THE LAST FRONTIER: PRACTICES OF EXTERNALIZATION OF MIGRATION CONTROL WITHIN EUROPE AND BEYOND

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ABSTRACT:
This dissertation analyzes everyday practices of externalization of African migration control beyond and within Europe's geopolitical limits, in sites such as detention centers in Libya, but also in Rome; in dinghies adrift at sea among herds of sophisticated military vessels, but also in machine-readable bodies adrift within European digital data fields. After exploring at length the role of Gaddafi's Libya in the last ten years as a gendarme of Europe, I deploy methodologies not only of International Relations, but also of transnationalism and translocalism to expand the concept of externalization beyond geospatial accounts of borders. Moving through spaces of in/security, and times of panic, this work redefines borders and frontiers in ways that can account for their dialectical nature, and for the dialectical nature of political life practices.
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On one breezy morning in spring 2008, I found another story of the type that I had been hunting for a while. I read and collect them almost every day, but still cannot get used to them. Perhaps that is not a bad thing.

This particular story related to a place that I hold dear. Perhaps for this reason, I could not maintain the safe distance or impartiality, that some would say is proper for a political scientist. Certainly, I felt a need to write about this event.¹ So, back to setting the scene: Here I am one morning pouring my black coffee and reading through Il Messaggero, a popular Italian newspaper. A tiny piece in the lower left corner of the local news section reads, “A 44-year-old woman was found hanged in her cell at the CIE (Center [or prison] for [migrants’] Identification and Expulsion) of Ponte Galeria in Rome.” A couple of other local newspapers tossed in an acronym: M.M. But these papers reported her initials incorrectly. Her name was Nabruka Mimuni, and Nabruka was born in Tunisia.

She had been living in Rome for 30 years, and was on her way to renew her residence certification. Unfortunately, and tragically, she was arrested while in line to complete the certification. After her arrest, she would have been deported to Tunisia, where she had no family. Instead, she hanged herself in her cell, the night before I sat here drinking my coffee. Nabruka left a child and a husband behind—and us, to think about what had been done to her.

In spring 2008, I had already started to organize and develop a narrative from my research on the European externalization of migration control. My understanding was initially in line with the views of most scholars, who attend to the externalization of migration control policies primarily using geographical terms. After all, “European externalization” suggests policies that are implemented in geopolitical spaces beyond that of continental Europe. Many scholars refer to externalization as a “remote control”² process (Zolberg 2003), and limit their analyses of this phenomenon to

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¹ Rinelli, “Another saddish story today.”
simple geospatial characterizations, which is understandable insofar as European policies have been implemented in, or externalized to, North Africa.

However, the story of Nabruka made me think that perhaps the externalization of migration control in Africa was just the tip of the iceberg: the most visible feature of a complex European apparatus that is meant to exclude or, better, to differentiate among and include, African migrants already in Europe or on their way to it. If externalization only pushed Europe’s gatekeepers beyond the geopolitical space of continental Europe, then how would one account for the role of the detention centers that now exist in every European city? Sitting over my morning coffee, I recalled the indifference of the media professionals who misspelled Nabruka’s initials, and the indifference of most Roman citizens about current immigration policies and legislation. Can we define geo-spatially local Roman practices of marginalization as externalization? Where does the internal end, and the external begin? In Nabruka’s personal, Möbius strip-like case, two allegedly geographically distinct and distant places—Tunisia and Rome—served as the alpha and the omega of a life made invisible to all of us who attend to the externalization of migration control policies using strictly conventional geospatial methodologies and conceptions of borders.

I then reflected more on how the phenomenon of externalization is not clearly defined in space and time. Where and when does it start and end? Eventually, I wanted to find out whether externalization (both in intent, and in practice) is merely a means of annihilating immigrants’ identities. Maybe the enormous amount of energy and capital that states expend and invest to manage migration from Africa is somehow productive. I questioned whether tensions generated at the border might cause certain types of politics, and lives, to proliferate, and how they could cause this proliferation. In other words, I wanted to prove through my research that it is possible to conceive of externalization as something other than a system of total control [the “Panopticon” of Foucault] or interdiction [the “Banopticon” of Didier Bigo3]. I argue that it is possible to theorize the border at the center of a new political project that reconciles the fracture between politics and policies. The task of my research is to demonstrate that

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3 Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, Borderscapes.
the externalization of European migration control is the indication of the departure from an idea of community of people [politics] towards a community of institution [policies] that everyday becomes more powerful and relies on complicated apparatus or dispositif. Policies of migration control are not meant to resolve underpaid and unregulated employment or to eliminate “illegal” migration. The goal is rather to reproduce an illegality that in turns justifies the necessity of a complicated apparatus of migration control. I realized how much my understanding of the phenomenon of Europe’s externalization of migration control is indebted to Foucault’s concept of dispositif⁴. In fact, once we look at the phenomenon of externalization, we see that all of its elements are internally related even as they remain necessarily different. Those are, for example:

- Biometrics, satellites, and databases, each of which is a technology that, by demanding answers to questions of truth and belonging, individuates, verifies, and controls migrants who the state imagines;
- Urban design, architecture, and urban planning within European cities commonly featuring immigrant detention centers;
- FRONTEX, or the [in] security risk-management rationale of European institutions and agencies that is in charge of coordinating European state strategies of migration control;
- Justices, tribunals, and domestic policies of intercepting migrants’ boats on the high seas and returning them to imagined homelands;
- Diplomatic agreements, neighbor policies, and international treaties with non-European countries that are meant to disrupt migration flows.

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⁴ Italian political philosopher Giorgio Agamben defines dispositif when he writes: “Further expanding the already large class of Foucauldian apparatuses, I shall call an apparatus literally anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings. Not only, therefore, prisons, madhouses, the Panopticon, schools, confession, factories, disciplines, judicial measures, and so forth (whose connection with power is in a certain sense evident), but also the pen, writing, literature, philosophy, agriculture, cigarettes, navigation, computers, cellular telephones and—why not—language itself, which is perhaps the most ancient of apparatuses—one in which thousands and thousands of years ago a primate inadvertently let himself be captured, probably without realizing the consequences that he was about to face.” Giorgio Agamben, "What is an Apparatus?” in What is an Apparatus? And Other Essays. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009: p. 14.
This assemblage of internal and external security elements offers a multiplicity of distinct vantage points from which to conceive and examine border effects. For instance, according to some angles and combinations, certain security agencies that in the past received great attention and visibility (e.g., gendarmerie, customs, border guards, immigration officers) become unintelligible. Though for some reason still maintaining a central role within the security field, the power of traditional border policing and control practices has now been distributed among different elements (some of them mentioned above, and all variously beyond and/or within state geopolitical limits). These powers have had to become more fluid and less localized to effectively respond to contemporary, globalized challenges. In other words, the field of professional migration controls has had to function, much as Nabruka did, like a Möbius strip or a Klein bottle, with the locations and interventions of agents never fully fixed, and never fully inside or out.

Of the many aspects of externalization that will be proposed and examined here, three are of particular significance, namely: the configuration/design of the dispositif of the externalization of migration control, inside and outside Europe; the nature of the border; and, finally, the dialectical complexion of power struggles among (in) security professionals and migrants. Together, these show that, if different elements and agencies participate in the same dispositif, i.e., European externalization within a field of (in) security, then inherent differences between kinds of (in) security threats disappear. Consequently, the concept of externalization entails, logically, the design of a semantic continuum of threats, ranging from undocumented migration and diseases – “there is a link between imagining disease and imagining foreignness”⁵ - to terrorism. This continuum is Möbius twisted and has real consequences not only for host societies and their intended targets, but also for security agencies and their activities and relations relationships in the prevailing political climate. Picture, for example, the phone and Internet tapping programs that the Western countries have launched since 9/11 in their primarily “external” Crusade on Terror.

The following comprehensive analysis of Europe's externalization of migration control is divided into different chapters, each one dealing with particular levels of the phenomenon. Chapter 1 provides the genesis of the externalization shift of migration control as framed in European policies. Chapter 2 will address preliminary theoretical and methodological matters in terms of borders and frontiers. Chapters 3 and 4 primarily attend to the canonical understanding of externalization in Africa and the Mediterranean, while the latter part of this work (Chapters 5 and 6) attempt to reconceptualize externalization in the virtual and urban dimensions.

In particular, Chapter 1 traces the genesis of the concept of externalization of migration control at the European level. This chapter emphasizes how the process of Europe’s disappearing internal borders checks has tremendously impacted constructions of the idea of Europe. The internal process gave birth to the Schengen area of free movement and marks a crucial moment in the process of the externalization of migration controls. Since then through the years, member states developed and implemented an extraterritorial system of immigration control that has centrifugally expanded out from the newly unifying European Union: coordinated Visa policies, national liaison officers at airports in countries of origin, and readmission agreements. I then put in relation intergovernmental initiatives such as those between Italy and Libya to certain tragic events that occurred since the implementation of such agreements and that I develop fully in chapter 3 and 4. The chapter concludes problematizing the concept of borders and calling for a re-definition of them to be developed in the following section.

Next, Chapter 2 introduces a personal reconceptualization of the border within the realm of International Relations and provides a theoretical umbrella for the rest of my dissertation. In particular, this chapter works to reconceptualize borders and frontiers by showing how they develop at the interstices of discourses of European migration control and African migrants’ trajectories, and not only through state-recognized collective identities. Because this chapter considers tribunals, politicians, policies, civil society, and migrants, it introduces and relies on a conception of territory, and therefore of borders and frontiers, that is constantly modified, contested, and
restructured according to the actions of both individuals and institutions. This theoretical approach, which stresses the essentially dialectical nature of borders and frontiers, will then be applied to each subsequent chapter. In general, these chapters seek to concretely apply Chapter 2’s theoretical insights, and through these concrete applications, to move away from positivist readings of International Relations (which do not pay attention to the concrete conditions in which actors interact). Positivist readings hide the intrinsic violence of exclusionary border practices and tend to domesticate alterity by naturalizing, and normalizing, the state’s efforts to define the limits of territory as a prerequisite frame of analysis.

My approach will therefore seek to abandon such ahistorical conceptions of borders and frontiers. Thus, Chapter 3 shows how the externalization of European migration control has been implemented in North Africa and how African migrants deal with the crossing of the Sahara desert. Migration flows from sub-Saharan Africa toward the European Union recently provoked a radical change of traditional security controls: for reasons of internal security, the strategic importance of the external southern border of the European area of free movement, the Schengen Area, has increased. Consequently, as the growing trend of outsourcing of migration controls from Europe to Africa clearly shows, the border has moved outside, away from nominal European national borders. Seeking good relations with the EU, neighboring states may not only seek to comply with EU external policy initiatives on migration, but also to emulate if not reinforce the most strict EU approaches to these issues, particularly with regard to detention and expulsion. Given the complexity of the situation and the particularity of each country belonging to the area called Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya), the chapter chooses to focus attention on Libya and on the migrant route that connects the Horn of Africa to the coastline of Maghreb via Sudan. As will be explained in detail, the eastern route is for different political and economic reasons currently the most frequently traveled migration route, even though it is also the most dangerous. At first sight, what becomes clear is that with over 4,000 km of desert borders, each of the six countries bordering Libya on the south, east, and western frontiers acts as a point of entry for refugees and migrants. Even Libyan
officials recognize the impracticality of sealing the borders (Herzog 2009). At the same time, however, the geological features of the desert often make the crossing deadly. This chapter will introduce the concept of technécology to indicate the dialectical relation between migrants and technologies of control. Where possible, as we will see, refugees and migrants have adopted trans-Saharan caravan routes that have operated for centuries in the transport of goods and slaves between Libya and neighboring African countries, notably Sudan and Chad. However, the way migrants now cross the desert is indissolubly linked with the use of satellite phones and trucks that were introduced to the African market from Europe. This dialectical methodological approach allows me to overcome the theoretical impasse of conceiving the Sahara desert as an enormous camp (a la Agamen) where migrants die without any hope or agency.

Chapter 4 moves north where African migrants reach the coastline of Libya and attempt crossing the Mediterranean Sea. This chapter seeks to theorize the dynamics that emerge from the intimate relation between contemporary borders and biopolitics. In doing this, I critique Agamen’s concept of the camp to the entire seascape of the Mediterranean basin investigating this space as both space of control as well as space of resistance. Starting from the news of 73 Eritreans who perished around the Island of Lampedusa, this chapter this chapter relies on both personal observations and photographs taken on the Island of Lampedusa during summer 2009, to highlight changes Italian migration control policies, and how asylum-seekers’ receptions, and concepts of borders and frontiers in the Mediterranean Sea, have changed as a result. Whether it is accurate to configure the Mediterranean basin as a zone outside/inside the law, a sort of space of exception in its functions of frontier, the validity of this analogy relies on the fact that undocumented migrants crossing the sea are reduced to bare life and die without anyone being held responsible. By analyzing the micro-rationality of different agencies, such as tribunals, local institutions, politicians, and civil society in and around the island, I aim to demonstrate how relations between territory, discourses of migration control, and the actions of individuals provide an ample understanding of the border, and ultimately of the shifting limits of the idea of
Europe in this particular historical moment. In another way, Chapter 5 argues that the correspondence between law, institutions and the actions of individuals, modulates the visibility of the border and defines the southern limits of Europe in this particular historical moment. In the same waters where Ulysses and Aeneas wandered for years, the Italian government has recently erected new borders that traverse two distinct legal realms. At the international level, on May 6th 2009, following a bilateral agreement with Libya that skipped over parliamentarian debates, the Italian government unilaterally inaugurated a new strategy for stemming the flow of African migrants and asylum seekers. It consisted of intercepting migrants in Mediterranean international waters sending them back to Libya.

These actions stand in violation of Art. 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, a convention Libya never endorsed. At domestic level, with the introduction and subsequent enforcement of the crime of aiding and abetting clandestine immigration (art. 110 of the criminal code, art. 12 of legislative decree 286/98), the state criminalized de facto any action aimed at rescuing boatloads of African migrants who may become stranded in the Mediterranean Sea. Some individuals, fishermen and NGOs, have decided to resist in violation of the law, while others, for respect or fear of the same law, have judged immigrant lives unworthy of rescue. In response to this new legal paradigm, three trials were initiated in the same court of Agrigento: one in 2006 against the crew of the Cap Anamur, a German aid agency, one in 2007 against seven Tunisian fishermen, both for aiding and abetting clandestine immigration. The third one, in 2008, was initiated against Mr. Mariano Ruggiero who has been charged with murder, having hit a migrant who had reached his vessel and thrown him back in the sea. By analyzing the testimonies and rulings of the tribunal of Agrigento, I will make an attempt to expose rigid conceptions of borders and frontiers that naturalize the state’s efforts to define the limits of territory, as the necessary frame to domesticate alterity and hide the intrinsic violence of bordering practices of exclusion. I call this approach sympathetic because involves the direct participation of individuals in engaging law and institution and interrogate its utility for reading other liminal spaces around the world, whether we come across torrid deserts, deep blue seas, or urban
peripheries at the margins of contemporary metropolis.

While this approach avoids a positivist reading of law that does not pay attention to the concrete conditions in which actors interact, it fractures Agamben’s bipolarity between the sovereign and the naked human being. In this direction, Chapter 6 theorizes the role of technologies in changing the contemporary understanding of the border. It is fair to say then that, on the one hand, standards of extraterritorial mobility control are more global and common to different areas of the world, such as Palestine/Israel, Mexico/USA and the Mediterranean Sea between Africa and Europe. On the other hand, thanks to the increasing role of sophisticated technologies of surveillance developed for military purposes, controls are also becoming more local and specific, deepening at the skin level and beyond, as through the collection of biometric data of people on the move. Border practices that are intended only to be re-enacted outside the geopolitical edges of states do not account for the reapplication of technologies that are overproduced in Europe’s highly industrialized societies and re-employed by African migrants. Technologies of migration control [satellite / biometrics/ radar/] are therefore at the same time causes and ends of the same process. Through these technologies, migrants are detected and differently included within the host society in positions of vulnerability. Technologies of visibility are therefore essential instruments for determining the structure of the working class; however, at the same time, they have become crucial economic components of research and industrial development for receiving countries within a comprehensive technécology of migration control. I call this approach technécology to stress the interconnectivity between technological practices of migration control and the utilization of the same technologies to migrate.

Lastly, Chapter 7 concludes my journey from Africa into Europe. Specifically, it follows few African migrants into the city of Rome. In this chapter, I locate one of the new frontiers of Europe within a paradox of the city of Rome that is both fundamental and vital to its economic expansion: an inexorable growth of buildings together with a mounting rejection and marginalization of an emergent immigrant population. To understand how contemporary Rome’s urbanscapes are changing with the new
immigrant societies that live within the nation-state and at the core of the city, analysis of this paradox is crucial. If we conceive the city as a striated space traversed by memories, sounds, images and experiences, as a sort of living and pulsing archive, then new migrants, and their experiences together with policies of migration control, have to be taken in consideration. First, I explain how contemporary European policies of migration control connect with the city of Rome through analysis of the document that anticipates Rome’s new urban plan and explicitly links Rome and the Mediterranean. We will also examine a documentary titled “The Vittorio Square Orchestra,” which exemplifies Rome’s organized discourse of multiculturalism. A critical reading of the documentary will give us an opportunity to consider how films and media in general can reinforce configurations of multiethnic society from above. Disillusioned with official discourses of multiculturalism, I then move my research toward the discursively external part of the city: the periphery. There, in the south-eastern area of Rome, we will ultimately recognize undeniable interconnections between Europe’s emerging southern border and the urban space of Rome. Like a border, the urban structure does not change spontaneously. Also, like a border, no single powerful agent, such as the state, can determine it. The urbanscape changes in ways that manifest social conflict that urban anxiety and indifference generate. They are related to forms of inclusion/exclusion that occur through modalities of externalization, or in the case of cityscape, of peripheralization.

As the reader may have noticed, I named the majority of the chapters “door” to suggest a different idea of border beyond the conceptualization of obstacle, and toward the idea of possibility and hope. Each one of them problematize the mainstream understanding on migration control intended as unidirectional and policy-driven. The last chapter, Chapter 8, brings this research to a close with a few reflections on recent political events in Libya that led to the demise of Gaddafi’s regime and eventually his assassination. Almost immediately after, prophets of misfortune on the European shores sighed for the old regime as they anticipated hordes of wretched of the Earth crossing the Mediterranean hiding Islamic extremists among them. While they never materialized, the fear of invasion served, once again to perpetuate the vicious cycle that generated the dispositif
of externalization and violence related to it in the first place. But before starting in the
next section I shall describe with some notes the methodology adopted and concerning
bias related to the development of my interests and values inherent to the object of this
research.

When the ordinary becomes beautiful: the role of images in discourses of
migration.

Visual and oral memories of African migrants, together with an attentive analysis of the
policies and the practices of migration control that Libyan authorities act out on behalf
of Europe, will allow for a uniquely comprehensive analysis of the externalization of
European migration, and for the extension of this concept of “externalization” both
beyond and within Europe’s formal geospatial borders. Through the screening of a
fieldwork photographic archive and an original video documentary, this dissertation
aims to reveal aspects of recent migration control policy changes that have been
concealed, and, by tracing the interstices of migration discourses, to reveal the
importance and agency of the ordinary. Consequently, it pays as much attention to
European and national policies as it does to visual representations of migrations.

Why embark on a strenuous defense of photography or film as a legitimate tool to
explain global migrations against the prevailing current of international relations
scholarship? Do we have the luxury to entertain ourselves with questions of aesthetics
when the world requires urgent action? I have come to the conclusion that aesthetics is
too present in human life to be left outside our analytical toolbox.

During a lecture delivered in 1975 at Wellesley College Susan Sontag, invoking
Oscar Wilde, says that the way we see the world (and therefore understand it) is ‘largely
determined by art in the larger sense’. We should not be surprised then if realism, the
most positivist approach for ‘seeing’ international issues, presents an uncanny
resemblance with the art of photography. Like photography, a neo-realist approach
presumes to merely describe the realities of world issues ‘independently of our values

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6 Wells, The Photography Reader, 64.
and assumptions. This proceeds as if representation is neither a process or a problem as reality is self-evident and therefore only obscured by insufficient data rather than the subjectivity of the observer.

Can we then bring photography to the same level as other positivist approaches? It is worth mentioning that Hans Morgenthau, one of the founders of American Political Realism, wrote that ‘political science is an art and not a science’. Can we go on then assuming that every methodological tool belongs to one or another form of art, a representation, intended or not, even if it is saturated with the discourse of scientific reason?

Indeed, to decode world politics we rely greatly on the art of numbers otherwise named statistics, the art of mapping the Earth and its resources that is geopolitics, or the art of diplomacy that focus on intricate sets of human correspondence among high-profile politicians and governors. Within the real of International Relations each one of these arts and their own insights have been elevated to the status of common sense so that they are not recognized as inevitably partial as they are. Why then has one of the most scientific among arts, that is photography, not been yet taken seriously within the realm of world politics? Yet, media images play a crucial role in representing and shaping world events, and more often than not they alone set the level of security alert. Why then are we not taking advantage of a scientific art whose mechanisms have been already deconstructed to actively engage world politics? Perhaps only few believe that a photograph can give a wide-ranging representation of the world realities, but to be aware of its limits is already a respectable starting point. From that point, next we can explore its vast potentialities.

Apropos Foucault explained that knowledge and power are interrelated and that consequently the concept of truth is related to a certain knowledge, which never

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7 Bleiker, Aesthetics and World Politics, 5.
8 Morgenthau, Scientific Man Versus Power Politics, 10.
9 Geopolitics has been obsessed with a particular kind of photography. The most famous being the U2 photos of Cuba that started the missile crisis but generally speaking the world of intelligence gathering has been one of ‘realist’ (in the art sense) photography. The possibility that the visible can ‘lie’ has never been acknowledge despite the fact that images have often been misunderstood or misrecognized. From the loc-ness monster images to the obsessive scrutiny of satellite images searching in hopes discovering clandestine nuclear silos or enemy troop movements or ‘weapons of mass destruction’ facilities in Iraq the self-evident reality of the photograph is an important part of geopolitics just one that require neither interpretation nor theory. It is fact, fact enough to invade.
exists outside of power. The regime of truth is then the product of a system of procedures for the production and distribution of statements of truth. The scope then is to develop methodological tools of analysis able to detect the ‘political economy’\(^\text{10}\) within which the mode of production of truth operates, while showing that a new politics of truth is possible. Photography can serve the scope. The lens can get closer than anything else, (think of a microscope lens and the politics of HIV diffusion in Africa) and perforate the veil of omniscient codes (thinking here of Barthes’s \textit{punctum}\(^\text{11}\)) opening up new possibilities for ‘seeing’ the world. Beyond an academic interpretation of a photograph, that is the cultural and linguistic structure if it, a photograph can determine a new relation between the viewer and the object of photography.

This point becomes clearer when we pay attention to common approaches to migration analyzed through the lens of security in terms of integrity of the state’s borders and the cultural integrity of the nation within it. Prominent Statist modes of representation of migration insist on hierarchy of high – state and politicians – over low – migrants and their interlocutors. What can be heard and what can be viewed is then, commonly filtered by these hierarchies. Framing migration through a security lens means to intend migration as a risk [contamination]/opportunity [economic] for the state and distrust for those social relations that are structured on the basis of dangerous encounters. Similarly framing migration as a humanitarian emergency, in the NGOs’ fundraising images of starving African kids, means to enclose it as a security question that generates compassion without altering unidirectional hierarchical top-down relations. Dealing with migration and refugees subjects has become a way of thinking of the state and thinking in state categories\(^\text{12}\).

The same is true for what cannot be heard and what must remain invisible. It is a (border) practice of consigning to the void not only the migrant but also social relations that prevent the identification of the migrant as one who does not belong. Photography as a method, intended as the act of photographing, opens up new perspectives and can expose the rationale of policies of security and migration control

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12 Sayad, \textit{The Suffering of the Immigrant}. 
whose violence becomes mundane. Regarding my research project, the counter-archive I have assembled highlights “that which you cannot see” in present-day European practices of securitizing the Mediterranean.

During the last decade, there have been many researchers who have shown the indispensability of aesthetic sensibilities in rethinking world politics. Among those, Roland Bleiker reminds us: “aesthetics is neither good nor bad, progressive nor regressive. It works more like an amplifier.” Bleiker experiments with poetic modes of expression, transversal discourses and aesthetic practices. In my case, I am trying to leverage aesthetics of the ‘ordinary’ or the banal against the way statistics fetishizes data as an impersonal accounting of life. Then you will have a warrant for what makes your reading more ‘nuanced’. An aesthetic sensibility can give us insights that cannot be detected by other practices like statistics, at the same time it allows us a more nuanced way of reading international politics. There is a resonance between photographic depictions of Africa and contemporary discourses of African migrations into Europe. The stereotypical depiction of African migrants as the wretched of the Earth, a desperate adventurer gambling with fate, systematically appears on European tabloids and TV news. Pictures of wrecked vessels adrift at sea, or images of black bodies washed ashore inundate summer nights on European TV screens. This visual documentation is intimately connected to a persistent colonial depiction of Africa and justifies violence and death as the necessary price for migration control. The task here perhaps is to allow that which does not fit, that which has no part, to resound onto the boundaries of political space as permanence, allowing for the thinking of space as constituted by ongoing social relations that would refuse the arbitrary force of a particular form of political authority.

In particular, photography of the ordinary as a method can locate and highlight symptoms of an epoch of any given society in the minute details of ordinary life. I am thinking here of seminal works like that of A Seventh Man conceptualized by

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14 I am thinking here of James Der Derian, Michael Shapiro, Cynthia Weber, Anthony Burk, David Campbell, Nevzat Soguk, to name only a few of them.
15 Bleiker, Aesthetics and World Politics, n.
16 Veena Das Life and Words: Violence and the Descent into the Ordinary
John Berger with photos by Jean Mohr\textsuperscript{17} in the late 60’s that show how industrialized countries in Northern Europe became dependent on the labor of Southern migrants. That extraordinary work shows the biopolitical dimension of borders by intruding into recruitment centers where migrants were examined and underwent medical tests to prove that they had the physical and mental abilities to join the workforce. Through this disruptive archive, we can get a glimpse of migrants’ gazes that turn away while the medical examiner slips his hand under one’s underwear. In that moment, all the shame of a violent encounter explodes within the frame of an unbalanced cultural and economic relation. A collision like that sends us toward other zones of intelligibility with regards to the political economy of north-south relations. While \textit{A Seventh Man} focuses on Turkish and Italian immigrant workers in Germany, it ignited a vast debate on the relation between labor and capital. It was translated into many languages and ‘began to be read by some of those whom it was about.’\textsuperscript{18}

In a similar way perhaps more notoriously, former Brazilian economist Sebastião Salgado gathered in his monumental \textit{Migrations: humanity in transition}\textsuperscript{19} hundreds of individual stories of migrations of our times. If we add the real time that the shutter was released for each photo to be composed, it equals to no more than one second of life on the Earth. Commenting on Salgado’s work on Sahel, David Campbell states that “photographs are a modality of power. They may conform to colonial economies of representation or can function as an ethical and responsibilizing practice in which the aesthetics repoliticizes.”\textsuperscript{20} Salgado succeeds in questioning modes of representing disasters, famines, and displacements. On one hand, he does it looking tirelessly for beauty in each of his shot. Most of the criticism departs from this point. While I do not deny the validity of this objection, I think we often underestimate the political power of finding beauty in each ordinary gesture of life.\textsuperscript{21} On the other hand, Salgado questions the regime of truth of humanitarian intervention within institutionalized frameworks of action (IRCR-IOM-UNDP, etc.). He problematizes and

\textsuperscript{17} Berger, \textit{A Seventh Man.}

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 8.

\textsuperscript{19} Salgado, \textit{Migrations.}

\textsuperscript{20} Debriz, \textit{Rituals Of Mediation.}

confronts the conventional depiction of humanity in trouble - the malnourished bellies of African children - and the spectacle of atrocities. Where other photographers’ work ends at pity and compassion, Salgado’s begins there to explore dignity and determination. He catches a different angle challenging viewers’ perceptions of disaster reveling hope for a new politics in every gesture without minimizing human sufferance.

The work of Alfredo Jaar on the Rwandan genocide follows a similar path exploring the politics and representation of trauma. Although an exhaustive analysis is beyond the scope of this brief intervention, it is important to underline how his work exposes the power relations that constitute the political economy of representation of global traumatic events like Rwanda’s genocide. Jaar reveals the power of editing in producing world news and he opens up the intricate junctions between power and knowledge. Moving beyond his predecessors, Jaar couples images, texts, and sometimes recreates the environment during an exhibition. Only in this way, he argues, it is possible to overcome the ‘feeling’ released by an image and amplify the limits of words for a powerful counter-information.

Having considered these prestigious precedents and my expertise as a photographer, I wanted to reclaim what conventional analysis of international migrations casts aside. I took a camera with me when I went to Lampedusa to complete my field research. There, I could gather snaps of life, which in connection with European and national policies facilitate my understanding of the phenomenon of the externalization of European migration control. Apropos, Ranciere wrote that film and photography underline the ordinary moments of life and render those moments “beautiful as a trace of true. This phantasmagoric dimension of the true, played an essential role in the formation of the critical paradigm of the human and social sciences.”

In the same way, I found that documentary films could render visible lives and experiences of those otherwise anonymous migrants who, once in Europe, managed to

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22 “Alfredo Jaar: Rwanda.”
share stories of their efforts to navigate European borders. As Ranciere writing about Chantal Akerman’s *De l’autre cote*, explains:

> The film’s political impact consist precisely in the way it turns an economic and geopolitical issue into an aesthetic matter, the way in which it produces a confrontation between two sides, and a series of conflicting narratives around the raw materiality of the fence.  

All of the elements of the dispositif of externalization will surface if we pay attention to the aesthetics of the documentary I chose, not only because it regards the geographical locus of my research, but also for two essential methodological reasons. First, while the arguably “extraterritorial” extension of the EU’s political-legal powers is not entirely new, its methods and idioms are fairly unprecedented, not to mention the intensity with which the European migration control is pursued all over North Africa as well as Sub-Saharan Africa. Although there have been several efforts to examine the dynamics of migration from Africa to Europe, scholarly analyses have either focused on policy and inter-states relations, and have disregarded the human dimension, or have attempted to map the route of the flow, almost like a herd, along geographical lines, with each route confined within its proper academic locus. I, instead, attempt to frame my research inside the gaze of a camera lens that intrudes on the intimacy of a few young Ethiopians who, with hardly any prospects for their future, left Addis Ababa, their families, and society. This camera lens is the documentary film, *Like a Man on Earth*. Without assuming that documentaries have any power of true representation, I believe that the memories, gestures and body language of the persons in the film ably recall the challenges that these contemporary migrants had to face, and reveal nuances between the lines of contemporary policies of migration control in Africa.

This leads me to the second reason, which relates to the representational power of *Like a Man on Earth*. When I consider the aesthetic dimension of this document, I mean to pay attention to issues of time and space more than to its commercial or

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24 Rancière, *Dissensus*, 150.
artistic rank among other video documentaries. What is important is to read the
director’s endeavor as an “attempt at reconfiguring the partitions of space and time” \(^\text{25}\)
of discourses of migration that insist on a hierarchy of high (States, politicians, public
figures) and low (migrants and their interlocutors), of subjects/agents, policies, and
data over most persons’ lives.

During my research, I met Dagmawi Imer, aka Dag, in December 2009, one
year after the release of Like a man on Earth. Dag was a student at the Faculty of Law of
Addis Ababa University when instances of political oppression and electoral corruption
after the general elections of May 2005\(^\text{26}\) made him leave his community. He embarked
on a long and perilous journey to Rome, where eventually he was granted the status of
a refugee. When in Rome, after surviving the violence of Europe’s geospatial borders,
Dag joined the school of Italian language in the Asinitas cultural association, a meeting
space for African migrants in Rome. There, Dag not only learned to speak Italian but
also became skilled in the language of video-documentaries. Shortly after, in an attempt
to rip the veil of silence shrouding how contemporary European policies of migration
control are implemented in Africa, he decided to gather the memories of others who,
like him, had journeyed from Ethiopia to Rome via Libya.

I, then, have decided to regard Dag’s film as a leitmotiv for my project. Like my
work, his film examines a fundamental shift in policies of migration regulation and
control in the European Union: the externalization of a regime of control to the
Mediterranean Basin and beyond. North Africa, as his film shows, is an increasingly
important a field for the application of the EU’s migration policies, and this shift of
importance stems from invigorated efforts to stem a perceived tide of EU-bound
immigrants before they even reach the EU’s borders. Coincidentally, Dag’s
documentary resonates with all of my dissertation’s different loci of analysis: the
journey through the desert on trucks before reaching the coast of Libya, where
migrants embark until they are intercepted at sea by the Italian coastguard and towed
to the Island of Lampedusa. After he obtained refugee status, Dag chose to visit

\(^{26}\) “Ethiopian protesters 'massacred'.”
FRONTEX’s headquarters in Warsaw where he managed to conduct an interview with the agency director. In the meantime, the backdrop to the stories of the African migrants who gather in the kitchen of the Association Asinitas is the city of Rome.

What can be heard: politicians arguing for the creation of new walls, or media venting citizens frustration about increasing unemployment and/or cultural loss/contamination, both allegedly caused by “illegals.” And what can be seen: boats loaded with desperate people whom police authorities rescue. Both kinds of sensory experience, and their limitations, depend on the discourses of migration mentioned above. What cannot be heard and what must remain invisible: a migrant reclaiming her political subjectivity within the new host society.

This documentary succeeds precisely in revealing what the recent transformations of policies of migration control in Europe and in Africa keep concealed. For instance, the interviews reveal to the audience the crude reality of the EU-sponsored or inspired (either directly or indirectly) detention/asylum/immigrant camps that have sprung in Libya as testimony to the changing dynamics of the EU’s migration control regime.

In other words, I read Dag’s documentary as an effort to reappropriate agency and voice his and his companions’ experiences in a universal (visual) language that breaks the above mentioned hierarchy. The author’s capacity of expression reclaims temporal and spatial mobility not only within the host society (Italy in this case), but also in spaces and times that actively resist the host society’s efforts to establish itself as a definite, clearly demarcated geopolitical territory. Dag’s agency as a person does not spring from his arrival in democratic but obviously radically hierarchic Europe. While breaking away from his society of origin along certain queer routes and at certain queer speeds, he reveals autonomy that, within the conventional geospatial logic of International Relations, Third World migrants ought not to have outside of colonial and post-colonial ordering structures. It exemplifies what Ranciere means by subjectification that is “the production through a series of actions, of a body and a
capacity for enunciation not previously identifiable within a given field of experience, whose identification is thus part of the reconfiguration of the field of experience.27"

To further underline the political significance of Dag’s interviews, it is important to mention that Like a Man on Earth is part of a larger project, the Migrants Memories’ Archive, which, since 2006, has sought to recuperate both the memory and the dignity of the migratory path of many out the Horn of Africa. The project is the outcome of conversations between social workers of the Asinitas Association, academic scholars specializing in the colonial and postcolonial history of the region of the Horn of Africa, and a group of refugees from the same area. According to Alessandro Triulzi, professor of History of Sub Saharan Africa at the Orientale University in Naples, the project has a double scope. First, it explores the possibility of filling the lacuna between migrants and the host community. Describing this alienation, Abdelmalek Sayad elaborates the idea of la double absence28, which is the social condition of the emigrant/immigrant who is condemned to be absent twice, both in respect to her origins and her new society. Through the migrants’ active participation in narrating and setting the conditions for the narration, the Archive facilitates the dispersion of the double absence. What is more, the project aims to invert the usual process by which “we” (migration experts, academics, and journalists) speak on the “other’s’” behalf. While I have underlined above the ways in which Dag and his companions re-appropriate their capacities of self-representation, it also important to note how their project seems to challenge the very limits of the concept of an archive conceived of as a ‘closed’ system of memory storage. In this sense, the active and continuous participation of migrants in the archive’s construction renders the project a political act, ‘un fare politico’.

