. After the crowd guaranteed to produce the two later for trial, they were set free on bail (Zhang 1994). Outside the capital, Han Chinese suffered from the new Turkic sense of power. Early August saw anti-Chinese and anti-Soviet riots in Kashgar, where police were called out to disperse rioters.

Such events, coupled with Zhang’s policy of compromise and conciliation toward national minorities, caused increasing concern among Chinese in the capital and other districts. Han Chinese saw their dominant role in Xinjiang affairs being threatened and began pressing the Chinese members of the government to look after their interest in the region. As if suddenly faced with reverse discrimination after years of domination, Many Han Chinese thought that their authority in Xinjiang declined because of Zhang’s constant concessions to national minority demands.
Olzak argues that: “group identity is an important mobilizing strategy and outcome of mobilization” (2004: 681). As a result of the efforts of the Ili group, Uyghur nationalism increased. The goal of independence ceased, but the movement had been able to build a strong collective identity. Since many Uyghur took posts in such political opportunities, the collation also brought about the emergence of stronger sense of Turkic nationalism. Although independence ended with the formation of coalition government, for the first time in their history, the people of the oases of Eastern Turkestan were united in an independent state for which they gain recognition from the existing regime.

Coalition Cracked

On the question of the ETR’s existence, Zhang (1994) pointed out that among the non-Han people in Xinjiang, there was a mistaken idea that was anti-homeland, anti-Han. This idea supposed that “East Turkestan” could be the name of a country whereas in reality it was only a geographic term and could not be the basis of an independent state. How was it possible, he asked, that provincial government representatives were asking for independence for Xinjiang? This was an issue that could not be discussed until Xinjiang had gained true freedom and equality and had built up its society economically, socially and politically.

Zhang ended his comments by saying that there were three roads open to the people of Xinjiang. The first road was union with the Republic of China and local autonomy. The second was total independence, and the third was union with the USSR. As for the latter, he quickly pointed out that the USSR had already claimed to recognize Xinjiang as Chinese territory. As to total independence, the region was not yet ready, and while it
might one day be capable of independence, this was absolutely not possible in the immediate future.

Zhang’s lengthy rebuttal of the independent East Turkestan thesis emphasized the vitality of the independence movement in Xinjiang at the time. Growing number of Turkic intellectuals and masses of young Turkic people had become committed to the idea of eventual independence for their homeland (Seypidin 1989). Abuses by Chinese officials and the nationalist army served to strengthen these feelings; despite the new government’s good intention, incidents of violence between non-Han people and Han Chinese continued. One of the factors strengthening Turkic nationalist sentiment in the region was the existence of the Ili government, which continued to exclude Chinese from the three districts; the other was the opportunity for Turkic members of the new government—both Ili and independent nationalist factions—to reach larger audiences with their message of nationalism. Since the Ili government represented another manifestation of the Turkic dream of independence, many non-Han people joined the movement. Many Muslims, initially at least, looked to Ili as a model for the future independence of the whole of Xinjiang.

Another important factor in Ili’s prestige was the influence of Alihan Tore, the respected Muslim leader who served as the ETR’s first president (Seypidin 1989). His leadership was important in bringing the Kazaks into movement. Impressed with his provocative speeches, various Turkic groups were united in a nationalist effort at creating a Muslim state in the region. A further factor contributing to the increase in Turkic nationalism was the expanding influence of the Turkic members of the coalition. As previously mentioned, Ahamtjan Qasimi emerged as a popular and charismatic speaker,
receiving a warm reception when he addressed mainly Turkic audiences. According to Seypidin (1989), from the time of his first public speech in Urumchi—during the inaugural ceremonies for the new government—his reception from the crowds was far more enthusiastic than anyone else, including chairman Zhang himself.

However, in the coalition government, neither party fully obeyed the coalition agreement. Both sides did not truly trust the other, and each continued to struggle for position. The GMD did this through its control of the police and key military units. The Ili group did this through political organization and spreading the idea of “we-Turk” throughout Xinjiang, not entirely abandoning its hope of establishing an independent Turkic state (Seypidin 1989; Sawdanow 1994). They disseminated the idea of pan-Turkism in the southern seven districts and organized Turkic nationalist opposition to the GMD presence in Xinjiang. This is done through a party known as the East Turkestan Youth League. This group gained supporters rapidly in Urumchi, Aqsu, Kashgar, Khotan, Hami, Yarkend and Korla, to the point where it could challenge the GMD organizations. In the Ili valley, the old ETR leaders maintained control of their military forces, kept the GMD military out of three northern districts. The Ili also maintained its separate currency and remained, in fact, an independent regime. So coalition was cracked in the end of 1946.

