THE DISCURSIVE MANAGEMENT OF EMOTIONALITY
IN THE L2 RESEARCH INTERVIEW

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ii
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ABSTRACT

This study investigates the ways in which emotions and emotionality are managed as topics and resources in second language (L2) research interviews. A continued challenge for researchers is how to define and operationalize emotions and other putative psychological phenomena. One popular research methodology that treats emotions as the object and product of inquiry is the qualitative interview, where emotions are investigated as initiators, inhibitors, or outcomes of language-related activity. However, a growing criticism of interview research is that by elevating the thematic and dramatic content of the talk we ignore the methodic interactional practices by which the data are produced.

Data are drawn from 30 hours of face-to-face interviews with adult immigrants from Vietnam, Cambodia, and the Philippines living in the US and Canada. Using the methodology of conversation analysis, and informed by ethnomethodology and discursive psychology, I examine how emotions are invoked, represented, and made procedurally consequential in interview interaction. Three specific interactional resources are examined: (a) emotion story prefaces used by interviewees to project emotion-implicative stories fitting the interview agenda, (b) interviewer questioning sequences and their function in eliciting interview talk of emotions and emotional experiences, and (c) emotion reformulations and how particular emotion-indexing terms are used to offer, take up, reject, and scale various descriptions.

Talk of negative emotions (e.g., anger, sadness, shame) and experiences (e.g., problems, complaints, discrimination) was found to be particularly salient in the data. One
explanation is that this is what is cooperatively treated as memorable, tellable, and expected in research interviews and autobiographic talk. This study further demonstrates that a discursive approach to emotions, employing a conversation analytic methodology, offers a systematic and empirical means to analyze, rather than summarize or speculate about emotions and emotional talk. It also allows a careful methodological and analytical critique of our research processes.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................ III

ABSTRACT............................................................................................................................ VI

LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................. XIII

LIST OF FIGURES .............................................................................................................. XIV

LIST OF EXTRACTS ......................................................................................................... XV

TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS ................................................................................ XVIII

PROLOGUE ...................................................................................................................... XIX

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 1

1.0. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 1

1.1. EMOTION AS TOPIC AND RESOURCE .................................................................. 2

1.2. LOCATING THIS STUDY WITHIN APPLIED LINGUISTICS ....................................... 3

1.3. ATTENDING TO METHODOLOGY .......................................................................... 4

1.3.1. Interview and Narrative Methods ..................................................................... 5

1.4. ADDITIONAL MOTIVATIONS .................................................................................. 8

1.4.1. Immigration and Transcultural Belonging .................................................... 8

1.4.2. Emotions, Mental Health, and Belonging .................................................... 11

1.5. A DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONIST APPROACH ................................................... 15

1.6. SIGNIFICANCE AND POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS ............................................ 16

1.7. STRUCTURE OF THIS DISSERTATION ................................................................. 17

CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ................................................................... 19

2.0. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 19

2.1. THEORIZING LANGUAGE AND EMOTIONS ......................................................... 19
2.2. INTRAPSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES ................................................................. 21
  2.2.1. Individual Differences .................................................................................. 22
2.3. SOCIO-CULTURAL APPROACHES ...................................................................... 26
  2.3.1. Language Socialization ................................................................................. 27
  2.3.2. Linguistic and Cultural Anthropology ...................................................... 28
2.4. EMCA APPROACHES ......................................................................................... 30
  2.4.1. Ethnomethodology ....................................................................................... 33
  2.4.2. Conversation Analysis ............................................................................... 38
  CA and emotions ..................................................................................................... 40
  2.4.3. Discursive Psychology ................................................................................. 43
  Discourse as co-constructed ................................................................................. 44
  DP’s program ........................................................................................................... 45
  DP diversity ............................................................................................................. 48
  DP as an approach to psychological topics .......................................................... 51
  Schegloff-Wetherell-Billig debate ........................................................................ 52
  Discursive psychology or “psychological” CA? ..................................................... 54
  DP as an approach, not a paradigm or methodology .......................................... 56
  2.4.4. A Discursive Constructionist Approach ...................................................... 57
  Diverging from contemporary DP .......................................................................... 58
  2.5. SUMMARY ......................................................................................................... 60
  2.6. RESEARCH QUESTIONS .................................................................................. 60

CHAPTER 3. DATA AND METHOD ......................................................................... 62
  3.0. DATA AND PARTICIPANTS ........................................................................... 62
6.3.1. Emotional Gradation ................................................................. 184
6.3.2. Action-Initiating Emotions ......................................................... 186
6.3.3. Emotion Reformulations and Membership Categories ............. 188

6.4. SUMMARY ....................................................................................... 196

CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION .............................................................. 199

7.0. INTRODUCTION............................................................................. 199
7.1. SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTERS AND FINDINGS ........................... 199
7.2. IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY .................................................. 202
7.3. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ...................................... 205
    7.3.1. Emotions and Mental Health ................................................ 205
          Negative bias?............................................................................ 206
          Emotion resources........................................................................ 211
    7.3.2. Noticing and Attention.......................................................... 212
    7.3.3. Longitudinal Development....................................................... 214

REFERENCES ..................................................................................... 216
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Focal interview participants................................................................. 63

Table 2. Examples of lexical repetition in reformulations.............................. 179
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Analytical focus of DP, CDA, and poststructuralist approaches to discourse
(adapted and expanded from Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 20) ............................ 48

Figure 2. Four components of feeling question sequences............................................. 139

Figure 3. Two-dimensional figure of emotion-explicit and emotion-implicative
reformulations. ......................................................................................................... 183
# LIST OF EXTRACTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extract 2.1. “Shot Outside Church” (Lemon, 2009)</th>
<th>31</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extract 2.2. From Drew (1998, p. 311)</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extract 2.3. From Heritage and Clayman (2010, p. 92)</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extract 2.4. From Leudar et al. (2008, p. 169)</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extract 2.5. From Edwards (1997, p. 159)</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extract 4.1. From Terasaki (2004, p. 184)</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extract 4.2. “Terrible misfortune”</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extract 4.3. Adapted from Kärkkäinen (p. 201)</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extract 4.4. Adapted from Schmidt (p. 159)</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extract 4.5. Adapted from Drew (p. 304) and Edwards (2007, p. 37)</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extract 4.6. Sang</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extract 4.7. Kim</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extract 4.8. John</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extract 4.9. Matt, Trang, Sang, and Jim (mealtime conversation)</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extract 4.11. Adapted from Widdicombe and Wooffitt (1995, pp. 96-97)</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extract 4.12. Trang</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extract 4.13. Trang</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extract 4.14. Trang</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extract 5.1. From Lerner (1992, p. 251)</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extract 5.2. From Lerner (1992, p. 255)</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extract 5.3. From Lynch and Bogen (1996, p. 161)</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extract 5.4. From Lynch and Bogen (1996, p. 161)</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extract 5.5. Sang</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extract 5.6. Kim</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extract 5.7. Kim</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extract 5.8. Rico</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extract 5.9. Trang</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Extract 5.10. John ................................................................. 122
Extract 5.11. Adapted from Heritage (2005, p. 189) ......................... 124
Extract 5.12. Adapted from Wetherell (p. 16) .................................. 126
Extract 5.13. Adapted from Holstein and Gubrium (1995, p. 35) ....... 127
Extract 5.14. Trang ................................................................ 134
Extract 5.15. John ................................................................ 136
Extract 5.16. Sang ................................................................ 140
Extract 5.17. Sang ................................................................ 142
Extract 5.18. Kim ................................................................. 144
Extract 5.19. Bona ............................................................... 150
Extract 5.20. Kiet ................................................................. 152
Extract 5.21. Adapted from Miller (2011, p. 6) ................................ 154
Extract 5.22. Adapted from Norton (2000, p. 65) ............................. 156
Extract 6.1. Adapted from Garfinkel and Sacks (1970, p. 350) ........... 160
Extract 6.2. Adapted from Heritage (1985, p. 101) ............................ 161
Extract 6.3. Adapted from Heritage and Watson (1979, p. 134-135) .... 162
Extract 6.4. Adapted from Heritage and Watson (1979, p. 141) ........ 163
Extract 6.5. Adapted from Rae (2008, p. 64) .................................. 165
Extract 6.6. Adapted from Rae (2008, p. 66) .................................. 167
Extract 6.7. Adapted from Rae (2008, p. 66) .................................. 168
Extract 6.8. Rico ................................................................ 169
Extract 6.9. Rico ................................................................. 171
Extract 6.10. Sang ............................................................... 173
Extract 6.11. Trang ............................................................... 174
Extract 6.12. Trang ............................................................... 175
Extract 6.13. Kim ............................................................... 177
Extract 6.15. Adapted from Sacks (1992, lecture 12, p. 723) ............. 178
Extract 6.16. Kim ............................................................... 180
Extract 6.17. Trang ............................................................... 182
Extract 6.18. Trang ............................................................... 184
TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS

( . 5 ) timed pause

( . ) untimed micropause

£ talk £ talk produced in a laughing voice

# talk # talk produced in a “smiley” voice

* talk * talk produced in a creaky voice

( ( ) ) additional explanations or descriptions

- sharp cut-off of an utterance

: sound elongation

( ) unclear fragment; best guess

. a stopping or a fall in tone

, continuing contour

? a rising inflection

underline speaker emphasis

CAPS noticeably louder speech

= contiguous utterances

[ ] overlapping talk

↓ ↑ marked falling or rising intonation

‘ talk ’ noticeably softer or quieter speech

“ talk ” talk produced as represented speech; in a way that indicates the speaker is voicing someone else (or a past or hypothetical self)

> talk < faster speech

< talk > slower speech

italics non-English words
Researcher positionality and reflexivity have become increasingly explicit topics of concern for qualitative researchers (e.g., Duff, 2008; Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2008; Jones, Torres, Arminio, 2006; Marshall & Rossman, 2006; Menard-Warwick, 2009; Ramanathan, 2002, 2005; Roberts, 2001). How researchers position themselves, as well as how they are positioned by others, bears strongly on the process of research, leaving an indelible mark on the selection of topic, context, and participants as well as the representation of the research and findings. As Herr and Anderson (2005) discuss, “the degree to which researchers position themselves as insiders or outsiders will determine how they frame epistemological, methodological, and ethical issues in the dissertation” (p. 30). Roberts (2001) speaks of the “researcher’s personal anthropology” (p. 326)—those aspects of the researcher’s background and historical context that contribute both to the particular topics of inquiry as well as the way in which the studies are framed. Thus, when recognizing the influences of these contextual factors in the research process, we become more aware of the predispositions and presuppositions that permeate our methodologies and analyses.

For qualitative researchers, there is no theory-free knowledge (Smith, 2008) nor value-free research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Although objectivity cannot be successfully sustained by either qualitative or quantitative paradigms, the “illusion of objectivity” (Holliiday, 2007; Medawar, 1963) is nevertheless perpetuated by researchers through their scientific and fact-reporting prose (e.g., “the findings demonstrate”; Donnelly, 1994), presentation of a step-by-step research model (Walford, 1991), and deletion of the problematic aspects of doing research (e.g., interview “failures”). Indeed, many researchers (e.g., Denzin, 2001; Denzin & Lincoln, 2008a, 2008b; Mehra, 2001), located primarily along the borders of interpretive, constructionist, feminist, and “post” (-modern, -structural, -colonial) traditions, recognize the importance of disclosing the researcher’s own subjectivity and encourage reflexivity throughout the various stages of the research process. Rather than ignoring or dismissing the researcher’s voice and

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1 Although much of this discussion is undoubtedly relevant to quantitative and mixed-method research, I am concerned here with qualitative research—particularly in an interpretive and discursive vein.
subjectivities, they urge a more direct and personal engagement with the dilemmatic, messy, and even unsettling aspects of the research process.

In the spirit of reflexivity and disclosure, I briefly contextualize for the reader my present research program and the development of my particular research interests. At the risk of appearing self-indulgent, I provide this brief background to make visible how this dissertation arose from my graduate studies, how I entered the research, and how it has shaped my ongoing development as a scholar.

Over the course of my MA and Ph.D. studies, I have been drawn to and engaged in a discursive and narrative-based exploration of the lives of long-term immigrants to the US and Canada. Throughout this exploration I became interested in various interrelated topics: immigrant literacy practices; social and participation networks; participant understandings of the long-term processes of dealing with dislocation (social, linguistic, psychological, and physical), relocation, and creating stability; and the emotional and subjective aspects of being multilingual and multicultural. Much of my initial interest was sparked as a reaction to two key factors. First, when I was conducting a series of psycholinguistic testing experiments for the Vietnamese Elicited Imitation Project I was involved in through the National Foreign Language Resource Center (NFLRC) at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa (Chaudron, Nguyen, & Prior, 2003; Chaudron, Prior, & Kozok, 2005), I noticed some curious responses from the Vietnamese participants (the majority of whom were men) before and after they were prompted to take part in repetition tasks. In that study, with the goal of developing an accurate test of language proficiency, L1 (first language) Vietnamese-speaking participants were instructed to listen to and repeat Vietnamese sentences of various lengths and syntactic complexity. Despite my efforts to encourage the participants to focus only on the repetition tasks as I conducted the experimental study, during their background and wrap-up interviews, they often diggressed into telling stories about life back in Vietnam and their lives now in the US. At the time, I treated these digressions as “verbal clutter” or obstacles to the task of collecting the repetition data I needed for our experiments. As is often the case in research, the extraneous material was excluded and set aside. However, as I conducted more research experiments with other Vietnamese participants, I noticed again curious digressions into storytelling.
For some time, the activity of storytelling and the content of the stories the research participants told stayed with me and finally the gnawing curiosity prompted me to bring the matter to the attention of Diana Eades, my professor at the time. I complained to her that I found it odd and even frustrating that the research participants kept shifting into storytelling sequences even though they were instructed to simply listen and repeat the test sentences. However, rather than sympathizing with my frustration, she offered her advice: “Try listening.” As it would turn out, her simple suggestion led to a change in the course of my research, my career, and my life. As I listened to the stories of these individuals (most of whom were men), I began to notice various topics and concerns that were forefronted and treated as unforgettable, emotional, and impactful on their lives as immigrants, former refugees, transculturals, and U.S. and Canadian citizens. Chief among these concerns were issues of belonging (e.g., linguistic, ethnic, societal) and feelings of shame and inadequacy surrounding language ability, education, and socioeconomic status.

A second influential factor on my interest in emotion talk and immigrant stories was media and social discourse that asserted that immigrants were often lazy, uninterested in learning English, content to live in ethnic enclaves or ghettos, and unwilling to get beyond their troubled histories and cultural ties to successfully blend into the social fabric of North American society. As one university professor commented after reviewing some of my data, “Why can’t they stop being so tragic and get over it?” It was from a growing critical awareness of and interest in better understanding the lives and represented experiences of immigrant groups and individuals that pushed me to conduct ethnographic research exploring their literacy practices, family structures, and social participation networks. I discovered that contrary to societal assertions that immigrants were lazy and uninterested in learning English, those whom I met were deeply concerned about matters of language learning, development, and even attrition. Moreover, they often spoke that they desperately wanted to belong and longed to break through the boundaries of accent, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status. Intrigued by the centrality of narratives and story-like representations in their talk, I became increasingly conscious of both the discursive and the psychological aspects of making sense of and representing self and experience. To examine these personal aspects of second language use and social
participation, my research agenda then moved to a more discourse-centered and narrative-based approach.

Although it might appear here that I am advocating a personal and reflexive interview, narrative, or autobiographic approach as a remedy to more positivistic or scientific approaches, it is not simply a matter of replacing one paradigm with another. Discussing the debate between “methodological purists” and “critical” scholars, Hammersley (2000) has pointed out that it is not the case that one approach is better at capturing the truth or reality. While these debates did not originate with this dissertation, nor will they be settled by it, throughout this dissertation I keep in mind that interview-based research is more than simply locating oneself along an objective-subjective continuum or taking a particular ontological or epistemological stance on the objects of inquiry. It requires also a close engagement with a number of important questions:

Who is this research for?
What is this research attempting to achieve?
How did this research come about?
What is happening during the research process?
How is this research going to be analyzed and shared?
Why does this research matter?

Above all, I approached the process of this research as a learner. My goal was not to teach these interview participants English or evaluate their language proficiency. Nonetheless, I recognize that my status as a doctoral student, language educator, American, and L1 speaker of English—as well as my visible gender and ethnic identities—no doubt influenced the research process (in ways both positive and negative). Sometimes my participants asked me to check their pronunciation, teach them new words, help them understand documents, or fill out various forms in English. They also displayed a concern regarding the reception of their interview talk by checking with me to see if it was appropriate for them to discuss sensitive topics such as discrimination, sexuality, and things that were sad, depressing, or even violent. In the beginning, some were puzzled why an American, particularly a white man, would want to know about
their experiences. In fact, several mentioned that nobody wanted to hear their stories and people were constantly telling them to “get over it” and move on with their lives.

Despite my interest in the topics of multilingualism, immigration, and transculturalism, I realize that in many ways I am an outsider in this research. I am not an immigrant nor am I visibly identifiable as a person of color. I have never been a refugee nor have I ever experienced firsthand the horrors of war and the violent deaths of family and friends. Neither have I ever been forced to leave my home behind and start anew in a strange land and in a new language. Therefore, these stories and experiences are not ones that I can claim as my own. At times I felt a mixture of voyeuristic guilt from peeking into the lives of strangers, wondering if I should be ashamed of wanting to learn more about them and, in turn, who I was—and was not.

Although coming from very different life experiences, the study participants and I did have more in common than I initially expected. As men, we found our gendered experiences linked us together. We expressed concerns over the same things: family, career, finances, the uncertain future, masculinity, and personal relationships. We also found a shared concern regarding matters tied to dislocation and belonging. In my case, I have moved numerous times across the US, Canada, and Japan. For me, the location of “home” has always been a difficult question to answer, and we discovered a mutual bond over that dilemma. We also experienced similar upbringings, as we all came from large families that had been dislocated, estranged, or otherwise split apart. Most of the men were older than I, but we grew up in similar generations and located ourselves somewhere between the “young kids” and the “old men.” Thus, despite our many differences, we did find points of convergence in our life histories through which to engage with one another.

The categorization of the research participants in this study as “immigrants” is particularly problematic for me as a researcher. This parallels similar issues raised in sociological and discursive work on gender. For example, Speer (2005) has criticized feminist researchers who, although aiming to take a constructionist approach to gender, nevertheless reify the notion of gender as an object by treating it “as an independent variable against which to study talk…. The unit of analysis, then, is still the gendered subject, not the talk” (p. 84). A solution Speer offered lies in the ethnomethodological
refusal to impose “commonsense” ideas about gender categories, for example. Nevertheless, she points out that most ethnomethodological research has failed to show us situated examples of gender construction because it has given us little firsthand evidence of participants’ accounts (p. 85). In the same way, by referring to my research participants as immigrants, transculturals, or refugees, I also risk reproducing these categories in the research process. I am aware of this difficulty but I have not yet arrived at a comfortable solution. In the meantime, I use the terms “immigrant” and “transcultural” as tentative labels without making a particular commitment to them. I intentionally avoid using the term “refugee” as my research participants are no longer seeking refuge and do not define themselves by that label. I prefer to use the term “former refugee” when locating the participants in terms of their past forced immigration experiences. When they label themselves, they most often use the terms “immigrant,” Asian, Vietnamese, Cambodian, Filipino, and even “FOB”\(^2\) (Fresh Off the Boat).

Finally, I am aware that this study is but one contribution toward a closer engagement with emotions and the practices of qualitative research. Like all theoretical and practical research and representation of knowledge, it is necessarily partial and continually unfolding (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Given, 2008):

There is a sense in which research is never finished. Reflection will enable you as a researcher to see both the possibilities and the liabilities of your ever-developing reflexive and interpretive account of your research. (Burgess, Sieminski, & Arthur, 2006, p. 89)

For some, this study will not be critical enough—as I refrain from making claims about the particular social conditions driving the form and content of the interview and narrative talk of the study participants. For others, because this study deals with interview talk in which the interviewer is a participant (see Chapter 4 for more discussion on this) and engages with the difficult topics of emotions and emotionality, it runs the risk of an analysis that is overly theoretical, rhetorical, subjective, and even intuitive. Nevertheless,

\(^2\) “Fresh Off the Boat.” A derogatory term often directed at Asian immigrants and refugees—one that originally referred to the Southeast Asian boat people from Vietnam. A more recent version of this is “FOP” (Fresh Off the Plane). See Talmy (2004) for an insightful discussion of the social and discursive construction of this label in a public school in Hawai‘i.
it is my hope that this dissertation, with all its strengths and flaws, will contribute to a more serious consideration of the dynamic nature of the investigation and representation of subjective experience and emotional life.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.0. Introduction

Across applied linguistics and the human sciences there has been a recent groundswell of interest in investigating the meaning, role, and representation of emotions in our daily lives. Following what has been labeled the “affective turn” (Clough & Halley, 2007; Greco & Stenner, 2008) or “emotional turn” (Clarke & Hoggett, 2009), researchers are seeking to understand emotions not as a peripheral part of language, social life, and experience but as centrally constitutive of and constituted by them. Key early work on emotions in anthropology (e.g., Besnier, 1990; Lutz, 1988; Lutz & Abu-Lughod, 1990), psychology (e.g., Edwards, 1997, 1999), cognitive linguistics (e.g., Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Kövecses, 1987; Wierzbicka, 1991, 1995), and interdisciplinary traditions (e.g., Russell, 1995) have fueled more recent treatments exploring the complex relationship between language and emotions (e.g., Kövecses, 2003; Pavlenko, 2005, 2006; Wilce, 2009).

Despite the growing body of research on emotions and associated topics (e.g., affect, feelings, moods), and claims that this recent treatment of emotion as a topic in its own right is opening up a new area of research (e.g., Lewis, Haviland-Jones, & Barrett, 2008; Pavlenko, 2005), there is still little agreement among scholars regarding how to define and investigate psychological and subjective states and stances. As a result, we are left with more questions than answers: Are emotions intra-individual or inter-individual? Do emotions precede language? Are they encoded by it? Does language reflect internal emotional states—or is what we feel, think we feel, or say we feel shaped by the semiotic resources available for expressing those states? At best, we have a variety of disparate research approaches working toward a common agenda (i.e., the investigation of emotions); at worst, the putative objects of those approaches, although labeled “emotion,” offer no means of cross-comparison. In other words, what some cognitive researchers mean by “emotion,” for example, may in theory and practice point to an entirely different object than that pursued by researchers working in other frameworks.
1.1. Emotion as Topic and Resource

This dissertation directly engages with the theoretical, definitional, and methodological challenges involved in the study of language and emotions—but not by seeking to arrive at a comprehensive description or definitive research program. Indeed, such efforts would undoubtedly prove fruitless, as the relationship between language and emotions likely has “no single coherent story” (Pavlenko, 2005, p. 42) but involves multiple interconnected physiological, psychological, and semiotic processes that are socio-culturally mediated (e.g., facilitated and constrained) and meaningful (e.g., visible and relevant). Moreover, as Lutz and Abu-Lughod (1990) have argued, essentialist and universal treatments of emotions make alternative forms of emotion invisible and obscure how emotions function as social practices. I suggest a productive engagement with language and emotions necessitates a critical re-evaluation of what we have gained thus far by the various approaches as well as a careful consideration of how the ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying those approaches influence our understandings of emotions as topics (i.e., as concerns of researchers and ordinary language users) and resources (i.e., as ways and methods of interacting within and interpreting the world).

This two-part attention to emotion as topic and emotion as resource is central to this dissertation. To narrow the field of focus, I largely confine my discussion of emotions as it directly pertains to the domain of applied linguistics. This will involve a

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3 This is not to say that there are no efforts toward integrated and universal theories. Plutchik (1991), a renowned researcher on emotions, has raised the issue of the lack of progress in emotion research in psychology:

The problem of developing a satisfactory psychology of emotion is still with us. Whether the reasons for this are related to the burden of tradition, or confused terminology, or a priori conceptions, or a variety of other problems (as we shall see), it is evident that there is a need for an integrated theory of the emotions.” (p. 5)

Izard, Kagan, and Zajonc (1988), also citing the urgency of coherent work on emotions, have argued for more attention to the universal processes of emotions:

The urgent need in a growing field, such as emotion, is less for strict and formal definitions (although we do wish to have some common agreement about what we mean by “emotion”) and more for insight into what are essentially and fundamentally processes that are necessarily implicated in all emotions.” (p. 4)
consideration of both L1 (first language) and L2 (second language) speakers and contexts. In the following section, I discuss how attention to emotions and how they are researched are relevant to the concerns of applied linguistics.

1.2. Locating this Study Within Applied Linguistics

How does the study of emotions fit into the aims of applied linguistics? Since its development from generative and structural linguistics in the 1950s and 1960s, and subsequent influences from across the humanities and social sciences, including such disciplines as education, anthropology, psychology, and sociology, applied linguistics has evolved together with its sub-discipline SLA (Second Language Acquisition; for a historical perspective, see Gass & Selinker, 2008; Ortega, 2009) to encompass a broad range of research programs including language testing and assessment (e.g., Bachman & Palmer, 1996; Brown & Hudson, 2002), program development (e.g., Brown, 1995; Richards, 2001), language planning and policy (e.g., Blommaert, 1996; Lin & Martin, 2005; Tollefson, 1991), literacy (e.g., Auerbach, 1996; Ball, 2004; Kern, 2000), pragmatics (e.g., Kasper & Blum-Kulka, 1993; Leech, 1983; Levinson, 1983), conversation analysis (e.g., Markee, 2000; Seedhouse, 2004), discourse analysis (e.g., Gee, 2010; McCarthy, 1991), forensic linguistics (Eades, 2005, 2008), special needs learners (e.g., Ardila & Ramos, 2007; Kormos & Kontra, 2008), health issues (Higgins & Norton, 2009; Ramanathan, 2011), gender and sexuality (Kappra & Vandrick, 2006; Nelson 2009; Vandrick, 1998, 2003), and social justice (Grabe, 2002; Hall, 2002).

Undoubtedly due in part to its interdisciplinary origins, the proper scope, aims, and ethical obligations of applied linguistics have been the subjects of much internal debate over the years. Much of this debate has consisted of oppositional rhetoric resulting in binary divisions such as “cognitive vs. social” and “traditional vs. alternative” (e.g., Atkinson, 2002, 2010; Block, 1996, 2003; Bygate, 2005; Firth & Wagner, 1997; Grabe, 2002; Gregg, Long, Jordan, & Beretta, 1997; Kaplan, 2002; Lantolf, 1996; Long, 1990; Ortega, 2005; Pennycook, 2001; Van Lier, 2004; Watson-Gegeo, 2004; Zuengler & Miller, 2006). Among the issues scholars have raised include questions regarding what

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4 I use the terms “second language” or “L2” to include the learning and use of multiple or additional languages, not only the second.
exactly applied linguistics is (e.g., a field, discipline, or domain), whether it is mainly “linguistics applied,” and to what extent it should locate its attention on theory, research, pedagogy, use, acquisition, or even sociopolitical concerns.

Despite the various paradigmatic and programmatic debates, there is consensus, at least on a general level, that applied linguistics deals with the “theoretical and empirical investigation of real-world problems in which language is a central issue” (Brumfit, 1995, p. 27; see also Hall, 2002; Kaplan, 2002). Grabe (2002) extended Brumfit’s definition by defining applied linguistics as “a practice-driven discipline that addresses language-based problems in real-world contexts” (p. 10)—moving from an etic focus on the “problem” (i.e., as it is defined by the researcher) by taking an emic turn to the particular context in which that so-called problem is located (i.e., to examine how the problem is defined, made relevant, and managed in situ by social members themselves). Similarly, Bygate (2005), in his discussion of applied linguistics as a discipline, expanded the definition of “real-world problems” to include a wider examination of various types of language use and language users across a variety of contexts and interactions (see also Duff, 2002; Eades, 2005; Hall, 2002).

It is at this nexus of language use and language users that emotions and subjectivity have been afforded a space to be treated as topics in their own right—primarily as initiators, inhibitors, or outcomes of language-related activity—particularly in autobiographic studies (e.g., Menard-Warwick, 2010; Norton, 2000), individual differences research (e.g., Dörnyei, 2005, 2006; Ellis, 2004; Robinson, 2002) and research on bilingual processing and the mental lexicon (e.g., Pavlenko, 2005, 2006; Dewaele & Pavlenko, 2004).

1.3. Attending to Methodology

As the initial focus on language problems has expanded to include the contextually-relevant and dynamic nature of language-in-use, applied linguists have been called on to re-examine not merely the formulation of the objects of their empirical and theoretical investigations but also the manner in which their research is conducted and disseminated (e.g., Ortega, 2005; Tracy, 2001). Thus, a key implication of the concerns raised by many contemporary scholars is the need for more careful attention to matters of
methodology, data analysis, interpretation, potential generalizations, and significance of the research findings—not to mention the role of applied linguists in identifying particular research issues and effecting individual and social change (e.g., Pennycook, 2000, 2001; Ramanathan, 2002). It is from these concerns with methodology, analysis, interpretation, and the social implications of research that this dissertation finds impetus and takes as its focus the topic of emotions while giving attention to how they are managed in a widely popular yet often under-examined methodology and resource in applied linguistics and emotion-related research: the qualitative research interview.5

1.3.1. Interview and Narrative Methods

According to much of the literature on qualitative interviewing, the task for the interviewer is to take an empathetic stance and make use of guiding questions to encourage and enable respondents to describe and reveal their spontaneous, authentic, and deep-seated thoughts, feelings, and opinions:

In the interview situation…the main questions should normally be in a descriptive form: “What happened and how did it happen?” “How did you feel then?” “What did you experience” and the like. The aim is to elicit spontaneous descriptions from the subjects rather than to get their own, more or less speculative explanations of why something took place. (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p. 133)

Most helpful questions would be those that guide the storytelling toward the feeling level. This is where the interview becomes active, and interactive, at its best, and where the most meaning in a person’s life comes from. Getting to a deeper level of reality can be achieved in various ways, from specific types of questions to comments to sympathetic and responsive listening. The more interest, empathy, caring, warmth, and acceptance that can be shown, the deeper the response level. It is when these qualities are present in the interview that it can become a creative search for mutual understanding (Douglas, 1985). Questions such as, “How did that feel to you?” Or comments such as, “You seem to be saying…,” coupled with a sincere, endearing sense of wonderment and appreciation at what is being revealed to you, will go a long way in assisting the storyteller to share his or her deep story. (Atkinson, 1998, p. 41)

If strong emotions arise during the interview, you should be prepared, if necessary, to “mirror” them. This will give the interviewee the feeling that you

5 I use this as an umbrella term to include the ethnographic interview, narrative interview, life-story interview, and related biographic interview types and methods that seek to understand social members’ experiences and understandings through their own words.
accept them and their expressed emotions, and that they do not have to avoid feeling those emotions for fear of upsetting you. For example, if they start to cry, you should not rush in to “rescue” them by quickly changing the topic with a new “objective question” or in some other way. It is more helpful and accepting to say “That’s still hard for you”, “It’s still painful for you to remember that”, “That makes you said when you think about it” in an empathetic and non-judgmental way. But always as little as possible, as minimally as possible: ideally, they should remain scarcely aware that you have done anything. If they express feelings of anger, you might say “You feel angry about it” to show that you understand what the emotion is that they are expressing, in such a way that they can stay with the emotion or emerge from it in their own time. (Wengraf, 2001, p. 128)

Taking similar stances as those represented by the above-cited scholars, applied linguists have for some time used qualitative and ethnographic interviews, learner narratives, and other autobiographical data for insight into the challenges, successes, and lived experiences of second language learners and users. As Pavlenko (2007) has described in her overview of autobiographic narratives in applied linguistics, the growth of the field of narrative study across the humanities and social sciences led to a “narrative turn” (see also Berger & Quinney, 2005; Riessman, 2008) in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Making its way into the work of L2 researchers, this narrative turn fueled an interest in the collection (often through interviews and diary studies) and representation (by the researcher) of the life stories, accounts, memories, and diaries of groups and individuals and their identities and experiences as differentially successful L2 learners, users, and even teachers (e.g., Baynham & DeFina, 2005; Belcher & Connor, 2001; Bell, 2002; Benson & Nunan, 2004; De Fina, 2003; Kalaja, Paiva, & Ferreira, 2008; Koven, 2004; Kramsch, 2009; Lvoovich, 1997; Mantero, 2007; Menard-Warwick, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009; Pavlish, 2007; Richmond, 2002; Ros i Solé, 2007).

Much of this contemporary research, driven by poststructural, critical, and feminist concerns, has given a great deal of attention to matters of identity, agency, access, subjectivity, and the lived realities of immigrant groups and individuals, particularly women (e.g., Goldstein, 1994, 1996; Langman, 2004; Menard-Warwick, 2004, 2009; Morrow, 1997; Norton, 2000; Norton, Pavlenko, & Burton 2004; Pavlenko, 2001; Vitanova, 2005; Warriner, 2004), asylum seekers (e.g., Blommaert, 2001b), immigrant children and/or children of immigrants (e.g., 1.5 generation: Campey, 2002;
Stritikus, 2002; Talmy, 2004, 2008), and immigrants in the workplace (e.g., Duff, Wong, & Early, 2002; Goldstein, 1996).

This work has contributed to an influential critique of power, gender, and social inequality in the classroom, the workplace, the home, and society. Furthermore, it has demonstrated that making and maintaining a life in a new culture and language involves more than acculturation and successful linguistic attainment; it is also a dynamic and emotion-laden process of coping, belonging, and identity (re)construction. Qualitative interviews and narrative-based studies are often treated as a means to access that ongoing work:

Narratives give insight into the experience of second language learning from the learners’ perspective. Through narratives we can gather data useful to understanding differences among speakers in terms of their learning process and ultimate attainment that cannot be accounted for in other methods of studying language learning. Narratives allow for a nuanced understanding of how individuals perceive access to resources for learning language as well as for constructing new identities within new communities of practice. In these narratives, issues of investment, positionality, and emotionality are accessible to the researcher. The authors examine narratives as part of larger ethnographic studies of second language learning. Although the researcher as interlocutor represents a specific setting for narrative, it nonetheless allows for an examination of the multiple and often conflicting identity practices that represent ways in which individuals articulate and practice their second language becoming. (Langman, 2004, p. 238)

There is no denying that autobiographic methods may be powerful tools in giving voice to previously unheard speakers and their experiences, bringing to light hidden dimensions of language use, motivation, investment, and social participation, and providing social critique. Although some researchers (e.g., Langman, above quote) do recognize that “the researcher as interlocutor represents a specific setting for narrative,” the specific setting of the research interview continues to go unexamined within much of this research (see Lee & Simon-Maeda, 2006, for a notable exception).

The failure to examine the sites and processes of qualitative research runs the potential risk of privileging the interviewer/researcher and the research findings at the expense of the interviewee/researched. Moreover, by elevating the thematic, emotional, and even dramatic content of the data we may even obscure the process by which those
findings were elicited, solicited, and (co)constructed. It is with these concerns that a growing number of contemporary researchers in the human sciences (e.g., Antaki, Billig, Edwards, & Potter, 2003; Briggs, 2007; Holstein & Gubrium, 2004; Rapley, 2001; Silverman, 2004; van den Berg, Wetherell, & Houtkoop-Steenstra, 2003) and applied linguistics (Richards, 2003; Talmy, 2010; Talmy & Richards, 2011) have begun to lead a challenge against the unproblematized acceptance of these forms of autobiographical talk as accessing “reality” by pressing for a closer examination of them as accounts that are occasioned and co-constructed within specific interactional contexts.

1.4. Additional Motivations

Along with the aim of explicating emotions as topic and resource in the research interview, this dissertation is fueled by two interrelated considerations that deal not just with the interview proper, but with the respondents and the significance of the content and construction of their talk: (a) transcultural and social belonging, and (b) emotions and mental health. The former relates to L2 users’ concerns with language as an integral part of identity, self-representation, and a link to their place within society and various networks of belonging. While the former consideration is closely linked with identity and identification with language and its contextualized use, the latter is concerned with how matters of identity and belonging are made relevant to and even constitutive of one’s mental/emotional health and well-being as an integrated person. In the following section, I outline these two areas in more detail and discuss some of the inherent tensions and challenges they present for the qualitative researcher.

1.4.1. Immigration and Transcultural Belonging

An additional motivation for this study is an interest in the shifting rates and directions of global and local migration as well as the need for deeper understandings of the role of discourse for as constitutive and agentive in the processes and trajectories of

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6 Although an etic description, I prefer “transcultural” (Castles & Miller, 2003; Ortiz, 1940, as cited in Allatson, 2002) over “transnational,” as the latter maintains a reliance on identity tied to nation/state while the former offers a broader consideration of “trans” (-national, -cultural, -ethnic, -gendered, etc.) identities—allowing for multiple affiliations while taking into account the potential tensions among them.
L2 interaction, language use, and social participation. Porous borders, diasporic communities, and “in-betweenness” are concomitants of an increasingly transnational era, contributing to a de-centering and destabilization of the boundaries separating the divides between us/them and global/local. Identity is then seen as “a passage from one space to another” (Fortier, 2002, p. 2) and “a discourse of (not) belonging…which is continually negotiated and renegotiated within a localized social context” (Meinhof & Galasinksi, 2005, p. 8).

A characteristic of much contemporary applied linguistics and second language (L2) scholarship on identity and multilingualism is a rejection of assimilation models (see Baker, 2006; Fishman & Garcia, 2010; Hornberger, 2003) that seek to explain or predict linguistic attainment and social success as largely determined by an individual’s desire or ability to integrate. Turning to situated and ecological approaches, scholars are increasingly arguing the need to understand language learners and users first as people, and “as people who are necessarily located in particular cultural and historical contexts” (Ushioda, 2009, p. 216). Along with this attention to context is a concern with the ways in which people simultaneously inhabit multiple spaces while redefining and being redefined by their social roles, relationships, and language practices (Canagarajah, 2005; Pavlenko & Blackledge, 2004).

While poststructuralist and postmodern views see identity, by its very nature, as fluid, conflicting, dynamic, fragmented, and evolving (Giddens, 1990), and even celebrate its hybrid potential, some social-constructionist and ethnomethodologically-informed views see the potential for identity to also be stable and consistent (Garfinkel, 1967; Gergen, 1994; Stokoe & Edwards, 2007). However, this stability is not considered by these researchers as an inherent quality of identity; instead, it is social members themselves that are seen as creating this stability out of the flux. A question these differing views raise is: How do multilinguals and transculturals see and represent themselves? As Pavlenko and Lantolf (2000) warn, we should consider additional language users as people and individuals (rather than subjects) embedded in social networks, and we must recognize the affective, personal, and agentive nature of multilingual identities.
Moreover, to date, there are relatively few studies that examine the talk and experiences of immigrant men. The few notable exceptions (e.g., Duff, 1993a, b; Menard-Warwick, 2006; Miller, 2010; Teutsch-Dwyer, 2001; Vitanova, 2004), with the exclusion of Duff’s work, draw heavily on post-structuralist, feminist, and Bakhtinian frameworks. Although many of these and earlier-cited L2 studies have made reference to the presence of emotionality in immigrants’ experiences with language learning and use, emotions were generally treated as reflections of experience and evidence of its authenticity—not as part of its representation for or interaction with the researcher.

Menard-Warwick (2006), using life history interviews, examined how an undocumented immigrant man from Mexico living in the US became empowered by developing “technical masculinity” based on computer skills after he was injured and “psychologically abused” (p. 366) in his automotive repair job. In a case study of a Polish immigrant man in the US, Teutsch-Dwyer (2001) found that despite his limited L2 grammatical development and “hurt” masculinity due to his difficult socioeconomic situation, he was able to reconstruct his masculinity through conversations and interactions anchored around his female coworkers. Vitanova (2004), in an ethnographic interview study of four East European couples, observed that the wives made use of emotion discourse to describe their linguistic and social experiences in the US, while the husbands did not. Instead, the men relied upon their wives to interpret and supply vocabulary items for them. None of the three above-mentioned studies treated the interview context itself as an object to be examined. In keeping with most interview-based studies in applied linguistics (as well as the human sciences in general), the interviews and narratives were made use of for their thematic content and potential for providing access to the speakers’ life histories, perceptions, and personal observations.

Unlike many case studies of immigrant L2 users, Duff’s (1993a, b) study of JDB (also referred to as “Jim”; Duff, 2009), a Cambodian refugee to Canada, took a longitudinal approach. Following JDB’s English language progress from the time shortly after he arrived in Canada over the following two and a half years, Duff focused on his syntactic development. However, in a critical reflection of her case selection, data collection, and analysis, Duff (2009) later stated that in light of recent L2 developments, one might move from a strictly linguistic approach to address “a more complex portrayal
of the research participant as a multifaceted social being and not just a ‘site’ of L2 development” (p. 19). Although Duff does stress the importance of carrying out research from a wide range of interests, she insists that all research must be rigorous:

Whatever the focus, the research would need to be informed by, and speak to, theory or broader principles, contextualized within other relevant research or literature, and supported by systematically collected, analyzed, and interpreted data with representative evidence for claims. (p. 19)

In addition to the paucity of research on the experiences and discourse of immigrant men, I am aware of no studies located within applied linguistics that directly investigate the L2 qualitative interview as an object of study. Despite the predominance of biographic methods in L2 research, there are also surprisingly few texts on conducting the qualitative interview in our field. There are a handful of volumes on language research that touch briefly upon the interview (e.g., Duff, 2009; Hinkel, 2005; Mackey & Gass, 2005), but most offer little more than a few warnings and helpful suggestions for researchers. A few noteworthy exceptions include a chapter in Richards’ (2003) volume on Qualitative Inquiry in TESOL and Pavelenko’s (2007) often-cited Applied Linguistics article on autobiographic narrative research. As for theory and analysis, Talmy (2010) offers a careful critique of the interview in applied linguistics research and Duff (2009) discusses the use of qualitative interviews in case study research. For the most part, qualitative interview and interviewing methods continue to be dealt with in other fields and disciplines (e.g., Briggs, 1986; Holstein & Gubrium, 1997; Kvale, 1996; Mishler, 1986, 1991; Potter & Hepburn, 2005).

1.4.2. Emotions, Mental Health, and Belonging

It is not a stretch to link immigration and transculturalism with emotions and mental health—even within the study of L2 use. David Block, an important figure in L2 studies, is well known for his work on globalization and its social, sociolinguistic, and educational consequences. Discussing immigration and transnationalism, he hints at their potential links with psychology:
While classical immigration and the expatriate experience are still options for migrants today, there is a progressive tendency towards transnationalism and the development of what are known as transnational social spaces…. Thus migration today opens up new and different adaptations options for migrants. Whereas in the past, immigration, with the connotation of “staying for life”, was the dominant option, today migrants can live, as it were, straddling geographical, social and psychological borders.” (Block, 2007, p. 33, emphasis added)

Although we may find little disagreement that personal motivation and affective (e.g., emotional, attitudinal) factors are important influences in successful adaptation to a new language and culture, there is still little consensus on how to go about defining and measuring these influences. Moreover, even when they are defined and research is carried out, it is unclear how to interpret or even what to do with findings. Despite such challenges, beyond an intrinsic theoretical or academic interest in the workings of language and psychology, I suggest this line of research offers important insights for ongoing “mental health” and emotion work and the quality of life for multilingual immigrants and transculturals.

Research has shown that linguistic and migratory patterns are indicators of mental health and social well-being (Berry, 1997, 2001; Berry & Kim, 1988). It is also well-established that there is a negative relationship between socioeconomic status and mental illness (i.e., the lower the socioeconomic status, the higher the risk of mental illness; Taylor, Morrell, Carter, & Harrison, 2004). In the US, for example, Laotian, Cambodian, and Haitian refugee communities had the lowest median annual household income at just over $25,000 (Portes & Rumbaut, 2006). Even the Surgeon General’s 2001 report (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2001) expressed a serious concern for the mental health of Southeast Asian (Cambodian, Hmong, Laotion, and Vietnamese) immigrants who continue to suffer from national trauma, post-traumatic stress disorder, relocation issues, language difficulties, and cultural conflicts. The Surgeon General further pointed out studies documenting the high rates of mental disorders among refugees (as high as 70 percent in some studies; e.g., Blair, 2000; Carlson & Rosser-Hogan, 1991; Kinzie et al., 1990; Kroll et al., 1989; Moore & Boehnlein, 1991).
Although the Surgeon General’s report (U. S. D. H. H. S., 2001) admitted that while it is known that many factors influence mental health and acculturation, there is still little understanding about the mental health needs of these diverse populations:

The influence of acculturation on mental health has not been clearly identified, in part because of problems with measuring acculturation. Nonetheless, the level of exposure to and involvement in U.S. culture is important when examining mental health factors for Asian Americans. (p. 113)

A central challenge in addressing matters related to psychology and mental health lies both in the recognition of “mental,” “mental health,” “mental illness” and their definitions. While Western (i.e., Anglo, dominant) discourses make a distinction between the body and the mind, many Asian cultures do not—and even express “psychological” stress (to use the dominant Western discourse) in terms of physiological complaints (Hsu & Folstein, 1997). Again, this also suggests the value of approaches (e.g., discursive) that are able to display and make relevant members’ understandings and localized displays of the particular phenomena of interest.

Matters potentially relevant to emotions and mental health have appeared in numerous L2 studies (such as those cited earlier) using interviews and narratives with immigrant and transcultural populations, although mental health and emotions were not a focus of those studies. Vitanova (2004), for example, found many displays of emotion by her participants:

Extract 1.1. Adapted from Vitanova (pp. 268-269)

S: Take it easy (speaks of Boris).
G,S: (Laugh.)
S: I am afraid
B: I no feel guilty
S: I am afraid all the time
B: I no feel guilty. American people / all American people / was /immigrate. Live a few people / now / English. A few
[...] Why not for me?
(Sighs.)

7 Nwadiora and McAdoo (1996) in a study of Amerasian refugee youth from Vietnam also found a strong correlation between low English skills and acculturative stress.
S: Why / I / must / be guilty? Why?
B: He hasn't any / complexes. It seems to me / I / kak skazat (how do you say) / neudobstvo (discomfort). Ya prichinnya / lyudem / neudobstvo (I cause people discomfort).

In her analysis, Vitanova noted that the women in her study tended to invoke emotion discourses of guilt and shame while the men did not. Discussing this excerpt, Vitanova pointed out that Boris negated Sylvia’s talk of her own feelings (e.g., guilt and shame) by positioning himself on equal terms with native speakers. I suggest that there is also some interesting “psychological” work being done here by these speakers. The fact that Sylvia repeatedly describes her affective state as “afraid,” and Boris contrastively reformulates that fear to “guilt,” is in itself a point for analysis. Rather than treating this as their actual mental states, we can examine how they describe those mental states and what they are achieving by those descriptions. For example, Sylvia’s statement that Boris does not have any complexes is offering up an inferential characterization of her own mental state (i.e., as having a complex)—and she confirms this by stating that she causes other people discomfort. Although Vitanova did not do in-depth analysis of the emotion talk by the immigrant women in her study, she did point out, in a stance compatible with a discursive constructionist approach, the need to examine emotions as social actions:

Sylvia’s feelings were not, however, individual mental states, nor did her words of emotion express those individual states. Her feelings of shame and guilt originated in the dialogical process with other interlocutors. (p. 269).

In another example, Menard-Warwick (2006) and one of her participants, Jorge, talk explicitly about mental health issues stemming from stress at work. Menard-Warwick writes, “Jorge told me he felt ‘psychologically abused,’” and goes on to quote Jorge’s talk about his boss:

He’d [Jorge’s boss] psychologically give you situations in the head, for example, many other companies ask for reference, no? So one of the things he’d say to me is that “if you leave the carwash, …when they ask me for a reference, I’ll tell them that you’re a very bad person…and wherever you go, you’re not going to be able to work.” (p. 367, emphasis added)
Although Menard-Warwick did not analyze Jorge’s use of psychological talk, as that was not the focus of her study, a question that one might raise based on this data is how Jorge uses this talk of psychological matters to make sense of his actions and the actions of others—as he organizes his stories for the researcher (i.e., as self-presentation work).

As the above examples illustrate, emotions, mental health, and psychological states are topics that L2 users make use of in their talk (just as L1 speakers do) and are therefore no less deserving of direct attention by researchers. Furthermore, if we are interested in understanding the L2 user as a “whole person” (e.g., Cook, 2002; Dörnyei & Ushioda, 2009; Kanno, 2003; Noels & Giles, 2009), then we should consider the emotional aspects of self as well as the social and cognitive.

1.5. A Discursive Constructionist Approach

To focus my investigation of the management of emotions in qualitative interviews, I draw upon and develop a discursive constructionist approach to emotions and psychological talk. While this approach is directed toward the ways in which these individuals go about making sense of and organizing experience, it is not merely concerned with analyzing snippets of decontextualized talk or displaying summaries of “what was said.”—nor is it aimed at getting inside the heads of social members to discover what they “really” think, feel, or experience. It is focused on the activity of talk and interaction, what Holstein and Gubrium (2004) refer to as the *whats* (content and informational aspect of talk) and the *hows* (resources, means, and modes) of meaning production.

