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Nationalism and egalitarianism in Indonesia, 1908–1980

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NATIONALISM AND Egalitarianism in Indonesia, 1908-1980

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF
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Although I am alone responsible for the whole content of this dissertation, it is impossible to finish it without the help and support of many people and a number of institutions.

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This thesis examines how the ideas of nationalism and egalitarianism emerged and were contested in Indonesia. It begins by uncovering the uniqueness of Indonesian history, which gave birth to the uniqueness of Indonesian culture and economy. This in turn determined the contour of the land's politics during independence movements and long after.

The colonial scheme ingeniously combined the use of coercive and symbolic forces. The Dutch deployed and manipulated them in such a way as to enable the maintenance of the colonial order through which an unprecedented system of exploitation was perpetuated. The eradication of natives' international and interinsular trade in the 17th and 18th centuries was followed by "the five-time exploitation" in Java and the establishment of a number of colonially deformed traditions and institutions throughout the islands. Hence the prevalence of economic and cultural distortions.

This largely concocted inegalitarianism collided with the egalitarian forces which antedated or evolved during and after the colonial period. The decimation of the natives' economy led to the politics of "the mobilization of meanings," which molded Islam, Javanese traditionalism, Dutch liberalism, and Russian Communism. Here the egalitarian Malay played an important role.
The long exploitation of the majority of Indonesians and the molding of existing ideologies rendered the birth of a distinctly egalitarian nationalism. This ideology survived the uncertainty and ordeal of the era of Guided Democracy as the mobilization of meanings turned into a contestation of meanings.

The egalitarian nationalism remained hegemonic in political discourses amidst the New Order's inegalitarian practices in the fields of economy and politics. Comparable discourses from the inegalitarian side were non-existent. Moreover, the inegalitarian practices had to move in masks using the rhetoric of egalitarianism. Thus the thesis seriously questions "the enduring school of interpretation" which maintains that inegalitarianism is culturally rooted and sanctioned in the land.
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Many studies dealing with Indonesian politics have been written using frames of reference not always appropriate to the Indonesian situation. They frequently give too much emphasis on the Marxian thesis or on the chronology of events at the expense of a fair and penetrating analysis. Others employ an approach largely determined by a symbolic reading of the Indonesian politics, which tends to anchor the analysis in too distant a past. The penetrating analysis we here have is largely offset by the skewness in the method of locating the meaningful.

Unlike the approaches above, I have tried to read Indonesian politics with a balanced emphasis on the historical, economic, and symbolic-ideological factors. As such, the inappropriate imposition of external frames of reference is hindered without necessarily sequestering Indonesian politics from world politics.

Attention is given neither to the chronology of events nor to locating the meaningful, but on the different and ever shifting and contested understanding of political ideas due to transformations in political discourses and practices. These transformations resulted in turn from discontinuities occurring in the fields of economy, culture, and techniques of power. Awareness of the power involved and embedded in the discourses/practices engenders
awareness that patterns of ideology exist not so much in "the said" but primarily in "the unsaid."

The venture of combining with equal weight the historical, economic, and ideological perspectives implies the use of an epistemology broader than is commonly applied. With such a strategy, I have tried to uncover the fine and intricate textures of the particularity of Indonesian politics during the periods under discussion.

I have also tried to free my analysis from the blurring and frequently misleading influence of worn out jargons (whether of Marxists or of developmentalists) as well as from the ethnographic inflation of so-called the historical determination of value systems. More importantly, I hope to gain a better approximation of political evolvements pertaining to continuities and discontinuities in Indonesian politics.

To be specific, this work deals with (1) Indonesia's colonial experience and unravels the historical--economic, political, and symbolic--forces which simultaneously determined the birth and the character of Indonesian nationalism; (2) the ideal encounter between the Indonesian language and the discursive practices of Dutch liberalism, of Russian Communism, and of Reform Islam, all of which privileged the principle of egalitarianism; (3) the genealogy and the evolvement of political movements in Indonesia.
and why they became at once nationalistic and egalitarian; (4) the discrepancy between the politics of the pergerakan era and that of the New Order, focusing on what I refer to as "the inegalitarian constellation" and how it should be contested; and, finally, (5) the enduring voices of egalitarianism in Indonesia irrespective of great political and economic inequities which have characterized the country ever since the period of Guided Democracy.

The period coverage stated in the title of this dissertation is not meant to be precise, but only to give a sense of times involved.
PART ONE

THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE:
EXPLOITATION, INEGALITARIANISM, DISTORTION
ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION AND DISTORTION

Upon his return from around-the-world travel as a sort of good-will ambassador to the United States early in 1962, Robert F. Kennedy related an interesting story. It was about his meeting with a large student body in Indonesia. In the meeting, one of the students described "in a derogatory sense" the United States as "a system of monopolistic capitalism." Kennedy's reaction was strong: "What is it that you mean by monopolistic capitalism?" and "What is it that defines the description in the United States?" The "boy" was dumbfounded. The same dumbfoundness filled the air when Kennedy directed the challenge to half of the student body who applauded the student as he made his point. We find this incident, cited from that year's New York Times (April 24), in the Preface of Baran and Sweezy's Monopoly Capital along with Paul Sweezy's comment on it. (1)

How are we to understand this encounter? How far the "boy" was indeed a blind prisoner of concepts tinged with leftism? Was it possible that the "boy" or "boys" were shocked less by their ignorance—as Sweezy argues—than by a sudden realization of the different construal of "monopoly capitalism" and their lack of words to explain the difference? What is the relevance of this exchange with our
attempt to probe into the genealogy of Indonesian nationalism and egalitarianism and, later, into the problems of discontinuity in Indonesian politics?

Sweezy was certainly right when he observes that the "boy" and the audience did have knowledge of what he was talking about and that they had "seen its ugliest face." The incident functions as an apt opening to the book in which Paul Baran and Sweezy see the problematic of monopoly capitalism and call it an "irrational system." But it should be made clear from the beginning that the monopoly capitalism of the Indonesian experience Sweezy is referring to is not wholly identical with the monopoly which he and Baran elaborate in the book. In the former, he is talking in general terms, whereas in the latter they focus on a highly particular case, i.e., the case of the present American economic and social order. The important thing to realize in our present discussion is that once we move from one particular case of monopoly capitalism to another, we are ipso facto also moving from one problematic to another, which can be radically different.

**Exploitation as a Relentless Historical Motive**

For one thing, monopoly capitalism in an advanced industrial country is problematized by people like Baran and Sweezy because they are conceiving of some "direct"
alternative to the monopoly they are criticizing. But with
the monopoly in the case of colonization we are, as a
matter of fact, entering a different world.

The Indonesian experience of merchant- and state-trade
colonization of the 17th century until the first three
quarters of the 19th century clearly testified this. Our
recent example would be South Africa. Here once that
colonization is historically tangled, it would be a long
way for both sides of the participants to end up with an
alternative.

The reason is plain. In the monopoly capitalism of the
advanced state we generally appeal to conscience in conjur­ing up an alternative, simply because we still see or
believe in the possibility of an ideally conceived alter­
native to somehow cure or compensate for the ills of the
monopoly capitalism. In colonial monopoly capitalism, quite
the contrary, we generally appeal to force, just because
bitter experience on the part of the colonized and
political confusion on both sides have nullified the
possibilities of such an alternative.

Irrespective of some riots here and there, the ills of
the British industrial revolution, for example, were not
rectified by another revolution, but by a gradual evolve­
ment of the human conscience as well as economic wisdom
inherent in the revolution itself. As Crane Brinton puts
it, "Even the defenders of the new society had to base
their defense on the concrete achievements of the Industrial Revolution."(2) It is with the tradition of believing in the integrity of human conscience that Baran and Sweezy call for "courage to face the facts, and faith in mankind and its future."(3)

Unfortunately, none of the cases of tangled colonization ceased without a deadly, costly, and often protracted, war. And the only explanation to it is that the economic and political practices in the colony have distorted, twisted, and confused the otherwise would be clear contour of social circumstances from which an unambiguous response could somehow be formulated.

All this brings us to the final and distinct difference between the two kinds of monopoly capitalism mentioned above. In the first instance, i.e., in "the general law of capitalist accumulation," we talk about exploitation only "indirectly," that is, only after theory is duly adjusted and all factors and processes are carefully examined and we find as the end result that, behold!, there is exploitation. However, that exploitation—the systematic extraction of surplus value, is not only barely seen on the surface; it is also barely perceived by the general public as exploitation. Hence the general reading of Karl Marx as the master debunker, the great reader of silence. But no less important is the fact that here the whole process of accumulation takes place in a well-integrated social
interaction where heads and tails are decipherable. It is free of distortion.

In the second instance, however, we are talking right from the beginning about a brazen and highly manipulative capital accumulation by the colonizer as profit-makers. These profit-makers are indistinguishable from profiteers who harness indigenous social forces by concocting their value systems in order to move along the crevices of local practices. And whatever movement they take they always end up squeezing out an irrationally huge "profit" from both land and people.

The problem of concern in our case is, consequently, not so much monopoly as it is exploitation pure and simple. That is to say, monopoly here should be seen more in the sense of a historical motive (4) rather than of a theoretical mode. The motive is to regularize—frequently even at the expense of the regularity of rules—extraction of the maximum wealth in the shortest and cheapest possible way without regard to the lot of the actual producers. With that motive there is no mode other than monopoly. In other words, the mode is contained and determined by that haphazardly corporealized motive. Probably in no other colonial history did exploitive motive, amidst so many changes of self-contradictory colonial policies and regulations, more enduring than in colonial Indonesia. While mode is here
necessarily after the fact, motive is always before the fact.

This shift of emphasis serves two complementary purposes. On the one hand, it shows agreement with the assertion that colonialism and/or imperialism is, indeed, nothing but monopoly capitalism in its primeval form. And here monopoly shows itself as implying motive rather than mode. **It is a blunt confession of the refusal not only to any alternative to the naked exploitation, but also to fixture to a particular way to pursue that objective.** It is monopoly tempered with compulsion and arbitrariness. In the political sense, colonialism or imperialism means doing away with any conceivable forms of competition from within and without as well as with any hindrance, formal or procedural, to the speedy and irrational maximization of "profit." Accordingly, the contention by Lenin that "imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism" is only tenable when we conceive of that monopoly not as something permanent, irreversible, or pliable to rationalization as the word stage connotes. Plunder can never be rationalized.

On the other hand, the emphasis on motive places us in a better position to explain the unique case of—the unre­lenting and the haphazardly developing—exploitation occurring in colonial Indonesia. When we choose the historical motive as the basis of our discussion of exploitation rather than a theoretical mode, which necessarily implies a
somewhat strict boundary of practices, we are actually addressing the regularity of motive irrespective of the irregularity of practices.

Emphasizing motive is, therefore, tantamount to providing latitude to approximate the distinct, and yet unsettled, particularity of the Indonesian experience. As soon as the same acquisitive motive moves along different socio-cultural or socio-economic contexts, different kinds of practice emerge. From then on, we no longer read events by what we might regard as "standard practices" (i.e., as constituting a mode); rather, we read them in their nakedness—that is, by their intention.

In a word, we are reading major economic and political events with a positive amalgamation of Marxian, Weberian, and Foucaultian approaches. Historical motives are grounded in economic necessities, meaning systems, and language practices. By using these three approaches simultaneously, historical individualities can be uncovered. It prevents us from imposing our own notions or interpretations onto the observed social phenomena. For in so far as we use western categories of economic history as a starting point, of which Van Leur reminds us, "full justice cannot be done to the economic history of other areas."(5)
Exploitation: Practices and Discourses

Perhaps the Indonesian colonial experience can only be closely measured when it is compared to the plunder of the African continent by the European nations after the Berlin Treaty of 1885. But beginning almost three centuries earlier until the Japanese occupation in 1942, the Indonesian colonial experience was unprecedented in the intensity, breadth, and tenacity of exploitation of both people and land. The exploitation occurred in what Clifford Geertz rightly calls "a series of politico-economic devices." They are the periods of Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie--VOC) (1602-1800), of Forced Cultivation (8) (1830-1877), and of Corporate Plantation System (1880-1942) (9). The rapacity of the three long rounds of exploitation on the Indonesian soil was well presented by Sukarno in his stunning address before the Dutch colonial court in Bandung in 1930--so far probably the best illustration to the point made by Sweezy that Indonesians do remember the "ugliest face" of monopoly capitalism. "Well, Your Honors," spoke Sukarno,

we know all about it. We know how in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Dutch East India Company initiated a system of monopoly.... We know the harshness and cruelty used in securing that monopoly.(10)

Here Sukarno reminded his judges of the thousands of people killed in the Moluccas and of millions of spice trees
yearly cut down. He cited thousands of Makassarese who "were deprived of their means of livelihood and...forced into piracy" and the unquenchable cupidity of contingenten and leverantien.(11) Sukarno also quoted gloomy passages from Dutch and German sources about "inhuman cruelty" and "public calamity" inflicted upon the Indonesian people by Jan Pieterszoon Coen, probably the most ferocious Governor General in the entire history of Dutch colonization.

Indeed, Coen's iron hand that struck upon the Indonesians during the second and third decades of the 17th century was judged as "excessive even to the eyes of the Company's own employees."(12) His unrestrained determination for profit is probably best reflected by his own words that, "You cannot have trade without war, or war without trade."(13) He regarded the Indonesians as mere cattle.

May not a man in Europe do what he likes with his cattle?...Even so does the master here do with his men, for everywhere these, with all that belongs to them, are as much the property of the master as are brute beasts in the Netherlands. The law of this land is the will of the King, and he is King who is strongest."(14)

These memorable words of justification from Coen laid bare the underlying character of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia for centuries to come.

But we should remember that looming large in the establishment and daring venture of the VOC were profound
changes as regards the Netherlands as a nation. The triumphant revolt against Spain by "The Sea Beggars" in 1581 ended the hundreds of years suffering of the Netherlanders. Previously they had long been victimized by the Roman tax collectors, by the Anglo-French crown rivalry, and by the haughty Spanish empire. (15) The establishment of the Company overturned the vulnerable position of the Dutch trade both in Europe and overseas. The suffocation of Dutch trade by Philip II now ended.

There were lifelong prejudices and negative competition between provinces in the Netherlands themselves (16) during decades before and after the turn of the 17th century. Overseas trade contest was hard, bitter, and ugly. The Dutch position in Europe as well as the segmented world commerce of the day seemed hardly permitting for any humane treatment in so far as the Dutch colony was concerned. In addition, the Far Eastern waters had just become a new arena for economic contentions between the European powers.

Hence, we can argue that Coen's ruthless policy was an intertwined function of Europe's own experience of incessant and bitter economic and political contentions. It was also a function of the soaring of Dutch nationalism with its determination to acquire for the Dutch nation a vast share in transoceanic commerce. It was the strengthening of the latter which gradually developed into colonization in
order to have a secure hold of key commodities, particularly of spices. (17)

Seeing history on both sides will improve our understanding of the course of Dutch actions during the first era of their colonization. This consisted of the ruthless wars of pacification by the VOC against autochthonous peoples and rulers. Afterwards the Dutch implemented a forceful cultivation—and monopoly—of export crops the Dutch wanted for their European markets.

During the second half of the 17th century they had overpowered the lesser kingdoms of Banten, Makassar, Banjarmasin, and Ternate. The Dutch took over their ports which commanded a long established route to the Moluccas, the classical locus of spices. Soon they were forced to make themselves the jealous guard of Indonesian waters. The reason is that while the risk was high, the Asia-Europe trade took time to bear fruit. Thus every encroachment on the monopoly either by the Indonesian rulers, "smugglers," and "pirates," or by the "war-mongering" Portuguese could be seriously felt. (18)

In general, however, the Company always deployed its force with economy only after fully considering its commercial profitability. As hinted above, the Dutch did not initially intend to colonize, let alone to follow in the footsteps of the Portuguese to spread Christianity in the archipelago. Their sole intention there was to secure a
trade monopoly for a maximum profit. That turned out to be the strongest motive. It is precisely in the sturdiness of their "economic mentality" that the Hollanders outrun the evangelistical Portuguese,(19) the earlier conqueror of the Moluccas.

The Dutch played with prudence the might of their well-armed fleet. This was coupled with their artful practices of solicitation and manipulation of local customs. They were skilful in winning the heart of the country's disparate rulers to make them willing partners in their trade monopoly.(20) They were capable of drawing up false treaties with these rulers or contending princes according to the injunction of the moments' needs. For the economy of their exploitation, the Dutch recruited native soldiers from parts of the country to destroy uncooperative rulers in the others (21)—practices which we might judge as already embodying a divide-and-rule stratagem.(22)

This stratagem the Dutch carried out mostly with ingenuity throughout the more than three centuries of their colonization. All of the measures mentioned above were taken by the Dutch to facilitate their monopoly. They administered this exploitive monopoly 1) by reducing the price of commodities to the level inappropriate even by local standards while ruling that they were to be the only rightful buyer; 2) by restricting or concentrating the site(s) of plantations, frequently through the destruction
of fertile plantation areas; 3) by enforcing a primitive economic exchange with the Indonesians. The Dutch exacted payments in kind and thereby precluding the possibility for the development of modern economic practices among the Indonesians. And, finally, 4) by recruiting forced laborers from parts of the country already conquered to be put to work throughout their plantations.

The manner this exploitation was done by the Dutch East India Company was "the most cruel in the history of colonialism."(23) In the words of Snouck Hurgronje, "we are hard put to stifle our revulsion, despite full consideration of the laws and standards of the times."(24)

Marx did not fail to notice this first round of colonial exploitation in Indonesia. He calls Holland "the head capitalistic nation of the 17th century."(25) The history of Dutch colonial administration was to him full of "treachery, bribery, massacre, and meanness."(26) He also notes the notorious activities of "man stealers" in the neighboring islands in order to meet the great need of forced labor in Java.

The men stealers were trained for this purpose. The thief, the interpreter, and the seller, were the chief agents in this trade, native princes the chief sellers. The young people stolen, were thrown into the secret dungeons of Celebes, until they were ready for sending to the slave-ships.... Wherever [the Dutch] set foot, devastation and depopulation followed. Banyuwangi, a province of Java, in 1750 numbered over 80,000 inhabitants, in 1811 only 18,000. Sweet commerce!(27)
Through trade monopoly and forced delivery of crops to the Company, the Dutch easily gathered "profit" of hundreds of millions of florins. Its "profit" was in the order of more than 100% per annum and the value of its shares reached 1,080% of their nominal value. "Enriched by these millions from their colony," writes Hatta, "the Dutch were able to increase their trade and navigation in Europe considerably and to enlarge their cities."(28)

But it was precisely the rapacious way of extracting wealth which had led to the downfall of the Company. Decadence, demoralization, and unbounded greed gradually infected the Company's officials from top to bottom. The tentacles of corruption were too big and too widespread to overcome. By the end of the 18th century VOC was pronounced bankrupt. Its debt of more than f.134 million was formally taken over by the state of the Netherlands.

But neither the voracity of exploitation nor the persistence of monopoly system ended with the closing of the old monopolistic epoch in colonial Indonesia. As old practices receded, the motive prevailed. Accordingly, the second round was no less exploitive. Sukarno maintains that "the break-up of the Company in about [1800], did not end the system of monopoly, nor was coercive profit-seeking discontinued."(29) The British interregnum of 1811-1816 in Java and some parts of the country terminated the ruthless three-year rule of H.W. Daendels. But less than two decades
later Van den Bosch introduced the notorious Forced Cultivation with the full support of the ambitious, yet debt-stricken, William I. (30) If the first round of colonial exploitation in Indonesia was identified with the flourishing of the Dutch East India Company, the second one must be with the enforcement of the Forced Cultivation. This lasted formally from 1830 to 1877.

In theory, the Forced Cultivation was devised by Van den Bosch to be as good and as simple a system "based on native custom." The Dutch Government stipulated that every village in Java should assign one-fifth of its rice-land for the cultivation of export crops to be delivered in kind to the Government. This the Dutch did in order to assure the tenacity and continuity of their market in Europe.

The villagers were also held accountable for reaping and transporting the crops to the factories at the time when roads were yet a rarity. (31) The labor to be spent for the system should not exceed the amount usually spent for producing rice on the same acreage. (32) To compensate for such a stipulation, the villagers were to be freed from the duty to pay land-revenue. Any surplus in excess of the amount of crops to be delivered, which might accrue from the sale of the produce, will be credited to the village. Besides, the Government was to be liable for any crop failure which was not of the cultivators fault. (33)
But well-meaning as the system appeared, the underlying historical motive remained. The system was endorsed from the Netherlands just when the country was having a long period of confusion and uncertainty during the first three decades of the 19th century. (34) William I had great difficulty paying the debt left by the late Dutch East India Company (VOC). (35) He was also hard put in financing his ambitious and expensive projects at home. New harbors, network of canals, roads and streets, railways, dykes, factories, schools were built. (36) The five-year war (1825-30) waged by Prince Diponegoro in Central Java against the Dutch and the eight-year war with Belgium, following her secession from the Netherlands in 1830, constituted two heavy blows to the Netherlands Treasury. (37)

It is, therefore, a mere euphemism to maintain that the Forced Cultivation was initially devised in order to realize the decision of William I to create a "general welfare," namely "the welfare not only of the Dutch, but also of Indonesian people." (38) Van den Bosch conceived of the plan in a seemingly innocent phrase as "an expedient for restoring Java to solvency" (39) following Raffles's unfinished reform during the five year British interregnum. But the real intention was by all means to save the Netherlands from bankruptcy. (40) Even years before the inauguration of the system, Java had never been intended other than, as the oft-quoted saying indicated, to be "the
life-belt on which the Netherlands kept afloat."(41) And when the contest with Belgium in the Low Countries was over, "Java had come to be regarded as a milk-cow."(42)

Accordingly, the system as it was practised was a far cry from its original theory or written rules. The rule stated that the system only required one-fifth of the land to cultivate export crops, consisting mainly of coffee, sugar, and indigo. But often enough one-third, one-half, and even the whole of the field were used up by the system.(43) Those in charge of carrying out the system also rarely saw to it that the remains of the crops were cleared off the field after harvesting. This prevented the villagers from planting their rice in time, forcing them "to grow a short-lived and less productive variety."(44) Violating the original limit of 66 days working on the export crops, the peasants of Java were frequently necessitated to labor for 240 days or even more as the crops demanded.(45) Moreover, people were paid not according to the amount of their land/labor production, but according to the amount which the factory was capable of handling at the moment.

The consequence was that many cultivators merely received what Mohammad Hatta calls "starvation wages"(46) or no payment at all for their trying labor.(47) There was no sustained control as regards the arbitrariness of the Dutch colonial agencies over the Indonesian people throughout the entire cycles of the Forced Cultivation. "With no other
limit than those imposed by their physical stamina," writes George Gonggrijp, a Dutch professor, "the people could be illimitably exploited."(48)

Formally initiated by Van den Bosch in 1830, the system was concluded at the end of 1877--the time when the Government was pressed by the liberal movement in the Netherlands to withdraw gradually from the practices of the Forced Cultivation.(49) But that year should be seen as merely the beginning of an end. It took four more decades before State cultivation for "profit" actually stopped.(50)

From the Dutch standpoint, the Forced Cultivation as a whole was a resounding success. By the year of the formal conclusion of the System, i.e., in 1877, "it had paid off the East India Company's debts of f.134.7 million and in addition brought into the Netherlands home treasury a tribute totaling f.832.4 million."(51) For the people of Indonesia, however, it was another widespread cataclysm.

The rapacity of the system was admitted by Furnivall as he writes that successive famines between 1843 and 1848 "caused such distress that in one regency the population fell from 336,000 to 120,000 and in another from 89,000 to 9,000."(52) These regnant famines resulted largely from the confiscation of all fertile fields in the village and were exacerbated by heavy and irrational taxes.(53) The system's rule allowing compensation for villagers' service in cultivating the export crops was violated. It was an arbitrary
expropriation of people's labor to be freely expended by the colonial government at the people's expense.

Consequently, the system was virtually a five-time exploitation/expropriation: that of village land, of people's labor, of the cost of labor reproduction, of the products of the people's labor and village land, and whatever rightful earnings they had at their disposal were also swallowed by endless duties. The system was, therefore, worse than slavery. The cruelty inflicted upon the Javanese peasantry was perhaps only comparable to that of what Chinweizu called "the rubber-mad orgy" of the Leopoldian "system" in Congo towards the end of the nineteenth century.(54) Professor Gonggrijp gives us an apt illustration:

No other crop brought such wholesale calamity as indigo. When foolishly planted in Priangan in 1830 it meant nothing less than disaster. Men from a number of villages in the nearby district of Simpur were compelled to work in indigo fields far from their homes for seven months without a break, while also having to furnish their own food. Upon returning home they found their rice paddies in ruin. Five thousand men and three thousand buffaloes of the same area in the first five months of 1831 were forced to till land for a factory just completed. When they had finished, the indigo seedling had still not arrived. Only two months later, after tall grass and weeds had sprung up and covered the fields again, did the ships arrived from Batavia. Men, women, and children were put to work getting the fields in shape again. It was not uncommon for a pregnant woman to give birth while hard at work...."(55)

This illustration seems to agree readily with the saying of the day that, "One is born, wed, and buried in the
indigo plantations."(56) Sukarno was not remiss in unearthing before his colonial judges this ominous practices. He pointed out that after the period of confusing contest between the old ideology of imperialism and the new ideology hailed by the French Revolution, the people were again trampled under what Sukarno calls the "far more cruel, far more enthralling and exhausting" exploitation of the Forced Cultivation.(57)

**Imperialism as Capitalism Distorted**

Essentially, the Forced Cultivation derived its fundamental features of exploitation directly from the acquisitive practices of its predecessors in the field, the Dutch East-India Company. The only difference is that the new system moved openly one step further in the process of production, that is, from tapping only the crops to controlling the cultivation of the crops as well. Both arbitrarily expropriated the people's labor and determined the price of the people/land products. In such a way, Marx's general theory of surplus value as well as his notion about "primitive accumulation" were here inapplicable.

There are two reasons for the inapplicability. First, Marx's notion of "primitive accumulation" implies an actual expropriation of the producers' means of production. During the bulk of the Forced Cultivation era, such an expropriation generally did not occur. The cultivators retained
their land. What the government did was to keep the land under the bupati (native regents)—through whose authority the common populace were mobilized to cultivate the land. The concept "primitive accumulation" as it is understood in Marxian literature is thus not pertinent here. By means of a unique "feudal" mechanism, the Dutch used their acquired right to have the land cultivated at the terms and with the crops they determined. The people got back their right to cultivate their land as soon as the deal was over.

Secondly, the "capital" the colonizers provided consisted merely of organization and brute coercive power. In the classical Marxian theory the surplus value consisted of a small fraction incurred out of "the more than necessary labor" exacted from the worker. Only gradually does the surplus value accumulate to further increase the magnitude of capital. Where the condition is reversed, however, that is, where the capital needed consists only of a tiny fraction of the immense amount of "profit" to be made out of it—as what we have with the Indonesian experience, we should probably speak of the overcoming of surplus value.

This certainly does not imply that the entire Marxian perspective has been rendered irrelevant. Colonialism is itself the severest form of immiseration not contradictory in intent and outcome as that conceived of by Marx. Seen from a Marxian angle, the increasing exploitive power of the Dutch colonizer is but a function of the congealed
labor having been expended by the Indonesian cultivators during the time of the Company's Forced Deliveries which ended in 1800. The same function holds true with the Forced Cultivation which greatly contributed to the introduction of modern and capitalistic exploitation in various parts of the country as from 1880. Thus here, again, we find the echo of Marx's words that

the higher the productiveness of labour, the greater is the pressure of the labourers on the means of employment, the more precarious, therefore, becomes their conditions of existence....(58)

The impertinence of the Marxian notion only begins with the fact that while Marx believes in the impossibility of zeroing the cost of labor, i.e., as "always beyond reach", the evolvement and practices of colonial exploitation prove precisely the reverse.(59) In colonialism, and in no other country was it testified so grimly than in colonial Indonesia, not only the entire labor was exploited in toto but also the constant capital (fertile land)--both without the capitalists having to bother with their reproduction or refertilization. Only toward the end of the colonial period did Dutch capitalism gradually come to the actual expropriation of land.

To top this deviation, while Marx believes that capitalism can only grow out of the ashes of feudalism,(60) in colonial Indonesia, as we will show in the following
chapter, the same capitalism reaped an unprecedented profit with the corroboration of "feudalism." (61) We should then conceive of imperialism as distorting in two directions. Rather than being "a monopoly stage of capitalism" or an extension of capitalism overseas, imperialism can only be rightly approximated when viewed as a distortion of the classical capitalism formulated by Marx. It is also a distortion of feudalism. For while it harnessed fully the feudalistic practices of "accumulation," it disintegrates the unity of the feudal world and transforms it simply into a bastard feudalism. (62) Above all, however, it should be seen as the most congenial cooperation between capitalism and feudalism.

The practices of Forced Deliveries and Forced Cultivation are similar in two other respects. Both adopted the policy of what K.M Panikkar calls "a restriction of plantation and an open system of cheating." (63) With such a practice, the people were not only actually robbed of their land and labor by means of the already plunderous regulations, but were plundered still during the implementation of the already plunderous regulations.

Both also sowed and manipulated political discords within the disparate social and/or cultural groups. Of particular import was the use of later Chinese, namely those Chinese who came or were brought to Indonesia in the
wake of the colonial establishment. They became middlemen and monopolists of certain kinds of merchandise, notably opium, and farmer of taxes—all for the Netherlands. Given this opportunity, the Chinese proved themselves to be an effective colonial associate. Coupled with the reinforcement of the vestiges of feudal customs, a concerted force of exploitation detrimental to native economy was unleashed. In other words, the Dutch managed to harness and combine acquisitiveness (the function of the later Chinese) and legitimacy (the function of native aristocracy) or simply greed with power for the advantage of the colonial enterprise.

Here again all the Dutch needed was to add their skill of manipulating social forces around them and meted out coercive power as circumstances required. This concerted force of exploitation created an insurmountable distance between the peasantry and the market. It strangled the people's economy, making it impossible for them to revive their trade and entrepreneurial class which thrived during the precolonial era.(64)

The advent of modern imperialism in colonial Indonesia brought about the third round of colonial exploitation, roughly from 1880 until the Japanese occupation in 1942. Here Dutch capitalists merely took over the place occupied by the State for more than two centuries. By no means did they change the lot of the Indonesian masses, What happened
instead was the transformation of the merchant-State monopoly. The monopoly, now carried out by Dutch corporations, stayed intact as the looting of the land and people continued. Besides, feudal-capitalistic practices of exploitation did not die out overnight. The only difference was that if in the first, and particularly in the second, round the looting was largely carried out by the State, in the third the practice was handed over to the Dutch capitalists. Rather than continuing its former role in the act of exploitation, the State now merely facilitated the act with legal and policing measures. (65)

Under such circumstances, the name "modern capitalism" as it was understood in the West became a farce in the East. Here modernity was not accompanied with economic rationality tempered with humane enlightenment. The three practices of colonial economy mentioned above as well as most of the severity of the five-time exploitation continued in the colony. Change occurred only in the rhetoric of exploitation. In some respects, they even acquired worse records. We can mention, for instance, the unruly expropriation of communal land very much similar with the Indian colonial experience under Lord Canning's "Waste Land Rule" of 1858. (66) Dutch capitalists' outcry of "free trade", "free enterprise", and "free labor" in the wake of the rise of liberalism at home turned out to be quite a different thing when translated into the colony.
Representing the Character of Dutch Colonialism

Throughout the bulk of the period of modern capitalism in the colony, there was only one and a single freedom: freedom of the colonizer's enterprises. In his speech before the International League of Women for Peace and Freedom in Gland in 1927, Hatta put forward that, "since the beginning of the Company up to our own times the general character of the colonial regime of Holland has not been altered."(67) Rules and regulations may change or even contradict each other, but the motive and end result remained—"to keep the colony in the service of the mother country."(68) Until approximately a decade before the Indonesians proclaimed their independence in 1945, freedom of trade and of labor as well as other forms of social and political rights commonly known in "the civilized world" did not exist for average Indonesians.(69)

In the meantime, the well of profit merely shifted to new stockholders, whose private capital exercised ever greater influence over the state and consequently over the colony as well. "'Net profit' never flowed so freely as it is under the hand of its new reapers; only its means were more subtle."(70) It was no doubt a capitalism with a more or less complex division of labor and interdependence of the producers at both national and international levels --the main features which Marx uses to characterize a developed capitalism.(71) But in the colony they represented a
sheer parody of it. Conspicuously absent was what John Stephens calls "the socialization of labour and the organization of workers." (72) Out-moded practices as firmly reestablished by the Forced Cultivation lingered on as a structural barrier.

The effect of the absence of labor organization was notoriously shown by the treatment of the so-called "coolie contract." Van Kol, a member of Dutch Parliament, declared that the treatment reminded us again of slave-trade, (73) particularly as it flourished in Dutch plantations on the Outer Islands. Poor job seekers from the densely-populated Java were put at the mercy of plantation employers. Under the Government Coolie Ordinance of 1880 with its provisions known as Penal Sanction, these employers had at their disposal the right to inflict whatever pain meeting their fancy upon those who happened to be fettered under a practically interminable contract. (74) It is difficult for us not to suspect that there were many deaths in the jungles of the plantations which history would perhaps never recover.

All this practice brought unprecedented wealth to the Netherlands. This wealth drain is again testified by Sukarno when he cited the figures he obtained from Jacob van Gelderen that in 1880

the export surplus stood at f.25,000,000; in 1890 it had reached f.36,000,000; by the final years of the nineteenth century it had climbed
to f. 45,000,000. In 1910 the figure stood at f.145,000,000; in recent years it has been f.700,000,000; by 1919 it actually attained a record of f.1,426,000,000."(75)

With this huge "profit," neither the laboring people nor the land received anything of worth. An average farmer in Java lived miserably and could do absolutely nothing to rectify his situation. "His chief contribution to society is as a drag on wages."(76) The same wretchedness befell the land as a whole. As "profit" began to flow in abundance, practices of profiteering infected the Netherlands' Ministry of Colonies. Once it happened that for almost twenty years government expenses in the country "were pared to the bone," irrespective of educational or political needs, "in order to increase the yearly remittance from Batavia to Europe."(77)

During the last decades of the Dutch colonization, the number of landless farmers was increasing by leaps and bounds.(78) This observation corresponds with the figures given by Sukarno as regards the land expropriated by foreign (mostly Dutch) plantation owners.

In 1870 tenure lands totaled 35,000 bahu,(79) by 1901 already 622,000 bahu, by 1928, 2,707,000 bahu; with agricultural concession also included the total for 1928 becomes 4,592,000 bahu! At least 488,000 bahu are now under rubber cultivation with a yield of about 141,000 tons; there are 132,000 bahu in tea plantations yielding about 73,000 tons; 127,000 bahu in coffee plantations yielding about 55,000 tons,
79,000 bahu in tobacco yielding 65,000 tons,  
275,000 bahu in sugar yielding 2,937,000  
tons.**(80)**

By contrast, Sukarno laid bare before his colonial 
judges that the net annual income for the head of an aver-
age Indonesian family was **f.138.50**, which means less than 
f.12 per month.**(81)** If the value of one florin equaled 40  
cents at the rate of exchange of the 1939 American dol-
lar,**(82)** it means that a family of an average of five lived 
together on **$4.80 a month.**(83)** Thus Sukarno, following  
Professor J.H. Boeke, rightly calls the average Indonesians  
as living "a wretched life."**(84)**

Another important indicator which Sukarno surfaced was 
a 1928 statistics. It showed that there were only 342 gov-
ernment hospitals to serve the more than seventy million  
Indonesians--a fact which rendered the mortality rate per  
year never less than 20 percent. Sukarno said that in large  
cities the rate "sometimes goes as high as 30 percent, 40  
percent, or 50 percent, as in Betawi, Pasuruan, or  
Makassar!"**(85)** It is only understandable that along with  
their material deprivation, the Indonesian mass were also  
denied all rights necessary for the functioning of a decent  
life.**(86)**

The foregoing discussion of the virulence of  
Indonesia's colonial experience is neither intended to
darken the image of the colonizer nor to stop just there. We should not forget that part of what we have uncovered so far is a discourse or rather discourses privileging humanity at the very point in which liberalism and Marxism partially met. The picture has indeed been presented as black as the discourses permit us. The many accounts of Dutch observers on the subject of Dutch colonialism are just as grim and chilling as that of Sukarno and Hatta.(87)

But the purpose is less to be vindictive than to search for more explanation as to how all those grim practices became possible in the first place. The purpose is to read the naked discourses and capture the contour supporting the intensity and persistence of the underlying motive and practices. This question will be addressed more comprehensively in the following chapter.

In his 1932 article "Swadeshi dan Massa Aksi di Indonesia," Sukarno provides a revealing explanation to the "ugliest face" as bequethed by Dutch colonization up to the first half of the twentieth century. By way of answering the growing pressure among Indonesian freedom fighters towards the adoption of a swadeshi line of struggle, Sukarno suggests that there were obvious differences in the nature of Dutch imperialism in Indonesia and that of the British in India. This difference, according to Sukarno necessarily hampered the far-fetched Gandhian alternative.
Sukarno's argument was based on the idea that different characteristics of imperialism were determined by the different kinds of capitalism which gave them birth. He upholds that Britain, being richly endowed with natural resources for industry (which were lacking in the Netherlands), managed to create a mechanizing industry.

The consequence is that where the prime impetus for British "imperialism" was the need to find and transform her colonies to be a vast foreign market (afzetgebied) for her industrial products, the Netherlands took her colonies primarily as "a life-belt upon which [it] kept afloat"—as its levensmiddlegebied. Hence, in Sukarno's eyes, the centuries-long and voracious exploitation. Hence also his view about the impossibility of following a swadeshi line, despite his high esteem of the Indian response to British colonization and of the Indian culture in general.

If colonial exploitation was less than an ultimate venture for the British, it was very much so for the Dutch. Where it was in the interest of the British to maintain a certain level of purchasing power among the Indians in order to enable them to buy British products (which meant allowing a certain level of industrialization and economic independence to the Indian middle-class), the Dutch could hardly tolerate a flourishing Indonesian middle-class. The only middle class they could tolerate, if not encouraged, was that willing to do "the unpleasant jobs" in the
exploitation scheme, and that they could always find best among the Chinese and Indonesians, particularly among the priyai.\(^{90}\) It was by collaborating with these two groups that the Dutch were capable of extracting wealth out of the country at an inordinate level.

As mentioned earlier, circumstances in the Low Countries were also responsible in preventing the Dutch from allowing any moderation in colonial exploitation. But there was yet another major cause. Indonesia was always regarded as but one of Dutch economic enterprises. William I, for instance, held the administration of the colony as his personal concern, keeping the Dutch public at home ignorance of the condition in Java.\(^{91}\) The Dutch seized virtually the entire purchasing power of the Indonesians and thereby preempting the possibility of the growth of a level of industrialization and economic independence among them comparable to that of the Indians.

Van den Bosch did restore Java to solvency, as he had planned, but that was by no means for the Indonesian economy proper. Where there was a relative liberalism in the Indian economic policy by the British, with that of the Dutch there was only monopoly through and through. Sukarno writes,

\begin{quote}
In the Company era it was monopolistic, in the post-Company era it was monopolistic, in the era of Cultuurstelsel [Forced Cultivation] it was monopolistic, and in the era of 'modern imperialism' it was still monopolistic!\(^{92}\)
\end{quote}
Sukarno's observation on the impact of British colonization in India is vindicated by Panikkar. Panikkar writes that with the establishment of European entrepots along the major coastal areas of India, a powerful Indian capitalist class had developed. This class was closely linked with foreign merchants and gathered great profits from them.(93) Accordingly, in spite of the exploitation by the British East India Company,(94) particularly during the century of what Ramkrishna Mukherjee calls the "bleeding India white," the colonization itself had transformed India into a powerful nation under its own name. It strengthened India's bureaucracy, energized her military and intellectuals, and provided ways for the growth of India's industry with its ancillary enterprises.

The British colonization of India was not so much based on plantation as it was on transportation, insurance, credit facilities and the hold of trade within the country through the machinery of distribution.(95) The Indian middle-class, while withholding their desire for a complete independence, adjusted themselves with the British rule by becoming agencies for British firms.(96) Thus they positioned themselves as their country's potential asset. The cruciality of the asset had surfaced even decades prior to India's independence.(97) Mukherjee sums up the Indian colonial experience as a bitter pill necessary to awaken the country out of her deep slumber.(98)
But probably the strongest support to Sukarno's contention comes from Furnivall. In the latter's view, British industrial revolution can be seen as one factor which brought into existence a class of Englishmen "who wished to sell goods to India and, therefore, wished to see India prosperous."(99) The British interests, as Raffles construes them, were highly compatible with the "advancement and improvement" of the colonial people. He deemed it necessary to establish "a free and unrestricted commercial intercourse, to draw forth their resources, while we improve our own."(100) The ideal state of colonization, for the British, should be that which benefited both the colony and the metropolis.

The Dutch, on the other hand, "had nothing to sell and were interested only in [Indonesia's] produce."(101) With her rich merchants, England was in general motivated by a desire to trade with her colonies. In Indonesia, British trade continued making headway during the centuries of Dutch colonization. This happened irrespective of the latter's protectionist measures, including the tough efforts by Van den Bosch, to have the British trade restricted and curtailed. As attested to by British interference in parts of Sumatra and Borneo long after Dutch political dominance was established, it was the British which were constantly on the offensive in the field of economy. The English traders "had been following the Dutch round the
archipelago, pursuing them like gadflies."(102) Even during the peak years of the Forced Cultivation, the Dutch trade was no match to that of the British.(103)

Constituting a similarly important factor in differentiating the two kinds of imperialism was the political practices evolving in England relative to that in Holland. Furnivall is well aware that unlike the case with the Low Countries, 18th-century England had seen the development of a relatively sound system of checks and balances as embedded in her progressive Parliament.

Indeed, England's parliamentary tradition dates as far back to the time of "Convention Parliament" in 1688 with its issuance of the Declaration of Rights which significantly curbed most of feudal privileges.(104) Such a development did not occur in the Low Countries. Furnivall argues that "the cumbrous and inflexible" United Provinces of the Netherlands left no room for party rivalry and consequently had a little chance for a self-correcting mechanism in their general administration.(105) Furnivall relates this political practice to the inevitable transformation of the Dutch East India Company as "a State within a State."(106) The British leaning toward a liberal course and the Dutch predilection toward an authoritarian rule were, accordingly, traceable to the political makeup of their central governments.
This difference is epitomized by Furnivall in the politics of Raffles and Van den Bosch, two great and more or less contemporary colonial figures once ruling in the land. If Raffles championed individual liberty, including that for the colonial subjects, Van den Bosch advocated social bonds with reinforcement. (107) More importantly, if Raffles believed in "law and order," Van den Bosch preferred "peace and quiet." Following the tradition of English law and negative government, Raffles was in favor of "letting the tares grow up and in repressing crime by punishment." (108) By contrast, Van den Bosch believed--after the tradition of Roman law and positive government--in "keeping the field clear of weeds, in preventing crime." (109) Just like the case with the character and fate of the East India Company of the respective nation-colonizers, the difference between their two kinds of imperialism was rooted in Europe and entrenched in the "superior political and economic machinery of England." (110)
II
CULTURAL INEGALITARIANISM AND DISTORTION

The foregoing narrative on Dutch colonization tends less to exaggerate the grimness of exploitation than to overlook the lingering of premodern values and practices in the colony, which partly underlie them. The very pointedness of the discourses militates against awareness of the role played by other social forces. Their voice almost invariably veers at putting the brunt on the shoulder of the colonizers. For instance, while Sukarno discloses the ominous practices of the Hollanders, he consistently silences the no less significant part played by the Indonesians. He ignores the involvement of the Indonesian rulers in facilitating colonial exploitation.

When Jan Pieterszoon Coen claimed that his ruthless hand in dealing with the Dutch colony was only modelled after the prevailing practices among the Indonesians, he was being rhetorical. But Multatuli repeats, if for a diametrically different reason, the same allegation in Max Havelaar more than two centuries later. The message he sent home was essentially the same: the native rulers were by no means less oppressive than we were. In his other book, Multatuli states the matter more point-blankly. He writes that "The [Forced Cultivation] is nothing but the Javanese customs translated into statute terms." While
Coen simply blamed the ugly native rulers to his own advantage, Multatuli attacked the colonizer's systematic use of the ugly rulers and customs for extremely exploitive purposes in defense of the common people. In juxtaposing these two figures, however, we should not lose sight of the fact of the great temporal distance between them. (3)

In any case, it is certain that roughly from 1830, the voracious exploitation in colonial Indonesia was as much the work of the Indonesian functionaries as that of the Dutch colonizers. The evolvement of colonial exploitation was codetermined by the particularities of social circumstances then obtaining in the country and the colonizers' motive to profit as much as possible. The might of brute force alone never forms an adequate explanation to the colonial exploitation. Bernard Vlekke writes that when the British moved to take over the country in 1811 as the Netherlands was occupied by the French, there were only 3,000 soldiers in the Indies, of whom only 1,000 were Europeans. "That a small force like this was sufficient to maintain order in Java shows that the government had the full support of the Javanese princes and regents." (4)

A major contributing factor was the fact that until the first decade of the 20th century there was no sustained and enlightened resistance from any segment of the Indonesian society. Unlike the mandarinated class in Indochina and the Indian colonial bureaucracy as from the
middle of the 19th century, the upper level of native bureaucracy increasingly found themselves transformed into a symbiotic relationship with the colonizers. So tangled was the relationship that there existed what D.J. Steinberg et al. call "Dutch-Javan institutions." This in turn should be explained in terms of the absence of a relatively integrating power prior to the coming of the Dutch at the end of the 16th century. What existed then was a loosely tied connection and haphazardly built relationship between disparate entrepots, principalities or kingdoms—a situation the Dutch quickly exploited. In the name of local practices the Dutch tightened their grip in the archipelago to pursue their objective. Hence their contention that their policy and practices to secure major products of cultivation, particularly from Java—one of the most fertile islands on earth, was "based on native custom."

The notorious cooperation between the Dutch and the bupatis had already begun about a century and a half before the more systematic exploitation emphasizing net profit (batigslot) by Van den Bosch was carried out as of 1830. Since then the Dutch East India Company had outmanoeuvred and gained supremacy over the Kingdom of Mataram in Central Java. Gradually the latter became more and more dependent upon the Company's military help. The Company supported Mataram's dream to recover its former hegemony by suppressing the challenges of local rulers along the
northern coast of Java. But the more she received support, the more she became enfeebled, and the deeper the Dutch took over her administrative power.

In the 1677-78 treaty with Mataram, the Dutch had forced the Susuhunan to deliver 4,000 measures of rice annually at the market price, thus putting an end to her rice weapon which at times had threatened to starve the Dutch stronghold of Batavia. In addition, Mataram also ceded to the Dutch the control over all economically strategic ports along the northern coast including the monopoly of the sale of opium and cloth in the entire regions of the kingdom. In 1696 a similar duty was levied upon the Sultan of Banten as well as the regents of Priangan to deliver pepper, indigo, and cotton yarn cultivated in their lands again at fixed, mostly very low, prices. This was later called the Priangan System. "Here," writes Furnivall, "we can see the origin of Forced Deliveries and Contingencies."

At this point the nature of the Company began to change significantly. The Dutch realized that they could take over the practices of native rulers of exacting fixed tributes from their vassals. Originally drawing its profit from trade, the merchant adventurers from the Low Countries now saw the opening of an easier way to amass fortune: by transforming themselves into a merchant prince.
tributes of its vassals to be the main source of income. (14) In the words of Schrieke, "the Company took upon itself the allure of a sovereign power." (15) This change signifies that the Dutch merchants took over the exploitive practices of traditional rulers of the country, which in the past were reciprocated with protection for the people and with the maintenance of the flourishing social order. The Dutch transformed such practices into immense lucre for the Netherlands.

The Forced Cultivation by Van den Bosch merely systematized on a massive scale the Company's exploitive practices. It is well understood that the Forced Cultivation drew its inspiration directly from the Priangan System which was carried out by VOC for over a century (1696-1800). In the new system, the Dutch levied no taxation on regencies. Instead, peasants under their authority were obliged to cultivate and deliver export crops assigned by the Dutch at prefixed prices. Receiving no salary from the colonial government, bupatis were entitled to get their income from the crops, and so were chiefs and headmen down the ladder proportionate to their respective places in the "feudal" hierarchy.

It turned out that the colonial government was only concerned with its lion share and strictly saw to it that it be gathered. Here again we see that the intention was exploitation pure and simple. The other side of the written
objective, namely to increase the prosperity and lighten the people's burden, was mere lip-service. The government closed its eyes to the widespread abuses by underpaid officials involved in the task of gathering the tributary crops. These officials consisted of Dutch subjects and native colonial bureaucracy (priyayis). As their greed ran unchecked and as the Javanese in general failed to overcome their pejorative portrayal in the colonial literature as "the most docile folk on earth," the actual exploitation was inordinately increased.

Like what befell so many regulations concerning the colonial people, the written rule exacting no more than one-fifth of the cultivated land for the assigned crops and no more than 66 days of work remained only on paper. The Dutch and the priyayis were thus equally responsible for the aggravation of people's burden. Kahin captures the irony of the land's colonialism in the following passage:

It must be emphasized that not only the Company but the native aristocracy upon which the functioning of the system was dependent likewise benefited. The quid pro quo for its serving as the instrument of the Company's policy was not only political, the strengthening and expansion of its power vis-à-vis the native population made possible by the Company's backing; in addition, it shared with the Company the direct economic benefits of the system. Over and above the amount they were charged with delivering to the Company in return for its backing, these aristocrats were generally free to add to these demands as much more as could be squeezed out of the villages in the areas under their control. Thus the demands for these products by the Company in the interior...
frequently was made heavier by the Indonesian lords to their own advantage.(17)

Most of the exploitation was done in the name and language of Javanese culture and made possible by the priyayis. Multatuli's contention is, therefore, pertinent. The meaning system underlying the Forced Cultivation, just like that of the Forced Deliveries in the days of the Company, was largely indigenous. Both Daendels and Raffles tried to check the exploitation of the Javanese peasantry by their own rulers. For instance, they abolished the hereditary right of a bupati to rule over his land and people as practised during the Forced Deliveries.(18) But their innovations were subsequently reversed by Van den Bosch.

Kahin rightly maintains that the Forced Cultivation "could not have succeeded without the support of the top elements in the Javanese aristocratic hierarchy, the regents..."(19) The upper priyayis realized that they were indispensable to the colonial scheme. But they failed to reject or play the circumstances in favor of their subjects as the mandarinated class in Indo China or the Indian bureaucrats attempted in their own colonial worlds.

What happened instead was "the slavish subjection of the native regents" to the colonial overlord.(20) The subordinate position of the bupatis was garbed in the familiar kinship terms of the land. They were called "the younger brother" of the Dutch residents.(21) It is not uncommon
that the Dutch was presented euphemistically as "protector" and "father."(22) As the Dutch made use of the traditional functions of the bupati, the latter, for their turn, did so not to alleviate the exorbitant burden of their people, but to enhance the exclusiveness of their own rank. It is generally conceded that under the Forced Cultivation "their power actually increased."(23)

The remarkable flowering of priyayi subculture in the 18th and early 19th centuries (24) explains this tendency of the priyayis to alienate themselves up and away from the populace, particularly from the peasantry. This period roughly coincides with the latter half of the era of Forced Deliveries and primarily with the era of Forced Cultivation. New court literature was composed and enlarged, the art of batik found its "classical" styles and colors, the wayang kulit repertoire was enriched with a more refined and developed music and gamelan, and out of the fascinating wayang kulit tradition, the wayang orang—a manned dance drama on the stage proper—was created.(25)

But perhaps the most important innovation by the native upper class during this long period was the incorporation of social stratification into the Javanese language. The outcome was cultural inegalitarianism. This mode of inegalitarianism manifested in three hierarchical variants of Javanese. Largely through this symbolic involution, the exploitation of the agricultural populace was sanctioned.
From then on a Javanese could no longer engage in social intercourse by freely using words from the same vocabulary. Three different sets of Javanese vocabulary now existed. The highest set became the privilege of the priyayis whereas the other two were for the peasantry and for social equals. Put differently, the set of locution used to one's superiors, i.e., krama, has been strictly differentiated from the one used to social equals, madya, and to inferiors, ngoko. (26) Violating the rule is tantamount to committing a social offense.

The difference, in Geertz words, "is not minor, a mere du and Sie difference," because here "a peculiar obsession is at work." (27) With that "obsession," communicating does no longer simply mean expressing feelings, thoughts, or messages. Over and above, it means the incorporation into the speech itself of affirmation of the interlocutors' social classes. (28) Without that affirmation, communication is automatically disturbed. Interlocution becomes status bargaining before message conveying. (29) Status determination becomes a prerequisite to interlocution.

Originated and deployed from kraton, (30) the most important social differentiation guarded by this practice was that of the aristocracy/priyayis and the peasantry. (31) As Geertz puts it, "the Javanese pattern their speech behavior in terms of the same alus [refined] to kasar [coarse] axis around which they organize their social
behavior..." (32) Here the aristocracy/priyayis represent the alus and the peasantry the kasar.

This interesting evolvement in the symbolic sphere — perhaps unprecedented in the history of languages — should be read as having a strong political and pathological underpinnings. We say political because it represents the native's equivalent of the Dutch practice not to allow Indonesians to address them in Dutch. Rather, they had made it an unwritten rule that Indonesians, with a very few exceptions, should address them only in Malay or in Javanese. (33) The colonial tradition propagated that "Dutch does not sound well on native lips." (34) While Indonesian officials were not required to learn Dutch, their European counterpart were required to learn Malay or Javanese. (35) Dutch was not taught in most schools for natives, but proficiency in Dutch and higher school fees were required to enroll in European higher education. (36) This was certainly one of the colonial policies to obstruct the Indonesians' road to emancipation.

The end result was that Dutch was only taught to children of the native upper class, most of them priyayis, and the purpose was to get them prepared for lower administrative posts within the colonial structure. In short, behind all the policy of language instruction was what Frantz Fanon sees as the will to propagate the ideological superiority of the colonizer and the inferiority of the
colonized. This principle of differentiation between the colonizer and the colonized in language practice was extended well into the styles of dressing. Against de Kat Angelino's anthropogenetic apology for not teaching Dutch to Indonesians, Bousquet observes that the real reason is that "the Dutch desired and still desire to establish their superiority on the basis of native ignorance." He further discloses the colonizers' hidden fear that the use of Dutch by natives "diminishes the gap between inferior and superior--and this must be avoided at all cost."

Indonesians were not allowed to wear European styles of trousers, shirts, jackets, and shoes. Instances in which a native appeared to outsmart a Dutchman hardly went with impunity. The social intercourse between the colonizer and the colonized was regulated in such a way as to underscore the "nobleness and authority" of the former and the "lowliness and subordination" of the latter.

Corresponding with the language practice of the Dutch, the political intention of the artificial ramification in Javanese was two-pronged. It was to let the peasantry as well as other non-bureaucratic segments (traders, artisans) of the native populace know their place within the colonial structure as the servants and/or subordinates of priyayis, who in turn were the servant of the Dutch. But probably more important than that it was to solicit for themselves a preferential treatment vis-à-vis the rest of the society.
This, as a matter of fact, met the colonial scheme very nicely, because nothing could do better to ease the process of exploitation. Soliciting a preferential treatment from the Dutch can only mean maintaining and facilitating the exploitation of the peasantry. Here the law of social reciprocity is at work. For their turn, the Dutch reversed Raffles's policy by recovering the hereditary right of the bupatis to stay in office. (41)

Language was thus transformed to be an effective "panopticon," (42) encompassing the entire colonial society, in which every subject was every moment reminded of his or her inferiority, servility, and subjection. Thence his/her duty to render whatever service was required by the foreign and domestic oppressors. Here was the exact pair of the concurrent system of agricultural exploitation: the docilization of the peasantry by making both language as language (Dutch, Malay, Javanese) and language as practices the very guard of social stratification. The use of a particular language or the deployment of a particular language practice (e.g., krama) automatically signifies a particular position in the hierarchy of power. Thus if the voracity of material exploitation noticeably exceeded the testimony of Marx, the parsimony of cultural and ideological emasculation in it went beyond the confines of power discourse in the West as unearthed by Foucault. In Foucault only parole is politicized; here even langue was.
Just like what took place in Javanese agriculture, this involution in the symbolic sphere also betrays a pathological response to the grim reality of the time. The symbolic involution was by no means a positive answer benefiting any Indonesians. It was at best a flight from the real challenge. It destroyed the symbolic integrity among the major segments (priyayis, peasantry, traders) of the Javanese society. Subsequently, it let each segment in it develop its own symbolic world irrespective of their social proximity and relation to each other. The cultural unity was thus broken and distorted.

To the bulk of the peasantry in particular, the symbolic involution constitutes a forceful pulling down to the bottom of symbolic crudeness, them being denied all the possibilities of ever becoming symbolically elevated. Here the parallel with what obtained in the agricultural field is instructive. The theory of "dualistic economy" by J.H. Boeke views the way of life of Indonesian peasantry as the principal cause of their economic stagnation. Geertz, prior to Andre Gunder Frank, responds sharply that the economic stagnation of the Indonesian peasantry "grew not from the immutable essence of the Eastern soul...but from the in no way predestined shape of colonial policy...."(44) If ex-volution is completely barred while volution is necessary, the only alternative will be involution. Hence what Geertz
calls "the agricultural involution" in Java. But this phenomenon is as true in land as it is in language. If elevation is impossibly denied the symbolic world of the peasantry, the only alternative will be "crudification."

Now, this crudification was arbitrarily imposed for good from above. It was a political act par excellence. Since ngoko is a term not for a yet to be developed language, but merely an invented name affixed to a respectable and flourishing language, the act can only mean a wily and unfair degradation of that language. The symbolic destiny was thus arbitrarily sealed. A painful contradiction was in store for the peasantry, the principal speakers of ngoko. With them to grow or evolve culturally could only mean to keep staying on the crude track. The vestige of the curse to be in the mire of the crude can still, for example, be found in Geertz's observation in the nineteen fifties of priyayis' frown upon the peasantry who tried to cross the pseudo-caste barrier and imitate some of the alus, refined, and elevated way once exclusively belonged to priyayis. (45)

But no less damaging was the pathology embodied in the symbolic involution within the world of priyayis themselves. It was a self-deluding way of trying to escape the total loss of their worthiness as traditional rulers. The priyayis attempted to "make available an ever more capacious and perfect cultural world as a refuge from the
dysharmony in the political world of the time."(46) But unlike what happened in the case of ngoko, priyayis had to create the whole gamut of new words in order to establish what they intended to be an elevated locution. However, since krama did not grow in the normal way a language grows, it, again, had to be invented through whatever concoction possible. Yet because a set of symbols has its own laws and because a healthy language necessarily requires a natural growth, the more the new locution was forced to exist, the more the concoction manifested itself. Hence the symbolic pathology.

It is Benedict Anderson who uncovers the pathological character of this symbolic involution. According to Anderson, krama as the "new court language" did not originate from a cosmopolitan familiarity with the Sanskrit, the primeval language often coveted by priyayis for political purposes. Instead, the elevated locution resulted from "artificial, archaizing variations on a language that all Javanese more or less had in common."(47) Krama was pathological because it

was above all a function of the increasing impotence and decadence of the Javanese upper class--and indirectly of Dutch colonial encouragement, in other words were a sort of compensation for a loss of real authority.(48)

Ronggowarsito, the nineteenth century poet-laureate of Java, honestly expressed this loss of authority in his
bitter confession, *Serat Kalatida* (Poem of a Time of Darkness). The same bitterness, coupled with shame, prompted the father of Dr. Sutomo, prominent leader of Budi Utomo, to forbid any of his children to become colonial bureaucrats.

Anderson relates to us an apposite incident occurring in a colonial court, which exposed the essence of this symbolic pathology. Tjokrosoedarmo, a leader of "back to ngoko" movement, bluntly refused to answer the krama used by the colonial prosecutor in comparable krama, thus expressing his disesteem. Upon rebuke, he responded that the prosecutor was charging him in his position as the servant of the colonial government, not as a representative of a respect-deserving Javanese.

**Cultural Distortion and Colonial Exploitation**

At least there were three closely related factors responsible for the alienation of priyayis from the rest of the populace. They were dependence on colonial government, overvaluation of bureaucratic positions, and typical flight, justified or contrived, to "the other world."

Dependence on colonial government can be seen as the unintended result of primordial conceptions and practices, marked with ignorance about development occurring in other parts of the world. The Dutch penetrated the land with their superior armament and fleets. Caught off guard, the
Indonesian rulers had only a vague idea of what was in store for them. (53) With the probable exception of Aceh, apparently none of the rulers were in a position to approximate the actual might of the advancing Western nation.

But history has been unfair to the Indonesian rulers. There was no lesson similar to that drawn by Rama III of Thailand from the humiliating experience of Burma against Britain in the Yandabo Treaty of 1826. (54) The lesser kingdoms in the archipelago were caught up by the swift armed penetration of Western nations into their waters, in which interinsular and international trade had thrived peacefully for centuries. Unlike the case with Rama III and his brother, Prince Mongkut, in Thailand over two centuries later, Sultan Agung challenged the VOC. He saw his kingdom as above all the rest in the archipelago and perhaps rightly so. By the end of the 17th century all other trade/political centers but Aceh had been forced to acknowledge the sovereignty of the Dutch. Unfortunately, just like the other centers, Mataram fell short of her ambition after decades of virulent wars.

But even with her fall, Mataram never duly regarded the Dutch by their own right. (55) She wrongly viewed the white intruders as just another band of foreign traders, like the Chinese, the Arabs, the Portuguese, the Japanese, the Persians, who would before long come and go. (56) Or, at best, she wrongly took the VOC as merely a valuable
"instrument" to help establish and enlarge her own hegemony or suppress pretenders to the throne. Here then was a decisive encounter of a "mediaeval" force with the harbinger of modern political power well versed in political, economic, and military struggles in the West.(57)

The widespread perception of the Dutch as not constituting a real danger, and certainly as not a colonizing nation, enabled the Dutch to move freely in the Indonesian waters. They had every chance to play with advantage in between disputes of rulers and principalities. They could also take their time in subjugating the entire chain of Indonesian islands—a process only completed in 1914 after three centuries had passed.(58) The dependence of the native rulers on the colonial power was to a great extent a function of their centuries-long misjudgement and the stealthy evolvement of the Dutch colonial scheme.

Viewed from another angle, this dependence should be seen as a vicious circle. As soon as bupatis derived their authority from the Dutch, their coercive power over the peasantry remarkably increased.(59) But this increase of power was a liability in itself.(60) Since a bupati no longer needed the consent of the people, he became alienated from them. Sartono Kartodirdjo notices this treacherous flirtation with power by the priyayis.

Desirous of preserving their position, they needed to curry favor with the Dutch who were
their political masters; but the association with the infidel authorities was detrimental to their prestige among the people...(61)

The more the bupatis were alienated from the people, the weaker they became in the eyes of both the people and the Dutch. Hence the vicissitudinous, ever changing, terms of appointment and functions of the office of kabupaten (regency), tailing financial situations and political winds in the Netherlands.(62)

Overvaluation of bureaucratic positions among the priyayis largely developed from the dependence mentioned above. It resulted from colonial suffocation of virtually all paths of social mobility other than those befitting and benefiting the colonial establishment. So impeded were other walks of life that to have a respectable life became, for Indonesians at large, identical with entering the rank of civil servants. Only from this vantagepoint can we make sense of the noxious practice of giving bribes "on a large scale" to Dutch high officials by "priyayi wanting appointment" in the colonial bureaucracy.(63) Not until the second decade of the 20th century did this situation begin to change.

But a social psychological process gained precedence over this plainly political and economic phenomenon. The priyayis concealed the real state of affairs by refracting
the bitter reality of foreign domination. They did so by inflating the value of bureaucratic positions and by identifying such positions exclusively with the alus while the rest, namely that of traders, artisans, and the peasants, with the kasar.

A revealing account of this phenomenon is given by Leslie Palmier in *Social Status and Power in Java*. She maintains that

There has always been a hierarchy of statuses; nevertheless there is just one quality which gave and gives positive value to an occupation: distance from manual labor. The further away, the higher the status. A way of life free from the toil of one's hand is "refined"; one which involves it is coarse.(64)

Priyayis held, if self-deludingly, that their yearning for such positions stemmed not from the obstruction of other channels to social elevation by the colonial structure, but because bureaucratic positions themselves were the most honorable niche a man could procure.(65) Here then we find an instance of the exact opposite of "the sour grapes mechanism."

We need to emphasize that this overvaluation of bureaucratic position is a peculiarly colonial phenomenon. It certainly did not originate from the precolonial era as suggested by Geertz when he observes that priyayi ethic "is the outcome of nearly sixteen centuries of urban living."(66)
Geertz characterizes the priyayis by their "intense sense for status difference," "calm assertion of spiritual superiority," and "dual emphasis on the inner life of refined feeling and external life of polite form." (67) The meager historical records of precolonial eras, however, hardly permit us to indicate a particular social class embodying these three traits simultaneously. Such traits can only be a by-product not of sheer power, but of secure and lasting power—something we hardly find throughout precolonial Indonesia. They were more likely a by-product of Dutch durable colonization rather than the crown of "sixteen centuries of urban living." Krama, by far the most powerful locution maintaining status difference, should be called an invention of the colonial period.

Particularly untenable is the alleged "spiritual superiority" of the priyayis. This quality is usually attributed to Javanese kings in their babad, (68) the main concern of which is not to write history, but to solicit or invoke legitimation, even by means of all out misrepresentation. (69)

Perhaps we can argue that priyayis retained the "spiritual superiority" by being in personal proximity to the kings. The ancient conception of power in the land acknowledges that supernatural power possessed by a king shines out onto his surroundings and invests in them portions of that power, the closer the stronger. And yet
the mostly turbulent and insecure—unlike the so certain
effect the babads intend to impress—history of old king-
doms in the archipelago disallows such a claim. The glori-
ous period of Majapahit lasted barely one century, that is,
from her foundation by King Wijaya in 1295 to the death of
his grandson, Hayam Wuruk, in 1389.(70) This is not to
mention the ever crowded contestants for power as played by
kings, brigands, courtiers, traders, pirates, and plain
pretenders to the throne throughout the all too frequent
changes of kingdoms in this part of Island Southeast Asia.
The Indonesian kingdoms lacked both the restriction of
contestants (71) and the endurance of, for instance, the
Thai Kingdom of Ayudhya.

But constituting the final pathological practice which
had removed priyayis up and away from the populace at large
was their typical flight to what might be called "the
serene world." This resulted from the flourishing of mystic
sects among the priyayi circles. The main objective of the
sects was the maintenance of inner peace by a constant
effort to concentrate upon and control one's own psyche.
Geertz identifies the mystic practice as "the intense
regulation of the life of thought and feeling."(72) The
purpose of the practice was to organize "the individual's
spiritual resources for an attack upon ultimate enlighten-
ment."(73) Such an enlightenment is achieved when one
enters swara ing asepi—the voice in the serenity.(74)
Priyayi mystics refused to concede that their sects breed escapism, a flight to the other world.\(^{(75)}\) On the contrary, "mystical practice is considered to be a means not of turning away from life but toward it."\(^{(76)}\) But here another confusion needs to be disentangled.

There is a ring of truth in the claim of "turning toward [the world]." Similar to what obtained in the bifurcation of the Javanese language, priyayis' mystic sects also reinforced the ethos of the colonial civil servants.

As Geertz aptly suggests, "the normative social theory the sects support is congruent with the need of a rank-conscious class of white collar administrators with idealistic pretensions."\(^{(77)}\) Hence priyayi's claim that the spiritual strength is proportionately correlated with social status, and that "the lower class people are well-advised not to try too much along such lines."\(^{(78)}\) Peasants were discouraged, because they are "notoriously poor at meditation when compared with priyayis."\(^{(79)}\) Ignored are the facts that engagement in meditation, just like that in creative and artistic fields, requires security of income, which during the entire colonial period only priyayis could muster. It can even be asserted for that matter that the last century's flowering of Javanese culture within the confines of kratons was directly related to colonial protection and the stability of aristocratic seats it brought about.
But the claim of "turning toward the world" becomes questionable as we read the problem more politically. Running parallel to the ideology behind the stratification of Javanese language, the norms cherished by the sects were intended to ease the work of the priyayis as the native counterpart of the colonial administration. Their principal duty was to preserve the feudal, old-time, notion of who were to rule and who to obey. The underlying motive was to justify the antagonism of the social loci to which the priyayis and the peasantry were respectively assigned. This ultimately justified the colonial exploitation.