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27 Ranciere, Disagreement, 35.
28 Sayad, The Suffering of the Immigrant.
CHAPTER 1. EXTERNALIZATION
Our interest more generally speaking is to establish partnerships with those countries that are either countries of origin of illegal migration or countries of transit. The philosophy behind that is that border control cannot be carried out at the border only. We have to act before the border where the problem arises, we have to cooperate and act across the border, with our colleagues in third countries and then at the border and also behind the border.29

Col. Ikka Laitinen, Executive Director of Frontex

1.1 An introduction

Once upon a time in Europe, there was the city-state with its well-built walls and massive gates around which foreigners would gather waiting for authorization to enter. For centuries, this space in between city-states was of no great concern to sovereign powers, which were more preoccupied with those who lived in the city and determining how many people could enter relative to how many would leave. Admission decisions where made at the ports, riverbanks, and gates of the city. Even today political analysts and historians of migration note strong similarities between contemporary gateways and those of the past. A renowned example is depicted for instance in Mimmo Gangemi’s latest novel La signora di Ellis Island [Ellis Island’s Lady, 2011]. In Chapter 4 I detail Ellis Island’s role as the quintessential mechanism of filtering in/out the USA’s foreign population. However, modern gateways such as Ellis Island also reveal differences between past and present practices of migration control. Perhaps the most striking is that, whereas state immigrant selection used to be made at a country’s gateway, like Ellis Island, today a process of extraterritorial selection is far more common. This chapter deals with the nature of extraterritorial European migration control.

29 Segre and Yimer, Like a Man on Earth.
In general, one can argue that the beginning of extraterritorial migration control practices began with the introduction of the visa. Nonetheless, while practices of extraterritorial migration control have been largely implemented by Western states in the past two decades since the introduction of visa requirements, after 9/11, this approach changed in kind and border controls have become more diffuse and less clearly localizable. Globalization’s perception of increased human flows combined with the global war on terror have been infused with an idea that was popular among policy makers - a permanent clash of civilizations. Thus, since 9/11, the category of the exceptional has been invoked to justify an array of violent practices that feature in the dispositif of the externalization of migration control: detention without trial, derogation of human rights law, torture, “extraordinary rendition”, curtailment of civil liberties and the securitization of migration. Concurrently, the concept of exceptionalism has prompted a switch from the mere control of immigration (e.g. determining how many people can enter relative to how many people will leave) to the detection of human movement within and away the gateways of the state. In Europe, the space in between and within city-states has become the field of migration control activity. This change in kind leads my research far off from Europe’s traditional gateways, inside and outside the EU Schengen zone of free movement for citizens of the Member States.

In this regard, while the practice of extraterritorial immigration control is at the core of the idea of externalization, this geospatial conception does not, as I envision it, account for all of externalization’s features. McSweeney’s comments are apropos in this context. He argues “the individual is ignored in conceptualizing the idea of security at the state level, only to be reinstated as its basic rationale – as it must be – in order to make sense of, and legitimize, the policy derived.” The individual intended as the abstract legitimate member of any European society, is the rationale of an apparatus of securization that actively ignores and is direct against actual, not abstract individuals. This Other individual - vaguely dark-skinned, uncivilized, most certainly illegal, from the South, is the target of the policy of externalization. Thus, undocumented [read

30 Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?”.
31 Security, Identity and Interests, 16.
untraceable] immigration has been singled out in security issue as an international threat to peace and stability. A chain of syllogistic deductions is unleashed. There is migration. Therefore, there is a risk. Therefore, there is a possibility and perhaps a civil duty of intervention. Instead of focusing only on the extraterritorial aspect then, I contend that the discursive nature of externalization makes it characteristically polycentric and polymorphic. As much as it moves outside, [desert and sea chapter 2 and 3] it also extends and shapes the inside, including the domestic management of economic resources [chapter 4 Frontex], virtual dimensions [biometric databases chapter 4] and urban spaces [chapter 5 Rome’s urban plan].

First, the apparatus of externalization has been put into practice through a process of problematization. How might the Foucauldian concept of problematization function in this particular context? To problematize means to read practice in a certain way. As Soguk explains, Foucault intends problematization as the idea that “transforms the difficulties and obstacles of practice into a general problem for which one proposes diverse political solutions” (Foucault, 1984:389 in Soguk, 1999:50). This includes a necessary initial stage of analysis of a particular situation during which, certain activities are understood as “difficulties”: for example, the EU members conceive the influx of immigrants into the EU, as trouble. But “danger is an effect of interpretation.” The influx is thought to be threatening the homogeneity for maintaining of those recognized as members of the state and sanctioned within the triptych birth, territory and order. Through the first stage of problematization, tension charges space where migrants’ now detrimental trajectories cross discourses of [in] security and neoliberal capitalism [see Figure 4.1]. One merges into the other. The border is located at these points in time and space that are charged with this tension that generates the border; it is not necessarily at the gateways of European countries.

It is important to emphasize how the process of Europe’s disappearing internal borders checks has tremendously impacted constructions of the idea of Europe. In my opinion, this internal process marked a crucial moment in the process of the externalization of migration control. Perhaps from the moment that the Schengen

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32 Campbell, Writing Security, 2.
Treaty went into force (1995), it has been the most celebrated European pact since the signing of the Treaty of Rome that created the European Economic Community (1957). However, to comprehend the intimate link between the project of the European Union and contemporary European migration control policies, we must travel back in time to a period of fifteen years ago when the Schengen Area became reality in Europe and opened the internal borders among the European states. Call to mind the imaginative power of that moment. Like a good fairy-tale ending, the Schengen agreement defined the new dimensions of Europe.

Hence the checks on persons are only carried out at the time of crossing of the external border of a member State, which then acts on behalf of all of the other States of the Schengen area. (http://www.mediavisa.net/schengen-area.php).

That instant, crystallized in cinematic form, remains in the images of Wim Wenders’ Lisbon Story released in 1994. At the beginning of the movie, we drive with the protagonist Winter from Germany to Lisbon in Portugal and we share his sense of freedom as he passes checkpoints abandoned at the border. Winter is intoxicated by this new experience; we watch him laughing frantically as he passes the border where no one is stationed, and where nobody will search inside his trunk. Winter’s exuberance was shared. At that time European citizens were all inebriated by the image of a borderless Europe; Schengen marked perhaps the first time they felt part of a great project, or could at least enjoy the effects of idea, the EU, that had always been too far removed from everyday reality. Only later did people start to realize that the borders simply multiplied, thickened, and migrated where they were not before. Only later did people understand that ubiquitous border practices are intimately connected with the power of imagination. In this sense, the outside and inside are uncannily tied.

Notwithstanding the force of international agreements, member states reserve the right to temporarily reintroduce controls at their internal borders when there is a

33 Wenders, Lisbon Story.
34 As a short methodological note, I do not read films ad a mere cultural representation of what Europe was and is but cinema instead as a critical thinking apparatus that allow us the relation between space and imagination.
serious threat to public policy or internal security. This is the so-called safety clause that adorns the vast majority of international treaties. According to the Migration Policy Institute, “between 2000 and 2003, Schengen member States reinstated border controls 33 times and, in almost half of the cases, they did so in anticipation of political events such as European Council meetings.”(Migration Policy Institute, paper n. 20/2007). Recently in May 2011, the leaders of France and Italy asked to revise the Treaty of Schengen. The problem, as they imagined it, was that over a thousand of Tunisians were travelling with temporary visas issued in Italy. “The situation concerning migration in the Mediterranean could rapidly transform into a crisis that would undermine the trust that our compatriots have in the [principle] of freedom of travel within Schengen.” We are reminded with France reintroduction of controls at its geographical limits with Italy specifically to stop Tunisians travelling through the Alps, of Schmitt’s ([1922] 1985: 5) declaration that the “sovereign is he who decides on the exception”.

While protection and hospitality for 25,000/30,000 Tunisians was on the agenda, it seems obvious that relations between Europe and Maghreb were not part of the negotiations. Rather “neither country wants to accommodate the North Africa migrants and both want to ensure the situation is not repeated in the future.” Thus, hundreds of Tunisians were rounded up in Paris and Marseille and put in prison for a night or two before being sent back into the streets where they join an invisible army of undocumented workers. Regime practices, therefore work not so much to “solve” the “refugee problem” as to utilize bodies marked as refugees to stabilize various territorialized relations, institutions, and identities that afford the state its reason for being.

What, then, is the externalization of migration control if not a regime practice, a dispositif, whose different elements work together for a common goal, namely to

35 http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/FS20_SchengenDisappearingBorders_121807.pdf
36 “France-Italy Seek Schengen Reform.”
37 Ibid.
38 Soguk, States And Strangers, 52.
manage the specific historical urgency of this new problem of unmanaged, excess African migrant bodies? As Foucault explained about his vision:

What I’m trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements.” (1980:194)

Externalization as a dispositif consists of various elements, such as internment camps for migrants that are disguised as hospitality centers, architectural pretensions of urban alienation, mass deportations (a.k.a., readmission agreements), hi-tech border patrolling, ultramodern databases, and political economic labels of differential inclusion. Also, it operates in controlled departures and Visa requirements. How to draw the list of those countries, how to decide those populations to be considered dangerous, and therefore to be banned?39

When we pay close attention to the text of the Schengen website, it contains in itself the genes of the dispositif of externalization.

In order to reconcile freedom and security, this freedom of movement was accompanied by so-called "compensatory" measures. This involved improving cooperation and coordination between the police and the judicial authorities in order to safeguard internal security and in particular to tackle organized crime effectively. With this in mind, the Schengen Information System (SIS) was set

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39 E. Guild and D. Bigo, Le visa Schengen: expression d’une strategie de “police” a distance, in Culture and Conflicts, 49-50, 2003
up. SIS is a sophisticated database used by the authorities of the Schengen member countries to exchange data on certain categories of people and goods.

Not only databases, such as SIS and later SIS II, but also other “compensatory” measures accompany the project of the Schengen area of “free” movement, such as more effective coordination between administrations on border surveillance, and police cooperation on forced repatriations, (see chapter 5 for a detailed analysis of these compensatory measures, with each one identified as key component of the apparatus of externalization). It is increasingly clear that the inside and the outside are blurred; there is not externalization without the idea of a homogenous space of Schengen.

Externalization must be analyzed, then, with the discourse of Europeanization, and be traced along this discourse’s trajectory through time and space. I will therefore now proceed to examine those policy documents that constitute the process of externalization and how the nation-state attempts to retain its predominant position despite the apparent *communitarization* of migration control policies.

Most likely, the key moment signaling the revival of the European integration after the institutional crisis of the 70s was the making of the Single European Act (1986). According to its creator Jaques Delors, this act was designed to allow the new economic Union to withstand challenges of economic globalization:

The Single Act means the commitment of implementing simultaneously the great market without frontiers, more economic and social cohesion, a European research and technology policy, the strengthening of the European Monetary System, the beginning of a European social area and significant actions in environment.41

41 [http://www.historiasiglo20.org/europe/acta.htm](http://www.historiasiglo20.org/europe/acta.htm)
A further and important advancement was made in 1992 with the Treaty of European
Union (TEU), signed in Maastricht, which established agreement on moves towards a
single currency among other institutional reforms. Namely, the TEU introduces a
structure that consists of 3 “pillars”: the EC pillar that concerns common policies,
monetary union and citizenship, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
pillar that relates to common defense, and the Justice and Home Affairs pillar. The last
two were distinctly intergovernmental; that is, the Members states were powerful actors
and they controlled the nature and the pace of the process.

The third pillar, JHA, is of particular interest to us since, under the TEU, member states cooperate in areas such as the formation of asylum policies, the control
of people crossing the external frontiers of the Union, immigration policy, and judicial
practice. A fundamental shift later occurred with the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997),
which apparently made JHA communitarian. This is an important moment; plausibly
since the beginning, the member states showed reluctance to bind themselves to any
supranational law. However, JHA officials found other ways to establish autonomy at
the European level, particularly by collaborating with counterparts of other member
states. If we maintain a vision of the EU’s architecture that is not just multilevel but
also polycentric, then we can see how the member states could maintain their roles as
keepers of national concerns through dialogue within EU institutions. Lavenex clearly
states that “by acting jointly at the intergovernmental level, national executives gain an
information advantage over their domestic counterparts and act in the capacity of
gatekeeper” 42. The Treaty of Amsterdam’s paradigmatic shift of immigration policy at
the European level nonetheless allowed subsets of Member states, such as particular
parties, courts, and domestic civil societies, to operate relatively freely of supranational
constraint.

An external dimension of the EU in terms of the control and filtering of
asylum seekers was substantively embraced in 1999 at the Special European Council on
Justice and Home Affairs in Tampere. There, the EU declared its intention to establish
a Common European Asylum System to be based on the full and inclusive application

42 Lavenex, “Shifting up and Out: The Foreign Policy of European Immigration Control,” 33.
of the Geneva Convention. The five-year agenda from 1999 to 2004 – the “Tampere programme” – outlined the first set of legally-binding EU-level asylum agreements. It also designated temporary protections for persons displaced by conflicts, established a common understanding of refugee status, and detailed subsidiary protections such as formal legal warranties, minimum procedural guarantees, minimum conditions for the reception of asylum seekers, and procedures for deciding which Member State would be responsible for assessing which asylum claim.

Since then, the externalization of European migration control policies has played out at two levels: communitarian and intergovernmental. Nonetheless, the latter has developed much faster and powerfully. Without dwelling on single documents, it will suffice to notice that, at the community level, attention to comprehensive economic and social issues has informed migration control approaches, while for single member states, these policies have always primarily been an issue of control. Through the years, member states developed and implemented an extraterritorial system of immigration control that has centrifugally expanded out from the newly unifying European Union: coordinated Visa policies, national liaison officers at airports in countries of origin, and readmission agreements, officially celebrated by Art.3(3) of the Council regulation no.343/2003 of 18 February 2003 that replaced the 1990 Dublin Convention. The list continues.

It is even true that European member states sometimes enthusiastically exceed the letter of the above regulation, which clearly requires the State of destination to be “in compliance” with basic international refugee treaties. Instead, member states routinely organize group deportations to third, often non-safe countries. Since unification, governments of Europe increasingly find it advantageous to delegate the management of undocumented migrants and asylum seekers to third countries. As several authors (Castels 2004, Guirandou and Lahav 2000) demonstrate, different and multiple interests and loci of domestic dissent can clearly constrain government’s attempts to reject unwanted migrants.

43 The first one being concluded in 1991 between Schengen states and Poland
44 3. “Any Member State shall retain the right, pursuant to its national laws, to send an asylum seeker to a third country, in compliance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention.”
It is worth recalling [as I will in chapter 3] a well publicized mass deportation that the Italian state organized first in fall 2004\(^{45}\) and later in spring of the following year. Both expulsion operations deported hundreds of migrants by plane to Libya, which is not a signatory to the Geneva Convention on the protection of refugees. After detention in miserable conditions, these African migrants were deported to different countries of origin in clear breach of the basic principle of non-refoulment. Deportation flights still continue almost on a weekly basis and are perceived by state representatives as a viable “solution” for the management of an influx of people. From the Guardian last March 2008 about the Anglo-French effort to tackle illegal immigration:

The joint action plan to tackle the migrant pressure at Calais will include exchange of data to enhance identification, cooperation on redocumentation and joint flights where necessary to deport illegal migrants. The French believe Britain has a better policy and developed expertise on deportations. In practice, most joint flights would be to Africa or the Indian subcontinent.\(^{46}\)

From the Cimade’s press communication of November 5, 2008:

The French government, in cooperation with the British authorities is preparing to send back collectively and by charter Afghan exiles placed in the detention centre at Coquelles. A flight London-Paris-Bakou-Kabul is planned for the coming days. Until today 57 Afghans arrested in the Calis and Dunkirk region have been placed in the Coquelles detention centre. While the humanitarian condition and safety continue to worsen in Afghanistan, NGOs and the Secretary General of the United Nations declare themselves to be particularly worried about the situation Britain and France organize together charters destined for Kabul.\(^{47}\)

\(^{45}\) Johnston and Johnston, “UN Accuses Italy over ‘Mass Deportations’.”
\(^{46}\) “More Anglo-French Teamwork Makes Entente Formidable.”
\(^{47}\) http://www.cimade.org/communiques
It is clear enough that, even if Amsterdam readmission agreements fall within the communitarian domain, member states actively work to secure bilateral cooperation across the Mediterranean. As a matter of fact, already in May 2002, a Secretaries of Foreign Affairs conference held in Tripoli discussed the possibility of integrated regional cooperation on immigration practices. The next year, Libya officially moved forward at Alessandria [Egypt]. Of particular relevance to my research, in 2004 Italy and Libya concluded an agreement that includes, apart from hi-tech border control equipment, the establishment of reception centers to prevent asylum seekers and migrants from attempting dangerous journeys across the Sahara and Mediterranean to cities such as Rome in southern Europe. At the time, Ferruccio Pastore\textsuperscript{48} noted that

> It is hard to consider it fortuitous that the EU Council agreed to lift all economic sanctions against Libya, including the arms embargo (thereby allowing Italy to supply Libya with the surveillance equipment needed to control migration), on 7 October 2004, only a few days after Silvio Berlusconi, then Head of government, had gone to Libya to inaugurate with Muammar Qadhafi, “Greenstream”, a gas pipeline linking Libya (Mellitah) and Italy (Gela).

Italy has been a forerunner when it comes to establishing centers for managing asylum seekers’ requests outside of the states, but the method had already been utilized with Guantanamo for Haitian asylum seekers and, in the case of Australia’s Pacific Solution, with off-shore processing centers in Nauru or PNG. This approach clearly contrasts not only with the tradition of safety havens for people displaced by war and conflicts, but also with the tradition of states processing asylum requests on their own territory (from which the principle of non refoulment is derived). Most importantly for my purposes, it indicates a recent modification of the concept of the territory of a state and, consequently, of the border. Today’s borders accord with the exigencies of the dispositif of externalization.

\textsuperscript{48} Ferruccio Pastore, Libya’s entry into the migration great game. Recent Developments and Critical Issues. Cespi, 2007
Bredeloup and Pliez (2011) believe that intergovernmental initiatives such as those between Italy and Libya make sense only in relation to certain tragic events that occurred in 2002. In June, 45 Sudanese died in the Sahara Desert. In September, 14 Liberians died on their way to Sicily. Then in December a hundred died in a shipwreck. According to Fortress Europe,49 since 1988, 13,351 people have died attempting to cross the frontier, because of the heat of the desert or the waves of the sea, but also more recently because of the bullets of Libyan police or the harsh conditions of the “identification-expulsion” centers.

European countries voiced their indignation at the drowning of Africans; then Libya was invested in the role of gendarme to prevent such disasters caused by ‘illegal’ immigration. In chapter 3, I provide an exhaustive analysis of how Libya’s cooperation began when the arms embargo was removed and, at the same time, a well-orchestrated media campaign transformed more than 1,000,000 Africans working in Libya into a horde of illegals ready to invade Europe. As I will point out in that chapter, the realities of the Maghreb, and of Libya in particular, is quite different; Maghreb is a place of immigration for Sub-Saharan Africa, and migration there helps to develop and create opportunity in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in marginal areas of the Sahara.

Moreover, according to Libyan sources, the Libyan regime it is not currently able to operate as gendarme of undocumented migrations because of the NATO bombings that destroyed army facilities along the coast. Consequently, migrants keep dying while crossing the Mediterranean Sea.50 On May 8, 2011, the Guardian reported the tragic story of a boat carrying 72 passengers. They were mostly Eritreans, and were therefore most likely eligible to obtain the status of refugees. All but nine of the passengers died. According to the Guardian, they had run out of fuel and been adrift since March 27 – that is, for more than a month. Although the boat encountered a number of military units, no effort was made to save the passengers. Eventually, they died of thirst and hunger. The president of the Council of Europe, Mr. Çavusoglu,

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50 “Libyan regime accused of exploiting boat people | World news | The Guardian.”
called for an inquiry and seemed to voice the general indignation of Europe's elderly when he declared that:

If this grave accusation is true – that, despite the alarm being raised, and despite the fact that this boat, fleeing Libya, had been located by armed forces operating in the Mediterranean, no attempt was made to rescue the 72 passengers aboard, then it is a dark day for Europe as a whole," Çavusoglu declared. "I call for an immediate and comprehensive inquiry into the circumstances of the deaths of the 61 people who perished, including babies, children and women who – one by one – died of starvation and thirst while Europe looked on.\(^{51}\)

This is not the first time African migrant and asylum seekers were simply and actively ignored by the advanced technologies of European migration control. An almost identical story opens up chapter 4. There, I explain how the desire of the dispositif of European migration control is to render migrants’ bodies literally invisible instead of martyrs. Thus, I define externalization as a multifaceted dispositif that aims to problematize but also to ignore the movements of people inside, outside, as well as across the Schengen space. That is, externalization conceptualizes certain human bodies in motion as detrimental trajectories that must be managed by a fluid framework of practices that cannot help but continuously reproduces individualities in excess, such as the lives of those 72 migrants. The process of migration control mirrors those trajectories of people that pierce, perforate, drill the most contested walls and cut across what maps attempt to colonize and make abstract.\(^{52}\) Thus, today’s borders have changed. They are more flexible and fluid, and are characterized by an “erratic geometry”\(^{53}\) which, more than distinguishing the inside from the outside, operates a sort of “differential inclusion.”\(^{54}\) In fact, to understand the dispositif of externalization

\(^{51}\) "Libyan migrants’ boat deaths to be investigated by Council of Europe | World news | The Guardian."
\(^{52}\) Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, 129.
\(^{53}\) Mezzadra, *Derecho De Fuga*.
\(^{54}\) Palidda, *Mobilità Umane. Introduzione Alla Sociologia Delle Migrazioni.*
will require a re-thinking of the idea of the border. Today’s borders operate as a new control regime. They create states of permanent insecurity, or better, a sort of “camp effect”. As a complex mechanism, they function as a transnational and transversal regime practice that, like a strainer, makes up “the part of those who have no part”\textsuperscript{55} and, simultaneously, merely sketches the silhouette of a hazy European identity.

\textsuperscript{55} Ranciere, \textit{The Politics of Aesthetics}. 
CHAPTER 2. FRONTIERS AND LIFES
'And yet I would invite you to pause and consider what Frontiers mean, and what part they play in the life of nations.'

2.1 An invitation

Perhaps nobody more than Lord Curzon would want to pause and consider the consequences of the act of drawing a line. During his second mandate as Viceroy of India, he presided over the partition of Bengal (October 16, 1905) into two provinces: the Eastern, which was more rural and had a majority Muslim population, and the Western, which was more industrialized and had a Hindu majority. The colonial administration considered the Eastern part underdeveloped and naturally isolated. In reality, the two provinces, although differently developed, were richly interconnected. In fact, the British colonial government’s decision to divide Eastern and Western Bengal for administrative reasons fueled one of the first anti-British nationalist movements, including violent opposition mostly from the Hindu population, to the point that the partition had to be revoked after only six years. However, and this is what matters here, the British policy of divide et impera was grounded on an idea that certain geographical features such as mountains and rivers were inherently divisive and therefore tended to generate categorically distinct types of people. This colonial emphasis on identity difference arguably left an indelible mark on the population living in this geographical area, which later set the stage for two further partitions: in 1947, when Bengal turned into East Pakistan, and in 1971, when East Pakistan became the independent state of Bangladesh.

Ever since Lord Curzon extended his invitation to the audience gathered in the Sheldonian Theater, Oxford, for his 1907 Romanes Lecture and presented his thoughts about frontiers, studies of frontiers and borders have proliferated. Certainly especially within the discipline of International Relations after WWII the border surged to the role of “mediator” between egoistic state-units, each one the “final judge

56 Lord Curzon, "Frontiers."
of its own cause” 57 within an anarchic world system. Then again, after the collapse of the Soviet system, the study of borders and frontiers surged beyond the contours of geopolitics and international law to the realms of sociology, anthropology, literature, and cultural studies 58. Borders and frontiers had once been mere accessories of nation-states. Today, border studies have upgraded them to the level of signifiers for increasingly shifty globalized identities. This chapter deals with the nature of borders and frontiers.

Notwithstanding the increase of interest on this subject, or perhaps because of it, a clear and distinct definition of border and frontier has yet to be found. One might hope that different disciplines simply have different definitions. But it could be that the very search for positive understandings of “border” and “frontier” is misguided. As Étienne Balibar has noted, how can one possibly define the concept of a border if “to define or identify in general is nothing other than to trace a border?” 59 Thus, at best, different theoretical approaches can underline different aspects of borders and frontiers: their spatiality more than their symbolic significance, their significance with respect to the labor market instead of their utility as military outposts, etc. In any case, any analysis that considers citizenship and migration its central theme must reflect on borders and frontiers in some particular, non-universal way.

The field of migration studies still tends to consider movements of population flows to be ‘the’ variable within the larger field of International Relations, and to consider nation-states’ policies of migration control to be its predominant object of analysis, yet it pays scant attention to the spatial dimension that necessitates any appearance of a migration. Nonetheless, as Shapiro writes “of all the forms of collective affiliation, modernity citizenship would appear to be the one whose constitution is almost exhausted by a model of space; the territorial boundaries of the nation-state system 60.” Following Shapiro, I propose that we take seriously Lord Curzon’s invitation and pause to reflect on the importance of borders and frontiers in the lives of peoples,

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57 Waltz, Man, the State, and War, 160.
58 Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera.
59 Balibar and Hahn, Politics and the Other Scene, 76.
60 Shapiro, “National Time and Other Times,” 80.
in living spaces, and not necessarily within the unquestioned static space that structures nations.

If a century ago Lord Curzon would state that ‘frontiers are indeed the razor's edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war or peace, of life or death to nations,’ today frontiers and borders are the dominant structures of intelligibility in terms of modern political identity. To open up alternative possibilities of belonging, we must intervene against this particular style of conceptualizing. My research therefore commences with the idea that, within the performance of these ways of thinking borders dwells a violence that is needed to exclude and delegitimate alternative narratives. To develop this idea, I therefore focus more on what is excluded and silenced, instead of what is rendered visible within the nation-state's prevailing frame. The scope of this chapter then, is to liberate the study of international migrations from the perimeter of nation-states’ dominant narratives, and to focus instead on the specific intersections between migrants' trajectories, border and frontier transformations, and shifting imaginings of citizenship. Only by revealing what is continually excised, is it possible to mediate contests over identity and belonging, rather than merely moralizing, as Lord Curzon does, about borders and frontiers.

In the dominant vision, borders or frontiers are synonymous with questions of defense, war, citizenship and the right to punish criminals through interstate collaboration with other states. The spatiality this vision yield is essentially an interstate map wherein ‘frontiers delineate natural cultural containers and clear security barriers.’ To revise the spatial imaginary of these concepts would involve relating contemporary world politics to the limits of past methodologies, or styles of conceiving of borders and frontiers, in primis the juridical one that considers the State the territorial paradigm of modernity. Jurists define territory as ‘that section of the earth over which the State can legitimately exercise authority’ [My translation]. Understood in this way, territory is not only categorical, but also becomes a source of different juridical-political concepts. From this loaded notion of “territory”, emerge

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61 Bigo and Guild, Controlling Frontiers, 54.
62 Martines, Diritto Costituzionale, 168.
both the idea that some borders are “natural”, and the juridical abstraction of extraterritoriality. “Natural borders,” “territoriality,” and “extraterritoriality” are all clearly artificial, theoretical concepts, and can seem otherwise only when geological features, such as seas, rivers, or great barren deserts, are incorporated within juridical constructions.

2.2 Natural confines

Of all Natural Frontiers, the sea is the most uncompromising, the least alterable, and the most effective. 

For a long time, and still somewhat today, a specific story dominated the Mediterranean space of life, and imagination between Africa and Europe. As the story went, proto-Europeans had been continuously threatened by hordes of enemies on the other side of Mediterranean Sea. *Hic sunt leones* (Over there, there are [only] lions) is inscribed on Roman maps of Africa. The Mediterranean Sea came to be seen as the most effective protection that those on the Northern shores of the basin had available. Countless were the battles to incorporate this space under different empires’ spheres of influence. Nevertheless, as Lord Curzon imagined it, “second in the list of Natural Frontiers may be placed deserts, until modern times a barrier even more impassable than the sea”. The great Sahara, that immense sprawl of sand, dominates the geography of the northern side of Africa. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that, along with the Mediterranean Sea, the Sahara represents the stage on which, in the last 10 years, European states have enacted much of their migration control politics.

This spatial imaginary, which exploits the “natural” attributes of the earth, continues to dominate the establishment discourse of migrations. It should be no surprise then that the natural defensive characteristics of geographical features, such as

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63 Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond,” 165.
64 Lord Curzon, “Frontiers.”
65 Ibid.
rivers and oceans, are still thought to be valid today and are considered indispensable conditions of migration control and political identity formation. We should not be shocked, therefore, to look at states’ contemporary migration control policies in the southern frontier and see Lord Curzon’s reflections on the natural character of frontiers. Despite widespread dissatisfaction with nation-state narratives, contemporary international migrations discourse still seems to be dominated by persistent thoughts of pushing and surrounding population flows against and within naturalized geopolitical narratives.

These narratives are very powerful one. In fact, so powerful, that they are often taken for granted. In such a view, which mistakes a non-universal style of imagining for a universal one, territorial borders are assumed to have to be about delimiting ownership and authority, establishing defensive lines, and marking differences between “us” and “them.” Such functions may even be assumed to be natural, and linked to the physical geographical features of rivers, deserts, seas, and mountain ridges that are often rendered as the topographical sites of territorial borders. Territorial borders, then, along with their inherent geographical attributes are never questioned, but are instead reinforced and exploited through acts of naming border sites and drawing border lines. The violence these acts of drawing inflict is never emphasized, and what these geopolitical narratives erase is hardly ever recovered. Those who are left behind on the boiling sand or at the bottom of the sea are rendered bodies in excess: in the vision of the dominant narrative, they are mere bumps on the road in “our” universal, inevitable, irresistible drive to modernity.

The border-as-defense imaginary silences many stories of encounter across opposite shores and provide fertile ground for contemporary forms of antagonisms, such as racism and anti-immigrants violence, that are characteristic of modernity. The imaginary offers a perspective that inevitably denies all other perspectives. Alternatively, because the very concept of the border “implies the existence of people languages, religions and knowledge on both sides” one might imagine that the sea, much like

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67 Mignolo and Tlostanova, “Theorizing from the Borders,” 208.
rivers, provides waterways that connect different communities and therefore allows for the diffusion of cultural traits and knowledge through most of the Mediterranean Basin. Unfortunately, however, borders tend to be studied in IR primarily within two analytical fields: state-territory and state-to-state relations. It is worth noting, however, that even if physical barriers have disappeared (I mostly refer here to Europe), the connection between nation-state and territory in these analytical frames has not. On the contrary, with the advent of the “global”, along with such notions as “civil global society,” “transnational social movements,” or “transnational corporations,” borders have acquired new life. Now standing out against the peril of a “borderless world” 68, borders have begun to assume increasing ethical importance.

### 2.3 Ethics of confines

‘The country was really young
Chivalry its only protection
The stunning green of the prairie
Clearly proved the existence of God,
Of that God who draws the frontier
And assembles the railway.’69

As I have mentioned above, at the dawn of the new millennium, the study of borders and frontiers has attempted to move beyond mere geographical and legal discourses. Recent studies have emphasized their mobility 70 and their social origins. 71 Yet still, quasi saintly status of borders in definitions of identities and a community has not been shaken. If we could summarize in a sentence how the contemporary field of IR

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68 Pecoud, Migration Without Borders.
69 Francesco De Gregori, Buffalo Bill.
70 Balibar and Hahn, Politics and the Other Scene.
71 Wilson and Donnan, Border Identities.
approaches the study of borders and frontiers, we would certainly underline their progressive de-naturalization. Borders, even if often not clearly distinguished from frontiers, have been liberated from a territorial fixity and returned to the social world, to the world of humanity where they find their origins.

According to the constructivist approach for instance, borders are not merely physical spaces but are also the fundamental elements for the organization of the State as a territorial entity. In other words, in spite of the constructivist attention to the social process that creates borders and frontiers, these remain within the State framework. In this paradigm, migrant flows are considered a unitary mass that confronts the territorial subject par excellence: the sovereign state. Thus, a self-proclaimed classical constructivist such as John William can proclaim that “returning borders to the social world, though, opens a host of possibilities for renewed investigation.”72 This shift will liberate the analysis of international migration from the cage of economic forces (push and pull factors) and social constraints and will, at the same time, reconcile politics and ethics via borders. The series of possibilities that this turn in IR will present are as unlimited as the choices of human beings. If borders are products of human choices and have not always existed in nature, and therefore do not have to be taken for granted in mainstream IR theory, then it becomes possible for international relations theorists to reflect upon the ethical consequences of these socio-political artifacts.

If the nature, meaning and role of, for example, territorial borders are not determined by some material structure, but are instead the result of a long series of human choices and decisions, then it is both reasonable and necessary to examine the thinking that saw some choices taken over others and to insist on the possibility of changing the way of thinking in the present and future with a view to addressing injustices, inequities and other ethical problems with currently dominant ideas. 73

72 The Ethics of Territorial Borders, 7.
73 Ibid., 8.
Williams mentions generic injustices, to the point that I wonder whether he considers undefined famines and natural calamities at the same level with wars and armed conflicts. He leaves unresolved whether the injustices that need to be solved are Rwanda’s genocide or the precarious statelessness of those who dwell in the land between Pakistan and India. However, leaving this critique aside for a moment, the author does not believe that borders have an inherent ethical value, but instead holds that borders can be used to obtain an ethical outcome: namely (and loosely) to tackle global injustices and inequities. In this sense, borders are ethical tools. Without borders then, ‘war and violence would become ubiquitous.’ How then is one to make sense of a world where borders are multiplied and conflicts became ubiquitous? Williams in this regards has no doubts:

The idea of territorial borders as the boundaries between sovereign states has enabled a rich skein of rules, to develop about the ownership of property and the ways in which it can be transferred, about when it is permissible to resort to force and about who the actors are that are permitted to enter into international agreements and the kinds of subjects those agreements can cover. We tamper with this at our peril.Borders then are synonymous with order, and in particular with the Westphalian order of self-reliant state-like units, of the sort that the realist approach to International Relations has outlined. However, apparently his approach does not lead to any fixed territorial demarcation between communities, races or classes. Borders are, and have to be mobile as the title of his book The Ethics of territorial borders: drawing lines in the shifting sand suggests. Hence, despite constructivist attention to the social processes that create borders and frontiers, this approach remains within the State framework. In this

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24 Ibid., n.
25 Ibid.
constructivist paradigm, migrant flows are pictured as a unitary mass that confronts the territorial subject par excellence: the sovereign state.

The author contends that borders, intended as social practices, divide communities while being performed by communities. In other words, borders are inherent to the very human condition. They are “natural” for the reason that they are vital to maintain an indispensable diversity and freedom between individuals, and this separation has to take a territorial form. Therefore, borders are, for Williams, still rooted in the territory even though the ethical role they play is potentially detachable from their physical location. Otherwise, if borders were firmly, deeply drawn into the ground, many problems would arise, such as nationalist ideologies that tie certain communities to specific territories and generate perpetual homelands. Williams finds cautionary examples, for example, in conflicts “‘over the location of territorial borders in places such as Palestine and Kosovo where the idea of ‘holy land’ comes into play.’”

Williams’ argument for the ethical value of borders as instruments for preserving communal life is grounded on Hannah Arendt’s political philosophy. As she sees it, the freedom of the individual is guaranteed through political community, and totalitarianism is a political machine that annihilates individuals by isolating them from their communities. Her theory of the political community is, then, similar to the Athenian agora: it is the public space where the individual is a rights holder and where plurality, the diversity of individuals, is maintained. Policymakers must erect walls around the agora to defend the community against what she, referring to the genocide against the Jews, describes as “an attack upon human diversity as such, that is upon a characteristic of the ‘human status’ without which the very words ‘mankind’ or humanity’ would be devoid of meaning.” How to effectively fight then, she asks, against a bureaucratic apparatus, its “banality of evil,” that aims to flatten pluralism (the diversity of communities), and plurality (the diversity of individuals)?