Although the content of talk is certainly an important feature of interaction, central to my approach is the view of language as social action. By this, I consider the role of language as it is used to *do* things (Austin, 1962; Edwards, 1997; Volosinov, 1973)—for example, to convince, complain, justify, attribute causality, share knowledge, record and organize experience, affirm social relationships, and perform identity. In other words, I am simultaneously concerned with the semiotic resources that social members employ to index and implicate emotionality as well as the ways in which they make use of those resources in their interactions with others (here, the focus is the interview...
context). This stance requires also that talk and action be considered in situ (i.e., both constructed by and constructive of the local context of use).

1.6. Significance and Potential Contributions

In summary, the purpose of this study is three-fold as it addresses a number of gaps and concerns in the research literature. First, it examines emotions as both a discursive topic and resource, thus expanding previous research to include attention to the ways in which emotion talk is constituted by and constitutive of interaction. As a relatively unexplored area of inquiry (at least within applied linguistics), a crucial contribution here is a close examination of the interactional and semiotic resources that go into the construction and reception of emotionality in talk. Second, by opening up the L2 qualitative interview for inspection, it addresses matters of relevance to methodology, representation, and analysis—particularly for application to L2 and multilingual users, topics, and settings. Through this methodological and analytical critique of interview- and autobiographic-based research, it aims to provide an example of and framework for a discursive constructionist approach to L2 interview talk.

Third, this study explores the links between emotions and autobiographical talk of experience. In other words, I am interested in what adult immigrants and transculturals make relevant in their talk of language-in-use and language-of-use (not just language learning), as well as how they locate themselves and others and how those accounts are shaped by the context and interactants. The particular focus of interest here is on the ways in which emotions and psychological talk are made visible and relevant to the understanding of self and experience—and how it is represented. By including attention to the lives of adult immigrant and transcultural men, this study expands previous research by bringing attention to a wider range of gendered experiences. In addition, by considering emotionality and the rhetorical and agentive work speakers carry out within and across their interviews and narratives over time, this study offers potential links for future interdisciplinary research on matters related to acculturation, mental health, and social participation.

As I have outlined in the preceding sections, I seek to arrive at local understandings of the representation and organization of emotion and experience. A
distinctive aspect of this study, in comparison to other work at the intersection of emotions, interviews, and transcultural individuals, is its point of departure. I am attempting engage with this research not by starting from a larger theoretical perspective and working down, but by looking at how social members themselves make sense of the subjective aspects of experience and represent that subjectivity in and through their autobiographic talk.

1.7. Structure of this Dissertation

In Chapter 1, the introduction, I located this study within the field and detailed the background, motivation, significance, and potential contributions of the present focus on the management of emotionality in L2 qualitative research interviews. Continuing this investigation, Chapter 2 provides a selected theoretical background informing the present study. Discussing the study of language and emotions, it first presents previous research categorized here as intrapsychological approaches and socio-cultural approaches. The chapter then gives an overview of the key discursive methodologies (ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, and discursive psychology) informing the discursive constructionist framework employed in this dissertation. It also discusses critiques of these discursive approaches (e.g., matters of context, micro-macro structures) and some of the challenges involved as I set forth a grounded discursive approach to L2 interviews and autobiographic talk. Chapter 3 gives an overview of the participants and presents the data collection, transcription, and methodological procedures used.

Chapters 4-6 make up the core data analysis of this dissertation. Chapter 4 leads with a focus on the interviewees by examining how they make use of emotion story prefaces to project autobiographic stories fitting the interview agenda. Chapter 5 focuses on interviewer questioning sequences and their function as a powerful resource for eliciting and steering the interview toward emotional stories and responses. Addressing the matter of how particular emotion-indexing terms are used to offer, take up, and reject various descriptions, Chapter 6 turns its attention to the explicit and inferential features of emotion reformulations. The chapter also explores how we might go about examining how reformulations are scaled in terms of their relative weights and inferential meanings.
Finally, in Chapter 7, I discuss the main findings, limitations, and implications of this study and offer suggestions for future research.
CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

2.0. Introduction

As this dissertation focuses on emotions, psychological talk, and the subjective side of talk and experience, it is important to address some of the key epistemological, theoretical, and methodological challenges that lie at the heart of this investigation. Tracing a broad historical perspective, in this chapter I discuss three lines of research that have to varying degrees considered the relationship between emotions and language learning and/or use. I first discuss intrapsychological and socio-cultural approaches to the study of emotions and point out some of their key characteristics, findings, and research agendas. I then examine in some detail discursive approaches to the study of emotions, giving specific attention to EMCA-aligned approaches and their contribution to the discursive framework of the present study.

2.1. Theorizing Language and Emotions

First, a few words regarding terminology are necessary. As I have discussed, the labeling and definition of subjective psychological states are notoriously difficult projects, contributing to much of the confusion across the research literature. Psychologists undoubtedly lead in the ever-growing number of definitions. Plutchik (1980), in an overview of the psychological research literature, listed 28 different definitions of emotions. Twenty years later (Plutchik, 2001), his estimate rose to 90. William James is credited with presenting one of the first influential psychological theories and definitions of emotion in his 1884 essay entitled “What Is An Emotion?” Arriving at the same conclusions as Danish scholar, Carl Georg Lange (Lange & James, 1922; Myers, 1986), this became known as the James-Lange theory of emotion (for critiques of this theory see Magoun & Marshall, 2003; Pastorino & Doyle-Portillo, 2008). Essentially, this theory posited that emotion is not a primary feeling, but a secondary feeling following the physiological responses to an initiating object:

Our natural way of thinking about these standard emotions is that the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My thesis on the contrary is that the bodily changes follow the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact,
and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion. (James, 1922, p. 13, emphasis in original)

More recent definitions show the continued focus on emotions as linked to feelings, physiological and perceptual changes, and mental states. Gray (2010), for example, has defined emotion as “a subjective feeling that is mentally directed toward some object” (p. 220, emphasis added). In a review of work on cognition and emotion, Roald (2007) pointed out that emotions have been explored in at least three ways: “as feelings, as cognition and as brain processes” (p. 24, emphasis added).

Many linguistic anthropologists, taking a socially-oriented stance, prefer to use the term “affect” to broadly encompass “emotion, feelings, moods, dispositions, and attitudes associated with persons and/or situations” (Kulick & Schieffelin, 2004, p. 342). Besnier (1990) offers a caution for cross-cultural researchers working in the area of emotions:

Care must be taken not to adopt Western taxonomies of psychological processes as analytic tools in investigations of how language is interwoven with the psychological makeup of self and society, and adopting a broad (but malleable) definition of “affect” can be seen as a wise empirical stance. (p. 421)

Other researchers such as Wilce (2009) prefer to use the term “emotion” to distance themselves from connotations that link affect to intensity or biology. While keeping in mind the various definitional challenges and problems involved in conducting research on emotions, throughout this dissertation I will use the terms “emotion” and “affect” interchangeably.

The following overview of the literature on emotion and language is not intended to be exhaustive. For more in-depth and discipline-specific treatments of the history of emotion research, see work in anthropology (e.g., Besnier, 1990; Milton & Svašek, 2005; Wilce, 2009), psychology (e.g., Edwards, 1997), SLA/L2 studies (e.g., Benson & Nunan, 2005; Pavlenko, 2005, 2006), and communication (e.g., Planalp, 1999). I have selected some of the key studies that I consider directly relevant to the study of emotions in L2 research.
2.2. Intrapsychological Approaches

One way of investigating emotions and psychological states is to treat them as mental (i.e., internal) and perceptual (i.e., individually-perceived) processes—or at least evidence of those processes. The work of cognitive linguist George Lakoff (1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 2003; see also Kövecses 1987; Wierzbicka, 1991, 1994) has contributed greatly to the view of emotion categories (e.g., “anger”) and emotion metaphors (e.g., “hot under the collar”) as revealing the internal organization of the mind. A claim made by work in this vein is that emotions are conceptualized and experienced metaphorically and physically. An assumption underlying this research is that an analysis of conceptual models of linguistic categories will reveal how those categories are correspondingly mapped in the mind.

In L2 studies, several researchers have taken up this exploration of emotions in terms of conceptual categories and bilingual processing (e.g., Dewaele, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c; Dewaele & Pavlenko, 2002; Pavlenko, 2002, 2005, 2006; Pavlenko & Dewaele 2004; Rintell, 1984, 1990; Wierzbicka, 1991, 1995). The work of Pavlenko and Dewaele has been particularly influential in opening up the study of emotions in SLA and has contributed to breaking down the monolingual bias prevalent in much of the previous research in favor of a multilingual and multi-competency perspective. Among the findings of these researchers is the recognition that L2 users employ a smaller range of emotion vocabulary than in the L1 (Dewaele & Pavlenko, 2002); multilinguals tend to favor particular languages for expressing emotions (Dewaele, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2005a, 2006; Pavlenko, 2004, 2005; Pavlenko & Driagina, 2007); and L2 socialization may cause a shift in speakers’ conceptualization and perception of emotions (Pavlenko, 2002). Key concerns of much of this work have been the perception and semantic categorization of emotions by multilinguals and how affective repertoires influence speakers’ perceptions of their “bilingual” (Pavlenko, 2005) or “double” (Koven, 2004) selves. To get at the perception of emotions by speakers (and listeners), many of these studies involve the use of qualitative research methods including interviews, narratives, and self-reports (e.g., questionnaires), or quantitative measures such as surveys and statistical analysis (e.g., Dewaele, 2006).
This recent work connecting emotions and L2 studies is exciting for its potential to open up new avenues for research into the psychological aspects of multilingualism. Because the majority of these studies treat emotions and emotional terms and categories as primarily residing in the individual mind, there has yet been little or no consideration given to how emotions function in L2 use and social interaction (except perhaps as action initiators or outcomes). There has also been little attention given in previous studies of emotion to the research practices of data collection or elicitation and the epistemological assumptions embedded in those methodologies.

2.2.1. Individual Differences

The individual differences (ID) literature has perhaps most directly engaged with affect, often grouping it with motivation and attitude, not just as the focus of inquiry but also in terms of methodological approaches (e.g., Dörnyei, 2005, 2006; Ellis, 2004; Robinson, 2002). In education and then L2 learning, motivation research rose to the forefront in the 1950s during the psychosocial period of language research (Crookes & Schmidt, 1991; Dörnyei, 2005), in large part due to behavioral and educational psychologists such as Mowrer (1950) and later, Gardner and Lambert (Gardner, 1985; Gardner, Lalonde, & Moorecroft, 1985; Gardner & Lambert, 1959, 1972). For these early researchers, at issue was the relationship between a learner’s motivations, desires, and orientations (i.e., learning goals). Dissatisfied with aptitude and ability as explanations for differential learning outcomes, Gardner and his colleagues sought to construct a causal model to explain how a learner’s own goals led to motivation—again, conceptualizing it as a process initiated and maintained by the individual. In the Handbook of Motivation and Cognition, Sorrentino and Higgins (1990) exemplified this view when they wrote, “The goal state or desired outcome specified by the wish thus becomes an end state that the individual feels committed to achieve” (p. 57, emphasis added), and the “individual is motivated to act or behave by internal cues, which may be instinctual, psychological, or learned (as in drive theory), and which signal the organism to behave in a particular manner” (p. 133, emphasis added). Thus, emotions in the ID literature are seen as internal motivators and realizations of needs, desires, and feelings (cf. Maslow, 1970).
In L2 studies, models proposed by John Schumann and Steven Krashen made some of the most direct links between affective factors and L2 learning and use. Schumann’s Acculturation Model (Schumann, 1978, 1986) was developed from his research that sought to discover whether L2 learner language and pidginization were influenced by similar processes. Based on Schumann’s research on immigrant learners of English in non-instructional settings, this socio-psychological model contended that the greater the degree to which a learner acculturates to and identifies with the L2 culture (i.e., in terms of social and psychological distance), the better the end state of language acquisition. Offering a causal and predictive explanation of ultimate second language attainment, at least for natural learning settings, this model had an intuitive appeal. However, Schmidt (1983), in his landmark “Wes” paper, tested Schumann’s acculturation model through a longitudinal case study of a Japanese adult learner of English in Hawai‘i. Schmidt showed that despite Wes’ positive attitude, integrative motivation, relatively high socioeconomic status (as a successful artist), social opportunities for interaction with native speakers, and other socio-psychological factors that should, at least according to Schumann’s predictive model, positively facilitate acquisition, his grammatical competence never developed on a par with his communicative and pragmatic competence. This led Schmidt to conclude that contrary to Schumann’s claims, positive affect does not automatically facilitate the development of grammatical competency; rather, effortful processing and analysis of input are also essential pieces of the learning puzzle.

The central role of affect in SLA was also addressed by Krashen’s (1976, 1985, 1988) Monitor Model of L2 language learning. According to a component of this model labeled the Affective Filter Hypothesis, low affect (or reduced anxiety) allows the adult L2 learner to receive comprehensible input, while high affect caused by negative stress or anxiety creates a psychological or “mental block” that prevents comprehensible input from being processed (1985, p. 100). Although Krashen’s model, like Schumann’s, has a commonsense appeal as a learning metaphor (i.e., we all “know” that learner anxiety negatively impacts language production), it has been severely criticized (e.g., Bley-Vroman, 1989; Ellis, 1985; Gregg, 1984) and largely rejected for its lack of explanatory power and failure to adequately operationalize the focal concepts (such as “affect”).
Despite the general criticisms in the field against the Acculturation Model and the Affective Filter Hypothesis, the ontology represented by both constructs—namely, that affective variables offer a causal explanation for learning success or failure—has gone relatively unquestioned by many L2 researchers.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the influence of the cognitive revolution in psychology and the increasing dissatisfaction with the overly restrictive treatment of affective variables led researchers to reexamine current thinking regarding motivation, attitude, and other individual differences (Crookes & Schmidt, 1991; see also Dörnyei & Schmidt, 2001; Oxford & Shearin, 1994; Royer, 2005), particularly in terms of the role of context or social influences beyond the individual mind. In their influential critique of traditional motivation theory and research, Crookes and Schmidt called for a new research agenda that would attempt to unpack motivation from attitude, for example, and take on motivation as a broad taxonomy while investigating its various potential subtypes (e.g., intrinsic, extrinsic, instrumental). Dörnyei (2005) pointed out that this more recent period was characterized by the application of psychological work on cognition and thought to motivation, and a narrowed focus on a situated analysis of motivation, with particular attention placed on classroom settings.

Also expanding the agenda were psychological (and causal) theories such as self-determination theory (Deci, Eghrari, Patrick, & Leone, 1994; Deci & Ryan, 1985, 2000) and attribution theory (Weiner, 1992), imported from cognitive psychology to help explain both the psychology and social-situatedness of L2 motivation (Noels, 2001, 2009; Noels, Pelletier, Clément, & Vallerand, 2000; Pae, 2008; Ushioda, 1998, 2001; see also Dörnyei 2003, 2005, 2009a, 2009b). While attribution theory explains the link from one’s perceptions of past successes and failures, self-behavior, degree of control, and stability to positive motivational thinking and future success or failure, self-determination theory sees the degree to which behavior is volitional or self-chosen as regulating and sustaining the intrinsic motivation (enjoyment derived from the activity itself) necessary for educational success. Both theories offer a means to consider affect and its role in learner identity and learning trajectories. SDT, in particular, has been cited by Noels (2009), a leader in the application of SDT to L2 learning, as compatible with a range of contexts
and constructs, including sociocultural theory, “imagined communities,”8 and language socialization.

Similar to work in cognitive linguistics, features of much past and recent research on individual factors such as affect, attitude, and motivation are the assumptions that (a) these internal states are already in existence, waiting to be found, and (b) they can be accessed via qualitative and quantitative analysis of questionnaires, narratives, and interviews, or even through analysis of neurophysiological responses (e.g., Schumann, 1997; Schumann, Crowell, Jones, Lee, & Wood, 2006). So entrenched are measures such as surveys and the Attitude/Motivation Test Battery (AMTB; Gardner et al. 1985) that Dörnyei wrote, “I believe that ID research is inextricably linked to psychometrics and research methods, with the issue of questionnaire design being at the forefront” (2005, p. 8). Nevertheless, none of these researchers, at least to my knowledge, has challenged the assumptions at the heart of questionnaires and other self-report methodologies: namely, that self-reporting gives insight into internal (i.e., individual) perceptions and processes.

Despite the enormous body of work on individual differences and learner variables involved in L2 acquisition and use, the fact remains that “affective variables are the area that SLA researchers understand the least” (Scovel, 2000, p. 140). Moreover, there is an increasing dissatisfaction by ID researchers themselves with the way in which cognitive and affective constructs are defined and studied. Dörnyei, the most prominent contemporary L2 researcher on individual variables and motivation (Dörnyei, 2005, 2008, 2009a, 2009b; Dörnyei & Schmidt, 2001; Dörnyei & Ushioda, 2009), has recently argued against the individual differences paradigm, even going so far as to call it a “myth” (2009). The current paradigm cannot hold up, according to Dörnyei, because ID research, based on its own definitions, assumes an impossible stability and generalizability of variables across people and contexts.

Again, we are left with the definitional challenge. Emotions are especially problematic for theorists and researchers—particularly in terms of specification and operationalization (Crookes & Schmidt, 1991; Ellis, 1985). It is no surprise then that emotions/affect are often lumped together with motivation and “individual” or “other”

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variables involved in SLA (e.g., Gass & Selinker, 2008; Ortega, 2009). As Fehr and Russell (1984) stated over twenty years ago: “[e]veryone seems to know what an emotion is, until asked to give a definition. Then, it seems, no one knows” (p. 464). More recently, Parrott (2004) pointed out the definition may rest on whether one is speaking as researcher or layperson: “Emotion terms have developed for the purposes of speakers of the language; these purposes often include judgments of the appropriateness of a person’s actions, but social psychologists do not necessarily share those purposes” (p. 6). It seems we are still no closer to a definition. Moreover, as Dörnyei (2009a) recently explained, an added difficulty is the question of whether or not to include long-term emotions (e.g., love), moods (e.g., depression), dispositions (e.g., benevolence), and so on. Thus, the definition as well as the intensity, duration, and even the conscious or unconscious nature of emotions make them exceedingly difficult topics for researchers to investigate.

Because current static models are unable to capture the complexity and multi-componential nature of the cognitive, affective, environmental, and other factors that are involved in language learning and use, Dörnyei (2009a) has recently argued for a dynamic systems approach (see also de Bot, Lowie, & Verspoor, 2007; Ellis, 2007; Larsen-Freeman, 1997) that takes into account the internal (e.g., motivation, emotions) as well as the external (e.g., social, environmental) aspects of language: “A truly dynamic systems approach will need to bridge this gap between the inner mental world of the individual and the surrounding social environment” (p. 50; see also Ushioda, 2009). In the following section, I will argue that a discursive approach to these matters may offer some links between the “psychological” and the “social.” However, a discursive approach (at least the EMCA-aligned approach discussed here) is not equipped to comment on inner mental states, but instead focuses on talk or inferences about them (i.e., the psychological and the emotional as ways of talking and representing oneself and the world).

2.3. Socio-Cultural Approaches

Although cognitive researchers have examined emotions largely as internal or psychological processes, language socialization researchers and linguistic anthropologists have treated the expression of emotions and affect as socially-learned and socially-valued
phenomena. In addition, while much SLA research has treated affect as simply another individual variable involved in L2 learning, or as a part of constructs such as motivation, more socially-grounded theories such as interlanguage pragmatics and language socialization treat affect as a key learning object by attending to the ways in which learners learn how to interpret and “do” emotionality in their interactions with others.

2.3.1. Language Socialization

In first and second language socialization research, affect is considered “a central dimension to any theory of becoming” (Kulick & Schieffelin, 2004, p. 352; also, Bamberg, 2001; Duranti, 2004; Garrett & Baquedano-Lopez, 2002; Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986). Indeed, language socialization is concerned with “socialization through the use of language and socialization to use language” (Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986, p. 163). As novice members develop increased sociolinguistic and pragmatic competence in a language and participation in a culture, they learn to recognize and employ culturally sanctioned affective stances (i.e., a speaker’s emotional or attitudinal orientations) through indexicals (Kasper & Rose, 2002; Ochs, 1996): linguistic resources (e.g., discourse particles, prosody, gestures, word order) that index local values and understandings, and social relationships (Baquedano-Lopez, 2002; Besnier, 1990; Brice-Heath, 1983; Clancy, 1986, 1999; Kanagy, 1999; Miller, 1986; Miller & Sperry, 1987; Ochs, 1986, 1988, 1996; Saarni & Crowley, 1990; Schieffelin, 1986a, 1986b, 1990; Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986; Valsiner & Connolly, 2003).

L2 researchers have also demonstrated the same sorts of L1 socialization processes occur for both child and adult L2 learners. Several studies have examined how actual linguistic resources, such as affective and epistemic stance markers and displays, are used by novices and experts. Cook (1992, 2006a, 2006b, 2008), for example, showed how L2 learners of Japanese are socialized into the second language and cultural norms through interactional particles, speech style, and dinnertime talk. Looking at sentence final particles in Japanese, Ohta (1994, 1999, 2001) demonstrated that L2 learners of Japanese are socialized into classroom interactional routines through the sentence final ne-particle (indexing shared empathy, affect, or perspective) as they learn to make use of it to display alignment with the teacher and their fellow learners.
However, the socialization into the use of affective resources is not always a given; learners may fail to acquire the norms of use of indexicals and may even actively resist making use of them. Yoshimi (1999), in a discourse-based study of the use of the final *ne*-particle by five L2 learners of Japanese, found that while learners were judged by native-speakers to use the particle appropriately to indicate shared information and cooperation, non-target-like uses were found to be influenced by L1 (English) pragmatic transfer of epistemic stance norms. The presence of negative affect surrounding language use has been demonstrated by researchers who highlight the non-linear, multilateral, and “unsuccessful” aspects of language socialization. Talmy (2008), in a study of high school students in Hawai‘i, found that ESL students used affective and epistemic stances to actively challenge and resist school-sanctioned positioning of them as stereotypical ESL students by asserting their own oppositional discourses (e.g., Local ESL vs. ESL student).

2.3.2. Linguistic and Cultural Anthropology

Linguistic and cultural anthropologists (e.g., Averill, 1980; Besnier, 1990; Lutz & Abu-Lughod, 1990) have been particularly sensitive to the socially- and culturally-embedded nature of emotions. In a detailed overview of the literature on the role of affect in language, Besnier pointed out the omnipresence of affect and discussed the various ways in which emotion labels and displays of affect are resources social members call on in particular contexts to define relationships and manage interaction. Besnier, stating that “[i]nvestigations of the role of affect in language cannot proceed without a fine-grained ethnographic inquiry into language use in context” (p. 437), argued that emotion categories and their management must also be objects of attention—even going so far as to suggest that “the ethnographic interview itself can provide rich ethnographic opportunities for such investigations” (p. 438).

Lutz’s (1988) often-cited anthropological work on the “emotion theories” of the Ifaluk community in Micronesia demonstrated how emotions are bound up within the moral order of the community (i.e., they both constitute and reflect cultural values and norms). Discussing the Ifaluk emotion term *song* (roughly translated as “justifiable” and even “morally obligatory” anger), Lutz showed that this emotion is directed downward in the social hierarchy (e.g., produced by parents to children). However, the justifiability of
song is predicated on specific social rules that allow and require individuals to experience it:

(1) there is a rule or value violation, (2) it is pointed out by someone, (3) who simultaneously calls for the condemnation of the act, and (4) the perpetrator reacts in fear to that anger, (5) amending his or her ways” (p. 157). As a socially important and socially sanctioned motion, song “plays both a moral and an ideological role in Ifaluk everyday life. (p. 181).

Although this anthropological work has served to challenge the prevailing Western biases in much emotion-related research, the social constructionist stance of many of these studies has not gone unchallenged. Hinton (1999), for example, found fault with the insistence of some social constructionists (e.g., Lutz & Abu-Lughod, 1990) who reject the biological component of emotions in favor of the social:

They erroneously portray biology and culture as mutually exclusive and force themselves into an extreme position that denies any substantive role to the body in generating the emotions….The constructionists’ anti-body bias is due both to their desire to critique biological reductionism and to their emphasis on language and discourse which, while important, ignores crucial non-verbal processes and behavior. (p. 10)

Hinton’s criticism may have merit when set up against some extreme (i.e., reductionist) social constructionist rejections of the physiological components of emotions, but it would be wrong to suggest that non-verbal (e.g., face, voice, posture, touch, gait) aspects of emotions have been ignored (e.g., Manusov & Patterson, 2006; Montepare, Goldstein, & Clausen, 1987; Oatley, Keltner, Jenkins, 2006; Weisfeld & Beresford, 1982). Goodwin and Goodwin (2001, 2007), whose work crosses anthropology, sociology, and applied linguistics, also considered emotions as social phenomena and gave special attention to their situated deployment. Using conversation analysis to examine the interactions of preadolescent girls at play and an aphasic patient with his family, Goodwin and Goodwin (2001) turned from the commonly-held view of emotions as part of an individual’s psychology to an investigation of emotions as resources used by social members to carry out their interactional goals (e.g., accusing, making assessment, displaying understanding). It is also important to note that the social
members Goodwin and Goodwin observed were able to do emotion work without the use of explicit emotion labels by making use of the context, gestures, repetition, pitch, and intonation. As a number of emotion scholars (e.g., Besnier, 1990; Edwards, 1997; 1999; Ochs & Schieffelin, 1989) across the human sciences have demonstrated, culturally recognizable affective states and stances are often displayed and recognized through available linguistic/discursive resources (e.g., lexicon, grammatical constructions, pronouns, code-switching, speech acts, topics), but paralinguistic cues and social context can be equally exploited for affective purposes.

2.4. EMCA Approaches

As I have maintained in the preceding discussion, emotions are a ubiquitous part of social life and communication. As humans, we engage in a variety of physiological and interactional displays that we attribute to emotions and emotional states: we laugh, cry, get angry, feel shame, experience joy, and so on. One way of establishing intersubjectivity and cultivating and maintaining relationships with other social members is through displaying, recognizing, acknowledging, contesting, and attributing meaning to particular emotional states and stances (Denzin, 1984; Edwards, 1997; Whalen & Zimmerman, 1998). There are a multitude of semiotic resources by which people can make emotions visible and relevant (e.g., gestures, facial expressions, intonation, prosody, lexicon, metaphors, topics). As it is largely through talk that emotional states are established, named, maintained, questioned, and negotiated, in this study the locus of attention is on emotion-indexing resources in discourse.

This is not to say that emotions are only discursively constructed. It would be an error to deny the physiological, psychological, neurological, cultural, and even possibly universal components of emotions (cf. Candland, 2003; Röttger-Rössler & Markowitsch, 2008; Schumann, 1997; Turner & Stets, 2005; Whalen & Zimmerman, 1998). In cross-cultural research on the private and public display of emotion (e.g., Ekman, 1972, 2003; Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Friesen, 1972), researchers found that the private (i.e., individual) display of facial expressions seems to be universally hard-wired. Evidence suggests that members of all cultures exhibit and are able to recognize the same emotions based on facial expressions (even though researchers found the human face can make
more than 10,000 expressions; Ekman, 2003). The difference, Ekman noted, lies in the cultural management of emotions, governed by culturally-specific “display rules” (p. 4) that dictate what, how, when, and to what degree emotions may be displayed or masked.

In addition to establishing what particular emotions are being made relevant, discourse also facilitates the negotiation of the meanings and consequences of those emotions for the parties involved. In their daily encounters, social members do not have direct access to one-another’s emotional states. It is through talk-in-interaction that we engage with emotions as social phenomena—even as we label and interpret the emotional states of others and ourselves in our social worlds. Thus, even though we do not have direct access to the minds of others, we act as if we do. To illustrate this practice of “emotional reading” in interaction, I consider the following case from a television news interview between Don Lemon (CNN news anchor and program host) and Father Pfleger (Catholic priest and activist against gangs and guns). Lemon is interviewing Pfleger about the recent deaths of two teens in a gang-related shooting outside Pfleger’s church:

Extract 2.1. “Shot Outside Church” (Lemon, 2009)

D.L. Father Pfleger (. ) was, extremely, extremely upset in that video an’ you can see him there now live, he joins us now from Chicago, (.4) .hh a:h (. ) you doin’ okay sir? (0.5)
F.P. .hh much better today Don, u:m (. ) than was last night. it was very painful last night, u::m (. ) when I- (0.2) heard the gunshots, I ran to the uh (. ) gym. (0.9) .hh right inside the doorway I saw (. ) two young boys, uh: (. ) shot. (0.4) um: one laying there, (. ) um (0.2) blood gushing from him an’- (0.3) .hhh (0.2) a:nd, (. ) and screaming for help. (0.3) and uh, to see that in the (0.3) .hhh (0.2) in the entranceway of a building that you’ve, (0.2) built as a place o’ safety and a sanctuary for safety for kids all, (0.2) .hh (. ) year round u::m (0.2) was-was hurtful=an’ I was angry, an’-an’ I was d-.hhh (. ) very uh (0.3) very sad by it to see this (. ) this reality brought to my door (0.3)
D.L. yeah. an’ I can see that you are still hurting, uh:=
F.P. =yeah
(0.3)
D.L. ba- (.) about it right now Father. (.) ‘cuz I
I know you and, (.) you look upset.
F.P. right.

Observable in this extract are Pfleger’s emotion avowals and descriptions (“It was very painful”; “I was angry”; “I was very sad”) and Lemon’s characterization of Pfleger’s emotional states in the past and present (“Father Pfleger was extremely, extremely upset”; “I can see you are still hurting”; “you look upset”). In this interaction both men are engaged in labeling, ascribing, and attending to emotional states. They are also both doing rhetorical work that goes beyond simply labeling emotional states; those emotional states are described in relation to particular people and events. For example, they are treating emotionality as something that can be read off of events (e.g., “to see that…was hurtful”) as well as people (“I can see that you are still hurting”; “you look upset”).

Located within the institution of the news interview, where the interviewer’s primary objective is to elicit newsworthy commentary (McHoul & Rapley, 2001), it is Pfleger’s emotional reaction to events, not Lemon’s, that is treated as newsworthy. Pfleger also provides a mini-narrative account that describes how he came across the shooting victims and rationalizes his sadness and anger as normal, expected, and a direct result of events (e.g., “an’ I was angry, an’-an’ I was d- .hhh (.) very uh (0.3) very sad by it to see this (. ) this reality brought to my door”).

Lemon’s description of Pfleger’s emotional state not only references the kinds of emotions relevant to these events but also the strength and duration of those emotions (e.g., “Father Pfleger was extremely, extremely upset”; “I can see you are still hurting”). The membership category selection of “young boys” and “kids” (rather than teens, youths, young men, gang members, people, victims) works to highlight the innocence and helplessness of the victims, further contributing to a description of the heinousness of the crime and a corresponding and normative emotional reaction to their deaths. By describing events in emotional and emotion-implicative terms, Lemon and Pfleger are reflexively characterizing and constituting the tragic and morally accountable nature of
this shooting (and its newsworthiness), thus locating it in a larger interpretive frame of urban gang activity, murder, violence against children, and social problems. As this example illustrates, although on a public scale and undoubtedly shaped by the journalistic activity of soliciting emotional displays as evidence of first-hand authentic experiences, invoking and accounting for emotions is an ongoing activity in our social interactions, intimate and public.

In the following sections I continue the discussion of a discursive approach to emotion talk. A large part of the discussion will center on discursive psychology, as its epistemological mindset informs this study. Because discursive psychology draws heavily on ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, I will briefly discuss them first. All three research traditions take an active interest in the investigation of “talk as a central activity in social life” (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008, p. 1), and maintain important theoretical and analytical interlinkages, but each also offers its unique contributions and challenges to that ongoing investigation.

2.4.1. Ethnomethodology

Ethnomethodology (EM) is essentially the sociological investigation of how order is created by social members in their descriptions and actions of daily life. Coined by Harold Garfinkel (1967) and expanded upon by a generation of researchers (e.g., Clayman & Maynard, 1995; Heritage, 1984a; Lynch, 1982, 2008; Maynard & Clayman, 1991), ethno-methodology refers to social members’ methods and practices for creating this order:

It represents an effort to study the methods in and through which membersconcertedly produce and assemble the features of everyday life in any actual, concrete, and not hypothetical or theoretically depicted setting. (Maynard & Kardash, 2007, p. 1483)

The body of common-sense knowledge and the range of procedures and considerations by means of which the ordinary members of society make sense of, find their way about in, and act on the circumstances in which they find themselves. (Heritage, 1984, p. 4)

Standing in radical contrast to other sociological theories (e.g., functionalism, Marxism, poststructuralism) that locate individuals within an external social order, EM
begins with the assumption that social order is an illusion and asserts that social life is chaotic. Thus, the order is not an inherent attribute existing independently of society but arises out of the coordinated interactions of social members engaged in their ordinary activities.

According to Edwards (1997), EM is concerned with “practical reasoning” and the categories and resources that social actors draw upon in their daily activities. EM eschews making claims regarding accuracy or truth; instead, it examines “participants’ public sense-making practices” (p. 63). Whereas EM and its focus on indexicality (i.e., context-boundness of meaning), reflexivity (i.e., ongoing cyclical process in which the same procedures for doing an activity are the same ones for recognizing it), and the consequentiality (i.e., “what happened” or the meaning for the interactants) of talk opens up these practices and talk of practices as objects of inquiry, most other sociological and psychological investigations proceed from basic assumptions regarding the nature of the world and how it is ordered. Such pre-determined and top-down views of social structure go against EM’s program of accountability and stance that the world can be better understood in terms of descriptions and other social actions, rather than as oriented to an external reality. One could make the argument that EM is taking an ontological stance by its insistence that there is no underlying social order; however, I suggest that whether social order is intrinsically orderly or otherwise, EM’s refusal to pre-define that order allows for a less confined view of what that shape that order may or may not take.

Describing the ethnomethodological view, Bilmes (1986) has pointed out that social members use rules to both recognize and display social order. He further argued that conversation analysis differs from ethnomethodology because CA does not just look at the rules in the interpretation of behavior, it examines how these rules and procedures are present in the phenomena itself. Bilmes also made a point of emphasizing that members orient to the rules and recognize whether particular behavior conforms to those rules or not (p. 166). However, ethnomethodologists, in Bilmes’ view, are not interested in these social rules but in the accounting practices people use to report on social life (p. 183). He further suggested that rules can serve as sociological resources because they are external to the activity—that is, they are social conventions that exist independently of
individuals. Bilmes also asserted that for a rule to be constraining, it must meet two conditions:

1. it must have a definite sense of what is permissible and impermissible in a particular context, and

2. permissible actions must be objectively distinguishable from impermissible actions. (p. 184)

These two rule conditions tie well into discursive psychology’s interest in the rhetorical nature of talk and bear important implications for analytical consideration of the morality (i.e., norm-boundedness) of talk and interaction.

Perhaps one of the most radical aspects of EM is its constructionist treatment of topics such as (but not limited to) sex and gender (Speer, 2005; Zimmerman, 1992). Rather than treating gender as an individual attribute or as a macro-level deterministic construct, EM shifts the focus of analysis, so that “gender itself becomes the topic of research” (Speer, 2002, p. 77, emphasis in original). Garfinkel (1967), in his EM study of Agnes, an intersexed person, examined how she convincingly presented herself as female in her daily interactions with others—although it was later revealed that Agnes was in fact biologically male and had been secretly taking female hormones. Nonetheless, the value of Garfinkel’s study lies not in its ability to determine whether someone is “really” male or female, but to make visible how male-ness and female-ness work as topics and objects of concern for social members, not just the analyst. This same analytical stance can be applied to any other topic (e.g., emotions, interviews, mental health, motivation) to allow us to investigate their associated social meanings and practices.

Some ethnomethodologists (e.g., Lynch, 2006; Lynch & Bogen, 2005) observe that the cognitive sciences are showing an interest in the situated and everyday aspects of cognition and suggest that EM and CA should “join the larger movement” (Lynch, 2006, p. 96). Lynch has argued that rather than trying to replace or reform cognitive science, EM and CA offer an alternative treatment of psychological topics (e.g., memory, learning, perception; see also Chapter 4)—one that does not require speculation on cognition as “internal” or “individual” but as activities embedded in social relationships:
ethnomethodology empirically investigates practices, and that such practices differ qualitatively from any real or imagined cognitive domain. They are describable and analyzable, but not in a way that traces back to an internal, individual center of mental agency; instead, they are collaboratively organized, and bound up with distinctive instruments and objects. To investigate practices as practices does not require skepticism about mind or denial of neurological discoveries; instead, it requires attention to relationships among persons and things that have an unclear relationship to the properties and functions of brains and minds. (Lynch, p. 102)

This investigation does not compete with cognitive science. Instead, it takes up a topic that has been appropriated by that science and gives it a radically different treatment. Our programmatic attitude toward cognitive science is one of indifference, not competition. (Lynch & Bogen, p. 227)

The EM perspective does, however, present a potential quandary for the researcher: namely, if we are investigating a topic (e.g., cognition, emotion, gender) are we not assuming that it independently exists and are thereby starting from some explicit or implicit assumptions about that topic? Lynch (2006), making a commonly-used argument, notes that “cognition,” like other names of psychological processes, is just a word. Therefore, the meaning of cognition, emotion, and so on, for all practical purposes, lies in the meanings attached to these descriptions by social members engaged in the activities (e.g., telling, describing, interacting, doing self-presentation, managing relationships) of everyday social life.

It should be emphasized that EM is a diverse discipline. Its interest in cognition (and related topics) has resulted in a divide between EM scholars “drawing from Schutz, Chomsky, and ordinary language philosophers who lean toward a concern with internal mental structures that underlie and make discourse possible” (Maynard & Clayman, 1991, p. 396) and those who draw on Ryle and Wittgenstein, for example, to take up the “mental” and its associated vocabulary as ways and practices of displaying, ascribing, and describing “various subjective qualities to one another in everyday life” (p. 396). Cicourel (1974), as an example of the former, pushes EM even further in his program of “cognitive sociology.” In comparison, Coulter (1989), in his “sociology of cognition” (p. 16), has given attention to the ways in which so-called internal states function in interaction as ascriptions and argumentative devices.
Collins (1990) has argued that although EM appears to be a cognitive project, emotion lies at its core. He has pointed out that in Garfinkel’s well-known “breaching” experiments, participants faced with disruptions of the normal social order always reacted with strong emotional reactions (e.g., outbursts, anger, bewilderment). Collins further argued that as Garfinkel has shown that social order cannot be based on rational and conscious agreement, it must be emotion that ties all this order together. Ellis (1991), like Collins, has also argued that emotions are central to human experience and sensemaking. Ellis has criticized sociologists and social constructionists for neglecting to consider what emotions feel like and how they are experienced by the individual. According to Ellis, the interactional focus on emotions as primarily social phenomena has failed to access the private and introspective side of emotional life. As a remedy, Ellis has proposed an introspective narrative approach that encourages researchers to study their own emotions as well as those of their research participants.

A solution afforded by an EM approach is its policy of “bracketing”—suspending our usual taken-for-granted assumptions. Perhaps a way to deal with the various dilemmas surrounding research on emotions is to take the notion of emotions (and cognition, memory, etc.) as a starting place, without giving any particular commitment to what they “actually” mean, and then see how social members themselves speak about and make use of them as topics and other objects of concern in their interactions. I do not mean that an agnostic stance is synonymous with being disinterested. I suggest that in the same way that ordinary social members are not “cultural dopes” (Garfinkel, 1967) who blindly conform to social rules, neither is the researcher. As analysts, we can also bring our knowledge as social members to bear on topics of interest as well as our analyses—albeit as a cautiously informative and bracketed resource. In other words, once we have identified emotional moments in our data (e.g., by means of our taken-for-granted or intuitive cultural knowledge), we can then closely attend to the ways (i.e., the semiotic resources) by which emotions are produced, recognized, and made procedurally consequential.

This brief overview of EM has painted a broad picture—and has sidestepped much of the discipline-internal debate (e.g., Clayman & Maynard, 1995). Nevertheless, some key features of EM include: (a) an interest in explicating how members’ methods
(i.e., their practical reasoning; accounting practices) construct order, and (b) attention to natural and actual talk and interaction (rather than hypothetical). These features of EM are important to consider as they have had a significant impact on the development of the EM-inspired research program of conversation analysis (CA).

### 2.4.2. Conversation Analysis

Building on Garfinkel’s ethnomethodological work, CA is a research program initially developed by Harvey Sacks and his colleagues Emmanuel Scheglof and Gail Jefferson in the 1960s and 1970s. Essentially, CA is the application of EM principles to the analysis of naturally-occurring talk, with the goal to discover the underlying principles and procedures (i.e. the “machinery”) creating social order and organizing social interactions (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008; Psathas, 1995; Seedhouse, 2004):

Conversation analysis is characterized by the view that how talk is produced, and how the meanings of talk are determined, are the practical, social and interactional accomplishments of members of a culture. (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008, p. 1)

Conversation analysis—like the other research streams of ethnomethodology—is concerned with the analysis of the competences that underlie ordinary social activities. (Heritage, 1984, p. 241, emphasis in original)

After Sacks’ untimely death in a car crash in 1975, his work has been continued and expanded upon by Scheglof and Jefferson, as well as a number of other prominent CA researchers (e.g., Lerner, 2004; Pomerantz, 1978, 1986; Psathas, 1995), including a rapidly growing body of researchers in L2 studies (e.g., Gardner & Wagner, 2004; Hellerman, 2008, 2009; Hauser, 2005; Hosoda, 2006; Kasper, 2004; Markee, 2000; Mori, 2004; Nguyen & Kasper, 2009).

Despite the vast amount of CA research over the past decades, there remain points of continued debate. One question concerns whether CA is a theory, approach, method, or something else. According to Psathas (1995), CA is both an approach and a method. Citing a number of CA scholars, Schaeffer and Maynard (2005) stated that CA “provides a theory about how interactional sequencing makes utterances and associated interactional objects understandable” (p. 119; emphasis added). Heritage (2005) claimed “CA research represents an extended body of theory and empirical analysis that examines
the organization of particular social actions and their empirical and theoretical interrelations” (p. 104, emphasis added). Earlier, Heritage called CA a theory as he laid out its program:

…in fact, CA embodies a theory which argues that sequences of actions are a major part of what we mean by context, that the meaning of an action is heavily shaped by the sequence of previous actions from which it emerges, and that social context itself is a dynamically created thing that is expressed in and through the sequential organization of interaction. (1997, p. 162, emphasis added)

CA can perhaps best be seen as an analytical (not a predictive) theory with a methodology that employs the recording (audio and video) of interaction, the detailed transcription of that talk, and a rigorous empirical analysis that locates all claims in the sequential unfolding of the talk, members’ orientations, and the interactional context itself, rather than a priori assumptions or pre-established theoretical constructs. CA’s theory of interaction can be summed by three fundamental assumptions (Heritage, 1997; Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008; Schegloff, 2007; Seedhouse 2004):

1. Talk is context-shaped (i.e., interactants are sensitive to what preceded)
2. Talk is context-renewing (i.e., in their current action, interactants project a range of possible “next actions”)
3. Talk makes visible mutual understandings (i.e., by producing the “next actions,” interactants display how they “understood” the ongoing interaction)

Based on these three components of interactional organization, CA takes an active interest in a number of interactional resources and structures (e.g., adjacency pairs, turn-taking, repair preference organization, pre-sequences).

Another point of debate among some scholars has been the scope of CA research. Since its beginnings in the work of Harvey Sacks, CA has become a broad program. There is the so-called “pure” (also, “traditional,” “Schegloffian,” “sequential,” “technical,” or “canonical”) CA of “mundane” or ordinary talk that treats conversation itself as an institution (Drew & Heritage, 1992; Heritage, 1998; 2004). The aim of this program is to describe in formal terms the basic “architecture of intersubjectivity”
(Heritage, 1984, p. 254) and the “procedural infrastructure of interaction” (Schegloff, 1992, p. 1338). There is also “applied” CA of talk in institutional settings (e.g., Atkinson & Drew, 1979; Maynard, 2003; Maynard & Heritage, 2005; Pomerantz, Gill, & Denvir, 2007; Seedhouse, 2004) that examines how social institutions (e.g., classrooms, offices, courtrooms, companies) are constructed and maintained as institutions by social members who are orienting to institutional goals and institutional identities. In this dissertation, I consider the qualitative research interview as exhibiting both aspects of institutionality.

A criticism often leveled against CA research is that it ignores the macro-context (e.g., power, social structures) and tends to overfocus on how interaction is achieved at the expense of what it is that interactants talk about or bring into being. Blommaert (2001a) has suggested that more careful attention to the some of the “hidden contexts” (e.g., the particular resources available and unavailable to speakers) may help CA researchers bring to bear a more rigorous contextual analysis to their analyses. Although Schegloff (1997) is willing to concede that the local interaction is not all there is, he insists that before extending one’s gaze to the so-called macro orders of gender, power, and so on, we must first conduct a rigorous contextual analysis to see if those claims are warranted by the interactants and the context of their interaction—or if it is actually driven the researcher’s own agenda (see also Speer, 2005). Thus, a fundamental difference between Schegloff’s CA program and that of its critics is the status of so-called exogenous context. This point will also be taken up in more detail in the following section on Discursive Psychology.

CA and emotions

For the most part, CA scholars have not taken an active interest in psychological topics, preferring instead to focus on ordinary and institutional talk. However, a few studies have explored topics related to emotions and cognition. Drew (1998), for example, in his work on complaints, showed that by reporting their personal emotional responses to events, speakers are able to characterize the extreme nature of the misconduct of others:
Extract 2.2. From Drew (1998, p. 311)

Emma: *...Isn’he re:diculous?*  
(1.0)
Lottie: *He’s cra:zy.*  
(0.4)
Emma: *Oh: Go:ed dammit....*

In this example from a conversation between two friends, Emma is complaining about the behavior of a third person (“...Isn’he re:diculous?”). Emma’s raised intonation invites Lottie to take up Emma’s perspective with an agreement. In an aligning response, Lottie also makes an assessment of that person (“He’s cra:zy”). The emotionality of their turns is created through their lexical choices, vocal delivery, intonation, and word stress. Based on his analysis, Drew asserted that these demonstrations of indignation were often collaboratively constructed displays of affiliation and empathy—indicating that emotion displays were as much social as they were (ostensibly) individual.

One area where CA has dealt directly with psychological topics has been in institutional settings such as emergency call lines (Heritage & Clayman; Whalen & Zimmerman, 1998), medical settings (Maynard, 2003; Maynard & Heritage, 2005), and psychotherapeutic/counseling sessions (Antaki, 2007; Antaki, Leudar, & Barnes, 2005; Peräkylä, Antaki, & Vehviläinen, 2008). In institutional settings, emotionality may be treated as both normative and problematic. How that emotionality is managed can have a significant impact on how those institutional interactions are carried out and treated as successes or failures.

Heritage and Clayman (2010), examining emotionally-intense emergency calls, showed that emotion displays by agitated, angry, and anxious callers could impede the critical transfer of information to the call-taker trying to dispatch the needed emergency services. To defuse the callers’ emotions and reorient them to the task of providing the necessary information, Heritage and Clayman found that call-takers avoided displays of empathy (as would normally be found in ordinary conversation) and would purposefully modify their vocal delivery to be non-emotional. The following illustrative case comes from a fire department emergency call by a man who fell off the stairs:
Extract 2.3. From Heritage and Clayman (2010, p. 92)

01 FD: Yeah what ha- what happened to you.
02 Clr: Uh I fell down:=I want them to fuckn’ check my head
03 er my-.h my finger cuz I’m- I’m kina cut an’ shit.
04 (0.9)
05 FD: kay.
06 (.)
07 FD: You fell off what.
08 Clr: (( )
09 Clr: What?
10 FD: Wha’dju fall off of.
11 (0.4)
12 Clr: Fuck’n stairs:’n shit like [that. ( )
13 FD: (( )
14 (0.5)
15 Clr: Eh: too much information ‘n shit.=man?
16 FD: Well we need to get the information so we know what
17 uh: what ambulance to send.

Although the caller (Clr) here is hearably angry and upset, the fire department call-taker (FD) does not show empathy or respond in the same tone. Instead, the FD provides an acknowledgement (line 5) and probes to elicit the facts of the incident. Heritage and Clayman noted that in line 15, the caller registers a complaint, hearable as an oppositional move and challenge—signs of aggravation and anger. However, instead of responding with empathy or taking the same emotional (i.e., “angry”) tone, the call-taker defuses the tension by delivering an explanation and speaking in a low, steady, and calm voice.

