IMPORT OF THE ARCHIVE:

AMERICAN COLONIAL BUREAUCRACY IN THE PHILIPPINES, 1898-1916

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ABSTRACT

When the U.S. acquired the Philippines at the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898, it also acquired the Spanish Crown’s archives on the archipelago. The vagaries of war had resulted in the destruction of many of the colonial government’s records, and those that had survived the upheaval were, in many instances, unsatisfactory to the officials of the newly-installed American government. Shortly thereafter, the Bureau of Archives was established to care for the existing Spanish records and house the inactive records of the American government.

The archives played a crucial role in the entrenchment of the American colonial state in the Philippines. Over the next twenty years, the Bureau of Archives became more than just the repository for inactive records of the two colonial regimes. It collaborated with the Bureau of Lands in attempts to register public lands, to settle natives on theretofore uncultivated arable land, and to settle disputes about privately-owned land. During this period, the bureau also managed the government’s new system to register cattle brands, trademarks and copyrights, a crucial function in the islands’ economic development. The establishment and growth of the state’s archives in the early years of colonial occupation were important to the suppression of the ongoing Philippine revolution, the disposition of seized lands, and the development of a colonial economy.

Though a much less spectacular and less memorable colonial project than the establishment of public education or the construction of roads, it was precisely the
Bureau of Archives’ insidiousness that made it so effective. The Bureau of Archives was not a passive receptacle for the government’s unneeded documents; and it did not simply document the work of the colonial state. It was part of the undeniably political and ambitious project of American empire.
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgments........................................................................................................................................................................... ii

Abstract........................................................................................................................................................................................................... iv

Introduction.................................................................................................................................................................................................. 1

Chapter 1: Empire’s Credentials: Archives in the United States and the Philippines.......... 35

Chapter 2: Archives and War.......................................................................................................................................................... 91

Chapter 3: Archives and Anti-Imperialism......................................................................................................................................140

Chapter 4: Archives and Land.........................................................................................................................................................183

Chapter 5: Archives and Labor.........................................................................................................................................................234

Conclusion.................................................................................................................................................................................................. 282

Bibliography................................................................................................................................................................................................ 303
INTRODUCTION

“And I say that between colonization and civilization there is an infinite distance; that out of all the colonial expeditions that have been undertaken, out of all the colonial statutes that have been drawn up, out of all the memoranda that have been dispatched by all the ministries, there could not come a single human value.”

--Aimé Césaire, *Discourse on Colonialism*

Between 1898 and 1916, the United States ruled its colony with true gusto. The war and military occupation between 1898 and 1902 included ambitiously atrocious acts, such as burning of villages, “reconcentrating” natives, and torturing persons of interest. Even before President Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed the United States’ war on the Philippines over on July 4, 1902, the second Philippine Commission, also known as the Taft Commission, worked in earnest to establish civil colonial rule in the islands. Civil rule turned out to be even more ambitious than martial law had been. The Philippine Commission passed dozens of laws within weeks of assuming authority in the islands, concerning itself with construction of roads and bridges, improvement to ports and harbors, establishment of universal public education, and promotion of sanitary and public health initiatives. In the first two decades of the United States’ occupation of the Philippines, Americans made their presence definitively known.

It would have been impossible, for example, to live in Manila and not notice the United States troops hunkered down in the city’s various administrative buildings, which had formerly housed the Spanish regime. The arrival of schoolteachers from the United States was heralded in the media with great enthusiasm. The widely-circulated United

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States policy of “Benevolent Assimilation” was the referent for American administrators who bemoaned Filipinos’ “misunderstanding” of the United States’ intentions in the Philippines. In short, some aspects of the United States colonial rule were incessantly touted, evidence of Americans dutifully bearing the “White Man’s Burden.”

This dissertation examines one aspect of the American presence in the islands that has not received much attention in the scholarship on the United States’ rule of the Philippines: the colonial state’s archive. This dissertation takes this “archive” to mean (a) government documents, published or unpublished, of the Spanish regime that were ceded by Spain to the United States to form the core of the Bureau of Archives or its later iterations (b) government documents, published or unpublished, of the American regime that were transferred to the Bureau of Archives (or its later iterations) and (c) historical manuscripts acquired by the American colonial government—by seizure, purchase, or reproduction in the United States, Philippines or Spain—to enrich the collections of the Bureau of Archives or its later iterations.

While such an understanding of “colonial archive” may seem rather narrow, the body of material encompassed by this definition is actually quite voluminous and for the purposes of this dissertation, more than sufficient. Indeed, in analyzing the material that the colonial government itself defined as its archive, this dissertation follows Ann Laura Stoler’s suggestion to read “along the archival grain”—to attempt to understand the colonial project as simultaneously powerful and fragile, as at once repressive and unsure, as both ideally ordered and manifestly unruly. In the context of the United
States’ colonial rule of the Philippines, colonial projects were all of these things, as well as ambitious and tutelary: roads were supposed to bring economic development; schools were supposed to mold model citizens; civil service regulations were supposed to yield skilled laborers, and a bicameral legislature was supposed to transform natives into self-governable subjects. In the context of the United States rule of the Philippines, then, what did the archive offer?

To answer that question, this dissertation examines the archive within the context of the American Progressive Era sensibilities of reform, order, and efficiency. It demonstrates that the ideal archive—in both its content and form—perfectly exemplified these sensibilities. The manifest archives, by contrast, perfectly exemplified another facet of the Progressive Era, the upheaval and uncertainty of the first decades of the twentieth century in both the United States and the Philippines. In the Philippines, the ideal colonial state’s archive neatly corresponded with the United States’ policy of civilizing uplift, “Benevolent Assimilation.” This policy aimed to re-make the Philippines, from a war-torn site of native revolution, into a laboratory for the United States’ purportedly modern and reformist approaches to colonial governance. Whether the administration’s goal was suppressing dissent, homesteading public land, reforming civil service, or crafting national identity, the colonial archive played a crucial role. This tension—between the ideal and the manifest, between the order and the upheaval—illustrates the tenuousness of the United States’ hold on the Philippines and the vigilance required to maintain its sovereignty there.
“Import of the Archive” considers the archive’s import in both senses—its importance and its importation, its logical value and its establishment in the Philippines. It argues that the archive served the political needs of the moment: it made the case for the “benevolence” of American occupation, by holding the voluminous records of a modern bureaucracy; it obscured the messy violence of American rule, by its precise and scientific constitutional form; it provided a narrative of progress, by merging its work with the libraries and museums of the islands. In other words, it offered the foundation for the more spectacular colonial projects—building roads and schools, opening the government service to natives, holding open elections. It provided the administrative structure, mapped the official channels of communication, and supplied historical information needed for the American colonial state’s improvement upon the preceding, Spanish regime. Thus, it also offered, perhaps more importantly, flexibility. In light of the institutional changes it underwent between 1898 and 1916, the colonial archive could support the political needs of the administration at any moment; sometimes these had to do with familiarizing the administration with the landscape of war, the disposition and naming of public lands, the registry of private property, or the development of a model labor force. With its rich and complex history, the archive is a most important and enduring technology of colonial rule.

“Import of the Archive” explores what makes this technology so effective, by examining how the colonial archive’s different iterations facilitated the entrenchment and normalization of the United States colonial administration in the Philippines.
Indeed, while the Bureau of Archive’s institutional history has been so readily overlooked, this dissertation begins from the premise that there are political meaning and material consequences in the archiving of everyday communications. Moreover, while the archive was presumed to render special the records held therein, this dissertation demonstrates that the more significant achievement of the colonial archive was otherwise: it rendered records of remarkable events—imperial conquest and colonial governance—into matters of routine business.

Sources

This study of the archive of the United States’ colonial government in the Philippines draws almost exclusively on the sources generated by that government and on sources created by individuals who, though not officially tied with the colonial government, were very closely associated to it. The decision to approach the topic in this way has its strengths and weaknesses, which will be the subject of the next section. To preface my discussion of that decision, this section describes the sources consulted to form the basis of this dissertation.

In the United States, the records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs (BIA) at the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland offer the largest body of material on the United States’ colonial government in the Philippines. As the colonial government’s point of contact with federal officials in the United States, the BIA maintained a collection of the manuscript editions of the Philippine Commission’s and Governor-General’s annual reports, dozens of bound volumes of outgoing letters to
the Philippine and other insular territorial governments, incoming letters from colonial officials filed by subject, internal memos on those territorial governments’ activities, and extensive libraries about the United States’ island territories. These records not only provide the material to understand the activities of the colonial government in the Philippine Islands; they illustrate the official channels through which information coursed, the shape of the bureau’s everyday activities, and, in some instances, the different tones taken with individuals on a single topic. In other words, the records tell us something about the activities of the colonial government in the Philippines and the colonial office’s activities in Washington, D.C.

Other government records relating to the colonial government of the Philippines are maintained at the National Archives and Records Administration at Washington, D.C. There, the Records of U.S. Overseas Operations and Commands are held. While voluminous, the records of operations and commands in the Philippines are thin, so their use in complementing or rounding out the records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs is somewhat limited. The description of the records pertaining to Philippines is worth citing at length:

The National Archives has in its custody virtually none of the records created and maintained by the Division of the Philippines or the Philippine Department during its existence from 1900 to 1942. After World War II, repeated efforts were made by the Department of the Army to obtain information about these records. Since the War Department records made no mention of the transfer of any noncurrent Philippine Department records to Washington, it has been assumed that the records were still in the custody of the headquarters offices at Manila when hostilities began in 1941. The assumption that these records were either destroyed by the U.S. Army or surrendered to the Japanese upon the fall
of Corregidor was tentatively confirmed through correspondence with surviving senior officers of the Philippine Department in 1959.²

Military records are useful for a study of the history of government archives in the Philippines during the United States colonial rule of the islands for at least two reasons. One, military records help to illustrate United States rule before the establishment of the civil government in 1901; given that the United States was given charge of Spanish Crown’s archive’s with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, there was a period of time when the Military Governor and Civil Governor had shared responsibilities for those materials (1898-1901). Second, even after the establishment of civil rule and the creation of the position of Governor-General, the civil government continued to cooperate with the United States military forces in the islands.

The above description, then, of the condition of records is notable for a few reasons. It highlights the fact that there was no policy for the transfer of records from the islands to the United States. Whether the absence of such a policy indicated that the Philippine Division’s non-current records were of far greater use in the islands than in the United States is impossible to ascertain, as the records are presumed to have been destroyed during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. The absence of a transferal policy, the presumption of their maintenance in the Philippines, and the subsequent presumption of their destruction belie the claim, often in the text of records themselves, that recordkeeping and safekeeping of archives were of utmost importance

to the colonial administration. As this dissertation will show, while the importance of an organized and efficient recordkeeping system was often idealized, it very rarely lived up to expectations.

All of this is to say that records of the United States civil and military governments in the Philippines in the United States are very spotty at best. Bearing this point in mind, the following consideration of specific bodies of material crucial to this dissertation—*Official Gazette*, Bureau of Insular Affair records, manuscript collections of colonial administrators, and published sources—and their origins underscores the challenges of articulating, in Renato Constantino’s words, “historical truths from biased sources.”³

*Official Gazette*

Continuing in the tradition of the Spanish regime, the United States colonial government periodically published record of its activities in *Official Gazette*. Its purpose was to provide information about the state’s activities to constituents, government officials in the Philippines, and their authorities in the United States. It included executive orders, Governor-Generals’ inaugural speeches, selected circular letters from various departments and bureaus, notice of land claims, and other documents of interest. Thus, as the official published record of the colonial state, the *Official Gazette*  

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offers a view into those records that the government found it necessary and worthwhile to publish.

Review of executive orders—issued by Governor-Generals and published in the Official Gazette afterwards—between the years between the years 1902 and 1916 indicate that the maintenance of the government’s records was a matter of regular, if not frequent, concern. An early executive order, Executive Order 80 (April 12, 1902) relates to the distribution of government documents and indicates both the scope of topics and the variety of forms included in these documents. Every department, bureau, and office of the civil government was ordered to send one copy of documents that had not been printed and ten copies of documents that had been printed, created by their division, to the War Department in Washington, D.C. for distribution.\(^4\) Twice in 1906, requirements for the number and specific titles to send to Washington, D.C. would be increased.\(^5\) These are just a couple of examples of how the Official Gazette is helpful for a chronicle of the Bureau of Archives.

\(^4\) More specifically, the order called for “one copy of each circular, ordinance, regulation, report, serial order, and other public document, including those containing information as to the establishment of new post-offices, construction of highways, harbor, and other public improvements, data correcting existing maps, or in connection with the general knowledge of the Archipelago, and at least ten copies of each such publication which is issued in printed form, and such additional number of copies as it is probably, in view of the character of the document, will be required for distribution [...]”

\(^5\) Executive Orders 35 and 55 (1906 series) increased the number of and specified publications to be sent to the War Department.
Bureau of Insular Affairs

On December 13, 1898, Assistant Secretary of War George de Rue Meiklejohn ordered the creation of the Division of Customs and Insular Affairs. Two years later, this division was reorganized into the Division of Insular Affairs. With the passage of the Philippine Autonomy Act on July 1, 1902, the DIA was renamed the Bureau of Insular Affairs assigned with “all matters pertaining to civil government in the Island Possessions of the United States subject to the jurisdiction of the War Department.”

By the end of 1902, the BIA had seven branches: Records, Correspondence, Accounting, Compilation, Statistical, Map, Philippine Insurgent Records and Captured Documents. In 1903, the following branches existed: Records, Correspondence, Purchasing and Disbursing, Compilation and Cuban Records, Statistics, Accounting, Map, and the Philippine Insurgent Records and Captured Documents. In 1906, the Philippine Insurgent Records and Captured Documents branch was dropped. In August 1912, Purchasing and Disbursing, and Accounts were combined to become Purchasing, Disbursing, and Accounts branch, and one year later, the Superintendent of Filipino Studies was added.

Romeo Cruz schematizes the work of the BIA into Personnel I, those “dealing with the ordinary operation common to all government offices” and Personnel II, whose work “had to do with policies—either formulating, altering or modifying them.”

6 Romeo V. Cruz, America’s Colonial Desk and the Philippines, 1898-1934 (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1974), 42.
7 Ibid., 63.
non-policy work included filling requests for information, recruiting and sending civilian personnel and military officers to the Philippines, “fiscal and monetary supervision of insular affairs,” administration of the pensionado program, responding to critics of US policy, and the “internment or sending home the remains of those Filipinos who died abroad.”

Thus acting as the United States’ colonial office, the Bureau of Insular Affairs was compelled to deal with a range of constituents. Among these were officials in the United States government who requested information—either for themselves or for their constituents. Shortly after the Division’s establishment, its acting chief wrote simply, “It is common knowledge that the correspondence of this Division has grown to hurculean proportions.”

In one instance, the Bureau received so many requests for material that did not, in fact, exist that Chief Frank McIntyre wrote expressly to a man who, during lectures in Ohio, told audiences that a 72-volume history of the Spanish-American War was available free-of-charge. The policy of access to records in the bureau was conservative and set early, when the bureau was yet just a division in the War Department. Though some inquirers, most notably Dean Worcester and David Barrows, were permitted to use the records for research for their books on the United States colonial administration on the Philippines, most Americans relied upon the records that the bureau itself elected to circulate. The policy basically prohibited staff

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8 Wilcox to Chief Clerk, War Department, Nov. 1, 1899, file 119, entry 5, Records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, RG 350, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD (NACP).
9 McIntyre to Lord, June 20, 1906, file 1898, entry 5, RG 350, NACP.
from allowing others’ consultation of the records, unless permitted to do so expressly by one of their superiors.10

*Manuscript Collections of Colonial Administrators*

Manuscript collections of Governor-Generals, rather than having been maintained in the Philippines or in the United States National Archives, are scattered throughout repositories all over the continental United States at the Library of Congress, Harvard University’s Houghton Library, and elsewhere. This dissertation draws on the papers of several Governor-Generals, including William Howard Taft, W. Cameron Forbes, and Francis Burton Harrison. The papers of other colonial administrators, such as Dean Worcester, Frank Carpenter, and Beekman Winthrop are likewise scattered throughout the United States. This dissertation draws from collections held at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C., the Special Collections Library and Bentley Historical Library at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, Michigan, and the Massachusetts Historical Society in Boston, Massachusetts.

*Published Sources*

Finally, this dissertation draws on published materials—publications of the United States Government Printing Office, publications of the Philippine Bureau of

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10 Assistant Secretary of War Meiklejohn wrote in a memo for eventual circulation among all staff of the Division of Customs and Insular Affairs, dated Feb. 20, 1900, that “hereafter no person outside of the division be furnished access to or copies of any papers from the files of this division unless express directions to allow the same are received by the Officer in Charge from competent authority. Where copies of any documents or records are permitted to be made at private expense, employees undertaking such work will not be permitted to perform the same during office hours.” File 119, entry 5, RG 350, NACP.
Printing, as well as books and periodicals produced by commercial publishing houses throughout the United States and the Philippines. The Bureau of Insular Affairs maintained an enormous and enormously helpful library of material, but this dissertation also draws on the book and periodical holdings of the Library of Congress, the American Historical Collections at the Ateneo de Manila University, the Ortigas Foundation Library, the Lopez Museum Library, the University of Hawaiʻi’s Hamilton Library, and Cornell University’s Kroch Library.

This extended discussion of the primary sources consulted in the research and writing of this dissertation presages one element of its argument: the constitution of an archive—that is, the body of historical records that an archive contains—has a material effect on the historical accounts that are provided. This follows very logically. If an historical account is based on sources, the determination of which sources are available to historians may have some influence on the resulting historical account. Next and likewise, those who have privileged access to those sources begin as authorities on the subject. As noted in the preceding discussion of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, retired colonial administrators with close ties to the remaining administration in the Philippines, such as Dean Worcester, David Barrows, and Bernard Moses, had special access to records created by the colonial government when writing their celebratory histories of the United States rule of the Philippines. Their discussions of their sources provide evidence enough of this, but other sources supplement the published acknowledgement. The catch-22 that emerged from this is readily apparent: those who critiqued the
colonial government were themselves criticized for not having expertise on matters relating to the Philippines or for not having served in the administration, but the material that could be had regarding the Philippines and the United States government on the Philippines was minimal. H. Parker Willis, Herbert Welsh, and especially Maximo Kalaw rather brilliantly critiqued the colonial historiography of the period, as it was coming into being.\textsuperscript{11}

Beyond the contents of the archives and who is allowed to access those contents, there is the matter of centralization. The merits of centralized and de-centralized administration were a topic of discussion among bureaucrats both in the United States and the Philippines. Such discussions and the decided-upon resolution of those merits, of course, had consequences for the everyday management of current records; they would eventually have ramifications on the transfer of those records, once non-current or “dead,” to the colonial government archives. In other instances, colonial administrators took back to the United States records that more properly belonged in their vacated offices in the Philippines for their successor or in the Bureau of Archives or its later iterations.

In the matter of archives in the United States, the greatest concentration of official records of the colonial government are found, as noted above, in the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park. Yet the fact remains that some administrators brought records home with them, mixed in with their personal papers

\textsuperscript{11} These works will receive extended treatment in Chapter 3 and the conclusion.
(such as journals or diaries and correspondence with family), and that those collections ended up at any number of archival repositories (such as an alma mater, a home state, or other institution with which the individual was affiliated), for any number of reasons. Such disparate collections makes systematic review of these papers, which are of considerable value considering that so much documentation of the colonial government was lost. Thus, these two forces—namely the non-adherence to a transfer of non-current record policy among colonial bureaucrats in the Philippines and the absence of a national archive in the United States—worked in tandem to create a situation where students of the United States colonial period in the Philippines, from the beginning of the twentieth century to the present, face considerable challenges to writing any kind of account of the period.

**Literature Review**

Still, Americans have been writing about the United States’ relations with the Philippines for more than a century, and from these works a cursory—and familiar, and in some respects, disputable—account of the United States’ arrival and subsequent exploits in the islands may be easily composed: United States forces landed in the Philippines in 1898 to assist a native and mestizo revolution to oust the centuries-entrenched Spanish colonial regime. That same year, rather than winning their independence, the leaders of the recently-formed Philippine Republic found themselves at war with their next would-be rulers, the theretofore helpful Americans. By February 1899, the Philippine government was at war with the United States, and in 1902,
President Roosevelt declared “the splendid little war” over and won. The United States thus embarked on an exceptional colonial project, instructing the natives in the ways of political, social, and economic development. Given the benevolence of the Americans’ many projects, dissatisfaction and dissent among the people of the Philippines was dismissed as the result of a little misunderstanding. In fact, the beginning of the century marked the beginning of a great friendship.

Not a new or recent debate, the veracity of this narrative and its implicit valuations of the United States’ accidental ascent to power have been the subject of much heated debate for as long as the United States has been at all engaged with the Philippines. Indeed, shortly after the United States sent naval forces to Manila Bay as part of the Spanish-American War, Americans could read any number of books on the navy’s spectacular victory, natives of the islands, economic promise of the archipelago, and political stakes of annexing the Philippines. Dispatches from journalists in the islands, letters from soldiers stationed there, and publicly-accessible government documents often formed the core of sources consulted by these early works and presented themes that would find expression, and later critique, in scholarship on the American period in the Philippines. The question of empire—its meaning and purpose—has long held the interest of students of the United States, whether those students are political leaders, academics, or activists.\(^\text{12}\)

\[^\text{12}\text{ William Appleman Williams, Empire as a Way of Life: An Essay on the Cause and Character of America’s Present Predicament Along with a Few Thoughts about an Alternative (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 45;}\]

\[^{12}\text{ Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History}\]
way of coming into national being to be celebrated or corrected, according to these thinkers, nothing less than freedom, independence, and sovereignty are at stake in discussions of United States empire.

One body of work on the first decades of the United States’ rule of the Philippines focuses on the islanders’ fight for national sovereignty, sometimes in terms of the ongoing Philippine revolution after the ouster of Spain, and other times in terms of anti-colonial fighting against the United States in the Philippine-American War.\textsuperscript{13} Highlighting the brutality of the conflict between the United States and the Philippines, these works belie the simplicity of friendship between the two nations.\textsuperscript{14} Indeed, a substantive body of work by Philippine historians, among the most forceful and prolific is Reynaldo Ileto, carefully frames opposition to colonial rule in terms that do not neatly correlate to national aspirations. Yet while these works note the broad base of natives who fought against foreign aggression, they neither gloss the logistical challenges that


guerillas faced nor diminish the internal divisions that sometimes compromised their efforts.\textsuperscript{15}

Another body of work analyzes life of relative peace that prevailed as the major fighting between the United States and the Philippines came to a close. Some of these works recount achievements of individuals of the colonial state, and more or less explicitly or apologetically, suggest the benefits of the state’s various projects.\textsuperscript{16} Other works posit that one of the major goals of those early civil projects—whether to take the islands’ first census or to stem the spread of cholera—was to quell underground revolutionary activity.\textsuperscript{17} Such scholarship has presented the United States’ rule of the


\textsuperscript{16} Frank Lawrence Jenista, \textit{The White Apos: American Governors on the Cordillera Central} (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1987); Howard T. Fry, \textit{A History of the Mountain Province} (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1983); and Glenn Anthony May, \textit{Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution, and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913} (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980). Rodney J. Sullivan offers an explanation for the tradition of such accounts: “It is true that a considerable body of literature emphasizes the constructive dimension of his work on behalf of tribal peoples, but this tradition was begun by Worcester himself in his \textit{Philippines Past and Present}. By using this massive work and Worcester’s official reports as primary sources, historians in successive generations have reinforced this emphasis, offering up fresh praise for his supposedly humane and energetic regime.” \textit{Exemplar of Americanism: The Philippine Career of Dean C. Worcester} (Ann Arbor: Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, The University of Michigan, 1991), 232.

Philippines to have been, in its most generous reading, misguided and thus, has focused on the powerful, detrimental ideological work of the programs of the colonial state.\(^\text{18}\)

Whether celebrating or critiquing the United States’ military or civil occupation of the Philippines, making sense of what Ruby R. Parades has called “the paradox of Philippine colonial democracy” is central to any project focused on the early years of the United States’ rule of the islands.\(^\text{19}\) As the above-rehearsed narrative of the United States’ arrival in the islands indicates, the United States touted its colonization of the Philippines as an exceptional project: it differed from European colonization insofar as it sought to establish modern, progressive institutions of government, and it served as a laboratory for the newest tropical science.\(^\text{20}\) Moreover, given that the Philippines was not to become a colony settled by Americans, the United States’ creation and maintenance of a colonial government required the participation and cooperation of the


\(^{19}\) Ruby Paredes, ed., *Philippine Colonial Democracy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1988), 1. She suggests that if the Philippines had been a settlement colony, rather than a conquest colony, the possibility of colonial democracy may have been realized.

native population. Of course, that participation and cooperation was to be limited to a certain class of Filipinos, with ultimate decision-making power rested in the Philippine Commission.21

If the Filipino elite were crucial to the everyday operation of the colonial state, the natives of what would become the Mountain Province and the Moro Province (later the Department of Mindanao and Sulu) were also crucial, but in another way. Nationalist colonialism held that Americans should recognize Christian Filipinos’ capacity to rule a colony of non-Christians within the Philippines; imperial indigenism held that the United States’ colonial presence was required to protect non-Christians from Christians. These dynamics, centered on the prize of political recognition, were contested insofar as Filipinos and Americans struggled to define racial categories and diagnose Christian Filipinos’ capacity for self-government; racial bifurcation resulted, whereby the categories of Christian and non-Christian at once proved Filipino capacity and American necessity.22 The formalization of these differences had unanticipated

22 Kramer, Blood of Government, 73.
consequences—such as animating anti-imperialist discourse, empowering datus’ navigation of the new political scene, and planting the seed for later separatist movements—in the first decades of colonial rule, as well as later.23

Whether interpreting the events of the Philippine-American War or the devastation of its aftermath, analyses of United States-Philippine relations, all take seriously the insight of Edward Said that culture acts “dynamically along with brute political, economic, and military rationales,” and Amy Kaplan’s elaboration of Said that warns of the perils of scholarship that continues “the absence of culture from the history of US imperialism; the absence of empire from the study of American culture; and the absence of the United States from the postcolonial study of imperialism.”24

More precisely, scholarship on United States-Philippines more or less explicitly concede that the ideology of Americans’ racial superiority was a fact of life that found an impressive range of expressions—from private communications to family from American soldiers in the Philippines, to textbooks in the islands’ newly-established public schools, to political cartoons in Manila and New York City newspapers, to exhibits

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at World’s Fairs in St. Louis and other cities in the United States.\textsuperscript{25} Other interpretations take seriously the way notions of gender informed personal, colonial, and international relations and manifest in law, science, and political activities in the Philippines and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{26} These works accept that the categories of analysis available in the writing of military or diplomatic history, or even in the histories of political economy, may be fruitfully supplemented with those lenses of cultural historians.

Whatever their analytical orientation, historians would be hard-pressed to dismiss what so many of their fellow students of United States-Philippine relations have found, namely that the United States has a long and ambitious tradition of territorial


conquest; and moreover, that this conquest was not simply a matter of military force, but a complex project that included the establishment of benevolent projects attending to native populations’ education and health. Analyzing the complexity of how these projects worked is one way to understand a history of colonialism and begin to think about its legacies. Thus, there are two ways that an account of the establishment and development of colonial government archives can be of use to students of the United States’ colonial rule of the Philippines. The first and most obvious one is that such a study presents the provenance of the materials upon which those histories rely, at the same time that it begins to account for the materials that are lost, destroyed, or otherwise inaccessible to historians. That is, the existing scholarship suggests the value of revisiting the questions of how historians find our sources and determine them to be reliable.

The second way an account of the establishment and development of colonial government archives can be of use to scholars in both the fields of United State history and Philippine history is that it enriches the field’s understanding of the colonial government’s structure, official channels (both internal and with other governments), and extent. That is, the archives not only record events and the thinking behind the promulgated policy; they are a kind of palimpsest for how the colonial government functioned internally and whether that functioning was efficient or not. More so than other aspects of the colonial government, the maintenance of internal recordkeeping systems and government archives were for colonial government use and not for public
consumption or use; banal as such things were, they were more of a demonstration to the officials in the United States and in the Philippines of good government than to natives in the Philippines; for the latter, the construction of public schools, roads and ports, and health clinics were more obvious demonstrations of efficient, honest, and good-willed government. Examination of the archives demonstrates how colonial government managed its internal affairs and organization and how the colonial government in the Philippines related with the federal government in the United States.

Scope and Method

This dissertation covers the period between 1898 and 1916, from the annexation of the Philippine Islands by the United States into Francis Burton Harrison’s tenure as the Governor-General. During this period, the colonial archives underwent considerable institutional change, as the United States quickly entrenched its occupation government and then changed its course in the Philippines with the passage of the Jones Act in 1916. Rather than attempting a sweeping account of the entire United States colonial period in the Philippines, this dissertation accepts the notion that single events or institutions may, when examined closely and in context, can help to make more complex understandings about a larger political culture or phenomena. In other words, by examining how a small bureau in the colonial government was conceptualized,

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27 In this regard, David Stannard’s most recent work has served as a model for me: David Stannard, Honor Killing: Race, Rape, and Clarence Darrow’s Spectacular Last Case (New York: Penguin Books, 2006).
established, developed and, at times, undermined, can serve as a window onto other matters facing United States colonialism in the islands.

A second reason that this dissertation covers the period between 1898 and 1916 is because these years include both Republican and Democratic Presidents of the United States and Republican and Democratic Governor-Generals of the Philippines. This dissertation thus manages to cover three major periods of the United States colonial period in the Philippines. From 1898 to 1902, the Philippine Revolution, Spanish-American War, and Philippine-American War were on. Between 1901 and 1913, the imprint of William Howard Taft on the colonial policy in the islands would be difficult to ignore. From 1913 to 1916, Francis Burton Harrison’s administration left its own mark by aggressively pursuing and implementing the policy of Filipinization.

Between 1901 and 1913, William Howard Taft played varied, but always important, roles in the government of the islands. In 1900, he served as the head of the second United States Philippine Commission, also known as the Taft Commission. From 1901 to 1903, Taft was the Governor-General of the Philippines. Though Taft left his post as Governor-General to return to the United States in 1904, he did so to become Secretary of War in President Theodore Roosevelt’s administration. Holding that position until 1908, Taft was the highest-ranking United States official to whom the colonial government reported, before reaching President Roosevelt; the Governor-General reported to the Chief of Bureau of Insular Affairs who reported to Secretary of War Taft. Of course, as President of the United States from 1909 to 1913, Taft was the
absolute highest ranking official in the United States and contended to maintain an interest in the Philippines. Taft’s ascension to the United States presidency by way of the Philippines and avowed continued interest and affection for the islands, perhaps predictably, led to the naming of the “Taft Era.”

During the period between 1913 and 1921, when Francis Burton Harrison served as Governor-General, the new administration’s policy was alternately viewed as a period of sharp divergence from the policies during the “Taft Era” or a more aggressive continuance of its policies. Prior to his appointment to the highest office in the Philippine government, Harrison had served in the United States House of Representatives, a Democrat from New York with well-known anti-imperialist sentiments. His appointment as Governor-General was viewed by some as a cynical political move to rid the United States of a party deadweight; others considered his appointment as a clear indicator, given Harrison’s anti-imperialist views, of President Woodrow Wilson’s intentions in the Philippines. In any event, every aspect of Harrison’s administration was overshadowed by the controversy surrounding Filipinization, or the appointment of Filipinos to positions in the government service, and represented the starkest difference between the rules of Taft and Harrison. Given this purported difference, this dissertation treats, to a degree, the political issues that defined the praise and condemnation of both Republican and Democratic rule.

However, by focusing on the Bureau of Archives, this dissertation can trace the continuities between the two parties’ policies in the islands. This is possible for two
reasons: first, the colonial government’s archives were understood, under all of the Governor-Generals during the period encompassed by this dissertation, to be of use to the business of governing the islands, so there is a steady amount of attention paid to archives and recordkeeping systems throughout the period and, in turn, legislation and other government documents to analyze.

The second reason, related to the first, is that the colonial archives and the recordkeeping systems that channeled government documents into the archives tended not to be the showcase of any administration. If an administration wanted to demonstrate its order and efficiency, it might highlight the improved operations of the Customs House; if the administration wanted to highlight industry and economy of energy, it might highlight the construction of roads and bridges. By contrast, because the Bureau of Archives was not an exemplar of American ingenuity and efficiency, it garnered very little media coverage; the Bureau of Archives’ cross-referencing systems and filing cabinets were the unremarkable workhorses of the bureaucracy, only drawing the attention of the colonial administration when they faltered.

Thus, this dissertation supposes that any existing documentation on the Bureau of Archives had little currency beyond the administrators who either produced the records or whom received them. Because these records were unlikely to be of interest to anyone not directly related to them, they lacked the partisan language that often accompanied any administration’s description of other aspects of United States rule. As
the later chapters will show, however, the absence of partisan language does not necessarily mean the absence of political meaning.

Finally, the archives offer some continuity because they and the recordkeeping system were passed on from administration to administration; there was thus incentive to maintain some order and usefulness for the next administration. Because Manuel Yriarte maintained leadership of the archives throughout this period, the archives were not the site of partisan politicking to the degree as was, for example, the construction of Benguet Road or the governments of so-called Non-Christian Tribes. Being able to trace the continuities between the administrations of the “Taft Era” and Harrison is useful for understanding the ways that, despite all of the blustering from both sides, the United States presence in the Philippines from 1898 to 1916 was consistently and unapologetically colonial.

In addition to a clearly delineated chronological scope, this dissertation also has a delineated topical scope. This dissertation, as mentioned at the opening of this chapter, takes “colonial archive” to mean a particular body of material. By focusing the material of my study in this manner, my analysis of the colonial archive is necessarily limited, and those limitations merit explicit listing here.

This dissertation focuses on the United States’ activities in the Philippines, and the sources upon which it relies are those created by Americans about the Philippines for, generally, consumption by Americans either in the colonial government in the Philippines or the United States government in Washington, D.C. Thus focused, this
dissertation does not include analysis of the records Philippine Revolutionary
Government except insofar as they appear in what the United States Department of
War called the Philippine Insurgent Records. This dissertation’s examination of anti-
colonial perspectives is limited to those Americans generally associated with the
activities of the Anti-Imperialist League, an organization with very close ties to
representatives in the United States government. The myriad speeches, fiction, and
drama of the period—both in the United States and the Philippines—are not analyzed
per se in this dissertation; when they do appear, they do so in the context of specific
authors’ and other agitators’ interactions with the colonial government, usually as a
result of the Sedition Law, Flag Law, or other censorship measure. Put simply, this
dissertation focuses on the records created by the colonial government for the colonial
government; outsiders—natives, American civilians, and other foreigners in the
islands—make appearances only insofar as they transact business of one kind or
another with the colonial government.

“Import of the Archive” supposes that such an approach to reading, often
reserved for analyzing the absences in a conventional historical record, may be fruitfully
applied to those conventional historical records themselves. This dissertation accepts
the argument that some records, such as those of the “colonial archive” obscure other
and dissenting perspectives; this dissertation then goes on to ask: how do these official
records function to obscure? What was the organizational structure that enabled such
elision? The following chapters attempt to answer these and related questions.
Chapter Outline

Chapter 1, “Empire’s Credentials: Archives in the United States and the Philippines,” chronicles the establishment and growth of government archives in the United States and the Philippines. Examining the American Historical Association’s Public Archives Commission and published writings about the need for a National Archive in the United States, this chapter shows how early-twentieth-century efforts to create archives national in scope relied on a particular understanding of the United States. Through an examination of Philippine Commission acts and Governor-Generals’ Executive Orders, this chapter also chronicles the establishment and changes to Bureau of Archives in the Philippines between 1898 and 1916. Throughout this period, the archive moved physically and administratively between the Executive Bureau, the Education Bureau, and the Department of Justice, and it merged and unmerged with other divisions and cognate institutions. This chapter shows that the growth of archives in the United States and the Philippines coincided with the growth of United States empire. More precisely, by considering that growth contrapuntally with major political issues facing the colonial government at large, this chapter suggests that the archives offer a unique way to reconsider issues relating to the disposition of land, labor and civil service, and the crafting of national identity.

Chapters 2 through 5 offer specific illustrations of the form, purpose, and efficacy of the archive in United States colonial rule of the Philippines. Each chapter
examines the colonial state archive’s role in relation to critical, political issues facing the United States’ administration of the islands: war, anti-imperialism, land, and labor.

Chapter 2, “Archives and War,” examines the relationship between archives and war, especially the Philippine Revolution, Spanish-American War, and the Philippine-American War. More specifically, this chapter will examine the political issues raised by the cession of Spanish archives on the Philippines to the United States per the Treaty of Paris; the collection, translation, and deferred publication of the Philippine Revolutionary Papers, also known as the Philippine Insurgent Papers; and the publication of Blair and Robertson’s The Philippines Islands. These “flashpoints” in the relationship between archives and war will be set against a chronicle of sundry Philippine Commission Acts through 1905, the civil laws which mandated the collection of some records and the suppression of others. This chapter argues that, while the archive is most generally understood as an entity of civil rule, as evidenced by the Commission Acts, it has undeniable martial origins and, thus, martial legacies.

Chapter 3, “Archives and the Anti-Imperialist League,” reconsiders the activities of the Anti-Imperialist League in the context of archive-building in the United States and the Philippines. Remarkably prolific and self-consciously historically-minded, the league circulated pamphlets, published periodicals, maintained meeting minutes, and regularly wrote to elected officials and newspaper editors demanding federal investigations of war atrocities. The materials resulting from these efforts constituted a sizable, informal, and archival counterpoint to the mass of government records amassed in Chapter 2.
Chapter 3 examines the forces—ranging from lofty ideals and strategies borne of the abolitionist movement to pettiness and in-fighting—that drove the documentary efforts of the Anti-Imperialist League. In so doing, this chapter offers an example of how gaps in the official historical record compelled the generation of complementary—if not always ideologically contrary—records.

Chapter 4, “Archives and Land,” examines the relationship between archives and land, especially with regard to the disposition of public (as opposed to private or friar) lands. When the Bureau of Lands was established in 1901, its chief responsibility was “To collect and safely keep all existing Spanish records relating to the public lands or their conveyances.” In 1903, the Bureau of Archives merged with the Bureau of Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks. Thus, with these two early acts of the Philippine Commission, the importance of archives to the ownership and development of land was established. Later efforts and failures of the administration to settle natives on public lands, modeled after United States homestead laws, illustrate how and why the perfect paper system did not always translate to the administration’s desired result.

Considered against the more familiar backdrop of the “Friar Lands”—their purchase in 1905 and the scandal associated with them in 1910 and 1911—the oblique means by which “public lands” were commodified and administered emerge. This chapter argues that the remaking of land into real estate relied not only upon Taft’s statecraft that resulted in the disposition of public lands and the purchase of friar lands, but crucially,
upon the documentary mechanisms and responsibilities of the Bureau of Archives, Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks.

Chapter 5, “Archives and Labor,” examines the relationship between archives and the general economic development of the islands, especially with regard to the instruments for establishing businesses and the controversy of Filipinization. In 1903, when the Bureau of Archives became the Bureau of Archives, Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, the new entity clearly became a mechanism for the administration’s efforts to alter the way business was done in the islands. It was the place of record for land, timber and mining patents, the authority on and depository for cattle brands, and the registrar for acts of incorporation and product logos. This chapter will show how difficulties that attended the Bureau’s new responsibilities—cattle stealing, inaccurate land surveys, and the destruction of infrastructure—were clerical and political in nature, grounded in local conditions, and understood through a lens of labor and industrial relations in the United States. In 1913, when the process of Filipinization was pressed by the newly-installed Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison, the difficulties of the previous decade were subsumed by an insistent, familiar critique of native capacity to manage the work of government. The critique was founded on the argument that Filipino incapacity created an unstable government which, in turn, discouraged investment of foreign capital. Reviewing the changes in the Bureau of Archives in 1903 and the heated debate about Filipino ability after 1913, this chapter argues that the native appointees to the civil service served as the familiar scapegoats for an
administration that, far from being a paragon of modern efficiency, was from its beginnings, unsound and beleaguered.

This dissertation concludes with a discussion of the consequences of Filipinization for the Bureau of Archives in 1916. The Reorganization Act of that year merged the Philippine Library with the Insular Museum to create the Philippine Library and Museum and, in so doing, ousted the American director, James Alexander Robertson. Thus, in the same year as the passage of the Jones Act, the archives no longer singularly served the colonial administration; rather, it served a broader constituency and was part of an institution whose purpose was the edification of the Filipino people. With an orientation and purpose public rather than administrative, the colonial archive was, at least figuratively, open to scrutiny in a way that was previously improbable. This chapter reviews Maximo Kalaw’s critique of the political discourse of United States’ rule of the Philippines to suggest that the need for an analysis of the colonial archive, and of the other mechanisms that governed the colony, was early identified and paradoxically facilitated by the organizations’ consolidation.
CHAPTER 1
EMPIRE’S CREDENTIALS: ARCHIVES IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES

“They are treasures of so sacred a character, that the public enemy who wantonly devotes them to the flames is, by all civilized people, branded as a barbarian; and of so priceless a value, that no money could purchase them of the poorest state in the Union, or replace them when once destroyed.”

--Richard Bartlett

Introduction

At the turn of the twentieth century, the United States was in great upheaval. The Civil War, the destruction it wrought, and the subsequent gains and failures of Reconstruction were major events still in living memory. People in the U.S. survived through the economic depression of the 1890s and the Panic of 1907. Cities grew, factories boomed, “robber barons” emerged, poverty increased, and immigrant populations swelled. And, of course, there were the strikes: hundreds of thousands of workers in a range of industries, for a variety of reasons, to differing results walked off their jobs to protest labor conditions. Groups of organized African-Americans sought to assert their recently-won political rights and to put an end to lynching. Suffragists agitated for women’s right to vote. Populists and Socialists were consistently viable and sometimes winning candidates. The annexation of Caribbean and Pacific islands that included millions of “little brown brothers” worried the nation’s xenophobes. These

were the circumstances that prompted Theodore Roosevelt, to warn that Americans were “standing at Armageddon.”

It was in this context that historians made repeated calls for the establishment of a national archive. This call initially seems peripheral to the truly pressing issues of the day, but was actually in keeping with other reform measures in the United States at the time. Unruly immigrant populations in urban centers were believed able to assimilate to American life, with the help of charitable organizations and public educational institutions. Among these institutions were the public library and the public museum, whose work was closely related to that of archives and historical societies. Over the course of the nineteenth century, museums changed from institutions that had been, for the most part, inaccessible to the general public to institutions that welcomed working-class, immigrant populations. These museums provided clean, wholesome fun that required a learned, reserved decorum. Likewise, libraries were conceived as places of quiet study, accessible even to working classes who sought to improve themselves. As libraries and museums gave the first lessons in proper American behavior to European settlers, the promise of a national archive was advanced study into the “major events” since the founding.

Because government archives—whether created at the municipal, state or territory, or national level—meant the retention and organization of government

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records, the drive to establish such archives must also be understood within the context of widespread critique of political corruption, even if this was not made explicit by archives’ proponents themselves. Amidst the muckraking journalists’ regular exposés of political corruption, the imperfections of government in the United States were well-known. As the radical demands of the 1880s and 1890s by the Populist and Socialist parties in the United States made their way into mainstream political discourse by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, legislative measures to curb political abuses became a staple of major political parties’ platforms. The maintenance of archives—that is, the records of transactions among government agencies and between government agencies, corporations, and private individuals—was part of a general trend towards institutional measures to ensure government accountability.

Archives in the United States

Thus analyzed in these lights, historians’ calls for a national archive is in keeping with the reform movement of the time, rather than, say, radical workers’ movements. In short, the efforts to establish a national archive in the United States may be understood as within two, more conservative and interrelated movements in the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century: middle-class charitable organizations’ work to educate and uplift the country’s newest settlers, and Progressive party measures to put an end to machine politics.

Historians made their call for a national archive through the American Historical Association. Established by the U.S. Congress “for the promotion of historical studies,
the collection and preservation of historical manuscripts, and for kindred purposes in the interest of American history and of history in America,” the American Historical Association (AHA) was the first organization in the U.S. to address the matter of establishing government archives. In 1895, the AHA established the Historical Manuscripts Commission (1895), and in 1899, appointed a Public Archives Commission (PAC) to investigate the condition of government records at the local, state, and territorial levels.31 After its first year, the PAC reported that the archives of the nation were in quite poor condition:

“The information gathered by the commission through its adjunct members has served to make clearer—what was already clear enough—the imperative necessity of a more rational and scientific treatment of documentary material in the United States. It may be doubted if in any country in the world archives of relatively so much value are so lightly regarded or so carelessly kept.”32

Further investigation elucidated the extent of that poor condition, with reports that excerpted legislation or otherwise highlighted records relating to the disposition of land.33 In just the first ten years of its existence, the commission published more than

31 More precisely, the PAC’s charge was to “investigate and report, from the point of view of historical study, upon the character, contents, and functions of our public repositories of manuscript records, and having power to appoint legal agents in each State, through whom their inquiries may in part conducted.” American Historical Association, *Annual Report of the American Historical Association* (1898): 24-25.
33 In 1906, Robert T. Swan’s “Summary of the Present State of Legislation of the States and Territories Relative to the Custody and Supervision of the Public Records” was included in the Commission’s report to the AHA. The Commission’s inaugural report, for example, excerpts the ultimately unsuccessful, but purportedly supported, H.R. 1767, “Perpetuation and Preservation of the Archives and Public Records of the Several States and Territories, and of the United States.” In the course of describing the records’ poor condition and the need to establish archives for their preservation, the legislation pointed directly to the connection between
1,300 pages of description of archives, or nearly forty reports on the conditions and contents of archives across the United States and its territories. Not only did such reports establish that theretofore neglected archives indeed existed, the volume of archival descriptions showed the wealth of material available. To complement these descriptions, the commission also mentioned reports in-progress, not yet ready for inclusion, to indicate the ongoing nature of the commission’s work. They suggested the timelessness, or endlessness, of the PAC’s mission.

The first challenge to the maintenance of public archives was primarily physical; they were as easily destroyed by such forces of nature as fire, mold, and insects as they were by the neglect of government administrators. The threat of fire prompted Arnold J.F. Van Laer to suggest that, “It is in such [fire-proof] buildings alone, and not in large monumental structures, whether libraries or administrative buildings, that the future of our records lies.”34 In general, proponents of the construction of fireproof buildings shared the sensibilities of custodians of records who sought scientific, practical efficiency in their work.35

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35 See, for example, Joseph Kendall Freitag’s The Fireproofing of Steel Buildings (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1906). He writes: “The want of any systematized and collected form of information on the subject of the development of the fireproofing of steel buildings and its
In a couple of ways, the amassing of records, unrelenting because of the absence of a retention/destruction schedule, had the paradoxical effect of endangering them. First, the indiscriminate amassing of records resulted in the wholesale removal of non-current records to out-of-the-way places. There, they were susceptible to destruction by insects, mold and flooding in the most undesirable locations of a building. Of the archives of federal government, for example, Waldo G. Leland observed that “while some records are shrunk with cold in the winter and shriveled with heat in the summer, others receive the drippings of steam pipes, or collect a rich store of mould or dust which must be removed before binders’ titles can be deciphered.”36 Second, because records indiscriminately mixed together became a burden and a nuisance, office staff would destroy them to make space either for everyday business or storage of more recent records.37

On March 3, 1901, the United States provided that research facilities should be established in government departments, libraries, and museums.38 While this provision may have captured the ideal of open institutions, whether they were indeed equipped present most approved and most efficient methods of treatment, as recommended and used in the best practice of the day, has induced to author to offer this volume. It is hoped that it may round more general interest in a phase of building construction, the full importance of which, from an economic standpoint and from its close relation to the safety of human life, still largely remains to be realized in a practical and adequate way,” iii.

to accommodate researchers was disputed.\textsuperscript{39} The 1906 Lodge Bill and the AHA resolution of 1911 were efforts to push the establishment of a national archive.\textsuperscript{40} In early 1912, President William Howard Taft addressed Congress on the need for a national archives building, and later on that year, he issued an executive order requiring the heads of executive departments outside of Washington to transmit reports on the condition of their archives to the Librarian of Congress, Herbert Putnam.\textsuperscript{41}

Summarizing the reports on the conditions of federal archives, their problems turned out to be quite similar to those outlined decades earlier with regard to the condition of archives in the United States, as well as those contemporaneously encountered in the Philippines. Putnam observed that, “They develop the governmental history of the country, and reveal much material for history which has hitherto been hidden.”\textsuperscript{42} The most obvious problem was the condition of the records, diminished due to constant moving from office to office, too dry or too moist storage facilities, fire, flood, and insects. While the records of the various offices were


\textsuperscript{40} Vincent P. Tinerella, “An Examination of John Franklin Jameson’s Role as a Great Leader in the Establishment of the National Archives of the United States,” Illinois Libraries 85, no. 3 (Spring 2005): 23.

\textsuperscript{41} Taft’s message to Congress was given on February 2, 1912. The Executive Order asked specifically for four pieces of information: “The earliest date of the archives, and the subjects to which they relate up to the year 1873,” “For what years, if any, the archives are missing,” “The condition of the archives, where they are kept, what care they received, and, if they have been destroyed, the cause of such destruction,” and “Whether they are accessible for administrative and historical purposes; and the extent to which they are used and can be used for such purposes.” Executive Order 1567 (July 19, 1912).

\textsuperscript{42} Archives of Government Offices Outside of the City of Washington, 4.
reportedly easy to access, they were incomplete, and many of the records that did
survive were of little value. The archives tended to be in dis-use, except in cases where
the business of the office necessitated the routine referral to older records. Little action
was taken, even in light of these reports, prompting Estella Adelaide Bear, in 1916, to
ask: “Where are our nation’s credentials?”⁴³

Beginning with the observation of the absence of a “systematic plan of archive
for public documents in the United States,” Bear argued that the documents relating to
the birth and development of the country should be the property of the American
people, not private collectors. By 1919, the Treasury Department, too, was arguing for
the need for a centralized, national archive. The Acting Secretary of the Treasury argued
that the construction of a national archive was compelling on at least three counts,
namely “the addition security against loss or destruction of official papers, the economy
in time and labor resulting from the greatly improved facility for examining the same,
and the consequent increased efficiency in the public service.”⁴⁴ In the first twenty
years of the new century, despite much clamoring and critique, the United States still
did not have a national archive.