Certainly not by claiming respect through abstract legal principles such as human rights, she proclaims. Appeals to abstract ethical categories such as humanity
offer little hope to those who seek to create philosophical foundations for tolerance. In support of her point, it is revealing to recall what happened on the southern frontier of Europe after human rights activists put enough pressure on the Italian government to prevent it from imprisoning undocumented African immigrants for indeterminate periods within the detention facility of the Island of Lampedusa. In chapter 3 I will highlight how on May 6th 2009, Italy unilaterally inaugurated a new policy for stemming the flow of immigrants from the Africa, which amounted to intercepting migrants on the high seas and sending them back to Libya. This was the first time since the Second World War that a European state has openly violated the principle of non-refoulment, as indicated in the 1951 Refugee Convention. What is left of legal principles such as that of non-refoulment when more than 1000 have been intercepted and sent back to non-secure (that is only a euphemism) places such as Libya? Does the right to have rights belong only to members of recognized communities? “The world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human”78 Arendt cries.

State-centered analyses of borders face a simple but devastating paradox: while the system of human rights is designed to protect those human beings who have nothing left but their naked body, it is also a result of a nation-state logic that is constructed around a concept of homogeneous and stable populations. Arendt traces the origin of the paradox within the text of the Declaration of the Rights of the Man and Citizen that was adopted between August 20 and 26, 1789. She notes the ideas of the French Revolution aimed to supplant an old system, one of aristocratic power, with a new one. Men are born equal and free because they are members of the nation as clearly stated in art. 3 of the Declaration. Once incorporated into the nation, once within the protective wall and sitting on the steps of the agora, men (not women or slaves) would be considered active members of the polity regardless of their origins or diversities. In that instant, community and territory become consecrated together as protectorates of a newly democratic state. Its institutions would continuously shape an otherwise merely nominal national identity. But to mould is to draw a line; it is to identify who belongs and to expel others beyond freshly inked margins. Therefore,

78 Ibid., 299.
theories that maintain the fiction of the rigidity and permanence of the border while failing to take into consideration those who live “smack in the fissure”79 keep this system, and in paradoxes, intact.

2.4 New Ethics

Although Williams’ study helps to recognize the multiple roles and functions that borders and frontiers play in the realm of contemporary IR as well as their centrality in the study of international migrations, I would like to expose how contradictions that are inherent to state-level analyses persist within Williams’ ethical exploration of territorial borders. In fact, even if we welcome the theoretical turn toward abandoning the obsolete ‘border-as-fence’ analogy, it remains the case that the power to question the legitimacy of borders continues to be monopolized within the community in a blatant reification of a coordination of isolations. The author even observes that:

There is a need for division and distinction between communities and this can take, and frequently has taken, a territorial form. This territorial form does not to have to be via exclusively sovereignty but this has proven to be a durable and attractive mechanism, and, despite the undoubted costs that cosmopolitan critics are quick to highlight, such durability and attractiveness ought not to be dismissed out of hand.80

In other words, the international order is based upon the concept of borders because borders, and a need for division and distinction between communities, are part of human nature. However, is it possible to reconcile a constructivist position with this contention that borders are natural? The first incongruence leads to a second: if borders are inherent to human nature, they and their problems are timeless. This position clashes against the author’s post-positivist pronouncement that it is necessary to pay attention to history and to the fact that criteria of legitimacy are always historical located, and therefore relative. Borders, as practically normative concepts, have

79 Gomez-Pena, Warrior for Gringostroika, 37.
80 Williams, The Ethics of Territorial Borders, 105.
histories, but Williams appears to efface the historical differences of borders in favor of a homogeneous, ahistorical concept, which he locates in a universal human need to divide and distinguish between communities. This represents the danger and contradiction of a foundational approach, which reproduces a series of practices of exclusion to reaffirm the political right to exclude alternative approaches.

It is certainly urgent to dig out the bricks of the wall, “because borders have history; the very notion of border has a history. And it is not the same everywhere at every level”\(^8^1\). And what is more, it is important to note that the history of borders cannot be limited to territory but also to knowledge. In this direction Walter D. Mignolo reminds us how the world map drawn by Gerardus Mercator and Johannes Ortelius “worked together with theology to create a zero point of observation and of knowledge: a perspective that denied all other perspectives”\(^8^2\). In this sense, the border (with the colonial camp as its corollary) is always imperial.

Re-thinking borders then is indeed an ethical endeavor — it emerges in response to the violence of imperial epistemology. As I have noted before, however, this is not the violence that interests Williams, because maintaining a generic allusion to indefinite injustices without digging in depth into genealogies of violence allows a reification of the concept, and the sanctity, of borders. See, for instance, the role of Belgium’s strategy of colonial difference in Rwanda in the violence that erupted between Hutu and Tutsi. Borders signify the violence of the “space in-between,” which we define as the frontier, the spaces between imagined communities. This is the place, according to the author:

Where political action can occur and real politics takes place. We can get away from the ‘border-as-fence’ analogy and view them as devices for creating space in-between rather than a perimeter maintained and policed by a small diplomatic, political and military elite. \(^8^3\).

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81 Balibar and Hahn, *Politics and the Other Scene*, 77.
82 Mignolo and Tlostanova, “Theorizing from the Borders,” 206.
83 Williams, *The Ethics of Territorial Borders*, 104.
Critiquing Williams’ remarks and advancing contemporary understandings of borders and frontiers will require new concepts. These will be concepts that pay attention to the violence inherent in the fracturing of, the spaces in between, legitimate members of communities and excluded bodies. Ironically, Williams emphasizes Arendt’s recognition that “the world lies between people, and this in-between ...is today the object of the greatest concern and the most obvious upheaval in all the countries of the globe” (2006b, 103). Only being open to the world and recognizing the familiar as well the unfamiliar allows one to re-conceptualize the space that a constructivist approach opens, and to move ideas of borders beyond the realist approach of order within anarchy as well as nationalistic imaginings of them as geographical bastions of glorious pasts. The stories that follow in Chapter 3 and 4 highlight specific violent implication of spatio-temporal orders that cleave the performativity of borders into two evenly cut sides and therefore implicitly yet actively seek to refuse those in frontiers either visibility or agency. The stories take place in the space in between Europe and Africa, and can help us to re-conceptualize borders in ways that attend to the roles of practice, rather than to mere geographical tropes. Nowadays the Sahara desert as well as the deep blue Mediterranean Sea constitutes the two most evident feature of the last frontier of Europe. Its borders, in a similar vain to the Roman limes, operates beyond the geopolitical limits of the state with perpendicular incursions, revealing the essential violence on which ultimately it relies to secure state’s legitimacy. As I attempt to show, we should not conceive these geopolitical confines as a definite line that coincides with the sovereignty influence of states’ territories ‘for the border is not a thing but a materialization of authority.”

2.5 For a re-conceptualization

As I mentioned before, borders have histories that are not the same everywhere. In the ancient Western world, for instance, the border was the line marked by the plow. Because marking land by a plow was indistinguishable from taking control of a

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84 ibid., 103.
territory, the border originally indicated sovereignty over a territory. In Chapter 3, I reflect on how Agamben’s reminder that, in the Roman system, borders and sovereignty were, since the foundation of the Eternal City (753 BC), inextricably linked. A life that is sacer, which Agamben calls bare life, and a life that is sovereign, are two poles of one system, two elements of one space of exception that find in the Western world’s prevalent concept of borders the perfect meeting point. In Chapter 3, I am going to recall the myth of the foundation of Rome to illustrate how the cancellation of borders was one cause of sacratio, which is the violation of a specific prohibition and one’s consequent ban from the community. At first sight, the border can be seen as a sort of camp where doomed migrants exist as bare life. Nonetheless, if we follow Agamben we risk universalizing a concept of borders as fences, in which only sovereignty is permitted agency; consequently, we overlook the dialectical feature of borders and frontiers. As I show in Chapter 3, one way to transform this approach will be to dislodge identity from rigid territorial inscriptions.

Territory is never only spatial. Instead, it is a contingent, shifting, and continually emerging result of institutions’ and individuals’ political actions. Dialectical political performances precede a juridical notion of territory, that of the State, and often, as I demonstrate in the following chapters, the actions of migrants are what incite a response by the institutions and/or the community. Within State / territorial models of borders, the memory and significance of these actions is immediately removed, incarcerated, and made to appear doomed and bare. In Chapter 4, I draw mostly on field notes from my research on the island of Lampedusa to recover stories of encounter between fishermen and migrants, who, like centuries of predecessors, actively navigate and negotiate the space in between the Mediterranean sea. I hope that these stories will help to locate an ethics of encounter that is less abstract and static than the ethics that Williams presents.

For instance, in Chapter 5, I tell a story related to the Cap-Anamur, a German Ngo’s ship that has actively helped refugees since the 1970s. It could be read as another story of “First World” compassion toward otherwise inactive members of the “Third World.” But the story of Mr. Mariano Ruggiero, a fisherman who was arrested on
homicide charges after throwing a migrant out of his boat, even if discouraging, should help to maintain salutary distance from this narrative. Both stories impeccably explain the multiple dimensions of borders and frontiers; each highlights their mobility and the role of single members of the community in shaping them, for or against state directives. The first reveals an attempt to appropriate the space of the other, who, seeking an unadulterated ethics of encounter within the space in between, in the moment of border practice, must remain infinitely other.

As I have stated before, Williams’ analysis reifies borders as essential justifications for certain kinds of communities, and is fated to be merely partial, because non-citizens / “illegals” are not considered adequate subjects of social due processes. Starting with essentialist premises, his constructivist approach fails to clarify how and why borders move and multiply at political interconnections. In Chapter 6, my analysis instead turns towards a discussion of virtual borders. My attempt in that chapter is to clarify the complex interconnections between technological innovations and human migrations, and to show how, in a dialectical process of territorialization and deterritorialization, they generate a system of relations and spatial organizations. I call this process technécology. Other scholars have tended to either focus on technologies of surveillance and control, or, from an anthropological point of view, to try to explain how human beings use technologies and technological know-how to migrate. Nobody seems to have considered the impact of technologies on migrants and border controls as mutually constitutive elements of dynamic power relations.

Technologies of migration control(e.g., satellites, biometrics, radar) are simultaneously causes and ends of state migrant and labor processes. Because of these technologies, migrants are detected and differently included within the host society in positions of vulnerability. Technologies of visibility are essential tools for determining and structuring the working class, largely through exclusion. However, through inclusions they simultaneously effect, they are crucial instruments of economic research and industrial development for receiving countries. Technologies of migration control therefore operate within a comprehensive technécology of migration control.
I call this approach technécology to stress the interconnectivity between technological practices of border control and migratory movement. More and more, the West is developing and implementing technologies of detection as much as lifestyle or war technologies. As in the case of gaming consoles, these often blend together. In one way or another, these technologies overflow from the West to the Rest, and, in one case, from Western Europe into North Africa. Once deployed, they are re-elaborated in their scope and reason d’être, therefore prompting new technological practices of border control. Border controls and migratory movements therefore form an organic system of relation.

To acknowledge the dialectical character of borders means to fundamentally question the myth of the social contract from Hobbes to Rawls, which is secured within the shell of the classic, yet hardly ever stable, Westphalian sovereign state. Such a rigid conception of the state cannot withstand the changes caused by the emergence of a global financial economy or the vacuity of legal human rights proclamations, both of which the figure of unbearably naked human life traversing allegedly sovereign countries undeniably haunts.

But how then to make sense of the mass of nakedly human beings traversing the distinct borders of the sovereign state if not only by problematizing the dichotomies of inclusion / exclusion and citizen / alien? Isn’t the effort to make sense of them what produces the dichotomy in the first place? Currently, camps in multiple forms are scattered everywhere within the frontiers of the first world. Since these spaces of containment are already leaking, what is contaminating the artificial essence of the nation-state? Today, millions of people ‘in-excess’ cross the territories of nation-states, their number multiplying since WWII along with the numbers of borders and conflicts. As Soguk writes, ‘Once they are in circulation in larger contexts, movements of individual bodies have significant implications; they play an important part in the historically contingent practices and processes by which peculiar identities (of citizen
and domestic community) are constructed, assigned, negotiated, resisted, and most importantly, fixed in the image of the modern state.\textsuperscript{86}

It is important therefore to highlight the excluded subject’s role in the unstable dialectic of inclusion and exclusion, the spatio-temporal dimension of borders and frontiers. “It is precisely when one enacts the rights that one does not have,” Isin and Rygiel write, “that one becomes a political subject”\textsuperscript{87}. Therefore, I suggest that the border emerges whenever practices of statecraft enter in relation, or rather collide with migrants’ obstinate trajectories. Thus, the new frontier of Europe is to be located around points of interaction between the implementation of policies of migration control and acts of flows, that is, at the juncture of multiple discourses of migration.

When borders materialize, they localize in time and space the acts of power and resistance, which conversely mold new emerging and shifting frontiers. In this sense, the last frontier of southern Europe, the Mediterranean as well as across the Sahara desert, resembles Foucault’s heterotopias; that is, spaces “still nurtured by the hidden presence of the sacred.”\textsuperscript{88} (\textit{Toutes sont animées encore par une sourde sacralisation}). A sacred space, like the overcrowded trucks that run across the desert, reserved for those who are in a state of crisis in relation to the society in which they live, and for that reason always temporary, and fleeting, in their self-constitutive excess. Borders are spaces, in the Foucauldian language, where it is difficult to locate power and resistance at distinct points.

The concepts of frontier and border that emerge are therefore twofold: on the one hand, they amount to two key elements of a statecraft that aims to prevent people from acting politically — that is, from being heard — but paradoxically, on the other hand, they emerge from and are shaped by people’s abilities to reclaim their political subjectivity. In this sense, migrants seem to challenge the classical logic of International Relations, which portrays migrants’ physical mobility as an interference with unquestioned principles of territoriality. The intent of this remapping of the borders and frontiers of Europe is not to plot a sequence of points which, when unified, will

\textsuperscript{86} Soguk, \textit{States And Strangers}, 27.
\textsuperscript{87} Isin and Rygiel, “Abject Spaces: Frontiers, Zones, Camps,” 189.
\textsuperscript{88} Foucault, “Of Other Spaces.”
help states to draw lines more accurately split the outside from the inside. Rather, the
desire for such spatial representations, for such lines, obfuscates the attention we must
pay to the re-territorialization moment.

Alternatively, marking out points of action/non-action without yearning for
totality can help to show that “some borders are no longer situated at the border at
all”90 and that, instead, “they are dispersed a little everywhere, wherever the movement
of information, people, and things is happening and is controlled”90. Synchronic
(timeless) conceptualizations of borders do not apply to contemporary political
communities that nowadays have to answer to migrations that are increasingly mobile
and multidimensional. In fact, as Agnew writes, “fixed boundaries are displaced by
flows and diversions that undermine as well as reinforce existing spatial divides”91. Still,
the border remains contingent on power practices whose perennial fluctuations,
as Williams recognizes, make the border appear natural and inevitable. Therefore, to
shake such tendencies to totalize, demonstrating the border’s reliance on complexly
interconnected historical contingencies, and thus revealing its precariousness and
simultaneous violence, are especially important. Tendencies to imagine fixed, stable
borders reinforce the discourse of Fortress Europe (Gebrewold-Tochalo 2007) — the
vision of Europe as a socio-political body that is under permanent siege — and therefore
reinforce an imaginary that instigates violent panic reactions. Because they privilege
ahistorical perspectives, as I mentioned before, synchronic approaches interpret
conflicts, for instance in Africa, as discontinuous with politics and colonial histories,
and instead interpret them as security issues that threaten an imagined stable political
space. A discourse of securitization and risk analysis conceals the real functions of
European frontiers and borders, which are to filter out certain individuals while
crystallizing the imagery of the Nation-State as the only place in which “authentic
politics”92 is possible. This is the logic behind the state’s strategy of leveling human
trafficking charges against fishermen who help nakedly human castaway refugees, or the

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90 Balibar and Hahn, Politics and the Other Scene, 84.
91 Balibar, We, the People of Europe?, 1.
92 Mastering Space, 214.
93 Walker, Inside/Outside.
Italian government’s latest practice of disrupting resistant trajectories by intercepting migrants/asylum seekers in international waters.

In the following chapter, we will move into Africa, and specifically across the Libyan Sahara desert where the effects of the externalization of European migration control practices extend at least to Sahel. I will highlight how the aggressive implementation of new European border control systems, which seek to create a clear and transparent borderscape and justify strict measures of migrant control, have obliterated intra-Saharan migrations. Notwithstanding the impressive and ubiquitous migration control apparatuses implemented by Libya on Europe’s behalf, migrants not only use the desert to avoid controls, but also live on it, which shows that the desert cannot be defined merely as a totalizing camp that annihilates human life. Only if we intend the frontier and the border as spaces of politics, as Primo Levi93 remarkably showed in his ‘Se questo e’ un uomo’ (Survival in Auschwitz), can we disrupt the imperturbability of the space of exclusion, the void of the space in-between.

Hence, my dissertation suggests, it is possible to overcome the bipolar impasse of Sovereign/bare life that Agamben’s concept of the state of exception94 imposes, along with his evident pessimism about any possibility of resistance. We must rediscover the substance of the borderscape at the edge of the dominant meaning of migration control, inside as well as outside the territorial features of the state. Here, I claim, we find a space of negotiation, confrontation, and still not homogenized diversity, without which there can be no polis and no politics, but only pencil-drawn silhouettes of the European citizen, cut off from state bureaucratic due processes.

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94 Agamben, *State of Exception*. 
CHAPTER 3. THE SAND DOOR
The sand, the stones, the sky, the sun, the silence, the suffering, not the metal and cement towns with the sounds of fountains and human voices. It was here – in the barren order of the desert – where everything was possible, where one walked shadowless on the edge of his own death.95

3.1 The Great Desert

As I have mentioned above, migration flows from the Sub-Saharan toward the European Union recently provoked a radical change in traditional forms of traditional security controls: the external border of the European area of free movement has increased in its strategic importance for the purpose of internal security. Consequently, the border has moved toward the outside, away from nominal European national borders, as the growing trend of outsourcing of migration controls from Europe to Africa and its consequences, which are today at the heart of the migration issue in both continents, clearly show. In pursuit of good relations with the EU, neighboring states may not only seek to comply with EU external policy initiatives on migration, but also to emulate if not reinforce the tightest of EU approaches to these issues, particularly with regard to detention and expulsion.

Given the complexity of the situation and the particularity of each country belonging to the area called Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya), I will focus this chapter on Libya and on the migrant route that connects the Horn of Africa to the coastline of Maghreb via Sudan. The route that goes from East and Central Africa towards Libya via the Sahara desert is today the most heavily trafficked and policed in North Africa, and certainly the most dangerous. The Great Sahara, and, within it, the Libya state, function as a limbo where the flux of migrants often find a precarious destination. At the same time, because of the impervious character of the geography, the Sahara provides a perilous but possible path to the Mediterranean coast.

95 Clezio and Dickson, Desert, 12.
of Maghreb. The desert is therefore opaque and shielding, and at the same time, longed for. For thousands, we must remember, it constitutes a tragic end. In this chapter, I attempt to clarify the ambiguous role that this desolate space has acquired as a crucial tool within the European management of migration control from Africa into Europe. My methodology includes the visual and oral memories that the documentary Like a Man on Earth gathers, along with attentive analysis of the policies and practices of migration control acted out by Libyan authorities.

What emerges at first sight is that with over 4,000km of desert borders, each of the six countries bordering Libya on its south, east and western frontiers acts as a point of entry for refugees and migrants. Where possible, refugees and migrants have adopted existing trans-Saharan caravans routes, which have operated for centuries in the transport of goods and slaves between Libya and neighboring African countries, notably Sudan and Chad. Even Libyan officials recognize the impracticality of sealing the borders (Herzog 2009). Depending on the political and security circumstances, routes regularly change. Like the desert facade, they shift. “Three main migration routes can be identified in the African continent, namely the western, northern and eastern routes.” (Sørensen and Dansk Institut for internationale studier. 2006, 48). The eastern route is the route chosen by those that from the Horn of Africa who intend to reach Libya and possibly, but not necessarily, Italy.

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96 Segre and Yimer, Like a Man on Earth.
97 Sørensen and Dansk institut for internationale studier., Mediterranean Transit Migration, 48.
3.2 Migrant = terrorist = cheap labor\(^{98}\)

It is worth noting that the majority of African residents in Europe originated from the North African countries,\(^{99}\) which conversely play a central role in the implementation of European policies to curb African Sub-Saharan migration. It is also worth noting

\(^{98}\)In Europe, media discourses from the left as well as from the right political spectrum related to ‘illegal’ immigration is still depicted as Fortress Europe to reinforce the idea of rigid borders/walls around the fortress of Western culture under threat. Not only is this vision superficial and passé because it ignores the dynamics of capitalist system of labor, but it is dangerous in creating instances of racism, which conversely serve the above mention mechanism of labor exploitation. Europe seems to be slow in adjusting to this paradox while in the USA the militarization of the southern border is a business that goes along with that of the black market within the frontier. (See Palidda 2008 for instance).

\(^{99}\) As for the countries of origin of African migrants in Europe, 65\% come from the three Maghreb states of Morocco (36\%), Algeria (20\%) and Tunisia (9\%). Relatively few migrants in Europe originate from Egypt (2.3\%) or Libya (0.5\%). The most prominent sub-Saharan countries of origin of migrants in Europe are Ghana (2.8\%), Somalia (2.8\%), Senegal (2.7\%), Nigeria (2.6\%), South Africa (2.0\%), Cape Verde (1.5\%) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (1.4\%).(Sørensen and Dansk institut for internationale studier 2006, 28)
that a perception still prevails in Europe that an army of millions of African ready to leave the coast of Libya to invade Europe. Even in summer 2011, the attack by the NATO forces on Gaddafi’s forces is justified, in part, by an urgency to reestablish a geopolitical order to prevent that invasion. On July 7th 2011, British Foreign Secretary William Hague, when pressured on the cost and time length of the military operation in Libya clearly linked it with the need to avoid the risk of a migration invasion in Europe. On that occasion, he stated that:

‘If we had just allowed Gaddafi to re-conquer the rest of the country by force, [...] causing thousands of casualties, creating a humanitarian crisis, with uncontrolled migration to Southern Europe as a result, the cost for UK and our European partners could be vastly greater than the cost of this military operation.”

Two points are worth noting here: first, as I will explain later, migration it is seen in term costs and economic efficiency. This idea of migration management continues the dispositif of European externalization of migration control in North Africa. Migration from Africa becomes exceptional and invasive as it was a virus that may infect the entire European continent. It is worth mentioning here than I am not arguing that the translation of migration as risk does not necessarily build a hypothetic European identity. This is not the aim of my research and I do not think it is responsibly argue in one direction or the other. What I am trying to assert is the transformation of European migration control management and the increasing sanitization of migrants that is a symptom of the widening gap between a Europe of Institution and a Europe of people.

Second the idea that there are 1.5/2 million sub-Saharan African migrants ready to migrate into Europe is based on a poor understanding of African migration and the

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100 The Arabic name of the Libyc leader will be here romanized as Muammar Gaddafi according to BBC and mayor British publications. However there are several spelling as many transliteration of regional Arabic as journalists noted already more than 20 years ago:

role of Libya in the economic and socioeconomic milieu of that continent in the last 20 years.

It is therefore indispensable for us to clarify the foundations of this image, these allegations, of masses of Africans ready to sail to Europe. Numbers in this case come from different sources, mostly think tanks and national authorities, and often are not mutually corroborating. Still, it is possible to draw some conclusions, or, better, to raise questions, from the data that inform current European policies of migration control. For instance, Libyan authorities currently estimate that the “foreign population residing legally in Libya is 600,000, and that a further 700,000 to 1.2 million are residing illegally - 2 million according to IOM. Moreover, the same authorities estimate that each year 75,000 to 100,000 foreigners enter Libya. Migrants, then, represent 25%-30% of the Libyan population, but only a small percentage of those who reside there, a few thousand, decide to cross the Mediterranean Sea. Even today, in the summer following the Arab Spring, only a few thousand Tunisian migrants crossed the Mediterranean.

These conclusions therefore clash with dominant European discourses on African migration, which instead perpetuate the myth that millions of Sub-Saharan Africans are waiting on the shores of Maghreb, driven by desperation to invade Europe. It is thus helpful at this point to recall the statements expressed in a resounding declaration made on 21 July 2004, by Mr. Giuseppe Pisanu, then Minister of the Interior in the second Berlusconi government (2001-2006). He specifically rang the alarm bell problematizing the “two million” desperate people waiting on the coast of Libya ready to reach Europe. One might also recall French President Chirac warning in 2006 that all of Africa was about to flood into Europe, and Italy’s warnings of "an exodus of biblical proportions" from Libya.

This droning mantra of Western media focuses only on those who are the victims of human trafficking and/or the weather, and is always aimed at generating fear
in the Western audience and a sense, about the phenomenon of migration, of incompleteness in suspension when referred to migrants as Sayad (2004) explained. The reality of migration into Europe is more complicated than this discourse allows, and the causes of these alarming proclamations are deeper than what emerges on the surface. Even if many African migrants reach their destination, their odyssey goes unnoticed. It is therefore essential, I believe, to link the reasons behind the externalization of European migration control in North Africa with acts of ignoring certain kinds of domestic political debate (Lavenex 2006). Delocalizing police control to a country, such as Libya, that did not sign the 1951 Declaration on the Protection of refugees is a way of avoiding irritating and problematic internal debates that might otherwise affect national elections. Picturing migrants as victims whom must be saved from brutal human traffickers, and associating migrants with terrorism, are products of convenience, not truth.

The majority of smugglers, dalalla, are ex-migrants or nomads who have some small network connected to other networks. In pre-colonial Maghreb, nomadic tribes such as the Maqil, the Arib, the Requibat, and many others, always supported the North-South link, acting as a sort of shifting hyphen between Maghreb and Sahel. In fact, because of its severe climate, the great Sahara cannot be occupied. It is a space of permanent transition over an extension of hot sand that takes fours hours to fly over. To acknowledge this is not to disregard the involvement of criminal organizations in the exploitation of migrants, but rather to prevent convenient ignorance about the increased militarization of traditional migration paths and the consequent need for migrants to look for alternative, more dangerous routes. Ironically, to practically travel these routes today often requires tools and means that only criminal and state’s organizations possess. Attention to the complexities of migration in the region also calls into question, although only incidentally, the efforts of NGOs to prevent migration by spurring development and launching awareness campaigns, since it is now evident that increased schooling and wealth boost human mobility (see de Haas

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108 Biemann and Holmes, The Maghreb Connection.
The militarization of borders as well as the business of international aid are only two different sides of one approach that aims to control, manage and orchestrate human mobility for the sake of convenience and profit.

3.3 Containers

With us, there was a kid, four years old, with his mother. During the whole journey, I was looking at the kid, asking myself how it was possible to let him travel together with 100 other people, crammed in like animals inside a container, like those that deliver vegetables, where there is no air to breathe or space enough to move. For a twenty-one hour journey, where one urinates in front of everybody because the door of the restroom is blocked by the people sitting in front of it. We travelled from 4PM until 1AM the next day. Every time the driver would stop to eat, we stayed locked inside the container under the sun. There was no air and everyone stood up panicking because it was impossible to breathe and we wanted to get off. For those at the end of the trailer it was even harder. Watching the kid gave us courage, and every time the truck would stop, we took him and lifted him close to the window.\textsuperscript{110} [My translation].

For those who attempt to reach Libya from the sub-Saharan region, trucks head up north, while containers carrying migrants captured by the Libyan police head south towards the Sahel, or “the shore,” in Arabic, of the great sea of sand. There, the Libyan police will eventually abandon the migrants to their fate, unless the migrants have the financial resources required to pay the price of their existence and resume their journey, hoping not to be arrested again.

These containers sailing the great sand sea may at first sight recall the concept of boats as heterotopias described by Michel Foucault. At the end of his excursus,\textsuperscript{109} de Haas, “The Myth of Invasion.”\textsuperscript{110} Segre, Come Un Uomo Sulla Terra, 67.
Foucault writes that the boat is a floating piece of space, a place without a place that exists by itself. “It is closed in on itself and at the same time is given over to the infinity of the sea.” However, as the analogy of cramped sand containers fails to resonate with the celebration of boats sailing towards limitless seas, we may instead link the container to crisis heterotopias, or places of loss and death where migrants often die and become one with the sand. Thus, these containers are perhaps places without places that house those who live in a condition of crisis within their surrounding societies and who, once confined to non-spaces, are then being abandoned to the infinity of the desert.

The image of the container recurs in many interviews with migrants who have experienced the unforgiving Sahara desert and the brutality of the Libyan police. Like caravans and camels before, these containers carry neo-slaves from a prison to an oasis where migrants will be sold. Officially, according to agreements that Maghreb countries signed with the UE, Libyan police take undocumented migrants from the southeast of Africa, such as Ethiopians, Eritreans and Somali, back beyond the Libyan border. Sadly, the expulsions do not occur very often. It is more profitable to spread the migrant-resources sporadically over the territory and thereby stimulate the economy around camps and oases in the middle of the arid desert, like that of Kufra for instance.

Kufra is an oasis located at the southeastern limits of Libya, one of the most arid part of the Sahara, and therefore crucial for any attempt to cross the desert. Ironically, history tells us that it was often used by the Italian Army as a stop on the way to Italian East Africa (AOI) when the Suez Canal was closed to them. Today the oasis is a place where people are detained upon entering the country as well as when they are about to be deported across the land borders with Sudan and Egypt. But deportation but does appear to be what externalized European migration control efforts in Kufra are primarily about. “Before it was the place where the expulsions were carried out, but now it is a city of commerce,” Fikirte remarks. According to migrant testimonies,

111 Foucault, “Of Other Spaces,” 27.
112 Segre, Come Un Uomo Sulla Terra, 68.
Kufra’s prison functions more as an employment office than a place for detention. For example, although there is a government-run migrant detention center at Kufra, smugglers also operate their own detention facilities there.

The detention center has six large detention rooms each of which can hold more than 100 people...the facility is surrounded by high walls with only air holes near the ceiling so the detainees cannot see anything outside... There is no doctor or nurse on site or available. Everyone sleeps on the floor either with shared mattresses or no mattresses at all. At most, people are allowed outside once per day when the guards conduct their count of detainees. Although this is the one chance to breathe fresh air, it is also the time when the most beatings occur.113

Because smugglers run their own facilities and wear military uniforms, migrants do not have a clear distinction between “illegal” smugglers and “legal” authorities. Therefore, they have the impression that the two forces work together. In this sense, the renowned opacity of the desert, exemplified by sand that covers all traces, does not relate only to its geological aspects. As soon as the prison starts to fill, the local dallala, African smugglers, come to visit the “legal” facility and, if they think that they can extort some money from migrants, buy them for 30 Libyan dinars. Many Christian migrants point out that this was the price that Judah requested to betray Jesus.

The migrants-slaves are then moved into a field (misrah) where they work until they can reimburse the dallala the price they paid to buy them and save enough money to head again to the north. The migrants are then sold to Libyan smugglers and cross the desert again via truck. Very often, when they reach the coast, they are again arrested, tortured, expelled, and sold in what amounts to a vicious circle.

113 Human Rights Watch, Pushed Back, Pushed Around, 8.
3.4 Give me a good reason to leave

The decision to migrate is more and more made by individuals. One day, they have just disappeared, they didn’t inform their family and even their mothers don’t know where they are. They only call their family when they have reached Europe.’

Representative of the local Ngo ANAFA in Saint Louis (Senegal).\textsuperscript{114}

At the beginning of the documentary Like a Man on Earth, Dag confesses that when he decided to leave, he did not tell it to anyone. Above all, he did not tell his father because:

He would have probably interpreted my decision as an escape from my responsibilities as student, and a betrayal of all his sacrifices to make me study in the most prestigious school of Addis Ababa.\textsuperscript{115}

Thus, first and foremost, it is a personal and individual motivation to improve one’s life and/or that of one’s family that leads young Africans to embark on their journey. This point is often underestimated by mainstream analyses of migration, which mostly focus on economic and structural push/pull factors to make sense of a human process, that of migration, that has to be contained and managed. To focus on an econometric method of analysis leads scholars to exceptionalize the migration process and to portray migration as a consequence of determinate factors that can be controlled and adjusted; the presence of the individual is lost inside myriad data and charts. Dag’s documentary recuperates a form of presence that overcomes “the traditional scheme of rationality in terms of ends and means, causes and effects.\textsuperscript{116}” Through what is said and unsaid, and

\textsuperscript{114} Schapendonk and van Moppes, Migration and Information. Images of Europe, Migration Encouraging Factors and En Route Information Sharing, 7.
\textsuperscript{115} Segre and Yimer, Like a Man on Earth.
\textsuperscript{116} Rancière, “From Politics to Aesthetics?,” 16.
especially within moments of silence, the camera is able to capture what cannot be said to any interviewer: the burden of real human sorrow that these persons carry.

Young migrants often leave with close friends without saying anything to others, but at other times, the entire community is involved. Migrants who are “sponsored,” whether by families or entire communities, feel enormous pressure to complete their voyage and find some way to send money back to repay the investment made to support their endeavor. Because of the responsibilities they bear, migrants often prefer to continue their journeys even in the face of unbearable conditions and risks to their life. What is worth noting here is that only the most audacious and skilled individuals decide to leave or are chosen among the community. This element conflicts with conventional discourses of migration that portray war and endemic African misery as the root causes of migration, and depict African migrants as desperate people. As a result of this form of intelligibility, enormous capital is invested in “development” plans to improve education. Allegedly, these investments will eventually curb the desire to emigrate; in effect, they help nation-states to consolidate their territorial borders.

The actual relation between development and migration is rather more complicated. Hein de Hass 117 contends that “economic and human development increases people’s capabilities and aspirations and therefore tends to coincide with an increase rather than a decrease in emigration, at least in the short to medium run”. The link between improved economic conditions, better education and increased mobility is evident when we consider the impact of new information and media technology on the lives of migrants [see chapter 6]. The perception of the West that filters out from images on TV and the web certainly builds a strong desire in the minds of many young Africans to join the First World; therefore, even if the exact extent that Internet access impacts migration decisions is unclear, it is undoubtedly high. Ros et al. state, for example, that “technology providers, (migration) webmasters and Internet café holders should therefore be viewed as new actors in the migration scene118”). The same analysis can also be extended to the advertisements of companies that profit from the business

117 “The Myth of Invasion.”
118 Schapendonk and van Moppes, Migration and Information. Images of Europe, Migration Encouraging Factors and En Route Information Sharing, 9.
of migrant remittances, the control and management of which seems to be at the top of the agenda of NGOs, International Organizations, and private corporations.

If media play an important role by building desire and aspirations, migrants rely on accounts made by other migrants who have already settled in Europe. For different reasons, these migrants provide incomplete if not simply biased information about life conditions at their destinations.

My name is Negga, I am 19 years old... We did not know how difficult reaching those places would be. We only knew that life in Europe was better than ours. That is how we got the desire to leave.119 [My translation]

As it emerges from the many interviews in the documentary, many stories and rumors circulate among aspiring migrants within their society of origin, but nobody knows the exact difficulties and coordinates of the journey. The most important reason behind this important aspect of migration — apart from personal motivations to provide families accounts that are “cleansed” of all horror stories — relies on the fact that migration routes constantly change. They open and close depending on different circumstances. There might, for instance, be increased security at the borders and/or changed economic/political/social conditions along the preferred route. Sometimes new opportunities emerge from these changes, always in a dialectic way.

3.5 Along the Eastern Route

But there are not just rumors. Sub-Saharan Africans living in North Africa do find jobs in specific niches of the informal service sector: construction, agriculture, petty trade and fishery. Trans-Saharan migration also causes trade to flourish and helps revitalize desert towns. The foundations of contemporary trans-Saharan migration were laid in the 1970s and 1980s when nomads and traders started migrating to work at construction sites and oil fields in southern Algeria and Libya. Such immigration was

119 Segre, Come un uomo sulla terra, 46.
often openly welcomed, because migrants filled local labor shortages and meshed with policies to revitalize under-populated desert regions. It is also important to note that patterns of labor migration in and through these countries have roots in the long history of Saharan caravan routes.