In related work on emergency calls, Whalen and Zimmerman (1998) found that in filling out the required emergency call record form, call-takers would sometimes characterize the caller as “hysterical.” In a closer examination of this practice Whalen and Zimmerman showed that labeling a caller as hysterical was sometimes used by the call-takers when portions of the form were left blank. When failing to complete the form in its entirety, the call-takers used this label to deflect responsibility upon the hysterical callers—that is, the call-takers accounted for the blanks in the reports by indicating that hysterical callers did not provide them with the necessary information (rather than the call-taker failing to ask the required questions).
Leudar et al. (2008), in a study on psychotherapy sessions, examined the observational reports written up by trainee therapists. The following example is a written report by a trainee making observations of another therapist (TH1) and a group of children in interaction:

Extract 2.4. From Leudar et al. (2008, p. 169)

01 Abu had trouble getting his dough
02 Out of the tub and began to panic,
03 Taking a lot of talking down by Th1,
04 The panic rising out of him and spreading
05 To those who weren’t having any trouble
06 Themselves, putting people on edge

Based on this and other examples, the researchers observed that the therapists recorded and interpreted interactions in terms of their emotionality. In the example above, emotion-indexing words such as “panic,” “talking down,” “panic rising…and spreading” characterize the emotionality of the interaction as well as its movement between people. The researchers found that the therapists did not examine and write down just any activities of the clients but primarily those “activities done with emotions that stir up emotions in others” (p. 170). In terms of real world consequences, this means the interaction and how it is interpreted by the therapist influences what is recorded and, in turn, how future therapeutic intervention may be designed.

2.4.3. Discursive Psychology

While some EM and CA researchers have slowly begun to engage with psychological topics, Discursive psychologists (DP) have done so from the start. DP is an approach that allows the researcher to examine people’s presentations of self as talk-in-interaction—as something they do, rather than as something they are. A relatively recent addition to discourse analytic approaches, DP emerged in the UK in the 1980s and 1990s out of social psychology (e.g., Antaki, 1988; Billig 1987, 1991; Burman & Parker, 1993; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Harré and Gillett, 1994; Wetherell & Potter, 1989, 1992) and was also influenced by social constructionism (e.g., Gergen, 1985; Shotter, 1993), “the sociology of scientific knowledge, post-structuralism, linguistic philosophy, ethnomethodology and conversation analysis” (Potter & Hepburn,
2007, p. 162), narrative analysis, Bakhtinian literary theory, and Wittgenstein’s later philosophy (Edwards, 1997; Wetherell, 2007; Wittgenstein, 1967). Perhaps because DP research is dominated by researchers in the UK, mainly working in psychology, it has not had as strong an influence outside of the European context; however, the influence of DP researchers on discourse analysis in general is without question (e.g., Antaki et al., 2003; Wetherell, Taylor, & Yates, 2001a, b).

Like CA and EM, DP does not seek to separate language from behavior. It takes an action orientation to discourse, to examine the accomplishments achieved in and through talk and interaction. All three approaches (EM, CA, and DP) can be said to share four main points of agreement:

1. A focus on talk-in-interaction/talk as action
2. A view of talk as locally and situationally organized
3. A primary interest in the points of view of social members (rather than the analyst’s)

While there is much overlap among these three approaches, reflecting DP’s analytical and theoretical origins, defining features of DP include its direct engagement with psychological and cognitive issues such as emotions, motivation, intention, attribution, attitudes, memory, and social representations (Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 2003). As Potter and Hepburn (2007) explained, “DP is a perspective that starts with the psychological phenomena as things that are constructed, attended to, and understood in interaction” (p. 160) and it “looks for psychology in a completely different place” (p. 161). This takes “psychology” away from psychologists and cognitive scientists and returns it to social members, radically relocating the focus of attention from the internal to external and from the individual to a relational self.

**Discourse as co-constructed**

It is important to emphasize that analysis in DP treats as consequential the co-constructedness of discourse and how it is recipient designed (Sacks, Schegloff, &
Jefferson, 1974) by recognizing that it is all interactants and roles (e.g., researcher, interviewer, interviewee, participant, speaker, audience) that potentially influence the sequencing, interpretation, actions, and versions of situated discursive “realities” (although DP, like EM and CA, makes no evaluative claims regarding intentionality, truth, reality, or authenticity). Most DP researchers also employ CA-derived transcription methods (Jefferson, 1985, 2004a; Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974) that take into account the often seemingly “insignificant” or nonverbal (e.g., pauses, hesitations) aspects of interaction. In this way, DP expands its focus from the individual to the context as it unfolds. Discourse is thus both constructive and constructed. It is constructed through the use of lexical choices, grammars, phrases, sequencing, rhetorical constructions, as well as produced and oriented to by non-vocal factors such as temporal cues, sequencing, gaze, and gesture. Together, linguistic utterances and other semiotic resources allow social members to organize their talk to construct, perform, and stabilize particular situated realities, accounts, or versions of the world within the context of local interaction.

**DP’s program**

There are different strands of DP (or approaches called DP), but there are basic programmatic interests that most of these researchers share (Edwards, 2005; Hepburn & Wiggins, 2007; Potter & Hepburn, 2007; Weatherall, Watson, & Gallois, 2007):

1. *Respecification and critique* of topics from psychology and the cognitive sciences from a discursive perspective. “Memory,” for example, in DP is examined as an object or topic of talk (i.e., not as cognitive processes, but as an action or accomplishment achieved between communicative participants).

2. Exploration of the *psychological thesaurus* or categories, metaphors and other words and labels used by social members to talk about mental and emotional states such as anger, fear, remembering, knowing, etc. as they carry out their business in every interactions.

3. *Management of psychological business*. How do people display these psychological states and what do they accomplish through their use? How, for example, might claims of knowing or forgetting shape interaction between people?
4. *Discursive psychology of institutions* (therapy sessions, classrooms, police interrogations, courtrooms) is an emerging theme in DP research (Edwards & Potter, 2001; Hepburn & Wiggins, 2007; Potter, 2005).

DP’s explicit engagement with psychological topics makes it a useful approach for psychologists as well as non-psychologists interested in studying language and emotions. Its recognition that discourse is a primary site for emotions and their management sets it apart from cognitive approaches. Perhaps one of the most straightforward ways of indexing emotions in discourse is by lexicalizing them through explicit labels and categories (e.g., Averill, 1975; Wierzbicka, 1999). In Extract 2.1, I showed how speakers may use various terms to index emotions and emotion states (e.g., “upset,” “painful,” “hurtful,” “angry,” “sad,” “hurting”). Emotions may also be descriptively built through metaphors (e.g., *heated argument, brimming with rage, hot and bothered*; Kövecses, 1986; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). However, DP approaches them in an inverted fashion. Instead of looking for evidence of inner psychological states in discourse, DP begins with discourse as practices (Edwards & Stokoe, 2004). Edwards gives an example from a marriage counseling session:

Extract 2.5. From Edwards (1997, p. 159)

\[ J: \text{ Uh: I was (.) \textcolor{red}{boiling} at this stage and I was real angry with Connie ( )}. \]

In this example, Jimmy is telling the counselor a narrative of a particular problematic episode with his wife, Connie. As Jimmy talks about how his wife’s actions pushed him to jealous anger, his metaphorical description of his emotional state (“I was (.) \textcolor{red}{boiling} at this stage) formulates it as extreme, built up over time, and directed toward an \textit{intentional object} (Averill, 1980; Edwards, 1999): “I was real angry \textit{at Connie}.”

In a similar example from a telephone conversation between two friends, Lesley and Joyce, Lesley uses an emotion metaphor to describe her present emotional reaction to a troublesome interaction that occurred earlier at a vicarage sale:
In this example, Lesley’s use of the emotion metaphor “broiling” allows her to do an announcement of her complaint and receive “go ahead” responses from Joyce to tell the story. It is these kinds of emotion prefaces that will be explored in Chapter 4.

Edwards (1999) links emotion metaphors to the “metaphorical thesaurus” (itself a metaphor) made available to speakers of a language. While Lakoff and other cognitively-oriented researchers were primarily interested in the ways in which emotions were conceptually categorized in the mind (e.g., anger as \textit{heat}), Edwards (1999) pushed for greater attention to their rhetorical deployment in talk:

The choice between such alternatives is useful for constructing alternative narratives of causal attribution and accountability. Indeed, the point of all those alternative metaphorical expressions is, surely, to enable certain things to be \textit{said} and not just \textit{thought} (Edwards, 1991), such that the proliferation of metaphors may be motivated not only by their conceptual sense (as suggested by Lakoff, 1987, and Gibbs, 1994), but by what they allow us to say and do. (p. 280)

Emotion formulations have been referred to in the literature as “emotion talk” or “emotion discourse” (Edwards, 1997), as well as “emotionology” (Stearns & Stearns, 1985, 1988), “emotionality” (Moir, 2005), and “emotional language” (Forsberg & Vagli, 2006). For the purpose of discussion, I follow Edwards (1997) by using \textit{emotion talk} and \textit{emotion discourse} as broad-level descriptors that include emotion terms, categories, metaphors, emotion-implicative descriptions, and other emotion-indexing linguistic devices.
DP diversity

Despite a general agreement regarding a discursive approach to psychological topics, there is considerable diversity within DP (illustrated in Figure 1), just as there is diversity within CA and EM approaches (see Clayman & Maynard, 1994; Kitzinger, 2000; Maynard & Clayman 1991; Silverman, 1998). In their overview of the various types of discourse analytic work, Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) distinguish among three distinct strands of DP: (a) poststructuralist, (b) interactionist, and (c) synthetic (or integrative). While an oversimplification of the diverse and overlapping nature of work falling under the label “Discursive Psychology,” these three categories nevertheless provide a way of discussing the origins, focal interests, and theoretical and methodological frameworks of this particular area of discursive analysis.

![Figure 1. Analytical focus of DP, CDA, and poststructuralist approaches to discourse (adapted and expanded from Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 20).](image)

social contexts and macro structures of society and is interested in “enabling forms of
critique and resistance” (Hook, 2001, p. 522). This radical strand of DP takes a more
abstract view of discourse and is interested in how people’s understandings of the world
and their identities are created and changed in specific discourses. It is also interested in
the social consequences of these discursive constructions. Ian Parker’s (Parker, 1992,
2002) somewhat eclectic approach draws on discursive analysis, Marxist psychology, and
psychoanalysis to criticize both and psychology and discursive analysis. Yet, this
eclecticism has opened him up to criticism by mainstream psychologists, discourse
analysts, and discursive psychologists who point out that he does not appear to be doing
psychology or discourse analysis—particularly since his critique is a theoretical one and
not based on concrete examples of real talk (Wooffitt, 2005).

While agreeing with DP researchers such as Potter and Wetherell (1987) and
Parker (1992) that the job of discursive analysis is not to assess the truth value of talk,
Hook (2001) has criticized them for not paying enough attention to “the underlying forms
of knowledge in which truth-claims are rooted” (p. 525). What is necessary, he claimed,
is a closer engagement with Foucault’s conception of discourse (Foucault, 1977) that
takes into account history, power, and the conditions that construct what is considered
knowledge (i.e. discourse as knowledge). Summing up his criticisms of Parker (1992)
and Potter and Wetherell (1987), Hook cited their failure to “drive analysis of the
discursive through the extra-discursive” (p. 543, emphasis in original). Like Parker,
Hook’s arguments are theoretical and social critiques, not based on the analysis of actual
samples of talk.

The interactionist perspective is perhaps the best-known of the three DP strands
and is most often associated with Potter and Edwards (Edwards, 1997; Potter & Edwards,
1992), who are often credited as the founders of DP, but the conversation analytic work
of Antaki, Heritage, and Woofitt would also be quite compatible here. This more
“mainstream” DP analytic approach builds on work in CA and EM and like those two
approaches is interested in interaction, microprocesses, and the situatedness of talk and
interaction. Like EM, it examines how social organization is produced through speech
and interaction. In keeping with CA, interactionally-oriented DP researchers aim to
bracket out their own perspectives in favor of an analysis that is empirically based upon the data at hand. This DP strand treats discourse as having three key characteristics:

1. Discourse as *action*

2. Discourse as *situated* (in the local context of interaction and rhetorically)

3. Discourse as both *constructed* (talk as made up of a combination of words, categories, and semiotic resources) and *constructive* (discourse creates and maintains particular versions of the world and the events within it) (Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Hepburn, 2007)

In early DP work (e.g., Potter & Wetherell, 1987), open-ended interviews were used to elicit data, but more recent work in the interactionist strand has mostly abandoned interviews in favor of naturally-occurring material (for a critique of the problematic use of qualitative interviews see Hepburn & Wiggins, 2007; Potter & Hepburn, 2005). When reading the work of Edwards and Potter, one must keep in mind that when they refer to discourse analysis (for discursive work in general; e.g., Antaki, Billig, Edwards, & Potter, 2003), they are referring to their own interactionist approach to discourse, not necessarily CDA or other discursive approaches.

A third strand of DP takes a more synthetic perspective that unites the poststructural and interactionist positions. Of interest to researchers working in this area are both the locally constructed interactions as well as macro-social influences. Potter and Wetherell’s influential work (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) was responsible for laying out this new approach to psychology as discourse. Potter and Wetherell, influenced by Gilbert and Mulkay (1984), foregrounded the notion of *interpretive repertoires* but gave equal stress to talk and discursive resources. Potter and Wetherell (1987, p. 138) describe interpretive repertoires (Edley, 2001; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) as “a lexicon or register of terms and metaphors drawn upon to characterize and evaluate actions and events.” Wetherell and Potter (1992) employed the concept of interpretive repertoires to study the way Pakeha (white) New Zealanders constructed various versions of conflict between ethnic groups (namely, Pakeha and Maori). While interpretive repertoires and discourses both refer to distinctive ways of talking about the world, discourse (or “Discourse” with a capital “D”
in Gee’s framework; Gee, 1999) is more closely aligned with Foucauldian perspectives on power and social members as subject to ideological structures.

Wooffitt (2005) and Potter and Hepburn (2007) also point out the influence of work by Rom Harré (1979; Harré & Stearns, 1995) and Michael Billig (1987) on DP. Harré’s social constructionist stance and his critique of the cognitive orientation of psychology and Billig’s rhetorical psychological approach (discourse as a form of argumentation) and focus on ideology were important theoretical and analytical contributions. EM and CA examine the rules that people follow and the techniques they apply to accomplish the business of talk; rhetoric gives insight into how people’s constructions of the world are designed to counter potential or actual challenges and to undermine alternative versions. However, Harré’s interest in grammars of expression, formal and logical structures, pre-conditions on the use of psychological language, separates him from other researchers. Also, Harré's work is more of a theoretical endeavor than analysis of empirical data.

With its focus on the rhetorical (action) organization of discourse and the construction and function of emotion talk, psychological states, categorization labels, remembering, and accountability in talk, DP (the interactionist and synthetic strands, in particular) allows a rich perspective into both the productive and receptive potential of talk-in-interaction (Drew & Heritage, 1992; Psathas, 1995). f

**DP as an approach to psychological topics**

Because of its direct engagement with topics such as identity, emotions, memory, attribution, and perception (Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Edwards & Potter, 2005), DP also enables the study of affect, intentions, and agency—topics of interest to a growing number of L2 scholars (e.g., Pavlenko & Lantolf, 2000). Yet, DP engages with these topics in a rather radical way. Instead of examining talk as a conduit to a person’s private emotions, thoughts, intentions, and experiences, DP avoids such mentalist assumptions. Taking the view that people do emotionality through the arrangements of talk and text, DP is centrally interested in analyzing how speakers (and writers) explain and give shape to their thoughts, intentions, and experiences in a publicly accountable
As Edwards (2006) asserted, “It is the primary work of language to make all those “other” phenomena accountable. That includes not only what participants say, including what people (purportedly) think or feel but do not say” (p. 42). In the context of qualitative interviews and narrative research, in which speakers construct social worlds and work to make themselves understood, this stipulation implicates the interviewer just as much as the interviewee in the construction and interpretation of talk.

Schegloff-Wetherell-Billig debate

I turn now to the issue of “context” as this is a point of some contention within DP, as it is in CA and other discursive approaches to talk-in-interaction. Perhaps one of the most public exchanges in the field of discourse analysis was the debate between Margaret Wetherell and Emmanuel Schegloff regarding the proper consideration of context in the analysis of talk (Billig, 1999a, 1999b; Schegloff, 1997, 1998; Speer, 2005; Wetherell, 1998; Wooffitt, 2005; see also Potter, 2010). Although this was framed as a CA versus CDA (critical discourse analysis) debate, Wetherell’s and Billig’s involvement, and the general topics of discussion (e.g., context, talk-in-interaction, perception, and agency), makes the exchange relevant to DP work as well.

In his 1997 article, Schegloff argued for a “technical” microanalytic perspective that first examines talk for what the participants themselves orient to and make relevant to the unfolding of the interaction. Schegloff’s aim was to provide an argument against discourse analysis (in particular, politically and critically oriented approaches) that takes an a priori stance regarding the social contexts in which talk occurs and the significance of social factors such as gender and power. While Schegloff did not dismiss the possibility that social politics, gender, identity etc. can be potentially relevant to social members in a given setting, he argued that, researcher claims and agendas aside, it is the “orientations, meanings, interpretations, understandings, etc. of the participants” (p. 166, emphasis in original) that must be given foremost consideration. According to Schegloff, once the analyst has conducted a technical analysis based on the participants’ own...
orientations (i.e., emic displays of understanding) and discovers what is of concern to them, only then can an analysis of sociopolitical (i.e., exogenous) concerns take place. Thus, Schegloff was not arguing against the possibility of CA to tackle issues related to gender and power, for example; he was, rather, advocating against analysis that starts off with assumptions regarding what is relevant.

Wetherell, an advocate of feminist and critically-oriented discursive approaches, took issue with Schegloff’s critique of CDA and in her subsequent public exchange (1998) argued that Schegloff’s version of CA is unbearably limiting and while it may be able to explain “how” talk-in-interaction works, it does not explain the “why this now?” injunction of CA. In her view, the local context does not, for example, always explain why it is that particular ways of speaking and topics of discourse are valued and come into being in a society. In Wetherell’s view, a more “complete” or “scholarly” analysis must also be informed by post-structuralist views on agency, power, and discourse. It is not enough to examine how identity is constructed, she argued: one must also examine the discourses and political contexts that make particular subject positions possible or impossible, available or unavailable, and desirable or undesirable.

Soon after Wetherell and Schegloff’s public exchanges, Michael Billig (1999a, 1999b) joined in the argument against Schegloff. He accused CA (at least Schegloff’s version) of being overly naïve in assuming the analyst’s description of participants’ behavior in terms of “paired action sequences,” “repair,” etc. was actually describing the participants’ understanding of the interaction. In Billig’s view, “CA constructs and uses analytic terms that are not the participants’ own” (Billig, 1999b, p. 573). Schegloff countered by stating that CA is not trying to analyze interaction based on the participants’ own terms, it is seeking to understand interaction through the ways in which participants display and show their understandings through their conduct. In addition, Billig’s attempt to defend feminist research inquiry from Schegloff’s rigid position was met with some puzzlement and criticism even by his own colleagues, such as Celia Kitzinger (2000), who chastised Billig for ignoring CA work that does engage with feminist research (namely, Kitzinger’s own).

Kitzinger was also responsible for raising a collegial challenge to DP researchers. While Kitzinger (2006) appeared to be in agreement with Edwards’ and Potter’s
mainstream stances on psychological topics and talk as interaction, she suggested a
danger in DP defining itself as anti-cognitivist is that it remains defined by what it
opposes (i.e., DP not as a discursive project on its own terms, but as a reactive project
against traditional cognitive approaches). As a result, Kitzinger argued, DP’s
overextended argument that cognition (i.e., “psychological talk”) is made manifest in
discourse does little to further DP as a disciplinary approach. The thrust of her argument
is that DP, having made its point about the relevance of psychological topics in
interaction, now needs to move beyond its original critique of psychology to develop its
own disciplinary agenda.

**Discursive psychology or “psychological” CA?**

*interactionist*, and *synthetic*). McIlvenny (2002) lists only two varieties: the older
poststructuralist/feminist-informed approach (which he associates with the work of
Kitzinger & Wilkinson, 1995; Wetherell, 1998; and Wetherell & Edley, 1999) and the
more recent CA-influenced work of the interactionist strand. It is worth noting that while
Potter and Wetherell (1987) were instrumental in establishing the early synthetic
approach, Potter has since shifted to the more CA-influenced interactionist approach for
which he and Edwards are now best known (see the following discussion on
contemporary DP).

Although it is readily apparent that the poststructuralist (i.e., Foucauldian)
versions of DP of Parker and Hook, and the synthetic (i.e., feminist) version of Billig,
Edley, and Wetherell differ substantially from mainstream or “technical” CA in terms of
their methodologies and interests, one might find it a bit more difficult to tease apart the
interactionally-focused DP of Edwards and Potter (Edwards, 1997; Potter & Edwards,
1992) from CA. After all, that strand of DP employs CA transcription procedures and CA
methodology, so why not just consider DP as a kind of “psychological CA”? Robin
Wooffitt, a prominent researcher working in the CA and DP traditions, has responded
that he sees little if any difference between the two (Wooffitt, personal communication).
As examples, recent edited volumes by DP researchers (Hepburn & Wiggins, 2007; te
Molder & Potter, 2005) on cognition and other psychological topics combine work by
ethnomethodologists, conversation analysts, and discursive psychologists.
It is important to note that as the DP project has matured over the past 20 years, Potter (2010) now refers to his program as “contemporary discursive psychology” to distinguish it from earlier traditions. Situating contemporary DP, Potter has described a gradual shift (starting around the mid-1990s) where CA took a more central role in analysis. He has also implied a lessening of the anti-cognitivist rhetoric (perhaps taking to heart Kitzinger’s earlier criticism) as he described an associated interest in studying categories, the production of social science findings, and institutional practices. DP’s earlier interests in rhetoric appear somewhat inconsistent over recent years—sometimes emphasized as central to DP and other times conspicuously absent. Edwards and Stokoe (2004), in a critique of Korobov and Bamberg’s DP approach (Korobov & Bamberg, 2004), have argued in favor of the recent CA-aligned DP work and referred to earlier DP work on construction, rhetoric, and variability as “outdated” (p. 500). DP’s increased engagement with CA is no doubt responsible for the blurring of the various strands (see Potter, 2010).

Contemporary DP has also shifted toward an exclusive focus on spontaneous and institutional interaction (e.g., casual conversation, emergency helplines, doctor visits, focus groups). However, early versions also showed an interest in written discourse: “What makes it discursive psychology is that psychological topics are considered through the way talk and texts are used in action” (te Molder & Potter, 2005, p. 30, emphasis added). Edley (2001), for example, examined spoken discourse, photos, and posters for insight into the “discursive reproduction of men and masculinity” (p. 189). Contemporary DP’s almost exclusive focus on spoken and nonverbal interaction is further indication of its increasing alignment with CA.

It is unclear whether the CA-DP distinction\(^\text{10}\) will hold or whether the DP work by those in the Edwards and Potter camp will eventually meld into a project of *interaction analysis* that combines CA’s interest in the organizational infrastructure of conversation/interaction and DP’s interest in “psychological” topics. Recent interdisciplinary volumes by te Molder and Potter (2005) and Hepburn and Wiggins

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\(^{10}\) It is curious that Schegloff, considered the reigning “father” of CA (after Sacks’ death), has had practically nothing to say about DP. It appears he either sees it as an entirely separate research program or considers it little more than a new label for CA.
(2007) give indications of at least some ongoing merger. Some researchers have even suggested an interdisciplinary enterprise called “sociology of mind, praxiology, discursive psychology or even social psychology” (te Molder & Potter, 2005, p. 54).

**DP as an approach, not a paradigm or methodology**

As Sarangi and Wilson (1998) have pointed out, DP is an approach to social-psychological topics—not a methodology. As a non-cognitivist approach, it starts with the view of mind, emotions, memory, etc. as resources and constructions in talk, but it does not provide the methodological tools for carrying out the examination of how such states are constructed and made use of in talk to carry out various social actions. It is curious to note, however, that Edwards (1997) earlier claimed that DP “offers a perspective and methodology for dealing with many of the topics that cultural psychology is also interested in” (p. 47); however, he and Potter appear to have since distanced themselves from the claim of a DP methodology, highlighting instead CA’s contribution. CA does provide the methodological tools (e.g., transcription, sequential analysis) for carrying out DP’s goals. At the same time, as I have already mentioned, DP is not limited to talk, but can potentially include analysis of visual communication (e.g., CA-informed work on gesture and non-verbal communication: Goodwin & Goodwin, 1992; Goodwin, 2007) as well as text. Thus, while it reflects the primary focus on “talk,” CA is not the only possible methodology for carrying out DP work—that is, if one embraces a wider view of the DP project. Billig’s rhetorical analysis, Goodwin’s visual and nonverbal work, and Foucauldian analysis are all potential methodologies for examining the construction and reception of “psychological” and “emotional” topics. However, if one is to be confined to “contemporary DP,” then CA must be the primary methodology—although one may wish to go further once a CA analysis has been conducted (Schegloff, 1997).

Hammersley (2003a, b), in a critique of Potter’s version of discourse analysis (DA), has argued that DA and CA have been developed as distinct paradigms, yet they each lack coherence. In Hammersley’s view, they are not enough on their own. They should be treated as useful, but limited methods, which can be effectively used in conjunction with other methods. In his rebuttal, Potter (2003) agreed with Hammersley by stating that that DP is not a paradigm but “an engagement at a theoretical,
methodological, and conceptual level with mainstream psychology and its approach to (and construction of) basic topics such as attribution, attitudes, and social representations” (p. 784). Potter also reiterated that DP is not a method. In his defense of his version of DP, Potter (2003, p. 785, 787) described four of its fundamental features:

1. DA is the recognition of discourse as action and action oriented;
2. DA/DP is neither a self-contained paradigm nor a stand-alone method that can be easily mixed and matched with others;
3. It is an approach with a range of meta-theoretical and methodological elements; and
4. It does not tell us all we need to know about social life—nor is it intended to.

This leads into the debate regarding the nature of reality. Hammersley (2003) has criticized DP for denying the “fact” that phenomena have an objective reality. Defending DP as an approach, Potter responded that DP does not deny any objective reality; rather, it considers the role of those phenomena in terms of people’s descriptions, glosses, categories, orientations, etc. In other words, DP (like ethnomethodology) takes a radically emic view of analytical objects (whether they be motives, gravity waves, social classes, or whatever). That is, those things are understood in relation to their involvement in participants’ practices (Potter, 2004, p. 788). This also deals with the definitional challenge, by looking at how social members themselves (rather than the researcher) conceptualize and make use of “emotions” and “attitudes,” for example.

2.4.4. A Discursive Constructionist Approach

There are many questions that drive my interest in socially-informed and discursively-driven approaches to emotions, language, multilingual identities, and self-presentation. For example, how can we, as L2 researchers, engage with the subjective side of language use and social participation? How can we begin to explain the motivations, concerns, drives, and challenges involved in using, avoiding, and even resisting particular linguistic resources and practices? How do we investigate how members interpret and represent their experiences? And, how can we attempt to answer
these questions without imposing our own worldviews or constructing the data we expect to find?

The data-driven version of DP advanced by Edwards and Potter (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Edwards, 1997) and other closely aligned approaches (Buttny, 1993, 2004; Kitzinger, 2000, 2005; Speer, 2005) offer a potential solution: “It starts by studying the way things appear as participants’ concerns. That is, DP treats mind, personality, experience, emotions, intentions and so on in terms of how they are constructed and oriented to in interaction” (Potter, 2006, p. 132, emphasis in original).

**Diverging from contemporary DP**

Although I draw heavily on CA and the closely-aligned contemporary DP, there are some areas in which my approach to discourse diverges from aspects of those research programs and invokes some of the tensions surrounding DA and CA.

One difference is my use of interview data. While early DP made use of qualitative research interviews (e.g., Edley, 2001; Wetherell & Potter, 1992), contemporary DP, however, eschews qualitative research interviews, narratives, and other data “gotten up” by the researcher because they fail the “dead researcher test” (i.e., if the researcher were not there would this interaction have come about anyway?). There is good cause for this, because self-reports are inherently fraught with analytical difficulty (i.e., how people talk about what they do or feel does not really tell us what they actually do). Another potential criticism is the matter of interviewer as analyst. It is largely the case that DP and CA researchers avoid conducting research in which the analyst is also the interviewer (Potter & Hepburn, 2005). However, some researchers do not find the researcher/analyst double role necessarily problematic (e.g., Edley, 2001; Hollway, 1984) and even suggest that this may further inform the data analysis. Moreover, in qualitative research in general, particularly in interview-based studies, the interviewer as analyst has long been an accepted practice (e.g., Briggs, 1986; Mishler, 1999).

Despite concerns over the use of interviews, I am in agreement with Speer (2005), that there is no need to throw away these research tools as long as we treat the research process itself as interaction:
As conversation analysts have shown, all data can be natural or contrived depending on what one wants to do with it (see, for example, Houtkoop-Steenstra 2000; Widdicombe and Wooffitt 1995). Thus, it is fine if we, as feminists, want to use interview data to explore how gender talk is derived in research contexts, paying close attention to the constructive processes involved (the interview data can be “naturalized—or treated as natural”: (see Speer 2002d). However, if one wants to analyse interview talk where participants are asked to comment on gender in order to discover how people routinely do gender in “everyday” settings, then such prompted “gender commentary” may seem contrived, and thus not the best data for our present purposes. (Speer, 2005, p. 196, emphasis in original)

For the researcher taking this view, interviews are neither natural or unnatural on their own—what matters is how they are treated. Therefore, for the purposes of opening up the L2 interview for inspection as well as how emotionality and other “psychological” matters are derived and constructed in autobiographic talk, then I see no incompatibility in taking a CA/DP approach.

DP, at least in earlier versions, demonstrated an active interest in the rhetoric of talk. As in the CA paradigm, discourse in DP is seen as situated and sequentially organized. Utterances are not formed in isolation, but in relation to and embedded within the temporal/physical context as well as previous utterances and actions. However, unlike CA, DP began with an active interest in the defensive and offensive rhetoric of talk (Potter, 2004), to see how discourse sequences deal with issues of accountability, blame, stake, and interest. By examining how people manage discourse around notions of normativity, order, morals, and rationality, DP researchers sought to understand how tellers claim, create, and stabilize versions of the world according to how they view the world is or should be (Edwards & Potter, 1992, p. 158). The emphasis was on action and construction, and often included a focus on ways in which speakers would describe, challenge, and justify their actions and the actions of others (Hepburn & Potter, 2003). For example, a narrative teller may recount a particular action taken, then counter or defend that action to either preserve or contrast the natural or moral order of things. Although DP’s rhetorical interests appear to have been somewhat tempered in recent work (e.g., they have abandoned work on interpretive repertories and ideological dilemmas), I argue that DP’s work on rhetoric was one of its unique contributions. I suggest that the abandonment of this line of research not only reduces DP’s
distinctiveness, it may even impede the development of potentially productive analytical tools.

2.5. Summary

To engage with the management of emotionality in L2 interviews, I take a discursive constructionist approach informed mainly by ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, and discursive psychology. This requires a commitment to an empirically-grounded analysis set in the sequence and structure of the data.

Before continuing, a few words of clarification are in order. First, when I use the terms “mental” and “psychological,” no claims are being made in support or rejection of internal or individual processes. Neither am I attempting to triangulate or otherwise determine the veracity of talk. Rather, I am interested in the ways in which speakers talk, represent, or negotiate emotionality (i.e., psychological matters as “ways of talking”; Edwards, 1999) and what they achieve by it. An advantage of a discursive constructionist approach is that it encourages a healthy skepticism toward our taken-for-granted understandings of emotions, identity, or even the world. This discursive constructionist approach to emotions in L2 research is a work in progress. Thus, one of the goals of my dissertation is to push the boundaries of both DP and L2 studies by developing this approach to tie language use, psychology, interview, interaction, and identity together in a way that is data-driven and theoretically, analytically, and methodologically consistent while not restricted by preconceived ideas regarding the ways in which the mind, society, or the world work.

2.6. Research Questions

Based on a discursive constructionist approach to the management of emotionality in L2 qualitative research interviews, this study takes an interest in the emic meanings and contextualized negotiation of subjectivity and experience. Focusing on the resources, junctures, interactants, and actions involved in making emotionality recognizable and relevant in the interview, the following three research questions guide the present study:
1. **Resources:** What are the semiotic and interactional resources that speakers draw upon to construct emotionality and make emotions relevant in the ongoing interaction?

2. **Actors:** How and by whom is emotionality elicited and topicalized? How are emotions implicated in the interactants identities and relationships?

3. **Actions:** What do explicit and implicit displays of emotionality accomplish in the interaction? What are they mobilized to do?

A fourth question concerns the implications of the present approach for research beyond the present study:

4. What are the contributions and implications of a discursive approach to emotions and emotionality for EMCA, interview research, and emotion research in applied linguistics?
CHAPTER 3. DATA AND METHOD

3.0. Data and Participants

In the course of this study, I interviewed 15 research participants about their immigration and language experiences before, during, and after coming to the US and Canada. All were introduced to me through the process of “snowball sampling” (Babbie, 2008; Engel & Schutt, 2009), where one informant introduced me to another, and so on. Snowball sampling is particularly useful when working with sensitive topics or individuals not easily recruited. The present study data consist of approximately 30 hours of transcribed data from a larger corpus of 90 hours\textsuperscript{11} of face-to-face interviews, conversations, and spontaneous storytelling in English. Some non-English (e.g., Vietnamese, Khmer, Visayan/Cebuano, Tagalog, Pidgin) data were present in the data but consisted mostly of lexical items, short translations, or cultural terms. The interviews included topics such as immigrating, English learning, social participation, work, hobbies, friends, and family. Interview data were supplemented by field notes, email correspondence, online chats, as well as solicited and unsolicited interview reflections. Observations were also conducted at mealtimes and various social gatherings and other activities. Additional audiorecorded data include four hours of recordings of some of the participants in multi-party talk at dinnertime or home interactions, and 10 hours of bilingual data from Khmer language classes that one of the participants (Trang) and I attended together. Although the interview talk is the focus of this study, the supplemental data give further evidence that these speakers make use of emotional stories and talk of emotions in their interactions with the interviewer and others with whom they interact.

For this dissertation, I am focusing on interview data from eight participants (see footnote below). Details on the participants are provided in Table 1.

\textsuperscript{11} A portion of this data was lost due to hardware failure and is still being reconstructed. For that reason, I am concentrating here on data from eight participants.
Table 1. Focal interview participants\textsuperscript{12}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trang</th>
<th>Sang</th>
<th>Bona</th>
<th>John</th>
<th>Hong</th>
<th>Kiet</th>
<th>Kim</th>
<th>Rico</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>40s</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>30s</td>
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<td>30s</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
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<td>Khmer\textsuperscript{13}</td>
<td>Cambodian</td>
<td>Cambodian</td>
<td>Chinese born in Vietnam</td>
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<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
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<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
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<td>Khmer English (Chinese lost to attrition)</td>
<td>Vietnamese English</td>
<td>Vietnamese English</td>
<td>Vietnamese English</td>
<td>Vietnamese English</td>
<td>Vietnamese English</td>
<td>Visayan Tagalog English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yrs. Residence</td>
<td>25 years</td>
<td>25 years</td>
<td>25 years</td>
<td>25 years</td>
<td>20 years</td>
<td>12 years</td>
<td>16 years</td>
<td>1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Manager in the service industry</td>
<td>Factory worker</td>
<td>Taxi driver</td>
<td>Hair stylist</td>
<td>Restaurant worker</td>
<td>Nail Salon owner</td>
<td>University Student</td>
<td>Caregiver Hotel worker Warehouse worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Education</td>
<td>High school (Canada) Dropped out of ESL classes</td>
<td>High school (US)</td>
<td>2-year degree (US)</td>
<td>High school (US)</td>
<td>High school (US)</td>
<td>High school (US)</td>
<td>High school (Vietnam) B.S. (US)</td>
<td>2-year certificate in nursing (PH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours of Interviews</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{12} Participants’ names are pseudonyms.

\textsuperscript{13} I will use Cambodian and Khmer interchangeably.
Five of the men (Trang, Sang, Bona, John, and Kiet) immigrated to the US and Canada in the 1980s during the postwar influx of refugees from Southeast Asia. They had similar immigration and life experiences, and told many stories of war and their dangerous escapes through the jungle or by boat to the refugee camps.

Trang, whose interviews were the most extensive, immigrated alone to eastern Canada as a teenager. Born to a Vietnamese mother and Cambodian father, Trang grew up speaking Vietnamese and Khmer. When the Khmer Rouge took power and killed several of his family members, he escaped to a Thai refugee camp and made his way to Canada. At the time we were introduced, Trang lived in Canada with his French partner but visited Hawai‘i every winter for two to three months at a time. For the most part, Trang avoided interactions with Cambodians and Vietnamese because he said he did not want them to ask about his mixed accent or ethnicity.

Although Trang was alone in journey to Canada, Sang, Bona, John, and Kiet immigrated with their families to the US. Sang (ethnic Khmer) and Bona (ethnic Chinese) both grew up in Cambodia and spent time in Thai refugee camps. After high school, they worked a series of jobs and eventually married Cambodian women, had children, and settled down in local Cambodian communities. At the time of the interviews, both men had divorced and were living in Hawai‘i, where they met and became friends. Sang and Bona were well connected with Cambodian communities in Hawai‘i and the mainland US and often took part in Cambodian festivals, religious ceremonies, and other community events.

John and his family fled Vietnam by boat and lived in a refugee camp in the Philippines for a year before immigrating to the US. Although John was born and raised in Vietnam, he identifies himself as “Chinese born in Vietnam” because his grandparents were from China and he speaks some Chinese. John had an American partner at the time of our initial interviews but they later separated. John and Trang had been friends for several years before the start of this study, and it was through John that I met Trang, Kiet, and Hong. Although John had a few Vietnamese friends, he did not take part in community events, stating that he did not want to be known so well because they might
talk about him.\textsuperscript{14}

Like John, Kiet and his family escaped from Vietnam by boat and spent time in a refugee camp in the Philippines before immigrating to the US. Kiet lived with his family on the West Coast, where he helped run a small family business. He visited Hawai‘i often and was also acquainted with John and Hong. Kiet said his only friends were Vietnamese, so he was happy to have the opportunity to talk with me in English.

Hong and his family arrived in the US from Vietnam in the late 1990s. Because his father had been imprisoned by the Vietnamese government for helping the American military during the Vietnam war, Hong’s family delayed immigrating to the US until his father was released. Hong had many Vietnamese friends in Hawai‘i and was acquainted with John and Kiet.

Rico, an asylum seeker in Canada, did not know any of the other study participants. He was introduced to me by mutual friends before he arrived in Canada. We carried out approximately 10 hours of online text and audio chats before he left the Philippines and continued our correspondence after arrived in Canada. Audio-recorded interviews with Rico were conducted during my trips to Canada. I was initially interested in comparing long-term residents with recent immigrants, but most of the recent arrivals (those who had been in the US less than two years) worked long hours or moved often, so it was difficult to find times to meet. Although several recently-arrived immigrants from the Philippines agreed to be interviewed, they did not want to be recorded, citing worries about privacy and legal status. Through Rico’s introduction, interviews were set up with five other Filipino asylum seekers (his co-workers) in Canada, but all lost their appeals and were deported before we could meet.

Kim, the only woman in this study, arrived in the United States in 1990 from Vietnam and did not know any of the other study participants. We became acquainted when she took a course I was teaching and we kept in contact. When she learned of my study, she asked if I would be interested in her stories. I decided to include Kim’s interview data in this study to see how her experiences compared with those of the men.

\textsuperscript{14}John said that although he had a same-sex partner, he was not “out” about his sexuality and did not want that to be a topic of gossip in the Vietnamese community.
Although her talk contained many similar concerns as the three single men (e.g., accent, ethnicity, gender, discrimination, education, family, and future), unlike the men (except Hong), she did not come to the US as a refugee. Kim was also the only study participant with a four-year college degree—and, at the time of the interviews, was working toward an advanced degree in the medical field.

3.1. Data Collection

I first developed a social relationship with the participants before inviting them to join this study. I introduced myself as a second language educator and researcher and explained that I am interested in immigrants and their experiences with language and coming to and living in the US and Canada. Our recorded meetings took place in my office, our homes, outdoors, as well as in the context of socializing, outdoor activities, and mealtimes. We began the interviews with small talk about our families, mutual acquaintances, travels, hobbies, and other interests. Once participants gave their permission to be recorded and appeared comfortable with the recording equipment, I asked them about such topics as their experiences coming to and living in the US and Canada, their language-learning histories, and language practices.

Autobiographic narratives (Pavlenko, 2007; Riessman, 1993, 2008) were also a part of their interviews, and although I did not always explicitly ask participants to tell me stories, storytelling was encouraged (see chapters 4 and 5). Recognizing interviews as co-constructed events and sites of data generation and construction rather than data collection (Byrne, 2004; Given, 2008), I made an effort to allow participants to direct the interview to topics that they represented as significant to an understanding of them and their experiences. At the same time, approaching interviews as conversational encounters (Holstein & Gubrium, 2003, 2004; Potter & Wetherell, 1987), I actively participated by following up various topics and at times even challenged their utterances to better make visible their accounting practices.
3.2. Transcription

The interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed following CA conventions (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984)\textsuperscript{15} that attempt to capture the fine-grained detail of the recorded interaction. This fine-grained detail includes attention to what was said (i.e., the words), where it was said (i.e., the utterance boundaries and location in the overall talk), who said it (i.e., the speakers and their turns), how it was said (e.g., code, intonation, speed, pitch, vocal quality, represented speech), and even what was not said or not responded to (e.g., pauses, silences, partial or abandoned utterances, uncompleted adjacency pairs). Video-recordings are preferable to audio only, as they permit a much richer data record that allows the analyst to notice gestures, body position, eye gaze, the physical settings, and other nonverbal cues. However, the participants in this study refused to be video-recorded, expressing concern over privacy and the personal content of their talk.

Recordings and transcripts are always representations, never the object or event that was recorded. As such, transcripts are always partial, selective, motivated, methodologically driven, and an integral part of the analytic process (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008; Lazaraton, 2002; Ochs, 1979; Psathas & Anderson, 1990). Transcripts in CA research are considered to be useful referential tools in the study of recorded interaction, but they do not replace the recordings (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008; Wooffitt, 2005). In this study, viewing transcription as a process of observation and noticing (Zimmerman, 1988), after transcribing the data, the transcripts were read repeatedly and compared with the recordings, and then examined for instances of emotions and emotionality, “curious” patterns (Maynard, 2003), actions (e.g., blaming, justifying, denying), structural, sequential, and rhetorical organization, and co-construction.

In earlier chapters I pointed out the definitional and operational challenges involved in the study of emotions. Because this study takes a discursive approach to emotions, as a means to identify instances of emotions and emotionality, I focus primarily on speaker resources such as descriptive vocabulary (e.g., emotion terms, category labels) that make emotions explicit; I also give attention to devices that make

\textsuperscript{15} See preface for transcription conventions.
emotions and emotionality inferentially available (e.g., affective stance markers, memory claims; topic choices; paralinguistic cues).\textsuperscript{16}

In Chapter 4, the first of the data analysis chapters, I begin my investigation of emotion management in the L2 interview by examining how interviewees project emotional stories.

\textsuperscript{16} Research examining the display of emotionality is highly problematic (Edwards, 1997). As Buttny (1993, p. 103) remarked, “A problem for the analyst is how to identify the emotions as exhibited in and through these nonverbal or vocal cues. There is no one-to-one relationship between a particular nonverbal or vocal component and emotion.” Nevertheless, the following chapters aim to include implicit as well as explicit displays of emotion.
CHAPTER 4. INTERVIEWEE EMOTION STORY PREFACES

4.0. Introduction

This chapter investigates the ways in which emotion talk and emotionality are invoked and projected in the opening portion of storytelling sequences within the research interview. Based on extracts from the present study data, and supplemented by related first language (L1) and second language (L2) data from the qualitative research literature, I focus my attention on a type of story opener that I refer to here as an emotion story preface. This chapter has two primary goals: to explicate the features and functions of emotions and emotionality in story prefaces, and to show how interview interactants make use of emotion story prefaces to shape the interview trajectory and the talk that is co-produced.

While taking into account Holstein and Gubrium’s (1995) injunction that qualitative interviewers should consider both the “whats” and the “hows” of interview talk, this chapter also considers the “whos” and the “wheres”—that is, the speakers and the interactional junctures involved in making emotionality “visible” (i.e., displayable and recognizable) and relevant. I show how speakers use emotion story prefaces to carry out a number of activities: project the nature of the talk that is coming, indicate its relevance to the ongoing interaction, set the affective tone of the story, prepare the recipient to receive it (e.g., as an “emotional” and empathy-worthy story), respond appropriately, and know when it is completed.

I begin by presenting a brief overview of story prefaces in qualitative research and the EMCA literature, giving attention to the normative features of these opening devices—including tellability, stancetaking, and subject-object relations work. Linking story prefaces to previous research on complaint talk, I show how emotionality is bound up as a discursive resource for projecting stories. I then turn my attention the use of emotion story prefaces in the present study data. Through worked example extracts, I point out some of the functions of emotion story prefaces in interviews, and examine the role of pre-preface and post-story material, normative features, and memory claims in the production and reception of emotional stories and episodes. I conclude the chapter by
summarizing the importance of emotion story prefaces and how attention to them can contribute to work on storytelling and qualitative interview research in general.

4.1. Normative Features of Story Prefaces

In L2 research using qualitative interviews (e.g., Benson & Nunan, 2005; Kramsch & Lam, 1999; Langman, 2004; Miller, 2003; Menard-Warwick, 2009; Norton, 2000; Pavlenko, 1998; Pavlenko & Blackledge, 2004; Pavlenko & Lantolf, 2000; Schumann, 1997), participants are routinely called on to provide autobiographical talk and meta-commentary to describe and explain particular topics of interest to the research study (e.g., personal experiences, opinions, attitudes, language learning trajectories, motivations, literacy practices). A frequent outcome of interview approaches and person-focused research topics is the production of stories (Charmaz, 2005; Denzin & Lincoln, 2008a, 2008b; Mishler, 1986, 1991). Although the stories produced in research settings have received much consideration in the literature—often subjected to structural, thematic, and content analysis (cf. Riessman, 2008; Roulston, 2010)—less direct attention has been given to the ways in which these stories are purposefully introduced or fitted into the ongoing interview interaction. This chapter aims to contribute to this gap in existing research by providing a closer look at storytelling as a discursive resource.

4.1.1. Tellability

Whether elicited or spontaneous, a built-in requirement of autobiographic talk, storytelling, and news in general, is that it be tellable and reportable (Labov, 1972; Norrick, 2005; Sacks, 1992; Thornborrow & Coates, 2005); that is, there must be something tell-worthy—something that enables it not only to be told but also to be heard. An important normative constraint in storytelling is that speakers should not tell listeners what they already know (Sacks, 1992; Schegloff, 2007; Sidnell, 2010a).17 Moreover, as stories are often produced within extended turns maintained by a primary speaker (or multiple speakers, as in the case of co-told stories; Lerner, 1992; Ochs & Capps, 2001; Thornborrow & Coates, 2005), among the challenges the storyteller faces are how to (a)

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17 There are exceptions to this normative constraint. Some discourse analytic researchers have examined how repeated stories can also be important interactional resources for doing self-presentation and social commentary (e.g., Koven, 2002; Norrick, 1998; Prior, 2011; Schiffrin, 2006).
secure a slot within the ongoing interaction to tell the story, (b) maintain the floor as storyteller, and (c) demonstrate the immediate relevance of that story for the present interaction (Liddicoat, 2007; Sacks, 1992; Sidnell, 2010).

Considering how talk is recipient designed, EMCA scholars (e.g., Cuff & Francis, 1978; Edwards, 2005; Liddicoat, 2007; Sacks, 1992; Schegloff, 2007; Sidnell, 2010) have observed that speakers routinely preface conversational stories with material to recognizably project an upcoming story, indicate its relevance to the ongoing interaction, and prepare the listener to receive and respond appropriately to that story. As an “interest arouser” (Sacks, 1992, p. 226) the story preface works as a methodic device to suspend the normal turn-taking operations so that speakers can take and hold an extended turn, create a listening audience, produce a story that is interesting, and project its completion:

Characteristically stories begin with something we call a ‘story preface’ which contains varieties of information and does a range of businesses, of which a perfectly prototypical instance is “Something really weird happened to me on the way to work this morning.” That announces more or less that I want to tell a story, and it tells various things about the story relevant to listening to the story. For example, it tells how to listen to the story to find out when it will have been over; where, say, the term “weird” as a characterizing adjective in the story preface gives a listener something with which to monitor the story so as to see, when something ‘weird’ has been told, then that’s what the teller was intending to tell as the ‘story,’ and until then the story isn’t finished. (Sacks, 1992, p. 530)

It is not enough that an extended utterance is heard as “a story” once it is completed, it must be made recognizable as a story before it is completed so that recipients can monitor its progress and know when and how to respond (Sidnell, 2010). A function of story prefaces, then, is to enable the speaker to take and maintain an extended conversational turn and cue the recipient to respond appropriately.

Often these story prefaces (also, news announcements, pre-tellings, pre-announcements, pre-announcement firsts) consist of a variation of the “Guess what?” proposal device (Edwards, 1997; Liddicoat, 2007; Schegloff, 2007; Terasaki, 2004) that enables the speaker to create a slot fitted for the projected story or news item. Similarly, Thornborrow (2001, 2010) found story elicitation a common practice in TV talk shows, where one of the primary goals is to elicit life stories and personal experiences from
participants by asking questions such as “What happened?” or “Has it ever happened to you?”

