COMMUNITY STRUGGLES, STRUGGLING COMMUNITIES:
LAND, WATER AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN WAIĀHOLE-WAIKĀNE, HAWAĪ'

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a comparative case study of three resource struggles in a rural community of Hawai‘i: an anti-eviction fight by the Waiāhole-Waikāne Community Association, a battle for water by Waiāhole taro farmers, and a Hawaiian family’s fight to protect its land from the U.S. military in Waikāne. Native Hawaiian, multiethnic Local, and American traditions have been politically mobilized in ways that have both helped and hurt the community’s ability to use their land and water. Sometimes the mobilization of tradition enabled alliances across diverse ethnic and economic groups, and sometimes it did not. Traditions that accommodate multiple identities and plural practices can be effective political resources, especially when articulated into broad public policies of sustainable and equitable development in the islands. This study shows that issues of land, water and self-determination in Hawai‘i are not simply ‘Hawaiian issues’ separated from other ‘Local issues’; on the contrary, community struggles for control and use of resources are most successful when diverse people from across socioeconomic classes come together in a productive politics of difference rooted in traditions of place in a Hawaiian Hawai‘i.
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NOTE ON INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS AND CITATIONS

I conducted formal, recorded interviews with over 40 Waiahole and Waikane community residents, activists, and allies during 2003 to 2008. On average, each interview was two hours long. All of the interviews with valley residents and some allied activists took place on windward Oahu, Hawaii (Waiahole, Waikane, Kualoa, Kahalu‘u, Kãne‘ohe, or Kailua), in their homes, at public parks, or at local restaurants. Most interviews with allied activists took place in Honolulu, Hawaii, in private offices or at local restaurants. All but three interviews were transcribed. Informal post-interview conversations continued in person or by telephone with many of the interviewees for years following my initial interview.

While I do not directly cite all of these people and the words they have shared with me, I am indebted to each and every one of them for their time, thoughtfulness, and sincerity. Occasionally, such as in Chapter One, I aggregate and paraphrase repeated perspectives and recurring themes evident in the interview transcripts, which clearly inform the rest of my work as well. When I do cite interviewees, I use direct quotes as recorded in the transcripts and which I reference in the following format: non-identifying letter initial followed by abbreviated month/day/year of the interview (such as A. 1/01/11).

As much as possible, I have tried to retain the anonymity of all the interviewees. Although I would like to give each of them their due recognition, given the nature of intra-community conflicts and personal contentions, I believe it is more appropriate to respect their privacy.
NOTE ON HAWAIIAN LANGUAGE TRANSLATIONS

All Hawaiian language translations are from the Hawaiian Dictionary by Mary Kawena Pukui and Samuel H. Elbert (1971). In the text, the first use of a Hawaiian word has a simple English translation next to it, italicized and in parenthesis; subsequent use of the same word does not include a translation. When appropriate, extended English translations of Hawaiian words or phrases are included in the text or in a footnote. When referencing older texts, I reprint Hawaiian words as originally written, without newer diacritical notations. In Chapter Four, I reprint the text of two Hawaiian songs as they appeared in a 1972 community publication. These reprints include substantial Hawaiian language spelling and grammar mistakes, which I have left uncorrected.

I am indebted to Kahealani Lono for her review of this dissertation; her unwavering assistance has been invaluable.
CHAPTER 1

CONTENDING TRADITIONS, AN INTRODUCTION

Early in the morning
she would gather all her island fruits
and pack them as she starts another day.
Carefully she makes her way
beside the mountain stream
as she sings an island chant of long ago.

Sweet lady of Waiāhole,
she’s sitting by the highway
selling her papaya
and her green and ripe banana.

My first introduction to the Waiāhole and Waikāne valleys on the windward
(eastern) side of O‘ahu1 was through the song *Sweet Lady of Waiāhole* sung by Bruddah Walter & Island Afternoon. I was in my teens and enjoyed listening to the Hawaiian-
style island music popular in the late 1980s. I used to sing along with this song when I
heard it on the radio, with little thought to its significance. Despite driving by Waiāhole
innumerable times on my way from Kailua to the North Shore, I didn’t know that *this*
was the place described in the song. For many in my generation, the place and the
people of these valleys are unknown. However, for many of our parents’ generation, the
mere mention of Waiāhole-Waikāne invokes the sociopolitical activism in 1970s Hawai‘i.
This activism sought to retain the uniqueness of Hawai‘i—its people and places—
against the threats posed by endless construction of luxury hotels, sprawling urban and
suburban homes, shopping centers, military bases, and other ‘development’ projects.
The people of Waiāhole-Waikāne were among the most active during this time, and the
place of Waiāhole-Waikāne remains one of the uniquely successful in *keeping the country*

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1 Waiāhole and Waikāne are two distinct valleys or, in Hawaiian terminology, two adjacent ahupua‘a
(*traditional land division*; which usually follows the natural contours of the land and corresponds with a
valley from mountain to ocean). Since the 1970s, many of the residents of Waiāhole and Waikāne consider
themselves joined as one community and will refer to themselves as Waiāhole-Waikāne. Depending on the
context, I use all of the above: at times referring to Waiāhole and Waikāne; at other times referencing
Waiāhole-Waikāne; and sometimes only naming Waiāhole or only Waikāne.
country. The first two stanzas of the song *Sweet Lady of Waiāhole* illustrate this uniqueness of persons and place: an abundant, lush natural environment with hard-working, kind people who provide much-appreciated foods for passers-by. Preserving this lifestyle for future generations has been their goal.

This dissertation studies Waiāhole and Waikāne through an examination of three contemporary sociopolitical struggles: the 1970s anti-eviction resistance by the Waiāhole-Waikāne Community Association to resist displacement by (sub)urban and tourist development projects; a Native Hawaiian family’s fight against the U.S. military to clean up and return their ancestral lands in Waikāne during the 1980s and 1990s; and the Waiāhole taro farmers movement in the 1990s through 2000s to regain use of waters diverted from the valleys by multinational corporations and government agencies. Waiāhole-Waikāne is a rural place where ethnically and economically diverse people resist, and at times accommodate, global capitalism and Euro-American imperialism to keep or regain their land and water. But while Waiāhole-Waikāne is a singular place, how its residents understand that place varies: as a local country community, Hawaiian ahupua‘a (*traditional land division*), or American neighborhood. People have invoked different genealogies of place through their struggles—sometimes complementary, often overlapping, and at other times competitively. In so doing, they form different understandings of themselves as political actors and political communities. Nevertheless, they all seek to preserve the land and traditions: local traditions of fishing, farming and working-class labor; Native traditions of shared resource use; and Hawaiian traditions of land stewardship.

I ask the following question: How do communities mobilize tradition for political ends? I look specifically at how residents of Waiāhole-Waikāne used tradition to fight for control and use of the land and water resources necessary for their livelihoods. The three struggles that I study show different political manifestations of tradition. The anti-eviction fight by the Waiāhole-Waikāne Community Association (WWCA) drew on Hawai‘i’s 20th century multiethnic plantation history and labor traditions. The Kamaka
family grounded their struggle to hold on to their ancestral lands on traditions from the 19th century Hawaiian Kingdom’s system of collective land ownership blended with American regimes of private property. Waiʻahole taro farmers relied on much older Native Hawaiian traditions of communal land and water use in their fight for the return of long-diverted waters. Despite different uses of tradition, each of the three struggles drew upon Hawaiian and Local understandings of persons and place. Here, Local (upper-case “L”) refers to a uniquely Hawai‘i identity category for multiethnic, long-time island residents (this is in contradistinction to local, with a lower-case “l,” as a contextual place-based designation).\(^2\) These shared traditions are embedded with collective resource management, subsistence fishing and farming combined with wage labor, historical sociopolitical marginalization, extended family networks, and intergenerational cultural continuity. Importantly, all of these traditions accommodate multiple identities and practices.

While the residents’ anti-eviction and taro-farmers’ water struggles succeeded in security tenancy and water rights, the chiefly-descendant Kamaka family’s fight failed. Why? The answer, I suggest, rests in how tradition was deployed. Other factors certainly contributed to the successes and failure of these three struggles, such as the strength of individual leaders, different organizational structures, and the particular timing of external conditions. Both the anti-eviction and water struggles had highly charismatic and tactically astute leadership within broad-based grassroots organizations and amid a receptive political climate; the Kamaka struggle generally lacked these characteristics. Nevertheless, I contend that how tradition was used was an important denominator that contributed to these factors, especially in terms of the alliance-building capacity and political efficacy of each struggle.

If we understand tradition as a political resource that can be mobilized by political actors, we can see it as holding both progressive potential and problematic

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\(^2\) There is certainly slippage between the two terms Local and local. See Chock et al (1998), Rosa (1999, 2000), Stannard (2005), and Yamamoto (1993[1979]) for varying discussions of the development and deployment of Local in Hawai‘i. See Fujikane and Okamura (2008) for critiques of Locals as settler colonialists.
limits. Tradition is not merely political, however; tradition involves consistent cultural practices, repetitious rituals, and sustained social patterns of daily life. It is an important cultural and spiritual resource that connects present-day people with their ancestors and contributes to personal identity, group cohesion and collective continuity. Yet there is a certain paradox of tradition, as Zygmunt Bauman explains, in that

once it has been spoken the tradition is no more what its spokesmen claim it to be. Tradition is invoked for the authority of its silence: a silence that neither needs nor brooks argument and which renders all argument superfluous, pretentious and impotent. Yet in order to yield its authority (that is, to be of that use whose prospect has seduced the speaker in the first place), tradition needs to be argumentatively established: its silence must be broken...It is said that human conditions do not exist until they are named: but they are not named until they are noticed, and they are hardly ever noticed until their existence becomes a matter of concern, of active search and creative/defensive efforts (1996: 49).

In other words, the power of tradition is that it silently adheres people to it, but it can only do so once its silence is broken when people must utter the tradition in the first place. This reflects a discursive dimension of tradition, wherein its meaning and significance is constituted through its circulation. Hawai`i hosts a multitude of traditions that alternately complement and compete. I wish to show how some traditions resonate broadly and gain political potency while others are unable to cultivate common cause.

**COMMUNITY POLITICS**

Highly contentious issues of land and self-determination came to the forefront of contemporary island politics in the 1970s, and, as noted by McGregor-Alegado (1980), Aoude (1999), Trask and Greevy (2004), Wai`ahole-Waik`ane was an important staging site. I interviewed several dozen valley residents during the mid 2000s, most of whom were leaders in the community struggles, and I also interviewed more than a dozen allied activists who participated in Wai`ahole-Waik`ane` politics. My conversations with residents and allies trace painfully enduring intra-community conflicts to a particularly impassioned moment in 1976.
At the onset of the Hawaiian wet season in 1976, as the Makahiki (annual harvest festival)\(^3\) neared—along with its Euro-American holiday counterparts of Thanksgiving, Christmas and the New Year—residents of Waiāhole and Waikāne were engaged in a fierce debate. Most of the one hundred families living in the valley faced immediate eviction from the large landowner in the area, and a partnering developer’s proposed suburban housing and tourism resort plans that threatened to displace all of them. For nearly three years, the Waiāhole-Waikāne Community Association (WWCA) had fought in varied social, political and legal arenas to keep their homes. Despite winning key battles, such as retaining the agricultural zoning laws, securing overwhelming public and political support, and preventing politically targeted eviction of their leadership, the WWCA’s tactical options were dwindling. The State of Hawai‘i law allowed for landlords to evict tenants with only a 28-day notice.\(^4\) Moreover, the recent history of the Hawaiian Islands demonstrated how the political and business ‘establishment’ repeatedly and disproportionately protects the private property rights of the few to the disadvantage of the many. The residents of Waiāhole and Waikāne and their allies had to decide what to do next.

Some residents wanted to continue to collectively refuse to pay their rents and thereby ‘occupy’ the valleys illegally, which would escalate a confrontation with state authorities. Others wanted to pay the rents and continue negotiating with the landlord and developer while pressuring elected public officials to intervene on the residents’ behalf. A few preferred a ‘wait and see’ approach. Factions were rallying their respective sides in this fierce debate, which was ignited in one fateful meeting of the Waiāhole-Waikāne Community Association in the late fall of 1976. Arguments over a vote on whether to defy a court order that required payment of collective rents that had been accruing in a community escrow account went like this:

\(^3\)The Makahiki is an annual Hawaiian festival beginning in mid-November and lasting through mid-February to commemorate the year’s harvest and a time for rest and play. In Chapter Two, I come back to the Makahiki as a frame of reference to discuss traditional Hawaiian society.

\(^4\)In the absence of a contractual lease, landlords and tenants are equally subject to 28-days notice of rental termination by either party. Standard practice in Hawai‘i is for a contractual lease to be signed for the first year of rent, after which time the terms of rent automatically renew on a monthly basis. This was the case in Waiāhole-Waikāne. Most of the tenants had been renting on a month-to-month basis for over a decade.
'We as strong as we’ll eva be, wit all kine people hea to help us—les bring on da confrontation!'

‘Ho’omalu malu, slow down—we need make shur we do it right, dat we pono in our actions.’

‘No more time! We gotta act NOW, ‘fo it’s too late and we all gone.’

‘Dese kine actions too radical! Who you tink you are, no need pay rent—sound like dem now, [the communists], not like us!’

‘We da ones built dese valleys, and care for dese valleys. I willing to die for dese valleys—are you?!’

If the residents defied the court order and continued to collectively withhold their rents, they would have to confront police and state authorities tasked with evicting them. The exchanges at the meeting were ‘excruciatingly painful’ and ‘simply awful,’ residents recalled. Neighbor was pitted against neighbor; childhood friends were on opposing sides. The WWCA rigidly followed practices of democratic centralism, influenced by Marx-Lenin-Mao allied activists. While the association encouraged intense discussion, once a vote was taken, the majority ruled and no dissent was allowed. Following this

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5 In this subsection and all subsequent text, when not directly quoting someone, I am aggregating and paraphrasing perspectives expressed by Waiahole-Waikane residents and allied activists.

6 The colloquial use of these terms by this Hawaiian man (who is non-fluent in the Native language) may not directly correspond with the dictionary definition, but nonetheless, it clearly indicates an alternative frame of reference being asserted. Ho’omalu is defined as “to bring under the care of; to govern, make peace between warring parties” and malu is “shade, shelter, protection, peace, control, strength” whereas malü is “secretly, clandestinely.” As with many Hawaiian phrases and verbal utterances, double or multiple meanings are at play. This person is clearly speaking of some aspects of reconciliation or bringing together of differing people or opinions, but it is unclear if he invokes such reconciliation in terms of overt control or secretive engagement. Nevertheless, in couching the Hawaiian words “Ho’omalu malu” with the English “slow down” he bespeaks of the need to take the time necessary to come to some forms of mutual understandings. He is probably speaking in reference to both the immediate group conflict among WWCA members and to the conflictual relationship between WWCA and the landowner and developer.

7 “(1) Goodness, uprightness, morality, moral qualities, correct or proper procedure, excellence, well-being, prosperity, welfare, true condition or nature, duty; moral, fitting, proper, right, just, fair, beneficial, successful, in perfect order; eased, relieved; should, ought, must; necessary. … (2) Completely, properly, rightly, well exactly, carefully, satisfactorily, much. …”

8 This point was repeatedly emphasized by almost all interviewees involved in WWCA during the anti-eviction struggle. Many considered democratic centralism to be a positive process, while some experienced it as a negative dynamic and would have preferred to maintain their earlier practices of consensus decision-making.
contentious debate, some WWCA members contended that the vote was rigged—a serious accusation that lingers through today.\(^9\)

The ultimate decision came down to a three-vote margin favoring confrontation.\(^10\) Residents continued to withhold their rents, allied activists trained the community on how to resist police nonviolently, and several hundred supporters from across the islands were called in to ‘occupy’ and ‘defend’ the valleys. The group also made plans to erect roadblocks and carry out other militant measures if police came into the valleys.\(^11\) There was no turning back.

On January 4, 1977 the Waiʻahole-Waikāne community staged an historic confrontation with a large landowner, a politically connected developer, and state authorities. They stood in the road and blocked traffic for several hours, believing the police were coming to evict them. Their defiance proved successful. Shortly thereafter, the governor of Hawaiʻi negotiated a resolution with the landowner and developer, culminating with the state purchase of six hundred acres in Waiʻahole valley and the eventual issuance of long-term leases at reasonable rents to the residents of both valleys.\(^12\) No one was forcibly evicted nor unwillingly displaced, and a large part of windward Oʻahu was preserved as a rural place for its local people.

\(^9\) Specifically, the accusation of vote-rigging pertains to some ‘under-age’ family members being allowed to participate in the vote. ‘Under-age’ here refers to teen-age family members of valley residents, many of whom were active participants in the youth-wing of WWCA, at protest demonstrations, and in island-wide outreach efforts. It is unclear if WWCA had a specific age-requirement for voting at general meetings. Family units usually voted as a bloc; however, with the prevalence of extended families in the valleys, this may have been difficult to maintain with clarity. The accusation of under-age voting reflects more than just the voting process and refers to the politicization of the youth towards the agenda of particular factions, and the recruitment of the youth to attend this particularly contentious meeting whereas they were less likely to attend such meetings in general.

\(^10\) Some residents recall the margin being only one vote.

\(^11\) In addition to the roadblock, which was effected, WWCA discussed plans for resisting state authorities if they came by way of water (boats) or air (helicopters). It is unclear to what extent plans were enacted or if it was primarily brainstorming discussions.

\(^12\) It took nearly two decades of ongoing negotiation between WWCA and the State of Hawaiʻi before leases were actually issued. This was regrettable because many of the original residents and activists died before receiving their leases. Yet, in many respects, this was also fortunate because residents and activists were able to stay in their homes and on their lands for an additional twenty years prior to the signing of their 55-year renewable leases. A small scale development of a dozen ‘gentlemen estates’ (two-acre parcels) did occur in Waikāne as part of a contentious ‘compromise’ following the state purchase; however, none of the residents were forcibly dislocated and some chose to purchase fee-simple farm lots in Waikāne at below-market prices, while others received long-term leases in Waiʻahole, and a few relocated to urban or suburban Honolulu. About five hundred acres in Waikāne valley were still vulnerable for development, which came to fruition in the 1980s when a series of Japanese corporations had purchased the lands proposed two golf courses. Waiʻahole-Waikāne residents again successfully resisted this development project in a separate struggle, which I do not adequately cover in this work (see Modavi 1992). The Japanese corporation
Nevertheless, the contentious decision for confrontation deepened community rifts. These rifts show different understandings of persons and place. One is the positioning of Localness through the use of pidgin (Hawai‘i Creole English): “We as strong as we’ll eva be, wit all kine people hea to help us.” Residents of Waiāhole-Waikāne viewed the anti-eviction struggle as a Local issue because they were Local people. Like Local residents throughout the islands, their community included Hawaiians whose families were Native to the valleys or other nearby rural locales, resident Asians whose families came to Hawai‘i to work on plantations, haoles (foreigners; white Euro-Americans)\(^\text{13}\) whose families had lived in the area for a few generations, and mixed genealogies resulting from extensive intermarriages therein. Their connection to Waiāhole-Waikāne was rooted in multiple ethnicities, working class backgrounds, and a dedication to the land they cultivated and the homes they built: “We da ones built dese valleys, and care for dese valleys.” The struggle also was one of many other Local struggles that took place in the 1970s in reaction to post-statehood capitalist development and an influx of mainland American haoles who filled newly-built houses and hotels.

A second understanding places Hawaiianness at the center. The statement “Ho‘omaluhia, slow down—we need make shur we do it right, dat we pono in our actions” shows Hawaiianness through the use of Hawaiian language and concepts such as ‘pono’ (correct, proper).\(^\text{14}\) ‘Ho‘omaluhia’\(^\text{15}\) refers to bringing together different people or opinions. Conjoined with ‘slow down’ this statement is probably referring to both the immediate group conflict in WWCA and the conflictual relationship between residents and the landowner-developer. Although the speaker identifies as both Hawaiian and Local, as seen in the concurrent use of pidgin, conflict-resolution for Waiāhole-Waikāne is framed within Hawaiian protocols as an alternative to Local-

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\(^\text{13}\) A folk etymology of haole claims that it derives from the Hawaiian words ha (breath) and ole (without), which refers to the fact that the white foreigners did not greet each other by exchanging breath as the Hawaiians did (by touching their noses with each other and inhaling). While this may not be linguistically or philologically accurate, it is a significant metaphor to the extent that many Hawaiians believe this etymology.

\(^\text{14}\) See footnote 7 for an extended definition.

\(^\text{15}\) See footnote 6 for an extended definition and discussion.
infused, labor-styled militancy. These Hawaiian protocols show that some residents understood the anti-eviction struggle as a Hawaiian struggle because many residents were Hawaiian and were connected to Waiāhole-Waikāne through ancestral links. The Hawaiian movement for self-determination was burgeoning in the 1970s alongside the islands-wide Local struggles, and a desire for Native autonomy influenced the Waiāhole-Waikāne debate.

A third understanding is seen in “Who you tink you are, no need pay rent.” Here, some Hawaiian landowners reflect an unease about valley tenants aligning too closely with the university educated Marx-Lenin-Mao activists who had helped organize the anti-eviction struggle. “Sound like dem now [the communists], not like us” expresses the prospect that increased militancy would lead to overthrow of the islands’ system of property ownership. While most Hawaiians had lost land to American capital interests when private property was instituted in the mid nineteenth century, a fortunate few did not. These Hawaiian families retained fee-simple title to their ancestral lands. In addition to viewing the community struggle as Local and Hawaiian, these Hawaiian landowners connected it to American private property rights. Landowners, however, were not unlike the tenants. Most of them shared the working-class backgrounds and subsistence production and consumption livelihoods of Waiāhole-Waikāne’s ‘country-living people.’

Thus, the ‘excruciatingly painful’ vote revealed three political identities rooted in differing traditions: working-class, multiethnic Localism; culture-centered Hawaiianess; and landowner Hawaiians. While distinct, these positions—like the traditions they drew from—also overlapped, allowing residents to assume more than one of these identities. The rift did not prevent neighbors from living side-by-side as they had before, but it did allow for the different political positions and contending traditions to surface in future community struggles, as I will show. Some of those on the ‘losing side’ of the 1976 debate went on to win a significant water struggle that returned

\[\text{16 This statement also recalls Hawai‘i’s “red scare” when leaders of the islands’ labor movement were accused of being communist. See Holmes (1994) for further discussion of Hawai‘i’s “anti-communist impulse.”}\]
long-diverted waters to the valleys and expanded kalo cultivation and other Native cultural practices. Others on the ‘losing side’ went on to lose their ancestral lands despite having legal title and a contractual agreement on their side.

CENTRAL THEMES

The successes and failure of Waiāhole-Waikāne’s three community struggles say much about issues of land, water and self-determination in Hawai‘i. Simply put, the fight to control and use the resources necessary for personal and communal livelihoods are not merely ‘Hawaiian issues’ that are somehow distinct from ‘Local issues.’ Instead, they are about all of us who are invested in Hawai‘i’s future of justice and sustainability. Moreover, such struggles are most successful when they bring together Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians from across socioeconomic classes. In Waiāhole-Waikāne, this ‘bringing together’ is rooted in the valleys as both a Hawaiian place and a Local place. As a Local place, Native Hawaiian traditions are valued and respected alongside the variety of multiethnic traditions that emerged and melded through Hawai‘i’s history. This understanding of the valleys as a Local place refuses to relegate Hawaiian tradition as one among many. Rather, Hawaiian tradition is understood as inherently inclusive of non-Native persons related to the place they share. The bringing together of community members in Waiāhole-Waikāne has not been easy. Often, internal cohesion has emerged primarily in the face of outside threats. This temporary cohesiveness suggests that successful sociopolitical struggles need not rely on permanent political communities, unitary identities or pre-determined practices, but rather are built upon shared goals that accommodate overlapping and shifting communities, multiple identities, and fluid practices. Tradition serves as a binding social force and political resource when it resonates across multiple ethnic and economic groups. Unlike invocations of tradition

17 In their comparative study of three American towns, Greenhouse, Yngvesson and Engle describe the paradox of ‘community’: whereas community is predefined as internally harmonic and conflict is placed outside the community, it is the conflict (precipitated by change) that give meaning to ‘community’ in the first place (1994: 168). Unlike the cultural or symbolic threats posed to these towns, Waiāhole-Waikāne faced physical and material threats of complete displacement by bulldozers or a choking off of water necessary for subsistence and other farming.
that function conservatively as defensive shields against progressive programs, the
crystal mobilization of Native Hawaiian and multiethnic Local traditions in these cases
advances progressive agendas, particularly in terms of more equitable and fair control
and use of land and water for self-determination. When tradition is narrowly
constituted, political mobilization is unlikely to occur.

During the course of research and writing, two issues repeatedly surfaced: the
limits of Localism as an identity category and historical narrative, and the role of non-
Hawaiians in a Hawaiian Hawai‘i (as opposed to a Local Hawai‘i or an American
Hawai‘i). While Localism was a highly important factor in the success of the anti-
eviction struggle, I find that it has lost its usefulness because it has come to be articulated
in ways that divide Local issues from Hawaiian issues. Similarly, I find that in struggles
for Hawaiian culture and self-determination there is a productive ‘place’ for non-
Hawaiians. Because the close alignment and mutual support of Local and Hawaiian
understandings and preferences during the 1970s is missing today, I suggest that the
originary resistive edge of Localism that supported Hawaiian causes be recuperated. I
further suggest that re-creating a Hawaiian Hawai‘i based on an ahupua‘a management
system—a goal of Wai‘ahole taro farmers—allows the role of non-Hawaiians to be
understood within the parameters of their kuleana (right, responsibility, jurisdiction,
authority), which is different from and delimited by the privileged kuleana of Hawaiians.

An additional issue concerns the relevance of class. ‘Working-class’—like
Localism—was an identity category and historical narrative that helped unify the
community and its islands-wide network during the anti-eviction struggle. However, I
find that the Marx-Lenin-Mao-inspired articulations of class and identity have
contributed to long-lasting intra-community divisions, which impeded the community
coming together in the taro farmers’ water and Kamaka’s land struggles. Thus, I offer a

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18 I use this term Hawaiian Hawai‘i to refer to self-determining, Hawaiian-centered social and political
preferences and practices (as well as cultural and economic preferences and practices). This term reflects
how many interviewees articulated such preferences and engaged in such practices without reference to
Hawaiian nationalism or pursuits of state sovereignty. Therefore, using the term Hawaiian Hawai‘i avoids the
risk of narrowly constituting Hawaiian self-determination within nation-state constraints.
renewed and nuanced class analysis that moves beyond Marx-Lenin-Mao articulations and incorporates postmodern Marxist insights.¹⁹

These findings make my work distinct from other writings on the Waiāhole and Waikāne valleys. Most of these earlier works focused on organizational or conditional dimensions of either the anti-eviction struggle or the water struggle. There have been no comparative studies of the three Waiāhole-Waikāne struggles, and except for passing references and a handful of journalistic pieces, there has been nothing written about the Kamaka family land struggle. James Geschwender (1980-81; 1982; 1983) argues that the WWCA anti-eviction struggle was successful because 1) it framed and re-framed the issues in terms that the broader (mainstream, middle-class) island community could support; 2) its working-class values and consciousness were essential for long-term mobilization; and 3) the activists used radical and oppositional tactics. Neghin Modavi (1992) argues that the WWCA effectively created a legitimation crisis for the State of Hawai‘i which caused it to purchase the disputed land and then co-opt the community’s leadership as a means to stabilize the long-term functioning of the capitalist system. D. Kapua’ala Sproat and Isaac H. Moriwake (2007), as attorneys for the Waiāhole taro farmers delineate how the Hawai‘i Supreme Court’s Waiāhole decision advanced legal tools for environmental advocacy. Lawrence Miike (2004) suggests the case holds future relevance to Hawai‘i’s water laws. Jonathan Scheuer (2002) suggests, however, that the long-term implications may be limited, given competing portrayals of the islands’ agricultural future, rights of Native Hawaiians, and environmental protection.

My work puts the three struggles together, and focuses on how they relationally interact. When I do so, the different understandings that each of these struggles has had for its participants become visible. Noenoe Silva (2004) demonstrates how colonial historiography silences and erases Native agency and resistance, and she counters these discursive and material violences by providing an alternative, resistive Hawaiian historiography that empowers those in the present to struggle against ongoing

¹⁹See, for example, the work of Resnick and Wolff (1987, 2005), edited volumes by Gibson-Graham (2000, 2001), and the journal Rethinking Marxism.
colonization and occupation. Following Silva’s work, I document and analyze the resistive histories of contemporary community struggles detailed in the narratives and experiences of community members, activists and allies. What results is a history of Waiāhole-Waikâne that for the first time documents and analyzes the three struggles from the vantage of the political actors and the valleys’ traditions. It is a ground-up approach to researching and theorizing that centers on the activists, organizers and everyday people who actually live the tensions, ambivalences and contradictions that scholars merely talk about. By privileging the words, ideas, and practices of those who experience these political histories, this work contributes to historical/futures archives as resources for the present.

Diverse histories are embodied resources for envisioning alternative futures that resist imposed, pre-assigned subject positions or political identities pegged to overarching, rigidly structured frameworks. Sohail Inayatullah contends that cultural myths and metaphors are central tools of empowerment for people and communities to make their future their own. He insists upon “listening to the language others use to talk about the future” (Inayatullah 2002: 13) as a means of “deconstructing hegemonic images of the future held by the powerful, thereby creating the spaces for the emergence of authentic alternative visions and social designs” (Ibid: 109). James Dator emphasizes

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20 Silva explains: “Hawai`i is not a postcolonial but a (neo?)colonial state, and historiography is one of the most powerful discourses that justifies the continued occupation of Hawai`i by the United States today. For those of us living with the legacies and the continuing exercise of power characteristic of colonialism, it is crucial to understand power relations in order to escape or overcome their effects and, further, to understand the resistance strategies and tactics of the past in order to use them and improve upon them” (2004: 9). For example, the ‘invention of tradition’ debates in Pacific Studies (Linnekin 1991; Keesing 1991, 1989; Trask 1991) as Teresia K. Teaiwa cogently explains, “failed to…establish a conception of culture, identity, and space that moved beyond discrete boundaries and disconnectedness. …ultimately, both sides of the debate had difficulty allowing the Native to be fluid, multiple, and complex” (2001: 76). This work, then, offers such allowances by privileging the words, ideas and practices of those who experienced and continually re-make these political histories of community struggles and struggling communities. It is important to note that Teaiwa makes a distinction between native and Native: “my use of the lower case and capitalized terms (native and Native) indicate a distinction between a diverse but generalizable reference on one hand and a generic discursive figure on the other” (2001: 134). She further explains: “My interrogation [of the category of the Native] is based on a refusal to abandon the Native position in favor of hybrid and more mobile subjectivities. I am encouraged in this endeavor by particular examples of Cultural Studies that begin to indicate the possibility of figuring the Native as a relational and situational figure” (45-46).

21 Elsewhere, Inayatullah adds that the term “Futures Generations” serves as an enduring metaphor which “recovers the past—our grandparents and further back—and the future—our grandchildren and further on—and thus is more inclusive of all cultures” (1994: 29). In this context, he argues for a rights model for future generations: “What this means is that rights have to be expanded as much as possible, and that there has to be a world discussion on the cultural framing of rights: the rights of the individual vs. the rights of the family as paradigmatic of one division between West and East Asia, for example. While the chaos of the
“the reality of ‘alternative futures’ rather than a single ‘the future’ [as important to understanding] the future [as] fundamentally plural and open, an arena of possibilities” (Dator 2002: 6). These understandings from futures studies help contextualize the political manifestations of tradition in Waiāhole-Waikâne as openings for alternative futures enacted in the present. These fluid possibilities also move us away from state-centered understandings of a Hawaiian Hawai‘i—past and future—and offer a promising prospect for progressive, sustainable, and practice-oriented self-determination.

TOWARDS POST-IMPERIAL RELATIONS

As much as this study focuses on the past, it is about sustainable and self-determining practices in the present and for the future, in Hawai‘i and elsewhere. This dissertation adds to the body of work on social movements (Burawoy 2000; Fantasia 1988; Guidry 2000; Johnston 1995; Morris 1992; Stammers 1999; Tarrow 1998; Melucci 1989). While struggles over land have long characterized colonial and postcolonial politics in much of the world—and it is here where the anti-eviction and Kamaka land struggles tend to be located—it is becoming increasingly clear that the new terrain of struggle is over water (Llamas et al. 2009; Pearce 2006; Solomon 2010; Shiva 2002). Associated with this are struggles over food (Lang and Heasman 2004; McDonald 2010; Shiva 2000). The politics of water and taro farming in Waiāhole are nestled squarely in this terrain. In the water struggle, the Waiāhole taro farmers move away from earlier forms of ‘resistance identity’ and toward what Manuel Castells calls a ‘project identity’ that leads to the building of a new identity based on available cultural materials, a redefinition of their position in society, and a new quest to transform the overall societal structure (1997: 8). The people of Waiāhole-Waikâne saw tradition as cultural material, and used it as a political resource for societal transformation. In doing so, they offer what Charles Taylor describes as “a change in the way people imagine belonging” present, in the sense of ordered disorder, is confusing and often frightening (in that power has tended to move to chauvinistic leadership) the chaos has also created the possibility of new forms of globalism and unity. Central to this new synthesis is an emerging future in which future generations (and their future) have a say on our present” (Ibid: 40).
(Taylor 2004: 159). I suggest that this way of belonging, rooted in the Waiāhole taro patches, extends both backwards and forward in time, and has the potential to alter our relations with each other in places and spaces beyond the islands. These formations offer innovative strategies for winning battles over resource use and control away from elite, corporate interests.

Hawai‘i politics are necessarily embedded within American politics, as both a state of the union and as a colonized/occupied place. Documenting and analyzing the Kamaka family land struggle provides a much needed addition to the growing body of work on Native American land cases and resource laws (Banner 2007; McMillen 2009; Royster and Blumm 2007), and the success of Waiāhole water struggle serves as an exemplary case for other Native and local environmental struggles in American courts (Sproat and Moriwake 2007). This dissertation further adds to the growing body of scholarship on Hawai‘i politics and Hawaiian history (Isaki 2008; McGregor 2007; Sai 2008; Silva 2004; Iaukea 2008; Fujikane 2008; Howe and Osorio 2010), and is the first to provide a political history of the Waiāhole-Waikāne community struggles and to theorize it in terms of contending traditions.

In doing so, this work addresses issues of Native self-determination, settler-colonialism, and the role of non-Natives. While all three community struggles of Waiāhole-Waikāne fought against the state, corporate, and/or military control of land and water resources that has typified the over one hundred years of American occupation of Hawai‘i and colonization of Hawaiians, none of the struggles did so solely in the name of Native self-determination or Hawaiian nationalism. Furthermore, all of the struggles involved non-Natives. Understanding these struggles as the political actors involved in them did identifies some of the limits of the analytical and action-oriented frameworks of Native (Hawaiian) nationalisms and (Asian) settler colonialism. Specifically, the Waiāhole-Waikāne community struggles for land, water and self-

23 I use both terms, colonized and occupied, because since the United States overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1893 and subsequent ‘annexation’ in 1898, the U.S. military has occupied the islands and the U.S. government has administered the islands and its people as a colony.
determination destabilize both the concepts of Native nationalism vis-à-vis the state (be it a Hawaiian nation-state or an American nation-state) and the political category of settler (as a subject position upon which to organize around). They also show that practices of self-determination “on the ground” or in the lo‘i (taro patch) demonstrate a plurality for Hawaiian ways of being in a Hawaiian Hawai‘i. This understanding significantly advances Native and local self-determination by incorporating diverse ethnic and economic groups towards shared social and political goals.

Haunani-Kay Trask (2008) has shown that the Native people of Hawai‘i are subjugated by non-Hawaiians—Asians and Euro-Americans—under a hegemonic system of settler colonialism that allows for non-Haole immigrants to Hawai‘i to profit at the expense of Native people. Trask argues that Native self-determination, especially vis-à-vis land, is the purview of Hawaiians and the (counter-hegemonic) role of non-Native settlers must be one of supporting Hawaiian self-determination by dismantling the system of settler colonialism. Trask’s argument has prompted many persons in Hawai‘i to self-identify and be identified as settlers in contradistinction to Natives in Hawai‘i (Fujikane and Okamura 2008). As a result, the settler identity since the late 1990s has come to be a political category in which Asians among other non-Natives are beneficiaries of and/or collaborators in continued colonization of Hawai‘i. Thus, analysis of and activism

24 It is important to note that some Hawaiian nationalists and scholars disagree with the characterization of Hawai‘i/Hawaiians as colonized and prefer, instead, the (legal) language and framework of Hawai‘i as a still-sovereign nation-state (and Hawaiians as still-citizens of the Hawaiian Kingdom) under American occupation (Beamer 2008; Sai 2008, 2006; Vogeler 2009; Young 2006). While I consider the two terms—colonization and occupation—rather collapsed in discussions of Asian settler colonialism because Asian complicity applies to occupation as well, one distinction between the two approaches concerns the subject of decolonization/de-occupation—who is to be decolonized/de-occupied. For those advancing an occupation framework, it is the multiethnic/multiracial citizenry of the Hawaiian Kingdom (and their descendents) who hold this privileged subject position and not the colonized indigenous persons or peoples advocated by those working within a colonization framework.

25 Eiko Kosasa emphasized this point that settler is a political category and not a social identity in a panel discussion on “The Place of Hawai‘i in American Studies” held at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa on May 8, 2009. In a ‘non-Hawaiians supporting Hawaiians’ political organization that I actively participated in 2007 and 2008, several participants also emphasized this distinction between settler as a political category vs. social identity. However, the obvious (to me) blurring of the distinction in practice became a point of contention that seems to have led to the break up of our relatively small, still-forming group—some members became uncomfortable with what was perceived to be ‘identity politics’ at work. In all honesty, I am still a bit confounded by this (and similar) debilitating contention(s) among activists and scholars who clearly share a political commitment to decolonizing/de-occupying Hawai‘i. Of course, personality differences were likely at play as well. My point in referencing this short-lived group is to note the difficulties in organizing around a (purely) political category rather than a social identity. While political categories are analytically important, it is social identities that enable effective political mobilization, and in my estimation this is the point of contention concerning the sociopolitical efficacy of the settler colonial framework.
against settler colonialism fundamentally underscores the Native/settler distinction as a basis for alliance work towards decolonization/de-occupation.

However, Davianna Pōmaika’i McGregor contends that the “labeling of Asian immigrant workers and their descendents as colonial “settlers” is ahistorical, narrow-minded, lacking in class analysis, and too simplistic to explain our complicated islands’ society” (2009). McGregor argues that the Asian settler colonialism framework fails to elucidate the complexities of one hundred-plus years of American colonization/occupation of Hawai‘i, in which plantation worker Asians acted as allies of Hawaiians in fighting shared oppressions and Hawaiians also participated in and sometimes benefited from colonization/occupation. 26

Others have expressed “ambivalence” with regard to the settler colonial framework. Ty Kāwika Tengan suggests that naming the settler situation is of value in revealing a system of power relations and dispossessions that enables one to locate oneself therein, yet the main thrust of the matter comes down to “what we as individuals can do about it.” 27 Long-time progressive activist Kyle Kajihiro, a fourth-generation Japanese in Hawai‘i, articulates the challenges of the settler identity for political organizing and argues for holding on to the positives of Localism in regard to solidarities and coalitional work. 28 These ambivalences reveal a disconnect—experienced or otherwise perceived—between the systemic (political) categories and

26 These critiques by McGregor are based upon my hand-written notes as one of three panelists who presented papers critiquing multiculturalism as part and parcel of settler colonialism in Hawai‘i at the Association of Asian American Studies conference in Honolulu, Hawai‘i on April 23, 2009. McGregor was the panel discussant, and other panelists included Bianca Isaki and Diane Letoto. The chair of our panel was Hokulani Aikau, and she added that not all Hawaiians were (or are) positioned in the same way to the colonial/occupation apparatus.

27 These comments by Tengan are based upon my hand-written notes as an audience member at the “Contemporary Indigenous Issues in Australia & Hawai‘i” at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa on April 30, 2009. Tengan was a panel member and other panelists included Patrick Wolfe, Haunani-Kay Trask, Momiala Kanahele, and ku‘ualoha ho‘omanawaimu.

28 Kajihiro, a contributor to the Asian Settler Colonialism volume, is the program director for the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) Hawai‘i Area Program, a Quaker organization committed to social justice activism. He has been active for many years in peace building, demilitarization, and human rights initiatives in Hawai‘i (and globally), and is considered a well-respected ally among most activists in Hawaiian movements for sovereignty. These comments by Kajihiro are based upon my hand-written notes as an audience member at the “Asian Settler Colonialism Forum” at the Japanese Cultural Center of Hawai‘i on May 23, 2009. Kajihiro was a panel member and other panelists included Jonathan Okamura, Candace Fujikane, Haunani-Kay Trask, Momiala Kanahele, Eiko Kosasa, Ida Yoshinaga and Healani Sonoda.
individual (social) identities attending (Asian) settler colonialism in Hawai‘i and how productive alliance work can be forged therein.

It is in these spaces of disconnect that my research is situated. The use of Hawaiian and Local traditions by the people of Waiāhole-Waikāne reflect present-day positions that cut across the Hawaiian/non-Hawaiian, Native/settler divide. By shedding light on how diverse political actors maneuver and negotiate “on the ground,” they show both the structural and individual dimensions of the self-determination struggle as well as the fluid identities that could be mobilized toward a productive end.

The debates surrounding the Native/settler distinction reveal to me the impossibility of taking sides. It is not a question of either/or, but how/when: When do Local political actors positively contribute to Hawaiian struggles for land and self-determination, and when do they not? How does Localism function in tandem with Hawaiian nationalisms against American empire, and how does it serve to further America’s colonial and imperialist pursuits by sedimenting settler colonialism in the islands?

Documenting and analyzing such moments of Native Hawaiian and multiethnic Local alliances in the anti-eviction and water struggles shows that histories, presences, and futures of people living and struggling together are anything but straightforward or given. This understanding allows for non-Hawaiians to act in a capacity that isn’t circumscribed by a settler (political) status. It does not discard the settler colonial framework but rather places it interactively with capitalism/class, sovereign state/occupation, heteropatriarchy, and other frameworks. While I show the importance of a settler colonial framework, I also demonstrate its limits by looking at it alongside the class framework of Marx-Lenin-Mao activism, which imposed a working-class subject position on residents that inadvertently and negatively divided land-owning Hawaiians from non-landowning Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians within the community.29 I further complicate the framework by offering examples of non-Hawaiians who are actively at the forefront of one of the quintessential Hawaiian

29 The Asian settler framework has the potential to do the same: impose a rigid subject position that inadvertently divides communities in unproductive ways.
cultural and political struggles for land, water and self-determination: contemporary kalo cultivation. In Chapter Eight, drawing upon my discussion in Chapter Two on the ahupua’a system and social relations within traditional Hawaiian society, I show how the Hawaiian concept of kuleana is practiced together yet differently among Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians working in Waiāhole’s taro patches. The diverse political actors of Waiāhole-Waikāne demonstrate that the Native/settler distinction does not divide; instead, it informs ethical and responsible relations between persons and places.

The Waiāhole community taro patch gives us an example of what post-imperial relations might look like. Post-imperial refers to non-colonial and non-imperial ways of being that reckon with—but don’t rely on—the legacies of colonialism and imperialism. Post-imperial relationships are about moving beyond colonial- or imperial-impositions of social and political relations between persons and groups without waiting for all the vestiges of colonialism or imperialism to end. While the term post-imperial has a certain alignment with postcolonialism—as a set of theories and practices—it is distinct in both its genealogy from indigenous scholars (rather than ‘third world’ scholars) and its method of direct action (more than critique). Recent works exploring the connections between indigenous and anarchists philosophies and goals help conceptualize these types of post-imperial social relations and politics (Coulthard and Lasky eds. 2011 (forthcoming)). Taiaiake Alfred articulates anarcho-indigenism as:

[I]mportant strategic commonalities between indigenous and anarchist ways of seeing and being in the world: a rejection of alliances with legalized systems of oppression, non-participation in the institutions that structure the colonial relationship, and a belief in brining about change through direct action… (2005: 46).

Richard Day (2005) emphasizes the anti-hegemonic nature of such social relations and politics, which make the state and its corresponding political economies redundant.30

Through direct action alternative forms of governance are constructed and ways of being-in-relation are unhinged from state requisites.

30 Anti-hegemonic movements are distinct from counter-hegemonic movements because the former do not seek to replace the ‘rulers’ of the state with their own (like the latter movements do) but instead seek to make the state unnecessary as they meet their own needs.
This is precisely what was taking place in the Waiāhole community taro patch. In occupying state land designated as ‘open space,’ multiethnic taro farmers rehabilitated ancient lo‘i to re-create Hawaiian ahupua‘a governing practices as a basis for alternative material and cultural economies separate from the islands’ consumer capitalism and state politics. In the space and time of the Waiāhole community taro patch—however short lived it may have been—Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians committed to living Hawaiian culture and tradition were cultivating post-imperial relations with each other and with the land and water resources necessary for their lives. This provides a significant example of possible forms of self-determining collective personhood in the here and now.

**RESEARCH METHODS**

Between 2003 and 2008, I conducted several dozen open-ended, oral history-like interviews and I have hundreds of pages of transcripts that serve as primary source data for this research (in addition to other primary and secondary source data such as governmental transcripts, newspaper articles, and archived materials). The words and stories of the people of Waiāhole and Waikāne provide a fundamental basis for this work. In his study of the pay-equity movement, Michael McCann explains the potential problems of such an approach:

Some social scientists complain that interviews merely capture post hoc rationalizations for action. My interviewees confirmed this in their acknowledgement that the logic of particular strategies is often clearer in retrospect than at those particular moments of historical struggle when they acted on particular tactical designs. But at the same time, such constant reconstructions of past experience in part constitute and structure political consciousness over time, and for this reason they are very important topics of analysis (1994: 20; footnote 15).

Like McCann, I find the documentation of first-hand accounts of political struggles to be important research topics. In utilizing my interviews, I draw upon a rather eclectic methodological mix.
Clifford Geertz’s (1973) concept of ‘thick description’ involves 1) identifying cultural texts (stories, relevant acts, and so forth); 2) situating these cultural texts within a web of associated practices, beliefs, and structural realities; 3) analyzing how meaning is derived and understood therein by the social actors; and 4) being attuned to unsettling or unexplainable paradoxes which can be used as analytical frameworks for further investigation. Michel de Certeau’s (1984) focus on stories as forms of “narrativity for everyday practices” emphasizes how people navigate contingent situations. He argues that although people’s stories may be fragmented and metaphorical, and “in spite of the ruptures separating successive configurations of knowledge, [stories] represent a new variant in the continuous series of narrative documents” (70). Joan Scott (1991) cautions against placing experience as the sole basis of evidence because when experience is taken as an unquestionable explanation for why a person is who she is or why a person acts how he acts, then it “leads us to take the existence of individuals for granted (experience is something people have) rather than to ask how conceptions of selves (of subjects and their identities) are produced” (782). For Scott, the importance of experience is in its ability to help explain how identities are formed, how knowledge of particular subject positions are constructed, how various identities and subject positions relationally interact, and under what conditions these processes take place. Rick Fantasia’s (1988) concept of ‘consciousness-in-association’ considers how individual intersubjectivities and group identities—as temporary as they may be—arise through collective action and lived experience. He argues that research methods which utilize individual interviews and group surveys must also pay attention to organizational forms that facilitate the politicization and mobilization of persons in relation to each other and the power structures they are challenging. Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller’s (2002) focus on discursive tensions and the meanings traceable therein allows for interlocking themes to emerge from oral and written materials. In doing so, he shows how narratives frame public debates, discursively construct social boundaries, and rhetorically constitute conflicts that are negotiated at the level of everyday discourse.
My research incorporates these methodological insights in the following ways: first, I take seriously the words, stories and experiences of the people of Waiahole-Waikane; and second, I evaluate how such articulations structure their political consciousness, are embedded within cultural networks, contribute to their sense of self and self-in-community, reflect their navigation of contingent situations, and illuminate the ways in which meanings and practices are produced, negotiated, and deployed in the very contentiousness of competing stories and experiences. While these interviews took place years—sometimes decades—after the original struggles took place, there was a certain coherence evident in the repeated articulations made by different people. For example, those situated on opposing sides of the community split (described at the beginning of this chapter) shared similar accounts of what happened, and although their interpretations as to its consequences differ, their reconstruction of past events were fairly consistent. Although each person’s reconstruction may have been incomplete and fragmented, I was able to trace interlocking themes that emerged—a process of piecing together that Donna Haraway (1988) refers to as “multiple partial perspectives.”

Haraway’s concept of situated knowledges and partial perspective is instructive on two levels: positioning myself as researcher, and positioning my work in terms of ‘who’ and ‘what’ is being researched. She puts forth “a doctrine of embodied objectivity” or “situated knowledges” in which objectivity does not mean disembodiment of the researcher and the research project—a disembodiment that assumes the researcher to be separate from, and thereby a neutral observer in, the research project. Such a scenario is an impossibility because the act of writing itself already implicates the researcher in her research project.”

31 Haraway explains: “[O]bjectivity turns out to be about particular and specific embodiment and definitely not about the false vision promising transcendence of all limits and responsibility. The moral is simple: only partial perspective promises objective vision. …Feminist objectivity is about limited location and situated knowledge, not about transcendence and splitting of subject and object. It allows us to become answerable for what we learn how to see” (1988: 582-83). In other words, there is no one objective, unifying truth that explains reality; however, there are realities in need of explanation through delimited positionalities or situated knowledges. Moreover, the methodology for objective research in this framework requires the researcher to not only acknowledge the positioning of oneself vis-à-vis one’s research project and the inevitable partiality of that positioning, but to take responsibility for how the knowledge gained is thus utilized or deployed. Embracing the reality of multiple partial perspectives allows objectivity to flourish in this nexus.
kind of objectivity is with an embodied knowledge of oneself as researcher and a receptivity to the embodied knowledges of others (such as those who are ‘being researched’). I have already detailed above how I position my research and those whom I am researching; now let me situate myself in this knowledge-production work—something which my interviewees repeatedly called me to task.

At a Kahalu‘u Neighborhood Board meeting that I attended in the spring of 2005, the various people whom I had previously interviewed initially greeted me warmly, only to become suspicious of me later as I talked with others in attendance and it became evident I had interviewed a broad spectrum of the valley residents. It was a contentious meeting in which the Waiāhole-Waikāne Community Association opposed the Kalo Pa‘o Waiāhole taro farmers in their use of designated public open space for a community taro patch. ‘I thought you were with us?!’ they glaringly implored/demanded as the contending sides took their oppositional positions in the meeting, and I tried to neutrally observe the drama unfold.

Of course I wasn’t simply an ‘objective researcher,’ for I have personal investments in similar island and global struggles and I have political sympathies with both of the competing factions. I admire the tenacity and longevity of the WWCA (primarily represented by the steering committee members) and I understand their need to retain control of their hard-fought local community leadership and sense of unity. I also admire the fortitude and dedication of the taro farmers and I understand their need to expand Hawaiian cultural practices and protect threatened natural resources. Moreover, I believe in locally embodied autonomous agency for persons and communities, which is evidenced in the decades of struggle by the people of Waiāhole-Waikāne. For these reasons I have been challenged to carefully situate myself in the context of my work and I constantly grapple with ethical commitments to my interviewees and professional responsibilities to this project. ‘Who am I writing for?’ is a question repeatedly posed to me. Perhaps naïvely or stubbornly, I insist upon writing for both the academy and the community, and additionally, for myself.
Negotiating the complexities and contradictions of being a partial, intersubjective, multiply-situated, person-in-communities is a recurring theme in my life. I am a first-generation American born of immigrant parents and raised in Hawai‘i. My father, a Polish Jew, immigrated as a child to the U.S. following World War I and prior to World War II to escape extreme religious persecution and oppression. Settling in the so-called ‘land of opportunity,’ he ‘pulled himself up by the bootstraps’—first with the laboring boots of menial employment, then with the military boots of the U.S. armed forces. It was in this latter context that he met my mother in Thailand during the Vietnam War. As the eldest of eight children in a poor, rural family, my mother quit school at the age of eleven to work at a variety of jobs to help support her siblings. Seeking employment in her 20s, she eventually made her way to the joint Thai-U.S. military base where she met and later married my father, a man almost three decades older than she. When I was two years old we moved to and settled in Hawai‘i, the American ‘paradise’ my father desired in his retirement. This is the genealogy that I shared with my interviewees, often at their behest—an intrinsic part of Hawai‘i’s ‘talk story’ tradition.

Growing up in the islands I always considered myself a hapa-haole local—a half-white brown-skinned average girl of moderate yet comfortable means. Of course, I also considered myself to be an American of Thai ancestry, who was Jewish and Buddhist—none of which seemed particularly unique in the so-called ‘melting pot’ of Hawai‘i as part of the United States. It wasn’t until I went to college in the ‘mainland’ that I came into consciousness of being unique, of being an ‘other’ in the eyes of white, Judeo-Christian Americans. Initially, this heightened my identification as a Local in Hawai‘i and further marked Hawai‘i as a special place un tarnished by this oppressive gaze. It wasn’t until I spent a year studying abroad in Israel witnessing the oppression of Palestinians by Jewish settlers that I came into consciousness of myself as a settler in Hawai‘i with my own oppressive gaze directed (as indirectly as it may have been) at Native Hawaiians, while also appropriating Hawai‘i and Hawaiian things as my own. Experiencing the transformative potential of the Oslo Peace Accords at the time, when I
later returned home to Hawai‘i I had newfound political commitments to support Hawaiian struggles for self-determination and sovereignty. Yet it took me many more years to fully grasp what this really meant and I still grapple with how to enact this support in everyday life and in an academic arena.

Therefore, this work is, in part, my attempt as a non-Hawaiian Euro-American-Asian settler in Hawai‘i to contribute in some small, meaningful way to a Hawaiian Hawai‘i. This work is also, in part, my attempt to pay tribute to the multiethnic residents and activists of Wai‘ahole-Waikāne, whose dedication and persistence have kept the country country, which has given me cherished memories of favorite childhood beaches and campsites along the northeast and north shores of O‘ahu—places that I still enjoy and appreciate to this day. Additionally, this work reflects my own complex negotiations of tradition, identity, class, and politics.

**Layout of This Work**

This political history of Wai‘ahole-Waikāne is structured in two parts. The first details the various cultural and political traditions of the valleys and Hawai‘i more generally. The second details how the various traditions were politically mobilized in each of the three community struggles.

The chapters in Part I serve as historical grounding for my comparative case study in Part II. I start with a brief discussion of the place of Wai‘ahole and Waikāne showing the relationality embedded in lands, waters and peoples therein. I then examine three historical periods of Hawai‘i in relation to the two valleys: pre-state Hawaiian society (Chapter Two), Hawaiian Kingdom (Chapter Three), and post-overthrow (plantation to statehood) era (Chapter Four). In Part I, I pay particular attention to the ways differences are negotiated, such as status and rank differences, varying interpretations of governing practices, and distinct responses to societal changes.

Next I examine the three contemporary community struggles that parallel and overlap with each other in the same place: the Wai‘ahole-Waikāne Community
Association’s anti-eviction fight (Chapter Five), the Waiāhole taro farmer’s battle for water (Chapter Six), and the Kamaka family land struggle (Chapter Seven). In Part II, I outline the background and strategies of each struggle, and explore the impact of each on its own and in relation with each other. I pay particular attention to narratives of class and identity and how contending articulations problematically inform the struggling community of Waiāhole-Waikāne. I conclude with an examination of the Waiāhole Taro Patch and its significance in melding the pasts and working towards better futures (Chapter Eight).

This tale of two valleys is about struggling to live together, with justice, given all of our many differences. Despite, or perhaps because of, the conflicts and contentions among the diverse people of Waiāhole-Waikāne, one of the most important lessons we can learn from their community struggles is best articulated by this resident-turn-activist:

Still one big thriving community. [laughter] You know, get political differences, but I guess da main ting to rememba hea is you’re neighbors, eh? You are neighbors. … You still hea! [laughter].

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32 Y. 1/15/04.
PART I:

GENEALOGIES OF PLACE

The three chapters in Part I use a two-fold understanding of genealogies as cultural and political practices to discuss Hawaiian and Hawai‘i histories of persons and place. These practices comprise the traditions that serve as political resources for each of the Waiāhole-Waikāne struggles. Chapter Two examines how pre-state Hawaiian social relations and governance systems were reflected in and negotiated through the Makahiki. Chapter Three examines the transformations of 19th century Hawai‘i in terms of culture, politics, economics, and ethnicity when Hawaiians selectively appropriated Euro-American terms and technologies melded to Native understandings and intentions. Chapter Four outlines changes in uses of land and water that occurred between 1893 and the 1970s and the consequences of those changes. Each of these chapters look at historical conditions and traditional practices that have informed the three contemporary struggles in Waiāhole-Waikāne, which I examine in a comparative case study in Part II.

Genealogical practices in Hawai‘i are multidimensional. On one level, genealogy helps “connect people to one another, to place, and to the land” and reflects a sense of “expansive inclusivity” based on kinship and ancestry (Kauanui 2008). On another level, genealogy serves as a map guiding relationships of self with the world and providing histories of the Hawaiian people (Kame‘elehiwa 1992). In these senses, genealogy is about knowing who you are and where you are within a relational framework of persons, places and histories directed towards future actions.33 Acting upon such genealogical knowledge helps rectify past wrongs and assert present and future rights. On a different level, genealogy is a critical political practice. It traces the contours of power relations in knowledge production as a means of unearthing

33 Kauanui notes “the political nature and strategic positioning of genealogical invocations” that have always been a part of this Hawaiian cultural practice (2008: 12).
subjugated knowledges (Foucault 2003). Engaging in genealogy means mapping the successive power relations that have produced certain ways of knowing, and in so doing, disrupting those power relations and opening up spaces for alternative configurations of knowledge to come forth. It means not taking anything for granted, dispelling the idea that things are ‘always already’ the way they are, and demonstrating that there are no self-evident truths. As both cultural and political practices, genealogies establish relationships, and the ways they are invoked or deployed enable certain relations to be made, un-made, and/or re-made.

Residents and activists in each of the struggles make claims to the place of Waiāhole-Waikāne based upon different prioritizations of historical wrongs and different preferences for traditions to make it right. My use of genealogy desubjugates historical knowledge and creates a relational map to make sense of the shifting relationality of persons to the place of Waiāhole-Waikāne. In doing so, I acknowledge that land itself—the ‘āina, *that which feeds*—has its own genealogy, evident in natural inscriptions of stream beds, mountain peaks, habitual and migratory animals, weather patterns, and in other natural (and supernatural) articulations. In Hawai‘i, the names of places are enriched with stories that enliven the culture, history, geography, geology, ecology, livelihoods, traditions, spirituality and lessons learned of its people. Often, these place names describe emotional states or important events, and thus serve as a dictionary or map to the physical and emotional landscapes of a place. “The largest

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34 Foucault explains: “genealogy is a sort of attempt to desubjugate historical knowledges, to set them free, or in other words to enable them to oppose and struggle against the coercion of a unitary, formal, and scientific theoretical discourse. …[A]nd genealogy is a tactic which, once it has described these local discursivities, brings into play the subjugated knowledges that have been released from them” (2003: 10-11).

35 “Land, earth”, derived from the word ‘ai “to eat” and na “belonging to.” Many Hawaiians refer to ‘āina as “*that which feeds*” because that land provided the food crops which fed the people.

36 Pukui, Elbert and Mookini explain: “Like most Polynesians, Hawaiians are fond of proverbial sayings that are memorized verbatim and are used less for didactic purposes than as displays of wit and as praise of the land. … These traditional expressions say a great deal in a few words and are elliptic. … [S]uch expressions are greatly admired” (1974: 266).

37 For example, Pukui, Elbert and Mookini describe in great detail the various emotional landscapes that are brought forth when particular place names are evoked: “Anger: Nā-pele-pele nā pali o Ka-lalau I ka wili ‘ia e ka makanai ‘crumbling are the cliffs of Astray, twisted by the wind.’ … Grief: Lu‘u-lu‘u Hana-lei i ka ua nui, kaumaha i ka noe o Alaka‘i ‘Hana-lei is downcast with great rains, heavy with the mists of Alaka‘i’. Love: ‘O ka ua o Hilo e mao ana, ‘o ke aloha i ka ipo, mea pau ‘ole ‘the rain of Hilo clears, love of a sweetheart—endless’. … Intelligence: No Ka=lae nō ka wahine ‘the lady is from The=forehead.’ … Failure: Aia akula puha i Wai=ki-ki Hamo-hamo i ka ‘imi’ahu awa ‘maybe just as Wai=kiki Groping-about (Hamo-hamo) looking for bitter grass’ (1974: 267-268).
proportion [of place names] show aloha ʻāina ‘love for the land and the people of the land’, and this function [is] so important in Hawaiʻi’" (Pukui, Elbert, and Mookini 1974: 267).\(^{38}\) Anne Kapulani Landgraf elaborates:

> A Hawaiian place name physically and poetically describes an area while revealing its historical or legendary significance. Place names evoke power in the Hawaiian language by emphasizing pride in our homeland. They are like kūpuna [ancestors; grandparents, respected elders], linking us to the past (1994: v).

Thus, a place name reflects the meaning (or meanings) of the place, not only for its residents but also for Hawaiians in general.

Many of the Waiāhole and Waikāne residents and activists made reference to the place names and the various moʻolelo (story, tale, legend, record) associated with them as a source of strength for their struggles. This practice provides insight into how the place of Waiāhole-Waikāne has empowered its people in the face of their contemporary resource challenges. The section that follows provides a brief discussion of these place names and an historical context for understanding their meanings in terms of the contemporary land and water struggles.\(^{39}\)

### WAIĀHOLE: WATERS OF THE ĀHOLEHOLE FISH

### WAIKĀNE: WATERS OF THE GOD KĀNE

The ahupuaʻa of Waiāhole and Waikāne are sacred in Hawaiian tradition. They are regarded as the residence of kāhuna (priests; experts) and as being endowed with

\(^{38}\) Pukui, Elbert and Mookini elaborate: “There are probably thousands of aloha ʻāi-na sayings. They name illustrious chiefs and places, important rains, seas, winds, and distinctive features. A speaker of Hawaiian never tires of hearing them over and over again; they recall to him his own grandmother or older relative who used to say them, and songs he heard as a child. They thus reinforce ties to family as well as to places, and are a link with a past that in many ways seems still a glorious never-never land. To the outsider, some of them may sound foolish, and this may be why Kepelino said, more than a hundred years ago, that when the foreigners ask and ask they get only a heap of foolishness… Even more cogent than the association of aloha ʻāi-na sayings with friends and relatives were the ties with the land and the sea, the source of life. The present and the future lay in the gardens, fishing grounds, and surfing sites. This attachment to the land and the sea was reflected in the poetic aloha ʻāi-na sayings that one heard in conversation and in song (1974: 269).”

\(^{39}\) I am certain that there are many more moʻolelo (stories) and ʻōlelo noʻeau (proverbs or poetical sayings) for Waiāhole and Waikāne (and the specific place names within these two ahupuaʻa) than what is touched upon here. I am also aware that the breadth and depth of the kaona, the hidden meaning, is inaccessible to me as a non-Native from elsewhere.
plentiful fresh water, wai. “When O‘ahu came under the rule of Kama-pua’a, he gave the land containing the word wai to the kahuna…in perpetuity” and subsequent rulers re-affirmed this (Kamakau 1867 quoted in Bushnell, Shideler, and Hammatt 2002). Waiāhole means waters of the āhole and is named for the āholehole fish that are abundant in the brackish water where the stream meets the sea. Hawaiian legend holds that the demigod Māui blazed a trail through the ahupua‘a (while being pursued by those who wished to destroy him (Pukui 1983: #1674). Waikāne (also known as Waiakāne) means waters of Kāne and is named for its namesake, Kāne, one of the paramount Hawaiian gods, who dug for water in the valley to benefit the people of the ahupua‘a. Waikāne’s two streams, Wai‘ōlolī (narrow waters) and Wai‘ololā (broad waters), are mentioned in the Kumulipo chant (creation genealogy):

He pōuhe‘e i ka wawā
He nuku,
he wai ka ‘ai a ka lā‘au
‘O ke Akua ke komo
‘a‘oe komo kanaka
‘O kāne ia wai‘ōlolī
‘O ka wahine ia wai‘ololā
It is night passing through the passage
Of an opening,
a stream of water is the food of plants
It is the god who enters,
not as a human does he enter
Male for the narrow waters
Female for the broad waters

The complementary nature of masculine and feminine spirit make the waters of Waikāne an allegory for the procreative energy of the gods and natural deities. Similarly, a pair of stones serving as a kū‘ula (stone god used to attract fish) in Waikāne is referred to as male and female (Bushnell et al. 2002: 56). Spirituality and love infuse these two ahupua‘a with meaning, as seen in a story that describes Waiāhole and Waikāne as man and wife whose mists continue to embrace in the clouds above the ahupua‘a (Raphaelson 1929: 24 quoted in Bushnell et al. 2002).

Both ahupua‘a were blessed with several heiau (place of worship), and Waikāne held a rare pu‘uhonua (place of refuge). As the dwelling place of priests, Waiāhole and

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40 Landgraf details: “Wai‘ololī refers to a narrow bay where surging water brings fish. Wai‘ololā is a wide shoreline where waves roll in without breaking” (1994: 28).
41 Johnson (1981: 12) quoted in Langraf (1994: 28). Bushnell, Shideler, and Hammatt note: “Whether the Kumulipo actually refers to specific sites in Waikāne Valley is less than clear although it does seem clear that certain Hawaiians have interpreted it this way since at least as early as 1912” (2002: 19). They cite George Po‘oloa’s article “Nā Pana Kaulana o nā Inoa o ka Mokupuni O‘ahu” in the Hawaiian language newspaper Ke Aloha Aina on February 18, 1919.
Waikāne were part of the larger mokuʻāina (district) of Koʻulaupoko, which was a symbol of sovereignty; even the great King Kamehameha would lower his sail when passing by. In addition to the sacred home of god Wākea and goddess Papa, the valleys are well-noted in the epic journey of Hīʻiaka, sister of the goddess Pele.

Many Hawaiians now living in Waikāne and Waiāhole trace their genealogies to kahuna and aliʻi (chiefs; chiefess), and they continue to view and act upon their kuleana (right, responsibility) to this place, as do those with makaʻāinana (commoners; people who work the land) genealogies in these ahupuaʻa (Bushnell et al. 2002: 45). For example, several families still chant at the healing heiau when someone is sick, make offerings to the local ahu (stone altar) when blessed with a good fish catch, and participate in other spiritual practices (Ibid: 58, 55). In terms of political inspiration, protecting the waters of Kāne helped mobilize the 1990s water struggle and continue to inform the taro farming movement.

At Waikāne, both prominent and ordinary people would come to a famous hölua (sled course on grassy slopes) to enjoy themselves (Poʻoloa 1919 quoted in Bushnell et al. 2002: 20), highlighting the inclusive fun spirit of the ahupuaʻa despite it being the residence of kāhuna. Also in Waikāne is the Puʻu Menehune, a perfectly circular hill (puʻu) of cinder built by the legendary menehune (small people who worked at night) (Raymond Kamaka quoted in Napoka 1977). The menehune were the secret helpers or unsung heroes supposedly responsible for many of Hawaiʻi’s ‘public works’ projects,

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42 Heiau were/are often elaborately constructed stone platforms; some are simply made earth terraces.
43 Puʻuhonua were places of peace and safety where commoners sought sociopolitical asylum. Puʻuhonua were also used for religious purposes and spiritual ceremonies.
44 J. 1/12/05.
45 “Here lived Wakea the sky-father and Haumea (sometimes called Papa, meaning flat stratum) the earth-mother; here were born of their union the progenitor of the taro plant, Haloa-naka, and the human race—the younger son Haloa. Here occurred the cosmic battles between kumu-Honua (Earth-Foundation) and Wakea and Haumea, and the great subsequent upheaval and tidal wave. Here was located the most sacred heiau on Oahu, the shrine of Lono. This was the general area in which were enacted the early episodes of Kamapuaʻa, his birth and youthful exploits. In historic times this was the scene of the training, as warrior and ruler, of one of Oahu’s greatest chiefs, Kualiʻi. Finally, here lived the first high chief to be elected by his peers to be ruler of all Oahu, the chieftan Kahanahana” (Handy, Handy & Pukui 1972: 436).
46 Bushnell, Shideler and Hammatt describe: “Many kamaʻāina families knowledgeable of both Hawaiian traditions of Waialohi and Waikane as well as current controversial issues affecting those traditions. Some of these families can trace their roots back to the Māhele and some even further. Their deep conviction that the land and the water are for the use of the people of those ahupuaʻa has influenced their involvement in current issues affecting those resources” (2002: 45).
47 Although Felix Pacayu, Jr. of Waikāne doesn’t directly say this, Bushnell, Shideler and Hammatt (2002: 55-56) suggest that the ahu may have been a kūʻula (stone god to attract fish).
such as certain fishponds and taro irrigation systems. Their presence in Waikāne further illustrates the ahupua’a’s inclusiveness and cooperative spirit.

An important navigation marker erected in Waikāne’s mountainside guided those sailing to Maui. This stone formation was called the Manu Kölea (*Pacific golden plover*)\(^\text{48}\) because “the kölea bird acted as a guardian on these voyages” (Napoka 1977) and the stones represent the flight pattern of the kölea (Bushnell et al. 2002: 55).\(^\text{49}\) The significance of Waikāne as a sacred guidepost is evident, both physically and spiritually.

In Waiāhole there is a fresh water pond said to be connected to a fresh water pond on the other side of the island in Koko Head. Herein lives a magical mo’o (*lizard; water spirit*) who sometimes appears as a beautiful woman. One story tells of a wanderlust man named Kawa’a who met ill-fate when he attempted to apprehend the woman; he was found near Koko Head wandering absentmindedly (Richard Pagliniwan quoted in Ibid: 15). Perhaps this story is to warn against lusting after that which you cannot possess, less you lose what you have and receive an unwanted welcome. Or maybe it is cautionary tale of uncontrollable magic that exist.

Waiāhole is the site where a great slaughter took place in the legend of Halemano as a result of love, jealousy and warfare (Forander 1919: vol. V, part II quoted in Bushnell et al. 2002: 12). The Pōhaku Wela in Waikāne is a stony cliff that emits smoke as a sign or portent of things to come (pōhaku is *stone*; wela is *hot, burned* and is figuratively used to indicate *lust, passion*); a magical sight that was beheld twice by a Hawaiian man whose ancestors were kāhuna of the area (Raymond Kamaka quoted in Napoka 1977). Both this reference to Waiāhole and this site in Waikāne indicate the intensity of emotions that have scarred the landscape.

Waiāhole and Waikāne are also renowned for their abundance of taro and plentiful fishing grounds. Extensive archeological evidence of lo‘i and ‘auwai (*irrigation*...
water-ways) systems are ‘excellently preserved’ throughout the ahupua’a.\textsuperscript{50} Of particular significance was the āhole fish, after which Waiāhole was named. “Because of the meaning of hole, to strip away, this fish was used for magic, as to chase away evil spirits and for love magic” (Pukui and Elbert 1971).\textsuperscript{51}

In my interviews, one of the most frequently recounted stories was this:

Ke kalo pa’a o Waiahole. \textit{The hard taro of Waiāhole}. A reminder not to treat others badly. One day, a man went to Waiahole, O’ahu, to visit his sister, whom he had not seen for many years. She was absent, and her husband neither asked the stranger in nor offered him any food. When hunger possessed the visitor he asked if he might have some taro to eat. His brother-in-law directed him to his taro patches and told him to get some from there. The man went to the patches and then continued on his way. When the woman returned she was told of the visitor, and by her husband’s description she knew it was her brother. She rebuked him for his lack of hospitality. When they went to their taro patches they found all the taro pulled up and hacked to pieces (Pukui 1983: #1735).\textsuperscript{52}

This proverb or poetical saying ‘Ke kalo pa’a o Waiāhole’ is a reminder to not treat others badly. Otherwise such poor manners will be repaid in kind. The explicit lesson within this mo’olelo is that hospitality is an important societal value, even with or perhaps especially with strangers. An implicit message is that you never know the social relations you may have with another person, therefore you should share with others as if they were your own relative. This point is further emphasized with the fact that the taro offshoot, ‘ohā, is the root of the ‘ohana, the intergenerational extended family network or kinship group. If you do not take care of your family members, then your family members will not take care of you.

Another version of the story broadens our understanding:

A warrior named Kuapūnōhu, who was known for his strange deeds. He went to visit his sister in Waiāhole. When he arrived, his sister was out fishing, but her husband, Ima’ole, was home. Kuapūnōhu asked if there was any food. Ima’ole replied, “We have food, but it’s standing

\textsuperscript{50} “Especially interesting [in Waikāne] is the presence of taro lo’i with numerous low earthen mounds within. These mounds were known in the literature, but this is the only place where physical remains of them have been found. The mounds were used in a specialized technique of taro raising. ... [These are the] only known examples of taro lo’i with interior mounds. ... Of all the known taro lo’i on O’ahu, this is the second most important” (Napoka 1977).