It has only been since the mid-1990s that Libya became a primary destination for increasing immigration flows, not just from neighboring Sahel countries but also from the wider Sub-Saharan region. In a perfect example of a push/pull factors analysis, Ferruccio Pastore explains that "besides preexisting and still strong Libyan demand for foreign labor, the specific determinants of the quick rise in inflows from Sub-Saharan Africa were political." The end of the conflict between Libya and Chad (1987), the bilateral freedom of circulation agreement (1994) that followed, and the repression of Tuareg rebellions in Niger (1995) and Mali (1996) all facilitated cross-Saharan transit. Above all, the spectacular pan-africanist turn in Qadhafi’s foreign policy, which was mainly motivated by the Leader’s disappointment with the other Arab regimes’ lack of support following the gradual hardening of UN sanctions against Libya after 1992, helped to establish Libya as a primary destination for trans-Saharan migration. Repeated and widely advertised promises by the Colonel that Sub-Saharan migrant workers would be welcomed as brothers obviously represented a good reason to leave.

The proliferation of conflicts in Western Africa and the Horn of Africa throughout the final decade of the twentieth century and beyond offers a final set of broadly political conditions that can be factored into the rapid increase of Sub-Saharan immigration to Libya. Several wars within the area impacted the Eastern Saharan route: Liberia (1989–1996 and 1999–2003), Ethiopia-Eritrea (1998–2000), the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005), and the conflict in Darfur (2003–present). In addition, Somalia has been without a central government since President Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991.

For many of the above reasons, during the past ten years, the route to Europe that goes toward the coast of Libya has been the most trafficked. In addition, in 1998,

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120 Pastore, “Recent Developments and Critical Issues.”
Italy concluded a series of agreements with Tunisia to curb migration flows through the region, which effectively closed that route. Migrants then started using alternative paths, including the one that goes through Libya. Consequently, the number of clandestine landings on the Sicilian coast increased, which put significant social and political pressure on Italian authorities. It is worth noting that, at the end of the 90’s, the international community still considered Libya a pariah state, and Italy still had still unresolved symbolic and economic issues dating back to its occupation of Libya.

Coincident with the shift toward global securitization strategies to halt terrorism, Libya re-entered the international political community. The political climate around international migration therefore started to change. Col. Gaddafi was cunning enough to exploit paranoid European and Italian visions of invading immigrants and the discursively associated risk of international terrorist attacks. The gradual cooperation of the Libyan regime with the West and the Colonel’s clear disapproval of the 9/11 attack certainly signified Libya’s redemption. With a lobbying campaign at the European level, the process of which Italy speeded up, Libya went from being on the top of rogue state lists to achieving status as a seemingly responsible member of the international community. It is uncanny how the histories of these two colonially intertwined states intertwined once again through bilateral cooperation in the fields of security and undocumented migration.

### 3.6 Libya polices of migration control

The milestone for this and other bilateral agreements was laid on December 13, 2000 when “Italy and Libya concluded a bilateral agreement for the promotion and protection of investments, which entered into force on October 20, 2004” ("Italy-Libya BIT" or "BIT").121 Most importantly, the two countries agreed to cooperate against terrorism, drug trafficking, and undocumented immigration. On December 29, 2007, Mr. Giuliano Amato, then Italian Minister of the Interior, and Mr. Abdurrahman Shalgam, his Libyan counterpart, signed an important treaty to conduct joint patrol operations to stem the flow of undocumented migration. This treaty perfectly crowned

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one year of intense economic and diplomatic relations between Italy and Libya. In October 2007, ENI and NOC Libya signed a wide-ranging agreement to amplify drilling operations off the Libyan coast. The new agreement set oil production expiry dates for 2042 and 2047 for gas. In November 2007, Mr. Massimo d'Alema, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, drafted a preliminary report determining compensations to Libya for Italian colonial atrocities. The draft included a project to build a highway along the coast from Egypt to Tunisia.

I will not dwell upon the specific content of these bilateral agreements. It is enough to say that all these agreements were concluded at the executive level between the two governments without parliamentary debate. Lavenex (2006) clearly states:

Government representatives gain autonomy because their action at the intergovernmental level is shielded from the pluralistic domestic arena, where they compete with other actors on the ‘right’ interpretation of social problems and possible policy solutions.123

Without any doubt, this kind of cooperation management faces some legitimacy problems. For instance, from August 16, 2003 to December 2004, the Italian government organized 47 deportation flights via Air Libya Tibesti and Buraq Air of more than 5,000 captive passengers, including Sudanese and Ethiopians. They were deported before their requests for asylum were examined, in violation of the principle of non-refoulment that several International conventions protect. In May 2005, the European Court of Human Rights “declared admissible complaints against Italy submitted by 83 refugees expelled to Libya from Italy” (Pastore 2007, 9).

The lack of political and social debate at domestic and European levels calls to mind Agamben’s reflections about the legal basis of “the camp.” The camp, and in particular the German concentration camp, was born out of martial law under the principle of a state of emergency. Before the Nazi regime systematized a complex

machine of extermination with the Lager as its maximal expression, even before the Nazi regime itself, German Social Democratic governments created “a Konzentrationslager für Ausländer where Jewish refugees from East Europe were deported” (Agamben 1995, 186). Agamben explains that this prison, where many communist militants were also locked in, had its juridical origin within the Schutzhaft, which was a preventive measure that allowed police forces to take anybody into custody even if she/he had not committed any criminal violation. The raison d’être of the Schutzhaft was the state of exception, or the state of siege, and the consequent suspension of constitutional articles related to personal freedoms (freedom of expression, personal freedom, freedom of circulation, and assembly). Agamben underlines how the state of exception or of siege was, according to the interpretation of the National socialists jurists, an Einen gewollten Ausnahmezustand, literally a desired state of emergency, thus a constructed state of siege. The relation between the state of siege and the camp is a strong one. Recalling the alarmist comments recently made by those European politicians mentioned above regarding the imminent menace of millions of African migrants ready to sail and invade Fortress Europe, it is worth remembering how the suspension of individual constitutional freedoms materialized in the Lager and, when the siege was declared permanent, became the norm.

3.7 Camps in the Desert to stem the human flow

How can you forget the concentration camps built from Italian colonists in Libya into which they deported your great family - the Obeidats? Why don't you have the self-confidence, why don't you refuse?” the Libyan intellectual Abi Elkafi recently asked the Libyan ambassador in Rome, who had initiated his country’s orientation towards the West, in an open letter. “The reasons I write to you are the odious new concentration camps set up on Libya's soil on behalf of the Berlusconi government.124

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124 Dietrich, “The Desert Front.”
Records of concentration camps in Libya’s desert date from 1929 to 1934 and signal the end of the heroic resistance of chief Omar al Mukhtar who, although more than seventy years old, managed to keep the Fascist army in check until his capture and hanging on September 12, 1931. To subdue him and the civil population, Fascist airplanes delivered gas and chemical bombs. His legacy, thanks to his deep religious devotion, military cunning, and bravery, helped to keep alive the Libyan refusal to accede to Mussolini’s colonial delirium. The colonial regime’s reaction was no less dreadful than it had been 20 years earlier when the Italian government, seeking to crush Libyan resistance, set a world record for the first aerial bombing, on the Oasis of Ain Zara on November 1, 1911. Because of General Graziani’s loyalty to the Fascist ideology and his notoriously cruel and rigorous methods, Benito Mussolini directly ordered General Graziani to to Libya in 1930. His strategy was to totally annihilate any form of dissent among the civil population by creating an empty buffer zone between the rebels and the population, including the construction of a 270 km long fence along the perimeter with Egypt to cut any aid to the resistance. The area of Gebel experienced mass deportations (amounting to 110,832 total units, and 100,000 units alone in 1931 according to Libyan historian al-Bargathi) with the consequent relocation and internment of 80,000 people among 16 concentration camps of different sizes: from el Abiàr with 3,100 prisoners to al-Agaila with 20,000 prisoners. By and large, living conditions in these camps were precarious at best. They were built in the middle of the desert and provided detainees no ability to make use of their nomadic métis. What is more, the whole endeavor was tinted by a layer of hypocrisy, since the fascist ideology pretended to use the camps to “educate and civilize” the imprisoned Libyan population. Scholars of Italian colonialism, such as Del Boca, Rochat and Ahmida, accuse the Italian government of systematically censoring and obstructing the disclosure of sources and notes of camps in Libya. Ahmida ended up turning to Libyan oral history to reveal the atrocities of Italian camps, especially with

125 Boca, I Gas Di Mussolini.
126 Aruffo, Storia Del Colonialismo Italiano.
129 Aruffo, Il colonialismo italiano.
reference to Ma Bl Marad — “No Illness but This Place” written by the famous Libyan poet Rajab Hamad Buhwaish al-Minifi on the concentration camp of al-Agaila³⁰.

The concentration camp system was formally dismantled in 1932; although Italy and Libya formally agreed in 1998 on a common document³¹ in which Italy recognized some of its responsibility for the atrocities committed during the colonial enterprise, the geography of the Sahara desert, and use of its lethal living conditions, still play an important role in policies of population control. In fact, the Libyan Desert is punctuated nowadays by several concentration camps for migrants. These are real structures with concrete walls, where every year, more 60,000 migrants are imprisoned (Herzog 2009). Each camp is connected to other smaller camps where migrants are arrested. Together, these camps function like a macabre web or strainer; they capture, select, and filter excess human bodies. Captured migrants are moved via container from satellite camps to principal ones, bearing an uncanny resemblance to the lagers network. The trucks that pull the containers are brand new six-tire Iveco Trakker 420s—an Italian brand that the Italian government sold to Libya after the 2003 bilateral agreements to stem the flow of undocumented migrations. I will dwell upon the role of these technologies in chapter 6.

Although no video is yet available, the configuration of the Libyan system of migration control and the poor conditions within detention centers where migrants are incarcerated are well documented via audio. Some of the camps are old prisons or military bases; others are warehouses where Qadhafi used to store chemical weapons (in fact, according to some testimonies, because chemical residuals still pervade the building, everyone held in Kufrah’s prison catches a skin disease call asasia³²). At least since 2004, when the European Commission published a report³³, Europe has known of the desperate conditions of inmates in these centers. The report also confirms that Italy provided funds for the construction of three of these camps for migrants along

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³⁰ http://english.libya.tv/2011/05/19/no-illness-but-this-place/#africa/lybia-national-lyrical-epic/
³¹ “Italy-Libya Statement.”
³² Segre and Yimer, Like a Man on Earth.
with technical resources to support Libyan police patrol operations. According to the report, in 2003 Italy financed the construction of a camp for undocumented immigrants, in line with European standards, to be built in the north of the country; the construction started by the end of November 2004. A final report provided at the end of a 2004 European Commission technical mission foresees a special allocation in the financial exercise 2004-2005 to effectuate two more camps in the south of the country, in Kufra and Sebha. Among the items provided by the Italian government, the European Commission’s report mentions the provision of “1,000 sacks for corpse transport” to the Libyan authorities. Dead migrant bodies are more than a natural eventuality in these detention centers. Therefore, hundreds of sacks are needed to remove those bodies from their cells.

In conclusion, after having visited the camps to verify the overall conditions in which migrants were held, notwithstanding room for improvement, the report contends that “in general, conditions in the camps were found to be difficult but relatively acceptable in the light of the overall general context.\textsuperscript{134}” In contrast, the testimonies of migrants held there seem to point in the opposite direction:

Kufrah it is a place of death. When you hear the noise of the keys turning in the lock, your blood freezes. You must turn your eyes towards the wall. If you dare to look into their eyes, they beat you up... We were at least 700... we used to sleep one over the other; there were no space enough to lie down on the ground. Single meal: a fistful of white rice for the whole day, 20 grams each... during the night they brought me in the courtyard. Every night. They asked me to do push-ups. Once exhausted they kicked me and cursed my Christian faith and me. Every night.... Personally, the first time I saw Kufra I wanted to hang myself... I cannot describe the filthiness, the hunger, and the incessant humiliations. There were also kids and women. They kept them separated. Women they will never tell you because of shame, but it is important that everyone knows what they (Libyan guards) do to women in Kufra. They

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., 34.
rape them in front of their husbands, in front of their brothers. They used iron sticks, wood sticks... it is shocking. They treat us like animals...\textsuperscript{135}

The impression that emerges from reading the direct experiences of migrants held in these camps is not one of tolerable conditions given exceptional circumstances. Rather, these voices describe the methodical, permanent, and unexceptional maintenance of inhuman conditions for these captured migrants. Detention is a mode of in-transience that is imposed on people who are categorized as temporary or in transition. Their detention is therefore perpetually indefinite. According to migrants’ stories, it may last anywhere from two weeks to many years. The temporary condition of permanence, of being trapped in a state of exception, a state of siege, as if perpetually adrift in a sailboat, or a life raft, is a state of absolute suspension; migrants find themselves lost in a void created by the immanent collision of two contradictory temporal states: permanence and transience.

As with twentieth century camps, these zones are zones that annihilate human conditions through incessant torture, indifference, and invisibility. Families, relatives, and friends often do not receive any news of arrested migrants for years, and believe they simply died during the dangerous desert crossing. While the number of people who perish during the crossing is high, many migrants who are arrested and lack any financial resources end up being enslaved; they use their bare bodies as their last resort to buy their freedom. Many die alone in cells, which are lonely and miserable regardless of whether they are deemed “illegal” or “legal,” after experiencing recurring tortures, humiliations, and deprivations.

The end or aim of this web of detention facilities is not to physically eliminate migrants, as I mention elsewhere, but to treat them as if they were invisible, or visible yet nonexistent, like ghosts. Their spirits will often be crushed, their determinations nullified, their voices unheard. By design, their presence will be rendered invisible and inaudible. Roman Herzog in 2009 managed to record an audio documentary from within migrant detention camps in Libya for the first time. In Zlitlen’s camp, he meets

\textsuperscript{135} Del Grande, \textit{Mamadou Va a Morire: La Strage Dei Clandestini Nel Mediterraneo}, 126.
a detained Nigerian woman who is unafraid to speak openly against the forces in charge of the prison. She states:

I have been here for 3 months. I cannot talk with my husband. People suffer in here. The water we drink is salty... many women got sick because of food. Sores cover us. Guards are not brutal, they simply leave us vegetating... if somebody passes out they do not bring her to the hospital. Simply they do not speak with us. Nobody care about us, some are at the point of dying, and some women are pregnant. Please, someone help us. We need to get out of here.\textsuperscript{136}

3.8 Filter them out/in

Camps are only one element of the complex system of migration control that uses geographical isolation to render migrants invisible and inaudible. As a camp-effect, the desert also filters out. For example, Dag confessed to me in an interview a few months ago that only those who are most fortunate and strong succeed. Those who perish on their ways across the desert vanish inside the golden dunes; their bodies are instantly mummified by “quartz-sand about to turn into liquid gas.”\textsuperscript{137} Therefore, the testimonies of detainees in the camp of Kufra are merely one part of a continuum of hardship and abuse that is characteristic of a sort of permanent limbo faced by those ensnared in a viciously circular slave economy that seeks to render migrant political voices silent. Much like twentieth century Italian colonial projects, by halting migrants’ trajectories, the externalization of European migration control seeks to halt their abilities to raise their voices, to be political subjects; ultimately, therefore, it aims to render migrants discursively, if not always physically, nonexistent. Only in this way can Europe uphold a contradiction: of waving legal principles of individual rights as its own distinctive ensign, while simultaneously orchestrating an apparatus of migration control with visibly obvious deadly effects.

Nonetheless, echoes of these practices in the Sahara desert sometimes reach Fortress Europe, along with clamoring within European society. Saharan itineraries are

\textsuperscript{136} Herzog,\textit{ Noi Difendiamo l’Europa}.
\textsuperscript{137} Biemann and Holmes,\textit{ The Maghreb Connection}, 45.
being projected into Europe, somewhat like the overdetermination of bordering practices mentioned by Etienne Balibar. Now not just in the desert, migrant detention camps are in every city in Europe, as well in new communities of Afro-Europeans. This proliferation of the external within the internal partially calls to mind the concept of overdetermination that Balibar assigns to colonial and later postcolonial borders. The French philosopher referred to overdetermination as a tendency of European empires to project their existence beyond Europe by replicating their borders within the colonies: e.g., French Africa vs. British Africa. Today, however, the process is reversed: the camps and the containers that mark out the routes of migrants in Africa arrive within the territory of Europe. These echoes highlight the interaction and interdependence of borders and camps, and can serve as stopwatches to count down the collapse of the system of inclusion that the end of the era of colonialism proclaimed. European politics of migration control in Africa reveal not only the limits of who is left out and who is included in the European society, but also how the system of limiting, of bordering, works. Borders are a precondition of the political economy of international migration insofar as they construct social relationships and determine the legal positions of people on the move in ways that are required for state, territory-based political analysis.

The colonial camps that were once used to clarify otherwise unclear distinctions between the colonizer and the colonized have today mutated into international airports waiting zones and miserable housing projects on the margins of European cities. These places within a place filter people and leave certain bodies, but not others, in a condition of crisis within the surrounding society. While “inside,” they nonetheless function as borders. Migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers frequently find residence within these contemporary camps or zones of exclusion within the state. These persons represent a surplus that is every day more convenient to re-allocate and re-organize within the cracks of the global economic system. At the core of concept of borders, at its essence, lays a process of differentiation, which in turn constitutes the most important gear of political economy. Selections that are made at border sites are

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138 Balibar and Hahn, Politics and the Other Scene, 79.
translated into different wages and divisions of labor. Transnational chains of value mechanisms (Piore, 1979) that are manifest in wage differentials link price differentials and segmented labor markets between as well as within countries. This is the background in which the desert and the sea are transformed into camp-effect areas. In the abyss of the sea and within the opacity of the desert, we see reflected the emptiness of the universal human being, into which the shadow of the European citizen collapses.

3.9 Territory and technology

How does the EU change the relation between territory, individual and the state? How does the virtual interact with the real? Chapter 6 will address such questions. For now, it is enough to anticipate how technologies inevitably adapt to territories. Migration policies have also had to continually adapt to reconfigurations of space by migrations, forming a process of continuous reterritorialization and deterritorialization. I have talked elsewhere of the camp-effect that the use of geographical entities like the Mediterranean and the Sahara desert to filter out African migrants signifies. It is interesting here to reflect upon conclusions that FRONTEX’s officials drew about the Sahara Desert in 2007 at the end of their mission in Libya.

Indeed, rather than viewing the southern land borders of Libya as green borders in line with the EU concept of control, there is a need to recognize their distinct characteristics, perhaps referring to them as brown borders. In the same way, seeking to improve controls of a vast desert space may require imaginative thinking, perhaps by viewing the desert as a sea — a brown sea — rather than a land space. (2007, 17)

Their gaze resembles that of earlier European scientists, geologists, and engineers who dreamt of conjoining the Mediterranean and Sahel, the southern shore of the Sahara desert. This colonial fantasy was one of mastering natural forces, a delirium of mechanical omnipotence over the most arid desert of the world. It would have been achieved by pouring the Med’s salt water into the desert and was supported by a
prominent scientist of that time, Ferdinand de Lesseps, a member of the Academy of Sciences and designer of the Suez Canal. But as Ali Bensaâd notes:

Long before the colonial fantasies, this conception lay at the basis of the spatial perceptions of the Arab geographers of the Middle Ages. They used almost exclusively maritime terminology to identify and describe the Sahara: the very name of the Maghreb finds its origin there, since it was called Djerizet El Maghreb, the Sunset Isle and it was identified as an island surrounded by the Mediterranean, The Ocean and the Sahara.139

Today trans-Saharan trajectories are alive more than ever, revitalized by sub-Saharan migrants who, led or carried by skillful Bedouins, traverse the sand’s vast sea. The incredible adventure of crossing the desert requires extraordinary resources that only the best of the best possess. The echoes of this intense circulation reach into the heart of bureaucratic old Europe, which responds with anxiety, sending a contingent of risk management experts to transform the desert into limes, the roman, fortified frontier. Frontex then operates through this meticulous risk assessment, deploying the most advanced technologies to reinforce Maghreb countries’ forces and delocalizing the dirty job of migration management to ruthless countries such as Libya.

As a result of the visit to the desert southern regions of Libya, the mission members were able to appreciate both the diversity and the vastness of the desert, which bears no comparison to any geographical region in the EU. Border control and management of such a vast and inaccessible area cannot be achieved by applying existing EU standards, and there is a need for a fresh approach to determine how best some form of improved control could be implemented. The land borders in the south of Libya do not equate to the EU green borders. Given the lack of clear demarcations and the size of the terrain, fixed border crossing points will play a limited role in controlling illegal

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139 Biemann and Holmes, The Maghreb Connection, 14.
immigration. This should not preclude however the need for a change in border management strategy and investment in premises and overall infrastructure including road access to border crossing points.¹⁴⁰

Not only are crossings of the desert made in nightmarish conditions, but migrants’ echoes appear to be so loud that they require the intervention of European forces to keep them silent. Yet, migrants go on, continuously opening up new routes as soon as European forces intervene, and masterfully adapting European technologies that are used to control them. As I will explain later in reference to the dynamic nature of technological borders, migrants are indeed true entrepreneurs of today’s technological era.

¹⁴⁰ Frontex, Frontex-led Eu Illegal Immigration Technical Mission to Libya.
CHAPTER 4. THE BLUE DOOR
They died in the sea, but politics, outlined in dispatches sent from the West, murdered them. They built walls in the water, they demanded that visas should appear out of thin air; politics assured that people will be moving on from one place to another.\footnote{Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, \textit{Borderscapes}, 205.}

4.1 \textbf{Underwater signposts}

I had just left the island of Lampedusa when on August 21, 2009 after 3 summer months of uncanny stillness, news from Lampedusa made national headlines. It was reported that five Africans had docked at the island’s small harbor. The news described them as if they were ghosts; they could barely walk and they had to be dragged off from the military boat by Italian authorities.

Still, the arrival of yet another few Africans is hardly material for nationwide news. At least since 2002, every summer thousands of African migrants have been dragged on Lampedusa and almost 18,000 (17,627 to June 2, 2011 according to Fortresseurope.blogspot.com) migrants have died since 1988 while attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea. In this story however there is something new; something so shocking that it was worthy of a front headline, for an audience that otherwise has become inured to violent stories. The five ghosts were the only survivors of a dreadful journey to escape the brutal war-torn reality of Eritrea; to get to Lampedusa these voyagers went through the harsh climates of the Sahara desert and survived the brutality of Libyan police control. They managed to sail, at the end of July, toward the shores of Southern Europe.

There were 78 passengers in total who sailed from the Libyan coast. After only a few days, their vessel began to drift, and they ran out of food and water. Fortunately, it is a near impossibility to navigate the Mediterranean basin without being sighted on radar monitors or intercepted by an army of helicopters, airplanes, vessels of any single state or European agencies. The externalization of migration control also exists at the
virtual level of satellite mapping of the area of the Mediterranean. Still, while several boats crossed their path, survivors told how no one gave them any assistance. They had been navigating for more than 3 weeks when the Italian authorities decided to intercept them. When they were finally rescued, only 5 of the initial 78 remained.

For a few days, the Italian government refused to accept their version of the story. To the Italian authorities, the most logical explanation was that they were human traffickers themselves. It would have been of use to inspect their boat but the authorities left it to be swallowed by the sea, as much as the other 73 companions, who became, to reword Glissant,142 “underwater signposts.” However, with the days passing, in the channel of Sicily, those signposts started surfacing, persistently one after the other, and public opinion realized the shockingly crude accuracy of their story. Today their corpses add up to other thousands of bodies that mark the route between Libya and Lampedusa. Within that moment of indignation, one may become conscious of that a new border practice around the European continent has materialized.

Does it suffice to configure the Mediterranean basin as a borderland, that is a space of exception where people die without anyone being held responsible? Indeed 73 Eritreans died and no person or authorities could be held responsible. The validity of this analogy to describe the frontier as a zone outside/inside the law relies on the fact that undocumented migrants crossing the Mediterranean can be reduced to naked life against the sacrality of their life.

4.2 Borders and Frontiers

I consider it critical not to use terms such as border and frontier interchangeably. I concur with Didier Bigo in contesting the unproblematic overlapping of the two terms in canonical IR discourse where the frontiers are the state frontiers and the state is a political entity sealed by borders. Following the analogy, Bigo remarks that 'borders or frontiers are synonymous with questions of defense, war, citizenship or the right to punish criminals through collaboration with other states. It is essentially an interstate

142 Poetics of Relation, 6.
vision where frontiers delineate natural cultural containers and clear security barriers.\textsuperscript{143}

I believe instead the nature of the frontier to be more complicated, being a space, in the Foucauldian sense, where it is difficult to locate power on one distinct point and resistance on another. It is the moving localizations in time and space of the emergence of power and resistance that mold the frontier. I suggest that at these points of encounter the border emerges, that is whenever practices of statecraft enter in relation/collide with migrants’ obstinate trajectories. In this sense, the last frontier of Europe, the Mediterranean as well as the Sahara desert, resembles one of Foucault’s heterotopias\textsuperscript{144}, that is spaces “still nurtured by the hidden presence of the sacred.” [“(toutes sont) animées encore par une sourde sacralisation.”]. The frontier then it is a sacred space reserved to those that are in a state of crisis in relation to the society where they exist. They are part of the society but they are excluded at the same time from it, always temporarily and in excess, but at the same time indispensable for the society to be complete.

To revise the theoretical background of concepts of borders and frontiers essentially means to question the myth of the social contract from Hobbes to Rawls secured within the shell of the classic Westphalian sovereign state as their foundation and basis. It is evident that such a conception of the state cannot stand the changes caused by the materialization of a global era. At the same time it is important to recalibrate the power of legal proclamations of universal human rights at the moment we face the unbearable bareness of human life.

\textsuperscript{143} Bigo and Guild, \textit{Controlling Frontiers}, 54.
\textsuperscript{144} Foucault, “Of Other Spaces.”
In this direction I have juxtaposed the geographical territory of the Mediterranean Basin with the visual cartography of different discourses of migration designed by the Transit Migration group to provide a comprehensive vision that allow the reader to comprehend better the interconnection between notions of frontier, borders, security and identity. As explained on the MigMap website:

MigMap conveys a picture of how and where the production of knowledge is currently taking place in the area of migration – and of who is participating in and has access to it. MigMap investigates precisely how the new forms of supranational governance that can be observed in the European migration regime function.\textsuperscript{145}

\textsuperscript{145}“MigMap - Governing Migration.”
Following this visual representation, I maintain that the new frontier of Europe is to be located around points of interaction between the implementation of policies of migration control and acts of flows, that is at the juncture of multiple discourses of migration. My understanding of the concept of frontier and border is twofold: on the one hand they amount to two key elements of the statecraft aimed at preventing people to act politically, that is to prevent their voice to be heard. Paradoxically on the other hand, as space entities, they surface and are shaped by the ability of people to reclaim their subjectivity.

Once the need to locate the border emerges, the intention is not to draw a sequence of points to be unified in order to identify a line that will split the outside from the inside. In that case, a spatial representation would take up the stage obfuscating the necessary attention I pay to the operational moment. I rather mark out points of action/non action without laying any claim of totality, conscious that “some borders are no longer situated at the border at all.” (Balibar, 2002, p. 84). Thus, the border manifests itself within the periphery of a metropolitan area as well as within the scorched Sahara desert, every time the authority of the state encounters someone or something that challenges it. In fact, concepts such as rigidity and immobility do not apply to the contemporary idea of border that nowadays has to respond to the increased mobility and multidimensionality of migrations: ‘fixed boundaries are displaced by flows and diversions that undermine as well as reinforce existing spatial divides’ in dialectical way.

Still, the border is contingent to power practices whose perennial fluctuations make the border seem to be natural and inevitable. It is my intention to shake this assertion and demonstrate the border’s reliance on a complex interconnection of historical contingencies and thus to reveal its precariousness. The idea of the fixity of the border reinforces the discourse of Fortress Europe as a socio-political body under a permanent state of siege that conceals the real functions of frontiers and borders to trap the subjectification of migrants and asylum seekers while crystallizing the imagery of the nation-state. This is the logic behind the state’s strategy of charging fishermen

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who help people adrift at sea with the accusation of human trafficking, or the latest practice of the Italian government to intercept migrants/asylum seekers in international waters to deviate their trajectories [see later]. The most resourceful methodology will be then to draw attention to where and when different ‘practices’ happen and the conditions before their existence at the moment that they become visible. As Foucault put it in *Questions of method*:

> It is a question of analyzing a ‘regime of practices’ – practices understood here as places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reason given, the planned and the taken for granted meet and interconnect.147

These practices once implemented or just acted out, attain their own life and indicate a direction to follow or simply serve as an example of what has to be done. But fundamentally, I believe, they sign the new contour of the frontier and delimit the space of the political.

### 4.3 Strategies and Tactics

Relying of the difference between strategy and tactic outlined by De Certeau148 I sustain that how Europe is configured, or bordered, is largely conditioned by the waving interaction between strategies of migration control and tactics of resistance. The difference between the two, as explained by De Certeau, relies in their different approach towards space and time. While a strategy “postulates” a place that belongs to the agent as well, as requires time that the agent has because of its favorable position, a tactic “is a calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” 149. According to De Certeau “as in management every ‘strategic’ rationalization seeks first of all to distinguish its ‘own’ place, that is, the place of its own power and will, from an ‘environment.”150

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147 [Foucault, 1991:75.](#)
149 Ibid., 37.
150 Ibid., 36
But the same agency can be attributed to tactics. In fact tactics relies on opportunities because ‘what it wins it cannot keep” making use of the cracks within strategies’ space. The extreme necessary mobility of this motus constitutes the intrinsic characteristic of borders and frontiers. Because the very trajectories of these migrants aim at the hyphen of the nation-state, the chaotic environment of the Mediterranean becomes a space to be appropriated and properly managed. As Joseph Pugliese writes, this idea “is perhaps best encapsulated by the Roman imperial tag: mare nostrum / our sea. The Mediterranean as mare nostrum is already conceptualized as a homogenous space of confinement, possession, and colonization.” 151 The definition Mare Nostrum appears on the first page of Ceasar’s De bello gallico (On the war against Galls) to indicate the confidence to have acquired full control over the Mediterranean and thus a change in Rome’s foreign policy, now re-oriented to the North towards the Atlantic. The idea of Mare Nostrum entailed a totality of control over that sea that ironically was considered by Roman Emperors as a mere lake. Instead, the Mediterranean Sea was never a homogenous space both during the Roman occupation and today when European policies of migration control attempt to purge it of foreign bodies. While this text is under revision for instance, thousands of North Africans are crossing the few miles that separate Europe from Africa entering Italian territory. ‘Interior Minister Roberto Maroni said migrants who have landed on the island of Lampedusa threaten the institutional and social structures of Europe. 152 It is then crucial to accept the fact that “to talk of the Mediterranean –of its past, present and future- is to move in this disquieting place.” 153

The eruptive encounters of the two strategies and tactics, as visually represented in the MigMap above, define the southern border of Europe from the Sahara desert to the coast of Sicily, Greece or Spain. “So the borders are porous, particularly so in the liquid materiality of the Mediterranean. The outcome of historical and cultural clash and compromise is that borders are both transitory and zones of transit.” 154 To capture

151 Pugliese, Transmediterranean.
152 “Italy Warns Europe over Migrants.”
153 Chambers, Mediterranean Crossings, 5.
154 Ibid.
the moment that borders emerge I needed to visit one of the island of the Mediterranean where these waves of encounters crush against and give existence to the border.

4.4 Lampedusa: the blue door

“We sweat and cry salt water, so we know that the ocean is really in our blood.” 155

Teresia Teaiwa

Imagine this space. Visualize the Mediterranean basin like a vast blue plaque156. Now, imagine the dispositif of migration control, freezing migrants’ motions in an endless temporary limbo: a zone that is inside as well outside the water. This is a space “in

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155 Hau’Ofa, We Are the Ocean.
156 I use the term plaque in a way that partially resembles its microbiological sense. According to Britannica.com plaque, in microbiology, ‘indicates a clear area on an otherwise opaque field of bacteria that indicates the inhibition or dissolution of the bacterial cells by some agent, either a virus or an antibiotic. It is a sensitive laboratory indicator of the presence of some anti-bacterial factor.’ Therefore, we can imagine the Mediterranean as a European plaque where the migrants’ trajectories are wiped out by a plethora of technological devices of migration control.
which the intention is not to treat people neither as subjects (of discipline) nor as objects (of elimination).” The plan is to render undocumented people’s existence “invisible and inaudible” (Isin & Rygiel, 2007, p. 184), therefore to transform the sea in a clear plaque, wiping out migrants’ presences, by absorbing their motus, and not allowing them to be recognized as subjects. This has to be done without generating new martyrs who could upset the imaginary of European public opinion. Unfortunately, sometimes life is too stubborn and cracks appear inside the clear space of the plaque. The chaotic environment of the Mediterranean becomes a space to be appropriated and properly managed. It represents the limits that define Europe. But the same agency can be attributed to resistance’s tactics. In fact tactics rely on opportunities because ‘what it wins it cannot keep” making use of the cracks within strategies’ space. The inherent fluctuation of this motus constitutes the intrinsic characteristic of borders and frontiers. One of the sites where this interaction occurs is the Italian island of Lampedusa.

Lampedusa is just one, yet critical, point around which Europe is defined. To write about this island it is to take into consideration the dimension of the Mediterranean that ends and begins on its shores. To write about this rock that emerges from the abyss of the sea, it is also to reflect upon the fact that geologically speaking, this is Africa and not Europe and not many thousands years ago it was possible to cross on foot from Tunisia to Sicily. Closer to Tunisia than to Sicily, Lampedusa has been in the past ten years the fulcrum of the European management of migration flows from Africa. It has been referred to both as the advanced extreme of two continents and also as the most southern European outpost. Is Lampedusa just the appendix of Europe or the Trojan horse of new hordes at the gates of the Fortress?

Even if for centuries, fishermen and sailors took advantage of its port to find refuge and protection, surprisingly Lampedusa does not appear to be a crossroad of different identities. Instead, its buildings and the urban structure of the village conveys a sense of dereliction and anonymity hesitantly covered with a flimsy layer of make up barely enough to compete with other shining tourist destinations around the

157 “Collected Essays.”
Mediterranean. This situation is the result of the decision of the central government in Rome to designate Lampedusa as the fulcrum of national and European discourse of management of migration flows from Africa. In consequence of this orientation, the island suffers because of a policy that divert money toward security and the control of immigration instead of paying attention to a enduring lack of basic education and health services.

This chronic condition has exasperated its inhabitants that have reacted in different ways. On the one hand, in the last ten years part of the resident population has incorporated a governmental discourse of blaming migrants for any problem, up to the point that in the regional election of 2007, the Lega Nord (Northern League) performed as the best party among the winning coalition, securing the position of vice mayor for one of its elected representative, Mrs. Angela Maraventano. On the other hand others opposed the centralized decision to relegate Lampedusa to the role of military outpost in the war against migrants’ flows while others recognized that the presence of migrants provide stable revenue during the desolate winter season when the island is populated by detained migrant, officials, and humanitarian operators.

In many ways, the ambiguous character of this island makes it a central site in which to investigate the implementation of the European migration control and the effects it has on the process of Europeanization. In this sense the Mediterranean, and to a certain extent the Sahara Desert, are spaces to be managed in a strategic way that is to be appropriated by Europe that operates inside as well outside the law.

4.5 At the airport

Landing at the airport of Lampedusa we can clearly see what remains of the detention center that operated from July 1998 as the Centro di Permanenza Temporanea (Centre for Temporary Permanence-CPT) until August 1st 2007 when former barracks in the Contrada Imbiacola were transformed into a new structure for migrants and asylum seekers. [Centro di Soccorso e Accoglienza - Center for Aid and Reception].

