DISASSEMBLING SCHOOL IN MICRONESIA:
GENEALOGY, SUBJECTIVITY, POSSIBILITY

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ABSTRACT

Schooling in the region known as Micronesia is today a normalized, ubiquitous, and largely unexamined habit. As a result, many of its effects have also gone unnoticed and unchallenged. By interrogating the processes of normalization that circulate and operate through schooling in the region through the deployment of Foucaultian conceptions of power, knowledge, and subjectivity, this dissertation destabilizes conventional notions of schooling’s neutrality, self-evident benefit, and its role as the key to contemporary notions of so-called political, economic, and social development.

This work aims to disquiet the idea that school today is both rooted in some distant past and a force for decolonization and the postcolonial moment. Instead, through a genealogy of schooling, I argue that school as it is currently practiced in the region is the product of the present, emerging from the mid-1960s shift in US policy in the islands, the very moment when the US was trying to simultaneously prepare the islands for putative self-determination while producing ever-increasing colonial relations through the practice of schooling.

The dissertation goes on to conduct a genealogy of the various subjectivities produced through this present schooling practice, notably the student, the teacher, and the child/parent/family. In the case of the student, I examine both visually and discursively the statue of Lee Boo, Palau’s venerated “first true scholar,” fronting Palau Community College. Next, I consider the construction of the teacher as a convergence of forces that brought the Peace Corps to the region in the mid-1960s and today demands a scientific and technical level of “certification,” thereby displacing local conceptions of what it means to speak as a holder of indigenous knowledges. Finally, I consider the effects of
No Child Left Behind legislation and its Parental Information Resource Centers, through a lens disruptive of conventional development discourses of the state, on the creation of the child and parent (and ultimately the family) in the islands. I conclude by offering a counter-discourse to the normalized narrative of schooling, and suggest that what is displaced and foreclosed on by that narrative in fact holds a possible key to meaningful decolonization and self-determination.
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“If they can get you asking the wrong questions, they don't have to worry about answers.”

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

“I should have preferred to be enveloped by speech, and carried away well beyond all possible beginnings, rather than have to begin it myself.”

Michel Foucault, 1984

An Introduction

In June 2006, I attended a Majuro Chamber of Commerce luncheon in the capital of the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI). The purpose of the meeting was for officials from the RMI Ministry of Education (MOE) to answer questions from the general public, and from the Chamber of Commerce specifically. After an hour and a half of standard introductions followed by a barrage of pre-circulated questions about the poor performance of schools in the RMI prepared by the Chamber president, the meeting was opened to the public. Nearing the end of the meeting, I asked a question. The transcript of my question, as well as the response from the Minister of Education at the time, follows:

Question from the floor. David Kupferman, CMI [College of the Marshall Islands].

Education has always occurred in the Marshall Islands. What we are talking about today is the schools. What do you want from the schools?

A. Wilfred Kendall, Minister of Education, read the MOE Mission Statement in answer to this question. (Majuro Chamber of Commerce, 2006)

What one should immediately notice, besides the awkward construction prefacing my question, is the brevity and emptiness of the Minister’s response. I should add that there was no further discussion on this point; clearly the Minister’s oral recitation of the MOE’s mission statement was taken to answer my bothersome question: what is the purpose of schooling in this context? And why is schooling as a practice assumed, rather
than questioned?

In the spirit of full disclosure, and to complete the image for the reader, I provide here the full text of the MOE mission statement:

We aim to educate and prepare all students to be independent, literate and successful, reach their greatest potential, be critical thinkers and problem-solvers, and be culturally and globally competent and responsive. We are committed to developing effective partnerships with parents and the community, placing qualified teachers in all schools, creating safe and conducive learning environments, and equipping our schools with vital learning resources. (Ministry of Education, 2007a, p. 6, original underlining)

One is hard-pressed to place the cultural, social, or geographic context to which this mission statement refers. Is this Majuro or Michigan? What does it mean to “educate and prepare all students”? Prepare them for what? How does Marshallese society define a child’s “greatest potential”? What does it mean to be “critical thinkers and problem-solvers”? Are critical thinking and problem-solving the same in Marshallese culture as they are, say, in the predominantly white, upper-middle class suburb of Chicago where I was raised? And what does it mean for anyone to be “globally competent”? Competent at what?

By way of comparison, let us consider the following section of the preface to the Education in Palau handbook written for American teachers new to the islands in 1963:

The educational aim of the Palau District Education Department is to build a truly integrated Palauan educational system, which will prepare Palauan children to live more successfully in their own communities as moral, educated, and responsible
citizens, at the same time, trying to prepare them for their responsibilities to, and in
the world community. (Ramarui, 1963, p. 1)

Here we can see the parallels in schooling as preparation for citizenship, both at the
community as well as the global levels, in addition to the basic purpose of “educating”
students. Again, we are left to wonder what it is, exactly, children are expected to be
educated in and for, how “education” relates to either the Marshallese or Palauan context,
what it means to “live more successfully,” and why such education can only occur
through the mechanism of school provided for by the state.

Such examples of the ways in which “education” is spoken about, and by extension
meant and defined, in fact are ubiquitous and can be found in a variety of geographical
and institutional contexts. In the summer of 2009, in one instance, the Kosrae State
Department of Education held an “Educational Awareness” conference geared to public
school teachers and the community at large; the tag line, to be found everywhere from the
banners announcing the conference to the t-shirts later worn by participants, declared the
purpose of the conference: “Everything for the Child.” The implications embedded in
such an event include the assumptions that the Kosraean community is simply not
“aware” of education or its “benefits”; that Kosraean teachers and parents do not,
presently, do “everything for the child” (an arrogant and surprisingly not uncommon
supposition often pronounced by proponents—usually foreign consultants—of
“education” in this formulation); and that the path to dedicating “everything for the child”
lies through an adherence to the principles and values inherent in formal state-sponsored
“education” and “educational awareness.”

What each of these examples demonstrates, in a word, is a normalization of school
and schooling in the islands of Micronesia that looks unsurprisingly like the American models upon which they are based. Here the normalization of the discourse and practices of school is the process by which one is required to employ a particular vocabulary in order to engage in the conversation; that is, there is one “normal” way to speak of school, a way that is non-contingent, uncontestable, and precludes and forecloses on alternative considerations of how and when one speaks of school or schooling. Moreover, such an approach suggests that school, and by extension the problematic term “education,” is somehow an ontological experience that is universal, essentializable, and coincidentally American. In other words, the proper way, and indeed the only way, to “educate” Micronesians is by employing American (i.e., “universal”) schooling habits and practices. Furthermore, since the Palauan example above was written more than four decades before our Marshallese and Kosraean illustrations, it seems reasonable to conclude that this process of normalizing school in the region is not new, yet at the same time it is nonetheless relatively recent.

What is most troubling about this normalization process is that it forecloses on any alternative discourses regarding education; that is, nowhere in the examples above is there a consideration of Marshallese, Palauan, or Kosraean processes of education from an autochthonous perspective or arising in context. The only way to engage in conversation about education and schooling is to assume school, and consequently to assume that school is, again, the right way to educate Islanders. However, as I will argue, schooling as it is currently configured in Micronesia is a fairly recent phenomenon (beginning with the advent of the American colonial period after World War II and culminating in the exportation to the islands Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs
of the mid-1960s) and is therefore not a concept that is indigenous to the islands nor necessarily compatible with island contexts. But the largely uncritical normalization of school and schooling is indeed unmistakable. The questions I am ultimately trying to answer with this project, then, are how schooling has been normalized in Micronesia; what the effects of that normalization process are; and what, if any, alternative discourses on education exist or can be considered? In Foucaultian terms, what were the conditions of possibility that led the Minister of Education to dismiss my question with a largely irrelevant answer, and why was his answer acceptable and reasonable to the luncheon audience?

*An Ocean of Discourse: Schooling in Micronesia and Beyond*

This study, in its attempt to consider the process of normalizing school in Micronesia using a Foucaultian power/knowledge analytic, is the first of its kind. Nowhere in the literature on Micronesian schooling (and, I would also argue, on the issue of Pacific schools) is there a philosophical counter-reading of the purpose of school and its effects. That is, there is yet to emerge an analysis of school and schooling in the islands that employs a methodology (or methodologies) in order to consider alternatives to school, either as a practice, an institution, or a system; in other words, we are still waiting, in the terms of Peters and Burbules (2004), for a “philosophical corrective to the confidence with which mainstream theorists allow these concepts or terms [such as truth, objectivity, and progress] to remain unexamined and unreconstructed in face of the demise of epistemological foundationalism” (p. 4). Instead, schooling is assumed; that is, school in Micronesia is given as an ontological, self-evident phenomenon, one that is acontextualized, dehistoricized, and depoliticized. The questions being asked in the
extant literature focus on how to “improve” or “indigenize” school, which I maintain are the wrong questions; the discussion would be better served by asking a more fundamental question: why have school in the first place?

As a result of the rather narrow focus of studies on school in Micronesia, the discourse is largely concerned with a restricted understanding of schooling employing a limited vocabulary (usually involving public policy buzzwords such as “curriculum,” “reform,” “parent involvement,” “no child left behind,” etc.). Certainly the largest repository on school “research” in Micronesia is provided by Pacific Resources for Education and Learning (PREL), a quasi-governmental non-profit consultancy based in Honolulu. Popularly considered the “experts” in Micronesian schooling, assisted in no small part by their diffusion of offices throughout the region as well as a Board of Directors that includes nearly every minister and director of education of each of Micronesia’s island states, PREL dominates the discourse on schooling through a variety of projects using qualitative and quantitative methodologies, thereby making educational research in the area “scientific.” While a comprehensive listing of PREL reports (or perhaps better yet its “archive”) is beyond the scope of this dissertation (and perhaps unnecessary for the purposes of the project), two examples, both from Kosrae, should suffice. In the first example, Kawakami (1995) employs a conventional qualitative research methodology to determine how best to improve school performance of “at-risk” youth in Kosrae. (It is interesting to note that this is one of a number of almost identical studies; one need simply replace one island name with another.) While the application of the term “at-risk” is problematic in itself in this context, what is more troubling is the set of conclusions and recommendations based on the analysis of surveys distributed to
teachers and parents in the island. Here the study reports that “Schools, communities, and parents should work together to give consistent messages about the value of education” (p. 19); the “value” of education here is undefined, and therefore assumed to contain a universalism that may have nothing to do with the social context of Kosrae. (Later in the study Kawakami goes on to remind the people of Kosrae that ‘‘It takes a whole village to raise a child’’ (p. 20), a rather condescending point to make to an island made up of village communities who probably have a better grasp of a village’s responsibilities than such an “expert” does.)

In the second study, Low, Clarence, and William (2002) employ a research model, “The Teaching Learning Cycle,” to direct teachers in a village school in Kosrae to improve “literacy” among students. Here, again, the lexicon of educational expertise is problematic, as “literacy” serves to delineate a narrow and specific meaning: that is, written communication skills in English, achieved through a linear, cause-and-effect teaching strategy. In this way, PREL’s approach uses a model of the scientific method in which western notions of schooling and the application of Enlightenment research methodologies are both assumed and necessary. This rather conventional way to speak about schooling is embedded in “the very Enlightenment norms that education research typically prides itself on: ‘truth,’ ‘objectivity,’ and ‘progress’” (Peters and Burbules, 2004, p. 4). Thus “literacy” among Kosraean students is reduced to an empirical problem that can be “solved” or “fixed” by applying some western problem-solving through experimentation, what Baez and Boyles (2009) critique as the “culture of science” in educational research.

A major limit to this scientific approach, however, is that such methods fail to
recognize that empiricism “contains a conception of the ‘thing’ as a datum cut off from the temporal processes responsible for producing it in its intimate connection with the human practices it represents” (Shapiro, 1985-1986, p. 199). Thus PREL’s study not only controls the ways in which schooling can be talked about, but it also forecloses on any alternative discourses on the subject. What is missing entirely from both these (and virtually all other) PREL reports on Kosrae is the role of the church, which dominates the island’s society. While Michalchik (2000) offers a useful analysis of knowledgeability in church, at home, and in school (in fact her study is the only one I have encountered suggesting that western schooling may be contextually inappropriate in the case of Kosrae, although her conclusions are much more tentative than what I am proposing), it is disconcerting that the literature produced by PREL could overlook such an indispensible facet of Kosraean society. By doing so, such studies not only foreclose on alternate ways of thinking about education in an island context, but negate discourses on the island itself.

Widely quoted among PREL reports, and an archive unto himself through Micronesian Seminar since 1972, Hezel is also widely seen as an educational “expert” in the region. As Hanlon (2006) has noted, “Hezel’s influence on Micronesian studies is formidable. He is consulted and his work cited by almost every expatriate government official, educator, researcher, and development specialist” (p. 203). This project is no exception, except that my purposes for citing Hezel’s work are intended to offer a critique of his analyses, rather than simply to quote him at face value. Running throughout Hezel’s work is a commitment to the modernization and development of Micronesia, which he argues can best be accomplished through the schools. This
approach betrays a teleological faith in western development models; in Hezel’s (1975) words, “Education has always had a ‘civilizing’ function throughout history” (p. 126), suggesting that educations have a common purpose and that schools in Micronesia are no exception, while implying simultaneously that Micronesian societies prior to the advent of western modes of schooling were neither educated nor civilized. While, like in the case of PREL’s archive, it is not necessary (or perhaps even possible) to conduct a discursive analysis of every article written by Hezel on the topic, it is useful to consider at least one more example that demonstrates the prevailing argument about schooling in Micronesia as a self-evident, and self-evidently beneficial, part of island society. Here Hezel (1989) remarks “Education, although originally a foreign artifact and one that was used quite deliberately to colonize the [I]slanders and induce them to change their ways and accept the ‘blessings of civilization,’ has now become a cherished part of Micronesian life” (p. 29). This analysis is complemented by (and perhaps based on) an earlier work by Heine (1974), a Marshall Islander who wrote that “as a Micronesian, I am colonized” (p. xi), and then goes on to say “The Americans may someday leave Micronesia, but they will long be remembered, for despite all their shortcomings in governing Micronesia, they made possible a new phenomenon in Micronesia, the ‘liberation of the mind’” (p. 93). Thus the normalization of school is inherently a good thing, one that is apparently, and uncritically, clamored for by the Islanders themselves.

Making a different argument, yet arriving at a similar conclusion, is a common theme in the works of Nevin (1977), Flinn (1992), Peacock (1993), and Heine (2002) in which the transformative characteristic of western schooling in Micronesia is openly acknowledged and critiqued as having a negative effect on “traditional” society—yet the
conclusion is not to reconsider the idea of such modes of schooling in the first place, but rather to “improve” or “reform” school. In this way, the notion of school as an institution is again normalized through an uncritical acceptance of schooling as a natural and universal part of any society. Thus Nevin (1977) writes “it is the cruelest irony that it is education itself which exacerbates their [Micronesians’] blind hopes, as year by year it trains their children away from the old culture and toward an ambiguous academic form that is supposed to be consistent” (p. 148), only to conclude that the answer lies in “giv[ing] them some training, some guidance, and a co-op structure…and they could accomplish things. Why not build a school that would put such instruction on a systematic basis?” (p. 182). We see here that it is not school that is the problem; it is the way instruction is delivered.

Likewise a similar intellectual sleight of hand is evident in Peacock’s (1993) analysis of Palauan school instruction in the 1950s, in which “students had weekly fishing trips, under the supervision of elder Palauan fishermen” (p. 11). In the next paragraph, however, Peacock contends, “The various languages and cultures of Micronesia called for locally created curriculum. The greatest problem in elementary education was the lack of well-educated teachers” (p. 12). Implicit here is that Palauan fishermen are not “well-educated teachers” as defined in a narrow, western sense; the answer to this dilemma therefore lies not in re-conceptualizing the need for school, but rather in how to credentialize (that is, prepare “well-educated”) teachers so that, in this case, traditional fishing techniques can be taught in a school setting. This line of reasoning is a bit like an old joke from the Catskills in which two elderly folks are in line at a lunch buffet and the first person declares “The food here is terrible,” to which the
second person responds “And such small portions.” Applied to our study of schooling, one can offer a similar joke in which western schooling is admittedly a powerful force for change, including the possible loss of “traditional culture”—and if only Micronesians could be better at it.

A pair of rather dated critiques of the American model of schooling, while making the case that school as it is configured in Micronesia is flawed at best, still has its own problematic analyses to contend with. In the case of Gladwin (1970), an attempt is made to consider the logic of navigators from Puluwat Atoll in Chuuk State within a comparative framework of poverty and “at risk” education in the US. Tied closely to this approach is Gladwin’s use of development discourse that links the poverty of minority groups in the US with the Chuukese, thereby defining the Islanders as “poor” within the terms of western material wealth; this “poverty” is then extended to explain cognitive differences between Chuukese sailors and “successful” western students, specifically as it relates to the lack of heuristics (in Gladwin’s words, “innovative problem-solving”) in the development of the navigators’ intellect. Perhaps the most frank critique of American influence in the region comes from Gale (1979), although his focus is framed within the lens of public policy analysis and his conclusions regarding school in Micronesia are limited to a lamentation on the increasing numbers of American teachers arriving annually in the islands. Taking issue with reports such as those by Gale, Gladwin, and Nevin (although not by name), Ramarui (1979) offers a roundabout critique of the critiques of schooling in Micronesia, concluding that the American model of school in Micronesia must be defended. Here he echoes Heine’s (1974) earlier assessment of western school as “liberating the mind” while simultaneously advocating for school as an
indispensable element of “development” in the region, without considering either the power relations operationalized by such “liberation” or “development” nor the effects of applying such a model of schooling to island contexts.

Broadening our scope, schooling in the wider Pacific has more recently been the focus of “indigenizing” school curricula and assessment practices, but without questioning the appropriateness of western models of schooling in the first place. Again, the vocabulary employed in such a discourse is inherently limited and narrow, forcing one to enter into the conversation by considering such things as “curriculum” and “assessment” and how they can become more “culturally appropriate,” which in turn forecloses on alternatives that allow for more fundamental questions, such as why have this type of schooling at all. Among the studies produced by scholars on this topic writing almost exclusively from Fiji and New Zealand (Bishop & Glynn, 1999; Pene, Taufe’ulungaki, & Benson, 2002; Thaman, 2003a; Thaman, 2003b; Nabobo-Baba, 2006), a short essay by Heine (2002), writing of the Marshall Islands, begins: “The debate about quality and relevancy of Pacific education is rooted in the belief that what we have in practice is not our own making. At the same time, we must take responsibility for its successes and failures” (p. 84). In other words, while the foreign nature of institutionalized school is recognized, though not questioned, it needs to become, in Heine’s case, more “Marshallese”—and the way to accomplish that is by taking aspects of “traditional” Marshallese culture and adding them to the school curriculum (this trend has come to be known in Majuro as “Majolizing” the curriculum, a phenomenon recently championed by the Marshall Islands Ministry of Education). Elsewhere, Thaman (2003a) argues for including “aspects of indigenous education into course curricula” (p. 11). This
approach amounts to a type of cultural “window-dressing,” requiring that island cultures be forced to fit a prescribed western model of school rather than meaningfully re-conceptualizing education so as to develop alternatives that allow for the context to shape the educational needs and forms of a particular community. In short, the imperative of school becomes continually normalized through a newfound sense of cultural “ownership” of the institution.

While this trend is lamented by Teaiwa (2006) when she states “Incorporating the Pacific into preexisting frames of knowing is not a new practice” (p. 74), what is being called for here is a shift in the functioning of the institution of school; nowhere is the argument made that alternatives to the institution may in fact exist. Thus the focus of the luncheon in Majuro is on providing free lunch to students, as that is what will allow them to improve test scores—and so long as we are asking the wrong questions, as Pynchon says, the answers are superfluous. This project therefore intends to ask the right questions, perhaps for the first time.

Decolonizing the Postcolonial Position

Complicating the present work is a number of notions, both political and philosophical, which need to be addressed at the outset. First among them is the issue of who gets to speak in a work on Micronesia, the islands and their Islanders, and how even this basic concern is tangled up in the complexity of the twin concepts of postcoloniality and decolonization. To begin, then, we should start with the latter obstacle and what we mean when we use such loaded language, and then consider the limits of conventional approaches through what is called positionality in Pacific Studies.
Hulme (1995) writes “‘postcolonial’ is (or should be) a descriptive, not an evaluative term” (p. 120). In Pacific Studies, it seems, the notion that we are researching and writing in a time of postcoloniality suggests that our methodologies should reflect that particular temporal condition (that we are operating in a space and time *after* colonization) and that our processes of research and reporting ought to be “decolonized” as well. Smith (1999), in titling her seminal work *Decolonizing Methodologies*, contributes to this focus of Pacific Studies as employing a post-colonial (that is, after colonization) perspective, and in doing so has offered a blueprint of sorts for scholars working within Pacific Studies and conducting qualitative research. Here the thrust of Smith’s argument is that research has been done *to* Pacific Islanders, and now, in a time of the post-colonial, more legitimate research is that which is conducted *by* and *for* Pacific Islanders; the assumption embedded in this line of thinking is one of native authenticity as a sign of merit or worth, as well as one of temporal certitude. Yet the period of the “post-colonial” is not easily defined as simply “a condition that is automatically and for all time assumed once a formal colonial status has been left behind” (Hulme, p. 121); rather, the postcolonial (without the hyphen) describes a process that is dynamic in its disentanglement from the colonial, one that is by no means complete in the Pacific, nor even assured. As Loomba (2005) observes, “if uprooted from specific locations, ‘postcoloniality’ cannot be meaningfully investigated, and, instead, the term begins to obscure the very relations of domination that it seeks to uncover” (p. 22). To “decolonize” methodologies in Pacific Studies, then, assumes even greater importance if one is to consider that the development of the postcolonial is in no way complete, acontextual, or even inevitable.
The picture one gets of research in Pacific Studies from Smith (1999), however, is somewhat less nuanced; her focus on “indigenous researchers” is simultaneously intended to bestow an essentialized value on the native researcher while (perhaps unintentionally) limiting the prospects for legitimate “decolonized” research on the part of non-native researchers. (I will return to this latter idea in the next section below.) For our purposes, it is useful at this point to consider an example from Micronesia that employs Smith’s approach, namely Heine’s (2004) dissertation on student success stories of Marshallese immigrants in the US. Using a qualitative methodology, and employing Smith’s framework of the native researcher going out into the field of one’s own community, Heine explores why some Marshallese students do better in school than others. Since Heine is herself Marshallese, and the interviews and surveys were conducted in the Marshallese language, we can bestow an air of authority on the mediation of Heine’s results. What are considered only cursorily, however, are the larger issues of why Marshallese would move to the US in the first place, and how the US-Marshallese relationship is reflective of colonial patterns of political, economic, and intellectual governance; in this way, Heine assumes the structures of power circulating through western modes of formal schooling as self-evident and non-contingent. The problematic in this instance is placed squarely at the feet of the Marshallese she is researching, rather than in the system of schooling that reinforces the narrative of colonization. Thus, there is little, if any, consideration of the postcolonial as it is understood as a process rather than as a temporal marker. So does Heine’s use of “decolonized methodologies” necessarily make this a postcolonial work? In other words,
is all that is required summed up by the indigeneity of the researcher without taking into account the broader objectives of the research itself?

One possible response to these questions is to consider the purpose of decolonizing academic work: to give voice to the previously voiceless. Certainly in the work of Smith (1999), Heine (2004), and others, the level of mediation of Islander voices is softened somewhat by the ability of island researchers to communicate in the vernacular, as well as to adhere to particular customs and protocols better than someone unfamiliar with that community. Other examples within the emerging writings on Micronesia by Micronesians include Hattori’s (2004) historical analysis of the effects of US Naval health policies and practices on the Chamorro population on Guam, as well as Diaz’s (2000) call to “re-collect” histories of Guam from the Islanders themselves. Yet what sets these types of works apart from one that employs a so-called “decolonized” methodology such as Heine’s is the intention of the research to contribute to the process of the post-colonial; that is, while Heine is concerned with assessing “what works” for Marshallese in US schools, thereby trying to figure out how to get Marshall Islanders to succeed according to the agendas and contexts of the colonizing entity (the US), Hattori and Diaz are more interested in privileging Chamorro voices by dispelling popular myths of US Naval benevolence or the idea that Chamorros have no history before the advent of colonization, respectively. Put another way, the former study results in the justification of particular structures of colonial power, while the latter examples attempt to explode the colonial narrative by shining a light on what has been displaced by colonization.

What is more, beyond simply “giving voice” to those who historically have not been privileged to speak, a decolonizing approach to Pacific Studies, and one that seems
to be emerging recently in writings on Micronesia, is one that treats culture not as a static state of being, one that is “traditional” or needs to be “preserved,” but rather as a mutable, contested space. Perhaps the most compelling recent example of this approach to addressing issues of culture and custom comes from the poetry of Kihleng (2008), who employs Pohnpeian vernacular as a way to express key local concepts. Interestingly, her poem “My Urohs,” also the title of her collection, is the only piece in which she does not give detailed translations of Pohnpeian terms and phrases; it is also arguably the most effective poem because it is not bogged down in translation. Here she writes of the hand-sewn flower-print dress ubiquitous in Pohnpei and other parts of Micronesia as a living, vibrant element of local custom, important for its present utility rather than as a signifier of some past relic that needs to be resurrected. This notion of giving voice through cultural expression is all the more potent in that Kihleng is not afraid to let her use of Pohnpeian stand on its own, suggesting that there are some things that are not transposable into either the English language or western frames of knowing. Indeed, here we see one way in which the process of a decolonizing approach speaks to the complexities of the “postcolonial” present.

At this point I draw on Hanlon’s (1992) explanation of Tambiah’s (1990) “edge of commensurability” where, “At this edge, cross-cultural comparisons, translation, and interpretation become increasingly problematic” (Hanlon, 1992, p. 109). It is at this “edge” that Kihleng’s poem does not need to include full translations in order to signify the presence of culture as operating in quotidian Pohnpeian experiences. Culture and custom in these instances do not need to be “reinvented” or “remembered”—they are already embedded in the contexts of their communities.
Indeed, the idea of decolonizing methodologies in Pacific Studies should mean more than asserting a native authenticity on the part of the researcher by virtue of her/his birth or ethnicity; rather, decolonizing research should consider the ways in which native authenticity emerges from the practice of giving voice to and utilizing custom as an ever-present characteristic of the process of postcoloniality. That is, rather than “resurrect” custom or “go back” to the way things were before colonization (implying, incorrectly, that things were somehow simpler before westerners showed up), research should deploy custom as a valid set of knowledges, one that may or may not be compatible with existing western lenses of analysis and evaluation.

For the purposes of the present work, I am most interested in the ways in which these local knowledges can be utilized in the service of self-determination; in other words, how can cultural practices and knowledges that are already in operation open up alternative conditions of possibility for what we mean by “education” in Micronesia and who gets to speak as an “expert” or “teacher”? While my work does not likely qualify as contributing to “decolonizing methodologies” according to Smith (1999), since, among other things, I am not conducting a qualitative study and I am not in a position to provide native authenticity as a non-native researcher, I argue that reconceptualizing the ways in which we consider the reasons for giving voice to extant customary practices in fact contributes to the development of a decolonizing approach that recognizes the descriptive (rather than evaluative) temporality of the postcolonial as an on-going process rather than as a fixed and perfected condition. It is my intention to utilize concrete examples of customary practices in my disassembling of school in Micronesia: not for the purposes of finding ways to fit culture to the technology of western schooling and hope Micronesians
get better at it, but rather to suggest ways in which custom and culture can be deployed in order to open up what constitutes conditions of possibility for “education.” (This idea is explored more fully in Chapter 5.) Decolonized research in this sense does not treat culture and custom as simply a hurdle that is navigated better by a native researcher; instead, such research treats culture and custom as organic, complex, and authentic elements of an ongoing exploration of the postcolonial.

Repositioning the Binary

Intimately linked to decolonization of methodologies in Pacific Studies is the role of positionality as one engages in research in the region. As is the case with much of qualitative research, one’s position in relation to the work being done is central to the trustworthiness of the conclusions drawn; and while issues of positionality loom over more disciplines than just Pacific Studies, for our purposes we should limit our discussion to the context at hand. Wesley-Smith (1995) traces the emergence of this debate over authority of voice and positionality to what he calls the “empowerment rationale,” which manifested itself in Pacific Islands Studies during the period of political decolonization in the region in the 1970s and 1980s. In this way, one’s positionality as an indigenous researcher lends an air of empowerment to one’s research if, in an age of political decolonization, one also participates in a form of intellectual decolonization. Here research is no longer simply something carried out by representatives of the colonizing entities, but rather an action of academic emancipation for the communities being studied as well as the researchers who are part of that community.

In it simplest and most reductionist form, however, positionality hinges on an inverted binary: one is either an insider and comes from the community being researched,
and therefore has a right to speak; or one is an outsider, and therefore does not “understand” the community being researched. In an age of decolonization, the argument follows, it is better to be an insider (or as close to an insider as is possible) than an outsider, for in the time of colonization, the binary precluded insiders and privileged outsiders. One unintended outcome of this reductionist approach to the empowerment rationale and matters of positionality has been what Teaiwa (2010) asserts is “the lack of honest indigenous analysis….that indigeneity becomes a catch-phrase or war cry for ownership of knowledge and resources that can block critical investigation—even by indigenous people” (p.117). In other words, research in this sense is worthy only if an indigenous scholar conducted the research, regardless of the quality of the work. Used in this way, the binary of positionality becomes a sort of “disempowerment” rationale, both intellectually as well as politically, for those who do not qualify as “insiders,” since “binary oppositions always support a hierarchy or economy of value that operates by subordinating one term to another” (Peters and Burbules, 2004, p. 19).

It is also important to note, however, that this approach emerged during a particular historical period, during the political decolonization of the 1960s and 70s, when the empowerment rationale manifested itself as both a political and intellectual response to what was seen at the time as the urgency to erase all vestiges of colonization. This binary approach to positionality and the consequent misappropriation of the empowerment rationale has driven much of the debate over what kinds of research are or are not legitimate within the realm of Pacific Studies. (Indeed, to get a taste of just how viscerally personal and emotional this debate can get, one need look no further than the Trask-Keesing debate in the early 1990s: see Keesing, 1989, 1991; Trask, 1991).
Nonetheless, as the development of Pacific Studies has exposed the complexities of decolonization and postcoloniality over the past five decades, the limitations of an essentialized positionality have lingered, and continue to inform the issue of who can speak in Pacific Studies. Thus, Thaman (2003a), in a poem entitled “Our Way,” sums up her critique of western approaches to qualitative research when she writes “your way/objective/analytic/always doubting/…my way/subjective/gut-feeling like/always sure” (pp. 3-4). Picking up on the notion of subjectivity and “gut-feelings,” Hereniko (2000) goes so far in his analysis of native versus non-native researchers working in Rotuma as to assert that “there are certain matters, largely to do with intuition, emotion, and sensibility, that the outsider may never fully grasp, for these are things in the realm of the unseen, acquired through early socialization in the formative years, and perhaps inherent in the Rotuman gene pool” (p. 90). Here Hereniko is willing to suggest that what makes one an Islander is attained not only by one’s social context, but also as a matter of eugenics; this problematic attempt to essentialize “native-ness,” and by extension non-native-ness, offers little for the non-native researcher (and, I might add, the native researcher), as one’s right to speak in this case is determined not by what one has to say, but rather by virtue of one’s DNA. And to return momentarily to Smith (1999), we see that she ends her introduction by asserting “The book is written primarily to help ourselves” (p. 17). We might then ask, if one pardons the awkward grammatical structure of the question, who is “ourselves”? Or, as Hall (1996) puts it, “If post-colonial time is the time after colonialism, and colonialism is defined in terms of the binary division between the colonisers and the colonised, why is post-colonial time also a time of difference?” (p. 242, original emphases). As issues of positionality arise out of the debate
over what constitutes “decolonized” research, they also lead to a series of uncomfortable questions: whose voice is allowed to speak? Can a non-indigenous researcher produce work that is worthwhile? Where is the line drawn regarding who is or isn’t an “insider” or “outsider”? And who determines one’s place in this binary?

These questions of positionality therefore suggest a limited and narrow strategy with which to unpack the larger concerns of methodological and intellectual decolonization. Positionality in this case tends to result in a rather simple formula in which one either is or is not allowed to speak by virtue of her/his place within the insider/outsider binary (in this case whether one is or is not an “Islander.”) Instead, one’s position is often much more nuanced and complex, and is not an attribute that is easily reducible to either/or conceptions. It is my contention, then, that “positionality” is too limited in its scope, as it is understood and employed in both Pacific Studies and writings on Micronesia. The rather limited binary of insider/outsider, as well as the cumbersome and generally unhelpful typologies evident in qualitative research (such as indigenous-insider, indigenous-outsider, external-insider, and external-outsider) which try to add differing degrees to *emic* and *etic* perspectives but result in the selfsame binary, focus too much attention on *what* the researcher is rather than on *where* and *when* it is from which s/he is speaking. Indeed, the implication of the binary of positionality is that one position is “better” than another (it is “better” to be an indigenous-insider than an external-outsider, for instance), and that the quality of one’s research is reflective of one’s positionality; in this way, like the misuses of “postcolonial,” “positionality” is manifest as an evaluative, rather than a descriptive, term.
The Temporality of De-Positionality: Locus of Enunciation

Foucault (1984) once wrote “I wish I could have slipped surreptitiously into this discourse which I must present today, and into the ones I shall have to give here, perhaps for many years to come. I should have preferred to be enveloped by speech, and carried away well beyond all possible beginnings, rather than have to begin it myself” (p. 108). Indeed, in many ways I wish that I, too, were able to simply join in this conversation as it was already progressing, rather than to have to be the one to initiate it. However, it is important to note that this project is very much a product of a particular perspective and of a particular moment in time, one that is informed primarily by my locus of enunciation.

Here I should offer a brief but vital distinction between what I mean by a locus of enunciation and the foregoing critique of positionality above. One of the great limitations (and challenges) of determining one’s positionality is that the term assumes a fixed essence: one is an insider or outsider; a participant or an observer; or some permutation of static categories (such as an insider-participant or a participant-observer or an outsider-participant-observer—you get the idea). Positionality, constructed in this way, allows little room for movement: one either is an Islander or is not an Islander, and the legitimacy of one’s argument is colored by one’s standing. In short, positionality in this way acts as a pre-existing condition.

One’s locus of enunciation, by contrast, is defined by both where and when one speaks; that is, locus of enunciation concerns itself less with what someone is and more with the time and place from which they are speaking. Mignolo (1995) explains that

Scholarly discourses (as well as other types of discourse) acquire their meaning
on the grounds of their relation to the subject matter as well as their relation to an audience, a context of description (the context chosen to make the past event or object meaningful), and the *locus* of enunciation from which one ‘speaks’ and, by speaking, contributes to changing or maintaining systems of values and beliefs.

(p. 5, original emphasis)

Locus of enunciation thus focuses on the twin components of narrative and temporality, and the reason for entering the discourse in this way is to acknowledge both that “understanding the past cannot be detached from speaking the present” (Mignolo, 1995, p. 6) and that there is no such thing as a neutral discourse. For our present purposes we will focus on temporality first, and address the narrative aspects below.

With this type of orientation in mind, when one writes is nearly as important as what one has to say (and certainly as important as what one represents). Instead of asking a question about my positionality (what am I?), the attendant locus of enunciation question might be: when am I? While I have mentioned the complexity—and pitfalls—of a chronological rendering of the term postcolonial above, it is useful to remind ourselves that such a term, according to Hulme (1995), should be descriptive rather than evaluative, and critical rather than temporal. Yet here I am attempting to make a particular argument about power-knowledge in a moment during which the sovereignty model of power dominates the field of Pacific Studies, and specifically scholarship concerning school/ing in Micronesia; and indeed this sovereignty model of power operates in such a way as to assume that colonization in the greater Pacific (and Micronesia) is somehow over and in the past (more on power below). In this way my use of the term “postcolonial” is intended to articulate, at the time in which I am making this argument, its critical and
descriptive functions, and not as a temporal marker—for while the sovereignty model works on the assumption that the “post” in postcolonial designates that the time of colonization has passed, in truth the effects of colonization still readily circulate through, among other things, the technology of school in the islands. I am therefore writing as part of Hulme’s (1995) “process of disengagement from the whole colonial syndrome” (p. 120, original emphasis), rather than in a time when the observation is made that colonization has ceased to exist (when it has not).

My locus of enunciation, then, fully embraces what Fuentes (1982) calls “the multiplicity of time” (p. 72), in that I acknowledge the various ways in which my own perspectival lens is shaped by, and reflective of, the peculiar moment in which I as a writer mingle with you the reader, as well as with the array of perspectives my argument is informed by, clashes with, or complements. Thus, at the time of this writing I approach the notion of the postcolonial largely in concert with particular poststructural strategies and I take issue with other strategies that rely on particular conceptions of positionality as exclusive (and in extreme cases exclusionary). It is in this way that we can appreciate what Fuentes (1982) meant when he said “Societies are healthy when they accept that history and language are an unfinished business—our unfinished business—and bring questions and skepticism to bear on that unsatisfaction” (p. 73, original emphasis). In other words, whether I am a colonizer or a post-colonial, from the standpoint of positionality, is largely irrelevant; what matters for my locus of enunciation is a recognition of the complexity of the overlapping layers of colonial practice in a postcolonial moment. And while I myself have not experienced colonization as an Islander, the time in which I am writing, that temporal aspect of my locus of enunciation,
allows me to see how it works—the “unfinished business” of colonization—in the time of the postcolonial.

**Narrator as Narrative**

But enough about that; let’s talk about me. For, when one speaks of a locus of enunciation, one must also take into account the place *from where* one speaks. Viewed in another way, exploring one’s locus of enunciation is an exercise in the construction and narrativization of the self. Indeed, The distinction between positionality and locus of enunciation lies in the opportunities afforded by either one to move and speak according to one’s descriptive locale, spatially, temporally, and perspectivally. Thus, while both positionality and locus of enunciation can ask the question “who am I to write this?”, the answer in the case of the former would necessarily entail the application of fixed essences and categories, while the latter allows for the production of the self through a plurality of narratives. Deleuze (in Foucault, 1977) addresses this latter approach by asking and answering “Who speaks and acts? It is always a multiplicity, even within the person who speaks and acts” (p. 206). My locus of enunciation in this sense acts as a sort of de-positionality, and this project is thereby the convergence of the multiplicity of narratives that inform my own subjectivity and identity.

Let us then begin with the obvious: I am a white, Jewish, middle-class male from an upper-middle class neighborhood north of Chicago. If this were the extent of the narrative, the reader might be left with the impression that I am unconnected from any meaningful interaction with the topic of this dissertation; in other words, why would a white guy (a pair of labels which undergird the stereotypical rendering of the imperialist in the Pacific) be interested in school in Micronesia? Or perhaps the reader would move
in a slightly different direction, and focus on the connection between my citizenship and the colonial relationship between America and Micronesia. Thankfully, that is not the end of the narrative, and so these static identifiers have little bearing on either my locus of enunciation or my intellectual project; thus, turning to Riley (2000), “which self-description is to count as broadly societal, or which is to be assessed as a private quirk or an idiosyncratic characteristic, depends largely on the intensity of its potential ‘politicisation’ in play at any one moment” (p. 7). I am, in a narrow sense, a colonizer if one is to think in terms of the “potential ‘politicisation’” of my whiteness and maleness operating in a time of the so-called post-colonial. But again, this dismissal of my self-construction arises in a particular way, specifically if one is fixated on fixed categories of positionality, and “my identity (if I am forced to locate such an object at all) may turn out to be not as much a matter of what it is, but of where it is” (Riley, 2000, p. 10)—and like our contention above that the temporality of one’s locus of enunciation is concerned more with when one is than what one is, we can similarly assert that the place from which one speaks carries more import than what one is.

All of this is not to deny that I am the beneficiary of discrete operationalizations of power circulating through either American or Micronesian contexts; certainly my entry into Micronesia as a so-called “teacher” has been facilitated by the history, and continuous production of, a decidedly colonial construction of identity in the islands. Indeed, it seems odd to me to invert my own encounter with the region: I arrived in Saipan as a 22-year old college graduate, and within a week of arriving landed a job teaching high school algebra and geometry. (Fittingly, my undergraduate degree is in history and politics and government.) My only other post-college work experience had
been a stint immediately prior in South Korea teaching English (again, a subject I am woefully unequipped to teach). Taking into consideration the fact that no 22-year old Chamorro from Saipan with less than a year of work experience, let alone teaching English (or Chamorro) in South Korea, could ever show up in Winnetka, Illinois, and land a job teaching any subject at New Trier High School (my alma mater so often and appropriately disparaged for its embodiment of white advantage), I would be remiss to not acknowledge that I come from a place of privilege (whether intentionally and of my design or not).

Yet that place of privilege is compounded by an intimate association with Micronesia that would develop upon my second foray into the islands, this time in my early 30s in the Marshall Islands at the college level and by way of parenthood (my daughters’ family on their mother’s side comes from Kosrae, and they can therefore also lay claim to an island heritage). This immediate engagement with Micronesia, or at least parts of it, has profoundly impacted my locus of enunciation. Whereas while in Saipan I was relatively free to come and go as I pleased (I could, if I had wanted, leave and never return), in this place and at this point (specifically Majuro while I am writing this) I can choose to leave my residence in the islands, but I cannot leave my connection vis-à-vis my daughters. From a viewpoint of positionality, I would probably be classified as some sort of outsider-participant; but from a standpoint of the narrative of my locus of enunciation, I am now inextricably linked, personally as well as professionally, with these islands. This is not to suggest that I am somehow “going native,” nor do I claim to be “an Islander” as other foreigners living in the region repeatedly, and indelicately, refer to themselves. I will never be “Kosraean,” as that is not part of my narrative; but my
daughters are, and they are most definitely part of the ongoing construction of my narrative self.

My locus of enunciation and the place from which I currently speak are both persistently informed by my professional and intellectual narratives as well. Above I refer to myself as a “teacher” in Saipan using quotation marks; the punctuation in this case is not meant to be entirely facetious, although it is meant to convey a certain amount of doubt on the certainty of the implications of such a word. While in Saipan I was a “teacher” in the American sense: that is, I taught an American curriculum to students who, although Islanders (mostly Chamorro and Carolinian, although there were students from other Micronesian islands as well, and Japan and Korea), were for the most part all American citizens preparing to attend college in the United States. Beyond the tropes of paradisiacal island beaches, warm weather, and coconut trees, there was little I did professionally to interact at all with any kind of “Islander” orientation. Again, though, I was barely into my 20s and I was the beneficiary of the structures of power that afforded me a certain amount of undeserved privilege; concepts such as colonization and self-determination did not inform my world-view.

The notion of “teaching,” however, played a pivotal role in my next steps, as I initially left the education profession, and Saipan, and returned to the mainland US to try my hand at something a little more concrete (quite literally—I spent the next two years attempting to learn the carpentry trade by building concrete forms for commercial buildings in downtown Chicago). After my stint in “the real world,” however, I returned to the classroom both as a student and as a teacher, this time in New Mexico. My master’s degree is in the education of at-risk youth, and I spent four years teaching 8th
graders history in a fairly conventional manner. At some point I decided to try my hand at returning to the islands, this time as a “qualified” teacher (that is, with a degree and license in hand), and wound up at the College of the Marshall Islands as an instructor in the education department.

And so it was there and then, first as an education instructor, then as the chair of the education department (a title conferred upon me 72 hours after my arrival in Majuro due largely to a departmental process of self-elimination), then as an academic administrator and dean (again, positions for which I am largely unqualified in terms of the academy), during the college’s accreditation “crisis,” that I began to see things in a different light. Mignolo (1995) asserts, “the need to speak the present originates at the same time from a research program that needs to debunk, refurbish, or celebrate previous disciplinary findings, and from the subject’s nondisciplinary (gender, class, race, nation) confrontation with social urgencies” (p. 6). Thus, as the college struggled to retain its accreditation status under the auspices of the Western Association of Schools and Colleges (WASC), the regional body that oversees junior and community colleges in California, Hawai‘i, and the “American-affiliated Pacific” (a nice euphemism for largely colonial relationships between the US and American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Guam, the Marshall Islands, and Palau), I was thrust into a position to help “save” the college. (While I have elsewhere considered the effects of accreditation, suffice it to say that the college needs to remain accredited by WASC in order to retain access to US Pell grant funding which makes up a large portion of the institution’s operating budget; see Kupferman, 2008.) It was through this process of struggling to retain accreditation that I saw laid out before me
a system of colonization pervading all levels of the institution, and leaking out into the rest of the community. My question to the minister which began this chapter is but one of myriad examples that opened my eyes to the ways in which western “education,” which was presented in the islands as somehow universal, non-contingent, and normalized, and in which I had a professional degree and years of experience (to say nothing of the fact that I was raised in the context of such a system), actively worked, and continues to work, to displace and marginalize local conceptions of education, self-determination, and social sustainability.

My locus of enunciation, then, is largely constructed from a self-narrative of dispersal, rather than unification. There is any number of elements, personal, professional, intellectual, which inform from where and when I speak. There are no solidarities or certitudes of origin or perspective that inform so much of conventional positionality. As Spivak (1990) says, “I can’t fully construct a position that is different from the one I am in” (p. 68); indeed, I am not an insider, outsider, or insider-outsider, because I am not in any of those positions. As complex (and perhaps disappointing to some) as this assertion is, the fact of the matter is that I am neither a colonizer nor the colonized (nor anything in between, if such a space is possible). Rather, I am speaking in a time of postcolonial discourse to professional circumstances that are influenced daily by my most personal of interactions. This locus of enunciation, this space-time from which I speak, is effected by my own narrative as well as that of the islands in which I live and work; in turn, my intellectual project is both a product of and productive of those narratives. In short, what I say in this dissertation is dependent upon where and when I am writing from. To attempt to insinuate some other agenda or some other narrative, or to
attempt to enclose my argument in terms of the binaries of positionality, ignores the magnitude of the spatial and temporal aspects of my locus of enunciation, and consequently ignores both the narrator and the narrative.

_Inconvenient Implications: “The Intellectual” and the University_

One’s locus of enunciation, it should be apparent by now, is not intended to provide an outline of personal and intellectual consistency or solidity, nor is the act of describing it meant to confer upon it any sort of infallibility; indeed, quite the opposite is true, as the more one considers her/his locus of enunciation, the clearer it becomes just how complex and constantly shifting it is. As such, the locus of the intellectual is, on the surface at least, always at odds with the very institutional structures of power that allow one to lay claim to the descriptor of “intellectual”; in other words, how does one reconcile engaging in a critique of the very institution that not only produces that individual but sustains and develops her/him? Here I am speaking of my relationship with American-style higher education, within which I am at least doubly implicated: first, as a graduate student at the University of Hawai‘i–Mānoa who is writing this dissertation in order to complete a doctorate, and second as an employee (at the time of this writing) of the College of the Marshall Islands (CMI).

To the first implication, that of my graduate studies, I can justify the impact of my engagement with the university as a student through a recognition of its temporary temporality: the time I have left to call myself a graduate student or PhD candidate is (hopefully) limited, and one that will likely not influence my locus of enunciation beyond the completion of the writing of this dissertation. The second implication, that of employment at an institution of higher education, is much trickier, since teaching at the
tertiary level of western schooling is, for better or worse (or until I think of a better idea), my “chosen” profession, and is something that I intend to do intentionally for the foreseeable future; it is therefore fair to say that my interaction with the College of the Marshall Islands has far more impact on my locus of enunciation than, say, my passing time as a student at the University of Hawai‘i.

The relationship of the university to the intellectual is certainly one that has vexed poststructuralists, working in the same milieu, at least enough to consider the implications of being so implicated. Foucault (1977), speaking about the role of the intellectual within the university, and that of the university on the intellectual, in the aftermath of the student riots in France in 1968, admits “It has always been a problem for someone like me, someone who has been teaching for a long time, to decide if I should act outside or inside the university” (p. 223). He then proceeds to follow up his point with a series of questions, none of which he answers. Elsewhere, Spivak (1990) speaks of “safety in locating myself completely within my workplace” (p. 3), and later goes on to suggest, “I don’t think there is an extra-institutional space” (p. 5). For my part, I am initially unsatisfied with either approach, hoping as I do for some statement of clarity with which I can shine a light upon my own locus in this context: it seems insufficient to name the problem, as Foucault does, and at least as problematic to embrace institutional space as somehow all-encompassing, as Spivak suggests.

Upon greater deliberation, however, I simultaneously acknowledge the importance of both stances while desiring to go further. My purpose here is informed perhaps most importantly by a third implication acting upon my locus of enunciation, professionally as well as ethically, in that I currently hold a curious, if not suspect, title at
CMI: coordinator of Marshallese Studies. I say curious (and suspect) because, firstly, I do not hold any sort of degree or qualification in the field of Marshallese Studies (we will put aside for a moment that no such area credential exists anywhere); and secondly, because, in the absence of such a qualification, I am not (even) Marshallese. As a matter of fact, I was offered the position as a compromise to my return to CMI after a two-year hiatus to complete my PhD coursework at the University of Hawai‘i—I left CMI in August of 2007 after having spent two years as the academic dean (a position I held for reasons which we dare not digress into here), and, having no interest in returning to mid-level management or to the obvious complicity of institutional power structures embodied in administration, I opted for a faculty position. Yet, with no regular faculty positions vacant, and at the urging of the accrediting commission (more on this in Chapter 3), the president of CMI at the time (himself not Marshallese either) by fiat created my current post; his justification of appointing me as the Marshallese Studies coordinator was summed up in his mistaken assumption that I was earning a PhD in Pacific Islands Studies (in fact, I will complete the requirements to earn a certificate in Pacific Islands Studies upon the completion of this dissertation)—and once again, we will put aside the problematic yet non-essential digression of why it was that the college had partially invested in my pursuit of a doctorate without clarifying what field it is I am studying (for the record, it is educational foundations).

