HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN LIBYA:
FIGHTING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS OR FOR REGIME CHANGE?

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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

1.1 Humanitarian Intervention

“At the direction of President Obama and Secretary of Defense Gates, U.S. Africa Command is commanding U.S. military support for the international enforcement of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 to protect the Libyan people” (General Carter Ham, Commander, U.S. Africa Command (March 19, 2011).

On March 19, 2011, the humanitarian intervention into Libya to protect civilians and assure human rights began when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched 110 missiles on Libya. The military intervention was led by France and Britain with the help of the American military. The idea of humanitarian intervention began with good intentions by the international community, but in the case of Libya, it raised much debate about the humanitarian purpose of the decision to intervene. In my thesis, I argue that the international community (specifically the UK, US, and France) have used the “Arab Spring,” a wave of revolutions in the Arab world, to remove Muammar al-Qaddafi and his regime from Libya in order to have a better politico-economic relationship and to have easier access to the scarce natural resource oil. Libya has one of the largest reservoirs of fossil fuels in the world. I found that the three permanent members of the UN Security Council created narratives of human rights and tyranny which were needed for eliciting public approval for military intervention in Libya. The analysis of the narratives from a critical geopolitics view point is significant because Libya was a sovereign nation, a member of the UN Human Rights Council, but this did not stop NATO and the UK, US and France from launching military action. Thus, there is a need for clarification regarding the steps that lead up to intervention and clear thresholds for when action should be taken.
The history of humanitarian intervention dates back to World War II in response to the mass atrocities that occurred. The United Nations developed the idea of protecting human rights into an international responsibility, and with this concept came the need to not only discuss human rights theoretically, but to discover a way to implement these protections. The protection of human rights developed further and led the international community to discover ways in which they must act, in a timely manner, when atrocities occur. As the conflicts became smaller and were between two or more ethnic groups or between groups and their government, the responsibility to protect human rights morphed into the responsibility to prevent atrocities from happening in the first place. Soon, the concept of prevention evolved into a responsibility to take action regardless of the sovereign rights that the invaded state may have as granted by the United Nations Charter.

Several controversies developed that led to the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect. The roots of this controversy began back with the United Nations and its Charter, especially after the international community failed to address in a timely manner the genocide in Rwanda. One of the major controversies regarding humanitarian intervention was the contradictory clauses regarding the rights of a sovereign state and the right to intervene in other states’ internal affairs, which, according to the Security Council, is not acceptable by any member of the United Nations. Even though the United Nations began with the intention to protect human rights in the future and maintain peace, and to recognize the sovereignty of nation states, this organization is not perfect, and it must deal with reconciling these contradictory missions.
Much of the debate was whether one state should intervene in the affairs of another sovereign state in order to protect innocent civilians. Libya, a sovereign state prior to the intervention, is a clear example of such controversies about whether the international community should have allowed Libyan ruler, Qaddafi, to solve the problem internally, or should they intercede into its sovereign boundaries and violate the sovereign rights the UN Charter grants it to all states. The idea that protection needs to be preventative of potential atrocities was accepted by the Heads of State during the 2005 World Summit. At which time, they set up guidelines regarding the responsibilities each state was to adhere to, specifically, “to protect their population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” (UN General Assembly, 2005). In the case of a state failing to perform the above mentioned responsibilities, the international community is to take “. . . collective action, in a timely and decisive manner . . . should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations (UN General Assembly, 2005). And yet, what often happens with responsibilities like these are the weaker states are on the receiving end of the prevention, while the stronger states are the preventers; clearly there is a double standard. These rules contradict Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which states that a sovereign state has the “inherent right to self-defense.” The Office of the Special Adviser of the Prevention of Genocide states: “Sovereignty no longer exclusively protects States from foreign interference; it is a charge of responsibility that holds States accountable for the welfare of their people” (United Nations, n.d.). This idea of protection has caused more problems regarding how to implement this idea and not violate the sovereignty of the state in question.
Related to this issue, Elden (2009) writes about territory and its relation to sovereignty as these two are closely interlinked and one cannot look at the political power itself without considering the spatial extent of that power. Indeed, without territory, statehood would not be able to exist. Elden (2009) argues that: “Territory is a political and legal term concerning the relation between sovereignty, land, and people” (p. xxvi). Because territory and sovereignty are interlinked, the spatial location of that territory and government in relation to the rest of the international community contributes to the view the rest of the world has regarding that state’s sovereignty. Further, Elden (2009) uses the term “contingent sovereignty” to argue that sovereignty is no longer exclusive but based upon adherence to global ideas of upholding human rights and preventing terrorism. He describes the “spatial extent of sovereignty” (Elden, 2009, p.140) as the state’s rights within its own territorial integrity, bounded by borders, which though limiting give sovereignty to the state. Territorial integrity, according to Elden (2009), plays a role as the state’s boundary protection and non-intervention into the internal affairs of one’s state on the one hand, and on the other hand, it limits states from expanding into other territories by changing borders. As such, sovereignty itself is exercised spatially in relation to a certain state’s location. It is important to analyze where and what kind of location a certain state has, and how this affects its international relations with the rest of the world.

In the case of Libya, the ruler, Qaddafi, had an estranged relationship with the rest of the international community, which can be argued to have influenced the decision to intervene. Also, the spatial location of Libya, with its natural resources, needs to be closely looked at in order to better understand the nature of the decision to intervene.
Further, this relationship contributes to the public approval of Libya by using the geopolitical language of a need for humanitarian intervention in the bounded territory of the nation state and the positive narrative of helping the innocent people within that state to gain their freedom. At the same time, narratives were created that showed Qaddafi as a ruthless leader, and a person that must leave the country for the benefit of the Libyan people to free themselves from tyranny and become a democratic state.

My thesis is a discourse analysis of these narratives, found in government statements, which were used to justify the decision to intervene. The specific focus of my analysis is on the statements made by the three permanent UN members (United States, United Kingdom, and France) because they have played a major role in the decision making process. An analysis of these statements provides a better understanding of why the Libyan conflict required humanitarian intervention, and why other more prominent cases of human rights violations such as those in Yemen, Bahrain, Sudan and Syria, did not qualify for intervention.

Through a combination of linguistic analysis and critical discourse analysis, I analyze the power of social ideologies in shaping language to support a particular representation to the public (Fairclough, 1992). In this case, my focus is on how the discourse for the necessity of humanitarian intervention in Libya was created and what impact the discourse had on the public. This data will answer three sets of interrelated research question(s):

1) What are the specific thresholds for military intervention in the United Nations Charter, the Genocide Conventions, and the Responsibility to Protect? Are there differences in the standards for intervention between these documents?
2) What arguments did the United States, the United Kingdom, and France make leading up to and during the debate? Were there differences between these three permanent members of the UN Security Council?

3) What were the specific conditions in Libya that justified the Humanitarian Intervention? Were they the same as the thresholds identified above? Do these thresholds differ from other examples of unrest in the region?

In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to look at the situation in Libya through the prism of a critical geopolitics theory. This theory looks at the connection between places, people and power and how that connection influences both the internal politics of a country and the external politics of the international community.

1. 2 Critical Geopolitics framework

Geopolitical narratives are created to influence the public conscience where such an action, as initiated by the mainstream political systems or governmental structures of specific countries, plays a predominant role on major international decisions. According to Dalby (1996), the term critical refers to post-structuralism, which is a radical approach to the study of political theory and international relations. Analyses of such discourse show the reasons and messages that may be behind the presented discourses structured for public audiences. In doing so, critical geopolitics examines the geographical knowledge as an inseparable part of the modern discourses of power. During the Cold War, many examined the geopolitical case of power struggles between the United States and the USSR and concerns about the nuclear war. With the end of the Cold War, the critical geopolitical examinations were directed toward examining issues of national security and international relations as the main part of the struggle for war and peace in the modern world (Dalby, 1996). A major concern in critical geopolitics is how
governance and power are exercised in the spatial sphere, and how it influences and creates different regions throughout the world. In this sense, region does not apply to demarcated official parts of the World, for example the European Union (EU), but rather the regions that are created throughout different socioeconomic practices while modeled by the politics of power. Indeed, critical geopolitics looks at the state, sovereignty and identity as created through these practices and not at the state as being a concrete subject. Kuus (2007) argues that critical geopolitics “disembodies state action and offers us little sense of human agency in the construction of geopolitical discourses” (p.243).

The connection between geography and politics, as Dodds (2007) explains, is identified by the size of the territory of a country, the type of sovereignty and the resources existing in that certain place. In the modern era of globalization, the importance of the place is even more pertinent and “... the relevance of territory, international boundaries, and claims to sovereignty remain as pressing as ever” (Dodds, 2007, p.1). The specific label that is given to a place determines what kind of politics will be practiced there. Dodds (2007) says that: “The labeling of a particular place as ‘dangerous’ and/or ‘threatening’ can invite military assaults from land, sea, and air . . .” (p.1). The places might not be actually problematic, but the creation of the negative narratives through epithets such as “dangerous” or “deadly” places can be used for provoking certain actions which are often in the best interest of the elite - those with power - both on an internal and international level.

From the view of critical geopolitics, I look at the different narratives used by the governments, through their official public statements, and how these narratives have set
the stage for the air strikes on Libya that took place in the spring of 2011.\textsuperscript{1} This thesis considers sixty nine statements made by the United States government, fifty one statements made by the government of the United Kingdom and twenty six statements made by the French government. I found that the framing of the situation in Libya prior to the intervention was done in both a positive and negative manner. Specifically, the discourses that were framed in a negative manner attributed those negatives to Qaddafi and his regime, while discourses that were framed in a positive manner attributed the positives to the Libyan rebels and citizens. The negative narratives described Qaddafi and his government as evil, as tyrannic, as suppressing democracy and basic human rights by torturing and killing their own people. What I argue, through my data analysis, is that the United States, France, and the United Kingdom found the perfect moment to get rid of Qaddafi by using humanitarian intervention, and in order to justify this action publicly, they created the necessary narratives to launch military action with the intention to gain public approval. Further, as a result of my analysis, I found that the main players in this decision making process, some of the permanent members of the United Nations - the United States, the United Kingdom, and France - used the positive narratives they constructed to frame the argument for humanitarian intervention in terms of democracy, the fight for human rights, and freedom. These positive and negative narratives were the basis for humanitarian intervention and created the political climate that allowed the international community to intercede into the territory of sovereign Libya and rid the country of Qaddafi and his regime.

\textsuperscript{1} The methods are explained in detail in Appendix
The importance of such categorizing is that it elicits public interest, because sensational descriptions contribute to public approval for humanitarian intervention. Without this public approval, it would not be acceptable to the rest of the world to launch military action in a sovereign country such as Libya. Analyzing these narratives helps to show how the international community framed their arguments for intervention in order to justify their actions.

1.3 Outline of Thesis

First, I discuss the history of the UN Charter, the Responsibility to Protect, and Humanitarian Intervention because it is significant to understand how these concepts came to exist in order to understand the problems and shortcomings that arose since their inception. Second, I discuss Libya and describe how the country is situated within the world, the history of the place and the development of international relations between Libya and the rest of the world. Further, I discuss the natural resources that belong to Libya and the spatial location of Libya to explain the value of the place and hence the animosity that Qaddafi develops over the years toward the western countries interested in these resources, specifically, the United States, France and the United Kingdom which played a decisive role during the decision making process to intervene in Libya. Finally, I analyze the narratives created by the United States, France and the United Kingdom, which created the public opinion and framed the discourse around the decision to intervene into Libya.
CHAPTER 2 – THE UNITED NATIONS, GENOCIDE CONVENTION AND
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

2.1 Introduction

The idea of Humanitarian Interventions emerged in response to the events of ethnic cleansing and mass killings of one people by another. An example of this is Rwanda in 1994, where an estimated 800,000 people were killed. The world stood by and did nothing. In the years following the incidents in Rwanda there has been much debate about when and under what conditions the international community should intervene in the affairs of another sovereign state to protect innocent civilians. The main issue is how to find a solution to prevent mass atrocities rather than act only once they have occurred. In order to better understand these agreed upon conditions, in this chapter, I analyze in detail the United Nations Charter, the Genocide Convention, the Responsibility to Protect, and a short discussion regarding the International Criminal Court (ICC) as this method of dealing with war criminals is an inseparable part of the post-conflict process of reconciliation. This will establish a basis for a critical discourse analysis as it establishes and clarifies the thresholds for humanitarian intervention as set by these official documents.