**Discussion and Summary: Political Process as a Negotiation**

This chapter explores how political structures and international conditions impacted the later development of the Ili movement.

A group of senior Soviet advisers arrived in Ili in early 1945. The Ili group began to fight on three fronts. By the end of January 1945 the whole Ili valley was in rebel
hands. On August 22, 1945, the Ili national army bombed the strategic hubs of GMD troops such as Wusu and Jinghe. This shocked the GMD force. During such a crisis, The Central Government decided to tackle the crisis through diplomatic channels, particularly with the political assistance of the USA. By summer 1945, the fighting between the GMD force and Ili National Army stopped abruptly and Stalin ordered halting the advance of the Ili army and keeping the Ili valley under its control. Thus a new political process unfolded resulting from great power politics and international diplomatic game. In February 1945, the Yalta Agreement was reached between Stalin and Roosevelt. The Yalta terms were part of the U.S. effort to obtain Soviet entry into the war against Japan. With rich concessions in northern China already in his hands, Mongolia’s Soviet satellite status ensured, and Japan no longer a threat, Stalin chose not to overreach in Xinjiang. In September 1945, the Sino-Soviet treaty was resigned, and short after that a sudden truce was announced and the negotiation started between the Ili group and the GMD force.

Political structures and international conditions impacted the later development of the Ili movement. How and why? Independence as a master frame guided the Muslims in Xinjiang from the 19th century Jahangir rebellion to the Ili movement. However, in the later development of Ili movement, the movement leaders were forced to accept the offer of autonomy, which was deeply influenced by the international relations and the new shifts in the political process. The Soviet consul actively intervened in the movement and drafted a nine-Point declaration as the political program for the East Turkestan Republic. Viewing from that declaration, there was no hint for autonomy within China. On the contrary, emotional language in each goal called for an independent Muslim government, free of external rule.
However, after witnessing the impacts of international relations, the movement discourse changed and slogan of autonomy replaced independence. During the negotiations, on the question of the ETR’s existence, the newly appointed governor Zhang (1994) pointed out that among the non-Han people in Xinjiang, there was a mistaken idea that was anti-homeland, anti-Han. This idea that “East Turkestan” could be the name of a country whereas in reality it was only a geographic term and could not be the basis of an independent state. How was it possible, he asked, that provincial government representatives were asking for independence for Xinjiang?” Eventually, the Ili group agreed to drop the label “East Turkestan Republic”. They reached an agreement under a system of advanced autonomy in Xinjiang.

If these changes in the international relation had not occurred, the movement leaders would have not chosen to form a coalition government and the new shifts in the political process would not have occurred. So I suggest that social revolutions can best be explained given their relation with international forces and political process. Skocpol’s approach to international relations would be refined if the findings of political process model (Tarrow 1994; McAdam 1999; Krisie 2004) are considered. We should give equal importance to the role of international forces, especially their influence on the development of revolutionary movements.
Chapter 8 Conclusion

Historical studies of revolution are many, but sociological studies are few. Although some sociologists have examined the link of revolution to states and nation building (Tilly 1978, Skocpol 1979), to international relations (Skocpol 1979) and to Islam (Kurzman 1996), the attempt to examine the link among them and to apply social movement theory to revolutions is rare. Revolutions and revolutionary movements were never examined from a social movement perspective. Likewise, the above mentioned sociological treatments exaggerated the role of structure and macro elements, neglecting the processes of meso-, micro mobilizations and cultural symbols related to revolution. This research is an attempt to fill in this gap.