Consequently, the claim is only tenable in so far as it signifies the placing of oneself in a comfortable haven within the turbulence and uncertainty visiting the entire colonial world. And yet it was an escape to disillusionment. For once it was realized that the prestige the priyayis enjoyed was borrowed, concocted, and treacherous, the serenity lost its meaning. The lack of genuine authority and the role as a mere puppet of the Dutch soon reigned over all illusions of greatness. The *swara ing asepi* is bluntly incompatible with the concomitant wretchedness inflicted upon the peasantry by the mystic practitioners. It is precisely this fact which Ronggowarsito points to in *Serat Kalatida*.(80) Not only was the mystic practice but a camouflage to political impotence; it was also a selling out of their alleged responsibility as protectors.
particularly of the peasantry, who provided them with material sustenance.

Representing the Colonial Structuration of Chinese Economy

The anti-imperialist discourse of Sukarno also failed to mention the contribution of the Chinese in the colonial drama. So important and thorough was their contribution that we can hardly talk about any step and/or field in the process of exploitation without taking due account of the role the Chinese had played in it. Ever since Coen adopted them as an "industrious and unwarlike" partner, the Chinese had irrevocably entrenched themselves in the Indonesian economy.

Beginning as middlemen to native rulers but more importantly to the Dutch, the Chinese by 1880 already owned more than one-third of factories and plantations in the country. Roughly from the inception of the Forced Cultivation until 1900, they were granted by the Dutch monopolies for the sale of opium and salt as well as for the running of government pawnshops. They were also given the monopoly for the import of clove and cambrics needed by native kretek and batik industries. During the previous centuries, land, taxes, road tolls, bazaar fees, and customs duties had been farmed out to them by the VOC. In that era, Chinese hirelings and servants were found even in the remotest part of the country to buy up pepper and
other wares. Apart from being owners of large private lands in Java, they also worked as coolies on tin mines and large plantations in the Outer Islands. They formed a very important part of the capitalists, bankers, and agricultural concessionaries.

In short, the Chinese, found largely in upper economic strata and present in almost every economic transaction, made up the bulk of the middle class in the country. It is thus impossible to talk about Dutch colonization and economic exploitation without mentioning the crucial role of the Chinese.

Records clearly show that the Chinese obtained a privileged position in Indonesia's economy by virtue of its linkage to and incorporation into the colonial economy. Onghokham maintains that prior to the arrival of the Dutch there had been a significant assimilation of the earlier Chinese into the Indies' society. But he emphasizes that the history of the Chinese in Java was closely related to the development of colonialism. He holds that from the beginning there had been a mutual understanding between the Chinese and the Dutch, and that the Chinese soon found the colonial pattern congenial. It was congenial to them not only in economic matters, but with respect to their effort to maintain the purity of their culture as well. The progress of colonial exploitation brought along reslinification of the descendants of the earlier Chinese and hampered
the process of further assimilation into the larger Indonesian society. In other words, the later and the earlier Chinese became blurred in colonial economy and politics.

This mutual reinforcement between the Dutch and the Chinese had precluded any significant participation of the Indonesians in the economy of their own country. What economic positions the Indians occupied in British India were swallowed up by the Chinese in Dutch East Indies. It should be noted, however, that not until the rise of Dutch power did the Chinese "enjoy a monopoly of certain economic functions in social life."(88) Put differently, the politico-economic penetration and domination by the Dutch had considerably shifted the balance of economic power between the Chinese and the Indonesians.

Before the coming of the Portuguese and the Dutch, Malay, Javanese, and Buginese traders had been masters in their own land, in spite of centuries of Chinese participation in their economy.(89) Ruling princes and aristocracy of the country, religious dignitaries, and merchant gentlemen—all of whom Van Leur identified as popolo grosso—were economically dominant during the precolonial era.(90)

As we will discuss further in Chapter V, Indonesian precolonial trade was distinctly international. It brought together traders from India, Japan, China, Persia, Arabia, and Europe. Trades occurred in high frequency and in huge
cargoes between these peoples and the Indonesians and among the Indonesians themselves. Indonesian traders sailed as far as Madagaskar and mainland China. It is interesting to note that the Asian trade was then superior to that of Europe in terms of capital, organization, and the quality of products or merchandise. (91) Coen's decision to concentrate on the Asian trade alone should be seen in this light. (92)

Along with the native aristocracy, the Chinese should, therefore, be mentioned as no less determining in the establishment of Dutch colonial enterprise. Kahin writes that,

Neither the system developed by the Company and continued along roughly similar lines after its demise under the name of the [Forced Cultivation] nor the social legacy of Dutch rule as a whole can be clearly understood without some account of the building up of the economic role of the Chinese in Indonesia. (93)

Just like the Dutch and the priyayis—their two counterparts in the colonial scheme, the Chinese, the later in particular, also treated the Indonesians poorly. They victimized the people through their money-lending practices, usurped village authorities, and forced peasants under their command to work beyond the limits of their natural capacity in the farms the Dutch leased them. They were not reluctant to shut the Indonesians off from industrial and commercial activities while restricting them to a
stagnant agriculture. They were willing to squeeze out to the last drop any agricultural products required by the Dutch. In addition, their monopoly of the sale of opium, through which they encouraged opium-smoking, also affected the society negatively. (94)

Of course, there are claims that the Chinese had obtained their prominence in the economic field due to their industriousness, and that the Indonesians were plunged in destitution due to their own idleness. Such arguments are easily vindicated by the characterization of village economy in Indonesia by Boeke. Arrant limitedness of needs, the reversal of the law of supply and demand, the lack of production for profit, the fact that income is a very scarce category, and the discontinuity of both labor and social units were indeed unwelcome traits preventing the villagers to grow economically. (95) It is by contrasting these and other characteristics with that of the Western mode of economy that Boeke draws his theory of "dualistic economy."

But even out of Boeke's own passages (96) we can easily contend that what really occurred in colonial Indonesia is neither a "clash" nor a fair co-existence of two divergent economies, but a literal suffocation of the entire Indonesian economy. This was effected first by crushing the land's international and interinsular trade and then making use of local customs to mobilize the peasantry to cultivate
the crops they needed. Hence the distortion of people's economic capacity.

Accordingly, Boeke's theory is internally weak. Here, Andre Gunder Frank's thesis is more befitting. Only by imposing an autarkic character onto the Indonesian economy were the Dutch able to sap the country to the marrow and to keep the people backward. The autarkic character of the Indonesian economy hinted at by Moertono and so much emphasized by de Kat Angelino is, therefore, more a function of colonial structuration than the original state of the people's economy. As disclosed in Chapter V, Indonesia's precolonial economy was much more dynamic and integrated than was generally believed. Only by suffocating the land's dynamic trade and by establishing an asymmetric symbiosis with its village economy did Dutch capitalism prosper. In the words of Furnival,

\[\text{the bitter experience of two hundred years [under colonialism] dulled the economic sense of the people and, after living for two centuries in a land where the laws of economics did not run, it is not strange that they ceased to recognize them. Thus the economic life of the people was not merely stunted by the suppression of all economic activities but agriculture, it was also vitiated by the nullification of economic laws.}(97)\]

To Furnival, it was the Dutch who constantly obstructed the functioning of the normal economic order. This observation by Furnival and the sociological studies by Schrieke
and Van Leur tend to undermine all arguments which put the blame upon the people's negative habits. In so far as the colonial scheme is concerned, the Dutch were playing against the Indonesians with "loaded dice"(98) in favor of the Chinese and that from the beginning of the colonial era the Chinese were already "in a position of advantage."(99)

If during the precolonial period we find a relatively harmonious relationship between the Chinese immigrants and the natives--with the former assimilating into the larger society, the colonial period reversed the course. The cultural and political orientation of colonial Chinese had always been to their mother country. The great influx of Chinese immigrants during the first decades of the 20th century reinvigorated their cultural identity. It goes without saying that most of them never identified themselves with the Indonesians. These non-economic factors perhaps prompted them to make use of their advantage in the colonial scheme in such an insidious manner that, alongside their laudable qualities, they had earned a reputation as "a pernicious influence"(100) upon the natives or, worse, as "a pest of the country."(101)

It is necessary to add, however, that such scapegoating statements should be read with extra caution. The Chinese, just like the priyayis, were not wholly and for all times docile associates of the Dutch. Over time even the Dutch found it hard to contain the forward drive of the
Chinese. We should not rule out the possibility that bad representations of both Indonesians and the Chinese—or of any important, non-European, participants in the colonial drama—were a function of Dutch political stratagem.

In a way, the granting of economic privileges to the Chinese by the Dutch is analogous to the "opening" of political channels to the emerging national consciousness among the Indonesians during the first decades of the century. Both turned out to be irreversible. It shows that, given an opportunity, both the Chinese and the Indonesians were talented peoples capable of overcoming their initially abject conditions.

With the foregoing discussion, we can now conclude that colonial Indonesia can never be fully understood without addressing the decisive partnership between the Dutch, the Indonesian aristocracy, and the Chinese middlemen with the Dutch functioning as the master of the game. Likewise, no account of the unprecedented case in the history of colonization will be substantial without due regard to the existing and interweaving practices in the fields of economy, culture, and discourses. And these social practices can never be rightly grasped without a reading of history with an open-minded humility, i.e., with the slightest imposition of the social dicta of our own era and an ever
willing readiness to accept chances, suddenness, and discontinuities.

Our principal concern, however, is not to present a historical treatise on the colonial era of Indonesia. Rather it is to try to provide the rich and living context subsequent movements of nationalism and of egalitarianism in Indonesia deserve, whatever forms they took. Familiarity with the richness and complexity of the colonial evolvement in Indonesia will not only greatly help us in capturing the motives and reasons of the movements concerned, but also in approximating the depth and intensity of their commitments to struggle. Put differently, the durability of a social or political movement was by and large a function of the durability of preceding or prevailing social structure, whether the movement was for or against that structure. And the uncertainty and confusion which visited such movements were also a function of the uncertainty, confusion, and distortions visiting the colonial world.
PART TWO

INDONESIAN NATIONALISM IN CONTEXT
III

LANGUAGE DETERMINATION OF THE INDONESIAN NATIONALISM

Most discussions of the birth of the Indonesian nation fail to address the role played by the Indonesian language, Bahasa Indonesia. To be sure, numerous studies do mention the fact that there was a language factor in Indonesian nationalism. Yet we are still in need of a more adequate attack on the symbolic dynamic of the rise of the nation. It is unprecedented that a country colonized for more than three centuries (1) could not only maintain her own language relatively intact, but also kept it growing regardless of colonization.

As soon as we talk about the relationship between language and politics, we are as a matter of fact entering the field of what Michel Foucault calls discourse, i.e., concerning the use of language which is consciously or unconsciously politicized.(2) If we define "discursive practices" as politicized and valorized interpretations of social phenomena based on different ideological preferences, then nationalism is clearly one. Nationalism always involves a particular way of treating, conceiving and understanding social reality—in such a way as to benefit its adherents. Indonesian nationalism should also be seen in this light. For unless we are capable of locating the "discursive context" of Indonesian nationalism, all
discussion of the events it has engendered will remain blurred in the multiplicity of what Foucault refers to as historical "documents."

Locating the variations of discursive practices in Indonesian nationalism will help us see its limits and obtain a better understanding of the phenomenon. This means that we have to deal with what languages were used then and what language practices were sanctioned.

The Dutch used their language very much as an instrument of exclusion, as a means of making the Indonesians "not equal to us." Dutch was identified with the European civilization, which was too high and too noble for a native. In such circumstances, language was doubly politicized. It was openly transformed into a means of struggle.

The use of Dutch by the Dutch in front of the natives always constituted a reassertion of "our superiority and your inferiority; and our right to rule and your obligation to obey." On the other hand, the use of Dutch by a native to a European "diminishes the gap between inferior and superior--and this must be avoided at all cost."

Here we encounter the full import of Foucault's contention of language as a politicized practice and, in a rather complex manner, as a means of control. It becomes complex because while power is deployed in our language usage (discursive practices) and therefore has become ubiquitous,
that power has also acquired the character of a doctrine. It is doctrinal because it is not meant to be resisted. Anyone who lives under its "spheres of influence" should comply with it. The concept "doctrine," which surfaces in Foucault as he deals incisively with discourse,

involves the utterances of speakers in the sense that doctrine is...the sign, the manifestation and the instrument of a prior adherence --adherence to a class, to a social or racial status, to a nationality or an interest, to a struggle, a revolt, resistance or acceptance. Doctrine links individuals to a certain types of utterance while consequently barring them from all others. Doctrine effects a dual subjection, that of speaking subjects to discourse, and that of discourse to the group...of speakers.(6)

Thus while a discourse which represents power originally comes from an individual or a group of persons, it becomes a machinery of its own as soon as it achieves the status of a discourse.(7) Power then is no longer exercised through the direct will of or proscriptions by the powerful. Rather it is exercised through the fabrication, and, inevitably, the creation of objects and persons. "Power is immanent...in rules that constitute these persons and things."(8) Precisely because power is exercised so subtly, Michael Shapiro argues that we need "a valid and useful metapolitics" to see it through.(9)

In our particular case, Foucault's perspective makes the picture even grimmer, just because what is involved is language in its entirety--language as both langue and
parole, which has been nakedly and deliberately made an instrument of suppression. Here we are not dealing solely with what kinds of speech acts are being used for political purposes. Political privileges are not merely obtained through the manipulation of speech acts, but more arbitrarily through the definition that Dutch and the people who identify themselves with it is the superior.

It was because of being defined as "inferior" and of being suppressed that the Indonesians fought back, not acknowledging the assumptions of their colonizer but transforming their own allegedly lowly language into a respectable one worthy of politically contending against the language of their colonizer. What the Indonesians were actually doing was to assert their independence. They fought back to regain their right to define themselves, which ultimately means a right to exist their own way. Thus what matters is no longer a contestation of meaning, but a contestation of being. Here a people's struggle has gone beyond the right to a language to the right to a life of their own.

Foucault has made us aware that language as a discourse is never neutral and is always laden with rules, privileging a particular group while excluding others. And as power is deployed in the very means we use to identify and speak of others, political contestation in the symbolic realm actually constitutes a real struggle.
The Genealogy of Bahasa Indonesia

Bahasa is based on Malay—originally the native language of the people living in the Malay peninsula, Sumatra and Borneo. Due to differences in later historical circumstances, created in part by the different colonial experiences of the peoples of the Malay Peninsula and of the Indonesian archipelago, the language gradually bifurcated into two sister languages. Original Malay had flourished several centuries prior to Marco Polo's visit to Perlak and Samudra in North Sumatra on his way home from China in 1292. The supposition concerning the antiquity of the language is partly based on the fact that Malacca had been in existence more than seven centuries before the Portuguese arrived in the late 15th century. Historically, people of this region have never been known to speak any other language.

The earliest inscriptions in Malay found in the vicinity of Palembang (South Sumatra), at Kedukan Bukit and Talang Tuwo, date respectively as far back as 683 and 684 AD. Similar inscriptions were found at Kota Kapur, Bangka and Karang Brahi in the upper reaches of Merangin River in the interior of Sumatra, both of 686 AD; at Gandasuli, Central Java (832 AD), and in the vicinity of Bogor, south of Jakarta in 942. These inscriptions, which according to Teeuw belong to "Old Malay," indicate that during this
period "Malay was in use over a fairly large area of present-day Indonesia."(14)

Perhaps Perlak, Samudra and Malacca were all seats of sultanates prior to the coming of the Portuguese. Malay was then the language of the common people as well as of the sultanate courts. It was also used much later by Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir Munsji (1797-1854), a close friend of Raffles, to write his famous autobiography, *Hikayat Abdullah*. But no less important than its use as a court and literary language, Malay constituted the *lingua franca* used by traders and peddlers throughout the archipelago.

For a long time, Arabic characters were widely used for writing Malay. Most of the local languages in the centers of trade, scattered between Aceh and Ternate, had been heavily influenced by Malay long before the arrival of the Portuguese. The latter had to learn the language in order to carry on their proselytizing activities in the eastern part of Indonesia. The influence of Malay was also strongly felt in the Philippines and to some extent also in Cambodia and Vietnam.(15) Naturally, Malay was also the common language in the bazaars. In this manner, the vocabulary of Malay entered that of the local languages in the coastal areas particularly of Sumatra, Kalimantan, but also of Java (for instance, in what is now Jakarta and Semarang), including that of Makassarese, Manadonese, Ambonese and Ternateans.(16) Betawi, Menadonese, Ambonese, and Ternatean
languages were virtually transformed into variations of Malay.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the influence has always been one-way. Malay was also influenced by other languages. Just as it has expressions which originated from Hindi, Chinese, Arabic, Portuguese, Dutch and Japanese, so do words from local languages enter Malay from time to time, particularly from Javanese and Sundanese. Malay is, therefore, characterized by a great capacity to accept and incorporate elements from various other tongues, and thereby considerably enriches itself. (17) Jan Huygen van Linschoten, who visited the Indies at the end of the 16th century, pointed out that whoever could not speak Malay in this part of the world would be left behind. He likens Malay to the peoples of this region as French to the peoples of Europe. (18) But a clearer picture comes from Teeuw:

From Aceh, in the extreme North of Sumatra, to Ambon in the Moluccas, Malay was the language of the literates, of the schools, which in the beginning were only religious schools. Religious writings were written or translated into this language on a large scale--again Christian as well as Moslem writings, and with varying degrees of respect for Malay idiom and grammar. It is true that from early times, especially, the Protestant missions paid great attention to the local languages, for their Bible translations and preaching, but the attraction of Malay was too strong. (19)
Thus trade, religion and educational factors of the olden days; the colonial practice of discouraging natives to speak Dutch; the invention of modern media of communication; the increasing administrative unification of the archipelago by the colonial government from the turn of the century; and the unprecedented spread of political consciousness among the people, all greatly facilitated the spread of Malay. The fact that the majority of the Malay-speaking population were Muslims and that Islam was professed by the majority of Indonesians had in part eased the acceptance of the prospective national language. Malay is, according to Anthony H. Johns, "the historical lingua franca of commerce and the cultural language of Islam throughout the archipelago."(20)

But there were at least two other factors which contributed to making Bahasa Indonesia the national language. In the first place, Bahasa Indonesia enjoyed a significant political and economic advantage over Javanese and Dutch. Secondly, Bahasa Indonesia was an independent language. It could neither be treated as the ngoko of Dutch nor as the madya of Javanese.

A few words about the advantage of Bahasa Indonesia in economic matters are necessary. In any country's market-places, the seller and the buyer prefer not to be bothered by considerations of social status or bureaucratic hierarchy. In normal economic terms, the social status of
the seller and the buyer is always equal, for in normal situations only their mutual and voluntary agreement can bring about a transaction. The larger the market, the more impersonal it will be.

Characterized by sensitivity to social status and social stratification, the Javanese language is not congenial to the demands of the increasingly economized life of the region. Dividing itself into three hierarchical levels, Javanese has been jeopardized by what Benedict Anderson calls the "problem of pronouns."(21) In order to communicate, the interlocutors should first approximate what they consider to be the appropriate pronouns they should use to speak to each other, for it is mainly in the pronouns that status is indicated. Usually there is a preliminary status bargaining prior to actual communication. Precluded is the economy of communication. Not infrequently, awkward situations result from wrong approximations. This will obliterate the benefits of communication or even ruin individual relations for good.

It should be understood, however, that what is involved is more than the "problem of pronouns." Here we have the radical difference between Malay and Javanese according to what we can call its "politico-normative code" very much akin to the difference between English and native languages in India. The latter has been cogently described by Braj B. Kachru. He points out that if an Indian native tongue is
"functionally marked in terms of caste, religion, region and so forth, [English] has no such 'markers'."(22)

The impersonal market is incompatible with the superfluous status-hierarchical "markers" of Javanese. The historical outcome of all this is that, notwithstanding the pre-colonial activities of Javanese traders in the scattered coastal centers of commerce in the land, their language has invariably been outmanoeuvred by Malay.

The Politics of Bahasa Indonesia

Perhaps much more important than the economic advantage of Bahasa Indonesia was its compatibility with the political demands of the time. In this case, even the numerical advantage of the ethnic Javanese, who comprised roughly 44 per cent of the total Indonesian population at the time,(23) was of no avail to hold back the rise of Malay.

Under D.A. Rinkes, Chairman of the Department of Native Affairs, the majority of books published in the vernaculars and provided to libraries by Balai Pustaka were in Javanese.(24) The deeply implanted hierarchy in Javanese, however, has rendered it handicapped as an alternative national language. The symbolic consciousness of the larger Javanese audience was too much characterized by social inegalitarianism and stratification to make Javanese the language of one nation.
An ideal national language presupposes equality. This principle of equality is of paramount importance to the diverse ethnic groups—just as it is to many Javanese. The Javanese language hierarchicizes the society as the Malay equalizes it. "Gifted with an extraordinary spirit of freedom," writes Pramoedya Ananta Toer, "Bahasa Indonesia can function well in whatever situation, in whatever circumstances, without undermining one's self-respect."(25) Here again we encounter an analogy with English among Indians and other non-native speakers of the language in their own countries.(26)

The different character of Javanese and Malay languages is rooted in their respective histories. Since the fall of Mataram, say in 1755, the Javanese language has evolved in the hinterland with a cultural system very much immersed with the symbiosis of "feudal"(27) and colonial world. Malay, on the other hand, has spread continuously during the last seven centuries, always in open maritime trading centers in which hierarchy is circumscribed by trade. Colonial subjugation both on the Malay Peninsula and throughout the archipelago did not obstruct the development of Malay. It continued to follow its natural advancement as in the earlier times. As a matter of fact, most of the peoples outside Java and parts of Sumatra carried through, if sporadically and intermittently, the fight against the
Dutch. (28) Their spirit of freedom was in part reflected in the flourishing of Malay.

Malay was thus never distorted for colonial purposes. Since most of the people outside Java either kept on fighting or unwillingly surrendered to Dutch power, a subterfuge to make Malay an instrument of colonial exploitation similar to what happened to Javanese was out of question. There was no need to hierarchicize the language, for there were within the Malay-speaking regions a lack of subordinated people to be exploited, just as there were limited compact agricultural fields to be cultivated. The egalitarian Malay reigned much more strongly in the Outer Islands.

Geertz once observes that Indonesia "probably has more hieratic symbols per square foot than any other large expanse in the world." (29) This much quoted observation is at best obscure. The obscurity lies in the word "hieratic." Does the word mean sacerdotal, priestly? If "priestly," does it also imply hierarchy? Now this meaning is ruled out by the fact that Islam, the creed of the majority, is hardly sacerdotal or hierarchic.

It is likely that by "hieratic symbols," Geertz simply means religious symbols and thus implying the multiplicity of religious experiences in the land. But, as Marshall Hodgson has pointed out, this position is marked by an ethnographic bias, which does injustice to the rootedness and prevalence of Islam throughout Indonesia even at the
center of so-called "Javanese religion."(30). Geertz's ob-
servation only makes sense when we grant that by "hieratic"
density, Geertz actually means the depth of ideological and
symbolic commitments in general rather than the multiplicity
of religious experiences. But even when this limitation
is granted, another objection stands in the way.

Geertz does not separate the precolonial from the
colonial era, the latter partly coinciding with liberal or
modern times. These times witnessed the proliferation of
both physical and symbolic interactions which are not
confined to Indonesia, but occurred in many parts of the
world. Improved means and technology of communication and
transportation had greatly intensified not only global
physical but also global ideological interactions. Where
population density and mobility coincided, it resulted in
an intensive exchange or contentions in symbolic systems.
Java of the early 20th century should not be seen as an
exceptional case. The Middle-East, the whole of Vietnam and
the entire Europe can easily pass to be as deeply soaked
with symbolic or ideological contentions. These parts of
the world were equally characterized by the depth of the
problems of ideology during that momentous era in world's
history.

In addition, we should bear in mind that the western
and eastern parts of Java should not be equated with the
hinterland of Central Java. The former, with their Islamized and internationalized ports (Jakarta, Banten, Surabaya, Tuban, Gresik) of the precolonial and colonial eras, can hardly be identified with the latter. In the hinterland of Central Java, colonialism had somehow effected an unprecedented symbolic involution, which sanctioned the economic looting of the land.

There are two things which are suppressed in Geertz's observation. Firstly, while it is true that Indonesia's population consists of many ethnic groups, only in parts of Java do we find the development of an intricate and rather perplexing cultural system. This cultural system is predicated upon feudalism and is said to be a syncretic scrambling of Hindu-Buddhistic and Islamic elements. However, I tend to argue that the intricacy and perplexity of the cultural phenomenon as they manifested around later kratons was more a function of colonial distortion than as something which developed naturally.

We know that Islam is also shared by the majority of other ethnic groups. We also know that wali sanga in Java had achieved a kind of symbiosis between the Indic mode of religiosity and the Islamic mode through the Sufic blend of Islam. The intrusion of the Dutch, however, rendered the once peaceful and ideal blend of the languages of Islam and Hindu-Buddhism bitterly contentious. This parting of the ways is further corroborated in the field of scholarship.
In Geertz's narrative, for instance, Sunan Kalijaga, "the son of a high royal official of Majapahit, the greatest and...the last of the Indonesian Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms," is made father to the "classical style."(31) By so doing, Geertz confuses the word "classical" with the word "royal" or "courtly." Worse, the appellation of "classical" to Islam in Java writes off the classic of pristine Islam to which the larger Is1amdom adhere and simultaneously downgrades other parts of the great tradition. The claim that the "classical style" was actually Hindu-Buddhistic at heart decenters the larger world of Islam even in Java.

In the colonial world, the "high" tradition became more and more artificially refined, colonially stigmatized, and was finally no longer accessible to the common populace in Java. This development turned out to be an anathema to the future prospect of Javanese language. If Islam at the top was royalized, so did the [Javanese] language of the priyayis.

Thus the intricacy and perplexity in religious matters went alongside the intricacy and perplexity in the language practice of the Javanese. The appeals of the "non-classical" Islam and the "non-royal" Bahasa, even in the strongholds of Javanese Indic culture,(32) should be traced to their opposite character, namely to their dynamic simplicity. The struggle to revive ngoko by Jawa Dipa during the pergerakan years should, therefore, be seen
as an effort by ordinary Javanese to regain the integrity of their symbolic world and as a plain recognition of where the dynamic actually resided. The movement of Jawa Dipa reflected the unfolding of an awareness that the involuted refinement of Javanese was more a colonial-related distortion than a genuine development. Put another way, the density of ideological contestations in parts of Java was a function of colonialism, particularly as the Javanese colonial bureaucracy felt the need to preserve their economic security by means of cultural manipulation.

Secondly, Javanese, being immersed in and coopted by the colonial scheme, was hardly suitable as a language of national liberation. The alienation of Javanese in the anti-colonial struggle was the price it had to pay for having accommodated the inegalitarianism of both hierarchic Hinduism and exploitive colonialism. The stratifying refinement of Javanese was detrimental to its outward mobility and had made it socially static. It scored poorly in what is called the "vehicular load" of a language. The concept "vehicular load" is here understood to mean the ability of a language to move with ease and economy along different social groups, vertically or horizontally, without undermining their political or normative preferences. (33) It refers to the mobility of a language in multi-normative spheres.
The character of Malay happened to be just the opposite of that of Javanese. Following Pramoedya Ananta Toer, the consonance of Bahasa Indonesia with an independent and non-feudal setting is also acknowledged by Selo Soemardjan. He maintains that in Yogyakarta the decision to adopt Malay as the national language helped create an atmosphere of equality in the Javanese society. (34) The same is true with Ki Hadjar Dewantara, himself an ardent admirer of the Javanese language and culture, who was explicitly in favor of Malay to be the national language rather than other native tongues. (35)

No less important is the reason already mentioned. Bahasa Indonesia has been a living and independent language, growing autonomously out of the people and historically rooted in the land. This rendered Bahasa Indonesia and Indonesian nationalism mutually reinforcing. It offered itself as a suitable medium to the nationalists struggling for national liberation. With Bahasa Indonesia, the nationalists did not have to violate any "ancient" or outdated grammatic/idiomatic rules to be popular. Old though it is, the language has never petrified. The people did not have to betray their social self nor jeopardize the purity of their language to emancipate themselves. At this point, some comparisons with the relationship between language and nationalism in other countries will help clarify the argument.
First of all, Bahasa Indonesia did not have the deep dilemma faced, for instance, by Egyptian nationalists of whether to choose Fusha, the standardized language of the Qur'an, or Ammiyyah, the colloquial language of everyday life. Bahasa Indonesia stood rather in the middle. It was far from reaching the level of the literary standard of Fusha, but it already developed far beyond the stage of Ammiyyah. In like manner, Bahasa Indonesia did not have to adhere to an outdated cultural-intellectual paradigm similar to that which had imprisoned Fusha. Nothing prevented it from "experimenting" freely along the richness of the symbolic traffic around. Unlike the fate of Ammiyyah before the venerated Fusha, Bahasa Indonesia turned out to be capable of standing before the increasing complexities of modern life.

More favorable comparisons for Bahasa Indonesia were Turkish and Vietnamese quoc ngu. Like Bahasa Indonesia, both languages represented a movement toward the people in the sense of siding politically with them while also adapting its intellectual standard to suit the ordinary people's cognitive capacity in order to grow with them.

But the virtue of Bahasa Indonesia was probably best seen in comparison with what might be called "the cloud of English" among Indian and African nationalists. This had to do with, say, the arrest of the mental horizon of non-native speakers of English in the universe of the language.
In turn, the arrest resulted from the long and decisive penetration of English under British colonial rule. Such an arrest implied difficulty of expressing oneself without being beclouded by the presence of the universe of one's ruler. Indian or African subjects had been captured in what Manfred Henningsen incisively refers to as *Ueberfremdung*, that is, alienation from one's Self due to domination by a foreign Self. (39)

The tenacity of *Ueberfremdung* is well put by Nehru:

Gradually we began to suspect and examine critically British statements about our past and present conditions, but still we thought and worked within the framework of British ideology. If a thing was bad, it would be called "un-British"; if a Britisher in India misbehaved, the fault was his, not that of the system. (40)

In stronger terms, Nehru adds, "Our challenge to the British version of history, economics, and administration in India grew, and yet we continued to function within the orbit of their ideology." (41) Thus fulfilled the dream of British authorities in India in the first half of the 19th century to create in India "a class who may be interpreters between us and those whom we govern, a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, English in taste, in opinion, in morals and in intellect." (42)

In Foucault's perspective, English is accepted willingly because it grips the mind and furnishes comfort or protection to the body, which has now been "docilized." (43) It
"initiates one into the caste that has power and, more importantly, that controls vital knowledge about the miracles of science and technology." (44) Here, a mighty Power foreign to one's self reigns over one's mind and dictates whatever is agreeable to that Power. Subtle and innocent though it seems, it is but the other side of the same Power which worked on the body and mind of Remigio and Salvatore before the Inquisition—to cite a literary example (45) or on that of Damiens in his amende honorable before the Church of Paris in 1757. (46) In both the subjects and the convicts, Power rules over mind and body simply because it has been carried out with the same determination and irresistible force by the ruling party.

With Bahasa Indonesia, the Indonesian nationalists did not have to go through this Ueberfremdung. Whatever word, phrase, idiom or discourse they expressed, original or borrowed, there was a shield protecting them from the cloud of another universe. Like the daring venture of Turkish and quoc ngu, (47) countless foreign concepts and terminologies have been adopted by Bahasa Indonesia without it losing the hegemony of its own universe.

Accordingly, there is a significant difference between the utterance of an English word by an English-speaking Indian and the utterance of an adopted English word by a Bahasa-speaking Indonesian. If in the former the totality of the English "cosmology" beclouds the word, in the latter
the totality of Bahasa's own is preserved. This is because a word in a particular language is necessarily a function of the rest of the words in it; its full significance and meaning is determined by their meanings. The word "modernisasi" in Bahasa Indonesia, for instance, connotes differently from the word "modernization," despite the fact that they share the same denotation. If in the former the picture we have is the staggering, the "unnatural," the snail-paced, and, above all, the estranged process of the endeavor "modernisasi," in the latter we have precisely the opposite.

Here, again, language is not only a matter of meaning; more importantly it is a matter of being. A non-native speaker using English inevitably takes on the imposition of another universe onto his or her mental horizon and thus creating, not so much alienation, as a confusion of being in himself/herself. Henningsen's understanding of Ueberfremdung should also be seen in this light.

Being under the domination of a foreign Self, the English-speaking African nationalists experienced this confusion of being. Probably in no other domain is this confusion more manifest than in the controversy surrounding the character of African literature. Under the spell of what Chinweizu et al. designate as europhilia,(48) African literature has long been forced to play its fiddle according to the dicta of so-called "eurocentric critics." Thus the
simple, morality-filled, earth-and-community-bound, and
direct, character of African literature is attacked by
these critics as flat, lacking in individuality, preachy,
and short-breathed.

Chinweizu et al. do give a strong and biting response
to all of these criticisms. Well-taken are their arguments
against the notion of "artistic elect," which should be
substituted by the principle of the social and political
engagement of literature. Art, according to them, should be
a public domain and should, after T.S. Eliot, stress "the
local" before "the universal."(49) Nevertheless, even in
their sharp response, the air of confusion remains and
precludes the possibility of a clear analysis of the prob­
lem.

The confusion manifests, for instance, in the defense
of oral literature as standing on parity with the written
when it has become our common knowledge that the primacy of
the former is everywhere a function of the absence of a
yet-to-be-established written tradition. In other words,
the written tradition marked a quantum leap from the oral
tradition not only in literature but in other creative
activities of knowledge sharing, knowledge perpetuation,
and knowledge preservation.(50)

The issues of "artistic elect" and "engagement" appear
to be raised on purpose by Chinweizu et al., but throughout
their work there is no explicit indication that their
eurocentric critics will disagree with them in those regards. It is perhaps the made-up locution of this argument which then make the Nigerian writers try to shift the area of contention by maintaining that the problem is really not oral versus written literature, but realistic versus non-realistic ones. But, again, here Chinweizu et al. fail to indicate whether or not it is really an issue of contention with their critics. Pervading the bulk of their arguments is the air of apologetics which in no way leads toward further enlightenment.

The problem with the heated arguments of Chinweizu et al. lies in their refusal to be judged by the English literary standard, notwithstanding the Africans' use of English as their medium. Ignored in the refusal, however, is an unfortunate dilemma. Given the nature of language as a carrier of cosmology, they are defending an abyssmal position. Denied in this respect is the fact that English is the being of the totality of Englishmen (or peoples of English descendants), and being their being, it is also their rules before that of any other peripheral derivations of the language. Forgotten is the thesis, as maintained by Shapiro, that most of our discursive practices are "centered."(51)

Chinweizu certainly has the right to confront the English being with that of the African and the English rules with their rules, but there is no denying the fact that the
more established being and rules are generally the more determining. The dying Hawaiian language is perhaps a good example here (52) as many Hawaiians take up English as their first language. But the iron law stays: ceteris paribus, you can never steal a people's language, by whatever means. Only the people themselves are capable of abandoning their language. In the final analysis, a language always privileges its original carrier; it is its "center."

It would be presumptuous to say that language-nationalism relations were completely smooth in Indonesia. Involved in it was a struggle just as hard, if not more so. And yet the decisive difference with the Indian-African experience remained. If the struggle in the former tended to be conclusive and zero-sum, in the latter the reverse was the case. This means that while the fruit of the language struggle of Indonesians would always be cumulatively attributed to the universe of their own language, that of the struggle of African writers in English would always be haunted by "the cloud of English." Unless this is understood, we can never empathize with the pain felt by people like Nehru and Chinweizu.

S. Takdir Alisjahbana's important work, Dari Perdjuangan dan Pertumbuhan Bahasa Indonesia, offers a better grasp of the crucial difference between the Indonesian case and that of the Indian/African. There are at least three causes which inflict difficulties upon the
language-nationalism relationship which influenced the development of Bahasa Indonesia.

First of all, among the Dutch there were some enlightened figures who, struggling against great odds, tried to make their countrymen realize the necessity of teaching Dutch in the country as widely and intensively as possible. Van der Chijs, J.H. Abendanon, and G.J. Nieuwenhuis had to some extent convinced the colonial government to establish schools for natives, which emphasized the teaching of Dutch. Nieuwenhuis was cognizant of the traditional short-sightedness of the government's language policy, particularly as compared to that of the British, French, and Americans in India, Annam, and the Philippines. Well-known is Nieuwenhuis's prescription that the teaching of Dutch to Indonesians would have a double advantage. It would help Indonesians build their future as it would help preserve a Dutch cultural legacy in the land. He also maintained, probably to solicit the support of those who were strongly oriented to economic exploitation, that the spread of Dutch language and culture "is the most direct way toward economic expansion."

The efforts of the Dutch progressive scholars did not fail to bear fruit among the natives. Already constituting the language of the elite and the ruling class, Dutch had indeed attracted Indonesians. Like English for Indians and Africans, the language increased the chances of the natives
to get better employment, position, and status, particularly within the colonial bureaucracy. (56) Alisjahbana writes that there had emerged a circle among the Indonesian youth who woke up and slept with Dutch, ignorant of and disinterested in their own language. (57) For them, Dutch was bahasa bangsa pertuanan, the language of the master people pure and simple. Likewise, it is impossible to exaggerate the primacy of Dutch among the upper priyayis, who used the language every day and no longer considered Dutch foreign. (58) In a very real sense, they were the Indonesian correlates of the Indian and African examples, representative of their own Ueberfremdung.

Secondly, if Malay was extensively used by various social groups throughout the archipelago, it was also heavily attacked by those in favor of Dutch. They denounced Malay as a loose, disorderly, and "preposterous language." (59) Prior to its gradual standardization, there were, indeed, various kinds of Malay simultaneously in use. The language became differentiated according to regions, ethnicities, and national groups. We had, for instance, variations between the Malays of Riau, Minangkabau, Betawi, Minahasa, and Ambon, on the one hand, and between that of Indonesians, Chinese, and "Indo" on the other. Each of them used and improvised with the language rather freely.

Finally, we must mention the colonial scheme to stem the tide of Malay. The increasing popularity and
effectiveness of Malay throughout the land was looked upon with apprehension by the colonial government, because it underlay the growth of national consciousness. This consciousness-through-language clearly heralded the spirit of unity and independence among Indonesians, rendering irrelevant the centuries-long colonial paternalism. To respond to this formidable future challenge, the government resorted to a countervailing language policy. Its colonial language policy was two-sided. While the government worked to inculcate into the mind of the native the superiority of Dutch, it also tried to enforce different local languages as media of primary instruction.(60)

But all these efforts to stultify the development of Malay failed. In part, it was doomed under the Dutch kruid-enierspolitiek, i.e., of giving too little and asking too much. Nieuwenhuis's progressive suggestion was accepted only with great reluctance. While the government did teach Dutch at the elementary level, it also prevented the continuation of learning onto more advanced levels. Not until 1914 was this policy corrected.(61) But the programme still failed, owing to the limited number of schools provided by the Government. "In comparison with the Philippines," writes Vandenbosch, "a very small percentage of the total governmental expenditures goes for school purposes."(62) To make things worse, the elitism and inadequacy of native supporters of Dutch only exacerbated the defeat.
The allegation that Malay was a loose and disorderly language was not vindicated. Such an allegation completely overlooks the significant drive beneath the surfacing looseness and disorder. What was at work in the seemingly wild development of the language was a creative force, a process of transformation. It was in fact a disorder of becoming or, in the words of Alisjahbana, kekatjauan jang nikmat, "a comforting disorder." He rightly perceives Bahasa Indonesia as undergoing what every great language has passed through to reach its maturity. Amidst the varieties of competing Malays, an authoritative version gradually emerged through a natural process of selection and unification.

Thus the charge against Bahasa as a "preposterous" language was predicated upon the ideology of colonialism. It was considered "preposterous" because it aspired to become its own Self and refused to acknowledge Dutch as its "center." The very fact that every nation doing some kind of regular activities in the land, such as trading or proselytization, had to use or translate their holy books into the language was itself significant evidence that the allegation was unfounded.

Other factors also contributed to the failure of the scheme to foster Dutch. A historical explanation is the first we must turn to. Malay was at once the language actually spoken in strategic parts of the archipelago
and Ternate—to mention just those places stretching eastward) and the *lingua franca* in the remaining parts. Throughout the centuries it continuously flourished, even with the influence of subjects of great civilizations surrounding or regularly frequenting the region. Hence the Chinese, Arabs, Portuguese, and Dutch had had to use Malay. "For many centuries," writes Alisjahbana, "the language called Malay does no longer belong solely to the Malays. It has belonged to all inhabitants of the archipelago."(64)

But the new political consciousness should perhaps be seen as the most powerful impetus for the growth of Bahasa Indonesia. Dutch and Javanese were rejected because they were inaccessible to the populace as a whole. In addition, there was elitism in both languages. Virtually the entire political discourse at that time was to side with the impoverished Indonesian masses. The discursive practices of Dutch liberalism, of the Russian Revolution, and of Reform Islam as they concurrently entered the East Indies invariably championed Indonesia's poor. In the next chapter, we will deal with these ideologies as they were unfolded in the discursive practices of the time. The high frequency of words like massa-actie, rakyat djelata, marhaen, etc. was a function of such practices.(65)

Nieuwenhuis's plan to spread and redouble the instruction of Dutch for the benefit of both Indonesians
and Netherlanders was doomed owing to what Alisjahbana calls *kutuk zaman* (the curse of time); neither party wanted it to work. The majority of the Dutch remained stubbornly against the teaching of their language to Indonesians, because such a policy would frustrate the ideological inculcation of their superiority.(66) Indonesian nationalists like M.H. Thamrin rejected Dutch because the only language the people as a whole could understand was Malay. The desire of Indonesian nationalists for immediate political independence or self-government also led to the urgency of a readily understood medium. No other language could fulfil the task other than Malay or Bahasa.

Nationalism was pivotal to this political consciousness. The most unequivocal expression of Indonesian nationalism occurred with the *Sumpah Pemuda* (Youth Pledge) declared at the Indonesian Youth Congress in Jakarta on October 28, 1928.(67) The pledge was a strong profession of the oneness of the land, of the nation, and of the language of Indonesians, who were no longer confined to Malays proper. The entire chain of islands under Dutch colonial government was then claimed to be the land of the new nation with Bahasa as the national tongue. This implies a determination to take up Bahasa *consciously*, rather than just *naturally*, as the national language of the archipelago.
The pledge served as an important political leverage for Bahasa Indonesia. Here lies the conceptual difference between Malay and Bahasa. While Malay was the language of various peoples living in British Malaya/Borneo and in the Dutch East Indies, Bahasa was a political transformation of the Malay of the East Indies into the language of the peoples now aspiring to be one nation. (68) Advocating Bahasa Indonesia was, therefore, tantamount to legitimizing the people's own Self. By legitimizing the Self, a two-pronged political act was achieved, namely the act of shielding the nation against the possibility of Überfremdung and, indirectly, of protecting the people from exploitation by the colonial power. (69) We will remember that a language always privileges its own carriers.

Lest it be misunderstood, it should be emphasized that the political transformation of Malay into Bahasa Indonesia was possible only after the natural and historical transformation of the language itself. It was not something "kunstmatig," to borrow Husein Djajadiningrat's expression. The power of Bahasa Indonesia was precisely there. Its growth was uninterrupted for several hundred years. It was thus the work of a long history—a process which went beyond the effort of the Dutch to interrupt the course of history. In addition to the figures mentioned earlier, a number of other people had already seen the prospect of Malay becoming the future national language. (70) Anthony H.
Johns concludes his discussion about the genesis of modern Indonesian literature with the following passage:

The area of thought, experience, and expression that present-day Bahasa Indonesia can serve to communicate with subtlety, grace, and exactness -- not to mention pungency if required -- is remarkable. It is adequate for the expression of Christian, Moslem, and Hindu belief, and all the needs of administration, scholarship, law, and commerce. Nothing could be more misleading than to imagine contemporary Bahasa Indonesia as a kind of superimposed lingua franca, without an organic vitality of its own. (71)

The virtue of Bahasa in terms of the birth of the Indonesian nation should primarily be seen in this light. Bahasa Indonesia is not merely a national language in claim as the impression we get from Benedict Anderson's famous article, "The Languages of Indonesian Politics," (72) which we will deal with in Chapter X. Neither is it something coerced from above as Khaidir Anwar mistakenly argues. (73)

Anwar's argument betrays ignorance of the imbalance of power during the colonial era, at which time (1928) the position of Bahasa Indonesia was formally sanctioned. He wrongly identifies the leader-intellectuals of the perce-rakan as representing the "above" party. Decades prior to independence the "above" party was the colonizer, who tried hardly to prevent Malay from spreading further, and the higher priyayi at large, who preferred to use Dutch or Javanese krama. More importantly, the fact that Malay has
been the effective lingua franca throughout the archipelago has ruled out any allegation of "imposition" or "sacrifice" by the Javanese people as Slamet Mulyana has it. It is simply because Malay, and, later, Bahasa Indonesia, captured the rising spirit of egalitarianism or, perhaps more correctly, has been nurtured in that spirit.

It is also rather flimsy to say, as Geertz does, that the Indonesian nationalist motto "'One people, One country, One language,' is a hope, not a description."(74)

Bahasa Indonesia has been firmly practised as the language of Indonesians. Not only is there no language in the land capable of contending its primacy nationwide; it has also been the language actually used in schools, in administration, and in economic, political and cultural spheres—in short, in whatever field of activity aspiring to appeal to or reach the entire nation. The fact that local languages are still spoken at home or in intimate communications does not nullify the unifying function and the staying power of Bahasa Indonesia. Indeed, it continuously adopts words of foreign origin or locally-derived. But the totality of its universe remains Indonesian with its own being, rules, and national centrality. Indonesian nationalism has immeasurably profited from the rise of Bahasa Indonesia. It is practically unthinkable without it.
An Ideal Encounter of Medium and Messages

The discursive context of Indonesian nationalism is a highly unique and synchronic amalgamation of discursive medium (Bahasa Indonesia) and major discursive practices (i.e., the ideologies of Dutch liberalism, of Communism, and of Reform Islam as they were expressed and contested in Bahasa Indonesia). The symbiosis of both medium and discursive practices had made the thrust of nationalism the more effective. Both extol the spirit of egalitarianism and independence.

The role of Bahasa in Indonesian nationalism can hardly be exaggerated. Thanks to Bahasa, Indonesian nationalism had spread into the larger public as the nation acquired a spirit and universe of its own. Only through their own language and language practice could the colonized people feel and maintain the blessing of being, and of pursuing, their own Self. Bahasa gave Indonesians an excellent opportunity to base the existence of their nation on its own cosmology born out of its own history. Henceforth Indonesians did not have to cite Wilhelm Tell, Garibaldi, or Willem van Oranje to speak about freedom. They had Pattimura, Diponegoro, Hasanuddin, Untung Surapati, to mention but a few—-their own champions of freedom so often represented as criminals in Dutch publications. The very choice of, and the determination to carry on with, Bahasa was an act of the spirit of
independence. It marked a lasting political and cultural breakthrough.

But, as hinted above, the political struggle through Bahasa would never reach the impact it had without its general use in the particular discursive practices influenced simultaneously by the ideas of Reform Islam, of Dutch liberalism and of the Russian Revolution. These discourses had implanted in the embattled Bahasa "ideal" contents, without which it would perhaps remain an anachronistic mounting of challenge against Dutch. Accordingly, Indonesian nationalism had been to a great extent a function of the evolvement of a mutually reinforcing encounter of medium and messages.

But the importance of Bahasa and the major discursive practices in Indonesia did not end just with the rise of the country's nationalism. In the particularity of Indonesia's history both the medium and the messages privileged the code of egalitarianism. In the impoverished Indonesian society in which the fulfilment of basic needs and basic rights were a rarity for the masses, ideas of Liberalism, Communism, and Reform Islam had worked simultaneously as a leverage enhancing the political, economic, and cultural position of the rakyat, prior to and after independence. Needless to say that discourses of this kind acquire a much greater urgency in the colonized countries than they do in the West where the relatively advanced level of social and
economic development was more capable of overcoming political and economic problems.

In the abject colonial setting, these discursive practices should be seen as heralds of the egalitarian consciousness. Accompanying the consciousness were grave ideological contestations, years before and after independence. These contestations among the egalitarian forces were largely precipitated by the utopian, orthodox, and alien character of the Indonesian Communism. (75) Nonetheless, the poor and ignorant masses did learn through the discursive practices and the ideological contestations in it to perceive their social position and material deprivation in the starkest manner.

The synchrony of Bahasa Indonesia and the concurrent ideological discourses was a function of the similarity of their code. Both privileged the natives or the suppressed. The power and impact of this synchronic movement was such that it resulted in a forceful political discontinuity with the past, both colonial and pre-colonial. The country has never been the same again.
IV

THE ROOTS OF THE DISCURSIVE PRACTICES

Of particular importance as we turn to the discursive practices which antedate the birth of Indonesian nationalism were 1) concurrent evolvement of liberal ideas within the Dutch nation, 2) the influence of socialist thought following the triumph of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia, and 3) the growth of Reform Islam in Indonesia. (1)

The Liberal Discourse

The age of Wilhelmina in the Netherlands, which began in 1898, witnessed the birth of a new liberal school in the Netherlands. By then Dutch classical liberalism had captured the political limelight for at least fifty years. It had also created its attendant misgivings. The country had learned her lesson concerning the dark side of the industrial revolution. The rate of unemployment was high and the housing condition poor. The new era was also marked by a great increase in "the number of accidents and the prevalence of occupational diseases." (2)

In a sense, the new liberal school formed a clear breach with J.R. Thorbecke's liberalism of 1845-1870. It was still liberalism against the conservative landowners and old-time aristocrats. But it was no longer liberalism
in the footsteps of Adam Smith. The latter was characterized by the advent of classical capitalism both in the Netherlands and, more abruptly and distortedly, in the East Indies. The new liberal school moved with the figure of John Maynard Keynes, who aspired to confront the contradiction of poverty amidst affluence and "the anomaly of idle men and idle machine"(3) where people began to realize that private initiative had its own limits.(4)

Accordingly, a policy of welfare state had been increasingly implemented from 1870s until well before the Second World War, with the only slight drawback occurring during the years of the Great Depression. Here we have the passing of the bill of no employment for children under twelve in the factories (1874). Subsequently following were the creation of Labor Law to control ominous practices by employers (1889 and 1895), the provision of workmen's compensation (1901), the cutting of working hours for women and minors to ten-hour limit and the increase of the minimum age for a child labor (1911). Finally, there were larger measures for social insurance with payments to the aged and infirm (1919) and the introduction of compulsory health insurance (1930). All this consumed a total of 975 million florins from 1903 to 1931.(5)

Parallel to the development of welfare policy we find the triumph of the Social Democratic Labor Party. Founded in 1894 by P.J. Troelstra, a renown socialist with a
radical tinge, the party's vote was only 13,500 in 1897. But in 1901, it already gathered 40,585, and by 1913 it reached more than 145,000. This gave the party eighteen seats, forming one of the strongest groups in the Parliament. (6)

Consistent with the Keynesian prescription, the welfare policy pursued by the state should not be seen solely in socialistic terms where people's wellbeing is the end in itself. Rather, it should be seen as what Robert Heilbroner calls a "tonic." This means that while all the social legislation was meant to improve "the social tone" and "the morale" of the rising and yet discontented industrial society, the real scheme was a "deliberate undertaking of government spending to stimulate the economy." (7)

But the application of the Keynesian idea of aiming more at expanding the economy rather than a concern for welfare is probably more apparent in the Dutch colonial policy concerning the East Indies. As early as 1859, Max Havelaar--a novel of the first order by Multatuli--appeared and launched "a fiery accusation of the East Indies' regime." (8) It deals with the story about the heart-rending exploitation of the peasantry in West Java by a Dutch-serving and feudally-entrenched bupati. The power of the novel owes considerably to the first-hand experience of the author when he served as a colonial official on the site. Ironically, the Dutch public received the novel not so much
as an accusation of the colonial system as it was "a really vibrant literary production."(9)

To the frustration of its author, the work failed to arouse any political move to check the cruelties inflicted upon Indonesians by the colonial system. Van Hoevell's humanitarian struggle in the parliament around 1869 and 1870 did succeed in legally abolishing the agelong compulsory production by the Dutch. As discussed in Chapter I, however, the new law failed to protect the natives from their modern, no less rapacious exploiters.

A new beginning for the colonial policy began when, in 1891, Baron van Dedem, then Liberal Minister, advocated Efficiency, Welfare, and Economic Expansion for the East Indies. The call now was different from the obsolete Liberal Policy of eliminating obstacles to progress. It now "advanced towards a constructive policy, the building up of a new political machinery, of material wealth and human welfare."(10) The struggle of Van Dedem was continued by Henri van Kol, a socialist member and a colonial expert in the Second Chamber. Against original ridicule, he managed to convince his countrymen that his criticisms of the Dutch colonial policy were well-founded.(11) Thus he effected still more progressive reforms and immediate plans for self-rule in the Indies.(12)

The new trend, however, came to be personified with the person of Cornelis van Deventer. This man joined the
Liberal Party upon his retirement in 1897. There he outlined a novel programme pressing on "the primary importance of providing for the moral and material welfare of the Natives." Alongside he insisted on the importance of decentralization and on a greater participation of Indonesians in the administration. (13) But rather than couching his invitation to reforms in terms of the incipient socialist discourse, the man reminded his countrymen of the traditional value of chivalrous honor, the appeal of which was significant in the historical consciousness of average Netherlanders. In 1899 he wrote an article, "A Debt of Honor," in which he summoned his countrymen to pay the Indies back. This "electrified the country" and "stands out as a turning point in colonial policy." (14)

Nonetheless, a closer look reveals that it was not so much the altruistic call of these reformers that made a dent on the policy. A more important cause lies elsewhere. As we have discussed in Chapter I, the East Indies had primarily been an exploitatiegebied to the Netherlands. Failure of the colony's agriculture and trade would mean failure of the colonial project. The period between 1896 and 1902 saw particularly such a failure. Root disease plagued the Indies' sugar plantation and another disease attacked her Liberia coffee. While sugar, coffee, and tin prices were falling, exports were stultified and imports dwindling. (15) To make things worse, the dragging Aceh War
was consuming the colony "like a cancer." Expenses soared, revenue declined and efforts to have it redressed faltered. News about gloomy prospects affecting crops and cattle created apprehensions about a general economic breakdown. (16)

Incited probably by the ascending Clerical Party which emphasized moral responsibility, the Queen announced before the Parliament in 1901 the government's intention to "enquire into the diminishing welfare of the people of Java." (17) Thus began the Ethical Policy. It constituted a new policy in the true sense of the word, because there was a considerable change in the way the colony was handled.

A grant of forty million guilders was provided in 1905 for the enhancement of economic conditions in Java. This was followed in 1912 by a complete budgetary separation of the East Indies and the Netherlands administrations. (18) Perhaps most important of all was the creation of the Indies' Volksraad (People's Council) in 1916, formally opened in the colony by the Governor General in 1918. Then we have the solemn promise made in November 1918 by Governor General Van Limburg Stirum of possible reforms in the nature and power of the Volksraad and in the structure of the East Indies' administration. Almost concurrently, the Netherlands Constitution was revised by omitting the words "possession overseas," replacing them with allegedly nominal names of the lands--Netherlands Indies, Surinam, and Curacao. (19)
But the policy remained as much rhetoric. There was an inherent contradiction between the ethical concern and the staying motive for colonial exploitation. The real intention was more to preserve the profitability of the colony than to have the roots of the people's destitution as they were embedded in the colonial structure redressed. The grant of forty million guilders should be read as nothing more than a symbolic gesture. The separation of the budget did not amount to much as decisions concerning the Indies' budget were still taken in the Netherlands. The Volksraad functioned only as an advisory body with the government playing the balance in its favor through an artfully devised mechanism of council members' appointment.(20) The Governor General's promise of reform was in less than a year ignominiously withdrawn on the pretext of political agitation by Indonesian parties. Finally, the constitutional revision was of no effect in the actual colonial mechanism.

As a matter of fact, it was during the Ethical Policy that the intensification of colonial administration and the feverish opening of new avenues for economic exploitation throughout the Indies took place.(21) Even the Decentralization Law of 1903 was but a measure to lighten the burden of the Central Government "of some of the overwhelming tasks which the extension and intensification of administration was heaping upon it."(22)
And yet one thing stays clear. The individualistic liberalism advocated by Thorbecke in the mid-nineteenth century had, toward the turn of the century, given way to a more socialistic liberalism. That was also true in the East Indies, regardless of colonial paradoxes. Among the Indonesians, the advocacy of this school of liberalism was probably epitomized in figures like H. Agoes Salim, Husein Djajadiningrat, and Dr. Soetomo. New practices, emerging out of new consciousness which promoted social welfare in the colony, had now come forth. But the exploitive motive hardly disappeared. As Furnivall puts it,

by 1900 the interest in native welfare was no longer, as with Van Hoevell, humanitarian, or, as with many Liberals, hypocrisy; it was economic. It had become a paying proposition to raise the standard of living.(23)

No one can ascertain how paying the proposition really was. The Dutch might have been influenced by the British administrative efficiency as effected by Lord Curzon in India. They certainly had reasons to fear that their lack of control of the Outer Provinces might end "in their absorption by a foreign power."(24) The British had always been their tough competitor around the region. Now, as from the years of the Great Depression, Japan had also stretched her trade tentacles southward and increasingly became the main source of Dutch anxiety as regards their colony in the Far East. Japan had become a real threat to the Dutch.
The Communist Discourse

Apart from the spurious effect upon some nationalist circles in Japan with respect to the country's victory over Russia in 1905, Japan contributed little in the actual formation of political discourses underlying the rise of Indonesian nationalism. Indonesian nationalists did not look to Japan for inspiration to their cause. Their inspiration came rather from the country Japan defeated, which was now ruled by a wholly different regime—the Soviet Republics.

Like the encounter of Indonesians with the liberal ideas from the Netherlands, the encounter between the Soviet ideology and the incipient nationalism in Indonesia was also reciprocal. Early in the twentieth century Moscow, just like the Netherlands, was already a political haven for political outcasts from Indonesia. The world-political orientation of these leaders was consistent with Snouck Hurgronje's observation in Mecca. There he noticed that compared with the other European countries ruling Muslim territories, "Russia was the least disliked." (25) The liberation of the Baltic states and the reversal of the Czarist policy toward the Asian states by Lenin were viewed with admiration by Indonesian students in Holland. (26) Conversely, Java had been of interest to Lenin even years before the October Revolution of 1917. (27)
The world-political orientation of Indonesian leaders is probably not that difficult to understand. Here we have a bitter colonial experience and a lack of enlightened political movement. This situation prevailed well until the first decade of the twentieth century. The impasse naturally made Indonesian leaders looked not only for better ways of understanding their situation, but also for better techniques of struggle from outside. Traditional ways had long been enfeebled. They failed to provide the rising leaders with an adequate framework to inspire their unprecedented struggle.

Going beyond the Eurocentric concern of Marx, Lenin's Marxism was globally oriented. He viewed the world as divided into two camps, the oppressing and the oppressed nations—the imperialist and the colonized. Lenin sided with the latter. Unlike the case with orthodox Marxism, colonial and national aspirations loomed large in the Leninist school. Hence the ideological proximity between Marxist-Leninism and the champions of national liberation in the Third World.

But there is yet another major factor leading to the nationalist-communist reciprocity. Lenin did not consider Russia as belonging to "the First World"(28)—"the advanced capitalist countries of Western Europe and the United States of America." Rather he placed his country in "the Second World." Ideologically, this second world of Lenin
did not stand in the middle between "the First World" and "the Third World"—"the semi-colonial countries...and all the colonies." (29). Instead, it stood next to and offered a shaking hand to "the Third World." In other words, Lenin viewed the Second World as forming a common bastion with the Third World against the predatory practices of the First World. He argued that the task of the proletariat in the Second World could not be achieved unless it championed the right of nations all over the world to self-determination. (30) Never before had a school of thought so squarely championed the Third World plight and expressed what the colonized peoples felt about the antagonisms between "the oppressing" and "the oppressed nations."

Referring to his theses on the national and colonial questions, Lenin writes that, "The idea of distinction, of dividing the nations into oppressor and oppressed, runs through all the theses..." (31) It is in order to be consistent with the principle of Communist Internationalism (Comintern) that Lenin reformulates his concept of "the East" in which he includes not only the colonized countries in Asia but those in Africa and South America as well. (32) No less important for our discussion is Lenin's preference to see his country as belonging more to Asia than to Europe. (33)

In discussing the Soviets' political discourse and practices as regards national and colonial problems,
however, we should be on guard of the complexity involved. Here we are confronted with the intricacies of the urge to stick to the party ideology, of purely strategic considerations within Russia, and of the particularity of historical circumstances surrounding various national or colonial questions outside Russia. In all this, serious problems of interpretation occurred. Much of the dubiousness of the Soviets’ actual policies on the problems emerged from these constraints.

The formal ideological position of Soviet Russia is probably well formulated by Lenin in his "Preliminary Draft of Theses on the National and Colonial Questions." Lenin opens his theses by pointing out the "falsity and hypocrisy" of the bourgeois principle of democracy. In his view, the bourgeois principle ignores the perpetuation and the increase of contradictions between nations. The purpose of the Comintern is to oppose "the bourgeois-democratic lies" which covers the colonial and economic enslavement. The ultimate objective is to end injustices inherent in the stale political relations and unequal access to resources in the colonies.

Out of such propositions, Lenin formulates at least two theses most appealing to the revolutionary in the colonized countries. He calls for a closer union between the laboring masses of all nations. This in his view will form a common bastion in the great cause "to overthrow the
landlords and the bourgeoisie."(35) From this position, he boldly asserts that

one cannot confine oneself at the present time to the bare recognition or proclamation of the need for closer union between the working people of the various nations; it is necessary to pursue a policy that will achieve the closest alliance of all the national and colonial liberation movements with Soviet Russia....(36)

Lenin's position was made more explicit by Stalin. According to him, Leninism recognized the staying revolutionary capacities of liberation movements within the oppressed countries. He also saw the possibility of forging these capacities to overthrow imperialism.(37) Stalin adds that support must be given to such liberation movements as tend to weaken and finally to edge imperialism out.(38)

Lenin's theory of imperialism similarly upholds this strategy. Colonies, in Lenin's theory, are no less indispensable to modern capitalism than are cheap labor reserves to traditional capitalists.(39) Hence Lenin's two-pronged strategy. The citadels of traditional capitalism should be attacked by inculcating class consciousness among the proletariat in industrially advanced countries. At the same time, the heart of modern capitalism is to be attacked by arousing the drive toward self-determination among the peoples in the colonies. In order to have a decisive combat
against modern capitalism, attacks should be directed to
the "soft underbelly of capitalism"--by freeing their
colonial possessions.(40) Here we see the disclosure of the
red thread inevitably linking, but also blurring, Lenin's
theory and strategy.

This ideological position faced a lot of difficulties.
The years following the October Revolution were particularly
trying to the Soviets. Until the end of 1918 they had to
face the opposition waged by the Mensheviks. They were also
confronted with so-called Right Soviet Republics and by
some other dissenting parties.(41) The young union of re-
publics had to deal with the problems of the nationalities
of the Letts, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians
and others within her own borders. In 1919 they also had to
contend seriously with the "imperialist backed armies" of
Kolchak and Denikin.(42)

With such a formidable challenge there was more than
enough reason to minimize as much as possible the severity
of the fronts, particularly to mitigate dissensions within
the country's own border. Not coincidentally, Lenin's and
Stalin's campaigns for national self-determination took
place during the critical period of 1917-1925. The victory
of the Russian Revolution against conspicuous odds was to a
significant extent due to this intensive campaigning.
"Holding out the vision of independence for non-Russian
peoples," writes Walker Connor, "proved very instrumental

In order to avoid risking encirclement by hostile powers, Moscow had preferred to establish an alliance with the already entrenched nationalist movement under Sun Yat-sen. Compared to the "embryonic CCP," the movement had better prospects "of winning power within China."(44) The same policy out of the same fear was adopted with regard to Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan--Russia's neighbors in Western Asia. Here the greatest emphasis in Russian propaganda were "Islam and independence."(45)

The remaining question, however, is whether or not such practice, that is, what Walker Connor calls "self-determination as stratagem," does not imply a sacrifice of the ultimate ideology for the sake of the moment's exigency.(46)

The last factor confounding our discussion of the Soviets' discourse and policy has to do with the particularity of historical circumstances surrounding various national and colonial problems outside Russia. What constitutes a problem at this point is the fluctuations in the Comintern's own view. The fluctuations manifest not so much in the dilemma of supporting or not supporting a particular "bourgeois" nationalist movement as in determining at what
stage a particular colonized country is at the time of the struggle according to Marxist-Leninist understanding.

Imbued as it is with the spirit of Internationalism, Marxist-Leninism is essentially against nationalism. The two ideologies are philosophically incompatible. In the cognitive paradigm of the communists, nationalism is a captive of the superstructure. But consciousness of the historical dialectic provides Marxist-Leninists with considerable latitude enabling them to alternate along the pro-and-con shifting of strategic positions. Nationalism, therefore, could be progressive or reactionary, depending on the level of a society's mode of production. "At a feudal or semi-feudal stage," writes Connor, "it is progressive, but at a stage of developed capitalism it is counter-revolutionary." Nevertheless, the problem stays as this general postulate is confronted with the actual challenge of whether or not to support a particular nationalist movement in Asia.

The influence of the Soviets on the movement for national liberation in Indonesia should also be seen simultaneously in these intertwining constraints of ideological, strategic, and historical/dialectical considerations. By no means did the influence spread into the country with a clear-cut prescription. Rather, it came more in a fluctuating and haphazard manner. Just like Dutch liberalism,
Communism also consisted of both rhetoric and actual practices.

But haphazard and rhetorical though it was, the Leninist influence in Indonesia was there, introducing a decided ethos of egalitarianism among the Indonesian leaders and masses. The ethos was quick to find its staunch upholders. The colonial circumstances, as we will find below, had been transformed in such a way as to be ready to accept virtually any form of revolutionary idea. "Marxism...," writes Jeanne S. Mintz, "did not burst upon the Indonesian scene as a revolutionary doctrine disturbing a tranquil, tropical paradise, but arrived at a time of significant change and growing tension."(50)

Thus entering the port of Semarang in 1913, H.J.F.M. Sneevliet, a Dutch member of SDAP (Social Democratic Workers' Party), found the country already brewing. Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union), the first Indonesian political association with a huge following already captured the political stage throughout Java. Within one year following his arrival, Sneevliet founded, together with some sixty other Dutch socialists, ISDV (Indies Social Democratic Association) in Surabaya.(51) After a period of wavering over what to do with so limited a membership and insufficient fund, ISDV decided to publish Het Vrije Woord (The Free Word). Its first issue appeared in October 1915. The objective was to revolutionize existing labor unions and to
"seek an alliance with a larger movement that would act as a bridge to the Indonesian masses." (52)

The choice of ISDV was Sarekat Islam. Here it sowed revolutionary ideas, promoted revolutionary actions in the regions and countryside, and tapped radical elements, particularly that of Sarekat Islam labor organizations. ISDV achieved a rapid expansion of membership. On May 23, 1920, at the seventh congress of the ISDV, a majority accepted a motion to change the party into Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). It was both to appease the growing Indonesian aspiration in the party and to state more firmly the party's orientation to the Comintern. (53) Accordingly, Indonesian Communism became the oldest in Asia beyond the Russian borders and, decades later, PKI turned out to be the largest communist party outside the Sino-Soviet bloc. (54)

But like the tough challenges the Soviets had encountered in their efforts to spread their ideology into their Islamic neighbors, PKI also had to vie with the rapidly growing consciousness of Muslims in Indonesia. Had the communist movement in the country begun half a century earlier, it might have commanded greater political power among the masses. Marxism grew contemporaneously with both Liberalism and Reform Islam. They learned of each others' existence without much delay.
The Discourse of Reform Islam

Sayyid Ahmad Khan, the Islamic reformist, was born in 1817, a year earlier than Marx. The International Working-men's Association of 1864 preceded the establishment of the Aligarh college by only eleven years. No less significant for our discussion is the fact that only with the victory of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 did Marxism begin to exert significant influence on the Asian soil. By that time Reform Islam had irreversibly spread to most major Islamic countries.

Social changes and political tension which greeted the communist movement in Indonesia were to a large extent a result of the activities of Islamic modernists. The tension-causing changes were largely effected by a small, and yet vocal, group within the conspicuously large Islamic community.