2.2 United Nations Charter

The United Nations is an international organization founded after World War II in order to maintain international peace and security. One of the main UN purposes is “To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations to achieve goals” of maintaining
the peace (United Nations (f), n.d.). As such, from its earliest beginnings, the United Nations is meant to serve every corner of the globe and all people.

Establishment of the United Nations (UN) was on October 24, 1945 “when the charter had been ratified by China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and a majority of other signatories” (United Nations (b), 2011). The basic idea of the UN organization was to maintain peace throughout the world, find peaceful solutions to crises, to codify the rules of warfare and, preferably, to find ways of prevention against war (United Nations (b), 2011). It was an attempt to prevent wars as had occurred in the first half of the twentieth century from ever happening again.

The United Nations “is based on the principles of both the sovereign equality of all its members” and requires that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” (United Nations (d), n.d.). As Karns & Mingst (2010) state: “The UN is, in fact, a complex system with many pieces. Among its functions are the creation of international law, norms, and principles.” (p. 95). As such, it calls for all member states and the ones that are not members to act according to this principle in order to ensure international peace (United Nations (d), n.d.). By this principle, the states are not to interfere in the affairs of the other states, and they should be in control of their own territory; therefore, retaining territorial sovereignty.

In the UN era, sovereignty is based on both internal control over a territory and external recognition of that control by the other states in the world (Murphy, 1996). Here the internal rule means the control by the state of its own territory and all the people
within the boundaries of that territory, and external recognition of these boundaries by the international community. How these relationships have been maintained in the recent past is a really important part of the work and philosophy of the United Nations as it is “... a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends” (United Nations (e), 2012).

The mission statement of Chapter I, Article 1, of the Charter of the United Nations states best the purpose of this organization:

“To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace”

The role of the United Nations in maintaining world peace is crucial, and it is the organization with the most respect and responsibility for maintaining peace all over the world.

This simple notion is difficult to implement in practice due to other provisions of the UN charter. The paradox is that the UN charter prevents expansionary wars that involve more than one state by guaranteeing the territorial integrity and internal sovereignty of all of its members. However, these same guarantees make it difficult for the organization to maintain peace within a single country. Besides its responsibility to maintain peace, the United Nations, with its members, have to follow certain rules as described in Chapter I of the UN Charter, Article II which states that: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations” (Charter of UN, n.d.). However, there are some exceptions to these rules and specific conditions where the international community must intervene in the country’s internal affairs in spite of the fact that the country is sovereign.

International involvement within a sovereign territory happens when the relationships between the state and its people are at risk and threaten to escalate into a conflict of larger dimensions and there is a need for some sort of action by the international community. In an ever-changing world and with the emergence of new internal conflicts, such as, conflicts among different ethnic or religious groups or the unethical acts of oppressive regimes toward their citizens, there is a need for a completely new approach to conflict solving - an approach where state sovereignty is valued less when compared to the well-being of the citizens of a particular state. It is necessary to look at the conditions that have led to that particular conflict itself, and how these conditions comply with the rules and guidance of the Charter of the United Nations.

Although all UN members participate in the General Assembly, most significant decisions are made in the Security Council. There are five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council: United States, France, China, Russia and United Kingdom and ten non-permanent members. The five permanent members have so called “veto power” where each of them can, at any time, exercise the right of veto (United Nations, (g) n.d.) This means, that at any time, any one of the five permanent members of the Security Council may exercise their veto power and any process of decision making or resolution will not be approved (United Nations, (g) n.d.).

The UN Security Council deals with questions regarding world peace and is a major player in the process of solving specific problems when there is an assumed threat
to peace. One of the primary steps in this process is to “. . . recommend to the parties to try to reach agreement by peaceful means” and if that does not have a positive result, then “. . . the Council itself undertakes an investigation and mediation” (UN Security Council, n.d.). If none of these measures work, the Security Council might send in its own investigators to try to find a peaceful solution. When everything fails and the dispute ends in conflict or war, the Security Council might issue “cease-fire directives” and send in peacekeeping forces in order to stop further hostilities (UN Security Council, n.d.). Finally, “The Council may decide on enforcement measures, economic sanctions [such as trade embargoes] or collective military action” (UN Security Council, n.d.). Yet, in taking these actions, the Security Council must comply with articles VI, VII, VIII, and XII which dictate that certain steps must be followed first. Specifically, an attempt must be made to negotiate, mediate and use every available peaceful method to solve the dispute prior to the use of any kind of force.

When the situation goes beyond the negotiation level, the Security Council must try first “. . . measures not involving the use of armed force . . . and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.” (Charter of The UN (b), n.d.). These measures could be anything from “. . . complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations” (Charter of The UN (b), n.d.). Thus, the Security Council must address conflicts in a tiered system. By first attempting to resolve conflict through negotiation and mediation, then through the implementation of an array of different sanctions, while at the same time ensuring that military force, as the most demanding in terms of people and finances, remain only as a last resort.
2.3 Genocide Convention

After the creation of the United Nations Charter, in the wake of Nazi Germany’s systematic mass murder of over 6 million Jewish people, there was a need for some way to prevent similar atrocities from ever happening in the future. The United Nation had a huge challenge ahead of them. The first step the UN took toward the prevention of such mass atrocities was “the declaration made by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 96 (I) dated 11 December 1946 that genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world” (Treaties.un.org, n.d.). This declaration recognized that in “all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity” and “in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required” (Treaties.un.org, n.d.). The responsibility is to be shared among all the countries, which are members of the United Nations and signed this declaration, and no action is to be taken or imposed without having every member comply with the rules of the organization (Treaties.un.org, n.d.). This was the first step toward making the world a better place and toward the protection of future incidents of mass murders.

Further, this declaration helped to initiate the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in Paris on December 9, 1948, also known as the Genocide Convention (Schabas, n.d.). The Genocide Convention became “... a major pillar in the evolving framework of international humanitarian rules” (United Nations [c], n.d.). The Genocide Convention was adopted unanimously on December 9, 1948 by the General Assembly of the United Nations and forty-two countries originally signed the Genocide Convention. Officially, the Genocide Convention “...condemns genocide,
whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, and provides a definition of this crime” (United Nations [c], n.d.). Article 2 of the Convention states:

“...genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” (UNHCR, n.d)

Further, this document coined the term “‘crimes against humanity’ to deal with the persecution and physical extermination of national, ethnic, racial and religious minorities” (Schabas, n.d.). The Genocide Convention came about as a result of an aspiration to do something about possible future genocide and as such, this document became a cornerstone for many future actions taken by the international community in the face of potential genocide or mass atrocities; especially, the Genocide Convention became the cornerstone for the prevention of such crimes in future conflicts.

Article III of the Genocide Convention states that the following acts will be punishable: “Genocide; Conspiracy to commit genocide; Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; Attempt to commit genocide; and Complicity of Genocide.” Also, the persons who have committed these crimes or atrocities are going to be punished no matter whether they are government officials, leaders of the country, or private individuals (Treaties.un.org, n.d.). While there are clear statements about genocide, the actors regarding genocide and their punishments, there is neither a statement nor any
elaboration regarding what the exact thresholds are concerning genocide and what actions and behaviors of those who commit such crimes would be considered acts of genocide.

Another problem is that the Genocide Convention does not have any kind of “monitoring body or expert committee” for such crimes; instead, “any contracting party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the United Nations Charter, which they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide” (United Nations [c], n.d.). As a result of this, later on, the UN as a peacekeeping Security Council was charged with having a “responsibility to protect” (United Nations (a), 2011). Even though the Responsibility to Protect appears on the surface to have been around since the beginning of the United Nations, its application has been fairly new and taken on new meaning. Facing new types of conflicts, as stated above, the international community is presented with new problems in response to this concept as it does not have clear guidelines of what should be done in the case of mass atrocities, and what specific words the international community must call these atrocities in order to intervene into the internal affairs of another sovereign nation.

2.4 Responsibility to Protect

“Millions of human beings remain at the mercy of civil wars, insurgencies, state repression and state collapse. This is a stark and undeniable reality, and it is at the heart of all the issues with which this Commission has been wrestling. What is at stake here is not making the world safe for big powers, or trampling over the sovereign rights of small ones, but delivering practical protection for ordinary people, at risk of their lives, because their states are unwilling or unable to protect them. . .The experience and aftermath of Somalia, Rwanda, Srebrenica and Kosovo, as well as interventions and non-interventions in a number of other places, have provided a clear indication that the tools, devices and thinking of international relations need now to be comprehensively reassessed, in order to meet the foreseeable needs of the 21st century” (ICISS, 2001).
The Responsibility to Protect was drafted as a result of the inability of the United Nations to actually act in the case of crisis or potential atrocities. This new concept was developed with the intention of providing the United Nations and the Security Council with the ability to take specific actions in the face of human rights violations in areas of unrest.

The report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICIS) in December 2001 was the first to introduce, as such, the concept of the Responsibility to Protect while questioning “... of when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take coercive – and in particular military – action, against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other state” (ICIS, 2001). This report was created in response to the questioning by the then secretary-general of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, (ICRtoP, n.d.). This issue of intervention into another sovereign state became the most controversial issue after the end of the Cold War and, at the same time, a challenge for the policy makers which sparked much discussion of who and under what conditions is there a right to military intervention in another sovereign country. This report was “...building on Francis Deng’s idea of sovereignty as responsibility, the Commission addressed the question of when state sovereignty – a fundamental principle of international law – must yield to protection against the most egregious violations of humanitarian and international law, including genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” (ICIS, 2001). However, this report came out soon after 9/11 and its initial implications have shifted from the responsibility to prevent further crimes, to the responsibility to protect humans from potential mass atrocities, and finally, into the
responsibility to protect states from terrorism. With new crises that have recently been
developing, such as genocide in Darfur, the importance of the international community
coming together and creating and implementing adequate policy and plans in case of
potential future genocide has brought to light the responsibility to protect in the world
arena (ICRtoP, n.d.).

The next step in the evolution of the Responsibility to Protect was at the 2005
World Summit, which was “the largest gathering of Heads of State and Government the
world has seen -- and was subsequently endorsed by both the General Assembly and
Security Council” (United Nations (e), 2009). The summit “aimed at providing a legal
and moral basis for assisting civilians in the event of State failure to do so in the specific
context of [committing] . . . four crimes.” (Sixty-third General Assembly UN, 2009). The
four crimes were referred to as mass atrocities, which would trigger a United Nations
approved response and were established to be: genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity and ethnic cleansing committed by the State toward its citizens (Sixty-third
General Assembly UN, 2009). Generally, the responsibility is mandatory within the state
itself, but once the state fails to provide security for its citizens, there is a need for the
international community:

“. . . to assist sovereign States, and to step in and engage in other
necessary ways if a State was failing to protect its own people. In those
cases, there was a need to consider an array of options, including military
options, as a last resort and with the Security Council’s support.” (United
Nations (g), 2009).

Here, it is clearly stated that the military option is “a last resort.” However, there is a lack
of explanation as to what specific actions of the state would lead to military actions by
the Security Council. Yet, “. . . the historic commitment was finally made at the World
Summit in September 2005,” where the Heads of State agreed to the following: that each individual state has “the primary responsibility . . . to protect civilians;” that each state should “. . . protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing;” that each state is responsible for the “prevention of these crimes;” that “the international community should encourage or assist states to exercise this responsibility;” that “the international community has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to help protect populations threatened by these crimes (ICRtoP, n.d.). When a state manifestly fails in its protection responsibilities and when peaceful means are inadequate, then the international community must take stronger measures, including collective use of force authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII” (ICRtoP, n.d.). There is a clearly stated focus on the importance of protecting, preventing and using peaceful means when dealing with conflicts, but the steps to achieving this responsibility are not explicitly defined. Therefore, there is a lot of debate as to what the steps are and what kind of approach needs to be taken in order to address mass atrocities appropriately and protect human rights rather than overextend the power of the international community for reasons other than humanitarian intervention.