To fully comprehend the dynamics of revolutions, seeing the Ili movement as a case, I sought to analyze how political opportunities, movement organizations, framing process, collective representation and international relations join together to impact the dynamics of revolutionary movements. For this purpose, drawing on movement documents, eyewitness accounts of movement leaders as well as secondary literature written by Western historians, I examined mobilization processes and impacts of Islam and international relations on the 1944 Ili revolution. I argue that the confluence of macro-, meso-, and micro-mobilization processes as well as the combined impacts of collective representation and international relations are responsible for the emergence, development and decline of the Ili movement. I suggest that sociological studies of revolutions should pay more attention to social movement theory, which has been neglected in the previous studies.
The findings of this study indicate that the dynamics of the Ili movement are multifaceted. First of all, it was a continuation of the previous independence movements and facilitated by spiritual politics of Islam and its sacred cultural repertoire, which was defined in this research as the strategy of mobilization in the name of the sacred. Sacred repertoire serves, vitalizes and characterizes almost all Islamic movements. The Ili movement and its predecessors are not an exception. Muslims tend to mobilize for the sake of sacred territory and sacred objects; they often unify in the face of political threats. In cultural narratives of Islam, Muslims were encouraged to keep a strong social bond regardless of class, race and ethnicity, to take actions for protecting sacred objects, to become heroes in their lifetimes, and to be honored after their death. In settled times, these cultural meanings are hidden and invisible. But whenever war or revolutionary movements break out, these deep cultural meanings (what Swindler coined “tool kit”, 1986) are destabilized. This leads to a mobilizing strategy for the sake of sacred objects (God, Prophets, Holy books, territory, nation, etc) that serves as a cultural repertoire; the slogan of holy war is used as a powerful strategy to agitate and mobilize the masses. Particularly, in the face of non-Muslim threats, rigid Islamic classification such as believers and non-believers unites Muslims from diverse ethnic backgrounds. This provides the unifying ideology for the master frame: liberation from the external threat. Sacred-oriented cultural repertoire reflects two twin elements entrenched in Muslim collective consciousness: worship of freedom and political recognition of the status of Islam. It also marked the characteristics of the cycles of protest between 1826 and 1933, and emerged as a powerful unifying tool in the Ili movement serving the master frame of liberation. Muslim leader, and the president of the Ili government Alihan Tore, used it
and called for mobilization for the sake of Allah (one God). In the movement, sacred-oriented cultural repertoire reflected an affirmation of Muslim refusal to compromise with the dominant non-Muslim authority since their freedom-oriented cultural narratives were anchored in Islamic texts as well as native people’s collective consciousness and beliefs about their collective identity.

The findings imply that the role of sacred-oriented cultural repertoire requires the presence of political opportunities. Indeed, the Ili revolution, as a grassroots movement, activated and mobilized a large number of movement actors. However, without political opportunities, this goal could not be easily attained. As shown in chapter four, prior to the movement domestic political opportunities played a key role. Persistent repression, the GMD’s misgovernment and economic crisis, and rise of Han Chauvinism accumulated the grievances of the masses. At the same time, dramatic changes occurred in the external political context and international relations. After the termination of the Sino-Soviet trade, the Soviet Union as a political ally, trained the Movement elites and provided military and political resources. This provided conditions for the rise of Islam as the most powerful ideology.

On a meso level, movement organizations were created as the political process developed. The Soviet Union constantly contributed to the formation and development of the movement organizations by establishing Marxist study groups in Ili and Urumchi and by training progressive intellectuals who pursue social change. The Marxist study group and the National Liberation Committee were established and united on the eve of this movement. Under the guidance of these organizations, the movement flourished very rapidly recruiting numerous members among the progressive youth and religious
devotees. During this process, three ideologies show their influences. They include Marxism-Leninism, Turkic nationalism and pan-Islamism. These three ideologies yielded insights helping activists learn how to frame and interpret specific events, and offered movement actors a simplifying perspective through which they could comprehend problematic social conditions.

But even these progresses were not sufficient. As described in Chapter Six, movement leaders carried out a set of frame alignment strategies grounding in the traditional cultural narratives. The movement frames include oppression, anti-Hanism, we-Turkic, friendship with the Soviet and one God principle. Each frame was guided by a specific ideology. For example, two frames such as oppression and friendship with the Soviet were guided by Marxism-Leninism. The We Turkic frame and the anti-Hanism frame were guided by nationalism, and one God principle by political Islam. The oppression frame held that the existing living conditions were unjust and intolerable. The frames of anti-Hanism and We Turkic held that the native people should be independent. The frame of friendship with the Soviet suggested that the revolutionaries should regard the Soviet as a political ally. The frame of one God principle held that the Muslims should launch a holy war against the occupiers and oppression. These bridged frames resonated with the values of the masses.