Be that as it may, it is this third implication of serving as coordinator that most troubles me, since it is the professional posting which I now inhabit and that which most directly affects my locus of enunciation. How exactly do I serve as coordinator of a non-existent field within an institutional structure that quite obviously models itself on a
colonial exemplar of tertiary schooling in an age of the postcolonial? It perhaps goes without saying that there is no self-evident answer to this question. Regardless, such interrogation is necessary to not only name my locus of enunciation, but also to privilege it as the starting (and ever-present) point of my orientation personally, professionally, and intellectually.

It is here that I am able to return to the contentions of Foucault and Spivak above. The act of naming the problem for the intellectual—that is, working inside or outside the institution—is primary for Foucault (1977), as “The university stands for the institutional apparatus through which society ensures its uneventful reproduction, at the least cost to itself” (p. 224). In this way, the tertiary school offers the technology with which particular knowledges are normalized and legitimized, at the expense of those knowledges which are in turn displaced, ignored, or erased by this “uneventful reproduction”; and it is therefore incumbent upon the intellectual to recognize that “it isn’t enough to suppress or overturn the university. Other forms of repression must also be attacked” (Foucault, 1977, p. 224). Likewise, Spivak (1990) remarks, “the whole de-glamourised inside [italics added] of the institution defines our stepping beyond this [the institution]” (p. 5). It is from within the institutional structures of power that one finds the most resistance, and it is there that, remembering Spivak’s earlier comments, she finds herself most comfortable.

Thus, I am able to name what troubles me (my current professional title) and also to acknowledge my role within that troubling (as an employee of an American-accredited tertiary institution in a non-western context)—and in doing so confess to and privilege my own locus of enunciation in that role, at this time, and at the time of this writing. It is
armed with such an awareness—although by no means with a concurrent clarity of purpose or ability to rationalize away my own complicity—that I write, in Foucault’s term, to attack the university (or in my case the college) and the structures of power that operate through it and offer the most resistance. Accordingly, professionally I have taken my dubious title to mean that I should act to uncover what has been displaced, ignored, and erased by the privileging of western knowledges at CMI, and in turn work to begin the process of privileging and normalizing those sublimated Marshallese knowledges; and in turn I simultaneously name my locus of enunciation, as much for myself as for the reader, in order to better render the complexities of the narrative I am constructing of both myself and my project in this dissertation.

An Imagined Non-Entity: Deforming and Reforming Our “Sea of Little Lands”

At this point it is appropriate to take a moment to consider the implications of my proposed set of methodologies, arising from what is popularly categorized as “poststructuralism” (although not by those who are most intimately linked to it as a “school” of philosophy), in dealing with a topic such as schooling in Micronesia. In terms of educational research, according to Peters and Burbules (2004), “poststructuralism has had difficulty making theoretical inroads, especially in education, where currency and ‘relevance’ are often elevated over purely intellectual exploration for its own sake, and where the good intentions behind educational institutions and practices are taken for granted” (p. 4). In the field of Pacific Studies in general, it seems, the notions of “theory” and theorizing the everyday experiences of a historically put-upon region are largely warned against, if not entirely dismissed, on a variety of grounds; in works on the Micronesian region the use of poststructural (or for that matter any) philosophy is
haphazard and inconsistent at best. To date there has been no penetrating analysis to help elucidate the lack of theorizing in this way, and while I consider the following merely to be an initial foray into the subject and by no means exhaustive or the last word, it is at least a start. And for the purposes of this work, it is a necessary first step in building a bridge that allows us to traverse the varied terrains of both philosophy and what could be called Micronesian Studies, so that we might consider new ways of integrating these fields rather than treating them as inherently antagonistic.

To begin, then, we should remember our foregoing discussion on the reasons for and limits of binaries of positionality in (descriptively) postcolonial works in Pacific Studies. In an age of intellectual and academic decolonization, one of the criticisms of the use of western philosophy and theory is that they are, by definition, western, and therefore have little to offer in the way of analyses of island paradigms. Hereniko (2000) cautions “many scholars tend to use theories that have originated in the West to understand the unfamiliar….Theory, in such instances, becomes an intellectual game that has little bearing on the realities of the native lifestyles” (p. 88). In response, it seems, Spivak (1990) takes an historical approach to the use of western theory in postcolonial studies: “To construct indigenous theories one must ignore the last few centuries of historical involvement. I would rather use what history has written for me” (p. 69).

Indeed, while taking a course on indigenous approaches to education, I brought up the work of Foucault and Derrida as helpful frames through which to consider discursive analyses and issues of power. I was told by fellow students that the use of such theorists was inappropriate in the context of the class because Foucault and Derrida were both French. Tracing the motives for such a conclusion, one can make the argument that it is
not unreasonable, in a time of the so-called postcolonial, to want to distance oneself from what are, on the surface at least, foreign conceptions for understanding the world, rather than drawing on indigenous models (if such things exist uncontaminated by the history of colonization). However, in light of the limits of such an approach, stemming from the shift in binaries of power and positionality, to dismiss the myriad tools and resources offered by what, for example, Foucault and Derrida, among others, bring to the discussion is to discount the ideas and the frames of poststructuralism on the very grounds used to dismiss local knowledges in a prior age of colonization; that is, such an argument amounts to a criticism that there is something essentially French (and therefore non-indigenous) about these particular thinkers, which in turn reinforces structures of “otherness” that so-called decolonization aims to subvert.

Recalling Spivak’s assertion above, Loomba (2005) notes that “the pre-colonial is always reworked by the history of colonialism, and is not available to us in any pristine form that can be neatly separated from the history of colonialism” (p. 21); such an act also requires denying the historical influence of colonization in the development of what we might today call “indigenous theory.” In another way, Teaiwa (2001) laments the want of the development of “indigenous theory” in Pacific Studies, but she is careful not to dismiss philosophical conceptualizations available through non-Pacific theories; theory for Teaiwa has the ability to both loosen the boundaries of conceptualizing Pacific studies, while at the same time losing an audience of Pacific readers. As Teaiwa puts it, theory can “lo(o)se” Pacific studies; thus here it is my intention to employ poststructural tools in order to open up a variety of possible ways to probe the topic of schooling in
Micronesia, while at the same time being careful not to alienate the audience to which this work is primarily addressed.

Broadening our scope for a moment, it is not difficult to find successful examples of the application of poststructural philosophies, beginning with the work of Said (1978), whose own ideas have found great traction in much of Pacific Studies. Early in his seminal text *Orientalism*, he writes “I have found it useful here to employ Michel Foucault’s notion of a discourse, as described by him in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* and in *Discipline and Punish*, to identify Orientalism” (p. 3). If we look specifically in Hawaiian studies (although I am using that term rather loosely here, and perhaps mean to suggest looking at those scholars working within the framework of a Hawaiian context), we see that such “western” theory is utilized rather prominently, and largely without apology for its geo-political origins. The early work of Kaomea (2003; 2005) takes on poststructural conceptualizations of the meanings of such Hawaiian “traditions” as May Day and the use of *kupuna* (elders) in the classroom by drawing heavily on the literary deconstruction work of Derrida and Foucault’s power analytics. Employing social semiotics as well as discursive analysis, Tavares (2003) “reads” the multiple meanings of Polynesian Barbie as they relate to larger issues of representation and their effects on Hawai‘i in the social imaginary. In a departure from the use of relatively abstract European theoreticians, Meyer (2003) even draws on the work of John Dewey to explore avenues through which to conceptualize customary Hawaiian epistemologies in a present-day context. In these examples and others, the national origins of the individuals who developed these philosophical approaches matters less than the ways in which their ideas are utilized to inform and expand the arguments of the academics who employ them.
Within the writings on Micronesia, however, there is a decidedly mixed, and less effective, use of poststructuralism, although the trend has shown recent signs of turning in a more constructive direction; to be sure, it is my unambiguous intention with this project to offer a potential model for the integration of emerging poststructural approaches with analyses of what it is we mean by Micronesia. It therefore seems useful to consider those rare instances in which we encounter specifically the work (or at least the name) of Foucault. In an early essay, Hanlon (1989) reports on the challenges of writing Micronesian histories from more than a western, or even more limited American, colonial perspective, briefly invoking Foucault. Later, in his book *Remaking Micronesia: Discourses over Development in a Pacific Territory, 1944-1982*, Hanlon (1998) offers a limited number of references to Foucault’s conception of discursive practices as an analytical tool with which to consider the ways in which power operates through western definitions and practices of so-called “development.” However, while Hanlon’s book is admittedly not one intended for a reading audience of philosophers, there seems to be a hesitation here to fully embrace the potential lens through which one could approach political and economic issues of “development” and colonization if one were to follow the thread of a Foucaultian power-knowledge circuit analysis. Ironically, in a review of the book, Marshall (1999) takes Hanlon to task for over-theorizing his argument:

One comes away from reading this book feeling rhetorically bludgeoned by ‘in’ language. Words such as hegemony (and hegemonizer!), hybridity, gaze, domination, resistance, subaltern, exploitation, entangled, polyvocality, representations, and the like are repeated so frequently that they interfere with Hanlon’s valuable critical historical observations. (p. 479)
While this may be a case of an author’s intentions being lost in translation, as Marshall himself is an anthropologist, not a philosopher, and as such expected something different from Hanlon’s methodological approach, it speaks volumes about the challenge of articulating issues in Micronesia through an unfamiliar (and in this case poststructural) lens. One wonders how Marshall would react to the present work.

More recently, Hattori (2004) has similarly offered Foucault in passing, but without any deeper reading or application of his work specifically in the ways in which power operates at the micro-level of the individual body through health systems in the west. In her analysis of an interview with a Chamorro on Guam regarding his experience as a child during the hookworm eradication campaign undertaken by the administering US Naval authority in the first half of the twentieth century, she writes “His recollections reveal a degree of intrusiveness unforeseen even by Foucault and others in their theorizations of state intervention and surveillance” (p. 180). Again, like the examples above, there is no further consideration of this statement; this convention of simply mentioning Foucault appears problematic if for no other reason than it fails to address the great body of work that he left behind specifically addressing the ways in which governmentality and the operationalization of power at the level of the body circulate.

Conversely, in his master’s thesis and later doctoral dissertation, both of which are breakthroughs of sorts in the use of theory, and specifically poststructural approaches, in writings on Micronesia, Dvorak (2004; 2007) draws rather considerably on Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) conception of rhizomatic connections in order to first frame the metaphor of coral reefs as one immense network spanning the floor of the Pacific Ocean, and then utilizes that metaphor to explore issues of belonging, “home,” and the
interconnectedness of such disparate sites as Kwajalein (in the Marshall Islands), the US east coast, and Japan. Indeed, in his master’s thesis Dvorak is able to employ a discursive analysis that rather exhaustively traces the operationalization of colonial power through a multi-layered reading of the Kwajalein phone book. Alternatively, I have attempted to consider the effects of the varieties of conventionally stereotypical representations of “Micronesia” and its Islanders on film through an application of both Deleuze’s (1986) cinematic analysis as well as Nietzsche’s (1874/1997) conception of the uses (and abuses) of critical historical methods in the service of the will to power (Kupferman, 2011). Drawing also on Said (1978), I make the case that the burgeoning “minor cinema” (Deleuze’s term) especially emerging in the Marshall Islands is opening up new notions of cinematic discourse and self-representation that run counter to those supplied by typical Hollywood fare.

Perhaps most importantly, what such effective poststructural approaches open up for us are the myriad ways in which we can unpack the various complexities surrounding seemingly every issue related to the region known as Micronesia (not the least of which, as we shall see, is that of formal schooling). Here let us take a brief look at what one might consider the most fundamental issue in the region, that of “Micronesia” itself. Since before the end of World War II, the bulk of scholarship conducted on, in, and in relation to the region belongs to the field of anthropology. What has emerged, most recently evidenced by the voluminous collection of essays edited by Kiste and Marshall (1999), is a body of work that tends to treat the concept of “Micronesia” as a conveniently fixed, essentialized geographic body marked by internal diversity that is simultaneously contained by unified elements; in other words, Micronesia, despite its
colonial and racial constructions, somehow exists as a conventional, objective “truth,” one that allows for anthropological variety and unity at the same time.

Taking issue with this view, Hanlon (1989; 1998; 2006; 2009) has consistently and effectively espoused an alternate perspective, reminding his audience of the specious origins, and more importantly the application, of the term “Micronesia.” Referring to “the region known as Micronesia” as a non-entity, Hanlon has repeatedly made the case that Micronesia as it is popularly construed is anything but self-evident; that is, the referent “Micronesia” in fact belies, and is colored with, a very particular colonial history, one that says more about the colonizing regimes than about the islands or Islanders themselves. For their part, Rainbird (2003) and Tcherkézoff (2003), in a special issue of The Journal of Pacific History, rather dutifully outline the ways in which “Micronesia” has been constructed and subjectivized either as absence (Rainbird) or as racial outlier (Tcherkézoff), filling in the empty space on European maps of the Pacific not classified as either “Polynesian” or “Melanesian.” In either case, from this counter-perspective, “Micronesia has existed only in the minds of people from the outside who have sought to create an administrative entity for purposes of control and rule” (Hanlon, 1989, p. 1).

More recently, Petersen (2009) has taken issue with both Hanlon and Rainbird and argued for a more conventional essentializing, universalistic approach to what he terms “traditional” Micronesian societies. While making this case, however, Petersen succumbs to a confused analysis, wherein he first states “all culture areas or regions are intellectual, rather than naturally occurring, categories,” but contradicts this thread by later arguing “The relevant questions are whether these categories are purely mental constructs or whether they in some measure reflect reality” (p. 15). The implication
seems to be that constructing groups such as “Micronesians” from ethnographic and anthropological perspectives is indeed a construct of some form of discourse and/or practice, but that these constructions betray something underneath that is fundamental, essential, and evocative of some sort of “true” reality. What is vital here is Petersen’s suggestion that “We must remember that we are talking about real people, real places, and real behaviors. The ways we group them together and the distinctions we make among them, however, are no more than perspectives we impose upon them” (p. 15). It is unfortunate, then, that Petersen seems willing to dismiss the very real consequences of constructions of Micronesia (which almost always reflect some underlying colonizing agenda) by maintaining that such constructions belie an ontological objectivity embedded in the term “Micronesia.”

But let us return to our proposition alluded to above: what is it that theory can do for the question that is “Micronesia”? Elsewhere I have suggested treating Micronesia as a text (Kupferman, 2011), one in which, through a Derridean analysis, we can determine the “rules of its game” (Derrida, 1981a). While I have been criticized for this approach as seeming to marginalize the daily realities of Islanders in the region known as Micronesia, the intent is not to reduce “Micronesia” to a verbal text. Rather, from a Derridean perspective the notion of the text that is Micronesia is one that is, historically at least, intentionally produced by specific language; in this way, “Micronesia” acts, as Spivak (1990) explains, as a paleonym, or “the charge which words carry on their shoulders” (p. 25). In an examination of VS Naipaul’s memories of learning to read the botanical origins of jasmine, a plant endemic to his native West Indies, through British texts, Vizenor (1994) reminds us “the colonial inheritance, however, is the recourse of the
word, not the scent of jasmine; the word is a shadow not the closure of remembrance” (p. 66). Approaching “Micronesia” in this way therefore opens up a space in which to consider the ways the label serves as “a network, a weave” (Spivak, 1990, p. 25) and more than merely a verbal text.

Yet another possible approach to exploring the concept of “Micronesia,” and one that I argue will yield the most fruitful results for our present task, is through the lens of Deleuze’s notion of “deformation.” Here I draw upon Shapiro’s (2006) use of “deforming” political thought, in which he writes that Deleuze, in his investigation of the construction of the art of Francis Bacon, “notes that it is wrong to assume that the artist ‘works on a white surface’” (p. 36). Instead, Deleuze contends that “everything he has in his head, or around him is already in the canvas, more or less virtually, more or less actually, before he begins his work” (Deleuze, 2003, p. 71), and that “the artist must ‘transform’ or ‘deform’ what is ‘always-already on the canvass’” (Shapiro, 2006, p. 36).

In other words, taking a cue from Hanlon’s caution against essentializing a non-entity and observing the conventional approaches taken to treating Micronesia as a self-evident geo-body by anthropologists and other social scientists, we see that “Micronesia” rather unfailingly serves as a convenient canvas upon which to reinscribe structures of colonization. Jolly (2007) remarks, “The meanings of the words [Micronesia, Melanesia, Polynesia] have shifted, but the way in which ethnic differences are connected with geographic location and with political and moral cartographies is more constant” (p. 516). Our responsibility here, then, is to “deform” those constant cartographies, and consider what “Micronesia” could be once we decide to transform, and reform, its canvas.
Arguably the most influential incidence of deforming the Pacific came in Epeli Hau’ofa’s (1994) essay “Our Sea of Islands,” a call to invert western development perspectives of the region. Here Hau’ofa makes the case for a deformed point of view through which to consider the Pacific not as a scattering of remote islands strewn across a vast and empty ocean, but rather as a sea of interconnected islands that comprise a sweeping space known as Oceania. Applied to Micronesia, this approach seems particularly potent, as the islands and people in that region have been consistently relegated to smallness, and by extension insignificance, in the popular imaginary; even the term “Micronesia” is a derivative of Latin meaning “small islands.” Indeed, one need not look too far to see examples of Micronesia’s triviality: taking perhaps a more poetic example, in their historical fiction novel about the life and times of David Dean O’Keefe on Yap, Klingman and Green (1950) note how the “islands known as Micronesia were scattered like crumbs on a tablecloth” (p. 19). In his prominent and widely read colonial history of the islands, Hezel (1995) reaffirms Micronesia’s diminutive stature in the western historical imaginary by beginning his preface with a reminder that

To westerners over the centuries, the tiny islands of the Carolines and Marshalls, lying across the western Pacific a little north of the equator, have always been a stopover on the way to somewhere else. These bits of land were scarcely more than navigational hazards to early European and American voyagers bound for the Orient. (p. xiii)

Hanlon (2009), in an argument that maintains his earlier assertions that “Micronesia” is little more than a colonial construct, goes so far as to co-opt a descriptive phrase from the turn of the twentieth-century anthropologist F.W. Christian in observing that “Christian’s
phrase ‘sea of little lands’ captured all of the prejudice with which Micronesia has come to be regarded” (p. 95). One is hard pressed to find references to the region, its islands and inhabitants as more than “little,” a “stopover,” or even “breadcrumbs.”

Yet if we were to employ a deforming, that is, poststructural, lens with which to view the islands, we might notice the ways in which the region *could* be conceived, deformed, and reformed. As an example, I offer the Marshallese conception of cartography. Through a typical and conventional rendering of the Marshall Islands on a “map” (as it is defined in western geographic science), we would see that the islands are rather disparately removed from one another, lying in roughly two semi-vertical lines that run more or less parallel to each other. In a field of blue ocean the various atolls are rendered as small, almost meaningless dots on the map, scarcely as prominent as the printing that spells out their names (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. A western map of the Marshall Islands. Copyright 2005 by the Center for Pacific Islands Studies, University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. Reprinted with permission.
In this version, the islands are indeed small and disconnected, not unlike Klingman and Green’s “breadcrumbs.” However, a deformed visual description might look something like a Marshallese rebellib, wapepe, or other navigation chart (commonly referred to as a stick chart) (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Marshallese maps of the Marshall Islands. Photograph by the author.

Here the atolls and islands, represented by cowrie shells, are all interconnected by the wave patterns (the sticks); in this way, the ocean is not overwhelming and it does not swallow up the tiny islands—rather, the ocean is simply the highway, and the wave currents are the paths on which to travel from point to point. Seen from this deformed perspective, and taking a cue from Hau’ofa, we might conclude that the Marshall Islands (and by extension “Micronesia”) is not small, bounded by its landmasses, but rather huge, a vast territory of water connecting the various points. A western map reminds us how large the ocean is, but it discounts the ocean as part of the territorialization of the islands. A rebellib, on the other hand, shows us how integral the ocean is to the conception of
what we call “the Marshall Islands,” and just how fluid concepts such as boundaries, especially boundaries of water, really are.

Or yet another type of conceptual deformation of “Micronesia” emerges from the notion of Anderson’s (1983) “imagined communities,” in which nations and nationhood are found to be no more real or essential than any other type of social or geo-political construction. If one briefly considers the national formation of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), one quickly sees that its four states, Chuuk, Kosrae, Pohnpei, and Yap, are what was left over from the original American colonial construct of Micronesia (which, as the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, also included the Marshalls, Palau, and Saipan). Indeed, one could go so far as to argue that the notion of nationhood for the FSM borders on parody, as the state of Kosrae, which was originally appended to Pohnpei State, somehow “became” a fully fledged state on January 1, 1977, in order to comply with the constitutional requirement of four voting member states needed to keep the Congress of Micronesia active. Yet what is most compelling about Anderson’s imagined communities is not whether there is anything essential or original about them, but rather their productive qualities. As Anderson puts it, “Communities are to be distinguished not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined” (p. 6). Applied to the nations of Micronesia, and the region as a whole, we should concern ourselves not with how they are constructed as remnants of colonization or as real or false communities, but rather what Micronesia could be, in a deformed rendering. To take both Hanlon and Anderson one step further, then, I argue that, for the purposes of our discussion here, it might be instructive to consider “Micronesia” as an “imagined non-entity,” one that we approach not as a blank canvas nor as “little lands,”
but rather, in the manner of Deleuze, as an opportunity to deform what we bring to the canvas. In short, we are not interested in what Micronesia is, but rather what it can mean, and what meaning we bring to the process of ultimately deforming, and reforming, what it is we intend when we refer to “Micronesia.”

It is important to conclude this idea, it seems, by reiterating the productive qualities and possibilities afforded to studies of Micronesia through theoretical, and specifically poststructural, lenses. These types of approaches, it should be noted, are not intended to ignore or elide the real, physical, and often times disruptive consequences for the Islanders and the islands which have had colonial, and other, constructions imposed upon them. Instead, it is my contention that a poststructural, deforming perspective will in fact allow us to consider these concrete consequences of colonization and imposition in new ways; ways that, perhaps to readers such as Marshall (1999) and others who dismiss theory and “in” language as inapplicable or even inappropriate to the subject of Micronesia, may initially be off-putting— but ways that open up opportunities for thinking of and considering those elements of contemporary Micronesian societies taken as “natural” or “normal” and revealing the forces operating through them. Indeed, while the language I employ may be specialized, it is not meant to be inaccessible; quite the opposite, it is my hope to allow the reader to encounter such language with facility, and not as an obstruction to meaning. As Baudrillard (1987) reminds us, “Discourse is discourse, but the operations, strategies, and schemes played out there are real” (p. 15). Thus, our discussion necessarily focuses on schooling, and while I do not intend to relegate “Micronesia” to a clever language-game, I do intend to employ poststructural approaches in order to disassemble schooling’s very real, physical, and often times
disruptive effects on those residents of what might be termed “Micronesia,” not in order to reinforce colonial constructions but rather to consider (both deformed and reformed) alternatives.

Power-Knowledge-Subject

Let us now turn to the approach that undergirds the rest of this dissertation, a poststructural (and specifically Foucaultian) conception of power and the power-knowledge-subject circuit. Here it might be helpful to begin with a consideration of more conventional understandings of power and their applications. In an essay lamenting the influence of international development aid on Pacific Island schools, Nabobo (2002) compares the fate of pre-contact island education and modern-day island states:

The external factors of colonialism, neo-colonialism and today of globalization have removed the absolute control the indigenous people once held over all aspects of their life. The same is true of states; they exist much like powerless pawns in a game they are not in control of. (p. 38)

Putting aside the reductive historical dualism employed in the above passage, it seems reasonable to ask what Nabobo means by “absolute control” that was “held” by Islanders, and how was it “removed”; we might simultaneously question what it means for a geopolitical state to be “powerless.” Indeed, of all the concepts swirling around issues of schooling, education, decolonization, postcoloniality, so-called development, and political and ethical self-determination, perhaps the most contentious and diversely interpreted is that of power.

To treat power as something to “hold,” and potentially to have “removed,” reveals a particular rendering of the essence and uses of power, one that is popularly employed in
academic writings on schooling and education in the Pacific and beyond. Conversely, notions of “powerlessness” are also pervasive, and are evident in the scholarship on processes of decolonization as they generally relate to colonizer and colonized, or dominator and dominated. While these are widely held understandings of power, and they make sense in the context of a temporally post-colonial period, it is my contention that another conception of power, specifically one that treats power not as a thing but rather as a network of relations, offers to open up possible analyses of problematics such as schooling in the Pacific in ways that not only de-center and deform fundamental assumptions of how power operates and what its effects are but also allows us to consider alternative conditions of possibility (and postcoloniality).

To begin, then, it seems appropriate to briefly explore more conventional, influential, and widely accepted definitions of power. In his useful analysis of various interpretations of power, Tanabe (1998) offers worthwhile definitions and distinctions between classical, liberal paternalistic, and social power paradigms. In the classical view of western philosophy, going back to Plato and taken up by John Locke and John Stuart Mill, power is framed by considerations of parent-child and family-state relations. For our purposes it is helpful to note that power as a “thing,” generally exercised as some form of control “over” someone, is assumed; the question of what power means is secondary to considerations of who or what has the “right” to it. For their part, those espousing liberal paternalistic readings of power, while paying closer attention to the meaning of power, also assume its utility as some form of control, specifically of teachers over students. Here, in its applications in education, this version of power concludes that a teacher exercises power as both “in authority” and “an authority”; that is, a classroom
teacher has the “power” to discipline students (acting “in authority”), as well as direct students’ intellectual development (acting as “an authority”). In this way power is legitimated by a combination of a teacher’s position of authority within the hierarchy of school along with her/his academic expertise; the fundamental contradiction in this interpretation, however, is that in order to teach students to be “free” a teacher must curtail their freedoms through the exercise of authority. In his explication of social power, Tanabe makes the case that power in this sense operates more widely than simply through the exercise of political power. Social power exists in economic, political, social, and familial relations, and can be classified as “power-to” and “power-over,” in which “power-to” refers to a situation in which one who has power has the capacity to effect someone or thing, regardless of whether a change actually takes place, while “power-over” connotes an action (or potential action) which results in the ability of one to control another, typically in the mode of a social hierarchy.

What one comes away with from this reading of various modes of power is that “power” as it is conceptualized here is negative and coercive, and as in the case of “power-over” the intention is to benefit the one who has power, rather than the one being acted upon. This approach to the nature and exercise of power is also characteristic of the sovereignty model, in which power as a “thing” is exercised by the sovereign, who is widely accepted as “holding” power. Foucault (1980) describes this sovereignty model as “an essentially negative power, presupposing on the one hand a sovereign whose role is to forbid and on the other a subject who must somehow effectively say yes to this prohibition” (p. 140). Accordingly, as Popkewitz (1999) describes, “Power as sovereignty often creates a dichotomous world in which there are the oppressor and oppressed, thus
producing a dualism whose effect is to define particular social groups as unified entities” (p. 6). In the case of a decolonizing Pacific, the influence of the sovereignty model makes historical sense, as the binary of colonizer/colonized was supposedly overturned in the wake of political “independence” movements. Indeed, as the political reigns of “power” were handed over from the colonizers to the now-formerly colonized, this dualism of who “has” power was inverted: Islanders were now seen as “having power” whereas during the colonial period they were “powerless.”

One of the limits of such an approach to conceptualizing power, however, is the conclusion that a shift in the exercise of political power equates to a shift in the exercise of social power; here Tanabe’s (1998) definition of social power as existing in a variety of contextual and institutional milieux beyond the political is borne out. Political decolonization, therefore, has not directly translated as social or intellectual decolonization. Yet the sovereignty model of power persists and is widely used to explain the current state of political, social, and economic affairs of the so-called postcolonial Pacific. In regards to education and schooling in the region specifically, perhaps the most apparent manifestation of the sovereignty model is evidenced by Bishop and Glynn’s (1999) study of power relations between Māori students and western forms of schooling in New Zealand. Here, the authors offer a traditional reading of the development of power in New Zealand, from the time of the Treaty of Waitangi (which established British governance over the islands and people) in 1840 forward, in terms of domination and subordination. Since New Zealand is not politically a postcolonial state, in that the colonial ruling class (the non-Māori of western descent) still controls much of the state apparatus, Bishop and Glynn argue that school is the site through which the binary of
power can be inverted or overturned, and culture is the vehicle through which power will be “returned” to the Māori. In this way they propose to develop a “power-sharing” paradigm between teachers and students, and between Māori culture and the influence of western values evident in the social context of New Zealand.

Elsewhere, Heine (2002) addresses issues of school “reform” in the Marshall Islands using a similar model of power as Bishop and Glynn. In this case, while schools are admittedly an imported institution, the Marshallese are advised to “reclaim ownership of their schools” (p. 89) in order to control the values that are transmitted through them. (It is interesting to note that Heine uses the word “reclaim,” which describes a process that assumes formal schooling as a somehow indigenous idea and practice, a notion antithetical to her initial assumptions of school as a foreign imposition.) What is of note in such examples as these is the way in which power is conceptualized and applied: as a “thing” to “have” or “own,” and one that needs to be “reclaimed” by certain groups through a binary of oppositions in an age of political decolonization. Additionally, and perhaps more limiting, is the evaluative nature of this approach to power; that is, power is “bad” when colonizers “possess” it, but “good” when Islanders do. Such an understanding of power, while on the surface seems to point out a rather obvious state of affairs in sites of contested political decolonization, also serves to curb what I argue could be more encompassing, and more important, questions about how power operates.

Thus, the current use of the sovereignty model allows scholars to point out the ways in which colonizing values and practices play out in schools in the Pacific, and the solution is therefore to “gain” power by inserting indigenous cultural values and practices into the curriculum and classroom. But such a conclusion seems to miss a more obvious
problematic: why have schools, as they are currently configured, in the first place? Why force culture to fit into an admittedly foreign institution and assume that indigenous groups will suddenly “have” power? What else is at work in cultural applications to western institutions? What conditions allow (and in some cases demand) school to persist, even after the binary of power has been inverted through a process of decolonization?

Relational Power and Foucault

In order to answer these types of questions, it seems necessary to employ a theory of power that moves beyond the limits of the sovereignty model. At this point I draw on Foucault’s conception of power first and foremost as relational and dispersed over a limitless field of micro-capillary sites and locations. Such a conception allows us to consider the effects of power and how it is exercised, rather than worrying about who or what “has” power. In this way, too, power is not a thing with corporeal characteristics embedded in a sovereign figure or a political or social class, but rather it is a network of relations that emerge through particular discursive habits and practices; as Foucault (1978) argues, “Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere” (p. 93). Thus, we are interested not in power’s essence or origin, but in how it is practiced and what the effects of those practices are.

One of the criticisms of this view of power is that if power is relational and operates through habits and practices of discourses and institutions, then it therefore severs the exercise of power from any agent or agency (see Connolly, 1984, for arguments both critical and supportive of this definition of “agentless” power). However, there is a fundamental flaw in this criticism, which assumes that for power to operate it
must do so through agents and therefore must be “held” as a possession by someone or object. Here we should recall our earlier discussion of the definitions and constraints of the sovereignty model; but the important question in Foucault’s model is not “who holds power” but “how is it operationalized”? For Foucault (1994), power does not rest in agents, but rather is constructive of subjects; that is, the subject (or agent) does not pre-date (or “own”) particular power relations, but is the product of them. Thus for my purposes I am not so concerned with power as “agentless” or denying agency any more than I am interested in which individual or entity power does or does not lie. In Deleuze’s (1988) words, “Power has no essence; it is simply operational. It is not an attribute but a relation” (p. 27). The key to this view of power has less to do with who or what exercises power than how power is exercised.

A final elementary characteristic of this view of power is that power is productive, rather than simply repressive or coercive (or, for that matter, agentless). In this way, power produces what constitutes knowledge and operates through a power-knowledge circuit, in which particular conditions of possibility are constructed, and by implication other conditions of possibility are foreclosed on or displaced. This particular exercise of power, mentioned above, is also constitutive of subjectivities, working not only through discursive and institutional practices but also through individual bodies and habits of the self as well (Gore, 1993; Levitt, 2008). One of the consequences of this production of particular knowledges is a normalization of habits and practices, both discursive and non-discursive, in which components of the social context are taken as normal parts of everyday life and therefore cease to be contingent or contested spaces (Shapiro, 1992). A brief example of this normalization process, mentioned above, is what has happened (and
continuously happens) with school in the Pacific; that is, while school and schooling are rather recent phenomena as technologies of colonization, the fundamental assumptions about school’s place in contemporary Pacific society remain undisturbed. The criticisms of school revolve around the delivery of instruction as it relates to cultural appropriateness, not the mechanism of school itself. (We will return to this idea in greater detail below.) Yet I argue that this productive quality of power is not static or immovable: certainly if power operates in one particular direction, it can operate in any myriad number of other directions. Similarly, if power can produce a particular set of knowledges that foreclose on others, then it can likewise be exercised in a redirected way to produce other sets of knowledges. The significance of this view of power is not to treat power as a coercive “thing” that resides “in the hands of” individuals, institutions, geopolitical bodies or socio-economic classes, but rather as a set of relations operating on a micro-scale that produce both knowledges and bodies. Power here is an exercise, rather than an essentialized commodity: “power is something that functions” (Baudrillard, 1987, p. 42).

*Production and Normalization*

The point of entry for conceptualizing the proposed analytic of power is in its productive qualities. This reading of power not only allows us to move beyond the dualism of possession and coercion for, as Dean (1994) writes, “Power is to be thought in its positive existence, and as productive of forces, relations, and identities, rather than as a manifest in interdiction and operating by repression and deduction” (p. 156); this approach to power as productive importantly discloses the conditions through which we might begin to problematize those constructions of social practices that appear at first
glance to be non-contingent or otherwise immune to interrogation. For my purposes, I am most interested in “the set of discursive or non-discursive practices that makes something enter into the play of the true and false, and constitutes it as an object for thought” (Foucault, 1989, p. 296) as it relates to school and schooling in Micronesia (and more generally in the Pacific) in order to problematize school, not as a mode of curricular delivery as it is typically critiqued, but as a technology of particular power relations—that is, as a ‘truth’ of the social context of the islands, one that pre-dates its discursive formations. But how do we arrive at this point of problematization; in other words, what do we mean by power as productive, and how does power produce knowledge and ‘truth’?

To begin, then, it is necessary to turn to the discursive function of the power-knowledge circuit and the various ways in which power produces knowledge. While Foucault never offered a linear blueprint to his conception of power, he was clear about the power-knowledge circuit wherein power produces knowledge via a distribution of discursive and non-discursive “truths,” through which power is operationalized and exercised. Deleuze (1988) tells us that power produces knowledge as “a practical assemblage, a ‘mechanism’ of statements and visibilities….There are only practices, or positivities, which are constitutive of knowledge: the discursive practices of statements, or the non-discursive practices of visibilities” (p. 51). However, this circuit of discursive/non-discursive formations is not sequential or straightforward, but dispersed over any number of fields in any number of manifestations. Like the foundational Foucaultian idea that power is everywhere operating through networks of relations, so too “Relations of power-knowledge are not static forms of distribution, they are ‘matrices of
transformations” (Foucault, 1978, p. 99). Thus the power-knowledge circuit produces a set of knowledges that in turn determine the conditions of possibility for who or what gets to speak, and the discursive habits and practices of these speakers serve as the mechanisms through which power is exercised.

Out of this power-knowledge circuit, then, comes what Foucault terms a “regime of truth,” a set of knowledges produced by and productive of the exercise of power through discursive and non-discursive practices. It is important to keep in mind here, however, that we are not concerned with some form of pre-existing “truth” that operates outside the power-knowledge circuit, but rather how that “truth” is exercised through power relationships. A regime of truth, then, “is not concerned with distinguishing between true and false statements but with the way in which the distinction between true and false statements operates within certain practices” (Dean, 1994, p. 159). Gore (1993) points out that regimes of truth, while serving as the link between power and knowledge, also connect power-knowledge to the governing of the body; that is, we are subjects of and subjected to regimes of truth that are actualized through the operation of power (an idea explored further in Chapters 2, 3, and 4).

A micro-level example might be of use here to illustrate this power-knowledge circuit. We should recall that the educational consultancy Pacific Resources for Education and Learning (PREL) conducted a series of nearly identical studies in the various islands of Micronesia titled “A Study of Risk Factors Among High School Students in…” (again, here one can insert and interchange any of the six states where the studies took place); for our purposes, we will return to the study conducted in Kosrae (Kawakami, 1995). Before even reading the article, we can already see the power-
knowledge circuit at work in its construction of Kosraean high school students: most obviously, they are classified as being “at-risk,” and therefore in danger of failing in school. Additionally, the use of the phrase “risk factors” corresponds to a term used commonly in western educational jargon, and is generally linked to issues of poverty, socio-economic status, or other environmental factors that put students “at risk” of failing to complete public school (and thereby jeopardizing their economic futures). By employing this same title to each island state, moreover, we see that PREL’s application of the discourse produces a “truth” about the whole Micronesian region as “at risk.” Looking beyond the title, however, we also notice that PREL’s reports offer a “solution,” as if the Kosraean (or Micronesian) student is a problem that needs to be solved. The preferred methodology in this type of reportage entails the application of quantitative and qualitative methods based on the scientific method, an act in of itself that is productive of a “regime of truth” in which the answer to problems can, should, and indeed are to be found in the implementation of the facticity of Enlightenment doxa. Consequently, Kawakami’s report on Kosrae displaces culturally appropriate considerations of school and schooling, most notably the role of the church, while simultaneously ignoring local conceptions of what it means to be “at risk” (if in fact the community defines “risk factors” in the same way as PREL) and how to respond in ways reflective of Kosraean society.

Regimes of truth therefore operate through the productive mechanisms of the power-knowledge circuit; in the case of the Pacific, one of those mechanisms is situated in school and schooling, which I argue function as technologies of colonization. In this way, it seems, efforts at “indigenizing” the curriculum are problematized not as a matter
of “decolonizing” school, but rather as investigations of the power-knowledge circuit as productive of colonial habits and practices through continuous discursive formations. In this case I draw upon the example of the Rethinking Education In the Pacific initiative that originated in New Zealand as a way in which to “rethink” school; the following conclusion was arrived at during a meeting held in Majuro in 2007:

This rethinking initiative is not an attempt to remove all remnants of the colonial education system, but rather an effort to look at what works within the Marshallese context, keep the parts that are working while replacing those that do not. Learning English and Math, for example, may be a holdover from the Trust Territory days and a relic of American-run schools, but they are still skills that Marshallese will need as we look to develop our country in the 21st century.

(Ministry of Education, 2007b, p. 4)

The issue at stake for the purposes of our discussion of power is not that Marshallese culture is included in the curriculum, or that the Marshallese context is used to “rethink” school. Rather, it is that the technology of school is uncontested; indeed, the “regime of truth” that is a standard western curriculum (including English and math, as well as science and western history) continues to circulate in the discourse as legitimate knowledge. What is more, the above passage also produces the subject of the Marshallese people as in need of “development,” which, while not explored further at the meeting in Majuro, serves to signify western models of neoliberal economic development, again displacing the very Marshallese context that this initiative claims to recognize.

What is additionally problematic about this approach to “decolonizing” school by including local culture into the system of instructional delivery is that it ignores
Foucault’s (1991) argument that “the exercise, production, and accumulation of this knowledge cannot be dissociated from the mechanisms of power” (p. 165). Thus to take the technology of colonialism that is school and try to “fit” local knowledges into this mechanism without problematizing them as a matter of the operationalization of power actually has the opposite effect of what is intended, namely that this approach delegitimizes what would contextually be considered legitimate knowledge. To “look at what works” as in the case of the Rethinking project and force it into a colonial power mechanism, as well as to juxtapose it against what is admittedly colonial—a regime of truth (specifically English and math)—merely serves to continually point to this local, contextual knowledge as somehow “different” or “other,” and therefore suspect in light of a curriculum that privileges more traditional western school knowledge. This attempt at “indigenizing” the curriculum is like building a canoe to drive down the road: the power-knowledge circuit produces conditions of possibility that are limited to forms of transportation that move along pavement. To declare one’s intention to sail on pavement is to ignore the power-knowledge circuit as it is operationalized, and results in a very short trip. If the Rethinking initiative wants to truly “indigenize” the technology of schooling, it will need to “rethink” the very productive qualities of power that operate through schools as a technology of power.

It is necessary to keep in mind that the power-knowledge circuit operates in such a way as to produce particular sets of knowledge; knowledge is therefore a “form of multiplicity” and not something that exists outside the productive qualities of power as a configuration of absolute truth (Foucault, 1997b). What has happened since the time of the Enlightenment, however, has been a manifestation of the battle for a pre-existing
knowledge framed as a struggle between darkness and light, between subjective non-
knowledge and objective truth. One of the effects of this endeavor to seek “true
knowledge” (or enlightenment) as produced through particular discursive and non-
discursive power strategies (namely the scientific method) has been to legitimate a set of
“normalized,” and therefore privileged, knowledges that are uncritically accepted as
somehow indispensable forms of “universal” knowledge; that is, everyone needs to know
how to access this type of knowledge in order to function within society. Unsurprisingly,
this formal knowledge set as it is laid out through schooling centers around a curriculum
of English, math, science, and history, each of which are normalized to constitute the
basis of “general” knowledge in any and all social and cultural contexts.

Thus this normalization process locates knowledge in a domain of unproblematic
or uncontentious normativity, and treats a particular construction of knowledge as non-
contingent and as something that is independent of how one constitutes reality (Shapiro,
1992). In this way the production of Enlightenment knowledge typologies is
uncontestable and dismisses not only contingency, but also alternatives. At the same
time, this form of “truth” claims to discover the very conditions of possibility that its
production and normalization help to create, thereby displacing or foreclosing on
alternative conditions of possibility and alternative formations of what constitutes
acceptable knowledge. As Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) explain, these technologies of
normalization “are themselves an integral part of the systematic creation, classification,
and control of anomalies in the social body. Their raison d’être comes from their claim
to have isolated such anomalies and their promises to normalize them” (p. 195). Returning
for a moment to our problematization of schooling in Micronesia, current processes of
normalization are therefore not interested in educating Micronesians in the service of political and ethical self-determination, but rather they are concerned with the production and legitimation of particular knowledges and the construction of subjectivities in order to remove those knowledges and subjectivities from the realm of contestation and contingency.

We can see this normalization process at work discursively in a recent publication addressing the role of the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) act in the various states of Micronesia and American Samoa. In her introduction, Low and Wilson (2010) declare

While we do not argue with NCLB and NCLB-like initiatives, we do raise concerns about the ‘fit’ of such reforms based on mainland research for schools in the Pacific….We believe that to give every Pacific child the opportunity to improve their educational outcomes, we need to contextualize the education in which they participate. (p. iii)

In this case, while we could draw parallels between attempts to “indigenize” with similar endeavors at “contextualizing” (an argument we will take up again in Chapter 5), what is important here is that the premise of Low and Wilson’s argument is not to question or contest NCLB, but rather how to normalize its application through the inclusion of cultural artifacts and thereby justify its implementation “contextually.” Indeed, the conception of “education” in this example belongs not to indigenous forms of education, but rather to the technology of schooling as a strategy of particular relations of power (specifically as they appertain to issues of colonization); accordingly, what Low and Wilson end up accomplishing is the normalization of NCLB as a legislative mechanism of governmentality which can now be rationalized “contextually” in the islands.
Expanding our view, we see this current normalization process at work not only in the primary and secondary school levels, but at the tertiary level as well. The disciplinarization of knowledges that Foucault traces back at least to the Napoleonic period has created a form of “disciplinary power” in which what counts as knowledge at the university not only validates this exercise of power and seeks to either displace or co-opt other forms of so-called false knowledge, but also sets in motion the following questions: “Who is speaking, are they qualified to speak, at what level is the statement situated, what set can it be fitted into, and how and to what extent does it conform to other forms and other typologies of knowledge?” (Foucault, 1997b, p. 184). Thus if we take as an example the non-discursive habits and practices embedded in the College of the Marshall Islands, we see that it has adopted a “core curriculum” that is required of all students; unsurprisingly (because the curriculum has been normalized), it is comprised of English, math, and science (including social and computer sciences). The disciplinarization of this set of knowledge, in turn, is constructed so that it is interchangeable with other colleges and universities and is therefore a legitimated type of rarified and “true” knowledge. In this way, the “core curriculum” is uncontested; thus, learning English is non-contingent (indeed one does not have a choice in the matter), while learning Marshallese is set aside as an “elective” and therefore dispensable. Ironically, the result of this type of normalization is to allow a student to graduate from the College of the Marshall Islands without encountering a local typology of knowledge; the college in effect could be considered just a college in the Marshall Islands, since the productive role of disciplinary power has effectively displaced the context and non-knowledges of the islands themselves from the very institution that claims to serve them.
Realizing that power operates to normalize particular relations through the production of the power-knowledge circuit is only one part of conceptualizing this form of power; Derrida offers as much when he states “One of the gestures of deconstruction is to not naturalize what isn’t natural—to not assume that what is conditioned by history, institutions, or society is natural” (quoted in Dick and Kofman, 2002). But we need to find a way to move beyond the questioning of assumptions and instead begin to patiently trace the effects of power. To perform such an analysis of complexity requires an equally complex set of tools.

One strategy that allows us to discover the contingencies of the production of truth is genealogy, a method of effective historical analysis that treats “history” not as a unified and perfected discipline but rather as a series of contingent, contested sites, habits, and practices of normalization. Genealogy’s purpose “is to discover that truth or being do not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents” (Foucault, 1977, p. 146). In the same way that Foucault’s conception is of power that operates through the production and normalization of particular knowledges through discursive and non-discursive strategies rather than as a pre-existing and unchanging entity, so too does genealogy eschew an historical truth that exists outside the power-knowledge circuit: “For the genealogist there are no fixed essences, no underlying laws, no metaphysical finalities” (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p. 106). Rather, by following and mapping out the ways in which power is exercised and normalizes knowledge by meticulously outlining the breaks, irruptions, and fissures of power-knowledge formulations, genealogy facilitates a “history of the present” that “is not
concerned with distinguishing between true and false statements but with the way in which the distinction between true and false statements operates within certain practices” (Dean, 1994, p.159). In the case of schooling in Micronesia, then, we are not interested in where or when schooling began in Micronesia; we are concerned instead with how it has been normalized and practiced, and what the effects of those normalized practices are. Genealogy allows us to delineate where and how power operates; and it is therefore our first point of entry into uncovering those ever-present moments through which we can resist, disrupt, and redirect those power relations.

Similarly, in order to explore the creation and emergence of subjectivity, in which the subject is constructed as a product of notions of power relations, we must also turn our attention briefly to how our conceptualization of power is applied in terms of subjectivation. Indeed, such a deployment of the construction of subjectivity rests upon an interpretation of power as productive, relational, and always transforming. As we have already seen, power is productive of knowledges and “truths” associated with processes of normalization through a power-knowledge circuit. This power-knowledge circuit is conditional and built upon a foundation of contingency; the exercise of certain relations of power at a given point emerges as the present, but it does so not as “a product of accumulated wisdom or other dynamics reaching into the distant past. It comes about as one possible emergence from an interpretive agonistics” (Shapiro, 1992, p. 3). Power in this interpretation is therefore productive not of essences but of practices and knowledges.

In turn, as Foucault (1980) explains, “‘Truth’ is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces
and which extend it. A ‘regime’ of truth” (p. 133). The power-knowledge circuit operates in this way to create particular conditions of possibility for the construction of subjectivities, centered on these regimes of truth. Thus the practices and habits of the self as subject are determined by this productive quality of power and its spaces of operationalization. Put another way, Gore (1993) reminds us “Power exists only in action and is actualized at the site of the body, in our actions and behavior, and thus we can identify political regimes of the body” (p. 55, original emphasis). The actualization of regimes of truth therefore manifests “in, on, through, and around the body”; that is to say, the subject. Stone (n.d.) helpfully reconfigures the power-knowledge circuit by including this production of subjectivation and thereby mapping out a power-knowledge-subject circuit.

Intimately linked to the production of knowledges and regimes of truth is the role of discourse in the power-knowledge circuit. Here discourse refers to both discursive and non-discursive practices exercised through strategies and technologies of power: “discursive practices are not limited to words: rather, discourse refers to the way in which discursive practices are social practices with material effects” (Jóhannesson, 1998, p. 305). Since this conception of power-knowledge necessitates that there is no essential pre-existing subject at work outside of the power-knowledge circuit, the multiplicities of discourse do not refer to a (historical or transcendental) subject of knowledge that would invent them one after another or would found them at an original level; they point, rather, to an anonymous and polymorphous will to knowledge, capable of regular
transformations and caught up in an identifiable play of dependence. (Foucault, 1997a, p. 12)

Thus we see the emergence of subjectivities produced by discursive practices that are constantly transforming.

Alternative Conditions of Possibility

We have before us, then, an exegesis of power as effective, relational, productive, and normalizing; what is missing up to this point is an answer to the inelegant question of “so what?” or, more precisely, “what now?” When asked such questions, Foucault (1991) responds by affirming his “postulate of absolute optimism” (p. 174). In this way, Foucault suggests that this perspective on power is not merely diagnostic, that things are the way they are and we have to live with them, but rather that this approach to understanding how power operates allows us to see the myriad ways in which power can be disrupted, resisted, and redirected. If we accept the fundamental assertion that power is indeed everywhere because it comes from everywhere, that it is always operating and always transforming, and therefore that it is not a fixed and static thing, then we must also accept that power emerges not from any one natural and ahistorical “truth” but rather from the enunciation of multiple relations of truths. What is required of us is to find those moments, fissures, and breaks through which we can redirect power so that it operates in any number of alternative directions, and in so doing open the conditions of possibility for the enunciation of alternative formations of discourses, knowledges, practices, subjectivities, and truths.