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158 “Lampedusa, Una Vicesindaco Leghista ‘Farò Una Scuola Al Posto Del Cpt’ - Politica - Repubblica.it.”
The old construction next to the airport was designed as a CPT following the Law n. 40/1998, so-called Turco-Napolitano law as it was referred to by those who drafted it. Designed by a centre-left government, it is the earliest Italian organic immigration law that established detention centers for immigrants and asylum seekers. The center in Lampedusa was designed to contain only 186 people but soon it was clear that would have been inadequate to deal with the number of migrants that were rescued and transported to the island by Italian and European authorities. It is clear then that Lampedusa is not automatically a voluntary destination for immigrants who are often located on radars around the Mediterranean sea and then transferred on the Island. Perhaps it is true that migrants follow fisherman routes between Sicily and Tunisia to increase their chances to be intercepted in case of (frequent) engine breakdown.

The center at the airport was extremely close to the runway in order to have easy access to carriers and therefore manage with more ease relocations of undocumented migrants to other structures in Italy or even deportation to the countries of North Africa. In fact the airport of Lampedusa was the stage of well publicized mass deportations, the first of which took place between the 2nd and the 9th of October 2004. La Rete Antirazzista Siciliana (Sicilian Antiracist Network) circulated images of the deportation\(^{159}\) of both 2004 and 2005 in which the camera gives a wide shot of migrants escorted by police officers. They walk in line formation from the detention structure next to the runway to the Adriatic Air charter, a small Croatian company. The whole scene has something of surreal about it: it is a bright midday and the migrants are handcuffed one to the other. It looks like if they where holding hands, as if seeking comfort before embarking towards the unknown. They do not know where they are going; Most probably, imagine to be re-allocated in some other facility in mainland Italy. In fact, this was and still is the main function of the detention center of Lampedusa as we read of thousand of Tunisian who nowadays are relocated in

\(^{159}\)http://www.ngvision.org/download/487/ngv.bradipz.net/new_global_vision/disc75/ngv_la_it_20050320_lampedusa_scoppia_19_marzo_05.avi
different centers of Southern Italy or even better let them go roaming across Europe with temporary Schengen visas\textsuperscript{160}. I will return later on this point.

Suddenly an activist outside the fence shouts out in Arabic to alert them that they would be deported back to Libya. The scene acquires here its tragicomic character. Like in those silent movies that inevitably culminate in an eruption of physicality, every man runs for his own life in different directions; most of them are arrested in few seconds. With a mix of sympathy and compassion, we follow the last one chased by a few officers running along the runway looking for a way out that does not exist. On the other side of the fence there are overhanging rocks, and then the deep blue sea. It does not have the grace of a great escape ‘ala Steve McQueen’ but still it retains the grandiosity of a rebellion.

Following the deportations of October 2005, a group of 10 NGOs from France, Spain and Italy filed a complaint addressing Mr. Barroso, at that time President of the European Commission, to take action against Italy for violation of various principles of human right law that constitute the flagship of the European Union. The complaint cites first of all the violation of the right of defense and of all parties to be heard according to Art. 6 and 7 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. At the same time, the deportation could be considered an infringement of the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, provided for in Art. 4 of the European Charter of fundamental rights and article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. What is certain is that, the Italian government operated in violation of the prohibition of collective expulsions provided for in article 4 of the 4\textsuperscript{th} Protocol of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, a Art. 19 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, and in violation of the non-refoulment principle as in Art. 33 of the 1951 Refugees Convention.

Specifically we read in the complain that:

\textsuperscript{160}“France Seeks Border Control Shift.”
By deporting over 1,000 migrants and potential asylum seekers between the 2nd and the 9th of October 2004 as part of collective expulsions to Libya, the Italian authorities contravened the right to asylum as recognized by the Amsterdam Treaty, as well as by the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental freedoms, which the European Union has undertaken to respect, and of the European Charter of fundamental rights integrated into the Constitutional Treaty signed on 29 October 2004, whose principles are referred to by the European Court of Justice in its rulings”\textsuperscript{161}

4.6 Tourists and bodies

Being the island of Lampedusa a gem of the Mediterranean its economy relies heavily of tourism, and the proximity of the centre with the airport implicated a disturbing visibility and promiscuity with tourists disembarking. The following considerations are related specifically to those days when in the summer of 2009 I visited Lampedusa. Today in winter/spring 2011, the situation is completely different with young Tunisian who surpass local inhabitants with a ratio of 5 to 1. It does not really change my point of analysis in considering Lampedusa a crucial point in the implementation of European migration control. What my research demonstrates is that the externalization of migration control must be view as system of relations between migrations and control that has elected Lampedusa as a one of the preferred stage.

In summer of 2009, the detention center next to the airport did not function. No more disturbing presence of “illegals” leaning against the fence, like spectators of the exhibition they represented for holyday makers on their way to a much planned vacation. Their bodies juxtaposed with the ease with which tourists can enjoy the island. The bodies of the migrants behind the fence reveal the politics of disparity

between those that have legitimacy and those that have not. They carry the border within themselves.

But the juxtaposition did not occur when I visited the island. The island was empty of undocumented migrants. There was no trace of ‘li turchi’ (Turks) as locals call African migrants here. I kept asking around about the unusual emptiness, covering my curiosity with the indignation of a northern tourist who does not want to look at such display of misery while in vacation. Locals reassured me that Lampedusa is empty and back to being one of the treasures of the Mediterranean echoing Mr. Andrea Ronchi Minister for European Policies who has had visited the island few days before and with a sort of profuseness he could affirm that:

Lampedusa today has zero immigrants in the CPA (Center of First Reception). Lampedusa returns to Italy as tourist gem. Today the Mediterranean Sea does not convey anymore those terrible images of illegals and desperation. This is the most tangible evidence of the great work of the Italian government.162

Thus, Lampedusa functions as a mechanism of the political apparatus of control. As I have anticipated above, no immigrant or asylum seeker arrives on the island if the authorities do not want. They have been always intercepted, captured, dragged here, to be filtered and distributed through the network of detention centers around the peninsula. Further peregrinations will confirm this hypothesis. Where are the hordes of immigrants, the third world’s invasion, which for years has been the spotlight of news every summer?

4.7 Boats and bodies

I wanted to locate the new center for undocumented migrants (today Center for Identification and Expulsion – CIE) but I cannot find it. It seems incredible that a prison could be invisible on this tiny rock. While I am looking for the new detention center, something else catches my attention. Next to any sort of rubbish, old rusty cars,

refrigerators there is a separate space where hundreds of wooden boats lie on one side, few still intact.

Figure 4.4. Tunisian Boats in Lampedusa [Photo by Lorenzo Rinelli].

Those are the boats of the immigrants captured and dragged here. Most of the boats have names written in Arabic; they are well built, they seem able to navigate high seas; this is so different from the representation that news show us of old wrecks with a crew of desperate people trying the last chance, gambling with border: to win or to die, but at least dying trying.

Why are these boats here, and not at the port? Why are residents not recycling the good ones and use the material to build/repair theirs? Why does the local administration spend money and energy to move these boats in the most remote corner of the Island, the most far point from the coast? I start to feel the ubiquity of the border. Alone, I am inside the only geographical depression of the island where the cemetery of migrants’ boats is located. And I feel the sacredness of these remnants, their disruptive power. The boats have to be hidden away, destroyed and what is left eliminated.
As I mentioned, how the border functions has to do with what is said and what is seen or concealed. If the migrants arrive on solid boats contradicting the image of desperate people sailing on wrecked vessels, it does mean that migrations’ patterns are stable, organized and regular. It means that migration is not just an ‘accident’, the ultimate decision out of desperation, but a human practice that relies on established patterns. According to Castells, the morphology of the structure has more importance than the individual’s willpower that ends to be channeled by different elements of control such as the State, socio-cultural obligations and different organizations. The individual mobility then tends to be captured within lines that ultimately privilege some trajectories instead of others. Thus, a migrant relies on well-defined routes marked by previous experiences and personal contacts (Métis) as well as juridical and economic restraints.

On the other end migration is not a mere trajectory from a defined point A to a clear point B; instead it includes the autonomy of the individual as much as the importance of the unknown and undeniably, the adaptability of the migrant to the latter. Ultimately the mobility of the individual is restrained by the extension of the structure that vice versa is modified by the flow in itself. This observation seems to pertain to the case of Lampedusa. The policies of migration controls put in force during the last 10 years and the capacity of the institutional structures build to accommodate a certain kind of number of migrants highlight the strategy to capture and direct any vessel in this zone of the Mediterranean toward the Island.

Finally, let me map out the new detention center at the Contrada Imbriacola. As appears in one of the picture taken on site, it is located at the center of the island surrounded by the only geological depression. Even if the CIE has been built only recently to accommodate 381 people (August 1st 2007) it has been already renovated because of the riots of February 2009 when migrants held inside the center (860 were held at that moment) “tried to break out ... sparking a clash with security forces that caused several injuries... A fire broke out in one of the buildings housing the illegal

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163 Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (The Information Age.
immigrants, largely destroying it." ("Immigrants riot in Lampedusa detention centre | France 24," n.d.)

It is after lunch when I arrive there. Under the midday heat there are no sounds coming from inside the structure: no guards, no movements but the drone of cicadas [sekedas]. The center is completely empty. What is invisible nonetheless exists and often constitutes the most essential aspect. Slowly, between the blinding rays of the merciless African summer the silhouette of a new border and its location becomes visible.

Thus, what are the real motives behind the construction of a big center of permanence for migrants on the island? What if the island functions as a tap that can be turned off and on according political climates? They are all dragged in here” insists Giusy Bartolini, a green activist I interviewed on the Island. “There is no immigrant who arrives on the island if the authorities do not want. They have been always
intercepted, captured and dragged here to be filtered, and distributed through the network of centers around the Italian peninsula.”

4.8. Locating the border

What’s the real function of Lampedusa? Bruno Siragusa (a member of the neoliberal political party Forza Italia) was mayor of Lampedusa from 2002 until 2005 and since then every summer there is a so called “emergency” of immigrants’ landings. Interestingly enough, in an interview with Roman Herzog, Siragusa admits that there are no landings in Lampedusa since migrants’ boats are intercepted 60 miles out in the sea. Instead, it would be more appropriate to declare that the government is performing a humanitarian rescue operation. In his own words (My translation):

When 10 years ago the center did not exist yet and the phenomenon started, these people indeed were landing on these shores and they (migrants) were wondering around the territory and the people of Lampedusa would provide blankets, warm soup, to eat, expression of a great human solidarity. Now that the phenomenon is under control there is no reason to complain about.164

This interview is remarkable for two reasons: on one hand it can be noticed how the visibility of migrants created a sense of immediate solidarity with the local inhabitants, it demonstrates implicitly that the wall that creates invisibility often provokes insensibility and hostility. More important it is acknowledged that Lampedusa functions as a gathering place but not necessarily as a voluntary destination for migrants. Surprisingly the Italian Prime Minister, Mr. Silvio Berlusconi, clarifies the location of the border when last summer declared that “it is much easier [...] to examine individual situations in the country of origin, otherwise they come here and go to a camp which, I should not be saying this, is very similar to a concentration camp.”165

164 Roman Herzog, La porta d’Europa.
165 “Italy: PM Defends Diversion of Refugee Boats Back to Libya.”
It would seem just a faux pas, although it reveals a further complexity when one examines the statement more in depth. On one hand, Mr. Berlusconi acknowledges the unbearable conditions of permanence of migrants in the camps. On the other end, he announces a change of strategy, revealing once again the inherent mobility and ubiquity of the border. On 6 May 2009 Italy has unilaterally inaugurated a new policy for stemming the flow consisting in intercepting migrants on high seas and sending them back to Libya. Only a week later at the port of Gaeta, Italy and Libya celebrate the pact with a solemn ceremony where were present Maroni Interior Minister of Italy Libya's ambassador to Italy Hafid Gaddur and head of Italy's Guardia di Finanza Cosimo D'Arrigo, who added that members of the Libyan coast guard will stationed in Lampedusa.  

Mr Maroni, a member of the Northern League Party and Italian Minister of Interiors, bluntly observes:

> For the first time in history we succeeded in sending directly back to Libya clandestines whom we have located yesterday on the sea on three boats (barconi). Until today we had to take them into custody, identify and send them back to the nations of origins...”("Respinti in Libia migranti presi in mare, Onu preoccupata | Prima Pagina | Reuters,” n.d.)

The strategy seemed to be effective being 500 the boats intercepted and sent back to Libya in the first week. The number of arrivals suddenly dropped so that the Times of Malta publishes an article titled ‘Where have all the immigrants gone?” As I have explained tactics, differ from a strategy for the different approach to time. A tactics relies on improvisations and immediate response. It is presumable that migrants did not attempt to sail during the first phase of the joint patrol operation and tried different routes. The European elections of the members of the Parliament held

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166 http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sala_stampa/notizie/immigrazione/0193_2009_05_14_gaeta_consegna_motovedette.html#_1084908904.html

between 4 and 7 June 2009 supported this shift. The European People Party – EPP, to which Forza Italia and the Northern League belong, became then the largest group in the European Parliament with 256 members.

Since the Second World War, this is the first time a European state openly violated the principle of non-refoulement as indicated in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Notwithstanding what Berlusconi and his ministers declare, intercepting boat with potential refugees on high seas therefore outside the territorial water still constitutes a violation of the Refugee Convention. “As we will see the conflict over the state of exception presents itself essentially as a dispute over its proper locus.” (Agamben, 2005, p. 24). A part from the fact that Italian military boats are part of the territory of the state, jurisprudence and scholars have repeatedly stated that non-refoulement obligations are not limited by territorial boundaries of any state.

The principle of non-refoulement does not imply any geographical limitation. In UNHCR’s understanding, the resulting obligations extend to all government agents acting in an official capacity, within or outside national territory. Given the practice of States to intercept persons at great distance from their own territory, the international refugee protection regime would be rendered ineffective if States’ agents abroad were free to act at variance with obligations under international refugee law and human rights law.168

What is left of the legal principles of non-refoulement when more than 1000 people have being intercepted and sent back to non-secure, (that is only a euphemism), countries like Libya that did not recognize the existence of refugees? “The world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human.”169 Arendt cries. The paradox is simple while devastating: the system of human rights designed to protect those human beings who have nothing left but their naked body has been reduced to a derivative of

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168 Executive Committee for the High Commissioner’s Programme, Standing Committee, Interception of asylum-seekers and refugees. The international framework and recommendations for comprehensive approach, 88th meeting, EC/50/SC/CRP.17, 9 June 2000
169 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 299.
the nation-state logic that is constructed around a homogenous and firm concept of population. The very fact that the idea of nation has squatted in the place of the state has necessary provoked a caesura between people and People\textsuperscript{170}, and hence the issue of refugees, stateless, exiles in the first place. On one end lays a compact corpus of citizens and on the other end the banished and wretched of the Earth.

Like Arendt, Julia Kristeva\textsuperscript{171} traces the origin of the paradox within the text of the Declaration of the Rights of the Man and Citizen that was adopted between August 20 and 26, 1789. As she notes the ideas of the French Revolution were aimed at subverting the old system, one of aristocratic power, with a new one based on nationality. Men are born equal and free because are members of the nation as clearly stated in the art. 3 of the Declaration; once incorporated into the nation, men are considered active members of the polity. At that moment, the triad is sanctified under the protection of the newly democratic state’s institutions that will continuously shaping the national identity. But to shape means also to draw a line; it means to identify who belongs from who has been expelled to the margins. Theoretical conceptions that maintain the fiction of the rigidity and permanency of the border state have helped maintaining intact this system while not taking in consideration those who live “smack in the fissure.”\textsuperscript{172}

### 4.9 Space of Politics

But then how to make sense of the vast mass of human beings moving and crossing the definite borders of the sovereign state if not only by problematizing the dichotomy of inclusion – exclusion? At this moment, that we are experiencing the presence of camps in multiple form everywhere within the frontier of the first world only an attentive distinction over the use and definition of borders and frontier can help. I dare to press on this suggestion further claiming that the idea of frontier in itself can be associate with that of the camp as a Moebius strip concept, inside as well outside the sovereign. In order to sustain this association I refer to an ancient idea of border and frontier that

\textsuperscript{170} Agamben, \textit{Means Without End}.

\textsuperscript{171} Kristeva, \textit{Strangers to Ourselves}.

\textsuperscript{172} Guillermo Gomez-Peña, 1993:37.
belong to a time before the nation-state framework. In the ancient world the border was the line marked by the plow. Because to mark the land by the plow it is indispensable to take control of the territory, the border in origin indicated sovereign over a territory. Agamben reminds us how in the Roman system borders and sovereign are linked since the foundation of the Eternal City. A life that is sacer, a bare life and the sovereign are the two poles of the same system, the two elements of the space of exception that has in the concept of border an interesting link. As a matter of fact, one of the causes of sacratio was the cancellation of borders. Therefore anyone who dared to erase the mark on the ground would immediately be considered homo sacer.

The myth of the foundation of Rome is clarifying in this sense and the relative concept of pomerium. The foundation of a city involved a complicated religious process. According to Lefebvre:

The founding of Rome...was effected in a distinctly ritual manner. The founder...described a circle with his plough, thus subtracting a space from nature and investing it with a political meaning. Everything in this foundation story...is at once symbolic and practical: reality and meaning, the immediate and the abstract, are one.

After an appropriate site was chosen, a first line or plough had to be drawn. Inside the first line was the mundus meaning clean pure where all the good religious symbols had to be put. Next a second line had to be drawn outside the first one, and the space between the two was called pomerium as explained by Milani. Inside this space between the first and the second line priests would confine ghosts, demons, grubs, spirits of war, sicknesses and any negative circumstance that could affect the city and its inhabitants. On the pomerium it was forbidden to eat, to build, to live, to cultivate and even to walk over.

It was the area consecrated where the walls eventually would have been built on. Livio in his monumental “Ab Urbe Condita” is the mayor source of information about the myth of the foundation of Rome. As the story goes, Romulus and Remus,

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173 1991:244.
twin brothers, could not agree on where to build the city. As soon as Romulus drew the pomoerium on what today the Palatinus Hill is located, Remus, as a sign of defiance, crossed it. Romulus enraged killed him and became the first king of Rome declaring that he would have killed anyone daring to cross the pomerium "Sic deinde, quicumque alius transiliet moenia mea."175

Contrary to Hobbes’s myth of the Leviathan, here the city is not founded on a social pact; instead it relies on an absolute:

Abandonment to an unconditional power of death...and what this untying implies and produces-bare life, which dwells in the no man’s land between the home and the city –is, from the point of view of sovereignty, the original political element.’176.

Can we define this no man’s land as the frontier? Is not the pomerium ultimately that represents the frontier as the zone of mistiness? We intend the frontier with a sense of limit of a territory, even more a sense of extraterritoriality, where the wild things are. For instance in Roman maps the area of sub-Saharan Africa is indicated only and just as the line: Hic sunt Leones. Only lions dwell there. Thus the frontier had always indicated the zone of the unknown; a source of conflicts (but also of mutual enrichment), certainly the limit of the sacrum. To surpass the frontier often meant to violate the divine authority and to be contaminated; interestingly this was the case in surpassing the Pillars of Hercules, the limit of the Mediterranean Sea, between the world know and the unknown, as much as it was with the pomoerium.

I maintain the validity of this analogy to draw up the concept of frontier in the ancient world to what Agamben refers to describe the camp as a zone outside/inside the law, in which undocumented migrants that dare to cross the Mediterranean can be reduced to homini sacri therefore human beings die without that anyone could be held responsible. Agamben in his Homo Sacer conceptualized the state of exception mostly

176 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 90.
within the specific space of the camp and perhaps this constitutes the limit of his opera. On the other hand astutely he observed that the state of exception had already materialized in other spaces such as waiting areas in international airport, the peripheries of mega cities or the Soccer stadium in Bari in 1991. He suggested that we found in the presence of a camp anytime the state of exception materialized. However, the camp far from representing absence of conflict or an homogenous place, indicates a subterranean permanent violence intrinsic to any form of social purification and political evacuation. The mechanism of externalization related to migration control is indeed an example of consensus wherever it may occur far from the state’s border or within the metropolitan areas of Europe.

Thus, it would be erroneous to configure the idea of consensus as a hegemonic and homogenous space, a Mediterranean plaque, where political life occurs separate from naked life. In this space of purity we will be all living dominated by an overwhelming power as Ranciere put it, “entrapped in the complementarity of bare life and exception.” Only if we intend the space of exception as a space of politics, as Primo Levi remarkably showed in his Se questo e’ un uomo (Survival in Auschwitz), the imperturbability of the space of exclusion can be disrupted. In this sense the bipolar impasse of Agamben’s argument of the state of exception, Sovereign/bare life, can be overcome. A political space “is not established solely by actions (with material violence generating a place, a legal order, a legislation): the genesis of a space of this kind also presupposes a practice, images, symbols, and the construction of buildings, of towns, and of localized social relationships.” Consider for instance the following three boat stories.

178 “Dissensus”, n.  
179 Survival In Auschwitz.  
180 Lefebvre, 1991:245.
CHAPTER 5. ANGLERS OF MEN
The boat is a floating piece of space, a place without a place that exists by itself, that is closed in on itself and at the same time is given over the infinity of the sea\textsuperscript{181}.

\textbf{5.1 Legal Borders}

This chapter seeks to theorize the dynamics that emerge from the intimate relation between contemporary borders and biopolitics in the waters around the Island of Lampedusa. As I have shown in the same waters where Ulysses and Aeneas wandered for years, the Italian government has recently erected new borders that traverse two distinct legal realms. At the international level, on May 6\textsuperscript{th} 2009, following a bilateral agreement with Libya that skipped over parliamentarian debates, the Italian government unilaterally inaugurated a new strategy for stemming the flow of African migrants and asylum seekers. It consisted of intercepting migrants in Mediterranean international waters sending them back to Libya. These actions stand in violation of Art. 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, a convention Libya never endorsed.

At domestic level, with the introduction and subsequent enforcement of the crime of aiding and abetting clandestine immigration (art. 110 of the criminal code, art. 12 of legislative decree 286/98), the state criminalized de facto any action aimed at rescuing boatloads of African migrants who may become stranded in the Mediterranean Sea. Some individuals, fisherman and NGOs, have decided to act in violation of the law, while others, for respect or fear of the same law, have judged immigrant lives unworthy of rescue. In response to this new legal paradigm, three trials were initiated in the same court of Agrigento: one in 2006 against the crew of the \textit{Cap Anamur}, a German aid agency, one in 2007 against seven Tunisian fishermen, both for aiding and abetting clandestine immigration. The third one, in 2008, was initiated against Mr. Mariano Ruggiero who has been charged with murder, having hit a migrant who had reached his vessel and thrown him back in the sea.

\textsuperscript{181} Foucault, “Of Other Spaces.”
In this last section I would like to engage those practices mentioned above that I include within the micro politics of justice. With this term, following Shapiro (2010) I refer to a “process in which individuals are affected by legality/illegalities and employ different courses of action of what is just in contrast to macro politics of justice or the way states administer the law”. Such encounters between concepts of legality/illegality and individuals highlight the way law articulate the spatial bases separating alternative loci of enunciation that exist before the law such as solidarity in the maritime context.

By analyzing the rulings of the tribunal of Agrigento, I will make an attempt to expose rigid conceptions of borders and frontiers that naturalize the state’s efforts to define the limits of territory, as the necessary frame to domesticate alterity and hide the intrinsic violence of bordering practices of exclusion. I call this approach sympathetic because involves the direct participation of individuals in engaging law and institution and interrogate its utility for reading other liminal spaces around the world, whether we come across torrid deserts, deep blue seas, or urban peripheries at the margins of contemporary metropolis.

5.2. Legal Framework

With regard to the international legislation, it is broadly recognized that the focus must be on saving the lives of migrants in distress at sea. This is a longstanding maritime tradition as well as an obligation enshrined in international law. This principle is based on two international Conventions:

- Article 98(1) of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides that "every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers: (a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; (b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distressed, if informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such action may reasonably be expected of him".
Regulation 33(1) of the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention) provides that the "master of a ship at sea which is in a position to be able to provide assistance, on receiving information from any source that persons are in distress at sea, is bound to proceed with all speed to their assistance, if possible informing them or the search and rescue service that the ship is doing so".

The obligations of States are also defined, such as for example in the 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention) which obliges State Parties to "ensure that assistance be provided to any person in distress at sea (...) regardless of the nationality or status of such a person or the circumstances in which that person is found" (Chapter 2.1.10) and to "(...) provide for their initial medical or other needs, and deliver them to a place of safety" (Chapter 1.3.2).

However, the interpretation of these conventions, which goes beyond the scope of this chapter, must be read in relation to the State responsible for the migrants found at sea, with particular regard to the distinction between rescues at sea and abetting undocumented immigration. The thin line that separate the two represents the space of politics in which the border emerges, especially if we consider that apparently, migration pressure on the southern borders of Europe increased over the last few years. According to the IOM from the 1980s onward the level of international migration has risen by more than 60% and approximately 175 million people are today likely to be migrants from their own countries.182

I say ‘apparently’ due to the fact that, if on one hand, migration experts take into consideration the importance of technologies of transportation in enhancing human mobility, they fail to recognize the impact of sophisticated technologies of detection and interception deployed in the Mediterranean Sea in counting the number of migrants approaching Europe. Notwithstanding the reality, and the partiality, of

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182 IOM 2005. 
http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/published_docs/books/wmr_sec03.pdf
these numbers, it is a given that only a tiny minority – between 10% and 13% of undocumented migrants arrive by sea. Still, despite the dangers and mounting death tolls\textsuperscript{183}, the situations migrants face crossing the Mediterranean has been spectacularized extensively by the media without taking in consideration the safety of migrants. Because of the visual impact of boats crowded with desperate migrants lost at sea, politicians have considered containing arrivals at Italian coasts an absolute priority\textsuperscript{184}.

Along these lines, state’s practice to accuse fisherman who save lives with abetting undocumented immigration is used as deterrent and ultimately as border control. Within Italian law, in 2002 the relevant penalties for the offence against abetting undocumented immigration, as enunciated by the art. 12 of Legislative Decree 286/1998, were made more severe. Unless the facts constitute a more serious offence any part that performs acts designed to procure the entry of foreign into Italy is subject to penalty. Smugglers are subject to detention for up to three years or up to fifteen years, in the event the object of the entry was the exploitation of minors or prostitution. Nevertheless, a specific exemption from criminal liability is granted in the event that assistance is given to migrants in need: humanitarian aid and assistance provided to these people does not constitute a criminal offence.

The position of those who rescue "boat-people" in need should, then, be protected in order to avoid that fishing boats and mercantile ships are dissuaded from providing assistance to migrants at sea, since they fear that they could be charged with facilitating illegal immigration. Without examining the matter in detail, which would require an in-depth legal analysis, it is worth mentioning two cases that have caused a tremendous outcry in Italy and abroad, and which are paradigmatic of the conflict between the need to effectively fight against irregular migration and the primary obligation to rescue people in need.

The first is the C\textipa{\textit{ap Anamur} case, for which the Agrigento Court pronounced a sentence of absolution on October 7, 2009. According to the historical reconstruction

\textsuperscript{183} At least 17,317 people have died since 1988 along the \textit{European borders}.

\textsuperscript{184} See Ministero dell’Interno, rapporto sulla criminalita’ in Italia. Analisi, Prevenzione, Contrasto (Rome:2007)
emerged at the trial, the Cap Anamur, flying a German flag and belonging to a humanitarian organization, had rescued 37 shipwrecked irregular immigrants in the Sicily channel, who declared themselves to have escaped from Sudan because of the civil war there. After taking on board the migrants in international waters, the Cap Anamur was deemed to have passed in Maltese territorial waters, without disembarking them there. The boat set sail for Sicily, but at 17 miles from Porto Empedocle, Italian authorities refused the ship entry to the territorial waters. A dispute therefore arose as to the competences and responsibilities of the Maltese, Italian and German States. Italy being the coast state, Germany being the state whose flag the boat was sailing with, and Malta being the first state where the boat arrived with the asylum seekers aboard.

As a matter of fact, as it emerged at the trial, the Cap Anamur had visited the port of Malta in two occasions, before and after the rescue. In particular, captain Schmidt on June 25, five days after the rescue, did not communicate the authorities of Malta the presence of 37 migrants aboard when the boat was docked for mechanical repairs. What is more the Italian authorities believed that Captain Schmidt had communicated them that the rescue happened on June 30 instead of June 20 in order to obtain permission to harbor. Finally, three weeks later Italy granted the permit of entry in Porto Empedocle and the following day disembarkation was authorized. The captain and the crew were accused of abetting irregular migration and were arrested, while the shipwrecked people were sent to a reception centre. The following day the captain and the crew were released, as the competent court did not confirm the restrictive measures against them.

The second case involved seven Tunisian fishermen who were arrested at Lampedusa and had their boats seized in August 2007. They claimed to have saved the lives of 44 migrants (including 11 women and two children) from rough seas 30 miles south of Lampedusa, but the captains of two fishing boats and their five crew were charged with abetting illegal immigration. The captains of the two Tunisian fishing boat informed the 'Maritime rescue coordination centre' asking for medical assistance for one of the two children aboard. A medical visit was carried out on board and it assessed that the health condition of the migrants was not critical and that therefore
the humanitarian reasons at the basis of the exemption from liability did not apply. The Court of Agrigento thus validated the provisional arrest of the captain and crew, finding that there was serious evidence of guilt in their conduct, in relation to the crime of abetting illegal immigration.

The two cases are particularly interesting in view of the fact that on one hand they raise the issue of the scope of the introduction of the criminal offence of abetting irregular immigration. On the other hand, they question the limit of the exemption from criminal liability for humanitarian reasons. Media and politicians before the end of the two trials were particularly effective in mounting a general among the general public a sense of diffuse insecurity and panic of immigrants’ invasion. Like in a TV show the audience, that is the legitimate citizenships of Italy, were puzzled with questions such as: Were they actually mere operations of rescue at sea or were the constitutive elements of a crime present? Did the rescuers merely intend to provide assistance or were they determined to take the shipwrecked migrants on board for other reasons?

Among other reasons it was decisive the element of profit. As a matter of fact, the reasoning of the decision, which validated the initial arrest of the captain and officials of the Cap Anamur, contains a reference to the notion of profit. Although they were certainly not passeurs, and were therefore not motivated by economic interests, the constitutive element of the crime of smuggling subsisted, since according to the Prosecutor they actually wanted to get the greatest media coverage and publicity in favor of the organization. As to the extent of the exemption for humanitarian reasons, the decision issued in relation to the provisional arrest agreed with the Public Prosecutor's position: the captain and officials of the Cap Anamur on the one hand willingly and unlawfully introduced the 37 migrants into Italian territorial waters, in breach of Italian law on migration. On the other, according to the accusation the persons involved were not neither real asylum seekers, nor they were in a critical status needing prompt assistance. As a consequence, they were not entitled to claim exemption from liability.
The judgment rendered in the case of the Tunisian fishermen aboard of the boats *Mohamed Hedi* and *Mortadha*, took a more "open" approach. It ruled against the decision issued by the Tribunal of Agrigento, which validated the provisional arrest of the rescuers. According to the court, the circumstances grounding that order in relation to the conduct of the fishermen were not sufficient to establish that they had acted for the purpose of facilitating illegal immigration. In particular the facts that neither net nor fish were found on the boat by Italian authorities was not considered appropriate evidence. Similarly, in relation to the exemption from criminal liability, the fact that the doctors who visited the shipwrecked migrants on board did not judge that their life was in danger was not sufficient to exclude that the fishermen acted in good faith. During the trials, it has also been pointed out those State obligations to cooperate in rescue operations at sea require appropriate behavior irrespective of their power to pursue people facilitating irregular migration or to adopt the measures set by the law against irregular migrants.

### 5.3 Micropolitics of Justice

The relevant judgments on both matters were expected with great interest considering the media coverage and the suspense they have generated. Both sentences were pronounced in 2009 and both absolved the defendants from the charge of abetting undocumented immigration, but with some relevant differences. In fact while in the case of the Cap Anamur, the defendant were absolved ‘because the fact does not constitutes a crime’ according to the art. 530 of the Italian Criminal Code, the Tribunal of Agrigento acquitted the seven Tunisian fishermen of abetting undocumented immigration but found the two captains guilty for resisting Italian coast guards that attempted to stop them. It is worth noting, that during the trial, important newspaper, both “Il Giornale” and “Der Spiegel”, sustained the public prosecutors accusation that the two boats ignored the stop of Italian Coast Guards to halt and return to a Tunisian port with bad whether conditions and survivors aboard who needed urgent medical attention.
At the trial emerged that fact of numerous attempts by the Italian Coast Guard to intercept and return the two Tunisian boats out of the territorial waters, as it was “an American Cup for illegals”\textsuperscript{185}. This border practice is in violation with all those international conventions that recognizes the right to ask for asylum even in extraterritorial waters and a dangerous practice that provoked a collision between the boat Sybille and an Italian Coast Guard and shipwreck of 70 Albanians in 1997\textsuperscript{186}. The practice of interrupting the flow of migrants across the Mediterranean Sea border became more frequent lately and until few months ago were made in collaboration with Libyan Coastguards. Even if a complete analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important noting that these practices of interception tend to focus on national security concerns and for this reason is hard to reconcile them with human rights treaty obligations\textsuperscript{187}. Indeed interception and rescue share little common ground.

While it is significant that both rulings absolved the defendants from the accusation of abetting undocumented immigration, it remains the idea among the public opinion, and especially among fishermen, that those who rescue lives stranded at sea, choose to do at risk of having their boats and fishing tools confiscated for years. They will then face public trials with enormous legal expenses, with the consequence of compromising the destinies of their families. The two cases mentioned here act as deterrent for those who may be in the position of rescuing migrants in international waters. The evidence given by many migrants refer that ships and fishermen boats ignored their request for help, sometimes without giving the alarm to the closest port or authorities. Sometimes migrants are left to die at sea, simply ignore and became ‘bare life [...] without there being a murder.’\textsuperscript{188} And sometimes things go even worse. The same Court of Agrigento that hosted the hearings I have mentioned here is in charge of ruling on the accusation of homicide against Mr. Mariano Ruggiero, a fisherman, 46 years old, who on the night of January 10, 2008 came across a dinghy with 60 Somalis. When one of the refugees reached the vessel by swimming and asked

\textsuperscript{185} \url{http://www.guidasicilia.it/ita/main/news/print.jsp?IDNews=27608}

\textsuperscript{186} \url{http://www.repubblica.it/online/fatti/vedetta/rinvio/rinvio.html}

\textsuperscript{187} These practices were defined by the IOM ‘one of the most effective measures to enforce states’ domestic migration laws and policies in UN Doc. EC/GC/01/11, 31 May 2001.

for help, Mr. Ruggiero hit him back in the sea. The man drowned and his body disappeared between the waves.\textsuperscript{189} “What other notion could he have of the world, if around him, the word ‘just’ had always been suffocated by violence and the wind of the world had merely changed the word into a stagnant, putrid reality?”\textsuperscript{190}

These practices once implemented or just acted out, attain their own life and indicate an alternative direction to follow, therefore alternately closing down or opening up for new possibilities of political community. Fundamentally I believe, they fashion innovative contours of the frontier and delimit the space of the political as they perform since “the genesis of a space of this kind also presupposes a practice, images, symbols, and [...] of localized social relationships”\textsuperscript{191} like between Tunisian anglers and African migrants. As a matter of fact the idea around which my research is built relies on a conception of territory that is constantly modified, contested, restructured both according to the actions of individuals and to the institutional infrastructure. In other words, it is the fundamental space where the concept of people finds its own perennial origins beyond the “normality of national citizen-subject.”\textsuperscript{192} When this normality is internalized and become essentially identity, it is also the border to be internalized and moving with the individual. “As a consequence borders cease to be purely external realities. They became also [...] what Fichte [...] magnificently termed inner borders [\textit{inner grenzen}]; that is to say, \textit{invisible borders}, situated everywhere and nowhere.”\textsuperscript{193}

Imagination is essential as much as indifference for the construction and operability of the border. The imagination of invasion from the South produces virtual anxiety, which conversely allows for the militarization of the border. This is true for the Mediterranean Sea as much as for European metropolis. By virtual I mean that the anxiety is experienced to the full as a feeling that lurks in ambush on the streets but takes shape almost never and nowhere. Anxiety provokes political immobility, which manifests itself as a wall of indifference, that is a border in itself. Still, the border is contingent on power practices whose perennial fluctuations, like in Williams’, make

\textsuperscript{189} “Il Comandante Di Un Peschereccio Accusato Della Morte Di Un Naufrago - Cronaca - Repubblica.it.”
\textsuperscript{190} Leonardo Sciascia, The Day of the Owl, 1961, pp. 102-103.
\textsuperscript{191} Lefebvre,\textit{ The Production of Space}, 245.
\textsuperscript{192} Balibar and Hahn,\textit{ Politics and the Other Scene}, 78.
\textsuperscript{193} \textit{Ibid.}
the border seem to be natural and inevitable. It is important to shake this assertion and
demonstrate the border’s reliance on a complex interconnection of historical
contingencies and thus to reveal its violence and at the same time its precariousness.
The idea of fixity of the border reinforces the discourse of Fortress Europe (Gebrewold-
Tochalo 2007) as a socio-political body under a permanent state of siege that instigate
violent panic reactions. Privileging an ahistorical perspective as I mentioned before,
synchronic approaches interpret conflicts in Africa for instance as disconnected to
politics and colonial histories, and instead interpret them as security issues that
threaten an imagined stable political space of Europe. A discourse of securitization and
risk analysis conceals the real functions of frontier and borders to filter out certain
individuals while crystallizing the imagery of the Nation-State as the only place in which
“authentic politics”\(^{194}\) is possible. This is the logic behind the state’s strategy of leveling
fishermen who help castaway refugees with charges of human trafficking, or the Italian
government’s latest practice of intercepting migrants/asylum seekers in international
waters to disrupt their trajectories.