⁴⁴ United States Treasury, Letter from the Acting Secretary of the Treasury Transmitting Estimate
of Appropriation for and Urging Necessity of the Construction of a National Archives Building,
American Archivists Discuss the Colonies

In 1909, a conference of archivists began meeting annually at the American Historical Association’s yearly meetings. Persons at these conferences discussed the “internal economy of archives,” the training of those charged with an archive’s administration, and “the work of making our historical sources more accessible and more usable.” A popular topic of discussion among archivists was the inaccessibility of government records, especially of the recently established Bureau of Insular Affairs and the Office of Indian Affairs, recently transferred from the Interior Department to the War Department. The real problem facing historians was that of access, as the

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46 “Proceedings of the First Annual Conference of Archivists, New York City, December 30, 1909,” Annual Report of the American Historical Association (1909): 348. On the training of archivists: “We must disabuse ourselves of the idea that anyone can be an archivist. The time was when anyone who liked books and was unfit for anything else could be a librarian, but that time has long since past. The evolution of the archivist will proceed somewhat as has the evolution of the librarian. Of special knowledge, aside from technical matters, the archivist should have training both historical and legal. Especially should he be familiar with administrative law and the history of administration. In order to know his archives, to understand their origin, to be able to classify them, this is indispensable.” Dunbar Rowland, “The Concentration of State and National Archives,” Annual Report of the American Historical Association (1910): 294.

47 The records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs included “the records of the Philippine Insurrection, now in the course of being published, the records of the first occupation of Cuba, and an enormous amount of correspondence, accounts and other documents relating to the military government of our new possessions.” Leland, “Archives of the Federal Government,” 88-90. Leland continued: “The richness of the material thus withheld makes the situation especially tantalizing. Here are all the records of the volunteer and regular armies, the correspondence of the Secretary of War and of military officers, a large collections, though not complete, of Revolutionary records, the captured Confederate archives, and the records of the Freedman’s Bureau and of the military districts during the period of Reconstruction.” The records of the Office of Indian Affairs included correspondence between government agents,
Department of War did not have a policy for public access to its archives. Several years later, when making his case for the construction of a national archive, Leland returned to the theme of inaccessible government records. Noting that it was still impossible to know exactly what was held at the Department of War, he complained that “no one not connected with the department has been permitted to have access to the records [...].”

Echoing the historian Frederick Jackson Turner, Henry Bourne argued that archives in the United States not only held the records of the county, they also in their form and lines of work embodied American-ness: “History, like the center of the population, has crossed the Alleghenies.” Appealing to a particular notion of national identity shaped by the United States’ westward expansion, Bourne’s observations fit neatly with the concerns of archivists who discussed the United States’ insular colonies and how to deal with these faraway collections.

Robert Swan surveyed archives in the states and territories and found that “the younger states, taking warning from the older, commence right.” Swan commended the Territory of Hawaii for having appointed a board of public archives charged “to collect all public archives and arrange, classify, and inventory them” and for having built “a new hall of records.” Swan complained that by contrast, in the continental United States, Indians, and territorial officials dealing with “all aspects of Indian administration, such matters as trade, the removal of Indians beyond the Mississippi, education, affairs of the Creeks and Cherokees, or claims holding prominent places.” Ibid., 96.

“the word ‘archives,’ [...] in some of the states means a distinct collection of ancient matter, being used in some of them as synonymous with records.” Swan’s commendation of the archives of the Territory of Hawai‘i suggests that maintenance of records in the colonies was a priority.

Not all colonial archives were made equal. Worthington Chauncey Ford, Chief of the Division of Manuscripts at the Library of Congress, reported on “Public Records in Our Dependencies” and raised concerns about the proper transfer and care of colonial records about the United States’ new territories. Assessing the state and church records in the United States’ recent territorial acquisitions of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, Ford framed his survey of the archives in these islands to be of particular interest to students of “Spanish colonial policy” from the 17th through part of the 19th century. Though only one of several reports that the AHA annually submitted to the Smithsonian Institution, Worthington Chauncey Ford’s “Public Records in Our Dependencies” importantly documents the organization’s early concerns regarding colonial archives in the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico, and just as significantly, it was the first AHA report on the status of archives in the Philippines. As it turned out, Ford’s report was also important because it would be the only report on the status of records in the Philippines for an American audience until 1910, when the recently-

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appointed director of the Philippine Library, James Alexander Robertson would bring Ford’s account up-to-date.

Robertson provided a concise summary of the archive’s holdings, the serious need for adequate, fireproof facilities for the records, and an indirect plea to the Philippine Legislature for funds to address these needs. Robertson’s address also described the peculiar nature of “by far the largest collection that has come into our [United States] possession through foreign sources.” And Robertson’s description makes clear why archives in the United States must remain separate from the archives of its overseas territories:

The old Spanish archives of the Philippines came into the possession of the United States in consequence of a treaty with a foreign power, as did the East Florida, the New Mexico, and the California papers. But, whereas the two former collections are now conserved in the Library of Congress, only a drastic change of policy, and one detrimental to the islands in every way, would cause the transfer of the Philippine archives to the United States. These papers belong peculiarly to the Philippine islands, in fact, are a part of the very web and woof of their whole history, and a decidedly active asset at the present time in land questions and other matters which are productive of lawsuits.52

Robertson’s argument that the archives of the Philippines ought to be maintained in the islands, rather than brought to the United States, paralleled larger political arguments about the separation of the Philippines from the United States. One of the major threads running through the anti-imperialist movement was the departure in policy that the annexation of the Philippines represented in U.S. foreign policy; opponents of the U.S. policy in the Philippines argued that while the acquisition of territory on the

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continent was the United States’ prerogative, the acquisition of overseas territories was not. Indeed, some anti-imperialists argued that populations in these islands were so different from and inferior to populations in the United States that their inclusion in “America,” in whatever manner, would be detrimental to all parties. Though Robertson’s argument shared the logic of these anti-imperialists, his point was not that the United States should leave the Philippines and its historical documents to themselves; rather his argument was to ensure the viability of the Philippine Library of which he was director.

Making the case for separate archives did more than just enrich the collections in the Philippines. This separation ensured the entrenchment of a colonial bureaucracy, as surely as it would settle questions of land disposition in favor of the new colonial regime. The maintenance of the previous, Spanish regime’s papers in the Philippines facilitated the governing of the islands from within the islands, rather than from, say, Washington, D.C. Moreover, the Spanish records would provide the core or model, either to be emulated or improved upon, for the American records to follow. Again and again, these records would provide the evidence for settling claims on public lands, ceded from Spain to the United States.

Finally, in addition to facilitating the entrenchment of colonial institutions in the Philippines and favorable land settlements for the United States, the separation of archives in the Philippines from those in the United States provided another venue for
American tutelage of Filipinos and pressed the need for standardization of archival classification.

It is good to know that the next few years will see provisions made for the efficient conservation of these precious manuscripts, and that not many years hence will see them as carefully housed as those in the unequaled division of manuscripts of the Library of Congress. The Filipinos appreciate thoroughly the importance of preserving these priceless records, and Americans are bringing enlightened means to bear for their future care. It is a serious question.\(^{53}\)

As with most other aspects of the United States policy, the ways of caring for records in government care prior to the Americans’ arrival were generally understood to be flawed or otherwise inadequate. Not only did Spanish recordkeeping systems leave much room for improvement, but United States institutions—in this instance, the Library of Congress—provided the model to which native archivists and clerks in-training could aspire. An unimportant detail was the fact that historians and archivists in the United States were far from standardizing the arrangement and description of historical records collections at the time Robertson delivered his address at the American Historical Association. Paradoxically, as historians and archivists in the United States pressed the issue of establishing a national archive and discussed best practices for the nascent field or archival science, the Philippines—where the establishment of an insular Bureau of Archives found no resistance—provided the better venue to make a case for a national archive and the perfect classroom in which to practice the administration of archives.

\(^{53}\) Ibid., 425.
Archives of the Crown of Spain (1898-1901)

On December 10, 1898, representatives of the United States and Spain signed the Treaty of Paris to end the Spanish-American War. In addition to ending hostilities between the two countries, the treaty also provided for the United States’ purchase of the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico. An infrequently-cited section of the treaty addressed the United States taking possession of more than Spain’s colonial territories; section eight of the Treaty of Paris provided for the cession of Spanish archives relating to the Philippines to the United States. Per this section, “all the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways and other immovable property which, in conformity with law, belong to the public domain” of the Philippines were ceded to the United States, as well as the documentation related thereto:

The aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, includes all documents exclusively referring to the sovereignty relinquished or ceded that may exist in the archives of the Peninsula. Where any document in such archives only in part relates to said sovereignty, a copy of such part will be furnished whenever it shall be requested. Like rules shall be reciprocally observed in favor of Spain in respect of documents in the archives of the islands above referred to.

In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, are also included such rights as the Crown of Spain and its authorities possess in respect of the official archives and records, executive as well as judicial, in the islands above referred to, which relate to said islands or the rights and property of their inhabitants. Such archives and records shall be carefully preserved, and private persons shall without distinction have the right to require, in accordance with law, authenticated copies of the contracts, wills and other instruments forming part of notorial protocols or files, or which may be contained in the executive or judicial archives, be the latter in Spain or in the islands aforesaid.54

In other words, Spain ceded documents that in their entirety related to the administration of the United States’ newly acquired territory; in instances where documents only partly related to that administration, Spain was obliged to provide a reproduction of the document upon request. Per the peace treaty, in addition to claiming ownership of “official archives and records,” the United States was obliged to care for them as well, to see that such archives and records, especially executive and judicial records, were “carefully preserved.” Further, the United States was obliged to make accessible “without distinction” to private persons “authenticated copies of contracts, wills and other instruments forming part of notorial protocols or files, or which may be contained in the executive or judicial archives.” In short, the Treaty of Paris provided the new American regime with the core archival records needed to administer the old Spanish colony and, in so doing, gave that nascent archive’s custodians a hint of the shape of things to come.

In addition to acquiring the Spanish records relating to “immovable property” on land annexed by the United States per the Treaty of Paris, the United States acquired records relating to the land itself in the public domain, or public lands. The mandate for the care for this series of records was embodied in Philippine Commission Act No. 218 (September 2, 1901), “An Act Creating a Bureau of Public Lands.” The first of the appointed chief of the bureau’s duties was “to collect and safely keep all existing Spanish records relating to the public lands or their conveyances.” The collection and safekeeping of these Spanish records, scattered throughout the archipelago in provincial
offices, was important for determining the extent of public lands upon annexation and the disposition of public lands as the colonial state entrenched itself.

According Manuel Yriarte, “the keeper of archives” under the Spanish regime and the first Chief of the Bureau of Archives under the American regime, the treaty was effectively observed. Records transferred after the change in colonial administration, included “all subjects connected with the Spanish Administration and all institutions affected by Spanish legislation.” Yriarte described a veritable trove of information about the previous colonial administration:

It embraces papers relating to the general administration of the Archipelago, the municipalities, civil and religious corporations, colleges, hospitals, pious foundations, banks and mercantile corporations, consulates, printing offices, colonies, penal institutions, Chinese immigration, patents and trademarks, personal records of officials, public charity and health, public instruction, post and telegraph, market license contracts, cock-pits, weights and measures, ferries, opium, construction and repair of State, Provincial and Municipal buildings, bridges, wagon roads, railroads and tramways, industrial, urban, cedula and Chinese head taxes, custom duties, revenue from stamped paper, revenue from vino and tobacco when these articles were monopolies of the States, sale of State lands, security fund, and various other matters.

And this was just a partial description of the archives transferred to the United States’ government in the Philippines per the Treaty of Paris.\(^5^5\)

In addition to accepting this mass of records ceded by Spain, the Philippine Commission worked to actively gather information about archives in the islands. The Philippine Commission passed a resolution on May 6, 1901, requesting that the Military Governor of the islands require from District Commanders reports “concerning the

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\(^5^5\) Report of the Bureau of Archives, Philippine Commission Report (1901), RG 350, NACP.
public records in the several districts, giving descriptions of the several classes of papers preserved, the period covered by the, their state as to preservation and completeness, and such other information as may contribute to a complete understanding of the condition of the public records of the Philippine Islands.” While the scope of this reporting system was ambitious, its findings were discouraging: some records were destroyed during battle; others were destroyed either by officers of the Spanish Government or the Revolutionary Government. Nevertheless, the Philippine Commission resolution, the Military Governor’s general orders, and District Commanders’ reports all illustrate the United States’ mindfulness of the importance of Spanish archives to the United States presence in the Philippines between the years 1898 and 1901.

The Bureau of Archives, Department of Public Instruction (1901-1905)

While the peace commissioners in Paris had negotiated for, and the new officials in the colonial government in the Philippines had legislated for, American ownership and administration of records relating to public property and lands acquired from Spain, these records were not constituted into an archive, officially named as such, until the passage of Act No. 273 (October 21, 1901), “An Act Creating a Bureau of Archives.”

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56 Exhibit AA: Spanish Records in the Provinces was appended to the Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Archives, a part of the Philippine Commission Report, 1901, RG 350, NACP. For reports of District Commanders, see box 1, Records of the United States Army Overseas Operations and Commands, 1898-1942, RG 395, NAB. Some, but doubtfully all, of the reports of District Commanders are held at the National Archives and Records Administration in Washington, D.C. They, like the archives reported on therein, are time-worn, bug-eaten, or otherwise physically compromised.
With the establishment of a Bureau of Archives, a history of the institution proper begins.\footnote{For a general history of the Philippine National Archives, see National Archives, \textit{Philippine National Archives: 100 Years, 1901-2001} (Manila: National Archives, 2001).}

Within the Department of Public Instruction and under the charge of Manuel Yriarte and ten clerks who had worked under him during Spanish rule, the functions of the bureau were three: to care for public records that, either by law of by order of the Civil Governor, were deposited in the “Insular Archives”; “to furnish such information derived from the Insular Archives and such papers or copies of such papers contained therein,” as requested by members of the Philippine Commission “or such other persons as may be authorized by law to request such information, papers, or copies”; and to deliver “pertinent records” to the Commission, if requested to do so. These inaugural three duties were, indeed, modest, but they also suggested the directions in which the institution would grow.

The first duty of the bureau chief was to attend to the very basic duty of caring for the contents of the archive; on the other hand, the language of the first duty suggests that future laws of the Philippine Commission will require the deposit of records into the archive and that the Governor-General may use the power of executive order to require the deposit of other records. If the first duty addressed the care of the archive itself, the second duty addressed the bureau’s service to the public; in this instance, the charge is anticipatory of the land and property claims that presumably were to come with the end of the Philippine-American War. In this regard, the
Philippine Commission anticipated correctly, as private individuals and corporation filed land and property claims when hostilities subsided, and the archive was consulted to settle disputes.

More than the first two duties, the third duty attended to the immediate needs of the colonial administration. The removal of records from the archive for delivery to the Philippine Commission was contrary to customary procedure in dealing with such unique material; the fact that the third of the bureau’s duties provided for regular loaning of material indicates that the immediate needs of the Philippine Commission—that is, the work of establishing the new law of the land—trumped the “best practice” of a like repository. Later, when the Philippine Commission’s need for such records was less pressing and when the removal of records finally proved detrimental to the bureau, this practice was phased out. Taken together, the bureau’s three charges suggest both the immediate needs and long-term goals of the colonial administration.

The bureau’s prescribed responsibilities were far more clear-cut than was its actual administration. Reporting on the Bureau of Archives’ first year, the Secretary of Public Instruction noted that the bureau’s priorities had been to “bring into more complete order” the records in its care, and to “furnish from the Archives such documents and copies of documents as have been required by the officers of the Government and other persons for their information or to settle questions in dispute concerning titles to property and other matters.” However, the increasingly poor physical condition of the records, as well as the general demand for information about
“the obscure history of the Philippines,” merited the printing of English translations of the Spanish records. Yriarte’s report to the secretary of education for that year specified the conditions contributing to the records’ physical deterioration and general disorder. These conditions included (1) a high turnover in Spanish Government employees after the installation of the American colonial state, (2) offices left in “absolute confusion” with the outbreak of war, (3) “the consolidation of all Spanish records in the Intendencia building, and (4) sharing the building with several recently-established offices, namely the Bureau of Forestry, Auditor’s Office, Civil Service Board, and Coast and Geodetic Survey.⁵⁸

As the colonial government grew, so did the responsibilities of the Bureau of Archives’ chief. On March 3, 1903, Act No. 644 amended the act that established the Bureau of Archives, and the three duties of the Chief of the Bureau of Archives were expanded considerably, to ten. Among these was responsibility for the use of “an official seal of suitable design bearing the inscription ‘Bureau of Archives Philippine Islands,’” the certification of documents and papers both for official government use and use by private persons, the collection of fees for reproductions provided to private persons and record of such transactions, the recording of papers or copies of papers provided to bureaus for their operation, and the annual reporting to the Secretary of Public Instruction of all services provided to the government and private persons.

The nature of these amended responsibilities demonstrates not only the growing need to access the records of the colonial government, but also the need to maintain accurate records about the records. According to the new law, for example, “no original document or file copy of any document shall be delivered to the head of any Bureau or Office or to any provincial board or municipal council without the written approval of the Civil Governor or the Secretary of the Department under which such bureau or office is established,” and in the event that an original document or file copy was provided, a system or receipts was instituted to track the borrow and return of records. Such careful attention to the maintenance and tracking of records had first been made a matter of policy with Civil Governor Taft’s Executive Order 104 (October 7, 1902), whereby government workers, upon leaving their office, were prohibited from taking with them any official records, namely “retained copies of accounts-current and property returns, together with their vouchers, official correspondence, files of acts of the Philippine Commission, executive orders, Department and Bureau circulars and orders, all of which must be preserved in good order.” These regulations effectively reneged one of the bureau’s founding responsibilities to deliver records to the central administration, within the Bureau of Archive’s first two years.

In the years between 1903 and 1905, the relationship between the Bureau of Archives and other bureaus more expressly related to the economic development of the islands grew more pronounced in two ways. First, just weeks after the responsibilities of the Chief of the Bureau of Archives were expanded by Act No. 644, Yriarte was
obliged per Act No. 744 (April 8, 1903) to assume the duties of the Chief of the Bureau of Patents, Copyrights and Trade-Marks. Thus, while the offices technically remained distinct, the Chief of the Bureau of Archives administered both. The Bureau of Patents, Copyrights and Trade-marks was the bureau of the colonial government charged with the registration, handling, and maintenance of patents, copyrights, and trademarks in the Philippine Islands and, given the regime change and the paperwork that attended it, was a bureau very much in demand.

In addition to dealing with the verification and replacement of patents, copyrights and trademarks issued under the Spanish government, the Bureau of Patents, Copyrights, and Trade-Marks also had to deal with private individuals and corporations interested in acquiring land and setting up shop. Of course, the necessities of order of, and ease of access to, records were true for both bureaus and Yriarte’s charge to administer both made a kind of sense. Indeed, many of the records of the Bureau of Patents, Copyrights, and Trade-Marks might, when no longer current, be transferred to the Bureau of Archives for safekeeping. In any event, this tacit relationship between the records held in the two bureaus was brought to light with the expansion of Manuel Yriarte’s administrative responsibilities.

Second, the relationship between and the responsibilities of the Bureau of Archives and the Bureau of Lands came to require clarification. Governor-General Luke E. Wright’s Executive Order 41 (October 17, 1904) provided this clarification with its designation of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands as “the custodian of all
unassigned Insular Government lands and buildings throughout the Archipelago, including the city of Manila, unless otherwise provided by law in specific instances,” and the Chief of the Bureau of Archives as “the custodian of all title deeds, leases, contracts of sale or purchase, and other documents of title appertaining to unassigned Insular Government lands and buildings throughout the Archipelago, including the city of Manila, unless otherwise provided by the law in specific instances.” The order noted that it was the responsibility of Chief of the Bureau of Archives to honor the requests of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands with certified copies of documents in the archives.

While the clarification of the two bureau’s responsibilities seems obvious—the lands bureau dealt with land, and the archives bureau dealt with paper—two aspects of Governor-General Wright’s executive order deserves further consideration: one, it demonstrated that the functions of the bureaus necessitated their cooperation and thus, also underscored the important role that archives placed in the disposition of lands in the Philippines; two, it demonstrated, through the specific instruction that the Bureau of Archives would provide its services to the Bureau of Lands, that the archives, while playing an important role in land matters in the islands, was to play a supporting role to the Bureau of Lands. That is, the Bureau of Lands did the work—surveyed the land, decided cases, made recommendations for land disposition—and the Bureau of Archives documented that bureau’s work, or held that bureau’s own documentation of its work.
As the heaviest fighting between the United States and the Philippines forces subsided, United States officials in the Philippines focused more attention on the shared and growing responsibilities of the various new government bureaus in other ways. The concerted efforts to concentrate provincial notarial records in Manila and the staff of the bureau’s overtime work to keep abreast of the everyday duties required of the forwarded notarial records illustrate the greater attention paid to bureaucratic affairs. At the beginning of 1905, Governor-General Luke E. Wright signed Executive Order 3 (January 19, 1905) whereby the records of all notary publics were mandated “to be forwarded to and deposited in the Bureau of Archives at Manila.” The short-term rewards of these deposits, likely modest compared with what other bureaus stood to bring in for the insular government, were the charges collected for copies of notarial records provided to private individuals. By 1904, reports of the work of the Bureau were organized in a manner that reflected its increasing importance to the economic development of the archives. The reports were divided into “classification and arrangement of documents,” “formation of index for royal cedulas and official letters addressed to the Madrid Government,” “copies of instruments and other documents, with amount of fees collected,” “certificates of trade-marks issued and patents filled with amount of fees thereon,” and “establishment of a general registers for brands of large cattle.”

In short, as the upheaval of war subsided, the onslaught of paper began.

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The general upheaval of the period was exemplified in one of Yriarte’s early annual reports. He noted that the Bureau had relocated to the Ayuntamiento, and in the course of the move, “archives, already arranged and classified, having been to a degree thrown again into disorder owing to such removal, in view of the vast number of documents and bundles of loose papers transportation of which was necessarily entrusted to inexpert people as otherwise the task would have been slow and interminable in completion.”

Around the same time that the colonial administration was making efforts at more complete records of the provincial government, Yriarte reported that record books were being removed from the archives for use in courts of first instance in Iloilo, Tayabas (Lucena), Cebu and Benguet; such removal, Yriarte argued not only endangered the records, but made “it much easier to abstract documents and commit other abuses which it is impossible to forsee at this time.” Thus, his proposed solution was for the Philippine Commission to pass an act that would obviate the need to remove records from the archives, that was based on the notarial law of the Spanish regime.

Yriarte’s claims about the conditions of archives were supported by American observers—namely Worthington Chauncey Ford, the Manuscripts Librarian at the Library of Congress and James Alexander Robertson, an historian of the Philippines and, later, Director of the Philippine Library—who reported their findings to the American Historical Association shortly after the establishment of the Bureau of Archives in the

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60 Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Archives, Sept. 14, 1903. RG 350, NACP.
In 1904, Ford’s “Public Records in Our Dependencies” reported on the disorder of the archives, as a result of war in the islands and other insular territories annexed by the United States in 1898. In his review of these records, Ford raised the question of incomplete records and re-iterated records’ importance in the determination of land questions. In 1910, the year he was appointed Director of the Philippine Library, Robertson’s “Notes on Archives in the Philippines” supplemented Ford’s assessment with a report on the condition materials in the islands. Focusing on the state of archives in the Philippines, Robertson’s report suggested that little had changed, as far as the care of archival records was concerned, in the more than ten years since the United States’ arrival in the Philippines. In both reports, the Americans affirmed what Yriarte had stated in his earliest reports as the Chief of the Bureau of Archives.

Despite the disorder of the archives and the lack of adequate space to house them, the year 1905 saw the issuance of two executive orders that dealt specifically with the building up and maintenance of archives: one saw to the destruction of records, and the other called for their creation and collection. On May 27, 1905, Governor-

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62 On January 10, 1903, Secretary of War Elihu Root wrote to Governor-General Taft, “At the request of Hon. Herbert Putnam, Librarian of Congress, I take pleasure in introducing to you Mr. Worthington C. Ford, who is visiting the Philippine Islands in the interests of the Library in order to report to Mr. Putnam upon what collections he may find there. Mr. Putnam in his letter to the Department says: ‘The public records now in the Philippines will have a special interest to this country, and I deem it very desirable that he should make a somewhat detailed report upon what material now exists in the public offices of the Islands.’ He further says that this work ‘cannot but be for the best interests of the Library, as the central source of information upon historical questions.’” Reel 38, William Howard Taft Papers, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress (LOC).
General Wright appointed a committee to examine “all the old documents and papers presented to it by the Chief of the Bureau of Archives, with a view of determining whether such documents are of any value to the Government or to the public.” This committee was also given license to burn documents deemed without value, record of which to be retained in the Bureau of Archives, so that “the space now occupied by said documents may be utilized for the better arrangement and convenient handling of more valuable books and documents.”

This executive order served as a kind of response to years of reports from the Bureau of Archives of the poor condition of its records and the poor condition of the facilities for its records’ storage. In this instance, the burning of archives was seen not as part of war, as had been the case during the Spanish-American and Philippine-American War; rather, the burning of archives was viewed as a necessary act to enable the Bureau of Archives to operate efficiently. The appointment of a committee to examine the government’s records and determine their disposition may, in today’s parlance, be considered a first effort at a records retention schedule, though Governor-General Wright’s order did not call on the committee to create such a schedule per se.

Governor-General Luke E. Wright’s Executive Order 19 (June 28, 1905)—signed shortly before the Reorganization Act changed the form and administration of the Bureau of Archive, Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks—required that provincial boards

63 Executive Order 17 (May 17, 1905) appointed Florentino Torres, associate justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands; Gregorio Araneta, Solicitor-General for the Philippine Islands; and Arthur W. Fergusson, Executive Secretary for the Philippines Islands to this committee.
maintain “a full and complete record of the minutes of every meeting of the board, written consecutively according to date, in a book used exclusively for that purpose; and such books will be carefully preserved when completed.” These minutes were required to “show the date of the meeting, and whether regular or special; names of members present; name of presiding officer; whether minutes of last meeting were read and approved, or the reasons for disapproval if such action were taken; name of member presenting each resolution; resolution in full; and the vote of each member by name.” Finally, these provincial records required the signature of the presiding officer and certification from the provincial secretary.

In these years before the election and inauguration of the first Philippine Assembly, native political representation and native political power were concentrated in provincial politics.\textsuperscript{64} Ironically, while the clout that provincial politicians were earning through these first years of United States colonial rule did not register with the administration in Manila because early supporters of the American regime in the Federal Party garnered more attention in the capital city, the records that documented the happenings in the provinces were of apparent concern to the colonial government in Manila. In this instance, attention to archives antedated attention to overtly political, pressing matters of the present.

Around the same time that the role of government archives was being refined, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 688 (March 17, 1903) in an effort to increase

\textsuperscript{64} See, for example: Cullinane, \textit{Ilustrado Politics}.
the colonial government’s holdings of historical manuscripts. Per this act, the Civil Governor appointed a collecting librarian “to visit the countries of Europe, Mexico, and elsewhere for the purpose of purchasing books and manuscripts relating to the history of the Philippine Islands, making historical researches into said history, procuring copies of official documents relating thereto, with the view to the foundation in Manila of a public historical library upon the subject of the Philippine Islands.” Together, this act’s two parts—one calling for the procurement of reproductions of official documents and another calling for the purchase of books and manuscripts —executed the Treaty of Paris and built upon the collections thereby gained.

Clemente Zulueta was named the Collecting Librarian, a position he held until his death in 1904. After his death, the Philippine Commission arranged for an archivist at the Archives of the Indies in Seville to send the materials Zulueta had copied or had purchased to the Philippines, then continue Zulueta’s work. Though the existence of the position of Collecting Librarian—a position that required the relocation of a resident of the Philippines to Europe, Mexico and elsewhere—was thus brief, its creation suggests that the members of the Philippine Commission had a sense of the incompleteness of the colonial government’s records, despite the great volume of records it had generated in its short tenure in the islands. It also anticipates later, more concerted efforts to build collections of historical manuscripts about the Philippines.
Division of Archives, Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, Executive Bureau (1905-1916)

With Act No. 1407 (October 26, 1905), “The Reorganization Act,” the Bureau of Archives was merged with the Bureau of Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks to become the Division of Archives, Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks. Manuel Yriarte, Chief of the Bureau of Archives, had responsibilities in the Bureau of Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks since April 8, 1903, but the two bureaus had remained separate entities. In addition to the merger, the act moved the archives from the Department of Public Instruction to the Executive Bureau. These two changes highlighted the archive’s increasingly important role in the economic development of the islands. Before 1905, the Bureau of Archives facilitated the Bureau of Lands’ disposition of land by providing relevant records; after 1905, it expanded its utility by becoming the repository for legal instruments relating to the development of that land.

Among the colonial state’s most ambitious projects was the construction of roads and bridges. While some roads—namely, the Benguet Road to Baguio—elicited consternation among the colonial state’s critics, most such projects were generally looked upon with favor. By contrast, the construction of railroads did not enjoy the same favor, perhaps due to the controversy and scandal that clung to the construction of railroads in the U.S., and was subject to scrutiny facilitated by the Division of Archives, Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks. The housing of notarial registers and the

65 Act No. 1710 (Sept. 3, 1907) provided for the filing of the first mortgage and contract of guaranty, between the Philippine Railway Company, the colonial government, and the Bankers'
registration of patents were subjects of no less than three laws passed between 1911 and 1913.\textsuperscript{66} In short, the bureau’s most pressing and important functions related to the immediate administrative needs of the colonial state with regard to economic development.

The belief that orderly, accessible archives were important to economic development was clear enough that Governor-General W. Cameron Forbes appointed a committee “to study the question of the custody and care of the Government archives.”\textsuperscript{67} More precisely, the Forbes committee was charged to:

“ascertain the present procedure in regard to the archives pertaining to the Insular Government in the different Bureaus, the methods of filing and storing, the division of live records and dead records, and the responsibility for the care and custody of original contracts and other documents of importance, including the documents retained by the Insular Auditor.”\textsuperscript{68}

This committee began from the premise that archival records served the government, whereas the archives committee under the Wright administration had begun with the question of archives’ utility. Signed with the belief that “some central depository for documents under one management and system could be devised productive of great...

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\textsuperscript{66} See Acts of the Philippine Assembly No. 2035 (Feb. 3, 1911), Act No. 2235 (Feb. 6, 1913), and Act 2244 (Feb. 11, 1913). Other measures were taken to ensure the protection of records from destruction; for example, Executive Order 47 (June 26, 1913) declared that government storage vaults at Corregidor were "under the direction, supervision, and control of the Insular Treasurer" and, further, that he was "authorized to transfer to such vaults such mondy, property, or archives in his charge as he may deem advisable or as shall be ordered by competent authority, from time to time."

\textsuperscript{67} This committee consisted of Newton W. Gilbert, Manuel de Yriarte, W.E. Parsons, William T. Nolting, and George A. Malcolm.

\textsuperscript{68} Executive Order 70 was signed into law by Governor-General Forbes on November 22, 1910.
economy,” the order hinted that the clamor for the construction of a United States National Archives had reached his ears. If the Wright administration had been attentive to the growing importance of archives to colonial governance, Forbes went further to suggest that the archives merited a proper storage place.

By another executive order, signed on January 26, 1911, W. Cameron Forbes inaugurated an ambitious historical manuscript collecting and documentation project in the Philippines that appealed to the sensibilities of “Benevolent Assimilation” and the notion of friendship between Americans and Filipinos. More specifically, this project requested that each municipal president gather together “the old mean in each and every barrio, sitio, or arrabal in his municipality and obtain from them and from any document in their possession the entire history of such community, in so far as may be possible.” The list of desired information was prefaced with Forbes’ acknowledgement that:

\begin{quote}
In view of the fact that the history of the Philippine Islands can not be fully ascertained from a perusal of official records only, and there being a great wealth of historical material in the possession of the people, which will be lost in a few years, since it is in the form of manuscripts, many of which are destroyed each year by fires, storms, and other untoward happenings, and much of which is committed to memory only and will pass away forever with the death of those whose memories serve as a veritable treasure-house of all that pertains to the Filipino people and their history:

The Government desires to recognize those individuals who have made the retention and transmission of the history of their people a sacred duty and to gather and preserve in proper historical form all that is interesting and valuable from a historical and ethnological standpoint.\textsuperscript{69}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{69} Executive Order 7 (Jan. 26, 1911) requested this information and provided these instructions: “1. Present official name of the barrio. 2. Native name of the barrio with its meaning. 3. Date of establishment of the community. 4. Who were the original families of the community? 5. Give a
If earlier colonial officials published English translations of Spanish documents in the belief that they could familiarize Americans with the history of the Philippines, by the time Forbes was Governor-General, colonial officials publicly recognized that such translations were not, and could not be, comprehensive. The stated facts, in view of which Forbes had signed his executive order, shared the logic that had prompted the American Historical Association’s distinction between the Historical Manuscripts Commission and the Public Archives Commission in 1899. In the United States and the Philippines, at roughly the same time, the ideal of collecting non-official records was shared.

6. Make a copy of any list of presidentes, cabezas de barangay, curas parracos, capitanes municipales, jueces, alacaldes mayores, or other officials that may be obtainable in the community. The name of the family that has kept this record should also appear, in order that due credit may be given such family for its patriotism. 7. Write out any legends or interesting stories that have been handed down from ancient times. 8. The story of old barrios or sitios that are not depopulated should be written down by the teniente of a near-by barrio. 9. The teniente of each barrio should procure this information from any man or woman who is too old to attend the meetings but who has a good memory and is noted in the community as being especially familiar with its history. 10. All writing should be on Catalan paper and should be signed by the teniente of the barrio and the old men who compose this council, with date, and name of the barrio, municipality, and province. 11. Information regarding books and documents treating of the Philippines owned in any community. This information is desired, in order that such books or documents as are desired may be obtained for the Philippines Library, if possible, by purchase or gift. 12. The names of all Filipino authors of any community and the titles of all their productions, whether printed or in manuscript. If the latter, in whose possession they may be found.
13. When complete, all papers shall be delivered to the presidente of the town, who shall forward all the original documents and translations, if any, to the governor of the province, who in turn shall forward them in a carefully made and well protected package to the Executive Bureau, Manila. Each package shall be marked ‘Historical Documents.”"
Without government intervention, the destruction of these non-official records was promised on two counts—first, as went the familiar refrain of archivists in the United States, on account of natural disasters, and second, as went the familiar refrain of ethnologists in the United States, on account of a native population dying off. Mistakenly understood as fundamentally natural phenomena, impossible to contain or halt, both reasons compelled a documentation project that brought together the sensibilities of the American Historical Association and the Bureau of American Ethnology. This was concisely stated in the final phrase of the executive order’s preface that noted the government’s desire “to gather and preserve in proper historical form all that is interesting and valuable from a historical and ethnological standpoint.”

The statement that “The government desires to recognize those individuals who have made the retention and transmission of the history of their people a sacred duty” makes clear an important shift—in terms of the colonial administration’s collection scope regarding historical records, or more precisely, in terms of the colonial administration’s posture towards individuals whose senses of the past predated the American occupation of the Philippines. This shift may be understood in one of two ways, or perhaps more accurately, in two ways in a complex and paradoxical manner.

On the one hand, it demonstrates the colonial government’s reneging of the repressive Sedition and Flag Laws that prohibited nearly every expression of “the history of their people.” Enacted during the Philippine-American War, these laws punished both oral and written expressions that at all undermined American sovereignty in the
islands. These repressive measures not only shaped the creation of a non-official body of work critical of the United States’ occupation of the islands; the Sedition and Flag Laws also ensured that when anti-colonial critique did appear in the official record—as in the presentation to the Philippine Commission of a native accused of having made an incendiary speech at Manila’s Metropolitan Theater, as documented in the commission’s executive meeting minutes—it was diminished, reframed as either ingratitude for or misunderstanding of the United States’ benevolent intentions in the Philippines, or otherwise misconstrued. The desire to recognize Filipinos’ history of their people in their own words may be seen as one, albeit cynical, facet of the colonial administration’s continued work to pacify the islands once and for all after the official conclusion of the Philippine-American War

On the other hand, the administration’s desire to recognize Filipinos’ history of their people in their own words should also be understood within a tradition of the United States’ promotion of an “official nationalism” which began as early as 1901 with William Howard Taft’s determination that Jose Rizal would be the ideal national hero for the United States’ recently-annexed colony. This may have been the case for a very simple reason: stories and other lore that circulated orally among peoples of the islands were, once transcribed and shipped to Manila in packages labeled “Historical Documents,” available to the colonial administration and literally contained in its archive. This widespread, government-sponsored transcription was particularly significant in the Philippines, given the oral and performance tradition in the archipelago
under the Spanish regime. These performances, informed by a syncretic practice of Spanish Catholicism, made accessible to vast swaths of the native population the notion of *kalayaan*, or freedom, which could be tapped to spawn revolution. Given the lessons of the Spanish regime in this regard, the colonial administration’s efforts to collect the stories passed down from one generation of natives to the next generation may be seen as a derisive means to assess popular feeling about political conditions under the United States’ administration. In other words, in this light, Forbes’ ambitious documentation project was an effort to contain dissent, or to co-opt nationalist impulses.

*Division of Archives, Patents, Trademarks, and Copy-Rights, Philippine Library and Museum, Department of Public Instruction (1916)*

The uncertainty of the motivations that launched the documentation and collection project outlined by Governor-General Forbes was due, in part, to Forbes’ position on United States-Philippine relations. As a Republican appointee serving at a time when the sensibility and policies of the “Taft Era”—namely, the sensibility that indefinite retention of the Philippines and the policies that entrenched the United States in the islands—were well-established, it was difficult to ascertain why Forbes and his administration would genuinely take an interest in the peoples’ history. In 1913, with the election of Woodrow Wilson to the office of the President of the United States and, in turn, Wilson’s appointment of Francis Burton Harrison to the office of the Governor-

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70 Ileto, *Pasyon and Revolution*. 
General of the Philippine Islands, every action of the colonial administration—for better or worse—was understood in light of Harrison’s early opposition to the United States’ imperialist policies toward the Philippines. Among these actions, of course, was the creation of the Philippine Library and Museum in 1916.

Ten years after the first Reorganization Act, the Philippine Assembly passed another Reorganization Act, Act No. 2572 (February 4, 1916). Theretofore certainly the most wide-reaching legislation in terms of the government’s archives, this law considerably changed the scope and structure of the Division of Archives, Patents, Copyrights, and Trade-Marks. The division was transferred to the Department of Public Instruction from the Executive Bureau, and it was consolidated with the Philippine Library and the Law and Library Division of the Philippine Assembly to create the Philippine Library and Museum.

Act No. 2572 was indeed ambitious, as other aspects of the law demonstrate. Section six noted simply that the Governor-General was empowered to direct that any number of kinds of objects—including pictures, paintings, photographs, books, documents, manuscripts, pamphlets, monographs, maps, and all objects of artistic, historical, or scientific value of any kind—from any of the government offices be transferred, with an inventory, to the Philippine Library and Museum. This section thus provided for the building-up of the Philippine Library and Museum’s collections on an object-by-object basis. Section seven provided for a more systematic building-up of

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71 To express his support of the colonial government’s reorganization, Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison signed Executive Order 22 on March 28, 1916.
collections; it required that “all departments, bureaus, offices, and dependencies of the Government, and all municipalities and provinces” to provide “at least fifty copies of all printed reports or documents published relative to their official work” and further, that “the printing establishments of the country shall also be obliged to send without charge to the Philippine Library and Museum at least two copies of each book, newspaper, or pamphlet printed or published by them.” Overall, with its clauses that described the Philippine Library and Museum’s purposes and its sections that directly addressed the matter of collections, the act that created the Philippine Library and Museum also provided ample means to ensure its continued growth.

However, just as the broad scope of the legislation highlighted the administration’s ambitions to create an enormous institution, the act creating the Philippine Library and Museum brought to light questions both of infrastructure and policy. These questions were raised and addressed in Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison’s Executive Order No. 51 (July 29, 1916) wherein he suspended the transfer of materials, noting that “the Philippine Library and Museum does not yet have a suitable building or adequate space wherein to house and preserve all the articles of the different Bureaus, Offices and Government dependencies,” and instead, these bureaus, offices and government dependencies should, “pending transfer, an inventory of all such articles be made by chief of the Bureau, Office or Government dependency concerned, and Director of the Philippine Library and Museum.” In 1916, the construction of a building to house the collections of the Philippine Library and Museum
was not a priority of the colonial government. The exigencies created by the European War required the administration to focus the islands’ finances elsewhere.

The Department of Public Instruction’s administration of the Philippine Library and Museum was short-lived. Shortly after the passage of the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Act, on August 29, 1916, the Philippine Library and Museum was transferred to the Department of Justice on December 18, 1916. While accelerated Filipinization was an avowed aspect of the Harrison administration since its installment in 1913, after the passage of the Jones Act, accelerated Filipinization was accompanied by broader Filipinization. More precisely, natives were appointed to leadership positions in the colonial government, including the position of secretary of the different departments. The single department to remain in American hands, however, was the Department of Education under which the Philippine Library and Museum was administered. This being the case, and there existing no perceived necessity for the Philippine Library and Museum to be under American administration within the Department of Education, it was transferred to the Department of Justice.

**Cognate Institutions, 1900-1916**

The establishment of the Philippine Library and Museum in 1916, per Act No. 2572, was the result of the merger of three organizations. Two of the three organizations (the Law and Library Division was the exception) were themselves the

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result of previous mergers. The Museum of Ethnology, Natural History and Commerce
had within it two sizable departments, the Museum of Ethnology and the Commercial
Museum; the Philippine Library had been formed in 1910 with the consolidation of
several government libraries. Thus, the creation of the Philippine Library and Museum
was the capstone consolidation for these many, predecessor organizations.

*Museums*

Very early on in the United States’ administration of the Philippine Islands, the
organization of an insular ethnological museum received attention. A Bureau of Public
Charities, Public Libraries and Museums was inaugurated under the purview of the
Bureau of Education (Act No. 222 of September 6, 1901) and shortly thereafter, there
was established an “insular museum of ethnology, natural history and commerce,”
within the Department of Public Instruction under the direction of Chief of the Bureau
of non-Christian Tribes.73 With the Reorganization Act of 1906, the Division of
Ethnology from wherein the museum had been administered was transferred from the
Bureau of Education to the Bureau of Science, and the Commercial Museum was
abolished.74

Within the Museum of Ethnology, Natural History, and Commerce was the
Commercial Museum; its purpose was “to encourage the intelligent and profitable
development of the resources of the Philippine Archipelago, and to aid in the extension
of our domestic and foreign trade relations” through “the collection and exhibition of

73 Philippine Commission Act No. 284 (Oct. 29, 1901).
74 Philippine Commission Act No. 1541 (Oct. 6, 1906).
commercial products and the collection and publications of commercial data.” Through the Philippine Government’s *Official Gazette*, the Commercial Museum invited potential exhibitors—foreign and local manufacturers and exporters, and local producers and importers—to loan materials, including “intricate machinery,” for exhibition. The museum’s Department of Information amassed “the fullest possible collection of data bearing on the resources and commercial opportunities of the island” through review of “trade journals, trade catalogues, consular reports, correspondence with other commercial museums and chambers of commerce, by personal investigation.”

As the myth of overproduction fuelled American’s initial popular support for the United States’ occupation of the Philippines, the prospect of capital investment maintained their interest.

Thus, the impulse that drove the work of the Commercial Museum complemented those of commercial museums in the United States. Though cooperation between the colonial government in the Philippines and all of the projects of commercial museums in the United States was not a foregone conclusion, as Bureau of Insular Affairs Chief Clarence Edwards’ assessment of Hamilton Wright’s plan to

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75 Philippine Islands, *Official Gazette* (Dec. 24, 1902), 5. In this same vein, the Bureau of Education maintained two related institutions—a library on these plants and an industrial museum that displayed “the plants and finished articles,” the latter of which was supposed to be a model for similar museums throughout the islands and which “forms a part of the General Office and has a definite place in the industrial plans of the Bureau.” The museum contained a collection of “the most important industrial plants of the Philippines” in herbarium cases, various raw materials and fabricated articles, including furniture, needlework, embroidery, lace, and macramé, and tools. Bureau of Education, Philippine Islands, *The Industrial Museum, Library, and Exhibits of the Bureau of Education* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1913).
“solicit funds from the manufacturers throughout the country in the interest of the Philippines” illustrates, the colonial government and the commercial museums did share interest in developing the economy of the Philippines. Indeed, before the Museum of Ethnology, Natural History, and Commerce had even been established, Governor Taft had already received notice from the Commerce Museum of San Francisco about its plans to present “accurate commercial knowledge for manufacturers and exporters of the United States,” with a “comprehensive exhibit of the raw products of the Islands, and of the manufactured articles consumed therein.” The industrial museum’s collections were large enough to supply exhibits that traveled throughout the islands and the United States: in the islands, the exhibits were considered a means of instruction and standardization; in the United States, the exhibits did the same work that Philippine exhibits did at world’s fairs, “making the people of the United States acquainted with the industrial work being done in the public schools of the Philippines” and “bringing the products to the attention of businessmen there.”

In 1902, with planning for the St. Louis World Exposition underway, the Philippine Government was presented with the opportunity to coordinate a display on its colonial projects that presented the United States as a leader of nations and peoples,

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76 Edwards to Worcester, Apr. 10, 1907, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP.
77 Scott to Taft, May 6, 1901, reel 32, Taft Papers, LOC. Also, the section of the Philippine Commission Report for the year 1902 noted that “To acquaint himself with the work of similar institutions, the chief of the bureau of non-Christian Tribes visited, in the past year, the commercial museums of Japan at Tokyo, Kyoto and Nagasaki, the Philadelphia Museum of Commerce, and the recently inaugurated Pacific Commercial Museum of San Francisco.”
economically and racially. Given such import, officials in the Philippines sought not only “to obtain specimens of every article made or used by every tribe of the archipelago,” but also to follow in the United States National Museum’s (USNM) best practices for displaying objects. In addition to the opportunity to educate the United States public on its country’s newest territorial acquisition, the exposition presented an opportunity to organize specialized staff to collect material for the Philippine exhibit which would, after the end of the exposition, form the core of a new insular ethnological museum.

The Museum of Ethnology, Natural History and Commerce continued work with United States museums even after the exposition closed down. This took the form of the Philippine museum presenting items of interest to the USNM, the Smithsonian offering specimens of interest to the Philippine museum, or simply exchanging information between the two institutions about the materials held therein. In addition, the Museum of Ethnology, Natural History and Commerce had ties with the

79 Rydell, All the World’s a Fair.
80 Philippine Commission Report, 1902, RG 350, NACP.
81 For example, writing to Acting Governor-General Luke E. Wright, Governor-General Taft reported that he had found a couple of men to assist in putting together the Philippine exhibit; one of these was Professor Gustavo Niederlein, of the Philadelphia Commercial Museum, who hoped to “secure part of the Philippine exhibit as shall belong to us for his museum and I think it would be wise to give it to him.” Taft to Wright, Apr. 11, 1902, reel 35, Taft Papers, LOC. Likewise, staff members from the islands’ museum were temporarily transferred out of the Philippine government to focus on the work of the exposition. See Philippine Commission Act No. 734 (Apr. 8, 1903) which transferred Samuel R. Shiley from the staff of the Insular Museum of Ethnology, Natural History, and Commerce to the Exposition Board for the second half of the 1903 fiscal year.
82 BIA to USNM, Mar. 25, 1912, Edwards to Smithsonian, Apr. 20, 1907, McIntyre to Forbes, Apr. 29, 1911, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP.
Field Museum in Chicago and the Wistar Institute of Anatomy Museum in Philadelphia, on matters as varied as the preferred exhibition cases to assistance in conducting ethnological studies in the Philippines to the shipment of anatomical specimens to the United States. In short, with the establishment of the Museum of Ethnology, Natural History and Commerce, a growing number of ethnologists and museum professionals in the United States and the Philippines located another place to call their institutional home.

While the Museum of Ethnology, Natural History, and Commerce was the premier museum of the colonial government, the colonial government appears also to have supported other museum projects in its first twenty years of rule in the islands. In a 1905 circular letter to Division Superintendents of schools, there was an announcement of the intention to create a Permanent School Museum in one of the buildings of the Philippine Normal School. As with the Museum of Ethnology, Natural History, and Commerce, the Permanent School Museum had connections with world’s fairs in the United States in terms of staffing and sharing materials for display. In a 1906 circular letter from Headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary, there was an announcement of the organization of “a museum containing arms and curios of the

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83 McIntyre to Ide, Apr. 13, 1906, McIntyre to Smith, Sept. 21, 1906, Edwards to Smith, May 15, 1908, McIntyre to Forbes, Oct. 10, 1909, McIntyre to Field Museum, Nov. 16, 1909, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP.
84 Philippine Islands, Official Gazette (Mar. 1, 1905), 103-4.
country pertaining to warfare” and, therefore, a request from constabulary officers for loans of such arms and curios as would be appropriate for exhibit.85

 Libraries

On March 9, 1900, Americans “moved by patriotic zeal” opened the American Circulating Library (ACL) as a memorial to “those officers and men of the military and naval forces of the United States who have lost their lives in the service of their country in the Philippines.” While the ACL was founded by private individuals, discussion of its transfer to the occupation government began in 1901. By 1902, despite early discussions of whether the library might be for the exclusive use of American servicemen, it was “expected the library will come to perform the real functions of a public library.”86

The prospect of remaking the American Circulating Library as a public library was significant enough to merit discussion at one of the Philippine Commission’s public meetings. At the center of this public discussion was the matter of the Library Executive Board’s composition. On the one hand, the library had been founded as a memorial and service for American military in the islands; on the other hand, if the library was to be owned and administered by the occupation government, a major tenet of which was service to and public education of the natives, the library administration ought not to be restricted to Americans.

85 File 15127, box 730, RG 350, NACP.
George C. Zellner and Mrs. Charles Greenleaf, two Americans involved with the administration of the library, opposed the proposed amendment that placed two natives on the Library Board, reasoning that not only were all the books of the library in English, that Americans would take a greater interest in serving Americans, and that “natives would hardly be the proper persons to promote that object [of the library as a memorial].” This reasoning highlighted the fact that the war between the Philippine-American War was ongoing, and that the civic good that public libraries were supposed to provide was a difficult goal to achieve when two nations were very plainly at war.87

The members of the Philippine Commission had varied perspectives. Dean Worcester was adamant that if the government was to own the library, it should be made public and natives should take a part in its administration for the public good, referring to the policies of “Benevolent Assimilation.”88 Henry Ide was concerned that requiring the service of American military officers would be a burden, once the hostilities ended. William Howard Taft suggested that ensuring that some proportion of the library board was native was not itself “invidious discrimination,” and in fact, was in keeping with the American charge to mind “the welfare of the islands [...].”89 Luke Wright underscored the tutelage of Filipinos, suggesting that Americans would be

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87 Public Meeting Minutes of the Philippine Commission, Mar. 4, 1901, pages 341-42, American Historical Collection, Ateneo de Manila University (AHC). The future purpose of the library, according Zellner, was a topic of discussion among the library’s executive board; five argued that it “should never lose its primary object of being maintained as a soldiers’ and sailors’ library,” while only two thought it “should have a broader scope.”
88 Ibid., 343.
89 Ibid., 347.
“familiar with American methods which it was desired to introduce here in the matter of administering the public library.”90 In the end, the Commission enacted a law that provided for the appointment of five trustees—with at least two military officers and two natives—with the duty “of providing the necessary rooms or buildings, of appointing the necessary librarians, janitors and other employees, and of making rules for the circulation of books in accordance with the terms and conditions of the trust.”91 By Philippine Commission Act No. 96 (March 5, 1901), the ACL was gifted to the colonial government.