It is necessary to underscore that ever since its spread in the coastal trading centers around the fourteenth century, Islam had historically been an emergent, rather than a ruling, creed in the country. Twice during the preceding centuries—at the end of the fifteenth century and toward the end of the sixteenth century, Islam would have swept the whole archipelago under its religio-political hegemony, had it not been interfered with by the Portuguese and by the Dutch. (55) This implies that its ascension to political hegemony was not checked by the Hindu-Buddhistic
followers previously flourishing in the country. The latter had been either rendered into the periphery (56) or incorporated into the more Sufic blend of Islam.(57)

There were two Islamic waves visiting the country, each influenced and changed the people's mode of religiosity. The first wave followed almost from the beginning the same pattern of Islamization occurring elsewhere during the first half of the 13th century to the end of the 15th century. Muslim merchants and traders from Irano-Semitic traditions and Sufi itinerants carried into the coastal cities and thence into the interior villages a distinctly Sufic Islam.(58) Having "an unusually cosmopolitan form" and entering "multiple historical interactions," this mystic Islam easily penetrated into different customs and mingled with different cultures.(59) Modifying and being modified in turn by local customs, the creed retained its universal character as well as its egalitarian spirit largely common to the world of Islam.(60)

It was this Islam which Raffles found during his reign in the country. In spite of his contention that the whole of Java had apparently been converted to Islam during the 16th century,(61) Raffles observed that in general the Javanese were unacquainted with the Islamic doctrines.(62)

And yet we need to be mindful that the Javanese usually internalized their religion more than they expressed it. Hence Geertz's observation that in Indonesia "almost
everything is tinged, if lightly, with metaphysical meaning ..."(63) Geertz attributes the pervasive religiosity in the people's mind as characteristic of Java's Indic tradition. What Geertz seems to overlook, however, is the fact observed by Raffles in 1817 that Islamic institutions in the archipelago "are still gaining ground."(64) Perhaps we should add that Sufic Islam was often indistinguishable from the Indic mode of religiosity.

Sufism never cares too much about the outward expression of a religion and is always tolerant of local religious practices. As is indicated in its nomenclature, the so-called "Javanese religion" of the earlier centuries had been deeply imbued with the spirit of Sufism, irrespective of Hindu-Buddhistic traces here and there. It follows that the internalization of religious experience, which Geertz calls "Indonesian illuminationism," is probably not so much Indic as it is Islamic, for illuminationism constitutes after all the most important goal of Sufism.(65)

In The Religion of Java, Geertz only discusses the influence of Sufism as he deals with the santri variant. This influence was curiously ignored as he moved to the priyayi variant, whereas even the core word in priyayi mysticism, i.e., batin, originated directly from the world of Sufism. Accordingly, Geertz underrates the importance of Sufism among the latter variant of the "Javanese religion." This aspect of Sufism was again manifest in most peasant
revolts against colonial authorities throughout Java, particularly in Banten, during the last quarter of the 19th century. The majority of the cases of revolt involved one or more tarekat—the semi-secret Sufi association.(66)

This observation indicates the discontinuity in the religious experience of the land's Muslims as from the last two decades of the 19th century. If previously they had been more other-worldly, now they became more this-worldly. The revolts of both the peasantry and the nobility used to emerge only in a spontaneous way, tinged with millenarism, usually accompanied by the distribution prior to action of amulets by kyai leading tarekats in the villages. Now the struggle was carried out in a more or less rational manner with a measure of knowledge about world politics and economy. Mystical sects/brotherhoods once captured the order of the day. Now modern schools, welfare programs, and social organizations were burgeoning throughout the islands. If previously Islamic political struggle had generally been inarticulate, now it was waged in the light of consciousness.

Such a discontinuity in Islamic experience is consequential. The Dutch used to suppress easily any unrest from the Islamic quarter. Things already changed in the early 20th century. It now became increasingly difficult for the Dutch to control Muslims' movements. To a great extent,
we can suggest that as from the first decade of the 20th century, Indonesian Muslims had largely confronted "the West" with a method similar to that prevalent among the more advanced humanity. All these important points of discontinuity within Indonesian Islam were to a considerable extent a function of the general revival among the Islamic communities the world over.

The revival of Islam, which is widely known as Islamic Modernism or Reform Islam, virtually began in two places. One was in India with the foundation of two notable Islamic institutions. The first, the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh, was founded in 1875 by Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898). He was an influential Muslim intellectual and a prolific writer on the subjects of Islam and modernity and on ways to emancipate the Muslim middle class of India. The second one, founded in Calcutta in 1877 by Amir Ali (d. 1928), was the National Muhammadan Association --an association intended as a political training and social organization for Indian Muslims in general.

Disagreeing in matters of ways to emancipate the Muslim community in India, Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Amir Ali introduced a number of novel ideas into Islam. The former called upon their fellow-believers to accept British political authority and follow the European cultural enlightenment. He advocated liberal changes in Islam, exposed the basic similarities between Islam and Christianity, and
decided William Muir's observations of Muhammad in *Life of Mahomet* (1877). He also rejected the notions that Islam sanctioned the purdah, jihad, taqlid (blind following), and slavery. But probably most notable in his work was his explicit rejection of the old figh and later accretions. At the same time, he viewed the Qur'an as the only valid religious source and orientation for Muslims. Hence his espousal of nechariyyah—an argument supporting the conformity of Islam with nature with a predilection to interpret "the word of God by the work of God."(67)

Amir Ali's work *The Spirit of Islam* (1891) follows a path similar to Liberalism. Less apologetic than Sayyid Ahmad Khan, he largely writes about the life of Muhammad and his teaching. Ali presents what he considers to be the Islamic position as regards war, bigotry, women, slavery, literature, science, rationalism, and democracy. He suggests that once Muhammad's Islam is understood within its own historical context, it will be shown not that Islam is compatible with modern ideas, "but that Islam's teaching, its spirit, is precisely those ideas."(68) Muhammad is here presented not as Sayyid Ahmad has attempted, but as what he historically was. Neither does he try to find similarities between Christianity and Islam. In contradistinction with the real message of Jesus, Christianity has, according to him, become "perverted and amusingly corrupt during the first few centuries."(69)
Unlike Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Amir Ali recognizes Islam not just as it is revealed in the Qur'an, but more as it is historically constituted.(70) While he looks up to the great virtue and contributions of Islam, he is not remiss in admitting its negative sides. Due to his historical understanding of Islam, he does not categorically reject the whole body of fiqh. Instead he argues that what is needed is its reinterpretation by means of ijtihad, enlightened reasoning,(71) in order to recast worn-out passages and maintain those which remain pertinent. The end result differs little from that reached by Sayyid Ahmad. ["Most] of the unwelcome details" of the fiqh are indeed ignored.(72)

Reprinted many times over, Amir Ali's work exerted a widespread influence among Muslims throughout the Indian subcontinent.

Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Amir Ali were largely responsible for breaking the seclusion of Indian Muslims, particularly after the bitter epilogue of the Great Indian Mutiny of 1857.(73) Their struggle purported to recover Muslims' humanism and intellectual tradition. Curiously they see the West "as a genuine development from the apogee of Islamic civilization itself and...as the true message of Islam."(74) Both men can be viewed as the predecessors of Muhammad Iqbal--the lustrous, if controversial, Islamic thinker of the 20th century.
Pertinent though it is to our understanding of the ideas underlying the revival of Islam, the wave of Reform Islam in Indonesia at the turn of the century was not directly influenced by the Islamic movement in India. The influence came instead from the Middle East, particularly from Egypt.

The man responsible for the widespread Islamic resuscitation was Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905). He was a disciple of Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1839-1897), a radical Muslim politician of impressive character and learning.(75) Abduh had managed not so much to cast Islam in the aura of modernity, but to unravel the theological foundation of the unity of reason and religion in Islam. He shared his teacher's consciousness of the abject backwardness of the Muslim world as well as his social and political lines of reform.(76) But he declined from following the apologetic path and refuse to call Western enlightenment Islamic. He believed that "the only method which held any hope of success was that of a general religious awakening in every Muslim country."(77) He called for a reappraisal of the credal principles of Islam.

Abduh's work proceeds by distinguishing two kinds of knowledge--about the Creator and about creations--and re-asserts the Qur'anic injunction not to venture in the former but to excel in the latter. Human reason and intellect is not given to knowing the Ultimate, but it is excellently
equipped to explore all of nature's phenomena and accidents including facts concerning man and history. Thus while he discourages philosophical speculations of what he considers beyond the ken of human intelligence, he urgently encourages the exertion of human intelligence "to discover the secrets which are concealed in the bosom of the universe."(78) As such he reaffirms the anti-classical thrust of Islam.(79)

The power of Abduh's call lies in its simplicity. As far as worldly matters are concerned, the final authority is with reason.(80) In such a way he puts his argument against taqlid and for ijtihad on surer ground than do both Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Amir Ali. Blind following of human or institutional authority is viewed sinful bordering on godlessness. A person is a believer "only when he grasps his religion with reason, and comprehends it with his soul, so that he becomes fully convinced of it."(81)

Just like the case with the Indian Muslims, this revival of religious thinking consequently fell upon a number of traditional practices and vested religious groups. It attacked superstitions or belief in the power of dead persons to bestow favors on the living. It denounced what Fazlur Rahman calls the "miracle-mongering doctrines and practices of popular Sufism." He criticized the excessive veneration of the hadith—the selected narratives of the Tradition of the Prophet. It also charged discrimination
against women and the centuries long abuses by the ulama. Apart from their different approaches, Muhammad Abduh and his Indian counterparts all imparted to individual Muslims a religious spirit which was at once critical and dynamic. They stirred a fresh wind as they lifted the dialectical pair of freedom of action and courage of responsibility. (82) Capitalized was the equal participation in religious understanding and worldly activities with openness and tolerance to "all scientific investigation." (83)

These ideas of Reform Islam entered Indonesia toward the end of the 19th century. Indonesian pilgrims to Mecca in the early decades of the 20th century had considerably increased, due in particular to the revolution in the means of transportation. As from the 18th century, Mecca had taken over the place of India as the main source of Islamic teachings in the country. (84) With the shift in orientation, Indonesian Islam became less Sufic and less accommodating to local practices allegedly bordering on syirk. (85) Muslims became more "puritanical" in the sense of a stricter adherence to Islamic law. The influence of Abduh's modernist teachings furnished further encouragement to the existing, basically Wahabi type of, Islam. In a way, this Islam already contained a nascent, though rather crude, celebration of reason.

If Mecca was the ritual destination of Indonesian pilgrims, Cairo and Constantinople were the two places the
more politically-bent pilgrims looked for their ideological orientation. As they returned, they began to spread both religious and political movements. For a time Pan-Islamism as advocated by Abdulhamid II of Turkey gained some favor. The influence of Pan-Islamic ideas, however, did not last long. The dream to have a universal caliphate for Islamdom was soon abolished by Kemal Ataturk. Besides, the attitude of most leaders of Reform Islam in Indonesia was generally too liberal to stick to such an ancient cause. Unlike the case with the Indian Muslims, there was no bitter feeling among the Indonesian reformists with the abolition of the dream.

Acting upon Snouck Hurgronje's advice, the colonial government imposed a tight control upon possible infiltration of "subversive materials" from Mecca. Muhammad Abduh's writings had to be smuggled via Tuban, a small port in East Java. Before long Abduh's ideas began to draw earnest supporters. Al-Manar, a periodical published by Muhammad Rashid Ridha, Abduh's disciple, was widely read. The same was true with Al-Urwat al-Wustqa, published earlier in Paris by Abduh and al-Afghani while living in exile. In 1912, Muhammadiyah was established by K.H. Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta, which was to be the largest organization of Reform Islam in the entire Muslim world.

To conclude, it is necessary to recognize two things. First, the roots of the discursive practices we have so far
elaborated by no means exhaust all contending discourses
during the rise of the new nation. Other roots of discursive practices also existed, such as that of Javanese traditionalism and of ethnic communalism, which were strongly assertive in the post-colonial periods. However, they played only a secondary role in the synchronic forces upon which Indonesian nationalism stood.

Secondly, the discursive context of the political development was greatly shaped by the economic context. It is impossible to understand such development without directly addressing the character, evolvement and impact of the colonial economy until the first decades of the 20th century. Being equally important, the economic context of Indonesian nationalism requires a separate treatment of its own.
THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF INDONESIAN NATIONALISM

The principal feature of the East Indies' economy was its highly distortive evolvement. It is perhaps less perplexing to talk about British economy in India (1) than about Dutch economy in Indonesia. Of course, we are not saying that in the former we find no distortions of the native economy. (2) We only need to emphasize that to refer to the East Indies' economy as the overseas extension of Dutch economy would be a misnomer.

The Indies' economy has been viewed as an ingenious superimposition of the Dutch economy upon that of Indonesian. (3) It constituted a mixture of precapitalistic and, later, capitalistic modes implanted from the Netherlands with the feudal practices typical of the colony. That is to say the economic practices of precolonial Indonesia were being harnessed into the mercantilistic and capitalistic practices the Dutch brought into the colony. The Dutch simply took up the practices of the land and cast them in a more systematic manner. Village autarky, communal ownership of lands (meaning, essentially, that the lands belong only to the sovereign), subsistence and absence-of-money economy believed to characterize the precolonial period survived during the bulk of the later period.
The notorious Forced Cultivation of 1830-1870 was only possible through the maintenance of feudalistic practices. Large compacts of plantation agriculture were facilitated by the manipulation of village communal lands through native rulers. The Javanese cultivators were "paid" for by giving them some turn to work on their own portions of the land. Neither money economy nor public treasury was needed among the villagers. Given village autarky, which implies a lack of effective nation-wide polity, the Dutch ruled out the possibility of a significant resistance to their exploitive schemes.

In other words, the Dutch had transformed feudal practices into the service of their post-feudal and, subsequently, capitalistic economies, without thereby supplanting them. It is by maintaining such practices that the Dutch were capable of making profit at an unprecedented rate. All this led to the impoverishment of the Indonesian people and the chronic retardation of their economy.

But this is a rather simplistic picture or formulation of an actually obnoxious phenomenon. It also implies that the experience of Javanese interior economy is taken to represent the varied economic practices prevalent throughout the archipelago during the precolonial and colonial era. As such the magnitude of economic deprivation of Indonesians tends to be down-played.
The economy of the early Indonesian society pulsated around two types of state structure: the "bureaucratic inland-states" and the "harbor principalities"(4) also known as coastal kingdoms. The former largely developed in the hinterlands of East and Central Java, of which the kingdom of later Mataram easily passed as its best representative.

The harbor principalities thrived in the coastal trading centers which formed a flat V-curve from the western to the eastern tips of the world's largest archipelago. This covers the Strait of Malacca and the seas of Java, Banda, and Molucca where the chain of autochtonous kingdoms of Aceh, Banten, Demak, Bali, Banjarmasin, Makassar, and Ternate were more or less contemporaneously located. The bureaucratic inland-states "were dependent upon services and crop deliveries from the peasantry by local chiefs or governors," whereas the harbor principalities found their support from seaborne trade.(5)

In spite of the developed state of the feudal culture of inland Java, there is every reason to contend that the economic mode conducted by the harbor principalities, that of littoral Java (Tuban, Gresik, Jaratan) including, was the more dominant throughout Indonesia prior to the intrusion of the Dutch.

The harbor principalities, particularly that of Acehnese and Malays of Sumatra and Borneo, Sundanese and
Javanese along the northern coast of Java, and Bugis-Makassarese and Ternateans in East Indonesia encouraged or carried out, along with the Chinese and Arabs, international as well as interinsular trade. Possessing "a very large capital," the Bugis, for instance, managed to import into and export out of Java various kinds of trade items. (6)

The argument that the Javanese, and, implicitly, all of Indonesian economy consisted of village autarkies operating in a subsistence level where money was hardly existent as typified by Boeke and de Kat Angelino is difficult to sustain. (7) There is a systematic evasion in their analysis. By consistently refusing to link Indonesia's stagnant economy with the intrusion and monopolistic practices of the Dutch colonialism, or by addressing such a repugnant policy only very peripherally, they, in effect, argue that precolonial Indonesia was characterized by a subsistence economy. They thereby deny ample historical evidence indicating the intensity of interinsular and international trade taking place along the Indonesian waters.

The trade of spice or what peoples in the West called "pepper dear" had created a durable international trade at least during the 15th and 16th century, connecting China, India (Cambay, Surat, Diu), Arabia (Aden), Persia, Alexandria, and Europe with Malacca or Banten as their common destination. Here peoples from those countries purchased spices brought from the Moluccas and parts of
Sumatra. The flourishing of Malacca as an international trade center was in turn supported by its access into the Indonesian ports of Palembang, Banten, Tuban, Gresik, Banjarmasin, Makassar, and Ternate.

The whole of Indonesian archipelago and the Malay Peninsula were in the precolonial era largely dependent on Java's rice for their staple food. Thus where spices constituted the core of the international trade in this part of Southeast Asia, rice was its correlate for the interinsular trade. Or where the center for the international trade was Malacca, its counterpart for the interinsular trade was Banten. To be sure, this does not imply that there was no international trade going on in the latter or interinsular trade in the former.

Along with spice and rice, numerous other goods were actively demanded and offered. Chinese silk clothes and Indian fine fabrics were also internationally much sought after. The richness of the trade is probably best captured by Van Leur:

The Indonesian products—clove, nutmeg, mace, pepper, sandalwood, sapanwood, gold, tin, precious stones, drugs and medicinal products, and rarities such as birds, tortoise shell, and so forth—were shipped to the north and the west, traded in exchange for Indian and Persian textiles, slaves, money, and uncoined metal, and for Chinese goods—silk and silk cloth, porcelain, lacquered objects, copperwood, paper, medicinal products, sugar, sumptuous handicraft goods—the largest part of which latter were reshipped to the west from the Indonesian staple ports.(8)
The interinsular trade covering the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian archipelago was no less opulent with merchandise traffic. Trade for the most part run reciprocally between Java and the rest of Indonesian or Malay world. Thus into Java were imported, mostly by native traders, Malayan camphor, gambir, tortoiseshell, edible birds'-nests, pamur—"the metal used for damasking the Javan kris" (dagger)—bees'—wax, Bugis sarongs "of very strong texture," and gold—dust.

In turn Java exported or distributed into the Outer Islands and the Malay peninsula rice, a variety of vetches, salt, oil, tobacco, timber, Java cloths, brass ware, and a variety of minor articles, the produce of her agriculture and manufactures, besides occasionally, as the market admits, a considerable quantity of European, Indian, and Chinese goods.(9)

A corroborating account of the land's precolonial trade has been found in Chinese, Arabic, and Portuguese sources.(10)

With all this evidence, the argument about the pristine characteristics of Indonesian villages as consisting of autarky and subsistence economy, or economy in a premercantilistic sense, as it is explicitly maintained by Boeke and de Kat Angelino, is untenable.

The same is true with Boeke's other notion of the absence of money, which implies that trade was conducted in kinds. Along with barter transactions, money was already in
use either in internationally unstandardized or in rudimen-
tary forms. This was in part due to the influence of trade
practice in China. Accordingly, during the 16th century the
Indonesian traders were by no means unacquainted with money
economy anymore than their European contemporaries were in
the Western hemisphere. This fact is well suggested, for
instance, by Van Leur and Robert Heilbroner.\(11\) It is
pertinent here to note that up to the 17th century, the
Asian trade was still superior to that of the West in terms
of both quantity and quality of merchandise.\(12\)

What I want to convey with this line of argument is
the fact that the Dutch had different ways of responding to
the two types of state and economic structure existing in
the archipelago. Being monopolistic, the Dutch assumed an
uncompromising attitude against independent harbor prin­
cipalities in order to extinguish their trade.

The enormous stretch of the archipelago, the numerous
navigable inlets and well-situated harbors, and the ancient
maritime tradition of the land made the Indonesian waters
difficult to control. Such circumstances had probably left
the Dutch with no other choice but to adopt a harsher meth­
od to crush any sign of independent economy/polity. Later
the same treatment befell indigenous bands of "smugglers"
regarded as interfering with their monopolistic policy. All
this the Dutch managed to complete only with great
difficulty and financial loss in the first decade of the
20th century. Various kinds of stringent trade regulations and sanctions were enacted by the Dutch to render into oblivion the once exemplary international and interinsular trade in the archipelago.

Adam Smith relates to us the earlier practice of the ruthless monopoly. He writes about the burning of sumptuous spice produce as well as nutmeg trees beyond the amount the Dutch could handle or load into their ships. Generally known as hongi-tochten, the raids had resulted in a considerable decimation of the native population in the Moluccas.(13)

But this constituted a minor prelude to a more devastating policy against native commerce in the subsequent period. Raffles gives us a detailed narrative of colonial regulations to ensure a "rigid monopoly." To get a sense as much of the intensity of precolonial trade as the severity of Dutch measures to put an end to the once blooming-trade, we need to quote Raffles's full passage:

"All persons whatever," says the first article of those orders, "are prohibited, under pain of death, from trading in the four fine kinds of spices, unless such spices shall be first bought from the Company." Opium was placed under the same restrictions, and enforced by the same penalty. The exportation of pepper, tin, and Japan copper was prohibited, unless bought from the Company; and the importation of them not permitted, except for sale to the Company, under the penalty of confiscation, and a fine of four times the value of the article. The import and export of Surat silks and of India cloths were strictly prohibited under the same penalty. White
cotton-yarn and all other sorts of it, Semarang arrack, and unstamped gold, were prohibited from being exported under the penalty of confiscation. No port was open to any vessel coming from the northward or from the Moluccas, except Batavia. No prahu or vessel was to carry any greater quantity of gunpowder and shot, than might be permitted, and regularly entered in the pass given to the party, under penalty of confiscation of the vessel, and the infliction of corporal punishment similar to that inflicted for theft. All persons belonging to the coast of Java were strictly prohibited from sailing from any part of the coast where there was not a Company's Resident. No navigation was allowed to be carried on by the vessels of Banka and Biliton, except to Palembang. All navigation from Celebes and Sumbawa was prohibited, under pain of confiscation of the vessel and cargo. No vessel from the latter place could pass Malacca, and the Company's pass to proceed to Siak was given only once in a year to three vessels from Batavia, two from the coast of Java, and one from Cheribon. The China junks were only permitted to trade at Batavia and Banjermasin. No trade or navigation whatever was permitted beyond the west point of Bantam without a pass from Batavia.(14)

Such a rigid monopoly in the land lasted until the 20th century as the case of West Sumatra indicates.(15) Raffles observes that those regulations effectively served "to shackle every movement of commerce, and to extinguish every spirit of enterprise, for the narrow selfish purposes of what may be called the fanaticism of gain."(16)

As for the bureaucratic inland-states, however, the Dutch pursued a very different policy. They reconstructed the cultural paradigm of inland Java which sanctioned the feudalistic practices of native rulers and transformed them into the most gainful undertaking hitherto unknown in the
world of colonies. Such an exploitive transformation is possible due to a simple reason. As the interior states were politically and culturally more developed in the feudal sense, they were likewise economically much more pliable to meet the Netherlanders' search for huge gain. The crux of feudalism after all lies in its principle of inordinate exploitation. A deep-seated feudalism like that in Java's hinterland was hardly found in the Outer Islands.

Virtually the entire acquisitive schemes of the Dutch in the interiors of Java were based on or followed the lines of practices of local rulers. The "success" of the Dutch colonial exploitation was to a considerable extent a function of the establishment of native "administration," which is quite irrational by modern standard, alongside that of the Dutch. Cleverly the Dutch transformed local practices into a lucrative deal. To use the symbolic analysis of Tzvetan Todorov, here was a case of the use of the fateful code of Montezuma for the sake of the pragmatic, gainful, code of Cortes.(17) "What resulted," as Baran observes a similar phenomenon, "was an economic and political amalgam combining the worst features of both worlds --feudalism and capitalism--and blocking effectively all possibilities of economic growth."(18)

But we should note that irrespective of the stringency of Dutch monopolistic and exploitive measures, the Indonesian entrepreneurial class did not completely die out,
however Lilliputian they might appear in the eyes of modern economy.

If the Dutch followed a two-edged strategy of exploitation in the colony, the Indonesians also seem to have two ways of responding. Most of the peasantry in Java had become part and parcel of the colonial exploitive schemes. But their counterparts in the Outer Islands, usually of orthodox Muslim orientation, refused to be incorporated and preferred to go along independently with various business or agricultural endeavors beyond those undertaken by the Dutch. Their traditional spirit of enterprise and the abundance of land at their disposal had made their economic condition not as miserable as that of their brethren in Java. They managed to hold on to their business in a number of ways.

The interruption of communication with the Netherlands due to World War I was grasped by the Indonesians "to fabricate many products formerly imported from Europe..."(19) The years of the Great Depression also witnessed the increase of "native" production. By 1937, Indonesians gained a considerable control in the production of rubber, pepper, maize, copra, and kapok.(20) The rise of their purchasing power had induced them to buy new manufactured goods from Java.(21) The drive toward economic independence was particularly true in parts of Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, and Bali.(22)
But even in Java, the Muslim urban traders kept alive against great odds their business spirit which Geertz refers to as "a genuinely bourgeois ethic." (23) In the Regency of Bandung, for instance, they invest their money in weaving industry. The drive for cooperation and organization was not lacking among the Indonesians. (24)

With all the evidence, it becomes clear that what hampered the economic development of the Indonesians had very little to do with the alleged carpe diem mentality. Rather, it directly resulted from the inordinate suppression, exploitation, and discrimination by the colonial masters. This rendered impossible any accumulation of capital among the Indonesians, which was indispensable for the transformation of their economy.

The colonial structure prevented the Indonesian "bourgeois" to be born. What retarded the Indonesian economy was not so much the agricultural exploitation as the stringent monopoly of trade by the Dutch. As instances during the First World War and the depression years clearly indicated, any relaxation of such a monopoly was quickly grasped by the Indonesian entrepreneurs in a positive manner.

The difference between the Indonesian and the Indian experience is to a great extent a function of the rigid monopoly in the former and the limited monopoly in the latter. Indian industry did not emerge from her agricultural sector. Like Java, India's rural economy was characterized
by overcrowding, fragmentation of lands, inconstancy of tax assessment on the cultivated lands, and communal ownership of village lands with the sovereign as the only disposer. All the Indian agricultural sector had produced were agriculturally-apathetic zemindars, a growing number of unproductive ryotwars, a cluster of rapacious moneylenders and a seemingly endless subrenting and submediating without actually increasing the productivity of the land.(25)

Writing on British India's economy, Barrington Moore observes that, "Agricultural implements and techniques did not change significantly between Akbar's time and the early twentieth century."(26)

And yet Indian industry developed. It grew out of the circle of Indian merchants who found opportunity to accumulate capital with the introduction of railway system in India. It was out of this social group that India's cotton mills, jute mills, and coal mines first appeared between 1850 and 1855. But this was only possible because the British colonial government allowed, in spite of its partial discriminatory practices, some room for Indian trade and industry to grow.

Indians did not fail to capture the opportunity to develop their industry during the First World War. For strategic reasons, the British government "supported the establishment of steel and such other industries."(27) As Sukarno and Furnivall have suggested, the British believed
that a stronger purchasing power of the Indian people would help the market of their own products in India, and a stronger purchasing power could only materialize if India's economy and industry also developed. Judging from history, the Dutch were hardly willing to adopt such "grow and let grow" policy.

The colonial edifice hampering or distorting Indonesia's economy did not end just with trade deprivation and agricultural exploitation of the people. Instead, it became structurally corroborated with the disintegration between capital and labor. Through this disintegration Furnivall locates the structural differences between Europe and Java as well as between Java and the Outer Islands. If in Europe capital and labor grew together within one nation, in Java capital was foreign and labor native. In the Outer Islands both labor and capital were, according to Furnivall, non-existent. These circumstances created another structural barrier which is anomalous to the European case: capital, being scarce, was far stronger than labor. It was stronger not only against the Indonesians, but vis-à-vis the colonial government as well. (28)

This contention of Furnivall, however, is less circumspect. As we have observed, Furnivall overlooks the divergent patterns of economic development between Java and the Outer Islands. For instance, the latter was distinct from Java in the expansion of smallholders' rubber exports in
spite of government restriction during the 1930s. (29)
Furnivall also fails to see the problem through a more political reading of the land's economy.

The crushing of Indonesia's international and interinsular trade in the 17th century ended most of the flourishing economic activities the mercantile class of the country once engaged in. The Dutch capital of the twentieth century was stronger against Indonesian labor because that capital was "the congealed labor" of the Indonesian cultivators during the Forced Cultivation. (30) Likewise, the government turned out to be weaker than the capital just because it was the government itself which intended, served, and made possible the accumulation of the now invested capital in the first place. The Dutch East India Company was chartered by the government and, as it fell into bankruptcy, it was the government which took the burden of the Company over.

If we may use the perspective of Michael Todaro, the interrelation between the superior and the inferior sectors of the economy are such that the existence of the one does virtually nil to pull up the other. "In fact, [the superior] may actually serve to push [the inferior] down--to 'develop its underdevelopment'." (31)

This essentially tangled problems of the colonial economy had retarded the growth of the Indonesian economy. It rendered initial steps toward industrialization in the
country out of question. Worse, it made most of the welfare programs served the very parties against which the sincere Ethici wanted to protect the native.

The laborers, and the society as a whole, depend for protection against the anti-social tendencies of capital solely on law proceeding from the Dutch Government. Yet the Dutch Government is so closely involved with the interest of capital that any attempt to resist the encroachment of capitalist forces on the welfare of labour must almost of necessity appear anti-Government and anti-Dutch. (32)

In like manner, Indonesian businessmen, already small as they were, still had to contend not with their counterparts from the Netherlands at the level of laissez faire competition, but with a few giant monopolistic corporations, which placed the entire government apparatus essentially at their disposal. (33)

The reigning of Dutch capitalists was nothing but a logical outcome of the exceptionally long history of intensive exploitation. To recapitulate, during the First Period (1600-1800), we have 1) the close alternation of wars, trade, and plunders, particularly as regards spices from the Moluccas; 2) the significant importation and incorporation of Chinese, whose purpose in the country was no less acquisitive than that of the Dutch as the gatherers of native produce for the latter and as their tax and monopoly farmers; 3) the crushing of Indonesia's international trade by the Dutch for the sake of Holland's Asian commerce
while simultaneously closing her interinsular trade; and, subsequently, 4) the Forced Deliveries exacted upon West Java—the notorious Priangan System which later inspired Van den Bosch to devise his exploitive scheme—and Central Java.

During the Second Period (1800-1870) we have 1) the Forced Cultivation requiring the Javanese to cultivate export crops by one-fifth up to the whole of the peasants' sawah (wet-rice fields); 2) the absence of both control against and limit to the five-time exploitation of the Javanese peasantry; 3) the distorted function of the principle of "based on native custom" whence the "Dutch-Javan institutions" or the "dual bureaucracy" was created; 4) the perpetuation of the hereditary principle in the upper levels of the native colonial bureaucracy in contrast with the short-lived attempts of Daendels's and Raffles's administrative reforms; 5) the introduction of numerous kinds of taxes upon the natives, the excessiveness and irrationality of which has prompted Raffles to call them "impolitic exactions," and 6) the beginning of the government long monopoly of salt, opium, and pawnshops.

Finally, during the Third Period (1870-1942), we have 1) the expropriation of the communal and so-called "waste" lands; 2) the issuance of Korte Verklaring (Short Declaration) demanding the full political allegiance and economic subservience of the native chiefs of the Outer Islands to
the colonial government alone; (34) 3) the opening up of the Outer Islands for sumptuous mineral extraction; 4) the burgeoning of millions of reserve laborers in Java out of which contract coolies were in part instituted in East Sumatra; 5) the supplanting of native weaving industry by the import of printed cotton goods from the Dutch industrial area of Twente; 6) the export discrimination by colonial government against native rubber producers of the Outer Provinces; and 7) the increasing fragmentation of the already small landholdings (35) to accommodate the even more rapid increase of the landless peasants.

This is certainly not the whole story. But it should suffice to maintain that the Dutch colonial policy is not to be reduced merely to the symbiotic cooperation of capitalistic and feudalistic forces as is typified by the inland Javanese mode of colonial exploitation.

The colonial practices reflect first and foremost the policy of liquidating competitors while gradually tapping and squeezing economic potentialities the Dutch could handle in the archipelago for the sole benefit of the Netherlands treasury. "The Europeans," writes Van Niel, "were, in the last analysis, in the East Indies to make money." (36) We should thus reject any totalization of cultural explanation as exemplified by Boeke and development theorists and go back to the overall scheme of economic suffocation and exploitation by the colonial policy. (37)
Some external factors not directly related to the exploitive intention of the Dutch also contributed to worsen the Indonesian economy. West Java was successively hit by physical disasters. There was a cattle plague in 1879. A year later a fever epidemic "caused the death of more than ten percent of the population." Krakatau erupted in 1883. Widespread famine due to crops failure ravaged the land between 1878 and 1886.

Yet the more lasting in effect did not come from a disaster. It was a breakthrough in the international route of transportation—the opening of the Suez Canal in 1870. This global short-cut had greatly facilitated the Dutch capitalists in stepping up the rate of exploitation in the colony, just as it heightened the Anglo-Dutch competition for market space in the Far East.

Vandenbosch believes that the incompatibility of the Netherlands and Indonesian economies was also another factor. Not much of the Indies' products were marketable in the Netherlands. Rubber and sugar, the two most important tropical products of Indonesia in later colonial years, were little imported to and consumed in Holland. There was generally no import duties for the East Indies' export of agricultural and mineral products. Conversely, Holland's exports of manufactured goods were usually liable to import taxation. Only tea could get a better treatment. But Holland's import of tea was worth almost five times less
than Holland's export of manufactured goods to the East Indies.(39)

In the second half of the 1930s, under the shadow of World War II, the colonial metropolis did belatedly devise some measure of trade preferences. Hence the quota granted to Indonesia's fodder cakes and vegetable oils, tariff benefits to Indonesia's maize, rice, and sugar, and subsidies to Javanese batik industry.(40) But even these bits of preferential treatment were far from enough to offset the skewness of the metropolis-colony "trade." According to Vandenbosch, there was hardly any way for the Netherlands to treat her colony's economy the way the British treated India or the United States the Philippines.(41) He argues that, given the structure of their respective economies, the degree of mutuality between the Netherlands and the East Indies was very limited.

All this argument, however, silences the principal motive of colonization: to plunder or milk without payment. Hence the apologetic tone of Vandenbosch that, "Whatever is gained by one part of the empire...is almost invariably paid for by another."(42)

The underlying thrust of the Dutch colonial policy remained virtually unchanged regardless of the Ethical Policy. It is true that, with the abandonment of batig slot (net profit), the wealth was no longer drained into the mother country. But the exploited/extracted wealth was
merely detoured into the hands of the Netherlands residing temporarily in Indonesia or into building capitalistic amenities and infrastructures to facilitate further and greater exploitation of the land.

In the meantime, the earlier equilibrium of international economy in the Far East began to shake. The supremacy of Dutch economy, which had long been challenged by the British and to a lesser extent by the American capital, now had to confront a newly awakened giant--Japan.

In 1930 the Japanese capital under the name of Borneo Oil Company began to enter the field of mineral extraction previously under strict Dutch monopoly. Japan's southward expansion followed the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War with the Peace Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. With this treaty, Japan obtained the Pescadores Islands and Formosa. But the expansion also resulted from the tough opposition the Chinese nationalists and communists managed to mount against Japan's westward move during the earlier period.

England and the United States had had their economic expansion in the East Indies restrained. Their world-wide domination was closely entwined with the perpetuation of Dutch colonization in the region. Japan had neither such interest nor such restraint. Already during the period of 1919-1929, Dutch share in the East Indies' imports fell from 32.5 percent to 17.6 percent due to a trade slump
affecting the Netherlands and other European countries. With the influx of cheap goods from Japan, Holland's share dropped further to 12.4 percent in 1933 whereas that of Japan jumped from 10 to 32 per cent. (44)

The years of depression marked a great shift in the economic power relations around the region. Japan also penetrated into the fields of shipping and distribution with their well-known cheap rates. The rising sun took advantage of Dutch liberal shipping regulations in the Indies. Kobe was then becoming "the maritime center of the western half of the archipelago." (45) This and other factors made the Japanese obtained the upper hand in the war of shipping rates against the Dutch. (46)

The undeterred aggression of Japan's economy soon prompted the Dutch to reconsider their open door policy which was inaugurated in 1870 and shifted to protectionist measures. (47) By so doing they inadvertently exacerbated the economic burden of Indonesians. As from the years of the Great Depression, it had been the Japanese goods that had literally eased the deteriorating conditions of the people. Every increase of import tax levied on the Japanese goods meant a blow more to the Indonesians than to the Japanese.

Apart from the effects of the Great Depression and of the Japanese offensive, however, the latter part of the liberal age in colonial Indonesia—roughly from 1900 to
1942—was marked by a conspicuous progress of the colonial economy. While the old agricultural cultivations continued and were even enlarged and intensified, investment in mineral exploitation also showed a steady increase. Prices of tropical products of tin and copra in 1910 rose as compared to their prices in 1895. *Erfpacht* (land on long lease) in Java opened up for plantation agriculture multiplied almost by four hundred percent from 1900 to 1930, whereas land rented from the peasantry increased by 129 percent. Though coffee production stagnated, sugar production thrived by 292 percent, and that of tea rose almost ten times during the same period. Rubber production, which only began in 1915, waxed even more marvelously than that of tea. (48)

Yet it was precisely at this juncture that the colonial paradox manifested itself most clearly. Up to the end of the Dutch rule, Indonesia's economy was typically colonial. The conspicuous undertaking in the fields of agriculture and mineral extraction was unaccompanied by a comparable growth in manufacturing sector. Raw material production is for the colony; industrial production is for the metropolis.

From 1902 to 1925, export of agricultural produce in general boosted more than eight times. The total area of *sawah* almost doubled between the period of 1885 and 1930. Of about the same period, coal and crude oil production also increased by leaps and bounds, i.e., from 8 to 1870
and from 1 to 5531 thousand metric tons. Also growing remarkably were irrigation and communications by rail. (49) The year 1920 witnessed an export surplus of 1,1 billion florins. (50)

This progress in the field of economy coincided with the Ethical Policy, which should be seen as purporting to introduce liberal principles into the political administration of the colony in order to keep abreast of those already taking place in the economic field. It was a pacing up of the policy to develop human resources in the colony to balance the centuries-old development of its natural resources. (51) The rationale was plain. Public works for the development of economic resources were to be accompanied by economic services for the development of human resources. According to Furnivall, the main object of the new policy was "to stimulate the material welfare of the people, to strengthen the native social order, and to promote the unification of society." (52)

But with all the trend of economic progress, the people's welfare hardly increased. On the contrary, it actually declined. Being as much dependent on the export economy, any unfavorable fluctuations of the price of tropical produce always hit Indonesians the more sorely. It was depressing to know that even the sincere programs of the Ethical Policy had failed to raise the living standard of the people. (53)
Meijer Ranneft and W. Huender, who wrote perhaps the most important government-sponsored investigation of the welfare of Indonesians during the first three decades of our century, underscored the decline of natives' welfare. They found, for instance, that in the critical period of 1920-1923 the income of average Indonesians were 5 to 10 percent less compared to that of 1913, whereas the population increased by at least 10 percent. (54)

Another study by L. Gotzen elicited an even gloomier picture. Between the years 1926-1932, the average per capita income of the native "declined steadily from 47.6 guilders to 20.3 guilders in Java and Madura and from 52.5 to 18.8 guilders in the rest of Indonesia." (55) Sukarno's citations, as we have seen, were even worse. (56) The inadequacy of health care facilities further contributed to the increase of the mortality rate among the Indonesians during the last decades of the Dutch colonial rule.

As suggested in the first three chapters, all this is only possible because of the well-integrated and highly effective use of political, economic, and cultural forces for the purpose of inordinate exploitation. It is, therefore, more than "a series of politico-economic devices" as Geertz calls it. Symbolic mobilization also played a significant part. The skill of the Dutch to manipulate and mete out coercive power from among different ethnic groups against native contenders constituted the political device.
The use of and provision for the Chinese served as the economic device. The utilization of native heads, with an emphasis on the utility of priyayi meaning system, functioned as the cultural device. In actuality, these devices worked in an intermingled fashion.

We have amply elaborated the Dutch colonial practices. We now need to reemphasize, as Kahin does, that in the whole of the three periods of colonization the Chinese and the upper priyayis actively participated in the colonial exploitation. As a matter of fact, the Dutch were capable of perpetuating their colonial scheme due to what might be called "the shielding service" of these two groups. Hence the irony that while the overall drama of Indonesia's exploitation was masterminded by the Dutch, the Dutch frequently posed or appeared as people's savior against the rapacities of their two allies.

The political buffer between the Dutch and the Indonesian masses provided by this aristocracy was matched by the buffer in economic relationships provided by the aristocracy and the Chinese jointly and subsequently by the Chinese alone. By virtue of their indirect political rule and indirect economic exploitation, the Dutch for three centuries were able to avoid collision with the reaction and opposition of the general Indonesian population to the conditions for which in an ultimate sense the Dutch were responsible.

Sartoño Kartodirdjo points out that the overseas Chinese, just like the priyayis, increasingly identified themselves
with the Dutch and looked down upon the Indonesians in general.\(^{(59)}\) Their exorbitant exploitation was largely based on their conception of the lowliness of the non-aristocratic populace. This means that the Chinese also assumed feudal behavior and in some cases even feudal titles.

As lessees of plantations, the Chinese acted as new feudal lords, "who kept an unwilling population in check, if need be by force of arms. The result of this system was that the lessees, 'like bloodsuckers, took as much as they could get'.\(^{(60)}\) Also rampant was their usurious practices among the villagers, where they controlled the village heads through whose authority repayment was assured.\(^{(61)}\)

The Dutch government also gave them a conspicuous preferential treatment by bestowing upon them monopolies for collecting road tolls, levying bazaar fees, selling salt and opium, importing cambric (the basic textile required by the traditional batik industry), even collecting the customs duty. Coupled with their hold on the rice trade due to their firm grip on village economies, "the Chinese came to govern almost completely the internal commerce of Java, the indigeneous merchant class being nearly eliminated."\(^{(62)}\)

It is, therefore, difficult to reject Van Hogendorp's contention about the Chinese as getting the utmost but giving the least to the land's welfare.
The basis of all civil communities is incontrovertibly the sacrifice of part of the liberty, rights, and even property of each individual, for the enjoyment and security of the remainder; and this remainder, when fixed, forms the civil freedom and privileges of such community. Not only are the Chinese quite exempt from this sacrifice, but they are also, by the corruption of the Batavian government, much less burthened than all the other inhabitants, even the Europeans, and are besides favoured with considerable privileges and exclusive means of gaining wealth. These are facts, which no one who is acquainted with Batavia can or will contradict. (63)

It would be wrong to view the Chinese in Indonesia as a homogeneous people. It seems plausible to argue that some Chinese groups who relatively remained outside the Dutch colonial scheme were perhaps not as exploitive as the rest. They comprised the Chinese who came to the country by their own means or those who had lived there long enough to commingle with the natives. Many of the Chinese of this category came from southern Fukien and known as Hokkiens. They are usually referred to as peranakan. Noticeable among this group is what Onghokham calls Cina-Jawa (the Javanese Chinese). (64)

At variance with the peranakans were the Chinese tok, who maintained the purity of their blood and culture. The totoks, who became, toward the end of the Dutch rule, increasingly more numerous due to the fresh waves of newcomers, were also named hoakiauw (overseas Chinese). This group of Chinese, largely Hakkas and Cantonese, "were not
interested in Indonesian affairs, but always looked back to China [where] they hoped to return as soon as they had a little 'in the bank'."(65) By the first decades of the 20th century the totoks had easily outnumbered the peranaks.(66) In addition, a tiny group of Chinese who had been converted to Islam also existed.

Not all Chinese groups were invariably well-to-do. Chinese contract coolies in East Sumatra and agriculturists in Riau and West Borneo certainly formed deviant cases. They constituted the minority within the Chinese minority. Still this observation does not rule out the fact that the Dutch colonial policy was systematically in favor of the Chinese as a whole at the expense of Indonesians. The rapacity of Chinese exploitation of the natives stood on the basis of this very discrimination. Hence what Furnivall calls the "loaded dice."

But the native aristocracy and/or higher priyayis were by no means less exploitive. As a matter of fact, colonial exploitation in Java, unlike that of Vietnam, reached such proportion only under their inegalitarian cultural code coupled with their subservience to the Dutch. The practices of Forced Deliveries and Forced Cultivation were conducted through their mediation. They were free to add up to their own benefit the demands charged by their colonial masters upon the cultivating villagers in the areas under their
contro1.(67) Multatuli in Max Havelaar portrays this situation vividly.

Accordingly, the centuries-long colonial exploitation in Indonesia evolved through the anathema of the particular characteristics of Javanese traditional rulers. Culturally they ended up denouncing trade and other manual professions and aspired to ksatriya class after the Hindu caste system. Politically their ethos was full submission to the superior and unfeeling authoritarianism toward their inferiors. Economically they were completely dependent upon the toil of the others, particularly the peasantry and the artisans. "As there is no division of labor among a rude people," writes Raffles, "so there is no division of power in despotism: the despot is proprietor, all the rest is property."(68) These social characteristics of the native rulers fit perfectly with the Dutch colonial scheme for the intensive and long lasting exploitation of inner Java.

But there were other colonially rooted causes to their predatory custom against the common folk. Most of the bupatis, for instance, obtained their positions after proving full allegiance to the colonial government. Not infrequently such "loyalty" was proved by their willingness to pay a great amount of position money (ambt geld) to the Governor.(69) Usually those who made the highest bid got the positions. What made them serve the Dutch the more obediently was the fact that the Dutch had made their
positions heréditary—an administrative practice they could hardly expect from native princes.

The bupatis had thus found more security under the Dutch and grew accustomed to seeing their privilege as tied with the Dutch rule. So subservient were they to their colonial masters that their nickname became "plantation overseers." Such was their title after rendering "excellent service to the Netherlands" during the Diponegoro War (1825-1830),(70) which in part prompted the Dutch to speed up their rehabilitation against Daendels's and Raffles's reforms. Above all, however, it was their willingness to milk the Javanese peasantry, their subjects by traditional standard, that had determined the certainty of their appointment or incumbency. The more draining their exploitation, the greater was the possibility for them to hold their position.

But this pattern of colonial division of labor between the Dutch, the Chinese, and the native rulers began to weaken with the progress of Dutch liberalism. Now ensuing was a major historical discontinuity in the Dutch colonial policy. As Dutch ventures in Indonesia accumulated more and more capital and as their colonial regime acquired more and more confidence, the Dutch began to feel the redundancy of collaboration with the Chinese and the native rulers. In 1900, they stopped granting the Chinese opium and pawnshop monopolies. Earlier, in 1867, they already disallowed the
practice of remunerating native officials with appanages, which Van den Bosch had crucially revived in the wake of his Forced Cultivation. Thenceforth the native officials lived on the salaries from the government.

In like manner, the Dutch put an end to the traditional rights of the Javanese rulers to be served in various forms and occasions by the peasantry. The infamous pantjen-diensten was declared illegal in 1882. Other practices such as compulsory deliveries of rice at lopsided prices; involuntary services to the administration; percentages on cultures; regents' pomp and costly ceremonies exacted upon the peasantry to maintain their traditional prestige were all checked or wiped out by the strong current of liberalism in the administration. (71) All this marked the process of "de-feudalization."

To higher native officials, this defeudalization was experienced as their general humiliation. With the support of the Dutch capitalists and liberals, the colonial government gradually moved away from the principle of indirect rule. This means that the Dutch no longer needed the preservation of the symbolic function of bupatis as the ruler of their own people. Ronggowarsito's Serat Kalatida was but one expression of this lost of authority in the late nineteenth century. Rather than being treated as native heads, the bupatis were now transformed into mere civil servants. If in the good old days, they ranked equal
to Dutch residents, now they were treated as lower than Dutch assistant residents. The anguish this experience imparted upon the native rulers was depicted, among others, by the celebrated Javanese princess Kartini.(72)

But those changes constitute only a minor aspect of a much greater transformation in the Dutch colonial policy and practices during the first decades of the 20th century. As the Netherlands became firmly industrialized, the interests of the Dutch capitalists also changed. Cultivation of profitable crops, such as coffee, sugar, tea, and tobacco was no longer expected of the colony. "[Far] more important was the supply of raw materials they offered to Western industry."(73) The period of the primacy of Java as an exploitatiegebied in the country was now rapidly challenged by major economic opportunities in the Outer Islands. Here the richness of Indonesia's mineral deposit such as oil, tin, bauxite, and coal now had a stronger temptation.(74)

The open door policy of 1870 had been there to greet this economic transformation. Now all is needed was the pacification and enhancement of administrative efficiency throughout the archipelago. Hence the escalation of the Aceh War, which lasted more than thirty years and devoured over f.400 million and a great toll of lives.(75) Subsequently, we find the policy of decentralization, which actually means spreading and distributing governmental
responsibilities to facilitate for the surge in economic activities.

The influx of new investment and new administrative positions was followed by an unprecedented inflow of Europeans to fill the best part of employment opportunities. The stigma attached to "the East" was disappearing in the metropolis. In the earlier times Dutch immigrants into the East Indies consisted mostly of a rather defective stock in their own country. Now "men of all ranks of society began to look upon Indonesia in the same way as upon nineteenth-century America."(76)

The building up of administrative efficiency also meant the multiplication of government employees, which in turn resulted in a sharp increase in government expenditures for salaries. These expenditures soared from 37,000,000 florins in 1900 to 224,000,000 in 1928.(77) With this new policy, a clearer substitution of the principle of direct for the indirect rule took place.

Unlike the cases of other colonized countries in South and Southeast Asia early this century, Indonesia during this period seems to be overwhelmingly administered by the Europeans. In this respect, Indonesia's colonial administration was probably the worst in the region. With her proud bureaucratic tradition, Vietnam, for instance, did not experience as much encroachment in the form of Gallicized personnel.(78) The same is true with the
Philippines and British India. If the Philippines went through a rapid decrease in the number of American administrators during the first three decades of our century, Indonesia experienced a multiplication of Dutch civil servants in the higher positions.

Within the vast British India, there was a restricted number of Britons in the business of native governance. Whereas the Dutch allowed only a little over 2 percent of Indonesians to fill the higher posts of administration, in the entire British India there were 1750 Indians to share with the 3500 British in equivalent positions. These figures indicate that the Dutch East Indies government lured in some nine times as many European civil servants as the Indian government.

Analogous to the development within the Chinese community, Dutchmen who saw the Indies as a temporary dwelling (i.e., trekkers) outnumbered those who already regarded the land as their own country and were ready to assimilate with the Indonesians (i.e., blijvers). Again just like their Chinese counterpart, it was the trekkers' social, cultural, and ideological paradigm which were the more dominant.

The most outrageous part of the Dutch administrative policy, however, lies in the fact that the 9 percent of the Netherlanders (out of the total 212,386 government employees in 1928) received over 40 percent of the total
government salaries (224,000,000 florins). This was not including the 25,000,000 florins they obtained for furloughs and pensions. (82) The figures clearly indicate the dual, highly asymmetric, salary system—a system overtly based on racial-colonial discrimination.

The tremendous increase of expenditure by the colonial administration was not paid for by the Netherlands home treasury. Instead it was borne by the Indonesians through the increased taxation. Three-fourths of the tax revenue during this period came from them. (83) The positive impact of the abolition of the Forced Cultivation was soon offset by the widespread indebtedness among the natives. (84)

Accordingly, the third decade of the 20th century witnessed a completely different colonial setting. The native rulers receded to the background. Following the rise of Kuomintang in China, the Chinese society in Indonesia, the newly arrived hoakiauw in particular, became more organized and more distinct. They were not reluctant to show their "hauteur and political aggressiveness" in their contact with Indonesians, (85) while the peranakan sections of it faced a strong tide of resinification. The entire Chinese community fell more and more under the totok leadership. (86)

Getting more numerous as it was, the Dutch community in the East Indies also became increasingly exclusive. In the cities, Dutch or European cultural associations were
mushrooming, to which the larger Indonesian society were denied access. With the increasing visibility of Dutch administrators in the urban and rural areas; with the numerous implantations of European cultural institutions; with the similarly deep penetration of Western corporations; and with the much improved communication between the Netherlands and Indonesia as well as within the colony proper, Indonesia during the last decades of Dutch rule "became in a certain sense more colonial in nature, rather than less."(87)

The Indonesian population in the period of 1880-1930 grew by 109 percent, whereas that of the Foreign Orientals (mostly Chinese) and Europeans increased by 189 and 473 percent respectively.(88) This in part questions the traditional notion that the Indonesians procreate more than they produce. Such questioning is bound to arise even when we grant that population increase among non-Indonesians were largely due to immigration. The non-Indonesians were productive because remunerative jobs provided by the colonial scheme were already waiting for them even before they arrived. The vacuity of the notion becomes clear if we take into consideration that it was above all the colonial structure which had strangled the native economy.

As the economic polarization between the Europeans with the Chinese and the Indonesians became increasingly acute, a sharp awareness began to creep into the hearts of
many Indonesians that their interests in general were incompatible with the colonial structure.

The realities of exploitive colonialism had never been so fully exposed and so deeply felt. Aversion and bitterness were now widespread. Sons of the nobility and high priyayis ceased to dream of official careers. Those having acquired Western education painfully realized their position as the underprivileged in their own land.

The miniscule class of Indonesian entrepreneurs and merchants had long learned to develop a feeling of animosity against the many colonial restrictions and discriminating rules. The majority of the peasantry and other segments of the people of the poorer means, all comprised roughly eighty percent of the total Indonesian populace, increasingly felt the burden of the numerous kinds of irrational taxation. To the great bulk of Indonesian society, therefore, the last two decades of the Dutch colonial rule had brought them to the limits of their tolerance.

Nonetheless, we should be mindful of the possibility that all this does not so much imply an increase in the grimness of exploitation (89) as compared to the first two periods of Dutch colonization. Rather, it implies that the milking of the country became more "rationalized" and the profit the Dutch gained therefrom far outweighed the benefit it brought to the Indonesian people. It also implies
the now unrestrained cultural penetration into the Indonesian soil, which hitherto the Dutch carefully suppressed for their prudential policy of indirect rule.

This reminds us of the same phenomenon observed decades later by Frantz Fanon and Albert Memmi in Algiers. The starkness of this material and cultural deprivation stood bare before the eyes of the Indonesians as they compared their own conditions with that enjoyed by the Europeans and Chinese communities. As more and more unfamiliar things paraded by the Europeans and the Chinese, the Indonesians began to feel the urgency of the situation. The loss of their material world was exacerbated by the loss of their meaningful world. Put differently, they began to sense their total alienation in their own land.

This complex evolvement of colonial economy brought about several important consequences, which were highly contributive to the subsequent development in the country's politics. First of all was the further destruction of Indonesian middle class, or, more precisely, the destruction and/or retardation of the trading segments of the Indonesian society, irrespective of the shaky signs of growth particularly in the Outer Provinces.

Secondly, unlike the case of British India, Indonesia's economy did not develop what Samir Amin calls "an 'integrating' effect," in spite of the fact that administrative unification occurred in both countries. If
differences in economic practices increasingly gave way to a nationally integrated economy in British India, in colonial Indonesia inter-sectoral exchanges were only of minor importance. The principal exchanges took place with the outside world.

Thus a curious contrast between the colonial and precolonial economy emerged in Indonesia. If in the precolonial period there seemed to be more economic than political integration between the disparate islands, toward the end of the colonial period the reverse was the case: there was more political integration than that of the economy. In Indonesian economy proper, no bourgeoisie was remotely in the making.

The third consequence which engendered a lasting impact on the general political evolvement in the country was the almost total absence of industrialization. Workers who only had their labor to sell were mushrooming both in the rural and urban areas. But those working in the petty factories existing here and there were insignificant, just as insignificant as the local factories themselves. Most of them were employees in the government railway system or pawnshops. The landless peasants usually lived in rural, agriculturally involuted, areas or joined the army of the unemployed in the similarly involuted and squalid economy in the cities. Hence the multiplication of subsistence
occupations such as becak drivers, artisans and food vendors of various kinds, or plain household servants.

Here again an interesting comparison with British India is in order. If in the British colony a section of the indigenous party was made a class of bourgeoisie, in the East India virtually the entire people of the land were "proletarianized."

The fourth consequence playing a major role in the future of Indonesian politics is the levelling down of Indonesian social stratifications. Until 1932 the Chinese immigrants were hardly part of the Indonesian society proper. From the latter half of the 19th century, the Chinese were the only middle class developing in the country.

All Indonesians, with the exception of a tiny native corps in the colonial bureaucracy, were included in the fragmented lower class of the urban proletariat, poor and landless peasants, petty retailers, peddlers, low repair workers of various kinds, small businessmen and artisans, and the countless of the fully or partly unemployed both in the villages and in the cities. The native corps of the colonial bureaucracy actually constituted a pseudo middle-class--being merely middle in income but, because of their dependence on the colonial treasury, procured no active capital of their own.
Finally, the impoverishment of the nation as a whole had not only multiplied the number of landless peasants and the army of the unemployed; it had also reached such a proportion that the economic and cultural antagonisms between the colonizer and the colonized had already crystallized and threatened to explode any time. Here then is an instance of what Lewis Feuer refers to as "psycho-economic" facts so crucial "for decisions in historical crises."(90) All these consequences later ramified into political activities which further complicated the social, economic, and political evolvement in the country.
PART THREE

THE MAKING OF AN EGALITARIAN NATIONALISM
What distinguishes political movements in the East Indies was the fact that their social bases were not strong enough to sustain their politics. With all economic resources and opportunities squeezed by the Dutch for the sake of the Netherlands, not a single social class emerged as a dominant force—not the proletariat, not the peasantry, not the prospective middle class. Thus the word rakyat in the Indies strongly connotes to the impoverished and marginalized people in general.

The neglect of industrialization by the Dutch in the colony was similarly consequential. With the Indonesian mercantile class wiped out, the Dutch were able to direct all the capital and forces accumulated from and gathered in the colony to perpetuate their exploitive scheme.

All this had left the country with a very weak class of farmers, an extremely small class of regularly employed laborers, and practically without a middle-class of its own. The majority of Indonesian farmers were forced to live at a subsistence level. They were scattered in disconnected pockets in the periphery of big Dutch plantations and estates. What the Indonesian communists tended to treat as proletariat were by and large not factory workers (1) as
was the case in the West or even in Russia before the October Revolution. (2) The majority of them were only pseudo-proletariat.

The levelling down of the economic positions of Indonesians was not preceded by the transformation of the mode of production. Absent was the forceful plunging of the laborers into the invariant material condition of the drab, unhygienic, and absorbing factories typical of the incipient capitalism. As we have observed in Chapter I, Marx's \textit{primitive accumulation} did not quite occur in colonial Indonesia. Those working in the Dutch plantations usually had their own tiny plots of land to cultivate during their off or spare times. In rural Java, the peasantry usually had their turn to cultivate their tiny plots during the plantations' off seasons.

The Dutch deliberately left the Indonesian farmers and workers with some economic leftovers. With this, the latter were expected to reproduce their labor in the mire of the backward, centuries-old "Asiatic mode of production." In that way, their labor could be used gratis again and again by the Dutch in their plantations, estates, and mines.

The consequence is that only the colonial, modern, foreign sector of the economy grew and was well integrated, not with the colony but with the metropolis. The thriving economy was decidedly \textit{other-centered}. The rest, which belonged to the Indonesians proper, was left involuted,
shattered, localized, in its homogeneously miniscule forms. They were impoverished in the wealth-producing colony. The weakness, disintegration, and peripheral position of the Indonesian economy directly determined the character of Indonesian pergerakan (political movements) and was well reflected in their programs and practices as well as in the kinds of ideologies they championed. (3)

Budi Utomo

The 1908 statutes of Budi Utomo adopted in its first congress in Yogyakarta explicitly suggests that it intends to promote "the harmonious development of the land and of peoples of Java and Madura," (4) not the entire East Indies. It also mentions that the movement's programme will cover

a) the interest of education in the broadest sense; b) improvement of agriculture, cattle raising, and commerce; c) the development of techniques and industry; d) the revival of native arts and tradition; e) the upholding of universal human ideas, f) anything beyond this that might contribute to promoting the welfare of the nation. (5)

In those statutes a number of things can be disclosed. At one level of reading, we can discern the absence of economic, political, and cultural integration of the land as far as the East Indies people are concerned. Hence "the revival of native arts and tradition." The same is true with the absence of capital, growth, skill, and specific
concentration of economic efforts. The inclusion of "the interest of education in the broadest sense" and "the upholding of universal human ideas" was intended to extol the cardinal principle of liberalism and, therefore, to please all parties involved and the larger audience. (6)

At another level, however, we can already see the pushing aside of younger and more progressive members of the pergerakan as represented by the Mangoenkoesoemos (Tjipto and Goenawan), Soerjodipoetro and Soewarno, mostly of the Betawi Chapter of Budi Utomo. (7) The listing of so many big projects without specification as to priority should be read as a blurring—and thence a refusal—of the more focused programme desired by the younger or lesser priyayis.

Soewarno, for instance, did not want Budi Utomo to privilege only the Javanese. Tjipto was against the promotion of Javanese arts and culture. In his eyes, they were the "exclusive possessions of the princely courts, totally alien to the common people." (8) Like his brother, Goenawan, Tjipto dreamed of Budi Utomo as primarily an agent for the enhancement of villagers' education, not that of priyayis. They wanted "education from below." As Goenawan put it, "Our task is in the countryside." (9)

But this position of the Betawi chapter had to buckle under the pressure of the Yogyakarta chapter led by Wahidin Soedirohoseodo, the veridical inspirer of the
At variance with Tjipto MangoenKoesoemo, he was an inveterate advocate of Indic Javanism. He believed in the greatness of Javanese culture and in the importance of maintaining the caste of priyayi (upper class Javanese) and of kromo (lower-class Javanese), claimed to be a modified version of the social stratification of Ancient India. His domination of the early years of Budi Utomo imparted into the pergerakan the idea of Javanese traditionalism.

Soon this was to emerge in the form of Javanese nationalism, which was manifest in an article written by Soeriokoesoemo. He contends that "Budi Utomo...desperately intended to preserve its own individuality," (12) and that Javanese nationalism is "geen idee fixe"; it is "the form of existence cherished by the Javanese for their self-expression."(13) It springs from the consciousness of what Noto Soeroto calls the oldest, the largest, and the most civilized member of the Malay-Polynesian race.(14)

The blurring of the programme can be seen as something deliberate, as another practice of priyayi's indirection. As much as it hid the priyayis' craving for "a nation of dignity,"(15) it betrayed the reality that the statutes did not really take most of the programme seriously. It should not be a surprise if during the entire life of Budi Utomo nothing substantial was ever carried out with programs a), b), c), e), and f). Even the word "native" and "nation" in
programs d) and f) exclusively privileged the ideology of bureaucratic priyayis rather than that represented by the professional priyayis like Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo.

The colonial suffocation of political activities had obstructed much of the political drive of Budi Utomo. Until 1917, as it reached ten years of age, the programme remained largely at the level of rhetoric. In the field of education, it scarcely reached beyond the talk about how to provide studie fonds for its members wanting to study in the Netherlands. Part of the reason was the rise of Muhammadiyah, which eclipsed Budi Utomo in the field of native education. Where it went to the level of political actions, Budi Utomo was generally oriented to maintaining the status quo in the interests of the elite membership in it.

This effort to maintain the status quo was noticeable during the widespread discussion of Indie Weerbaar in the years prior to the outbreak of World War I. The issue was first raised in 1914 among the leaders of Budi Utomo, possibly through a covert suggestion by Dutch officials. According to McVey, it was actually a Dutch project resulting from fear of Japanese or Australian invasion.

Most of the native parties had at best a lukewarm attitude to or a divided opinion of the prospect of native militia. By contrast, Budi Utomo showed its enthusiasm and full support. It initiated a serious campaign for it
and sent Dwidjosewojo and Sastrowidjono, two of its prominent members, on "canvassing tours" to seek support for the plan throughout Java. (21) The leaders of Budi Utomo even began talking about establishing a committee for native conscription to carry out the plan.

While this issue of Indie Weerbaar certainly increased the "credibility" of Budi Utomo in the eyes of the government, it exposed to the rest of pergerakans the general character of the movement and drew sardonic criticisms from them.

How did the Board of Directors of the Budi Utomo conceive its demand for militia duty? In the name of the people? The Budi Utomo, with a couple of thousand members, is still too small to speak in the name of the Javanese people... (22)

There were other indications telling the closeness of Budi Utomo to the central government in Batavia. For one thing, the election of the party's first chairman was preceded by an intensive consultations with the government. (23) For another, the more progressive and critical leaders hardly had any say in the organization.

Within the government circles there was a talk about programming Budi Utomo to curb the excessive prestige and pomp of the higher priyayis or to make the party a government partner in the opium control. The same circles also contemplated about transforming the party into a government advisory body to help the people with technical
and agricultural instructions. Other authorities wanted to see the party serve as people's spokesman. All this illustrates the conspicuous favor that Budi Utomo enjoyed from the colonial government. Thus in a real sense, the organization "had been acting as a quasi-governmental party." (25)

As from 1918, however, Budi Utomo seemed to undergo a significant change. That year it joined the other parties, that of Indonesians and Dutch progressives, to establish the so-called Radical Concentration in the Volksraad. The concentration asked for further concessions toward self-rule. (26) It forced the government to establish the Reform Commission to contemplate on changes in the political constitution of the colony. (27) This commotion in the Volksraad and in the higher executive was effected by the threat of a socialist revolution under Troelstra in the Netherlands.

With the new leadership of Raden Soetopo, Budi Utomo voted narrowly in 1919 to get involved more in the life of the common people. (28) Again in 1921 Budi Utomo, Centraal Sarekat Islam (CSI), and several labor unions formed Komite Meneguhkan Keberanian Pergerakan (Committee for Strengthening the Spirit of the Movement) in Yogyakarta to join their endeavors together and support those having problems with the authorities. (29)
But this shift to the left turned out to be momentary. The movement toward the masses was soon reversed on the pretext that radical leanings had disturbed the Indonesian life. (30) The truth, however, is Budi Utomo had never attracted the people in general (31) and remained a party laden with the interests of the Javanese higher bureaucracy. Irrespective of its efforts to go to the people, it remained what Pringgodigdo calls an association for the upper class with very little drive toward political liberation among its supporters. (32) Accordingly, its participation in the first Radical Concentration was broken in 1920 with a pledge of "loyalty to the Government." (33)

In 1922, Budi Utomo again entered the second Radical Concentration and veered into the direction of non-cooperation with the government only to reclaim its moderate course a year later. Even Van Niel was not hesitant of contending that the party's political activity was uncertain and that its political actions and programme were apparently dictated by immediate interests, always moving "in the direction that seemed most expedient." (34)

If Budi Utomo looked toward the examples of the Indian National Congress, (35) it never had the latter's combination of moderation with courage. Neither did they show direct actions in matters of daily politics and steadfastness in matters of ultimate goals. Worse, their alleged concern for the suffering of the general populace was at
best suspect. Such a concern was shown only by figures like Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and Soerjodipoetro, who had all been ousted in the first years of the pergerakan.

**Sarekat Islam**

In many respects, Sarekat Islam was a party sharply different from Budi Utomo. Prior to its movement from Surakarta to Surabaya in 1912, the organization still based its struggle in a rather narrow religious platform and called itself *Sarekat Dagang Islam* (Islamic Trade Association). It was against the encroachment of the Chinese into the traditional sectors of Javanese economy, which previously constituted the preserves of Javanese Muslim entrepreneurs.

The spread of Christianity in some circles of the East Indies society was also looked upon by Sarekat Dagang Islam with apprehension. The syncretic practices of Islam in the areas of Surakarta and Yogyakarta were likewise regarded by the rising tide of Islamic orthodoxy among the Muslim community as an abomination to Islam. As Tjokroaminoto took over the leadership of the new organization, he discarded its commercial label and decided to promote the social and economic conditions of the Indonesian people. Soon *Sarekat Islam* became the first pergerakan which was fully open to the participation of the *rakyat*.