Revolutionary movements occur in certain social circumstances and political contexts and are left untouched by international relations. As presented in chapter seven, political structures and international conditions impacted the later development of the Ili movement. The Ili movement resulted in proclamation of the “East Turkestan Government.” The newly established administration created a well-armed and disciplined
popular army. They fought and defeated the GMD forces. However, by summer 1945, the fighting between the GMD forces and Ili National Army stopped abruptly and Stalin ordered halting the advance of the Ili army and keeping the Ili valley under his control. This new political process resulted from great power politics and international relations. In February 1945, the Yalta Agreement was reached between Stalin and Roosevelt. The Yalta terms were part of the U.S. effort to obtain Soviet entry into the war against Japan. With Mongolia’s Soviet satellite status ensured and rich concessions in northern China already in his hands, Stalin chose not to overreach in Xinjiang. In September 1945, the Sino-Soviet treaty was resigned. Shortly after, a sudden truce was announced and the negotiation started between the Ili group and the GMD forces. After the movement witnessed the impacts of international relations, a new shift in political process came into being with the formation of a coalition government in 1946. During this time, the movement goal of independence was replaced by autonomy. If these changes in international relations had not occurred, the movement leaders would never form a coalition government and never accept the offer of autonomy. This implies that we should give equal importance to the role of international forces, especially their influence on the development of political processes.

Overall, the findings in this study imply that: (1) no single perspective on social movement can best account for the dynamics and unique characteristics of revolutionary movements; the macro-, meso-, micro-mobilization processes must be equally examined; (2) the master frame and movement repertoire are anchored in the collective representation; (3) the dynamics of revolutionary movements largely depends on combining influence from five factors: political process, movement organization,
effective framing, collective representation and international relations; (4) shifts in political opportunity structure effect the organizations and resources. Movement ideologies, organizations develop dialectically through political process, and determine the construction of movement frame. International conditions indirectly impact the development of political process; (5) even if a revolutionary movement fails, it would facilitate the formation of collective identity.
References


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Appendix A

Chronology

1750  The Qing troops conquers Xinjiang

1825- 1826 the Jahangir Rebellion

1864 Muslim rebellion, resulting in the emergence of Kashgaria Islamic State

1877  The Kashgaria Islamic State collapses and Manchu General Zuo Zongtang reconquers Xinjiang

1884 Xinjiang province is created with the appointment of Liu Jintang as the first governor

1911 Qing collapses, the Chinese Revolution begins

1912 Yang Zegnxin takes power and becomes the second Xinjiang governor

1921 the Tashkant Conference, the name of Uyghur reinvents

1928 the Governor Yang Zengxin is assassinated; Jin Shuren becomes governor

1931 Qumul Rebellion

1933 Sheng Shicai takes command in Urumchi

1933-1934 Eastern Turkestan Republic is proclaimed in Kashgar (November-February)

1938 the Horse Donation Movement

1942 Xinjiang-Soviet trade terminates

    National Liberation Council is established in Alma-Ata, Kazakstan

1943 The movement activists are trained in Soviet, movement organizations are formed

1944 October the Ili revolution breaks out in Ili

1944 November 12, Eastern Turkestan Republic is proclaimed
1944 Establishment of the Ili army, the GMD forces are defeated

1945 February, the Yalta Term

1945 August, the Ili army stopped at Manas River

1946 July, the Coalition government is formed with the participation of ten Ili Representatives

1947 Coalition government collapses

1949 proclamation of the Chinese Republic state and arrival of the Chinese troops in Urumchi.
Appendix B

Who is who in the Movement

Abdukerim Abbasov (1921-1949), Uyghur, a Marxist leader of the Ili movement, progressive Uyghur of the Ili valley, associated with the National Liberation Council (NLC). In 1946 became Deputy Secretary General of Xinjiang government under Zhang Zhizhong. He was killed in air crash during his trip to Beijing in August 1949.