It is important to keep in mind simultaneously that these points of resistance and disturbance are extra-juridical. That is, while “We can never be ensnared by power: we
can always modify its grip in determinate conditions and according to a precise strategy” (Foucault, 1988, p. 123), that strategy must exercise disruption outside of “the sovereignty of a preexisting subject” (Fontana and Bertani, 1997, p. 281). In other words, if we are interested in disrupting current power relations in schools in the Pacific, we should not make calls for “reclaiming” schools as Heine (2002) does, nor should we romanticize a past in which one had “absolute control” over indigenous forms of education and all other aspects of life as Nabobo (2002) suggests. Rather, to resist power and disrupt it we need to look elsewhere than at the level of the sovereign subject and the governmental apparatus of the state. Instead, disruption and redirection occurs at the micro-capillary level, in localized, concrete situations, for that is the level at which bodies are both subjects of as well as subjected to power relations (Foucault, 1980). One cannot disrupt the power-knowledge circuit by “indigenizing” the curriculum of a nation-state school system—one must begin at the level of the subject, exposing the fissures within the constructions of the student, the teacher, and the family.

But again, how do these disruptions occur? What is the catalyst through which redirection of power becomes realized? In this instance Foucault offers two simultaneous orientations, specifically for the intellectual who approaches power as a network of potential problematizations with which to question the assumptions of society: first, to ask (difficult) questions; and second, to avoid taking a prescriptive position. To the former point Foucault (1991) is clear when he states “I play my role at the moment I make problems evident in all their complexity, by provoking doubts and uncertainties and calling for profound changes” (p. 162); and again when he tells us “It is the reality of possible struggles that I wish to bring to light” (Foucault, 1989, p. 189). But it is
necessary for the intellectual, or rather anyone who is engaged in such a project as resisting and disrupting power, to also ask the questions within a framework of complexity so that the answer is neither self-evident nor merely reflective of normalized discourses. For my purposes, then, I need to ask the question “Why have school in Micronesia?” in such a way that the various levels of the operationalization of power as well as the breaks and ruptures within that exercise of power through the technology of schooling does not engender a reaction reflective of uncritical development discourses (such as: “we need school for our future,” a common slogan heard throughout the islands). What is more, I need to ask questions that will allow for the exposure of “the reality of possible struggles” such as “What are our alternatives to schooling, if we choose to consider them?”

Here, though, I (and others who take on this interrogatory role) need to be careful not to offer either prescriptions or proscriptions. The most optimistic characteristic about this conception of power is that the possibilities are infinite; since power is not omnipotent and is always transforming and producing knowledges, any number of alternative conditions of possibility arise in which alternate productions and formations are imaginable. That being said, it is equally important to bear in mind that, as Foucault (1991) clearly explains, “I absolutely will not play the part of one who prescribes solutions” (p. 157); for to do so would be to foreclose on those very conditions of possibility which one is trying to loosen and open up. Thus, while I am critical of contemporary movements that aim at “reforming” school in the Pacific, and specifically Micronesia, I am careful to ask questions in such a way that will open up the field of possibilities without pointing to one specific course of action and proclaiming that that
one is “the” answer. Instead, I am concerned with an appropriate analysis that disrupts the power-knowledge circuit in such a way as to trace the production of micro-level subjectivities while being careful not to declare one possible direction better than another. My role here is to question a particular technology of power in order to disrupt and redirect it; it is not for me to choose, however, which direction or form it ultimately takes.

One of the (many) criticisms of Foucault’s conception of power is that it results in no answers, and that it is fundamentally a negative conceptualization precisely because he refuses to give concrete directions and a set of “next steps.” But it is exactly this open-ended approach to redirecting power that offers the greatest amount of hope and promise to meaningfully considering alternate possibilities. It is not that Foucault has argued that all things are permissible, as is often heard in criticisms of his project, but rather that all things are possible. In a similar way, this optimism is echoed both by Derrida’s (1981b) thinking “at the limit of philosophical discourse” (p. 6, original emphasis) in order to uncover what is foreclosed, displaced, or forbidden by a particular exercise of the power-knowledge circuit, as well as Nietzsche’s (1887/1992) call for “more affects…more eyes, different eyes” (p. 555, original emphases) in order to conceptualize various knowledges. It is not a matter of a lack of answers; on the contrary, there is any number of answers available to us once we become aware of ruptures within power relations and begin to resist and redirect them.

Thus, without offering too reductive a prescription or a sequential list of directions, and in the spirit of our conception of conditions of possibility, one possible step in the political act of disrupting power relations and redirecting them in the service of ethical and moral self-determination is to begin with the question, the
problematization, of normalized modes of discourse. This act, in a word, is the purpose of my dissertation project as it relates to the problematizing of school in Micronesia. The act of disassembling the complexities of schooling in the islands and tracing the operationalization of power through the technology of school is in itself a potential step towards disrupting that exercise of power by opening up alternative conditions of possibility.

**A Note On What This Project Is/Not**

It was once pointed out to me that Foucault likes to begin to make his case by explaining what it is *not*, thereby addressing issues of methodology and analysis even before he gets to letting the reader know what his argument *is*. Taking a cue from Foucault, then, I will begin by delineating what I am not intending to do. This project is not rooted in quantitative or qualitative methodologies; I will not be conducting interviews or “mining the data”; and I will not be making analyses or drawing conclusions based on statistical evidence. To that end, the format of my study will not follow a conventional education dissertation format, so there will be no separate sections for a literature review, methodology, analysis, etc. That being said, I do intend this proposal to be of a conceptual/theoretical nature. In so doing, such elements as the literature review and methodology will be woven throughout the narrative of the text. As the American Educational Research Association (AERA, n.d.) standards for humanities-oriented research state, postmodern/poststructural

Methods are interpretive strategies that take the texts of archives, interviews as events rather than data. The events are studied discursively, for example, to identify the rules and standards that order reflection and action, and the changes
that occur through multiple historical interactions and mediations which have no single origin. (p. 11)

By employing a bricolage of methodologies, including Foucaultian genealogy, discursive analysis, visual art interpretation, and archival research, I will attempt to consider how power is operationalized through the technology of school in Micronesia and what conditions of possibility exist for alternatives.

A brief outline of the structure of what follows is appropriate here. Chapter 1 offers a Foucaultian genealogy of schooling in Micronesia; I will argue that schools in the region are much more a product of the present than of any distant past. Employing a methodology of “effective history,” I will show that, while various colonial regimes in the region had established some sort of formal schooling over a period of disparate decades (if not centuries, as in the case of Guam), state-sponsored formal school is in fact a product of the very recent present: specifically, as part of the culmination of US policy towards the islands in the early 1960s coupled with the imposition of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs beginning in 1964. As such, formal schooling as it is currently conceived is not part of some great colonial legacy, but rather one that can be discretely traced to a point in time that coincides with both US public pronouncements of withdrawal from the region formally while simultaneously deploying schooling as a technology of colonization that persists—and thrives—to the present day.

The next three chapters are concerned with the construction of subjectivities; that is, how one’s identity and habits of practice of the self are constructed both externally and on a micro-level (at the level of the individual body) specifically through schooling. Chapter 2 will address the construction of the student; here my point of departure is a
reading of the legend that has grown up around Lee Boo, a Palauan “prince” who became the first Micronesian exchange student when he traveled to England in 1784 with the crew of the British Antelope that had run aground off Palau’s reefs the year before. By considering the “history” of Lee Boo, how that history has transformed into mythology, and especially how that transformation plays out through the visual in the form of the statue of Lee Boo that fronts Palau Community College, I will consider the ways in which Lee Boo has come to represent not only the construction of the ideal western formal school student in Micronesia, but how he has come to embody the normalization of that ideal as well.

Chapter 3 will attend to the construction of the teacher, which I argue emerges through the development of teacher’s colleges in the region beginning with the College of Guam in 1952, the arrival of the Peace Corps in Micronesia in 1966, and the ongoing importation of young, largely unqualified, and predominantly American “model” teachers who operate under the auspices of, among other agencies, the volunteer organization WorldTeach.

Chapter 4 will focus on the construction of the parent and child through discourses of the child, the state, and the school, and particularly as they are subjectivized by the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) act of 2002 and PREL’s recent Parental Information and Resource Centers (PIRCs). Funded by the US Department of Education and operating primarily in Majuro and Pohnpei, the PIRCs function in a way that defines the family and its components as reflections of a western hetero-normative nuclear ideal, a notion that is, in large part, anathema to, and acts to displace, local conceptions of
family in the islands, but importantly one that serves to police the parent and govern the child.

So as not to suggest that the search for meaningfully different approaches is futile, Chapter 5 addresses possible alternative discourses to notions of “education” in Micronesia, and by extension considers the conditions of possibility to schooling in its current iteration, notably in relation to the predominant discourses of development circulating in the region. Throughout the project, I will trace both the discursive and non-discursive habits and practices through which power becomes operationalized, how power is exercised through particular relationships and constructions, and ultimately how different relationships can emerge through the productive qualities of power.

Finally, this study of the operation of power through formal schooling in Micronesia, it should come as no surprise at this point, is rooted in a specific (and intentional) poststructural analytical approach. It should also be apparent that while such a project cannot be all things to all people (and indeed, if poststructuralism had tenets it would certainly deny the construction of certitudes, universalisms, and absolutes), it is not intended to be. Like all intellectual exercises, the current one has its limitations. In conversations with so-called “Pacific educators” in a variety of media, including face-to-face chats, emails, and listserv discussions, there have been three consistent responses to the ideas I pursue in this dissertation: the first response is simply to ignore what I have to say, which is to be expected; the second is to react, often personally, which rarely leads to fruitful resolutions; the third, and perhaps the most persistent, is to thank me for my observations and arguments, but then to dismiss what I have said as being either irrelevant to or out of touch with the daily lives and struggles of Pacific Islanders. I do
not accept the assumption underlying this last response (that I am somehow out of touch with the islands), as I am a resident—by choice—of the Pacific (and indeed quite literally in touch with the daily concerns of Islanders, or at least to the daily concerns of my wife and daughters), but such a response is nevertheless understandably comforting to those who find danger in the possible conclusions one might draw from this approach: that entire foundations of at least one element of contemporary Pacific Island society, namely formal school, is somehow suspect due to its complicity in the variety of ways power operates through it. Destabilizing foundational institutions and practices such as school/ing is not easy to accept, especially if one is immersed in formal school at any number of levels in the Pacific; indeed, the degree to which one recognizes one’s own complicity in such activities, and I include myself in this group, necessarily dictates at the very least an internal compromise between what one is willing to think about this topic and what one does on a daily basis to participate in it.

An easy, and perhaps more legitimate, criticism of this approach is that it focuses largely on my locus of enunciation and the perspective(s) that I bring to the topic; one may rightly ask, where is the Islander voice and presence? This notion of Islander perspectives, especially when viewed through the lens of Pacific Islands Studies, is conventionally considered to be vital to any work on the region. However, the present work does not employ a methodology that relies solely on Islander voice and presence, nor does it necessarily preclude (or worse, exclude) them; rather, what I am attempting to do here is to interrogate the ways in which we (that is, those living and working in and around the islands) reason about formal schooling as demonstrated through normalized and normalizing discourses, habits and practices. To be sure, I am not trying to dismiss
Islander voices—on the contrary, my conclusions, which are really calls for new
growings, rely on them, and indeed would be quite impossible without them. But this is
not a work built on interviews. It is constructed through a very particular methodology
informed by my very personal locus of enunciation. And what that methodology and
locus have allowed me to do is consider ways in which we can open up the conversation
on school/ing and education in the islands and begin to construct and legitimize
alternative conditions of possibility and modes of being. To define what those alternative
constructions are, however, is not up to me; they are dependent upon a variety of Islander
perspectives—and it is my hope that this dissertation is one way in which to create a
space in which those perspectives can ultimately be heard.

Indeed, there is any number of ways in which to consider formal schooling in
Micronesia; I have briefly outlined what I see as limitations to those approaches that have
come before, and I am presently offering another set of lenses through which to view the
problematic. But I am also employing a deliberate philosophical strategy, one which
opens up schooling in a way that allows for possibilities for conditions of being that
previously have been disregarded as either impractical or otherwise threatening to the
established social order. To those who reject poststructural methodologies for being too
narrow in focus and not expansive or inclusive enough for the challenges surrounding
formal schooling in the islands, I would remind them of Spivak’s (1990) admonition “that
you might want to entertain the notion that you cannot consider all other subjects and that
you should look at your own subjective investment in the narrative that is being
produced” (p. 29). I do not intend for this project to be the end of the conversation; on the
contrary, I hope for the opposite, which might constitute a fourth type of response: that
this project opens up additional spaces for discursive formations and considerations of alternative conditions for what we mean by school/ing and education in Micronesia with real, practical applications. The purpose of such a poststructural orientation is neither to prescribe or proscribe, nor to limit or confine; rather, its purpose is to consider the possible and the infinite. As Spivak (1990) says of such a propensity for poststructuralism, “Try it, you might like it” (p. 30).
CHAPTER 1: A GENEALOGY OF SCHOOLING IN MICRONESIA

“We need history, certainly, but we need it for reasons different from those for which the idler in the garden of knowledge needs it.”

Friedrich Nietzsche, 1874/1997

In the Beginning There Was School

In the spring of 2006, the College of the Marshall Islands (CMI) embarked on an accreditation-mandated exercise in the rewriting of the institution’s vision statement. At this point I was still acting as the dean of academics, and in my role as an administrator I was present at every meeting regarding this process, from the initial planning stages to the hands-on activities meetings with community members and constituent groups within the college. The starting point for the president at the time was to ask, “What kind of college do you want?” I took issue with this line of questioning when it was first proposed and at each subsequent gathering where it was asked; a more legitimate starting point, I argued, would be to posit, “Do you want a college?” Each time I objected I was laughed out of the room. Yet my point remains: the president’s approach assumed the college as a self-evident thing, one whose essence was unchallengeable and therefore impervious to existential inquiry. By beginning, for lack of a better phrase, nowhere near the beginning, the president reinforced the narrative that the college must exist, and that its vision and mission would therefore focus on what it should do, rather than if it should be. Indeed, to ask the people working at the college and living in the larger Marshallese community if they even wanted a college in the first place may have yielded some surprising answers, if for no other reason than that question has never been put to the people of the Marshall Islands (nor, by extension, to communities in the rest of the
region). Indeed, this approach should not come as any surprise, as Kelly and Altbach (1978) concluded three decades earlier “The thread that ran through all colonial education was the fact that it was offered by the colonizer without the input or consent of the colonized” (p. 2). So the community did not get that chance during this process, and what followed from the community meetings and college in-services produced a vision statement that asserts the college’s place in contemporary Marshallese society using language that is deliberately vague and devoid of any real meaning: “The College of the Marshall Islands will: 1. be a source of national hope and pride; 2. provide tailored, quality, educational opportunities; 3. provide a window on the global community; 4. serve as a center for research and inquiry for national advancement” (College of the Marshall Islands, 2010, p. 13). Unsurprisingly, the vision statement links the college to notions of nationhood, schooling (assuming that such practices are both “tailored”—to whom? for what purpose?—and of “quality,” a term which, in this case, carries no weight), globalization, and modern development discourses. If we don’t worry about questions, recalling Pynchon, we need not worry about the answers, either. And in this case, discourse that both produces, and was very intentionally produced by, the college establishes the institution as normal, non-contingent, and, perhaps most perplexingly, *sui generis*; indeed, through asserting its role, in the first instance, as “a source [italics added] of national hope and pride,” it assumes its place among “immobile forms” or “‘that which was already there’” (Foucault, 1977, p. 142). The college is innate, and it intends to remain so.

Seen from another perspective: In the follow-up to his popular general history of Micronesia up to 1885, Hezel (1995) assumes a similar stance in *Strangers in Their Own*
Land: A Century of Colonial Rule in the Caroline and Marshall Islands, a text that (once again) focuses on the colonial history of the region told primarily from the perspective of the colonizing powers. Scattered among the various anecdotes, commentaries, and government documents is a discourse of schooling that betrays a process of the normalization of school as both natural and benevolent, and, by extension, desired by the Islanders themselves. Writing of the Japanese period, Hezel tells us “The public school system, something previous colonial administrations had neglected to establish, was offering an education, and with it an escape from the cycle of ignorance and poverty, to hundreds of young Micronesians” (p. 206). Here we see a number of assumptions operating simultaneously: first, that a public school system is the only means of attaining “education”; second, that Micronesians, without the previous benefit of such a system were, in Hezel’s words, ignorant and poor; and third, that school as a state-sponsored service alleviates those shortcomings and is therefore not only benign, but more importantly a necessary good. Later in the book, Hezel describes the uneasy transition between the end of World War II and the occupation of the islands by the US Navy:

Island life had barely resumed a measure of normalcy when local people began pleading that the schools be reopened. Some adults had been attending the military-run day schools to learn English, and one group of Pohnpeian laborers recruited for construction work on Enewetak would only agree to go if a school were opened for them. (p. 258)

With this passage Hezel reinforces a narrative that implies the natural, non-contingent space which school occupied in island-life by the late 1940s; what is more, the schools in this passage are linked emphatically with the use of the term “normalcy,” and, indeed, the
schools Hezel writes of were so compelling that they led Micronesians to the point of begging for them from US naval administrators. What we discover, if we are to look just a bit farther than the discourse Hezel provides, is that these passages establish a form of “truth” about state-sponsored schooling that is barely supported by outside sources cited in either footnotes, endnotes, or bibliographical references (for Hezel provides but one brief note about the Pohnpeian workers while omitting sources for his assertions regarding both the Japanese school system and the return to “normalcy”); what is more, they unmask a discursive agenda that is intent on normalizing school in the present by demonstrating its undeniable origins and natural state in the past. In short, what Hezel provides us is not a useful “history” of schools in the islands, but instead a window into processes of contemporary development and modernization deployed through such “historical” discourses linking some “truthful” past with the inevitability of some ongoing perfectibility of history.

It is fair here to ask if Hezel is in fact correct, and that Micronesians were actually “pleading” with the US Navy to reopen the Japanese schools, those same institutions which offered an escape from “ignorance and poverty,” as early as 1946. In fact, we do not know, because we are not dealing here “in fact.” Rather, we are in the realm of discourse, and it is necessary to consider the role of discourse in the production of knowledge and, recalling our earlier discussion in the Introduction Chapter, the role of the productive qualities of the power-knowledge circuit. Here I will briefly turn to Foucault (1984), who suggests “that in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events,
to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality” (p. 109). In this way, the narrative produced by Hezel, as well as that produced by the College of the Marshall Islands, implies a particular way in which we are to think of school and schooling: as ontological, benevolent, and constituting a form of historical “truth” that is so self-evident it transcends any further exploration of its own necessity. In a sense what we are discovering through this discourse is actually the “soul” of schooling, one that, if I may be permitted to paraphrase Foucault, is born not out of benign impositions of colonial “education” projects intended to “civilize” the natives, but rather out of contemporary practices of “development” and a belief in the superiority of particular development models. And it is through this “soul” of schooling “in which are articulated the effects of a certain type of power and the reference of a certain type of knowledge, the machinery by which the power relations give rise to a possible corpus of knowledge, and knowledge extends and reinforces the effects of this power” (Foucault, 1979a, p. 29). So we should ask, just what are these effects, and how do they facilitate the circulation of power-knowledge as it relates to the production of historical “truth”—and, in fact, the historical inevitability—of school in the islands?

A quick glance at any number of examples of this discourse demonstrates the emergence of two themes of schooling in the region: first, that schooling provides “enlightenment,” not the least of which delivers Islanders from the implied backwardness of island societies and their customs; and second, that schooling is economic, and therefore of practical utility. If we return to Hezel for a moment, we see both of these themes at work in his use of the phrase “ignorance and poverty” in reference to the benefits of Japanese schools. Writing during the time of the Japanese occupation of the
islands, Yanaihara (1940) in his slightly less elegant way is nice enough to remind us
“The saying that uncivilized races are not congenital mental cripples but just uneducated
children or uncultured villagers applies also to the natives of the South Sea Islands” (p.
246). Meanwhile, Oliver (1951), in one of the first economic reports on the islands at the
time of the shift from US naval to civilian rule, gives a five-step prescription for the
creation of a vocational and technical course of schooling; to do so, he explains that the
shift in colonizing regimes, from Japanese to American, “will provide the [US]
Administration with a unique and challenging opportunity, with a clear field, to introduce
Micronesians to western systems by means of enlightened educational techniques” (p.
86). A similar sentiment is expressed (again) four decades on, as Flinn (1992), writing of
the Islanders of Pulap Atoll in Chuuk State, tells us that the Pulapese “view education as
a route to money and jobs….Rather than a chance for self-development, personal
fulfillment, or growth of critical thought—the American ideal—education provides an
avenue to money and material goods” (pp. 127-128). While the implication that, in
Flinn’s case, the Pulapese do not, or perhaps cannot, otherwise pursue “self-development,
personal fulfillment, or growth of critical thought” outside of formal school is troubling,
nonetheless the discourse of the economics of schooling continues to intersect with the
“enlightening” aspects of western schooling (“the American ideal”), even well after the
“independence” of the Federated States of Micronesia in 1986. And, not to forget the
perspective of an Islander (in this case a Marshall Islander), we would do well to recall
Heine’s (1974) sentiment that the Americans “will long be remembered, for despite all
their shortcomings in governing Micronesia, they made possible a new phenomenon in
Micronesia, the ‘liberation of the mind’” (p. 93).
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The assumption that is made in these examples, moreover, is that school, at any given point in time, serves the same purposes; that is, whether we are speaking of Japanese schools, American schools in the first decade of the US Trust Territory administration, schools in the latter part of the Trust Territory in the 1960s and 1970s, or schools since “independence” in the 1980s and 1990s (and, by implication, schools under the Spanish and German colonial administrations in the 19th century), school is an acontextualized and ontological construct that fits a conventional historical analysis. In other words, contemporary schools and systems of state-sponsored schooling bureaucracies have the successive waves of colonizing regimes—the Spanish, German, Japanese, and Americans—to thank for their present state, and that school is an integral part of the historical “development” of the region. Thus, Hezel (1984) is able to declare: “in the course of the three centuries since schools were introduced to the islands, this institution has taken as deep root in Micronesian soil as the churches that first carried it there” (p.95).

But there are two important limits to this type of historical approach, one that treats school as something outside of history and therefore transposable in both its deployment and effects in one era or context as simply as in another. First, there is the issue of the historian, who “must invoke objectivity, the accuracy of facts, and the permanence of the past” (Foucault, 1977, p. 158). To be clear, I refer here not to recent developments in contemporary historiography; rather, I am concerned with those histories of schooling in the region. Thus, without providing any sources outside their own declarations, one sees that Oliver (1951), Heine (1974), Hezel (1984;1995), Flinn (1992), and any host of others present the discourse of schooling as, for example,
“enlightening” through statements that, if one will excuse the allusion to religion, come across as *ex cathedra*. There is no tautological need for proof, for the historian in our case must only assert the veracity of her/his statement as proof enough. Second, such an approach to historical analysis

closes the event in a cyclical pattern of time. Its error is grammatical; it treats the present as framed by the past and future: the present is a former future where its form was prepared and the past, which will occur in the future, preserves the identity of its content. (Foucault, 1977, p. 176)

Here we have the limit of teleology, that faith in the linearality of history’s timeline, one that fixates on ascertaining a beginning, a point of origin and of original essences, and insists on following the thread ever-forward, to some predictable and inevitable future (that is already-evident in its own essential past). Thus we can follow the thread of school, an institution and practice which itself both precedes and lies outside of the timeline of conventional history, through successive colonizing entities in the islands, landing on the schools today and seeing in them not only the problems but their inevitable solutions embedded in a unified field of “history.”

Unfortunately, this type of historical approach is not very useful. All too often such history is concerned exclusively with causes rather than with effects, with the result of metaleptic conclusions that mistake effects for causes; in our case, to take one example, the effect of the normalization of the “enlightening” aspects of formal schooling is taken as one of schooling’s primary causes, especially as it relates to schooling in the islands as a mechanism of the technology of colonization. A more worthwhile approach to historical exploration can be found in genealogy, an examination of the historical
record that seeks effects, and, by extension, serves as a history not of the distant past but rather of the present. Genealogy is opposed to origin and the search for essences, and in this way it is also unconcerned with unbroken historical threads or the linearity of fixed periods and their ultimate perfectibility; rather, “genealogy counter-actualizes events, returns to the virtual structure of events, in order to re-actualize them in another manner” (Colwell, 1997, para. 2). But we should not think that genealogy will uncover heretofore unknown events, or that it will play historical detective and bring to light new facts. Instead, genealogy takes the historical record of events and reconsiders them, in terms of relations of power, and seeks to lay bare the fissures, irruptions, and shifts in aims and strategies that allow us to trace how power is operationalized and deployed in particular ways. Thus, Nietzsche (1887/1992) locates the emergence of morality not in the origins of the church but rather in the more recent period during which the church denied fundamental freedoms and liberties; similarly, Foucault (1979a) traces the contemporary prison state to the 18th century, when there was a shift away from public displays of punishment to the secreting away of prisoners to more and more elaborate prisons, an event accompanied by changes in the practices of governmental surveillance and concern not with what was public but with controls imposed over individual bodies. As Visker (1995) asserts, “Genealogy can clarify for us the nature of the reason we are employing and the historical consequences of that reason” (p. 101). For our purposes, then, taking the lead from both Nietzsche and Foucault, I am concerned with the emergence of contemporary state-sponsored schooling in the region known as Micronesia, not as the legacy of some distant church schools established in Guam in the 17th century, nor of German mission schools or Japanese public schools, nor even of the schools established
under the American administration in the 1950s. In fact, my argument is that when we speak of schools in the islands today, what we are speaking of is the product of a very particular moment in time, one that surfaces in the mid-1960s during the convergence of various US national security imperatives and the normalization of present-day development discourses, and one that therefore allows us to uncover the multitude of ways that forms of political, economic, and colonial power relations circulate through the habits and institutions of what we call “school.”

It should be noted that genealogy as effective history is not prescribed by any particular forms of method or methodology. As Colwell (1997) reminds us, “genealogy is defined or identified by its effects instead of something intrinsic to the process itself” (para. 1). Thus, there are no successive steps to be taken in conducting a genealogy of schooling in Micronesia; instead, we will seek out those moments of disruption in practice and discourse, as effective history is “without constants” (Foucault, 1977, p. 153). To that end, we are not interested here in teleological readings of the birth of school, but rather in a history that “introduces discontinuity into our very being—as it divides our emotions, dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our body and sets it against itself” (Foucault, 1977, p. 154). Such an approach demands that we interrupt the power-knowledge circuit not to engage in processes of normalization or “historical accuracy” but instead to read those same events with a different perspective, to interrogate relations of power with the purpose of unpacking those layers of discursive and non-discursive practices that discourage us from looking critically. In this way, we can not only disrupt narratives of school/ing as benevolent and benign, but begin to consider them in terms of a genealogical record: that is, school/ing as part of a larger technology of contemporary
colonization, one that displace, erases, and ignores all other conceptions of what we mean when we employ such terms as “teaching,” “learning,” and “education.” Indeed, we would do well to consider what is practiced—that is, what is real—and, perhaps more importantly, what potentialities—what is imagined—are being foreclosed on; for what is at stake is not simply those conceptions which are already submerged or waiting, but also the making, inventing, and imagining of possibilities for meaning.

Our task is therefore before us: we should begin by examining the historical discourse; locate those events and points of emergence that signify shifts in the strategies of power relations; and consider their effects on the history of the present. Genealogy, according to Foucault (1977), is not intended to find the past in the present, nor to predict the future in the past: “it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations—or conversely, the complete reversals—the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us” (p. 146). For our analysis of schooling in Micronesia, then, we should not ask, “how did we get here?” and expect an unbroken history of schooling as innate and self-evident, but rather that the task might require asking a different set of questions such as “why do we speak of school as we do?” and consider the effects of that perspective of schooling as natural on our habits and practices today—including, it seems, college visioning processes, the imputation of schooling as an imperative good in the historical record, and its indispensability in the “enlightening” of Islanders’ minds.

The Colonial Period?

Certainly in conventional histories of Micronesia, careful (if not total) attention is paid to the successive colonizing regimes of the Spanish, the Germans, the Japanese, and
the Americans, sometimes (depending on the date of its publication) with a concluding section on Micronesia “today”—that is, “independent” Micronesia, in a time of the so-called postcolonial. Indeed, conventional histories of the birth and development of schools (often misnamed as histories of “education”) in the islands consistently follow a similar pattern; one need only read Anttila (1965), Romisher (1974), Hezel (1975; 1984), Ramarui (1976), Sachuo (1992), and Tellei (2005), to name but a few examples. This is not one of those histories.

That is not to say that I am not interested in the so-called “colonial” period in Micronesia. But what I am concerned with here is not the origin and ultimate improvement of schools and schooling systems imposed on the islands over time; rather, I am mostly curious about how such approaches to a history of schooling fixate on schooling’s origin, and the way that fixation on genesis leads one to conclude that colonial schools have anything to do with contemporary state-sponsored schooling. In other words, my argument about the so-called “colonial” period, including the administrations of Spain, Germany, and Japan (the Americans will be dealt with separately, and in greater detail, below), is that I have no argument—put simply, they have nothing to do with “school” as we speak of it today. I am addressing them, however, in the service of uncovering a discourse that serves to normalize present-day schooling as somehow the result of some distant and long-standing tradition of school, in a variety of forms, over the course of Micronesian colonial history. To that end, we should turn to Foucault’s (1977) consideration of descent, a concept which, borrowed from Nietzsche’s critique of Herkunft, or racial type and stock, allows the genealogist to consider not one singular point of origin, but rather the unraveling and convergence of beginnings.
dispersed over time and space. Thus, we are not searching here for the “beginning” or the “first school,” as so many others have done; in Foucault’s words, “The search for descent is not the erecting of foundations: on the contrary, it disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself” (p. 147). We are, in Foucault’s phrase, opposed to origin.

To put it more prosaically, Benjamin (1968) offers: “His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he see one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet” (p. 257). The “colonial” period, and its subsequent fits and starts at establishing formal schools in the islands, whether Jesuit schools built in the 17th century by the Spanish or administrative schools erected by the Japanese in the early 20th century, is surely nothing more than the angel’s pile of wreckage. To suggest otherwise is to argue that “school”—as a practice, institution, concept and corporeal entity—is somehow characterized by a chain of events, one that has its roots at some point in the colonial past.

For the moment, though, let us briefly consider two studies that argue against the beneficence of colonial schools while paradoxically defending school’s descent against our examination. The first is from Ramarui (1976), who begins by stating

Before Spain, Germany, Japan and the United States began their colonization, occupation, and administration of Micronesia, education in these islands was a family affair….Education in this regard was, and to a greater degree in the various Micronesian cultures, is still a way of life as opposed to the formal or
institutionalized education which aims to be a preparation for adult life following formal schooling. (p. 9)

Here Ramarui argues two things: one, that education as islanders knew it existed before colonization; and two, such pre-colonial education is in opposition to formal, or colonial, education. Yet, in an effort to explain the “chain of events” that brought him to his position as the Trust Territory director of education, Ramarui then proceeds to offer a “history” of school in the islands, beginning, unsurprisingly, with the Spanish period, followed by the German and Japanese administrations; this teleological approach then concludes with the American era, which Ramarui introduces by writing “In light of the foregoing evaluation of the development of educational systems in Micronesia under various regimes and the impact upon Micronesians, I would like to approach the subject of the present basic educational system in the Trust Territory” (p. 15). Interestingly, Ramarui suggests that the present school system, established under the American administration, can best be understood “in light of” the various colonial systems and regimes that preceded it. The implication here is that of conventional historiography, that the present is explained by the past. (It is also instructive to note that there is no further mention of pre-colonial “education” except an oblique reference to an “indigenous higher education capability,” a concept that is never defined.)

Similarly, Sachuo (1992) argues that the effects of schooling under the various colonial regimes can still be felt in Chuuk. Oddly, although echoing Ramarui, he goes on to state “But formal education, as an operational phenomenon in terms of teaching and learning, has been a function of the Trukese culture from time immemorial. However, the externally designed and imposed educational paradigms mediated under colonial
mandates have subverted indigenous modes of cultural transmission” (p. 16). In this way, there is a thread of some form of native “formal education” that, while frayed by colonial schooling, remains unbroken; the implication here is that there is a configuration of unadulterated “school” that predates the colonial period and that still persists, while conflating processes of customary local knowledges with the contemporary perspective of formal schooling as inevitable. Ironically, this argument that establishes “school” as an Islander concept and invention, in an effort to critique the colonial origins of school, in fact serves to reinforce the narrative that school, in any form, is an ontological phenomenon—and that schooling in the islands today is a product of the corruption of pure forms inherent in the colonial experience. In both the examples from Sachuo (1992) and Ramarui (1976), we see the angel of history eyeing the wreckage.

So what are we to make of origin, then? Does schooling begin with the colonial period, or does it come before? Where does school in the islands begin? When does it begin? Does it matter? In a word, no. But in an attempt to avoid appearing dismissive of the whole discourse of the history of schooling in the region, we would do well to consider three key shortcomings of this search for origin, and, in our case, the search for origin, which Nietzsche termed Ursprung, in—or before—the “colonial” period: essence; perfection at birth; and truth.

To begin, there is the issue of essence, the notion that there is something authentic, pre-existing, or static to be found in the search for origin. In this way we speak of historical beginning as “the existence of immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and succession” (Foucault, 1977, p. 142); thus school, as a colonial construct, has as among its essential characteristics particular, and narrowly defined,
forms of subjectivation and practice. What are often referred to as the “first” schools are assumed to hold within them the image of contemporary schooling habits and institutions, regardless of where or how such a “first school” emerges. In this way, Hezel (1984) begins a history of colonial schools with the original school, the Collegio de San Juan de Letran in 1669: “The first school in Micronesia—for that matter, in all of Oceania—was founded less than a year after the arrival of the first Jesuit missionaries in the Marianas” (p. 95). The implication in such an opening statement is that one can trace the essence of schools today as arising from such humble beginnings—beginnings that originate in Christian missionizing and that are exemplary of the urgency of school, evidenced by the notion that this original institution opened “less than a year” after the coming of the missionaries. Indeed, Hezel goes so far as to not just make the connection between the Collegio de San Juan de Letran and schools in contemporary Micronesia, but in fact “in all of Oceania” as well. We have the Jesuits, Hezel seems to be saying, to thank for the school system as we know it today. Ecce schola.

But whereas Hezel is willing to assert the primacy of school on Guam as the origin of school in Micronesia (to say nothing of Oceania), we might ask how such an historical lens reinforces the colonial construction of the region—that is, that somehow the origin of school in Guam signifies the origin of school throughout the islands. To be sure, Hezel’s approach results in one of two possible scenarios: either that it produces a history of Guam that reflects the rest of “Micronesia’s” colonial history, an interesting postulate considering that Guam did not have a German period, its Japanese experience was limited to the years of occupation during World War II, and that the American colonial administration somehow included Guam in the rest of the regional trust territory
(indeed, Guam’s American period, which began in 1898, follows a much different trajectory than the rest of the region); or, more naturally, it neglects the variations of successive colonial regimes in the rest of what we call Micronesia, and in so doing demands that school is an immutable entity, one that by some unknown and unknowable means transcends time and space.

One answer to this question lies in affirming school’s essence in each individual case, all the while hearkening back to the authenticity of school’s origin in some “first school.” In this way, we see Flinn (1992), rather correctly, state “Chuuk’s current educational system emerged relatively recently, stemming from policy changes in the 1960s and early 1970s”; but she then goes on to contradict herself by declaring “U.S. missionaries introduced the first formal Western education in Chuuk beginning in 1884 with the arrival of Robert Logan, a Protestant missionary” (p. 35). Thus, again we see the essence of school as somehow born from religion, implying that school today is simply the latest iteration of this form of religious school moving along the teleological plotline of history. Why Flinn feels the need to reach back to 1884 when she has already rather accurately traced the emergence of contemporary schooling from the 1960s is unclear, other than to suggest that we are expected to take away an understanding of school’s true origin, and its essence, to be found in the introduction of Protestantism in the islands.

Likewise, the locating of the essence of school in the colonial period can be seen in a remark by Fischer (1957), again writing of Chuuk: “The [I]slanders themselves lacked formally organized schools before Western contact….The closest thing to a formal school was in the education of the magician-war leaders” (pp. 230-231). Formal school as we know it today, Fischer seems to be saying, can easily be traced back to the colonial
period; if we are to go back any further, we risk entering the realm of illegitimate science
and “magic,” certainly two elements that have no bearing on formal schooling in the
islands since the advent of colonization. Implied in such a distinction, once again, is that
formal western schooling has at its core the same undefined set of characteristics today
that it did when it was first introduced to the islands, characteristics that, if nothing else,
can easily be contrasted with local forms of “education” that are opposed to what it is we
mean when we use the term “school.”

A second complimentary complication of the search for origin is the assumption
that school as we conceive of it was somehow perfect at birth, that by declaring a “first
school” we are proclaiming an innocence and purity of both practice and institution. “We
tend to think that this is the moment of their greatest perfection,” Foucault (1977)
counsels, “when they emerged dazzling from the hands of a creator or in the shadowless
light of a first morning” (p. 143). So it is that Tellei (2005), in his history of workforce
development in Palau, tells us “The Spanish contributions were restricted to the spread of
Catholic doctrine. However, in the course of proselytizing, they introduced the
following:…Formal schooling. They introduced formal schooling for the first time,
mainly to teach catechism and other religious doctrines” (p. 67). Putting aside for a
moment Tellei’s idea that “workforce development” as it is understood in the 21st century
is a concept that arises out of the 19th century or before, it is instructive to note the
comparison between “formal schooling” as originary and introduced to Palau by the
Spanish and that of pre-colonial “education” in the islands: “The contributions of the pre-
1885 Palauans to the field of education in general and workforce development in
particular are hard to put into writing due to the differences in the educational systems”
(pp. 61-62). What is of consequence here is that pre-colonial education is somehow not “true” education when compared to that of formal schooling imposed by the Spanish, and that by extension there is some flaw or imperfection in pre-Spanish education (since it did not have the benefit of formal schooling). What is more, such a comparison is made only between pre-colonized Palau and the emergence of formal schooling during the Spanish colonial period; no similar comparison is made, “due to the differences in the education systems,” between the Spanish and the German approaches to formal school, nor to schools operated by the Japanese or American regimes. Indeed, it is only the non-colonial, Palauan “system” of education that is difficult to assess, not, for example, because of a lack of literature, but because of some undefined “differences” in educational “systems”—differences that erase Palauan educational practices from “the field of education in general,” as if that field of education exists outside of history, entering the narrative dazzling from the hands of, in this case, the Spanish in 1885.

Our third problematic of origin lies in its function as the source of truth. Here, the origin contains within it the starting point of a particular field of knowledge; for our present discussion, we enter into a typical and conventional discourse of schooling by searching first and foremost for its beginning, hoping that within that moment of origin we can deduce the unity of knowledge that is “school” and that will consequently contain for us the answers to contemporary questions and problems of schooling. To paraphrase common clichés of the uses of history, a search for origin as containing truth amounts to understanding the past to determine the most appropriate future, or, at the very least, to not repeat the mistakes of the past. Thus, “From the vantage point of an absolute distance, free from the restraints of positive knowledge, the origin makes possible a field of
knowledge whose function is to recover it, but always in a false recognition due to the excesses of its own speech” (Foucault, 1977, p. 143). In this way, we venerate the origin as the keeper of truth and true knowledge, but in doing so we fail to see both the ways in which that search produces what we mistake as “truth” as well as what such adulation for the purity of beginning in turn erases through processes of producing that knowledge.

In the discourse of a history of school in Micronesia, then, this search for truth embedded in origin suggests nothing short of a unification of school (and, in many cases, the notion of “education”) that begins with the advent of colonization, one that, while it has undergone a number of changes in the minutiae of instruction and delivery, nonetheless carries within it not only the site of truth but also that of a very proscribed future direction for school/ing, and, by extension, education. Returning to the purported progenitors of Micronesian schooling, the Spanish in Guam, Del Priore (1986) tells us “Without a systematic study of the system used by the Spaniards to teach the natives, a clear comprehension and analysis of the cultural influences which have shaped the lives of the inhabitants of the Island of Guam and, reaching out from Guam throughout the Marianas Islands, are not possible” (p. 13). That is, the way Chamorros on Guam and the rest of the Marianas live today can be found only if we truly understand the Spanish colonial school system: or, only if we understand the truth in the origin can we comprehend the Fall. Similarly, Ramarui (1976) makes the case that “It is important that we compare and contrast all the facts of the past and present and assess the status of the current educational system and its relevancy to Micronesia” (p. 14). This attempt to understand the truth of the present as exposed through an examination of the past thus carries with it the assumption that not only is the truth to be found in the past, but that the
past, as a precursor of the present and the future, is therefore true serves to underscore the
discourse that compels the conventional historian to seek ever farther back, to an absolute
origin, wherein the answers to all our questions have already been written.

For the genealogist, however, such a search is not only futile, but also
unnecessary. To be sure, such a belief in the infallibility of the past as a vindication of the
present and the ultimate predictor of the future represents a normalization of a particular
approach to history that can be seen in the contemporary discourse of schooling in the
islands: here I turn to the recent Rethinking Education initiative referenced in the
Introduction Chapter, which, during its 2007 conference in Majuro declared that “To
understand why this major effort to ‘rethink’ the education system in the Marshall Islands
is needed, it is first necessary to understand the history of education here” (Ministry of
Education, 2007b, p. 3). That is to say, the “truth” underlying the Rethinking Education
in the Pacific initiative, and specifically in the Marshalls, can be found, once again, in an
examination of the colonial regimes of Spain, Germany, Japan, and the United States.
Without the production of such an origin, it is therefore impossible to understand not only
present-day schools in the Marshalls, but the entire rethinking initiative itself. But the
production of this knowledge as embedded in the perfect absolute origin itself is an
exercise in the production of that selfsame origin and the notion that it is indeed perfect
and absolute. The effect, according to Foucault, is one not only of production, but also of
loss—the loss of an effective history that seeks not only descent, but also emergence, and
emergence not from one perfect origin but from dispersion: “Thus all that appears to our
eyes is a truth conceived as a richness, a fecundity, a gentle and insidiously universal
force, and in contrast we are unaware of the will to truth, that prodigious machinery
designed to exclude” (Foucault, 1984, p. 114). We should retire this search for origin in order to consider what is excluded, and in order to trace the operationalization of relations of power that are otherwise hidden from our unseeing, conventionally historical eyes. To that end, I give you the so-called “colonial” period of schooling in Micronesia, one that offers us genealogists little in the way of effectively grasping the circulation of power through contemporary schooling. Let us now leave that pile of wreckage with the angel of history and turn our sights instead not on colonial (or, in the case of Sachuo and Ramarui, curiously pre-colonial) descent, but rather on emergence. Let us now consider a history of the present.

The Song, and Actualized Event, of Solomon

To return to a quote from Flinn (1992) that we glanced over earlier: “Chuuk’s current educational system emerged relatively recently, stemming from policy changes in the 1960s and early 1970s” (p. 35). The key to this passage lies in the usage of the word “emerged,” suggestive of some process wherein Chuuk’s “current educational system” does not originate, in Nietzschean terms, as some sort of pre-existing Ursprung, but rather is the result of a convergence of forces and relations that are much more recent, and therefore more compelling, as part of an effective history of the present. To be sure, Flinn’s own phraseology is closer to that of a genealogist than might have been intended: another telling formulation from the passage is the idea that the system at work today in Chuuk comes not in one fixed moment in time but rather “in the 1960s and early 1970s,” over a period of time wherein series and events dispersed over time intersected and produced what we mean when we refer to today as “school.” Indeed, it is here, in the period Flinn speaks of, that we must train our eye in order to consider the ways in which
certain irruptions and convergences of relations and strategies of power shifted, and in which school in the islands effectively emerged.

Foucault (1977), once again drawing on Nietzsche’s vocabulary, reads Entstehung as emergence, “the moment of arising” (p. 148). To be sure, this notion of emergence should be seen not as the opposite of descent, wherein one seeks a definite lineage, but rather as its complement; for in examining descent, we discover that distant origins and original states of being (and by extension states of truth) are of no help to the genealogist, and that we are in fact concerned with the “substitutions, displacements, disguised conquests, and systematic reversals” (Foucault, 1977, p. 151) exposed by an exploration of emergence. Where, then, does school emerge in the region? What are its points of dispersion and convergence?

The irruption that resulted in the “shift in aims and strategies” in terms of formal schooling manifested itself beginning with nominally designated Solomon Report of 1963. Commissioned by President Kennedy after an embarrassing United Nations visiting team assessment in 1961 that, among other things, criticized the US for neglecting the various social and economic “needs” of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI—what today we call “Micronesia” minus Guam) since the advent of US administration in 1946, Harvard economist Anthony Solomon and his team produced an analysis of the region that considered various strategies for social, economic, and—interestingly still-classified—political “development” of the islands that would in no uncertain terms benefit the national security interests of the United States. In short, the purpose of the Solomon Report was to address the concerns of the 1961 UN visiting team, but to do so in a way that would provide a path to some form of political self-
determination for the islands of the TTPI in a manner that would result in Micronesians “choosing” to remain closely allied with the US (and, ideally, in a relationship that would allow the US to continue its policy of strategic denial of the region to rival powers, most notably, at the time, the Soviet Union). While the Solomon Report contains any number of insightful elements into just what the US thought it could and could not accomplish in the islands, nowhere is the shift in relations of power more clear-cut than through the technology of schooling.

This is not to suggest that the Solomon Report is “the” event or an isolated moment that, in of itself, is responsible for what we call schooling today. That is not how emergence operates, and in fact the Solomon Report is merely one moment among many that converges over a period of time to produce what we might call the present; as Foucault (1977) reminds us, “Emergence is always produced through a particular stage of forces…..Emergence is thus the entry of forces; it is their eruption, the leap from the wings to center stage, each in its youthful strength” (pp. 149-150). Thus, the Solomon Report is one moment in which we can, and should, focus our eyes on this specific shift of forces, one that radiates out from the early 1960s and continues to the present day. Indeed, while the Solomon Report as a discursive exercise offers vital insight into our investigation of schooling as a recent phenomenon, we should be careful not to lay either the credit or the blame at any one individual’s doorstep; to that end, we are not concerned with Anthony Solomon, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, or any one figure (such as, in a more conventional history, Father San Vitores in Guam in the 17th century), but rather with the movement from one set of strategies to another, through a particular mechanism of power (in this case, schooling as a technology of colonization). In this way, emergence
of the present materializes through processes over time, and therefore “no one can glory in it, since it always occurs in the interstice” (Foucault, 1977, p. 150).

So just what does this shift look like? To begin, it may be helpful to briefly consider the aims and strategies of the US administration in the islands prior to the advent of the Solomon Report. From the end of World War II through 1951, the islands were administered by the US Navy; civilian administration began in 1951 with the transfer of responsibility of the territory to the Department of Interior. It was under the direction of Robert Gibson, the director of education for the first dozen years of civilian rule of the region, that the US began the project of building schools and training Micronesians as teachers. The development of that system, it is important to note, reflected the larger US policy of what amounted to benign neglect in the islands: the lack of direct interest and involvement in the social aspects of island life mirrored that of a similarly lackadaisical economic interest on the part of the US, and not only did the Americans engage in a form of anthropological “zoo theory” in their intentional distance by refraining from “changing” (and by implication, harming) island societies, the administration would ultimately come under attack for administering, after its first decade, what would be pejoratively referred to as the “Rust Territory.”

At the same time, however, there is a discursive game afoot, one that critiques the U.S. administration, but in doing so simultaneously asserts the benefits of “education” as a universal good. Trumbull (1959), as an example, writes of his visit to Micronesian classrooms while employing the standard discursive narratives of schooling: “In these makeshift quarters, with a drab exterior in depressing contrast to the wild tropical scenery that surrounds them, the small faculty of six American teachers and two Micronesian
teacher-trainees had pushed the advancement of Micronesia years ahead” (p. 113). In the same chapter, however, he quotes Gibson as saying “‘We want more Americans as supervisors, but not as teachers….We don't want to impose America on Micronesia.’” In the same breath Trumbull cites the territory’s High Commissioner, Delmas Nucker: “‘We don’t want Americans to teach Micronesians….We want them to teach Micronesians how to teach other Micronesians’” (p. 127).

Both Gibson and Nucker, representing an overwhelming colonizing regime, in their own ways ironically, if not genuinely, appear intent on limiting the amount of American influence in Micronesia’s schools; Gibson, for his part, pushed for local control of schools within the territory’s six districts. However, what is of note here is the rather nonchalant way that both Gibson and Nucker assume schooling. That is, from this perspective, it appears possible to separate the direct influence of Americans from Micronesia while normalizing the schooling discourse—without, of course, acknowledging the ways in which both discursive and non-discursive practices of schooling in fact help to reinforce power relations between colonizer and colonized. Interestingly, Trumbull himself seems to disqualify Gibson’s and Nucker’s hopes for the limiting of the American administration when he tells of his experience in a “world news” class, in which “I answered questions for more than an hour, I suppose the same questions that would be asked by an American high school group” (p. 116).