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fashion innovative contours of the frontier and delimit the space of the political as they
perform since “the genesis of a space of this kind also presupposes a practice, images,
symbols, and […] of localized social relationships”\(^ {195} \) like between African anglers and
African migrants.

As these boat stories highlight, any individual can assume the responsibility to
set up a dialogue with the other, to have a say on who is in and who is out, to break the
wall of silence and invisibility intrinsic to any externalization practice to function.
Relying barely on police( a la Ranciere) at distance we run the risk to become
anesthetized and indifferent when people silently disappear within the space of
exception. Because:

\(^{194}\) Walker, 1992

\(^{195}\) Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 245.
One of the paradoxes of the state of exception lies in the fact that in the state of exception, it is impossible to distinguish transgression of the law from execution of the law, such that what violates a rule and what conforms to it coincide without any remainder.\textsuperscript{196}

It is indispensable then to rediscover the substance of the borderscape, at the edge of the externalization of migration control, inside as well as outside the geographical features of Europe. That is a space of negotiations, confrontations and recognitions of diversities without which there exists no polis and no politics but only a pencil-drawn silhouette of the European citizen, cut off from bureaucracy.

\textsuperscript{196} Agamben, 1998:57
CHAPTER 6. THE VIRTUAL DOOR
Οὐ καὶ ἥ τεχνη, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγὼ, ἐπὶ τοῦτῳ πέφυκεν, ἐπὶ τῷ τὸ συμφέρον ἐκάστῳ ζητεῖν τε καὶ ἐκπορίζειν; ἔπὶ τοῦτῳ, ἔφη.

And isn’t the art [techne] naturally directed toward seeking and providing for the advantage of each?

Yes, that is what it is directed toward.

Plato ‘Republic’ Book I, 341d.

6.1 Towards a technéology of European migration control

Elspeth Guild and Didier Bigo have repeatedly pointed out how European migration and US policy have changed during the 90s to extend outside the geographical territory of the state. Therefore, the role of visas regulation, consulates as outposts of the state, and bilateral agreements with other states has been emphasized (2005). However, the 21st century, with 9/11 as its incipit, saw the transformation of such controls in width and depth. A propos Guild and Bigo say that to:

Analyze the forms of policing at distance only as remote control public policy [...] is nevertheless insufficient [...] it does not address the central relations between order, border, and identity. It fails to understand that the violence the Western societies project, or the freedom ‘we’ want to spread by measures of policing are often two faces of the same coin, i.e. the incapacity to a have a cosmopolitan identity assumed through the values of freedom, equality and justice while living in a world where inequality is just next door. [258].

That is similar to the concept of the Empire that Hardt and Negri sketched at the beginning of this century when they state that 'the passage to Empire emerges from the
twilight of modern sovereignty. In contrast to imperialism, Empire establishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. In this context, it is fair then, to pronounce standards of extraterritorial mobility control more global and common to different areas of the world, such as Palestine/Israel, Mexico/USA and the Mediterranean Sea between Africa and Europe. The rule of Empire is thus decentered and deterritorialized wrapping the entire planet in a net of multiple mobility controls. Still this conceptualization remains somehow flat, bidimensional given that, on the other hand, thanks to the increasing role of sophisticated biometric technologies of surveillance developed for military purposes, controls deepened at the skin level and beyond. These risks require coordinated and immediate response and the deployment of the latest technologies of surveillance and control. It is worth reiterating here that visibility of a few migrants serve the scope to fulfill the need to rest from an anxiety of the invisible and unknown. Even if clearly located on night vision radar screens, migrants bodies are only white dots that, like a virus when detected, run in every direction. On the contrary the image in this video below, transform the corporeal elements of migrants escaping into data analogous to those signs that enclose them.

Figure 6.1. Frontex Operation at the border with Turkey seeking migrants with infrared. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xde5J6xqxn0

197 Hardt and Negri, Empire.
198 Watch video RABIT Operation Nov 2010 Frondex RABIT Greece Turkey Video. Here: http://frontexplode.eu/
The effect is one of ubiquity (it could be anywhere, even your backyard) and suspension (the viewer keeps staring at this image) between real and virtual. Its visual representation is suggestive of a contested space whose impossible location produces anxiety into the viewer, which in return is the rationalization for its existence (of the image and the technology that produces it).

Given that my research focuses on the European externalization of migration control, a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon cannot avoid facing the changes that technological advancement have brought into it. Border practices intended only as re-enacted outside the geopolitical edges of states, do not account for the application of technologies that are overproduced in highly industrialized societies of Europe and re-employed by African migrants. Even in its spatial multiplicity, the border if intended only as static, resembles an analogical device similar to Bentham’s scheme of a prison, reread by Foucault, where individuals were interned and eventually disciplined while been always under the undetectable gaze of the guardian. That vision implies an idea of arrest, correction and individualization gathered in a specific place.

6.2 Banopticon vs. Panopticon

Although extremely groundbreaking at that time, it cannot describe how migration policy changed in order to facilitate the high mobility of goods and the identification of human beings [where previously with passport we had ‘identities’] required by contemporary flows of capital. Therefore, when a human being crosses the border or dwell in what remains stuck on her skin is neither a name nor nationality. She is illegal, Muslim, prostitute, temporary worker, black, alien resident, or gambas manipuladora (shrimps handler) according to the setting of that border in a specific moment. This concept emerges clearly from critical visual scholar Ursula Biemann’s video Europlex, in which the author follows women going back and forth between Morocco and Europe to work in transnational zones in North Africa for the European market. Superimposing digital images and script over their traditional clothing, Biemann points
out how the border practice let surface only one layer of any human being, that is the one that it is important in that particular moment.

However, while I underline the continuous human beings across frontiers, I am not here accepting the totalizing assumptions of liberal globalization of a bordless world. Instead, I recognize the need to deepen the study of contemporary externalization of border practices beyond a mere spatial displacement of the border inside as well as outside Europe. My attempt is to clarify the complex interconnection between technological innovations and human migrations that generates a system of relations and spatial organization in a process of territorialization and deterritorialization. Borders do not exist anymore like military defense lines or as locations for exchange and commerce. As explained elsewhere, borders exist in symbiosis with increased mobility both appearing here and there, in a continuum of events and power relations, and live through individuals who are the vehicle of its existence.

If then a border is not located at the border anymore, a Foucauldian approach is without a doubt instrumental to understanding the multiplicity of border practices. According to Foucault to study events is ‘to rediscover the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, play of forces, strategies and so on which at any given moment establish what subsequently counts as being self evident, universal and necessary.’ Without doubt, Foucault’s writings on disciplinary societies exhibit a peculiar kind of power, that is a power of seduction. This methodological approach has generated countless studies on disciplinary power and surveillance, among which, Gilles Deleuze’s *Postscript on the Society of Control* emerges as a highly influential piece in explaining the shift from a disciplinary society of 19th century to a contemporary society of control.

With this in mind Deleuze claims that disciplinary societies are turning into control societies, from a analogical system to a digital one, where power has become more fluid, abandoning structures of confinement in favor of fluctuating networks where the lines [borders] are blurred and where the inside is not so distinct from the outside. Deleuze argues that ‘whereas discipline set up a productive tension between masses and individuals, with control we witness a world of ‘dividuals’ whose context is
not the mass or society, but proliferating databanks, profiles and markets. (Walters 2006, 191). In this direction, Didier Bigo, taking inspiration from Foucault’s concept of disciplinary societies, develops the concept of ‘Banopticon’ in attempt to explain contemporary social practices of control. While Bigo delivers a comprehensive analysis of European system of migration control, his study remains indissolubly linked to an Orwellian system of domination of mobility realized by ‘routinization of the monitoring of groups on the move through technologies of surveillance.’ (Borderscapes, 4). Despite the keen interest that his studies have generated in the understanding of the use of technologies for the political management of populations, scholars either focus on technologies of surveillance and control, or try to explain how human beings use technologies and knowledge related to them to migrate from an anthropological point of view. Nobody seems to have considered the impact of technologies on migrants and border controls as elements of power relations that are mutually constitutive. As I implement Foucault’s suggestion to focus on practices, I am aiming beyond the implementation of technologies as merely a device of control. I pay attention to practices of bordering as much as de-bordering. I have in mind a passage at the beginning of Discipline and Punish when Foucault admonishes to:

Not concentrate the study of the punitive mechanisms on their ‘repressive’ aspect alone, on their ‘punishment’ aspects alone, but situate them in a whole series of their possible positive effects, even if these seem marginal at first sight.

As a consequence, regard punishment as a complex social function.\textsuperscript{199}

In the final part of this chapter then, I look into productive tensions generated by the interaction between migrants and new available technologies. New technologies, I sustain, provide the means and sometimes the motivation for engaging border practices intended as practices of control as well as of migratory performances. Technological development in fact provides the necessary support for the organization of migrant trajectories and at the same time accounts for the newest realization of border control

\textsuperscript{199} Discipline & Punish, 23.
in response to longer and more fragmented and elusive migrants’ trajectories. However, it is very important to underline the productive tensions that occur at the border without romanticizing the agency of the migrant, while also focusing attention beyond the regulatory function of the border. Taking this approach means studying how the overproduction of contemporary technologies of border control impacts the meaning of European externalization of migration control in relation to African populations and societies.

Technologies of migration control [satellite / biometrics/ radar/] are at the same time causes and ends of the same process that involve labor and migration. Because of these technologies, migrants are detected and differently included within the host society in a position of vulnerability. Technologies of visibility are then essential to determine the structure of the working class but at the same time, they became crucial economic factors of research and industrial development for receiving countries within a comprehensive technécology of migration control. I call this approach technécology to stress the interconnectivity between technological practices of border control and migratory movement. More and more the West is developing and implementing technologies of detection as much as lifestyle technologies or war technologies which often blend together like in the case of gaming consoles. In one way of another, these technologies overflow from the West to the Rest, in this case from Western Europe into North Africa, and are -re-elaborated in their scope and reason d’être within an organic system of relation. As a matter of fact, as Plato suggested in the first book of the Republic, techné [art or craft] is functional for everyone according to his or her intention. Isn’t it?

6.3 From analogical to digital

The EU had to use "the most advanced technology to reach the highest level of security" to stop visitors overstaying their welcome in Europe and to prevent terrorists from coming in.200

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200 "EU Plans Biometric Border Checks."
This section investigates the transformation of European borders into technological and digital borders. It can be argued that the border performs today as it did in the past: filtering the good from the bad, the welcomed from the unwanted. Within this general understanding, specific geographical locations are designed as points of entry/exits or gateways into specific political entities. Europe accordingly has 1,792 designated crossing points among which 665 are in the air, 871 are across the sea and 246 are over land crossing points. To presume these data represent the reality of the border is misleading for the reason that they simply cannot account for the ubiquity, multiplicity and mobility of border practices today. The border performs simultaneously at different times and spaces and a contrast with official designated entry locations of the past would perhaps allow for a better understanding of contemporary technological features of border practices.

Ellis Island is a clear example of a past gateway to the emerging society of North America where the biopolitical operation of filtering was performed. Migrants had to pass through those points that were at the same time points of arrival but also receptions. There was a real feeling to be at edge of two societies, a point of passage from one social dimension into another. Peter Andreas (2003) examined the change in border technology at the turn of the twentieth century when industrialized regions of the world designed points of entrance where the implementation of new legislations of migration control interconnected with scientific and medical notions of health. Ellis Island was an iconic place in this sense, performing a powerful role in the imagination of migrants who ventured in crossing the Atlantic, lured by a marketed mirage of a land of promises.

This moment has been visually expressed in many novels and visual documents among which the Golden Door 201 perhaps accounts for one of the most vivid re-enactments. The Golden Door recovers the odyssey of a Sicilian family that decides to leave the land where they belonged to migrate to the new world of North America. It is not a coincidence that the most heartbreaking shot in the film is when the ship departs the port of Naples to embark in an epic journey towards the dreamland of America.

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201 Crialese, Golden Door (2006) - IMDb.
The director, Mr. Crialese raises his camera high above the masses so that they, those who leave, at the beginning indistinguishable in their commonality, are slowly torn apart as the ship leaves the dock. The void thus created is filled with agony, hope and an intense silence broken only when the sound of the foghorn goes off. The journey across the Atlantic Ocean lasts more than a week and the movie goes on between the bowels of the liner where the third class of humanity struggles with dramatic bravery against claustrophobic conditions and a storm that leaves everyone almost dead.

The approach to Ellis Island is covered in fog preventing the passengers and film viewers from seeing the New World. The reality of America would certainly at that point hold a different view than the idyllic dimension of hospitality and acceptance inscribed on the Statue of Liberty. However, the focus here is on the specific space of the Island as a site of selection that for many years has represented the quintessential nature of the border, condensed in a definite time and place to be traversed and lived. Immediately upon entrance, migrants are subjected to a series of tests, both medical and social, to assess their worthiness to go beyond the "Golden Door" and enter the New World of scientific and logical civilization. Here at the border the government of the new world reveals its bio-political side, doing away with those having biological (both mental and physical) features that do not fit with the preordered model.

The dialogue between mother Fortunata and the custom officer is illuminating when she has been asked to assemble geometrical shapes in a “logical” order. When she questions the officer’s authority to define a worthy human being, (an attribute that for her belongs only to God) we hear the absurdity of a scientific delirium that defines biological defects as infectious for the purity of the new world’s society. Her skepticism brings to light what narratives and discourses celebrating the United States as an open-armed sanctuary for everyone obscure (Behdad, 2005). Eventually Fortunata will return back to her world because there is no space for the magical and the illogical in the New World, a world that is headed towards a technological future. The rest of the family will stay, and Salvatore and Lucy will get married fulfilling those requirements that draw the line between legality and illegality for any migrant, which is still the case even today.
Even if Foucault never wrote about Ellis Island, he wrote that disciplinary societies of the 19th century were concerned with floating populations and that we could locate their most visible expressions in the school, the hospital, the prison, and the factory. Disciplinary societies thus became interested with the regulation of the human population at the level of mind and body. Ellis Island condensed all these functions, the quintessential dispositif of discipline because it had different institutions inside a single one. In fact it was an institution meant to arrest the movement of migrants, to break or re-invent emotional and blood ties dividing and rearranging groups of individuals, and after examining their mental and corporeal fitness, to distribute those bodies inside the territory beyond the gate to form a new nation. With the transformation and multiplication of the border practices, the spatial dimension of the border has changed. Institution like Ellis Island have lost their practicality and have become historical attractions, simulacra of amnesiac societies that became more democratic according to some, more Orwellian according to others. Among the latter, Bigo, distancing himself from Orwell’s analysis of centralized policing of surveillance, sustains that border practices of surveillance appear here and there, outside and inside, as in a Moebius strip (Bigo 2001). He explains what he calls Banopticon and how it differs from Bentham’s Panopticon reread by Foucault when he states:

The latter supposes that everyone in a given society is equally submitted to surveillance and control, that [there?]exists a physical proximity between watchers and the watched, as well as an awareness of being under scrutiny. The Banopticon on the contrary, deals with the notion of exception, and the difference between surveillance for all but control of only a few.

The dystopia of diffuse control along the frontier as well as inside and outside it is made possible by the implementation of technologies of control and security. What is new is the simultaneity of border practice in different place at the same time and how

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202 Foucault, Discipline & Punish.
203 Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, Borderscapes, 6.
the same technologies are equally utilized to assist necessities of war, health and business together\textsuperscript{204}. Even if it is fair to claim that the border always functions as a filter, today I sustain, the border, in its technological reconfiguration is extremely permeable and mobile. Similar to a firewall, it differentiates between low and high speed, it fights viruses and freezes Trojan horses [but at the same time, it exists because of them]. It materializes here and there. As a matter of fact, there exist points of interceptions, convergences and crises that manifest themselves on the geographical territory and appear sometimes and somewhere, but whose trajectories are often dislocated from a tangible materiality.

This is particularly true if we refer to the virtual gateways of Europe. Walters reminds us how the UK immigration service provides companies and their staff with detailed instructions to detect bodies that utilize the mechanical technology of the truck to enter the UK from continental Europe. What we might call the 'securization of the truck and its milieu' turns the truck and its entire route into a dispersed, mobile border. (2006:194). The border practice of control does not happen only before leaving France or when the truck disembarks in the UK, but it continues until destination, at every gas station or random checkpoint on the highway. Technologies therefore rendered the EU externalization of migration control an integrated system with all components in communication with each other under the supervision of FRONTEX, a special agency created ad hoc for this scope. In the next section I will examine the single components giving at the end a complete description of what FRONTEX is how it works.

\textbf{6.4 Technologies of migration control}

Enhancing control and surveillance of external borders of the EU remains an absolute \textbf{priority}. An Integrated Border Management Strategy should ensure a higher degree of efficiency ...To that end, the Council and the Parliament

\textsuperscript{204} On the technologisation of security practices, see Didier Bigo and Julian Jeandesboz, \textit{Border Security, Technology and the Stockholm Programme}, INEX Policy Brief No. 3. CEPS, Brussels, November 2009.]Here Bigo's latest: \url{http://www.ceps.eu/search/node/bigo}
should as soon as possible reach an agreement on the proposal to amend the Frontex Regulation, which should address, inter alia, the issue of the processing and exchange of personal data in accordance with the legal framework for data protection. Another crucial measure is the swift implementation of the phases and steps laid down for the development of the European Surveillance System (EUROSUR) and the further employment of modern technological means such as entry-exit system and automated border control, while ensuring the interoperability of the different systems drawing on lessons learnt while developing the existing systems. Common Schengen visa policy has also a crucial role to play. To fully benefit from it, swift implementation and rollout of VIS are essential.  

As articulated in the 2004 Hague Programme, measures to control crime and terrorism are interconnected with a fight against undocumented immigration, defined ‘illegal’, to the point that the very concept of war has been reframed beyond interstate dynamics under these logics. After the terrorist attacks on 9/11 in NY and on 3/11 in Madrid, terms such as criminal, terrorist and illegal immigrant once distinctive, now overlap, ‘establishing a continuum of security measures that effectively links visa application procedures and entry and exit procedures at external border crossing.’ (Hague Programme 2004, 25). The Hague Programme in this sense represents the central document that articulates in Europe the interconnection between security controls and migration management and clearly articulates the technological and digital transformation of the externalization of migration control at the European level. This transformation entails words and things that, even if with apparent different aims, play an important common role in maintaining an incessant in/security continuum. Therefore collection of personal biometric data, deployment of technologies of surveillance inside/outside/above the EU, patrolling, interception, intervention and

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205 Council conclusions on the follow-up of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum 3018th Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg, 3 June 2010].
expulsion before entry, media campaigns, all of this constitutes a continuum of in/security measures that features the most advanced technological devices available.

6.5 Biometric Data Collection and Information System

‘The body is simply a source of data.’

‘The decomposing body of a pregnant woman was kept on one of the ship’s life boats.’

Campaign against new full-body backscatter x-ray airport scanner machines. [image]

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207 “Italy Allows Ship with Rescued Migrants to Dock | World News | Guardian.co.uk.”
Michael Foucault locates the emergence of the biopolitical form of state governance when the state’s interest moved from territory to population. The family, school, barracks and prisons then constituted a system of discipline based on individuation, arrest and correction of any deviant behavior. But also, technologies of body measurement and identification that anticipated contemporary biometric and are directly outcomes of phrenology, physiognomic or anthropometry. Fingerprints for instance were once developed by the colonial British administration in India after the Mutiny (1857) to reinforce control and identification of a population otherwise indistinguishable (Cole 2002).

Today state governance is still very much interested in a population that after the end of historical colonialism became increasingly mobile beyond the frontiers of the Empire. Once normally conceived as progress that would bring people together and foster inter/intra cultural understanding, the miniaturization of our habitat has come together with the proliferation of technologies of tracking. We can scamper free now across the gate attached to an invisible leash that run deeper than our skin. Today fingerprints operate together with iris scans, face recognition, DNA, and palm prints to amount to incredible volume of data stored in digital databases available contemporarily at different access points. Biometrics and data collectors are still firmly inscribed within state logics of population control that split the body in a myriad of digital bits of identification. When accessed at any nodal point of the network, these technologies materialize a digital template that will disclose clandestine identities without corporeal presence of the subject.

Biometric technologies and data collectors operate within a system of population management centered on the concepts of speed and mobility. It is not necessary essential to arrest or to correct anymore. It is important understand how the
implementation of these technologies relies on the assumption that biometric technologies will eventually gain the absolute truth of what one person is. As Bigo stated:

‘The security industry [...] has presented the border technologies of control in an open society, as the way to deal with this new context, and as solution to terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal immigration and movement of people, by reinforcing the technologies of tracing the flows [...] and monitoring the future of the course of action by profiling the next events and prevent them before they happen.’

The question of ‘what have you done?’ has been replaced then by ‘what are you?’ and this is more often that “who are you? In fact goods and bodies often are treated the same, shipped, transferred, allocated and sold. The key element that characterizes biometric and data collection then, is not certainly arrest, but traceability of both goods and bodies.

6.6 European Database

At the European level, the Schengen Information System [SIS] was the first European database developed for migration control purposes in 1995. The reason for its introduction emerged ten years before when the Schengen Convention was signed to eliminate internal borders of Europe and facilitate movement of labor guaranteed in the Treaty of Rome along with free movements of goods, services and capital. The collapse of internal checkpoints as consequence of the Schengen Treaty caused necessitated the registration of every good and person who was refused entry at the external checkpoints. It is necessary to understand that speed and traceability are the key elements behind the development of technologies of surveillance. It is not a coincidence that the development of SIS is strictly connected with the Schengen area of free movement and marks the beginning of a new era of European migration policy characterized by the reinforcement of external borders. As a matter of fact, SIS was

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designed as a tool of inter-communications among different crossing points. With the entry of East European countries joining the EU, SIS expanded into SISII and SISone4all in order to cope with the increase of goods and people crossing the borders of Europe. At the end, SIS turned out to be the biggest European database. Accordingly, in 2010, “SIS contains over thirty one million records, including more than one million records of persons [Council of European Union, doc. Nr. 6162/2010].

Next to SIS, Eurodac was designed to cope with asylum requests according to the Dublin convention of 1991 that forbids multiple requests of asylum into different states, [cynically defined as asylum shopping]. As a matter of fact the Eurodac database ‘enables European Union (EU) countries to help identify asylum applicants and persons who have been apprehended in connection with an irregular crossing of an external border of the Union. By comparing fingerprints, EU countries can determine whether an asylum applicant or a foreign national found illegally present within an EU country has previously claimed asylum in another EU country or whether an asylum applicant entered the Union territory unlawfully.’ [Council Regulation, Nr. 2725/2000]. Currently the EU relies on biometric data to record asylum seekers fingerprints, and, with the second generation of SIS, developed to register any entry into the Schengen Area, is equipped with biometric technology called Automated Fingerprint Identification System whose results are then stored in the Biometric Matching System [BMS].

Lastly, the Visa Information System (VIS) has been designed to record all visa applications of third nationals (non-EU) and will make use of the same technological infrastructure of SIS for storage, namely the BMS. To indicate the size and capability of VIS alone according to the Home Affairs 'the VIS database will become one of the largest biometric databases in the world, storing close to 70 million fingerprint sets after a period of five years and allowing accurate and rapid one-to-many searches.'

A particular problem emerges when we consider that fact that biometric reliability is not absolute. About five percent of mankind has no fingerprints or has

\[209\] Brom and Besters, "Greedy Information Technology," 4.
fingerprints that are difficult to read with a machine (European Data Protection Supervisor, C 181/13). And, 'according the Dutch Minister of Internal Affairs (2005), the quality of the fingerprints of young children and elderly people are so bad that they can hardly be read by a machine.' On the subject of children’s rights, it is worth mentioning that the age limit of 14 years to collect biometric data it is openly in contrast with existing international law instruments, namely the Convention of the right of the child of 1989. In this regard the Council has ignored concerns expressed by the European Parliament. More importantly with regards to centralized data storage, it seems that decisions are taken without too much political debate and without much distinction between anti-terrorism measures on one hand and migration control policy on the other.

With the development of larger and more inclusive databases, the endorsed government aim appears to render migration flows visible giving a sense of total control and traceability. What it is undetectable is a source of anxiety, at personal and social level, and it is the reason behind technological innovations of surveillance. In fact, the possibilities to make migration flows visible are intrinsically connected and dependent on the possibilities offered by technological means. Without a doubt, considering the amount of money invested in R&D of biometrics and data gathering, the design of European migration control policies is more and more related to technological tools and the outcome of their implementations, and conversely rendering the trajectories of migrants visible, is strongly dependent on the effectiveness of technological advancements.

Hence, is it convenient a total visibility if invisibility sustains the whole mechanism of control? After all, migrants who have passed through the border and survived, they are far from being politically and socially included. They acquire a condition characterized by a differential form of inclusion and clandestinization. They acquire a precarious status that serves perfectly a capitalist market, which needs illegal people, non-people, not even denizens, to be used and trashed away (so-called Kleenex

210 Ibid., 5.
212 Brom and Besters, “Greedy Information Technology,” 10.
worker). The scope seems to be externalization after detection, to ban those that do not fit within the visible space of the society and the rest to keep controlled but invisible. Thus we have undocumented migrants sleeping in the parks of European cities but well visible when the sun rises and they gather at the busy corners of cities’ outskirts waiting for a chance to get a job. They are living a life wrapped into a Moebius strip, officially depoliticized by anachronistic model of citizenship, but at the same time completely immersed within economic power relations. This is also, is the logic of the European externalization of migration control.

6.7 Arming the Border: Surveillance and Patrolling

In 2008, the European Commission outlined to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions a technical framework for setting up a "European border surveillance system" (EUROSUR), which will enhance the capabilities of member states to control the Mediterranean southern limits of Europe. The EUROSUR system will be developed in three phases: (i) interlinking and streamlining existing national surveillance systems, (ii) common tools and applications for border surveillance at EU level, and (iii) creating ‘a common monitoring and information sharing environment for the EU maritime domain’.  

EUROSUR is backed by a plethora of security research projects - STABORSEC (Standards for Border Security Enhancement, PASR), OPERAMAR, WIMA2 project on Wide Maritime Area Airborne Surveillance, and EFFISEC a €16 million project on Efficient Integrated Security Checkpoints - whose common idea is to enhance interoperability between technologies of surveillance and patrolling. As expressed in one of these projects: ‘You cannot control what you do not patrol.’ Maritime and land border security then must be conceived as a fully integrated requirements because commercial and tourist transportation systems are intertwined inextricably with the security and migration control infrastructure. . Security and stability of trading routes

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are the main concerns of the securization of the border when inevitably those routes cross migrants’ trajectories. There human beings and commodities become one.

On the other side of the Mediterranean ‘Libya agreed last night to pay Irish-based company Transas Marine about US$28 million for a sophisticated radar system to monitor its vast coastline for illegal migrants and outbreaks of pollution.’  

214 Until 2003 Libya was sealed off from military trading because of the embargo imposed in 1992 by the Security Council [Resolution 748] as a consequence of several terrorists attacks perpetrated under the direction of the Libyan government, particularly on the flight Pan Am 103 and French Uta 722 in 1988/89. In September 2003, the Security Council lifted the embargo after Libya agreed to pay compensation to relatives of those killed in the attacks. In October, European Union foreign ministers followed suit, agreeing to end sanctions, including an arms embargo. This followed pressure put on the EU by Mr. Berlusconi, the Italian Prime Minister, who wanted sanctions lifted so that Italian companies could supply Libya with hi-tech equipment intended to curb illegal migration. And the Italian government indeed facilitated the transfer of technologies and know-how in Libya but also reached an agreement to create joint patrolling operations with Italian and Libyan coast guards working together on Italian military vessels whose operations would be coordinated by a Coordination Center in Tripoli equipped with Italian technologies of radar and satellite.  

215 After nearly a decade of negotiation, Italy and Libya signed The Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between the Italian Republic and Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (the ‘Friendship Pact’) on August 30, 2008. The real trade off for Libya’s cooperation in stopping irregular migration appears to be Italian investments: the Italian government provides the Libyan forces with ‘100 dinghies, 6 four-wheel drive vehicles, 3 buses, 40 nocturnal viewers, 50 water-proof cameras, 500 scuba wetsuits, 12,000 wool blankets, 6,000 mattresses and pillows, 50 GPS navigators, 1,000 tents, 500 life-safe jackets and 1000 body bags.’  

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214 Maltatoday, “Libya Buys Coastal Monitoring System.”
215 “Immigrazione, Italia e Libia Insieme Per Pattugliare Le Coste Libiche.”
216 Del Grande, Mamadou Va a Morire : La Strage Dei Clandestini Nel Mediterraneo, 126.
6.8 Frontex

Privatization of migration control is a consequence and the cause of the above mentioned over production of technological means of migration control that overflow into North Africa. Drones are deployed over the desert transmitting data back to remote receivers; unmanned aerial vehicles spot migrants crossing nighttime equipped with night vision and thermal cameras; technologies of visionability and reconnaissance order divide and master territories covering everything with a carpet of satellite and radio signals where migratory and digital geographies overlap.

Traces of the inextricable connection between private and public in practices of border control do not rest only in stellar profits of public competitions. It important also to pay attention to a certain language that betrays a managerial matrix and that nowadays characterized discourses of migration control. Therefore, interoperability, effectiveness, efficiency, rate of risk, are not anymore concepts limited to financial speculations.

Interoperability of multiple borders control practices and management of mobility are key contemporary features of practices of border control that operate around and beyond the geopolitical limits of the state. The two concepts are not in contradiction to each other because mobility cannot be halted. [There is agreement from both side of the wall on this point.] Instead, from States’ and corporations ‘point of view, it needs to be controlled, managed and fragmented in different paces in order to synchronize with accelerated flows of capital, services and workers, but also it has to respond to security needs from the European social and cultural space.

Practices of mobility management must operate then simultaneously everywhere by ‘using the connection between the speed of digitalized information, the capacities of computers to manage huge quantity of data and to share them under procedures on interoperability.’217. The border then is performed by different agencies at regional, state and municipal level that share information and risk assessments. In this sense risk management has become a characteristic of migration control intended as opportunity for agencies to choose among different course of action. Interestingly enough these

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agencies exist as public institutions but operate as private actors and in terms of accountability, often 'at the margin of civil society' (11).

The colossal deployment of European State forces at the southern frontier of Europe would not function well without coordination and integrated strategy. This function has been provided since 2005 by 'the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union - FRONTEX. We can define FRONTEX as the brand new technology of migration control that functions as the umbrella for the single technological innovations deployed by the EU and single State to stem the flow. The Council Regulation 2007/2004 established it with a headquarters in Warsaw. Since then the Agency has been active in stemming the migration flow from Africa, coordinating several joint operations of EU States among which, 'Hera' (2008) in the Canary Islands- West Africa was the most successful when it is measured in number of migrants diverted back (5,969) and 10 billion euro of budget\textsuperscript{218}.

From the Frontex's official website\textsuperscript{219} we can read that its main tasks are:

- **Risk analysis** - monitor and analyze the day-to-day situation at the EU's external borders and optimize the allocation of resources.

- **Coordination of operational cooperation between Member States** - when needed Frontex proposes joint operations at the Union's external land, sea and air borders in which Member States are invited to take part.

- **Training** - Frontex assists Member States in the development of common training standards for border guard authorities.

- **Facilitating the attainment of research and development goals** - Frontex serves as a platform to bring together Europe's 400,000 border personnel and

\textsuperscript{218} http://wiki.triastelematica.org/index.php/Frontex  
\textsuperscript{219} http://www.frontex.europa.eu/origin_and_tasks/origin/
the world of industry to bridge the gap between technological advancement and the needs of the end user.

- Providing a rapid crisis response capability available to all Member States - Frontex has created a pooled resource in the form of Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs) bringing together specialist technical and human resources from across the EU.

- Assisting Member States in joint return operations - When Member States make the decision to return foreign nationals who have failed to leave voluntarily, Frontex assists those Member States governments in coordinating their efforts to maximize efficiency and cost-effectiveness, while also ensuring that respect for fundamental rights the human dignity of returnees is maintained at every stage of the operation.

Frontex’s origins can be traced back in the Commission Communication 2002 “Towards integrated management of the external border of the Member states of the EU.” As expressed by the combined reading of art. 62(2) of the EC treaty with the Art. 66 on measures to ensure administrative cooperation between member States in the areas covered by the Title IV of the EU Treaty (visa, asylum, immigration). The legal framework that define the general competences of FRONTEX does not help though to resolve a problem of coordination between European and State level that has been

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220 **Frontex launches first expulsion charter, 4 October 2010**

For the first time since it was launched in 2004, Jean-Pierre Masse and Lodge Juliet, *Are you who you say you are?,* 10, the Warsaw-based agency responsible for the EU’s external borders, has funded and organized its own charter flight to deport undocumented aliens. *Le Monde* reports that on 28 September, “in a deliberately low-key operation,” 56 Georgian migrants arrested in Poland, France, Austria and Germany were flown from Warsaw to the Georgian capital Tbilisi. In 2011, Frontex, which has been granted a budget of 676 million euro for the period 2008-2013, plans to organize and finance between 30 and 40 charters to repatriate migrants who have illegally entered the EU. For FRONTEX’s deputy director, the increased role of the European Union “will come as a relief to national governments who will no longer have to ‘carry the burden’ of negative public opinion, embarrassment and disapproval prompted by collective repatriation procedures.” *Le Monde* also notes “another advantage” of grouped operations is that they benefit from the “added weight” of the EU, “which can exert more pressure than individual member states when negotiating with third countries on the return of their citizens.”

extensively analyzed elsewhere (H. Jorry, 2007) but that also is reflected outside Europe, sometimes with detrimental consequences.

‘At the beginning of the mission, there was some notable confusion between Libyan representatives concerning the role of Frontex, which appeared to be equated to the EU and the Commission. Libyan representatives were encouraged by Frontex members to view the possible bilateral cooperation with Frontex as entirely separate from previous relations with EU institutions at the political level. Furthermore, the Frontex delegation made the point that operational cooperation could prove mutually beneficial and, as the first North African country Frontex had approached formally, Libya had the opportunity to lead the way within the region.’ (Frontex report 2007,4).