The following extract provides a prototypical example of a story preface news announcement:

Extract 4.1. From Terasaki (2004, p. 184)

<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01 D:</td>
<td>Didju hear the terrible news?</td>
<td>02 R:</td>
<td>No. What?</td>
<td>03 D:</td>
<td>Y’know your Grandpa Bill’s brother Dan?</td>
<td>04 R:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Functions of this story preface/news announcement device include: (a) signaling the upcoming story as presumably unknown to the other speaker (and thus newsworthy), (b) offering an assessment of that news, and (c) making the telling of the story the contingent next step (Terasaki, 2004). In the example above, D’s first pair part in line 1 (“Didju hear the terrible news?”) offers up a contingent telling as recent news, laying the groundwork for its immediate relevance and sharing. D’s utterance also interactionally requires that R provide a corresponding second pair part response (e.g., “Yes, I did…”; “No, what happened?”; “What news?”) to complete this adjacency pair and show how he understood D’s utterance. In this example, R’s subsequent provision of the second pair part in line 2 (“No. What?”) affirms that this potential news is unknown (and thus tellworthy) and gives D the go-ahead to take the conversational floor and proceed with the telling of the news or story.

In terms of emotionality, of interest to the present discussion is D’s use of the adjective “terrible” to assess and describe the nature of the news (i.e., as bad news). Among the various adjectives potentially available to speakers when describing events

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18 Despite work on story solicitation in media programs, most EMCA research on pre-announcements and announcement sequences has been concerned with spontaneous tellings (i.e., stories of the speaker’s own initiative), not on those elicited or invited, for example, by a question (e.g., as in an interview; see Chapter 5 for further discussion). Sidnell (2010, p. 178) suggests that speakers are more likely to launch into a story without explicitly labeling it as such (e.g., “Lemme tell you what happened to me today”). Nevertheless, I argue that by initiating a turn to produce a tellable, whether explicitly labeled as a story or not, the speaker is still projecting something tellworthy.
(e.g., “exciting,” “big,” “good,” “bad,” “shocking,” “tragic,” “terrible”), it is “terrible” that D uses to provide a clue regarding the kind of news that is being projected (just as the previously-cited quote from Sacks, 1992, gave an example of “weird” as a monitoring clue by the listener). By using “terrible” to characterize the news, D indicates that it does not merely belong to the class of bad news—it also falls along the extreme end of the continuum—thus ruling out certain kinds of news and suggesting others (e.g., death, illness, or other tragedy). In Extract 4.1, R was able to guess the terrible news (a death in the family) based on the clues provided by D.

4.1.2. Stance Work

It could also be argued that adjectives such as “bad” and “terrible” are subjective rather than objective descriptions—as exemplified in the often told “that’s good, that’s bad stories” (Abrahams, 1963; Maynard, 2003). These formulaic stories derive their humorous punch by trading on social norms of tellability and the subjective and interpretive nature of news descriptions. An illustration of this comes from a television skit by comedians Archie Campbell and Roy Clark (n.d.):

Extract 4.2. “Terrible misfortune”

01 A: an’ I guess you heard about my terrible
02 misfortune.
03 (0.5)
04 R: “ohhh”
05 (.)
06 A: yeah, (.) my great uncle died.
07 R: oh that’s bad.
08 A: no that’s good.
09 (0.2)
10 R: how come?
11 (0.5)
12 A: well when he died, he left me fifty thousand
13 dollars
14 R: oh that’s good.
15 A: no that’s bad.
16 (0.2)
17 R: how come?
18 A: well, when the internal revenue got through

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19 See Chapter 6 and its discussion on the discursive scaling of emotion descriptions.
with it all I had left was twenty five thousand dollars. (0.4)

oh that's bad.

no that's good. (0.2)

how come?

WELL I bought me an airplane and learned t'fly::

OH:: that's good?

no that’s bad. (0.3)

how come?

well I was flying upside down the other day and I fell out of the dern thing. oh that’s bad. [story continues]

As this humorous episode illustrates, something that is bad news to one person when seen in the context of particular events may also be treated otherwise in a different context. For example, the death of a family member, although potentially tragic or sad news, could also be treated as good news (e.g., if the deceased had left an inheritance, if the person’s death had ended suffering, if the person were a convicted murderer). This differential treatment of news highlights that the design of story prefaces enables explicit or implied stance-taking functions.

Kärkkäinen (2007) observed that speakers frame the outset of their story sequences with evaluative stances so that listeners will orient to the speaker’s perspective:

Extract 4.3. Adapted from Kärkkäinen (p. 201)

Kevin: Some guy came out and he- he was, ((laughter)) [=]

Wendy: [<<HI> Oh </HI>>].

Kevin: he was trying to ‘sell us cologne [lines deleted]

I guess he was trying to like, lure us to a (. ) place where they would sell, like,

(. ) imitation cologne,
But he said, it’s not imitation, because [story continues]

In an analysis of this interaction, Kärkkäinen pointed out that Kevin produces his story (lines 1-2, 4) with an implied evaluation about a man who tried to sell cologne to him and his friend Wendy in the parking lot of a mall—that there is something strange, humorous (indicated by Kevin’s laughter), or problematic about the activity of trying to sell them cologne, as well as the place of that activity. As he continues his story (lines 10–11), Kevin makes his evaluative stance more explicit as his descriptions of this episode (e.g., “lure,” “imitation,”) negatively characterize the would-be seller (“some guy”), the object (the cologne) as well as the place (a parking lot), implying something deceptive and possibly even dangerous.

Another illustrative example of stancetaking in a story preface comes from a well-known L2 study by Schmidt (1983) of an adult Japanese learner of English living in Hawai‘i. Schmidt relates the following spontaneous narrative produced by Wes to an L1 speaker of English (NS):

Extract 4.4. Adapted from Schmidt (p. 159)

01 Wes: listen / today so funny story
02 NS: yeah / what happened?
03 Wes: you know everyday I’m go to McDonald for
04 lunch
05 NS: yeah
06 Wes: and today I saw so beautiful woman / so
07 beautiful clothes / make-up / everything /
08 NS: but / so crazy!
09 Wes: how? What do you mean?
10 talking to herself / then she’s listen to
11 some person / everybody watch / but no one
12 there / then / somebody / local woman I
13 think say “are you OK?” / she’s so snobbish!
14 / so funny!
15 NS: Jesus

Schmidt analyzed this extract as a well-formed narrative (following Labov, 1972) and, despite Wes’ grammatical inconsistencies, cited this recorded conversation as
evidence of Wes’ conversational competence in L2 English. From an interactional perspective, striking here is how Wes organizes his story at the outset to be an interesting story that is tellable, hearable, and entertaining. Prefacing his story with “listen” (line 1) as a story proposal and attention-getting device, Wes projects the kind of story that is to follow: a recent, personally-experienced, and extremely funny story (line 1: “today so funny story”). In keeping with previous example extracts, Wes’s story preface implies a deviation in everyday norms is responsible for him having a legitimate story to tell. After NS gives Wes the go-ahead to tell his story, Wes produces the story about the “crazy” woman that appeared normal but was talking to herself. What also makes this story of interest to the present discussion is that the speaker describes other people’s behavior (e.g., the local woman, the crazy woman) and assesses it as normal or crazy by comparing and contrasting it against social norms, ultimately resulting in a humorous story—but humorous only by virtue of being “built to manifest transgressions by others of normative standards of conduct” (Drew, 1998, p. 297; i.e., by making moral judgments).

Returning to Extract 4.1 and the interaction between D and R, although “terrible” characterizes the unpleasant nature of the news, it also hearably displays the affective stance of the news-giver (and the expected stance of the news-receiver) toward that news:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{D:} & \quad \text{Didju hear the terrible news?} \\
\text{R:} & \quad \text{No. What?} \\
\text{D:} & \quad \text{Y‘know your Grandpa Bill’s brother Dan?} \\
\text{R:} & \quad \text{He died.} \\
\text{D:} & \quad \text{Yeah.}
\end{align*}
\]

In other words, D indicates a personal stance toward this news as something terrible and expects that R should similarly orient to it that way. In each of the preceding extracts, the prefatory story material either explicitly or implicitly displays the speaker’s stance toward people and events (e.g., as funny, terrible, strange, crazy), while containing an expectational cue that the story recipient should respond in a particular way (e.g., by

\footnote{Although Schmidt considers Wes’ grammatical, sociolinguistic, discourse, and strategic competence, Wes also demonstrates the ability to carry out stance-taking and psychological evaluative work to create a tellable, interesting, and well-formed story.}
providing a go-ahead response, by taking an aligning stance). I have noted that story prefaces provide cues to the recipients regarding how to respond, particularly with an appropriate emotional response. Sacks (1992b, p. 572), making observations relevant to this discussion of story prefaces, tellability, and affective stance, observed that news-telling involves the teller specifying the emotionality of the news very early in the talk and eliciting appropriate emotional responses on the on the recipient’s side (but typically only after the teller further elaborates upon that news):

That is, if someone has some very large news that would involve having sorrow or joy about it, then it’s their business to call others up while they still have the sorrow or joy. And it’s not only their business to call others up while they still have the sorrow or joy, but they should also tell it to them right off. ….Okay, we locate sorrow and joy very early in the conversation relative to the overall organization of the conversation. If we then look at the sorrow/joy sequences, we find that the recipient of the news expresses and appropriate emotion. (p. 572)

An illustrative case of the forefronting of the teller’s emotional stance toward news and the recipient’s affiliated but delayed response is found in Extract 4.4, where Wes prefaces the news with an emotional stance (line 1: “listen / today so funny story”) and the recipient provides an affiliative but delayed emotional response at the end of the story (line 15: “Jesus”).

4.1.3. Subject-Object Relations

Although story prefaces work to convey a speaker’s subjective reaction or stance toward events, they also carry an “objective” quality due to conventionalized constraints on talk. It is not the case that any scenario will make sense. As speakers shape their talk for their interactional recipients (Schegloff & Sacks, 1979) they draw from commonsense knowledge of the world, mutual knowledge between the speakers, and the present conversational context (Maynard, 2003; Schegloff, 1988) to create a believable or recognizable version of reality. This social order is not imposed on the data but is “assembled by participants using their commonsense members’ resources” (Baker, 2003, p. 792). In this way, social members display a sensitivity to talk as both subjective and objective. These subject-object or mind-world relations are a key interest in discursive psychology (e.g., Edwards, 1997, 2005, 2006).
By delivering news or telling stories, talk indexes the speaker’s purported feelings, thoughts, and stances (i.e., the “subject” side) as well as the nature of the world or things being talked about (i.e., the “object” side). In other words, as speakers describe their (subjective) reactions to or stances toward events, those (objective) events are simultaneously being described. For the analyst interested in language and social interaction, this management of subject-object relations can be studied as topic and resource. In Extract 4.1, it is the death of a family member that is treated as “terrible” news. In Extract 4.2, death is humorously treated as both bad news and good news. Therefore, it is not enough that speakers describe an event as “good,” “bad,” “terrible,” and so on—it must be potentially recognizably so (i.e., it must “make sense” in relation to those descriptions).

I have found that in organizing the content, sense, topic, emotionality, etc. of their talk, speakers may also treat their stories as “interpretive puzzles” (e.g., Baker, 2002, p. 792) to be solved. For example, as shown in previous extracts, and as I will discuss in the following sections, speakers may produce an emotional news/story preface and then wait for the listener to ask for clarification or give a go-ahead response21 (e.g., Extracts 4.1, 4.2, 4.4) so that the emotionality of an event (and its meaning in the present) can be unpacked.

4.2. Emotions in Complaint Stories

Considering emotion story prefaces requires acknowledgement of their function in the activity of giving an account. The notion of accounts has a long history in the EMCA literature (for overviews, see Buttny, 1993; Drew, 1998; Garfinkel, 1967; Scott & Lyman, 1968). Here, I focus on a subset of accounts that work as complaints about the conduct of others or justifications for one’s own (i.e., as offensive and defensive descriptions).

Several scholars have shown the presence of emotionality in stories of transgressions, misconduct, and complaints (e.g., Buttny, 1993; Drew, 1998; Edwards, 2005). It is a common occurrence that when faced with breaches in social norms, people

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21 Go-ahead responses to projected tellables are not only verbal. Nonverbal cues (e.g., head nods) and even silence can license the speaker to produce the news or story.
respond with anger, surprise, or other strong emotional reactions (e.g., as found in breaching experiments; Garfinkel, 1967). Edwards (2005) observed that in complaint talk, as in news telling in general, speakers may include an announcement to project the complainer’s stance or attitude. These announcements often consist of an explicit or implied affective stance or emotional description. The following illustrative case from the EMCA literature was previously analyzed by Drew (1998) and Edwards (2007). This extract comes from a telephone conversation between two friends, Lesley and Joyce. After a short sequence in which Lesley inquires about Joyce’s health (potentially analyzable as a “fishing” device by Lesley to encourage Joyce to respond in kind; i.e., as a bid by Lesley to tell her story), Lesley introduces a complaint story through a disjunctive topic shift (lines 9-10):

Extract 4.5. Adapted from Drew (p. 304) and Edwards (2007, p. 37)

01 L: Are you not feeling very well, [we'll, “( )”
02 J: (. )
03 J: No I’m alright
04 (. )
05 L: Yes.
06 (0.6)
07 J: “Ye- is I’m alright,”
08 L: Oh:... hh Yi- m- You know I-I- I’m broiling about something heh heh heh
11 J: [Wha:t.]
12 L: Well that same. (0.2) at at (. ) the vicarage.
13 (0.6)
14 J: Oh ye[ :s
15 L: [.t
16 (0.6)
17 L: u (. ) iyYour friend ‘n mine wz the_re

In an analysis of this canonical complaint sequence (Drew, 1998), Edwards (2007) noted that the speaker prefaces her projected complaint to her friend with a metaphorical emotion formulation (“I’m broiling about something”; see also Extract 2.6). Edwards further considered how Lesley’s metaphorical description and ensuing laughter

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22 On fishing devices, see Pomerantz (1980).
work in the delivery of her story and observed that Lesley’s potentially ironic or comical announcement allows her to simultaneously describe her strong reaction to events while avoiding the appearance that she is overly sensitive or overreactive.

Drew (1998), in an analysis of this and similar complaint sequences, also found that announcements and story introductions are common features of complaint talk. In particular, Drew showed that complaint sequences tend to be clearly bounded, set off by disjunctive openings and closings. In his analysis, Drew noted that Lesley’s emotional utterance (lines 9-10: “Oh::... hh Yi-m- You ↓ know I-I- I’m broiling about something”) functions as a story introduction that introduces a new topic. Drew further observed that in characterizing their emotional response to transgressions, speakers tend to formulate these expressions as first-person assessments to emphasize the personal nature of their grievance:

In this respect it may be noted that these expressions of indignation are formed as first person assessments, for example, as “I was so angry,” “’l th’ tee’d me o::ff,” rather than generalized assessments (in the form “it was so…”). (p. 311)

In these prefaces, attention-getting devices, or summonses (Schegloff, 1972), speakers design disjunctive sequences (Couper-Kuhlen, 2004) by means of lexical prefaces (e.g., “oh,” “hey”), address terms, and paralinguistic cues, to make them hearable as emotional announcements (e.g., by highlighting particular stances and the personal, memorable, and tell-worthy nature of events)—as illustrated in the preceding extracts:

Extract 4.1: “Didju hear...”

Extract 4.2: “an’ I guess you heard about...”

Extract 4.3: “Some guy came out and...”

Extract 4.4: “listen...”

Extract 4.5: “°Oh::...”

Similarly, as I will show in an analysis of my own interview data, I found that emotional
prefaces (via explicit and implicit indexing and projection of emotional episodes) also function as sequence boundary markers.

As I have mentioned, in EMCA work on story prefaces and complaint talk, researchers have been primarily interested in spontaneous tellings, not in stories or accounts elicited by the researcher or other conversational interactants. However, the qualitative research interview is a hybrid event (van den Berg, Wetherell, & Houtkoop-Steenstra, 2003), exhibiting features of both institutional talk and conversation. Attending to the ways in which interview talk is brought about can serve as a powerful critique of the findings of interview-based research and can better open up the social and institutional activity of interview for inspection. In the following section I extend previous work on story-prefaces and first-person complaints in an analysis of the present study data.

4.3. Emotion Story Prefaces in Interview Talk

In this study, in keeping with findings of previous research on complaint talk and storytelling, common ways that interviewees invoked emotionality was through story prefaces, immediately before they launched into a complaint story or a description of an emotional episode. I refer to these story preface subtypes as emotion story prefaces. Emotion story prefaces, like narrative openers (Ochs & Schieffelin, 1989) and news telling in general, involve matters relating to tellability, stance, and subject-object relations. A distinguishing feature of emotion story prefaces, as the name suggests, is their focus on the emotionality of events and/or emotional reactions to them. Often these prefaces make use of explicit emotion terms (e.g., “anger,” “mad,” “shame”) as descriptive labels for a projected story. Speakers also make emotionality inferentially available through their vocal delivery (e.g., intonation, emphasis, laughter, tone) and description of the episode as unforgettable or personally difficult.

4.3.1. Emotion Story Preface Examples

The following extracts illustrate how interviewees in this study prefaced talk of emotional episodes. I first present some selected examples of these prefaces to outline some of their general features. These extracts are presented in extended sequences to better show the context and trajectory of their production. I then take up some of these
extracts in more detail to better explicate the function of emotion story prefaces in the activity of the qualitative research interview.

Leading up to the following example (Extract 4.6) from an initial interview, Sang (S) had been talking about how he did not speak any English when he first arrived in the US. The interviewer (M) then asks Sang if he can think of any particular experiences related to learning English. When no immediate response is forthcoming, the interviewer prompts Sang by stating that another interviewee had mentioned a funny experience (Chapter 5 discusses interviewer-prompted stories). It is at this point that Sang produces an emotion story preface (lines 4-7):

**Extract 4.6. Sang**

01 M: an' then he told me (0.7) about that experience.
02 it was kind of a funny experience.
03 (1.3)
04 S: u:::m
05 (2.7)
06 well? (0.6) ( ) remember like s- (. ) mos’
07 people (they) say bad word we don’t know nothing
08 (.)
09 M: uh[uh=
10 S: [we just say “yes”, (. ) yeah we smiling?= 
11 M: =uh[uh
12 S: [EHAHAHAHA .hhh $ after we know we say like
13 “oh like THIS guy BA:(H)D” $ ((claps hands))
14 M: oh (. ) like (. ) that happened here?
15 (0.8)
16 in,
17 S: $ ‘in United Sta[te$ $ ]''uhu:h''=
18 M: [>in the United State]s?<
19 S: ‘in Illinois this the firs’state I come here’
20 M: OH Illinois?
21 (.)
22 S: ‘yeah’
23 (1.3)
24 M: so what happened
25 (1.2)
26 S: so (I was) y’know I feel uh awww=now I know
27 that- (. )$ that one you cannot say that word
28 anymo(h):r(h)e $ heheheh
29 M: oh- like students were saying to you?=
S: $ "yeah" $ ['yeah'] [yeah (tha's right)]
M: =like classmates at [ ] [school?
S: (1.0)
M: (=that "we're gonna fuck you" or something=I
don't know that guy ( ) did they "fuck you
you" $ "OKA:::Y $ [I (love) you" (. ) smiling
[>eheh eheh eheh<
M: >(I know I [do that]<
S: [((S slaps leg))]
(0.5)
M: when I know that word "(that's when) I get mad
[*uh*]
S: [oh
M: (1.8)
S: was it difficult learning English?
[S talks about learning English in high school]

A second example comes from my second interview with Kim (K). As a touched-off second story, this extract follows a previous complaint story about her experiences with customers in her job as a department store clerk. In that story Kim described how a mother and daughter accused her of discriminating against them by refusing to assist them, and how they even claimed that Kim was unable to speak English. Kim then describes how her manager, Mary, came to her defense. After completing her story, and receiving an emotional response from the interviewer (M) (line 16: "wow"), Kim produces a story preface (lines 23-24) linked to the emotionality and unforgettablility of events:

Extract 4.7. Kim

01 K: so (. ) Mary said. Mary asked her "If she
doesn’t speak English, how do you know (that)
she refused?"
04 M: heh
05 K: and that’s first. and second (. ) Mary said (. )
07 "Kim’s work her long time. we never have any
complaint about she (. ) her-her English. so I
don’t think it’s right that you bring it out
that this discrimination."
10 M: hm
11 K: and Mary she just step back and she say you know
what? "that- that is what we call
Another example comes from an early interview with John (J), where he has just finished telling the interviewer (M) two stories about his early experiences in high school soon after he arrived in the US. One story was about how an American boy bullied him.
(discussed in Chapter 5 as Extract 5.10), and the other was about how the bigger American boys knocked him around in gym class after the teacher forced him to play football for the first time. While the interviewer checks the recorder, John displays his work to come up with a relevant story. John then produces an emotion story preface in lines 11-17:

Extract 4.8. John

01 J: .hhh (0.9) anyway so what else (. ) what else?  
02 (1.4)  
03 M: "second (0.5) check this. (1.0) this is working  
04 (. ) testing testing" ((M is checking the  
05 audiorecorder and the microphone))  
06 (1.5)  
07 okay  
08 (1.2)  
09 say something  
10 (1.3)  
→ 11 J: OH (0.3) OH then=  
12 M: =>"oh there we go okay"=((M is setting up the  
13 microphone))=  
→ 14 J: =remember, (9.5) remember like (0.5) how sh::ame  
→ 15 we-we not try to speak English in Philippines  
→ 16 because we like (0.7) ashamed to open my-my- our  
→ 17 mouth?=  
18 M: =why is that?  
19 (0.5)  
20 J: I dunno I guess because like=  
21 M: =mean [in ] the class with Canadian teacher?=  
22 J: [uh-]  
23 M: =with=  
24 J: =YEAH even in the class or, (0.6)  
25 [an’ then outside ] you always have all=  
26 M: [with Filipino people?]  
27 J: =the Vietnamese people around you s[o ]y-you=  
28 M: [oh]  
29 J: =don’t open your mouth(by them) (. ) in the class  
30 you kinda like, (1.5) you shame like you- when  
31 you speak up you might say something wro:ng or,  
32 ( . ) somebody might laugh at you. cuz that’s ho-  
33 ( . ) uh that’s how all the kid in Vietnam like  
34 that=even now my-my nieces and nephew in Vietnam  
35 when I went to see them? and I ask (0.9) I told
‘em “speak up” (. ) I mean (. ) “can you guys say
something ’English?” and they shame “yeah” and
that’s how I was. (0.9) how I used to be.

an’ then when I was in high school here (0.4)
an’ I realize that like (0.6) “oh you gotta open
your mouth otherwi’ you never (. ) be able to
speak.

so (0.5) I just open my mouth one day an’ start
talking? talking, (0.7) talking to English
[to-
M: [in high school?
(0.4)
J: yeah, even- (. ) I know I said wrong I have to
say it=
M: =uhuh
(0.4)
but how did you do that?
[J goes on to give examples of how he made
himself speak in English]

In the present study data, emotion story prefaces were not limited to one-on-one
interviews. They were also found, for example, in group interactions. The following
sample extract (Extract 4.9) takes place in the middle of mealtime conversation involving
the interviewer (M), Trang (T, an immigrant from Cambodia and Vietnam), Sang (S, an
immigrant from Cambodia), and Jim (J, a Japanese-American friend of the interviewer
and Sang). This extract follows a conversation led by Trang about the hatred between
Cambodians and Vietnamese23 (tied to their embittered wartime past) and includes a
segment where the interactants joke about the confusion with Trang and Sang’s name
(although it is not apparent from their pseudonyms, their English name is the same). After
a 3.0-second group silence, Trang produces an emotion story preface in a disjunctive
topic opener (lines 30-31):

23 The ethnic tensions between Vietnamese and Cambodians, Southeast Asians (e.g., Vietnamese,
Cambodians, Filipinos, Lao) and East Asians (e.g., Japanese, Koreans, Chinese), and Asians and Whites,
were represented in much of the research participants’ talk.
Extract 4.9. Matt, Trang, Sang, and Jim (mealtime conversation)

01 T: that’s why most Cambodian don’t like
02 Vietnamese.
03 (2.0)
04 they call Vietnamese cheater.
05 (1.3)
06 right?
07 (0.5)
08 Sang?24
09 (2.4)
10 Sang?
11 (0.3)
12 hh heh
13 (0.3)
14 Sang
15 (0.3)
16 J: I know that’s funny you guys (0.5) HAH
17 T: Sang?
18 (0.3)
19 J: "(can’t understand)"
20 (1.1)
21 S: sometimes you say “Sang” I say “HUH?”
22 (0.3)
23 M: [heh
24 S: ["(you over there)" "(looks at Trang)"
25 M: =Sangha:: ((Sang’s Khmer name))
26 (0.2)
27 T: [Sang ]ha
28 S: ["yeah"
29 (3.2)
30 T: I-I was scare’ you know the first time when I
31 (. ) left Vietnam to Cambodia.
32 (0.9) an’ then (0.3) I cros-I-wen- I-I took a
33 train b-by myself. (1.0)
34 ( ) Phnom Penh city (0.9) past- (0.3) past
35 [his ((looking at Sang)) uh, (0.5) his uh—
36 S? [ [khmer] ]
37 (1.6)
38 T: his province.
39 (0.4)
40 J: "uhuh"

24 In this interaction, Trang and Sang used and were referred to by the same English name. In line 25, M uses Sang’s Khmer name (also a pseudonym here).
Based on these illustrative extracts, a few general observations can be made. First, although the emotional prefaces appear in various interactional contexts (e.g., office interview, home interview, dinner conversation), all are introduced as bounded, disjunctive openings. For example, each comes after a pause in conversation and contains some kind of an announcement, attention-getting device, or explicit emotion description that enables the teller to redirect or advance the topic of conversation. In Extract 4.6, after Sang uses “u:::m” to display a search for material or a “thinking” stance, he uses “well?” (line 6) and memory claims (line 6: “remember like”) to project a tellable. In Extract 4.7, Kim makes use of the contrastive marker “but” (line 23), increased volume, repetition,
unforgettability claims, and extreme case formulations to build the emotionality of her story preface (lines 23-24: “but- (. ) ONE-ONE more (. ) that’s the one thing I can never forget”). Like Sang, John (Extract 4.8) also displays a search for tellable material (line 1: “.hhh (0.9) anyway so what else (. ) what else?”), and builds into his story preface an emphatic “Oh” (line 11), a lexical preface (Couper-Kuhlen, 2004) and change of state token (Heritage, 1984), to indicated a disjunctive shift. In all of these examples, the interviewees build into their prefaces cues that shift attention and initiate a slot in the ongoing interaction to share autobiographic material. In Extract 4.9, for example, Trang prefaces the telling of his negative experience in Cambodia by describing himself as “scare” (line 30).

Another important feature of these emotion story prefaces is that although they are bounded sequences, they are also preceded by material that occasions or otherwise leads into the preface and subsequent story. In Extract 4.6, Sang’s emotion story preface to a story about learning a “bad word” is preceded by the interviewer’s request for an experience about language learning and a story prompt recounting another interviewee’s “funny” experience (see Chapter 5 for an analysis of emotion talk prompted by interviewer questioning sequences). In Extract 4.7, Kim’s emotion story preface follows her earlier story, functioning as a touched-off second story rather than one requested or prompted by the interviewer. The pre-preface material in Extract 4.8 shows the interviewer engaged in the side activity of checking the recording equipment, and the John, the interviewee, searching for appropriate topic material to fit into the upcoming sequence. The preface does not begin until the interviewer prompts the interviewee with an imperative: “say something” (line 9). In Extract 4.9, Trang’ preface shifts from playful group talk about Trang and Sang’s English name to return to a continuation of the earlier talk of ethnic conflict. As these extracts illustrate, emotion story prefaces do not stand alone, nor do they simply lead into the telling of an emotion-related story: they are retrospective and projective transitions in a larger sequence of topic shifts, questions, and interaction.

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25 This is not to claim that anything that is treated as memorable is linked with emotion; however, both laypersons and cognitive scientists (see Kensinger, 2009) treat the emotional content of events as well as the emotional states they induce as important components of memory and remembering.
An important but easily-overlooked feature of these emotion story prefaces is that they are successful. None of them shut down the conversation or are met with rejections or resistance to the telling of the projected stories. Each results in a successfully told story sequence and comes to its completion before transitioning into a new sequence. In Extract 4.9, Trang continues his story without any verbal prompts, continuers, or go-ahead responses from the other interactants. Admittedly, although some of the nonverbal data was written in field notes, without video data, we cannot know where, when, and what other nonverbal cues (e.g., eye gaze, head nods) facilitated this telling. We can observe, however, that M’s upshot formulation of T’s story (line 51: “so you kept your mouth shut”) functions as a typical closing move to the story sequence (Heritage & Watson, 1979; Schegloff, 2007). In the same extract, Jim’s hesitation and abandoned utterance in line 57 (“OH umm,”), his weak affiliation in line 59 (“mm”), lack of continuers and affiliatory and emotion responses from the other recipients, the long 3.5-second silence (line 65), and abrupt topic shift by M (line 66: “so are you guys really going to X Shopping Center?”), may all be indications of the story recipients’ treatment of Trang’s story as sensitive or delicate—and thus a display of their reluctance to comment or pursue the topic with continuers or follow-up questions.

In Extracts 4.6 and 4.8, the interviewer takes an active role by providing acknowledgement tokens (e.g., “uhuh”; “oh”) and asking questions to unpack details of the interviewee’s stories (e.g., Extract 4.6, line 14: “oh (. ) like (. ) that happened here?”; line 24: “so what happened?”; Extract 4.8, line 18: “why is that?”; line 49: “in high school?”). At the end of these story sequences, the interviewer also introduces a question that narrows or refocuses the topic toward the interview agenda (see Chapter 5 on interviewer question sequences). For example, in Extract 4.6, at the end of Sang’s story sequence about learning the meaning of the expletive “fuck,” the interviewer suggests further interest in eliciting trouble talk by asking, “was it difficult learning English?” (line

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26 Of course, as the goal of interviews is to elicit interviewee talk and information, it is in the interest of the interviewer to allow the interviewees to continue. It should also be noted that the interviewees were all able story tellers. However, see Extract 5.15 and the discussion on story elicitation failures.

27 On delicates, see Lerner (in press); Schegloff (2007); on culturally sensitive topic management, see Cheng (2003).
In Extract 4.8, after John talks about the shame and fear of speaking in English, the interviewer asks, “but how did you do that?” (line 54)—showing his interest in John as an individual (not just someone whose experience is similar to other people from Vietnam) and the factors motivating or initiating his decision to speak up.

Taking a discursive and rhetorical perspective to emotion story prefaces, I have noted that emotion story prefaces are both preceded by talk that fits into the occasioning of the preface as well as talk that the preface occasions. I will now examine Extract 4.8 in more detail to show how emotionality is projected and how it influences the unfolding interaction.

4.3.2. A Worked Example: John

Pre-preface material

In Extract 4.8, J’s pre-preface material locates him, the interviewer, the interview context, and the emotional content of his autobiographic talk. It also sheds as much light on the interview context itself as it does J’s talk of his experiences. Seen in the larger interactional context, J’s emotion story preface can be seen as shaped by the local context of the telling. Lines 1-10 are particularly significant for showing how this emotional talk gets established or selected (Chapter 6 will consider emotion formulations and selection in more detail).

In line 1 of this extract, J displays a search for material to fit M’s interview agenda (“.hhh (0.9) anyway so what else (.) what else?”), showing his understanding that he is expected to recall and produce talk of autobiographic experience for the interviewer. As I will show throughout these chapters, emotionality is made to be a part of the interview agenda. It is unclear whether J’s audible topic search (line 1) is meant as self-talk or an implicit clarification request to the interviewer; however, because it is said aloud and followed by a 1.4-second pause, it is potentially hearable by M as a request. Instead of responding to J’s utterance as a clarification request by giving him examples of potential topics, M focuses on the recording device (lines 3-7) and defers his response to J’s topic search (lines 3-4: “second (0.5) check this. (1.0) this is working (.) testing testing”), essentially putting J and the “on the record” (i.e., interview, information-sharing) activity on hold. In line 7, with a change of state token “okay” (Heritage, 1984),
M signals a shift in the present activity or a “state of readiness for moving to next-positioned matters” (Beach, p. 143).

After initiating a new activity, M confirms that the recorder is working and then in line 9 instructs J to “say something”—returning to the on the record activity of the interview. M’s utterance to J in line 9 could potentially be taken by J in one of two ways: (a) say something so M can check the recording levels, or (b) say something relevant to the interview agenda (i.e., continue telling a story or sharing experience). After a 1.3-second pause in line 10, J provides two emphatic (through louder volume) tokens (line 11: “OH (0.3) OH”) that show a change from a state of not knowing to a state of knowing (e.g., from being unsure about an appropriate topic to now having remembered and selected one). In line 12, produced as a softer and rapid utterance, M latches onto J’s talk to indicate that the recorder is set and now they can continue on the record (“>° oh there we go okay˚<”). Only after both M and J transition from peripheral or off-the-record talk (e.g., what to talk about, setting up the recording device), does J produce his emotion story preface (lines 14-17).

**Emotion story preface**

In this extract, John continues our interview session by prefacing his currently-projected story with a reference to a previously-told story where he talked about the shame he and other refugees felt when speaking English in the camps in the Philippines:

14 J:  =remember, (9.5) remember like (0.5) how sh::ame
15 we-we **not** try to speak English in Philippines
16 because we like (0.7) ashamed to open my- my- our
17 mouth?

As many EMCA scholars (Edwards, 1997; Jefferson, 1978; Ryave, 1978; Sacks, 1992; Sidnell, 2010) have noted, stories often appear in clusters and series—with one touching off and leading into another. Sacks observed that “second” (and subsequent) stories work as displays of intersubjectivity because, similar to the way that a listener’s response (e.g., “I see”) functions as a display of understanding to the primary speaker, second stories also function as receipts of and responses to previous stories by doing such things as continuing the topic, commenting on the same characters, and reasserting or
challenging positions (Edwards, 1997; Sacks, 1992; Silverman, 1998).

A common pattern in the telling of second stories is that speaker A tells a story and then speaker B latches on to features of that story to tell his or her own related story (see also Sacks, 1992, on tying techniques). Alternatively, a single speaker may tell a series of stories, linking one to another (e.g., Extract 4.8). Speakers may also co-tell a shared story (e.g., Lerner, 1992). Extract 4.8 differs from much of the previous EMCA work on stories because it is not a case of a speaker offering up a new yet related story—it is a speaker referring to and repeating a version of the same story (see also discourse analytic work on repeated stories by Koven, 2002; Norrick, 1998; Prior, 2011; Schiffrin, 2006).

J’s explicit link to a previously-shared telling (line 14: “remember (9.5) remember like”), and lexical description of “shame” in his emotion story preface (lines 16-18: “how sh::ame...we like (0.7) ashamed,,,”), create an interpretive frame (Goffman, 1981) for the interviewer to hear and respond to this projected story. J directly links these feelings of shame with speaking English in the refugee camp in the Philippines, and he makes these emotions personal (i.e., his own) as well as collectively shared (lines 15-16: “we-we not try”; “ashamed to open my-my- our mouth”). Moreover, by linking this emotion story preface with his almost 10-second display of “remembering” and appeals to shared knowledge based on his interactional history with M, J is also invoking the emotionality of his past experience (e.g., as “shame”) as well as the consistency of his characterization of those events across time.

This extract also shows that emotion talk on its own may not always be treated as self-explanatory by recipients—particularly when the recipient is an interviewer engaged in the activity of soliciting emotional and subjective talk of experience. By treating emotion talk and emotion state claims as interpretive puzzles, recipients may require the speaker to account for them, potentially even occasioning further emotion displays. For example, after J provides his emotion story preface (lines 14-17), M makes a request for an account to explain why J and the other members in the camp were ashamed (line 18:

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28 Sacks (1992) refers to tying techniques (via pronouns, conjunctions, repetitions, and so on) as ways that speakers build links between turns of talk.
“why is that?”). J prefaces his response with (line 20: “I dunno I guess because like”). Researchers have noted that epistemic uncertainty markers such as “I don’t know” and “I dunno” are frequently used in response to questioning. They can be ways of handling the speaker’s stake or interest in the building of a particular description (Edwards, 2005; Potter, 1998).

In an analysis of a televised interview between journalist Martin Bashir and Princess Diana that followed on the wake of an expose on the royal family in a recently published biography, Potter observed that Diana’s use of “dunno” in response to Bashir’s question acts served as a device to manage potential face or identity threat (partially reproduced below as Extract 4.10). In light of the fact that Diana’s involvement in the book has been established, and the book has made trouble for the royal family, Diana’s response works to sidestep implications that her actions as pre-planned, vindictive, or otherwise motivated. Instead, she coordinates her verbal and nonverbal responses to claim that an answer is not readily at hand:


01 B: How would a book change that.
02 PD: I [↑] dunno. ((raises eyebrows, looks away))
03 Maybe people have a better understanding (.)
04 maybe there’s a lot of women out there
05 who suffer (.) on the same level
06 but in a different environment (.)
07 who are unable to: (stand up for themselves (.)
08 because (.) their self-esteem is (.) cut into two.
09 I dunno ((shakes head))

The use of “dunno” or “I don’t know” may also indicate that the speaker does not know how to respond—or is taking an oppositional stance toward the question (Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 1995; Wooffitt, 2005):

Extract 4.11. Adapted from Widdicombe and Wooffitt (1995, pp. 96-97)

01 I: Can you tell me something about your style and the
02 way you look,
03 (0.7)
04 I: how would you describe yourselves
Returning to Extract 4.8, we cannot know if J, by his “I dunno”-prefaced response is attending to matters of stake and interest, indicating an inability to respond, or even resisting or rejecting M’s question. We can observe, however, that his unsure and tentative response displays a lack of certainty and is met by M with a latched question that elicits some of the necessary contextual information for the telling of the story. M and J then go through some subsequent clarification steps (lines 20-27) to establish the setting (e.g., in English class with the Canadian teacher; with Vietnamese people inside and outside class) and then J moves to unpack what he means by “shame.”

In terms of responsibility, J’s description of events attributes the unwillingness or failure to try to speak English in the camp to feelings of shame—rather than to lack of opportunity or aptitude, personality flaw, or other obstacle. Shame here is characterized by J not as an emotion inherent in the activity of speaking, but a result of social stigma arising from making mistakes and being laughed at by others (lines 27-32). This claim is naturalized even further as J extends it from himself and the other members in that refugee camp to include “all the kid in Vietnam” (lines 33-34). J offers up a personal example based on his young family members in present-day Vietnam to exemplify and strengthen his claims. He then projects a possible completion point for his story by making a distinction between how he was in the past with how he is now.

In Extract 4.8, not only has J provided the interviewer with an emotion-related story, he has also provided one related to language learning, language use, and his personal experiences across time—thereby displaying his understanding of the relevant interview identity (i.e., immigrant, L2 English user) and fulfilling his role as interviewee by providing corresponding talk of autobiographical experience.

**Post-story material**

At the possible completion point of J’s story (line 38: “that’s how I was. (0.9) how I used to be.”), in line 39 (a transition-relevant place), the interviewer has an
available slot to take a turn to respond to J’s previous talk. After a one-second pause and no contribution from M, J continues by making a link from the past to the present and his psychological change (by means of represented speech to show his cognitive state): (lines 40-43: “an’ then when I was in high school here (0.4) an’ I realize that like (0.6) “oh you gotta open your mouth otherwi’ you never (.) be able to speak”). Again, this is a potential completion point and transition relevant place, but still there is no uptake from M after a one-second pause, so J continues (line 45-47: “so (0.5) I just open my mouth one day an’ start talking? talking, (0.7) talking to English to-”). M then responds with an overlapping question about the place/time setting (line 48: “in high school?”). After a short pause, J provides a confirmation (line 50: “yeah”) with another possible completion point (lines 50-51: “even- (.I know I said wrong I have to say it”). M gives an acknowledgement (line 52: “uhuh”) and, after a short pause, initiates a new sequence by a question (line 54: “but how did you do that?”). The contrastive marker “but,” while demonstrating M’s understanding of J’s talk, treats it as insufficient. The stress on the verb “do” makes clear M’s present interview agenda is not about the content and quality of talk that J produced after deciding to speak up; rather, M is displaying an interest in what initiated J to do so.

In the preceding section, focusing on an extended interview extract, I showed that emotion story prefaces must be seen in light of the context of the material that precedes and follows the prefaces and their stories. Although emotion story prefaces may be initiated by the interviewer and/or the interviewee, both parties work together to signal and recognize sequence boundaries to enable a preface and its story to be produced and located in the ongoing interaction. In the following section, I consider some normative features of emotion story prefaces in more detail.

4.3.3. Normative Features of Emotion Story Prefaces

Interviewers and interview participants not only carry out the interview activity through question and answer sequences, they also orient to the normative nature of that institutional format (e.g., Wooffitt, 2005). Although talking about news interviews, Wooffitt’s observations are equally relevant to the qualitative research interview:

What is interesting, however, is not merely that this is how interaction proceeds in news interviews, but that this is how participants tacitly expect it to proceed. It is
a normative arrangement which bestows obligations and expectations on the participants in different ways. (p. 57, emphasis in original)

As shown in the extracts in preceding sections, interviewees offer emotion story prefaces while demonstrating sensitivity to the conversational context (i.e., that their talk “fit” the research interview requirements). I also showed that interviewers may orient to the relevance or meaning of these emotion story prefaces by asking for further clarification (e.g., Extract 4.8, line 18: “why is that?”) to unpack the causes and contexts surrounding these descriptions. The normative nature of talk (not limited to interviews) as requiring a demonstration of the relevance of one’s claims is further illustrated in Extract 4.12. This is from an interview with Trang (T). In this segment he invokes emotionality and makes it explicit that he expects this to lead to an account:

Extract 4.12. Trang

01 T: I don’t belong to Vietnamese community. I
02 don’t belong to Cambodian community because
03 they always talk about me. why?
04 (2.0)
→ 05 ask me?
06 (2.0)
→ 07 M: why?

In line 1, T makes an emotional claim about not belonging to Vietnamese or Cambodian communities because they talk about him. Although he does not use explicit emotion labels (e.g., “mad,” “shame,” “anger”) at this point, it is hearable as an emotion story preface. This emotionality is brought off by the way T treats what is knowledge shared with the interviewer and what is not shared (i.e., what is “news”). In his turn, T formulates himself as not belonging to either the Vietnamese or the Cambodian communities. By not going into an explanation as to why he should be expected to be a part of those communities, he is displaying the shared understanding that membership in those communities is assumed (e.g., because of his ethnic background, language ability, and other biographical details). However, produced through syntactic parallelism (e.g., “I don’t belong to X,” “I don’t belong to Y”), his claims of not belonging create a dramatic counter-normative rhetorical contrast to what the interviewer is treated as knowing. A
hearable extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) in T’s statement (line 3: “they always talk about me”) characterize the gossip or other talk about him an ongoing and habitual activity by those ethnic communities. In addition, by claiming category exclusion from the Vietnamese and Cambodian communities, he rhetorically locates himself in an unnamed place. By not naming that place (e.g., as “in-between,” “Canadian community,” “American community”) or even by not naming any place of “belonging,” he creates un-belonging by contrast. Thus, as these claims of not belonging are worked up as hearably extreme, they are also made to be emotion implicative.

Even as T works up the nature of his experience as emotional and undesirable, he also orients to an interactional expectation that these present claims require unpacking to be understood (line 3: “why?”). However, when T’s account request prompt is not met with the desired response from the interviewer (M), even after a long two-second silence, T then makes it explicit through an imperative utterance and rising intonation (line 5: “ask me?”). In other words, T is modeling for the interviewer the response that he expects. By taking the direction of the interview and asking a question, T now has reversed the typical interview frame and the roles of interviewer and interviewee. The subsequent two-second silence may be an orientation by M to this unexpected frame switch. It is noticeable, however, that T does not continue his story until M has provided the second-pair part to his request (line 7: “why?”)—treating this as the expected and necessary response for T to continue.

4.3.4. Emotion Story Prefaces and Remembering/Memory Claims

I noted earlier that when prefacing and projecting proposed tellables, interviewees may make the emotionality of an episode inferentially available by describing it as memorable or unforgettable. In other words, the memorability and enduring impact of events are treated as deriving from their emotional impact (see Brown & Kulik, 1977; Maynard, 2003; Wooffitt, 1992, 2005, on “flashbulb memories”). Maynard (2003), for example, found that not only do people tend to remember momentous news (e.g., births, deaths, disasters), they also remember comparatively mundane events (e.g., illness,

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29 A two-second pause is not intrinsically long, but its duration relative to the surrounding talk makes it hearably long.
promotions, breakups, transgressions). Maynard suggests that both good and bad news interrupt the taken-for-granted normality of our social world and “inevitably provoke emotional reactions of one kind or another just as they necessitate a realignment to and realization of a transfigured social world” (p. 4).

Taking an interest in the pragmatic organization of memory claims, Wooffitt (2005) pointed out the assumption that memorable (i.e., emotional) events are accurately recalled is false. Recall of memorable events (e.g., the 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger explosion) has been shown to be subject to change over time (see Neisser, Berman, Schreiber, Palmer, & Weldon, 1996; Neisser & Harsch, 1992; Wooffitt, 2005). Wooffitt has suggested abandoning the pursuit of accurate recall (since that cannot be verified anyway) by refocusing instead on memory claims as methods of persuasion and identity work.

Embedded in extended interviews, the emotion story prefaces and stories in this study were found to link back to previous talk and memorable events, thus doing an embodied display of remembering (Heritage, 2005a) as well as topical coherence or tying (Sacks, 1992). As analyst, this is neither to claim nor deny that speakers are pulling stories from their memory to share with the interviewer; rather, it is to emphasize that interviewees responded to the interview context and questions by engaging in recognizable demonstrations to show they were actively searching for and selecting relevant autobiographical stories and experiences. For example, turning again to Extract 4.8, the interviewee makes memory claims central to his story preface:

11 J:  OH (0.3) OH then=
12 M: => oh there we go okay<= ((setting up microphone))
14 J: =remember (9.5) remember like (0.5) how
15 sh:ame we-we not try to speak English in
16 Philippines because we like (0.7) ashamed to
17 open my-my- our mouth?

In line 11, J makes use of an oh-prefaced response (Heritage, 1984, 1998a, 2005a) and adverbial topic continuer (“then”) to indicate topical coherence while embodying a search for and successful retrieval of a relevant memory. From line 14, J ties that memory
to a shared interactional history with the interviewer (based on a previous telling) to preface his story.

Another example of the use of explicit memory claims in emotion story prefaces comes from Kim (discussed earlier as Extract 4.7). In this extract, she talks about one of her experiences in her job as a department store clerk. After telling several related stories about problematic interactions with customers, she spontaneously produces an emotion story preface using explicit memory claims:

23  K: but (. ) ONE ONE more (. ) that’s the one thing I
24       can never forget.

K characterizes the relevance and unforgettableness of the projected story in several ways. First, “ONE ONE more” categorizes this story as belonging to the previous series of complaint stories, thereby maintaining topical coherence. Second, she makes an explicit claim of its memorability (lines 23-24: “that’s the one thing I can never forget”) as a reason for being able to recall it. Third, not only is the projected story described as unforgettable, it is formulated with extreme case formulations as “the one thing” that Kim can “never” forget—as the most unforgettable episode in this series of complaint stories. Third, her animated vocal delivery, produced by the louder volume on “ONE,” repetition, and emphasis on “never,” makes the emotionality of this story hearable.

In addition to characterizing emotional events as memorable and recallable, speakers may also make contrasts with what is not recallable. In Extract 4.9, I showed how Trang brought up the topic of hostility between Vietnamese and Cambodians in his group talk. In an individual interview, he again describes the angry relations between Cambodians and Vietnamese and then draws parallels with the historically-situated wartime hatred of the Japanese and French by Americans. He links emotionality with what is and is not recallable:

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30 At the time of this interview, the United States’ anti-French sentiment (e.g., “Freedom Fries”) tied to the Iraq war made this selection particularly salient. It is also important to note that Trang represents himself as knowledgeable about French language and culture—as his partner is French and he has traveled to France several times.
Extract 4.13. Trang

24 T: I have a classmate in ((city in Canada)) call me names.
25 M: like what?
26 T: he called me (.) for example (5.0) what do Americans call French when they’re angry?
27 (2.0) they call them frogs. if the American during the wartime between American and Japanese American have war with Japanese (.) they say Jap. when you (.) have war with another country you give each one a name.
28 for example in Cambodia (.) they call Vietnamese a name (.) a bad name. I didn’t expect to hear that in my face. especially from a classmate. I’m just a young man trying to grow up in North America (.) trying to go on with my life. I met a Cambodian classmate.
29 → we get along ok. but later on (.) we disagree about something. I don’t remember (.)
30 → but I just remember he called me a name (.) a name I didn’t expect to hear.
31 so I didn’t want to associate as much with some of them. I have to be selective. ‘cuz I don’t want to hear any negative toward me again.