Conversely, Peacock (1990), in an exhaustive and comprehensive study of the “Gibson years,” not only praises the efforts of Gibson and his supporters, but also finds irony in the fact that many of the initiatives introduced in contemporary schooling, such as bilingualism, biculturalism, and local control of schools, echo those of the 1950s in the
islands. Indeed, Peacock (1990) suggests “It is entirely possible, and I would hope probable, that Micronesians will wish to focus serious attention on an earlier educational system that aimed at their independence and in whose history may be found some of the answers to the problems that beset Micronesian schools today” (p. xx). But even here we see that there is, once again, an assumption that the answers to the present lie somewhere buried in the past, and that if we can only return to a simpler age, or in the case of the Gibson years, a purportedly more Islander-centered era, that the so-called postcolonial states of Micronesia can solve many, if not all, of their contemporary social, political, and economic issues. The underlying problematic in this approach, as we have already discussed, is in thinking that the answer lies somewhere in the habit and practice of a normalized process of school/ing.

Fascinatingly, every one of the aforementioned “histories” of school in the islands identifies, to varying degrees, the moment signified by the Solomon Report in 1963 as an important shift in American policy towards the region. Indeed, Peacock (1990) uses it as the bookend of her study, since the recommendations that emerged from the report, coupled with the trajectory of the Kennedy administration, derailed, and in many cases overtly reversed, Gibson’s approaches to schooling in the previous decade; this turn is also covered by Hezel (1975), Nevin (1977), Gale (1979), and Hanlon (1998), among others. But what is largely missing from conventional readings of the Solomon Report (with the exceptions of Gale and Hanlon) and the irruption it represents is the notion of its function as an event, what Foucault (1977) refers to as “not a decision, a treaty, a reign, or a battle, but the reversal of a relationship of forces, the usurpation of power, the appropriation of a vocabulary turned against those who had once used it….The forces
operating in history are not controlled by destiny or regulative mechanisms, but respond to haphazard conflicts” (p. 154). In fact, what distinguishes the Solomon Report as an event in this sense is that it signals a fundamental change in the very conditions of possibility that result from it. Colwell (1997) reminds us that an event “is that which repeats but repeats differentially….the key to understanding how the event emerges in time lies in the notion of actualization” (para.7, 9); what therefore separates the moment of the Solomon Report from conventional histories of school in Micronesia is that it is an event, and moreover that it is an actualized event.

Here I should make a brief digression into Deleuze’s (1991) distinction between real and virtual events. Real events may or may not result from particular conditions of possibility; that is, what is real is what is possible, while the possible needs only to exist in order to be characterized as real. Virtual events, on the other hand, become actual events, and it is through this process of actualization that events are not only produced, but become productive in themselves. The key to actualizing an event, then, lies in its productive qualities: “in order to be actualized, the virtual cannot proceed by elimination or limitation, but must create its own lines of actualization in positive acts” (Deleuze, 1991, p. 97, original emphasis). In other words, schools as sites of institutional practice and discourse may have existed long before the writing of the Solomon Report in 1963, under any number of purported colonial administrations in the islands, but the contemporary idea of schooling as we speak of it today has been actualized—in effect, created—by the fissure in relations of power exposed by the Solomon Report. What is more, the lines of differentiation and actualization of the event “are therefore truly creative: They only actualize by inventing, they create in these conditions the physical,
vital or psychical representative of the ontological level that they embody” (Deleuze, 1991, p. 101). Thus the Solomon Report stands before us as an event that disrupts the putative series that would have us believe in a teleological history of schooling, one that assumes the report as merely one in a series of co-equal moments as we traipse along the timeline of history. We should now turn to the Solomon Report itself, as an actualized event, to see how it creates the conditions of possibility that we find ourselves attending to today.

First and foremost, the Solomon Report embodies what Colwell (1997) refers to as “a shift in aims and strategies” — a shift characterized by contemporary relations and operationalizations of power in the region. To that end, the Solomon Report mirrors the “civilizing” function referred to by Hezel, among others, although this time around the “civilizing” or enlightening aspects of school/ing are dressed up in terms of present-day development discourse: “Now the schools must be looked at in the light of new major policy decisions from Washington. The first of these was the decision ‘to bring the inhabitants of the island complex into the orbit of 20th century living as rapidly as possible’” (US Government Survey Mission, 1963, p. 130), the Report tells us. It goes on to state that school “must provide knowledge about 20th century living and the place of Micronesia in it” (p. 152), implying both that the islands in 1963 somehow exist apart from the 20th century and that school is the natural site through which the islands can join the rest of the modern world. In terms of “development,” the Report states “it should be stressed that providing a sound program of education unique to Micronesian needs is possibly the biggest single challenge facing the United States in its objectives of bringing about the most rapid political, economic and social development” (pp. 177-178); indeed,
school is the premeditated proving ground for this shift in strategy on the part of the US, as “insofar as education is concerned, the revised policy places the schools, more than any other public institution and agency, in the vanguard of a deliberate program of cultural change” (p. 131).

Moreover, considering the US administration’s desire to “prepare” the islands for eventual self-government, it is instructive to consider the enthusiasm displayed by the Report for administrative control over the schools. Here, the Report explains, “Through its department of education, it is the Territory’s obligation to guide the destiny of the local school systems at all times. The educational interests of the children as well as those of the Territory must be protected against localism, petty or otherwise” (p. 135), the implication being that American administrators, who will ultimately be replaced by Islanders, must protect the sanctity of the schools from the Islanders until they (the Islanders) are ready for self-administration. A useful parallel can be found in the establishment of the political wing of the Trust Territory’s policy shift, the Congress of Micronesia, which convened in 1964. The Solomon Report almost seems to prophesy both the political development of the Islanders and the danger that their presumably parochial views pose to the entire enterprise when, two pages on, we see “the Code of the Trust Territory should contain provisions which will insulate the education function in the Trust Territory from administrative interference and harrassment [sic], from partisan politics, and from the radical changes that may follow on the heels of elections” (p. 137). Thus, while the Islanders may not know what they do, the normalization of a very particular form and function of schooling must be preserved at all costs. After all, if I may paraphrase the tenor of the Report, this is all for their own good.
But just what kind of schooling is this, on the ground and in the classroom, that is such a thorough departure from the immediate past—that is to say, the Gibson era? Fundamentally, the most important change comes in the form of official language policy, as “English is the most important single subject in the schools” (p. 148). Following closely on the heels of English instruction is that of civic education—meaning, of course, the teaching of *American* civics: “As the administering authority, it is only proper that Micronesian children know about the United States, its history, government, people and its way of life” (p. 149). Beyond curriculum content, however, something more proscriptive emerges from this restructuring of school and its purpose: the delimitation of conditions of possibility for Islander children. In this way, high schools especially “should have a double function” (p. 151): to teach a set of knowledge, founded on the aforementioned English language skills and US civics curriculum, and, more importantly, to prepare students for vocational work. Thus, “The Trust Territory…can not afford to offer only an academic high school which does not prepare students for useful work in their home communities” (p 152). In other words, the American administration from this point onward not only defines what constitutes useful knowledge, but also what students can become insofar as they are economic subjects through the determination of what, exactly, is meant by “useful work” (a term that is not considered further, but simply offered as some self-evident thing). Indeed, usefulness as a concept runs throughout the Solomon Report, although nowhere else is it as vaguely menacing to the notion of true political self-determination for the islands as when it states “The real test of Micronesian schools is not how close they are to copying American schools in their structure, curriculum, subject-matter and form, but rather how effective they are in producing good
and useful citizens” (p. 152). Again, we are left to wonder citizenship for what end, and, perhaps more importantly, for what geopolitical body: Micronesia or the United States?

The Colonial Period.

In order to see just how overwhelming the Solomon moment is insofar as it is an actualized event, one that produces the very conditions of possibility that delimit its own boundaries, we would do well, at this point, to follow the money. It is difficult to overstate the importance of the financial aspects of this strategy shift on the part of the US administration. In 1962, for example, the education budget for the Trust Territory was $775,700, while in 1964 the budget had ballooned to $3,436,022 (Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1963; 1965). The Solomon Report itself seems to prefigure the language of the No Child Left Behind legislation of 2002 when it links money with the shifting aims of schooling in the islands: “The assumption of financial responsibility for the maintenance and operation of elementary schools by the Trust Territory government will assure every child of an equal opportunity for an adequate education program” (US Government Survey Mission, 1963, p. 134). But let us not think that the Solomon Report is solely responsible for this remarkable, and very present, change in US strategic aims; in Foucault’s (1977) words, “The world we know is not this ultimately simple configuration where events are reduced to accentuate their essential traits, their final meaning, or their initial and final value. On the contrary, it is a profusion of entangled events” (p. 155). To that end, we should consider the myriad elements of this fissure and irruption in the relations of power that converge on what we call the Solomon moment.

One way to think of this moment is as an elaborate network of schooling, underwritten most notably by an influx of financial largesse the islands had never seen
before. Indeed, here we have not only the recommendations of the Solomon Report (which, incidentally, was never officially enacted as it was delivered to Kennedy six weeks before his assassination and became lost in the shuffle, as it were; nonetheless, it served as the foundation for the exportation of what would become the hallmark of the next administration), but beginning in 1964 the exporting of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs to the islands. In this way, the Trust Territory became the beneficiary of America’s most sweeping domestic programs since the New Deal, and the deluge of funding resulted in educational budgets territory-wide that dwarfed those of previous years; by 1966, this increase in budgetary resources was “made possible by the trust territory’s participation in the U.S. Elementary and Secondary Education Act” (Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1967, p. 10). Also in 1966 the Peace Corps arrived in the islands (a topic explored in greater detail in Chapter 3), making the region the only place in the world eligible for both funding from Great Society domestic programs as well as funding for foreign activities under the direction of the Department of State. In 1963 the Micronesian Teacher Education Center (MTEC) was established in Pohnpei; by 1977 it would be renamed the Community College of Micronesia and accredited by the Western Association of Schools and Colleges (WASC), headquartered in California. A year earlier, the University of Guam would be the first higher education institution to be accredited, a result of the reauthorization of the Higher Education Act in 1976; while the creation of these institutions is considered further in Chapter 3, suffice it to say that the advent of accreditation brought with it the very tangible benefit of, for the first time, access to Pell funding for students’ tuition.
The importance and influence of funding as a non-discursive practice of the operationalization of power and normalization of contemporary schooling should not be misunderstood, however. Besides the enormous sums of money that are directed at the ministries and departments of education across Micronesia, as well as to the colleges and university in the region, there is also the illuminating case of Pacific Resources for Education and Learning (PREL, formerly known as the Pacific Region Educational Laboratory), a quasi-governmental non-profit organization that is synonymous today with educational consultancy throughout the islands. Beginning in 1990, PREL’s mission has been “building capacity through education,” echoing the recommendations of the 1964 Trust Territory Annual Report and, as part of the discursive teleology at work, assuming school. Moreover, PREL’s ability to acquire and allocate funding for schooling has not gone unnoticed by the US Department of Education, as, in Title I, Part A, Subpart 2, Section 1121 (Grants for the outlying areas and the Secretary of the Interior) of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), “the [US] Secretary [of Interior] shall award grants…on a competitive basis, taking into consideration the recommendations of the Pacific Region Educational Laboratory in Honolulu, Hawaii” (US Department of Education, 2002a). While Chapter 4 is devoted to a more in-depth look at PREL and its effects, we should note here that much of PREL’s present-day activity is directed at “indigenizing” and “reclaiming ownership” of the schools in the islands by Islanders, often through cultural programs with the result, as has been discussed in the Introduction Chapter, of applying cultural rationalizations for the perpetuation and domination of the decidedly non-indigenous institutional practice and habit of American-style school. But while Peacock (1990) sees an irony of history in this financing of federal programs designed to “return”
to the bilingualism/biculturalism of the Trust Territory in the 1950s, the genealogist sees a manifest reorientation of relations of power moving in the direction of, for all intents and purposes, the colonization of the islands during the very moment of purported political decolonization; indeed, one should keep in mind that issues of accreditation, NCLB, and the role of PREL all embody a particular strategy, made possible by the role of funding through the technology of school, that is operationalized during the time of so-called “independence,” or, we might go so far as to suggest, a conventional reading of the temporal postcolonial.

In addition, an examination of annual Trust Territory reports to the US Secretary of Interior evidences the US administration’s discursive (complementing the non-discursive financial) shift in aims and strategies through schooling, as the section on education moved from Chapter 14 in reports through 1962 to its elevated and much more prominent position as Chapter 3 from 1963 onward. The 1962 report mirrors its predecessors, in that it is concerned with acquiring instructional materials, construction of school buildings, and school enrollments. One initiative of note is worth mentioning here: the territory-wide shift from instruction in the vernacular to instruction entirely in English, a decision that was made, the report tells us, “in conformance with the desire of the Micronesian people as expressed by the Council of Micronesia, and by Micronesian teachers and students” (Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1962, p. 55) and echoed a year later in the Solomon Report. By 1964, the annual reports to the Secretary of Interior display a marked change in tone. One of the first non-discursive practices became the training of Micronesians to eventually replace American personnel within the newly imagined school system. As the report of that year states, “Micronesian participation is
important in all aspects of the education program. As Micronesian educators gain professional know-how and experience, administration authority in the education field is transferred to them” (Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1964, p. 21). Thus here we see that Micronesians are expected to preside over schooling, although they would do so over a system that was reified and reinforced by a dramatic increase in the presence of American money—and, with the arrival of the Peace Corps in 1966, with an equally dramatic increase in the presence of actual Americans.

Thus there are three contemporaneous fissures through which we can trace the normalization of schooling and its operationalization as a strategy of power. The first comes as schooling that was externally imposed (by the US) becomes internally imposed (by Micronesians through such agencies as the territory-wide Board of Education and the later local Ministries and Departments of Education). The second break can be located conversely in the regulation of schooling by external loci of power; here schooling is tied almost completely to funding relations, and can be found in relations between local school administrations and the US Department of Education (in the case of Saipan and Guam), the US Department of Interior (in the case of FSM, Palau, and RMI), and WASC (in the case of the community colleges and the University of Guam). In these ways, Micronesians “freely” choose to participate in schooling practices that are inseparable from colonial financing. Both of these practices are in turn constructed by, and constructive of, the development of a narrative of the normalization of a teleological rationale for schooling; in other words, the third irruption is defined by a teleology of schooling as a normal, natural, and desirable part of Micronesian society.
What, then, does this genealogy of schooling in the Micronesia offer us? What is to be done? In a phrase, so what? To begin, it is necessary to consider the binary of problem/solution which plagues so much of present-day discourses of educational and school “reform”—or, in the case of the Rethinking Education initiative mentioned earlier, the “re-thinking” of school. A variety of aspects of school are constructed as problems to be solved, and one need not look very deep or far to see this discursive practice of producing a “problem” that is by definition in need of a “solution.” A recent audit of the Chuuk Department of Education (DOE), for example, found that the department had misused its textbook funds, resulting in either the wrong or no textbooks being distributed to students in Chuuk’s schools. The “problem” is evidenced by the low number (3%) of Chuuk high school students able to pass the English language entrance test for the College of Micronesia. The “solution” is therefore to ensure that the Chuuk DOE acquires the proper textbooks. (Jaynes, 2010). Nowhere is there a discussion of the appropriateness of school, practices of schooling, or the Chuukese context in this analysis; of course there must be school, but it must get better. There is a problem; therefore there must be a solution—if we can only find the absolute solution to all our schooling problems, the solution of the terminal reform.

Colwell (1997), on the other hand, offers that, for our genealogical purposes, “Events… remain problematic; they do not have solutions or, more to the point, they do not have solutions except insofar as they are actualized” (para. 22). That is, “The goal is to make the problem problematic, to make it a real problem once again, a problem we no longer know the answer to but for which we are compelled to find solutions” (para. 26). Thus, the purpose of genealogy is not to provide answers, but to re-actualize and re-
problematize events by discovering the very forms of construction and creation that lie embedded within them. In short, it is primarily a matter of perspective, whether it is historical, political, economic, or social; the key is that we employ knowledge, and the redirection of the power-knowledge circuit, as perspective. In this way, “Problems are of the order of events” (Deleuze, 1994 p. 188), and the solution(s), for example, to a visioning process do not emerge from asking what kind of college should exist, which assumes the college as a self-fulfilling ontology, but rather why have a college in the first place, a question which re-actualizes, and therefore re-problematizes, the very forces which converge to produce that college at all.

To conclude, then, I would simply offer that any effective history of schooling in Micronesia must take into account not only the actualized event but also an application of knowledge as perspective. We can therefore ask why, at the time of this writing in late 2010, schooling in Micronesia operates as a colonial enterprise, much more so than it did during the vaunted and so-called “colonial period” prior to World War II; and why does this operation purport to hold the “solution” to problems of development (and, in more extreme cases, civilization) in terms of a project of benevolence? Indeed, I turn here to Deleuze (1991), who succinctly states “the problem always has the solution it deserves, in terms of the way in which it is stated (i.e., the conditions under which it is determined as a problem), and of the means and terms at our disposal for stating it” (p. 16). I therefore offer, as a first step in seeking alternative re-problematizations (if not solutions), an opening up of the conditions of possibility for what we mean by school and schooling, not as a natural and ontological phenomenon in the islands but as a very deliberate and conscious effect of a history of the present. Schooling in the region of
Micronesia today is a product of the 1960s, not the 1660s; it is the creation of a set of relations of power circulating between the various island states and the United States, not Spain, Germany or Japan; it embodies the aims and strategies of colonization dressed up as development and globalization, not the processes of decolonization or the postcolonial moment.

But our genealogy does not end here; rather, we have now established at least one perspective through which to consider the conditions of possibility afforded by the discursive and institutional habits and practices of school/ing, and to offer that there may in fact be any infinite alternative ways to consider what is, indeed, possible. What follows in the following three chapters is “how various series of discourses and practices develop on their own, intersect, combine with, support and resonate with other series to generate meanings and identities that are then deployed against individuals” (Colwell, 1997, para. 17); what we have, in a phrase, is a genealogy of subjectivities, of the student, the teacher, and the parent/child/family. In the interest of consistency, I will end here with Foucault (1979a), who explains “the body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body” (p. 26). Let us now continue our history of the present by turning our gaze toward the body and that of the school/ing subject.
“This is the west, sir. When the legend becomes fact, print the legend.”

The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance, 1962

John Ford in the Rock Islands

The story of John Ford’s 1962 classic oater The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance is at heart a moralistic tale about Ransom Stoddard, played by Jimmy Stewart, who rises to public fame and fortune thanks to a particular moment of misplaced acclaim. Largely credited with killing the outlaw Liberty Valance in an archetypal western shoot-out, Stoddard goes on ultimately to the US Congress; upon his return to the town that made him famous, he admits to a newspaper editor that he in fact was not the shooter of Liberty Valance, but that a rancher, played by John Wayne, had shot Valance from a side-street at the exact moment that Stoddard, who was otherwise completely incompetent with firearms, discharged his gun. Admitting all this to the editor, Stoddard tries to set the record straight and confess that his whole persona was based on a falsehood; in response, the editor destroys his notebook and says to Stoddard, “This is the west, sir. When the legend becomes fact, print the legend” (Ford, 1962).

The so-called “Liberty Valance effect,” through which certain historical individuals rise to places of prominence in the social imaginary despite the “facts,” is by no means new in Micronesia. Elsewhere, I have applied the term to the “histories” of

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1 Owing to the lack of agreement on the Romanization of various Palauan (or, as we shall see, Yapese) names and the general inconsistencies of historical spellings, “Lee Boo” is alternately spelled LeeBoo, Leeboo, Le Boo, LeBoo, Lee Bu, Leebu, etc. Similarly, the name of Lee Boo’s mother, Ludee, also provides an array of spellings from which to choose. For the purposes of this discussion I am using the most common spelling of Lee Boo’s name as well as his mother’s, where appropriate.
David Dean O’Keefe, a copra trader from Ireland via Savannah, Georgia, and self-proclaimed “King of Yap,” as well as to the American blackbirder and all-around scourge of Pohnpei and Kosrae William “Bully” Hayes (Kupferman, 2011). In these instances, as well as others, the “official” history is largely the reporting of rumor and instantiation of conjecture; so little evidence exists of any empirical record that the legend, through repetition, reinforcement, and normalization, becomes fact—and so we continue to “print the legend.”

The story of Lee Boo follows a similar trajectory as other figures whose legend looms large over the Micronesian historical and social imaginaries. Lee Boo’s tale begins with the 1783 shipwreck of the Antelope, a British vessel that ran aground on the shallow reefs of Palau south of the kingdom of Koror, in what would today be called the Rock Islands. The captain of the Antelope, Henry Wilson, successfully befriended the ibedul (chief) of Koror, whom he mistakenly named Abba Thule, and, along with his crew, was able to build another ship out of the wreck that was the Antelope. Largely touted as the first encounter of westerners and Palauans, the interchange between Wilson and the ibedul was facilitated by Wilson’s willingness to supply the ibedul with guns and other military support during Koror’s campaign against its main rival, the kingdom of Melekeok. Upon completion of the repaired ship, dubbed the Orooolong after the British interpretation of the name of the island (Ulong in Palauan) on which they had decamped after the shipwreck, the ibedul offered his son, Lee Boo, to travel with Wilson back to London (the reasons for which we shall consider below) via a stopover in Canton, China; in exchange, Wilson left behind Madan Blanchard, who, the story goes, found a violent end not long after the departure of his fellow countrymen from the islands. While in
London, Lee Boo stayed at the home of Wilson and his family, attended school and church, and, not long into his stay, died of smallpox.

Much of what we know about Lee Boo, of course, comes not from this so-called “prince of Palau” or from any other Palauan; instead, the accounting of this tale comes almost entirely from Wilson’s recollection of events to George Keate, a writer and fellow Londoner. Yet, paraphrasing the opening epigram, this being Micronesia, the propensity for an accurate accounting of historical events takes a back seat to printing the legend. As such, what has come to be recognized as the “official” history of Lee Boo is, at best, third-hand (since the Englishmen and the Palauans communicated through Malayan intermediaries), and it is always mediated through the lens of westerners and western-oriented cultural translation.

The perspective in this way is always mono-directional; that is, the impressions of the English singularly construct the story, while the thoughts of the Islanders can only, at best, be guessed at. In his history of Palau, Ngiraked (1999), himself a Palauan, offers a striking example of this skewed historical reportage when he describes the first encounter between Wilson’s crew and the Palauans: “The men of the Antelope represented the culture of the nation regarded as the industrial capital of the world. On the Belauan side, the English saw a portrayal of tribalism not far removed from the Stone Age antiquities” (p. 66). But what, exactly did the Palauans see? Did they really regard England as “the industrial capital of the world”? (Since this was the first encounter between the English and Palauans, such a set of globalized preconceptions on either side seems, to be generous, unlikely.) Unfortunately, without a comparable Palauan narrative, the history
of this encounter remains firmly grounded in Keate’s retelling of Wilson’s retelling of events.

More troubling, then, is the way in which the thoughts, wishes, and beliefs of, for example, the *ibedul* are reported as matter-of-factly as are his actions. Hezel (1983), in his immensely popular and influential history of early contact (what he terms “pre-colonial” history, the period before the establishment of formal European colonial administrations in the islands), tells us that

The *ibedul*, for his part, decided that he would send his own son, LeeBoo, to accompany the English, for it was a common Micronesian practice for parties to exchange individuals as well as material gifts upon leave-taking. But there was more to it than that. The high chief, who had been the principal beneficiary of the Englishmen’s astonishing technology and skills, had every reason to want his son to learn their ways and to instruct his own people in them on his return. (p. 72)

Without footnotes, endnotes, or references other than Keate’s account from 1789, we are expected, it seems, to take Hezel’s description of the innermost thoughts of the *ibedul* at face value and as historical fact: the *ibedul* was not only astonished by the English, but he also wanted his son, and by extension other Palauans, to be just like them.

Similarly, Ngiraked (1999) tells us “Men on both sides, especially King Ibedul, felt the increasing pangs of grief at heart as the impending voyage of the new ship Ulong [*Oroolong*] neared” (p. 70). Elsewhere he describes Lee Boo’s reaction to first seeing a rickshaw in Canton: “It enthralled Lebuu how much such device [*sic*] as the wheel and the stick could multiply and enhance man’s physical strength for heaving burdensome loads” (p. 78); while in London, Ngiraked assures us that “It has been said that if you are
tired of London you are tired of life itself, and Lebuu was so eager to live” (p. 78). Again, like Hezel, Ngitaked provides no references (not even a bibliography) for any of these assertions; such a “history,” upon further inspection, becomes little more than one person’s opinion of events and of internal thought processes and feelings, and thereby reinforces what emerges as legendary, heroic, and, most problematic, self-evident. Of course Lee Boo was enthralled with the wheel and spoke, especially since he came from a culture and society that, in Ngiraked’s words, would be characterized by the sailors on board the Antelope as “tribal” and reminiscent of “Stone Age antiquities.” And, by extension, of course the ibedul would therefore want to send Lee Boo to learn the obviously superior ways of the English.

Perhaps the greatest example of printing Lee Boo’s legend comes from Peacock (1987), who wrote the first (and so far only) modern book-length retelling of the “Prince in London,” but who also employs a historical “method” that makes use of its share of conjecture: throughout the book, Peacock repeatedly uses words like “may have,” “might,” “would have,” etc., in order to report on Lee Boo’s thoughts and feelings. Like Hezel and Ngiraked, Peacock provides such passages as “The elaborate decorations and furniture inside it fascinated him, but he gave his most searching attention to its interior construction” (p. 72) to describe Lee Boo’s first encounter with the interior of an English household. To his credit, Peacock provides the reader with a set of endnotes severely lacking in Hezel’s and Ngiraked’s accounts. At the same time, however, his paean to Lee Boo certainly fits the mold of such “history” with his statement beginning the preface “This is not a work of fiction” (p. xiii), which is followed almost immediately by a statement of historical fantasy: “Had Lee Boo lived out his years in his own islands, at
least some of his wisdom and insights might have been passed on to later generations in traditional ways” (p. xiii). And so we persist in printing the legend.

Indeed, a visitor to Palau today would not have to search very far in order to encounter Lee Boo: both Bank Pacific and Joe’s Bar orient themselves in the Palau phone book as located on “Lebuu Street” (an interesting phenomenon in a country that lacks official street names) (Palau National Communications Corporation, 2009, p. 60); and traveling farther north along the same back road in Koror one comes to the now-defunct “Lee Boo Gift Shop” that has recently been converted into office space (although the signage remains). Curiously, Lee Boo plays almost no part in either of Koror’s museums, the privately owned and operated Etpison Museum and the government-run National Museum of Belau. In the former institution, Lee Boo’s portrait, as well as that of the ibedul and his wife, Lee Boo’s mother Ludee, sits quietly at the bottom of a display case that tries to cover all of Palau’s history in three glass-enclosed wall panels; in the latter case, he is merely alluded to, almost as an afterthought, in the description of a storyboard depicting the interchange between Henry Wilson and the ibedul of Koror. Conversely, Lee Boo’s portrait is given its own stamp as part of a philatelic commemorative sheet celebrating the National Museum. And returning to the phone book, one sees Lee Boo, the ibedul, and Wilson are given their own full paragraph, a prominent amount of space considering that the entire history of the people and their islands is condensed into one page (Palau National Communications Corporation, 2010, p. 6).

As such, Lee Boo and his legend have seamlessly woven themselves into the popular conventional history of Palau and even pervaded daily life, what with Lee Boo’s own street, stamp, and (former) retail outlet. But nowhere else is Lee Boo’s legend
greater than at Palau Community College (PCC), a two-year US-style junior college that is accredited by the Western Association of Schools and Colleges based in California. PCC not only offers its students a Lee Boo Scholarship, but fronting the college on the main road is both a Lee Boo *abai* (local house) and a statue of Lee Boo, the figure standing atop a marble pedestal (see Figure 3). The statue is particularly compelling as one is hard-pressed to find similar figurations in Micronesia; indeed, commemoration in the form of statuary is a rare honor in the islands, which includes, to the best of my accounting, Haruji Matsue, the Japanese Sugar King on Saipan; Henry Nanpei in Kitti, Pohnpei; a bust of the first president of Palau, Haruo Remeliik, outside the Belau National Museum; and, of course, Lee Boo.

*Figure 3.* Lee Boo statue and *abai* fronting Palau Community College. Photograph by the author.
We should first, however, turn our attention to the Lee Boo *abai*, and specifically the story it tells on the outer panels facing the statue (we will consider interior panels and lintels separately below) (see Figure 4). Following the tale from the bottom to the top, we see a depiction of Palauan life prior to the arrival of the English, and notably the examples of strife evident among the Islanders. Next, we see the *Antelope* run aground on the reef, and initial contact between the Europeans and Palauans as a canoe of Islanders arrives to greet the doomed ship. Apparently first contact was a success, because we are then treated to a snapshot of a battle between Koror and Melekeok, wherein the warriors from Koror (in the upper left canoe) are accompanied by an Englishman wielding a musket. We are next given a glimpse of the Englishmen in what is presumably the *ibedul*'s household on Koror, where they are either being feted or preparing for departure, or both; in the succeeding panel we see the *Oroolong* depart from the Rock Islands, although this time without a Palauan entourage to see them off. Finally, and perhaps most perplexingly, we see on the topmost panel a single figure, dressed in western clothes though depicted with brown skin (whom we may accurately assume is Lee Boo) throwing a spear at a coconut tree. What is not clear is whether this scene is taking place in London, where Lee Boo would have dressed as an Englishman, or in Palau, where he would have had access to coconut trees. What is more, the background elements of rectangular buildings with square windows suggests that he is in London, although the green hill behind the buildings remains ambiguous: is that part of the rolling hills of the English countryside, or one of the Rock Islands? Upon further reflection, and as we shall see below, such a conflation of geography, culture, difference, and time is not uncommon in the modern printing of the legend of Lee Boo; to be sure, as the final panel of this
telling of his story, such artistic, as well as discursive, historical imprecision and complication of representation is to be expected.

*Figure 4.* Lee Boo *abai* at Palau Community College. Photograph by the author.
Certainly for our purposes the crucial piece of the legend is the uppermost panel, as the construction of Lee Boo, real or otherwise, signifies the assembly and normalization of the originary and essential student in Palau, and perhaps by extension Micronesia. Returning for a moment to our biographers of Lee Boo, we see that the construction of such a subjectivity is not difficult to locate, as Hezel (1983) tells us that the ibedul “had every reason to want his son to learn their [British] ways and to instruct his own people in them on his return” (p. 72), while Ngiraked (1999) expands upon Hezel’s notion by reporting “The King wanted his son to be schooled in the knowledge and skills of the English people which can be useful for the people of Belau” (p. 71). What is notable about this second statement is the implication that the ibedul in fact knew what formal schooling was, how it was situated within British society, and that it carried with it inherent benefits for the presumably unschooled Palauans. And, not to be forgotten, Peacock’s (1987) rendering reminds us that while in England, “Such incidental observations of life in London, however satisfying, or even salutary, would not suffice to make of Lee Boo the Englishman his father hoped for. Nor would guided tours of the city. In other words, it was time for Lee Boo to be enrolled in a school. And he was” (p. 95).

Taking this heroification, and in some cases hagiography, into consideration, we would do well to ask what it is we can discern from a closer reading of the intertextuality of Lee Boo, both discursively and non-discursively. In other words, how is the subjectivity of the student in this case constructed, what does that construction simultaneously normalize and constitute as “truth,” and what does it displace and ignore (specifically in terms of “knowledge” in Palau)? Put another way, remembering our
earlier excursus on subjectivity, we should consider the figuration of Lee Boo as a student along the lines of Spivak’s (1990) narrative, since “as you proceed along the narrative, the narrative takes on its own impetus, as it were, so that one begins to see reality as non-narrated. One begins to say that it’s not a narrative, it’s the way things are” (p. 19). In his own way, though certainly not through his own deliberate actions, Lee Boo as a representation of the student in Palau has come to signify the student not as a construction, but rather as “the way things are”; that is, he is the originary student (as well as the first Palauan exchange student), and he displays certain essential and universal traits for today’s students to both emulate and reproduce.

Taking into account Besley and Peters’ (2007) clarification that “The notion of the self belongs to a culture and can really only be understood in relation to a culture comprised of values, social relations and practices” (p. 5), we recognize immediately the complex web and multiplicity of layers that frame Lee Boo as the figuration of the student; so much so that the schema of networks that form Lee Boo conflate a confused history of colonization with the universalism of the subject of the ideal western formal school student as a self-evident and ontological phenomenon in the islands. Thus, one way to begin to unpack all these various layers is to look at again at the curiously unique statue of Lee Boo and consider how the power-knowledge-subject circuit operates through it, and attempt to answer Foucault’s (1997a) vital question “How was the subject established”? (p. 87) and what is at stake in this rendering of the Micronesian student?

Scopic Regime, or Why Is He Painted White?

Seemingly emerging from a day of classes at Palau Community College, the monument of Lee Boo appears to be in mid-conversation, no doubt discussing some
important academic subject. Erected in 1999 and publicly unveiled in 2000, the statue was commissioned by the Lee Boo Society, the same group responsible for the Lee Boo Scholarship. The unveiling ceremony was a rather consequential affair, featuring as it did remarks by the High Chief of Palau as well as a who’s who of political luminaries: the then-President of Palau, along with the Speaker of the House of Delegates and the Senate President at the time (Palau Community College, 2000). Lee Boo stands atop a block of marble. He is dressed as the ideal western Enlightenment figure, complete with a bowtie, waistcoat, knickers, and pantaloons; in fact, considering the number of layers he seems to be wearing, he looks dressed more for the weather in London rather than that of Palau. In his left hand is a book, oddly reminiscent of the Statue of Liberty. His hair is neatly combed. And he is painted completely white (see Figure 5).
Figure 5. Statue and plaque of Lee Boo. Photograph by the author.

Rose (2007) offers us a variety of visual analytics with which to consider the Lee Boo monument, both as a “found” image as well as a discursive practice, one that situates the audience gazing upon it. For our purposes we should concern ourselves with the twin
concepts of visuality, “the way in which vision is constructed in various ways,” and scopic regime, which refers “to the ways in which both what is seen and how it is seen are culturally constructed” (p. 2). Here we should take careful note of Rose’s “sites” of visuality and scopic regime, specifically those of the image itself and of the audience, as well as the complex of compositional (that is, what the image is made of and how it is formed) and social (the ways in which the various social and political forces both construct the image and are produced by it) modalities that constitute, in our case, the statue of Lee Boo. In this way, we are concerned not only with the found image of Lee Boo, but also what Hill and Helmers (2004) call “visual rhetorics”: how we see it, what that seeing constructs for us as the audience, and what the implications are for our discussion of the construction of the currently normalized student in Micronesia. In Debord’s (1983) estimation, we would do well here to keep in mind “The spectacle is not a collection of images, but a social relation among people, mediated by images” (para. 4). Indeed, I argue that this monumental figuration of Lee Boo, rather than serving as a neutral representation of the conventionally implied benevolence of schooling in the islands, is in fact a site of contestation among a multiplicity of power relations. As Rose (2007) reminds us, “the important question is ‘not how images “look”, but what they can “do”’” (p. 11).

To begin, then, we shall look again at the site of the image itself, and consider its composition. Perhaps the most obvious feature of the monument is that it is painted a flat ivory, which, under the noonday Palauan sun, has the effect of intensifying just how white Lee Boo is. Here is it important to consider that the statue of Lee Boo serves as a field of visual rhetorics in a way that operates not on a reflective plane, but rather as a
mimetic (Hill and Helmers, 2004). Unlike a surface of black marble, such as that found at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, DC, through which the viewer becomes implicated in the very thing being commemorated by facing her own image reflected back among the names of the fallen (Friedman, 1995), Lee Boo is wholly non-reflective. What this aspect of compositionality suggests is that one is not supposed to see oneself reflected in the image of Lee Boo; rather, the figure is mono-directional, in that one is required instead to emulate Lee Boo. The matte white surface of this first Palauan pupil therefore serves as a lesson for the viewer, what s/he should be in developing the habits of the self that makes one a “student,” rather than a reflexive dialogue of what it means to construct such a subjectivity for oneself. Additionally, as Friedman (1995) tells us, “Monuments have no interior in the domestic or psychological sense; they are positive and solid” (p. 66). In the case of Lee Boo, curiously, his monument is composed of a metal alloy, which, when rapped on by one’s knuckles, produces, perhaps fittingly though ironically, a rather hollow ring. Compounding this positivity and solidity (or hollowness, and perhaps lack of substance) is the tradition in which Lee Boo has been composed; that is, as a classical figure, along the lines of Michaelangelo’s David, as a realistic representation of Lee Boo the man (and by implication the realistic representation of the student). There is no abstract rendering of either Lee Boo or the student; there is only, in this case, the compositional “real.”

But what makes this image particularly problematic is its social modality, in that it not only describes what Lee Boo the student is, but perhaps more importantly what Lee Boo the student is not; by doing so, the monument serves as a form of cultural “truth” (Hoorn, 1998; Zerilli, 2000). In its attempt to produce a narrative of Lee Boo as the ideal
western pupil, the monument simultaneously produces a parallel narrative of Lee Boo who is no longer an Islander; in short, the Islander and the student are configured by difference. Thus, what remains is a Lee Boo who is literate, as demonstrated by the book he clutches in his left hand, implying that unschooled Islanders (the “non-students”) are illiterate. Moreover, Lee Boo is, to use an unfortunate trope of colonization, “civilized” (or perhaps, in more current terms, “developed”) as evidenced by his western dress; this in turn suggests that native dress is, naturally, “uncivilized” (or “undeveloped”). Still yet, Lee Boo the western, literate student who travelled to London also conveys an air of cosmopolitanism, in that he is a world traveler and, again to employ more a contemporary label, a “global citizen.” Of course, such a conceit leaves us with an imputation of the Palauan native as somehow provincial and unsophisticated.

Most damning, however, is, again, the factor of Lee Boo’s color (or absence thereof). While much has been made of the construction of non-western Europeans as “the other” (see, for example, Said, 1978; or Rainbird, 2003, and Tcherkézoff, 2003, for a more localized, Micronesian delineation of “otherness”), it is striking that Lee Boo is quite literally white. In this way, Lee Boo is not “othered” in that he stands out from his fellow Islanders, but rather reassuringly is constructed as “one of us” (“us” being westerners, of course); implicit in this reading of the whiteness of Lee Boo is that the normalized western school student is familiar, and not some foreign or “other” construct. Indeed, this racializing, or perhaps de-racializing, of Lee Boo stands in direct contrast to Hezel’s (1983) “othering” of the Palauan prince prior to his formal designation as a student in London: twice in the same paragraph Hezel remarks on Lee Boo’s skin color, first describing him as Captain Wilson’s “dusky charge,” while in the next sentence
making reference to Lee Boo’s “tawny flesh” (p. 74). Thus, Lee Boo the Palauan is somehow an exotic “other,” while Lee Boo the student schooled in western ways becomes safely (and genuinely) white.

The monument also makes a pair of additional assumptions about unschooled Islanders and their western “educated” contemporaries, both through the gendering and privileging of the student. In this way, Lee Boo represents schooling as the provenance of the privileged male; in line with the historical subjection of Pacific women (see McClintock, 1997; Teaiwa, 2000; and Tavares, 2003, among others), the ibedul did not send any of his daughters (nor is there a record of any female offspring, serving as they often do in such tales as part of the scenery and domesticity of island life), nor is there any corresponding celebration of women as similarly “educated,” either in Palau or elsewhere in Micronesia. What is more, it is important to keep in mind that Lee Boo as the first student was also, we are told, the ibedul’s son, thereby conferring upon him a place of customary cultural privilege, and suggesting that schooling is available, unsurprisingly, to those who can most afford it. Counterpoised against the offering of Lee Boo to become, in a sense, English is Madan Blanchard, the Antelope crewman who stayed behind in Palau as a guest of the ibedul in a type of cultural exchange. Yet Blanchard was nowhere near English nobility, and therefore not on a cultural par with Lee Boo; in this sense, then, we are told that anyone can live like an Islander—but it takes a special, privileged person (or, more specifically, man) to become a student, and by extension “educated.”

But what does the Lee Boo monument do to, for, or with the audience? How does the statue situate the viewer, and how does that viewer then consider Lee Boo’s image as
a site of interpretation? Rose (2007) suggests that such “audiencing…refer[s] to the process by which a visual image has its meanings renegotiated, or even rejected, by particular audiences watching in specific circumstances” (p. 22). Considering our earlier application of compositional modality, we see that the viewer’s interaction with Lee Boo is one of almost unintentional double reverence, as the audience must not only look up at the statue in order to take it in (as Lee Boo stands approximately ten feet high) but also “look up” in a symbolic way to this commemorative figuration of Lee Boo as the first student; he stands, quite intentionally, as someone the audience is expected to esteem, admire, and “look up to.”

More importantly, however, is the social modality through which Lee Boo serves to situate the audience; here Rose (2007) asks us to contemplate the dual aspects of both “the social practices of spectating and the social identities of the spectators” (p. 25). In this case, we should bear in mind that viewing images as discursive practices is never a neutral or passive activity. Rather, such spectating necessarily entails the various modes through which the viewer interprets an image as well as the ways in which the image operates on the viewer, what Friedman (1995) reminds us is the process wherein “the viewer becomes the subject” (p. 69). Thus, taking into account the siting of Lee Boo at the entrance to Palau Community College, the viewer-as-subject suggests that Lee Boo’s image projects a parallel construction of the subjectivity of the viewer-as-student that mirrors the viewer’s interpretation of Lee Boo as the originary Palauan scholar. To paraphrase a popular slogan, we are all Lee Boo; by extension, we are all students in his manner.
But Lee Boo also offers a paradoxical wrinkle to the act of spectating, for spectators are not just those complicit in schooling—the monument is visible from the road, and therefore implies a normalization of the student as a universal truth, not just for those who have business on campus, but for Palauan society as an audiencing whole. In this way, in a sense, the normalized student in the form of Lee Boo is a truly “public” construction. Yet to truly view the monument, to get close enough to “look up” at Lee Boo and read the inscription that stands at his feet, a spectator would need some sort of reason to be on campus; in doing so, one has to physically arrive on campus, an act in of itself which situates the viewer firmly within the milieu of formal schooling.

It is here that we can determine that this social spectating compounds a modality of institutionalization that circulates between the monument and the audience. Seen from the road, for example, Lee Boo appears to be the successful (white) student leaving Palau Community College having “learned,” and, one suspects, having learned what has been normalized as “true knowledge.” Here, then, the college serves as a stand-in for Lee Boo’s London, where he was sent to “learn” in this way, and by extension the triumph of the west in the production of legitimate knowledges and the normalization of subjectivities constructed through the “benevolent” project of formal western schooling. Indeed, as Naylor (2002) tells us, the “geography” of Lee Boo, that is, his siting at the front of the college, legitimates both the monument’s and the institution’s “significance in the production of scientific and civic knowledges of the region” (p. 495). Curiously, however, those acknowledged “knowledges of the region” do not include local, Palauan definitions of knowing, as both Lee Boo and the college serve as exemplars of the colonial schooling project in the region. Thus we are left to ask of the Lee Boo
monument: “What does the work do to the [school’s] processes of memorialization?” (Smith, 2001, p. 646). What “history” are we to take away from Lee Boo’s statue, and what does that history tell us about college as a place of “teaching” and “learning”? To be sure, the western orientation of both the statue and Palau Community College, which, we should remember, proudly advertises on its seal outside the administration building that it is “accredited by the Western Association of Schools and Colleges,” in fact displaces local knowledges by privileging “real” (i.e., western) knowledge which is available not in local cultural contexts but only through formal schooling. The student, for our purposes, is clearly a multilayered construction, one that employs the scopic regime of the statue of Lee Boo through which schooling as a technology of power circulates not only to produce Lee Boo as the ideal western student, but also to double-back on the audience-as-subject, thereby constructing the subjectivity of the student through and onto the viewer. While the foregoing is by no means intended to be a comprehensive visual analysis, we can begin to recognize how the monument offers a number of ways in which to consider the subjectivity of the student in Palau (and perhaps in the region), most notably through what the student both is and is not, and what that construction privileges and what it displaces. Given all of this, we might wonder if Lee Boo is separable and recoverable from his subjectivation as a student (or, more properly, “the” student). In order to begin to address this idea, we should now look away from the monument itself and turn our spectating eye to the discursive practice that lays at his feet.
“Osiik a Llomes” and the Limits of Heliotropic(al) Translation

Situated below Lee Boo, and serving as a discursive marker of what the figure is intended, ostensibly, to represent, the descriptive plaque goes on to retell the story of Lee Boo the man while simultaneously providing yet another layer of multiplicity to Lee Boo the student. In Foucault’s (1983) words, the text “has returned to its natural state—below the image, where it serves to support it, name it, explain it, decompose it, insert it in the series of texts and in the pages of the book. Once more it becomes a ‘legend’” (p. 22). Emblazoned with the flag of Palau at the top, the title of the plaque is “Osiik a Llomes,” which can be translated roughly to mean “to seek light” or “to seek education,” albeit to seek such things elsewhere. Taken with the foregoing analysis of the figuration of the monument itself, we see that Lee Boo is the essential representative of “osiik a llomes,” an idea, we are told at the bottom of the plaque, that in fact represents its own philosophy (see Figure 6.)

Before venturing further into the discursive turns that operate through this narrative that is, almost quite literally, etched into stone (or at least mounted on it), we should consider first the metaphor at play in “osiik a llomes” and the ways in which Aristotle’s heliotrope operates through the subjectivation of this first Palauan student. Derrida’s (1982) analysis of the Aristotelian metaphor of the sun (helos) delineates the often subtle, and more often invisible, strategy of the heliotrope; applied to the empirical “truth” and “objectivity” of the Enlightenment, we see that “the sun represents what is natural in philosophical language” (p. 251). Thus what was “discovered” as “truth” in the 17th and 18th centuries in western Europe, embodied in the notion of “enlightenment,” is in fact the work of the metaphor of the sun. From the vantage point of western
philosophy, this heliotrope has signified as “both a movement turned toward the sun and the turning movement of the sun” (p. 251). In this way, the search for “meaning,” “truth,” “light,” and other comparable euphemisms, is an act of discovery of some “already-there” essential and universal idea (in Greek *eidos*, or light).

*Figure 6.* Explanatory plaque beneath the Lee Boo statue. Photograph by the author.
What is more, there are two vital elements of the heliotrope beyond the simple metaphoricity of “enlightenment”: first, that the heliotrope is in a sense a duality of knowing and seeing; and second, that the metaphor as the ultimate metaphor in fact simultaneously “lightens” as well as remains invisible, and therefore appears to exist ontologically outside the realm of metaphoricity. To the first point, Derrida observes that running through the heliotrope is “the analogy between the vision of the nous and sensory vision, between the intelligible sun and the visible sun” (pp. 254-255); for our purposes, then, the so-called “philosophy” of *osiik a llomes* serves as the intelligible sun while the monument of Lee Boo, and by extension the monument of the student, serves as the visible sun.

To the second point, that of metaphoricity, Ankersmit (1996) tells us “the heliotrope is the use of metaphor that tends to obscure its metaphorical character” (p. 264), which it does “by bathing everything in a clear and even light that makes us forget that the light must have a source” (p. 265). In this way, the heliotrope inspires what Derrida calls its “revelation” while simultaneously incurring in us an amnesiac state that reinforces our ability to disremember its own production. One of the effects of this assumed detachment and objectivity, and therefore “discovery” of “truth,” is that, in Ankersmit’s terms, “the less a political philosophy has empirical content, the more it is inclined to eliminate political action from its scope” (p. 269). The invocation of *osiik a llomes* as the guiding philosophical construct with which to consider the meaning of Lee Boo, therefore, serves to attempt, through metaphor, to aspire to dispassionate reality; the effect of such an approach, as Shapiro (1985-1986) observes, is that “immanent in figures of speech are philosophical commitments and theories of value and that often the figures
are so venerable and thus familiar that they do their partisan work under the guise of neutrality (passing for the literal)” (p. 195). Thus, the construction and reverence of Lee Boo, as well as the underlying “philosophy” of osiik lllomes, operating through the heliotropic(al) metaphor, together assemble the student, and more specifically the student of “enlightenment,” as natural, without cause, and revelatory, rather than as the construction of a subjectivity that is produced, and therefore contestable and contingent.