In less than five years, Sarekat Islam became a genuine mass political movement. Unlike Budi Utomo, the
movement was supported by the most heterogeneous components of the East Indies society. Having Islam as their common bond, educated youth, religious teachers, small businessmen, peasants, and workers (38) all flocked into the fold of the new party. By 1916, Sarekat Islam already had "hundreds of thousand members and was far and away the giant among the Indonesian movements."(39) Bernhard Dahm indicates that in 1912, the pergerakan had only 4,500 members in Java, but by 1918 it had reached 450,099, including 60,689 from outside Java.(40)

If Budi Utomo couched its programme in a cloaked manner to conceal its character as a means to promote Javanese traditionalism, Sarekat Islam stated very clearly that it stood for Islam and struggled for the Indonesian Muslims as a community of economy and of faith. The worldly spirit of Reform Islam was likewise indelible in the movement. This is well reflected in its four-point programme:

a) promoting commerce among Indonesians; b) mutual support of members who encounter economic difficulties; c) promotion of the intellectual development and material interests of the Indonesians; and d) opposition to wrong religious concepts concerning the Mohammedan religion, and promotion of religious life among Indonesians.(41)

The widespread appeal of Sarekat Islam did not nullify the fact that it was first and foremost an Islamic fraternity. Not only was the Islamic theme always present
throughout its existence; the theme retained its dominant position even as its leaders appropriated now and then the discourses of Liberalism, Socialism or Communism. David Steinberg et al. miss this point when they hold that Sarekat Islam had not professed any single identity.(42)

In his narrative about the rise of Indonesian nationalism, Kahin maintains that Islam "was not just a common bond; it was, indeed, a sort of in-group symbol as against an alien intruder and oppressor of a different religion."(43) Pringgodigdo corroborates Kahin's observation. He sees Islam as an "overwhelming flood" determined to emancipate the living condition of the impoverished people.(44) In short, Islam was simultaneously viewed as something internalized and as a common denominator. Orang Selam (Muslims) was then synonymous with bumiputra or the natives of the Indies in general.(45)

The colonial government sensed a reason for alarm right from the birth of the pergerakan. Sarekat Islam was deemed capable of taking over a number of important administrative functions normally under colonial jurisdiction. Frightened by such a prospect, the authorities were neither willing nor ready to see the formation of a party with as strong appeal to the masses.(46) This concern was well justified since Sarekat Islam really responded to the rakyat's sensibilities. It won the sympathy of the people
because of their allegiance to Islam and because Sarekat Islam set on to rectify political oppressions and economic exploitations inflicted upon them by the colonial regime.

The rakyat, particularly in the villages, saw the rise of Sarekat Islam as a herald for the coming of Ratu Adil (the Just King). Still the "meteoric" rise of Sarekat Islam should not be judged solely through the mystification of the millennial belief of the rakyat. (47) Traditionally, such a belief became widespread in Java's countryside only every time the oppression of the rakyat had become unbearable. (48) It cannot be explained as stemming from people's irrationality. Neither has it something to do with religious heterodoxy. (49) It is more a function of the nascent symbolic solidarity when the people experienced the limits of their privation.

Of equal importance in attracting not only great number of followers but also people from various ideological inclinations was the charismatic figure and broad intellectual makeup of Tjokroaminoto. He could speak as staunchly communist as he was devoutly Muslim and his extraordinary power of oratory was capable of attracting throngs of people in most of the rallies held by Sarekat Islam.

With the concurrent conditions pulling the rakyat together, the authorities deemed it impossible to declare the movement illegal without somehow endangering the Dutch
colonial policy of rust en orde. Still Governor General Idenburg found an astute solution to the new challenge. He allowed Sarekat Islam to exist at local levels only. It was denied becoming a single corporate whole (rechtspersoon) comprising the entire archipelago as one organization. The pergerakan was refused a national legal entity because the many thousand people flocking in it were considered by the government as of the "least developed class of the people."(50)

As such the colonial regime was taking an ingenious version of the divide-and-rule policy to preclude the emergence of a concerted, nation-wide political movement, which might well endanger its security. The government did not have to use such a measure against Budi Utomo. Now all Sarekat Islam could do was to distinguish the locus of its leadership from its 50 "branches" throughout Indonesia. In 1915, the party decided to establish Centraal Sarekat Islam (CSI) in Surabaya, whereas the branches were then called local SIs.

But it turned out that this legal fragmentation of Sarekat Islam was only partly responsible for the seemingly endless obstructions in the life of the party. Almost from its inception, local SIs had already suffered from various slanders and libels forged mostly by local government officials. These officials, native or Dutch, ceaselessly
tried to obstruct the movement of the pergerakan in any conceivable way. (51)

But one of the main sources of the difficulties could be located elsewhere. It lay in the contention between the more Islamic oriented CSI and the more communist-inclined Semarang SI, the so-called "bloc within." Semarang SI, for instance, stood against the participation of Sarekat Islam in the Volksraad.

On the issue of Indie Weerbaar the two leading centers of Sarekat Islam again disagreed. Under the influence of Abdoel Moeis, CSI was in favor of supporting it. Unlike Budi Utomo whose support of the plan for native militia was largely motivated by a sense of duty to the metropolis, Sarekat Islam saw the positive things it might entail for the Indies people. It presupposed "economic progress, and intellectual advancement as well as spiritual maturity." (52) Moeis's move, however, was vehemently opposed by the Semarang-SI.

Tjokroaminoto wisely checked this breach in policy by raising the more central issue related to it. He disclosed the incongruity between all the commotion concerning a native militia to defend the colony and the lack of people's representation in the government bodies. Contrary to what many had expected, he shrewdly called off the party's support of the plan until people's representation (volksvertegenwoordiging) was first guaranteed. (53)
Nonetheless, it should be maintained that until 1921 the tension between the communist and the Islamic factions of Sarekat Islam was more dynamic than destructive. Here again lies another difference between Sarekat Islam and Budi Utomo.

Budi Utomo moved to the left only as it saw signs of relaxation in the government's political control or when the opposition against the government appeared to be insurmountable. By contrast, Sarekat Islam consistently worked in close cooperation with the radicals in ISDV under the influence of Sneevliet. It did not only move farther and farther left. Inside its body the communist elements were taking over the momentum of the movement.

Sarekat Islam was also the first East Indies movement to organize the East Indies peasants and labor unions on an extensive scale. It is true that the tension between the more communist and the more Islamic in Sarekat Islam was always there. But the leadership of the party remained under the firm control of the Islamic faction embodied in the person of Hadji Agoes Salim. Besides, both wings realized that cutting one of the wings off would inevitably incapacitate the whole of the pergerakan.

Probably one of the most interesting statements molding the communist and Islamic principles was that drawn up by Semaoen and Hadji Agoes Salim and adopted as the party's
programme just before the SI national convention in March 1921:

In all [its] policies and aspirations the Sarekat Islam is inspired by the principles and precepts of Islam: a) Regarding state power, there must be a people's government, with right to appoint and discharge officials in the common interests.

b) Regarding management of the various types of labor, councils must be formed composed of the leaders of these groups of workers who will direct them at their tasks.

c) Regarding production and the seeking of a living, every person must work with all his strength and heart, but in no [way] may he appropriate for himself the fruit of another's labor; which requirement can be met at present by returning the wealth and property used for production to the common ownership of the people.

d) Regarding the division of the fruits of toil, Islam forbids anyone from hoarding these for himself, requiring instead that the common interest be served by using the results of all labor to further the goal of human equality. It is felt this can be achieved only if the distribution of products and profits is in the hands of popular representative assembly.(54)

This statement of principles was not simply socialist rhetoric on the part of the Muslim faction. Not only was there sincerity in the wordings, it was also in full accord with the Islamic principle of justice in so far as people's economic conditions were concerned.

The most consistent feature of Sarekat Islam was its siding with the rakyat. The 1920 "back to ngoko" campaign urging the Javanese to use ngoko in opposition to krama we deal with in Chapter II was also initiated by Sarekat
Islam. (55) Known as Gerakan Jawa Dipa, the purpose of the campaign was to inculcate the spirit of self-confidence, solidarity, and egalitarianism among the rakyat as much as to fight against paralyzing feudalism in Java. (56) Perhaps the "back to ngoko" movement only stopped as its advocates saw that its message was better taken care of by the exuberant rise of Bahasa Indonesia.

Tjokroaminoto wrote in Islam dan Sosialisme three years later (1924) that exploiting the workers, denying them proportionate profit due their toil on the cultivated crops, and extorting surplus value were all against the teaching of Islam. (57)

Sarekat Islam was not alone in its anti-capitalist struggle and in its veering into the Muslim-Communist path. Genuine Islamic communists were not lacking throughout the Indonesian pergerakans, in particular during the 1920s. Haji Muhammad Misbach in Surakarta (Central Java), Datuk Batuah in West Sumatra, and Ibrahim Mulla (58) in Makassar (Celebes) were champions of the creed. Misbach was likened to a "tiger" in attacking "those people who claimed to be [good] Muslims, yet attach more importance to amassing wealth than helping the Rakyat in their distress...." (59)

The colonial government considered Misbach particularly dangerous. His explicit conviction of Islam as congruent with the struggle of Communism was characterized by a rare combination of courage, a sense of mission and solidarity
in dealing particularly with the villagers. He insisted that the true mission of Islam was to correct economic inequalities and colonial corruptions.

Soon he found a perfect companion in the person of an equally relentless fighter for the poor villagers, Tjipto Mangoenkesoemo. Struggling side by side, Misbach and Mangoenkesoemo formed a great pair of justice fighters in the villages of Surakarta. Indeed, many of the peasants' strikes (mogok) and nggogol (61) in the area during the years of 1918-1920 were directly related to their activities.

Likewise, and almost contemporaneously, the West Sumatra Muslim communists also opted vigorously for the path of Muslim Communism in the Indies:

Let no one speak ill of the communists, for whosoever does that is a kafir, an unbeliever. There are, after all, four ways in which a man may invalidate his being Moslem: a) by doing a thing of which he has no knowledge, b) by not doing a thing of which he has knowledge, c) by, lacking knowledge, being unwilling to learn from those who know, d) by speaking ill of those who do right.

...The communists wish to do right but are prevented from so doing by the capitalists. Whoever does not join the communists and whoever speaks ill of them are themselves capitalists.(62)

Unfortunately, Salim-Semaoen's statement was nothing but a last flickering of SI-Communist cooperation. Shortly after, the resolution by Moeis and Salim to impose a party discipline against the communist members of Sarekat Islam
in the party's National Congress of 1921 was accepted. But as discussed in Chapter IV, the contention between those who believed Islam as the principal basis of the pergerakan and those who put primary emphasis upon Communism had begun when Sneevliet decided to infiltrate Sarekat Islam. Dahm maintains that "the infidel revolutionaries had tried in vain to undermine Islam and the place of Allah."(63)

The contention went for the worse when Darsono accused Tjokroaminoto of swindling SI membership dues. This was the Achilles' heel not only of Sarekat Islam, but virtually of the entire pergerakans of that period, including that of the communists.(64) Lacking proof to support his charge, Darsono had to apologize.

But the credibility of SI leadership was already tainted. Tjokroaminoto resented Darsono's move as "a stab in the back."(65) It was indeed a blunder on the part of the communists. As will be disclosed in Chapter VII, the communists needed Sarekat Islam more than the other way around. Tjokroaminoto had been the only figure capable of molding the two wings into a concerted pergerakan. Attacking Tjokroaminoto, therefore, means very much attacking the communists' own strategy.

With the accumulated resentment of each other, the accusation marked the beginning of the decisive schism among
the most advanced revolutionary elements in the Indonesian pergerakan. In spite of the communists' personal attack against him, Tjokroaminoto was still struggling to maintain the unity between the Islamic and the communist factions. But circumstances had been bad for him. The decision to expel the communists out of Sarekat Islam was done in his absence. (66) The result was an irreversible decline of Indonesian pergerakans in general. It was not to recover even under the imposing figure of Sukarno.

The farther and farther movement of Sarekat Islam to the left is probably best reflected in the Volksraad. In 1916, it launched the slogan "with the Government to help the Government"; in 1917, it demanded self-government (zelfbestuur) for Indonesia; in 1918, it still strived to increase the weight of the Volksraad in order to function as a genuine people's representation, elected by and answerable to the people. (67) Yet already by that year, at its Third National Congress in Surabaya, Sarekat Islam declared its opposition against the government in so far as the latter protected "sinful capitalism." It also harshly attacked the Indonesian corps of the colonial bureaucracy as "an instrument, supporters of the capitalist interests." (68)

But, as narrated penetratingly by Sartono Kartodirdjo, the more tangible impact of Sarekat Islam as a genuine pergerakan was probably found at the local level with the
village populace. For centuries, the peasantry had been the most intensively exploited people in the land. The social groups with whom they had the most frequent contact—the native bureaucracy (priyayis) and the Chinese—were the very colonial agents that brought about most of their sufferings. With but a modicum of formal education and with so scanty a means at their disposal, they were unable to voice their political and economic yearnings, still less to see them into action.

In people's mind, Sarekat Islam was the first organization of fellow countrymen to serve as a true ally. In the words of Kartodirdjo, it provides the peasants with "the means of actualizing their potential force through its ideology, leadership, organization and symbols."(69)

Having socio-economic reforms as the priority of its programme, sticking to a "goal-oriented outlook," and strongly imbued with the spirit of mutual-help between its members who called each other sudara (brother), Sarekat Islam "made its own direct contribution to the restiveness of the agricultural population as a whole."(70)

The most common source of local disruptions had to do with the suffocation of peasants' economy. It happened when there were disagreements about the prices of particular commodities and about the amount of tjuke (taxes); about laborers' wage in the rice-fields; or about the proper places for cattle-grazing.
These causes of social unrests mostly pit the villagers against village retailers, land-owners, tax-collectors, or cattle-breeders all largely happened to be of Chinese ethnicity. Confrontations also took place between the villagers and the government officials concerning the length of time the villagers should serve in the task of classifying the land; over unfounded accusations against members of Sarekat Islam; over instances of wood-stealing by the relatives of the members; or over officials' secret support of Chinese organizations inimical to Sarekat Islam. \(^{(71)}\)

With all this evidence, we can argue that probably the most important contribution of Sarekat Islam was not to be found in its activities aiming at social welfare. In that respect, the party mostly failed. \(^{(72)}\) Rather, it lay in its effectiveness in changing the mentality of the Javanese villagers. From being "the most docile people on earth" as the Dutch used to dub them, they now rose with a new spirit of self-worth and self-confidence. Hence their newly acquired dynamics. Kartodirdjo describes that in establishing its own authority, Sarekat Islam "was moving away from a position of conciliation and restraint and was revealing itself as fundamentally revolutionary in character." \(^{(73)}\)

The relationship of Sarekat Islam with the government worsened irreversibly following an uprising in Toli-Toli (Central Celebes) and, subsequently, a revolt in Garut
(West Java) in 1919. In both incidents Sarekat Islam was seriously implicated. It is not clear whether or not CSI really orchestrated or even gave its consent to incite the incidents. What remains clear is the fact that such "wild actions" could very well occur within the organizational constraints of the divide-and-rule policy imposed upon Sarekat Islam by the government. With its denial to give the party the right to coordinate itself nationwide as a single corporate body, the government had already prevented the CSI from controlling the actions of local SIs. That constitutes the best fruit of the legal fragmentation of the party.

In 1923, Sarekat Islam left the Volksraad never to return. In the same year, the party also enacted its final purge of all the communist elements inside its body due to the inevitable strife for leadership between the communist and the Islamic wings two years later.

This purging of the communists did not imply that Sarekat Islam shifted to the right. It retained its stance of non-cooperation with the colonial government even after PKI was banned in 1926. Its drive as a rakyat's movement, however, was continuously undermined by internal dissensions and factionalism. The communists' slander against the leadership left a lasting impact. With all this, it never again captured the greatness it had had prior to the schism. On the other hand, the communists' access to the
great masses of the semi-proletariat, both in the urban and in the rural areas, had greatly diminished. The bitter development of a once so radiant pergerakan led by SI-Communist coalition is put tellingly by McVey:

The collapse of the alliance represented more than the end of a period for the Indonesian Communist Party. It marked a great and fatal schism in the Indonesian independence movement, which resulted in the retirement of the general populace from the political scene for the rest of the colonial period.... Clearly, the mass movement had fallen on evil times; but those on both sides who believed that discipline would give it momentum and direction were never more wrong.(74)

At this point, we can now sum up three important differences between Sarekat Islam and Budi Utomo in so far as political discourses and practices are concerned. First, Budi Utomo was characterized by its efforts to maintain the status quo or by its endless wavering in the scales of the colonial structure only to end up with a pledge of loyalty to the government. By contrast, Sarekat Islam increasingly took up a position against the colonial structure and brought itself all the farther left.

Second, while Budi Utomo intended to propagate Javanese nationalism, Sarekat Islam already privileged the bangsa (nation) of the Indies. Tjokroaminoto was among the first to use the name Indonesia.(75) The politicization of colonial antagonisms was also unmistakable in Sarekat
Islam. Thus while Budi Utomo was still dreaming of Great Java in association with the Kingdom of Netherlands, Sarekat Islam already nurtured the idea of an independent Indies as forming one "natie."

Finally, Budi Utomo strived to gain a secure position only for the Javanese upper class. At variance with Budi Utomo, Sarekat Islam had provided the rakyat—peasants, small traders/businessmen, and urban workers—with a movement to defend their interests against the centuries-old practices of colonial deprivation. In other words, Sarekat Islam had taken side with the rakyat and privileged its exploited bangsa.

But in terms of efforts to create a political cohesion to overcome the political discordance among the Indonesians both Budi Utomo and Sarekat Islam had been short. The emphasis of Budi Utomo on Javanese traditionalism and on bureaucratic career for its members made them exclude the majority of the Indies people. Likewise, Sarekat Islam's favor of the Indies Muslims made it marginalize non-Muslim minorities. This liability had inherently prevented both pergerakans from envisioning a common platform, a symbolic solidarity, as a prerequisite toward national liberation and toward an encompassing nationhood. Nonetheless, it is fairly warranted to maintain with Korver that Sarekat Islam was the closest intimation toward the unification of Indonesia.
VII

DISCOURSES AND PRACTICES:
THE EXEMPLARY FIGURES AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY

The evolution of Budi Utomo and Sarekat Islam were such that they can be conveniently analyzed as pergerakans. Their leaders could well be located in the movements they led. Yet a pergerakan could sometimes be traced better in leaders than in their organizations. The reason is that given the economic conditions of the Indies in which among the native a predominant economic group was not emerging, and given the rapid social changes occurring "nationally" and globally during this period, it is not always easy to address political discourses and practices along the lives of parties. Parties appeared and disappeared in a fast procession. There were also interesting mutations and permutations between them.

With the inconsistent and short-sighted character of the colonial administration, parties seldom lived more than a decade. The consequence was that political figures frequently loomed larger than the parties they led if for no other reason than the fact that the struggle of the former outlasted the lives of the latter. It is in this context that we have to talk about the ideas and actions of Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and Soewardi Soerjaningrat, two outspoken
members of the non-bureaucratic priyayis. Along with their Eurasian friend, E.F.E. Douwes Dekker, the great nephew of Multatuli, the first sparkle of "Indies nationalism" was ignited.

The Indies nationalism they advocated in 1912 was a dream of far broader fraternity. This included not only the natives, but all those who considered the Indies their homeland. For the first time the Dutch blijvers and the Chinese peranakan were provided with a common platform to belong to one nation with the natives. They called themselves "Indiers," and they fought for the freedom of the Indies. Their catchword was "Indies for Indiers."(1) True that by the 1920s the Dutch blijvers generally turned back to their European moorings and that too few Chinese entered their pergerakan. But the importance of the idea about how should the nation ideally be constituted exceeded the political messages of all other movements hitherto existing, including that of Budi Utomo and Sarekat Islam.

However, this idea of Indies nationalism was not accompanied by a genuine effort to work with the rakyat. It failed to find support from the masses, precisely because Insulinde remained by and large under the domination of the Eurasian, who, in J.S. Mill's words, did not really "feel with the people." To free their followers from such a Eurasian conservatism, Douwes Dekker founded Sarekat Hindia in
1919. But even this new association did not fare better. It died in 1923.

Insulinde initiated the advocacy of a grand, all-embracing, nationalism for the Indies. And yet if it is remembered at all, it is due to the inspiring ideas and actions launched by its "peripheral" leaders. Its headquarter in Semarang was virtually static and conservative. But its Surakarta branch managed to transform the party into a respectable pergerakan.

The Exemplary Figures

With the entrance into the arena of the courageous Haji Mohammad Misbach, former Sarekat Islam activist, Insulinde managed to introduce in the countryside some crucial ideas and actions similar to, but also different from, Sarekat Islam. Such a revolutionary struggle was carried on with vigor and distinction by Mangoenkoesoemo and Misbach from 1917 until 1919.

That period marks the peak years of over ten years (1912-1923) of pergerakans by the Indische Partij, Insulinde, Nationaal Indische Partij, Sarekat Hindia, and the local SI of Surakarta with which it coalesced. With these parties--or, more appropriately, local parties--we find some of Soerjaningrat's and Mangoenkoesoemo's original attacks on the established social order in the land.
In 1912, Douwes Dekker provoked the colonial society. He wrote an article which claimed that the Indies were for the Indonesians, Indos, and blijvers. (2) Again in 1913, he incurred the indignation of the Dutch rulers and conservatives when he drew on a vitriolic comparison between the Indies under the Dutch and the Netherlands under the French. Dekker's attack occurred just as the colonial authorities were preparing for the centennary celebration of Dutch independence. (3)

But a greater furor came from Soerjaningrat's caustic article "If I were a Dutchman" ("Als ik eens Nederlander was"). (4) It was a diatribe exposing the blunt irony of asking the people of the Indies to contribute money for and participate in celebrating the Dutch independence.

Posing himself alternately as a representative of the natives and of the Netherlanders, he sharply contrasted the antagonistic situations wherein the two peoples were located. Uncovered was the oxymoron of celebrating the independence of "a freedom-and-justice-loving people" in the very country whose people's freedom they trampled and whose people's cry for justice they suppressed. Soerjaningrat writes:

...What joy, what delight to be able to celebrate such an important national day! I wish I could temporarily be a Dutchman.... How joyful I would be in November on the much-awaited day, the day of the independence celebration. How merry my heart would be at seeing the tricolor flag with
the orange border. My voice would become hoarse from singing the song "Wilhelmus" and "Wien Neerland's bloed" when later the music starts....

But that is not so....

If I were a Dutchman at this moment, I would protest against the wish to have a celebration. I would write in every newspaper declaring that such an intention is wrong. I would warn all my fellow colonists about the danger in holding an independence celebration at this moment. I would advise all Dutchmen not to hurt the feelings of the people in the Indies who already have begun to have the courage to disobey us and who may in fact do so. Indeed, I would protest as hard as powers let me.

But...I am not a Dutchman. I am only a brown-colored person from the tropics, a native of Dutch colony, and because of that I will not protest.(5)

In this passage the Dutch topos is reversed. Soerjaningrat appropriates the code nationally glorified by the Dutch to attack their practices in the colony. More than reminding the Dutch of their self-conception as a staunch supporter of freedom and justice, he questioned their sense of honor. This concern for honor had long been inseparable from the ideal perception of Dutch social self. It was too rooted in their symbolic tradition to be ignored.

The political load of the article is comparable to Van Deventer's "A Debt of Honor." This, too, could not pass unheeded because it was likewise couched in the context of Dutch sense of honor. Multatuli wrote Max Havelaar also with this code in mind. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the author had sacrificed himself for the cause of
rectifying what he considered to be grave injustice done to the "Indiers."

Unlike Dekker, Soerjaningrat did not compare the Dutch rule in the Indies with that of French in the Netherlands. Instead, he opposed Dutch colonial practices with their own conceptions of right government or confronted such practices with their ideal conception of social self.

Soerjaningrat turned the table around by doing precisely what William, Prince of Orange, did to King Philip of Spain in the charter of the foundation of the University of Leyden in 1575. Holland was then the only province of the Low Countries capable of expelling the ruthless reign of Duke of Alba. In the charter, the astute prince took King Philip "at his own word," reminding him of his own pledge "to rule the Netherlands according to their laws," and referring him to his own self description "as a patient and merciful prince and loving father of his children."(6)

Soerjaningrat used the same trope. He said that being in fact a brown-colored native, he "will not protest." Protesting meant behaving insolently toward Her Majesty the Queen, the honorable queen, which should not happen. A subject of her colony must always be loyal to her.(7) Both William and Soerjaningrat had thus assumed the Anthony-against-Brutus locution. This implies the reiteration of the code of the adversary so as to expose its vacuity
and having for themselves a low-keyed posture before a made-up "benevolent ruler." By so doing they put the ruler to shame, just as what Mark Anthony did to Brutus. As such, both documents represent "a subtle rebuke to a perjured sovereign."(8)

This article had indeed caught the Dutch authorities off guard and prompted them to sentence Soerjaningrat, Douwes Dekker, and Mangoenkoesoemo to exile in the Netherlands. Upon their return, the three of them continued the radicalism of their movement.

Unlike Soerjaningrat, Mangoenkoesoemo was not an advocate of independence from the Netherlands. He did not conceive of political independence as a solution to the Indies' problems. The political stance of Mangoenkoesoemo, however, did not make him any less radical. As a matter of fact, his radicalism, in a sense, went even farther than that of most of his compatriots. He stated in 1912 that "the fundamental antithesis lies neither in East or West nor in Indiers and non-Indiers, but in domination and subordination in whatever forms."(9)

This statement represented the political belief of Mangoenkoesoemo. At the same time, it evinced the outline of his political struggle, which he held to the end. His active political career and his attacks in several directions stemmed from his awareness of the multiplicity of the sources of domination and subjection. His liberal
conviction and his uncompromising attitude toward anything hampering the people's road to progress had earned him an appointment by Governor-General Van Limburg Stirum in 1918 as one of the first members of the Volksraad. The appointment was perhaps prompted by the pressure of the Ethical movement in the Netherlands.

Mangoenkoesoemo first disclosed the domination-subjection problematic in his tract "The Cornerstone." Here he harked back to the traditional Javanese conception of Kawula-Gusti (Subject-King). This idea of statecraft enjoined the necessity of a harmonious and symbiotic relation between the ruler and the ruled for the former's glory and the latter's happiness. In that piece, Mangoenkoesoemo voiced his criticism against the Dutch Gusti for neglecting their duty as a ruler while taking the utmost advantage from the native Kawula. This the King did irrespective of the subject's loyalty, devotion and sacrifice for His sake. (10) The Dutch was, therefore, accused of forsaking their mission as Gusti.

Mangoenkoesoemo's solution to the distortion of the Kawula-Gusti dyad was interesting. Rather than trying to arouse the Dutch national sensibility as Soerjaningrat did, he unhesitantly called for "the spirit of resistance" from among his people and advanced the idea of "the organization of discontent." (11) But even with this move, he did not become xenophobic. "Please don't take this as an expression
of my antipathy for Dutch domination, for I would carry on
the same opposition if the Javanese ruled."(12) Indeed, his
strongest criticism went to his own people. In their lack
of "the spirit of resistance," he recognized the "malady."
Tjipto made it clear that the Javanese culture did not
allow criticism of the policies of a ruler and required
nothing but unconditional subjection to his/her view.(13)

Accordingly, his first program was to reinculcate into
his people's mind the long forgotten "spirit of resistance"
by showing them honorable examples out of their own past or
out of their own tradition. In his 1913 booklet Some
Remarks on the Javanese: Their History and Ethics, he
recalled the example given by Prince Diponegoro, who fought
valiantly and with great tenacity against the Dutch in the
Java War (1825-1830). Mangoenkoesoemo held that this the
prince did in order to overcome the moral deterioration of
the Javanese and to recover their honorable character.(14)

Here Mangoenkoesoemo and Soerjaningrat drew opposing
interpretations. Soerjaningrat saw Diponegoro's revolt as
the cause of the degeneration of the Javanese nobility.(15)
Mangoenkoesoemo, on the other hand, read it as an instance
of "a noble task to be carried out."(16) If the former
judged according to the result of the war, the latter
counted on the moral justification of the war irrespective
of the result. The war to Mangoenkoesoemo elicits the mes-
sage that "the Javanese really have a sound ethical
foundation on which they should be able to build."(17) Very much like Gandhi,(18) Mangoenkeesomo, commenting on the final destiny of Diponegoro, writes: "He failed, but I think that you, as well as I, should not judge anyone's work exclusively in terms of its success."(19) The important thing is never the immediate result, but the endless action toward an ultimate goal.(20)

Eleven years later, the year the Dutch had him exiled to the remote island of Banda, he still expressed the same conviction and optimism: "The divinity has placed difficulties in our path in order to exercise our powers, and thus to make us conscious of these powers hidden within us."(21)

Mangoenkeesomo's first attack was directed against the center of the Javanese feudal culture in Surakarta, the seats of what the Dutch called vorstenlanden (regions of kings or principalities)--Kasunanan (region of the Sunan) and Mangkunegaran (domain of Mangkunegara). In 1909, he offended the Sunan by riding his carriage in the palace square, in which by tradition only the carriages of the Sunan and his entourage were allowed.(22) Ten years later he resumed his anti-vorsten campaign in stronger terms through his party's periodical, Panggoegah, and through the Volksraad.

As we have discussed in Chapter II, Mangoenkeesomo detected the root cause (oer-oorzaak) of the Indies' misery
"deep in the heart of the 'rotten' and 'medieval' system of the vorstenlanden." (23)

...The Surakarta region lives beyond its means. It goes without saying that the two royal households there must prey upon the population; that they cannot sustain themselves without squeezing the people to the bone, without turning the taxation screws so tight that in the final analysis it is only thanks to the gentle nature of the Javanese that a movement of resistance by the population against their own nobility and government has not developed earlier. I mention the nobility and the government in one breath because they must be regarded [jointly] as the root cause of the abuse there.... (24)

Mangoenkoesoemo rightly saw the inordinate exploitation against the Indies people as directly related with the maintenance of these vorstenlanden by the Dutch. The ostentatious "pomp and ceremony" that they displayed from time to time was invariably paid for by the people in order to impart into the people's mind the feeling of awe and amazement. This was necessary to make the people ever more docile objects of exploitation. Hence Mangoenkoesoemo's objection to the perpetuation of the life of the vorstenlanden, "for in the end it is the little men in the village who has to 'keep alive' the king with his retinue of princes and half-princes, regents and half-regents..." (25)

The attacks by Mangoenkoesoemo both in Insulinde's Panggoegah and in the Volksraad were particularly forceful. They were based on first hand knowledge of the worsening condition of the peasants in the Surakarta villages of
Mangoenkoesoemo suggested in 1919 that the government pension off both heads of the vorstenlanden with an allowance of f.2,000 a month or return Madiun, a former appanage of the Kasunanan, to the Sunan so that the impoverishment of the people supporting the principality could be alleviated. (27)

Earlier that year, Mangoenkoesoemo delivered a provoking speech before the Volksraad. He warned the government of the seriousness of famine in the vicinities of the sugar plantations in the countryside of Central Java. This food shortage was said to result from the decision by the British government to stop India's rice export to the Indies. (28) The Indies government readily blamed this food blockade as well as various plant diseases and natural disasters as causes. (29)

But Mangoenkoesoemo managed to show that the principal cause of the famine was the expansion of the sugar plantation into the people's farm land. This prevented the villagers from cultivating gadu during the dry season. Mangoenkoesoemo pointed out that rather than the paddy, it was the sugar cane which carried plant diseases during and after the dry season. (30) He ended his speech with proposals that the government had the sugar plantation area reduced by 25 percent and that peasants were given freedom to decide the extent of their gadu cultivation. (31)
Like that of Misbach, Mangoenkosemo's 1917-1919 campaign to improve the conditions of the peasantry in the villages of the *vorstenlanden* coincided with or was followed by peasants' strikes and other forms of protests. Yet his proposal concerning the *vorstenlanden* went unheeded by the authorities. His call for a redress of the worsening conditions of the peasantry in Surakarta was partially accepted only after the government had its punitive actions. Mangoenkosemo was detained in 1921 and banished from all Javanese-speaking regions as those peasants participating in the strikes expelled.

Mangoenkosemo still tried with Dekker to revive the Nationaal Indische Partij and, later, to establish Sarekat Hindia, but the government refused in 1923 to give their new party legal recognition. In 1927, following the rebellion of PKI, Mangoenkosemo was again implicated and exiled to Bandaneira until 1941.(32) Three years earlier, his faithful compatriot, Haji Misbach, was banished to Manokwari in West Irian, where he died two years later.(33)

This heavy-handed treatment by the government did not deter Soerjaningrat from launching another major attack. Roughly eleven years after he wrote "If I were a Dutchman" which shocked the colonial authorities, he now came up with the strategy of noncooperation.

The idea of noncooperation had probably been discussed in secrecy among the leaders of pergerakans and was likely
influenced by Gandhi's example. Soerjaningrat, however, couched the principle of noncooperation very much in the language of Bharatayudha, an epic the Javanese literati and dalangs (34) had ingeniously developed from the Indian Mahabharata. The Bharatayudha tells about a sharply antagonized war between the Pandawas and the Kaurawas over the Kingdom of Astina, which by right belonged to the Pandawas.(35)

In his call for noncooperation against the colonial government, Soerjaningrat shrewdly represented the Indonesians who wanted independence as the Pandawas and all those against the role of Kaurawas. The leaders of NIP --Soerjaningrat, Mangoenkoesoemo, and Dekker--assumed the role of ksatriya (warrior-crusaders) in their defense of the Pandawas. Such a transposition resulted in a powerful appeal among the Indonesians. With other similar tropes, the principle of non-cooperation was stated unambiguously militant and having national independence as its goal.(36)

The endurance of these tropes was well testified by the fact that the principle was to stay with the Indonesian pergerakans until the end of the Dutch rule.

**The Communist Party**

Growing partly out of Sarekat Islam was probably the most radical party ever to flourish in the East Indies, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). As observed in Chapter
IV, PKI was an "indigenization" of ISDV (Indies Social Democratic Association) founded by Sneevliet, a radical member of the moderate Dutch SDAP (Social Democratic Workers' Party). As narrated in Chapter IV, Sneevliet went to the East Indies to join the editorial board of the powerful Sugar Syndicate newspaper, *Soerabajaasch Handelsblad*. (37) But the first Indonesian leaders of ISDV-turned-PKI, i.e., Semaoen, Darsono, and Tan Malaka had been and still were members of Sarekat Islam at the time of the birth of PKI in 1920.

In its Party Regulations of 1923, PKI stipulated its basis for action, programme for political struggle, statutes, and rules. These regulations emphasized the orthodox view of the antagonisms between the capitalists and the proletariat. The proletariat, however, was extended to include the peasantry.

PKI recognized the existence of Indonesian middle class, but did not specify what it really consisted of. Together with the intellectuals, the middle class had, in PKI's view, become an instrument of capitalism. National freedom could only be achieved with the destruction of both national and international capitalism. Political and economic freedom were only possible if the means of production were in the hands of people's representatives. In addition, national and international struggle had to be pursued simultaneously. For this purpose, soviets had to be
established in the villages, factories, districts, and provinces.(38)

In spite of the radicalism of its general programme, however, the PKI, more than any other party, was ridden with endless internal conflicts, contradictions, and inconsistencies. This determined the character and outcome of most of its programs and practices. For instance, we find no evidence that, with the probable exception of a cluster of factories in the city of Semarang, the soviets were actually established in other parts of Java.

The contradictions besetting the PKI were largely parallel to that visiting the Soviet Russia as regards the colonial question. They emerged from a confusing mixture of concerns for the urge to stick to the party ideology as this was confronted with the purely strategic considerations and with the attendant consequences of the lower stage of native economy in the colony. But the Soviets' case was different from that of the PKI in that the former had the situations well under control, while the latter did not.

Constituting the biggest failure of PKI was its inability to devise a general programme which met the social conditions of the land. This they had to do without undermining the basic objective of Communism, which was to empower the oppressed and to have their suffering redressed. Ruth McVey gives us a pertinent hindsight about the
character of Indonesian Communism. She writes that the majority of those present in the first meeting of ISDV in 1914 were Netherlanders. Indonesians and Eurasians stayed in the background, giving doubtful evidence that the party "was either Indonesians or Communist." (39)

The convulsive life of the party testifies the correctness of the observation. In other words, McVey intimates that essentially there was never any Indonesian Communist Party in the true sense of the word during the third decade of the century. The party we had turned out to be of a strictly orthodox Communism anachronistically implanted in the Indies. Unlike its counterparts from China (the Chinese Communist Party, CCP) and from Vietnam (the Indo Chinese Communist Party, ICP), PKI tragically flunked the test of political inventiveness so requisite in its situation.

There were two tangled sources of contradictions which accompanied the PKI throughout its life. In terms of political actions, it was parasitic to the social bases of other pergerakans, that of Sarekat Islam in particular. In terms of ideology, it was either too dependent on the weathery prescriptions of the Comintern or too rigid in their interpretation of the communist cause. They overlooked the fact that even the strategic prescriptions from the Comintern were largely dictated by the changing domestic situation in Russia. It is the failure of PKI to overcome all of the
challenges that finally led the party to an "inglorious end."

The second source of contradiction certainly imparted the greatest difficulty in the life of PKI. But it is also possible that this difficulty was largely a function of the way the party came into being. At variance with the CCP and the ICP, which emerged with their own indigenous leaders, PKI was a Dutch party "Indiesized." Unlike Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh who were both motivated by an indigenous, independent, and strong "nationalist" sentiments prior to their conversion to Communism, both Semaoen and Darsono, the first Indonesian leaders of PKI, began their political career in ISDV under the tutelage of Dutch socialists. This upbringing within a "foreign" party left its indelible mark.

None of the PKI leaders tried to translate Communism into the symbolic heritage understood by the people as what Mao did. The latter found in communist dialectic his own Confucian "unity of opposites." Neither did PKI leaders earnestly try to base their power in the people as both Mao and Ho had done. They put the fate of their struggle more in the chances offered by external circumstances.

As Semaoen disclosed in 1918, he hoped that the political situations in Europe would work to the advantage of the people's struggle in the Indies or that Sneevliet's party would "gather its forces to carry out the mandate
which the socialists in the Netherlands will send." (42) In West Sumatra, the lack of self-reliance can also be discerned in the communists' expectations that when the D-day arrived, "the Russians and the Chinese would come with battleships and airplanes to help" them. (43)

The foreignness of the umbilical cord and, probably, the lack of proximate example like that enjoyed by the ICP with its closeness to the CCP, had made the PKI unable to implant its roots independently in the Indies. The party's leaders did not have the confidence that the people belonged to them. Neither were they sanguine about the prospects of winning their heart in the end.

The truth is likely the reverse. Underneath, they did not really "feel with the people." Even where their party's programme for the people up to 1924 was largely successful, as is indicated by the consistent growth of its Sekolah Rakyat, the PKI leaders could not get rid of their doubts.

Was it wise to have tied their small and poorly disciplined party—less than 1,000 members, not all of whom paid their dues—so closely to the non-communist masses? Was it wise to devote so much energy to the nonproletarian elements, which in spite of the best party efforts gave little hope of becoming disciplined, faithful, or patient? (44)

The ambiguous and inconsistent attitude of PKI toward nationalism and Islam was perhaps as much influenced by what their Dutch and Russian mentors had publicly stated
earlier. The Dutch socialist Pieter Bergsma once pointed out, that "only the communist method of struggle could bring national liberation." (45)

The inability of PKI to preserve its alliance with Sarekat Islam and, later, to establish its own basis among the peasantry as a substitute for the Islamic party stemmed in part from the same reason. The communists' slight of nationalism and religion during this period was proverbial. They considered them simply the "tools of capitalism." (46) As late as 1920 Adolf Baars had called nationalism "the ideology of murder" or "a speculation of man's lowest instincts." (47) Worse, this slight of nationalism and Islam by the Dutch socialists was inconsistent with their desire to keep an alliance with the former's movements.

The fatal SI-communist schism should, therefore, be seen more as an outcome of the communists' mistake in the way they treated their Islamic counterpart. This by no means happened because of some kind of religious fundamentalism on the part of Sarekat Islam. As Jeanne S. Mintz has pointed out, the Indonesian people "are remarkably tolerant on matters of religion." (48) Instead it was a function of the communists' failure "to take sufficient account of the vigor of the prevailing mores, and in particular the role of religion in Indonesian life." (49)

More importantly, however, the majority of PKI leaders were unaware of the fact that Islam which they found
already moving in the Indies when they entered the field was not merely driven by blind circumstances. Instead, it moved with the revival of its "modern" consciousness. (50) It was internally motivated.

The Islamic resistance as from the early decades of the twentieth century was no longer that of the Java War, the Aceh War, or the Banten Revolts in the bygone eras. As observed in Chapter IV, it was Islam which emerged from the recapture of its orthodox ethos conscious of being an agent of historical determination. Modern Islam, just like pristine Islam, accepted the Qur'anic teaching that "the conditions of a people are not going to change unless they change it themselves." It stemmed from Muslims' rediscovery of the dynamism of their world view.

But the schism can also be traced rather straightforwardly. It grew out of the communists' insensitivity of the plain fact that they simply could not preserve a credible and durable alliance with the people they continuously ridiculed. Lenin's attack against Islam in his "Theses on the National and Colonial Questions" (1920) was published by the PKI in the same year. Later he modified his position. But the preconception remained. It was the communists who began attacking Islam or Islamic leaders, not the other way around. By so doing they alienated much of the masses' support they hoped to mobilize. (51)
The same is true with the communists' work within Sarekat Islam. The Islamic leadership of the great pergerakan initially looked upon the communists as a respectable partner in propagating their common cause. Conversely, the communists typically saw Sarekat Islam as but a principal representative of bourgeois nationalist movements "to be squeezed like a lemon and then thrown away."(52) Tan Malaka did try his best to overcome the growing feeling of mutual bitterness by emphasizing both in Comintern congresses and in Sarekat Islam's National Convention of 1921 the revolutionary nature of Pan-Islamism.(53) But the damage was done.

All this certainly indicates a contradiction between the orthodoxy of the communists' ideology on the one side and the strength of the people's attachment to their own symbolic world on the other. At the same time, this stemmed from the contradiction of imposing an ideology premised under a proletarianizing social relations within a society which had very little of such experience.

We will remember that industrialization with a transformed mode of production did not occur in colonial Indonesia. Or even if it did occur in a few cities, it did not serve the country's economy. The leaders of the Semarang-based Red-SI seemed to be oblivious of the fact that the revolutionary fermentation created by the combination of the Dutch and Indonesian socialist agitations and
the burgeoning "industrialization" in cities such as Surabaya, Semarang, and Batavia was hardly emulated in the rest of the country. As observed by Hatta, these pockets of industrialization were implanted from without to serve the colonial scheme. They neither belonged to the land nor to the people.

The ideology-society contradiction, which the PKI was unable to overcome, similarly impinged upon its inability to avoid being entrapped into the contradiction between national and social/international revolution. It refused to pursue its struggle at the level of people's understanding and experience.

These ideological contradictions led the PKI into a serious dilemma concerning strategy. First of all, it was the dilemma of operating as a "bloc within" or as a "bloc above." The "bloc within" was meant to be the communists' strategy of trying to capture the revolutionary momentum from inside a "bourgeois" party. According to Sneevliet -- the principal advocate of this strategy, the communists had here nothing to lose.

If they were fortunate, they could win the non-communist leadership to their side or drive it out, capturing the whole movement for themselves; if they were less successful, they could at least hope to emerge from the broken alliance with a good part of the mass movement's supporters. (54)
This was precisely what the communists had done to Sarekat Islam. The "bloc above" was a reversal of that strategy. It purported to control the head of the mass movement and have it steered through "a disciplined and ideologically cohesive elite."(55) But both options, the latter in particular, were more wish than feasibility.

On the surface, what the Indonesian communists had gone through did not really constitute a dilemma, for they adopted the strategies in alternation. In practice, however, each time they followed one strategy, the other was pushed in by the ideological/social contradictions to contend the ongoing one more or less hazardously. Thus even during the eight-year adoption (1916-1923) of the strategy of the "bloc within" inside Sarekat Islam and even before the SI-Communists schism, some of the top communist leaders already voiced and practised the reversed strategy.

One of the important reasons for the schism was the divergent understanding of the function of trade unions between the communists and SI leaders. Baars and Bergsma, for instance, believed that if the communists regarded labor organizations as a road toward revolution, Sarekat Islam viewed them "as an escape" from it.(56) Nevertheless, such an argument pointed to the actual source of contestation inaccurately. The question involved was not whether one was for or against revolution, but what kind of revolution each party really wanted to pursue.
Tjokroaminoto stated that he was opting for a national revolution and that social revolution had to wait until the former was completed. (57) As a matter of fact, Sarekat Islam did not really separate the two revolutions in any strict manner. Tjokroaminoto was willing to take the risk to defend the right of the peasants, which was arbitrarily violated by the Dutch plantations. "If the plantations persist in their old time practices," he said in the Second Congress of CSI in Jakarta, 1917, "we will defend our right to the last drop of our blood. If peaceful means are not obtainable, one of the two sides should perish." (58)

Unfortunately, the communists, particularly in the post-schism years, seemed to be determined to ignore this mixture of national and social revolution as advocated by Sarekat Islam. Instead, they followed an uncompromising course toward a social, international, revolution. The leaders of ISDV-PKI never recognized national revolution as genuine. To them, there is only one revolution, the social.

From this divergence emerged other strategic dilemmas -- between class/international and non-class/national struggle and that of between the parliamentary and the extra-parliamentary. Here again the communists continued to waver between the social realities in the Indies and the tenets of Communism they had learned. Schrieke observed in West Sumatra that, "The slogan of the class struggle found little response among the lower middle class of farmers and
traders." (59) As we have seen through the programme and the struggle of Sarekat Islam, this situation virtually applied in the entire East Indies. The Volksraad was ceaselessly attacked by ISDV/PKI as but a komidi omong (talking comedy). And yet the communists had always participated in the town council elections of major cities and tried to influence other parties for electoral purposes. They also took the work of the committee councils seriously. (60) McVey calls this strategy "curiously schizophrenic." (61)

Neither did PKI's reversal to "the bloc above" strategy following the SI-Communist schism of 1921-1923 manage to free the party from its emaciating dilemma. As a matter of fact, it was with the new strategy that the dilemma reached its chronic proportion. For it was at this juncture that the weakness of PKI was fully uncovered.

The new strategy basically followed what the CSI had done with respect to its mass bases. (62) Ignored, however, was the crucial fact that CSI did not adopt that strategy voluntarily. It was forced by the refusal of colonial government to grant the pergerakan the right to have a single organization in one legal body comprising the entire East Indies. This the colonial government did because it was aware of the possible emergence of a "nation-wide" resistance based on Islam. This fear was well founded in view of the astonishing development of Sarekat Islam and the
relative ability of CSI to move concertedly with the local SIs until 1919.

In other words, there was a fundamental difference in the positions of the PKI and the Sarekat Islam before the adoption of "the bloc above" strategy. The SI was forced by the government to accept the strategy because it was indeed capable of mobilizing the masses. By contrast, the PKI had to do so because its alliance with those capable of mobilizing the masses had been broken and, therefore, now had to create its own mass organization, which it was not capable of.

This move of the PKI turned out to be a double exposure of its weakness. If it could in fact mobilize the masses, it needed not adopt "the bloc within" strategy in the first place. Neither did the communists need to refuse renouncing "the bloc within" strategy under the 1921 pressure of Haji Agoes Salim and Abdoel Moeis. Thus the Sarekat Rakyat which they did found as a substitute of Sarekat Islam soon proved to be bogus. It was more an anathema to the party's members and resources from which the PKI painfully struggled to get rid of.(63) Semaoen's reticence and unaccountability to his Dutch comrades concerning this development during his exile in the Netherlands and his use of "unbelievable statistics" for Sarekat Rakyat membership should also be seen in light of this failure.(64)
The inglorious rebellion of PKI in 1926 largely evolved around the issue of whether or not to continue the "alliance" with Sarekat Rakyat. The Comintern under the influence of both Lenin and Stalin, including that of the Dutch socialists, insisted that PKI retained its alliance with "the mass organization." Conversely, Aliarcham, Muso, Alimin—the new leaders of PKI as Semaoen was exiled for his strike attempts—all turned to the orthodox emphasis on the purely proletarian struggle irrespective of whether or not the masses would join.

But this bitter contention between the Comintern and the PKI was actually focused on something no longer there, and yet treated by both sides as if it was still there. If the Comintern insisted that PKI continued its alliance with the mass organization, what they had in mind was a mass organization just like the Sarekat Islam they knew, with which a revived alliance was out of question. The Comintern was essentially telling the PKI to rely wholly on the revolutionary forces available in the Indies and not to expect any help from outside. This unequivocally meant that no material support from Soviet Russia were to be contemplated—not at the very time when even Lenin had to court the capitalist world with his New Economic Policy.

For their part, PKI insisted on the futility of recovering the alliance on the pretext that the mass organization could never form a reliable ally. Silenced was the
fact that the communists were no longer capable of command-
ing one. The PKI, particularly under Semaoen, had to act as
if the mass organization was still at its disposal, because
arguing otherwise would greatly diminish the import of its
return to the orthodox path of Communism. Hence Semaoen's
unaccountability and falsification of the membership
statistics of Sarekat Rakyat.

In a word, it was a war on the same use of representa-
tion—that "the mass organization was there," with two di-
vergent political intentions. The one was to emphasize that
a revolution without reliance upon one's own power (i.e.,
an organic and sufficient command of the masses in the
land) was doomed to failure. The other was to conceal its
revolutionary incompetence in face-saving rhetoric.

The rebellion of the PKI followed directly from the
fact that concealment and rhetoric could not last long as
the PKI was isolated domestically and internationally.(65)
Neither was the Comintern suggestion toward "a long-term
public activity" of any value to the party. Following a
PKI-led campaign in 1925, which was disastrous, the Dutch
authorities decided that "the PKI and its sympathizers must
be rendered inactive at all costs."(66) Its resources and
mass following dwindled rapidly. Hence the party's
so-called "deviation to the left," which means a complete
reversal to the secretive, cell-built, and underground
proletarian struggle.
Unfortunately, the party leadership was too divided to carry out an effective struggle. Countering the move of Aliarcham-Muso-Alimin, the exiled Tan Malaka did all he could from the neighboring countries to foil the rebellion as he was convinced that it would end up a mere Putsch. He even concluded that losing the legal status of the party was still better than having it completely crushed "in an abortive revolt."(67)

The Batavia and Bandung centers of the party were far from well-coordinated. Worse still, the colonial intelligence service had obtained the party's secret signals and found no difficulty in following the details and the course of the plan for revolution.(68)

In spite of its decision to emphasize its proletarian struggle, the PKI strategy at this stage were as much right as it was left. It tried hard, if to no avail, to win the heart of the Chinese community in Indonesia and pay homage to the struggle of Kuomintang in China.(69) It sold "red cards" and asked for donations from among the "more affluent followers"(70) to fund the revolution. It also recruited "a fairly large proportion" of members from the juara society in Banten,(71) whose allegiance and integrity were at best questionable. These practices and all of the factors mentioned above had led the PKI in 1926 to a self-inflicted pressure toward an unprepared, confused, and, indeed, "inglorious" rebellion.(72)
In retrospect, the cardinal source of the PKI failure should perhaps be located not so much in the internal dilemmas, contradictions, and inconsistencies of the discourses and practices of the party. It should be located more in its hesitant acknowledgement of the necessity of refusing the colonial constitution and exploring the symbolic factors prevalent in the land.

The Indies' colonial constitution was by no means reducible simply to capitalistic relations of productions as most of the PKI leaders had it. To the extent that it extracted as much profit out of modern economic practices as the Dutch could, it was capitalistic. But to the extent that such modern economic practices were supported by feudalistic operations and by racial discriminations, the essentially rational character of capitalism was distorted.

To be sure, it was not the people to be blamed if they did not capture the "rationality aspect" of Dutch colonialism. Capitalism never really grew in colonial Indonesia. What the people at large came to internalize into their consciousness was the reality of domination and exploitation by a different people, a different bangsa. These aliens coopted a semblance of the land's traditional rulers to support their exploitive practices in turn. The centuries of domination and oppression by these aliens as well as the cultural legacy prevailing in the land had
inaugurated a new bangsa, which denied both the foreign oppressors and their domestic collaborators.

The PKI, on the other hand, invariably tried to downplay this emerging, antithetical constitution for something yet too abstract to the people—for the ideology and the objective of Communism, which later PKI leaders themselves unsurely grasped.(73)

If there is anything the PKI leadership was totally negligent of, it would be an effort to forge a symbolic solidarity, which was indispensable if a nation was to be built, whatever ideology the nation was to adopt in the future. For one thing, the PKI denied the pertinence of both nationalism and Islam, which overlapped in the colony and should serve as two major components of the symbolic solidarity.

As Sukarno would point out later, PKI failed to see that nationalism and Islam in the colonized countries were major ideologies striving toward egalitarianism in their respective ways and understanding. Unlike the way Confucianism was treated by the communists in China and in Vietnam, the rootedness of the faith and the actual import of the rise of the new Islam had totally escaped the historical understanding of the "Indonesian" communists. The failure of the PKI to build an independent mass organization of its own as well as its lonely struggle in the end should be traced mainly in this direction.
The PKI was trapped in the doctrine of orthodox Communism that it no longer moved with the spirit of historical materialism. It disregarded the fact that humanity progressed by stages, in discontinuities, and with particularities. Like other ideologies, nationalism and Islam were certainly imperfect. But while imperfection was inherent in ideologies, their imperfection correlated positively with the great force they were capable of harnessing in times of need. (74)

In the eyes of the PKI, people were nothing but an aggregate of economic creatures. Culture was to them either nonexistent or irrelevant. In the final analysis, they were never willing to acknowledge either its necessity or its potentialities in the life of the Indonesians.
SUKARNO AND THE MOBILIZATION OF MEANINGS

The ultimate political synchrony of the Indonesian nationalism began with Sukarno. More than the examples of Mangoenkoesoemo and Soerjaningrat, here again we find an instance in which the influence of a leader outweighed that of the party he represented. More than Tjokroaminoto, here again we find a leader with power to blend different ideologies. Sukarno's figure was certainly imposing. His political belief was as overarching as it was controversial, and his influence in the entire politics of the nation lingers on.

In a unique way, Sukarno embodied and took over the distinctive and important traits of previous pergerakans and/or leaders. He owed to Budi Utomo a significant appreciation of the richness of Javanese culture and the greatness of the people's past. He imbibed from Indische Partij/Insulinde a sense of the historical necessity of a broader nationalism encompassing all ethnic and racial groups in the land.

His arch model for a pergerakan, however, was Sarekat Islam. He was impressed by the way SI was capable of actually accommodating, if uneasily, people of different ideologies, within its fold. Dahm cogently argues that the
synthesis of nationalism, socialism, and Islam was already nurtured in its embryonic form by Sarekat Islam. This nascent synthesis "was later brought to perfection by Sukarno and is the real key to understanding him."(1) Sukarno also retained from SI an awareness of the vigor of Islam and its rootedness in the mind of the majority of the rakyat. In addition, he absorbed from the communists their relentless siding with the oppressed, which was the rakyat themselves.

In 1926 Sukarno wrote probably his most important tract, "Nasionalisme, Islamisme dan Marxisme." It was a very strong call for the unity of pergerakans. He urged that the parties of nationalism, Islamism, and Communism laid down all their fissiparous tendencies in order to form one formidable front against the Dutch. Here we need to emphasize that Sukarno never privileged or identified himself with any single one of the three ideologies.

The nationalism he juxtaposed with Islam and Marxism was explicitly that of Budi Utomo with its dream of Great Java and that of Indische Partij with its dream of Great Indies.(2) Such explicit identification of Islam with Sarekat Islam or Marxism with PKI is neither found nor implied in the text.

In Mentjapai Indonesia Merdeka (1933) he depicts Sarekat Islam as already the gado-gado--"salad" mixture--of Islamism, nationalism, and "socialism."(3) What Sukarno called for was not the same gado-gado but a genuine unity,
an amalgam of major political streams prevalent in the Indonesian society. He exhorted the proponents of each ideology to accept their compatriots of different convictions not only for the sake of expediency but with conscience. In other words, Sukarno's crusade was for a transforming unity. His reasoning was simple. Colonialism was an exploitation of one people by another, and unless the colonized were capable of forging an effective unity among themselves, their chance for independence was practically nil.

Sukarno was not the first leader to call for a perennial unity among the Indonesian pergerakans. Tjokroaminoto had always been a champion for it. In his own way, even Semaoen was.(4) One of the main reasons prompting Abdoel Moeis to jettison the communists out of Sarekat Islam was his concern for national unity. In the Second National Congress of Sarekat Islam (1917), he vigorously stated:

Because our own conditions are now so miserable, they demand all our strength. They demand the efforts of nationalists, whose force must not be dissipated. For the betterment of the whole world, we need not begin by turning into internationalists.(5)

Moeis was here speaking against the subversive activities of the communists inside the Sarekat Islam. He believed that the communists were undermining the party's efforts to unite all forces existing within the native society,
irrespective of class considerations, for the purpose of national liberation. Anti-communist leaders of Sarekat Islam even questioned the motive of Dutch support of their activities. In Moeis's view, it might be a stratagem to undermine the morale of the party in order to neutralize its danger.\(^{(6)}\)

A vigorous invocation toward national conciliation prior to that of Sukarno came from Perhimpunan Indonesia, the fraternity-turned-political organization founded by the Indonesian students in the Netherlands. Since the beginning of 1925, the organization had developed four basic principles to adhere to. They were **national unity, solidarity, non-cooperation** and **self-reliance**.

The first principle emphasized the need to do away with narrow political and ethnic differences with a view to forming a common front to fight for a free nation. The second held the need to do away with any ideological contestations between the Indonesians and to put at the center of their political consciousness the ultimate difference of interests between the colonizer and the colonized. Nationalists should thus underscore the conflict between the "white" and the "brown" peoples.\(^{(7)}\)

The third principle was based on awareness that Indonesia's freedom will never be granted voluntarily by the Dutch. It should be seized from them. Hence the fourth--the need to develop one's own power and resources to create an
alternative political and economic structure. All this
should come from the Indonesians themselves and should be
elevated to stand on the same level with the colonial
structure.(8)

Vigorous and clear though they were, the basic prin­
ciples set up by the Perhimpunan Indonesia were born from a
great distance. As much as they came from critical con­
sciousness, they generally resulted from a strictly
detached observation. The realities of colonialism and the
divergence of ideologies were largely grasped by the
majority of PI leaders with a cool intellectual manner.
Bernhard Dahm observes that contact with their people was
minimal. Their views had become too modern or too
"Western." These their people, whom they now looked down
upon, hardly understood.(9) But this observation by Dahm
probably applies more to figures like Soetan Sjahrir and
Tan Malaka than to figures like Hatta.

Sukarno also perceived the discordant ideologies and
captured the realities of colonialism with an understanding
of the working of world politics and economy. His principal
difference from PI leaders lay in the fact that he did so
while remaining vivid and expressive in the symbolic world
of his people. He mounted his attack upon the colonial
structure with feeling, intellect, and imagination.

Sukarno concentrated on ideologies and on what he
considered most relevant for national liberation. Thus he
picked up nationalism, Islam, and Marxism. In his view, the character of all pergerakans for the people came full circle with these three. Accordingly, he immersed himself in their essentials and thence showed why they should unite.

Drawing mostly from Ernest Renan and Otto Bauer, Sukarno defined nationalism as emerging from the similarity of experience, of historical consciousness, and of social objectives, which then formed a strong sense of identity. (10) Sukarno realized that nationalism easily fell prey to excessive racial arrogance. But he was careful enough to distinguish racial arrogance, which was based on what he called the biological principle, from nationalism, which stemmed from the sociological principle. (11) To him, those advocating nationalism, Islam, and Marxism in the East Indies had all sociologically descended from the unprecedented experience of the oppressed and exploited. (12)

Sukarno pointed to the fact that in the entire Asia all movements under the banner of nationalism and of Islam faced a common enemy—Western capitalism and imperialism. He reminded the nationalists that Muslims could be as staunchly nationalists as they were. At the same time he was telling his Muslim colleagues that everywhere Muslims did not, regardless of their cosmopolitanism, view nationalism as an anathema to their religion.
Islam, wrote Sukarno, was socialism under a religious banner. With Marxism, whose socialism was based on materialism, Islam should be able to see an important affinity. Just like Tjokroaminoto before him, he admonished Indonesian Muslims that what surplus value was to Marxism is *riba* to Islam. (13) To his communist compatriots he simply asserted that Islamic pergerakan, similar to that of the Marxists, "emerges from the suffering of the Indonesian rakyat, whose livelihood became the more difficult each day." (14)

True Marxism in Sukarno's view would never be the creed of the fanatics. Marxism changed according to times and places. The change already began with Marx and Engels themselves. Thus Marxism developed in response to new findings. As an example, he mentioned that Marx's understanding of Verelendung in *Das Kapital* was no longer that found in the *Communist Manifesto*. (15) Marxism had also thrown away its demand that religion be "abolished." (16)

In the same manner, the lack of proletariat in most countries of Asia necessitated the Marxists in them to change their strategy and "cooperate with the parties of the 'klein-burgerlijk'." (17) This cooperation with the small middle-class was necessary since feudalism in this part of the world still constituted a formidable obstacle toward progress.
Sukarno went further by citing Otto Bauer that the laborers needed national autonomy to be able to pursue an unhampered socialist pergerakan. The Marxists should, therefore, join this struggle toward national autonomy with the nationalists and the Muslims. He also emphasized that unlike Christianity in Europe, Islam, particularly in the East Indies, was the religion of the unfree. Hence his conclusion that the conflict between Islam and Marxism was "at bottom an error." With this plain logic, Sukarno writes

Marxists who reject unity, whose theory and tactics have turned obsolete, Marxists who are hostile to the serious nationalist and Islamic pergerakans—those Marxists should not feel their honor slighted if they are called poison to the rakyat.

Well reflected in the entire argument was Sukarno's self-confidence. He knew not only the "sounds" of major ideologies in his country, but "their faces" as well. He was at home with them. The ease Sukarno showed in his call for national conciliation emerged from an internalization of the Javanese world view that essentially "all things are one" and that any centrifugal tendencies result from misconception.

Finally, Sukarno was not really after a "liberal" discussion with the others, those he personally knew or merely cited. He cared little for scholarly authorities. He
mentioned most of them "in support of his own without ever seriously coming to terms with them."(23) In a word, all that came out of his pen or speeches was squarely baptized into his own discourse, centered to his own cause.

Still more important than all that was his move toward national conciliation. Unity to him was the demand of the time.(24) He frankly admitted that it was not his intention to suggest that disagreements were not there. His intention was to reason that a "national brotherhood is possible."(25) This enlightened "inspiration" of the most faithful representative of what Van Niel calls the "political elite" endures. Sukarno had given "his hearers a vision of that unity, and though it was never quite to be achieved in practice neither was it ever again lost to view."(26)

In 1927, a year after the article was published, Sukarno founded Persarikatan Nasional Indonesia (PNI). All three words in the name should be read as pointing to a single topos. Sukarno named his pergerakan a persarekatan --a league, a union, an alliance. It was not meant to be a party. The same reasoning applies to the word "nasional," which should be carefully dissociated from the ambiguous term "nasionalis."(27) The word Indonesia finally put a seal to what its founder(s) really meant. It was intended to be a step forward, perhaps a long leap, from the previous persarekatan, Sarekat Islam. It was also intended to express full agreement with yet another persarekatan on the
other side of the globe, the Perhimpunan Indonesia in the Netherlands.

Owing to a demand to create a more effective pergerakan, the First Congress of PNI in Surabaya in 1928 decided that the name partai was formally substituted for persarekatan. But the purely technical reason for changing name was not without an ideological implication. With the adoption of the term partai, the word nasional gradually underwent a blurring or change of meaning. It was now confused with the word nasionalis in the narrow sense. It thus became incongruent with the spirit of the original name the founder(s) gave. Likewise, it was also incongruent with the spirit Sukarno conveyed in "Nasionalisme, Islamisme dan Marxisme"—the article containing Sukarno's lifelong credo.

Sukarno was never a nationalist in the sense of giving unreserved allegiance to nationalism. He was never the nationalist represented in the article discussed. He was only a nationalist in the sense of advocating a genuine welding particularly of the three major ideologies existing in the land. Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism to him all privileged the rakyat. The pergerakans emerging from them were consequently rakyat's pergerakan. It is therefore plausible to argue that Sukarno's nationalism was a nationalism of the rakyat. It was not the nationalism of the Javanese aristocracy as advocated by Budi Utomo. Neith
Indisce Partij, which kept itself aloof from the rakyat. Instead, it was an egalitarian nationalism which "feel with the people."

The word nationalist should also be understood the way Moeis did, that is, in contradistinction with the Marxists' internationalist. Sukarno was a nationalist in so far as nationalism meant the embodiment of all existing pergerakans, big and small, which collectively privileged the rakyat and fought for Indonesia's independence. But while not necessarily becoming an internationalist in the Marxian sense, he claimed his nationalism as remaining broad and commodious. He asserted that unlike European nationalism, which is "aggressive" and self-interested, true nationalism stemmed from the love for humanity and against narrow-mindedness. It was something vast and all-covering --"like the atmosphere, which has room for everything needed to sustain the life of each living thing."(30)

There were times in which Sukarno appeared as an all out nationalist, or a convinced communist, or a devoted Muslim. But the truth was that Sukarno always refused to be "boxed." With this understanding, it is rather untenable to divide, as Dahm does, Sukarno's political career into three phases--"the nationalist," "the marhaenist," and "the Islamic."(31) Throughout the turbulence of his political career, his ideology remained an amalgam of nationalism, Islam, and Marxism. With astonishing consistency, he
projected his entire struggle to be the unifier, the champion of national conciliation, and the Bapak (Father) to his people.

This craving for national unity was most obvious in the programme of PNI, which basically took over that of the Perhimpunan Indonesia:

Central to the party's whole position was the idea of *merdeka*—political independence for Indonesia, and embedded in that principle was the idea of an Indonesian nation which would be welded together through participation in the common struggle for independence. As a corollary to the concept of struggle there was present also the principle of noncooperation with the Indies Government. (32)

But this unprecedented drive toward genuine national conciliation was as clear in the brief yet fiery life of the PNI (1927-1929) and Sukarno's key role in it. Five months after the foundation of PNI on July 4, 1927, Sukarno pressed for the establishment of a common platform named *Permufakatan Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia* (Consensus of National Political Associations of Indonesia) or PPPKI. This included Sarekat Islam, PNI, Budi Utomo, Pasundan, Sarekat Sumatra, Kaum Betawi, and Kelompok Studi Indonesia.

The successful foundation of PPPKI was a clear testimony of the acceptance by the leaders of other pergerakan of Sukarno's politics of conciliation. But, more importantly, it was a general acceptance of his central
role in it. As Legge puts it, "Sukarno's success in creating the PPPKI and in holding it together was a personal tour de force."(33)

The two years following the establishment of PPPKI saw Sukarno as a fearless and tireless ksatriya. During this period he gave speeches almost without a break. In the meantime, he still found moments to write. In 1928 alone, he contributed eleven important articles to PNI's periodical Suluh Indonesia Muda, which were written during a marathon of campaigning from one place to another. The themes largely bore upon his call for unity and noncooperation. But he also talked about forging real power out of the Indonesian pergerakans, about the colonially-sponsored notion of European indispensability in the government of the "colored races," about "Pan-Asiatism," or about Indonesian women's congress.

In response to a writing in Soerabaiaasch Handelsblad, which demanded the formation of a white front against "de massa van 'inlanders'" typical of the rising conservatism among the European community, Sukarno tersely wrote that, "Een 'blank front' verzwakt de Europeesche stelling in ons land."(34) Such a formation would only bring about the solidification of "a brown front."(35)

Thus in addition to the problems of unity and noncooperation, Sukarno imparted into the Indonesian pergerakans a consciousness about the irreconcilable contradictions,
due to irreconcilable interests, between the colonized and the colonizer. Following Hatta and Soerjaningrat, Sukarno summoned that the struggle between the *sini* (those who stood here) and the *sana* (those who stood there), between the Pandawas and the Kaurawas be crystallized. At this time Sukarno had established himself as the greatest leader of the Indonesian pergerakans. He was dubbed "the lion of the podium." As the masses were stirred by his rallies, he was also invigorated by the masses.

He seemed to be almost continuously on the move from end to end of Java, fulfilling a speaking engagement here, encouraging the faithful there....

In July he was speaking at Pekalongan, the end of August found him at Gresik, and immediately afterward in Surabaya for the first PPPKI congress. PPPKI affairs claimed him again later in September in Batavia and in early October in Bandung, where the local section of PPPKI organized a general meeting of the member organizations. Then he visited Semarang for more speech-making before returning to Bandung where another general meeting of PPPKI was in preparation. And so the round continued into 1929.(36)

There were other major political events occurring in 1928. The first was the crucial trial of Hatta as the leader of Perhimpunan Indonesia in the Netherlands. He was accused of spreading disrespectful ideas about the government of the Netherlands Indies. Hatta successfully transformed the accusation into a *cause celebre* for the sake of his struggle. His defense made a comprehensive
argument of the incompatibility of the economies of the colonizer and the colonized and of the duplicity of any such notion as Dutch "mission civilatrice." Hence the import of non-cooperation. "The truth," writes Hatta, is that we have been set free from the colonial hypnosis and have therefore become self-confident. From here we can see the colonial truth clearly. And this is what our action is based on. (37)

There was a mutual support between PNI and Perhimpunan Indonesia. The political offensive of PNI in the land strengthened the position of Perhimpunan Indonesia in the Netherlands. Reversely, the latter's outspoken publication in its periodical Indonesia Merdeka (Indonesia Free) as well as its speeches at major international conventions in Europe greatly enhanced the spirit of its compatriots back home. (38) Sukarno did not fail to use Hatta's trial to step up his campaign and captured the momentum of national awakening.