Ahmatjan Qasimi (1912-1949), Uyghur, a Marxist and nationalist leader of the Ili movement, native of Ili, taken to the Soviet Union by his uncle in 1929. Here he remained for about 10 years, studied in Moscow and possibly adopted Soviet Nationality. He returned to Xinjiang in 1938, and in 1942 he was imprisoned by Sheng Shicai. A communist-minded progressive, he played an important part in the Ili uprising of 1944, and was almost the leading member of National Liberation Council. In 1945 he became the most powerful member of the ETR, and in 1946 he became Vice-Chairman of the Xinjiang provincial government. He was killed in air crash during his trip to Beijing on 27 August 1949.

Alihan Tore (Uzbek, dates unknown), popular religious leader at Kulja who became titular head of the ETR in 1945. He opposed the September 1945 cease fire between the ETR and the GMD, and was reportedly kidnapped by Soviet officials from Khorgos in August 1946 because of his leanings toward pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism.

Burhan Shahidi (1894-1989), Tatar, native of Aqsu, he became the chairman of Xinjiang in 1949 after the CCP’s takeover. In 1937 he was accused of “Trotskyism” and sentenced to nine years of imprisonment, and remained in Jail until Sheng’s fall from power. Served under Wu Zhongxin, and in 1946 he became second vice-Chairman of Xinjiang under Zhang Zhizhong.

Zhang Zhizhoong (Han Chinese, 1891-?), He served as Chairman of Xinjiang from March 1946 to May 1947, earning a reputation as a moderate and tolerant administrator who genuinely sought to ameliorate conditions in the province. Following his replacement by Masud Sabiri in May 1947, he continued to serve under Chiang Kai-shek until 1949, when he chose to remain in Peking under CCP.

Sheng Shi-cai (Han Chinese, 1895- ), replaced Jin Shuren as de facto ruler of Xinjiang from 1933 to 1944. Much of that time he was a virtual puppet of the Soviet Union. Replaced by GMD in 1944 and left for Nanjing.

Wu Zhong Xin (Han Chinese, 1884-1959), became Governor of Xinjiang under GMD in 1944-45.

Source: from Forbes (1986)
Appendix C

“Why are we fighting?”

(The Movement Pamphlet)

Our fathers and our father’s fathers called the place where we are living “East Turkestan”. From ancient time there have lived in this place Uyghurs, Taranchis, Kazaks, Uzbeks, and Tatars; at the present time also it is the place of their habitation.

In this territory there are counted to be four million people; more than three million of them are of these nations (that we have named); for that reason the area---Turkestan---was called the hearth of the Turkish nations. Our nearest blood relations are Kazaks, Kirghiz, Uzbeks, and Tatars. In the Soviet Union each of these races has organized its own Government and its members are living free and joyful lives. Let us listen to the white bearded old men among us while they tell us, as they alone can, what was the beginning of the history of our East Turkestan nations, and how it began.

Two hundred years ago from Astrakhan and the borders of the Caspian Sea there came to our East Turkestan several Kalmuk families and from that time forward they lived among us as friends and without friction. Thus we see that their roots also were not in China but sprang from the Russian Kalmuks. If they are asked they themselves will confirm this.

The (white) Russians now resident in East Turkestan can also make the same statement about themselves [i.e., that came not from China but from Russia].

Of the fourteen nations living in East Turkestan, the ten nations accounted the most numerous have had no rational, racial, or cultural relationship nor any community of blood with the Chinese, nor did ever exist.
But through the sands of the desert from remote China there came Chinese to our East Turkestan. With the help of sabres and taking advantage of our love of peace, the whiteness of our hearts, and our truthfulness, (Great Hanism) they took into their hands the control of the whole government; they extracted from us heavy taxes and many kinds of contributions; they oppressed us until we had no more rights than animals. And they were at that time the least enlightened people in the world; they could not give to us brighter lives, they could not increase our knowledge of culture, they could not improve the ordinary living conditions of the people; instead they robbed us of light, held us in slavery, kept us illiterate and plunged us in darkness. From that time forward our territory was called “West China” or “Sinkiang” and it was forbidden to pronounce the name “East Turkestan” which the land had borne for years without end throughout history.