So just how does this heliotropic(al) metaphor function discursively? To answer this question, we should now turn to the plaque itself. The first part of the plaque offers our by-now expected “history” of Lee Boo: “With the consent of his father, King Ibedul of Koror, Prince LeeBoo departed Palau with Captain Henry Wilson and the crew of Antelope to London, England on November 12, in the year of our lord 1783.” At this point there is little to surprise us in this rendering of the legend, with the possible exception of the invocation of the phrase “in the year of our lord” (certainly that was not the year of Lee Boo’s lord, or of the ibedul). For now, let us continue reading: “While in London, Prince LeeBoo became Palau’s de facto ambassador of goodwill to England and Palau’s first true scholar.” Here, we should take note, we have begun the process of the subjectivation of the student in Palau; indeed, Lee Boo is not only the first student, he is the first true scholar. The implication, if we are to take this statement at face value, is that prior to Lee Boo, Palau had no true scholars and therefore no true scholarship. The fact that Lee Boo underwent this transformation in London suggests, of course, that true scholarship is to be found there and by extension the western world, since, naturally, that is where true scholars are made.
Continuing on, we learn of the tragedy that befalls Lee Boo, and perhaps more tellingly, the tragedy that befalls Palau: “However, LeeBoo’s plan of returning to Palau to spread universal knowledge and scientific discoveries to his people came to an abrupt end when the young prince succumbed to small pox in the winter of 1784.” Here we come to see how universal knowledge and scientific discoveries, and by extension the trope of science as neutral, are to be found in London, and not anywhere in Palau. Thus there is nothing universal about Palauan knowledges; in fact, implicit in this discourse is that Palauan culture and society has nothing to offer the world, and indeed Palauan customs are the purview of the non-universal, that is, the parochial, the unsophisticated, and, if one excuses the paleonomy of the term, the uncivilized. Conversely, we see that London (and the west) has no contingent, locally produced, contextualized knowledges; rather, London, and the rest of “enlightened” Europe, is the home of universal knowledge (and let us be clear here that we are using the singular to be sure that there is only one type and set of universal knowledge), and therefore London is the home base of “truth,” insofar as our heliotropic(al) metaphor is concerned. What is more, we see that to be a student (that is, a true student), one must study not only universal knowledge and what is neutrally referred to as “science,” but that one must leave Palau, travel to London (or the west), and return to “enlighten” one’s fellow Islanders. Palau, therefore, lacks true enlightenment, and by metaphorical insinuation, ironically enough, it lacks osiik a llomes as well.

The next two sentences on the plaque, while completing the conventional narrative of Lee Boo, will be considered in detail in the next section below. For now, let us skip ahead: “For a grateful nation whose spirit he invigorated and for the new
generation of prolific scholars whom he inspired, the memory of Prince Lee Boo and his
profound dreams, is enshrined here, now and forever.” It is at this point, invoking “the
new generation of prolific scholars” that the subjectivation of Lee Boo as a student is not
only reinforced, but from this point forth he serves both as a model and as an inspiration,
much in the mode of Derrida’s metaphorical “revelation.” Yet when did this “new
generation” emerge? Certainly not in the century after Lee Boo’s death, or even for most
of the century after that; rather, these “prolific scholars,” if we recall the institutional
siting of the monument, both by and of the audience, do not emerge temporally until the
founding of the college itself, chartered in 1993, or even as late as the erection of the
statue in 1999. This suggestion of a “new generation of prolific scholars” therefore puts
Palau Community College itself squarely within the metaphoricity of osiik a lloses and
the heliotrope, insofar as its complicity in producing such scholars is concerned. (This
idea also complicates the role of the college within the framework of osiik a llomes, for
how can the college at once lay claim to western knowledge—or at the very least claim
western accreditation—and in the same moment reinforce the notion that nothing of
universal worth or value is to be found in Palau?) Concluding the narrative of the plaque,
then, we see a parallel sentiment regarding the construction of the student, especially
those at the college, as “This memorial is dedicated...to the youth and the aspiring [sic]
scholars of Palau” (certainly the authors meant “aspiring scholars”). Again, the student in
this case is both youthful—and therefore in need of “enlightenment” through schooling in
the ways of universal knowledge and true scholarship—and aspiring to Lee Boo’s
academic heights (that is, to leave Palau and its apparent intellectual shortcomings).
Perhaps one last observation should be noted in reference to the discourse on display, specifically the language employed therein. Here I refer not to the discursive turns we see outlined above; rather, what is striking about this narrative as it is laid out on the plaque is that, with the exception of the title phrase ("Osiik a Llomes"), the entire piece is written in English. This application of language suggests two simultaneous ideas, albeit in conflict: the use of English as the “universal” language (as well as the official language of instruction at the college and one of the official languages of Palau) gives lie to the metaphor of the heliotrope and reinforces the primacy of western Enlightenment doxa as “universal,” “truth,” etc.; concurrently, the use of Palauan in the title implies some kind of indigenous connection to the heliotrope, ascribing the meaning of osiik a llomes as a Palauan concept while such metaphoricity serves to displace Palauan knowledges as “false,” or at least non-universal, knowledge. Thus the attempt to co-opt the “clarity” of European enlightenment by applying the vernacular results in an effect that both reinscribes the heliotrope while at the same time claims to discover (coincidentally) a parallel between cultures—which in turn erases the very knowledges embedded in, and symbolized by, the local language.

More than this, though, there is a separate tension at work, one that emerges upon consideration of the very cultural contexts in which this discursive practice is deployed. For rather than venerate the sun, customary Palauan practice is in fact to pay homage to the moon, specifically the full moon. As a matter of custom, reproductive and planting cycles are dependent on the moon, as are decisions such as building a house or getting married. What is more, Palau’s national flag is the only one in the world that displays a full moon, and one sees the full moon, interestingly enough, exhibited on the flag present
atop the title of the commemorative inscription affixed to the Lee Boo monument. With our present investigation of the Lee Boo plaque and the Aristotelian heliotrope, we might ponder the possibility of a counter-conception of a metaphorical lunatrobe, one which venerates not the sun but its celestial opposite, the moon, as a form of cultural resistance. But even this opposing lunatrobe is not immune from the larger normalization processes currently at work, as evidenced by a public service announcement outside the Palau Ministry of Education (MOE) building in Koror. Here we see a picture of an elder reading to a child, both of whom are seated in what looks like a traditional structure amid a stack of books along with a pen and pencil (see Figure 7). What is of note in this image is that the source of light by which the elder is reading is the full moon, reflected in the water and illuminating the beach and the limestone rock islands in the background. The phrase running along the top of the image, again employing the vernacular, reads “A Omesuub a Kerebil a Klechad”, which (roughly) translates to mean learning (or perhaps education) as a model of a way of life, or, perhaps more fluidly, that learning is or should be a way of life, a mode of being. Finally, it might be worth mentioning that this scene takes place at night, at a time when customarily Palauan children are not just eating dinner but also (metaphorically) the words of their parents and elders.
Yet we should remember that this image is, at heart, an advertisement for the bureaucratic organ of state-sponsored formal schooling in Palau; in a parallel way, we would also do well to take into account that the light of the moon, and in this case the full moon, is in fact light reflected from the sun. But while a customary Palauan lunatrope employs the refraction of the sun’s rays in the service of cultural habits and practices of being, the lunatrope deployed by the MOE, while ostensibly situated as the opposite of the heliotrope, actually supports and bolsters the heliotrope since it operates on the assumption of learning by light (in this case the light of the sun mediated by the moon). The metaphor here can reasonably be extended and applied to our earlier discussion and critique of contemporary “indigenizing” reforms of formal western schooling models (see
the Introduction Chapter), in that the use of the full moon suggests that formal schooling is somehow connected to indigenous Palauan ways of learning and knowledges. But this simply serves to privilege systems of state-sponsored schooling with a veneer of indigeneity, simultaneously applying a derivative metaphor of the heliotrope; after all, the sun’s rays are what make the moon visible in the first place. In fact, what the image above suggests is that customary ways of knowing now necessitate books, a narrow definition of literacy, the use of pens and pencils, and, of course, illumination or enlightenment, although an enlightenment that is layered with discourses of nationalism as embodied in the symbolism of the Palauan flag and engineered by a government ministry.

But still, what do we make of the apparent tensions between our (controverted) lunatrope and heliotrope, as they are encapsulated in the structures of power that operate through the Ministry of Education and Palau Community College? Indeed, the heliotropic(al) notion of osiik a lomes would appear to be negated by the efforts of the Ministry’s attempt at metaphoricity, by suggesting that one does not in fact need to leave Palau anymore in order to be a “true scholar” in the mode of Lee Boo, that in fact the world has now come to Palau, and it has done so in the manifestation of the ministry as the provider of what is now termed “education.” Conversely, the college’s privileging of osiik a lomes might suggest that one in fact “leaves” Palau at the point when one enters the college to learn “true” knowledge. And again, from the perspective of the college, Lee Boo as Derrida’s visible sun of the student along with his intelligible narrative located in the plaque in their own way negate the custom embodied in the lunatrope, and by extension they foreclose on the conditions of possibility for Palauan knowledges.
To be sure this tension merely serves to underscore just how interconnected the narratives of formal state-sponsored schooling are with the modern Palauan nation-state which in turn intersects with the embodied sun in the figure of Lee Boo, “Palau’s first true scholar.” What this tension does not reveal, however, is any attempt to privilege or offer primacy to Palauan knowledges, and in fact the co-opted lunatrope-heliotrope friction only serves to further displace those indigenous knowledges while both the Ministry of Education and Palau Community College struggle to lay authentic claim to formal schooling. “Knowing” in both (ministerial) luna- and heliotropical senses is a passive act, one illumined either by the universal and always-present sun during the day or those same beams of light manipulated by the ministry and reflected from the moon at night. All things being equal, as Shapiro (1985-1986) councils, “we would better understand what we do when we ‘know’ if we regarded knowing as an aggressive act rather than something as passive as the reception of rays of light” (pp. 194-195). And where in all of this, we must ask, is the student? For our purposes, Lee Boo is where he has always been: brightened by rays of light emanating from the source of enlightenment—school.

A Portrait of the Student as a Young Man: The Benevolence of the Colonial Project

We would do well here to return for a moment to the abai positioned next to the statue of Lee Boo. To begin, there appears at first glance to be an inherent conflict between the seemingly self-evident customary implications of siting a local structure next to a monument with as western an orientation as that of Lee Boo. But if we take into account our earlier discussion of the MOE’s public service announcement, we see that while the use of the abai can be seen as a cultural legitimation of Lee Boo’s Palauan
heritage and authenticity, and therefore as an attempt to “indigenize” Lee Boo and his subjectivation as a western formal school student, upon closer inspection we can begin to recognize how in fact the opposite is the case. In other words, rather than serving as a parallel “traditional” monument to the legend of Lee Boo, the abai serves instead as yet another manifestation of the use of “tradition” and “culture” to normalize what is a decidedly western concept of schooling.

While in the opening section of this chapter I have briefly described the outside wall of the abai facing Lee Boo (see Figure 3), it is time now to head inside the structure and read, yet again, the heroification of Lee Boo the student. Beginning from the right, the first interior lintel facing the entrance to the abai shows Lee Boo (we presume) riding in a carriage along the English countryside. This scene seems to come almost directly out of Peacock’s (1987) account of Lee Boo’s introduction to London in a chapter titled “A House ‘Ran Away with by Horses’:

Describing the trip from Portsmouth to London, George Keate quotes Lee Boo as having said ‘he had been put into a little house, which was ran away with by horses—that he slept, but still was going on; and whilst he went one way, the fields, houses, and trees, all went another!’ (p. 80)

There are a number of curious elements to this sentence, not the least of which is why Lee Boo, if Keate is actually quoting him, uses the third person to refer to himself. More importantly, however, is the notion that the idea of a moving vehicle was new to Lee Boo, and that while he seemed to remain stationary in the carriage the scenery moved past him; indeed, one wonders if Lee Boo, in his twenty years in Palau, had ever been in a canoe, since the visual effect would have been the same (or if he had been paying
attention at all to the way in which the *Oroolong* operated on his way to England). What this rendering of Lee Boo’s carriage ride does, in fact, is supplant local (Palauan) modes of transportation with more “modern” (English) vehicles—and by extension therefore privileges the machinery of the English, with its land-based technological superiority, in relation to the relative backwardness of Palauan modes of movement (which on land would mean walking), simultaneously displacing the rather impressive achievement of navigating and settling the vast Pacific Ocean thousands of years before Captain Wilson ran the *Antelope* aground on the reef.

Moving to the left of this same lintel, we see a sort of diptych in which Lee Boo, in the right-hand panel, is dressed in shirt and pants, seated in a chair at a desk in a schoolhouse, holding in his left hand a piece of paper (or a book)—recalling the Lee Boo statue’s clutching of a book in his left hand—and interacting rather animatedly with a teacher standing and pointing to what we can assume is the day’s lesson on a board. To the left we see Lee Boo again dressed in western clothes, seated in a chair, and this time at a table where he holds a fork in his right hand and a spoon in his left. Food in a bowl, a bottle, and a glass are set on the table, and one can safely imagine that the two standing figures holding another bottle and glass in front of Lee Boo are Mrs. and Captain Wilson, teaching Lee Boo how to eat like an Englishman (see Figure 8). It is useful to note here that, while Lee Boo is distinguished in both parts of this diptych as seated and wearing a stylized cap (if that is not meant to represent his hair), in respect to skin color he is indistinguishable from either the teacher or the Wilsons; in a sense, his “education” in England, both formal and social, has had a whitening effect on Lee Boo. Of note is the contrast with which Lee Boo is portrayed on the outside of the *abai* throwing spears at
coconuts, apparently in the middle of a city (one presumes London): here he is painted brown, and is in this way marked both as different from Europeans and indistinguishable from the other Palauans represented on this side of the abai (the Englishman in the canoe with the musket in the panel depicting the battle with Melekeok, we recall, is painted white). All but one of the rest of the interior lintels of the abai go on to recall the rest of Lee Boo’s story, including his death and burial and the return of the English to Palau to inform the ibedul of Lee Boo’s passing. The one lintel that does not contribute to Lee Boo’s legend depicts, more customarily, a line of fish.

Figure 8. Detail of an interior lintel from the Lee Boo abai. This diptych shows Lee Boo in London, both at the Wilson household and in school. Photograph by the author.

But the question we must ask ourselves in relation to this diptych is not so much what it looks like, recalling Rose (2007), but rather what it does. Certainly there is a connection to be made between formal schooling and learning English “manners” (and therefore becoming “civilized”); indeed, both the schoolhouse and the Wilson household are drawn to be almost exact matches. The implication here seems to be that there is no substantive difference between being schooled in the standard English curriculum as well as in social etiquette; one might go so far as to suggest that both formal school and proper English comportment are two sides of the same colonizing coin. To be sure, much has been written in regards to the contemporaneous link between formal western schooling
and the typically violent project of colonization. Kelly and Altbach (1978) remind us early on that colonial “schools were primary designed to serve the needs of the colonizers” (p. 2); this was certainly the case for those among the colonized population who were “fortunate” enough to be educated in the colonizing metropolis. Writing of the British colonial school system in India (fifty years after the first encounter between the English and the Palauans), Loomba (2005) writes of Thomas Babington Macaulay, “the architect of English education in India”:

“English education, he suggested, would train natives who were ‘Indian in blood and colour’ to become ‘English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect’. These people would constitute a class who would in fact protect British interests and help them rule a vast and potentially unruly land.” (p. 75)

Focusing in on the American interest in “developing” Micronesian education in the wake of the damning report by the 1961 United Nations visit, we recall how the Solomon Report informs us “Now the schools [in the Trust Territory] must be looked at in the light of new major policy decisions from Washington. The first of these was the decision ‘to bring the inhabitants of the island complex into the orbit of 20th century living as rapidly as possible’” (US Government Survey Mission, 1963, p. 130). And more recently, we should recall Hezel’s (1975) assertion that “Education has always had a ‘civilizing’ function throughout history” (p. 126), a history that should include Micronesia.

Thus, in both scenes of the diptych, Lee Boo is “learning” how to be “civilized,” and his construction as a student in both instances cannot be understated: in the schoolhouse, he is literally subjectivized as a student who sits and interacts with the standing teacher, listening to what (western) knowledge the instructor has to impart to
him. Here the student is passive (as evidenced by being seated), yet he is also active in his engagement with the teacher and the material; in modern parlance, he is “on task.” Considering that both Lee Boo and the teacher are holding books of some sort, and there is a lesson written on the board, the student is also literate, in a narrow definition of that term (that is, able to read and write in English). In the panel on the left, Lee Boo is also a student, this time of English mores and the “proper” way to comport himself. He is “learning” here how to eat with utensils, drink from a glass, and do so while sitting in a chair at a table. Again, his learning is passive (as he is seated), but the lesson is apparently not lost on the student: once more, Lee Boo is focused as much on learning the behaviors and practices of “the civilized” as he is “true knowledge.” As the narrative found in the monument’s unveiling ceremony program tells us, Lee Boo demonstrated “eagerness to learn and aptitude for comprehension and observation” (Palau Community College, 2000). And in a phrase, Peacock (1987) tells us that Lee Boo was “so curious and so appreciative of all that he saw and learned” (p. 90). There is perhaps no better summation of the subjectivity of the ideal student.

All of this learning, most of all how to become a student in the formal western schooling sense of the word, is, we recall, exactly what the ibedul had in mind for his son (or so we are told—how the ibedul could have envisioned any of this is unclear). But embedded in this multiplicity of layers of Lee Boo is an assumption that formal schooling, as an arm of the colonial project, is, at heart, benevolent. This gloss on the realities of colonization also plays out in its contemporary expression: development. Thus a return to one of the sentences on the Lee Boo plaque that we earlier had skipped over allows us to consider just how interrelated Lee Boo’s schooling is with both the colonial
project and that of contemporary development discourse: “The remains of Prince Lee Boo and his grand plans for Palau lay buried today in the courtyard of St. Mary’s church in Rotherhite, London, England.” The implication here, embedded in the phrase “grand plans,” is that if only Lee Boo had survived his London “education” and been able to return to Palau and indeed implement those changes that he (and by extension the ibedul) had anticipated for the “improvement” of Palau, then perhaps today’s Palauan nation-state would occupy a rightful place beside so-called “developed” countries of the west—knot the least of which, of course, is England.

This missed opportunity for Palau is echoed (again) by Peacock (1987): “[Lee Boo] did not covet material things that would be impractical to import to his distant homeland. Seeds would suffice, but those he had ready for his return, along with the ideas he hoped to plant among his people, were never to reach his islands” (p. 108); and it is reiterated (again) by Ngiraked (1999):

it is difficult not to get involved in contemplative projection such as would elicit questions of what political and social conditions would have arisen in consequence had Lebuu’s mission to London were successfully completed [sic];
and had the heir apparent to the Belauan crown returned home to assume his office. (p. 86)

Yet both these authors go even further in grieving just what might have been for today’s Palau, while simultaneously normalizing the tropes of development discourse and the displacement of Palauan knowledges as inherently “undeveloped.” By the 1870s a peace treaty had been negotiated between Koror and Melekeok at the behest of the British, yet in the absence of Lee Boo’s triumphant return to the islands Peacock holds forth that
Captain Cyprian Bridge, who pushed for the treaty, disapproved of the use of British weaponry in the preceding inter-island warfare and that Bridge “might also have been saddened to think that after a century Lee Boo’s people had still not learned their letters, his peace treaty having been signed with the X marks of the Abba Thulle and the Reklai” (p. 183). Not to be outdone, we should quote Ngiraked’s historical projection at length:

He [Lee Boo] would have begun a schooling [sic] in reading and writing the English language; He would have taken steps to change the lifestyle from that of hunting into those of farming and herding; He would have had to do something about clothing for men and women; He would have introduced new ways of cooking and food preparation, such as salting, pickling, smoking, and frying; He would have sought to make a seafaring force of the Belauan warriors, perhaps by means of more seaworthy crafts than the canoes; He would have converted the natives to Christianity and led them at worship and praying in church. (p. 86)

Putting aside what may be explained as a stylistic peculiarity the capitalization of “He” (which lends an air of religious infallibility to the proceedings), the link between Lee Boo as the student, his “civilizing” experience through school, and his importation of western (i.e., “universal”) knowledge to Palau (which was, alas, cut short by his untimely death) is inextricably linked with the island’s current state of “development” (or lack thereof). And while it is admittedly rare to read of a present-day Islander, writing in a (supposed) time of decolonization and the postcolonial, who pines for an historical corrective to a perceived failure in the teleological progression of development (through the colonial project) as applied to his home island, still Ngiraked (1999) goes on to envision that
“Nothing is more conceivable than for Lebuu to have sought some political affiliation or alliance with England” (p. 86).

A parallel affiliation, at least at an institutional level, of course has been reached at the college, in this case with the Western Association of Schools and Colleges, through the accreditation process. While I have earlier problematized accreditation issues in Micronesia (see the Introductory Chapter), it is useful, in light of our present discussion of the link between schooling, colonization, and development, to point out that Lee Boo makes only one appearance in the current Palau Community College catalog: on the bottom of page 11, his statue serves as the backdrop for a picture of “PCC Board of Trustees and the Accreditation Team” gathered in a group at Lee Boo’s feet (Palau Community College, 2008, p. 11). Hidden among the daily business of the college, Lee Boo continues to operate as the link between the ideal student of the Enlightenment and the benevolent colonial project with that of the present-day college student and the benevolence of the dual processes of institutional accreditation and nation-state development.

But perhaps nowhere is this projected historical fantasy better visualized than in a painting that greets the visitor to the new library at Palau Community College upon entering the building. Painted by Greg Flores, and donated to PCC by the Lee Boo Society shortly after the unveiling of the monument out in front of the campus, the image is one of Lee Boo as the prodigal son who has returned home, presumably to now play the role of “teacher” to his otherwise unschooled (and by implication “uncivilized” or “undeveloped”) fellow Islanders. Here Lee Boo strolls along a beach among the Rock Islands, holding in his right hand a rope (which, we are told by Hezel, Ngiraked, and
Peacock, Lee Boo used to tie off knots as a way in which to remember important events), and dressed, as he is in the monument, in a waistcoat, bowtie, shoes, and pantaloons (see Figure 9). Having been to Palau I can say with certainty that this outfit is not only unnecessary, it is also entirely contextually inappropriate—one need not wonder too long just how waterlogged those shoes would get considering how closely Lee Boo is walking to the shoreline, or how quickly he would sweat through at least three (visible) layers of shirts and jacket. Of course, since Lee Boo never returned to Palau, this painting is one of historical fiction and fantasy, and we will never know just how long Lee Boo would have stayed dressed as an Englishman in the middle of a sunny day at the beach.

So what does this image tell us then? To begin, it suggests the visualization of the subjectivity of the ideal student as successful, having learned all that he could; the student has gone abroad, as evidenced by his dress; and that the student has returned to his home, ostensibly to now share what he has learned with his people. In a way, this rather superficial analysis provides us with a basic conception of the policies of the scholarship offices in the various states in contemporary Micronesia: whether in Palau, the FSM, or the RMI, students who study abroad are expected to return having graduated with advanced degrees in order to contribute to their communities’ efforts at “development” (conversely, this order of operations is also intended to eliminate what is commonly called the “brain drain” wherein students leave the islands, never to return). Additionally, we see that the perspective of the image shows a Lee Boo who is now taller than the beach’s coconut trees, implying some form of mastery of the “educated” man over nature, or, if we may be permitted, of the return of the prodigal—and now conquering—student.
Figure 9. “Prince Leeboo of Belau.” Copyright by Greg Flores. Image used with permission; photograph by the author.
Yet more importantly, this image reinforces a number of assumptions about schooling, development, and the role of the student, while at the same time foreclosing on any number of local and contextual conditions of possibility. For the image requires that a student return to the islands (in this case Palau) wearing western dress (and not just any western dress, but that emblematic of the Enlightenment), and by implication privilege western ways of knowing as somehow “objective truth.” Indeed, this displacement of local knowledges and modes of being is perhaps clearest in the painting (as well as the image of the Lee Boo the Englishman exhibited in the monument), since, as Zerilli (2000) observes, “The Eastern gaze gives back to the West its ideal image of itself, confirming the status and value of the original by showing it worthy of replication” (p. 187). Thus, it is entirely expected (and normalized) that Lee Boo would dress as an Enlightenment figure upon his (fictional) return, since it is from the west (and not from Palau) that he has become “educated”; and by employing such a metalepsis, what Spivak (1990) tells us is the process by which we mistake an effect for a cause, we are left with the security that because the west is emulated, western knowledge is “good”—conversely, the parallel conclusion to be drawn is that displaced (Palauan) knowledges are “bad” or not of value, since they are not “worthy of replication” here. Indeed, Debord’s (1983) exploration of the spectacle is of note as, like in the case of Lee Boo’s portrait fantasia, “The spectacle presents itself as something enormously positive, indisputable and inaccessible. It says nothing more than ‘that which appears is good, that which is good appears’” (para. 12). The artist therefore provides us with a plain delimitation of the boundaries of illustration and subjectivation, as his painting is one of fantasy, imagination, and unreality. That is, here “we have a clear failure of the famous
empirical eye, the truthful eye of the Enlightenment” (Hoorn, 1998, p. 56), since this image of Lee Boo the conquering Englishman is one of manifest misrepresentation. But the interconnectedness of the student, schooling, and development remain, and in so doing continue to normalize what one should want to do and be when one is constructed, and constructs oneself, as a student in the islands.

The Student as Simulacrum

Given the above, it seems we may well have a clearer picture of Lee Boo the student, Lee Boo the man, and Lee Boo the monument. The multiplicity of texts that layer one atop the other to produce “Lee Boo” seems, perhaps, inexhaustible; to that end, we should come away from the image(s) of this “first true scholar” with a deeper and more utilitarian appreciation for the myriad ways in which this originary student is constructed. But do we? If this is indeed the case, then what are we to make of Nero’s (2002) recent pronouncement that Lee Boo may not, in fact, have even been Palauan?:

The most important sign is the name of Ibedul’s adopted son, Lebuu—a Yapese, not Palauan name. In Yapese Lebuu refers to a floral head wreath. Naming practices are highly significant in both island groups, indicating parentage. According to Koror and Yapese oral histories Lebuu was half Palauan and half Yapese, although accounts differ as to whether he was of the Idid [chiefly Koror] clan through his mother or father. (p. 17)

Does this problematic interruption in his lineage help to explain why his father (or, in Nero’s terms, his adopted father) was so willing to send his “son” halfway around the world with a crew full of foreigners? Did the ibedul really expect (or want) to see Lee Boo again? More importantly for us, what does Lee Boo’s designation as the first
Palauan student mean if we can wonder aloud whether or not he was even Palauan? Is there an original, essential student after all?

To consider these latter questions, it is helpful to turn to Baudrillard’s (1994) logic of the simulacrum (the model) and its resultant turn to simulation (the process of copying the model). Here Baudrillard explains that this process “no longer has anything to do with a logic of facts and an order of reason. Simulation is characterized by a precession of the model, of all the models based on the merest fact—the models come first, their circulation, orbital like that of the bomb, constitutes the genuine magnetic field of the event” (p. 16, original emphasis). In this way, the model precedes the real: that is, the legend, statuary, and narrative of Lee Boo the student come first—and do so monumentally only as recently as 1999—followed by the construction of the student in the region, modeled as it is on “Palau’s first true scholar.”

If we take Lee Boo as Palau’s first student, in other words, then there is no “first student”; there is only the copy, upon which all other “students” in the islands are modeled, and the construction of the student becomes an exercise in the simulation of the non-originary copy. Baudrillard goes on to observe that “it is now impossible to isolate the process of the real, or to prove the real” (p. 21, original emphasis). Much like the move away from a teleological reading of the history of schooling in the region (in Chapter 1), here we need to consider the move away from the schooling subject (in this case the student) as somehow “real,” universal, and essential, especially taking into account the role(s) played in the process of this subjectivation by forces of colonization and the delineation of what constitutes “true” knowledge as an effect of the power-knowledge circuit. “The problematic of the subject implies that reality can still be
represented, that things give off signs guaranteeing their existence and significance—in short, that there is a reality principle,” Baudrillard (1987) tells us (p. 70). Yet moving away from an insistence on this “reality principle” allows us to search instead for those moments when in fact the subject emerges, and conversely when it begins to disappear, leaving in its wake the logic of the simulacrum. In deliberating this act of disappearance, we see that “It is the loss of the real, the absolute distance of the real. One can no longer touch things” (Baudrillard, 1987, p. 76). Thus Lee Boo begins to disappear once his legend is printed, when we discern his simulation of the ideal colonized island figure of the Enlightenment, and yet again once he loses that most basic of self-constructing elements of one’s identity, one’s lineage. In his place is the statue, a simulation of someone who may or may not have existed in that form, and a simulation of some subjectivity that contains only the image of the copy—a copy, problematically, without an original, but also a copy that perpetuates itself through the logic of simulation, producing untold copies of “the first student” indefinitely. And, perhaps most importantly of all, along with Lee Boo, cultural and contextual knowledges, the legitimacy of Palauan ways of knowing as “true knowledge,” disappear in tandem with the sublimation of the resistance of the Palauan lunatrope by the western (i.e., “universal”) heliotrope.

But what is the effect of this insistence on claiming the real, and Lee Boo as the “first true scholar”? How does the power-knowledge circuit operate through such reinforcement of the logic of the simulacrum? One effect of this process is what I would call the “Palauan exception.” Since Palau lays claim through the legend and heroification of Lee Boo to the essential student in the islands, it is reasonable to conclude that Palauans are somehow inherently “better” at formal schooling (euphemistically conflated...
with processes of “education”), and always have been. Peacock (1987) suggests as much at the end of his account of Lee Boo: thanks to his experiences with the English, and despite his untimely passing, “Seeds of learning were planted that have never stopped growing….And Belauans moved faster into the twentieth century than other peoples of the Caroline Islands. As if drawing inspiration from Lee Boo, Belauans seem also to travel farther” (p. 188). The implication here is, to put it diplomatically, troubling for the rest of Micronesia, as it sets up an intellectual hierarchy that situates Palau at the front of the line in terms of “development” (and its unfortunate corollary, “civilization”) while the rest of its neighboring island states lag behind.

Moreover, this “Palauan exception” can be seen at work in the narrative of the program at the unveiling ceremony of the Lee Boo statue: “It is a basic value of Palauan culture to regard education in high esteem, whether traditional schooling or experiences that expand one’s world view” (Palau Community College, 2000). The claim in this case is that Palau has always had schooling, and that formal schooling, such as that exemplified by Lee Boo in London or at Palau Community College in Koror is the equivalent of customary “traditional” Palauan educational habits and practices. Yet even here these two examples operate within the milieu of what Foucault (1983) defined as the similitude, in which “similitude circulates the simulacrum as an indefinite and reversible relation of the similar to the similar” (p. 44). In this view, there is no operational difference between formal and “traditional” schooling; indeed, the invocation of the noun “schooling” and its modification with the caveat of the “traditional” privileges western notions of school through a conflation of school and education as comparable processes of learning, simultaneously displacing what may be termed “traditional” ways of
knowing. These attempts to give cover to the “Palauan exception,” however, in fact assert the primacy of western, colonial, Enlightenment notions of school and schooling as the “right” way to learn; the danger here, though, is that “it is always a false problem to wish to restore the truth beneath the simulacrum” (Baudrillard, 1994, p. 27). To claim the objectivity, universality, essence, and truth of the triumph of Palauan mastery of western modes of schooling through the example of Lee Boo as the “first true scholar” results in the assertion of the perpetual copy of the copy; as Foucault (1983) puts it, “Similitude multiplies different affirmations, which dance together, tilting and tumbling over one another” (p. 46). It is through this dance of similitude, simulacrum and simulation that Lee Boo the student emerges and, perhaps more tragically, Lee Boo the person disappears altogether.

What, then, are we left with? Surely there are students at Palau Community College and throughout the region; this analysis is not to suggest that they do not in fact exist. But we need to recognize how they are constructed, what is included in that construction of the subjectivity of the student, and what is displaced or ignored. The disappearance of the student as real, as universal, as essential, as having a clear origin which we can name (in this case, “Lee Boo”), offers a series of simulations that are grounded in processes of colonization and development (both historical and ongoing) that point to continuing contemporary processes of normalization through the technology of schooling. Indeed, the lionizing of an Islander dressed as the ideal Enlightenment figure, as the representation of the benevolent project of colonization through schooling, erected and unveiled in the period of the so-called postcolonial and situated at an institution of formal schooling that is accredited by a commission headquartered in northern California,
suggests that the interconnection of schooling, subjectivation, and decolonization, has yet to be resolved. As Vizenor (1994) writes, “postindian warriors of postmodern simulations would undermine and surmount, with imagination and the performance of new stories, the manifest manners of scriptural simulations and ‘authentic’ representations of the tribes in the literature of dominance” (p. 17). In the case of Lee Boo, we would do well to consider the possible modes of being afforded those constructed as “the student” if, instead of circling the simulation of the copy, we turned our attention instead to the conditions of possibility that allow them, and us, to undermine and surmount that subjectivity.
CHAPTER 3: CERTIFIABLY QUALIFIED: CORPS, COLLEGE, AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE TEACHER

“This place isn’t either utopia or an exile….It’s the capital farthest west,
daughter of ones preceding it….This narrative recounts white Empire’s expansion
eastward.”

Jean-François Lyotard, 1989

Dilettantes and Differends

While at lunch at a restaurant in Kosrae, I overheard a group of three WorldTeach
volunteers complaining about the lack of academic capacity displayed by their students;
one individual in particular was lamenting the fact that none of his high school students
could write four lines of poetry in English in one hour. Presumably unwinding after a
hard day’s work, the volunteer “teachers” traded anecdotes that highlighted the peculiar
habits of their students’ English skills (or, rather, lack thereof). I wondered to myself
what the purpose of writing four lines of poetry in English was, and whether the three
Americans smoking during lunch could write four lines of anything in Kosraean (let
alone in iambic pentameter or, say, free verse).

Elsewhere, in an uncredited article in the Marshall Islands Journal, Majuro’s
weekly—and only—print media, an anonymous writer reflects on the impact of
WorldTeach and Dartmouth volunteer teachers on the “education” of Marshallese
students: “If we made a wild stab at how many students they’ve helped, we could
multiply those 55 volunteers by 30 (a wild guess at averaging their class sizes), which
would mean 1,650 Marshallese kids have enjoyed the volunteers’ talents over the 2007-
2008 academic year. Wow!” (“Bye Bye to RMI,” 2008). As any regular reader of the
Journal can observe, such articles lauding the “talents” and “help” of predominantly young, American, and recently-graduated from college “teachers” appear periodically: in the fall we are introduced to the new volunteers; at Christmastime we are told of their vacation plans; and at the end of the school year we are requested to bid them goodbye as they get on with their lives elsewhere. What is perhaps more striking about these paeans is the complete lack of any similar articles lauding the talents and heroic schooling exploits of Marshallese teachers. Indeed, reading the Journal one could be excused for thinking that the only “teachers” in the Marshall Islands are those of foreign extraction.

But where do these “teachers” come from? In Kosrae since 2008, Pohnpei since 2006, and the Marshall Islands since 2002, WorldTeach is a “volunteer” program (which requires a $2000 deposit, refundable upon completion of services for programs in the FSM and RMI) that was originally founded in 1986 by a group of Harvard graduates whose offices are currently housed at the Kennedy School of Government (WorldTeach, 2010a). The RMI program was the first one to connect directly with a national ministry of education, which allowed WorldTeach to transfer administrative costs from the shoulders of the volunteers and onto the host-country. To qualify as a “teacher,” one must be a college graduate, a native English speaker, and have completed 25 hours of ESL teaching experience (either as a volunteer or as a professional) prior to the start of the WorldTeach semester/year. Interestingly, “No prior teaching or foreign language experience is required. WorldTeach provides teaching and language training during the in-country Orientation period prior to the beginning of school” (WorldTeach, 2010d). Additionally, applicants must be at least 18 and no more than 75 years old. Since 2002, an average of
30-40 such “teachers” have come to “help” (in the Journal’s word) students in the Marshalls; slightly fewer have done so in the FSM more recently.

What is troubling about this arrangement, beyond the fact that we produce “teachers” in the RMI and FSM as constructed through conditions of possibility that allow an 18-year old college graduate (in any field) who speaks native English, is the way in which this construction, and these types of “volunteer” programs in general, operate within the circulating milieu of development discourse. Here I am speaking of development discourse as a function of “regimes of representation” that take as fundamental the economic, political, and social imperatives of the habits and practices of development since World War II, and that eliminate the contingency of development as a construct rather than as self-evident (see Chapters 4 and 5 for a fuller consideration of this point). As WorldTeach advertises it,

you will witness firsthand the challenges and rewards of education in a developing country. You will share the skills and knowledge gained through your education and life experience with your students who have not had the same advantages, and you will make a concrete and lasting difference in their lives.

(WorldTeach, 2010b)

One wonders how much “life experience” such a candidate can possibly have, especially if one has just graduated from college and can afford both the $2000 deposit as well as forgo a year of employment at the ripe old age of 22. Indeed, it seems that privilege is the primary requirement for this program, as well as the construction of such an individual as a teacher, since one’s privilege, in comparison with her/his potential students’ relative disadvantages, will “make a concrete and lasting difference in their lives.” Fulfilling the
trod trope of discourses of development, schooling in this context is seen as the primary “escape” from underdevelopment, and what better model for the developing world’s children than the privileged life and “experience” of the west’s best and brightest to show the way.

A complimentary program also operates in the Marshalls, this one through the auspices of the education department at Dartmouth. Since 2000, Dartmouth has sent two sets of volunteers to the RMI: the first is through a 10-week teaching “practicum” geared to upper-level undergraduates; the second, like the WorldTeach program, is a full academic year for Dartmouth graduates. The difference with the Dartmouth program, however, lies in its purpose, specifically to focus on those communities in the Marshalls impacted directly by US nuclear testing from 1946-1958. Dartmouth volunteers in this way focus on those atolls and islands that house the majority of the displaced Marshallese (mostly from Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap, and Utrik) who now reside on Majuro and Jaluit atolls and the islands of Ejit, Gugeegue, Kili, and Wotje. Yet the problematic effects of constructing these volunteers as teacher parallel those of WorldTeach (if they do not surpass them, as the “teacher” according to Dartmouth’s classification now includes current undergraduate students). What is more, while the undergraduate “teachers” are responsible for their own food and travel expenses, housing is covered by unnamed sources; like WorldTeach, the graduate volunteers’ expenses are all covered by the RMI Ministry of Education (without the need for a $2000 deposit on the part of Dartmouth participants). This funding scheme, instructively, functions as the inverse of the predecessor of such groups, the Peace Corps (a group we shall consider in more detail below), whose costs were borne almost entirely by the United States. Requirements for
participation in the Dartmouth program also echo those of WorldTeach, in that they involve a course or two of educational methods as well as a number of workshops focused on ESL, US-Marshallese historical relations, and “third world educational issues,” among others (Dartmouth College Department of Education, 2008).

Like WorldTeach, Dartmouth also traffics in the tropes of development discourse, by turns describing the Marshall Islands as having “limited resources, little private enterprise,” the schools as having “few or no textbooks and little in the way of curriculum,” and the Dartmouth volunteers as providing “the key to the development of bilingual proficiency necessary for interacting with much of the outside world” (Dartmouth College Department of Education, 2008). (As an aside, it is amusing to note that such “bilingual proficiency” is not needed by westerners for “interacting with much of the outside world.”) Interestingly, however, tension exists between the two programs, insofar as their stated aims are concerned. For its part, Dartmouth declares “The eventual aim of this program is not for the United States to become a stronger presence in the country, but for the Marshallese citizens to eventually wean themselves from dependency on the U.S. and the international community” (Dartmouth College Department of Education, 2008). After eleven years in the RMI, however, with no signs of bringing the program to a close, it is not clear when or how Dartmouth intends to help the RMI “wean themselves from dependency” on the Dartmouth program. WorldTeach, on the other hand, has no plans for distancing itself from the islands; indeed, it proudly states

Like the rest of Micronesia, the culture of Pohnpei is in transition, with the resultant challenges to individuals, families and communities. Schools have also come under transition and we anticipate that the WorldTeach FSM program will
continue to grow, with requests for more volunteers and placements in other FSM States (Yap and Chuuk). (WorldTeach, 2010c)

Thus, WorldTeach expects to expand, since some amorphous “transition” is occurring, not only uniformly throughout the various states of the FSM, but also in a manner both approved and facilitated by WorldTeach.

Since it is apparent that neither of these programs is going to abate any time soon, it seems fair to ask who is intended to benefit from this type of experience. This issue, homiletically, is not in question, as Dartmouth proudly boasts that

It is our hope that a number of the Dartmouth students who participate in the Marshall Islands program will eventually become teachers in U.S. public schools, making use of the lessons they learned and the skills they developed in the central Pacific. We concur with former Yale University Chaplain William Sloan Coffin’s statement that every ‘first-world’ college student needs a ‘third-world’ experience, particularly when such interaction empowers citizens of both nations. (Dartmouth College Department of Education, 2008)

For its part, WorldTeach promises that volunteers will gain cultural understanding and the ability to work independently in a new environment. You will have a role in the community, and an opportunity to learn about the local culture and contribute to community life and development. And you will develop key skills—including teaching, language, cross-cultural communication, and leadership—that will be useful in any career. (WorldTeach, 2010b, original emphasis)
“Teaching” in this context is therefore a rather selfish endeavor, one that subjectivizes already-privileged westerners as the keepers of knowledge (in this case, the ability to speak English without a foreign accent) in the service of “developing” the RMI and, at least in the case of Dartmouth, benefiting the US as well (should participants in fact return to teach in the US, which, by implication, is not nearly as difficult as it is in the Marshalls). To be a “teacher” in this way is, in fact, to be in it first and foremost for oneself—indeed, one’s western self.

A brief consideration of the visual imagery at play within the WorldTeach and Dartmouth websites also constructs such “teaching” as, unsurprisingly, a day at the beach. On the WorldTeach site, “teachers” are depicted (both standing and seated at the front of the class) wearing backwards baseball caps, t-shirts, and shorts; the Dartmouth site’s lone picture shows a shirtless male “teacher” on a beach, arms raised in a biceps flex and surrounded by students, one of whom is held aloft on his left arm (see Figure 10). To be a “teacher” in the Marshalls, invaluable, according to the Journal, and by implication irreplaceable, is to be both a conquering hero (as per Dartmouth’s scantily-clad volunteer) as well as on vacation (as demonstrated by both the use of the beach as backdrop as well as the casual dress requirements, apparently, of the RMI Ministry of Education). To be a teacher in this setting is strictly the purview of privileged, mostly American twenty-somethings (clothing optional—which offers a curious counter-point to the overdressed student signified by Lee Boo in Chapter 2). Behold the construction of the teacher in paradise.
Figure 10. Dartmouth volunteer website image featuring a Dartmouth “teacher” on the beach with Marshallese children. Copyright 2008 by Dartmouth College Department of Education. Reprinted with permission.

It seems appropriate at this point to bring into the analysis a recently published popular account of the experiences of a WorldTeach volunteer, namely the 2009 book-length travelogue *Surviving Paradise: One Year On A Disappearing Island* by former volunteer Peter Rudiak-Gould. This firsthand account of his WorldTeach year on Ujae Island where he was one of only a handful of teachers at the sole elementary school in the atoll is by turns a tale of a young, privileged American finding himself, coming to terms with his preference for things western, and a brief meditation, as implied by the title, on the potential consequences of global climate change and sea level rise on the Marshall Islands. The book has been received exceedingly well by foreigners living in Majuro, first garnering the praise of one long-time American resident who *The Marshall Islands Journal* reported “couldn’t put ‘Surviving Paradise’ down. ‘I finished it on the plane
today,’ he said. ‘It was fantastic.’” (“Ujae Stars,” 2010); and over the summer of 2010 the Journal published excerpts from the book, describing Rudiak-Gould’s experiences as an “adventure” (“Surviving Paradise,” 2010).

But how does one go about “surviving paradise,” as it were (or, to cite two chapter titles, how does one survive a “moon landing” or “a beautiful prison”)? To begin, Rudiak-Gould (2009) constructs the book as a conventional anthropological narrative, immediately establishing the exotic he encounters in the Marshalls through what Pratt (1985) identifies as a normalized otherness often found in similar travelogues. While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to take a fuller accounting of the history and application of anthropology, we should acknowledge the more critical literature in the field in order to help us consider just how Rudiak-Gould’s approach fits in the larger development of that discipline. To that end, it is important to note that what we are concerned with here is how what Clifford (1986) calls the discipline’s “partial truths” construct both knowledge and subject; that is, a conventional anthropological or ethnographic approach takes the context of the researcher as self-evident and normalized, which in turn produces a subject that is constructed in relation to degrees of difference within that normalized discourse.

Indeed, what is immediately problematic with Rudiak-Gould’s approach, then, is how he produces the Islanders with which he finds himself living, interacting, and teaching. To begin, he offers a racially coded construction, one that evokes Stocking’s (1982) history of anthropology fixated on race at the turn of the 20th century. As early as on page 2, Rudiak-Gould (2009) describes his students’ apathy to a particular lesson by depicting them as “A sea of bored, chocolate-covered faces” (p. 2). Later, Rudiak-Gould
tells us “It would have been surreal to live as a middle-class Westerner among Stone Age animists, but it had been even more surreal to live here” (p. 224). It is here, at the convergence of race and human evolution, that we see a standard application of anthropology, albeit one from an earlier age, in which the production of the Other was influenced by notions of social Darwinism then in vogue. Fabian (2002) tells us that this sort of anthropology “promoted a scheme in terms of which not only past cultures, but all living societies were irrevocably placed on a temporal slope, a stream of Time—some upstream, others downstream” (p. 17). Stocking (1982), reiterating the historical foundations of such a perspective, reminds us “In turn-of-the-century evolutionary thinking, savagery, dark skin, and a small brain and incoherent mind were, for many, all part of the single evolutionary picture of ‘primitive’ man, who even yet walked the earth” (p. 132). From which century, then, is Rudiak-Gould writing?

A few short chapters later, Rudiak-Gould (2009) goes on to detail his first Sunday in a Marshallese church:

The minister approached the podium. He was a rotund, charismatic man with a piano-keys smile. He began with a song, a missionary hymn rendered in Marshallese. The women were shrill sopranos, entering a range previously reserved for cartoon chipmunks. The men heaved out their voice at the beginning of every musical phrase producing a sound almost like a grunt. (p. 15)

Later on, while in his classroom, Rudiak-Gould describes how, when he tries to quiet his students, “the well-intentioned little girls in the front row took this to mean that I wanted them to scream that dreadful Marshallese syllable, a nasalized aaaaaaaaaa that sounded like the Coneheads’ call of alarm or a pig being slaughtered” (p. 65, original emphasis).
Here we see a string of physical and animalistic comparisons, from the “piano-keys smile” to “cartoon chipmunks” to “grunts” to “pigs” that hearken back to images of minstrelsy and Sambo-ism from an earlier, less refined era, one swayed by social Darwinism and more commonly reserved, in Oceania at least, for depictions of Melanesians (see Stella, 2007; also see Lutz and Collins, 1993, for a comparison of conventional sexualized and feminized Micronesian representations and those of Melanesians as stereotypically “savage”).

Unsurprisingly, the Islanders are also simultaneously considered part of the scenery, as just one more element of the (primitive) natural surroundings: “Flat horizons, a perpetual warmth, an air made of moisture, brown skin and black hair and dark eyes, blazing green foliage, dark coral lacquered by many-colored waters…” (p. 77). The Ujae community is in this way both primitivized and dehistoricized, as when Rudiak-Gould asks “how had I become a twenty-one-year-old American in a two-thousand-year-old village?” (p. 4). Here we should turn again to Fabian (2002), who contends

A discourse employing terms such as primitive, savage (but also tribal, traditional, Third World, or whatever euphemism is current) does not think, or observe, or critically study, the ‘primitive’; it thinks, observes, studies in terms of the primitive. *Primitive* being essentially a temporal concept, is a category, not an object, of Western thought. (p. 18, original emphases)

Thus, taken together with the “chocolate-covered faces” of his students, his curious assertion that after only a few days on Ujae and with admittedly almost non-existent vernacular language skills he determines that the churchgoers “recited the Lord’s Prayer in mumbled Marshallese” (p. 15), as well as his attempts to be invited to ride on a canoe
despite the “jungle of unspoken customs” (p. 94) and his need “to machete my way through half-truths in order to get a ride” (p. 96), one gets the unwavering sense that the primitiveness of Ujae and its inhabitants can be summed up through a cursory nod to formerly conventional and (one hopes) outmoded “Orientalism” of inarticulate savages suffused in an untamed land that is fixed in time. In the same way that Said (1978) and Mudimbe (1988) interrogate the west’s invention of the Orient and Africa, respectively, we might question Rudiak-Gould’s parallel construction of Ujae and the Marshallese. (For what it’s worth, the Marshall Islands Journal did not excerpt any of the chapters that contained the foregoing phrases.)

Of course, this production of what Hall (1997) calls “the spectacle of the ‘other’” is not new; but its deployment in this instance is telling. Baudrillard (1996) offers that “The aim is no longer to kill the other, devour it, seduce it, vie with it, love it or hate it, but, first, to produce it. It is no longer an object of passion, it is an object of production” (p. 115). In this way, Rudiak-Gould’s account produces the otherness of the people of Ujae, and, by extension, reinforces the production of otherness between cultures (the west and the rest). But this productive quality of otherness is not ontological; rather, “the Other has to be produced imperatively as difference” (Baudrillard, 1996, p. 115). In the play of civilized-uncivilized, developed-undeveloped, the otherness which Rudiak-Gould both produces and also mocks serves not only to construct his narrative as a tale of boy meets world or fish out of water, but rather as one of establishing a standard (awash as it is in western cultural references) and thereby delimiting a hierarchy of difference. As Deleuze (1994) explains, “Difference is understood only in terms of the comparative play of two similitudes: the exemplary similitude of an identical original and the imitative similitude
of a more or less accurate copy” (p. 127). So if we take Rudiak-Gould’s “partial truths” about the primitive state in which he finds (and ostensibly leaves) Ujae, we come to the construction of “the teacher” as a function of difference, one that mirrors the production of the category of the primitive (or savage, or Third World, or even “developing”) as part of the temporality of human evolution.