The American Circulating Library’s first decade was one of fast-pasted and enormous growth. Highlights of the institution’s early years included the acquisition of Guemes’ Bibliography of the Philippines, complete runs of the Official Gazette in English and Spanish, the acquisition of fire insurance to cover the value of the library’s holdings, and the circulation of pamphlets advertising its services.92 With the Reorganization Act of 1906, the ACL became the Division of the American Circulating Library Association of Manila, Philippine Islands, within the Bureau of Education. Whereas it had been an entity within the Division of Public Instruction, under the Bureau of Education, it was its own division under the Bureau of Education after 1906. The closure of the Commercial Museum resulted in the transfer of some of its holdings, “a large list of trade journals from all parts of the world.” Meanwhile, the library had plans to further build its

90 Ibid., 348.
91 Report of the American Circulating Library to the Philippine Commission, 1902, RG 350, NACP.
92 Executive Committee meeting minutes of the Philippine Commission, Mar. 21, 1906, Aug. 2, 1906, Mar. 12, 1907, July 5, 1907, AHC.
collection in terms of material relating to the Philippines, in service of which “a special room [had] been set apart for such collections, to which admission may be made upon application.” Both of these circumstances were part of the library’s efforts to become “thoroughly cosmopolitan,” by holding a range of materials in a number of languages.\(^{93}\)

Moreover, the ACL’s annual reports focused sustained attention to the physical arrangement of the books, the condition of the library furniture, and the space of the general reading room. As was the case with both the Ethnological or Insular Museum and the Bureau of Archives, the limited physical space for the collections was a daily reality that might benefit from repeated calls for more room. Just as importantly, the ACL administration’s concerns were shared by administrators of public libraries in the United States. As the major library in the islands for United States military personnel, and after 1901, as the main public library of the islands, the ACL exhibited elements of both subscription-based circulating libraries and tax-supported free libraries in the United States.\(^{94}\) The ACL’s aim to educate and amuse its patrons in the Philippines with both fiction and non-fiction collections, as public and circulation libraries in the United States did, suggest a mindfulness of the changes in libraries in the United States and attention to the “benevolent” intentions of public education under American colonial rule.

\(^{93}\) Report of the Director of Education, 1906, RG 350, NACP.

In its first decade, the ACL came to resemble the free public libraries of the latter half of the nineteenth century United States more than the subscription libraries of the former half of the nineteenth century. In ways similar to those Tony Bennett describes in relation to the educational uses of the public museum, the practices of the public library in the last decades of the nineteenth century—through the silence to be observed in the reading rooms, the kinds of books that ought to be read, and the neat checking-out and punctual checking-in of books—may be understood as part of that period’s sensibility of reform and uplift.

In the context of the Philippines, where the United States had taken on the “white man’s burden,” the value and function of the American Circulating Library was even more pronounced, as its successes and failures stood to belie the altruism of the United States’ colonial policy. Like the school libraries that offered reference works to complement class studies, a lifelong “taste for literature,” and “a source of entertainment that is at once instructive and proper,” the public library of the Philippines was believed to play an important role in native education.

The actions necessitated by the ACL’s move to the Oriente Building in 1904 obscured the library’s traditional function as a memorial to United States military in the

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95 In the United States, the growth of public libraries was part of a reform movement that sought to educate and uplift immigrants in the nation’s cities. The American Library Association was founded in 1876; Melvil Dewey established the United States’ first library school at Columbia University in 1887; and Andrew Carnegie opened the first public library in Pittsburgh in 1890.

Philippines. Reclassified and rearranged, the ten memorial libraries were dispersed throughout the collection; though marked with a “memorial slate or stamp,” they were shelved under the library’s general subject headings. The library after the move was described as follows:

The present quarters consist of two rooms on the second floor of the Oriente Building, one of which is the general reading room, and is a large commodious and well lighted room; the other, somewhat smaller, is used as an office for the librarian, and contains the more valuable reference books.

New book stacks were constructed as the old stacks were found not suitable to transfer to the new building. The library furniture was made in the workshop of the Bureau of Forestry, such as the library table, newspaper rack, magazine desk and rack, four reading shelves along the windows, Century Dictionary stands, and large bookcase for valuable bound periodicals and reference books. […]

The library has room for at least 10,000 additional volumes by the time this additional number is secured it is to be hoped that a suitable library building will be provided. Two very beautiful sites for such a building have been partly promised by the Manila municipal board.97

Describing the ordeal, the Acting Librarian noted that “The noise, dust, and confusion were terrific,” and that the librarian Bessie A. Dwyer, worked ninety-seven hours overtime with the assistance of two messengers, prompting the observation that Dwyer’s work was “probably the heaviest ever required of an American women in the Orient.”98

With the collection moved, the annual refrain became a request for increased staff. In the four years since the colonial government’s acquisition of the ACL, the collection had more than doubled, but the staff remained minimal—“one librarian

97 Report of the Acting Librarian of the American Circulating Library, 1905, RG 350, NACP.
98 Ibid.
absent on leave, one acting librarian, one assistant, and two messengers.” Beginning work in January 1905, Syrena McKee had charge of cataloging the collection, which she candidly observed “to be in a most primitive state,” but that with the delivery of adequate supplies and a systematic work plan, and “after it has been put on a thoroughly modern basis,” McKee thought that the growth of the library would be “remarkable.”

*Philippine Library, 1910-1916*

Act No. 1935 (1909) created the Philippine Library, constituted of four divisions: law, scientific, and circulating, and Filipiniana. The law library was to be housed per the direction of the Supreme Court; the science library would remain with the Bureau of Science; the circulating division was, in fact, the old American Circulating Library; and the Filipiniana division, which had been a part of the American Circulating Library, was now its own division. From 1910 to 1916, James Alexander Robertson was director of the Philippine Library.

Further, this act mandated that the Library Board try to make the library accessible to teachers and students, through the establishment of reading rooms and availability of books in the schools themselves. According to the Bureau of Education,

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99 Ibid. McKee wrote in her 1905 report on cataloguing: “It will be necessary to buy a great many more supplies before the cataloguing is completed. Labels, books cards, pockets, and cataloguing slips and cards will be required. A large catalogue case will be absolutely indispensable. Then the charging system will have to be changed, and cards for subscribers, record cards, cases for filing same, files for records of books issued, for subscribers’ cards, and for fine records will be needed.” Revered for his decimal system for library classification, Melvil Dewey’s real genius may be found in having incorporated his Library Bureau to sell all the products necessary to operate a modern, efficient library.
this was considered a characteristic of “all progressive modern communities,” and the Philippines was no exception. The board was also directed to “make a special effort within the means at its disposal to procure and preserve from time to time all books, papers, documents, and periodicals of every kind or class which relate to the history of the Philippine Islands or to the Filipino people, and to provide a chief of the division of Filipiniana with proper qualifications to classify and arrange said historical collection.”

The library collected historical manuscripts aggressively, many of which remain today as “Treasures of The National Library.” During this period, the Philippine Library emerged as the premier repository for Filipiniana.

Conclusion

In the United States between the years 1898 and 1916, there emerged a movement, more organized than ever before, to establish government archives. If the sounding call for the creation of government archives in the United States had been made by Richard Bartlett in his 1837, American historians heeded it by the end of the nineteenth century. The concern over the potential destruction wrought by natural disasters helped push the archives argument forward. The influx of Europeans settling

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100 Bureau of Education, Philippine Islands, Libraries for Philippine Public Schools, 7.
101 For an overview of the history of The National Library, see Chando Morallos, Treasures of The National Library: A Brief History of the Premier Library of the Philippines (Manila: The National Library, 1998). Act No. 2021 on January 13, 1911, which approved of the library’s purchase of Jose Rizal’s manuscript “Noli Me Tangere,” as well as “all the books, pamphlets, papers, and other documents that remain of his private library.” The Philippine Legislature also passed Act No. 2043 (Feb. 3, 1911), appropriating 20,000 pesos to purchase materials for the Division of Filipiniana. On February 3, 1913, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2223, appropriating 200,000 pesos to purchase the Library of the Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas at Barcelona, Spain.
in the United States and the political upheaval caused by clashes between labor and management in cities across the United States compelled affluent social reformers to act. These conditions, combined with the United States’ annexation of island territories created a situation wherein support for a government archive could take hold nationally.

The incorporation of the American Historical Association in 1884 brought together a group whose professional concerns, by congressional mandate, necessarily included the condition of government archives. In 1908, the AHA appointed a committee composed of J. Franklin Jameson, John Bach McMaster, and Alfred T. Mahan to bring the issue of a national archive to the President and Congress; this committee would eventually be known as the Committee on the National Archives. The next year, the American Historical Association would host an annual meeting of archivists, where issues relating to the housing of archives were discussed, as well as matters of policy of access and order. By 1912 the collective efforts of the American Historical Association membership were formidable enough to prompt President William Howard Taft to issue an executive order on archives.

Organized action concerning public archives in the United States’ coincided with the United States’ annexation of new island territories in Asia, the Pacific, and the Caribbean, as the annexation of these territories meant also the acquisition of records relating to their administration under previous colonial regimes. Historians,

102 Gondos, 22-25.
103 By 1921, the question of establishing a national archive would reach congressional debate. However, not until 1934 would the United States National Archives open, and two years later, the Society of American Archivists was formed. See Viola, National Archives of the United States.
manuscripts librarians, and archivists analyzed the issues relating to government archives in these newly-annexed lands. The physical condition of records varied, depending upon the degree to which war had ravaged the territory; the value of records varied, depending upon the degree to which the territory was considered of use to the United States; the arrangement and description of records varied, depending upon the duration of American occupation of the territory. In the case of the Philippines, the leaders of the colonial state were mindful of the role archives could play in the United States governing of the islands.

Between the years 1898 and 1916, the American colonial state in the Philippines launched ambitious projects purported to be in keeping with the United States’ proclamation of “Benevolent Assimilation.” The more spectacular of these projects then, such as roads and schools, remain the most memorable today. Ironically, among the least memorable of colonial projects was the one whose function was its own documentation and documentation of the workings of the colonial state: the establishment, maintenance, and development of the colonial government’s archive. Though the Bureau of Archives, its predecessors and its later iterations were neither spectacular nor accessible to the majority of natives, nevertheless, its organizational and functional change over time reflected the evolving concerns of the colonial administrations over time. Most importantly—in many instances and in a variety of ways—the Bureau of Archives and its later iterations provided the flexible, administrative support required to realize colonial policy. Indeed, in the first two
decades of American colonial rule of the Philippines, the government archive was the workhorse of every administration; with very little in its filing and registration systems to attract public praise or ridicule, it nevertheless kept the machinery of bureaucracy in motion.
“No war ever left such a wonderful mass of material for historians. It is not only the
great newspapers and the news-gathering associations that are to be considered. These
sent experienced correspondents and observers capable of describing and
understanding great events, but there was also a real “army” of correspondents of the
“home papers.” Every regiment and company had its enlisted reporter or
correspondent, whose letters to the town or village paper will lend a new interest to the
history of war. And all these reported the opinion of the general movement or the great
events. Then, all the newspapers were deluged with private letters from soldiers to
their families at home. The intelligence of the United States was writing the history of
the war it was prosecuting. Only the archives of the Navy, War, and State Departments
are to be opened to complete the material.”

--Henry Watterson, History of the Spanish-American War

Introduction

The United States acquired Spain’s colonial archives of the Philippines per the
Treaty of Paris in 1898, but in the years after the Treaty of Paris, as the Philippine-
American War raged on, archives in the islands would cease to be only a matter of post-
Spanish-American War spoils. As the above excerpt from Henry Watterson’s History of
the Spanish-American War demonstrates, there existed an awareness of the historic
importance of the moment, and along with such recognition, attention to the
dimensions of “such a wonderful mass of material for historians.” Of course, the
“yellow journalism” of the period provided consistent, if not always reliable, accounts of
events in the Spanish-American War theaters. Watterson suggests, however, that the
real treasure for historians—himself and, one presumes, subsequent generations of
historians—is actually the letters in local papers, from their reporters and soldiers. As

104 Henry Watterson, History of the Spanish-American War (New York: The Werner Company,
1898), 587-88.
the publication of Watterson’s account itself indicates, though the works made available by the major newspapers and, eventually, by the federal government would be useful, the sources presently available sufficed.\footnote{There are more sources than those Watterson mentions, such as those discussed at greater length in this chapter. Given his special interest in the details of war, however, it is worthwhile to mention that official records of military regiments were sometimes published; these records included musters and orders. See, for example, C.U. Gantenbein, comp., \textit{The Official Records of the Oregon Volunteers in the Spanish War and Philippine Insurrection} (Salem, OR: J.R. Whitney, 1903). These records were published by mandate of the state assembly, as explained in the volume’s introduction: “The records of Oregon Volunteers in the Indian and Civil wars are very incomplete, so that it is always different and often impossible to furnish desired information. The legislative assembly very wisely adopted the above provision for perpetuating the official records of the late Volunteers, in case the originals, by any accident, should be lost or destroyed,” xi.} And while the volume of letters in local and regional papers was significant, and while the government had—early on—its fair share of criticism for not making more records more readily available, United States officials predictably spent a considerable amount of time accounting for why the nation’s involvement in the Philippines was justified.

As the Philippine-American War was coming to an end, the Senate Committee on the Philippines heard testimony about the conditions in the islands, calling upon United States officials who had executed the war or established the civil government. Among these were Arthur MacArthur, Elwell S. Otis, William Howard Taft, and David Barrows. When asked of Filipinos’ attitudes towards Americans, MacArthur observed that they “like our institutions,” even if trust on an individual level was sometimes hard to achieve.\footnote{\textit{American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection: Testimony Taken from Hearings on Affairs in the Philippine Islands before the Senate Committee on the Philippines, 1902} (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1969), 139.} Picking up on this in his testimony, Elwell S. Otis noted that he did not have
trouble finding “honest, intelligent, capable Filipino gentlemen throughout the islands”
to fill posts in the service. ¹⁰⁷ David Barrows offered the argument that would become
gospel—that conflict in the islands was due to misunderstanding—and suggested that
through understanding, the various groups in the islands were able to get along
reasonably well by 1902. ¹⁰⁸ For his part, William Howard Taft discussed the necessity
for “the maintenance of a strictest kind of civil service reform system,” for the sake of
Americans in the service as for the sake of showing Filipinos “the possibility of an honest
administration of government—something that they have never known under Spanish
rule, and that they never knew under their own rule for the eight months during which
they had a government under Aguinaldo.” ¹⁰⁹ Whatever the differences in their
testimonies’ details, all of the officials agreed that the United States’ course in the
Philippines was the correct one, even as conditions on the ground suggested otherwise.

Speaking before the Union Reading College in Manila, Governor-General William
Howard Taft referred again and again not only to the anecdotal record of the United
States in the Philippines, in terms of developments to the islands’ economy and to the
population’s education, but also referred repeatedly to the written, historical record.
He suggested that while partisanship and willful misinterpretation accounted for current
opposition to the United States’ administration in the Philippines, the distance afforded

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 148.
¹⁰⁸ Barrows spoke of wartime blandly: “But I think the feeling among the great majority of them
[Filipinos] was one of great hostility to us through the year 1899 and through a large part of the
year 1900.” Ibid., 160.
¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 150-51.
by later generations and its historians would judge the United States’ work as among the noblest episodes in American life. Whereas Watterson tacitly praised the publication of soldiers’ and local reporters’ letters in the smaller newspapers in the United States, Taft was somewhat of an apologist for the disparaging views of Filipinos maintained by American newspapers in Manila, “whose editorial staffs were largely composed of men recently in the battlefield and whose subscription lists were largely swelled by the names of soldiers, whose advertising columns, were filled by the advertising of these American merchants [...]”110 Years later, when the so-called “Taft Era” had come to a close and Dean Worcester retired from his post as Philippine Commissioner and Secretary of the Interior, he went on lecture tours that criticized the newly-installed Francis Burton Harrison administration in the Philippines, basing his critique on not only his well-known collection of lantern slides, but also his access to colonial government records over the course of his tenure in the islands as well as the “records of the Insurgent Government.”111 In other words, in the earliest years of the United States’ occupation of the Philippines, historians and colonial officials alike were well aware of the sources currently, imminently, and eventually available. They were

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mindful of the powerful narratives that could be told from the sources, and how such accounts could undermine the United States’ interests in the archipelago.

This chapter explores how archives figured into how the United States waged its war in the islands, beginning with a closer examination of the Treaty of Paris, and how the clause relating to archives therein, tested a nearly a decade after the treaty’s passage, sheds light on the changing uses of the archives. This chapter also reviews the work of Captain John R.M. Taylor on the papers that came to be known as the Philippine Insurgent Papers, or the Philippine Revolutionary Papers, the controversy surrounding their compilation and deferred publication, and what the documents of the Philippine government, created at the height of its hostilities with Spain and the United States, outlined for archives under independent Philippine rule. Taken together, these “flashpoints” in the relationship between archives and war show that while the archive is most generally and readily understood as an entity of civil rule, as evidenced by the Philippine Commission’s many acts related thereto, the archive has undeniable martial origins and, thus, martial legacies.
**Treaty of Paris and the Spanish Colonial Government’s Archive**

“The librarian believes that the leniency should not extend to the voluntary relinquishment of a body of documents that are so valuable for the history of the Philippine Islands, and which are in great part mere dead material in the Archives of Spain. The history of the Philippine Islands is daily assuming large proportions among the Filipinos, and these documents will have a great use here.”

Writing to the Philippine Commission’s Executive Secretary in 1912, Philippine Library Director James Alexander Robertson described the United States’ assertion of claims on Spanish archives permitted by the 1898 Treaty of Paris to have been minimal, and the United States’ treatment of Spain in general to be lenient. As the top administrator for the islands’ premier repository for government archives and historical manuscripts, Robertson interpreted the treaty broadly and in such a way as would allow for the institution’s acquisition of a great deal of material. As it so happened, he was quite familiar with the material he requested, having years before consulted it and overseen its publication in his and Emma Helen Blair’s compilation of European documents pertaining to the islands, *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898.* In any event, the salient point here is that while Robertson’s case for the colonial government’s acquisition of materials from the Archives of Spain was historical—he appealed with his assessment that “The history of the Philippine Islands is daily assuming large proportions among the Filipinos”—his argument relied upon the peace treaty that had

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112 Robertson to Executive Secretary, Nov. 12, 1912, file 702, RG 350, NACP.
113 For a recent, critical history of Robertson and his work, see Gloria Cano, “Blair and Robertson’s *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898*: Scholarship or Imperialist Propaganda?” *Philippine Studies* 56, no. 1 (2008): 3-46.
ended the Spanish-American War. In other words, Robertson’s argument for the resources to support scholarship on the history of a people, an unmistakable project of the United States’ civil government in the Philippines, depended on the United States’ successful military occupation of the Philippines.

By the time Robertson was writing his letter to the Philippine Commission’s Executive Secretary in 1912, the purpose of the Spanish archives in the entrenchment of the new American regime was less clear than it had been just a decade earlier. In early reports, the military occupation and establishment of civil rule loomed in the narratives about the archives. In the Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Archives, included in the Philippine Commission Report of 1901, for example, Manuel Yriarte explained his bureau’s early effort to bring all the records dispersed throughout the offices of the Spanish government into the Intendencia Building; he noted that such records were valuable not only for their historical information, but for their use in “the formation and administration of laws relating to the Filipino people.” Despite his bureau’s earnest efforts to consolidate the voluminous records of the Spanish government, they were nonetheless thwarted by soldiers who, unaware of the papers’ special value, used them “for fuel in the preparation of their food or threw them into the streets.” The purposes of the archive—some desirable in Yriarte’s eyes, others not—were most basic in the project of United States occupation. The establishment of civil government under the direction of William Howard Taft was a political maneuver designed to suppress the ongoing revolution to establish a Philippine Republic, and the Bureau of Archives could
materially aid such a project. Likewise, the vagaries of war and military occupation required food and shelter; burning archives enabled the preparation of food and their removal to the streets provided the space for indoor shelter.

While the language of the Treaty of Paris clauses pertaining to the United States’ acquisition of the Spanish regime’s administrative records was broad, colonial administrators—holdovers from the Spanish regime and, later, recent American arrivals—found that the records ceded from Spain were in poor condition. Manuel Yriarte’s 1901 report of the Bureau of Archives, cited above, certainly attests to these conditions. In the first decade of the twentieth century, as the new American regime began the work of entrenchment, newcomers to the islands evaluated the records ceded from Spain. Of course, these archives were not perceived to be the most valuable concessions from the Spanish Crown per se, but as Worthington Chauncey Ford and James Alexander Robertson would depict it, paying serious and proper attention to them was crucial to the writing of historical accounts of the colonies and the Spanish empire, as well as to the United States’ successful administration of its new colonies. In other words, though archives were not immediately and obviously the most valuable of war booty, such as arable land and mining concessions and harbors and ports, they were important for understanding the development of these more valuable elements under the Spanish regime, and under the Americans, for their new administration. It was to this conception of the United States’ enterprises in the Philippines that, taken together, Ford and Robertson appealed.
In the United States, both Ford and Robertson enjoyed some currency, as far as their evaluations of archives were concerned. Worthington Chauncey Ford descended from a family that had settled in New England in 1623 and, though he did not complete his degree at Columbia University, he nevertheless enjoyed a bookish life and social standing that gave him positions in the United States State Department and Treasury Department as a young man; Ford later worked at the Boston Public Library and, at the time he wrote about the condition of public records in the United States’ colonies, he was employed in the Division of Manuscripts at the Library of Congress.¹¹⁴ James Alexander Robertson, for his part, was the first director of the Philippine Library. Robertson began his career as a proofreader at the Burrows Brothers Publishing Company in Cleveland, Ohio, which included collaboration with Reuben Gold Thwaites and Emma Helen Blair on *The Jesuit Relations*. This collaboration, in turn, led to Robertson’s move to Madison, Wisconsin, to continue work on *The Jesuit Relations* and eventually, to the beginning of his collaboration with Emma Helen Blair on *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898*. That project required Robertson’s extended stays in Europe between 1902 and 1907 to visit institutions holding material on the Spanish rule of the Philippines which, in the years after the publication of *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898*, would inform his later scholarly works and position him well to acquire materials for the Philippine Library, most notably materials from the Compañía General

de Tabacos de Filipinas.\textsuperscript{115} Whereas Ford established himself with a career in the United States, Robertson did the same for himself in the Philippines. Taken together, their assessment of the conditions of archives in the Philippines would have been accepted as authoritative.

In 1904, Worthington Chauncey Ford delivered a paper, “Public Records in Our Dependencies,” to the membership of the American Historical Association at their annual meeting. Reporting on the archives acquired by the United States per treaties with Spain in the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico, Ford assessed the utility of the records for historians of the Spanish empire and, secondarily, to genealogists. Ford began from the premise that “It would seem as if a student of Spanish colonial policy should be able to find in the United States the material that was essential for a study of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and a part of the nineteenth centuries,” going so far as to cite articles pertaining to archives in treaties with Spain from 1803, 1819 and, of course, 1898. These treaty articles, coupled with his assessment that the Spanish colonial state was very—perhaps excessively—active in its administration of colonies, suggested to Ford that there should exist rich collections for historical research. However, he then proceeded to describe the reasons for why, despite treaty articles relating to the care of public records, they were indeed so incomplete and in disarray.

To varying degrees, Britons, Americans, and Spaniards were all responsible for the incomplete and disarrayed public records in the Philippines. During the British occupation of the islands between 1762 and 1764, Spanish colonial records were transferred to the British Museum. Beyond accounting for the removal of a specific series of records (Spanish decrees dating before 1660), Ford “feared that the tradition surrounding the disappearance of these earlier decrees serve as a convenient cover for carelessness or a worse fault somewhere in the long custodians of record.”¹¹⁶ In the first months of the American occupation, United States soldiers, in their need to make space for themselves inside the colonial administration’s buildings, destroyed records that they mistakenly believed to be without value. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the collecting the spoils of war and addressing the exigencies of active combat, translated into the absence of public records.

Even during times of relative peace under the Spanish regime, however, public records did not receive, in Ford’s estimation, proper care. There were two major reasons for this: the influence of the tropical environment and the indifference of the colonial bureaucrat. Insects and mold were a physical menace to the records, while the heat and humidity, “the tropical sky,” helped to constitute an environment wherein colonial officials did not work at full and efficient capacity, resulting in shoddy recordkeeping. This ultimately meant that when a newly-appointed governor approved inventories provided to him by their predecessor, “he signed for a vacuum, so far as

¹¹⁶ Ford, 135.
records were concerned.”\textsuperscript{117} The environment and the poor performance of colonial officials therein presented Americans with a distinct set of challenges.

Indeed, given these conditions—British occupation, American war, Spanish indifference, religious tyranny, and the tropical climate—Ford concluded that “The problem which constantly meets us in dealing with records is the reasons for their incompleteness. Apparently, under a government largely military and strongly centralized, possessing a centripetal energy that drew to certain places the activities of the outlying administrative regions, the material has disappeared.”\textsuperscript{118} Tacit in Ford’s final assessment was that, under the new American regime, these conditions would be corrected. While American soldiers, in their ignorance, were responsible for the destruction of certain records in the Philippines, Ford’s survey suggests American accountability and an outline for correctives; this is apparent given the United States’ negotiations with the religious orders to remove remaining friars from the islands, the promise of improved and efficient government administration, and even the introduction of modern methods to protect the archives that happened to have survived the centuries. In short, Ford outlined how the “public records in our dependencies” would seem to be, how in fact they were under Spanish control, and how they might be under United States control; in so doing, his report to the American Historical Association promoted—in its modest way, but in keeping with popular imperialist

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 142.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 140-141.
views—the benefits of United States rule in the Philippines, as well as Guam and Puerto Rico.

While Ford’s report on the condition of archives acquired by the United States per treaty with Spain primarily focused on the physical condition and the extent or scope of the public records, his discussion of the content also indicates, even if tacitly, the ways that United States rule of the Philippines could be posited as superior that of Spain. For example, Ford suggests the ways that the spoils system—a concept and institution that certainly would be familiar to his audience at the American Historical Association—would affect the content of the colonial state’s records.

“The laws of the Indies were in their day a monument of administrative industry, but it was one thing to pass a law and another to carry it into effect. The colonies were distant, close supervision difficult, the agent spoilsmen, and the natives were to be exploited. The mass of decrees and dispatches indicate that there was weakness somewhere in the chain, and hence this great mass is needed for a corrective. The good or the ill wishes of the home government were embodied in the decree; the application of the wish and the results would be recorded in the report of the colonial administration. If a rosy view dominates in the actual message from the governor-general to his official superiors on whose favor his office and profits depended, a corrective exists in the local and provincial reports, also prepared by those anxious to please the higher powers, but written at a so much closer range as to be deprived of a certain tropical exuberance that gave a pictorial effect to the summary.”\(^{119}\)

Thus, in identifying three classes of records—decrees and dispatches, reports of the governor-general, and reports of local and provincial officials—Ford made clear why a greater and more comprehensive body of records would facilitate a more complex, and likely more accurate, understanding of the Spanish colonial state. The local and

\(^{119}\) Ibid., 147.
provincial reports record the problems; the governor-general reports minimize the problems; and the laws outline their resolution as they also further delineate the shape of the problems. While all parties involved in the production of these records have a vested interest in projecting “a certain tropical exuberance,” if their records could be read alongside each other, another picture may emerge. This dashed possibility was Ford’s unfortunate conclusion about public records in the United States’ new colonies.

The delivery of this assessment of the records acquired per the Treaty of Paris coincided with the vocal and scathing critique of American anti-imperialists who alleged that the United States’ colonial government in the Philippines reported inaccurately upbeat news about conditions in the islands and maintained a stranglehold on information that would allow for any divergent views of conditions in the Philippines. In any event, reading Ford’s critiques and critiques of anti-imperialists suggests that information provided about the islands by the United States, if not records generated therein, was as sparse and distrusted as under the Spanish. If Ford’s report promoted the interests of the new colonial state in some ways, on this point, his analysis undermined the United States’ purportedly modern and efficient administration.

As telling as Ford’s assessment of the incompleteness of certain classes or series of Spanish colonial archives, was his valuation of the records that possibly were complete.

“The larger mass of papers was naturally of a purely administrative character, bureau and departmental reports, and documents, local, municipal, and provincial. The nature as well as the arrangement of these papers forbade a
close examination of any branch of them. To strike a number of formal returns, the stubs of public documents issued, or a package of minute items not unlike the individual returns made to our census was too discouraging.”

The above excerpt refers to the sorts of records that, by Ford’s own estimation, present the most clear and accurate accounts of conditions in the Philippines. Indeed they are a considerable volume of material, but they also present a range of types and originating offices—reports and documents of bureaus and departments, and of local, municipal, and provincial offices. Beyond the fact that the volume and nature of these records made the prospect of inventorying them “too discouraging,” Ford’s use of the records of the United States Census as a point of reference is telling. Of course, the reference would help Ford’s audience of American historians to calibrate their sense of the volume of materials, unseen by them and thousands of miles away. Their nature, “purely administrative,” suggests that the labor required to review them was not worthwhile, at least for the purposes of Ford’s investigation for an audience of American historians. Moreover, their prohibitive arrangement does not merit description. In short, though Ford himself concluded that such mundane records would be useful for understanding the Spain’s colonial government in the Philippines, he did not conduct “a close examination” of any of them.

The application of these records, theoretically valuable for precisely their minuteness, was prevented by the volume that necessarily defined them. This aspect of Ford’s assessment of the Spanish archives ceded to the United States per the Treaty of

120 Ibid., 134.
Paris would recur throughout the administration of the Bureau of Archives under American rule; the records whose volume and nature was “too discouraging” both served the colonial state in their primary and explicitly stated sense—documenting local legislation, for example, or as would be the case in 1905, tabulating the islands’ first census—but the discouragement they inspired also served the colonial state by dissuading close and careful observation and, thus, also curbing critique.

If Ford’s “Public Records in Our Dependencies” provided a survey of the present conditions and research promise of Spanish archives in Puerto Rico, Florida, Louisiana, California, Guam, and the Philippines, James Alexander Robertson’s “Notes on the Archives of the Philippines” (1910) provided an update to Ford’s report with a focus on the Philippines. While the utility of Spanish colonial records to the United States’ administration of the Philippines may have been inferred from Ford’s 1904 report, its focus on the disorder resulting from war featured more centrally. By 1910, however, major hostilities between Philippine and United States forces had concluded, and officials in the United States were focused on the efficiency of its colonial administration; Robertson’s report reflects the shift in concern from military occupation to civil administration.

Indeed, the Americans had become what Ford had, just a few years earlier, had said of the Spanish: “The Spanish official was created to prepare reports, and in the dependencies of Spain this function received a cultivation that borders upon excess. It is possible, perhaps, to picture the first comers with sword in hand; their successors
took to the pen.”

Moreover, Robertson was the consummate historian-bureaucrat, having made a name for himself with his scholarship on the Philippines and making a life for himself as a division head in the United States’ colonial administration. These differences—between the concerns raised by military occupation and civil administration, between an American based at the Library of Congress and an American based at the Philippine Library—are neatly encapsulated by Robertson’s opening comments, which in turn, set the tone for his report on the state of archives in his care, in the Philippines.

Robertson introduced his report on the conditions of archives in the Philippines with the observation that while the United States had acquired the Spanish archives on the Philippines per treaty, just as it had done in the cases of East Florida, New Mexico and California, the archives in the Philippines distinguished themselves as the collection that ought to stay at its originating location, rather than be transferred to the Library of Congress. The impressive volume of these records, which Robertson estimated to be more than 5,000,000 pages, may have accounted in part for the distinction, but more probably, the case for their staying in the Philippines rested on the fact that they were a “decidedly active asset at the present time in land questions and other matters which are productive of lawsuits.” Robertson posited that the archives’ primary importance was utility to colonial administration.

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121 Ibid., 133.
122 Robertson, 423.
Two other aspects of Robertson’s report on the archives of the Philippines deserve mention, as they enjoyed especial currency throughout the first two decades of United States rule. First, the report dutifully details the poor physical condition of the archives, noting that many documents “have been destroyed through the wanton fortune of war, by the insect pests so much to be dreaded out here, and by the tropical climate which is so hostile to the preservation of documents.”

Throughout the first two decades of Untied States colonial rule of the Philippines, the sorry state of the archives was a consistent theme in reports from the Bureau of Archives to the Philippine Commission. The stated reasons for this were invariably reported as the inadequate storage facilities and the ignorance of soldiers; the tacit reason was the ineptitude of the previous administration, which found expression whether United States officials were discussing the economy of the Philippines, public health and education, or central administration.

The second noteworthy aspect of Robertson’s report both complements and contradicts the assessment of the archives’ conditions. More precisely, Robertson is careful to note that the colonial government’s archivist, Manuel Yriarte, is “almost entirely Spanish in blood” and that “The Filipinos appreciate thoroughly the importance of preserving these priceless records, and Americans are bringing enlightened means to bear for their future care.”

Thus, while the maintenance and operation of the archives necessitated the continued employment of Manuel Yriarte, they would only be

123 Ibid.
124 Ibid., 425.
fully appreciated when the work of the Spaniard was brought under the “enlightened means” of the Americans. This formulation—Spanish ineptitude replaced by American ingenuity for Filipino benefit—was one that enjoyed considerable currency throughout the years of United States rule in the Philippines. Its ready application to the archival spoils of war was clear in Robertson’s report in 1910, as well as in his later reports as Director of the Philippine Library.

Ford and Robertson demonstrate that in the first years of the United States’ occupation of the Philippines, the administration of archives ceded by Spain faced the same challenges as did nearly every other of Spain’s cessions to the United States. That is, once having been won from previous colonial administration, what were the Americans to do? Negotiating for the transfer of ownership was just the beginning. Shortly after his installment as the Director of the Philippine Library, Robertson attempted to interpret the Treaty of Paris even more broadly; this attempt highlighted again how Robertson could argue that historical research and the privileges of colonial administration were complementary.

Between 1910 and 1916, historian James Alexander Robertson was Director of the Philippine Library. Having completed the publication of his and Emma Helen Blair’s *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898*, a 55-volume compilation of documents from European archives relating to the Philippine Islands along with English translations, in 1907, officials in the United States colonial administration of the Philippines deemed Robertson authoritative enough to merit appointment to the islands’ major public
library. As perhaps ought to have been expected given his previous experience,

Robertson’s attention quickly turned to the acquisition of additional historical

manuscript material for the library’s Filipiniana division.

The means by which the Philippine Library could acquire such material,

Robertson reasoned, was through Article VIII of the Treaty of Paris that referred to the

transfer or reproduction of Spanish documents relating to the administration of the

Philippines. This proposed route of acquisition ultimately placed some strain on the

library’s relationship with the Bureau of Insular Affairs and demanded careful attention

to the meaning and limits of Article VIII of the treaty. The article pertaining to archives

allowed for the cession or reproduction of records that, in whole or in part, referring to

the sovereignty of the islands in the archives of Spain; likewise, if any ceded records

pertained to the sovereignty of Spain, the United States would make them available to

the ousted regime.

In a letter to the Governor-General and a copy thereof to the Chief of the Bureau

of Insular Affairs on May 10, 1912, Robertson noted that the archives of Spain held

“thousands of documents relating to the Philippines,” and Clemente J. Zulueta,

collecting Librarian for the Government of the Philippine Islands, had collected only “a

few hundred of these documents.” Robertson believed that the colonial government

had right to receive more such documents or copies thereof at the expense of the
Spanish Government, noting that if such transfer had been lackadaisically pursued in the past, “now is the time to cause enforcement.”

Analyzing both the treaty and Robertson’s right to request the transfer or reproduction of materials in Spanish archives to the Philippine Library, Chief of the Division of Archives Manuel Yriarte highlighted the fact that Spain needed only to provide copies from the archives upon request. Further, he observed that the Philippine Commission’s appointment of Clemente Zulueta at Collecting Librarian in 1903 to procure copies of historical manuscripts addressed the government’s desire for documents not directly relating to the administration of the islands and, therefore, obviated the need for Robertson’s requests. In conclusion, Yriarte wrote that he did “not believe that obtaining copies of such documents just to enrich libraries may be considered for official uses.”

After circulation throughout the colonial government in the Philippines and the metropolitan government in the United States, Robertson’s general request did not make its way to the highest Spanish authorities. Rather, he was asked to provide a

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125 Robertson to Governor-General, May 10, 1912, file 702, RG 350, NACP.
126 Yriarte to Minturn, May 4, 1912, file 702, RG 350, NACP. In the same file as Yriarte’s memo is another, unfortunately unsigned. Unlike Yriarte, it concurred with Robertson’s views and noted both the historical and administrative value of the records: “Among the documents now in Spain there are, I understand, important papers affecting proprietary rights of citizens and residents of the Philippine Islands. Such documents have only a historical value to the Spanish Government and people but would in a large number of cases be of immense practical value to the Government and people of the Philippine Islands and for this reason should, if it can, be obtained. [...] The question whether such documents, if obtained, should go to enrich the Philippine Library or should go to complete the Division of Archives of the Executive Bureau is a matter that may be decided later.”
more specific list of materials he desired for the Philippine Library, which he did in November 1912. Robertson’s case for the acquisition of these Spanish archives was undeniably and unapologetically historical in nature, noting that the leniency with which the Spanish and Philippine governments dealt with the colonial archives “should not extend to the voluntary relinquishment of documents that are so valuable for the history of the Philippine Islands, and which are in great part mere dead material in the Archives of Spain.”

When Robertson’s request for materials from the archives of Spain arrived in Washington, however, the Bureau of Insular Affairs did not receive it kindly. Forwarding Robertson’s letter to a subordinate at the BIA for review, bureau chief Frank McIntyre wrote plainly that:

This request from the P.I. comes in such bad shape that it is difficult to put it into intelligent form. We should not forward propositions that would only embarrass our Minister. If there is something we want, it should be specifically described and our right to it made reasonably clear; if we have no right we should make clear why we request it as a favor. Half baked requests for an entire library will receive no consideration. Have some one examine these papers and see what is wanted, whether we are entitled to it and if not why we want it.\(^\text{127}\)

Review of Robertson’s request concluded that his case for the transfer or reproduction of records should not be forwarded, because the materials he sought were not of administrative value. However compelling his case for their historical value, which indeed was the value upon which Robertson made his point, such a measure did

\(^{127}\) McIntyre to Woodson, Mar. 31, 1913, file 702, RG 350, NACP. See also Woodson to McIntyre, Apr. 2, 1913, file 702, RG 350, NACP. For further criticism of Robertson’s request, see also Knox to Oliver, Aug. 15, 1912, file 702, RG 350, NACP.
not merit the attention of American and Spanish diplomats. Indeed, as the internal memoranda illustrate, Robertson’s persistence seemed to grate on the administration at the Bureau of Insular Affairs. Thus, again, Robertson’s request was denied; the final comments of McIntyre on the matter provide a concise explanation of why. He noted “an indispensable condition to establish our right to these papers is to show that they have an administrative value and are needed in our administration of the affairs of the Philippines Islands,” and further that, while “Robertson has laid particular stress on their historical value but there is nothing to show that they are really needed for administrative purposes. It is doubtless true that the documents would be a valuable acquisition from an historical standpoint but at the same time might not the question be well asked—Are they not as valuable to the Spanish Government, and would it be fair to ask the Spanish Government to deprive itself of data covering history-making epochs?”

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In 1904 and 19010, Ford and Robertson indicated how the clauses of the treaty that addressed the cession of archives from Spain to the United States were important for the colonial administration of the islands. It was obscured somewhat in the decade after, as Robertson—newly appointed director of the Philippine Library—sought to

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128 McIntyre to Governor-General, Apr. 11, 1913, file 702, RG 350, NACP. McIntyre’s letter continues: “Without going into the question as to whether we are entitled to these documents under the terms of the Treaty of Paris, it seems to me that if such right existed it should have been exercised long ago and that unless we can present a real active necessity for these documents in the administration of affairs of the Philippine Islands we could only present a poor case which would receive no consideration.”
increase that institution’s holdings. The three interests in tension in these instances of interpreting the archives clauses and evaluating Spain’s and the United States’ efforts to adhere to the conditions of those clauses are apparent; they figured centrally in reports of the United States’ administration in the Philippines. First, the attention to archives in the Treaty of Paris established the archives as part of negotiations to end war and thus, indicated the archives as an institutional prize to be won in conquest.

Second, when questions of how much of the archives Spain was obliged to reproduce or outright cede to the United States were raised, the argument that the archives were not just a trophy of war, but also as an administrative necessity, gained currency. Related to this, the archives were read to document, in the esteem of Americans, an inadequate, inefficient, and corrupt Spanish colonial system that would serve as a foil for the United States’ purportedly benevolent, efficient, and modern system of colonial governance. Finally, the arguments for the care of archives as important for the historical study of Spanish colonialism by Americans and, later, for the historical study of the Philippines by both Filipinos and Americans underscored the United States’ conscientious role in crafting a national identity, not just through the suppression of dissent in the Philippine Commission’s sedition, flag, and treason laws, but also by making accessible particular classes of records originating from an authoritatively colonial source.

In short, the Treaty of Paris to end the Spanish-American War was a big deal. It not only ended hostilities between an empire in decline and an empire in ascension, but
it also transferred for those twenty millions dollars, Spain’s colonial territories to the United States. The drama and excitement of the war was concluded, and negotiating the loot was the business at hand. Arable land, ports and harbors, mines, forests—these assets of the Philippines and the promise of their exploitation quickly drew the attention of both proponents and opponents of annexation.

The clauses in the Treaty of Paris that dealt with the transfer of archives also addressed the transfer of immovable property such as buildings and other colonial government structures in the islands. Without a doubt, these were the least spectacular of the United States’ gains, but their deliberate treatment in the peace agreement indicate their importance to the administration of the islands’ agricultural and forest lands, as well as their waterways. In other words, these facilities and archives—however inadequate Ford, Robertson, and Yriarte would report them to be—were crucial to the development of the bigger prizes of the Spanish-American War. The changes to the administration of land under the United States’ regime, for example, was supposed to demonstrate the marked improvement of the governance from what natives experienced under the Spaniards. The greatest projects of the civil government owed their existence to the negotiations to end a military conflict.

Still, reports of the armed occupation of the islands would come to be drowned out by reports of the successes of “benevolent assimilation.” The origins of successful colonial projects—such as the construction of trails and roads, the improvement of ports and harbors, the establishment of public schools and health clinics—had origins in
the military occupation, and in some instances, served to ease the transition from
military to civilian rule. However, to trace the continuity of the promise of disciplinary
violence and to consider how this violent promise animated the civil administration, the
changing interpretations of clauses of the Treaty of Paris pertaining to archives are
especially instructive because questions about the archives always referred back to the
treaty that ended the Spanish-American War. With this invariable referent in these
eyear discussions, the archives’ martial origins were unmistakable, even though the
archives were those of the Spanish colonial bureaucracy. Equally unmistakable was the
necessity of archives in times of war, and in the preparation for war’s end, as
consideration of John R.M Taylor’s compilation and translation of Philippine government
documents—captured in the Philippines and sent to the United States Department of
War’s Bureau of Insular Affairs—attests.

“An archive of basic source materials”: Captain John R.M. Taylor’s *Compilation of
Philippine Insurgent Records*

“I had this book of official stamped paper of the Philippine Insurgent Government
bound in Manila twenty years ago without any particular intention of using it. Now I
have decided to use it as a note book—a commonplace book in the old term I think—in
which to note references to books read and to conversations heard which seem worth
recording. It would have been an interesting record if I had begun it in 1900 but there
may be something yet if I fill these pages. At any rate I shall try.”129

In 1900, amidst the upheaval of the continuing Philippine Revolution and the
Philippine-American War, Captain John R.M. Taylor, the army officer and editor of
*Compilation of Philippine Insurgent Records*, had the stationary of the Philippine

Revolutionary Government bound into a neat volume that has survived the twentieth century and remains housed in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. The above quote is Taylor’s introduction to his journal that covers, as promised, “books read” and “conversations heard,” beginning in 1921.

That Taylor tidily bound his souvenirs of war into a book, that his observations in this book are made on the stationary of an ousted revolutionary government, that his “commonplace book” covers his everyday, everyman observations after he and his staff worked to compile, translate, and publish the records of the Philippine Revolutionary Government—these matters of fact provide an illustration as neat as bound, blank stationary of how the archives of war could be so readily and easily incorporated into the pedestrian business of colonial governance. An important aspect of American evaluations of the revolutionary government turned on how closely the Filipinos approximated the United States models of governance. Of course, the drafting of a constitution, the circulation of decrees, and the official appeals to United States representatives in the both the United States and the Philippines were all practical measures to advocate for the revolutionary government and demonstrate capacity for Filipino self-government. Also, they required stationary, which Taylor idly gathered up and brought back to the United States.

What makes this example so neat, of course, is that though Taylor used the actual stationary of the revolutionary government as the pages of his commonplace book in 1921, with his responsibility for the compilation, translation and annotation of
seized government records for readers in the United States, the seized documents
functioned anyway as his blank stationary. Beginning in 1899, commanding officers at
United States military posts throughout the archipelago were required to send reports
to the Military Governor on the condition of archives in the area they occupied; also,
soldiers were mandated to transfer found records to the central administration for
review. Despite the fact that many records were lost in the course of war, Captain John
R.M. Taylor nevertheless had approximately three tons of documents at his disposal. By
the end of those four years, Taylor had “read and analyzed about 12,204 items.”

Concerns about the political wisdom of publishing Taylor’s work as William Howard Taft
campaigned for the office of the President of the United States, as well as unfavorable
review from James LeRoy, resulted in the indefinite postponement of the compilation’s
publication.\(^{130}\)

Consideration of the efforts to collect, translate and publish the
Philippine Revolutionary Government’s records, and the challenges that attended those
efforts, suggest how seriously the United States took the archives, that is, how
important such documents were to waging a war or suppressing a revolution.

The United States’ recognition of the importance of the records of the Philippine
Revolutionary Government, known to Americans as the insurgents, was immediately
apparent, as the creation of the Office of Insurgent Records was mandated by paragraph
three of the first special order of the Office of the United States Military Governor in the

\(^{130}\) Constantino, introduction to *The Philippine Insurrection against the United States*, x-xi; and
Philippines in 1900. Beginning with naming the office as the Office of Insurgent Records, the United States demonstrated a clear, vested interest in de-legitimating the newly-established Philippine Republic; by insisting that the revolution was an insurgency, the Americans situated the United States as the rightful sovereign of the islands and framed the work and aspirations of Filipino nationalists as in unjust conflict with the rule of law.

Under the aegis of a Captain Frank Taylor of the 8th U.S. Infantry, the Office of Insurgent Records was charged with “the classification and translation of captured insurgent records,” many of which related “mainly to the military operations of the insurgents and the operation of such governments, municipal and central, as were set up and conducted by them.” Some of the records reviewed by this office would eventually be those included in Compilation of Philippine Insurgent Records.

As the director of the compilation project administered through the Department of War’s Bureau of Insular Affairs, Captain John R.M. Taylor was the point of contact for government officials in the United States and the Philippines who sought primary source information on the war. In 1902, for example, Taylor provided Senator Dietrich (R-Nebraska) with a report on “the more prominent Filipino leaders at the beginning of the Philippine insurrection and the acts by which they are best known.” Four years later,

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131 “Additional Appendices to the Annual Report of Major General Arthur MacArthur, Military Governor of the Philippine Islands, 1900,” file 1239, RG 350, NACP. MacArthur’s report continues, noting that: “The completion of the work of classification and translation of the more important documents will necessitate the continuance of this office for a considerable period.”

132 Taylor to Dietrich, 1902, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP. Taylor goes on to explain that though he had not conducted extensive research into the “personal records” of the people
after the controversy surrounding the compilation’s publication, Taylor would still be reviewing the documents held in the Office Insurgent Records for his commanding officer, Chief of Bureau of Insular Affairs Clarence Ransom Edwards. Even so, the enormous volume of the records and the understaffing of the office made it impossible to maintain intellectual control over the documents; thus, in 1908, though at least two employees of the office had lain eyes on every document to come into United States possession, a complete index of the captured materials was, nearly a decade after the first records were acquired, an impossibility.

The challenges facing the Office of Insurgent Records were numerous and considerable, given that its charge was three-fold: to collect, translate, and circulate records received. The first of these challenges was the simple acquisition of records and their unmolested transfer from the Philippines to the United States. Sometimes illegible records would arrive at the Office of Insurgent Records, making it impossible to translate or publish them.

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133 Taylor to Edwards, May 1, 1906, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP.
134 Bureau of Insular Affairs Chief Clarence Ransom Edwards explained this situation to Secretary of the Interior Dean C. Worcester, in his response to a request for information to be derived from the captured records. Edwards to Worcester, Nov. 19, 1908, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP.
135 Taylor to Edwards, Aug. 6, 1903, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP; Edwards to Taft, Aug. 6, 1903, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP. As to be expected, the transfer of records was sometimes achieved without incident, especially after major hostilities had subsided; see, for example, McIntyre to Smith, Dec. 22, 1908, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP.
A second challenge was the hiring and retaining capable translators, and related thereto, readily accessing to dictionaries and grammars to facilitate translation. With so few Americans proficient in any of the languages of the Philippines, the translation of captured documents was likely very arduous. This translation relied on access to dictionaries, either on loan from the Library of Congress, Augustinian Friars in the islands, or the Philippine Constabulary’s Division of Information. Filipino records in Spanish, of course, were far more accessible to Americans, and the records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs evidence the hiring and retention of these documents’ translators.

A third challenge was the prohibitive cost of publishing the documents. With the Deficiency Act of 1905, for example, the federal government sought to limit publications “not having to do with the ordinary business transactions of the Executive Department,” and other efforts at economy rendered the compilation less of a priority. Even the modest expense of printing the compilation in galley proof did not escape the notice of the Office of Insurgent Records’ superiors.