Some of the cases that have caused this debate are the humanitarian actions taken in Bosnia and Kosovo. In these cases many questioned whether human rights were actually protected or was more harm being done than good to the people involved (ICIS, 2001)? On the other hand, the lack of intervention in the cases of Rwanda and Darfur, where there was actual evidence of mass killings, leaves the grey area of humanitarian intervention up for debate (ICIS, 2001). As each situation and each conflict is an
individualized example, with its own unique problems, the international community has to look at different ways to bring about resolutions, while at the same time, be prepared to adjust the rules and act accordingly to conflicts when it is necessary. It is important to clarify what steps need to be taken when making a decision to intervene into the territory of a sovereign state. As Mr. Joseph Deiss, President of the General Assembly, stated in his opening remarks of the United Nations General Assembly on July 12, 2011 “. . . we cannot apply a single standard, benchmark, or template to all regions,” and when there is conflict, there is a need to incorporate “. . . the views of neighboring States and regional bodies” which “may be taken into account by members of the Security Council when determining which course of action to take in particular situations.” (General Assembly Security Council, 2011). According to this statement, the Security Council should refer to the states that are in the vicinity of the state in conflict and should rely on those state’s expertise and knowledge about the issue in question (General Assembly Security Council, 2011).

With conflict being a dynamic process, one of the major issues with the Responsibility to Protect is the “. . . anxiety about misuse of the concept” which arose from serious concerns of having stronger states intervene in the affairs of weaker states based on the premise of humanitarian actions (United Nations (g), 2009). However, examples exist where diplomacy and economic and policy assistance were productive, as in the case of Kenya, where “the responsibility to protect had been well articulated in diplomatic rather than military means,” or in the case of Sri Lanka where “[d]iplomacy also had a significant effect on the Sri Lankan Government.” (United Nations (g), 2009). There is no doubt that the Responsibility to Protect has had some positive effects on
world peace and stability and the protection of human rights. However, it is difficult to
overlook how these actions really are performed in the name of humanitarian
intervention, and whether or not the intervention is applied both in a timely manner and
without exceptions being made for some at the expense of others.

Timing issues are first mentioned and discussed “on a case by case basis” at the
2005 World Summit (United Nations (i), 2005). The statement “case by case” reiterates
that different countries with different conflicts require different responses, and the
problems arise from the fact that there are no general guidelines for when to intervene.
This leads to speculation as to what needs to be applied in each case and each country,
and what other deciding factors the individual members of the UN Security Council may
be bringing to the decision table. Different countries, based on different interests such as
economic interests or fear from overflow of refugees to the area due to the conflict, might
propose different measures for action and intervention in the affairs of another state. This
puts an extra burden on the Security Council to establish a balance while taking into
consideration different points of view. This may help to support the views of those who
are making the decisions to intervene but, might not meet the needs of those who actually
seek help from the international community.

In the case of Libya, some UN members strongly supported the Responsibility to
Protect concept, such as the United States, the United Kingdom and France, while others,
such as Russia, Brazil and China, look at it much more skeptically while abstaining from
the vote to intervene. Economically weaker countries tend to be more skeptical of the
Responsibility to Protect, stating that it should not “become a basis for contravening the
principles of non-interference and non-intervention” but rather the UN should “provide
appropriate, diplomatic humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter” (Sixty-third General Assembly UN, 2009).

However, the more economically powerful countries tend to support the Responsibility
to Protect principles as a way of protecting people from the harshness of their own states
(Sixty-third General Assembly UN, 2009).

The United Nations, the Responsibility to Protect, and the Genocide Convention
are clearly the pillars for maintaining world peace. However, there was an explicit need
to have a structured way in which to deal with those people who were committing war
crimes and were imprisoned. Thus, as a logical part of the world peace keeping process,
on July 17, 1998, the international community, consisting of 122 countries, created the
International Criminal Court (ICC) with its seat at The Hague in the Netherlands. The
court was assigned to punish perpetrators of war crimes and mass atrocities, and received
it’s legal basis from the adoption of the Rome Statute (International Criminal Court, (a)
1998). It began by dealing with the specific cases of Yugoslavia and Rwanda, but
nevertheless, the idea of the court’s basic principles were general and supposed to be
applicable to any similar conflict anywhere in the world. Part 1 of Article 1 of the
establishment of the court states that:

“The Court An International Criminal Court ("the Court") is hereby established. It shall
be a permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over
persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute,
and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The jurisdiction and
functioning of the Court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute.” (Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (a), 1998).
This court is meant to be the fairest and most reliable way to deal with the world’s war criminals and to bring justice to its victims, while at the same time, this type of trial should bring some sort of relief for the victim’s family members. Finally, to bring someone to this court and start the process of a trial takes a serious collection of evidence from the ground as “. . . the ICC tries only those accused of the gravest crimes” (International Criminal Court (b), 1998). The downside of this process is that it could take years before enough evidence is collected and before those responsible for the crimes are brought to the Hague for an actual trial. Once those accused of war crimes are brought to the court, it could take many more years for the presentation of evidence and witnesses testimony prior to the issuing of an actual verdict.

An example of this can be seen in the case of the Serbian politician, writer and lawyer, Vojislav Seselj, who was accused of war crimes within the former Yugoslavia, specifically Kosovo. He has been held in detention at the Hague for eleven years now without being sentenced. This case is, as the President of Republic of Serbia, Tomislav Nikolic, says, “. . . unprecedented in the world’s history, because the prosecution was unable to gather evidence for their undocumented indictment issued beforehand. . . these are the most flagrant violations of human rights of the accused committed both by the prosecution and by the ICTY [The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] itself.” (2013). Yugoslavia (known now as Serbia) was one of the countries who first supported the ICC and cooperated with the tribunal since its establishment, but today - 20 years later - there is an uncertainty about the fairness of the court. As President Tomislav Nikolic asked in his speech at the Sixty-first UN General Assembly: “Is it justice, as Simone Weil would say, a fugitive from the winning camp, because the
Thus, in the case of the International Criminal Court one sees many of the same problems that the United Nations, the Responsibility to Protect and the Genocide Convention runs into, specifically, that the most powerful governments and the victors receive more justice. There are numerous examples of unfair treatment toward the accused criminals. There is a lack of access to media, data collection and funding for preparing the defense of the accused, which gives the prosecution an upper hand in the trial process over the defendant. Overall, the idea of the ICC can be seen as a good way to deal with war criminals, and it is necessary for maintaining peace and reconciliation. However, the court system itself seems to be oriented in favor of the prosecution and does not leave the accused much room for a fair and just defense.

2.5 Conclusion

In this chapter I have explained how the United Nations was formed after WW II as a new international organization with the purpose to prevent future wars and maintain peace. Besides maintaining peace, there was a need for the prevention of any kind of atrocities which further elicits the specific evolution of peace keeping and its move towards addressing the need for possible intervention into other sovereign nations when certain crimes, such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, take place. There is absolutely no doubt that these are noble causes and that there is a global need for such safeguards. However, in recent years there has been a shift from last resort military tactics to those that espouse the elevation of the concept of the
Responsibility to Protect. Moreover, the failure to distinguish the exact guidelines under which the Responsibility to Protect should be employed leads to speculation concerning the motives of those who use it. It is also clear that the Responsibility to Protect tends to be viewed most favorably by the strongest nations and looked upon much more skeptically by weaker nations. There are some general guidelines for the threshold of when to intervene, specifically: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. When there has been a clear establishment of thresholds for intervention, then the ICC should be the final effort to bring justice to the victims by trying and punishing war criminals. However, the international community fails to provide clear guidance as to what exact actions warrant these definitions, or what the thresholds are that would result in military intervention. This leads me to question what role the post 9/11 view of the Responsibility to Protect plays within current international peace keeping tactics; as well as, what this means specifically in the case of the humanitarian intervention in Libya.
CHAPTER 3 – LIBYA AND THE WEST

3.1 Introduction

Libya is significant because its history, location, resources, and divisive relationship with the west can be argued to have led to the decision to intervene militarily during the recent period of unrest in 2011. Over the years, the relationship of Libya and its leader Qaddafi with the rest of the world, specifically, the United States, United Kingdom and France, was estranged. During this time of estrangement the relationship reached a tipping point and the beginning of the unrest in Libya in 2011 created a perfect stage for the international community to act in order to remove Qaddafi and his regime. Such an intervention can be seen to be largely due to these countries wanting greater access to the oil supplies of Libya. In this chapter I will discuss the economic and political relationship that Libya had with the international community, especially in relation to Libya’s vast oil supplies, and the historical context that Qaddafi and oil have in regard to access to such oil supplies.

3.2 Libya and oil

When a country has a natural resource that is valuable throughout the world such as oil, the world pays a lot of attention to the actions in that country. Oil plays a crucial role in the development and existence of capitalism in the modern western world. Further, it is really difficult to predict the exact amounts in oil reserves. The abundance or scarcity of oil resources are linked to conflicts in the areas where it is commonly found, especially in the Middle East. The economic reasons behind conflicts and wars inform geopolitics, international peacekeeping and peace-building policies that can be alternatives to violence and conflict. With the current globalization of the world it is
significant to look at the importance the abundance or scarcity of natural resources has involving any conflict. For instance, Libya, before the conflict, had the largest African oil reserves and was the world’s ninth largest oil producer (Reuters, 2011). It is for this reason that the conflict in Libya must be examined in juxtaposition to its abundance of oil, and thus, its position within the capitalist system of a global economy.

3.3 Capitalism and oil

While the availability of natural resources has been a major focal point in academia in recent history, there are two theories which dominate the main stream narratives when it comes to the question of oil abundance and oil scarcity. Scholars have proposed two theories - Abundance/Scarcity theory and Peak Oil theory - that in combination explain the social and physical causes of resource conflicts over oil.

The Abundance/Scarcity theory is based on Marx’s primitive accumulation of capital (Marx 1887). He sees this as a general principle of market expansion and capital and because of the relations of production, it usually ends up surrounded by violence or crisis. The reason for that is capitalists need to establish themselves in certain territories where the means of productions are different. The property relations are then transformed from land owners to the capitalist land barons as part of their assets. This property ownership further estranges the relationship between land owner and capitalist - creating prime conditions for future conflict.

Harvey (2003) looks at conflicts and “volatility” from a deeper viewpoint, a view that is below the surface of what one would consider to be the real reasons for a conflict (p. 1). He calls it “historical-geographical materialism” where, as much as it is important
to look at the geographic locations and physical characteristics of places, it is important to focus on the social and international relations that shape these places and the access to their natural resources. With every different power that has come about in history one finds a different usage of the natural resources; a usage that shapes human consciousness of the time. To be specific, Harvey (2003) uses the example of the UK and Western European countries during the time of colonialism, where abundance in natural resources and early access to it provided for a “jump start” for these large colonial powers. More recently, he uses an example of, what he calls, the New Imperialism of America, which America started to exercise after 9/11 in order to protect “homeland security,” which marks the beginning of the narrative of the “war on terror.” With the development of capitalism and increased consumerism in Northern American and European countries came new challenges and increases in the need for more natural resources in order to sustain the high standard of living of these powerful nations (Labban, 2010; Harvey, 2003; Watts, 2001; Jhavery, 2004). The increase in opening up of more free-trade markets, which are paradoxically completely controlled by the few hegemonic capitalistic industries and international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the economic stresses of one country have a direct impact on many economies around the world. This action contributes significantly to globalization through improved technology, which enables the transporting of information and goods faster from one side of the world to another.

Watts (2001), elaborates on the direct impact oil resources have on the local population of the country where oil is abundant, and how the presence of oil has a negative effect on the people rather than bringing prosperity. Watts (2001) uses Nigeria
and Ecuador and their issues with the big oil companies - Shell and Texaco - as examples. The governments of these two countries have to give up a certain level of sovereignty in order to have access to the global markets. They also are organized in a way that enables an uninterrupted oil flow, even at the expense of the citizens of the country.