\textsuperscript{51} The āhole fish was also called a “sea pig” (pua’a kai) and used ceremonially as a substitute for pig (Pukui and Elbert 1971).

\textsuperscript{52} Pukui probably draws from the account of Kaehuaea in the Hawaiian language newspaper Ku’oko’a on September 16, 1865 entitled “Na Mea Kaulana o Waiāhole” (Bushnell, Shideler and Hammatt 2002: 11).
in the patch.” This answer angered Kuapūnohu, and he went to the patch and pulled out two kalo. He cut them into pieces and burned them to ashes. He continued pulling out and burning kalo until the whole four-acre patch was destroyed. “Serves him right,” he said and left (Landgraf 1994: 30).

Landgraf suggests that the hard taro for which Waiāhole is known perhaps refers to the obstinate man. But which man was obstinate? Surely Ima‘ole was obstinate in his refusal to be hospitable, yet perhaps Kuapūnohu was also obstinate in being destructive. The hard taro of Waiāhole refers to the denseness of the taro that is so dense and hard that it will burn—a characteristic attributed to the people of this place who cultivate this taro. While this stubbornness and unyielding quality can be detrimental, it can also be considered a positive attribute, as many present-day Waiāhole residents expressed to me. For example, the militant refusal of Waiāhole’s people to be evicted in the 1970s and their unyielding pursuits of water through the 1990s proved to be valuable traits for their community struggles. In a contemporary context, Kuapūnohu might be a parable for intrusive and demanding outsiders whom one should be wary of.

As we have seen, such place names and landscape markers reveal a multitude of historical, cultural, and emotional meanings. How one applies these meanings varies according to context and intent. Manulani Meyer (2003) describes this as an “embodied knowledge system” with “multiple realities of living in society.” This relationality and functionality allows for the two valleys to be inscribed as a place of spiritual connection and personal refuge, love and war, industriousness and recreation, stubbornness and political strength, cosmic origin and magical wonderment, guardedness and regeneration, abundance and appreciation. Aloha ʻāina, love of the land and for the people of the land, is evident throughout and was a recurring theme in many of my interviews. As one individual put it:

I’m going to tell you what I really love about being in this community: we have a lot of active people. I mean, active on a community level and they are passionate about it: Hawaiian burials, archeological preservation, churches, task forces—I could go on... The goodness of this place comes out of the ground and why that is—I don’t think because kings lived here and everything... I think the people that lived here made this place like that. In my Hawaiian eye, inside my naʻau
[“intestines, bowels; mind, heart, affections”—Western equivalent of ‘gut feeling’], the people that lived here were very happy and good people and that’s the spirit that is in this land. It’s very special. ... It is interesting that in this time in Hawai‘i [with rampant] development, that people [with] perspective happen to congregate in this part of the island. It is almost like in some way it was meant to be. It is like karma because there is something here—I don’t know what it is—the culture, the place, the valleys that need to be taking part and for whatever reason we showed up on the spot.53

53 I. 4/12/05, emphasis added.
CHAPTER 2:
THE MAKAHIKI IN HAWAIIAN SOCIETY

As Waiāhole and Waikāne residents were debating their options in the 1976 anti-eviction fight, most did not know the annual Hawaiian harvest festival—the Makahiki—was approaching. At the time, the Makahiki was regarded as a relic of Hawaiʻi’s past as a result of nearly two centuries of Western imperialism and ongoing militarization of the islands. A religious and colonial education system along with a collapse in the Native population had forcibly displaced Hawaiian knowledges in favor of the ‘melting pot’ ideology of Hawaiʻi as the ‘Aloha State’ of the United States. The Makahiki has been revived in recent decades as Hawaiians and their allies reconstitute their preferred life-ways, and it offers a useful lens for discussing Hawaiian cultural and political traditions, particularly those that emphasize local or commoner points of view. Waiāhole taro farmers invoke these traditions in their kalo cultivation as part of an effort to revitalize traditional relationships of persons to each other and with the land. As one farmer explains:

To a traditional Hawaiian, this [holding up a taro plant] is Haloanaka; this is the direct descendent of the first taro plant. He’s also my older brother; he was born just before me. So by taking care of him I take care of my family, and in return, he takes care of me. He gives me food, he gives me self-esteem, gives me a base, gives me a root—where I come from.

The Kamaka family also invokes these Hawaiian cultural and political traditions, primarily from the chiefly points of view. As descendents of konohiki (chiefly overseer of ahupua’a), they emphasize their role as stewards of the land and water:

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54 McGregor notes that in 1982 the Protect Kahoʻolawe Ohana “revived the annual celebration of the Makahiki or harvest ceremonies in honor of Lono, the Hawaiian god of agriculture” (2007: 266). Since then, the Makahiki has been increasingly celebrated by Hawaiians throughout the islands in a variety of commemorations and festivities. In 2008, there were at least four venues of celebration on the island of O‘ahu that included ceremony, procession of the gods, tribute, games, feasting, and so forth.

55 B. 8/10/05.
...because the land is your life. It’s your future. And my mom always use to say to us...the land will take care of you as long as you take care of the land. And then you pass it on, because we are just caretakers.

Using the Makahiki as an analytical frame for pre-state Hawaiian society, this chapter examines traditional social relations between chiefs and commoners and the community governance practices within ahupua’a. These traditions of communal resource management, layered responsibility, and reciprocal exchanges are centered on taro and its cultivation. I will show how observances of the Makahiki allowed maka’ainana numerous opportunities to engage in varied power relationships with ali’i that fostered collectivity and cooperation in their day-to-day lives.

CELEBRATING SHARED CONTRIBUTIONS

Samuel Kamakau, a 19th century Hawaiian historian and statesman, describes the Makahiki as “a time of rest” and feasting for “the life and health of the body.” During the Makahiki, manual labor was prohibited and Hawaiians engaged in games and sports designed to strengthen the body (Kamakau 1964: 19). A key component of the Makahiki was showing gratitude to all: the gods, the ali‘i, and the maka‘ainana. The gods created and blessed the natural world; the ali‘i managed it properly through their actions and deeds; and the maka‘ainana sustained it through their labor. In this way, the Makahiki celebrates the connectivity and mutuality embedded in Hawaiian society. All living beings and natural elements (even those that might otherwise be considered inanimate, such as stones) are imbued with spirituality and form the basis of Hawaiian relationality. The rich pantheon of Hawaiian akua (god, goddess, spirit) reflected in the figurative phrase “‘forty thousand Akua’...refer[s] to the divinity in every aspect of life” (Kame‘eleihiwa 1999). Because Hawaiian traditions have many versions, ‘multiple realities of living in society’ are often negotiated with a consciousness toward relationships and their functionality (Meyer 2003). In the extensive oral traditions of Hawaiian society, Hawaiians embrace a plurality of beliefs, ideas, actions, and life-ways

S. 4/13/05.
(Kepelino 1932: 8), which allows for flexibility in relational interactions. Noelani Arista considers this ‘structural multiplicity’ as something to be ‘reveled in’ because “homogenization or seeking for the one true history is not a satisfying goal” (Arista 2007). This plurality and multiplicity was, and is, a fundamental characteristic of Hawaiian society—an aspect of life reveled in during the Makahiki.

The genealogies of the maka‘ainana and ali‘i are intertwined as descendants of the multitude of gods, like a plant with multiple stems that may start at differing points and grow along differing paths, yet are connected (Malo 1951: 2). In the Kumulipo genealogy of the Hawaiian people (and in related genealogies), the first child of the mating gods (Wākea, sky father, with his daughter Ho’ohoku-i-ka-lani from Papa, earth mother) was a stillborn malformed son. From his burial ground sprouted a taro plant, named Hä-loa. The second child of these mating gods was a human being. Thus, the taro plant is the elder sibling of Hawaiians, and Hawaiians are interconnected with each other, their natural environment, and their gods through familial origin. This connectivity provides the fundamental basis for Hawaiian social relations centered on the cultivation of kalo. Caring for elder brother Häloa, the kalo plant, means caring for the land and water that sustains its growth, which contributes to the health and well being of each other and ensures continued blessings from the gods.

Taro as the staff of life, the land which provided subsistence, the people who dwelt on it, the ritual and festival in honor of the rain god, the role and place of fresh water upon which the life of food plants depended... these provided the basic patterns of Hawaiian culture (Handy, Handy, and Pukui 1972: 18).

While it was the responsibility of the ali‘i to ensure optimal conditions for kalo through proper management of resources and righteous spirituality, the commoners were responsible for its cultivation. Kamakau notes that “Of the maka‘ainana it was said that, in the end, the well-being (pono) of the kingdom was in their hands” (Kamakau 1964: 8).

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57 See Beckwith (1951), Handy, Handy and Pukui (1972) and Kame‘eleihiwa (1992) for in-depth discussions of the Kumulipo genealogy.

58 See also Kame‘eleihiwa (1992) for further discussion of this relational understanding, specifically pp. 25-31.
This connectivity between people, chiefs, and gods, and their shared contributions to societal well-being, were celebrated and renewed during the Makahiki.

Social relations in traditional Hawaiian society were fundamentally communal. People had layers of responsibility, and produced and distributed goods and services in a shared manner. While this political economy was not ‘equal’ in the sense that everyone was doing the same work and sharing equally in the products of that labor, there was a large degree of ‘parity’ in terms of equitable resource-use, reciprocal exchange networks, and shared labor practices. These communal social relations existed alongside a highly stratified system of chiefly blood, rank and status tied to Hawaiian cosmology and the role of taro therein. The three-month Makahiki celebrated the fruits of makaʻāinana labor through its prescribed rest.

The Makahiki festivities began with various days of kapu (sacred prohibition) in which specific places and things were placed temporarily off limits and certain practices were banned. One of the main functions of the kapu system was to regulate natural resources, such as specifying how water was to be shared among farmers, designating fishing seasons to avoid spawning times, assigning planting locations to allow land to lay fallow and regenerate, and delineating collective roles and responsibilities for the building and maintenance of infrastructure. This system of regulation sustained an estimated population of 800,000 on the Hawaiian archipelago at the time of British Captain James Cook’s first landing in 1778 (Stannard 1989). The kapu system also maintained a symbolic economy of the sacred, primarily through distinctions in successive ranks between aliʻi and the makaʻāinana. This governance system entailed a stratified structure with the most sacred aliʻi at the top (those with ‘pure’ blood whose parents were siblings

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59 See Handy, Handy and Pukui (1972) for a detailed discussion of the kapu system as practiced in relation to planting taro and other essential food crops.
60 It’s important to note that the ‘official’ population estimates are significantly lower, at about 400,000 persons in 1778 (Schmitt 1968). I choose to cite David Stannard’s figures because I find his methodology, evidence, and analysis more compelling, especially his use of journal entries by early Europeans that detailed the large populations sustained by extensive agricultural terraces and aquacultural fishponds. Others have suggested that while the official estimates may be too low, Stannard’s estimates are too high (Bushnell 1992). Kameʻeleleihiwa (1992) considers Stannard’s figures too conservative and estimates the population to have been one million.
or close relatives of each other), followed by other high ali‘i, kāhuna, lesser ali‘i (such as konohiki), maka‘āinana, and kauā (outcast who doesn’t follow the kapu; servant).

Despite the hierarchy, the maka‘āinana—who were the most numerous class—enjoyed substantial rights and significant personal freedom. Individuals and ‘ohana had lands that were in their care to use and live upon as long as they wished, with unfettered access to utilize common resources in upland forests and the ocean. The governing power that ali‘i exercised were “subject to the rights of native tenants” (Chinen 1958: 29) and ali‘i were careful not to abuse their power. For example, when chiefs would tour the islands it was not right for them (and their party) to burden commoners in any way, thereby ali‘i would stay on the main roadways or sea routes to avoid maka‘āinana homes, villages, and fishing grounds. The intent was to avoid taking food from the commoners (crops or fish), sleeping in their homes, or otherwise unduly imposing upon them (Malo 1951: 193).

McGregor notes “though the tenure of the maka‘āinana was stable, they were not tied to the land and did have the option to move away if they chose to” (2007: 27). Hence, the power of an ali‘i was based upon the productivity and satisfaction of the maka‘āinana within his/her ahupua’a. When the people were subjected to an abusive chief, they would either kill him or move to another ahupua’a. As Trask notes, “[t]he genius of the mutually beneficial political system...was an incentive for the society’s...

61 This stratification was not completely rigid, as the story of ali‘i ‘Umi-a-Liloa demonstrates. He was born of a maka‘āinana mother and an ali‘i father, but due to his pono actions and deeds, he was a beloved and well-respected ali‘i who gained much power. For further discussion, see Kamakau (1871 [1992]: Chapter 1).

62 Malo recounts: “the commoners were the most numerous class of people in the nation, and were known as the ma-ka-aina-na; another name by which they were called was hūi. (Hū, to swell, multiple, increase like yeast.) ... There were many names descriptive of the ma-ka-aina-na. Those who were born in the back-districts were called kanaka no-hii-kua (noho-i-kua), people of the back. The man who lived with the chief and did not desert him when war came was called a kanaka no-lua-kua, a man for the pit of battle. The people were divided into farmers, fishermen, house-builders, canoe-makers (kalai-waa), etc. They were called by many different appellations according to the trades they followed” (1951: 60-61).

63 Chinen explains: “All these persons in possession of lands, superior and inferior, were considered as having certain rights in the products of the soil. Each individual was deemed entitled to a share of what he produced from the soil, gathered from the seashore, or collected from the mountains. These rights were not clearly defined, but were recognized and acknowledged by all. ... Because it was not considered just and right, dispossession did not occur too frequently” (1985: 28).

64 Malo explains: “It was the king’s duty to seek the welfare of the common people, because they constituted the body politic. Many kings have been put to death by the people because of their oppression of the maka‘ānana. ... It was for this reason that some of the ancient kings had a wholesome fear of the people. But the commoners were sure to be defeated when the king had right on his side” (1951: 195).
leaders to provide for all their constituents’ well-being and contentment. To fail to do so meant the loss of status and thus of mana [divine power] for the ali`i” (Trask 1993 [1999]).

Practices of kuleana were integral in negotiating these relational boundaries. The expanded definition of kuleana is “right, title, property, portion, responsibility, jurisdiction, authority, interest, claim, ownership; reason, cause, function, justification;...” All Hawaiians in the various strata of society had kuleana in the sense of having certain rights and responsibilities within clearly constituted areas of jurisdiction and authority. Knowing and acting upon one’s kuleana continued the reciprocal relationships, grounding “authority and obligation based in interdependence and community” (Goodyear-Ka’ōpua 2007). Kuleana also has a legal meaning as the designation for the land-titles maka`aina claimed and received when private property was instituted in the Mähele (division) of the 1840s, reflecting the tenancy rights and responsibilities of Native planters to the lands in their care (Handy, Handy, and Pukui 1972). Kuleana values and practices continue to inform Hawaiian life ways (Warner 1999; Dudoit 1999), and a significant number of Hawaiians in Wai`älåhole and Waikåne are kuleana landowners.

Reciprocal equivalences also guided relations of gender and sexuality. There was a broad range of sexual practices and a large degree of freedom to love who one wanted to (when one wanted to), unrestrained by codified institutions such as permanent marriage. Transgender/transsexual persons were integral members of society with little bias and no disenfranchisement (Anbe, Carvajal, and Xian 2001). Although constraints were placed upon ali`i to maintain their royal bloodlines through official and parallel marriages/matings, both male and female chiefs had multiple husbands and wives. While common-law marriages and monogamous relationships did exist, they and corresponding nuclear families were not the primary social unit.

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65 Handy, Handy and Pukui explain: “Kuleana in old usage meant a portion or share of a thing or enterprise. It was chosen as the legal term applicable to the claims filed by tenants who sought permanent title to parcels of land then being allotted under the law of 1848. The word in old Hawaiian also meant a man’s right, affairs, interest, being derived from the adjective kulea meaning competent, successful. It was to the competent planters, formerly merely tenants, that title in fee simple was given during the Mähele to the lands they were then cultivating for their own use; thus the titles and land involved were termed kuleana – the planter’s property or competence. Because of its fairly recent adoption as a definitive legal term, kuleana is generally regarded as not having applied to land in ancient use” (1972: 54). It should be noted that fee-simple title was not ‘given’ but acquired upon payment of exorbitant conveyance fees. For a case-study on the Mähele allotments of kuleana title in Kahana, see Stauffer (2004).
The ‘ohana was/is the constitutive feature of Hawaiian life, wherein relations between successive generations (e.g. grandparents–parents–children–grandchildren) took primacy in kuleana, as did strong sibling and cousin relations. Hawaiian scholar Mary Kawena Pukui explains “you may be 13th or 14th cousins, as we define relationships today, but in Hawaiian terms, if you are one of the same generation, you are all brothers and sisters” (Pukui, Haretig, and Lee 1979). Hawaiian children were often hänai (foster; adopted) by their grandparents or other relatives or friends of the grandparents’ generation (Ibid). While genealogies affirmed both patrimonial and matrilineal descent, a child’s social standing (and often a child’s name) generally followed the parent of higher status within the social strata, whether it be the mother or father. And if a child were born to a woman who had two lovers, then both men would be considered the father of that child.

All Hawaiians were subject to the kapu system, however, different kapu applied to different people depending on their position in society. The numerous kapu of the ali‘i, especially the high chiefs, restricted their everyday freedom much more than the maka‘āinana. The most sacred ali‘i had kapu for which anyone upon whom the shadow of the ali‘i (or his/her things) would fall (or whose shadow fell upon the ali‘i or his/her things) was put to death. Kamakau explains:

because of the great many kapus [of these high chiefs], it was not right for them to go out in the daytime; at night was the property time for them to associate with other chiefs and people, when no shadow could be cast upon them (1964: 10).

Kamakau further explains that “the chiefs themselves were afraid of the consequences of their kapus; that is why they hid themselves in the back districts” among the

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66 Handy and Pukui (1972) explain that unlike other Pacific Islanders, Hawaiians were primarily organized in ‘ohana rather than tribes or villages, and many ‘ohana comprised the population of an ahupua’a.

67 Hänai practices were widespread and commonly integrated into ‘ohana genealogies, wherein the hänai child was essentially grafted upon the family tree of the adopted parents.

68 Kepelino notes that different families had different kapu depending on their worship practices, personal gods, ancestral traditions, and so forth (1932: 16).

69 Malo concurs that the “rule” was for these ali‘i to “not go abroad by day but only at night, because if he went abroad in open day (when people were about their usual avocations), everyone had to fall to the ground in an attitude of worship” (1951: 54), and if this rule of traveling only by night required transgression, then ali‘i would go to great lengths to warn commoners of their passing to avert any ill effects (Ibid 57; see also ‘ī‘ī (1959).
maka‘āinana where they could live without so many prohibitions (1964: 10) and “because they knew of the abundance of food in the country” (Ibid: 6). Contrary to the image of the ali‘i as cruel rulers with absolute power, 19th century Hawaiian historian Kepelino describes how the norm was for chiefs to act with mercy in sparing the lives of commoners who would otherwise be put to death for their kapu infractions. Even the early American missionary William Richards notes the “comparatively few” executions that resulted from kapu violations (Merry 2000).

These practices suggest two things about traditional social and political relations: the everyday lives of the maka‘āinana had sufficient prosperity with a significant degree of liberty, and the ali‘i did their best to not infringe upon the freedoms and rights of the maka‘āinana. Moreover, it seems that many chiefs coveted this agency and well being of the commoners enough to secretly imitate their lifestyle, even if only temporarily. These practices suggest that despite many interpretations of Hawaiian society as restrictive, the relationship between chiefs and commoners was reciprocal and complex.

The work of anthropologist Dean Saitta is useful here. In his research of the power relations between elites and subordinates in what are called middle range societies (‘pre-modern’ or traditional societies), Saitta rejects the standard depiction that “the relationship linking elites and [agricultural] producers is [necessarily] tributary or even feudal in nature” (2001: 251). Instead, they could be understood as a

70 Among other reasons that chiefs—even the most sacred ali‘i—lived in the countryside like commoners, a practice termed living “under clumps of grass (malalo o ke opu weuweu), [was] perhaps because their ancestors had been taken captive…” (Kamakau 1964: 6).

71 Kepelino further describes: “When the chiefs traveled together, many people became involved in the tapu [kapu]… The executioner would have killed them, had not the chief spared them. This is what he would do. The executioner came last in the procession. If he saw some one breaking the tapu he would call to the people, “E! kill the wrong-doer! catch him!” Some one caught the offender and when the chief saw who it was he would cry “E! just a worthless crab! Let him alone! let him live!” If the executioner refused to release him, the chief would go and place his hand on the man, saying, “You live! go home! no one shall kill you! you are sacred to me!” So he was saved. … This custom of the chief was known before the coming of the missionaries to Hawaii (1932: 138-140; emphasis added).

72 Merry contends that in this traditional Hawaiian governance system: “The focus was not on the correction of everyday offenses but on the dramatic and vivid display of the awesome power of the ali‘i and the reinforcement of hierarchy and rank. This was a symbolic economy of punishment whose severe rules tinged with mercy dramatized the power and majesty of the ali‘i and marked them as different (2000: 57-58).

73 An example of this is provided in the classic tale of The Wind Gourd of L‘amaomao where a chief leaves court to live with/marry a commoner. I would like to thank Noelani Goodyear-Ka’ōpua for pointing this out.

74 This is not to deny that oppressive or exploitative relations did exist in traditional Hawai‘i, but it is simply to acknowledge that such relations were not the norm.
fundamentally communal relationship if we see the goods and/or services...as payments, allocated by subordinates to elites as compensation for their work in procuring socially important valuables... [Another] possibility [is that] the goods and labor transfers can be understood as reciprocal exchanges of equivalents – subordinates perform labor in return for the valuables provided by elites [such as religion or status exchanges or material regulation] (Ibid; emphasis in original).

In other words, communal class processes are often evident in the collective production, appropriation and distribution of labor, and in reciprocal exchanges of both material and symbolic goods and services. Understanding traditional Hawai‘i as inherently communal and not feudal is significant because so many history text characterize Hawaiian society as oppressively and exploitatively feudal (Kuykendall 1938 [1976]; Fornander and Stokes 1878; Davenport 1964; Parker 1907). Such mischaracterizations continue to problematically mis-inform the view that many people have of what a Hawaiian Hawai‘i was and could be, as I will show in later chapters.

Even the lowliest (and smallest) class of Hawaiians, the kauā, had complex relations with the maka‘āinana and ali‘i that defy clear delineation or explanation. The kauā were outcasts and servants because they lived in profanity by not following sacred kapu, such as the eating kapu that prohibited men and women from eating together and designated certain foods for only men and only women (Kamaka 1964: 8). As the lowest strata of society, the kauā were the class from which human sacrifices were drawn when required by sacred ritual (since they did not abide by the sacred protocol of kapu to begin with). Yet, kauā were not mere slaves because they were not a laboring class and sought their own livelihoods on lands which they cultivated autonomously (Kepelino 1932). David Malo, a 19th century Hawaiian historian, further notes that these servants and outcasts also had chiefly genealogies and “were spoken of as aumakua [guardian spirit] of their master” (Malo 1951: 69-70). When the kapu system ended in 1819 through the act of King Kamehameha II (Liholiho) eating with female high ali‘i; the kauā—who

75 For a related discussion, see Chakrabati and Cullenburg’s typology of class sets that delineate “a useful way to see complex coexistence of classes in society and the complexity involved in the process of transition” (2001: 186-7). This is a recognition of multiple class processes and lived experiences beyond the standard feudal—lord binary classes, and later the working—property-owning classes. That is, multiple and overlapping class processes displace conceptions of static class positions.
were already eating freely, without kapu—were thus “freed” from their subordinated status and integrated into the maka‘ainana.

In recognizing the complex sociopolitical and communal class relations that can exist in traditional hierarchies, it becomes possible to think about the agency of all members of society and not just the “holders of power” as many histories represent.76 Waiāhole taro farmers are inspired by maka‘ainana traditions in the ahupua‘a and they invoke these Native identities and practices in their pursuits of self-determination over land and water resources. In this way, the Hawaiian “self” might be better understood as a self-in-relation mediated through kuleana practices of persons and groups/classes (and not simply feudal, state, or other identity categories). The annual Makahiki festival of shared commemoration and collective thanksgiving among all members of society is one such example in traditional Hawai‘i.

A TIME OF ‘PLAY’

“When the Makahiki kapu was ended, the akua pa‘ani, the god of play, came forth. His work was to promote the strengthening of the body” (Kamakau 1964: 20). Both commoners and chiefs played many types of games and sports throughout the festivities, such as surfing contests, hula, rolling stones (similar to bowling), running races, and gambling. When possible, many of these games were played throughout the year as well. During the Makahiki, a favorite sport was boxing, wherein large audiences would watch while “[m]any an opponent would receive a punch in the chin breaking the jaw, and be left “floating on the water” (ho‘olana i ka wai; semiconscious)” (Ibid). Other games similarly left people badly beaten or with broken limbs. This was true for commoners and chiefs alike, whether it be a maka‘ainana hurting an ali‘i or vice versa. During the Makahiki and at other times of the year, “warlike contests frequently broke out between certain chiefs and the people, and many of the former were killed in battle by the commoners” (Malo 1951: 58). While these games were violent, the fact that the

76 Kayatekin and Charusheela (2004) speak of this in terms of non-modernist subjectivity or agency.
violence occurred in a prescribed setting suggests that spaces existed within the hierarchies of Hawaiian society for elites and subordinates to engage in alternative and diffused relations of power. This allowed for re-articulations of kuleana and what constituted authority. The annual Makahiki might have been a sanctioned time for the commoners to put an abusive chief “in his place,” or to otherwise neutralize social strife that might have existed.

Vilsoni Hereniko (1995), in an analysis of ritual female clowning on the Pacific island of Rotuma, argues that culturally sanctioned opportunities for power inversion served as safety valves for small island communities to maintain their kinship and social networks over time. Hereniko (1994) further notes that within the frame of ‘play’ role-reversals and inversion of societal norms allowed powerful persons to be humbled and rebuked without losing public face. The same could be said for the entertainment value of sports in masking the seriousness of injuries inflicted during the Makahiki games. Geertz’s (1973) analysis of Balinese cockfighting suggests that the cockfight provides a symbolic structure to negotiate subjective meaning and societal sensibilities. Similarly, the games and contests of the Makahiki can be understood as aesthetic representations that make visible the ways in which Hawaiians negotiated their social relations, derived meanings therein, and potentially produced a sense of parity within their communities.

I suggest that the intensity of sanctioned violence during the Makahiki (and at other times during the year) provided an opportunity for Hawaiians to establish or reaffirm the social parity of the participants, irrespective of status. Within the arena of sports and games, the status differences between chiefs and commoners were collapsed as they engaged with each other on an equal terrain. In this way, practices of play have cultural and sometimes economic functions in redistributing disparities in status.

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77 Hereniko explains: “Through role-reversal and inversion of society norms, an alternative worldview was explored within the frame of play. The message “this is play” masked the seriousness of important messages that were disguised in laughter but nonetheless experienced and felt. Ambiguity reigned, and individuals who were lampooned through a comic sketch were chastised in a manner that allowed for the saving of face, since humor deflected attention to the entertainment aspect of clowning performances” (1994: 1-2).

78 Hereniko explains: “Here, the chief’s elevated position is collapsed as clown [or sportsman] and chief meet as actors in a play who can appreciate and celebrate their shared humanity, of which humor [or sport] is an integral part” (1994: 10). Hereniko further likens Polynesian forms of play to Euro-Caribbean carnival wherein the guise of comic theater provides “a multitude of human voices [to] engage in a dialogue that regenerates and revitalizes society” (Ibid: 16).
and wealth, even if only temporarily. This suggests that the annual festivities served important cultural and political functions in diffusing or inverting power dynamics and displacing conflict into socially acceptable arenas. The same may be true for the many non-violent and purely fun games.

The Makahiki also included games of a sexual nature such as ‘ume (to draw, pull, attract, entice) and kilu (small gourd used to pair off partners). Both involved a variety of sexual liaisons among unrelated people that could range from kissing to intercourse. During these games, ‘married’ couples might go off with other partners without any jealousy invoked or high chiefs might engage in sexual relations with lower members of the ali‘i class or with commoners (Malo 1951: 214, 217). Kilu, when initiated by a chief, “was a supreme expression of hospitality,” Malo notes, as if to say “all that I have is yours” (Ibid). I suggest that this festive playing was a cultural practice that provided for the negotiation of social relations concerning hierarchy and rank, status and wealth, communal and private property, sexual attractions and jealousies, familial obligations and individual liberty, and so forth. The experience of Hawaiians’ social stratification might thereby be less rigid than otherwise structurally perceived.

Hawaiians use the term kaona—hidden meaning in Hawaiian poetry—to describe buried or multiple meanings within Hawaiian thought and narrativity. Many Hawaiian mele (song, chant, poem), for instance, describe features of the islands’ natural beauty while also referring to the physical or sexual attributes of a person. Similarly, Hawaiian mo‘olelo often bespeak of veiled praise, caution, critique, debate, or argumentation that are not readily intelligible by those who lack particular knowledge. Kaona relies upon intimate knowledge of Native culture and ways of life, including the islands’ land, water and other natural elements. These understandings suggest that Hawaiian practices, articulations and traditions are not always what they seem at first appearance or utterance, nor are they easily accessible to non-Hawaiians. Expanding upon Kepelino’s use of “Hawai‘i ‘imi loa,” Arista argues that ‘play’—the fun imbued in the
“give and take” of meaning evident in kaona—is integral to Hawaiian self-conceptions and life-ways (Arista 2007).79

Play thus enables people to work across multiple contexts, both discursively and materially. The fact that the akua pa’ani, the god of play, was/is an essential part of the Makahiki suggests that importance of play in Hawaiian life-ways. Perhaps, as Hereniko contends, play functions as a safety valve to release tension in small island communities, or as Geertz describes, games serve as symbolic structures in which subjective meanings and societal sensibilities are negotiated.

Today, the play and humor embedded in “talk story” continues to serve a similar function in Hawai‘i as a means of relating to each other, lessening status and cultural differences, and diffusing or displacing conflict among the islands’ multiethnic residents in their local communities. I have many anecdotal stories of how I have been “put in my place” through friendly jokes directed at me during talk story sessions with fellow public high school friends who are not college-educated. Such jest offers a sort of “test” that reinforces a sense of humility to “equalize” status differentials and lessen cultural distance. In this way, play continues to function in ways that help strengthen the bonds of affability among friends, acquaintances or others who coexist and interact.

TRIBUTE AND COMMUNITY GOVERNANCE

Following the god of play, Kamakau explains, a series of other gods were cared for and carried by the kähuna throughout the islands: “Much wealth was acquired by the god[s] during this circuit of the island in the form of tribute (ho‘okupu) from the

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79 In an introduction to Kepelino’s Traditions of Hawai‘i (1932[2007]), Arista translates Kepelino’s observations of the challenges that foreigners continually contend with as they try to understand Hawaiians, their culture, and the plurality of their histories: “A heap of amazing things can be learned about Hawai‘i ‘imi loa! However diligently the foreigner inquires, he cannot fathom all of the doings of far seeking Hawai‘i. This is a very unusual thing of a certain kind and that is a strange thing of another kind! A heap of absurdities is all he has to show from Hawai‘i the great land! (Kepelino 1932[2007]: xi). Arista goes on to examine Kepelino and his nineteenth-century contemporaries to gain insight into the self-describing phrase “Hawai‘i ‘imi loa”. “The phrase “‘imi loa” literally means “to engage in profound inquiry, to seek or search.” Making this phrase a part of his naming of Hawai‘i—“Hawai‘i ‘imi loa”—Kepelino clearly conceptualizes Hawai‘i itself as seeking, searching, and deeply inquiring. An attempt to define the nature of Hawai‘i as a specific or fixed list of characteristics is an elusive prospect because “Hawai‘i ‘imi loa” is always moving, seeking, changing” (Ibid: xii). For this reason, Arista (2007) explains: “A Hawaiian approach to a satisfying sense of knowing assumes that a multiplicity of meanings rather than a set or fixed quantity will serve as an answer. It is...the fluidity of action or process [as a mode of] of meaning-making.”
[various] land sections” (1964: 20). This ho‘okupu is often interpreted as the annual “tax” paid by the maka‘ainana to the konohiki, and collected by the kāhuna and shared among the ali‘i. Yet, an understanding of this aspect of the Makahiki as simply a “tax season” is unsubstantiated. Ho‘okupu is not merely tribute or tax, but also “ceremonial gift giving to a chief as a sign of honor and respect” (Pukui and Elbert 1971). Serving the chiefs was likened to serving each other, and humility was an important social value. With this understanding, the preceding consecrated times of kapu and festive playing (which had many opportunities for people to be humbled) may have helped foster a sense of sincere sharing and willing tribute among the maka‘ainana and with the ali‘i. In other words, the various strands of the annual Makahiki festival—observing sacred prohibitions, playing games, and giving tribute—were woven tightly into the social fabric of Hawaiian society to reinforce bonds of spirituality, mutuality, obligation, respect, responsibility, celebration, and gratitude, creating “an indigenous political economy of sacredness and sharing” (Ferguson and Turnbull 1999: 12).

“The ahupua’a is the basic unit of Hawaiian natural and cultural resource management…[that primarily] runs from the sea to the mountains and contains a sea fishery and beach, a stretch of kula or open cultivable land, and, higher up, the forest” (McGregor 2007: 282). They include a heap (ahu) of stones and an image of a pig (pua’a) placed at the dividing points; hence the name ahupua’a. The Makahiki gods collected their tribute at these spots. Within the ahupua’a system, integrated subsistence practices sustained Hawaiian communities, and each ‘ohana contributed its tribute as part of its kuleana. It was the responsibility of the konohiki to collect the ho‘okupu and present it to the kāhuna and higher ali‘i. A high ali‘i or king/queen might have numerous ahupua’a under his/her charge with designated konohiki having principal jurisdiction therein. Because, as Malo explains, “[t]he king…had no laws regulating property, or land, regarding the payment or collection of debts, regulating affairs and transactions among the common people, not to mention a great many other things” (1951: 57), konohiki acted as ‘judge’ and ‘ohana functioned as the primary means of ‘law enforcement’ within
ahupua’a. Each ahupua’a, and ‘ohana within these ahupua’a, had particular common law protocol specific to them, as did different konohiki had particular arbitration methods particular to them. This reflects a disaggregated or decentralized structure of governance similar to modern federal systems. These place-based community governance processes functioned in tandem with the overarching kapu system.

‘Ohā is the sprout that shoots off from the taro root and it is the basis for the word ‘ohana. Pukui explains that taro is the “biological prototype of the form in which heredity and relationships [are] conceived. ...The family stock, then, budding and branching from parent stock, was conceived in terms of the habit of reproduction of taro” (Handy, Handy and Pukui 1972: 76). Thus, ‘ohana provide the roots for Hawaiian social and political traditions of kalo cultivation. ‘Ohana were often dispersed, spanning locales from the ocean to the mountains, which allowed for work and resources to be shared within and between ‘ohana of a given ahupua’a. These ‘ohana relationships were further strengthened through intermarriage and adoptions. As ‘ohana “constituted the community in which the economic life moved” (Handy and Pukui 1972: 76), reciprocal exchanges and layered responsibilities flourished.

Taro, as noted, is the elder sibling of Hawaiians, Häloa. Cultivation of taro equates, as Trask explains, to “mālama ʻāina: care for the land who will care for all family members in return” (Trask 1993: 80). This organic and familial relationship provides the basis for much of Hawaiians’ spiritual and cultural practices that revere the natural deities in the balance and harmony of their lives. Hawaiian lifecycle practices correspond to the lifecycle of taro, which approximates a lunar year, providing the patterns of worship, festivities, work, play and war (Kamakau 1964: 35). Poi, the primary food product of taro, represents harmony between humans and nature, and especially within the ‘ohana. Pukui recounts how the kūpuna in her ‘ohana would bring out the poi bowl whenever they wanted to quell an argument, because it was implicitly

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80 Poi is made by steaming the taro root and pounding/mashing it with water. Traditionally, two people would often make point by sitting on opposite sides of a large wooden bowl and alternately pounding the taro. Although this still takes place today in families and among friends, for commercial production of poi machines are often used.
recognized as a symbol of peace (Handy and Pukui 1972). When taro is cultivated and when poi is shared no disputes or unpleasant discussions are permitted. Additionally, war was prohibited during the taro planting season.

Kalo cultivation is labor-intensive work that requires a collective effort. In the past, ‘ohana and the larger ahupua’a community organized that collective effort. It included building lo’i (irrigated terrace for taro) and extensive ‘auwai (irrigation ditch) to cultivate the crop, the harvesting of the root, and the pounding of it into poi. Taro was cultivated in community patches for the chiefs, and in private ‘ohana lo’i for personal uses by commoners. Water was essential to the ahupua’a, not simply as a resource but also as a spiritual link to the gods of nature, “providers of life-giving water” (Kamakau 1870: 35). Pukui explains:

Taro, which grew along streams and later in irrigated areas, was the food staple for Hawaii, and its life and productivity depended primarily upon water. The fundamental conception of property and law was therefore based upon water rights rather than land use and possession. Actually there was no conception of ownership of water or land, but only of the use of water and land. The word kanawai, or law, also tied back to water. Ka-na-wai is literally ‘belonging-to-the waters’ (Handy, Handy and Pukui 1972: 58).

Kanawai, the Hawaiian word for law, is a mix of both common-law and kapu practices, and through it Hawaiians engineered and managed extensive lo’i for kalo cultivation and vast near-shore fish ponds for fish cultivation. In the ahupua’a system, preserving the quality of all resources—land, plants, water and wildlife—was (and increasingly, very consciously, still is) the governing principle. The kanawai concerning resources were based on use-rights, not property ownership, usually through long-term use patterns and in proportion to the amount of labor contributed by families and individuals (MacKenzie 1991). For example, if an ‘ohana was well represented on the work days to build or repair the ‘auwai, then the members of that ‘ohana would receive ample water for their lo’i and other crops; whereas an ‘ohana who did not contribute much labor would receive little or no water. Similarly, if an individual or family was found to be under-utilizing their water or cultivable lands, then they would forfeit rights
to that water and land. Wealth was measured by one’s capacity to share. “The word waiwai means wealth, prosperity, ownership, possession. Literally it is water-water” (Handy, Handy and Pukui 1972: 58). A farmer with abundant water was indeed wealthy, and community governance focused on sharing wealth among all members. In these ways, reciprocal relations within and between ‘ohana and within the ahupua’a were continually reproduced through effective management by the konohiki and ali‘i, guided by kapu and common-law practices, and commemorated during the Makahiki.

Through the taro plant, an off-spring of the mating gods, the Hawaiian people maintain their ancestral links to the gods. The shared social and political goals of the chiefs and the commoners were to maintain balance and justice among all dimensions of spiritual and material life. Because the ali‘i relied on the maka‘āinana for their shared livelihoods through kalo cultivation, the norm was for ali‘i to act as stewards rather than oppressors. Taro provided the basis for allocating water and land according to infrastructure contribution and resource use. Taro further provided the basis for extended family networks of production, consumption and exchange, which were further extended into broader circulations of symbolic and social capital within and across ahupua’a. The resting period of the taro season served as a pretext for play and an opportunity to lessen the power differentials between different societal strata/groups and a means to redistribute power and status for collective harmony.

These cultural and political traditions demonstrate a Native understanding of self-in-relation mediated through kuleana practices of layered responsibilities between persons within and across different groups/classes. Community governance practices relied on—and reproduced—social relations of reciprocity and parity, with significant degrees of freedom and autonomy in everyday life. There is an inherent plurality in Hawaiian knowledges and life-ways reflected in their numerous gods, historical renderings, sexual diversity, and hidden/multilayered meanings. This allowed for relational interactions to be flexible in changing contexts over time.
These pre-state traditions extend far into the islands’ past, and despite changes coinciding with Hawaiian state formation in the 19th century (which I examine in the next chapter), persist. The various strands of Hawaiian tradition are self-consciously woven into the Waiāhole taro farmers’ contemporary kalo cultivation, and moreover, mobilized as political resources as they seek to reconstitute an ahupua’a management system through their water struggle. In their fight against the U.S. military pollution and confiscation of their land, the Kamaka family, too, drew from these traditions in self-understandings as konohiki descendants and stewards responsible for the care of land and water resources.

Recall the central question of this dissertation: how is tradition used in ways that help or hurt communities’ abilities to control and use the land and water resources necessary for their livelihoods? I suggest that the different emphases placed on maka‘āinana traditions by the taro farmers versus ali‘i traditions by the Kamaka family partly explain why the Waiāhole water struggle was successful and the Kamaka land struggle was not. Commoner traditions resonated broadly with the valleys’—and islands’—more recent working-class traditions of the plantation era and early statehood period; and chiefly traditions simply did not. This was unfortunate because, as I show in this chapter, communality and reciprocal equivalences between chiefs and commoners were an integral part of Hawaiian tradition.
CHAPTER 3:
HYBRID MODERNIZATION IN A HAWAIIAN HAWAI‘I

Hawai‘i’s 19th century transition from a ‘traditional’ society to ‘modern’ nation-state was filled with complex negotiations between ali‘i and haole in which ali‘i sought to both modify existing indigenous structures and work through Hawaiianizing Euro-American structures to suit their own needs, what Kamanamaikalani Beamer (2008) calls hybrid modernization. During this time, Hawai‘i transformed from a Native centered, communal- and subsistence-oriented society to a Euro-American dominant, capitalist-oriented nation-state. Amid these changes, the maka‘ainana continued to exercise their individual and collective agency evident in governmental petitions, hui (group, association) land movements, and persistent land- and water-use patterns. This chapter examines Hawaiian Kingdom traditions pertaining to changing relationships of persons to place in an era of hybrid modernization when a blend of both Euro-American and Hawaiian governance models were being negotiated. The formation of the Hawaiian nation-state shifted traditional understandings of self-in-relation centered on the ‘ohana and ahupua’a to modern notions of the citizen/subject and state sovereignty. Yet, as I will show, the inherent plurality of Hawaiian knowledges and life-ways was reflected in multiple meanings of sovereignty, and in expanded practices of peoplehood and community belonging.

Hybrid modernization informs both the Kamaka family and Wai‘ahole taro farmers practices. The Māhele instituted in the mid 19th century and the subsequent hui

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81 Beamer contends that “the dichotomies of the ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ and their connotations are false” and illustrates his point with present day taro farmers who continue traditional cultivation yet use the sickle, a modern tool. He and other scholars (Beamer 2008; Sai 2008; Vogeler 2009) critique the traditional and modernist divide as “conceptual shackles” that reinscribes the colonizer-colonized relationship. These scholars interpret Hawai‘i’s modernization process as one of “strategic adaptation” to Euro-American ideas and institutions and not mere imperial “impositions”. This non-colonial vantage point puts forth an occupation framework that emphasizes the (continuing) state sovereignty of the Hawaiian Kingdom and its constitutive national subjects. I believe that understanding Hawai‘i through both a colonization and occupation framework shows the disjunctured and overlapping historical and present-day processes of both, and helps contribute to broader visions of a future Hawaiian Hawai‘i. I wish to maintain a similar fluidity between traditional and modern as I discuss some of the sociopolitical changes that took place in the 19th century.
land movement provided the konohiki descendant Kamaka family with fee-simple land title in Waikāne and Waiāhole, which gave them a legal and political basis to fight for their land. Yet, Hawaiian notions of property were imbued with Native understandings of communal resource use, and it is this tradition that the Waiāhole taro farmers assert in their water struggle.

**AN ISLAND ‘CONTACT ZONE’**

In 1778 “when the Hawaiian Islands discovered Captain Cook, lost in the Pacific Ocean” (Kahikina 2000), the Hawaiian people inadvertently discovered Western diseases that wreaked havoc on the relatively isolated island society. Although Hawaiians had voyaged across the Pacific Ocean for centuries, engaging in trade and other social exchanges, they had little immunity to venereal disease, cholera, smallpox, and other diseases. Less than fifty years after contact with Euro-Americans, the Hawaiian population declined by over 80 percent (with an additional 67 percent decline over the following fifty years). The immense tragedy of this population decline cannot be overstated. “The reordering of the land and people [that was to come] was more easily accomplished by the loss of those thousand[s of] voices, and the rupture of social relations and ways of life of the people of old” (Ferguson and Turnbull 1999: 19).

Kalo cultivation declined significantly because there were not enough people to sustain previous production levels. At the same time, the international whaling and

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82 This is an intentional play on words in which a Hawaiian nationalist reasserts the agency of the land as a subject acting upon the object of Cook, rather than vice versa.
83 On the lower end, Stannard (1989) estimates 800,000 Hawaiians in 1778. Missionary estimates in 1823 have the Hawaiian population at 134,925, and Hawaiian Kingdom estimates in 1884 have the Hawaiian population (including part-Hawaiians) at 44,232 (Schmitt 1968). Some of this population decline prior to the arrival of the missionaries may have been attributed to war-related deaths during King Kamehameha’s unification of the Hawaiian Islands; however, war-related deaths were not uncommon in Hawai‘i’s history of frequently warring chiefs. The impact of war-related deaths pales in comparison to disease-related deaths and to the lower birthrates resulting from widespread venereal diseases. It’s important to note that following the establishment of the Hawaiian Kingdom under King Kamehameha in 1810, there was an end to inter-chief warfare in the islands and prolonged peace was established, yet the massive death tolls persisted. In disagreement with Stannard, Bushnell (1992) argues that post-Cook voyagers reported a healthy population through 1820s, and only after that did the population plummet. However, numerous epidemics and related widespread deaths were recorded in Hawai‘i between 1778 and 1820, such as venereal diseases and tuberculosis introduced by Cook and subsequent seamen, a typhoid fever outbreak in 1803, and a smallpox epidemic in 1804. Even with Bushnell’s estimate of 450,000 Hawaiians at the time of Cook’s arrival, there would have been a 70% population decrease in the first 50 years—what I would consider to still be a near-collapse of the population.
sandalwood trades, along with its related luxury goods markets, introduced capitalist commerce and commodity-exchange to Hawai‘i (Kent 1993). The reciprocity of kuleana practices between the ali‘i and maka‘ainana were substantially altered as material capital increasingly mediated exchange relations. Moreover, the introduction of gunpowder and the use of Euro-American advisors enabled one high chief, Kamehameha of the island of Hawai‘i, to gain military and political dominance over all the islands, thereby unifying the Hawaiian Kingdom by 1810.84

The Hawaiian kapu system formally ended in 1819, following the death of King Kamehameha I. Ending the kapu system was a response to the population collapse that cast doubt on the power of traditional religious governance to protect the people as well as a result of shifting power dynamics among Hawaiian ali‘i searching for new or alternative sources of spiritual strength and political authority in the face of foreign intrusions (Kame‘eleihiwa 1992).85 The governance system that regulated spiritual, cultural, political, economic, and social relations of Hawaiian society was literally coming apart, leaving Hawaiians in a precarious and vulnerable position. Calvinist missionaries arrived in early 1820 from America and offered a rigid form of puritan Christianity to re-connect the society.

The missionaries offered the Christian bible as a guide for societal spirituality and governance, and Hawaiians readily embraced the bible for the power of the written word it represented. Lilikala Kameʻeleihiwa explains how the ali‘i “were delighted with the *palapala* [writing of any kind] because it allowed them to extend their great intellectual and poetic traditions” (1992: 142). This embrace of reading and writing illustrates one way that Hawaiians appropriated Western practices and refashioned them to meet Hawaiian needs. The shift from an oral to a literate society also transformed practices of law and

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84 This is how the entire archipelago received the name Hawai‘i; perhaps if another high chief from Maui (or O‘ahu) had united the islands then they would be called Maui (or O‘ahu). Accordingly, Hawaiians were not known as Hawaiians. Those Native to the islands had/have numerous names for themselves: kanaka (*human being, person*), kanaka maoli (*native, genuine, true*), kanaka ʻōiwi (*native, of the bone*), among others. More importantly, recounting one’s genealogy was the primary means of self-identification in terms of familial lineage as was as place associations.

85 See Kameʻeleihiwa (1992) for extended analyses of the end of the kapu system, various understandings therein, and changes in land-tenure from a Native perspective.
governance. Whereas the submerged system of local community governance survived the end of the kapu system (as did many forms of spiritual practices of maka‘āinana and within ‘ohana), the inherent flexibility of common law practices became difficult to sustain as new Christian laws, and then Western-style secular laws, became statically written and rigidly enforced (Kame‘elehiwa 1992; Osorio 2002; Merry 2000).  

One of the first and foremost sites of conversion was the Hawaiian body: clothing, sex/sexuality, and labor. Regulating Hawaiian bodies significantly curtailed the traditionally broad range of freedom Hawaiians experienced. The nuclear family was codified through the institutionalization of patriarchal marriage. Sex was restricted to the marital bed, and all other sexual acts were deemed illegal and punishable by imprisonment and hard labor (Merry 2000). The introduction of such a rigid understanding and enforcement of heteropatriarchical marriage had several consequences. The ‘ohana networks (not necessarily actual ‘ohana) were effectively broken up, whereas primary affinity shifted from relations between and within generational cohorts to spousal and parent-child relations. Likewise, patterns of production and consumption shifted from shared resource use and integrated collective labor to wage-income work, individual and family “goods,” and conceptions of personal ownership. Additionally, new relations of authority, self-regulation, and organization were also created, wherein individuals “controlled” their desires and “submitted” to and “relied upon” new sources of authority—such as church doctrine, the husband/father patriarch, and regimes of law and order—rather than exercise a broad range of personal liberty according to shared beliefs or collective decision-making. Jonathan Kamakawiwo‘ole Osorio contends that

[19th century] sumptuary laws proceeded to change the relationship between the various elements of Hawaiian society by creating kingdomwide regulations, granting to the state, for instance, the right

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86 Merry explains how “The shift to a printed system fosters universalism at the expense of local particularisms (2000: 68). This effectively restricts local Native variabilities to universalizing Euro-American standards. See also Buck (1993: Chapter 6) for a discussion of the radical shift from orality to literacy in Hawai’i and its effect on altering Hawaiians’ basic cognitive processes and shaping their social consciousness.

87 See Ralston (1989) for a discussion of sex and sexuality vis-à-vis early post-contact Native women.
to intrude into the kanaka [Native] family in ways that had not been allowed or even before imagined (2002: 13).

These norms of civilization enhanced the establishment of capitalist relations throughout the islands. While the early missionaries often commented on the widespread indolence of Hawaiians who partook in numerous sports and playful pastimes instead of endless hours of industrious work, a latter visiting missionary leader observed “[a]s their wants multiply with advancing civilization, they show a disposition to labor for the means of supplying those wants” (Anderson 1864: 250).

Kame‘eleihiwa explains that the ali‘i (especially the greater chiefs) sought to do what was pono—correct, fitting, just. Being pono and maintaining balance for the entire society, was the source of the chiefs’ mana (divine power, authority). Amid the death and influx of foreign influences, ali‘i saw the ‘modernization’ of their society as a way to protect it from foreign predation and sought advice from missionaries for this reason. However, becoming more “modern” and Euro-American-like resulted in an empowerment of foreigners in Hawai‘i who wrote the laws that effected these transformations, and at the same time disempowered Hawaiians in the process. Kamakau (1867) noted that many people felt as if the Kingdom had “been taken away” because it “depended on the new good ways,” while the rulers of Britain and France allowed Hawai‘i to remain independent because they believed its government was capable. Osorio describes the relationship

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88 Merry describes how this “disciplin[ing] of everyday life” through the disciplining of the Hawaiian body and the normalization of self-discipline therein “was fundamental to the Christian law” and the civilizing mission of the Calvinist missionaries in Hawai‘i (2000: 72). She elaborates: “Peter Fitzpatrick argues that the Calvinism of the sixteenth century was a pastoral precursor to modern forms of disciplinary power relying on normalization, the production of personhood, and the discipline of the body. These new forms of discipline, as [Michel] Foucault argues, operate through microtechnologies of power rather than through repression and constraint. With modern law came a new demand for self-responsibility, a capacity for self-governance, and a new subject whose efforts at self-subjection in disciplinary, civilizing, religious, legal, or other spheres were private and voluntary. Discipline and punishment under the kapu law was quite different: an occasional, repressive intervention by the sovereign in response to transgressions of the sovereign’s prohibitions. The chiefly law was designed to enhance the awesome power and distinctiveness of the chiefs, its majesty tempered by the mercy of pardons and places of refuge. There is no indication that chiefly authority was engaged in policing and controlling the everyday life of commoners beyond enforcing kapus and decided conflicts brought by maka‘ainana. There was no prison, no concept of correction through punishment. Within maka‘ainana communities, of course, a distinct legal regime emphasized interdependence and reciprocity as well as vengeance and ostracism when these failed” (2000: 72).

89 Osorio explains: “The church became an institution promising life when death was everywhere, and the eventual conversion of Hawaiians by the thousands must be understood in the context of a time when their own religion, akua [gods] and Ali‘i could not prevent them from dying” (2002: 12). Also see Anderson (1864) for an interesting perspective from a missionary point of view.
between the ali‘i and foreign rulers as leading to a slow insinuation of non-Native people, ideas, and institutions that literally dismembered “the lāhui (the people) from their traditions, their lands, and ultimately their government (2002: 3).\(^9^{0}\)

Law, however, is double-edged, as Sally Engle Merry notes. It can be used to resist impositions of power. Hawaiians, and later Asian laborers, fought their oppression under the plantation system that was introduced in the second half of the 19\(^{th}\) century (Merry 2000), while the Hawaiian Kingdom enacted laws as a means to resist colonization altogether. In doing so, the kingdom secured formal Western-styled sovereignty, codified in a constitutional monarchy and through dozens of treaties with other nation-states beginning in 1839 (Sai 2008).

These practices of accommodation and resistance help show how Hawaiians negotiated the complexities of the 19\(^{th}\) century ‘contact zone.’ In addition to legal processes and state-based norms, non-legal and non-state meanings informed Hawaiians’ sense of peoplehood and community belonging as they juggled traditional relations of persons and place within the newly formed Hawaiian Kingdom. This juggling continues today among Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians such as the Waiāhole taro farmers. Understanding that juggling can help bridge some of the contentiousness in present-day Hawaiian and local politics.

**EA: HAWAIIAN CONCEPTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY**

The mid 19\(^{th}\) century brought new concepts of national/state sovereignty to Hawai‘i. The modernist concept of state sovereignty that originated in Europe is mutually constituted through the idea of the sovereign [rational] man, the subject of the state sovereign. While that concept influenced the meaning of citizen/subject in Hawai‘i, people in Hawai‘i held onto a multiplicity of meanings of sovereignty and peoplehood

\(^{90}\) Osorio continues: “[T]he mutilations were not physical only, but also psychological and spiritual. Death came not only through infections and disease, but through racial and legal discourse that crippled the will, confidence, and trust of the Kānaka Maoli as surely as leprosy and smallpox claimed their limbs and lives” (2002: 3).
above and beyond this understanding. Varied uses of the Hawaiian word “ea” illuminate this point.

One of the first instances of the word ‘ea’ being used in the context of sovereignty occurred in 1843 when King Kamehameha III (Kauikeaouli) proclaimed “Ua mau ke ea o ka aina i ka pono” after the Hawaiian Kingdom was restored following a five-month takeover by British Lord George Paulet over a land dispute between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the British Consul. This dispute stemmed from years of British and American rivalries in the islands and throughout the Pacific, and against the backdrop of persistent French rivalry (Kuykendall 1938 [1976]: 206-226).  

British Admiral Richard Thomas intervened and negotiated a treaty with King Kamehameha III to protect British subjects in the islands, after which the Hawaiian flag was raised once again on July 31, 1843.

“Ua mau ke ea o ka aina i ka pono” has been translated in a variety of ways. The main words – mau, ea, aina, and pono – mean:

91 Kuykendall explains: “[there was] a belief in the minds of British officials at home that the Hawaiian islands were practically governed by the United States through the missionaries, to the prejudice of British subjects” (1938 [1976]: 207). During this time French warships also frequented Hawai‘i claiming that French subjects, who were Catholic, were being prejudiced against by the American missionaries, who were Protestant (Calvinists). Concurrently, France was taking control of various Pacific Islands, such as the Marquesas and Tahiti, and the threat of a French take over of Hawai‘i appeared looming.  

92 Shortly thereafter, on November 28, 1843 Britain and France signed a joint declaration recognizing Hawaiian Statehood and pledging non-interference. The United States did not follow suit, waiting until December 20, 1849 before signing a treaty with the Hawaiian Kingdom.  

93 “Ua Mau Ke Ea O Ka Aina I Ka Pono” is now the motto for the State of Hawai‘i, as part of the United States of America. The state government’s translation is: The Life of the Land is Perpetuated in Righteousness. This “official” translation makes no mention of sovereignty whatsoever—a rhetorical erasure of Hawaiians’ complex conceptions and practices of sovereignty by the “new sovereigns”, the American state. “Life of the land” is transformed into a near-abstraction linked with an environmental ethic, effectively displacing the people of the land whose life is sustained by the land and vice versa. And being “perpetuated in righteousness” evokes a Christian ethic as a form of agency that gives life to the land, rather than the land as a force of agency in itself, as was the tradition of Hawaiian faith. This insistence of a Christianized interpretation is evidenced in a U.S. governmental website that suggests that Queen Ke‘opuolani first uttered the words that would become the Hawai‘i State motto in 1825 when she was baptized into the Christian faith (Netstates website http://www.netstate.com/states/mottoes/hi_motto.htm accessed on January 17, 2009). By locating an origin for “Ua Mau Ke Ea O Ka Aina I Ka Pono” in a specifically Christianizing moment, the sociopolitical context of Hawaiian independence that is at the core of the proclamation is blurred. In this “history” of the Hawai‘i State motto, King Kamehameha III is reduced to one of several successive authorities who invoke this phrase. Providing “factual” information on all fifty states, this website explains: “State mottoes may be said to reflect the character and beliefs of the citizens of the state… State mottoes can help us gain insight into the history of a state” [Ibid]. This oft-repeated “history” traces the motto “Ua Mau Ke Ea O Ka Aina I Ka Pono” from the Hawaiian Kingdom to the so-called Republic of Hawai‘i—which adopted the motto in 1894, a year after it overthrew the Kingdom, a fact omitted from this “history”—to the U.S. Territorial Government of Hawai‘i—which adopted the motto in 1900, two years after it illegally annexed the islands, another fact omitted from this “history”—to the State of Hawai‘i in 1959, which ignored United Nations self-determination mandates, also a fact omitted from this “history”. This sequence of forcible appropriation and perhaps willful mistranslations attempts to legitimize a supposed transfer of sovereignty from the Hawaiian Kingdom to the United States while concealing the actual suppression and usurpation of
Mau:  1. Always; steady; constant, unceasing, continual, perpetual; to…persevere. … 2. Stopped; … snagged, caught… 3. Conceived, as at the very moment of conception. … […] firm, steadfast …

Ea:  1. Sovereignty, rule, independence. … 2. Life, breath, vapor… spirit. … 3. To rise, go up, raise, become erect. … 4. To smell. …

Aina:  [‘aina] Meal; to eat.  
[‘āina] Land, earth.

Pono:  1. Goodness, uprightness, morality… correct or proper procedure, excellence, well-being, prosperity, welfare, true condition or nature, duty; … fitting… just, fair, beneficial, successful; … should, ought, must; necessary. … 2. Completely, properly, rightly, well, exactly, carefully, satisfactorily… 3. Property, gear, possessions, necessities, livelihood. … 4. Use, purpose. … 5. Hope. … (Pukui and Elbert 1971)

The proclamation became the Kingdom’s motto, and was restated in English in 1848 by Chief Justice William Lee as “The life of the land is preserved by righteousness” (Shillaber v. Waldo, 1 Haw. 21, 25, [31, 38] (1848)). Here ea refers to life, specifically the life of the land that was restored when the king was reinstated. As early as 1836, ea was translated by American missionary Lorrin Andrews as “spirit, vital breath, the breath, life” (1836: 15 quoted in Mykkèanen 2003: 173). Non-Hawaiians, who were likely unfamiliar with the multiple, nuanced, and hidden meanings in Hawaiian words used both of these early English translations of ea. Keanu Sai suggests that at the time of King Kamehameha’s proclamation, ea referred to life and not sovereignty, noting that a December 14, 1842 letter (predating the proclamation) written by Hawaiian Kingdom

Hawaiian sovereignty by America. Warner explains that this “non-Hawaiian interpretation serves to obscure and render meaningless a historic moment in Hawaiian history. … The irony that a proclamation by a native king (that the sovereignty of the native Hawaiian people is perpetuated through a triumph of justice) was subsequently selected as the motto of the state (an extension of the government that trod upon Hawaiian sovereignty) in order to promote the state’s own ‘distinctiveness’ cannot be understated and stands as an extreme case of cultural and linguistic appropriation” (Warner 1999:82). Moreover, in denying Native sovereignty and citizenship, this “official” translation bolsters continued American colonization and occupation of the islands. Interestingly, America’s Christian Right and their conservative allies on the islands have utilized the Hawai‘i State motto in contemporary debates over the legalization of same-sex marriage. In fierce opposition to same-sex marriage, testimonies included the following: “In keeping with the motto of our great state, Ua mau ke ea o ka aina I ka pono—the life of the land is perpetuated in righteousness—let us as citizens of Hawaii do the correct thing—the righteous thing. If we lower the standards of life by committing the unrighteousness act of legalizing same-sex marriage, we will no longer have the spirit of aloha.” and “I strongly oppose same sex marriages. Our state motto is “Ua Mau Ke Ea O Ka Aina I Ka Pono (The life of the land is preserved, perpetuated, continues, is constant, and perseveres in righteousness.) … Same Sex marriages would allow “unrighteousness” to infect Hawaii nei” (Goldberg-Hiller 2002: 148, emphasis in original). Arguably, these testimonies reflects the enduring and extensive Christianization of Hawai‘i that began with the early missionaries and the outlawing of Hawaiians’ diverse life-ways and sexual practices. See Inoue (2003) for a discussion of historical and contemporary constructions of Hawaiian Christianity.
officials Timoteo Haalilio and William Richards to U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster shows the Kingdom actively seeking state sovereignty through mutual recognition by the United States. That state sovereignty was achieved on November 28, 1843, and the date is now celebrated as Lā Kū’oko’a, Independence Day. It is evident that kū’oko’a means independence in the Western, legal sense of (external) state sovereignty.

Hawaiians also celebrate July 31—the day that the Hawaiian flag was raised and King Kamehameha issued his proclamation—as Lā Ho’iho’i Ea, (Sovereignty/Life) Restoration Day. This suggests ea also was understood as sovereignty of the people and the government, not simply life. The naming of Lā Ho’iho’i Ea, (Sovereignty/Life) Restoration Day, celebrated the king’s reinstatement, the restoration of his ability to rule (his sovereign capacity) as an embodiment of the life of the land and its people. Because the genealogies of commoners and chiefs (what would now be considered “the people” and “the government”) derive from the same source—Hāloa, the taro plant as a manifestation of Hawaiians’ akua (gods) and ‘āina (lands)—land is “a living and active being – in relationship with the mö‘ī [king], the people, and the governing apparatus” (Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua 2008)\(^\text{94}\)

I suggest that King Kamehameha III’s use of ea not only pertains to (internal) sovereignty in a Western sense, but also more importantly attests to notions of Native sovereignty-as-life incapable of being captured by legal norms and forms of state sovereignty alone. In Hawaiian understandings, the life of the land could only be preserved and perpetuated through pono—righteous actions by the chiefs and diligent care of the maka‘āinana. This broader context of Hawaiian traditions and life-ways focuses on the interconnectedness of all aspects of life, including chiefly governance over land as much as anything else. As a result, when “Ua mau ke ea o ka aina i ka pono” was proclaimed, ea was not merely life nor simply an equivalent of Western legal sovereignty but rather a hybridized concept of Hawaiian tradition. Sam No‘eau Warner translates the proclamation as “The sovereignty of the land continues once more

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\(^{94}\) See Basham (2007) for an insightful discussion (in Hawaiian) of important 19\(^{\text{th}}\) century Hawaiian concepts such as ea, ‘āina, pono and lāhui.
through justice/as it should be” (Warner 1999). It is not the sovereignty of the king but the land that is emphasized; and it is not simply righteousness but “justice/as it should be” that constitutes pono.

Writing in the 1860s Hawaiian language newspapers, Kamakau, elaborates upon the significance of King Kamehameha III’s proclamation.

‘Ua mau ke ea o ka aina i ka pono.’ Ua malu kou waiwai me kou aina—Ua malu kou hale me kau wahine—Ua malu kou ohana, me kau mau holoholona. Ua malu kou puka ana, a me kou komo ana—Ua malu kou ao ana, a me kou haipule ana—Ua malu kou kalepa ana, a me kou kuai ana—Na ka mea Mana Loa oe e hoopomaikai mai—No ka mau ana o ka aina i ka pono (Kamakau 1865).

Contemporary scholar Keao NeSmith’s translation of Kamakau is:

‘The sovereignty of the land continues in integrity.’ Your property [belongings, wealth] and land are safe—Your home and wife are safe—Your family and animals are safe. Your out-goings and your in-comings are safe—Your learnings and your religious devotions are safe—Your dealings in commerce and your purchases are safe—The Most Powerful one grants you blessings—So that the land would continue in righteousness.

Kamakau continues, and NeSmith translates:

‘Ua mau ke Ea o ke Aupuni i ka pono.’ O ka mau o ka Noho Alii o ke Aupuni Hawai‘i, i na moopuna, a i na mamo a ka mea nana i hooihio iho i Aupuni holooka mai Hawai‘i a Kauai… (Ibid).

‘The life of the Government continues in righteousness.’ The continuity of the rule of the Hawaiian government to the grandchildren and to the descendants of the one who united the entire nation from Hawaii to Kauai…

After recounting the words and deeds of Kamehameha I, Kamehameha II (Liholiho), and Kamehameha III, Kamakau repeats the phrase “Ua mau ke ea o ka aina i ka pono,” which NeSmith translates here as “Firm is the sovereignty of the land in integrity.” Kamakau then repeats the phrase “E mau ke Ea o ke Aupuni i ka pono,” which NeSmith translates as “The breath of the Government shall continue in moral and spiritual integrity.”

Kamakau’s repeated invocations of ea show that the term has several meanings that vary with context. Similarly, pono has multiple meanings, including “that which is
necessary for survival." Kamehameha III emphasized ea and pono and Hawaiians of the time, such as Kamakau, understood the words to mean independence of the Hawaiian Kingdom and its lands, people, and government, and saw that independence as connected to ʻāina, the land, “that which feeds”—the source of life for the Hawaiian people, and the basis for their independence. In this context, sovereignty links the people, their leader(s)/government, the land, practices of integrity and justice, a sense of autonomous agency, and life itself (or life-giving breath) in perpetuity.

This understanding of sovereignty in the 19th century speaks of the many interconnected layers of Hawaiian life-ways—life-ways that were undergoing tremendous transformations but were nevertheless rooted in traditional knowledges and practices as a means of engaging present and future challenges. As the Hawaiian Kingdom established its state sovereignty through the ensuing decades, the Hawaiian people were transformed into “national citizens.” This concurrent transformation occurred because the formation of modern nation-states is mutually constituted through the formation of modern national citizens (Anderson 1983; Smith 1991; Ashley 1988). The multiple understandings of peoplehood in Hawai‘i became associated with the state and norms of citizenship in a way that extended Hawaiian concepts of peoplehood in and through their adoption of Western legal categories such as citizenship and rights. Similar to Hawaiian conceptions of sovereignty, the Hawaiian lāhui (nation, people) embodies the many interconnected layers of Hawaiian life-ways. Noelani Goodyear-Kaʻōpua explains:

Generally speaking, ‘lāhui’ refers to a great number of people, sharing a common connection and a collective identity. The prefix ‘lä-’ is a contracted form of ‘lau,’ meaning leaf or a plant’s manner of leafing out... ‘Lau’ also means many or numerous and is often used poetically to refer to an unquantifiable number of people or beings, as in the countless gods or descendants. ‘Hui’ can be used as both noun, meaning a society, organization, association, or team, and a verb, meaning to join, unite, mix, or combine. Thus, the components of the word lāhui suggest both a singular, organic body with branches that nourish the whole and a gathering of distinct, pre-existing elements combining to form a new entity (2008: 12).

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95 I would like to thank Noelani Goodyear-Kaʻōpua for pointing out this additional meaning.
96 See Hoffman (2004) for a critique of state-centric citizenship and a discussion of new/alternative conceptions of citizenship beyond the state.
Lähui, then, can be understood as both a unifying whole and a plural composite.

With the first Hawaiian constitution in 1840, and several subsequent constitutions, concepts of lähui became aligned with the citizenry of the nation-state. In the mid 19th century lähui as citizenry expanded to include non-Hawaiians subject to Kingdom laws; in other words, newly incorporated non-Native citizen/subjects of the Kingdom. Yet, as numerous makaʻainana petitions to the King and aliʻi demonstrate, many Hawaiians resisted the notion that foreigners could be or should be absorbed into the lähui (Osorio 2002). This resistance suggests that many preferred the lähui to be identified with the people and not the state. Nevertheless, Hawaiians loved their aliʻi and their government. Aloha ʻāina, love of the land, came to be equated with aloha lähui, patriotism and love of country—that which will sustain the life of the land. Who makes up the lähui, how it should be defined, and in which ways it should function remain contentious issues today.97 Hawaiian Kingdom traditions of peoplehood demonstrate expansive notions of community belonging tied to the government’s ea, sovereignty-as-life.

The genealogy of sovereignty in Hawaiʻi is multi-branched and intertwining, similar to Malo’s description of Hawaiian creation genealogies as a plant with multiple stems that may start at differing points and grow along differing paths, yet are connected (1951: 2). When Waiāhole taro farmers speak of sovereignty, it rarely involves legal definitions or state-based claims. Instead, they draw from these Hawaiian traditions to articulate sovereignty in terms of people’s relationship with the lands and waters that sustain their livelihoods. One taro farmer described sovereignty as “directly related to [our] ability to have a relationship with the land, [an] ability to take care of it and to take care of ourselves in a healthy way for both the land and the people.”98 Another farmer described sovereignty as “determining for ourselves how we want to

97 Goodyear-Kaʻōpua explains: “Pukui and Elbert include the following English translations of the word lähui: ‘nation, race, tribe, people, nationality; great company of people; species, as of animals or fish; breed, national or racial.’ In the context of highly charged political struggles for control of land, people, and other forms of wealth in Hawai‘i, the shades of difference between these meanings sharpen. Hawaiians are variously defined as a racial group within a multietnic state of the US, an indigenous group with contemporary rights to self-determination because of our continued presence on the land for millennia, and a national group based on descent from the citizenry of the modern Hawaiian Kingdom founded in the mid-19th century” (2008a:13).
98 S. 4/13/05.
live, self-sufficiently, self-reliantly [on the land]. ... Sovereignty: this [taro patch] is the tool.” The farmer brings visitors to the taro patch with the hope that “they can get connected and understand their relationship to the environment and that they can have a direct result by staying informed in the politics around you.” The relational dimensions of sovereignty emphasized by these farmers’ self-sufficiency on the land reflect the enduring legacy of the hybrid modernization that took place in the 19th century. I now turn to shifts in land-use that occurred during this time period.

**REFORMING THE LAND**

Hawai‘i’s transformation of land tenure and social relations began with the 1839 Declaration of Rights (also known as the Rights and Laws of 1839) that delineated the rights and responsibilities of the three main strata of the Hawaiian Kingdom (the King, the chiefs, and the commoners), and culminated with the 1850 Kuleana Act of the Māhele. During this time a constitutional monarchy was established, non-Native subjects were incorporated into the citizenry, and private property was instituted. The Māhele significantly loosened the bonds of connectivity and reciprocity embedded in traditional structures and practices of Hawaiian society. In doing so, the meanings that people derived from the land inevitably shifted. The transformations wrought by the Māhele laid the groundwork for the later monopolization of land and water resources by the Euro-American oligarchy that overthrew the Hawaiian Kingdom.

The direct and indirect influence of foreigners in the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, incorporation of non-Native subjects into the citizenry, and the institutionalization of private property are undeniable. At the same time, The King and chiefs knowingly and actively sought to maintain and bolster Hawaiian independence as they “modernized” their governance system through this establishment of a constitutional monarchy. Similarly, the maka‘āinana knowingly and actively sought to maintain and bolster Hawaiian independence as they questioned and cautioned the King and chiefs.

99 B. 8/10/05, emphasis added.
against such modernizations. Maka’āinana sent dozens of petitions to the Kingdom
government during the 1840s expressing fears that the government was becoming “too
foreign” and that foreigners would soon replace them as the people of the land (Osorio
2002: 30-33).\(^{100}\) Most of these maka’āinana petitions explicitly asked the government not to
sell land to foreigners (Ibid 45). Despite this vocal protest, the Kingdom government
decided it was in its best interest to follow through with the modernization.