A final challenge was neither logistical nor financial, but plainly political. This challenge was, of course, the most formidable then and most telling. As late as 1908,

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136 Edwards to Taft, May 23, 1903, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP; in this letter from Edwards notes that Taylor knows of the existence of Tagalog dictionaries among the friars, as one was found among the captured records of Emilio Aguinaldo.
137 Edwards to Wright, Jan. 9, 1904, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP; Edwards to Root, July 29, 1903, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP.
138 Bureau of Insular Affairs memo, Apr. 8, 1905, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP; Scofield to Edwards, June 21, 1906, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP; McIntyre to Fergusson, Sept. 3, 1907, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP; McIntyre memo, Oct. 7, 1907, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP.
Chief of Bureau of Insular Affairs Frank McIntyre candidly wrote to James A. LeRoy, former secretary to Dean C. Worcester and an historian of the Philippines, that “Captain Taylor’s compilation has not yet been published, and it begins to look as though it never would be.”

Controversy attended Taylor’s introductory chapter to the compilation to such a degree that Secretary of War William Howard Taft was enlisted to revise the statement, though in fact, according to Clarence Ransom Edwards, he never saw it. Taft noted that, “I am a good deal concerned in reference to the propriety of publishing at public expense a history that gives so many opinions as Taylor’s resume does, and I feel, therefore, that I must go over it with a great deal more care, in order to eliminate the expression of opinion, than under ordinary circumstances.” And Taylor seemed well aware of his political mis-steps that resulted in the compilation’s deferred publication, when he wrote to Clarence Edwards that “I have always been rather afraid that the Secretary of War would find that I had said a good deal that he did not consider expedient to publish and therefore I was not willing to print ‘The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States’ until he had gone over the galley proofs.”

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139 McIntyre to LeRoy, Mar. 13, 1908, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP.
140 Taft to McIntyre, Aug. 16, 1906, Clarence Ransom Edwards Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society (MHS). See also McIntyre to Taft, July 27, 1906, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP. As Secretary of War with a looming presidential primary campaign, however, Taft was pressed for time and revisions to Taylor’s introduction unsurprisingly languished; see Edwards to Putnam, Jan. 9, 1907, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP.
141 Taylor to Edwards, Aug. 23, 1906. Edwards Papers, MHS.
In addition to Secretary of War Taft, James A. LeRoy, W. Cameron Forbes, Luke E. Wright, and perhaps others received the proofs as well. Taft’s reservations did not necessarily mean that Taylor’s introduction was especially critical of the United States’ relations with the Philippine Revolutionary Government; LeRoy mentioned to James A. Robertson that the Taylor’s work “was even worse than I had feared, both in editing of documents and in his ‘historical’ chapters,” going so far to say that he hoped the “the result will be the postponement and entire revision.” In 1909, the compilation remained unpublished. Chief Edwards’ written request to Governor-General Luke E. Wright for permission to publish Taylor’s work provides the most complete account of the work of the Office of Insurgent Records and the reasons for the compilation’s deferred publication. This deferral may have tarnished Taylor’s reputation somewhat, even as Edwards explained that “as a trained and experienced officer, an active participant in the Spanish War and Philippine insurrection, familiar with many of the incidents and scenes to which these documents refer, and possessing a wide acquaintance with the people producing them, together with a knowledge not only of Spanish but of local dialects, his fitness for the work designed seemed assured.”

Edwards also explained some of the reasons why it made sense to publish the insurgent records presently, but not previously; he noted that it would not have been wise to publish the revolutionary papers before the United States’ benevolent

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142 McIntyre to LeRoy, Dec. 28, 1908, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP; McIntyre to Forbes, Sept. 17, 1909, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP; Edwards to Wright, Jan. 10, 1909, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP.

143 LeRoy to Robertson, Jan. 11, 1909, box 5, James A. Robertson Papers, LOC.
intentions were adequately impressed upon the native population, and that likewise, it would have been unwise to publish the papers while elections were taking place in the United States.\textsuperscript{144} This reasoning revealed political wisdom, as the compilation included precisely the kinds of government documents that Filipinos allegedly were incapable of writing. These included, of course, circulars and memoranda pertaining to the establishment of a civil government independent of the Spanish regime.

The Would-Be Government Archives of the first Philippine Republic

Though neither comprehensive nor necessarily representative, the documents of the Philippine government that Taylor and his staff compiled and translated were nevertheless the primary sources upon which Americans would have relied for information about the constitution and actions of the revolutionary government. The operative phrase here is “would have,” since Taylor’s work was unpublished until 1971. The translations were accessible to the staff of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, others in the War Department, and officials in the United States’ military and, later, civil governments in the Philippines. In the throes of war, these government officers were likely paying closest attention to the translations pertaining to the Philippine forces’ movements and guerilla strategies and taking less seriously the Philippine government’s decrees and instructions on recordkeeping. Still, mixed in with these more urgently needed documents were those that outlined why good records were needed while hostilities between United States and Philippine forces continued, and that outlined the

\textsuperscript{144} Edwards to Wright, Jan. 10, 1909, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP.
bureaucratic shape and mundane operations of the Philippine government that would be realized, once the war was won.

The Philippine documents pertaining to recordkeeping and archives are significant for a consideration of the United States colonial government’s archives for a few reasons. They indicate that recordkeeping was important for particular aspects of the war effort (supplies, political and financial support), in spite of the fact that their loss of records and their collection or seizure by Americans threatened to compromise that effort. Also, they suggested the ways that the government would look once the war was won, especially with the different departments, and this is important for understanding not only what the Filipinos were trying to achieve but also for appreciating that being able to formulate such a structure was part of the project of exhibiting capacity for self-government. Finally, they show how similar some of these departments would be structured, under Filipinos or Americans, when the Americans self-legitimating line was that they were able to bring good, modern government to the natives.

The Philippine government documents compiled and translated by Taylor relating to the care and maintenance of records may themselves be categorized. One class of them addresses the creation of records or inventorying of existing, Spanish records relating to property that would be of short- or long-term use to the government. Another class of records relate to the (demographics of) the people not directly involved in combat with Americans. A third class relates to the proper coursing of records through official government channels, speaking both to the immediate needs of the
military government and the shape of the bureaucracy once hostilities with the United States subsided. A fourth class addresses historical records directly. Taken together, these documents illustrate the varied and invariably significant roles that recordkeeping played in the Philippine government, both for the everyday business of governance and for the demonstration of native capacity for self-rule.

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Whether it was through the generation or inventorying of existing Spanish records that accounted for property at a given site, records that accounted for abandoned or seized property was important for the continuation of the Philippines’ struggle against the United States. Such records would not only suggest the monetary value of property with therefore long-term use for the Philippines government, but more importantly, they would suggest the ways that such property—whether arms and ammunition or a safe place to bunker—could be used for the immediate needs of the armed struggle. These were complemented by circulars that offered guidelines and instruction for the collection of taxes from non-combatants in support of hostilities against the United States. While the primary purpose for the uniformity of the records that accounted for property and income was to gain an accurate financial picture for the Philippine government during the way, the mandates to gather these records centrally would be helpful in the immediate aftermath of war, and would eventually constitute the core of a government’s archive.
As early as May 24, 1898, notes attributed to Emilio Aguinaldo on the establishment of the Provisional Government of the Philippines included a part that ordered that “All property hereafter seized from the enemy must be recorded or entered in an inventory made by the municipal captain and the officers of the Tribunal (members of the Municipal Board), and same shall be considered as the property of the Provisional Government of the Philippines” and, further, that “All records and documents, such as tax books, etc., shall be properly kept.”\textsuperscript{145} Later letters of instruction to military commanders and provincial presidents specified that these inventories should be made of seized rifles, and others of “the amount of money, number of animals, and other property seized from the enemy”, and “all the property left by the Spaniards, in cash as well as in kind and live stock.”\textsuperscript{146} In a document dated May 19, 1900, the importance of these inventories was underscored by the threat of death:

You, Captain Antonio and Judge Cornelio must perfectly understand what this order says; when the wealthy are Americanistas, you must seize all their money, clothing and other property belonging to them, immediately making an inventory of the property seized, and you may remain in the place where the seizure is made as long as may be necessary to make said inventory, even though a great amount is spent for maintenance.

Know furthermore, that if the soldiers take any of the property seized, they will speedily be put to death and will surely go to hell; therefore, when it becomes


necessary to enter a town to make a seizure, you must direct the soldiers not to touch the goods seized, even the most insignificant, in order to avoid consequences of this character. ¹⁴⁷

By the time of this order, the Spanish-American War had ended; the Philippine-American War had begun; and as Spaniards left the islands or pledged their allegiance (either to Spain or to the United States) and Americans were poised to establish a civil government, the treatment of people sympathetic to the United States’ project, “Americanistas,” grew severe. Such treatment—namely the seizure of “all their money, clothing, and other property belonging to them”—served not only to set an example for others of what would result from such sympathies, but just as importantly, the treatment materially aided the Philippines forces in its ongoing warring with the United States.

While the extant records of the Philippine government that were seized, compiled, and translated by the United States do not happen to contain the inventories resulting from the above order or any other, and the United States’ eventual military victory over the Philippine Republic resolved the question of what would have been the

¹⁴⁷ “Exhibit 1315, Dionisio Papa to Rufo Oyos, May 19, 1900,” in ibid., 5:625. During this period, Governor and General Leandro Fullon ordered: “1. Any meeting or assembly of a popular character, held at the instance of the Officers of the United States, for the purpose of recognizing the liberty and independence of the towns of this province, is absolutely forbidden. 2. The person arranging such meeting shall be shot at once without trial or court martial, unless forced to do so by force majeure. 3. Any Filipino filling any office in the name of the United States shall be considered a traitor to his country, and in addition to the penalties imposed by the Penal Code of Spain, provisionally in force, all his property shall be confiscated, and if this should not be possible, the authorities of the Philippine Republic shall endeavor to *** (remainder of sentence unintelligible).” “Exhibit 1293, July 11, 1900,” in ibid., 5:595. See also “Exhibit 1301, Oct. 1, 1900,” in ibid., 5:603-4.
course of that government’s military records, it is worthwhile to consider this question of “what would have.” This is a worthwhile pause, because the Philippine government’s beginning steps, as demonstrated by these orders, suggests that its later steps might have paralleled those taken by the United States. The United States’ forces did just as the Philippine forces, insofar as seizing and inventorying materials from opposing forces and non-combatants. (Indeed, Taylor’s five-volume work of compilation and translation is made possible by such seizures.) These materials presumably included more than food and clothing, and buildings that were occupied or money that was confiscated would require disposition when the war was over. As it so happened, with the United States’ military triumph, this disposition facilitated the establishment and entrenchment of the colonial government. This facilitation would be especially evident with regard to the seizure, inventorying, and disposition of land.

For the Philippine government, the inventories generated by its military forces served the immediate needs in fighting a war with the United States, but after the war—having served their primary purpose—would have been used for the sorting out of goods and property under the new republic. If these early orders of the Philippine government—first provisional and later first republic—indicate the immediate and material necessity to both seize and inventory arms, ammunition, money and animals, a parallel series of documents that appertain to the lands of the archipelago suggested officials’ foresight about the government’s needs once the hostilities with Spain and, later, the United States, subsided.
Writing to officials in Batangas on June 11, 1898, for example, Emilio Aguinaldo wrote that “Whereas this Government is still in a state of organization and all its efforts are to secure the welfare of the Philippines, I deem it wise to advise all Local Chiefs to protect all titles to estates and not to consider any claim which would seem to disturb their owners in the peaceful possession of such estate.”  

Shortly after the establishment of the Philippine Republic, on November 30, 1898, the new government decreed the introduction of instruments and procedures in transactions pertaining to land with the aim of avoiding and correcting “fraudulent transactions.” This decree placed the power of selling land to Spaniards and other foreigners in the hands of the Office of the President and ordered instruments and contracts not approved by that office “null and void.” Implicit in this decree was that the upheaval of the ongoing revolution and the goal of correcting the concentration of land and wealth in the hands of Spaniards necessitated the introduction of an entirely new system of recording land tenure and justified the annulment of land titles claimed outside of the Philippine government’s jurisdiction.

By February 27, 1899, the recently established Office of the Secretary of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce distributed “Regulations for the Adjudication of

149 “Exhibit 303, Nov. 30, 1898,” in ibid., 3:416-7. Article 1 of this decree states: “Instruments or contracts which may have as an object the creation, transfer, modification or extinction of real rights over landed property situated in the territory of the Philippine Islands, and leases of the same property, provided that the latter may prejudice a third party, must set forth in a public instrument, which shall be executed before an official of this Government empowered to certify to documents.”
Uncultivated Lands, which have not yet passed into private ownership, or cultivated lands the ownership of which it is desired to acquire.”¹⁵⁰ This document not only included a detailed listing of the requirements to acquire land; it also included several forms—which asked for the applicant’s name, profession, listing of relatives, and physical descriptions of the desired lands—that upon receipt in the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce and subsequent approval, would be filed on government record and subsequently published in the government’s official news organ. Thus, in the midst of war, the Philippine government was creating and circulating the public instruments by which it would eventually record the extent of the land of the archipelago and the demographics of its inhabitants.¹⁵¹

A series of records suggest that the formal and systematic gathering of information about the people of the Philippines was not just incidental to the registration of land. Rather, there are indications that even at the height of hostilities with Spain and the United States, the Philippine government sought to compile a reliable register of the people. Instructions to municipal and provincial officials detailed where and how births, deaths, and marriages ought to be recorded.¹⁵² Casualties of

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¹⁵⁰ “Exhibit 952, Feb. 27, 1899,” in ibid., 4:736-45. Later, the Philippine Commission’s Act No. 496, also known as the Land Registration Act, approximated the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce’s regulations.

¹⁵¹ According to a document from the Office of the Commission of Public Instruction and Communication, the civil project of public education deserved attention in the midst of war. See “Exhibit 1252, May 25, 1899,” in ibid., 5:516-8.

¹⁵² “Exhibit 36, June 20, 1898,” in ibid., 3:120. These instructions state, in part: “Rule 25. The same Commissioner [of Justice] shall keep three books; one in which he shall enter the births, in chronological order, specifying the name of the new-born, the place and day of birth, the names,
war also necessitated keeping records on people. Such recordkeeping, of course, may have been useful for developing strategy for warfare, but it was also necessary to determine the payment to the families of soldiers who had been killed and soldiers who had been wounded in the fighting. Indeed, the more comprehensive the registration of individuals, the better the government’s sense of not only the numbers of potential supporters of the cause of independence, but also the numbers of individuals subject to cedula payment that, in turn, would support the cause of independence; in this sense, getting to know the population was as crucial as successful campaigns against the United States. The Revolutionary Government’s Secretary of the Treasury, M. del Rosario, addressed this connection in a communication to the head of the province of Pangasinan in which detailed the kinds of registers that should be sent to Malolos:

I believe that it is excusable to recommend to your zeal the importance that at the present moment is involved in the adoption of the above measures: for these must form the basis of my work in a branch that must be the chief sinew of our new-born Government and of our administration; and likewise I trust in the patriotism that distinguishes you hoping that, without causing any necessity for

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surnames, and residence of the parents of the same, and lastly, the name, surname and residence of the God-father, who shall sign the entry as witness with the Chief and the aforesaid Commissioner. Rule 26. He shall keep another book in which he shall enter the deaths, giving the name, surname, profession, conjugal conditions and residence of the deceased, the names, surnames and residence of the parents of the same, and the disease and cause of death. The entry shall be signed by the Chief and the Commissioner, together with a witness who shall be a member of the family or a neighbor of the deceased. Rule 27. In the third book marriage contracts shall be entered, after conforming to the following requisites: The contracting parties shall sign a paper stating to the Chief of the town that by mutual consent they have agreed to marry, and requesting that he proceed to enter said contract in the public registry. If the contracting parties be under twenty-three years of age, their respective fathers shall subscribe the paper with them; in the absence of these, the mothers, and lacking both of these, the elder brothers, who shall have completed twenty-one years [...].”

reminders, you will secure exact compliance with this circular, with all the peremptoriness and urgency that this matter demands.\textsuperscript{154}

Thus, even as the war with the United States loomed, the Secretary of the Treasury emphasized the importance of maintaining orderly records. In this instance, Rosario made the understandable connection between such records, the administration of the new government, and appeals to the provincial officials’ patriotism to underscore his desire for their compliance. This connection—between the creation and maintenance of records and the project of nation-building—was drawn repeatedly, and with good reason. Just as the property inventories helped with the immediate needs of the military forces, and as the civil registers helped with an understanding of the population, the Philippine Republic’s departmental records kept the machinery of the new government in motion; they also marked the Philippine Republic as a bureaucracy and underscored the revolutionary forces’ claims to the capacity for self-government.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{154} “Exhibit 431, Oct. 8, 1898,” in ibid., 3:561.

\textsuperscript{155} See, for example, this portion of an unsigned draft of “Bases of a Resolution for the Regulation of Official Communications Directed to the Local Authorities,” included in Taylor’s compilation: “For the better understanding of the rulings to be issued concerning this matter it would be well to publish forms for official orders and communications which shall serve as models, such as the most enlightened powers use, and so that there be not one more ground for our enemies saying that Filipinos have no governmental aptitude; and in these models it shall be endeavored to do away with entirely the discredited Spanish method observed heretofore in treating with the disdained and unfortunate Gobernadorcillos and Municipal Captains, now Local Chiefs, it depending on the judgment of the writer, be it clear and upright or otherwise, whether the form be dignified and decorous or disrespectful and offensive, and which, if the latter, will only cause a dislike for the service and indifference on the part of the person called upon to do anything, which in turn causes controversies and divisions favorable to the enemy, that a clever government with good foresight should avoid through rules and measures that aim at attaining that cohesion of all its citizens so necessary at a time of Independence.” “Exhibit 348, [1899?],” in ibid., 3:451.
Emilio Aguinaldo’s purpose in distributing his June 27, 1898, instructions from Cavite, for example, was “to insure that in the future the conduct of administrative proceedings shall not mean the paralysis of public business, but, on the contrary, that it shall constitute the best guarantee of regularity, promptness and expedition in the execution of public service [...]”\(^{156}\) These instructions described the offices of the central government, composed of four departments: Foreign Relations, War (which was constituted by four divisions: Campaign, Military Justice, Military Administration, Medical, and Public Works), Interior, and Treasury. Per these instructions, the latter two departments—Interior and Treasury—were charged with responsibilities that had previously fallen to military officers in the field and municipal and provincial officials; the Department of the Interior became responsible for, among other things, the civil registration and the poll; and the Treasury Department became responsible for, among other things, the registration of property and cattle.\(^{157}\) Notably, when the Philippine government was ousted and the United States government installed, the new regime


\(^{157}\) A more detailed description of the charge of the Department of the Treasury was offered later that summer. See “Exhibit 124, Aug. 11, 1898,” in ibid., 3:211-12. Per a statement issued on September 26, 1898, the departments of Fomento and Justice were added to the central government, and administrative responsibilities somewhat redistributed. See “Exhibit 261, Sept. 26, 1898,” in ibid., 3:368-70. At a later date, the Department of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce was charged with the regulation of “proprietary rights of manufacturing and commercial marks,” which, under the Americans, would fall to the Division of Archives, Copyrights and Trademarks. See “Exhibit 509, Jan. 20, 1899,” in ibid., 3:666-67.
was structured similarly and the responsibilities of the departments of the Interior and Treasury roughly approximated those outlined by Aguinaldo.

The revolutionary government’s recordkeeping did not entirely depart from the systems established by the Spanish colonial government, as it was impracticable to institute entirely new systems. The Philippine notarial law of 1898 drew upon several articles of the Spanish notarial law of 1889, and even allowed for the notarization of public instruments on paper of the Spanish government. This allowance reflects the vagaries of war more than an affinity for Spanish colonial governance. At around this same time, the revolutionary government provided directions for the inspection of local authorities and their maintenance of records in their charge; of course, these inspections, in turn, were documented in reports to be submitted to the central office.

In addition to outlining the rather involved protocol for official transactions, the June 27, 1898, instructions explicitly note that “The officials in charge shall take care of the records of their respective divisions, arranging cases which are closed in numbered

\[159\] Inspectors were sent to “carefully examine the papers and books kept in each presidente’s office and see if they conform to the requirements of our decrees, and especially in the case of the account books; compare also very carefully the receipts with the expenditures and if you should not any defalcation of malversation or other illegal acts, you will institute the proper proceedings and suspend the guilty persons, appointing temporary substitutes for them and calling new election for officials who are to take the places of the defaulters, without prejudice to the instructions requested of this Department [of the Interior].” “Exhibit 470, Nov. 23, 1898,” in ibid., 3:614-5. The guidelines for the inspection reports were included in several documents: “Exhibit 471, [Nov. 23, 1898?],” in ibid., 3:615-17; “Exhibit 474, Dec. 20, 1898,” in ibid., 3:620-21; “Exhibit 475, [Dec. 1898],” in ibid., 3:621-22.
packages. The provincial and popular archives shall be in charge of the respective Chiefs, assisted by suitable personnel.”\textsuperscript{160} Thus, two weeks after the Philippines’ declaration of independence, the instructions for the creation of government archives were folded into the general orders to establish the central government’s constituent departments. In fact, several of the documents that United States forces seized, compiled, and translated address the matter of historical documents.

When the Department of Fomento was established, its responsibilities were divided among three directors—one of public instruction, the second of public works, and the third of agriculture and industry. The director of public instruction was charged with the regulation of “the institutions of primary and secondary instructions, universities, archives and libraries, fine arts and special schools, geographical and statistical institute.”\textsuperscript{161} As the administrative structure of the Philippine government grew to include seven departments—Foreign Affairs, Interior, Treasury, War and Navy, Public Instruction, Communications and Public Works, and Agriculture, Industry and

\textsuperscript{160} “Exhibit 47, June 27, 1898,” in ibid., 3:148. The rather involved protocol required: “The assistants in the bureaus shall draw up a record of each case, to which they will add the documents which may be necessary, requesting these of the interested parties or of the other offices, through official letters, which the directors or provincial and popular chiefs shall sign. When all the data and necessary documents are attached to the record, the assistant shall make an abstract, specifying clearly the object of the business and the evidence which appears pro and con in the same. With this abstract it shall be forwarded to the official in charge, who will countersign it, or append a memorandum of the changes and observations which he may make, and at the end state his opinion upon the decision to be adopted, forwarding the record at once to the director. The latter shall examine the record and confer with the Secretary so as to prepare the decision in the form of a decree or order, which the latter shall submit for the approval and signature of the President of the Government, if no prior consultation with Congress be necessary. The provincial and popular offices shall observe similar formalities.”

\textsuperscript{161} “Exhibit 508, Nov. 29, 1898,” in ibid., 3:664.
Commerce—the regulation of archives was removed from the specific charge of the director of public instruction; instead, each department was ordered to maintain on staff “an archivist who shall have charge of the organization and management of the archives.”¹⁶² Thus, as the government planned for growth, the maintenance and final disposition of the government’s records were no longer centralized, but the responsibility of each department of the new administration. One division in the Bureau of the General Staff of the Army was charged with “daily accounts of operations and compilation of the history of the army and of its Official Bulletin.”¹⁶³

There is a peculiar irony to examining the documents of Taylor’s posthumously published compilation to trace the history of an archive, or in the case of Philippine revolutionary government, the would-be archive of that government. The translations were to aid the American war in the islands—most obviously by knowing the movements and locations of the revolutionary forces, but also understanding the personalities, the rhetoric, and the alliances of forces. In some ways, it was clear what

¹⁶² “Exhibit 655, May 8, 1899,” in ibid., 4:98. The maintenance of archives within government departments may have been the practice in some departments, before it was mandated for all departments; a memorandum to the Secretary of the Interior, dated March 17, 1899, indicates the one of the special powers of the department was “To order that in this officer there be kept a registry book wherein entry shall be made of all papers that come in and go out of the same; and that an archive be formed of all the papers (expedients) relating to questions finally settled.” “Exhibit 792, Mar. 17, 1899,” in ibid., 4:517. The reasoning that prompted this decentralization may be gleaned from documents the detail the extensive and complicated nature of the records each department was charged to generate. See, for example, the instructions and reports from the Bureau of Information within the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Treasury Department: “Exhibit 732, July 26, 1899,” in ibid., 4:231-32; and “Exhibit 751, Feb. 12, 1899,” in ibid., 4:305-8.

was being squelched—one needs only look at the lofty language of liberation, slavery, imperialism, and honor to understand the appeals to the general populations’ sense of national becoming. What was also squelched was the creation of a government bureaucracy, and more importantly, a different way to manage the disposition of land.

Conclusion

The creation and maintenance of archives was an important element of the United States’ war in the Philippines. Though the core of the archives was acquired per the Treaty of Paris that ended the Spanish-American War, the so-called Philippine Insurgent Papers—in terms of Captain John R.M. Taylor’s work to compile and translate documents of the first Philippine Republic as well as the content of those documents—suggest that when the United States and Philippines were at war, archives and recordkeeping were not simply matters to consider after one side triumphed. They were matters of consequence as the fighting raged on.

When Taylor’s work was finally published in 1971, Renato Constantino introduced the compilation with the observation that “There is no source, no matter how biased, that does not yield a bit of historical truth.” When considering Taylor’s work and The Philippine Insurrection against the United States, “a bit of historical truth” about the relationship between archives and war emerges: The exigencies of war—that is, the conditions that prompted the seizure, compilation, and translation of the revolutionary government’s documents—provide a glimpse into how the leadership of

\[164\] Constantino, introduction to The Philippine Insurrection against the United States, ix.
that revolutionary government envisioned the role of archives in an independent Philippine Republic. The United States suppression of the Philippine documents that articulated that vision created a conspicuous kind of informational vacuum about conditions in the archipelago. Thus, where Philippine government documents that illustrated the role of archives and that demonstrated capacity for self-rule would have circulated to make an argument against annexation and occupation of the islands, there were instead the records of more, other Americans. The records that filled this informational vacuum are the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER 3
ARCHIVES AND ANTI-IMPERIALISM

“Dear Uncle Moorfield: You asked me to keep my mind open and come out here and see things for myself as they really are. This I have tried to do, but I must own up to having spent a great many hours a day reading the official records, and yet it is hard to read the reports of the work done here by the Commission and the Chiefs of the Departments and not be impressed with the earnestness with which they have undertaken the great and difficult task imposed upon them, and the success which has attended some very important and material parts of their effort.”

--W. Cameron Forbes to Moorfield Storey, January 3, 1905

Introduction

If the Civil War pitted brother against brother, the Philippine-American War and the establishment of the United States colonial government in the islands pitted, as the epigraph indicates, uncle against nephew. In 1905, W. Cameron Forbes arrived in the Philippines as head of the Department of Commerce and Police and thus, also as a Philippine Commissioner; that same year, Forbes’ uncle Moorfield Storey, would become president of the Anti-Imperialist League. Over the course of his career as Philippine Commissioner and later Governor-General of the Philippines, Forbes consulted volumes of official government records and saw to the production of voluminous records, especially with regard to the construction of railroads in the islands. Moorfield Storey, as president of the Anti-Imperialist League for more than fifteen years, was the leader of an organization most prolific in its critique of the United States’ actions in the Philippines. They stood firmly on opposing sides: Forbes convinced of the

165 Forbes to Storey, Jan. 3, 1905, Moorfield Storey Papers, LOC.
considerable good that the United States was doing in the islands, and Storey certain that the American course was a flawed one.

Taking a long view of the effects of imperialist policy, of course, was not only cause for disagreement and sounding of alarms; the United States’ policy in the Philippines influenced partisan politics. The presidential election of 1900, for example, prompted Carl Schurz to note that McKinley’s policy in the Philippines was “bound to bring upon this republic evils infinitely more disgraceful and disastrous in their effects than anything that has been predicted as likely to result from McKinley’s defeat.” It prompted others to appeal for the continued work of the Anti-Imperialist League and the independent efforts of its members. And throughout the first years of the twentieth century, especially when it was unclear whether Taft would stay to govern the Philippines or return to the United States, the course of action in the islands seemed even more volatile. Understanding this variety of opinion requires an appreciation of not only the national and international political concerns of that period, but also the tradition of protest with which a particular group of “anti-imperialists” were aligned.

166 Schurz to Adams, Oct. 25, 1900, Charles Francis Adams II Papers, MHS. Schurz wrote more specifically: “I have laboriously and carefully studied what has happened in all its details and bearings, and that study has profoundly convinced me that the story of our “criminal aggression” upon the Philippines is a story of deceit, false presence, brutal treachery to friends, unconstitutional assumption of power, downright betrayal of the fundamental principles of our democracy, wanton sacrifice of our soldiers in a wicked war, cruel slaughter of tens of thousands of innocent people, and that of horrible blood,—guiltless, without parallel in the history of republics; and that such a policy is bound to bring upon this republic evils infinitely more disgraceful and disastrous in their effects than anything that has been predicted as likely to result from Mr. McKinley’s defeat.”

167 Ingalsbe to Atkinson, Oct. 10, 1900, Edward Atkinson Papers, MHS; Atkinson to Osborne, July 3, 1900, Atkinson Papers, MHS; White to Adams, Apr. 26, 1906, Adams Papers, MHS.
Moreover, while the lofty question—of whether to build an empire or maintain a republic—was one that animated debate about whether the war was just, the pedestrian question of how to manage abrasive or conflicting personalities also factored into discussions about the United States and the Philippines. In short, what came to be known as the anti-imperialist movement was complex. This complexity and conflict resulted in the generation of an enormous body of material, a counter-balance to that generated by the United States government in time of war.

The conditions that characterized and circumscribed the creation of documentation about the United States’ war in the Philippines succeeded in defining the terms of the recorded debate, but they did not stem the voluminous production. This chapter considers one example of the Philippine-American War’s unofficial archive, namely the testimonies and books, the pamphlets and editorials, of the Anti-Imperialist League and others opposed to the United States’ course in the Philippines. This body of material may be recast in the light of anti-imperialists’ self-conscious recording of an alternative record on war atrocities in the Philippines.
National Issues

“I do not mean to underestimate the villainy of Spanish administration, but it is only within your memory and mine that we became virtuous [and abolished slavery], and even yet—judging from what the papers have been recently reporting about the lynching and burning of negroes—have not even now become thoroughly accustomed to being virtuous.”

--Charles Parkhurst, 1898

Though the question of how the United States ought to manage its relationship with the Philippines attracted considerable attention in the first decades of the twentieth century, other issues—pertaining to labor disputes, race relations, civil service reform, currency, and free trade—also demanded the attention of Americans.

Members of the Anti-Imperialist League had different motivations for joining. Though they could agree to protest the United States’ occupation of the Philippines, their views differed on other subjects; unsurprisingly, such a composition gave rise to conflicts within the movement, as well as garnered the vocal disdain of the movement’s opponents.

Reverend Charles Parkhurst cites the United States’ only very recent abolition of slavery and the subsequent rise of lynching to suggest that the United States was not


169 William Howard Taft wrote that “The shrieks, for I think they can be criticized as nothing less, of the anti-imperialists in the last campaign, in light of the result, are likely to become part of the humor of American politics.” Taft to Hollister, Dec. 1, 1900, reel 31, Taft Papers, LOC. Regarding anti-imperialists and civil service reform, see Taft to Foulke, May 18, 1901, reel 32, Taft Papers, LOC. Erving Winslow’s conviction, early stated, that the Anti-Imperialist League be a single-issue organization seems to have won the day, Winslow to Atkinson, June 23, 1898, Atkinson Papers, MHS.
necessarily well-equipped to annex and occupy the Philippines. There are at least two ways—by discussing virtue and lynching—that Parkhurst is helpful for understanding the relationship, in general, between archives and war in the Philippines and, more specifically, between national issues and the generation of an alternate, anti-imperialist archive. For one, Parkhurst’s questioning of whether the United States has virtue enough to justify taking the place of the Spanish colonial administration in the Philippines, given the United States’ historical and current treatment of African Americans, makes use of the notion of progress. Whereas the more frequently posed question of that moment was: Have natives in the Philippines progressed enough to govern themselves? Parkhurst’s statement suggests the question: Have Americans progressed enough to govern others? In short, he used the logical frame used to justify the United States’ occupation of the Philippines to present an argument against the United States’ course of action in the islands.

In so doing, Parkhurst used the analytical tools available to him—or at the very least, those with a considerable amount of currency in the fervor of war—to make a counterpoint; if this sermon shows how such a rhetorical move may be made with the notion of hard-won, slow-to-realize virtue, it also shows how recent domestic events could be harnessed to critique foreign policy. In 1898, when Parkhurst delivered his sermon, lynching the United States was regular and widespread, demonstrative of a national, state-condoned (if not state-sponsored) method to maintain a particular racial hierarchy. Whereas the terror of lynching worked to uphold white supremacy over
African Americans, and by extension—one was to suppose—to non-whites all over the
globe, Parkhurst’s flip on the notion of virtue allows for an argument that the epidemic
of lynching was precisely the reason the United States ought not to get involved in the
Philippines.

That Parkhurst’s example was lynching is notable, given the “red record” that
was absent from the mainstream press. By 1899, Ida B. Wells had been working for
years to identify and make a case for the fact that lynching was a national problem; she
had taken two speaking tours through England, Scotland, and Wales to discuss the
problem of lynching in the United States; she had also published two influential
pamphlets, *Southern Horrors: Lynch Law in All Its Phases* and *A Red Record*, that
compiled information about and detailed instances of lynching in the United States.

Wells’ project to aggregate information published in newspapers—white, mainstream,
and therefore, indisputable—named a national crisis, creating a record of great
import.\(^{170}\) The alternative archive that was Wells’ serial investigation of lynching in the

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Goldsby, *A Spectacular Secret: Lynching in American Life and Literature* (Chicago: University of
Imperialist League used this same model in its pamphlet “Marked Severities.” Sending a copy to
a colleague, Charles Francis Adams noted that every fact “was carefully verified from official
documents. Tortures was of every day occurrence; ravishing, not infrequent;—murders too
common to specify.” Adams to Hull, Jan. 10, 1906, Adams Papers, MHS. Revolutionary forces in
the Philippines were mindful of the connection between the United States’ war in the
Philippines and the treatment of blacks in the United States. A poster, printed in English and
seized by United States forces, stated: “To the coloured American soldiers: It is without honour
nor profit that you are spilling your costly blood. Your masters have thrown you to the most
inicuous fight with double purposes. In order to be you the instrument of their ambition. Your
friends the Philipinos give you this good warning. You must consider your situation and your
United States provided both a model—using the sources or terms in ready circulation—and the content—the continued, indeed increasing, violence against African Americans—for Parkhurst’s argument about the misguided United States policy in the Philippines. In addition to the publication (upon request) of Parkhurst’s sermon, publications critical of the annexation of the Philippines and the American war in the islands were sometimes targeted to segments of the United States population that, for one reason or another were believed to be amenable to an anti-imperialist perspective.\(^1\) In other words, domestic politics could be harnessed and reframed to make compelling points about the United States’ occupation of the Philippines.

Aspects of past domestic political issues also informed the thinking of anti-imperialist organizers. Carl Schurz relished being regarded as a crank, having “heard it so often—in connection with the anti-slavery movement, the civil service reform movement and other things—that I am rather used to it. It may be very fierce sometimes, but it always wears off if the cause provoking it is a good one.”\(^2\) Atkinson suggested that the nascent moral indignation of war atrocities in the Philippines would overcome “the spirit of greed, of war,” even as people were not united on the course of action the United States ought to take in the islands, recalling that “we were not united

\(^1\) Minutes of the Executive Committee of the New England Anti-Imperialist League, Dec. 24, 1902, vol. 2, Erving Winslow Papers, Special Collections Library, University of Michigan (Michigan); Atkinson to Taussig, Apr. 11, 1899, Atkinson Papers, MHS.

\(^2\) Schurz to Adams, Feb. 8, 1903, Adams Papers, MHS.
against slavery but slavery went down."\textsuperscript{173} Hoar, by contrast, believed that moral indignation over the United States’ occupation of the Philippines was the same as that over slavery; whereas every defeat of abolitionists still did its part to weaken the institution of slavery, every defeat of anti-imperialists could not be counted as a victory. He noted that “if we get a government there in the hands of a set of ambitious and money-making officials and a system established there able to affect the Filipinos by patronage and jobs and corrupt methods, every year we shall be getting deeper and deeper into the mire.” In fact, Hoar suggested the strategy of “counting up to the American people their mistakes in the past,” namely the United States’ treatment of African Americans, Native Americans and Hawaiians.\textsuperscript{174} Though their evaluations of the similarities and differences between these situations and that in the Philippines varied, these past movements were the regular referents.

Whereas Charles Parkhurst questioned the wisdom of embarking on a colonial project in the Philippines when considering the condition of race relations in the United States, others argued against United States expansion by appealing to the turbulence of class relations. In Republic or Empire? The Philippine Question (1899), President of the American Federation of Labor Samuel Gompers and tycoon Andrew Carnegie both contributed essays that critiqued United States overseas expansion. Gompers

\textsuperscript{173} Atkinson to Mason, May 1, 1902, Atkinson Papers, MHS. See also, Atkinson to Gilman, Nov. 7, 1898, for Atkinson’s economic argument against slavery as it related to the annexation of Texas, Atkinson Papers, MHS.
\textsuperscript{174} Hoar to Atkinson, Nov. 21, 1899, Atkinson Papers, MHS; Hoar to Adams, Nov. 29, 1898, Adams Papers, MHS.
questioned how Americans could reasonably expect its representatives in the
Philippines to treat natives with due respect, when American workers were mercilessly
murdered in the United States. Andrew Carnegie suggested that the “dread of war”
made investors nervous and served to stalemate economic growth. Others less
prominent in national labor disputes also weighed in on the United States policy, finding
that it would be detrimental to working people in the United States. If the
abolitionist movement was the movement of the past, the burgeoning labor union
movement was that of the present. Charles Francis Adams had fought in the Civil War,
and his experience in battle compelled him to lead a group of men to conduct an
investigation of the alleged atrocities in the Philippines. Writing that he was “now
expiating some of my own weaknesses and shortcomings of forty years ago,” Adams
figured that the strategy to “persistently thrust their own record into the Army’s face”

innocent men can be shot down on the public highway as they were in Lattimer, PA, and Virden, Ill., men of our own flesh and blood, men who help to make this homogenous nation great,
because they dare to ask for more humane conditions at the hands of the moneyed class of our
country, how much more difficult will it be to arouse any sympathy, and secure relief for the
poor semi-savages in the Philippines, must less indignation at any crime against their inherent
and natural rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” (211).
176 Andrew Carnegie, “Should the United States Expand?,” in Republic or Empire? The Philippine Question, 89-99. Carnegie observed: “The entrance of the United States into the zone of
constant dread of war is even more to be feared than the danger of actual war itself, except so
far as the latter involve direct sacrifice of human life. On the other hand, lack of steady
employment through seasons of panic caused by alarm of war also claims its victims, sometimes
in the course of years even exceeding in number those who fall in battle. There can be no
genuine prosperity in a country which is kept in constant apprehension of war,” 96-97.
177 John Daniel, “The Effect of Annexation of the Philippines on American Labor,” in Republic or Empire? The Philippine Question, 367-425; Anti-Imperialist League, Philippine Independence:
shamed them, and “That fact of shame,—the constant denial, the attempts at suppression, the brazen extenuations,—is the most hopeful feature in the situation. It forecasts improvement.” Adams’s conviction that men would act when the shamefulness of their conduct was brought to light was itself animated by his experience in war and making amends for his own conduct during the Civil War.\(^{178}\)

As many Americans at the time would, Charles Francis Adams understood the Philippine-American War through the lens of the American Civil War—through which Adams not only lived, but also fought. Whereas he found the salvation of the United States in a “veil of oblivion” that covered the past of the Confederacy’s secession, he found, too, the salvation of United States-Philippine relations in President Roosevelt’s proclamation of amnesty and the war’s end.\(^{179}\)

While Adams believed that sending the memory of war into “oblivion” was an important phase in peace-making efforts, he also believed that eagerness to do so ought to be tempered by an honest recognition of what had happened in war.\(^{180}\) There were at least two reasons for this, at once practical and ideological. The reconstruction of the Philippines under American rule could not be effectively administered without the recognition of the war’s atrocities, necessary for understanding native discontent.

Second, the atrocities of the United States military needed to be recognized—for the

\(^{178}\) Adams to Lodge, Sept. 30, 1902, Adams Papers, MHS.

\(^{179}\) Adams to Schurman, Aug. 4, 1902, Adams Papers, MHS. In this letter, Adams assessed Roosevelt’s proclamation of amnesty “was and statesmanlike.” For more on Adams’s positive view of Roosevelt’s proclamation, see also Adams to Welsh, Aug. 4, 1902, Adams Papers, MHS.

maintenance of national character, to indicate that Americans’ intentions were indeed benevolent. In fact, Adams’s conviction that an American ought to be sent to the Philippines to investigate conditions was informed by his assessment of Reconstruction in the United States.181

When speaking before the Senate in opposition to the Organic Act in 1902, after revelations about the United States’ military forces war atrocities in the Philippines had rocked the United States, Massachusetts Senator George Frisbie Hoar compared the wanton violence in the islands to acceptable violence in the United States. If the United States government had the right to begin a war and torture natives in the Philippines, just as it had the right to do so “at home,” then he had the same right to question the government’s conduct: “I have the same right as an American citizen or an American Senator to discuss the conduct of any military officer in the Philippine Islands that I have to discuss the conduct of a marshall or a constable or a captain in Pittsburg or in Cleveland if there were a labor riot there.”182 The violence of labor disputes in the

181 “You unquestionably hold fresh in memory the disastrous results of the experiment at ‘reconstruction’ we attempted in the case of the Confederate States during the administration of Andrew Jackson. We must all be anxious that there should be no repetition of the experience in the case of the Philippines; and the only way, we believe, to avoid a repetition is to proceed in some well-considered way, on a basis of real knowledge of conditions in the Archipelago.” Adams to Cooper, June 28, 1902, Adams Papers, MHS. On national character, see Adams to Norton, Apr. 15, 1902, box 1, Herbert Welsh Papers, Michigan; on military accountability, see Adams to Welsh, July 10, 1902, box 1, Welsh Papers, Michigan; Adams to Willis, Aug. 16, 1902, Adams Papers, MHS; Adams to Willis, Oct. 30, 1902, Adams Papers, MHS.

182 George Frisbie Hoar, Speech of Honorable George Frisbie Hoar, of Massachusetts, in the Senate of the United States, May 22, 1902 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902), 3. Citing fellow senators, Hoar continued his critique: “I see that my enthusiastic friend from North Carolina seeks to break the force of these revelations [of torture] by saying that they are only what some Americans are wont to do at home. It is benevolent assimilation all over again. It is
United States, understood alongside war atrocities in the Philippines, of course, indicated the extent of Hoar’s critique of draconian efforts to suppress social and political movements; it provided, too, a way for people in the United States to grasp what was happening in the Philippines. This way of framing the conditions in the islands—with reference to domestic violence—would endure throughout the early years of the American occupation in the Philippines.

In this light, the United States occupation of the Philippines was sometimes justified by its supporters in political or economic terms, and the protest to it was grounded in moral terms. Yet, the urgency and force of a moral argument depended upon the economic climate. Andrew Carnegie agreed, writing that “Our revenue are great and the masses are prosperous at present, therefore the huge expenditures of the government are not criticized. Wait till the wheel turns and we enter upon a period of depression, then every dollar taken will cause protest.”183 In any event, Adams’ analysis of the situation in 1903 serves as a reminder of the widespread labor disputes and lynching of African-Americans; Adams believed that economic prosperity could quiet

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183 Carnegie to Adams, Feb. 5, 1901, Adams Papers, MHS.
critique of such domestic violence, and that it could quiet critique of violence in the faraway Philippines.\textsuperscript{184}

While Parkhurst, Gompers, Carnegie and others judged the American war in the Philippines harshly, with a regretful eye to the Civil War, Charles Morris argued that, at the very least, the Spanish-American War had the fortuitous effects of both “removing the shreds of ill feeling remaining between North and South” and arousing “a strong sentiment of affinity between the Anglo-Saxon peoples of the earth.”\textsuperscript{185} If this was the case, the weight of the dispatches of American war correspondents in the Philippines and the speeches and writings of colonial officials amounted to an even more considerable body of work against which anti-imperialist arguments were posited. In

\textsuperscript{184} Adams wrote: “So far as politics and the development of results in this country are concerned, I am well satisfied no amount of work on our part would accomplish much under existing conditions. The country is thoroughly apathetic. It is prosperous, growing rapidly, making money fast. Under these circumstances, it does not wish to bother itself over moral, or other, questions, and it gives languid ear to those who insist upon bothering it. A clear and striking case in point is that of these labor troubles, and this tendency to lynching. Both are regarded in an apathetic sort of way, as if the general consciousness was that, somehow or other, they would in good time cure themselves.” Adams to Welsh, July 21, 1903, box 1, Welsh Papers, Michigan. See also Adams to Carnegie, Feb. 10, 1903, Adams Papers, MHS. With regard to moral imperatives, David Starr Jordan provided an interesting counterpoint several years earlier: “If it were possible to exterminate the Filipinos as we have destroyed the Indians, replacing their institutions and their people by ours, the political objections to annexation would, in the main, disappear whatever might be said of the moral ones. For our treatment of the Indians, there is, in general, no moral justification. There is a good political excuse in this—that we could and did use their land in a better way than was possible to them. We have no such excuse in Luzon; we cannot use the land except as we can use the lives of the people.” David Starr Jordan, The Question of the Philippines (Palo Alto, CA: Graduate Club, 1899), 26.

\textsuperscript{185} Charles Morris, The War with Spain (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1899), 383. Charles Francis Adams had his doubt about the unifying work of war: “Every nation which has undertaken to colonize in Asia, or the tropics, has had first to shot-gun the inferior race into submission, then flog them into obedience. I fancy we have a somewhat similar experience before us; and when confronted with that experience, I imagine our people may revise conclusions they are now quick to reach.” Adams to Hoar, Dec. 20, 1898, George Frisbie Hoar Papers, MHS.
the light that Morris cast, anti-imperialists were opposed to a war that reunited a divided nation.

The Anti-Imperialist League

While many of the figures in the anti-imperialist movement would remain the same throughout the beginning of the twentieth century, their approaches to organizing against United States policy in the Philippines differed in light of the official conclusion of the Philippine-American War and the efforts to pass the Jones Act.

After the passage of the Jones Act on August 29, 1916, the role of the Anti-Imperialist League was evermore unclear. In letters to Erving Winslow, Moorfield Storey expressed surprised at the league’s influence and seemed to wonder if it should not fall quietly out of existence. As World War I raged in Europe, participants in and supporters of the Anti-Imperialist League held varied opinions of how the organization ought to proceed. Some believed that the group ought to refrain from its usual outspoken critiques of the United States government, at least while “in the present of so much vaster matters and dangers and sacrifices.” In addition to echoing the view that the United States government had larger issues with which to deal, Moorfield Storey

187 Clement to Winslow, Aug. 11, 1917, box 1, Winslow Papers, Michigan. Clement continued: “Persevere we must, on all proper occasions, in insisting on independence for the Philippines,—which indeed, thanks to the faithful and sagacious and gracious support of President Wilson, we have written in solemn words into laws enacted by Congress. But pertinacity in pressing our special and particular purpose with the country embarking on a new departure perfectly stupendous in its implications, as to our committals in world politics, amounts, under the circumstances, to what our enemies would call, impertinence!”
doubted the wisdom of further actions during the war on account of the possibility of the group “irritating the very persons whom we wish to conciliate” and the uncertainty of how further action of the Anti-Imperialist League would actually be of service to the Philippines at a moment of global upheaval. Others suggested that the scope of the Anti-Imperialist League should broaden to address the United States’ “imperialist doings” in other parts of the world.

Unsurprisingly, conflicts were not limited to those between supporters of the United States’ policy in the Philippines and “antis,” and did not only arise after 1916. Within what was known as a rather monolithic anti-imperialist movement, conflicts arose. These conflicts appear to have as much to do with political strategy as personal differences. Very shortly after the formation of the Anti-Imperialist League, one of its most formidable and influential allies Senator George Frisbie Hoar of Massachusetts, wrote that several of the men involved with the anti-imperialist movement (Edward Atkinson, Charles Francis Adams, and Carl Schurz) had “been opposed to nearly everything the American people have believed in and have done in for the last twenty years—however much they may be in the right now—and are not likely to lead a movement of this kind to success.” Lovering regarded Edward Atkinson as “just the

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188 Storey to Winslow, Mar. 14, 1918, box 1, Winslow Papers, Michigan. See also Perry to Winslow, Apr. 9, 1918, box 1, Winslow Papers, Michigan.
189 Minutes of the Executive Committee of the Anti-Imperialist League, Jan. 3, 1918, vol. 5, Winslow Papers, Michigan; Jordan to Winslow, July 21, 1917, Erving Winslow Papers, MHS.
190 Hoar to Storey, Mar. 6, 1899, Storey Papers, LOC. Hoar continued: “The masses of the people, of both parties, think it is very strong evidence that a proposition is wrong when such gentlemen believe in it. I have myself pitched into them a good deal, and at the same time have had a very
man who in a storm would be likely to interfere with the helmsman.”

Politically hostile to anti-imperialists, W. Cameron Forbes wrote in his journals that, “Dougherty, the Chicago Anti-Imperialist is here, another wild-eyed fanatic who is, however, saner than Fiske Warren, but by no means sane. He came to see me one day and told me that Fiske had issued an Anti-Imperialist leaflet calling for my resignation. I am rather proud of that. If he'd been satisfied with my work and character I should have begun to feel uneasy.”

James LeRoy, who worked as Dean Worcester’s secretary but nevertheless counted himself among those “who do not believe in a colonial policy for our country,” kindly side toward them, as I had toward the old Garrison abolitionists in their day. But their utterances seem not like those of a man desires to make converts or to accomplish results, but when they have borne their own testimony against what they think wrong, they seem not only contented to remain in the minority, but rather to like and prefer it.”

191 Lovering to Adams, May 19, 1899, Adams Papers, MHS. What Lovering confided to Adams, Hoar wrote directly to Atkinson: “You are a good man and I like you, and the hard things that I have ever had occasion to say about you I have always said to you and have stood up for you pretty stoutly in many companies of your critics. But you are wrong from the top of your head to the sole of your foot, not in principle, still less in purpose, but in your utter incapacity to understand the point of you of other men and your inability to see that men who are looking at the other side of the shield may be as honest, as desirous for the public good and often quite as intelligent as yourself.” Hoar to Atkinson, Jan. 21, 1901, Atkinson Papers, MHS.