In his descriptions of schooling, students, parents, and teaching, Rudiak-Gould (2009) almost always frames his observations in terms of problematics. As to the system of schooling in the RMI, and Ujae in particular,

The United Nations had ranked the Marshall Islands dead last in educational achievement among Pacific Island nations. Of the eighty-two elementary schools in the Marshall Islands, Ujae was ranked seventy-eighth. It was the worst school in the outer islands and the lowest ranked school to which any of the twenty-five WorldTeach volunteers had been assigned. (p. 60)

What such rankings mean, however, is largely irrelevant, as it assumes first, that all schools in the Pacific, as well as in the Marshalls, are essentially the same in form, function, and purpose, and second, that the RMI ranks its schools in ways similar to those employed by the United Nations. (It does not.)

When it comes to the community’s general attitude toward schooling, Rudiak-Gould refers to “the school’s black hole of apathy” (p. 205). Students are constructed in this rendering as thoughtless troublemakers conditioned by poor parenting skills:

“Draconian parenting at home and rote memorization at school had taught them to think as little as possible” (p. 70), while “at school, they [students] rebelled against thought itself….I had a feeling it was because I was an authority figure—though unwillingly—
and every other authority figure had proven so hostile to young creativity” (p. 71).
Indeed, in his descriptions of parenting in Ujae, one cannot escape the sense that Rudiak-Gould is mediating the disciplinary apparatus of western educational science, as when he explains “I treated the children far more gently than any other adult in their lives, and, for this, they treated me far more harshly than any adult in their lives….The parents harshly punished misbehavior, whereas I gently corrected it” (p. 108). Moreover, parents themselves are implicated with the general feeling of apathy and ennui of the benevolence of schooling, as “the parents never complained about the teaching because they didn’t care” (p. 71); this criticism of parenting as deficient also codes recent movements towards parent-school “partnerships” in which the school serves as the technology through which parents learn, for lack of a better term, “real” parenting (see Bloch, Lee, and Peach, 2003; also, see Chapter 4 for a fuller discussion of the parent). While it is difficult to assess the veracity of these statements, presented as they are as reminiscences and opinions of one trying to tell a story, what is clear is that the story layers various levels of complications with the effect of establishing difference as an evaluative marker; that is, since the parents “didn’t care” about their children, it falls to Rudiak-Gould, as the hero of this tale as well as the avatar of western educational science and discipline, to do so, and especially in his capacity as their teacher.

Indeed, the teacher as it is discursively constructed here is, to be sure, fashioned on Deleuze’s (1994) “exemplary similitude of an identical original” in that the subjectivity of “the teacher” is taken as self-evident and natural; concomitantly, school (and the misappropriated term “education”) is seen as neutral, if not benign. In this way both the teacher and the school are uncontested and non-contingent. It is worth noting
that this natural state of being for the teacher (and especially the American teacher) is also heavily layered with otherwise unexplored notions of “development”; thus, while Rudiak-Gould (2009) does not explicitly consider the conditions of possibility that allowed him to arrive in Ujae as “the teacher,” such statements as “Ujae wanted me to be its English teacher” (p. 4) operate as axiomatic. And where, we may ask, are the other “teachers” on Ujae, the locals employed by the RMI Ministry of Education? Rudiak-Gould tells us that they, too, circulate the problematic of schooling as inherently a flaw to be found within the Other: “It wasn’t that Marshall Islanders with waged employment never performed their job descriptions. It was just that they regarded it as an optional extra. The teachers on Ujae didn’t need to teach” (p. 111). Such analysis also permits the teacher-as-author to distinguish his own place in this milieu, as when he says “But in any case, my job was hell, and I was a failure at it. And I was the best teacher at the school” (p. 110). Unsurprisingly, there is no further discussion of this point, and so we are left to wonder what makes him the best teacher in Ujae?

Perhaps the answer lies in the ontology of the normalizing discourse of schooling deployed throughout this work. At one point, Rudiak-Gould (2009) clearly explains his dilemma as a teacher:

My mission here was self-contradictory. My duty was to help the community, but also to accept it as it was….If I adopted my host community’s apathy toward education, I would achieve greater cultural integration but fail at making a positive contribution. If I crusaded for education, I could make a positive contribution but fail at integrating into the culture. (p. 116)
Here we see the tension between the manifest benevolence of school and schooling (or, rather, “education”) as advocated for by the knowing westerner who see its obviously inherent goodness (or at least its uncontestable neutrality) and the “developing” community that has yet to grasp that, in fact, he is right. What is more, western schooling and Marshallese culture are constructed as mutually exclusive: either the Marshallese can come along with the author and rid themselves of their cultural constraints, or they will remain forever stuck in their traditional modes of being, which in turn implies that they will never, in a normalized sense, become “educated.”

What is distressing about the logic as laid out above is that the role of “the teacher” as an expert and possessor of knowledge, and specifically someone like a WorldTeach volunteer, borders on the absurd. Here we read Rudiak-Gould (2009) musing, “I could draw from my well of previous experience, but I had none” (pp. 3-4); “I was going to teach at a very, very bad school. I took this as good news. My teaching experience was close to nil, so it was heartening to know that I could hardly make things worse than they already were” (p. 61); and, perhaps offering a possible recruitment slogan for future participants, “To succeed as a volunteer in the Marshalls, one only needed to do better than horrible. One only needed to teach more than teachers who taught nothing” (p. 130). Thus, echoing the visual imagery of Dartmouth’s shirtless participant and WorldTeach’s casually-dressed twenty-somethings, we can see here the rather naked (or at least half-naked) contention that to “teach” in the Marshalls, if one is a westerner with a degree, is to do very little, and that one’s qualifications to act as a teacher can be summed up in one’s privilege and status within the hierarchy of development discourses.
It seems reasonable to ask here what is missing from this context, and what, if we are constructing “the teacher” as a function of difference and othering, is displaced, erased, and ignored by this construction? In a phrase, it is any alternate conception of who can act, call themselves, and be considered “teachers.” In at least three cases, Rudiak-Gould describes how he learns to sail, learns to fish, and learns about Marshallese oral traditions. In the last instance, referring to the elder who explained a number of Marshallese sayings, Rudiak-Gould (2009) tells us “I learned a great deal from this man” (p. 167); but what is of note here is that he does not refer to this elder as a “teacher,” nor does he refer as such to the Islanders who show him how to sail and fish. Nor can he, to keep a consistent narrative, since he has already declared the he, and he alone, is “the best teacher.”

Here let us recall for a moment Peacock’s (1993) earlier juxtaposition of Palauan fishermen who ostensibly “taught” young schoolchildren how to fish using “traditional” methods with the lament that “The greatest problem in elementary education was the lack of well-educated teachers” (p. 12). Like on Ujae, the implication at work here is that to be a “teacher,” let alone a “well-educated” one, one’s subjectivation needs to deal in what might be termed “real” knowledges (in the case of Rudiak-Gould, WorldTeach, and Dartmouth: English language teaching) and not in “false” knowledges (such as Marshallese oral history or Palauan fishing techniques). As we will see below, the production of certain knowledges as non-contingent severely impacts the construction of what constitutes a legitimate “teacher.”

But beyond the construction of particular knowledges and conditions of being as they relate to teaching, we must also consider issues of transposability and
commensurability when we speak of such things as “highly qualified” or “well-educated” teachers. In this way, a turn to Lyotard’s (1988) conception of the differend offers a lens through which to evaluate the privileging of one construction of “the teacher” over another, and what the effects of that simultaneous process of sublimating and displacing alternative notions of valid subjectivations of a “teacher” might be. According to Lyotard, a differend is

a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgment applicable to both arguments. One side’s legitimacy does not imply the other’s lack of legitimacy. However, applying a single rule of judgment to both in order to settle their differend as though it were merely a litigation would wrong (at least) one of them (and both of them if neither side admits this rule). (p. xi)

In this way, when we speak of a “teacher” as deployed through a normalizing discourse of schooling, we refer to her/him as “highly qualified,” “well-educated,” “certified,” and in the image of WorldTeach and Dartmouth volunteers, whose native English skills and undergraduate degrees from US universities meet the minimum (if not only) requirements of such a construction. The mistake we make, in the case of the differend, is that the Marshallese oral historian and Palauan fisherman are removed from consideration as “highly qualified,” or as “teachers,” and Islander teachers must therefore be subjectivized in the image of the western college graduate. In this way, we fall victim to the caution of the differend, as we “enforce the rule of one discourse or the other, resulting in a wrong suffered by the party whose rule of discourse is ignored” (Nuyen, 1998, p. 175), and
expect *all* teachers to look like those of WorldTeach and Dartmouth since we cannot, in engaging such a discourse, conceive of an alternative to them.

Thus there is only one highly regulated way in which we currently speak of the logic of the teacher, a way that erases other possible forms of being as a teacher. The key to the differend as it operates in this way through the idiom of “the teacher” is to navigate “the unstable state and instant of language wherein something which must be able to be put into phrases cannot yet be” (Lyotard, 1988, p. 13), while being careful not to fall into the trap of acquiescing to the always-present possibility of the idiom of silence. That is, we cannot simply return to a form of expression that ignores the possibilities of Islanders as “teachers” through silence, but rather the imperative, as Lyotard (1988) suggests, instead “is to bear witness to differends by finding idioms for them” (p. 13). At the same time, this search for idioms which describe differends needs to recognize the danger of the trope of the Other; for while “it is the Other-structure that ensures individuation within the perceptual world. It is not the I, nor the self: on the contrary, these need this structure in order to be perceived as individualities” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 281), the notion of the self (the legitimate teacher) exists only in relation to the negation and sublimation of the Other (the illegitimate teacher). In this way the credentialed, and therefore “highly qualified,” teacher produces itself through its opposite, the Other uncredentialed and “unqualified” teacher. And it is here, at this moment of erasure and illegitimation, that we must take care not to wrong the latter in the service of the reinforcement and normalization of the former and instead must “bear witness,” as the differend “is nobody’s special prerogative” (Lyotard, 1993, p. 10). Thus we must now ask how the conditions of possibility operate in the current space that allows for the construction of
the “teacher” in Micronesia to take the form it does. In order to begin to unlayer this set of circumstances, we should turn to the predecessor of WorldTeach and Dartmouth: the Peace Corps.

Peace Corps in Paradise Micronesia

In the 1985 movie Volunteers, the Peace Corps sends characters played by Tom Hanks, John Candy, and Rita Wilson to a village in northern Thailand to teach, administer health assistance, and build a bridge across the bordering river. After a series of conventional fish-out-of-water comedy set-pieces, most involving cultural miscommunications on both sides, we soon learn that the bridge is actually intended as a means for transporting drugs and weapons across the Thai border; the Peace Corps volunteers in this scenario thus lend an air of legitimacy to the real agenda, which is cloaked in US military strategy and international arms and drugs smuggling. Once our innocent Peace Corps heroes figure out what is really going on, only after the bridge is complete, they call a meeting with the local villagers to explain the situation. Rita Wilson’s character, Beth Wexler, earnestly explains in Thai, “The Peace Corps wants to help people, not change them.” The next day the villagers, led by the volunteers, blow up the bridge they were sent there to build (Shepherd, Parkes, and Meyer, 1985).

In the case of Micronesia, the Peace Corps may have couched itself in the trope of liberal American development discourse and international aid (the “help” part of Wilson’s commentary), but in fact it was most deliberately deployed in the islands in order to change them. Initially advertised to college graduates in a hurried manner in the spring of 1966, the agency distributed brochures on college campuses around the country declaring, “The Peace Corps goes to Paradise.” Unsurprisingly, much in the way that four
decades later Rudiak-Gould (2009) would parrot this construction of the islands as somehow instinctively prelapsarian yet beset with contemporary complications that Islanders are ill-equipped to deal with, the brochure also establishes Micronesia as problematic—and therein, naturally, lies both the challenge for the volunteer as well as the discourse of development as benevolent aid. Inside, the pamphlet announces “There are Problems in Paradise” and goes on to describe how “The day is rapidly approaching when Micronesians will decide what their self-governing status is to be. In early May, they requested that the Peace Corps send ‘middle-level manpower’ to help build the social, economic and political basis for self-government” (Peace Corps, 1966a, n.p., emphasis added). However, the Peace Corps’ decision to enter Micronesia was not simply a last-minute decision by the agency to come to the aid of the islands; rather, it was the culmination of years of internal wrangling between the departments of Interior and State, as well as the White House, as just how best to “help” the islands achieve “self-government.”

Let us begin, for example, with the sheer quantity of volunteers sent to the region. By the end of 1966, the first group numbered 323. A year later that number almost doubled, reaching 600. By 1968, there were 940 volunteers stationed in the islands; considering that the entire island population of the Trust Territory at the time numbered just under 100,000 Micronesians, this meant 1 Peace Corps volunteer for every 100 Islanders. Nowhere else in the Peace Corps’ history has the agency constituted as much as 1% of a service area’s population—and this doesn’t take into account the US personnel already living in the islands. And most of these volunteers, we should keep in mind, were headed to the classroom.
Then there is the issue of the Peace Corps’ role and jurisdiction in the anomalous political region known as the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI). Since 1951, we will recall, the TTPI had been administered by the US Department of Interior, and the Peace Corps was run under the auspices of the US State Department in order to serve “foreign” entities. So what, exactly, did that make Micronesia? Was it foreign enough for the Peace Corps but domestic enough for the Department of Interior? This question was not an easy one to answer, as has been widely documented (see Ballendorf and Seay, 1976; Nevin, 1977; Lowther and Lucas, 1978; Gale, 1979; Hezel, 1995; Hanlon, 1998); ultimately the decision was made to include Micronesia in the Peace Corps’ service area, but not before 1966, a full four years after the founding of the agency. Of course, the decision to send the Peace Corps required the veneer of foreign solicitation in order to legitimize its presence in-country, which the recruiting brochure for Micronesia points out; but as Hapgood (1968) demonstrates, “from that first, often vague, request, the entire planning process is in the Peace Corps’ hands, with the result that the country often gets something quite different from what it had asked for” (p. 12). In the case of Micronesia, that “request” is colored with the various layers of Trust Territory administration, political jockeying among US executive departments, and plans for future “self-determination” of the islands.

What complicates this picture even further is the role of the Solomon Report and its calls for a deliberate reconstruction of the territory in the image of the US, or at the very least in the image of US national security interests. As we have seen earlier (in Chapter 1), the shift historically in the normalization of western schooling irrupts around the period between the Solomon Report in 1963 and the importation of Great Society
programs to the islands in 1964-65; the Peace Corps, arriving as they do in greater and
greater numbers beginning in 1966, are critical to this normalizing moment. It should
come as no surprise, then, that the Solomon Report explicitly calls for the application of
the Peace Corps to Micronesia; specifically if “it remains necessary for the Trust
Territory government to recruit American teachers directly, the [Solomon] Mission
would recommend that the Peace Corps be asked to cooperate with Interior in handling
the screening and the orientation of the teachers” (US Government Survey Mission, 1963,
p. 161). Indeed, the “use of Peace Corps volunteers to promote the American character of
this school system” (Hanlon, 1998, p. 93) was part and parcel of the Solomon Report’s
larger mission of changing Micronesia and Micronesian attitudes through school; and the
key to that mission was to be found in the construction of the “qualified teacher”: “The
key to good education is the good teacher. It is imperative, therefore, that every
classroom in Micronesia have a professionally qualified and competent teacher” (US
Government Survey Mission, 1963, p. 155). At the same time, laying the framework for
conditions that would not necessarily exclude Peace Corps teachers, or their American
counterparts, from future professional influence in the islands even after “self-
government” had been established, the Solomon Report goes on to argue that
it would be a wise policy to have at least five to ten percent of the teaching
positions in each district and at both the elementary and secondary levels open for
competent American teachers on a limited-term appointment in order to bring to
Micronesia new blood with new ideas and practices in education. (US
When the Peace Corps finally arrived in Micronesia in 1966, before its peak at the end of the decade, half of the classrooms featured American teachers in them already. It seems the Peace Corps exceeded even the Solomon Report in manifesting the presence of the American teacher in Micronesia and normalizing the construction of the “qualified teacher” as uniquely American.

Ironically, at the same time that the agency was promoting the legitimate construction of the teacher in the islands, the Peace Corps was simultaneously encouraging volunteers who had little or no teaching experience, either practically or academically, to serve as “teachers” in the region. Gale (1979) reminds us that One hundred and three of them [Peace Corps volunteers] were to work in public health programs but because of their lack of skills and a lack of work for them, most were assigned to teaching in elementary schools. Requiring few tools, and being even less expensive than a Micronesian teacher, the Peace Corps volunteers have been firmly wedded to the classroom. (p. 119)

It is interesting to note here that while public health, according to the Peace Corps, at some level requires at least a modicum of expertise, apparently anyone can be a classroom teacher in Micronesia—so long as they are not Micronesian. Indeed, the Peace Corps rather intentionally sought out generalists and liberal arts graduates to serve as teachers: “Partly from necessity and partly by philosophy, the Peace Corps leadership decided that teaching would be a good project to assign volunteers with little specific training” (Fischer, 1998, p. 151). That the volunteers would have limited exposure to academic or theoretical considerations before entering the Micronesian classroom as “the teacher” was not kept secret; in fact, it seemed a point of pride that the Peace Corps
training regimen would make “teachers” out of volunteers in a truncated period of time. The recruiting brochure says as much when it advertises that its program “was developed to utilize liberal arts graduates with special Peace Corps training in the skill areas requested” (Peace Corps, 1966a, n.p.); and as one training manual from 1966 attests of its English teaching program, “Theory and practice must be jammed into an eleven week program” (Peace Corps, 1966b, p. 26). The implication here, like those alluded to by Rudiak-Gould (2009) forty years later, is that any native-English speaking American, with at least a little (if any) training is preferable—and more “qualified”—than a Micronesian to serve as a “teacher.”

I want to make it clear that I am not suggesting, however, that if Peace Corps (or WorldTeach or Dartmouth) volunteers were more credentialed, experienced, or otherwise better “prepared” that I would moderate my reading of their effects; rather, my problematizing of their training and instruction through two- or three-month “orientation” programs and workshops has little to with “teaching.” In fact, the premise of my present critique is in no way a prescription for sending “better teachers” to Micronesia. Instead, my argument is not about how we conceive of “teacher education” but how we conceptualize “development.” Here I mean those regimes of representation that circulate through discursive practices that produce the United States as “developed” while the islands of Micronesia are not; consequently, in this narrow discursive practice it makes sense (in fact, it is the only way to conceive of things) that “developed” Americans could be utilized in the “development” of the Islander. In this way, it does not so much matter whether the Peace Corps volunteers were teaching professionals or not; but the fact that the majority of them were not does betray a principle of development discourse, in that
one’s fitness to serve as a teacher in the situated context of contemporary Micronesia is dependent not upon any degree of preparation in a conventional western sense of the term but rather almost exclusively on one’s status with hierarchies of development. It is in this way that, as Fischer (1998) explains, even for Peace Corps volunteers engaged in areas other than the classroom, “all were asked to be teachers, with the host nationals as their students, learning how to better cope with their world from the image set by the volunteer” (p. 151).

To that end, it is fair to ask, given the circumstances surrounding the preparation of both the volunteers and the project in Micronesia in general, just how effective the Peace Corps really was. (The agency pulled out of the RMI altogether in 1996, and while it still operates in parts of the FSM and Palau, volunteers are now engaged in activities outside the classroom.) The answer is fairly consistent: the Peace Corps in Micronesia, if not an outright failure, was certainly less effective than it was in other parts of the world. The reason often cited for this poor performance is the tension that arose between Peace Corps volunteers, who thought they were doing worthwhile work, and the perceived (if no less real) ulterior motives of Trust Territory personnel working as agents of the department of Interior who looked upon the Peace Corps as an opportunity to provide cheap labor to the TTPI project (see Gale, 1979, and Hanlon, 1998, among others). US assistant secretary of the Interior John Carver, for one, is quoted as having concluded that the Micronesia venture “‘is the most unworthy page in Peace Corps history’” (quoted in Nevin, 1977, p. 134), while Ballendorf and Seay (1976) argue that Peace Corps activities in the islands in the areas of community and economic development “more often than not faded after they [Peace Corps volunteers] left” (p. 32). Yet such reasoning, that the Peace
Corps failed in Micronesia because there was little to no “progress” in development projects with lasting value in the islands, misses a larger, and for our purposes more important, effect of the Peace Corps: the normalization of school and the legitimation of the construction of the teacher as currently constituted.

Indeed the narrative of the Peace Corps, while one of disappointment and disenchantment, nevertheless simultaneously produces a counter-discourse about the triumph of “the teacher,” and, more importantly, the teacher as American. To begin with the latter, then, Nevin (1977) writes, “Some three hundred of the volunteers were teachers, and many were posted to outer islands, where some were the first Americans the people had ever known” (p. 133). Ridgell (1991), writing of his personal experience as a volunteer in Chuuk, states somewhat puzzlingly “in my opinion it is undeniably beneficial for third world countries to take the opportunity that allows their ordinary citizens to make close contacts with ordinary American citizens” (p. 5). This ontology of encounter, borrow a phrase from Shapiro (2010), characterized by benevolence and mutual goodwill, serves to underscore the narrative that constructs the teacher as both knowledge expert and agent of western schooling (couched as the latter is in euphemisms of neutrality and objectivity such as “education”). Challenging their criticism of the Peace Corps’ non-classroom projects reported above, Ballendorf and Seay (1976) go on to say

The lasting ones [Peace Corps contributions] will probably be revealed in education; here were the things that PCVs did well—teaching, exploring, and promoting new awareness in young people….as expressed perhaps in a comment made recently by a freshly arrived Micronesian student to the
United States: “Ah, yes, the PCVs, I had one once as a teacher. It was she who first taught me that science is real, and encouraged me to come to the university.” (p. 32)

Thus the American as Peace Corps volunteer teacher is knowing, benign, and, to echo the normalizing discourse of schooling, instrumental to learning “true” knowledge (exemplified by the acontextualized and dehistoricized declaration that “science is real”).

However, the discourse also reveals a seamier effect of this narrative of benevolence and good works, one that results in the rather systematic (and therefore problematic) erasure of other conditions of being for “the teacher” in the region, and in fact erases the notion of local Islanders as “teachers” in any form of alternative conception. Here Hezel (1995) offers an instructive, if curious, example of this when he assesses the impact of the Peace Corps on the school system in Micronesia: “The 1960s was clearly the age of growth, a time of rapidly expanding enrollment, while the school system was being reinvigorated from within. No more choruses of ‘Old Macdonald Had a Farm’ would ring through the schools; children would be reciting their sentence patterns from Friese readers instead” (p. 315). What is implicit in this statement is that prior to the arrival of the Peace Corps, when schools in the islands were staffed primarily by Islanders as “teachers,” students were wasting their time on children’s play and nursery rhymes; now that the Peace Corps had come, the schools could get down to more serious business (such as, for some reason, sentence patterns.) Here, once again, we see the local “teacher” as both ineffective and inauthentic, and in need of American direction (and American “teachers”).
Ridgell (1991) also reinforces this narrative thread, as he begins by acknowledging “Peace Corps took me in, made me a teacher, and I have been teaching ever since, even though I was positive that teaching was something I never wanted to do” (p. 4); he then goes on to describe how my second year I had an assignment that made me feel like I was accomplishing something. There were six or seven brand new elementary teachers [Islanders] for the four western islands. It was my job to train them. The best thing was, they were just out of high school, my age or younger, and had no idea what to do in a classroom. They eagerly and gratefully accepted my guidance and help. The older teachers tolerated my efforts to show them new methods, and went back to doing things their way as soon as I was gone. But these new teachers needed and wanted my help. (p. 8)

While the older “teachers” in this instance had no need of Ridgell, the Peace Corps, or “new methods,” and simply reverted to their ineffective positions, the author, acting as both a knowledge expert (of “new methods,” learned presumably in Peace Corps training) and, more importantly, as an agent of the western “development” project, constructs himself as the “true” teacher in this case, one who “teaches” the more malleable, and therefore more desirable, Islander “teachers” in his own, and by extension America’s, image. The litigation of the differend in this case has the curious effect of erasing (and therefore wronging) the customary requirements of what it means to be a “teacher” in a non-western context, specifically age and experience, and their corollary respect traditions of elders. Again, there are no legitimate alternatives to “the teacher,” and even here Islanders become dispensable as knowledge agents since the only effective
teacher educator is the Peace Corps volunteer who himself only recently was “made a teacher” (almost, it seems, in spite of himself), a sentiment echoed, once again, in similar and more recent testimony provided by Rudiak-Gould (2009).

None of this is to suggest that this process of constructing and normalizing the Peace Corps volunteer as the exclusive representative of the subjectivity of “the teacher” is without its critics. Certainly, even (some) island leaders were skeptical of the effect of the Peace Corps and its true purpose in the region. Writing of Roman Tmetuchl, a representative from Palau to the Congress of Micronesia in 1973, Hanlon (1998) reports “The Solomon Report, the increasing number of Peace Corps volunteers in the islands, and an American educational system all suggested to Tmetuchl that the real process afoot was not economic development but Americanization” (p. 135). Hapgood (1968) similarly asks, “did the volunteers who sought to make changes in the schools offer any real improvement or just Americanization?” (p. 3). It seems reasonable to suggest that the answer to this question is to affirm the latter part’s assumption, that in fact the Peace Corps’ involvement in the school system in Micronesia was a deliberate effort to Americanize the islands through the classroom; as much is borne out in even cursory readings of the Solomon Report, and even in evaluation reports of the Peace Corps, such as one in 1968 that asserted the role of the Peace Corps teachers in the island schools was “viewed as stopgap assistance until the Peace Corps could ‘redesign…the system and philosophy of education in Micronesia’” (Lowther and Lucas, 1978, original emphases).

Yet, for our purposes it seems necessary to focus not on the so-called “Americanization of Micronesia,” but rather on the effects of that Americanization in the process of normalizing American schooling, and in this case the construction and
normalization of the teacher through the image of the Peace Corps. Not only does the advent of the Peace Corps signal a rapid shift in this normalizing process; it also prompts the very exclusive conditions of possibility that allow the construction of one as a teacher, thereby displacing all other conceptions. In the case of the Peace Corps, “true” teachers are American college graduates with no particular experience, or even interest, in classroom teaching; all other conceptions of the “teacher,” specifically those that involve Islanders as knowledge experts operating in contexts other than school, are effectively sublimated, or, even worse, erased. Thus the Peace Corps offers an instructive moment in the ways in which the subjectivity of the teacher is not only produced, but also layered in discourses of development and knowledge construction; the Peace Corps, is, in short, the catalyst for the conditions of possibility that reinforce structures of power deployed through such “teachers” as those operating in the islands today under the auspices of our opening examples of WorldTeach and Dartmouth. To return to Rita Wilson’s quote from *Volunteers*, it is not that the Peace Corps did not (and does not) want to help Micronesia, but rather that it cannot help but change the islands.

It is necessary at this point to both recall the cautions inherent in the litigation of the differend when it comes to normalizing the subjectivity of the teacher in this context, as well as to recognize that our foregoing analysis is but one part of a processional binary. Thus, when we speak of the construction of the teacher in this case, we are operating with the understanding, as Rancière (1999) explains it, that “all interlocution supposes comprehension of some kind of content of the illocution. The contentious issue is whether this understanding presupposes a telos of mutual understanding” (p. 48).

Situated in the normalizing processes circulating through the subjectivity of the teacher,
then, we should keep in mind that this construction is based on an assumption that there is, in fact, some decontextualized universal subject that we call idiomatically “the teacher”—and that this assumption is where we initially run into trouble. Indeed, the notion of a pre-existing subject that is somehow divorced from social practices and relations thus suggests a natural subject that emerges from an uncontested, non-political space. In her critique of the natural relations of this “absolute subject,” Wittig (1992) contends, “Belonging to the natural order, these relationships cannot be spoken of as social relationships” (p. 5) and are therefore indisputable in the social domain. What we have before us is the construction of the teacher as an “absolute subject,” and one that is most problematically coded with discourses of development, race, and privilege; in short, “the teacher” in Micronesia assumes some uncontestable affiliation with western expertise, if not western origin.

What is most troubling about this process, however, is the fact that it is, as we are about to see, only the first step in a binary circulation in which both aspects mirror each other. The challenge for us is to begin to disassemble the ways in which that mirroring effect operates, and to determine what its effects are. Here we are concerned with a linkage of phrases (Carroll, 1987) in which metaphors of idiom link one to the other, but with the effect of erasing any non-linked phrases. In this way, we are interested in teasing out how the “absolute subject” of the teacher as continually produced and normalized refers almost exclusively to a circling of the American volunteer model (our first step in the construction process laid out above), as well as how the Islander “becomes” a teacher in that context and through relations of power operating within development discourses. Our second step, then, is to consider how the Islander is constructed in the image of the
absolute subject of the teacher, and, most importantly, what the effects of that process are on how we view alternate subjectivations of the teacher as a product of various relations of power. It is to this second part of the binary of the construction of the teacher that we now turn.

Colleges and Knowledges

In order to begin our discussion of the Islander as teacher, we must first take a brief look at one vital remainder of the teacher as originally American—and do so in terms of linkages of metaphor at play in between the binary construction of the subject, and phrasing, of the teacher. Turning to Carroll (1987), our task is to interrogate just “how convincing are the links made between this minimal level of the phrase [in our case the teacher] and the historical-political on a larger scale, on how effectively a philosophy of phrases reveals, not only the limitations, but also the particular stakes of the historical-political in general” (p. 167). To that end, we are required to consider not simply the displacement of the Islander (as a legitimate teacher of local knowledges) through the litigation of the differend, which is in turn built upon a suspect yet inordinately forceful framework of Othering, but also the construction of the Islander as a legitimate teacher in the mode of the dominant idiom. That is to say, the Islander is erased within the metaphor of linkages of “the teacher” until s/he enters into that same, exclusionary linkage of the legitimate teacher, one who is certified through a technical apparatus of schooling and a teacher first and foremost of legitimate knowledge. It is to this latter point where we will begin.

It would seem unremarkable by now to observe that the primary focus of the Peace Corps’ (ostensible) responsibilities in the classroom centered on teaching English.
While during the previous 15 years of US administration of the islands prior to the arrival of the Peace Corps, the official stance of TTPI education administrators, especially the director of education Robert Gibson, was to “educate” Islanders in the multiple vernaculars, even before the completion of the Solomon Report there was a shift in language policy in the islands: as the report applauds, “In an important step forward, English will replace the local vernacular as the language of instruction” (US Government Survey Mission, 1963, pp. 131-132). Going further, the report lays out its vision of what should happen in elementary and secondary schools in the region, beginning with the introduction of English language instruction during a student’s so-called “ungraded years” of schooling (US Government Survey Mission, 1963, p. 147). The impetus for the importation of “teachers” such as those exemplified by the Peace Corps is therefore justified, “Since English is the most important single subject in the schools” (US Government Survey Mission, 1963, p. 148).

In a moment of self-reflection, Ridgell (1991) asks a necessary question of his presence in Chuuk as a Peace Corps volunteer: “But why are they learning English?” Indeed, this question demands further inspection; unfortunately, we are not given that opportunity, as Ridgell answers with “I justified helping Micronesians learn English because they will need it as a tool to deal with the United States and the outside world in general. They also need it to talk to each other, for the Micronesian islands have between ten and twenty local languages and dialects” (p. 8). Similarly, nearly two decades later Rudiak-Gould (2009) explains, in an aside, “When I signed up for my South Seas adventure, I was often asked why children living on a miniscule isolated island needed to learn English. The short answer I gave was that it was the key to the lock on the rest of
the world….Or perhaps teaching English was linguistic imperialism, Western paternalism, or worse. I still don’t know” (pp. 62-63).

While the larger implications of the primacy of English language instruction belong in a separate project, I will suggest that such attitudes towards teaching English are both reflective of the broader colonial implications in “Micronesia” as an ontological space and region as well as productive of a colonial perspective, here colored with discourses of development, as Micronesians in this context must learn English in order to not only communicate with each other (as part of the colonial construct) but also with “the outside” world (i.e., the west, specifically the United States). Indeed, as evidenced by the most recent (as of this writing) placement test (read: English and math) results of high school students in the RMI applying to the College of the Marshall Islands (CMI), of the 615 prospective students who took the test only 4 were eligible to attend credit-level courses (“Few to Credit,” 2010). It appears that even today the issue of English language instruction has neither been solved nor resolved; but in any case it has been normalized, over a series of points and dispersed in a variety of spaces, as central to the project of “development” in the islands, regardless of how “successful” the acquisition of English has been. Currently, it seems, the institutional practices of such sites as the College of the Marshall Islands are still attempting to teach English to Micronesians, much in the same way, and for very much the same reasons, as the Peace Corps volunteers did in the 1960s and WorldTeach and Dartmouth participants do today. And while by their own admission these agents and agencies are in a constant state of “improvement” in and assessment of English language instruction, one effect of these efforts has been, and continues to be, the delineation and demarcation of what constitutes “real” knowledge (led, no doubt, by the
subject of English), displacing “false” knowledges, and reinforcing this distinction through the construction and deployment of “teacher education” programs.

But perhaps I am getting ahead of myself. To understand the intersection of teacher education colleges and programs with the construction of the teacher and issues of colonization and development, it is necessary first to consider the process by which knowledges are constructed and legitimized, and how they are operationalized through the power-knowledge circuit embodied in the practices of “higher education” institutions. Foucault (2003) notes that beginning in the 18th century in Europe certain knowledges become decontextualized, ahistoricized, and “disciplined,” through a process of selection, normalization, hierarchalization, and centralization. While I am not suggesting that the construction of legitimate knowledges today is a function of the 18th century, it is important to note, as Samoff (2003) does, the centralization of knowledge within the university that reflects a normalization not only of Enlightenment disciplines but also those layered with globalizing and development discourses (and specifically those discursive practices employing the vocabulary of business, such that legitimate “education” is now couched in terms of “investment”). It is this last piece of Foucault’s, then, of centralizing “true” knowledge that most interests us, as this activity is embodied in the institutions of colleges and universities situated in and around Micronesia.

It is through this system of producing particular types and forms of knowledge as acceptable, and therefore non-contingent, that we see most clearly the deployment of a particular exercise of power. Here we would do well to turn to Foucault (2003) to mark that this disciplining of knowledges carries with it a vital characteristic of both definition and delegitimation: it is at this point (that of disciplinarization) that “the internal
organization of every knowledge became a discipline which had, in its own field, criteria of selection that allowed it to eradicate false knowledge or nonknowledge” (p. 181). Moreover, according to Foucault (1977), “you are asked to learn certain things and to ignore others: thus, certain things form the content of knowledge and its norms” (p. 219), while those things that are not included in the process of content formation are dismissed as contingent “false” knowledge.

What is important for our discussion here is to remember three things: first, that the disciplinarization of knowledge occurs, rather crucially, at the state level (through centralization), and that we should bear in mind that the teacher education colleges in Micronesia are all state-sponsored institutions; second, the institution that is the teacher’s college is in fact a site of mirroring, or at its most extreme mimicking, of western (specifically American) models of tertiary schooling; and, finally, that the curricula produced and legitimized through such institutions employ disciplinary knowledge that is couched in a discourse of “universalism” and at a level of “enunciations” which therefore “not only [lead] to an accumulation of knowledge, but also identify possible domains of knowledge” (Foucault, 2003, p. 184). In this way, the College of the Marshall Islands, as an example, requires all students to take a variety of courses in English, math, humanities, and science (physical, natural, social, and computer); these requirements are thereby produced, in Spivak’s (1993) terms, as “the ontic, the everyday, the ground of identity” (p. 53). By so doing, all other knowledges, that is, those that operate outside of this process of disciplinarization, by definition, lack both enunciation and legitimacy within the (state-sponsored) institution and are produced as ungrounded, contingent, and therefore contestable, knowledges. For our purposes, these nonknowledges are of interest.
because of their disappearance from the institutional practices involved in the construction of the teacher through very particular sites of teacher education.

It is also necessary to consider one additional point, which is to point out the obvious in this case: none of these disciplinary knowledges are endemic to the islands, and no alternative ways of knowing, such as those produced by socio-historical processes played out in the islands’ contexts, are allowed, at least in a meaningful way, into this mode of disciplinarization. In other words, the required courses for CMI students looks just like those for community college students in the FSM, Palau, Guam, the CNMI, Hawaiʻi, California, North Dakota, and so on. Indeed, it is the normalization of this disciplined knowledge that “makes not only knowledges, but also those who possess them, interchangeable” (Foucault, 2003, p. 180). In this way the modernization and development project of the United States, and indeed the global economic project, necessarily requires that students graduating from Micronesian schools and colleges look, act, and think like mainstream American college students; and the gateway to that “universality” and interchangeability of knowledge is dependent on, especially in the case of the colonial project, the ability to speak in English.

And so, if we are to take as a discursive turn Foucault’s (1977) assertion that “The university stands for the institutional apparatus through which society ensures its uneventful reproduction, at the least cost to itself” (p. 224), we might do well to consider just which society we are talking about in the case of Micronesia. To begin, there is the Territorial College of Guam established in 1952 in an agreement between Ohio State University and the territorial legislature; its primary purpose “was to prepare teachers for the public elementary schools” (Guam Territorial College, 1960, p. 4). Perhaps more
instructively, however, is the assertion by John R. Trace, Director of Education for Guam, that the construction of a permanent facility for the college in 1960 “marks another major step forward in the development of American education in the Pacific” (Guam Territorial College, p. 3). It should be noted that here we are speaking of Guam, which was not part of the Trust Territory administration, and relatively small numbers of Islanders were sent to the College of Guam for teacher training during the 1950s. Yet the effects of this relationship today can be seen in the impressive numbers of students from the region who now attend the four-year University of Guam (which became a bachelor degree-granting institution in 1968), a sizable number of whom attend the School of Education’s teacher training program.

Similarly, the colleges that today operate in Micronesia—the College of the Marshall Islands (CMI); the College of Micronesia (COM) headquartered in Pohnpei with branch campuses in Chuuk, Kosrae, and Yap; Northern Marianas College (NMC) in Saipan; and Palau Community College (PCC)—have their origins in the Micronesian Teacher Education Center (MTEC), instituted in 1963 on the grounds of the Pacific Islands Central School in Pohnpei (at the time the only high school in the Trust Territory). Here we see “the upgrading of the present corps of Micronesian teachers is a task of urgency and magnitude” (Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1963, p. 26), not the least reason of which was the island teachers’ perceived lack of facility in English and general inadequacy in the classroom. Simultaneously the Solomon Report would echo these sentiments by repeatedly noting “the low level of training of Micronesian teachers” (US Government Survey Mission, 1963, p. 144). (We shall turn to the “poor performing” Micronesian teacher below.) By 1970 MTEC became the Community College of
Micronesia (CCM) and began issuing 2-year degrees in elementary education; eight years later the institution again expanded and became the College of Micronesia (COM) with branches for nursing (in Saipan) and vocational education (in Palau), as well as continuing education centers (CECs) in the other districts of the Trust Territory (including Chuuk, Majuro, and Yap).

With this in mind, let us now look briefly at the disciplinarization of knowledges operating and dispersed through these institutions. In the Master Plan for the construction of new facilities for the burgeoning Community College of Micronesia in 1970, we see that the physical layout of the institution is intended to deliberately reflect this disciplining of knowledges: “The instructional area is composed of five clusters according to five main disciplines of business administration, humanities, science, engineering, and practical arts”; indeed, the design of the campus was to provide “specific interrelationships” between the disciplines, such as “between business administration and humanities (language labs); between humanities and science (lecture halls)”, and so on (Hawai‘i Architects and Engineers, 1970, p. 17). Similarly, at a planning conference for CCM in 1973, the following disciplines were ranked in order of importance for the purposes of the institution: “1—Teacher Education; 2—Liberal Arts; 3—Short-Term Training; 4—Business/Middle-Level Management; 5—Micronesian Cultures; 6—Tourist Support; 7—Pre-College Training” (Community College of Micronesia Planning Commission, 1973, n.p.). What is of note here is that “teacher education” as a discipline is the priority of the institution; indeed, the Teacher Education Committee goes so far as to assert “Regardless of what CCM does, we must continue to educate teachers” (p. 1), since, apparently, “Many of the secondary teachers presently
employed as teachers don't know how to teach” (p. 2). Interestingly, after a decade of focused teacher education (at least since the advent of Micronesian Teacher Education Center), the actual training of teachers was still an issue—but the normalization of teacher education and its primacy among the disciplinarization of knowledges is uncontestable. In this instance, both teacher education and liberal arts—two very western conceptions—are already non-contingent thanks in part to the centralizing function of state-sponsored tertiary institutions like CCM and UOG.

Which is not suggest that this situation has altered in any significant way in the past four decades. An examination of the courses required (that is, non-contingent “real” knowledge) for an Associate of Science degree in elementary education from the College of the Marshall Islands shows that one needs three classes in English (composition I and II and speech communication); two psychology courses (introduction to psychology and human growth and development); one class in math; one science with a lab; children’s literature; introduction to computers; one sociology class in contemporary issues in Micronesia; something called CMI 101 (a first year seminar class which essentially teaches new students how to be “students” at CMI); and two courses in what can loosely be called “Marshallese Studies”: either Marshallese orthography or grammar, and either Marshallese government, culture, or history. In addition to these “general core (and other) requirements” are seven classes in “education”: introduction to teaching; math for teachers; science for teachers; classroom methods and strategies; classroom management; and ESL speaking and listening methods as well as ESL reading and writing methods (College of the Marshall Islands, 2010, p. 55-56).
If we look first at the required courses, we see a “universal” (i.e., normalized) liberal arts core consisting of disciplines to be found in any western tertiary institution: English, math, science, computers, etc. Additionally, the “education” courses are similarly decontextualized and normalized, and go so far as to include two classes in how to teach ESL (reinforcing the primacy of English language instruction as uncontestable and referencing the shift in language policy in the Trust Territory as cited earlier from the Solomon Report). For a student wishing to teach in the RMI today, one would also need to complete a Certificate of Completion in Teaching, which involves, ideally, an AS degree in elementary education from CMI along with twelve credit hours of a teaching practicum. An alternative includes an AS degree from “an accredited college” with a minimum grade point average, along with the practicum, classroom methods and strategies, and classroom management courses (College of the Marshall Islands, 2010, pp 55-56).

Which brings us back to the issue of the Marshallese Studies courses. If one transferred in from another institution with an associate’s degree in hand, s/he could quite legitimately avoid ever having to take a Marshallese Studies course in order to earn a certificate of completion in teaching and qualify as a certified “teacher” in the RMI. As Foucault (2003) suggests, “this disciplinarization of knowledges result[s] in both the removal of certain epistemological obstacles and a new form, a new regularity in the proliferation of disciplines” (p. 185), thus removing Marshallese Studies from this new form and relegating it to somewhere outside “possible domains of knowledge.” Likewise, a student who graduated from any other degree program from CMI, such as in business and information technology, liberal arts, or nursing, who wanted a teaching certificate
would also be exempt from encountering Marshallese Studies so long as they completed the “education” courses and practicum. For those “traditional” students, that is, those who are completing the associate’s degree in education, they must take at least two classes in Marshallese Studies; but it is instructive to note that *which two* classes is not delineated. Indeed, even within the Marshallese Studies “requirement,” one can choose among orthography or grammar and government, culture, or history. Thus while “Marshallese Studies” is generally “required,” the courses themselves are *electives*, and thereby represent contingent—and contestable—knowledges. In short, Marshallese Studies has yet to be selected, normalized, hierarchalized, and centralized; or rather, this “discipline” is not yet a “true” discipline because it lacks legitimate enunciation. It is still a valid perspective to conclude that Marshallese Studies can be challenged within the institution, and especially as part of a course of study that is ostensibly structured for “teacher education.” Indeed, the subjectivity of the teacher as the college constructs it is not a site of contestation—but the legitimation of local knowledges most certainly is.

I will conclude this section by pointing out that local area studies, such as Marshallese Studies at CMI, are gaining acceptance in the region. There is a Palauan Studies certificate program at Palau Community College, a similar course of study at the College of Micronesia focusing on Micronesian Studies, as well as a Masters Degree in Micronesian Studies at the University of Guam. However, none of these programs, not the least of which is the Marshallese Studies program at CMI (in which I am complicit, serving as I have as its principal author), adequately addresses issues of normalization and legitimation of knowledges; in fact, I fear that these programs, especially the one I am responsible for in Majuro, will simply serve to reinforce the existing structures of
institutional power and in fact operate as tertiary-level “indigenization” of the institution (or, as I refer to this process in the Introduction Chapter, “cultural window-dressing”). In this way, these programs seem to mirror a curious element of the Peace Corps training program in which volunteers were taught basic “survival skills” that included canoe-building, fishing, and making a fire before they were sent to Micronesia’s various communities to teach Islanders how to modernize. To that end, I return to Foucault (1977), who cautioned “to imagine another system is to extend our participation in the present system” (p. 230); thus it may not be possible to create a meaningful Marshallese Studies program within a set of institutional habits and practices such as those embodied by the College of the Marshall Islands, or, if we do, we run the risk of wronging legitimate Marshallese knowledges if we litigate the differend and take as our starting point the already disciplined knowledges privileged in the institution—that is, disciplining and institutionalizing local knowledges may have the effect of erasing them. For now, it is enough to recognize the ways in which not only the institutions of “higher learning” emerged out of particular moments in time to produce teacher education centers, coinciding with the event that is the Solomon Report and the mass influx of Peace Corps volunteers as teachers, but also how these institutions have disciplinarized particular, conveniently western, forms of legitimate knowledge, and in so doing trivialize and contest alternative knowledge systems—such as those operating in the islands that construct a form of the teacher as in any way deviating from the normalized (western) model.
The “Highly Qualified” Cult(ure)

In 2003 the RMI Ministry of Education, in conjunction with the College of the Marshall Islands’ accreditation status bestowed upon it by WASC, was able to acquire a Teacher Quality Enhancement Grant (TQEG) from the US Department of Education. The timing of the grant could not have been worse for the college, since it is at this moment when it was most vulnerable in terms of losing accreditation (sliding as it was down the sanction ladder to eventually land at “show cause” during the second year of the grant). But in terms of the intersection of policy, politics, and development agendas and the site of the construction of the teacher, the TQEG was yet another event that both required, and was only possible because of, particular relations of power. Without accreditation there would have been no TQEG, and therefore the RMI would not have been able, in terms defined by the US Department of Education, to produce the subjectivity of “highly qualified”—and by extension highly uncontestable—teachers.

Emerging from the Bush administration’s 2002 No Child Left Behind legislation, the US Secretary of Education’s Annual Report on Teacher Quality stipulates that “all teachers of core academic subjects be ‘highly qualified’” (US Department of Education, 2002b, p. 4). Framed in ostensibly neutral, if not benevolent, language, the term “highly qualified” is left intentionally vague, with the effect of appearing to be self-evident; after all, who doesn’t want their child to be taught by someone who is “highly qualified,” even if the terms of that quality are never defined? This type of discourse is similar to that employed by accreditation (since it is so obvious as to be unquestionable that an institution would want to undergo “continuous improvement” and so on); yet the important point to remember here is that while this use of language may appear to be
operating neutrally, in fact discourse never does. As Ball (2007) tells us, “Discourses are fallible but influential particularly in providing possibilities of political though and thus policy” (p. 1). Thus, we must consider just what the effects of this discursive practice are, in order to trace the myriad ways that particular forms of power circulate through the application of such language, and so that we may begin to consider, ultimately, not only what is limited as possible but also what is foreclosed on.

Two observations should be noted when analyzing the Annual Report on Teacher Quality before considering its application in a context such as the RMI. First, teacher “quality” is linked inextricably to licensure; indeed in the only section where the report—or anywhere in the No Child Left Behind legislation, for that matter—defines its terms it explains

The term ‘highly qualified’—when used with respect to any public elementary school or secondary school teacher teaching in a State, means that—the teacher has obtained full State certification (including certification obtained through alternative routes to certification) or passed the State teacher licensing examination, and holds a license to teach in such State. (US Department of Education, 2002b, p. 4)

That is, qualification, and by extension construction, of “the teacher” is technical and can be determined only through the credential. The second observation is the effect that this “culture of licensure,” according to the US Secretary of Education, may have on teachers’ colleges. Here the secretary goes on to suggest, “This new approach would not necessarily mean the end of schools of education. Rather, it might signal a new beginning for these institutions, which could come to resemble graduate schools of business” (US
Department of Education, 2002b, p. 20). Indeed, the business model of total quality management is not far off from that proposed by Teacher Quality Enhancement Grants, and adoption of such models from the private sector is by no means unique (see Ball, 2007; Kupferman, 2008). What is noteworthy here are the ways in which these twin issues—of licensure and the role of the teachers’ college—play out in the RMI between the Ministry of Education and the college, and how these factors all converge to produce the “highly qualified teacher” in the Marshall Islands today.

The purpose of the TQEG in the RMI was to ensure that every Marshallese teacher working for the Ministry of Education had, at least, an associate’s degree from the College of the Marshall Islands, as well as to develop a teacher licensure program that would be tied to credentials and teacher pay. In this sense the implementation of the TQEG operated as an extension of the US Secretary of Education’s call for “highly qualified teachers” in every state—and in this case, the so-called “freely associated” state of the Marshall Islands. In total, the TQEG amounted to $4.5 million in matching funds, making the grant an impressive $9 million injected over three years into what in the US would be a moderately sized school district (approximately the same size as that of, say, Santa Fe, New Mexico) (Ministry of Education, 2003). During the first year of the grant, the college was placed on its first round of “show cause” by the accrediting commission (it would remain there for two more consecutive rounds, totaling 18 months hanging on to accreditation by a thread); and while there was reasonable concern that the loss of accreditation would jeopardize the application of the grant, in fact the ministry and college were unable to complete the primary task of the grant over the three year period (and a fourth year using previously unspent carry-over funds) of graduating every public
school teacher with an associate’s degree. I should note here as well that the growth of WorldTeach participants also coincided with the TQEG, since the volunteers were sent to schools around the RMI to fill in for those vacancies created by MOE teachers who were sent to CMI full-time to finish their associate’s degrees. Thus, we see the network that serves to construct “the teacher” in the Marshalls as layered by policy, practice, and procedures converging at various points.