Many times in the past our people have been unable further to endure this oppression; their patience exhausted, they have turned on their savage oppressors and fought with great heroism. These battles are known to history. The beloved names of our heroic grandfathers who died in these struggles should serve us banners calling us forward to do battle against Chinese who enslaved us!

In the years of 26 and 27 the savage policies of Sheng Tupan began to be put in operation, at the same time that fascism started.

State Terror and Repression: In the same way that fascism counts as its enemies all people who love peace and freedom, thus did Sheng Tupan and savage Chinese who surrounded him count us, the native people of East Turkestan, as their enemies and as inferior race. They oppressed us with every kind of cruelty. In 26 and 27 and the subsequent years Sheng Tupan arrested Han Jeeneeyas, Sherif Jan, and over four
thousand others of the vanguard, of those who most killed, of those who knew the most, of those who were outstanding for leadership. Can we forget them?

After he had arrested them, Sheng Tupan put them in torture cells, bet them until their bones were broken, strangled them and poisoned them, until they were dead. Their crime in the years of the Tupan was that he accounted them our representatives, who sought for our people freedom and good fortune.

Very few of these men who were arrested at that time are still alive. Those few are in dark prisons waiting for the coming of death to end their tortures at the hands of the Tupan’s executioners. Their condition is so pitiful that their best friends would not known them if they saw them, and their mothers, wives, or children would go mad at the sight of them.

These helpless, unfortunate people are Uyghurs, Taranchis, Kazaks, Kirghiz, Uzbeks, and Tatars. But they are more than representatives of the races to which we belong: they are our fathers, our elder brothers, our younger brothers and our relatives.

Hail, people! Let all men know well:

That these helpless, unfortunate people in the prisons of Sheng Tupan, drawing their last breaths of life before dying, turn upon us the eyes of their souls and in their moaning say to us: “for the suffering which we have endured at the hands of the savage Chinese, you must avenge us. We are pouring forth our blood and yielding up our souls for our people: for this also you must avenge us.

At the present time, in our territory of East Turkestan, all of the ruling power is in the hands of the Chinese alone. We are people who have lost all human rights. It should be known by every man of knowledge that when the rule is in the hands of
Chinese, there is no equality and no justice. Only when the throats of the Chinese fascist oppressors have been cut and they have bled to death will come again into the life of light.

Chinese administrators plan to move from far-away China a million Chinese and Chinese bandits into our territory. Some of them, in the guise of soldiers and of refugees, have already come to Dihua; they are being dispersed among the several districts and counties. It is the aim of the Chinese to drive us out thereafter from our native Turkestan and remove us by force to the east. This thing which the Chinese seek to do to us is for us the same thing as the most horrible death: everyone should understand this. Our bones will not unburied on either side of the long road across the Chinese steppe to far away China; Chinese and Chinese bandits will live in our houses, take over our goods, enjoy our riches, be masters in our stead; by force they will go into our wives and our daughters. Because of our fear and our docility and our trustfulness they will mock us with contemptuous laughter.

The progressive, forward looking people among us, who give thought to our future welfare and fortune, have in every place organized illegal groups in order to fight against the savage Chinese, because the Chinese are dragging us toward a bottomless well, into which they mean to fling us.

Our fathers for the people’s freedom will unite our forces in friendship and under right leadership to rise against the Chinese in order to destroy their savage mastery and power; therefore there have been formed in every locality the illegal “National Freedom Groups.”

Our aim in forming the “National Freedom Groups” is to free our people from enslavement to the savage Chinese and thereafter to make it so that these people, who
have been oppressed by the Chinese, strangled by them, crushed down by them, may arise again as national races in possession of freedom, equality before the law, wealth, culture, and a fortunate life.

Our national freedom groups and all the members of every group have taken an oath in the name of one God, before the souls of our heroic grandfathers and in the presence of all the people, to achieve, through enthusiasm and heroism, by legal and illegal means, by words and by force of arms, by night and bay day and without resting the objectives set below.

3. We are fighting to do away with Chinese rule in all our East Turkestan and to destroy for all times the roots of Chinese tyranny in our territory.