But probably the most important fruit of Sukarno's crusade was the declaration of Sumpah Pemuda, which was sponsored by Perhimpunan Pelajar-Pelajar Indonesia (PPPI, League of Indonesian Students). As observed in Chapter III, this pledge epitomized the vivacious growth of the consciousness of belonging to one land, one nation, and one language. "That their nation should be called the 'Netherlands Indies' was now for Indonesians as unbearable as, in
its time, the designation 'Spanish Netherlands' had been for the Dutch."(39)

Thanks to the sustained activities of Hatta's Perhimpunan Indonesia and Sukarno's PNI, the idea of Indonesia gradually became embedded in the mind of the people. The Dutch authorities jealously forbade the use of the word and the discussion of the dreamed-of nation.(40)

By no means is the idea something already dormant for centuries under the bosom of history as ardent nationalists would have it.(41) Neither can it be claimed as a portrait whose dirty plate only needs some brushing to reveal its hidden countenance.(42) The new nation was born out of a discontinuity of the first order. Steinberg et al. describe more appropriately what was essentially there with the idea. They contend that

it was, in fact, a new creation, the product of a great and difficult leap of the imagination. The idea of Indonesia required the denial of the political meaning of the societies into which the first Indonesians had been born. It required also the acceptance of the new reality of the Dutch Indies, and then the transmuting of that into 'Indonesia'.(43)

In our language, the idea of Indonesia constitutes an enlightened grasp of the political synchrony born out of originally disparate forces. What is difficult, however, is not "the leap of the imagination," because the historical "alchemy" in the land, though complex, had already provided
the "materials" for a future synchrony. The difficult part lies in the struggle toward materializing the "imagined." It is precisely that task which Sukarno had pursued with exemplary tenacity.

Sukarno was arrested in December 1929, accused of contemplating a widespread rebellion. Eight months later he was tried. Following Hatta, he transformed the event into a determined, well-measured, political crusade. Thus he delivered his "magisterial" defense "Indonesia Accuses!"

Not all of the pergerakan leaders agreed with the path chosen by Sukarno. Some leaders were critical of the usefulness of his crusade. Anwari, the chairman of the Surabaya chapter of PNI, regarded as erroneous the emphasis on open and intensive political agitation by the party's headquarter in Bandung. Imbued by the liberal spirit, he put forward that how to improve the chronic conditions of people's economy deserved more to be of top priority in PNI's programme.(44)

A powerful criticism came from Hatta. He viewed the PPPKI formed by Sukarno as a loose conglomerate having no working power of its own. He also suggested that PNI was still at "the stage of demonstration." It lacked a higher organizing capacity. The leadership of PNI should not be placed under the domination of the formally educated; it should include community leaders as well.(45)
Indeed, beyond the exuberance of his populist rhetoric during the few turbulent years of PNI, Sukarno did not develop any link regularly following the conditions of or having a close contact either with the urban laborers or with the impoverished peasantry. Sukarno lacked Gandhi's steadfast crusade in the midst of India's villagers and untouchables. (46)

The three headquarters of PNI (Bandung, Jakarta, and Surabaya) had, with all their statements to be close to the lower people, concentrated their efforts in the urban centers, not in the countryside. (47) Sukarno's peasant-derived doctrine of Marhaenisme was but a convenient name for the plight of national conciliation. Dahm observes that the size of PNI membership is "nothing" compared to that of Sarekat Islam. (48) In the biting language of Geertz,

Sukarno not only had no throne to inherit, he had no comprehensive party organization as, say, Nkrumah had in Ghana, no modernized civil service as Nehru had in India, no populist army as Nasser had in Egypt. He did not even have the indigenous bourgeoisie upon which Quezon built in the Philippines or the tribal pride upon which Kenyatta built in Kenya. He had only ideology and those men to whom ideology most appeals—the intelligentsia. (49)

But this judgement of Geertz has gone a bit too far and deserves some comment. It is not clear which Sukarno Geertz is referring to—the leader of the 1920s or of the 1960s. Sukarno may well be judged differently in each
period. But in either case the fact of the crucial role of Sukarno in the political life of his country should not be overlooked.

Ever since the Gianti Agreement of 1755, Mataram—the last kingdom of Java—had been fragmented and rendered unsovereign by the Dutch. The Sultanate of Aceh which survived much longer was of the Sumatrans. It is thus impertinent to relate Sukarno with a "throne" as Geertz does two centuries later anymore than to talk about the Tsar in Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution. The same impertinence applies to Geertz's other points. A comprehensive party organization, a modernized civil service, and a flourishing indigenous bourgeoisie were very much encouraged with the British or American way of colonization, but they were short of the possible under the Dutch.

Sukarno also avoided any commitment to doing a tangible social programme. As Dahm has pointed out, that would have been time consuming. It would also interfere with the rising momentum to end the foreign rule.(50) Sukarno realized that nothing significant could be accomplished without coming to terms with the government. Sukarno's repugnance to specifications and the normal way tallied with his anxiety that "the 'main outline' would be lost sight of; and that 'main outline' was the struggle for independence."(51) This choice of Sukarno was right. In addition, his obsession for the unity of all pergerakans
had necessarily made him less desirous of building a party of his own. A Bapak should not encase himself into another political box, for it will be self-contradictory. Also, as we will show shortly, he had another impelling reason.

Inter-ethnic contentions had indeed influenced Indonesian politics. A number of rebellions were precipitated by ethnic problems. But "tribal pride" is a somewhat superfluous allusion to use for the country's politics. Such a thing had never formed a significant feature in Indonesia even in precolonial times. Other than a number of remote instances, the land had always been a distinguished heir to great cultural traditions flourishing in the East. From Aceh to the Moluccas, the orientations of most of the people in the land were more toward the cosmopolitan and the universal, which cut across ethnic boundaries. Hence the history of the land knew very little of inter-ethnic wars.

But most elliptical in Geertz passage above is the contention that Sukarno only had the intelligentsia. We will remember that by the turn of the century the economic potentiality of average Indonesians was very low. Most of them were unable to join the pergerakans in any substantial manner. The intelligentsia, the privileged few, were the only ones who could afford to do so. The rest of the people were generally unable to contribute regularly to the meager funds of the pergerakans.
But throngs of rakyat would gladly answer political rallies of leaders claiming to fight and actually sacrificed for their sake. This indication of popular support unquestionably went to Sukarno. (52) Tan Malaka, a serious contender for national leadership, had to acknowledge the depth of Sukarno's influence among the people as he toured the interiors of Java. (53) His grip of the people's movements continued into the abysmal years of the Guided Democracy in the early 1960s.

Sukarno spoke with the people's language. He used their symbols. The humor, the pathos, and the aggressiveness of his discourse were in harmony with what the rakyat felt and had long dreamed to hear. (54) In a word, he "feels with the people."

The wayang characters so vivid in Javanese mind were mobilized into the real political strife of modern times. As much as he quoted Rousseau, Thomas Carlyle, Marx, Arthur Griffith, Gandhi, Hilferding, Sun Yat-sen, Adolphe Blanqui, Sukarno would stuff his speeches and writings with the wayang figures such as Dasamuka, Aria Bima-Putra, Dewi Sita, Niwata Kawaca and Begawan Mintaraga. As he threw out current jargons like *historische taak*, *belangenbasis*, or *naar de politieke macht*, he would also come up with the men-on-the-street phrases in Bahasa Indonesia such as *nasib kokoro*, *tipuan yang tak memper*, or *merah-mbahnya-merah*. (55)
Typical of Javanese, Sukarno's intention was not really to wage a physical war against the Dutch. His many pronouncements about massa-actie notwithstanding, he never tried, overtly or in secrecy, to wage an armed struggle. He was well aware of its unfeasibility. The revolutionary action of PKI was easily crushed barely two years earlier.

What Sukarno intended was not a social but "a psychological revolution."(56) Here Dahm was in error in confusing Sukarno's rhetoric on Marxian dialectic with the actual Marxian dialectic and then judged Sukarno's power as a mere illusion.(57) He misses the point that in Sukarno's way of choosing, inventing, and couching his words, he already gathered power and with it already attacked. His target was not a physical but an ideological victory—to supplant the language privileging the colonial constitution in the land with the one thwarting it.

Such a victory is by no means politically inconsequential. In Sukarno's view, "once the people's psychological dependence upon and feeling of inferiority against the Dutch are overcome, the most important step toward independence has been taken."(58)

Essentially, Sukarno has come forward with a powerful discursive aggression. What he calls "a psychological revolution" resulted from a deliberate accumulation of symbolic forces, which were then hammered intelligently
against the institution of colonialism. Nonetheless, this
discursive aggression resulted in as much, if not more,
damage to the colonial constitution as what an armed
struggle could achieve.

PNI meetings, for instance, would always begin and end
with the newly composed national anthem *Indonesia Raya*
(Great Indonesia), irrespective of the objection of the
colonial officials present. Only *kerbau* (lit.: water
buffalo; fig.: blockheaded), they stated, would remain
seated if the anthem was sung.

Such a statement never failed to ridicule the colonial
officials regularly sitting in to watch over such
meetings.(59) They were disturbed and wanted the Governor
General to have the practice immediately declared illegal.
Yet the high executive restrained himself from any hasty
action as it might rather fortify the position of the
anthem and with it the national movement itself.

In the meantime, the activists of pergerakans used
Bahasa Indonesia more and more in their meetings even when
they were now demanded by the authorities to speak Dutch.
The language the Dutch used to mock now stood firmly and
confronted them. It had become too late to ask the people
to speak Dutch, which was once declared "doesn't sound good
on the native tongue." The national consciousness was
spreading throughout the land. Just as Sukarno intended it,
that was the most important victory the "nationalist" ever imagined.

Referring to this period of our discussion, Van Niel repeats in his concluding remarks his praise of the "functional elite," while scoffing at the "political elite." Underscoring the latter as "diminishing in significance," he concludes that only the 1942 invasion of the Japanese "gave them a new lease on life."(60) This observation betrays a lack of political understanding, which prevents Van Niel from perceiving the weight of the emergent. Commenting on the same object, Jan Romein writes,

...Sukarno and his friends had a greater sense of reality than the Dutch Government. It became ever more evident that the nationalist movement in Indonesia was not simply the creation of wild intellectuals and communists, but was the natural and general reaction of a colonial people which was resolved to be free, that the ferment all over Asia (and also in Africa and South America) was not a little fire lit by a few modernists but a conflagration started by the backward, oppressed majority of the world's peoples. What was now to be seen was the revolution of our times. As Sukarno put it: "The sun does not rise because the cock crows; the cock crows because the sun is rising."(61)

It is with Sukarno that we first witness the contour and the reality of the imagined. None of his predecessors conveyed the concept "Indonesian people" as vividly as he did. Following the example of Hatta and Soerjaningrat, Sukarno ceaselessly inculcated into the mind of his people an antithetical self-definition. He also identified those
forces wanting to perpetuate the colonial constitution as the sanan and those who struggled to do away with it as the sini. He did his best to overcome the political discordance among the people, which was colonially sustained, by establishing the PPPKI.

Sukarno's unmatched metier, however, lay in his ability to create an effective symbolic solidarity by carefully upholding and blending the ultimately meaningful particularly of the three dominant ideologies then prevailing in the land. Sukarno's impelling reason of not seriously building a party of his own was precisely that. It was to forge the symbolic solidarity upon which the new nation was to be born. As a matter of fact, it was in his person that the symbolic solidarity had come to be embodied. In the words of Dahm, Sukarno was now "the pivot of unity."(62)

The Mobilization of Meanings

The important dictum of Marx that the ideas of the ruling class have always been the ruling ideas does not hold true in the case of most major national movements in the colonized countries. The assumption that power is based solely on the material, the non-symbolic, becomes out of place in the kind of historical phenomena we have so far uncovered.

Accordingly, the focus of analysis should also change. Here we are not dealing with the (practice of) relations of
production, but with the (practice of) discourse. Again we are moving from the world of Marx to the world of Foucault. If in Marx the oppressed class is always those whose means of production have been expropriated, in Foucault it is always those whose discourse has been excluded, suppressed, or made irrelevant. But there is a crucial difference between the two. While the one assumes a zero-sum relations of power, the other does not. However, the two are interestingly connected.

The connection is well testified in our case. As soon as the ruling class expropriated the "entire" means of production, the oppressed class would resort fully to non-material resources, symbolic or ideological, which somehow met the social circumstances and, therefore, could serve as points of resistance against its oppressor.

The queer prevalence of Social Darwinism in Vietnam during the period of the country's national upheaval should be understood from this vantagepoint. In addition to Social Darwinism we can also find in Vietnam of that period a hodgepodge of other Western creeds. Utilitarianism, voluntarism, internationalism, idealism, materialism co-existed with indigenous belief systems like Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism.

These ideologies were all utilized in one way or another to overcome social lethargy and political inertia
which had affected colonial Vietnamese for decades. Vietnamese writers cited Gandhi and Garibaldi, Charles Maurras and Jesus Christ, Hegel and Einstein, Joan of Arc and George Washington and easily found in every one of them bits of lesson for the oppressed people to learn. They did not care to find out actual or possible contradictions between them.

Closely related with this phenomenon was Mao's Chinese notion of "the unity of opposites" or Sukarno's Javanese idea that "at bottom all things are one." Thus Pham Quynh, one of the Vietnamese writers, chose Maurras as among his paragons—the same Maurras who denounced all kinds of progressive ideas emerging from Western enlightenment or from the French Revolution.(64)

As we have seen, a similar practice obtained in Indonesia. The conscious effort of a number of nationalist leaders, most notably Sukarno, to appear simultaneously as advocates of Islam, Marxism/socialism, and nationalism has been regarded as one of the brazen acts of ideological syncretism.(65)

I am a follower of Karl Marx, but, on the other hand, I am also a religious man, so I can grasp the entire gamut between Marxism and theism.... I know all the trends and understand them.... I have made myself the meeting place of all trends and ideologies. I have blended, blended, and blended them until they finally became the present Sukarno.(66)
More reasonless to the rational mind, however, is the invocation of the mystical power of Indic Javanese mantrams amidst the flow of the logic of historical-materialism. This occurs in Sukarno's "Indonesia accuses!" Sukarno seems to believe that the world we live in is full of spiritual forces and convinced that one can transform them into an invincible weapon "of tjandrabirawa and pantjasona--all powerful...and everlasting!"(67)

Writing in the sixties at the height of Sukarno's power or in the fresh memory of it, Geertz calls this blending the politics of "the exemplary center" or of "theater state."(68) Indonesia of the sixties neatly supports Geertz's argument. That was the period of Guided Democracy during which Sukarno launched what has been referred to as politik mercusuar (beacon politics) throughout the Third World.

With economic and political problems of the early 1960s seemed to abound, which were then deflected by Sukarno through his thundering speeches from one stage to another, Indonesia was indeed becoming a theater state. Yet the question facing us is how shall we account for his pronouncements, which were basically the same, during the years of the pergerakans about forty years earlier?

To imply that such pronouncements as vigorously stated in Sukarno's article "Nasionalisme, Islamisme dan Marxisme"
of 1926 was intended to establish an exemplary center is to miss the crux of Indonesian nationalism. They should be above all read as stemming from a prognosis concerning the fragmentation of political forces in the emerging nation. This fragmentation had been the actual and claimed reason upon which Dutch colonialism was perpetuated.

Just like the British in India, the Dutch established themselves as the only upholder of unity in the land. De Kat Angelino still reiterated this colonial myth as late as 1931. He maintained that the society of Indonesians and other groups which was growing up overseas "cannot look for a better leader and partner."(69) He also held that the Dutch was responsible not only for the welfare of Indonesians, but also for the security of other groups with which the Indonesians had to live in the larger society of the East Indies.(70) De Kat Angelino certainly referred to the political discordance among the peoples. But this the Dutch came to address only as they saw the foundations of their colonial enterprise began to crumble.

Sukarno was well aware of the fact of the discordance. He saw it in Sarekat Islam and later experienced it himself. Unless such a fragmentation could be overcome, the myth of the necessity of Dutch rule would prevail and the prospect for the birth of the dreamed-of nation—for a political independence—was dim.
But what Sukarno did was not to establish a "theater state." It was to forge a unity of mind upon which to build a nation. Hence his rhetoric of dialectic and his allusions to Karl Kautsky's Der Weg zur Macht. (71)

But before an actual unity of mind could be achieved, all competing ideologies in the land had to be reconciled by means of directing them to a commonly shared goal: national liberation. Now such a liberation cannot be created only through a cool, dissecting analysis of the colonial structure. It should be supported as well by the power of feeling and imagination.

This was precisely what Sukarno deployed during the 1920s. He aimed at the mobilization not of material forces, but of symbolic ones. Gandhi's early struggle should also, contrary to Elie Kedourie's contention, be understood with this perspective. Gandhi's indictment of the West in Young India, (72) his romantic conception of India's past, and his consistent efforts to respect the sensibilities of the Indian Muslims, which finally cost him his life in the hands of a Hindu fanatic, were by no means signs of ethnocentrism. They were part and parcel of the strategy of the mobilization of meanings.

The early period of nationalism in Vietnam was characterized by a similar mobilization. Pham Quynh, for instance, believed in the continuing relevance of
Confucianism as it was "stiffened with some compatible Western ideas."(73) Phan Boi Chau took up a more direct position. He advocated "the old images of 'unity of hearts' (dong tam) and 'great unity' (dai dong) and gave them lyric, patriotic significance."(74) Together with other scholar-gentry leaders, Phan Boi Chau did a great service "to raise political identifications from king to country, from personal loyalty to love of nation."(75) Even a figure as revolutionary as Ho Chi Minh was not exempted from this universal trend toward the mobilization of meanings:

More importantly, ideals tended to change, even while many of the categories and symbols remained the same. Ho Chi Minh understood all this as well as anyone in Vietnam, even though he was out of the country for three decades prior to 1941. In particular, his ability to weld together revolutionary aspirations and selected traditional morality, often employing language that only a few years before had been the forte either of the Neo-Confucian literati or of the French-educated schoolteachers, surely represents one of the pillars upon which Ho Chi Minh's political accomplishments were built.(76)

Here we are facing an extraordinary psycho-historical situation visiting a people as they have reached the limits of their tolerance of exploitation, wherein rebellion or revolution has become a resounding call. Having lost all trust in the colonizer and having no material resources to start a revolution with, the colonized will desperately turn to, and grapple with, the symbolic resources. They
will take it from anywhere—the more meaningful the better, hoping that such resources will somehow turn into a road to power leading to the recovery of the command of one's own destiny as a people.

The phenomenon of the mobilization of meanings does not have to occur prior to political independence. It can be after, as people are plunged into the same inordinate exploitation and as they reach the same limits of tolerance. In the trenchant words of Robert Stauffer:

> The counter attack can only take place along with a determination to regain control over the creation and recreation of the guiding values, myths, and goals of society. In this larger sense, the attack will be addressed to the redefinition of history, to the recreations of visions of the future in which the political independence already achieved by third world nations will be used no longer as a shield behind which the continued exploitation of these nations is carried on. Rather, politics will be employed to achieve cultural autonomy and dignity that rightly belong to the nationhood. (77)

Coalescing at this juncture were three mutually reinforcing perceptions. They were perceptions of the reality of economic deprivation, of the pertinence of concurrent political discourses, and of the necessity of cultural resistance. These constituted the roots and the essence of the mobilization of meanings.

It is this mobilization which so strongly tempted the colonized to give special meanings not only to major
discursive practices then prevailing, but to particular events, which in normal times would have passed unnoticed. These invested-with-meaning instances were numerous. We can mention the 1905 victory of Japan over Russia, the 1922 triumph of the Turks against the allied forces of the West, the Sinn Fein resistance, India's civil disobedience, the Treaty of Versailles—which Hatta reads as indicating the myopia of the superpowers,(78) Sun Yat-sen's national revolution, President Wilson's declaration,(79) etc.

However independent each of them was when examined in its own context, they had all been appropriated by the colonized peoples as somehow supporting the rightness or justness of their cause. This "will to truth," this mobilization of meanings ends up in creating a political synchrony. Ideologies, personalities, events are all seen as pointing to one direction, supporting one conclusion.

For instance, Karl Kautsky to Sukarno voiced only one message. Never was there any "renegade Kautsky," and Kautsky would always be worthy of Lenin's company. Trying to read Kautsky's ideology apart from that of Sukarno, as what Roger K. Paget has done in his pioneering analysis of Sukarno's "Indonesia Accuses!," is certainly missing the point.(80) Sukarno had already refused to recognize the existence of difference when he asserted the existence of identity. The more identity the more sacred and legitimate his cause became.
Here we arrive at an interesting comparison with Columbus as he is understood by Todorov. To the fifteenth century Spanish colonizer of America, it is difference which engenders right (i.e., to persecute). (81) The same holds true with Hitler's Germany. By contrast, in the rhetoric of Sukarno it is identity which engenders right (i.e., to be free). Right to freedom becomes all the more legitimate because ideologies, personalities, and events herald the one and single message.

As a matter of fact, the unbridgeable dissimilarity between the mobilization of meanings in Hitler's Germany and in the liberation movements of at least Indonesia and Vietnam is determined by the antagonism of their basic premises. The mobilization of meanings in the former is premised upon the crucialness of difference, whereas in the latter it is upon the necessity of identity.

Nhat Linh, the famous Vietnamese novelist, recorded his first time journey to France by ship in 1927 that the closer the ship got to France, the better the people aboard the ship treated him. (82) The author narrated tragically the strange correlation between geographical locations and treatments. He was treated as a dirt in the China Sea, as a malaria agent to Europe by the Gulf of Siam, with signs of empathy as the ship entered the Indian Ocean. (83) When the vessel crossed the Mediterranean, "suddenly they viewed me as being civilized like themselves, and began to
entertain ideas of respecting me."(84) This, indeed, is as symbolic as it is real a journey from difference to identity.

Similar to Hatta's and Sukarno's earlier contentions, Alexander Woodside also touches the essence of the problem as he writes that, "The spread of the Vietnamese revolution, far more so than that of the Chinese revolution, depended upon the demystification of the claims and illusions of colonialism."(85) Demystified here is the difference, established the identity.

Fourteen years earlier it was Soeryaningrat who decoded and transcoded with an equally biting language the illusions of colonialism. By alternating his position back and forth as a free Dutchman vs. a subjected native, colonial Indonesia vs. the sixteenth-century colonial Netherlands, and the Queen of modern Netherlands vs. King Philip II of Old Spain, Soeryaningrat not only turned "the Dutch history against the Dutch," but also exposing "all the racist fatalities that underlay Dutch colonial ideology."(86)

Virtually the entire political practices of the Indonesian pergerakans since 1926 can be subsumed under the mobilization of meanings toward identity, for identity, as in Todorov's perspective, engenders equality.(87) Here identity and equality do not apply only as regards the Indonesians and the Dutch, but also internally between the
struggling factions of the colonized people. This mobiliza-
tion of meanings was to be the main theme of the Indonesian
pergerakans and outlasted the severity of Dutch political
repressions, just as it survived the ruthless occupation by
the Japanese.

In the last few months of the Japanese occupation,
Sukarno delivered a speech before the Committee for the
Preparation of Indonesia's Independence. There he
introduced and elaborated the five principles upon which
the new nation was to rest. Known as Pancasila, they are
Nationalism, Humanitarianism, Democracy, Social Justice,
and Belief in God. It is clear that, overlapping though
they are, crucial themes from Liberalism, Communism, and
Reform Islam are strongly represented. Pancasila was soon
accepted unanimously by the members of the Committee and
inaugurated as the ideology of the new nation.

As witnessed by the subsequent political developments,
different interpretations of the state ideology became the
source as well as the locus of fundamental political con-
testations. "An sich," writes Allan A. Samson, "war Pantja
Sila als ideologie begrenzt und verschwommen."(88) Prior to
Samson, Geertz has given virtually the same argument.(89)
It is indeed a circumscribing and blurring ideology, but
not in the way Samson or Geertz understands it.

Samson's misunderstanding of the Five Principles lies,
just like that of Geertz, in his seeing them as each
representing a different ideological strand in the Indonesian political community. (90) Overlooked is the fact that all Five Principles are adopted to privilege the rakyat — the unsovereign and the unfree native of the East Indies, whose past rulers, precolonial and colonial, hardly treated them with justice.

The Founding Fathers of the new nation did not concern themselves with the coherence between all five principles. Coherence can wait. What matters is "the will to truth" that Indonesians are not different from other respectable peoples. And because they are not different, they have the same right to be free. Identity engenders right. The claim that as much as they believe in God, the majority of the rakyat also adhere to nationalism and humanitarianism, and as much as they believe in social justice, they also cherish a democratic way of life is actually beside the point.

To the Indonesian nationalists, Liberalism, Communism, and Reform Islam, including themes from local cultures were all identical symbolic forces in that they fostered equality with their country's nation-oppressor. Here again the prospect that this expedient blending into one identity may invite problems in the future was beside the point at the moment. The same holds true with ideas from various social thinkers in the West and East. They were all mobilized by the nationalists, by Sukarno in particular, into a single
identity in order to emphasize Indonesians' right to a respectable place of their own.

The ultimate fruit of this summation of identity toward equality was Pancasila. This is well-encoded in the preamble of the Constitution of the new republic and with it the birth of the Republic was proclaimed on August 17, 1945. The Indonesian nationalists took Pancasila as a "historical necessity." Against the background of a highly exploited and fragmented society, Pancasila privileges an egalitarian nation. Only when it is understood away from this context, can it be called a more or less unrealistic ideal.(91)

Sukarno stood with the specificity of the exploitation millions of Indonesians had and still experienced. Quaint though it may sound, it was a valid experience of a section of humanity, just as Sukarno's mobilization of meanings was a valid response to the plight of the suffering people.

Now while the experience was still as relevant as it had been in the past, the response of Indonesian political elite seemed to be different from one generation to another, even as each of them claimed to adhere to the same state ideology. The question now confronting us is how faithful were subsequent political discourses and practices to the code cherished in Pancasila.
PART FOUR

PROBLEMS OF DISCONTINUITY
In his celebrated article "Indonesia: Growth or Development?", Rex Mortimer argues that Indonesia's economic and political ordeals can only be overcome if Indonesian people enjoy more political rights. This can only happen if development programs in the country are oriented to and put into the hands of the people, that is, if the "traditional" top-down strategy is radically reversed. Indonesia's development is, in Mortimer's view, inconceivable without dissolving the power of those circles "whose interests and outlook constitute an insuperable barrier to the mobilization of the population for the goals of development."(1)

This ideological position of Mortimer is important not so much because it easily rings as plain truth as because it surfaces an enduring school of interpretation covering simultaneously three fields: culture, politics, and economy.

What I refer to as an enduring school of interpretation can be traced along important studies on Indonesia which have gone through publication in the "West." All these studies emphasize the inegalitarian character of the Indonesian society. To get a concrete picture, a short observation of the fields mentioned is in order.
Clifford Geertz, Leslie Palmier, Harry Benda, and Benedict Anderson have all noticed the prevalence of a marked cultural inegalitarianism in Indonesia. In *The Religion of Java*, Geertz outlines the cultural variants—the abangan, the santri, and the priyayi—he actually found in Java toward the end of the 1950s. He maintains that the ethics of the abangans and the santris is strongly in favor of an egalitarian community.

By contrast, the priyayi ethics is, as observed in Chapter II, characterized by an obsession for status difference and spiritual superiority as well as by an emphasis on the internal and external refinement. Polite external life means detachment from the *kasar* or manual labor which the priyayi regards to be the stigma of peasants, laborers, and traders. Leslie Palmier corroborates this observation. She points out that to the Javanese nobility, the farther the distance from manual labor, the higher one's status. In conjunction with his own observation, Geertz quotes Cora DuBois's assertion on the ruling class of Southeast Asia:

> Here was a class (the gentry) whose ethos was deeply at variance with that of the peasantry. It conceives of life in terms of hierarchy and power rather than in terms of simple communal democracy; in terms of privilege rather than mutual obligations; in terms of ostentations and aggrandizement rather than subsistence and communal obligations.
Harry Benda also stresses the importance of the conception and symbols of power among "Indic" Javanese. He holds that the most salient characteristic of politics in the Indianized sector was that all power, specifically, all right to land, was vested in the kingly office. Accession to the locus of concentrated power was emphatically a function of the possession of royal regalia. Thus Benda contends that,

With such extreme emphasis on the royal power, the distinction between "royal" and "non-royal" became crucial. Royalty was a sacral force, sui generis, and the social and political division between those in contact with such a force (those of the sacred sphere) and those not in such contact (those of the profane sphere) became absolute.(6)

Probably the most vigorous observation of cultural inegalitarianism in Indonesia is Anderson's "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture." Anderson begins his analysis by juxtaposing the Western and the Javanese conceptions of power. If Westerners understand power as abstract, of heterogeneous sources, having no inherent limits, and morally ambiguous, Anderson argues that the Javanese view power as concrete, homogeneous, constant, and raising no question of legitimacy.(7)

Seeing power as "morally ambiguous" and as "raising no question of legitimacy" perhaps do not entail any different practical outcomes. But differences in all other respects
might entail far reaching consequences. In those other respects, the Javanese conceive of power as a zero-sum game, whereas their Western counterpart do not. The Javanese believe that a "concentration of power in one person requires a proportional diminution elsewhere."(8)

Anderson sees the Javanese conception as a far cry from that evolving in the West. This difference results in "contrasting views of the workings of politics and history."(9) With his exceptional familiarity with the field of study, Anderson has unraveled a number of ulterior motives and vexing contradictions underlying the Javanese social, economic, and political behavior.

For instance, Anderson explains why asceticism in Java became a power-concentrating practice of the good and the bad alike and why both sexual control and sexual indulgence could generate power. Anderson also provides answers to why corruption at all levels of the Indonesian society contributed to the stability of the state; why Sukarno's populism was actually a disguised act of the silencing of the rakyat; why Sukarno and Suharto--leaders of such contradictory qualities--were both against decentralization and opposed granting economic autonomy to the Outer Islands; why people's welfare resulted from the concentration of power; and why Sukarno's Nasakom,(10) so much seen by foreign observers as a "compromise or stratagem," was in fact "a
powerful claim to the possession of Power by the ruler."

With Anderson, all these anomalies or aberrations are explainable through the four related definitions of the Javanese conception above, i.e., power as concrete, as homogeneous, as constant, and as residing outside the spheres of ethics and legitimacy.

This view of cultural inegalitarianism in Indonesia rests on three related assumptions. First, it is assumed that this cultural inegalitarianism resurfaced in Javanese traditionalism. All notions of the refined and the coarse, of the central locus of power and its periphery, are derived from the Javanese traditional conception of power. Second, it is believed that the Javanese idea of power has answered political questions "more or less satisfactorily for its own time." Third, it is implicitly accepted that such symbolic inegalitarianism has been there from centuries prior to the coming of Islam down to the present.

The long and profound process of Islamization, colonization, and capitalistic intrusion is regarded as scarcely changing that inegalitarianism. Accordingly, Anderson's thesis underscores the working of the Javanese idea of power in the evolvement of Indonesia's economy and politics. The thesis holds that this idea of power directly impinges upon the Javanese behavior in politics and in so far as
Indonesia is concerned it is the Javanese idea of power which best explains the character of Indonesian politics. A leap of imagination is not needed to fathom the alarming implication of such a conception. A ruler who is subjected to it would have to place himself/herself in a restless campaign not only against rival nations and potential contenders outside the kraton, but also against any slightest sign of power aspirants in his/her personal surroundings. If power is zero-sum, so should the distribution of rights, of development projects, or of social privileges. There is no such a thing as grow and let grow. If one is to be ruling, others should be made powerless; if one is to be rich, others should be made poor; if one is to be facilitated, others should be constrained, and so forth. Serious efforts should be wielded ceaselessly toward the concentration of power.

Since power is concrete, an intense preoccupation is given to symbols of power. Thus in traditional kraton we found priests, soothsayers, all kinds of weaponry, wealth, poets and artists, dwarfs and hermaphrodites all located around the person of the King. In post-independence Indonesia, this regalia would include technocrats, expensive cars and mansions, skyscrapers, golf courses, palaces, luxurious goods from many parts of the world, and a reincarnated, sacred, towering—phallus-like—monument.
Any other persons or parties trying to accumulate power in the field independently of the center would be considered power contenders and should be crushed in the bud. Since this idea sees wealth as accruing from power, every wealth belonging not to the kraton circle should be suspected and expropriated. Power becomes simultaneously a schizophrenia of concentration and a source of restless phobia or paranoia.

The intensely coveted notions of chakrawartin ("the establishment of a world-state with a sole and supreme ruler") and radja sewu negara nungkul ("the kings of a thousand kingdoms offer submission") clearly stem from this idea of power. In this context, the principle of egalitarianism can hardly be operative and the very birth of social contract is precluded. For such a contract is predicated upon the existence of relative independence and restraints between parties.

Now, unlike reading cultural inegalitarianism in Indonesia, which is implicitly taken to continue from the distant past, reading the country's political inegalitarianism should begin from the period of the pergerakan, that is, the time Indonesians consciously took their political responsibility in hand.(13)

Thus by no means do we imply that political inegalitarianism only exists in the post-independence era. After all, inegalitarianism in all fields was the sine qua non
for the functioning of colonialism. It is thus natural to expect that the first book dealing exclusively with Indonesian politics, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* by Herbert Feith, would belabor on political inegalitarianism not as something novel but as something rooted in the land.(14)

The question was only raised three years after the publication of *The Decline* in the widely known critical exchange between Benda and Feith. This exchange bears considerably on the problem of (in)egalitarianism. Irrespective of the fact that democracy, the center of the debate, has become increasingly controversial, both Benda and Feith share, at least at the time of the debate, more or less similar understanding of the concept.

Democracy was here viewed as a principle fostering equality in politics, in which individual citizens had equal right to express and to pursue their ideological preferences. When Benda argues that the question "Why did democracy fail in Indonesia?" appears to be less meaningful than its opposite, "Why should it have survived?", he, in effect, assumes that egalitarianism has never been a distinct feature throughout the land's history.

We can easily find support to Benda's assumptions. R. William Liddle writes that most discussions of Indonesian political history "have emphasized the apparently inexorable movement of the political system away from
popular participation...."(15) We can go further back. In the concluding chapter of his classic, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, George Kahin already maintains that democracy in Indonesia was mainly precluded by the "surviving authoritarian tradition and the related habit of dependence upon orders from above."(16)

There is a number of studies which have more directly addressed inegalitarianism in Indonesian politics during the rule of the New Order. One study uncovers the process of depolitization at the village level.(17) Another tells us about the exclusion of some 2,000,000 voters of former members of PKI, Masyumi (the Islamic League of Indonesia), PSI (the Indonesian Socialist Party) and countless other political prisoners.(18)

Van Marle writes about the systematic disenfranchise­ment of millions of Indonesians by the New Order.(19) He observes that there were at least two discreet measures that the government adopted to achieve its political monopoly.

First, the Government changed the basic unit of election from district to province level. This means preventing Java and Madura, in which about 60% of Indonesia's total population live,(20) from dominating the electoral scene. But it also means crippling the influence of social forces inimical to the New Order, which was believed to be con­centrated there.(21) All candidates were to be initially
approved by the central government. This obstructed the possibility of the entrance of potential contenders to command a sizable political support. It further means that a candidate could only run in one province, limiting the chance of rising contenders to gain influence nationwide.

Secondly, out of the total 460 Parliamentary seats, the Government appointed arbitrarily 100 members of the Armed Forces without having to go through the general election. This was the most undemocratic measure of all, since with the extra 100 "people's representatives" at the government's disposal, in addition to the officially-sponsored Golkar,(22) the control of the representative body is more than assured.

The political parties that were permitted to enter the 1971 election contest have emerged with drastically reduced parliamentary strength and influence. Their combined strength only amounts to 30 per cent. of the votes in the parliament. This means that they will be constantly outmanoeuvred and out-voted by the Government-sponsored Golkar and the Armed Forces nominated representatives who will together dispose of the remaining 70 per cent.(23)

As discussed in Chapter I and Chapter V, economic inegalitarianism in Indonesia began with the establishment of the Dutch East India Company and then structuralized during the centuries of Dutch colonial rule. The works of Raffles, Furnivall, Boeke, Geertz (1963) can all be read as pointing to the suffocation of the prospects for the
development of an autochtonous economy due to the rigid monopoly by the Dutch. Virtually during the 1619-1942 period, all the Indonesians could do was to make the best out of Dutch economic leftovers. But even these crumbs were shrinking due to the steady expansion of Dutch exploitive plantations and extractive economy.

Kahin, for example, provides a pertinent indicator as regards the expansion. He writes that while in 1882 the ratio between individual and communal ownerships was 47:42, in 1932 the ratio had changed into 83:13, during which most of the individually-owned estates went to Dutch companies. Economic classes were then more and more simplified into a binomial division: a privileged minority, including the Chinese, supporting the export oriented corporations and a deprived majority, many of whom were directly exploited for that goal. Such a political reading of the economic phenomena of Indonesia's past certainly deviates from Boeke's heavily cultural reading as embodied in his concept of "dual economy."

At least until 1980, economic inegalitarianism in Indonesia had been conspicuous. Observers from various quarters almost unanimously indicate that there were at least three intertwining economic trends in the country, which largely resulted in inequality. They were 1) fixation to growth, 2) export-oriented economy, and 3) overemphasis on modern/urban sectors at the expense of the
traditional/rural sectors. It is therefore warranted to suggest that these "new" trends were virtually a continuation of that of the colonial period.

The tangled nature of this economic evolution becomes clear as soon as we argue that all of them marginalized the majority of Indonesians and made their economic positions the more vulnerable. Ingrid Palmer writes that while agriculture and fisheries only got 61.6 million dollars in Indonesia's Foreign Investment Approvals, mining obtained 535, manufacturing 267.4, and forestry 381.4.(26)

In similar fashion, while investment approval for agriculture and fisheries only doubled during the five year period, that is, 61.6 million dollars in 1970 and 123.5 million dollars in 1974, the share of real estates which built luxurious housing, buildings and hotels for the urban/modern rich increased ten times as much--from 40.8 million in 1970 to 408.3 million dollars in 1974.(27) Gustav Papanek (1980), W.F. Wertheim (1980), and William Collier (1981) witness as major consequences the increasing poverty, landlessness, declining of real wages as well as farmholding, and worsening unemployment in rural Java.

With all these inegalitarian bases and practices, is it still legitimate to raise the question of egalitarianism in Indonesia? Would not Benda have asked the same question: if inegalitarianism, why posing egalitarianism? If we insist on pursuing the thesis of egalitarianism, are we not
merely reiterating a proposition based on an axiom that since nothing is absolute in social life there must also be room for egalitarianism in Indonesia? The only way to answer these questions fruitfully is to get immersed more into the complexity of social studies and interpretations concerning Indonesia.

**Questioning the Primacy of the Symbolic Reading**

Among the three fields of the enduring school of interpretation, the cultural is the most tenacious. Its tenacity is to a considerable extent due to the impressive studies by Clifford Geertz during the span of more than two decades.\(^{(28)}\) Indeed, we could say that the most widely and most frequently cited work concerning Indonesia is that of Geertz. Of particular import is his analysis of the variants of so-called Javanese religion. Equally contributive is his disclosure of aliran politics and his thesis of "agricultural involution."

The works of Ruth McVey, Daniel Lev, Benedict Anderson, Rex Mortimer, Donald Emmerson, James Peacock, Karl Jackson, R. William Liddle--to mention a few--have with varying degrees used Geertz's findings as pertinent to their own studies. Anderson rightly points out that "the seminal work of Clifford Geertz had an enormous impact on virtually all the Indonesian specialists."\(^{(29)}\)
Geertz's studies are particularly strong with respect to symbolic analysis. They constitute an ethnographic or interpretive approach in an unmistakably Weberian sense. In addressing meaning systems, Geertz moves with a two-pronged strategy. He emphasizes the particularity, rather than the universality, of cultural phenomena. "To be human...," writes Geertz, "is thus not to be Everyman; it is to be a particular kind of man...."(30) In order to be particular, according to Geertz,

we must descend into detail, past the misleading tags, past the metaphysical types, past the empty similarities to grasp firmly the essential character of not only the various cultures but the various sorts of individuals within each culture, if we wish to encounter humanity face to face.(31)

As Weber points out, "All knowledge of cultural reality... is always knowledge from particular points of view."(32)

To emphasize particularity, it is necessary for Geertz to resort to the method he calls "thick description."(33) By thick description Geertz means that an ethnographer should get immersed into the richness and intricacy of conceptual structures.(34) The principal task of theory construction, in Geertz's view, "is not to codify abstract regularities but to make thick description possible, not to generalize across cases but to generalize within them."(35) Only with more and more descriptions of a certain cultural entity can they become more and more distinctly particular.
Closely related to the emphasis on the particular is Geertz's stress on the coherence of the textures of meanings embedded in a particular (sub)culture. Culture here always denotes "webs of significance." Analysis, writes Geertz, means "sorting out the structures of signification...and determining their social ground and import."(36) What Geertz is after is not "a rising curve of cumulative findings," but "a disconnected yet coherent sequence of bolder and bolder sorties."(37)

In Weber's conceptualization, studying meaning-systems implies attempting "to bring order into the chaos of those facts which we have drawn into the field circumscribed by our interest."(38) Very much like Weber, Geertz argues that the essence of semiotic approach to culture is "to aid us in gaining access to the conceptual world in which our subjects live so that we can...converse with them."(39)

The two emphases stand out in Geertz's outstanding symbolic studies. Such an incisive theoretical approach, however, contains its own weaknesses. In so far as understanding social phenomena in Indonesia is concerned, the approach is problematic on at least two counts.

In the first place, Geertz's emphasis on the particular and on "thick description" breeds an inherent aversion to include with comparable analytic weight the non-symbolic factors (i.e., what Geertz calls "the causal-functional") as well as symbolic factors (i.e., what Geertz calls "the
logico-meaningful") which are either outside or beyond the confines of the particular meaning-system which commands more of Geertz's attention.

With some important exceptions,(40) the insurmountable thrust of world economy into the heartlands of Indonesia and how it shaped social phenomena finds only a marginal place in this line of Geertz's work. Subcultural meaning-systems tend to be rendered intact, constant, changeless.(41) Questions about the penetration of Islam into so-called Indic culture are likewise insufficiently addressed.

It is precisely the way Geertz conducts his cultural analysis that calls for reservations. These reservations spring not so much from the classical epistemological contention between Marxian and Weberian perspectives, which as a contention has been found less and less justifiable.(42) Rather, it springs from the need for a more "contesting" way of reading social facts.

The quality of Geertz's work lies in his exceptional ability to draw distinct and vivid ethnographic maps. Proportionately, its weakness lies in its failure to address with comparable intensity the social determination by external forces which cut across cultural and non-cultural boundaries.(43) The same is true with the extent of the demographic or political weight of each subculture,
and the possible outcome of either successful or failed "bargaining" among them. (44)

Indonesia, the object of the bulk of Geertz's studies, is culturally more heterogeneous than homogeneous. In terms of religion, however, the land is more homogeneous than heterogeneous. To be sure, there is great difficulty of knowing where culture and religion meet and where they depart. Still we should say that in the final analysis the impact of Islam, of centuries of immersion into world economy, and of the political impact of later period of Dutch colonization, including the Japanese occupation, tend much more to homogenize the country than to heterogenize it.

Now drawing an ethnographic map, which is necessarily static, out of this puzzling land in which about ninety million people have cross-symbolic interaction almost every moment is a much more precarious business than doing it in a country whose population is sparse or whose culture and religion are perfectly correlated. The precariousness of Geertz's particularistic approach is, however, more evident in his symbolic studies, (45) of which we can provide several instances.

In "Afterword: The Politics of Meaning", written in conjunction with the tragic aftermath of the abortive coup of the communists in September 1965, Geertz points out that,
The sense that something has happened for which no one was prepared, and about which no one yet quite knows what to say, haunts these papers, making them read, sometimes, like the agon of a play with the crisis left out. But there is no help for this: the crisis is still happening.(46)

This statement is more misleading than revealing. For one thing, the crisis had certainly been over when Geertz wrote his afterword about five years later. The unspoken wound and trauma did stay, but they no longer formed a crisis, anymore than did political contrivances in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution in China.(47) For another, each participant of the crisis must have been prepared at least several months before the crisis took place.

Situations had been volatile in Indonesia for about two years prior to that tragedy. Blood-shedding incidents among contending alirans, with each consolidating its power and constantly on alert, had virtually become the order of the day. Only completely isolated individuals in the country would escape the sense of mounting tension toward a terrible, hardly controllable, eruption. B.J. Boland records this situation as he writes that years before 1965 some Indonesians already wished "the clash" to occur sooner for fear of a "more catastrophic" tragedy if it was delayed.(48) He further relates the ensuing situation of mass-hysteria where people took the law in their own hands. People thought of killing or be killed. Many believed that
they "would have been killed, should the Communist coup have succeeded."(49)

There was a widespread convulsion of political activities from all sides.(50) Geertz's statement then betrays not so much a vexing crisis as a failure of explanation, of seeing the tragedy as a logical outcome of a long-withheld failure of political bargaining. Neither was the tragedy an extension of Paidjan's funeral, or "an incongruity between the cultural framework of meaning and the patterning of social interaction."(51) Such an incongruity happens daily in Indonesia, perhaps ever since the rise of pergerakans, even in the absence of social turbulence.

The tragedy resulted from the contestation of meanings born out of the ashes of the mobilization of meanings of almost four decades earlier. It thus stemmed from an ill-fated course of political orchestration which went out of control and turned against itself.

Secondly, the vividness and coherence with which Geertz depicts the Indic signification in Java deflects our judgement and makes us accept the meaning-system as the only one that really matters. Most of the social realities out there are then signified through the privileged meaning system.

Crucial to our present argumentation is the fact that preoccupation with meaning-systems can easily be inflated beyond its proper boundaries. This prompted Geertz to
argue, for instance, that Indonesian nationalism "has been arrested and to some extent reversed."(52) In Geertz's view, Indonesian nationalism has fallen back "to the classic image of a polity as a concentrated center of pomp and power."(53) This inflation of the Indic residue has rendered Geertz to contend that the word "unity" in Indonesia is mere "slogan," which was implausible and difficult to credit.(54)

All of us have learned that while the massacre was indeed real, saddening and of large scale, we also witness that the Indonesian unity was stronger than the massacre. As a matter of fact, the massacre took place in part because the consensual acceptance of "unity" had been bitterly jeopardized by the years of mounting heat of unilateral actions out of the intentionally mobilized contestations by irresponsible politics. The threat to Indonesian unity did not begin with the massacre. Rather, it began years earlier as the mobilization of meanings turned into a contestation of meanings.

Geertz's observation also betrays the beginning of confusing the nationalism of Javanese traditionalists represented by people like Soeriokoesoemo with the original nationalism generally shared by the representatives of the Indonesian pergerakans. This confusion is a function of Geertz's tendency to see ideology "as a cultural system,"(55) which has led him to formulate a cultural
anchorage for Indonesia's nationalism. In fact, Indonesia's genuine nationalism originates from an emerging culture, out of one still very much in the making.

Put another way, Geertz denies the emergent a fair chance in favor of the old, remembered or imagined. Following Ludwig Wittgenstein's equation of language with an old city, he extends the image of language to culture. Thus he argues that anthropologists have traditionally taken the old city for their province, wandering about its haphazard alleys trying to work up some rough sort of map of it, and have only lately begun to wonder how the suburbs... got built, what connection they have to the old city... .

Far from intending to depict the prevailing social circumstances as they are, this line of Geertz's analysis is generally directed at showing and then magnifying the extent of the residue of the old culture in them. What Geertz pursues is a cultural anchorage—a meaning system, nomos—on which subsequent social phenomena are deemed forever chained. Consequently, the remoter the Old Culture, the greater its inflation in order to establish the past-present continuity.

As noted in Chapter II, such an inflation manifests in numerous instances of cultural reading into political and economic phenomena in Indonesia. Geertz is not alone in this respect. Anderson in "The Idea of Power in Javanese
Culture" also falls into such a reading, irrespective of the ingenious and powerful elaboration of the thesis. Perhaps all students of Indonesia who read or cite that outstanding piece by Anderson take him to be dealing with the culture representative of Java, and Anderson himself is only of little help in this misapprehension.

In fact, the culture which Anderson elaborates—the meaning-system central to all of Geertz's studies—was only one of a couple of subcultures in Java. It was the subculture of the "ruling" class, the priyayis.(58) The idea of power of the santris, a much larger subcultural group, is marginalized. Anderson assumes that the Javanese ruling class attained their position of political dominance because of their conception of power.(59)

The possibility that the priyayis attained their position due to a peculiar and unexpected convergence of various historical forces is ruled out.(60) Inconsistency of treatment appears when Anderson attributes the weakness of the santris' political power to the divergence of the santri ideology from that of the others, domestic or foreign.(61) In other words, external forces are here taken to matter only in so far as the santris are concerned. The function of external forces are eliminated in so far as the deal is with the priyayis.

The reason for the inflation is obvious. Almost all ethnographic projects embark on by initially encapsulating
their objects of study, by trying to fix in advance the boundaries of the meaning-systems of their objects. When Geertz maintains that analysis "is sorting out the structures of signification...and determining their social ground and import," he is already committing a theoretical reduction of social facts.

Sorting out the structures of signification will always be arbitrary in a double sense. First, it is arbitrary with respect to the perspective of the observer. Secondly, it is arbitrary because social facts largely bifurcate into those whose meaning or significance is "ready" and those whose meaning or significance is actually suspended. Hence the arduous work of interpreting and reinterpreting particular social phenomena from time to time.

Another reason for the inflation is of theoretical necessity. The powerful description a researcher can here gain is offset by a comparable neglect of whatever social facts which resist inclusion into such coherence. Emphasis on coherence works very much like a closed approach.

The reason is that if we begin with an assumption that culture always contains its own coherence, cultural analysis will mostly tend to follow its own circumfluent reasoning. Everything to analyze is analyzable from its own universe. Observing culture here always means observing from inside the universe. Sticking to coherence means holding fast to a conviction that every phenomenon within
the particular culture should be accountable by other phenomena within the same culture. It tends to close its door before other valid and ever-present phenomena.

Those who emphasize coherence will always find it difficult to include processes like acculturation, modernization, or rationalization and their function in a particular universe. However far this approach goes, it will always bounce back to its own symbolic universe. Essentially, it is a homeostasis. It is as self-contained as it is circular. It is complete in itself.(62) Hence there is a strong temptation that all other explanations or that any introduction of other determining variables from without --whether of on-going "causal functional" or of contending "logico-meaningful"--tends to be made irrelevant or of secondary importance.(63)

Robert Bellah's criticism of Geertz are pertinent here. He argues that what Geertz calls "the general order of existence" is over time subject to change toward a "more differentiated, comprehensive, and in Weber's sense, more rational formulations."(64) Although Bellah's charge is still entrapped in Weberian rationality, it is right in observing that while Geertz has been successful in addressing some general cultural paradigms,(65) he fails to give a fair account of changes occurring in terms of the newly emerging signification.
What cries for more explanation as far as Geertz's studies are concerned is whether or not the once hegemonic general order of existence remains hegemonic regardless of the onslaught of historical changes over the centuries or whether or not another general order of existence has become more important. (66) Is "the classical style" (67) remains as dominant as it was in the sixteenth century, or are we going to accredit more political weight to "the scripturalist" (the modernist Muslims), whose place, according to Geertz, was only in the interlude?

Bellah's remark then aptly shows the inherent weak point of Geertz's studies—the weakness of preoccupying oneself almost doctrinally with meaning-systems. Virtually every time Geertz talks about social change, he terminates his analysis right when he begins to encounter tension between meaning-systems. (68) His depictions of tension, vivid though they are, remain short of a balanced account.

Just as important, Geertz's symbolic approach does not welcome the uncovering of discontinuities. Rather it tends to read a culture as remaining intact and as retaining its meaning-system. Tension is only hanging or fleeting; meaning-systems remain the real.

Here Geertz's symbolic approach becomes problematic. As soon as he turns to give more emphasis on discontinuities, his emphasis on the coherence of meaning-system will be offset. The strong tendency with this line of study is
to disregard as analytically unwelcome every symbolic and non-symbolic phenomenon not yet contained in one general order of existence. Secularization, rationalization, privatization, and pluralization all hardly find a way of entering Geertz's general order of existence simply because they are still in the making.

The general order of existence as Geertz understands it stands, as a matter of fact, on the assumption of the culmination of potentialities of a particular culture. Such a culmination, however, is to be reached not in decades, but in centuries. There is nothing wrong in capturing a culture in culmination, but such a culture is by definition a dying one. In so far as Geertz stops short of dealing with the emergents, he will find himself in an increasingly smaller space to move and will be caught unprepared with surprises. The more modern the times, the more fraught are peoples with changes and discontinuities and the more distracted are the old symbolic worlds. In short, students of social phenomena are fighting an increasingly losing battle if they deny the emergents.

Therefore we need to shift to an alternative strategy which provides room for incoherences, ambiguities, and discontinuities. Apart from the seemingly smooth flowing of meaning-systems, there will always be that character of ruptures, abruptness and accidents in them.
Historicizing the "Javanese" Idea of Power

Anderson's construal of "the idea of power in Javanese culture" bears a great deal of affinity with Geertz's symbolic reading. Both emphasize coherence, which is rather averse to analytic interferences and discontinuities. Both try to generalize not between cases, but within them. We can certainly argue that Anderson has outstandingly executed Geertz's approach and carries it over to its finest reaches. Perhaps his is an exemplar of what Geertz refers to as "bolder and bolder sorties." But as is the case with Geertz, his weak points can also be traced in a more or less parallel direction:

1) Anderson largely neglects the fact of the contestable nature of the idea of power among the Javanese. What Anderson enthrones as the Javanese idea of power is actually that of the priyayis. (69) The abangans and the santris, like most of their fellow countrymen from the Outer Islands, would prefer to see power as not concentrated, but dispersed and shared. (70) The essential contestability of the idea of power in Javanese culture could be extended to the nation as a whole, because the very term "Indonesia" itself could well be divergently understood. (71) Our objection in this particular respect parallels our reservation to Anderson's concept of "the imagined political community."
Anderson rightly defines nation as "an imagined political community," but he fails to emphasize the contestability of "the imagined." Such an emphasis is particularly necessary in the Indonesian case. The reason is that while by nation we refer to the same set of populace, each social/political group in it is likely to have not "the image of their communion" as Anderson claims,(72) but its own image of their communion.

Accordingly, nationalism is here taken to imply the ideology of "the imagined community" only in so far as nation is taken to imply "the imagined community" which does not write off the contestability of the imagined. It is thus crucial at this point to acknowledge the ambiguity of "the imagined" and to maintain a room for such ambiguity. Here we find the pertinence of Ernest Renan's words that "a nation's existence...is a daily plebiscite."

Even the word "tradition" or "traditional" upon which Anderson anchors his thesis is suspect of imposing one particular notion above the others. For what we call tradition is itself continually contested, just as the social contract--overt or implicit--is continually reassessed.(73)

Besides, over and above the Indic, the Islamic, or the western conceptions proper, another conception of power, which is simultaneously blending, rational, and egalitarian, is in the making. Though far from conclusive, this conception stretches long in the consciousness of the

The continuity of this alternative from the old to the younger generation should be enough to tell us that "the idea of power in Javanese culture" is only one among a number of competing ideas of power in the field, and a minor one at that. This observation is corroborated by the absence in the national limelight of comparable manifestations in the discourse of inegalitarianism although the situation for it has been extremely favorable as from the 1970s. While we can easily show the rebirth of the spirit of Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, or of Hatta, Sjahir, and Sukarno among the younger generation, we hardly find a comparable rebirth of the spirit of Soeriokoesoemo or Noto Soeroto.

To be sure, Anderson has presented an important interpretation of Indonesian politics. We only have to be mindful of Foucault's warning that the stronger the will to interpretation, the easier for us to do "violence...to things."
2) Anderson's explication of the thesis stands on the inflation of the idea phenomenon of power as if idea alone can create power or as if idea necessarily has a grounded correlation to reality. Both Geertz and Anderson privilege a particular meaning system, but Anderson goes down to the core of the meaning system—to the idea it contains, and crowns it as uncontestable in its determination of social phenomena in Indonesia. In so doing, however, Anderson is trapped into an act of reifying the idea. He lets the idea get a hold on him and leads his analysis.

Before him, Soemarsaid Moertono has also read "traditional" Javanese texts as the texts "instructed" him to read. He fails to confront the texts as a discursive practice obtaining in a dialectic relationship with contemporaneous non-discursive practices out of which a particular motive or function is identifiable. Anderson takes over Moertono's reading and casts it in a tightly coherent manner with superior intellectual provisions.

Nevertheless, in both Moertono and Anderson, the material/historical root of the so-called "idea of power in Javanese culture" itself is largely silenced or inappropriately addressed. Both largely neglect the necessity of shedding light upon the material and/or historical bases of the idea. In doing so both become suspect of suppressing any unideal representation of power, such as power is divided or contested or even in fact powerless.
Precolonial Java and Indonesia were dotted mostly by lesser kingdoms. But there were important exceptions. Sri-wijaya and Majapahit were certainly great kingdoms by any means. Of smaller statue we should mention the sultanates of Aceh and Mataram. But we find very little historical data to support an argument for the existence of a really imperial state as we generally understand the word. We hardly find in Indonesian history a state with power comparable to that of Ancient Rome, or the Mongolian Khans, or the Great Britain, or the Islamic Sultans before, during, and after the Crusades.

The contradictory claims between Pararaton and Negarakrtagama lend doubts to the much vaunted claims of Prapanca concerning Majapahit.(77) It is difficult for us to believe in the historical ground of the encomium raja sewu negara nungkul, which is used by Anderson to underscore the weight of the idea. The idea of power as proposed by Anderson should thus be read more as an instance of histoire-récité than as of histoire-réalité.(78)

As to colonial Java—and other colonially important islands, the ultimate power wielder was the colonizer, the Dutch. The stark reality of Dutch colonialism, which actually sustained the almost illusory power of the priyayis is rendered analytically marginal. The idea is thus presented in a delusional narrative. It is delusional "in as much as it administers dimensions of silence as soon as it begins;"
it establishes a narrative which forcefully leaves out other possible explanations. (79) The result is that as it becomes more and more coherent, it also becomes more and more mythical.

Anderson is, therefore, liable to the charge of falling into the babads' unselfconscious practice of what Shapiro calls "naturalization"(80) as if what the Javanese classics narrate is a natural state. Forgotten is the fact that in politics there is no such thing as a natural state. Politics are always soaked with contestations, which give birth to discontinuities. This fact of the eternal presence of contestations and discontinuities is too obviously suppressed in most of the Javanese classics. While the texts practise politics, they do their utmost to hide them. The politics they practise is, therefore, the politics of mystification.

In a word, the error of Anderson, like Moertono before him, lies in his failure to "historicize" the Javanese idea of power. He still moves with Geertz's postulate which sees "ideology as a cultural system," and yet he ends up inaugurating "culture as an ideological system." That is to say, as the claimed culture is not there, the idea he is propagating is actually not that of any culture, but that of ideology—the ideology of Javanese traditionalism. For the moment we historicize the texts, we would encounter the very opposites of the values or virtues claimed by the
idea. Such a reading would lay bare the vacuity of the idea.

Historization would unravel the alus doctrine as disguising cowardly deceptions and treacheries; asceticism as camouflaging inordinate greed for earthly comforts; sepi ing pamrih as masking the pathological obsession for worldly gains; concentration of power and tata tentrem kerta rahardja as concealing chronic polity fragmentations and rampant poverty and sufferings the rulers visited upon the general populace.

A contesting reading, therefore, becomes all the more necessary as we strongly suspect that the Javanese' obsession to power increased its grip precisely when what used to be Javanese rulers had been rendered powerless. The appearance of puffed-up namings such as Pakubuwono (Nail of the Universe) and Hamengkubuwono (Sustainer of the Universe) was concurrent with the unmistakable "puppeteering" of the Javanese princes by the Dutch East India Company. Such world-power assuming was completely lacking in the names of precolonial kingdoms throughout Indonesia. It was also around this period that the telling and retelling of babads proliferated. The stratagem is obvious. The self-glorifying namings and babads were magical incantations thrown into the game of politics as a kind of discursive aggression.
In fairness to Anderson, we should mention that he presents the idea not because he is in favor of it, but in order to show how it works and what its correlates are in real world. Like many concerned scholars in and outside Indonesia, he is strongly against it. It is because his strong opposition to the idea—or to what he considered as the reality correlates of the idea—that he tries his best to vivify its reality.(82) But it is here that he falls into the babad stratagem: to impress the reality of what is essentially a mantra writ large.

A mantra is directly related to the "rationality" of magic. Magic-practising people know no distance (or intervening historical processes) between reality and wish, or between intention and objective. It is the mantra which rules out the distance and the process of becoming.(83)

Entrapped in the mantra logic, Anderson gives us speedy explanations of some of the crucial problems faced by the country. He argues that widespread corruption due to the resurgence of patrimonialism—the administrative mode of the idea—during the post-independence period contributed to stability in Indonesia. He also maintains that Sukarno's Nasakom,(84) Sukarno's and Suharto's opposition to decentralization, and Sukarno's populism as it was expressed in his favorite maxim Penyambung Lidah Rakyat (Conduit of People's Voice) were all but a twisted trick to reenter the ideal leader "as the concentrated focus of the
Power" and as exemplifying *sembada*.(85) The singularity of explanation no doubt contributes to a strong analytical coherence.

But these powerful—because-of-coherence explanations will be seriously contested once we see the idea as something valorized and thence get into the diverse and many times incoherent processes of becoming in history. Rather than prompted by patrimonialism, the widespread corruption within the bureaucracy, was a function of the notorious, centuries-long perpetuation of the niggardly salary system of the Dutch East India Company and, subsequently, the Netherlands East Indies government.(86) And just as VOC was unable to stand the chronic corruptions in its body, in no way did or would it contribute to economic or political stability in modern Indonesia.

Likewise, the principal foundation of Sukarno's populism should be related not with the Javanese idea of power, but with the reigning discourses of Liberalism, Marxism, and Reform Islam. The pergerakan advocates of these ideologies took side with and found a responsive cord from among the impoverished rakyat. The inegalitarian discourse of Javanese traditionalism never reigned among the populace during the era of the pergerakans. Neither had it in the post-independence period nor during the 1970s.(87)

Probably the best nullifier of Anderson's notion about the real character of Sukarno's populism comes from Sukarno
himself. If Anderson, following Moertono, relates the concept *chakrawartin* to a supreme ruler, Sukarno explicitly relates it to the *Rakyat*. (88) Sukarno's objection to decentralization and regional autonomy has less to do with the dicta of the idea than with the real threat of national fragmentation. The same is true with Suharto. Rebellion after rebellion threatened to tear the country apart from 1948 until 1965. Finally, Sukarno's *Nasakom* was, again, hardly a fulfilment of *sembada*. More likely, it was a direct, if anachronistic, continuation of Sukarno's strategy of the mobilization of meanings in the 1920s.

Apart from the will to politicize mantra, it is equally possible that the idea was largely prompted by what Geertz calls the real, the summation of what a people wants to believe as normal or making sense. The desperate attempt of the court literati to realize the unreal, to preserve the relative self-centeredness of their own universe, should be seen in this context. Hence the identification of Jan Pieterszoon Coen as "our own Moer Jangkung." (89)

The idea constituted a direct response to the painful experience of what Manfred Henningsen aptly calls *Verfremdung*. (90) It is along this line of argumentation that we should read Soedjatmoko's rejection of the ethic of *Wedhatama*--a derivative of an Old Javanese text, which he deems as conveying the spirit of *Weltverneinung*. (91) In any case, the idea is parasitic to both nature and history.
It claims nature where it is by no means natural and history where the sole reasoning is mythical.

Finally, 3) Anderson's thesis is based on so-called Javanese cyclical and cosmocentric conception of time.(92) This explains why any preoccupation on legitimacy and morality in the idea becomes irrelevant. The allegation that the Javanese remain subscribers of such a notion of time should be seriously questioned. As Sartono Kartodirdjo suggests in his discussion of Serat Pralambang Jayabaya, an old Javanese text of the early eighteenth century, the Javanese philosophy of history, world view and cognitive structure have changed.

The serat clearly indicates that the Indic cyclical conception of time has long been supplanted by the Islamic linear conception. The millenarian phenomenon of Imam Mahdi is here placed in the growing of the Javanese concern with the ethical and the legitimate. Thus messianism as a Weltanschauung, which in Kartodirdjo's view is ultimately oriented to what he calls "eschaton," is essentially egalitarian in character.(93) People are rewarded in the hereafter not according to blood or ancestry, but according to their personal deeds. Thus Kartodirdjo argues that there has been a shift in the Javanese conception of time--from the cyclical, or what Geertz calls the "pulsative," to the linear; from the meaninglessness of human life to a concern of purpose, of telos, and of meaningfulness.
H.J. de Graaf and Th. Pigeaud suggested a much earlier period for the change. They maintain that great changes in world view and in culture already occurred with the increasing spread of Islam in the fifteenth century. (94) Social arrangements through rigid caste considerations were then supplanted by more egalitarian ways. P.J. Zoetmulder concludes in *Kalangwan*, a recommended study concerning Old Javanese literature, that by the end of the 17th century, "Java's transition to Islam was complete." (95)

Therefore, it should not come as a surprise when Kartini spoke for the rakyat in 1900 (96) irrespective of the fact that she was a daughter of a bupati in Central Java. She was renown as Indonesia's early "feminist" and "emancipationist." The unprecedented and revolutionary movement of the rakyat in Sarekat Islam, which originated in Java, as well as the struggle of Tjipto Mangoenkesoemo and Haji Misbach must also be seen in this light.

We are not saying that the old conception of time has been entirely supplanted. A limited circle among the priyayis and aristocracy might yet see the necessity of perpetuating the conception for whatever reason. As late as 1927, Tan Malaka still chided his fellow countrymen:

> You 55,000,000 people of Indonesia, you will not possibly become independent, as long as you have not thrown all the "dirt" of magic out of your heads, as long as you still hold to the ancient
culture which is full of fallacies, resignation, and fossilized notions, as long as you still have a slave mentality.(97)

But the grip of the cyclical/pulsative/cosmocentric conception of time has given way to a linear/historical/anthropocentric correlate. While this gives room for humans' endeavor to program their life, it also made people see the old social arrangement critically. Gone was the mediaeval conception which divided humanity into rigid castes.

The new conception inevitably demanded an egalitarian society. Within the large Muslim community, the modernity/egalitarian discourse and practices began to have the upper hand in the early decades of the twentieth century.(98) As discussed in Chapter IV and VI, they moved forward with the ideas of Reform Islam as well as with that of Western socialism and liberalism, which continued to hold sway, particularly with the onslaught of modern economy and technologies of communication.

Confusing Sukarno's authoritarianism with adherence to the idea is thus missing the point. Most of his rhetorical citations of Old Javanese symbolism were a purchase on the fighting spirit, on the necessity of righting the wrong and unjust, and on patriotism. In his work, we can hardly find any indication that Sukarno ever bought the cyclical conception of time of the Old Javanese. He stood squarely with Marx in his teleological understanding of history. His
repeated invocation of "historische Notwendigkeit" signifies a belief that progress and overcoming constitute the iron law of history.(99)

**Locating Indonesia's Inegalitarianism**

We can locate at least a number of factors which were at work in perpetuating inegalitarianism in Indonesia. In the first place, we should mention the return of the priyayi mode of bureaucracy beginning early in the 1950s, which was colonially inherited.

We will remember that in general bupatis had long been accustomed to "settling" social problems under their jurisdiction not through consultations with the people, but through orders from their Dutch superiors. They hardly ever composed independent authorities. If they were excessively submissive to their ruler, they were authoritarian to their subordinates, particularly to the peasantry. Now where they served no effective ruler, they served only themselves.(100) As Sartono Kartodirdjo has maintained, the bureaucracy Indonesia inherited from the colonial period "has not developed as a legal-rational bureaucracy."(101)

An unfortunate coincidence exacerbated this situation. Sukarno "took over" the government by changing the parliamentary system unilaterally into the presidential one with the return to the 1945 Constitution.(102) Sensing that something had gone wrong, the leaders of PSI (the
Indonesian Socialist Party) and Masyumi (the League of Indonesian Muslims), mounted an opposition to many of Sukarno's subsequent political moves. Concurrently, the Outer Islands began to feel unfair economic and political treatment by the central government. Before long they translated the feeling into stronger means of opposition.