In his version of events, T describes what is memorable (e.g., meeting a Cambodian classmate, getting along, having a disagreement, being called a name) in contrast to what is not memorable (e.g., the specifics of his disagreement with his classmate). A question that arises is, What do speakers achieve by making claims of remembering and forgetting? As I have discussed, claims of the memorability of events characterizes their strong impact upon and personal significance for the speaker. Conversely, claims of not remembering or forgetting suggest events were not important enough to remember. Memory failures are also a means by which speakers may attempt to avoid blame or other negative assessments, particularly when called to provide details “for the record”—such as in courtroom settings (e.g., Bogen & Lynch, 1989; Coulter, 1985; Lynch & Bogen, 1996, 2005) and counseling sessions (e.g., Edwards, 1997). By claiming not to remember, witnesses to events are neither confirming nor denying the
objective or subjective nature of events but are indicating their “practical unavailability” (Lynch & Bogen, p. 184) and are able to resist the force of interrogation (Ekman, 1985).

Lynch and Bogen (1996), in their ethnomethodological analysis of the testimonies of Oliver North and other witnesses in the Reagan era Iran-Contra hearings, observed that practical unavailability can be a two-edged sword. On the one hand, by not remembering, social members can avoid having to deny or give an account for their involvement in events. On the other hand, as Lynch and Bogen note, there are “standards of memorability” (p. 196) against which social members are held to be publicly accountable. Oliver North’s repeated claims of an inability to remember key events that someone in his position should remember caused him to be held accountable and even treated as purposely evasive. Lynch and Bogen’s work demonstrated that the success or failure of one’s memory claims is dependent upon not how forcefully or consistently one makes those claims but upon whether those claims are treated by one’s interactants as sufficient or deficient.

Discursive psychologists have given much attention to the function of memory claims and terms in discourse (e.g., Edwards, 1997). They have found that claims of what is remembered or forgotten can shape the details of autobiographic talk as well as the self-presentation work that the talk achieves:

Inability to recall certain details may also provide a way of implying that those details were not worth remembering. This can imply that, despite the significance they might obtain later … they did not have that significance at the time for the person now remembering, and this in turn can signal and innocent involvement in those events. (Edwards, p. 285)

In Extract 4.13, by stating, “we disagree about something. I don’t remember” (lines 40-41), T treats the disagreement as secondary to the primary matter of being called a name. Whatever the exact nature of the disagreement was, by not naming it, he characterizes the outcome of that conflict, rather than the conflict itself, as significant. Also, by claiming an inability to recall the disagreement, T makes that disagreement unavailable for scrutiny by the interviewer and avoids any implications of wrongdoing on his part. In contrast with his memory failure, T’s memory claims (lines 42-43: “but I just remember he called me a name (. . a name I didn’t expect to hear”) shows what T treats as
memorable and important: that he was called a name and that it was a name he did not expect to hear in North America. A result of Trang’s discursive work to show what is memorable and relevant to the ongoing interaction is that his negative feelings and decision to avoid the Vietnamese and Cambodian communities come off as natural and understandable reactions (rather than overreactions) to mistreatment.

Memory claims in emotion story prefaces are not always explicit. Returning to the emotion story preface in Extract 4.12, it was shown that T made an implicit memory claim by using an extreme case formulation to describe the mistreatment by others as ongoing and habitual:

```
01 T: I don’t belong to Vietnamese community. I don’t
02 belong to Cambodian community because they always
→ 03 talk about me. why?
[story]
```

By claiming “they always talk about me” (line 3), Trang prefaces his emotional story with a claim based on experiential knowledge and thus directly tied to memory.

Memory claims and displays are not only respondent-generated; the interviewer may also be implicated in their construction. In the following extract, it is the interviewer (M) that does a display of remembering that touches off a complaint story by Trang (T) of discrimination and mistreatment by his bank.

Extract 4.14. Trang

```
01 T: and then aft-after that I paid it (. I-I paid
02 the mortgage (. off? and if (. the ba::nk
03 (. the stupid bank worker at the bank there.
→ 04 M: weren’t you mad at them?
→ 05 T: I’M MAD AT THEM (. I’M VERY MAD. BECAUSE
→ 06 (. WHAT THE HELL IS IT WITH ↑PEOPLE. (0.8)
[T retells his bank story]
```

31 Trang, even when pressed, avoided saying the “name” he was called. Avoiding saying the name works to construct it as traumatic and hurtful by making it “unsayable.” It may also be that the interviewer was not familiar enough with Vietnamese or Cambodian languages to make the actual name relevant or meaningful. However, on one occasion when asked (and never again thereafter), Trang did say a name that Vietnamese called him, which was part of a derogatory rhyme used to insult Amerasian children (even though Trang was not Amerasian): My Lai muoi hai lo dit, dit lo nay xi lo kia [“Amerasians have twelve assholes. If you plug one, gas and shit come out from the others’”] (DeBonis, 1995, p. 6).

103
In keeping with Sacks’ (1992) observations of the sequential nature of storytelling, tying turns can be seen in this extract. In line 1 (“and then after that”), T ties the present utterance to the previous talk of his breakup with his partner and buying out his ex-partner’s share of the condominium they had co-purchased. This in turn leads into talk of T’s problems with the bank and the “stupid” bank workers. In line 4, M does a display of remembering and understanding of T’s interactions with the bank as emotion-laden by an embodied recollection of T’s previous telling of his story of his anger at the bank (line 4: “weren’t you mad at them?”). Even without background information that T has produced a retelling of the story, M’s utterance in line 4, formatted as a reverse polarity question, formulates the emotional upshot of T’s story. Sequentially this comes in a transition relevant place where an assessment is relevant. With its strong presumptive tilt, the emotion formulation aligns M with T while maintaining an orientation to T’s epistemic authority regarding his own experiences. In other words, “doing empathy” is accomplished here through sequence organization and turn design. Finally, the explicit labeling of T’s emotional stance toward the bank as “mad” is taken up by T (line 5: “I'M MAD AT THEM”) as he constructs an emotion story preface that upgrades M’s description and then leads into the repeated story of T’s angry dealings with the bank.

4.4. Summary

This chapter investigated the ways in which emotions and emotionality are invoked and made relevant in storytelling pre-sequences. Through an analysis of illustrative cases from the present study and the published research literature, I showed that the emotion story preface, as a subtype of story preface or tellable, is a powerful device used by interview participants to project talk as emotional and prepare story recipients to listen to and interpret that talk. In addition, as multifunctional devices, emotion story prefaces, like other general conversational resources, enable interactants to attend to (and display their attention to) the interviewer-interviewee relationship and matters of tellability, stance, subject-object relations, and memory. I also argued that emotionality need not be explicitly labeled (e.g., “mad,” “funny”) to be made relevant; prefaces may make use of implicit and suggestive features of talk to make emotionality
hearable and significant for an understanding of the story.

Analysis also demonstrated that respondents actively display their orientation to the activity of the interview (and the interview agenda) and show that they are attending to the relevance, quantity, and quality of their talk. They do not just recall memories but use memory claims as a resource to demonstrate that they are fulfilling their obligations as interviewees. I also showed that the interviewer may collaborate in these tellings by orienting to speakers’ epistemic authority and the empathy-worthy aspects of their talk. Moreover, I found that emotion story prefaces may be treated as interpretive puzzles that need to make sense and may require unpacking by interview interactants. In fact, respondents may orient to an expectation that they would be asked—and in some cases, must be asked—by the interviewer to account for the emotionality of their talk. When an emotion story preface is given, and the interviewer does not ask the speaker to give an account for that emotion, the speaker may either wait to be asked or may even prompt or invite the interviewer to ask for clarification.

Although this study is focused on the active management of emotionality in the interview, an additional observation regards the content of the respondents’ prefaces and stories. Much of their talk centered on topics such as discrimination, bullying, mistreatment, complaints, and other negative and emotionally-loaded matters linked to language use, identity, immigration, and social participation. Based on the content of this talk, a picture emerges of the immigrant experience as one of struggle and negative emotions. However, I will suggest that the interviewees, the interviewer, and the interview context make these particular experiences relevant. In Chapter 5, I will examine how interviewer-initiated questioning sequences solicit and occasion explicit and implicit emotional talk.
CHAPTER 5. INTERVIEWER QUESTIONING SEQUENCES

5.0. Introduction

In Chapter 4, I examined how interviewees made use of emotion prefaces to project and tell stories of discrimination, mistreatment, and other personal complaints tied to talk of their social experiences. I argued against the assumption that study participants were telling emotional stories simply because they had numerous difficult and emotional experiences as L2 users, refugees, immigrants, minorities, transnationals, and so on; instead, I suggested that specific features of the dialogic activity of the qualitative research interview (e.g., the structure of the interview format; the institutional agenda; the identities under which participants are recruited; the topics, identities, and experiences that the interviewer makes relevant; the ways in which topics are taken up and responded to; and the activity of telling autobiographical experience) all serve to elicit, highlight, and maintain a focus on emotions and emotional talk and problematic episodes.

In this chapter I shall be concerned with a detailed examination of interviewer-initiated question sequences that occasion emotions and emotional responses. Based on an analysis of data from the research literature and the present study, I seek to explicate how the activity of questioning in this context (through eliciting and soliciting talk) actively contributes to the procedures and the products of the qualitative interview.

5.1. Soliciting Subjectivity in Interviews

In the broad literature on the practice of conducting qualitative interviews, interviewers are often encouraged to ask interviewees about their subjective experiences and opinions—or to at least take them up as resource topics once they are brought up in the interview. A fundamental assumption lying behind interview questioning and topic pursuits is that interviewees have privileged access to things that the interviewer does not, referred to in the literature as “B-events” (Heritage, 1985; Labov, 1972; Labov & Fanshel, 1977). “Typically, B events involve characterizations of what the recipients know, feel, or believe or, alternatively, what they have done or said” (Sidnell, 2010b, p. 25). As I noted in my review of the interview research literature in Chapter 2, instead of asking only about objective events (i.e., “what happened”), interviewers are often
encouraged to investigate the subjective or personal meaning of those events for the interviewees.

5.1.1. Questioning as a Normative Practice

Despite the recognition that questions figure centrally in the activity of interviewing and play an important part in establishing the interviewer’s agenda (Clayman & Heritage, 2002; Heritage 2002; Mishler, 1991), how the institutional activity of questioning in qualitative research interviews is carried out by interview interactants has been given relatively little attention in the social sciences (notable exceptions include Briggs, 1986; Mishler, 1991; Rapley, 2001; Roulston, 2010). Mishler, addressing the unproblematized use of interviews in qualitative research, pointed out the importance of considering interviews as a form of discourse between speakers, rather than simply a means of data generation:

Questioning and answering are ways of speaking that are grounded in and depend on culturally shared and often tacit assumptions about how to express and understand beliefs, experiences, feelings, and intentions. I have referred to this knowledge as ordinary language competence. (p. 7, emphasis added)

Like Mishler (1991), who spoke of the “ordinary language competence” involved in carrying out question-answer sequences, Briggs cited “rhetorical competence” (1986, p. 88) as an important aspect of pragmatic effectiveness in interviews (e.g., making one’s talk relevant, cohesive, and culturally appropriate). A problem, Briggs noted, is that interviewers, particularly when working with communities in which they are not members, tend to bypass the groundwork leading up to cultural competence and focus their questions on topics in “which only the most advanced speakers are competent” (p. 89). By focusing only upon responses, not on how they are occasioned by and assembled for the interviewer, we miss the important interactional, rhetorical, and even cultural.

32 The issue of researcher as cultural insider/outsider has been taken up by a number of scholars (e.g., Briggs, 1986; Liamputtong, 2010; Mehra, 2001; Messerschmidt, 1981; Trimble & Fisher, 2006), with some scholars arguing that researchers who are cultural insiders have better access, greater cultural sensitivity, and the ability to understand respondents on their own terms. Nevertheless, when the researcher does not share the same cultural knowledge as the interviewee, more must be made explicit and visible—often necessitating greater explanation and accounting. For the researcher interested in accounting practices, outsider status may be facilitative, rather than an obstacle. Of course, as Briggs has shown, the researcher must still be sensitive to culturally-appropriate ways of asking, interacting, and knowing.
work that goes into organizing talk as relevant and comprehensible. This is precisely the criticism that Briggs leveled against Labov (1966, 1972). Echoing Wolfson (1976) and quoting Labov (1966), Briggs wrote:

Labov evinces little understanding of the way in which the unique features of interviewing shape the form and content of the sum total of utterances that constitute it, even in the course of “spontaneous,” emotionally charged responses. The commonsensical basis of Labov’s view of interviewing is apparent in the way he uses the interview “to gather the information which is the ostensible subject of the questions being asked.” (p. 18)

Although the interactional activity of questioning has been largely ignored in qualitative interview research, across a range of other institutional settings (e.g., doctor-patient interaction, counseling sessions, news interviews, classrooms, courtrooms), question-answer sequences have been a topic of continued interest by researchers (e.g., Freed & Ehrlich, 2010; Lindström & Lindholm, 2009). In contrast to the workings of casual (i.e. spontaneous) conversation, one of the key findings of research on talk-in-interaction in institutional settings is that turns may be pre-allocated because of the interactants’ institutional roles and asymmetric distribution of rights and responsibilities (Atkinson & Drew, 1979; Drew & Heritage, 1992; Frankel, 1984). For example, in healthcare settings, physicians’ utterances consist primarily of questions that limit the scope of the information exchange (Francis & Hester, 2004; Frankel, 1984). In the courtroom, the lawyer holds the right to ask questions, not the witness (Atkinson & Drew, 1979). Similarly, in journalistic interviews, the interaction is largely constrained by the interviewer-led question and answer sequences (Clayman & Heritage, 2002).

While there may be occasional exceptions to the norm (e.g., interviewees may resist particular lines of questioning and even challenge the interviewer’s agenda, presuppositions, or implication claims; Harris, 1991; Heritage, 1985), the interview trajectory is collaboratively built by the questions formulated by the interviewer, the responses produced by the interviewees, and the ways in which those responses are treated by the interactants (e.g., as sufficient, relevant, needing clarification). Furthermore, questioning sequences, whether in formal or semi-structured interviews, are constructed in accordance with the analytic interests of the researcher and research
audiences (Gubrium & Holstein, 2002; Heritage, 1985; Wooffitt, 2005). These questioning sequences may exhibit institution-specific features—what Heritage and Clayman (2009) have called the institution’s “unique ‘fingerprint’ of practices” (p. 18), such as turntaking structures, lexical choices, sentence patterns, question types, and responses. For example, although acknowledging an answer to a question with “oh” or an assessment (e.g., “that’s great!”) may be commonplace in ordinary conversation, it has been shown to be comparatively rare in many institutional contexts (Heritage & Clayman, p. 18). This appears especially so for news interviews (e.g., Greatbatch, 1988, 1992; Heritage, 1985; Schegloff, 1992), where interviewers treat the overhearing audience, rather than the interviewer, as the primary addressee.

Despite evidence supporting the unique aspects of institutional interaction, the boundaries between “institutional talk” and “mundane conversation” are not clear-cut, as noted by Drew and Heritage (1992). Practices of ordinary conversation can be found in institutional settings; conversely, institutional talk can be found in conversation—making many settings (e.g., healthcare visits, teacher-student meetings) “quasi-conversational” (Freed & Ehrlich, 2010; He, 1998; Heritage & Greatbatch, 1989). As Heritage (2005b) has explained, “The relationship between ‘ordinary conversation’ and ‘institutional talk’ can be understood as that between a ‘master institution’ and its more restricted local variants” (p. 108). For the individual and society, the institution of mundane conversation is relatively stable and experienced prior to institutional interaction. Institutional talk, in contrast, is relatively recent and involves a great deal of change (Heritage, p. 108). Because conversation is the bedrock of social life (Heritage & Clayman, 2009; Schegloff, 1987a, 1987b, 1995) and thus enables the functioning of institutions such as “the economy, the polity, the family, socialization, and so on” (Schegloff, 1995, p. 187), a continued topic of debate is the warrantability of analytical claims about the “institutionality of institutional interaction” (Kasper, 2009, p. 15). For Schegloff (1992), the researcher’s focus should not be overly restricted to questions such as “how are they now doing interview?” (p. 127), but should include more open attention to the organizational and interactional details of the setting:
If the form of inquiry is the organization of conduct, the details of action, the practices of talk, then every opportunity should be pressed to enhance our understanding of any available detail about those topics. Invoking social structure or the setting of the talk at the outset can systematically distract from, even blind us to, details of those domains of events in the world. (Schegloff, 1992, p. 127)

In the same way that the analyst cannot apply “institution” as an a priori category to a setting, neither can the meaning and organization of activities such as “questioning” be pre-specified. Freed and Ehrlich (2010), recognizing this point, have observed that as “no single linguistic factor determines whether a particular utterance is understood as ‘doing questioning,’ we require a definition of questions that includes both functional and sequential considerations” (p. 6). Although the action of questioning may be accomplished through interrogatives, not all syntactically-formed interrogatives (or even utterances with rising intonation) act as questions (Heritage & Roth, 1995; Koshik, 2005; Schegloff, 1984; Sidnell, 2010b; Weber, 1993); they may also function as requests, complaints, invitations, and epistemic and affective stance claims. For example, Freed and Ehrlich (2010, p. 4) noted that an utterance such as “How could you?” is not conveying the activity of questioning but is indicating the speaker’s stance toward the recipient of that utterance (e.g., as a complaint). Similarly, interrogatives such as “Why don’t you come and see me sometimes?” (Schegloff, 194, p. 31) can be heard as invitations as well as complaints. Declarative utterances may also function as questions, particularly when followed by (a) a tag question and/or rising intonation (e.g., “You went there, didn’t you?”), and (b) falling intonation when commenting on B-events (e.g., “And you never called the police.”; Labov & Fanshel, 1977, p. 101).

Sidnell (2010b) defines question as “both a practice and a category implicated in members’ own reflection upon, descriptions of, and ideas about their practice” (p. 21). In other words, in an ethnomethodological view, what “counts as” a question is sequentially and retrospectively determined by the interactants themselves. Freed and Ehrlich (2010, p. 6), adopting a broad definition based on functional and sequential characteristics, define questions as utterances that (a) solicit or are treated by the recipient as soliciting information, confirmation, or action, and (b) are delivered in a way that creates a slot for the recipient to produce a responsive turn. This action-oriented treatment of questioning
In my discussion on emotion story prefaces in Chapter 4, I showed that they may be self-initiated by the interviewee as well as produced in response to the interviewer’s questions and comments. I also noted that much of the qualitative research interview literature both explicitly and implicitly encourages (or at least recognizes) the elicitation of emotional responses—whether or not emotions are the stated topic of investigation:

Investigations of emotions such as anger in interview contexts may lead to emotional responses in researchers and also in the participants. In addition, the method of interviewing itself, which often involves participants sharing personal aspects of their lives with researchers, can elicit emotional responses whether or not the interview focuses on a topic of emotions. (deMarrais & Tisdale, 2002, p. 116)

Despite the recognition that emotions are elicited and made relevant in qualitative interviews, few researchers have addressed the matter of how interviewers and interviewees make emotions explicitly accountable (i.e., tellable, hearable, visible) through the questioning practices. Taking up the topic of emotion elicitation in qualitative interviews, in the following sections I will examine three question sequence types that invite or otherwise make relevant and produce emotion responses: (a) invited/solicited stories, (b) “feeling” question sequences, and (c) emotion-implicative question sequences.

5.2. Eliciting and Producing Emotion Talk

5.2.1. Sequence 1: Inviting and Soliciting Emotional Stories

As I touched upon briefly in the preceding chapter, much of the research literature on storytelling sequences has focused on those initiated by the storyteller (see Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008; Labov & Waletzky, 1967/1997; Sacks, 1992; Sidnell, 2010a), particularly in everyday conversational settings. However, as I have noted, stories may also be prompted, invited, or otherwise solicited by others (e.g., Cuff & Francis, 1978; Lerner, 1992; Sidnell, 2010a):

Extract 5.1. From Lerner (1992, p. 251)

L: Oh you haftuh tell’m about yer typewriter honey,
Extract 5.2. From Lerner (1992, p. 255)

M: ‘Member the wah-guy we saw?

In both of these examples from multi-party conversations, one speaker is prompting another to tell other co-present members a story that is shared by the prompter and the projected storyteller, but not the other listeners.

Some researchers have also recognized that storytelling may be an invited or normative practice in institutional settings (e.g., Cuff & Francis, 1978; Hall, Sarangi, & Slembrouck, 1997; Liddicoat, 2007; Lynch & Bogen, 1996; Wooffitt, 1992), and may even be used in research interviews as a data elicitation technique (e.g., Chase, 2005; Labov & Waletzky, 1967/1997). Although the interactional organization of storytelling in institutional settings is seldom the focus—as much of the research has centered on conversational storytelling (e.g., Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008; Liddicoat, 2007; Norrick, 2000; Sacks, 1992; Sidnell, 2010a)—a number of researchers have investigated related practices such as accounting (Buttny, 2004; Garfinkel, 1967), blaming (Edwards & Potter, 1993; Potter, 2000), complaining (Buttny, 2004; Drew, 1998), assessing (Heath, 1992; Speer, 2005), aligning (Boden & Zimmerman, 1991; Speer, 2005), making knowledge claims (Drew & Heritage, 1992; Edwards & Potter, 2005), and remembering (Lynch & Bogen, 1996, 2005; Wooffitt, 2005). Nevertheless, how stories are occasioned in research interviews remains an understudied topic of research.

Unlike storytelling in casual conversation, where the storyteller is faced with the challenge of securing and maintaining an extended turn within the ongoing interaction to tell a story, settings in which interactants solicit or invite storytelling sequences provide that space by design. The key functions of prefaces in both self-initiated and other-initiated stories are similar: namely, to align participants within the activity of storytelling and project what kind of story is to follow (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008). Bringing storyteller and story recipients into alignment is essential in enabling the story recipients to know when the story is complete and what kinds of responses are appropriate (Sacks, 1992)

Cuff and Francis’ (1978) examination of sociological interviews on marriage breakdowns is one of the few studies to directly address the topic of solicited stories. In
their study, Cuff and Francis noted that although the interviewees were not faced with the
difficulty of locating a slot to tell their stories, they were still faced with a number of
other issues when invited to produce particular stories, such as complying with the
invitation, determining how to begin, knowing what to tell and how much to tell, and
identifying the story recipient(s) (e.g., the immediate listener(s), a later audience who will
hear the recording).

Lynch and Bogen (1996), in their investigation of the testimonies of witnesses in
the Reagan era Iran-Contra hearings, observed that not only do interrogators routinely
occasion the telling of particular stories (e.g., Extract 5.3), they “often collaborate in the
telling of the witness’s story by making specific claims about what the witness already
knows” (p. 161), as in Extract 5.4:

Extract 5.3. From Lynch and Bogen (1996, p. 161)
Nields: Would you simply pick up the story of the Hawk
shipment, starting with that call that you received
from the Israeli official, and tell us in your own
words what you remember

Extract 5.4. From Lynch and Bogen (1996, p. 161)
Nields: Uh- well, in fact Colonel North, you believed that the
Soviets were aware of our sale of arms to Iran,
weren’t you.

An additional aspect of stories solicited in various institutional settings (e.g., court
hearings, news reports, research interviews) is that, as they are “on the record” accounts,
speakers may be held accountable to “the accumulating record of the events” (Lynch &
Bogen, p. 162) they are asked to describe. For publicly solicited stories, these records
may include official institutional documents as well as previous testimony and
eyewitness accounts. In the qualitative interview, the audio and video recordings, written
transcripts, research notes, shared interactional history between the interviewer and
interviewees, documented sociohistorical events (e.g., the Vietnam war) that are brought
up as topics, and even “commonsense” cultural knowledge potentially serve as records by
which to hold speakers accountable.
Soliciting emotional stories

Both self-initiated and other-initiated stories make use of story prefaces to align the interactants toward the activity and topic of storytelling. In the present study data, more common than interviewee-initiated story prefaces were those elicited by the interviewer. As these stories were told in response to an invitation or request for a telling, they point to an underlying institutional agenda within the interview setting. More specifically, I found that emotional story solicitation by the interviewer is a prevalent practice to encourage the production of stories of detailing emotional events. In the following section I will consider how the interviewer actively solicits and contributes to the shaping of emotional story prefaces by the interviewees and their emotional material.

In Chapter 4, I noted that in my data the interviewer is active in inviting stories from the interviewees. These story invitations involved both explicit story requests as well as requests for elaboration (e.g., “tell me about…”). Some of these story invitations employed extreme case formulations (Pomerantz, 1986; e.g., happiest, funniest, craziest), making use of an often-used sociolinguistic research strategy of eliciting interviewee stories by asking about extraordinary and emotionally charged topics (e.g., Labov & Waletzky, 1967/1997; Milroy, 1987). By way of illustration, I draw from 5 examples of interviewer questioning sequences that initiate storytelling in the study data. All are from one-on-one interviews and involve the interviewer inviting the respondents to supply autobiographic stories tied to experiences and emotional episodes. Only brief extracts are shown here to illustrate some of their general features, but I locate them in the unfolding interactional sequences.

Some general features of story invitations

Story invitations, like other interactional sequences such as storytelling, requests, complaints, and adjacency pairs (the most basic units of interaction) are all bounded units. That is, they are embedded in a larger interactional structure and topical organization. These sequences have beginnings and endings, and alternative ways in which they can occur. Of interest to the analyst is not how these sequences are pre-

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33 The stance taken here is that whether stories and emotionality are interviewer-initiated or interviewee-initiated, all interview talk must be treated as interaction and versions of events rather than “more” or “less” truthful representations of experience.
structured, but how participants in their “practices of talking accomplish recognizable beginnings and endings” (Schegloff, 1996, p. 120).

One way in which story invitations are bounded is by the interviewer producing a question that explicitly invites a story, particularly one describing strong, emotional, and memorable experiences. Three illustrative cases are shown in Extracts 5.5-5.7. The first extract is from my second interview with Sang (S) and takes place at his apartment. While the interviewer (M) and Sang are both waiting for Bona (recently introduced to the interviewer by Sang) to come for an interview, Sang asks about the interview agenda. After the interviewer explains that he will ask Bona about his experiences, Sang then announces that he also has more stories, so the interviewer should ask him, too. This interviewer then follows up Sang’s invitation by producing a story request:

Extract 5.5. Sang

⇒ 01 M: so, do you have any interesting stories for
⇒ 02 me?: ”heh heh”
03 S: what stories. ((surprised tone))
04 M: about: (. ) your life. your happiest
05 experience. your funniest experience. your
craziest experience. ”heh heh” (. )
07 ((S turns on TV, searches for something and
08 then inserts a Cambodian music video into the
09 DVD player))
10 (33.0)
11 ((Cambodian music starts))
12 (40.0)
13 you can read English in there. ((nods head
14 toward TV screen))

Initiating a change in activity with a so-preface (a disjunctive marker) that also ties his utterance to S’s previous talk of having more stories, M makes an open-ended request to Sang for a particular category of stories: interesting stories (line 1: “so, do you have any interesting stories for me?”). Instead of providing a story or asking for elaboration on the kind of story that is being requested, S treats the story request as problematic and even surprising (through his tone) by initiating a repair in line 3 (“what stories?”). Reformulating his request, M lists several potential types of stories that fit
within the category “interesting”: stories about S’s life, and extreme case formulations such as his “happiest,” “funniest,” and “craziest” experiences. M immediately follows his initial and reformulated story descriptions with laughter (lines 2 and 6) and treats the action of making these questions as laughable. It is possible that M may be orienting to the potential of story requests to elicit sensitive material (e.g., laughter can be a signal of a face threatening act; Jefferson, Sacks, & Schegloff, 1976) and is working to mitigate the possible seriousness of his questions and the activity of interviewing (also possible, since M is a guest in S’s home).

Although Extract 5.5 offers an illustrative example of an interviewer story request, it does not represent a successful story elicitation. Despite M’s explicit request for a story (in response to S’s initial story offering), S does not provide a story or even an acknowledgement; instead, he puts a music video in his DVD player and spends the next 30 minutes watching Khmer music videos and teaching M Khmer terms.34

The following two extracts are from interviews with Kim (K), and also show interviewer story requests for strong, emotional experiences:

Extract 5.6. Kim

\[01\] M: do you have any like (. ) really (. ) strong experiences or-or something you re-remember
\[02\] 03 K: about (. ) learning English? or, maybe after
\[04\] you came here using English, some (. ) funny experience, or (. ) crazy experience,
\[05\] 06 something happened?
\[07\] 08 K: when I come here?
\[09\] 10 M: yeah. sure. about English.
\[11\] 12 K: I guess it ((English)) not helping in-in Vietnam. it not helping in Vietnam, but it help to be here. you have to be here. I- (. )
\[13\] 14 M: (2.0) is uh (2.0 bartender helper.
\[15\] 16 K: I work in a nightclub

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34 This interview was initially treated as a “failed” interview but was later reexamined for an understanding of the different interviewer/interviewee activity trajectories and the interactional accomplishments (Prior, in preparation).
okay.  
and so funny (. ) one cust- (. ) not customer.  
it’s my (. ) boss sister  
[K tells a story about learning a new word]  

Extract 5.7. Kim  
→ 01 M: mmm. did you have any like (3.0) I don’t know  
→ 02 like (.) really- (.)  
→ 03 K: extreme?  
→ 04 M: nah (. ) I’m just kinda won-wondering what  
→ 05 kind of experiences you had [with English.  
→ 06 K: [I have many.  
→ 07 (. )  
→ 08 umm. as I work longer (. ) with the company at  
→ 09 [store name] (. ) I know most of the (. )  
→ 10 merchandise.  
→ 11 M: “mhm”  
→ 12 K: I know how the procedure (. ) i-it true (the  
→ 13 action) that I learned  
→ 14 M: Oh  
→ 15 K: you learn more and more every day. (1.6) so I  
→ 16 get to the point to (. ) I move and I also  
→ 17 move from one department to another=  
→ 18 M: oh  
→ 19 ([lines deleted. K goes into detail about her  
→ 20 job and co-workers])  
→ 21 K: so one day I have the mother and daughter  
→ 22 they came and (. ) they try to (. ) return a  
→ 23 (. ) handbag.  
[K tells a story about rude customers]  

Extract 5.6 is similar to Extract 5.5 in that the interviewer explicitly requests talk  
about “strong,” “funny,” and “crazy” experiences. Although these story solicitations do  
not use extreme case formulations (as in Extract 5.5), they do request stories that are not  
ordinary or everyday events but ones that are memorable and tied specifically to K’s  
experiences using and learning English. M then reformulates the scope of experiences  
from which to choose—tied to place (in Vietnam or the US), time (before coming to the  
US and after coming to the US), and language proficiency (while learning English and  
after using English).
In contrast, in Extract 5.7, from a separate interview with K, M produces another story request (lines 1-2: “did you have any like (3.0) I don’t know like (.) really- (.)”). As in the previous extract, M incrementally forms his question with hesitation markers and incomplete utterances, pausing after each possible completion point:

do you have any like (3.0)
I don’t know like (.)
really (.)

In Extract 5.5, from the interview with S, M self-completed his question with “strong”—but here, K anticipates M’s story request completion by suggesting “extreme?” (line 3), projected by M’s use of “really” (line 2). By completing M’s question, K is displaying her understanding that, like in her previous interview, the focus of the interview agenda is on “strong” rather than ordinary experiences. The hedged and hesitant production of M’s story request may display an orientation to the sensitive or delicate nature of the talk that it is inviting (Lerner, 1999; Pomerantz, 1984; Schegloff, 1996b). Although neither M nor K specify in lines 1-3 the topical object (e.g., stories, experiences), both are orienting to a shared understanding that “any” in line 1 is indexing stories. However, M produces a weak rejection (“nah”) of K’s question completer and reformulates his question with hesitations and mitigators as he abandons “really” and downgrades and respecifies the object and the scope of the autobiographic talk he is requesting (lines 4-5: “I’m just kinda won-wondering what kind of experiences you had with English”). In overlap with M in line 5, K anticipates M’s question completion and responds with “I have many” (line 6). As K’s response is produced as an overlap, so that “I have many” is supplied as a response to “experiences” (rather than “experiences with English”), it again displays her understanding of the type of experiences M is requesting (i.e., strong experiences).

Some story invitations may be focused not just on eliciting specific types of stories (e.g., strong, emotional, autobiographic) but also specific episodes. In the following extract (5.8), Rico (R), is telling the interviewer about his interview with
immigration officials in Canada regarding his application for refugee status. The topic here centers on the telling of “the” story (rather than “a” story):

Extract 5.8. Rico

01 R: so:, I had my interview? um l-last December,
02 (. ) eight. but before that uh my:: my lawyer 
03 advised me to make (. ) a, (. ) story about, 
04 (. ) what would be the reason why I have to 
05 get (. ) I have to apply: a refugee. so I made 
06 a statement=I made a story like, (. ) um, 
07 somebody (. ) um (2.0) uh there’s a group who 
08 persecute me. >that’s my story.< that’s why 
09 I’m afraid to go back to the Philippines 
10 because, people: persecute me, "somebody": 

→ 11 M: so, can you tell me the story? 
12 (1.8) 
→ 13 so what is the story you told immigration. 
14 R: okay um (. ) tsch [the story was,] 
15 M: [so, ] oh sorry 
16 (. ) go ahead 
17 R: um (1.4) I-I met a guy and then:: (. ) this 
18 guy um:: introduces himself (. ) and he wanted 
19 me to- to be his friend. so:: (. ) 
[R continues his story about meeting terrorists and having his life threatened]

In lines 1-10, R tells the interviewer about his recent immigration interview and gives an abstract of the story that he told officials to explain why he was seeking refugee status and why he should be allowed to stay in Canada. M then asks R if that story can be shared with him (line 11: “so, can you tell me the story?”), a yes-no (polar) question that pragmatically functions as an implicit story request. After a 1.8-second pause and no response is forthcoming from R, M self-repairs his question as a direct request (line 13: “so what is the story you told immigration.”) Note the sentence-final falling intonation—

Although I refer in my discussion of these extracts to “stories,” it is important to note that what a story “counts as” and functions as to the teller, interviewers, gatekeepers, etc. is an important aspect of the activity of organizing experience for others. For example, Rico’s story here is treated as a story, a legal reason for a refugee application, and a statement produced to officials. Rico’s talk also shows how a story may transform from being “a story” to officially becoming “the story” (see also work on asylum seeker stories and the processes of entextualization by Blommaert, 2001; Jacquement, 2009; Maryns, 2005; Maryns & Blommaert, 2001).
hearable as imperative-like—lies in contrast with the previous request made with rising intonation).

This pattern of question-pause-question frequently occurs in questioning sequences. Gardner (2004; see also Kasper & Ross, 2007) found that extended question sequences often consist of a four-turn structure:

A: asks a question

B: [gap (answer unfilled)]

A: rephrases question (e.g., paraphrase, increment, modification, or expansion)

B: answer (usually a dispreferred response)

This four-turn sequence was also found in much of the present data. In Extract 5.8, R prefaces his response with an agreement and hesitation markers (a dispreferred response in Gardner’s model; line 14: “okay um (.) tsch the story was,”) as he produces the requested story. R’s prefatory comment, “the story was,” indicates that he is not referring to the story as an objective episode (i.e., as something that “happened”), but to the story that he told to the immigration officials (i.e., as a storytelling about a storytelling). As this suggests, a consideration of stories as activities, rather than simply objects for content analysis, is also a concern for interviewees, not only the interviewer/analyst.

In the following two extracts, instead of asking the interviewee to provide a strong (emotional, funny, crazy, etc.) story or requesting that they retell specific episodes, the interviewer asks for a story that links back to a description previously provided by the interviewee. The first example comes from an interview with Trang. This is located in a larger sequence where he is talking about his anger at rude people and verbal confrontations with others:

Extract 5.9. Trang

01 T: s-some people yeah pe-people might say
02 something t’other people not nice. I say it.
03 I tell them.
→ 04 M: like what?
05 (3.7)
→ 06 can you think of an example?
07 T: okay
08 (0.7)
09 example when one time one Chinese girl from
10 China, she new worker an’ she (0.5)
11 .hh she work there an’ (.) this- (.) in my
12 work so many Sri Lankan people working
13 there.
14 M: Sri Lankan?
15 T: yeah and everyone tried to tease her an’ joke
16 with her: hand sometime very rude joke.
17 (1.4)
[T continues with a story about scolding his
workers for teasing their Chinese coworker
and making her cry]

Following up his previous talk about rude people and confronting others, T’s
utterance in lines 1-3 is a defensive account, making a morally-justified claim that his
actions are predicated on the wrong behavior of others. He also locates his response as
appropriate by keeping it at the verbal level (“I say it”; “I tell them”) rather escalating to
physical violence (e.g., he hits them; he threatens to hurt them).36 In a four-turn extended
question sequence, M then invites T to elaborate on his preceding talk (line 4: “like
what?”) by providing an account to explain what it is that he “says” and “tells” them.
After a 3.7-second silence and no response from T, M reformulates his previous utterance
as an explicit story request (line 6: “can you think of an example?”). T then produces an
agreement token (line 7: “okay”) and projects a relevant story by labeling at as “example”
(line 9: “example when one time…”), and produces a story for the interviewer.

A similar request for an example story based on the interviewee’s previous talk of
general experience is shown in Extract 5.9.37 In this interview segment, John is speaking
about his time in high school, right after he immigrated to California from the
Vietnamese refugee camp in the Philippines:

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36 This story later leads into talk of threats of physical violence against rude employees and other people.

37 This interview interaction took place shortly before Extract 4.8 in Chapter 4.
Extract 5.10. John

01 J: when you hear- when your accent I guess some
02 people like, (1.2) “oh, where you from?”
03 right away
04 (0.5)

→ 05 M: can you think of experience “or-“?
06 (0.8)
07 J: the experience? uh: (1.9) uh:: (1.4) oh like
08 high school? maybe high school=I got picked-
09 (1.7) ‘is that (like)I-
10 M: [you got picked on?
11 J: I got picked on by the ‘merican kid?
12 M: “why”
13 J: becau’ I guess they think I’m different?
   [J tells a story about a confrontational
   encounter with an American classmate]

At the beginning of this segment, J, like T in Extract 5.9, brings up accent and the
issue of origin and belonging—potentially hearable as an emotional topic. In terms of
emotional story elicitation, line 5 (“can you think of experience “or-“?”) shows the
interviewer’s explicit request to J to provide talk of an experience relevant to his previous
utterance in lines 1-3 (i.e., an example of accent and belonging). In light of the data, the
interviewer story requests in this study sought three interrelated kinds of explicit and
emotion-implicative stories: (a) those of strong, extreme, and memorable experiences
(Extracts 5.5-5.6); (b) those dealing with specific episodes (Extract 5.8); and (c) those
serving as examples of more general experiences (Extracts 5.9-5.10).

Another feature of story request sequences is that they may occasion cognitive
displays by the interviewees as they formulate their responses. Heritage (2005) has noted
that “Cognitive process is not something which speakers simply report, it is also
something which they embody in talk-in-interaction” (p. 188). In their responses to the
story requests, the interviewees in this study produced their stories while displaying their
active selection, remembering processes, and attention to the relevance of their talk.38
These cognitive processes were displayed, for example, through discourse and hesitation
markers (e.g., um- and oh-prefaces, pauses, restarts), confirmation checks (e.g., “Yeah?”),

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38 See Bartsasaghi and Bowen (2009) on remembering in interviews as a category-bound activity.
and provision of contextual information (e.g., time, place, people), as shown in Extracts 5.6-5.10:

Kim (Extract 5.6)
Lines 9-12: I guess it ((English)) not helping in-in Vietnam. it not helping in Vietnam, but it help to be here. you have to be here. I- (.) my first job? (.) yeah?

Kim (Extract 5.7)
Line 8-10: umm. as I work longer (.) with the company at [store name] (.) I know most of the (.) merchandise.

Rico (Extract 5.8)
Line 14: okay um (.) tsch the story was,

Lines 17-19: um (1.4) I-I met a guy and then:: (.) this guy um:: introduces himself (.) and he wanted me to-to be his friend. so:: (.)

Trang (Extract 5.9)
Lines 9-13: example when one time one Chinese gir::l from China, sh::e:s-she new worker an’ she (0.5) .hh she work there an’ (.) this- (.) in my work so many Sri Lankan people work-working there.

John (Extract 5.10)
Lines 7-9: the experience? uh: (1.9) uh:: (1.4) oh like high school? maybe high school=I got picked-

Line 11: I got picked on by the ‘merican kid?

Taking up Extract 5.10 in more detail, it can be seen that J, in his response (lines 7-9) to M’s request, displays his active work to select an appropriate story—through his repetition of the operative lexical item specified by M’s request (line 7: “the experience?”) and use of hesitation markers (“uh:”) and pauses. J then narrows this search and offers up a candidate story (lines 7-8: “oh like high school? maybe high school=I got picked-”). As an embodiment or epistemic stance marker of cognitive activities such as “remembering,” this oh-prefaced utterance (Heritage, 2005), also indicates J’s primary and independent access to the story being projected thereby
signaling it as a piece of autobiographic talk relevant to M’s story invitation.

Heritage (2005) offers an illustrative extract of interactional remembering:

Extract 5.11. Adapted from Heritage (2005, p. 189)

01 G: t.hhh Oh well thank you but you we ha— yihknow
02 Victor.
03 → S: ↑OH that’s ↑RI:GHT.=
04 G: That’s why we were going {we}
05 S: [I FERGO:T.
06 Completely.
07 G: Yeah. Bec’z, .hhh he called tih invite us,

Leading up to this segment, Shirley (S) has offered her friend Geri (G) a place to stay during her upcoming trip to San Francisco. In lines 1-2, G turns down the offer by indicating her intention to stay with Victor, the person she was apparently intending to visit. In his analysis, Heritage (2005) argued that S’s display of interactional remembering (line 3: “↑OH that’s ↑RI:GHT.”) is doing delicate interactional work that goes beyond simply providing an acknowledgment. First, S is “remembering” G’s relationship with Victor (thus demonstrating this is shared knowledge), not just registering this as new information. Second, by doing a recognizable display of remembering, S is indicating that her previous invitation to G was sincere and not “phony” (i.e., if S had realized that G was going to stay with Victor, S would not have offered G a place to stay; otherwise, her invitation would be a hollow one).

As interview and storytelling devices, oh-prefaces carry out a number of functions for the primary speaker. For example, they display a change in state, indicate a cognitive search, and make a primary claim to personal knowledge. In Extract 5.10, with no confirmation from the interviewer after the oh-prefaced response, J then produces a tentative confirmation check (line 9: “is that (like)”) to confirm whether this specific story fits the interviewer’s story request. In line 10, after a 1.7-second pause and confirmation request from J, M immediately follows up with an understanding check (“you got picked on?”), now requiring J to respond with either a confirmation or further expansion. In line 11, J reformulates his story preface with more details (“I got picked on by ‘merican kid?”), providing an abstract (Labov, 1972) to his projected story. Just as I
showed occurs in previously-discussed emotional story prefaces (Chapter 4), this preface is also is followed up by a “why?” (line 12) question continuer from the interviewer.

In the preceding section I showed that questioning sequences that invite and result in storytelling are bounded and coordinated sequences. These interviewer-initiated stories may be elicited by story requests that ask for explicitly emotional stories, specific episodes, or illustrative examples that continue the previous topic of an interviewee’s talk. With one exception (Extract 5.5), I found that questioning sequences in which the interviewer invites or solicits emotional stories result in the production of emotion-implicative stories by the interviewees. The stories and their production are treated by both the interviewees and interviewer as relevant to the ongoing talk and interview activity. I also showed that story request sequences may occasion cognitive displays in which the interviewees show that they are selecting, recalling, and producing for the interviewer an experience fitting the story solicitation. Turning my attention from the way in which emotion talk is solicited by questioning sequences that request stories, in the following section I consider a questioning sequence that elicits emotion talk by asking about feelings.

5.2.2. Sequence 2: “Feeling” Questions

Another questioning sequence that elicits emotion talk is produced by “feeling” questions: interactional sequences occasioned by the interviewer asking a question about the interviewee’s feelings, subjective state, or affective stance toward topics and events (e.g., “how does…feel?”; “how do you feel about…?”; “how did you feel when…?”). 39

Soliciting opinions and emotionality

The qualitative research literature is replete with examples of researcher questions that invite talk from respondents about their opinions, thoughts, internal states, feelings, or subjective viewpoints. In survey research, for example, feeling questions are commonly used to elicit opinions from respondents:

39 I make a distinction here between feeling questions such as “How do you feel?” that are produced as general greetings or interaction openers, and questions such as “How do you feel about…” and “How did you feel when…” that are produced for the purpose of eliciting personal opinions or views about topics, people, objects, or events. It is the latter type that concerns the present discussion.
Course Evaluation Survey (Brown, 2005, p. 287)
Q. How do you feel about the objectives?

Teacher Surveys (O’Donoghue, 2006, p. 81)
Q. What do you feel about the experience of teaching online?

Telephone Survey (Fink, Bourque, & Fielder, 2003, p. 105)
Q. How do you feel about congressional proposals for stimulating the economy?

Attitude Research (Hyman, 1955, cited in Mishler, 1991, p. 45)
Q. Now that the war is over, how do you feel about the way the countries of the world are getting along together these days?

Basic Needs Survey (Sirgy & Samli, 1995, p. 184)
Q. How do you feel about the income you and your household have?

Social Indicators Research (Andrews & Withey, 1976, p. 87)
Q. How do you feel about your life as a whole?

Similar types of questions can also be found in interview research, as shown in the following illustrative extracts. Extract 5.12 comes from Wetherell’s (2003) study of race talk in New Zealand. In this sequence, the interviewer is asking a Pakeha (Caucasian) respondent about personal responses to the social tensions surrounding the revival of the indigenous Maori culture and language. The interviewer uses questions with both “think” and “feel” to elicit a topic-focused response from the respondent:

Extract 5.12. Adapted from Wetherell (p. 16)

\[\begin{align*}
01 \text{ I: } & \text{ Do you think in general that’s been (0.4) constructive} \\
02 & \text{ or (1.4) what do you feel about the way things are going} \\
03 & \text{ on that front? (2.0)} \\
04 \text{ R: } & \text{ I think they’ll end up having Maori w:ars if they carry} \\
05 & \text{ on the way [they have I mean no it’ll be a=} \\
06 \text{ I: } & \text{ } \text{ } \text{ } [((\text{laugh}))] \\
07 \text{ R } & \text{ =Pakeha war} \\
08 \text{ I: } & \text{ Yes} \\
09 \text{ R: } & \text{ U::hm (1.6) they’re ma:king New Zealand a racist cu-} \\
10 & \text{ country uhm but ya’know you usually feel (.) think that} \\
11 & \text{ racism is uhm (1.4) putting th- putting (.)=} \\
12 \text{ I: } & \text{ } \text{ } \text{ } [\text{Yes} \\
13 \text{ R: } & \text{ =the darker people down} \\
14 \text{ R: } & \text{ [but really they’re doing it (.) the other way around}
\end{align*}\]
Extract 5.13 is from an open-ended interview with an adult daughter who is the primary caregiver of her mother suffering from dementia. This extract takes place in the context of the interviewer asking the daughter how she manages taking care of her mother while working part-time and sharing the household with her husband and two sons. The interviewer asks a feeling question that elicits the daughter’s talk of her feelings about the present situation:

Extract 5.13. Adapted from Holstein and Gubrium (1995, p. 35)

→ 01 I: **How do you feel about it** in your situation?
02 R: Oh, I don’t know. Sometimes I think I’m being a bit selfish because I gripe about having to keep an eye on Mother all the time. If you let down your guard, she wanders off into the backyard or goes out the door and down the street. That’s no fun when your hubby wants your attention too. Norm works the second shift and he’s home during the day a lot. I manage to get in a few hours of work, but he doesn’t like it. I have pretty mixed feelings about it.

→ 11 I: What do you mean?
12 R: Well, I’d say as a daughter, I feel pretty guilty about how I feel sometimes. It can get pretty bad, like wishing that Mother were just gone, you know what I mean? She’s been a wonderful mother and I love her very much, but if you ask me how I feel as a wife and mother, that’s another matter.

Despite the ubiquitousness of feeling questions in survey and interview research, some scholars (e.g., Fink, 2008) argue that questions such as “How do you feel about…,” because they are personal and emotionally charged, may potentially offend some interviewees and should be avoided or used with caution. In each of the previous examples, the interviewer produced feeling questions designed to elicit respondents’ talk about their personal views and opinions regarding people and events. It is also important
to recognize that the interviewer’s questions were all successful in eliciting further talk and commentary from the interviewees.