The conflicts surrounding oil are more often attributed to both the increase in global oil consumption and the demand oil has caused around the world, as well as the decrease in available supplies (Labban, 2008). Therefore, there is a dominant desire to control the geographic locations where oil is plentiful, insuring that a continuous flow of this economic capital is uninterrupted. While many desire control, what one finds is that the hegemonic powers, such as the United States, are the ones who play a major role in developing the geopolitical strategies to control the oil resources around the world. Labban (2008), states that this competition for geography is nothing but a “competition for oil” (p. 3). Also, he argues that the reason for a lack of resources lies not in the unavailability of the resources, but rather in a geopolitical creation of “unavailability” which is artificially created in order to continue “. . . to make its [oil] production profitable” (p. 3). Further, this keeps international surpluses accumulating, which supports the hegemony of the most powerful countries. The most interesting part of Labban’s argument is that there is no “scarcity of the resources” but rather an abundance (2008, p.3). Therefore, the transnational oil companies make sure that there is not an “over-supply” of oil which would lower oil prices and the demand at the same time. While the most prominent companies originate in the most powerful countries, the question is how these companies control market trade when it comes to keeping up with
the constant reproduction of revenue and increase in capital. Labban (2008), states that: “The scarcity or abundance of oil is ultimately a social-spatial relationship, not merely a geological fact or technical appraisal” (p.xx). According to him, “the real scarcity of oil, however, derives primarily from the monopoly of landlord states and oil companies, national and transnational, over extraction and access to reserves in order to avoid the build-up of inventories and maintain inflated market prices” (p.4). Thus, in order to keep control of oil resources, the powerful oil companies keep market prices of oil high to create an artificial scarcity (Labban, 2008).

The second theory that dominates the main stream narratives when it comes to the question of oil abundance and oil scarcity is Peak Oil theory. Labban (2010), describes how “peak oil” advocates believe that the oil resources are finite and that the “natural oil polarity” (meaning those places where there is abundant amounts of oil resources are rare and just in certain areas of the world) puts importance on those geographic locations where it is found. Therefore, access to these areas becomes a dominant concern for industrial capitalism and there follows a desire for a surplus supply of oil. Labban (2010) describes this best when he says: “As world oil reserves are depleted, the Middle East particularly will claim larger shares of world reserves, allowing OPEC to exercise its monopoly more effectively, manipulating supplies and oil prices” (p. 543). OPEC stands for The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, a permanent intergovernmental organization, currently consisting of twelve countries, including Libya (OPEC, n.d.). According to Peak Oil theory, for the international community to have access to oil resources the members of OPEC are crucial (Labban, 2010). For example, the United States has a good relationship with Saudi Arabia and thus, access to Arabian
oil. However, in Libya, the political situation has been one in which there have not been the crucial ties with the Libyan government, a member of OPEC. Further, Labban (2010), describes how peak oil advocates claim that there are not any geopolitical reasons for the oil crisis, because any non-obedient country in the Middle East can be easily destroyed by sending military troops to the country. On the other hand, the real reasons for oil crises is rather geophysical and something needs to be done in order to prevent oil sources running out (Labban, 2010). While this argument leads to the “grim prospect of imperialist conquest” the other theories take this a step further (Labban, 2010 p. 544).

The world’s usage of oil is incredible already and increases every day. This impacts core countries the most. Even though they are economically the most powerful, at the same time, they are the most dependent on oil availability and thus, more vulnerable. The best example of dependency is the United States. Klare, (2010) states that “The United States - with something less than 5 percent of the world’s total population - consumes about 25 percent of the world’s total supply of oil” (p. 11). If this trend continues, in the next decade or so, the United States will consume “half as much petroleum again as . . . today” (p.11). The major issue here is that US oil resources have to be delivered from elsewhere. Therefore, the United States is not just dependent on oil, but also the countries which control the supply, production, and distribution of oil (Klare, 2004). This presents several different problems for core countries. First of all, the dependence of the core countries on those countries that own the oil resource fields is huge. The core countries have to employ many different strategies in order to keep this natural oil flow coming to them. Some of the strategies involve becoming very good friends with the governments of the countries where the natural resources are abundant,
such as Saudi Arabia. Hence, the actions of many oppressive governments are overlooked in order to continue good working relationships with them and to ensure unobstructed oil flow. In addition Klare (2004) states “. . . dependence often requires [one] . . . to grant all sorts of favors to the leaders of major . . . foreign suppliers, whether [they] . . . like them or not” (p.11). For the United States, the political leaders often do favors for foreign governments that they may not agree with, because “. . . they often feel bound to do so to facilitate the flow of oil” (p.11). Yet, the biggest problem is that this “facilitation” leads to the involvement of the United States into the political happenings, unrest, and wars within the areas of oil abundance to continue the constant flow they are so dependent on. This puts the national security of the country and U.S. military into many troublesome areas and situations.

The American leaders began involving oil resources into their politics of national security close to the end of World War II, while under the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration. Even though this was a prime time for oil production in the United States, there was a fear that the excessive warring would seriously deplete the reserves of oil and some sort of insurance was needed. In order to secure oil flow, the United States “. . . attempted to protect future U.S. energy imports by establishing an American protectorate over Saudi Arabia and a permanent military presence in the Persian Gulf” (Klare, 2004 p.12). What is most important here is that the actions of President Roosevelt “. . . set in motion the process of ever-increasing American military involvement in the greater Gulf area” (Klare, 2004, p. 12). This practice of seeing “foreign petroleum through the lens of national security” continues to this day and it represents a major cornerstone of American
foreign policy (Klare, 2010, p. 12). As American consumption grows and there is more and more desire for bigger vehicles, the dependency grows as well.

Finally, Klare (2004 p. xiii) states that “the centrality of cheap and abundant petroleum” leads to “the preservation of a distinctly American way of life.” It is important to understand the involvement of America in the Middle East. Especially its connection with the different governments in the Middle East, as these links play a crucial role in the oil supply to the American market and for the American users in all different sectors - from military uses to public uses. This also illustrates America’s relationship to Libya, its oil supply, political situation, and its geographical location. The rest of the Western countries, such as France and the UK, are also very dependent on oil. However, they are geographically much closer to Libya and have an even greater interest in getting access to the territory of Libya and to its oil resources. How these connections were created is explained in the next section by giving an account of the historical context of Libyan oil with the western world.

3. 4 Libya – The History

The history of Libya is quite complicated. Its physical geography, years of colonization, international involvement, and many different rulers (the last Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi), have played a large role in shaping the country into the way it was right before the recent humanitarian intervention of 2011.

Libya is a country located in North Africa, encompassing 685,524 square miles of land. It has a population of about six and a half million people (CIA.gov, n.d.). The current political divides in Libya line up with its location between three cultural worlds:
Arab, African and Mediterranean. The natural barriers of the sea on the north and desert in the northwest and south resulted in the division of Libya into three regions: Tripolitania (West), Cyrenaica (East), and Fezzan (an area largely in the Saharan desert which comprises 90% of Libyan territory). The majority of Libyans belong to the Berber and Arab (97%) ethnic groups, and the remainder belong to numerous other ethnic groups including Greek, Maltese, Italian, Egyptian, Pakistani, Tunisian, Indian, and Turk (CIA.gov, n.d.).

Beginning in ancient times, Libya was conquered by the Greeks and the Turkish Ottoman Empire followed by an Italian occupation, which lasted until WW II and the defeat of Italy. Soon after WWII, in 1949, King Idris I established an independent monarchy. Thus, “Libya found itself in the unenviable position of having to start at the lowest level on the political and economic scale” (EL-Kikha, 1997 p.22). As a former Italian colony, Libya struggled for survival as the largest part of Libya, about 90% of the land, was not arable and there were harsh living conditions. After gaining its independence in 1957, as granted by the United Nations, the overall situation in the country was bad. The yearly income was very low, approximately $60. The infant mortality rate was 40%. There was very little trade occurring in such a bad economy (El-Kikhia, 1997). This situation changed in 1959 when some leading oil companies such as “the US oil company, Esso, discovered large petroleum deposits in the Cyrenica region of Libya” (Sullivan, 2009, p. 190). But, the Libyan people did not benefit that much from this discovery. King Isidri I was accused of depending too much on Western involvement and for collecting a lot of revenue from oil which benefited mostly himself and his closest people, leaving the majority of Libyan people still to live in poverty (Sullivan,
A corrupt monarchy and the poor conditions of the majority of the people led to the overthrow of King Idris I by Muammar el-Qaddafi who ruled the country for nearly forty-two years.

Muammar el-Qaddafi, the only son of a Beduin, was born in 1942 into a very poor family living along the gulf of Sirte (Tuttle, 1992 p. 170). His family resisted the Italian occupation, and his father even served a sentence for fighting against the foreign occupiers. The family lived in a tent, always ready to pick up and move to the next point (Sullivan, 2009). After his primary mosque education, where he was trained in the Islamic-faith, Muammar el-Qaddafi attended secondary school at the Fezzanese centre of Sabha (Sullivan, 2009 p.23). While in this school, Muammar el-Qaddafi was fascinated by the ideology and the politics of Gamal Abdel Nasser (the Egyptian president at the time) and “soon became a political activist, publicly espousing Arab nationalism” (Tuttle, 1992, p. 170). With this idea in mind, Qaddafi, on September 1, 1969 overthrew King Idris I and established the Libyan Arab Republic (Tuttle, 1992). Soon after the revolution, Muammar el-Qaddafi “declared [himself] as devoted to the goals of anti-imperialism, Arab socialism and Arab unity” (Sono, 1984 p. 25). The new “. . . Libyan regime dismantled American bases, nationalized oil companies and pursued a policy of non-alignment” (Sono, 1984, p.11). Qaddafi became “a voice for what many Arab rulers could no longer say” and “he spoke the unpalatable truths that others did not dare to articulate” (Vandewalle, 2006 p.81). He was determined to pursue unity with other Arab countries and he “became [the] self-appointed guardian of Nasser’s legacy, nurturing the notion of Arab nationalism and unity as part and parcel of Libyan revolution”
Qaddafi changed Libya’s politics toward the foreign oil companies and directed the profit from oil revenues to stay within country.

This diversion of the profit for Libya only is significant because, when oil was discovered in the late 1950s, the extraction and price control of oil was controlled by the foreign petroleum companies (Asser, 2011). This was benefiting mostly the oil consumers and least the Libyan people. Also, the foreign refineries were taking half of the profit from the oil revenue. Colonel Qaddafì stopped this practice by the “negotiation of the contracts, [and] threatening to shut off production if the oil companies refused” (Asser, 2011). Immediately, Qaddafì showed his firm attitude with the international community and established a good profit for his country. The rest of the Arab countries, rich in oil resources, followed Qaddafì’s example and did the same type of negotiation and “the 1970s Arab petro-boom began” (Asser, 2011). From this time on, Qaddafì secured a large portion of the profit from the oil revenue and the availability of the oil resources quickly made Libya rich.

Qaddafì’s anti-Western politics attracted negative attention from the Western media and resentments from the international community (Sono, 1984; Sullivan, 2009). Libya participated in the oil boycott of the United States during the world oil crises in 1973, which added to the bad relationship with the Western world, especially the United States and the United Kingdom (Sono, 1984). During the administration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan, U.S. intelligence agencies connected Muammar el-Qaddafì with various terrorist attacks such as: the bombing of French airliner UTA 772 over Niger on September 19, 1989; the attack on a US embassy in Tripoli on December 2, 1979; a bomb that exploded at a discotheque in West Berlin, killing three people and injuring over a
hundred on April 5, 1986; and the bombing of the Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie on December 21, 1988 (Vandewalle, 2006). From this time on, Libya became synonymous with Muammar el-Qaddafi’s name and Muammar el-Qaddafi became synonymous with terrorism and tyranny.

Further, the Western media portrayed Muammar el-Qaddafi as a threat to the rest of the world and someone that the international community should get rid of (Sono, 1984). Various sanctions were placed upon Libya, and its leader was not willing to cooperate with the Western countries, neither politically nor economically. From 1986 on, Qaddafi was not only accused of involvement in various terrorist actions, but he was accused of being involved in the killings of Libyans living out of the country who were speaking out against him.

In spite of the relationship with the international community, Qaddafi’s economic reforms in Libya brought to the Libyan people “income, food, decent homes, education opportunities and health services” (Sono, 1984 p.6). Nevertheless, these health care facilities were poor, as was the housing. Also, the best care was going to Tripoli and its close surroundings, as Qaddafi and his people were located there. Qaddafi, also, invested in building the infrastructure and connecting highways along the remote parts of Libya all with paid foreign workers. Further, he set up “... a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)” which was for the pro-Arab union of North Africa and the Middle East and the anti-Western and anti-US influences “within their country” (Sullivan, 2009 p. 30). Muammar el-Qaddafi called himself the “Leader of Revolution” and “created a role for himself as a spiritual leader for the Sunni branch of Islam, the denomination of Islam to which the majority of Muslims belong” (Sullivan, 2009 pp. 31-32). Qaddafi's link to the
western world has been critical from the earliest beginnings of his reign because he did not like the presence of the western military in his territory. There were British soldiers and an American base which he dismantled soon after coming to power.