This opposition culminated in a number of "rebellions" in Aceh, West Java, South Sulawesi, West Sumatra, and North Sulawesi. The PRRI-Permesta "rebellion" of the last two regions involved some leaders of PSI and Masyumi. Sukarno used that as a pretext to ban both parties. Thus a government without opposition was first introduced in Indonesia, which essentially betrayed the principle of checks and balances sanctioned in the Constitution and for some time was indeed carried out.(103)

Ten years later, it turned out that this move by Sukarno was merely a prelude to further deviation—a gross obliteration of the appropriate mechanism of people's representation by the New Order. Ultimately, this means infringement of the principle of people's sovereignty as it is encoded in the 1945 Constitution. What Anderson calls patrimonialism in modern Indonesia began here.

This non-representational practice in government enabled Suharto to assume power. Supersemar (104) was a mandate from above, not from the rakyat. The fact that Suharto himself is an anak desa (a country lad) does not
nullify the fact that he became a president from above. Structurally, this put him in a position similar to that of the bureaucratic priyayi. Hence the patrimonial character of the New Order.

This character was neatly supported by three related developments: 1) the neglect of genuine representation of the people; 2) the subjection of the entire nation to an unwarranted rule by the few,(105) and, finally, 3) the ever so quick resort to force to get things done. Ruth McVey finds the position of the New Order analogous with that of the Dutch during the late colonial period.

At first blush, the East Indies and the New Order elites appear quite dissimilar: The former was overwhelmingly foreign, the latter indigenous. In the New Order, the military has a hegemonic role, whereas the late colonial was indisputably civilian. But this contrast disguises a fundamental similarity, the fact that both military and colonial rule rested openly on force. They were not legitimate in any terms of local understanding....(106)

It is due to the precarious position of the New Order that the government always tried its best to undermine any political movements enjoying strong popular support as well as any ideology which fails to sanction the ruling of the multitude by the few.

Another factor suppressing egalitarianism is the rise of "militarism" in Indonesia. This has a history of its
own. The Indonesian military grew out of the Indonesian Revolution for independence. From the outset, the Indonesian military was largely independent from the civilian politicians led by Sukarno and Hatta. At times there were even disputes between them, such as the determination of General Sudirman in 1948 to continue waging armed struggle against the Dutch and Sukarno and Hatta's preference to have themselves detained by the Dutch for the sake of diplomacy. (107)

Unlike Mao in China or Ho in Vietnam, Sukarno did not have any interest in the military affairs and was not directly involved in military activities. Neither did he have a military strategy of his own. The problem of Indonesia's army and its distinctive guerilla warfare found no entry in the many writings of Sukarno. (108) This disinterest in military affairs is also reflected in the vague articles about national defense in the Constitution. (109) The unwillingness of the civilian-politicians to join the armed struggle had stigmatized them in the eyes of the army.

But there were four more important developments which boosted the position of the army. When the Young Republic was terrorized by the returning Dutch forces, the army virtually stood alone with the people in the countryside, doing anything it could to continue proving that the Republic still stood. Sukarno and Hatta were then already under Dutch detention.
Secondly, when the Dutch companies were nationalized in 1958 in the wake of the Irian Campaign, the army took control over them. Thirdly, when Sukarno decided in the same year to supplant the parliamentary system and return to the 1945 Constitution, he asked for the support of the army. Finally, it was only thanks to the integrity of the central command of the army that several regional "rebellions" haunting the new nation for almost two decades were put to an end.

In this regard, we should also mention the great conscience and resolution of the first generation Central Command of Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesia's Armed Forces) to pursue its military policy with statesmanship. From then on, the position of the army was unshakeable. Sukarno had to wrestle endlessly with them, in part by giving relatively comparable concessions to the communists.

But as the army grew stronger from the early 1960s, it became more institutionalized, more self-serving, and more demanding. It all began with the doctrine of dual function (dwi fungsi), in which the army claimed itself as both a military and a formal political force. All of a sudden this coincided with the gigantic inflow of capital following the fall of Sukarno. Ben Anderson captures this right to the point:
It was above all this massive inflows, in some years covering 50 percent of the cost of all imports, that allowed Suharto to build, over the course of the 1970s, the most powerful state in Indonesia since Dutch colonial times.... In other words, not only was the power of the state vis-à-vis society vastly enhanced, but within the state the center came decisively to dominate the periphery.(114)

As its interests and role in the economic field also increased, the army freely exacted the lion's share out of the big pie. This monopoly of both economy and politics could neither be done in a democratic way nor in a rational manner. As a result, the army underwent what we might call a process of "priyayization." By this we mean that the increasing corruption by military officers in both economy and politics over time resulted in alienation from the people and collisions with their interests.(115) Most of the known huge embezzlements at the expense of the people involved army officers.

In order to preserve stability and a safe political dominance, the Suharto administration ruled that the Armed Forces be liberally given more than one-fifth of the seats (i.e., 100 out of 460) of non-elected "representatives" in the parliament. Like the institution of priyayism, this meant positioning from above. It outrageously violated the principle of genuine representation, not to mention the already "heavily overrepresented" priyayis at the higher levels of the military institutions.(116)
Another major factor was the age-long makeup of Indonesia's economy. This ex-colonial economy still depended very much on her exports, which implies that only state-owned, state-controlled, and state-related companies, trades, and business could flourish and develop. This also means that cities and the modern sectors in them took precedence over both their rural and traditional counterparts. Here again the Indonesian Chinese—a tiny fraction of the Indonesian populace—were greatly favored. Thee Kian Wie presents this old-new phenomenon very clearly:

As a result of their better access to capital, managerial skills, international business contacts, and no less important, well-placed political connections, Indonesian Chinese were able to move on a large scale into several economic activities, notably manufacturing and services, such as real estate and banking.

...Without much exaggeration it can be said that at present 'the Indonesian Chinese had never had it so good'! (118)

Economic initiatives from below or potential middle-class natives were structurally impaired. As was the case with the Dutch, the bureaucratic priyayis and the military officers had always preferred the Chinese to be their counterpart in economic matters. (119)

Thus reestablished the solid economic structure for inegalitarianism in Indonesia. This structural hindrance was subsequently corroborated in government economic policies and practices. Fixation to growth, export-oriented
economy, and partiality to the urban and modern sectors naturally prevented the growth of a strong middle-class among the Indonesians. This was in turn reinforced by the impolitic practices of the New Order.

With such an imbalance in the economic structure, policies, and practices and with the absence of a political machinery capable of checking the effects of such a structural collusion, an egalitarian social and political relations failed to surface.

It is certainly not the hegemony of the priyayi meaning system which brought all this about as Anderson's idea would put it. Rather, here we were confronted with what I elsewhere refer to as "a historical coincidence."(120) By historical coincidence, I mean the comfortable symbiosis between the ruling priyayi/military and the economic forces of the core capitalist countries. It forms a symbiosis precisely because

while the economically hegemonic from the outside needs an ally which is politically 'legitimate' within the host country, the politically ruling inside needs an ally from outside capable of supporting and preserving its privileges by means of modern armaments and expertise against the bulk of the population..., which is to be exploited.(121)

What we basically have in this apparently novel situation of post-Sukarno was the reenactment of the colonial practices in economic and political relations. The same
beneficiaries inside the country scarcely change. They were the Chinese, the priyayis and the priyayized military. Only the foreign beneficiaries are pluralized. The rakyat in general remain economically and politically enfeebled.

Finally, and probably most important of all, major forces of egalitarianism in Indonesia--representing Islam, Communism, Social Democrats and/or Western liberals--in the 1950s and 1960s were strongly suspicious and contentious of each other. Perhaps, and this is ironic, their contentiousness among each other was even more so than that of each of them against the non-egalitarian forces. They had not overcome their oldtime prejudices of each other.

The result is that these forces of egalitarianism were decidedly divisive. There were unyielding contentions between Islam versus Communism and Communism versus Social Democracy. We can also find intraideological contentions between the "traditionalists" and the "modernist" Muslims and between the nationalist communists and the communist internationalists.

This situation was not found within the inegalitarian forces irrespective of their far-flung ethnic, national, or cultural orientations. Javanese priyayis, Dutch colonizers, the Chinese middlemen, and the multinational capitalists have always gone neatly hand in hand. Here the symbiotic cooperation seemed to work so effortlessly.(122) This was
the case both in the colonial and particularly during the post-colonial periods.

Certainly the blame should not be put solely on what we might brand the belligerent tendencies of Indonesia's rakyat-privileging ideologies. Egalitarianism was directly related to the problems of power/resources distribution, or to the vicious circle embedded in the structure of the country's economy. Unlike the case with England and America prior, during and after the Industrial Revolution and the Civil War,(123) Indonesian egalitarianism did not move with the backbone of a growing middle-class, the main reasons for which we have discussed in Chapter V.

We will remember that at variance with the British policy in India, which let the Indian middle-class grow along with the establishment of British markets, the Dutch in the East Indies crushed every native contender in the field. If the Dutch granted a social group to do subordinate trading and commercial activities at all, it did so not for the Indonesians, but for the Chinese.

Here lies what we have referred to as the ingenuity of the Dutch colonial scheme to master both the economic and political situations. They could enjoy the work of a middle-class without being politically endangered by its economic growth. The Chinese were numerically too small and culturally too alienated to pose any significant political
danger. The Chinese were still, if in a rather surreptitious manner, forced structurally into alienation from the rest of the society. (124) To a great extent, it was the very colonial scheme that the New Order had been following in order to stay in power.

Paradoxically, criticisms against inegalitarian practices were often launched vigorously from among those circles which strongly supported them. The inegalitarian practices encrusted within the priyayi sub-culture have been strongly attacked among others by the descendants of the priyayis. Likewise, among the military and the Chinese, we have encountered from time to time voices of clear conscience, glimpses of vision of what Indonesia's future should be. (125) Without implying that hope might in the near future arise from the majority of the priyayis and the Chinese, which--given their sociological conditions--is unlikely, things do many times end up contrary to the initial course. But by no means Indonesia's egalitarianism depends on this chance alone. It has its own bulwarks.

Having mounted a critical appraisal of and an alternative explanation to what we call the enduring school of interpretation which has reigned so long in the Indonesian studies, we need to uncover some of the other side of the story.
UNCOVERING THE OTHER SIDE: 
THE EGALITARIAN CONSCIOUSNESS AND LANGUAGE 

Throughout Chapter IV and Chapter VIII we have dis- 
cussed the origins, sources, and unfolding of the egalitar- 
ian consciousness in Indonesia. To capture exhaustively the 
origins and sources of that consciousness in the land is 
next to impossible. All we can be sure of is the plurality 
of origins and sources. 

Allowing for the plurality of determination will in 
part prevent us from being entrapped in our modern bias as 
if egalitarian notions were completely lacking in 
pre-modern civilizations. (1) At the same time, this will 
save us from excluding the contribution of, for instance, 
institutionalized rationalizations in the colonial bureau-
cracy, including such a short-lived reform by Daendels and 
Raffles (2) or such a sham body as the Volksraad. To know 
the sham as sham is also part of the making of the 
consciousness. 

The role of Dutchmen who sincerely sympathized with 
the plight of the rakyat also left its indelible mark. 
Figures like Multatuli, Van Deventer, J.H. Abendanton, 
Setiabudhi, Jan Romein and many others will always be 
related with the rise of the egalitarian nationalism, the
memory of whom will be forever cherished by the Indonesian people.

During the reign of the New Order, the society was also significantly transformed from the agrarian to the industrial society. Here and there mechanical solidarity turned to be more organic, achievement orientations were substituted more for the ascriptive. Since the first decades of the century there was a drastic decline of Indonesian parents sending their children into traditional schools. The increasing importance and accessibility of standardized and/or higher education within the society at large clearly mirrored such a transformation.

At the individual level, S. Takdir Alisjahbana was perhaps the most relentless of all Indonesians in advocating the change of orientation from the old feudal cosmology to a new world view, which emphasized dynamism and freedom. Alisjahbana also lured his countrymen to have the courage to enter the new world in accordance with the command of reason.(3)

Herbert Feith maintains that Indonesians were forced to realize the necessity of modern technology and efficient economic organizations not only for development, but first and foremost for their country's own survival.(4) But more important was the consciousness of Indonesians to break with their past, to acknowledge that they belonged to a
people different from their ancestors. In the words of Alisjahbana:

It is very important to point out that [the nation] began in the 20th century, was conscious and determined to follow a new path for its people and country. The eras prior to it, which stretched to the end of the nineteenth century was pre-Indonesian. The eras were completely ignorant of the Indonesian character and cognizant only of the history of Oost Indische Compagnie, of the history of Mataram, of Aceh, of Banjarmasin....(5)

This statement emphasizes a belief in the distinctly dynamic and egalitarian principle upon which the new nation was built. Similar statements can be found in the works of Mangoenkoesoemo, Tan Malaka, Sukarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir. Revolution in communication—in mass media and land-aerial transportation with the speed and magnitude unimaginable at the turn of the century—also greatly helped the spread of egalitarian ideas.

Of paramount importance was the social determination of world economy. The distribution of goods and services was now increasingly determined by market relations and the more the market economy penetrated into the remotest crevices of the land, the more the people were forced to move away from their traditional moorings and obsolete hierarchies. A more equalitarian social relations would very likely have been Indonesia's fate much earlier had the economic evolvement in the land not intruded by Dutch
colonialism. Barring dependency relations between nations, rational considerations of the market economy took precedence over caste-cleavage arrangements.

This chapter will deal specifically with the staying consciousness of citizens' rights and dignity and the persistence of egalitarianism in the character and practices of Bahasa Indonesia throughout decades following Indonesia's independence.

**Consciousness of Citizen's Rights**

We need to emphasize that the rise of pergerakans with their discourses and practices cannot be understood apart from consciousness of the necessity of equalitarian social relations. This consciousness became more widespread during the subsequent periods. At times it found expressions in open resistance in Java and enduring rebellions in the Outer Islands.

The relative absence of major armed resistance under the New Order should not be taken to signify the weakening of the consciousness. Rather, it should be judged as reflecting the increasing coercive power of the state whose bureaucratic octopus had never before penetrated as deep into the body of the society. (6)

But even with the increasing power of the state, the consciousness remained firm and was expressed in various ways. To perceive the prevalence of the consciousness at
the time when suppression was rampant is to see its tenacity. In any case, both Sukarno and Suharto had learned from time to time that they could not conduct state affairs at their own will with impunity.

There are two ways of detecting Indonesian consciousness of citizens' rights as from the period of Guided Democracy. One is by looking carefully at the occasions of people's physical protests against felt infringements.(7) The other is by disclosing the discursive efforts among the educated section of the people to unravel such infringements. To be sure, physical protests and discursive practices cannot be separated. They are as close as what people think and do.

The present discussion is not given to the first approach. But a brief observation concerning the political dynamics of both the Guided Democracy (1958-1965) and the New Order (1966-1980), which served as the backdrop of such reactions and protests, would be of help in situating the second approach and in giving a sense of reality to the discursive practices we are to present.

The regimes of both Sukarno and Suharto adopted what we might call the politics of no constituency. Ever since his imprisonment following the hectic campaign of the earlier PNI from 1927 till 1929, Sukarno never had a party of his own.(8) Suharto had been with the bureaucracy from the very beginning.(9) In spite of the great ideological
differences between them, both leaders were actually rootless in terms of organized party politics.

And yet Suharto's position was markedly different from that of Sukarno in that the former had the support of a well-organized army behind him. We can also mention the support of the Functional Group (Golkar). But this group was merely an outright extension of government bureaucracy sponsored by the government-military coalition to assure Suharto's incumbency. It was by no means a party capable of standing on its own.

As party politics had been a reality for many decades, the rootless leaders had to resort to incessant political manipulations. However, politics based on sheer manipulations is bad politics. It tends to be suicidal. Political manipulation by both the Guided Democracy and the New Order bred corruption in many fields.

This implies the spread of a culture of unaccountability, which were particularly devastating if practiced by the state's top officials. Both Sukarno and the army attacked party politics and by so doing undermined the very foundation of the people's channels for participation. Their decision-making process invariably moved from top to bottom, not so much because they were elitist or authoritarian from the outset as because of the rootlessness of their power.
Most of the regional "rebellions" had less to do with ideological incompatibilities than with the lack of a conducive atmosphere for an undistorted communication between Jakarta and the Outer Islands. The abruptness and the magnitude of national tasks to handle after the Dutch transfer of sovereignty in 1950 exacerbated the situation.

There were personal rivalries among the military officers and inter-party greed. Also widespread were vicious bickerings and political intrigues, including that of the communists as they managed to build a stronger position around Sukarno. The distortive factors just mentioned tended to becloud the essentially egalitarian essence of the regions' demands.

Criticisms against Sukarno came from a number of important quarters. Mohammad Natsir, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Mohammad Hatta, S. Takdir Alisjahbana, Kahar Muzakkar, M.H. Lukman, Moehammad Slamet, D.N. Aidit, as well as the Evangelical Church of Kalimantan had all raised voice against the authoritarian tendency or against other aspects/practices of the Guided Democracy even before it was formally adopted.

One of the strongest criticisms was that launched by Djojohadikusumo. In "The Failings of Sukarno," he points out that the dismal economic and political condition made it very hard for the common people even to survive. All this resulted from the policy pursued by Sukarno.
Djojohadikusumo concludes that Sukarno and his cliques should step down if improvement was desired. He charges Sukarno as fully responsible for the negative consequences of edging out people who had the will, competence, and integrity to materialize the ideals of the Republic.

Djojohadikusumo rightly observes that Sukarno's self-serving politics of pitting major political groups against one another had been detrimental to the morale and values of the "politicos" which escorted Sukarno. The importance of Sumitro's ideas warrants a longer quotation:

Under such circumstances...the problems that are of real and vital importance to the masses have seldom been seriously tackled. True, our people have been made to swallow dose after dose of high-sounding formulae that may have served as opiates but that have contributed next to nothing to the actual alleviation of the burdens of daily life.... This is particularly true when they cannot be assessed against criteria appropriate to concrete efforts in the realities of the social process and becomes even more dramatically obvious when in a given situation the confrontation with the realities demonstrates actions and behavior that are in flagrant contravention of the self-righteous formulae and concepts wielded by the ruling cliques....

Or, as has happened under Sukarno's rule, the point comes where only those interpretations are considered as "right" and "correct" that suit the tempers and the capricious whims of the powers that be.

Next to Djojohadikusumo, we should mention Alisjahbana. In one of his articles, he lunges a vigorous criticism against the concentration of the nation's capital in Jakarta and the "offensive favoritism" and "unbridled
negligence and bureaucracy" in handling the already small share allocated to the Outer Regions. (17) With the political elite in Jakarta immersed in the "struggle for power, rank, and riches," nothing could be expected of "more polite warnings, protests, and resolutions." (18) Alisjahbana warns that the progress of Jakarta alone by no means represented Indonesia's development.

Undeniably Djakarta, as the center of government and business, has exhibited extremely rapid progress.... If Djakarta conditions were a gauge to the conditions of the country as a whole, we could well be proud of Indonesia's progress and development. But what are we to say of the real situation, in which Djakarta, with its population of top officials and business leaders who are all tied to each other by a whole range of political and financial connections, is like a fat leech sucking on the head of a fish, the fish being Indonesia? The leech sucks blood from the body of the fish and so grows fatter and fatter while the fish, losing blood, gets thinner. (19)

The New Order was characterized by an even greater concentration of power and capital and an even severer suppression in a number of conceivable fields. With the systematic emasculation of political parties and critical figures, the students took over the task of resistance. In December 1974, students' demonstrations erupted into anti-Japanese (or disguised anti-Chinese) violence and riots in the main streets of Jakarta, burning and demolishing mostly Japanese cars and setting a part of Jakarta's biggest shopping center on fire. (20)
Who began the riots will perhaps remain unknown. (21) Factors prompting it were mixed. We can mention the perceived arrogance of the Japanese entrepreneurs in Jakarta and the conspicuous growth of the *nouveaux riches* with their inordinate consumptiveness in the midst of the growing or perceived poverty among the poor. We can also mention the partiality of development programme to the minorities, which were already strong economically. Besides, the general doubt concerning the correctness of the development strategy and the government's neglect of seriously handling so-called "excesses" of development helped heighten the social tension. (22)

Students' major demonstrations continued until 1978. The damaging blow came with the publication of the White Book signed by Heri Akhmadi, chairman of the Student Council of the Bandung Institute of Technology (BIT). It directly damaged Suharto's public image due to the rapacity of corruption and what many thought as outright violations of the ideals of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. (23)

Irrespective of its dilettantism, the White Book was a "cogent" and solid attack on the economic and political practices of the New Order. Soon the tanks of the military broke into the walls of the universities in a number of the country's major cities, chasing and beating the students, confiscating their documents, banning their publications, and setting down rules to "normalize" campus life. (24)
Of the protests of the masses of the poor, we should mention two major instances of unrests occurring in Bandung in 1973 and in Muncar, East Java, in 1974. The latter involved "two or three thousand" small nelayan (traditional fishermen using traditional means of gathering fish) against "the intrusion of the Chinese" using big motorized boats and huge seine nets.(25) A similar uprising took place in Bagan Siapi-api, North Sumatra. But what happened in 1980 seems to be of a greater scale, which is perhaps comparable only to the destructiveness of the so-called students' riot of 1974. On November 22, 1980 mass disturbances occurred in the town of Solo, which had as their apparent cause long standing anti-Chinese feeling. The disturbances spread to several other towns in Central Java (Semarang, Klaten, Ungaran, Kudus, Jepara, Boyolali) and even as far as East Java. It was later reported that eight people had died and dozens were injured. The aim of the masses was the destruction of the property of the Chinese or of Indonesians of Chinese descent.(26)

All these instances indicate that some sense of dignity or justice among the poor or among the lower middle class had been violated. Only with the accumulation of felt violations could the destructive spontaneity of the masses occur with the frequency and the severity it had.(27)

The frequency and the severity of violations of what people regard as meaningful or as their rights are probably best seen through the critical discursive practices of the
learned section of the society. Here also one scarcely finds a lacuna of protests.

As mentioned above, the voice raised by the Student Council of BIT through the publication of their White Book had damaged the image of the Suharto regime. It was image-damaging precisely because while it was outspoken and to an extent convincing, it was also carried out in the open and directed to the general public. (28) Here most of the major encroachments in the political, economic, and legal fields were plainly presented.

But no less important is the fact that the strong criticisms were launched from Bandung, the city in which Sukarno delivered *Indonesia Accuses!*—a defense attack against the corruptions and the illegitimacy of the colonial regime fifty years earlier. It is clear that the White Book made use of the coincidence and judiciously uncovered the same line of arguments: the corruptions and illegitimacy of Suharto's regime. It is thus understandable why the students' activities were harshly met with punishment.

In the political field, the Book's first target was the parliament, which it accused as incapable of "channelling the aspirations of the people" and failed to serve "as an effective institution for control." (29) Cases of huge corruptions concerning Palapa, Pertamina, Bulog, Bank Bumi Daya, mausolea for Mrs. Tien Suharto, most of
which involved millions of dollars, were all disclosed unceremoniously. (30) With all these corruptions, the parliament, according to the White Book, did its job for the sake of appearance only and existing problems were never really attacked. (31)

The Book identifies two reasons why the parliament functioned as "simply a spectator." In the first place, the members of the parliament were largely appointed by the president and where some were elected, the list was also scrutinized and decided upon by the government. This made both the parliament and/or the People's Consultative Assembly unconstitutional. (32) People of courage and integrity were deemed dangerous and were dropped off the list. (33)

Secondly, the General Election under the Suharto regime followed the proportional representation, rather than the electoral district system. As observed in Chapter IX, both the candidates and regional constituents were appointed by the president. In effect the members of the parliament became responsible not to any constituency, but solely to the president. (34) Neither the people at large nor the constituencies of individual members had any control over them whatsoever. Parliament was so crippled that "it can no longer make use of its right of enquete [investigation], its right of interpellation, and its right to determine the budget. (35)
The White Book expresses the students' anger at famines occurring several times in the remote countryside, which were unheard of. With all the political power centralized and the media muzzled, there was just no mechanism effective enough to convey feedback regularly to the "center." (36) Moreover, in order not to chance any single weak point, the New Order also created a watertight machinery whereby government control bodies were rendered meaningless. The Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan (BPK) or the Accounting Office and the Mahkamah Agung (Supreme Court) were thus incapable of fulfilling their true function as examiner of the government's financial and legal conduct. (37) As the Book puts it, the end result is that,

The innermost voice of the little people, who live under the oppression and repression of the "elite" forces, never reaches the ears of the government.... Thus a system in which the city people exploit the villagers, the rich oppress the poor, private cars elbow city buses out into the slow lanes, wealthy idiots kick aside poor bright people, non-native businessmen kill off native businessmen, etc., goes on and on, and the oppressed have no way of stopping it. There aren't any complaints about it in Parliament any more." (38)

With respect to the economic field, the students censured government's obsession to increase the GNP by sacrificing everything else, which meant only those sectors readily contributing to the objective would be included in development-related activities. Sectors beyond that were
considered recipients of the downward trickles, which was but an excuse. (39)

Even more outrageous in the students' eyes was the fact that government credits scarcely reached the Indonesians proper. As observed earlier, most of those credits fell into the hands of the Chinese. (40) Here the students revealed a bitter story: while big embezzlements of credits occurred in the hands of the non-natives, it was "their per capita income that has increased many times over." (41) The rakyat themselves remained poor, even poorer. (42)

The accusations of the White Book are also animated by the spirit of Indonesian nationalism. This is explicit in the language the Book deploys, for instance, as it reports the behavior of a foreign company in Garut, West Java. The Book writes that the company has "drained off all the water from the wells of the people nearby," razing the people's dwellings and rice-fields—all for the sake of the "'development' of industrial centers, luxury hotels, real estate projects." (43) The people "have not been able to stop all this, even though they are the legitimate owners of this country!" (44) The reason according to the Book was simple. What was adopted by the authorities in the field of law were "legal sanctions for ordinary people, legal protection for bigshots." (45)

Another brewing issue with a nationalistic overtone was the government's rice price policy. The price of rice
produced by Indonesian farmers was set arbitrarily low by the government as it paid more for the rice imported from South Korea, Japan, and Australia. This meant that the Indonesian government helped foreign farmers at the expense of the Indonesian cultivators. Dictated by the same government's principle of political stability, this price "freezing" was extended to other kinds of farmers' produce. "They face a fixed-price barrier. Yet the same farmers have to pay for the capital goods or production equipments they need at the 'market price.'"

All these vivid descriptions of the abuses of power and of corruptions cast serious doubts of the legitimacy of Suharto's regime. They were presented to support the Book's opening declaration that the students of the BIT "DO NOT TRUST AND DO NOT WANT SUHARTO TO BE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AGAIN."

Three years following the students' indictment, a stronger charge against the practices of the New Order was published by the Legal Aid Institute in Jakarta. Called Human Rights Report: Indonesia 1980, the publication begins by unraveling what went on with the dependent and weak economic groups. The Report recognizes that the government had drawn up a plan devised to counter population pressure by stepping up the programme of family planning and by directing economic efforts toward the opening up of economic opportunities. A measure of success was indeed achieved by
the plan. However, the success was still grossly offset by the unwelcome effects of the development projects as a whole.

The Report is cautious not to place the entire blame on the government. For one thing, the sheer size of the low-income population militated against efforts to implement a minimum wage policy. Small industries were by and large synonymous with low wages and, accordingly, had only a very limited capacity to attract workers. In addition, while industrial sectors were not capable of absorbing the labor force pouring into the cities, agricultural intensification in the rural areas had turned many villagers into an army of the landless and the unemployed.

Nonetheless, the Report is unequivocal in disclosing that the general trend clearly indicated the government partiality at the expense of the low- or moderate-income groups. They were marginalized by the steps of economic policy such as the introduction of labor-saving technology in the cities and in the rural/agricultural sector without considering its effect upon traditional industries and traditional fields of employment. Of similar effect to the less fortunate was the provision of economic infrastructure and modern economic facilities for the rich in accordance with "economic development" and export-oriented economy. (50)
Thus the Report maintains that development programmes in Indonesia has created a "dominant-dependence" structure. This is due to the arrangement whereby those circles close to political power and authority, controlling economic resources at the various levels of power, have had the opportunity to obtain facilities to develop their own positions, and at the same time weaken other groups. In other words, several development programmes have in reality created an economic distortion consistently detrimental to the weak group in society.(51)

The Report emphasizes that the entire domain of government jurisdiction was geared in such a way to ease development programmes for the sake of the ruling elite and the minority. Political participation worked only for the elite.

The Report seriously questions the wisdom of this policy.(52) It suggests that even the limited political participation allowed the people was progressively shrinking. This becomes clear as it compares the participation of the "central group," which was widely open, with those of "the periphery." As the consolidation of political power was denied the latter, whereas every facility to that effect was given the former, the participation for the many was bound to wither. The latter's participation was only needed in times of "crisis" or during general elections.(53)
The question of the function of mass media was also seriously raised. Rather than serving as the primary source of information, the mass media was transformed into the "society's watchdog" in the interest of those in power. (54) The dismissal of 15,000 timber workers in East Kalimantan scarcely found any coverage in the press because it was not in the ruler's interest. (55)

The media were extremely cautious not to get caught as spreading haatzaai artikelen, a legal stipulation against provoking animosity particularly against the government, which was inherited from the Dutch. They were even obliged to practice "self-censorship"—which, in effect, means forcing the journalists to internalize the sensibilities of the regime so that they would always be on their guard not to transgress them.

It was clearly a normalization of docility in the media whose important function is to exert control. In fact, all kinds of laws were issued to make sure that not a single avenue existed to tamper with the wishes and the whims of those in power.

The Haatzaai artikelen limit the freedom of spreading information and opinion; the Anti-Subversion Act makes the interpretation of "subversion" so elastic that an awful lot of things can be classified as subversion; many labor regulations approve of the oppression of workers by employers; the Act of Political Parties and Mass Organizations limits the right of political organizations to exist in a whole range of ways for the sake of simplifying the
political structure; the Act on General Elections prevents people from coming to the ballot-box with true freedom to choose; and the Act on Village Administration destroys the democratic rembug desa (village consultative body) and replaces it with the hierarchical bureaucracy. All these are limitation on human rights legally implemented and approved by our positive law.(S6)

Thus the Report makes us aware that with such an accomplished legal arsenal, all kinds of violations and infringements befalling the weak and the poor either went unheeded by the authorities or ceased to count as violations/infringements. Indonesia's judiciary suffered from the Court Mafia (Mafia Peradilan), which enabled the rich and the strong to win the majority of cases involving them.(S7) Even if the court brought in a verdict in favor of the poor, the rich were always able to find ways not to comply with the verdict.(S8)

On top of all this, the government introduced, following the crush of the campuses in 1978, a systematic policy to curb the last bastion of freedom in the country—the voice of university students. The Report writes that at this stage, not only the students but the entire academia were forbidden to engage in what the authorities called "practical politics." This included conferring honorary doctorates by a university rector without the approval of the Ministry of Education and Culture.(S9) Most telling in this regard was the very name used by that policy, Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus (Normalization of Campus Life). The
totally unreflective use of the word "normalisasi" only revealed the true character of the regime.

The demand of the normalization was plain and the assumption self-evident. Students and faculties were to stop engaging in demonstrations, speeches, publications, even meetings intended to denounce the development programmes as well as the logic which underlay them. The government was to be left completely undisturbed with its serious work to implement the programmes. Political activities had their proper channels, i.e., through existing political parties and the parliament. Projects for development had their men and they all were doing their job fine. The universities were supported by the government in order that the entire academia work conscientiously to create "a scientific community."

The policy was said to be normal, for it squarely stood on the principle of the division of labor. Thus Minister Daud Yusuf argued that already there was "a business community," "a religious community," "an [artist] community." Now all he wanted to establish was "a scientific community." In his view, this was the normal way of conducting life in modern states and nations.

In the eyes of the Report, the whole logic was outrageous because it was based on the very assumption that everything else has been normal in the country, including the discharge of students and lecturers employed by the
universities under pretexts which were not at all academic.(60) The political, economic, and legal marginalization of the majority of Indonesians was under this assumption also considered normal. Put another way, rakyat's right for political participation and self-expression, right for decent and respectable jobs, right to start and to engage in one's own business, and right for protection were all considered abnormal. In the caustic words of the Report,

what is called a scientific community does not create values for the other communities, but it is precisely the values of the other communities that are imposed upon the scientific community.(61)

The White Book and the Human Rights Report are here presented both for the knowledge of what was going on and the students' and intellectuals' resolution to express it. To be sure, they were not alone in raising voice against violations of citizens' rights and dignity.

Known as Petisi 50, fifty statesmen and politicians laid bare in 1980 the serious mistake in Suharto's exclusivist and monopolist view of the state ideology, Pancasila.(62) The petition made it clear that Suharto had interpreted Pancasila at will and degraded it as a mere tool to crush his enemies. This, according to the petition, mocked the ideals of the founders of the Republic.(63) The way Suharto established elitism and marginalized the
majority of the people made, in the eyes of the petitioners, his further rule unwarranted.

In spite of the unpleasant consequences facing all those who had the courage to speak out, individuals and groups kept coming forward to express their critical views on important social matters. (64) The manner these protests were raised was a far cry from the indirect and reluctant ways of "traditional" protests in Java. The White Book, the Report, and critical leaders at large no longer mentioned the principle of Kawula-Gusti, so-called Old Javanese idea of statecraft once raised by Mangoenkoesoemo. This notion has been supplanted by the modern idea of governance in which the citizens were conscious of their rights and dignity, if not of their sovereignty.

Bahasa Indonesia and Egalitarianism

In Chapter III, we have discussed the egalitarian predisposition and practices of the Indonesian language particularly as it is compared with Javanese and Dutch in colonial times. What we now need is to question and answer whether or not such an egalitarian predisposition and practices held ground with the onslaughts of inegalitarian practices, which naturally affected Bahasa as well.

Here again we encounter Benedict Anderson's apposite article. In "The Languages of Indonesian Politics" (1966), Anderson observes that Bahasa Indonesia was increasingly
accepted as the language through which all Indonesians "are coming to grips with modern and ancient realities." (65) He also maintains that the gigantic cultural projects involved and the great success achieved had been "inadequately appreciated" as "the morphology of transformations... insufficiently studied." (66) Curiously, Anderson did not develop this argument further. What he did develop in the article was the reverse.

Bahasa Indonesia in Anderson's view subsumes "Revolutionary Malay," Dutch modalities, and characteristic features from Javanese. All this was "approaching a fusing point" in Bahasa Indonesia. Its revolutionary ethos as it was derived from the amalgamation of the "Revolutionary Malay" and the Dutch of the pergerakan intelligentsia was rapidly dwindling. (67) The situation was not that good for Bahasa as Anderson believes that two decades after the Revolution, "Indonesian is by no means the everyday language of more than a tiny segment of the population." (68)

Anderson holds that the fusing point of Bahasa occurred due to four entwined developments: 1) "the kramanization of public Indonesian," i.e., the making of Bahasa as yet another language of politesse, similar to that of the Javanese krama; 2) the "influx" of Javanese ngoko into Bahasa; 3) "the neutralization or capture of the revolutionary symbols;" and 4) the "Javanese images of politics" based on the cyclical conception of time and of
lakon/dalang (play/puppeteer) understanding of politics, to which mask was indispensable.

This position is further corroborated by Anderson in his 1978 article, "Cartoons and Monuments: The Evolution of Political Communication under the New Order." Here again he argues about the fading away of the revolutionary ethos in Bahasa. But rather than emphasizing "the fusing point," he now relates the passing of "the revolutionary generation," i.e., that generation which was successful in ending both the Dutch and the Japanese occupations.

Anderson holds that the passing of that "revolutionary generation" reintroduced the old [Indic] tradition in which conflicts and no-conflicts were essentially meaningless. Like Geertz's "scripturalist" Islam, the Indonesian Revolution is here looked upon as a mere "interlude," which is to be reclaimed by the endless, faithful repetitions of history. There is no discontinuity; only continuity from time immemorial.

With all this observation, Anderson has, again, presented a provoking thesis concerning the complex phenomenon of language in the land. He intends to show us the dangers Bahasa has been facing or into which it has been transformed.

A balanced reading of Bahasa, however, would seriously contend Anderson's observation and conclusion. Let us begin with the central point: the extent of Bahasa's currency.
It is a common mistake among Indonesianists abroad, particularly those strongly inclined to the symbolic reading or ethnographic studies, to see Indonesia as characterized by a mutually exclusive multi-lingualism. Ethnic languages or vernaculars were still spoken and to a large extent still flourished in most parts of the country. They were used at home, for intimate intraethnic intercourse, and for artistic expressions—some of them were of surpassing beauty.

But the scope of the currency of ethnic languages was limited in a double sense. It was limited within the geographic or demographic confines of the ethnic groups concerned and it was increasingly found by the Indonesians themselves to be either inadequate or unfitting as the language of modern Indonesia. Far more so than in the time of Indonesian pergerakans, the thrust of Bahasa was the more vigorous during the last three decades.

Bahasa was unchallenged in the fields of administration and education. All government offices, just as all public and private schools in Indonesia used the language. Virtually all Indonesian homes from the lower middle class up to the higher class read books, novels, magazines, and newspapers in Bahasa. This had been the case since the early 1950s. They also listened to and/or watch radio, movies, and, later, television—thanks to Palapa communication satellite—using the language.
In addition, the vehicular load of Bahasa was enhanced with the agreement between Malaysian and Indonesian governments to use the same standard of spelling to be shared by the two nations as from August 18, 1972. (70) It would not be exaggerating to say that at least ninety percent of all creative, literary and non-literary, works done in the land, particularly by the younger generations, used Bahasa as their medium. As Khaidir Anwar rightly puts it:

The fact is that the younger generation are not interested enough in promoting their regional languages as compared with their concern to master and cultivate Indonesian. When they come to write, they normally prefer to do so in the national language perhaps in order to have a larger audience as much as to show their Indonesianized orientation. (71)

Local dialects certainly appeared here and there to convey messages or to crack some familiar jokes. But it would be a big mistake to deny that, in spite of the lingering regional dialects, Bahasa increasingly entered not only the Indonesians' public lives throughout the land, but their private activities as well. (72)

In short, Bahasa was not merely a claimed national language as the impression we get from Anderson. It was, indeed, nationally functioning. (73) And it was an effective and intimate language of its own. (74) Neither was it something imposed from above as Khaidir Anwar curiously argues. (75)
It might well be true that knowledge of Dutch by the intelligentsia boosted the capacity of grammatical and rhetorical expressions in Bahasa, that is, by forcing them to systematize Bahasa and create Dutch modern equivalents in it. The Japanese language policy in favor of Bahasa was also seen by some observers as decisive. But these views should not make us overlook the fact observed in Chapter III that many centuries prior to the coming of the Dutch, Bahasa had been used throughout the archipelago, most notably in the markets and harbor areas. And during the colonial times it by no means stopped from flourishing.

With all this understanding of the actual community of Bahasa, the first objection to Anderson's thesis would be that it is, like his thesis concerning the Javanese idea of power, too priyayi-centric. Three of his four-point observation—the kramanization of public Bahasa, the neutralization of the revolutionary ethos, and the predominance of Javanese images of politics—are predicated upon the priyayi subculture, ideology, and way of deploying language.

But these charges were largely vindicated only within the bureaucracy proper. They were hardly applicable in at least three major discursive practices: 1) in the creative fields; 2) in the public/non-official areas, and 3) in the many ethnic and local constituencies of Bahasa.
In the first group we should include the language of many intellectuals and/or scholars, university students, poets, artists, novelists, playwrights, not to mention humorists (both modern and traditional) in general. All of them refused to succumb to the discursive modalities of the priyayis. They were not given to simply parroting the empty rhetoric and metaphors of government officials. On the contrary, the latter's language consistently became the object of their ridicule. Or they simply followed their own modalities, which were generally as open and free as they were critical and people-oriented.

The favorite theme of Arifin C. Noer, Indonesia's renown playwright, bore upon the lives and dreams of the poor. The language he used was that of the common people. Consider the words bandot, bau pete, bunting, goring, bangsat, pesangon, gombal, etc., which he deploys in Kapai-Kapai. Add to this the literal use and visual representation of the word denoting human excrement by Putu Wijaya, another outstanding playwright, in one of his plays. More extremely, there was a radical refusal to use words at all in one of the "teater mini-kata" produced by W.S. Rendra--Indonesia's greatest dramaturge to date.

Yudhistira Ardi Nugraha, a younger writer, openly attacked the priyayi modalities and world view as well as the status-obsessed nouveaux riches in general. Savitri Scherer writes that the main targets of Nugraha's wit and
humor "are the symbols and slogans which enable the privileged to present an altruistic public image while actually promoting their own selfish interests...."(80)

In "Prostitutes of Jakarta, Unite!", Rendra gives us the following lines, "The politicians and senior civilservants/ are a tight bunch of rogues/ Their congresses and conferences/ wouldn't go without you/ You who must never say no/ because of the terror of hunger/ and the yoke of poverty/ and your long futile search for work/ School diplomas were useless/ The section heads/ could only open the door of opportunity/ if you could open your legs."(81)

A piercing attack comes from Minke, the nineteenth century protagonist in the great tetralogy of Pramoedya Ananta Toer, himself a Javanese of priyayi background:

Excuse me for using the word javanism, which might be unsympathetic. What can I do. Couldn't find another word.... In every aspect of life we find this javanist complex. In the power of words, as in mantras. Words are considered to spring from some transcendental power, not of the material world. Not from the society's agreement in naming an object or situation—a symbol for an idea. Words are viewed as magic creations, unconnected with etymology, sequestered from their actual meanings. My people, this people, have been alienated from the development of science, cast out by the winners from Europe, and become the people of the colonial natural preserve.(82)

This anti-krema posture and the taking up of the humanity of the down-trodden stretched deep and wide in the nation's literary world.(83) Sapardi Djoko Damono gives us a
tangible picture of the reigning of this practice in the Indonesian modern literature.\textsuperscript{(84)} He neatly uncovers the consistency of the appearance of the paupers, the dragged away, the expropriated, and those with fester and ringworm who roamed around piles of stinking garbages scraping for food in city slums.

It turns out that from the very beginning our modern literature has become an arena for the portrayal of social inequities, and, furthermore, to express criticisms against the inequities.\textsuperscript{(85)}

The genealogy of this language of anti-politesse should be traced to the language modalities of Chairil Anwar—perhaps still the greatest of Indonesia's poets, Idrus, Achdiat K. Mihardja, Utuy Tatang Sontani, and Armijn Pane of the \textit{Angkatan 45}.\textsuperscript{(86)} The same language was shared by the nation's great artists (Affandi, S. Soedjojono, Hendra), comedians (such as Mang Udel, S. Bagio, Srimulat, Prambors), and a host of intellectuals/scholars, some of whom we have already discussed in the foregoing section. They all refused the language of politesse, work rather to unmask the language, contest the normalizing power of the bureaucracy, demystify the legitimacy and authority in existing institutions, and recapture "the feel of the jostle of words in the mouth."\textsuperscript{(87)}

In the second place, we find the generally contending discourse of the middle and lower class Muslims. They did
not purchase the ontological conceptions of the Old Javanese which animated the discourse of the ruling priyayis. Their language had been strongly characterized by dissent. This language of dissent could easily be found in mosque sermons and speeches, in Islamic *tabligh* and *pengajian* at homes and meeting halls, and in countless Islamic publications.

A pertinent example can be derived from an address by Mohammad Natsir in the *Konstituante* of 1957. He launched an apt criticism to those mystifying Pancasila and using it as a mere shibboleth or ideological weapon. He plainly stated that

nobody denies that there are good ideas in the Pantja Sila. But the explanation given by the supporters of Pantja Sila indicate that they themselves cannot decide what are its true contents, its proper sequence, its source, its nucleus, and the interdependence of its components. Because these are not clear, difficulties will gradually increase. (88)

Like the language of the creative, that of practising Muslims also refused the mythical, the cyclical, the unethical, and the cosmocentric modalities of the bureaucratic language. As if anticipating the rise of "dictatorial" Sukarno and the elitist New Order, as early as 1948 Wiranata Kusuma already wrote that Islam was against absolutism in government. (89) The language of social groups adhering to ideologies which rejected the inegalitarian
status quo as exemplified by the signatories of Petisi 50 also belong to this category.

It is important to remember the historical Bahasa as largely growing and flourishing from among the Muslim traders and organizations throughout the country. The Islamic dynamism, which cut across ethnic lines, necessarily led the Muslims to find in Bahasa a congenial medium for their activities. As discussed in Chapter III, Bahasa was propagated by the Indonesian Muslims and by those falling under their cultural and political influence. The propagation of Bahasa by Sarekat Islam and Muhammadiyah is merely an instance of an already dominant trend among this community, which harks back even long before the coming of the Portuguese around the 15th century.

To discuss Bahasa without duly taking into account its Islamic modalities as Anderson does would be a gross mistake. In other words, his understanding of Bahasa stems largely from his initial position that in this respect there are only two symbolic worlds which count, that of the Dutch and that of the priyayis. The Islamic tradition proper, which was independent and whose vehicular load in the land was perhaps greater than even the Dutch and the priyayi traditions combined, is treated as non-existent.

Finally, the ethnic and national constituency of Bahasa enclosed the priyayi modalities as actually a very small segment in a much larger symbolic corpus actively
contributing to the life of Bahasa. In Java's countryside and along the northern coast, the language practice of the tiny segment of the priyayis was actually eclipsed by the language practice of the santris and the abangans, to use the now tiring categorization by Geertz (92)—simply because of their numerical superiority.

Likewise, people of the western and the eastern parts of Java spoke a much less kramanized language than their brethrens from the hinterland of Central Java. Add to this the different language modalities of other social groups such as the Batak, the Minangkabaus, the Buginese-Makassarese, (93) the Manadonese, and dozens others, then a different contour of the character of Bahasa would appear.

The bilateral agreement of mutual spelling with Malaysia in 1972, realizing the 1957 Indonesia-Malaysia Cultural Agreement, (94) should be seen as further adding to the discursive weight of Bahasa toward a more egalitarian blend. The Malaysians use Bahasa more or less the way people from Sumatra, Borneo, Sulawesi and the Moluccas use it. The reaffirmation of the mutuality of language with Malaysia means the inclusion of at least ten million interlocutors of Bahasa. (95)

In addition, we should include the language of the youngsters, the extreme form of which—was known as bahasa prokem. The modalities of this language practice was clearly anti-krama. It was imbued with the spirit of freedom,
tinged sometimes with an air of naughtiness, in which forms of corrupted or unnecessary authority were cast away.

Further alienated from the priyayi context, the notion of mask occupying so central a place in Anderson's thesis becomes even more suspect. The use of Bahasa in creative and intellectual fields, in the public/non-official domain throughout the land, and among non-Javanese ethnicities in general was scarcely characterized by the willed blurring mode of communication.

In other words, these three groups of Bahasa speakers hardly belonged to what we might call the double-opacity of the priyayi discourse.(96) The crucial difference lies in the fact that even when their language was not at all readily transparent, the three or four (to include the prokem) groups of the carriers of Bahasa were generally not inclined to playing "closed cards" in their interlocution. Unlike the priyayi mode of kehalusan, indirection, and etok-etok,(97) that of the four groups would gladly show their feelings, unabashed by exposure of their real intentions, and talk and reason openly with the general public or with their interlocutors.

The passing away of the Dutch-speaking intelligentsia should not be taken too seriously either. In place of Dutch, which in Indonesia was stigmatized by elitism, English reigned more and more prominent among the younger generations and intellectuals. Indeed, the influence of
English during the last three decades was increasingly contributive to making Bahasa a modern language.

Bahasa took over English words after adjusting their spelling to the Indonesian tongue or promoting Bahasa's own root-words capable of conveying equivalent meanings. While English usage can be regarded as having an elitist tendency of its own, English was also largely perceived as reintroducing afresh the ethos of egalitarianism. Unlike the case with Dutch, the majority of Indonesians learned English in the post-colonial periods. The foreign language was thus relatively untarnished by the social segmentations in colonial/hierarchical terms.

The passing away of Bahasa-Dutch (or krama-Dutch) bilingualism was not an irreplaceable loss to Bahasa as Anderson has put it. Like what the Indonesian Chinese had earlier realized, English provided Indonesians with an even better alternative.

With all the discussion above, we have to conclude that "the kramanization of public Indonesian" and "the Javanese images of politics" carry much less weight than it is in Anderson's observation. Anderson's allegation of the drying up of the creativity of Bahasa and its defeat "as a modality of thought" is also difficult to sustain. His second point, that is, the influx of new ngoko, does not run counter with our reading of Bahasa. The other, "the neutralization or capture of revolutionary symbol," is
incongruent with our findings about the way Indonesians used Bahasa in creative fields and in public/non-official discourses wherein the fight for their rights as citizens of a free republic continued.

At variance with Anderson's contention, Bahasa has been, like any great language, "a fusing point" since many centuries back, not just recently. But this fusion in Bahasa did not nullify the "revolutionary" spirit which had come to characterize pristine Bahasa. For, as observed in Chapter III, the revolutionary spirit of Malay was a function of the ideal encounter between medium and messages. And as we have just discussed, the revolutionary messages continued to be deployed through Bahasa.

Also there are two principal weaknesses in Anderson's "Cartoons and Monuments" (1978). In the first place, he overlooks the fact that the revolutionary spirit in Indonesian political discourse is not to be identified with Angkatan 45,(100) even though they have come to be referred to as the "revolutionary generation." This generation did inherit the revolutionary spirit and acted it out in the revolution for independence. But it was also under this generation that there appeared a political structure which bred a language practice among the bureaucracy that was too submissive to those in power, a practice frequently using masks and excessive euphemism, which Anderson rightly captures in his 1966 article.
The revolutionary spirit is to be found in the generation of the pergerakan leaders, who are usually referred to as Angkatan 28. It is in the Generation of 28 that the revolutionary ideas leading the country to independence were first disseminated and reached their ideal-consensual form.

Secondly, the samples Anderson chooses to support his analysis determine the skewed outcome of his argument. Virtually none of the three or four groups we have discussed appears in the article. The New Order cartoons he presents are that of the apolitical Pos Kota, not of Indonesia Raya, Merdeka, or Harian KAMI—dailies which were consciously political. Monuments built during the New Order necessarily lead to traditional, non-revolutionary representation of the nation, simply because the raison d'être of Suharto's regime was after all total departure from Sukarno's political discourse that "the revolution continues."
Indonesian Islam was an important egalitarian force. The rise of Islam as a major champion of egalitarianism had as much to do with its pristine character as with the particularity of its evolvement in the land, which was steeped in feudalism and exploitive relations.

In Chapter IV and VI we have discussed the discontinuity of Islamic experience in Indonesia, rendering the birth of a dynamic Islam toward the end of the 19th century. Hence the widespread influence of Sarekat Islam, Muhammadiyah, and, later, Nahdatul Ulama at the grassroots level as well as among the leaders and intellectuals. It is hard to imagine Sukarno gaining so much influence throughout the land without his close relation with Tjokroaminoto and Sarekat Islam and without his explicit adoption of the Islamic modernist discourse, which emphasized reason and rationality, during the early 1930s.(1)

The period of Sukarno's Guided Democracy witnessed the discursive decline of Indonesian Islam. Politically, Islam remained an egalitarian force, challenging Sukarno's veering into authoritarian practices against people's political freedom and against the economic interests of the Outer Islands.(2)
The ban of the Islamic modernist party of Masyumi was the price the modernists had to pay. Their advocacy of an Islamic state during deliberations of the Constitution coupled with the implication of some leaders of Masyumi in the 1958 "rebellion" of PRRI has been used to stigmatize the image of the modernists. This made them susceptible to the charge as secessionists just like all previous and later Islamic resistances had been and were branded.

Indeed, the Suharto regime did precisely that. (3) From 1958 on the modernists' media was constantly under tight scrutiny. Abadi, its nationally influential daily was shut down by Sukarno in 1960. If their political aspirations survived, the channels for expressing them was significantly curtailed.

The New Order continued its discursive suppression of the modernists. But it did so out of a reason completely different from that of Sukarno. Sukarno's project remained populist. He could not do otherwise. (4) It was the unwillingness of the modernists to cooperate with the communists that strained Sukarno's relationship with Masyumi.

Conversely, the New Order had to suppress all kinds of populism and/or popular participation in politics as it was dictated by the necessity to deal with Indonesia's gargantuan economic difficulty. Over time, as the interested groups in it became more powerful, vested, and corrupt, (5) the New Order was also rendered increasingly sensitive to
criticisms and to challenges against its elitism in the economic and political spheres.

Never before since the turn of the century had Islam been marginalized on such a scale. Not only were the modernists barred from sharing important positions in the government as they did until 1958, their ideas concerning what development programmes should be were mostly discarded and their participation in deliberations about national planning and the allocation of resources were written off.

The political and economic base of Islam was not spared in the systematic marginalization. Before, during, and after the oil boom, no favor was given them in development projects. Its only escape was in the traditional, rural, and informal economic sectors. But these were likewise sacrificed for the sake of the modern, urban, and formal sectors now dominated by "non-Islamic" groups.(6)

What does all this mean for the development of Islam in Indonesia? It means a major stagnation--politically, economically, and intellectually. In effect, the modernist Muslims had been "traditionalized." It was a painful experience even to a number of Muslim generals.(7) The political mechanisms of Sukarno's Guided Democracy and the Suharto era pushed aside what used to be a progressive and leading force in the pergerakan era, in the defense and in the early development of the new nation. Being barred from entry into the development process, the modernists were
gradually entrapped in an escape mechanism, which made them largely vacillating between "utopia" and nostalgia on the one side and "reactionary" actions on the other.

In short, they practically became indistinguishable from the negative forces the Sukarno regime and the New Order projected them to be. They were portrayed as the enemy of Pancasila, as secessionists, as saboteurs of development. In Foucault's perspective, here power has given, maintained, and proved its definition of the other. Islam seemed to have exhausted all of its cultural creativity.

But it was precisely during the early years of the process of marginalization that a new vision of Islam, or, rather, a new way of conceiving Islam in Indonesia, emerged and diffused, and with it an overcoming version of egalitarianism.

It all began from a small circle of leadership in the Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Islamic Student Association) led by Nurcholish Madjid (8) from 1966 to 1971--the same association responsible in publicizing the "tyrannical" and "immoral" practices of Sukarno and finally effecting his unpopularity.

Madjid's first tract appeared in 1968. It invites younger generation of Muslims to learn and examine Islam "with courage to do a creative and judicious reinterpreta-

(9) In a controversial address, "Keharusan Pembaharuan Pemikiran Islam dan Masalah Integrasi Ummat",
he suggested that Islamic reconstruction should begin with two closely related actions, to free Muslims from the fetters of tradionalism and to find ideas which fit the demands of time. Thus a process of liberalization was needed. In another important address, he introduced a profoundly anti-absolutist credo:

> Since God as the destination of religious internalization and appreciation is totally Absolute, essentially beyond human reach, what we can and should do is an endless approach to Him.... This should never terminate. For any termination would imply an unwarranted claim of having reached the Absolute.

Madjid is the sharpest to come up with a radical—and far-reaching—reinterpretation of the essence of Islamic religiosity. But he is by no means the first and the only Indonesian in the venture. Over fifty years ago (1936), Sukarno's "modernist" discourse had already intimated the need for Muslims to be fully cognizant of the flow of history as they enter the modern time. Just like any religion, Islam should be incessantly reinvented for each new era. Sukarno reminded his fellow-Muslims that society does not stand still; it continuously changes, moves, and evolves with given dynamics. In his typical metaphors, he wanted to capture Islam as fire, never as sonto-loyo (idiotic).

As if fulfilling Sukarno's forecast in 1936, the drive toward viewing Islam in a liberating light was
phenomenal among Madjid's generation. From 1969 to 1972, Ahmad Wahib records in his posthumously published diary his discontent with Islam he encounters. He states that those the Muslims traditionally refers to as "unbelievers" have moved ahead and are now much more progressive.

Wahib also mentions his skepticism of the so-called the "legatees of the prophet."(15) He holds that in so far as the Muslims fail to have due regard to social condition as "a source of law" along with the Qur'an and Sunna, the Muslims will remain captives of scripturalism. The same failure will make Islamic law incompatible with the social development in which the law is to be applied.(16) Much like Sukarno and Madjid, he also calls for

'the assertion of an open mind, freedom of thought, idea of progress...,' finding 'an adequate reinterpretation of the normative image' so that Islamic teachings are capable of conversing and touching the secular mind, and at the same time trying to capture the genuine 'will of God' by freeing it from the shackles of time and place. This implies that Islamic thought "should have well-rounded and 'ideal readiness' capable of 'serving' the development of humanity and its ideas which are bound to result in new contradictions."(17)

The Islamic egalitarianism in Madjid comes in a detour, by way of inference from his advanced theological conception. But as it comes, it comes profoundly, because in two important ways it breaks off from the early modernists' perception of politics.
The first is the **distancing** of God, by insisting His Being as the **final** destination and by seeing the entire history as but a **process** to reach Him. When Madjid conceives of God as the final destination, he does so not in the teleological but in the summative sense of history. We need to emphasize that Madjid never equates the entire possibility of history with the omnipotence of God.

Unlike Hegel who "draws God into the world,"(18) Majid views God as the ultimate **telos**, which in history can only be approached but never reached. Also, unlike Hegel, Madjid consistently avoids any unwarranted claim over God. Close but not similar to Reinhold Niebuhr's conception,(19) God to him will forever remain the Perennial Other.(20)

This brings us to probably the most politically consequential in Madjid's theology. Since the entire history is merely a process or a "medium" to approach God, since God is beyond reach in history, and since God remains the Perennial Other, **truth in the world can never be appropriated**.

There are at least two practical implications of this path of religiosity. In the first place, since the **summation** of the historical Ideal could by definition only occur at the end of history, what the Muslims traditionally think of historical Islam as the highest possible civilization becomes obviously untenable. Just as untenable in Madjid's view is the general notion in the West (reminiscent of the
Hegelian conception), which sees Western civilization as the highest form of modernity. (21) Hence Madjid's contention that modernization is not westernization. Rather, Madjid sees Modernity as inseparable from Truth. To quote from a paraphrase:

Modernity becomes inseparable from Truth precisely because modernity emerges from scientific knowledge which implies rationality: understanding, adaptation, and utilization of "objective laws which characterize the universe." "Modernization," writes [Madjid], "means thinking and working in accordance with the laws of nature as ordained by God, ... which endures." As such, modernity does not only contain a direct and practical utility. It has a deeper and more essential meaning, i.e., as an approach to the Ultimate Truth, to God. "God, the representation of the Ultimate Truth is at once the representation of the Ultimate Modernity." (22)

With such an original understanding, Madjid informs his coreligionists to take up a positive attitude toward modernization, liberalization, and secularization.

Other practical implications are the opening up of Muslims' mind and the rediscovery of Islamic dynamism. To speak with Madjid, Truth is not only historically immersed in "the endless process of becoming and approaching," it perpetually "corrects, even denies, itself in order to regain its rightness, which is subject to the relativity of case, time, and place." (23) This implies that, "In the human condition, appropriating Truth will always mean
distorting Truth." (24) Humankind should, therefore, be willing to learn from and measure each other's truth.

According to Madjid, ideologies such as democracy, socialism, communism, "constitute the pinnacles of human-kind's reflections on their own life and society," which should be duly respected, even if they are later found to be mistaken. (25) This theologically-derived willingness to respect and to learn from the others forms one of the hallmarks of Madjid's Islamic view.

Brought squarely to Indonesian politics, this theological conception of Madjid and others implies that there has emerged from within Indonesian Islam (26) a strong voice advocating Islamic religiosity which is averse to the tyranny of absolutism. This voice is willing to accept non-Muslim communities on an equal footing and has renounced the cause of post-pergerakan Islam to establish an Islamic state. (27)

Madjid attacks Islamic leaders who tend to magnify negative religious sentiments among the Muslims for selfish reasons. (28) The nation, according to Madjid, is craving for appropriate ideas to fortify its existence. Those ideas should not be merely structural or procedural, "but something capable of combining strength and loyalty with warmth in the heart." (29)

It is true that we are yet to see how this new conception of Islam will actually fare. But it is clear that it
is capable of breaking cultural and political parochialisms which have at times stultified the country's efforts toward development. It has worked to unfetter major complexes from the body of the Islamic community to open up new vistas for Indonesians—Muslims and non-Muslims—to breathe and work in an atmosphere of more freedom and equality.

The same message has been voiced by M. Dawam Rahardjo, a progressive Muslim writer. He urges the pesantren to move beyond its narrow horizon, to understand the larger world, and to know their possibilities. In like manner, Abdurrahman Wahid, a distinguished figure of the new generation of Islam, calls for the liberation of Muslims' mind into "a more cosmopolitan world view with tolerance toward other religious experience and a readiness to gain new insights for developing itself." This is also the message of Kuntowidjojo and Djohan Effendi. This unprecedented phenomenon has led Jacob Vredenbrecht, a Dutch scholar, to speak of "self-conscious Islamic youth, which is increasingly making itself felt" and "promises confidence and hope in the future of Islam."

Two further points concerning the character of what we might call the new "egalitarian theology" in Indonesian Islam need illumination. First, with his insistence that modernization is not westernization, Madjid has implicitly indicated that he is not walking in the footsteps of Kemal Ataturk. Denouncing traditionalism, he remains firm
with the Islamic tradition, i.e., out of a rediscovery that revelatory Islam provides for a liberal view of life and that historical Islam has developed a long chain of open tradition.

As such Madjid has left behind the apologetic stance of Syed Ahmad Khan. And unlike the work of Amir Ali which focuses on the message of historical Islam, Madjid is willing to accept what he sees as essentially the same message scattering here and there in the broader history of humanity.

Neither is the Islamic reconstructive thought of Madjid to be traced back to Jamaluddin al-Afghani of the nineteenth century as is the case with most of the earlier Indonesian modernists. (37) At variance with Muhammad Abduh who largely sticks to the Islamic tradition, he opens up his mind to learn from the history of ideas at large to reconstruct his religious thought. In this respect, he is more like Muhammad Iqbal.

But the genealogy of Madjid's reconstructive thought goes back to Ibn Taymiyyah of the fourteenth century Syria. (38) Ibn Taymiyyah's work is more appealing to Madjid than the reconstructive thought of al-Afghani, who already perceives some of the pain of a nation subjected to dependency relations. (39)

In the teachings of Ibn Taymiyyah Madjid sees the renouncement of the absolutism of the ulama and the
emphasis on *ijtihad*. Religious teachings are to be carried out for public benefit according to different social contexts. He also finds in the great ulama respect for critical mind, because no mortals, including the Prophet, are wholly free from mistakes. In the same corpus, Madjid identifies the importance of moderation, the necessity of preventing anarchy and absolutism, and the need for "participation of each social segment based on equality."(40)

Madjid's holistic reading of the Qur'an (41) uncovers historical Islam as offering the ethos of egalitarianism and of liberalism. Both sides acknowledge the ideals of equality and democracy (in the principle of *syura*) and the need to translate them anew for different times and places. All this amounts to what Wahid calls "a creative process in which the positive legacy of the past is used to discover the essence of religious experience in its totality."(42)

Second, Madjid's rejection to identify modernization with Westernization by no means implies that he is anti-Western or xenophobic, the way Ali Shari'ati can be characterized.(43) Shari'ati rejects Marxism simply because of a few pronouncements by Marx denying the existence of God.(44) Unlike Shari'ati, Madjид is no captive of Islam as the "real."(45) While he seems to be as devout as any Muslim can be, he succumbs neither to bigotry and exclusivism nor to authoritarianism. He appreciates Communism not because of its denouncement of God, but because it
unhesitantly takes sides with the poor. In a sense, this view is reminiscent of Muhammad Iqbal's brave statement that, "Islam is Bolshevism plus God."(47)

In Madjid, respect for differences of opinion is part and parcel with the Islamic faith. His guide is none but the Prophet himself who considered differences of opinion within the Muslim community as a blessing.(48) His stronger guide, however, comes from his theological conception that the entire humankind is forever destined to undergo a common struggle to approach the Ultimate Truth, which in history can never be arrested to claim. We can say that Madjid believes in the unity of humankind just as Islam believes in the unity of the long chain of prophethood covering many nations.(49)

The egalitarian brand of Madjid's theology serves as a pertinent point from which many of the stereotypical readings of Indonesian Islam are found wanting. We should bear in mind, however, that the Islamic egalitarianism is by no means a downfall in Indonesia. H.J. de Graaf and Th.G.Th. Pigeaud observe that traders, who brought Islam, already introduced an egalitarian character, which was distinctly different from the inflexible caste system then prevailing in the land.(51)

This Islamic egalitarianism in the past was not confined to the coastal or harbor areas which dotted the entire archipelago. It was also prevalent in the
hinterland. **Surau, langgar, and mosques** functioned as diffusion loci of such an egalitarian culture throughout Indonesia. In Java, much has been uncovered about the character of the **pesantren**. Already flourishing prior to the coming of the Dutch, the **santri** and **kyai** of the pesantren identified themselves with the oppressed villagers and provided them not only with leadership against the colonial-feudal structure, but with the ethos of economic and political **independence**. (52) While among the priyayi there was "a deep contempt for village life," pesantrens accommodated the villagers and provided them with ways to survive (53) and a human sense of worth. "The whole supra-village ties of real emotional depth," writes Kartodirdjo, "were those linking the peasant to the informal religious leaders." (54)

As to the birth of modern Indonesia through the pergerakan, we already know the centrality of the role of Sarekat Islam, both its CSI, which was the first to organize Indonesian trade unions on a massive scale, and the local SIs, which instructed the peasantry in rural areas of their political and economic rights. As early as 1916, leading urban santris had, along with young nationalist radicals, already talked about "amalgamating Islamic and socialist principles." (55) Muhammadiyah's contribution in the field of indigenous education, not to mention in other welfare activities, was probably second to none. (56)
During the time when it briefly controlled the government prior to the debacle of Sjahrir's parliamentary democracy in the 1950s, Masyumi took good care of the principle of social justice. (57) In brief, Madjid stands as solidly on the dynamism of Islam in his own land as he does on the Islamic universal tradition. Marshall Hodgson writes that,

Muslims could not rest content to be irrelevant deviants in a society founded on contrary principles. Sooner or later the challenge of the Qur'an was bound to require the creation of a just polity as the natural outgrowth and context of the personal purity it required. (58)

If all this observation is warranted, two other arguments, both made by Ben Anderson, need to be contested. Acknowledging that the language of Islam is capable of overcoming the "pressures of kramanization," Anderson still sees Indonesian Islam as characterized by a tendency "to be exclusive and inward-looking." (59) Our reading of the historical evidence concerning Indonesian Islam questions this observation. Studying the complex expansion-contraction shifts of the meaning of umat (community) among the Javanese Muslims, Sidney Jones has argued that Indonesian Islam is by no means static. (60) Anderson's tendency to subordinate Indonesian Islam, particularly to the cultural niche of the "Javanese cosmology," should also be confronted with such observations as launched by Anthony Johns. The latter argues that although we need to study
Muslim learning in Southeast in terms of its tuning up with local conditions, its import and character cannot be captured "outside the 'great tradition' of Islamic disciplines which gave it birth."(61)

Secondly, Anderson holds that in terms of statecraft the Islamic modernist cosmology has been inadequate relative to that of the Javanese cosmology.(62) He maintains that the Muslims' belief in the equality of humankind before God "poses problems" with respect to political theory and political legitimation. "If all men are equally abject in the eyes of God," writes Anderson, "what is the religious basis for the political rule of one man over another?"(63)

Anderson's question is here rather surprising in view of the central assumption which stands behind all modern political discourses in the West probably ever since Leviathan—the existence of the Ultimate Other which humankind should always be aware of so as not to appropriate. The social contract ideas of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Mill assume, directly or implicitly, the existence of God. It is the unsaid of all their arguments about the universal equality of humankind. Even Marx's God-denying propositions are difficult to dismember from the same tradition. Acknowledgment of such an existence is necessary for the right positioning of humankind as a political and rational
being. With gradations, their ideas are all based on the "immeasurable distance" between the mortals and the Immortal.(64)

Only with the acknowledgement of the "immeasurable distance" between man and God or only with the memory of it is the reciprocal social contract conceivable. It is precisely because the four thinkers above accept humankind as necessarily conscious of a completely different Being, who is omnipotent, whose knowledge is all-encompassing, but at once unpredictable that no human is to act like one. Still we should underscore that their ideas are by no means a denial of God. Rather, they remain what we might call "a reserved affirmation" of His Being.