Just because the interviewer asks interviewees how they feel about something does not necessarily make emotionality or talk of feelings the default response. In the same way, as I will show, asking someone what they think about a topic does not guarantee a mental claim nor preclude an emotion-indexing response. Some scholars (e.g., Patton, 1990) have pointed out questions such as “how did you feel about...?” can be treated by recipients as general opinion, stance, value solicitation, or “perspective display” (Maynard, 1991) requests. It is unclear, however, just how opinions, views, stances, etc. differ—as they are treated somewhat interchangeably in the literature:

Both Clayman (1987) and Greatbatch (1988) document a predominant turn-taking organization in which interviewers refrain from stating opinions, and ask questions of interviewees who, in answering, are allowed long turns in which to express their views. (Maynard, 1988, pp. 324–325)

One of the key issues addressed by analysts stems from the fact that, in their role as questioners, interviewers are required to avoid stating their views or opinions on the news. Rather, their task is to elicit the stance, opinion, or account of the one being questioned, but to do so at least technically without bias or prejudice. (Hutchby, 2005, p. 444)

For present purposes, I treat opinions, perspective displays, subjective stances, accounts, etc. all as subjective and personal representations by the interviewee in response to interviewer utterances inviting stories and commentary on specific topics, events, people, and so on. I also note that opinions and subjective responses can be constructed as explicitly emotional or emotion-implicative.

Turning again to Extracts 5.12-5.13, I now examine the feeling questions and the talk that is produced in response to them. In the segment represented in Extract 5.12, immediately noticeable is the alternation between question types as well as talk of thinking and feeling. In lines 1-2, the interviewer makes use of both “think” and “feel” through a split or alternative question structure (Clayman & Heritage, 2002; Sidnell, 2010b). The interviewer’s incremental and hesitant production of the question creates slots for the interviewee to collaboratively complete the utterance. Produced as a think-
prefaced yes-no question (line 1: “Do you think in general that’s been (0.4) constructive or…”), the interviewee is invited to insert a relevant response. The space after “do you think in general that’s been (0.4)” projects a relevant transition relevant place (TRP), by means of a pause and a designedly incomplete utterance (Koshik, 2002), for the interviewee to insert a descriptive term. For example,

I: Do you think in general that’s been (0.4) [______]

R: A big problem?

After the pause, the interviewer continues with a candidate insertion followed by the alternative marker “or” and a longer pause (line 2: “Do you think in general that’s been (0.4) constructive or (1.4)”), another designedly incomplete utterance and pre-completion slot for the interviewee to respond. The production of this question makes relevant at least two related potential interpretations for the interviewee. First, “Do you think in general that’s been (0.4) constructive (1.4) or,” as a polar question, projects a yes-no or confirmation-denial (plus an account). For example,

I: Do you think in general that’s been (0.4) constructive or (1.4)

[not]

R: Yes, I think it’s been somewhat constructive.

R: No, it’s hasn’t been very constructive. Look at all the recent tensions and violence.

Another possible interpretation is that the conjunction “or” and the 1.4-second pause makes relevant a split or alternative question and an answer that contains one of two alternatives (e.g., “constructive” or “positive,” helpful,” “destructive,” “divisive”).

40 Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974) stated that if a pause is an intra-turn silence, it is not a TRP and “not to be talked in by others” (p. 715). However, intra-turn silences and pre-completion positions (see Schegloff, 1996) may be equally available for opportunistic completion (Lerner, 1996, p. 261). Also, without video data available for this segment, it is unclear whether this pause may also have been used for achieving mutual gaze, as Goodwin (1980) notes occurs at turn beginnings.

41 Projected alternatives are not necessarily contrasts. They are simply alternative formulations.
For example,

I: Do you think in general that’s been (0.4) constructive or (1.4) [___]

R: I’d say it’s been somewhat constructive, but there are still problems that need to be addressed

R: Well, it’s been divisive, hasn’t it?

Although I have presented invented responses to the interviewer’s question in Extract 5.12, my point to show that the ways in which questions are incrementally formulated and produced by the interviewer can open up a number of alternative interpretations and responses by the interviewees. Continuing in line 2, after a potential transition-relevant pause where the interviewee could offer a response, the interviewer repairs the preceding utterance by reformulating the subjective state/opinion marker from “think” to “feel” (line 2: “what do you feel about…”). By reformulating the previous closed question to an open, “feeling” question type, the interviewer shapes the question sequence to facilitate a broader and more in-depth and personal response.

At first glance, the interviewer appears to be inviting the respondent to frame a response to cultural matters in New Zealand as an emotional one (line 2: “what do you feel about…”). However, taking advantage of the potential interpretive ambiguity of this question, R responds to the interviewer’s question not with a feeling response (e.g., “I feel…” but with a thought-prefaced opinion (“I think…”). In contrast, in line 10, the respondent begins with a generalized feeling claim and then repairs it to think (“you usually feel (.). think that…”). As a general practice, both thought and feeling formulations can work to elicit and provide the respondent’s subjective opinion or perspective.

Although feeling and thought questions and responses appear to be used similarly in this interview segment (e.g., to solicit subjective responses), their location in the talk suggests there may be some subtle differences. There is some indication here that thought formulations are used by this speaker when representing more specific opinions and feeling formulations are used for more general or less certain claims. For example, in line 1, “Do you think…” is used by the interviewer to elicit a general opinion about specific
features of the Maori movement (i.e., whether it has been “constructive” or otherwise). When the interviewer reformulates the question, “what do you feel about…” is used to elicit an open-ended response. In the following turn, the respondent uses “I think…” to offer a specific opinion about potential Maori wars. In line 10, although the respondent begins with “I feel…,” it is quickly reformulated to “I think…” to preface a specific opinion statement (i.e., that racism is about putting the darker people down) that is then negated by a contrastive reality claim that the “darker people” are actually putting whites down.

The respondent’s use of “I feel” (line 17) cannot be linked to the interviewer’s formulation of “reverse racism” (line 16), as it is produced as an overlap. It may be a mitigation move, to downgrade the potentially sensitive claims that Maoris are racist, and by following the first part of the interviewer’s utterance in line 16 (“A sort”), takes a weaker epistemic stance begun by that description. Thus, although both thought and feeling questions may work in similar ways to elicit subjective opinions and perspective displays, they may be used to convey different strengths of epistemic authority and certainty. This suggests a productive area for future research.

Thought-feeling alternation can also be seen in Extract 5.13, after the interviewer presents a feeling question to the respondent. In transcribing this interaction, the researchers have not provided the fine-grained details (e.g., pauses, restarts, prosodic cues) recognized as important in CA research, but there are still a number of observations that can be made. Like Extract 5.12, the interviewer here makes use of a feeling question to elicit a response from the interviewee (line 1: How do you feel about it in your situation?”). The interviewee then prefaces her response with a change of state token (“Oh”) and an epistemic uncertainty marker (“I don’t know”), treating the topic as sensitive as well as displaying her cognitive processing (Heritage, 2005) of the question and a response. Heritage (1998a) observed that oh-prefaced responses are common in the second position of an adjacency pair and can “indicate that the inquiry being responded to is problematic as to its relevance, presuppositions, or context” (p. 286) or otherwise show reluctance to advance the conversational topic. As I discussed in Chapter 4, epistemic uncertainty markers such as “I don’t know” and “I dunno” are also frequently produced
in response to questioning, and are resources for managing sensitive topics and possible negative interpretations of responses and can be used to hedge or soften one’s opinion.

Similar to Extract 5.12, the respondent in Extract 5.13 uses “think,” rather than “feel,” in her response to the interviewer’s question (line 2: “Sometimes I think I’m being a bit selfish…”). In an analysis of Extract 5.12, I noted that the speaker used think-prefaced responses before describing a general opinion or stance. In Extract 5.13, although the speaker is talking about herself and her actions (and the actions of others), the rhetorical structure of her account (e.g., coordinate and subordinate conjunctions, cause-effect relations), use of the generic “you,” and listing of the facts work together to highlight the conditions of her situation, imply its emotionality, and assess her actions and their consequences rather than describing how she personally feels:

Lines 2-3: Sometimes I think I’m being a bit selfish because I gripe about having to keep an eye on Mother all the time

Lines 4-6: If you let down your guard, she wanders off into the backyard or goes out the door and down the street.

Lines 6-7: That’s no fun when your hubby wants your attention too

Lines 7-8: Norm works the second shift and he’s home during the day a lot

Lines 8-9: I manage to get in a few hours of work, but he doesn’t like it

In lines 9-10, after describing her situation, the respondent then formulates the upshot of her account (“I have pretty mixed feelings about it”), bringing her response to a possible turn completion. Summary assessments and utterances that present an “emotional take on what has preceded” (Schegloff, 2007, p. 186) have been shown to be moves by the speaker to close a sequence or the topic-in-progress. Again, although the respondent formulates her summary in general emotion-indexing terms (“mixed feelings”), she does not explicitly label any of those feelings.
Instead of treating the interviewee’s response as sufficient and complete, the interviewer orients to the problem of ambiguity or the specificity of her response (see also Schegloff, 2000, on the problem of granularity) and produces a next turn repair initiator (NTRI) in line 11. Repairing her response, the respondent begins with a tentative well-preface. When following questions and NTRIs, well-prefaced turns indicate to the recipient that a non-straightforward response (projecting topical or interactional trouble) is forthcoming (Schegloff & Lerner, 2009). After her well-preface, the respondent then formulates her response with “feel,” recycling this particular lexical item from the interviewer’s original question in line 1 (a tying move that shows the speaker’s understanding of the topic focus) to now give a personal (consistently using the first-person pronoun) and explicitly emotion-indexing response (lines 12-13: I feel pretty guilty about how I feel sometimes”). Relatedly, Extract 5.13 also shows that feeling questions such as “How do you feel about…” may occasion responses that make directly relevant a number of membership categories and their category-bound emotions. In lines 12-17, R invokes the categories of daughter, wife, and mother, and the differential emotion claims that attach to those membership categories (e.g., “guilt” and “love” are bound to the category of daughter, but the categories of “mother” and “wife” occasion different emotions).

Feeling question sequences in the present study

Turning now to the present study, feeling questions were found to elicit and directly lead to emotional responses and descriptions from the research participants. Moreover, there is evidence that the interviewer invited emotion talk when it was not immediately forthcoming. I now discuss some illustrative examples of feeling questions in my data.

Extract 5.14 is from an interview with Trang (T). Leading up to this particular segment, Trang had been telling the interviewer (M) a story about his recent experience returning to Cambodia to visit his father and other relatives. Trang often brought up the topic of the emotional, mental, and physical abuse he received from his father and other authority figures and institutions (e.g., police, soldiers, lawyers, banks, schools) and this became a recurrent theme throughout much of his talk within and outside the interviews. This particular segment was located at the end of the story where Trang described how he
finally confronted his father about the continued abuse, and as a result, his father refused
to speak to him for a week.

Extract 5.14. Trang

01 T: suddenly I realize I don’t want ((him)) to
02 mistreat ((me)) like that. so I told him.
03 a whole week he got mad at me. wouldn’t talk to
04 me. heh heh
→ 05 M: did you feel better?
→ 06 T: I feel better.
→ 07 M: I mean after telling him.
→ 08 T: I feel relieved. you know I got it off my chest
09 for a change. for all 25 years later. I become a
10 man now. I’m not a boy anymore. you cannot talk
11 to me like that. heh heh

In his description of events in first position, T makes use of contrasting objective
and subjective stances (see Chapter 4) to locate him and his father in terms of their
respective rationality and irrationality. For his part, T describes his conscious (i.e.,
rational) psychological realization and decision to act against mistreatment. In contrast,
characterizing his father’s emotional response, T describes here how his father got “mad”
(rather than “sad,” “ashamed,” etc.) and would not talk to him for “a whole week”—an
extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) further characterizing his father’s reaction
as extreme (adding descriptive weight to T’s description of his father as stubborn and
unrepentant).

T’s laughter in lines 4 and 11 is a typical display of resistance to troubles talk.
Speakers will often insert laughter to indicate to their listeners that they are coping and
bravely dealing with those troubles instead of overreacting or taking them too seriously
(Glenn, 2003; Jefferson, 1984). Recipients of trouble talk, however, generally avoid
producing or joining in laughter as they take an empathetic stance toward the speaker’s
trouble talk: The recipient of trouble talk rarely joins in the teller’s laughter. Instead, he
or she tends to treat the trouble seriously to exhibit “trouble receptiveness” (Jefferson,
1984, p. 351). As shown in this extract, although T initiates laughter, treating this story as
something laughable, M takes a more serious and empathetic stance by not laughing
along or otherwise treating this story lightheartedly.

After T’s description, M displays an orientation to the emotionality of T’s story by asking a “feeling” question (line 5: “did you feel better?”). This question trades on psychological inferences by leading with the presumption that after confronting someone about abuse or mistreatment, one should normatively be expected to respond with positive feelings (e.g., relief, satisfaction, happiness). Moreover, the grammatical construction of the question biases the interviewee toward a confirmatory response (Heritage, 2010), and T confirms that confronting his father did lead to a positive psychological outcome (line 6: “I feel better”).

However, as M’s question was about past events and T’s response uses the grammatical present tense, it is unclear here if T is talking about how he feels now or how he felt then (i.e., in the past). This ambiguity touches off a repair sequence starting at line 7. Treating T’s utterance in line 6 as a trouble source (in first position), M formulates his question, not with a repetition or an explicit focus on grammar (e.g., “I said, “did you feel better?””), but by locating his question in terms of the temporal sequence of events in relation to the story (line 7: “I mean after telling him”). As a repair initiator in second position, M’s question occasions T’s reformulation (rather than a repetition) of “I feel better” (line 6) to “I feel relieved” (line 8) in third position and results in an extended account. It should also be noted that T’s repair involves an emotion state reformulation (“I feel relieved”) instead of the possibly grammatically expected “I felt better” or “I felt relieved.” This may be attributable to T’s idiosyncratic control of English past tense (e.g., he produces “got” in lines 3 and 8 but not “realized” or “became” in lines 1 and 9). T’s lexical substitution from “better” (line 6) to “relieved” (line 8) does display the appropriate grammatical past tense—perhaps in response to M’s question about time. In terms of emotionality, it is important to recognize that “relieved” reformulates “better” into a more explicit affective state, a type of reformulation or lexical substitution also commonly found in therapeutic discourse (see Vercelli, Rossini, & Vireo, 2008; Rae, 2008; also Chapter 6 on reformulations).

Another example of an interviewer-initiated feeling question in these data comes from an interview with John, where he constructs a metaphorical description of himself as “split in pieces” from being pulled back and forth between his various identities (e.g.,
Chinese, gay, straight).

Extract 5.15. John

01 J: So if the wind blows me a gay direction, >I can
02 go to gay. but if it blow me to a straight
03 direction< °I can go straight direction.°
04 M: °hm°
05 J: so (. ) I can yeah (. ) go to (. ) yeah (. )
06 basically (. ) I split myself in pieces.
07 (0.7)

→ 08 M: UH: (.) and how does that feel?
09 (1.4)

→ 10 J: it not good sometime but: (2.0) like I say (0.8)
11 I have to live with all these lie and it- (. ) it

→ 12 feel (. ) not too good. (1.3)
13 but then, (. ) hopefully it not be continue going
14 °but- (.) I-° (.) HOPEfully it not continue going
15 but I don’t know when
16 [(.) i]t could stop (. ) unless I tell (. )
17 M: [oh: ]
18 J: come out (. )and tell everybody. I still don’t
19 have the nerve.

As John formulates a description of himself as “split in pieces” (line 6), his pauses and hesitant production of his utterance (lines 5-6) display his situated “thought” process (Heritage, 2005)—showing his work to organize and summarize the upshot of his talk for the interviewer. Responding to J’s formulation at a TRP, and treating it as emotion-implicative and characterizable in emotional terms,42 M produces a feeling question (line 8: “UH: (.) and how does that feel?”). By formulating the upshot of John’s talk as a description of feelings toward events, M is building an assumption into this talk (i.e., that one would likely have a “feeling” about such things). M’s uh-prefaced question is produced here with many of the same features (e.g., increased volume, sound stretch, pause) found in the use of other possible disjunctive topic shift markers such as “anyway” and “oh” (Drew, 1997, p. 76). However, by continuing with “and” (line 8) and using the demonstrative “that” as a deictic/indexical (line 8: “and how does that feel?”), M links

42 Based on the implied assumption that the precipitating conditions and state of being “split in pieces” result in a tell-worthy emotional account.
the present topic of talk to J’s previous mention of identity troubles—thereby furthering the previous topic rather than starting a new one. In Jefferson’s terms, M “potentiates further talk by the troubles recipient” (Jefferson, 1984, p. 202).

Examining J’s extended response to M’s feeling question, several points stand out. First, J cooperates with M by formulating his responses as emotion-implicative (line 10: “it not good”; lines 11-12: “it feel (. ) not too good”). This maintains across the turns the treatment of the emotional consequences of J’s situation as important within the interview agenda. Second, although J could have formulated his response to M’s feeling question (line 8: “how does that feel?”), as “I feel not good sometimes” or “I don’t know when I could stop,” his consistent use of deictic reference displays his recognition that he and M share the same topic focus. J responds with a consistent use of “it” to refer to the “emotional object” (i.e., the cause of the imputed emotion or the object toward which the emotion is directed) specified by M’s question:

Line 8: M: **how does that feel?**

Line 10: J: **it** not good sometime

Lines 11-12: **it** feel (. ) not too good

Line 13: hopefully **it** not be continue going

Line 14: HOPEfully **it** not continue going

Lines 15-16: I don’t know when (. ) **it** could stop

In contrast, J consistently uses the first person pronoun to describe his actions—not his feelings or desires:

Line 10: Like **I** say

Line 11: **I** have to live with all these lie

Line 15: **I** don’t know when
Line 16: unless I tell

Lines 18-19: I still don’t have the nerve

Another illustration of the interviewer’s question shaping the interviewee’s response is found in a comparison of Extract 5.14 (Trang) with Extract 5.15 (John). A similar consistency between the form of the feeling question and the form of the feeling response is immediately apparent.

Line 5: M: did you feel better?

Line 6 J: I feel better

Line 8: I feel relieved

Lines 8-9: I got it off my chest for a change

Lines 9-10: I become a man now

Lines 10-11: You cannot talk to me like that

Just as the interviewer’s use of “that” in Extract 5.14 occasioned the interviewee using “it” in his response, in Extract 5.14, responding to “did you feel better?” (line 5), the interviewee recycles part of the interviewer’s question (“feel”) and produces the correct pronoun change—keeping consistent the emotional subject (i.e., the person experiencing the putative emotions). Also, as in Extract 5.15, J uses the first-person pronoun to highlight his individuality within these emotional events.

As an analysis of the preceding extracts shows, feeling questions are occasioned by emotion-implicative talk just as they also occasion emotion-implicative talk. Feeling questions, as one type of question found in questioning sequences, are used by the interviewer to treat what came before as emotion-implicative, tell-worthy, and describable in emotional terms. In addition, the duration, causality, and temporal

sequencing of emotions appear to be important features of emotion talk. Another observation is that feeling question sequences found in this study consisted of at least four components: description, question, response, and elaboration/account:

![Diagram showing the sequence: Description of emotion implicative circumstances → Feeling Question → Emotion Response → Emotion Elaboration.]

Figure 2. Four components of feeling question sequences.

Respondents were not just asked what they felt and then prompted to describe those feelings—the questions and responses were bound up together to create a sequence of accountability. The interviewer’s feeling questions were occasioned by the interviewee’s previous talk that made available emotional inferences, the emotion responses were occasioned by the feeling questions, and elaborations to account for those emotions followed the speakers’ descriptions of their psychological states. However, to be clear, I am not making any claims that this pattern is unique to emotion talk, storytelling, or even interviews. Similar sequences can be found across a wide range of talk, including storytelling, news delivery, telephone openings, and complaints. Sacks (1974), for example, described stories and jokes as consisting of a three-part sequence: preface sequence, telling, and response sequence. Maynard (2003) described news delivery as having a four-part sequence consisting of an announcement, announcement response, elaboration, and assessment. Similarly, in an extension of Scott and Lyman’s (1968) work on accounts, Schönbach (1980) offered a four-part account sequence: failure event, reproach, account, and evaluation. As this suggests, emotion talk appears to be supported by the same kinds of abstract organizations (e.g., story prefaces, elaborative question sequences, accounts, formulations, epistemic and affective displays) that support all talk-in-interaction.
5.2.3. Sequence 3: Emotion-Implicative Questions

Not all interviewer-initiated question sequences soliciting emotion talk in this study used descriptive terms such as “feel” and “feelings.” Emotionality was also brought out by emotion-implicative assessments and questions. An analysis of an interview with Sang (S), an adult immigrant man from Cambodia, provides an illustrative case of the interviewer (M) soliciting talk of experience—negative experience in particular.

Leading up to this extract, Sang spoke about some of his difficulties (e.g., learning English, being picked on by “American” and “Asian” students) in high school in the Midwest. Upon discovering they had both lived in the same Midwestern city, they joked about the short summers and cold winters (line 1). After the shared laughter, the interviewer abruptly transitions to a more serious-sounding tone and initiates a new sequence:

Extract 5.16. Sang

01 M: heh heh heh
02 (1.0)
03 S: heh
04 (0.6)
05 M: ((sniff))
06 (0.3)
07 M: yea::h
08 (2.0)

→ 09 was it hard for you sometimes to talk to
→ 10 American people?
11 S: “oh yeah lot of time yeah. uh (.) I don’t have
12 (.) I don’t have (any:- (.) any more) friend
13 with American people so I- (.) my English is
14 bad (that time).“=

→ 15 M: =>did you have< (.) you had no friends?
16 (0.5)
17 S: “no friend at all that time”=
→ 18 M: [only the pastor?]44
19 S: [only only ]Lao. Lao people.
20 M: oh
21 (0.8)
22 S: yeah (.)”Lao people are my friend.”

44 Sang and his family were sponsored by a local U.S. church group.
The laughter (lines 1 and 3), gaps (lines 2, 4, 6, 8), and vowel stretch (line 7: “yea::h”) work together to jointly initiate closure of the current sequence (Chafe, 2007; Glenn, 1992; Holt, 1999, 2010; Liddicoat, 2007). After a two-second silence in line 8, M then initiates a new topic sequence with a question to S about past language troubles (lines 9-10: was it hard for you sometimes to talk to American people?”). By producing his question in the past tense, M is inviting talk of autobiographic experience rather than personal opinion. Although M’s question is not requesting talk of a specific episode, the word stress on “hard” and “talk” (instead of on “was,” “sometimes,” “American people,” etc.) makes relevant the interviewer’s interest in a response tied to matters of difficulty and speaking. In addition, the positive polarity structure of M’s question and lack of perturbation takes advantage of the conversational preference for agreement (Sacks, 1987; Schegloff, 2007). Anything other than a confirmatory response would require S to explain why it was never even “sometimes” hard for him to talk to American people (particularly since he had already established in previous talk that he did have trouble with others in high school).

Responding with the second pair part to M’s question, S offers an emphatic agreement with an oh-prefaced epistemic marker in line 11 (“oh yeah lot of time yeah”). This oh-preface serves as a recognizable display of remembering and epistemic claim to personal experience similar to that found in previous extracts. Instead of simply offering a confirmation (e.g., “yes,” “yeah,” “uhuh,” “that’s right”), S continues with a strong agreement through repetition and word stress on “yeah” (line 11), upgrades (i.e., reformulates) the interviewer’s time formulation from “sometimes” to “lot of time,” and gives an account (e.g., he doesn’t have American friends, his English is bad) using an extreme case formulation (line 12: “I don’t have any:-) for why it was hard. After S describes his English as “bad” at that time, M immediately follows up with a question in line 15 focused on the topic of friends (“you had no friends?”)—not S’s language skills.

This segment gives further evidence of the ways that the interviewer can use the preference organization of questions to bias the interviewee’s responses. In line 15, M begins his utterance with a positive polarity (“did you have”) repair initiator favoring a “yes” response and then abruptly repairs it to a negatively polarized question (“you had no friends?”) that favors a “no” response (Heritage, 2010). Following the conversational
preference for agreement, S responds to the interviewer’s question with an upgraded reformulation of his response in lines 11-12 by claiming that his lack of “any” friends extended from having no American friends to having no friends at all (line 17: “‘no friend at all that time’”). Orienting to the extreme nature of the claim that S had “no friend at all,” M initiates a repair (line 18: “only the Pastor?”) and, in overlap, S self repairs by downgrading his claim of having “no friend at all” to state he only had Lao friends (one of the only other Southeast Asian groups at his school).

Later in the interaction, M contrasts S’s talk about the past with the present (lines 22-23):

Extract 5.17. Sang

22 M: how about now? is it (.) easy for you to talk
23 to American people or,
24 S: (now-)now it’s okay
25 M: now no problem?
26 (1.0)
27 S: ‘yeah I s-sometime I have problem too but (.)
28 it’s ok I can (.) let them explain and I can
29 understand.”
30 (0.7)
31 M: oh
32 S: ‘but before when I- (.) they explain I still
33 don’t understand’.£
34 M: oh really?
[S tells a story about how he learned swear words in school and became angry when he learned what other students were calling him]

In Extract 5.16 (focused on S’s past experiences) it was found that interviewer’s questions made use of the conversational preference for agreement to elicit confirmatory responses. Each of those responses confirmed that the interviewee had problems interacting with others. In Extract 5.17 (focused on S’s present experiences) the interviewer’s question in lines 22-23 (“how about now? is it (.) easy for you to talk to

45 As some of the transcripts suggest, and substantiated in the interviews and social observations, the Cambodian and Vietnamese interviewees reported that because of the historical enmity between their countries, they generally avoided interactions with members of the other group.
American people or,"), produced with a continuing intonation contour, creates an “alternative” or “split” question (Clayman & Heritage, 2002). The first part of the question invites agreement (i.e., that it is easy for S now to talk to American people). The contrasting response projected by the disjunctive marker “or” (i.e., that S still experiences some difficulties talking with American people) leaves room for S to contradict the propositional content of M’s question. Instead of responding with a claim of difficulty, S confirms M’s initial description (line 25: “now it’s okay”).

After S confirms that he has no problems talking with American people (line 24: “now it’s okay”), M does not treat that response as sufficient by offering an acknowledgement token (e.g., “I see,” “Okay,” “Oh”). Instead, in his turn as a third position repair, M responds with a negative polarity question (line 25: “now no problem?”) that favors a negative response (e.g., “no problem”). M’s rising intonation and interrogative structure could indicate a request for clarification or elaboration, a pursuit of “problem” talk, and even an invitation to reformulate (see Chapter 6) S’s description of “okay” into more explicit terms (i.e., as “problem”) to enable a complaint story. M’s code-switch to a simplified register (line 25: “now no problem?”), by reducing the focus of the question to time and the matter of “no problem,” also functions as a repair or a rephrasing of S’s prior turn.

Rather than providing a negative response, after a one-second pause (potentially an embodied display of thought), S responds with “yeah I s-sometime I have problem too but (. ) it’s ok I can (. ) let them explain and I can understand” (lines 27-29). S appears to orient to his dispreferred response as he provides an account to explain that although does have problems in the present they are no longer a problem in the present.

Further evidence of M’s agenda to elicit “problem” talk is found in the next line when he replies to S with a minimal response made up of a simple news receipt

46 It is possible that S may be hinting that he does have some problems in the present—as evidenced by his downgrade of M’s description of “easy” (line 22) to “okay” (line 24).

47 This code-switch into a simplified register could be considered a type of foreigner talk. Whereas foreigner talk can be seen as an orientation to the non-native status of the addressee, it has also been considered as a kind of linguistic modification to aid in repair and better communication (Hatch, 1992; Snow, van Eeden, & Muysken, 1981).
(Heritage, 1984; Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2006) rather than an expression of surprise. However, when S produces with laughter talk about some trouble in the past, M’s response becomes a more emphatic expression of surprise (line 34: “oh really?”). As multi-functional devices, oh-prefaced responses can indicate surprise by upgrading the change of state display (Liddicoat, 2007). Wilkinson and Kitzinger (2006) found that oh-prefaced surprise tokens can also display emotionality (particularly through prosody) as well as affiliation toward the speaker.

The next illustration of interviewer-elicited emotionality takes place in the middle of a second interview with Kim (K), an immigrant woman from Vietnam. This extract follows her previous talk about an angry and rude customer who complained about customer service and told K and another female co-worker that they should work in a bar. The interviewer (M) was called away to the phone for a few minutes and has now returned:

Extract 5.18. Kim

01 M: ((M hangs up the phone and returns to his chair))
02 K: [do I talk too much?]
03 M: [”testing. ] ((checking the mic))
04 M: >no no no no no no no< no.
05 testing. testing. ((checking the mic))
06 K: heh heh
07 M: yeah I can hear it.
08 K: 12.0 ((talk about the phone call omitted))
09 M: umm (. ) no but you said something (. ) you said (. ) people- (. ) because you have an accent, because you’re a non-native speaker=
10 11 K: =mhm
12 M: people can do that (. ) or people do that or something. I’m wondering, (3.4) as a nonnative speaker (. ) >whatever that means.< and having
13 17 how do you deal with things like that
14 18 (2.5)
15 20 I mean do you (. ) get angry or do you just say “oh there’s nothing I can do about it or~”
16 21 K: I-I-I-I guess. it depends also on my mood of the day.
M: heh heh heh
K: so sometime if you're in a good mood you tolerate? and sometime (. ) you cannot
tolerate. especially that (. ) very insulting the way he s- (. ) you know that how he sound?
M: mhm
K: like- (. ) “oh, you should (. ) work in the bar.' and I look at him and I say, “an:: (. )
who are you? I mean (. ) w-what do you think? (. ) that I'm deserve that and and the way you
speak like that(. ) what category that you fit in? You know are you some kind of a (. ) a (. )
doctor? lawyer? teacher? or just a low class (. ) 'speaker that I have to pay attention
to.'
M: you said that to him?
K: no, [I said that in my-my [mind, right?
M: [Oh [oh
K: that's what I'm thinking. if-if you insulting me, in that way. I can insulted him also too
(. ) but (. ) I don't want to do that. if- I don't want to level with him to begin with.
M: "mhm"

I will focus here on the segment beginning from line 10. M initiates a change in activity and an extended turn with a disjunctive preface (line 10: “umm (. )”). In lines 10-15, by formulating K’s previous talk of her feelings of incompetence, difficulty, and mistreatment linked to her status as an L2 speaker, M ties directly into their shared interactional history and displays his understanding of the gist of her talk as well as the matters that he is treating as relevant to the present interview. Embedded within these formulations is the projection of an upcoming sequence. When asking questions, particularly on potentially sensitive topics, speakers often project their question through a pre-question sequence (Schegloff, 1980, 2007). These preliminary sequences serve to prepare the listener that a particular sequence is coming and helps them to respond to it. In questioning sequences, these pre-sequences are often initiated by a question announcement (e.g., “Can I ask you a question?”).

In lines 10-15, M projects a question sequence by producing a pre-sequence as well as pre-pre-sequence (Schegloff, 2007). First, through a pre-pre-sequence, by
reporting what K said (through indirect represented speech), M is putting her talk “on display” and treating it as accountable—thereby projecting that in the next step of this sequence he will make clear its relevance. Next, M produces a pre-question (line 15: “I’m wondering,”)—similar in function to “Can I ask you a question?”—followed by a long pause (potentially displaying M’s stance toward the projected question as delicate). M then begins an insertion (lines 15-17: “as a nonnative speaker (.) >whatever that means.< and having an accent (.) >whatever that means.<”), produced as a “rush through” (Schegloff, 1982, 1987) to extend and hold his turn and show K that he is leading up to a question. Having projected and prefaced his question, M now begins his question (again, produced as a four-turn sequence). This extended questioning sequence is represented below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Turn</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
<th>Annotation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>M: umm (.)</td>
<td>New topic initiator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-15</td>
<td>no but you said something (.) you said (.) people- (.) because you have an accent, because you’re a non-native speaker=</td>
<td>Pre-pre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K: =mhm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M: people can do that (.) or people do that or something.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>M: I’m wondering, (3.4)</td>
<td>Pre-question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-17</td>
<td>as a nonnative speaker (.) &gt;whatever that means.&lt; and having an accent (.) &gt;whatever that means.&lt;</td>
<td>Insertion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-18</td>
<td>how do you deal with things like that?</td>
<td>4-Turn Structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.5)</td>
<td>a. Question 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td>b. Gap (non-response)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-21</td>
<td>I mean do you (.) get angry or do you just say “oh there’s nothing I can do about it or−”</td>
<td>c. Question 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-23</td>
<td>K: I-I-I guess. it depends also on my mood of the day.</td>
<td>d. Dispreferred response (with hesitations)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Just as sequence organization is normative and thereby exercises a moral imperative, so does categorization-in-sequence (Baker, 2004; Jayyusi, 1984, 1991; Sacks, 1992; Schegloff, 1988). That is, by the interviewer asking a question that ascribes an identity category, the interviewee is called upon to respond as a member of that category. Of all the potential categories or identities that K could have been called upon to speak as (e.g., woman, mother, wife, store clerk, immigrant, Asian, Vietnamese, multilingual, second language user, student), she is called on here (by M) as a victim of mistreatment. “How do you deal with things like that?” (lines 17-18) stands to elicit an answer to a wider problem (mistreatment in general) not just the rude customer incident; thus, K is asked to speak not just as a clerk, but also from a wider range of categories (i.e., “mistreated person”) of which clerk, female, Asian, etc. are all potential membership subcategories with their associated subjective experiences and responses.

Because the formulation of M’s question opens up the potential for K to respond from a variety of identity categories, it also allows for a variety of possible emotional responses (e.g., anger, laughter, exasperation). After a 2.5-second silence, a possible transition relevant place for K to respond to the question, M reformulates the question by asking, “I mean do you (. .) get angry or do you just say ‘oh there’s nothing I can do about i:t or-’”—narrowing it down to at least two candidate responses: getting angry or resigning oneself to the inevitability of the circumstances. It is significant to note that this is performed as represented thought. Thus, the interviewer, by describing Kim’s hypothetical thought process, also invites her to comment in terms of her state of mind and psychological coping strategies. K’s initial response to the interviewer’s disjunctive question is produced with tentative agreement (line 22: “I-I guess”)— again, a dispreferred response in Gardner’s (2004) four-turn model — but with which candidate response is she aligning? K’s following qualification of her response in lines 25-26 (“It depend also on my mood of the day.”) offers up a third option based on mood. K now constructs her own emotionality (as mood) as something that fluctuates and is not under conscious control. 48 Kim’s account, “it depends also on my mood of the day?” (22-23)

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48 Edwards (1997) has pointed out the moods can be conceptually distinguished from emotions “on the grounds that emotions take ‘intensional object and moods do not: we are angry at things, fearful of things,
prefaces the conditions that generate particular emotion responses: a good mood allows her to tolerate abuse, but insulting behavior prevents her from being tolerant.

As a general practice, when a speaker is talking about problems or complaints, their listeners withhold laughter—to show that they are treating that talk seriously. However, M treats K’s statement as a laughable (line 24)—as something humorous—perhaps responding to K’s talk of how her response to mistreatment is determined by mood. Kim does not align with the interviewer’s humorous stance and instead describes that a good mood allows one to tolerate mistreatment, but sometimes it cannot be tolerated. An interesting aspect of her construction is that it reframes the interviewer’s options of getting angry or doing nothing into a description of her active work to control her behavior (i.e., tolerate implies control and rational behavior).

As the interaction continues and Kim retells her story, she invokes social categories and moral behavior and entitlements. There are a number of rhetorical contrasts present in this segment: categories of high-status occupations—or authority figures (doctor, lawyer, teacher) and a low class speaker. Through represented speech (i.e., by voicing herself), Kim injects herself into the narrative space to talk back to the rude customer. Here she is hearably “silently angry” by posing rhetorical questions to the customer. In this segment, Kim uses these categorizations to challenge hierarchies based on occupation and language ability. She is not just talking back to him as her customer, but as an English speaker. In other words, she is countering her status as a non-native speaker (brought up earlier by Kim and then by the interviewer) by raising herself up based on moral conduct; that is, even as a non-native speaker, person with an accent, or visible minority, she abides by a code of moral conduct, as a department store clerk and as a member of society. K makes a distinction between what is said, what is thought, what one is entitled to say or do, and what one chooses not to say or do. In lines 42-45, although K is claiming entitlement to get angry and insult the rude customer, she constructs herself as rational and self-controlled. Thus, she is appealing to norms of

but can be simply jovial or frivolous” (p. 199). Nevertheless, as the distinction is a tenuous one, Edwards prefers to consider the emotion-mood dichotomy as a discursive resource rather than a discursive fact.
moral conduct to locate herself as morally wronged and choosing not to engage the insulting customer on his level.49

Initiated by the interviewer, emotion talk in this segment becomes a resource that enables K to explain her actions and responses to events in a morally accountably way. A conclusion of her rhetorical work is that she characterizes her stance and reactions toward the actions of others as mutually constitutive of and constituted by particular emotional states. One might suggest that by qualifying her response in this way, K allows the conversation to continue by linking back to the previously-shared story of the rude customer as well as creating an emotional story preface (or a pre-expansion; Liddicoat, 2007; Sacks, 1992; Schegloff, 2007) that signals an upcoming story. This emotional story preface is also restated in lines 25-28 (“So sometime if you’re in a good mood you tolerate? and sometime (.) you cannot tolerate.”), also creating a narrative abstract, or the summing up of the point of the story (i.e., sometimes you can tolerate it, and sometimes you can’t). Through direct and indirect emotional terms and inferences (e.g., anger, helplessness, mood, good mood, tolerate), an emotional story preface and attendant affective stances provide interactional cues that a story (of an emotional nature) or at least an illustration of those claims is to follow. Moreover, through the activity of storytelling, K also makes relevant the respective roles of the interactants (K as interviewee and storyteller, and M as interviewer and story recipient).

Positive emotion solicitation failures

Based on the discussion so far, the emotionality of these interviews has been characterized as intense, memorable, and the result of mistreatment by others. In light of the talk projected and produced by the interviewees and elicited by the interviewer, it is noticeable that the content centers around negative emotions. This is likely due in large part to the way in which the interviewer’s questions bias potential responses. While

49 In this study, how individuals represented and even recategorized talk of negative experience varied. As this project was longitudinal, I saw some changes in the ways speakers organized about their experiences over time. For example, like Kim, some responded by using the narrative space to “talk back” and “fight back” against people who wronged them. Some used the narrative space to reframe their stories over time—to treat events as “funny” rather than “depressing.” Others used narratives to make visible and create a cohesive self across time.
feeling questions allow for a range of emotional responses (negative and positive), emotion-implicative questions (particularly those utilizing descriptions such as “hard,” “problem,” “angry,” and so on) greatly narrow the range of potential responses—forcing the respondent to either follow the conversational preference for agreement or work up an account to justify disagreement with the interviewer.\(^50\)

Although I have discussed how the interviewer may co-construct, prompt, and even solicit talk of an emotional nature, it is not the case that only talk of negative emotions and experiences was pursued in this study. Explicit requests by the interviewer for positive (e.g., “happy”) experiences often led to elicitation failures. I present here two illustrative cases of these failures to elicit positive emotions.

The following extract takes place in my first interview with Bona (B), an immigrant man from Cambodia.\(^51\) Bona and I met through Sang, our mutual friend (and study participant), at a Cambodian community social gathering. Bona has come to Sang’s apartment to be interviewed by me. Sang is in the kitchen cleaning and cooking while Bona and I talk in the living room. After Bona and I talked a bit about his background, he told some stories about his family, work, and immigration experiences. In the interaction represented in the following extract, I initiate a new topic by asking him about his happiest memory:

**Extract 5.19. Bona**

```
01 M: so- (1.4) what’s yer- what’s your happiest
02               memory?
03               (0.5)
04 B: happiest memory?
05               (1.0)
06               I don’t know.
07               (2.0)
08               happiest memory what is that?
09               (1.0)
10               never heard of that. ha ha ha
```

\(^50\) Speakers may also give an account for agreement. However, in keeping with work on dispreference (see Mori, 1999; Schegloff, 2007), it is more common that speakers provide accounts (usually longer than those produced in cases of agreement) when disagreeing.

\(^51\) This interview with Bona took place shortly after Extract 5.5, an interview with Sang.
11 M: never heard of it?
12 (0.8)
13 B: never heard of that.
14 M: heh heh heh=
15 B: =hh hm hm hm
16 (1.7)
→ 17 M: would you say you’re a happy person?
18 (1.8)
19 B: ah::: (2.2) below that

In this segment, the interviewer (M) asks B, by means of an extreme case formulation, to provide a story of his “happiest” memory (lines 1-2). After a short pause (0.5), B responds with a partial repetition (Sacks, 1992) that recycles part of M’s utterance (line 4: “happiest memory?”). Partial repetition or try-marked utterances have been found to be a feature of other-initiated repair (Sacks & Schegloff, 1979; Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977) as well as dispreferred actions such as disagreements (e.g., Goodwin, 1990; Koshik, 2005; Pomerantz, 1984). Among the possible achievements of B’s partial repetition are (a) an indication of some trouble located in M’s utterance, (b) a request for confirmation, (c) a resistance to providing “happy” talk, and (d) a display of understanding of the topic of this line of talk. The partial repetition is followed by a longer pause (1.0), and then B in a joking tone cancels out M’s story request by claiming his inability to provide the requested material (line 6: “I don’t know”). After a long pause (2.0) and still no repair or clarification forthcoming from M, B then repairs his own response by indicating that the trouble source lies in the meaning of the phrase “happiest memory” (line 4), not with an inability to conduct a search for a relevant memory. With an extreme case formulation (line 10: never heard of that”) and word stress on never and that, B intensifies his assertion that he does not know what “happiest memory” is.

Based on B’s high English ability, it is unlikely that his claim not to know “happiest memory” is to be taken at face value. Indeed, by his subsequent laughter in line 10, N indicates that this is to be treated as laughable. Laughter has been shown to be part of a closing sequence (Glenn, 1992; Holt, 2010; Liddicoat, 2007) as well a means to treat matters as delicate (Haakana, 1999, 2010). B’s laughter in line 10 may be hearable as a resistive move toward this line of talk and a bid to shut it down. B then repeats the punch
line of his joke (another closing move) and M then joins in with laughter, followed by B. With this line of questioning effectively shut down, M then shifts from an open-ended request for B’s “happiest experience” to a yes/no question regarding B’s personality (line 17: “Would you say you’re a happy person?”). B’s hesitation marker “ah:::" and surrounding pauses display a cognitive search to respond to M’s question. Instead of responding with “yes” or “no” type-conforming response (Raymond, 2003; Schegloff, 2007a)—which may potentially lead to a sequence requiring B to account for his answers—this line of questioning is also shut down by B with a statement (19: “below that”) that rejects the emotion description of him as happy. Despite M’s repeated requests for “happy” talk, B rejects the topic and that categorization.

Another example of resistance to happy talk comes from an interview with Kiet (K), an adult immigrant man from Vietnam. Kiet and his family own a successful nail salon in the city. This interview took place in Los Angeles, Kiet’s city of residence. Kiet has just talked about his life in Vietnam and has been comparing it to life in the US. The interviewer (M) then asks Kiet whether he is happy in LA.

Extract 5.20. Kiet

01 M: are you happy in LA?
02 (1.0)
03 M: you happy here?
04 K: good choi’ (.)(this is) my family here? (.)
05 my mom, (.)(you know I’m gay life. I don’t have family, so (.)(I thinks) I live with my (parent).
08 (1.0)
09 sometime I so upset I want move. (0.7) I had before few people (0.5) they want invite me go live uh-out state?
12 M: uuhuh
13 K: and live with them. they have a hou’ already [have] business nail salon ( )
15 M: [yeah]
16 K: take care of me
17 M: why not?
18 K: I just work.=I can’t.
19 (0.7)
20 M: why?
In line 1, M first asks K if he is “happy in LA” and then, after a one-second pause and no uptake by K, immediately reformulates it to “happy here.” As place formulations (Schegloff, 1972), the former restricts K’s response to the LA area. The latter is ambiguous, as “here” is potentially hearable as LA, California, the US, and so on. It may be that the reformulation is a strategic move on the part of the interviewer, possibly in response to the lack of response from K, as the more ambiguous reading of “here” allows for a wider range of potential answers. Both are positive polarity questions that project an affirming answer as a type-conforming response. Instead of providing a type-conforming yes-no response, K lexically ties his response (“here”) to M’s question (indicating its relevance) and frames living in LA not as a matter of “happiness,” but as a culturally-bound choice based on family values. K then leads into an emotional story preface (line 9: “sometimes I so upset I want to move”) that develops into talk about people who have invited him to move and be a part of their nail salon businesses.

This extract is filled with a number of category contrasts related to emotions (happy ↔ upset), place (LA/here ↔ out of state), people (family, mom, parent ↔ friends), and institutions (family nail business ↔ other nail business). Rather than spontaneous productions, these category contrasts are produced in direct response to interviewer’s solicitation in lines 1-3. M’s question was produced by an emotion formulation and a place formulation. As a display of intersubjectivity toward the interviewer, K ties his response to the interviewer’s question by bringing up emotions (e.g., “unhappy”) and place (e.g., LA, out state). Although “happy” talk was not forthcoming from K, he talked of being “upset,” maintaining the interview focus on negative emotional experience.

As Extracts 5.19 and 5.20 illustrate, interviewer moves to elicit or talk about positive (i.e., “happy”) experiences were met with failure. Interviewees often responded with non-type conforming responses. Non-type conforming responses to yes-no questions have been shown to be a device by which respondents resist the institutional agenda or presuppositions behind the question (Raymond, 2003; Stivers, 2007). I suggest that this is
further evidence that both interviewees and interviewers may orient to a bias in qualitative interviews toward talk of negative emotions, complaints, and problems. However, it is unclear whether this bias is due to the interview context, the overall questioning patterns, the interactional history between interviewee and the interviewer, the activity of talking about and describing experience, or basic norms of conversation.

**Examples from other studies**

Question sequences soliciting emotionality are also found in a number of other interview-based studies across applied linguistics and the social sciences. An example comes from Miller’s (2011) research interviews with adult immigrant learners of English. In this extract, Miller (I), is interviewing Peng (P), a Chinese-born immigrant to the U.S. about his experiences. Leading up to this extract, Peng had told a narrative about his trouble at the post office when the clerk did not understand the number of stamps Peng wanted to buy. Miller leads this interview sequence with a “feeling” question:

Extract 5.21. Adapted from Miller (2011, p. 6)

01 I: Has- have y- has anyo:ne (.) made you feel
02 bad? (. ) Have you had someone sometimes make
03 you feel bad because you couldn’t speak or
04 you couldn’t understand?=  
05 P: =>Yeah yeah yes.<
06 I: What- what happened?
07 (1.0)
08 P: Mmmmmmmm
09 I: Did they say some[thing bad o::r]
10 P: [sssss  ]
11 U:::h i- if if uh very important, for
12 example, if my my my workplace.
13 I: Yeah ha
14 P: If uh really important, uh the cowork uh wri-
15 write the paper for me,

52 The interview context and topics may even be constructed as part of the larger “immigrant experience.” Work on stories of Holocaust survivors suggests that these first-person accounts may be treated as institutional history, whereby the narrative teller is a witness and the interviewer is the historian. In this way, “the oral history interview is a site for both personalization and depersonalization of accounts” (Bartasaghi & Bowen, 2009, p. 226).

53 See Chapter 7 for further discussion on interviewee talk of negative emotions and experiences.
I: Mmhmm
P: And and use from dictionary.
I: Mmhmm
P: And sometimes- some the guy if just talking,
if I didn’t understand, and they talking
again,
I: Yeah
P: But if not understand, uh, o(hh)h that’s
okay, that’s jus- that’s okay.
I: Yeah
P: The the speak the other uh subject.
I: Yeah.
P: Yeah.

At the start of this sequence, the interviewer produces two positive polarity feeling questions that take advantage of the conversational preference for agreement:

Lines 1-2: Has- have y- has anyo:ne (. ) made you feel bad?

Lines 2-4: Have you had someone sometimes make you feel bad because you couldn’t speak or you couldn’t understand?

As expected, based on preference norms, P responds with an agreement—performed here as an emphatic agreement (line 5: “⇒Yeah yeah yes.<”). This is followed by a story solicitation (lines 5-8). When P does not respond right away and produces an extended hesitation or search-marker (line 8: “Mmmmmmmmm”), the interviewer produces a question in line 9 that makes use of a negative emotion-implicative structure (“…something bad”) as well as a split or alternative question structure (“…o::r”) to tilt the response toward a negative emotion description. Although this example shows how the interviewer’s questioning may lead the talk, it also shows that the interviewees may resist that agenda. In this extract, while Peng confirms that he has felt bad because of his language-related difficulties (line 5), in lines 11-26, he avoids attaching blame to his coworkers. Instead, he describes the strategies they employ to resolve language difficulties (e.g., by writing things down, repeating, changing the subject).

Another example comes from Norton’s (2000) study of immigrant women in Canada. In this extract, Norton is interviewing Eva, a Polish immigrant, about her...
feelings of oppression at work.

Extract 5.22. Adapted from Norton (2000, p. 65)

01 E: When I’m at the cash – when somebody goes for
02 summe – I take the order but the manager she
03 comes and she listens and then I feel like –
04 she’s watching my mistakes and I already do
05 some mistakes when I say something.

→ 06 B: You mean that makes it worse? You think that
→ 07 makes you nervous?
08 E: Mm – hmm.

After Eva describes how her manager keeps a watchful eye on her when she works as cashier, Norton offers up two successive descriptions that formulate (i.e., summarize or give an interpretation; Drew, 2003; Heritage & Watson, 1979) the gist of Eva’s story and assess its psychological implications:

Line 6: You mean that makes it worse?