Since Qaddafî did not allow any outside involvement in his internal affairs, the international community started to impose different sanctions on Qaddafî in order to force him to allow foreign companies and governments to gain more access to oil and to have a say in the countries oil production. For a long time, Qaddafî was able to resist this pressure and continued to stand up to the international community while focusing on keeping the profit for his country as he states in one of his interviews prior to conflict: “Foreign service companies working in Libya earn millions. Why do we not earn these millions which currently go to foreigners?” (al-Qadhafi, quoted in Aljazeera, 2006). However, after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Qaddafî started to shift his foreign policy regarding the Western world, and he opened up a bit more to foreigners, just in time to be swept away by the Arab Spring revolution in 2011.

Prior to the revolutionary unrest in Libya in 2011, there were other attempts to overthrow Muammar el-Qaddafî’s regime, but with no success. Everyone who tried to criticize or oppose Qaddafî’s regime could no longer be a part of any planning involving the future of the country (Vandewalle, 2006 p. 101). Also, Qaddafî incorporated the members of his tribe and his family into all important military positions and other powerful positions which helped him to assure the people would not riot against him (Vandewalle, 2006). This was true until the Arab Spring, which initiated regime changes in Arab countries across the Middle East and which, eventually, led to the fall of Qaddafî’s regime in October, 2011.
The Arab Spring was a wave of protests that took place throughout the Arab world beginning with Tunisia. It began when a young man, Mohamed Bouazizi, in the small town of Sidi Bouzid, was humiliated when his means of making a living, a small non-licensed vegetable stand, was taken away from him by the police on December 17, 2010. Desperate, he went to the local government building and poured gasoline all over himself, setting himself on fire (Council on Foreign Relations, 2011). He died on January 11, 2011. This action not only set Bouaziz on fire, but it sparked a wave of revolutionary protests throughout the country which brought Tunisian president, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s reign to an end. The wave of protest spread further throughout the region and ended the reign of Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak. It brought unrest in Syria, Bahrain and, finally, the end of Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi’s reign in Libya (Council on Foreign Relations, 2011). All these protests came as a result of a combination of people’s desperation within these totalitarian political regimes, economic despair, and social frustrations with the situations in their countries (Council on Foreign Relations, 2011). The revolution happened unexpectedly and fast, and its speed surprised even the leaders of these countries.

Soon after the regime change in Tunisia, the revolutionary wave spread to Libya, where protesters took to the streets and began throwing rocks at government offices in the eastern part of the country (Weaver, 2011). In the city of Benghazi, the second largest city in Libya, the protesters clashed with the security forces and set one of the government offices on fire. The main protest was against the government corruption that had led to the lack of decent housing and normal living conditions in the eastern part of the country (Weaver, 2011). Qaddafi had been neglecting the city for a long time and its
residents had never really trusted him, and he did not trust them either (BBC [a], 2011).
The demonstrators consisted of all types of people, including lawyers, professors and doctors, and they all took to the streets to fight Qaddafi’s regime. The area surrounding Benghazi was a much poorer area of the country than the area around Tripoli. Tripoli was a central base for Qaddafi, his tribe and his family which, at the same time, was receiving a lot more money, health care and better housing than Benghazi or other cities on the east side of the country.

The housing provisions were a problem because only through the bribery of government officials was it possible to obtain housing. Then the problem escalated when people started entering the empty units and squatting in them while the people who paid the bribes were not able to enter units due to other people already living in them (Weaver, 2011). The demonstrators started their protests without weapons and with only bare hands, but soon were attacked by Qaddafi’s armed forces and a bloody civil war began.

Qaddafi gave an interview to various western media sources denying that there were any kind of protests in Libya saying: “My people love me. They would die for me” (quoted in The Guardian, 2011). At the same time, his “government used overwhelming force against demonstrators in Tripoli and then started to move on the second city, Benghazi, where the rebels had seized control” (BBC [b], 2011).

The international community started expressing concern that thousands of people could be killed as the Libyan Army surrounded Benghazi. Finally, on March 17, 2011, the United Nations security council passed the Resolution to Protect 1973, with Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia abstaining. NATO began airstrikes that continued until
October 27, 2011 (BBC.co.uk [c], 2011). With the help of NATO airpower, the rebels slowly gained control of the country. Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi was killed on October 20, 2011 by the rebel forces in his home town Sirte. Currently Libya is under the power of an interim National Transitional Council. This “New Libya” was left severely damaged; a lot of infrastructure and buildings were destroyed during the NATO air attacks and by the internal unrest and fighting between Qaddafi’s followers and the revolutionaries. Currently, Libya’s future is in limbo while awaiting national congress and multi-party elections to decide its fate.

Nevertheless, the Arab Spring revolution in Libya was the perfect opportunity for the international community to get rid of Qaddafi. This was the time for the Western countries to secure their place in Libyan oil production. As Shadi Hamid, a director of research at the Brooking’s Institution’s Doha Center in Qatar, had said, if Qaddafi wins “Western companies won’t get back in any time soon and won’t be able to invest” (Oil&Gas Journal, 2011). By encouraging a new government in Libya the Western world secured better conditions for economic negotiations for easier access to oil resources. However, it is significant to note the Arab Spring revolution only led to the perfect internal conditions for intervention, what was needed was the proper external conditions, the public approval of the international community.
CHAPTER 4 – THE DEBATE LEADING TO INTERVENTION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter describes how the United States, the United Kingdom, and France expressed their views about the situation in Libya through their public statements. These governments created narratives that elicited a sense of violation and a breach of responsibility by the Libyan government. Specifically, they identified a failure to fulfill their duty of taking care of their own people by denying them basic human rights, democracy, and freedom. Further, they created narratives in which they described Qaddafi and his regime as tyrannical and accused him of killing his own people. Based on these narratives, it was argued that Qaddafi must resign his post. Analyzing these different narratives, which developed in the time leading up to the intervention in Libya, helps to better understand how these public statements created the conditions and gained approval from the rest of the world and have set the stage for military action into sovereign Libya.

4.2 Construction of the positive case for intervention: democracy, the fight for freedom and human rights

One of the main positive terms used by the United States, the United Kingdom and France to describe the stance that the international community took regarding Libya in their narratives was the phrase “fighting for democracy.” This phrase was equally supported by the statements of the three governments and was represented as the main reason for unrest in the area. It was also portrayed as the main reason why these
governments supported the Arab Spring revolution, especially in Libya. Whatever the situation actually was on the ground in Libya, revolution was acceptable because it was the people’s fight against their tyrannical leaders for democracy. Any response Qaddafi had was described in the narratives as a response against “peaceful demonstrators.”

The way that each of these governments perceived democracy was expressed both similarly and differently through their public statements. For example, basic human rights, as stated by the US Assistant Secretary Philip Crowley, was defined as being “... universal rights, including freedom of speech and peaceful assembly.” Further, a similar statement was reiterated on February 22nd, by the US Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Rosemary A. DiCarlo, who said that: “We believe that governments must respect these rights, the right to assemble peacefully, to protest, to speak, and to form political organizations.” Alistar Burt, The Minister for the Middle East for the UK government, said: “I call on the Libyan Government to respect the right of peaceful assembly and freedom of expression.” While, the official France Diplomatie website states that: “President Sarkozy condemns the unacceptable use of force against Libyans, who are simply exercising their fundamental right to freedom and assembly and expression.” These statements sent a clear message to the Libyan government that these basic human rights were important, and the Libyan government needed to do something about the issue and help their people. In addition, UK Prime Minister David Cameron

2 US Department of State Press Statement on February 22.
3 US Department of State Press Statement on February 20.
4 US Department of State Remarks on February 22.
5 UK Foreign&Commonwealth Office Minister for the Middle East comments on recent events in Libya on February 16.
6 France Diplomatie Libya-Communique issued by the Presidency of the Republic on February 21.
explained that the lack of respect for human rights such as “... the right to peaceful protest, in freedom of speech and the internet, in freedom of assembly and the rule of law,” can lead to unrest rather than peaceful society. With such narratives about the need for freedom, democracy and human rights, the international community justified the unrest on the ground as the people fighting for their basic rights, not as a rebellious overthrow of their government. These narratives, thus, set the stage for intervention into Libya and helped the people gain the democracy they deserved, which the Libyan government was not offering.

The UK, the US, and France, by promoting the main reason for unrest in the region as being a “fight for democracy,” created a foundation for narratives that supported international involvement in Libya. This view was supported because it was viewed to be a means of bringing about freedom and human rights for the Libyan people. The French government sent a clear message to Qaddafi and the rest of the world calling for some sort of action through its statement: “The international community cannot stand idly by in the face of these massive human rights violations.” Furthermore, the French government implied a readiness to bring democracy to Libya through statements such as: “Our worry, our concern, is – just as we’ve always said – to support Libya on the path toward democracy.” For the French government and the US and UK, democracy is something that each country must provide to its citizens. In the case of Libya, these governments

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7 UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office *Prime Minister urges reform in the Middle East* on February 22.
8 France Diplomatie *Statement issued by President Sarkozy at the Council of Ministers meeting* on February 23.
were sending a message to Qaddafi that he was to provide these precepts of democracy, and if he did not, the US, the UK, and French governments would “not stand idly by.” Certainly, the narratives about struggles in Libya revealed that democracy was something that the Libyan people lacked and were fighting for. The international community saw democracy as something they must have. Therefore, they had to support the Libyan people in their effort to achieve democracy, even if that meant intervention into a sovereign nation.

These collective statements regarding the Libyan people’s “fight for democracy” not only set the stage for intervention, but also played a major role in gaining international support for intervention. With the use of the terms “democracy” and “human rights” in their narratives the US, UK and France created a foundation argument for expelling the Libyan government from the Human Rights Council. This was the first step in the process of alienation of Qaddafi and his government prior to intervention into the country.

4.3 Construction of negative narratives: tyrannical, killer, atrocities

Once the narratives regarding democracy, freedom and human rights had been set forth, the statements that the US, UK and France created were framed in a much more negative context. Specifically, the narratives claimed Qaddafi to be a cruel ruler who ruthlessly killed his own people - people that, as already noted, were only fighting for their basic human rights and freedom. The new narratives focused on the tyrannical nature of Qaddafi and proposed immediate action in order to protect and save the Libyan people from their ruthless dictator. Further, the narratives implied that, once Qaddafi was
gone, the freedom from his regime would deliver basic human rights to the Libyan people. Only after Qaddafi was expelled would there be a hope that democracy would come to Libya. Further, once Libya was free and democratic the country would open up economically bringing prosperity for all, not just the Libyan people, but the United States, United Kingdom, France and the rest of the world.

As March 19, 2012, the actual date of intervention, drew closer the emphasis in the narratives became even more negative. The narrative themes spoke more and more about the atrocities, tyranny, and mass murders that were said to be happening on the ground in Libya. Therefore, the Libyan government's wrongdoing became the focal point of the discourse concerning the situation in Libya. When referring to the situation in Libya, the United States UN Permanent Representative, Susan E. Rice, said that there were “. . . outrageous and heinous crimes that are being committed by the government of Libya against its own people.”10 The statements by the US, UK and France framed the situation on the ground as horrific, and therefore, called for the international community to act quickly and with urgency. Intervening was framed as the most appropriate action for the international community to take. Each of the members framed their discourse around “the atrocities” on the ground and the tyranny of Qaddafi. They then presented their case as to why Qaddafi should step down from his position as Libya’s ruler.

4.4 Tyranny and atrocities on the ground

From the three government's statements there was a sense that the international community did not know exactly what was actually occurring on the ground in Libya. There was not a clear picture of how many victims there actually were, just assumptions

10 US Department of State Daily Press Briefing on February 26
and suppositions about the numbers of dead, injured and tortured. In general, the statements described the situation on the ground mainly as “significant bloodshed,” “horrifying,” and as a “brutal and bloody crackdown.” These terms were used to describe the urgency of the situation on the ground, but the sources for information were vague and unnamed, leaving many questions of credibility. For example, the US Assistant Secretary, Philip J. Crowley, said in one of his daily press briefings that the number of victims was in the “hundreds” and that the US was “working to ascertain the facts,” and the information regarding the “hundreds of victims” was sourced from “credible reports” while “. . . the full extent of the death toll is unknown due to the lack of access of the international media and human rights organizations.”11 What seemed questionable was that there was no naming of “credible sources,” no mention of how the information was collected, and no explanation as to how the US government would “ascertain the facts.” It left the public to believe the government officials’ claims based on assumed expertise, not facts laid out for their own reasoning.