East Turkestan belongs to the real masters of the territory, the Uyghurs, the Taranchis, the Kazaks, the Kirghiz, the Tatars, the Uzbeks, together with all those who live among them in peace and friendship and alike suffer Chinese oppression, such as the Mongols and other non-Chinese nations. There is no place in East Turkestan for Chinese colonial government for Chinese colonists.

4. The national freedom groups and all of their members are fighting to establish in East Turkestan a real equality of rights between all races one with the other.

5. We are fighting for the organization of a National Political Alliance, that is, a Congress composed of elected representatives of the People living in East Turkestan; the representatives comprising this National Political Alliance should be elected in numbers proportionate to the total numbers of their respective races. We should ourselves be the real master of this National Political Alliance and not the Chinese. Thereafter the Chinese will have no way to deride and ill treat us: we
will make our own lives and our own happiness according to those of the Chinese. From among the elected representatives to the National Political Alliance we will select most intelligent, the most just, and those who most love the people, and with them we will organize our own new government.

6. the National Freedom Groups and their members are fighting in the interests of the people of all races except the Chinese so that in the future district, town village and small village administrations and organizations will be composed of trusted, energetic, capable, just members elected according to the popular will by the locally resident people themselves.

7. the National Freedom Groups and their members are fighting for the cultural development of every racial nation [in Sinkiang] and for the establishment of lower and middle schools in their respective languages for the children of every nation, these schools to be supported by the government.

8. The National Freedom Groups and their members are fighting to reestablish the separate national contingents of troops, such as those comprised respectively by Uighurs, Kazaks, Mongols, and members of other national races, which were disbanded by Sheng Tupan because of his fear that they might oppose his political policies.

9. Sheng Tupan, running wild, took all military and civil rule into his own hands; throughout the entire East Turkestan all rule became military; in the cities martial law was declared, and as soon as it became evening all movement in the streets was absolutely forbidden; it was impossible to leave the city without permission.
After nightfall you were prevented not only from visiting your friends, but you could not go to see your closet relatives on the most urgent business, because the moment you stepped out of your door, a Chinese would seize you and begin: “Where are you going?” “For what reason?” “What have you said” and [he would ask you] many other questions. Each person was obliged to spy on everyone else and inform the police. At the present time East Turkestan [Sinkiang] has become one vast prison; the nations are captives in it and the Chinese are the executioners. The Chinese themselves account the situation to be one of happiness and a fortunate life for the natives!

The National Freedom Groups and their members are fighting to overthrow the prison system set up by the oppressor, Sheng Tupan; to wrest the military and civil powers from the rule of one man, and to free unoffending people from captivity.

10. The National freedom Groups and their members are fighting to give freedom to such among the number of those natives who (because of their interest in the welfare of the people) were arrested and imprisoned by Sheng Tupan as may yet be still alive and still suffering from Chinese oppression; these persons are the most trusted of our people, possess naturally the most authority, are the foremost among us and the most dear to us.

11. There previously existed friendly trading relations between the people of East Turkestan [Sinkiang] and the Soviet Government; this relationship was disrupted by the Chinese administration; this cessation of trade worded great hardship in our lives, checked the growth of peasant holding s in the villages, and brought to a
standstill the trading in the bazaars for each family the daily livelihood became difficult. In every locality those who were starving, who were without clothing, who could not find employment and whose condition was altogether piteous, became more and more numerous. Big merchants became small; the small became bankrupt; the bankrupt became beggars. For skilled workers also there are no jobs because there is no one who needs to employ them. As a result they too have fallen into dire poverty. The number of people who have met this kind of misfortune mounts up higher every day. In the market there are no buyers for cattle, for the various kinds of wool, skins, or grains, or for the other products of the small village holding, not for the production of the cattle raisers. The powerful Sovsintorg, a large purchaser, went out and away from East Turkestan [Sinkiang] as a consequence of the inside-out political policies of Sheng Tupan. The prices of the food supplies and other products of the village holdings and cattle and sheep husbandary are too cheap: the husbandman cannot buy any of the things he needs for his family’s livelihood with the money he realizes from the sale of his products. From this money the Chinese authorities also forcibly take all kinds of taxes and exactions, for which reason no one can spend for his own needs or as he likes in a carefree way the money he receives. The life of the peasant, of the cattle and sheep herder, of the whole generality of the population, thus becomes progressively more difficult day by day. The people of East Turkestan [Sinkiang] are like an orphaned child, without father or mother or anyone to heed its cries. The savage Chinese have torn the child from the mother that bore it (the Soviet Government) and seek to give it to a foster mother (the Three People’s Principles).
for the latter to trample it under foot. For the people of East Turkestan the severance of their mutually friendly relations with the Soviet Union and their subjection to the discipline of the Tree People’s Principles by the savage Chinese is the same thing as death by torture.