Some scholars have regarded the Māhele as disastrous (Kame‘elehiwa 1992; Trask 1993; Osorio 2002; Kelly 1956), while others considered it progressive (Kuykendall 1938 [1976], Daws 1968, Fitzpatrick and Moffat 1995), and La Croix and Roumasset 1990). A growing number of scholars view the Māhele as a uniquely Hawaiian
adaptation of modernization (Beamer 2008; Preza 2007; Sai 2008; Beamer and Duarte 2006). What I wish to consider is how the Māhele is related to shifts in land-use and
changing relations of persons to place, because these changes in land practices reflected
a significant degree of traditional continuity while tradition itself was changing.

The 1839 Declaration of Rights and the 1840 Constitution were in effect a
codification of Hawaiian common law that reaffirmed the collective interest in the lands
and its resources shared by the King, chiefs, and commoners.\(^{101}\) These measures further
extended that collective understanding by positioning “everyone, chiefs and people,
kanaka and haole, into one definition of people, all entitled to the rights granted by

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\(^{100}\) Osorio explains: “Petitioning was the Maka’āinana’s opportunity to reinforce the traditional relationship
that existed between them and the Ali‘i as well as to define them both together as a people unified against
the incursions of foreigners” (2002: 36). Osorio notes that Native petitioning to the Kingdom government
was framed around a political process familiar to Hawaiians and this practice continued throughout the
late-19th century.

\(^{101}\) Sai explains: “The chiefs and the native tenants did not have a separate and distinct private interest in the
land, but rather a collective right in fee-simple together with the King, as stated in the 1840 Constitution. …
It wasn’t until 1848 that the division of this collective ownership, called the Great Mahele, would take place”
(2005: 239). Chinen explains: “that, though all the land belonged to King Kamehameha I, it was not his own
private property. It belonged to the chiefs and people in common, of whom Kamehameha I was the head,
and had management of the landed property.” This was the first formal acknowledgement by the king that
the common people had some form of ownership in the land, aside from an interest in the products of the
soil” (1958: 8). Chinen continues: “Under the constitution, the common people were still unable to acquire
absolute ownership of the land which they cultivated and on which they lived. However, they were no
longer subject to arbitrary removal by the kind or his chiefs.” Chinen himself in an earlier statement
concerning traditional land tenure, however, contradicts this latter statement: “Because it was not
considered just and right, dispossession did not occur too frequently” (Ibid 5). In this broader context, even
if the King or chiefs had a ‘right’ to remove commoners from the land prior to the 1840 Constitution, they
rarely did so because it was improper to do so; therefore, the constitution and the 1839 Declaration was in
effect a codification of these Hawaiian common law practices.
God” through the “authority of law” (Osorio 2002: 25). This centralized codification was a marked departure from the relatively decentralized practices in the ahupua’a management systems. It also shifted notions of authority and sovereignty from the high chiefs and king to the people as a whole (Merry 2002: 36). The Hawaiian name for this Declaration was He Kumu Kanawai a me ke Kanawai Hooponopono Waiwai, roughly translated as the foundational law to make right/correct prosperity/wealth, or more commonly known as The Declaration of Rights and the Laws Regulating Property. The language reflects King Kamehameha III (Kauikeouli)’s intent to do what was pono and ensure that the maka’ainana and ali’i were equally protected under the law, and that practices of shared vested interests in the land and resources would continue (Sai 2008). However, by the time of the declaration’s enactment, changes in the islands’ land and resource uses and Hawaiians’ social relations made the intentions almost unrealizable.

The early 19th century whaling industry resulted in hundreds (if not thousands) of Hawaiians migrating from the countryside to urban centers. Additionally, hundreds (if not thousands) of Hawaiians enlisted in whaling ships as crew members, and emigrated to areas of North America and elsewhere (Okihiro 2008; Barman and Watson 2006; Koppel 1995). Fewer Hawaiians worked in food cultivation, and food crops themselves were increasingly grown for commodity exchange in the seaports and not for subsistence and sharing among ‘ohana (Kent 1983: 22). These changes, coupled with population decline, reduced ahupua’a production and governance, and may have led to food shortages among maka’ainana (Beechert 1985: 13, citing Jones 1931: 965; Morgan 1948: 68-73; Ralston 1978: 6). The end result, as Edward D. Beechert describes, was that maka’ainana who once were planters or craftsmen were transformed into laborers “employed by the chiefs to supply the visitor” (1985: 12).

During the first few decades of the 19th century, ali’i had become accustomed to Western goods (such as tools/instruments, decorations, weapons, etc.). Unfamiliar with

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102 Beechert explains: “The logs of the visiting ships show clearly the penetration of the new concept of wealth brought by the visitors. Clothing, furniture, cookware, china, silverware, and, most important, weapons and gunpowder were the items demanded by the chiefs” (1985: 13) citing Meares 1790 and Jones 1931.
capitalist practices of loaning money for interest, the chiefs became financially indebted to European and American businessmen to pay for these new consumption practices. Foreign governments increasingly intervened, often with the implicit threat of military force, to settle these debts between foreigners and the Hawaiian chiefs or King (Kuykendall 1938: 91-92). As a result, the political independence of the Kingdom appeared tenuous. In return for the debt owed, many of these Euro-Americans accepted sandalwood as payment, which they would then use in trade with China. The ali`i increasingly placed demands upon the maka`ainana to laboriously cut down sandalwood in the upland forests and transport it to merchant ships. Sandalwood was thus depleted from the islands while practices of labor expropriation began to take root (Kent 1983). Whereas in traditional society commoners’ collective labor for and ceremonial tribute to the chiefs were interwoven with the chiefs’ management of lands and spiritual care of the gods, reflecting a high degree of mutuality, these modern practices of commodity production and consumption, coupled with religious and cultural adoptions of stringent Christianity, reflect an increasingly feudal class dynamic with patterns of exploitation and oppression.

Concurrently, the growing numbers of foreign missionaries, businessmen, and government advisors were increasingly frustrated with what they felt to be their insecure tenure on the islands. The fact that they were “granted permission” to reside on land without enduring “rights” to the land was at odds with Western notions of private property. Because there were no written contracts concerning land transactions between Hawaiian chiefs and foreigners, disputes often arose. Foreigners were

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104 To be clear: feudalism as a mode of production and overarching structure of social relations did not exist in traditional Hawai`i prior to these 19th century transformations; characteristics of feudalism only become evident afterwards. Preza (2008) and others (Keanu Sai) contend that kālai`aina, the traditional practice of carving (kālai) the land (`āina) with the ascension of each new high chief, was “feudal-like” because the land always reverted back up to the source for re-distribution and was dependent upon a type of “lord—vassal” relationship with no mechanism for hereditary free-hold succession of land (or downward inheritance). Preza notes that the Hawaiian “feudal-like” system was a parallel development with European feudalism—it was similar, but not the same and with different origins. I remain rather ambivalent about this characterization of traditional Hawaiian forms of feudalism because 1) little has been written about it, therefore it is difficult for me to come to a conclusive understanding at this time (while I look forward to learning more as numerous works are in the midst of being produced and published), and 2) my conceptions of feudalism focus more on social relations of production rather than on formal structures of land exchanges, thereby having resonance with Kame`elehiwa’s (1992) analysis of kālai`aina.
persistent in their pressure for land reform, which they argued would also protect the maka‘āinana from chiefly abuses.

It was in this context that over time, and for varying reasons, the King and chiefs transformed traditional land tenure relations to fee-simple and lease-hold ownership, and eventually privatized water. The Māhele of 1848 (and the related 1845 Organic Act, which created the Board of Commissioners to Quiet Land Titles, and 1850 Kuleana Act) in many ways was an extension of the process initiated in the 1839 Declaration of Rights. Whereas the Declaration articulated the various ‘rights’ of Hawaiians divided among the King, chiefs and commoners, the Māhele effected this division vis-à-vis land rights and fee-simple title. While there is significant disagreement on how to interpret these transformations, it is important to look at how the Māhele affected cultivation patterns and social relations, particularly concerning the maka‘āinana, because despite the ruptures of the 19th century, these patterns and relations have persisted in rural places like Waiāhole and Waikāne.

One often-stated justification for the Māhele was that fee-simple ownership of land would encourage and enable Hawaiians to remain on the land, cultivating their crops, being self-sufficient, strengthening their bodies and minds, and thereby prospering and replenishing their dwindling numbers. Unfortunately, introduced diseases continued to wreak havoc on the islands and seemingly little could be done by the Hawaiian Kingdom’s government to abate these deaths. More than 1,000 ahupua‘a were identified in the Māhele but only 80,000 Hawaiians were left (Preza 2008), compared with approximately 800,000 to 1 million Hawaiians three generations prior. Keeping the ahupua‘a system alive may have seemed no longer tenable.

105 I would like to thank Donovan Preza for pointing this out.
106 Was it a positive or tragic development (and what factors made it such)? Were Hawaiian ali‘i misled by self-interested Europeans and Americans (Kame‘elehiwa 1992)? Did the ali‘i act upon their own self-interests (Kuykendall 1938[1976])? Was the adoption and adaption of Western concepts of law and property a wise or unwise appropriation by Hawaiians (Osorio 2002)? To what extent did Hawaiian conceptions of “applied knowledge” influence these changes (Beamer and Duarte 2006)? Did the Māhele dispossess Hawaiians of their land, or did dispossession come much later (Preza 2008a)?
107 Similar arguments were made in favor of the 1920s Hawaiian Homelands Commission Act, which, as Kauanui (2008) demonstrates, produced more negative outcomes than positive ones.
By 1850, the previously shared or undivided interest in Hawai‘i’s land had been allocated roughly into thirds: 1 million acres to the King/Government (these lands are known as the “Crown Lands”); 1.5 million acres to the several hundred chiefs; and 1.5 million acres to the commoners (Chinen 1958: 31). Later, the King/Government lands would be separated into the King’s private lands and the Kingdom government’s public land, and the unclaimed chief and commoner lands would be added to the government lands. Importantly, all land titles issued by the Hawaiian Kingdom were “subject always to the rights of tenants,” including the King’s and chiefs’ lands (Laws of Hawaii, 1848: 22 cited in Chinen 1958: 27, emphasis added). This meant that irrespective of who owned or leased the land, the maka‘ainana rights to reside on the land, cultivate it, and utilize its resources persisted. Clearly this was a codification of Hawaiian tradition and common-law practices blended with the new legal instruments of fee-simple or lease-hold land titles. The intent of the King and chiefs was to protect and perpetuate the commoners on the land.

Yet, in addition to the population decline, migration away from the countryside, and the growing inability of the ahupua‘a system to sustain itself, the ‘āina, that which feeds, was also becoming that which could be bought, sold, granted, traded, taxed, mortgaged, foreclosed—in other words, land became a commodity. This didn’t mean that Hawaiians’ deep-rooted affinity with the ‘āina was severed, but it did mean that new understandings were being added to older conceptions. The right of Native tenancy needed to be reconciled with the new rights of private property owners, including Euro-American ones. The question arises: what mechanisms were in place to ensure that codified tenancy rights would and could be exercised by Hawaiians on all the lands after 1848?

108 Initially the King’s personal lands were separate from the government’s lands, but they were later conjoined. When the American-backed coup overthrow the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1893, the newly formed so-called Republic of Hawai‘i appropriated the Crown Lands, as did the United States when it so-called annexed Hawai‘i in 1900. When Hawai‘i became a state of the American union in 1959, the Crown Lands are specifically identified in both federal and state law as held in trust “based on a clear recognition that Native Hawaiians had continuing claims to these lands and that they must be held in trust until those claims are finally resolved” (Van Dyke 2008: 258). Unfortunately, Hawaiian claims to the Crown Land have yet to be resolved. Many Hawaiians (and non-Hawaiians) believe that the Crown Lands should serve as a land-base for a sovereign or independent Hawaiian nation in whatever self-determining form(s) it may take. See Van Dyke (2008) for an extensive discussion of the Crown Lands.
The answer is not clear. What is clear is that despite the 1.5 million acres allocated to commoners in the Māhele, less than 30,000 acres were awarded to about 8,000 Native tenants as private property kuleana awards (Chinen 1958; Stauffer 2004).

Handy, Handy and Pukui explain the concept of kuleana land titles as a “modernized” form of traditional land tenure:

*Kuleana* in old usage meant a portion or share of a thing or enterprise. It was chosen as the legal term applicable to the claims filed by tenants who sought permanent title to parcels of land then being allocated under the law of 1848. The word in old Hawaiian also meant a man’s right, affairs, interest, being derived from the adjective *kulea* meaning competent, successful. It was to the competent planters, formerly merely tenants, that title in fee simple was given during the *Mahele* to the lands they were then cultivating for their own use; thus the titles and land involved were termed *kuleana* – the planter’s property or competence (Handy, Handy, and Pukui 1972: 54).

Kuleana awards were made to planters who had cultivated the land for their own use. Although tens of thousands of maka‘āinana had resided on land and used it for this purpose, fewer than 30 percent of commoners obtained less than 1 percent of these kuleana award designated fee-simple lands. Most of these fee-simple titles were made to male-headed nuclear families and did not extend to ‘ohana networks or female-headed households. As a result, ‘ohana members working and living in the cities and actively sharing cash income, crops, fish, and other products with ‘ohana members in the countryside may have had difficulty establishing a claim to kuleana land because they were not presently on the land nor recognized as part of the nuclear family to which the title was awarded. In such cases, legal title to kuleana land held by some ‘ohana members and not others would have added further stress to already changing traditional social relations. Additionally, traditional cultivation patterns of collective production and appropriation between and among ‘ohana and within ahupua‘a likely

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109 Handy, Handy and Pukui further explain: “Because of its fairly recent adoption as a definitive legal term, *kuleana* is generally regarded as not having applied to land in ancient use” (1972:54).
110 Stauffer, citing Schmitt (1968), notes “The Hawaiian population in 1850 was about 80,000, with some 29,000 male adults. The more than 8,000 awards to maka‘āinana that came out of the process apparently provided for only 30 percent of the adult male population. This rendered the other 70 percent of the adult males, with their spouses and children, if they had any, landless” (2004: 20).
diminished with the institution of private property, as production and appropriation became increasingly privatized within nuclear families that owned the land.

The legal process for claiming and receiving a kuleana title involved: filing a claim with the Kingdom by the specified date; showing proof that one cultivated the lands for a living; paying to have the land surveyed; having the land boundaries validated by Native witnesses; and paying additional government fees.\textsuperscript{111} Relatively few maka‘ainana filed kuleana claims. Why the filings were limited may have been due to cost. Maka‘ainana also may have believed that the codified “rights of tenancy” did not necessitate obtaining fee-simple title. Others sought fee-simple title through government land grants instead of kuleana land awards because more land was available at a reduced rate and without the necessary conditions of continuous cultivation. The concept of private ownership of land also may have been too foreign for many Hawaiians to absorb. Those that did receive kuleana titles held their lands for at least one or two generations (Stauffer 2004; Andrade 2008). Some Hawaiians continue to reside on kuleana lands throughout the islands, such as in Waiāhole and Waikāne.

Concerning the ali‘i allocation of land, about 245 chiefs received over 1.6 million acres, large portions of which were later sold to foreigners (often in the form of debt-payment) and some portions of which later reverted to the Kingdom government.\textsuperscript{112} Hawaiians—chiefs and commoners alike—were able to later acquire some of these lands through purchases of fee-simple title, lease-hold, or life-estates from the Hawaiian

\textsuperscript{111} In his analysis of land title in the windward O‘ahu ahupua‘a of Kahana (adjacent to Waikāne), Stauffer finds that “the total fee [paid by kuleana awardees] ranged from $20,000 to $37,000 in today’s [2000] dollars. These were large sums, certainly, but manageable ones, particularly when you consider that in exchange for this fee, the family was awarded land and certain land and water rights that were worth around $350,000 today” (2004: 36). I disagree with Stauffer’s characterization of the fees as “manageable,” especially given that Native tenants eligible for kuleana lands were “cultivating those lands for a living” and did not necessarily have large amounts of cash income. Some Hawaiians, of course, did have cash through regular wage-labor, consistent savings, and/or collective sharing. Preza emphasizes the point that “no one has proved Hawaiians did not have cash to pay the necessary fees or purchase lands outright,” referencing the fact that the cattle industry provided a viable cash economy for Hawaiians at the time. He further references the results of an 1840s missionary survey indicating the average daily wage of twelve cents, which would have provided sufficient cash to purchase government lands that were being sold at the time to Hawaiians for $0.50 to $2.00 per acre.

\textsuperscript{112} Significant portions of these chiefly lands constitute the endowed charitable trusts that continue to benefit Hawaiians today. These include Bernice Pauahi Bishop’s Kamehameha Schools, Queen Emma’s Health System, William Charles Lunalilo’s Home, Queen Lili‘uokalani’s Children’s Center, and Queen Kapiolani’s Medical Center.
Kingdom, or through the formation of hui (associations) to collectively own and control ahupua’a lands. These practices show that despite the small number of kuleana land titles granted, Hawaiians did come to own substantial amounts of private property through other forms of land titles. This demonstrates yet another form of Hawaiians’ hybrid modernization in the 19th century.

In Waiāhole, there were fifty-three kuleana awards ranging from less than a half acre to more than five acres, with the total acreage (specifically) for Native tenants of little more than 106 acres (Bushnell, Shideler, and Hammatt 2002: 26). In addition, three Hawaiians received large land awards, presumably through outright purchase of lands from government grants: Pu‘uiki of 225 acres, Kaho‘ohanohano of 93 acres, and Kaniau of 57.2 acres (Ibid). One foreigner named William Walker received 81.6 acres (Ibid). Later, two Hawaiians received large land grants: Kakakeiki of 264.68 acres in 1860, and Kaopulupulu of 113.33 acres in 1862 (Ibid). While the non-kuleana awards were larger, fewer Hawaiians – only five – benefited in Waiāhole. Additionally, one foreigner received almost as much land (eighty-one acres) as the fifty-three Native tenants combined (106 acres). In Waikāne, much of the valley became government land (Griffen and Pyle 1974: 11), with only nineteen kuleana awards ranging from 0.15 to 7.76 acres for a total acreage of 53.49 acres in Native tenancy (Bushnell et al. 2002: 25). In comparison, foreigners Edwin O. Hall and Henry Dimond received 1,689.48 acres—which was a majority of the lands in the ahupua’a—and over thirty times the amount of lands received by the nineteen Hawaiians combined (Ibid). The foreigners used their land awards to establish ranching and cattle grazing. Nevertheless, intensive taro cultivation continued (Griffen and Pyle 1974: 11).

Preza’s research (forthcoming) reveals that Hawaiians obtained over 667,000 acres—roughly 17 percent of all the islands—as a result of the Māhele up through the 1893 overthrow of the Kingdom. In 1847 this Waikāne land was granted to Dimond and Hall “provided always that those portions of land occupied and improved by the natives shall be reserved to them in fee simple” (Hawaiian Kingdom Interior Department, Land Matters, December 16, 1847 quoted in Dunn, Haun and Goodfellow 1992: B-5). In 1850 this Waikāne land was subsequently “sold” to Dimond and Hall, with 5 acres set aside for a Church that was never appropriately titled nor ever utilized (Ibid). The Waikāne Hui, of which a Kamaka family ancestor was a member, later bought the Dimond and Hall land. The 5 acres set aside for the church later became subject of an 1881 land dispute between Waikāne Church and the Waikāne Hui. More research is needed to trace the transfers of land title or related land agreements.
The Kingdom’s intention for the Māhele’s was to perpetuate Native land tenancy. However, the disproportionate distribution of land to foreigners, and changes in cultivation patterns and social relations that resulted, undermined that goal. In exchange for fee-simple title to large tracts of ahupua’a land in their care, the chiefs relinquished their traditional claim to the collective labor of ahupua’a residents. Over time, this relinquishment effectively lessened chiefly responsibilities to oversee and manage the ahupua’a resources as a whole, especially when ahupua’a lands were bought, sold, leased, or mortgaged to unrelated persons of the ahupua’a. In other words, commoners were no longer responsible for collectively producing or appropriating the ahupua’a’s resources as was governed by traditional kānāwai (common laws), and chiefs (particularly the konohiki and lesser chiefs) were no longer the primary overseer of community issues. That responsibility shifted to state governing apparatuses. The gathering rights of maka’āinana to ahupua’a resources were codified in 1850, and those rights were based on “their own private uses” in distinction from commercial uses of natural resources. A growing notion of individual rights (as opposed to collective rights) is evident here. Amid these changes, there was a diminished function for the broader ‘ohana network in reciprocal exchanges of goods and services and the enforcement of collective decision-making.

For all these reasons, the Māhele furthered and significantly loosened the bonds of connectivity and reciprocity embedded in the structures of traditional society. In many instances, this “loosening” led to the eventual severing of social relations when lands were later sold to foreigners, or taken by them (in form of debt collection or mortgage foreclosures), and continued Native tenancy was indeterminate. Although many Hawaiians might have continued to live in the same locales with the same peoples, the meanings they derived from their “community” no longer relied on collective interactions and interdependencies.

However, Hawaiians did not passively accept these governance changes or simply succumb to the pressures of foreigners. Recall that dozens of maka’āinana petitions protested foreign ownership of land. In addition, numerous Hawaiians ranging from
politically active local chiefs to a range of commoners asserted their agency through the formation of associations known as land hui. The formation of these associations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in what has come to be known as the Hui Land Movement are of special relevance to the future activism that would emerge in Waiāhole and Waikāne. In the section that follows, I show how this movement provided a vehicle for Hawaiians to negotiate the ideas of private property without giving up all traditional ideals of land tenure. The formation of hui in Waiāhole and Waikāne allowed the Kamaka family to become owners of considerable acreage but also gave water baron Lincoln Loy McCandless ownership or control of most of the valleys in post-overthrow Hawai‘i.

**THE HUI LAND MOVEMENT**

Robert Stauffer characterizes the hui land movement that began in the 1870s as a counter-revolution in response to the Māhele’s revolution in land tenure. However, the movement also can be seen as part of Hawaiians’ ongoing efforts to selectively incorporate Euro-American ideas into Native practices. A hui is a “club, association, society, corporation, firm, partnership, union” and to hui means “to join, unite combine.” Land hui took root throughout the Hawaiian Islands as a means of creating and sustaining collective land-holding associations among maka‘ainana and some konohiki following the Māhele. Because the Māhele loosened traditional relationships, Stauffer notes that Hawaiians kept communal culture alive through school, church, and other collective activities. Banding together to acquire land title to ahupua‘a was an extension of these practices. Stauffer explains:

>The [Hui] system, as it was employed throughout the Islands, used legal arrangements that were uniquely Hawaiian. They were not sanctioned by the American-led government, but rather sprang up spontaneously from the people. *Hui* were primarily by *maka‘ainana* whose *kuleana* [lands] were inadequate and who, when the opportunity presented itself, banded together to lease or buy out the rest of their district’s land (2004: 125).

After twenty-plus years of private property, many Hawaiians seemingly rejected at least parts of these foreign/modern institutions, and sought to resurrect at least parts
of the Native/traditional land tenure systems. Notably, they did these partial rejections/partial resurrections through the mechanisms provided by the new nation-state and constitutional monarchy. In coming together and pooling their financial resources to purchase ahupua‘a lands, land hui were a hybrid formation: collectively-held fee-simple ownership of shared land and resources. The land and resources were typically undivided, as were each members’ interest in the hui.\textsuperscript{115} In recreating their preferred traditional system within Western laws and land tenure terminology beginning in the 1860s, the hui land movement represents a form of Native and local resistive agency amid all the transformations of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{116} Hui lands were a combination of indivisible “commons” and personal ʻohana property, replicating the Hawaiian ahupuaʻa system. Importantly, the by-laws constituting land hui reflected self-determining community decision-making processes. While many Hawaiians did not participate in and were not incorporated into land hui, it is conceivable that they nonetheless supported the land hui movement.

Participation in land hui was not restricted to Hawaiians, although it was initiated by Hawaiians and was primarily a Hawaiian movement.\textsuperscript{117} By the 1870s the Hawaiian Kingdom was an ethnically diverse nation-state with Americans, Germans, Portuguese, Chinese and Japanese. What brought so many foreigners to Hawai‘i in the latter part of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century was the rise of the islands’ sugar plantations, often characterized as the reign of King Sugar. In this context, the concurrent hui land movement represented resistance to the plantation oligarchy that increasingly

\textsuperscript{115} “The hui, as a peculiar native institution, has pursuant to its rules and customs, certain powers as an association which do not belong to its members individually as tenants in common. Among these powers is that of binding all its members at a regularly called and duly attended meeting, by a vote not unanimous” (Mahoe v. Puka, 4 H. 485 (1882) cited in Thayer and Lydecker 1916)

\textsuperscript{116} Stauffer notes Watson’s (1932) description of the development and dissolution of Hawaiian Land Hui: “in his 1932 essay on the hui movement, [Watson] spoke of these organizations representing an institutional intermediary between the traditional and Western land tenure systems. He argued that the hui served as an adjustment to modernity. There is no question that the hui contained elements of both the traditional and the modern. I would argue, however, that the hui movement was not viewed by hui members as a step toward modernity but rather a counter-revolt to regain some of what was taken in the Great Māhele. Watson and I generally agree on what the hui were and how they operated. The fact that he worked for a major landowner, who was able to buy up much partitioned hui lands following their liquidation in the 1920s, may speak of his view that the hui were only an intermediary step and the later dissolution of many hui was a mark of progress” (2004: 125).

\textsuperscript{117} Stauffer (2002) notes that several Asians joined the Kahana Hui years after its initial formation by Hawaiians. The names listed in the Waikāne Hui also suggest a similar pattern. It is unclear if these Asians were part of Hawaiian ʻohana or were part-Hawaiian themselves.
concentrated land ownership and controlled expropriated labor. For the Hawaiians who initiated the movement and the Asians who later joined them, land hui provided an alternative to the sugar plantations in terms of both land and labor.

The land hui movement was short-lived however, and with the institutionalization of the U.S. territorial government following the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom, hui were broken up. During this time of American occupation the hui lands were divided among share holders. This splitting led to the lands being sold as individual private properties to a growing number of Euro-American and Asian settlers; or monopolized by large landowners, as was the case with the Waiāhole Hui. The division of lands also forcibly ejected a dwindling number of Native landowners and extinguished their rights to the collective land and water resources, as was the case with the Waikāne Hui. Nevertheless, the hui land movement did re-create a sense of cooperative land ownership through a melding of private property norms with traditional Hawaiian land use practices.

The Hawaiian Kingdom traditions of blending Euro-American and Native ways of being that this chapter has outlined continue to inform present-day Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians struggling for self-determination, and, as later chapters will show, have strongly influenced the Waiāhole taro farmers successful water fight through a similar blending of Western and Hawaiian ways. This blending, however, was not present in the Kamaka family’s effort to retain its land. The latter struggle may have failed because the family did not sufficiently mobilize Hawaiian Kingdom traditions—despite being informed by them—and instead the Kamakas relied primarily upon post-overthrow American legal traditions to protect their share of the Waikāne Hui lands (further discussed in Chapter Seven). The next chapter examines those American territorial traditions in more detail.

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118 Stauffer (2002) identifies 1887 as the pivotal year in which the effectiveness of the ‘counter-revolution’ shifts, thereafter ‘the land is lost.’ He makes no mention of the fact that this is the year in which the Bayonet Constitution was forced upon King Kalākaua (at the point of a gun) and effectively stripped Hawaiians of substantial political rights and participation in the governance of the Kingdom, placing power instead in the hands of the haole would-be usurpers. See also Sai (2005) for a critical review of Stauffer’s work.
Artesian well diggers Lincoln Loy McCandless and his brothers, James and John, were key developers of Hawai‘i’s sugar industry and participants in the 1893 overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom. By the early 20th century, “Link” was among the top ten landowners in Hawai‘i, owning or controlling most of Waiāhole and Waikāne valleys among other large tracts of land. World War II and Hawai‘i statehood brought further Americanization and unprecedented ‘development’ to the islands in the form of militarization, tourism and construction. By the 1970s, McCandless’s daughter and heir, Elizabeth Loy Marks, sought to cash in on the islands’ post-statehood development boom. The oppressive conditions of Hawai‘i’s oligarchic plantation society gave rise to Localism as an identity category and historical narrative. In the early post-statehood years, that category was used by politicized surfers to fight developments that threatened the islands’ ocean and near-shore resources. Informed by Marxist praxis, Localism was firmly grounded in Hawaiian issues to produce a cohesive resistive agency among diversely situated persons who nonetheless shared and acted upon demonstrated commitments. These commitments led to the most successful example of 1970s coalition politics: the Waiāhole-Waikāne Community Association’s anti-eviction struggle.

This chapter examines how McCandless rose to power by diverting water from rural communities to service ‘King Sugar’ in the post-overthrow period, how the people of Waiāhole and Waikāne nevertheless persisted on the land with multiethnic rural traditions, and how shared experiences of discrimination and inequality during the territorial period were mobilized to resist the islands’ new power elite following statehood. This historical period significantly informed the anti-eviction struggle, and to a lesser extent, the taro farmer’s water struggle. The plantation era further informed the Kamaka struggle in two ways: first, American property relations were increasingly
forced upon them; and second their family lands were militarized by the United States during and after World War II. Despite different emphases and trajectories, as will be shown in Part II of this dissertation, all three Waiāhole-Waikāne community struggles invoked these Hawai‘i territorial traditions that centered on the islands’ sugar oligarchy.

**Sugar waters**

An American company opened the first sugar plantation in 1835 on Kaua‘i. Several additional plantations opened and closed over the next decade. The foreign-owned plantations initially struggled partly because the planters were inexperienced, and more significantly because the planters neither owned the land nor had a labor force they could rely upon. The latter issues provided the impetus for the Māhele and the importation of Asian labor. American planters often complained of Native ‘indolence’; as one noted, Hawaiians simply did not “understand that it is their *duty* to serve their masters faithfully” (William Hooper quoted in Beechert 1985: 22, emphasis in original). The complaints suggest that Hawaiians saw “faithful duty” less as a capitalistic labor-management relationship and more as an aspect of their traditional commoner and chief relations of reciprocal exchange (Saitta 2001). Accordingly, the labor situation improved “[w]hen local chiefs permitted the workers to plant cane on their own land” (Beechert 1985: 23). Both the Euro-American plantation owners and the Hawaiian laborers were dissatisfied and the first labor strike occurred in 1841 over unfair salary practices and wage compensation (Ibid).

Throughout the 1840s, several laws (*Laws of 1842, Statutes of Kamehameha III, 1845-1846*) were passed to criminalize “idleness” and “vagrancy”, effectively shifting authority from local chiefs to national state enforcement. Thus, a penal labor force was

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119 Beechert explains: “There is ample evidence to suggest that the Hawaiian commoners asserted themselves in the only manner open to them—by simply not responding to the demands of wage hire at exploitive rates. ... Caught between exploiting chiefs and a patronizing missionary class, it is not surprising that the Hawaiian found more agreeable pursuits than employment as wage labor in the proposed agricultural schemes” (1985: 34).
However, this labor force was still insufficient to meet the industry’s growing labor demands. Therefore, in 1850, the same year of the final phase of the Māhele in the Kuleana Act, “An Act for the Governance of Masters and Servants” was enacted, creating an indentured contract labor system. The weaving of the islands’ complex ethno-cultural tapestry began.

Hawai‘i’s sugar industry boomed during the California Gold Rush (1848-1855) with its “seemingly incessant demand for food and goods” (Ibid 37). When the demand subsided, discussions arose among American planters about the possibility for American annexation of Hawai‘i to ensure continuation of favorable trade. Again, following the sugar industry boom during the American Civil War (1861-1865) and its subsequent slowdown, there were discussions among the increasingly powerful land-owning American missionary-cum-businessmen in the Kingdom government for possible American annexation of the islands for the benefit of Hawai‘i’s sugar industry. After several decades of effort by the Hawaiian Kingdom, a reciprocity treaty was finally ratified in 1876 by the United States, which provided for the tax-free importation of Hawaiian sugar into the United States. According to Carole Wilcox:

The Reciprocity Treaty [of 1876] was predicated on full government support of the fledgling sugar industry, including its efforts to develop water. Without that support, which included allowing the sugar planters to transport water out of the watershed, investors would not have been attracted to Hawaii (Wilcox 1996: 16).

The availability of water drew the three McCandless brothers to Hawai‘i. In 1882 they used the oil drilling and mining experience they had acquired in the eastern U.S. to open a successful artesian well company in Hawai‘i. At this time, plantations were drilling aquifer wells to water the ever-thirsty sugar plants. Less expensive water delivery systems were being explored to transport water from the abundant natural streams and watersheds on the traditionally heavily cultivated wet windward (eastern)

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120 For example, the Statutes of Kamehameha III, 1845-1846 stated: “Persons found to be without valid employment were to be bound by the sheriff to an appropriate person for a period of one year. The wages earned were to be divided between the worker, the sheriff, and the treasury, each receiving one-third” (cited in Beechert 1985: 36).
121 The 1887 renewal of the Reciprocity Treaty required U.S. exclusive military basing rights at Pu‘u‘ula (also known as Pearl Harbor).
sides of the islands to the sunny and dry leeward (western) sides of the islands. Wilcox notes that the term “ditches” for these water systems is both humbling and misleading: misleading because they were not all ditches—many were mostly flumes, siphons, and tunnels—and humble because their size and scale were often quite large. And they were everywhere (Wilcox 1996:16).

Wilcox further notes that “very few watersheds escaped the winding, burrowing network of ditches” (Ibid). While a couple of ditches were constructed during the Hawaiian Kingdom period, it wasn’t until after the 1893 overthrow and 1900 incorporation of Hawai‘i into the United States that heavy investment went into ditch development. The McCandless brothers were quick to cash in. In 1913, the brothers, under Lincoln’s leadership, began building the Waiāhole Ditch for the O’ahu Sugar Plantation, of which John was vice president.

As the ditch siphoned tens of millions of gallons of water a day from the mountain streams of windward O‘ahu to the ‘Ewa plains of leeward O‘ahu, Native planters who relied upon the water to grow taro and other subsistence crops suffered. The Native planters were accustomed to viewing water as a shared resource; suddenly it had become a privately held commodity and was taken from them without compensation. Traditional farming practices circulated the water back into the streams to flow into the ocean. The Euro-Americans did no such thing. If the water was returned, it usually came back polluted with pesticides and chemicals from the plantations. As early as 1866 the Kingdom’s Water Commissioner Daniels noted: “There’s going to be much trouble … respecting Water as the plantations are taking all the water from the natives and I am sorry to say the natives will, if it continues, become very short of Kalo for food” (Letter from Daniels to Hutchinson dated 23 April 1866 quoted in Wilcox 1996: 31). Native testimony in Beckley v. Ohule (1873) and Cartwright v. Gulick (1886) further document these exacerbating problems for Hawaiians as a result of the growing dominance of the sugar industry in the islands (Wilcox 1996: 27). The post-overthrow 1895 case of Horner v. Kumuliilii (10 Haw. 174) reveals that “from the testimony we gather that a goodly number
of other kalo patches had been abandoned by their native owners... [in part] through inability to get sufficient quantity of water to cultivate them” (Wilcox 1996: 29).\footnote{Wilcox minimizes this enormous and primarily negative impact on those most dependent on water in the streams by claiming that “many people, if not the majority, benefited from these changes” (1995: 29). She continues: “in many cases the relationship between water diversion and downstream impact was gradual and delayed. By the time the diversion caused hardship, the greatest proportion of the diversion had already happened much earlier. It was hard to establish a cause and effect relationship” (Ibid: 32). I disagree with Wilcox, citing her own work that includes several legal cases in which numerous Native planters petitioned and protested this unfair taking of water that deprived them of their livelihoods—why else would they have done so if they did not experience a direct cause and effect relationship? Similarly, why would Water Commissioner Daniels, whom Wilcox cites, warn of such a dire outcome had he not witnessed a direct cause and effect relationship so early in the process? Wilcox suggests that “A degree of despair, fatalism, and chaos must have characterized those times. Large numbers of Hawaiians left their traditional homes in the rural areas. By the time of sugar’s ascendancy, when the large water projects were diverting water away from the valleys and their villages, these villages did not have the population, organization, or will to protest. Another reason may have been cultural. It was unthinkable in the native culture for the people to protest what the king had mandated” (Ibid: 31-32). Again, although there is some basis to her argument on a generic level, I disagree with Wilcox’s contention that Native planters and tenants did not protest these water diversions. The work of Osorio (2002) and Silva (2004) provide ample evidence that commoner Hawaiians did actively and consistently protest the transformations of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century; however, these forms of protest—primarily petitions, oral testimonies (such as those cited by Wilcox) and literary discussions—may not have been recognized or acknowledged by non-Natives at the time or henceforth. To claim that “many people, if not the majority, benefited from these changes” and that there was a “lack of public reaction to the shift of water” (Ibid: 32) willfully silences the breadth and depth of Hawaiian experiences therein. Although depopulation of ahupua’a did negatively affect Native cultivation patterns and practices, the hui land movements provide evidence that Hawaiians did persist in their traditional land tenure adapted to the modernizing milieu. The taking (stealing) of water by the extensive sugar plantation ditch systems was therefore detrimental not only to the people most dependent on the waters for their livelihoods, but also on the political economy of Hawai’i that became highly dependent on sugar at the expense of other, more self-sustaining opportunities. It was the corrupt sugar oligarchy and occupying/colonizing American governance that sustained this.\footnote{B. 8/10/05, who retains a copy of this letter written by his wife’s grandmother.}}

The taking of the islands’ waters hastened the debilitating transformations of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century well into the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. In the early 1920s, at least one windward farmer who had relied on stream water that was being diverted to the Waiāhole Ditch petitioned the U.S. territorial government for redress: “I woke up this morning and had no water in my lo‘i. How am I supposed to feed my children?”\footnote{B. 8/10/05, who retains a copy of this letter written by his wife’s grandmother.} Initially following the Māhele, water was not owned and Native tenants continued to exercise their traditional water rights alongside owners of lands adjacent to streams who were now entitled to reasonable use of that stream’s water. This was called riparian rights, wherein “no one owned the water, and the rights of one owner were not superior to another’s” (Miike 2004: 79). Later, the law shifted so that certain owners attained appurtenant rights in which the use of water became attached to specific parcels of land. In the 1867 case of Peck \textit{v. Bailey} (8 Haw. 658), the Supreme Court of the Hawaiian Kingdom ruled that property owners who had easement rights could “take” previously shared water for purposes differing from original use. Although water was not “legally” owned at this
point, thereafter it was increasingly treated as private property (Miike 2004: 78). As a result, the right to water shifted from Native tenants to property owners. What is important to note is that the Peck case reflects an effort by the Hawaiian Kingdom to mediate the traditional equal sharing of water (kānāwai) against the modern needs of the increasingly influential sugar industry. Those efforts of hybrid modernization ended with the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1893.

A number of court cases between 1893 and 1930 increasingly restricted tenants’ use of water for their own purposes and all but eliminated practices of shared water use among ahupua’a residents. The 1930 case of Territory v. Gay (31 Haw. 376) denied any recognition of riparian rights. In effect, American territorial laws of resource privatization overrode Hawaiian common law practices of shared resource use. Although the Māhele did lay the groundwork for dramatic changes in land and water use (Miike 2004), I argue that the widespread and systematic taking of water occurred only after the 1893 overthrow and 1898 annexation, both of which usurped the Hawaiian Kingdom’s hybrid legal traditions.

It is not a coincidence that many of the government officials in the new and illegal American regimes were sugar plantation owners, financiers, or industry developers, or were otherwise directly connected to the oligarchy that dominated Hawai‘i. The McCandless brothers were no exception: John was a member of the Committee of Thirteen which led the overthrow, and a subsequent vice president of Oahu Sugar Co. and Pioneer Mill, and president of Hawaiian Electric Company (HECO) and Honolulu Insurance Company (Siddal and Nellist 1921). James was a senator and a corporal of the Sharpshooters Company for the new regime (Ibid). Upon American annexation, Lincoln became a territorial senator and financier of various development projects throughout the

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124 These cases were: 1893 Lonoaea v. Wailuku (9 Haw. 651), 1895 Horner v. Kumuliilii (10 Haw. 174), 1896 Wong Leong v. Irwin (10 Haw. 265), and 1904 Hawaiian Commercial & Co. v. Wailuku Sugar Co. (14 Haw. 50).

125 Many consider the Bayonet Constitution of 1887 as the pivotal moment in which this foreign oligarchy came to take control of the Hawaiian Kingdom government; this constitution was so named because it was forced upon the king at the point of a bayonet. See Osorio (2002) and Sai (2008) for further discussion.

126 The conspirators called themselves “The Committee of Safety”, ostensibly referring to their goal of keeping safe their American sugar interests in the islands.
islands (Ibid). During the post-overthrow period, the brothers expanded their water drilling company, creating 700 wells in the ‘Ewa plains of O’ahu alone.

Before the overthrow, the McCandless brothers—like other foreigners—had to deal with the Kingdom’s insistence on Native tenant rights. After the overthrow, the brothers were able to expand their enterprises with little interference. For example, in 1889, Lincoln asked the Hawaiian Kingdom government to buy the Waikâne and Waiāhole valleys (significant acres of the land having reverted back to the government when kuleana owners lacked heirs or boundary markers were no longer identifiable), but no action was taken (Dunn, Haun, and Goodfellow 1992). However, in 1897, Lincoln McCandless began to buy large tracts of land in Waiāhole and Waikâne from the new haole government (Griffen and Pyle 1974: 12). He then proceeded to drill into the Koʻolau mountain range, and ultimately bored thirty-two miles of tunnels. The system he produced allowed for large sugar plantations on the ‘Ewa plain to be expanded. He owned the water because he owned the land above it.127

By 1920, Lincoln McCandless acquired 300 acres of Waiāhole valley (Miyagi 1963: 103) and 35 percent of the Waikâne valley (Dunn, Haun and Goodfellow 1992: 5). These lands were Hawaiian government or crown lands taken by the American occupiers (Van Dyke 2008; Preza 2008). He also acquired shares in the 300-acre Waiāhole Hui and 600-acre Waikâne Hui, and over time came to be the majority and controlling shareholder of these collectively owned properties. He also came to own or control numerous acres from Hawaiian kuleana properties in both ahupua’a.

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127 Stauffer describes the situation in the early 1900s as follows: “In the sugar wars of Hawai‘i, control of water was paramount. The key was to buy low and sell high. Good sugar lands and the usual water sources, by 1912, could no longer be purchased cheaply. To enter that field in [Lincoln] McCandless’s day meant high capital start-up and little net return. McCandless’s genius—at the time some said his folly—was in searching for unusual water sources. He reasoned that great amounts of fresh water existed to be tapped within the Koʻolau mountain range [of O‘ahu]. This was a time, it will be recalled, when the hydrology of the Island was not well understood. It was known that a water table existed below the Wahiawā plains on the other side of the Koʻolau Mountains. But water up in the rock of the actual mountains? … He concocted a scheme that eventually bored thirty-two miles of tunnels within the Koʻolau mountain range to collect spring water underground and divert it to Wahiawā. … Ultimately, the water the tunnel system produced made possible the expansion of large sugar plantations on the ‘Ewa plains. Under the water-rights law of the day, the control of this underground water went to the owner of the land above it. The tunnels were therefore carefully constructed between 1913 and 1916 on the windward side of the Koʻolau peaks, beneath the back lands of Waiāhole, Waikâne, and Kahana, where McCandless had carefully bought up land (2004: 190, emphasis in original).
McCandless acquired all of this land in a variety of ways, according to longtime Waiāhole and Waikāne residents. Sometimes he bought the land, sometimes he foreclosed upon mortgaged kuleana or Hui properties, and sometimes sexual liaisons led to him fathering children with property owners. The residents often used the word “swindling” to describe these practices.\(^{128}\)

In addition to Waiāhole and Waikāne, McCandless attempted to acquire land in nearby Kahana because the Waiāhole Ditch was partly constructed in that valley. Mary Foster, a part-Hawaiian, part-haole member of the island elite who consolidated her land titles in Kahana, fended off McCandless. While McCandless paid Foster a regular fee to use her water rights,\(^{129}\) his vast acreage in Waiāhole and Waikāne gave him control of almost all the water that could be diverted to ʻEwa via his Waiāhole Ditch system.\(^{130}\) “Because of [their] control of the water, the McCandless heirs have been able to control [land] usage of the area up to the [mid 1970s]” (Griffen and Pyle 1974: 12).

**STAYING ON THE LAND**

By 1900, only 1,279 acres in Hawai‘i were used for taro cultivation compared to 1 million acres a century earlier (Stannard 1989; Schmitt 1977: table 1.6). Taro cultivation was further cut in half between 1900 and 1930 (Schmitt 1977: table 1.8). As previously noted, depopulation, capitalist commerce, urbanization, changes in land tenure, shifts in water use, and other factors contributed to this dramatic decline. Large tracts in Waiāhole and Waikāne were leased for grazing goats and cattle ranching, (Griffen and Pyle 1974), and with the influx of Asian laborers in the late 19th century and their accompanying demand for the local production of rice and an increased demand to

\(^{128}\) C. 8/8/05.

\(^{129}\) See the 1913 Hawai‘i tax appeal court case of Waiāhole Water Co.: “The water right is not an inseparable appurtenance, for it may be severed in ownership from the land by a separate sale of the water right” (21 Haw 679 .682 cited in Hutchins 2004: 181).

\(^{130}\) McCandless sold all the water rights above 600 feet elevation to the Waiāhole Ditch Company, which he controlled; and he retained the water rights below 600 feet elevation for his and heirs’ personal use and discretion. Interestingly, kuleana owners in Waiāhole describe how, in exchange for their water rights, McCandless built a water line that he maintained for use by the kuleana owners. The McCandless water system in Waiāhole is still in use today, in conjunction with the Board of Water Supply system.
export rice to California, many marginal taro patches were converted to rice paddies.131 The demand for rice brought Asian farmers to the Waiāhole and Waikāne valleys. In 1892, there were over 200 acres of rice cultivation and production in Waikāne (Coulter and Chun 1937) and at least a comparable amount in Waiāhole (Young 1975; Bower 1882). The first Chinese indentured laborers who did not leave Hawai‘i after completing their plantation contracts became agricultural entrepreneurs in rural areas, and throughout the early and mid 20th century, Japanese, Okinawan and Filipino laborers also became farmers following the end of their plantation contracts. Many Waiāhole and Waikāne residents trace their genealogies to these early Asian migrants.

The changes in land tenure left their mark. Many Hawaiians leased kuleana lands previously used for taro production to haole or Chinese farmers. These lands had never been surveyed and the natural landmarks used to identify specific plots had disappeared through the intensive cultivation of rice or sugar. As a result, Hawaiians with claims to ancestral lands could no longer identify the land and lost their claims (Miyagi 1963; Griffen and Pyle 1974). As the land became the property of the haole government, Lincoln McCandless bought it up (Griffen and Pyle 1974: 11-12).

The construction of the Waiāhole Ditch had further changed the demographics of the two valleys. Dozens of Chinese were brought in to build the railroads to and from the tunnels, and many more Japanese were brought in to do the actual tunneling, many of whom settled in Waiāhole and Waikāne (Young 1975). A rise in ranching in both valleys brought in Euro-American and other multiethnic ranch hands and paniolo (cowboys), many of who became valley residents.

Despite these changes and the substantial decrease in available water, one could still find substantial taro crops in Waiāhole and Waikāne as late as 1935. The larger district of Ko‘olaupōko was the most active area of commercial taro cultivation on the

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131 Griffen and Pyle explain: “Although there was never a sugar plantation in Waiāhole-Waikāne, the area was indirectly affected. The plantations needed laborers and imported many contract workers from China. The Chinese needed rice as their staple food and soon rice cultivation was taking over many of the deserted taro lo‘i. … Most rice was grown in individual lots of from one to thirty acres, but some “plantations” were as large as 300 acres” (1974: 11). Rice paddies did not require cold flowing water like taro, so it was the marginal taro patches that were often converted into rice paddies and not good or productive lo‘i. I would like to thank Davianna McGregor for pointing this out.
islands during the 1940s through 1970s (Devaney et al. 1982). The Asian farmers who settled in Wai‘ahole and Waikãne also cultivated taro, and it was not unusual for Chinese, Okinawan, and Hawaiian farmers to share their skills and labor. These practices meant that while taro cultivation had declined dramatically, it did not disappear entirely. This was because poi continued to be the staple food for most Hawaiian families. Commercial taro cultivation remained active in Ko‘olaupōko alongside cultivation of subsistence and commercial crops such as sweet potatoes and bananas (Miyagi 1963), and the Wai‘ahole Poi Factory was established in the 1940s. This factory purchased taro from local farmers and distributed the poi it produced throughout Hawai‘i (Wenger 1997). This persistence of taro cultivation occurred even as newspapers were reporting island wide poi shortages from the 1930s through the 1970s as a result of the lack of available water in the windward areas due to the Wai‘ahole Ditch diversions. Moreover, this persistence of taro farming reflects a continuity of Native ways of life combined with introduced Asian life-ways.

While some taro farmers had their own lands, many farmed on lands leased from McCandless at rates that were well below market value. In addition, some present-day residents remember McCandless engaging in reciprocal relations reminiscent of ahupua‘a traditions: processing farm produce or providing equipment in exchange for a portion of the goods produced. This might also be considered a local version of sharecropping that was prevalent in America’s post-Civil War South. These practices continued after Lincoln McCandless’s death in 1940 when his (‘legitimate’) daughter and primary heir, Elizabeth Loy Marks, became the landlord.


133 An oral-history account by one resident in the early-20th century recounts the relationship: “Fiscal matters were simple. Fields were rented or acquired by share-cropping. Owners of the land, principally Lincoln L. McCandless, advanced cash for payroll, food, and other expenses. Settlement was made for the rice [or other crops] harvested and delivered to the landowners’ warehouses. Landlords did the hauling. Renters were permitted to sell their rice [and other crops] to others, usually their financiers. In share-cropping, no rental was paid for each area of the land, but the landowner took 30 percent of the crop. In this plan, the landowner sometimes supplied the tools and work animals” (Young 1975).

134 To become the sole landowner in Wai‘ahole and Waikãne, Marks traded lands elsewhere in Hawai‘i with fellow McCandless heirs (Peterson 1979). In addition to legally legitimate heirs of McCandless, there
In addition to the full-time commercial farmers, most of the valley residents also farmed for subsistence (Honolulu Star Bulletin, September 28, 1974 in Dunn, Haun, and Goodfellow 1992: B-13). Valley residents supplemented their farming with fishing, some for subsistence use and some for commercial exchange. As was common practice in Hawaiian ‘ohana, and similarly in Asian kin relations, some family members worked in urban employment while residing in the rural community, and there was general sharing of cash and crops among them. Additionally, related families who lived in the cities would often spend weekends in Waiāhole-Waikāne, again with general sharing of cash and crops. The same was true for full-time fishermen and their families. Systems of reciprocal exchanges were in place to help meet the individual and collective needs of the increasingly multiethnic residents and neighbors of the valleys.

These patterns of daily life in the early and mid 20th century were recounted to me by dozens of Waiāhole-Waikāne residents, which reflects enduring Native traditions of the ‘ohana and ahupua’a that were melded with similar Asian traditions brought to the valleys. Despite tremendous pressures forced upon the resources of rural places such as Waiāhole and Waikāne, people persisted in staying on the land. Significantly, it is these shared social and economic experiences that cut across ethnic and cultural differences in their community.

Already there was a growing sense of Local identity cultivated in the plantations by the labor movement of the early 1900s (Beechert 1985; Takaki 1983) and in the aftermath of the Massie case in the 1930s (Rosa 1999; Stannard 2005). This Local identity drew upon shared working class experiences of plantation discrimination, electoral disenfranchisement, and widespread exploitation and oppression of Hawaiians, Japanese, Filipinos and other non-white people of Hawai‘i following the 1893 overthrow and during the territorial period (Aguiar 1996; Jung 1999; Liu 1985). Here a working-class logic intersected with a resistance to colonialism. In many ways it was also an oppositional

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are numerous “illegitimate” children he bore with local and Hawaiian women in the valleys, and presumable, elsewhere.

135 See Kubo (1997), Kwon (1997) and Nishimura (2003) for relevant discussions of how language and other shared cultural practices shape ‘local’ identity and community in Hawai‘i.
identity vis-à-vis the privileged white Americans who came to control the islands political economy and governance system (Chock et al. 1998; Chock and Lum 1986).\footnote{Of course there were some Hawaiian (and Chinese) elite who were also financially privileged and participated in the islands’ governance, but they were not seen to be in control nor were they perceived to be part of the source of the systemic discrimination, disenfranchisement, exploitation and oppression. There were also whites who were not part of the elite and lacked financial privilege.}

**A NEW POWER ELITE**

When Japan bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the United States entered World War II, martial law was enforced throughout the islands for nearly four years. During this time, the U.S. government acquired sizable acreages of Hawaiian land for military use. At its peak in 1944, the U.S. military held 600,000 acres (Lind 1984/85: 36). Most of those lands were Hawaiian Kingdom government and crown lands (Kajihiro 2007), but some were private lands. Among these lands were hundreds of acres from the Waikāne Hui that the McCandless estate leased to the military for training.

By the 1930s, McCandless was one of two shareholders of Waikāne Hui lands. The other shareholder was the Kamaka family. As the dominant shareholder, the McCandless family leased large tracts of the Waikāne Hui lands to the U.S. military during World War II, and the Kamakas had little say. The lease arrangement continued until the 1970s. The military’s acquisition of Hawaiian lands through such leases, outright takings, or other arrangements that began during World War II would continue throughout the islands into the 21st century, often in the context of other American wars (Korea, Vietnam, and the so-called War on Terror).

Many Hawaiians, Asian laborers and other multiethnic Locals enlisted in the U.S. military during World War II, partly to demonstrate loyalty to the U.S. and partly because the wartime economy limited other employment options. Second-generation (nisei) Japanese Americans are particularly known for their “super-patriotism” in response explicit anti-Japanese racism (Okihiro 1991). After the war, these multi-ethnic veterans, particularly those who self-identified as Americans of Japanese Ancestry (AJA)
led the charge for Hawai‘i statehood, seeing it as a means to achieve equal rights under the law, at least as pertaining to American law.

According to international law, however, Hawai‘i was considered a non-self-governing territory and the Hawaiian people retained the right of self-determination. But, since the Kingdom’s overthrow, the United States had governed the islands as a colony and Hawai‘i had effectively disappeared from the international stage as a member of the Family of Nations. In addition to military uses of Hawaiian lands since the overthrow, the U.S. government occupied land for American business interests.

Throughout the 20th century, this taking of Hawaiian land occurred alongside policies that banned the Hawaiian language (Warner 1999; Kapono 1994; Lucas 2000), suppressed Hawaiian knowledges in the educational systems (Goodyear-Ka‘opua 2005; Saranillio 2008; Benham 1998), and encouraged the Americanization of the islands’ multiethnic peoples (Tamura 1990; Lindsey Buyers 1995; Imai 2005; Iwata 2003; Kosasa 2008). Under these conditions, few Hawaiians and other island ethnic groups understood the United Nations recognition of Hawai‘i’s autonomy and the international legal options available to them.

The push for statehood drew opposition. At least one-fourth of Hawaiians opposed statehood and a small cadre of respected kupuna (elder) consistently spoke out against it (Coffman 2003: 290 citing Bell 1984). These individuals were joined by whites and others, making the Japanese the only ethnic group who were clear supporters of statehood (Ibid). Despite the opposition to, or ambivalence towards, statehood, once

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137 Hawai‘i was listed as a U.S. colony under UN Charter XI (1946) “List of Non-Self-Governing Territories.” Accordingly UN Resolution 1514 (XV) (1960) “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples” applies and many Hawaiian sovereignty activists and allies are actively working towards Hawai‘i’s reinstatement on the UN’s list. Sai and his compatriots, on the other hand, contend that Hawai‘i’s initial listing was a mistake because Hawai‘i has never been a colony of the United States but is a nation occupied by the United States. Accordingly, the 1907 Hague Convention IV (Article 43) “Laws and Customs of War on Land” (36 U.S. Stat. 2277), Convention V “Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land” (36 U.S. Stat. 2310), and the 1949 Geneva Convention IV “Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War” (6 UST 3516, 75 UNTS 287) are the appropriate international laws that apply and they have sought redress in the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration (2001 Larsen v. the Hawaiian Kingdom).

138 For example, vocal Hawaiian activist Alice Kamokila Campbell pushed for commonwealth status instead of statehood (Coffman 2003: 290).

139 In varying personal conversations, I have heard some Hawaiians explain how their parents or grandparents were ambivalent towards statehood because they did not necessarily want to be a part of the United States, yet they also did not like the territorial status quo at the time either. They suggest that many Hawaiians did not vote in the statehood referendum for this reason.
achieved, American traditions of democratic rights and public participation were incorporated into other island traditions and embraced by many islanders.

The AJA push for statehood signified the emergence of a new power elite in the islands. Japanese in an American Hawai‘i desired the American Dream and “first-class citizenship” through statehood. AJA veteran Matsuo Takabuki explains, “Our social and economic goals were not revolutionary. We wanted to accelerate the changes that had begun during the war, not destroy the [American] system” (Takabuki 1998 cited in Kajihiro 2008). Statehood, in other words, signified an opportunity for Japanese Americans to benefit from America’s occupation and colonization of Hawai‘i. Building upon their prominent role in Hawai‘i’s post-WWII labor movements and Democratic Party politics—the so-called ‘Democratic Revolution’—and with an accompanying decline in sugar production, AJAs took advantage of two new economic forces: tourism and post-war militarization of the islands. They were ‘pulling themselves up by the bootstraps,’ and notable, it was military boots in which they did so.

In the first decade after statehood, Hawai‘i experienced an “economic takeoff” within a prevailing political “development” consensus (Cooper and Daws 1985). Many observers ironically joked that the state bird was the construction cane, with mainland

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140 A mix of local labor pressures and global market diversification decreased the profitability of the sugar industry for the islands’ Euro-American oligarchy (Kent 1983). Many plantations became multinational corporations and shifted sugar production to less developed countries, such as the Philippines.

141 Cooper and Daws explain: “The opening years in Hawai‘i’s economic takeoff were marked by two huge new forces bearing down on the Islands from outside: The first was a mass tourist business using the new commercial jet planes to fly in ‘visitors’ by the hundreds of thousands each year, then by the millions. The second was the result of the Cold War and then the involvement of the United States in a hot war in Southeast Asia—a buildup of the military establishment at Pearl Harbor and Schofield Barracks [and elsewhere]. In the late 1950s military spending became the heaviest input into the economy of Hawai‘i, and in the 1960s tourism became number two, both far outstripping the old mainstays of sugar and pineapple. And the total economy grew by leaps and bounds” (1985: 9). Cooper and Daws intricately detail the direct material benefits that Local Asians—primarily Japanese—have gained in Hawai‘i’s post-statehood political economy. They note, “Most notably [absent from land investment in early Democratic years, 1954-1970] are Hawaiians and Filipinos. These missing groups simply did not get in on the land boom as investors, in part because they were not politically well-connected, for the rest because they were not financially well situated to begin with. And of course those two factors are connected. By the same token there has been a strongly marked presence of Japanese names (and to a lesser degree Chinese names) in this book [Land and Power in Hawai‘i]. This is because Japanese tended to dominate the Democratic Party from the 1950s to the mid-1980s. People who rose in politics tended strongly to come from the same groups that were rising in business, and the reasons for success in politics were largely the same reasons for success in business. Moreover, people rising in each of these spheres of life could and did give each other a helping hand” (1985: 452).

142 Kajihiro describes the AJA ascendency: “In their rise to power, the Democratic leadership in Hawai‘i forged a new partnership with the [U.S.] military. Looking to modernize Hawai‘i’s economy but lacking the capital to do so, the young Democrats ‘embraced defense spending as a welcome alternative’ to the plantation economy” (2008: 174).
American haoles flocking to fill newly built hotels, houses, and military bases. By the early 1970s, however, it became clear that statehood was hurting many of Hawai‘i’s longtime multiethnic residents and especially its Native people.143 Local Japanese had replaced haole elites in political office and were increasingly sharing business power with them, but many others were feeling the brunt of new development. Many working-class multiethnic Locals (including Hawaiians) could not afford the new urban and suburban homes and new hotels and resorts that were fast replacing their longtime urban neighborhoods and rural communities. Against this backdrop, McCandless heir Elizabeth Loy Marks partnered with prolific local developer Joe Pao144 to develop Waiāhole and Waikāne in the early 1970s, and met fierce opposition from the residents of these two valleys and their allies.

RESISTING THE ‘REVOLUTION’

While many trace Waiāhole-Waikāne’s genealogy of struggle to the beginning of the 1970s and Kalama Valley (Kido 2008; Trask and Greevy 2004; Choy 2000; Aoude 1999), I wish to take it back further to the formation of Save Our Surf (SOS) in the early 1960s.145 What started off as an informal group of dedicated surfers grew into a “militant movement” (Udall and Stansbury 1971) that effectively shook the political establishment of post-statehood Hawai‘i. Inspired by the mantra of “Educate, Organize, Confront!”,

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143 Coffman describes the gubernatorial campaign of Tom Gill in 1970 as a “watershed” moment that highlights this turning point. The Gill faction characterized the so-called Democratic (Party) revolution of post-war Hawai‘i as an “ethnic revolution” that replaced old haole with local Japanese in positions of power, while “the system” was retained in relative tact (Coffman 1973: 106). Coffman contends that “by the late 1960s, Hawai‘i was undergoing yet another revolution, this one in values and attitudes. Or, more rightly, it was a reaction. The firmest of American tenets, that growth is progress and progress is good, was suddenly thrown open to question” (Ibid: 9). Coffman notes that at issue in the 1970 campaign was the influx of haole American “mainlanders” that was widely interpreted as upsetting Hawai‘i’s precarious ethnic balance (Ibid: 12).

144 Pao was the first-generation island-born son from a working-class Portuguese family. Although the name Pao sounds Hawaiian, a Pao family member told me that the name derived from the Portuguese word for bread, suggesting that the Pao family were bakers at one time.

145 The Honolulu Advertiser obituary (October 5, 2007) of SOS co-founder John Kelly notes that the organization was founded in 1961. Several documents on the Save Our Surf (2005) Digital Collection archive (http://digicoll.manoa.hawaii.edu/sos/index.php) indicate that SOS was founded in the mid-1960s, roughly 1964. Numerous references note that SOS started as an informal group and became much more formally organized in the late 1960s, particularly 1969. When I met with John (and Marion) Kelly in 2005 he was unable to confirm the exact date of SOS’s inception due to his Alzheimer’s disease; however in his autobiographical interview in Mast and Mast (1996) he mentions 1960 as the beginning of discussions which led to the formation of SOS. Other SOS members I’ve spoken to have also been unable to confirm the exact date of origin.
their premise was simple: Surfers and other local residents who enjoyed the islands’ ocean and beaches educated and organized themselves in order to confront the forces threatening water and land resources. Following statehood, there was a massive increase in urban, suburban, tourist, and military developments across the islands. These so-called developments not only displaced longtime communities and neighborhoods, but also dredged off-shore reefs, polluted in-shore waterways that led to the ocean, closed shoreline access routes, created metered oceanside parking lots, and cemented near-shore open spaces—all of which had direct impacts on the availability and quality of surf sites.

Thousands strong by the 1970s, SOS effectively preserved dozens of surfing sites such as Ma‘ili Point, Kaimu, Queens and Baby Queens; prevented destructive developments such as on Ala Moana reef and along Sandy’s Beach; ensured public access to island shorelines such as in Portlock; and discouraged foreign investment in Hawai‘i development projects (Save Our Surf 2005).

Using old fashioned political techniques—hand-bills, demonstrations and colorful presentations at public meetings—the SOS teenagers quickly won the respect of the politicians and developed strong grassroots support in the community at large (Udall and Stansburg 1971).

Other tactics and strategies included extensive research to expose corrupt connection between developers and elected officials; the conducting of scientific surveys of soil samples and water quality measures; the publishing of fact sheets and relevant self-described “propaganda” as counter-education material; guided public tours of threatened beach and inland locales; public conferences on ocean and shoreline issues; and the forming of and working with broad coalitions of labor unions, welfare rights activists, anti-war organizations, environmentalists, and Hawaiian groups. In a nationally syndicated opinion-editorial piece which ran in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin on September 15, 1971, former U.S. Interior Secretary Stewart Udall applauded Save Our Surf as “a bright story of participatory democracy”:

When not cited directly, most information comes from the various documents available at the Save Our Surf Digital Collection, and from informal conversations with SOS members.
Surfing is one of the most individualistic sports, and SOS describes itself as more of a hang-loose movement than an organization. It has no dues, membership lists, monthly newsletters or officers. Its single minded goal is the preservation of Hawaii’s wave producing reefs and public access to them (Udall and Stansbury 1971).

How did this group of young surfers transform itself into a powerful, collective sociopolitical movement that captured national attention?

First, SOS members never understood saving Hawai‘i’s surf sites as a single issue. The threats to the ocean came from multiple sources that were surfacing in the islands’ postwar transformation from a plantation colony to a U.S. state. As its co-founder, John Kelly, explains:

Hawai‘i was in the post-statehood grip of rapid change when “Save Our Surf” (SOS) struggles began in the early-1960s. Freeways were beginning to rip up old communities. Waikiki was turning into a concrete jungle. Familiar landmarks were disappearing. Surfing friends were being drafted for a far-off war and coming home bitter, if alive. Hawai‘i’s shorelines—the habitat of many people—was under assault (Kelly 1994).

Significantly, SOS recognized and articulated both a critique of tourism and a critique of militarism, and its relationship to the islands’ natural and social environment. Save Our Surf’s early formation during the 1960s reflects a concomitant resistance to the so-called Democratic party revolution and post-statehood development consensus. From the beginning, SOS forged a different kind of politics. Kelly explains:

we found from experience that overly tight organization cannot cope with the constant stresses of rapidly changing issues, participants, times and growth. We believe a flexible style is appropriate for an environmental-political movement of [this] kind. … A democratic non-centralized style characterized SOS work (Kelly 1994).

A second factor in the growth of SOS was its roots in the radical faction of Hawai‘i’s labor movement and the use of traditional Marxist principles in that movement. Throughout the first half of the 19th century, numerous labor strikes occurred on Hawai‘i’s plantations and at harbor docks (Beechert 1985). The first protests against unfair working

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147 A latter manifestation of this dual critique can be seen in SOS’s 1971 report to the State Legislature that has the following subheadings: ‘People, not Profits,’ ‘Endangered Surf,’ and ‘Military Dependency’ (Save Our Surf 2005).
conditions and poor wages were ethnic group-specific, such as Japanese workers or Filipino workers. This was in part a response to the racial hierarchies of the plantation system in which Filipinos were paid less than the Japanese, who were paid less than the Portuguese. It also reflected the cohesion of ethnic groups and their minimal intermingling in the early years. Soon, however, labor strikes were organized across ethnic groups and a vibrant multiethnic labor movement proved increasingly effective in gaining more humane working conditions and wages.

Beginning in the early 1960s, Kelly held Marxist study groups in his home to contextualize the threats to Hawai‘i’s surf sites in terms of Hawai‘i’s labor struggles as part of a larger capitalist world-historical system.\textsuperscript{148} In addition to studying Marx’s fundamental writings (under subject headings such as “The Economic Base,” “The Historical Process,” and “Ideology”), these study groups also read Lenin, Stalin and Mao. SOS printed and distributed posters on the “plundering systems” of slavery, feudalism and capitalism and its influence on “structur[ing] privatization of land, labor and resources” (Save Our Surf 2005). Just as Marxist class analysis functioned as one of the primary mechanisms through which Hawai‘i’s surfers became politicized in the 1960s and early 1970s, so the cultural practice of surfing was thereby politicized.\textsuperscript{149}

The co-founders of SOS saw a conscious connection between organizing surfers and sharing a Marxist analysis as the basis for that organizing, and often used the latter to educate the young surfers it recruited. Kelly explains:

\begin{quote}
We went to the youth because they are primarily interested in surfing. It gives them good health, good bodies, and good contact with the ocean. With many surfing areas threatened, we felt that was a good way to educate and mobilize large numbers of people and awaken their sense of responsibility and love for the ocean, and learn what
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{148} These began informally under the direction of Dr. Karl Niebyl, a German Marxist who befriended John and Marion Kelly at a Honolulu union office (Mast and Mast 1996), and evolved into a more formal gathering with syllabus and reading list (personal discussions with former SOS members).

\textsuperscript{149} See Walker (2006) for a discussion of the Hui ‘O He’e Nalu, an O‘ahu North Shore surfing organization and movement that began in the late 1970s. Walker argues that the Hui, as it was known, functioned as a Hawaiian space (in the “borderlands” of the ocean) from which to challenge American colonization and subjugation. There is little reference to Save Our Surf in Walker’s work and it is beyond the scope of my project to make such references to the Hui. While the Hui served to politicize surfers and the cultural practice of surfing within an Nativist framework, I suspect that many of its members had roots tracing back to SOS in the late 1960s or early 1970s, and an earlier politicization within a Marxist framework; the two need not be oppositional, as I hope my larger project makes clear.
forces within the economic and political sectors were responsible (Mast and Mast 1996: 86).

Although these young surfers didn’t necessarily develop a class consciousness of the proletariat, per se, they were solidifying a consciousness of themselves as “average” or “everyday” Locals in opposition to the destructive forces of so-called development. This form of Localism was more than an oppositional position against outside mainland haoles because SOS consistently targeted the upwardly mobile Asian Locals in the political establishment who were benefiting from these developments. Moreover, SOS members developed keen analytical and critical skills that they effectively deployed in a variety of social and political situations. These study groups eventually evolved into the SOS Political Theory study group (Greevy 1995) and extended their analysis to political economy and sociocultural conditions of Hawai`i. As SOS grew, its agenda began to attract older surfers and residents, many of who were fishermen and other ocean enthusiasts. By the late 1960s, SOS’s organizational structure included subcommittees on land-use policies, legal issues, and political and legislative agendas. Surfing had become highly politicized and increasingly served as a vehicle for broad-based social mobilization and militant activism. While some SOS members became mainstays in later struggles, most regularly mobilized as needed for specific actions in support of other land and water movements.

A third factor in the growth of SOS was that its development of a radical political participatory vision coincided with rifts in Hawai`i’s labor movement that led to the highly polarized 1970 gubernatorial candidacy of Tom Gill in his challenge of two-time incumbent Governor John Burns. Coffman (1973) notes that Gill was part of a more radical faction that opposed the unions’ cooperation and eventual incorporation into the state political system. Like the AJA, unions in the 1960s had become benefactors of Hawai`i’s post-statehood military, tourism and sub/urban development. Union leaders received lucrative business deals and investments and union workers received continuous employment. That relationship between labor unions, businesses, and
government in Hawai‘i reflected America’s postwar corporatism in general, and Gill and his supporters challenged that corporatism. For them, Hawai‘i’s economic boom was a bust, in which a few benefited at the expense of the majority who were being displaced from the land and economically marginalized. Gill’s candidacy—like Save Our Surf—represented a radical, participatory political and economic vision for post-statehood Hawai‘i. Gill lost his bid for governor because incumbent Burns and the Democratic Party were able to portray him and his supporters as “outsiders”—non-locals who favored confrontation (i.e. a haole/foreign way) as opposed to (the Local/Asian way of) cooperation and consensus.

Save Our Surf was aware of the rifts and actively exploited the electoral milieu in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Kelly explains:

In the early 1960s we had approached some of the politicians and government administrators. Look, we said, this project will destroy a public surfing site. How about changing the plans? Meetings of this kind brought off few changes. But by the mid- and late-60s, the political administrators of Gov. John A. Burns began to say, ‘sorry, fellas, the economy of Hawaii is more important than a few surfing sites. We’re going ahead with these plans!’ It was at this point that we turned ourselves around. Instead of going begging without power to those with power, we decided to build our own power base, not inside the system where big money rules, but outside it… Potentially, we had the people, we decided… (Kelly 1994).

Some of the many public petitions that SOS circulated explicitly targeted Governor Burns during the 1970 election. Their rationale is explained in one open letter of invitation to Hawai‘i’s high school and college students:

Geschwender (1980-1981) explains: “The successful struggle for unionization led by the ILWU [International Longshore and Warehouse Union] brought a measure of economic democracy to Hawaii just as the joint building of the Democratic Party by the ILWU and Japanese-American veterans brought a measure of political democracy. Over time, McCarthyism and its very success eroded the crusading spirit of the ILWU and transformed it into a ‘bread-and-butter’ union reminiscent of the majority of the American trade union movement. Similarly, the crusading spirit of the Democratic Party seemed to wane as it achieved greater amounts of success and the Republican Party faded into virtual oblivion. In recent years [the 1970s] the fight for social and economic justice reemerged in the form of various community struggles” (121).