192 W. Cameron Forbes journal, June 10, 1906, W. Cameron Forbes Journals, MHS. Forbes’ opposition to anti-imperialist impulses in the United States is well-documented in his journals; see, for example: “I wonder if the fool-killer has gone out of business in the United States. Every one he has spared seems to have a new plan of disposing of the Philippines, each one sillier than the last; and the wild-eyed enthusiasts seem to suggest many alternatives, always ignoring the sane and simple one, so easily to hand, of sitting tight and doing nothing but what we are doing. That very reasonable solution seems to have escaped nine-tenths of those whose views penetrate the cables and reach us.” Forbes journal, Sept. 28, 1907, Forbes Journals, MHS; and “The only things on my desk to be taken up are the paper relating to representation by Irving Winslow and the Anti-Imperialist League that I take to be libellous on me and that I may go after in the courts at home if I have a good show of winning, as I want to punish one or two scoundrels [...].” Forbes journal, July 23, 1911, Forbes Journals, MHS.
too, was critical of New England anti-imperialists. Even George Frisbie Hoar, sympathetic to the Anti-Imperialist League, was critical of the most active men in the Anti-Imperialist League; he conceded to fellow Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge that “The cause of anti-imperialism, as it is termed, has been so managed that Bryan has made it odious to the West, and its managers in Boston have made it ridiculous in the East.”

193 LeRoy to Garrison, Jan. 19, 1904, letterbook, James Alfred LeRoy Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan (BHL); for other expressions of LeRoy’s opposition to United States colonial policy and aversion to anti-imperialists, see LeRoy to Doherty, Dec. 21, 19004, letterbook, LeRoy Papers, BHL; Leroy to Park, Sept. 15, 1904, letterbook, LeRoy Papers, BHL.

194 Hoar to Lodge, Oct. 10, 1903, Henry Cabot Lodge Papers, MHS. Hoar’s view is made further apparent in his letters to former Massachusetts Governor George S. Boutwell. Shortly after the conclusion of the Spanish-American War, he wrote: “We have been somewhat unfortunate in the fact that the gentlemen who have come to the front in the matter of opposing the treaty or acquisition of foreign territory are men who have been, in the judgment of the people, in the wrong almost always in the past, and are regarded not only as unsafe, but as very absurd leaders.” Hoar to Boutwell, Dec. 31, 1898, Hoar Papers, MHS; and reflecting back on the re-election of McKinley, which Hoar had supposed, he wrote: “President Harrison, Mr. Reed, Senator Edmunds, President Schurman, President Eliot, President Hadley and hosts of other men eminent for integrity, ability and large public influence took the same position that I did. If it had been taken by all the Anti-Imperialists we should have defeated Imperialism, and the position of the little company in Boston would not have injured—as it did—the cause of Anti-Imperialism by making it utterly ridiculous.” Hoar to Boutwell, July 20, 1904, Hoar Papers, MHS. Writing to Adams about the matter or torture in the Philippines, Hoar managed to include an assessment of Moorfield Storey: “He is an able la: Indeed the nature of the war has been such as to make that inevitable. A weak is an able lawyer, and has great capacity for public usefulness. But he seems to me to be a monomaniac on political questions. When I talk with him and any political matter about which he is deeply interested comes up, his countenance changes and a look comes over it which I have frequently seen come over the countenance of a man, otherwise sane, but has insane delusions. He seems to be absolutely incapable of believing that a man can differ from him without being a scoundrel. [...] The result of this trait in Storey is that his very able arguments on public questions lose much of their weight from the fact that they are published under his name. It is very unfortunate for the man, and unfortunate for the public when the people are prejudiced against good and strong arguments because of their dislike of the mental quality of the author.” Hoar to Adams, Sept. 29, 1902, Hoar Papers, MHS.
Erving Winslow, one of the most visible and active leaders of the Anti-Imperialist League, managed to raise the rankle of not only his enemies but also his closest allies. Manuel Quezon explained to H. Parker Willis that “it is a pity that we should be handicapped by such a man who does not seem to have any conception of practical politics.” By 1919, Quezon had decided to stop corresponding with Winslow, as the latter challenged Quezon’s and Osmeña’s dedication to the cause of Philippine independence; writing to Moorfield Storey, Quezon hoped that breaking with Winslow would not also damage his relationship with the Anti-Imperialist League.

One of the critiques of the work of the Anti-Imperialist League, the entity central and most readily identified with the anti-imperialist movement in the United States, was its exclusive use of “genteel” approaches to agitating against the United States’ policy in the Philippines. Certainly one of the results of the Anti-Imperialist League’s approach

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195 Quezon to Willis, Aug. 7, 1914, reel 5, Manuel Luis Quezon Papers, BHL; see also Aug. 19, 1914, reel 5, Quezon Papers, BHL. Though Quezon and Winslow frequently disagreed (Quezon to Winslow, Aug. 7, 1914, Aug. 17, 1914, Sept. 16, 1914, Oct. 3, 1914; Winslow to Quezon, Aug. 15, 1914, Sept. 17, 1914) about United States-Philippine politics, they did maintain regular correspondence throughout the efforts to pass the Jones Bill. In 1916, Quezon graciously thanked Winslow, despite the latter’s many, animated criticisms: “I wish to renew the expressions of my profound appreciation for the noble work done by the Anti-Imperialist League in favor of Philippine independence. My people owe the League an eternal gratitude. I am sure that we never would have secured as much as we have, had it not been for the untiring campaign of the League. We have not, as yet, reached the goal, but I have no doubt that you will and I am confident that the League will, continue the fight until complete victory is won.” Quezon to Winslow, Aug. 21, 1916, reel 7, Quezon Papers, BHL.

196 Quezon to Storey, June 8, 1919, reel 9, Quezon Papers, BHL.

197 See, for example, the criticism from the editorial director of the American Union against Militarism: “It has always been a source of dissatisfaction to me that the Anti-Imperialist League has stayed in Boston and maintained what, rightly or wrongly, have always seemed to me to be "genteel" methods of propaganda. Boston, like Oxford, is the home of lost causes, whereas
was the creation of an enormous body of material about the United States’ involvement in the Philippines. Several active members of the Anti-Imperialist League were also prolific authors. In addition to these volumes, the Anti-Imperialist League—in New England and elsewhere—produced a variety of pamphlets and fliers that discussed and critiqued the United States’ involvement in the Philippines. Beyond these publications, individuals in the Anti-Imperialist League also initiated and organized their own investigations, e.g., H. Parker Willis’s trip to the Philippines to report on conditions there, and private citizens’ examination of evidence of war atrocities committed by Americans in the Philippines.

The creation of this body of work, at least in the organization’s early years, was necessitated by what the leadership of the Anti-Imperialist League considered a dearth of reliable information about the Philippines in circulation. The scarcity of information about the Philippines for American audiences signaled different opportunities—military, academic, commercial—for different segments of the population. For the Anti-Imperialist League, the gap in the record of American actions in the Philippines marked a space that could be filled with information that reframed the dominant analysis of the United States’ involvement in the islands and offered a corrective to the notion that the American presence in the Philippines was wholly benevolent. The leadership of the

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Washington is the home of big crass middle class movements which unaccountably muddle through to success.” Hallinan to Brooks, Dec. 21, 1916, box 2, Winslow Papers, Michigan.

198 Beyond serving the political needs of that particular moment, the work of the Anti-Imperialist League would maintain some level of influence into the twentieth century. By the last quarter of the twentieth century, as the American war in Vietnam escalated, the United States’
Anti-Imperialist League maintained an eye not only on the crisis in the Philippines; they appreciated and cultivated their work within a larger historical sweep. In addition to creating a record to address the issues of United States-Philippines relations, the Anti-Imperialist League was invested in the project of creating an anti-imperialist archive.\(^{199}\)

In other words, the attention to the historical record was not the concern of all anti-imperialists; but it was for those whose sense of justice or honor was offended by the United States’ actions in the Philippines and who thus sought to locate themselves on “the right side of history.” When mention of the Anti-Imperialist League failed to appear in James Blount’s *American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912* in 1913, for example, Erving Winslow complained to Manuel Quezon that the omission from Blount’s “interesting and really quite monumental book” actually indicated “some sinister motive.”\(^{200}\) Likewise, as is most evident in the views of Charles Francis Adams, the anti-imperialist historian, the documentation and preservation of a viewpoint—however unpopular and unheeded at the moment, would maintain on the written involvement in the Philippines and the Anti-Imperialist’s critique of that involvement enjoyed a renewed currency. In other words, activists and critics and historians found that the questions that the Anti-Imperialist League raised in 1899 resonated. While this process of “remembering” a “forgotten” war was prompted by the political needs of that moment. See, for example, Daniel Schirmer, *Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine War* (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing, 1972).

\(^{199}\) See, for example, the minutes of the Executive Committee of the New England Anti-Imperialist League, May 2, 1901, during which it was “voted that the Secretary be authorized and requested to make a chronological record of the principal facts in the history of Anti-Imperialism and a bibliography of the movement, with a view to its future publication.” Vol. 1, Winslow Papers, Michigan.

\(^{200}\) Winslow to Quezon, July 31, 1912, reel 3, Quezon Papers, BHL. For his part, Quezon doubted that Blount’s omission indicated a sinister move, Quezon to Winslow, July 31, 1912, reel 3, Quezon Papers, BHL.
record. According to Carl Schurz, Adams had “the peculiar strength as the representative of what is supposed to be the conservative element on the anti-imperialist side.” Of course, Charles Francis Adams was just one of several authors involved with the Anti-Imperialist League.

*Edward Atkinson and The Anti-Imperialist*

The experience of Anti-Imperialist League Vice-President Edward Atkinson highlights not only the varied and sometimes conflicting strategies of adherents to a broad anti-imperialist cause, but also the ways that the United States’ martial rule in the Philippines at once circumscribed and fueled the generation of an anti-imperialist archive. In other words, though intended to contain the circulation of Edward Atkinson’s *The Anti-Imperialist*, the actions of the United States government prompted even more discussion about and requests for access to Atkinson’s work.

Under the rule of Governor-General Taft, the delivery of mail and other information into or out of the Philippines was the subject of considerable legislation. Censorship of the mails by the military authorities and the Director-General of Posts for the Philippine Islands was considered acceptable practice, including the postcards that

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201 By contrast, Schurz noted that he himself was “always considered, or at least called, a radical extremist.” Schurz to Adams, May 7, 1902, box 2, Welsh Papers, Michigan.

202 Atkinson to Gage, Apr. 22, 1899, Atkinson Papers, MHS. Both Erving Winslow and Winslow Warren of the Anti-Imperialist League were critical of Atkinson’s actions, and the organization went so far as to publicly differentiate Atkinson’s personal actions from those of the league, Warren to Atkinson, May 5, 1899, Atkinson Papers, MHS. In turn, Atkinson wrote to Winslow: “It may embarrass you to have my name remain as a Vice-President of the League. You may therefore remove it if you see fit, and if I have occasion hereafter to communicate with you or the Executive Committee in advising any course in which the Executive Committee may differ, I will be careful to mark my letters “Private” or “Not for publication,” Atkinson Papers, MHS.
featured revolutionary leaders as they were considered “to be attempts to revive the memories of the Insurrection and to encourage the hope of another [...]”  

Meanwhile, in the United States, journalists and others sympathetic with the anti-imperialist cause were critical of these censorship efforts. Libel and sedition laws discouraged and punished criticism of the new colonial administration, and the censorship of mails was to designed to prevent criticism in the islands from reaching the United States. The lack of information arriving in the United States from the Philippines made balanced analysis of the situation difficult.

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203 Vaille to Smith, Sept. 24, 1900, entry 5, box 274, RG 350, NACP; General Order 24 from the Bureau of Posts of the Philippine Islands, Sept. 26, 1903, entry 5, box 274, RG 350, NACP; Edwards to MacCarthy, May 24, 1900, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP. In the first decade of rule, the colonial administration’s attention to mail does not seem to have waned, though the war had officially concluded. While in 1900, Director-General of Posts F.W. Vaille had contended that “censorship shall be resorted to only in case of absolute necessity,” by 1909, the censorship of mail had grown to be quite ambitious; General Order 1, Jan. 8, 1909, from the Bureau of Posts of the Philippine Islands read: “Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy book, pamphlet, picture, paper, letter, writing, print or publication, and every publication of an indecent character, and every article or thing designed or intended for the prevention of conception or the procuring of an abortion, and every article or thing intended for or adapted to any indecent or immoral use, and every written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement, or notice of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly, where or how or of whom or by what means any of all the hereinbefore mentioned matters, articles or things may be obtained or made, and any mail matter containing any filthy, foul, or indecent article, device, or substance, whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office nor by any letter carrier, and shall be withdrawn from the mails and forwarded to the Dead Letter Office of this Bureau for destruction. All matter otherwise mailable by law upon which may be written or printed or otherwise impressed or apparent, any delineations, epithets, terms, or language of an indecent, lewd, obscene, filthy, libelous, scurrilous, defamatory or threatening character, or calculated by the terms or manner or style of display and obviously intended to reflect injuriously upon the character or conduct of another, shall not be conveyed in the mail or delivered from any postoffice nor by any letter carrier, and shall be withdrawn from the mails and forwarded to the Dead Letter Office of this Bureau for destruction.” Entry 5, box 274, RG 350, NACP.

204 Mercer to Welsh, Dec. 31, 1901, box 1, Welsh Papers, Michigan; Peypoch to Sniffen, Nov. 6, 1902, box 1, Welsh Papers, Michigan; Wilby to Welsh, Nov. 5, 1900, box 2, Welsh Papers,
According to his own account of events, Atkinson authored a series of pamphlets about the costs, financial and otherwise, of an American war in the Philippines with the intention of circulating them among “economic students and legislators.” Though he had requested from the Department of War a list of 500 or 600 names of military personnel to whom he could send his pamphlets, Atkinson had, in fact, only sent his pamphlets to Jacob Gould Schurman, Dean Worcester, J.F. Bass (a journalist with *Harper’s Weekly*), Admiral George Dewey, General H.G. Otis, Henry Lawton, and one other individual with the last name Miller. The Postmaster General—whether mistakenly believing that the mailing of pamphlets were to be sent to several hundreds of people or not—ordered them removed from the mails and prevented from leaving San Francisco and going on to the Philippines.

The debacle with the United States Postmaster General earned Atkinson some supporters. At the same time, the widespread circulation of his views also provides

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Michigan; Adams to Schurz, Dec. 15, 1902, Adams Papers, MHS; Atkinson to Jennings, Feb. 25, 1902, Atkinson Papers, MHS; Atkinson to Hoar, Feb. 24, 1899, Atkinson Papers, MHS. This is not to suggest that the suppression of information was an altogether successful endeavor, as the letters home from American soldiers and the legacy of the so-called “seditious Tagalog playwrights” attest. See for example, Starr to Lawton, Aug. 2, 1899: “General Lawton requests that in the future you will not discuss any official matter of any nature whatsoever with any person or persons, either in this office or out of it, except in the proper transaction of official business. This request is rendered necessary by reason of allegations made by the Department Commander that many official matters have become known to newspaper correspondents and others, to the detriment of the service, through remarks made by the members of the Staff of this Division,” Edwards Papers, MHS.

205 Atkinson to Udell, May 18, 1899, Atkinson Papers, MHS.


207 Baird to Atkinson, May 3, 1899, Atkinson Papers, MHS; Winslow, May 8, 1899, Atkinson Papers, MHS.
glimpses into how unfavorably he was viewed. One recipient of Atkinson’s pamphlet reported that he had destroyed it upon receipt, having “no sympathy with the publication or with the weak, traitorous minds that inspire it,” and at least two public libraries refused to include the gift in their collections.208

On balance, however, the action of the United States government to stop the mailing of Atkinson’s pamphlets in the United States—rather than, say, destroying them upon receipt in the Philippines—seems generally to have been understood as a misstep of, at the very least, the Postmaster General, and at the highest possible level, President McKinley. Atkinson was confident that his work had ignited “a spark to start the suppressed indignation all over the country.”209 Even Winslow Warren agreed that Atkinson’s scheme may produce some good effect, noting the resonance between The Anti-Imperialist and abolitionist works: “My impression is that the same course was pursued as to “Uncle Tom’s Cabin” and the “Liberator” and the results are sufficiently plain.”210 By drawing attention to The Anti-Imperialist by stopping their mailing, the United States government created a situation where Atkinson and his work were actually in demand; people wanted to know what all of the fuss was about, resulting in the greater production and circulation of writing about the anti-imperialist cause.

Atkinson to Bowditch, May 4, 1899, Atkinson Papers, MHS.

Warren to Atkinson, May 3, 1899, Atkinson Papers, MHS.
Of course, other individuals and organizations, not necessarily attached to the Anti-Imperialist League, also criticized the United States’ policy in the Philippines. One organization was the Philippine Information Society. Founded in Boston, the Philippine Information Society published and circulated information about the United States’ actions in the Philippines. The Philippine Information Society was an alternative to the Anti-Imperialist League, the latter being characterized by United States officials as an impractical and hysterical group of cranks. Though it might seem that the Philippine Information Society would be a welcome party to the discussion on the United States’ policy in the Philippines, with the two organizations together covering a broader political spectrum, the work of the Philippine Information Society garnered some private disdain from at least one individual closely involved with the work of the Anti-Imperialist League for precisely its more conservative orientation. Thus, even as the Philippine

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211 Writing to Herbert Welsh, Sniffen reported: “I think I also sent you a clipping telling you of the formation of a Society in Boston, Thursday of this week, for the purpose of bringing to light information regarding the Philippines that is now buried in various reports, letters and documents that are on file in the Government’s depositories. The people who are at the head of this movement have heretofore been ‘on the fence.’” Sniffen to Welsh, Dec. 15, 1900, box 2, Welsh Papers, Michigan. Two days later, Sniffed continued: “The newly formed ‘Philippine Information Society’ is preparing to rehash the facts that have already been published, for the most part, by the Anti-Imperialists. Of course, they aim for some new material, but it will practically amount to using the Anti-Imperialist statements without the association of the League’s name. Mrs. Glendomar [?] Evans who is the moving spirit in the enterprise said to me, with a great deal of force, that their organization can get many good people to read information quite readily, who would be scared off by any statement coming from the Anti-Imperialist League; that the name seems to be a ‘bugaboo.’ The general effect produced on these people is to arouse their interest and convert them unconsciously into the most rabid anti-imperialists, although they would hardly admit it. In some respects the new movement is amusing. The promoters do not care in any way to be associated with those who have all along borne the brunt of the battle, on account of existing prejudices. Some of these good people are inclined to believe that President McKinley is ignorant of the true conditions in the Philippines, that his
Information Society and Anti-Imperialist League shared concerns about the United States’ occupation of the Philippines and similar strategies to voice those concerns, their memberships did not necessarily work closely.

Just as the Philippine Information Society was an organization at the center of some private criticism of other anti-imperialists, Jacob Gould Schurman was a prominent individual subject to criticism, and alternately praise, from people on both sides of the United States’ policy in the Philippines. President of Cornell University, Schurman was appointed to chair the United States’ first commission to the Philippines; this group—officially named the United States Philippine Commission and sometimes referred to as the Schurman Commission—was composed of Schurman, Military Governor of the Philippine Islands Elwell Otis, George Dewey, Charles Denby, and Dean Worcester, and its charge from President McKinley was to investigate conditions in the Philippines and make recommendations for the United States’ course of action there.

When the Philippine Commission submitted its report to President McKinley, native aspirations to an independent Philippine Republic were dealt a setback, and Schurman earned the esteem of many McKinley supporters in the United States. After speaking on the Philippines shortly after his return from the islands, for example, Schurman received a note from McKinley’s secretary, reporting the President having been “very much

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information was derived second hand, etc.” Sniffen to Welsh, Dec. 17, 1900, box 2, Welsh Papers, Michigan.

212 The efforts of the first and second United States Philippine Commissions, namely the Schurman and Taft Commissions, in the creation of the American colonial state in the Philippines will be discussed in greater detail in chapter six.
pleased with what he has seen of your speech in Chicago.” Indeed, throughout 1900, Schurman delivered several addresses on the Philippines, all of which were thought to be “doing great good.”

In early 1902, however, Schurman’s views on the Philippines had changed—from a perspective that wholly supported the Republican policy in the islands to a perspective that questioned the wisdom of retaining the islands—and with this change of view came a change in Schurman’s own supporters and detractors. After publishing Philippine Affairs: A Retrospect and Outlook, Schurman received a kindly letter from the publisher W.D. Howells, who noted that, “Your speech on the Philippine situation is full of a manly humanity. [...] You have struck the true note. If we are not in the Philippines to help their people to a safe independence, we are wrongfully there.” Schurman’s swing to an anti-imperialist view prompted not only praise, but requests—to write about the Philippines for The Independent and to participate as a member of the investigating committee that Charles Francis Adams hoped to convene. By the spring of 1902, Schurman was even the recipient of conciliatory letters from Filipino nationalist Sixto Lopez:

The policy which you advocate is, in my humble judgment, the one that will bring permanent peace and contentment not only to the Filipinos but to the heart and mind of every true American who desires to see the ideals and duties of the Republic maintained and performed.

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213 Porter to Schurman, Feb. 24, 1900, Jacob Gould Schurman Papers, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University (RMC); Porter to Schurman, Oct. 27, 1900, correspondence, Schurman papers, RMC.
214 Howells to Schurman, Jan. 27, 1902, correspondence, Schurman papers, RMC.
215 Scott to Schurman, Apr. 11, 1902, correspondence, Schurman papers, RMC.
I do not wish to disguise the fact that I have differed from you in the past, perhaps through misapprehension of your motives and views, for I know how easy it is to misjudge an opponent, especially from a distance. But I trust that any mere flesh wound that have been inflicted on either side in the contest for the right have long since healed. 216

This warm sentiment of Lopez in 1902 had its correlate from the Taft administration. In fact, William Howard Taft’s unkindly suspicion was that Schurman’s real purpose in his participation in debates about the United States’ policy in the Philippines was simply to “keep in the public eye.” 217

Schurman’s presence “in the public eye” was noteworthy not only because as a scholar president of a large university, he had wide visibility, but also because he had been one of few American government officials in the islands. His commission was the first to meet extensively with individuals to discuss the political and social conditions in the Philippines, and such experience earned political Schurman currency. In 1899, Stanford University President David Starr Jordan had observed that “We know nothing of Philippine matters, save through cablegrams passed through government censorship,

216 Sixto Lopez to Schurman, May 20, 1902, correspondence, Schurman papers, RMC.
217 Taft to Seymour, Mar. 16, 1903, reel 38, Taft Papers, LOC. When working together on the first Philippine Commission, Dean Worcester’s writing did little to conceal his dislike for Schurman: “He has seriously injured his standing with the authorities at Washington, and I fancy his career as a diplomat will be decidedly rocket-like. He soared rapidly, but has begun to come down now. It would be like him to go home and try to become the apostle of the “antis.” Well, we shall see. Michigan, Worcester, vol. 16. See also, Worcester, July 5, 1899: “Schurman announced yesterday that he must leave here by July 1st, or thereabouts! […] Every one was glad to hear he meant to go so soon, and no one asked him why he had changed his mind. He probably sees that he cannot rule the roost here, and wants to get home and try to influence the President. If he had not send [sic] that telegram I should be more or less afraid of him, but as it is I fear his career as a diplomat will not be prolonged!” Vol. 16, Dean Worcester Papers, Michigan.
and from the letters and speech of men of the army and navy. The letters and
cablegrams do not always tell the same story." Years later, Representative William A.
Jones would echo Jordan’s sentiment, though he would not go so far as to suggest the
government’s misdeed of censorship; rather, he suggested that the administration in
the United States relied on select, but not entirely dependable, sources that were bound
to support American policy.

*H. Parker Willis and Our Colonial Problem*

It was along these lines of thinking that members of the Anti-Imperialist League
developed plans to send an American to the Philippines to gather, report, and publicize
information about conditions in the islands. Charles Francis Adams, Jr., had headed a
committee of men to investigate the allegations of war atrocities in the United States
military’s campaigns in the Philippines. Over the course of this investigation, it

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218 Jordan, 8. See Taft to Hoyt, Nov. 3, 1900: “I have not received from you Root’s speech or
Richards [sic] speech, but General Corbis sent me a copy of Root’s speech and I think it is the
best presentation possible. It is a very able document and shows the flimsy character of the
alleged facts upon which most of the anti-imperialist argument proceeds.” Edwards Papers,
MHS.

219 “But the largest and most influential class from which the administration derives its
information is that of the American officeholder whose names are truly legion. These men are
naturally in full accord with the policies of the administration to whom they owe their positions.
They wish to continue to hold their jobs, and it is absurd to support that they will ever give
public utterance to opinion not in accord with those held by the powers that be. Many of them
have no sympathy for the poor Filipinos, and some, at least, despise them and take no pains to
disguise the fact.” William A. Jones, *Misgovernment in the Philippines and Cost to the United
States of American Occupation: Speech of Hon. William A. Jones of Virginia in the House of

220 Charles Francis Adams, Carl Schurz, Edwin Burritt Smith, Herbert Welsh, and Andrew
Carnegie composed the committee. See their report, July 23, 1902, reel 319, Taft Papers, LOC.
The committee was formed, in Adams’s words, for the purpose “of taking whatever steps might
be necessary to effect a full disclosure of facts connected with processes and executions in the
became clear to Adams that the information coming out of the Philippines was not always reliable. Colonial officials had a vested interest in portraying the conditions in the Philippines in a positive light, and their reports reflected that interest; newspaper correspondents were sometimes charged with the motivation of selling newspapers; returning servicemen were discredited as disgruntled or embittered; soldiers in the field could not write freely about conditions in the islands, for fear that some retribution may be taken; and whether in the Philippines or the United States, unfavorable accounts were believed to be censored. In other words, while all such information would provide an alternate assessment of the United States’ course of action in the

course of military operations in the Philippines Islands.” Adams to Storey, Aug. 22, 1902, box 3, Welsh Papers, Michigan. For more on the committee, see Adams to Norton, May 2, 1902, Adams Papers, MHS. In the spring of 1902, the composition of the committee appears to have been different—with Moorfield Storey in the place of Andrew Carnegie, and including a Finance Committee of George Foster Peabody and William H. Baldwin, Jr. Herbert Welsh wrote that “The work of our Committee is to gather witnesses, to sift evidence, and to present such material to the Investigating Committee of the Senate, to throw light on all that is hidden in this business, and to secure in the Philippines themselves, by the demand of an irresistible popular sentiment, a rigid investigation of conditions which exist there.” Welsh to Lewis, May 16, 1902, box 1, Welsh Papers, Michigan.

221 On the unreliability of sources, see Adams to Welsh, May 9, 1902, box 1, Welsh Papers, Michigan; Adams to Culberson, May 7, 1902, Adams Papers, MHS; Adams to Schurz, July 1, 1902, Adams Papers, MHS; Welsh to Adams, May 8, 1902, Adams Papers, MHS. Perhaps Norton expressed the sentiment best when, writing to Herbert Welsh, he noted that “I do not think we should be content with a military investigation conducted under the authority of Secretary Root. His duplicity in the matter of the Philippine atrocities, and his recent eulogistic adulation of Senator Platt suffice to destroy all confidence in him.” Norton to Welsh, Apr. 17, 1902, box 1, Welsh Papers, Michigan. On sending an agent and on H. Parker Willis as the ideal person to conduct the investigation, see Storey to Palmer, July 28, 1903, box 1, Welsh Papers, Michigan; Adams to Schurz, Aug. 7, 1902, Adams Papers, MHS; Adams to Schurz, Aug. 13, 1902, Adams Papers, MHS; Adams to Davison, Oct. 27, 1904, Adams Papers, MHS. Willis himself made a case for funding an investigation at least once, Willis to Welsh, [undated, probably 1901?], box 2, Welsh Papers, Michigan.
Philippines, there remained a compelling case for sending someone to the islands to conduct an investigation.

Adams, Schurz, and Welsh correctly anticipated that anyone sent to the Philippines from the United States to assess the conditions there in general, and the work of the occupation government in particular, was bound to meet some resistance. For this reason, they conducted their affairs with a degree of secrecy. Adams wrote to Schurz of the wisdom of “proceed[ing] very cautiously, putting as little in writing, outside of our own circle, as possible. I, of course, have to communicate with you and Mr. Welsh, frankly and frequently; but, so far as the public is concerned, it seems best to preserve a religious silence.”\textsuperscript{222} The work of creating an alternative archive sometimes required a concerted effort to not document work for the anti-imperialist cause.

Willis’s preparation for the trip included reading available sources on the Philippines and obtaining letters of introduction (by his own account, upwards to 100) to colonial government workers. H. Parker Willis arrived in the Philippines in May 1904, by way of Hong Kong. Once in Manila, he regularly reported his findings back to the United States.\textsuperscript{223} Willis spent the spring in Manila conducting interviews and writing up

\textsuperscript{222} Adams to Schurz, May 8, 1902, Adams Papers, MHS; Storey to Sniffen, June 3, 1904, box 2, Welsh Papers, Michigan.

\textsuperscript{223} Willis to Storey, May 12, 1904, Storey Papers, LOC. These reports were sent per instruction: “The objects and methods of our mission have been already sufficiently discussed. If you go, you will go simply as a traveller seeking information, and have it distinctly understood you are not in correspondence with any newspaper. You are merely passing the winter in the Philippines for your information, and not improbably with a view of publishing the result of your observations. These, however, would be transmitted to us frequently. In other words, you
notes, and the summer traveling through several provinces—Rizal, Cavite, Batangas, Laguna, Bulacan, Bataan, Tarlac, Pangasinan, Mindoro, Romblon, Masbate, Cebu, Zamboanga, Jolo, Pampanga, and Morong—to conduct interviews there. His method was, first, to read all of the official published reports on a particular topic, then conduct interviews with “unofficial persons in Manila (sometimes with subordinate government officials, who were discontented, or with local journalists, or with critical natives, or with army officers hostile to civil rule).” In synthesizing the information gathered in these interviews, Willis identified controversial points or policies about which he then interviewed “the higher official persons who were conversant with or responsible for the existing facts” with the hope of obtaining “categorical statements on the converted points.” Willis concluded with site visits and interviews with local officials at those sites, before drafting his own analysis of a situation. He indicated that he employed a Filipino, Simeon Kison, for interviewing “with natives who were under surveillance and who could not safely receive visits from travelling Americans, as well as in obtaining information on topics outlined by me.” In the provinces, Willis simply spoke directly with native officials and American school teachers. He left Manila in August 1904.224

Despite Willis’s precautions, the purpose of his stay in the Philippines was soon known among Americans in Manila. After having been in the islands only about one month, Willis reported that the Philippine Commission was tracking his movements;

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224 Willis to Storey et al, Sept. 22, 1904, Storey Papers, LOC.
fortunately for his investigation, by that point, he had already gotten all the material that he wanted from other colonial officials. When it became impolitic for serving colonial officials to speak with Willis and difficult for him to gather information from interviews with this group, Willis turned to natives, soldiers, and ex-government employees. 225 In addition to interviews with various groups in the capital, Willis traveled to the southern islands in the archipelago, studied legislation of the Philippine Commission, establishment of public schools, administration of civil service, and government censorship of local media. Writing from the Philippines, many of Willis’s reservations about and criticisms of the colonial administration were confirmed. 226

The challenges that Willis faced while conducting his research in the Philippines continued upon his return to the United States. On top of personal attacks, Parker initially had trouble placing his work with a publisher. 227 Published by the Henry Holt Company in 1905, Our Philippine Problem: A Study of American Colonial Policy provided a detailed critique of nearly every aspect of the colonial administration, offered

225 Willis to Storey, June 23, 1904, Storey Papers, LOC; Willis to Storey, July 8, 1904, Storey Papers, LOC; Willis to Storey, Sept. 12, 1904, Storey Papers, LOC.
226 Willis to Storey, July 19, 1904, Storey Papers, LOC; Willis to Storey, June 4, 1904, Storey Papers, LOC; Willis to Storey, May 27, 1904, Storey Papers, LOC. In his May 27, 1904 letter to Moorfield Storey, Willis summarized: “On the whole, I feel that our general policy and its effects on the islands have been worse by far than I had supposed. On the other hand, I believe that, so far as not inconsistent with their political well-being, some of the men at the head are doing what they can to furnish a good administration. The problems are too tough for them, however, and I feel that the whole government, with here and there an exception, may properly be styled incompetent. The Taft cult shrinks to wonderfully small proportions when viewed from close at hand and I believe his alleged popularity was purely fictitious.”
227 See Willis’s report on finding a publisher: Willis to Storey, Mar. 26, 1905, Storey Papers, LOC. On personal attacks, see Willis to Adams, Nov. 2, 1904, Adams Papers, MHS; Adams to Willis, Nov. 4, 1904, Adams Papers, MHS; Willis to Adams, Dec. 3, 1904, Adams Papers, MHS.
recommendations for how to improve the situation in the Philippines, and ultimately, advocated for “a declaration of the intention to work toward independence, and a distinct definition of the time when such independence may be possible.” Moreover, Willis suggested, such a declaration would “render it easier, not harder, to govern the natives in the interim [...]”\(^{228}\)

Charles Francis Adams’ investment in the two investigations—first, the investigation that resulted in a report to President Roosevelt and, second, the investigation that resulted in H. Parker Willis’s *Our Colonial Problem*—was complex and suggest some of the larger issues at work when people in the United States considered the actions of the government in the Philippines. From the beginning, he disapproved of the United States’ course of action in the islands, but he was especially offended by revelations of torture executed by United States forces in the course of war. His efforts to coordinate investigations of the military’s conduct was to put on record the actions of the government before proceeding with a colonial policy with which he continued to disagree. Though he understood that both government officials and the general public were “weary of the topic” and ready for “fresh fields and pastures new,” he thought that a record of past misdeeds was important for moving forward. And once the record

was made and acknowledged and perchance sent into oblivion, all parties could proceed.\textsuperscript{229}

As evidenced by H. Parker Willis’ trip to the Philippines, the actions of the Anti-Imperialist League were not limited entirely to the United States. While the work of the Anti-Imperialist League was often the subject of ridicule in both the Philippines and the United States, the league’s conviction that their efforts affected some change and discomforted the United States colonial administrators was confirmed in at least one important instance. In 1901, for example, Boston lawyer Fiske Warren was reported to have traveled to the Philippines on the same boat at Sixto Lopez and other members of the revolutionary government to see if he, too, would be requested to take an oath of his acceptance of United States sovereignty in the islands.\textsuperscript{230} Writing to Secretary of War Elihu Root about the legislative work of the Philippine Commission, Taft wrote that while a sedition law was not yet passed, the Commission sought to do so shortly. Taft noted that “We anticipated that that fool Fiske Warren of Boston, with Sixto Lopez may come here and that Lopez may feel called upon to say the things he has been permitted to say in America. If so, we shall prosecute him and we desire to have the law in such shape that the prosecution may be effective.”\textsuperscript{231} Even in the years after the conclusion

\textsuperscript{229} Adams to Lodge, Oct. 3, 1902, Adams Papers, MHS; Adams to Schurz, Oct. 25, 1904, Adams Papers, MHS.
\textsuperscript{230} LeRoy travelogue, Oct. 17, 1901, LeRoy Papers, BHL. LeRoy continued: “Ex-Lieu. W.F. Pack, of Michigan, who came from Hong Kong on the same boat, told Professor Worcester that Warren had a load of Lopez’s speeches and other like documents in his baggage, and that he said he was coming here “to see why he was paying a war tax.”
\textsuperscript{231} Taft to Root, Oct. 14, 1901, reel 464, Taft Papers, LOC.
of the Philippine-American War, when the importance and influence of the Anti-Imperialist League was widely supposed to be on the wane, officials in the United States and the Philippines sometimes found reason for concern. When an entertainment manager was reported to be neglecting a group of natives, for example, Chief of Bureau of Insular Affairs Frank McIntyre wrote to Governor-General Henry Ide that if they were not provided passage back to the Philippines, the Anti-Imperialist League which was “hunting for grounds to make us trouble,” would generate unwanted publicity for the United States administration in the Philippines.\(^{232}\)

Even framing the writings of the leadership of the Anti-Imperialist League in this manner, the generation and circulation of monographs, pamphlets, and other materials may still be considered an outmoded and less effective way of having tried to organize an anti-imperialist movement. The publications of the Anti-Imperialist League somewhat lacked the sensationalism of muckraking journalists of the period. The Anti-Imperialist League’s war of words was rather tame when considered alongside the protests of thousands, and sometimes tens of thousands, of workers in the streets of American cities. Still, to understand the work of the Anti-Imperialist League alongside

\(^{232}\) McIntyre to Ide, June 23, 1906, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP. In 1911, the BIA still kept tabs on the activities of the Anti-Imperialist League. Dinwiddie wrote to Worcester that, though a project to educate Americans about the Philippines was nixed by the BIA leadership, it was not ended before he had the opportunity to collect “over 60,000 words of publicity” that shed a favorable light on Worcester and “holds up to ridicule the Anti-Imperialist League’s propaganda,” Dinwiddie to Worcester, May 23, 1911, box 1, Dean C. Worcester Papers, BHL. Worcester’s contempt for any anti-imperialist impulse is well-documented, such as when he notes that “our anti-imperialist friends will insist upon making idiots of themselves.” Worcester to Beal, Apr. 24, 1911, box 3, Junius E. Beal Papers, BHL.
other archive-building projects at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century, the league’s efforts are not only in keeping with the model of creation, distribution, and preservation of records that enjoyed currency at the time. When reviewing the work of the Anti-Imperialist League alongside similar projects of this period—such as the Bureau of Insular Affair’s *Philippine Insurgent Records*—with far greater resources, the political forces against anti-imperialist sensibilities in general, and the creation of an alternative archive in particular, are even more considerable and daunting.

**Conclusion: The Martial Origins of Civilian Archives**

“We have here the history of the Filipino insurrection, written in official documents; not invented, not done with exaggeration but taken from the archives where the decrees and the dispositions of the general government are kept.”

--Javier Borres y Romero, 1897

With the cession of Spanish colonial archives per the Treaty of Paris, the United States government owned a veritable trove of information on the colony. Though the colonial administration ultimately designed a larger and purportedly more modern system for maintaining and preserving records in the islands, the records acquired by clause VIII of the treaty provided the core from which the administration could build. Moreover, as the records of the outgoing colonial state, they had been generated and used and circulated with particular administrative purposes. These government records were to facilitate the establishment and operation of a new, American colonial state.

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If the records of the Spanish colonial government were to be acquired by treaty negotiation, the records of the Philippine revolutionary government were to be acquired by seizure. As was the case with Spanish language documents, the Tagalog language documents required an office of translators within the Department, and later the Bureau, of Insular Affairs in the Department of War. With the enlistment of Captain John R.M. Taylor to direct the editing and translation of captured revolutionary records began a project that highlighted several important aspects of the American war in the Philippines. The difficulty of seizing records of the revolutionary government underscored the unfamiliar and challenging terrain in the United States’ latest theater of war; the shortage of available and qualified translators suggested the degree to which the Philippines and its languages had been (at best) peripheral to the concerns of the United States in any practical way; the controversy of the compilation’s publication reflect the ways that partisan politics in the United States figured into the circulation of information about the Philippines; and the critical review of the compilation by a burgeoning group of historians of the Philippines and Spain anticipated the questions about reliable sources—access to, translation and publication of—that would concern historians throughout the early decades of the twentieth century. These government records, the capture and translation of which were necessitated by the exigencies of the ongoing Philippine Revolution, were to aid in the war and occupation by United States forces.
Even as the cession of Spanish archives pertaining to colonial administration and the capture of Filipino records pertaining to revolutionary government were of undeniable, explicit value to the United States’ war in and occupation of the Philippines, the Untied States was no less assisted by the generation of monographs, newspaper and magazine articles, memoirs and pamphlets, and other coverage by authors either enthusiastic about, or at least friendly to, the United States’ actions in the Philippines. Whether the argument was economic, about the solution that Asia offered to the American problem of “overproduction”; or political, about the lessons in democracy that the United States was especially qualified to teach; or cultural, about the civilization that white men ought to at least try to share, Americans were never too far from a media that would express it. War correspondents in the Philippines, soldiers’ letters home, and “armchair” experts on the islands all contributed to a body of writing that argued that the United States’ occupation of the Philippines was necessary and just. Such a barrage was significant not only for people living in the opening decades of the twentieth century, trying to understand national and world events; these records would maintain significance for decades to follow.

The forces against which the members of the Anti-Imperialist League and like-minded people struggled were formidable. The *Compilation of Philippine Insurgent Records*, the endless stream of “yellow” journalism, and *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898* worked in tandem to create a case in support of the United States’ course of action in the Philippines. The work of Captain John R.M. Taylor suggested the dangers
of the native “insurgents”; the popular press sang the praises of the United States military exploits in the islands and painted not a somber, but a glorious, picture of war; and the work of James Alexander Robertson and Emma Helen Blair provided the entire endeavor with a particular Spanish colonial frame, primarily academic in its pretensions. In short, these works provided military, popular, and scholarly cases for the military occupation of the Philippines. In later years, after the official conclusion of the Philippine-American War—even as coverage of the Philippines in national newspapers and magazines waned—the works of Taylor and Robertson and Blair would endure, when a reminder for the purpose and value of a civilian occupation, the establishment of a colonial government, was required.

Considering the moment in this manner—in terms of the generation and circulation of material that would serve contemporary political and commercial purposes, as well as endure for later ones—the approach of the Anti-Imperialist League deserves review. Its work been understood as an outdated, outmoded tactic from the movement to abolish slavery. The rallies and public meetings that the Anti-Imperialist League hosted were undoubted tely tame events, compared with the Marches and strikes by working people all over the United States. Yet, the work of the Anti-Imperialist League—to compile statistics and testimony, to draft polemics, and to circulate any and all information that ran counter to the glowing reports about war in the Philippines—may be understood in terms of building an archive that ran counter to that created by
Taylor’s division in the Department of Insular Affairs, Hearst’s newspapers, or Robertson and Blair’s edited volumes.

Indeed, while they may have been rightly critiqued by their contemporaries for being satisfied with “bearing witness” to the injustices committed by the United States, these testimonies nevertheless remain—opposed to the military and civilian occupation of the Philippines. The attention of the Anti-Imperialist League to an American tradition of exploitation of Native Americans and African-Americans on the continent, and the country’s misdeeds in the Pacific and Caribbean, and their consistent framing of the situation in the Philippines with these events, were considered, by at least one ally, to be detrimental to the cause in the Philippines; however, it was undoubtedly in keeping with thinking historically about the United States. The attention of at least some of the Anti-Imperialist League’s members to the league’s place in the story of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century may be, ungenerously, considered among the members’ inflated and unwarranted sense of their own importance; still, when considered in terms of creating a viable and vying historical record, upon which later generations may rely, such attention seems a more sympathetic and reasonable approach.

The United States’ military actions in the Philippines created a political need for what would become an enormous archive of material on the islands. More than simply a library of material, this body of work encompassed a broad variety of media, sought to include both old and current documents, and was supposed to be of future
administrative and historical use. Whether the ceded Spanish documents or Taylor’s English translations, these records spanned centuries of colonial and revolutionary life, all for the purpose of facilitating the United States’ military occupation and later civil government of the Philippines. In short, war was the motor that drove the creation of the United States’ first archives on the Philippines.

These resulting government archives compelled the creation of complementary and oppositional non-governmental archives. While some accounts of the United States’ involvement in the Philippines were celebratory or otherwise supportive, a vocal minority also provided arguments for why the United States’ course of action was not ideal. What was clear enough to members of this vocal minority was their sense that while the body of material the United States government was amassing on the Philippines was enormous, the public’s access to that material was limited. That is, if war was the motor that drove the generation of a government archive on the Philippines, that resulting government archive was the motor that drove the generation of a non-governmental archive.

This examination of the archive amassed as a direct result of war in the Philippines—the cession of Spanish records, the translation of Filipino records, the publication of American records—suggests that archives of material relating to United States-Philippine relations at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century have undeniably martial origins. These origins are important to keep in mind when beginning the project of understanding archives’ relationship to matters
of an apparently strictly civil nature, namely the disposition of land and the development of a colonial economy. The colonial bureaucracy’s ability to obscure its own martial origins not only enabled the entrenchment of the United States’ colonial state; it enabled that state’s representatives to boast of the government’s efficiency in maintaining the colonial order. In short, obscuring the martial origins of civil order made room for colonial celebration where anti-colonial revolution had been.
CHAPTER 4
ARCHIVES AND LAND

During generations the processes of empire have been working, unobserved in the United States. Through more than two centuries the American people have been busily laying the foundations and erecting the imperial structure. For the most part, they have been unconscious of the work that they were doing, as the dock laborer is ordinarily unconscious of his part in the mechanism of industry. Consciously or unconsciously, the American people have reared the imperial structure until it stands, to-day, imposing in its grandeur, upon the spot where many of the founders of the American government hoped to see a republic.

--Scott Nearing, *The American Empire*

Introduction

In the final decades of the nineteenth century and opening decades of the twentieth century, the rise of industrial manufacturing in the United States itself gave rise to critique of how such industry changed living and working conditions. Individuals from ordinarily opposing sides in labor-management relations found common cause in opposing the United States’ course in the Philippines. Scott Nearing’s analysis differed from those offered by Gompers and Carnegie. Rather than invoking a notion of international solidarity or warning against empire’s perils for national wealth, Nearing likened every American to “the dock laborer” insofar as both are unconscious of their work in constructing an “imperial structure” or a “the mechanism of industry.” More an indictment than a lament, Nearing indicated that the United States’ course might be changed once the unsavory, unconscious work for empire was presented to his readership.

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While not referencing Frederick Jackson Turner explicitly, Nearing’s discussion appears informed by Turner’s 1892 discussion of the frontier in American history. Whereas Turner argued that territorial expansion was precisely American, Nearing argued that such expansion was not in keeping with American ideals. With twenty years, significant differences in political opinion, and the annexation of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam separating them, Turner and Nearing stood at opposing poles in the discussion of territorial expansion. Rather than settling the question of territorial expansion, however, the annexation and subsequent colonial rule of the Philippines raised the question again. In addition to envisioning a port that would facilitate trade with China and alleviate the problem of “overproduction,” Americans saw the promise of the natural resources of the islands for commercial agriculture and mining, or more generally stated, saw the promise of the islands as a site for American investment capital. As fighting between United States and Philippine forces continued, of course, realizing the promise of the islands was impossible.

The Philippine-American War did not officially end until July 4, 1902, and hostilities continued for years afterward. Nevertheless, the United States inaugurated its Civil Government in the Philippines on July 1, 1901, and soon after, conflicts between the newly-installed civil occupation government and the entrenched military occupation government erupted. At the crux of the conflict between the military and civil government was a disagreement about how the native population would be most efficiently pacified, about which approach would lead to greater peace and prosperity.
The three Military Governors in the Philippines between 1898 and 1901—Wesley Merritt, Elwell Otis, and Arthur MacArthur—had ruled with the belief that martial rule was the surest way to ensure safety in the islands, whereas Civil Governor Taft believed that civil rule would demonstrate the United States’ benevolent intentions and thereby cultivate peace in the Philippines. Indeed, believing that continuing military rule would be “a fatal mistake,” Taft wrote to Secretary of War Root that he believed that “the people are only waiting for an excuse to lose all insurgent sympathy or offishness, such as they now have, and to come in under the United States Civil Government.”

The territorial conflict between the Civil Governor and Military Governor, and later between the Governor-General and United States military forces in the Philippines was not simply metaphorical. Physical territory, too, was as central to the conflict between the military and civil government, as it was to the conflict between the United States and Philippine governments. During the first decades of American rule in the islands, land was allocated in one of a number of ways: military reservations, public lands, private lands, or friar lands. Military lands were allocated for use by American

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235 Taft to Root, Dec. 14, 1900, reel 463, Taft Papers, LOC. In a letter to Edward Colston, Taft elaborated on this point, observing that “The experience of nine months now under a military government convinces me that an army officer, whether he be the subject of the Czar of Russia or a citizen of the United States is not adapted to conduct the affairs of a civil government.” Taft to Colston, Apr. 24, 1901, reel 32, Taft Papers, LOC. See also Taft to Root, July 26, 1900, reel 463, Taft Papers, LOC; and Taft to Wilcox, Sept. 24, 1901, reel 33, Taft Papers, LOC. On the provincial level, governor of Tayabas wrote to Taft, “I have endeavored to state truthfully the difficulties that civil government encounters by reason of the attitude of the officers of the Army. In doing so I feel that should my report be made public I will have the whole army against me. But I believe it is my duty to tell the truth and take the consequences whatever they may be.” Gardener to Taft, Dec. 16, 1901, reel 34, Taft Papers, LOC.
forces by the Philippine Commission; public lands were those lands ceded by Spain per the Treaty of Paris in 1898; private lands were those claimed by individuals or organizations with proper title; friar lands were those owned by the various religious orders. Matters of land ownership in the islands were considerably varied, and this variety proved meaningful, as the administration sought to cultivate the islands’ economy, both in the sense of its capacity to generate income for the colony and in the sense of its capacity to generate that income with efficiency.

When appointed Governor-General, William Howard Taft, who had served previously as the first Civil Governor of the Philippines alongside Military Governors Otis (1898-1900) and MacArthur (1900-1901), had no higher authority in the islands to dispute his slogan and purported policy of “The Philippines for the Filipinos.” The most literal, unqualified meaning of this slogan clearly did not stand, as in fact, the Philippines were for the Americans per the United States’ Treaty of Peace with Spain. Still, the question of whom the islands should most benefit was insistent throughout the early years of the United States colonial rule of the Philippines. How much more or less should the Philippines benefit than the United States? If the United States benefited more and the Philippines less, was it acceptable because the Philippines had benefited at all?

If the war-ravaged condition of the islands presented the United States with challenges to developing a profitable agricultural economy and entrenching a new colonial administration, it nevertheless offered room for some political maneuvering.
The destruction of entire villages provided the United States with, on the one hand, the need and license for reconstruction as it saw fit, and on the other hand, a justified excuse for slow or stymied growth. The inauguration of major public works projects provides one example of this: Provincial roads were not nearly as extensive as they could have been under the Spanish regime; the U.S. Philippine Commission’s legislation for the construction of roads and bridges was an early and persistent priority, because public works were essential for the transport of goods. Likewise went the argument for improvements to the islands’ ports and harbors. The opening of harbors to a greater degree than had been the case under the Spanish administration was thus understood to be an important piece of the execution of the United States’ policy in the Philippines.

Economic prosperity would be measured through the extensiveness of the roads and bridges, the improvement of harbors, or the percentage of the total land of the islands recorded on title. The pre-requisite for the administration’s realization of such prosperity was the imposition of an American order, an ordering of land and labor. While such imposition was made difficult by the destruction of Spanish land records and the inadequacy of those still extant, the conditions did provide the United States with a compelling reason to impose a new Land Registration Act and build an archive of land records with, literally, the United States’ colonial government’s stamp on every document.