Yet the triumph of the TQEG in Majuro was the second objective of the “highly qualified” mandate from the US Department of Education, in that the ministry outsourced to Pacific Resources for Education and Learning (PREL) the approximately $150,000 in direct TQE grant monies for “consultants” to develop a licensure and certification system (Ministry of Education, 2003). And so, as in the case of accreditation, the RMI government took up the charge, and wasted little time codifying the incontestability of the “highly qualified” teacher, even if such language remains vague, shrouded in some form of ontological neutrality, and therefore lacks any meaning. Following the lead of the US Secretary of Education’s reading of the No Child Left Behind legislation, the RMI law creates a Teachers’ Standards and Licensing Board that refuses to define “highly qualified”—and in fact does not even use that term—and instead, in rather plain language, constructs the subjectivity of the teacher by stating “No person shall serve as a teacher, head teacher or school administrator in any school in the Republic, without first having obtained a certificate and license from the Board” (Nitijela of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, 2007, p. 3). Thus, in order to serve as a teacher in the RMI, to be considered “highly qualified,” one needs only to obtain a license (again echoing a technical requirement), and in order to acquire such a license one needs, tautologically, to
demonstrate they are “highly qualified” by having, at the minimum, an associate’s degree.

The production of the “highly qualified” teacher, however, only prevails if that process also produces the “unqualified” teacher, one which is characterized by expertise in “false” knowledges, lacking in technical credentials, and therefore immediately erased, or, as in Baudrillard’s (1996) terms, the Other produced by difference: “What defines otherness is not that the two terms are not identifiable, but that they are not opposable. Otherness is of the order of the incomparable” (p. 122). We can see this approach to the local teacher as “unqualified” on three levels on display in a cartoon from the Marshall Islands Journal (see Figure 11). Here the substitute teacher (who is Marshallese) is mocked for his lack of credentials: “What proof do you have that you’re qualified to teach?”, to which he replies “My father was a teacher and I had a workshop for four weeks with the specialists at MOE.” Of the numerous implications operating through this exchange, there are three ideas to take particular note of. First, that the transmission of knowledge is no longer hereditary; that is, while customarily knowledge in the Marshall Islands is sacrosanct, and particular members of society had access to various parts of it and could pass it down to their hand-picked heirs, this phenomenon no longer counts in the modern-day republic. The effect of this, by extension, is to negate customary modes of being constructed as a knowledge expert, and in turn unleashes yet another form of the litigation of Lyotard’s differend in wronging customary dissemination of multiple knowledges in favor of the uncontestable nature of contemporary teacher “qualifications”—that is, expertise in “real” knowledges such as those disciplinarized and controlled through a teacher education program—as self-evident. Second, while the
substitute is made fun of for “only” having four weeks of workshops at the ministry, this
type of preparation is really no different from those enjoyed by Peace Corps and
WorldTeach volunteers—and, interestingly enough, such orientation programs seem
more than adequate for that type of “teacher.” Finally, the entire episode seems to call out
in favor of some national, state-sponsored mechanism with which to certify teachers as
“qualified”—a mechanism that is now codified in the RMI, and that is intended to
“solve” the “problem” of the (variously) unqualified local teacher.

Figure 11. Cartoon by Nashon Nashion mocking the Ministry of Education’s teacher
training qualifications. Copyright 2005 by The Marshall Islands Journal. Reprinted with
permission.
What is more troubling, however, is that the discourse surrounding the need for “highly qualified” teachers in the RMI, unlike that narrated by the US Secretary of Education, is couched in no uncertain terms of the subjectivation of the Marshallese “teacher” as a problem, and indeed a threat to the wellbeing of the state. Such a construction of the “unqualified” teacher as a threat is by no means new; to be sure, PREL has issued any number of reports on the Micronesian as a problem (as evidenced by such habits as missing work) and in need of policy remediation (see, for example, Uehara, 1999). Returning to the Solomon Report (1963) and continuing through Rudiak-Gould (2009), we see this same construction of the Micronesian teacher as somehow incapable of “real” teaching, at least not in the way that, say, American teachers (or, more correctly, WorldTeach volunteers today) are able to teach. What is more, recalling the issue of teaching English, we can divine yet another layer of the schema producing the conditions of the unproblematic (read, non-Micronesian) teacher as a “content area specialist” (in the terms of No Child Left Behind). Thus, if we may return for a moment to the notion of the “other” in terms of the subjectivation of the teacher as knowledge agent in Micronesia, we see that the American “teacher” is constructed as legitimate through not only her/his ability in English, the acquisition of a bachelor’s degree, and the universally de-racialized aspect of volunteers from the so-called “developed” world to “help” those who are “undeveloped,” but, perhaps most importantly, the subject of the American teacher in the islands is produced as the solution, since, through the process of difference, we see that they are very much not island teachers—and therefore very much not the problem.
We would do well to also consider the ways in which the licensing program has, in fact, normalized this construction of the American teacher as legitimate, and in so doing established the conditions of possibility in which island teachers are compelled to look like their supposedly altruistic volunteer counterparts. To demonstrate this mechanism, let us return one last time to the RMI licensing scheme. Now codified through legislation inspired (if not entirely directed) by the US Department of Education, we see that even though not all RMI teachers have an AS degree, those with high school diplomas are grandfathered into the system through a series of emergency, temporary, and provisional certificates (Ministry of Education, 2010). It is when we arrive at the Professional Certificates, however, that we can begin to recognize this process of normalizing the model of the American teacher as legitimate knowledge expert, as a Professional Certificate I requires an “AS in Education or AS in another field and have earned 16 credits in Education…or BA degree with less than 15 educational credits”; a Professional Certificate II requires an “AS Degree [sic] in Education plus 30 hours of course work, or BA Degree [sic] in Education or BA degree in another field and have earned 16 credits in Education”; and a Professional Certificate III requires any amount of credentialing or coursework beyond that stipulated by the previous level (Ministry of Education, 2010). In effect, this process serves to certify all American volunteers at least at the Certificate I level, while relegating all Marshallese teachers who have yet to complete an AS degree (as of this writing a sizable number of classroom teachers in the RMI) to either emergency, temporary, or provisional status. By so doing, the licensure program operates as a mechanism through which to produce all WorldTeach and Dartmouth participants as “highly qualified” (or at least professionally certifiable); in
contrast, a majority of Marshallese teachers are subjectivized in a way that, like
“development,” requires they constantly engage in a game of catch-up with the west.

Here we would do well to remember Deleuze’s (1994) conception of difference,
paying particular attention to the second part: “Difference is understood only in terms of
the play of two similitudes: the exemplary similitude of an identical original and the
imitative similitude of a more or less accurate copy” (p. 127). Thus, the Marshallese
teacher is constructed through a process of imitating WorldTeach and Dartmouth
volunteers, none of whom need to be considered “highly qualified” in any context other
than the RMI—which, ironically, they are due to their “content area mastery” of the
English language (although whether or not someone who speaks English is therefore
qualified to teach it remains unasked, and consequently unresolved, or at least
unanswered). And so through a series of intersecting historical, political, and policy
maneuvers the “highly qualified” teacher in the RMI today looks like a WorldTeach
volunteer—who in turn is subjectivized as a legitimate teacher in the islands as an effect
of the conditions of possibility for “the teacher” emerging from the experience of the
Peace Corps. In fact, we should not be surprised by the prescriptive character of this
normalizing process, since, as Zimmerman (2006) reminds us, “the Peace
Corps...actively sought such candidates [those with a BA degree or less], rejecting the
entire principle of teacher credentialism—indeed, of teacher professionalism—in the
United States” (p. 140, original emphasis). Paradoxically, then, it is exactly this rejection
of teacher professionalism that, through a series of institutional and discursive turns, has
become, quite literally, the law of the land in the Marshall Islands in terms of certifying
and licensing “qualified teachers.”
I will conclude this section with a return to Lyotard’s differend. “In the differend,” Lyotard (1988) tells us, “something ‘asks’ to be put into phrases, and suffers from the wrong of not being able to be put into phrases right away” (p. 13). What has been displaced through the foregoing construction of the teacher is not the “Marshallese teacher,” but rather the conditions of possibility that allow us to consider alternative conceptions of what it means to act as a legitimate teacher, one that is not prescribed by such unhelpful language as “highly qualified” or “licensed” or “certified.” Indeed, the “teacher” as an idiom is itself part of the problem, as “the Marshallese teacher” now, in an age of No Child Left Behind and teacher licensing schemes, takes on a paleonomic weight which completely displaces and erases customary or otherwise non-legitimate constructions of what it means to be a “teacher” in a context such as the Marshall Islands. We have codified the “highly qualified” teacher in the RMI, and in so doing we are now at a loss for linking with an idiomatic phrase what, as a cultural practice, we might have earlier called “a teacher.” This type of wronging of the differend is particularly problematic when we recognize that the operationalization of power circulating through “the teacher” is now so narrow that we can only conceive of the subject of the teacher as somehow non-customary—and in doing so we make custom itself contingent and therefore “non”-knowledge. Through the wholly unimaginative RMI teacher licensing process we have, in a word, lost our creativity in conceptualizing the “teacher.”

In this way, the Marshallese teacher, in circulating the model of the American, becomes universalized as simply “the teacher,” or in Wittig’s (1992) term, an “absolute subject,” and all other forms of construction of the subjectivity of the teacher simply fall away. We would do well, then, to move beyond thinking in terms of similitudes, much
like in our analysis of the student (in Chapter 2). In short, we should allow for difference as difference, and cease relying on the limits of language and idiom when speaking of “the teacher”—highly qualified or not—as a construction that can be legislated, and therefore litigated. In this way difference as difference produces not the construction of an absolute subject, but rather the “disintegration of the subject” (Foucault, 1977, p. 183). We would do better, it seems, to try to open up all possible irreconcilable forms of “the teacher” as legitimate subjects, and by so doing opening up spaces in which alternate conditions of being can emerge and circulate as possible. As Lyotard (1984) counsels, we should “be clear that it is our business not to supply reality but to invent allusions to the conceivable which cannot be presented….let us be witnesses to the unpresentable” (pp. 81-82). Let us be witnesses also to the uncertifiable.
CHAPTER 4: THE MOTHER AND CHILD REUNION: THE SUBJECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY

“Although grown-up now, with jobs and families of their own, the daughters and sons speak as if bent on regressing, as if they could capture and hold fast the shadowy outlines of the past, as if time could stand still, as if childhood never ended.”

Günther Grass, 2010

All in the Family

My daughters’ cousin was sent home recently with a note from his school in Kosrae announcing an upcoming parent-teacher conference. What was unclear to the adults—and at least one of the children—in the household was just who should attend.

His biological parents live in the United States, and since the time he was two years old his maternal grandparents have raised him. He is also being raised by his mother’s sister and her husband, and along with their four children, they share his grandparents’ cookhouse and live on the same parcel of farmland. In addition, his grandparents are also raising another child from another daughter (who is in the US military), as well as their own biological son who is still in high school. Their son also takes part in raising the children on the family farm, even though he is only seventeen. Which begs the question: who, in this scenario, is this child’s parent? Who should attend a parent-teacher conference? There are any number of possibilities: one or both of the grandparents; his aunt and/or uncle; his uncle who is still in public school himself; or any combination of these. But perhaps we should rephrase the question: Who, according to the school, is this child’s parent? That is, will the teacher and school administration tolerate the presence of a teenage high school student as a “parent”? Will they do the same for an aunt or a
grandparent? Just what is implied in the phrase “parent-teacher conference”? What kind of subjectivities does this arrangement assume, construct, and by implication preclude? And does a normalized, western approach to parent-teacher conferences make sense in the context of a bucolic Kosraean household? In other words, what do we mean when we speak of the family, parents, and children, and what do those subjectivities mean in terms of formal schooling?

Perhaps some of these questions can be considered in another way, through a pair of visual examples of contemporary representations of the “family” in the islands. To begin, we should look first at a sign outside the Berysins Community Health Center in downtown Kolonia, Pohnpei (see Figure 12). In the foreground is a quartet of figures, all completely white (including their clothing), holding hands and seemingly floating on the water. Behind them, perhaps to situate the center geographically on the island of Pohnpei (or perhaps merely in the Pacific), is a trio of small islets peeping just above the waterline, with the left-most islet sporting a palm tree. In the background is a brick building that seems buttressed by larger green cliffs behind it. We can presume that the building is the health center, and that the four figures represent the community, in this case the normalized western ideal nuclear family, complete with a father, mother, son, and daughter. The images are gendered both by their clothing, as well as their relatives sizes: the father and son are wearing pants, while the mother and daughter wear a skirt and dress, respectively; additionally, the father appears larger than the mother, while the son is taller than the daughter. Putting aside for the moment the fact that the figures are all white, it is interesting to note that all the figures are holding hands, suggesting an intact family unit; this unity of the nuclear family implies, among other things, that this
ideal type of social unit is, in fact, healthy, and is central to a healthy larger community composed of similarly constructed and intact families.

Figure 12. Berysins Community Health Center sign, Kolonia, Pohnpei. Photograph by the author.

Offering a similar narrative, although in much different ways, is the recent logo of the Republic of the Marshall Islands census, conducted under the auspices of the RMI Economic Policy, Planning, and Statistics Office (EPPSO). In this image we see a group of five figures sitting under a roof and encircled by the words “2011 RMI Census

2 The logo referred to here was first publicized by EPPSO in The Marshall Islands Journal on January 14, 2011, but was quietly replaced by a second image due to copyright infringement concerns on the part of EPPSO (see “‘Nico’ Wins,” 2010).
Below the figures, but within the space of the outer circle, is the phrase “Together We Count” (in the Marshallese language version of the image, the phrase is “Ippăn Doon Ewőr Bõnbônîd”). There is any number of ways to consider this image in its entirety, but perhaps we should begin with the figures and the space they inhabit. Let us look first at the four figures seated presumably on a bench facing the viewer (or, more correctly, the three figures facing the viewer, with the fourth figure looking to the right). We can assume that these four figures represent the family, including a father, mother, son and daughter—again, the ideal western nuclear family. The figures are, also again, gendered by size and clothing, as well as by hairstyle. The figure to the far left is presumably the son, who is larger than the sister but smaller than the other male figure seated next to him, the father. Both father and son are wearing t-shirts and shoes (although it is curious to note that there is no white line between the bottom of their legs and their shoes, like there is with the figure seated to the far right, resulting in the unfortunate effect of a father and son who are wearing no pants). Seated next to the father is the mother, who is larger than the son and daughter but smaller than the father, and wearing some sort of dress. On the mother’s lap is the daughter, the baby of the family, in a dress and with her hair in a bun. She is facing the fifth figure, who is facing the other four while sitting in a chair and holding a pen or pencil and a notebook or pad of paper. This figure is presumably the census worker.

So what, exactly, does this image both denote and connote, to use Barthes’ (1977) terminology? That is, what does the image tell us literally, and what does it imply? In the case of denotation, we notice that the group is sitting under a pitched roof reminiscent of some generic pan-Oriental design. Completing the structure is a three-layered foundation
upon which the bench and chair rest. What is connoted, however, is the “symbolic image”: in this case we are observing a household of some sort; the four figures being interviewed represent a typical family. The literal message, that this is the 2011 census in the Marshall Islands, “appears as the support of the ‘symbolic’ message” (Barthes, 1977, p. 37, original emphasis), so we can also be sure that this is supposed to be a typical Marshallese family. Indeed, from the perspective of the use of color, it is worthwhile to compare the sign from Pohnpei, in which all members of the family are white, with the logo from the Marshalls in which everyone in the family, including the census worker, is completely black. This application of monochromatics suggests that, on the surface at least, there is no variation among family members and that there is homogeneity to be found in what are essentialized depictions of either Pohnpeians or Marshallese. But beyond this surface denotation of white and black standing in for skin color, what might be connoted in these highly racialized images? Is the four-member, gender-balanced, nuclear family such that it implies a direction towards whiteness, as in the case in Pohnpei? Or does the use of black to signify skin suggest that there is something inherent about the nuclear family that is, in the case of our latter example, somehow Marshallese? In other words, is this depiction of a nuclear family in fact representative not of a normalized western ideal, but rather actually rooted in something indigenous to the Marshall Islands?

In order to answer this question, we need to consider the linguistic message delivered by the census logo, specifically the statement “‘Together We Count.’” The use of this type of caption employs what Barthes (1977) calls anchorage, in that “The text helps to identify purely and simply the elements of the scene and the scene itself” (p. 39).
Thus, one could conclude that the census-workers expect to find households in the Marshall Islands that look like the one represented here, complete with a father, mother, and two children, typically of opposite sexes. Tellingly, the phrase “‘Together We Count’” is already in quotation marks, suggesting that this phrase is being said aloud, presumably by the government (here represented by the census worker); this type of anchorage “remote-controls [the viewer] towards a meaning chosen in advance” (Barthes, 1977, p. 40). In this way the government has normalized the nuclear family in advance of the actual census, and what makes this approach so problematic is that, according to a national 2007 survey, the average household in the RMI contains 7.2 people; in the urban areas (notably Majuro Atoll, the capital, and on the island of Ebeye in Kwajalein Atoll), that number rises to more than 9 people per household (Economics Policy, Planning, and Statistics Office, 2007). As Anderson (1983) tells us, “The fiction of the census is that everyone is in it, and that everyone has one—and only one—extremely clear place” (p. 166). This representation of a four-member nuclear family as comprising the only inhabitants of a particular household, however, does not count everyone together; in fact, it erases over one half of the entire population of the country.

What is also missing from these two images and the normalized discourse they connote is the element of the multi-generational household in the islands. In the case of my daughters’ cousin, where grandparents are his primary caretakers, there are at least three generations residing in the same household; in the images above, that multi-generationality is erased and replaced by the generational duality of the nuclear family. Writing of the island of Fais in the outer islands of Yap State, Rubinstein (1979) explains that household residence is both modal, depending upon one’s mode of social
development, and variable. This movement between households on one’s land, called
*bogota* (usually belonging to one’s father or on the parcel in which one was born), often
results in multi-generationality:

residence…is more variable in the early and later stages of development, for
young children and aged adults. Owing to this residential mobility of both the
young and the very old, there is a tendency for households to be multi-
generational—children sharing the house of an aged relative, or a widowed parent
living with her grown children or grandchildren. (p. 159)

Even Petersen (2009), while in one stroke essentializing the entire region, concludes
“Typical Micronesian households are, first of all, multigenerational” (p. 94), although it
should be noted that he qualifies his statement by suggesting “there may well be no
typical form at all in some societies” (p. 95). Regardless, what emerges from our
elements from Kosrae, the Marshalls, and Fais is that, while the particular composition
of households may (and do) vary, what one is hard-pressed to argue is that the model of
the nuclear family is either indigenous or widespread.

Indeed, what is importantly absent from attempts to normalize the “family” as
consisting exclusively of two parents and their children is what Shapiro (2000) calls “the
radical contingency of the family” (p. 267). Here this familial contingency is juxtaposed
against Hegel’s (1821/1991) “natural unity” of the family, wherein a universal family
exists both as the moral and ethical foundation of the state while the state simultaneously
“creates the condition of possibility for the ethical life of the family” (Shapiro, 2000, p.
276). It is no accident, then, that the original census logo utilized by EPPSO in the RMI
represents the family in terms of a western model of non-contingency, since it is much
easier to regulate and govern self-contained nuclear units than sprawling households and familial groups that do not adhere to strict interpretations of what a healthy family *should* look like, at least in terms of Hegel’s natural unity. The challenge this contingency of the family presents to the state is one of coding, in that the state offers “patterns of normativity” (Shapiro, 2000, p. 274) which direct subjectivities and delimit the possibilities of various modes of being which not only prescribe but also proscribe ways that one *cannot* be (such as in delegitimizing our examples from Kosrae or Fais). For the moment, however, let us put aside the intersection of the family and state, which we will deal with again below, and return to what should by now be a familiar discursive practice.

In his personal study of what he considers the powerful alterations of society and culture in the islands since World War II, *The New Shape of Old Island Cultures*, Hezel (2001) echoes (or perhaps foreshadows) the connoted messages we read in the images above in regards to the seemingly inexorable shift from more customary family units characterized by multi- and inter-generationality, adoption, and contingency to the nuclear family. Hezel (2001) opens the book with a chapter titled, simply, “Family,” in which he states: “As the family’s membership has shrunk, it has become identified with a single residential dwelling, often housing not much more than a nuclear family” (p. 8). Further on in the book he remarks on “the nuclear family that is becoming more and more the norm” (p. 44), while elsewhere he concludes

In short, the new Micronesian family has gradually retreated into the nuclear household. The communal cookhouse, like the earth oven before it, is on the way to becoming obsolete. In most households the cooking space has moved into the
kitchen, where the nuclear family can discreetly prepare food for its own members. (p. 13)

This last passage is instructive for two reasons: first, Hezel uses the word “retreat,” suggesting that the nuclear family is somehow innate, and that large, extended families are now returning to their original, non-contingent form; second, that one marker of this “retreat” is the preponderance of interior kitchens. Here I will only point out that, as recently as 2007, over 25% of all urban households in the Marshalls had a kitchen that was either part of a separate building from the main quarters or was a cookhouse situated outside the house entirely, while 96% of rural households had kitchens detached from the house or outside cookhouses (Economic Policy, Planning, and Statistics Office, 2007). The imminent obsolescence of cookhouses in island communities, and by extension the social units that employ them, is not nearly as endangered as the normalizing discourse would have us believe.

So just where does Hezel (2001) locate the catalyst for the shift from families of contingency to the inevitability of the nuclear family? In a phrase, the turn for Hezel comes with the advent of the “cash economy,” resulting in the “nuclearization” of the family (p. 14). Similarly, Shapiro (2000) considers Donzelot’s (1979) historical analysis of the production of the contemporary family as a function of the economies of the state, locating the turn towards the governing of the family in “changing structures of occupational recruitment” (p. 278). But Shapiro goes further, explaining that state intervention in the construction of the family “required increasing degrees of intervention in the health, education, and fiscal conditions of family members” (p. 278). I would like to stop for a moment and reiterate the use of the word “education” in Shapiro’s analysis,
since this is one area, rather ironically, that Hezel seems to have neglected. Indeed, in a book dedicated to explaining and evaluating social change, Hezel ignores education almost completely, as there is no chapter, section, or even paragraph concerned with it, and school is nowhere to be found (not even in the index). Thus, we have a work detailing shifts in social and cultural patterns that treats education, and especially formal schooling, as either incidental or otherwise unrelated. Or perhaps, in keeping with his earlier approaches to normalizing school, Hezel (2001) regards education as ontological, such as when he remarks about the modern teenage Micronesian girl, “From the moment she returns home from school, she is given jobs by her mother one after another so that she becomes the extension of the mother” (p. 19). With no other context, school is merely one more part of the natural, normalized background in which teenagers operate in an otherwise transfigured social setting.

What makes Hezel’s (2001) inattention to school in this particular work so curious is the cover image on the front of the book: a group of young island children smiling and sitting at their school desks with their books in front of them, all superimposed over the silhouetted image of a Kosraean fisherman. If school plays no role in the so-called social change Hezel is commenting on, why feature it on the cover? Indeed, at the risk of repeating myself, it seems appropriate here to remember that the Solomon Report itself admitted that, “insofar as education is concerned, the revised [US Trust Territory] policy places the schools, more than any other public institution and agency, in the vanguard of a deliberate program of cultural change” (US Government Survey Mission, 1963, p. 131). How is it that Hezel, who as we have seen in earlier chapters is so highly regarded in the discourse on schooling in Micronesia that he is
almost an archive unto himself, could have so thoroughly missed the connection between
the rise of American-style schooling in the islands with the rise of the normalization (if
not the reality) of, among features of a “deliberate program of cultural change,” the
nuclear family? And how could he fail to see the fundamental move of the site of the
production and transmission of knowledge from the family to the schoolhouse?

It is this last point, the situating of legitimate knowledge, more than the economic
shift evidenced by the rise of a cash economy in Hezel’s estimation, that demonstrates the
rupture in the forces of subjectivizing what constitutes a family, as well as its component
parts, within the context of a normalizing model of formal school. Falgout (1984), writing
of the transmission of certain types and forms of knowledge in Pohnpei, even in the
contemporary era of formal schooling and credentialing, explains that while some
knowledges are claimed by the sou (commonly referred to as one’s matrilineal clan), so-
called “traditional” knowledge is passed down through a strict hierarchy, one that is
customarily situated within the family. As Falgout (1984) tells us, “Persons who serve as
the repositories for this [traditional] knowledge are considered authorities within the
living culture. Within individual households, adults serve as instructors for children” (p.
141). Metzgar (1991) makes a similar observation in his study of cultural transmission on
Lamotrek Atoll in Yap State. Recalling an example from the Introduction Chapter,
Michalchik (2000) reminds us of the role that the church plays, historically as well as
socio-culturally, in modern-day Kosrae: “For the better part of one hundred
years…family and church organized the activities in which Kosraean children learned
most everything they learned about their world” (p. 10).
Popularized in the 1990s thanks primarily to a book published by then-US First Lady Hillary Clinton with the same title, the slogan “it takes a village to raise a child” connotes a variety of meanings. For Hezel (2001) and Kawakami (1995), for example, the phrase suggests that Islanders throughout the region have forgotten what it means to exist as a community (or, rather, as a village), and that they need to be reminded. What is more, those same villagers must understand, in the case of Kawakami’s report for PREL on Kosrae (referred to in the Introduction Chapter), that failure in any number of indicators having to do with formal schooling is evidence of their failure to act as a proper village—indeed, that the notion of village life now prevails in order to further normalize schooling. Put another way, the metaphorical village of formal schooling has erased the actual village. What is implied by this line of reasoning is threefold: first, that customary constructions of villages, families, and other social units have broken down; second, that therefore learning can no longer take place within customary social units; and third, that in order for “real” learning to occur it must do so within schools, and that the so-called “predominance” of the new nuclear family has no choice but to support state-sponsored school as the site of legitimate knowledge.

What we are interested in, then, is interrogating just how this convergence of school, the state, and the subjectivities of both childhood and parenthood operate, and what the effects of that circulation of various relations of power are—between school and the state; between school, state, and the child; and between school, state, and parent—and how they create the conditions of possibility for the subjectivities of the child, parent, and family. In other words, how does the state, through the mechanism of schooling, construct the child and parents, how does it govern those subjectivities, and what are its
effects? In the words of Foucault (1997), “How was the subject established, at different moments and in different institutional contexts, as a possible, desirable, or even indispensable object of knowledge?” (p. 87).

Child, State, School

In the mid-2000s, Delap Elementary School (DES) in Majuro adopted a new slogan, which was posted outside the school’s fence and was featured on the new t-shirt uniforms worn by its students: Ajiri Mokta, or Children First. At first glance this discursive formation seems rather unnecessary, and borders on the tautological; after all, whom else would DES put first? The adults? Indeed, the slogan is reminiscent of the theme of the 2009 education conference in Kosrae referenced in the Introduction Chapter: Everything For the Child. What is immediately implied in both of these phrases is a temporal distinction: that is, now we are putting children first, now we are doing everything for the child. The deeper assumption is that the opposite has been true up until this point, and the family, village, and larger community units have, it seems, been negligent in their duties to “the child,” while the formal school is there to pick up the slack. Yet we should not stop there, since there is a third conclusion to draw from such sloganeering: that schooling constructs not the student, but the child. DES could have just as easily gone with Ri-Jikuul Mokta, or Students First—especially since the word for “student” in Marshallese, ri-jiikuul, is a combination of the word for person (ri) and the Marshallese phoneticization of school (jiikuul). An interesting comparison can be made with the College of the Marshall Islands, which in 2010 did roll out the slogan “Students First.” Putting aside the fact that CMI’s slogan is seen on campus only in English, it is instructive to note that the tertiary institution is concerned with students, who in this case
are adults; it would be awkward for the college to do otherwise. But the elementary (and secondary) schools in Majuro and Kosrae are focused on constructing the child, a subjectivity that, through contemporary practices and habits of schooling, both defines and delimits childhood through formal schooling, which is itself layered with discourses of development and of the state.

Anderson (1983) offers us a useful example of the conflation of education, schooling and childhood from the perspective of the colonizing model, wherein “Youth meant, above all, the first generation in any significant numbers to have acquired a European education….by ‘Youth’ we mean ‘Schooled Youth’” (p. 119, original emphasis). From the University of Guam in the early 1990s we have a series of teachers’ resources that suggests a similar mode of being among children as subjects of schooling in the islands. Here the child is constructed not only through an amalgamation of “traditional” education values and the purposes of western-style schooling, but also through an essentializing that, very deliberately, presents to the public-school teacher on Guam (who we may assume is not of these societies, or more correctly, is American) subjectivations of the Chamoru child (Tacheliol, 1991), the Pohnpeian child (Cantero, 1993), the Marshallese child (Keju and O’Connor, 1994), and so on. This approach to reducing the child to what is at bottom a reinscribing of the colonial narrative of the region of Micronesia also serves to present the indigenous child, and her/his home life and values, as a series of problems for the teacher to overcome in order to facilitate the child’s “success” in school. Importantly, school becomes the context and the referent, while indigenous values and habits are hurdles to be navigated around, if not overcome entirely. And once again, we are confronted not with the Chamoru student, but the
Chamoru child, one who is removed from one’s home (in a variety of ways) to become “educated” in fields of legitimate knowledge that are only found in the practice of schooling.

Baker’s (1998, 2001) genealogies of the construction of the child and childhood offer useful lenses through which to consider not only the child as a subject of school but also the more recent phenomenon of the child as a subject of economic and political development discourses, often through references to schooling. The notion of childhood as a natural, ontological mode of being, Baker tells us, can be traced to shifts in the romantic notion of the child emerging with child/adult binaries of the western European Enlightenment period, most notably through the work of Rousseau. Importantly, the child became constructed additionally as a subject of what Baker terms “rescue”—economically, morally, and intellectually—beginning in the early 19th century; in more contemporary idiomatic speech, Bloch, Lee, and Peach (2003) consider the effects of the construction of discourses of “potential.” In both instances, schooling becomes the mechanism through which the middle class achieves levels of socioeconomic improvement; simultaneously, children are rescued morally through the emergence of the middle-class ideal of the safety (and morality) of the nuclear family; and lastly, schools become, in Baker’s (1998) term, a form of middle-class “intervention” to ensure the intellectual maturation of their children.

Tied to this notion of childhood “perceived as a universal, stable category bound by norms of development and ways of assessing deviations” (Baker, 1998, p. 117), and subsequently subjectivized as in need of various forms of rescue, it is necessary to also consider the ways in which schooling, as an “intervention,” reinforces notions of
“development” of the child with what, at the time (and I would argue continue
euphemistically to this day), were considered the psycho-social stages of “development”
from so-called “savagery” to “civilization.” This discourse, it should come as no surprise,
was (and still is) heavily racialized; in Baker’s analysis of US public schools in the early
20th century, it is rather easy to draw a very distinct color line in an age of rampant school
segregation. Thus, “blackness” is associated with “savagery” while “whiteness” denotes
accelerated development towards “civilization.” (We should recall here the contrast of
Lee Boo’s skin color from Chapter 2, in which he is brown while throwing spears, and
white while learning to read in school and how to use utensils in the Wilson household.)
Simultaneously, childhood corresponds to the earliest stage of human development, that
is, the “savage,” while adolescence and adulthood mark one’s having successfully
achieved “development” (Baker, 1998; Jenks, 1996).

It is at this point that we should consider how these discourses of “child
development” operate on a comparative and contemporary politico-economic level. To
begin, then, there is the Convention on the Rights of the Child, a document that came
from the United Nations in 1989, and went into effect among its signatory nations the
following year. Midway through the 54 Articles of the Convention are Article 28, which
deals explicitly with schooling (albeit in the now-common mode of conflating school
with education), and Article 29, which speaks of the intersection of education and “child
development” (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
1990). Coded with discourses of economic and political development, the “child” to
whom the Convention refers is, not surprisingly, the child from a “developing” country,
conventionally located in the (non-white) economic South, and a state that has yet to
reach its fullest potential (that is, it has yet to become “developed” in the way that the west, rather conveniently, already is). Tied to notions of statehood, development, and layered with conflated notions of human and economic “maturation,” school is conceived here as the requisite intervention in order not only to develop the child, but also the state. This complex layering can be seen, for example, in a situational analysis of the FSM conducted by the FSM government and UNICEF in the mid-1990s:

The depressing conclusions of this section [on child development, education and literacy], that the educational attainment of the population of the FSM appears to be declining, have to be addressed by all government entities if the nation is to reduce its reliance on external workers, develop indigenous businesses, and provide more efficient public administration. (Government of FSM, 1996, p. 38)

Of note in this piece is that both Articles 28 and 29 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child appear in “dialogue boxes” throughout, suggesting that the economic success of the nation-state depends heavily on the successful intervention of the school in helping the child reach her/his full potential (that is, to be developed, or, more coarsely, civilized).

What is striking about this type of conclusion is that it lays the burden of development almost squarely on the state-sponsored school, one who’s quality is largely in doubt; this dilemma, in turn, produces a child that is the subject of not only state schooling bureaucracies, but of the entire state apparatus. Thus, writing of modern-day Uganda, Cheney (2007) tells us “children are often caught in a double-bind: while they are told that schooling is essential to their future and that of the country, the challenges of quality and access keep them back from reaching those goals” (p. 76). This double-bind,
as it were, can be found in Baker’s (1998) parallel example of segregated US public schools over a century ago, in which “African American children were not positioned as fully rescuable” (p. 134, original emphasis). Although while in Baker’s case race corresponded with “natural” phenomena, in the so-called “developing” world of the present-day race is largely coded by discourses of economics, and in any event both cases operate on assumptions of what Baker (1998) calls “categories of deficit” which are “disproportionately filled with children further labeled as ‘minority’ [racially categorized] and ‘poor’ [economically categorized]” (p. 138).

Indeed, one wonders if the whole mechanism of contemporary “development” on display in the Convention on the Rights of the Child isn’t designed entirely by such categories of deficit and issues of who is or is not fully rescuable. For instance, as Article 28 explains: “States Parties recognize the right of the child to education, and with a view to achieving this right progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, they shall, in particular: (a) Make primary education compulsory and available free to all” (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1990). While secondary and tertiary schooling are encouraged, only primary education is compulsory, suggesting that the child is only rescuable, in developing contexts, up to 8th grade. This notion of compulsory elementary schooling is echoed in the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), a product of the United Nations Development Programme, which in 2000 set out eight goals to be achieved by developing nations by 2015. Goal 2 of the MDG is to “Achieve universal primary education,” and is to be measured by increases in net enrollment in elementary schools, increases in the proportion of children who persist through 8th grade, as well as the literacy rate of 15-24 year olds (United Nations, 2000)—
making primary schooling essentially an issue of quantity. Leaving for the moment the assumption that school is a given in this context (indeed, it is compulsory), we might wonder just what the effect of this limited rescuability is on children in “developing” states, and, by extension what the effect is on the state itself.

After all, taking the interconnectivity of the child and the state in the contemporary context of development, is there an analogous conclusion to be drawn about the development prospects of certain geo-political bodies and their own rescuability? A cursory glance at the RMI Millennium Development Goals Progress Report (Republic of the Marshall Islands, 2009) suggests as much, as we notice in the upper-right quadrant of the front cover of the 75-page document a smiling girl whose head is tilted slightly to the left; across from her is a 24-pointed star, the same one on the flag of the republic, denoting the 24 electoral districts. The middle of the cover is swathed in dark blue, bordered on the bottom by two diagonals, one orange atop one of white, suggesting the rest of the country’s flag. In this way childhood and nationalism are inextricably linked. Given the focus of the MDG themselves, I would go so far as to suggest that the health and wellbeing of the child is pivotal to the health and wellbeing of the state; the reverse, since this is ostensibly about governmental reforms of social sectors, is also true. But this link between child and state persists well inside the report, as 10 of the 21 pictures included in the document are of children in various states of play, singing, or other social interaction. From a visual perspective, Debord (1983) reminds us that such a spectacle—that of the child, in this instance—“has become actual, materially translated. It is a world vision which has become objectified” (para. 5). In this case, the link between children, statehood, and development becomes “truth” in terms of the
production of the child and the state. In other words, “the spectacle is the present model of socially dominant life” (para. 6, original emphasis); that is, the spectacle of the child produces the “real” (that of the “real” child and “real” state) while simultaneously claiming to reflect that very reality which it creates. Taken further, we can also conclude that this progress report has a second message: that the state is itself a child, one that is in need of rescue—or, in more benign language, in need of “development.”

In is also instructive to consider that such a child-centered approach—to schooling, statehood, and politico-economic development discourses—does precisely that: it centers the child. Thus, if we return to Baker (1998), school, and by extension here the whole state itself, not only centers the child through, for example, compulsory primary education, but it also decenters, specifically those children who are not included in this rush to economic, moral, and intellectual rescue. In this way, to take our earlier examples of the Chamoru child or the Pohnpeian child, such child-centered resources focus on the child as a subject of school, since that is the context in which they are centered; but what of the Chamoru child who is not in school? In the decentering of the schooling subject, is s/he fully rescuable? Is that child even Chamoru anymore? As Baker asks the question, “Do new projects of rescue [such as the Millennium Development Goals] require a dependent child who can be rescued economically, morally, and intellectually” (p. 139)? The decentered child, in this case, would appear to occupy the space of the “other,” existing outside the normalized subjectivity of the by-now standard schooling-constructed child. What is more, “The normalization of ‘childhood’ as ‘stages of development’ produced ‘others,’ whose protection was not guaranteed” (Baker, 1998, p. 139). So do the Millennium Development Goals, if not met by 2015, then produce
these others, who are not guaranteed the same rights as their schooling counterparts? That is, are they doomed to falling short of developing, not only as children into adults but as economic subjects as well?

Perhaps a return to the use of language can help clarify some of these issues, specifically if we look at the Convention on the Rights of the Child or the teacher resources dealing with the Pohnpeian child. The application of the definite article suggests that, through discourses of development and schooling at least, there is an assumed universal, one might almost go so far as to say natural, state of childhood, one that is in need of varying levels of rescue depending upon one’s stage of “development” (economic, intellectual, political, etc.), in short, an uncontestable epiphenomenon that transcends context and culture and which is only fully centered through schooling practices. As Bloch, Kennedy, Lightfoot, and Weyenberg (2006) explain, “The supposedly universal notions of child development, early education policies, and high standards for ‘all’ currently circulating cross-nationally, foster ideas that, because they are assumed to be applicable to all, they are assumed to be inclusive” (p. 4), and instead pass over what is “exclusive.” But is this normalized state of affairs an effective mode through which to consider the child, if indeed there is such a subjectivity? Jenks (1996) reminds us “Childhood is to be understood as a social construct...[it] always relates to a particular cultural setting” (p. 7). When discourses of schooling and politico-economic development are taken as givens, however, rather than as socially and contextually constructed frames in of themselves, there seems to be little room for what O’Loughlin (2009) suggests are the “shifting subjectivities” of childhood: “If we choose to expose children only to unitary or monological discursive formations, or only to discursive
formations alien, for example, to their pre-existing class, gender, and ethnic identifications, we are severely limiting the possibilities of such children constructing expansive and emancipatory subject positions for themselves” (pp. 12-13). Indeed, it is only when “the child” is “available for discussion and childhood open to contestation” (James, Jenks, and Prout, 1998, p. 213) that we can consider alternatives to a particular schooling subjectivity that is always and ever in need of rescue and centering, and by extension in danger of abandonment and decentering.

What this ostensible “ontology of childhood” does, however, is foreclose on such alternatives, and a child in the islands therefore needs to leave the home (and its context, beliefs, and practices) to become and to develop, intellectually, morally, and economically. School, as a function of the modern-day development imperatives of the state, becomes the site not only of the production of legitimate knowledge, but also of legitimate childhood. As the contingency of the family is displaced, so is the contingency of childhood. One important effect of this construction of the child through schooling is how the state, through the school and other institutions and agencies, is able to govern childhood, delimiting its legitimate possible alternatives even further. Thus, beyond Delap Elementary School’s call for “children first,” the Kosrae State Department of Education’s entreaty of “everything for the child,” and the University of Guam’s teacher resources on the Pohnpeian child, we come to the apex of the governmentality of the child, No Child Left Behind, a topic to which we now turn our attention.

No Child Left Micronesian: Governmentality and the Child

Enacted in 2002, the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) act became the signature piece of domestic reform legislation of the George W. Bush presidency. While it has been
widely praised and criticized, its impacts and effects can be felt and seen in multiple areas of the United States’ schooling apparatus. Within the various political entities in the region known as Micronesia, NCLB has also made its presence known, albeit to differing degrees; one primary reason for these varying effects is simply that the law has some jurisdiction in the territory of Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, but no legal standing in any of the freely associated states of the FSM, Palau, or RMI. While NCLB does have an impact on US Department of Education and Department of Interior grants to those island-states, it is far from acting as the law of the land. Yet one could be forgiven for thinking that NCLB in fact is Marshallese or Palauan or Pohnpeian law, since it has become a normalized part of the daily education discourse in the region and its effects are impressively widespread—and even more impressive if one takes into account the fact that its legal jurisdiction stops at the boundaries of the United States.

My purpose here is not to reconsider the pros and cons of the NCLB law, however; what I am interested in is more subtle, complicated, and consequential. Once again, the network linking the state, school, and child is not hiding from us: indeed, the name of the legislation, No Child Left Behind, is a rather straightforward declaration of the power of the state not only to subjectivize the child, both as a subject of schooling as well as a subject in need of rescue (since the child is, apparently at risk of being “left behind”), but also of the role of the state, and no longer just the school or its curriculum, in centering the child—and, by extension, the power of the state to marginalize the decentered child. What is at stake here, moreover, is not simply an understanding of how this state-school network operates, but what its effects are on the construction—and, conversely, the erasure—of the child (and later the parent) through apparatuses of
governmentality. In other words, how does NCLB regulate “the child” in Micronesia, and how does it effectively govern childhood? What does it mean for the state-school network already circulating, not to leave a child behind, but rather to leave no child unregulated? That is, how does this law, which in most of the region of Micronesia is not the law, regulate the child as a construct of schooling?

To begin to answer these questions, we should consider first what it is we mean by governmentality. Foucault (2007) refers to governmentality as

the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument. (p. 108)

Elsewhere, Foucault (1979b) describes this assemblage as the “art of government,” wherein a particular formulation and circulation of knowledge and power are coordinated by the state. Indeed, the dual conception of power-knowledge as circulatory and productive, considered in the Introduction Chapter, is at the heart of governmentality, as is the third component of subjectivity, wherein the power-knowledge-subject circuit flows through mechanisms of state schema. Levitt (2008) points out “This structure [of governmentality] operates on forms of knowledge (regimes of truth) that politically regulate populations through technologies…to deliver the forms of educability” (p. 51); thus it is both straightforward and necessary to note the central coupling of the apparatuses of governmentality, the state, and the school.
Embedded within governmentality are the practices of government. That is, like conceptions of power-knowledge, genealogy, or processes of subjectivity, Foucault is not seeking to define the state, but instead to consider the effects of the deployment and circulation of the practices of governmentality: “Rather than a theory of the state, Foucault proposes to analyse the operation of governmental power, the techniques and practices by which it works, and the rationalities and strategies invested in it” (Dean, 1994, p. 179). Thus, for our purposes, we are interested in what we might call effective governmentality, or the various ways in which practices of government construct specific subjectivities while erasing others as well as the conditions of possibility that could produce others. We are interested therefore in the _how_ of government, for as Dean (2010) offers, “To ask how governing works, then, is to ask how we are formed as various types of agents with particular capacities and possibilities of action” (p. 40). We are interested, then, in an analytics of government, one that examines and exposes the variety of regimes of practices utilized by the state. Helpfully, Dean (2010) organizes Foucault’s analysis of the art of government into four intersecting and interconnected axes of governmentality: visibility, _techne_, rationality, and modes of subjectivity. Here we should keep in mind that these interstices do not always operate simultaneously, nor do they operate equally, but they overlap and reinforce each other in a multiplicity of ways and locales such that they constitute the broad elements of regimes of practices and offer a lens through which to interrogate the effects of governmentality.

Let us begin with the notion of visibility, in which the visibility of the government operates as a form of regulation through textual and visual discourse, by considering two images, both hand-painted public service signs announcing a school in Pohnpei and
another in Majuro. In the first instance, the sign for Nett Elementary School in Pohnpei, the center of the sign is a ribbon, folded twice, which gives the image a sense of the triptych (see Figure 13). In the middle is the name of the school and its location in the municipality of Nett; in large black letters surrounding the triptych are the words “Kadaiala oh Katehlapahla Marain, Koahiek oh Lelepek,” or “expand and broaden knowledge, skills and attitudes.” The right panel of the sign contains two elements of Pohnpeian custom, the elinpwur, a yellow-flower head garland, and a stalk of sakau shown in a kind of cut-away to still be growing in the soil. (It is curious that the school, which, like all Pohnpeian public schools touts itself as a “drug free zone,” would include an image of sakau, the unofficial drink of Pohnpei State which, like its Fijian counterpart kava, is well-known to have narcotic effects on its users.) Below the elinpwur and sakau, at first glance seemingly out of place, is the all-too-familiar phrase “No Child Left Behind.” Opposite this panel to the right is a scene out of a naturalist’s guidebook, featuring a waterfall and a kingfisher perched on a tree branch. Below this image is the Pohnpeian “Seri Koaros Kesemwpwal,” roughly meaning, “every child is important”—or, perhaps, “no child left behind.”
In terms of the field of visibility of government, it is necessary to keep in mind that this sign uses a slogan that is shorthand for school reform in the United States, not Pohnpei; that, prior to the passage of NCLB in 2002 this slogan (and this signage) was nowhere to be found in the islands; and that this textual language, adopted as it has been by the elementary schools in Pohnpei, is interwoven and coupled with a visual discourse. Indeed, the visually discursive weight of the sign exceeds the rather banal use of text, in that, on the left side of the triptych we read a layering and linking of governmentality and culture with the otherwise inexplicable association of an *elinpwur* and sakau plant with the name of school reform legislation that only has legal recourse in a foreign country (the United States); while on the right side we are told, by translating “no child left
behind” into the vernacular and using it to prop up images of the island-state’s natural resources, that somehow the basic idea behind this same foreign legislative reform is endogenous to Pohnpei—that it is, essentially, a feature of Pohnpeian society as natural, say, as a waterfall or a kingfisher.

As to the second image, which we will consider again in the concluding section below, we should mention only briefly those similar messages connoted through the decussation of textual and visual discourse (see Figure 14). Again we have the ever-present language, “No Child Left Behind,” anchored by a Marshallese translation. In this image, unlike the former, the verbal text is located at the top of the sign, in effect announcing the image below it, as well as the message of governmentality carried within it. The visual image features the silhouettes of what appears to be a nuclear family complete with father, mother, and child holding hands with what one can assume is a teacher standing before the rays of a rising sun in the tropics (signaled by the pairs of coconut trees on either end). This part of the sign, in turn is set on top of another layer of text, declaring, in English, “Parents Teacher Partnership For A Brighter Future of RMI.” To the left of the sign is another, much plainer and more drab sign composed entirely of stenciled letters describing the building as Uliga Public Elementary School. This message, that this is indeed a state-sponsored school, plays off of the discourse of nationalism in the image next to it, since the image in the latter represents the brighter future not of the child, the parents, the teacher, or the people, but of the “RMI,” or the Republic of the Marshall Islands—that is, the government, which runs the school system.
Indeed, it is at this multiple layering of visibilities of government that we should consider a second element of our present regime of practices, the *techne* of government. Dean (2010) makes a distinction between *techne* and technology, suggesting that technologies compose but one part of a larger *techne* of governmentality that posits “by what means, mechanisms, procedures, instruments, tactics, techniques, technologies and vocabularies is authority constituted and rule accomplished?” (p. 42). Another piece of this *techne* is embedded in the strategic logic, or worldview, values, and beliefs, of a regime of practices. Here we mean “regimes of practices possess a logic that is irreducible to the explicit intentions of any one actor but yet evinces an orientation toward a particular matrix of ends and purposes” (Dean, 2010, p. 32). In this way, we see that the strategy of this particular regime of practices is characterized by contemporary
beliefs in “development” through schooling (what in an earlier age we could describe as colonization); the program of this strategy, in the current example, is No Child Left Behind; and its techne is the apparatus of schooling itself. Indeed, one might suggest that the strategic logic of this regime of practices could be summed up as “No Child Left Unschooled.”