Lines 6-7: You think that makes you nervous?

In the first description, the interviewer employs a common formulation (“you mean…”; see Drew, 2003; Heritage & Watson, 1979) to offer her understanding of Eva’s talk, while assessing its emotional upshot (“You mean that makes it worse?”). In the second, the interviewer formulates not the meaning of Eva’s talk but her internal mental processes that result in an emotional diagnosis (“You think that makes you nervous?”).

In this chapter, I have argued that the topics and content of the interview and interviewer-initiated questioning sequences (e.g., using questions such as “How does that make you feel?”) steer or bias the interview toward psychological talk. “How does that make you feel?”—although a biasing an emotional response—is an open-ended question that allows the interviewee to select from alternative descriptions. In contrast, formulations such as “You mean that makes it worse?” and “You think that makes you

54 Drew (2003) has noted that formulations may be lexically realized differently in various institutional settings. For example, “you mean” formulations are common in psychotherapy (see also Peräkylä, Antaki, Vehviläinen, & Leudar, 2008) but “what you’re saying is” is found in call-in programs.
nervous?” (as positive polarity questions) make agreement the preferred response. Again, like Miller (2011) and the data in the present study, the interviewer here steers the talk toward emotional and psychological matters.

The preceding discussion of solicited emotional stories, feeling questions, and emotion-implicative question sequences should not be thought of as rare or deviant cases. They are very common and can be found with little effort in interview-based studies that provide detailed transcripts. Unfortunately, these emotion-eliciting question sequences may have received little attention due in part to the tendency of qualitative researchers to focus mainly on the interviewee’s responses and less upon the interviewer-led and context-bound sequences that were responsible for eliciting those responses.

5.3. Summary

Addressing the dearth of research on emotions as accountable phenomena in the research interview, this chapter examined the role of interviewer question sequences in the elicitation and solicitation of emotional responses. I showed that questioning is a normative interview practice that enables the interviewer to establish the interview agenda and obtain talk on particular topics of interest to the research project. Focusing on three specific question sequence types (story solicitations, “feeling” questions, and emotion-implicative questions), I demonstrated how interviewers may use them to steer the interview toward emotional matters. When responding to story solicitations, respondents engage in cognitive displays to show that they are actively selecting appropriate stories for the interviewer. I also showed that feeling questions, seeking subjective responses, may elicit both talk of opinions and emotionality. Feeling question sequences, like turn-taking sequences in general, are found to consist of at least four components: description, question, response, and elaboration/account.

Emotion-implicative questions, although not necessarily requesting talk of feelings or emotions, make emotionality relevant by focusing on assessment terms such as “good,” “bad,” “easy,” and “hard”—terms that invite interviewees to respond from an affective stance. Although negative emotions and complaints were highlighted in the present data, interviewer moves to elicit positive emotions were met with failure. This suggests that interview interactants (interviewees and interviewer) orient to a normative
understanding or bias (e.g., interactional, institutional) in interviews toward talk of negative emotions and experiences. I also showed that although this area of inquiry has been largely ignored in the qualitative interview literature, question sequences that elicit talk of negative emotions and experiences can be easily found in other studies that provide complete transcripts.

Finally, in this chapter I have argued that questioning sequences are a powerful device used by the interviewer to bias the interview toward talk of emotions and emotional experiences. Moreover, interviewees orient to the normative nature of these sequences and the interview context by providing emotional responses relevant to the interviewer’s questions. As a productive inquiry, by attending to the influence of questioning sequences upon the content and trajectory of interview talk, we can better understand the interview as a site of social action.
CHAPTER 6. EMOTION REFORMULATIONS

6.0. Introduction

In Chapters 4 and 5, I identified how, within the institutional and quasi-conversational activity of investigating and soliciting the autobiographic experiences of L2 language users, the interviewer and interview participants make use of story prefaces, questions, and accounting practices to bias and maintain the interview focus on talk of an emotional nature.

In the present chapter I shall be concerned with a more detailed examination of the specific lexical devices deployed by the interview interactants to topicalize and label emotion talk. First, I examine the use of emotion-explicit and emotion-implicative formulations and reformulations for insight into how they are selected, contrasted, expressed, and organized in the interview talk. Second, I seek to elaborate how multiple emotion reformulations are scaled in terms of their relative strengths and contrastive meanings.

6.1. Formulations Defined

6.1.1. A Broad Definition

“Formulation” is a term that is often used and inconsistently defined in the research literature. In its most general sense, formulation can refer to any expression or utterance. Within this broad use of the term, it can be defined as “speaker choices in style and content of expression, including categorization”55 This is the sense in which it is often applied to a number of utterance types, including extreme case formulations (e.g., Edwards, 2000; Pomerantz, 1986), person reference formulations (e.g., Enfield & Stivers, 2007; Fox & Thompson, 1990; Sacks & Schegloff, 1979; Stivers, 2007), place formulations (e.g., Sacks, 1992; Schegloff, 1972), time formulations (Button, 1990), memory formulations (e.g., Edwards & Potter, 1992; Lynch & Bogen, 1996; Shaw & Kitzinger, 2007; Wooffitt, 1992), story formulations (e.g., Edwards & Stokoe, 2006), and script formulations (e.g., Edwards, 1994, 1995, 1997).

55 Bilmes, personal communication. Bilmes has also noted that Sacks most often used “formulation” in this broad sense.

159
Formulation, as it is used in the traditions of EMCA, has a long history, going back some forty years. Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) observed that when engaged in interaction, listeners can at any point offer up a “gloss” or a retrospective formulation of another speaker’s talk to display their understanding of the situation so far:

A member may treat some part of the conversation as an occasion to describe that conversation, to explain it, or characterize it, or explicate, or translate, or summarize, or furnish the gist of it, or take note of its accordance with rules, or remark on its departure from rules. (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970, p. 350)

The activity of formulating, to Garfinkel and Sacks, is defined as “saying-in-so-many-words-what-we-are-doing (or what we are talking about, or who is talking, or who we are, or where we are)” (p. 351). For example, in the following extract, JH has just commented on a group of people in an office:

Extract 6.1. Adapted from Garfinkel and Sacks (1970, p. 350)

JH: Isn’t it nice that there’s such a crowd of you in the office?
⇒ SM: You’re asking us to leave, not telling us to leave, right?

Though there are a number of ways in which JH’s utterance could be taken (e.g., as a positive statement of admiration or pleasure, or a sarcastic remark), SM displays the understanding that JH wants them to leave, but reformulates it by trading on pragmatic norms of request-making, and even institutional or legal authority to make such a request.

As “an utterance about a previous utterance” (Schwartz, 1976, p. 62) or “descriptions of where-we-both-are-in-the-conversation” (Antaki, 2008, p. 31), the activity of formulating the talk of self and others is an important interactional resource for keeping track of the ongoing talk, showing you are listening, indicating what aspects of the ongoing talk are treated as significant (or not), and indicating what the current actions are as well as projecting what next actions are relevant.
6.1.2. A Narrow Definition

Gist and upshot formulations

Although the formulation of prior utterances, in the broader sense, can come at any point in talk, Heritage and Watson (1979, 1980) further refined the concept to encompass a narrow adjacency pair structure:

A: Utterance

B: Formulation of A’s previous utterance

A: Confirmation

According to Heritage and Watson, formulations in this sense consist of two types: “gist” formulations and “upshot” formulations. Summarizing the sense or gist of what has been said so far is essentially to paraphrase and summarize, while preserving and highlighting relevant features and recasting or transforming others. Formulating the upshot, on the other hand, involves arriving at a presupposition or conclusion based on what has been previously said.

Two oft-cited examples from the literature demonstrate these two types of formulations. In the first example, from Heritage’s analysis of a British news interview (Heritage, 1985), the “slimmer of the year” (S) describes her weight loss experience to a news interviewer (I), who then formulates his understanding of her account:

Extract 6.2. Adapted from Heritage (1985, p. 101)

01 S: You have a shell that for so long
02 protects you. (0.7) But sometimes: things creep
03 though the shell and (. ) then you become really
04 aware (. ) of ‘ow awful y’feel. .hhh I never ever
05 felt my age or looked my age.=I as always (.)
06 older,.people always took me for older. .hhhh
07 And when I was at college I think I looked a
08 matronly fifty. .hh And (. ) I was completely
09 alone one weekend and I got to this stage where
10 I almost jumped in the river(hh).=I just felt
11 life wasn’t worth it anymo:re,=it hadn’t
12 anything to offer (.). .hhhh and if this was
13 living I had had enough.
In this example, S describes her life prior to becoming “slimmer of the year” as having negative effects on her mental, emotional, and physical well-being. In response, the interviewer formulates or paraphrases his understanding of the gist of her mini-narrative description: “You really were prepared to commit suicide because you were a big fatty.” S then confirms I’s understanding and the talk continues. Just as formulations convey the speaker’s understanding of the talk so far, it is also important to note that they also normatively “expect” confirmations or agreement (Antaki, 2008; Antaki, Barnes, & Leudar, 2007; Heritage & Watson, 1979), as shown in the above example. Thus, in a sequentially unfolding process of intersubjectivity, not only do listeners display how and what they are understanding, the primary speakers also comment (and are even normatively compelled to do so) on the accuracy of those represented understandings. Contradiction is a “first priority response” (Bilmes, 1993): If the primary speaker does not contradict the listener’s formulation, he or she will normally be understood as accepting that attribution.

An upshot formulation, on the other hand, demonstrates the inferential work on the part of the listener by drawing out the potential implications of what was said. The following example from Heritage and Watson (1979) shows how the interviewer (I) ties his formulation to the respondent’s (R) utterance and projects its logical outcome:

Extract 6.3. Adapted from Heritage and Watson (1979, p. 134-135)

01 I: If occasion- if occasion ‘rises again will you take similar action?
02 R: well we have never hesitated so far to er take action where er freedom is being abused.
05 I: So there might be another occasion on which you will use the law again unions
07 R: Not necessarily against unions but against any body or which has become over mighty er and is abusing its responsibilities er if that happens to be a trades union so be it but we’re not
The interviewer, addressing the respondent’s claim about past actions, takes that as a premise to make a logical inference about the respondent’s future actions. Moreover, as formulations normatively project agreement, the respondent must either provide a confirmation or work to challenge or otherwise modify or qualify the formulation. The respondent, from line 7, provides an agreement, but qualifies it (i.e., through a reformulation of a reformulation; see following discussion on reformulations) in relation to the interviewer’s displayed understanding, shifting the focus on union-related matters to foreground this as an issue of justice and the abuse of power in general.

As I have noted, Heritage and Watson (1979) found that formulations normatively occasion the production of a confirmation or disconfirmation\(^{56}\) in the next turn, although confirmations are interactionally preferred. The following example gives an example of formulation, confirmation, and disconfirmation:

*Extract 6.4. Adapted from Heritage and Watson (1979, p. 141)*

| 01 | S: you know, but-er she (these’re) not the              | formulation |
| 02 | type you’re wanting you’re want- to                   |             |
| 03 | meet a girl so that you might settle                 |             |
| 04 | down one day and get married                         |             |
| 05 | C: that’s right sir yes                               | confirmation |
| 06 | C: …… you just don’t want to hear about it            | formulation  |
| 07 | S: No I haven’t said I don’t want to hear             | disconfirmation |
| 08 | at all Mrs. N.                                        |             |

\(^{56}\) Heritage and Watson have also linked confirmations and disconfirmations to the more general category of decisions. In their analysis of the material shown here as Extract 6.3, they referred to line 5 as a +decision (i.e., it shows the desired event or decisions) and lines 7–8 as a –decision (i.e., an undesirable course of action).
As this extract shows, although confirmation is the norm, it is not the case that every formulation is met with a confirmation. In line 5, C confirms S’s candidate formulation of C’s prior talk; however, after C offers a mental state formulation (making a claim regarding what S presumably does not want to hear), S disconfirms C’s formulation with an exposed repair that rejects C’s assertion. It can be noted, however, that disconfirmations, as dispreferred seconds in general, tend to be longer, indirect, and make use of hedges and other hesitation markers (Levinson, 1983; Schegloff et al., 1977). Although the particular disconfirmation in Extract 6.4 (lines 7-8: “No I haven’t said I don’t want to hear at all Mrs. N) is direct and does not use hesitation markers, it is noticeably longer than the confirmation in line 5. This clarification also serves to disambiguate the ambiguous “no” (the exact nature of the disagreement is not made clear by a simple “no”).

Heritage and Watson’s (1979) landmark paper has led to an increased focus on formulations (e.g., Antaki, 2008; Antaki et al., 2007; Barnes, 2007; Drew, 2003). Despite the analytical groundwork laid out by Heritage and Watson, there is a continued need to examine the different subclasses of formulations as well as the distinctive interactional consequences resulting from the deployment of gist and upshot formulations (e.g., Barnes, 2007). The cumulative research suggests that formulations (in the narrower definition of the term) are rare in casual conversation but common in institutional talk (e.g., Drew 2003b; Heritage 1985). Barnes (2010) suggests this is because institutional settings have a particular agenda and the goal is that talk may be “marked for the record” (p. 278).

As previous researchers have found, formulations are a common interactional device for achieving intersubjectivity and developing the interactional agenda, particularly for institutional talk. In the next section I will consider the function of emotion state reformulations and therapeutic settings, and a comparison of their use in qualitative research interviews.
6.2. Reformulations

6.2.1. Reformulations in Therapeutic Settings

In the EMCA literature, formulations are generally treated as a means of displaying intersubjectivity by a speaker offering a summary, gloss, gist, or upshot of what another has said (e.g., Antaki et al, 2007; Sacks, 1972). Turning to CA research on counseling and psychotherapy, formulations, or more accurately, (re)formulations (Davis, 1986), are a means by which the therapist casts the client’s talk toward therapeutic (i.e., institutional) ends (e.g., Antaki et al., 2007; Davis, 1986; Gale, 1991; Rae, 2008; Peräkylä, 2005; Peräkylä, Antaki, & Vehviläinen, 2008). Therefore, in therapeutic settings, reformulations comment upon the contents and implications of talk as well as the way in which it should be interpreted toward a resolution. Bercelli et al. define therapist reformulations as “something that was implicitly meant by the client, so claiming that they are still offering a candidate reading of the perspective expressed by the client” (p. 46). These reformulations often take the form of “you mean…,” “so you’re saying…,” and so on.

Reformulations are not simply verbatim repetitions of what another speaker has said (although they may be purported to be so); they frequently make use of lexical substitutions and second descriptions, or otherwise transform the original formulated utterance. Rae (2008) refers to these subsequent reformulations as proposing a redescription. For example, in the following extract from a therapy session, the therapist reformulates the client’s own subjective emotion state formulation from “a little uncomfortable” to “a lot uncomfortable”:

Extract 6.5. Adapted from Rae (2008, p. 64)

01 CL: I am surviving and I am
02 TH: But it feels (.) doesn’t feel right
\rightarrow 03 CL: It feels a little uncomfortable
\rightarrow 04 TH: Or a lot uncomfortable.
05 CL: It feels a l(hoh)ot unc(huh)omfortable actually

In his analysis, Rae suggests that the therapist’s reformulation reproduces part of the client’s utterance (“…uncomfortable”), but through the contrastive marker “or” and substitution of “a lot” for “a little,” constructs an alternative description that proposes, for
therapeutic purposes, “a freer expression of feeling” (p. 64). It can also be observed that after the client uses “I am surviving” as a general psychological state description, the therapist reformulates it to highlight negative feelings and turn the focus from survival (i.e., as a state of maintenance) to a need for resolution (line 2: “But it feels (.) doesn’t feel right”), which then leads into the client providing a more personal feeling claim (line 3: “It feels a little uncomfortable”). As this shows, how utterances are reformulated and how those reformulations are taken up are directly relevant to the unfolding of the interaction.

6.2.2. Formulations as Alternatives

Discursive and rhetorical psychologists have long noted that descriptions are performative, rhetorically organized, produced within particular interactional sequences, and entail the selection among and potential and even contrasting alternatives (e.g., Billig, 1987; Edwards, 1997; Potter & Edwards, 2005).

…the fact that formulations allow the current speaker to select some parts of the prior speaker’s words, ignore others, add spin, and present the package in a form that projects agreement makes them a powerful discursive tool. (Antaki et al., 2007, p. 168)

Previous findings on reformulations have demonstrated that focusing on how interactants pick out what is reformulated and how those selected transformations influence the development of interaction can give us insight into how speakers demonstrate their understanding of one another’s talk, the institutional topics and agendas (e.g., psychological talk, therapy, interview), and how intersubjectivity is negotiated in situ.

6.2.3. Emotion Reformulations

Amidst the multitude of formulations available for analysis from the interview talk in the present study (e.g., emotion, time, place, person), I limit my focus on emotion reformulations, with a specific focus on redescriptive reformulations.

Redescriptive reformulations in therapy

Building on Heritage and Watson’s (1980) work on formulations and CA research on therapeutic settings (e.g., Antaki, 2008; Bercelli et al., 2008), redescriptive reformulations, as used here, refer to the summarizing by the interviewer of what the
respondent ostensibly meant.\textsuperscript{57} Rae (2008) goes a step further by pointing out that lexical reformulations,\textsuperscript{58} while offering up the gist of what was said, narrow and reshape the previous talk toward therapeutic ends.

An example of redescriptive psychological state reformulation in therapeutic talk is shown in the following extract between a client (CL) mourning her husband’s death and the therapist (TH) seeking to help her come to terms with her loss.

Extract 6.6. Adapted from Rae (2008, p. 66)

12 CL: It’s \textbf{hard} talking about this Michael

13 TH: Yeah I can \textit{see:} that (. \textbf{w-} when you say \textbf{har:d} \\
→ 14 I think you mean \textbf{painful} \\
15 CL: Yeh it’s \textbf{painful} talking about this it’s actually \\
16 \textbf{painful}

In this example, the client describes the activity of talking about her husband as “hard.” The therapist reformulates the client’s description by proposing a hearing of that description as “painful.” In terms of affect and the therapist’s institutional agenda as a counselor, Rae (2008) suggests that the therapist is proposing “painful” as a more suitable alternative that “describes affect more explicitly” (p. 66). This suggests that formulations, particularly in therapeutic settings where the institutional goal is to lead the client to self-understanding and recovery, may operate not only as periodic summaries of what was said (i.e., as intersubjective “checks”), they also work as re-formulations to recast talk in the language of therapy (Antaki et al., 2007). Although such re-descriptions are narrowing the focus of the previous utterance toward therapy-centered topics (e.g.,

\textsuperscript{57} Bercelli et al. (2008) also examined \textit{reinterpretations}: “something that, though grounded in what the client has said, is caught and expressed from the therapist’s own perspective—therefore something possibly different, and ostensibly so, from what the client meant” (p. 47, emphasis added). Examples of reinterpretations were not found in the present study, perhaps indicating an important difference between the institutional settings of therapy and the qualitative research interview.

\textsuperscript{58} Although Antaki (2008) and Bercelli et al. (2008) do touch upon what I refer to here as “psychological” or “emotion state” reformulations, Rae (2008) attends more directly to their alternative selection.
emotions, feelings, memories), they are still treating the therapist’s reformulation as “what the client meant.”

Another example from Rae (2008) shows how clients in therapy adopt the exact lexical alternative proposed by the therapist:

Extract 6.7. Adapted from Rae (2008, p. 66)

01 CL: Tis the season to be **jolly** y’know an I say
02 TH: y’actually
03 CL: tis the season to be **jolly** and y’know
04 TH: I can play
05 CL: I can do jo- I can do **jolly**
→ 06 TH: **Pretend jolly**
07 CL: I can **pretend jolly** I can just be out there

[interaction continues]

As in the previous extract, the therapist’s redescription of the client’s emotion state formulation transforms it to meet the central goals of therapy: to recast talk in therapeutic terms, to work through psychological matters, and achieve resolution and healing. In Extract 6.6, by transforming the client’s description of “jolly” to “**pretend jolly**,” the therapist is able to turn the focus to the emotional state claims of the client as well as the truthfulness and consequences of those emotions.

Qualitative research interviews appear to bear some similarity with psychotherapy and counseling settings. Both types of institutional talk seek to get at members’ representations of their social worlds, make use of questions, occasion autobiographic accounts, and, explicitly or otherwise, invoke talk of emotions and feelings. Another feature in common between these two institutional settings is the use of emotion state reformulations. As I show in the following illustrative extracts, redemptive emotion

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59 In addition to Rae’s (2008) analysis, I suggest the client’s production of “I can play” (line 4) could be taken up in at least two ways: (a) as a description of being playful, and (b) as a description of playing a part or being false in one’s external “jolly” display. If the therapist arrived at the second interpretation, this may have initiated the therapist’s reformulation of “jolly” to “**pretend jolly**.”
state reformulations similar to those found in therapeutic settings were also found in the present study with L2 immigrant participants.

**Redescriptive reformulations in L2 qualitative interviews**

In the following extract, Rico (R), an asylum seeker from the Philippines, is giving an account of the “stress” he feels from the risks involved in being an illegal worker in Canada. Leading up to Extract 6.8, he has been telling a story to the interviewer (M) about his night job in a warehouse and his work lifting and moving boxes into trucks. Rico has expressed his concerns that if the police or immigration officials find out he is working illegally, he could go to jail or be deported before his asylum hearing. This extract contains a number of reformulations, but I will focus on those directly or indirectly indexing emotions.

Extract 6.8. Rico

01 R: **it’s really hard.** (1.0) that’s why I’m-

02 I’m stress.

03 (2.8)

04 ((R’s cup hits saucer loudly))

05 (1.0)

06 it’s very tough

07 M: **it’s scary.**

08 R: ‘scared.’

09 M: so if they come to your work, they can (.).

10 take- send you home?

11 R: yeah. probably. (1.7) yeah?

12 M: dangerous.

13 R: **(it’s a big risk.)** that’s true.

14 M: why you do that?

15 R: because you want to earn.

16 (1.2)

17 M: dangerous.
First, it should be noted that reformulations in this study were not just initiated by the interviewer. Interview participants also reformulated their own emotion state descriptions within and across utterances. As this sequence begins, R formulates his situation as “it’s really hard” and then describes the negative personal consequences: “I’m stress.” After two long pauses (lines 3-5), there is no response from the interviewer and in line 6 (“it’s very tough”) R restarts with a semantic equivalent to line 1 (“it’s really hard”). This reformulation succeeds in eliciting a response from the interviewer, who offers up his own reformulation of Rico’s situation: “It’s scary” (line 7).

Just as in Extracts 6.5 and 6.6, where the therapist reformulated the client’s description from “hard” to “painful” and “jolly” to “pretend jolly,” in Extract 6.8, the interviewer reformulates R’s description of his situation from “it’s very tough” (line 6) to “it’s scary” (line 7). R then adopts a lexical substitution (line 8: “scared”) similar to that proposed by the interviewer, although not exactly the same. Although “scary” describes external events as causing fear, “scared” indexes one’s internal or personal emotional response. In the same way that reformulating “hard” to “painful” creates a more emotionally-focused and subjectively-experienced description within the therapeutic setting, the reformulation of “tough” to “scary” in this qualitative interview also indexes an emotional (and personal) reaction to events.

As the interview continues, M provides an upshot formulation (lines 9-10: “so if they come to your work, they can (.) take- send you home?). After R gives a confirmation (line 11: “yeah. probably. yeah”), M offers up another reformulation (line 12: “dangerous”) to characterize R’s situation. In turn, R, rather than taking up the exact lexical reformulation offered by M, reformulates it as “a big risk” (a semantic

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60 Although many researchers study formulations produced by institutional agents (e.g., therapists), a few studies (e.g., Drew, 2003) have also examined formulations produced by respondents (e.g., clients).
equivalent)\textsuperscript{61} and then provides a confirmation. In line 17, M again produces the description “dangerous,” and after a short pause, R then uses the same lexical description and provides another confirmation.

Later in the sequence, R states, through represented speech (lines 53-55), that his boss told him if the police or immigration showed up unexpectedly and saw him loading boxes, he should pretend he is just a curious tourist and not a warehouse worker. The emotion reformulations “scary” and “dangerous” are brought up again by M:

Extract 6.9. Rico

53 R: “you are lifting boxes because you are curious=you want to see- you want to see something inside the box.” °he he he° (2.0)
54 (R and M laugh)
55 (R and M laugh)
56 
57 M: £ that’s crazy. £
58 R: £ that’s crazy. £
59 (3.3)
60 so:: th- they have a false alarm now.
61 (1.8)
62 M: false alarm?
63 (1.5)
64 R: I mean (1.4) not to get in trouble. (.5)
65 M: °oh°
66 (3.2)
67 R: °.hh m°
68 M: scary
69 R: scared
70 M: dangerous
71 R: dangerous, that’s right

After treating the warehouse manager’s statement as laughable (lines 55 and 56), M provides formulates an assessment of R’s story (line 57: “that’s crazy”). R then repeats

\textsuperscript{61} This may be hearable as a semantic equivalent to “dangerous”; however, “it’s a big risk” implies that it is a risk for someone (i.e., Rico), thus narrowing the definition to a more personal level—showing that speakers reformulate their own utterances toward “emotional therapy” or “empathy solicitation” work.
with an exact lexical repetition (line 58: “that’s crazy”) that confirms M’s formulation as accurate. Although this is not an explicit emotion state description, it is emotion-implicative, as it treats events as laughable, silly, or otherwise ridiculous—in relation to R and M’s shared perspective. Later, in lines 68-71, M and R recapitulate the sequences from lines 7-8 and 17-19:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>it’s scary.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>“scared.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>dangerous.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>dangerous.</td>
<td>really.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>scary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>scared</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>dangerous</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>that’s right</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each time M offers up an emotion-implicative description (e.g., “scary,” “dangerous”) of the events and concerns mentioned, R takes up those reformulations. After “scary,” R (re)formulates it to “scared,” a more personal representation of his emotional state. Both times after M produces “dangerous,” R gives an exact lexical repetition and a confirmation.

I have noted that interview participants may confirm the interviewer’s reformulation by offering up a semantic equivalent. I also showed that the interviewer may even repeat of “pursue” a particular reformulation when it is not taken up or otherwise confirmed by the interview participant (Extracts 6.7-6.8). Thus, in the same way as a therapist may reformulate and shape the clients’ psychological descriptions in therapeutic settings, in talk produced in qualitative interviews, the interviewer is also active in reformulating talk in psychological terms and may even pursue a psychological agenda.

In another example, Sang (S) describes his early high school years in the US. Sang did not speak any English when he first arrived, and his stories included talk of his difficulties in understanding teachers and other students. In this sequence, a number of emotion-implicative reformulations are produced by the interviewer and the interview participant, but only some descriptions are pursued and confirmed, while others are ignored:
Extract 6.10. Sang

01 M: was it **difficult** learning English (.) in the beginning?
02 S: Yea:::h (0.2) °yeah°
03 M: did you have **bad** experience or **good** experience.
04 S: I (. ) thi::nk (. ) the first when I learn English I think (. ) (oh no y’know) (. ) it 
05 M: **very hard.**
06 S: mhm
07 what was **most difficult?**
08 ((Sang talks about his ESL class and how all the Asian kids made fun of him))
09 S: **very hard,** y’know.
10 (1.0)
11 M: that’s **tough.**
12 S: °yeah (0.2) hard° y’know.° (. ) °°(I mean that)
13 (. ) uh°°
14 (0.5)
15 M: °mhm°
16 (0.3)
17 S: an’ um, (1.5) well like, (1.7) when we came they put- (. ) put us in high school right?
18 (0.2) °hard° in high school.°
19 (0.4)
20 M: °mhm°
21 (0.7)
22 S: yeah

This segment begins with M asking S to produce “trouble” or “emotional” talk. After S confirms “difficult” as an appropriate reformulation (line 3), M then offers up a disjunctive proposal in line 4: talk of **bad** experiences or talk of **good** experiences. S does not repeat the reformulations “bad,” “good,” or “difficult,” but describes learning English as “very hard.” M, in a request for a specific story, gives an exact lexical repetition of his previous reformulation (“difficult”), but transforms it to an extreme case formulation:
“most difficult.” This then leads into S telling a story about being made fun of by his classmates and not doing his homework.

After S finishes his short story, he reformulates those events as “very hard” (line 12), but M then reformulates them as “tough” (line 14). Although S confirms M’s reformulation (line 16: “yeah”), he repeats his own reformulation (“hard”) in line 16 and then again in line 23. In line 27, M returns to the reformulation he used in line 14 (“tough”), but this time his inserts it in a question (“was that tough?”)—arguably a stronger reformulation that solicits an explicit “yes or no” response. Both parties produce various reformulations, and each repeats the particular ones they have used; however, M pursues confirmation of his own reformulations (e.g., “difficult” and “tough”) through questions (lines 11, 27), but S does not. This gives further evidence of the influence of the interview context on the formulation and pursuit of talk.

Another example of emotion reformulation by the interviewer and a confirmation from the interview participant comes from Trang (T) in complaint story about his problems with the bank.62

Extract 6.11. Trang

01 T: and then after that I paid it (.). I-I
02 paid the mortgage (.). off? and if (.). the
03 ba::nk (.). the stupid bank worker at the bank
04 there.

→ 05 M: weren’t you mad at them?

06 T: I’M MAD AT THEM (.). I’M VERY MAD. BECAUSE

07 (.). WHAT THE HELL IS IT WITH ↑PEOPLE. (0.8)

T, speaking about his problems with the bank and his home mortgage, describes the bank workers as “stupid”—making his affective stance inferentially available through his angry tone, word stress, repetition of the object of his talk (lines 2-4: “the ba::nk (.)

62 Trang routinely tells versions of this story (earlier shown as Extract 4.14; see also Prior, 2011).
the stupid bank worker at the bank there”), and explicit assessment of the bank workers as “stupid.” Responding with an affiliative stance, M proposes an inferential formulation of T’s emotional reaction to the events with the bank. This is formulated as a reverse polarity question with a negative interrogative format (line 5: “weren’t you mad at them?”) that pursues a confirmatory response. In his next-turn response (line 6: “I’m mad at them”), T confirms M’s reformulation, not by an explicit confirmation (e.g., “Yes, that’s right”) but by transforming the personal pronoun and giving an exact lexical repetition (“I’m mad at them”). Moreover, T goes beyond simply providing a confirmation to M’s reformulation by upgrading or intensifying his own subsequent reformulation through prosody (e.g., louder volume, word stress), a lexical intensifier (e.g., from “MAD” to “VERY MAD”), and an expletive or formulaic expression of exasperation and anger (line 7: “WHAT THE HELL IS IT WITH ↑PEO↓PLE”).

In another illustrative case (presented previously as Extract 5.14), this time at the coda of an emotional story, Trang talks about how he returned to Vietnam to confront his father about physical, verbal, and mental abuse. After he confronted his father and told him he would no longer accept that mistreatment, Trang states that his father did not speak to him for a week:

Extract 6.12. Trang

01 T: suddenly I realize I don’t want ((him)) to
02 mistreat ((me)) like that. so I told him.
03 a whole week he got mad at me. wouldn’t talk
04 to me. heh heh
→ 05 M: did you feel better
06 T: I feel better.
07 M: I mean after telling him.
08 T: I feel relieved

After T completes his story, M asks a question that functions as an emotion state reformulation (line 5: “did you feel better?”). M’s utterance, while displaying his understanding of T’s story by reformulating its emotional upshot as a positive polarity
question, trades on folk-psychological beliefs that by confronting problems one should normatively feel better. Confirming M’s description, T produces an exact lexical reformulation (line 6: “I feel better”). Although T’s second position response potentially completes this adjacency pair, M, treats it as a source of trouble and initiates a third position repair in line 7 (“I mean after telling him”). Repairing his previous utterance, T makes a partial repeat (line 8: “I feel…”) and reformulates “better” to “relieved,” a more explicit emotion formulation (see Extract 5.14 for a discussion of the grammatical features of this sequence).

In each of the cases discussed so far, interviewer reformulations steer the interview toward talk of an emotional nature, often through using explicit emotion-indexing lexical terms. Contrary to the metaphor of the interview as a “window” or “inner view,” these data show that the emotion talk produced in these interviews and the specific descriptions that interactants use are directly shaped by the interview questions and reformulations. It can also be seen that, in keeping with previous CA research on institutional talk (e.g., Heritage & Watson, 1979), speakers orient to the conversational preference to provide a confirmation after a reformulation. This may stem from the basic interactional need for speakers to intersubjectively and economically arrive at a shared understanding of the topic, content, and meaning of talk and its relation to the ongoing interaction, the social relationships of those involved, and the world (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008; Schegloff, 1992).

Although confirmations after reformulations retrospectively treat them as shared understandings of prior talk, speakers may also show concurrent intersubjectivity in their overlaps. I have one instance in the interviews that shows the interviewer and the interviewee collaboratively completing an emotion reformulation.

In the following interview segment, Kim (K) is telling a story about how she initially broke up with her boyfriend (who later became her husband) in Vietnam before she immigrated to the United States. After she came to the United States her first job was in a bar as a server, and she then cut off contact with many of her friends in Vietnam.

63 Many medical professionals, narrative scholars, and laypersons often treat confrontation and the expression of strong emotions as therapeutic and transformative (see discussions in Atkinson, 1998; Brown & Augusta-Scott, 2006; Launer, 2002; Monk, Winslade, Crocket, & Epston, 1997).
In lines 3-5, Kim describes feeling “disconnected” and “lost” after arriving in the US. When the interviewer asks her to explain those feelings (again, an indication of the pursuit within the interview of emotional and personal accounts), Kim links them to the bad feelings stemming from working in a bar and the negative associations typically attached to that kind of job. In lines 16-17, M offers up an “upshot formulation” (i.e., the reason Kim cut off contact with people in Vietnam was because she worked in a bar) via a designedly incomplete utterance (Koshik, 2002). After a micropause, M and K simultaneously produce “ashamed” and “shamed” in a collaborative completion (Lerner, 1991)—displaying their intersubjectively shared understandings that “shame” is the reason why Kim cut off contact with people in Vietnam. However, as discussed in Chapter 5, once a particular emotion state claim is put out in conversation, it is often explained and accounted for by the person to whom it is attached. In lines 18-24, K
weakens the claim of shame by giving other explanations for not contacting her friends in Vietnam: she did not have time, she had class, she was tired, and as a result, she did not have anything to talk about. Taken together, K’s explanations form a device that might be called “objective practical exigencies of everyday life” and thus contrast with a subjective account of being ashamed.

Repeated reformulations

When reformulating the talk of self or others, speakers often repeat an utterance in part or in its entirety. This ultimately conforms with the conversational requirement for intersubjectivity. As Sacks (1992) pointed out, through their next turns, speakers display how they understand a prior utterance. One way that interactants show how they understand one another is by tying utterances together. Sacks describes “tying techniques” (Sacks, 1992, p. 716) as a means by which speakers link lexical items (e.g., pronouns, verbs, conjunctions) in their talk in the present turn with those in talk in the prior turn.


Ken: What i- what’re those, cigars?

Roger: Yeah, me an’ Al’s gonna smoke //cigars.

Ken: Oh.

Ken: Lemme have a cigar,

Roger: You don’t smoke cigars

Extract 6.15. Adapted from Sacks (1992, lecture 12, p. 723)

A: I wanna fast car so bad

B: You wanna what?

I suggest that speakers also use tying techniques to link emotional descriptions across consecutive utterances. Table 2 lists those found in the extracts presented so far and indicates the directionality of those reformulations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extract</th>
<th>Interviewee (re)formulation</th>
<th>Direction</th>
<th>Interviewer (re)formulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>a little uncomfortable</td>
<td>→</td>
<td>a lot uncomfortable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>a lot uncomfortable</td>
<td>←</td>
<td>a lot uncomfortable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>hard</td>
<td>→</td>
<td>hard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>painful</td>
<td>←</td>
<td>painful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>painful → painful</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(exact self-repetition)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>jolly → jolly → jolly</td>
<td>→</td>
<td>pretend jolly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(exact self-repetition)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>pretend jolly</td>
<td>←</td>
<td>pretend jolly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>scary</td>
<td>→</td>
<td>scared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(partial morphological</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>repetition)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>scared</td>
<td>←</td>
<td>scary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>dangerous</td>
<td>←</td>
<td>dangerous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>dangerous → dangerous</td>
<td></td>
<td>(exact self-repetition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>that’s crazy</td>
<td>←</td>
<td>that’s crazy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>scared</td>
<td>←</td>
<td>scary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>dangerous</td>
<td>←</td>
<td>dangerous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>difficult → most difficult</td>
<td></td>
<td>(partial self-repetition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>very hard → very hard</td>
<td></td>
<td>(exact self-repetition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>very hard → hard</td>
<td></td>
<td>(partial self-repetition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>hard → hard</td>
<td></td>
<td>(exact self-repetition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>mad</td>
<td>←</td>
<td>mad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>mad → very mad</td>
<td></td>
<td>(partial self-repetition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>feel better</td>
<td>←</td>
<td>feel better</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>feel better → feel relieved</td>
<td></td>
<td>(partial self-repetition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.13</td>
<td>bad → really bad</td>
<td></td>
<td>(partial self-repetition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.13</td>
<td>shamed</td>
<td>←→</td>
<td>ashamed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(collaboratively</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>completed)</td>
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</table>
As Table 2 illustrates, the majority (10) of the repeated reformulations were produced by the interviewees in response to the interviewer, offering further evidence of the mutual orientation to the institutional activity of interview. There were only four examples of lexical repetition of the interviewees’ reformulations by the interviewers. Seven examples of self-repetition (four exact; three partial) were found by the interviewees and three by the interviewers (one exact; two partial). Only one collaborative completion was found. Because of the small data set, it is impossible to generalize these findings. A larger corpus of comparative data would be useful to determine general patterns of lexical repetition in reformulations.

**Unrepeated reformulations**

As shown earlier in this chapter, interviewees may take up and confirm emotion state reformulations through at least four procedures: (a) through an *exact lexical repetition* of all or part of a previous formulation, (b) through an *explicit confirmation* (e.g., “that’s right”), (c) by offering a *semantic equivalent* (e.g., “it’s dangerous” → “It’s a big risk”), and (d) by *upgrading or intensifying* the reformulation (e.g., “mad” → “very mad”).\(^{64}\) It was also shown that interactants may collaboratively complete a reformulation at a relevant TCU juncture.

Not all other-formulated emotion state reformulations are taken up by speakers. Moreover, as shown in previous extracts, even when the “same” emotion state reformulations were arrived at, speakers may qualify or otherwise account for those emotions. In the following extract (also discussed in Chapter 5, Extract 5.18), Kim initially does not take up the interviewer’s reformulation. This sequence comes after a brief telephone interruption during the course of the interview. The interviewer (M) returns and picks up the topic of Kim’s (K) earlier talk about being mistreated because of her accent and status as non-native speaker:

Extract 6.16. Kim

01 M: I’m wondering. as a non-native speaker (.)
02   >whatever that means.< and having an accent
03   (. ) >whatever that means.< how do you **deal**

\(^{64}\) Upgrading was found to be more common than downgrading in the present study.
with things like that? (2.5) I mean do you (.)

get angry or do you just say, “oh there’s
nothing I can do about it or—”

K: I-I-I guess. it depends also on my mood of the
day?

M: heh heh heh
K: so sometime if you’re in a good mood you
tolerate? and sometime (.). you cannot
tolerate. especially that (.). very insulting
the way he s- (.). you know that how he sound?

This segment, by way of the interviewer’s reformulation of K’s previous
statements and introductory question (lines 1-6), opens up the potential for K to respond
from a number of identities (e.g., non-native speaker, person with an accent), and thus
allows for a variety of possible responses. However, the interviewer reformulates the
question (lines 4-6) with an affective bias by way of a disjunctive proposal: (a) does she
get angry? or (b) does she just accept the situation? As I have previously noted, M’s use
of represented speech or thought (lines 5-6: “oh there’s nothing I can do about it or—”) is
produced ostensibly from K’s perspective. K initially indicates weak agreement (line 7:
“I- I- I guess”) and then begins an emotion-indexing account based on her “mood of the
day.” Thus, by constructing a question that makes an emotion response relevant, the
interviewer has directly shaped how the talk unfolds. K’s talk of her “mood” is directly
related to the preceding utterance.

As previous extracts have shown, interviewees may repeat the interviewer’s
reformulations, or they may substitute their own. Instead of building off of “get angry” or
“there’s nothing I can do about it,” K again repeats talk of her “mood” and reformulates
her own disjunctive proposal: “tolerate” or “cannot tolerate.” In this extract, after the
interviewer reformulates Kim’s talk toward an explicit emotional description, K follows
that up by talking about her mood. She then substitutes her own reformulations, but
orients to this as a dispreferred action, as evidenced by her accounting work, long turn,
qualifiers, and hesitation markers.65

65 Although I suggest these indicate a dispreferred action, they may also result, for example, from
uncertainty or desire for accuracy.
Another example of an interview participant not taking up the interviewer’s reformulation come from an interview with Trang. He is speaking here about the conflicts faced by Vietnamese, Cambodians, and other immigrants, and how people tend to look down on Cambodians especially:

Extract 6.17. Trang

01 T: it’s really a shame huh?
02 M: so are you ashamed to say you’re Cambodian.
03 T: I feel sad for the nation. I feel for people.
04 people they have to face the kind of-
05 environment. but ( ) inside of me I-I love
06 ( ) that’s why I told you ( ) even I come
07 back here I want to find my roots I want to
08 find some natural thing like nature plant
09 related to my country. even countryside people
10 I respect them and I like them.

In response to T’s description of these problems as “really a shame,” in line 2, M personalizes and pursues a subjective emotion response by offering an emotion state reformulation via a clarification question (“so are you ashamed to say you’re Cambodian,”). Instead of taking up or confirming M’s reformulation, T goes on to select alternative emotion reformulations (e.g., “I feel sad,” “I feel for people,” “I love,” “I like them”) and cites the nation, people, and the environment as reasons for positive feelings and identification with Cambodia. In keeping with previous research, and the data in this study, this extract indicates that while confirmations are normative, when speakers do not take up reformulations offered by co-participants, they tend to take longer turns, use hesitation markers, and provide accounts to explain why their own reformulations are appropriate.

In the following section, I make some preliminary steps toward a formalized approach to the ways in which multiple reformulations are assembled in talk.

6.3. Emotion Scaling

A feature of emotion reformulations (particularly self-reformulations) found in the present study was that they were often done in the service of escalation and de-
escalation—as kinds of scaling devices. That reformulations can be intensified, softened, and otherwise located along a scale, implicates them in a complex vertical and horizontal (i.e., paradigmatic and associative/syntagmatic; Harland, 1993; Jakobson, 1960) alignment. In discursive psychology (DP), Edwards (1999) has linked the paradigmatic (the substitutional or contrastive potential of individual items) and the syntagmatic (the combinational potential of individual items) dimensions of discourse with the representation of emotion:

A key feature of emotion discourse is its deployment in narrative and rhetoric. Emotion terms occur not merely as one-off descriptions of specific acts or reactions, but as parts of interrelated sets of terms that implicate each other (syntagmatically) in narrative sequences, and also (paradigmatically) in rhetorically potent contrasts between alternative descriptions. (p. 279)

Adopting this notion of paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations to emotion state reformulations, it is possible to consider the selection, directionality, and intensity of the various alternatives. In, on the vertical axis I locate alternative emotion-state formulations, and on the horizontal axis, I indicate the comparative intensity and combinational potential of the various formulations.

![Figure 3. Two-dimensional figure of emotion-explicit and emotion-implicative reformulations.](image)

For simplicity, this figure is only representing two dimensions (alternatives and intensity), but other aspects that can be considered are emotions across time, emotional objects (i.e., the events and actions that take emotions), emotional subjects (i.e., the groups and individuals that ascribe or are attributed emotions), and so on.
6.3.1. Emotional Gradation

Through emotional upgrading, downgrading, and even clustering (i.e., linking emotion terms together), speakers label the types of emotionality to be recognized in their talk, as well as the comparative strength and location of those emotions in relation to other emotions, people, and objects. In Extract 6.11, for example, the speaker goes beyond simply providing a confirmation to upgrading it by the use of suprasegmental features (e.g., louder volume, word stress), and gradational intensifiers (e.g., adverbs, repetition, list-making):

M: weren’t you mad at them?
T: I’M MAD AT THEM (. ) I’M VERY MAD. BECAUSE
( . ) WHAT THE HELL IS IT WITH ↑PEOPLE.

As a storytelling device, emotional upgrading can be an effective resource. After Trang moves up this three-part emotional scale, he begins a retelling (returning to the previous topic) of a story about an angry encounter with the bank.

As in the previous extract, a common way that interviewees scale their emotion reformulations is through the use of adverbial intensifiers (e.g., “very,” “really,” “so”) and comparatives (e.g., “more”). This is often done by creating an emotion reformulation and then upgrading it through stepwise movement:

Extract 6.18. Trang

01 T: but at the same time if they ((Cambodians))
02 know you (. ) dishonest (. ) then when they hate
03 you they really hate you too.

They hate you       they really hate you

66 In these figures, lexical descriptions are represented in approximate, not exact, relation to each other.
Extract 6.19. Trang

01 T: suddenly I got mad. (0.5) > I got so mad

I got mad

I got so mad

Stepwise movement of emotion reformulations is not always scaled explicitly. In Extract 6.20, “that make me very angry” is not indicating an intensification of a single lexical item; yet it does indicate directionality because it implies a shift from a less-intense emotional state to a stronger one. By saying “that make me angry” the speaker claims to have been previously in a less angry state but something caused that anger to increase. In this case, Trang is referring to discrimination:

Extract 6.20. Trang

01 T: an’ sometimes that make me very angry

(not angry/less angry/angry)67 that make me very angry

In another example (Extract 6.21), Kim’s emotion reformulation “more happy” implies a comparison with “happy.” This locates her described emotions along a scale, while linking them to place (e.g., Vietnam, the US) and time (e.g., the past, the present). Without resorting to describing herself as “unhappy” or “less happy,” she is able to do so by contrastive implication:

Extract 6.21. Kim

01 K: You know (. ) what (. ) I feel more, (1.0) uh
02 (. ) I feel more, (. ) I feel more happy when I
03 am at home. in Vietnam right?

67 Parentheses and white circles indicate descriptive contrasts implied by the stated emotion reformulation(s).
Speakers also explicitly orient to the notion of scaling. In an interview with Bona, when I ask him if he is a happy person, he locates himself as “below happy” on a scale of “happiness”:

Extract 6.22. Bona

01 M: Would you say you’re a happy person?
02 B: Below that.

“below that” happy person

(less than happy person)

Emotional scales appear to be approximate, not exact measurements, and they may contain only two units. Here, for example, it is not clear exactly where Bona is locating himself in terms of being a happy person, but it can be seen that he is placing himself below the “happy” end of the scale.

6.3.2. Action-Initiating Emotions

Another important function of emotion formulation and reformulations is to create an action chain of accountability—to account for the speaker’s reactions/actions in response to people and events in the social environment. Minimally, this action chain contains reference to (a) a violation (of moral conduct; usually against the speaker), (b) an emotional response (a change of state; by the recipient of the violation), and (c) an action by the speaker (an unplanned response to the violation). Another way of stating this is: Someone did $X_1$. I felt $Y$, so I did $X_2$.68

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68 See Jefferson (2004) for a similar discursive device (At first I thought X, Then I realized Y) for normalizing events.
Extract 6.23. Hong

[talk about a restaurant manager who tricked the K and his friend in paying double for their meals]

01 H: I’m so mad I just walked out

Extract 6.24. John

[talk about an American boy who bullied J repeatedly]

01 J: I just like so mad I just did that.

Extract 6.25. Trang

[talk about professional and personal mistreatment by bank workers]

01 T: suddenly I got mad. (0.5) > I got so mad I say...
02 (not mad) mad so mad →[action]

In the portions of the stories directly leading up to the segments shown in the above illustrative examples (Extracts 6.23-6.25), the speakers made reference to specific violations they experienced by others, their own emotional reactions (anger), and their subsequent actions. In Extract 6.23, in response to a manager who twice tricked Hong and his friend into paying double, he reports that he complained to the manager, got mad, and walked out of the restaurant. In Extract 6.24, in response to repeated bullying by an American boy, John tells a story of how he stood up to the boy, and he cites being “so mad” as the impetus for fighting back. In Extract 6.25, after experiencing mistreatment by bank workers and mismanagement of his account, Trang reports that he finally got mad, complained to the bank staff, and closed his account. In each case, their emotional reactions and following actions are described as the direct result of mistreatment, rather than an overreaction or personal tendency to get angry.

It was also found that instead of simply intensifying their emotion state formulations (e.g., “That made me mad”), speakers may start at various points on an
intensity scale to characterize (often through implicit contrasts) the extreme nature of events, the justifiable moral indignation, the unjustified actions and attitudes of others, and the speaker’s subsequent emotions and actions. In the preceding three illustrative cases (Extracts 6.23-6.25), the speakers located an upgraded emotional state (“so mad”) in relation to an implicit contrast with a less intense emotional state (e.g., mad), while simultaneously characterizing that emotional state as responsible for initiating an action response to people and events. By intensifying their emotional reaction (e.g., “so mad”) to norm violations, speakers are not only characterizing their own emotional states at the time, they are also reflexively characterizing the initiator of those emotions (i.e., the violation) as extreme. In other words, this action chain of accountability is linked together by explicit and implicit claims of violations, normative and moral conduct, and spontaneous emotions and emotion-driven responses.