While such total order was determined to be required of the land, it was not achieved. Still, efforts to maintain archives and records provide a different way to see
how these disruptions in the execution of United States policy to exploit Philippine natural resources came to pass. Bearing in mind Nearing’s observation that everyday work builds the machinery of industry and empire, this chapter considers how archives and recordkeeping were integral to the colonial administration’s economic development of the islands. More precisely, it recounts how the registration of land title, the disposition of public lands, the paper trail of the friar lands controversy, and the branding of carabao, that the archetypal beast of burden in the Philippines, set the stage for the new—purportedly modern and efficient—United States bureaucracy that displaced the Spanish one.

**Philippine Commission Land Laws**

“Before concluding it will not be too much to say that he who successfully regulates the adjustment of titles to the lands in these islands will merit a crown of glory, receive the congratulations of an obedient and grateful people, and guarantee the political policy which may be implanted, promote agriculture—the basis of wealth in any country—and prevent a possibility of a repetition of the evils of the past.”

--Forestry Bureau of the Philippine Islands, 1901

The colonial administration needed an orderly and efficient system to maintain land records to suppress revolutionary fighting and develop the colonial economy. The complications associated with establishing such a system is evident in the notion that doing so would “merit a crown of glory.” These complications included the destruction of land records throughout the revolution and the new colonial government administrators’ finding fault in the surviving Spanish land records. With the imposition

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of colonial government came legislation on the disposition of land; crafting legislation, too, was complicated, as it was to take into account the expectations of American would-be settlers and investors and their detractors. Resolving questions of title to privately-owned land, disposing of public lands by lease, sale, homestead, or ancestral claim, and settling the question of who could purchase the so-called friar estates—all of these tasks required either the consultation of existing archives of land records or the generation of new land records, and oftentimes benefited from both.

While not knowing the extent of ceded lands was an important factor in planning for land disposition, another important aspect of the trouble was the domestic situation in the United States. The Philippine Bill, which allowed for the establishment of a civil government in the islands, showed the marks of negotiation that took into account public sentiment in the United States. Characterizing the land laws in the Philippines as “colored with excessive caution,” Jose S. Reyes wrote that “Such solicitude for the public lands, for the friar lands, for the mines, the forests, the franchises, and the public debts arose more out of conditions in American history and politics than from an objective examination of Philippine needs and problems.”

And, indeed, one strain of criticism of the colonial administration’s sale of lands to Americans was informed by an awareness of the United States’ dealings with American Indians.

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238 Charles Parkhurst warned, “I have been reading recently the book entitled ‘A Century of Dishonor’ which details with blood-curdling particularity the steps by which for a hundred years we have been trying to ‘elevate’ the aborigines of this country. And there is no reason to
amount of public land that individuals and corporations could purchase were the result of the combined forces of those individuals loathe to see American exploitation of native land and the various trusts, specifically that of sugar, that stood to lose business should the Philippines be left wide open to foreign investors.  

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suppose that we shall be any less heathenism in our dealings with savages around the other side of the globe than we are with those at home, in fact the more remote our government officials the less there can be expected of them, for it is by so much the harder to watch them, and watching an American official is the only way to keep him from devouring the people he is paid to take care of. There is no leech that will draw more blood or leave less life. So long as it is an understood thing that office is spoils we may well pray to be delivered from the responsibility of governing dependencies.” Parkhurst, 15-16. Natives fighting in the Philippines also noted this parallel; Lukban wrote, “Liberty and independence being then the very pure ideal which we are all pursuing, join me in the field so as to expel these deceitful Yankees, for they have come with the intention of exterminating us later, as they exterminated the Indians of America, who were the real owners of that land, and rather than have this happen to us, before a large number of Americans arrives, let us hurl ourselves against these who are already here, and let us wage a war without quarter against these heartless vandals; for when a people united as brothers are defending themselves, there is no army strong enough to conquer them. It is only necessary to note the striking example of our brothers of Luzon, who preferred to have their towns reduced to ashes and their presidents corpses rather than surrender. To-day Luzon is already independent, already enjoys the sweets of liberty, the fruit of four years’ constant warfare. Let us imitate them and let us persevere in the struggle until the longed-for independence is attained. “Lukban to the local presidentes of this province of Samar, Mountains of Samar, Exhibit 1323, Feb. 4, 1900,” in Philippine Insurrection against the United States, ed. Taylor, 5:637-8.

See, for example, Storey and Winslow to Taft, Dec. 20, 1911, vol. 4, Winslow papers, Michigan.
“People have asked why the ownership of real estate should not be as readily ascertained, and transferred as easily, as the ownership of stocks and bonds; they have asked, and with reason, if there was anything inherent to land which debarred it from taking its place in the march of progress and ridding itself of the old and outgrown forms and practices fastened upon it in some epoch remote and different from our own.”

--Associate Judge D.R. Williams, Court of Land Registration, 1903

It was in this political context that the Bureau of Public Lands was established (Act No. 218 of the Philippine Commission on September 2, 1901). Organized within the Department of the Interior, the Bureau had charge of all government-owned lands, except those that fell under the purviews of the Bureau of Forestry and the Bureau of Forestry. The act required that the chief of the bureau collect and maintain Spanish land records, devise a plan to organize the bureau informed by land laws in the Philippines under the Spanish regime and in the United States, organize and oversee the surveying of lands, and report on the extent and quality of government-owned lands.

Every one of the duties assigned to the bureau chief indicate how little the new colonial government knew about its acquired territory: the land records contained in the Spanish colonial state’s archives were not centralized, and the colonial administration anticipated that as the Spanish records were collected, they would be found to be unsatisfactory. Just as much as creating a system for organizing records, the new Bureau of Public Lands laid the groundwork for the colonial government to suggest the necessity of its continued existence and increasingly broad powers.

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While the charges of the Chief of the Bureau of Lands indicate the colonial government’s intention of refashioning the system that the Spanish colonial government already had in place, and that such a refashioning would require a good deal of effort, the chief’s various responsibilities also suggested that the Spanish system offered an object lesson in misadministration. Though the bureau chief was required to maintain the Spanish records and formulate a plan for the bureau’s organization with the former land system in mind, the bureau was nevertheless to be “framed as nearly after the organization of the Public Land Office in the United States” as would be allowed. Assignment of titles to land facilitated re-settlement of natives away from their ancestral lands; this re-settlement, in turn, provided the means and presumed mandate to establish postal and agricultural savings banks; the establishment of these institutions and, more generally, the inculcation of a sensibility about land settlement were lessons in political education under the Americans. Thus, the archives served the interests of the colonial state in more ways than one; the most important of these was to give evidential weight to the United States’ policy of “Benevolent Assimilation,” when all other experience and evidence belied the colonizers’ good intentions.

In the same year that the Bureau of Public Lands was organized, Governor-General Wright signed Executive Order 93 (June 2, 1902) to authorize the chief of the bureau to certify documents therein relating to title, just as would a notary or other official authorized to certify documents; the order indicated an effort to streamline the generation and processing of records, in light of the volume of documents to come.
Indeed, the legislation to organize the bureau and the executive order to expand the responsibilities of the bureau chief anticipated the work that would result from the passage of the Act 496, also known as the Land Registration Act. Passed by the Philippine Commission on November 6, 1902, the Land Registration Act enabled greater legislative and executive attention to be trained on building up an archive of land records to replace that ceded from Spain.

In the first year after the passage of the Land Registration Act, conditions in the islands required the law’s amendment. With the civil colonial government more firmly established, the Philippine Commission passed Act 627 on February 9, 1903; this act brought more land under the operation of the Land Registration Act, namely lands within military reservations, as well as lands that the United States wanted to purchase for military purposes. On March 26, the Land Registration Act was further amended, this time to detail the responsibilities of the Court of Land Registration and to provide for new forms for the Bureau of Public Land’s “Certificate of Acknowledgment” and “Form of Acknowledgement,” which were provided by the bureau to individuals seeking to register land. Further, this law mandated gathering of more information about such individuals, requiring the marital status of anyone applying for a grant, mortgage, or lease. These amendments reflected the incorporation of elements of the United States’ martial rule into the everyday workflow of newly-organized civilian entities, as well as the normalization of gathering information about governed individuals. In short, they
exemplify what Reynaldo Ileto has called “Knowing America’s Colony,” by means of creating a record of civil government lands.

Publications in the *Official Gazette* originating from the Bureau of Public Lands and the Court of Land Registration suggest that the imposition of the Land Registration Act met resistance. Two articles published in 1903 addressed questions of how and why people in the islands ought to apply to the state for access to lands. “Rules and regulations of the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands” provided a concise listing of the required elements to registering land title with the colonial government; it offered a more easily digested report of information that did the lengthy law itself, intended for a broader readership. The earlier of the two publications, an essay by an Associate Judge in the Court of Land Registration, “Operation of ‘Land Registration Act’” explained that the law was “an attempt to apply to dealings with real property the same rules which are now applied by business men the world over in their dealings with personal property.”

Whereas under the previous system, the colonial office housed the instruments of a title, the new system established the colonial office as the official center for all titles.

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241 The problems of the Bureau of Public Lands were not limited to a population averse to its programs, but also to internal factors. In addition to anecdotal evidence of the inadequacy of workers in the colonial government service, there is indication of this in the passage of Philippine Commission Act 876 on September 9, 1903, which including a section on “levying a penalty upon notary publics who fail to enter in the certification of instruments acknowledged by them the number, place of issue, and date of the cedula certificate of each of the parties to said instruments.”


If not registered with the bureau, the title was not legally recognized; likewise was the case for alterations to the title. In short, title ownership and transfer thereof began and ended with the new state. This system of land registration was established to alleviate doubts surrounding ownership of lands, which theretofore had made the negotiation of mortgages challenging and otherwise discourage “the purchase and sale of real estate, thus preventing that free movement of property so essential to the progress and prosperity of a country.”

The Philippine Commission’s efforts to develop a colonial economy continued with the passage of Act 926, also known as the Public Land Act, on October 7, 1903. This law outlined the different methods of acquiring public land, which required documentation of the same kind demanded by the Land Registration Act and, thus also contributed to the building up of a central depository of land records to replace the old, Spanish system. Shortly after the passage of the Land Registration Act, the Philippine Commission passed Act 1128 to differentiate the process of acquiring public lands containing coal and other public lands.244

On October 17, 1904, Governor-General Wright’s issued Executive Order 41 which designated the Chief of the Bureau of Archives as “the custodian of all title deeds, leases, contracts of sale or purchase, and other documents of title appertaining to unassigned Insular Government lands and buildings throughout the Archipelago, including the City of Manila, unless provided by law in specific instances.” Further, the

244 Philippine Commission Act 1128 (Apr. 28, 1904), An Act prescribing regulations governing the procedure for acquiring title to public coal lands in the Philippine Islands.
Chief of the Bureau of Archives was required to “furnish to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands certified copies of such of said documents as the latter may from time to time request.” For his part, the chief of the Bureau of Lands was obliged to provide to anyone interested in applying for title per the Public Land Act official blank forms—free of charge, in Spanish or English.\(^{245}\)

With the change of the Bureau of Archives to the Bureau of Archives, Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks in 1905, the Bureau of Lands worked with that office to register, survey, and administer the islands.\(^{246}\) While its work drew from the previous work of the United States’ and other imperial powers’ management of their territories, the bureau still faced numerous problems—both internally and in its interactions with natives.\(^{247}\) In 1906, Governor-General Ide issued Executive Order 31 to address the issue of people being unable to correctly fill out the official blank forms for title to land, mandating that municipal secretaries must prepare applications without charge for individuals seeking land within such secretaries’ municipalities.\(^{248}\) As the scope of the colonial government expanded, bureaucrats in the colonial state not only provided such


\(^{246}\) To facilitate the bureau’s execution of its expanded duties, the Philippine Commission passed Act 1491 on May 22, 1906, “providing for the education of Filipino students as surveyors.”

\(^{247}\) On drawing from the work of others, see Sanger to U.S. Secretary of the Interior Hitchcock, Jan. 9, 1902, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP; Sanger to U.S. Secretary of the Interior Hitchcock, Jan. 24, 1902, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP; Sanger to U.S. Secretary of the Interior Hitchcock, Sept. 4, 1902, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP; Sanger to U.S. Secretary of the Interior Hitchcock, Sept. 30, 1902, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP; Taft to Frear, Sept. 14, 1900, reel 31, Taft Papers, LOC; Carpenter to Tipton, Oct. 3, 1901, reel 33, Taft Papers, LOC; Tipton to Carpenter, Oct. 12, 1901, reel 33, Taft Papers, LOC.

\(^{248}\) Executive Order 31 (June 29, 1906).
services to the public; they also supplied information from the amassed land records to facilitate other colonial projects. The purpose of and challenges to the Bureau of Lands, when considered in tandem with the transactions that resulted in its records, illustrate the role that archives—the destroyed, the outdated Spanish, the new and modern American—were poised to play in remaking the Philippines into a land of homesteads and agricultural corporations.

While the purpose of imposing a new order on land through their survey and registration was to encourage small-scale agriculture among the natives through settlement of uninhabited lands, the imposition also created a context in which colonial administrators could readily envision the Philippines in familiar terms of progress.

Writing about his trip from Nueva Vizcaya to Isabela, Governor-General Forbes wrote:

We passed through most lovely country all the way, great rolling slopes of hills, mostly bare, and covered with waving grass and occasional bits of woodland that remind you of northern New York and the Geneseo valley, a paradise; and finally Isabela, a vast level plain, the cruel part of it all being that it’s wholly uncultivated. Here are thousands of square miles of country as lovely as any I

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249 On August 3, 1908, Governor-General Smith signed Executive Order 80 requiring the assistance of bureaus in the Bureau of Coast and Geodetic Survey’s efforts to make maps of the archipelago, by transmitting “a copy of all geographical information, including descriptive reports, which may have been collected by them or under their direction, including a copy of all maps or sketches which may have been prepared.” Philippine Commission Act 2325, passed on February 19, 1914, specified the public notices required for sale of lands; these specifications suggest not only the volume of records the new land laws mandated, but also the scope of regulations that the Bureau of Public Lands was required by law to ensure, namely published notice once a week for 6 consecutive weeks, in 2 newspapers, one in Manila and one (if there is one) near the land, one in English in an English-language paper, and one in Spanish in a Spanish-language paper, and at least 10 days after the last published notice, a notice posted near the land.
ever saw, ranging from 2500 to 1000 or less, feet above the sea, and not a soul nor a domestic animal in sight.\textsuperscript{250}

Forbes’ observation that the Philippine landscape might remind someone of northern New York and the Genesee Valley captures both his vision of promise and his unsympathetic view of many Filipinos’ aversion to leave their homes to settle in other parts of the archipelago. Such aversion disrupted the former Secretary of Commerce and Police’s plans for the development of unfarmed lands in the islands. Despite his political efforts, the “cruelty” of uncultivated land continued throughout Forbes’ administration, and the development of agriculture—large- and small-scale—falttered. Indeed, the lack of interest in resettling elsewhere continued beyond Forbes’ tenure as Governor-General; the Philippine Legislature passed an act that extended the offer of free patents to native settlers beyond the date determined in the Public Land Act, through the end of 1922.\textsuperscript{251} In this instance—of building up the core of the colonial archive with the newly registered land titles under the United States’ regime—failure was at least in part due to mistaken assumptions and expectations about how people in the islands would respond to new laws. As the duties of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands and Forbes’ push for native resettlement to other regions of the Philippines make clear, plans for the disposition and registration of land and the development of

\textsuperscript{250} Forbes journal, Apr. 22, 1911, Forbes Journals, MHS. Forbes’ eagerness to “vivify the whole agricultural life of the islands” by land registration and titles is expressed in his journal entry of September 17, 1910.

\textsuperscript{251} Philippine Legislature Act No. 2222 (Feb. 3, 1913), “An act further to amend section thirty-three, chapter four of act numbered nine hundred and twenty-six, entitled ‘The Public Land Act,’ as amended, by providing for the granting of free patents to native settlers until January first, nineteen hundred and twenty-three.”
agriculture in the islands in the first decade of the twentieth century were modeled on the homesteading of public lands in the western territories of the United States. The mistaken expectation was that the colonial government’s efforts on this front would yield results in the Philippines similar to those in the United States.

**Public Lands**

“The organization of these offices [Mining and Forestry] as well as others which have followed, under legislation of the Philippine Commission, took on a bureaucratic character, and thus from the beginning Philippine administration in American hands was unified, centralized, and made responsible to the chief executive of the archipelago.”

--David P. Barrows, 1917

In 1902, the Philippine Commission sent David P. Barrows to the United States for a month to investigate “the operation of Indian legislation and the organization of scientific work by the government,” paying special attention to “irrigation on reservations, land allotment, Indian police, and Indian education.”

The supposition driving Barrows’ research, and that of Taft and Worcester when they stopped over in Hawai‘i, was that the United States’ dealings with American Indians and Native Hawaiians would offer lessons for the new administration in the Philippines. As the first two decades of United States’ rule of the islands came to a close, Barrows could assess the organizational structure of the colonial administration. Though in this instance, the praiseworthy offices were the Bureau of Mining and the Bureau of Forestry, the ideal to which Barrows refers—central bureaucratic units accountable to


253 Barrows to Taft, Feb. 11, 1902, reel 4, Taft papers, LOC.
the highest colonial officer in the Philippines—was one to which the directors of the other bureaus, including the Bureau of Archives and the Bureau of Lands, aspired.

Given the relationship between the Bureau of Archives and the Bureau of Lands appertaining to the gathering or generation, filing, storage, and retrieval of land records, however, centralization had to be split between the two units. Though all of the departments of the colonial government transferred their “dead” records to the Bureau of Archives, the relationship between the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Archives was more involved because the latter maintained the inactive and active records of the Bureau of Lands. Whether documentation of routine transactions of the colonial government units or registered land titles, the volume of records destined for the archives promised to be considerable. Even so, the creation of records associated with the disposition of public lands (titles, announcements, surveys) and the labor involved (research of Spanish archives, drafting of American titles, surveying of Philippine land) may have been the most ambitious, beginning early and ranging broadly.

The Land Registration Act, passed in 1902, set into motion the enormous project of attaching titles to lands throughout the islands. The Land Registration Act outlined the different ways that Philippine citizens, United States citizens, and citizens of other United States territories could acquire land in the Philippines—by demonstrating their continuous occupation of a parcel of land, by identifying land on which to homestead, by lease, by perfecting titles, grants or concessions obtained under Spanish sovereignty,
or by purchase. The application process for making claim to land varied, but taken together, they all served to map the islands as a place of potential agricultural development. The voluminous records that constituted the application process also constituted an archive of land records that displaced the system operated under the Spanish regime. Even so, Filipinos were not eager to apply for titles to land by any of the means outlined by the Americans. In the first few years after the passage of the Land Registration Act, turnout was low, and the colonial government needed to identify ways to promote their project.

The result was a primer, published by the Bureau of Lands in 1906, that answered common questions relating to the acquisition of land. In addition to answering questions about which land was covered by the Public Land Law and how to obtain a free patent to public land, the primer also provided some explanatory context for why the public land law was in place. The primer explained that the reason there was so little private land in the islands was “Because the Filipinos have not tried hard to get land of their own. They have worked on the lands of other people. They have not often enough sought and planted new land for themselves.” Explaining why Filipinos did not “try to get land for themselves,” the primer offered that “They did not know where the public land was. They did not know how to get it. Also they did not like to move away from their homes to distant places. If a man wishes to have land and a home of his own, he must be willing to leave for a while his town and his amusements and friends. This is the way the early settlers of America and many other countries
In short, the primer’s ultimately faulty reasoning was that with some explanation of the project and the process, Filipinos would be eager to acquire title to land. The problem, supposed the bureaucrats at the Bureau of Lands, was a lack of information. While they were wrong in their identification of the problem, the resulting primer nevertheless provides a glimpse into why and how the colonial government sought to administer the disposition of lands and thus create a body of land records.

Current Occupants Claiming Title

“Suppose the public land I wish is already occupied by someone. If the person living on the land is a person who has a right to gain a homestead or a free patent, he must be told his rights and given one hundred and twenty days to ask for the land. He has first claim during that one hundred and twenty days. If he does not ask the Government for the land he must leave the land. If he does not leave it you may ask the Director of Lands to compel him to leave.”

A person seeking to settle on public land had to determine that the land was public and available, by researching old Spanish land records, consulting longtime residents of the area, and determining the history of tax payments on the desired land. Of course, this route for acquiring public land was active, beginning with an individual who sought land and thus set into motion a series of inquiries into the records of the Spanish colonial regime that were held at the provincial level or centrally at the Bureau of Lands or the Bureau of Archives. The Bureau of Land’s Primer Containing Questions and Answers on the Public Land Laws in Force in the Philippine Islands suggests

\[\text{\textsuperscript{254}}\text{ Department of Interior, Bureau of Public Lands, Philippine Islands, Primer Containing Questions and Answers on the Public Land Laws in Force in the Philippine Islands (Manila: Government Printing Office, 1906), 4.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{255}}\text{ Ibid., 13.}\]
something different. The hypothetical question here—of how to deal with public land already occupied—illustrates how engagement with the colonial government could be reactive; research into the existing land records created under the Spanish regime and the generation of new land records under the American regime could very likely be the resulting effort of someone who simply desired not to be evicted from the land.

While this American system for simultaneously accommodating settlers and documenting the expansive arable land of the archipelago was severe, and it found its antecedent in the Spanish colonial government’s land laws. An unsigned report submitted to William Howard Taft in 1901 indicates how Spanish public land law would inform those to be imposed by the American colonial government in the Philippines.

Under the Spanish system orders of sale could be made upon petition of private parties or at the instance of the administration. Only residents of the Philippine Islands could acquire land, and all land was saleable, except those that had passed to private ownership, those belonging to forest zones and those which were found within a limit of the commons belonging to towns or within zones which had been granted to the towns for the use of the people.

There seems to have been no limit to the amount of the land which could be sold, but all sales had to be for cash, at the current market price of the land in the province, determined by the average price per hectare [sic] obtained in the sale and adjustment of land values during the five years preceding. In the case of two applicants for the same land the land was sold at auction to the highest bidder. All sales had to be after due notice and advertisement. Parties in possession of alienable lands at the time of the passage of the act, February 13, 1804, could obtain title deeds to the property provided they fulfilled one of the following three conditions: To hold or have held the lands under cultivation without interruption during six years preceding. To have held them in possession uninterruptedly during the preceding twelve years, having them under cultivation at the time of the possessory proceedings and during three years preceding thereto. Third, to have held them in possession ostensibly and
without interruption during thirty or more years, although the land had not been under cultivation.

Lands could also be granted to organizations forming colonies upon special terms in each case, or by grant to agricultural colonies as an aid thereto.  

Under the Spanish system, most public lands were available for purchase—after notice and advertisement—by residents of the islands. There was no limit on the amount of land that could be bought, but it could not be had on credit and was awarded to the highest bidder. In instances where people were already living on land eligible for sale, proof of cultivation of or continuance residence on the land qualified them for titles before others.

As it turned out, the Public Land Law, enacted October 7, 1903, nearly a century after the Spanish land law was passed, reflected the United States colonial administration’s attention to the land laws of the previous regime. Under the Public Land Law, natives were eligible to receive “free patents” for lands on which they lived, if they met certain criteria. These criteria were not identical to the Spanish land laws of 1804, but were similar in principle insofar as they limited the persons who could acquire land in the Philippines. To obtain a free patent, A Filipino must have lived on and cultivated the land “From August 1, 1898, to the present time. If his ancestors have occupied and cultivated the land during part of this time and he the rest of the time, he is entitled to a free patent. Also, if he and his ancestors continuously occupied and cultivated the land from August 1, 1895, to August 1, 1898, and from July 4, 1902 to July 256

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256 “Summary of Land Laws of Hawaii, United States, and the Philippines (under Spain).” Reel 34, Taft Papers, LOC.
26, 1904, he may claim a free patent, even if he and his ancestors did not live on the land between August 1, 1898, and July 4, 1902. The challenge lay in providing sufficient proof of continuous occupation and cultivation, but given the eagerness of colonial administrators for natives to register land title, the application process was less onerous than one may expect.

If a native met these criteria, he could then provide a written application to the provincial treasurer who also served as the local land officer. The application required statement of name, age, address, and whether the applicant was a native of the Philippines; it also required the name of the province he occupied, a description of the land, a statement that no one else already occupied the land, a statement of how long the applicant or his ancestors had lived on the land, and a statement of any improvements made to the land. “If the claim is based on the holding of land by an ancestor, the name of the ancestor and satisfactory evidence of the date and place of his death and burial must be given.” By so doing, the native provided the colonial government with a description of himself as well as the land it had annexed from Spain.

How this system would ideally work for the generation of land records is clear: A man would come upon land he cared to own. If another man already lived there, he would be told of the first man’s desire to live on the land, and if he wanted to continue to live where he was, would apply to the Bureau of Lands for the right to homestead or for a free patent. If he chose not to apply to the Bureau of Lands, he would have

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257 Philippines, Department of Interior, Bureau of Public Lands, Primer, 5.
258 Ibid., 6.
approximately four months to arrange to leave the land. At that point, the first man could come and live upon the land and cultivate it. Regardless of who ended up living on and holding title to the land, that parcel would be accounted for in the land records.

**Homesteads**

“Why does the Government give homesteads to people? Because it is better for the people have land and homes of their own than to work for other people and live on the lands of others. People who have their own homes are better citizens and more prosperous than those who do not.”

Under the homesteads section of the Public Land Law, citizens of the Philippines, United States, or any of the United States’ insular possessions were entitled to a homestead. The widespread settlement of Americans in the Philippines, however, was considered unlikely; at most, discharged American military men, Americans in the colonial civil service, and their families were anticipated to live extended periods in the islands. Still, the land grab in the western territories of the United States offered a model for some Americans in the islands. For these people, the prospect of homesteading or purchasing lands in the archipelago had some appeal.

Indeed, the war between Americans and Filipinos had hardly begun when the Bureau of Insular Affairs began fielding questions from Americans about the

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259 Ibid., 7.
260 See, for example, Hamilton Wright et al, *America Across the Seas: Our Colonial Empire* (New York: C.S. Hammond and Company, 1909), 13. Wright observed, “Those men of our early West who divided their time between shooting the skulking Indians and cultivating their crops were not greater pioneers than the soldier boys in the Philippines who have turned farmers. But the white man has not proved a ménage to his Malay brothers. The population of the Philippines has increased twelvefold since the Spaniards came. While, on the other hand, the American Indians either perished in resisting civilization or in succumbing to it, the Malay profits by contact with civilization.”
homesteading and investment prospects in the islands. Individuals inquired about what kinds of crops were suitable for the climate, how much land private individuals and companies could acquire, what support the United States government would provide for prospective American homesteaders, and whether the United States would honor Spanish concessions.\footnote{261} If some Americans thought they might make their name and fortune through service in the colonial government, others considered, with colonial government subsidies, finding their way through private enterprise.

The trouble that the colonial government faced in selling or homesteading public lands was more than enticing Americans from the United States or recently-relieved United States soldiers. The colonial government was unsure which lands could be made available. A Bureau of Lands primer on public lands offered only this:

The public lands have not been surveyed under either Spanish or American rule. Therefore, it is not known exactly where they are. You may find out by asking the old residents of a town. You may also learn something from the old “Registro de Propiedad” and the “Register of Deeds” now kept. Here you may find whether the land has been registered. The provincial treasurer will tell you if the land has ever been taxed. If not, it is probably public land.\footnote{262}
Without a reliable survey of public lands at their disposal, the best that representatives of the colonial government could offer was directions to people who might be able to determine ownership. While such an assessment of the colonial government’s handle on the status of ownership of lands caused some embarrassment to an administration eager to make economic inroads, the condition of the records—or more accurately, the absence of them—precipitated an ambitious cadastral survey under the Forbes administration as well as special reports of investigations into existing records from the chief of the Bureau of Archives.\(^{263}\)

To obtain a patent to unoccupied public land per the homestead sections of the Public Land Law, applicants followed a course similar to that of applicants for free patents for land they or their ancestors had occupied. First, a prospective homesteader identified the land he wished to own and checked with the provincial treasurer/land officer who, in turn, determined whether the identified land was public or not, “as far as his records show.” The prospective homesteader then completed and returned to the land officer a “Homestead Application, B.L. Form No. 7.” This application form asked for the name and address of the applicant, statement of where the land was located, statement that the land was primarily for farming and “contains no coal, salt, or valuable mineral, like silver or gold,” statement that no one was already living on the land, statement that the homestead is for the applicant himself, and a description of the

\(^{263}\) Bureau of Archives, Philippine Islands, *Special Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Archives to the Honorable Civil Governor through the Secretary of Public Instruction: Lands of Arroceros and Aguados* (Manila: Bureau of Public Printing, 1904).
The applicant was then required to have the form notarized and returned to the provincial treasurer/land officer with the application fee of ten pesos. Having turned in the form, the applicant then returned to the land and cultivated it; after five years, the applicant needed two men who would swear to his having lived on the land for five years, then send this “final proof” to the Bureau of Lands, along with another fee of ten pesos. Upon receipt of this final payment, the status of the land was recognized and official: “The Government will then give you a paper called a ‘patent’ or ‘title.’ This paper says that you own the land. No one can take that land from you. The Government, before giving you the patent, will survey, or measure carefully, the land. The Government will pay the expense of this survey.”

Thus, these records passed through many hands—statements from the applicant, notarization from a certified notary, review by the provincial treasurer, transmittal to the Bureau of Lands in Manila, and finally the issuance of a patent to the applicant. Through this process, the extant Spanish land records were complemented and perfected, resulting in American land records that conformed to the requirements outlined by the new regime’s land laws. In short, as in the case of current occupants making claims on lands, the application process for homesteads served the twofold purposes of providing information on individuals and on land.

_Lease and Purchase_

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264 Philippines, Department of Interior, Bureau of Public Lands, _Primer_, 10.
The Public Land Law instituted a similar application process for the leasing of public lands. The prospective lessee had to submit to the provincial treasurer/land officer an application with his name, address, and citizenship, as well as a statement that the land did not contain valuable minerals or timber and was more valuable for agricultural purposes than all others. In addition, however, people or corporations who intended to lease public lands had to make public notice of their intention in no less than in six places: in one Manila newspaper (in Spanish and English), “a place on the land where it can be easily seen,” “At the front door of the municipal building of the municipality in which the land is located,” “On the bulletin board of the barrio in which the land is located, if any,” and “On the bulletin board at the office of the Bureau of Lands.” In this instance, the transaction between applicant and land bureau invited more attention than did the application process for free patents or homesteads.

With the establishment of a system for the registration of public land in the Philippines, the system by which public lands could be purchased was also elucidated. As mentioned above, a number of forces appear to have been at work in the crafting of these regulations. While the homesteading section of the land law provided the means by which private individuals could purchase land, this section of the land law provided the means by which groups of individuals or corporations could purchase land. The most important aspect of the law was the restriction on the number of hectares that a corporation could purchase; the law provided that corporations could own no more

\[265\text{Ibid., 15.}\]
than 2500 acres for commercial agriculture. The law provided one loophole for corporations, however, and that was that there were no limits on the amount of land that could be acquired for the irrigation of lands purchased for commercial agriculture.

*Unperfected Titles and Spanish Grants and Concessions*

The colonial government also had to deal with instances where individuals claimed title to land but had no proof that they had acquired it from the Spanish colonial government previous to the arrival of the United States in the Philippines. For the most part, the procedure for individuals claiming to have had title to land under Spanish rule was similar as that for individuals looking to purchase, lease, or settle land, or make claim to land by their own or ancestral occupation; the exception was that the former could make their claims through either the provincial treasurer/land officer or the Court of Land Registration rather than through the provincial treasurer/land officer per se. The reasons provided for why individuals would have to confirm their claim to land through the United States colonial government were that “the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands has held that no title can be acquired against the Government by prescription,” and that “there is no other way of obtaining registered title to your property, as the old methods of *Infomracions Posesorias*, etc., were done away with by the Code of Civil Procedure.”

The regulations that governed obtaining title in this way served to send documents through several offices for final approval and disposition.

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266 Ibid., 17.
The Department of the Interior anticipated that the enormity of the project of correcting imperfect titles and accounting for titles made under Spanish rule would raise the simple question of “Why?” The answer referred back to the relationship between war and archives: “Because all the land records in the Islands, with the exception of three or four provinces, were destroyed and no record exists showing what lands were thus disposed of by the Government.” The destruction of records during the wars created the pretext for the implementation of the United States colonial policy of recordkeeping for the disposition of land.

Friar Lands

It is impossible to give chapter and verse in underhand dealings of which the records, if they exist, can only be got at under another Administration.

Erving Winslow

In 1900, the records of underhand dealings to which Erving Winslow referred pertained to the deal brokered between the United States and the religious orders with land interests in the islands. When the United States purchased the Philippines from Spain per the Treaty of Paris, the United States acquired the public lands, also known as Crown lands. The United States did not and could not make claim to lands owned by private individuals or corporations, including the lands owned by the religious orders. These lands, commonly referred to as the “friar lands” presented a multi-faceted problem for the United States, but it was basically this: Spanish friars were well known to abuse their power in the islands, and when the Philippine Revolution of 1896 broke

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267 Ibid. See also Travelogue, Apr. 25, 191901, LeRoy Papers, BHL.
268 Winslow to Welsh, Mar. 15, 1900, Welsh Papers, Michigan.
out, many of these friars left the church estates for fear of punishment or death at the hands of native revolutionaries. With acceptance of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, the question of what would happen to the friars remained. It was a disservice to all parties, it seemed, to allow the friars to return to the estates—Spanish friars had reason to fear for their safety, Filipinos had reason to loathe their return, and Americans would appear to condone their abuses if they allowed them to.

The solution that Civil Governor William Howard Taft brokered with the Vatican was the purchase of the friar lands and the provision for the friars’ departure from the Philippines. This occurred over the course of two years and resulted in the purchase of the friar lands in 1904. The agreed-upon price for the friar lands was eventually made public, and thought by some to exceed their market value; others argued that the political peace enabled by the purchase was worth any monetary price. In the end, the United States Congress agreed to loan the money required for the purchase of the friar lands to the colonial government in the Philippines.

Thus indebted, the government of the Philippines was under obligation—how pressing the obligation was debatable—to aggressively sell lands, the profit from which would help to repay the loan from the government of the United States. Writing to Governor-General Smith in 1908, Bureau of Insular Affairs Chief Clarence Edwards saw a discrepancy between his view of the status of Friar estates and those maintained in the Philippines, noting that “when Worcester was here he expressed confidence in the way Captain Sleeper was taking hold, and everybody knows what a good reputation he has
for executive ability, but after looking over these figures and trying to analyze them, I concluded that I am from Missouri, and I can't see where he, or anybody else, can gain any comfort out of such analysis, or for the future.”269 Less than two years later as the controversy about the friar lands was beginning to stir, Edwards wrote to Smith’s successor, Governor-General Forbes expressing the same reservations about the handling of the lands in the Philippines; he observed that the Philippine Commission’s recommendation that corporations be permitted to purchase land at 6,000 hectares at a time could not come at “a more inopportune moment,” as the trend toward the conservation of natural resources in the United States gained currency.270 Edwards’ successor, Frank McIntyre, wrote to Governor-General Gilbert that to facilitate the sale of the friar lands, the Philippine Commission should see to it that a law “making the price more elastic.”271 Such expressions of doubt and concern account for what would be later characterized by defenders of the colonial administration as pressure to expeditiously repay the debt incurred by the colonial state to purchase the friar lands.

Indeed, the means of easing this debt—namely, selling the friar lands—caused controversy. More specifically, the controversy surrounded three sales: the alleged proposed purchase of 55,000 acres by the Mindoro Development Company which was suspected of being connected with the “Sugar Trust” of the United States, the purchase of lands by a relative of the Secretary of the Interior Dean C. Worcester, and the

269 Edwards to Smith, May 16, 1908, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP.
270 Edwards to Forbes, Apr. 19, 1910, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP.
271 McIntyre to Gilbert, May 23, 1912, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP. Manuel Quezon agreed; see Quezon to Jones, Feb. 14, 1912, reel 2, Quezon Papers, BHL.
purchase of lands by Executive Secretary Frank W. Carpenter. The controversy turned on whether the restrictions on the purchase of public lands relative to the extent allowed for purchase by individuals and corporation per Act No. 496, more commonly known as the Land Registration Act, applied to the purchase of friar lands.

Of course, views of the propriety of these purchases varied, as did interpretations of the meanings of large land purchases by Americans. Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs Frank McIntyre wrote to former Philippine Commission David Barrows that he saw no problem with the actions; he thought that the controversy surrounding Carpenter was really a problem of perception, while he was surprised by Worcester’s lack of supporters and defenders.\footnote{McIntyre to Barrows, July 21, 1910, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP.} The Anti-Imperialist League determined to send a letter of protest regarding the sale of friar lands to President Taft, noting that such sales “tend to postpone the independence of the Philippine Islands and to embarrass the relations between the islands and the United States by creating interests adverse to the interests of the Filipino people.”\footnote{Anti-Imperialist League to Taft, Dec. 30, 1911, Winslow Papers, Michigan. The decision to send this letter is noted in the Executive Committee meeting minutes of the Anti-Imperialist League, Dec. 28, 1911, Winslow Papers, Michigan.} The Resident Commissioners in the United States, Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmeña, did not object to the sale of friar lands to individuals up to 40 acres per person, but Quezon did understand that the questions raised by the scandal had significant bearing on the people of the Philippines.
For Manuel Quezon, the question of the friar land estates raised “the question of the illegality of permitting Americans to purchase lands in the Philippines, a thing the Philippine Government has been allowing for years and years and nobody has paid any attention to it, nor found any fault with it,” as well as the purpose of the United States having acquired the friar lands in the first place. In Quezon’s estimation, the purpose of the acquisition—“to sell these lands to their tenants on easy terms, even at a loss to the Philippine Government, in order to settle an agrarian question and a system of “absentee landlordism”—was woefully unrealized when “tenants on all these friar estates are discontented and assert that they are treated worse by the Government than they were by the friars.”

Looking back on the inquiry, Quezon wrote to Representative Martin (D-Colorado), who had led the investigation; the Philippine statesman, even in light of the administrators’ exoneration, wrote that some good had been achieved. Had attention not been drawn to the actions of colonial administrators, and the questions of ownership and purpose broached, “It would, in the long run, have

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274 Quezon and Osmena to Garrison, Apr. 29, 1913, reel 3, Quezon Papers, BHL; Quezon to Winslow, May 18, 1912, reel 2, Quezon Papers, BHL.
275 Quezon to Jones, Feb. 14, 1912, reel 2, Quezon papers, BHL. Complaints from tenants are also referenced in McIntyre to Governor-General, Feb. 3, 1911, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP. In his “Disposition of the Friar Lands” in the House of Representatives, Quezon sounded what would become his familiar call for Philippine independence: “If to be free we must keep the Philippines undeveloped, if to be free we must refuse to admit foreign capital into the islands, if to be free we must be poor and remain poor, we will unanimously and unhesitatingly prefer to be poor but free, than to be rich but subjects.” Manuel Quezon, Disposition of the Friar Lands (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1912), 16.
deprived the Filipinos of their resources, and place them forever in political
bondage.\textsuperscript{276}

A congressional committee was appointed to investigate the actions of the
colonial administration, and the majority of the committee found the three accused
parties to be not guilty of any wrongdoing, either in the letter or spirit of the public land
laws. The committee ultimately submitted four reports. Of the three minority reports,
one was signed by five members, a second by three members, and the final by a single
member. The majority committee, with nine members signing, reasoned that the
public lands laws applied only to lands that had been transferred from Spain to the
United States. They did not apply to the friar lands, which were purchased through
dealings between the Vatican and the Philippine government, not the United States
government. Not only were the accused cleared of charges of wrongdoing, they were,
according to the majority report, to be commended for taking seriously the financial
obligations of the colonial government to the United States Congress and doing all in
their power to sell the friar lands profitably.

The friar lands scandal highlights two of the issues that were central to the
colonial government’s administration of lands. The first of these was the importance of
differentiation of types of land, as public, private, or friar. This differentiation depended
upon reliable recordkeeping under the Spanish regime, and the proper transfer of such
records to the United States upon its occupation of the islands. Second, the

\textsuperscript{276} Quezon to Martin, Jan. 10, 1914, reel 4, Quezon Papers, BHL.
investigation of the colonial government’s dealings required examination of the current condition of records in the Philippines. For those accused of wrongdoing, they would have been better situated had the hearings and investigations been held in the Philippines. There resided the vast majority of records, such as they were. As it turned out, however, the hearings were held in Washington, D.C., requiring Governor-General Forbes, Secretary of the Interior Worcester, and Executive Secretary Carpenter to deliver themselves and select materials to the investigating committee. Worcester bitterly estimated that “some 8 tons of records” were transported from the Philippines to the United States for the hearings.\(^\text{277}\) The requirements of this investigation occasioned an assessment of the condition of records in the Philippines, whether ceded from the former Spanish colonial government or created by the current American colonial government.

The sections of the Treaty of Paris appertaining to the transfer or reproduction of colonial records indicates that the United States and Spanish governments anticipated that these questions would arise. The Land Registration Act and the Public Lands Act, coupled with the shared workflow of the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Archives, underscored the absence of records or inadequacy those records existing records. Underlying all aspects of the disposition of land—whether private, public, or formerly owned by religious orders—were the economic questions of how the land of the Philippines could be used most profitably for United States interests, who should be

\(^{277}\) Worcester to Reighard, Dec. 12, 1910, box 6, Jacob Ellsworth Reighard Papers, BHL.
permitted to use the land, and who should be able to determine these matters. The establishment of the Bureau of Lands in 1903, and its eventual cooperation with the Bureau of Archives, Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, answered these questions in part.

**Carabao and “this nefarious organization”**

While settling questions of land title in the face of less-than-ideal conditions was sometimes achieved, getting a handle on such recordkeeping did not eliminate other problems appertaining to developing a colonial agricultural economy. The establishment, use, and misuse of a system of registration of brands for cattle, for example, is an example of how social and political conditions in the islands prompted the creation of a system, but how precisely those same conditions enabled negotiation of that system in ways not intended or desired by the colonial administration. That such a well-planned government business of carabao branding was nevertheless open to this exploitation underscores not only the ingenuity with which people engaged and resisted a system that discounted the degree to which the ravages of war made such seemingly simple plans impracticable.

The spread of rinderpest throughout the islands was a persistent problem for people in the Philippines in the first decades of the twentieth century. Just as the colonial administration aggressively sought to survey the arable land in the archipelago and encourage native settlement on tracts previously uninhabited and unfarmed, the islands’ carabao—the cattle crucial to agricultural endeavor all over the islands—were
dying in droves of the spreading viral infection. Thus, concurrent with the drive to
survey and settle land, the colonial administration prioritized the containment of the
disease. The Government Laboratories was established under the purview of the
Secretary of the Interior, and the pressure on the government scientists to provide relief
was enormous, immediate, and unrelenting. 278

While the problem of sickness among carabao was well-documented and oft-
reported, the problem of carabao theft and the conditions that gave rise to it were, and
remain, less well-known. This difference may be accounted for in the difference in the
remaining records on the topics. Whereas the deaths of carabao on such a large scale
were significant for the economic development of the islands and therefore reported
annually, the problem of carabao theft was, by comparison, quite small. 279 While the
government stood to lose money on the spread of rinderpest, those who stood to gain
and lose the most from the thefts were not so numerous or powerful to garner much
attention. Nevertheless, the emergence of carabao theft came into being as a result of

278 The friction between Chief of the Bureau of Agriculture Frank Lamson-Scribner and the
Secretary of the Interior, Dean Worcester, to whom he reported is well documented, at least
from Lamson-Scribner’s point of view, and resulted in the Philippine Commission’s request for
his resignation, Taft to Lamson-Scribner, Feb. 24, 1904, box 4, Lamson-Scribner Papers, LOC.
Writing of Worcester, Lamson-Scribner observed that, “He is a man for whom I have no respect
in any capacity, and is a dangerous man to be given so much power as the Commissioners
possess.” Lamson-Scribner to Galloway, Oct. 15, 1903, box 3, Lamson-Scribner Papers, LOC. For
more descriptions of his working conditions in the Philippines, see Lamson-Scribner to Galloway,
May 30, 1903, box 3; Lamson-Scribner to Wilson, June 10, 1903, box 3; and Lamson-Scribner to
Galloway, Apr. 19, 1903, box 3, Lamson-Scribner Papers, LOC.

279 The scrapbook collection of Archibald Ward, an American veterinarian sent to the Philippines
to see to the epidemic, neatly captures the scope and tenor of media coverage in the Philippines.
In addition to reportage of measures considered and taken, local outlets analyzed, critiqued,
and sometimes praised administration for its efforts; discussion of possible remedies, the extent
of the problem, and its causes were also routine. See Archibald R. Ward Papers, #6596, RMC.
the upheaval of war, military occupation, and the establishment of civil rule, and it provided a glimpse into how archives and recordkeeping could at once enable and document its own undermining.

Philippine Commission Act No. 1147 (May 3, 1904) designated the Bureau of Archives, Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks as the repository of brands for cattle either to be used for work animals or for food, beginning with the 1904-1905 fiscal year. Based on its own records, the bureau estimated 250,000 cattle owners in the islands, in addition to those owned by the colonial government and individuals in areas without municipal governments, namely those territories designated as those of the “non-Christian tribes.” The responsibility of registering cattle brands was added to the “unlimited labour, already burdening this office, since the concentration of the notarial protocols and the annexation of the Patents, Copyrights, and Trade-Marks office.”

The bureau’s work relating to cattle branding had several aspects to it, each presenting particular challenges. The first of these was volume. Given that the purpose of the sections of Act No. 1147 pertaining to the cattle brands was to ensure the distinctiveness of the brands and the maintenance of their clear and orderly record, the bureau faced an enormous task. These hundreds of thousands of brands were to be collected in books made especially for them, which had been distributed to the provincial offices; when these books were filled with brands and reviewed by provincial officers, they would be forwarded to the bureau in Manila for final approval and storage.

In principle, such a system would work smoothly even with the large population of cattle owners in the islands, but this turned out not to be the case.

Errors in the required forms proved to be an issue for the final registration of cattle brands, even after a circular with instructions was provided to provincial officers. At the bureau, clerks examined the copies of the brands but found that “the majority of these documents are received deficient and do not state the age, civil status and occupation of the owners.” Eventually, the chief of the bureau considered it expedient to change the policy, so that brands were sent monthly to the Manila office rather than immediately upon their recording in the province; for one reason or another, however, these instructions were unheeded by provincial officers. In his annual report for the year 1908, Yriarte mused that, “Though this instruction was complied with by some, others continue using the old method, perhaps because of their not having received the letter of this division, which doubtless was lost, or because they considered their system to be better than that proposed by the writer.”

Reporting on August 15, 1905, the bureau chief noted that the archives had received brands from 290 municipalities, returned 4,868 for correction, and of those received only 527. In total, the bureau registered 11,236 brands.\textsuperscript{281} The registration of cattle gradually picked up momentum, and for the year 1905-1906, 10,998 brands had been registered. In the year 1907-1908, 13,000 brands were registered, while 31,796

\textsuperscript{281} Report of the Bureau of Archives, Patents, Copyrights, and Trade-Marks, Aug. 15, 1905, RG 350, NACP. Yriarte further reported that “Four hundred thirteen municipalities have not yet sent in their brands and the brands of the private citizens resident within their jurisdictional limits.”
were received and 124 returned for correction. In the year 1908-1909, 28,000 brands were registered, while 18,620 were received and 1,255 returned for correction. In the year 1909-1910, 30,000 brands were registered, while 17,569 were received and 353 returned for correction. In 1911-1912, 14,647 brands were received, and of these, 2,460 were returned for correction. In 1915-1916, 18,000 brands were registered, while 19,875 brands were received and 1,950 returned for correction. These numbers not only show the number of brands registered and the number of records in need of correction; they also illustrate the bureau’s back-log of work in this aspect.

Nevertheless, the bureau continued to complain about the manner in which provincial officers completed the required forms, and as the registration of cattle became a larger and larger project of the bureau, these complaints became more pointed:

Sixty-two thousand eight hundred and forty-two copies of brands have been received. Eleven thousand five hundred and forty-six of these were returned as defective, of which 2,259 have been returned by the municipalities duly corrected. Ten thousand nine hundred and eighty-nine brands have been registered. The number of copies of brands received since the establishment of the service to date, with the exception of those returned which have not been corrected, is 75,563. […]

A total of 3,209 letters have been sent to municipal treasurers returning defective brands above mentioned, which is more than sufficient proof of the fact that, in spite of the efforts made by this office to regulate the system by giving those official definite and precise instructions and furnishing them with printed forms for the copies of brands, they remain in complete ignorance as to the form in which they should comply with the law in this respect, omitting necessary details in the forms or filling them in erroneously. The persistent repetition of so many errors of omission reached the point where this office found it necessary to call upon the provincial treasurers to understand that it is
their duty, pursuant to section 3 of the Act [No. 1147], to prevent the
registration of brands having similarity to those already registered. [...] 

The facts stated show very clearly that the greatest burden imposed upon the
Division is the registration of cattle brands, not by reason of the actual work of
registration and filing of copies of brands, provided all of these come to it in legal
form, but because of the constant struggle to keep up with the correspondence
made necessary by ignorant, careless and dilatory municipal officers. ²⁸²

One might reasonably suppose that the work of maintaining and developing the colonial
government’s archive would be the most burdensome work of the bureau, but the
above excerpt from the Executive Secretary indicates that the back-and-forth that
characterized the process of registering a cattle brand proved more burdensome.

Nevertheless, the cause of the “greatest burden” was the same potential problem of
even the most well-designed recordkeeping system, such as that of the Executive
Bureau described earlier in this chapter: human error. In this instance, the humans
erring were not Executive Bureau clerks distinguished by their “gross carelessness,” but
the “ignorant, careless and dilatory municipal officers.”

This dissatisfaction with the native population was compounded by the rise in
cattle stealing that inadequate documentation, in concert with a loophole in Act No.
1147, made possible. The areas of the Philippines designated as “non-Christian” and the
city of Manila were exempted from the requirements of cattle branding, and while the
designation of regions in northern Luzon and the southern islands had little effect on

²⁸² Report of the Executive Secretary, Sept. 1, 1906, RG 350, NACP.
cattle stealing, Manila’s exemption, its lack of cattle registration laws, and its central location provided means to subvert the bureau’s charge of cattle registration.