What emerges from this report’s excerpt is a general confusion with regard to the role and the nature of FRONTEX. It seems to aspire to operate above European institutions with a very business-oriented approach in dealing with Third country governments. For instance, Sergio Carrera provides some critical reflections about the nature and legal basis of the FRONTEX as an Agency that is supposed to be a depoliticized organism, neither private nor public, which in fact has been greatly influenced by both the European Commission and the Council. What is more, FRONTEX coordinates European States forces in joint operations of migration control. Its hybrid nature manifests in an evident uncertainty in the demarcation of responsibility between member states and Agency in operational activities. A propos the Regulation 2007/2004 establishes that 'the responsibility for the control and surveillance of external borders lies with the Member States’ but in reality the operations of interception and expulsion are carried out according to the Agency’s risk analysis. Some scholars envisage a reduction of state’s autonomy (Baldaccini, 2010, 234) but also a decrease of responsibility. Who is responsible, for instance, for the

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221 forthoming, Extraterritorial Immigration Control, 229.
death of a migrant during operations of interceptions carried out by a national coast guard with different official from different states under the supervision of Frontex officials? According to Neal (2009), Frontex represents a shift from the previous intergovernmental approach to border surveillance to a supranational one. But considering that a board of national border control high officials and two European Commissions manage it, the reality is more complicated. Because European states’ reservations about creating a European border police (with which powers, which jurisdictions, what hierarchy?!) there is a degree of ambiguity over the Agency’s role.

Still, single Member States and EU Institutions seem willing to assist and support FRONTEX like it was their natural offspring. This is clear in the words of Javier Moreno Sanchez MEP who described Frontex as “a baby which was born just two years ago and which needs the support of its parents.”223. Also, on a note regarding the supposed supranational management of European migration control, we should consider that Frontex has not been always successful in coordinating EU member states with each other. According to the Human Right Watch Report 2009 on official Frontex release

In 2008, Operation Nautilus focused on the flow of migration between North Africa and Italy and Malta but diverted no one back to North Africa. Its failure was attributed to the difference of opinion concerning the responsibility of migrants saved at sea.224.

Baldaccini (forthcoming 2010, 248) underlines how FRONTEX’s sea operations translated in no accountability or compliance with European and International legal obligations with particular regard to the question of disembarkation and possible violation of the principle of no refoulment (see for instance Miltner in Edwards and Ferstman 2010). A propos the Executive Director of FRONTEX, Gen. Lakkinen

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224 Human Rights Watch, Pushed Back, Pushed Around, 36.
justifies the legality of operation of interception and forced return of migrants’ vessels when he states that:

FRONTEX is a coordinator and the things that we are doing is to do and make and operational plan. For the single plans are responsible the member states that participate in and each single captain who decides...We insure that instructions are according to the law...We know that are cases within international waters where it is all about saving human life. To do this, is to assure the safe return to the port of origin. For this reason we go aboard to verify that they have lifejackets water, food, and enough fuel to return back, and merely explain to them what the safest way to solve the problem. (My emphasis)²²⁵

Therefore, it is through a process of problematization that FRONTEX put into practice the apparatus of externalization. Foucault intends problematization as the idea that “transforms the difficulties and obstacles of practice into a general problem for which one proposes diverse political solutions” (Foucault, 1984: 389 in Soguk, 1999: 50). How might the Foucauldian concept of problematization function in this particular context? To problematize means to read a practice [of migration] in a certain way, and this includes a necessary initial stage of [risk] analysis, secretive and undisclosed, of a particular situation during which certain activities are understood as “difficulties.” In this particular situation, FRONTEX conceives the influx of immigrants into the EU, their trajectories, as a problem that includes a certain quantity of risk and that requires an adequate response. But also to achieve a completely integrated border management FRONTEX operates a true de-territorialization of borders intended as a moment of interventions that occurs here and there beyond geopolitical configurations and according to maps of detected emergencies.

²²⁵ Herzog, Noi Difendiamo l’Europa.
The problematization of migrants’ trajectories requires a constant individuation of emergency, a continuum of risk that from Africa leaks into the heart of Europe and that necessitates urgent and rapid actions. Since the beginning, European States have persistently demanded FRONTEX to intervene to deal with exceptional challenges related to holding common external borders of the Schengen area. The exceptionality turned out to be the normality of an invasion that required extraordinary powers and exceptional tools. These are the reasons behind the implementation of RABIT responses. Or would it perhaps be better to call them RABID considering the panic generated by States’ declaration of national emergency and the disproportionate war technologies deployed when European territories are vandalized by a few migrants?

Following a request from the Greek government, the EU will deploy its Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT-s) for the first time since their creation in 2007. Drawn from the member states’ "national reserve" put at the disposal of Frontex, the EU’s border control agency, the RABIT-s are mandated to observe national and EU law and will be embedded with Greek border patrols.
The RABIT-s have authorization to access Greek databases and "when necessary, use force." They are authorized to carry their service weapons and national uniform, but will wear a blue armband with the EU and Frontex logo. However, the intention is to provide Frontex with more independency in terms of operability and equipment. According to Africa news:

The European Border Guard Teams, will replace and unify the current Frontex Joint Support Teams and Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITS). The European Border Guard Teams will consist of a pool of national border guards assigned by Member States to the agency for joint operations, rapid interventions and pilot projects. Within one year, the European Commission will present a feasibility study on establishing a system of European Border Guards.227

6.9 Technologies of Migration

"We cannot have mafia or traffickers or terrorists using better technology than our police," Mr. Frattini, [aka Golden Buttocks] EU former Justice Commissioner 228

The over production of European technologies of control of African migrations inevitably makes these technologies available in the region and allow African migrants to move across inhospitable territories and reinforce existing social networks among the same migrants. In contrast, with the majority of academic analysis of the externalization of European migration control, that give the impression of a total control over migration, I emphasize the symbiotic relationship that exists between technologies of migration control and occurrences of African migrations. These analyses cannot explain the ramifications of power relations at the moment of border control. Following Said’s postcolonial approach I apply a contrapuntal method in reading the discourse of externalization of migration control and sustain that an organic reading of

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226 Pop, “EU to Deploy Armed Patrols at Greek-Turkish Border.”
227 “Frontex to Have Own Border Guard Teams.”
228 “EU Plans Biometric Border Checks.”
this phenomenon allows a comprehensive understanding of the same. As a matter of fact, migrants must continuously be aware of migration control and even if the majority of them tend to avoid these encounters, it is fair to say that sometimes they voluntarily cross the lines of control because they want to get caught. They have knowledge of satellite map that cover a certain area and being present in a particular spot can represent a form of resistance. For instance, following my interviews on the Island of Lampedusa, I understood how migrants sail often along the route of patrolling hoping to be intercepted and saved from being left adrift in the ocean. At the same time I have demonstrated in chapter 3 with regard to the Mediterranean Sea, how States’ control agents avoid intervening in order to render the migrants invisible.

Starting from the beginning of any given journey, a migrant leaves for a variety of reasons that cannot be reduced to economic pull and push factors. At the same time political and social instability of the country of origin are not comprehensive enough for any deep study of migration. Without going into the intricacies of this debate which does not interest me, I would like to point out how technologies of surveillance like satellites or the internet can trigger desires for change and can function as an important determinant factor. I am referring here to images of a prosperous Europe broadcast directly into the houses of many parts of Africa as a legacy of colonial enterprises or, if you allow me, rhizomatic ramifications of post-colonial encounters. Internet cafes also function as political spaces where it is possible to create connections and acquire knowledge of travel possibilities. It is not a coincidence that Europe has now enforced a new policy of asking the ID and sojourn permit to those who wish to utilize computers to surf the web in order to capture as much information on undocumented migrants as possible.

When the journey begins at every step of the journey migrants must have access nonstop to financial capital to avoid getting caught in one of the viscose nodes of transit. I have encountered some of these individuals who have explained to me how new technologies of satellite phones intertwine with ancestral systems of financial trust especially in East Africa. Trucks are manufactured in Europe and serve to patrol as much as they have replaced camels to cross the desert. Thanks to these technologies
migrants are now able to remain in contact with family members and friends at a relatively cheap cost, sometimes using the beep of a telephone as Morse code without spending any money. No one of these technologies was available ten years ago and today they are indispensable along the trans-Saharan routes. Even if migration routes rely of antique patterns and established social networks, nowadays they have to function at a distance and they have to be able to respond immediately to migration policy changes. For example referring to FRONTEX operations, I mentioned how operation HERA has been considered the most effective operation implemented in the Mediterranean basin so far, both in terms of the high number of interceptions and the resulting drop of migrants embarking from the coast of Morocco to cross the tiny strait of Gibraltar to get into Spain. Nonetheless, it has been noted how, while “the number of irregular boat arrivals to the Canary Islands, Spanish territory off Africa’s western coast, dropped by 74 percent from 2006 to 2008, meanwhile, in Italy, boat arrivals increased by 64 percent from 2006 to 2008.”

In conclusion, the deterritorialization of territories due to the deployment of aggressive technologies of migration control corresponds to a reterritorialization of the same territories due to the same technologies employed with opposite intent. To comprehend this phenomenon of re-definition of border practice is fundamental to understanding the migrant’s journey. Given that migration as well as surveillance and control practice are today structured along a fluid network of interoperability, any technologic event at any point in the network (closing or opening of opportunities) will be felt in any other node of the network, in an organic relation of symbiosis I define as ‘technecology.’

Technologies of control have changed the concept of border because they have altered the concept of visibility/invisibility, which conversely is inherent to phenomenon of identity and identification at the core of the concept of border. In this chapter, I have attempted to show how technologies of externalization of migration control attempts to encapsulate the migration flow within a net of databases, after being filtered through sophisticated scanners. Because the technologies of control have

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229 Human Rights Watch, Pushed Back, Pushed Around, 36.
changed, they have changed the concept of the border, and have produced / materialized / “developed” new practices of recognition, and new non-spaces of invisibility,

But because technology is intended as a tool of detection, it is intrinsically dependent on migration flows that not only must continue, but also will continue to be invisible in a vicious cycle. After all, as I have shown telling the story of the 73 Eritreans, the implementation of total control technologies of total visibility does not necessarily imply that migrants will be rescued when they are located.

Migrations from Africa into Europe continue with high or low intensity partially in response to inputs from the first world (economic push/pull factors as well as personal dreams or desires) but those factors are never questioned. The flow then is the raison d’être of the virtual control. War, hyper-production, hyper-waste hyper-media floods over the south, which in return generates mobility, which conversely stimulates technologies of control in a vicious capitalist cycle. North technologies hyper production overflows onto the South where flows of people head North where technologies of control are conceived. As a matter of fact according to Mezzadra ‘there is no capitalism without migrations’ and it is indispensable to comprehend the historical changes within the regime of migration control in order to grasp different forms of submission of work to capital and contemporary class arrangements. 

For instance, Foucault emphasized how the disciplinary society of the 19th century was analogical in nature as it founded its expressions in the school, prison, hospital and barracks within a well-planned city. Disciplinary society aimed at individualizing, fragmenting and re-educating whole identities for a planned society. This was an anti-nomadic technology. “This is why it fixes, arrests and regulates movements; it clears up confusion; it dissipates compact groupings of individuals wandering about the country in unpredictable way; it establishes calculated distributions.”

However today Deleuze states that:

\[\text{Mezzadra, Derecho De Fuga, 186.}\]
\[\text{Foucault, Discipline & Punish, 218.}\]
Man is no longer man enclosed, but man in debt. It is true that capitalism has retained as a constant the extreme poverty of three-quarters of humanity, too poor for debt, too numerous for confinement: control will not only have to deal with erosions of frontiers but with the explosions within shantytowns or ghettos.\(^\text{232}\)

There is a structural nexus that links contemporary capitalist economy and transformations of migration control policies in Europe: new technologies of surveillance. This technological transformation according to Deleuze ‘must be a mutation of capitalism’ (1992, 6) and it is extremely dispersive. It is an intricate relationship between migration, labor, and new technologies of control and production.

There are several reason why immigrant labor forces are crucial for the global capital: first of all, more work force means more production. Immigrant work force is awfully low cost, de-unionized, and generally socially and economically more submissive and flexible. Finally, as Wallerstein and Balibar mention \(^\text{233}\), immigrants bring in new lines of division among workers, now defined along ethnic and racial axes, disintegrating union cohesion and increasing competition within the workspace. Until 30 years ago there were immigrant workers in Europe, *gestarbeiter* or guest workers, as they use to call them in Germany, to indicate their specific function linked to a specific working task.

They were part of a formal guest worker programme (*Gastarbeiterprogramm*) that Germany concluded with Southern European countries and Turkey. The contemporary de-regularization of the labor market and the change in relations between the market and the state rendered those immigrants undocumented, ‘illegal’, therefore invisible. It is neither economically nor socially suitable to create and sustain complicated public programme to import workers linked to specific tasks and need. It is preferable to let them be invisible and vulnerable. The market will take care of them,

\(^{232}\) Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” 6.

\(^{233}\) *Race, Nation, Class.*
those without a voice, mentioned many times by Ranciere, who interestingly published *Disagreement* the same year of the revolt of the *sans papiers* (without papers) in France. Since then, the number of undocumented invisibles grew in numbers to include both nationals of the EU as well as third country national. The technologies of screening and detection are envisioned as the perfect solution to solve any social unrest caused by inequality of social and economic conditions among members of the same society. Inequality does not only emerge in terms of power of access to technology. Even if the technology is the same technology it is perceived utilized and has effect that differ according to gender, race and national codes.

The representations of transnational subjects produced by global capitalism differ greatly. While discourses about residents of technology-consuming societies tend to efface specificities related to identity in favor of transnationally mobile consumers, those on the producing end become even more overdetermined and restricted by gendered, sexualized, racialized, and nationalized representations.234

Thus, visibility/invisibility becomes an essential relational condition and a strategic characteristic that different actors (agents/officials/nannies/sex workers/politicians) try to control because its effects have immediate repercussions on the society and life of these individuals. Recent studies highlight how ‘the aim of the information system is to increase the visibility of the migration flow [...] to facilitate both the identification of risk categories as well as recognition of migration patterns’235. According to this approach the development of technologies of visibility and the implementation of technologies of border control virtually everywhere at anytime aims at eliminating that ‘part of the flow that is ‘invisible’, unidentifiable and [that] presents a big threat simply because it is inestimable. To focus on a technological transformation of the border it is a matter of analyzing practices of bordering or re-bordering and of comprehending how

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234 Biemann, “Performing the Border: On Gender, Transnational Bodies, and Technology,” 2.
the network nodes where the border operates, as the FRONTEX map shows, are the space of politics in itself. I am thinking here again about Internet café as a space of resistance through the web and at the same time, a space of control via monitor and ID identification.

The management of that portion of the unknown variable, that is, management of risk, then constitutes the new aspect of migration control policies of the EU and is calculated upon the degree of in/visibility. We need to clarify what we intend for visibility. Undocumented migration control does not operate to exclude migrants but instead, ‘to socially include [them] under imposed conditions of enforced and protracted vulnerability’ (De Genova 2002, p. 429). The intent is not to render manifest every single migrant’s trajectory, but to scan and tag them to reinforce racialized social vulnerability. If we recognized that illegality is a product of [today’s] law, technologies of migration control in reality are not aimed at eliminating the existence of ‘illegality’ by rendering everyone visible and legitimized. They aim at containing the power of mobility of migrant workers in term of social and economic conditions. As Brighenti put it: ‘To be visible means to be legally legitimized to exist, or, on the contrary, it means to be more exposed to the consequences of one’s own juridical and social illegitimacy.’ [P.86]

Thus, an accurate management of visibility is of great importance for marginalized subjects [abject] and implies a knowledge and mapping of technologies of surveillance. For instance, the city centers in Europe are nowadays mapped out by undocumented migrants who choose which trajectory to take according to the position of video surveillance cameras and deployment of police forces in strategic spots. In conclusion, the externalization of migration control in Europe is a dispersed phenomenon; it becomes an everyday experience whose rhizomatic ramifications are far inside the core of Europe. As a matter of fact, technologies of surveillance turn an entire autobahn or a subway station into a mobile border. It is fluctuant and volatile because of new technologies of control that translate the flows into calculable comparable data and produce percentages of risk that continuously change and adjust. Lastly, technologies of border control have transformed border practices into a more
dynamic phenomenon, almost entirely dependent on the use of the same technologies. In conclusion, in relation to migrants' trajectories, border technologies resemble the way an antivirus relates to a hacker: both exist in relation to each other. Therefore, as Foucault mentioned, a fuller understanding of the border power relations would not confine its attention to surveillance and control because not all power relations tend in that direction.
CHAPTER 7. THE BRICK DOOR
On the one hand the orbis and the urbs, circular, with their extensions and implications (arch, vault); on the other hand the military camp with its strict grid and its two perpendicular axes, cardo and decumanus – a closed space, set apart and fortified.\textsuperscript{236}

### 7.1 Peripheralization and other Roman stories

The social and political questions posed by present-day European migration control policies in Libya and their repercussions lead my investigation into the Roman urban space, which is the most frequent destination for migrants in Italy. As cities become home to a greater number of immigrants, urban and immigration policies necessarily overlap. The filtering effect of urban borders, which alternately deflect, tolerate, or promote dwelling, conditions every urban person’s existence. Consequently, analysis of the architecture of the European Union’s border management practices will reveal an interior design that features detention camps for immigrants as ordinary features on the landscapes of the most populated outskirts of European cities. These are places within the state that are without it. The fringes of global cities such as Paris, Los Angeles, Bangkok, Cairo, etc. have repeatedly been the stage for internal uprisings of people who refuse to be considered ‘in excess’ and instead claim that their human dignity to be heard. Once migrants have crossed the border, they come to occupy a precarious space that exists at the margins of “integration,” a space that mirrors both societies of immigration and societies of emigration. That is, they dwell in frontiers. As my research shows, no migrant enters a neutral ideological context after arriving in the EU. Depending on how immigration controls situate and catalogue migrants individually and collectively, they differently regulate how, and even whether, people are able to enter the EU’s urban centers and call them “home” (Balibar, 2004).

\textsuperscript{236} Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 245.
There are two reasons to study the city of Rome in relation to the European externalization of migration control. First, the main flow of migrants who travel from Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe sails from the Libya’s coast and arrives at the southern coast of Italy. Rome represents the place where immigrants in Italy can most quickly find points of reference and social coordinates to build new ways of life. Second, the new urban plan for the city of Rome explicitly promotes the Mediterranean Sea as a harmonious centre of different cultures. The history of urban planning in Rome, and particularly during the fascist regime, linked the idea of Rome and that of the Mediterranean Sea; this link should be problematized yesterday as much as today.

This chapter locates one of the new frontiers of Europe within a fundamental paradox of the city of Rome: an inexorable expansion of buildings together with a mounting rejection and marginalization of an emergent immigrant population that is vital to the city’s expansion. Analysis of this paradox is crucial if one is to understand how contemporary Rome’s urbanscapes are changing with the society of new immigrants who live within the nation-state, yet without it, and at the core of the city. If we conceive the city as a striated space traversed by memories, sounds, images and experiences, a sort of living and pulsing archive, then new migrants, their experiences, and those policies of migration control that affect their lives have to taken in consideration.

First, I explain how the city of Rome is connected with contemporary European policies of migration control. The document that anticipates Rome’s new urban plan explicitly links Rome and the Mediterranean. Further, the documentary entitled “The Vittorio Square Orchestra” exemplifies Rome’s organized discourse of multiculturalism. A critical reading of the documentary will give me the opportunity to explore how films and media in general can help to reinforce configurations of multietchnic society from above. Disillusioned with official discourses of multiculturalism, I then move my research toward the discursively external part of the city: the periphery. There, in the south-eastern area of Rome, I ultimately recognize the interconnections between Europe’s emerging southern border and the urban space of Rome. Like a border, the urban structure does not change spontaneously. Nor does a
single powerful agent, such as the state, determine it. Urbanscapes change in ways that manifest social conflicts generated by urban anxiety and indifference. They are related to forms of inclusion/exclusion that occur through modalities of externalization, or in the case of the cityscape, of peripheralization.

7.2 The Central Paradox of the New Urban Plan for Rome

Forty-five years after the last urban plan, on March 14, 2008, the city council approved a new urban plan for the city of Rome. The introduction to the new plan is solemnly titled “Rome Peace Capital of The Mediterranean: the new urban plan of Rome” (“Roma capitale di Pace.pdf,” n.d.). Apart from initial trivial reflections on cultural and social cohesion, much space of the introduction emphasizes the municipal economic improvements that the then current city administration has made possible. According to the document, the level of employment in the city increased by 4% and the city of Rome itself generates 6.4% of the national GDP (2004). The document informs us that Rome is not only first among Italian cities in terms of number of IT companies, but is also the capital of cinema with the Cinecittà Studios (built under Mussolini’s regime) and one of the most attractive tourist destinations in the entire world. (Rome is among the top ten most visited cities in the world, with sixteen million tourists alone in 2005).

But how does the new plan supposedly promote social cohesion? First of all, it does so through environmental protection. It reserves 88,000 hectares of territory to green areas. Second, the protection and preservation of historical Rome is to be extended beyond the classical roman ruins to include contemporary architecture that is located within the periphery. Third, and most important, the innovation that the urban plan envisions revolves around the concept of the polycentric city: there will be eighteen new urban nodes, or miniature cities, within the city, each with schools, hospitals and administrative services. Lastly, Rome requires the so-called “iron cure,” which is the modernization and lengthening of the entire metropolitan rail system.

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237 Rome as capital of the Italian state had other five urban plans: 1873-1883-1909-1931-1962 but only one, that of 1909 has been adopted by the City Council. The urban history of Rome confirms its peculiarity in terms of transparency of planning mechanisms.
Reading close to the urban plan, we identify a displacement from formal to informal techniques of government so that market-based interests increasingly organize the city. However this does not entail any diminishing of the state’s capacity to plan. Rather, if we compare the present day urban policies with those of the past, State functions are privatized and deregulated. There is clearly a tendency “to politically construct the market as the preferred social institution of resource mobilization and allocation” (Soja, MacCannell, & Smith, 2008, p. 63). Several successive city administrations had taken on the difficult task of formulating a new urban plan for Rome. This result is a compromise among groups of private landowners, developers, and city hall to regulate the expansion of the city. Squeezed in the middle, yet without, is a growing immigrant population who is very much integral to the urban plan, but has been left out of the public debate.

The true strength of this new urban plan is an administrative tool named Accordo di programma (Plan’s settlement), which is said to make the decision process of urban interventions more comprehensible and, when needed, to help to leverage Rome’s strengths quickly and effectively. Technically, it is supposed to help to modify provisions of the general plan for reasons of social utility and urgency, and only for the community’s interests. In such cases, approval of the plan’s variance requires a declaration of public utility, urgency, and strict collective interest. Instead, according to Berdini, by the frequent use of this exceptional administrative tool:

The urban plan ‘has the characteristics of a sum of multiple projects planned through conciliation with private developers. Today we do not project urban plans, instead cities are transformed via plans’ settlements.’

By using, (and in many cases abusing), this administrative tool, the most influential builders in Rome have asked and obtained from the city administration authorization to increase the volume of residential constructions up to 70,000,000 cubic meters. This is equal to 1,700 eight-story buildings and would provide housing for roughly 350,000

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new residents. Instead of creating multiple micro cities, the polycentric city mentioned above, each with schools, hospitals, transportation, government buildings and services, as the introduction to the urban plan indicated, the Accordo di Programma has been already abused to justify building new apartment complexes and malls, with no connections to other centralities. Consequently, rather than the envisioned polycentric city, there will be new areas of segregation, each with new borders of incommunicability.

According to the ISTAT (the Italian National Institute of Statistics), between 1995 and 2006, three billion cubic meters of cement were used to build two million new houses, although the number of families increased only by several thousand (see P. Berdini ‘la casa in briciole’ Il Manifesto July 22, 2009.) Rome already extends for 1,285 square kilometers [versus only 892, for instance, in the case of Berlin], and with 3.4 million inhabitants, is the largest municipality in Europe. Still, despite a demographic decline of the city’s population, the new urban plan of 2008 authorizes 70 million new cubic meters of new cement. The new plan anticipates, and requires, urban growth. But, given the static demographic condition of the Italian population, immigrants must, in one way or another, be expected to be the final consumer of this profitable housing market.

In the last 15 years, immigrant communities have produced visible effects on the city of Rome. They constitute 10.3% of the total population, whereas the national average in 2009 was 6.5%. They counted for 9.3% in 2008 and only 4.8% in 1998. (Menghi, 2010, 167). In numbers, the population with foreign citizenship was in January 2009 equal to 293,948 [+ 9%, or 24,299, compared to January 1st, 2008; in 2004, there were 201,633 foreign nationals in the city, and, in 2000, there were 151,221]. The city’s immigrant community has grown rapidly in the past decade and has deeply changed and shaped the character and identity of Rome in multiple aspects. In particular, the positioning of immigrant communities within the urbanscape of Rome, with its municipality that is 12 times bigger than that of Paris, differs compared to other European capitals where immigration flows have a longer history. Clearly, the tremendous growth in housing authorized by the new urban plan must be meant to
satisfy largely immigrant demand. Nonetheless, the new privately funded houses are hardly affordable or accessible for the majority of new immigrants. The rent paid by new immigrants is thirty to fifty per cent higher than the average rent paid by Italians. Further, eight-five percent of immigrants have signed unregistered rental contracts. About a billion worth of Euros in taxes have been dodged as a result of building policies that prey on, and marginalize, the immigrant population.

Because of these economic factors, the majority of new immigrants do not sleep within the municipality of Rome. To be specific, their dwelling depends on their occupation. There is a unique dynamic of immigrant communities in Rome. They make use of any interstices of the city and generate a phenomenon of overlapping among different communities. These communities did not necessarily have any previous relations; their positioning does not reflect urban differentials from previous immigration or international articulations. They seem instead to live in any part of the city with only a partial preference for ethnic cohesion. According to several analyses, recent immigrants tend to camouflage within the urban territory without constituting ethnic enclaves. However, municipalities I-XX-VIII have 11.8%-7.9%-9.1% of the total population of immigrant residents, respectively. In general, VIII has had the highest increase of residents of foreign origin in recent years, with +74.8% between 2005 and 2009 (versus a +31.3% average in the whole city). Another five municipalities, I, VII, X, XII, XIII also experienced an increase higher than average.

There are two distinct traits that we can associate with the immigrant residents within the urban morphology of Rome: on one hand, there are immigrants who work as domestic aids and live in the house where they work. This group is localized in the richest area of the city, approximately in zones XIX, XX, II. Second, there is another big group that, in an opposite way, chooses to live far from the job location because of the availability of cheaper housing around zones VIII and XIII. Nevertheless, this does not mean that they do not live in and shape the city. Perhaps immigrants, properly speaking, are those who transform the urban space simply by living in it, before and beyond any city hall intervention, as they engage and contest administrators’ urban segregations. That is, through European policies that have externalized migration
control and deliberately constructed fantasies of a new free, democratic (yet threatened) age on the inside, even within the center of Rome, there are borders. The urban border, in fact, appears only in the moment at which one has been crossed, at the moment when one has intentionally or unintentionally contested or subverted some line of authority, “for the border is not a thing but, rather, the materialization of authority” (Chambers, 2008, p. 6). The challenge, then, is to locate these borders within the city, despite a thicket a optimistic liberal rhetoric that celebrates multicultural difference. As Deleuze and Guattari have noted, “the dividing line is not between inside and outside but rather is internal to simultaneous signifying chains and successive subjective choices” (A Thousand Plateaus, 1987, p. 178). The border, whether “internal” or “external,” implies a fulcrum, and a homogenizing principle at its core. The idea behind the document that introduces the urban plan is that Rome’s history provides it with such a core.

7.3 Rome: Peace Capital of the Mediterranean.

The document intends to highlight Rome’s crucial role in promoting intercultural and inter-religious dialogue. The key word of the new plan is social cohesion. The document describes a utopian city that is accessible to its inhabitants, that is filled with social opportunities, and that is modern without forgetting its historical character. But what exactly will this entail? Does it in any way relate to the overall European policy of migration control in the Mediterranean Sea?

It worth mentioning again that the purpose of the Fascist colonial endeavor in Libya was the pacification of the Mediterranean, to subjugate the famous “fourth shore.” Indeed, Mussolini visited Tripoli in 1926. In his program, Italy’s economic and financial expansion was tied together with literature exoticizing Libya to promote the colonial project and to find financial capital to sustain it. Today, instead, as a postcolonial migration of north African and sub-Saharan migrants runs through the arteries of the global city (Sassen, 1991) and shapes its distinctiveness, the migrant incorporated, as soon as she becomes visible, in optimistic, liberal rhetoric as a multicultural ingredient in state literature designed to promote the image of a tolerant
and multiethnic city. This latter image, and the roles that migrants who are subject to “externalized” border controls play in it, has to be contextualized within the strict relation between market and urban society.

Multiculturalism has a major leverage for generating future growth and attracting investment capital and consumers. Officially, the plan aims to give voice to different sounds of the immigrant communities living in the city; in reality, I contend, it renders their rhythm unintelligible, and their essence never a possibility. The plan’s documents reveal an attempt to capture those bodies that have filtered in and have pierced the clear space of the Mediterranean, by encapsulating them within a web of profitable and homogeneously intelligible commodification – i.e., optimistic, liberal multiculturalism.

This phenomenon illustrates a growing relationship between neoliberalism and cosmopolitanism, whereby Rome, just like the others, is distinct from the other great capitals of Europe such as Paris and London in its competitive makeup. Each city has its own historicity and migration, which is then to be celebrated generically. In this, the immigrant stands as a classic example of a fetish where multiculturalism and the celebration / construction of difference are natural outcomes of a neoliberal managerial approach to the city. The slogan Roma Peace Capital ultimately signifies a homogeneous space, without conflicts, where capital markets can flourish. Peace intended as an absence of conflict is the necessary milieu to build any place of harmony. Where to find harmony if not within an orchestra?

7.4 Orchestra di Piazza Vittorio

The documentary L’Orchestra di Piazza Vittorio (Vittorio Square Orchestra) takes place in the district around Rome’s main train station. Today the area is largely populated by immigrants whose activities revolve around a square that is a hub for various cultures, sounds and odors from all corners of the world: Piazza Vittorio Emanuel II. This Piazza, its essence, inspired musician Mario Tronco, and filmmaker Agostino Ferrente to reunite some of the most extraordinary performers among
immigrants, each one unique in origin, instrument, and musical experience, in a orchestra, that plays music from all over the world.

In 2006 a documentary that tells the story of how the project took shape has been released and since then screened in many festival around the world winning several awards. The documentary provides a short introduction to the central square around which the story revolves. The area called Esquilino developed, the film informs us, when Rome became capital of the Italian state and changed completely its urban aspect. The newly constituted Italian troops entered in Rome on September 20th, 1970. At once Pope Pius IX was deprived of his temporal power over the city and Rome became the capital of the new state. On September 30 the government announced the institution of a committee of architects and engineers to ‘take care of enlargement and embellishment projects.” (Insolera, 1993, p. 12). Catholics and non-together composed the committee, who had no problem to join forces in order to obtain a share of the colossal profits. Immediately real estate companies, often constituted with foreign investment, bought vast portions of the land that once belonged to ecclesiastic orders in the area of the city’s historical centre where bureaucratic structures were located. The Esquilino area close to the train station and to the main government’s buildings went under a full transformation featuring wide orthogonal streets reminiscent of Haussman’s Paris. As a matter of fact once Napoleon conquered the North of Italy, Parisian urban features became elements in Turin and then in Rome around the Esquilino area where the new class of high bureaucrats from Turin was coming to live in. 239

During this time, due to massive immigration of workforce necessary to develop construction projects, there was considerable population growth. By 1900, Roman population nearly doubled from 200,000 to 400,000. The newly appointed capital of the state engaged in a biopolitical project of externalization. This plan, which I define as proto-peripheralization, consisted in externalizing foreign construction workers from

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239 Thus, in an uncanny way, the structure of Roman barracks so dear to Baron Haussman, by Romans utilized only for military purposes, came back to its origins in concomitance with the birth and strengthens of the state. The castrum (camp) designed to house and protect the soldiers and their equipment became an urban trait of government areas of the city so that no peasant and their filthy herds could dwell there and, in case of necessity, troops could be immediately deployed and order restored.
and within the same city they were building. Those immigrants were attracted to the demand of workforce that the numerous constructions projects and came to Rome from other part of Italy. A propos of that period in Rome’s urban history, it is interesting that Rhodes noted that:

There was little construction dedicated to housing the same workers. For workers who had migrated to Rome, each new middle-class apartment building, therefore, concretely figured both their incorporation into and exclusion from Rome’s spatial and material economy. Ironies of this sort season modern Roman urban history.”(2007, p. 3)

Not only the immigrant workers, but also many Roman artisans and merchants who were born and raised in the central area found themselves unemployed after the end of the Pontifical State. But mostly they were peasants that used to come into the city following revolution of seasons because Rome had remained until then, essentially agricultural agglomerate. A propos Silvio Negro writes that still, during the last years of the Pontifical Rome, “at night the tranquility of the Eternal City used to be interrupted often by the crow of roosters, by the bray of donkeys and by the bleat of sheep.”(Insolera, 1993, p. 38). Those peasants who before 1870 used to ‘offer themselves in Montanara or Farnese Square for the harvest...in the malaria infested Agro Romano’ (Insolera, 1993, p. 63) afterward became construction workers. Immediately they had no barns or stables to sleep after work like they used to do before. In a fast changing city they had to build shacks wherever they could find a fracture, an interstice, mostly among ancient ruins and temples within the old city, not too far from the new construction sites.

Exactly 150 years later similar tactics of survival and molding of the city are deployed today by new immigrants attracted to present-day city expansion projects. Since the beginning, the enlargement of the city was a private business that found

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240 Basically becoming the nation’s capital required Rome to house a large number of offices and bureaucrats who will be an important segment of the city population. Consequently, large construction projects were initiated that demanded and attracted work force form the rural area of
completely acceptable the fact that those who were materially building the city, could not become citizens of it. There was no plan to build a section of the city for those who had this specific relation with the city. Not just a project for poor peoples but instead a 'quartiere operaio' (working class district). There were social consequences due to lack of urban planning. First of all, this provoked conflicts between the new immigrants coming from villages around Rome who tended to preserve their habits, and the local Roman population. Secondly, the new population lacked a political consciousness and coherence, mostly for two specific reasons: first, a failed relationship between habitat and inhabitants that was a product of a lack of attentive urban planning (see the absence of working class districts mentioned above). Second, a chronic absence of industrial units within the area around Rome which, similarly with the north of Italy, would have generated a blue collar cohort so vital in Gramsci’s war of position. After the WWII, the Vittorio Square became a vast open market where it was possible to find anything. Here is where Antonio, the protagonist of the famous De Sica’s Bycicle Thieves will come to find his bicycle. Today the square’s market has been closed due to lack of hygiene and Chinese merchants have bought most of the shops around the square. The rest of the immigrants gravitate around the main train station working in little restaurants or as vendors.

Watching the documentary, we have the impression to walk in a sort of harmonious melting pot that fits perfectly with the official discourse of Rome as a multicultural place presented with the new urban plan. While the story revolves around the project to revitalized and save an old theatre, the Apollo Theatre, from being transformed into a Bingo, we have the impression that immigrants exist simply to provide some color to this political mission; they never participate directly in the group’s meetings nor are they involved in conversations with the town hall representatives. They remained isolated from the political possibility of this endeavor. They are left aside to do what they are good at doing: playing music.

The two central characters, both Italians and both quite established within the
art community, seem to enjoying a practice of fishing for new artists in the area around the square. An attentive reading of these scenes reveals an instinctive hesitancy, incomprehension if not hostility, towards the two Italians. When at the beginning of the documentary they enter in different shops to look for any sort of artist, whether a singer or a player of tablas, they do it intruding others’ spaces with a sort of nosiness and naivety “only dimly aware of a certain unease in the air.”