Similarly, US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, responded in one of her remarks with the Latvian Foreign Minister, Girts Valdis Kristovski, that: “. . . we’ve received reports of hundreds killed and many more injured. This bloodshed is completely unacceptable.”12 There was no information stating how Secretary Clinton got this information about “hundreds of victims” and who delivered these numbers to Secretary Clinton. Uncertainty about the situation on the ground can be ascertained in other instances where Secretary Clinton stated “. . . it is difficult to get a clear understanding of

11 US Department of State Daily Press Briefing on February 20
12 US Department of State Daily Press Briefing on February 22
everything that is happening everywhere throughout the country.”13 Acting Deputy Department Spokesman for the United States, Mr. Toner, said in one of the daily briefings that they were “monitoring human rights abuses. I mean, we continue to collect and monitor.” However, when asked by a reporter how they were monitoring, he answered: “Well, through a variety of means. Obviously, we don’t have eyes and ears on the ground, which is limiting to us. But we continue to . . . talk to people within and without – and outside of Libya to get a better sense of what’s going on there.”14 This was the time when the US, UK, and France were using caution while talking about the situation in Libya and the atrocities that Qaddafi was said to be committing in his country. US Secretary Hillary Clinton said in one of her interviews “I’m cautious in how we talk about this [about the evidences of aerial bombardment of civilians by the Qaddafi forces].”15 Further, she admitted that most of the stories about attacks on the ground were “anecdotes” and as she said “. . . we don’t want to make any decisions based on anecdotes.”16

On the other hand, the statements revealed complaints about the lack of access by foreign reporters and news media in Libya. The daily briefings by the US Department of State asserted that the news media pressured the officials to do something about the situation in Libya as bloodshed and mass atrocities happened, but no one said how many people were actually being killed or if there was any evidence of that killing. This was completely contradictory information to the lack of access if it was actually the news media pressuring the government to act. In that case, the statements about “hundreds of killed” were questionable and something not to be taken for granted. What one sees here

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13 US Department of State Daily Press Briefing on February 23
14 US Department of State Daily Press Briefing on March 9
15 US Department of State Interview on February 28
16 US Department of State Interview on February 28
is the narrative creating a horrific picture on the ground that elicited the compassion of the public and gained the support of the public to escalate the situation and take action on Libyan soil. There were also statements that propagated the fear that if the Libyan unrest was not stopped it could spread across the borders of the country putting Libya’s European neighbors at risk. The UK and French statements revealed this fear most clearly as they were in close proximity to Libya and Qaddafi.

After creating narratives explaining the “horrific” situation on the ground while creating a strong sense of urgency to stop said atrocities, the three government’s narratives turned towards military intervention. Thus the statements began as calls to Qaddafi to give his people freedom and basic human rights, but then the statements clearly began giving Qaddafi an ultimatum to either leave or resign before he was militarily removed from his role as leader. The demands on Qaddafi and his close advisers became more and more volatile. At first, the messages were more like warnings. However, as time went on they were more like orders for Qaddafi to step down and leave without compromises. The demands for Qaddafi to step down and leave left no room for alternatives. For example, on March 3, 2011 Alain Juppe, The French Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, at his joint conference with William Hague, First Secretary of State for Foreign Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, stated that: “. . . we utterly condemn the attitude of Colonel Gaddafi, who has discredited himself by using violence against his people. So we’re very clearly demanding that he go.”

17 France Diplomatie Visits - Statements by Alain Juppé, Ministre d'Etat, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, at his joint press conference with William Hague, First Secretary of State, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

It was a clear demand for Qaddafi to leave but it also implied
that the international community, together with the UN Security Council, would take military action against Qaddafi and his regime to remove them from the country should he fail to remove himself.

Even when Venezuela’s president Hugo Chavez offered “his good offices to try to defuse the crisis,” the French Minister, Juppe, responded to the offer that he “can see nothing [in it]” and “no mediation aimed at enabling Colonel Gaddafi to remain in power is welcome.” On the other hand, the United States was a bit hesitant when it came to the question of whether Qaddafi should resign as a head of state. Thus, what we see is a delegitimizing of Qaddafi’s power in Libya, but with clearly mixed messages being given. For example, when asked about what he thought about the legitimacy of Qaddafi, The US Assistant Secretary Crowley answered: “I believe, from a legal standpoint, he is still the head of state and head of government. But clearly, he has lost legitimacy in the eyes of his people, and that obviously influences our perceptions of him as well.” Here, Crowley distanced himself, and the US, from the implication that Qaddafi was not legitimately recognized as head of state anymore, but called on Qaddafi by stating that “he has lost legitimacy in the eyes of his people.” Thus, the narrative implied that Americans should doubt his legitimacy, as the Libyan people already had. Therefore, Qaddafi was legally the head of state, but because there were Libyans that did not find this to be legitimate then Americans should not as well. In addition, the history of the relationship between Qaddafi and the international community showed a different

18 France Diplomatie Visits - Statements by Alain Juppé, Ministre d'Etat, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, at his joint press conference with William Hague, First Secretary of State, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

19 US Department of State Daily Press Briefing on February 25
situation and the loss of trust was something long present between Qaddafi and the rest of the world, including the United States (Sullivan, 2009). But, the way the discourse was created here was intended to persuade Americans and the international community that it was right in wanting to remove Qaddafi, because the Libyan people were fighting for freedom and democracy and they did not feel that Qaddafi was a legitimate leader any longer.

Different foreign ministries used slightly different narratives regarding the decision that Qaddafi must step down from his position as leader. But the common conclusion gleaned from all of the narratives by all three countries was that Qaddafi must go, the only difference was the way they arrived at such a conclusion. Regarding the US statements, at the beginning, they did not state that Qaddafi was a dictator. The way they were describing Qaddafi’s coming to power was as non-democratic. In one of his daily briefings, Mr. Crowley, the US Assistant Secretary, when asked whether he thought Qaddafi a dictator, answered: “I don’t think he came to office through a democratic process.” On the other hand, the United Kingdom and France immediately called Qaddafi a dictator without fearing public outrage at such a claim. This is important because it shows how the states with closer proximity to the states of conflict had more significant connections that they needed to protect. In this case France and the United Kingdom were more decisive and more involved in the issue itself.

On the day of the intervention, the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton said that the intention of the international community was to establish some sort of relationship with Qaddafi, after his “decision to give up nuclear weapons in 2005,” had failed after

20 US Department of State Daily Press Briefing on February 16
many years of him being non-responsive to the international community. “But unfortunately, that has not borne to be true . . . which reminds us all why he was considered an outlaw in the past.”21 This statement reflects the US attitude and the long history of Qaddafì and his regime being out of control for years in the eyes of the international community. Qaddafì obviously was not behaving in a way the rest of the world wanted him to.

The representation of Qaddafì and his government as being a failed government and one that used weapons against its citizens created a narrative that urged the international community to intercede in order to stop further atrocities in Libya. The first step was to stop the violence and then for Qaddafì to step down from his position of power. As narratives turned from warnings to orders for Qaddafì to leave, there was little space left for negotiation. The only solution left was for Qaddafì to leave or the international community would intervene in order to save the innocent people of Libya who were fighting for basic human rights and democracy from the tyrannical reign of Qaddafì.

4.5 The United States, the United Kingdom and France in comparison

The narratives created by the governments of the US, UK and France, three of the five permanent members of the United Nations, were similar in their intention to create a discourse that provided a sense of urgency regarding the violation of human rights and democracy by Qaddafì, who they claimed had lost his legitimacy and must resign. However, there were some differences in the way the narratives were created. While the United Kingdom and France were more decisive from the beginning that Qaddafì was a

21. US Department of State Daily Press Briefing on March 19
dictator and must resign, the United States was more careful and developed their discourse regarding Qaddafi as a dictator more slowly leading up to March 19- the day when the no-fly zone was implemented and the air attacks were launched on Libya.

The UK implied from the beginning that there would be consequences for Libya should Qaddafi fail to heed their demands. For example, Peter Gooderham, Permanent Representative to the UK Mission to the UN in Geneva, said that: “The United Kingdom wants to send a clear message to the Libyan regime that the world is not just watching and making statements. We are and will continue to take action.”22 Further, Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, said: “The countries of the European Union need to match their [the protesters] bravery and get behind this movement for change. They are creating a new world” and it is a “defining moment for Europe;” therefore, “we need a genuine partnership of values with conditionality, a bold new European economic offer and a step-change in our fostering of political pluralism and open societies.”23 The necessity for an “open society” referred to Qaddafi’s forty-two years as leader in Libya and the inability of the rest of the world to be involved in the internal affairs of this country. The unrest and demonstrations were seen as a leading force and a great opportunity to penetrate into Libyan society and open Libya up to the rest of the world, which was unimaginable while Qaddafi was in power.

Throughout this time there was only one reported conversation with a member of the Qaddafi regime. The United Kingdom Foreign Secretary spoke to Qaddafi’s son, Saif el-Qaddafi, during which the Secretary “. . . made clear the UK’s grave concern at the escalation in violence” and he told Mr.Qaddafi that “. . . the Libyan Government’s

22 Foreign & Commonwealth Office on February 25
23 Foreign & Commonwealth Office on March 2
actions were unacceptable and would result in world-wide condemnation” (Hague, 2011). The United Kingdom was straightforward from the beginning and demanded an immediate stop be put to Qaddafi’s armed attacks against civilians in Libya. Otherwise there were no reported conversations between the Qaddafi regime and the international community. There was no room for possible peaceful agreements or negotiations that the UK or any other government had offered to Qaddafi. Qaddafi’s only alternative to being overthrown was to step-down willingly from his position as ruler in Libya.

While the United States started by expressing concerns for Libya right away on February 16, when the protests started, it seemed that the United Kingdom expressed concern for the situation in Bahrain first, where they implemented several measures such as revoking individual arms and export licenses as “Britain has some of the most rigorous export controls in the World” (Burt, 2011). This complied with the United Nations Charter, where some of the first measures were sanctioning the arms export to the state in question. This revoking of export licenses initially happened in Bahrain and later on in Libya, as well as in some other countries in regions such as Yemen. The major concern for Britain was to take responsibility for their arms exports and not to support any ‘human rights abuses’ with their exports; as Burt said: “We have no evidence of British equipment being used in the unrest in Bahrain” especially if “. . . proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression” (Burt, 2011). Exporting weapons to Libya was just one example of the direct involvement of the United Kingdom economically with the Libyan government. This could be explained by the proximity of Libya to Europe which resulted in European countries being more engaged in economics with Libya. Further, the United
Kingdom had more citizens involved in Libya than the US. There were also detailed reports on the evacuation of the British citizens from Libya and their safe departure from Tripoli, Benghazi and other major towns in Libya.

Another way in which the UK was economically involved with Libya was evident through oil companies and other form of business. A year before the unrest, the UK investments in Libya were 377 billion pounds, and after the conflict started the majority of the businesses began pulling out of Libya (The Telegraph, 2011). Royal Dutch Shell, an Anglo-Dutch oil multinational company with the registered office in London, had “billion –dollar oil exploration projects” in Libya (The Telegraph, 2011). Mike Pullen, a partner at DLA Piper, a global UK law firm positioned to help companies with their legal needs in Libya, said: “We have close historical links with the country and have been very instrumental in the change of regime.” (quoted in The Telegraph, 2011).

On the other hand, France had its own economic ties with Libya. These two countries had signed the ‘Declaration of Intent’ in October, 2010, a strategic partnership which included the building of a nuclear power plant in Libya as well as projects in other sectors such as, “banking, gas and oil and refined products as well as renewable energy” (The Tripoli Post, 2010). Direct investments and economic ties between the European countries and Libya clearly showed why there was more interest in the Libyan conflict and a desire to solve the conflict in a way that was best suited to their own economic interests.