Conversely, if God is viewed as the Constant Power residing or emanating fully in the world and directly participating in worldly affairs, as it is believed in the "Javanese" cosmology, the symmetric social contract would necessarily be impaired. Anderson is quite right as he argued that the God-postulating modernists would not work in a polity shared with other people not adhering to their cosmology—a situation which both Rousseau and Mill have related to us.(65)

However, the same argument can be levelled against Anderson's position. Outrageous practices of political corruption and arbitrariness would easily characterize any political cosmology which claims God as appropriable. An
open Islam in Indonesia is certainly a much better alternative than the ideology of Javanese traditionalism, if only by virtue of the logic that non-appropriation [of God] implies accountability. In so far as the ideology is an open one and supported by the majority of Indonesians, there is a good chance that it will work.

**Imagined Paths of Indonesian Egalitarianism**

Indonesian egalitarianism was also continuously expressed in discursive practices not exclusively intended as criticisms against a particular regime, but more as reflections of what kind of egalitarian society one had in mind given Indonesia's social conditions.

It is thus in the continuing evolvement of the imagined paths toward egalitarianism that we should turn in order to obtain yet another indicator of the tenacity of the egalitarian commitment in Indonesia. Put differently, one way of judging such tenacity is to see how it is imagined. Is it imagined in a utopian way or with adequate respect for historical details and particularities? Do imaginations evolve as the historical circumstances also evolve? Do the acts of imagining tilt more, to use Benedict Anderson's frame of inquiry, toward "fabrication" or toward "creation"?(66).

In 1925, the executive committee of PKI in Semarang published *Apakah Maoenja Kaoem Kommunist?* (What the
Communists Want?) and P.K.I. dan Kaoem Boeroeh (PKI and the Workers) by Axan Zain.(67) The two volumes constitute perhaps the first work concerning the principles and objective of Communism in Bahasa. They contain all historical postulates upon which Communism stands and the role of PKI in the communist struggle.

With a popular language, the work explains the orthodox exegesis of Marxism concerning the genealogy of labor and commodity. Then it goes on to elaborate the differences of self-employed labor from labor as a commodity; the inevitable multiplication of the latter; its necessary immiseration and alienation; and, finally, the overthrow of the capitalist system through a united and worldwide action by the working class.

What characterizes this discursive practice is the simplicity and clarity of the problematic as the communists saw it. There was a mathematical certainty as to things to undo, enemies to fight, and friends to rescue. Referring to what kind of future society desired, both volumes say only the grand outline: the abolition of private ownership on all properties socially indispensable and the right for all to enjoy their own produce.(68)

As was common among the communists everywhere during the early decades of the 20th century, such a text contained a lengthy discussion concerning class positions and numerous things it dreamt of abolishing. But it ended
up in too simplified a path toward the future society intended—through a universal revolution. Once the classless society is attained, everything will fall in place.

This kind of ideological simplification of historical problems was not typical of the communists during the time of the pergerakan. Tjokroaminoto's *Islam dan Sosialisme* (1924) offers just as little in terms of the imagined path toward egalitarianism. The fact that many modernists tended to identify the era of Muhammad and the Companions as the ultimate example to emulate contradicts the modernists' own claim of privileging rationality. The drive to understand the Qur'an literally was still regnant among them.

Such a simplified understanding of egalitarianism also held true with the nationalists. The revival of the themes from Indic literature or from the *wayang* repertoire to some extent underscored the sense of the *we* and added cohesiveness to the nationalist rank. But at the same time this gave justification to the feudal modalities inherent in them. The small minority of liberals mostly reasoned in terms of the present, that is, how to lighten the burden of the rakyat and provide them with a better education and healthier nutrition and housing.

With all this, one thing stays clear. Most of them—communists, modernists, and liberals—opted for the
socialist or the revolutionary path, however vague and unselfconscious their construals of the terms were.

A clarified statement of intention toward the socialist and revolutionary paths surfaced among party leaders and intellectuals during the period of 1945 to 1965, during which a new contending ideology within the broad egalitarian stream had emerged, namely the so-called Democratic Socialism. (72)

Within the Radical Nationalists, Ruslan Abdulgani presents a restatement of why Indonesia's nationalism is inseparable from the ideals of democracy and social justice. He argues that the modern man is yet to establish a theory of modern nationalism not solely based on a community of culture, religion, or race. (73) We should not, in his view, subsume Indonesian nationalism under the "traditional" conception of nationalism common in the West. It emerged out of the similarity of historical experience of tens of million of the exploited in the East Indies, which later gave birth to the consciousness of belonging to one nation. (74) But this in fact is a restatement of Renan's position.

Abdulgani further observes that since colonialism was a concurrence of political domination, economic exploitation, and cultural penetration, Indonesia's nationalism also manifested in those three aspects:
First: a political aspect which involves overthrowing the political domination of foreign nations and replacing it with a democratic system of government; second: socio-economic aspect which involves efforts to put an end to foreign economic exploitation and to build a new society which is free from poverty and misery; and, third: a cultural aspect which involves reviving identity and attuning it to the exigencies of the times. (75)

As observed in the foregoing chapters, equally strong statements of egalitarian ideals can be found from the advocates of Islam, Communism, and liberalism. Such statements, however, are clearly no substitutes for a realistic assessment toward an egalitarian path. Also they easily conceal internal contradictions in the very thoughts of the ideologues. (76)

This was true until well before the period of Guided Democracy and was later checked by Soedjatmoko, a prominent member of the Socialist Party. (77) "All we have," writes Soedjatmoko in 1954, "is tendencies." (78) In order to move beyond sheer "tendencies," Soedjatmoko argues that,

We must come to a new determination of our aims in the light of our needs in our present situation in the world and in terms of the economic, social, and cultural changes which have occurred in our society since the revolution. These aims must be formulated in such a way that they can revive our confidence, our capacity, and our idealism, enabling us to work for a better life. And, in addition, they must be realistic. That means they must be formulated with a recognition of the limits of our capacities and our means. (79)
Many things have happened in Indonesia since 1965, many of them were reversal from the more than six decades of incessant egalitarian leanings and practices. (80) All of a sudden the state took the opposite turn. Soon the dominant economic, political, and cultural life overcame the preceding tendencies and practices of egalitarianism and, as observed in Chapter IX, replaced them with downright inegalitarianism in the nation's economy and politics.

Nonetheless, the spirit of egalitarianism did not die out. In spite of immense adversity, it held its ground. More importantly, it was now reformulated in a more concrete manner.

There were two things which deserve our attention here. First is the fact that the discourse of egalitarianism evolved in the absence of formal/material political support. It was a discourse which is suppressed by the Suharto regime. Secondly, beyond the official or semi-official level, there was no counterveiling discourse comparable to the egalitarian one both in vigor and in straightforwardness. In other words, even with the severe crushing of the communists and even with the sustained suppression of the modernist Muslims, the radical nationalists and the democratic socialists, the ideals of egalitarianism survived in better and better formulations.

In the limited space we have, we shall deal primarily with some important ideas of Soedjatmoko, of whom we might
well speak of as one of the most informed intellectuals the country has ever had. A comprehensive discussion which includes figures comparable with Soedjatmoko requires a book of its own. We choose Soedjatmoko because not only was he a distinguished proponent of egalitarianism; he was also influential among the younger intellectuals. (81)

There are areas of egalitarian discussion in which Soedjatmoko's ideas are as freshly inspiring as they are quietly convincing. Among them is the need to respect the rakyat, both as subject and object, and to heed their culture(s) in order to achieve an integrated and independent development.

In an article written in 1954, Soedjatmoko already emphasized that "economic development should constitute a movement of the rakyat with an enlightened guidance from the Government." (82) This means "finding in and mobilizing from our own culture(s) autonomous assets which, based on our own power, will develop our own social dynamics..." (83) This, again, presupposes a sensitivity in reading what aspects of the culture(s) most likely capable of moving the rakyat to development out of their own volition. It reflects a belief that the Indonesian culture in general was not a captive of inegalitarianism.

Soedjatmoko's understanding of the difficulty and intricacy of the situation of the rakyat and the possible
ways of effecting a remedy was perhaps best exemplified in his widely acclaimed treatise, "Basic Needs Model: Its Implications in National Policy." (84)

The treatise is not explicitly addressed to a particular country, but we can easily realize that the problems and details discussed in it are that of Indonesians, irrespective of their universal relevancy. Here Soedjatmoko argues that first of all we need to recognize the problems of employment and distribution of income as equally central as that of growth. What is significant, however, is his call to turn more of our attention to the living standard of the poorest in the villages.

Soedjatmoko tells us that not only were the villagers sacrificed for the sake of the urban population; they also had to make do with all circumstances prevailing at the wrong ends in the social-economic continuum. They were sacrificed in matters of nutrition and employment just as they were in housing, health, and education. The small plots owned or cultivated by the majority of peasants did not have enough irrigation; the prices of their produce were arbitrarily made low; and the fact that land reform was never actually carried out also worked against them.

Soedjatmoko suggests that the systematic exploitation of the villagers was only possible because the villagers had so little political power. Thus he reminds us of the
necessity to decentralize and devolve the power at the center. He writes that all problems we have encountered in this regard "show the limits of the ability of the central government to overcome numerous basic needs of the poorest 20 percent of the population."(85)

According to Soedjatmoko, the middle and higher education should be geared to solving problems in the villages. Contrary to the government policy to alienate the academia from the business of policy-making, he calls for a deeper involvement of the universities in determining government policies. This is to be done through development planning and evaluation, and practical training in the villages. Such an involvement would diffuse among the academia "the feeling of social solidarity and a commitment to serve the majority of the poor."(86)

Soedjatmoko emphasizes that the problem of village poverty and backwardness can only be overcome through a macro-economic planning by the government. To this end, he suggests that the government pursues the following seven-point policy:

1) Land reform, including the protection of the communities' right of profit as regards the fluctuations in the price of land; 2) the abolition of price policy on primary food, which has traditionally benefited the urban population, and the adoption of a diverse price policy designed to give more profits to the rural areas and to stimulate more production of primary food which will at the same time assure an improvement in calorie-protein intake of both the urban poor and
the landless peasants; 3) the change of the terms of trade between the urban and the rural sectors... to reverse the benefit so far accruing to the urban sector. This is done by directing import and export duties, and a reassessment of the exchange value, which will thereby change the appreciation of labor and capital in favor of the laborer; 4) progressive taxation, which is extended, and the reduction of the difference in the consumption pattern between the modern and the rural sectors; 5) industrial policy which gives priority to labor-intensive industries in accordance with the requirement of efficiency; a policy benefiting the capital-intensive industries (such as processing factories, cold storages, motorized fishing boats to be gradually owned by the cooperatives of the primary producers); a policy of locating industries, which ensures a judicious spread of industries throughout the rural areas, and where possible attach them in various forward and backward linkages with local productive and service capacities. We also need a policy capable of preventing a modern company in a rural area to compete with local businesses in the use of local raw materials. Finally, we need various policies controlling new investments in the modern sector to support all policies above; 6) the increase of the number of non-exploitive linkages between the modern and the rural sector as soon as the economy and related institutions in the villages acquired sufficient strength. We also need the improvement of a chain of services supporting agriculture, the road system, and transport facilities; 7) a national policy of settlement, covering the entire nation. A policy of regional development encouraging the development of intermediate cities and residential areas in the villages with an affordable transport facilities.(87)

These reforms should, as Soedjatmoko sees it, be accompanied by related reforms in communication, culture, energy, government, law, research and technology. Soedjatmoko's imagination of the path toward egalitarianism is elaborated with exemplary knowledge of details and a
firm grasp of the broader context. The Basic Needs Model is here formulated as development from below with people's participation and initiatives, and with village autonomy and self-sufficiency.

Soedjatmoko is well aware of the risk and of the price of errors and sluggish development inherent in this path. But he argues that only in freedom can people "learn and develop skills, discipline, and self-reliance essential for further development." Hence his contention that "perhaps only a genuinely motivated government with power to discipline its bureaucracy is capable of achieving such a transition." In short, development is to be facilitated by the bureaucracy without heavily bureaucratizing the society so as to kill its internal motivation in the process. He also warns against using the Basic Needs Model as a mere excuse toward totalitarianism.

At this point, Soedjatmoko uncovers the other crucial side of the Basic Needs Model, namely the covert reluctance or unwillingness on the part of the developed countries to see it actually carried out in the Third World. The OECD has not been able to fulfil its commitment made in the World Food Conference to provide for 10 million tons of food to draw up world-wide nutritional programs. It also failed to expand food aid to boost development in developing countries, and to overcome various trade difficulties.
In so far as food production amounts to a decisive factor in Basic Needs Model, the weakness of the implementation in this regard creates doubts of the sincerity of the developed countries' commitment in Basic Needs Model. (93)

Nevertheless, Soedjatmoko hastens to add that any programme which assumes a world-wide dimension easily invites misunderstanding between nations. Here he points out the need to be on guard so as not to treat the Basic Needs Model as merely a humanitarian project. For such a shift in emphasis would reduce the model into just another version of first aid convention, which is ignorant of the real needs for development. "This would make the poor remain poor and dependent." (94)

Elsewhere Soedjatmoko argues, in perfect congruence with our observation, that Indonesia has always been structurally impoverished. He writes that as of 1850 until 1950s, Dutch scholars had described poverty in Indonesia as a function of the rapid increase in population. They did not relate it to the pattern of the Dutch Forced Cultivation (95) and the subsequent liberal policy of the Dutch enabling the influx of cheap industrial products from abroad. This had, similar to the experience of China and India, destroyed non-agricultural skills in the countryside. (96)

Soedjatmoko rightly contends that "awareness of the structural dimensions of poverty in Indonesia had
accompanied and animated our national movements from the outset."(97) This observation corroborates our thesis concerning Indonesia's egalitarian nationalism. While alerting us of the immensity of the problem of poverty in Indonesia, Soedjatmoko wisely points out that it has been there for a long time and that any discussion of it does not amount to a censure against Indonesia's present or past governments.

Soedjatmoko also questions why the provision of resources and social services seldom reached the absolutely poor. He believes that the difficulty had to do with the pattern of social organization and institutional arrangements nationwide.(98) He mentions the hierarchical and asymmetric patterns in the society and the pattern of discrimination, including racism, the pattern of exploitive relations between different sectors in the society. All this formed the structural barrier.(99)

"It is clear," writes Soedjatmoko, "that efforts which merely emphasize economic development will reinforce these structural imbalances."(100) This is what happened during the reign of the New Order. Moreover, the very structure rendered the poorest powerless, voiceless, and often unheard of "unless we are determined enough to study and find them."(101) They largely flourished "outside the national current" and "are not organized...."(102) Hence Soedjatmoko's contention that one way to overcome this imbalance is "that the poorest should be allowed to
organize themselves, with the help and guidance by the Government."(103)

It is necessary to add that with all this observation, Soedjatmoko is against the path of violence. He believes that as much as injustice breeds poverty, poverty in turn breeds, by the very conditions of scarcity, injustice. A resort to violence would easily flare up primordial sentiments and religious tensions.

In many Asian countries, such sentiments and tensions were concealed by the apparent village harmony and social hospitality.(104) Soedjatmoko invariably opts for the way of persuasion and unity, not only of Indonesia but of the world, through genuine respect for differences and for the right of others.

Like that of Soetan Sjahrir, Soedjatmoko's nationalism is a democratic one.(105) It is an ideology to fight against structural impoverishment. He is particularly aware of the two sides of nationalism, the egalitarian and the ethnocentric, and he wants no part of the latter.(106)

As mentioned earlier, Soedjatmoko has been significantly influential among Indonesia's younger intellectuals. Among them we should perhaps mention M. Dawam Rahardjo. Like Soedjatmoko, Rahardjo calls for the adoption of a development strategy which underscores people's participation and initiatives; efforts to rectify the lot of the poorest in the countryside; the strengthening of voluntary
institutions among the society to balance the predominance of bureaucracy, and the necessity of decentralizing state power and doing away with the structural sources of injustices.(107)

However, Rahardjo stands in his own right in terms of his broad knowledge of the world's contemporary economic problems, particularly of the general economic conditions in Third World countries and of the egalitarian experiments in a number of them. His familiarity with Indonesian history enables him to ground his social, and, particularly, economic analysis. His imagination of the egalitarian path is inseparable from his construal of the Indonesian history as is Sukarno's, Abdulgani's, and Soedjatmoko's. Likewise, it should not be understood as separate from the economic principles as they were first advocated by Hatta and encoded in the 1945 Constitution.(108)

Rahardjo contends with Paul Sigmund that the rejection by Third World intellectuals to the paths of capitalism and Communism and their preference for "a middle road" is sanctioned by their colonial experience.(109) With such an understanding, Rahardjo argues that what Indonesia essentially needs is not development but liberation.(110) This is particularly so since Rahardjo clearly sees the Indonesian equivalents of what Gunder Frank has aptly called "the development of underdevelopment."(111) The political power has become a "commodity," controlled
covertly by the metropolitan centers and by the multinational corporations. (112)

The egalitarian path imagined by Rahardjo is directly determined by the ideal of liberation:

1) To create a new social-political order which ensures the rule of law, peace, and political stability...; 2) To preserve the nation's unity within the national region...; 3) To build a national character in accordance with the people's own cultural values as they are embedded in Pancasila...; 4) To build a national prestige within nations and a capacity to participate internationally both to guard the national interests and to work toward a world of more freedom, peace, and justice; 5) To create an economic system capable of fulfilling the material needs of the poor..., general welfare which enhances the spiritual dignity of men, social justice which reaches all levels of society, the integration of national economy, and economic independence, where the productive capacities gradually move into the hands of the people....(113)

These egalitarian ideals are certainly too broad to match the local-universal comprehensiveness we get from that of Soedjatmoko. But it is important to note that Rahardjo stays solidly with the ideals of Indonesia's Founding Fathers, which combine egalitarianism and nationalism.

Soedjatmoko and Dawam Rahardjo are only two of a host of prominent intellectuals, scholars, and statesmen who dream of Indonesia as an egalitarian nation. (114) The character of their imaginations coupled with the consciousness of citizens' rights and human dignity; the modalities of
Bahasa Indonesia; the rise of an open theology in Islam; and all other factors mentioned earlier form the bulwarks of Indonesia's egalitarianism.

We should bear in mind that just as the socialist and revolutionary ideas persisted, so did the pergerakan version of Indonesian nationalism. It is also interesting to read some kind of convergence in Indonesia's contemporary discourses of egalitarianism. It does not mean that contestations among them were non-existent. It means that the surviving advocates of egalitarianism seemed to have learned about the trivialities and "impossibilities" of much of their predecessors' contestations and to see the virtues of the egalitarian streams of the others.

For instance, there was a lot of affinity between Madjid's understanding of Islam and Soedjatmoko's ideas of egalitarianism, although they originated from different subcultural or political groups. In particular, the Islamic theology of Madjid which reemphasized the oneness of humankind and the universality of Islam would easily find a communion with Soedjatmoko's appreciation of kesuwungan. This, in Soedjatmoko's view, is identical with what Jacques Maritain refers to as the "yielding to the oceanic consciousness."(115)

The historical foundation of Indonesian egalitarianism and the signs of the discovery of a common ground are all reasons to believe in both its tenacity and thrust. It is
curious that the movement toward a new convergence in the ideas again occurred in the absence of the communists.

But equally interesting, both the earlier and the more recent generations agree that any path to egalitarianism should be capable of at least taming exploitation, feudalism and backwardness from within or without.

To conclude, three points need recapitulation. First is our finding that there was a significant discontinuity in Indonesian political practices. The fifty years or so of rakyat-privileging politics roughly beginning from the establishment of Sarekat Islam in 1912 until the collapse of Sukarno in 1965 was abruptly reversed by the rise of the New Order, which was still in power.

It was not a discontinuity between an era inaugurating politik sebagai panglima—politics as the supreme commander—and one substituting economy for politics as it is widely thought. Rather, it was one whence politics was commonly shared to where politics became the privilege of the few. In a sense, therefore, politics was more panglima in the New Order than in the Old, as the former ruthlessly carried out its policy to depoliticize the majority of the people and by so doing monopolized the right to politics.

The implication of the arguments made by Harry Benda, Clifford Geertz, and Benedict Anderson, which essentially suggest that the rakyat-marginalizing politics makes a
smooth continuity from the long and distant past, is here seriously contested. Originating from what I call the "enduring school of interpretation," the arguments are grounded on the feudal-colonial or colonial-orientalist ideology and amount to a gross simplification of the much more complex politics already evolving in the land.

More importantly, the arguments betray a determination of knowledge by power. They move with the knowledge of the powerful and with what the powerful want to believe as true. From the outset, the Dutch had privileged a ruling few, original or concocted. It is the knowledge of the ruling few which was continuously being created, polished, and deployed, unfortunately also by distinguished scholars in the field.

The knowledge of the ruled majority was suppressed, treated as non-existent. The intermittently surfacing rebellions, mostly by the people, throughout the colonial and post-independence periods were seldom connected with the knowledge different from the rulers'. The rebels had no knowledge. They only had incidental discontents, which prompted their rebellions from time to time. The notion of continuity in Indonesian politics stems from this knowledge marginalization.

Such marginalization has been repeated in the New Order. There was a strong tendency in the regime to consider all uprisings against the center as ones against
the Republic or against the Pancasila and the Constitution -- an allegation which is sheer mystification.

Of the six major uprisings against Jakarta, only two were squarely counter-ideological and directed against the Republic proper, that is, the Madiun Revolt by the PKI and the resistance by Kartosuwirjo's Darul Islam. All the rest (i.e., PRRI, Permesta, "gerombolan Kahar," and "pemberontakan Aceh") were originally local discontents concerning issues of local concern against Jakarta, not against the Republic. The same weapon of mystification befell all social discontents occurring or fabricated during the 1970-1980 period of the New Order.

But this kind of marginalization was hardly possible as from the time of the pergerakan, when leaders of the oppressed rakyat took politics in their own hands, fostered their demands in an organized and self-conscious manner, and began to spread their contending knowledge. The discontinuity from Indonesia's past began here.

The manifestation of the knowledge of the oppressed was followed by the manifestation of their own power, which brought forth Indonesian Revolution and independence. The same is true with the entire egalitarian discourse sur-facing under the Guided Democracy and the New Order.

The thesis of continuity by Benda, Geertz, and Anderson ignores this historical evolvement or at best argues as it were that, yes, there was a discontinuity, but
this discontinuity was supplanted by yet another discontinuity in the manner of "negation of the negation," thus recovering the so-called predominant Indonesian culture so as to effect a continuity. Hence Geertz's "scripturalist interlude" or the hollowness of "the revolutionary generation" in Anderson's "Cartoons and Monuments."

But such a reasoning is more a function of "the will to truth" than what our reading of history has suggested. For the continuity claimed is merely a fragmentary semblance of it, which, as we have uncovered, is itself highly contestable. Involved here are two consequential theoretical errors: of seeing social phenomena in an imposingly monocultural perspective and of being trapped into the "naturalization" of history.

It is particularly difficult to maintain that the new nation emerged out of, or was captured by, the Indic culture resting on a caste-based social conception. History has gone too far for that. Neither was it grounded singly on Islamic, or communist, or liberal ideals. If the new vision explicitly invalidated the Indic political paradigm as well as the colonial/modern exploitive modalities, it transcended the Islamic, communist, and liberal ideals into the one which was "broad" and "commodious."

As such, the young nation cannot be represented as an embodiment of the "Old Javanese" conception of statecraft, which itself was concocted. Neither can it be simplified as
Islamic, communist, and (western) liberal. The young nation's principle has adjusted and gone beyond the familiar paradigms of these creeds to reach the position where all rakyat-privileging ideals commingled and at once modified and complement each other.

The perennial amalgam constituted a major cultural discontinuity, the dynamic unfolding of which resulted from the dialectic between the land's locally evolving culture(s) and other historical forces. It now rested on the universal principle which centralized the equality of humankind and privileged the right of every citizen to live a decent and respectable life in the land.

The upholders of the thesis of continuity are misled by Max Weber as Weber himself is misled in his preoccupation with the historical causation of the singly meaningful. In Weber's own words,

We seek knowledge of an historical phenomenon, meaning by historical: significant in its individuality.... Order is brought into this chaos only on the condition that in every case only a part of concrete reality is interesting and significant to us, because only it is related to the cultural values with which we approach reality.... They alone are objects of causal explanation.(116)

However, the meaningful does not have to be singular and coherent-as-we-know-it. The meaningful can be plural and move to a never ending journey toward coherence--where plurality prevails.
There is nothing wrong in selecting a set of social phenomena as significant; but it is completely untenable to regard other sets of social phenomena as thereby insignificant. Put another way, Weber in this regard fails, as do his disciples, to distinguish between those social phenomena whose significance is ready and those whose significance is suspended. It is strongly characterized by a disregard of any symbolic or non-symbolic phenomenon not yet contained in a system, in one "general order of existence."

A number of major historical forces are locked out by the thesis simply because their pattern or order is still in the making and their symbolic attachment suspended. Here then lies the limitation of interpretive analysis as it is largely projected to reach a singular symbolic coherence.

To interpret, according to Foucault, is to seek to find a hidden meaning "rather than to undertake a more politicized inquiry into the discursive economies they represent."(117) Such a mode of inquiry can be, as is presented in our narrative, delusionary in itself. To borrow Michael Shapiro's piercing words, "Any discourse constitutes a delusion as it administers dimensions of silence as soon as it begins; it establishes practices which force out other possible practices."(118)

This brings us to our second point: that the discontinuity in Indonesian politics as from 1965 did not occur in the field of knowledge. If the whole point of the
continuity thesis is based on the function of knowledge, here again we encounter its vacuity. As we have observed, the egalitarian and rakyat-privileging discourse of the pergerakan era continued to hold sway in the time of the New Order, with clearer paths to follow.

It is thus important to point out that the egalitarian discourse over the last thirty years kept conveying the message of egalitarian nationalism of the 1920s. Indonesian egalitarianism remained nationalistic as Indonesian nationalism remained egalitarian. While the post-independence egalitarian discourse no longer used the language of the pergerakan, its grammar stayed there, was "protected" and "legitimized" by the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. And while Indonesian nationalism and Javanese nationalism were both political stratagems, the former was a "historical necessity"—to borrow Sukarno's expression, and duly encoded whereas the latter was not.

The argument for egalitarianism in Indonesia is, accordingly, not a mere presentation of instances, which goes with the maxim that the coin always has two faces. Egalitarianism in Indonesian political discourses is neither the incidental nor the peripheral; it is the trend, the mainstream. Hence its open and public expressions. On the contrary, the inegalitarian discourse has to move in masks, waging its "guerilla" wars from the walls of the existing political-economic structure.
Closely related to the first and second point is our third, which indicates the invalidity of the maxim, "The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas." The starkly inegalitarian practices in Indonesian politics during the last twenty odd years were not supported by a concomitant discourse of inegalitarianism.

On the contrary, even the New Order regime tried to justify its political practices by using, if mystifyingly, Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. In other words, it was the egalitarian discourse which was hegemonic. We should therefore establish, at variance with Marx and Gramsci, that the hegemonic discourses in the field of economy and politics can be divergent from the on-going practices in the two fields. The suppressed in the economic/political practices can be the prevailing in the economic/political discourses. We have proven our case particularly in the periods of the pergerakan and the New Order.

The inegalitarian practices of the New Order at least until 1980 were based on ideological mystification, as if what the regime was doing is for the rakyat and as if the people believed in its mystification. This observation readily agrees with the case of the poor peasants and workers in San Ricardo, Philippines, as it is penetratively unraveled by Benedict Kerkvliet in "Everyday Politics and Contending Values." (119) The poor peasants and workers in San Ricardo
are neither passive nor mystified. Nor have they bought the dominant ideology's rationalization for their deprivation. They have alternative ideas and beliefs that pose significant challenges to dominant groups' views about how property and other resources should be used and by whom.(120)

Social reality, then, does not have to be supported by a congruent discursive reality, or a social phenomenon does not have to stand on an isomorphic social idea as both Marx and Weber tend to lead us to believe.

This brings us back to the perennial question: With all the manifestations of egalitarian ideas in Indonesia, how could such inequitable practices in the fields of economy and politics reigned so triumphantly? As is generally the case whenever social sciences are confronted with the question of historical causation or determination, the answer will be vague and inconclusive.

Weber too has failed to put a similar question at rest. "It is by no means clear," writes Barrington Moore, whether Max Weber's famous contribution in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism constituted an important breakthrough or a blind alley."(121) We are no exception. The best we can proffer is to argue that the constellation of historical forces just happens to be in favor of the inequitable practices, or that, again after Moore, the egalitarian alternative is a "suppressed historical possibility."
NOTES

Chapter I


(3) See Baran and Sweezy, op cit., p. 367.

(4) Here motive is understood not in terms of the personal or the individual, but as it is historically and socially situated. "As over against the inferential conception of motives as subjective 'springs' of action," writes Mills, "motives may be considered as typical vocabularies having ascertainable functions in delimited social situations." See C. Wright Mills, "Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive," in Michael J. Shapiro (ed.), Language and Politics. New York: New York University Press, 1984, p. 13.


(6) Chinweizu, The West and the Rest of Us. New York: Random House, 1975, p. 41. It would be interesting to compare the Indonesian colonization and that of America as it is construed by Tzvetan Todorov. We can argue that colonization was severest in the latter. But we should note the important difference between colonization for the sake of conquest and one for the sake of exploitation. In the first instance, the plunder is once-and-for-all; in the second, it is intended to be repetitive and permanent. It is here that the question which one is severer between the two becomes contestable.

Another related difference is the prominence of proselytization in the former and its relative insignificance in the latter. And yet Todorov's perspective is relevant to our discussion in terms of the ideological underpinnings of colonization, i.e., with respect to knowledge-power relations. For Todorov's excellent account in this line of argument, see Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1984.

(8) In existing literature, this is often called "Culture System" after the Dutch "Cultuur Stelsel." I have two reasons to support the use of "Forced Cultivation"—to avoid the ambiguity of meaning inherent in the word "culture" and to indicate its sequel from the practice of "forced deliveries" as it was instituted by the VOC during the preceding era.

(9) Geertz, op cit., p. 50.


(11) *Contingenten* were taxes to be paid in the forms of agricultural produce and *leverantien* were forced deliveries of agricultural produce, bought by the VOC at very low prices. See ibid, p. 18.

(12) Cited in ibid., p. 19.


(14) Cited in ibid., p. 44.


(16) See Furnivall, op cit., p. 23.


(18) Van Leur, op cit., p. 239.

(19) Ibid., p. 263.

(20) Ibid., pp. 239-45.

Up to now Indonesian nationalists are still fond of reiterating the Dutch political skill of divide and rule, ignoring the fact that during the colonial times and even much earlier Indonesians themselves hardly formed one single nation. But while alerting ourselves of such a prejudice, historical records do tell us that the various segments of Indonesian people were better off in terms of economic interactions among themselves and with the world at large prior to the establishment of Dutch domination. See, for instance, Van Leur, op cit., pp.120-22; B. Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies. Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1955, pp.7-48; and T.S. Raffles, The History of Java. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1965, pp. 189-220.

Quoted in Paget (ed.), op cit., p. 20.

Ibid., p. 20.


Ibid., p. 752.

Ibid., p. 752.


See Paget, op cit., p. 21.

Furnivall, op cit., p. 108.

Ibid., p. 118.

Vlekke, Nusantara, op cit., p. 289.

Furnivall, op cit., p. 118.

Ibid., pp. 80-114.

Ibid., pp. 52, 134.

Ibid., p. 83. See also Riemens, op cit., p. 78.

Furnivall, op cit., p. 119.

Vlekke, Nusantara, op cit., p. 271.

Furnivall, op cit., p. 119.

Ibid., p. 119.
(41) Ibid., p. 119.
(42) Ibid., p. 119.
(44) Furnivall, op cit., p. 137.
(45) Kahin, op cit., p. 12.
(47) Furnivall, op cit., p. 137.
(48) Quoted in Paget, op cit., p. 21.
(49) Furnivall, p. 165.
(50) Ibid., p. 183.
(51) Ibid., pp. 210-11.
(52) Ibid., p. 138.
(55) Quoted in Paget, op cit., pp. 21-2.
(56) Quoted in Furnivall, op cit., p. 139.
(57) Quoted in Paget, op cit., p. 21.
(58) See Marx, op cit., p. 645.
(59) Ibid., p. 600. The ingenious exploitation of the Indies by the Dutch is aptly described by Furnivall: "Everything had to be done, but everything had to be done without money. That was the basic fact." See Furnivall, op cit., p. 85.
(60) See Marx, op cit., p. 715.
(61) Even as Marx observes that, "The expropriation of the agricultural producer, of the peasant, from the soil, is the basis of the whole process. The history of this expropriation, in different countries, assumes different aspects, and runs through its various phases in different
orders of succession, and at different periods," (Marx, ibid., p. 716) we can hardly find the exploitive practice in our case as being remotely anticipated.

(62) That even feudalism is, in so far as it maintains its autocentricity, capable of ushering a country into a positive growth in its own right was well testified by Japan under the Meiji restoration, in spite of the sharply contested valuations of the rightness of her growth. But perhaps the classical example of a relatively peaceful transition from feudalism to capitalism came from England. As Barrington Moore writes, "Despite a good many expressions of contrary sentiment from their own members, it is fair to say that the most influential sector of the landed upper classes acted as a political advance guard for commercial and industrial capitalism. This they continued to do in new ways during the nineteenth century." See Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966, p. 30.


(64) See note 22.

(65) W.F. Wertheim, for instance, observes that, "The government was obliged to take steps to supplement the work of private capital and to mitigate or remove its harmful effects; but it did not endeavour to guide social development as a whole into new channels." See W.F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition. Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1959, p. 102.

(66) Panikkar, op cit., p. 114.

(67) Hatta, op cit., p. 177.

(68) Ibid., pp. 170, 429-33.


(70) Ibid., p. 25.


(72) Ibid., p. 7.

(73) Furnivall, op cit., p. 353.

(75) Quoted in Paget, op cit., p. 31.

(76) Ibid., p. 36.

(77) Vlekke, op cit., p. 292.


(79) Approximately 1.75 acres make one bahu.


(81) Ibid., p. 36.

(82) See Kahin, op cit., p. 19.

(83) This figure should be measured against the fact that Indonesia was then only marginally engaged in money economy, which implies that many of the daily necessities particularly in rural areas were obtained not through the market. Still with the tiny proportion of Indonesians' involvement in market mechanism, the figure could not but indicate the impoverishment of the people.

(84) Quoted in Paget, op cit., p. 36.

(85) Ibid., p. 40.

(86) Ibid., pp. 32-41.

(87) As a matter of fact, most of Sukarno's and Hatta's accounts of Dutch colonialism were either literally taken from Dutch sources or in congruence with the ideological epistemes of their time in the West.


(89) Ibid., p. 144.


(91) Barnouw, op cit., p. 194.

(92) Quoted in Paget (ed.), op cit., p. 145.

(93) Panikkar, op cit., p. 77.


(95) Panikkar, op cit., p. 115.

(96) Ibid., p. 115.

(97) Ibid., pp. 121-2.


(99) Furnivall, op cit., p. 51.

(100) Ibid., p. 69.

(101) Ibid., p. 51.

(102) Ibid., pp. 26-7.

(103) See the comparison between Dutch and British imports of private merchandise into the East Indies in ibid., p. 130.

(104) Brinton, op cit., p. 338.

(105) Furnivall, op cit., p. 51.

(106) Ibid., p. 51.

(107) Ibid., pp. 150-1.

(108) Ibid., p. 151.

(109) Ibid., p. 151.

(110) Ibid., p. 151.
Chapter II


(3) Coen wrote his letters from Batavia to the Low Countries in 1618 whereas *Max Havelaar* was published in 1860.


(7) The claim made mostly by Dutch colonial authorities that the Forced Cultivation was "based on native custom" is at best contestable. There are three arguments which we can raise to counter its validity: (1) agricultural duties of the peasantry to native rulers were traditionally exacted in rice, not in export crops; (2) the traditional custom was actually devised in such a way as to benefit both the ruler and the ruled; it was by no means other-centered as was the case with the Forced Cultivation; (3) the coercive power of the Dutch had significantly undermined the reciprocity of duties between the native rulers and subjects and destroyed their cultural and political integrity. In short, a politicized reading will disclose the concocted nature of the authorities' claim. For some accounts to support this contention, see Furnivall, op cit. pp. 5-6, 44.

(8) Ibid., p. 37.

(9) Ibid., p. 37.

(10) Ibid., p. 33.

(11) Ibid., p. 37. See also Vlekke, op cit., p. 197.

(12) See Furnivall, op cit., p. 37.

(13) Ibid., p. 37.
(14) Ibid., p. 37.


(18) Furnivall, op cit., p. 65; Barnouw, op cit., p. 193.

(19) Kahin, op cit., p. 11.

(20) Schrieke, op cit., p. 205.


(22) Schrieke, op cit., p. 78.

(23) Kahin, op cit., p. 11.


(25) Steinberg, op cit., p. 149.


(27) Ibid., p. 248.

(28) It is endless because while interlocution is a social necessity, it has in Javanese been attached to status screening.

(29) Here we should enter the Javanese practice of etok-etok, i.e., telling or acting oneself divergently from the (socially) accepted state of the matter or of hierarchy. The etok-etok is practiced for politesse sake, for "bargaining" social positions, or for the sheer fun of it. However, there are two important things many observers of this phenomenon in Javanese overlook. First, while virtually all Javanese can practice this "proper lying," those considered to be of low status can never etok-etok to
be of higher one in real communication. Only the high could pretend to be lower, not the other way around. Secondly, what might initially be regarded as etok-etok, as when a progressive priyayi consistently addresses the peasantry with the highest "styleme," has actually ceased to be etok-etok; instead, it has become a manifestation of a sincere refusal of social/cultural stratification.

(30) Literally kraton means the seat of the king/queen. More precisely, however, it implies the ultimate center of power. Thus during the later part of the colonial period, many Javanese intellectuals increasingly realized that the actual kraton was no longer located in Java, but in the Netherlands.

(31) Steinberg, op cit., p. 149.


(34) Furnivall, op cit., p. 221.


(36) Furnivall, op cit., p. 221.


(38) See Bousquet, op cit., p. 88.

(39) Ibid., p. 88.


(41) Furnivall, op cit., p. 126.

(42) An analogy with Bentham's panopticon becomes pertinent as soon as we grasp the reason leading to the tying of the three "stylemes" with the status hierarchy obtaining in Javanese society. If panopticon is intended as an ingenious device of making inmates automatically observable by the guards, the "stylemization" is intended to make the Javanese people constantly conscious of their social positions and openly affirm them every time they communicate. If the former watches the physical movements of the
inmates, the latter watches the verbal expressions of the subjects. Both are ultimate means of control.

(43) On Javanese agriculture, Geertz writes that, "The means for accomplishing this effort to keep the natives native and yet get them to produce for world markets was the formation of the chronically, and in fact intrinsically, unbalanced economic structure sometimes referred to as 'dual'." (Emphasis added). See Clifford Geertz, Agricultural Involution. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963, p. 48.

(44) Ibid., p. 62.


(46) Steinberg, op cit., p. 149.


(48) Ibid., p. 22.


(50) The movement of Budi Utomo will be critically discussed in Part III, Chapter 6.


(53) There was certainly an inadequate understanding concerning global interdependence and international determination of history. This lack of understanding was common to many peoples in those days. Each of a number of centers of civilization still largely saw itself as the center of civilization, largely unaffected by historical developments in other parts of the world, and mostly oblivious of the fact that other centers might even be more central than its own.
(54) Steinberg, op cit., pp. 101, 111.

(55) Ibid., p. 86.

(56) Vlekke, op cit., p. 105.

(57) I am referring particularly to France, England, and Spain of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth century.

(58) Furnivall, op cit., p. 237.

(59) Steinberg, op cit., p. 147.

(60) Steinberg, op cit., p. 147.


(62) See Furnivall, Chapters V-IX, op cit.

(63) Steinberg, op cit., p. 147; Schrieke, op cit., p. 208.


(65) Here a social psychological process might have functioned in which the priyayis tried not so much to identify themselves with the Dutch as to do their best to internalize an ideology they thought would please their masters, the Dutch rulers.


(67) Ibid., p. 231.

(68) Originally referring to the felling of trees in Java's wilderness to open up new settlements, babad gradually acquires among the Javanese the meaning of history. The historicity of the babad is, however, highly suspect owing to the incorporation of mythological notions and outright misrepresentation of historical facts. This the author(s) did without the slightest attempt to distinguish the factual from the mythical.

Accordingly, C.C. Berg argues against regarding babad as history. In his view, babad should be read as a practice of magic whose intention is not to narrate the past but to mold the future through magical incantations. See C.C. Berg, "The Javanese Picture of the Past," in Soedjatmoko et al (eds.), An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965, pp. 89-90.
(69) "These Javanese writings," writes Vlekke, "mention many names of rulers and districts, but their stories are so strongly colored by mythological and allegorical concepts as to render a reconstruction of the true course of events almost impossible." Vlekke, op cit., p. 104. In this regard, see also Moertono, op cit., pp. 12-5.

(70) Vlekke, op cit., p. 68.

(71) A comparison with the kingship phenomenon in Thailand would give us a better understanding of what was going on in Javanese kingdoms. See Steinberg, op cit., p. 63.

(72) Geertz, The Religion, op cit., p. 238.

(73) Ibid., p. 238.

(74) Geertz translates swara ing asepi as "the voice in the quiet." See ibid., p. 315.

(75) Ibid., p. 311.

(76) Ibid., p. 320.

(77) Ibid., p. 333.

(78) Ibid., p. 321.

(79) Ibid., p. 328.

(80) See Partokusumo, op cit., pp. 73-9.

(81) Furnivall, op cit., p. 46.

(82) Ibid., p. 201.

(83) Kretek is Indonesian cigarette heavily spiced with cloves.

(84) Kahin, op cit., p.10. See also Furnivall, op cit., p. 47.


(86) Vandenbosch, op cit., p. 24.


(88) Furnivall, op cit., p. 45.
(89) See Schrieke, op cit., p. 25.

(90) Van Leur, op cit., pp. 92, 133.

(91) Ibid., p. 243. See also Schrieke, op cit., p. 64.

(92) Ibid., p. 64; also Van Leur, op cit., p. 228.

(93) Kahin, op cit., pp. 7-8.


(96) Ibid., pp. 29, 39, 50.

(97) Furnivall, op cit., p. 45.

(98) Ibid., p. 48.

(99) Ibid., p. 47.

(100) Ibid., pp. 234, 307.

(101) Ibid., p. 47.
(1) Some deny that Indonesia was really colonized that long. The basis of their argument is plain, for the scope and intensity of Dutch administrative penetration varied widely from region to region. Only the western part of Java was colonized for more than three centuries, beginning with the establishment of Batavia in 1619. The rest of Java followed suit about 136 years later if we take the Gianti Treaty of 1755 as a marking point. Most of the Outer Provinces were not formally administered by the Dutch until the first decades of the twentieth century. Aceh continued her relentless war until 1904.

There are, however, a number of reasons to argue otherwise. In the first place, the center of civilization in the archipelago, probably ever since Majapahit, has largely been in Java. By this, I do not imply that there were no other instances of shining civilization in the Outer Islands during the centuries preceding the establishment of VOC.

Secondly, almost 60% of the country's population was concentrated on the island. Thirdly, there was really no economic reason for the Dutch to colonize the vast archipelago in an active manner when the feasibly exploitable area for an economic undertaking was only Java. The previous exploitation of the Moluccas had lasted much shorter. Fourth, as from 1680 there was—with the exception of Aceh—virtually no indigenous power left that continued its own trade or political relations with foreign powers. Finally, the gradualness of Dutch administrative expansion was a function more of the gradual growth of Dutch exploitive practices than of their inability to subjugate the existing indigenous powers.

The denying argument is therefore based on the confusion of exploitation with colonization. It is my contention that while administration/exploitation and colonization usually go together, they are not necessarily coterminous. History testifies that beginning with the establishment of Batavia, there was virtually no indigenous power which could effectively reverse the Dutch movement throughout the archipelago. Thus, with the exception of Aceh and other sporadic and intermittent resistance, colonization was complete.

In other words, while it is true that the entire archipelago was not simultaneously administered/exploited, it is truer that all the islands now comprising Indonesia were under no econo-political hegemony other than that of the Dutch. The Dutch did not rule the other parts of the country as intensively as they ruled Java for a simple reason: the purpose of colonial administration is economic exploitation. The rest of the land merely had to wait their
turn, and the Dutch had every reason to take their time. If the Dutch were not the exploiter of the entire land, they were certainly its master.


(3) Ibid., p. 7.


(5) Foucault writes that "in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality." Michel Foucault, "The Order of Discourse," in Michael Shapiro (ed.), Language and Politics. New York: New York University Press, 1984, p. 109.

(6) Foucault, op cit., p. 226.


(9) Ibid., p. 231.

(10) Foucault, op cit., p. 216.


(12) Ibid., p. 224.


(16) As a hint to the influence of Malay in the variety of languages in the East Indies, see some comparison of languages in the archipelago in T.S. Raffles, The History of


(21) Commenting on the difficulty of writing to a large anonymous public in Javanese, Anderson observes incisively: "For the first time Javanese writers were confronted with an invisible, atomized public. Silent prose rather than sung poetry became the norm. But the central problem for anyone writing now in Javanese was what one might call the 'problem of pronouns.' For it became more and more difficult to sustain the old pronomial forms in the world of the market. One can see this on both sides of the I-You divide. The old ingsun-I might be the singer, the composer, the sovereign praised, or a particular character in a poem's narrative, but the identity of this 'I' was clear to everyone listening. In the silence of the market, however, who was ingsun (or aku or kula)? No one could be sure except as this 'I' imposed himself through his own words, that is, personalized his voice and style, and, if successful, eventually imposed the persona of 'I, the author X,' whom most readers would never encounter except on the printed page. So with 'you,' for the market created a multiplicity of 'yous'--aristocrats, busboys, hairdressers, officials, schoolgirls, and even Dutchmen. For this social multiplicity, the Javanese language offers no obvious answer; there is really no word for a homogeneous, collective, public (thus equal-before-the-author) 'you,' perhaps even no real second person plural." Benedict Anderson, "Sembah-Sumpah (Courtesy and Curses): The Politics of Language and Javanese Culture" in Change and Continuity in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia Paper No. 23, Center for Asian and Pacific Studies, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1984, p. 25.

(23) Calculated from Karl J. Pelzer, "Physical and Human Resource Pattern" in McVey (ed.), *Indonesia*. New Haven: Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University. By arrangement with HRAF Press, 1963, pp. 14-15. The population of ethnic Javanese is calculated by adding the percentage of the population of Central Java, Yogyakarta, East Java, and Madura. The percentage will be less if we subtract the population of Madura, which in fact forms a distinct group.

(24) J.S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India*. Cambridge at the University Press; 1939, p. 422.


(27) The word 'feudalism' is here understood broadly, as defined for instance by Jan Romein, who writes that, "Today it is used generally to describe a social structure in which a predominantly agricultural population is economically and politically ruled by a landed aristocracy whose status and rights are hallowed by tradition and are more or less treated as something quite natural." See Jan Romein, *The Asian Century*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965, p. 156.

(28) Aceh, for instance, waged war against the Dutch until 1904, a war which was tough, protracted, and particularly costly to the Netherlands.


(32) Muhammadiyah, the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia and probably the largest modernist movement in the Muslim world, was established in 1912 and published both its periodicals *Suara Muhammadiyah* (Yogyakarta) and *Adil* (Surakarta) in Bahasa Indonesia.

(33) Kachru, op cit., p. 4.


(37) "By the end of the nineteenth century," writes Hodgson, "liberal Turkish authors had been simplifying the courtly Ottoman language, to write in a less Persianized Turkish, more like that spoken by ordinary people. This tendency was now implemented systematically.... Turkish, the speech of the enduring folk, so far as possible restored to what it was before even the Turkish nation adopted the Perso-Arabic civilization. Superfluous Persianism... could be swept away simply by inspiring a spirit of straightforward simplicity....

"So far as possible, indeed, even the technical terms of civilization, which were relevant to the specialized callings of an international society rather than to the culture of a folk, were rendered through Turkish roots, which in many cases, at least, made them easier for ordinary people to learn when they needed them." Marshall Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, Vol. III. Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1974, p. 265.

On the populist movement of quoc ngu, David G. Marr holds that, "Two factors were critical: the desire of an increasing number of intellectuals to make quoc ngu more useful than Chinese or French for defining and disseminating modern Vietnamese culture, and the decision of the newly founded Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1945 to make the struggle against ignorance and illiteracy one of three top revolutionary priorities (the others being to resist the return of the French and to overcome famine)." David G. Marr, Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920-1945. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981, p. 137.
(38) Hodgson, op cit., pp. 33, 137, 150.


(41) Ibid., p. 270.

(42) Kachru, op cit., p. 5.


(44) Kachru, op cit., p. 1.

(45) Umberto Eco, The Name of the Rose. New York: Warner Books, 1980, p. 469 ff. In his Foucaultian understanding of power, Eco says through his protagonist, "Under torture you say not only what the inquisitor wants, but also what you imagine might please him, because a bond (this, truly diabolical) is established between you and him" (p. 63).

(46) Foucault, Discipline, op cit., pp. 3-5.

(47) Hodgson, op cit., p. 251; Marr, op cit., p. 137.


(49) Ibid., p. 292.

(50) This of course does not imply that oral literature has been totally overcome by written literature. There are several traits of orature which can never be emulated or superseded by the printed words.

(51) The concept of the "centeredness" of discursive practices is taken from a study by Michael Shapiro, "The Constitution of the Central American Other: The Case of 'Guatemala'." See Michael Shapiro, The Politics of Representation. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1988, Chapter 3. Shapiro maintains that "most of our practices are centered. We know who we are, and rather than seeking to extend the reach of the 'we,' we appropriate, often violently, the world of others--persons, animals, and landscapes--in a way that allow the familiar discourses
containing that 'we' to maintain their various economies. Our interest in these Others flow from what we understand and prize in on-going personal and collective wants and needs as we understand them" (p. 103).

(52) I owe this to the remark made by Professor Henningsen, a member of my dissertation committee, as he finished reading this chapter. Professor Henningsen has been very helpful in sharpening many of the arguments presented here.


(54) Ibid., p. 30.


(56) Ibid., pp. 19, 24.

(57) Ibid., p. 28.

(58) Ibid., p. 29.

(59) Ibid., p. 64. The allegation that Bahasa Indonesia is a "preposterous language" is cited by G.H. Bousquet in his work A French View of the Netherlands Indies. London: Oxford University Press, 1940, p. 79. Here Bousquet is merely summing up the general Dutch opinion of Malay, rather than expressing his own judgement.

(60) Alisjahbana, op cit., pp. 10-11.

(61) Ibid., pp. 9, 24.


(63) Alisjahbana, op cit., pp. 62-64.

(64) Ibid., p. 34.

(65) The first word meaning mass-action; the second common people, generally impoverished; the last means, in Sukarno's term, "the people whose possession of everything, if any, is always meager."

(66) Bousquet, op cit., p. 88; Alisjahbana, op cit., p. 8.

(67) In Bahasa Indonesia the Sumpah Pemuda (Youth Pledge) reads as follows, "Kami putera dan puteri Indonesia mengaku
bertumpah darah jang satu, Tanah Indonesia. Kami putera dan puteri Indonesia mengaku berbangsa jang satu, Bangsa Indonesia. Kami putera dan puteri Indonesia mendjundjung bahasa persatuan, bahasa Indonesia." See Alisjahbana, ibid., p. 34.

(68) In the words of Alisjahbana, "Oleh kedatangan semangat baru, penduduk Nusantara jang ber-abad2 petjah-belah, tjerai-berai ini, mendapat sebuah nama jang melukisan perasaan persatuan jang ber-njala2 dalam kalbunja. Dan demikianlah nama 'Melaju' jang telah lama tiada pada tempatnya dibelakang perkataan 'bahasa' itu—sebab telah lama bahasa itu bukan hak milik bangsa Melaju sadja—diganti, terganti dengan sendirinya dengan perkataan baru, jang mendjadi lambang, mendjadi simbol perasaan persatuan dan keinginan bersatu itu." Alisjahbana, ibid., p. 34.

(69) The absence of an independent self is a prerequisite to exploitation by an external power. As Shapiro puts it, "[T]o the extent that the Other is regarded as something not occupying the same natural/moral space as the self, conduct toward the Other becomes more exploitive." Michael Shapiro, The Politics of Representation. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1988, p. 102.

(70) After touring all Java as early as 1848, Governor Rochussen suggested that Malay be made the medium for both communication and administration in the entire land. As mentioned above, Ki Hadjar Dewantara gave the same vindication in 1916. Several years before the Sumpah Pemuda, the same assertion was repeated by G.J. Pijper and Muhammad Yamin. See Alisjahbana, ibid., pp. 21, 36-37.

(71) Johns, op cit., p. 437.


(74) Geertz, The Politics, op cit., p. 323.

Chapter IV


(4) Barnouw, op cit., p. 199.


(7) Heilbroner, op cit., p. 271.

(8) Vlekke, op cit., p. 311.

(9) Ibid., p. 311.


(11) Ibid., p. 230.

(12) Vlekke, op cit., p. 325.

(13) Furnivall, op cit., p. 231.

(14) Ibid., p. 231.

(15) Ibid., p. 233.

(16) Ibid., p. 233.

(17) Ibid., p. 233.
(18) Vlekke, op cit., p. 324.

(19) Ibid., p. 336. The name Netherlands India is certainly not the nominal name of the land and the very idea of colonial possession stays with it. The name East Indies will be more nominal for both the Dutch and the Indonesians, although the latter never call their land as such.

(20) Of the 39 members of the original Volksraad, which was established out of the East Indian Government Act of December 16, 1916, the chairman was to be appointed by the Crown and half of the members were to be appointed by the Governor General. The rest were to be elected by indirect suffrage.

As from 1925 the revised East Indian Government Act allowed for 61 members including the chairman, the appointment of which remained vested in the Crown. As to the distribution of membership, 20 Indonesians, 15 Netherlanders, and 3 non-native Asiatic members were to be elected. The rest were appointed by the Governor General. The Indonesians electoral members were divided along ethnic lines. See Vandenbosch, op cit., pp. 111-5.

A surface look will show that in the revised Act there was progress toward a more equal participation between the Netherlanders and the Indonesians. A closer look, however, will reveal that the Government retained its firm grip not only with the stipulation that the body had only an advisory function, but also that the Indonesian members came to the fore not as Indonesians. Their membership represent their ethnic constituents.

It was well-known that it is along the ethnic lines that the Dutch sowed their divide-and-rule politics. Also the fact that only 15 Netherlanders were to be elected gives a greater leverage to the colonial government to have a buffer against possible intrusion of Dutch members who sympathized with the Indonesian cause.


(22) Ibid., p. 65.

(23) Furnivall, op cit., p. 227.

(24) Ibid., p. 228.


(26) Ibid., p. 372.


(29) Ibid., pp. 11-2.

(30) Ibid., p. 12.


(33) "In very many and very essential respects," writes Lenin, "Russia is undoubtedly an Asian country and, what is more, one of the most benighted, mediaeval and shamefully backward of Asian countries." See Lenin, The Awakening, op cit., p. 11.

(34) We will discuss the problem of interpretation in the chapters dealing with nationalism and egalitarianism as contested ideologies, i.e., Chapter VIII and Chapter IX.


(36) Ibid., p. 23.


(38) Ibid., p. 185.


(40) See McVey, op cit., p. 4.


(42) Ibid., p. 94.

(44) Ibid., p. 67.

(45) McVey, op cit., p. 53.


(47) Connor, op cit., p. 5. Connor argues that, "Nationalism is predicated upon the assumption that the most fundamental division of humankind are the many vertical cleavages that divide people into ethnonational groups. Marxism, by contrast, rests upon the conviction that the most fundamental human divisions are horizontal class distinctions that cut across national groupings."

(48) Ibid., p. 7.

(49) See, for instance, Lenin-Roy contention in the Comintern congress in McVey, op cit., p. 59.


(52) Ibid., p. 16.

(53) Ibid., pp. 46-47.

(54) Ibid., p. xi.


(56) The last center of Hindu-Buddhistic religion now flourishing is Bali, an island adjacent to the eastern tail of Java.

(57) The widespread notion among Indonesianists that Islam can only enter the archipelago by compromising its rigorous creed with the prevalent Hindu-Buddhistic elements in the country has been challenged particularly by Marshall Hodgson's important work, The Venture of Islam. According to Hodgson, the notion that Indonesian Islam has been mysticized by Hinduism overlooks the fact that Islam itself has a long—and still thriving—tradition of mysticism as
it manifests in Sufism. He is, therefore, arguing that rather than Islam being mysticized by local practices, Islam which entered Indonesia in the thirteenth century was already a mysticized Islam.

It is observable that most of the terminology used by Javanese mysticism, for instance, is directly derived from Arabic or Islamic nomenclature. Javanese names of the months and of different kinds of "passions" so important in Javanese mysticism are a good case in point. Even the word "slametan" common to both abangan and priyayi has the same Arabic root as islam.

Hodgson's argument, however, derives its plausibility from the established fact that Islam was brought into the archipelago by Indo-Persian Islamic traders, which were then highly Sufic. But the best way of putting it is by maintaining that there was an active and dynamic interaction between the in-coming Islam and the recipient culture. An instance of this is well presented by Hodgson when he writes that, "perhaps nowhere else in Islamdom did the early heroic legendry retain so active a religious valuation as in eastern Javanese aristocratic circles. When the gentry adopted Islam, these tradition were woven into Sufism, which they enrich and endowed with a distinctively Javanese beauty," p. 551.


(62) Ibid., p. 2.
(63) Geertz distinguishes between the force and the scope of religiosity. By force, he refers to the thoroughness with which a religious pattern "is internalized in the personalities of the individuals who adopt it, its centrality and marginality in their lives." By contrast, scope means "the range of social contexts within which religious considerations are regarded as having more or less direct relevance."

However, I find it problematic not to use the term "internalized" in the latter. For more than the former, internalization of religious belief here seems to be more marked than in the former, which is more an externalization of religion. See Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed. Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1968, pp. 111-2.

(64) Raffles, op cit., p. 2.

(65) Again Geertz was mistaken to call this characteristic of the Javanese. The first and foremost business of Sufism is after all illuminationism, i.e., the lumination of one's inner being thoroughly with the light of the "presence" of God. See, Geertz, Islam Observed, op cit, p. 98.

(66) Sartono Kartodirdjo, The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888. S'Gravenhage, Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, p. 94. Sartono also writes: "As for the Sufi disciplines, we know with certainty that they were an early importation in Indonesia and dated back to the 16th or the beginning of the 17th century. The Satariah tarekat was originally propagated in Atjeh by Abdurra'uf of Singkel. From the 17th century onwards, the Satariah movement travelled from Atjeh to West Java and from there to Central and East Java," p. 144.


(68) Smith, op cit., p. 51.

(69) Ibid., p. 55.

(70) Ibid., p. 52.

(71) Fazlur Rahman defines ijtihad as "the effort to understand the meaning of a relevant text or precedent in the past, containing a rule, and to alter that rule by extending or restricting or otherwise modifying it in such a manner that a new situation can be subsumed under it by a new solution." Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity. Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1983 (?), p. 8.
The Great Mutiny of 1857 emerged, according to rumors, as a response to "the introduction of the Enfield rifle whose cartridges...were greased with cows and pig's fat" (see Jan Romein, The Asian Century. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965, p. 63). The harshness of the British reaction left a lasting and traumatic memory to all Indians.

But the most crushing defeat seems to fall upon Indian Muslims. The British, with the support of the Gurkhas and Sikhs, had particularly blamed the Muslims as they saw in the revolt an attempt to revive the old Islamic power of India. Thus a great bulk of the British counter-attack was directed to them.

For many years Indian Muslims, more than their Hindu brethren, had to bear the rancor of defeat. Hence the long retreat of the Muslims into their worn-out shells. Only the rise of Syed Akhmad Khan was to alleviate much of the bitterness and lead his co-religionists to the path of reenlightenment.

As to al-Afghani's position, see, for instance, Adams, ibid., pp. 15-6. In Islam, Rahman writes of him as "the first genuine Muslim Modernist." Rahman holds that "although he propounded no intellectual modernism himself, he nevertheless made a powerful appeal for the cultivation of philosophical and scientific disciplines by expanding the curricula of the educational institutions and for general educational reforms."

Rahman also sees al-Afghani as working toward developing "the mediaeval content of Islam to meet the needs of a modern society," as propagating "a type of modern humanism, a concern for man as such." It is this humanism which, according to Rahman, has made the man a populist, "a legacy which has been a powerful factor in the shaping of the political and social thought of the Muslim Modernists." See Rahman, op cit., p. 216.
(78) Ibid., p. 123.


(80) To support his view, Muhammad Abduh also quoted the Prophet as saying: "You are better informed (than I) concerning your secular affairs." See Adams, ibid., p. 123.

(81) Ibid., p. 131.

(82) Abduh contends that "one becomes a believer only when he grasps his religion with reason, and comprehends it with his soul, so that he becomes fully convinced of it. But he who is trained to simply admit it, without the use of reason, and to practice without thinking—even though it be something good—he is not to be called a believer. For the design of faith is not this, that a man should be drilled for the good, as though he were trained for it like an animal; rather, that the reason and soul of the man should be elevated by knowledge and comprehension...." Quoted in Adams, ibid., p. 132.

(83) See ibid., pp. 130-6; 151-3; 231-9; see also Rahman, Islam, op cit., pp. 218-221.


(85) Syirk implies a belief in supernatural entities other than God or in the power of mediations by venerable personages, dead or alive. In "traditional" Indonesian Islam, syirk includes the practices of asking favor at the grave of parents or men considered holy as well as slametan, i.e., a communal gathering in commensality to drive away evil spirits.


(87) Ibid., p. 28.

Chapter V

(1) In British India the development of the agrarian sector, where classes and pseudo-classes under the name of the zemindars and ryotwars proliferated, was not accompanied by transformation in the mode of production. Rather, it occurred in the urban sector, creating both India's bourgeois and proletariat. See particularly Chapter VI and Chapter VII of A.R. Desai, Social Background of Indian Nationalism. Bombay: The Popular Press, 1948.

(2) Remarking on Indian nationalism as a response to British colonization or its impact upon the free evolution of the Indian people, Desai writes: "This was done by subordinating the interests of such free and normal development to British interests, by obstructing or restricting Indian industrialization, by distorting her agricultural production to meet the raw-material needs of British industries, in short, by keeping India as primarily an agrarian, raw-material producing colony of Britain and as a market for British industries." See Desai, ibid., p. 33.

(3) "'Superimposed'," writes Geertz, "is the proper word, because what the the Dutch were essentially concerned to do, from 1619 to 1942, was to pry agricultural products out of the archipelago, and particularly out of Java, which was saleable on world markets without changing fundamentally the structure of the indigenous economy." See Clifford Geertz, Agricultural Involution: The Processes of Ecological Change in Indonesia. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963, p. 47. See also J.R. Boeke, Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies as Exemplified by Indonesia. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953, p. 29: "It meant superimposing western corporate bodies on the eastern communal bodies. It also meant emptying the precapitalistic village household of a good deal of its content in favor of the municipalities and higher western institutions."


(5) Ibid., p. 53.

(6) Thomas S. Raffles observes that, "The Bugis import into Java from the other islands, Malayan camphor, tortoise-shell, edible birds'-nests, bees'-wax, clothes called sarongs, of a very strong texture, their own manufacture, and gold-dust, which they lay out in the purchase of opium, iron, steel, Europe chintzes and broadcloth and Indian piece-goods, besides tobacco, rice, salt, and other


(11) Van Leur writes that, "With trade spread out among many isolated markets there was a wide variation in weights and measures.... The kinds of money varied just as much. On Java, and probably in the ports on which Javanese ships traded, circulated the lead cash imported from China, thousands of which, threaded on a string through a hole in the center of them, counted for one real of eight; and alongside it there were Spanish and Portuguese money, Chinese trading money of bar silver, Persian larrins.... In Acin people reckoned in taels of gold...." See J.C. Van Leur, op cit., p. 136. In the West, Robert L. Heilbroner's account of a sixteenth century German merchant goes as follows: "Each community he visits has its own money, its own rules and regulations, its own law and order. In the area around Baden alone there are 112 different measures of length, 92 different square measures...." See Robert L. Heilbroner, *The Worldly Philosophers*. New York: A Touchstone Book, 1980, p. 20.


(13) See Raffles, op cit, p. 229.
(14) Ibid., pp. 218-9.


(19) Wertheim, op cit., p. 70.


(21) Wertheim, op cit., p. 110.

(22) Wertheim notes that, "In the greater part of the Outer Territories the adaptation to modern economy was carried out by the Indonesian themselves. At a time when the Western rubber plantations were still in the experimental stage, Indonesians on Sumatra and Borneo--mostly Malays--were embarking on cultivation of rubber on their own account on their ladangs.... By reason of the sparsity of the population, the ladang pattern of cultivation offered a better chance of dynamic expansion than did the sawah pattern on Java." Wertheim, op cit., pp. 97-8. See also Geertz, op cit., pp. 114-6. On the economic dynamic in Bali, see Clifford Geertz, Peddlers and Princes, Chapter IV. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963.

(23) Geertz, Peddlers, ibid., p. 49.


(27) See Desai, op cit., p. 186.


(30) "The culture system was introduced at a time when authority over the colony still rested almost completely with the king. After 1848, however, the Dutch bourgeoisie represented in Parliament gained a significant voice in colonial affairs. The bourgeoisie, which had been able to build up considerable capital from the profits derived from the culture system, now looked for investment in the colony." (Emphasis added) Wertheim, op cit., pp. 61-2.

Geertz gives us a similar observation: "...the Culture System appears to represent the kind of governmental mobilization of 'redundant' labor for capital creation projects which has been often proposed and occasionally attempted in underdeveloped areas." See Geertz, Agricultural, op cit., p. 63.


(33) Wertheim, op cit., p. 100.

(34) Furnivall, op cit., p. 237.

(35) This fact gave rise to the phenomena of what Geertz refers to as "agricultural involution" and "shared poverty," see Geertz, Agricultural, op cit., pp. 80-82 and p. 97.


(37) "The difference in 'economic mentality' between Dutch and Javanese which Boeke took to be the cause of dualism was in fact in great part its result. The Javanese did not become impoverished because they were 'static'; they became 'static' because they were impoverished." Geertz, Agricultural, op cit., p. 142.


(40) Ibid., p. 237.

(42) Vandenbosch, ibid., p. 237.
(43) Ibid., p. 256.
(44) Ibid., p. 236.
(45) Ibid., p. 399.
(47) Vandenbosch, op cit., pp. 399-401.
(49) Ibid., pp. 324, 329.
(50) Vandenbosch, op cit., p. 235. To this Sukarno cites a greater figure (see Chapter I of this thesis, p. 29).
(51) Furnivall, op cit., p. 346.
(52) Ibid., p. 346.
(53) Van Niel, op cit., p. 244.
(57) Kahin, op cit., p. 8.
(58) Ibid., p. 41.
(60) Quoted in Kahin, op cit., p. 9.
(61) Ibid., p. 9.
(62) Ibid., p. 10.
(63) Raffles, op cit., p. 226.
(65) Vlekke, op cit., p. 342.


(67) Kahin, op cit., p. 7.

(68) Raffles, op cit., p 266.

(69) Ibid., pp. 271-2.

(70) Vlekke, op cit., p. 134.

(71) Schrieke, op cit., p. 193.


(73) Wertheim, op cit., p. 97.

(74) Ibid., p. 77.

(75) Furnivall, op cit., 236.

(76) Vlekke, op cit., p. 310.

(77) Vandenbosch, op cit., p. 171.


(79) Vandenbosch, op cit., p. 173.

(80) Furnivall, op cit., pp. 259-60.

(81) Vandenbosch, op cit., p. 173.

(82) Ibid., pp. 171-3.

(83) Vlekke, op cit., p. 314.

(84) Wertheim, op cit., p. 108.

(85) Kahin, op cit., p. 66.


(87) Wertheim, op cit., p. 100.

(88) Calculated from Furnivall, op cit., p. 347.

Chapter VI


(2) Ebenstein writes that, "In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, industry in Russia made rapid headway, often with the aid of foreign engineers and financiers, and an urban proletariat began to fill the big factory towns. A sense of acute class consciousness developed in the new proletariat, which was without political protection, without hope of social equality, and which was working at a wage level below the bare necessities of life." See William Ebenstein, Great Political Thinkers. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960, p. 682.


(5) Ibid., p. 165.