Even when the documentary offers glances of the real life of some of these musicians while they struggle to survive in the city of Rome, the Italian organizer are preoccupied with accomplishing their musical and political project. For example, they panic when the date of the concert is approaching, and the Indian player is sent back to India for visa issues. A the same time, after several requests of help made by Raul, the Argentinean drummer, who is going to be evicted from the garage where he lives, the documentary does not rest enough upon city’s urban policies and market’s high renting costs and the consequent marginalization connected to it. It seems like that immigrants exist outside of global capitalist social relations with its corollaries of nationalism and racism.

Mostly the documentary never engages in a dialogue with immigrants who are part of the Orchestra, without whom the Orchestra would not exist. This is possible, because creating a dialogue would highlight tensions that occur within the ‘organization of difference as a qualitatively homogeneous fetish.” In the same way the discourse of multiculturalism presented within the urban plan does not implies a reification of separation between immigrants. Instead, the celebration of difference, both within the Orchestra as well as between the lines of the urban plan celebrates sameness within a generic alterity. The fundamental separation exists within hierarchical differences that aimed at “reducing complex and overlapping relations.” It suggests the preservation of a firm core around which legal and economic status and

241 Floyd, Sheep.
242 Sharma, Home Economics.
243 Hardt and Negri, Empire.
place meaning revolve as the planets do around their sun. As Fernandes brilliantly put it:

The West is cosmopolitan only insofar it understands its culture as the final step in a historical movement. Hence Western cosmopolitanism does not celebrate globalization as flows that breed differences but seek to discipline the proliferation of differences through colonial-inspired racial and spatial hierarchies Fernandes, Challenging Euro-America’s Politics of Identity, 99.

In conclusion a well-liked project as the L’Orchestra di Piazza Vittorio despite and because its politically-correct multicultural language not only lacks in questioning and investigating the political organization and creation of differences, but also despacializes other ideas of communities and reinforces the homogenization of immigrants’ unique experiences of the urban. Instead, true relationships within the urban occur when they are disconnected from planned idea of difference and they are connected to space through practice. Home is defined through experience rather than by constructed identities. As Cresswell put it, ‘the geographical ordering of society is founded on a multitude of acts of boundary making – of territorialization – whose ambiguity is to simultaneously open up the possibilities of transgression.244 By concentrating on the marginal we achieve a novel perspective on the role peripheries play in defining the central or the normal and dominant. At the margins of the city, it is possible to encounter processes of transculturation that, instead of being transcendent, rely on continuous negotiation. Processes of transculturation are indeed linked to subjectification that happen through imaginative reconfigurations of the political in a perennial movement of subjectivity.245

244 In Place/Out of Place, 149.
7.5 Rome: Mother or Stepmother?

The systematic and planned peripheralization of the population was initiated during the Fascist regime and continued after the WWII (Fried, 1973). It is emblematic that “up to 2001 only ¼ of the total of the residents who in 1951 were living there (in the historic city centre), still dwell in that area” (Sonnino, 2006, p. 117). Two mutually related reasons generate and reinforce this phenomenon: on the one hand, the municipality did little or nothing to invest in public housing, and on the other hand, the municipality, with premeditation, ousted the most vulnerable populations from areas that seemed attractive to financial speculators. In the last ten years, the municipality’s attitude toward its residential property changed, moving away from a policy of maintaining and preserving public estate toward the exploitation of the same asset as a financial investment following a global trend of aggressive marketing competition with other postmodern metropolises. As indicated in the City Hall Decision # 139 of December 2001, the City planned to sell 1400 units (“Truffa nella vendita alloggi Comune di Roma,” 2008). Consequently, due to privatization of previously publicly owned buildings within the city center, the cost of rent became no longer affordable even to the middle class. Residents of the city center then had to move outside toward the periphery of the city. As a consequence of this relocation from the urban core, commuting became a way of life, and because of the poor transportation system, to own a car or a scooter became vital. (Sonnino, 2006, p. 118). Little has changed since Vittorio De Sica filmed Bicycle Thieves in 1948. In the film, Antonio has to lie about the fact that he does not have a means of transportation to keep the job that is offered to him.
But much more than its predecessors, Pier Paolo Pasolini’s 1962 Mamma Roma is a complex critique of the urban development of Rome. Its central character, played by a superb Anna Magnani, is a prostitute who dreams all her life to abandon her life on the streets, and bring her son with her to have their home *coi signori* (with gentlemen) in one of the new buildings of the expanding southeast periphery of Rome [see photo 7.2]. What emerges in this film is an important urban document that anticipates property speculations connected to the new urban plan of 1962. It is worthy of note that such a film was shown at the prestigious Cannes film festival the same year when the previous urban plan for Rome was approved. This plan at that time foresaw a boost in Roman population up to 5 million inhabitants. Apart from being largely wrong, these estimates substantiated a undisciplined building development whose effects remain even today. Justified by an anticipated flood of people into Rome, a series of amnesties\(^\text{246}\) for local building regulation infractions has characterized the last thirty years of urban policy in Rome. As a result, the exception has become the plan’s

\(^{246}\) The first amnesty was authorized with the Law 47/1985, which repaired all abuses committed in the period of 2 years before. Then another amnesty was approved in 1993 and again 2003 with LAW 326/2003.
regulation, and with it, the space (of exception) where newcomers dwell. I have chosen Mamma Roma firstly to support the idea that cinematic interventions engage the social and urban landscape in which they operate. In the final section, I make the case for the documentary Like a man on earth to produce an original and innovative encounter with the society and city of Rome, along the same tradition as Pasolini’s cinema\textsuperscript{247}; it questions the distribution of the sensible in terms of race, colonial history, and migration policy. Secondly, the figure of the landscape that informs Pasolini’s aesthetics constitutes the scenario of my research around the station of Anagnina, southeastern appendix of the subway ramification of Rome.

This is the same periphery where Dag decides to start his documentary Like a Man on Earth – Rome’s vital center on the outskirts of the city for immigrants who live outside the municipality of Rome and commute in the morning to find jobs within the city’s limits. It is the desire of those who help to build and run the city to get into the urban dimension, to be part of the recognized polis, that drives the newcomers into this frontier and against these limits, these borders, as much it drove migrants to Mamma Roma fifty years ago. Mamma Roma documents the hope for happiness and relief on the periphery of an entire generation of sub-proletarians (Rome for historical reasons discussed above, never developed a distinct class of proletariat) whom the centrifugal force of several externalization policies marginalize. These hopes resonate with Dag’s documentary and interviews I had with him, and are as much a part of the marginalization of the new population because of neo-liberal approaches to urban expansion as Europe’s Mobius strip-like externalization of borders is a part of a contemporary Europe’s generic multicultural identity. At the time when Pasolini filmed Mamma Roma, there was a great faith in liberal growth. It received instead Pasolini’s cynical gaze who, an isolated critical voice within the booming years after the WWII, renders in Mamma Roma the periphery sublime in its cruelty and immensity. Through recurring wide-angle shots of the urbanscape, the periphery seems at times a vast desert or a deep blue sea — sublime, incomprehensible, and overwhelming for those who cross and dwell in it.

\textsuperscript{247} Rhodes, Stupendous, Miserable City.
For Pasolini, the south of the city where city meets fields was opposite to the northern part, where exchanges between people conducted on the basis of reason in contrast to life in the south that was fed by passion and life. Today this marginal section of the city is again a vital center for the entire city and for all immigrants that live in the south, outside the municipality of Rome and come in the morning at the bus station Anagnina to find a job at the limits of the city. It is the desire to get into the urban dimension, to be part of the legitimized polis that drive here the newcomers as much it was driving Mamma Roma and his son with an entire generation of Italian migrants fifty years ago. What follows is an account of this area around the bus station Anagnina.

### 7.6 Periphery

At the beginning of the documentary Like a man on Earth, we sense that Dag, an Ethiopian refugee, and his companions have finally reached Europe and the city of Rome after an agonizing odyssey. Their odyssean struggles are over and they can finally begin to live happily ever after.

We see a close-up aligned with Dag’s profile. In the background, grey benches outline the bus station Anagnina, the southeast limit of Rome and until only a short time ago the unmistakable threshold of the urbanscape. Today, the wide-open space is a neuralgic center/crucial hub for trade and information sharing among migrant workers who, from the countryside, come to find work in the city.

The bus station Anagnina is emblematic to understand the peculiarity of Rome. First of all, immigrants live in this area because they cannot afford to pay the rent within Rome proper. The renting market operates together with immigration laws as an effective filter to keep immigrants disconnected from the city without turning away a cheap workforce. It is worth noting here that the station functions as the southeast door of the city as it welcomes the long distance bus routes that arrive form the small villages and towns along the coast south of Rome. These towns are being occupied by newly arrived immigrants who have revitalized the spaces abandoned by Italians and
have boosted, if not basically created from scratch, a renting market otherwise sterile along the coastline during winter seasons.

Basically, those who utilize these long routes as means of transportation are of foreign origins. When these bus arrive at the Anagnina Station to drop into the underground metropolitan network, immigrants sit at the margins, genuine strangers to the city, looking for a good bargain or a some useful information, before scattering along the ring that surround the Eternal City. Every day, the space of the bus station blooms with vendors selling every kind of object.

These vendors mostly come form the former Soviet block but also from Africa and South Asia. It is a self-sustaining, spontaneous market, still at the beginning of its existence and does not have the official endorsement of the municipal authority. In fact, the authorities have cyclically challenged their presence but immigrants have always come back to set up their stands.

This is a transient space, for and by nomads who nonetheless are increasingly involved in organizing a series of social, economic, and cultural activities. They dwell in this space that belong to them because they intervene in the ‘distribution of the sensible’ (Ranciere, 2004) of the political space that otherwise has been sterilized and evacuated. These are border figures that exist in between citizenship and exile, in a space beyond the dichotomy of legitimization and illegitimization, between multiculturalism or complete integration.

Instead of representing a pathological invasion that can be cut out, these “outsiders within” personify an indication/warning/symptom of the central paradox of a new Roman urban policy that will hear no alternative to liberal multicultural hegemony. There is a widespread consensus among Italians that the urban condition needs to be taken seriously, that a managerial approach from above should be implemented in the cities like Rome or Milan to avoid otherwise inevitable social calamities (see Paris’ banlieus in 2005 and 2007). As Ranciere puts it, consensus, far from representing the absence of conflict or peace, indicates a permanent subterranean violence that is intrinsic to any form of social purification and political evacuation.
Indeed, the mechanism of externalization in the context of migration control is one example of consensus building, and this mechanism does not cease to operate, and to proliferate borders, after immigrants pass through the metropolitan gateways of Europe.

It would be erroneous to configure the idea of consensus as a hegemonic and homogenous space, a plaque, where political life occurs separately from naked life. In this space of purity, we would all be living dominated by an overwhelming power, “entrapped in the complementarity of bare life and exception.” Instead, proper politics is all about perforating such imagined spaces, producing breaks of elocution, which before were heard merely as noise. This is what Dag’s documentary achieved.

Political argumentation is at one and the same time the demonstration of a possible world, in which the argument could count as an argument, one that is addressed by a subject qualified to argue, over an indentified object, to an addressee who is required to see the object and to hear the argument that he ‘normally’ has no reason either to see or to hear. It is the construction of a paradoxical world that puts together two separate worlds.

It is possible to come across/enter such a paradoxical world a few miles from the Anagnina bus station, where the second University of Rome Campus ‘Tor Vergata’ scatters across a vast desolate industrial area. The neighborhood also quarters a huge mall complex, the comforting blue profile of IKEA, plus several former factories that are now clothing and home furniture outlets that attract thousands of distracted consumers everyday. One of the university buildings, the former Faculty of Humanities, is a 12-store blue glass building. Here, without electricity nor a heating system, lives a community of 500 refugees from the Horn of Africa, including almost 30 children. Some were born during the exodus through the Sahara Desert and then across the Mediterranean Sea. These are survivors of the strenuous journey across many borders. They became refugees at the port of Lampedusa, but nonetheless made it to Rome.

248 Rancière, *Dissensus*.

249 Ibid., 39.
There, however, their inexorable crashing against the active indifference of contemporary “post-political” Europe continued. Acts of bordering didn’t stop after they had crossed Europe’s imaginary static, territorial borders. After being transferred to identification centers in Sicily, they were set free. Like many others before, they caught the first train to Rome, without any help or directions.

The center of Rome, you might say, is therefore the last frontier of Europe: it is its most internal and probably the most difficult to decipher.

For example, consider this former Faculty of Humanities building at Tor Vergata. In December 2005, with the support of Action [http://www.actiondiritti.net/], the building was occupied. But in 2006, the refugees were cleared out. After that, the city hall signed a rent contract with the society that owns the building, and in the meantime worked to find solutions to accommodate the refugees. The solutions that resulted were always temporary and, according to the refugees, simply inadequate. They complain of the size of the rooms in which people
had to live with 5 or 6 other people and of night curfew. “Political and humanitarian refugees have rights. Either Italy receive and assist refugees or otherwise should not accept them.” And many of them would like that Italian authorities clear their biometric data form within the Eurodac database (see chapter 5). According the Dublin Regulation [2003/343/CE], the state responsible for examining asylum requests is the one through which the asylum seeker first enters in the EU. Once recognized as a refugee, that person cannot apply to another state where he/she may have better chances of success and living conditions. The aim of this regulation, which replaces the original Dublin Convention [1990], is to prevent multiple applications, hordes of mobile “asylum shoppers” moving around the EU, and therefore to reinforce the role of the border in those states that are geographically proximate to ‘problematic’ countries. It is beyond the scope of this analysis to present the inescapable consequences of this reform on the lives of asylum seekers who more and more are subject to policies of interception, forced rejection and expulsion. Here it is important to note that even after they enter within Europe, other forms of externalization intervene. With externalization, the border does not stop at the border, whether outside or within. Particularly in this case, the process of externalization operates through a combination of legislation of migration control together with the new urban plan for the city and its rental market. Muse[1], one of the residents, says that “to find a house in Rome is a massive challenge considering the renting rates. And more, when they [the landlords] hear that you are a foreigner they say that they do not rent anymore.”

According to the SUNIA, a National Union for residents, rents for immigrants are 30% to 50% higher than for native Italians (“Casa, il Sunia: «È emergenza affitti» · Corriere della Sera,” 2009) even though the supply of houses for rent surged 130/145% in the decade 1999-2008. Also according to the same organization, Rome has the highest cost of rent in Italy with 685 Euros/month, which has generated an exodus of +195.5% from the city toward the surrounding area in from 2002-2007 [Provincia di Roma , La provincia Capitale . rapporto annuale sull’area romana 2007-

If we consider then than that only 11.8% of regular immigrants owns an apartment, it is easy to see that the rental market relies on immigrant residents. ("Immigrati, l'esercito dei senza tetto - cronaca - Repubblica.it," 2007)

However, immigrants are forced to rent apartments often without a contract or any legal protections. What is more, real estate agencies do not want to deal with immigrants because Italian property owners do not trust them or prefer to deal with them in a condition of quasi legality. The result is a situation of peripheralization at the margins within and without the urban society. 20% of the 72% of immigrants who rent live in overcrowded and often unsuitable housing conditions. This marginalization is the product of virtual anxiety and active indifference against those who share the same territory with Italians but are not considered worthy of trust, even though their presence is crucial to the city’s growth and survival. According to Salvatore Leggio of Tecnocasa, one of the major estate agencies, property owners who have an apartment to rent compel them to rent neither to people with animals nor to immigrants. The latest legal provision regarding public safety, L. 94 July 15, 2009 also known as Pacchetto Sicurezza (security set of laws), only exacerbated this virtual anxiety.

7.7 Urban (in)security (virtual anxiety)

Apart from making illegal entry a crime and increasing the detention of migrants up to 18 months, there are legal provisions indicated by Law 94 that focus on housing conditions. The new law states that whoever rents to an irregular immigrant commits a crime, and at the same time, that immigrants who go to the hospital can be reported to the police if they do not have a residence permit, and that immigrants without a residence permit cannot legally recognize their children. Moreover, immigrants must have the residence permit for two years before they can marry even if they do not have any children. If they have a spouse far from them, immigrants must present a residence permit to send any money home. Finally, the law establishes a fee of 200 Euros everytime a residence permit is released or renewed.

Law 94 also denies the fundamental human right to live with one’s own family in cases when the house does not satisfy the hygienic standard set by local regulations.
Additionally, as with traditional, iconic bordering sites such as Ellis Island, when the health commission issues a negative result, the permit of residence is refused. Without residence, it is impossible to access public services, such as nursery school and first aid, that the city usually provides. So much, apparently, for the polycentric city!

Access to an adequate habitat is obviously important, and not just for those who seek housing but for the health of the city as a whole. However, given the realities of the rental market and prevailing social discrimination, Law 94 helps to proliferate slums and precarious dwellings for migrants and increases their overall condition of marginalization. After a majority of immigrants, or most people for that matter, share their habitat with more than one other family, the apartment will most likely not meet the hygienic and safety standards required by law. Apart from bureaucratic violations, situations of overcrowding not infrequently lead to human tragedies. In January 2007, an apartment caught fire and Mary Begum and her son Hasib lost their lives. They lived with her husband, another son, plus eight other immigrants from Bangladesh. The same happened within the building at the Tor Vergata Campus, mentioned above. Reflected on the glass surface of that building is the silhouette of the urban that once delimited the imaginary of the city and that Pasolini used to frame one of the last scenes of ‘Mamma Roma’ (1962). On those glass, it seems to me, is reflected the absurdity that emerges at the interstice of two worlds, within a frontier. There is one world for those who dwell in the building and another that only exists as an outside reflection. It is extremely close, but at the same time, indefinitely inaccessible.

7.8 Falling

Today, Rome’s strategies are largely based in the outsourcing of all the services of immigrants’ first assistance to civic and religious organizations, who developed their experience in the 1980s, when the City Hall largely ignored the presence of immigrants. Those whom these services do not help, we assist merely to expand, but certainly not progress, the city. It is complicated to translate the intricate correlation between Rome’s market and urban policies, but I may summarize it: both operate in a permanent condition of exception that allows financial speculators and developers to
prosper. The immigrants, who constitute the housing market’s mobile future resource and construction labor force but are not able to reside in the dwellings they build, occupy today the new periphery.

Despite the similarities, today’s urban plan fundamentally differs from the urban policy of the past fascist regime. Today, the city administration is not interested in enforcing a strict regulatory plan to guide urban expansion. Indifference instead constitutes the political soil of the contemporary border within the city where immigrants are considered bare lives not only within the perspective of official documents. This resonates with the story of Nabruka I mentioned at the beginning of my research. The so-called lenience that is typical of Rome and is exemplified in the Roman slang expression, “Nun me ne po’ frega’ de meno” (I couldn’t care less about it) is indicative of a certain attitude of leaving the person next to us to her destiny (Rinelli, 2009). We leave to the State the task of selecting and filtering who belongs or who doesn’t, and we leave it to private corporations to make use of those bodies that are being filtered in. The authorities are in charge of controlling the virtual anxiety of the invasion. Centers for the detention of irregular migrants and asylum seekers are nowadays a common feature of European urbanscape, and Rome it is no exception.

The externalization of migration control thus operates within the city of Rome through national legislation that makes it obligatory to have residence papers in order to stay. As a result, this social and political condition splits immigrants’ personas schizophrenically: they are simultaneously vital clients of the expanding housing market and concrete victims of the same market speculations that flourish thanks to immigrants’ marginalization. Migrants finds themselves relegated to the margins of a society that simply finds it opportune to ignore them and render their presence simultaneously necessary and invisible.
Imagination is as essential as indifference in the operation of contemporary border controls. The imagination of invasion from the South produces virtual anxiety, which conversely allows for the militarization of the border within the imagined geographical limits of Europe as much as beyond them. This is true for the city as much as it is for the Sahara desert and the Mediterranean Sea, as I have pointed out throughout this dissertation. By “virtual,” I mean that the anxiety is experienced to the full as a feeling that lurks in ambush on the streets but takes shape almost never and nowhere. This anxiety provokes political immobility, which manifests itself as a wall of indifference within the city. We have stopped living the city because we “move” and “act” inside a cultural and political system that directly supplies us with interpretations that do not need to pass at all through experience. We know nothing of life, and even less of migration. We know nothing of our town. We just envision it. We imagine it. We
move within the city with the frenetic clumsiness of someone who has lost contact with the earth, with experience, and is falling in a void.

“Heard about the guy who fell off a skyscraper? On his way down past each floor, he kept saying to reassure himself: So far so good... so far so good... so far so good. How you fall doesn’t matter. It’s how you land!”

251 Kassovitz, *La Haine*. 
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS
8.1 Postscript in the wake of the Arab spring

Springs are brief in Arab countries, if they ever blossom. As I write these conclusions, the second spring of rebellions among Arab societies is already arrived. We have rapidly shifted from a season of revolutionary enthusiasm to one of economic depression and geopolitical instability. In Egypt and Tunisia, youth’s aspirations are frustrated by old power structures, which equally fuel new riots and repressions. On the shores of Libya, to navigate between the mounting criticism of national civil society and the underestimated resilience of Gaddafi’s regime, the West rushed to outlaw Gaddafi and support rebel forces, arguably going beyond UN Resolution 1973, with technologies, weapons and most important, diplomatic recognition. Last after a long list of western countries, the US administration recognized the newly formed National Transitional Council [NTC] on February 27, 2011 as the official partner in Libya. With the recognition by the US government, large sum has been freed to boost NTC’s chances to take control of the whole country, which eventually happened in October. Today the specter of a new Somalia is everyday more real without Col. Gaddafi defeated and conveniently executed on October 20th, 2011 by rebels of the Transitional National Council. Meanwhile prophets of misfortune on the European shores sigh for the old regimes as they foresee the wretched of the Earth crossing the Mediterranean hiding Islamic extremists among them. More than an Arab Spring, thus, the situation on the Arab world feels more like a Mediterranean Winter. Moving further East from Syria to Yemen via Bahrain, encounters with revolts shake the Arab peninsula and the Middle East while the US is re-evaluating its role of world super-cop. If the quick sands of instability should swallow the Saudi monarchy and the world’s largest reserve of fossil fuel, the question resides with a future of freezing summer for everyone.

What is the role of the European imagination of an imminent African invasion of immigrants in the context of NATO intervention in Libya? What is the relation between the political economy of the considerable undocumented sub-Saharan population in Libya and the Gaddafi’s regime downfall that occurred last summer?

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252 Arsu and Erlanger, “Libya Rebels Get Formal Backing, and $30 Billion.”
How did the Libyan crisis and Gaddafi’s death affect European migration policies in the Mediterranean? Political unrest in Libya and its society’s political aspirations for self-determination should have been an opportunity for a new mode of relations between Europe and Africa in the matter of policies of migration control that unfortunately seems unlikely to come soon. My perplexities draw from the impression that migration across the Mediterranean is still analyzed through the lens of a security approach. For instance along with diplomatic recognition, on June 17, 2011 Italian government signed a pact with NTC to start a collaboration and basically confirming the intention of stemming the flow of African migrants who aspire at crossing the Mediterranean including repatriation of undocumented migrants intercepted.253

I have explained how the large amount of undocumented sub-Saharan African workers has constituted for years an unstable but permanent socio-economic force in Libya. From the start of the Libyan rebellion in February 2011, black people in Libya have been attacked and lynched by rebel mobs. This has been known by human rights groups and the United Nations as well as by the intelligence agencies, military forces, media and political leaders in the NATO countries – but they have generally kept a lid on it because it does not suit the narrative. It does not suit the narrative of an oppressed people standing up against tyranny and for human rights to find rebel lynch mobs targeting black people, lynching them and ethnically cleansing them. Where reports of racial atrocities have reached the media, the story has been that the victims are “African mercenaries” despite plenty of evidence to the contrary. Amnesty workers on the ground have reported that the widespread allegations of African mercenaries have little or no basis in fact – but this information has been suppressed and the fears of African mercenaries, extremely useful both to the rebel side, and NATO side.

The attack by the NATO forces on Gaddafi’s forces is justifies by an urgency to reestablish a geopolitical order to prevent that invasion. On July 7th 2011, the Britain's Foreign Secretary William Hague when pressured on the cost and time length

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253 “Flussi Immigrati, l’Italia Firma-accordo Con Ribelli Libici.”
of the military operation in Libya clearly linked it with the necessity to avoid the risk of a migration invasion in Europe. In that occasion, he stated that:

If we had just allowed Gaddafi to re-conquer the rest of the country by force, [...] causing thousands of casualties, creating a humanitarian crisis, with uncontrolled migration to Southern Europe as a result, the cost for UK and our European partners could be vastly greater than the cost of this military operation.”

What matters in terms of Mediterranean’s politics, those 2 million migrants made possible embodied a fear of a Biblical exodus from Africa over Europe. As I have noted in chapter 3, the risk of a biblical exodus is still the best tool to support a costly and complicated military intervention by NATO forces that European and American societies started questioning everyday more and more in the midst of rising unemployment, raising national deficits and spreading financial crisis. The orchestration and manipulation of this fear as I have indicated can be traced back at least to 2003, but it acquired a new significance following the popular uprisings and violence that spread all over the Maghreb and reached Libya in the middle of February 2011. In a media rush to spectacularize actuality, notorious newspapers such as Le Monde of February 25 the 2011, national ministers, and academic articles argued that, as consequence of the end of Gaddafi's regime, the number of potential migrants ready to invade Europe lie between 200,000 and 700,000.

Two points are worth reiterating here: first, as I have made clear in my research, migration is conceived in terms of emergency and economic efficiency. The idea of a management of migration carries on the dispositif of European externalization of migration control in North Africa. Second, the idea that there are 1.5/2 million of sub-Saharan African migrants ready to migrate into Europe is based on a poor understanding of African migration and the role of Libya in the economic and social

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256 “Kadhafi Harangue Ses Troupes à Tripoli - LeMonde.fr.”
257 The Libyan migration corridor by Sylvie Bredeloup, and Olivier Piez, 2011
milieus of that continent in the last 20 years. This assumption has based on the conviction that Libya is a transit country of migration and that these million African migrants are just transiting on their way to Europe. This calculation I sustain, is made by design as conscious maneuver that serves as ideological foundation for the externalization of European migration control in Africa. Politicians and migration agencies have had always an interest in migration being ‘problematized’ so that any European intervention is ‘emergency driven.’ When the exceptional becomes the norm, immigration becomes an invasion and a highly political spectacle. The more African migration is seen as a threat for the integrity of Europe, the bigger the financial and electoral support for governments and agencies which are seen as capable of stopping migrants from coming or sending them back. It well served Gaddafi who made advantage of it in 2004, using it as diplomatic leverage to trade the removal of the arms and economic embargo on Libya with the guarantee of stemming the flow of sub-Saharan migration into Europe.

This idea has been continuously restated in Europe since the beginning of the Libyan conflict but as I have noted in my research, it has never stopped for many years now. Since the 90s’ media have been directed our attention to thousands of sub-Saharan African who risked their life crossing the Sahara desert, sailed on dinghies from the coast of Libya in order to reach Europe. My dissertation questioned this simplistic vision that describe the Sahara desert and Libya as a mere transit space to Europe. I claimed instead that Libya and the portion of the ‘sand box’ containing it are very much dynamic spaces in which migrants often settle down and find a destination. Following this line of inquiry, I have pointed out how Gaddafi’s policy of Panafricanism has opened up Libya’s labor market to almost 2 million of sub-Saharan migrant workers that in Libya means one third of the entire population. Consequently, new links between two shores of Sahara, the Sahel and Maghreb came to life. The rationale of my project has been in part to identify the ways in which European policies of migration controls changed and were implemented in North Africa countries in relation to a so much feared exodus of Africans into Europe.
Unexpectedly the above-mentioned reason behind the externalization of European migration control in Africa acquired new life from the turmoil that caught the North African. If we look into the magnitude of the ‘exodus’ with fresh data available of those who escaped violence in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, it seems clear how that fear of an biblical exodus into Europe did not exactly materialize. According to the chart below released by the International Organization for Migration [IOM] up to April 8th, 2011, the real refugees crisis was unfolding within Libya and large majority of migrants fleeing violence in Libya were running into Egypt and Tunisia in order to return to Philippines, Vietnam, China, Bangladesh or different sub-Saharan African countries. Only a minority was leading North towards Europe. As a matter of fact, “figures from the beginning of May put the number of migrant arrivals over the Sahara from Libya at 65,000. The figure is more than six times the number of migrants that have landed on the Italian island of Lampedusa from Libya in the same period.”

Recently according to the spokesperson for the United Nations' High Commissioner for Refugees in Italy, Mrs.Laura Boldrini, since last February only 24,000 people crossed the Mediterranean Sea, seeking asylum in Italy. It confirms in some way my thesis that the European externalization of African migration control is a complicated security apparatus that consists in ideas, images, architecture and perceptions, and has not too much to do with an African invasion of Europe.

258 “Migrants Fleeing Libya Flood Niger.”
259 August 2, 2011 http://rassegna.governo.it/testo.asp?id=65102099
Figure 8.2 Cross border movements from Libya.
http://heindehaas.blogspot.com/2012/03/arab-spring-and-migration.html

If read against data above mentioned, the effects of military intervention in Libya and the violence related to it suggest that hundreds of thousands if not a million were trapped in Libya and were the first victims of violence and murder. Among those, sub-Saharan were the most vulnerable both because as mentioned above, a chronic racism with a long historical roots and because generally perceived as mercenaries hired by Gaddafi. The TNC and the West invoked the name of the people, the injured body (mostly children) and the sanctity of the body politic as the basis for military intervention or a criticism of other violent actors. In this way, the politics of the body, its violation and protection, rather than open up the discourse on Libya to other
political and diplomatic possibilities, it foreclosed them by becoming a site for the affirmation of moral conventions.

On Feb. 23, 2011\textsuperscript{260}, Italy’s interior minister, Roberto Maroni, has voiced fears of an immigration tsunami caused by revolution in the Arab countries of the Mediterranean. Maroni said: “A humanitarian emergency risks carrying to the shores of our country 300,000 refugees. This humanitarian emergency cannot be left to our countries alone to handle.”

Claims that black African mercenaries have been ‘unleashed’ on the Libyan population thus triggering xenophobic/racialized attacks against civilians from Sub-Saharan Africa should be treated in light of the diplomatic transactions that make it possible for such violence to take place and their implications for the Libya that become imaginable as a result of the current uprising. At a minimum, a focus on the multiplication of sites of violence and the diplomatic conditions of possibility for the externalization of migration control in Libya inflects the analyses of the Arab spring by illustrating that there is more going on in the region than a large-scale democratization process. To support the peoples’ revolution therefore, involves the refusal to engage in a premature celebration of the insurrectional event or an uncritical sympathy for Gaddafi. It involves locating both processes within the history of relations with Europe that have made Libya and Gaddafi possible. As ‘we’ look at, or better still, celebrate or complain about Gaddafi’s execution, we should pay attention to the reproduction of values, exchanges, violence and erasures of bodies and voices that characterize the passage to the ‘new.’ Over the past few years Gaddafi have consistently used the mass migration/exodus threat to as a trade tool with his European counterparts. Last time it was only few weeks ago in the wake of the UN Security Council Resolution to attack Libya\textsuperscript{261}. The TNC seemed to confirm this trend.

In fact besides oil, the migration issue was Gaddafi’s negotiation tool in order

\textsuperscript{260} http://www.euronews.net/2011/02/23/eu-considers-immigration-emergency/
\textsuperscript{261} http://en.rian.ru/world/20110311/162958762.html
to forge partnership with European countries and Italy in particular. Prior to the recent outbreak of the Arab uprisings in the MENA region, the Italy-Libya nexus in North Africa had already become an active field of policy where the EU’s migration controls were applied in an effort to stem the tide of the EU-bound immigrants before reaching the EU borders. In 2008, Silvio Berlusconi and Colonel Gaddafi signed a pact of friendship, which contained an apology that fully and morally recognizes the damage inflicted on the Libyan people during the Italian colonial period. It also included an economic deal related to Italian investment in Libya and cooperation in controlling undocumented immigration of Africans with Libya agreeing to deport sub-Saharan migrants over Libyan territory to their origin countries. Refugees have been deported back to countries like Eritrea and Sudan where they faced persecution, which was a clear violation of human rights and refugee law. Italy has also drawn criticism for handing over to Libya migrants it intercepts at sea, without screening first whether they might seek asylum. Ironically, it served Italy well that Gaddafi was a systematic human rights violator. This made him the perfect partner to prevent migrants from leaving and to deport migrants or imprison them in desert camps under inhumane conditions. This is another dimension of the problematic and perverse nature of “dealing with dictators”. It well served the EU with the creation of a new European Agency coordinating border operations - Frontex - whose budget increased from 6.2 millions Euros in 2005 to 83.3 in 2009. (Bredeloup and Pliez, 2011). From the European side, fear mongering about a looming migration invasion seems part of a deliberate, electoral strategy. The invasion imaging fits perfectly into the strategy of a new generation of European politicians who, since the end of the Cold War, have defined (mass) immigration as the central problem of our time. They also skillfully amalgamate fear of immigration and Islam. Populist politicians who link most social and economic problems to “mass immigration” have therefore an interest in a strong magnification of the actual migration phenomenon. In their efforts, such politicians are aided by sensationalist media, who unfortunately tend interpret the sight of each fishing boat overloaded with migrants as a harbinger of the coming African exodus. All this together creates the image of a threat, the "black danger’ that together with the creation
of the Schengen area of free movement within the EU, provoked the change of European migration control policy toward the outside and made Lampedusa its prominent outpost.

Today Lampedusa’s camp of Contrada Imbriacola, that I found empty in 2009, re-opened in the wake of the Italian government’s announcement of the state of emergency. This camp was previously closed after Italy signed an agreement with Libya allowed the straightforward refoulment of migrants intercepted in high seas. According the Italian government this current is a temporary re-opening due to the exceptional circumstances of these days. With the upheaval in Tunisia, even before Libya’s uprising, the Italian island of Lampedusa struggled to deal with a wave of merely few thousands Tunisians. After two months of protests over a mounting social crisis, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi visited the southern island of Lampedusa, where thousands of Tunisian migrants now outnumber inhabitants. Berlusconi promised to clear the island of the Tunisians within three days. But the islanders are skeptical, and many Italian regions don’t want African immigrants.

The port of Lampedusa hosts thousands of Tunisians – mostly young men. More than 20,000 have come since January, and many were transferred elsewhere in Italy. But thousands are still here, sleeping outdoors and without access to sanitary facilities. The town is a garbage-strewn encampment. The migrant wave has tested the island's traditional warmth and openness. And when the Tunisians outnumbered the 5,000 inhabitants, anger exploded.’(NPR News - March 31, 2010)

Few thousands Tunisian crossed the sea for reasons only partially connected to the Arab spring as an Italian and Tunisian research committee concluded. In reality, as I wrote above, thousands of workers tried to go back home, whereas Bangladesh or sub-Saharan Africa. The response of the north of the world, - Europe, Italy, NATO, and USA – has been decidedly security focused and emergency driven. Why these young

262 “Ils N'ont Pas Fui La Révolution Du 14 Janvier Comme L'ont Prétendu Certains Médias Occidentaux.”
Africans were not evacuated before the beginning of the bombings of Gaddafi’s forces? Why were not allowed to reach the first airport in Tunisia? In the meantime, more than 250 people drowned 39 miles south of Lampedusa while they were trying to dock\textsuperscript{263}. They have been left between that tiny rock and a hard place, where my research had begun few years ago. There, paraphrasing the late Édouard Glissant\textsuperscript{264}, if one pays attention can discern migrants’ bodies that like underwater signposts head North to the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, gently collapsing into the pleasures of Europe sand, making one vast beginning of society, but a beginning whose time is tainted by those bodies decayed and gone green.

All on that day
Well I run to the rock, please hide me
I run to the rock, please hide me
I run to the rock, please hide me, Lord
All on that day
But the rock cried out, I can't hide you
The rock cried out, I can't hide you
The rock cried out, I ain't gonna hide you guy
All on that day
I said, rock, what's a matter with you rock?
Don't you see I need you, rock?\textsuperscript{265}

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\textsuperscript{263}“Boat With Libyan Immigrants Capsizes Off Italy.”
\textsuperscript{264}Glissant and Wing, \textit{Poetics of Relation}.
\textsuperscript{265}Nina Simone - Sinnerman.
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