4.6 Decision to intervene
Transitions from “Qaddafi must step down” to “we need to intervene” happened fairly quickly - within a few weeks. In mid-February the French government began narratives that called “. . . on the Government of Libya to meet its responsibility to protect its population” and “. . . to respect human rights and international humanitarian law, and to allow immediate access for international human rights monitors and humanitarian agencies.”\textsuperscript{24} Here we specifically see a call on the international community’s “responsibility to protect.” Calls for stopping the violations of human rights within Libya were followed by requests to the European and International Communities to implement certain sanctions and to ensure that everyone responsible for the unrest (in this case, Qaddafi and his regime) would have to deal with specific consequences. For example, president Sarkozy requested that “. . . concrete sanctions should be swiftly adopted in order to ensure that all those involved in the ongoing violence are aware that they must accept the consequences for their actions.”\textsuperscript{25}

The first consequence was to suspend Libya from the United Nations Human Rights Council, which it had been a member of since 2010.\textsuperscript{26} On March 1, 2011, with a unanimous decision by the member states of the UN General Assembly, Libya was suspended from the Human Rights Council.\textsuperscript{27} After the sanctions, the idea of military intervention soon entered the debate. French Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, Alain Juppe, expressed this possibility for the first time at a meeting with William Hague, First Secretary of State of United Kingdom, where he said that they “agree about thinking

\textsuperscript{24} France Diplomatie. \textit{Press Statement by the President of the Security Council on February 22.}

\textsuperscript{25} France Diplomatie. \textit{Libya – Situation in Libya on February 23.}

\textsuperscript{26} France Diplomatie. \textit{Libya – Situation in Libya on February 24.}

\textsuperscript{27} France Diplomatie. \textit{Libya – Adoption by the UN General Assembly of the resolution suspending Libya from Human Rights Council on March 1.}
and even acting to plan a no-fly zone over Libya.” Qaddafi was asked to implement an immediate cease fire, but to no avail. The actual decision to implement a no-fly zone was made by the adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973.

Thus, the decision to intervene was delivered in a way that left a lot of confusion about what exactly Qaddafi had done to trigger the military intervention. What began as a call by the United Kingdom and France, joined by the United States, for the protection of the Libyan people from their ruler Muammar el-Qaddafi and his regime quickly turned into an international conflict. The responsibility to protect human rights and protect the Libyan people was the main premise of the narratives these countries used for the justification of their decision to intervene militarily in this country. From the beginning of the unrest in Libya the attention of the world was on Qaddafi and his supposed abuses, but as time went on there was no more evidence - just merely the same anecdotes.

This unsureness about the exact situation on the ground showed that there was still a large level of uncertainty and a lack of evidence regarding the atrocities just ten days prior to military action. There was also a large amount of uncertainty regarding the opposition to Qaddafi. Mr. Toner stated: “I wish we had a better sense of what the opposition was and what’s emerging there. I think it still is emerging.”

Although the narratives focused on the struggle of the Libyan people to get their freedom and to strive for democracy, there was a clear lack of knowledge about who would or what would take the place of Qaddafi. Thus, what was seen was that the discourse was full of contradictory statements as to what the real reason for intervention was; was it the atrocities, the Libyan people’s struggle.


29 US Department of State Daily Press Briefing on March 9
gle for freedom and democracy, was it Qaddafi’s illegitimacy, or the responsibility to protect? From all the statements it was clear that the international community was focusing on getting rid of Qaddafi and his regime, and there were not any statements that looked to the future of Libya after Qaddafi.

According to Chapter VII, Article 52, of the UN Charter, regional arrangements, if it is in order to protect international peace, action can be taken as long as “. . . such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations” (Charter of the UN, (c) n.d.). Prior engagement of any militaristic action by regional agencies have to show all possible measures to achieve peace prior to the military intervention. This includes the recommendation of peace plans, negotiation and mediation or the incorporation of “pacific settlements of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council” where “pacific” methods refer to the passive processes of mediation and negotiation first (Charter of the UN, (c) n.d.). The international community did begin planning solutions for Libya with an emergency UN Security Council session on February 22 and agreed to do everything to stop bloodshed in Libya. However, there was not a specific settlement or negotiation plan that the international community offered to Qaddafi besides sending the message to step down from his position of power in Libya. For example, when asked by one of the reporters about what different options besides stepping down were offered to Qaddafi, Mr. Toner, stated that by no means should any action of force be taken “by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council” unless all other “pacific” efforts to settle a dispute in question, fail (Toner, 2011). Further, Article 54 of Chapter VIII states that: “The Security Council

30 US Department of State Remarks on February 22
shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security” (Charter of the UN, (c) n.d.). What appeared to be the first step toward getting rid of Qaddafi was a suspension from the Human Rights Council which happened on March 1st, 2011 and was the first time in history that a member had been suspended from the Council.

Finally, when asked was “there an actual trigger for military action?” the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, responded that: “. . . it’s very challenging, and I think we ought to be – have our eyes open as we look at what is being bandied about and what is possible in order to make good decisions.”31 There was still uncertainty and a lack of concrete answers regarding the plans and steps taken towards peace keeping efforts in Libya. There was also uncertainty and confusion as to what the reasons for intervention were, and many diplomats when asked direct questions regarding the trigger for military action appeared to actually evade the question. Further, according to the UN Charter the international community must first try peaceful negotiation and open dialogue between both sides involved in the conflict prior to any decision to intervene. The narratives showed a lack of any intention to solve the conflict by means of a peaceful dialogue.

Most striking is the clear difference of standards for Libya and Qaddafi on one hand and for other countries where similar unrest has occurred and where people are struggling for democracy in much the same way the Libyans were. For example, US Under Secretary for Political Affairs, William J. Burnes, when asked about the situation in Bahrain and what their plans are regarding the unrest in this country, responded that: “. . .

31 US Department of State Remarks on March 10
we will continue to urge serious political reform as well as urgent peaceful dialogue between governments and opposition leaders.\textsuperscript{32} However, when asked the same question regarding the Libyan situation, Mr. Burnes responded in a more decisive way saying that: “. . . in the sad and violent case of Libya, we are working hard to maximize international pressure for Qadhafi’s departure, and to support the courageous Libyans who have risen up to regain their rights.”\textsuperscript{33} Further, US Secretary, Hillary Clinton, stated that with Bahrain the United States has “. . . a decade-long relationship . . . that we expect to continue long into the future. Our goal is a credible political process . . .”\textsuperscript{34} We see here that just two days prior to the intervention into Libya, the narratives got stronger and more decisive than ever that Qaddafi must go without any chance of negotiation, or with any inclination that the international community was ready to negotiate or to solve the conflict through peaceful or political means, and yet, with Bahrain, the political solution is the only option. It is apparent that, although these are similar conflicts there are different standards for dealing with them.

On the day of the intervention into Libya, President Obama, explained the reasons for the intervention and what had led to such a decision. In his announcement speech there was a clear parallel to the official narratives created by the official statements of the governments of the US, UK, and France. The reasons for such a decision, as President Obama stated, were “. . . Qaddafi’s refusal to respect the rights of his people, and the potential for mass murder of innocent civilians.”\textsuperscript{35} Here we see the US President stating that there is a “potential for mass murder,” but no references to the assumed and much

\textsuperscript{32} US Department of State \textit{Testimony} on March 17
\textsuperscript{33} US Department of State \textit{Testimony} on March 17
\textsuperscript{34} US Department of State \textit{Remarks} on March 19
\textsuperscript{35} US Department of State \textit{Remarks by the President on the situation in Libya} on March 18
touted atrocities on the ground. Thus, the positive narratives are reinforced - there is a responsibility to protect the Libyan people - but the negative narratives are abandoned for a more benign threat of violence not claims of specific mass killings and actions of Qaddafi and his regime. The President finished his speech by saying that he had made “. . . this decision with the confidence that action is necessary, and that we [the United States] will not be acting alone. Our goal is focused, our cause is just, and our coalition is strong.”\textsuperscript{36} With this statement the president leaves no space for any kind of doubt whether the decision was necessary or not.

\textbf{4.7 Conclusion}

There is no doubt that the United Nations intentions are very good and the international community uses this organization to help deliver aid to many different parts of the world while trying to maintain peace in the areas that have the most conflicts and unrest today. However, the main decisive bodies of this organization happen to also be some of the most powerful countries in the world, among the members: the United States, United Kingdom, and France. The Security Council, that is the main body of this organization, has a strict set of codes for action in any case where a country commits certain crimes or atrocities. However, there are loopholes throughout the system which enable manipulation of the Security Council and the rules are not equally applied to all members. Without the ability to provide preventive measures, the United Nations is incapable of dealing with situations where there is a need to prevent atrocities from happening, and where there is a need to investigate the actual situation on the ground when unrest is in question.

\textsuperscript{36} US Department of State \textit{Remarks by the President on the situation in Libya} on March 18
The discourse analysis of many different statements by the three permanent members of the United Nations - UK, US, and France - revealed that there were both positive and negative narratives which led to the humanitarian intervention. The positive narratives were connected to the rebels, the Libyan people who were presented as fighters for democracy and basic human rights and the responsibility of the international community to protect these people. The negative narratives were connected to Qaddafi and his regime which were portrayed as dictatorial and a regime that has lost its legitimacy by using weapons against its own people. The problem with these narratives is that they failed to show clear evidence about the crimes and atrocities that Qaddafi supposedly had committed. This left room for debate about the legitimacy of the decision to intervene militarily into the sovereign territory of Libya under the label of humanitarian intervention. Also, the lack of willingness to negotiate with Qaddafi and look for a peaceful plan or method of mediation as stated by the UN Charter showed the failure of the international community to follow the UN Charter’s rules and do everything possible prior to launching the humanitarian intervention. In the end, when the military attacks happened, the government officials failed to provide concrete proof of mass atrocities in Libya. To quote US President Obama, there was the “potential for mass murder.” By portraying the lack of democracy, a ruthless dictator and possible atrocities, the US, UK, and France decided that Qaddafi must go and launched the humanitarian intervention without supporting it with exact numbers and clear information of what was really going on as they were not able to monitor the situation closely on the ground.
CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION

5.1 Findings

The international community launched a Humanitarian Intervention into Libya as a result of the assumed potential for mass atrocities that ruler Muammar el-Qaddafi was said to be about to commit. Prior to the intervention, Libya was a sovereign state where Qaddafi ruled for nearly forty-two years. Qaddafi’s relationship to the international community was strained from his exclusionist policies. One of the main reasons for this strained relationship between Qaddafi and the rest of the world, especially the United Kingdom, United States and France, is due to the fact that he was accused of being involved in numerous terrorist attacks, which after 9/11 only strained the relationship more as he became a target for the war on terror. Qaddafi was also accused of being involved in the killing of Libyan citizens abroad, who were said to be plotting against his regime or simply trying to escape from his dictatorship in Libya. Also, Qaddafi was a staunchly pro-Arab leader, who was working on the unity of the Arab countries and against the involvement of western countries in the Arab economies and cultures (Vandewalle, 2006). As one of the main oil producing nations, Libya was inaccessible to most of the international oil companies as Qaddafi nationalized its oil production and participated in the 1973 Oil-Crisis by boycotting the western world, especially the United States and United Kingdom, which added even more tension in the already fragile
relationship with these western countries (Sono, 1984). As such, Qaddafi is seen as a leader against western countries and excluding said countries from Libyan oil exports. All of these things contributed to the creation of discourses by the western media making Libya and Qaddafi synonymous with terrorism and tyranny and the Libyan people fighting against him as freedom fighters. United States Secretary of State, Hillary Clintons accused Qaddafi that for forty two years of reign, he has been “destroying all institutions” and is considered an outlaw and someone that the international community has been trying to fight against since he came to power in 1969.

My findings suggest that there are some uncertainties and contradictions within the rules and conditions as stated by the United Nations Charter, as well as a double standard when it comes to protections of the territorial integrity of the country. Further, my findings suggest that there are some uncertainties and contradictions within the rules and conditions as stated in the United Nations Charter. The contradictions are clearest regarding the responsibility of the United Nations to protect and be an international peace keeper, while at the same time ensuring the territorial integrity of the nations that make up its organizations. The uncertainties fall within the realm of what the specific thresholds for the crimes against humanity are that trigger humanitarian interventions.