Coffman (1973) discusses the interesting role of ethnicity in the 1970 gubernatorial election in which Burns and Gill were portrayed differently despite both being Local haole with similar middle-/working-class backgrounds. Gill’s “attack” mode of campaigning was poorly received by Americans of Japanese Ancestry (who were dominant in Hawai‘is electoral politics); whereas AJAs looked favorably on Burn’s “loyalty”. To exploit this, Burns chose George Ariyoshi, an AJA veteran of WWII, as his running mate and Burn’s campaign focused on AJA voting districts, which proved effective for AJAs as well as other non-white ethnicities. Interestingly, and importantly, Tom Gill had previously served as John Burn’s Lieutenant Governor until political differences severed their partnership.
We are young and cannot vote, but S.O.S. got 12 bills through the Legislature last year. This means that young people will be heard if, and only if, they will stand to be counted. This is an election year. Issues are hot. Any public action we take now will be magnified by that fact (Save Our Surf 2005).

Increasingly, SOS’s structural analysis of exploitation in Hawai‘i became explicitly linked to a critique of Hawai‘i’s colonization/occupation. In its activism, Save Our Surf repeatedly invoked traditional Hawaiian practices of communal resource use, including and especially water and land resources. They stressed the destruction, degradation and exploitation resulting from America’s takeover of the Hawai‘i. Importantly, SOS drew from traditional Hawaiian land- and water-use practices to frame their critiques of capitalist development in the islands, being especially cognizant of surfing as a “Hawaiian heritage”, even if many surfers were non-Hawaiians. For example, a poster urging widespread resistance to a proposed deep-draft harbor in Wai‘anae proclaims at the onset: “Our ‘Āina, Heritage & Lifestyle are in Danger from Campbell Estate, Developers & Politicians” (Save Our Surf 2005). Similarly, at a fundraising event co-sponsored by SOS on July 23, 1972, “A Benefit for Hawai‘i’s People,” the several-page program highlighted “Hawaii People’s History”—the common history of Hawai‘i’s “ethnic” working people who have been exploited by Euro-American imperialism and colonization.

Some scholars working within a settler colonial framework have critiqued positions such as the ones put forth by SOS as Local Asian and longtime haole resident attempts to appropriate and lay claim to Hawaiian culture through a trope of working class unity, thus naturalizing their place on Hawaiian lands. A parallel struggle in the late 1960s and early 1970s drew on what Candace Fujikane has described as a “terra nullius argument of land in Hawai‘i being ‘empty’ or ‘belonging to no one,’ erasing Native peoples and places in order to celebrate their role in the ‘building’ of the settler

152 In 1970 the voting age was 21; the 26th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution lowering the voting age to 18 wasn’t ratified until 1971.
153 It’s important to note that SOS’s critique of colonization and capitalism in Hawai‘i extended back to the pre-contact chiefly system, which was likened to feudal exploitation. Nevertheless, as John Kelly (1994) explains, SOS placed “educational emphasis on the past structural aspects of both the communal sharing of land, labor and resources; together with deep understanding and respect for the environment among the Kanaka Maoli (Native Hawaiians).”
colony” (2008: 2). Fujikane cites a 1976 poster announcing a rally for the Ethnic Studies movement as stating:

‘We working people of Hawai‘i cultivate the land and harvest the sea. We build every home, harbor, airport and industry. Throughout the centuries we’ve fought loss of lands, evictions, low pay, unemployment, and unsafe working conditions. Yes, we working people struggled for and built Hawaii!’ (Ibid).

While there is a clear similarity between the Ethnic Studies poster and the aforementioned fundraiser’s “Hawaii People’s History”—which begins its program with “Many ethnic groups make up Hawaii’s people today; most of them share a common history as workers who built Hawaii” and ends that section with “All power to Hawaii’s poor and working people!”—I suggest that worker-based Localism in this moment functioned less as an alibi for settler colonialism and more as a form of resistance to larger forces of American empire.

In that same 1972 SOS fundraiser program, the remaining pages are dedicated to printing Hawai‘i Pono‘i and Kaulana Nā Pua, patriotic Hawaiian songs written at the time of American usurpation of Hawaiian sovereignty. Both songs were printed in Hawaiian first (with attending grammatical errors reflective of this early stage of language recovery), followed by English. Both songs are explicitly and politically pro-Hawaiian:

**HAWAI‘I PONO‘I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HAWAI‘I PONO‘I</th>
<th>Hawai‘i’s own,</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nānā i Kou mō‘ī</td>
<td>Look to your king</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ka lani ali‘i</td>
<td>The royal chief,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ke ali‘i</td>
<td>The chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makua lani e,</td>
<td>Royal father,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamehameha e,</td>
<td>Kamehameha,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nā Kāna e pale</td>
<td>We shall defend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Me ka ihe.</td>
<td>With spears</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawai‘i pono‘i</td>
<td>Hawai‘i’s own,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nānā i nā ali‘i,</td>
<td>Look to your chiefs,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nā pua muli kou</td>
<td>The children after you,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nā pokī‘i.</td>
<td>The young</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawai‘i pono‘i</td>
<td>Hawai‘i’s own</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E Ka lāhu e,</td>
<td>O nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘O Kāu Lanahui</td>
<td>Your great duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E uie.</td>
<td>strive.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Kaulana Nā Pua

Kaulana, nā pua aʻa Hawaiʻi
Kupaʻa mahope o ka ʻāina
Hiki mai ka elele o ka loko ʻino
Palapala ʻanunu me ka pākaha

Famous are the children of Hawaiʻi
Ever loyal to the land
When the evil-hearted messenger comes
With his greedy document of Extortion

Pane mai Hawaiʻi i moku o Keawe
Kökua nā bono o Piʻilani
Kākoʻo mai kauaʻi o mano
Paʻapū me ke one Kakuhihewa

Hawaiʻi land of Keawe answers
Piʻilani bays help
Manoʻs Kauaʻi lends support
And so do the sands of Kakuhihewa

ʻA oleʻaʻ kau i ka pūlima
Maluna o ka pepa o ka enemi
Hoʻo ohuiʻāina kuʻai hewa
I ka pono silvia aʻo ke kanaka

No one will fix a signature
To the paper of the enemy
With its sins of annexation
And sale of native civil rights.

ʻAʻole mākou aʻe minamina
I ka puʻukala a ke apuni
Ua lawa mākou i ka pōhaku
I kaʻai kamahaʻo o kaʻāina

We do not value
The governmentʼs sums of money
We are satisfied with the stones
Astonishing food of the land

Mahope mākou o Liliʻu-lani
Aʻloaʻaʻe ka pono a ka ʻāina
(A kau hou ia e ke kalaunu)
Haʻina ʻia mai ana ka puana
O ka poʻe i aloha o kaʻāina

We back Liliʻu-lani
Who has won the rights of the land
(She will be crowned again)
Tell the story
Of the people who love their land.

In the first song, Hawaiʻi Ponoʻi refers to the Native people and their chiefs, that is, the Hawaiian governance system. The second song, Kaulana Nā Pua, bespeaks of infinite loyalty to the land and its sovereign governance in direct opposition to the imposed (American) ways and people. In closing the program for this “Benefit for Hawaiʻi’s People” with two powerful Hawaiian patriotic songs, Save Our Surf, as a co-sponsor along with other like-minded groups/struggles in the early 1970s, shows an attempt to recruit a sense of Local identity, rooted in working-class sensibilities, for an avowedly pro-Hawaiian, anti-American Empire project. In other words, the interlinking of Local

This reprinted text contains substantial grammar and other Hawaiian language mistakes. Although language recovery was still at an early stage in the Hawaiian movement, the mostly young activists were bringing it back to life. For relevant discussions on the importance of “Kaulana Nā Pua” for Hawaiians and Hawaiian sovereignty, see Nordyke and Noyes (1993) and Stillman (1999).
and Hawaiian identities and struggles was made possible by foregrounding Native issues as a means to resist the state’s political-business-military establishment.

This strategic politicization of Hawaiian culture and resource-use practices functioned as a means to mobilize Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians to protect Hawaiian lands and culture, and was frequently deployed in Hawai‘i at the time. A Hawaiian man who was very active in the Wai‘ahole-Waikāne struggle recalls that the nascent Hawaiian movement and the numerous Local community struggles shared politicized cultural forms, such as Hawaiian music and slogans of “Keep the Country Country.” He claims that this was not a casual linkage but a very deliberate and conscious one because it was seen as mutually beneficial to Hawaiians and non-Hawaiian Locals. As a discursive practice and activist platform, Localism firmly grounded in Hawaiianess (and vice versa) in this moment produced a cohesive resistive agency of sociopolitical mobilization among diversely situated persons who shared the same locales and/or similar objectives. And this was done under an overarching framework of class analysis adapted to Hawai‘i’s particular sociopolitical conditions.

As a “watershed” moment for the resistive 1970s, the Kalama Valley anti-eviction struggle shows a similar conjoining of Hawaiian and Local (Choy 2000; Milner 2006; Niheu 1999). Longtime tenants and farmers in the east O‘ahu community were displaced to make room for the expanding Hawai‘i Kai suburb. During the latter stages of their eviction, Hawaiian and multiethnic Local activists coalesced around the tenants and farmers plight, catapulting the Kalama Valley anti-eviction struggle to the forefront of the islands’ resistive politics. Rather than an incipient Hawaiian moment (Trask 1987) or Local moment (Kido 2008), Kalama Valley was both. In early 1970s

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155 A similar argument applies to the Wai‘ahole taro farmers water struggle and the ways in which Hawaiian culture were invoked as a means to protect water resources. See Scheuer (2002) and Sproat and Moriwake (2007) for relevant discussions.
156 E. 1/16/04.
157 See Milner (2006) for a discussion of how the Kalama Valley struggle “forged a new identity that reflect [the] move from haole to local to indigenous people” (165) and through the re-visioning of ‘home,’ ‘homelessness,’ and ‘homeland.’
158 Trask argues that Kalama Valley marked the “birth of the Hawaiian movement.” However, forming at about the same time as the Kalama Valley struggle, The Hawaiians were the first Hawaiian political organization of the 1970s. McGregor-Alegado explains: “Formed in 1970, it claimed a membership of 5,000 grassroots Hawaiians throughout the state by 1971, and 8,000 members at its peak in 1974-75. The purposes
Hawai‘i, Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians involved in radical activism were committed to both anti-capitalist and anti-imperial politics. These activists recruited Localism, rooted in working-class sensibilities, for a pro-Hawaiian, anti-American empire project. This history suggests that the building of any present or future “common ground” in Hawai‘i must be predicated on shared political commitments.

The significance of Save Our Surf is that it, like numerous moments of activism in the 1960s and 1970s, gained strength by being produced through and producing both Hawaiian and Local collective agencies. A mutually-constituted critique of capitalism and imperialism functioned in an articulated local-global nexus that linked the activism of specific island communities to related struggles across the islands and throughout the world. As one of the earliest radical political groups in Hawai‘i at the time, SOS members dispersed into other struggles early on, such as the Kalama Valley anti-eviction struggle, the anti-H-3 coalition, and the Protect Kaho‘olawe ‘Ohana, among other movements. Additionally, their members were acutely aware of and actively participated in global struggles, such as anti-apartheid activism, support for Japanese farmers resisting eviction, and a variety of other Third World struggles (SOS 2005). Their articulation of relevant global dimensions in local activism, and vice versa, remains particularly astute, and many subsequent groups built upon SOS’s groundbreaking work.

of the organization were to “seek justice and promote the general welfare of the Hawaiian people” and to have Hawaiians “participate fully and more meaningfully in the determination and development of policies and decisions affecting the destiny of the Hawaiian people.” Initially, The Hawaiians focused on reforming the Hawaiian Homes Lands Commission, the major land-based institution for Hawaiians. The Hawaiians also started the “People’s Market” in 1973, which has since become established in various parts of O‘ahu. Under the program, farmers bring their produce to the People’s Market and sell directly to the people rather than through a retailer. The Hawaiians also experimented in the design of low-priced homes which could be simply constructed with the cooperation of friends and neighbors. Calling attention to the major problems facing disadvantaged Hawaiians, The Hawaiians worked for changes in government policies and community programs (McGregor-Alegado 1980: 44). Niheu notes that The Hawaiians were reluctant to publicly support the Kalama Valley struggle because it was initially seen as ‘too haole’ (1999: 46). Several activists I interviewed told me that prominent members of The Hawaiians did nevertheless support the Kalama Valley struggle unofficially or indirectly. My point here is that the Kalama Valley struggle was not the beginning of the Hawaiian (sovereignty) movement, as the parallel formation of The Hawaiians demonstrates; but rather, Kalama Valley did signal a pivotal moment for Hawaiians who were organizing at the time.

In opposition to Trask and arguing that Kalama Valley was a decisively Local movement, Kido (2008) seeks to recover an historical space for common ground in present-day contentions between Hawaiians and Locals. She demonstrates how conceptions of “Third World” solidarity infused Local components of the Kalama Valley struggle, and she argues that once the struggle ended the “Third World” component got phased out and latter-day Hawaiians re-articulated and laid claim to this history of Kalama Valley as a Hawaiian struggle (Ibid: 122-124). What is missing from Kido’s work is an analysis on how notions of Third World Solidarity were produced through an explicit co-joining of capitalist and imperialist critiques “on the streets,” and how any present or future “common ground” must be predicated on shared political commitments through activist oriented analysis and action.
In describing the loosely-construed but highly-organized grassroots coalition that formed in Kalama Valley, Soli Kihei Niheu shows how the struggle transformed into ‘Kokua Hawai‘i’ in order to have “global understanding” and as a means “to expose some of our grassroots people to world issues” (1999: 47). Because of the groups’ connecting of one struggle with another, when “bodies” were needed in specific direct actions such as a protest demonstration or for days-long campouts to “occupy” and “defend” a community locale threatened with eviction, information was quickly dispersed and people and groups from all over the islands would come together. Niheu was like many activists of his era. He attended college on the continental U.S. and was influenced by such groups as the Black Panthers, Young Lords, Students for a Democratic Society, and by anti-Vietnam War activism.

Many of the core activists in the Kalama coalition came from a Marx-Lenin-Mao (MLM) study group that was an off-shoot of SOS’s earlier study groups. These MLM activists would meet in a house on 10th Avenue in Kaimuki, and one of their primary goals was to deploy a Marx-Lenin-Mao analysis to resist capitalist-imperialist onslaughts that were manifest in the eviction of Hawai‘i’s Local residents. One of the core activists in this grassroots coalition explains:

> It was people. We formed little collectives, like study groups and stuff, and we fought for [UH] Ethnic Studies, and we studied so hard about how to make conscious and socially responsible change using the Marx-Lenin-Mao, MLM, analysis. What it is with MLM is that the powerless, those without power, learn how—by struggle and strategy—it’s a whole way of how to make your stand and fight for more power.

The fledgling Ethnic Studies program at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa also became a central axis in this era of organizing by drawing in seasoned island residents to learn from their experiences, and dispersing the young energetic students its professors were educating to the many anti-eviction and anti-development struggles. Intellectual

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160 Niheu goes on to talk about his personal turn towards Hawaiian nationalism and the drawbacks and limitations of the grassroots- and similar coalitions for Native activism in Hawai‘i.

161 MLM activists were also sometimes called “The House People” or known as the Pacific Rim Collective (Choy 2000).

162 N. 8/25/05.

163 See Aoude (1999) for various firsthand accounts and analysis of the Ethnic Studies struggle.
grounding in Marx-Lenin-Mao praxis enabled the various community struggles to be articulated as widespread “system” failings and not simply grievances between individuals and landlords. While residents in these struggling communities were educated and politicized by the “ethnic studies folks” (as they were often referred to), the intellectuals valued the residents’ life experiences and practical knowledge and not only foregrounded these experiences in formulating tactics but also incorporated them into their curricula. This cross-fertilization was mutually beneficial: island residents repeatedly mobilized to support the struggle to transform the Ethnic Studies program into a full Department; and committed faculty and students consistently participated in anti-eviction and related struggles throughout the islands. Having an academic center fostered research that empowered the community struggles with information and evidence to use in their public relations campaigns and in their political-legal engagements. Ethnic Studies functioned as a resource base, enlisting and organizing professionals (such as lawyers, architects, doctors, sympathetic businessmen, and others) who might not otherwise be politically active. Many of the core activists in Ethnic Studies would become integral allies in the Waiʻahole-Waikâne anti-eviction struggle.

Around 1972-73, there were several small-scale struggles taking place in urban Honolulu that served as a “testing ground” for the growing grassroots coalition, which included former SOS members, Kokua Hawaiʻi people, MLM activists, and Ethnic Studies faculty and students. One of the struggles was the Old Young Street improvement project. As a means of accommodating more urban growth and traffic in Honolulu, the city government planned to widen Young Street and expand the city’s infrastructure (sewers, utilities, etc.). Not only would this project have displaced many longtime residents, many of whom were elderly and would have had difficulty relocating, but also the exorbitant costs of the project would have been passed onto remaining residents, many of whom did not have the financial means to absorb the service fee rate and property tax increases. Members of the grassroots coalition

\[^{164}L. 10/12/04.\]
mobilized in support of the (Old) Young Street residents and helped negotiate a mutually satisfying compromise with the City of Honolulu.

Another such small-scale struggle took place on Old Vineyard Street. The State of Hawai‘i planned to build a large parking structure in downtown Honolulu that would displace the residents of Old Vineyard, who were primarily retired plantation workers. While many of the residents at (Old) Young Street were Japanese homeowners, at Old Vineyard almost all the residents were tenants, primarily Hawaiians and Filipinos. When the residents began organizing, they enlisted the help of the “Ethnic Studies folks” and others in the grassroots coalition, who in turn spent a lot of time in the neighborhood conducting small group informational meetings and canvassing door-to-door as a means of creating a sense of legitimacy as outsiders. Allied lawyers communicated and negotiated with governmental officials; allied architects drew up alternative parking plans and urban residential designs; and allied church groups raised money and attended to social needs of the residents. Through this coming together of various island interests to organize the Old Vineyard neighborhood and resist their evictions, the struggle was in large part successful wherein the state scaled down and largely relocated (underground) its parking structure while also building a new housing complex for the residents who wished to remain in the community.

As “testing grounds”, Old Vineyard and Old Young Street were ideal: the communities were numerically and geographically small, the objectives were clear and simple, and with the help of professionals the solutions became creative and attainable. Successful involvement in these small-scale struggles provided the grassroots coalition with a paradigm for how to create and maintain unity of multiethnic communities in ways that garner support from the broader public to pressure the government to make accommodations. Over time, the grassroots coalition was able to incorporate into a political movement the disparate communities throughout the islands who were similarly situated in their vulnerability to Hawai‘i’s rampant development. The anti-eviction struggle of the Waiāhole-Waikāne Community Association greatly benefited
from this movement and the WWCA became one of its most visible and vocal representatives. By the mid 1970s, large-scale “Stop All Evictions” demonstrations and marches (Trask and Greevy 2004), coupled with the militancy of the WWCA, helped create a climate in Hawai‘i in which “the potential of launching a more broad-based land-use rights movement” seemed immanently possible (Modavi 1992).165

With the help of Marx-Lenin-Mao activism, radicalized surfers and students, and a broad-based grassroots coalition, residents of these local community struggles came to see themselves as collectively marginalized in “the system”—a capitalist political economy that had come to control the islands’ land and water resources in a way that was destructive to Local people. It was an intermixture of theoretical and practical traditions, and with this shared genealogy of marginalization/oppression, residents and allies empowered themselves with a resoundingly shared voice that asserted their collective agency in the political world. This is well-described by MLM activists:

At the heart of it all is to have a broader worldview, so that you can see everything in context. ...you can’t actually teach people tactics; you must teach them a broader worldview. ... The latent untapped power of the people is so great; it’s unbelievable how much power there is if we could just unleash it, focus it.166

[A] lot of it was raising the level of political awareness and consciousness so that people are not naive, you know, about what it is that they’re up against. And once they understand the terms of the struggle then you can move accordingly...167

In other words, as David Forgac’s describes Gramcian praxis: “Marxism...enter[ed] people’s common sense, giving them a more critical understanding of their own situation” (Gramsci and Forgacs 1988 [2000]: 421).

Since the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Hawai‘i’s land and water resources have long been usurped from Native and local control and use by capitalist interests. World War II brought extensive militarization of Native lands, developments of tourist

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165 Modavi (1992) demonstrates that the State of Hawai‘i recognized this immanent possibility that threatened both capital accumulation and the government’s legitimacy, therefore in the case of Waiāhole-Waikāne the state stepped in to purchase the disputed lands as a means of averting such a confrontation, which effectively quelled a broad-based land-use rights movement from coming to fruition.

166 N. 8/25/05.

167 E. 1/16/04.
resorts and condominiums that have threatened Hawai‘i’s natural resources and displaced many of its longtime residents, and the ascendancy of AJAs and other Asians who saw participation in the American system as self-beneficial. All of this provided the impetus for resistive activism launched by the Save Our Surf movement and extending to a grassroots coalitions in Kalama Valley and other locales throughout the islands.

Hawai‘i’s territorial traditions include shared discrimination and subjugation among (mostly non-white) island residents and its subsequent multiethnic labor movement, as well as rural farming and exchange networks among former plantation workers and other local, rural residents (including whites). While all three struggles are firmly situated in this historical period, it is the tenants and allied activists in the Waiahole-Waikane anti-eviction struggle which invoked these multiethnic Local and working-class traditions strongly. They cultivated a form of Localism firmly grounded in Hawaiianess combined with wide-reaching Marx-Lenin-Mao anti-imperialist critiques. In the process, Hawaiian culture and traditions were politicized as a means of mobilizing Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians to act upon shared and demonstrated sociopolitical commitments to “Keep the Country Country.”
PART II:
A TALE OF TWO VALLEYS

Part I of this dissertation outlined traditions from three historical periods: pre-state Hawaiian society, Hawaiian Kingdom era, and territorial Hawai‘i (plantation to statehood). Each chapter in Part II now details the ways in which these traditions have been used by the people of Wai‘ahole-Waikāne for political ends, the impact of each struggle on its own and in relation with each other, and what those outcomes are for their community and Hawai‘i in general. Chapter Five examines how Local multiethnic and labor traditions from the post-overthrow plantation era, combined with American democratic rights traditions from the post-statehood period, were mobilized in the anti-eviction struggle to forge broad-based alliances and halt suburban and tourist developments along the upper coast of windward O‘ahu. Chapter Six examines how the Wai‘ahole taro farmers in their water struggle mobilized Hawaiian culture and traditions, both from the pre-Kingdom ahupua‘a management systems and the Kingdom’s hybrid modernization of law. Hawaiian cultural practices and shared access to and use of the islands’ land and water resources were thus protected and codified, setting a precedent for similar community- and resource-struggles on other Hawaiian Islands and elsewhere in the United States. Chapter Seven examines how, despite being grounded in Hawaiian Kingdom traditions of collectively owned private property and older Native norms of land stewardship, the Kamaka family relied on traditions of American propertied individualism that were both forced upon them and integrated into their self-articulations during the territorial and statehood era. This reduced the political saliency of their land struggle and prevented possible alliances which may have averted the U.S. military condemnation and confiscation of their land in Waikāne.

Chapter Eight concludes with an examination of the community taro patch that the Wai‘ahole taro farmers re-established during their water struggle. The ways in
which taro farmers speak of the Mauka Lo‘i reflects an intersubjective and plural understanding of themselves and the place—simultaneously, and in shifting configurations—as Hawaiian, Local and American. I explore the ways in which the Mauka Lo‘i dis-placed notions of sovereignty and subjectivity as the basis of political community and political actors, providing an alternative vision for collective self-determination rooted in practices of kuleana.

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It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us...

So begins Charles Dickens’ *Tale of Two Cities*. It is an apt description for this tale of two valleys half a world away and two centuries removed. Dickens wrote of revolution: the hopes and dreams it embodies, and the reign of terror that it can inadvertently usher. Wai‘ahole and Waikāne is also a tale of revolution, power imbalances and reversals, and its inadvertent consequences for well-intentioned people. Take for example the reflections of one community leader referring to the tumultuous 1970s, “Dat’s what’s good ’bout da [anti-eviction] struggle; it make everybody join togetha as one”\(^{168}\) in contradistinction to a statement by another community leader—“Lotta heartaches… lotta internal conflicts… Three years of hell.”\(^{169}\) It was simultaneously the best of times and the worst of times; emphases that would alternate through the passing decades. Like the Dickens’ story of late 18th century Europe, the story of this dissertation, too, is a love story: not about a woman whom two men love, but about land—the ‘āina, *that which feeds*—and the love of the land that impassions people to action in disparate ways. Other analogies can be drawn, such as heroism of ordinary people, thirst for justice and the lack thereof, festering family feuds, general melancholy and malaise, and lingering promises of redemptive possibilities.

\(^{168}\) T. 1/12/04.
\(^{169}\) Y. 1/15/04.
CHAPTER 5
STANDING IN THE ROAD, THE ANTI-EVICTION STRUGGLE
OF THE WAIĀHOLE-WAIKĀNE COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION

Da night was still, da moon was by da mountain. It was like a little cloudy over da moon but it’s still there, it’s shining brightly. Da night is still. When dat horn wen blow, people wen know already “It’s time; they coming in.”

When the people of Waiāhole and Waikāne heard the warning horn blowing from a treetop on the night of January 4, 1977, they knew that it signaled the police were coming to enforce their evictions. Hundreds of supporters from all over the Hawaiian Islands were camped out to “occupy” and “defend” the valleys. The residents and activists had previously held rehearsals of nonviolent resistance in anticipation of the police. They had fought their evictions in the courthouse, at the state capital, in the media, in front of business and labor offices, at neighborhood and church meetings, and in alliance with other communities facing similar evictions during the turbulent decade. This night was the culmination of three years of struggle to stay in their rural homes and fend off the encroachment of suburban and tourism development. They knew this moment would eventually come, and most of the people of Waiāhole and Waikāne and their dedicated allies were ready to stand in the road for the final “battle.”

A vehicular and human barricade was formed across one mile of the two-lane Kamehameha Highway on windward O‘ahu. Island-wide supporters converged on the valleys, and traffic was effectively stopped for hours on the only road along the thirty-mile coastline. Only a handful of police officers arrived on the scene and it was unclear if there was sufficient “backup” waiting to come in and enforce the eviction decrees. Members of the Waiāhole-Waikāne Community Association (WWCA) were canvassing the waiting cars, handing out information pamphlets and talking with drivers and passengers to

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170 T. 1/12/04.
explain their anti-eviction struggle as the reason for the roadblock. Many WWCA members recall that all who were inconvenienced were nonetheless supportive of the community. The police appeared uncertain of how to proceed. An officer threatened to arrest the president of WWCA, who describes the scene:

Dat’s why I’m suppose to tell you, officer, dis is my attorney right here. I’m standing on private property. I didn’t park any of dese cars, but, you know, I’m in charge of da people who did.

What you like me do, call da mayor?!

Yeah, dat’s exactly what I want you to do!

The mayor of Honolulu was called. The governor of Hawai‘i was called. Ultimately, the chief of the Honolulu Police Department gave his personal assurance that there would be no evictions that night and promised to notify WWCA in advance of any future actions. Thus ended the historic roadblock. A few days later the Governor of Hawai‘i announced a deal with the large landowner, McCandless heir Elizabeth Loy Marks, in which the State would purchase six hundred acres of Waiāhole Valley and issue long-term leases at fair and reasonable rents to all the valleys’ tenants. The anti-eviction struggle was a success.

This chapter examines how the Waiāhole-Waikāne Community Association drew upon Hawai‘i’s plantation and labor traditions of the 20th century, combined with American democratic traditions that accompanied statehood, to resist their displacement from the land that they lived upon for generations. Using multiple island traditions, the residents and activists connected the valleys’ land issues to all of Hawai‘i and forged broad-based alliances therein—alliances that were invaluable to their success. I discuss how community members were politicized into action, the various strategies they employed at different times, an intra-community conflict that surfaced and its long-term implications for other community struggles. This documentation of the anti-eviction struggle serves as a historical/futures archive for understanding how the diverse people of Waiāhole-Waikāne engaged in effective sociopolitical mobilization to stay on the land.
**Preserving a ‘Country Lifestyle’**

Before the [struggle], of course, well, it was a family thing. People knew each other. People were farmers; people were fishermen. And we had that sharing and caring thing in the valley.\(^{171}\)

[Before the struggle] we wouldn’t come up and talk like how we talk today. Stay behind our closed doors, mind your own business. In the rural lifestyle, that’s the way people are, you know, they just mind your own business, do your own thing. Yeah, but when the eviction [struggle] happened, everyone was being affected, so that’s what made everyone come out, you know.\(^{172}\)

I didn’t know anybody; just went to work, straight ahead, over to work and come back home, straight to home. … But through the struggle I got to know everyone.\(^{173}\)

Localized lifestyle, community lifestyle. Everybody different ethnic values: Filipino, Hawaiian and mixed Hawaiian, Okinawan, Japanese, Chinese – all these guys living together with haoles, you know.\(^{174}\)

These various perspectives from participants in the anti-eviction struggle reveal the multiple and sometimes contradictory ways in which residents view their shared community. For some, these two valleys were always a communal space in which reciprocal exchanges were a part of everyday life. For others, Waiāhole and Waikāne was a collection of insular spaces in which people kept to themselves and respected each other’s privacy. Residents’ day-to-day communal experiences varied,\(^{175}\) and “community” in Waiāhole-Waikāne has never been a singular construct, but rather has always encompassed many overlapping everyday practices within the same rural place: different cultural and religious holidays and traditions celebrated by some but open to all irrespective of religious affiliation;\(^{176}\) various occupational and work conditions in and outside of the valleys yet often supplemented with homegrown or gathered foods; various extended family networks and neighborly networks of exchange; and so forth.

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\(^{171}\) T. 1/12/04.
\(^{172}\) H. 2/28/04.
\(^{173}\) G. 2/28/04.
\(^{174}\) Y. 1/15/04.
\(^{175}\) McMillen (1978) found that the different self-identifications and community articulations were divided between those who had extensive kinship networks within the valleys and those who did not. She contends that through the organizational form of WWCA an “emergence of the ‘wholistic’ [sic] view of the community” arose (Ibid: 4). While this may have been true for many who stayed in the community association through the end of the years-long struggle, a “wholistic” [sic] view of community is not evidenced in the clear split that left many at odds with each other for years to come.\(^{176}\) There were Catholic and Protestant churches and a Buddhist temple in the valleys.
Nevertheless, long-time residents shared mostly-fond stories and childhood memories of working hard on independent farms or family garden plots, fishing with extended family members from outside the valleys, participating in ethnic-specific organizations in the valleys, and intermingling among multiethnic friends in a variety of venues. These recollections recall both Local and Hawaiian traditions.

At the beginning of 1974 there were about 100 families with several hundred residents in the two valleys, most of whom where at least second- or third-generation families on the land. For many Hawaiian families, their genealogy to the place extended even further back. Almost half the residents were Hawaiian, twenty percent were Japanese, seventeen percent were Filipino, twelve percent were haole, and the remaining residents were of other ethnicities (Geschwender 1980-1981: 122). Among the residents, there were Hawaiian kuleana landowners, tenants who worked in the city and varyingly participated in subsistence farming, tenants who lived and farmed commercially in the valleys, and tenants who lived elsewhere and farmed commercially in the valleys (Ibid: 123). Almost everyone in this multiethnic and economically-diverse community referred to themselves as “country folks” or as living a “country life,” and this was a sufficient enough basis for community identification (among many other identifications).

This concept of country lifestyle—“keeping the country country”—served as a rallying point for the residents of Waiāhole-Waikāne and was incorporated into their four-point platform that proved salient with the rest of the island people:

1. Long-term leases and fair and reasonable rents;
2. Expand agriculture;
3. Preserve the integrity of the community and its lifestyle; and
4. Provide for community involvement in regional planning.

177 McMillen (1978) puts the figure at 900 persons (which included large numbers of children), noting that 600 of whom where tenants.

178 About a decade earlier, Miyagi (1963) notes that there were 453 people in 94 households in Waiahole (he excludes Waikāne from his study): 27% Filipino, 25% Japanese, 25% Hawaiian, 15% Portuguese and haole, and 8% other (Chinese, Korean, so forth). The change in the ethnic distribution between Miyagi and Geschwender may be explained by the difficulty in categorizing the many part-Hawaiians who also identify with other ethnicities/nationalities; for example, many Hawaiians in Waiahole-Waikāne are also Filipino and Miyagi and Geschwender may have placed them in different categories thereby resulting in a different ethnic distribution. Another explanation is that more Hawaiians moved into the valleys during the decade (due to earlier rural displacements), as was noted by several residents. I use Geschwender’s figures because my interviewees roughly confirmed these figures. Miyagi also notes that in the early 1960s 21% of Waiahole residents were full-time farmers, with most of the remainder being part-time of subsistence-oriented.
The integrity of this rural, country lifestyle meant being able to raise animals, farm, fish and otherwise gather food resources to feed your family; it meant being able to keep to yourself while also sharing as you pleased.

In Hawai‘i, as elsewhere, articulations of “‘country’ life also bear a class connotation, as it is associated with subsistence practices maintained by people who continue to get food from the land and sea, whether by choice or by the demands of poverty” (Goodyear-Ka‘opua 2005). Residents of the two valleys often repeated this theme of having “less-than”:

We never did consider ourselves poor because we always had something to eat. … But by the standards at the time, I guess, we were—all of the people in the valley were—poor: they lived off the land.179

I think everybody was the same. We were raised poor but I didn’t realize that we were raised poor. … I don’t remember being without. It was just that kind of give and take, and we still kind of do that now, but with the older generations. You had to depend on your neighbors, your friends, your relatives. It was just part of that life. That was our lifestyle. … Everybody used to farm; not wide-scale farming, just enough for them to handle.180

Most residents—irrespective of their occupations, educational levels, property ownership, ethnicity/nationality, or other relevant factors—tended to share this experience of minimal wealth or capital and fewer material goods, which they supplemented with subsistence activities. For example, small Hawaiian kuleana landowners were often workers in factory-type production or similar industries just like their Filipino neighbors; commercial Japanese farmers often retained little profit despite owning their businesses and like their Chinese merchant neighbors had to supplement their incomes with subsistence production. Regardless of their varying degrees of education—some only had a grade school education, most attended high school even if they didn’t complete it, while some graduated from trade school or college—almost all lived in modest homes and drove simple cars; children wore hand-me-down clothes and shared used toys. In this way, despite having different class positions (sometimes simultaneously)—as workers,

179 D. 8/18/05.
180 E. 8/18/05.
peasant-like farmers, landowners, business owners—Waiahole-Waikane residents participated in similar class processes: producing surplus labor while not controlling its appropriation or distribution at the workplace; supplementing this wage income by producing surplus labor at home through farming and fishing; and retaining what was gained for family consumption or distribution among neighbors.

These economic traditions with its attending social relations were rooted within Hawaii’s multiethnic plantation society and earlier Native Hawaiian society. Images and articulations of a “country lifestyle” resonated with Hawaii’s Local urban and suburban residents who were often only one or two generations removed from the plantations and similar “country living.” This is clearly demonstrated by the 1975 Hawaii State Legislature House Resolution 685 that expresses support for:

> [the right of] each family [to] chose its own particular lifestyle of community from a variety of offerings... [and acknowledging that] the people of Waiahole-Waikane have demonstrated their commitment to preserving a way of life that is a part of the values of all our citizens and to producing some of the necessary food to sustain our society.\(^\text{181}\)

Drawing upon the islands’ rural traditions of Hawaiian culture and multiethnic plantation cultures—which coalesced in the place they shared—was a deliberate organizational strategy to unite the community and avoid potential ethnic divisions (Nakata 1999). For example, the WWCA leadership and the majority of residents actively refused several efforts by outside groups who wanted to support various ethnic-specific constituencies within Waiahole-Waikane. The group The Hawaiians and related organizations offered to organize and lobby on behalf of Hawaiian kuleana owners to ensure their property rights and for Hawaiian tenants having primacy. Similarly, the Farm Bureau, which was primarily made up of Japanese Americans, offered to support the valleys’ commercial farmers (who were mostly Japanese or Okinawan) in representing their interests or otherwise using the Bureau’s organizational influence in the state government to negotiate favorable outcomes for

\(^{181}\) Cited in “In Response to House Resolution 685, Relating to the Preservation of Waiahole-Waikane Lifestyle” in Hawaii State Department of Agriculture; Honolulu: 8th Legislature of the State of Hawaii.
the valleys’ farmers. Some unions, which had large numbers of Filipinos in their ranks, attempted to represent Filipino workers in the valleys to ensure they received the contracts to build the new homes. Some of these carpenters and other construction industry workers shared how difficult it was for them at the time to receive such pressure from their friends and colleagues; their reply would be “So what if I have work wen I no more place to live.” This description by a WWCA leader aptly illustrates the experiences shared by many:

We had several groups coming to us to tell us dat, you know, we should do it dis way and—One guy just pissed me off. His ting was “Eh, I don’t mind da Japanese, but we gotta take care of da Hawaiians.” You believe him?! “You know what, good-bye” [laughter and hand-waving gesture]. ... There were other, several factions dat wanted to tell “Oh, you know, we got good rapport wit da governor [who was Japanese American], we can get you guys in...” [We said:] “No, we gonna do ‘em wit us. Thru us, not thru anybody else, but thru us.” Started dis ting, goin’ see it thru, as a community.182

It is here where “country lifestyle,” and its shared socioeconomic experiences, functioned to unite what might otherwise have been ethnically-divided interests.

When under threat of displacement, these shared traditions of a country lifestyle were politicized into action. The role of the grassroots coalition and Marx-Lenin-Mao (MLM) activists was instrumental in this process. With designated “point persons” dispersed in different community struggles, the core MLM activists regularly came together to update each other, work out individual tactics and joint strategies, and to regroup and redeploy as needed.183 With such a network, they helped to facilitate and mobilize a larger activist body—including Save Our Surf, the Ethnic Studies program, and allied groups (environmentalist, labor, welfare rights, anti-war, Hawaiian, and so forth)—bringing them out in the thousands for specific actions, such as at contested governmental

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182 Y. 1/15/04.
183 Initially it seemed that the various struggles were ethnic-centric and the outside activists aligned with struggles pertaining to their particular ethnic group, for example Filipino activists gravitated towards Ota Camp while Hawaiians worked with Waiahole-Waikane. However, as a core Ethnic Studies activist explains: “[We] still all agreed that the root of the problem was the capitalist economy and that it wasn’t just a race issue, it as a class issue, and we had to understand that the interworkings of race and class in Hawai’i to really empower the communities and protect the communities from these assaults that were coming from—really, I mean these are more imperialist kind of investments” (E. 1/16/04). In this context, the perceived ethnic alignment of activists with respective communities was strategic in fostering intersecting identifications and articulations of race/ethnicity and class.
land-use hearings. The MLM activists invested themselves in their particular community struggles for many years, and in so doing they unambiguously attempted to cultivate a form of proletariat/working-class consciousness among local residents. Local and Native traditions of plantation subjugation and rural land tenure were recruited into this class-consciousness raising. As one core activist in the Waiāhole-Waikāne struggle explains:

Class [consciousness] is always brought from the outside. I don’t think it ever just [chuckles] bubbles up out of the ether, you know. I mean, we were the radicals from the university Ethnic Studies program and we basically had that talk. … People don’t necessarily become full fledged radicals in and of their own right. …[Some of them were] as radical as you could be…but I wouldn’t necessarily say the “class consciousness” part of it. Well, they had a lot of talk among themselves in the early days about “the system.” So if you say the code word “the system” there’s gonna be a bunch of them that know or have a familiarity with that.\textsuperscript{184}

Importantly, however, the working-class consciousness brought in from the outside resonated with residents’ own experiences: many were urban workers, former plantation workers, or otherwise not in control of their own labor. Moreover, residents absorbed, appropriated, and adapted this class identity to their own needs and experiences that were not defined simply in terms of relations of production.\textsuperscript{185} The same allied activist has this to say:

We not the ones that did it; they had to move. If they didn’t move then nothing moved. … [We said] ‘well, this is how capitalism works and this is how money works and this is how politics works—and this is what’s evicting you guys; not just somebody that’s making these particular decisions (which they are) but they exist within this overall context.” … The activist element was at least successful in making the point that it’s not necessarily because they [the landlord and developer] have all the political connections and the money [that] they gonna win – they gonna win if people just say “Well, I’m not going to resist and I’m gonna move.” [chuckle] But if they put their foot down and transform it into a political struggle it’s quite possible that people can stay. But that took a long time, I mean, that took a while to get to that point.\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{184} E. 1/16/04. Note how similar this sounds to Lenin (‘What is to be Done?’ 1902): “there could not have been social-democratic consciousness among the workers; it would have to be brought to them from without.” Geschwender (1983) describes how many of the core outside activists in Waiāhole-Waikāne and other anti-eviction struggles later organized into the Hawai’i branch of the Revolutionary Communist Party with an explicit purpose to function as a vanguard party instilling revolutionary worker consciousness among residents and in communities.

\textsuperscript{185} Geschwender (1983) notes how the struggle was built very deliberately on a working-class basis even if the issues involved were not in terms of relations of production.

\textsuperscript{186} E. 1/16/04, emphasis in original.
Traditions of Marxist class analysis gave meaning to the residents’ sense of disempowerment as they began to locate themselves as a subjugated class in the capitalist system. Moreover, the sincere commitment that MLM activists demonstrated in the anti-eviction struggle was welcomed and appreciated by many residents in the early stages. As one ally explains: “[the residents] were feeling so isolated by the power structure that many of them said ‘If this is what communism is, I want it too’ (or something to that effect). ‘They’re the only one’s that care for us’ ” (Nakata 1999: 70).

As one resident recalls:

> da communist ting didn’t really bother us because dey Local and we Local and we can see for ourselves if it’s good for da community or not. ... We just take whateva good dey give us and we use it. And there’s a lot of good in it.  

Even if they didn’t self-identify as communists or socialists with a proletariat- or peasant-class subjectivity, most of the Waiāhole-Waikāne residents saw themselves as similarly situated amid the overwhelming threats of displacement by large systemic forces:

> “Really, it didn’t seem to be real radical when you’re faced with losing your home.”

As many community struggles by the mid 1970s became more militant in their resistance to evictions, there appeared a concerted effort by pro-development forces to frame these struggles as communist and therefore illegitimate and outside the parameters of the islands’ American political system. Indeed, some of the allied activists were part of the national Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP). To maintain a broad base of islands-wide support, struggling communities sought to emphasis their Localness in order for other Locals—working-class as well as ascending middle-classes—to sympathize with and support them, as evident in the quote above, and in this recollection:

> Nobody from the community that I know of was swayed by the [MLM] ideology. ... It was more of the Local appeal, you know, Local poor people rather than a class thing. That’s my sense of what happened. But one thing that shouldn’t be discounted is that they’re looking at it from a class and not an ethnic standpoint helped build a bigger base.  

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187 C. 4/7/05, emphasis added.
188 E. 8/15/05.
189 B. 11/14/03.
This statement is curious because it disavows Marx-Lenin-Mao ideology while simultaneously appreciating the class-analytical influence of MLM, which functioned as a means to unite a potentially ethnically divided Local constituency. Here class interests do not take precedent to Local interests. I suggest that although there was an ambivalence to revolutionary proletariat- or peasant-class subject position, those active in community struggles such as Waiʻāhole-Waikīne embraced and employed MLM inspired class analysis nonetheless, specifically in terms of forging unity among multiethnic Locals. In this way, it was not necessary to have an articulated Marxist, Leninist or Maoist subjectivity or political identity in order to assert and act upon one’s agency as a worker, farmer, or tenant. Here, “working-class” functioned as a catch all phrase or concept to incorporate the fluidity of a country lifestyle with all of its varied class processes and experiences.

In addition to a class-consciousness, the interface between the Ethnic Studies folks and the Waiʻāhole-Waikīne Community Association produced a rights-consciousness, evident in the following statements:

For me, I was very inexperienced in the very beginning. Never knew how to go about doing things... After going through all these struggles and fights and everything, we become like how we say, more educated, more brave, more, you know, more in the sense of saying that if you know something is wrong and you feel that you can fight the issue then fight ‘em because you believe in what you’re doing is right. So, it’s a sense of saying that after that now we’re educated, we know our rights, it’s like we know our rights already. We’re not afraid to do what we really want to do. ... Now everything is with strength and belief and no scared. Those are the kind of people we became in our struggle.190

We just came up from da boon docks. We not educated people, we just live day by day, expecting dat nothin’ goin’ to happen. But when someting going to happen, they corner; den you start fighting back. And dat’s what happened. Wen you no place to go, you got to fight, so dat’s our battle. ... We fight for—always—what we believe. ... We always fight against whateva go against us, and dat’s what make us really strong. ... Even up to now we still fightin’, ‘cause we’ve been thru experience already at if you don’t fight, you do whateva—nothin’. But if you fight you goin’ end up wit someting. So, dat is da real changes in our lives.191

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190 T. 1/12/04, emphasis added.
191 O. 1/12/04.
I speak a little better to people now. … I can relate to people. … I learned that everybody have a right in this world… [and] we have the right to fight…

These articulations reflect a cultivated class-consciousness that gave rise to often-combative resistive agency of rights-bearing political persons with newly found or reclaimed “voice.” For example,

The research that the [MLM activists] provided was essential to people ‘cause that’s where they brought out the facts: how when we were part of a territory [U.S. colony pre-statehood], how the guys in the legislature rigged the laws to take lands from Hawaiians and all that. And when people heard the injustices of that they started questing the legitimacy of the land laws.

The man who would later become WWCA president notes that many residents were initially hesitant to participate in the anti-eviction struggle:

A great majority of the people here didn’t know a thing about politics, including myself! Never made a sign or protested on the street. We were all—we weren’t activists—we were country living people, quiet and law-abiding [chuckle].

The thought of challenging the large landowner and politically connected developer was not only daunting, it was simply inconceivable. As one resident explains:

At the beginning my idea was “These people are crazy. They gonna challenge the landowner?! The landowner’s got the right! They no more…”

Many of the people in Waiāhole and Waikāne held a self-image as “quiet and law-abiding” country folk, which translated into an acquiescence of the status quo political-economy of Hawai‘i’s governance system. The idea of “no make waves” was often invoked by the residents in retrospect. “Before, I was shame” was another an often-repeated phrase. This reflected a shared cultural value among Hawai‘i’s Locals to not call attention to one’s self; to call attention to one’s self is a potential embarrassment and

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192 C. 4/7/05, emphasis added.
193 L. 2/28/04.
194 G. 2/28/04.
therefore should be avoided. However, through the course of the anti-eviction struggle, and with the very explicit working-class framing of the struggle, residents increasingly articulated and forcefully acted upon their “rights to resist” an unjust political economic system that protects the landowner and developer at the expense of those “who built the place” or “worked the land.” Take for example this statement by a resident-turned-activist:

At first I told myself, I told my wife, da landlord have all da right in da world to evict us. But as I stayed wit da struggle, I got more knowledgeable about da bad life we had. ... After, I know a little bit about da moral rights of people, yeah?!

This theme was repeated over and over again in my interviews:

At the beginning my idea was... The landowner’s got the right [to evict and develop the land]. But then I heard the attorney say “What about the question of people working on the land for years, people who were born here and provided for their families?” And then the attorney said “These people don’t have rights?!” ... And that made me thinking of the ethics... so I thought “Gee, this makes sense.”

In this newly acquired language, rights became “agents of political mobilization” (Scheingold 1974 [2004]: 148). McCann explains that “rights talk is powerful not because it expresses some abstract universal good, but rather because it is linked to people’s learned sense of justice and familiarity with established traditions of struggle” (1994: 236). In Waiāhole-Waikāne, residents and activists linked the present injustice of their evictions to the prior injustices of the islands’ plantation society and American

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195 In discussing this form of Local knowledge in public settings, Kathleen Kane focuses on Local students in the university classroom. “Perhaps you have noticed how quiet some of your local students are. If my “good manners” have taught me to be quiet in public, to not impose my noise on others, I have to jump my rudeness hurdle each time I speak in class” (Louise Fuji (Kubo)). ... These behaviors reflect very deep cultural and social values about appropriate and respectful behavior, in relationship to both a teacher and other students. ... “Every time I say something political, I get phone calls from ten different relatives – “Was that you, was that you? Shame! Shame!” (Alison Yap). Intricate and cohesive family, community, and school bonds of coherence and knowledge extend throughout the islands. ... In other words, from the perspective of local students, the classroom is not private space but a public one. What Allison Yap describes is only partly captured by having what she says travel home ahead of her; rather, it infers something that lies at the heart of local island culture. It is not just Allison Yap who stands there when she speaks. Her family and community ties are part of who she is as she stands. She is connected in a complex, untangled web; and in part, this is how she knows who she is. It does not necessarily mean she will not or cannot speak, but it does mean that the bond between herself and others accompanies her into the classroom and into the act of speaking” (Kane 1999: 141-42). Likewise, at public hearings, Local residents had a “rudeness hurdle” to overcome.

196 C. 4/7/05.
197 G. 2/28/04.
usurpation of the Hawaiian Kingdom; thus, it was their right to resist such continued oppression and injustices. It was through this multifaceted use of tradition that they were politicized into action.

Additionally, WWCA drew upon American traditions of citizens’ rights, which were brought to the forefront in the islands’ struggle for statehood. Residents didn’t align with the MLM goal of ‘overthrowing the government’\textsuperscript{198}, rather:

[When you] teach the people to push back you don’t have to overthrow the whole system to see change happen, [what you want is] that the power balances more on the people’s side.\textsuperscript{199}

In addition to more equitable distribution of land resources, Waiāhole-Waikāne residents sought more direct participation in the American governing system:

We couldn’t fight it with money ’cause we didn’t have money. Couldn’t fight it with legality ’cause the law was quite clear: landlord has the right to evict people and do whatever they like with their property. But like everybody else, they had to go through the correct process – through the government. So that, we thought, “We might have a fighting chance at that,” by fighting in the political forum.\textsuperscript{200}

To me, I think the big lesson is really one of: if the people get involved, raise their consciousness, they can actually really have some semblance of democracy.\textsuperscript{201}

Despite their demonstrated militancy and willingness to engage in extralegal tactics, the right to continued tenancy articulated by WWCA was firmed rooted and routed through the American political system and ideals of democracy participation. As one resident-turned-activist explains the general climate of the resistive 1970s:

I think it kind of woke up a lot of people in Hawai‘i about using the political process—something that people don’t normally do in Hawai‘i because, you know, it’s a kick back kind of place.\textsuperscript{202}

These various statements reveal a multiplicity of traditions that contributed to the politicization and community members, and which were mobilized by them:

Hawaiian-rooted Localism; MLM praxis; and the American democratic rights. While

\textsuperscript{198} H. 2/28/04.
\textsuperscript{199} L. 2/28/04.
\textsuperscript{200} F. 1/15/04.
\textsuperscript{201} E. 1/16/04.
\textsuperscript{202} Y. 1/15/04, emphasis added.
some of these traditions might seem contradictory (for example mixing Marxism and liberalism), the WWCA *made these traditions work for them*. And they did so in the context of a *collective* resistive agency, not solely an individual one. Most residents emphasized this collectivity of their political community:

> We fought *as* a community, not just a bunch of individuals living together. ... [We focused on] maintaining the integrity of the community...the lifestyle over here is what you make it to be. Some guys like to party; these guys like to raise fighting chickens; those neighbors like to raise pigs that stink like hell. You know, all this kind of stuff, that, I guess, people put up with.\(^{203}\)

> Da main ting [for] any community: a [whole] community got to get involved. Cannot rely on da guy next door. You gotta get out der and get involved ‘cause dat’s what makes da community really strong.\(^{204}\)

Thus, through their anti-eviction struggle the rural residents of Waiāhole-Waikāne were transformed into political actors. Diverse country folk who “shared and cared” and “minded their own business” became resistive activists with a working-class sensibility to resisted the capitalist/colonialist system that threatened to displace them. They named themselves and the conditions of their lives—“I got more knowledgeable about da bad life we had”—and were able to articulate this in terms of collective rights to struggle for better conditions. Their rights to be diverse in their cultural practices, and to maintain the diverse community that they mutually built and shared, served as a resource for both internal cohesion and an alternative vision to the islands’ development frenzy that other persons and communities could rally around. This use of tradition articulated through class- and rights-talk sustained the WWCA through the many years of a self-described ‘war of attrition,’ which I now turn to.

**War of Attrition**

In early 1974, many of the residents noticed outsiders in limousines driving through their dirt roads and they started talking among themselves, wondering what was going on. Unbeknownst to them, the large landowner Marks and partner

\(^{203}\) F. 1/15/04, emphasis added.

\(^{204}\) T. 1/12/04.
developer Pao had submitted a letter of intent to the State of Hawai‘i Land Use Commission (LUC) in December 1973, requesting that 1,337 acres of agriculture-zoned lands in Waiāhole and Waikāne be re-classified into urban or large-lot residential zones for 6,700 houses and 20,000 residents. As one of only a few heirs to the vast estate of Lincoln Loy McCandless, Marks was part of the haole elite who had dominated the islands political economy for much of the 20th century. After consolidating her title to Waiāhole-Waikāne by trading lands with other heirs in the late 1950s, Marks changed most of the tenants’ leases from long-term to month-to-month with the intention of developing the lands. Transforming the rural valleys into upscale residential homes was intended to be Mark’s lasting legacy, much like how Hawai‘i Kai in East O‘ahu was Henry Kaiser’s legacy. For Pao, this would be one of many such rural-to-urban transformations under his direction in post-World War II Hawai‘i, such as Enchanted Lakes in Kailua, parts of Mānoa and areas in Hawai‘i Kai. By this time, Joe Pao was known as a notorious developer among the environmentally-minded: dredging wetlands and filling them in with garbage (literally, landfill materials) as the foundation to build homes upon; carving out mountainsides to unsteadily nestle homes against; and other “careless” or unethical practices. Moreover, Pao was politically well-connected and used these connections to bypass the political process to help his friends (as well as himself) become quite wealthy. One key activist describes Pao this way:

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205 While the initial letter of intent in December 1973 did not specify the number of houses and residents, the revised zoning request of June 1974 did specify 6700 houses with 20,000 residents (Geschwender 1982).

206 Modavi describes how disputes between Mark’s three sons delayed the 1959 development plans: “As a result of these intra-family disputes, the tenants in Waiāhole-Waikāne were left alone with low monthly leases of $10 per acre until 1973” (1992: 93, citing Department of Agriculture 1974).

207 It was also rumored that she was planning to use the monies from the land sale to fund an around-the-world tour with her much-younger Italian boyfriend.

208 For a list of Pao’s extensive business and personal ties with politics government see Cooper and Daws (1985: 218-9). The brief biography they provide of Pao is informative: “Born on Kaua’i of Portuguese descent and born poor, [Joseph R.] Pao rose from literally nothing to become one of the largest homebuilders in post-World War II Hawai‘i. … Pao was among the group of locally born, non-haole businessmen in favor with the new political establishment, one of ‘the former have-nots who were to be given every consideration,’ as he was described by Kekoa D. Kaapu in an interview for this book. Kaapu from the early 1960s through the mid 1970s was an aide to Governor Burns, then a Honolulu city councilman, then Honolulu’s urban renewal coordinator, and again a councilman. He said that when someone like Pao petitioned the government, it was understood that he should be accommodated. And ‘normally something like that wouldn’t even have to be spoken. The idea that he’s one of our guys kind-of-thing, our friend.’ Pao had ready enough access to Gov. Burns. He was also a close personal friend of Honolulu Mayor Neal S. Blaisdell. … The emergence of people like Joe Pao also illustrated the changing sociology of Hawai‘i’s business and political leadership in the late 1950s and 1960s. … [most of these interconnected people went to] “a largely working class Catholic high school, St. Louis in Kaimuki. No longer were the graduates of the
“Pao was used to doing what he wanted. ... Pao was overheard saying ‘The public? Whoever listens to the public?!’” 209 Marks and Pao had every reason to believe their proposed re-zoning application would be approved. Initially, many of the Waiāhole-Waikāne residents agreed; such was the pattern they saw in Kalama Valley, He‘eia-Kea, and other rural places in which longtime residents were easily evicted to make room for “development.”

In neighboring Kahaluʻu (two valleys to the south of Waiāhole and a couple miles down the road), there were already well-established community organizations attuned to the development plans for windward O‘ahu. Kahekili Highway in Kāne‘ohe and Kahaluʻu was built in the 1960s as a “gateway” for expansive residential and resort developments, connected to urban Honolulu by way of the then-proposed H-3 highway. As a result, townhouse complexes and suburban homes were already being constructed in Kahaluʻu, and a small but growing group had formed to resist further development and especially the construction of H-3.210 Another group in Kahaluʻu that overlapped and allied together was Hui Mālama ʻĀina O Koʻolau, an organization made up of Hawaiian farmers, fishermen and kuleana owners working to protect land and water resources from infringing development.211 Additionally, the environmental group Life of the Land, the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) Program, the Windward Regional Council, and the Kualoa-Heʻeia Ecumenical Youth (KEY) Projects were all active in Kahaluʻu, oftentimes overlapping and allying with each other in resistance to proposed developments in this area of windward O‘ahu. Importantly, through KEY

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209 B. 11/14/03. Pao was notorious for saying other crazy things such as ‘we’re gonna bulldoze the farmers back into the valley’ or ‘we’re going to bulldoze them out of existence.’ Such statements would actually help WWCA garner public support. E. 1/16/04.

210 Although H-3 was subsequently built in the late 1990s, much of the anticipated development it meant to herald had already been diverted to ʻEwa on West O‘ahu, thanks in large part to these early activists and organizations who persisted in their decades-long resistance.

211 McGregor-Alegado describes Hui Malama ʻĀina o Koʻolau: “The kuleana owners banded together for mutual support in their efforts to protect their land and water from infringing development. They wanted to put a stop to development that did not consider or serve their interests. While “Hui Malama” itself was comprised of a small core of Kahaluʻu residents, it had a broader base of support along the Windward coast of Oahu from Kāneʻohe to Kahuku. It could rally up to 300 people for a given issue. The group monitored plans of developers and state and county agencies and organized community pressure at public hearings, meetings, and through petitions and letters” (1980: 46).
Projects, the Legal Aid Society and Volunteers In Service To America (VISTA) were locally established with innumerable volunteers and resources available for further community organizing, which the Waiāhole-Waikāne Community Association later tapped into. Many of these community organizations were funded by national grants spurred by the 1960s civil rights movement and the Model Cities Program in the United States. In early 1974, the Kahaluʻu activists had already demonstrated the effectiveness of community organizing when they blocked a 1,600 unit condominium project for the back of Waiheʻe Valley (near Waiāhole-Waikāne). Noting their success, Waiāhole-Waikāne residents were quick to mobilize as well (Nakata 1999).

These Kahaluʻu activists had learned of the City and County of Honolulu’s General Plan for the area, which, in addition to suburban residents and tourist hotels, included a power plant and oil refineries (hence the eviction of Heʻeia-kea), a deep-draft harbor with hundreds of boats, artificial “islands” in the bay for recreational use, and so forth. Many of these Kahaluʻu activists had ties to Waiāhole-Waikāne, having attended Waiāhole School (at the time Kindergarten—8th grade) and often being high school classmates together (at Castle High School), as well as sharing family ties. When the Waiāhole and Waikāne residents noticed limousines driving through the valleys in early 1974 and started talking amongst themselves, word reached the Kahaluʻu activists who instinctively brought their community organizing skills into action.

Self-described housewives in Waiāhole had previously been hired on as VISTA volunteers to conduct community-based land-use surveys for KEY Projects and the Windward Regional Council. When someone from the University of Hawaiʻi “conducted a survey of valley residents for development planners under the guise of doing objective scholarly research” in February 1974, there was heightened fear and

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212 One of the principle activists who later became a Hawai‘i State Senator came to find out that much of this General Plan was already in the works, unbeknownst to the Kahaluʻu organizations at the time: “[In a lot of ways it’s good that we didn’t know how close to reality those plans were. We thought we were fighting a paper plan...but in reality] we stopped something that was already in motion. [If we had known] we may not have fought! (T. 9/8/06)

213 Although many of the women in Waiāhole-Waikāne described themselves as ‘just housewives,’ their work included more than home- and child-care duties; women often participated in subsistence production activities as well as other contributions to family labor and income.
speculation regarding immanent development and displacement (Geschwender 1980-81: 123). A core member of the Windward Regional Council, whose uncle was one of the larger farmers in Waiāhole, began researching development plans for Waiāhole and Waikāne and meeting with the housewives and farmers to share information. In addition to Kahalu‘u activists, core ethnic studies activists who had been instrumental in researching the City’s General Plans for the area, and islands-wide environmental activists from the group Life of the Land, were brought into Waiāhole-Waikāne for early discussions and planning.

A first-ever meeting of valley residents was held on April 1974 to share information, answer questions, and consider actionable options. There was enough interest (and anxiety) to form the Waiāhole-Waikāne Community Association. The early leadership of the WWCA was comprised primarily of landowners, who were Hawaiian kuleana owners, and some lessees, who were Japanese or Okinawan commercial farmers. Residents and allies described this as “only natural”—a tactical decision at the time—because as small landowners or business owners they were the ones who were the most protected from immediate eviction. The month-to-month lessees, who comprised the vast majority of the valleys’ residents and tended to be blue-collar laborers, were much more vulnerable and therefore highly reluctant to be involved in organizing the community. While some Hawaiians were kuleana owners, many more Hawaiians in Waiāhole-Waikāne were tenants who had been dispossessed of their lands or had migrated from other rural valleys or urban areas. The focus at this early stage was preparation for the Marks-Pao re-zoning petition hearing at the Land Use Commission in October 1974.214

214 The State Land Use Law of 1961 “was written with two principles uppermost: make urbanization efficient in the use of all types of resources; and preserve agricultural and conservation lands as much as possible” (Cooper and Daws 1985: 87). The first of its kind in the United States, this law established a statewide zoning measure, five-year land boundary reviews, and a Land Use Commission (LUC) overseeing its implementation. LUC hearings were quasi-judicial, that is, they were more judicial than legislative in nature: “the rights of those who are most directly involved or most affected by the decision are accorded due process before an action is taken”, (http://luc.state.hi.us/about.htm#HISTORY, accessed February 18, 2005). Despite its original intent to curb the excesses of urban development, during the 1960s and early 1970s the LUC granted almost all rezoning requests of prime agricultural land for urban development “in excess” and “beyond evidenced need” according to LUC staff director and outspoken critic, Ramon A. Duran (Ibid 91). Cooper and Daws demonstrate that a “basic fact of LUC life by the late 1960s [was] how deeply the political establishment, and
At this time, WWCA’s primary modes of sociopolitical activism focused on educating and mobilizing the community residents to participate in the LUC hearing; and soliciting support from the broader island residents and communities. The Community Association functioned as a forum in which to begin talking about the relevant issues, identifying key people to influence or target (e.g. elected officials in varying positions, sympathetic religious leaders, the bank financing the development project, the labor leaders partnering in the project, etc.), learning to write and/or deliver testimony publicly, learning to make signs and participate in political demonstrations, sharing ideas and exploring strategies, and simply getting to know each other in ways that strengthened their communal bonds. These activities began in the community association and spilled over into the valley. Families talked and organized in their homes, neighbors shared ideas and worked on projects together, and valley churches engaged the issues in their congregations.

At the Land-Use Commission hearing in October 1974, the people of Waiāhole and Waikāne presented powerful and moving testimonies in their own words. Most spoke in pidgin, some spoke in Japanese or Filipino, others silently held their homemade signs. Rather than be embarrassed about their lack of “proper” English as compared to the landlord and developer’s lawyers, the residents together were empowered to share their feelings and opinions in the public forum. The outside activists were instrumental in this regard: “We said, ‘Look, you speak pidgin, but the Land Use Commission is made up basically of Local people who will understand pidgin, so never mind—just practice and be ready to make your testimony” (Nakata 1999: 65). One older Japanese woman spoke in broken Japanese and “her testimony was a gem to the valley” (Ibid).

members of the LUC themselves, were tied up in development business,” which further included labor union leadership who often negotiated housing programs for their union members (Ibid 91-92). Nevertheless, with its mandated statewide review of land use an opportunity for community resistance existed. While the first review in 1969 was relatively uneventful, the 1974 review was in the midst of burgeoning resistive activism. “At the suggestion of LUC chairman Eddie Tangen (an ILWU officer), all major landowners were contacted [in advance] and asked to write letters of intent stating their development plans” (Ibid: 92). The result was 167 separate proposals statewide. Having all these letters of intent on public file well in advance of the LUC hearings provided the grassroots coalition with much-needed time to organize and mobilize struggling communities to action. This is what took place in Waiāhole-Waikāne and elsewhere.
An elder Hawaiian woman spoke in Hawaiian, in what many latter describe as the most effective presentation of the hearing.

We found this old lady in the valley, Mrs. Kawa’a, who had been born and raised there, who knew Lincoln McCandless, knew Mrs. Marks’ dad... So she went up there to give testimony, you know, against the rezoning of Waiāhole-Waikāne and her [grand] daughter went up there to translate. And so she starts giving this vituperous type of testimony in Hawaiian: [dramatic imitation of loud voice and animated gestures], her face and everything like that [full of facial expressions], you know, and then the daughter would say ‘Oh, and she’s just trying to say that, you know, to bless this land and... [in soft voice] blah, blah, blah. And everybody going ‘No, no, no. She’s saying something more!’ The interpretation no sound right, you know what I mean. [laughter] Afterwards, she’s [Mrs. Kawa’a] cursing them and calling the guards to get in their way, you know, she was just—she was mad. [laughter]

An older Japanese woman performed a traditional dance that conveyed the importance of farming the land without words. A group of young girls spoke about their lives in the valleys and their fear of displacement. A longtime farmer held up his well-worn hands and exclaimed: “With these hands I have worked the earth; what will I do now??”

All the testimonies underscored how the people of the two valleys belonged there because of their enduring investments in the place (their “sweat equity”), and how the proposed development was misplaced. Moreover, they emphasized how the people of Hawai‘i in general would continue to benefit from significant agricultural productivity of the two valleys and the few remaining rural open spaces that brought relief from Honolulu’s ever-expanding concrete jungle. To further emphasize this point, and as part of traditional Hawaiian protocol, flowers, plants, fruits and vegetables from the valleys were brought to the hearing and offered as gifts to the commissioners.216 The testimony of Waiāhole-Waikāne residents and allied activists lasted for hours and clearly overwhelmed the landlord-developer’s position. Nearly all of the several hundred residents were at the LUC hearing, with an additional five hundred activists and supporters, as opposed to the “few guys showing up in suits who were paid” by Marks and Pao.

215 E. 1/16/04, emphasis in original. E. describes how after the hearing someone on the ‘other side’ came up to him and said ‘Oh man, you guys fight dirty. You bring da kine old ladies up to testify!’ Another allied activist describes a similar situation where one of the LUC members came up to him after the hearing and said it was ‘pilau tactics’ (rotten, stink) to have the Hawaiian lady testify.

216 See Chapter Two “Tribute and Community Governance” for a discussion of Hawaiian gift-giving practices.
Prior to and following the LUC hearing, the Waiāhole-Waikāne Community Association engaged outreach to solicit support from the broader island residents and communities. This included slideshow presentations to the City and County neighborhood boards (resulting in all but the Hawai‘i Kai board officially supporting WWCA), churches and civic organizations (resulting in official endorsements and collections of funds), and various schools (resulting in volunteers to further outreach); sign-waiving on high-traffic streets; door-to-door conversations in different neighborhoods; petition drives collecting tens of thousands of signatures (including Senator Daniel Inouye’s); educational fundraising events; demonstration marches at the State Capitol and elsewhere in Honolulu and on the windward side; and alliance-building with other community struggles, environmental groups, Hawaiian rights advocates, farming organizations, and so forth. Scholars have understood these early efforts as moderate, middle-class outreach within the parameters of “acceptable” sociopolitical norms (as opposed to later more radical forms of activism) (Geschwender 1980-81; Modavi 1992).

In December 1974 the Land-Use Commission ruled against the Marks-Paorezoning request. The WWCA marked its first victory. The saliency of their anti-eviction struggle was evident in the widespread support WWCA received from broader island residents and communities, many of whom as Modavi and Geschwender note were moderate and middle-class. The notion of preserving the community’s agricultural integrity and rural lifestyle was ambiguous and thereby flexible, making it an important concept and catch phrase that people in Hawai‘i could grasp on to and adopt as their own. The ability of WWCA to make their anti-eviction struggle resonate is reflected in a newspaper article at the time:

It’s easy to romanticize Waiāhole-Waikāne, but it isn’t a fairytale. It is simply a place endowed with the natural splendor that blesses many similar settings in Hawai‘i, populated with residents whose lifestyle is both fading fast on O‘ahu and demands an expansive environment which is increasingly out of place and time with

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217 Geschwender notes that “[t]he McCandless Heirs had apparently anticipated this outcome. They submitted a revised proposal directly to the WWCA on October 29 which the WWCA rejected on November 4” (1980-81: 125).
urbanized society. Thus, Waiāhole-Waikāne becomes a symbol that stands for a goal, supported by those that aren’t personally connected nor share a common lifestyle, but have a similar moral conviction (Bowman 1977, emphasis added).

The goal that Waiāhole-Waikāne symbolized for the rest of the islands was to slow down Hawai‘i’s post-statehood development frenzy and reprioritize in favor of local and Local empowerment. Victory at the first LUC hearing was one step closer to obtaining that goal, and for the Waiāhole-Waikāne community, the LUC victory represented significant community empowerment and unity.

Despite a clear victory for WWCA, Joe Pao and Elizabeth Marks proceeded with their development plans. In early summer of 1975 Pao purchased part of Waikāne and paid a deposit for first option to purchase Waiāhole under his newly formed hui (incorporated land holding group), Windward Partners, and Marks substantially increased rents (ranging from 50 percent to 745 percent) on all tenants in an effort to either evict them or subdue their resistance (Geschwender 1982). Although Waiāhole appeared safe from development for the time being, Windward Partners announced they were moving forward with the development of 130 two-acre house lots in Waikāne (which involved city approval), thereby immediately evicting nine families. At this point, about 90 percent of Waiāhole and Waikāne residents were members of the community association (McMillen 1978), and they decided to collectively negotiate all tenants’ leases under the auspices of their attorney, a young lawyer working pro-bono

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218 While the re-appearance of land hui in post-statehood Hawai‘i demonstrates an enduring tradition from the Hawaiian Kingdom era, it no longer serves a vehicle for disenfranchised Hawaiians to assert their preferred land tenure system (Chapter Three); on the contrary, hui such as Pao’s often displaced Hawaiians and other local residents from the lands they lived on for generations.

219 Geschwender provides the following detailed timeline: “It was announced on May 22 that developer Joe Pao had purchased the 2,868 acres owned by Mrs. Marks in Waiāhole and Waikāne. This sale was not registered and no details were released at the time. It later became clear that only a small portion of Waikāne was purchased outright—the portion scheduled for development in the first five-year phase of the development plan discussed above. The purchase of the remainder of Waikāne was contingent upon rezoning. An option to buy was taken on Waiāhole land, had to be exercised prior to November 1, 1977, and was also presumably dependent upon favorable rezoning. Pao stated that he would soon announce a new plan to keep agriculture in the valleys at the same time that some land would be rezoned urban. He further stated that if his rezoning request was denied then he would develop the land in large lot (two acres) residential units. On June 2 the Waikāne tenants received letters from Mrs. Marks canceling their leases effective June 1 and informing them that their new landlord, the Pao Investment Company [Windward Partners], would contact them shortly regarding their future tenancy. On June 3 the Waiāhole tenants received letters from Mrs. Marks raising their rents effective July 1 by amounts ranging from 50 to 745 percent” (1980-81: 125-26).
for the WWCA. Throughout that summer, the WWCA attempted to negotiate with Marks and Pao to no avail. In the summer of 1975 the State Department of Agriculture (DOA), under the direction of Governor Ariyoshi, stepped in to help broker a deal between tenants and Marks-Pao, which proposed extensive development and a relocation of residents from the land (Modavi 1992: 105). Modavi contends that Marks and Pao were well aware of this and therefore raised rents and proceeded with evictions in order to pressure WWCA into a DOA brokered settlement. An eviction date was set for September 30 for Waikâne residents.

In a bold move, WWCA decided to collectively withhold paying the higher rent to Marks-Pao, and instead deposited their rents (at the lower rates) into an escrow account, until a mutually satisfactory resolution could be assured. From what I could ascertain from the available data and my interview materials, this decision was not particularly controversial at that moment in time because it was based upon a rather strong consensus within WWCA. They recognized that they were up against not only the landowner and developer, but also the state governance system. Although the WWCA leadership, represented by the steering committee, was still primarily made up of small landowners and commercial farmers, community unity was strong. As one original steering committee member describes it:

We did things on consensus—that is, we didn’t take too many votes. We discussed until we came out with consensus and then we moved and it was a very strong association.

Although the small landowners were unaffected by the rent increases and did not face direct eviction, they also recognized their vulnerability if the massive development project proceeded. As Hawaiian kuleana owners, they were well aware of

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220 It should be noted that this young attorney—one year out of law school—resigned from his prestigious, large law firm in Honolulu to devote himself full-time to WWCA’s anti-eviction struggle.