6.3.3. Emotion Reformulations and Membership Categories

Interviewees may use emotion reformulations to locate and comment on social members in terms of their social categories and category-bound emotion attributes. Emotion clustering is particularly useful for accomplishing this. In the following example, from a story about rude customers encountered in her department store job, the speaker (Kim) (re)formulates the emotions of others—in this case, a rude mother and daughter:

Extract 6.26. Kim

01 K: so when Mary she come down (.) and (.) the
02 mother and daughter happened to be Caucasian
03 (.) so they- they- they t-talked to Mary and
04 they very angry and they’re very upset. they
05 said that I refuse to- to give them customer
06 service and I don’t speak English. they don’t
07 understand what I’m saying.

(angry) very angry
(upset) very upset

[customers] [store workers]
Along the horizontal axis, there is a strong characterization of the customers as “very angry” and “very upset.” As storytelling resources, a rhetorical function of these intense emotion reformulations is to create a contrastive emotional and moral counterclaim between the very angry and upset customers on the one hand, and the rational and non-emotional manager (Mary) and store clerk (Kim) on the other. The character of Mary and Kim as rational and non-emotional is built up by the ways in which Kim’s story is organized. No emotion reformulations are attributed to Mary or Kim, and their actions are objectively (i.e., as matter-of-fact) described in this story. Kim’s description of the customers’ in line 2 makes their ethnicity relevant while treating it as a disinterested account (“the mother and daughter happened to be Caucasian”). Potter (1997) refers to the production of disinterested accounts as “stake inoculation” (i.e., whereby narrative tellers work to prevent the undermining of their talk by presenting it as disinterested or unmotivated). By describing the customers’ ethnicity Kim reflexively invokes a contrast with her own. In the larger interview context, the hearability of this contrast is made even stronger when located in the context of Kim’s repeated talk of her experiences of discrimination because of her ethnicity, language, gender, and immigrant experience. Instead of starting off by framing her story by pointing out the ethnicity of the customers, she brings it up only after making her complaint about them and inserts it within her description of events as an aside—and emphasizes it as such: “they happened to be Caucasian.”

Stokoe and Edwards (2007), in an analysis of racial insults in police interrogations and telephone calls to mediation centers also found that when race is mentioned when making complaints about others, it was always followed talk about other troubles. It was never made to be the primary complaint. This same pattern is found here. I also suggest that Kim’s description of the mother and daughter as “Caucasian” rather than “white” may be a way to bring off “disinterest” through lexical selection. Although an impressionistic interpretation, I suggest “Caucasian” implies a more detached and report-like description. For example, in Stokoe and Edward’s study, although “white”

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69 Edwards (1997, p. 200) and Coulter (1986, p. 126), citing Mischel (1969, p. 263), have noted that emotion state ascriptions may be used to explain a person’s failure to act appropriately.
(e.g., “white this”; “white whore”) was treated by speakers as having racially-loaded insult potential, “Caucasian” was not used as a term of insult.

Another observation is the use of *emotion clustering*. Through the conjunction “and,” Kim attributes “angry” and “upset” to the mother and daughter, linking these emotion reformulations as category bound attributes to the membership category of “customers.” Because Kim and Mary are not placed on the emotional scale, Kim avoids having to give an account for her own emotions.

In another example, the speaker uses emotion state reformulations to describe specific feelings (as emotion clusters) as category-bound self-attributes:

Extract 6.27. Trang

01 T: .hhh *I feel bad* (.8) “you see?” (.5)
02 if someone (. ) put down the: (.6) l-like
03 example lessay “oh-oh f:: (1.0) ef oh bee
04 ((FOB)) (0.2) >not you but other people say
05 it< *I feel a little bit* .hh (1.3) *upset and* angry? an’ (.9) too. (. ) because (. ) it’s
07 still a part of me: (. ) “you see?”

Trang, in the middle of talking about the mistreatment and discrimination caused by others because of his status as immigrant and ethnic minority, uses “bad” and “a little bit upset and angry” to describe his subjective emotional states. As in previous extracts, these descriptions are described as resulting from the morally sanctionable actions of others (in this case, discrimination and name-calling).

When talking about their troubles, speakers will often attempt to avoid appearing that they are overreacting or taking those troubles too seriously (Drew, 1998; Edwards, 70 FOB (“Fresh Off the Boat”), a derogatory term often directed at Asian immigrants—particularly from Southeast Asian countries.

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70
As discussed in Chapter 5, one way speakers do this is by inserting laughter (Glenn, 2003; Jefferson, 1984). Another way, as shown in Extract 6.27, is by offering up a weaker emotion state reformulation. By using “a little bit,” Trang characterizes himself as self-controlled and not prone to becoming overly enraged. This stands in contrast to Extract 6.26, where Kim’s description of the rude customers as “very upset and angry” characterizes them as extreme and overreactive. These examples show the situated deployment of emotion formulations as strategic resources. Thus emotions are described as (a) the result of others’ actions, and (b) the cause of one’s own. The contrastive and scaling work involved in constructing emotion reformulations works as much to comment on the social actors and events described as it does the represented emotional states and associated actions.

In the following extract, the work of emotion reformulations to construct category contrasts between individuals is made even more explicit. This comes from a multi-party informal dinner gathering that extended from the interviews. In this segment, Trang (T) describes his co-present Cambodian friend, Sang (S).

Extract 6.28. Matt, Trang, and Sang (mealtime conversation)

01 M: and everyone says “how come Sang doesn’t let
02 go when he hugs us? & cuz Sang will hug and he
03 doesn’t let go.” & yeah he just holds holds
04 holds.
05 S: yea::h
06 (2.0)
07 ( ) just let me sit down ( ) and I
08 just go sit down that’s why=
09 T: =he-he uh affectionate (.) person. very uh (.)
10 generous people.
11 (2.0)
12 M: so what’s the difference between Cambodian and
13 Vietnamese?
14 (4.0)
15 T: Vietnamese the north people very cold. very
16 cold people. very cold.

71 This interaction took place at Sang’s home. Jim, a Japanese-American, was also present but did not talk in this segment.
At the beginning of this segment, S was speaking about a dance class that he, the interviewer (M), and one more co-present individual attended, and he has just invited T to join the following week. The interviewer uses represented talk to describe (i.e., formulate) S’s physical behavior with others (e.g., hugging, not letting go, holding) and treats it as an interactional, and possibly even cultural, puzzle (lines 1-2: “how come Sang doesn’t let go when he hugs us?”). After S confirms that description of events (line 5), he goes on to mention something about how he just sits down at the dance (he rarely dances, preferring to just sit down and talk to people). In lines 9-10, T then steps in with reformulations to explain S’s actions as an individual and as part of a collective: “he-he uh affectionate () person. very uh () generous people.” Responding to those descriptions, M requests a specific explanation of the differences between Cambodians and Vietnamese.72 Narrowing the focus from Vietnamese to the north Vietnamese,73 Trang then describes them with a three-part repetition in lines 15-16: “Vietnamese the north people very cold, very cold people. very cold.”

As shown on the scale above, along the horizontal axis, Trang’s description of Sang as an “affectionate person” and Cambodians as “generous people” locates them in terms of positive attributes.74 In contrast, the explicit (“very cold”) and implied (e.g., non-

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72 Trang is mixed Vietnamese and Khmer, Sang is ethnic Khmer, Matt is Anglo-American, and another co-present individual is Japanese-American (not an interviewee in this study). This question then is oriented toward Trang’s expert knowledge about both Vietnamese and Cambodians. Trang also orients to his expertise by stating a few lines later that Sang would not know about differences between Cambodians and Vietnamese because he “hasn’t much experience with Vietnamese people,” and Sang confirms this.

73 As with the majority of Vietnamese who immigrated to the US and Canada, Trang’s family is from Saigon (Ho Chi Minh), located in the southern part of the country.

74 I make a distinction between emotions (e.g., mad, sad) and personality traits (e.g., affectionate, generous). Nevertheless, I argue that by describing people as “affectionate” or “generous,” for example, ...
affectionate, stingy, greedy) emotion-indexing reformulations locate the north Vietnamese in another part of the continuum in terms of negative attributes. Through the use of emotion explicit and emotion-implicative reformulations as rhetorical resources, speakers are able to cluster these descriptions as well as place social members into social groups in relation to those descriptions.

Another, even more explicit, example from Trang (T) shows how he locates his own emotions along a scale. Leading up to this interview segment, Trang has been talking about the difficult situations and conflict faced by immigrants. He lists a number of emotion state reformulations that result from this conflict:

Extract 6.29. Trang

01 T: I’m become fear see? b- right now (.) become
ten 02         fear?
03 M: uuhh
04 T: _fearful?
05 M: uuhh
06 T: and then, (2.0) panicking? no. (1.5) .hh
07         anxiety?
08 M: uuhh?
09 T: anxiety that the worse.
10 M: that’s the worst?
11 T: yeah that’s the worse. anxiety? (6.0) _fear?
12         (2.4) fear of re-_ rejection?
13 M: be-because of being immigrant or [because] of
14 T:      [yeah   ]
15 M: language or because of,
16 (0.4)
17 T: b- l-language (0.4) barrier (0.7) because the-
18         (0.6) because (0.6) because the color of your
19 skin different? because (. ) you have problem
20 with English? (1.4) because (0.8) you don’t
21 have any (. ) degree or bachelor. you don’t
22 have MUCH to offer. you have MUCH to uh (1.5)
23 to uh to prove that you _better. (1.7) “you
24 know?”

one is taking an affective stance. This affective stance is also made hearable by the tone in which the utterance is produced. In Extract 6.28, Trang produces lines 9–10 with a notably “light” tone—in comparison to lines 15–16, which are produced with what could be described as “cold,” “heavy,” “serious,” or “disdainful.”
A curious aspect of this sequence is that rather than offering one or two emotion reformulations, T gives several (*fear, fearful, panicking, anxiety, fear of rejection*), but he produces them as an emotion “word search.” That is, T is not treating emotions as pre-existing or pre-named, he is attending to them as emergent phenomena (i.e., selected in the here and now of the telling) that need to be examined and weighed in relation to the meanings of the various potential labels. As he lists *fear* and some of its morphological (e.g., *fearful*), causal (e.g., *become fear*), and specific (e.g., *fear of rejection*) permutations, he clusters those descriptions along one part of the emotion scale. T also displays a search to determine the appropriateness or “fit” of particular reformulations. He tentatively offers up *panicking*, but then abandons it in favor of *anxiety*. *Anxiety*, according to him, is the worst of these emotions.

It is of interest to note that although the interviewer (M) in line 10 initiates an embedded repair (Jefferson, 1987) of T’s previous utterance (repair of “worse” to “worst”), there is no uptake of this repair from T in line 11—another indication that although these were L2 English interviews, language learning was generally not oriented to by the interviewer or interview participants.

Emotion reformulations can also place emotions and individuals along other scales in addition to intensity. In the following extract, John is talking about the negative consequences of hiding that he is gay from his friends and family:

**Extract 6.30. John**

01 J: so (.) I can yeah (.) go to (.) yeah (.)
02  basically (.) I split myself in pieces.
03  (0.7)
04 M: UH: (.) and how does that feel?
05  (1.4)
In this example, after John has formulated the upshot of the negative consequences of hiding his sexuality, M initiates a “therapy-like” feeling question sequence (Chapter 5) in line 4: “and how does that feel?” J then provides two emotion state formulations: line 6: “it not good sometime”; line 8: “it feel (.) not too good.” In keeping with earlier examples, this shows an intensifying movement (in a negative direction) from “good” to “not too good”—and implies a scale that includes “good,” in addition to “not good” and “not too good.”

\[
\text{not good} \quad \text{feel not too good} \quad \text{(feels good)}
\]

The particular scale used is an important rhetorical and interpretive resource. Previously, I showed that when talking about their troubles, speakers may downplay the seriousness of events, or at least their reaction to them, by using laughter or by offering up a weaker emotion-state reformulation. Considering alternative reformulations, John could have used “terrible” or “bad” instead of “not too good”:

\[
\text{[terrible]} \quad \text{[a little bad]} \quad \text{[bad]}
\]

\[
\text{not good} \quad \text{feel not too good} \quad \text{(feels good)} \quad \text{(feels great)}
\]

By using a “good”-ness (i.e., positive) scale instead of a “bad”-ness (i.e., negative) scale, John is able to minimize his personal reaction to the negative events and avoid coming off as overly dramatic or complaining. This same procedure was found in
Extracts 6.21 and 6.22, where the participants used positive scales rather than negative scales to describe their feelings. This use of a positive or “good-ness” scale makes even more sense when considering that in this segment, John is attributing his inability to “come out” due to constraints from family and society as well as his own unwillingness to act. By describing the situation as “not good” instead of “bad,” John minimizes the severity of his problem to come out, thus minimizing his own culpability.

Emotion reformulations may carry out multiple functions. For example, John’s emotion state reformulations also place these descriptions along a temporal or frequency scale:

- (not good never)
- not good sometime
- (not good all the time)

By using the reformulation “it not good sometime,” John places the “not good” feelings in relation to their frequency. “Not good sometime” implies other frequency points (e.g., never, seldom, all the time, and so on) along the scale. Across these data extracts, speakers can be seen to formulate and reformulate emotion-explicit and emotion-implicit descriptions along a scale of intensity as well as time and place.

6.4. Summary

In this chapter I have documented two important aspects of emotion reformulation use in qualitative interview talk. First, I showed how the interviewer, much like a therapist in counseling sessions, may use redescriptive emotion reformulations to pursue specific lexical descriptions and receive confirmation from the interview participants. Confirmatory responses from the interview participants were produced in four ways: (a) through an exact lexical repetition of all or part of a previous formulation, (b) through an explicit confirmation (e.g., “that’s right”), (c) by offering a semantic equivalent (e.g., “it’s dangerous” → “It’s a big risk”), and (d) by upgrading or intensifying the reformulation (e.g., “mad” → “very mad”). I also found that interactants may even collaboratively complete a reformulation at a relevant TCU juncture. The pursuit and confirmation of particular reformulations has a direct bearing on the discursive trajectories that are pursued as well as those that are abandoned. Ultimately, what gets talked about in
interviews and how that talk is understood is directly tied into the specific formulations and reformulations that get treated as important and relevant.

A second research finding is that although the majority of interviewer-initiated reformulations received confirmations, not all interviewer-produced emotion reformulations were taken up by the participants. In those cases, two patterns emerged: (a) the interview participant used a different lexical reformulation but gave an account for it, or (b) the interviewer pursued a particular lexical reformulation until it was confirmed. Contrary to CA findings on therapeutic talk (e.g., Bercelli et al., 2008), reinterpretations—reformulations expressed from the therapist’s own perspective—were not found in the present study. Although it was shown that the interviewer pursued particular emotion reformulations, they were not explicitly shaped as the interviewer’s own descriptions, nor were they found to be formulated in the explicit service of “therapy.”

In the second half of the chapter I examined emotion reformulations as scaled descriptions. At the center of this investigation is a focus on how speakers themselves organize their talk in relation to the directionality and implications of particular lexical selections. Emotion scaling is not a new concept, as it has been explored in some depth in psychology, particularly in terms of dimensional models (e.g., Ekman, 1992; Larsen & Diencer, 1992; Ong & Van Dulmen, 2007; Turner & Ortony, 1992). However, this chapter differs from that work because it is not seeking to discover what emotions are, nor is it attempting to grid them according to their pre-established meanings and strengths. Instead, it approaches emotions by examining how speakers themselves label and use emotion-explicit and emotion-implicative terms within the moment by moment activity of interview and autobiographic storytelling. Although this was a preliminary effort to examine how emotions are organized in talk, further research based a larger corpus of emotion categories produced in interaction would be a step toward a better understanding of how they function.

From a discursive perspective, I showed that when talking about emotions and emotion-implicative descriptions, interview participants engage in emotion upgrading, downgrading, and clustering. Although much of this gradation is explicit (e.g., mad → very mad), many contrasts can be constructed through contrastive implication. For
example, describing oneself as “very angry” invokes other contrastive descriptions such as *angry, less angry, not angry,* and so on. In terms of identity and membership categories, this study also found that emotion reformulations are useful resources for categorizing people along a scale. It also found that by scaling some members and not others, accountability for emotions and emotion-implicative actions can be emphasized, minimized, or avoided. By clustering emotion-explicit and emotion-implicative descriptions in relation to groups and individuals, speakers are able to delineate the boundaries between self and others. In relation to complaint stories, this is a particularly powerful device for (re)directing blame or accountability.

These observations reinforce the claim that emotion talk is an intrinsic part of telling stories of autobiographic experience. Emotion reformulations, as intersubjectively produced and confirmed descriptions of social life, are “built into” the structure and activity of the qualitative interview as its emergent products. It was also shown that the interviewer and interview participants actively attend to the matter of which emotion reformulations “count” or fit best in talk of autobiographic experience. The interviewer may bias the interview toward emotion talk, but the participants have room to agentively resist particular reformulations by substituting their own. Specifically, I have shown that even within the interview’s bias toward emotion talk, interview participants accomplish a variety of actions through the ways they actively organize their emotion descriptions and reformulations along an implication scale. As this project of examining emotion reformulations is relatively new, particularly in qualitative research in applied linguistics, more work and more data are needed to investigate how a wider range of L2 users, including less proficient speakers, may manage emotion reformulations and scaling. Moreover, more research is needed to better understand how emotion reformulations are managed in a variety of settings, including interviews, the classroom, service encounters, and everyday interaction.
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION

7.0. Introduction

Throughout the previous chapters I explored the “whats” and the “hows” (Holstein & Gubrium, 2004) of emotion management in the L2 qualitative research interview. Treating the interview as a social practice, I examined the emotion-indexing topics that interview interactants take up, the discursive and extradiscursive resources they use, and the ways in which they actively “bracket in” and “bracket out” particular aspects of their stories and descriptions. I gave consideration also to the “whos” (i.e., the groups and individuals engaged and described in the talk) and the “wheres” (i.e., the interactional junctures and contexts of activity) to better contextualize the dynamic processes of emotion management. In the present chapter, I will briefly summarize the previous chapters and the study findings. I will then consider some of the main implications of this research for applied linguistics scholarship on emotions and psychological topics in general. Finally, I shall describe some ways in which this line of research might be further developed within applied linguistics and L2 studies.

7.1. Summary of the Chapters and Findings

In Chapter 1, I located this study within the larger domains of applied linguistics and the human sciences. First, by examining emotions as both a discursive topic and resource, I stated that this study adds to previous research by attending to the ways in which emotionality is constituted by and constitutive of talk-in-interaction. I am aware of no other study within applied linguistics that has adopted a similar discursive approach to emotions. A crucial contribution of this study is its close examination of the methodic interactional practices by which emotionality is produced and received (i.e., elicited, displayed, claimed, attributed, denied) within the research process. Second, by opening up the activity of the qualitative interview for inspection, it addresses matters of relevance to methodology, representation, and analysis—particularly for application to L2 and multilingual users, topics, and settings. Third, this study explored the links

75 I credit this insight to Wooffitt (1992).
between emotions and autobiographical talk of experience, particularly for adult immigrants and transculturals in their talk of language-in-use (not just language learning). In addition, by giving attention to the talk of adult immigrant and transcultural men, this study brings attention to a wider range of gendered experiences.

In Chapter 2, to situate this study within the research literature, I addressed some of the key epistemological, theoretical, and methodological challenges that lie at the heart of research on language and emotions. Taking a broad historical perspective, I discussed intrapsychological, socio-cultural, and discursive approaches to the study of emotions and pointed out some of their key characteristics, findings, and research agendas. Giving specific attention to EMCA-aligned approaches, I outlined their contribution to the discursive framework of the present study. I argued that an EMCA approach allows a means to disengage with endless philosophical debates about matters such as ontology, epistemology, and intentionality by engaging with emotions primarily as members’ concerns and resources for carrying out various activities in interaction.

Chapter 3 described the research participants, the data corpus and methods of collection/production, and the CA transcription procedures used in the present study. I also discussed matters related to the selection and representation of recorded material.

In Chapter 4, the first of the data analysis chapters, I investigated emotion story prefaces, a type of story opener or tellable, and the ways in which emotion talk and emotionality are invoked and projected by interviewees and interviewers in storytelling sequences. Based on an analysis of L1 and L2 data, I showed that speakers use emotion story prefaces, like any other general conversational resources, to display their attention to the interviewer-interviewee relationship and matters of tellability, stance, subject-object relations, and memory. I also showed that emotionality need not be explicitly labeled to be made interactionally available; speakers may use implicit and suggestive features of talk to make emotionality hearable and relevant for an understanding of their talk.

Chapter 5 took up the topic of interview questioning sequences and how the interviewer may use them to solicit talk of an emotional nature. Focusing on three question sequence types (emotional story invitations/solicitations, explicit “feeling” questions, and emotion-implicative questions), I discussed how the interviewer may
exploit them to bias the interview toward the production of emotion stories and talk. I also considered cases where even when the interviewer invites talk of positive emotions (e.g., “happy” experiences), such talk is not forthcoming from the interviewees, indicating an orientation in interviews toward talk of negative emotions and complaints. Although I argued that interviewer questioning sequences occasion emotion talk, and even suggested that specific features of the dialogic activity of the qualitative research interview (e.g., the structure of the interview format; the interactional history between interviewer and interviewee; the institutional agenda; the identities under which participants are recruited; the topics, identities, and experiences that that interviewer makes relevant; the ways in which topics are taken up and responded to; and the activity of telling autobiographical experience) may steer the interview toward talk of emotions and emotional experiences. Clearly, more work in this area is necessary to better understand the individual and combinatory factors that lead to the production of emotion talk—negative emotion talk in particular.

Turning to the labeling of emotions, Chapter 6 examined the specific lexical devices used by interview interactants to formulate and reformulate emotions and emotionality. Reviewing previous literature on formulations and reformulations, I considered how they function as displays of intersubjectivity as well as indicators of the interviewer’s agenda. In the same way that counselors redescribe client emotions in psychotherapy settings, I showed that the interviewer may use redescriptive emotion formulations to pursue specific descriptions and receive confirmations from interviewees. Confirmatory responses were shown to be produced by (a) an exact lexical repetition of all or part of a previous formulation, (b) an explicit confirmation (e.g., “that’s right”), (c) a semantic equivalent (e.g., “it’s dangerous” ⇒ “It’s a big risk”), and (d) an upgrade or intensification (e.g., “mad” ⇒ “very mad”). I also demonstrated that the interviewer and interviewee may display their shared understanding by collaboratively completing a reformulation at a relevant TCU juncture. However, although the qualitative interview exhibits some features in common with therapeutic talk (e.g., talk of emotional experiences, storytelling, emotion formulations), contrary to CA findings on therapeutic talk (e.g., Bercelli et al., 2008), reinterpretations (i.e., reformulations expressed from the therapist’s own perspective) were not found in the present study. A second research
finding of Chapter 6 is that although the majority of interviewer-initiated reformulations received confirmations, not all interviewer-produced emotion reformulations were taken up by the interviewees. In those cases, two patterns emerged: (a) the interviewee used a different lexical reformulation but gave an account for it, or (b) the interviewer pursued a particular lexical reformulation until it was eventually confirmed by the interviewee.

Chapter 6 took the discussion of emotion reformulations further through a preliminary exploration of how they may be assembled along directional and implicational scales. I showed that when deploying emotions in descriptions of people and events, speakers make use of resources such as emotion upgrading, downgrading, and clustering. Although much of this gradation is explicit (e.g., mad \(\rightarrow\) very mad), many of these emotion contrasts and alternatives are constructed through contrastive implication. I also argued that emotion reformulations are useful resources for categorizing and assessing people along a scale. For example, by scaling some members and not others in terms of particular emotional descriptions, accountability for those emotions and emotion-implicative actions can be emphasized, minimized, or avoided.

7.2. Implications of the study

As I have discussed throughout these chapters, the investigation of emotions and emotionality is a difficult enterprise. Defining, identifying, and operationalizing emotions are among the many challenges faced by the researcher. There is no shortage of both folk and academic theories regarding the processes that underlie the production and reception of emotions. Often these various theories are at odds with each other—due in large part to conflicting views regarding the nature of the phenomena (e.g., psychological, physiological, social, internal, external, innate, learned). Nevertheless, theory and model building are often considered fundamental aspects of research in applied linguistics and, indeed, across the social sciences (Chalhoub-Deville, Chapelle, & Duff, 2006; McCarthy, 2001; McGroarty, 1998; Shoemaker, Tankard, & Lasorsa, 2004). However, building theories and models need not be the only goals of research. A closer examination of the assumptions underlying our theories and methods can also be objects of study. In addition, knowledge-building is just as important as contributing to theory:
An important part of the research process is drawing theoretical implications out of your own data. However, advancing theoretical knowledge is not a step every researcher can make. Pointing the way for others or adding to the accumulation of knowledge is just as important. If you present your account well and offer what you can by way of analysis and interpretation you will be making your research accessible and fulfilling your obligation as a researcher and writer. (Burgess, Sieminski, & Arthur, 2006, pp. 97-98)

Rather than seeking to develop yet another theory of emotion, this study has aimed to contribute to previous scholarship while advancing our understanding of the discursive functions of emotions as well as the methods by which we produce our research data. Unlike previous studies on language and emotion in applied linguistics that mainly treat emotions as intrapsychological phenomena and initiators, inhibitors, or outcomes of language-related activity, this study directly engaged with emotions and their functions as interactional topics and resources. Focusing on the qualitative interview as a site of interaction as well as a research tool, I have argued that an EMCA-aligned discursive approach allows a systematic and empirical means to analyze, rather than summarize, emotion talk. Although not dismissing the importance of the thematic and emotional content of the data, I contend that by attending to the methodic interactional practices by which emotions are produced (i.e., elicited, displayed, claimed, attributed, denied), we can learn more about how emotions function as well as how they are produced by our methods of inquiry.

Other contributions of this study come from the attention given to the three devices investigated in this study (emotion story prefaces, questioning sequences, and reformulations). Although a number of researchers have examined story prefaces, and a few have looked at transgression and complaint stories (e.g., Buttny, 1993; Drew, 1998), none have treated the emotion story preface as an object of inquiry. I suggest more work examining a wider variety of story preface may help us better understand how they, and the stories that are produced, operate as interactional devices. Also, as I have pointed out, there is much research on questioning sequences in institutional settings (e.g., doctor-patient interaction, counseling sessions, news interviews, classrooms, courtrooms), but the analysis of questioning sequences in qualitative interviews has been conspicuously absent. This study contributes to that area of research. If recent calls (e.g., Edwards &
Stokoe, 2004; Talmy, 2010; Talmy & Richards, 2011) to critically re-examine interview practices are heeded, perhaps more researchers will join in this investigation and actively seek to develop researcher training and an increased understanding of our methods and tools of analysis. Other ways in which this study adds to new understandings include attention given to solicited/invited stories, “feeling” questions (as a type of emotion and opinion sequence initiator), and reformulations. Reformulations and how they are discursively scaled in interaction deserves more sustained attention. Furthermore, as this study has shown some important similarities and differences between qualitative interviews and psychotherapy, I suggest more research into the relationship between these two institutional contexts may be a fruitful area of inquiry. In particular, it may be useful to examine other kinds of reformulations beyond redescriptions and reinterpretations.

Overall, this study showed that an EMCA approach to emotion is a productive means of empirical inquiry and analysis. Although this study departed from contemporary DP work by focusing on qualitative interview data and highlighting the rhetorical work of the interview interactants, it still maintained its analytical footing along canonical CA lines by seeking to first address what the parties in the interview understand themselves to be doing (Schegloff, 1998).

Just as previous EMCA work on gender (e.g., Speer, 2005) demonstrated its fruitful application to a variety of concerns and disciplines, including feminist and other critical purposes, I argue that there is nothing intrinsically unique about the topic of this study that precludes a similar discursive approach to other psychological or sociological topics (e.g., cognition, motivation, identity, power). In fact, what is rather remarkable about the findings of this study is that the use of emotion talk by L2 English speakers in qualitative research interviews does not appear to be unique as an interactional resource—it is impressively unremarkable. Whether this points to universal forms and functions of emotion talk or whether the participants in this study, as advanced L2 speakers, did not manage emotions in unique ways is a matter for future empirical study. To do a more in-depth investigation of the function of emotion talk in L2 (and multilingual) interaction, I suggest studying larger groups of L2 speakers with a wider
range of English proficiencies and backgrounds (and in a variety of socio-cultural contexts) would be both valuable and essential.76

7.3. Directions for Future Research

Considering future directions for a discursive approach to research on language and emotions in applied linguistics and L2 studies, I will discuss three promising and interrelated areas: mental health, noticing/attention, and development.

7.3.1. Emotions and Mental Health

In Chapter 1, I cited as an additional motivation for this study an interest in the interlinkages among discourse, immigration, transculturalism, and mental health—particularly in light of the backgrounds of the research participants (e.g., as immigrants, former refugees, and minorities). That the content of these interviews contained talk of negative emotions and experiences, complaints, trauma, stress, discrimination (ethnic, linguistic, socioeconomic), and dilemmas tied to gender, sexuality, and social belonging (and unbelonging), suggests potential connections to matters related to mental health and social well-being. Of course, these topics are not unique to the participants of this study. Although seldom the objects of sustained research interest, similar concerns can also be found in many interview- and narrative-based studies, as the psychological and subjective processes of being and becoming are made relevant by both researchers and research participants. Therefore, as ways of constructing, organizing, and making sense of personhood may change across time and place (see discussions in Baynham & De Fina, 2005; Langman, 2004; Pavlenko & Blackledge, 2004), greater attention to how multilinguals and transculturals manage the shifting processes of self-identification and self-presentation may help to explain differential representations of agency and success over both the short term and long term.

In this study, how individuals described and even recategorized talk of negative emotions and experiences varied. Because the data were collected longitudinally, I had

76 Displaying and recognizing emotions and emotionality cannot be separated from the cultural and historical contexts in which they are located. As Edwards (1997) has pointed out, “It is that emotions and the names we call them are intrinsically tied to social conditions, rights, and responsibilities, which change historically and differ across cultures” (p. 181).
the opportunity to observe changes in the ways speakers organized and talked about their experiences over time. For example, some initially described themselves as victims and then later used the narrative space to challenge or fight back against those who wronged them (e.g., Kim in Extract 5.18). Some made use of multiple tellings to reframe their stories over time—to later treat events as “funny” rather than tragic or depressing. Others used narratives to make visible and create a cohesive presentation of self across time (e.g., by emphasizing ethnicity; see Prior, in press-b). Some psychologists have suggested that the ways in which individuals talk about and are able to regulate their negative emotions has important implications for their mental health, sense of well-being, and ability to interact with their social environment (see Gross, 2007; Lazarus, 1991; Nyklíček, Temoshok, & Vingerhoets, 2004). Due to the time commitment involved and the amount of data produced, longitudinal interview and discourse-based studies remain exceptions to the norm. However, if we wish to study change and consistency over time, I argue that more longitudinal studies are sorely needed in this area.

**Negative bias?**

I have noted that interviewers and interviewees orient toward talk of negative emotions, complaints, and problems. This bias may be attributable to the particular features of the interview context as well as basic norms of conversational reporting and/or storytelling. As a pervasive feature of conversation, negative emotions appear to be closely bound up with persuasive discourse, complaints, and talk seeking to elicit sympathy (see discussions in Buttny, 1993; Haakana, 2007; Johnston & Klandermans, 1995; Thagard & Kroon, 2006). The literature on conversational narratives has given some attention to the representation of negative or problematic experiences. According to many narrative scholars (e.g., Becker, 1999; Labov, 1982; Ochs & Capps, 1996, 2001), reported (i.e., tellable) events are by definition unusual, deviant, or problematic. Storytelling is thus seen as a means for organizing and representing the transgressive aspects of social life while coming to terms with it:

77 Across a range of contexts, there is evidence that depression correlates with more frequent displays of negative emotion (Vingerhoets, Nyklíček, & Denollet, 2008).
Narrators attempt to identify life problems, how and why they emerge, and their impact on the future. As such, narrative allows narrators to work through deviations from the expected within a conventional structure. As mentioned, the conventionality of narrative structure itself normalizes life’s unsettling events. (Ochs & Capps, 1996, p. 27)

Some sociologists have argued that breaches of social life naturally result in negative emotions:

In short, when people have to recognize that they are tacitly constructing their social worlds, and in an arbitrary and conventional way, rather than simply reacting to a world that is objectively there, they show intense negative emotions. […] One could well say that everyday life reality-construction is an emotional process, and that emotions that uphold reality come forth in intense from when the social reality is broken. (Collins, 1990, p. 29, emphasis added)

It is likely that the ordinary activity of reporting predisposes speakers toward talk of extraordinary or problematic events (see also Thagard & Kroon, 2006). As a general feature of interviews, where autobiographic experience is a focal object of the institutional activity, it may be that talk of troubles, negative emotions, and the like are made exceptionally salient. In other words, the interview context may amplify normal conversational and storytelling norms—resulting in a large number of questions and responses oriented to negative emotions and problematic life events.

There may also be age-related factors that bias talk toward negative topics. In a narrative-based study of autobiographical remembering by young and older adults, Alea, Bluck, and Semegon (2004) found negative affect to be especially salient for older adults ($M = 61.9$), who were shown to express negative emotion more intensely and more frequently than younger adults ($M = 20$). As the participants in the present study fall between the ages of those in Alea et al.’s study, it is unclear whether age-related factors influenced their talk of negative emotions and events. Alea et al. speculated that something about narrative telling is sensitive to differences between the two age groups. More work is certainly warranted in this area.
There are undoubtedly also cultural components that promote talk of negative emotion/experience and restrain talk of positive emotion/experience. A number of scholars (e.g., Averill, 1980; Ellis, 1991; Gaylin, 1979; Schrauf & Sanchez, 2004; Thagard & Kroon, 2006) have noted the preponderance of talk of negative rather than positive emotion in English. In Western contexts, particularly in the US, socialization into and through talk of negative emotion/experience has been shown to begin in early childhood. Conversations between children and caregivers in the US frequently center on talk of negative emotion, leading to more linguistically sophisticated input, moral and ideological development, and problem-solving and social coping skills (Dunn & Brown, 1991; Fivush, 1994; Gross, 2007; Quas & Fivush, 2009; Saarni, 1999). Although much attention has been given to the ways in which young children are socialized into culturally-appropriate ways of displaying, recognizing, and talking about emotions, less understood is how these socialization processes operate for older children and adults—particularly for multilinguals and transculturals. It has been argued that due to differing levels of socialization and exposure to L2 norms, the development of emotional arousal and personal associations with particular emotions varies widely for multilinguals (Dewaele, 2008; Dewaele & Pavlenko, 2002; Pavlenko, 2005).

The literature on how various ethnic/cultural groups, immigrants, and those who have experienced trauma, discrimination, and other stressors use emotion talk shows mixed findings. Some research on adult immigrants has indicated that the L2 may facilitate talk of emotions precisely because it is less emotional (i.e., more detached) than the L1 (Marian & Kaushanskaya, 2008; Pavlenko, 2005). Marian and Kaushanskaya, in an interview-based study of emotionality in immigration narratives by Russian bilinguals, found that interviewees used more emotion words in the L2, and negative emotion words

78 However, see Gross (2007) on the minimization of negative emotions and the amplification of positive emotions.

79 For discussions of socialization in and through emotion talk in non-Anglo cultural contexts, see Cervantes, 2002; Cole, Tamang, & Shrestha, 2006; Lutz, 1988; Schieffelin, 1990; Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986)

80 In a narrative-based study of autobiographical remembering by young and older adults, Alea et al. (2004) found negative affect to be especially salient for older adults, who expressed negative emotion more intensely and more frequently than younger adults.
were more prevalent than positive emotion words. Some health researchers have noted that Indochinese immigrants and other Asian groups tend to suppress talk of feelings in general and negative emotions in particular (e.g., Enelow, Forde, Brummel-Smith, 1996; Tran, Ngo, & Conway, 2003). In ethnographic and interview-based research with survivors of the infamous Cambodian genocide at the hands of the Khmer Rouge, Hinton observed that Cambodians manage negative emotions by minimizing or hiding them:

Yet, Cambodians often do hide negative feelings in order to avoid losing face or making someone else lose face. If, for example, a person becomes angry at another individual, he or she will sometimes not let the other person know. As one informant told me: "Cambodians put their anger in their head and don't let it out." (1998, p. 104)

Cambodians only talk about such sad stories once in a while….If a person starts to get upset and begins to cry…, the person should stop speaking about the matter that is making them suffer. They should think about something else. (2007, p. 441).

Despite the existence of cultural norms that discourage the overt expression of negative emotions, Hinton (2007) also found cases of intense physical (e.g., crying, shaking) and verbal expressions of emotionality (e.g., talk of fear, hate, suffering, anger) in his interviews with Cambodian survivors who talked about their wartime experiences. Therefore, while there may be cultural norms that encourage the suppression of negative emotions, features of the interview context may also facilitate emotional expression.

Similar contrasts have been found in interview-based research with Vietnamese respondents. In focus group interviews with older Vietnamese immigrants in Australia about their emotional well-being and family relationships, Vo-Thanh-Xuan and Liamputtong (2003) discovered that many elderly Vietnamese declined to participate in their group interviews because of an unwillingness to discuss negative points. McKelvey (1999), a child psychiatrist, carried out oral interviews (through an interpreter) with Amerasian children from Vietnam, many of whom who had faced discrimination and abandonment because of their mixed race. McKelvey observed that while some dealt with their anger and sadness by hiding negative emotions and transforming them into positive emotions (e.g., concern for others), many interviewees also talked openly about
their negative feelings and experiences. Kamm (1996), in a journalistic study of post-war, present day Vietnam, found that many interviewees did not hide talk of anger and other emotions. 81 Groleau and Kirmayer (2004), in an investigation of the illness narratives of Vietnamese immigrants in Canada, found that respondents who spoke of negative emotions made use of a cultural model called uất ức 82 [to be indignant or angry because of injustice]:

Participants in this study described uất ức as a complex negative emotion composed of several different emotions including anger, sadness, indignation, bitterness, stress, hate, and frustration. A young woman suffering from uất ức told the interviewer that it is ‘a mental depression more sophisticated than what Westerners call depression because it is a social disease of indignation’. Vietnamese know who suffers from uất ức only by knowing the personal story of that person. For example, one participant explained that a lot of Vietnamese who were held in war camps and tortured suffer from uất ức because they were, as one participant said, ‘treated like animals and couldn’t say a thing about it; they couldn’t denounce their captors’. (p. 120)

The Vietnamese respondents in the present study did not talk explicitly about uất ức, but much of their talk described negative emotions (e.g., anger, sadness) resulting from injustice and breaches of moral conduct. Despite over thirty years of post-war immigration from Southeast Asia—and much present-day interest by researchers in contemporary transcultural flows—studies of immigrant groups and individuals and their indigenous, hybrid, alternative, and even enduring and shifting83 ways of constructing and managing emotions remain rare.84 Clearly, more research is needed if we are to

81 However, many of the respondents in Kamm’s study directed their anger against governments and soldiers, rather than individuals.

82 I am grateful to Hanh Nguyen, personal communication, for pointing out that uất ức is often treated as a result of having to suppress one’s anger at injustice and unfair treatment (i.e., one is angry but is not able to act on that anger).

83 Notable exceptions include Pavlenko’s work on emotions and multilingualism (2005, 2006). A related area in need of investigation includes the construction and reception of emotion by lingua franca speakers (i.e., speakers who interact in a language that is shared but not necessarily native). A rare mention of this comes from Russell (1995), who cites the code-switching patterns of Wolof speakers as an important part of emotion discourse and multilingualism.

84 There are a number of health-related studies of Southeast Asian immigrants that have looked at mental health, coping practices, and attitudes toward healthcare (e.g., Carlson & Rosser-Hogan, 1991; Donnelly,
understand the various modes and methods of managing *talk about* emotions (i.e., emotion as topic) and *talk by means of* emotions (i.e., emotion as resource) in daily life.

**Emotion resources**

Other questions that this study raises concern the semiotic resources speakers use to do emotionality: How do individuals come to have (or not have) particular affective resources (e.g., emotion vocabulary, emotional stories)? What, if any, are some of their general and specialized functions? Again, this suggests the potential benefits of longitudinal and ethnographic research on language and emotion socialization.

Discussing the analysis of interview data, Rapley (2001) has argued that the discursive resources are part of the wider cultural context; nevertheless, the local context of their production must be primary:

> Interviewees’ talk speaks to and emerges from the wider strategies and repertoires available to, and used by, *all* people. A focus on interview-talk as locally accomplished does not deny that interviewees’ talk is reflexively situated in the wider cultural arena (Silverman, 1993). The ways of speaking that are available to talk (and texts) that are engaged in talk about drugs, or other topics, can be highlighted as well as both speakers’ negotiations with the broader (moral) social context. Whatever analytic stance is adopted, extracts from interviews should always be presented in the context in which they occurred, with the question that prompted the talk as well as the talk that follows being offered. In this way, readers can view how the talk is co-constructed in the course of the research and, thereby, judge the reliability of the analysis. (p. 318-319, emphasis in original)

As the main argument of this study is that interviews and emotions should be treated as interaction, I concur with Rapley’s insistence that data must always be analyzed and presented in the context in which they occurred. However, from the perspective of applied linguistics and L2 studies, I find problematic the assumption that strategies, repertoires, etc. are available to and used by *all* people. Certainly, there are semiotic resources that are shared—otherwise, communication would be impossible. However, resources that are available to and used by multilinguals and monolinguals, L1 speakers

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2002; Hsu, Davies, Hansen, 2004; Kinzie et al. (1990); Kroll et al. (1989); however, consideration of emotion talk and/or the expression of emotions is either absent or a peripheral concern.
and L2 speakers, adults and children, etc. may not be the same resources.\footnote{See also Footnote 83.} Again, a language (and emotion) socialization perspective may be useful in exploring the differential availability and deployment of particular semiotic resources in interaction.

I should note that after carrying out many of the interviews and other data collection for the present study, I discovered that several of the research participants had previously been in psychotherapy and/or had told many of their stories (or versions of them) to therapists, lawyers, government officials, and other professionals and gatekeepers. This undoubtedly contributed to the organization, production, and even rehearsal of their stories, and suggests the importance of taking into account the entextualization\footnote{On entextualization, see Bauman (2004), Bauman and Briggs (1990), Silverstein and Urban (1996).} processes by which stories become interactional resources.

Another question that one might raise is how the interviews and the activities of talking about and managing emotionality (i.e., their retrospective organization and present production) can influence future language use and social participation.\footnote{I discuss the transformative aspect of narrative-based research in Prior (in press-a).} To link applied linguistics research with mental health topics, other promising areas of inquiry would include extending CA research on psychotherapeutic talk to include attention to L2 users/multilinguals, the management of stress by students and teachers (for an example, see Hepburn & Brown, 2001), and how emotion talk may be learned, used, resisted, avoided, etc. in the language classroom and other contexts.

\subsection*{7.3.2. Noticing and Attention}

I have pointed out that a finding of this study is the prevalence of talk of negative emotions and experiences. Negatively-valenced phenomena appear to be what speakers treat as noticeable, memorable, and tellable. Some scholars have recognized the predominance of negative emotions in the working emotional vocabulary of speakers of English (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000; Schrauf & Sanchez, 2004), and have offered their own theories. For Ben-Ze’ev, this is explained by the fact that negative emotions are implicated in memory and the ability to recall experience:
Thus, although English contains more words with positive than negative connotations, the reverse is true of emotion words….It seems that we are more aware of negative emotions, which are more differentiated than positive emotions….the duration and the amount of rumination associated with negative events are usually far greater. People ruminate about events inducing strong negative emotions five times as long as they do about events inducing strong ones. Hence, it is no wonder that people tend to recall negative experiences more readily than positive ones. (p. 99)

As discussed in Chapter 4 (section 4.3.4), although memory claims may be made on the basis of negative or powerful emotions, the accuracy of that recall has been shown to be inconsistent. Schrauf and Sanchez (2004), however, have argued that the prevalence of negative emotion vocabulary in English “does not imply that humans have more negative than positive emotional experience. Rather it seems to be a statement about human cognition” (p. 269) and the different ways we process positive and negative emotions. In their view, positive emotions are processed according to mental schemata based on previous experience; negative emotions, on the other hand, are subjected to more detailed and effortful processing. Psychological work on emotion regulation paints an even more complex picture. Urging greater investigation of the differences between positive emotion and negative emotion in daily life, Nezlek and Kuppens (2008) remarked that negative emotions appear to be less frequent but more intense than positive emotions, thus making them more difficult to regulate. More recently, Macklem (2011), summarizing many of the findings on emotion regulation, has emphasized the strong links between emotion regulation and attention control. Among the findings include the recognition that emotional control is an important part of being able to focus and shift attention (see also Yap, Allen, & Sheeber, 2007) and negative events are processed in the brain more rapidly than positive events.

If it is indeed the case that negative emotions lead to more effortful and attentive processing—or at least influence attentional processes—this may suggest some important links for language-related research on noticing and attention (e.g., Schmidt, 1990, 1993, 1995, 2001). For L2 users, a number of interesting findings have been raised: in particular, the emotion lexicon is often smaller and underutilized in the L2 than in the L1
(Dewaele & Pavlenko, 2002; Macklem, 2011), and the ability to process emotion words is less automatic in the L2 (Segalowitz, Trofimovich, Gatbonton, & Sokolovskaya, 2008).

A discursive approach to emotions, noticing, and attention could examine the relationships among various kinds of emotion talk and affective displays and how they are made visible and procedurally consequential in interactional sequences such as conversational repair (e.g., in the language classroom, workplace, tutoring sessions). This could even prove to be useful to renewed (and respecified) SLA investigations of individual differences in noticing and awareness. Schmidt (2001; 2010) has argued, “What happens then within the attentional space largely determines the course of language development, including the growth of knowledge (establishment of new representations) and the development of fluency (access to those representations)” (p. 14). I suggest that emotions may be an integral part of the “attentional” and even “motivational” space involved in language development.

A discursive approach may also be a profitable way to investigate how emotions attributed to life histories and trajectories may influence how one actively attends to and organizes past, present, and future experience. Extending this approach to the topic of motivation, for example, we may find that the processes of motivation (and demotivation) have discursive influences—not only intrapsychological and environmental. We may discover that the processes of “motivation” and trajectories of language learning and use involve important changes in how L2 users talk about and organize their motivation over time in relation to people and events. In other words, we may find that becoming a highly motivated language learner/user involves learning to talk about one’s language learning in motivated terms.

7.3.3. Longitudinal Development

While CA has a strong foothold in L2 research (e.g., Gardner & Wagner, 2004; He, 2004; Kasper, 2004; Markee, 2000; Mori, 2004; Seedhouse, 2004) and has established itself as a discipline able to examine L2 learning and use in situ, DP has yet to establish a visible presence. One reason for this is that DP, though a compelling approach to issues relating to emotion, cognition, motivation, understanding, perception, categorization, identity, and social relations, has not been developed for research with L2 users. Neither have DP researchers shown an interest in developmental processes or the
talk and interactions of multilinguals, partly because of the time and difficulty involved in conducting longitudinal research and partly because they are not interested in “non- or partially-competent” members (Edwards, personal communication).

Kasper (2009) has expressed optimism that a discursive approach to cognition (extendable to emotions and other psychological topics) can examine L2 developmental processes. She cites Wootton’s (1997) CA-based study on a child’s discourse-based understandings and pragmatic development as an example of this developmentally-oriented work. I believe a DP-informed approach can not only deepen our understanding of L2 learning and use as a multi-faceted and reflexive process of interaction and meaning-making—it can also contribute to the body of knowledge on individual variable research, multilingualism, and language as a contextualized and developmental process by examining how L2 users themselves conceptualize and organize their accumulated experiences over time. Furthermore, a DP approach can show us the general, specific, and unique semiotic and interactional resources that multilinguals make use of in the midst of negotiating the various social arenas in which they live and interact.

For L2 researchers with tools in language socialization, discourse and interaction analysis, intercultural communication, and even psychology, I believe a discursive approach to emotions and psychological topics to be a ripe area for research and theory. However, let me be clear that I am not advocating “methodological eclecticism”88 (cf. Hammersley, 1996; Richardson 2002), where the researcher can simply pick and choose theories and methodologies at whim. I am arguing for a grounded and cohesive, yet ecological view of language, interaction, experience and sense-making that examines these from the perspective and for the purposes of advancing L2 studies and our knowledge of the life-long processes of multilingualism. I also see this approach as having powerful reflexive potential for informing research practices by opening up for examination the ways in which we as researchers construct the objects of inquiry and how we go about eliciting, collecting, analyzing, and reporting our data and studies.

88 Bucholtz (2001), however, is not opposed to methodological or theoretical eclecticism by discourse analysts (both microanalytic and critical) and even warns against “slavish adherence to a single method” (p. 175).
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239


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