The National Freedom Groups must fight to free all people from the claws of death by hunger, to establish anew strong and truly sincere relations of friendship with our great, freedom-loving friend and neighbor, the Soviet Union, and to develop wide and full trading relations between all our trading men and the Sovsintorg. We are fighting to do away with the fixed market prices set by the Chinese by proclamation and to destroy the other systems of regulations harmful to the people.

Source: from Benson (1990)
Appendix D

“Struggle for the Motherland”
(The Ili Declaration)

Originally Eastern Turkestan, our motherland, was the real territory of the Turkish Race. We consist of seven million people. This land is our birthright left by our brave ancestors and it is our duty and responsibility to guard this heritage. The Chinese oppressors and usurpers came to this land two hundred years ago, like savages and bandits, seizing our territory, enslaving us, making our land a colony and dishonoring our holy religion. In brief, we became like men who have eyes but are blind, ears but are deaf, tongues but are dumb, and legs but are lame. How can they be endured? Ponder over these things. Which of them can be gainsaid? If you are not a spy or quisling; if you are born of your mother; if the blood from your umbilical cord wet this soil; if your father owns you as his legitimate son then you cannot deny the truth of what has just been said!

You must not forget how our country flourished of old under the leadership of such heroes of our race as Sultan Sokushbora Khan. During the times of these great men we were masters of our territory and maintained the luster of our culture equal to any others. Within the last two hundred years we have lost our birth-right and live like animals under the cruel sway of the Chinese who are filthy and barbarous.

After and abundance of bloodshed we won a compromise peace which consisted eleven articles of agreement. In order to preserve this agreement in full, the people must be willing to sacrifice everything.

The crafty foxes, with their swinish snouts, seeking to obtain what is not theirs, the shameless and oppressive Chinese, using these eleven articles as a blind, are seeking again to trap us in their net. The Cunning Chinese serve us with a wooden plate (which
can be used only and must be thrown away). “May Allah protect us from falling once more into the Chinese hands.” If we do so again the people know how they will be treated. People, you must remember the past. The land is ours and invaders have no claim to it.

Ho, shameless beasts and devils. You must know that you already caught in Hell. We, people of same flood, must not let you quislings dance to Chinese music.

The present is an era of democracy, justice and liberty—no longer of absolute dictatorship. This is no more a time for slumbers but a brightening period of the Twentieth Century. WE `must struggle unceasingly with our belts still tightened.

Let these oppressors depart quickly from our Eastern Turkestan.
Let these spies, traitors and puppets also leave at once.
Let these running dogs of the Chinese and their coterie get out also.
Long live free Eastern Turkestan.
Long live our Muslim republican government.
Long live the great, the heroic warriors.
Long live the crescent calling for our thirty days of holy fast.
Long live the star calling for our free daily prayers.
Away with, away with, away with those oppressors, these spices, these pro-Chinese. If you do not depart there is no room for you here above the ground.

Source: Benson (1990)
Appendix E

The Yalta Agreement

(February 11, 1945)

On behalf of the United States, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. on February 11, 1945, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin signed at Yalta an agreement containing the political conditions upon which the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan. This agreement reads as follows:

The leaders of the three Great Powers – the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain – have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (the Mongolian People’s Republic) shall be preserved;

2. The former rights of Russia Violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:

   (a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union,

   (b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of port Arthur as a naval base the U.S.S.R. restored,

   (c) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese
company, it being understood that the preeminent interest of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria.

3. The Kuril islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood, that the agreement concerning Outer-Mongolia and the port railroads referred to above well require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek. The president will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The Heads of the three Great powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

Source: Benson (1990) This is a reproduction of this document, which appears in the U.S. Department of State, *Unites States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the period 1944-1949*(Washington DC: 1949), pp.113-114.