221 Geschwender (1982) provides the following detailed timeline: on July 1, 92 of 120 lessees presented a common check to Marks at old lease rates and she refused the check; the tenants then created a trust fund in which rents were deposited; on July 17, Marks issued 1 year leases at lower rents with a clause for 2 months cancellation notice; most tenants refused while some accepted (this weakened WWCA somewhat but not significantly); in August, Windward partners accepted the WWCA rental check for Waikâne tenants as back-rent only (not for future rent) and prepared to evict 9 families for their planned development of 130 large house lots (which were acceptable within agricultural zoning).

222 L. 4/27/05.
their people’s history of dispossession by unfair or unethical means. For this reason, they sought to unite with tenants to maintain their shared country lifestyle:

For me, it was more like “Huh?! Dis community goin’ get overwhelmed; I goin’ get overwhelmed too!” I own my place, but, eh, dat’s nothing. Condemn ’em or put a sewage treatment plant on it or for whateva reason, dey know how take care of dis.\textsuperscript{223}

Even someone from the neighboring ahupua‘a, Ka‘alaea, who was initially ambivalent because he owned his home just outside of the valleys, came to be an active supporter of WWCA because he recognized that his home would likely be destroyed for road expansion along Kamehameha Highway (as was planned on the proposed development maps). Similarly, although Elizabeth Marks had offered the commercial farmers longer-term leases (one year, sometimes up to five years) and Joe Pao had offered other accommodations, the self-employed farmers, too, were well aware of the tenuousness of small farmers who had been consistently marginalized and displaced to make room for ever-expanding developments. Some of the farmers had relocated to Waïhole and Waikâne years earlier because they had been pushed out of once-rural areas of central and east O‘ahu. For this reason, despite owning their own business which provided them other avenues of negotiation, they too remained united with all tenants rather than making their own deals with the landlord-developer:\textsuperscript{224}

My dad said “Where am I gonna go? Where am I gonna find land I can afford that I can earn a living as a farmer? There’s no place else.” ... When farmers were offered deals like “You can stay on the land if you sign this five-year lease,” that kind of stuff, my dad said “No! Where am I going to be in five years?! Then what?”\textsuperscript{225}

This strong sense of community unity following the LUC victory was repeatedly mentioned by everyone irrespective of what side of the split they would later be on. Nevertheless, with such a bold move of withholding rent as a means of collectively leveraging negotiations, a noticeable shift was starting to occur in which WWCA was

\textsuperscript{223} Y. 1/15/04.
\textsuperscript{224} A few farmers did make or attempt to make their own individual deals with Marks and Pao, and as a result other farmers, tenants, and landlords alike ostracized them (K. 8/25/05).
\textsuperscript{225} L. 2/28/04.
not only insisting on greater participation in the liberal democratic polity but also
directly challenging notions of private property and contractual agreements. And this
started to make some members of WWCA uncomfortable, such as some commercial
farmers and small landowners who relied upon these standard capitalist conventions.

The decision to collectively withhold rent from the landlord-developer marked a
tactical shift towards a more confrontation-oriented targeting of capital, which
culminated in the protest of Honolulu Federal Savings and Loan (the bank financing the
Marks-Pao development in the valleys). WWCA subsequently employed more militant
confrontations in addition to its mainstay of middle-class outreach. These earlier
strategies continued throughout because they were critical in opening and keeping open
a political space of public receptivity and support for Waiāhole-Waikāne activism,
especially as it became more aggressive. There was a marked increase and frequency of
targeted mass protest demonstrations: at the governor’s office, at the landlord’s private
residence, at the landlord’s secondary residence that she moved to in order to avoid the
protesters, at the developer’s offices, at the union headquarters (because union leaders
were partners in the development group), at the courthouse, at the various financial
institutions, at a “Stop All Evictions” march through downtown Honolulu, and so forth.

The growing militancy in WWCA was reflected in their language of warfare:

[When] they corner you, then you start fighting back. And that’s
what happened. When you no place to go, you got to fight, so, that’s
your battle. 227

This is war. When you’re in battle, it’s a war and you gotta have that
war mentality. 228

…these are the warriors and these are the fighters. 229

226 The protest demonstration in front of union headquarters to protest Harold Lewis and Art Rutledge’s
participation in Windward Partners highlighted the irony of union leaders investing in a capitalist venture
that would evict working-class people. This was clearly a public embarrassment and it produced internal
union pressure on what was seen to be ‘union boss cronyism.’ In this way, Art Rutledge’s unethical dealings
eventually got him pushed out of the union.
227 O. 1/12/04.
228 S. 2/28/04.
229 D. 1/8/04.
They spoke of battles with the enemy, secret plans of attack, discipline of the troops, self-defense of their homes and occupation of the valley. The president during the anti-eviction struggle explains, following by perspectives of non-leadership members of WWCA:

For me, I just had to focus on the main goal, and that was to stop the evictions. Whatever way possible, that’s the way I had to go. I lost some troops along the way—that was the sacrifice I had to take, you know [laughter].

Da rest of us [non-steering committee members of WWCA] were kinda like soldiers.230

The community formed their own security force called Up in Arms, made up primarily of women.231 Members of Up in Arms wore helmets, boots and armbands during protest demonstrations and at courtroom proceedings. Their role was twofold: to counteract the intimidation that residents often felt by the significant police presence at such occasions, and to maintain the discipline of WWCA so that nobody (residents or supporters) misrepresented the community to the media. As one Up In Arms member explained, the demonstrations were emotionally charged and some community members would get highly excitable and they needed to be handled in appropriate ways internally without police provocation.232 In general, war talk and militant organizational forms functioned to strengthen and unify their sense of political community and focused on what was seen as a war of attrition as they fought the evictions in the courtrooms.

Take for example this statement by a resident-turn-activist:

When dey ask me “Are you willing to fight for da valley?” [I say] “I’m not only willing to fight for da valley, I’m willing to die for da valley.” I always tell dem “Eh, I was in da [U.S. military] service, I prepared to die for dis country, you know. I’m ready—even more for da valley and every one of us.” Even now I would do it all over again if I had to. But, whoa, when my family evicted from my house—it’s more

230 E. 8/15/05.
231 In a forthcoming article, I discuss the role of women in the anti-eviction struggle and the ways in which the ‘fighting family’ functioned to both reinforce and challenge traditional (Western) norms of a woman’s ‘place’ in the community. On the one hand, activist women leaders disavowed any women-centric or feminist consciousness or subject-position; and on the other hand, they acted upon a wide-range of authority and agency available to them as Pacific Islander and Asian women within extended family networks. I argue that the women leaders of the Waiāhole-Waikāne Community Association reformulated and reasserted a gendered personhood in a variety of innovative and effective ways during and following their anti-eviction struggle. What the ‘women warriors’ of Waiāhole-Waikāne reveal is that it is not necessary to have an articulated feminist subjectivity in order to assert one’s agency as a woman.
232 T. 1/12/04.
worthwhile to fight for my family dan to fight for dis country. I always tell them dat, because I do and I willing to die.\textsuperscript{233}

At the protest demonstrations residents and activists held signs, chanted in unison with bullhorns, and uniformly marched under the direction of Up In Arms “captains”. This show of force was always orderly with no arrests or injuries. Many Waiāhole-Waikāne residents describe their good relationships with the police because they either knew many police officers personally (or, as is typical in the islands, had some extended familial or friendly connection to each other) or could otherwise relate to each other as Local and/or working-class people. Moreover, many residents and activists talked about how the internal discipline of WWCA was respected by the police.

The police \textit{liked} the Waiāhole-[Waikāne] people. And, you know, the police knew “Okay, here’s the Waiāhole people, who are the captains?”—‘cause they always knew there were captains—the police would go to the captains and say “Here are the rules.” The captains would say “We understand.” And the police were very good: “You play by the rules and those rules hold.” And so, the intent was never to, in any of the demonstrations, block passer-bys—it’s not a union picket line where you’re trying to block access of people going out. And the Waiāhole people were always sensitive that every person that walked by or near [a demonstration] was a convert. So somebody was always chosen, usually one of the captains would delegate people: there goes a lady, if it’s a middle-age lady, a middle age Waiāhole resident; if it’s a young person, a young person; if it’s a man, a man; if it’s a woman, a woman. So the people being approached wouldn’t feel intimidated. And always use small people. A lot of big people live in Waiāhole, but you never used the big people to make the approach because people might get a little, you know, taken aback. Every passer-by is a convert, and so you’re not trying to block people, you’re not trying to make access difficult. You want them to go through. So that’s the big thing with the police, in part, is like “Are you intruding on private property and are you blocking public access?” You don’t do either, they’re cool. And the Waiāhole people had a reputation of maintaining that discipline.\textsuperscript{234}

Other tactics included an aggressive public relations campaign of writing and distributing their own reports (self-described as propaganda), regularly inviting media reporters and personalities into the valleys, staging a mock eviction drill for TV cameras, and general showmanship in “a series of stuff that the media just ate up.”

\textsuperscript{233} J. 1/22/04, emphasis in original.
\textsuperscript{234} L. 10/12/04, emphasis in original.
Additionally, WWCA residents and especially allies persistently researched the political and business connections of Pao and Marks, and confronted them verbally with their findings. For example, the WWCA put pressure on the chair of the Board of Water Supply, a man who had close ties to Pao and would later become a Honolulu city councilman, as well as his friends and colleagues. This pressure notably disturbed the chair who told one resident: “You guys are making me look like I’m riding the black horse, wearing the black hat. And I always ride the white horse with the white hat. And I don’t like that!” As the 1976 elections approached, legislators, city council members, the mayor and the governor were all targeted with persistent telephone calls, intense meetings, protest demonstrations, biting newspaper editorials, and so forth.

One activist describes WWCA’s tactics:

We pressured them [all] on almost every conceivable level, and then at the same time, we also went out and got petitions and support from other communities, etc. The key to winning these things is that it has to be built real broad and real big, and the bigger and broader it gets built, the harder it is for them to win. And for them to win, they’re gonna have to pay a very high political price for winning. … You had to almost fight them with a guerrilla warfare. You have to let them know that, you know, you’re everywhere, you’re not gonna let go, you’re gonna keep on reminding them. You know, we’re gonna hit the financing, we’re gonna hit the investors, we’re gonna hit the union leaders, we’re gonna hit the politicians, you know. For them, we tried to keep it raining everyday, as much as possible, relentlessly.

Although the WWCA supported non-violence, Modavi notes that the group “did particularly convey to Ariyoshi the impression … that violence was a very real possibility in the event of eviction” (119). This issue of violence was a precarious

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235 L. 10/12/04.
236 E. 1/16/04.
237 Modavi describes this as a key element of a broad-based approach: “[The] strategy to focus on a few top political officials from the onset denotes [their] attempts to take advantage of political opportunity structures. … WWCA’s tactics took advantage of electoral uncertainties and competition” (108). … [Governor Ariyoshi] was also made to understand clearly that the WWCA intended to publicly hold him accountable for any confrontation’ (119). Governor Ariyoshi’s own words are worth recounting here: “The [Waiahole-Waikane] farmers’ [and tenants’] cause became the cause of activists who proliferated in the 1970s as a manifestation of vast social unrest. On the fringe, some individuals were talking about violence. A few were enthralled with the idea of violent revolution and the establishment of a new order. We had long, frustrating meetings. I was the object of political harangues and personal attacks on my motives and integrity. I tried to take these in stride, but a point came at which I did not. It was the one time I remember displaying my anger. I threw my papers on the table and said, “If you read these, you will know I am trying to help you people.” I left. The more I studied the situation the more I became determined to use the Waiahole-Waikane conflict to advance the cause of planning and preservation” (1997: 102-3). One key activist in the Waiahole-Waikane anti-eviction struggle took issue with Ariyoshi’s ‘mischaracterization of
tightrope: the WWCA needed to convey a high level of militancy in order to deter the state from using its own means of violence but also had to avoid any actual violent acts that might serve as a pretext for state use of violence against them. Residents and activists often invoked the idea that they were acting “in the finest of Gandhian tradition” and following the example of Martin Luther King, Jr. As one activist explains:

To threaten violence?! I mean, the whole concept on that issue was that the people didn’t have the tools of violence. For the people who don’t have the tools of violence to threaten violence is simply to justify those who have the tools of violence and who have legitimacy to use tools of violence against the people.238

Several residents indicated that there was some talk of using sticks and stones to resist evictions if push came to shove. Yet, the explicit position of WWCA was non-violence and when hundreds of islands-wide supporters came into the valleys to “occupy” and “defend” it on the days prior to eviction, there was a community guard station of sorts in which each car was searched for weapons prior to entry into the valleys.

None of these militant and more mainstream strategies, however, were able to change the law in which a landlord can evict a tenant with twenty-eight days notice. Ignoring the vast political and public sentiment favoring Waiāhole-Waikāne residents’ continued tenancy, Marks and Pao proceeded with the evictions. Despite the perceived lack of legal standing that tenants had, the WWCA actively engaged in legal battle for several reasons discussed below. Whereas their political position was often offensive in its confrontational orientation, their legal position was always a defensive one, responding to court-ordered evictions initiated by the landlord-developer. When the district court considered the first set of orders in the fall of 1975, massive public support for Waiāhole-Waikāne was effective in persuading elected officials to influence the judge to postpone the case (Modavi 1992). By spring of 1976, the district court had ruled in favor of eviction and WWCA appealed to the circuit court with the innovative legal argument that the landlord-developer was engaging in retaliatory evictions that violated tenants’ first

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238 L. 10/12/04.

Another activist says: “Ariyoshi deserves significant credit, but he wouldn’t have moved if we hadn’t been out there protesting the way we were” (B. 11/10/03).
amendment rights. They argued that the fact that Marks-Pao had increased rents for Waiahole-Waikane tenants unevenly, with the largest increases applied to the more active WWCA members and leaders, suggested that the rent increases were in retaliation for tenants’ political activism and in effect an attempt to evict them unfairly. The WWCA attorney argued that this form of retaliatory eviction was inherently unconstitutional.

We developed something called retaliatory eviction defense, which was an extension of what some courts had recognized and what a landlord-tenant codes provide for as being when a tenant complains about public health issues, safety issues, and the landlord subsequently moves to evict, there’s a doctrine and in our jurisdiction: you can’t do that. … We said “Look, you know, if you’re going to evict [hundreds] of families, we outta have our day in court that says the reason for this eviction is because, you know, they want to clear off opposition to land-use changes.” And, I mean, it resonates [with the Locals’ plantation history].

Moreover, this type of retaliatory eviction was reminiscent of earlier plantation style retaliatory firings of labor organizers. The WWCA attorney noted that the Asian judge in their case was only one generation removed from the plantation and therefore he agreed with the WWCA’s argument and ordered the landlord-developer to “do the evictions right.” This meant they either had to apply the exorbitant rent increases to everyone or simply evict everyone. Marks and Pao chose the latter approach, and eviction orders for nine Waikane families and seventy-nine Waihole families proceeded in the winter of 1976-77.

One reason that WWCA engaged in legal battle was simply to buy time while other political solutions were being pursued (such as pressuring the legislature and governor to intervene). As the attorney recounts, and a community leader concurs:

The position always was “I can always buy time, buy time to organize, buy time to consolidate, buy time to work the political fight, to go out to other communities to get help, to go to other interest groups to get help, you know, to formulate broad coalitions. I can try to buy time. I can’t win this. Because at the end of the day, you have a right to 28 days notice. Sooner or later they’ll get that 28 days notice correctly.” And so, you know, it really needed to be hammered in. And the [MLM activists] were very good at reminding me of that [chuckle]. … You gotta come back to reality in your own mind and go “There’s no constitutional right to be a tenant.” But, you know, the

239 L. 10/14/05.
tendency to have a legal silver bullet ideology is very, very strong. And I’ve seen it in a number of struggles when that silver bullet isn’t there, the struggle collapses because people have built everything on that, or critical opinion is that somehow the courts are going to save you, the legislature’s going to save you. You know, something like that. (emphasis in original)

…dat’s why time was essential: we needed dat time to build, and we did dat. … Consciously we all knew dat we were goin’ to lose in da end, in da court. So in order to kind of change dat we had to politically build and doin’ dat took time. So we had to go thru a really long processes. But what we learned as we began to go thru da process was it was a bigger enemy. [Not just] Mrs. Marks but you had investors and labor unions all in der. Everybody was in dis together: da politicians, da police, you know, military, everyting was linked in one way or another, to protect da interests of da landlord. And we were up against dat. And our weapon was da people. 240

The second reason to engage in legal battle was to foster a sense of legitimacy for the Waikäne-Waiāhole cause among the broader public—“da people” who were their “weapon.” Because of the powerful symbolism of American legal tradition, which was cultivated in the islands during the territorial and post-statehood period of Americanization, many residents felt that having a lawyer fighting on their behalf in a court of law was vital for their outreach efforts and public relations campaign. As one resident explains:

The legitimacy of our struggle happened when seventy or eighty attorneys put an ad in the paper—half page ad—I think it was half page or one page. You know, it’s about $2,000-$3,000. They put an ad in the paper and they announced that they gonna supply legal service for the struggle, pro bono. From that point on, when I went out and solicit support, the tone of their reception was totally changed, you know. … The legitimacy issue is really critical. 241

WWCA residents and activists believed that bolstering the legality of their anti-eviction struggle gave them further legitimacy in the eyes of the public, and thereby the politicians. 242 Other Hawai‘i residents were able to relate to the WWCA through their

240 H. 2/28/04.
241 G. 2/28/04, emphasis in original.
242 In this way, as Michael McCann’s work on pay equity reform demonstrates, “legal norms significantly shape the terrain of struggle…and, concurrently, that litigation and other legal tactics provide movement activists an important resource for advancing their cause” (1994: 4).
acceptable use of law in the courtrooms, mitigating any unease or alienation that might otherwise be felt by their more militant action on the streets. 243

An inadvertent consequence, perhaps, of WWCA’s use of law was that it de-legitimized the courts in the eyes of the tenants, thereby further radicalizing them towards deploying extralegal tactics. Recall the description of one resident-turned-activist’s view of Waiāhole-Waikāne prior to the anti-evictions struggle: “We were country living people, quiet and law-abiding.” 244 Many other residents concurred with this sentiment of being law-abiding citizens: “At the time we thought we were all good American citizens.” 245 As they kept losing in the courts at the same time as they were adapting an increasingly stringent Marx-Lenin-Maoist critique, WWCA embraced a very cynical view of the legal system. Many residents describe how they became disillusioned with the collusion and corruption of the American political system. One of their favorite chants was: “courts are the tools of the rich man’s rules.” This de-legitimization of the laws and courts also contributed to an increase in rights talk. A right to resist not just unfair laws but an unjust political system that protects the landowner and developer was bolstered for many people in Waiāhole-Waikāne and their supporters. As one resident-turned-activist put it:

I know a little bit about da moral rights of people, yeah? ... [The landlord] didn’t put one ting in a valley. No house, no pipe, no noting. We did it all—da residents. ... [The landlord] didn’t invest noting. But da whole valley was like dat: people built their own tings... So why shouldn’t we have da right to fight like dis?! 246

To be a good citizen now meant much more than simply following the law; it involved pursuing what was “right” irrespective of legal parameters. This sense of justice and right to resist was manifest in Hawaiian and Local people traditionally oppressed in the

243 The WWCA consciously avoided making their anti-eviction struggle a legal struggle and continually foregrounded their sociopolitical activism. The attorney explains the significance of this: “Because unless you’re ensured a victory in the courts, to define it as a legal struggle really elitizes the fight, firstly; secondly, it mystifies the fight; thirdly, it provides huge diversion of energy and focus; and fourth, that which the law does the law can undo (emphasis in original)” (L. 10/14/05). Piven and Cloward (1977) would concur in their comparative study of worker-, black-, and welfare-rights movements in the U.S. They found that the force of American electoral beliefs and politico-legal traditions often undermined the transformative potential of movements as protests (and protest leaders) were absorbed into a bureaucratized infrastructure. The Waiāhole-Waikāne anti-eviction struggle attempted to avoid this by directing the bulk of their energies and resources towards protest-oriented activism, while still engaging in electoral and legal processes.

244 Y. 1/15/04.
245 S. 4/13/05.
246 C. 4/7/05.
islands’ oligarchic governing system. While the multi-prong strategy of law-use, moderate outreach, and militant activism was an effective balancing act in garnering broad public support, it caused a rift to surface among community members.

‘AND THEN CAME THE SPLIT’

We had a split in our version of how to run a struggle. [pause] I don’t want to mention names. [pause] ... Dey have der own philosophy; dey have der own idea. Good for dem, you know? Free country—can say what you want. But whateva da community say, you gotta abide by it. Dey da minority, we da majority.

There are limits to things you can do, yeah? I didn’t go along with what they believed in. Some of the things they do is too personal. ... They take it that I was one of the guys that’s just looking out for myself. Well, naturally I look out for myself!

From that time on there has been a split in the community, which I think is very sad because the community—if it were organized and were together—would be mean. If it were a solid community that worked together it would be unstoppable.

A major split happened...that has never healed and, in fact, has become more [pause] venomous. ... [It is] what I call the civil war... [people] get caught in the cross-fires.

Geschwender contends that the split is best characterized as a necessary transition from a more moderate position to a more radical one, the former employing strategies of middle-class outreach and the latter deploying militant confrontation-oriented tactics. While the necessity of such a transition may be accurate for the overall success of the struggle, its unintended consequences have remained unexplored. I examine the split as a means of understanding the continued and complex significance of class for local and Native struggles for land, water and self-determination.

247 This is a quote from a Waiahole-Waikâne resident and longtime activist. In numerous interviews, Waiahole-Waikâne residents and activists would often (in varying degrees) exuberantly talk about how the community united in their anti-eviction struggle, and later on, with a pause and some inward reflection—sometimes prompted by my question, but often times not—many would say in a subdued tone something to the effect of “...and then came ‘the split’...” After recounting their particular version of ‘the split,’ some would speak regretfully of it; most would emphasize its importance (be it positive or negative), others would dismiss its significance, and few would embrace it.
248 C. 4/7/05.
249 K. 8/25/05.
250 N. 4/27/05.
251 B. 11/14/03.
A community rift first became evident in Waiāhole-Waikāne protests of Honolulu Federal Savings and Loan in mid 1975. Because Hon Fed (as it was known at the time) was financing Pao and Windward Partners, WWCA decided to target it on several levels. One, they asked all their supporters to withdraw their money from the bank, which many churches, organizations and individuals did. Picture this scene: About five or ten members of WWCA’s steering committee marched into a meeting of the Honolulu Federal board of directors, and throwing down dozens of passbook savings accounts onto the table exclaimed: “We are not going to allow our own money to evict us!” Two, they contacted private investors urging them to pull out and discontinue further financing of the Waiāhole-Waikāne development project. We must’ve had an effect because they [investors] told Joe Pao, and then he’d call us! He’d say: “Don’t call my investors!”

Lastly, WWCA held a community-only protest demonstration in front of Honolulu Federal’s downtown headquarters during peak business hours. They were so freaked out they didn’t let anyone out to lunch [that day]. And if anyone closed an account they asked if it was because of Waiāhole.

By many accounts, this massive demonstration was the first of its kind to target a financial institution in Hawai‘i, and it was seen as a big success. Several residents and activists told me how important this first community-only demonstration signaled the internal strength of the community. This show of strength was as much for external perception as it was for internal cohesion.

Therefore, when one prominent member of the steering committee announced that he would not participate in the demonstration it was not well received. This Hawaiian tenant (whose family also had kuleana lands nearby) was a craftsman whose work was partly supported by Hon Fed; thereby he had a personal conflict of interest. While this person and his family continued to be active in the anti-eviction struggle,

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252 E. 1/16/04.
253 E. 1/16/04.
many locate the origin of the split to this moment when self-interest took precedence over community interest. Subsequent disagreements or disengagements by this and other persons or families, be it temporary or permanent, were also articulated as constituting narrow self-interest outside the bounds of acceptable communality. Over time, however, these seemingly personal conflicts transformed into perceived class conflicts as a more rigid MLM-inspired class framework of analysis and action was adopted by the WWCA. The resident who did not participate in the Hon Fed demonstration was increasingly articulated as being part of the petit-bourgeois because he was a small business owner-entrepreneur, had a college degree and his family owned kuleana land. This assigning of a class position outside the proscribed working-class unity of WWCA effectively ignored the similar class process that this person shared with most of those inside the community, such as his history of wage-labor, his family’s subsistence farming and fishing, and their minimal capital accumulation or material wealth. It is a pattern which would later be applied to other WWCA members and residents who were part of the “minority” who disagreed with what would become highly controversial tactical decisions.

While competing class interests certainly contributed to the discomfort some residents began to feel (and act upon) as WWCA shifted towards a more explicit critique of capital, I argue that this class-ification was largely misplaced, or at least too sweepingly applied, because it ignored the similar class processes that all the residents shared, such as supplementing their incomes with subsistence farming and fishing and participating in reciprocal exchange networks—class traditions rooted within Native and local rural practices. In other words, the previously fluid understanding of “country lifestyle” gave way to articulations of more rigid class positions or identities—class traditions of the Marx-Lenin-Mao variety.

One MLM activist describes this transition in WWCA:

The earliest group in there was one of the kinds that wanted to fight real soft, you know. “We can kinda criticize but we can’t say anything really too bad. You know, it’s not really the system, it’s just this one sort of bad lady,” you know, like that. And the activists are going
“Well, this is how capitalism works and this is how money works and this is how politics works—and this is what’s evicting you guys. And, so, if you have an understanding of that, you’re able to conduct the struggle on a little bit more of a strategic basis. I mean if you have illusions about the players, then well, jeez, Mrs. Marks, why don’t we just meet with her and appeal to her and say ‘Why be so cold-hearted and why don’t you just keep accepting our nickels and dimes and why do you need to have the millions from Joe Pao for the development? Well, that’s probably not going to do it, you know, that’s not how things work.’ … My opinion is that if they stuck with the early leadership the struggle would never reach that conclusion, only because that group had a mamsy-pansy kind of way of analyzing what needed to be done and was never going to confront the powers that be in the way they needed to be—to more to where they had to go. … [So we actively organized the tenants] So out of that you really had a lot of strong people that came to the forefront, people who had been involved in union organizing, people who had worked in the plantation—your really basic proletarian working-class kind of people, you know, who once they kind of understood the terms of the struggle were a lot more resolute and a lot more stronger fighters than, say, farmers, who essentially are small businessmen, or small landowners who weren’t facing an eviction notice, or small business people who tend to work by themselves, you know, as their daily existence.254

As more and more residents—most but not all of whom were tenants—became radicalized, it was observed that those who remained moderate and later withdrew from WWCA were primarily small land- and business-owners. However, this was not true across the board, and the smaller but significant number of commercial farmers and small landowners who were also radicalized helped to foster a sense of solidarity in spite of the split. And those who did withdraw still participated on a limited basis at “crunch times.”

Furthermore, as choices and decisions became more controversial among the residents, consensus-based decision-making transformed into majority-rule voting. Leninist conceptions of vanguard leadership and democratic centralism took root.255

There was leadership. There was what we used to call centralized democracy, I mean, you make your pitch, you lose, you don’t dissent—there are no dissenters. You participated in the process, you either had your position adopted, compromised on, or lost, but the exterior position that you take is the majority position. …there was internal discipline.256

254 E. 1/16/04, emphasis in original.
256 L. 10/12/04, emphasis in original.
Discipline of the association; that meant that you fought and argued in the meeting, but once the decision was made, you had a united front. You gotta have discipline. You got to. I mean, if you don’t have discipline, then you get wildfire, you get people out there, you cannot have strategies, you cannot have plans...

Time and again, this concept of discipline was repeated over and over again by those that remained highly active in WWCA through the anti-eviction struggle, and especially those who remain a part of the WWCA steering committee three decades later. Discipline meant that there was no space for dissent once a decision was made; everyone fell in line behind the decision. This had a marked impact on participation: those in the majority position were emboldened to participate more assertively while those in the minority position felt increasingly marginalized and therefore disengaged. Not surprisingly, those who withdrew from active participation do not speak of WWCA’s discipline but instead of its strident rigidity.

The decisive split occurred in early spring 1976 when many of the original steering committee members who were commercial farmers, kuleana owners, or otherwise perceived to be too moderate were voted off and replaced with the increasingly radicalized tenants. Two years prior when WWCA first organized, many of these tenants were reluctant to join or actively participate because of the precariousness of their situation (Nakata 1999). At that time, the general consensus was that the small landowners or business owners who made up the steering committee were the most protected from immediate eviction; however, as a result of the protracted struggle with no end in sight, they were now seen to stand in the way of the radical action needed to “win the war.”

This community split would further be exacerbated in the late fall of 1976 when the decision to bring on a confrontation with state authorities tasked with enforcing the evictions was voted on (as described in Chapter One). At issue was whether or not to

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257 B. 11/14/03. B. goes on to describe how, nevertheless, people never forgave people for voting ‘the wrong way’ regardless if they were on the wining side or the losing side of the vote.

258 H. 2/28/04, emphasis in original.
continue collectively withholding rents. Throughout 1976, the WWCA was in court (first the district court, then the circuit court, then the state supreme court) to fight their repeated eviction orders, and by late fall, tenants had received a stay of execution (of the eviction orders) while their case was on appeal at the Hawai‘i Supreme Court. This temporary reprieve was conditioned upon WWCA’s payment of the back rents that had been accruing in their escrow account; if the Waïhōle-Waikāne residents chose not to pay the rents then it would surely result in government authorities enforcing the eviction orders. Whereas in the summer of 1975 when the decision to first withhold rents was non-controversial based on an overall community consensus, a year and half later it would split the community nearly in half.

Although the 39-36 split had significant numbers of small landowners and commercial farmers on the dissenting side while most tenants were on the majority side, notable numbers of small landowners and commercial farmers were also on the majority side and shared this view of what “needed to be done.” Regardless of how one voted in that “awful meeting,” when push came to shove, most residents of Waïhōle-Waikāne stood in the road together during the historic roadblock. With the hindsight of several decades, and their continued tenancy now assured (as much as possible), most residents and activists of Waïhōle-Waikāne on both sides of the split tend to now agree on the necessity of radical action. It is plausible that without a confrontation being forced in the form of the roadblock at time when WWCA continued to have widespread public support, the governor may not have intervened to purchase Waïhōle valley, and Marks-Pao would have succeed in displacing the all residents and developing the two valleys (as they did on a very limited scale in Waikāne as that part of the struggle dragged on a few more years). In other words, the earlier approach fostered a broad base of support within the community and across the islands that enabled the latter approach to be effective.

Why does the split matter? It matters because the articulation of landowning Hawaiians—or elite school educated Hawaiians—as ‘petit-bourgeois’ in opposition to ‘working-class’ Locals persist. This persistence of an MLM-inspired class narrative
functions to distance Local issues from Hawaiian issues in Waiåhola and Waikåne, as will be discussed in the following chapters. Some of the residual effects of the split can be seen in an incident in the 1990s concerning the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands (DHHL), which has administered low-rent, 99-year homestead leases on lands ceded/seized from the Hawaiian Kingdom to Hawaiians of 50 percent or more ancestry or blood quantum since 1920. 259 DHHL came into Waiåhola in a “backdoor deal” when then-Governor John Waiheåe III traded some of the state-owned land in the valley. No one in the community and few in the state were aware of this transaction at the time. As a result of Waiheåe’s land swap with DHHL, new tenants are moving into Waiåhola on terms more favorable than what the original lessees have earned (and this is the word they used: they “earned” their leases). Furthermore, despite the 1977 purchase of the disputed 600 acres from Elizabeth Marks for the establishment of the Waiåhola Valley Agricultural Park, the State of Hawaiåi did not issue long-term leases at fair and reasonable rents to the older tenants until 1998—more than thirty years after the struggle supposedly ended! 260

Several longtime residents of Waiåhola who are Hawaiian but do not qualify for DHHL land (due to blood quantum rules) are upset at the advantage that the newer tenants are perceived to be receiving. Several non-Hawaiians have expressed concern about this seeming encroachment by a Hawaiian agency onto lands they secured for local tenancy. The situation came to a head in 2005 when the State of Hawaiåi attempted to transfer all of its Waiåhola acres from the Housing and Community Development Corporation of Hawaii, the agency that currently administers leases for the Waiåhola Valley Agricultural Park, to the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands. The Waiåhola-Waikåne Community Association mobilized in resistance and repeatedly went in busloads to the state legislature to block the transfer. As one resident explains:

> It wasn’t clear exactly what the terms of the [new] leases would be under Hawaiian Homes and whether the leases would still be renewable for the people who already had existing leases [such as non-

260 This had both positive and negative implications: the unfinished business of unsigned leases was surely taxing for many tenants and the WWCA wearily maintained its vigilant pressure on the State; however, the long delay gave tenants an extra three decades in addition to the 55-year leases they eventually signed.
Hawaiians]. And, without having that clarified, it’s not possible for us to support Hawaiian Homes taking over the leases. We never really could get to that discussion. The discussion was just kind of cut off.\footnote{261}

Nevertheless, with the lands it currently holds in Waiāhole, DHHL has proceeded to issue new leases with an anticipation of limited new construction. A few Hawaiians in Waiāhole are satisfied with this:

> I think that people view it like—especially I think non-Hawaiians view it as taking. But when you view it in the context of the bigger taking [of the Kingdom], it is not a taking, it is \textit{a return of the lands}.*\footnote{262}

This relatively minor dispute clarifies the class differences that persist between landowning and non-landowning Hawaiians, and the growing political distance between the two groups. It also gestures to the present-day contentions and competing traditions of Localism versus Hawaianness.\footnote{263} Are the valleys to be a Local place or a Hawaiian place? Or to what extent can they be both? I found that many veterans of the anti-eviction struggle insist upon the Localism of Waiāhole-Waikāne in ways that lessen or dissipate its Hawaiannness. For example, a Hawaiian woman in Waiāhole has this to say:

> In Waiāhole, color doesn’t mean a thing. Color or background or whether you are Samoan, Tongan or Filipino or what, it doesn’t mean nothing. In here, people respect each other for who they are. And, to me, even with the Hawaiian issue, I mean, [as a Hawaiian] if you Hawaiian at heart, you could be Japanese and be Hawaiian at heart. You have Hawaiians screwing over Hawaiians, so what does that do, you know, so? … That’s how we all destroy each other by fighting for class, you know, you’re Hawaiian you get yours, and your Japanese and you get yours. And that’s stupid.\footnote{264}

When asked what part did Hawaiian culture and values play in the anti-eviction struggle, another Hawaiian woman explains:

> Actually, there was no part in the Hawaiian—not [pause], no. Every nationality, whether you’re Hawaiian, Chinese, Japanese, whatever,

\footnote{261}{L. 5/5/05.}
\footnote{262}{L. 4/27/04, emphasis in original.}
\footnote{263}{In the 1970s Localism was hinged upon a working-class sensibility in opposition to the haole oligarchy, and while in Waiāhole and Waikāne remnants of this are still evident, elsewhere in Hawai‘i the ascendancy of many Local Asians to positions of power and as recipients of privilege has prompted a Hawaiian backlash to Localism. In brief, Hawaiian movements challenge notions of Localism as aberrant forms of settler colonialism and call upon non-Hawaiian Locals to affirm the primacy of Hawaiians and all things Hawaiian \textit{in Hawai‘i}. Locals are further challenged to articulate their place in the islands vis-à-vis Native Hawaiians \textit{without} subsuming Hawaiians under the Local label.}
\footnote{264}{H. 2/28/04.}
all was together. Not one self, not one Hawaiian group or like this. Everybody together.265

As one Japanese woman describes it: “there wasn’t racial barriers in the community.”266 While the non-Hawaiians I interviewed often shared this experience about the amiability and non-discrimination among valley residents, it was interesting that the Hawaiians were much more ardent about the Localism of Wai‘ahole-Waikāne. The sentiments expressed by these residents reflect how persistently almost all residents and allies now say that the anti-eviction struggle was a Local, and not a Hawaiian, struggle. The significance of this is two-fold. On the one hand, it provides a powerful narrative for how future community struggles can be structured on the basis of multiethnic unity. On the other hand, this emphasis on multiethnic Localism can impede the building of a Hawaiian Hawai’i, as evident in the Hawaiian Homelands dispute. Moreover, this prioritization of Localism hindered the Wai‘ahole-Waikāne community coming together in the taro farmers’ water struggle and the Kamaka family land struggle.

Another lingering effect of the split is evident in a new organization that recently formed in response to a perception that WWCA represents only tenants and not landowners. The Wai‘ahole Landowners Association (WLA) consists of Hawaiian kuleana owners. There are roughly sixteen landowners in the valley and not all of them are a part of WLA. Those who organized decided to do so because:

We felt that we were in such diminished numbers, and we will have problems, so it’s better to focus on our immediate ahupua‘a. We’re looking at it as an ahupua‘a. We approach it as an ahupua‘a—now here’s a Native perspective!267

This founding member describes the function of the Wai‘ahole Landowners Association to “service the landowners” who are neglected by the Wai‘ahole-Waikāne Community Association. As he told WWCA in a meeting in 2003:

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265 T. 1/12/04.
266 E. 8/15/05.
267 G. 1/28/04.
You guys have only been here two generations, at most. Landowners have been here for over a hundred year – that’s five generations in a hundred years.  

This founding member of WLA explains that WWCA was originally organized by landowners “leading the charge” who had become marginalized. It is unclear how many kuleana owners are actively involved in the Waiāhole Landowners Association, but the fact that this group organized in the first place is telling of the growing distance between tenants and landowners, which was nearly absent prior to the anti-eviction struggle. When asked about any differences in class interests of landowners and lessees, the reply was adamant:

Bypass this [question]—five generations of stories versus two generations of stories: it’s a big difference. … We are landowners. Some of [us] are not very big, but the fact that [we] are contiguous is—the longevity of the history is the main thing. So what you have here is some mixed history of people who came through from the Monarchy days; then you have people who are just recent generations here—two—and they represent 1975.

For this kuleana landowner, and presumably for others in WLA, issues of Hawaiian nationalism are foregrounded:

We have a story, so automatically we stand historically senior to [the state and lessees]. We suffered the worse. That is a new perspective that everybody has to adjust to. We may be a minority in number [in the valley], but we are senior by history and culture. That’s a huge perspective everybody has to take care of. And the reason is because we stand from the patrimony of the Hawaiian—*the real Hawaiian*. It makes people uneasy.

Such a nationalist position has made both non-Hawaiians and Hawaiians in Waiāhole uneasy. Does a lack of kuleana landownership make them less Hawaiian? The intersection between Hawaiianess and class that the WLA asserts cannot be easily disentangled.

My point in describing the community split and its manifestation through the years is to demonstrate the continued relevance of class for the people of Waiāhole-Waikāne, and I suspect, for many people throughout the islands who struggle for self-
determination in their land and water resources. Their narratives of class and identity are informed by multiple and competing traditions, with the potential of ‘disarticulating’ their shared country lifestyle and hindering their coming together. This is what happened in the taro farmers’ water struggle and in the Kamaka family land struggle, as will be shown in the following two chapters. ‘Class’ as a mobilizing concept is no longer something adequately discussed in community struggles, nor is it something sufficiently analyzed in academic approaches. For this reason, I suggest a renewed and nuanced class analysis that moves beyond MLM articulations and incorporates postmodern Marxists insights that consider class processes—the shared economic (and other) practices of peoples’ everyday lives as the basis for progressive politics.

**LESSONS LEARNED OF A SUCCESSFUL, SEMINAL STRUGGLE**

The legacies of the Waiāhole-Waikāne Community Association anti-eviction struggle are many. Not only were large sections of northeast O‘ahu spared from (sub)urban and tourist development and “kept county” but also precedent was set for establishing community participation in city/island planning. As one long-time Windward community leader explains, this struggle—nestled within concurrent islands-wide movements of the 1970s—

laid the groundwork for the 1980s when the city government, and the state likewise, finally acknowledged that the community has a right to a chair at the table. And even, to the point where they sometimes agreed that the government’s got to get out here and get a table out in the communities. … [This led to] very, very focused discussions of what our development plans should look like, property by property. And, for the first time, island communities had a chance to say what development plans should be for every single space and how they should relate to one another. …The communities were active, they were well informed.  

For Hawai‘i’s people, one of the lasting legacies of Waiāhole-Waikāne is the knowledge and experience of resistance and empowerment—the capacity to resist the juggernaut of Progress and empower themselves (as persons and communities) through such

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271 The city and county of Honolulu encompasses the whole island of O‘ahu.
272 H. 4/4/05.
resistance. Perhaps the most important legacy for the residents is their continued ability to live in the homes most of them built, among the same neighbors they grew up with for generations, in the lifestyles of their choosing amid the beautiful green valleys and sparkling blue ocean, and, for the majority tenants, the security of long-term leases at fair and reasonable rents.

Let me begin by briefly summarizing the main lessons that were repeatedly shared with me: the need to address problems collectively; the strong leadership of individuals who worked together; the decision-making process that prioritized ‘talking things out’ followed by unity behind the decision; the importance of maintaining internal control of a struggle while utilizing outside resources and alliances; the ability to work across ethnic differences to avoid divisions; and the capacity to articulate a struggle as part of a broader systemic problem in ways that draw support from the general populace. An additional point concerns the presumed sanctity of private property that has dominated Hawai‘i politics since the overthrow. A paradigm shift started to occur in which private property was increasingly understood as subject to democratic principles of collectively decided upon land-use policies and conditioned upon the rights of those who work upon and improve the land. The widespread radical activism in Hawai‘i during the 1970s, in which Waiāhole-Waikāne was at the forefront, created a political space in which to engage in open debate about this paradigm. To date, the loss of commoner uses of land has been one of the greatest crises in Hawai‘i’s history.

Here is what the residents and activists have to say in their own words.

273 Geschwender (1982) adds that WWCA was able to demonstrate how power was “not a fixed commodity” but rather a force that can be created to force dramatic change. Mondavi concurs and further notes that the state and land developers learned to avoid a confrontation and legitimation crisis by co-opting community leadership in future land struggles. In that respect, the anti-eviction struggle was a paradoxical success: while state intervention ensured the continued tenancy and country lifestyle of Waiāhole-Waikāne residents, it simultaneously marked the beginning of the end of the transformative (revolutionary) moment (Modavi 1992: 127-29). Mondavi explains: “The Waiāhole-Waikāne dispute not only had emerged in a period of intense anti-development disputing, but also held the potential for a broad-based and radical movement against the landed elite. As such, the conflict posed a threat to the stability and predictability of capital expansion, an essential condition of profit production and accumulation. The case also shows how the state was forced to intercept an increasingly intense opposition that not only threatened capital but one which posed a serious political legitimation crisis” (1991: 91). The state intervention to purchase the disputed land in Waiāhole and broker a satisfactory compromise for the disputed land in Waikāne demonstrates how Waiāhole-Waikāne residents and allied activists “fueled and utilized crisis as a political opportunity to secure an eventual victory” (Ibid: 92).
I definitely became more political after the struggle. It was a learning experience like none other. It made me more aware of the politics and a whole different culture that is alive behind the scenes that regular people don’t know or are not privy to. And I realized that there’s a power in people that you can overcome some of these things that these nasty people are planning and doing to everybody else, the general population.  

We’ve seen when people get involved, when people start asking questions, then you can start getting your way. And it’s not that, you know, for those in power have access to power; [when] those below get organized—and learn—you can get something your way. So, we’re not ready to overthrow the government, but we can still work with it and make it do what we want it to do.  

Before we were getting’ to be educated; after dat we are da educator.

Participation in the anti-eviction struggle politicized most of the residents of Waiāhole-Waikāne to be further involved in electoral politics, social movements, cultural organizations, and general issues they cared about. Many explain how they were apolitical prior to the struggle, and how through the struggle they gained a sense of empowerment and knowledge of their rights, which led to ongoing civic engagement. For some, this has meant visible and vocal community leadership during the past three decades on a variety of issues; for others this has meant more latent commitments mobilized as needed in moments of consequence; for many this has meant choosing to be actively involved in organizations that make a difference in theirs and others’ lives. Only one resident-turned-activist during the anti-eviction struggle expressed to me that his participation had a reverse effect: prior to the struggle he was quite involved in local Democratic Party politics, but after he came to know of the “allegiance” politicians had for their financial backers, and how “politicians lie,” he has been rather apolitical since. Nevertheless, all of the residents shared how the personal and collective empowerment they gained has been influential in other areas of their lives, such as “speaking up more” concerning interpersonal and workplace relations, and “fighting for their rights” especially vis-à-vis any “issues with the law” they
encounter. These residents-turned-activists now *instinctively* challenge state authorities when faced with unfavorable impositions. For example, several women have aggressively fought for custodial rights of their grandchildren when the state’s Child Protective Agency has intervened in familial disputes. Notably, these women have effectively enlisted allies, engaged in their own research and analysis, and articulately represented their positions in judicial proceedings—all skills they attribute to gaining in the anti-eviction struggle.

Some residents have continued to actively work with other struggling communities or social movements, often in terms of being “the educator” and teaching them how to organize and mobilize. Two residents explain the importance of education in the following dialogue:

A.: You got to expose the enemy. … Because actually a lot of people hurting, they just don’t realize it. You know, like one of the things was [people saying about us]: “They keeping me from doing my job. I’m a carpenter, I building homes and you guys are preventing me from doing that.” And we’re saying “We have carpenters in our valley and they cannot afford a home. No matter how many homes they build, they still cannot afford one home, right?” Then they say “Well, we own our land, we don’t want to see people fighting against us.” [We’d say:] “Well, unless you own it and not owe a bank…you know what I mean?” But you see, those are the kinds of things they begin to think “Whoa, that’s right. I mean if I lose my job I cannot pay, then I don’t really own my home—the bank own my home.” Right? But they don’t [initially] think so because they think “I better than you, I got a home.” [And we’d say:] “That’s not necessarily true.” So those are the kinds of things we had to look at, to say.

S.: [By exposing the enemy, it causes] other people going to say “That’s not fair; that’s not right what [the landlord and developer are] doing.” And they support [us]. I mean, you show people [how the politicians who make] land-use policy or making laws they got interests in what they making laws about and what they making policy about. Then the people wonder “Are they serving the people or are they serving themselves.”

What this dialogue speaks to is the importance of “exposing the enemy”—the interconnected interests of capital—as a means to unite diverse people with diverse competing interests in common cause through a shared understanding of their similar
marginality vis-à-vis capitalism. Education is key here, especially “learning about the system,” and this was emphasized over and over again by everyone.

Another important dimension that was repeatedly emphasized—a dimension characteristic of Hawai‘i’s mix of Hawaiian, Pacific Islander and Asian traditions—was the important role of elders:

Because there’s a lot of different generations here [and active in the struggle]—there were some older people, like my father’s age—they were wise so they had good input. … Within the valley there was a lot of inner strength.278

The old folks, they so instrumental! Oh, you can’t get that! Lot of them, they no care, man [laughter]. They’re great, lotta the old timers, they’re great.279

It was the older residents that were some of the most militant, and it was their testimonies at various governmental hearings that proved most effective. Culturally, elders serve as the repositories of knowledge and wisdom beyond the “book smarts” that formal education might provide. This gave the struggle a breadth and depth that enabled their issues to resonate with other island residents and communities. Moreover, elders also function as vital links in intergenerational, extended family networks, which was the fundamental basis of community mobilization. Although residents didn’t articulate the role of elders as a lesson to be learned for their struggle, the fact that almost all residents emphasized the importance of their role is a telling lesson in itself. Hawaiian and Local traditions of intergenerational continuity remain strong.

An important lesson that was repeated again and again by residents was the rights consciousness they gained through their anti-eviction struggle.

Da lesson learned, dat I have learned, is dat we have at least a moral right about what we fightin’ for. I learned dat everybody have a right in dis world. Especially us have da right to what we doin’ [because we built our own homes and we work the land].280

277 This is the same as what Gramsci says about building alliances to form an effective counter-hegemony. Talk about organic intellectuals!
278 L. 8/15/05.
279 Y. 1/15/04.
280 C. 4/7/05.
As previously discussed, this rights-consciousness was enmeshed with a class-consciousness. I often heard something to the effect of: ‘we learned of our rights and we now exercise our rights.’ Residents continue to be empowered by rights talk. It is a right of survival for them to continue living the traditions of the valleys:

Social and political [empowerment] is possible, if [done] through collective means. You can pool your resources—the thing that we don’t have is more money—but we have people and we have instinct to survive. People have their instinct to survive.\(^{281}\)

What about the lessons learned for the allied activists from outside Waiāhole-Waikāne? Almost all of the allied activists who were involved in Waiāhole-Waikāne and other community struggles throughout the islands have become a part of “institutions of power” in Hawai‘i:\(^{282}\) as state legislators, financial executives, real estate agents, high level attorneys, directors of significant nonprofit organizations, and educators.\(^{283}\) I found it particularly curious that some of the most dedicated and militant Marx-Lenin-Mao and Revolutionary Communist Party activists became self-embedded into the capitalist system making large profits for personal gain.\(^{284}\) As one allied activist explains:

A lot of people, I think, who were MLM people just got sucked into the system. People just got sucked away. Some became disillusioned; with their talents and abilities, they used it for themselves. Others went more to nationalism. [pause] But I think the ideas are still out there, they just don’t do tactical organizing; they do more campaigns and education and stuff.\(^{285}\)

This reminds me of what a Marxist professor of mine once said: ‘Marxists aren’t against money, they just know that poverty sucks.\(^{286}\) Another professor, in direct reference to some of the allied activists of Waiāhole-Waikāne’s anti-eviction struggle, said: ‘Having

\(^{281}\) N. 4/27/05.
\(^{282}\) H. 4/4/05.
\(^{283}\) Several residents mentioned, with irony, how the attorney who represented them throughout the most contentious parts of the anti-eviction struggle is now partner of one of the top law firms in Honolulu and how he represented Bishop Estates/Kamehameha Schools in the lease-to-fee conversion cases. The irony is that Bishop Estates is the supposedly—‘for Hawaiians’ trust whose eviction of Hawaiian and Local families in Kalama Valley instigated the political activism of the resistive 1970s. This attorney, however, articulates his representation of Bishop Estates in the lease-to-fee conversion cases as consistent with his representation of WWCA because both cases involved unfair ‘takings’ of Hawaiian lands by private property interests; for Bishop Estate this meant forced divestment which would have negatively impacted its financial trust funding the Hawaiians-only Kamehameha Schools.
\(^{284}\) For example, one activist became vice-president of a large financial investment firm.
\(^{285}\) W. 8/25/05.
\(^{286}\) S. Charusheela, Spring 2007 at University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa.
thoroughly analyzed capitalism, and after struggling tirelessly for years and eventually needing to make some money to support growing families, they were in a position to use their knowledge of capitalism—which was better than most capitalists!—to make some money—a lot of money—for themselves.\textsuperscript{287} Although several residents mentioned these seeming contradictions, no one had anything disparaging to say, and all residents and allies spoke highly of the work of these allied activists-turned-entrepreneurs.

Some allied activists remained dedicated revolutionaries in some form or another, either as Marx-Lenin-Mao activists, Hawaiian nationalists, or part of the progressive Left in general. This statement by an allied activist expresses what many shared:

For me [Waiāhole-Waikāne] is one of those events that define me, I think, and define the person that I’ve become—to the extent that this is a good person—and that is certainly a substantial result of the experience that I went through.\textsuperscript{288}

Another 1970s activist continues to be allied in Waiāhole-Waikāne, specifically with the taro-farming water struggle. When asked if MLM-type of class analysis is still present, she answered:

I don’t think so. I think it’s just brilliant people with great spirit. They’re intelligent; they know the world. They can see what’s happening. [But] there’s no conscious study and no systematic analysis.

However, she goes on to say:

The main lesson from Waiāhole-Waikāne is that the latent untapped power of the people is so great. It’s unbelievable how much power there is if we could just unleash it, focus it. … But it also shows that without the continuing education and lobbying of your views, you can use those same kind of tactics in a self-serving way or in a very timely way. The things that divide us now in the valley, or anywhere, we all have to look in terms of the larger picture. … I just believe with knowledge—it’s so critical that we have knowledge—that with a lot of knowledge, combined with experience, I think we can win anything. We just have to have the strategy and the message and the love. If we lose the love, what is it all for? [laughter] … What I really believe it is, is consciousness: it’s got to be the primary thing. Consciousness doesn’t mean you’re in the lead. [laughter] Consciousness has got to be primary, and then all else will follow from it—tactics and strategy will follow—it’s your roadmap. … And hope.\textsuperscript{289}

\textsuperscript{287} David Stannard, Spring 2000 at University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa.
\textsuperscript{288} L. 10/12/04.
\textsuperscript{289} W. 8/25/05.
This chapter has shown how various traditions from Hawai‘i’s territorial (plantation to statehood) period were mobilized in the anti-eviction struggle of the Waiāhole-Waikāne Community Association. Foremost among these traditions were the rural farming, subsistence fishing, wage-labor and embedded exchange networks among diverse ethnic and economic families, which constituted a ‘country lifestyle.’ Added to this were the islands’ labor traditions and Marxist class-consciousness, combined with American democratic rights and legal traditions. Despite seeming contradictions, the valleys’ residents and allies made these varied traditions work for them. They used these multiple traditions to articulate ‘the system’ which was threatening to displace them—elite, corporate interests manifest in the landowner and developer with collusion of the government—and their rights to resist such displacement. Such use of tradition was politically potent at a time when the islands’ post-statehood development frenzy was increasingly called into question. Multietnic Localism, in particular, provided a common social and political referent that was useful in unifying the community, forging alliances with an islands-wide network of supporters, and sustaining sociopolitical mobilization during the many years of struggle. If “places develop meaning through language and activity” (Milner 2005: 156), then through its anti-eviction struggle, Waiāhole-Waikāne came to epitomize the country lifestyle in opposition to the islands’ extensive urban- and suburbanization.
CHAPTER 6

KALO PAʻA O WAIĀHOLE (HARD TARO OF WAIĀHOLE),

THE WATER STRUGGLE OF WAIĀHOLE TARO FARMERS

[In the anti-eviction struggle] we played up the agriculture because Waiāhole was the biggest sweet potato grower in all the state at that time, then the papayas and the bananas and stuff like that. [We asked] why not taro? ... [Later] we started reopening the taro patches up there [in Waiāhole valley].

Just being in the Waiāhole-Waikāne [anti-eviction] struggle and rooting ourselves in the community, it became natural to go with the kalo fight. ... In this modern time, the struggle for the water became representative of that issue that resonates with people, like how the development issue in Waiāhole was at one time.

Displacement is probably one of the main [problems or issues]. It starts with the Māhele and doesn’t end until—well, it doesn’t end actually. ... This has had profound effects on families. I think that the effect of it has been separation from ʻāina and for people whose culture that is directly connected to the ʻāina that is devastating. ... [We try to meet this challenge] by reconnecting ourselves, our famil[ies], to the place, to the ahupuaʻa.

In the mid 1970s in the midst of the raging anti-eviction struggle in Waiāhole and nearby ahupuaʻa, a group of farmers were quietly engaged in their own resistive actions. This group was not in militant confrontation with state authorities; rather, it was generating a more gradual yet highly persistent challenge to overturn prevailing oligarchic resource allocation in the islands. This struggle was a water struggle, centered on taro farming as a Hawaiian cultural practice, which would alter the islands' developmental doctrines and accompanying socioeconomic and political institutions. It took nearly three decades before the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court would rule in favor of returning long-diverted water to Waiāhole taro farmers and allies—water diverted by Lincoln McCandless in the 19th century for King Sugar, and even now, the court ruling has

290 V. 4/27/05.
291 W. 8/25/05.
292 L. 4/27/05.
not been definitive and the battle for water wages on. Nevertheless, the water struggle of Waiāhole taro farmers has succeed in codifying and repeatedly reaffirming water rights for Hawaiian cultural practices in the Hawaiʻi State Constitution, and establishing a statewide public policy framework in favor of ‘the public trust’ and away from rampant and unchecked development of land and water resources for private profit.

As the quotes above demonstrate, most Waiāhole taro farmers and allies saw the water struggle as an extension of the earlier anti-eviction struggle. Both struggles developed concurrently and evolved from the same resistive climate of the early 1970s that gave rise to the loosely construed grassroots coalition. While the residents and tenants of Waiāhole-Waikāne were resisting what they didn’t want—rampant sub/urbanization and tourist development—the taro farmers were actively working towards what they did want: reinvigorated Native cultural practices in a Hawaiian Hawaiʻi. As the last of the quotes above reveal, the farmers articulated the displacement threats experienced by Waiāhole and Waikāne residents in the mid 1970s as part of the larger forces of displacement directly implicated in the occupation of Hawaiʻi and colonization of Hawaiians. The Waiāhole taro farmers continue to mobilize in opposition to an oligarchic allocation of resources that sustain the islands’ ceaseless development—not just for Hawaiʻi’s Locals but more importantly, for Hawaiians, the islands’ Native people. Re-establishing traditional relations of persons to place in a contemporary context is one means in which to do so.

This chapter examines how the Waiāhole taro farmers drew upon pre-state Native traditions of makaʻainana in ahupuaʻa, Hawaiian Kingdom traditions that sought to balance Native tenants’ resource rights with modern regimes of private property, and American political and legal traditions that accompanied statehood. Like the anti-eviction activists, taro farmers invoked multiple traditions to connect the water needs of Waiāhole to all of Hawaiʻi and forged a broad-based taro-roots movement therein. I discuss how Hawaiian culture was politicized, the various strategies the farmers employed prior to and during the Waiāhole Ditch Combined Contested Case (In re Water Use Permit Application 94 Haw. 97, 9 P.3d
409 (2000); also known as Waiāhole, and the intra-community conflict that hindered their efforts. This documentation of the Waiāhole taro farmers’ water struggle serves as a historical/futures archive for understanding how Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians have successfully reclaimed water resources for Native traditional uses, expanded Hawaiian cultural practices, and environmental protection for the broader public.

**The Hawaiian Renaissance**

As a teacher at Kamehameha Schools, I was tired of teaching what Hawaiians did—I wanted to be one of the Hawaiians that was actually doing.293

[W]e were actively looking at the time for a place to grow taro because we felt like that was where it was for us. We were idealistic. We all had long hair. We all had this level of Hawaiian culture, but hadn’t really exercised it, you know…294

We started farming to get away from everything. We were suppose to be hippies, you know, hippie farmers.295

A small group of Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians (haoles, Asians, Portuguese) in Waiāhole and adjacent ahupua’a (Waihe’e, Kahalu’u, Hakipu’u) joined together in the mid 1970s to grow taro as a means of re-establishing and living Hawaiian culture in contemporary Hawai‘i. They consciously sought to bring Hawaiian tradition back to life. They organized as families, both in terms of their nuclear families and as ‘ohana. All of them had longstanding ties to the area, either as kuleana holders dating back to at least the mid 19th century or as immigrant-settlers from the early 20th century. They were all a part of, and highly influenced by, the stirring social, political and cultural climate in the United States in the 1960s and in Hawai‘i in the 1970s.

[There was] this gradual awakening in each [of us], realizing more and more what our economy is about, why we have these great, huge, green, open spaces and finding out that everyone of those big open spaces was a holding pattern for major, major, development. And how was that the case when the families we grew up with were still

293 While this is not a direct, verbatim quote, it is an accurate synopsis of what was said by L. 4/27/05.
294 H. 4/4/05.
295 L. 5/5/05.
farming, they were still fishing, they were still working their, you know, regular jobs and what not. It was like a huge storm brewing.296

They shared the collective resistive agency fostered in the early 1970s, which drew from multiple traditions: MLM, Hawaiian-rooted Localism, and American democratic rights. As the decade progressed, however, from the “watershed moment” of the Kalama Valley Struggle (Trask 1987; Kido 2008), the burgeoning Hawaiian movement followed its own course, at times intertwined with, and at other time separating from, working-class, multiethnic Localism. The story of one activist is telling in its personal parable for the politics of that decade:

I remember—it was the moment. We were all so high! My husband and I met in the Kalama Valley struggle, and our first child is named for the place. I was pregnant at the occupation of Waiahole, when we camped out to defend the valleys. Those were the days! We thought we were unstoppable! We were literally unstoppable for a long time. It was quite a generation. But then life goes on. Later, my husband and I split because he became a Hawaiian nationalist and I remained a Marxist.297

The revitalization of Hawaiian culture and politics that took place during the 1970s is often called the Hawaiian Renaissance, likened to the enlightening rebirth of European culture and arts following the Middle Ages. Like the European Renaissance that consisted of a ‘series of encounters’ with non-European peoples and cultures,298 the Hawaiian Renaissance was also infused with influences from elsewhere, such as post-World War II anti-colonial independence movements, African-American civil rights and American Indian activism, and re-established and strengthened Pacific Island exchanges. Moreover, like its European counterpart of several centuries prior, the Hawaiian Renaissance in culture and arts was inseparable from concurrent political and economic developments. It is this politicization of culture and its economic underpinnings and ramifications that I examine here.

296 H. 4/4/05, emphasis in original.
297 While this is not a direct, verbatim quote, it is an accurate synopsis of what was said by an allied activist in both the anti-eviction and water struggles.
298 I do not have a direct citation for this reference, but I would like to attribute it to Michael Shapiro, whom I am almost certain I heard it from.
McGregor-Alegado (1980) notes that Hawaiians’ sociopolitical activism during much of the 20th century was substantially curtailed by the territorial oligarchy of post-overthrow and pre-statehood Hawai‘i.299 The ‘Democratic (party) Revolution’ and statehood further disempowered Hawaiians in the political system. At the same time, however, these changes established a basis for the 1970s activism around Hawaiian issues.300 As the islands’ postwar and post-statehood tourist economy brought Hawaiian culture to the forefront in order to commodify and sell it for corporate profit and state tax coffers,301 Hawaiians in the 1970s began mobilizing against their economic and political marginalization as well as to re-claim their culture from its bastardization by the prevailing political economy. Once a source of shame, Hawaiian culture now was seen by Hawaiians as a source of strength. Hawaiians were actively involved in union organizing, welfare-rights advocacy, anti-eviction struggles, and other sociopolitical activism in the years after statehood. A central demand, according to McGregor-Alegado, was the need for a land base (1980: 41).

A receptive judiciary under the leadership of Hawai‘i Supreme Court chief justice William Richardson facilitated this grassroots demand for land by Hawaiians, and the water resources necessary to sustain the land. In the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s openings in the islands’ governance system were being forged by several

299 Following the 1920 establishment of the Hawaiian Homes Commission, Hawaiian concerns and political issues were absorbed into their alliance with the Republican party. McGregor-Alegado explains: “Perhaps the cultural domination of Hawaiians by the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant American culture contributed most to the conspicuous absence of political activism around Hawaiian issues. Through a systematic process of assimilation in the schools, especially restricting the use of the native language, Hawaiians were taught to be ashamed of their cultural heritage and feel inferior to the haole American elite in Hawaii. Stereotyped as lazy low-achievers…Hawaiians were made to feel personally responsible for their lack of achievement in the school system, their inability to get other than manual labor jobs, their low incomes, their substandard homes and the reliance of many on welfare. … In schools and churches, Hawaiians were instructed to be grateful to the Republican Party and the Big Five missionary-descended families who doled out government and commercial patronage in return for native Hawaiian votes. As a result, Hawaiians lacked the political education and experience to challenge the government, voice their concerns about discrimination, and demand their rights as Hawaiians” (1980: 33).

300 McGregor describes how the break up of the territorial oligarchy by the postwar labor movement and the 1950s Democratic [Party] revolution shifted the balance of power in the islands. “Hawaiians thereby lost their political influence [through Republican party patronage] and were cut off from an important channel through which they had previously raised issues. This loss removed any restraints that Hawaiians might have felt in organizing around their concerns for fear of negatively affecting friends or relatives in office or their own positions. At the same time, Hawaiians found it necessary to raise their concerns in the form of political pressure groups and grassroots organizing outside of the electoral process” (1980: 33-34).

301 See Imada (2003) for a discussion of how Hawaiian culture was commodified and sold as part of America’s imperial project in the early 20th century. See Trask (1993 [1999]) for an analysis of how Hawaiian culture continues to be ‘prostituted.’
seminal cases and rulings that not only halted the century of imposed Western legalism on the islands, but also reverted back to more ancient Hawaiian customary law practices. The emergent Hawaiian movement readily exploited these openings. The Waiahole taro farmers in their water struggle would mobilize this mix of Hawaiian and American legal traditions.

William Richardson was the first Hawaiian chief justice since the judiciary was created by the only other Hawaiian to have held the position, King Kamehameha III (Kauïkeaouli). As previously discussed in Chapter Three, Hawaiian Kingdom law—as the nation-state itself—combined traditional, Native customary practices with Western forms of jurisprudence. Richardson sought to re-establish this hybrid legal tradition that was supplanted by American regimes of private property in post-overthrow Hawai‘i. As previously discussed in Chapter Four, during the territorial era the sugar industry monopolized water and land in ways the diminished local and Native uses. The Richardson Court, beginning with the 1968 case *Palama v. Sheehan* (50 Hawaii 298, 440 P.2d 95), reversed this trend by upholding Native claims to public access on private property and affirming the use of “kama‘aina testimony” (local knowledge and oral histories by reputable community members or elders) as permissible evidence. This opening was further expanded in the 1968 case of *In re application of Ashford* (50 Haw. 314, 440 P.2d 76), the 1973 case of *County of Hawaii v. Sotomura* (55 Haw. 176, 517 P.2d), and the 1977 cases of *In re application of Sanboru* (57 Haw. 585, 562 P.2d 771) and *State of Hawaii v. Zimring* (58 Haw. 106, 566 P.2d 725). All of the rulings in these cases drew upon Hawaiian customary law to protect Native traditional practices for the common use of land and water resources.

302 The Hawaiian Kingdom Supreme Court first accepted kama‘aina testimony in 1879 (*Re: Boundaries of Pulehuni*, 4 Haw. 239, 241), defining what it was and why it was important. An allied attorney in the Waiahole case explains the importance of kama‘aina testimony today: “which allows older Hawaiian elders who know a practice to testify about it in court and it’s acceptable as evidence. That was important in the case, for example, establishing the shoreline, and so a lot of the history of the lands could be brought back in” (T. 1/21/04).

303 See Dodd (1985: Chapter 3) for an insightful discussion of the Richardson Court’s rationale in these seminal cases.
Richardson believed strongly in both traditional Hawaiian culture and the American legal system, actively melding the two in the Court’s decisions and urging others to do the same. In effect, he was asserting a genealogy of state law rooted in both Hawaiian Kingdom law and long-held pre-state Hawaiian customary law, kānāwai. Like the 19th century chiefs, Richardson was pursuing a path of hybridization by making complex negotiations with and modifications of U.S. law to reflect the islands’ Hawaiian traditions. He insisted that “the law can be used by creative attorneys as a sword for advancing the rights of our Hawaiian people” (Dodd 1985: 97).304

Many Hawaiians and their allies were already doing what Richardson urged in the spaces created by the judicial rulings and the resistive openings of the 1970s political economy. Hawaiians were mobilizing in a variety of organizations such as The Hawaiians, Aboriginal Lands of Hawaiian Ancestry (ALOHA), Hui Malama ‘Āina o Koʻolau, Homerule Movement, the ‘Ohana o Hawai, and others (McGregor-Alegado 1980). Many of these groups focused on holding the state and federal governments accountable to their legal responsibilities to Hawaiians (as codified in the 1920s Hawaiian Homes Commission Act and the 1959 Statehood Admissions Act).305 While many Hawaiians continued to participate in or actively support the more resistive, militant approach of some Hawaiian groups, such as the Protect Kahoʻolawe ‘Ohana, and some Local movements, such as the anti-eviction struggle of Waiāhole-Waikāne and elsewhere, they also directed their attention to enacting far-reaching changes from within the governance system.

The struggles against the system enabled the changes within. In other words, the mass, radical activism of the 1970s forced open and kept open the spaces for change within the politico-legal structures of Hawai‘i. Moreover, as successes were increasingly demonstrated in these seminal court cases, Hawaiians and their allies were empowered

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304 The extended version of Richardson’s statement is this: “I know some of you may disagree with me, but I believe we must accept the fact that we live under a system of law and courts, which have replaced the traditional ways of our ancestors, and, in order to preserve our people, culture, and land, we must take an active role in this system. The law can be used by creative attorneys as a sword for advancing the rights of our Hawaiian people” (Dodd 1985: 97).

305 For example, ALOHA sought reparations in Washington D.C. and the Home Rule Movement fostered political ties among a widening circle of college education Hawaiians who would later obtain State political positions (Coffman 2003: 296). The Coalition of Native Hawaiian Claims (later called Hawaiian Legal Corporation) formed in 1974 as a research and legal resource for Hawaiians pursuing litigation of their claims against incursions by large landowners and developers (McGregor-Alegado 1980: 46-47).
to pursue further changes through the courts and other government bodies. As one allied attorney in the Hawaiian movement explains: “[These] were cultural events [as much as] they were legal and political events, [and] they were emotional events.”

Of significance for Waiʻalae taro farmers was the 1973 case of *McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson* (54 Haw. 173, 504 P.2d 1330), which used the 1846 and 1850 Hawaiian Kingdom Laws to reverse numerous early post-overthrow and territorial Supreme Court cases that had privatized water. The *McBryde* case, also known as the Hanapepe decision, ruled that “in treating water as a private commodity, public interests had been sacrificed for the benefit of a handful of large property owners” (Dodd 1985: 59). Moreover, the *McBryde* decision also acknowledged for the first time ever in post-overthrow Hawai‘i the “right of water for taro farming” (Muuie 2004: 99). Despite multiple appeals to federal courts claiming that this decision was an unfair and uncompensated “taking” by the government of what had long been private property, the *McBryde* decision was repeatedly affirmed. In a related case nine years later, *Robinson v. Ariyoshi* (65 Haw. 641, 658 P.2d 287 (1982)), the Hawai‘i Supreme Court articulated a public trust doctrine specific to Hawai‘i derived from Hawaiian customary and Kingdom laws wherein the State functioned as a konohiki who managed land and water resources held in trust for all island peoples. The Waiʻalae taro farmers used the precedent set by the *McBryde* case, and the climate of judicial receptivity demonstrated in the other seminal cases, to initiate their own legal case in *Reppun v. Board of Water Supply* (65 Haw. 531, 656 P.2d 57 (1982)).

Prior to actively farming taro in Waiʻalae, those who would become known as the Waiʻalae taro farmers began cultivating kalo (*taro*) in the nearby ahupuaʻa of Waiheʻe and Kaʻalaea. At first they learned how to grow dry-land Chinese taro from

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306 T. 1/21/04.
307 See Chapter Three, ‘Sugar Waters,’ for a discussion of these cases. Also see Scheuer (2002: Appendix) for detailed information on these water cases.
308 The Supreme Court decision was significantly expansive because the public right to water was never at issue by the competing parties in the *McBryde* case, which narrowly concerned the allocation of water among competing parties.
309 The appeal to the Supreme Court on a ‘ takings’ claim by the competing parties in the *McBryde* case was denied because the case wasn’t ‘ripe,’ meaning that there was no actual taking that occurred.
longtime farmers in the area but shifted to the better varieties of wetland Hawaiian taro because it was tastier and more culturally rooted. They noticed that the taro was rotting due to insufficient water when the Honolulu Board of Water Supply drilled new wells near the base of the valleys. Discussions with the Board of Water Supply were unproductive, so the taro farmers collectively filed a lawsuit to stake a claim to the valleys’ water. As one of the farmers explains: “we knew it was going to be a legal fight from the beginning…from that point on we were always involved in water issues.”  

The legal fight began in the mid 1970s, reached the Hawai‘i Supreme Court in 1982 and then fizzled in the appeals process in the late 1980s due to lack of sufficient funds. In addition to the legal fight, the taro farming group reached out to other farmers and lobbied within the Hawaiian movement for water rights to be part of the overall “agenda.” As one Wai‘āhole taro farmer explains: “We actively tried to work the water struggle from different angles…we were able to make it travel.”

That two-pronged approach of politico-legal engagement and grassroots mobilization characterized the taro farmers’ water struggle through the coming decades. Added to this was the steady expansion of kalo cultivation throughout the Hawaiian Islands—for which the Wai‘āhole taro farmers were at the forefront. They understood that politico-legal protection of resource rights was needed in order to expand Hawaiian cultural practices that relied on those resources. Shared cultural practices and political economy commitments were the basis of their political community. This community of Wai‘āhole taro farmers was part of a broader Hawaiian political community mobilized during the Hawaiian Renaissance.