The main premise for the military action in Libya focused on the responsibility to protect, which emerged recently and found its base in the United Nations Charter. It relies on the rules and practices as stated in the Charter. What the exact thresholds are when a sovereign state’s responsibility to protect its citizens is violated are debatable as no country is the same and no universal rules apply to each conflict. The creation of the United Nations was to be a cornerstone from which peaceful solutions would arise and “a

centre for harmonizing the actions of nations to achieve goals” of maintaining peace (United Nations (f), n.d.). While there is no question about good intention of the United Nations which is meant to be for the whole world, the UN principles are sometimes overused or disregarded by the most powerful countries. One of the basic principles of the UN is that “all members should refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force” (United Nations (d), n.d.). Since UN is a pretty complex system it is hard to keep everything straight so there is opportunity for many loopholes to arise. The UN is also an organization that develops “international rules, norms, and principles” (Karns & Mingst, 2010, pg. 95). Therefore, it is necessary to revise these rules and to improve conflict resolutions as needed. In this process there is a lot that can be left to interpretation and loopholes can arise. If some loopholes are overlooked, mistakes can be made and they have to be reexamined over and over again in order to find the best possible solution for the conflicts that are evolving throughout the world. In addition, the UN was formed with mind set that there is a need for prevention of wars when there are two or more states involved. But, when it comes to one state only, a sovereign state, such as Libya or Yugoslavia, the UN is put between two fires, the rule of non-intrusion into a sovereign nation as stated in Chapter I of the UN Charter, Article II, on one hand, and the responsibility to protect human lives on the other (Charter of UN, n.d.). These basic rules described by the UN Security Council include: attempting to make peaceful plans including - negotiations or mediation between the two sides, some type of sanctions - such as asset freezing or travel bans for leaders involved in the crime, and only as a last option, when all other methods have failed, the use of military force. However, there is no description of the exact behavior that is considered atrocious, and how many victims
are considered mass atrocities. Even though each conflict is different, there must be an appropriate way to add specific thresholds to the general rules that would allow for more discriminate decisions.

The case of Libya shows that the most powerful countries, permanent members of the United Nations - the US, UK, and France - created the geopolitical narratives that became the cornerstone for public approval regarding the decision to intervene militarily into Libya. The results of my research show the creation of two types of narratives in order to convince the public of the righteousness of the decision to intervene militarily in sovereign Libya. First - positive narratives which describe and develop the idea of the people’s fight for human rights and democracy, as these are basic conditions that each sovereign state must provide for their citizens. Second - negative narratives which describe the situation on the ground as atrocious and Qaddafi as a tyrant killing his own people. Both of these narratives contributed to the main public belief of urgency to act fast and launch the military action which will save the Libyan people. It can even be argued that the premise for action comes directly from these countries as part of the United Nation’s having a responsibility to protect the people of Libya.

There are two main issues with these narratives. First, not all Libyans were fighting against Qaddafi for democracy and human rights. There were people in Libya who were truly supporters of Qaddafi and his regime, and they fought on the side of Qaddafi. There were a large number of Qaddafi’s supporters, especially in the area around Tripoli where Qaddafi was residing with his close political and familial circle, opposed to the people in Benghazi where the original demonstration had started (BBC [a], 2011). Second, throughout the discourse leading up to the intervention the
international community was constantly repeating that there was an oppressive regime in Libya and massive killings on the ground which Qaddafi must stop immediately. However, there was no concrete evidence stating the exact number of victims, nor was there documentation regarding where in Libya these atrocities were happening, nor who or how these claims of killings were being delivered to the international community. This lack of actual evidence and the number of victims on the ground did not give any space for an International Criminal Court trial, as the court “tries only those accused of the gravest crimes” (International Criminal Court (b), 1998). In addition to the lack of evidence, the inability of the international community to get a real picture of the situation on the ground without either intervention or permission from Qaddafi, both of which appeared impossible, did not lend itself to the option of an ICC trial. Also, according to the United Nation Charter there was supposed to be “pacific” or peaceful plans to attempt to solve the conflict in Libya, and yet, there was no mention of these negotiations, mediations or the like in the narratives leading up to the intervention. Just sending the message that Qaddafi must go did not give any space for discussion or negotiation regarding the conflict, rather, it was a form of ultimatum. There was constant pressure on Qaddafi and his followers to step down from their positions, without giving him any alternative, as he had already been deemed illegitimate as a leader by the international community. Further, the inability of the Western world to access Libya’s oil production can be argued to have contributed to Qaddafi’s removal as leader. After NATO helped remove Qaddafi with air-strikes Reuters claimed, (2011): “. . . Gaddafi’s fall . . . reopen[ed] the doors to Africa’s largest oil reserve.”

5.2 Future implications
Considering the overall situation in Libya, and prior cases of humanitarian interventions, such as those in Yugoslavia where there were allegations that the intervention generated more carnage than it averted, the responsibility to prevent future atrocities needs continuous revisions in order to find the optimum balance of protection and prevention, both of sovereignty and human rights. There also needs to be a balance regarding timeliness, between cases that are too sudden, such as Yugoslavia, and cases that are too late, such as Rwanda. There is apparently a double standard when it comes to the decision making process regarding interventions into sovereign territory; therefore, the process that leads up to the intervention and the actual trigger for the intervention must be clearly defined and the actions that are attributing to the claims of atrocities and mass killings must be clearly described. There should be actual numbers, who saw it, how it was investigated and at what point is the tipping point where the international community should launch a humanitarian intervention. The differing examples of the following cases, such as Rwanda where 800,000 people were killed and the international community did not take any military nor humanitarian action, or the case of Yugoslavia where the military action was launched onto sovereign territory without finding any signs of atrocities on the ground afterward, and finally, Libya, where NATO forces launched air strikes claiming a responsibility to protect the innocent, but turned into advising, training and arming rebels for a new government, reveal that there are different standards for different conflicts according to the world’s interests in the economy and politics of each country (Aljazeera, (a) 2011). It is necessary to work more on making sure that only in those cases where clear thresholds are met should the international community act in a
timely manner without violating the sovereign rights of a state in order to protect innocent civilians.

My research has filled the gap by revealing how geopolitical narratives are created by powerful governments, such as, the United States, United Kingdom and France in order to justify interventions while, at the same time, failing to provide concrete evidence of the actual atrocities on the ground.

Finally, today’s Libya is controlled by an interim National Transitional Council. This “New Libya” was left severely damaged; a lot of infrastructure and buildings were destroyed during the NATO air attacks and by the internal unrest and fighting between Muammar el-Qaddafi’s followers and the revolutionaries. This has left the country in a condition where Western countries have to help building the infrastructure by giving loans via the IMF and the World Bank, which in return makes Libya more dependent on western help because these loans come with certain austerities which affect Libyan internal politico-economic policies. This also puts the country into a position where it must give up certain sovereign rights in order to gain assistance, leaving the country vulnerable to more powerful influence over its natural resources (Watts, 2001). Currently, Libya’s future is in limbo while awaiting national congress and multi-party elections to decide its fate. What was portrayed as a quick air-strike to help freedom fighters gain human rights, turned into an ongoing turmoil with major western involvement in Libya’s post-conflict era. Further, any government put in place will be more cooperative with the west, to quote Rachel Shabi, a political journalist: “A liberal intervention for humanitarian ends may be the comfortable hook; but securing assets and resources, as usual, is the real goal” (Aljazeera, (a) 2011).
METHODOLOGY

6.1 Introduction of Methods

The method I use in my thesis is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (Fairclough, 1992, 1995, 2003; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; Locke, 2004; Richardson, 2007; van Dijk, 1997). The CDA method encompasses an analysis of public government’s statements. The importance of this method is that it looks at all different narratives and discourses created by the several specific players involved in the decision making process to intervene. First I have analyzed the UN charter, the Genocide Conventions, and the Responsibility to Protect in order to identify the thresholds for Humanitarian Intervention. Second, I have analyzed the public statements of the three permanent members of the United Nations Security Council: United States, United Kingdom and France, in the weeks leading up to the decision to intervene militarily in Libya.

Often analysis of the structure of language or, as Fairclough (2003) calls it, “‘formal linguistics’ which is concerned with abstract properties of human language . . . has little to offer in the analysis of what people say or write” (p.1). The emphasis here is on why people say what they say. I attempt to disseminate the narratives and look for key
words which will help me understand the framing used by government officials prior to making the decision to intervene in Libya.

Any social change is accompanied by the language or by the text in which that particular language is expressed (Fairclough, 2003). According to Fairclough (2003) “...language is an irreducible part of social life, dialectically interconnected with other elements of social life, so that social analysis and research always has to take account of language” (p. 2). In short, CDA is an inseparable part of social practices “which constitutes other elements as well as being shaped by them” (Chouliaraki et al., 1999 p. vii). For the purpose of my research, I am not focusing on the language itself and its structure; for example the semiotics or word counting. Instead, I look at the different narratives used by the governments, through their official public statements, and how these narratives have set the stage for the air strikes on Libya that took place in the spring of 2011.

There are many different styles of discourse analysis (van Dijk, 1997). Each separate situation is different and it shapes the discourse differently, and there is a reciprocity effect of shaping reality by certain discourses as well. There are two major reasons for my use of CDA. First, I look at how each representation has shaped the identity of the international community, and the idea of rogue states, in this case Muammar el-Qaddafi and his followers, and what role these narratives have played in painting a picture of Libya which caused the crossing of the threshold where the United Nations made a decision to intervene. Secondly, I chose CDA because this method can help me to answer my research questions(s) as it “views the systematic analysis and interpretation of texts as potentially revelatory of ways in which discourses consolidate
power and colonize human subjects through often covert position calls” (Locke, 2004 p.2). Thus, Richardson (2007) explains that CDA is “a perspective on critical scholarship: a theory and a method of analyzing the way that individuals and institutions use language,” while van Dijk sees the CDA as having “especially the role of discourse in the production and reproduction of power abuse or domination” (van Djik, 2001 p. 96 quoted in Richardson, 2007). As Richardson states: “CDA starts by identifying a social problem, chooses the perspective of those who suffer the most, and critically analyses those in power, those who are responsible and those who have the means to solve such problems” (van Dijk, 1996). In the case of Libya, the major players were the US, UK, and France whose discourses, regarding the situation in Libya, led to the actions of the international community by way of NATO air strikes.

During textual analysis “one can identify the particular perspective or angle or point of view from which they are represented” (Fairclough, 2003 p. 129). In the case of Libya, by using CDA, I analyzed these perspectives which helped me to reveal whether or not there was an agenda behind the narratives stated to the public about the decision to intervene. These narratives, as identified and problematized by the CDA, will uncover many more sociopolitical implications which shape the world as a whole. Finally, the best way to understand this method is through Fairclough’s (1995) description of the impact that different narratives have on the creation of the human conscience, which states:

. . . the ideological work of . . . language includes particular ways of representing the world (e.g. particular representations of Arabs, or of the economy), particular constructions of social identities (e.g. the construction in particular ways of the scientific experts who feature on
radio or television programmes), and particular constructions of social relations (e.g. the constructions of social relations, e.g. the construction of relations between politicians and public as simulated relations between people in a shared lifeworld)” (p. 12).

6.2 Data Set

For the first part of my data analysis, I analyzed in details the United Nations Charter, the Genocide Conventions, and Responsibility to Protect. For the second part of my analysis, I have used the public and government's official statements (when available) by each of the three permanent members of the United Nations: United States, United Kingdom, and France. These are my primary sources and very important because these countries produce the news and their statements created the main narrative regarding the situation in Libya. Produced and set by those in power, “. . . the sourcing and construct of the news is intimately linked with the actions and opinions of (usually powerful) social groups; it is impossible to select and compose news without a conception of the target or intended audience” (Richardson, 2007 p.1). In the case of the Libya discourse, the target was Libya itself, with Muammar el-Qaddafi as a bad guy and the rebels as the good guys. On the other hand, the international community or the public was targeted and the discourse was shaped differently and with its own agenda to each of them. Also, due to the obstacle of language, I limited my sources to those issued in English only to avoid the misinterpretation bias and/or mistake of the translation of the text.
The specific time period I was looking at within the government’s statements is from February 15 through March 22, 2011. I have chosen this time period because of the need to have a manageable time frame to collect my data, as well as to include the time leading up to the intervention and the immediate days after the air strikes began.
The terms I was looking at while doing analysis of the foreign ministry websites of the US, UK and France are as described in the Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positives</th>
<th>Negatives</th>
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<td>Human rights</td>
<td>Tyranny</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberation</td>
<td>Civilian killing</td>
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<td>Revolution</td>
<td>Mass atrocities</td>
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<td>Freedom</td>
<td>Massacre</td>
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<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Oppression</td>
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Table 3. The list of the positive and negative terms used by the Foreign Ministry of five permanent members of the United Nations while creating the justifying narrative prior to the Humanitarian Intervention in Libya.
<table>
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<th>Statement</th>
<th>Reporting Agency</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
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