In the years after the official end of hostilities between United States and Philippine forces, there arose what Executive Secretary A.W. Fergusson termed “this nefarious organization,” composed of cattle stealers and cattle owners taking advantage of the disconnect between the records held at the bureau and those of the city of Manila. The scheme went like this: the carabao owner and his accomplice, “the stealer,” from province X would agree to allow the “stealer” to take a number of carabao from the owner’s property, and register them in Manila under an assumed, agreed-upon name. With these “gilt-edged” papers, the stealer would take the carabao to a neighboring province Y for sale. After some time, the owner of the cattle would go to the neighboring province Y to recover his carabao, known as such thanks to his cattle brand registered at the Bureau of Archives, Patents, Copy-rights, and Trademarks under Province X, and upon threat of suing its purchaser for possession of stolen property, would recover his carabao. The owner would have proper claim, because his brand was officially registered with Bureau; the buyer could not know of the scheme, because the papers the stealer presented to him at the time of sale were for a carabao whose brand was officially registered with the city of Manila.283 This scheme was possible, of course, because the registers of cattle brands in Manila were separate from the registers of

283 Report of the Executive Secretary, Sept. 1, 1906, RG 350, NACP. Fergusson named only Rizal and Bulacan as being sites of operation for the scheme but suggested that it also occurred in other provinces surrounding Manila. Fergusson renewed his call for legislation to address cattle stealing in his 1907 report, Report of the Executive Secretary, Oct. 20, 1907, RG 350, NACP.
provincial cattle brands in the Bureau of Archives, Patents, Copy-rights and Trademarks. If the registers were unified, the carabao would have been discovered as stolen as soon as an attempt was made to register it under an assumed name.

The call for legislation that would bring the registration of cattle in Manila together with registration in the rest of the islands was renewed in the following years. These requests, however, couched in continued accounts of insubordinate provincial offices and the bad press received in the local media, went unheeded until late in 1908. On November 20 of that year, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila passed Ordinance No. 106 to regulate the registration and branding of cattle, thus in part silencing “the clamors of the local press and the complaints of governors of adjoining provinces, which caused so much harm to agriculture in said provinces, as stolen animals were brought to Manila, and due to the defects of procedure in such cases, were easily provided with legal certificates and then shipped to other distant provinces.”

With the passage of municipal Ordinance No. 106, the circulation of cattle brand registers grew in accordance with the new law. Manila’s City Assessor was provided with copies of brands of cattle in the provincial municipalities, townships, and rancherias. And because the ordinance was expected to address the problem of property theft, the Secret Service Department was also furnished with cattle brand registers of the provinces of Bulacan, Cavite, Batangas, Laguna, Tayabas, and Rizal, “in order to enable them to cooperate with the provincial authorities in the arrest of cattle

284 Report of the Chief of Archives, Patents, Copyrights, and Trade-Marks, 1909, RG 350, NACP.
thieves.” The systems thought to be perfect for keeping records were thus imperfect; the streamlining systems ballooned in size. Along these lines, there could flourish a “nefarious organization” designed to steal money from would-be carabao buyers, using precisely the system designed as part of the larger project to get all the elements—land, labor, farm animals—in place for Filipinos’ path to prosperity through resettlement and small-scale agriculture.

Conclusion

Still, perhaps the best expression of the United States colonial government’s ethos of uniformity was not in the matters of equal population distribution across the islands, the standardized land titles, or cattle-branding, but in the normalizing of geographical names. As would be expected, the creation of a government body to oversee this normalization was concurrent with the beginning years of the Bureau of Lands, the Public Lands Act, and the Land Registration Act. Executive Order 95, signed on November 5, 1903, established a Philippine Committee on Geographical Names. Philippine Commissioner T.H. Pardo de Tavera, Chief of the Bureau of the Bureau of Coast and Geodetic Survey, the Chief of the Bureau of Ethnological Survey, the Chief of

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285 Report of the Chief of the Division of Archives, Patents, Copyrights, and Trade-marks, 1910, RG 350, NACP. Despite these measures, the annual report of this year states that the situation had not been entirely remedied. In fact, Yriarte notes that recent developments showed that “notwithstanding the said ordinance, which restricts the registration in this capital [Manila] of cattle coming from the provinces, in order to prevent thefts, these continue to the detriment of the agriculture. It is hoped, however, that this state of affairs will disappear very soon, in view of the activity with which the provincial and municipal authorities and other agents of the Government endeavor to remedy the same by eliminating the persons who make their living in this reprobate manner.”
Public Lands, the Director of Posts, and Manuel X. Burgos were appointed to the committee, and their duty was to “discharge the same duty in respect to Philippine names as has heretofore been discharged by the Board on Geographical Names appointed by President Harrison in 1890.”

The Board on Geographical Names referred to here was a board created by United States President Harrison by Executive Order 27-A, issued September 4, 1890, to decide “cases of disputed nomenclature” in the United States. About fifteen years later, by Executive Order 399 (January 23, 1906), the board’s responsibilities were expanded to “include determination, revision, and fixing of geographical names in United States and its insular possessions.” Later on that year, the Board of Geographical Names was renamed the United States Geographic Board with the added responsibility of advising the preparation of surveys and maps; this latter responsibility became that of the Board of Surveys and Maps when it was established in 1919.

In the case of the Philippines, the language of the charge of the Philippine Committee on Geographical Names was, more precisely, to decide “questions of

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286 This configuration of the committee was not permanent. With Executive Order 27 (Sept. 25, 1905), Sixto S. Sandejas replaced Burgos. With the issuance of Executive Order 53 (June 23, 1917), the committee consisted of the Secretary of the Interior (chair), Director of Coast Surveys, Chief of the Executive Bureau, Director of Education, Director of Public Lands, Director of the Bureau of Science, and Director of Posts.

287 This expansion of the responsibilities of the Board of Geographical Names seems to have conflicted with those of the Philippine Committee on Geographical Names, as the latter continued to publish its decisions on geographical names even after Executive Order 399 went into effect.

288 Executive Order 493 (Aug. 10, 1906), called for the renaming and expanded responsibility of the United States Geographic Board. Executive Order 3206 (Dec. 30, 1919) called for the creation of the Board of Surveys and Maps.
orthography in the spelling of geographic names in the Philippine Archipelago, with a view of securing uniformity of usage throughout the Departments of the Insular Government, and particularly upon maps and charts, issued by its various Bureaus.” The uniformity of names was important for the “transaction of public and private business,” including the delivery of mail in general and communications with government officials in particular. The committee’s decisions were published regularly throughout the beginning years of civil government in the Philippines. The publications included the decided-upon name and spelling of a town, river, mountain, etc., as well as the names and spellings by which it had been known. Determination of uniform geographical names was one element of the colonial state’s efforts to standardize its operations. Other efforts included standardizing the way an envelope was addressed, the official channels through which communications should course, the conventional signs for

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289 William Tipton, Secretary of the Philippine Committee on Geographical Names, to Editor of the *Official Gazette*, Feb. 6, 1905, *Official Gazette*, Mar. 1, 1905.
drafting maps, and even what to call, officially, the Philippine Commission in English and in Spanish.\footnote{Executive Order 52 (Dec. 10, 1906) introduced a particular “form and style of printed envelope shall be used by all Bureaus and Offices of the Insular Government”; Executive Order 77 (July 28, 1908) directed that the metric system should be used in all official documents; Executive Order 47 (Aug. 22, 1912) depicted the signs used by the United States Geographical Board, to be adopted by the Government of the Philippine Islands; Executive Order 8 (Jan. 16, 1917) described the courses through the colonial government for official mail; the text of Executive Order 39 (Oct. 19, 1906) reads: “It having been observed that in official documents the Philippine Commission is variously referred to as ‘Comision Legislativa de Filipinas,’ ‘Comision Civil,’ or ‘Comision en Filipinas,’ notice is hereby given that the official name of said body is, in English, ‘Philippine Commission’ and, in Spanish, ‘Comision de Filipinas.’”}

The work of the Philippine Committee on Geographical Names underscores the issues raised by the foregoing discussion of the relationship between the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Archives, and of the myriad ways to acquire land under the United States colonial government: the project of documenting the population and the land of the Philippines required careful attention to the details and extent of both. Such simultaneous small- and large-scale thinking and project-planning benefited from, and relied upon, the standardization of single form letters and, subsequently, the near-re lentless reproduction and distribution of those letters. What resulted from the mundane and detailed work of the Philippine Committee on Geographical Names and the Bureau of Lands was the core of the colonial archive: an extensive series of land records, uniform in form and content, thus easily assessed and filed, and documenting a vast expanse of the United States’ recently-acquired territory.

Taking all these aspects of the Bureau of Lands together—the cooperation and correspondence with other bureaus, the application processes, and the provisions for
legal instruments—the bureau generated an enormous body of records that. It was constituted in part by Spanish records and informed by United States records and served to identify the different parts of the islands—not only in surveyed, topographical ways, but also in the formulaic ways of the applications, the published ways of the Official Gazette and Spanish and English announcements in Manila newspapers. This body of records served to identify the many people of the islands, whose names, occupations, addresses, and ancestry were crucial information for the acquisition of land—either by purchase, lease, homestead, or occupation.

Such a mass of records would prove useful when, in 1910 and 1911, the land records of the Philippine Government were required to be brought to the United States by congressional committee charged to investigate the friar lands controversy. The accused colonial administrators relied on archives sent to Washington, D.C., from Manila to defend themselves. Though a minority of the investigating committee, as well as individuals and organizations outside of the federal government, found Worcester, Carpenter, and Forbes at fault, the majority of the investigating committee not only found them not guilty of wrongdoing; the committee’s reading of the archives showed them to be patriotic in the execution of their duty, of trying to sell large tracts of lands in the Philippines to reduce the colonial government’s indebtedness to, of all things, the United States government. The records that the Bureau of Land had generated in its first decade to document its activities would, in light of the controversy surrounding the sale of the so-called friar lands, also serve to elucidate the meaning and limits of the
Land Registration Laws, and to eventually exonerate the United States colonial administration in the Philippines of violation of the letter of that particular law and of the spirit of the United States policy of “Benevolent Assimilation.”

The tension between the military and civil government in the Philippines was defined by a difference of political opinion between United States military forces and Governor-General Taft. The necessity of resolving this tension, and more to the point, pacifying the revolution in the Philippines had consequences for public land laws of the Philippines. The major point of disagreement about land legislation, that which made it so contentious in both the Philippines and the United States, was the question of whether the rapid influx of foreign capital to the islands would be good or bad for the natives. Throughout the American colonial period in the Philippines, the rules and regulations for land ownership continued to be the topic of discussion. This was especially true as the colonial government struggled to attain some measure of prosperity, or at least the conditions for prosperity. Though there was ongoing disagreement about the utility of its restrictions, the land registration law was ultimately successful in at least one important, insidious, and enduring aspect. It was cause for the consultation, assessment and ultimate displacement of the Spanish system of land recordkeeping, part of the general project of American occupation of the Philippines. It precipitated the establishment of an American system of recordkeeping, the creation of a new archive of land records.
The creation of uniform, far-reaching, centralized recordkeeping and archival retrieval systems were central to the effort to develop the islands’ colonial economy. It was also central to an economy of effort insofar as the work of the bureaucrats at the Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Archives was concerned. Throughout the first two decades of United States colonial rule of the Philippines, despite carefully-crafted legislation and the development of forms and procedure, the ideal of settling islanders on theretofore uncultivated, arable land was not realized. Indeed, even as the Philippine Committee on Geographic Names labored to make the names of towns and rivers and mountains uniform, the people living there remained unruly.
CHAPTER 5
ARCHIVES AND LABOR

“The great problem of the Philippine Islands is that of labor.”
--William Howard Taft, 1900

Introduction

Even with the considerable challenges that war and land disposition posed to the new administration, the first Governor-General of the Philippines identified labor as “the great problem of the Philippine Islands.” The fact of the islands’ exploitable natural resources was indisputable; uncultivated land was expansive and potential mines were unclaimed. The use of these resources required more than just the presence or vision of American administrators; it also required people to manage the state’s projects. Perhaps more crucially, the exploitation of the islands’ natural resources demanded thousands of people to clear and farm the soil, to cut the timber, to mine the ground.

If maintaining reliable archives and records was one essential step in ending fighting between the United States and the Philippines and establishing title to lands, another essential step was maintaining a record of the people who would go to work, once the land was peaceable and ready for business. This chapter examines the successes and failures of the Bureau of Labor in its efforts to create this record. Though the relationship between the Bureau of Archives and the Bureau of Labor was not explicitly named in the latter’s reports, the tacit and routine relationship between the

292 Taft to Harlan, June 30, 1900, reel 30, Taft Papers, LOC.
two indicates how the work of the former simply had become a part of everyday colonial governance.

More precisely, to provide a sense of the ideal organization to deal with the management of labor, this chapter begins with an examination of the Bureau of Insular Affairs in Washington and the Executive Bureau in Manila; though these organizations never realized the ideals they outlined, they nevertheless indicate the degree to which the proper maintenance of records were valued. The chapter concludes with consideration of the colonial government’s Bureau of Civil Service and the Bureau of Labor; more directly engaged with the general population of the Philippines than the Bureau of Insular Affairs or the Executive Bureau, the efforts of the Bureau of Civil Service and the Bureau of Labor to document and cultivate workers illustrate the dissonance between the order of the ideal and the unruliness of the manifest.
Ideal Institutions

In the past two years we have made a collection of all official documents in any way relating to our insular possessions. This compilation embraces over 6,000 separate publications and has been bound together in about 200 volumes. That this voluminous compilation might be consulted to advantage, an index is now nearing completion which it has taken some two years’ work to prepare. It will contain references, not alone to the insular compilation, which is directly available only to those who possess the same, but also to congressional and other documents, by title, number, and page. It is purposed to print this index and thereby make this terra incognita of public documents available to every one.

Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs Clarence Edwards, 1904

Though the Bureau of Insular Affairs, a division within the United States Department of War, was not authorized to—and in any event, could not feasibly—assist the Bureau of Labor in the Philippines in its charge directly, the BIA was an important institution in the creation and maintenance of an American civil service class in the Philippines. The volume of records created in the course of maintaining the civil service law was considerable and the generation of records in Washington, D.C. rivaled that of the Bureau of Labor in the Philippines, as the movement to reform the civil service, with its attention to documentation of appointments, enjoyed great currency in the United States. Indeed, the BIA’s position as the point of contact between administrations in Manila and Washington, D.C., resulted in the creation of the most extensive archive of documents from the United State colonial government on the Philippines in the world. The scope of the BIA’s administrative business, since its inception, ensured this.

Preceded by the Division of Customs and Insular Affairs (1898-1900) and the Division of Insular Affairs (1900-1902), the Bureau of Insular Affairs was established by a section of the Philippine Organic Act of 1902 and assigned with “all matters pertaining to civil government in the Island Possessions of the United States subject to the jurisdiction of the War Department.”

Complementing the policy work of the bureau’s leadership was the more mundane work of filling requests for information, recruiting and sending civilian personnel and military officers to the Philippines, “fiscal and monetary supervision of insular affairs,” administration of the pensionado program, responding to critics of US policy, and the “internment or sending home the remains of those Filipinos who died abroad.”

When the BIA first opened, this work was divided among five branches (Records, Correspondence, Accounting, Compilation, and Statistical), but it was later expanded and divided among eight: Records, Correspondence, Purchasing and Disbursing,Compilation and Cuban Records, Statistics, Accounting, Map, and the Philippine Insurgent Records and Captured Documents.

One of the responsibilities of the Bureau of Insular Affairs was to assist with the examination, appointment, and transport of individuals in the United States who sought positions in the Philippine Civil Service. Also, the BIA attended to letters of inquiry and

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294 Cruz, 42.
295 Ibid., 65-93.
296 Ibid., 141-42. The organizational structure of the BIA changed considerably throughout the period that Cruz covers. In 1906, for example, the Philippine Insurgent Records and Captured Documents branch was dropped; in August 1912, Purchasing and Disbursing, and Accounts were combined to become Purchasing, Disbursing, and Accounts branch; and in 1913, the Superintendent of Filipino Studies was added.
requests for transfer, administered examinations for service in the Philippines, underwrote the costly and often complicated travel arrangements for Americans in the colonial service, and assisted in transfers from the Philippine Service to the United States Civil Service. Voluminous correspondence between officials in the colonial government and the Bureau of Insular Affairs addressing these matters suggests the amount of time and energy required for these routine matters of administration. The colonial government in the Philippines was a large, complex organization that required an equally large and complex workforce. This included military personnel that sought to stay in the islands, as well as civilians that sought to make their name or fortune or both in the islands.

The volume of records and the human error that inevitably accompanied efforts to manage that personnel frustrated bureaucrats. In turn, they developed systems designed to obviate further frustration and error, such as was the case when managing the transportation for civil servants between the United States and the Philippines.\footnote{Fergusson to McIntyre, Aug. 24, 1906, entry 5, file 1814, RG 350, NACP.} The business of transporting them between the United States and the Philippines was not itself lucrative for a number of reasons: Sometimes, recruits backed out at the last moment, having wasted the labor of arranging for their transportation. Other times, recruits arrived in the Philippines, shortly thereafter realized that they preferred not to stay in the service, and never returned from their approved leave of absence. And every
time, when civil servants made it to the Philippines and opted to remain in the employ of the government, a record was maintained of their comings and goings.

This volume necessitated the creation of form letters to encourage the timely submission of requests for transportation back from approved leaves of absence at the discounted, government rate. Form letter A, provided to the employee when leaving the Philippines, arranged for transport back to the Philippines. Forms B and C elaborated on that request, arranging for the advance of funds to the employee to cover the expense of transport back to the Philippines. These form letters were to minimize embarrassment of the Bureau of Insular Affairs when unexpected requests for transport were submitted, to minimize typewriting work, and tacitly, to increase efficiency of both the Executive Office of the colonial government and of the Bureau of Insular Affairs. Still, the forms did not entirely eliminate the need for individualized work, as labor was still needed to consult the rolls of employees eligible for leave, as well as to deal with employees whose requests for leaves of absence and related transportation were not entirely covered by forms A, B, and C.

The decrease in the volume of correspondence regarding transport associated with leaves of absence hints at the effectiveness of the form letters. The old problems—of the absence of written requests, tardiness of written requests, and the typewriting work associated with dealing with these—were addressed with the creation of formalized records. Thus, in some instances these form letters filled a gap where no records existed, and in other instances, they obviated the need for the creation of other
records. This record system, borne of individual frustration and institutional embarrassment, was important for the efficient operation of the civil service, and thus, much of the colonial government. Eventually, for the Bureau of Archives, these would be easily identified as a series of records and grouped as such, rather than, for example, as routine or chronological or miscellaneous correspondence. Perhaps most importantly, the attention to this detail suggested both the routinized and normalized presence of Americans in the islands and the shift in the administration’s attention from the suppression of revolutionary guerillas to the creation of colonial institutions.

Speaking in more general terms, the BIA’s situation was politically difficult, because as on the one hand, it was to serve the civil government in the Philippines which espoused the policy of “Benevolent Assimilation,” already a difficult sell in the islands, while on the other hand, operating under the charge of the United States Secretary of War. This difficult situation was made even more so, given the expectation that the United States’ benevolent government would also be “good government,” insofar as progressive reform polices were to be in effect, while the BIA was obliged to deal with the United States Civil Service, itself a new operation that purported to solve similar problems of nepotism and corruption in the filling of government posts in the United States.298

298 Throughout the first two decades of the twentieth century, the language of “good government” persisted throughout the United States’ and the colonial government’s assessment of American rule in the islands. Perhaps Secretary of War Jacob M. Dickinson best summed up the point: “The American people can well be proud of this illustration that they are giving to the world of their ability, at least away from home, to conduct an honest government.
Though the practice of elected officials rewarding supporters with appointments in the government service had existed for generations among the “government by gentleman,” the “spoils system” was inaugurated with the election of President Andrew Jackson in 1828. Conceived by Jackson as a reform measure, the spoils system was intended to democratize the work of governing by making it more accessible to more people. The Jackson administration’s response to the corruption that arose from this change in the principles informing appointment was to “narrowly define duties to limit the opportunity for fraud,” but while such redefinition may have curbed such practices, they also sometimes made agencies less efficient. While this politics of patronage in the United States may have began as a critical and popular response to the elite politics that preceded it, by the 1870s, the “spoils system” would itself be the object of reform. President Ulysses S. Grant appointed an Advisory Board of Civil Service, which worked on reform measures until 1873. In 1881, the National Civil Service Reform League was formed, and its work was described in a language of urgency. 

I don’t think that in any state or city of this union there is a cleaner or more effective administration than we have given in the Philippines.” Jacob M. Dickinson, *Address delivered by the Honorable Jacob M. Dickinson at the Banquet of the Industrial Club of Chicago, Congress Hotel, Chicago, Saturday Evening, February 28, 1914* (Chicago, 1914?), 14. For earlier iterations of this same sentiment, see Jacob Gould Schurman, *Philippine Affairs: A Retrospective and Outlook* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Son’s, 1902), 61; and Thomas F. Millard, *America and the Far Eastern Question* (New York: Moffat, Yard, and Company, 1909), 415. William Howard Taft clarified the claim of “Philippines for the Filipinos” by noting that “[...] it so happens, and if fortunately so happens, that generally everything we do for the benefit of the Filipinos and the Philippines will only make their association with the United States more profitable to the United States.” William Howard Taft, *The Philippines* (New York: Press of the Chamber of Commerce, 1904), 18. See also William Howard Taft, *The Duty of Americans in the Philippines*, 14.


300 Ibid., 34-35.
Civil Service Reform League at its first annual meeting, for example, the president of the league William George Curtis argued that “to persist in throwing doubt upon the honesty of the vote is to persist in invoking anarchy.” The invocation of chaos resulting from dishonest and disorderly government administration would find renewed voice twenty years later in the Philippines, as the United States worked to establish its own colonial bureaucracy in the islands.

Indeed, the Civil Service Act passed by the Philippine Commission in 1900 resonated with the Civil Service Act passed by United States Congress in 1883. The Pendleton Act authorized the appointment of a civil service commission, the responsibilities of which included the creation of rules and regulation, the investigation of civil service matters, supervision and preservation of exams records, appointment of a chief examiner, maintenance of commission proceeding minutes, and submission of an annual report of activities to the President. Several sections of the act specifically

301 George William Curtis, "This Year’s Work in Civil Reform," *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the National Civil Service Reform League* (New York, 1882). Curtis went on to outline the purpose of the civil service reform leagues: “The accumulation of a vast official corruption fund for the elections is a danger possible only under a system of appointments and removals in the civil service by personal intrigue, influence and favor. To destroy the growing peril; to remove this fatal distrust of a party in power; to restore parties to their normal and proper function; to emancipate the civil service from the degradation inseperable from a tenure of personal favor; to restore equal rights to every citizen whether in office or out of office, and to promote in the highest degree the economy and efficiency of administration, this is the purpose of the National Civil-Service Reform League and of the local associations which compose it,” 19-20.

302 The act’s primary proponent of the United States Civil Service Act, George Hunt Pendleton, was a Democratic Ohio senator, from a prominent family in Cincinnati, who had began his career as in Ohio and served as a representative in the State legislature. Though he suffered losses in his bids for governor of Ohio and vice-president of the United States, he was the major force behind the civil service act that would come to bear his name. Thomas S. Mach, “Gentleman George” *Hunt Pendleton: Party Politics and Ideological Identity in Nineteenth-Century America* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2007).
address the possibility of corruption in civil service: any employee who compromised the exam process would be fined and perhaps imprisoned; persons “habitually using intoxicating beverages to excess” would not receive appointments; not more than two members of a single family could hold positions in the same grade; political assessments were prohibited; and promotions, demotions, or dismissals based on political grounds were also prohibited.\(^{303}\)

Unsurprisingly, a single piece of legislation did not remedy the myriad problems identified in the federal civil service, and by the end of the nineteenth century, the government faced, as Schultz and Maranto outline, at least three new concerns/directions in reforming its administration. The first problem was that a government run by people appointed through a politically-neutral merit and tenure system could be seen as compromising the country’s principle of “public accountability of public office holders through competitive elections;” in other words, if people in government had exams, and not voters, to thank for their jobs, what would compel them to do their jobs well? Second, the bureaucracy was inefficient, and reformers of the latter part of the nineteenth century were more focused on economy of effort and professionalization in the civil service. Finally, reformers of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries sought to include more federal positions within the merit

system as a way to lessen turnover in staff with each new presidential administration.\textsuperscript{304}

These concerns surrounded the civil service in the United States, would find similar expression in the Philippines which thus provided a venue for their resolution.

Impossible to ignore in this chronicle of the ascension of a “spoils system” and consequently, the civil service reform efforts in the United States, is the fact that the country’s landscape and demographics were undergoing significant, unprecedented change during this period, especially with regard the growing populations of European immigrants in cities across the United States. Thus, while the arguments for civil service reform, for the end of political corruption and “bossism” are familiarly rehearsed, another perspective—especially when later considered alongside how the Philippine Civil Service would be organized—is worth mentioning: Calls for civil service reform that would require appointments to government positions be based upon merit determined by competitive and non-competitive exams, could be seen as an effort to institute a system whereby those individuals who had historically held such positions would continue to do so.\textsuperscript{305}

This lesson of the history of the civil service reform movement in the United States—namely, that the advertised purpose of a particular reformist policy belied that


\textsuperscript{305} Nell Irvin Painter observes that “The civil service reform movement of the 1879s and 1880s, which sought to reserve political office for educated people instead of party regulars, was in large part a nativist, class-bound reaction against the success of the Irish—a foreign, Catholic, working-class people—in urban politics.” Painter, xxvii. See also William Nelson, \textit{The Roots of American Bureaucracy} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 9-12.
policy’s adverse effects on large segments of the population—is useful in general, but is especially prescient when considered in the context of the Philippines, the laboratory for reformist policies of “Benevolent Assimilation.” Indeed, Patricio N. Abinales has argued that the conflict between machine and Progressive politics in the United States strongly informed U.S. colonial policy in the Philippines. Rather than considering colonial rule to be a monolith, he argues that US policy in the southern and highland regions were shaped by Progressive sensibilities while the system that Quezon and Osmeña came to dominate was shaped by machine politics.306

Building on “the decimal idea”: Records of the Executive Bureau after 1913

The reform movement in the United States was more than a decade old when the so-called “Taft Era” came to an end. Still, with the appointment of Francis Burton Harrison as Governor-General in the Philippines in 1913, the notion that the established system could be re-organized and generally improved upon took hold with renewed vigor. The most well-known aspect that Harrison sought to improve was implementation of Filipinization, or the appointment of natives to government posts. Though the policy was conceived and initiated by Taft, his administration and subsequent administrations were critiqued for the absence of Filipinos in leadership positions. In short, with the change in partisan leadership in the United States came the impetus for changes in the administration in the Philippines.

While the changes wrought, or sought to be wrought, by the change in administrations in the United States should certainly be appreciated, it is helpful to recall the organizational changes described in chapter one. Investigations relative to drafting the Reorganization Act of 1906 marked one occasion when the structure and operation of the colonial government’s offices received technical attention. Per that legislation and the several Executive Orders throughout the so-called Taft Era, the Bureau of Archives changed form insofar as it came to include land titles, trademarks and copyrights; it also changed department heads to which it reported, going from the Department of Public Instruction to the Executive Bureau. In other words, while the appointment of Francis Burton Harrison as Governor-General of the Philippines may have accounted for some of the subsequent adjustments to the scope and character of the Bureau of Archives’ work, the demands on that particular bureau had been invariably variable, adjusted as needed to suit the exigencies of the new colonial regime.

In this light, the business of recordkeeping appeared to have little to do with what amounted to be the pettiness of political personalities. Even if the land titles maintained by the Spanish were destroyed, the efforts to create land titles under the Americans were stilted, and the native workers of the Philippines were restless, the recordkeeping systems established in the first decades of United States rule of the Philippines depicted ideal institutions to which administrators could aspire but would fail to realize.
Because of the absence of its organizational archives, an understanding of the American colonial government’s Executive Bureau may be gleaned mostly from archives housed in the United States. The Department of War’s Bureau of Insular Affairs was the division with which the government in the Philippines made its most frequent direct contact, and through which it often communicated with other divisions of the United States government. The communication sometimes pertained to matters of policy, and other times, documented routine transactions or procedures. Far less frequently, the communication addressed issues of recordkeeping, but sometimes it happened.

Correspondence between the Chief Clerk of the Executive Bureau of the Government of the Philippine Islands Clifford Mitchell and the Chief Clerk of the Bureau of Insular Affairs L.V. Carmack in 1913, for example, illustrates the attention that both offices paid to modern and efficient recordkeeping systems.

Mitchell reported to Carmack that beginning on January 1, 1913, the Executive Bureau of the Government of the Philippine Islands would use a recordkeeping system "modeled somewhat on the decimal idea, with some ideas gleaned from your system added." This new system would include a "vertical file" segmented and organized according to subject by a modified decimal system, as well as a "self-classifying" system for the bureau's correspondence files based on dictionary arrangement, special classes of correspondence, and a name index. Moreover, the Executive Bureau planned to dispense with the system of recording the receipt of every letter sent through the bureau to another office of the colonial government, as it did not prove very helpful in
locating correspondence afterwards anyway. The measures to be adopted by the
colonial government were on par with the President’s Economy and Efficiency
Commission’s recommendations for the records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs.\footnote{307}

With the installation of the civil colonial government in 1901, the new regime’s
executive bureau established an index card system. For each paper received by the
office, a clerk printed on an index card the relevant information; annually, the
information on these cards was copied onto sheets of paper which were then bound
into volumes. By 1912, the bureau had 229,613 pages in 220 volumes. Mitchell noted
that “In searching for a paper received previous to January 1, 1913, unless the
approximate date or year is known, it is necessary to search through twelve years of
indexes, under the same subjects in twelve different books.” From this description, the
manner of managing the records of the new government was the same as that of the
Bureau of Insular Affairs before it, too, changed its index card system in 1913.

The system that replaced the cumbersome index card system resembled a
modified Dewey Decimal System, whereby each subject was given a number and each
heading within a subject was given a decimal of that number. The modification of the
Dewey system was the clerk’s designation of the subjects and headings within a subject
at his discretion. Topical (rather than chronological or alphabetical by name)
arrangement allowed for greater latitude in organization. A particular subject could
grow over time and its growth could be easily accommodated; if a subject had been

\footnote{307 Mitchell to Carmack, Dec. 2, 1912, file 702, RG 350, NACP; Carmack, Jan. 21, 1913, file 702,
RG 350, NACP.}
inadvertently omitted, it could easily be added later; likewise, if a subject was no longer “active” it could easily be withdrawn from the file and transferred to the division of archives; and, of course, the system was designed for easy access to material in the course of everyday, routine business.

Under this new system, though records were first and foremost organized thematically, the vertical file schema also allowed for the maintenance of chronological order and well as ordering by type of record. Mitchell explained:

By this method all correspondence on any one subject is filed in one folder. The folder shows on the exposed margin, or lip, of the back fold, the subject of the contained correspondence, as well as the number assigned to that subject. After a folder for general correspondence on a subject other folders follow in proper order for sub-divisions of that subject.

In each folder the papers are arranged, whether incoming or outgoing, in the order of their respective dates, and are so filed that the paper bearing the latest date is the first seen upon opening the folder.

Memoranda and other matter bearing upon the subject of the folder are attached to and filed with the correspondence therein.

In size the folder is eleven and one half by nine inches over all, with a lip three eighths of an inch high. They are cut with right and left lips, and are filed to alternate right and left.

The guidelines for the new system even accounted for the physical appearance of the records, paying special attention to color, size, and neat labeling. Assignment of particular alternating colors to sub-headings within a subject (orange was designated the color for main subject headings) accentuated the divisions that differences in size and order made in the vertical files. At other points in his report, Mitchell detailed the
colors that his office had assigned to different kinds of records, and he devoted a brief section of his report to the “neat appearance of the files” and even observed how folders in the system “are large enough to contain a number of documents and communications without leaving the ragged edges exposed.”

While such attention to the minutiae of recordkeeping may seem simply to bear the marks of a highly organized clerk, the modifications to the existing system were instituted with the purpose of running the bureaucracy more smoothly and efficiently. Indeed, as the colonial administration redoubled its efforts to promote native settlement on and ownership of public lands and to attract foreign investment capital, the bureau prepared for an increased amount of paperwork to course through the government’s offices. Anticipating questions about the practicality of such an involved recordkeeping system, Mitchell provided the example of how useful the system was for the management of information on taxes in the Philippine Islands. He noted the value of a system that allowed for the simple categorization of statistical data on taxation under the different colonial regimes in the Philippines, data on other colonies, or requests for information on taxation. He stated that “the fact that the correspondence had in connection with the various classes of taxes can be taken care of, filed and readily located when wanted, is believed to be sufficient proof of the practicality of the system.”

308 Elsewhere in his report, Mitchell provides the example of automobiles to illustrate how important attention to sub-division of a subject heading: “In the indexes of the Executive Bureau for the year 1912, under the subject ‘Automobiles’, will be found correspondence in regard to
One way that records could be “filed and readily located when wanted” was by use of a system of cross-referencing. Under the previous system whereby files of correspondence or letterbooks were maintained in the order in which they were received, the best way to later find material on a particular subject was to index the correspondence (by name, subject, place) upon receipt. With the new system of placing correspondence in the files marked by subject, there arose the question of how to deal with material that could reasonably be found under several subjects. The piece of correspondence would be placed in one subject file, and in additional subject files where that same piece of correspondence could be logically filed, a cross-reference slip was placed.

Though this cross-reference system had the capacity to eliminate the previous index card system, the administration opted to limit the use of cross-references to subject filing. For names, it maintained an index card system. This system prioritized the records pertaining to an individual over the subjects that might be related in the content of the records, and made use of cards to indicate this.

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the purchase of autos, payment for, repairs to, rental of, catalogues, surcharges, acceptance of bids, delay in shipment, requisitions from various provinces and bureaus, purchase of spare parts, photos, circular proposals, etc. In order to have every paper easily accessible such a subject requires extensive sub-dividing. […] The subject ‘Automobiles’ in this office is quite an important one and one that requires constant attention to keep the proper arrangement. The above illustrates how one of the larger subjects is handled: all other subjects, large or small, are handled in the same manner. There is no limit to the number of sub-divisions that can be sued as each additional one adds to the value of the files.” Mitchell to Carmack, Jan. 1, 1913, RG 350, NACP.
The purpose of maintaining this element of the previous system was to save time and space. Indeed, the report on the Executive Bureau’s new system explained:

The name index is not absolutely essential to the successful operation of the system, but it is a labor saving proposition in that it allows the destruction of certain classes of papers, thereby saving the time and labor of filing and saving filing space. [...] Should the correspondence showing the service record of William Smith be called for, the name card would answer every purpose and could be sent to the official making the request. As a time and labor saving proposition, this scheme works both ways; the record clerk does not have to remove from the file and charge various papers to Smith, and the official who desires to see his service record has only a brief of each communication to read, and at the same time he has all the pertinent information.\textsuperscript{309}

The creation of a new overall system that maintained some aspects of the predecessor organization suggested that despite the impulse to remake everything upon arrival in the islands (as the United States’ administration’s many public works projects seemed to suggest), indeed some attention was paid to the ways that existing systems were satisfactory. As in the descriptions of the systems devised for civil service records and land titles, the use of the language of “labor saving” and efficiency was fluent.

Ideally, with this system in place, the majority of records held by the Executive Bureau were ideally, easy to locate. This series of systems for maintaining different kinds of records—correspondence, name index cards, telegrams—facilitated the search for and retrieval of information in the extensive files of the Executive Bureau. The practical value of the system, of course, would be found not only in the way that materials could be placed into files or in the ease with which clerks within the bureau

\textsuperscript{309} Mitchell to Carmack, Jan. 1, 1913, RG 350, NACP.
could find materials in those files; another aspect important to the success of the new record system was the efficiency with which they could be transferred to other departments or bureaus. To achieve this, Mitchell instituted a system of charge slips—small pieces of paper to be filed in place of a document when it was sent out of the bureau. These slips could be cited, in the event that another bureau sought a record that was charged out to another official.

Related to the charge slip aspect of the recordkeeping system was the “call-up file,” a series of files kept separate from the regular files described above; organized by date, materials that required deferred response at a later date, or action for which relied upon a forthcoming response from another bureau, were placed in this file. So, at the beginning of every day, a clerk would check the “call-up file” for that day and attend to the business required.

In these ways, the recordkeeping system inaugurated at the beginning of 1913 was more organized—arranged thematically, then by color and date—and facilitated the speedy search for and referral or transfer of documents. The “telegram file” was

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310 The details provided about the colonial government’s new recordkeeping system included attention to even how papers ought to be bound together. “It is customary in Governmental correspondence to refer a communication from one office to another by indorsement. Of course a complete copy of the correspondence must be retained. The records division makes a copy of the communication and the indorsement and, if more than one page in length, binds the pages together with a Hotchkiss fastener, and stamps or writes the number and subject on the back of the bottom sheet. The bottom should be the first page of the communication and the top the last page of the last indorsement; by so binding the pages it is necessary to stamp and number the pages only once and the communication and indorsements follow one another in proper numerical order and chronological order, the latest indorsement or action being on top. Binding the correspondence together prevents the loss or mislaying of pages and keeps the one
another part of the system, necessary because incoming telegrams often referred to previous telegrams received from the office. This “telegram file” thus contained the telegrams of the previous two months, easily referenced in the office. One copy of telegrams that were older than two months were destroyed, and another copy was filed in the regular vertical files.

Consideration of the destruction of duplicate or otherwise unnecessary records, as is described here in the case of the telegram file, was part of this new recordkeeping system and is the most explicit expression of the relationship between the everyday and routine or “live” records of a bureau and the transfer of those materials to the Bureau of Archives. Indeed, this report of the recordkeeping system devoted three sections to matters that would have material effect on the form and condition of the archives: “One Record Room in Each Bureau,” “Destruction of Useless Records,” and “Dead File.” The first of these three sections noted that the successful implementation and maintenance of the records system described required the establishment of a single, central record room for each bureau, rather than the continuation of record rooms for each department within a bureau. With a central records division within each bureau, “there would never be any question as to where a document is filed or as to who is responsible for its production when wanted.” When materials in the record room were no longer needed for routine reference, they could be identified in one of two ways: (1) inactive

set of papers together, makes it easier to handle and to file or to remove from the files.” Mitchell to Carmack, Jan. 1, 1913, RG 350, NACP.
and useless and therefore appropriate for destruction or (2) inactive but potentially needed, or in the language of the Executive Bureau, “dead.”

Thus, the new system accommodated records at every moment from its receipt in the bureau to its disposal or transfer. Moreover, because the system accounted for the circumstances under which records could be destroyed, the operation of the system in the earlier stages—when a document was originally filed, referenced, circulated, and returned—was facilitated. While according to these guidelines many records could be destroyed, it was equally important to identify the kinds of records that should not be so readily and easily destroyed; indeed, several kinds of records—leases, contracts, and bonds, for example—were maintained. The reason for this was that it was plausible that these types of materials would be needed for reference by others in the colonial administration, or because their loss “would cause embarrassment or financial loss.” These records, as neither active nor appropriate for destruction, could be identified and maintained as “dead”; as such, they constituted a file unto themselves, which the bureau aptly named the “Dead File.”

The identification of records for a so-called “Dead File” complemented the creation of a centralized record room insofar as “dead files” would be good candidates

\[311\] On the destruction of records, the report noted, “One of the many advantages of this system is that it is now possible to readily destroy a great deal of routine correspondence after it has become old and of no further value. As there are no book indexes to correct, nor index cards to destroy, it is a simple matter occasionally to examine the files and destroy any papers that are no longer necessary for record. [...] The destruction of useless correspondence saves time of filing, prevents clogging of the files, and save filing space, all of which is of great importance in the successful operation of the system.” Mitchell to Carmack, Jan. 1, 1913, RG 350, NACP.
for transfer to the Bureau of Archives. Records maintained in the Dead File were to consist primarily of “correspondence that is old and that may never be called for or used, but which could not be safely destroyed.” The system for describing the records in the Dead File would mirror that used for the Base File.\textsuperscript{312} Having been described in a similar manner, the dead file would clear out the files referred to in the course of routine work, while maintaining them in an easily accessible system.

This file will be operated in the same manner as the base, by dead file numbers, correspondence slips in the regular files showing the number under which the papers are filed in the dead file. It will not be necessary to make cross reference slips for each paper transferred, but for each set of papers on one particular subject filed together. For instance, the cross reference slip will show that “all correspondence re purchase friar lands – 1902 to 1905” had been transferred to “D.F. 46.”\textsuperscript{313}

The example used here, of the correspondence relating to the purchase of the friar lands, certainly would have underscored the necessity of a dead file to anyone paying attention to Philippine affairs in 1913, when the new recordkeeping system was instituted. Just a few years previous, several senior-ranking officials in the colonial administration were alleged to have brokered deals on the sale of friar lands that ran counter to the letter and spirit of the islands’ land laws. Ultimately, the congressional hearings and investigation of these allegations required review of pertinent documents from that period, as well as the transport of many of those documents to Washington, D.C. for examination. It was taken for granted that records documenting the

\textsuperscript{312} The base file accommodated “large blue prints, maps, pamphlets, books, and heavy bulky documents that would clog and make the regular document files difficult to handle.” Mitchell to Carmack, Jan. 1, 1913, RG 350, NACP.
\textsuperscript{313} Mitchell to Carmack, Jan. 1, 1913, RG 350, NACP.
transactions in question would exist at the time of the initial investigation; the creation of a dead file marked the beginning of a system that would ensure that such records, as a matter of policy, would not be destroyed.

Indeed, the project of developing the economy of the islands by creating a vast and centralized record of land title and labor force, required too, a place for the records. While the present-day absence of these records from the National Archives of the Philippines, presumed to be the consequence of the upheaval of World War II in the islands, reiterates the point regarding the destruction of archives over the course of the Philippine Revolution, Spanish-American War, and Philippine-American War, some trace of those records may be found in the documents that chance not to have been destroyed. These extant records primarily consist of published documents such as circulars, general or executive orders, or reports and documents that, for some reason or another, were routed to the United States. To read these documents—whether they detail the procedure for applying for a homestead or the process of joining the civil service—is to begin to piece together how the colonial government’s bureaucracy would ideally be run. The Executive Bureau inaugurated its new recordkeeping system in the same year the colonial government inaugurated Francis Burton Harrison, the first Governor-General of the post-Taft Era.

The new recordkeeping system made explicit the purposes of a central office for records that colonial officials might need to review, the destruction of records that were no longer necessary for everyday operations and were unlikely needed for future
reference, and the maintenance of a dead file. However, this dead file, constituted of records whose destruction “would cause embarrassment or financial loss,” when considered alongside the general subject file, call-up file, telegram file, base file, and mail book, suggests that while the new system significantly altered and purportedly simplified the existing recordkeeping system, it nevertheless included the introduction of a series of complications. The determination of which of these files records belonged was oftentimes based on its form, some times on its subject, and other times on the frequency with which it was referred. The institution of the cross-reference system based on subjects and names, coupled with the neatness of the files, was to minimize the problems and errors that might arise from a new system. The Executive Bureau’s response to this was to concede that while human error of misfiling was always a possibility, “it is by no means of such frequent occurrence and, if done, is due entirely to the gross carelessness of the clerk.” After the elaboration of a system at once complex and simplifying, it had to be conceded that human action—whether the aversion of a family to homestead in another part of the archipelago or “gross carelessness of a clerk”—could upset even the most well-designed of systems, the most ideal of institutions.
Philippine Institutions

By the way, if you happen to know any young engineers who are looking for a chance to make a reputation for themselves, you had better send me their names. We are putting, in every province, a white official who must be a civil engineer and surveyor and who has charge of all roads, bridges and public works and of the surveying of land in connection with the establishment of a land tax. This means that in every province in the Philippines there is an opportunity for a man to show what he is good for, and you can depend on it that the men who succeed will go upstairs. Salaries run from $1,500 to $2,500 American currency, according to the importance of the province, and all the positions come under the provisions of the civil service law.

--Dean Worcester, 1901

Throughout the American occupation of the islands, the Philippine Civil Service was based in the burgeoning capital city of Manila. Several factors, the direct result of other colonial projects in the islands, encouraged Filipinos to leave home for Manila: the public schools established in the provinces prepared potential migrants to find work in the city; the health and sanitation improvements in Manila made the city a more attractive place to live; and the construction of roads and rails literally facilitated people’s move away from the provinces. Probably the most important factor that accounts for the population shift from province to city was the fact that better wages were to be found in the city than in the provinces, though such wages and the availability of jobs that paid these wages were cyclical, effected by the rise and decline of the United States economy. The removal of Spanish bureaucracy, the general growth of that colonial government’s bureaucracy, and most importantly the public

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314 Worcester to Reighard, May 5, 1901, box 3, Reighard Papers, BHL.
education that qualified natives for service in the colonial government worked in concert to create “an indigenous bureaucratic middle class.”\textsuperscript{316} This class of Filipinos was to grow, too, through the \textit{pensionado} program, which sent Filipinos to the United States for formal study. Writing to the U.S. Secretary of Labor Cortelyou, Bureau of Insular Affairs Chief Edwards wrote that such students, “upon the completion of their education are to return to the Islands. This act is in line with the general educational policy in the Philippines and these students upon graduation will be expected to submit to competitive civil service examination with the view of appointment to the civil service.”\textsuperscript{317} Colonial projects motored the growth of the civil service which, in turn, transformed the capital city.

As the above excerpt of a letter from Secretary of the Interior Dean Worcester to Jacob Reighard suggests, however, the civil service in the Philippines was not only an avenue for Filipino’s advancement, however constrained. It was also an opportunity for young, American men to “make a name for themselves.” Indeed, the Bureau of Civil Service in the Philippines was intended to serve purposes similar to those of the civil service in the United States. On September 19, 1900, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 5, for “the establishment and maintenance of an efficient and honest civil service in the Philippine Islands.” Under section 15 of this Civil Service Act, the bureau was prohibited from questioning a civil servant or prospective civil servant about his or her “political or religious opinions or affiliations,” though all civil servants were required

\textsuperscript{316} Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{317} Edwards to Cortelyou, Oct. 12, 1903, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP.
to take an oath that expressed recognition and acceptance of, and allegiance to the United States as the “supreme authority” of the Philippines. So, the question of at least political affiliations at least was clear, and in the event that it was not or that a member of the Philippine Civil Service reneged or betrayed this oath, he or she would be completely disqualified from the service.

Section 18 of this legislation stated that civil servants were not “under obligation to contribute to a political fund or to render a political service, or be removed or otherwise prejudiced for refusing to do so.” This prohibition found its counterpart in the United States Civil Service’s restriction on civil servants’ participation in partisan politics, an effort to minimize a system of rewards based on party loyalty. However, in the context of the Philippines when a Civil Service was established there, the only political party, practically speaking, was that of the United States’ occupation government. Thus, at least initially, this aspect of the civil service law adopted from United States civil service law may seem inapplicable to the Philippines. Upon further consideration, though, the restriction on political party membership could be understood to respond to two realities of the situation in the Philippines: either the restriction anticipated the creation of multiple, contending political parties in the future, as a result of American political tutelage of Filipinos per “Benevolent Assimilation,” or far more likely given the political exigencies of that present, the restriction was meant to limit Filipinos’ affiliation with and investment in partisan politics in the United States.
The second of these two reasons for the restrictions is considerable, given the importance given to the United States presidential race between William McKinley and William Jennings Bryan in 1900. During that election year, Filipinos fighting for independence appealed to Americans to let their legislators know that they supported the cause of Philippine sovereignty.\textsuperscript{318} In the time leading up to the presidential election and for years to follow, the Anti-Imperialist League published and distributed pamphlets outlining reasons to oppose the war. Charles Francis Adams and Carl Shurz privately contended that though McKinley’s election would not necessarily represent the United States’ population’s approval of his administration’s policy in the Philippines, his re-election would “—wrongfully to be sure—be represented as a popular verdict and will be so accepted by a large part of the American people.”\textsuperscript{319} Senator George Frisbie Hoar expressed his confidence in the incumbent administration’s handling of the Philippines situation; he also conceded that a reason for the Democratic loss was that “The cause of anti-imperialism, as it is termed, has been so managed that Bryan has made it odious in the West, and its managers in Boston have made it ridiculous in the East.”\textsuperscript{320} Indeed, once the election was decided, Civil Governor Taft optimistically observed that the “election has cleared away the clouds and the collapse of the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[318] Galicano Apacible, \textit{To the American People} (Toronto, 1900), 19.
\item[319] Schurz to Adams, Oct. 25, 1900, Adams to Schurz, Oct. 25, 1900, Adams Papers, MHS.
\item[320] Hoar to Lodge, Oct. 10, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS.
\end{footnotes}
insurrection in my judgment is not far distant. There has been a marked decrease in insurgent activity since the result was known and it is the beginning of the end.”

Though warring between Filipino and American forces did not promptly end with McKinley’s re-election, the bureaucratic machinery to be established with Act No. 5 was part of the government’s general approach to pacification, the entrenchment of a civil administration of the islands. The legislation created a Civil Service Board of three (chair, secretary, and examiner) responsible for the general administration for the bureau, as well as the generation of documentation on its activities; this documentation was in the form of annual reports to the Military Governor that including documentation of oaths taken by new civil servants; minutes of the board’s “proceedings, the rules which it has adopted, the practical effect thereof and suggestions for carrying out more effectually the purpose of this act;” records pertaining to the identification and appointment of examiners with “special, technical or professional expertise;” the creation and rating of examination papers; “official books and records” created in the course of investigation of the enforcement of civil service rules; written notice from offices subject to the civil service act of appointments, rejections, transfers, promotions, reductions, resignations, or other vacancies; and records relating to the payment of workers cut from the service. The creation of an entity that, by law, was to generate and maintain such voluminous records, and constituted by staff prohibited from having political allegiances to any body other than

321 Taft to Hoyt, Nov. 30, 1900, Edwards Papers, MHS.
the occupation government resulted in, as Ledivina V. Cariñi has suggested, a group of workers not only cut off from political debates in the United States but also “stuck to technical assignments that could be tackled regardless of one’s views about the policy area.” In terms of understanding or appreciating how bureaucracy, or the general burden of paperwork and different manifestations of machine politics, mattered in the Philippines, the historian needs only to recall how important sources, the generation of historical records, are for an account of the period.

Despite the many and significant changes affected by the Philippine Civil Service, it nevertheless faced problems specific to its location in the Philippines and its constitution as part of a purportedly democratic colony. The debates surrounding the civil service’s problems, of course, were charged with concern that an American spoils system had taken root in the Philippines. To some degree, these debates had little to do with Filipinos in the service, because, as Visitacion de la Torre has aptly pointed out, “Appointments being made the spoils of political parties was most unlikely since the Filipino parties had practically no influence at that time in appointments to the civil service.”