Beginning in the mid 1970s Hawaiians participated in a series of meetings called Puwalu (all together, in unison, united, co-operative). At these meetings, Hawaiians came

310 L. 5/5/05.
311 V. 4/27/05.
312 These gatherings were sponsored by the newly-formed Alu Like Inc., a non-profit service provider focusing on “assist[ing] Native Hawaiians in their efforts to achieve social and economic self sufficiency” (http://www.alulike.org/ accessed March 10, 2009) and “based on the maximum cultural participation of its Hawaiian beneficiaries” (Coffman 2003: 297). In 1975, Alu Like engaged in widespread outreach and surveys in Hawaiian communities, finding pervasive and widespread concerns over lack of education, lack of job training, desire for access to land, need to protect traditional water rights, wanting Hawaiian political
together to share knowledge, explore options, ask questions, intently debate, formulate consensus, and begin strategic mobilization. One participant describes the energizing climate of the Puwalu, which intersected with preparations for the 1978 Constitutional Convention (Con-Con):

There were real debates, and there were real consequences. It wasn’t a plastic artifice that it has become. It wasn’t scripted; it was real. The debates were remarkable debates...some of the most eloquent, gifted speeches I’ve ever heard. They were incredibly moving, they were honest, and they were real. People were going out to do things as a result of this, and they were making tactical decisions, having debates among themselves [and] with lawyers who were not distant, not remote, but a part of the community, and struggling to incorporate those ideas, and so the debates had a vitality to them, which [is what] it must have been [like] when the United States was formed. If you look at it now, it’s sort of abstract constitutional principles, but at the time, there were a lot of questions. How should we do this? And people were thinking beyond their own personal needs. They were thinking based on a series of values, and the debates were about those values.

These values were rooted in Hawaiian tradition. Some of the taro farming families from Waiāhole actively participated in the Puwalu and brought forth the issue of water rights for taro farming and other Hawaiian cultural practices. Their goal was to literally shake the foundations of the State of Hawai‘i and re-build it in their fashion. The upcoming Con-Con provided them the opportunity to do so.

The Hawaiian movement which had been intertwined with Local movements during much of the decade began to articulate their explicitly indigenous/nationalist orientation in a Hawaiian platform for the State of Hawai‘i, which: mandated the teaching of Hawaiian history in public schools; made Hawaiian an official state language along with English; protected traditional and customary Hawaiian rights; and created the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (Coffman 2003: 311). In addition, a framework was outlined for the return of federal lands, such as Kaho‘olawe, to the
State and for the use of Hawaiians. Coffman describes the Con-Con as “reflect[ing] the course of the decade, in which first the environment and then Hawaiian culture were the overriding concerns” (Ibid: 313).

The Waiāhole taro farmers actively campaigned for one of their family members to be a delegate to the Con-Con and succeeded by utilizing the islands-wide support network of taro farmers that they had helped cultivate. Throughout the 1970s, they had traveled around the islands working with other taro farmers on water and land issues. The Waiāhole taro farming delegate was a non-Hawaiian. She proved instrumental in not only helping codify the protection of traditional and customary Hawaiian rights (Article 12, Section 7) for practices such as taro farming but also pushing for the creation of a statewide Water Commission (similar to the Land Use Commission). The result was Article 11, Section 7 ensuring that the State meet its “obligation to protect, control and regulate the use of Hawai‘i’s water resources for the benefit of its people” by creating a water resource agency to regulate and manage ground and surface water in the islands. This State of Hawai‘i Commission for Water Resource Management (Water Commission) has helped to shift the decision-making power for water allocation from private interests and corporate uses and towards public interests and shared uses.

Moreover, the State of Hawai‘i Water Code reflects traditional kānāwai in terms of preserving the quality of water for all its uses, particularly Hawaiian ahupua‘a customary practices.

It is also important to note that the adoption of Article 11, Section 4 on Public Land Banking—the State purchase of real property “to control future growth, development and land use”—was a direct result of the Waiāhole-Waikāne anti-eviction struggle and Governor Ariyoshi’s decision to purchase the disputed valley. As far as I can tell, none of the Waiāhole-Waikāne residents participated in the Puwalu or Con-Con except the taro farmers. However, many of the grassroots coalition activists and allied supporters were involved. Convention delegates, the majority of whom were non-Native Locals, approved the Hawaiian platform. Moreover, all of the progressive
amendments to the State Constitution were adopted in a statewide vote, often exceeding 70 percent of the electorate voting in favor.

Many of the Con-Con delegates were young, college-educated community-oriented activists. The Waiahole taro farmers’ representative was among this group. As one of my interviewees stated, those who went to ‘the mainland’ for their undergraduate and/or graduate degrees,

probably brought back a lot of ideas about things like the environmental movement[, people’s rights[,] and so on...] and they sunk their roots back into the community and decided to stay and really make a difference.\(^{314}\)

Another interviewee noted that:

The interesting thing was [that] a lot of the people doing this were people that had known each other in high school, so it wasn’t just a bunch of strangers. It was people coming back and bringing with them some talents that they’ve acquired. I think the willingness of people to try to experiment, and willingness to do it in the context of a community that they rediscovered the value of... There was a critical mass of talent and cultural renaissance that was making all of this exciting.\(^{315}\)

These formally-educated, and often private school graduated (Kamehameha, ‘Iolani, Punahou, St. Louis, Sacred Hearts),\(^{316}\) convention delegates were more likely to effectively utilize the politico-legal process to make strategic changes in the system, as compared to the residents-turned-activists of the earlier community struggles who often resorted to more militant, extra-legal tactics that placed pressure on the system from outside. While both were complementary and necessary—the latter laying the groundwork for the former—it is clear that the college-educated Hawaiian and Local

\(^{314}\) H. 4/4/05.
\(^{315}\) T. 1/21/04.
\(^{316}\) Punahou and ‘Iolani are the top college-preparatory schools in Hawai‘i, with annual tuition over $14,000. St. Louis and Sacred Hearts are same-sex Catholic college-preparatory schools, with an annual tuition of about $8000. Kamehameha Schools was founded in 1887 and endowed by Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop, a Hawaiian chiefless descended from King Kamehameha I. Only Hawaiian children are eligible to attend (which is the subject of ongoing legal attacks following the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Rice v. Cayetano). The estate of Pauahi was the largest landowner in the islands for much of the 20th century, and it is revenues generated on these landholdings that funds the majority of operating costs for Kamehameha Schools (among other educational programs). Students attending Kamehameha pay $2,000-$3,000 for an education on par with the islands’ other elite private schools. In this way, a Kamehameha graduate is not directly identified as one whose family “has money”; nevertheless, s/he is identified as having a high degree of privilege unavailable to the majority of Hawaiians.
activists had significantly more social capital resources available to them than their counterparts in struggling communities. The Con-Con delegates knew how to write laws; they knew how the system worked not just from critical vantage points but also from practical perspectives; they understood how to negotiate and exploit electoral politics; and they desired to participate therein. In short, they moved the issues from the streets and into the centers of state power.

Class and status here played an important—if unarticulated—role. The high levels of education status shared by many activists signal an “upper-class” position in comparison to the majority of “working-class” Locals and Hawaiians who were public school educated, some never graduating high school. Higher education, especially elite-private school education, often reflects significant capital investment and material wealth as well as social and political status. This is not all-encompassing, of course, as many of the persons and families who attend private schools in Hawai‘i or receive a college education (especially on the “mainland”) do so with significant material sacrifice. My point, however, is that with education comes status and influence, which informs people’s perceptions and provides a context for how they relate to each other.

It is important to point out that despite their prominence in Hawaiian movements, the formally-educated often defer to the embodied knowledge of the grassroots activists, or as they are often called, the taro roots. Those who may not have received high levels of formal education often have more intimate knowledge, experience and wisdom of land- and water-based cultural practices that provided the foundation for the Hawaiian Renaissance. In this way, issues of class and status were not defining characteristic of culture-centered Hawaianness. What continued to be a

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317 It should be noted that Hawai‘i’s public school education system is unique in the United States because it is the only statewide unified school district and each student and each school is funded equally from a general fund rather than from local property taxes. What this means is that a student from, or school in, a poor neighborhood or rural community receives the same amount of educational funding than students in or schools in more affluent areas. It is more democratic and fair, but it also has the tendency to depress the overall educational achievement of public schools. Therefore, families who can afford it will send their children to private schools. And among private schools, there is a gradation between less expensive parochial school to highly elite private schools; the annual tuition of the former is $5000-8000, while the annual tuition of the latter is $14,000-$17,000+. 

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defining feature was the political economic objectives for fair and just redistribution of the islands resources for its Native people.

There is no evidence to suggest animosity among the different types of activists and activism at the time; however, over time antagonistic sentiments would become evident at least in Waiāhole and Waikāne. For example, one allied activist describes how the community split has thus become articulated as not only a difference in class interests or tactical disagreements, but also linked to different educational abilities and skills:

It’s a mix bag of things because you’ve got [the taro farmers], and a bunch of them folks who are one set of people—those people are like college-educated, they’re smart, they know how the system works, all this and that, but they kinda have an existence somewhat independent and apart from [the rest of the] community, you know. I mean, they’re not the same kind of people. Yeah, they got different skill sets, they have a different analysis of how things work, and to get a lot of stuff that they want, you know, they certainly felt that you didn’t have to fight a real hard struggle. You just sorta kinda make your case, and beg, or like form your 501(c)(3) and submit your grant [chuckle]. You know what I mean, that’s kinda where [their] struggle is at [and] that was good enough for them. 318

Sentiments such as this were often expressed, directly or indirectly, in my conversations with Waiāhole-Waikāne residents and allied activists. This suggests that the taro farmers were much less resistive than the anti-eviction residents/activists had been to “the system” and much more collaborative with “the system”, while still being highly collective. Consider the views of this Waiāhole taro farmer:

Everyone of [us] has a very deep connection to this State and believes, probably very strongly, “I’m the State too.” … You can’t live in a box and you have to develop relationships to progress. 319

The water struggle of Waiāhole taro farmers was not a spontaneous reaction to a perceived threat to their country lifestyle; rather, it was a pro-active, planned-out approach to re-creating Hawaiian ways of life. In many ways it made perfect sense for Hawaiians and their non-Native Local allies to utilize the growing social capital they acquired through their education, and to invest this in the opening spaces provided by

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318 M. 1/16/04.
319 H. 4/4/05.
the resistive 1970s activism, 1978 Constitutional Convention, a receptive judiciary, a
defensive governorship, and a supportive electorate.

This political community of culture-centered Hawaiianess was not an exclusionary
or essentialist Hawaiians-only identity, evidenced by the fact that non-Hawaiians not only
supported a Hawaiian-centric political position but also embraced and acted upon it. The
Waiāhole taro farmers and allies often said: ‘Hawaiian culture is for the betterment of the
larger community’[^320] and ‘Whomever is willing and able to help is welcome.’[^321] This is
further evidenced in the fact that their Con-Con delegate was a non-Hawaiian member of a
taro farming family. They often spoke in terms of each persons’ kuleana, and the collective
contribution of everyone thereof. The focus was on sustainability and the viability of living
on an island with limited resources and with mutual respect among diverse people—all
within a Hawaiian cultural and political framework. Protecting Hawai‘i’s land and water
resources for Hawaiians also shifts control of these resources from privatized over-
development, which benefits the public as a whole.

There is an element of resistance to America, as evident in these sentiments
shared by a Waiāhole taro farmer:

> Because it’s not in our interest, especially Hawaiian people. … We
have to look out for our own welfare and in doing so we are not only
looking out for ourselves, but the entire population. You know, *what
is good for the Hawaiians is good for everybody*. But a respect for us as a
whole culture is also part of that. Why can’t we live the way we want
to live? Why do we have to change our food, speech, everything to
accommodate people from some place else?[^322]

However, it is not so much a resistance to the American political system per se, but to
the American way of life that privatizes and consumes everything—in other words, a
resistance to American capitalism and its dominance in Hawai‘i. America has occupied
Hawai‘i and colonized Hawaiians in the interest of capital, and this is what is being
resisted, paradoxically perhaps, by using American political traditions such as the
courts, a Constitutional Convention, and so forth. In this way, the taro farmers and their

[^320]: B. 8/10/05.
[^321]: This is an accurate paraphrasing of what was said by L. 4/27/05.
[^322]: V. 4/27/05, emphasis added.
allies were very much like 19th century Hawaiians who negotiated between traditional and modern forms of governance and peoplehood. Taro farmers used these traditions to forge a taro-roots movement among like-minded Hawaiian and environmental groups and ‘good governance’ advocates.

**Cultivating a Taro-Roots Movement**

I think we were very lucky nobody saw what we were doing. Water is a huge issue that it is kind of mind boggling to me that we have been able to do what we have been able to do. … This competition for water is a forever thing… I think we were very fortunate to get the constitution amended so that we can rely on that to always go back to—‘It’s in the constitution!!’ All the rights and stuff like that were in place already [for the 2000 Waiāhole Ditch Contested Case], it was just kind of a reaffirmation.\(^{323}\)

This farmer is speaking to the fact that the constitutional changes they pushed through in 1978—specifically the protection of traditional and customary Hawaiian rights in Article 12, Section 7 and the creation of a water commission in Article 11, Section 7—were part of a deliberate strategy to fight for more water. In the mid 1970s they had already experienced a lack of water for their taro growing needs and were in the process of suing the Board of Water Supply in nearby Waihe’e valley. The new constitutional amendments provided an important foundation for the 1982 Hawai’i Supreme Court’s Reppun decision to provide more water for the taro farmers. It was affirmed that taro, as an integral part of Hawaiian tradition and culture, had a right to water for its cultivation. Moreover, the Waiāhole taro farmers actively contributed to writing the State Water Code in 1987 (the first step to the creation of the Water Commission), which defines Native Hawaiian rights to water in terms of customary practices reliant on free-flowing water (kalo cultivation, gathering of native aquatic species, use of medicinal plants, and so forth). In other words, maintaining a healthy stream ecosystem in which Hawaiians could exercise their customary rights became an integral part of Hawai’i State law. This, too, provided an important foundation for the

\(^{323}\) V. 4/27/05.
2000 Hawai‘i Supreme Court’s *Waiahole* decision that returned significant amounts of long-diverted waters to windward valleys. As explained by the Waiahole taro farmer above, they were step-by-step laying the legal groundwork for the expansion of kalo cultivation in their taro patches and throughout the islands. All of the farmers and their allies emphasized how, in the early years, they were consciously setting out to create the type of community they wanted—a community based upon Hawaiian ahupua‘a and ‘ohana traditions. Taro was integral to this, just as it had been for Hawaiians of old.

Taro is propagated by planting the cuttings from a taro root, which then grows into a new plant. Through a similar process Waiahole taro farmers propagated kalo cultivation in the 1980s throughout the islands: bringing in farmers, school groups and other interested persons to their Waiahole taro patches to learn, appreciate, and share knowledge of kalo cultivation; or taking their experiences and expertise and sharing it with farmers in other ahupua‘a and helping them in their taro patches. At first, this dissemination was done informally. The islands-wide network of taro farmers consisted of overlapping extended family networks and friendships. They cultivated kalo in their own lo‘i on lands they either privately owned or independently leased. Through repeated trial and error, an expanding body of collective knowledge and information on taro developed. Fourth-graders who were learning Hawaiian culture and history (as mandated by the State curriculum they helped push through) were invited to the Waiahole taro patches to experience this culture and history first-hand. This educational outreach offered an alternative frame of reference for schoolchildren familiar with American consumerism and fast-food culture. Hundreds, if not thousands, of children and adults from diverse backgrounds came through the Waiahole taro patches or were otherwise touched by the Waiahole taro farmers’ outreach efforts in other taro patches during the 1980s and 1990s.

Most people experience the tactile sensations of mud in one’s toes and between one’s fingers while working in the lo‘i, which provides a very physical connection with the earth, the ‘āina, *that which feeds*. In the lo‘i, one is refreshed by cool, flowing waters
that feed the taro patches and flow back into the streams and to the ocean. The Waiāhole taro farmers, allies, schoolchildren, and interested persons were quite literally *feeling* the vitality of water in the taro patches. In this way, many people throughout the islands came to understand water as an issue—not just for the Waiāhole taro farmers, but also for the ever-expanding taro-roots movement. One farmer explains it this way:

> Water issues are a very deep foundation. Understanding water is a very long-term, complex thing. It comes once you’re involved in a situation. It’s very hard to describe abstractly. You don’t tend to sense the importance of it, because in the water there you pump, turn on a pipe, the faucet, there’s water and you don’t understand the context for water until you get into land use issues, you get into fisheries issues, you get into environmental issues, and you start to see that water is the link between all these things.\(^{324}\)

In addition to growing taro, the farmers were building a broad-base of support for their water struggle. In the taro patches, sociopolitical alliances were being forged between environmentally- or culturally-minded educators, children who would grow up to be professionals and entrepreneurs, Hawaiian cultural practitioners in other fields of knowledge, and people who wanted to try something new and simply be a part of nature.

This use of Hawaiian tradition was significant in at least two ways. First, the farmers were cultivating a sense of cultural pride in being part of a Hawaiian lifestyle in the present-day, in caring for Haloa-naka, big brother who feeds you (as one taro farmer quoted in an earlier chapter puts it). In caring for that which feeds you, esteem is also cultivated—esteem in one’s self and in one’s culture. After more than a century of denigration, the lo‘i now functioned as a safe space in which Hawaiians could recover from their painful history. In the lo‘i, they could heal themselves and they could heal the land. While this was particularly important for Hawaiians, it was also invaluable for non-Hawaiians who were *experiencing* how to relate more positively to Hawaiian culture, people, and the ʻāina itself.

Secondly, cultivating kalo provided an alternative to the ever-developing sub/urbanization of the islands and its ceaseless consumerism. Taro farming made

\(^{324}\) T. 1/21/04.
families and local communities more self-sufficient in producing the food they eat, helping increase food production in the islands and decreasing dependency on imports. The taro in most demand is the Hawaiian variety needed to make poi, the stable food of Hawaiians. According to the Hawai‘i Department of Agriculture, “after years of continual decline [since the 1940s], poi taro acreage began to stabilize in 1981,” and despite occasional setbacks resulting from unusually wet weather or other factors, poi taro acreage has been steadily increasing since the mid 1980s (United States Agriculture Department 1998, 2002, 2009). Between 2007 and 2008, the latest years for which there are figures, the total taro production increased 10 percent. Again, it is highly significant that the traditional practice of taro farming provided and continues to provide a viable social and economic alternative to corporate-based political economies. Although taro farming itself may not overthrow the colonial/capitalist system that has long dominated the islands, it can and does carve out ever-growing spaces within the system in which to effectively live Hawaiian culture in an economically viable way now and for the future.

This informal network of taro farmers became more formalized in the mid 1990s. A Hawaiian family on the island of Moloka‘i sought to re-open lo‘i in Halawa Valley, which once was renowned for its extensive cultivation of kalo, and called upon the Waiāhole taro farmers and allies for help. The farmers brought to Halawa their “troops”: more than 200 volunteers who worked tirelessly for three days. The first step was to map the ancient ‘auwai, which carried water from Halawa Stream to a series of terraced lo‘i. ... For three days, Halawa Valley was the site of a flurry of activity the likes of which the valley had not seen in half a century or more. People from around the state moved boulders the size of small cars to send water into the ‘auwai first dug centuries ago. In the taro lo‘i, they cleared brush with machetes and felled trees with chainsaws. They hauled, they dug, they filled the lo‘i with water and planted the huli, the stalks used for propagating taro. Women and men, young and old alike. Taro farmers and office workers. City kids and keiki (children) from rural areas. Everyone participated in the hard work in the old Hawaiian style. And then they feasted. When the crowds dispersed, they not only had brought taro back to Halawa, they had also organized themselves into a group ‘Onipa’a Na Hui Kalo (roughly translated: the Steadfast Taro Growers) (Tummons 2001).
The Queen Lili‘uokalani Children’s Center, one of the four Hawaiian chiefs’ endowed trusts, subsequently sponsored ‘Onipa’a Nā Hui Kalo (The Taro Association is Steadfast) because they “felt that one way to empower the Hawaiian community was to begin to do kalo restoration.” Since this first collective restoration in Halawa, the Hui has gone on to re-open different lo‘i in different locales each year, with as much as five hundred people coming out to help. As one of the Waiāhole taro farmers explains:

In fact, the interest was way bigger than even we thought it was. It became a real popular thing. … Demand for taro planting education far exceeds supply.\(^{326}\)

[G]oing to all the islands, helping the farmers to open lo‘i and open taro factories and that kind of stuff. I guess that can be considered political, but [it’s] education in general.\(^{327}\)

This educational component has meant the establishment of Hawaiian protocol combined with State guidelines for restoring lo‘i (to ensure that “nothing stupid takes place.”\(^{328}\) When a traditional irrigation system is identified, along with identifiable taro patches watered by this ‘auwai, then it is “rehabilitated.” In this way, ‘Onipa’a Nā Hui Kalo does not open “new” taro patches, rather it re-opens previously existing ones—which conceivably date back hundreds of years. In so doing, re-opened lo‘i and ‘auwai that are continually maintained are conceivably protected by State laws protecting Hawaiian cultural practices and resources. This is the political component.

Thus, the educational and political, cultural and economical aspects of kalo cultivation, and the social relations therein, are intertwined. Not coincidentally, all this is rooted in Hawaiian ahupua‘a traditions of collective resource management. In the taro-roots movement, Hawaiian tradition was effectively used to “build community.”\(^{329}\) It is a taro farming community not confined to one locale, but spanning multiple places and involving many overlapping peoples who are linked together in common practice.

\(^{325}\) N. 8/25/05.
\(^{326}\) L. 5/5/05.
\(^{327}\) V. 4/27/05.
\(^{328}\) V. 4/27/05.
\(^{329}\) M. 1/12/04.
or common cause. These alliances proved invaluable for the Waiāhole taro farmers when they sought the return of long-diverted waters. One farmer explains:

When we went to fight the water fight, we were amazed at the support that came forward, and then not amazed—because we’ve been taking kids up to our farm for 25 years and we were having adults coming up to us going “I came to your farm in the fourth grade” and they’re at a [government] hearing… on Waiāhole water saying “We need [the water] back in the stream.”

Changes in the global market prompted O’ahu Sugar Company to close its Hawai‘i operations in the mid 1990s and move to the Philippines (where labor was cheaper and land more readily available). This provided an unprecedented opportunity for a redistribution of Hawai‘i’s water resources. For almost a century, an average of 25 million gallons of water a day had been diverted from the wet, windward side to the thirsty sugar plantations on the dry, leeward side of the island by way of McCandless’ Waiāhole Ditch. At the time of the initial diversion in the mid 1910s, water was deemed a form of private property, the rights to which could be bought and sold. By mid 1990s however, water was determined to be a public resource under management of the State of Hawai‘i. A year before the announced closure of O’ahu Sugar, and in response to a community petition, the relatively new State Commission of Water Resource Management (Water Commission) designated windward O’ahu a groundwater management area under the State’s Water Code. This “triggered the Commission’s regulatory control over the water in the area and requiring users of the water to apply for water use permits” (Sproat and Moriwake 2007: 256). O’ahu Sugar’s right to diverted windward water was permissible as long as the waters were utilized for initially intended uses. With the closing of this last sugar plantation, the diverted windward waters were up for grabs, and dozens of would-be users filed permit applications with the Water Commission. These taro farmers describe their approach to the ensuing battle for Waiāhole water:

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330 H. 4/4/05.
331 See Chapter Four for further discussion of “Sugar Waters.”
Our first thought was we need more water for our taro. But as we got more into the issue, we began to realize that the issue was bigger than just water for our taro. The issue was if you want to revive taro planting, you need lots of water in the streams, and then stream life itself needs water to support stream life, particularly things like endemic [species], like o’opu, opai, hihiwai, and things like that. Then at the same time, the water flowing to the ocean was important to the health of the estuary. … So it became a real broad issue that kind of encompassed all the issues of development, population growth, water conservation, reuse of sewage, [and so forth]. … We were well aware [of these issues before], overdevelopment and that kind of thing, but we didn’t put it together as a strategy to fight for water. 332

We have a political fight on our hands. It’s a political fight [and] it’s a legal fight. But at the same time, if you don’t use that water, you’re not going to be able to hang on to it. … [The lawyers] always [said] to us: “You can bring this battle on a legal plane, but you’ve got to fight this in the community and politically and socially as well as [legally]. And so you got to fight in the media and take all those things into consideration.” And so we knew that from the beginning. 333

The Water Commission hearings for the Waiahole Ditch Combined Contested Case began in early 1995. The windward parties—Waiahole taro farmers and allies—were pitted against leeward parties—the most powerful local and multinational corporations (several of which were local-turned-multinational companies) in Hawai‘i, State and City agencies, and the U.S. military. 334 In this “largest and most significant battle over water in Hawai‘i’s history” (Scheuer 2002: 1), the decades-long sociopolitical activism of Waiahole taro farmers and the islands-wide alliances they built was put to the test.

Adding to the conflict was the discovery in 1994 that the private owner of the Waiahole Ditch, Amfac JMB (Waiahole Irrigation Company) had been dumping unused diverted water into leeward gulches rather than returning the water to its windward source. A public outcry prompted by the Waiahole taro farmers and allies forced the temporary return of the dumped water. In mid 1995, residents, farmers and allies of the

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332 L. 5/5/05, emphasis added.
333 V. 5/5/05.
334 The leeward petitioners in the Waiahole Ditch Contested Case were: Amfac JMB/Waiahole Irrigation Company, The Estate of James Campbell, The Robinson Estate, Dole Foods/Castle & Cooke, State Department of Land and Natural Resources, State Department of Agriculture, Nihonkai Lease Co., U.S. Department of the Navy, Hawaiian Farm Bureau Federation, Del Monte Fresh Produce (Hawaii) Inc., City & County of Honolulu Planning Department, Honolulu Board of Water Supply, Land Use Research Foundation, West Beach Estates, Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, Royal Oahu Resort Golf Course, Koei Hawai‘i Inc., and Pu’u Makakilo Inc. The windward petitioners in Waiahole were: State Office of Hawaiian Affairs, State Department of Hawaiian Home Lands, Hakipu‘u ‘Ohana, Kahalu‘u Neighborhood Board, Hawai‘i’s Thousand Friends, Ka Lähui Hawai‘i, and Waiahole-Waikâne Community Association.
Waiāhole and Waikāne community staged a blockade at the gate to the ditch at the back of Waiāhole valley. This action, reminiscent of the roadblock two decades earlier, proved effective in dissuading Amfac from re-taking the temporarily returned water.

The Waiāhole taro farmers and allies instinctively understood that they needed to take advantage of this water in order to safeguard it against future takings while the Waiāhole case proceeded. As a deliberate strategy in their water struggle, and as part of the movement to restore lo‘i throughout the islands, they re-opened a community taro patch in Waiāhole valley, called the Mauka Lo‘i (mountainside taro patch). This community taro patch was the first of its kind in contemporary Hawai‘i, and community here has multiple references: 1) a community taro patch for and within the Waiāhole community; 2) a community taro patch located within Waiāhole but for the broader taro farming community that spans the islands; and 3) a community taro patch in the Hawaiian ahupua‘a system of shared subsistence and sustenance uses and collective resource management. One farmer explains:

Like the original struggle against evictions, [the water struggle] was supported by a broad group of people all around the island and the islands in general. And one of the things that came out of the fight over water and the forming of that Waiāhole Mauka Lo‘i was an attempt to help people get back to growing taro. In general, there was a revived interest in growing taro, and so Waiāhole Mauka Lo‘i was just one manifestation of that interest.335

After receiving an Office of Hawaiian Affairs grant to conduct a land survey of the valley (which included aerial mapping), Waiāhole taro farmers mapped out the traditional ‘auwai and identified a suitable lo‘i to re-open. They cleared away the vegetation and began collectively planting kalo. The farmers and allies formed a non-profit 501(c)3 organization, Kalo Pa‘a o Waiāhole, Hard Taro of Waiāhole. In the ensuing years, weekly workdays brought together diverse people from across the islands who would come to the Mauka Lo‘i to practice Hawaiian culture in a traditional way. Those who contributed labor had rights to share the products of their labors in the form of harvested taro or produced poi. The Mauka Lo‘i served as an alternative to American

335 C. 5/5/05.
fast-food consumerist culture and as a source of personal and communal rejuvenation, as this statement demonstrates:

Food is coming from this place [the Mauka Lo‘i]. …[I]t gives [people] an alternative to what we are used to, [such as] Costco and Safeway.\textsuperscript{336}

Moreover, the Mauka Lo‘i reflected an important shift that occurred among taro farmers: the contemporary kalo movement which began in personal lo‘i on lands that were either privately owned or individually leased gave way to collective lo‘i on lands which were now claimed as public—and Native Hawaiians—places. The Mauka Lo‘i was quietly established on public land, that is, on state-owned “open space.” This was an act of civil disobedience insomuch as it was unauthorized by the State—no permission was sought, no permission was granted. During the ten-plus years of its existence, the Mauka Lo‘i functioned as a laboratory of sorts for the cultivation of old/new social relations based on Native traditions, present-day circumstances, and future preferences. In Chapter Eight I will discuss its significance further; my point here is that through the Mauka Lo‘i the Wai‘ahole taro farmers mobilized tradition as a means of regaining water and land resources. This was an effective use of tradition during the course of the water struggle because it provided taro farmers with a certain degree of legal standing and constitutional protection. One farmer explains:

We use the lo‘i as a group. There are a couple of reasons we made it, and one [was] as a tool, so that if they want to divert water again, we can tell the courts “No, we’re practicing culturally traditional practices up here. You can’t divert the water, we have lo‘i.”\textsuperscript{337}

Furthermore, working in the Mauka Lo‘i helped sustain the taro farmers and allies during the many years of the water struggle as it proceeded in the politico-legal arena. Another farmer explains:

Whereas we’re swimming upstream [in our water struggle], we have to enjoy the swimming, so planting taro is very soothing and healing, and it is healthy on many levels: physically, spiritually, mentally.\textsuperscript{338}

\textsuperscript{336} L. 4/27/05.
\textsuperscript{337} B. 8/10/05.
\textsuperscript{338} V. 4/27/05.
After numerous conflicts of interest and ethical improprieties on the part of several Water Commissioners and then-Governor Ben Cayetano (Miike 2004; Scheuer 2002), the Water Commission ruled in late 1997 to split the Wai‘ahole Ditch water favoring leeward petitioners while awarding a portion of the water to the windward petitioners. Both sides appealed to the Hawai‘i Supreme Court, which issued its landmark ruling in 2000 favoring windward petitioners and the general “public trust” for all Hawai‘i’s people. The Court mildly reprimanded the commissioners and the governor’s less-than-fair actions, and remanded the case back to the Water Commission, instructing it to return more water to the windward side. In late 2001, the Commission issued another ruling that defended its 1997 decision but did divide water more equitably to the windward streams and communities. The windward parties appealed the decision again, and in 2004 the Court again remanded the case to the Water Commission, reinforcing the public trust framework (Sproat and Moriwake 2007: 260). The Commission defended its earlier decisions again in a mid-2006 ruling, which prompted the windward parties to appeal again to the Supreme Court. While the battle for water still wages on, the significant victories won by the Wai‘ahole taro farmers and their allies have empowered them to utilize the returned water to expand kalo cultivation, and moreover, to legally and politically challenge the privatized allocation of water throughout the islands on other Wai‘ahole-like cases (Sylva 2007).

339 Lawrence Miike is a Water Commissioner and was involved in the Wai‘ahole case. While his detailed chapter on “The Wai‘ahole Ditch Controversy” is highly informative, in many ways it is an attempt to justify the actions and decisions of the Water Commission in response to the accusations and evidence of malfeasances on the part of the Commission and the apparent reprimand issued by the Supreme Court in its decision.

340 Miike (2008) clarifies the current situation: “In the second remand from the Supreme Court, the Commission adopted this position: i.e., if there can be no absolute priorities between trust purposes, there can be no absolute priorities between trust resources (between ground and surface water). If so, then the Commission is the proper authority to make that choice, as long as it does so under procedures and guidelines that the Supreme Court can review for appropriateness. This second remand is still under review, now several years since the Commission issued its last decision. In the interim, the Court pushed successful legislation to have the Commission’s decisions reviewed by the Appellate Court and not directly by the Supreme Court, which had been the procedure under the 1987 Water Code. The Appellate Court has had trouble garnering the minimum of justices to review the decision, so it has not yet even begun its review, much less its decision. Once that is done, I fully expect the parties to appeal that decision, and then it will go to the Supreme Court, which will in turn most likely also take several years to review the Appellate Court’s decision and then in turn issue its decision.”
The Waiāhole case produced “qualified” positive outcomes for Waiāhole taro farmers and Hawaiian cultural practitioners in general. The biggest winner was the public and the environmental ecosystem. The Supreme Court ruled that the State,

[In] balancing between public and private purposes [must] begin with a presumption in favor of public use, access, and enjoyment. ...[The Water Commission] must take the initiative in considering, protecting, and advancing public rights in the resource at every stage of the planning and decision making process. ... The [public] trust also requires planning and decision making from a global, long-term perspective (cited in Sproat and Moriwake 2007: 264-65).341

In other words, the public right to water resources outweighs private uses. Importantly, the case also recognized domestic and Native uses as public trust purposes. In many ways, Supreme Court decision in Waiāhole is an affirmation of former Chief Justice Richardson’s prior articulation of the public trust modeled on the Hawaiian ahupua‘a system with the State functioning as the new konohiki. The affinity between a Hawaiian ahupua‘a management approach and an environmentalist ecosystems model is not lost here. However, there is little distinction between Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians as they are collapsed into “the public.” In other words, Hawaiian rights were not explicitly reaffirmed in their own right.

The limited scope of the decision vis-à-vis Hawaiians rights is noteworthy, not least of which because many of the Windward parties were petitioning for water as Hawaiians. These Hawaiian entities included the State Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), the State Department of Hawaiian Home Lands (DHHL), the Hakipu‘u ‘Ohana (a Hawaiian extended family network), and Ka Lāhui Hawai‘i (a Hawaiian sovereignty organization)—all of whom claimed the water for Hawaiian cultural practices. On the opposing side was another Hawaiian entity making a Hawaiian claim to the water, Kamehameha

341 Sproat and Moriwake (2007) describe in detail the following precedence set by the Court decision in Waiāhole: “adopting the “precautionary principle” wherein the State, as trustee of the public trust, must favor choosing presumptions that protect the natural resource amid scientific uncertainty; reaffirming a “limitation on transfer” or loss of public resource from “substantial impairment” from public or private uses; establishing a “process mandate” that “requires early consideration of impacts, including mitigation and alternatives, on a cumulative scale” and with consideration of present and future generations; adopting ‘preferential burden shifting’ wherein private users of water must prove that their use does not impede the public trust; establishing a ‘heightened standard of review’ in the courts (and not just through the legislative or executive branches); reaffirming the constitutional foundation of the public trust doctrine; and establishing a shield against takings claims wherein the public trust functions ‘as a defense against claims that the regulation of water effects a Fifth Amendment “taking” of property requiring just compensation.’”
Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, one of the four Hawaiian chiefs’ endowed trusts and one of the (if not the) largest landowners in Hawai‘i. Kamehameha Schools’ claimed the diverted windward waters on the grounds that some of the water originated or flowed through their private property and that as a Hawaiian chiefly trust they had certain cultural and codified rights to the water (Scheuer 2001; Scheuer 2002). These claims were unsubstantiated by the Court decision, and with a change of its Board of Trustees, Kamehameha Schools withdrew their petition for water in 2002. Notwithstanding this, the Hawaiian claims put forth by OHA, DHHL, Hakipu‘u ‘Ohana, Ka Lāhui Hawai‘i, and the Waiāhole taro farmers themselves were also not substantiated as Hawaiian claims and were instead absorbed into “public trust purposes.” Contrary to prevailing perceptions of the Waiāhole taro farmers’ victory in the Waiāhole case, Scheuer suggests that “Windward Hawaiians are perhaps one of the clearest losers in the case” because the Courts absolutely failed to state that Hawaiians’ subsistence rights are enforceable beyond the requirements of instream flow standards. Because of this, Hawaiians around the state do not have any precedent that specifically addresses their claims to water for subsistence [or other uses] (2002: 271).342

Nevertheless, the Waiāhole decision did strengthen the application of the Water Code which protects stream ecosystems for Hawaiian customary practices. Hawaiian rights to cultivate kalo, fish in streams and near-shore waters, gather plants and animals, and practice other Native traditions are only meaningful when the ecosystems they rely upon are protected, and this is precisely the basis upon which the Waiāhole decision was made. This significantly broadens conceptions and applications of Hawaiian rights beyond subsistence and other natural resource uses. Perhaps the often-stated assertion by Waiāhole taro farmers that “what is good for Hawaiians is good for everyone” can be

342 According to Scheuer, the long term precedent of the Waiāhole decision is “not very helpful.” He further points out that windward farmers and allies must constantly check the in-stream flows and make sure the decision is implemented, all of which is on a voluntary basis unlike the paid staff of the leeward parties (2002: 271). He goes on to note that “the windward side also fought to have the state consider the different social and economic implications of different kinds of farming systems [for example, small family- or community-based farms vs. large corporate or multinational agro-businesses]. In this regard the windward parties totally failed. While they managed to raise the issue for debate, the Commission and the Court chose not to recognize the differences windward parties asserted were important. If windward parties are proven to be correct regarding their prediction of closing farms elsewhere in the state due to the economic advantages of leeward O‘ahu farms, then this loss will be substantial” (Ibid: 272).
inverted here: what is good for the general public is good for Hawaiians if it means returning water to streams and ecosystems for which Hawaiian cultural practices are an integral part. This is how many Waiāhole taro farmers and allies, including their attorneys, have embraced the Court’s decision:

State law says that the water in the river...belongs in the river because there are endemic life in there, there are species of plants and animals known only to Hawai‘i that live in this water, in these rivers. They have a right to live. They have—as an indigenous or endemic life—a right to live. ... Also, traditionally and culturally, this water is important to the Hawaiian, to take care of big brother [the taro plant]. Without it, I cannot grow taro, not in its best form [as wetland taro]. ... The state law says that we have a right to this water, us as indigenous people. The only right that supersedes is the right of the indigenous plant and [then] indigenous people. Indigenous culture is for the betterment of the larger community.”

Notice the slippage here between endemic life and indigenous life, from indigenous plants to indigenous people. Regardless of how one might interpret the legal ruling that foregrounds public and environmental rights more than Hawaiian rights, the net result is the same: more water for taro. In effect, the Waiāhole decision reflects a formal return to Hawaiian Kingdom legal tradition that negotiated between private interests and public goods in natural resource allocation, and a return to pre-state customary laws of kānawai, “of the waters.”

Moreover, Waiāhole has set important precedence that Waiāhole taro farmers, environmental allies, and Hawaiian sovereignty activists continue to pursue in other politico-legal battles. In these thus-far sustained alliances, the public trust doctrine has become a resource that can and is being used as a tool to chip away at capital-controlled water and land resources that have dominated Hawai‘i. A similar contested case and lawsuit pursuing the return of long diverted water is underway on Maui. As allied attorney Kapua Sproat explains: “Waiāhole is a beacon of hope for communities throughout Hawai‘i who are looking at this case after being subjected to years of plantation agriculture. It’s not just a symbolic thing—it’s been very real” (quoted in Sanburn 2007).

B. 8/10/05, emphasis in original.
A 2000 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in the case *Rice v. Cayetano* (528 U.S., 495 (98-181)) that prohibited a Hawaiians-only voting requirement for the State Office of Hawaiian Affairs prompts some disquieting questions concerning Waiāhole’s affirmation of Native Hawaiian traditional and customary rights to resource uses as public trust purposes. Although no other laws or programs were directly implicated, *Rice* opened up a flurry of pursuant legal challenges. It is uncertain how the constitutional protections of Hawaiian traditional and customary rights would fare if similarly challenged. Water Commissioner Lawrence Miike suggests that Hawaiian traditional and customary rights—such as the right to water for taro—might be expanded to include non-Hawaiian practitioners, for example “non-Hawaiian members of a Hawaiian ‘ohana that has such practices, as well as to descendants of [subjects] of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i who had engaged in such practices” (Miike 2008). In other words, charges of racial discrimination can be avoided when Hawaiian Kingdom subjects are identified politically and Hawaiian ‘ohana members are identified genealogically or affinally.

This suggestion is significant for at least two reasons. First, traditional or customary practice is foregrounded. For example, a non-Hawaiian ‘ohana member or descendant of a Kingdom subject that does not engage in the cultural practice does not retain the traditional or customary right. In other words, the right is attached to those who practice the culture within a traditional Hawaiian framework. Second, Hawaiian relationality is foregrounded. For example, a non-Hawaiian who practices Hawaiian culture or tradition without a direct relational link to Hawaiian ‘ohana or the Hawaiian Kingdom does not have the protected right to do so. In other words, the right to practice Hawaiian tradition and culture resides with Hawaiians who choose to adopt a non-Hawaiian into their ‘ohana or according to agreed upon political affiliations. Note the non-essentialist nature of this form of Native self-determination. Also note the old/new conceptions of collective personhood that are brought back into play here.

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In marked contrast to the 1970s anti-eviction struggle, the 1990s-2000s water struggle did not engage in militant protests. As a whole, the Waiāhole taro farmers relied much more on their legal engagements and the organizational momentum of their ongoing outreach and education, than on regular protest demonstrations. Despite its non-confrontational nature, the assertive impact that the taro farmers have had cannot be discounted. The Waiāhole taro farmers and allies repeatedly emphasized the Hawaiianness of the water struggle and Contested Case. This comported to the growing momentum of the Hawaiian sovereignty movement in the early 1990s and helped foster cross-fertilization. Yet, the taro farmers as a whole did not engage issues of Hawaiian sovereignty directly or publicly. Perhaps the nonmilitant positioning and non-confrontational tactics of the windward parties functioned to offset the public perception of “angry Hawaiians” in the “radical” sovereignty movement. The relatively mild-mannered legal maneuvering of Waiāhole taro farmers and allies, and their quiet and concealed work in the taro patches may have been more palatable to the Local audience who were becoming increasingly ill-at-ease with widening differences between Localism and an assertive Hawaiian nationalism. Privately, however, many of the taro farmers supported Hawaiian self-determination, if not sovereignty. Their work in the Waiāhole Mauka Lo‘i attests to this.\textsuperscript{345} Unfortunately, the Mauka Lo‘i was closed in 2007 due to intra-community conflict within Waiāhole-Waikāne, which I now turn to.

\textbf{“A VERY UNEASY ALLIANCE”}

There was a very uneasy alliance on the water issue. They [WWCA and the taro farmers] stayed together long enough to win.\textsuperscript{346}

The human side of all this—it’s been a major toll. It really is like the Hatfields and the McCoys out there…the ‘civil war’…\textsuperscript{347}

While residents of Waiāhole and Waikāne came together to fight for the return of long-diverted water, in was not easy. All agreed on the need for water and its

\textsuperscript{345} See Chapter Eight for a discussion of the Mauka Lo‘i as a radical space with progressive potential.
\textsuperscript{346} A. 11/10/03.
\textsuperscript{347} B. 11/14/03.
importance to the valleys. Disagreement revolved around the Mauka Loʻi and its place in the community. Because the taro patch was established on state-owned “open space,” some residents believed that it was an inappropriate and unacceptable ‘land grab’ by the taro farmers. A member of WWCA explains:

The association supports taro-farming—there’s no question about that. But we feel that everything that is done with regard to taro farms got to be done the right way. … What open space means is that people in the valley can go up hiking, and this lot 79 [where the 3-5 acre Mauka Loʻi is situated] has about 75 acres, and so it covers the mountains and all kind of places. … The association’s position has always been that you cannot occupy those open lots because it’s not a lease-able lot.\textsuperscript{348}

To them, it is ‘unfair’ that some people were using lands designated for all people’s benefit, and they were doing so without regard to legal title or lease payments.\textsuperscript{349}

Leave it open space, yes. We got nothing against taro patches. By all means, we support agriculture. I mean, that’s one of our basic positions: expansion of agriculture. But do it the right way. Don’t just come out—it’s open space, it’s for the public, whoever like go over there walk around like that.\textsuperscript{350}

In the years following the 2001 Waiāhole decision, tensions between WWCA and Kalo Paʻa intensified and their uneasy alliance during the water struggle broke down. Despite the help of allies (of both the anti-eviction and water struggles) who attempted to facilitate discussions and negotiations, no resolution was forthcoming. Eventually the State was drawn into the intra-community conflict, precipitating the closure of the Mauka Loʻi.\textsuperscript{351} One WWCA member describes the situation:

They [taro farmers] say it is a project for the Hawaiians. … We told the State that there is an illegal occupation of State land, and what they [taro farmers] needed to do is they need to withdraw from the area. … We [WWCA] cannot support anything that is done illegally.

\textsuperscript{348} D. 1/8/04. 
\textsuperscript{349} M. 1/27/04. 
\textsuperscript{350} T. 1/12/04. 
\textsuperscript{351} The State only reluctantly got involved after several more years of a stalemate between WWCA and Kalo Paʻa. I concur with the observation made by several allies: the State simply did not care about a few acres being used for taro farming in a community known for militant action, sustained sociopolitical mobilization and politico-legal sophistication. In other words, the State didn’t want to ‘walk into a hornets nest.’ However, the high level of animosity among community members was untenable and the State was repeatedly asked by WWCA to intervene. Because of the overwhelming hostility expressed by WWCA, Kalo Paʻa decided it was in the best interest of all involved to close the Mauka Loʻi.
This was an illegal stuff. They [taro farmers] thought it was only a cultural thing.\textsuperscript{352}

This statement reveals a deeper source of disagreement: the Waiāhole-Waikāne Community Association viewed the Mauka Loʻi as a land grab by Hawaiians in a Local place. Several WWCA members reiterated this point to me. To them, the anti-eviction struggle was a Local struggle for local people in a Local place, and this was at odds with the Mauka Loʻi as a Hawaiian space for persons inside and outside of the valleys. Here, Localism and Hawaiianness have little to do with ethnicity or race because many Hawaiians align on the side of Localism and many non-Hawaiians align on the side of Hawaiianness. The contentions in Waiāhole-Waikāne are more complicated and difficult to disentangle. They deal with competing traditions: multiethnic Local traditions versus culture-centered Hawaiian traditions; and with complex narratives of class and identity: working-class versus college-educated and/or landowning ‘upper-class.’

Take, for example, this statement by a Hawaiian woman who is a non-farming tenant in Waiāhole:

Well, for me...if it comes down to where the water is going to go, it’s going to go to the people—not to the taro patches. ... But you know, the way I look at it, I cannot even afford to buy poi. It’s so expensive, you know, it’s so expensive. And everybody wants to do this whole taro bit—but where’s the land? I mean, we have lands already that people doing taro on that’s not really utilizing the whole taro patch, you know. So, I don’t know—for me—I don’t have that cultural stuff. ... Talk about taro patch: there’s more important things. I tell you, there’s more important things than taro patch.\textsuperscript{353}

She expresses a certain lack of cultural identification with Hawaiian traditions such as kalo cultivation, and she further hints at her lack of financial means in her inability to even purchase poi. For her, there are “more important things,” presumably having to do with mere survival and staying on the land in the house her father built. Her statement reveals a certain degree of class differences that exist—or are perceived to exist—between Hawaiians such as herself and the ones with the “cultural stuff” such as

\textsuperscript{352} D. 1/8/04.
\textsuperscript{353} H. 2/28/04, emphasis added.
the taro farmers. *They* can afford to buy poi, or perhaps more to the point, they are making money off of selling poi to others. Another statement by a community ally describes the status differences that exist between the taro farmers and WWCA:

It’s a mix bag of things because you’ve got [the taro farmers], and a bunch of them folks who are *one set of people*—those people are like college-educated, they’re smart… I mean they’re not the same kind of people.\(^{354}\)

Many community members and allies traced the Mauka Lo‘i conflict to ‘the split’ that occurred during the anti-eviction struggle. A community leader in the anti-eviction struggle who was also involved in the water struggle as a non-farmer has this to say:

> Da way dey [WWCA] look at it is ‘Dey illegal, dey trespassing.’ [chuckle] We were all trespassing at one time! I kinda huhū *angry, offended* about dat too. We [worked]—a lot of dem—to try to get sympathy from a public about da need for da water, da need for da land to produce, and I tink a lot of dat is forgotten about [by WWCA]. Now it’s more of ‘We’re da association, so you guys better do what we tell you. Follow dese rules.’ You know what, when we was fighting dis battle, ‘Rules was made to be broken.’ [laughter] Anyway, I look at it like ‘Eh, instead of going against dese guys [taro farmers], you [WWCA] should be supporting.’ *It’s just some differences—from way before dey had their differences.*\(^{355}\)

In addition to competing ideas, varying leadership styles, strong personalities, hurt feelings, and other interpersonal dynamics, these differences that go “way before” involve factions that paralleled those of the anti-eviction struggle.\(^{356}\) Some of the more

\(^{354}\) E. 1/16/04, emphasis added.

\(^{355}\) Y. 1/15/04.

\(^{356}\) The golf course controversy in Waikāne during the 1980s is another manifestation of the community split that, in part, is viewed as a power struggle between WWCA and other community leadership which included the taro farmers. While the State purchased the disputed land in Waiāhole in the late 1970s, the Marks-Pao land in Waikāne was still vulnerable to development. A compromise had been negotiated between the WWCA and Windward Partners (Pao’s development group) wherein a very limited residential development would be built (about a dozen 2-acre “gentlemen” estates) and the less than ten tenants and farmers there were given the option to buy at a reasonable cost or be relocated to Waiāhole (K. interviewed on April 12, 2005). The Waikāne compromise, however, only pertained to a couple dozen acres; about 500 acres were still up for grabs. In the early 1980s the Windward Partners sold the remaining Waikāne land to a Japanese investment group that intended to develop golf courses. The property changed hands numerous times until the Azabu Corporation finally pursued the necessary land-use permitting to develop the golf courses. Modavi (1992) shows how the State and corporate interests collaborated with the WWCA to push the deal through. While it is unclear exactly what transpired, varying accounts suggest that in return for supporting the proposed golf courses, the developers promised the WWCA employment preferences, a sizeable donation to the local elementary school, possible use of the facilities, and perhaps other incentives. When other Waiāhole-Waikāne residents heard about the deal, they were dismayed to say the least. In response, a new community organization formed to fight the golf course development. Members of Concerned Residents of Waiāhole-Waikāne (CRWW) included taro farmers, other farmers who were on the ‘moderate’ side of the original split, former ‘radical’ WWCA leaders, and kuleana and other small landowners from Waikāne’s new residential development. It does not appear that CRWW ever attempted to be *the* representative of the Waiāhole-Waikāne community as a whole, only a voice for those residents who
moderate property- and business-owners from the anti-eviction struggle were now the Waiâhole taro farmers while the more radical tenants of the past were now arguing that the non-leaseable land that the farmers were using should not have been put into use. It wasn’t just that the various actors in the opposing sides held different views of what the community should be; it was also that the various actors were repeatedly articulated as being different, and this difference was mediated through notions of class and status.

The following statements—the first by a Waiâhole taro farmer, and the second by a non-farming valley resident who was active in the anti-eviction struggle and supportive of the water struggle—reference the educational distance between the taro farmers and many of the valley residents, including the WWCA steering committee members.

Because the Waiâhole-Waikâne Community Association is not coming from a Hawaiian cultural standpoint, I think they feel threatened. They don’t want to feel overrun. … There’s probably a certain getting threatened by a more organized and more educated argument being laid against—laid for—what’s trying to be accomplished. That’s sad, but it’s also our responsibility, those of us who want to go do these kinds of things [Hawaiian cultural practices], it’s just as much our responsibility to try and make that a more comfortable fit. 357

A lot of people are not so much afraid of them [the taro farmers], but because they’re smart. They’re smart, they’re articulate, they can think on their feet. A regular person would not be able to argue against them because it’s very intimidating. I think that’s an asset that they have as a skill, but on the other hand, for a regular Joe, a regular person, they’re intimidating. 358

This theme kept surfacing in my conversations with the non-taro-farming segments of the community, who emphasized that the taro farmers were private school educated (Punahou or Kamehameha) and college graduates (mostly in the mainland). This educational divide was less pronounced in conversations with the taro farmers, who might acknowledge their academic pedigree but gave little weight to it.
Lee Cataluna, a Hawai‘i newspaper columnist and playwright, highlights this dynamic well:

We all know that “Where you wen’ grad?” is a complex, sometimes loaded socio-economic question in Hawai‘i. Sometimes it’s asked when someone is trying to place you. Sometimes it’s asked when someone is trying to put you in your place (2008).\(^{359}\)

The high school in which a person graduates from is a marker of their class and status: private school graduation usually indicates more material wealthy or enhanced political-economic privilege; public school graduation usually indicates a modest socioeconomic background along with more ‘street credibility.’ Often times it is one of the first queries asked of people, providing a framework to inform their relational interaction if they don’t otherwise know each other.\(^{360}\)

The higher levels of education that the Wai‘ahole taro farmers experienced signal their increased social capital or elevated class position as compared with many of the other residents. While the taro farmers were heavily involved in the Con-Con, the WWCA was not; similarly, while taro farmers were actively participating in the

\(^{359}\) Cataluna’s quote refers to a comment made by U.S. Senator Daniel Inouye while campaigning for then-presidential candidate Hilary Clinton right before the Hawai‘i caucus in 2008: “If you ask the people in Hawai‘i what they know about Barack Obama, I think the honest answer is, “Very little.” He went to school in Hawai‘i—but he went to Punahou. ... I don’t hold it against anyone who is a Punahou grad. It’s a fine school. I would say one of the finest in the United States. But—” (Cataluna 2008). Because the vast majority of Locals are public school graduates, or graduates of less prestigious (and thereby less expensive) parochial schools, marking Obama as a Punahou grad functions to distance him from the Local populace in a contested election. This was not lost on Obama, whose response was: “Shame on Danny for trying to pull that stunt. I went to Punahou on a scholarship. I was raised by a single mom and my grandmother” (Ibid).

\(^{360}\) This rang true for me in the dozens of interviews with Wai‘ahole-Waikāne residents. At the beginning we would “talk story” and the fact that I was a public school graduate was noticeably well-received among the fellow public school graduates—they could relate to me better because we were more “equal.” Knowing where to ‘place’ someone by their high school of graduation is a method of identifying where someone fits into the matrix of material accumulation, politico-economic capital and socio-cultural privilege. Despite being a Kailua High grad, the fact that I was in graduate school working towards my Ph.D. created a bit of socio-cultural and class and status distance between myself and the residents, but potentially made me appear more like the better educated taro farmers. This was remedied in the course of our conversation when the person I was interviewing would invariably say (in some form or another): “You don’t need a Ph.D. in order to know...” or “You don’t need a Ph.D. to be able to do...” These reminders were that despite my high level of education, I still had much to learn from my interviewees regardless of their formal educational achievements or income levels. This functioned to bridge the educational difference that existed between us and to equalize our class and status differentials—they were putting me in my place—which was perhaps all the more possible because I was, like them, also a public high school graduate.
government development planning process, few other residents were. The “very uneasy alliance” during much of the water struggle accentuated the class and status disconnect. As one allied activist in the anti-eviction struggle and observer/supporter in the water struggle explains:

They [taro farmers] were not necessarily seen, in the early days, as some of the more resolute folks. So, when the [water] struggle got into this little more complicated, more bureaucratic thing, that’s kinda like the arenas that they do good. They know how to operate well, and stuff like that, you know. And you don’t need to necessarily have a mass base. Or, at times, when they felt that they needed a mass base, then they would go to [WWCA] and the ladies and say “Hey, look, we need to get everybody together.”

Several aspects of this quote stand out. One is that the terrain of struggle for the water struggle was the politico-legal terrain in which highly educated persons operate best. This offers little opportunity for engagement by less educated persons and non-taro farmers, especially if they are not specifically mobilized to engage on this level. Second, the identification of “the ladies” of WWCA gestures toward a gender disparity in the visible and vocal leadership of the Waiāhole taro farmers which is predominantly male. While there are certainly a lot of women who were actively participated in the water struggle and are part of Kalo Pa’a as members of taro farming ‘ohana and are taro farmers and poi producers themselves, women are far less visible and vocal than men as a whole. Perhaps “the ladies” of WWCA, who were at the forefront of the anti-eviction struggle, do not appreciate this gender disparity and by vocally and visibly opposing the Mauka Lo‘i they are attempting to re-assert the womanly authority they had previously experienced in the community. Third, the mass base referred to in this quote is the mass base of community-level support in the valleys and not the widespread support among like-minded and often similarly-educated “experts” in water matters, taro

361 E. 1/16/04.
362 I want to be clear here: I am not suggesting that women are not as involved in taro farming or are less important in the water struggle; rather, my point is simply that women are less visible and vocal as the public face of taro farmers or the water struggle. It is also worthwhile pointing out that, like the anti-eviction struggle, the water struggle and taro farmers therein organize as ‘ohana (extended families). A comparative analysis of women in the two struggles would be an interesting topic for future research.
363 In a forthcoming article I discuss the activist role of community women. See Chapter 5, footnote 231, for further discussion.
farming protocols, bureaucratic maneuverings, environmental assessments, and so forth. This ties into the type of “community” taro patch that the Mauka Lo’i represented.

As previously mentioned, community here has multiple references: a taro patch for and within the Waiāhole community; a taro patch located within Waiāhole but for the taro farming community that spans all islands; and a taro patch in the traditional Hawaiian ahupua’a system of shared subsistence and sustenance uses and collective resource management. Here I want focus on this second form of community in relation to the first. As a community taro patch for the broader taro farming community that spans all across all islands, on the collective work days (every Wednesday) the Mauka Lo’i was open to anyone interested in contributing their labor and enjoying/appreciating the place. What this meant was that a lot of “outside” people came into the valley on these work days, and of these people, many were either similarly-educated or culturally/environmentally-dedicated as the Waiāhole taro farmers. On one level, this disturbed the general quiet that typifies a “country lifestyle.” On another level, these cosmopolitan or uppity outsiders were seen as an unwanted intrusion into this somewhat insular place. This Waiāhole taro farmer offers an additional interpretation:

The situation as I see it today is there are many people in here—[who], when you go and turn on the lights in Waiāhole, somebody in there is screaming “Turn the lights off!” They don’t want it to be seen that their rent is cheap [and] nobody is following through with really farming [and] there’s no education. ... They’re not—at their base—they’re not agricultural interests [anymore]. I hate to say it: very selfish interests I think, [like] chicken fighting, gambling, lots of drug activity. And so, yeah, when people coming in from outside and turning on the lights: “Turn off the lights!” Because they really are trying to hide from the world there. But you can’t get away. 364

To be fair, this taro farmer goes on to contextualize how these “selfish interests” have been produced and reproduced in the years of community struggles and as a seemingly endless struggling community:

We [Waiāhole] may be a casualty of these incredible stresses of pro-development, displacing kinds of proposals that have happened and swept across the island, and it does take that toll. I think this community has been under so much stress, but much of it has landed

364 O. 4/4/05, emphasis in original.
on the shoulders of people living in Waiāhole-Waikāne. Then, a tendency, when you get depressed, when you get down, when you feel overwhelmed, what do you want to do? Sleep, close your eyes, pull the blanket over your head, don’t look too far, just go about your day-to-day and pretend that the world doesn’t exist until it ends. Sorry, it doesn’t work that way.\textsuperscript{365}

The actively cultivated multiple and overlapping communities in the Mauka Lo‘i, then, was discomforting for many valley residents who were either ill-prepared to engage therein or who were otherwise uncertain as to their place therein. This leads into the tensions between understanding Waiāhole-Waikāne as a Local community and/or Hawaiian ahupua‘a and complex issues of class and status therein.

When you are by and large not the Hawaiian part of your community, and I think that’s the case for many of the tenants, the part [that is the] Hawaiian community—\textit{the cultural, the deeper cultural background} for Waiāhole through Kualoa is very sacred area; deep history [as the] training ground for ali‘i; lots and lots of backgrounds here—that’s being pushed down. The tenants that are here, who came in during maybe plantation era or just out of that—you know, many of them come from other ethnic backgrounds and ourselves included—and so there might be some feeling of being threatened by this underlying [Hawaiian] culture that it’s hard to quite describe. It’s hard to describe.\textsuperscript{366}

This issue of Waiāhole-Waikāne’s Hawaianness is “hard to describe” because it is articulated as Hawaiian culture in ways that are surprisingly de-linked from ethnicity/nationality.\textsuperscript{367} The quote above is from a non-Hawaiian taro farmer who practices Hawaiian culture and foregrounds a Hawaiian framework for his sociopolitical activism and community engagements. When he speaks of the non-Hawaiian part of the community which feels “threatened by this underlying [Hawaiian] culture” he is referring to both non-Hawaiians and Hawaiians who don’t strongly identify with Hawaiian culture, such as the Hawaiian woman quoted earlier who doesn’t “have that cultural stuff.” On one hand, there are Hawaiians that don’t fully support Hawaiian cultural practices such as that which takes place in the Mauka Lo‘i; and on the other hand, there are non-Hawaiians

\textsuperscript{365} O. 4/4/05.
\textsuperscript{366} H. 4/4/05, emphasis added.
\textsuperscript{367} I conjoin ethnicity/nationality here because it is both: some consider issues pertaining to Hawaiians vis-à-vis non-Hawaiian Locals as ethnic or racial issues (that is, without reference to citizenship claims), while others consider the same issues to be national issues between Hawaiian nationalists and Locals who identify as American nationals, or Hawaiians as forced into American nationality.
who actively practice Hawaiian culture and foreground Hawaiian issues in their sociopolitical activism. There are also Hawaiians who support and practice Hawaiian culture, and non-Hawaiians who don’t. The point here is that the convergences and divergences between culture, ethnicity, and nationality are hard to describe.

I find this de-linking of Hawaiian culture from ethnicity/nationality intriguing. My question is not whether Hawaiians should support Hawaiian cultural practices and political positions such as taro farming but rather why, as Hawaiians, do they not support such Hawaiian cultural and political identities? In part, the lack of support has to do with competing personalities and a leadership struggle in the valleys, as evidenced by this allied non-Hawaiian activist’s observation:

...Hawaiian practices and values...that’s a really treasured part of Waiāhole. And if...those who...want to see those practices perpetuate and enhanced and grown, did so in a way that was consistent with the community’s sense of decision-making, that would be wonderful. And I think there have been some examples of that. ... [For some Hawaiian families] I know it irritates them to no small degree to have those who are non-Hawaiian but purport to be practicing Hawaiian traditions, to assert a greater legitimacy after 1) splitting [the community], and 2) not consulting with the Hawaiian majority. 

In larger part, though, the lack of support has to do with the residents’ continued adherence to the multiethnic, working-class form of Localism that prevailed in the anti-eviction struggle. After all, it was their disciplined solidarity within the “community’s sense of decision-making” and their confrontational militancy that assured continued tenancy in the valleys. Therefore, these Local Hawaiians have a lot invested in articulating Waiāhole-Waikāne as a Local place inclusive of everyone, and not a Hawaiian place (which may also be inclusive, but under different terms of inclusivity). For example:

Localized style, community lifestyle: everybody different ethnic values: Filipino, Hawaiian and mixed Hawaiian, Okinawan, Japanese, Chinese—all these guys living together with haoles, you know.

I think race has never been a problem. I think that because there is so much old timers in Waiāhole, everybody knew each other. Filipinos have their own style and their cooking and all kind of stuff, what they celebrate. And the same is true for everybody else. So I think it was

368 L. 1/12/04.
369 Y. 1/15/04.
really never an issue. In fact, I don’t recall any kind of racial incidents that have happened in Waiʻahole-Waikäne. Because just like everybody in the same boat, you got to row to a certain location to get it, otherwise you all sink.\footnote{D. 1/8/04.}

A self-image of multiethnic Localism, of being “in the same boat,” is threatened by the explicit Hawaiinanness of the Mauka Loʻi, and the taro farmers in general. While the Mauka Loʻi is clearly a Hawaiian space, it is ambiguously so insomuch as it is not just for Native Hawaiians and it is not hinged upon national claims to Hawaiʻi. Nevertheless, the issue remains: how can a Hawaiian cultural space (among other Hawaiian spaces) coexist, or exist alongside, or overlap with Local spaces? This is what the community of Waiʻahole-Waikäne continues to struggle with.

This non-Hawaiian taro farmer describes a slightly different articulation of this intra-community struggle:

The State bought this valley to preserve farming. It didn’t buy this valley just for some people to \textit{keep a certain lifestyle}. Farming is the key ingredient to this valley. If that farming isn’t revived and made stronger, then a lot of people in the State are going to resent the fact that the State bought this valley.\footnote{U. 5/5/05, emphasis added.}

Here “keeping a certain lifestyle” is juxtaposed against maintaining and expanding agriculture; yet, \textit{both} were the stated platform of the anti-eviction struggle. That “certain lifestyle” was a country lifestyle in tandem with agriculture. The problem, in part, is that the type of agriculture that symbolically dominates Waiʻahole now is taro farming\footnote{I have found no recent survey detailing the current distribution of agricultural in the valley. While sweet potato, bananas, papayas, ti leaves, nursery plants and flowers, and other crops continue to be grown and collectively outweigh taro; it is taro that has become \textit{the symbol} of Waiʻahole.}—specifically Hawaiian rooted-kalo cultivation—and this has come to be seen at odds with the aforementioned “Localized style, community lifestyle.” The other problem concerns the dark underside of this “certain lifestyle”: drug-use, gambling, and other illicit activities that also exist in Waiʻahole-Waikäne. In these rural valleys, as in many similar locales, there are higher rates of poverty, and residents as a whole rank lower on most socio-economic indicators—all of which contribute to the valleys’
susceptibility to these societal ills. Here the class distinction comes into focus between some residents and the taro farmers, who are above the fray in these respects.

Issues of class and status intersect on another level as well. When discussing Hawaiian nationalism, several residents—Hawaiian and non-Hawaiian alike—express sentiments such as this: “They want to be chiefs, they don’t want to be the kānaka maoli.” Hereniko would concur with this characterization:

Many of the new educated elite [in Pacific Island societies], therefore, are “chiefs” in the modern sense. I therefore include traditional and modern leaders in a broad definition of the word “chiefs,” which refers to anyone in a position of influence...[and] are deemed by locals to be in a position of power... (1994: 3).

Although not directly referencing the Waiāhole taro farmers, this reference to Hawaiian nationalist support for the taro farmers reveals a certain incongruity because, indeed, it was the kānaka maoli commoners, the makaʻāinana, and not the chiefs who cultivated kalo. This comment was made in the context of a dialogue with a Hawaiian who was criticizing the leadership of the Hawaiian sovereignty movement (the same Hawaiian who said “I don’t have that cultural stuff”):

I think those of us who are true Hawaiians, we really got to look at the situation. Because, to me, I think there is an injustice to Hawaiians, but the leadership is one I wouldn’t follow. You know, they don’t [make sense] to me: every Hawaiian should be in Kamehameha School. To me, every Hawaiian should have a hospital to go to, you know. Because where is all the revenue from all the land of all the islands that’s suppose to belong to all the Hawaiians? Where?! Yet, all the Hawaiians are all in prison, all in the schools not getting educated, right? But when you go Kamehameha Schools you got to pass one test—that’s ridiculous. That’s ridiculous!³⁷⁴

This statement demonstrates an articulated class analysis that informs her relationality, or lack thereof, with other Hawaiians politically and culturally. In other words, being Hawaiian is an insufficient common denominator for cultural or political affinity. For this Hawaiian woman, a more equitable distribution of resources among Hawaiians—especially with who are less educated, impoverished, and imprisoned—is a presumed...

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³⁷³ L. 2/28/04.
³⁷⁴ H. 2/28/04.
precondition. The Hawaiian woman asserts herself as a “true Hawaiian” because of her concern not with cultural issues but political commitments focused on the socioeconomic conditions of Hawaiians. As one of the “ordinary grassroots people who really work the land” (as she earlier articulates herself in this same dialogue), she acknowledges a working-class sensibility (and perhaps peasant-class orientation) that simultaneously underpins her Hawaiianness and her afore-stated Localness. These intertwining narratives of class and identity make it difficult for her and other Waiāhole-Waikāne residents to wholesale support Hawaiian cultural practices such as kalo cultivation. This is juxtaposed against the non-Hawaiian taro farmer first quoted who is much more connected to “the deeper cultural background” of the “Hawaiian part of the community” because he foregrounds a political commitment to Hawaiianess, while also practicing, Hawaiian culture. He downplays his class position and higher educational experience because he is in a position of social privilege that enables him to do so. Bridging the distance between these class and status differences is an ongoing struggle in Waiāhole-Waikāne.

LESSONS LEARNED OF A SUCCESSFUL, SUSTAINED STRUGGLE

The Supreme Court decision in the Waiāhole Ditch Combined Contested Case has been heralded for its buttressing of the Public Trust Doctrine and strengthening the ecosystem approach to protecting Hawaiian customary rights as codified in the State Water Code. While public interest and environmental considerations are highlighted.

375 This reference to Kamehameha Schools is telling because several of the Waiāhole taro farmers are graduates of this Hawaiian-only, elite private school. Moreover, the taro farmers maintain close personal and professional ties (and likely funding ties too) with Kamehameha. The Schools were founded in 1887 and endowed by Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop, a Hawaiian chiefess descended from King Kamehameha I. As recipients of one of the (if not the) largest landed estates in the islands, the students attending the Hawaiians-only Kamehameha pay only $2,000-3,000 for an education on par with the islands’ other elite private schools (such as Punahou and ‘Iolani, which cost $16,000-$17,000). In this way, graduating from Kamehameha does not signal material wealth or upper-class status. Nonetheless, a Kamehameha grad is identified as having a high degree of privilege unavailable to the majority of Hawaiians. This privilege translates into higher levels of social and symbolic capital, thereby widening the educational, and often political, distance between Kamehameha-educated Hawaiians and especially public school-educated Hawaiians. And this continues to be a source of contention and resentment in Waiāhole-Waikāne and elsewhere. In my interviews, many Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians alike were critical of the shortcomings of Kamehameha Schools to live up to Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop’s charge for bettering the education and lives of Hawaiian children (see (King and Roth 2006); this is particularly evident for Hawaiians whose life experiences have often been filled with ‘hardships.’
much more than Hawaiian claims to water in the *Waiahole* decision, the implications for Hawaiian issues are significant. Since the *Waiahole* decision, and acting upon the precedence it set, another water struggle has emerged on Maui between a similar coalition of taro farmers and environmentalists, Na Moku Aupuni O Ko’olau Hui (Na Moku), fighting for the return of long-diverted waters used by corporate giant Alexander & Baldwin. Summer Sylva (2007) notes that while “the letter of the law provides significant protections of their water interests, its application by state agencies and communities leaves something to be desired.” In other words, even though the Waiahole taro farmers have succeeded in securing the codification of water rights for taro and other Hawaiian cultural practices in the State Constitution, diligent watching is required to ensure the State agencies, legislatures, and courts *actually implement these laws*. The articulations of taro farmers, allies, and residents of Waiahole-Waikâne best sum up this water struggle.

Within our lifetime, within the next ten or twenty years, all the groundwater will have been permitted out by checks on the bank, and what that means, economically, is the only way you can have some future use defined is by either conserving more, which is probably the next thing to do, or by diminishing somebody else’s use, or taking it away. … So water will be the lynchpin towards social decisions, and people don’t understand that yet, they want to run away from [the issue]. … Waiahole brought [this] to a lot of people’s attention. …

The [water] battle will go on forever; there is never going to be an end…it is never going to go away and so we have to settle into a mode of keeping things good and strategizing to do that on a long-term basis. … One of the best ways for water is to plant taro: take care of that kuleana…it is our kuleana to take good care of taro patches because they feed [us]. … Taro has water rights—that was reaffirmed in the constitution, too—so you take care of taro, he gets the water, we get to have a say in making sure the water keeps flowing.

A broad range of issues concerning land-use, governmental decision-making, sustainable growth, ecosystem viability, and Native livelihoods are encapsulated in the Waiahole taro farmers’ water struggle, as the above quotes attest. They have operated effectively on both the politico-legal terrain and on the socio-cultural level, because they

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376 T. 1/21/04.
377 T. 1/21/04.
378 V. 4/27/05, emphasis added.
have embodied the idea that, as one of my interviewees put it “The legal stuff should be...a reflection of the non-legal stuff.” The need to use the law to help create policy that reflects what is occurring on the ground also requires an understanding of how the legal and the cultural are brought into conversation and practice with each other:

[Probably a lesson for us: whatever the setting, wherever you are in this world, if you are literate in the languages that are being spoken around you, whether it’s the spoken tongue or your understandings of the systems that are in play—the infrastructure, how they work, how your community is formed—if you’re literate in that, your chances of surviving are way, way, way better, and I think, that’s what our goal has to be in helping people to stay literate in all the many languages that we speak day-to-day.]

The process of staying literate is ongoing, requiring one to re-learn what may have been forgotten as well as to incorporate improvements and the learning of new languages and knowledge systems.

A second key lesson learned from the water struggle is the need to foster opportunity within the community for re-connection, multiple forms of participation and leadership, and spaces in which disagreements can be negotiated and anxieties alleviated. This doesn’t mean all agreeing or all being the same, but it does mean coalescing around commonalities as much as possible, as fleetingly as that may be. The ongoing contentiousness and bitter split in the community emphasizes the importance of this lesson and the need to value all the resources that people have to share. As one taro farmer put it:

We have to appreciate who we are, and the other people inside our community too, and the land itself. ... [Our work has been about] how to reconnect ourselves, our families, to the place, to the ‘āina. ... The land is alive and we can be connected to that.