(6) Here the priyayi ethic of the alus and indirection is again manifest. Many times alus and indirection in Javanese speech acts are synonymous with uttering "empty" words. The emptiness is necessary in order not to offend the person(s) one talks to or any particular group among the audience one addresses.

Observing the interlocutionary practices among the users of krama, Siegel writes, "If one is speaking High Javanese, it means phrasing one's sentences so that they are long and, if possible, full of archaism. Given the right opportunity and a skilled speaker, the result can be a pleasing vacuity, one that stills whatever tumultuous feelings one's listeners might have while one says as little as possible." Thus Siegel suggests that it is accepted, if not encouraged, among the alus speaking Javanese to speak "a long while...and said nothing." See James T. Siegel, Solo in the New Order. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 17.


(8) Nagazumi, op cit., p. 46.

(9) Surjomihardjo, op cit., p. 94.

(11) Ibid., p. 44.


(13) Ibid., p. 6.


(15) Soeriokoesoemo, op cit., p. 5-6.

(16) See Nagazumi, op cit., p. 168.

(17) Ibid., p. 121.

(18) Pringgodigdo, op cit., p. 2.


(20) See Nagazumi, op cit., p. 95ff.

(21) Ibid., p. 97.

(22) Ibid., p. 101.

(23) Ibid., pp. 51-6.

(24) Ibid., pp. 61-2.

(25) Ibid., p. 144.

(26) Van Niel, op cit., p. 144.

(27) Ibid., p. 144.

(28) Ibid., p. 174.


(31) McVey, op cit., p. 166.


(34) Ibid., p. 215.

(35) For a close observation of the successes and some failures of the Indian National Congress, see Jawaharlal Nehru, Toward Freedom. New York: The John Day Company, 1941, particularly on pp. 256-262. The cooptation by the Dutch of the majority of Budi Utomo leaders was also indicated by Sudjadi's report from Indonesia to Hatta in the Netherlands: "Kini saya tidak bisa berharap banyak dari Budi Utomo; 99 persen anggotanya adalah orang-orang Jan Compagne." See Ingleson, op cit., p. 16.


(37) To an extent, the denotation of rakyat can be taken from one of the meanings of the word people in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary. (Springfield, MA.: G & C Merriam Company, 1977). It pertains to "the mass of a community as distinguished from special class." But this definition still implies that "the mass" are free, and although they might not enjoy special rights, they are more or less to be seriously reckoned with.

Rakyat, in so far as Indonesian folk-tales are concerned, does not imply an aggregate of people having a say in the state business. It refers to indetermination in terms of politics and economy and as such to the reality of subjection. Like proletariat, rakyat has a strong class connotation. But unlike proletariat, rakyat usually retain their means of production, however meager they usually are. The economic exploitation befalling them is conducted not through surplus-value extraction, but through a politico-cultural manipulation.

In Bahasa rakyat should be distinguished from bangsa, of which our dictionary can provide an apposite definition under the same entry (people): "a body of persons that are united by a common culture, tradition, or sense of kinship, that typically have common language, institutions, and beliefs, and that often constitute a politically organized group."


(39) McVey, op cit., p. 19.

(40) Bernhard Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1969, pp. 13-4. This study of Dahm should be rated as
one of the most important studies on Sukarno's intellectual/ideological development.

(41) Kahin, op cit., p. 68.


(43) Kahin, op cit., p. 38.

(44) Pringgodigdo, op cit., p. 4-5.


(48) Sartono Kartodirdjo, op cit., p. 78: "Whenever the people were oppressed or suffered hardships the Ratu Adil idea tended to emerge."

(49) Taufik Abdullah aptly refutes the tendency among some Indonesianists to draw a correlation between the Indonesians' mystical or heterodox belief of Islam with the social unrests in the colony. Thus he suggests, "Tetapi sifat yang kelihatan heterodox ini tidaklah berarti apa-apa jika struktur dari situasi, yang menjadi wadah tindakan dan perbuatan itu diperhitungkan. Struktur interen dari panji-panji Islam, atau agama yang dipakai, menjadi kurang mendesak dalam tinjaun yang bersifat kontekstual, ketika pemahaman masyarakat terhadap situasi riil yang mereka hadapi dijadikan ukuran. Maka, tidaklah pula terlalu sukar untuk dimengerti mengapa pemerintah dan perumus kebijaksanaan Hindia Belanda menempatkan kesemuanya ke dalam rubrik 'politik radikal Islam'. Bukankah pemerintah, sebagai wakil kekuasaan, dengan para petani radikal berada dalam

(50) Dahm, op cit., p. 17.

(51) Amelz, op cit., pp. 104-5.


(54) McVey, op cit., 96-97.

(55) Amelz, op cit., p. 114.

(56) Ibid., p. 114.

(57) Ibid., p. 146.

(58) McVey, op cit., p. 455.


(60) Ibid., Chapter IV, p. 21.

(61) Nggogol means peasant procession to a high official as one of the traditional forms of rural protest.


(63) Dahm, op cit., p. 38.

(64) McVey, op cit., p. 93.

(65) Ibid., p. 93.

(66) The Congress imposing the party discipline against the communists in Sarekat Islam was held when Tjokroaminoto was
under arrest due to a charge of perjury in the investigations of the so-called SI Section B, and was awaiting trial in the prison. Ibid., p. 102-3.


(68) Pringgodigdo, op cit., p. 7.

(69) Sartono Kartodirdjo, op cit., p. 143.

(70) Ibid., p. 148.

(71) Ibid., p. 159ff.

(72) See A.P.E. Korver, Sarekat Islam, 1912-1916: Opkomst, bloei en structuur van Indonesia's eerste massabeweging. Amsterdam: Historische Seminarium van de Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1982, p. 120.

(73) Ibid., p. 171.

(74) McVey, op cit., p. 104.

(75) See Deliar Noer, op cit., p. 113.

(76) In Korver's view, Sarekat Islam by far exceeded Budi Utomo and Indische Partij as regards the evolvement of Indonesian nation: "In de eerste plaats was de Islam, als de ene factor die de etnische verschillen in Indonesie kon overbruggen, reeds in de negentiende eeuw werkzaam als een integrerende factor in de Indonesische samenleving. In de tweede plaats bezat de Islam een sterke psychologische lading die appelleerde aan een groot deel van de Indonesische bevolking." With this observation, Korver concludes that Sarekat Islam is "een beweging die een belangrijke bijdrage heeft geleverd aan de eenwording van Indonesie." See Korver, op cit., p. 274.
Chapter VII


(2) J.S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India*. Cambridge at the University Press, 1960, p. 244.

(3) Ibid., p. 245.

(4) This article was first published in *De Express*, July 13, 1913.


(7) Scherer, op cit., p. 301.

(8) Barnouw, op cit., p. 75.


(11) Shiraishi, op cit., Chapter 4, p. 9.

(12) Ibid., Chapter 4, p. 9.

(13) Ibid., Chapter 4, pp. 8-9.

(14) Ibid., Chapter 4, p. 13.

(15) Scherer, op cit., p. 87.


(17) Ibid., Chapter IV, p. 13.


(20) Scherer, op cit., pp. 139-40 (emphasis added).

(22) Ibid., Chapter IV, p. 3.

(23) Ibid., Chapter IV, p. 3.

(24) Ibid., Chapter V, p. 3 (emphasis added).

(25) Ibid., Chapter V, p. 3a.

(26) Ibid., Chapter V, p. 2.

(27) Ibid., Chapter V, p. 2.

(28) Scherer, op cit., p. 149.

(29) Ibid., p. 150.

(30) Ibid., p. 150.

(31) Ibid., p. 151.

(32) Pringgodigdo, op cit., p. 32.

(33) Ibid., p. 27.

(34) A dalang is sometimes translated as a Javanese puppeteer. As a matter of fact, he or she is more than a puppeteer. He/she should be able to recite extemporaneously and correctly the Indic Javanese epics of Bharatayudha and Ramayana or other derivative and popular stories. He/she should also be well versed in the philosophy and the subtle meanings of Javanese words as they are conveyed in particular wayang plots, characters, and interlocutions.

An ideal dalang is in many respects the epitome of the Javanese culture. His/her initiation to be a dalang goes through a long process of approximation with the Javanese audience and internalization of the Javanese culture. Unlike a puppeteer which can perform in any culture, a dalang can only flourish in the Javanese symbolic context and the standard ways he/she should perform the art.


(36) Ibid., p. 52.


Dealing with the development of Ho Chi Minh's political career in Europe, Alexander Woodside writes that, "At the Congress of Tours in December 1920, Ho participated in the creation of the French Communist Party. Here he denounced the crimes of imperialism in his own homeland, and made it clear that his conversion to communism was inspired essentially by nationalism." See Alexander Woodside, Community and Revolution in Modern Vietnam. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976, p. 165.

(41) Fairbank, op cit., p. 229.

(42) McVey, op cit., p. 32.


(44) McVey, op cit., p. 196.

(45) Ibid., p. 62.

(46) Schrieke, op cit., p. 86.

(47) Ibid., p. 89.


(49) Ibid., p. 26.

(50) The "modernity" of orthodox Islamic consciousness is, for instance, espoused by Ernest Gellner. He writes that, "Only Islam survives as a serious faith pervading both folk and a Great Tradition. Its great tradition is modernisable; and the operation can be presented, not as an innovation or concession to the outsiders, but rather as the continuation of an old dialogue within Islam... Thus in Islam, and only in Islam, purification/modernization on the one hand, and the reaffirmation of a putative old local identity on the


(55) Ibid., p. 158.

(56) Ibid., p. 87.

(57) Ibid., p. 62.


(60) McVey, *op cit.*, p. 68.

(61) Ibid., p. 68.

(62) Ibid., p. 158.

(63) Ibid., pp. 257, 262.

(64) Ibid., pp. 252-5.

(65) By this time the colonial government had also decided to increase its surveillance of every movement of PKI. Internationally, the PKI was concurrently confronted with no less serious problems. "By 1925 the problem of maintaining foreign communications became acute for the PKI, both because it was engaged in a controversy with the Comintern and because most of its top leaders had by then either fled abroad or been exiled." McVey, *ibid.*, p. 230.

(66) Ibid., p. 289.
(72) The end of PKI was "inglorious" in two senses. First, the pergerakan ended while dissensions were rampant among its leaders. Hence the strong impression that the rebellion itself was in fact only an escape of incompetence. Secondly, the persecution and punitive actions taken by the Dutch government seemed to be no longer measured with discretion. It was harsh and merciless. "Some 13,000 Indonesians were arrested in the days following the uprising; of these, 4,500 were imprisoned and more than 1,000 interned" at the swampy and malaria-ridden Boven Digul in New Guinea. (Mintz, op cit., p. 33.) McVey observes that "there were about 3,000 in the Digul camp at the beginning of 1930." (McVey, op cit., p. 490n20.)

Most Indonesian leaders of pergeraks deeply resented the severity of the repression, particularly as many of the internees, who were more "nationalists" than communists, never returned. The camp remained in use until as late as 1941. Vlekke gives the following description: "The enormous distance stretching between the camp and the coast, the dense jungle and its head-hunting inhabitants fenced off the camp more effectively than any barbed-wire fence could ever have done." See Bernard H.M. Vlekke, Nusantara. Bruxelles: Les Editions A. Manteau S.A., 1943, p. 370.

"When I arrived at the desolate camp...," writes Hatta, "I could have believed that I had come to one of those terrible convict settlements of the French deportation colony in Cayenne." (See Hatta, op cit., pp. 388-9.) Hatta concludes his testimony in "The Digoel tragedy of the Dutch Colonial imperialism" by telling that, "Digoel is no longer a place. It has become a heap of consumptives and malaria sufferers, neurotics and semi-lunatics, under the scorching heat of the merciless tropical sun, surrounded by unhealthy marshes in the midst of dense impenetrable forests" (p. 379).

(73) McVey writes that "unquestioning obedience to orders from Moscow was hardly a basic tenet of the PKI leadership of the time...and the PKI Indonesian leadership in general was neither well versed in Marxist-Leninist doctrine nor inclined to accept outside opinion as law." McVey, op cit., p. 136. All this only supports our conclusion that PKI's..."
"deviation of the left" is wholly determined by the major internal difficulties the leaders themselves had inflicted upon their party.

(74) The fact that virtually all armed struggles against the Dutch, including the serious ones such as the Java War and the Aceh War, were carried out under the banner of Islam is strongly indicative. The same is true with the so-called "'meteoric' rise of Sarekat Islam." (See Benda & McVey, eds., The Communist Uprisings of 1926-1927 in Indonesia: Key Documents. Ithaca, N.Y.: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1960, p. xi.) And yet, the PKI chose to ignore this historical fact.

A similar treatment also befell nationalism. PKI refused to accommodate the nationalist approach, not because nationalism was then not yet in vogue as Benda and MacVey have argued (See ibid, p. xxv.), but because—as it was well reflected by the pronouncements of the Dutch socialists or even by Lenin and Stalin—they viewed nationalism as resulted from indelible "false consciousness."
Chapter VIII


(3) Ibid., p. 304.

(4) Upon his return from a brief visit to Russia, Semaoen still declared that "the task of the Communists was to ally with the national revolutionary movement and not to compete with it." (Ruth T. McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965, p. 141). While exiled in the Netherlands, Semaoen offered Perhimpunan Indonesia then under Hatta to form a new nationalist movement to be led by Perhimpunan Indonesia. See John Ingleson, *Jalan Ke Pengasingan*. Jakarta: LP3ES, 1983, pp. 27-8.

(5) Dahm, op cit., p. 34.


(7) This seemingly racist conception of Hatta's nationalism was in fact a function of the imposition of centuries-long racist practices by the colonial government. The brown people of the Indies were continuously branded by the Dutch as belonging to a lowly race. Hence Hatta's third reason for the birth of Indonesian nationalism. "As from early childhood the Indonesians had been taught to realize their backwardness as a people and a race. From the primary school they had experienced the humiliation of this colonial and racial antagonisms. They learned about it not from scientific books, but from their very skin." See Mohammad Hatta, *Indonesia Merdeka*. Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1976, p. 15. Analogous to the rise of Bahasa Indonesia, the consciousness of the brown people was thus reared by the Dutch colonial practice itself. It did not emerge independently.

(8) Ingleson, op cit., p. 5.

(9) Dahm, op cit., p. 61-2.
(10) Sukarno, op cit., p. 3. Sukarno also cited Renan's "desir d'etre ensemble" and Bauer's "aus Schicksalsgemeinschaft erwachsene Charactergemeinschaft." See Dahm, op cit., p. 66.

(11) Sukarno, op cit., p. 4.

(12) Ibid., p. 4.

(13) Ibid., p. 12.

(14) Ibid., p. 13.

(15) Ibid., p. 19.

(16) Dahm, op cit., p. 74.

(17) Sukarno, op cit., p. 19.

(18) Ibid., p. 21.

(19) Dahm, op cit., p. 74.

(20) Sukarno, op cit., p. 22.

(21) Dahm, op cit., p. 62.

(22) Ibid., pp. 26, 77.

(23) Ibid., p. 99.


(25) Sukarno, op cit., pp. 4-5.

(26) Legge, op cit., p. 105.

(27) "It is very important to realize that there was then a very real distinction in the Netherlands Indies between the "national" and "nationalist" movements." McVey, op cit., p. 63.


(29) Sukarno, op cit., p. 6.

(30) Sukarno, Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism. Translated into English by Karel H. Warouw and Peter D. Weldon with an

(31) See the major chronologization of Sukarno's struggle in Dahm, op cit., pp. 59-196.

(32) Legge, op cit., p. 90.

(33) Ibid., p. 93.

(34) Sukarno, Dibawah, op cit., p. 38. Compare this with Hatta's contention.

(35) Ibid., p. 38.

(36) Legge, op cit., p. 95.


(39) Dahm, op cit., p. 53.


(44) Ingleson, p. 104.

(45) Ibid., pp. 91-3.

(47) Ingleson, op cit., p. 118.

(48) Dahm, op cit., p. 110.


(50) Dahm, op cit., p. 106.

(51) Ibid., p. 106.

(52) Ingleson, op cit., p. 111.


(54) Ingleson, op cit., p. 110.


(56) Ingleson, op cit., p. 70.

(57) Dahm, op cit., p. 114.

(58) Ingleson, op cit., p. 70.

(59) Ibid., p. 111.


(62) Dahm, op cit., p. 100.


(64) Ibid., p. 110.


(70) Ibid., p. 650.

(71) See Paget, op cit, passim.

(72) See Kedcurie, op cit., pp. 57-61.

(73) Marr, op cit., p. 112.

(74) Ibid., p. 119.

(75) Ibid., p. 119.

(76) Ibid., p. 57 (emphases added).


(79) See Steinberg et al., op cit., p. 269.

(80) See Paget, op cit., pp. xxxi-xxxiii.


(83) Ibid., p. 4.

(84) Ibid., p. 4.
(85) Ibid., p. 4.


(87) Todorov, op cit., pp. 146, 191.


(90) See Opitz, op cit., p. 165.

(91) Ibid., p. 167.
Chapter IX


(2) See Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1960. It should be noted that the terms santri and abangan have been extended to cover all Indonesian Muslims having similar religious predispositions.

(3) Ibid., p. 231.


(5) Geertz, op cit., p. 234.


(9) Ibid., p. 4.

(10) Nasakom is an acronym for Nasionalisme (Nationalism), Agama (Religion), and Komunisme (Communism). This was the political coalition Sukarno had forged during the period of Guided Democracy.

(11) Anderson, op cit., p. 15.

(12) Ibid., p. 60.

(13) I do not mean to insulate culture from politics. I merely acknowledge the different disposition of the two fields. Culture deals with the meaning system underlying surface conducts, whereas politics deals primarily with the encoded, valorized, and legitimized aspects of such
conducts. Specifically, while Indonesians can be held responsible for their culture throughout history, they can be held responsible for their politics only after they were ready to embark upon a conscious struggle to secure their political rights and to defend those rights.

(14) But it does not. At various points, Feith does touch on issues, such as what he calls "an elite model" in Indonesian politics or the pressing need for political legitimacy, which, if pursued deeper, might have cast doubt upon his original assumption. See Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962, passim.


(19) A. van Marle, "Indonesian Electoral Geography," in Lee, ibid.


(21) van Marle in Lee, op cit., p. 40.

(22) Golkar stands for Golongan Karya, which literally means Functional Group. During the course of its development, however, it has deviated more and more from the functional orientations of its founders and has taken over the modalities of the aliran politics.

(23) Oey Hong Lee in Lee, op cit., p. 36.

(25) Kahin, op cit., p. 17.


(27) Ibid., p. 110.


(30) Geertz, *The Interpretation,* op cit., p. 53.

(31) Ibid., p. 53.


(33) Geertz, *The Interpretation,* op cit., p. 6 ff.

(34) Ibid., p. 10.


(36) Ibid., p. 9.

(37) Ibid., p. 25.

(38) See Weber in Dallmayr and McCarthy, op cit., p. 35.

(40) We can mention *Peddlers and Princes* and *Agricultural Involution* as belonging to a different trend in Geertz's work. These important books by Geertz put a greater emphasis on historical factors rather than on the cultural.

(41) For instance, not only Geertz's view of the abangan, santri, and priyayi have been quickly challenged by scholars such as Koentjaraningrat and Harsja Bachtiar, but the trichotomy itself is, to my judgement, more a function of an "historical anomaly" in Indonesia. This anomaly occurred and flourished during the colonial period and reached its peak during the time of the pergerakan. But even during the colonial period, most of the priyayis remained at once santri or abangan. Independent Indonesia seems to put back the last two variants into much less a dichotomy than a continuum between the most and the least devout in Islam—a situation which, in fact, obtains in all religious communities.


(43) *Agricultural Involution* is, again, an exception. But as observed by William Collier, even this study is largely valid only within limited areas in Central and East Java. See William Collier, "Agricultural Evolution in Java," in Gary E. Hansen (ed.), *Agricultural and Rural Development in Indonesia*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981.

(44) The description of the distinct individuality of meaning-systems in Indonesia by Geertz can easily lead us away from the fact that given the density of the population in Java and the familiarity of Javanese culture in general, there is an intensely close communication between most of subcultural groups.

(45) Collier in Hansen, op cit., p. 171.


(49) Ibid., p. 141.


(51) See Geertz, The Interpretation, op cit., p. 153 ff, 169.

(52) Ibid., p. 224.

(53) Ibid., p. 224.

(54) Ibid., p. 246.


(56) See Geertz, Local Knowledge, op cit., p. 73.

(57) Ibid., pp. 73-4.

(58) See Anderson in Holt, op cit., p. 38.

(59) Ibid., p. 63.

(60) As we have elaborated in Chapter II and IV, the latter is more plausible.

(61) In "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," Anderson treats the modernist Muslims as culturally peripheral vis-à-vis that of the priyai for two reasons. First by inferring from Geertz's Islam Observed (p. 12) that Islam is more assimilative than revolutionary, because it came to Java "on the heels not of conquest but of trade." Secondly, because the modernists "were not only handicapped by their sociologically intermediate and economically weak positions but also by their intellectual problems involved in abandoning assimilationist traditionalism" (p. 60).

My objection is simple. Introducing religion through trade does not necessarily result in assimilative religiosity nor does conquest revolutionary. Christianity, for instance, came to the West not through conquest. But it will be missing the point if we argue that it failed to change completely the religious map in Europe. Conversely, the revolutionary conquest by Genghis Khan of the Arabian peninsula did not eliminate Islam. On the contrary, it was his great descendants who preserved and carried the banner of Islam further.
Likewise, it is hardly tenable to say that the modernist Muslims in Indonesia is sociologically intermediate. The sheer size of Muhammadiyah membership in the land will readily counter such an argument. Even as part of the Indonesian Muslims only accept the religion in the nominal sense, the fact of such acceptance itself points to something culturally capable in the faith, especially if we bear in mind that there has never been any coercive proselytization by Muslims in Indonesia.

(62) Weber would probably object to this criticism, for he leans more toward the sociological approach than toward the anthropological. Still the anthropological in Weber remains a dominant voice in at least two of his major studies, i.e., The Sociology of Religion and The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.

(63) In an important work on Islam, Marshall Hodgson also criticizes Geertz's understanding of Islam in Indonesia. He maintains that "the general high excellence" of The Religion of Java is marred by a major systematic error. Influenced by the polemics of a certain school of modern Shari'ah-minded Muslims, Geertz, according to Hodgson, identifies 'Islam' only with what that school of modernists happens to approve. He ascribes everything else to an aboriginal or a Hindu-Buddhist background, gratuitously labelling much of the Muslim religious life in Java 'Hindu'. Geertz also identifies a long series of phenomena, virtually universal to Islam and sometimes found even in the Qur'an itself, as un-Islamic. Hence his interpretation of the Islamic past as well as of some recent anti-Islamic reactions is highly misleading.

Hodgson further argues that Geertz's error has at least three roots: "When he refers to the archipelago having long been cut off from 'the centres of orthodoxy of Mecca and Cairo', the irrelevant inclusion of Cairo betrays a modern source of Geertz's bias. We must suspect also the urge of many colonialists to minimize their subjects' ties with a disturbingly world-wide Islam (a tendency found also among French colonialists in the Maghrib); and finally his anthropological techniques of investigation, looking to a functional analysis of a culture in momentary cross-section without serious regard to the historical dimension." See Marshall Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization (Vol.2). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974, p. 551.

(64) It is worth noting that while Geertz has introduced a number of important concepts (such as "shared poverty," "aliran," "agricultural involution," "blurred genres"), it
is the concept "exemplary center" which has turned out to be the more persistent theme in his work on Indonesia. In his recent book, *Negara*, the concept thoroughly predominates.


(66) As a matter of fact, Geertz is aware of such an overcoming and of the limitation of his approach. See, for instance, the last paragraph of "Ritual and Social Change: A Javanese Example," in Geertz, *The Interpretation*, op cit.

(67) As to what Geertz means by "the classical style," see his *Islam Observed*, op cit., pp. 23-55. In this chapter, Geertz deals with two so-called "classical styles"--that of Indonesia and that of Morocco.

(68) Here, again, the near exception would be Geertz's "Ritual and Social Change: A Javanese Example." Here he limits his socially determining factors only to the "cultural structure" (or "the logico-meaningful") and "social structure" (or "the causal functional"). But we should remember that social change in general can hardly be grasped through "structure" or "meanings" or "function". It is to be grasped with a readiness to accept the emergent and incoherent, the ruptures or surprises, and/or the discontinuities.

(69) Anderson writes, "Today, the word *priyayi*, which is the most common appellation for this class... etc." See Anderson in Holt, op cit., p. 38.

(70) See the earlier part of Chapter X below.

(71) An early intimation to this situation is found in Mohammad Ali, "Historiographical Problems," in Soedjatmoko et al. (eds.), *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, pp. 6-11. See also Herbert Feith, "History, Theory, and Indonesian Politics: A Reply to Harry J. Benda," in Anderson and Kahin, op cit. Countering Benda's charge about the flaw of the "problem-solvers' efforts" in post-colonial Indonesia due to the preponderance of the Indic culture, Feith brilliantly states his point:

In the first place the phrase "Indonesian (especially Javanese) history" contains a large element of ambiguity. Indonesian history is not the
of Java and it is certainly not the history of the ethnic Javanese (or the inland and non-santri, not strongly Islamic Javanese) who are the bearers of Hindu-Javanese culture. So for Indonesian history to find its "way back to its own moorings" there was no need for its values or styles to become those of this culture. The fact that priyayi Javanese have emerged in a position of political preponderance under Guided Democracy can hardly be seen as a natural consequence of "decolonization," or of the resilience of their culture (p. 24).


(73) Two things need to be clarified here. First, tradition and social contract begin not with societies but with individuals. Secondly, both are, as a matter of fact, two overlapping terms. It is upon these assumptions that Barrington Moore rightly argues that "the terms of social contract are always being renegotiated." See Barrington Moore, Jr., Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt. While Plains, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1978, p. 18.

(74) Soemarsaid Moertono fails to see the claimed pomp and greatness in Javanese statecraft (as it is expressed in the babads and other texts) as a function of colonial subjection. Thus while he does realize that gross historical falsification occur in the Javanese texts (See Moertono, op cit., p. 14), he merely expresses his wonder why the flourishing and involuted refinement of ethics and art coincided with the colonial subjection (p. 59). While Moertono does not deny the realities of the latter, he nonetheless treat the texts as a transparent representation of political realities.

In like manner, Moertono overlooks the fact that the proliferation of the Indic conception of statecraft is a function of the Dutch scheme to alienate the priyayi from the Muslim populace, particularly from Islamic movements. (See Heather Sutherland, "The Priyayi," in Indonesia, April 1975, p. 73-74.)

The absence of political sensitivity precludes Moertono from perceiving the political significance of two important political injunctions. In the first place, the Javanese court taught its subjects to respect Sultan Agung, but warning against his political ambition (p. 58)—which was to drive the Dutch out of Java. Secondly, the court tried to represent the Diponegoro War (1825-1830) as only making the Javanese lot even more abject and powerless,
thus mystifying the fact that abjectness and powerlessness resulted instead from the total want of sustained resistance.

Contrary to Tjipto's perception of the war, Moertono even questions its necessity (p. 56), completely silencing the collaboration of bupatis in suppressing Diponegoro's resistance. Moertono is also short of uncovering the political message of such injunctions by Paku Buwana IX to the nobility around him against any attempt to dethrone and succeed a king for "it will fail." Instead, they should offer their beautiful daughters for the king's wives (p. 125).

This mystification and political evasion is carried by Moertono all the way to his conclusion. Thus he reemphasizes the identification of the king with god; the necessity of dynastic falsification and wahyu (an Islamic word meaning divine revelation but twisted in Javanese to mean some kind of "mandate of heaven"); the importance of the center's alertness of signs of power contestation; and the need to strengthen the priyayi ethic and esprit de corps (pp. 160-2). All this constitutes the very stuff which Anderson recasts in a more forceful narrative.

(75) The best example of such a critical reading of Javanese texts is given by C.C. Berg. According to Berg, the Javanese "historical" texts, whose chronology and referents are deliberately made confusing, could only be well understood if seen as a practice of magic. If a word is treated by the Javanese court as a magical incantation, so is a text.

Very much in line with Foucault's position, Berg argues, "Javanese texts which served a purpose of verbal magic at the time of their birth could in due time become part of the picture of the past, if circumstances were favorable. But we should not forget that such texts are potential weapons: if used to strengthen the position of a king, they must be as disagreeable to his opponents as they are welcome to him, so that a change of regime could only be detrimental to their survival." Hence the burning of texts in many dynastic changes. Berg has, therefore, rightly alerted us of what I would call "the double opacity" of the texts. See C.C. Berg, "The Javanese Picture of the Past," in Soedjatmoko et al., op cit, p. 89-90.

melalui ideologi..., namun sebenarnya di dalam struktur kongkritnya ia lemah. Sering hubungan antara keduanya ini dilupakan oleh para sarjana yang meneliti masyarakat Jawa tradisional...." (p. 5).


The lack of historical clarity in Old Javanese texts is a function of three factors which are equally distorting. First was the untempered political motives which dictated the writing of the texts. This in turn rendered the tendency of any new rulers to destroy texts which flourished earlier. Secondly, the vulnerability of the lontar leaves used as "paper" to write the narratives down. And, finally, the archaism of the Old Javanese used by the texts. This old language was in general not sufficiently mastered by text transcribers from generation to generation.

Consequently, the older the texts, the more damaged done to the original. See P.J. Zoetmulder, Kalangwan. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974, pp. 46-49 and passim. Zoetmulder rightly contends that, "The odd against any literary work surviving for so long and under such conditions are too great for us to be able to draw any firm conclusions from an argument ex silentio. For the same reason we should be equally hesitant about forming a judgement on the popularity of a given work at the time of its origin on the basis of the number of copies still in existence" (p. 44).


(80) Ibid., p. 53.

(81) Interestingly, Raffles distinguishes the character of Javanese "privileged classes" and the Javanese "mass of people." "Long continued oppression may have injured the character of the latter, and obliterated some of its brighter traits; but to the former, the constant exercise of absolute dominion has done a more serious injury, by

Consider the way in which Trunojoyo was deceived to surrender for his life after years of war against Mataram, which was supported by the Dutch. Consider also the loathsome manner in which the Susuhunan brought him before a big audience only to stab him in the breast and then had his men finish the work by "stabbing him in a thousand places and cutting his body to pieces," "severed the head from the trunk, rolled it in the mud, made a mat of it, and at last cast it into a ditch by the express order of the Susuhunan."

No doubt the Dutch were again a witness and likely an initiator of this invidious plot, but the fact that the Javanese ruler complied with it reflects the character of all involved. See Thomas Stamford Raffles, The History of Java, Vol. II. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 169-71.

(82) See Anderson in Holt, op cit., p. 63.

(83) Analogous to our observation, Berg writes, "Thus a priestly doctrine is likely to invert a prevailing picture of the present. The broader the gap between the popular picture of the present and the priestly doctrine, the more impressive must be the priestly statement as the instrument of inversion; the use of Sanskrit, of allegories and chronograms, etc., should be seen in this light." See Berg in Soedjatmoko et al., op cit., p. 91.

(84) Nasakom stands for Nationalism, Religion, and Communism.

(85) Sembada means absorbing all divergent forces outside into a syncretic blend, that is, following the notion of "the idea of power in Javanese culture" that Power can only be in concentration.

(86) For some discussion of the salary system of the Netherlands East Indies' government, see Chapter V ("The Economic Context of Indonesian Nationalism"), pp. 171-73.

(87) The fact that Anderson does not mention any authoritative source or any discursive practice propagating the idea in modern Indonesia could perhaps be read as indicative of the correctness of our judgement.

(88) "Our democracy," writes Sukarno, "should be a new democracy, a genuine democracy, one that is truly of the Rakyat. Not 'democracy' of the European and American...
but political and economic democracy giving a 100% chakrawartin to the Rakyat." See Sukarno, op cit., p. 320.

(89) Serat Baron Sakender constitutes an appropriation of Iskandar Zulkarnain—the Islamized version of Alexander the Great—as a personage partly of Javanese origin. The strong-willed Jan Pieterszoon Coen, Dutch first Governor-General in Batavia, is treated the same way in one of the Javanese texts. He is transformed into a fabricated Eurasion hero, Moer Jangkung. See Berg in Soedjatmoko et al., op cit., p. 116 and Vlekke, op cit., p. 148.


(92) This also leads to the incorrectness of Bernhard Dahm's understanding of the Ratu Adil phenomenon and particularly of Sukarno's movement, which leads him to identify Sukarno as merely another Bapak Kajah. See Bernhard Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969, p. 118.


(97) Tan Malaka as quoted in Mohammad Ali in Soedjatmoko et al., p. 21.

In this sense, Sukarno was very much with Tan Malaka as the latter internalized the ideas of materialism, dialectic, and logic in his intellectual makeup. Tan Malaka elaborated all this in his important book, Madilog (Jakarta: Penerbit Widjaya, 1951).

With respect to the building of a nation, however, Sukarno surpassed all his compatriots. If Tan Malaka, just like Hatta and Sjahri, moved with the sheer force of intellect, Sukarno combined this force with that of local imagination. He believed that in the final analysis a nation can only be created with the power of imagination, of iming-iming.

Accordingly, all the shibboleths he had frantically produced during the period of the Guided Democracy should also be read with the intention of iming-iming, which Anderson sees largely as disguised mantras. Sukarno had only to learn when to stop imagining and begin the more arduous work of building the economic and political foundation of the young nation as Hatta had suggested since the time of the pergerakan.

This is particularly true if we remember that by the late colonial period much of the earlier traditional "independence" of the priyayis was already a matter of the past. The priyayis inherited by the young Republic were a sickly social class, which was parasitic rather than progressive. The exemplary figures who came from among its rank actually occupied a marginal position within it. Moreover, they became exemplary only as they denied priyayi exclusivism and fought with and for the rakyat. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and Sukarno were arch-representatives of such figures.


The practice of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia from 1950 to 1958 was an attempt to carry out the principle.

Supersemar is an acronymic rendition from Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret (Presidential Instruction of March 11). This document stated the transference of all executive power from President Sukarno to then General Suharto, which the former signed on March 11, 1966.

Even with the large victories of Golkar, the allegation remains. Golkar is a party from above, whose principal
rationale is to depoliticize; it is essentially rootless.


(107) The unwillingness of the national leaders to engage in an armed struggle was to stigmatize their image as freedom fighters even up to now.


(111) In the first generation of TNI, a strong sense of integrity and efforts to preserve the unity of the nation were obvious. With consistency, TNI had managed to persuade and coerced others to comply with the necessity of unity. But it also instructed itself to carry out its mission in such a way as not to introduce a bad precedent for endless military instability as what had happened in many Third World countries. See Simatupang in Bulkin, op cit., p. 59 and passim.


(113) For the genealogy of the dwi-fungsi, see ibid., pp. 24-5; also see Simatupang in Bulkin, op cit.


(115) To a considerable extent, this was analogous to the colonial experience of the priyayis.


117) In this connection, it is interesting to recover Hatta's observation in his address before the Committee for People's Political Consultation of the People's Republic of China (on December 24, 1957) concerning the growth of Indonesian cities. "The capitalism which first entered Asia was trade capitalism.... For the sake of the capitalists'
trade all it needed were fortresses near the harbors, from which cities emerged. The cities did not emerge from within the land, but were imposed from without. These cities became the center for the political and economic power of the foreign capitalists." (See Mohammad Hatta, *Kumpulan Pidato II*. Jakarta: Inti Idayu Press, 1983, p. 88.) Hence we can easily imagine how both the rural areas and the traditional sectors were gradually cornered to occupy the wrong end of the economic and political equation.


(119) The reason is simple. While the Chinese are well adept concerning the economic situation and practices of the land, both the Dutch and the priyayi/military rulers can rely on the so-called "double minority" status of the Chinese as not to pose any political threat whatsoever to their position.


(121) Ibid., p. 15.

(122) It is this symbiotic cooperation between widely different social groups which I refer to as "historical coincidence." See also note 119 above.


Chapter X

(1) In part due to the Orientalist notion of the East, it is a common mistake to see pre-colonial Indonesia as a country where inequitarianism was rampant and rooted. Historical records indicate that the reverse was more the case. While we have to be mindful of our modern bias, it should be maintained that relative inequitarianism had and has been practiced there autochtonously for a long time.

Within the Indies society facets of inequitarianism were already observed at least from the fifteenth century, probably with the more secure establishment of Islam in the land. De Graaf and Th. Pigeaud, for instance, observe that, "The matrimonial law of Islam, which essentially does not distinguish people by ancestry, groups, and ethnicity, constitutes a major renewal" in the land where social intercourse used to be so fragmented and caste-arranged. (See H.J. de Graaf and Th.G.Th. Pigeaud, Kerajaan-Kerajaan Islam di Jawa: Peralihan dari Majapahit ke Mataram. Jakarta: Grafiti Pers, 1985, p. 27.)

In Java, villages used to be referred to as "little republics" by virtue of the established customs in which villagers chose their own chiefs and mutually conferred on their problems. J.S. Furnivall, relying partly on Van Vollenhoven, the Dutch outstanding expert on Indonesia's customary law, also denies the Indicized, caste-modelled, picture of Indonesian villages. Such a view, according to him, "is hardly consistent with the evidence." Van Vollenhoven further argues that "it is a very different matter to suggest either that the territorial village, as it now exists, was ever a ring-fence closed-in unit, or that the social tie was feudal." (See J.S. Furnivall, Netherlands India. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1939, p. 11.) For yet more evidence about early inequitarianism in Indonesian social life, see B. Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies: Selected Writings. Bandung: W. Van Hoeve, 1955, pp. 170-7.


(3) In this context, we should see the polemik kebudayaan (polemics on culture) between Indonesian intellectuals in 1930s as crucial. In an incisive article S. Takdir
Alisjahbana asserts the historical meaning of Indonesia as a new cultural phenomenon in the land, a new way for the people to understand their social relations and the goals of their society.

To Alisjahbana, Indonesia implies a radically new way of looking at one's social self. But just as remarkable is the manner he maintained his position against attacks from the culturally more conservative intellectuals. See S. Takdir Alisjahbana in Achdiat Kartamihardja (ed.), Polemik Kebudajaan. Tjetakan Ketiga. Djakarta: Perpustakaan Perguruan Kementerian P.P. dan K., 1954, pp. 31-2, 131.


(11) The absence of a conducive communication can be found, for instance, from the 1955-1957 editorials of the local newspapers in Makassar, South Sulawesi. On July 6, 1955, Tinjauan wrote that parties in the Ali Cabinet merely used the administration to enrich themselves. On August 20, 1955, the same newspaper called for decentralization. On November 18, 1955, it charged against Sukarno's "majnu
"kata-kata" (words craze). "Such craze of words and slogans ... only blurs our understanding and by no means clarifies the problems we are facing." On May 30, 1956, an editorial title reads "the region will not glorify the center."

On February 26, 1957, in an editorial titled "Judging the Idea of President Sukarno," one of the local newspapers expressed fear that the country was veering into a totalitarian course. "We are concerned that these ideas of the President will only bring our people to a catastrophe of humanity."

In dozens of editorials I collected locally for these years, I found not a single instance suggesting a desire of the region to secede from the Republic. Most of them merely expressed anger with the pervasiveness of corruptions and insensitivities of Jakarta to both national and regional problems. The language they used was hardly that of rebellion.


(13) For the criticisms of these figures and institution, see Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (eds.), Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970.

(14) Ibid., p. 142.

(15) Ibid., p. 143.

(16) Ibid., pp. 143-4.

(17) Ibid., p. 324.

(18) Ibid., pp. 322,324.

(19) Ibid., p. 322.

(20) Tempo, January 26, 1974, p. 5.

(21) See, for instance, "Defense of the Student Movement Documents from the Recent Trials," in Indonesia, Cornell
Modern Indonesia Project, April 1979, p. 19n34: "The authorities, and some students, blame student leaders either for poor organization or for instigating the riots to bring down the government. Many others believed the riots were instigated by government agents provocateurs as part of a campaign to discredit student protests and justify greater repression."

(22) Questions were raised by concerned elite (usually intellectual leaders and informal leaders) about the use of development funds for the importations of luxurious goods for the few; the destruction of Indonesia's forests, or huge embezzlements in state companies.

The native lower middle class complained about the general "pulling down of small shops previously occupied by indigenous traders" (allegedly for the sake of modernization) only to be replaced by non-indigenous businessmen; issues of moral degradation as introduced by the higher-ups particularly in big cities, the privileging of the Chinese at the expense of Indonesians in taking the lion's share of the development facilities and benefits.

As to the large armies of Indonesia's parish, we can mention such practices as the forceful evictions from the lands they had occupied for generations (or the unfair purchase of their collective plots) to be transformed into various expensive projects; the prohibition to peddle by, or to drive their becak in, the streets of the cities; the growing landlessness in the rural areas, and such things as the arousing of emotions due to the abduction and raping of a poor girl peddler in Yogyakarta by a youth gang involving the sons of the higher authorities.

(23) See the "White Book of the 1978 Students' Struggle," in Indonesia, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, April 1978, p. 152.


(27) The frequency and the severity of such incidents must have been much greater had the domestic media been allowed to cover and report all of them in fairness.

(28) It was said that Heri Akhmadi, the Chairman of BIT Student Council, sole signatory of the document, even named his son, Gempur Suharto (Pound on Suharto).


(30) Ibid., passim.

(31) Ibid., p. 154-6.

(32) In line with our observation earlier in Chapter IX, the students point out that, "The General Elections, conducted with so much effort at the cost of Rp.60,000,000,000 [i.e., approximately $35,000,000 by 1990 exchange rate], in which people flailed at one another till blood flowed, elected only 39 percent of the members of the MPR. So supposing that, in a general session of the 1977 MPR, the 39 percent of the members elected through the General Elections could not be present, and those present were only the 61 percent that were appointed, that session would still be legitimate." See "White Book," op cit., p. 158.

(33) Ibid., p. 156.

(34) This means that although a member enters the political contest through a particular constituency of a particular political party, he/she is no longer answerable to them as soon as he/she is elected or appointed.


(36) Ibid., p. 160.

(37) Ibid., pp. 159-60.

(38) Ibid., p. 154.

(39) For an instance of this, see ibid., p. 178.

(40) Ibid., p. 161.

(41) Ibid., p. 161.

(42) "Ten years ago the Astra group, the Panin group, the Central Asia Bank, Liem Soei Liong and other cukong ["vastly wealthy Chinese financiers of key Indonesian political figures"] were nothing to what they are now. But
the people of Krawang still starve. The government proudly aggregates the incomes of these cukong with the incomes of the people of Krawang, Boyolali, and Gunung Kidul, and then averages them.... The people of Krawang have become the victims of statistics. It is said that in 1967 per capita income was $US 80, while by 1977 it had increased to $US 130. But the fact remains that Krawang, which always used to be a rich rice granary where people never suffered hunger, has today declined into a famine-area, where people are reduced to eating water-hyacinths!" See ibid., p. 161-2.

Thus reminiscent of Van Hogendorp's observation of the Chinese at the turn of the nineteenth century (see Chapter V, "The Economic Context of Indonesian Nationalism," p. 172), now the students repeat, if more sardonically, the same indictment: "Those who contributed nothing during the war for independence are now enjoying the most of the benefits of development. How come?" See ibid., p. 162.

(43) Ibid., p. 162.

(44) Ibid., p. 162. Rhetorics of nationalism also occurs on pp. 165, 173, 176.

(45) Ibid., p. 163.

(46) Ibid., pp. 169-70.

(47) Ibid., p. 169. Elsewhere I have offered an account of this economic marginalization. "In the colonial era, the Dutch export-oriented agricultural policy restricted rice cultivation and other staples to the minimum, which were required to generate the peasants' labor, in order to maximize agricultural export commodities.... In the post-colonial era, the government gave priority to increasing rice production in order to meet part of the nutritional need of Indonesia's increasing population... This policy, however, was contradicted by the government price policy which kept the rice price far below that of the international market. [The unsaid purpose was] to 'subsidize' the burgeoning population in the cities, along with its direct subsidy by purchasing rice from foreign markets.... The end-result of both colonial and post-colonial governmental policies are virtually the same. Both use rice producers to support the functioning of their respective economies, that is, supporting the functioning of exploitative plantations in the colonial era and supporting broader productive forces in the post-colonial era. In both, the rice producers (mainly villagers) are victimized to support the export-oriented policies in order to gain foreign exchange. If in the colonial era the advantage was
conspicuously and exclusively enjoyed by the Dutch plantation owners, in the post-colonial era the benefit flows to foreign mineral-extraction companies and owners of cash-crop, export-oriented, estates, [which] do not have to bear the full cost of labor reproduction. In the latter case, the pursuit of foreign exchange has been done with substantial unfairness to the majority of villagers particularly in Java and even, in a perverted way, to regions in the Outer Islands which were the immediate producers of the export commodities but were denied their fair share.

Through this perspective, we can understand why many peasants and small-holders object to using their land to respond to government's call for their participation in planting food crops and prefer to engage themselves in cash crops." See Mochtar Pabottingi, "The Traditionalization of the Modernists." Master's thesis, University of Massachusetts, 1982, pp. 96-8.


(49) Ibid., p. 152.

(50) See T. Mulya Lubis and Fauzi Abdullah, op cit., p. 27.

(51) Ibid., p. 18.

(52) Ibid., p. 29.

(53) "Consequently, the development process brings about something that is 'not developing': e.g., excessive dependence, injustice, centralization of decision making and control, vulnerability—all of which weakens the 'periphery' group." See ibid., p. 30.

(54) Ibid., p. 33.

(55) Ibid., p. 37.

(56) Ibid., p. 48.

(57) Ibid., pp. 52-4.

(58) The consequence is that, "Never before in the history of this Republic were the people so cynical about the courts, as if the courts merely assist in the process of distancing justice from the people. Justice has become something complex and expensive, and only within reach of rich people." See ibid., p. 52.

(59) Ibid., p. 68.
(60) Ibid., p. 69.
(61) Ibid., p. 71.


(63) Ibid., p. 162.

(64) In this context, we should also include, numerous articles or columns in the newspapers and magazines which launched the same criticisms. These were usually presented in a disguised narrative, both for fear of the officials' retaliation against them and for the culture of restraint typical of the Indonesians.

(65) See Benedict Anderson, "The Languages of Indonesian Politics," Indonesia, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, April 1966, p. 89.

(66) Ibid., p. 89.

(67) Anderson is emphatic about the role of Dutch. The admixture of the "Revolutionary Malay" with the modernity-bearing Dutch had helped creating a symbolic ethos greatly conducive to the unprecedented rise of the nation. Thus Anderson contends that, "The spread of Indonesian as a national language was impossible, paradoxically, except once Dutch had been developed as the inner language of the intelligentsia." See ibid., pp. 101-2.

(68) Ibid., p. 107.


(70) Probably the most recent comprehensive study about the use of Bahasa is Husen Abas, Indonesian As A Unifying Language of Wider Communication: A Historical and Sociolinguistic Perspective. Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University, 1987, p. 54.

(71) See Khaidir Anwar, Indonesian: The Development and Use of A National Language. Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1980, p. 139. See also p. 146. As I observed while living from 1969 to 1974 in Yogyakarta, one of the centers

(72) As probably 90 percent of the media use Bahasa, the language now flourishes as effortlessly as it is natural. Even the question of intimacy is now much less a matter of either-or than of gradation. In other words, Bahasa has, along with the local vernaculars, gained its own intimacy in the mind of Indonesians. As Indonesians of all ethnic groups can sing Indonesian songs or recite Indonesian poems with genuine emotion, they do not seem to be handicapped in trading humors in the national language.

(73) Contrary to Anderson's allegation that Bahasa "is by no means the everyday language of more than a tiny segment of the population," Husen Abas writes, "As of 1971, more than 50% of the total population of fourteen of twenty-six provinces of the Republic of Indonesia were speakers of IN [Bahasa Indonesia], the highest of which was West Irian with 98.38%. As for the other twelve provinces less than 50% of their respective population were speakers of IN, the lowest of which was the province of West Nusa Tenggara with 23.23%." See Abas, op cit., p. 163.

What is surprising, and also squarely at variance with Anderson's contention which tends to identify users of Bahasa with the urban population, is Abas's finding that the majority of those actively speaking Bahasa live in the rural areas (p. 163). Abas, furthermore, writes that, "The projection for the future of IN which reveals that by 2041 Indonesia will have a 100% IN-speaking population is likely inaccurate. The existence of modern facilities such as the PALAPA Communication Satellite will accelerate the development and the spread of IN. The time when Indonesia will have a 100% IN-speaking population should be much earlier than 2041--perhaps by the turn of the twenty-first century" (p. 172).

(74) Though wrongly attributing the success of Bahasa to the willing "sacrifice" of Javanese and Sundanese speakers, Slametmulyana argues that, "Gradually people begin to feel that Indonesian is their own language beside their regional language. The strangeness of Indonesian for the regional population is disappearing...." Quoted in Anwar, op cit., p. 141.

(75) Ibid., p.178. Khaidir Anwar's explanation, however, is rather confused. See, for instance, pp. 180-81 and passim.
Most notable is his unawareness of the pergerakan essence of the rise of Bahasa. He wrongly identifies the leader-intellectuals of the pergerakan as representing the "above." Half a decade ago the "above" party was the colonizer, who tried hardly to prevent Malay from spreading further to become a national language, and the higher priyayi at large, who preferred to use Dutch or Javanese krama.

Of greater import, Anwar seems to overlook that Malay has been the de facto lingua franca of the majority of the middle class and lower class populace in the archipelago, irrespective of whether or not it was inaugurated as the national language. This has nothing to do with the "above" nor with any "sacrifice." It is simply because Malay—and, later, Bahasa—captures the rising spirit of egalitarianism. Or, perhaps more correctly, it has been nurtured in that spirit, and/or because they were prevented from learning and using Dutch.


(77) Noer, op cit., passim.

(78) This work by Arifin C. Noer is also available in English. See Arifin C. Noer, Moths. Translated by Harry Aveling. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1974.

(79) To cite a mocking passage from Nugraha's protagonist: "Yogyakarta's changed a great deal. You can see she's busy trying to smarten herself up, with the wrong lipstick and a vulgar powder. Yet her soul is the same as ever. The soul of a priyayi with its ever-present ironies: a blangkon [traditional Javanese male headdress] on his head, a tie at his neck, a kris at his waist, and Samsonite briefcase in his hand. Always talking about the glory of Mataram while dreaming of Amsterdam." See Ariuna Drop Out. Jakarta: Cypress, 1980, p. 23.


(83) The two features also characterize the works of Taufik Ismail, Nh. Dini, Dodong Djiwapradja, Subagio
Sastrowardojo, Goenawan Mohamad, Putu Widjaja, Toeti Heraty, Mochtar Lubis, Pramudya Ananta Toer, Iwan Simatupang, Isma Sawitri, and Y.B. Mangunwijaya. Consider the lyrical skepticism and authority-indicting language of Goenawan Mohamad in a prosaic poesy, "A man murdered near the day of the Indonesian general elections":

When the patrol discovered the body at the edge of the rice field it was like the sudden silencing of a barking dog. Face down. As if searching for the fragrance and warmth of the rice...// Beneath the hurricane lamps of the local office they found more wounds. The shadows shook and the verandah remained in whispers. The man had no identity card. He had no name. He had no party....

Or some penetrating lines from Taufiq Ismail's "The Republic Is Ours":

We are the people with sad eyes, at the edge of the road
Waving at the crowded buses
We are the tens of millions living in misery
Beaten about by flood, volcano, curses and pestilence
Who silently ask in the name of freedom
But are ignored in the thousand slogans
And meaningless loudspeaker voices

There is no other choice. We must
Go on

Quoted in Aveling, op cit., pp. 215, 169.


(85) Ibid., p. 118.

(86) In contrast to Indonesia's earlier literary school (Pudiangga Baroe) in the 1930s, which was predisposed to a flowery language, the principal characteristic of the Angkatan 45 (Generation of 45) is its terse, direct, concise, and biting language. The Angkatan 66 (Generation of 66) has, in spite of the noticeable influence of Sartre and Camus, not significantly departed from the direct and "peeling" style of its predecessor. For a valuable reference of modern Indonesian literature, see, for instance, H.B. Jassin, Kesusastraan Indonesia Modern Dalam


(88) See Mohammad Natsir in Feith and Castles, op cit., p. 218.

(89) "No one has a divine right to govern; no one has been chosen by God as a special instrument to express his will, so that he is free from error or mistake. That would amount to deification of man, which is the gravest sin a man can commit..., because one of the consequences of such a deification of man is that the Leader is relieved from all responsibility for his acts of government, and all public control ceases." See Wiranata Koesoema in Feith and Castles, op cit., p. 223.

(90) As a matter of fact, eighteen years following the publication of "The Languages of Indonesian Politics," Anderson writes that the language of Islam in Indonesia refuses social stratification in language. See Benedict Anderson, "Sembah-Sumpah (Courtesy and Curses): The Politics of Language and Javanese Culture," in Change and Continuity in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia Paper No. 23, Center for Asian and Pacific Studies, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1984, p. 23.

(91) In Anderson's words, "The languages are Dutch, Javanese, and 'Revolutionary Malay'---the traditions are Dutch-Western and Javanese." See Anderson, "The Languages," op cit., p. 89 (emphasis added).

(92) In spite of the originality of Geertz's uncovering of the cultural trichotomy of abangan, santri, and priyayi in an East Java small town, many Indonesians, in particular most Javanese, are uncomfortable with it. In Java the trichotomy is blurred. It overlaps with each other. It is, therefore, normal to encounter a santri priyayi or a priyayi abangan. For recent criticisms against the trichotomy, see Nurcholish Madjid and Kuntowidjojo in Tempo, November 16, 1985, and Kompas, November 26, 1985.

(93) Probably the greatest contrast of the modalities of the texts of Javanese babads comes from the Buginese-Makassarese historical texts. J. Noorduyn notes that, "Their writers have clearly tried to dissociate themselves from the mythological and legendary elements that they had to include because they found them in their sources.""In

(94) See Abas, op cit., p. 54.

(95) With the educational progress in Malaysia apparently outpaces that of the Indonesian as the ongoing trend seems to tell us, it would not be presumptuous to see the possibility of Indonesians increasingly read from and thence internalize the original modalities of Bahasa. This inference I gather from an informal talk with Professor Alisjahbana at the East-West Center, Honolulu, in 1985. He related the seriousness of the Malaysian government in having their students instructed abroad, in developing their educational programs at home, and in its willingness to allocate a proportionately much bigger budget for them relative to that of the Indonesian.

(96) The term "double-opacity" is here necessary in view of the fact that all languages are already inherently opaque. The conscious attempt of Javanese court scribes or the priyayis to institutionalize a deflective meaning of words only exacerbates the opacity of their language.


(98) What Indonesians usually do is borrow any important English expressions whose equivalents are not readily available, but at the same time they keep searching or exploring their suitable translations in Bahasa. Thus Bahasa offers canggih, swalayan, pantau, peti-kemas, liput, wiraswasta, and imbal-beli for the once untranslatable sophisticated, self-service, monitoring, container, cover [pertaining to news], entrepreneur, and counter-purchase in English.

(99) Hence, for instance, the familiarity of Indonesian intellectuals with such expressions as checks and balances; two-way communication; bottom-up planning.

(100) Here we should be careful not to be misled by the simultaneous use of the term "Angkatan 45" to refer to two different groups, i.e., first, to the military—and to some extent also to the civilians—waging the armed struggle against the Dutch and to a generation of Indonesian poets
and novelists. While the revolutionary spirit in the latter endures, that of the former is damaged by perceived corruptions and abuses of power by the New Order regime which claimed to represent the military-civilian Angkatan 45 but which in fact seriously ridiculed that spirit.

(2) More likely, however, the collision between Sukarno's and the modernists' politics represented a collision between two circumstantially incongruent egalitarianisms. On the one hand, we have the "utopian" egalitarianism of Sukarno intending to counter the world-dominating system of the capitalist economy, which he saw as beleaguring Indonesia. On the other, we have the modernists and the socialist-democrats who envisioned a much less ambitious project, namely one which enhances the economic position of the less fortunate without challenging the world capitalist system.

To fight the mighty global system, Sukarno needed all available forces in the land. Hence all forces should be subordinated to yet a greater political mobilization—something he could now hardly expect from the modernists, the socialists, and from what Feith calls "the problem solvers." As such, I am much less inclined to see the collision as one between the Old Javanese against the "peripheral Islam" as Anderson would have it.


(4) In independent Indonesia, Sukarno never had a party of his own. This forced him to rely fully upon political parties having large membership.


(6) We will remember that Islam went through political marginalization along with other mass political organizations such as the Nationalist Party (PNI) and the Communist Party (PKI). They had all been branded as the enemy of Pancasila.

(7) For an instance of this, see Jenkins, op cit., p. 162.

(8) See Madjid's own elaboration of his ideas in "The Issue of Modernization among Muslims in Indonesia: From A Participant's Point of View," in Gloria Davis (ed.), *What


(13) Ibid., pp. 340, 493.

(14) Against the negative reactions to his "Surat-Surat Islam Dari Ende" (Islamic Letters From Ende), Sukarno wrote in 1936 that, "Time will prove that the young are sincerely devoted to Truth, sincerely devoted to God." See Sukarno, Dibawah, op cit., p. 343.


(16) Ibid., p. 59.


(19) Both Niebuhr and Madjid see God as the Perennial Other, which is only approachable by the grace and love of God. Both also sanction the necessity of humility before Truth. The difference between them, I think, harks back to the difference between Christian and Islamic theology. While the former believes in the necessity of redemption by the person of Christ, the latter places responsibility on the individual believers for their own salvation while simultaneously believing in the endless grace of God. For

(20) Perhaps I am here overstating the difference between Niebuhr and Madjid. It might be wiser to point out that Madjid never believes in a simple way, doctrinal or practical, of reaching God.

(21) As William Connolly has alerted us, it is always important not to lose sight of the contestability of ideological notions in general. Modernity is one of them. There are aspects of modernity in the West which Indonesian Muslims, for instance, are unwilling to acknowledge as modernity; and, conversely, there are practices of the modernist Muslims in Indonesia, with which a Westerner would directly feel at odds.

(22) See Pabottingi in Pabottingi, op cit., p. 235.

(23) Ibid., p. 233.

(24) Ibid., p. 233.


(26) We will remember that Islam is professed by the majority of Indonesians.

(27) As Jamie Mackie observes, "The resolution of the ideological conflict may have been a brutal process, and the Muslims are still far from happy about their lack of influence in the new regime; but I doubt if their leaders really aspire any longer to the hope of creating an Islamic state." See Jamie Mackie, "Indonesia Since 1945--Problems of Interpretation," in Anderson and Kahin (eds.), Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982, p. 129.


(29) Ibid., pp. 21-2.


(32) Together with Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid was among the leading in the younger generation of Indonesian Islam. A grandson of the venerated K.H. Hasjim As'ari, founder of Nahdatul Ulama, he is now Chairman of Nahdatul Ulama.


(36) This great leader of Modern Turkey is quoted as saying, "We come from the East; we are heading for the West."


(38) If al-Afghani's drive for awakening and changing the Muslim World resulted primarily from his realization of the enfeebling dependency on and subjection to the West, that of Ibn Taymiyyah stemmed directly from his understanding of the revelatory Islam as well as of the practices of Muhammad and the Prophet's Companions.


(40) See my analysis of the genealogy of Madjid's reconstructive ideas in "Tentang Visi," in Pabottingi,
Another precedence of courage to interpret the Qur'an, upon which Madjid grounds his reconstructive effort, came from the example of the second Companion of the Prophet, Umar ibn al-Khattab. The latter had firmly objected to dividing up among the Muslim soldiers the lands and properties of the Iraqis and the Egyptians following the Muslims' victory and to disinheriting them. Bearing in mind "the fundamental considerations of socioeconomic justice," Umar managed to have his way in spite of the literal injunctions in the Qur'an, which justified the strong demand of the Muslim soldiers. (See Fazlur Rahman, *Islamic Methodology in History*. Karachi: Central Institute of Islamic Research, 1965, p. 180.)

On another act of "violation," he was charged as fleeing from the Decree of God. Umar is reported to have replied: "I flee from the Decree of God to the Decree of God" (p. 65). These historical referents impress Madjid not only as pointing to the direction of what social justice should be, but also as examples that capturing the right spirit of Islam is more important than hanging on the obsolete letters in it.


(42) Abdurrahman Wahid in Gematilleke, op cit., pp. 44-5.

(43) For a sustained criticism and account of the limitations of Shari'ati's intellectual horizon or monocentric understanding of Islam, see my article "Tentang Visi," in Pabottingi, *Islam*, op cit., pp. 203-5, 241-5.

(44) It seems that Madjid refuses to take such pronouncements of Marx too seriously. Rather, he accords more respect for Marx's social project which is fully taking side with the poor and the exploited.


(46) As Boland paraphrases Madjid's thought, "Why then should the idea of socialism be taboo, whereas in accordance with the Holy Book Islam must champion social justice and protect the poor and the oppressed? It was because the Islamic community was not prepared to take the initiative for social development that others took this task in hand, and Islam was excluded. It was lack of freedom of thought that caused this development." See B.J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971, p. 223.
(47) This statement of Iqbal, however, is only convincing if we discard Iqbal's own ethnocentrism against the West.

(48) Boland, op cit., p. 223.


(50) These Muslim traders to Indonesia are believed to have come largely from Persia and Gujerat in India.


(52) Studies by Kartodirdjo tell us about the meaningful and intimate interactions between informal, i.e., non-governmental religious leaders of the pesantrens and the villagers around them. See Sartono Kartodirdjo, Protest Movements in Rural Java. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 72.


(57) One of its major programs was to set up farmers' cooperatives (Sarekat Tani) throughout the villages. These were not only capable of driving away the Chinese money-lenders, but of executing some kind of landreform to provide the landless peasants with land to cultivate. The result was a significant redistribution of wealth. Kahin is not exaggerating when he identifies the progressive leaders of Masyumi as Religious Socialists. See George Mct. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952, p. 157.


(60) Sidney Jones, "The Contraction and Expansion of the 'Umat' and the Role of the Nahdatul Ulama in Indonesia," in Indonesia, Cornell Southeast Asia Program, October 1984, p. 20.


(62) See Anderson, "The Idea," in Holt, op cit., pp. 59-62. We should bear in mind that Anderson is here speaking of the earlier modernists. I take issue with it because it pertains to a principle of Islam which the "neo-modernists" adhere to even more strongly than did the earlier modernists, i.e., the "immeasurable distance" between humanity and God.

In addition, we need to beware of Anderson's language which assumes an antagonization of Islam and Javanese as if they are mutually exclusive or as if the terms "Islam" and "Javanese" are not contestable in themselves.

(63) Ibid., p. 60.

(64) We might place Hobbes as occupying our lowest gradation when he talks about the "mortal god, to which we owe under the immortal God, our peace and defense." (See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, edited by Michael Oakeshott. London: Collier Books, Sixth Printing, 1969, p. 132.) Here Hobbes in principle objects to deifying the "mortal god." Hobbes explicitly defines that he or she is "one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall thinks expedient, for their peace and common defense" (p. 132).

But Hobbes insisted on an unconditional and irrevocable subordination to the sovereign as soon as citizens have agreed to appoint one and transfer the supreme authority to him/her. In practice, therefore, Hobbes's system is still residual of the deification of the mortal. (See also Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 96.) Hence our putting him in the lowest rank.

For the second, we could take Locke. He readily concedes God as the creator of man, as the One who provides
innate social instincts and understanding. (See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960, pp. 361-2.) But just like the authority of parents over children, the authority of God should be relinquished as soon as man reaches that stage of understanding making him capable of taking social responsibility in his own hands. Rousseau could be viewed as evoking the third. He argues that, "All justice come from God, he alone is the source, but if we knew how to receive it from so high, we would need neither government nor laws." (See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Of the Social Contract & Discourse On Political Economy. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1984, p. 33.) But then Rousseau invents the vague concept of General Will, which, like God, is liable to man's appropriation.

The fourth, which we could take as our top gradation would be that of Mill. He maintains that religion remains "an agency that may be relied on for lifting man's eyes and minds above the dust at their feet." (See John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government. New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1950, p. 274.) But he adds that religion can also cease to be "of social concern," fall into individual idiosyncracies, and be "quite consistent with the most selfish and contracted egoism...." (p. 274) Mill thus refuses all religious interference in his system in order to ward off any such "selfish" appropriation.

(65) See Anderson in Holt, op cit., p. 61.


(70) For instance, Sajuti Melik, one of the principal interpreters of Sukarno's ideology, claims that the Indonesian nation was already "formed thousand years ago," thereby linking it with the kingdoms of Sriwijaya and Majapahit. See Melik in Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (eds.), Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945-1965. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970, p. 174.
(71) As we observe in Chapter IV, the ideologies of Communism, Islam, and Liberalism intermingled during the era of the pergerakan. Thus we can find as much liberal ideas among the Muslim modernists as we can among the liberals proper. Even the communists now and then came up with the liberal banner.


(72) For a brief discussion of Democratic Socialism in Indonesia, see Feith and Castles, op cit., pp. 226-9.

(73) Ruslan Abdulgani in Feith and Castles, op cit., pp. 170-1.

(74) Here Abdulgani is actually saying that nationalism should not be seen as singular and as typical of the West, but as plural and universal at the same time. Abdulgani recounts the symbiotic cooperation of colonialism and feudalism to inflict one of the most rapacious exploitations history has ever known and thereby creating "bitter social economic conditions." In such conditions, "ideals were born which were diametrically opposed to the political systems of authoritarianism and feudalism, and which were also diametrically opposed to the economic system of exploitation. In such circumstances, the ideals of democracy and social justice inevitably came into being." See ibid., p. 172.

(75) Ibid., p. 173.

(76) To unravel the contradictions inherent in the thoughts of the ideologues, another study is required. A careful reading of the available texts, however, will readily surface such contradictions.

(77) All this is well documented in Feith and Castles, ibid.

(78) See Soedjatmoko in Feith and Castles, op cit., p. 239.

(79) Ibid., p. 240.
The course of the New Order proper did not begin until 1970, i.e., given the fact that the period 1965-1969 was transitional. The six decades in which egalitarianism was continuously predominant in Indonesian politics is counted from 1908 until the collapse of Sukarno's regime.

This certainly has a great deal to do with his concern and sensitivity to the pressing problems Indonesia has been facing and the maturity of his intellectual responses.


Ibid., p. 6.

Ibid., pp. 125-55.

Ibid., p. 130.

Ibid., p. 134.

Ibid., pp. 134-5.

To illustrate, according to Soedjatmoko the village-bound information "should include the specifics related to the villagers' rights in accordance with each program" and "how to get a commensurate redress for every unjust treatment inflicted upon them" (p. 137). Village cultural participation should enter the programs of national television if we do not want the medium to continue luring more migrations into the cities. Villagers should be encouraged to adopt the positive values of individualism and courage in initiatives as well as to realize the importance of working together for higher goals.

Religion is to be allowed to continue functioning "in instilling the society about the meaning of life, man's relation with each other, with the society, with nature, and with the transcendental. It still constitutes a powerful resource for moral legitimacy, and for the drive in individual and social actions" (p. 139).

He calls for government's sensitivity to the needs of the poor in its choice of technology to be adopted and for the sharpening of our social indicators in order to be in a better position to read whether or not people's basic rights are fulfilled.

Ibid., p. 142.

Ibid., p. 143.

Ibid., p. 143.
(92) Ibid., p. 148.
(93) Ibid., p. 148.
(94) Ibid., p. 150.
(95) Ibid., p. 156.
(96) Ibid., p. 156.
(97) Ibid., p. 156.
(98) Ibid., pp. 157, 166.
(99) Ibid., pp. 157–8.
(100) Ibid., p. 158.
(101) Ibid., p. 160.
(102) Ibid., p. 160.
(103) Ibid., p. 163.
(104) Ibid., p. 186.
(106) Soedjatmoko, Etika, op cit., p. 87.
(108) On the correspondence of Hatta's economic ideas with that of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, which he helped formulated, see ibid., pp. 136, 139, 153, 169, 207, 210, 228–9, 234.
(109) Ibid., p. 208.
(110) Ibid., p. 212.
(111) Ibid., pp. 198–204.
(112) Ibid., p. 205.
(113) Ibid., pp. 232–3.
We should mention, for instance, the ideas of A.H. Nasution, Mubyarto, Sri-Edi Swasono, Y.B. Mangunwijaya, Yuwono Sudarsono, Sritua Arief, Thee Kian Wie, Mochtar Lubis, Adi Sasono, Arief Budiman, Emil Salim, etc., whose egalitarian ideas this limited study could not cover.


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Quoted from Kerkvliet, "Everyday Politics and Contending Values" in ibid.

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