322 Ledivina V. Cariño, A Dominated Bureaucracy: An Analysis of the Formulation of, and Reaction to, State Policies on the Philippine Civil Service (Manila: College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1989), 5.
323 Vistacion de la Torre, History of the Philippine Civil Service (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1986), 49. Of course, this did not address the spoils system of the United States finding its way to the Philippines in another manifestation, as succinctly observed in the Far Eastern Review: “The payment of political debts by appointments that would cheat a faithful and meritorious official out of his just promotion will not be a feature of the policy of this administration. And the wisdom of such a course is very evident to thos familiar with the difficulty experienced in
Thus, the more compelling and convincing of these problems included the challenges of attracting Americans to join the Philippine service, the wage differential between Americans and Filipinos in the service, and the rate of Filipinization. These problems were closely related to one another and showed the strain under which American insistence of a tutelary relationship with Filipinos maintained itself. In these regards, the imposition of civil service law from the United States to the Philippines was impracticable and in need of revision. It did not correct the problems of spoils in the United States, nor did it address the particularities of the Philippines. Furthermore, it underscored the inconsistencies inherent in American imposition of colonial bureaucracy and colonial democracy.

One of the major problems that embarrassed the United States’ administration in the Philippines was that a noticeable number of Americans in the islands were misbehaving. In the aftermath of revelations about war atrocities committed by American servicemen in the Philippines, especially surrounding the use of the “water cure,” the colonial government had to deal with the continued abuses of natives by servicemen when drunk. Writing in 1901, Jasper Whiting, an American in Manila who believed his, the American people, “the best in all the universe,” bemoaned the blight of American servicemen on the city:

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As I write, I see through my open window, a crowd of big, broad-shouldered, drunken American soldiers bowling along the Calle, jostling the little quiet Tagalogs, and singing a roistering song,—and I turn my eyes away. Down another street a great four-mule Army wagon comes crashing, frightening the Philippine ponies and creating havoc among the drivers of the old, little uncomfortable carromattas,—and again I shift my gaze.\textsuperscript{325}

Beyond the impressionistic views of a traveler, the Philippine Commission, too, believed that the drunkenness of United States servicemen required treatment, passing at least two bills, Act No. 1302 (February 24, 1905) and Act No. 1369 (July 7, 1905), that prohibited the sale of alcohol to United States soldiers and sailors in Cavite and Zamabales. Some of these were Americans in the civil service, and others were Americans who had found their own way to the Philippines or former military servicemen who decided to stay after their time in the service was completed. Whether they were attached at all to the civil government or United States military or not, the drunkenness, fighting, and most generally, “vagrancy” of these Americans belied the claims that Americans had something to teach Filipinos and that an American presence in the Philippines was an altogether good thing.

The embarrassment that these Americans presented was compounded by the critique of wage differentials between Americans and Filipinos in the Philippine Civil Service. The administration justified higher wages for Americans on two counts: first, that high wages would attract a good, talented lot of men to work for the government, and second, that high wages were deserved, because Americans did more work than

\textsuperscript{325} Jasper Whiting journals, pages 327-8, Jasper Whiting Journals, MHS.
Filipinos. There was some indication, however, that even when American were attracted to the civil service, they still used their positions to enrich themselves; Chief of the BIA Clarence Edwards wrote to Governor-General Forbes to impress upon him how leniently Americans who had been found guilty of “official irregularities” had been treated, in some cases not even being sentenced to time in jail.\footnote{Edwards to Forbes, Oct. 11, 1911, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP. Edwards listed only nine American men who were serving sentences for official irregularities; he wrote that his letter to Forbes was prompted by an expression of sympathy for “the many young Americans who, under the great temptations following the disorders in the Philippine Islands due to the insurrection, were tried and sentenced over there for official irregularities.”}

Both of these problems—undesirable Americans, on the one hand, and higher-paid Americans on the other—found neat expression in the controversy that surrounded Filipinization under Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison between 1913 and 1921. The creation of a civil service in the Philippines, its resonances with the federal civil service in the United States, and the ways that the challenges to its operation were specific to its institution in a colony of the United States suggest its importance to the creation of a civil government in the Philippines and its role as a tutelary mechanism in the relationship between Americans and Filipinos. Recalling the relationship between manager and worker that Frederick Taylor outlined in his scheme of scientific management, the place of civil service, bureaucracy, and the enormous volume of records it would form the core of the American colonial government’s archive of and in the Philippines. The Civil Service Act was, after all, the fifth act of the Philippine Commission, passed at precisely the moment that tension between Filipino
and American forces was high. Moreover, as noted earlier, it was a basic tenet of Taft’s thinking that the establishment of civil government would work effectively in quelling revolution in the islands and proposed as early as the Schurman Commission:

The business or merit system of civil service is economical of officials, for it aims only at the public good. The patronage system, on the other hand, creating offices for favorites irrespective of the needs of the country, implies and exorbitant number of officials. Good government being the result of the former system, the people are contented and only a small military force is necessary. The patronage system, on the other hand, necessarily involving incapacity and extravagance and issuing in misgovernment and corruption, alienates and embitters the governed and necessitates, in consequence, large armies to keep them in subjection.\(^{327}\)

Indeed, if the civil service in the United States could curb the political influence and power of new immigrants to American cities, and thereby quell that site of imminent revolution in the United States—what Theodore Roosevelt called “Armageddon”—the same technique seemed at least a little promising in the Philippines. One way to put down a formidable revolution was to put up a more formidable bureaucracy.

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“This creation filled a need that had been keenly felt since remote times, not alone by all persons who took a live interest in the laboring classes in the Philippine Islands, but also, and more especially, by the laborers themselves who, in view of the conflicts that arose with unusual frequency between capital and labor, and in view of the grievous condition to which they were relegated by the inscrutable designs of fate, compelled to suffer with stoical resignation all the bitterness of their misfortune, needed the cooperation of a government institution which, aside from solving in a manner satisfactory to both parties concerned any difference that might arise between them in the future, would constantly work for the material as well as for the social, moral, and intellectual betterment of the laborer.”

--Manuel Tinio, Director, Bureau of Labor, 1910

In his first annual report as the director of the Bureau of Labor, Manuel Tinio emphasized the Bureau of Labor’s role in improving harsh working conditions and the need for a government institution that, in good faith, “would constantly work for the material as well as for the social, moral, and intellectual betterment of the laborer.”

Tinio’s statement of the bureau’s purpose is certainly in keeping with the United States’ aggressive and so-called policy of “Benevolent Assimilation.” Thus, initially, it may seem surprising that the Bureau of Labor was established seven years after the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Archives, when native workers endured severe conditions, or in Tinio’s words, were in a “grievous condition,” thus “relegated by the inscrutable designs of fate.” It was, however, the uncertainty surrounding the proper titles to lands—whether public, private, or friar—that makes clear the logic of the sequence. Before individuals could be identified as workers, there needed to be identified workplaces.

When established in 1908, the Bureau of Labor was charged with great purpose. It enforced existing labor law and promoted the passage of further labor-related

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328 Annual Report of the Bureau of Labor, 1910, RG 350, NACP.
legislation; the bureau inspected the safety of working conditions and supported workers when they were hurt on the job; the bureau was the arbitrator between labor and management, working to ensure that production never stopped; the bureau organized and established the free employment agencies to facilitate the relocation of workers from their home province to another for work. Thus, though the Bureau of Labor was established a decade after the United States’ arrival in the Philippines, once organized, the bureau’s purview was considerable.

Of the bureau’s many responsibilities, however, it is the second and most detailed of the Bureau of Labor’s charges that most outrightly suggests the making of the colonial state’s archive, namely the charge “to acquire, collect, compile, systematize, and submit from time to time reports” to the department head on various aspects of the workforce in the islands; these reports provided supplementary and detailed information on labor in the Philippines to the information already gathered in the census. In addition to basic personal information (birth, age, sex, civil status, family members, “moral and mental culture”), the reports provided information on basic

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329 Philippine Legislature, Act No. 1868, “An act creating the Bureau of Labor, under the Department of Commerce and Police” (June 18, 1908). The Bureau of Labor’s annual report for 1910 noted that three of its 17 employees were “charged with the mission of recruiting laborers for emigration to provinces with a scant population that have vast areas of public lands, and particularly to the Island of Mindanao. This is a special mission which the Bureau of Labor has taken upon itself, in view of the announcement by the Honorable, the Governor-General in his inaugural address pronounced on the day of his induction into office, that it was his intention to adjust the population of the provinces where this would be necessary, making it proportionate to the territory of the province in each case.” Annual Report of the Bureau of Labor, 1910, RG 350, NACP.
workplace information (occupation/trade, hours, wages, savings), as well as data on how the two related (number of families with married workers or number of people dependent on wages). In addition to including information on workplace safety and accidents, the bureau analyzed unemployment rates, rental and other living costs, and property value of workers; when workers were also foreign-born, the bureau maintained records on their date of arrival and length of stay in the islands. The work of gathering and maintaining records of this information, as with that of other early projects of the new colonial regime, drew from models instituted and tested in the United States.\footnote{This included requests to various state labor secretaries in the United States for “all blank forms, particularly lists of questions, used by your office,” as well as a request to the United States Secretary of Commerce and Labor for help in building up the colonial government’s library. McIntyre to Smith, Sept. 7, 1909, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP; Taft to Metcalf, Mar. 1, 1905, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP; Tinio to U.S. state labor bureaus, July 14, 1909, entry 5, box 844, RG 350, NACP.}

The most telling elements of these labor reports addressed the burgeoning organizations focused on workplace issues and conflicts arising from efforts to mobilize Filipinos into mutual benefit association, workers’ insurance companies, private employment agencies, savings banks, and of course, corporations. And unsurprisingly, each report detailed the inadequacies of these institutions, as manifest in “strikers, suspensions of work, and other labor difficulties,” and analyzed the “causes and remedies adopted in each case.” These analyses varied in length and detail, accounts ranging from a few sentences to several paragraphs, sometimes including names, and other times only vague indications of the numbers of workers involved. This reportage
got even more detailed in the years after legislation authorized the establishment of registers of workers in a municipality or township, to document their place of residence and for other purposes.\textsuperscript{331} In all, not only were the reports of the Bureau of Labor substantial, so too was the volume of information about a sizable population, to be collected and analyzed by a staff of less than twenty.

Of course, the establishment of the Bureau of Labor to settle disputes between workers and management did not result in the end of walk-outs and strikes in the Philippines, even if—at least in estimation of Governor-General Forbes—the director of the Bureau of Labor, Manuel Tinio, was “hand-in-glove” with the central administration and adept at “playing one union against the other.”\textsuperscript{332} Throughout the first twenty years of the United States rule of the islands, such labor disturbances erupted regularly, an unsurprising fact, given the extent of the new regime’s public works projects. Whether with reference to the stevedores, construction workers, students at the

\textsuperscript{331} Act 2129 (Feb. 1, 1912).
\textsuperscript{332} Forbes journal, Oct. 13, 1909, Forbes Journals, MHS. Forbes relished crushing organized labor, and in this instance, having seized some of the organizers’ records, mused about the possibility of using the sedition law to prosecute them: “Strike troubles have arisen again, but I think I have succeeded in pasting this most recent strike in the eye, to use Mother’s pet phrase. I found the fool strike promoters had made their strikers sign a blood pledge which looks like conspiracy, and I have ordered their office searched, and if we prove it I’ll get a bunch of them in jail.” For newspaper coverage of other strikes in the Philippines that year, see “The Philippine Situation,” \textit{Far Eastern Review} 5, no. 1 (Mar. 1909): 341-2; “Failure of the Manila Strike,” \textit{Far Eastern Review} 5, no. 11 (Apr. 1909): 375.
Philippine General Hospital, or—more famously—printers, the correspondence of colonial administrators was peppered with news of strikes and other work stoppages.333

Conclusion

During the year 1902 there has been a movement for the organization of labor in the city of Manila, which doubtless will spread to other parts of the Islands. It has been regarded, because of abuses which crept in, as an unmixed evil. I cannot think it be so. If properly directed it may greatly assist what is absolutely necessary here, to wit,—The organization of labor and the giving to the laboring class a sense of the dignity of labor and of their independence.

--United States Philippine Commission Report, 1902334

For American bureaucrats, the question of laziness native to the tao, or as Erving Winslow wryly put it, the question of whether they could “be safely ‘hewers of wood and drawers of water’ for the ‘trustees of civilization,’” was genuine.335 Likewise, the inherent capacity of the “better class” of natives to manage these workers, or to take on roles of even greater responsibility in the colonial government, was uncertain.

334 United States Philippine Commission Report, 1902, RG 350, NACP. Just one year earlier, William Howard Taft’s assessment of the labor situation in the Philippines was considerably more downbeat. He wrote: “The Labor Problem: The Commission is not prepared to make recommendations in regard to the admission of Chinese as laborers. It is very difficult to secure good labor in the Islands, especially skilled labor. Labor such as is secured is irregular, poor and much more expensive for work done than in the United States. There is not the slightest danger of pauper competition in these Islands with the laborers in the United States. How much of the difficulty is due to unsettled conditions, and how much is inherent in the race, we cannot say; but we think the tranquilizing of the provinces will certainly make labor better and easier to get, though it will long be unsatisfactory when measured by American standards. Throughout the Archipelago, wages have doubled and in many cases trebled since 1898. In too many instances the immediate result of doubling the wage is to induce the laborer to work just half as many days.” United States Philippine Commission Report, 1901, RG 350, NACP.
335 Winslow to Quezon, July 28, 1914, reel 5, Quezon Papers, BHL.
Discharged military personnel did not present themselves as a viable workforce either, their continued presence accompanied by charges of their public drunkenness and other untoward behavior in Manila. Thus, there were several elements of the labor problem—a sober and suitable American presence to direct colonial projects, a class of Filipinos to serve as middle management, and a mass of tao to do manual labor—and each group, in its own way and over the course of the first two decades of the United States administration in the Philippines, enabled and complicated the recordkeeping efforts that aimed to document the land and people in service of the islands’ economic development.

To make sense of the labor problem in the Philippines, the administration could consider a growing volume of documentation on working Filipinos at home and abroad. In the Philippines, while the construction of the Benguet road was among the most publicized of the Philippine Commission’s public works, other legislation focused on the building of roads and bridges in Samar, Ilocos Sur, and Cavite; all of these projects required considerable labor, some of which was supplied by prisoners and students of the new industrial and agricultural schools. The application of the Chinese Exclusion Act to the Philippines was highly contentious; the controversy pivoted on the issue of protecting American labor interests in the United States, attracting American capital.

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336 On public works in the provinces and payment therefore, see Act 381 (Apr. 2, 1902), Act 564 (Dec. 22, 1902), and Act 687 (Mar. 16, 1903), Act 759 (May 21, 1903). On prisoner and student labor, see Act 1587 (Jan. 25, 1907), Act 1795 (Oct. 12, 1907), Act 2489 (Feb. 5, 1915), Act 2695 (Mar. 9, 1917). See also Whiting to Carroll Lamb, Superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony, Jan. 17, 1911, entry 5, file 1146, RG 350, NACP.
with a proven-efficient labor pool on the one hand, and as the Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs put it, teaching “the Filipino the dignity of labor.” In Hawai‘i, even if Filipinos were not especially useful to plantation owners there, Clarence Edwards observed that “they were being improved by their change of surroundings, and that the change might react beneficially on the Philippines.” Whether payment to workers in the Philippines, recruitment of Chinese workers to the Philippines, or recruitment of Filipino workers to Hawai‘i, these labor matters required recordkeeping more detailed and voluminous than ever before.

This approach was similar to that carried on by the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Archives. Indeed, though the question of labor under the newly-imposed United States administration of the Philippines was particular to the moment—for example, the applicability of the United States’ Chinese Exclusion Act to the Philippines or the behavior of former-military, now-civilian Americans then living in the islands—the leaders of the United States colonial administration more readily and more broadly understood the problem of labor as they did the problem of land; that is, they

337 Taft to Root, Oct. 17, 1901, entry 5, box 316, RG 350, NACP; Taft to Pope, June 23, 1903, reel 39, Taft Papers, LOC; Taft to Edwards, July 30, 1903, Edwards Papers, MHS; Edwards to Cortelyou, Aug. 14, 1903, outgoing letters, RG 350, NACP; Harrison to Walcott, Sept. 9, 1918, reel 8, Quezon papers, BHL.

338 Edwards to Forbes, Nov. 18, 1910, RG 350, NACP. In 1903, Governor-General Taft asked Secretary of the Interior Dean Worcester to make observations while stopping over in Hawai‘i on his way to the Philippines, and the latter reported that “there is a opportunity to learn a good deal there which might be useful to me on my return,” but less than two years later, Taft—now Secretary of War—was asked by President Roosevelt to “stop at Hawaii to look into the labor problem there, and especially into the Japanese business.” Worcester to Taft, July 28, 1903, reel 40, Taft Papers, LOC; Roosevelt to Taft, Feb. 9, 1905, reel 320, Taft Papers, LOC; and Roosevelt to Taft, June 16, 1905, reel 320, Taft Papers, LOC.
understood labor in terms of the previous, Spanish colonial administration’s shortcomings. Thus, the colonial administration’s unsurprising answer to the question of labor was the imposition of a new and improved American system for going about business. While the most heralded aspect of this solution was the opening of public schools for the industrial education of the archipelagos’ young people, the establishment of the Bureau of Labor and the Philippine Civil Service, to manage the archipelagos’ working adults was also crucial to the exploitation of natural resources.

While the volume of records generated by every bureau of the colonial government was considerable, those of the Bureau of Labor and the Philippine Civil Service were even more so, due to the regulations pertaining to the posting of and application for positions, and subsequently the hiring of workers and management of their leaves of absence. This pertains to the formation of the colonial archive in several ways. First, in light of the fact that the charge of the Bureau of Labor included the charge that might be given to a Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Bureau of Labor gathered a wide range of information about the people of the islands, their work, and their homes; this information—unlike that gathered by the Philippine Ethnological Survey or Census—was comparatively less spectacular, though certainly valuable to capitalists considering investing in the islands or to colonial officials trying to appeal to capitalists.

In any event, when the records passed out of their everyday use of the Bureau of Labor

339 Manuel Tinio, director of the Bureau of Labor, wrote: “In compliance with the instructions received, this Bureau, upon its organization, proceeded to search for Spanish legislation governing labor in the Philippine Islands, but unfortunately it failed to find any.” RG 350, NACP.

(perhaps when a worker died, and there was no longer a chance to place him), the records would be transferred to the Bureau of Archives. In short, the “live” records of the Bureau of Labor would eventually become the “dead” records of the Bureau of Archives.

Second, the records generated by the work of the Bureau of Labor suggested, as a palimpsest might, the shape of the Bureau of Archives’ holdings on wage workers. Of course, it was the case that, in the course of the bureau’s information-gathering, people were re-envisioned as workers with wages, with homes with values, with families with costs, etc., and that such individuated records had the cumulative effect of describing a people. Though to the dismay of observers, the people emerged from the data was not necessarily a very industrious one, the fact that such a class of people would emerge at all from the data made possible the question of labor—could Filipinos be induced to work away from their ancestral homes? For what compensation? Such questions were informed by a notion of slothful natives readily accessible to Americans in the early twentieth century, and the Bureau of Labor’s data provided the broad and systematically gathered evidence to confirm or refute such notions. In this way, the Bureau of Labor’s work on the Philippines provided the source material albeit biased for assessments of the native population.

Finally, and most broadly speaking, the Bureau of Labor did the same work as that done by the Bureau of Insular Affairs in Washington, D.C., and the Bureau of Lands in Manila; not only did these bureaus worked to put into order colonial society as the
United States’ occupying forces were making it, but also they put it into order for the Bureau of Archives, for posterity. Whether it was natives as insurgents or peaceable wage earners, or lands as sites of reconcentration or homesteads, each of the bureaus of the United States’ colonial government provided the language, documentation, and structure to think of the islands and its people in different ways. Simple customary observance of the archival principle that requires the maintenance of order of transferred records would ensure the preservation of the order established by the bureaus of insular affairs, labor, and land.

The establishment of a central archive of old records of the colonial government, and the maintenance of recordkeeping systems for current records of the colonial government, were integral to the development of a colonial economy. The disposition and registration of public land and the paper trail of the friar lands controversy set the stage for the United States bureaucracy to displace the Spanish one. The questions of who could own the land and who should work it raised again the question of purpose—namely, the purpose of the economic development of the islands, or even more precisely, who should stand to gain from that development. The various instruments and institutions to manage land and labor, however, never realized their ideals and—in fact, paradoxically—left themselves and the colonial administration vulnerable to exploitation by precisely the population that was to be managed. Despite, or perhaps because of these instances, this foregoing account of archives illustrates how they—and
the records that would later comprise them—were important to the creation of a
colonial economy.

Indeed, the bureaucratization of the colonial government, especially as it
manifest in the Bureau of Archives, is therefore noteworthy in several ways. First, the
development of the core of records about the extent and types (defined by category of
ownership) of land constituting the Philippines built upon previous caches of extant
Spanish records to provide an account of the potential for agricultural use and offer a
portrait of the demographics of the archipelago’s population. The information gathered
in this manner was accepted as a matter of colonial course just as readily as an
ethnological survey or a government census, and provided information about land, the
people thereon, and even the animals they had with them. This project of gathering
information not only necessitated the creation of systems to manage that information,
but prompted a careful uniformity of language, whether it was to describe people’s
occupations or the names of rivers and mountains.

Related to this management of information and uniformity of language was the
appreciation of the physical extent of the islands and the ambitious scale of the colonial
administration’s projects there. If the gathering of information about and the use of
uniform language to describe the land provided the content, the sheer volume of
records—whether it was the myriad applications for land title in the Bureau of Archives,
correspondence coursing through the Executive Bureau, or the tens of thousands of
cattle brands overwhelming the Bureau of Archives—and their centralization (relative to that mandated by the Spanish regime) indicated the enormity of the colonial project.

Yet, there is one aspect of the role of archives and recordkeeping systems in the economy of the Philippines that is perhaps even more important than gathering information about native inhabitants, creating a language of uniformity for the land, or visualizing the scale of the administration’s many colonial projects: the paradox of diminished accountability with increased documentation. Taken together, the various elements that constituted a recordkeeping system across different bureaus of the colonial government simultaneously economized labor (an increased efficiency that was regularly touted by officials) and enabled a lack of personal accountability. In the case of the system institute at the Executive Bureau, the filing system allowed clerks to make mistakes without immediate discovery or consequence. When humans erred in the operation of the recordkeeping system or the preparation of records for transfer, the form of the documents and structure of the recordkeeping system made it difficult to fix on an individual to blame.

More crucially for the successful and enduring operation of the colonial government’s various projects, however, was the fact that no individual was accountable when the system ran smoothly. This codification of ownership and ease of organization, facilitated as they were by these systems of recordkeeping, was designed

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341 Of course, there are exceptions. When Governor-General Forbes complained that the work of Filipino surveyors was sub par, for example, he could find out who had drawn the map through a search of the records of Bureau of Lands or consultation with the bureau chief.
to help the economy of the islands at the same time that it exemplified the economy of effort. A single application form multiplied hundreds of thousands of times over resulted in a volume of records—concentrated on any single subject pertaining to the colonial administration’s many projects in the Philippines—and facilitated the bureaucratic entrenchment of the United States’ colonial administration. Organized by subject or format, rather than chronologically, documents could be generated then maintained with greater ease to support public projects; a homestead could be issued, a government memorandum could be filed, a cattle brand could be registered—all without incidence, as though it had all always been so.
CONCLUSION

One fact must be conceded in studying the Philippine question: The Filipinos are a people, like the Cubans or the Irish or the French—a distinct political entity, with a consciousness of kind and with national feelings and aspirations, no matter how poorly developed they may be in some directions. Once this fact is conceded, the real issue to be dealt with then becomes not the success or failure of American experiments in the Islands or the fitness of the Filipinos to establish American institutions, but the relations that should exist between the American people and the Filipino people.

--Maximo Kalaw, 1916

Maximo Kalaw’s *The Case for the Filipinos* in 1916 begins by dismissing the two questions—whether people of the Philippines wanted independence, and whether they could handle it—that circumscribed the possibility of seriously discussing, as he stated it, the “relations that should exist between the American people and the Filipino people.”

Kalaw’s analysis of the discourse on United States colonialism between 1898 to 1916 was remarkable not simply because it was an astute reading of the present and recent past through which he lived, but also because it ran counter to an enormous body of work—generated by the colonial government, its unofficial organs, and even its opponents—that fixated on the question of Filipino aspirations and capacity.

Secretary of the Interior Dean Worcester’s public lectures so consistently addressed purported Filipino incapacity and American ingenuity that Kalaw could very well have cited any number of Worcester’s works; for the purpose of appreciating the role that colonial government archives played in facilitating Worcester’s arguments, it is helpful to suppose that Kalaw could very well have been thinking of “Conditions in the

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Philippines,” a speech delivered by Worcester at a banquet in his honor at the Manila Hotel in 1913 before the publication of his *The Philippines Past and Present*. In a typical moment of unchecked self-promotion, Worcester noted that his analysis was based on six months of “a careful reading of the records of the Insurgent Government” that allowed him to authoritatively report, “in no uncertain terms,” on the government, “basing [his] conclusions on evidence which cannot be controverted, to-wit, its official records.”343 Kalaw’s summary analysis of colonialis
t discours
e was, without naming names, a critique of Worcester’s uncritical use of “evidence”—seized, translated, and arranged by the United States military during his tenure in the Philippines—to make his point about Filipino incapacity, based on records complementary to his own.344

Though Dean Worcester could be relied upon to reproduce—with zeal and consistency—the arguments of which Kalaw was critical, Worcester was not the only colonial administrator who used his special access to government records to write enduring, laudatory historical accounts of the United States’ rule in the islands.

344 Manuel Quezon was also critical of Worcester. In a speech delivered on October 12, 1914, Quezon was precise in disapproval: “Both the policy of economy and that of doing justice to the Filipino people provoked a storm of criticism on the part of the necessary victims of such a policy, and Governor General Harrison was accused of disorganizing the Philippine Government, of disregarding the civil-service rules, and of using the methods of the ward politician. An article purporting to be an interview with Governor General Harrison saw the light in a Honolulu newspaper. This was quoted and requoted and several times reprinted to show that Governor General Harrison was an ordinary politician, to be ranked with those who believe in and practice the spoils system in the most extreme form. One of the most notorious occasions on which use was made of this supposed interview was the citation of it by ex-Secretary Dean C. Worcester, formerly of the Philippine government, in his book entitled “The Philippines—Past and Present,” published after the Philippine Islands had been relieved of his authority.” Manuel Quezon, *The Jones Philippine Bill* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1914), 76.
Immediately after having served on the Philippine Commission and returned to the United States, for example, Bernard Moses made contact with his former employer to request copies of the commission’s minutes, so that he could write “an account of the establishment of civil government in the Philippines” that provided an alternative viewpoint from that offered by the commercial press. Another former Philippine Commissioner, David Barrows, published his first account of United States rule in the Philippines, *A History of the Philippines*, in 1905 for use in Philippine schools, and a second edition of the textbook was published in 1914. In both cases, Barrows described his sources and how he was able to find them—namely, thanks to the courtesy of Philippine Commissioner Pardo de Tavera who allowed Barrows to use his private library and Bureau of Archives Chief Manuel Yriarte who granted him access to public documents. These connections appear to have continued to serve Barrows well, as his description of sources consulted in the writing of *A Decade of American Government in the Philippines, 1903-1913* specifies his use of government documents in the colony (Philippine Commission reports, bureau reports, reports of secretaries of executive departments, reports of the Military Governors, laws passed by the Philippine Commission) as well as some from the United States (testimony before the U.S. Senate

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345 Moses to Taft, Jan. 22, 1903, Taft Papers, LOC. Moses’ request for a copy of the minutes was approved by the Philippine Commission on February 3, 1904, in the Executive Minutes of the United States Philippine Commission, Sept. 1, 1903 – Sept. 1, 1904, page 480. After receiving the minutes, Moses reflected, “As I review some of Paterno’s operations, I am almost persuaded that I ought to attempt to make a comic opera rather than a sober historical statement.” Moses to Taft, Mar. 7, 1904, Taft Papers, LOC.

in 1902). Whether it was bombastic Worcester on the lecture circuit with his infamous lantern slides, faltering Bernard Moses with his would-be answer to the commercial press in Manila, or prolific David Barrows with a readership of Filipino schoolchildren and curious Americans—all were former colonial officials whose access to records of the colonial government facilitated the arguments that Kalaw sought to defuse.

Indeed, by the time of *The Case for the Filipino*’s publication, Kalaw had at his disposal hundreds of articles, essays, and monographs on the United States’ occupation of the Philippines. Those that supported the United States’ colonial occupation—such as works by Worcester, Moses, and Barrows—followed a pattern of argumentation so consistently that Kalaw could parse the works composed over the course of two decades in a few sentences:

The ordinary course taken in the discussion of the Philippine problem is this: If the writer be an advocate of Philippine retention, after hastily disposing, in his first few pages, of Philippine acquisition as an inevitable God-sent incident of the Spanish-American War, he usually devotes the rest of his work to an exhaustive discussion of American achievements in the Islands, the improvements in education, roads, and public buildings, the extension of sanitary measures, and the fostering of commerce and industry; belittling, ignoring, or denying the cooperation given by the Filipinos in accomplishing these results; often depicting them in the darkest colors, if not, indeed, flagrantly misrepresenting them, ridiculing their characteristics, exploiting their supposed ignorance, and exaggerating, if not entirely creating anew, native vices and shortcomings. He,

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too, often, takes the greatest pains to expose the mistakes of some locality or the crimes of some individual, and, by adroit innuendoes, indicates them as the prevailing tendencies of the Filipinos. Nothing in such volumes is spared to prejudice the American people against the Filipinos, so that he may close the volume with the conclusion that American domination must continue indefinitely and that Philippine independence, if any such thing ever be possible, is yet a long way off.\textsuperscript{348}

Kalaw’s pithy observation that the United States’ acquisition of the Philippines was immediately and hastily explained “as an inevitable God-sent incident of the Spanish-American War” is also wry, underscoring that for proponents of United States retention of the islands, the crux of the matter—how peoples of the United States and the Philippines ought to relate—was already, satisfactorily sorted out: the Philippines should remain a dependency of the United States. The discussions of whether certain colonial projects took hold and whether other colonial experiments were successful, to Kalaw’s mind, equivocated; they took for granted the condition of colonial occupation that enabled the United States’ sundry projects and experiments.

With regard to works by proponents of Philippine independence, Kalaw noted that they tended to make “a much more appreciative study of the Philippine Government, established at Malolos,” before detailing all the many ways Filipinos are

\textsuperscript{348} Kalaw, \textit{Case for the Filipinos}, xi-xii. William Jones provided a complementary analysis a few years earlier, noting that to critics of United States rule in the islands, “the reply has always been glibly made, as if that were sufficient in itself to disarm criticism and forever silence all complaint, that within the past ten years public schools have greatly multiplied in the Philippines; that the inhabitants of the islands have made wonderful progress in the acquisition of knowledge of various kinds that sanitary conditions have improved; and that many important public works have been inaugurated as a result of our beneficent rule. The Filipino who does not accept this reply as conclusive of the question is frequently denounced as an ingrate. Indeed, his failure to accept such reasoning as conclusive is cited as evidence of his incapacity for self-government.” Jones, 9.
prepared for immediate independence. By categorizing the writings on the Philippines under United States rule in one of two ways before proceeding with his case for Philippine independence, Kalaw at once read along and against the grain, acknowledging the dominant discourse before turning to propose an alternative model. In so doing, while the prize may seem to have been immediate independence, this was not the only measure of achievement. At stake, too, was the disavowal of the colonial project’s value—a shift away from discussions centered on the success and failure of American experiments in the Islands.

As this dissertation has attempted to show, the archives and archives-in-the-making of the colonial state—the “dead” and “live” records, in the parlance of the Executive Bureau—were integral to the United States’ military operations in the Philippines, as well as to its later civil projects. The work of American personnel to survey Spanish archives during the Philippine-American War assisted in the determination of the United States as the sovereign of the Philippines; the work to create an alternative to the government’s documentation of the war illustrated both the battle of public opinion and attention to posterity; the work to assess and record the extent and conditions of land was integral to remaking the archipelago’s economy; and the work to evaluate, place, and sometimes placate the workers of the Philippines was the final piece in colonial entrenchment. Whether assisting the United States’ interest in regard to war, public opinion, commerce, or governance, the Bureau of Archives and its later iterations were centrally situated in the colonial government, an important
administrative functionary in the United States’ rule in the islands. Thus, Kalaw’s analysis of how retentionists dwelled on colonialism’s “achievements” mark an important shift in the use of the colonial government’s records.

In other words, the end of the so-called Taft Era and the end of the tenure of the first cohort of American colonial administrators marked a beginning. Relieved administrators reflected on and wrote accounts of the United States’ first fifteen years of Philippine occupation. These accounts, as noted above, made use of the inactive records housed in the Bureau of Archives and active records made available to them by former colleagues. Though the number of researchers provided with access to the records was limited, as was perhaps the extent of records made available to them, it allowed for the continued production of writing on the Philippines after the initial excitement of annexation had waned, novel insofar as it was authored by former colonial officials who demanded a kind of authority on account of their involvement in the establishment of the colonial government.

That is, once the civil government was securely in place and its records became the source material that further secured colonialist arguments for the continued occupation of the islands, the archives became a more explicitly public and legitimating entity than it had been previously. For those opposed to the United States’ presence in the Philippines, the upshot of this shift is evidenced by Kalaw’s analysis of unapologetically, irrepressibly laudatory depictions of the United States achievements in the Philippines: Accounts of American benevolence were no longer only originating from
colonial administrations hangers-on, but from the colonial administration’s own. This being the case, the connection between praise and indefinite retention was easy to draw and—as Kalaw did—critique.

Thus, the archives not only continued to serve an administrative function but also became a resource for researchers, marking a shift in purpose and audience. Whereas it had served a primarily economic service from its establishment, after the 1916 creation of the Philippine Library and Museum, its primary role was to provide a cultural service. This change in purpose was especially clear after 1918, when the responsibilities appertaining to patents, copyrights, and trademarks were transferred to the new commerce department. Also, the shift to a broader audience was coupled with the fact that the archives’ administrators reported to new leadership. From the end of the Spanish period and well into the United States period in the Philippines, the archives had been under the administration of Spaniard Manuel Yriarte—whether the archives was a division or a bureau, whether in the Executive Bureau or the Department of Education. Still, even with all of these changes, throughout the first two decades of United States rule of the Philippines, Yriarte reported to an American administrator. After the 1916 creation of the Philippine Library and Museum, not only was the Bureau of Archives obliged to orient itself outwards; its leadership was obliged to report to a Filipino for the first time ever. Indeed, if the structural change to the archive altered its primary audience, the individual change in leadership altered the situation as well, in the post-Jones Act Philippines.
“I feel it is just a monument to wasted endeavor.”

--Syrena McKee, on the Philippine Library and Museum, 1919

The archives’ shift in audience, purpose, and leadership may initially seem to be a minor matter, but to accept it as such would be to continue the elision of the archives’ significant role in the economic development of the islands. Syrena McKee’s dismissal of the Philippine Library and Museum, shared privately with former director of the Philippine Library James Robertson in 1919, illustrates another way that the work of the archives in colonial rule could be obscured: it was a failed institution, no longer dynamic and unworthy of further investment or attention. Syrena McKee had been on staff at the Philippine Library, under James Robertson’s direction. In 1916, with the creation of the Philippine Library and Museum and the appointment of Teodoro Kalaw (brother of Maximo Kalaw) as director, Robertson elected to leave his position. In the years following Robertson’s departure, McKee sent periodical letters to Robertson, voicing her general disapproval of the situation in the islands. Writing about the Philippine Library and Museum in 1919, however, McKee did not equivocate; she noted simply that she felt the place to be “just a monument to wasted endeavor.” To her mind, the decline of the organization in the three years since the passage of the Jones Act was unmistakable and precipitous.

McKee to Robertson, Apr. 16, 1919, box 12, Robertson Papers, LOC.
In the context of the Philippines after the inauguration of Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison in 1913, McKee’s bitter assessment may not seem remarkable. Harrison was a well-known opponent of the United States’ policy in the Philippines and, therefore, was praised and welcomed by some Americans and Filipinos alike. According to Maximo Kalaw, Resident Commissioner Manuel Quezon considered his work to secure Harrison’s appointment “his greatest personal triumph in America.”  

Reflecting on his general support of the Harrison administration and its policy of Filipinization, colonial administrator Walter William Marquardt simply observed that, “It seems to me that there are a number of Americans whose services can as well be dispensed with, and that there are a number of Filipinos who should be promoted to higher positions.” Major-General J.F. Bell reported that he had “not talked with anyone who, having come in personal contact with the Governor-General, was not favorably impressed by him. He is universally considered a most kind, considerate, courteous, able and conservative man.”

Even those Americans averse to recognizing Filipino capacity whatsoever had to acknowledge the change. Writing to George Harvey after Woodrow Wilson’s successful campaign for the United States presidency, Harry Bandholtz ruefully observed that “The possible passage of the Jones Bill at the next or some early session of Congress […] has

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350 Kalaw to Winslow, Oct. 10, 1913, reel 4, Quezon Papers, BHL. Further, Kalaw opined. “He was practically, outside of the President, the one person responsible for the appointment of the Governor.”
351 Catechism of Marquardt, page 216, box 5, Walter Marquardt Papers, BHL.
352 Bell to Wood, Dec. 5, 1913, box 218, Leonard Wood Papers, LOC.
wrought our little protégés here into a considerable frenzy.” In the spring of 1914, a dispute about the dismissal of American employees in the colonial government found voice in the New York Times. When Worcester weighed in on the debate, he argued that Harrison had inaugurated “a policy under which experienced and competent Americans in very large numbers have been forced out of the service or have left it in disgust, and their places have been filled with Filipinos, some of whom are well known to be incompetent, while others are as yet untried”; Worcester concluded that “Disaster will inevitably follow the continuance of such a policy, and already begins to loom ominously.”

For his part, William Howard Taft attributed the islands’ financial troubles, especially as they related to the friar lands, to the replacement of Charles Sleeper with Manuel Tinio as Director of the Bureau of Lands, a change presumed to be made per the policy of Filipinization. Other officials, including James Alexander Robertson before he left the service, shared their criticisms of Harrison with Worcester, who offered a most sympathetic ear. Privately, in a letter to Secretary of War Garrison, the outgoing Governor-General W. Cameron Forbes predicted that Quezon himself would turn against Harrison, noting that “there could not be anything more dangerous to the peace and welfare of the Islands than to have Quezon think he can run the Governor-General and make and unmake him. Thus, if the experience of the past goes for anything, he will

Bandholtz to Harvey, Jan. 18, 1913, reel 5, Harry Bandholtz Papers, BHL.
very shortly undertake to dictate who shall be appointed, then turn against Governor Harrison as he has against me.”

Forbes seems to have relished the controversy he stirred on the eve of his departure. The predictable complaints drew on the well-rehearsed low estimations of Filipino capacity. Opponents of Philippine independence simply read doom in aggressive Filipinization.

What makes McKee’s evaluation of the Philippine Library and Museum worth considering further, however, is the fact that it should also be understood in the specific context of the change in the purpose and audience of the colonial state’s archives. McKee’s letters focus on the functions and staff with which Robertson would have been familiar, as well as the intrigue surrounding Kalaw’s appointment. Though McKee’s sense of the situation cannot be necessarily accepted as the prevailing view about the administration of the Philippine Library and Museum or of the archives, it does suggest misgivings about the role Filipinos began to take in the major cultural organization of the Philippine government.

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356 Forbes to Garrison, Aug. 25, 1913, box 592, entry 5, RG 350, NACP.
357 On September 4, 1913, Forbes wrote: “Well, my nine years of smoke and roar are over and I am a private citizen again. My secret ambition all these years has been to get back just where I am now—free-footed, my work behind, and an opportunity to do things from behind the scenes. I’ve told everyone they needed expect ever to hear of me again, as I want to retire. [...] President Wilson’s letter didn’t help the situation in Manila at all. People got madder and madder over the clumsy and gauche way my removal was brought about, and cables to this effect were sent to the States. I was sorry afterward that I’d let McIntyre’s foolish cable be published; I think it would have been bigger to have withheld it.” Forbes goes on to describe how he won again, by publicly stating that he was not offended by the new administration’s desire to oust him and thus winning over public opinion. Forbes Journals, MHS.
In view of this, McKee’s feeling that the institution was a “monument to wasted endeavor” is not as simple as it first seems and indeed addresses the ways the institution figured into the political context of the islands. To accept United States colonial rule on its own purported terms was to accept the notion that Filipinos were under American tutelage and had the capacity to learn to govern themselves to some degree. With the transition in organization and leadership to the divisions within the Philippine Library and Museum, an assessment of successful tutelage might have read, “monument to worthwhile endeavor.” As it was, however, McKee held the administration of the Philippine Library and Museum in low esteem and viewed its poor management to be the unfortunate conclusion to the Americans’ hard work. In short, she suggested that they had tried to teach the Filipinos lessons but had failed.

Another way to read McKee’s assessment is to understand her to mean that any institution transferred out of American administrators’ purview signaled a waste of effort, because the “endeavor” was not instruction of Filipinos but indefinite retention of the Philippines. This would indicate adherence to a strain of thinking that rejected Filipinos’ capacity to govern themselves. Thus, the Philippine Library and Museum would not be a monument to either wasted or worthwhile endeavor; never a monument, it would be an institution continuously in the making. In this light, they had tried to keep the Philippines but had failed.

Either way of understanding “a monument to wasted endeavor” suggests dissatisfaction with the changes to the library and archives. The Philippine Library and
Museum was not immune to the questions of Filipino capacity, implicit in McKee’s letter to Robertson and explicit in Kalaw’s *Case for the Filipinos*. Indeed, such questions obscured the question that Kalaw identified as most pressing, namely the question of relations between the United States and the Philippines.

At the same time, the question of Filipino capacity highlighted tension between American and Filipino workers; such tension further obscured the role of the archives, as it became just another site where Filipino capacity was tested. Thus, the questions of Filipino capacity obscured the purpose that the archive had served in the first two decades of American rule, as if the expansion of the bureaus expressly designated for economic expansion was not enough to obscure.

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“The public records now in the Philippines will have a special interest to this country […].”

Librarian of Congress Herbert Putnam, 1903

At the end of the nineteenth century, the archives of the Philippines did indeed “have a special interest” to the United States. If the lore around President McKinley’s ignorance about even the location of the Philippines is to be believed, the archives were necessary for learning the most basic information about the islands and their people. Even if that lore is not to be believed, the archives were certainly needed for assessing the threat of the revolutionary government, the extent and condition of the annexed

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358 Putnam quoted in Root to Taft, reel 38, Taft Papers, LOC.
lands, and the people who might be convinced to work on them. In the first two decades of United States colonial rule of the Philippines, the archives were flexible in serving these purposes. Also throughout this period, several factors worked to obscure the work of the archives.

The first factor was limited access to records, most broadly defined. Indeed, limited access to records characterizes every example offered in this dissertation. During the Philippine-American War, the United States military sought to capture any documents of the new Philippine Republic, and the Anti-Imperialist League was eager for greater access to United States government documents and busy creating their own. With the worst of the hostilities was over, the Philippine Commission established the Bureau of Archives within four months of civil government having been established, in an effort to track down and centralize the records of the ousted Spanish regime. With the records of the new regime, these documents became of keen interest to American historians whose use of the records was restricted. The challenges to the resettlement of Filipinos onto uncultivated land were numerous and complex, and among them were the matters of determining the extent of land and getting to people who might make a formal application. Whether it was failed attempts of organizations to access other organizations’ restricted records or stilted efforts of individuals to access records that were new and foreign, both getting at the documentation and making sense of it was easier said than done. Only some people could see and use the archives.
Second and paradoxically, the overwhelming volume of records that were in the care of the Bureau of Archives (and the Bureau of Insular Affairs) had the same consequences as did limited access to records. The enormous volume of records complicated the work that the archives was designed to do and obscured the work that it did do. The early reports of the Bureau of Archives reliably rehearse the unit’s woes of limited storage space, less than ideal physical conditions, and records in disarray. With the bureau’s expansion to include patents, copyrights, and trademarks, the volume of records—including those many forms completed erroneously—increased considerably. The surveys and other records of the Bureau of Lands over-corrected for its initial lack of records with its aggressive creation of replacements for missing Spanish records and revisions of Spanish records found wanting. The purpose of gathering so much information, of course, was to facilitate the growth and operation of the new government, but in regard to the work of the archive, the volumes of material resulting from such aggressive efforts made it difficult to see. Once able to gain access to the records, their physical extent, sometimes coupled with inconsistency and disarray, made it difficult to observe their larger function for the United States’ imperial ambitions and, indeed, even for the everyday business of the colonial government in the Philippines.

Within that government, of course, the Bureau of Archives was not the only unit working diligently. All of the other units had specific charges in service of colonial governance, and while the periodic reorganization of these units throughout the first twenty years of colonial rule does not make a chronicle of the archives impossible,
neither does the archive’s re-assignment within different bureaus and divisions of the
Philippine government make the chronicle simple. Moreover, because in 1916, the
Bureau of Archives ended up in the Philippine Library and Museum, the most expected
of places, it would be easy and not unreasonable to suppose that it had a relatively
direct route from its founding to the library and museum. Thus, a third factor obscuring
the work of the Bureau of Archives in the United States colonial project was the
common sense of its placement within the colonial government after the 1916
reorganization.

Finally and related to this common sense about the archives’ situation within the
Philippine Library and Museum, the role of the archives in the early years of the United
States occupation was later obscured by the growth of the bureaus it had initially
supported. The Civil Service Board, Bureau of Labor, the Bureau of Public Lands, and
Bureau of Archives were all organized at around the same time, and their successful
operation depended upon regular and active collaboration. As hostilities between
United States and Philippine forces subsided, the institutions of the new colonial
government had room to begin to thrive. Soon, the Bureau of Archives was less needed
to provide support to the other bureaus of the colonial government; for the most part, its job was done.

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The archivist thus may be regarded as a hewer of wood and a drawer of water for the scholars. [...] The archivist’s job at all times is to preserve the evidence, impartially, without taint of political or ideological bias, so that on the basis of this evidence those judgments may be pronounced upon men and events by prosperity which historians through human failings are momentarily incapable of pronouncing. Archivists are thus the guardians of the truth, or, at least, of the evidence on the basis of which truth can be established.


The primary goal of this dissertation has been to demonstrate the important political role that the colonial state’s archive played in the United States’ rule of the Philippines between 1898 and 1916. In examining the relationship between the archive and specific facets of the United States’ policy of “Benevolent Assimilation,” this dissertation has suggested several of the forces that drove and shaped the growth of the Bureau of Archives and its later iterations. It has taken another perspective on the truism that government documents alone ought not to be taken at face value and ought not to be presumed to present a full, complex picture of any situation, by showing that critique of the available sources is as old as the formal relationship between the United States and the Philippines. In short, “Import of the Archive” primarily makes a particular historical argument: In the context of the United States rule of the Philippines, if roads were supposed to bring economic development; schools were supposed to mold model citizens; civil service regulations were supposed to yield skilled laborers; and a bicameral legislature was supposed to transform natives into self-governable subjects, the initial

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and primary purpose of the colonial state’s archive was to facilitate those projects through documentation and other administrative support.

A related, secondary goal of this dissertation is to contribute to a rather muted conversation within today’s archival studies scholarship. Without a doubt, practicing archivists and scholars in archival studies are well aware of, and quite attentive to, the ways in which an organization’s internal culture and external political conditions can affect the establishment, maintenance, and development of an archival institution because these issues shape present-day best practice. Likewise, practicing archivists and scholars in archival studies are mindful of the way that past political conditions can affect their collections.\(^{360}\) Considering all of these works together—those that take seriously the impact of the present and past political context on best practice—there appears to emerge a gap that “Import of the Archive” attempts to highlight and to begin to fill.

In other words, this dissertation’s specific, historical argument raises questions for archival training and practice today. To be more precise, in the United States, archivists understand that the government archive in a democracy, ideally, provides accountability and transparency to the people it serves. Such thinking is fundamentally changed, however, when the United States’ government archive is in fact a colonial government archive. In the context of the Philippines between 1898 and 1916, the

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\(^{360}\) Work that addresses the origins and observance of the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), as well as studies of the efforts of scholars, activists, and archivists in post-apartheid South Africa come readily to mind.
archive’s administrators were not documenting a government accountable to Filipinos who had voted all of the islands’ leaders into power; rather they were documenting a government accountable to the leaders in the United States who had appointed officials to impose a colonial state. This circumstance begs the question: what does it mean to be a good archivist and gather, arrange, and describe—that is, to follow the seemingly endless directives of the colonial administration?

When framed in this way, the answer must be: to be a good archivist insofar as dutifully observing the colonial administration’s directives is to actively entrench and maintain that colonial administration. To be a good archivist is to do the everyday, humdrum work of keeping up a government that was not “benevolent.” As with all historical arguments, from the perspective of the present-day, any judgment of these past practices may be charged of presentism, of assessing an historical situation by today’s standards or value. The point of this dissertation, however, is to put the institution in historical context, and it has found that the activities of the colonial government archive were indeed subject, even then, to critique.

Even if such an allegation of presentism is conceded, and this work accepts that critique of past acts is “unfair,” this dissertation nevertheless raises the question of present day practice. That is, even if it is conceded that archivists in the United States’ government archive in the Philippines were acting in accordance with their own senses of professional and ethical duty (as neither was yet outlined for the then only-emerging science) at the same time that it is accepted that the United States’ policy of
“Benevolent Assimilation” was a centerpiece in the history of American exceptionalism—critiqued by some Americans at the beginning of the twentieth century and more readily critiqued now at the beginning of the twenty-first century—archivists must at least consider how present practice helps to maintain whatever “invisible,” unquestioned, or readily-accepted order. While such a question may never make it into a profession-wide discussion of professional ethics, it undoubtedly returns archivists to the claim that the work of archives can never be conducted outside of ideology.

Finally, and most importantly, this dissertation suggests that these two arguments—one historical, another applied—are in fact, two parts of a single argument about the relationship between scholarship and practice. An historical account of the creation of an archive serves as a reminder to historians and archivists of the times when they were not so removed from one another, but in fact, worked collaboratively to create institutions and bodies of scholarship for the United States, then an emergent world power. This reminder is not made to valorize those efforts, nor necessarily to condemn them. Rather, it is made to note that archives came from somewhere; they were made in specific historical contexts, under particular political pressures. They are not unchanging, immovable. Quite to the contrary, they are remade—as needed, again and again.
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