The important lesson articulated by this taro farmer is that, in addition to allowing for various forms of agency exercised by people in the community, the land itself has agency. This sense of agency of the ‘āina functions as a source of empowerment

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379 L. 4/27/05.
380 H. 4/4/05, emphasis in original.
381 L. 4/27/05, emphasis added.
and rejuvenation. Through kalo cultivation, in the lo‘i, this agency of the ‘āina can be felt as the soft mud squishes between one’s toes and fingers and the cool stream waters flow past, while the sun shines down and the wind dances in the trees. It’s a tactile sensation and a spiritual experience, both personal and communal. This understanding that the land has agency extends beyond taro farming, as many non-taro farmers also share or connect with this felt knowledge. Another resident explains that by getting connected to the place and *experiencing oneself as part of the land and environment*, people learn that “they can have a direct result by staying informed in the politics around you.”\(^{382}\) Put slightly differently: “It’s about self-empowerment”\(^{383}\) on multiple levels: personally, collectively, communally, environmentally, culturally, politically, and the empowerment of self-in-relation-to-land, which thereby empowers the land.

For allies and supporters of the taro farmers, the value of Hawaiian life-ways, and especially the ahupua‘a resource management system, was/is an important lesson learned. It is this Hawaiian knowledge of an integrated ecosystem that people are a part of, and responsible for, which resonated with environmentalist allies and many islanders in general. As one taro farmer explains:

> It’s kind of a new thing, this kind of working together [in community taro patches such as the Mauka Lo‘i and across the islands], but it is also how Hawaiians did this. … that value is very—we were very conscious of the fact that we weren’t re-inventing the wheel. [We were] re-establishing something that had been done a lot before.\(^{384}\)

Allies and supporters repeatedly mentioned an appreciation of this, and many consider the Supreme Court decision in the *Waiāhole Ditch Contested Case* as further affirmation and codification of this important and basic principle.

> In effect, without romanticizing the history of Hawaiian culture, if you live on an island for thousands of years, you have to figure out what it takes to balance things, or you don’t survive. It’s very simple. It’s not an idealized version. It is: don’t over fish the place, keep the water in control, and people have to share in their labor and share among themselves. You have to have a system of justice, and you have to have a balance, and that’s what an island teaches you. I think

\(^{382}\) B. 8/10/05.  
\(^{383}\) V. 4/27/05.  
\(^{384}\) L. 5/5/05, emphasis added.
that’s something that the people on the windward side have tried to reawaken people toward, so there are larger goals here in addition to their immediate needs to protect where people live.  

Wai‘ahole taro farmers continually educate others and lead by example in this respect. In doing so, they are continually cultivating communities (some more successfully than others). “Building families—that is important,” one taro farmer said. “And [through that], of course, you build individuals.” Notice that the building block of their communities are families, similar to the anti-eviction struggle. Families here are both nuclear and, more importantly, extended, multigenerational families. It is through families that both individuals and communities are empowered. These communities are multiple and overlapping, the friction of which often creates tension, but a tension that might also be productive and progressive.

I think it’s essential to any kind of fight to have a community of people with a common interest. Then the stronger that community is, the stronger that community is, the easier the fight is. That is not always the case, but we continue to try and work towards that. … There are enough people with common interests in restoring taro and fighting against development and putting water back in streams. That community is real strong. Even those people who do oppose it within [our] community—you know, certain people are always going to be opposed to the fight that goes on—I think the interest is still strong enough that it’s going to keep on going forward.

One final lesson is reflected in the words of this Wai‘ahole taro farmer: “The biggest lesson is to slow down. We don’t have to develop everything; in fact we shouldn’t develop everything.” Slow down. Many taro farmers refer to how it takes a lot of time for taro to grow—almost a year from first planting to harvesting—and this serves as an important lesson in understanding how everything takes time to grow. The lesson is to slow down and appreciate the flow of time, and moreover, use that time to grow in one’s self, in one’s communities, in one’s relationships with each other and with the ‘āina. In several of my interviews with taro farmers, I noticed how much time our

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385 T. 1/21/04.
386 V. 4/27/05.
387 L. 5/5/05.
388 L. 4/27/05.
conversations took, how there was a slowness in the flow of words they shared with me. Over time, I came to appreciate this embodiment of “slowing down” and “taking time” and the soothing sensation and enhanced knowledge that comes with it. When I took my young college students on a field trip to the Mauka Lo‘i, or my teenage nephew and his friend to one of the farmer’s taro patches, it was remarkable how quickly they not only learned this lesson but also embraced it.

There are a few additional points that I would like to elaborate upon concerning community organizing and sociopolitical mobilization in general. Touching upon the “very uneasy alliance” between the Waiāhole-Waikāne Community Association and the taro farmers of Kalo Pa’a o Waiāhole, the then-longtime president of the WWCA explains their position during and following the Waiāhole case:

I think in a struggle like that, there were a lot of organizations that came out to help Waiāhole and Waikāne. But we never allowed outside organizations to get involved in the decision-making process. .... And there is a reason why we didn’t want a lot of organizations.... Our people felt that by being independent, you know, it’s part of our identity. And that once you relinquish that, then there are other people that want to take credit for the kind of thing you fought for, and the kind of victories that you get. And so we have been very strict about that. ... But once decision [from the Supreme Court] was rendered, we withdrew...because of our independence. (emphasis added)

This statement provides insight into how the WWCA views themselves as “independent” and wary to trust outside organizations—characteristics that inhibit long-term alliances of the kind the Waiāhole taro farmers had developed through the 1980s and 1990s. It is also a curious statement because the WWCA was party to, but not leaders of, the water struggle. Herein lies the uneasiness of their temporary alliance with taro farmers, who were clearly leading the charge with their allied attorneys. The capacity of WWCA to make their own decisions, and their very “identity” as being “independent,” was constrained in the water struggle; therefore the alliance was untenable once the struggle came to a sufficient close.

In their model of decision-making, the WWCA steering committee still adheres to the principles of democratic centralism inspired by Marx-Lenin-Mao activism: democratic
discussion and decision-making followed by very centralized authority of majoritarian rule. As evident in the community split during the anti-eviction struggle, this rigidity—the requirement of “discipline” behind the party line and leadership—left little room for those on a minority side of a vote or position. The opportunity and willingness for broader-based community participation has thus become stagnant in the valleys.

What can we learn from this dynamic (which is not limited to the WWCA) in terms of coalitional work and alliance-building? On one hand, despite the attending unease, the water struggle can be seen as a successful coalition wherein disparate groups whose interests converged on the issue of water came together, and upon effectively meeting their objectives, these groups dispersed. Successful or productive coalition work does not require strict adherence or one hundred percent agreement to everything; it just requires enough agreement and cohesion to be productive in meeting individual and/or collective needs and reaching shared objectives. For struggles to be won it is not necessary for all parties to a coalition to remain part of a broader, longer-term alliance. Clearly it can be problematic for “community relations” when former-but-no-longer allies are still neighbors. Yet, even this does not preclude future alliances when mutual interests might converge. Some have suggested that this is a new, and positive, trend for conditional and temporary sociopolitical mobilizations, such as that evidenced in various strands of the global anti-globalization movement.389

On the other hand, the breakup of the uneasy alliance within the Waiāhole-Waikāne community does not bode well for the never-ending water struggle because conflicting narratives of class and identity that inform community contentions are likely replicated in other communities throughout the islands, and the island community as a whole. The growing political distance remains a hurdle between those with higher degrees of social and material capital and those with less; and this becomes even more of a hurdle when combined with the uncertainties of how Locals with less social and

389 Day (2005) argues for this type of affinity politics wherein groups with aligned interests or objectives come together to meet those objectives, and once accomplished or perhaps even simultaneously, align with others in working towards different/additional objectives.
material capital—be they Hawaiian or non-Hawaiian—fit into a Hawaiian Hawai‘i led by those with more social and material capital.\textsuperscript{390} For this reason, I suggest a renewed and nuanced class analysis sensitive to these issues, and for more ‘play’ in negotiating these tensions.\textsuperscript{391}

One last point is the importance of being attuned to political opportunity structures and taking advantage of openings therein. This is what the Wai‘āhole taro farmers did in the resistive political climate of the mid to late 1970s and in the shifting economic climate of the mid to late 1990s. Moreover, their persistent, long-term, direct engagement with governmental policy-making and electoral politics throughout the 1980s built a strong foundation linking the two time frames. Importantly, the Wai‘āhole taro farmers actively participated in state governance processes while not become part of the system themselves as politicians or full-time elected officials. One taro farmer who remains active in community-government interface notes that windward communities are significantly more active than other places on O‘ahu. The windward side was the last to adopt government development plans, two years after the rest of the state “because there was so much controversy over so many issues up and down. The communities were active, they were well informed.”\textsuperscript{392}

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This chapter has shown how Wai‘āhole taro farmers combined Native Hawaiian ahupua‘a traditions, Hawaiian Kingdom resource allocation traditions, and American

\textsuperscript{390} In other words, it will continue to be difficult for many island residents who identify as Locals (including Hawaiians) and who have little social or material capital to support a Hawaiian Hawai‘i when those at the forefront of Hawaiian movements have more social and/or material capital. I don’t believe we can ‘get rid’ of class and status, as in a communist or socialist utopia; rather, I believe that by directly or indirectly dealing with its social, material and emotional effects—calling it what it is, so to speak—it might be possible to lessen the negative dimensions or experienced disparities therein.

\textsuperscript{391} “Play” refers to the fun of games, sports, kaona or the hidden meaning in words and stories, and other such activities in traditional Hawaiian society and most Pacific Island cultures (as well as elsewhere). As I argue in Chapter Two, play was a fundamental part of traditional life, enabling people to work across multiple contexts discursively and materially. Play also served as symbolic structures in which subjective meanings and societal sensibilities were negotiated, and functioned as a safety valve to release community tensions into acceptable arenas. Moreover, through regular and almost ritualized forms of play, class and status differentials were lessened, hierarchies potentially inverted, social and symbolic power dispersed among participants (if only temporarily), and important sociopolitical critiques were put forth.

\textsuperscript{392} H. 4/4/05.
political-legal traditions to effectively regain needed water for their kalo cultivation practices. This mobilization of tradition took place on two fronts: in the taro patches and in the centers of government. Their sociopolitical mobilization through an alliance network of Hawaiian and environmental organizations succeeded in codifying Hawaiian traditions of shared resource use through constitutional reform, legislative measures, and case law. Concurrent to these state-level engagements, and under the radar of the State, Waiāhole taro farmers cultivated an active live of a Hawaiian Hawai‘i in their taro patches and across the islands in an ever-expanding kalo movement. On both levels, taro farmers drew upon traditional Native understandings of multiple and plural ways of being-in-relation with each other in the places they share. This allowed Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians from different backgrounds to develop a collective understanding of the importance of water for Hawaiian ways of life and for the islands’ sustainable future.
CHAPTER 7:

“THEY DROPPED THE BOMB ON ME,” THE KAMAKA FAMILY

LAND STRUGGLE AGAINST THE U.S. MILITARY IN WAIIKANE

They came down and dropped the bomb on me. They took the bomb out, still dropped a bomb on me. [The military said:] “We cannot guarantee it is clean and we have to condemn the land.”

Two exact things happened during World War II concerning land: one was Hawaiian land, and one was haole land. After World War II: haole land still got; Hawaiian land, over time, was lost. … Look at the land: you turn lo‘i into bomb range?! I mean, what makes more sense? One makes food, the other is a study of death, how to kill people.

Our family went back on it [the land the U.S. military used], with their letter that it was clean. Well, aren’t we the public? Our lives were in danger and we trusted them. So, in trusting our government when the lease was made, the contract said they would clean it. And then when the time comes they decided they don’t want to clean it [although] they can do it. But if you had a service station and you had an oil spill, they would make you clean it and they would penalize you until the day you cleaned it. Now why aren’t they subject to the same rules that they make us follow and why can’t they live up to their word?

The Kamaka family land struggle against the U.S. military not only occurred amid the Waiāhole-Waikāne Community Association anti-eviction and Waiāhole taro farmers water struggles but also predated them by several decades. In the mid 1970s the U.S. Marines (who had replaced the Army) discontinued training exercises that they had been conducting on over 1,000 acres in Waikāne valley since World War II. At roughly the same time, the Kamaka family gained fee-simple title to 187 acres of land as their share of the Waikāne Hui lands separated from the remaining acres held by the McCandless Estate. As Hui members, the Kamakas shared collective ownership of much of Waikāne since the mid 19th century; and prior to the Māhele, the ancestors of the present-day Kamakas were konohiki and kahuna in Waikāne and nearby ahupuaʻa.

393 M. 8/30/05.
394 I. 4/12/05.
395 D. 4/13/05.
396 Although I have not seen or heard this reference elsewhere, Kajihiro notes that some of these military training lands were also in adjoining Waiāhole (2008: 183).
In the 1920s, the U.S. territorial government in Hawai‘i forced the breakup of land hui and the division of their interests among shareholders. A decades-long legal dispute between the Kamakas and McCandless ensued.\footnote{Several Kamaka family members told me that negotiations and legal proceedings between the Kamakas and McCandless heirs began in the 1930s. The earliest court records that I was able to find date to the early 1960s.}

Unbeknownst to the Kamakas, the most heavily bombed and trained upon lands used by the U.S. military were the 187 acres they received through the mid 1970s settlement.\footnote{The separation of the Kamaka family lands from the larger Waikāne Hui occurred in a lengthy legal case that spanned several decades of contentious negotiation with the McCandless heirs. One Kamaka family member explains that her parents chose the farming area portion of the Hui lands because it was the area that their parents (her grandparents) had used before, and the intent was that “the land was for us, the children, and the children’s children, to have a place to live, and at this time it was agriculture conservation, and the family knew that” (S. 4/13/05). Several family members said that had they known these lands were the most heavily trained upon, then they surely would not have accepted it. Additionally, they believe that the McCandless heirs did know this, and that is why they waited until the U.S. military ceased training to push for a final agreement allocating the Hui lands (after delaying it for several decades).}

Many Kamaka family members note with anguish the unfairness and disparity of this land allocation without their informed consent. After an initial removal of 24,000 pounds of ordnances and an ‘all clear’ declaration by the Marine Corps (Aguiar 2004), Kamaka family members began cultivating kalo and other crops on the returned lands. Following Hurricane Iwa in the early 1980s, exposed military ordnances were found—including many unexploded ordnances. The Kamakas asked the military to come back in and clean the land according to the lease stipulations. In 1989, the U.S. government decided this would be too costly and instead condemned the land. After many years of legal battle, the Kamakas were forced into a settlement in which the U.S. government financially compensated them for the confiscation of their land in Waikāne.

The second of the quotes above is from a Waikāne resident who was not directly affected by the government taking of Kamaka lands, but who nonetheless expresses frustration at the ongoing injustice against Hawaiians. This Hawaiian observer juxtaposes America’s destructive militarization of Hawai‘i against the integrated and sustaining life-systems of Hawaiians. He refers to the condemnation and confiscation of Kamaka family land in contradistinction to the U.S. military return of land belonging to the Judd family (a prestigious missionary-descendant haole family) in the adjacent Hakipu‘u, Kualoa and Ka’a’awa valleys as a way of showing how haole profiteering
occurs alongside Hawaiian land dispossession. The Judd family lands consist of Kualoa Ranch, now a profitable tourist venue and “Hollywood” set for films such as Jurassic Park (1993), Windtalkers (2002), 50 First Dates (2004), and the TV series Lost. Similarly, the McCandless family made huge profits on the sale of their Waikāne Hui lands. This land was also part of the U.S. military training zone in Waikāne but was returned intact despite evidence of ordnances there as well.

Many Hawaiian families since World War II have shared the injustice experienced by the Kamaka family. The pattern of wartime land lease and post-war confiscation was replicated in Lualualei, Mōkapu, and in the Mākua Valley on west Oʻahu, among other areas. This taking of Hawaiian land is not limited to private properties of Hawaiian families; the majority of land under control and use—if not outright title—by the U.S. military consists of what are considered Hawaiian national lands commonly referred to as the “ceded lands.” Kajihiro estimates that ceded lands make up 54 percent of the land under military control (Kajihiro 2008). This is the broader backdrop for the Kamaka family land struggle against the U.S. military in the mid 1980s through early 1990s. The last quote above is from a Kamaka family member who reflects upon how, in “trusting our government,” they were deceived. She exclaims in sadness and frustration “why can’t they live up to their word?!” She goes on to describe how “the community at the time didn’t understand. See, we went at odds with our own community.”

Why didn’t the Waiāhole-Waikāne community, as a community, support the Kamaka family land struggle? Given the substantial success of the anti-eviction and the water struggles in Waiāhole-Waikāne, why did the Kamaka land struggle fail? In part, it has to do with how tradition was deployed, and in part, it has to do with debilitating intra-community conflicts. Perhaps the sheer magnitude of going up against the U.S. military was daunting for residents; yet concurrent anti-militarist

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399 See Van Dyke (2008) for further discussion of the Hawaiian “crown lands,” also known as the ceded lands.
400 D. 4/13/05.
activism of the Protect Kaho‘olawe ‘Ohana suggests that successfully challenging the U.S. military was not impossible.

This chapter examines how the Kamaka family drew unevenly upon Native traditions of ali‘i land distribution and stewardship, Hawaiian Kingdom traditions of collective land ownership, and American traditions of private property and law use. Emphasizing their ancestral relationship to Waikâne evident in longstanding fee-simple land title, the struggle was articulated as a narrow private issue pertaining to land-owning Hawaiians and not the general public. I discuss how their sense of propertied individualism was depoliticizing, how their reliance on legal strategies was limiting, and how intra-community conflict distanced community members from each other in unhelpful ways. I further argue that the Kamaka land struggle demonstrates the limits of multiculturalism in the islands. This documentation of the Kamaka family land struggle against the U.S. military in Waikâne serves as a historical/futures archive for understanding when the political mobilization of tradition is insufficient to forge common cause and protect Hawaiian control of land.

The Kamaka family constitutes a political community insomuch as the sixty-plus (adult) members of this Hawaiian ‘ohana, as a collective, became political actors in their land struggle. Although I do not address issues of intra-family conflict, the difficulty for such a large family—or any family for that matter—to ‘agree’ and ‘get along’ cannot be discounted. As political actors, their identity is unevenly situated within American norms of individual private property ownership, Hawaiian Kingdom practices of collective ownership of land, and Native ahupua‘a management and land stewardship values. I begin by looking at how the forced dissolution of the Waikâne Hui in the early through mid 20th century altered traditional place relations and introduced new forms of property relations.
This Hui shall be called the Land Hui of Waikane, Kookaupoko, Island of Oahu. The members of this Hui shall be persons who, themselves, purchased this land; and their representatives; and heirs; and who signed their names to this Constitution, and their By-Laws (Constitution of the Land Hui of Waikane, 1862).

My dad, until he died, was researching and telling the family—I remember his voice—he said, “We own this valley through our kūpuna. We must stand up and fight for what it was.” Nobody wanted to listen to him. He stood alone like I stand alone.

The Land Hui of Waikane (Waikāne Hui) was established in 1862 when thirty-six Hawaiians and their respective families pooled their money to buy more than 1,600 acres from haole Edwin O. Hall and Henry Dimond, who had received the land as a government grant in 1847 and who purchased it outright in 1850 (except for five acres set aside for a church). As shown in Chapter Three, hui were a hybrid innovation created by Hawaiians adjusting to a foreign system of private property ownership. Native land tenure and ahupua’a management protocols were melded with Western fee-simple ownership and governing instruments. Members of land hui collectively held fee-simple ownership of shared land and water resources, adopting constitutions and by-laws with elected representatives to manage the hui in a legally sound manner. In directly addressing the Waikāne Hui, the Hawaiian Kingdom Supreme Court case Mahoe v. Puka (4 Haw. 485, 1882) specifically outlines how members of a hui have certain undivided interests to the land and water resources that are different than simply being “tenants in common”:

The hui, as a peculiar native institution, has pursuant to its rules and customs, certain powers as an association which do not belong to its members individually as tenants in common (cited in Thayer and Lydecker 1916).

401 I borrow this phrase, in part, from Osorio’s Dismembering Lāhui: A History of the Hawaiian Nation to 1887 (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2002). In his book, Osorio discusses the ways in which introduced Western laws and governance practices—not to mention the actions of many Western people themselves, primarily Americans—“literally and figuratively dismembered the lāhui (the people) from their traditions, their lands, and ultimately their government. The mutilations were not physical only, but also psychological and spiritual” (3). So, too, I argue the forced break-up of land hui had similar devastating effects in terms of the severed relations embodied in the hui.

402 M. 8/30/05, emphasis added.
In other words, having a share in the hui meant more than owning a fraction of the hui lands; rather, it meant *sharing* the hui lands *as a whole*. This applied to the indivisible “commons,” which were usually upland areas. In addition, hui members also held lands that were personal ‘ohana homesteads, which were considered each members’ private lands. In these ways, the hui replicated the Hawaiian ahupua’a system. In the Waikâne Hui, the common lands were those on which the U.S. military trained. In claiming to “own this valley through our kūpuna,” the Kamaka family member quoted above is referring to the collective ownership of over 1,600 acres of Waikâne valley. One might interpret his father’s charge to “fight for what it was” as a reminder of the need to retain the collectivity of this common land as originally intended.

The Waikâne Hui, like other hui throughout the islands in the late 19th century, thrived for over a generation. In his research on the Hui of Kahana, a windward O‘ahu ahupua’a that borders Waikâne, Stauffer (2004) argues that the Hawaiian Kingdom’s nonjudicial foreclosure law of 1874 allowed the swift and injudicious mortgaging of hui and other Hawaiian-owned lands, which led to the eventual failure of the hui land movement because foreigners from outside an ahupua’a were able to dispossess Hawaiian tenant-owners of their lands through unscrupulous mortgage financing. Of more significance, however, were the 1893 overthrow of the Kingdom and the 1898 so-called annexation of Hawai‘i by the United States, through which Americans usurped Hawaiians’ government and lands. After this time, Lincoln Loy McCandless, brother of one of the Committee of Thirteen that overthrew Queen Lili‘uokalani in 1893, started buying out Hawaiians’ shares in the Waikâne Hui (as well as the Waiāhole Hui and, less successfully, the Kahana Hui). Among other questionable means, McCandless used the (il)legal tools of injudicious mortgaging and adverse possession provided by the American takeover of the Hawaiian government. According to a 1965 court filing:

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403 See Sai (2005) for a critique of Stauffer’s argument as inaccurate.
404 Numerous longtime residents of Waiāhole and Waikâne recounted to me McCandless’s land grab practices that also included having sexual liaisons and fathering children with property owners, falsifying documents, swindling people, and so forth. Stauffer found evidence of some of these same practices used by McCandless in Kahana (2004: 192).
Beginning in 1900 and continuing until 1940, L. L. McCandless acquired undivided interests in the Hui Lands of Waikåne. Most of these acquisitions took place before 1920 (all but three purchases). As a result of these acquisitions, McCandless claimed 31-½ shares out of 33 shares in the Hui-o-Waikane lands. He acknowledged ½ share in the Waiahole Water Company and 1 share in the Kamaka family (Roberts v. McCandless, Civil No. 12446 (1965): “Finding of Fact”).

The Kamaka family was the only family of the original thirty-six Hui members that were able to retain their share in the Waikåne Hui. By this time, however, starting in the 1920s a series of American territorial statues and case laws (Smythe v. Takara, 26 Haw. 69 (1921)), also known as Maalo) legally forced the breakup of land hui and divided its interests among shareholders. This began the process of transforming the collective ownership and shared use of land and water resources into individuated private properties. Hui were being literally and figuratively dismembered.

The Kamakas’ ‘ohana homestead was separated from the Hui in 1907 when the family received a deed from McCandless. References in relevant court cases indicate that several other hui members may have likewise separated out their ‘ohana homesteads at roughly this time. Some mortgaged these personal land allotments to McCandless, and others simply continued to live on their personal lands. Years later, a few of these former hui members or their descendants would claim title through adverse possession. According to some Kamaka members, the partition struggle over Hui lands began in the 1930s and remained unresolved for decades. In the early 1960s when Elizabeth McCandless Marks wanted to develop Waikåne valley, she and her fellow heirs had to establish clear title to the Hui lands. A civil suit was filed against over one hundred would-be claimants who were, at some point, party to the Waikåne Hui. This case, Marks v. Ah Nee (Civil No. 8966 and 48 Haw 92, 395 P.2d 620 (1964)), was combined with two additional cases related to Waikåne Hui Lands, Marks v. Kamaka (Civil No. 11927) and Roberts v. McCandless (Civil No. 12446), and a combined ruling was issued by the Hawai‘i Circuit Court in the early 1970s. Of all the non-corporate or non-government defendants, the Kamakas were the only ones to receive clear title to a
portion of the Waikåne Hui lands.\textsuperscript{405} The legal costs accrued by the Kamakas in this decades-long legal battle were significant, and the Court ruled against reimbursing defendants for legal costs. These costs dissuaded the family from strongly pressing their claims for their share of the Waiahole Hui lands.\textsuperscript{406}

When the U.S. military’s lease in Waikåne was due to expire in the mid 1970s, Marks and developer partner Joe Pao were in the midst of attempting to evict the handful of tenants and farmers in Waikåne to make room for a 7,000 home development. Several Kamaka family members recall the pressure placed upon them to quickly partition their share of the Hui, and after several years of unsuccessful negotiation the Circuit Court judge in the case threatened to allocate the land for them if the Kamakas could not make up their minds. They didn’t want the judge making the decision because he had no knowledge of the land; and intimate knowledge of the Waikåne lands was something the Kamaka family cherished. In the end, they selected the lands on which their parents and grandparents had cultivated taro prior to U.S. military training, without any knowledge that these 187 acre were some of the most heavily bombarded areas of the U.S. military training zone. Several Kamaka family members suggest the McCandless heirs knew this because they had all the military maps and withheld this information from the Kamakas.

\textit{When the selection [of land] was being made, when we were in court in the ’70s and finally the partition came up, you know: “Okay, you do own [Waikåne Hui land] and now you choose an area”—because they [McCandless Heirs] wanted [us to choose a parcel] instead of us owning all over because we owned part of this whole valley. They said “Okay, let’s come down and say where exactly you own, and I don’t own there,” you know, and break it up.}\textsuperscript{407}

\textsuperscript{405} Several business entities and government agencies received certain exclusions, such as for utilities, access rights, etc. Dozens of individuals and families were unable to provide sufficient documentation to claim their Hui shares. The findings of fact in these civil cases did verify some fee-simple title for adverse possession claims against McCandless’ Waikåne lands, which may have been in the Hui at one time, but now were no longer considered part of the Hui lands. However, most adverse possession claims against the McCandlesses were denied.

\textsuperscript{406} Unlike their share in the Waikåne Hui for which the Kamakas held all the necessary collaborating documents, they lacked sufficient supporting evidence demonstrating their share in the Waiahole Hui, which hindered them in pursuing their claim. When the State purchased the six hundred acres of Waiahole valley from the McCandless family, the Kamakas lost their allocation of Waiahole Hui lands. S. 4/13/05 exclaims: “It’s like, how many more times are we going to lose land? … In the long run, we had a hard time proving that we were definitely the owner. [However] we were definitely owner of part of it. They [the State] ended up just settling it and paying us off, which boiled down to whether you like it or not, we are going to take it from you anyway.”

\textsuperscript{407} S. 4/13/05.
Not only were the Kamaka lands divided out from their previously undivided interests of Hui lands, but after decades of legal struggle with the McCandlesses and a concomitant generational succession of increasingly Americanized Kamakas, the attendant cultural understandings and social relationships of Hui lands were also being divided out. In other words, the stewardship component of collective ownership and shared-use of land and water resources that was inherent in the ahupua‘a system and embodied by the Hui diminished as the Hui was broken up and the Kamakas were forced to fight for their allocation of “private property.”

This articulation of the land struggle as a private property dispute overshadowed other understandings of Kamaka relations to the lands of Waikāne even though all the Kamaka family members I spoke with clearly appreciated these additional understandings of and relationships with the disputed lands. For example, in addition to stating that “the land doesn’t belong to us anyway; it belongs to the Lord up there—He built this land,” this Kamaka family member also repeatedly emphasized this:

Now came down to what we lost. The family had over 2,000 acres. The haoles came in [and] took, took, took, took. … 187 acres. That’s the only acreage left out of 2,000 acres. \(^{408}\)

Similarly, his cousin acknowledged that “we are just caretakers of the land” while also repeatedly emphasizing:

Over the years the family has lived here. They have land on the makai side, ocean side, and they have mauka, which is mountain. And the mountain side is where they farm. And then you know, so they had areas, two sides, okay, so they owned in two sections. \(^{409}\)

Other Kamaka family members also spoke of their spiritual and familial responsibility to the land while highlighting their ownership of the land:

At one time we were the greatest landowner in the windward side, and nobody wanted to get involved with us somehow or another, … It wasn’t affecting nobody else anyway, so they never care, yeah. \(^{410}\)

\(^{408}\) M. 8/30/05.  
\(^{409}\) S. 4/13/05.  
\(^{410}\) L. 8/13/05.
As far as our family’s concern, we have a water right different from what they’re doing [in Waiāhole] trying to get, you know, so many percent of the water going over to the windward side. We are owners...we have a 3.3 percent interest in our water rights. ... [Despite the military confiscation of land, the documents state] that all mineral rights still belong to the Kamaka family.\textsuperscript{411}

What these Kamaka family members asserts is certainly true: they did own vast acreage of Waikāne, and they did own the rights to water on those lands. However, their statements belie the fact that ownership here, in the original conception of the Waikāne Hui—“what it was”—was not solely the family’s own. Ownership of Hui lands—specifically, the vast acreage of the valley’s mauka lands—was collective. As the Hui was forcibly dis-membered, and as the only remaining Hawaiian member struggling against the domineering McCandless family, the Kamakas necessarily made their claims to Hui lands in terms of their private property rights.

This shift to claiming the land as private property became problematic in the subsequent Kamaka land struggle against the U.S. military, which occurred less than a decade after the final allocation of Hui lands was finalized in the mid 1970s, amid the raging Waiāhole-Waikāne anti-eviction struggle. The Kamaka family’s insistence that the U.S. military live up to its lease agreement and clean up the ordnances it left behind was predominantly understood as a property matter: a landlord enforcing the terms of a lease. When the military refused and decided instead to use the U.S. governmental powers of eminent domain to condemn and then confiscate the Kamaka land, the family’s struggle was framed as a private affair: a landlord resisting the governments’ taking of their land.

The prevalence of this framing is evident in a newspaper article written in 2004:\textsuperscript{412}

This is a man’s home and this is a family’s estate. We’re not happy that they have taken away the public lands like Bellows, Barking Sands, Lualualei or Pōhakuloa, but in this particular instance (all...
Americans should be outraged that an individual’s private property should be used and abused like this (Osorio quoted in Aguilar 2004).

Similarly, when I asked activist allies of the Kaho‘olawe struggle and other subsequent anti-militarist struggles why there was no islands-wide mobilization to support the Kamakas, I was often told (sometimes with introspective, quizzical facial expressions) that it was family legal matter or that no organized call for support was put forth. The Kamakas themselves, being a more “conservative” family that distanced itself from the concurrent politics of the Hawaiian movement, contributed to this framing of their struggle as a private dispute and not a public issue.

Perhaps they thought that in a court of American law, the U.S. government would ultimately protect their private property rights, and therefore they had more standing by not staking their claims in Hawaiian political or nationalist articulations. However, in so doing, it was difficult for the Kamakas to draw upon the significant sociopolitical resources of the burgeoning Hawaiian movement to re-articulate their family’s land struggle as part of the ongoing historical wrongs of American usurpations of Hawaiian lands and marginalization of Hawaiian people. If the Kamakas had made such a re-articulation, then they might have been able to mobilize large numbers of supporters as activist allies, and to engage in much broader and more effective strategies and tactics other Hawaiian and anti-militarist movements were doing. Instead, the Kamakas almost solely relied on American legal traditions and judicial processes to protect their private property rights, and this was observed by the Hawaiian movement. Perhaps another reason why persons, groups and organizations in other sociopolitical alliances stayed out of the Kamaka family struggle was because, as a private dispute, any “success” likewise would have been private. Unlike the return of Kaho‘olawe, which was experienced as a collective success for all Hawaiians, it is unlikely that the Hawaiian movement would have benefited if the Kamaka family would have succeeded in retaining their fee-simple

413 Only one Kamaka family member made an explicitly political Hawaiian nationalist claim for this family’s land, which I will discuss later in the chapter.
title to the 187 acres in Waikāne. In emphasizing American legal traditions of individual private property more than Hawaiian Kingdom traditions of collective land ownership or earlier Native traditions of chiefly land stewardship, the Kamakas were unable to mobilize political support for their land struggle. This was made even more difficult because in Waikāne, like elsewhere throughout the islands, the normalization of the U.S. military produces and reproduces a high degree of complacency among islanders, including members of the Kamaka family.

**RESISTING WHAT IS HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT**

Everywhere you look in Hawai‘i, you see the military. Yet in daily life relatively few people in Hawai‘i actually see the military at all. It is hidden in plain sight. … For something to be hidden it must be indiscernible, camouflaged, inconspicuously folded into the fabric of daily life…they become “just the way things are.” (Ferguson and Turnbull 1999: xiii).

We would go to Waikāne because they used to have the military training. They [the soldiers] would leave their C-rations...the older kids would sneak over and bring back these little tins of food. We never knew what was inside, but after a while we got to know that if it was flat and this shape [gesturing with hands], it would have crackers. If it was like this shape [gesturing with hands], it would be pork and beans or something like that. We would have our own little fire outside. We would cook it and heat it up. That was just like camping out. We used to love to do that.

The military presence in Waikāne was a “natural” part of life for residents of Waiāhole-Waikāne for nearly four decades. Many recall the enjoyment of partaking in military things as kids. Consuming military foods and camping out like soldiers were favorite pastimes. Numerous residents shared stories, like the quote above, of how they would play—unauthorized by the military and disallowed by their parents—in the Waikāne military training zone. They had fond, adventurous memories of directly

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414 Similarly, the ongoing Hawaiian-centric, anti-militarist activism in Mākua Valley is framed as reclaiming the ahupua‘a for Hawaiians and all who wish to take care of the land, and not in terms of returning the confiscated lands to the Hawaiian tenants and owners who were previously displaced. I am not suggesting that returning persons and families who were previously displaced back to the land in Mākua is not an issue or that activists aren’t actively integrating this into their struggle; rather, I am simply pointing out this is not part of the frame—internally or externally—of the Mākua struggle. See Kajihiro (2008) for further discussion of this struggle.

415 E. 8/15/05.
interacting with soldiers who would give the children food and other treats. Unacknowledged was the danger of bombing and destruction of live-fire ammunitions in the valley, a regular occurrence of which was less than a few miles from where most residents lived. While the attending noise and commotion of military training were clearly heard, its reassurances of ever-present American national security effectively muted the significance of militarism on the day-to-day lives of the Waiāhole-Waikāne community. Many residents were veteran military persons themselves, some of whom served in World War II, the Korean War or the Vietnam War. Many more had extended family members or close friends who were/are active duty or retired military personnel, or who otherwise work in military-dependent employment. McGregor notes that:

By the end of World War II and martial law [in Hawai‘i], the military had become the largest single source of income and employment in the islands, thereby guaranteeing the support of a major part of Hawai‘i’s local population for their continued use of Hawaiian lands for military bases and combat training (2002).

It is this political economy that Kathy Ferguson and Phyllis Turnbull refer to as “a form of bribery, in which Hawai‘i’s economic and physical security can only be guaranteed by military presence” reinforced through “narratives of reassurance” (1999: xv). Moreover, the mutually reinforcing memories of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the bravery of Hawai‘i’s Americans of Japanese Ancestry (AJAs) during World War II were continually reproduced in local retellings in the media, at schools, and among acquaintances. These continually re-lived memories remind the islands’ people to be thankful for America’s military protection against future enemy attacks and to be grateful for the opportunities American citizenship provide as evidenced by the AJAs attainment of the American Dream from their humble and discriminated beginnings on the plantations. This statement by a Hawaiian resident of Waiāhole-Waikāne demonstrates this well:

[416] Ferguson and Turnbull explain: “The narratives of naturalization imbricate military institutions and discourses into daily life so that they become “just the way things are.” The narratives of reassurance kick in with a more prescriptive tone, marking the military presence in Hawai‘i as necessary, productive, heroic, desirable, good. This discursive interbreeding between what is natural and what is good results in a tone of inevitability: what is, is good and in any case cannot be changed” (1999: xiii).
We need the United States. I don’t care what they say. That’s my feeling. We are too small to think we can do without them. Look what happened with Pearl Harbor.\footnote{417}{S. 4/13/05.}

Silenced is the real possibility that Japan might never have attacked Hawai’i had the U.S. naval fleet not been anchored in island waters, and the reality that the ladder of success upon which AJAs climbed to political and economic power rested upon the disempowerment of Hawai’i’s Native people and dispossession of their lands. The prerogatives of American national security interests to take whatever lands were needed for military training was simply something that most islanders took for granted during World War II and through the early post-statehood period. The visible markers of a pronounced military presence (such as helicopters, tanks, food rations, spent ammunitions and other soldierly things in Waikāne) were readily incorporated and normalized into the daily lives of residents in Waiāhole-Waikāne and elsewhere in the islands.

As one Kamaka family member describes the general climate of support for the U.S. military during and following World War II: “[we] all thought [it was okay] because it was for national security and it was [a] time when Hawaiians were pro-American and willing to help military training.”\footnote{418}{T. 8/13/05.} Another Kamaka noted that their family’s support of the military continued through the end of the training period in the early 1970s: “At that time we thought we were all good American citizens.”\footnote{419}{D. 4/13/05.} Most Waiāhole-Waikāne residents shared this self-image of being a good American citizen.\footnote{420}{Recall how a leader of the Waiāhole-Waikāne Community Association describes residents prior to the anti-eviction struggle as “country living people, quiet and law-abiding” (Y. 1/15/04).} They enjoyed the freedoms that being law-abiding citizens conferred upon them, and this self-understanding lent itself to the prioritization of American national security. As other WWCA leaders explain: “We support the Marines to go and do their training [in Waikāne]...We enjoy the price of freedom, so why shouldn’t we?”\footnote{421}{Rs. 1/22/04.} Such articulations, as Ferguson and Turnbull demonstrate, correspond to militarized norms of citizenship resulting from the thorough
normalization of the U.S. military in the islands.\footnote{422} Part of being a good American citizen, then, is the unquestioning acceptance of a militarized order in Hawai‘i, which places national security above almost all other issues. Concerning a recent attempt by the U.S. Marines to re-train in Waikäne, this Waiåhole-Waikäne resident describes a sentiment shared by several: “It’s a good cause, I mean, for the state anyway, for our own survival. Plus, ‘cause we need to be protected yeah.”\footnote{423}

Ferguson and Turnbull point out that such articulations and embodiments of militarized norms of citizenship foster an institutional forgetfulness about other possible ‘orderings’ in the islands (1999: 198). In this sense, the military order in Waikäne valley muted and blurred the Hawaiian ordering of the ahupua‘a, and in the process, an American national security state was reinforced by and for all citizens. This form of citizenship was coded as a \textit{multiethnic} citizenry, of which Hawaiians were one among many ethnicities. Many of the Local, multiethnic residents of Waiåhole-Waikäne, including most of the Hawaiian Kamaka family, readily accepted such terms of American citizenship. Accordingly, a large degree of complacency towards the militarization of Waikäne and numerous places throughout the islands was produced in the post-war period and reproduced through today.

However, by the late 1960s and early 1970s, the dominating U.S. military presence in Hawai‘i was increasingly called into question by Save Our Surf’s protests of environmental degradation associated with military-related development projects, the anti-Vietnam War movement’s linking of local military training with death and destruction in Southeast Asia, Marx-Lenin-Mao activists’ critique of capitalism and imperialism in Hawai‘i and across the globe, and the Hawaiian movement’s focus on American domination and its negative repercussions for Hawaiians. From these resistive openings, the island of Kaho‘olawe became a focal point in the mid 1970s to question the pervasive militarism of Hawai‘i and to envision an alternative Hawaiian Hawai‘i. Since

\footnote{422} Ferguson and Turnbull argue that “militarized practices of citizenship…define and administer bodies—social, physical, and environmental—that occlude alternative notions of citizenship and embodiment (1999: xvi).”

\footnote{423} J. 1/22/04.
the beginning of World War II, the entire island was used by the U.S. military for live fire ordnance exercises and combat training. In resistance, the Protect Kaho‘olawe ‘Ohana (PKO) was formed, and like its contemporaneous sociopolitical movements, engaged in a two-prong strategy of grassroots mobilization and legal engagement.

Members of PKO directly confronted the U.S. Navy in a series of highly visible and politicized illegal landings on Kaho‘olawe. In their grassroots mobilization, the Protect Kaho‘olawe ‘Ohana re-discovered that the island “served as a refuge for Native Hawaiian spiritual customs and practices” (McGregor 2002: 74), which became an essential component of the PKO’s sociopolitical activism. The PKO helped revitalize traditional mo‘olelo, religious ceremonies, and customary practices, using them as resources for strengthening Hawaiian communities and for pursuing political and legal claims as Hawaiians against the United States and especially the U.S. military. This cultural and spiritual component continued alongside militant political actions.

The PKO’s second level of engagement involved the legal system. The PKO filed a lawsuit in U.S. District Court seeking to end the Navy’s bombing on Kaho‘olawe (Aluli et al. v. Brown, 602 F.2d 876 (78-1364) (1979)). After several years of partially-favorable court rulings, growing public support, and intensive negotiations between the PKO and the federal government, an out-of-court settlement was reached in 1980. Called the Consent Decree, it mandated that the Navy survey and develop a plan to protect historic sites and features; limit its bombing considerably; clear the island of

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424 McGregor describes PKO as political, and more importantly, spiritual. “In January 1976 Native Hawaiians staged an occupation of Kaho‘olawe as a means of drawing national attention to the desperate conditions of Native Hawaiians. A bill to grant Native Hawaiians monetary reparations for the illegal overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy by U.S. naval forces was pending in Congress. Two young men from Moloka‘i—Noa Emmett Aluli, M.D., and Walter Ritte—were in the one boat that made it past the Coast Guard blockade and actually landed on the island. While the Navy arrested the protesters, Ritte and Aluli remained hidden. Having stayed behind, they roamed the island for two days before being discovered and arrested. Not only did they witness vast destruction around the island, they also felt the presence of a deep spiritual force. Kaho‘olawe revealed to them that it was not just a barren target island. Seeking an explanation of their spiritual epiphany on Kaho‘olawe, Aluli and Ritte sought out Native Hawaiian kūpuna to share their memories of Kaho‘olawe. They recruited [George] Helm and drew upon the kua’aiina of Moloka‘i, Hāna, and Hawai‘i. … Aunty Edith Kanaka‘ole of Hilo, Hawai‘i, advised the young men to organize their work in stopping the military use of Kaho‘olawe in a Hawaiian manner: as an ‘ohana for the island rather than as an association. Through the course of this spiritual journey, an entirely new image of Kaho‘olawe as a sacred island emerged” (2007: 151-53).
surface ordnance; and begin soil conversation and revegetation. The decree also declared the PKO Ke Kahu O Ka‘āina or Steward of the Land and allowed access to the island for religious, cultural, and educational activities for four days in ten months of each year (McGregor 2007: 265). Seen as an interim measure, the PKO simultaneously continued to press for an end to all bombing and military training on the island and co-existed with the U.S. military and federal government in order to begin their restoration and “healing” of Kaho‘olawe.

During the 1980s the political militancy of PKO subsided while the cultural and spiritual grassroots activism expanded. Then-U.S. President George H.W. Bush ordered a temporary end to the bombing and live-fire military training on Kaho‘olawe, and Democrats in Congress pursued legislation to permanently cease military use of the island and clean it of ordnances. This was enacted in November 1993, at roughly the same time that the Apology Resolution was enacted to acknowledge the United State’s illegal overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom one hundred years prior. In addition to this national-state conjunctural moment in the early 1990s, it is important to point out that the PKO effectively exploited another conjunctural moment in the 1970s when an alignment of political, economic, and community interests on Maui were receptive to halting the Navy bombing of Kaho‘olawe. While island politicians, businessmen and their associates throughout the state, were generally supportive of the U.S. military presence in Hawai‘i, the continual

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425 Specifically, the Consent Decree provided the following: 1) the bombing was limited to the central third of the island; 2) the Navy ceased bombing 10 days of each month for 10 months; 3) within the 10 days the ‘Ohana was to be provided access for 4 days for religious, cultural, educational and scientific purposes; and 4) within the 10 days, the Navy was to begin cleaning 1/3 of the island, as designated by the ‘Ohana, conduct a survey of the cultural and historical sites to develop a management plan, do goat eradication, and do revegetation (McGregor, personal communication).

426 McGregor goes on to explain: “Several members of the ‘Ohana criticized the consent decree as an unacceptable compromise because it meant joint use of the island with the U.S. Navy and therefore an acknowledgement of their presence and use of the island. In protest, they resigned from the organization. Those who remained in the ‘Ohana viewed the consent decree as an interim measure to relieve the island of full-scale, year-round bombing. Isolating the bombardment to a third of the island meant that two-thirds of the island could begin the healing process, being cleared of surface ordnance and replanted with grasses and trees” (2007: 265-66).

427 This was political maneuvering during a heated election year in which a rare Republican was in serious contention for a Hawai‘i congressional seat (which is usually filled by a Democrat); both Republican President Bush and the Democrats who controlled Congress hoped to favorably influence the election.

428 This was based upon the recommendations of the congressionally-appointed Kaho‘olawe Island Conveyance Commission (KICC).

429 See Cooper and Daws (1985: Chapter Nine “Maui: Developing Kihei”) for a detailed discussion of these aligned interests in Maui and their connections throughout the state.
military training on Kaho’olawe was seen as an impediment to expanding tourism in Kihei on southwest Maui. Maui residents also supported an end to the bombing for the sake of their own safety and their island’s environment.

The Protect Kaho’olawe ‘Ohana took full advantage of this and other receptive political climates. After nearly ten years of extensive clean-up of ordnances and environmental restoration projects by the U.S. military, the State of Hawai‘i received full access control to Kaho’olawe in 2004. For nearly thirty years, the Protect Kaho’olawe ‘Ohana has been hosting annual Makahiki festivities, frequent community access trips, navigational gatherings, and myriad cultural practices and spiritual rituals. The PKO has been one of the most successful Hawaiian and anti-militarist movements in the islands to date. In directly confronting the U.S. military—making visible what was previously hidden in plain sight amid a generally complacent public—the Protect Kaho’olawe ‘Ohana brought forth a Hawaiian subject no longer subjected to American national security prerogatives. It was one of the first explicitly Hawaiian nationalist moments. Through the ensuing decades, this Hawaiian political identity has continued to be articulated and acted upon in multiple and vibrant ways by diverse Hawaiians and allies.

What was the impact of Kaho’olawe’s anti-militarist struggle on the Kamaka family land struggle in Waikāne? Members of the Protect Kaho’olawe ‘Ohana came to Waiāhole-Waikāne to “defend” and “occupy” the valleys in late 1976/early 1977 during the anti-eviction struggle. The Waiāhole-Waikāne Community Association welcomed this support even though they didn’t reciprocate “cause the Kaho’olawe thing was seen pretty

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430 McGregor explains: “The key to the clean up and return of Kaho’olawe was the insistence of the ‘Ohana and the State of Hawai‘i that title ownership to the island be turned over to the State before the clean up (in May 1994). Never before had title been turned over to a previously used military ordnance site prior to clean up—because, the military has never certified that a previous military ordnance training site is clean and safe. Even at Kaho’olawe, after the ten year $400 million clean up, the Navy says that they can only guarantee that they are 90% confident that they detected 85% of the ordnance. If we had waited for the transfer of title until after the clean up, the island would never be returned to the State of Hawai‘i which holds it in trust for eventual transfer to the sovereign Hawaiian entity when it is re-established and recognized by the federal and state governments” (personal communication).

431 As Coffman observes: “Kaho’olawe altered the nature of the Hawaiian movement. What had begun as a series of initiatives to secure help from the government—with modest experiments in autonomy, such as Alu Like—had been transformed into a spiritual and nationalistic movement. Around this time, the word “lāhui” (nation) was revived (2003: 304)."
much as a Hawaiian thing” whereas WWCA was not.\(^{432}\) 1976 was that same year that the PKO began their illegal landings on Kaho’olawe and the same year that the U.S. Marines returned lands to the Kamakas. Despite the overlap, it is unclear that the PKO’s Hawaiian nationalism had any bearing on the Kamaka’s struggle. As a whole, most family members surprisingly distanced themselves politically from the Hawaiian movement.

However, in their own non-politicized way, as lineal descendants that trace their genealogy to konohiki, kahuna, and ali’i in Waikāne for innumerable generations, the Kamakas articulate and act upon their Hawaiianness in terms of spiritual and cultural connectivity akin to—and beyond that expressed in—the Kaho’olawe struggle. In referencing the ahupua’a, two family members share numerous stories of the “sacred things in there.”\(^{433}\)

Let me tell you something. [There is a medicinal heiau taken care of] from our great grandparents, on to our parents, up to our time, up to the ’70s when the law came down [and took the land from us. Recently we went there.] Nobody walked there, nobody traveled in [to the back of the valley], … Around the heiau [there’s] like a trail and it’s about two-and-a-half foot back. Grass [smoothed back; gestures with hand], right, [like] people been walking—but nobody walks there! … This is a true story; I’m not lying, a true story. And the man that takes care of that is our great-great-grandfather.\(^{434}\)

Their kūpuna continue to care for the lands and waters of Waikāne and present-day Kamakas have been imbued with this same sacred responsibility. For example, these Kamaka family members have found and continue to care for sacred pōhaku (rock; stone) from undisclosed locations in the valley, emphasizing how they cherish and protect these sacred things rather than “cashing them in” for a profit. They explain:

\(^{432}\) E. 1/16/04. The quote in its entirety is: “You know, in fact, I can’t even really think if there were any like support contingent from Waiahōle-Waikāne that ever went to [a] Kaho’olawe thing, ‘cause the Kaho’olawe thing was seen pretty much as a Hawaiian thing, you know. Whereas the thing there in the valley was never seen as a Hawaiian thing, [there] was a Hawaiian component—there were Hawaiian people in that struggle—but the struggle in and of itself was not a Hawaiian struggle, per se. So they didn’t quite intersect on that level, but when the call for support went out for the valleys, the leadership of the Kaho’olawe struggle—Protect Kaho’olawe [‘Ohana], which was just really beginning at that point—came. Those, of course, were your most advanced people; so they didn’t come with 50 people or something like that. But George [Helm] came and he played, and the leadership came. And I’m sure they must’ve taken to heart, I mean, how they saw that thing developing. Yeah, but they’re kinda like, to me, they’re two different kinds of struggles. Based differently, organized differently, leadership different kind, you know, way of approaching—but, I mean, the similarities is that both were built big” (emphasis in original).

\(^{433}\) Ks. 8/13/05.

\(^{434}\) Ks. 8/13/05.
If you are blessed with your ancestors, that will keep you here and to where and what they want you to be, you’ll survive happy, wherever. … Sacred places for people with, you know, pure mind and good hearts.  

Another Kamaka family member recounts how his father came to him in a dream, urging him to return to the land, to care for it, and to never get rid of it. Hawaiian anthropologist Lynette Cruz explains that “[d]reams and visions are significant for Hawaiians, particularly in times of conflict. The person who has a dream or vision...[has] a responsibility to pass the information along” (2003). This Kamaka family member acted upon the responsibility imparted upon him in the dream by coming home to Waikâne (from living off-island): “Seeing the vision, and I live the vision.” He re-opened lo‘i for taro farming and began raising other crops on the family lands returned by the U.S. military. In the early 1980s, he was living and working on the mauka lands within an explicit Hawaiian cultural and spiritual framework. Like his cousins’ story above about the heiau, this Kamaka family member shares several otherwise unexplainable spiritual moments and personal epiphanies related to his family and their relationship to the lands of Waikâne. Another cousin describes the values passed on to her generation from their parents’ and grandparents’ generation as follows: “The land will take care of you if you take care of the land. And then you pass it on, because we are just caretakers.”

For these Kamaka family members spiritual and cultural dimensions of Hawaiian personhood tended not to correspond with political or nationalist Hawaiian identity. One Kamaka family member said very straightforwardly:

I don’t believe in sovereignty. To a certain point. I don’t think you can go backwards. In other words, you can’t go back already. I think [Hawaiians] need to be recognized, something needs to be done, but I personally don’t feel—today a little more; ten years ago, no. … And then you have all these different sovereignty factions coming up, it’s like “Well, which one should we belong to?” … We need the United States. …I think we’re lucky to live here.

435 Ks. 8/13/05.  
436 S. 4/13/05.  
437 D. 4/13/05.
This statement suggests that her American national citizenship overrides Hawaiian political affinity, while at the same time, it apparently does not interfere with her cultural and spiritual Hawaiianess. When asked specifically about Hawaiian issues, the Hawaiian movement, and Hawaiian cultural revitalization (in those terms), another Kamaka family member said, after some pondering:

You got to excuse me. For me, I don’t know, maybe it’s because I still have the old ways of keeping things to yourself. I know what’s right and I know what’s wrong. And I don’t want to disrespect any belief or opinion so I tend to stay by myself and do what I think is right.438

After a brief pause, he then went on to mildly criticize Kamehameha Schools and the lack of leadership in the Hawaiian movement. This suggests that he and others who share his views are decidedly not politically active to avoid “disrespecting” or offending anyone, especially within the extended Kamaka family. He (and others) choose instead to be actively involved in “a lot of spiritual things.”

One prominent Kamaka family member was an elected official, and later appointed official, in the state government since the 1950s. He even ran for mayor of the City and County of Honolulu in 1980. He was part of the political establishment, and while he no longer lived in Waikāne, it was well known that he disapproved of the confrontational militancy exhibited by the residents of Waiāhole-Waikāne in their anti-eviction struggle. Since this family member was of the older generation, other family members may have been reluctant to embrace a Hawaiian political identity or nationalist position.439 Other family members who were not politically connected with the state expressed similar disapproval of the Waiāhole-Waikāne Community Association’s extralegal tactics. The perception inside and outside of the valleys, as one allied activist from the PKO put it, was that “the Kamakas are not that political as a family; they are rather conservative…that was part of the problem.”440 This lack of an explicit political or nationalist Hawaiian orientation was problematic for activists in the

438 T. 8/13/05.
439 In a slightly different context, McGregor explains how Hawaiians’ familial relations affect their political participation: “Hawaiians might have felt [restraint] in organizing around their concerns for fear of negatively affecting friends or relatives in office or their own positions” (1980: 34).
440 V. 5/2/05.
broader Hawaiian movement and thereby made it difficult for them to mobilize in support of the Kamaka land struggle.

However, there was an exception to the generally non-political, non-nationalist position of the Kamakas. For the Kamaka family member who had the dream urging him back to the land, over time, he developed and deployed an overtly political Hawaiian nationalist position. It was he who was farming on the former military training zone when ordnances were unearthed—only a few years after the Kahoʻolawe Consent Decree was issued. And it was he, alone, who after years of struggle refused to sign the forced settlement in which the U.S. military financially compensated Kamaka family members for the taking of their lands.441 He explains:

I fought the government tooth and nail. ... [T]he way I put my claim in was this: ‘...I’m a Hawaiian subject [in the] Kingdom of Hawai‘i. I still have my rights as I talk to you today—forever.’ ... What I did was insert our law, our constitution and our government as the Kingdom of Hawai‘i into the American law.442

In supplanting American citizenship with Hawaiian nationalism, this Kamaka family member, like the PKO before him, refused to be subjected to American national security prerogatives. He went further than the PKO by questioning the very legitimacy of American law in Hawai‘i. In exercising his agency as a Hawaiian national, he has gained a sense of political empowerment as well as spiritual empowerment. He describes it as a spiritual calling that pushed him to be more political:

I did not enter these problems. I got involved with these problems through the kūpuna—not here, but gone already.... I was chosen [by my dad who said to me:] “I don’t want you to sell our land, or give it away. I want you to fight for the land.”443

The ironic outcome of this family member’s assertive form of Hawaiian nationalism is that it resulted in less support for the Kamaka struggle within the predominantly self-identified Local Waiāhole-Waikāne community (which was generally complacent vis-à-

441 During and since the mid 1990s settlement, the U.S. federal government has repeatedly pressured this lone Kamaka family member to sign off on the condemnation/confiscation and receive the compensatory money. He has refused to do so with the hopes of eventually getting back the land or back onto the land (Aguiar 2004).
442 M. 8/30/05, emphasis in original.
443 M. 8/30/05.
vis the U.S. military in Hawai‘i), and even from the taro farmers who were rooted in Hawaiian culture but not nationalism per se, which compounded the lack of support the family received from Hawaiian groups outside the valleys. The intersecting issues of Hawaiian nationalism, political identity, and class distanced community members from each other and hindered their coming together to support the Kamaka struggle.

“WE WENT AT ODDS WITH OUR OWN COMMUNITY”

[The Kamaka family didn’t really participate in the anti-eviction struggle] because they were safe and secure. ... In the end it cost them. If they had been involved that whole struggle would have coalesced around their issue. They would have won. I know they would have won. But they stayed out...  

This statement by an allied activist of Waiāhole-Waikāne expresses a view shared by many veterans of the anti-eviction struggle. Initially, the Kamakas were actively involved with the Waiāhole-Waikāne Community Association even though they were not directly threatened with eviction. As one Kamaka family member explains: “these are our fellow families and neighbors and we supported them. Just because we owned land doesn’t mean we don’t care about them. That’s why we joined [WWCA].”  

However, when the split occurred, the Kamakas were on the minority, moderate side—many of whom disengaged from active participation. The same Kamaka explains:

[S]ome of the methods they were using we didn’t feel too comfortable with. ... we didn’t go against them; we didn’t speak against them. We just pulled away, yes, because we didn’t like some of the actions they were taking and it wasn’t for us.  

Because they essentially withdrew from the anti-eviction struggle, many residents who remained in the WWCA—which was now made up of increasingly radicalized tenants informed by a Marx-Lenin-Mao class analysis—understood the Kamakas to be acting in their class interest as property owners. Despite their shared ‘country lifestyle’ and its

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444 B. 8/9/05.
445 S. 4/13/05.
446 S. 4/13/05.
attendant mixed economic activities, the tenants were now articulating the landowners as being petit-bourgeoisie in opposition to the tenants who were “working-class.”

There was some basis to this, for example as this Kamaka family member articulates similar oppositional positions:

We pulled out... because we could not understand the way they were moving. ... You are a lessee, where do you get telling the landlord what to do with their land?! We own land too. Some of us rent our land out, you know, houses and stuff. And as long as you are abiding within the law—I mean, how is it that a lessee or a renter can tell the landlord what they’re going to pay and what they’re not going to pay. And who do you think put up this house? You know what I mean? That kind of stuff.  

The Kamakas were clearly uncomfortable with the implications of the WWCA decision to collectively withhold rents because it could have negative consequences for those who were landlords themselves and relied upon rent-collection as income. In the 1950s, the Kamakas had built a small subdivision on their ‘ohana homestead lands that were previously separated out from the Waikāne Hui. This older generation of Kamakas consisted of eleven siblings, and the younger generation of their children (those whom I interviewed) consisted of more than fifty siblings/cousins. The Kamaka subdivision of two dozen or so single-family and duplex homes was built for their own family occupancy as well as for rental income to be used by some family members. In this way, the WWCA charge that the Kamakas withdrew from the anti-eviction struggle because they were acting in their own, class-situated, self-interest is substantiated.

Their withdrawal, however, was also a reaction to the allied MLM activists who were becoming members of the Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP) and heavily influencing the Waiāhole-Waikāne residents to become more strident. The Kamaka family member quoted above goes on to say:

So that was one reason [because of the lessee position], but more it was the communistic thing was starting to get involved and that’s when we said “Whoa, we don’t want any part of this!”  

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447 S. 4/13/05.
449 S. 4/13/05.
This “communistic thing”—in addition to particularly militant tactics—refers to the MLM/RCP activists who were radicalizing tenants with a forceful class analysis. Numerous residents emphasized how important the outside “education” by allied activists helped them overcome their initial hesitation and naïveté. But the education that residents received from MLM/RCP activists was an overarching structuralist class framework. Structuralist here refers to the materialist dimensions of class as structurally determined resulting from one’s position in relations of production. A structuralist understanding of class is one in which class functions as a noun: one occupies a class position based upon one’s location in a politico-economic structure. This is distinct from a non-structuralist (postmodern) understanding of class in which class functions as a verb (Resnick and Wolff 1987): one participates in class processes based upon a variety of possible production activities in various socioeconomic situations.

Armed with a structuralist class framework, Waiāhole-Waikāne tenants articulated “the system” as a code word for the totality of this capitalist structure in the islands. With the knowledge of, and language in which to, position themselves within this system, residents active in the WWCA took on this increasingly rigid understanding of class over the more fluid and multiple class processes they previously had experienced. While articulations of working-class served to unite the Waiāhole-Waikāne residents in mobilizing against impending displacement in the mid 1970s—and many residents and allied activists emphasize how important this sense of unity was to prevent ethnic splitting—it also unwittingly created a wedge in the community. Over time this foregrounding of MLM-inspired class analysis introduced opposing positions in the community where little existed before: kuleana Hawaiian or otherwise small-landowners were now identifiable as the petit-bourgeoisie because they occupied the position of landowner. In this way, these country neighbors were constituted as holding a differentiated class position despite sharing similar class processes—and being the fortunate few who survived earlier land disposessions by the oppressive few such as the McCandlesses.
Two divergent forces were at play beginning in the anti-eviction struggle: one was centripetal by pulling in the various ethnic groups together through a Localized working-class subjective identity; the other was centrifugal in pulling apart longtime neighbors along the seams of land-owning Hawaiians versus tenant Hawaiians and tenant non-Hawaiians. As a result, self-identifying working-class tenants found it difficult to identify with, and thus support, the issues of land-owning Kamakas. When asked, valley residents and WWCA members would say “that was a different issue,” “that was their family’s fight,” or “it didn’t concern us.” Or as more than one resident pointed out: “[Y]ou have the landowner and you have the lessees and they are coming from two different sides of the world. Two different opinions, two different things that affect them.”

However, the Kamakas were not so different from their tenant neighbors.

Consider this lamentation by a Kamaka family member:

[We are] a family that has land but no money. … We are a poor family; we are not rich. And you know, as far as our families are concerned, they didn’t have the college education. Many of them didn’t even finish high school. But they struggle to pay their taxes every year with what little they had and held on to it for us. Then when it came to our generation, we couldn’t hold on to it. It’s sad. … The community at that time didn’t understand, see. We went at odds with our own community.

While one particular Kamaka family member had notable material wealth as well as political power as a high-level public office holder, most did not. And while they were landowners as a family, the monetary benefits some received from rents were usually off-set by tax burdens and other expenses. Moreover, having land as capital did not correspond to higher education levels, increased social or symbolic capital, or more

450 According to Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 118-119), the phrase “working class” can “define a specific position in the relations of production” and also “name the agents who occupy that subject position.” The ambiguity that results from these two ways of using “working class” allows for some people who do “working class” work to not be named as working-class per se. In other words, this moniker of working-class conflates an economic identity with a political subjectivity, which is often then “fit into” a social totality (such as the hegemonic “capitalist system,” or counter-hegemonic systems such as socialism). This conflation of a working-class position and a working-class identity obscures the complexity of lived class experiences and diverse class processes, and ultimately denies the possibility that capitalism is not a social totality that encompasses all aspects of life, but instead a process that exists alongside other economic, political, and cultural processes.

451 W. 5/13/04.

452 S. 4/13/05.
material capital. Additionally, their supposed sociopolitical interests did not always align with their economic interests. For example, unlike the radicalized tenants who remained active on the WWCA steering committee, many Kamaka family members participated in the fight against golf course development in Waikāne in the mid 1980s and early 1990s. Rather than align with capital interests because their land values would increase, the Kamakas felt threatened by an accompanying increase in their property tax burden and preferred to continue their modest “country lifestyle.”

The unwitting class wedge comported with the framing of the Kamaka land struggle as a private dispute and not a public issue. The Kamakas’ articulation of their chiefly genealogy and land in Waikāne, combined with their legal focus on protecting private property rights, further contributed to the community’s demobilization. Added to this was the fact that the Kamakas did, after all, withdraw from WWCA at the height of the anti-eviction struggle. As one resident said, “in the end it cost them.” This same person observes that residents of Waiāhole-Waikāne don’t talk about the Kamaka land struggle, because perhaps:

I think there is some sense of guilt that maybe they [the Kamakas] should have been helped, but they [the community] couldn’t get past [this one family member]…not just as a Hawaiian nationalist, but a Kamaka nationalist—[he was] that narrow. It goes against what our basic trust [is] here: that there is a diversity and a kind of unity within that diversity that won it [the anti-eviction struggle].

This “kind of unity within that diversity” bespeaks of the working-class based multiethnic Localism that many Waiāhole-Waikāne residents continue to hold dear to them. The persistency of that working-class, multiethnic Local self-image impeded the capacity of most Waiāhole-Waikāne residents, and almost certainly the community association headed by the steering committee made up of radicalized tenants, to support their Hawaiian landowning neighbors. Complicating this further was the fact

453 The development of golf courses in Waikāne was pursued by the subsequent Japanese corporate owners of the former McCandless Hui lands. Because the WWCA did not oppose the golf course development (see Modavi 1992 for further discussion), an alternative community organization, Concerned Residents of Waiāhole-Waikāne (CRWW), formed in opposition to the golf courses. Some Kamaka family members were active participants of CRWW, as were Waiāhole taro farmers and others on the ‘moderate’ side of the community split during the anti-eviction struggle. See Chapter Six, footnote 356, for further discussion.
454 B. 8/9/05.
that the Kamakas’ genealogy traces to the chiefly class of pre-state Hawai‘i, and ali‘i traditions simply don’t resonate as well as maka‘āinana traditions do with the islands’ working-class people. This is what the earlier quote references in regard to the one family member who was a “Kamaka nationalist” because “he would claim all of the valleys for the Kamakas.”

It is here where class narratives intersect with a certain anxiety about Hawaiian nationalism and political identity. The following dialogue between two Waiāhole-Waikāne residents illustrates this dynamic:

There was a real big upheaval in Waiāhole because they [Hawaiian nationalists] were always saying how, you know: “We want to go to sovereignty; we want to tell the military get out; we want…” But what they didn’t realize is that here they were, educated people, trying to tell ordinary grassroots people, who really work the land, to tell our military to get out. But yet they were married to haoles, they live in condominiums. Were they going to give up all that [and] come back into the taro patches? I don’t think so.” —

—They want to be chiefs, they don’t want to be the kānaka maoli.

—I think those of us who really are true Hawaiians, we really got to look at the situation. Because, to me, I think there is an injustice to Hawaiians, but the leadership is one I wouldn’t follow.

These veterans of the anti-eviction struggle are speaking of a recent community controversy in which the U.S. Marines attempted to re-establish their military training zone in Waikāne for the so-called War on Terror. However, the perspectives they share have been lingering in the community for decades and inform how some (many) residents understand and articulate the contentious issues of class and identity. The Hawaiian woman first quoted juxtaposes her and her fellow residents as “ordinary grassroots people, who really work the land” against the Hawaiian nationalists who are

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455 B. 8/9/05.
456 H. 2/28/04.
457 L. 2/28/04.
458 H. 2/28/04.
“educated people”, “married to haoles”, and “live in condominiums.” Her first quote in the dialogue signals her subsistence- and working-class identity connected to the land. In the second quote, she marks her class position as that of a “true Hawaiian” in contrast to Hawaiian sovereignty leaders who lose legitimacy by being educated, out-marrying, urban-dwellers with upper-class markings. Moreover, she suggests that these Hawaiian nationalists insincerely romanticize the self-sustaining lifestyle of “the taro patch,” which evokes a time of Native sovereignty prior to the American military occupation of Hawai‘i, and in rejecting such invocations positions herself politically and culturally within the American present and future for which “our military” is legitimate. Her fellow resident chimes in that “they”—Hawaiian sovereignty leaders—“want to be chiefs” and not the ordinary grassroots people that are the true kānaka maoli (Hawaiian; true person). In this alignment, a working-class economic identity is coupled with a Hawaiian cultural identity and an American political identity. This intersubjectivity is preferred in Waiāhole-Waikâne, as opposed to the “real big upheaval” instigated by upper-class Hawaiian nationalists who were attempting to “be chiefs” again.

The invocation of Hawaiian chiefs as negative and threatening was not uncommon in my conversations with the people of Waiāhole-Waikâne. Although I have heard similar invocations by others elsewhere through the years, these are usually far outweighed by the overwhelming aloha that Hawaiians have for their ali‘i. Yet, here, many Hawaiians are consistently choosing to embrace an American political identity as they cast aside Hawaiian cultural and political traditions. Another Hawaiian resident of Waiāhole-Waikâne articulates this clearly:

We need the United States. I don’t care what they say, that’s my feeling. We are too small to think we can do without them. Look what happened with Pearl Harbor. The United States in my experience has not been the best big father there is, but I think we’re lucky to live here and I think we—I don’t know, I didn’t live during the days of the King and Queen, but I’m sure there’s certain things that if I didn’t do it right I’d be dead. With the [U.S.] government, you can speak up all you want; they may not be listening to you, but you can speak anyway. 459

459 J. 5/13/04.
There is much to unpack in this quote. First, like the dialogue above, U.S. militarism is deeply imbricated in these articulations. In saying “We need the United States...Look what happened with Pearl Harbor,” this resident is reiterating the “narratives of reassurance” (Ferguson and Turnbull 1999: xv) that naturalize the U.S. military presence in the islands as essential for “our” (American) national security. This reiteration simultaneously silences alternative understandings. For example, just as easily we might say: The U.S. military needs to get out of Hawai‘i to ensure that the islands will no longer be another country’s military target—look what happened with Pearl Harbor! This alternative articulation is effectively silenced by the resounding narratives of reassurance that are repeatedly reinforced not only by this Wai‘āhole-Waikāne resident, but also by government officials, military personnel (active-duty, reservists, retirees) and their families, news media, educational curriculum, and as seen in symbols and signs throughout the islands. Moreover, this resident, like many islanders, believes that it is because of the extensive U.S. military presence in Hawai‘i that we can exercise our (democratic) rights to “speak up all you want.” The U.S. might not be “the best big father there is,” but this statement suggests that we should be grateful because it’s better to have the U.S. than no father at all. The paternalism and trope of protection in this statement, in and of itself, demonstrates why this resident and his like-minded neighbors in Wai‘āhole-Waikāne did not support Kamaka family land struggle. Simply put: they supported and continue to support the U.S. military instead.

Additionally, however, I want to unpack another portion of this Hawaiian man’s statement. When he says “during the days of the King and Queen...I’m sure there’s certain things that if I didn’t do it right I’d be dead,” he is positioning the kapu system that governed traditional Hawai‘i in contradistinction to the so-called democratic freedom that the U.S. military protects. The fact that the U.S. government (as an institution and as the collective of public officials) “may not be listening to you” is downplayed because we are taught in American civics classes that it is the capacity to speak that signals democracy and freedom instead of the actual ability to participate in governance or exercise
autonomous agency in forms of one’s choosing. Combined with the anti-monarchism that is innately part of American national consciousness, the Hawaiian kapu system is therefore imagined in the most barbaric terms possible. “I’m sure there’s certain things that if I didn’t do it right I’d be dead” is a direct reference to the severe punishments meted out for kapu violations, such as when a commoner had the misfortunate to have a chief’s shadow cast upon him or her. Why does the shadow of the ali’i continue to have a foreboding presences in contemporary Hawai’i for so many Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians, more foreboding than the nuclear warships anchored in Pearl Harbor?

In Chapter Two, I showed how the kapu system, as a symbolic economy of the sacred, and in conjunction with local community governance systems in ahupua’a and among ‘ohana, reflected much more complex and nuanced social relations of reciprocal exchanges. The ali’i, maka‘āinana, ‘āina, and akua were all interconnected in traditional Hawaiian life-ways. Importantly, all Hawaiian historians of the early and mid 19th century (Malo, Kamakau, ʻĪtī, Kepelino), as well as early foreign observers (Richards), describe how the norm was for chiefs to act with mercy in sparing the lives of commoners who might otherwise be put to death according to the dictates of the kapu system. I also showed how Hawaiian commoners exercised a significant degree of liberty in their everyday lives, and that, in actuality, the day-to-day freedom of chiefs (especially the most sacred chiefs) was much more restrictive. Many chiefs would take great pains to stay indoors during sunlight hours so as not to cast their shadow on commoners and would save the lives of commoners. If this is the case, why do contemporary Hawaiians (and especially non-Hawaiians) articulate such apprehensions of the chiefs’ shadows? Why do the residents of Waiāhole-Waikāne believe they are “lucky to live here” in a highly militarized, Americanized Hawai’i instead of “back into the taro patches”? And how does this relate to the Kamaka family land struggle?