At this point, in order to provide an expansive analytics of the governmentality at work through the program of NCLB, it is necessary to consider one particular component of this techne of schooling, specifically the educational consulting agency Pacific Resources for Education and Learning (PREL). While we have alluded to PREL in previous chapters, it is important to focus here on its role as part of our techne of government and how PREL conjoins both the technical aspects of schooling with the larger strategic logic of governmentality currently circulating in the islands. I refer to PREL in the Introduction Chapter as “a quasi-governmental non-profit consultancy” deliberately, for, although PREL describes itself as “independent” on its website (Pacific Resources for Learning and Education, 2008b), it functions in practice as an arm of government—specifically, every government schooling ministry and department in the US-affiliated Pacific. To that end, its Board of Directors is comprised at the time of this writing of the following members: the RMI Minister of Education; the Palau Minister of Education; the Chuuk State Director of Education; the Pohnpei State Director of Education; the CNMI Commissioner of Education; the Guam Superintendent of Education; the Hawai‘i State Superintendent of Education; the American Samoan Director of Education; a senator from Guam; and a senator from Yap (Pacific Resources for Education and Learning, 2008a). (The rest of the board includes the Dean of the
College of Education at the University of Hawai‘i; the President of Guam Community College; a school administrator from Yap; a teacher from American Samoa; and an executive from Matson Navigation Company.) PREL has offices attached to every ministry and department of education in the region, including in Chuuk, Guam, Kosrae, Majuro, Palau, Pohnpei, Saipan, and Yap. In terms of NCLB, as was noted in Chapter 1, Title I, Part A, Subpart 2, Section 1121 (Grants for the outlying areas and the Secretary of the Interior) of the No Child Left Behind Act recognizes PREL, and indeed deploys PREL for the purposes of administering NCLB in the region: “the [US] Secretary [of Interior] shall award grants…on a competitive basis, taking into consideration the recommendations of the Pacific Region Educational Laboratory in Honolulu, Hawaii” (US Department of Education, 2002a).

A closer look at PREL’s involvement with, and influence over, NCLB in the islands allows us to consider a third aspect of regimes of practices of governmentality, that of the rationality of government. Here rationality is concerned with the production of knowledge, the consequent production of truth, and with legitimizing particular forms of knowledge production. Levitt (2008) reminds us “education depends on specific techniques of government over issues of knowledge” (p. 51); in this case, we are interested in how the techne of government, in the form of PREL, creates and controls issues of knowledge through the program of NCLB. On a macro level, it is instructive to look first perhaps as the rationality undergirding PREL’s mission, which states “Through our mission, Building Capacity Through Education, PREL envisions a world where all children and communities are literate and healthy—global participants, grounded in and enriched by their cultures” (Pacific Resources for Education and Learning, 2008b). The
circulation of power-knowledge-subject embedded in this statement offers a few windows into the political rationality of PREL. First, PREL’s mission is to “build capacity through education,” assuming that the island communities it works in do not have capacity (although capacity for what? For functioning within the discourses of development?); and that capacity is attainable first and foremost through “education” (by which they mean schooling). Secondly, PREL’s vision suggests that the world they would like to create does not currently exist—a world of literate and healthy children and communities. What is implied here is a sweeping illiteracy and sickliness, one in which individuals making up these communities are self-isolated, parochial, and inward looking (that is, not global participants), and they are disconnected from their own cultures, which, rather than enriching them, are currently obstacles preventing them from attaining literacy and health. In pointing out a distinction between political rationalities of government and technologies of government, Dean (1994) explains “Political rationality may generally codify and assemble particular technologies within various programmes, but the technologies themselves are a condition for that rationality and have forms of rationality inscribed within them” (p. 188). Thus, in the case of PREL, its function as part of the techné of government contains both a particular rationality, that of prevailing discourses of development through schooling, as well as a precondition for that rationality. It is through its ability to traverse both axes of techné and rationality that PREL serves the strategic logic of a governmentality of development through schooling, and thus deploy its programs within a regime of practices.

So what of the NCLB program? Here PREL plays a crucial role, as its claims to “independence” give credence to government systems of schooling as well as the primacy
of expanding the strategic program of NCLB throughout its so-called “service area” through three deliberate components of rationality: the ontology of schooling; economic colonization; and “scientific” ways of knowing. A special collection of papers dealing specifically with NCLB in the islands, *Research Into Practice 2010: National Policies in Local Communities*, offers perhaps the most accessible examples of PREL’s role in this regard. To begin, Low and Wilson (2010) introduce what they see as the challenge, and imperative, to implementing various elements of the NCLB legislation into the fabric of the islands’ school systems: “contextualization,” a concept which shows up periodically through the collection. “We want Pacific ways of knowing and doing woven into our children’s education” (p. iii), they tell us, effectively privileging the techne of schooling, as school is the uncontested site of the weaving; that is, school is pre-existing and ontological, and “culture” is simply an add-on, perhaps a different-colored thread. Elsewhere, Emesiochl (2010) similarly, and just as tellingly, offers “Contextualizing and sustaining best educational practices, as identified by NCLB, is a noble idea” (p. 33). Meanwhile, Low and Wilson (2010) are quick to diagnose what is at stake here, as well as to take the opportunity to offer the textual visibility of this regime of practices, by stating, “Pacific schools are struggling, and students are being left behind” (p. iv). In other words, the problem is, once again, the delivery mechanisms, as part of the techne of government, and it is those elements that need fixing in order to “rescue” the region’s children. What all of this discourse of rationality does, moreover, is take as fundamental the apparatus of schooling. Nowhere do the authors take issue with the program of NCLB, nor with its strategic logic; they do not even go so far as to try to make NCLB fit island contexts—instead, they are trying to fit those island contexts to NCLB. They are
not simply leaving no child behind; in their wake they are also leaving no island societies intact.

Churning just below the surface of this ontology of schooling, and by extension the contingency of culture, custom, and alternative ways of knowing and being, is an economic colonization that is tied, in ways more complex than we have space for here, to the US Department of Education, the US Department of Interior, PREL, and monies allocated to the Freely Associated States (FAS) of the FSM, Palau, and the RMI through their Compacts of Free Association with the United States. Yet the rationale persists, and hides in plain sight. In yet another essay, Morris (2010) affirms

FAS educators recognize that their fate—and federal funds—are linked to maintaining close ties to the U.S. and to U.S.-led educational initiatives. Hope remains strong that such initiatives, generally research-based, can be made culturally and philosophically relevant to the Pacific, thereby strengthening education systems across the Pacific. (p. 9)

The strategy, then, is one of finances, and in order to maintain current and future funding streams these island nations must, if one can by now pardon the expression, leave no child behind if the state itself does not want to be left behind, at least economically. Indeed, as Morris admonishes later in the piece, “It is time for traditional and elected leaders to move beyond the words that the children are our future. They must show by action and through increased funding that they are committed to a strong future for the children and the country as a whole” (p. 12). (It should be noted, if it is not already obvious at this point, that this collection of PREL papers was funded by the US Department of Education.)
The third aspect to this rationality of government is alluded to by Morris above, and indeed is the centerpiece of the NCLB legislation as it is deployed in the United States: that of the scientificity of schooling, and, as Morris accurately notes, the link between federal funding and “research-based” initiatives. Foucault (2007) points out that “The knowledge involved [in governmentality] must be scientific in its procedures…. this scientific knowledge is absolutely indispensable for good government” (p. 350). In this way, science, data, and other similar categories of “research” form the basis of what is produced and normalized as legitimate knowledge; applied to school, and specifically to NCLB, this translates into the rather amorphous yet restrictive practices of “accountability” and “assessment.” In yet another paper, Rechebei (2010) argues for a melding of contextuality and assessment: “A buy-in of the system from the community, leaders, parents, and students must be premised on a clear and rational understanding of the system itself and the underlying principles involved” (p. 3). Again, PREL produces a situation in which the non-contingent “system” is predicated on the imperatives laid out by Washington in the language and practices of NCLB, as well as on the paleonomy, or contextual weight, that terms like “assessment” and “accountability” carry. Rechebei goes further by explaining, “The community needs to understand the rationale underlying imported norm-referenced standardized tests; standards-based or authentic assessments using a second or third language; and the impact on the child, teacher, school, and community” (pp. 3-4). In effect, what this focus on data-driven and standards-based accountability, and the subsequent push for “contextualization,” does is ask elders, traditional leaders, and other community members to “assess” school using the very indicators that are assumed by the rationality productive of, and produced by, NCLB.
Such an approach does not so much “contextualize” the scientificity operating through NCLB as rationalize it as the only system possible.

It is here, then, at the intersection, overlap, and convergence of our three axes of governmentality—its visibility, techne, and rationality—that we can trace the fourth axis, that of subjectivation, or what Dean (2010) calls the “formation of identities” (p. 43). Thus, we see the construction of “the child” as centered, in need of rescue, and not left behind. But what we cannot move beyond is the construction of this same child as something other than a schooling subject, the schooled child. Indeed, a child who is left behind, that is, unschooled, is simultaneously decentered and not fully rescuable: so is this child even a “real” child? Dean (2010) reminds us “All practices of government of self or others presuppose some goal or end to be achieved” (p. 27); in effect, NCLB’s goal is not No Child Left Behind, but No Child Left Unschooled (or perhaps Undeveloped or, more to the point, Uncolonized). In this way, NCLB regulates and governs not only the subjectivity of childhood, but, more narrowly, and more ubiquitously, the subjectivity of the (more legitimate) schooling child. But the regime of practices of governmentality does not stop there, for there is one more subjectivity that needs to be produced through habits of schooling: the parent. It is to this other schooling subject that we now turn.

PIRCs and Other Benefits of Policing the Parent

In an evaluation of the Head Start program a few years after it was deployed in the Trust Territory, Withycombe (1972) notes, “It would never occur to a young Micronesian parent that he would be expected to take responsibility of rearing his own children” (p. 348). Here the author is making reference to an earlier observation about the
decentralized and non-nuclear character of a typical family in the region, while at the same time implying that this decentralization in fact removes an Islander parent’s so-called “responsibility” for her/his child. This remark is not neutral, nor is it made to legitimize Micronesian approaches to parenthood. In fact, this statement is intended to categorize the Micronesian parent as deficient, while simultaneously demonstrating the positive of effects of the Head Start program: namely, that it is requiring parents to “take responsibility” for, among other things, the “education” of their children. As Withycombe (1972) remarks,

Parent involvement, essential to good education anywhere, is impressive in the Micronesian Head Start programs. Not only do the parents provide the buildings, their maintenance and a major portion of the equipment, but they also assist the teachers, are involved in training programs, and make many decisions in coordination with the director and teachers regarding the Head Start program in their village. They are also involved in and reinforcing of the education of their children. (p. 348)

What is telling about this passage is the way in which parents are separated from the processes of “education,” or, more correctly, schooling. For most of this passage, parents’ roles are relegated to tasks of building maintenance, consultation (with a decision-maker), and teaching assistance. Nowhere are parents considered teachers, nor are they the final arbiters of what constitutes their children’s “education.” Indeed, they are included in the education process almost as an afterthought.

This distance between parents and “education,” “learning,” or other euphemistic functions of schooling can also be seen two decades later in our previously-cited situation
analysis of various social indicators in the FSM. In a description of the introduction of a “Teacher-Child-Parent” curriculum, the report, written by the government of the FSM and UNICEF, states “In the past parents have regarded school and the education of their children as being the responsibility of the State and the teachers. However, this new approach aims to get them more involved and to take more interest in the education of their children” (Government of FSM, 1996, p. 36). Again, the parent is constructed as somehow uninvolved, or, more damningly, uninterested in their children’s “education,” and, worse, that they have, in the case of FSM, abdicated their responsibility to their children, not only in school but, by implication, elsewhere.

The effect of this type of discursive construction of “the Micronesian parent” is twofold: it not only erases any customary conceptions of parenting and parenthood—a distinction that Smith (2010) makes between a practice of doing and a mode of being—but it also ascribes to those same so-called “parents” what Baker (1998) refers to as “categories of deficit.” In this way, the parent is subjectivized as lacking in a normalized set of parenting skills, and is therefore in need of “education”—education, that is, in how to be a “real” parent. The island parent is delegitimized, while simultaneously crying out for instruction in how to raise their children the “right” way. And who better to instruct parents in their fundamental responsibilities than the school?

One of the more visible initiatives in teaching parents how to be parents emerged with the NCLB legislation, the Parental Information and Resource Center (PIRC). As part of the strategic logic of the governmentality of schooling, the PIRCs mirror the rationality deployed through NCLB, including an ontology of schooling (in this case, early childhood education) and a parent in need of “education”; priorities tied directly to
federal funding, specifically the US Department of Education’s Office of Innovation and Improvement (OII); and data-driven assessment. In order to remove any doubt as to the PIRCs links to NCLB, the OII reminds us “The Parental Information and Resource Center (PIRC) program provides resources that grantees can use in pursuit of the objectives of the No Child Left Behind Act” (US Department of Education, 2010); in this way, we might think of the PIRCs as No Parent Left Behind.

Since 2003, PREL has operated two main PIRC offices, one in Majuro and one in Pohnpei. The FSM PIRC has two broadly conceived goals, with more specific objectives listed under each goal; for now, let us just consider a pair of these more detailed aims and how they reinforce the deficiency narrative of Islander parents. Goal 1, Objective 1.2 states that the FSM PIRC will “Increase parents’ roles and responsibilities as partners in children’s education” (Pacific Resources for Education and Learning, 2008c). Here we see at least two levels of the erasure of a Pohnpeian parent: in the first instance, the implication is that customary parents’ roles and responsibilities are insufficient when it comes to “educating” their own children; in the second, parents are not taking that education nearly as seriously as are the other “partners”—such as schools and those individuals employed by them. As Bloch, Lee, and Peach (2003) remind us, “Many home-school-community partnerships in which parents are to have equal roles with teachers, staff, or university partners embody inequitable processes and outcomes, despite the intentions of reforms” (p. 239). The effect of the assumptions underlying this type of discursive logic is not only that schools are more effective parents than Islander parents, but also, perhaps more instructively, that Micronesian parents are not actually parents. That is to say, the PIRC here is centering the parent, but in such a narrow and
proscriptive way as to decenter all other parents—a decentering that can only be measured using scientific indicators of a child’s (and therefore, a parent’s) “success.”

Turning to our second aim, Goal 2, Objective 2.1, we see that the FSM PIRC intends to “Improve parents’ understanding of early childhood development” (Pacific Resources for Education and Learning, 2008c). The assumption here, oddly enough, is that Islander parents do not understand early childhood development; that is, they do not understand how children (their own children, mind you) develop, and what their role, as parents, should be. Another way of thinking about this goal (as well as the others) is, instead, that Islander parents do not understand early childhood development as it is understood by PREL—and by extension as it is understood through western sciences such as psychology and physiology (a conventional position that is destabilized by Bloch, 2000) as well as the strategic logic circulating through NCLB.

Donahue (2003) notes that the “success” of Pohnpeian children in school depends largely on parental involvement, and that schools and parents in Pohnpei have to compromise—the schools need to be more “culturally aware” while parents need to trust schools more than they currently do—in order to forge the necessary partnerships. The assumption that operates through this type of analysis is that students must “succeed” in school, and that in order to do so their parents’ must be involved—and that there are no alternatives to the ontological definition of “success.” “Parental involvement” is therefore taken as given, an uncontestable requirement if one is to “succeed” as a parent. Thus, without any context or foregrounding, Koki and Lee (1998) begin a PREL paper by stating “In order to increase parents’ involvement in Pacific education, educators must understand the traditional system of education in the Pacific region” (p. 2). Nowhere in
the paper is there an interrogation of what “parental involvement” means, let alone why it must be “increased.” It is simply and irrevocably a fact.

So how do the PIRCs reach their stated goals (goals which are approved by the US Department of Education)? The discursive, if not actual, mechanism employed by the PIRCs lays in the idea of “partnerships,” specifically between the parent and the school. But these are by no means equal partnerships, as, we are told, parents need to take more responsibility for their children. In one instructive example, at a school in Yap, “Parents and teachers will be trained in Assessment for Learning (student performance, observations, and parent student conversations) to address corrective measures for student development” (Pacific Resources for Education and Learning, 2010). What is telling here is that parents are being trained in “parent student conversations”—in other words, in speaking with their own children. However, their children are not constructed as such; instead, they are constructed as students, as schooling subjectivities. The inverse is missing: teachers are not learning how to converse with children (presumably because the assumption is made that they already know how, as teachers). Thus parents must learn to speak to their children, not as their children but as constructs of the schooling apparatus. These partnerships are also interlaced with development discourses, as well as discourses of the political geo-body. If we return momentarily to Figure 14 above, we see the nuclear family of the father, mother, and child holding hands with what is presumably a teacher, anchored by text that proclaims “Parents Teacher Partnership For A Brighter Future of RMI.” Thus, the fate of the country (in this case the Marshalls) depends on parents and teachers partnering up.
In order to more fully interrogate this “partnership,” we would do well to turn to a concept that parallels the governmentality of the state, namely that of policing. Arising out of seventeenth and eighteenth century discourses and practices, Foucault (1988) describes the police as “what enables the state to increase its power and exert its strength to the full” (p. 82). Here he is referring specifically to the German conception of polizeiwissenschaft, an art of government based on a discrete form of political economy, one that is based on the organization of the family. As Dean (1994) explains, policing “coexists and is interdependent with a peculiar conception of economy, one still articulated around the ancient theme of the oikos or householding and stewardship conceptions of the economy” (p. 184, original emphasis). Thus, the policing of the parent through PIRCs is, in one sense, the state’s mechanism for regulating Islander parents through rather direct intervention; in another sense, there is the blurring of lines when we refer to “the state” in this instance, since the case can (and probably should) be made that what is effectively happening in the FSM and RMI PIRCs is not that the FSM and RMI states are policing parents, but rather that the United States is deliberately governing the Micronesian parent. Indeed, while effects of NCLB include the construction of the child, the PIRCs operate in tandem, yet subtly differently: they do not so much construct the parent as police it.

In yet another sense, we can also see the coupling of the state and the parent as mirror-images, a commissural pairing that borders on the symbiotic: the RMI state, for example, needs the parents to act a certain way; thus, the state invests resources in policing the habits and practices of parents through the techne of schooling. Indeed, the whole notion of “economy” or “oeconomy” (deriving from oikos, the household),
according to Dean (1994), “is the governance or husbandry of the household…and political economy is the governance of the state as household, and through its constituent households” (pp. 184-185). Thus, recalling Shapiro (2000) and Donzelot (1979) from earlier in this chapter, “The family was both model for the patriarchalist police state and an element in its constitution, a model of governance and the oeconomic means by which the sovereign governed” (Dean, 1994, pp. 189-190). In this way the PIRCs serve as the (US) state’s instrument for more fully exerting its strength over customary conceptions of parenthood in the region by inscribing a model of parenting that is itself the basis of the governmentality of the state, and in turn polices island parents in a way that requires them to emulate that particular form of oikos. To be sure, if we consider the linkages between polizeiwissenschaft as “a method for the analysis of a population living on a territory” (Foucault, 1988, p. 83), we find ourselves back at the beginning, or at least back at the census (that most scientific of ways to count, and more importantly monitor, a population), and we find ourselves faced with a conspicuous connection between the state, the nuclearization of the family, and the policing of parents in the region known as Micronesia. School is indeed the techne of this art of governmentality; the limited variety of subjectivities it produces—and polices—evidences a manifest political rationality at work, one that circulates through the very processes of erasing what one might call custom and replacing it with a seemingly boundless apparatus of non-endogenous legitimacy.

In the end, it is necessary to bear in mind that all of these subjectivities of schooling, whether they be the student, the teacher, the child, or the parent (and by extension the family), are the products of particular circulations of a power-knowledge-
subject circuit that manifests itself in the habits and practices of the self. Dean (1994) reminds us “The ethical problem, then, is not so much the state, but the ways in which the art of government, and the political rationality that invests it, have constituted various forms of individual and collective being and experience, various modes of political subjectification” (p. 186). These habits and practices, that is, are contingent and not rooted in any pre-existing truth operating outside of that subjectivation. In other words, if power-knowledge-subject circuits are capable of producing one form of normalized discourse, and in turn normalized subjectivities, then they can certainly form others. As Johnson (1999) reminds us “Active involvement in constructing and envisioning new, critical identities could simultaneously decenter old, familiar identities” (p. 74) and, I would add, decenter normalized subjectivities constructed from particular forms of power relations. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) speak of “striated spaces,” those territories prescribed and proscribed by the state. Certainly the schooling apparatus is composed of near perfect striated spaces, ones that produce “a tightly controlled ascription of identity to those who enter and traverse them” (Shapiro, 2000, p. 274). What we need to do, then, in order to operate beyond the limits of striated space, is to consider alternatives and to inflect a discourse that opens the conditions of possibility, a discourse that makes the striated spaces smooth.
CHAPTER 5: THE EMPEROR IS A NUDIST: A CASE FOR COUNTER-DISCOURSE(S)

“A child, however, who had no important job and could only see things as his eyes showed them to him, went up to the carriage. ‘The Emperor is naked,’ he said.”

Hans Christian Andersen, 1837

Over the River and Through Bretton Woods:
Development, Schooling, and Regimes of Representation

What we have before us then is a diagnosis of processes of the normalizing of schooling, laid out through interrogations of schooling’s genealogy and its operation as a site of the construction of subjectivities. But what is the prognosis? What needs to be done, taking as our starting point the foregoing analysis? More importantly, what can be done? Or, as I have heard indelicately from any number of people while discussing this topic, and what I have already asked indelicately myself, so what?

Before we can begin to answer these questions and others like them, I would like to share a passage from a short story, titled “The Tower of Babel,” from Hau’ofa’s (1983) collection Tales of the Tikongs, in which a local resident of the island of Tiko named Manu wanders around yelling at those experts and investors who have come to “develop” his home. The first of Tiko’s targets is an academic:

And Manu shouted at the Doctor of Philosophy recently graduated from Australia. The good Doctor works on Research for Development. He is a portly man going to pot a mite too soon for his age; and he looks an oddity with an ever-present pipe protruding from his bushy, beefy face. The Doctor is an Expert, although he has never discovered what he is an expert of. It doesn’t matter; in the balmy isles
of Tiko, as long as one is Most Educated, one is Elite, an Expert, and a Wise Man to boot. (p. 18)

In the fall of 2008, a new elementary school opened in Majuro, on the site of a former grocery store. The renovation and rebuilding cost a few million dollars, funded by monies allocated in the US Compact of Free Association with the Republic of the Marshall Islands. At the opening ceremony, the head of the construction company that physically built the school told the gathered students, “The reason for all of this is because you’re so important…When you’re finished learning, help to develop the RMI” (“Rairok’s Million,” 2008).

The notion of development, and its corollary investment in and legitimizing of school and schooling, could easily fill out another entire dissertation on its own. My purpose here is not to relitigate the history or origins of development, nor am I interested in examining underlying neoliberal economic theories of development and poverty. What I would like to do, however, is to expand briefly on some of the connective tissue that ties development discourses to those of schooling that I alluded to earlier in Chapter 4, and to consider what the effects of this ubiquitous discursive habit is on our prognosis. Indeed, to take a page from age-old Russian sentimentality: What is to be done?

To begin, it is appropriate to take as our point of departure, or rather of emergence and irruption, of contemporary development and its discursive practices that moment after World War II in which the United States found itself largely still intact and on the right side of history. Escobar (1995), Hanlon (1998), and Esteva (2010), among others, trace the genealogy and invention of “development” to US President Harry Truman’s inauguration speech on January 20, 1949; it is in this instant that Truman not only lays
out geopolitical space (which has come to be defined by such terms as “the West,” “First World,” “Third World,” “economic North and South”), but also the idea of development, as defined by its opposite, underdevelopment, which is rooted in new economic measures of poverty. My point here is not to lay blame or credit at the feet of Truman, but rather to note that development as it is conceived today, like schooling in Micronesia, is a recent phenomenon, one that circulates through a discourse that Escobar (1995) terms “regimes of representation.” It is through these regimes that development as a construct becomes hegemonic; that is, it becomes “both context and referent” (Escobar, 1995, p. 7). Thus, to engage in discourses of development is to enter a force of foreclosure. There is no other way to conceive of oneself, within the construct of development, as other than a product of those very forces of development that claim to discover the problems, and consequently the solutions, that the practices of discourse in fact create.

Escobar (1995) goes on to examine how this regime of representation, building from elements of nineteenth century classifications of poverty, in fact created what he calls “the social,” including those elements of society that, prior to 1949, were delinked from economic systems. Thus we see, beginning in the late 1940s and on into the present day, the continuous coupling of economic “solutions” with such areas as health, education, and population. Indeed, instead of eradicating poverty over the last sixty years, “development has been successful to the extent that it has been able to integrate, manage, and control countries and populations in increasingly detailed and encompassing ways” (Escobar, 1995, p. 47). In the case of schooling, my hope is that the previous chapters have demonstrated, at least in some part, how such regimes of representation operate.
As Samoff (2003) tells it, “The international order is a given, a background condition. To take as given what are potentially primary causes is to exclude them from the policy (and research) discourse. What is unseen and undiscussed will surely not be the focus of policy attention or public action” (p. 59). In a way, the whole concept of school and schooling has become part of this international order, as part of the furniture in the room, to paraphrase Samoff; that is, the notion of school is never in question—it, like development, has become both context and referent. Indeed, perhaps more than any other institution (with the possible exception of health), school has become linked to development, through the state, in such a way as to now constitute the natural order of things: once the students from the new elementary school in Majuro graduate, they can begin to develop the country. We have before us, in this international order, an ontology of schooling, one based, as Hunter (1996) explains, not on “the expression of the interests and capacities of a collective person…open to a democratic distribution….On the contrary, it is the product of those historically invented technical faculties of the administrative State whose institutional form is the bureau” (p. 162). And it is this technology of the state that has, in the current age, become part and parcel of a larger network of integrating state, school, and discourses of development. One can no more argue with the ontology of schooling any more than one can contest the natural order of development: it has, quite simply, become fact. It is the air that we breathe.

A useful example of this intersection of state-sponsored schooling and development discourse can be seen in the 1990 conference on Education For All held in Jomtien, Thailand, as well as its follow-up in 2000 held in Dakar, Senegal. Hosted by the World Bank, UNESCO, UNICEF, and the United Nations Development Programme, the
Jomtien conference called for those countries inhabiting the putative “South” to expand “educational” opportunities for all their citizens, since, as we have seen earlier in our discussion of the Millennium Development Goals in the RMI, the development of a nation requires a credentialed and schooled populace. The result of the 1990 conference, however, according to Brock-Utne (2000), was “a missed opportunity to reclaim education for freedom and self-reliance,” and, quoting Odora Hoppers, concludes that the conference in effect called for “‘school education for all’” (p. 11). Samoff (2003) echoes this sentiment, asserting that, after Jomtien and Dakar, “What emerges most clearly is the broad adoption of a common framework for describing, categorizing, analyzing and assessing education” (p. 62). Thus, at a broader macro level, “education” becomes simply a synonym for a very particular practice of schooling, one that fails to take into account the variety of purposes or contexts in which it is deployed and dressed up instead as a beneficent force; hence the call for “universal primary education” in the Millennium Development Goals, and, more insidiously, “No Child Left Behind.” Schooling as a technology of development becomes, through this regime of representation, both “universal” and necessary for everyone, especially those living in “developing” areas.

It should come as no surprise, then, that the largest physical structure in Kosrae, opened in 2010, is the new Kosrae High School (see Figure 15). Bigger than the capitol building, the airport, the new fire station, and even the gym, the high school buildings represent a new moment in the normalizing of schooling in Kosrae, one that links schooling with the state in the name of developing the island, and more importantly one that forecloses on the possibility of asking the question “why”? Indeed, “why have school in the first place?” now becomes a moot point, one that, when asked in Majuro at the
Chamber of Commerce luncheon in 2006, prompts the Minister of Education to respond, simply, “because.” Because there is no other way to think about school.

Figure 15. Kosrae High School in downtown Tofol, opened in 2010. Photograph by the author.

Similarly, in March 2010 Marshall Islands High School became the first public school in the RMI to receive accreditation by the Western Association of Schools and Colleges, and only the second in the region after Palau High School. While we have already considered some effects of accreditation in Chapter 3, what is worth noting here is the response that this event generated, specifically in the local newspaper in Majuro:

Blow the trumpets and beat the drums, cheer hooray and sing for joy—Marshall Islands High School makes history today. After years of thinking about it and

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years of working for it, the first public high school in the Marshall Islands can lay claim to being at the caliber of some of the best run schools in Micronesia with news released late last week that Marshall Islands High School gained accreditation from the Western Association of Schools and Colleges (WASC).

(Chutaro, 2010)

That schooling has developed its own regime of representation—that is, that schooling is normalized to the extent that its very existence is all the proof one needs demonstrate its importance and indispensability—should come as no surprise. But what we should concern ourselves with is what that normalization means, and what its effects are. Both of these examples, from Kosrae and Majuro, exemplify what I call a regime of foreclosure, in that there is no room for alternatives, and that whatever alternatives do emerge are in fact products of this very ontology of schooling. Kosrae High School erases alternative conditions of possibility for what we might mean when we speak of education, as does the rush to accreditation in Majuro and elsewhere, as does development discourse in terms of modes of being and self-determination. What comes out of these examples, therefore, is an understanding that the emperor is naked; what the almost overpowering regime of representation of school, the ubiquity of its discourse and institutionalization, has done, moreover, is convince the emperor that he is naked on purpose. In short, in the discourses of development, the emperor is now a nudist.

If we are serious about alternatives, then, we need to allow for the possibility that schooling, deployed as it is in the name of development, is not inevitable, ontological, or even necessary. As Foucault (1989) reminds us, “We must make the intelligible appear against a background of emptiness, and deny its necessity. We must think that what exists
is far from filling all possible spaces. To make a truly unavoidable challenge of the question: what can we make work, what new game can we invent?” (p. 209). I argue that a new game involves a consideration of custom and already-existing alternatives, albeit alternatives that have been denied by the rush to development. Others have also attempted to invent similar games through the application of culture. In the spirit of opening up alternative conditions of possibility, let us briefly consider these games and whether or not they work for our purposes. Let us turn, in a phrase, to the issue of the emperor’s nudism.

Culture, Custom, Catachresis

One of the consequences of the invention of development has been the predominance of value as entirely economic. Esteva (2010) tells us “Establishing economic value requires the disvaluing of all other forms of social existence. Disvalue transmogrifies skills into lacks, commons into resources, men and women into commodified labour, tradition into burden, wisdom into ignorance, autonomy into dependence” (p. 18). Recently there has been a push within the schooling discourse to “resurrect” traditions, through culture, and thereby give voice to indigenous practices, ostensibly in the names of decolonization and the postcolonial. For example, Low and Wilson (2010), argue that this phenomenon “is a momentum nurtured by the belief that indigenous peoples can and should reclaim and revalue their languages and cultures— their ways of knowing, doing, and saying—within the formal education system that educates their children” (p. iv, original emphases). Here we are “reclaiming” and “revaluing” languages and cultures, as the implication is that these are things that Islanders have lost or misplaced, and, more importantly, they are only to be retrieved
through the habits and practices of schooling. At the same time, this is the identical
system that “educates their children,” an assumption that reinforces a certain rationality
of governmentality of the state, or at least the state-sponsored school: children no longer
learn in the home, as the home has been erased by and replaced with the school as the site
of legitimate learning. Thus, as both context and referent, schooling is widely given a
pass as a site of contestation; it is, instead, the site of reclamation and revaluation. In
effect, the results of this attempt to “revalue” and “return” to culture through habits of
schooling are threefold: first, there is the push for “cultural responsiveness” on the part of
schools and those employed therein; second, there is a call for hybridity, in which
seemingly equivalent systems of relations of power are encouraged to act in unison; and
third, building off of hybridization, is the adjuration for what can best be described as
indigeneity, but an indigenizing force with very narrow and particular features. In each of
these approaches I argue that they are neither decolonizing nor approaching the
postcolonial, a position which has already and repeatedly landed me in hot water. So let
us consider each briefly in turn.

To begin, then, there is the notion of “culturally responsive” schools, institutions
which take a student’s home culture into account rather than approaching culture as a
hurdle; indeed, here culture is seen as an implied benefit, one which is largely
misunderstood by the schools. To be fair, this idea operates primarily in those schooling
sites in the colonial metropoles, not the least of which is the Hawaiian public school
system, which sees a large number of students from Micronesia. But the view of relations
of power expressed here can be applied easily to those popular arguments about the
detriment of the “foreign” (read: American) character of schools in the region discussed
in the Introduction Chapter. Thus, Bishop (2010) argues for a “culturally responsive” approach
to what many educators are suggesting as the greatest problem we face in
contemporary education, i.e. the seemingly immutable and growing educational
disparities that accompany the increasing diversity of our student bodies in
association with the continuing dominance of monocultural and deficit
explanations by teachers about the causes of the disparities. (p. 691)

In this instance, the expectation is that schools assume the onus of redirecting particular
relations of power, a notion echoed by Heine (2005) and Ratcliffe (2010); in other words,
schools are taken here as ahistorical and acontextual sites, whose neutrality belies a self-
correcting system. This approach becomes problematic, however, if we return to our
opening excursus on the circulation of power through discursive and non-discursive
operations: power in this sense is productive of a certain form of knowledge as well as
subjectivities, but it does not redirect itself. Thus a “culturally responsive” school is
exactly that: a school that responds to culture, primarily through a definition of that
culture. Culture does not, in this scenario, produce the school.

The second notion, that of hybridity, is equally problematic, yet I seem to have encountered it on any number of occasions. While presenting an interrogation of what a
Marshallese Studies program at the College of the Marshall Islands means in terms of
intelligibility and commensurability, I was corrected by a colleague who assured me that
the college could take “the best” parts of both the western system of schooling (evidenced
here by the institution of the college) and the Marshallese system of schooling (which,
while I have argued against such a thing existing outside of western models of schooling,
was simply presented here as a self-evident system). More recently, engaged in a similar conversation with yet another colleague, I was told, “everyone knows the answer is a mix of both systems.” Putting aside the axiomatic construction of this statement, as well as the certainty in “the” answer, we would do well to consider Rizvi’s (2009) contention that “by deploying concepts like hybridity, ambivalence, and mimicry, which imply the incorporation of the colonized into colonizing cultures, postcolonialism has effectively become a reconciliatory rather than a critical, anticolonialist category” (p. 51). Such an approach calling for a “blending” of the colonial and indigenous in effect assumes an equal playing field, that both the colonial structures of power and indigeneity are somehow equitable, while, like “cultural responsiveness,” takes schooling as a non-contingent locale. Rather than decolonizing school, hybridity in this sense reconciles the ontology of school and all its baggage with a patina of “culture.”

In turn, this idea of hybridity develops into one of indigenizing schooling with little effort, and the current reform trends in schooling in the islands seem to be a choice between the colonial construct, an “indigenous” institutionalization of schooling habits and practices, or some combination of both (our example of hybridity). Here, too, we return to our earlier discourses of agency and empowerment, those binaries of opposition that limit, rather than extend, definitions of what may be called processes of the postcolonial. One element of this push to indigenizing school is a return to the mythical purity of culture, one that essentializes culture as simultaneously authentic and endangered; in this way, culture is “preserved” through the schooling apparatus (see Lingenfelter, 1981; Fox, 1999; O’Neill and Spennemann, 2008). To take one final visual example, let us return to the public service billboard located outside the Palau Ministry of
Education office from Chapter 2. The flipside of the image of an elder reading from a book to a child by moonlight shows what is presumably a mother and daughter duo; this time, however, rather than reading, writing, or even dressed in western clothing, they are planting taro wearing traditional Palauan skirts. The mother figure is even adorned with bygone tattoos (see Figure 16). Anachronistically, the caption below the image reads “Teach your child something new every day” in English, suggesting, among other things, that planting taro is new, that it is an example of “traditional” schooling, and that the business of the Palau Ministry of Education is the equivalent of customary transmissions of knowledge. In other words, schooling is to be found in pre-colonial, “authentic” culture; thus, the distance between indigeneity and formal state-sponsored schooling is increasingly diminished.

*Figure 16.* Palau Ministry of Education Public Service Announcement B in Koror, Palau.

Photograph by the author.
Of course, no one is graduating from Palau High School by dressing in grass skirts and spending the day planting taro; in this way, culture is reduced to metaphor, one that is deployed in the service of “indigenizing” systems of schooling. Heine (2010) demonstrates this marginalization of culture through metaphoricity when she explains the introduction of the latest schooling reform in the Marshalls, “Majolizing” the curriculum of the school system, at a conference in Majuro in 2007, through the trope of navigation and the canoe:

In traditional Mantin Majol (Marshallese traditions), the navigators and captains of canoes could find their way over wide stretches of open ocean far from the sight of land by studying the wave and current patterns. Subtle disturbances in the currents caused by out-of-sight atolls informed a skillful navigator of his position and allowed him to make proper adjustments to lead himself and his passengers to their destination. The metaphor applies directly to the education systems in our respective island communities and the need to stop and adjust our course. This conference was an attempt to pause, reflect, and “study the currents” of education, and to recommend necessary changes to create an education system that will be the backbone of Marshallese society for years to come. (p. 40)

The implication at the end of this statement, that a new education system would be produced by the efforts of the conferees and in fact “be the backbone of Marshallese society for years to come” seems to assume that there was actually an attempt to toss out the existing schooling apparatus and replace it with one that reflects Marshallese cultural values; what it seems to miss is the fact that the RMI Ministry of Education—and its habits and practices of schooling—are not going anywhere.
Indeed, the lure of the metaphor cuts a variety of ways. Here I would like to turn to Rahnema (2010), who reminds us that development is presented as the only transcultural and universal road for all would-be travelers to reach their modern destination. In reality, what is proposed serves only the interests of the highway designers and their management system. For as one enters into it, one becomes a prisoner of its rules and logic. (pp. 185-186)

If we replace the notion of development with that of schooling, the metaphor of the canoe becomes incompatible with the metaphor of the road; yet in Majuro this clash of metaphors is perhaps itself an apt metaphor, since the preponderance of vehicles today is not one of the canoe, but of the automobile. Extending Rahnema’s metaphor a bit further, I would go so far as to suggest that, taking school and its logic as the road, one cannot sail a canoe on pavement, nor does one decolonize a road by trying to sail a canoe on it; similarly, attaching an outrigger to the side of a car does not make it a canoe. Just as the road assumes a car, “Majolizing” the curriculum assumes the curriculum; that is, it makes the reformer (or, if one can excuse the term, indigenizer) the prisoner of the rules and logic of curricula, and, by extension, school. There is nothing inherently “Marshallese” about writing curricula.

Another aspect of this push for indigenization of school can be found in calls for “ownership,” of the schools. This approach assumes some form of agency which, if we recall Foucault’s conceptions of power as always circulating relations rather than as a thing one holds, runs counter to our fundamental notions of power as productive and instead returns us to the rather unhelpful binary of colonizer/colonized that we have been attempting to move away from throughout this work. That being said, “ownership” of the
schools is a popular theme, as Low and Wilson (2010) explain that the Rethinking Education initiative that emerged out of New Zealand in 2001 “spurred an ongoing exchange, as Pacific educators continued to take more ownership of the formal education process in their islands” (p. iv). Reflecting this sense of ownership, the rethinking initiative has since been renamed and is known today as the Rethinking Pacific Education Initiative for and by Pacific Peoples (RPEIIPP). For their part, O’Neill and Spennemann (2008) explain “Micronesians need to be both encouraged and empowered to take control of their school curricula and the transference of their culture to their children” (p. 215), suggesting that Islanders are power-less (within a conventional conceptualization of power as something the operates in a binary of possession) and that they are not currently transferring “their culture to their children.” Such a conclusion, it seems, assumes a rather limited notion of cultural transmission, as well as a role that must, apparently, be played by school in that transmission.

I will again reiterate my earlier assertion that all of these approaches to the “reform” of school in fact demonstrate an ontology of school. This position, again, has landed me in trouble with other so-called “Pacific educators,” most recently at a conference in Hawai‘i in 2010. While I was presenting this perspective, I was told by a dismissive audience member to stop talking and go read an article written by Marshall Sahlins that supposedly contained “the answer” to my line of reasoning. With all due respect to Dr. Sahlins, I cannot recall the title of the article; I also continued speaking. What this incident and the reference to Sahlins indicate is another aspect of the indigenization argument, that of a particular kind of agency. Here I call on Hanlon (1998), who, in considering Sahlins’ analyses of development in the Pacific, asserts
“Pacific peoples are neither awed nor overwhelmed by external systems beyond their control. Their response is rather to appropriate” (p. 12). Elsewhere Hanlon (1988) makes a similar argument regarding Islander responses to contemporary events in Pohnpei. While I appreciate the notion that through agency Islanders are not merely victims of circumstance or history, but rather primary players in shaping their own destinies, such an approach seems to neglect the very relations of power that produce the conditions of possibility available to Islanders. That is, while I am not arguing victimhood or impotency on behalf of Islanders (for victimhood assumes some form of agency, the agent-less, which itself is caught up in binaries of power as a thing), I do think, as I have tried to show through this dissertation, that there are relations of power circulating through a variety of habits and practices, specifically those related to school and schooling. Thus, Islanders may indeed “appropriate” as Hanlon and Sahlins suggest, but they are not producing the conditions of possibility that are the effect of various relations of power. Instead, these relations of power limit, rather than enlarge, those selfsame conditions of possibility.

If we turn to Dean (1994), we see this very circulation of power at work within the lens of indigenizing the school, in that the problematic of government is one of “how its locales are constructed by specific means of knowledge and mechanisms of power, and how it enrolls local relations and networks of power in its strategies” (p. 181). The idea, then, is not to succumb to impulses to hybridize or indigenize, for to ask if it is possible to have one or the other or both—that is, colonial, indigenous, or hybridized systems of schooling—is to remain bound by the logic and rules of the school. The idea is not to rethink education for the purposes of creating slightly modified curricula or
“educational systems” (by which is meant state-run ministries or departments of education), but rather what is called for is a whole new conception of intelligibility, one that can think at Derrida’s (1981b) limits and invent Foucault’s (1989) new game(s). What we seek is a choice that does not take as its starting point the ontology of colonial structures and relations of power, or circulations of power-knowledge-subject produced and defined by development discourses. What we seek—what is necessary—is the opening up of alternative spaces for the purposes of producing new conditions of possibility.

What is lacking, therefore, in the conversation regarding culture and schooling is a need to occupy an uncomfortable space, one that does not reinforce the uncontestability of schooling or marginalize the knowledges embedded in customary habits and practices, one that does not sacrifice self-determination and the postcolonial on the altar of reconciliation, but one that demands a turn toward alternatives. Spivak offers a necessary construct, catachresis, which Young (2001) describes as “a space that the postcolonial does not want, but has no option, to inhabit” (p. 418). It is here, in the space of the catachresis, that power relations risk redirection and where definitions inhabit a realm of intelligibility otherwise unimaginable in more conventional sites of temporal postcoloniality or so-called decolonization via indigenization. As Spivak (1993) explains,

Political claims are not to ethnicity, that’s ministries of culture. The political claims over which battles are being fought are to nationhood, sovereignty, citizenship, secularism. Those claims are catachrestic claims in the sense that the so-called adequate narratives of the concept-metaphors were supposedly not
written in the spaces that have decolonized themselves, but rather in the spaces of the colonizers. (p. 13)

It is important here to clarify that the “concept-metaphor” to which I refer throughout the present work is not that of school. As Spivak would say, that’s ministries of education. Rather, the concept-metaphor which lies hidden beneath, or worse yet is erased by, the juggernaut of schooling is indeed that of education, but not in education as synonymous with school. To be clear, I am not using the term “education” in the same way that any number of authors or “ministries of education” use it—that is, not as a euphemism for state-sponsored schooling. Instead, I am employing education as a catachrestic intervention, that is, “As a way to intentionally wrest, displace, and misappropriate meaning from a referent or its proper name,” in order “to rework and expand terms and knowledge” (Coloma, Means, and Kim, 2009, p. 8).

In effect what I am calling for is an end to schooling as the dominant concept-metaphor, and an opening of the myriad possibilities embedded within conceptions of education. Indeed, education as a set of processes and strategies is not new to the region known as Micronesia; school, however, is. The danger lies in equating that catachrestic comprehension of education with more pedestrian, and colonial, applications of schooling. The two are not the same, nor do they function similarly. For schooling operates on a field of foreclosure: there is only one way to speak of school, to engage with school, to construct subjectivities through school. Education, on the other hand, in its broadest, most catachrestic sense, is effectively unlimited—and unlimiting. Spivak (1993) states, “the persistently critical voice must be raised at the same time as a strategic use of essentialism—in other words, this is the crucial scene of the usefulness of
catachresis” (p. 162). Thus, I am calling not for a “return” to culture in order to “indigenize” school. Rather, I am calling for a critical conceptualization of the possibilities of education and its multiplicity of conditions of being, in the service of self-determination, through a reconsideration, normalization, and legitimation of the various knowledges embedded in, produced by, and productive of already-existing customary habits and practices. In short, I am calling for an intervention in the concept-metaphor of education, one that does not automatically include school and thereby preclude alternatives, but one that is rooted in possibility.

Dressing the Emperor

I have no illusions about the practicality of what I am saying. I am sure that more and bigger schools will continue to be built in the region, ministries and departments of education will continue to function, hire teachers, and purport to teach students. They will persist with increasing parent involvement, among other habits of schooling. And subtle and not-so-subtle circulations of power-knowledge-subject will continue foreclosing on alternative conditions of possibility. At the same time, I also recognize that school is a very personal topic, one that engenders visceral and immediate reactions. In fact, it seems that my suggestions for redirecting power relations through genealogical interrogations of schooling result primarily in strengthening those existing circulations of power, and, ironically enough, emboldening arguments of resistance against redirection. It is difficult to imagine, for instance, an island in the region known as Micronesia without school. It is also very necessary. The emperor is not only naked, he is a nudist. And still the crowd compliments him on his new clothes.
And so what is my role, what is the role of the little boy with no particular importa

importance who can only report on what he sees? Part of the answer lies in the fable of the emperor, for I am indeed announcing that the emperor has no clothes. Whether he is naked by accident or by choice does not concern me. What clothes, if any, he ultimately wears, and who should dress him and how, is also not my primary goal with this work. What is important, what does concern me, is that we recognize the bare body of the emperor and stop pretending he is clothed. It is only after recognizing the naked emperor that we can then converse about dressing him.

Without impugning Hans Christian Andersen any further and risking an overworked metaphor, let me restate what it is I am trying to say. Schooling is limiting. It forecloses on alternatives. It is not the path that leads to either decolonization or a layered understanding of the postcolonial. Schooling erases all but one definition of self-determination, as well as disparate definitions of success and development. Schooling, in short, is not education. So what is education? That I leave up to the various island communities to determine themselves.

Schooling also produces a restrictive set of subjectivities. One becomes a teacher by a narrow set of requirements, namely that one is today “qualified.” The grandfather who takes his grandson into the hills of Kosrae to plant cassava and harvest breadfruit is not a teacher according to schooling’s construction (and if he is, he must be “certified” by some governing agency, usually a school). One is a student only if she attends school, not if she is learning how to grate copra. A family must, by definition, be nuclear; grandparents and other members of the extended family are not “true” parents. A child is taught in school, not at home, since school, unlike home, leaves no child behind. Parents
need to take more responsibility for their children’s “education” through participation in school; they do not “educate” their children otherwise. The village is no longer the site of learning; it has been displaced by overbuilt edifices that dwarf even other institutions invented through the deployment of “development.”

My point is not to tell anyone what a catachrestic intervention of education looks like. Perhaps it looks like the grandfather and grandson farming in the hills. Perhaps it looks like something completely different. Its form is not what matters; what matters is that it is even considered possible. As Popkewitz (1998) lays out when asked for “answers” to alternative modes of being and schooling, “I leave it to others to consider the ways in which an alternative set of rules can be constructed” (p. 136). This is not my attempt at a cop-out; but it is not up to me what any kind of alternative looks like. I am sure that there is no one answer, but I am not sure what an answer should be. What I do know is that if island societies such as those in the Marshalls, Kosrae, Chuuk, Palau, or any others in the region continue to invest in schooling as the key to self-determination and “development,” they will simultaneously be foreclosing on alternatives, alternatives that can, and should, be defined by those island communities themselves.

There is already any number of examples in the Pacific, and in the Micronesian region in particular, that have begun to consider alternative discourses. Bargh (2007), for one, takes on western definitions of economic-driven development and counteracts them with perspectives of Māori women; similarly, the poetry of Kihleng (2008), writing from Pohnpei, as well as that of Borja-Kicho’cho’ (2009) and Hoppe-Cruz (2009), writing from Guam, offer discourses that challenge the self-evident states of gender, politics, and decolonization. For my part, I offer this dissertation as a first step in opening up spaces
for alternate discourses of schooling and education. As Foucault (1989) says, “It is the reality of possible struggles that I wish to bring to light” (p. 189). I am simply attempting to begin an alternate conversation; it is up to others to direct it and take it further. What we have before us, then, is not a set of conclusions, but rather a political opening; as Popkewitz (1998) contends, “all intellectual work is inherently political through the ways in which it constructs its objects of study” (p. 137). My position is one of disruption, rather than confirmation. It is my hope that this attempt to destabilize what is taken as given will open up alternate discourse(s), so that we may begin the work of considering what is possible.

Earlier I criticized the pervasive and, in my opinion, usually unhelpful metaphor of the canoe to explain any and all aspects of formal schooling. In the spirit of complexity (if not consistency), I will therefore end the present work by invoking yet another canoe metaphor, although this one will not be in the service of the ontology of schooling. As has been previously noted, the vehicle of choice on Majuro is the car. On an atoll with one thirty-mile road, this effectively confines the country to the capital; there is no way to drive to any other atoll. The car, in this instance, is school. One possible alternative is to sail a canoe; here I mean education. The difference between the car and the canoe is that the car is limited: you can only drive in one direction, for a total of thirty miles, before having to turn around and driving back the way you came. You are cut off from the other Marshall Islands. In effect you construct the Republic of Majuro. In a canoe, on the other hand, you are linked to all the other islands and atolls; what is more, you can move in any direction, so long as you follow the currents. Indeed, our canoe is infinitely directional; we can, quite literally, travel anywhere, so long as we deploy it upon the waves.
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