I suggest that these articulations reveal a class/status anxiety that intersects with anxieties over Hawaiian political identity: the uncertainty of and therefore apprehension about what class one belongs to and therefore what status one has in relation to persons
in another class or of another status within a Hawaiian Hawai‘i. This concerns how class positions of chiefs—commoners, ali‘i—maka‘āinana, are (mis)understood to be cruel and exploitative, and thereby how such (mis)understandings obscure the class processes of mutual obligation and reciprocal exchanges of equivalences that not only characterize traditional Hawaiian society but which also provide a framework for many who seek to renew forms and practices of Hawaiian self-determination today. While some Hawaiian nationalists and sovereignty leaders do seek “to be chiefs” again, many more Hawaiian nationalists advocate Hawaiian life-ways that emulate collectivity, reciprocity and kuleana as was demonstrated by the majority of chiefs of old. Waiahole-Waikâne residents are wary when they hear one Kamaka family member (the only one) make statements such as these in both public and private settings:

My family had over 2,000 acres. … [Dad] said: “We own this valley through our kūpuna.”

We had organized a group here. At [that] time, nobody understands… We started reading books and started to remember. (emphasis in original)

There are two laws here, and the people know about it. You get two laws: Hawaiian Kingdom and United States. … They’ve got their constitution and we’ve got ours.

Many apprehensive residents may have wondered if this Kamaka family member was re-claiming the whole Waikâne valley (and maybe even Waiahole valley) for his family under Hawaiian Kingdom laws. Such a claim would understandably make residents of Waiahole-Waikâne uneasy if they believed their continued tenancy in the valleys was tenuous or unsupported by the Kamakas. They may have interpreted this Kamaka family member to be advocating a return to the Hawaiian Kingdom, through which he was positioning himself as chief over them. This mis-understanding of, or at least an un-appreciation for, the mutual and reciprocal relationships that existed among most chiefs and commoners, further informs their present-day skepticism.
The fact that the original Kamaka Hui member, Kalawai’apa’a, was an ali‘i no doubt adds to these class/status anxieties, especially when other Kamaka family members emphasize that they are the descendents of chiefs:

There’s a lot of spiritual things about being part of the ancestor of Kamehameha line, the royal line. And I understand why, too, the hardness of our blood line is because the warriors.460

Although this Kamaka family member is invoking his royal genealogy primarily in the context of spiritual strength, he also gestures toward the warrior in him and his kin. To an apprehensive resident, this assertion of greater legitimacy to the lands of Waikâne might be unsettling, especially for non-kuleana owning Hawaiians. For kuleana owning Hawaiians, their claim to Waiāhole-Waikâne is secure based upon longstanding Native tenancy, which is as legitimate as (if not more than) the konohiki claims of Kamakas. But the Kamaka claims may put into question relationship of the lands of Waiāhole-Waikâne that non-kuleana Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians hold. The clarity of the Kamakas’ lineage and ties to their ancestors’ lands may generate even more class/status anxiety for Hawaiians who do not have such chiefly genealogies, or who may not be aware of their genealogies beyond the immediate branches of their close family.

This slippage between understandings of the past and uncertainties about the future informs perceptions and articulations of class/status anxiety on the part of residents (and most likely others throughout the islands) vis-à-vis a Hawaiian Hawai‘i. Many residents, Hawaiian and non-Hawaiian alike, consider themselves, as a result, more protected—or to have their interests better served—under the American governance system (with all its attending faults) than under a Hawaiian governance system or any future uncertain formations of a Hawaiian Hawai‘i. This was articulated clearly when the U.S. military attempted to re-establish their military training zone in Waikâne—on the confiscated Kamaka family land. Like the Hawaiian woman who embraces “our military,” this dialogue between two of the leaders of the anti-eviction struggle (a couple whose wife is Hawaiian) is telling:

460 L. 8/13/05.
When a Marines was gonna train in Waikâne we were helping dem out, ‘cause it’s a good cause, I mean, for da state anyway, for our own survival.

Plus, ‘cause we wanna be protected, yeah.

Yeah, dat’s what I mean. But some of da other people, I mean, dat’s their own thinking, their own right. Dey go against dat. But, me and my wife, I fight for dis country, I need protection.

Yeah, we supported da Marines to go and do their training in their land. We enjoy da price of freedom, so why shouldn’t we.

...Whoever involved in a military before, they believe in military power for adhere to freedom...  

This couple, as with the two residents in dialogue earlier, emphasize that Waiâhole-Waikâne is a multiethnic, Local community. Class narratives are often articulated with and against narratives of ethnic and national identity. For many, being a “true Hawaiian” means being one of the “ordinary grassroots people,” that is, a maka‘ainana and not an ali‘i, a part of the working class and not the educated elite. Similarly, it is the working-class people that are the backbone—and the roots—of multiethnic Localism. Therefore, Hawaiian nationalists who position themselves in opposition to multiethnic Localism are articulated as upper-class and thereby not legitimate representatives of “true Hawaiians”. An inattentiveness to this intersection of class and identity on the part of advocates for a Hawaiian Hawai‘i limit their capacity to expand the movement in ways that are relevant to the life experiences of many Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians. I now turn to another area of inattention that warrants further discussion.

THE LIMITS OF MULTICULTURALISM

Multiculturalism, as a set of shared values and political practices, limited the capacity of Waiâhole-Waikâne residents to come together in support of the Kamaka family land struggle against the U.S. military. The continual reproduction of Waiâhole-

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461 Ys. 1/22/04, emphasis added.
Waikâne as a Local, multiethnic, working-class community has prevented a larger critique being levied against so-called American national security prerogatives that dispossess Hawaiians of land. This is because Localism in Hawai‘i is inextricably intertwined with American multiculturalism. The idea (and ideal) of multiculturalism is not a bad one; the problem, however, is that it functions to bolster the “idea” of America as a multicultural nation that is in constant need of defending. In other words, “the price of freedom” to be multicultural is paid by having an extensive U.S. military presence in Hawai‘i and elsewhere. What is left out of this equation is the price paid by Hawaiians in their homelands for this imposed militarism, and the opportunity costs incurred by all people in Hawai‘i who might otherwise live a more peaceful coexistence. Recall the evidence: “Today 54 percent of military-held land, approximately 112,173 acres, is so-called ‘ceded land,’ commonly understood by Kanaka Maoli to be stolen land” (Kajihiro 2008: 176). Add to this the hundreds and thousands of acres of private Hawaiian lands, such as the Kamaka’s family lands in Waikâne, that the U.S. military has condemned and confiscated in the name of national security. The American multicultural frame of Hawai‘i’s Localism inadequately deals with this reality (to say the least).

Additionally, the taro-farming practices that reproduce Waiāhole-Waikâne as an inclusive, Hawaiian community also inadequately deal with the extensive U.S. militarization of the islands. This is because taro farmers’ explicit cultural focus also comports to an American multicultural frame. In informal conversations with Hawaiian nationalist and sovereignty activists, I have heard comments pondering why the Waiāhole taro farmers tend to be more politically “conservative” at the same time as they are doing “radical things” in the taro patches. Without denigrating the importance of a cultural focus, I suggest that an almost strategic foregrounding of Hawaiian cultural practices that correspondingly minimizes Hawaiian political identity and practices is much more palpable for the larger Local communities of Hawai‘i because it makes practicing Hawaiian culture merely one of many cultural practices in the multicultural
American islands. In this framework, cultivating taro is not political and potentially dangerous but simply cultural and thereby harmless.

In discussing the limits of multiculturalism in Hawai‘i, my intent is not to discount the important contributions of the idea, ideals, and practices of multiculturalism for progressive politics. Rather, I am highlighting some areas that demonstrate the limits of multiculturalism in Hawai‘i. As an analytical framework and an identitive political project, the multicultural frame that undergirds Hawai‘i’s Localism delimits permissible discourse and action. What tends to be left on the outside of this multicultural frame are the injustices perpetuated by America’s continued occupation of Hawai‘i and colonization of Hawaiians. Any injustices that are discussed within the multicultural frame are limited to American-prescribed remedial actions (such as compensation, codified rights, and so forth). This is because Hawaiians are incorporated into the multicultural frame as one of America’s many cultural people even if their Native status is acknowledged to be a little more “special” than most. At the same time, many alternative Hawaiian self-determined corrective measures for ongoing injustices are simply left out of the multicultural frame (such as reparations, international restoration of nationhood, and so forth). This is because Hawaiians who assert a Native primacy above and beyond other peoples and issues in Hawai‘i transgress the limits imposed by a multicultural frame of “justice for all.” The “all” here in “justice for all” is an equalizing gesture that in effect places Hawaiian claims to justice on the same level as the claims of other ethnicities to justice in America as Americans.

The obvious problem is that 1) Hawai‘i is not America for many Hawaiians (and increasingly for non-Hawaiians as well), and 2) not all Hawaiians want to be American. Any articulation of this problem—that is, any transgression of the limits imposed by narratives and practices of “justice for all”—is simply incomprehensible in the framework of multiculturalism.

One way in which multiculturalism and militarism are related is evidenced in the profuse admiration that Locals have for the legacy of Hawai‘i’s AJA veterans of
World War II. In short, Americans of Japanese Ancestry (AJAs) in Hawai‘i overcame notable discrimination and oppressive conditions that they and their first-generation immigrant parents experienced to fight valiantly against fascist forces in Europe and prove themselves to be patriotic Americans worthy of “first-class citizenship.” Through hard work, diligence, and faith in the American Dream, AJAs represent the “model minority” that deserve the high levels of social, political, and economic privilege that they now exercise in Hawai‘i (and, more often than not, in Washington D.C. as part of Hawai‘i’s congressional delegation). In Local productions and reproductions of this legacy, all other “ethnic” groups in Hawai‘i—ethnic and not national because we (those of us who are citizens) are all assumed to be of one multiethnic American nation—are encouraged to follow in the footsteps of Americans of Japanese Ancestry. In the islands, AJAs emulate the American Dream of “pulling one’s self up by the bootstraps”—and importantly, it was military boots in which they did this. Although Local AJAs are the most well known of these returning war heroes, World War II U.S. military service cut across Hawai‘i’s ethnic/national communities, and included significant numbers of Hawaiians, Filipinos, and haoles. Additionally, those who remained in Hawai‘i invested themselves in protecting the “home front” within an immense American military build-up in the islands. This experience of World War II, and the post-war and post-statehood legacy of Local AJAs (and others who replicate their legacy or emulate their experiences), has helped to normalize military boots in Hawai‘i.

In Chapter Four, I discussed how Hawaiian-rooted Localism was understood and articulated in the resistive moment of the early and mid 1970s. What was being resisted, along with the rampant development fueled by foreign capital and indulged in by Local elites (many of whom were legendary AJAs), was the influx of “mainland haoles”. In the postwar and early post-statehood years, Hawaiians and Locals were part of the American

462 The work of Ferguson and Turnbull demonstrate the numerous hegemonic “boundary-maintaining, identity-forming work” (1999: 135) that is invested in producing and reproducing “the parameters of approved citizenship” (Ibid: 188) for the American national security state in Hawai‘i. For example, shared experiences of militarized sensibilities within a national security discourse were constituted through and reinforced by gender, race and class practices. The boys came home as men; the ethnic minorities earned the right to be full-fledged American (white) citizens; the former plantation workers ascended the ladder of economic opportunity.
national constituency, but tentatively so as their sense of political community was still strongly determined by their shared histories as islanders. Initially, a working-class narrative helped weld together a Local subjectivity with emerging issues and identities of Hawaiian indigeneity/nationalism. Local came to signify a shared background of primarily non-haoles who had less material capital than the haole missionary/business descendants and newcomer mainland haoles. Local also came to signify a lack of politico-economic rights and socio-cultural privilege. Over time, however, the Hawaiian political community came to be separate from the Local constituency and the Local constituency came to be aligned with a sense of Americanness. This was effected, in part, by an economic shift as more and more Locals—primarily Asians, but also some Hawaiians and others—became, or identified themselves as, middle-class through home ownership and business advancement. It was also a political shift as more and more Locals—primarily Asians, but also some Hawaiians and others—expanded their participation in political arenas and through public office holding. These aspirations and attainments of the American Dream also effected a cultural shift as more Locals—primarily Asians, but also some Hawaiians and others—identified as Americans living an American lifestyle with the attending consumption patterns and markers of middle-class respectability and political citizenship. This shift from a Hawaiian-rooted Localism in the early and mid 1970s is now in effect a Localism aligned with the American Dream. As

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463 Haoles who grow up in Hawai‘i can perform a Local class identity, for example, by wearing T-shirts and ‘slippahs’ everywhere, talking story (especially in pidgin), eating fish and poi, surfing the Locals, etc. The legitimacy of such performances, of course, is contingent on the relational interaction. Local haoles, especially those whose histories in the islands were not indebted to missionary/business forbearers, are able to navigate this precarious class terrain in a number of different ways: by growing up in a notably lower socio-economic community; by graduating from a public school; by surfing all the time; or by being “given that special door half way open because you’re the doctor’s children, especially a country doctor, a family doctor” (H. 4/4/05). So although Hawai‘i’s Localism has clear (non-haole) ethnic and working-class underpinnings, it is not impermeable in its representations of meaning and range of performativity. My point here is that the Local narrative attempts to construct its boundaries of political community upon an uneven racial/ethnic/national/cultural/class terrain.

464 ‘Middle-class,’ as with ‘working-class,’ is ever-ambiguous and thereby potentially all-encompassing as a marker of both class position and class processes, as well as class consumption. For example, a person might engage in working-class processes of wage labor supplemented by subsistence production, yet this same person might consider herself as middle-class because of material consumption patterns (clothing, cars, and so forth) that reflect a middle-class position. Likewise, a person might be upper-middle-class in terms of professional employment and income level, but may engage in working-class material consumption patterns. My point is that the American Dream, as an aspiration, functions to harness working-class Locals to an American political constituency as much as it reaffirms middle-class Locals’ attainment of the Dream. In this way, although Localism in Wai‘ahole-Waikäne is still largely imbued with its working-class roots from an earlier moment, the ambiguity of and slippage between working-class and middle-class is also evident.
Locals align with an American political constituency and increasingly against the Hawaiian political community, an unquestioning acceptance of the U.S. military presence in Hawai‘i—ostensibly to protect aspirations for and attainments of the *multicultural* American Dream—results.\(^{465}\)

When we break through some of the limits of multiculturalism, we can start to disrupt this idea of a multicultural nation in need of continual defense by military means. Moreover, we might recruit cultural traditions for more explicitly political and anti-militarist ends. While the inclusiveness and ethnic diversity of the anti-eviction and water struggles is highly significant and worth emulating in other land and water struggles, it may be an insufficient basis upon which to mobilize against American militarism as evident in the Kamaka case.

**LESSONS LEARNED OF AN UNSUCCESSFUL, SINGULAR STRUGGLE**

What are the lessons from the Kamaka family land struggle? First, this struggle lacked a sustained sociopolitical movement, which limited its access to available sociopolitical resources—such as broad-based alliances—that might have otherwise been used in the family’s legal case. The possibility of such broad-based alliances forming was curtailed because of the narrow use of tradition by the Kamaka family, which emphasized Hawaiianized American propertied individualism rather than Hawaiian Kingdom collective land ownership or Native ahupua’a traditions of reciprocal land stewardship. Second, within the community of Waiāhole-Waikāne, the oppositional class positioning of tenants/proletariat/working-class vs. landowners/petite-bourgeois/upper-class obscured the similar class processes that residents nevertheless continued to experience and share. This not only inhibited residents’ mobilization to

\(^{465}\) The American Dream is coded as multicultural in its essential narrativity. *he* American Dream *is equally* available to *all* whom believe in it. This so-called ‘fact’ is verified by oft-repeated stories of model minorities such as Local AJAs, and personal tales of success such as Barack Obama—‘Only in America could a black child of a single mom modestly raised by his grandmother become president!’ Of course, there is a preponderance of evidence which reveals the American Dream to be as much a myth as it is an idea and an ideal. The ways in which class, race, religion, ethnicity/indigeneity, sex/gender, sexuality, physical ability, etc. all preclude realization of, or even the capacity to pursue, the Dream is muted by resounding articulations of American multiculturalism.
support the Kamaka struggle, but it also produced a class/status anxiety that intersected with contending political identities: an apprehension and ambivalence surrounding Hawaiian as a national and political identity versus an indigenous ethnic identity within an American national and political constituency. In general, issues of dispossession for land-owning Hawaiians is insufficiently supported by broader organizations and movements. And third, the dominance of a multicultural frame in Hawai‘i that prevents larger critiques of American national security prerogatives that dispossess Hawaiians of land made it difficult for the Waiāhole-Waikāne community, as a community, to support the Kamaka family land struggle, and moreover, for the Kamaka family themselves to forge broad-based and sustained sociopolitical mobilization around these complex and intertwining issues.

For members of the Kamaka family, there isn’t much more to say about their land struggle against the U.S. military, as noted in this statement:

They didn’t keep their end of the bargain; there’s nothing much more to say. ... One of the many reasons why they told us that it was impossible to clean was that it was going to cost over one hundred million dollars. And now if you look at Kaho‘olawe, you can put many—three or four—Waikāne in there. And they use like five or six hundred million dollars, you know! And still cleaning, yeah? I don’t know why they can’t clean this place up.

It is done and it seems impossible to be un-done. Several members didn’t want to talk about it and simply referred me to a handful of family members who were most actively involved in the struggle. And of these, only a few were talkative at all. A sadness permeated our conversations as they recalled family stories associated with landmarks and sacred places. This statement expresses the sense of sadness:

It’s like taking part of your life away, you know, because the land is your life. It’s your future. And my [hanai] mom [my aunt] always used to say to us... “Never sell the land, because no matter what happens to you in your life, you are never homeless as long as you have soil under your feet. You know where you belong, where you can live, even if you live in a little house, a shack, a tent, you’re never homeless.

466 Such issues include high rates of inheritance and property taxes that force many Hawaiians to sell their land because they cannot afford the taxes. McGregor has referred to this as one of the last/latest forms of Hawaiian land theft (personal communication).
467 T. 8/13/05.
468 S. 4/13/05.
Something is missing from their lives, a part of their home has been taken away, and they have been denied the right and the responsibility to act upon their sense of sacred obligation to take care of the lands entrusted to them by their kūpuna.

With eyes downcast, a begrudging, slow shake of her head, and a heavy sigh, one Kamaka member called the whole situation “disheartening.” A deep sense of injustice is still experienced by all the Kamakas, especially when considering how much money and effort the U.S. military has put into cleaning up Kahoʻolawe through the years, and now—to add insult to injury—how the U.S. military is cleaning up private lands in Waikāne on which ordnances have since been (or will potentially be) unearthed. A series of meetings were held in 2004 and 2005 at the local elementary school concerning the almost four decades of military training in Waikāne. Military contractors shared information about recent federal legislation that mandates the U.S. military to clean up after itself on privately-owned properties. A Kamaka family member in attendance had this to say:

After that meeting, I got the feeling of how “No wonder they condemned it!” They didn’t have to clean it because now it didn’t fall under the criteria of the qualifications of cleaning because the government now owns this. It is no longer in private hands. But look at the number of years that we owned it.

The proposed clean-up pertains to a handful of small landowners in Waikāne (with an average of five to ten acres) whose properties are adjacent to or were partially included in the former military training zone. These are mostly Hawaiian kuleana owners or those who were part of the Waikāne Hui at one time but whom had partitioned their ‘ohana homesteads from the Hui in the early 20th century. This does not affect the Kamakas—who, with 187 acres, were by far the largest Hawaiian landowners in Waikāne—because the U.S. military confiscated their property well before the new laws went into effect. The Kamakas were outraged, to say the least.

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469 D. 4/13/05.
It should also be noted that the rest of the military training zone that was owned by the McCandless heirs has never been at issue. Elizabeth Marks sold most of the Waikāne Hui lands to Joe Pao’s development firm Windward Partners in the late 1970s. Although military ordnances were found on these lands, they were never at risk for condemnation or confiscation. Whether or not the military cleared ordnances from these lands is unknown. What is known is that Marks made a large amount of money in these Waikāne land sales, as did Windward Partners who later sold the land to a Japanese corporation. On the other hand, the Kamaka family received a very small amount of financial compensation from the U.S. military. As one Kamaka exclaims: “And we couldn’t even sell it, like the McCandless family sold theirs for millions of dollars.” It is difficult to argue against the claim that the Kamakas got the raw end of the deal because they are a Hawaiian family without the same sociopolitical stature and politico-economic connections of Marks and Windward Partners, who were respectively haole and Asian- and mixed- Locals. In the late 1990s, the City and County of Honolulu bought the approximately five hundred acres of Waikāne valley well below market value from the bankrupt Japanese corporation Azabu. The land has been turned into a public nature preserve with a master plan yet to be fully implemented. It is unknown what the status is for military ordnances on the land and any role of the U.S. military therein.

The bitter, bitter irony that the Kamakas were one of the fortunate few Hawaiian families to retain land for almost a century and a half after the Māhele only to lose it by eminent domain of the American government is not lost on the Kamakas. Throughout the almost four decades in which the military used their lands, the Kamakas nonetheless still trusted that the United States government would live up to its lease agreement to clean and return the land.

At the time we thought we were all good American citizens, yes? Then the government pulled in on us. Then it’s like ‘Do I really want to be part of this government? I mean, it’s really, really sad, you know. I even got to the point in my life I didn’t want to vote.”

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471 S. 4/13/05.
Their faith in America—especially one of the most fundamental tenets of American law: the protection of private property—was shattered. Many withdrew from participation in American political processes but did not, for the most part, align themselves politically with Hawaiian nationalism—perhaps, in part, because no Hawaiian organization came to support them. Disillusioned and isolated from their various communities, the Kamakas nevertheless persist in making the best of it.

I think the saddest part of all is—in some cases it was a blessing for my family, because then it stopped us from fighting any more as to what we were going to do with this land. Because when you have like sixty people owning it, for us to make a decision—and the numbers will continually grow as we pass on and our children step in and then as their children get farther and farther away, you know—they don’t have the same attachment to the land and to the history of the valley and where it all came from and the pride that goes with it. It’s just going to start diminishing. After a while, it’s just like just another piece of land, and when you shares go from 18 acres to 1,000 square feet—big difference on your feelings.472

In addition to seeing the silver lining in a very grey sky, this statement gestures towards the ways in which property relations mediate affinal relations to land: the amount of land and the type of land denotes the type and amount of personal attachment to land. I suggest that this reflects the ways in which Western notions of private property have been internalized. And it is this internalization, perhaps, that makes it even more bitterly ironic for the Kamakas that the U.S. government would violate their private property rights. In effect, the Kamakas succeeded in adapting to the “new game” of American capitalism in the islands, only to have the rules of the game change on them.

One of the tragic outcomes of the Kamaka family land struggle has been the strained state of neighborly relations in the Waiāhole-Waikāne community. While everyone acknowledges that there continues to be mutual respect and cordiality among residents, including the handful of newcomers in the valleys, there is also an undercurrent of pain and hurt. This quote describes the complexity of the situation for the Kamaka family:

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I know at one time when it was getting down to the wire, one of the news people asked [WWCA] “How are you helping the Kamaka family?” They didn’t know how to answer right. Then [the president] called me and then I said “Forget it.” Because I was one of the active members in our family and I said “Forget it, we don’t need your help now. We don’t want your help now. It’s too late. We’re losing it already.” As I said, one of the reasons that my family gave up and decided to settle with the government—not the only reason, but one of them—is when I was called into a meeting of the association because one of the members said, “Hey, you guys [WWCA] can’t do this. You got to ask them [the Kamakas].” So I went in and what it was is they were going to push the government to move the conservation line [in Waikâne valley], you know, bring it down lower. If they did that, that would encompass all of our land that we had up there. … [When we realized we would later have to fight WWCA] we said “forget it” [because the legal fees were already costing a lot of money.] If we beat the government on this, now we would have to go and fight the community? How much more can we handle? We’ll be dead; our kids will be in it now. It was like the straw that just broke our back. We said “forget it.”

The Kamakas were weary from constantly struggling outside and inside of their community. Although the contending issues of class and identity previously discussed are an important explanation for why the Kamakas were at odds with their fellow valley residents, such issues are not the only explanation. Some things perhaps are unexplainable beyond acknowledging that “personal politics” are often at play in small communities. It might also be explained by the rigid organizational structure and less-than-democratic nature that has evolved in the Waiāhole-Waikâne Community Association through the years. Whatever the various reasons are, the negative impact on the Kamaka family has been pronounced. And, as one resident suggested, perhaps the community feels guilty for not supporting the Kamakas in hindsight and therefore most people avoid discussing the topic now.

Here a Kamaka family member articulates the broad implications of their family’s land struggle:

The community at that time didn’t understand. See, we went at odds with our own community. They were more interested in the lease people and their problems. And we kept trying to get across to them—that this is not because we are the family that’s going to lose our land—but the importance of it, of our history, of our valley, of our people, period. I don’t care if you’re Hawaiian or not. What is yours is

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yours, you know, you worked for it. ... But I don’t think people understood the importance of it. I think it was more: “Well, that’s your family’s problem and it doesn’t affect us, and we’re the lessees, we’ve got our own problems.” ... We were the precedent setting case. It’s going to happen to them. So if they didn’t support us, you know, and try to stop what was happening, because it’s happened all over the world. It’s happened all over the United States. We are not the first one they’ve taken land from. ... [we said] “You really needed to support us because if we lose it, the government is going to just do whatever they want.”

There are several areas of this quote to unpack. On one level, the quote reveals the overall framing of the Kamaka family land struggle as a struggle that was over private property: “I don’t care if you’re Hawaiian or not. What is yours is yours.” This framing made it difficult for the majority tenant-residents to join the struggle because they were placed outside of its private property parameters. However, on another level, this Kamaka family member is pointing towards a larger issue of the abuse of government power and the militarization of the islands and elsewhere. She warns of the need “to stop what was happening because it’s happening all over the world. It’s happened all over the United States.” This broader frame could have been an effective means of sociopolitical mobilization, but it was not. The Wai`ahole-Waikâne community, and other island communities, simply did not view the Kamaka struggle against the U.S. military as a public issue at the time.

Sure enough, a decade later, the government did try to “do whatever they wanted” by coming back into Waikâne valley for military training, specifically the 187 acres that it confiscated from the Kamakas. Now the community and a small islands-wide coalition of allied activists came to support the Kamakas resistance of the U.S. military. According to the out-of-court settlement agreement, the Kamakas could buy back their land once the military cleaned it. With renewed training, this would almost be impossible.

So, when you go to the meetings a few years later and you hear all the people supporting you, it kind of hurts because it’s like too late for us. Now that we don’t own, so now they [WWCA] can get involved and say “Oh yes, just to fix our community, what should

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we do?” And we’re saying “That’s what you should have stopped right from the beginning.”

This family member is referring to community meetings and military-sponsored public hearings in Waiāhole-Waikāne concerning the military re-training, where support for the Kamakas felt disingenuous. What was now being resisted was the U.S. military’s ability to train on their military-owned, government-financed lands—that is, public lands. The Kamaka family land struggle had finally become a public issue, but for the Kamaka family, “it was too late.”

Shortly after the U.S. Pentagon and New York World Trade Center attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. military wanted to conduct jungle warfare training. The justification was that the terrain and environmental conditions in Waikāne replicate the southern Philippines where the U.S. intended to send troops to fight the Al-Qaeda affiliated Abu Sayyaf guerilla group (a so-called terrorist organization). Aside from the questionable legality of doing so according to Filipino law that prohibits foreign military intervention, the military had yet to clean up the ordnances it left behind from previous decades of training. As one Kamaka family member exclaimed:

So one minute it wasn’t safe—and now you can go and do that?! And the kind of comments we got was: “We’re Marines and we know what we’re doing.” And I’m thinking, I don’t care if you’re Marines or not. You step on the wrong thing, you’re going to blow up just as much as I am. And if you said it’s really dangerous, then what are you doing going back in without cleaning it?

Nevertheless, with flourishing displays of American patriotism in Hawai‘i following September 11, there was a general climate of public support for the U.S. military and American national security prerogatives. Effective resistance to the Marines re-training in Waikāne seemed unlikely.

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475 S. 4/13/05.
476 Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo invited U.S. forces to help suppress the separatist Muslim group under an executive agreement which many in the Philippine legislative body and, moreover, many Filipino people felt to be a violation of existing laws prohibiting such foreign intervention. In return, the U.S. would provide the Philippines with significant amounts of financial and military aid.
477 S. 4/13/05.
Yet, an effective resistance movement was mounted, albeit temporarily. Although members of the WWCA steering committee were initially in favor of the U.S. Marines’—“our military”—re-training in Waikāne, the WWCA backed away as it became clear that the majority of residents opposed the U.S. military coming back into the valley to conduct warfare exercises. Reminiscent of the Land Use Commission hearings of the 1970s and, to a lesser extent, the Water Commission hearings of the 1990s, mass numbers of people from all around the islands testified and protested against the U.S. military re-training in Waikāne at military-sponsored public hearings in the community. The opposition included Waiāhole-Waikāne residents, Kamaka family members, members of other Hawaiian families whose lands were taken by the U.S. military, allied activists of the Protect Kaho‘olawe ʻOhana, anti-militarist activists, professors and other “experts” on cultural and scientific matters, and Hawaiian nationalists and representatives of sovereignty organizations. However, unlike the other community struggles, it was not the Waiāhole-Waikāne residents who led the mobilization and organization of resistance but the islands-wide network of pro-Hawaiian, anti-militarist, allied environmentalist, and other activists.

The diverse islands-wide coalition that formed to resist the U.S. military re-training in Waikāne brought the local-global nexus of “Third World Solidarity” that characterized the early 1970s protests back into focus. The coalition linked global anti-imperialist analysis and activism with its local manifestations, showing how U.S. militarism in Hawai‘i enables and advances U.S. militarism and imperialism around the world. One informal collective of ten Filipinas, described as “settler-activists,” particularly articulated how the colonization of the Philippines and Hawai‘i were linked.\textsuperscript{478} Making explicit connections between U.S. foreign policy in the so-called War on Terror, expansive militarization in countries around the world, and U.S. militarism in Hawai‘i has the power to resonate among a broad range of persons, organizations, and communities. The Filipina group’s ability to make these connections helped block the

\textsuperscript{478}See Saranillio (2008) for further discussion of this Filipina anti-militarist activism in Hawai‘i.
U.S. military use and abuse of Hawaiian lands, and may provide a template for how future sociopolitical mobilizations and movements against militarism and so-called American national security prerogatives might be effective.

The massive show of resistance at the public hearings, sustained activism of coalition members, and mounting social and political pressures against the U.S. military led to the conducting of an informal environmental assessment of the Waikāne military training zone. The study found the area unsafe for renewed training and the Marines withdrew their plans. At about the same time the U.S. military, pursuant to new federal laws, began planning for the clean-up of ordnances on private properties affected by their earlier training in Waikāne. What is clear is that it is possible to resist and reject U.S. militarism in Hawai‘i, even in a heightened time of American patriotic sentiment, if the issues are broadly framed and interconnected in ways that foster the sociopolitical mobilization of a broad range of persons, groups, and communities. Perhaps it is not too late for the Kamakas to learn this lesson and somehow act upon the buy-back clause of their settlement with the military. Although a sustained and broad-based anti-militarist movement did not result from the recent activism in Waikāne, its successful resistance in a moment of impending and expanded militarization of the valley is an indication of this possibility.

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This chapter has shown how, despite Native traditions of chiefly land stewardship and Hawaiian Kingdom traditions of collective land ownership that informed their struggle, the Kamaka family narrowly used traditions of American propertied individualism and judicial processes to fight for their land against U.S. military confiscation. This use of tradition articulated the struggle as a private issue rather than connecting it to broader public policy issues of widespread militarism and ongoing Hawaiian land dispossession. Thus, much-needed alliances with concurrent Hawaiian and anti-militarism movements were forfeited. The pervasive normalization
of the U.S. military in Hawai‘i, combined with an overarching American multicultural framework for the islands’ multiethnic Localism and culture-centered Hawaiianness, further inhibited community residents and island allies from mobilizing to support the Kamakas. Added to this were the lingering effects of the community ‘split’ which positioned working-class Locals and Hawaiians against property-owning Hawaiians despite their shared socioeconomic processes of rural living. Finally, I suggest that the “long shadow of the ali‘i” must be reckoned with in order to allay the class and status anxieties attending contentious Hawaiian political identities and practices that inform this and other struggling communities.

The tragic failure of the Kamaka land struggle demonstrates the severe difficulty of challenging American militarism in the islands, especially when relying on American laws and courtrooms as the Kamakas did. In comparing the three community struggles of Waiāhole-Waikāne, it is surprising that this is the struggle that failed because the Kamaka family actually had the most political and legal standing; unlike the tenants that only had a right of 28-days notice, and the taro farmers who had an ill-defined ‘customary’ right, the Kamakas had legal title and a legally-signed lease which the U.S. military acknowledged to have violated. However, legal standing is insufficient without broad-based alliances and widespread public outcry, as demonstrated in this comparative case-study. An effective political mobilization of all available resources, including traditions that many people can relate to, is important for successful struggles land and water resources.
We still recovering colonial discovering
Steal the soul of the man, steal the life of the land
American sugar, pilgrim descendants
Rope the tribal laws with their own ten commandments
Thou shall not lie, though shall not steal
From peaceful friendly nations whose gods are real
[Touch that!]
—In Flagrante Delicto\textsuperscript{479} sung by Big Island Conspiracy

Every step into the future is a step into the past
As we trudge along an old familiar trail
We are coming home to thee
Modern nation, Hawai‘i
As we march from every corner of the land
—Sovereignty Song sung by Keali‘i Reichel

In concluding this dissertation, I am reminded of two songs of the last decade-plus that speak of Hawai‘i’s manifold and complex pasts in order to work together towards better futures for all of us who call Hawai‘i home. The first song recalls the various contradictions of American imperialism imposed in the islands that Hawaiians (and others) are “still recovering” from. In dismissing Euro-American laws, including religious laws, that contributed to the theft of land and government from Hawaiians, traditional forms of spirituality are called upon as a source of ongoing resistance and rejuvenation. The second song also brings the past into the present and for the future “as we trudge along an old familiar trail.” It is the precarious path of juggling two (or more) worldviews and ways of life—a Native one and a Euro-American one—which Hawaiians in the 19th century struggled with and Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians today still struggle with. Yet, it is part of the process of “coming home” as people come together and move forward “from every corner of the land.”

\textsuperscript{479} The rough translation of this Latin phrase is ‘in blazing offence’ referring to someone caught in the act of committing an offense.
In this final chapter, I examine how this coming together to recover and move forward was manifest in Waiāhole’s Mauka Lo‘i, a radical space in which old/new relations of persons to place were cultivated. Within this taro patch, tradition was animated in unique and meaningful ways to expand the capacity of persons and communities to control and use the water and land resources necessary for their livelihoods. First, let me provide a brief summary of this dissertation, a comparative case-study of Waiāhole-Waikâne’s three community struggles.

**SUMMARY OF THIS WORK**

These three struggles show different political manifestations of tradition. The first—the anti-eviction fight by the Waiāhole-Waikâne Community Association—drew on Hawai‘i’s multiethnic plantation history of the 20th century, its shared oppression and concomitant resistance. Two decades later, Waiāhole taro farmers relied on older, Native Hawaiian traditions of communal land and water use to fight for water needed to expand kalo cultivation. When, in between these two struggles, the Kamaka family faced a confiscation of their land by the U.S. military, they drew from the Hawaiian Kingdom’s tradition of hybrid modernization that combined collective land ownership with Western norms of private property. Why were the tenants’ anti-eviction and taro-farmers’ struggles successful while the Kamaka family land struggle was not?

This work has shown how different uses of tradition contribute to or limit the capacity of communities to advance self-determination over their land and water resources. The residents and activists in the anti-eviction and water struggle used multiple tradition to connect one place—Waiāhole-Waikâne—to all of Hawai‘i, and perhaps every place that has suffered the injustice of land and resource loss to elite, corporate interests. Amid the ‘development frenzy’ of the 1970s and late 1990s, the anti-eviction and water struggles were articulated into broader public policy issues of slower,
more sustainable, and more equitable development in the islands. The Kamaka family did not use multiple traditions to make their struggle relevant to all of Hawai‘i or to contemporary concerns, despite concurrent Hawaiian and anti-militarism movements in the 1980s and 1990s. Rather, the family emphasized their ancestral relationship to a place—Waikāne—within almost singular traditions of American property and legal regimes. Amid a popular complacency or ambivalence towards the U.S. military, and without a collective understanding of what U.S. military confiscation of Hawaiian lands means for all of Hawai‘i, few people or allied organizations were willing to mobilize for the Kamakas. The Kamaka struggle was thus articulated as a narrow private issue pertaining to land-owning Hawaiians. All three struggles were articulated within a rights framework; however, the Kamakas almost purely relied on strategies of legal rights to land, whereas the tenants and taro farmers foregrounded strategies emphasizing traditional rights of personal and place relationships. The latter strategy broadened the political resources available to the anti-eviction and water struggles.

Additionally, class and status differences among community residents were a political liability for the Kamaka fight, and to a lesser extent the taro farmers’ struggle, when such differences were articulated alongside Hawaiian land issues or Hawaiian cultural practices. Because the Kamakas were part of the property-owning class and the taro farmers had higher educational status, many tenants and veterans of the anti-eviction struggle positioned the Kamakas and taro farmers as ‘upper-class’ or ‘wannabe chiefs’ at odds with their self-identified working-class status as ‘people who work the land.’ Stemming from Marx-Lenin-Mao tradition, this structuralist understanding of class obscured the shared ‘country lifestyle’ (or class processes) of subsistence fishing and farming combined with wage labor that most Waiāhole-Waikāne residents participated in. As a result, the coming together of the community was hindered in the Kamaka land fight and led to the closure of the taro farmers’ community taro patch.

480 The taro farming movement aligned with the water struggle is further articulated with issues of sustainable and healthy food production and consumption.
As a whole, this tale of two valleys is necessarily a long and complicated one, tracing the various traditions that are woven into the fabric of contemporary island life for diverse people and groups. Using the articulations of Waiāhole-Waikāne residents and allied activists, I have traced the intersecting narratives of class and identity that inform their community struggles and struggling communities in order to urge more complex theorizing and robust frameworks for analysis and action. I demonstrate the limits of a structuralist Marxist framework in its assignment of oppositional, binary class (subject) positions that obscure the diverse lived economic experiences of political actors, and I suggest the limits of other such frameworks that assign such subject positions that don’t account for the complex lives of persons and communities. I conclude this work by considering how the ‘on the ground’ or ‘in the lo‘i’ experiences of Waiāhole’s diverse taro farmers evidence the limits of the settler colonial framework while also broadening and expanding its important contributions for re-creating a Hawaiian Hawai‘i. The distinction between Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians delineates different kuleana and parameters of rights and responsibilities; however, such distinctions do not fall neatly into the oppositional, binary subject positions of Native/settler and the circumscribed agency therein. Again, my intent is to urge more complex theorizing and robust frameworks for analysis and action to reflect the lives of self-determining persons and communities who struggle over land and water resources—so as not to insert an unwitting wedge that undermines such struggles. While it is beyond the scope of this work to do such thorough theorizing—‘from the ground up’ so to speak—I hope this work contributes to such theory-building.

While this tale of two valleys takes place in one community in Hawai‘i, it is a story relevant to all places with similar histories of ethnically and economically diverse persons struggling to live together and to control and use their land and water resources. Among other things, politics is a space in which to practice difference. This study has shown that those spaces have been created by Hawaiians for centuries and have helped sustain people and communities in the face of intense oppression. I have
shown how difference continues to practiced by the islands’ people through a mobilization of multiple and shared traditions. Part I illustrated historical manifestations of this practice of difference in terms of the Makahiki of pre-state Hawai‘i, the Kingdom’s hybrid modernization practices, rural farming in the plantation era, and resistive activism during the early post-statehood period. Part II demonstrated this practice of difference in how Hawai‘i’s varied traditions were used in sociopolitical mobilizations for land and water resources. In conclusion, my hope for progressive and sustainable politics is the creation and cultivation of ever-expanding spaces in which differences continue to be practiced. The Waiāhole community taro patch offers one example of such a space.

**POLITICAL HISTORIES AND ALTERNATIVE FUTURES**

Political histories such as this direct our attention towards alternative futures. Like the ‘backward’ orientation evident in all of these ‘forward’ community struggles—going back to tradition as a means of moving forward—this approach to knowledge and action is informed by both past(s) and future(s) in the very tensions of the present. While the preferred futures put forth in each of these struggles offer alternatives to the dominant tourist, militarist and consumerist development paradigm gripping the islands, they each outline different visions of the future. The alternative future of the Kamaka family was the least defined, wherein some family members sought a return to the Hawaiian Kingdom or similarly autonomous governance system and others were generally satisfied with the status quo balance of a Hawaiian/Local/American Hawai‘i minus the overriding military prerogative. Perhaps a lack of clearly articulated vision for an alternative future contributed to their difficulties in mobilizing support. The residents and activists of the anti-eviction struggle, on the other hand, were adamant and united in their vision for a Local Hawai‘i in which sustainable and equitable development prioritizes the interests of the islands’ multiethnic and working-class people above elite and off-island capitalist interests. This Local Hawai‘i was/is inclusive of Native
Hawaiians, however ill-defined and abstract their rights may be. Accepting this vision to a certain extent, the taro farmers further envisioned a Hawaiian Hawai‘i, inclusive of the islands’ multiethnic people, but prioritizing Native Hawaiian cultural practices and sociopolitical priorities in an altogether different development model. In many ways, the struggle within the struggling communities has been about these two conflicting images of the islands’ future: a Local Hawai‘i or a Hawaiian Hawai‘i.

I wish to focus on the alternative future of a Hawaiian Hawai‘i as manifest in Waiāhole’s community taro patch and the progressive prospects it offers. One important reason to do so is because such a future is both sustainable in economic and environmental terms, and equitable in social and political terms. I believe, and many others would agree (Kent 1983; Rohter 1992), that the current trajectory of Hawai‘i is both unfair and unsustainable, and if this unbridled ‘development’ continues then the islands’ ecosystem and socio-political economy may well collapse.\(^\text{481}\) Simply put: the islands are reaching—if not already exceeding—their population carrying capacity. If, or when, a collapse occurs, we may well look to taro farmers to teach us how to survive, much as Hawaiians did for thousands of years.

Hawaiian cultural conceptions of time and space are instructive here: Ka wā ma mua, the time in front or before—for which the future is behind and the past is in front: learning from the past in order to move forward in the future. Recall the description of the Mauka Lo‘i by this taro farmer, a non-Hawaiian, about the multiethnic group Kalo Pa‘a o Waiāhole (Hard Taro of Waiāhole):

> It’s kind of a new thing, this kind of working together, [but it is also] how ancient Hawaiians did this. They would get lots of people together, you know, many hands make for small work. That value is very—we were very conscious of the fact that we weren’t re-inventing the wheel. [We were] re-establishing something that had been done a lot before.\(^\text{482}\)

Similarly, an allied activist of Kalo Pa‘a during the water struggle adds:

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\(^{481}\) Such a scenario is not far-fetched, for example, if shipping to the islands were to stop for any reason (such as natural, health, or war-related disasters), then Hawai‘i would lack necessary food and fuel imports to sustain its population more than a few weeks.

\(^{482}\) L. 4/5/05.
Within our lifetime, within the next ten or twenty years, all the groundwater will have been permitted out by checks on the bank... So water will be the lynchpin toward social decisions, and people don't understand that yet, they want to run away from [the issue]. ... Waiāhole brought [this] to a lot of people's attention. ...[The Waiāhole taro farmers brought to the fore] the importance of certain issues in the long-term for the island. It's about alerting people everywhere as to what they had learned in their own struggles, and saying “Folks, this is not just about us this is about what happens on an island, what happens in a confined environment. ... In effect, without romanticizing the history of Hawaiian culture, if you live on an island for thousands of years, you have to figure out what it takes to balance things, or you don’t survive. It's very simple. It’s not an idealized version. It is: don’t overfish the place, keep the water in control, and people have to share in their labor and share among themselves. You have to have a system of justice, and you have to have a balance, and that’s what an island teaches you. I think that’s something that [the Waiāhole taro farmers] have tried to reawaken people toward, so there are larger goals here in addition to their immediate needs to protect where people live.

Another taro farmer, a Hawaiian, sums it up:

The whole thing about that taro patch [the Mauka Lo‘i] is to teach the generations. That is what the taro patch is there for, is to teach people how plant taro or how to live in harmony with the ‘āina. ... We are constantly building a community to empower ourselves. You know, planning, making plans, not waiting for other people to plan our communities, you know, just kind of planning ‘em how we like ‘em and go do ‘em how we like ‘em kind of stuff. Building families—that is important. And [through that], of course you build individuals.

In other words, what they were doing in this community taro patch was re-establishing traditional ways of working together and living with the ‘āina—that which feeds—in order to ensure for the future and future generations the sustainability of vital land and water resources. They were doing so based upon ancient protocols for contemporary practice among diverse persons and communities. Therefore, the significance of writing political histories such as this work is to not only map out the complex constitution of political actors and political communities in their resource struggles, but more importantly, to direct attention towards envisioning alternative futures and enacting them in the here and now.

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483 T. 1/21/04.  
484 N. 4/27/05.
For taro farmers and allies, their invocation of Hawaiian tradition is not about “going back” to some nostalgic past but about negotiating the past in the present and for the future: taking what is good, learning from the bad, and continually re-creating and re-vitalizing along the way. As detailed in Chapter Two, Hawaiian ways of knowing and being, cultural practices, and forms of collective personhood have always been and continue to be replete with reflexive intersubjectivity, multiple/plural/fluid and full of “play” in meanings, understandings, and applications. While traditions may “belong” to particular persons and places, traditions are often (if not always) inclusive and operate in accordance with the terms of belonging of those persons and places whose tradition it is. This is a crucial point in talking about Hawaiian tradition and the place of non-Hawaiians therein.

A Hawaiian Waiāhole taro farmer articulates well this point about Hawaiian tradition being the purview of Hawaiians while still inclusive of non-Hawaiians:

If other people can help to do [what is good for Hawaiians], to me that’s good. ... So the question of Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians has a long history and a lot of painful things inside of it that are going to effect today. ... [It is difficult for some Hawaiians to accept non-Hawaiians practicing Hawaiian cultural traditions because] you have a very strong sentiment of defensiveness, and for good reason, because of this two hundred year history of disrespect. ... [Yet, because there is no direct dealing with that history, feelings are expressed as] 'I don’t like so and so, and I don’t know why he is doing Hawaiian things.' ... [The solution is to go back into this history and unravel it, and only then can] we develop a relationship of mutual respect. Whomever is willing and able to help is welcome. ... [Because Hawaiian cultural concepts have been warped over time] I don’t feel we should be locked into that... If somebody is doing something and there are these attacks like 'Oh well, you know that is not Hawaiian or it is not tradition'—I think that we need to decide or have control over who we feel who we are and if something changed and we feel that it is within the realm of still being Hawaiian then we should say that and accept it as that. [However,] it is the kuleana of Hawaiians to decide those things. That is a Hawaiian decision. And of course it is going to be influenced by other people coming in, but that decision is a Hawaiian decision.

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485 Let us not forget the very real violences of warring chiefs in ‘traditional’ Hawai‘i (no one is suggesting going back to this!)—violences that Kamehameha ended with the unification of the islands and formation of the modern Hawaiian nation-state, itself a blend of traditional and novel ways of thinking, doing, and being.
486 L. 4/27/05.
By reckoning with the “two hundred year history of disrespect,” the taro farmers of Waiāhole, and especially at Mauka Lo‘i, have been cultivating old/new conceptions and practices of self-determining collective personhood for Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians in the development of a relationship of mutual respect.

I focus on the Waiāhole’s Mauka Lo‘i because it is fertile ground for such taro-roots theorizing. I believe that a profound and revolutionary transformation is taking place not in the courtrooms or legislatures but in the taro patches. The lo‘i has become an important space for cultivating Hawaiian ways of being in contemporary Hawai‘i—for contesting, negotiating and re-creating political, economic and social relations among Hawaiians and with the islands’ multiethnic people, all in the face of intense global capitalism and militarism. Multiple traditions are enlivened in the process; foremost among these are Hawaiian traditions that resonate broadly and include many.

When the Waiāhole Ditch Combined Contested Case began in the early 1990s, Waiāhole taro farmers and allies opened up the first, contemporary community taro patch for several reasons: to live Hawaiian culture; to create a tool to use against the further diversion of the islands’ water for corporate profit; to create a viable alternative to American fast-food consumerist culture; and to generate personal and collective rejuvenation. Despite its forced closure after ten-plus years, I explore its significance in cultivating old/new sovereignties and subjectivities and the openings it offers for the kind of theorizing, and praxis, that I urge.

**D**is**P**lacing **sovereignt(y)ies and subjectivity(y)ies**

Sovereignty is an issue that takes us back in time as well as forward while happening in the present (Chapin 1996: 339).

Kalo cultivation practices in the Mauka Lo‘i effectively dis-placed singular notions of sovereignty and subjectivity, the standard bearers of what it means to be a political actor in a political community. Unhinged from the state and its subscribed

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487 See Chapter Six for a discussion of the Mauka Lo‘i vis-à-vis the water struggle and intra-community conflicts.
citizenship, taro farmers were placing multiple and plural sovereignties and subjectivities within self-determining practices of persons-in-communities. This Hawaiian taro farmer describes the dynamic of the Mauka Lo‘i:

This place is sovereign. This place, we rule it, we own it, we rule it. We are the State. This is State land. We came here and cleared it and you are trespassing right now according to the State. I think they forget [that] according to the American Constitution who the government is: government for the people, by the people. We are the government. They represent us in their society. … We come here as a group to practice aloha ‘āina, which is love for the land, [and] malama ‘āina, taking care of the land. There is a lot deeper meanings; Hawaiians have more than one meaning to everything. … Sovereignty, this is the tool right here.\(^{488}\)

In his multiethnic group’s “occupation” of designated “open space” for Hawaiian cultural practices of kalo cultivation, the taro farmer quoted above evokes multiple sources of sovereignty: American liberal traditions of popular sovereignty, Hawaiian nationalist aspirations hinged on international legal norms (of either nation-state sovereignty and/or the sovereignty of indigenous peoples), and self-determining practices of pre-state traditional Hawaiian ahupua‘a political economy and social relations. Helen Chapin’s observation about the temporal multi-directionality of sovereignty in Hawai‘i is fitting here. Time (and for that matter, space) is no anchor in “this place” which embodies a plurality of sovereignties simultaneously. This co-mingling of sovereign sources produces and reproduces an intersubjectivity that empowers this man and his like-minded multiethnic farmers to carve a space on this global island in which to enact their preferred sovereignties. This is evident in at least three ways: Waiāhole taro farmers challenged the state’s authority in land and water legislation and enforcement; they exercised autonomy in the lo‘i; and they self-consciously speak of their sovereign rights and responsibilities.

In his discussion of Native struggles for liberation and sovereignty on the continental U.S., Bruyneel introduces the concept of “the third space of sovereignty,” which I find particularly relevant here:

\(^{488}\) B. 8/10/05.
The imposition of colonial rule denotes the effort of the United States to narrowly bound indigenous political status in space and time, seeking to limit the ability of indigenous people to define their own identity and develop economically and politically on their own terms. In resistance to this colonial rule, indigenous political actors work across American spatial and temporal boundaries, demanding rights and resources from the liberal democratic settler-state while also challenging the imposition of colonial rule on their lives. This resistance engenders what I call a “third space of sovereignty” that resides neither simply inside nor outside the American political system but rather exists on these very boundaries, exposing both the practices and contingencies of American colonial rule. This is a supplemental space, inassimilable to the institutions and discourse of the modern liberal democratic settler-state and nation (2007: xvii).

This third space of sovereignty is a politics on the boundaries, reflecting how Native people straddle the various worlds in which they reside. Moreover, it is a rejection of the boundaries imposed on Native persons and places. Bruyneel argues that Vine Deloria Jr. provides a vision of equality for indigenous people premised on their distinct place in the political time and the political space of North America. The emergence of these arguments for self-determination and tribal sovereignty was an expression of what I call postcolonial nationhood… [which] adhered fully to neither a civil rights framework for defining equality nor a third world decolonization framework for defining anti-colonial sovereignty. Instead, it located itself across the boundaries and through the gaps of colonial imposition, in the third space, where indigenous political life fights to claim its modern status on its own terms (Ibid: 126).

The Mauka Lo‘i was a space literally in the gaps of colonial imposition. During its decade of existence, the taro farmers effectively created and governed the community taro patch outside the reach of the state—“We rule it. We own it. …We came here and cleared it.”—while simultaneously claiming to embody the state—“Government for the people, by the people. We are the government.”—while, again, simultaneously maintaining the distinction of what it means to be Native—“They represent us in their society. … We…practice aloha ‘āina.” Located across the boundaries of intersecting and competing sovereignties and its constitutive subjectivities, the Mauka Lo‘i had “a lot deeper meanings; Hawaiians have more than one meaning to everything.” These taro farmers were enacting a form of sovereignty in the lo‘i unhinged from a state/capitalist
logic. Instead, traditional/contemporary Hawaiian ahupua’a livelihoods and collective personhoods were cultivated irrespective of state forms or functions (be it an American or a Hawaiian state). Much like traditional kānawai, the Mauka Lo’i was a place in which communal social relations and reciprocal exchanges ensured that those who contributed their labor to building and maintaining the lo‘i and ‘auwai received the kalo and poi produced therein. This old/new way of being and doing does not detract from the fact that taro farmers and allies also engaged the state and capitalist economy, evident in the Waiāhole Ditch Combined Contested Case and in their “regular jobs” as farmers, teachers, lawyers, firefighters, and so forth. What happened in the Mauka Lo‘i was the effective withdrawal of their (singular) subjective recognition of state sovereignty—they do not recognize themselves as wholly subject to the state. Instead, they position their intersubjectivities in relation to each other and to the land, and thereby they relate differently to the state.

Operating on multiple logics, the intersubjectivities of the Waiāhole taro farmers reflects what John Hoffman calls relational sovereignty. He argues:

Sovereignty…needs to be identified with individuals rather than states, [only if] sovereign individuals are analyzed in non-naturalistic terms. Individuality does not exist apart from, but it only manifest through, organizations which are constructed domestically, locally, regionally, nationally and globally – at every conceivable social level. Sovereignty…can only express itself in an infinity of relationships across time and space and these relationships also embrace that wider world of nature of which individuals are an ‘organic’ part (96). … A relational view of sovereignty sees individuals as continuously reappraising the view they take of others, and continuously reappraising the view they take of themselves. As an absolute concept, sovereignty can only manifest itself developmentally, dynamically, and through identities which are in a process of change (1998: 101).  

In a similar argument specific to Native peoples, Barker contends: “Sovereignty is historically contingent. What it meant and what it currently means belong to the political subjects who have deployed and are deploying it to do the work of defining their relationship with one another, their political agendas, and their strategies for decolonization and social justice. … Sovereignty carries the horrible stench of colonialism. It is incomplete, inaccurate and troubled. But it has also been articulated to mean altogether different things by indigenous peoples” (2005: 26). In a significant re-articulation of sovereignty, Meyer offers this: “I have been changed by my awareness of those living things that exist outside and inside my consciousness. They thrive, despite my ignorance, and wait patiently for my recognition. Some refer to this idea of potentiality and connection as ‘Chaos Theory,’ but I call it Ea. This is the idea that what animates us has never left, and thus what helps us thrive is always here. It is personal sovereignty—the kind that always comes before political. … It is a way of seeing the world and our connection to it or our separation from it (2003: 32).
What is significant are the ways in which the Waiāhole taro farmers effectively relate to and with the state in terms of water resource re-allocation, while simultaneously privileging their non-state relations to each other and the land. Take for example this farmer’s articulation of the sovereignty embodied in the Mauka Lo‘i, and all taro patches for that matter:

To me, the sovereignty issue is directly related to [our] ability to have a relationship with the land, ability to take care of it and to take care of ourselves in a healthy way for both the land and the people. That is what I look for in the sovereignty question. 490

These relational sovereignties of kalo cultivation demonstrate some “ways of enacting contemporary Hawaiian independence that are not solely based on Western statist forms...[further evidencing] the ways Kanaka communities are currently organizing to meet social needs” (Goodyear-Kaʻōpua 2008: 5). It is ea: sovereignty-as-life, rooted in the land, the people of the land, and their self-determining governance. It is an understanding and enactment of sovereignty reminiscent of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s hybrid modernization of the 19th century, which was imbued with a plurality of meanings for community belonging and autonomy.

In a critique of state forms of sovereignty that many Hawaiians now solely articulate, Osorio asks:

How independent is any government today? One criticism of the nation-state model is that, as a political entity, it seems designed to facilitate things such as international trade, capital expansion into previously “underdeveloped” regions, and rapid transformations of the environment. ... Clearly, a simple change in government will not create the nation. That nation is created of people who are today testing themselves against the most potent, omnipresent culture of materialism ever seen in the world (2004: 108-110).

While the Waiāhole taro farmers, as a collective, do not articulate their practices as creating a nation, in their capacity as political actors and a political community, they are “testing themselves” in living an alternative to “the most potent, omnipresent culture of materialism.” And in doing so, they are practicing Native and local self-determination:

490 L. 4/27/05.
[We focus on] how to connect ourselves, our families, to the place, to the 'āina. ... The land is alive and we can be connected to that too. ... Food is coming from this place...it gives an alternative to what we are used to, [such as] Costco and Safeway.\footnote{L. 4/27/05.}

This is food, this place [the Mauka Lo‘i]. When you go in a lo‘i, when you are working the lo‘i, if you put bad energy, if you talk in there and you argue, that is bad energy. That bad energy transmits to the food. When go in a lo‘i, you go in with peaceful intentions. When you plant the taro, you talk to that taro, you take your time: “Please grow big and strong.” Think about it. Every single one, it’s not “hurry up, time is money.” No, time is precious, take your time. This is a place for taking your time.\footnote{N. 4/27/05.}

Sovereignty: this [Mauka Lo‘i] is a tool. When I bring people up here I hope that they can get connected and understand their relationship to the environment and that they can have a direct result by staying informed in the politics around you. And if you like this better than Stryker brigades [proposed for expansion in Hawai‘i’s U.S. military bases], then you have got to get active. … Why do we need sovereignty? [We need to get] back to being self-sufficient, self-reliant. Sovereignty, we need to get back to self-determination...[which means] determining for ourselves how we want to live, self-sufficiently, self-reliantly.\footnote{B. 8/10/05.}

Notice that these taro farmers do not articulate a right to self-determination or a right of sovereignty. Rather, they are simply determining for themselves how to live and relate to each other; utilizing land and water resources according to traditional protocol codified by modern laws; producing their own food; healing themselves as individuals and as a community; and creating their preferred future. As one allied activist in the Waiāhole case observes:

\begin{quote}
Why do they keep doing this [water struggle, through which the Mauka Lo‘i was a direct manifestation]? ...[Because] it’s a better way to live. You’re more engaged, you’re more challenged in terms of what excites you, and I don’t mean that in a narrow sense; I mean, what animates you to feel alive. ... There are all sorts of psychological explanations, but it was more engaging; otherwise, people wouldn’t be there. You vote with your feet about what you do, and something in regular society was not satisfying, or eating at you, and there was something more—it wasn’t exciting in just the narrow sense, but it required you to apply what you had learned to your own life and take a risk. ... Nobody defined it for you.\footnote{T. 1/21/04, emphasis added.}
\end{quote}
Sidestepping the state/capitalist logic within the place of the Mauka Lo‘i, the taro farmers are not bound to the limits of rights discourse particular to sovereignty. Jeff Corntassel has aptly pointed out (much like Karl Marx did in a different context) that abstract, formal rights do little to sustain livelihoods and he argues that indigenous peoples’ struggles for self-determination should focus on restoring sustainable relationships within their own communities, with others, and with the natural world. Corntassel explains how contemporary indigenous rights discourses such as the focus on international rights of self-determination/sovereignty compartmentalize indigenous powers of self-determination by separating question of homelands and natural resources from those of political/legal recognition of a limited indigenous autonomy within the existing framework of the host state(s) (2008: 107).

In highlighting community centered actions that effectively shift sociopolitical mobilization from rights-based to collective responsibility-based movements, Corntassel urges a re-thinking and re-positioning of self-determination as “sustainable practices” that support sustainable livelihoods. This is precisely what the Mauka Lo‘i embodied and what the Waiāhole taro farmers are still doing.

Alfred contends that this shift away from state forms of “sovereignty” and “rights” has important implications for Native and non-Native persons and communities alike:

If non-indigenous [persons] are capable of listening, they will learn from these shared words [of spiritual reconnection], and they will discover that while we are envisioning a new relationship between [Native] peoples and the land, we are at the same time offering a decolonized alternative to the Settler society by inviting them to share our vision of respect and peaceful coexistence. The non-indigenous will be shown a new path and offered the chance to join in a renewed relationship between the peoples and places of this land, which we occupy together. …[The intent is] to motivate people to creatively confront the social and spiritual forces that are preventing us from overcoming the divisive and painful legacies of our shared history as imperial subjects (2005: 35).

Alfred goes on to suggest that “the strategic commonalities between indigenous and anarchist ways of seeing and being in the world” point towards non-state-based practices

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495 See Marx’s On The Jewish Question in Marx and McClellen (2000).
496 In the case of Hawai‘i, such discourses either focus on American federal recognition of Hawaiian indigeneity/sovereignty or push for international recognition of the Kingdom’s continued state sovereignty.
and relations. Building the capacity for self-governance requires direct action to create self-reliance and self-sustainable relationships here and now, not in some deferred time or space when “sovereignty” might be “achieved” through state recognition.\(^{497}\) Here, the means of sociopolitical change are the ends. It also involves non-Native persons and communities “to join in a renewed relationship between the peoples and places of this land, which we occupy together” as a “decolonizing alternative to the Settler society.” Notice that the goal is not to replace state power with one’s own government per se; rather, the goal is to make the state unnecessary and instead rely on one’s self and ones’ community(ies) for meeting shared needs.\(^{498}\) While the distinction between Natives and non-Natives is clear, the distance between them is not so vast, as both are understood to experience “the divisive and painful legacies of our shared history as imperial subjects.” The objective, then, is to create relationships of mutual respect with each other and with the land, and these relations are the ends in themselves.

These post-imperial relations are being cultivated in Hawai‘i’s lo‘i, without waiting for all the vestiges of colonialism and imperialism to end, and without pinning hopes upon state or international legal sanction. In the sovereign place and self-determining practices of the Mauka Lo‘i, the subject positions of Hawaiians and non-Hawaiian were not rigidly reified or essentialized, but lived and practiced through demonstrated sociopolitical commitments and cultural affinities. This Hawaiian taro farmer in Waiʻahole explains:

> People like the [non-Hawaiian taro farmers] have been here; there is no place [called] home for them but here. And my thinking is we all came from some place else, kind of—you have to start some place if you are going to make the commitment. … I think it is important that people make commitments to stay some place because that is when you get the people that are looking long-term of what this place is going to be like, then they are going to build on, make it almost instinctive that we are going to leave this place better than when we came—that’s the lokahi, that is the harmony with the universe. And

\(^{497}\) In addition to Alfred and Corntassel, see Adams (1989), Marule (1985), and Smith (2005) for discussions on how creative energies are drained from Native peoples and social justice groups because they pursue accommodationist and reformist strategies within oppressive systems, which often undermine their recuperative/progressive/radical potentiality in the long-run and reinscribes them as colonial/oppressed subjects in these systems.

\(^{498}\) See Day (2005) for a discussion on anti-hegemonic (rather than counter-hegemonic) social movements that reflect anarchist strands of thought and action.
to me, that [is what] we need. ... And so if people are willing to do that, these non-Hawaiians, good. 499

Here, sovereignties and subjectivities—what it means to be a pluralistically-constituted political actor in a multiply-sourced political community 500—is placed within the demonstrated commitments of kalo cultivation in the lo‘i. The Waiāhole taro farmers in their practices of sustainable self-determination take the following Hawaiian proverb or poetical saying to heart:

Pili ʻohā, he kāmau mai mawaho: A taro-offshoot relationship added to the outside of the corm. Said of one who is not a relative, yet is a member of the household (Pukui 1983: #2652).

KULEANA: HAWAIIANS AND NON-HAWAIIANS

The Mauka Lo‘i serves as an example that there is a productive “place” for non-Hawaiians in a Hawaiian Hawai‘i—as opposed to a Local Hawai‘i or an American Hawai‘i. This place is contingent upon how non-Hawaiians demonstrate their day-to-day political and cultural commitment on the ground, or in this case, in the lo‘i. Here is where the Hawaiian concept of kuleana is embodied, and I argue, can serve as an important means for Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians to relate to each other in a Hawaiian Hawai‘i.

ku‘ualoha ho‘omanawainui (2009) articulates kuleana as “respecting and knowing one’s place.” She refers to “kuleana consciousness” as a way of explaining that “there is a place [for everyone] who approaches ʻāina and people with kuleana”—“all of us have multiple kuleana at any given moment.” Recall the extended definition of kuleana: “Right, title, property, portion, responsibility, jurisdiction, authority, interest, claim, ownership; reason, cause, function, justification;...” (Pukui and Elbert 1971). Māhealani Dudoit further articulates:

499 N. 4/27/05.
500 See Chapter Three, section “Ea: Hawaiian conceptions of sovereignty,” for a discussion of the historical and traditional roots of this contemporary understanding.
“Kuleana” means both “privilege” and “responsibility.” We have certain privileges, and those privileges also carry responsibility. The word “kuleana” expresses that relationship between privilege and responsibility in a way that you cannot detach one from the other (1999: 1).

Sam No’eau Warner (1999) adds that decision-making in areas of cultural revitalization (among other socio-politico-economic-cultural areas) resides with those native to the culture being revitalized because the culture cannot be extricated from the broader Native people and environment that birth and sustain such culture. Warner argues against non-Hawaiians appropriating the kuleana of Hawaiians—specifically in terms of authority and jurisdiction in decision-making—while still acknowledging the capacity of non-Hawaiians to “help” when asked for and when the parameters of what constitutes “help” is first delineated by Hawaiians. In the context of kalo cultivation in general and the Mauka Lo’i in particular, then, kuleana means recognizing the differentiated privileges, rights and responsibilities each person brings to the collective; accordingly acting upon and within one’s own capacity of rights, responsibilities and jurisdiction; and not usurping the authority, rights and responsibilities of others, especially Native persons.

The non-Hawaiian taro farmers do not claim to be Hawaiian, nor do they attempt to appropriate Hawaiian culture as their own; yet, through their actions and deeds they advance culture-centered Hawaianness. Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua describes kuleana as “authority and obligation based in interdependence and community” (2008: 7). It is in this context that non-Hawaiians are incorporated into the contemporary community taro patch: because they “make the commitment” as the Hawaiian taro farmer describes above. He has this to add:

501 Focusing on the contested practices and politics of Hawaiian language (immersion) speakers and programs, Warner explains: “There is no question that nonnative peoples can assist Hawaiians in their efforts, just as nonnatives can probably assist other indigenous and minority peoples as well. But the help should be determined and defined by the indigenous and minority peoples themselves. Those non-Hawaiians or nonnatives who truly wish to help “others” should be encouraged to follow in the footsteps of scholars such as the late Dr. Charlene Sato, a local language advocate and sociolinguist who worked in the English as a Second Language Department at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. To “Charlie,” language issues were always people issues. I believe that she knew not only that language and culture are inextricably linked, as is commonly acknowledged today, but that language and culture are inextricably linked to the people from whom the language and culture evolved. Thus, throughout all her life’s work and all her life’s battles, Charlie never fought merely to save an autonomous entity called a language. She always fought to bring about changes in society that would lead to true equality, authenticity in the empowerment of a people, whether indigenous or not, and social justice for all” (1999: 89).
I learned a lot about planting taro from non-Hawaiians... I learned how to pound poi from non-Hawaiians, but I also learned from Hawaiians too. Everybody pounds differently; my style is a kind of mixture. ... I think we cannot do these things by ourselves as maoli people because we don’t have the numbers. We can, but, we also need to effect decision-makers because otherwise if the junk laws keep getting passed it makes it really difficult. They put you in jail because you not following it, that kine, and there is no way, I mean, you get police and you can’t match that. Marine helicopters right across the bay!—stuff like we seen what happened in Iraq... The U.S. military is the engine behind our economy right now [and] that is dangerous.  

This statement articulates kalo cultivation as an alternative against, and form of resistance to, American occupation/colonization of Hawai‘i. It also gestures toward the ways in which the privileges and authority of non-Hawaiians can help “effect decision-makers” and further Hawaiian causes. The skills that non-Hawaiian taro farmers bring to the lo‘i—be it the embodied knowledge of taro in third-generation Okinawan farmers or the Ivy League environmental science education of relatively recent haole farmers—are welcomed and valued in their respective areas of jurisdiction. Non-taro farmers are also welcomed if they, too, can help effect decision makers. Everyone has kuleana; but everyone’s kuleana is different—much like the layered responsibilities and reciprocal exchanges between the various strata of traditional Hawaiian society.

Knowing and acting within this capacity of what ho‘omanawainui calls “kuleana consciousness” is critical for non-Hawaiians and Hawaiians to negotiate their various overlapping and disjunctured political communities. To use Bruyneel’s term, this is the third space of sovereignty, a politics on the boundaries.  

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What does this comparative case-study of three land and water struggles that take place in the same “community” tell us about issues of land, water and self-determination

502 N. 4/27/05, emphasis in original.
503 The Hawaiian concept of palena or ‘place-boundary’ is pertinent here, as defined by Beamer: “The tension between the words Place and Boundary creates a unique framework toward understanding of the Hawaiian concept of Palena. ... Boundaries in the ‘Oiwí [Naive Hawaiian] system of old created places—they defined spaces of attachment and access to both the metaphysical and physical worlds. They delineated the resource access of maka‘āinana and ali‘i on the ground while also intimately connecting people to the material and spiritual resources of these places. ... In the Hawaiian context, there are multiple kinds of “place-boundaries,” each with different functions and relations” (Beamer 2008: 71-71).
in Hawai‘i? First, local504 self-determination in control and use of land and water resources is not only possible, but is practiced, as evidenced in the broad-alliances and multi-layered strategies that enabled both the anti-eviction and water struggles to succeed. Second, however important it was in the anti-eviction struggle, multiethnic localism is now highly problematic when aggressively prioritized above, or at the expense of, Hawaiian issues and Native cultural practices. Third, Native self-determination in control and use of land and water resources is not only possible, but it is practiced in the here and now, without reliance on state forms and functions as evidenced in the Mauka Lo‘i and in the many personal and collective taro patches throughout the islands. Importantly, such practices are inclusive on non-Hawaiians with a demonstrated political and cultural commitment. Fourth, however valuable culture-centered Hawaiianness is, it can be insufficient as a means of political mobilization and alliance against American militarization of Hawaiian lands, especially when easily subsumed as one culture among many in a multicultural Hawai‘i.505 Fifth, Native self-determination in control and use of land and water resources is difficult to sustain when narrowly framed as individuated or “private” issues, and especially when relying almost solely on American law (or any law for that matter), because potential alliances are forfeited as evidenced in the Kamaka family land struggle against the U.S. military. And finally, struggles for land and self-determination must be attentive to intersecting and constitutive narratives of class and identity that impede the success of such struggles. With such attention, more positive articulations or alignments might become possible.

Regardless of the contentiousness among themselves as political actors and political communities, the people of Waiāhole-Waikāne continue to coexist with relative harmony with each other and with the land and water they fought (and fight) so hard to preserve and flourish. Their enduring and empowering agency is demonstrated in the

504 Recall that I use locál (lower-case) as a place-based designation in contradistinction to Local (upper-case) as an identity category and narrative unique to Hawai‘i.
505 Culture-centered Hawaiian activists have been successful in establishing politico-legal mandates for the U.S. military in which they must consult with the Native Hawaiian community, such as in Kaho‘olawe, Mākua Valley, Bellows in Waimānalo, and elsewhere. Yet, such mandates do not prevent ongoing U.S. militarization of Hawaiian lands and displacement of Hawaiians from these lands.
fact that, through the many years of struggles and struggling, they continue to live their
shared country lifestyle much as they had decades ago.

My neighbors, wonderful neighbors around me. I cannot find a place like this. Never.506

What I like about the community is as long as we don’t get into other people’s issues, there is not a lot of tension. I guess we know the sensitive areas. We don’t talk about things that [cause problems]. Because we are small, everybody chooses to be friendly.507

Still one big thriving community. [laughter] You know, get political differences, but I guess da main ting to remember hea is you’re neighbors, eh? You are neighbors. So, you tryin’ to confront each other, whateva, but, you got to rememba you still neighbors. You still hea! [laughter]. …When I come home from work and I look across da street, “Yeah!” [two thumbs up]…You know, like dat song, “There are rainbows”—dat’s where I live!508
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